Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 13, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D20-1649

Lower Tribunal No. 16-20463

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Rafael Antonio Olvera Amezcua,

Appellant,

vs.

Hector Armando Vejar Cortez,

Appellee.

An appeal from a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge.

GrayRobinson, P.A., and Frank A. Shepherd, and Juan C. Martinez, for 

appellant.

Andreu, Palma, Lavin & Solis, PLLC, and Yulexy Solis, for appellee.

Before HENDON, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. 

MILLER, J.
2

Appellant, Rafael Antonio Olvera Amezcua (“Olvera”), challenges a nonfinal

order denying a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, dissolve a temporary injunction

entered in favor of Hector Armando Vejar Cortez (“Vejar”). We have jurisdiction. 

Fla. R. Civ. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). After receiving a formal request for assistance from 

a Mexican tribunal, the lower court recognized and enforced a foreign embargo 

order, prohibiting the alienation of a condominium unit located in Aventura, Florida. 

Olvera sought dismissal or, in the alternative, dissolution of the domestic order. 

Although a hearing was afforded, relief was denied. On appeal, Olvera assigns error 

in the continuation of the injunction in the absence of service of process.1

 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In mid-2014, Vejar deposited the sum of ten million Mexican pesos in Ficrea, 

S.A. & C.V., S.F.D., a banking institution organized and headquartered in Mexico. 

Shortly thereafter, the National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico

(“NBSC”) involuntarily dissolved and liquidated the bank, citing investor fraud.

Vejar filed suit in Mexico against Olvera, Ficrea’s majority shareholder,

seeking to hold him personally liable for the loss of his deposit. The Mexican 

1 We summarily reject the further contention that changed circumstances necessitate 

dissolution. See Tettamanti v. Opcion Sociedad Anonima, 67 So. 3d 356, 357 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2011) (“[A] post-recognition collateral attack on the [decree] ordinarily 

should be directed to the foreign court rather than the Florida court.”).
3

tribunal issued a preliminary embargo, enjoining Olvera from transferring certain 

assets, including a condominium unit located in Aventura, Florida. 

The Attorney General of Mexico issued an arrest warrant for Olvera, and, as 

the warrant remained unserved, the International Criminal Police Organization 

(“Interpol”) published a Red Notice alert. The alert notified cooperating countries 

of the existence of the warrant and sought the apprehension of Olvera.

Seeking assistance in enforcing the embargo in the United States, the Mexican 

court issued a letter rogatory directed to the Clerk of Courts of Miami-Dade County. 

In the document, the Mexican tribunal identified the need to enjoin any transfer of

the Aventura property and termed Olvera a “fugitive of [j]ustice.”

Vejar also filed suit in Miami-Dade County, seeking to effectuate the letter 

rogatory by invoking the ancillary jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of issuing 

a temporary injunction prohibiting the transfer of title of the Aventura condominium. 

After Vejar made several unfruitful attempts to serve Olvera at two separate 

residential locations, including the address identified on the embargo, he discovered 

the condominium was listed for sale. Vejar then sought entry of the injunction 

without notice. 

The lower tribunal scheduled a hearing, and Vejar unsuccessfully attempted 

to provide Olvera notice of the hearing date. Ultimately, the court, issued the 

injunction, and, some four years later, Olvera filed a motion to dismiss the case, or, 
4

alternatively, to dissolve the injunction, citing a failure to effect service of process

and changed circumstances. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief, 

concluding that, absent dissolution of the foreign decree, relief was improvident. 

The instant appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard of review in determining whether a trial court properly refuses 

to dissolve a temporary injunction is abuse of discretion.” Sea Tow Servs. Int’l, Inc. 

v. Pontin, 973 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citations omitted). However,

appurtenant legal matters are reviewed de novo. Price v. Taylor, 298 So. 3d 654, 

656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citation omitted).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The extraterritorial effect of a foreign decree “depends upon what our greatest 

jurists have been content to call ‘the comity of nations.’” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 

113, 163, 16 S. Ct. 139, 143, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895). Comity is meant to solve the 

dilemma that “[n]o law has any effect of its own force, beyond the limits of the 

sovereignty from which its authority derived.” Id. at 163, 16 S. Ct. at 143.

Although comity “has been fertile in suggesting a discretion unregulated by 

general principles,” in Hilton the Supreme Court “articulated clear rules for the 

enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States:”

[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before 

a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular 
5

proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the 

defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an 

impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own 

country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either 

prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was 

sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason 

why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits 

of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the 

judgment, be tried afresh.

William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 

2071, 2075-90 (2015) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03, 16 S. Ct. at 158). These 

rules have evolved slightly over the years, and, today, most state courts adhere to the 

standard promulgated under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law.

2

 Under 

the Restatement, 

a decree rendered in a foreign nation which orders or enjoins the doing 

of an act will be enforced in this country provided that such enforcement 

is necessary to effectuate the decree and will not impose an undue 

burden upon the American court and provided further that in the view 

of the American court the decree is consistent with fundamental 

principles of justice and of good morals.

