J-A07012-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TODD JOHN DIXON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 947 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-35-CR-0002899-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2020

Appellant, Todd John Dixon, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on February 6, 2019, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s

post-sentence motion on May 29, 2019. We vacate Appellant’s disorderly 

conduct conviction, vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for 

resentencing.

During Appellant’s March 27, 2018 bench trial, Police Officer Riccardo 

Godino testified that, on August 6, 2016, he was working as a police officer 

for the South Abington Township Police Department.

1 N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 

17-18. That day, Officer Godino was on-duty and working a special detail to 

aid the St. Benedict’s Church Picnic. He testified:

____________________________________________

1 At the time of trial, Officer Godino testified that he was a cadet with the 

Pennsylvania State Police. N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 17.
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Four officers are typically assigned the duties of foot patrol 

and directing traffic. Officers create a temporary crosswalk 

by utilizing two marked patrol units with their emergency 

lights activated. . . . And officers are in full uniform. We 

wear the high visibility traffic vests. And two officers will 

typically cross families and people coming in and out of the 

bazaar across Newton Ransom Boulevard. The other two 

officers at that time are on foot patrol in the actual church 

picnic patrolling the grounds on foot and just ensuring officer 

presence for the safety and concern of anybody who is 

attending.

Id. at 19-20.

Officer Godino testified that, at the time he encountered Appellant, he 

and Officer Leonard Harvey were directing traffic and Officers Justin Brown 

and Anthony Percival were “coming up to relieve us.” Id. at 20. He testified:

I [had just] cross[ed] a family from the church side of the 

road to the opposite side of the road. . . . At the time in 

question, [] the family was thanking me verbally for our 

assistance in safely crossing them across the road. . . . I had 

traffic stopped on Newton Ransom Boulevard which is a 

[45-mile-per-hour] road. . . . [Newton Ransom Boulevard] 

is a main road. It’s a highway. I was in the middle of this 

highway with the intention[] of stopping any and all traffic to 

safely cross people. . . .

[O]nce the family was completely across the road, I [] 

directed my attention to another couple that was now 

crossing in the opposite direction going into the church picnic. 

When I directed my attention to this couple, I had noticed at 

the time it was [Appellant] and his wife. We made eye 

contact, [Appellant] and I. And I [] gave a nod with my head 

as if to say hello or acknowledge[] a hello. And [Appellant] 

at that point also, I assume, noticed it was [me]. [Appellant] 

recognized me. And he extended his hand out to me and

gave me the middle finger. He also mouthed the words 

[“]fuck you[”] to me. . . . 

So, once the gesture was made to me . . . and he mouthed 

the words to me, I simply continued to look at [Appellant] 
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and I explained to him verbally[,] I said, “Sir, that’s not very 

professional. This is a family establishment and that would 

constitute disorderly conduct, don’t do that.” The second I 

had finished that sentence, [Appellant] rapidly and very 

aggressively came at me. He approached me in a manner in 

which, I’m still in the middle of the roadway, all of my 

attention was directed at [Appellant] at the time. [Appellant] 

got himself and his body and his face within one inch of my 

face . . . in what I took at the time as a possible fighting 

stance or manner. . . . And he proclaimed with putting his 

finger in my face[,] saying, “Do you remember me asshole? 

Well, fuck you.” At that point, I was in fear for not just my 

safety, but for the safety of [Appellant]. I was concerned. I 

wasn’t too sure what his intentions were at the time. And 

quite frankly, it happened so rapidly, I wasn’t really sure what 

his intentions were.

Id. at 20-23 and 49-50.

Officer Godino testified that, because of Appellant’s actions:

All of my attention was focused on [Appellant]. . . . I lost 

the ability to concentrate on the approaching traffic from in 

front of me and the traffic from behind me and all of my 

attention was now directed at [Appellant]. And my official 

job of stopping traffic or ensuring the safety of others to cross 

was not able to be done at that point.

Id. at 23.

He further testified:

Because of the fact that I could not concentrate on anything 

around me and I wanted to ensure that both [Appellant] and 

I were out of the danger zone of being in the middle of that 

highway, I [] told [Appellant], I said, “Let’s go, get off the 

roadway.” And at that time, [Appellant] said, “Fuck you, I’m 

not going anywhere.” And he more or less continued to carry 

on with his antics. So, I then said to [Appellant,] “Let’s go, 

you’re under arrest.” 

