MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023 ME	20

Docket: Fed-22-73

Submitted

On	Briefs: September	21,	2022

Decided: March	9,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	and	LAWRENCE,	JJ.

STEVEN	KNEIZYS

v.

FEDERAL	DEPOSIT	INSURANCE	CORPORATION	et	al.

JABAR,	J.

[¶1]		Pursuant	to	4	M.R.S.	§	57	(2022),	the	United	States	District	Court	for	

the	Western	District	of	Washington	has	certified	to	us	the	following	question	of	

state	law:

[W]hether,	under	Maine	law,	any	warranty	is	implied	by	the	use	of	

the	 term	 “Warranty	 Deed” to	 describe	 an	 instrument	 which	

“grants . . . real	 property	 with	 the	 buildings	 and	 improvements	

thereon . . . being	 the	 same	 premises	 conveyed	 to	 GRANTOR” by	

prior	deed . . . and,	if	so,	which	warranty	or	warranties	are	implied.		

[¶2]	 	 We	 answer	 the	 certified	 question	 as	 follows:	 “No	 warranty	 is

implied	by	the	use	of	the	term	‘Warranty	Deed’	to	describe	an	instrument	which	

‘grants . . . real	property	with	the	buildings	and	improvements	thereon . . . being	

the	same	premises	conveyed	to	GRANTOR’	by	prior	deed.”
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶3]	 	 The	 facts	 and	 procedural	 history	 are	 undisputed.	 	 The	 certified	

question	 arises	 from	 a	 property	 dispute between	 Steven	 Kneizys	 and	 the	

Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Corporation	 as	 receiver	 for	 Washington	 Mutual	

Bank (collectively, FDIC).	 	 The	 property	 dispute	 centers on four	 contiguous	

parcels	of	land	in	Baileyville,	Maine.		Prior	to	1997,	Alfreda	Morrison	became	

the	 owner	 of	 these	 four	 contiguous	 parcels,	 identified	 for	 tax	 purposes	 as	

Parcels	A,	B,	C,	and	D.		By	operation	of	local	ordinance,	on	October	1,	1997,	the	

four	parcels	were	merged	into	one.		

[¶4]		In	2000,	Alfreda	Morrison	borrowed	money,	securing	the	loan	with	

a	mortgage	on	the	property.		The	mortgage	referred	to the	property	as	Lot	11,	

but	described the	parcel that	had	been identified	for	tax	purposes	as	Parcel	A.

When	Washington	Mutual	 foreclosed	 on	 the	property	in	2005, it	 transferred	

title	 to	Lot	11	 to	itself.		Shortly	 thereafter,	 the	bank	purported	 to	 transfer	 to	

Joyce	M.	Earle	 (a/k/a	 Joyce	M.	Lizotte)	 “the	same	premises	conveyed	 to	[the	

bank]”	through	the	2000	mortgage	deed,	referring to the	property	as	Parcels	1,	

2,	and	3,	but	describing	the	parcels	that	had	been	identified	for	tax	purposes	as

Parcels	A,	C,	and	D.		 Joyce	Lizotte granted	a	mortgage	on	 the	property	 to	 the	

bank	 when	 she	 purchased	 the	 property	 from	 it,	 and	 the	 mortgage	 deed
3

identified	Lot	11	as	collateral.	 The	property	was	then foreclosed	on	in	2014.		

Kneizys	asserts	that	the	foreclosure	was	only	as	to	Lot	11 and	that	he	purchased	

Lot	11	from	the	bank	in	June	2015,	and	subsequently obtained	Joyce	Lizotte’s	

remaining property	interests in	Parcels	A,	B,	C,	and D.		

[¶5]		Approximately	three	years	before	Kneizys	purchased	the	land,	the	

heirs	of	Alfreda	Morrison	were	notified	that	they	had	an	interest	in	Parcels	C	

and	D, and	they	sold	that	interest	to	Alton	G.	Bohanon.		Upon	Alton	Bohanon’s

death,	 the	 property	 went	 to	 his	 son,	 James	 Bohanon,	 who	 subsequently	

transferred	 Parcels	 C	 and	 D	 to	 James	 and	 Vicki	 McLaughlin.	 	When	 Kneizys	

learned	of	this	second	chain	of	title	he	filed	suit	in	Maine	Superior	Court	seeking	

to	quiet	title	to	Parcels	A,	B,	C,	and	D.		

