UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4989

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY COLEMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-

cr-00305-RWT-1)

Submitted: April 25, 2012 Decided: May 9, 2012

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stacy 

Dawson Belf, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Anthony Coleman pled guilty to unlawful possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and was sentenced as an armed career 

criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years 

prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 2011). Coleman 

appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the fifteenyear sentence was error because mandatory minimum sentences 

conflict with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) to 

impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” 

He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is greater than 

necessary in his case to achieve the sentencing goals of 

§ 3553(a). We affirm.

The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part, 

dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with 

its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept 

as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) 

(2006). Courts have generally held that mandatory minimum 

sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus do not 

conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater than 

necessary” clause. See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 

529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 

(3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he mandatory minimum sentences [the 

defendant] was exposed to pursuant to [statute] clearly fit 
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within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion 

of § 3551(a).”). “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that 

§ 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language authorizes a 

district court to sentence below the statutory minimum.” United 

States v. Cirilo-Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per 

curiam) (listing cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 499 

F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors do not 

apply to congressionally mandated sentences”); United States v. 

Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (although 

acknowledging the tension between § 3553(a) and statutorilymandated sentences, holding that § 3553(a) as a “very general 

statute cannot be understood to authorize courts to sentence 

below minimums specifically prescribed by Congress.”). In 

United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 2005), we held 

that, post-Booker, except in limited circumstances not present 

here, “a district court still may not depart below a statutory 

minimum.” Id. at 862. Coleman’s reliance on United States v. 

Raby, 575 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case 

provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED