J-A16034-17

2017 PA Super 301

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

v.

JEREMY MELVIN,

 Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1438 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 19, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001959-2003

BEFORE: STABILE, J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER,

*

J.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2017

Jeremy Melvin (Appellant) appeals from the August 19, 2016 judgment 

of sentence imposed following a resentencing hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (“Batts I”). We affirm.

On November 10, 2003, [A]ppellant was arrested and 

charged with homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, escape, and 

other related offenses involving an incident at the George Junior 

Republic, a residential treatment facility for at-risk youth located 

in Grove City, Pennsylvania. [Appellant had been placed at this 

facility after he was adjudicated delinquent.] Appellant and 

Anthony Machicote (“Machicote”) had conspired to escape the 

facility by overpowering a guard. During the early morning hours 

of November 10, 2003, Machicote called the night manager (“the 

victim”) to his room. While the victim spoke with Machicote, 

[A]ppellant put the victim in a chokehold. Appellant and 

Machicote secured the victim, put a sock in his mouth, and then 

tied a sheet around his mouth. After taking the victim’s car keys 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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and wallet, they fled from the facility. The victim died as a result 

of suffocation.

Subsequently, both men surrendered and made 

inculpatory statements to the police. A hearing was held on 

August 4, 2004 on [A]ppellant’s motion to suppress; and 

thereafter, the motion was denied. On October 19, 2004, 

[A]ppellant entered a guilty plea to murder in the second 

degree, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed pursuant 

to a plea agreement. On January 7, 2005, [A]ppellant was 

sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 

and to pay costs and fines. Appellant did not file post-sentence 

motions or a direct appeal.

On January 23, 2006, [A]ppellant, acting pro se, filed a 

timely [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)] petition. Stephen G. 

Delpero, Esq., was appointed as counsel and an amended PCRA 

petition was filed. A hearing was held on May 30, 2006 before 

the Honorable Thomas Dobson. Thereafter, the PCRA court 

denied the petition on May 31, 2006. A timely notice of appeal 

was filed June 30, 2006, and [A]ppellant was ordered to file a 

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. Appellant 

complied with the court’s order.

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 928 A.2d 1126 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-2). On April 24, 2007, a panel of this Court affirmed the 

denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Id. Appellant did not seek review by our 

Supreme Court. 

On July 8, 2010, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition, which was 

denied by the trial court without a hearing. No appeal followed. Appellant’s 

third PCRA petition was filed on May 23, 2012. Shortly thereafter, on June 

25, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in 

Miller v. Alabama, wherein the Court held that “the Eighth Amendment 
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forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility 

of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).

On September 30, 2013 [the PCRA c]ourt granted 

[Appellant’s] third PCRA petition on the grounds the sentence 

was unlawful in light of Miller[.]

The Commonwealth took an appeal from that order.

On October 30, 2012 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 ([Pa.] 2013) 

ruled that Miller was not retroactive.

The Commonwealth withdrew its appeal.

On December 18, 2013 the Commonwealth was granted 

leave to reinstate its appeal.

On July 22, 2014 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

reversed [the PCRA c]ourt’s order of September 20, 2013, at 

[Commonwealth v. Melvin, 105 A.3d 798 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(judgment order)].

[Appellant] filed a petition for allowance of appeal. It was 

denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on December 11, 

2014. [Commonwealth v. Melvin, 104 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2014)].

On January 25, 2016 the United States Supreme Court in 

Montgomery v. Louisiana, — US —, [136 S.Ct. 718] (2016), 

held that Miller [] was retroactive.

On March 18, 2016[, Appellant] filed a motion for leave to 

amend his PCRA petition in light of the holding in Montgomery.

At a status conference on May 5, 2016 [the PCRA c]ourt 

granted the request to amend, vacated [Appellant’s] sentence 

and scheduled sentencing[.]

On August 19, 2016[, the PCRA c]ourt sentenced 

[Appellant] to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years 

nor more than life.
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A post-sentence motion was filed. It was denied without a 

hearing on August 30, 2016. This appeal followed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/1/2016, at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with the mandates 

of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s 

review, which we have renumbered for ease of disposition.

