* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R . 47.5, th e court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set fo rth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 6, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________ No. 06-10679 (Sum mary Calendar)

_________________ DELORES LAMBERT, Pl aint iff- Appellant,
versus LINDA S. MCMAHON, Acting COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas (3:04-CV-1235) Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Delores Lambert appeals the district court’s de n ial of her mo tion to mo dify the scheduling order and grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, the Social Security Administration-2-

(“SSA”), on various employment discriminat io n claims under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. Lambert was a Soci al Insurance Specialist in the SSA’s Dallas of fice between 1973 and her term inat io n in 1999. Her employment discrimination claims are based on four allegations: (1) she
was not selected fo r prom otion to nine different vacancies; (2) her supervisors failed to accommodate her seizure disorder; (3) the agency subjected her to a hostile work environment, which exacerbated her depression and other impairment s; and (4) she was unlawfully term inat ed wit hout just cause. The SSA mo ved fo r summary judgment on these claims. Lambert’s attorney apparently then suffered a m ental breakdown. Due to thi s illness, the magistrate judge found “good cause” to grant two separate extensions of time to file a response brief. Aft er Lambert failed to file a timely response after these extensions, her attorney filed a mo tion to file a brief out-of -time, blaming his thir d del ay o n com puter problems. The magistrate again found “excusable neglect” and granted leave to file a response out-of

-time. Lambert’s attorney eventually filed what Lambert claims was a “woefully inadequate” response to the SSA’s motion for summary judgment. Aft er all briefs were in, Lambert mo ved to allo w her attorney to wit hdraw, fo r continuance, and to mo dify the scheduling order so th at new attorney s could brief the summary judgment response. The magistrate judge determ ined th at there was no “excusable neglect” justifying extending the time fo r additional briefing and denied the mo tion. S ee FED . R. C IV . P. 6(b)(2) (“the court fo r cause shown may at any time in it s discretion . . . upon m otion made aft er the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect”). The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA, concluding th at Lambert failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that supports a prima facie case on her claims. Lambert first contends that the district court erred in denying her mo tion for a modification1 Lambert does not argue th at the di strict court abused its discretion in finding no

“excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b). Thus, any such argument is waived. S ee Edw ards v. Johnson , 209 F.3d 772, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000).

2 Lambert’s new counsel did not move for relief from summary judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Neither Lambert’s old nor new counsel moved for an extension of time under Rule 56(f). -3- of the scheduling order so th at her new attorney s could submit additional briefing. She argues that, due to her fir st attorney ’s ment al illness and inadequate response to summary judgment, the district
c ourt shoul d have treated her motion as a request for “extraordinary relief.” S ee FED . R. C IV . P. 60(b)(6). 1 We disagree. Because a motion under Rule 60(b) cannot be filed until a final judgment has been entered, the district court could not have treated Lambert’s request as such a mo tion. S ee FED . R. C IV . P. 60(b)(6) (“On mo tion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party ’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding fo r . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”); McMilla n v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A. , 4 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Ci

r. 1993) (“A Rule 60(b) motion cannot be filed until a final judgment has been entered.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Lambert’s motion to modify the scheduling order. Lambert also claims the district court erred in granting summary judgment, which we review de novo . H

oneywell Intern., Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 415 F.3 d 429, 434 (5th Ci r. 2005). Unfortunately, Lambert’s brief on appeal describes virtually none of the facts invo lved in this case and inst ead provides pages of general, conclusory allegations th at she sati sfied her prima facie burden and th at the SSA’s stated reasons fo r it s actions were pretextual. In fact, Lambert’s appellate brief all but concedes th at summary judgment was properl y granted on the record submit ted to the district court by her former counsel. 2 By failing t o adhere to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A)’s-4-

requirement that an appellant’s brief contain the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons fo r them, wit h cit ations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies,” Lambert has abandoned her contentions. S ee Lee v. Cytec Indus., Inc. , 460 F.3d 673, 679 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2006); Perez v. Barnhart , 415 F.3d 457, 462 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005). The only statem

ent in Lambe rt’s brief t hat could be construed as an argument against summary judgment )) th at the SSA did not show th at accommodation of Lambert’s disabilit y would
cause undue hardshi

p ) ) is unaccompanied by any explanation as to why Lambert is entitled to reasonable accommodation in the fir st place. S ee Chandler v. City of Dallas , 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1993) (requiring, fo r a claim under the Rehabilit ation Act, some evidence that plaintiff was an individual wit h a qualified disabilit y) . Lambert’s appeal is without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.