[¶6]		In	May	2017,	the	Superior	Court	(Washington	County,	Stewart,	J.)1

entered	summary	judgment	against	Kneizys,	finding	that	Alfreda	Morrison	had	

mortgaged	only	Lot	11	(Parcel	A)	and	that,	regardless	of	the	merger	ordinance,	

it	was	“not	compulsory	that	upon	entering	mortgage	lending	arrangements	that	

all	 of	 the	 residential	 property	 owned	 by	 a	 borrower	 be	 conveyed.”2	 	 Thus,	

1 We	affirmed	the	judgment	of	the	court in	a	memorandum	of	decision.		See	Kneizys	v.	Bohanon,	

Mem-18-4 (Jan.	18,	2018).

2 The	court noted	that	granting	a	mortgage	on	less	than	the	entirety	of	a	single	tax	parcel	may	

constitute	an	unlawful	subdivision	and	compromise	the	value	of	the	property,	but	it	does	not	affect	

the	title	analysis.		
4

Kneizys	had	acquired	 title only to	Parcel	A	out	of	 Joyce	Lizotte’s	 foreclosure,	

and	he	acquired	title	to	Parcel	B	through	a	separate	conveyance	from	the	heirs	

of	Alfreda	Morrison.		The	Superior	Court	found	that	the	McLaughlins	or	their	

successors	held	title	to	Parcels	C	and	D.		

[¶7]		In	2018,	Kneizys	filed	a	general	unsecured	claim	against	the	assets	

of	Washington	Mutual	Bank,	which	had	been	put	into	a	receivership	with	the	

FDIC.		The	FDIC	denied	Kneizys’s	claim.		Kneizys	then	 filed	suit	in	the	United	

States	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 District	 of	 Nevada to	 challenge	 the	 FDIC’s	

determination.3		Kneizys	argues	that	unmarketable	property	was	conveyed	to	

him	 in	 breach	 of	 various	 warranties, and	 he	 seeks	 to	 reform	 the	 original	

mortgage	instrument	and	quiet	title	in	favor	of	himself.		Kneizys	further	argues	

that	 Washington	 Mutual	 Bank	 attempted	 to	 convey	 more	 property	 to	 Joyce	

Lizotte	than	it	had	foreclosed	upon, and	he	seeks	to	hold	the	FDIC,	as	receiver	

for	 Washington	 Mutual	 Bank,	 liable	 for	 the	 losses	 arising	 from	 that	 error,	

claiming	 that	 Washington	 Mutual	 Bank	 breached	 express	 and	 implied	

covenants	or	warranties	owed	to	Joyce	Lizotte	and	her	successors.		Kneizys’s	

claims	for	breach of warranty	are	based	on	the	deed	Washington	Mutual	Bank	

3 The	case	was	later	 transferred	 to	 the	United	States	District	Court	 for	 the	Western	District	of	

Washington.		
5

provided	to	Joyce	Lizotte	in	2006	(WaMu-Earle	Deed).		The	WaMu-Earle	Deed	

is	titled	“Warranty	Deed”	and	includes	a	description	of	the	property,	but	it	does	

not	include	warranty-covenant	language.	 The	United	States	District	Court	for	

the	Western	District	of	Washington	(Lasnik,	J.)	certified	 to	us	 the	question	of	

whether	any	warranty	is	implied	by	 the	use	of	 the	 term	 “Warranty	Deed”	 to	

describe	a	deed	instrument.		See M.R.	App.	P.	25(a).		The	answer	to	this	question

is	essential in determining whether	the WaMu-Earle	Deed contained	warranty	

covenants.

4

II.		DISCUSSION

A. Acceptance	of	the	Certified	Question	of	State	Law

[¶8]		As	an	initial	matter,	we must	decide	whether	to	accept	and	answer	

the	certified	question.		See	4	M.R.S.	§	57;	Alexander,	Maine	Appellate	Practice

§ 25.1	at	196 (6th	ed.	2022)	(“Reaching	the	merits	is	not	automatic,	Law	Court	

consideration	of	certified	questions	of	law	is	discretionary.”).		

Wherever	reasonably	possible,	the	state	court	of	last	resort	should	

be	given	opportunity	to	decide	state	law	issues	on	which	there	are	

no	state	precedents	which	are	controlling	or	clearly	indicative	of	

the	developmental	course	of	 the	state	law	because	 this	approach	

(1)	 tends	 to	 avoid	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 inconsistency	 in	 the	

exposition	 of	 state	 law	 caused	 when	 federal	 courts	 render	

4 Prior	to	deciding	this	novel	question	of	state	law,	we	solicited	input	from	interested	persons	and	

entities	and	members	of	the	bar.	 We	received	one amicus	brief from	the	Real	Estate	and	Title	Section	

of	the	Maine	State	Bar	Association	in	response.
6

decisions	of	state law	which	have	an	interim	effectiveness	until	the	

issues	 are	 finally	 settled	 by	 the	 state	 court	 of	 last	 resort;	 and	

(2) minimizes	the	potential	for	state-federal	tensions	arising	from	

actual,	 or	 fancied,	 federal	 court	 efforts	 to	 influence	 the	

development	of	state	law.

Scamman	 v.	 Shaw’s	 Supermarkets,	 Inc.,	 2017	 ME	 41,	 ¶ 6,	 157	 A.3d	 223	

(alterations	and	quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶9]		“Title	4	M.R.S.	§	57	authorizes,	but	does	not	require,	us	to	consider	

a	 certified	 question	 of	 state	 law	 posed	 by	 a	 federal	 court	 in	 certain	

circumstances.”		Id. ¶ 7	(quotation	marks	omitted).		We may	consider	the	merits	

of	a	certified	question	when	three	criteria	are	met:	“(1) there	is	no	dispute	as	to	

the	 material	 facts	 at	 issue;	 (2)	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 controlling	 precedent;	 and	

(3) our	answer,	in	at	least	one	alternative,	would	be	determinative	of	the	case.”		

Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).	

[¶10]		In	 this	case,	all	 three	 requirements	are	met.		First,	 the	question	

presented	 is	 a	 purely	 legal	 one,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 District	 Court	 for	 the	

Western	District	of	Washington,	 the	court	 from	which	 this certified	question	

has	 been	 submitted,	has	issued	an	 order	granting,	in	part,	 FDIC’s motion	 for	

summary	 judgment	 and	 presenting	 the	 facts	 upon	 which	 it	 reached	 its	

judgment;	therefore,	no	dispute	as	to	the	material	facts	is	at	issue.		Second,	there	

is	no	clear	controlling	precedent.		The	district	court	noted	that	“[n]either	party	
7

provides,	and	the	[c]ourt	has	not	found,	any	case	law	or	other	Maine	authority	

interpreting	 a	 deed	 such	 as	 this,	 where	 the	 document	 is	 entitled	 ‘Warranty	

Deed’	but	contains	neither	an	express	warranty	nor	the	short	form	‘warranty	

covenants’	 language.”	 	 Our	 search	 for	 controlling	 precedent	 has	 similarly	

yielded	no	results.		Finally,	Kneizys’s	claim	for	breach	of	warranty	relies	on	our

answer	to	the	certified	question.		If	we find	that	no	warranties	are	implied	by	

the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “Warranty	 Deed”	 then	 Kneizys’s	 claim	 for	 breach	 of	

warranty	necessarily	fails.		Therefore,	in	at	least	one	alternative,	our answer	to	

the	certified	question	would	be	determinative	of	 the	case.		Because	all	 three	

criteria	are	met,	we will address	the	merits	of	the	certified	question.

B. Standard	of	Review

[¶11]		“We	review	questions	of	law,	including	those	certified	to	us	by	the	

federal	court,	de	novo.”		Bankr.	Est.	of	Everest	v.	Bank	of	Am.,	N.A.,	2015	ME	19,	

¶ 16,	 111	 A.3d	 655.	 	 Statutory	 interpretation	 and	 deed	 construction	 are	

questions	of	law	that we therefore	review	de	novo.		Tarason	v.	Wesson	Realty,	

LLC,	2012	ME	47,	¶¶ 11,	18,	40	A.3d	1005.	

