IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-20151

Summary Calendar

WILLIAM DALE CARTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

STUART JENKINS, TexasStateParole Division Director; MICHAEL LARSEN,

Conroe Texas Parole Agent; PAULA HARDILEK, Conroe Parole Agent;

CYNTHIA TAKACS, Conroe Parole Agent; MS. BURKS, Supervisor over Conroe

Agents; KEITH WARREN, Conroe and Huntsville Supervisor; IVY ANDERSON

YORK, Regional Director; TERRY MCKINNEY, Parole Division Preliminary

Hearing Officer; SYLVIA ANN MOKARZEL,Texas Interstate CompactProgram

Supervisor; PATRICIA BIZAILLION CARTER,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CV-3447

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

William Dale Carter, Illinois state prisoner # K97856, filed a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint against several employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and

Parole and his ex-wife, Patricia Bizaillion Carter. Although Carter’s conviction

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 5, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 13-20151

occurred in Illinois, his parole was transferred to Texas via the Texas Interstate

Compact Program. In his complaint, Carter alleged that his parole was

wrongfully revoked due to noncompliance with special conditions of parole

imposed on sex offenders. He also asserted that, because he was never convicted

of a sex offense, the sex offender restrictions were illegal and imposed in

violation of his due process rights. The district court dismissed Carter’s

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as frivolous, on the basis that Carter’s

claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). This court

reviews the district court’s dismissal de novo. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d

371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

“To plead a constitutional claim for relief under § 1983, [a plaintiff must]

allege a violation of a right secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of the United

States and a violation of that right by one or more state actors.” Johnson v.

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994). Because Carter’s exwife is not a state actor, she has no liability under § 1983. See Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Thus, the district court did not err in

dismissing Carter’s § 1983 complaint against Patricia Bizaillion Carter as

frivolous. See § 1915A(b)(1); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).

To the extent that Carter challenges the validity of his parole revocation,

the district court’s decision determining that such a claim is barred by Heck was

not erroneous. See Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123

(5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole is cloaked

with Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability for parole decisions. See id. 

However, accepting Carter’s assertions that he was denied a hearing prior to the

imposition of the sex offender restrictions as conditions of his parole, then he has

stated a nonfrivolous claim under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief. See Meza v.

Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 401, 412 (5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In light

of this decision, Carter’s challenge to the dismissal of his complaint with

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No. 13-20151

prejudice is denied as moot. Carter also contends that the district court made

a false statement in the first sentence of its memorandum and opinion when it

stated that Carter was a former inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. This argument is also moot because the district court granted Carter’s

motion to correct the statement. Carter’s motions for appointment of counsel

and to expedite the appeal are denied. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County

Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); 5TH CIR. RULE 34.5.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART;

MOTIONS DENIED.

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