The appellees were never served with process in the 

district court and are not participating in these appeals. After

examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeals

are submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643

JOSHUA HOSKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS DART, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 10 C 0677, 10 C 0703, 10 C 0705, 10 C 0702 &

10 C 0676—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.

SUBMITTED DECEMBER 22, 2010 —DECIDED JANUARY 20, 2011 

Before BAUER, TINDER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 
2 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643

PER CURIAM. Joshua Hoskins, a prisoner in Illinois,

brought five suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and various prison officers. The district court dismissed Hoskins’ suits after

concluding that he fraudulently misrepresented his

litigation history to the court. We affirm.

Hoskins’ five complaints allege that the officers used

excessive physical force against him and others, left

him naked overnight in a cold, drafty cell during the

winter, denied him prescribed psychiatric medication,

and refused to process prisoner grievances adequately.

Hoskins completed his five complaints on court-issued

forms. Each form ordered him to list “ALL lawsuits”

that he had filed or risk dismissal of his case. The warning

for violating the order appears in bold, capitalized font:

“YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT

THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO

SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE.” A

year earlier, Hoskins had filed three federal civil rights

cases on similar claims, all of which he was still

litigating, but Hoskins did not list them on any of the

five complaints. Instead, he prominently made large X’s

through the litigation-history portion of his complaints.

He then certified the accuracy of his complaints by

signing each of them below a warning cautioning him

that if his certification was incorrect, he “may be subject

to sanctions by the court.”

The district court screened the cases and discovered

that Hoskins had omitted his litigation history. The

district court found that the omissions were fraudulent
Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643 3

and then dismissed each case with prejudice. The court

reasoned that Hoskins made material and false omissions because he failed to identify the three cases that he

was currently litigating before the court. The court noted

that Hoskins certified the complaints’ accuracy even

though they were incorrect. Because Hoskins had

recently filed those three pending cases and was still

actively litigating them, the court concluded that the

omissions were not accidental, so dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction. Hoskins appeals.

We review the district court’s finding of fraud for clear

error and its dismissal of Hoskins’ claims with prejudice

for abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. General Motors

Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002).

The district court did not clearly err in finding that

Hoskins’ omissions were both material and intentional,

and thus fraudulent. Hoskins does not deny that he

filed and was still actively litigating the three cases. Nor

does he deny that his signed complaints contained

the highlighted instructions ordering him to list those

lawsuits. Hoskins insists, instead, that his omission

was innocent. He claims that he trusted another inmate

who helped him on a previous case and who told him

that he could ignore the portion of the complaint form

requiring that he list his litigation history. But he

signed the complaints, and the signature page (which

he does not deny reading) advised him that his signature certified the truth of the entire complaint, including

the litigation-history section that Hoskins crossed out.

The court was within its rights in rejecting his claim of
4 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643

innocence and finding fraud. See generally Dugan v. R.J.

Corman R.R. Co., 344 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting

that there is no “I didn’t read it” defense to signed contracts).

Having found fraud, the district court had the discretion to dismiss Hoskins’ cases as a sanction. In general,

courts may impose appropriate sanctions, including

dismissal or default, against litigants who violate

discovery rules and other rules and orders designed to

enable judges to control their dockets and manage the

flow of litigation. See, e.g., Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620

F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s

discretionary decision to impose lesser sanction for

failure to make disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1));

In re Thomas Consolidated Industries, Inc., 456 F.3d 719, 724-

25 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal as discovery sanction); Newman v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 962

F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal as discovery sanction); Hindmon v. National-Ben Franklin Life

Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming

dismissal and default as discovery sanction). Sanctions

may include dismissing complaints containing fraudulent information. See Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59

(7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal for deception about

“striking out” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); see also

Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2008)

(dismissing appeal for deception about financial status);

Taylor v. Chicago Police Dept., 2008 WL 2477694, at *4

(N.D. Ill. June 18, 2008) (Dow, J.) (dismissing action in

part for fraudulent omission of litigation history), aff’d,

Taylor v. City of Chicago, 334 F. App’x 760 (7th Cir. June 23,
Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643 5

2009). Such sanctions are permissible in a case like

this because a district court relies on a party’s description of his litigation history to manage its docket. Disclosure of a prisoner’s litigation history enables a court to

adhere to the three-strike requirement of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g). See Sloan, 181 F.3d at 858-59 (describing need

for reliable information about prior litigation).

We have considered cases with similar facts before,

albeit in non-precedential decisions and without having

to decide whether a fraudulent litigation history justified the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g.,

Taylor v. City of Chicago, 334 F. App’x at 761 (affirming on

alternative grounds without reaching issue of fraud on

the court by omission of litigation history); Heard v.

Blagojevich, 216 F. App’x 568, 571 (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007)

(noting that a district court has discretionary authority

to dismiss a case as a sanction for filing a fraudulent

complaint, but remanding on other grounds). Other

circuits have decided that a fraudulent litigation history

warrants dismissal, but again in non-precedential decisions. See Greer v. Schriro, 255 F. App’x 285 (9th Cir.

Nov. 26, 2007); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818, 819

(11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006) (per curiam); Byrd v. Romley, 131

F. App’x 548, 549 (9th Cir. May 13, 2005); Albright v.

Holden, 99 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996). Because of the

importance of affirming a district court’s discretion to

impose sanctions, including dismissal, against litigants

who intentionally misrepresent their litigation history,

we publish our decision today.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in this case. The court correctly acknowledged that it
6 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643

should generally consider lesser sanctions before dismissing a complaint with prejudice, citing Oliver v.

Gramely, 200 F.3d 465, 466 (7th Cir. 1999). We view the

court’s citation of Oliver as demonstrating that it considered lesser sanctions. Monetary sanctions are generally not as effective against a pro se plaintiff proceeding

as a pauper, as Hoskins does here. Furthermore, the

form complaint prominently warned Hoskins of the

potential consequence of sanctions and dismissal. We

have upheld dismissals after district courts have warned

litigants about consequences of disobeying other court

rules that are needed to manage judicial business. See

Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 446 F.3d 663, 665-66

(7th Cir. 2006); Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 755-56

(7th Cir. 1993). Although the district court would have

been well within its discretion in choosing a less severe

sanction, dismissal was permissible without further

warning or opportunity to cure in light of the warning

on the complaint form and the district court’s finding

of fraud.

The five dismissals were sanctions for disobeying a

court rule, not rulings that the suits failed to state a

claim or were frivolous or malicious (which requires a

finding, absent here, of an intent to harass, see Lindell v.

McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003)) under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Therefore

Hoskins incurs no strikes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Turley

v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2010), but

remains liable for all applicable filing fees. 

AFFIRMED.

1-20-11