1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s 

### WALLA CE v . KATO ET AL



### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVE NT H CIRCUIT No. 05–1 24 0. Ar g u ed November6, 2006—D ec ided Febr u a r y21, 2007

InJan u a r y1994, Ch ic ag o polic e ar r e sted petition er , a min o r , formur der. He wa s t r ied a n d convict e d, b u tt h e cha rges wer e ult i mat e ly dr opped inAp r il 2002. InApr il 2003, h e filed th is su it u n d er42 U. S. C. §1983 ag ain s t th e c i tyan d sev e r a l of its offic e r s , seekin g damages for, inter alia, his unla w ful a rre s tin viola t i on of t h e Fourt h Amendment

. The Dis t rictCourtgra n t e d res p onden t s s u mma r y j u dgment , a n d t h e S e vent h Circuita ffir m ed, ruling t h a tt h e §1 98 3 s u itwas time b a rred b e ca u s e petit i oner’s ca us e of a c t i on a ccrued a t t h e t i me of his a rres t , notw h e n his co nvict i on wa s la t e r s e ta s ide. Held: Th e stat u t e of limi tat i o n s u p ona §1 983 c l aim see k in gdamag e s

for a false arrest in violatio nof theFourth Amendment, wherethe a rres tis followed b ycrimin a l proceedings , b e gins t oru n a tt h e t i me th e c l aiman tb e c o mes detain e d pu r s u a n tto leg a l pr oc ess. Pp. 2–12.

(a) Th e statu t e of limita t ion s ina §1983 s u it is th at pr ov ided byth e State for personal-injury torts, e.g. , O wen sv. Ok ure , 488 U. S. 2 35, 249 –2 50; here, two years under Illinoi s la w. For false i m prisonment an d its su bspe c i es false ar r e st, “[t]h e. . . cause[s] of action provid[ing] th e c l osest an alogyto c l aim s of th e ty pe c o n s ider ed h e r e ,” Heckv. Humphrey , 512 U. S. 4 77, 4 84, th e st atu t eof li mit atio n s begi n s to run whent h ea lleged fa ls e impris onment ends , s e e, e. g
. , 4 Restate

men t(Sec on d) of Tor t s §899, Commen t c, th at is, inth e pr esen t c o n t e xt , when t h e vict im b e comes held purs ua ntt o lega l proces s , s e e, e.g ., He ck , supr a, at 484. Th u s , petition er ’s false imp r ison men tdid notend, a s he cont ends , w h e nhewa s relea s ed from cus t o dy a f t e r t h e Sta t e dr opped th e ch ar g e s a g ain s t h i m, bu t r ath erwh en h e appear ed befor e th e ex amin in gmag i st r ate an d w a s bou n dov erfor tr ial. Sin c e2 WALLACE v. KATO Sy llabu s more than two years elapsed betwee n that date and the filing of this s u it—even leav ing o u tof t h e cou n tt h e pe riod b e fore herea ched his major i ty—th e ac tionw a s tim ebar r e d. Pp. 2–7.

(b) Petitioner’s contention th at Heck compels t h e concl us ion t h at his s u itcould nota ccr ue un t il t h e S t at e dropped it s cha rges a g a i ns t him is rej e ct ed. The HeckCourtheld t h a t“in order t o recover da m a g es for a llegedly unco ns t i t u t i ona lconvict i on or impris onment , or for ot her ha rm c a us ed b ya c tions who s e un la wfulnes s would render a c o n v ic tion or sen t en c e in v a l i d, a §1983 pl ain t iff mu st p r ov e th at th e convict i on o r s e nt ence ha s b e en [s eta s ide]. A cla i m for da ma ges bear in gth at r e lation sh ip t o a c o nv ic tionorsen t enc e th at h a s not beenso in v a li dated i s n o t c o g n izable u n d er§1983.” 5 12 U. S., a t 486–4 87. Ev enassu min gth at th e Heck deferred-a c c rua l rule would be ap pliedto th e d ate pe t i tion erw a s fi r s t h e ld pu r s u a n tto leg a l proces s , t h erewa s in exis t e nce a tt h a ttime no crimina l convict i on th at th e c a u s e of ac tionw o uld impu g n . Wh at petit i on erseeks is th e adoptionof a pr in c i ple g o ingw e ll bey o n d Heck :th at an ac tionw h i ch would impugn an anticipate dfutu re co nvi c tion c a nn ot be br ou gh t u n t il t h a tconvic t i on occu rs a n d is s e ta s ide. The impra c t i c a lit y of s uch a speculative rule is obvious

.

The fact that §1983 action s some time s accrue before the setting aside of—inde ed, even before the ex istence of—the rela ted criminal c o n v ic tion r a ises th e qu estio nw h e th er , assu min gth e H eck bartakes effect when the la ter convict i on is o b t a ine d , the s tatute of lim ita t ions on the once valid cause of action is tolledas long as the Heck barsu b

sists. However, this Court genera lly refersto state-l aw tolling rules, e.g
. , Hardinv. Straub , 490 U. S. 536, 53 8–53 9, an d is u n aw ar e of Il

linois cases p r oviding tolling in e v en re motely comparable circum

stances. More over, a federal tollin g ruleto this effect wo uld create a jurisprudential limbo in which it would not be known whether tolling is a ppr opr i ate byr e asonof th e Heckbar u n t il it is e s t abli s h e d th a t t h e newly ent e red convict i o nwould b e impugned b yt h e not

- yet -filed, an d th u s u tter l yin deter m in ate, §198 3 c l ai m. Pp. 7–12. 440 F. 3d 42 1, affir m ed.

