United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2562

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Mark Perkins

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: January 12, 2023

Filed: March 31, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM. 
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Mark Perkins was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court1 denied his motion to dismiss his 

indictment. After he was convicted, Perkins moved for acquittal, which the district 

court

2 also denied. We affirm. 

I. 

For prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), the 

Government must “prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and 

that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing 

a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). Perkins argues 

that his indictment failed to allege—and the Government failed to prove—that he 

knew he belonged to the category of people barred from possessing a firearm as 

required by Rehaif. 

We review both the sufficiency of an indictment and the denial of a motion 

for acquittal de novo. United States v. Prelogar, 996 F.3d 526, 530 (8th Cir. 2021)

(sufficiency of indictment); United States v. Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d 887, 895 

(8th Cir. 2021) (denial of a motion for acquittal). For the latter, “[w]e review the 

facts in the light most favorable to the verdict and will affirm if [the fact finder]

could have found the defendant guilty of the charged conduct beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Sholley-Gonzalez, 996 F.3d at 895 (citation omitted). 

A.

Perkins first argues that his indictment was insufficient because it did not 

charge, as an element of the offense, that Perkins knew of his prohibited status. But 

1

The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western 

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable W. 

Brian Gaddy, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2

The Honorable Beth Phillips, Chief Judge, United States District Court for 

Western District of Missouri.
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“[a]n indictment is normally sufficient if its language tracks the statutory language,” 

United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2008), even if it does not charge 

the defendant with knowledge of his prohibited status. See United States v. Jawher, 

950 F.3d 576, 579 n.2 (8th Cir. 2020) (indictment that did not allege that defendant 

knew of his prohibited status was sufficient because it tracked the statutory 

language); United States v. Caudle, 968 F.3d 916, 921 n.2 (8th Cir. 2020) (same); 

United States v. Gurley, 803 F. App’x 988, 989 (8th Cir. 2020) (same). Perkins’s 

indictment closely tracks the language of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). 

Perkins argues that Jawher and its progeny don’t apply here because 

(1) Jawher addressed this issue in dicta since the case was remanded on other 

grounds, and (2) we reviewed for plain error in Jawher and Caudle, instead of de 

novo. But in Jawher, we necessarily decided whether the defendant’s indictment 

was sufficient before deciding whether his guilty plea to that indictment was proper. 

Had his indictment been insufficient, we would have dismissed the case instead of

remanding. And while we reviewed for plain error in Jawher and Caudle, in both 

cases we held there was no error at all, much less plain error. See Jawher, 950 F.3d 

at 579 n.2; Caudle, 968 F.3d at 921 n.2. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Perkins’s indictment was sufficient.

B. 

Perkins next argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence 

that Perkins knew of his prohibited status under §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Under 

Rehaif, the Government only needed to prove that Perkins knew he had been 

convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at 

the time he possessed the firearms. United States v. Davies, 942 F.3d 871, 874 (8th 

Cir. 2019). And, “[o]rdinarily, the Government will be able to point to evidence in 

the record demonstrating that a defendant knew he was convicted, preventing the 

defendant from showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the 

error.” Id.
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Perkins stipulated that he pleaded guilty to three felonies punishable by more 

than one year in custody and served more than one year for each. One of those prior 

convictions was for being a felon in possession of a firearm. This is sufficient for a 

fact finder to find that Perkins knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term of more than one year when he possessed the firearm in this 

case. See United States v. Owens, 966 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Rational 

jurors . . . could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that a felony conviction would be 

a significant life event that a person would know about when it happened and 

remember at a later date.”). 

Perkins also argues that the Government’s evidence at trial created a fatal 

variance from his indictment because the indictment failed to allege that Perkins 

knew of his prohibited status. “A fatal variance occurs when the essential elements 

of the offense set forth in the indictment are left unaltered but the evidence offered 

at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” 

United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). But, 

“[r]eversal is not required if the variance is harmless, that is, if the indictment fully 

and fairly apprised the defendant of the charges he or she must meet at trial.” Id.

(citation omitted). Even if this discrepancy was a variance, it would have been

harmless because Perkins was fully aware that he was charged for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm for knowingly possessing a Bersa nine-millimeter handgun 

on February 25, 2015. See United States v. Thomas, 791 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 

2015) (“[N]o fatal variance occurred because, even with the introduction of evidence 

not specifically mentioned in the indictment . . . [the defendant] was fully and fairly 

apprised of the charges she had to defend against at trial.”). 

II.

Perkins’s conviction is affirmed. 

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