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CHELSEA L. DA VIS, Plaintiff,

v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. No. 15-639C Filed January 7, 2016 FORPUBLICATION 

# FILED JAN - 

## 72016 U
.S. COURTOF FEDERAL CLAIMS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Pro Se; Rule 12(b)(l), Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; Claims Against a Private Party.**~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~** **)** Chelsea L. Davis, Dallas, TX, plaintiff prose. Michael D. Austin, Trial Attorney, Scott D. Austin, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman Jr., Director, Benjamin 

### C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department ofJustice, Washington, DC, for defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDER GRIGGSBY, Judge I. INTRODUCTION Pro se plaintiff, Chelsea L. Davis, broughtthis action asserting claims ofsexual abuse and human trafficking against a private individual, Leslie D. Ware, and challenging the suspension ofher lawlicense bythe State Bar ofTexas. The government has moved to dismiss the case for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) ofthe Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the government's motionto dismiss.II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 A. Factual Background Plaintiff, Chelsea L. Davis, is an attorney who has previously been licensed to practice law in the State ofTexas. See Compl. at 1, 3. OnMay 13, 2015, the Board ofDisciplinary Appeals appointed bythe Supreme Court ofTexas entered a Judgement ofIndefinite Disability Suspension, suspending plaintiffs law license. See In the Matter of Chelsea 

### L. Davis, Case No. 54202 (May 13, 2015) (Board ofDisciplinary Appeals, Judgment ofIndefinite Disability Suspension). Subsequently, on June 19, 2015, plaintifffiled this action challenging, among other things, the suspension ofher law license. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs complaint is difficult to follow. Id. Nonetheless, it appears that plaintiff asserts claims ofsexual abuse and human trafficking against a private individual, Leslie D. Ware, who had been originally named as the defendant inthe complaint. 2 Id. at 1, 6-8. Additionally, plaintiffappears to challenge the suspension ofher law license bythe State Bar of Texas. Id. at 3-4, 10. Regarding these claims, plaintiffrequests thatthe Court: [P]rovide [plaintiff] with an adequate remedy, which may require (1) taking [her] offthe list ofattorneys in Texas so that [she] may continue to practice Patent law before the USPTO; (2) taking [her] offthe list ofattorneys in the USPTO so that [she] may continue to practice Patent law in the State ofTexas; (3) doing away with federal licensure maintenance requirements; (4) doing away with state licensure maintenance requirements; (5) harmonizing state and federal licensure maintenance requirements; (6) get rid ofany admissions requirements of individual federal courts; (7) get the government off [her] back because [her] ability to practice law is [her] own intellectual property and the government must not interfere with [her] verythoughts inlight of [her] rightto privacy and liberties to work without unwanted interference; and/or (8) stop violating [her] right to privacy and rights as a person, including [her] intellectual property and copyrights outside ofwhat [she] make[s] public record for people. Id. at 11-12.

1 Unless otherwise noted herein, the facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiffs complaint ("Compl. at_"), defendant's response to the Court's Order to Show Cause and motion to dismiss ("Def. Mot. at_"), plaintiffs opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss ("Pl. Opp. at_"), and defendant's reply in support ofits motionto dismiss ("Def. Rep. at_"). 2 The Clerk's Office substituted the United States as the named defendant in this action on June 19, 2015.

2B. ProceduralBackground On June 19, 2015, plaintifffiled the complaint in this matter. See generally Compl. The government failed to file a timely response to plaintiffs complaint and the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on August 31, 2015. See generally Order to Show Cause. On September 14, 2015, the government filed a response to the Court's Order and a motion to dismiss this matter for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdictionpursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). See generally Def. Mot. On October 8, 2015, plaintifffiled a response and opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. See generally Pl. Opp. On October 9, 2015, the Court granted plaintiffleave to file a motion styled as "Chelsea L. Davis's Special/Non-Appearance Motion For Leave To File A Reply To The United States's [sic] Response To Show Cause Order To Request This Court To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over The Claims In The Attached Exhibit A Entitled 'Complaint."' See Pl. Rep. to Def. Resp. to Order to Show Cause. On October 26, 2015, the government filed a reply to plaintiffs opposition to its motion to dismiss. See generally Def. Rep. The government's motion to dismiss having been fully briefed, the Court addresses the pending motion. 

### III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Pro Se Litigants Plaintiffis proceeding in this matterprose. The Court recognizes that parties proceeding prose are granted greater leeway than litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding thatprose complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). Nonetheless, "[w]hile a court should be receptive to prose plaintiffs and assist them,justice is ill-served when ajurist crosses the line from finder of fact to advocate." Demes v. UnitedStates, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 369 (2002). And so, while the Court may excuse ambiguities inplaintiffs complaint, the Court does not excuse the complaint's failures. See Henke v. UnitedStates, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In addition, this Courthas long recognized that "the leniency afforded to apro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meetjurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. UnitedStates, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). For this reason, aprose plaintiff-like



### 3any other plaintiff-must establish the Court'sjurisdictionto consider her claim by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Riles v. UnitedStates, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010). 

### B. Rule 12(b)(l) When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction, this Court must
assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. UnitedStates, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006); RCFC 12(b)(l). Plaintiffbears the burden ofestablishing subject-matterjurisdiction, and must do so by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Reynolds v. Army & AirForce Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And so, should the Court determine that "it lacksjurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the claim." Matthews v. UnitedStates, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006). In this regard, the United States Court ofFederal Claims is a court oflimitedjurisdiction and "possess[es] only thatpower authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the Court jurisdiction over: [A]ny claim against the United States founded either uponthe Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding intort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l). The Tucker Act, however, is "ajurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages

.... [T]he Act merely confersjurisdictionupon [the United States Court ofFederal Claims] whenever the substantive right exists." UnitedStates v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). And so, to come within thejurisdictional reach and waiver ofthe Tucker Act, a plaintiffmust identify a separate
source ofsubstantive lawthat creates the right to money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Ifthe Court finds that the source oflaw alleged is not moneymandating, the Court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 

### Id. at 1173; RCFC 12(b)(l).

4

### IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. The CourtDoes Not Possess Jurisdiction To ConsiderPlaintiff's Claims The government has moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint upon two grounds. See generally Def. Mot. First, the government argues that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims, because plaintiffs claims are against defendants other than the United States. 

### Id. at 10. Second, the government argues that the Court also does not possessjurisdictionto consider plaintiffs claims, because plaintifffails to identify a moneymandating source oflawthat would create a right to recover money damages from the United States. 

### Id. at 10-11. For the reasons discussed below, the Court argues that it does not possess jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims. 

### 1. The CourtDoes Not Possess Jurisdiction To ConsiderPlaintiff's Claims Against A Private Party Or State Entity As an initial matter, the Court does not possessjurisdictionto considerplaintiffs claims against private individuals or state entities. In the complaint, plaintiffasserts sexual abuse and human trafficking claims against a private individual-Leslie D. Ware. Compl. at 8. In addition, plaintiffchallenges the suspension ofher law license by the State Bar ofTexas. 

### Id. at 10. This Court does not possessjurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims. It is well established that the United States is the only appropriate defendant in the United States Court of Federal Claims. RCFC lO(a); see also UnitedStates v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) ("[The Court ofFederal Claims']jurisdiction is confined to the rendition ofmoneyjudgments in suits brought for that reliefagainst the United States,

... and ifthe reliefsought is against others than the United States, the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond thejurisdiction ofthe court

.

. . ."). In this regard, thejurisdiction ofthis Court extends only to claims against the United States and "acontroversy between private parties could not be entertained." Nat 

### 'l City Bankv. UnitedStates, 143 Ct. Cl. 154, 164 (1958); see also Stephenson v. UnitedStates, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) ("[T]he only proper defendant

... before [the United States Court ofFederal Claims] is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.") (emphasis existing). In addition, the Court is also withoutjurisdictionto consider claims against states or state entities. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588 (For suits filed in the United States Court ofFederal Claims and its predecessor, "ifthe reliefsought is against others than the United States the suit as to them must



### 5be ignored as beyond thejurisdiction ofthe court."). And so, "the only proper defendant for any matter before this Court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." Stephenson, 58 Fed. Cl. at 190 (emphasis existing); see also Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. In the complaint, plaintiffasserts sexual abuse and humantrafficking claims against Leslie D. Ware, a private individual, and she seeks to recover monetary damages in the amount of$6,000,000 from Mr. Ware. Compl. at 8. Plaintiffalso seeks to recover monetary damages and other relieffrom the State Bar ofTexas and the State ofTexas in connection with the suspension ofher law license.3 Id. at 10. This Court does not possessjurisdictionto entertain such grievances. See Souders v. SC. Pub. Serv

.Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Reidv. UnitedStates, 95 Fed. Cl. 243, 248 (2010) ("[t]he Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claims naming states, localities, state government agencies, local government agencies and private individuals and entities as defendants"); Woodson v. UnitedStates, 89 Fed. Cl. 640, 649 (2009) (citing Shaihoub v. UnitedStates, 75 Fed. Cl. 584, 585 (2007)). And so, to the extent that plaintiffasserts claims against Mr. Ware, the State of Texas, or any other defendant other than the United States, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs complaint. RCFC 12(b)(l). 

### 2. PlaintiffHas Failed To Identify A Money-Mandating Statute Dismissal ofthis matter is also warranted because plaintiffhas not identified a moneymandating provision oflaw that would permit her to bring her claims inthis Court. In this regard, it is well established that to come within thejurisdictional reach and waiver ofthe Tucker Act, a plaintiffmust identify a separate source ofsubstantive lawthat creates the right to recover money damages from the United States. Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172. In the complaint, plaintiffcites several federal statutes and constitutional provisions. See generally Compl. But, plaintiffdoes not cite to any substantive lawthat would create a right to money damages in this case. Id. And so, plaintiffhas not shownthat the Courtpossesses subject-matterjurisdictionto consider her claims. RCFC 12(b)(l).

3 Although the complaint briefly references the United States Department ofDefense, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and the United States Postal Service, plaintiffdoes not assert any claims against these federal agencies in the complaint. Compl. at 2-3, 6, 11.

63. Plaintiff's Criminal Law Claims Are Jurisdictionally Precluded Lastly, to the extent that plaintiffalleges sexual abuse or human trafficking claims, the Court does not possessjurisdictionto consider such criminal law claims. The United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuithas held thatthis Court "has nojurisdictionto adjudicate any claims whatsoever underthe federal criminal code." See Joshua v. UnitedStates, 17 F.3d 378, 379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Jones v. UnitedStates, 440 F. App'x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011). And so, the Court must also dismiss plaintiff's criminal law claims for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction. V. CONCLUSION In sum, even the most generous reading ofplaintiff's complaint makes clear that the Court does not possess subject-matterjurisdiction to consider her claims. Plaintiffbrings no claims against the United States, or any ofits agencies. Rather plaintiffasserts claims against a private individual and a state entity. Itis well established that this Court does not possess jurisdictionto consider such claims. In addition, plaintiffalso fails to identify a source of substantive lawthat would create a right to recover money damages from the United States in this case, and she asserts criminal law claims that are not within thejurisdiction ofthis Court. And so, for all ofthese reasons the Courtmust dismiss the complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss and the Clerk is directed to ENTER finaljudgment in favor ofdefendant DISMISSING the complaint. Lastly, plaintiffhas filed three different complaints inthis Court-includingthis matter-related to the suspension ofher law license during the past seven months. The Court has dismissed all ofthese cases uponjurisdictional grounds. Memo. See Opinion and Order, Davis

v. UnitedStates, Case No. 15-608C, filed on July 10, 2015; see also Order, Davis v. United States, CaseNo. 15-598C, filed onJuly 21, 2015. The Clerk is directed to accept no further filings by Chelsea L. Davis without an order granting leave to file such filings from the Chief

7Judge ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims. In seeking leave to file any future actions, Ms. Davis must explainhowher complaintraises newmatters properly before this Court. 

### See RCFC Rule 1l(b) (barring the filing ofunwarranted or frivolous claims). No costs. 

### IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge

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