S CALIA , J ., delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in which R OBERTS , C. J., and K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , and ALITO , JJ., join ed. S TEVENS , J., filed a nopinion concu rrin gin t h e j u dgment , in which S OU TER , J., joined. B REYER , J., filed a dissentin g opinion, in which G IN SB U R G , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 24 0


### ANDRE WALLA CE, P E TITION E R v. KRIS T E N KAT O ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Febr u a r y21, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### delivered the opini o n of the Co urt. Petitioner filed suit un der Re v. Stat. §1979, 4 2 U. S. C. §1983, seeking dama ges for an arrest that violated t h e Fourth Am endment. We decide whether his suit is timely. I On January 17, 1994, John Handy was shot to death in the city of Chicago. Sometime around 8 p

. m. two da ys later, Chicago police officers loc a ted petitioner, then 15 years of age, and tran s ported him to a police station for questioning

. Af ter in terrogation s that last ed into th e early morning hours the next day, petitioner agreed to confess to Handy ’ s murder. Anassistant state’s attorney prepared a statement to this effect, and petitioner signed it, at the same time waiving his Miranda righ t s . Prior to tri al in the Circuit Cour tof Cook County, peti

tioner unsuccessfully attemptedto suppress his station house statements as th e product of an unlawfu l arrest. He was convic t e d of first-d e gree murd er and sent enced to 26 years in prison. On direct appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois h e l dthat officers had arrested petitioner without probable cause, in viol ation of the Fourth Amendment.2 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### People v. Wallace , 299 Ill. App. 3d 9, 17–18, 701 N. E. 2 d 87, 94 (1998). Accordi n g to th a tcourt (whose determina

tion we are not review ing here), even assuming petitioner willingly accompanied police to th e station, his presence there “escalated to aninvoluntary seizure prior to his formal arrest.” Id., at18, 701 N. E. 2d, at 9 4

. After an

other round of appeals, the Appellate Court c o ncluded on August 31, 2001, tha tthe effect of petitio n er’s illegal arrest had not been s u fficiently attenuated to render his statements admissible, see Brownv. Illinois , 4 22 U. S. 590 (1975), and remanded for a new trial. Judgt. order re ported sub nom. People v. Walla ce , 324 Ill. App. 3d 1139, 805 N. E. 2d 756 (200 1). On April 10, 2002 , prosecutors dropped the charges against petitioner. On April 2, 2003, petitioner filed this §1983 s u it against the city of Chicago and several Chicago police off i cers, seeking damages arising from, inter ali a , his unlawful arrest. 1 

### The District Co urt gran tedsummary judgment to respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Accordin g to the Seve nth Circuit, petitioner’s §1983 suit was time barred because his cause of action accrued atthe time of his arrest, and not when his conv iction was later set aside. Walla cev. Chica go , 440 F. 3d 421, 427 (2006). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. ___ (2006). II Section 198 3 provides a federal cause of action, but in several respects relevant here federal law looks to the la w of the State in which the cause of action arose. This is so for the length of the statute of limitations: It i s that which the State provides for personal-injury torts. O wens v. Okure , 488 U. S. 235, 249–250 ( 1989); Wilsonv. Garci a ,

——————

1 All of petition er ’s oth e rstate an d feder al c l aims w e r e r e solv ed ad

versely to him and are not before us. We expressly limited our grant of cert iora ri t o the Fourt h Amendmentfa ls e-a rres tcla i m. S e e 5 4 7 U. S. ___ (2006). The city of Chi c ago is nolonger a party to this suit.3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 471 U. S. 2 61, 279–280 (1985). The parties agree that under Illin ois law, this period is two years. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 7 35, §5/13–202 (West 2003). Thus, if the statute on petitioner’s cause of action began to run at the time of his unlawful arrest, or even at the time he was ordered held by a magistrate, his §1983 suit was pl ainly dilatory, even according him tolling for t h e two-plus years of h i s minority, see §5/13–21 1. But if, as the dissenting judge argued below, the commencement date for running of the statute is governed by this Court’s decision in Heckv. Humphr ey , 512 U. S. 477 (1994), that da te maybe the date on which petitioner’s conviction was vacated, in which case the §1983 s u it would have been ti mely filed. While we have never stated so expressly, the accrual date of a §1 983 cause of action is aquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law. The parties agree, the Seventh Ci rcuit in thi s case so held, see 440 F. 3d, at 4 24, and we are awa r e of no federal court o f appeals hol d ing to the contrary. Aspects of §1983 which are not gov e rned by reference to state law a r e governed b y federal rules conforming in general to com m on-law tort principles. See Heck, s u pra , at 48 3; Careyv. Piphus , 435 U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978). Under those principles, it is “the standa r d rule tha t[accrual oc curs] when the plaintiff has ‘a com p lete and present cause of action.’ ” Ba y Area Laundry an d Dry Cleaning Pen s io n Tru s t Fu nd v. F erba r Corp. of Ca l. , 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1 997) (quoti ng Rawlin gs v. Ray , 312 U. S. 96, 98 (1941)), that is, when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtai nrelief,” Bay Area Laundry, supra , at 201. There can be n o dispute th at petitioner could have filed suit a s soon as the alleged l y wrongfu l arrest oc

curred, subjecting him to the har m of involu ntary deten

tion, so the statute of limitations would normally com

mence to run from that date. There is, however, a refinement to be consider ed, arising from the common law’s distinctive treatment of the torts of4 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### false arrest and false i m prisonment, “[t]he .

. . cause[s] of action [that] provid[e] the closest analogy to cl aims of the type considered here,” Heck, su pra , a t484

. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Torts §47, p. 88 (2 001). Fals e arrest and false impris onment ove r lap; the fo rmer is a s p ecies of th e latter. “Ev e ry confinement of the person is an imprison

ment, whether it be i na common prison or in a priva t e house, or inthe stock s , or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets; and when a man is lawfull yin a hous e, it is impris onment to prevent him from leaving the room in which he is.” M. Newell, Law of Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment, and Abuse of Legal Process §2, p. 5 7 (1892) (footnotes omi tted). See also 7 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American La w of Torts §27:2, pp. 940– 942 (1990). We sh all thus refer to the two torts together as false i m prisonment. That tort provides the pro p er analogy to the cause of action asserted against the present respondents for the f o l l owing reason: The sort of unlawf u l detention remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without le ga l proces s , see, e.g. , W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §1 1, p. 54, §1 19, pp. 885–886 (5th ed. 1984); 7 Speiser, supra , §27:2, at 943–944, and the allegation s before us a r ise from responde nts’ detention of petitioner without lega l proc essin January 1994. They did not ha ve a warrant f o r his arrest. The running of the statute of limitations on false im

prisonment is subject to a di stinctive rule—dictated, pe r haps, by the reality th at the victim may not be abl e to s u e while he is still imprisoned: “Limitations begin to ru n against an action for false impris onment when the alleg e d false impri s onment en ds.” 2 H. Wood, Limi tation of Ac

tions §187d (4), p. 878 ( 4 th rev. ed. 1916); s e e also 4 Re

statement (Second) of Torts §899, Comment c(1977); A. Underhill, Principles of Law of Torts 202 (1881). Thus, to determine the beginni ng of the limitations period in this5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### case, we must determine when petitioner’s false impris

onment came to an en d. Reflective of the fact th at fa lse imp r isonment consists of detention without legal process, a false impris onment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to su ch proc ess — when, for example, he is b o und over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges. Dobbs, supra , §39, at 74, n. 2; Keeton, supra , §119, at888; H. Stephen, Actions for Ma l i

cious Prosecution 120–123 (1888). Thereafter, unlawful detention forms part of the damages for the “entirely distinct” tort of malic ious prosecution, whic h remedies detention a ccompanied, not by ab sence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process. 2 

### Keeton, supra , §119 , at 885–886; see 1 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, La w of Torts §3. 9 , p. 3:36 ( 3 d ed. 1996); 7 Speiser , supra , §27:2, at 943–945. “If there is a false arrest clai m, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until issua n ce of process or arraignment, but not more. From that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a malicious p r osecution claim and on the wrong

ful use of judicial process rather than detention itself. ” Keeton, sup ra , §119, at 888; see als o Heck , sup ra, at 484; 8 Speiser, su pra , §28:15, at 80. Thu s , petitioner’s contention

——————

2 We have ne ve r explored t h econt ours of a Fourt h Amen d mentma li

cious

- pros ecut ion s u itunder §1 9 8 3 , s e e Alb r igh tv. Ol iver , 510 U. S

. 266, 27 0– 27 1, 275 (1 99 4) (plu r a lityopin ion) , an d w e do n o t do so h e r e . S ee genera lly 1 M. S chwa rt z, S e ct ion 19 83 Lit i ga t i on §3 .1 8 [ C], pp. 3– 605 to 3– 629 ( 4thed. 2 0 0 4) (n otin ga r a n g e of appr oac h e s inth e low e r court s )

. As s u ming wit h outdecidi ng t h a ts uch acla i m is cognizab l e u n d er§1983, petition erh a s n o t ma de on e. Petit ion e rdid n o t in c l u d e s uch acla i m in his complaint

. He in fa ct ab a n doned a s t at e-la w ma li

c i ou s-pr osec u t ionc l aim inth e D i str i c tCou r t , an d stated, in h i s opposi

tionto r e spon den t s’ fir s t mo tionforsu mm ar yju dg men t , th at “Pla in tif f does n o t seek to r a ise .

. . a malic iou s pr os ec u t ionc l aim u n d er§1983,” Record, Do c. 1 7 , p. 3 , n. 5

. In t h is Court , he ha s t o ld us t h a tres p on den t s ar e “mi s takeninc h a r a c t er izin gpetition er ’s c a u s e of ac tiona s involving‘u nw a rra nt ed pros ecut ion.’ ” ReplyBr ief 12.6 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that his fal s e imprison ment endedupon hi s r e lease from custody, after the State dropped the charges against him, must be rej e cted. It ended much earlier, when legal proc

ess was initiated against him, and the statute would have begun to run from that date, but for its tolling by reason of petitioner’s minority. 3 

### Petitioner asserts that the date of his release from custody mu st be the relevant date in the circ umstances of the present suit, sincehe is s eek i n g damage s up to that time. The theory of his compl a int is tha tthe initi a l Fourth Am endment vi olation set the wheels in motion for his subseq uent conviction and detention: The unlawful arrest led t o the coerced confession, which w a s introduc e d at his trial, producing h i s conviction and incarceration. As we have ju st explained, at comm on law da mages for de

tention after issuance of process or arraignm ent would be attributable to a tort o t her than the unlawful arrest al

leged in petitioner’s complaint—and probably a tort chargeable to defendants other than the respondents here. Even assuming, however, that all damages for detention pursuant to legal process could be regarded as consequen tial damages attributable to the unlawful arrest, th at would not a l ter the co mmencement date for the statute of limitations. “Under th e traditional rule of acc r ual .

. . the tort cause of action ac c r ues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omissio n results in damages. The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not the nk n own or

——————

3 Th is is n o t to say , of c o u r s e, th at petition e rc o u l d n o t h av e filed su it immediately u p on his false arrest. While the statute of limitations did notb e gin t o run u n t il pet i t i oner b e ca me det a ined purs ua ntt o lega l process, he was injured and suffer ed damages at the moment of his ar r e st, an d w a s en titled to b r in gsu it at th at ti me. See Adle r v. Be v e r ly Hills Ho spital , 594 S. W. 2d 153, 156 (Te x . Civ