Id. at 23-24.
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As Officer Godino testified, when he placed Appellant under arrest, he 

put his hands on Appellant’s shoulder and “grabbed [Appellant’s] wrist in an 

attempt to put it behind his back and direct him off the roadway.” Id. at 24. 

However, Officer Godino testified:

When I put my hands on [Appellant] in an attempt to guide 

him off the roadway . . . , [Appellant] attempted to pull away 

from me. He started by pulling his arms and his shoulders 

away from me in which I then had to tighten my grip to 

ensure that he did not pull away from me entirely and I lost 

complete control. [Appellant] then, if you could imagine, 

thrusted his hip and his groin area away from me as to try to 

gain the control and be able to pull away from me. The faster 

[Appellant] went in an attempt to run away from me or flee 

or make me lose grasp of him, the quicker I had to go. And 

I was more or less behind him catching up to his pace. . . .

[The other officers saw] the struggle I was having with 

[Appellant]. In the attempt to [gain] control of [Appellant], 

Officer[] Brown and Officer Harvey came . . . to assist me. 

One officer was on each side of me and attempted to pull 

[Appellant] by a shoulder and his lower arm in the area of his 

elbow. And thankfully with the patrol car being there, it 

ceased [Appellant’s] abilities to continue to run from police.

Id. at 24-25.

Officer Godino testified that, during the struggle, Appellant “did not 

respond to any commands. Any commands that were given to him, 

[Appellant] continued to just say, ‘Fuck you, I’m not going anywhere.’” Id.

at 25-26.

As Officer Godino testified, 

We used [the police] vehicle as leverage. And I was trying 

to gain enough control to be able to remove my handcuffs 

from my duty belt and place them onto [Appellant] while the 

other two officers held his arms in place for me. The issue 
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though was [Appellant] was continuing to struggle and 

resisting from us by actively and forcefully pulling his arms 

from behind his back and trying to get them to the front of 

his body. Officers had to maintain a high amount of control 

with this because [] we weren’t sure what his actions were . 

. . we weren’t sure if he was in an attempt to pull a weapon 

from his waistband or swing at officers in a manner. So I was 

able to get my handcuffs out while Officer Harvey and Officer 

Brown assisted me. And handcuffs were eventually placed 

on [Appellant] and secured behind his back in which time he 

continued to fight and resist our attempt to gain control.

Id. at 26.

As Officer Godino testified, after Appellant was handcuffed, Appellant’s 

wife walked back towards them and began recording the incident on her cell 

phone. When Appellant saw his wife recording the incident, Appellant started 

“just screaming uncontrollably and very loudly.” Id. at 28. The officers asked 

Appellant whether anything was wrong and Appellant “did not respond 

verbally in any way . . . [h]e just continued to scream.” Id. at 28-29. Further, 

Officer Godino testified, Appellant then “dropped all of his weight . . . [h]e just 

passively resisted by going limp and officers had to hold him up at this point.” 

Id. at 30.

The officers called for Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMTs”) to 

evaluate Appellant. Id. To aid the EMTs in evaluating Appellant, Officer 

Godino eventually removed Appellant’s handcuffs. Id. at 31-32. Appellant 

then cooperated enough to lie down onto the EMTs’ stretcher and enter the 

ambulance, where volunteer Kelsey Landsiedel attempted to aid Appellant. 

Id. at 32 and 86-89. 
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Ms. Landsiedel testified that, once Appellant was placed on the 

ambulance, the ambulance drove off towards the hospital. She testified that, 

while in the back of the ambulance, she took Appellant’s vital signs and began 

helping Appellant. Id. at 89-90. However, Appellant would not respond to 

her inquiries. She testified that, since Appellant was unresponsive, she 

performed a sternum rub. Id. at 90. As she testified, when she performed 

the sternum rub:

[Appellant] lunged forward and swung his arm at me. I 

moved back in the seat away from him. And he said, “I will 

fucking kill you, don’t touch me, let me fucking tell you.” And 

I said, “I was just trying to make sure you were okay. You 

weren’t responding to me.” He was trying to get the seatbelt 

that was under his chest. And I at that point yelled to the 

driver to pull over, that we needed the police back because 

the patient was being combative.