1. Did the [PCRA] court impose an illegal sentence when it acted

without any statutory authority?

2. Did the [PCRA] court impose an illegal sentence by not 

sentencing [Appellant] for the lesser included charge of third 

degree murder or the underlying felony of robbery?

3. Did the [PCRA] court err by ruling the ex post facto clause of 

our Constitutions prevented him from considering current 

Sentencing Guidelines to an offense from 2003?

4. Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion when it denied 

[Appellant’s] request for additional financial aid even though he 

showed the material’s content, its relevance and its cost?

5. Did the [PCRA] court err by ruling that witnesses could give 

“victim impact” evidence without satisfying the statutory 

definition of a “victim”[?]

6. Did the [PCRA] court err in allowing character evidence to be 

admitted through opinion and not reputation evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (PCRA court answers omitted).

In his first two issues on appeal, Appellant presents a challenge to the 

legality of his sentence, arguing that the PCRA court had no valid statutory 

authority to impose a term-of-years sentence with a maximum term of life 
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imprisonment at his resentencing and, because the crime at issue here was 

committed before June 24, 20121, the only possible legal sentence is “on the 

lesser included offense of third[-]degree murder or the underlying felony of 

robbery.” Appellant’s Brief at 25-49. “When reviewing the legality of a 

sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 159 A.3d 531, 532 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted).

By way of background, in 2013, our Supreme Court decided Batts I, 

which addressed the effect of the holding in Miller on incarcerated 

Pennsylvanians serving mandatory life sentences without the possibility of 

parole (LWOP) for homicides committed while those persons were juveniles 

(so-called “juvenile lifers”). Applying this new precedent, the Court in Batts 

I held that

[the] argument that the entire statutory sentencing scheme for 

first-degree murder has been rendered unconstitutional as 

applied to juvenile offenders is not buttressed by either the 

language of the relevant statutory provisions or the holding in 

Miller. Section 1102, which mandates the imposition of a life 

sentence upon conviction for first-degree murder, see 18 

Pa.C.S. § 1102(a), does not itself contradict Miller; it is only 

when that mandate becomes a sentence of [LWOP] as applied to 

a juvenile offender—which occurs as a result of the interaction 

between Section 1102, the Parole Code, see 61 Pa.C.S. § 

6137(a)(1), and the Juvenile Act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302—that 

Miller’s proscription squarely is triggered. [] Miller neither 

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1 As discussed below, June 24, 2012 is the operative date for the new 

juvenile sentencing guidelines set in place after the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Miller.
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barred imposition of [an LWOP] sentence on a juvenile 

categorically nor indicated that a life sentence with the 

possibility of parole could never be mandatorily imposed on a 

juvenile. Rather, Miller requires only that there be judicial 

consideration of the appropriate age-related factors set forth in 

that decision prior to the imposition of a sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile. 

Batts I, 66 A.3d at 296. The Court recognized the difference in potential 

penalty between juvenile offenders like Batts, who was tried and convicted 

of first-degree murder prior to the issuance of Miller, and those who 

committed offenses after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.

As to the former, it is our determination here that they are 

subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment 

as required by Section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum 

sentence determined by the common pleas court upon 

resentencing. Defendants in the latter category are subject to 

high mandatory minimum sentences and the possibility of life 

without parole, upon evaluation by the sentencing court of 

criteria along the lines of those identified in Miller.

Id. at 297.

Thus, the Court remanded Batts’ case for resentencing and instructed 

the trial court to consider the non-inclusive list of factors outlined in Miller

before determining whether to impose upon Batts an LWOP sentence. 

Following a hearing, Batts was resentenced to LWOP. He took a 

second appeal to this Court, which affirmed his new judgment of sentence. 

Our Supreme Court granted Batts’ petition for allowance of appeal to 

address Batts’ contention, inter alia, that the Court should exercise “its 

authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to promulgate procedural 

safeguards [for juveniles convicted of first- and second-degree homicide] 
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including (a) a presumption against juvenile [LWOP sentences]; (b) a 

requirement for competent expert testimony; and (c) a “beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard of proof[.]” Commonwealth v. Batts, — A.3d 

—, 2017 WL 2735411 at *11 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II).

In June of 2017, while the instant case was pending, our Supreme 

Court issued its opinion in Batts II. The Court noted that, 

[d]espite the passage of four years since we issued our decision 

in Batts I, the General Assembly has not passed a statute 

addressing the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree 

murder pre-Miller, nor has it amended the pertinent provisions 

that were severed in Batts I. As we have previously stated, the 

General Assembly is quite able to address what it believes is a 

judicial misinterpretation of a statute, and its failure to do so in 

the years following the Batts I decision gives rise to the 

presumption that the General Assembly is in agreement with our 

interpretation.

Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *25 (footnotes, some citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

However, addressing the specific issues raised by Batts, the Court 

determined that, “in Pennsylvania, a faithful application of the holding in 

Miller, as clarified in Montgomery,

[2]

requires the creation of a 

presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without 

the possibility of parole.” Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *31. The Court 

____________________________________________

2 As the Court explained, Montgomery “means that only ‘the rarest of 

juvenile offenders’ are eligible to receive a sentence of [LWOP]. Only in 

‘exceptional circumstances’ will [LWOP] be a proportionate sentence for a 

juvenile.” Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *31 (citations and footnote 

omitted).
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then placed the burden of rebutting this presumption on the Commonwealth, 

concluding as follows.

To rebut the presumption, the Commonwealth has the 

burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile 

offender is permanently incorrigible and thus is unable to be 

rehabilitated. Consistent with the mandate of Miller and 

Montgomery, for a life-without-parole sentence to be 

constitutionally valid, the sentencing court must find that the 

juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and that 

rehabilitation would be impossible. The Commonwealth’s 

evidence and the sentencing court’s decision must take into 

account the factors announced in Miller and section 1102.1(d) 

of the Crimes Code. Even if the Commonwealth satisfies its 

burden of proof, the sentencing court is not required to impose a 

life-without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender.

Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *37–38. 

Finally, and of note with respect to the current appeal, our Supreme 

Court reaffirmed the sentencing scheme applicable to juvenile offenders for 

whom the sentencing court determines LWOP sentences are inappropriate 

(i.e., imposition of a term-of-years to life sentence as discussed above) and 

specifically “instruct[ed] sentencing courts to look to the mandatory 

minimum sentences set forth in section 1102.1(a) for guidance in setting a 

minimum sentence for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder prior 

to Miller.” Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *24 n.17. 

In creating the aforementioned sentencing scheme, the Court 

expressly rejected the claim of Batts and his amici, which Appellant herein 

now argues, that there is no legislatively authorized sentence for juveniles 

convicted of first-degree murder prior to 2012. Id. at *18-22. The Court also 
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rejected Batts’ contentions that the forty year maximum penalty for thirddegree murder is the only legal alternative and that severance of the statute 

is impossible. Id. at *23-27. Importantly, the Court held, inter alia, that a 

trial court, in resentencing a juvenile offender convicted prior to Miller, was 

constitutionally permitted to impose a minimum term-of-years sentence and 

a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, thus “exposing these defendants 

to parole eligibility upon the expiration of their minimum sentences”3. Batts 

II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *21. We are bound by our Supreme Court’s 

decision. Thus, we disagree with Appellant that his resulting thirty-years-tolife sentence is illegal and, as a result, we hold that he is not entitled to 

relief on his first two claims. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

determining that the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania and United 

States Constitutions barred application of Appellant’s sentencing guidelines.4

Appellant’s Brief at 66-72. Although we agree with Appellant that the court’s 

PCRA ex post facto analysis is in error, in this case, such error does not 

require remand. 