. App. 1 980) (“We m a y c o n c e de th at a per s onfalselyimpr ison ed h a s th e r i gh t to su e on the firs tda y for hi s det e nt ion” ).7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### predictable.” 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §7.4.1, pp. 526–527 (1991) (footnotes omi tted); see also 54 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions §112, p. 15 0 (2005). Were it oth e r wise, the statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff became sati sfied that h e had been harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose i nthe sol e hands of the party seeki n g relief. We conclude that th e statute of limitation s on peti

tioner’s §1983 claim commenced to run whenhe appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over fo r trial. Since more than two years elapsed between that date and the filing of this suit—even leavin g out of the count the period before hereached his majority—the action was t i me barred. III This would end the matter, we re it not for petitioner’s contention that H eckv. Humph r ey, 512 U. S., at 477, compels the conclusion that his suit could not accrue until the Sta t e dropped its charges a g ainst him. In H eck , a state prisoner filed suit under §1983 raising cl aims which, if true, would have es tablished the invalidit y of his ou t

standing co nviction. We analogi z ed his sui tto one for malicious p r osecution, an elementof which is the favor

able termin ation of criminal proceedings. Id. , at 484. We said: “[I]n order to recover dama ges for allegedly unconsti

tutional conviction or imprisonment, or for ot her harm caused by actions whose unlawfuln ess would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff mus t prove that the conviction or sen t ence has been re

versed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by astate tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas cor p us, 28 U. S. C. §2254. A claim for damages bearing that re

-8 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### lationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under §1983.” Id., at 486–487 (footnote omitted). We rested this conclusion upon “the hoary p r inciple tha t civil tort actions are not appropria t e vehicles for challeng

ing the validity of outs tanding cri minal judg ments.” Id. , at 486. “ ‘Congress,’ ” w e said, “ ‘has determined that ha

beas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attac k ing t h e validity of the factor length of their con

finement, a n d that specific determination must override the general terms of §1983.’ ” Id. , at 482 (quoting Prei se r v. Rodriguez , 411 U. S. 475, 490 (1973)). As the above excerpts show, the Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into pl ay onlywhen there exists “a convic

tion or sentence that has notbeen .

. . invalidated,” that is to say, an“outstandi n g criminal judgment.” It delays what would otherwise be the a ccrual date of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which suc

cess in thattortactionwould imp u gn. We a ssume that, for purposes of the present tort action, the Heck principl e would be applied not to the date of accrual but to the date on which the statute of limitat ions began to run, that is, the date petitioner bec a me held p u rsuant to l e gal process. See supra , at 4–5. Even at that later time, there was in existence no criminal conviction t hat the cau s e of action would impugn; indeed, there may not even h a ve been a n indictment. What petitioner seek s, in other wo rds, is the adoption of a principle that goes well beyond He ck:that an acti on which wou l d impugn an anti ci patedfutu re convic ti on cannot be brought unti lthat convi ction occurs and is set aside. The impracticality of such a rule shouldbe obvious. In an action for false arrest it wo uld require the plainti ff (and if he brings suit prom ptly, the court) to speculate about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### will result in conviction, and whe t her the pending civil action will impugn th at verdict, see Heck , 5 12 U. S., a t 487, n. 7—all this at atime whenit can hardly be known what evide n ce the pro s ecution has in its possession. An d what if the plaintiff (or the court) guesses wrong, and the anticipatedfuture convictionnever occurs, because of acquittal or dismissal? Does that event (instead of the Heck

- r equir e d setting aside of the extantcon viction) t r ig

ger accrual of the cause of action?Or what i f prosecution never occurs—what will the trigger be then? We are not disposed to embrace this bizarre extension of Heck. If a plaintiff files a fals e ar rest claim b e fore he ha s been convic ted (or files any ot her claim relat e d to rulings that will likely be made in a pendi n g or an tici pated crimi

nal trial), it is within the po wer of the district court, and in accord with common practice , to stay the civil action until the criminal caseor the lik el ihood of a c r iminal cas e is ended. See id. , at 48 7–488, n. 8 (noting that “abstention may be an appropriate response t o the parall el state-cou r t proceedings”); Quacken bushv. Alls ta te I n s. Co . , 517 U. S. 706, 730 (1996). If the plaintiff i s ultimatel yconvicted, and if the s t ayed civil suit would impugn tha tconvic tion, Heck will require dismi ssal; other w ise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Edwardsv. Bali

sok , 520 U. S. 641, 649 (1997); Hec k , 512 U. S., at 487. There is, however, one complication that we must ad

dress here. It arises from the fact tha t§1983 actions, unlike the tort of malicious prosecution which He ck took as its model, see id., at 484, sometimes accru e before the setting aside of—indee d, even befo re the existence of—the related criminal conviction. That of course is the case here, and it raises the question whether, a ssuming that the Heck b a r takes effect when the later conviction i s obtained, the statute of limitations on the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the H eck barsub s ists. In th e context of the present case: If petitioner’s conviction on10 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### April 19, 1 996, caused the st atu t e of limitations on his (possibly) impugning but yet- to -be-filed cause of action to be tolled until that conviction was set aside, his filing here would have been timely

. We have generally referred to stat e law for tolling rules, just as we have for th e length of statutes of limitation. Hardinv. St ra ub , 490 U. S. 536, 538–539 (19 89); Board of Regent s of Univ. of Stat e of N. Y. v. Tomani o , 446 U. S. 478, 484–486 (1980). Petitioner has not brought to our attention, nor are we aware of, Illinois cases providin g tolling in even remotely comparable circumstances. (In

deed, petitioner did not even argu e for such tolling bel o w, though he supported its suggestion at oralargument.) Nor would we be inclined to adopt a federal tolling rule to this effect. Under suc ha re gime, it would n o t be know n whether tolling is appropriate by reason of t h e Heck ba r until it is established that the n e wly entered convictio n would be impugned b ythe not-yet-filed, and thus utterly indeterminate, §1983 claim. 4

### It wo uld hardly be desirable to place the questionof tolling vel non in this jurispruden

tial limb o , leaving itto be determined by those later events, and then pronouncing it retroactively. Defendants need to be on notice to pres erve beyond the normal limita

tions periodevidence that will be needed for t h eir defens e; and a statute that becomes re troactively extended, by the action of the plaintiff in crafting a conviction-impugnin g cause of action, is hardl y a statute of repose. 5

——————

4 Ha d pet i t i oner filed s u itupon his a rres ta n d ha d his s u itt h en b e en dismi ssed u n d er Heck , th e statu te of li mit ation s, ab sen ttollin g , w o u l d have ru n b yt h e t i me he obt a i ned revers a lof his convic t i on. If under t h os e circums t a nces he we r e nota llowed t o refile his s u it , Heckwould pr odu c e immu n i tyfr om §1983 li abi lity , a r e su lt su r e lyn o t in ten d ed. Bec a u s e inth e pr esen t c a se petition erdi d n o t file h i s su it w i th inth e limita t i on s period, we need notdecide, ha d he done s o , how muc ht i me he would haveha d t o refile t h e s u itoncet h e Heckb a rwa s removed.