Id. at 90-91.

Officer Godino testified that he and Officer Brown were following the 

ambulance in their patrol car when “the 911 dispatcher . . . came over the 

radio and . . . said that the [ambulance] is going to be pulling [over] . . . due 

to [Appellant] becoming combative.” Id. at 32-33. As Officer Godino 

testified, after the vehicles pulled over, he and Officer Brown

entered the ambulance through the rear. We opened up the 

two barn style doors and we could observe [Appellant] now 

flailing about and trying to wiggle himself out of . . . the 

restraint system that the [EMTs use] on a stretcher to 

prevent somebody from falling out of it. And [Appellant] was 

actively trying to free himself of this stretcher and he was 

screaming profusely. And when [Appellant] saw [me] and 

Officer Brown enter the ambulance, he said, “Oh, fuck you 

guys.” And continued to scream and yell. Nothing very 
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specific in nature, but continued to be disorderly within the 

ambulance. So, . . . I told [Appellant], “At this time, due to 

your actions, I have to put the handcuffs back on you.” And 

at that time, I did. I took the handcuffs out and I had to 

secure [Appellant] in front. . . . And then, we assisted the 

EMTs in resecuring [Appellant] with the straps that are on the 

stretcher to try to prevent his movement from coming out of 

the stretcher.

Id. at 33-34.

Officer Brown then stayed in the ambulance for the remainder of the 

ride to the hospital. Id. at 34.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with aggravated assault, 

resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct.2 Following a bench trial, the trial 

court found Appellant guilty of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct and not

guilty of aggravated assault. See Trial Court Decision, 10/18/18, at 33-34. 

On February 6, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term 

of nine months of probation for the resisting arrest conviction and to serve a 

consecutive term of nine months of probation for the disorderly conduct 

conviction. N.T. Sentencing, 2/6/19, at 17. Following the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant 

numbers five claims in his brief:

[1.] Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence at 

trial to support [Appellant’s] disorderly conduct conviction?

[2.] Was [Appellant’s] conviction for disorderly conduct 

against the weight of the evidence presented at trial?

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(6), 5104, and 5503(a)(3), respectively. 
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[3.] Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence at 

trial that [Appellant] resisted arrest?

[4.] Was [Appellant’s] conviction for resisting arrest against 

the weight of the evidence presented at trial?

[5.] Do [Appellant’s] convictions for disorderly conduct and 

resisting arrest contravene public policy?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

First, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

disorderly conduct conviction. We review Appellant's sufficiency of the 

evidence challenge under the following standard:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we 

note that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 867-868 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en 

banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559–560 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (en banc).
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Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5503(a)(3). This section declares:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of disorderly 

conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, 

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:

. . .

(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene 

gesture[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3).

On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his disorderly conduct conviction under Section 5503(a)(3), as his language 

and gesture to Officer Godino did not rise to the level of obscenity. Appellant’s 

Brief at 19. We agree.

Our Supreme Court has explained:

When the judiciary is required to resolve an issue concerning 

the elements of a criminal offense, its task is fundamentally 

one of statutory interpretation, and its overriding purpose 

must be to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent 

underlying the statute. Generally, the clearest indication of 

legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself. As 

[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] stated:

To determine the meaning of a statute, a court must first 

determine whether the issue may be resolved by 

reference to the express language of the statute, which is 

to be read according to the plain meaning of the words. 

It is only when the words of the statute are not explicit 

on the point at issue that resort to statutory construction 

is appropriate. However, basic principles of statutory 

construction demand that when the words of a statute are 

clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to 

be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, 
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and legislative history may be considered only when the 

words of a statute are not explicit.

Commonwealth v. Dellisanti, 876 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa. 

2005). Moreover, every statute shall be construed, if 

possible, to give effect to all its provisions.

Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 98-99 (Pa. 2008) (corrections 

and some quotations and citations omitted).

Section 5503(a)(3) specifically prohibits the use of “obscene” language 

or gestures, when the language or gestures are done “with [the] intent to 

cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 

thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3). As this Court has explained, “for 

purposes of [Pennsylvania’s] disorderly conduct statute prohibiting the use of 

obscene language, language is obscene if it meets the test set forth in Miller 

v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 69 A.3d 

658, 665 (Pa. Super. 2013). Thus, language or gestures are obscene if they 

satisfy the following elements:

(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary 

community standards” would find that the work, taken as a 

whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work 

depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 

conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and 

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 

artistic, political, or scientific value.

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Bryner, 652 A.2d 909, 912 (Pa. Super. 

1995).

Here, the evidence demonstrates that Appellant communicated multiple 

profanities to Officer Godino. However, giving a person the middle finger and 
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telling a person “fuck you” in an antagonistic manner does not describe sexual 

conduct and does not appeal to anyone’s prurient interest. See McCoy, 69 

A.3d at 666 (the defendant shouted “fuck the police” multiple times during a 

funeral procession for a fallen officer; the Superior Court held that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s disorderly conduct 

conviction under Section 5503(a)(3) because “there is no evidence that the 

chant was intended to appeal to anyone's prurient interest nor did it describe, 

in a patently offensive way sexual conduct”). Thus, the evidence is insufficient 

to support Appellant’s disorderly conduct conviction.3

Next, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

resisting arrest conviction. 

A person commits the crime of resisting arrest “if, with the intent of 

preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any 

other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public 

servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial 

force to overcome the resistance.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104. Thus, “Section 5104 

criminalizes two types of conduct intended to prevent a lawful arrest: the 

creation of a substantial risk of bodily injury to the officer or anyone else or

means justifying or requiring a substantial force to overcome.” 

Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 95 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis in 

original). Further, as we have held, “a valid charge of resisting arrest requires 

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3 Given our disposition, Appellant’s second numbered claim on appeal is moot.
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an underlying lawful arrest, which, in turn, requires that the arresting officer 

possess probable cause.” Id. at 96 (quotations and citations omitted).

Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his resisting 

arrest conviction because: 1) “[i]t was only after [Officer Godino placed 

Appellant under arrest] that [Appellant] showed any signs of resistance;” 2) 

“the trial record is devoid of any evidence that [Appellant’s] actions put the 

officers at substantial risk of bodily injury;” 3) Appellant’s “apparent attempt 

to flee does not constitute resisting arrest;” and, 4) Appellant’s underlying

arrest was unlawful. Appellant’s Brief at 28-29. Appellant’s claims fail.

Appellant’s first sub-claim contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his resisting arrest conviction because he did not resist until after 

Officer Godino placed him under arrest. Id. at 28. We do not understand 

Appellant’s claim. Indeed, we have held that “a valid charge of resisting arrest 

requires an underlying lawful arrest.” Soto, 202 A.3d at 96 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, the fact that Appellant began resisting after he was placed 

under arrest is a sine qua non of the crime of resisting arrest. Appellant’s first 

sub-claim thus fails.

Next, Appellant claims that his resisting arrest conviction cannot stand 

because he did not “put the officers [or anyone else] at substantial risk of 

bodily injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. This claim is frivolous. As the trial 

court explained: “[b]y precipitating a physical struggle in a temporary 

crosswalk over a 45 mph highway, [Appellant] did create a substantial risk of 

injury to [the officers] and the public patrons and families using the temporary 
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crosswalk.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/18, at 19. Appellant’s claim to the 

contrary is frivolous and, thus, fails.

Appellant’s third sub-claim contends that his “apparent attempt to flee 

does not constitute resisting arrest.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. However, we 

have already determined that the evidence is sufficient to support the 

conclusion that Appellant’s actions “create[d] a substantial risk of bodily injury 

to the” officers and the public. Thus, we need not consider whether the 

evidence was also sufficient to support the alternate element of resisting 

arrest – that Appellant “employ[ed] means justifying or requiring substantial 

force to overcome the resistance.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104; see also Soto, 

202 A.3d at 95. Appellant’s third sub-claim is moot. 

Finally, Appellant contends that his resisting arrest conviction must be 

vacated because it was not supported by a valid underlying arrest. Appellant’s 

Brief at 29. This claim fails. 

Even though we have concluded that the evidence is insufficient to 

support Appellant’s conviction for disorderly conduct under Section 

5503(a)(3), this conclusion does not mean that Appellant’s arrest was 

unlawful. To be sure, in this case there existed probable cause to arrest 

Appellant for any number of crimes, including disorderly conduct under 

Section 5503(a)(1).

4

 This is because: Appellant began swearing at Officer 

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1) declares: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct 

if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly 
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Godino and then aggressively rushed at the officer while the officer was 

on-duty and engaged in a job that required him to escort families across a 

45-mile-per-hour highway; Officer Godino testified that, based upon 

Appellant’s aggressive behavior, the officer feared for his safety; and, after 

Officer Godino told Appellant to leave the middle of the highway, Appellant

said “Fuck you, I’m not going anywhere.” Appellant’s aggressive, violent, and 

threatening actions – which occurred on a public highway and in the middle 

of a public function – provided Officer Godino with probable cause to arrest 

Appellant for (at a minimum) disorderly conduct under Section 5503(a)(1).

5

As such, Appellant’s final sub-claim fails and we conclude that the evidence 

was sufficient to support Appellant’s resisting arrest conviction.

Next, Appellant claims that his resisting arrest conviction was against 

the weight of the evidence. This claim is waived, as Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion merely presented a boilerplate challenge to the weight of the evidence. 

See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 2/12/19, at 1-3; Commonwealth v. 

Holmes, 461 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Pa. Super. 1983) (en banc) (holding: “a 

____________________________________________

creating a risk thereof, he: (1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent 

or tumultuous behavior.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).

5

Indeed, during trial, Appellant’s counsel admitted that there was sufficient 

evidence to support Appellant’s conviction under Section 5503(a)(1). See

N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 124 (“And the disorderly conduct that he’s charged is 

5503(a)(3). . . . If he was charged with 5503(a)(1) or 5503(a)(4), 

there is no argument here. But the Commonwealth can’t get up here with 

its charging document and take a square peg and try to ram it into a round 

hold. They charged it.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 124-130.
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post-verdict motion, [] that . . . ‘the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence,’ will preserve no issue for appellate review unless the motion goes 

on to specify in what respect . . . why the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence”).

Finally, Appellant claims that his conviction for resisting arrest 

contravenes public policy. Appellant’s Brief at 30. According to Appellant, 

“[a]llowing law enforcement officers to arrest individuals who are merely 

exercising their right to free speech under the First Amendment is an 

outrageous result that should not be affirmed by” the Superior Court. Id. 

This claim is frivolous.

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court 

declared:

Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of 

the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the 

right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 

circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly 

limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 

which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 

problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 

the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words those which 

by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 

immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed 

that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 

of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 

that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 

outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 

Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper 

sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded 

by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act 

would raise no question under that instrument.
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Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942) (citations, 

footnotes, and some quotations omitted).

As was already explained above, the evidence in this case is sufficient 

to support Appellant’s resisting arrest conviction.6 Certainly, in this case: 

Appellant repeatedly swore at Officer Godino and then aggressively rushed at 

the officer while the officer was on-duty and engaged in a job that required 

him to escort families across a highway; Officer Godino testified that, based 

upon Appellant’s aggressive behavior, the officer feared for his safety; after 

Officer Godino told Appellant to leave the middle of the highway, Appellant 

said “Fuck you, I’m not going anywhere;” and, after Officer Godino told 

Appellant he was under arrest, Appellant began resisting the officer in the 

middle of a highway, where the posted speed limit is 45 miles per hour. 

Simply stated, Appellant’s aggressive actions in this case threatened to “incite 

an immediate breach of the peace” and, thus, went far beyond the limits of 

what the First Amendment protects. See id. As such, Appellant’s final claim 

on appeal fails.

In conclusion, we vacate Appellant’s disorderly conduct conviction. 

Further, since our decision may have disturbed the trial court’s sentencing 

scheme, we remand the case for resentencing. 

____________________________________________

6 We need not address this public policy issue as it relates to Appellant’s 

disorderly conduct convictions as we are vacating that conviction.
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Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/18/2020