The sentencing guidelines provide sanctions proportionate 

to the severity of the crime and the severity of the offender’s 

prior conviction record. This establishes a sentencing system 

____________________________________________

3 Batts was sentenced for the crime of first degree murder, while Appellant 

herein pled guilty to murder in the second degree. However, we discern no 

difference that would place Appellant’s claim outside of the Batts analysis. 
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with a primary focus on retribution, but one in which the 

recommendations allow for the fulfillment of other sentencing 

purposes including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.

204 Pa. Code § 303.11(a).

* * * 

Moreover, the guidelines set forth a framework, to be 

considered by the sentencing court in fashioning an 

individualized sentence. See Commonwealth v. Walls, [] 926 

A.2d 957, 962–963 (2007); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2154(a), 

9721; see generally 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.1–.18(c). To be 

clear, while the court must consider the guidelines, the court is 

also afforded broad discretion in sentencing matters, as it is in 

the best position to evaluate the individual circumstances before 

it. Walls, 926 A.2d at 961. Thus, the guidelines “merely inform 

the sentencing decision.” Id. at 962.

Commonwealth v. Fortson, — A.3d. —, 2017 PA Super 162 at *6 (Pa. 

Super. 2017).

In response to Miller and the codification of section 1102.1 (setting 

forth the applicable sentences for murder, murder of an unborn child, and 

murder of a law enforcement officer committed by persons under the age of 

18 where those convictions occurred after June 24, 2012), the Sentencing 

Commission created a basic sentencing matrix specifically for juvenile firstand second-degree homicide offenders where the offense occurred after 

June 24, 2012. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(b) (emphasis added). 

Because Appellant was 16 years old at the time of the murder at issue 

and had a prior record score of zero, using the new matrix, Appellant’s 

guidelines under subsection 303.16(b) called for a standard range sentence 

of 360 to 624 months. See Appellant’s Brief at 67. However, because the 
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offense at issue here occurred prior to June 24, 2012, the subsection 

303.16(b) guidelines are inapplicable to Appellant. Rather, as discussed 

above, in Batts II our Supreme Court mandated that where, as here, the 

lower court determines that a juvenile LWOP sentence is inappropriate for an 

offender who was convicted of homicide before Miller, the court must, in 

fashioning a term-of-years-to-life sentence, consider the sentencing 

requirements codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1, which provides, in relevant 

part, as follows.

(c) Second degree murder.--A person who has been convicted 

after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the second degree, second 

degree murder of an unborn child or murder of a law 

enforcement officer of the second degree and who was under the 

age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be 

sentenced as follows:

(1) A person who at the time of the commission of 

the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum 

of which shall be at least 30 years to life.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1. Here, the PCRA court found persuasive the “logic” of 

subsection 1102.1(c)(1) and imposed a thirty-year-to-life sentence. N.T., 

8/19/2016, at 85. As this sentence is compliant with subsection 

1102.1(c)(1) and Batts II, we find no reason to disturb it.5

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5 The record is unclear as to why the lower court generated a subsection 

303.16(b) guideline form for Appellant when this case did not meet the 

criteria under that subsection. However, we note that Appellant’s thirtyyears-to-life sentence is a standard range sentence according to those 

guidelines.
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Appellant next claims that the PCRA court abused its discretion in 

denying him additional funds to hire for his resentencing the same expert 

who evaluated Appellant prior to his guilty plea. Appellant’s Brief at 50-61. 

Appellant argues that the court’s refusal to grant him additional funds made 

it impossible for him to make a persuasive argument with respect to the 

factors outlined in Miller6that the United States Supreme Court has 

identified as relevant considerations for resentencing of juvenile homicide 

offenders to LWOP sentences. Id. at 53-55.

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6 As the Court in Batts II explained, 

The Miller Court concluded that sentencing for juveniles must be 

individualized. This requires consideration of the defendant’s age 

at the time of the offense, as well as “its hallmark features,” 

including:

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 

risks and consequences[;] ... the family and home 

environment that surrounds him—and from which he 

cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how 

brutal or dysfunctional[;] ... the circumstances of the 

homicide offense, including the extent of his 

participation in the conduct and the way familial and 

peer pressures may have affected him[;] ... that he 

might have been charged and convicted of a lesser 

offense if not for incompetencies associated with 

youth—for example, his inability to deal with police 

officers or prosecutors (including on a plea 

agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own 

attorneys[;] ... [and] the possibility of rehabilitation 

... when the circumstances [i.e. (the youthfulness of 

the offender)] most suggest it.

Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *14–15 (citations omitted).
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It is well-established that indigent defendants have a right 

to access the same resources as non-indigent defendants in 

criminal proceedings. The state has an affirmative duty to 

furnish indigent defendants the same protections accorded those 

financially able to obtain them. Procedural due process 

guarantees that a defendant has the right to present competent 

evidence in his defense, and the state must ensure that 

an indigent defendant has fair opportunity to present his 

defense.

However, [t]he provision of public funds to hire experts to 

assist in the defense against criminal charges is a decision 

vested in the sound discretion of the court and a denial thereof 

will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

In Batts I, which was the prevailing law at the time of Appellant’s 

resentencing, the Court held that the sentencing court “should consider” the 

Miller factors in determining whether a juvenile homicide offender should be 

subjected to an LWOP sentence; however, the Court was silent as to both 

the applicable burden of proof and whether expert testimony was necessary 

to make a Miller argument. Batts I, 66 A.3d 286 at 297.

In Batts II, our Supreme Court clarified the applicable sentencing 

procedure, holding as follows.

Pursuant to our consideration of the attendant due process 

concerns and the definitive language used by the Supreme 

Court, we conclude that to overcome the presumption against 

the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile 

offender, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile is 

constitutionally eligible for the sentence beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In an effort to satisfy this burden, the Commonwealth 

may present evidence relating to the factors announced in Miller

and the factors appearing in section 1102.1(d).
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Consistent with the requirements of due process and 

section 1102.1(b), if the Commonwealth seeks to have the 

sentencing court impose a sentence of life without parole on a 

juvenile offender, it must provide reasonable notice to the 

defendant prior to the sentencing hearing. 

Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *34 (citations omitted). Further, with 

respect to the necessity of expert testimony, the Court opined,

[t]here is an undeniable appeal to Batts’ contention that expert 

testimony is necessary for a court to determine that a juvenile 

offender is permanently incorrigible. We decline, however, to go 

so far as to hold that expert testimony is constitutionally 

required to rebut the presumption against the imposition of a 

sentence of [LWOP]. Expert testimony is admissible in 

Pennsylvania if the information is outside of the common 

knowledge of the factfinder and the testimony of an expert, so 

qualified based upon his or her “knowledge, skill, experience, 

training or education,” will aid in the understanding of the fact at 

issue and the expert utilized a generally accepted methodology. 

The necessity thereof is thus within the discretion of the 

sentencing court. 

Given the presumption against [LWOP] and the 

Commonwealth’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut the 

presumption, it is difficult to conceive of a case where the 

Commonwealth would not proffer expert testimony and where 

the sentencer would not find expert testimony to be necessary. 

Nonetheless, whether expert testimony is required to rebut the 

presumption against permanent incorrigibility beyond a 

reasonable doubt will be determined on a case-by-case basis by 

the sentencing court.

Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 at *34 (citations omitted).

While we recognize that the Batts II structure was not in place at the 

time of Appellant’s sentencing, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion. It 

is well-settled that “an indigent defendant does not have the right to choose 

his own expert or receive funds to hire his own. [Where an indigent 
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defendant] asked for experts and was given them by the trial court, the fact 

they were not the ones he would have chosen does not render them less 

effective or independent in their evaluation.” Commonwealth v. 

Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883, 895 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted). The Batts

decisions make clear that, while the court must consider the Miller factors in 

cases where the Commonwealth is attempting to meet its burden of 

overcoming the presumption against juvenile LWOP sentences, expert 

testimony is not constitutionally required. Batts II, 2017 WL 2735411 

at*14–15. 

Moreover, the PCRA court recognized that LWOP sentences for juvenile 

offenders are “appropriate in very limited circumstances” that did not apply 

to this case. N.T., 8/19/2016, at 46. Thus, even if the PCRA court’s 

decision regarding expert funds was in error, the issue is now moot because 

the court ruled that an LWOP sentence was inappropriate for Appellant. We 

note that Appellant does not challenge the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence with respect to the application of various sentencing factors 

outlined in the Sentencing Code, but focuses instead on the court’s failure to 

provide him funds for an expert of his choice. For the aforementioned 

reasons, this claim fails.

Finally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in holding that the 

court committed evidentiary errors with respect to the character and victim 

impact evidence admitted at his sentencing. First, Appellant contends that 
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the court erred in admitting the testimony of Commonwealth witnesses 

Robert Lanschak, the victim’s direct supervisor, and Tom Jones, the human 

resources director at George Junior Republic, arguing that neither man fits 

the definition of “victim” under the Crime Victims Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 11.1037. 

Appellant’s Brief at 73-75.

Mr. Lanschak, who discovered the victim’s body, testified as to the 

personal impact of the discovery, N.T., 8/19/2016, at 12-14, while Mr. Jones 

____________________________________________

7

“Victim” is defined by the Crime Victims Act as follows:

(1) A direct victim.

(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct victim, 

except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the 

alleged offender.

(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of the 

following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to 

crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a member 

of the child’s family:

Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).

Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including stepbrothers

or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a fiance, one of

whom is to be identified to receive communication as provided

for in this act, except where the family member is the alleged

offender.

18 P.S. § 11.103.
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explained the subsequent remedial measures George Junior Republic took to 

insure such an incident did not happen again, and the effect of the incident 

on other employees. Id. at 19-21. Although neither Mr. Lanschak nor Mr. 

Jones is a “victim” as defined by the Act, the sentencing court had broad 

discretion to consider their testimony. It is well-settled that,

prior to imposing sentence [a] sentencing judge may 

appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 

unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, 

or the source from which it may come.

Nevertheless, the discretion of a sentencing judge is not 

unfettered; a defendant has the right to minimal safeguards to 

ensure that the sentencing court does not rely on factually 

erroneous information, and any sentence predicated on such 

false assumptions is inimicable [sic] to the concept of due 

process. Obviously, the probability of receiving accurate 

presentence information is considerably enhanced when the 

defendant has an opportunity to review and dispute the facts 

and allegations available to the sentencing judge.

Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732, 746 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant was present for the testimony of Mr. Lanschak and Mr. 

Jones and his attorney availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine 

both individuals. Given that impact on the community is a relevant 

sentencing consideration, see e.g. Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 

970, 986 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding trial court appropriately considered 

hearsay statements in letter from police chief of the neighborhood in which 

the crimes occurred, as impact on the community is an appropriate 
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sentencing consideration), Appellant’s argument that the testimony of Mr. 

Lanschak and Mr. Jones was improper is devoid of merit.

Next, Appellant argues that the court erred when it allowed two 

witnesses to testify at sentencing that the victim was a “good employee.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 62-63. Appellant contends that this character evidence, 

admitted as both witness’s personal opinion as opposed to their 

understanding of the victim’s reputation in his community, was erroneously 

admitted. Id. Appellant’s argument is focused on whether this evidence 

constitutes proper character testimony under Rule of Evidence 405.8 We 

disagree. The testimony elicited at the sentencing hearing makes clear that 

the witnesses’ opinions as to the victim being a good employee were not 

being offered as character evidence but to add context to the witness’s 

individual impact statements. To the extent that the evidence was improper, 

Appellant offers no argument that the PCRA court relied upon those limited 

statements in fashioning his sentence. Accordingly, we hold that this issue 

is without merit.

For all of the forgoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence.

____________________________________________

8 The Rule provides that “[w]hen evidence of a person’s character or 

character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the 

person’s reputation. Testimony about the witness’s opinion as to the 

character or character trait of the person is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 405.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/20/2017