5 J US TI CE S TEVENS r e ac h e s th e same r e su lt byar g u in g th at, u n d er Stonev. Powel l , 428 U. S. 46 5 (19 76), th e Heckb a rca n never come in t o11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### argue s in diss ent that equitable toll ing should apply “so long as the issues that [a §1983] claim would raise are being pursued in state court. ” Post , at 4. We k n ow of no support (nor does the dissent suggest any) for the far-reaching proposition t hat equitable toll ing i s appropriate to avoid the risk of concurrent litigation. As best we ca n tell, the only rationale for suc ha rule is the concern th at “petition e r would h a ve had to divide his attention between criminal and civil cases.” Post , at 1.

—————— playina § 1 9 83 su it seek in gdamag e s fora Fou r t hAm en dmen t v i ola

tion , so th at“ ah abea s r e me dyw a s n e v e r av ailable to [p etition e r] inth e fir s t plac e.” Post , a t3 (opinion con c u rri ng in j u dgme nt). This rea d s Stone to say mor e th anitdoes. Un de r Stone , Fou r t h Amendment violations are gen erallyn o t c o g n izable on feder a l h abea s , bu t th ey are c o g n izable w h e nth e St ate h a s fa iled to pr ov ide th e h abea s pe tition er
“ a nopport unit yfor full a n d fa ir lit igat ion of aFourth Amendmen t c l aim.” 4 28 U

. S., at 4 82. F e der a l h abe as peti tion er s h av esome time s s ucceeded in a r guing t h a t Stone ’s general prohibi t ion does notapp l y. See, e.g. , He rrera v. LeMaster , 225 F. 3d1 1 76, 1 1 7 8( 200 0 ) , aff’d onth is poin t, 301 F. 3d 11 92, 1 195 , n . 4 (CA10 2 002) (enban c ) ; Un itedStates ex re l. Bo stick v. Pet ers , 3 F. 3d 1023, 10 2 9 (CA7 19 93); Agee v. Whit e , 809 F. 2d 1 4 8 7 , 14 90 ( CA1 1 198 7); Doesc her v. Estelle , 666 F. 2d 2 8 5 , 287 (C A5 1 9 8 2 ); Boyd v. Mi ntz , 631 F. 2d 247, 2 50– 25 1 (CA3 1 980); se e also 2 R. Her t z & J. Lie b man , Feder a lHabe as Cor p u s Pr ac tic e a n d Pr oc edu r e §§2 7.1–2 7.3, pp. 137 3– 138 9 (5 t hed. 200 5). At th e time of a Fourt h Amen d mentwron g , a n d a tt h e t i me of conv ict i on, itca n n ot b e known whether a prospective §198 3 pl aint iff will receive a full and fai r opport unit yt o lit igat e his Fourt h Ame ndmentcla i m. Itt hus remains th e c a se th at a c o n f lic t w i thth e feder al h abea s s tatu te is pos s ib le, th a t aFourt h Amendmentcla i m ca n neces s a rily imply t h e inva lidit y of a c o n v ic tion, and th at if it doe s it mu st, u n d er Heck , be dismisse d. Insofar as J US TI CE S TEVENS simplysu g g e sts th a t Heckha s no b e a r ing here b e ca us e petitionerreceived a full and fair opportu n ity to li tigat e h i s Fou r t hA m en dmen t c l aim instate c o u r t , th e ar gumen tis equ a l l y u n t en able. Atth e t i me th at pe tition er bec a me de tai n e d pu r s u a n tto legal process, it was impo ss i b le to predict whet h er t h is would b e t rue. And even a t the pointwhen his limit a t ions period ended, s t at e proceed

ings on his co nvict i on we re ongoing ; f u ll a n d fa ir opport unit yup t o t h at pointwa s not enough

. St oner e qu ir es fu ll an d fair oppor t u n i tyto lit iga t e a Fourt h Amendmen tcla i m “a t t r ia l and on direct revi ew. ” 42 8 U. S., at 494– 495, n

. 37 (emph asis ad ded).12 WALLACE v. KATO Opinion of t h eCourt 

### But when has it been t h e law that a criminal d e fendant, o r a potential criminal defendant, is absolved from all other responsibilities that th e law would otherwise place upon him? If a defendant has a breach-of-contract cl aim against the prime contractor fo r his ne w home, is he entitled to tolling for that as well while his criminal case is pending? Equitable tolling is a r a re remedy to be applied in unusual circumstan c es, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs. Besides its never-heard-of-before quality, the dissent’ s proposal suff ers from a more iron ic flaw. Al

though the dissent cri ticizes us for having to develop a system of stays and dismissals, itshould be obvious tha t the omnibu s tolling s o lution will require the same. De

spite the existence of the new tolling rule, some (if no t most) plain t iffs will nevertheless f ile suit b e fore or durin g state criminal proceedings. How does the di ssent propose to handle such suits? Finally, the dissent’s contention that law enforcement officers woul d prefer th e possibilit y of a later §1983 suit to the more li kely reality of an imme

diate filing, postat 5, i s both implausible andcontradicte d by those who know best. As no fewer than 1 1 States have informed us in this lit igation, “States and municipalities have a stro ng interest in timely notice of alleged miscon

duct by the i r agents.” Brief for State of Illin ois et al. as Amici Curi ae 18. * * * We hold that the sta t ute of limitations upon a §1983 claim seek ing damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Am endment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to r un at the ti me the clai m ant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Since in the present case this occurred (with appropria t e tolling for the plaintiff’s minority) more tha ntwo year s before the complaint was filed, the suit was out of time. The judg

ment of the Court of Appeals is affi rmed. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)
S TEVENS , J ., co ncu rrin gin j u dgment 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 24 0


### ANDRE WALLA CE, P E TITION E R v. KRIS T E N KAT O ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Febr u a r y21, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , wit hwhom J USTICE 

### S OU T E R

### joins, concurring i nthe judgm e nt. While I do not disagree with the Court’s co nclusion, I reach it by a more direct ro ute. The al leged Fourth Amendment violation a tissue inthis case had two distinct consequenc es for petitioner: First, it providedhim with a federal cause of action for damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, and second, it p r ovided him with an obj e ction to th e admissibilit y of certain evidence in his state criminal trial. The crux of petitioner’s argument before this Court is that Heck v. Hu mphrey , 5 12 U. S. 4 77 (1994), provides th e appropriate rule of accrual for his §1983 claim. As both he and the majority note, Heckheld that “in order to recover da ma ges for allegedly unconstitu

tional conviction or imprisonment, or for othe r harm caused by actions whose unlawfuln ess would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff mus t prove that the conviction or sen t ence has been re

versed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by astate tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas cor p us, 28 U. S. C. §2254. .

. . Thus, when a state prisoner seek s damages in a §1983 su it, the district court m u st con

sider whet her a judg ment in favor of the plaintiff2 WALLACE v. KATO
S TEVENS , J ., co ncu rrin gin j u dgment 

### would necessarily imply the inva lidity of hi s convic

tion or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sent ence has already been invali

dated.” Id ., at 486–487 (footnote omitted). Relying on this principle, petiti oner contends that his federal cause of action did not acc r u e until after the crimi

nal charges against him were dropped. Unlike the majority, m yanalysis would not depend on any common-law tort analogies. 1 

### Instead, I would begin where all nine Justices began i n Heck

. That case, we unanimousl yagreed, re quired the Court to reconcile §198 3 with the federal habeas corpus statute. 2 

### Inconcluding that Heck’s damages claim was not cognizable und er §1983, we found that the writ of habeas corpus, and n o t §1983, affor d s the “ ‘app ropriate remedy for state prisoners attac k ing t h e validity of the factor length of their con

-

——————

1 See Heck , 512 U. S., at, 492 (S OUTER , J., co ncu rrin gi nj u dgment) (“ Common-la w t o rtrules ca n provide a‘s t a r t i ng point for t h e inq u ir y u n d er§1983,’ Carey v. Piphus , 435 U. S. 247, 2 58 (1 97 8), bu t . . . [a]t t h e s a me t i me, we havec o ns is t e nt ly refus e d t oa llow common-la w an alogies to d i splac e sta t u t or yan al ysis, declining to import even wellsettle dc o mmo n - lawr u l es into §198 3 ‘if [th estatu te’s] h i stor yorpur pose c o u n s el ag ain s t apply i n g[su c h r u l es] in§1983 ac ti on s.’ Wyatt v. Cole , 504 U. S. 158, 16 4 (199 2)” (br a c k ets i nor igin al)).

2 See id., at 48 0 (“Th is c a se lies at th e in t e r s ec tionof t h e tw o most fert ile s o urces of federa l -courtpris on er lit iga t i on—t he Civil Right s Ac t of 187 1, Rev

. Sta t . §1 979, as amen ded, 42 U. S. C. §198 3, an d t h e feder al h abeas c o r p u s statu te, 28 U. S. C. §225 4”); id., a t491 (S OUTER , J ., con c u rrin g in j u dgment) ( “ The Courtb e gins it s a n a l ys is as I would, byobserv in g th at ‘th i s c a s e lies at th e in ter s ec tionof th e tw o mos t fert ile s o urces of federa l -courtpris on er lit iga t i on—t he Civil Right s Ac t of 187 1, . . . 42 U. S. C. §198 3, an d th e feder a l h abeas c o r p u s statu te, 2 8 U. S. C. §2254 ’ ”); id., at 49 0 (T HOMAS , J ., conc urri ng) (“ The Courta n d J US TI CE S OUTERcorrect ly b e gin t h eir a n a l ys es wit ht h e rea liza t ion t h a t ‘th i s c a se lie s at th e in ter s ec tionof . . . th e Civ il Righ ts Ac t of 187 1, Rev

. Sta t . §19 79, a s amen ded, 4 2 U. S. C §1 983, an d th e feder al 

### habea s c o r p u s statu te , 28 U. S. C. §225 4’ ”).3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)
S TEVENS , J ., co ncu rrin gin j u dgment 

### finement.’ ” Id., at 482 (quoting Preis er v. Rodriguez , 4 11 U. S. 475, 490 (1973))

. Given our holding in Stonev. Powell , 428 U. S. 465, 481–482 (1976), however, that wri t cannot provide a remedy for this p e titioner. And because a habeas remedy was never available to hi m in the first place, Heckcannot postpone the accrual of petitioner’s §1983 Four th Amendment claim. 3

### So while it may well be appropriate to stay th e trial of cl aims of thi s kind until after the completion of state proceedings, see, e.g. , Qua c k

enbushv. Allsta te I n s . Co

. , 517 U. S. 706, 731 (1996); cf. Youngerv. Har r is , 401 U. S. 37 (1971), I am aware of no legal basis for holdin g that the cause of ac tion has not accrued on ce the Fourth Amend m ent violation has been completed. The Court r e grettably l e ts the perfect become the enemy of the good. It eschews my reasoning because “[f]ederal habeas petitioners have sometim e ssucceeded in arguing that St one ’s general prohibition does not apply.” An te , at 11, n. 5 (emphasis added). However, in th e vast run of cases, a State will provide a habeas petitioner with “an opportunity for full an d fair litiga t ion of a Fourth Amen d

ment claim,” Stone , 428 U. S., at 482, and Heckwill not apply. It is always pos s ible to fin daberrant examples in the law, but we should not craft ru les for the needle rather than the haystack in an area like this.

——————

3 See Spenc erv. Kemna , 523 U. S. 1, 21 (19 98) (S OUTER , J., joined by O’Conno r, G IN SB U R G , and B REYER , JJ ., concu rrin g) (con cluding t h a ta plain t iff m a ybr in g§1983 c l aim if h e c o u l d n o t br in gth e same c l ai m u n d erth e h abeas sta t u t e); ibid . (G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urrin g) (“ I have come t o a g reewit hJ US TI CE S OUTER ’s reasoning: Indivi duals without r e c o ur se to th e h abeas st at u t e bec a u s e t h eyar e n o t ‘i nc u s tody ’ . . . fi t wit h in §1 98 3 ’ s ‘b roa drea ch’ ”); id., at 25, n

. 8 (S TEVENS , J., dissenting) (“G iv e nth e C o u r t ’s h o ldin g th atpeti tion erdoes n o t h av e a r e medy under t h e hab e a s s t at ut e, itis perfect l y clea r, a s J US TI CE S OUTE R ex plain s , th at h e maybr in g anac tionu n d er42 U. S. C. §198 3”)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)
B REYER , J., dissenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 24 0


### ANDRE WALLA CE, P E TITION E R v. KRIS T E N KAT O ET AL



### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SEVE NTH CIRCUI T [Febr u a r y21, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### , wi thwhom J UST I C E 

### G INSB URG

### joins, dissenting. I agree with the Court that the accrual dat e of a 42 U. S. C. §19 83 claim is not postponed by the presence of a possible bar to suit under Heckv. Humphr ey , 512 U. S. 477 (1994). I als o agree with the rest of th e Court and with J USTI CE 

### S TE VEN S 

### that had petitioner timely filed his §1983 case, the FederalDistrict Court might have found i t appropriate to stay the trial of his claims until the comple

tion of state proceedings. E.g., Quack e nbushv. Allsta te Ins. Co. , 517 U. S. 706 , 731 (1996). In the absence of a stay, a litigant like petitioner woul d have had to divide his attention between criminal and civil cases with attenda n t risk s of los s of time a n d energy as well as of inconsist e nt findings. The Court’s holding, however, simply leads to the ques

tion of wha tis to happ e n when, for example, the possibil

ity of a H eckproblem prevents th e court fro m considering the merits of a §1983 claim. And I disa gree with the Court’s insi stence upon a rule of law that would require immediate filing, follow e d by an un certain system of stays, dismissals, and possibl e refiling. Ante , at 9– 10, n. 4 (ma

jority opinion); ante , at 3 (S T E VENS 

### , J., concurring i n judgment). I disagree because there is a well-established legal tool better able t o deal with the problems presented2 WALLACE v. KATO
B REYER , J., dissenting 

### by this type of suit. Where a “ p laintiff because of di sability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond hi s control just cannot reasonably be expected to sue in time, ” courts hav e applied a doctrine of “equit able tolling. ” Miller v. R unyon , 77 F. 3d 189, 191 (CA7 1996) (Posner, C. J.). The doctrine tolls the running of th e limitations period until the disabli n g circumstance can be overcome. (This is why the limitations perioddoes not r un against a falsely arrested person until his false impris onment ends. His action has certainly accrued because, as the majority recognizes, he can file his claim i mmediately if he is abl e to do so. Ante , at 4, 6, n. 3.) 7 7 F. 3d, at 191; see al so Cada v. Baxter Heal th care Corp. , 920 F. 2d 446, 450–453 (CA7 1990). In particular, equitable tolling could apply where a §1983 plain t iff reasonably claims that the unl awful behav

ior of which he complains was, or will be, necessary to a criminal conviction. It could toll the running of the limit a tions period: (1) from the time ch arges are b r ought unti l the time they are dismissed or the defendant is acquitted or convicted , and (2) th ereafter du ring anype riod in whic h the criminal defendant challenges a conviction (on direct appeal, on s t ate collateral challenge, or on fed e ral habeas ) and reasonably asserts the behavior underlying the §1983 action as a ground for overturningthe convict i on. I find it diff icult to und erstand wh y the Court rejects t h e use of “equi table tollin g” in regard to typical§1983 plai n tiffs. Ante , at 10. The Court’s alternative—file a ll §198 3 claims (incl u ding potentially Hec k

- barred cl aims) at once and then seek stays o rbe subject to dismissal and refil

ing—suffers serious practical d i sadvantag es. For one thing, thatapproach would force all potential criminal defendants to file allpotential §198 3 actions soon lest they lose those c l aims due to protracted criminal proceedings. For another, it would often requi re a federal court, seeking3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)
B REYER , J., dissenting 

### to determine whether t o dismiss an action as Heckbarre d or to grant a stay, to consideriss u es likely b e ing litigated in the criminal proceeding (Was the Constitution violated? Was the violation-related evidenc e necessary for convic

tion?). The federal court’s de cision as to whether a claim was H eckb a rred (say, whether th e alleged constitutional violation was central to the stat e criminal conviction) might later bind a state court on conviction review. Be

cause of this, even a claim without a lik ely H eckbar might linger on a federal docket bec ause the federal court (or t h e plaintiff who has b een forced to early file) wishes to avoid interfering with any state proceedings and therefore mus t postpone reaching, not only the merits of the §1983 claim, but the threshold Heck inquiry as well. Principles of equitabl e tolling av oid these difficulties. Since equitable tollingobviates the need for immediate filing, it permits the criminal proceedings to winnow th e constitutional wheat from chaff, and thereby increase the likelihood t hat the constitutionally meritless claims will never (in a §1983 action) see the li ght of day. See Allenv. McCurry , 449 U. S. 90 , 95–96 (1980) (federal court gi ves preclusive effect to c o nstituti onal determinations as to issues a l ready litigated in state court). Moreover, an appropriate equitable tolling principle would apply not only to state criminal proceedings as here, but also to state appellate proceedings, state collateral attac k s , and federa l habeas proceedings. Of course, §1983 ordinarily borrows its limitations principles from state l a w. 42 U. S. C. §1988(a). And I do not know whether or which States have comparable equi

table tollin g principle s in place. If a give n state court lacks the n e cessary tolling provision, however, §1983, in my view, p e rmits the federal courts to devis e and impose such principles. See Hardinv. Straub , 490 U. S. 536, 538– 540 (1989) (“[G]aps in federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not inconsistent4 WALLACE v. KATO
B REYER , J., dissenting 

### with federal law” and its “chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformi ty and feder

alism” (footnote omitted)); H eck v. Humph re y , 997 F. 2d 355, 358 (CA7 1993) (Posner, J.) (articulating why federal tolling regi me may ap ply to §198 3 claims), a f f’ don other grounds, 512 U. S., at 489. Cf. Bo ard of Regents of Univ. of St ate of N. Y. v. Tomanio , 446 U. S. 478, 490 (1980). The use of equitable tolling in cases of potential tempo

ral conflict between civil §1983 an d related criminal pro

ceedings is consistent with, ind eed, it would further , §1983’s basic purposes. It would provide for o r derly a d ju

dic a tio n , mi nimize the ris kof in co nsiste nt le g a l dete rmi n a ti o n s , avoid clogging the courts with potentially unneces

sary “protective” filings, and, abo ve all, assu re a plaintiff who possesses a meritorious §1983 claim that his pursuit of criminalremedies designed tofree h i m f r om unlawful confinemen t will not compromise h i s later abil i ty to obtain civil §1983 redress as well. The Court is wrong in concluding that the principle I have described would “place” th e tolling “ question” i n “jurisprude n tial limbo. ” Ante , at 10. Under the approach I propose, supra , at 2, a potential §1983 plain t iff knows h i s claim is bei n g tolled so long as the issues that claim woul d raise are being pursued in state court. Su ch a rule is prophylacti c (it will sometimes tol lclaims th at would not be barred b y Heck), bu t under su ch an appro a ch neither the plaintiff, nor the defendant, nor the federal court need speculate a s to whether the claims are inan y way barre d until the st ate court h a s had the opportunityto consider the claims in the criminal context. A tolling principle certainly seems to me to create greater order than the rule the majority sets o u t, whereb y all criminal defendants must file their §1983 suits imme

diately, some will be stayed, so me dismiss e d, and th en some may be refil e d a n d entitled to tolling, ante , at 10, n. 4. The majority acknowledges that tolling may be5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007)
B REYER , J., dissenting 

### necessary to protect th e plaint iff who previously filed a n d was dismissed. Ibid. Why not simply appl y that tolli ng principle across the board? The majority is also wrong whe nit sugges t s that the proposed equitable tol ling rule would create a significa n t problem of lackof noti ce. Ante , at 12. Beca use the rul e would toll only while the potential §1983 plaintiff is c h a l

lengi n g thealle ged mi scon du ct ina s t a t e co urt, the Sta t e itself woul d have no ti ce of the plai ntiff’s clai ms. Fo r s i mila r reason s, th e po ten tialindivi dua l§1983 de fenda n ts , th e state office rs, wo uld also lik e ly have no ti ce of the cha r ge . Bu t e v en if the y do no t, I belie v e th at man y wo uld p r efe rt o f o rgo i m medi at e n o ti c e , f o r i t c o mes w i tha p ric et ag at

ta che d

—thepri c e consis ts of bei n g i mmedi atel y sued b y the filin g of a§ 1983 la wsui t, ri fe wi th sta y s an d delays , whi c h othe rwise, in the course of time (as claims arewinno we d in st at e c o urt) mightnev e r hav e been filed. The Cou r t ’ s su g g este dl i mita ti ons system, lik e an equita

ble tollin g rule, will produce som einstan ces in whi c h a plain tiff wil lfile a §1983 lawsui t at an ini tia lly un certa i n future da te. Ante, at10, n . 4. An d , u n d erb o th a p pr oac h es , in the man y§1983 s u its tha tdo not involv e a ny Heck ba r, a defen d an t can and will file immedi atel y an d hi s suit wo ul d pro c ee d (fo r the r e is notollin g unl ess the po tential§198 3 plain tiff is assertin g ina convi c tio nchalle nge tha ta co nsti

tu tional vio l ation did i m pu gn his convi c tio n). My pro b le m wi th the Court’s approach lie s in its in sis t ence tha t all pote nti a l pl ainti ffs (in c ludin gtho s e whose s u its ma y be Heckba rre d) file im media t el y—even though their sui t s cannot the n procee d. With t o l l i n g , on ly rar e ly w o u l d a plaintiff ch oose to file a potentially Heck -ba r red §1983 suit while his cr iminal case is pending; and in those cases th e district court could, if i twished, st ay the ac tion, or simply dismiss the suit without prejudic e, secure in the knowl

edge that the suit coul d be timely filed at a la ter date. The Co urt’ s refusal to admit the equitable tolling po ssi

-6 WALLACE v. KATO
B REYER , J., dissenting 

### bility mea n s tha tla rgenumbe rs of defen d an ts will be sue d immedi atel y b y all po tential §1 98 3 plain tiffs wi th a r guab le Heck issues, no matte rho w meritless the claims; these suits m ay be endlessl y sta y e dor dismisse d and then, a t some poi n t in t h e fu tu r e , some defe nda n ts w i ll also be s u ed agai n. With equitable tollin g, ho wever, defe n d an ts will b e suedon ce, i nsui t s wit hco ns tit u ti onal clai ms th atas t at e cou rt has n o t al rea dyf o und meri tl ess, a ta ti me w h en t h e suit can be pro m ptl y litiga t ed. Given the pra c tical diffi c ul

ties o f the Court’ s approach, I wo uld not rule out no w, in advan c e, th e use o f an equitable to lling rule al ong the line s I have described. Because this matter ha s not been fully argue d , I would vacate the Seventh Ci rcuit’s determination and reman d for consideration of t h e issues I here raise. For these reasons, I r e spectfully dissent.