2 “The federal doctrine of comity is applicable under Hilton only when a foreignnation judgment is presented to a federal court having 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal 

question jurisdiction. While the opposite result has been urged, Hilton-style federal 

comity, unlike federal full faith and credit, does not preempt a state’s version of 

comity either in an Erie [Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 

L. Ed. 1188 (1938)]-based federal diversity case, or in a state court case.” Robert 

Laurence, The Role, If any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary 

Enforcement of Federal, State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 Tulsa L.J. 1, 25 

(1999). 
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Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 102 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see 

also Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225, 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“[A]ny foreign decree 

should be recognized as a valid judgment, and thus be entitled to comity, where the 

parties have been given notice and the opportunity to be heard, where the foreign 

court had original jurisdiction and where the foreign decree does not offend the 

public policy of the State of Florida.”). 

In Florida, recognition of international final foreign judgments is governed by 

statute, while general principles of comity allow for the discretionary enforcement 

of certain interlocutory rulings. See § 55.604, Fla. Stat. As is relevant to this case, 

courts have “repeatedly approved the enforcement in Florida of temporary 

injunctions issued by foreign courts.” Cermesoni v. Maneiro, 144 So. 3d 627, 629 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

Here, it is uncontroverted Olvera was afforded due process in Mexico and the 

foreign tribunal possessed original jurisdiction. Further, given the preliminary 

finding by the NBSC of creditor fraud and the resultant weighty need to preserve 

assets, along with the pervasive sentiment that debtors ought “not be able to walk

away from their foreign court-imposed obligations by spiriting away their money or

assets” in the United States, the foreign decree neither offends the public policy of

our State nor emburdens our courts. de Pacanins v. Pacanins, 650 So. 2d 1028, 1029-

30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (citation omitted). 
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Olvera, however, assails the failure to perfect service of process in the MiamiDade County proceedings as fatal to the continuing vitality of the injunction. 

Undoubtedly, a judge “has the power to issue a temporary injunction prior to service

of process upon a defendant.” Pascul v. George Davis & Co., 170 So. 2d 466, 467

(Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (citing Smith v. Hous. Auth. of Daytona Beach, 3 So. 2d 880

(Fla. 1941); Thebaut v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1866); 28 Am. Jur. Injunctions § 246). 

Moreover, here, Vejar strictly complied with the narrow requirements of Florida 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(a) in seeking relief without notice. See Fla. High Sch. 

Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Benitez, 748 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“A party 

seeking injunction may, under certain narrow circumstances, be entitled to receive 

an ex parte hearing on his request provided that he complies with the procedure set 

forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610.”). Thus, the entry of the injunction

does not offend any traditional notion of due process.

Further, as Vejar persuasively argues, the role of the lower court, serving in 

an ancillary capacity to the Mexican tribunal, “was confined to the[] in rem matter[]”

of recognizing and enforcing the embargo. Cermesoni, 144 So. 3d at 629. Hence, 

the court “merely carried out the cross-border request for assistance by recognizing 

the [Mexican] Court’s ruling and entering the injunction directed to specific Florida 

asset[].” Id. Given the due process afforded in Mexico and the limited role of the

court below, while the failure to effect service within the four-year time span is 
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hardly ideal, the lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be deemed, in and of itself, an

insurmountable hurdle to the continuation of the injunction. See Archer v. U.S.

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 220 So. 3d 477, 478-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“[P]ersonal 

jurisdiction is not required to initiate a . . . proceeding[] instituted against the subject 

property [because it is an] in rem proceeding[].”) (citations omitted); Cooper v. 

Gibson, 208 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (“As a general proposition 

jurisdiction is either in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. The former two are based 

on the location of property within the jurisdiction of the state.”); Harris & Co. 

Advert., Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (“[A] 

judgment in rem may be entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction in actions on 

a debt due and owing.”). Compare Hamilton v. Hamilton, 142 So. 3d 969, 973 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2014) (reversing the denial of a motion to dissolve injunction for lack of 

personal jurisdiction on breach of contract claim where defendant “had notice, and 

specially appeared to contest personal jurisdiction”) with Smith v. Knight, 679 So. 

2d 359, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“A request for a temporary injunction often 

accompanies the original complaint and service of both are typically accomplished 

simultaneously. One ground for an ex parte temporary injunction is that to give 

notice would be to accelerate the injury. Personal jurisdiction is thus not required 

for a temporary injunction to issue.”) (citations omitted). 
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Finally, here, after the letter rogatory issued, despite expending reasonably 

diligent efforts, Vejar and the Mexican government were unable to ascertain 

Olvera’s whereabouts. Moreover, despite having knowledge of the Mexican 

embargo, Olvera waited four years to seek dissolution of the injunction. Hence, we 

decline to lay the blame for the delay in service solely at the feet of Vejar. Instead, 

we echo the sage words of a court convened long ago, 

for a court ought on motion to dissolve an injunction simply because 

the plaintiff is grossly negligent in progressing the cause, by permitting 

it to be continued at rules an unreasonable length of time, whenever 

such motion is made with reasonable promptness on the part of the 

defendant. But, if such motion also be unreasonably delayed by the 

defendant, the court ought not, except under peculiar circumstances, to 

dissolve the injunction on motion, though the plaintiff has been guilty 

of gross negligence in progressing his suit. 

McCoy v. McCoy, 2 S.E. 809, 824-25 (W. Va. 1887) (citations omitted).

Finding no procedural error, we reject the contention that the refusal to 

dissolve the injunction was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable [or that] . . . no 

reasonable man [or woman] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” 

Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation omitted).

Affirmed.