C. Analysis

[¶12]	 	 The	 certified	 question asks	 “whether,	 under	 Maine	 law,	 any	

warranty	 is	 implied	 by	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘Warranty	 Deed’ to	 describe	 an	
8

instrument	which	‘grants . . . real	property	with	the	building	and	improvements	

thereon . . . being	the	same	premises	conveyed	to	GRANTOR’ . . . by	prior	deed.”5		

Put	 more	 broadly,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 title	 “Warranty	 Deed”	 is	

sufficient	by	itself	to	convey	real	property	with	any	warranty	covenants	when	

the	body	of	the	deed	does	not	include	any	warranty-covenant	language,	either	

in	full	form	or	in	abbreviated	form	as	permitted	by	the	Short	Form	Deeds	Act,	

33	M.R.S.	 §§	 761-775	 (2022).	 	In	 the	 present	 case,	 the	 deed	in	 question,	 the	

WaMu-Earle	Deed,	is	titled	“Warranty	Deed,”	but	there	is	no	warranty-covenant	

language	anywhere	in	the	instrument.		Kneizys	contends	that, under	the	Short	

Form	Deeds	Act,	a	deed	need	not	contain	warranty-covenant	language	in	the	

body	of	the	instrument; rather, simply	titling	the	instrument “Warranty	Deed”	

is	itself	sufficient	for	the deed	to	include warranty	covenants.		

[¶13]		We	have said	that	“the	cardinal	rule	of	statutory	interpretation	is	

to	give	effect	to	the	intention	of	the	Legislature.”		Cobb	v.	Bd.	of	Counseling	Pros.	

Licensure,	2006	ME	48,	¶ 11,	896	A.2d	271.		Legislative	intent	is	discerned	“from	

the	plain	meaning	of	the	statute	and	the	context	of	the	statutory	scheme.”		Id.		

“All	words	in	a statute	are	to	be	given	meaning,	and	none	are	to	be	treated	as	

5 The	language	 quoted	in	 the	 certified	 question	is	 taken	 from	 the	 property	 description	in	 the	

WaMu-Earle	Deed.		The	property	description	of	a	deed	must	be	completed	by	the	contracting	parties	

and	is	not	part	of	the	form	language.		See 33	M.R.S.	§	775	(2022).
9

surplusage	if	they	can	be	reasonably	construed.”		Id.		“If	the	statute’s	meaning	

is	unambiguous,	and	not	illogical	or	absurd,	that	meaning	controls,	and	we	do	

not	look	beyond	its	words.”		Bank	of	Am.,	N.A.	v.	Cloutier,	2013	ME	17,	¶ 12,	61	

A.3d	1242.		

[¶14]		Moreover,	“[s]tatutes	in	derogation	of	the	common	law are	to	be	

strictly	 construed,	 and	 the	 Legislature	 will	 not	 be	 presumed	 to	 intend	 any	

innovation	 upon	 the	 common	 law	 further	 than	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 case	

requires.”		Emery	Waterhouse	Co.	v.	Lea,	467	A.2d	986,	996	(Me.	1983).		“It	is	a	

well-settled	rule	in the	construction	of	statutes	that	legislative	enactments	will	

be	construed	to	alter	the	common	law	only	to	the	extent	that	the	Legislature	

has	made	that	purpose	clear.”		Id.

[¶15]		According	to	the	rules	for	the	construction	of	statutes,	“Abstracts	

of	Titles,	chapters	and	sections,	and	notes	are	not	legal	provisions.”		1	M.R.S.	

§ 71(10)	(2022);	see	also	Grant	v.	Town	of	Belgrade,	2019	ME	160,	¶ 19	n.3,	221	

A.3d	112	(“[W]e	endeavor	not	to	rely	on	the	titles	of	statutory	enactments	in	

plumbing	 their	 meaning at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 text	 itself.”	 (alteration	 and	

quotation	marks	omitted)).

[¶16]	 	 The	 Short	 Form	 Deeds	 Act,	 33	 M.R.S.	 §§	 761-775, was	 enacted	

“[f]or	the	purpose	of	avoiding	the	unnecessary	use	of	words	in	deeds	or	other	
10

instruments	relating	to	real	estate,” 33	M.R.S.	§	762.		Notably,	the	Act provides

statutory	 requirements	 for	 how a short-form	 warranty	 deed	 that does not	

contain	full	warranty-covenant	language	must be	constructed.		Id.	§§ 763,	764,	

775.	 	Accordingly,	in	answering	 the	 certified	 question,	we look	 to	 the Act to	

determine	 whether	 covenants	 are	 implied	 in	 the	 title	 “Warranty	 Deed,”	 or	

whether	express	warranty-covenant	language	is	required.		

