IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-10-00161-CV

WILLIAM R. VANCE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF FLORENE K. GRACE, DECEASED,

Appellant

v.

CAROLYN G. VANCE,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 1

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12,787-PC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This suit arises from probate proceedings in the Estate of Florence K. Grace, 

deceased. William R. Vance, Jr., Individually and as Independent Executor of the 

Estate, appeals from two trial court orders: (1) an order holding him in contempt for 

failure to comply with a discovery order and ordering him to pay attorney’s fees; and 

(2) an order granting sanctions against him for violation of the contempt order. Carolyn 

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Vance v. Vance Page 2

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Brittingham-Sada de 

Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006). Probate proceedings give rise to a 

recognized exception to that general rule since multiple judgments may be rendered on 

discrete issues before the entire probate proceeding is concluded. Fernandez v. 

Bustamante, 305 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing 

Brittingham, 193 S.W.3d at 578). Not every interlocutory order in a probate case is 

appealable. Brittingham, 193 S.W.3d at 578. The Texas Supreme Court has adopted a

test for determining jurisdiction:

If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship 

judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and 

appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of 

which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or 

more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not 

disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.

Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995); Brittingham, 193 S.W.3d at 578; 

Fernandez, 305 S.W.3d at 337-38.

In this case, there is no applicable rule or statute stating that either contempt 

orders or sanctions orders are final judgments. Neither order is an appealable 

interlocutory order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (Vernon 2008). 

Moreover, contempt orders are reviewable by mandamus or habeas corpus, not direct 

appeal. See Pandozy v. Beaty, 254 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no 

pet.); see also Smith v. Detrich, No. 03-07-00726-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 238, at *11-

12 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 13, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Sanctions orders do not 

dispose of all parties and claims; therefore, they are not final. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
Vance v. Vance Page 3

215.1(d); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(8); TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.3; Zep Mfg. Co. v. Anthony, 

752 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding) (Rule 215 

“clearly prohibits appeals of interlocutory sanction orders.”); Thomas & Son’s, Inc. v. 

Seabrook Land Co., No. 01-09-00420-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7734, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Because neither the contempt order nor the sanctions order is an appropriate 

subject for direct appeal in this case, we grant Carolyn’s motion and dismiss the appeal 

for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

FELIPE REYNA

Justice

Before Justice Reyna, 

Justice Davis, and

Judge Rick Morris1

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction 

Opinion delivered and filed June 23, 2010

[CV06]

 

1 The Honorable Rick Morris, Judge of the 146th District Court, sitting by assignment of the Chief 

Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to section 74.003(h) of the Government Code. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.003(h) (Vernon 2005).