[¶17]		Sections	763	through	774	provide	rules	and	definitions	that	“apply	

to	all	[deeds	or	other] instruments	executed	or	delivered	on	or	after	January	1,	

1968.”		Id.	§ 762.		Section	775	provides	an	appendix	of	“[s]tatutory	short	forms	

of	instruments	relating	to	real	estate.”		Id. §	775.		Although	these	forms	“may	be	

used	and	shall	be	sufficient	 for	 their	respective	purposes,”	 they	may	also	“be	

altered	as	circumstances	require,	and	the	authorization	of	such	forms	shall	not	

prevent	the	use	of	other	forms.”		Id. § 761.		Of	particular	relevance	in	the	present	

case	are	the	definitions	of	the	terms	“warranty	deed,” id. § 763, and	“warranty	

covenants,” id § 764, and	 the	 specific	 language	 of	 the	 Warranty	 Deed	 form	

included	in	section	775.		A	“warranty	deed”	is	defined	under	the	Act as follows:

A	 deed	 in	 substance	 following	 the	 form	 entitled	“Warranty	

Deed” shall	when	duly	executed	have	the	force	and	effect	of	a	deed	

in	fee	simple	to	the	grantee,	his	heirs	and	assigns,	his	and	their	use	

and	behoof	forever,	with	covenants	on	the	part	of	the	grantor,	for	

himself,	with	the	grantee,	his	heirs	and	assigns,	that,	at	the	time	of	

the	 delivery	 of	 such	 deed,	 he	 was	 lawfully	 seized	 in	 fee	 of	 the	
11

premises,	that	they	were	free	of	all	encumbrances,	that	he	had	good	

right	to	sell	and	convey	the	same	to	the	grantee	to	hold	as	aforesaid,	

and	 that	 he	 and	 his	 heirs	 shall	 and	 will	 warrant	 and	 defend	 the	

same	 to	 the	 grantee,	 his	 heirs	 and	 assigns	 forever,	 against	 the	

lawful	claims	and	demands	of	all	persons.		

Id. §	763 (emphasis	added).		

[¶18]		“Warranty	covenants”	are	defined	under	the	Act	as	follows:

In	 a	 conveyance	 of	 real	 estate	 the	 words	 “warranty	

covenants” shall	 have	 the	 full	 force,	 meaning	 and	 effect	 of	 the	

following	words:	“The	grantor	covenants	with	the	said	grantee,	his	

heirs	and	assigns	that	he	is	lawfully	seized	in	fee	of	the	premises,	

that	they	are	free	of	all	encumbrances,	that	he	had	good	right	to	sell	

and	convey	the	same	to	the	said	grantee	to	hold	as	aforesaid,	and	

that	he	and	his	heirs	shall	and	will	warrant	and	defend	the	same	to	

the	said	grantee,	his	heirs	and	assigns	 forever,	against	 the	lawful	

claims	and	demands	of	all	persons.”

Id. §	764.		

[¶19]		The	Warranty	Deed	form	incorporated	in	section	775	reads:

1		Warranty	Deed

A.B.	of	. . . . . . . . . . . . ,	. . . . . . . . . . . .	County,	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,	

(being	 unmarried),	 for	 consideration	 paid,	 grant	 to	 C.D.	

of . . . . . . . . . . . . ,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	. County,	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,	with	

Warranty	Covenants,	. . . . . . . . . . . .	the	land	in	. . . . . . . . . . . . ,	. . . . . . . . . . . .	

County,	Maine.

(description	and	encumbrances,	if	any)

E.F.,	spouse	of	the	grantor,	releases	all	rights	in	the	premises	

being	conveyed.

Witness	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	hand	and	seal	this	. . . . . . . . . . . .	

day	of	. . . . . . . . . . . .	(here	add acknowledgment)
12

Id. §	775.

[¶20]		Reading	sections	763	and	764 together with	the	Warranty	Deed	

form, “[a]	deed	in	substance	following	the	form	entitled	‘Warranty	Deed’	when	

executed	has	the	force	and	effect	of	a	deed	in	fee	simple	to	the	grantee,	and	with	

the	inclusion	of	the	words	‘with	warranty	covenants’	has	the	same	effect	as	the	

long	 form	 warranty	 deed.”	 	 Cowan	 &	 Scannell,	 Maine	 Real	 Estate	 Law	 and	

Practice §	1:4	at	6	(2d	ed.	2007)	(emphasis	added);	see	33	M.R.S.	§§	763,	764,	

775.		

[¶21]		Giving	plain	meaning	to	the	words	of	the	Short	Form	Deeds	Act,

when	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the whole statutory	 scheme,	 and	 giving	

meaning	to	all	words,	treating	none	as	surplusage,	it	is	clear that	the	intent	of	

the	Legislature	in	passing	the	Act	was	simply	to	make	the	process	of	drafting

deeds easier and to	make	deeds more	concise.		See	Cobb,	2006	ME	48,	¶	11,	896	

A.2d	 271;	 33	 M.R.S.	 § 762.	 	 The	 Legislature	 established	 a	 process	 by	 which	

parties	could	include	warranties	in	a	deed	without	using the	lengthy	recitation	

of	 each warranty	 covenant.	 	 See 33	 M.R.S.	 §	 764.	 	 Comparing	 a long	 form	

warranty	deed,	see Cowan	&	Scannell,	Maine	Real	Estate	Law	and	Practice §	1:3	

at	 4-5	 (2d	 ed.	 2007),	 with	 the	 short	 form	 warranty	 deed	 provided	 in	

section 775,	 the	 Legislature	 kept	 the	 same	deed	 structure	 but	 simplified	 the	
13

language,	condensing	paragraphs	of	complicated	language	into	short	defined	

phrases, see 33	M.R.S.	§§ 763,	764,	775.	

[¶22]		Although	the	Act states	that	the	short	form	deeds	“may	be	altered	

as	circumstances	require,”	id. §	761,	it	would	be	a	leap	to	suggest	that	using	only	

the	title	of	one	of	the	short	form	deeds	would	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	statutory	

requirements.		The	statute	requires	deeds	“in	substance	[to]	follow[] the	form,”

not	just the	title	of	the	form.		See id. §	763.		As	the	statutory	construction	statute	

makes	clear,	 “Abstracts	 of	Titles [and] chapters	and	 sections . . . are	not	legal	

provisions,”	and	we	will	not	rely	on	them	for	their	meaning.		1	M.R.S.	§	71(10);	

see	also Grant,	2019	ME	160,	¶ 19	n.3,	221	A.3d	112.		

[¶23]	 	 In	 sum,	 if the	 Legislature	 had	 intended	 that	 use	 of	 the	 title	

“Warranty	Deed”	alone	would	be	sufficient	to	imply	warranties,	the	definition	

of “warranty	 covenants” and	 the	 forms	 provided	 in	 section	 775	 would	 be	

surplusage.	 	 Our	 rules	 of	 statutory	 interpretation	 do	 not	 support	 this	

conclusion.	 	 Therefore,	we answer	 the	 certified	 question	in	 the	 negative:	 no	

warranty	is	implied	by	the	use	of	the	title “Warranty	Deed.”

The	entry	is:

We	answer	the certified	question	as	follows:	“No	

warranty	 is	 implied	 by	 the	 use	 of the	 term	

‘Warranty	 Deed’	 to	 describe	 an	 instrument	

which	 ‘grants . . . real	 property	 with	 the	
14

buildings	 and	 improvements	 thereon . . . being	

the	same	premises	conveyed	to	GRANTOR’ . . . by	

prior	deed.”

Steven	Kneizys,	appellant	pro	se

John	G.	Osborn,	Assist. U.S.	Atty.,	Portland,	and	John	W.	Guarisco,	Esq.,	Federal	

Deposit	 Insurance	 Corp.,	 Arlington, Virginia,	 for	 appellee	 Federal	 Deposit	

Insurance	Corporation

Casey	M.	Olesen,	Esq.,	Eaton	Peabody,	Bangor,	for	amicus	curiae	Real	Estate	&	

Title	Section	of	the	Maine	State	Bar	Association

United	States District	Court	for	the	Western	District	of	Washington	case number	2:20-cv-01402-RSL

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY