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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

www.flsb.uscourts.gov

In re: Case No. 20-23359-LMI

MICRON DEVICES, LLC,

Debtor.

/

Chapter 11

ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT (ECF #234) AND APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court for evidentiary hearing on April 

30, 2021 and May 7, 2021 (the “Evidentiary Hearing”) upon the Trustee’s Motion 

For Approval Of The Settlement Agreement Entered Into By The Subchapter V 

Laurel M. Isicoff

Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

___________________________________________________________________________

ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on May 20, 2021.

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Chapter 11 Trustee, Kennedy Lewis Investment Management, LLC And Stimwave 

Technologies, Inc. (the “9019 Motion”) (ECF #234) filed by Tarek Kiem, the 

Subchapter V Chapter 11 Trustee (the “Trustee”), pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 

Rule 9019, seeking approval of Settlement Agreement filed with the Court on 

April 20, 2021 (the “Settlement Agreement”) (ECF #256, Trustee Ex. 2), as revised 

by the redlined modifications in the Trustee’s Exhibit 56 and by the modifications 

announced on the record at the Evidentiary Hearing and reflected at the end of 

this Order. The Court, having reviewed the 9019 Motion, Settlement Agreement,

the Objections filed by Maryam Amiri, Brandyn J. Perryman, Patrick Larson, 

Marlene Pena, Ronald Perryman, Gary Perryman, Micron Medical Corporation

(“MMC”), Luis Fernandez, Micron Devices, LLC (“Debtor”), and Cobalt Capital, 

LLC (ECF ##269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 283, 289, 290, 291, 312, 317, 322)

(“Objections”), all evidence admitted by the Court at the Evidentiary Hearing, 

including the Declaration of the Trustee (“Trustee Dec.”) (ECF #310) and 

Supplemental Declaration of the Trustee1 (“Trustee Suppl. Dec.”) (ECF #321), the 

Declaration of Jeff Goldberg (“Goldberg Dec.”) (ECF #300), the Certification of the 

Records Custodian of Stimwave Technologies Inc. (ECF #301), the Declaration of 

David Kho (“Kho Dec.”) (ECF #299), the Exhibits 1-62 submitted by the Trustee 

(“Trustee Ex.”) (ECF ##302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 320), the Exhibits 

1, 2, and 20 submitted by the Debtor (“Debtor Ex.”) (ECF ##356, 361) the 

Exhibits 2-4, 6-9, 11, 19-26, and 27-29 submitted by MMC (“MMC Ex.”) (ECF 

##315, 355), the live testimony of the Trustee, Jeff Goldberg, David Kho, Sanjay 

1 The Supplemental Declaration of the Trustee was admitted with the exception of the paragraphs 

25 through 42, which related to the Trustee’s Exhibits 63 and 64, which were excluded from 

evidence.

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Gupta, Pamela Beidleman, and Brandyn Perryman, and all arguments presented 

by the parties, and having taken judicial notice of the procedural record and all 

pleadings filed in this proceeding, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, makes 

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the Court 

GRANTING the 9019 Motion and OVERRULING the Objections.

2

FINDINGS OF FACT

Procedural History of the Bankruptcy Proceedings 

A. On December 7, 2020 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed a 

voluntary petition (the “Petition”) for relief under subchapter V of chapter 11 of 

the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 

District of Florida. (ECF #1.)

B. Laura Perryman, the Debtor’s majority shareholder executed the 

Petition, Schedules, and Statement of Financial Affairs on behalf of the Debtor 

as the Debtor’s Manager. (ECF #1 at 4, 6.) Laura Perryman managed and 

controlled the Debtor from the Petition Date through at least March 6, 2021. 

(Trustee Dec. ¶11.) 

C. On February 19, 2021, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause 

Why Debtor Should Not Be Removed as Debtor-In-Possession and Setting Hearing

(“Order to Show Cause”). (ECF #180.) The Order to Show Cause noted that there 

were “disputes as to who is in charge of the Debtor, concerns regarding alleged 

2 To the extent any of the following findings of fact constitute conclusions of law, they are adopted 

as such. To the extent any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are 

adopted as such.

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interference by the co-founder/majority shareholder, and concerns about the 

majority shareholder taking action ultra vires.”

D. On March 8, 2021, following a hearing, the Court entered an Order 

Removing the Debtor-in-Possession and Expanding the Powers of Subchapter V 

Trustee. (ECF #206.) 

E. Subsequently, the Trustee took over operating the business of the 

Debtor and possession of all property of the Debtor’s estate. (Trustee Dec. ¶15.) 

F. The 9019 Motion and Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing (ECF #235)

were served on all creditors of the Debtor’s estate, all counter-parties to 

executory contracts with the Debtor, all current and former directors of the 

Debtor, all current and former Managers of the Debtor, all of the Debtor’s 

employees, all holders of equity in Stimwave and the Debtor, and any interested 

party eligible for notice pursuant to the Court’s CM/ECF system. (ECF ##238, 

239.)

The Trustee’s Assessment of the Debtor’s Business and the Settlement 

Agreement 

G. Upon his appointment, the Trustee examined the Debtor’s business 

records. (Trustee Dec. ¶20.) The Debtor’s accounting records reflect that during 

the approximately one-year prepetition period the Debtor operated at a net loss 

on a cash basis of $591,110. (Trustee Dec. ¶54.) The Trustee concluded that, 

absent the Court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement, the Debtor will likely 

become administratively insolvent and this chapter 11 case could be converted 

to a chapter 7 liquidation. (Trustee Dec. ¶¶48, 50, 55.) If the Settlement 

Agreement is not approved, the Debtor’s continued operations would generate a 

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negative cash flow and the Trustee concluded that ceasing Debtor’s operations 

is in the best interests of creditors. (Trustee Dec. ¶¶55-56.)

H. The Trustee acknowledged the existence of a Micron Devices LLC 

Manufacturing Agreement with MMC (the “Manufacturing Agreement”) (MMC Ex. 

6.) dated January 1, 2020. The Manufacturing Agreement was not listed as an 

executory contract on the Debtor’s schedules. (ECF #1 at 30.) The Trustee 

testified that he was concerned about the validity of the Manufacturing 

Agreement and that he did not thoroughly review the agreement, but his 

understanding was that the agreement was supposed to provide inventory to 

MMC. (Tr. of April 30,2021 Hearing at 97 (ECF #381.)) The Trustee also 

acknowledged the existence of a Master Services Agreement between the Debtor 

and MMC (the “Services Agreement”) (MMC Ex. 2.) dated January 1, 2020. The 

Services Agreement was listed as an executory contract on the Debtor’s 

schedules. (ECF #1 at 30.)

I. Neither the Manufacturing Agreement nor the Services Agreement 

has been rejected or assumed by the Trustee, although MMC filed an Expedited 

Motion to Compel Assumption of the Manufacturing Agreement and the Services 

Agreement (ECF #389) (the “Emergency Assumption Motion”) on May 18, 2019. 

The Court has not ruled on the Emergency Assumption Motion. However, the 

relief sought will be moot in light of this ruling.

J. The Trustee testified that the proposed payment by Stimwave of 

$1,000,000 (the “Settlement Payment”), coupled with the consensual 

subordination of all KLIM and Stimwave claims provided for in the Settlement 

Agreement, would be sufficient to fund payment in full of administrative and 

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priority claims and to make a meaningful distribution to allowed unsecured 

creditors. (Trustee Dec. ¶49.) Based on his reasoned business judgment, the 

Trustee has made a determination that the Settlement Agreement provides a 

certain and prompt recovery for creditors and he recommends its approval. 

(Trustee Dec. ¶61.)

Alternatives to Settlement

K. The Debtor filed its Subchapter V plan on March 4, 2021 (ECF #196)

(the “Plan”). At a status conference held prior to the hearing on the 9019 Motion, 

the Debtor advised the Court that it was not proceeding to confirmation of the 

Plan until after the Court ruled on the 9019 Motion.

L. On April 28, 2021 the Debtor filed its Motion, Pursuant to Sections 

105(a), 349(b) and 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, for Entry of an Order (a) 

Approving Procedures for the Distribution of Assets to Administrative and 

Undisputed General Unsecured Creditors; (b) Voluntary Dismissal of the Debtors 

[sic] Chapter 11 Case and (c) Granting Related Relief (ECF #311) (the “First Motion 

to Dismiss”). The Court denied that motion by Order dated May 4, 2021. (ECF 

#343.)

M. On May 6, 2021, the Debtor filed its Motion, Pursuant to Sections 

105(a), 349(b) and 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, for Entry of an Order (a) 

Approving Procedures for the Distribution of Assets to Administrative and 

Undisputed General Unsecured Creditors; (b) Voluntary Dismissal of the Debtors 

[sic] Chapter 11 Case and (c) Granting Related Relief (ECF #368) (the “Second 

Motion to Dismiss” and together with the First Motion to Dismiss the “Motions 

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to Dismiss”). In the Second Motion to Dismiss the Debtor stated as one of the 

“causes” for dismissal that “the Debtor cannot confirm or consummate a Chapter 

11 plan.” The Court denied the Second Motion to Dismiss by Order dated May 

14, 2021. (ECF #384.)

N. On April 21, 2021, an entity called MidAtlantic Medical Association, 

Inc. (“MidAtlantic”) submitted a letter to the Trustee that expressed an interest 

in negotiating with the Trustee for the purchase of Debtor’s assets and liabilities 

for $1,750,000 (the “MidAtlantic Letter”). The MidAtlantic Letter was admitted 

into evidence as Debtor’s Exhibit 1. The $1,750,000 has been deposited in the 

trust account of attorney Adam Skolnick, who represents MMC as well as 

MidAtlantic in this case.

O. Another entity called “Cobalt Capital, LLC” made a written offer to 

the Trustee that expressed an interest in purchasing the Debtor’s assets free and 

clear of all liabilities for $2,000,000. (Tr. of April 30,2021 Hearing at 95:18-22 

(ECF #381.)) That offer was not filed with the Court or submitted as evidence at 

the Evidentiary Hearing by the Debtor or MMC.

P. The Trustee testified that he had phone conversations with several 

other parties about a possible purchase of the Debtor’s assets. Laura Perryman 

arranged for several of the calls and attended some but not all of the calls. 

However, the Trustee testified, none of those calls resulted in any written offers 

being submitted.3

3 Debtor’s counsel claims she knew nothing about either the MidAtlantic Letter or the Cobalt 

offer because the Trustee did not tell her about either. It is for this reason that the Court gave 

the Debtor the opportunity to file additional exhibits and witnesses with respect to the “best 

interests” portion of the Justice Oaks test to be considered at the second day of the Evidentiary 

Hearing. However, the Court finds it was reasonable for the Trustee to assume Debtor’s counsel 

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The Transfer Agreements

Q. The Debtor and Stimwave Technologies Inc. (“Stimwave”) are former 

affiliates. (Trustee Ex. 41, 301:24-25.) Laura Perryman formerly served as the 

Manager of the Debtor. (Trustee Ex. 24 at 19.) Ms. Perryman also served as 

Chief Executive Officer of Stimwave and separated from Stimwave in November 

2019. (Goldberg Dec. ¶27; Kho Dec. ¶26.)

R. Between March 2018 and January 2019, the Debtor entered into a 

series of agreements with Stimwave pursuant to which the Debtor transferred or 

assigned shares it owned in a related entity and certain intellectual property, 

including but not limited to licenses, patents, and certain other contractual 

rights (the “Assigned IP”), to Stimwave (the “Transfer Agreements”), as follows:

i. Contribution Agreement: The Debtor contributed its ownership 

interests (the “StimQ Equity”) in StimQ Medical LLC (“StimQ”) to 

Stimwave via the Stimwave Technologies Incorporated Contribution 

Agreement dated as of March 25, 2018 (the “Contribution Agreement”). 

(Trustee Ex. 3.) Laura Perryman executed the Contribution Agreement 

on behalf of both the Debtor and Stimwave. (Trustee Ex. 3.)

ii. License Assignment Agreement. The Debtor assigned all its duties, 

liabilities and obligations under certain licenses to Stimwave pursuant 

to the Assignment and Assumption Agreement dated as of October 13, 

2018 (the “License Assignment Agreement”). (Trustee Ex. 4.) Mark 

Coleman, a director, executed the License Assignment Agreement on 

behalf of the Debtor, and Ms. Perryman executed it on behalf of 

Stimwave. (Trustee Ex. 4.)

knew about the offers due to counsel’s day to day contact with Laura Perryman and the fact that 

Debtor’s counsel was working with counsel for MidAtlantic, who also represents MMC, on a daily 

basis in connection with the 9019 Motion and other matters. As for Debtor’s counsel’s argument 

that had she known about the MidAtlantic Letter sooner she could have negotiated a better deal, 

the Court notes that Dr. Gupta, MidAtlantic’s principal, has been involved with this case from 

the beginning, and may or may not have been a director of the Debtor when the case was filed 

(another of Ms. Perryman’s possibly ultra vires acts), and both counsel and Ms. Perryman had 

every opportunity to negotiate any deal with Dr. Gupta well before the MidAtlantic Letter was 

sent to Trustee’s counsel.

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iii. Patent Assignment Agreement. The Debtor assigned certain patents 

and inventions to Stimwave pursuant to the Patent Assignment, dated 

as of November 6, 2018 (the “Patent Assignment Agreement”). (Trustee 

Ex. 5.) Laura Perryman executed the Patent Assignment on behalf of 

both the Debtor and Stimwave. (Trustee Ex. 5.)

iv. Epimed Assignment Agreement. The Debtor assigned to Stimwave all 

of its rights under a contract with Epimed International, Inc. (the 

“Epimed Contract”) pursuant to the Epimed Assignment Agreement 

dated as of January 23, 2019 (the “Epimed Assignment Agreement,” 

and together with the License Assignment Agreement and Patent 

Assignment Agreement, the “IP Assignment Agreements”). (Trustee Ex. 

6.) Mark Coleman, a director, executed the Epimed Assignment 

Agreement on behalf of the Debtor, and Ms. Perryman executed it on 

behalf of Stimwave. (Trustee Ex. 6 at 4.) 

S. At Stimwave’s board meeting on February 22, 2018, Laura Perryman 

proposed that she and Debtor could contribute their respective ownership 

interests in StimQ Medical LLC to Stimwave for no consideration “on the premise 

that she and the holders of Micron Devices already have equity [sic] interests in 

the Company [Stimwave] and such contribution was expected not to have an 

impact for tax purposes.” (Trustee Ex. 15 at 1.) The Stimwave board authorized 

going forward with the contribution. (Trustee Ex. 15) (the “Contribution Board 

Resolution”). Three of the members of the Stimwave board were also members 

of the Debtor’s board. (Trustee Ex. 15.) There is nothing in the record to indicate 

whether the Debtor’s Board of Directors approved the Contribution Agreement. 

However, the Contribution Agreement recites that the contribution is for no 

consideration, and “qualifies under the appropriate provision of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), as a tax free capital 

contribution.”

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T. The Debtor’s Board of Directors authorized the IP Assignment 

Agreements pursuant to an Action by Written Consent executed on October 13, 

2018 (Trustee Ex. 7.) (the “IP Board Consent”). 

U. No one has disputed the validity of the Transfer Agreements. On May 

3, 2021, Laura Perryman, in her Objection to Stimwave Motion in Limine to 

Preclude Testimony (ECF #337), wrote that she had previously testified under 

oath as to the validity of her signature on the Transfer Agreements and that 

“[t]hese documents were attested to as accurate in the Delaware Chancery Court 

proceeding trial.” The basis for contesting the validity of the transfers is the lack 

of approval by the members of the Debtor or lack of prior consent of the Debtor’s 

board of directors allegedly in violation of The Limited Liability Company 

Agreement for Micron Devices LLC (the “LLC Agreement”) (Trustee Ex. 24). See

The Declaratory Judgement Action (defined infra).

V. The LLC Agreement requires an affirmative vote or written consent 

of a majority of the outstanding interests (greater than 50%) with respect to any 

“action that would constitute a Liquidation Event.” (the “Member Approval 

Requirement”) (LLC Agreement, 5.4(b).) A Liquidation Event is defined as “(a) a 

liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Company; (b) a sale of all or 

substantially all of the assets of the Company; or (c) a merger or consolidation of 

the Company into another entity in which the Members of the Company retain 

less than a majority of the voting control of the surviving entity.” (LLC Agreement, 

1.26.)

W. Section 5.4(a) of the LLC Agreement states that, without the prior 

consent of the Board of Directors, the Manager shall not “enter into any corporate 

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strategic relationship involving the payment, contribution, or assignment by the 

Company or to the Company of money or assets greater than $50,000.”(the 

“Board Approval Requirement”).

X. At the time of and following the execution of the Transfer 

Agreements, there was significant overlap between the ownership of the Debtor 

and Stimwave. (Trustee Exs. 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18; Goldberg Dec. ¶19.) 

Y. Following the execution of the Transfer Agreements, Laura

Perryman filed a cancellation of the Debtor’s active status with the Delaware 

Secretary of State on December 28, 2018 (the “Certificate of Cancellation”).

(Trustee Ex. 10.) The Debtor closed its only bank account in July 2019. The 

Debtor also filed its 2018 federal income tax return indicating that the 2018 

return was a final return, and sent each of its members final K-1s indicating the 

2018 federal income tax return was the final return for the Debtor. There is 

nothing in the Debtor’s records to indicate that any shareholder raised any 

concerns or objections after receiving the final K-1. (Trustee Dec. ¶38(d); Trustee 

Exs. 8, 13; ECF #1 at 39.)

4 

The Kennedy Lewis Loan

Z. On May 13, 2019, Stimwave entered into a loan and security 

agreement (the “LSA”) with Kennedy Lewis Investment Management LLC (“KLIM”) 

under which KLIM received a first-priority lien on and a security interest in 

Stimwave’s personal property, including the StimQ Equity and the Assigned IP. 

4 The Debtor prepared, and may or may not have filed, a new 2018 tax return sometime in early 

2020. (Trustee Ex. 14; Trustee Ex. 41 at 27-28.)

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In the course of negotiations, and in the LSA and documents and agreements 

executed in conjunction therewith, Laura Perryman, on behalf of Stimwave, 

made numerous representations as to Stimwave’s ownership of the Assigned IP 

and StimQ Equity. (Trustee Ex. 20 at 3; Ex. A; 4.1, 5.2; Trustee Exs. 21, 22; 

Kho Dec. ¶¶19, 20.) Laura Perryman executed the KLIM loan documents on 

behalf of Stimwave in her then-capacity as CEO. (Trustee Ex. 20, 21, 22; Kho 

Dec. ¶¶19, 20, 21.)

AA. KLIM negotiated and executed the LSA at arm’s length and in good 

faith. (Kho Dec. ¶23; Goldberg Dec. ¶26.) KLIM entered into the LSA in reliance 

upon Laura Perryman’s representations regarding the Assigned IP and StimQ 

Equity, among other things, and the documentation she provided. (Kho Dec. 

¶23, Trustee Ex. 29, 30.) At the time the LSA was executed and the perfection 

of all liens granted pursuant to the LSA, KLIM had no knowledge that any legal 

or factual basis existed, or was claimed to exist, to avoid the Debtor’s transfers 

of the StimQ Equity or Assigned IP to Stimwave. (Kho Dec. ¶25.)

Laura Perryman Separates from Stimwave and Seeks to Revive Debtor

BB. In the fall of 2019, Laura Perryman was placed on administrative 

leave by the Stimwave board. Ms. Perryman resigned as Stimwave’s CEO on 

November 25, 2019, hours before a meeting at which her continued employment 

was going to be discussed. (Goldberg Dec. ¶27.) 

CC. Subsequent to Ms. Perryman’s resignation, on November 25, 2021, 

she filed a Certificate of Correction of the Certificate of Cancellation in which 

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Ms. Perryman stated, “Due to clerical error, the entity was voluntarily cancelled 

when it should not have been.” (Trustee Ex. 23.)

The Adversary Proceedings and Stimwave’s and KLIM’s Claims

DD. Beginning in December 2019, Stimwave sued the Debtor and Laura 

Perryman in connection with, among other things, confirming the effectiveness 

of the Transfer Agreements, the ownership and use of the Assigned IP and the 

StimQ Equity, and the inclusion of those assets as KLIM’s loan collateral (the 

“Prepetition Litigation”).5 See Stimwave Tech., Inc. v. Micron Devices, LLC, No. 

2019-1003-SG (Del. Ch. 2019) (the “Delaware Action”). The Debtor and Laura 

Perryman filed counterclaims and third-party claims in the Delaware Action, 

including third-party claims against KLIM. (Goldberg Dec. ¶30.) The Delaware 

Action was set for trial in January 2021.6 (Goldberg Dec. ¶30.)

EE. The Debtor commenced two adversary proceedings against 

Stimwave (the “Adversary Proceedings” and collectively with the Prepetition 

Litigation, the “Litigation Matters”). In Case Number 21-01033-LMI (the 

“Turnover Action”), the Debtor seeks, inter alia, turnover of funds that it claims 

Stimwave owes the Debtor, totaling $4,479,928.27 (consisting of $1,081,405.16 

owed by Stimwave and the remainder owed by Stimwave’s affiliates). In Case 

Number 21-01034-LMI (the “Declaratory Judgment Action”), the Debtor seeks, 

inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the Contribution Agreement, License 

Assignment Agreement, and the Patent Assignment Agreement were null and 

5 For a detailed summary of the Prepetition Litigation, see allegations in ECF ##27 and 45.

6 Following the Debtor’s petition for bankruptcy protection, the Delaware Action was removed to 

the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. 

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void ab initio, and for related monetary relief.7 KLIM intervened in the 

Declaratory Judgment Action. (Declaratory Judgment Action, ECF ##8, 19.) On 

April 26, 2021, Stimwave and KLIM filed answers, affirmative defenses, and 

counterclaims in the Declaratory Judgment Action. (Declaratory Judgment 

Action, ECF ##40, 42.)

FF. Stimwave has asserted general unsecured claims against the 

Debtor’s estate in the amounts of $67,929.07, $3,772,073.00, and 

$3,042,158.28. See Claim Nos. 18-1, 19-2, 20-2. (Trustee Exs. 43, 44, 35.) 

Stimwave also has an allowed administrative claim against the Debtor’s estate 

in an amount to be determined by the Court. (ECF #163; Trustee Ex. 48 ¶¶5-

7; ECF #157 ¶3.)

GG. KLIM has asserted general unsecured claims against the Debtor

based on fraudulent inducement, see Claim No. 23-1, as well as contingent

secured claims against the Debtor that exceed $20,000,000, see Claim No. 22-

3, KLIM also has an allowed administrative claim against the Debtor’s estate in 

an amount to be determined by the Court. (ECF #163; Trustee Ex. 48 at ¶¶5-

7; ECF #174 ¶3.) 

HH. The Debtor has filed objections to the Stimwave filed claims and the 

KLIM filed claims. (ECF ##329, 330, 358, 360). The basis for the Debtor’s 

objection to the Stimwave claims is that the Transferred Assets were conveyed 

without the proper authority of Debtor. The basis for the Debtor’s objection to 

7 The Declaratory Judgment Action did not seek a declaratory judgment as to the Epimed 

Assignment. However, the validity of the Epimed Assignment was a subject of the declaratory

judgment sought by Stimwave, and contested by Debtor, in Delaware Action. (Goldberg Dec. 

¶32, n. 6.)

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the KLIM claims is, with respect to the unsecured claims based on fraudulent 

inducement, that the signatory to the LSA Agreement is Stimwave, not the 

Debtor and so any obligation is not an obligation of the Debtor; and with respect 

to the contingent secured claim, is that there was no transfer of the assets 

claimed as collateral by KLIM and that KLIM’s reliance of any misrepresentations 

made by Stimwave or Laura Perryman rests squarely with those parties and not 

with the Debtor.

The Trustee’s Conclusions Supporting the Settlement 

II. The Trustee has concluded that it is highly uncertain whether the 

Debtor could prevail on the merits of the Litigation Matters, including any 

Prepetition Litigation forming the basis of the Settled Claims. (Trustee Dec. ¶35.)

JJ. The Trustee has concluded that the ability of the Debtor’s estate to 

collect on any monetary judgment from Stimwave in the Turnover Action is 

uncertain, given the claimed lien of KLIM on the property subject to the Transfer 

Agreements, and the likelihood that the Debtor’s estate would need to satisfy all 

of KLIM’s secured claims and all administrative expense claims prior to realizing 

any net benefit for creditors of the Debtor’s estate. (Trustee Dec. ¶40.) 

KK. The Trustee has concluded that the ability of the Debtor’s estate to 

realize a net benefit from the Declaratory Judgment Action will be affected by the 

likelihood of claims in favor of KLIM and Stimwave resulting from, among other 

barriers described in the declaration, the representations made by Laura 

Perryman in the various Transfer Agreements which are directly inconsistent 

with the allegations of the Debtor, and Laura Perryman’s assertion of her Fifth 

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Amendment right against self-incrimination with respect to everything relating 

to these claims. (Trustee Dec. ¶¶38(e), 42.)

LL. The Trustee has testified that the Settled Claims, as defined by the 

9019 Motion, are deeply complex in nature, involve significant factual disputes 

dating as far back as 2013, and require resolution of legal issues spanning 

corporate governance, contract, tort and intellectual property law. (Trustee Dec. 

¶44.) The Trustee has further concluded that adjudication of the Settled Claims 

would require substantial efforts and expense by the parties to complete 

discovery, develop their claims and defenses, and prepare for trial. (Trustee Dec. 

¶45.)

MM. With the exception of the claims alleged by Stimwave and KLIM 

against the Debtor’s estate, there do not exist any recorded encumbrances 

against any property of the Debtor’s estate. (Trustee Dec. ¶31; Debtor’s

Schedules (ECF #1); Trustee Exs. 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40.) 

NN. No party has appeared in this case alleging an encumbrance against 

property of the Debtor’s estate. (Trustee Exs. 31, 32, 33, and 34.)

OO. A public records search reflects that there are no liens in the Palm 

Beach, Miami Dade or Broward Counties, the state of Florida, the state of 

Delaware, or the United States Patent and Trademark Office. (Trustee Exs. 39, 

40.) 

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over this motion pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §§157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning 

of 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2). 

2. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1408 and 

1409. 

3. The statutory and legal predicates for the relief granted herein are 

sections 105(a), 363(b), and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 

9019(a) and Local Rule 9019-1(A). 

4. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, 6006, and 9019, the 

parties to the Settlement Agreement have complied with all notice requirements, 

which constitutes good and adequate notice, and no further notice is necessary. 

5. The Subchapter V Chapter 11 Trustee has authority to file and 

prosecute the 9019 Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bank P. 9019, 6009 and 28 

U.S.C. §§323, 1183(b)(5).

The Settlement Agreement Meets the Standard for Approval

6. A compromise or settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 must be

fair, equitable, reasonable, and in the interests of the debtor’s estate. See 

Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 

390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); In re Se. Banking Corp., 314 B.R. 250, 272 (Bankr. 

S.D. Fla. 2004). A proposed settlement will be approved unless it “fall[s] below 

the lowest point in the range of reasonableness. See, e.g., Martin v. Pahiakos (In 

re Martin), 490 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2007); In re Arrow Air, Inc., 85 B.R. 

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886, 891 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). In considering a proposed settlement, the 

bankruptcy court “may certainly give weight to the trustee’s informed judgment 

that a compromise is fair and equitable.” In re S & I Investments, 421 B.R. 569, 

584 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). 

7. A trustee exercises sound business judgment when he evaluates 

“the strength and weaknesses of the potential claims and the cost and time it 

would take to litigate the claims.” See United States v. Hartog (In re Exporther 

Bonded Corp.), 597 B.R. 673, 679 (S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom.

In re Exp. Bonded Corp., No. 19-11937-FF, 2019 WL 4137769 (11th Cir. July 15, 

2019). 

8. In measuring whether the Trustee’s business judgment has been 

appropriately exercised, the Court must consider the following factors: (i) the 

probability of success in litigation; (ii) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered 

in the matter of collection; (iii) the complexity of the litigation involved and the 

expense, inconvenience, and delay attending it; and (iv) the paramount interest 

of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the premises. 

Wallace v. Justice Oaks II, Ltd. (In re Justice Oaks, II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1549 

(11th Cir. 1990).

9. “[P]ublic policy strongly favors pretrial settlement in all types of 

litigation because such cases, depending on their complexity, [like the Adversary 

Proceedings] ‘can occupy a court’s docket for years on end, depleting the 

resources of parties and the taxpayers while rendering meaningful relief 

increasingly elusive.’” Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Munford, Inc. (In re 

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Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449, 455 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting U.S. Oil & Gas v. 

Wolfson, 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992)).

10. Based on the findings of fact set forth herein, the Court concludes 

that the arguments, representations, proffers, and other evidence introduced in 

support of the 9019 Motion at the Evidentiary Hearing support and warrant the 

conclusions of law that the Settlement Agreement is an appropriate exercise of 

the Trustee’s business judgment, as it falls well above the lowest point in the 

range of reasonableness, and also meets the standards set out in In re Justice 

Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d at 1549.

11. Probability of Success. The Court finds that the probability of 

success on the litigation in the Turnover Action and the Declaratory Judgment 

Action is highly uncertain at best, based on the Court’s review of the evidence 

and applicable Delaware law. The Court finds the Trustee’s reasoning is a sound

analysis of the challenges to success. The Court cannot ignore that the key 

witness for the Debtor in all the Litigation Matters, and any objection to claims,

is Laura Perryman. Yet Ms. Perryman has asserted her Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination with respect to every element of any claims or defenses 

the Debtor might assert. Thus, regardless of any of those claims or defenses are 

actually viable, the Debtor would be unable to put on an effective case. See SEC 

v. Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. 896, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (citing McGahee v. Massey, 

667 F.2d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308 (4th 

Cir. 1991)).

12. Difficulties in Collection. This factor is not as compelling with 

respect to approval of the Settlement Agreement. The Court finds that the ability 

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of the Debtor’s estate to collect on any monetary judgment from Stimwave in the 

Turnover Action could be problematic, given the claimed lien of KLIM on the 

property subject to the Transfer Agreements. Jeff Goldberg testified that, if the 

Settlement Agreement is not approved, Stimwave will continue to litigate this 

issue because “resolution of the dispute regarding the Transfer Agreements is 

critical to Stimwave’s going concern value.” (Goldberg Dec. ¶34.) The Litigation 

Matters are certainly expensive8 and have clearly been a financial drain on the 

Debtor. Thus, it is fair for the Trustee to assume that collection, even if the 

Trustee were able to overcome the evidentiary hurdles, might be at least 

problematic. 

13. Complexity of the Litigation. The Court finds that the Litigation 

Matters are complex in nature by virtue of significant factual disputes

exacerbated by serious discovery violations9, and require resolution of legal 

issues spanning corporate governance, contract, tort, and intellectual property 

law. 

14. Paramount Interest of the Creditors. Several creditors support the 

9019 Motion. The Debtor has argued that the Court should not consider the 

support for the 9019 Motion by Stimwave or KLIM, both of whom are disputed 

creditors by virtue of objections filed by the Debtor and not impartial, or the 

support for the settlement by creditor Stryker Corporation, another creditor to 

8 Prepetition litigation attorneys’ fees and costs are at least $3,042,158.28 (Claim No. 20-2, page 

6).

9 See Final Report and Recommendation of the Special Discovery Master Concerning Motions 

Directed to Represented Defs, Stimwave Tech. Inc. v. Laura Tyler Perryman et al., Case No. 2019-

1003-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2020), as adopted by Order Adopting Report and Recommendations, 

Stimwave Tech. Inc. v. Laura Tyler Perryman et al., Case No. 2019-1003-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 

2020). The Delaware court’s order is attached as Exhibit H to ECF #45.

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whose claim the Debtor has filed an objection (ECF #350). However, while there 

may be times that a court might disregard or discount the support of disputed 

creditors, the Debtor did not cite to any authority, or any persuasive facts that 

would support the Court disregarding these creditors in this case.10

15. Moreover, the creditors whose interests this Court must consider 

include the administrative creditors, including the landlord, the Subchapter V 

Trustee and his professionals. See In re Vazquez, 325 B.R. 30, 41 (Bankr. S.D. 

Fla. 2005).

16. Since the Debtor has acknowledged that it cannot proceed with a 

confirmable plan, the only other option is dismissal.11 For the reasons previously 

cited by the Court at the Evidentiary Hearing, as evidenced by the two orders 

denying the two last minute Motions to Dismiss - the “structured dismissals” the 

Debtor has asked for, first directly and then indirectly - would not pass muster 

under Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). Thus, if this case 

were dismissed it would have to be a straight dismissal. The Court finds that, 

10 Debtor’s counsel has argued that this Court cannot rule on the 9019 Motion without first 

adjudicating the Debtor’s objections to the Stimwave and KLIM claims. However, as the Court 

explained to Debtor’s counsel at the Evidentiary Hearing, the very nature of compromise 

considers that there are unresolved issues that are being compromised. Moreover, the bases of 

the Debtor’s objections are the issues that are being resolved in the Settlement Agreement. “In 

approving the settlement agreement, the Bankruptcy Court did not have to rest its approval upon 

a resolution of the ultimate factual issues underlying the disputes that are compromised.” U.S. 

v. Hartog, 597 B.R. at 679. Finally, the Court notes the Debtor waited to file the objections until 

April 30, 2021, the same day as the first day of the Evidentiary Hearing.

11 The Debtor had every opportunity both before and after the 9019 Motion was filed to file an 

amended plan that included an exit strategy the incorporated MidAtlantic’s offer, subject to 

higher and better bids. But, putting aside the confirmability of such a plan, the Debtor never 

did so. Moreover, every other exit strategy motion filed by the Debtor, including the two Motions 

to Dismiss (ECF ##311, 368) and the motion to sell free and clear of liens (ECF #364), were filed 

at the last minute, literally on the eve of the Evidentiary Hearing. Thus, the Court finds that the 

Debtor has only filed these motions for the purpose of seeking to delay adjudication of the 9019 

Motion and not with the good faith intention to put forth a viable alternative. Indeed, the Court 

gave the Debtor a full week to put together a case on the “best interests” element and the Debtor’s

presentation fell well short of demonstrating to this trier of fact that the Trustee’s business 

judgment was unreasonable on this point.

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even if, after dismissal, MidAtlantic went through with an offer, at a minimum 

the administrative claimants would probably not get paid. There is nothing this 

Debtor has done that would lead this Court to believe that the Debtor would 

honor any financial commitment, and certainly not to the Trustee or his 

professionals, regardless of whether the Debtor was legally obligated to do so.

17. The MidAtlantic offer does not offer a viable solution for the Trustee 

if the case was not dismissed. The sale had no details other than money in a 

trust account. While Dr. Gupta, the principal of MidAtlantic, is clearly a 

passionate doctor, with very legitimate reasons for wanting to pursue the success 

of the Moventis product12, that is not relevant to the criteria either the Trustee 

or the Court must consider. The MidAtlantic offer contemplates a further 

negotiating period; it does not specify the additional terms upon which it is 

conditioned; it does not contemplate any good faith deposit; it does not specify 

what assets of the Debtor MidAtlantic seeks to purchase or the process by which 

the sale would take place. Moreover, the MidAtlantic offer proposes to pay certain 

creditors while not paying or reserving for all creditors’ claims which is not 

authorized by the Bankruptcy Code, does not specify how or by whom the 

existing litigation would be funded (although Dr. Gupta testified he would fund 

the litigation with his personal money if need be), does not address the issue of 

a reserve in the event of an adverse judgment, including the potential attorney 

fees liabilities13, or address the effect such adverse judgment would have on 

12 The product that MMC has apparently developed using the technology that is the subject of 

the Litigation Matters.

13 If the Debtor did not prevail in the pending Prepetition Litigation Stimwave could seek 

prevailing party legal fees under federal patent law, see 35 U.S.C. §285, and the Florida Unfair 

and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, see Fla. Stat. §501.2105. 

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parties holding administrative, priority, and general unsecured claims against 

Debtor’s estate. These postpetition administrative expenses would likely be 

substantial, and such liability would reduce or eliminate any recovery for 

creditors of the estate.

18. Dr. Gupta’s testimony that he would “close that very day” is an 

uninformed promise. With so many blanks to fill, it is also an empty promise. 

Thus, the Debtor has not provided any alternative that would benefit the 

creditors. 

19. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is in the paramount 

interest of creditors because absent court approval of the settlement and the 

receipt of the settlement payment, the Debtor will likely become administratively 

insolvent. This is supported by the Trustee’s projections that continued 

operations will generate a negative cash flow and will not be sufficient to cover 

administrative expenses. (Trustee Dec. ¶55-56.)14, 15

20. The proposed settlement payment, coupled with the consensual 

subordination of all claims of KLIM and Stimwave, projects to fund a meaningful 

distribution to holders of undisputed allowed claims, all secured claims, 

subchapter V administrative expenses, all unsecured priority claims, with 

approximately $100,000 available for distribution to general unsecured 

14 Brandyn Perryman testified that the Debtor could make “tens of millions of dollars” but neither 

MMC nor the Debtor provided any evidence to support this statement. Mr. Perryman’s testimony 

contradicts not only the Trustee’s financial analysis, which is based on the Debtor’s books and 

records (Trustee Dec. ¶¶19-20, 48, 54-55) but also the Debtor’s own projections appended to the 

Plan. 

15 Debtor argues in its Objection and at the Evidentiary Hearing that the Debtor would have 

plenty of money if the Trustee would just sell MMC the inventory that it is allegedly entitled to 

purchase. However, the Court finds the Trustee’s reasons for not concluding that sale are sound. 

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creditors, in addition to recoveries from avoidance actions and professional 

negligence claims. (Trustee Dec. ¶¶49, 59.)

The Transfer Agreements Are Valid

21. The Court concludes that the Transfer Agreements are valid, 

binding, and enforceable as of the respective date of each Transfer Agreement’s 

execution. 

22. The only issue raised regarding the enforceability of the Transfer 

Agreements is that they were all executed without either the Member Approval 

Requirement in the Debtor’s LLC Agreement, or, in the case of the Contribution 

Agreement, the Board Approval Requirement. However, the Court finds that even 

if the Member Approval Requirement or Board Approval Requirement was 

triggered by any of the Transfer Agreements, the Debtor may not raise that in 

order to seek to avoid the Transfer Agreements. Moreover, even if the Member 

Approval Requirement or Board Approval Requirement was appropriately raised, 

it does not appear that any of the Transfer Agreements triggered a Liquidation 

Event or a corporate strategic relationship as those terms are defined under the 

LLC Agreement. And, finally, even if any one of the Transfer Agreements 

constituted a Liquidation Event, the members of the Debtor ratified the Transfer 

Agreements after the fact.

23. A corporation may not seek to invalidate an act or the transfer of 

personal property on the basis that the corporation did not have the authority to 

take such act or convey such property. See 8 Del. C. §124. Assuming, arguendo, 

that any of the Transfer Agreements were within the Member Approval 

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Requirement or the Board Approval Requirement the Transfer Agreements were 

voidable rather than void. 

24. A contract entered into by a Delaware limited liability company 

without the receipt of an approval required under its operating agreement will 

ordinarily fall within the power and capacity of the company notwithstanding the 

failure to obtain such approval. CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 206 A.3d 

807, 817 (Del. 2018). The remedies available to shareholders where a corporation 

engages in a transaction for which it lacks capacity or power, are enumerated in 

Section 124 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law and do not include the ability 

to unwind, reverse, or void a consummated transaction on the basis that it falls 

outside the corporation’s power and authority.16 Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. 

v. Volgenau, No. CIV.A. 6354-VCN, 2012 WL 4038509, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 

2012), aff'd, 91 A.3d 562 (Del. 2014) (Under Delaware Law, “corporate actions 

will not be set aside and that capacity can only be challenged in three instances 

[identified in 8 Del. C. §124]”). Because neither of the Adversary Proceedings17

falls into one of these three procedural categories, the Transfer Agreements are 

enforceable irrespective of whether Member or Board approval was required 

16 8 Del. C. §124 titled Effect of lack of corporate capacity or power; ultra vires provides: “No act 

of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal property to or by a corporation 

shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without capacity or power to do 

such act or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer, but such lack of capacity or power 

may be asserted: (1) In a proceeding by a stockholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing 

of any act or acts or the transfer of real or personal property by or to the corporation. . . . (2) In 

a proceeding by the corporation . . . against an incumbent or former officer or director of the 

corporation, for loss or damage due to such incumbent or former officer’s or director’s 

unauthorized act; (3) In a proceeding by the Attorney General to dissolve the corporation, or to 

enjoin the corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.” 

17 Since the beginning of this bankruptcy case all parties to the Prepetition Litigation, including 

Stimwave and KLIM ,have expressed a willingness to have all the Debtor-related litigation relating

to the issue of ownership of the property subject of the Transfer Agreements, litigated in the 

Adversary Proceedings.

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25. Even if the Debtor was not barred procedurally from asserting lack 

of authority as a basis to set aside the Transfer Agreements, it does not appear 

that any of the Transfer Agreements constituted a Liquidation Event requiring 

Member approval. None of the Transfer Agreements constitutes a merger or 

consolidation. No merger or consolidation agreements were prepared or 

contemplated. Moreover, even if there were some basis to treat the Transfer 

Agreements as deemed mergers or consolidations, the members of Stimwave and 

of the Debtor at the time of the transfers were either all the same or virtually the 

same, such that the majority of voting control survived. 

26. The Transfer Agreements did not constitute a liquidation, 

dissolution or winding up of the Debtor. The only acts that constituted a 

liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Debtor were the filing by Laura 

Perryman of the Certificate of Cancellation and the filing of the 2018 final tax

return. Those acts were clearly ratified by the members of the Debtor since none 

of them objected to, or even commented on, the wind down when they received 

the final K-1s.

27. None of the Transfer Agreements constituted a sale of all or 

substantially all of the assets of the Debtor. While it is clear that with the last 

Transfer Agreement there were no remaining assets in the Debtor, the LLC 

Agreement does not say “sale or transfer”; it just says “sale”. And even this 

provision would have no applicability to the Contribution Agreement which was 

clearly not a transfer of either all or substantially all of the Debtor’s assets, that 

agreement was signed months before the other Transfer Agreements were signed.

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28. The Contribution Agreement might constitute a “corporate strategic 

relationship” under the LLC Agreement, but, even if the Debtor were 

procedurally able to challenge the possible lack of board authority, the fact that 

three members of the Debtor’s Board of Directors signed the Contribution Board 

Resolution would create a significant hurdle to any such challenge.

29. The License Assignment Agreement and the Patent Assignment 

Agreement were both executed in accordance with the IP Board Consent. The IP 

Board Consent makes clear that the execution of these agreements was not a 

sale, but rather, as set forth in the IP Board Consent, a transfer between two 

entities with the same ownership that “would improve the value and business 

prospects for Stimwave and better enable each of the respective companies to 

operate more efficiently.” Not only was this not a contemplated sale, it was also 

not contemplated that the Debtor would cease existence after the agreements 

were executed. Indeed, after the License Assignment Agreement and the Patent 

Assignment Agreement were executed, the Debtor clearly had assets left; those 

were conveyed through the final Transfer Agreement, the Epimed Transfer 

Agreement, which agreement the Debtor has not sought to set aside in the 

Declaratory Judgment Action.

30. The Court finds that even if the Debtor could assert lack of member 

or board approval, which it cannot, and even if board approval or member 

approval was required, which it was not, the Court finds that at least a majority 

of the members of the Debtor were aware or became aware of the transfers. First 

of all, all the members received final K-1s sometime in early 2019. That is a 

clear indication that the Debtor had transferred its assets. Second, the directors 

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who signed the IP Board Consent (Laura Perryman, Robert Anderson, and Mark 

Coleman) held 37.32% of the interests in the Debtor. Mr. Goldberg testified18

that the following unit holders were also aware of the transfers: (i) Echo 

Vibration Limited a/k/a Orchid, which held 6.15% of Debtor’s units and whose 

designee on the Stimwave board was present as an observer at the Stimwave 

board meeting at which the IP Assignments were approved (Goldberg Dec. ¶17; 

Trustee Exs. 8, 25); (ii) Elizabeth Greene, who owned 0.33% of the Debtor’s units 

and acted as Secretary at the same Stimwave board meeting (Goldberg Dec. ¶17, 

Trustee Ex. 8); (iii) the Debtor’s current Manager Patrick Larson, who was an 

employee of Stimwave and owned 5.84% of the Debtor’s units (Goldberg Dec. 

¶ 17; Trustee Exs. 11, 8); and Mark Loev, a current member of Stimwave’s board 

of directors who owned 0.85% of Debtor’s units (Goldberg Dec. ¶17; Trustee Ex. 

8). Those interests, together with the interests of Ms. Perryman and Messrs. 

Coleman and Anderson, constitute a majority of Debtor’s units as of December 

31, 2018, a total of 50.49%.

19 None of these investors sought to repudiate or 

challenge the transfers. Based on this, Stimwave might be able to seek 

application of equitable doctrines such as acquiescence, ratification, and laches 

to the Debtor’s challenges to the transfers.20 

18 No one disputed Mr. Goldberg’s testimony on this point or provided contradictory evidence.

19 Stimwave also owned over 5% of Debtor at the time, bringing the total units held by members 

with knowledge of the Transfer Agreements to over 55%, well over the majority required by the 

LLC Agreement.

20 The equitable doctrine of acquiescence could apply on the basis that the Debtor’s members 

with knowledge of their rights and the material facts, (1) remained inactive for a considerable 

time; or (2) freely did what amounts to recognition of the Transfer Agreements; or (3) acted in a 

manner inconsistent with the subsequent repudiation, which leads the other party to believe the 

act has been approved. Klaassen v. Allegro Development Corp., 106 A.3d 1035, 1047 (Del. 2014). 

The doctrine of ratification would apply on the basis that the conduct of the Debtor’s members 

was “such as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that [they] accepted or adopted” the Transfer 

Agreements. Genger v. TR Invs., LLC, 26 A.3d 180, 195 (Del. 2011). Laches would apply on the 

basis that the Debtor’s members had (i) actual or constructive knowledge of the Transfer 

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The Debtor’s Assets Will be Transferred Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and 

Encumbrances

31. The property the Trustee is required to convey under the Settlement 

Agreement is free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances as authorized 

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363(f)(2). No lien was of record in any relevant 

jurisdiction and no party alleging an encumbrance against property of the 

Debtor’s estate has interposed an objection to the proposed conveyance under 

the Settlement Agreement. 

Agreements; (ii) unreasonably delayed in bringing any claim; and (iii) prejudiced Stimwave as a 

result. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 210 (Del. 2005). And of course, the doctrine of 

unclean hands would apply to any challenge by Laura Perryman, the architect of all of the 

Transfer Agreements. The doctrine of unclean hands would apply to any individuals who 

authorized, and are now seeking to repudiate, or who made and benefitted from later statements 

concerning the validity of, the Transfer Agreements. Encite LLC v. Soni, No. 2476–VCG, 2011 WL 

5920896, at *23 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2011) (unclean hands applies where conduct would would 

“offend the very sense of equity”). 

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The Debtor’s Objection Presents Further Delay with No Evidence of a Viable 

Alternative Settlement or Plan

32. The Debtor’s amended objection to the 9019 Motion (ECF #317) (the 

“Debtor’s Objection”) requests further time to “allow for a restructuring plan 

which will not require liquidation” and additional “time to consider the offer 

presented” by the Debtor’s First Motion to Dismiss. (ECF #317, ¶¶2-3, 5, 7.) The 

Court has already addressed both the untimeliness of these arguments and the 

reasons why they are not sufficient to overcome the Trustee’s evidence.

MMC’s Objection is Overruled

33. MMC filed an objection to the 9019 motion (“MMC’s Objection”) on

April 28, 2021 (ECF #312). MMC’s Objection is based on the contention that the 

proposed Settlement Agreement would “force it to forfeit its property” (ECF #312, 

at 2), and “will cause MMC to fail as well” (ECF #312, ¶6). The premise of this 

objection is that because MMC has created a product using the technology that 

is the subject of the Litigation Matters, an agreement that resolves the ownership 

of the underlying technology will interfere with MMC’s product and will allow 

Stimwave to compete directly with MMC and use MMC’s know-how.

34. MMC did not introduce any evidence that the Debtor is in possession 

of MMC’s property. Section 2.1 of the Settlement Agreement states that Debtor 

is conveying only “Debtor’s right, title and interest in, to, and under the 

Transferred Assets” and the Trustee has submitted unrebutted testimony that 

the Settlement Agreement does not convey MMC’s property. (Trustee Dec. ¶57; 

Trustee Ex. 2 at 9.) MMC has argued, including in the Emergency Assumption 

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Motion, that Debtor is holding inventory, which the Trustee refuses to sell to 

MMC, with a total value of $250,000, which inventory can only be used by MMC. 

But MMC did not file the Emergency Assumption Motion until one week after 

competing orders were submitted to the Court, almost two weeks after the 

second day of the Evidentiary Hearing, almost three weeks after MMC’s counsel 

made an ore tenus motion seeking the sale and almost six weeks after the 9019 

Motion was filed.21 Moreover, the sale of the inventory to MMC would interfere 

with the Trustee’s obligations under the Settlement Agreement, if the 9019 

Motion were to be granted. And, the Trustee testified he was concerned that the 

Manufacturing Agreement was fabricated due to its sudden appearance. The 

inventory is property of the Debtor, not property of MMC, and the Trustee has 

the right to sell it.

35. The evidence shows that MMC can negotiate directly with the third 

parties that the Debtor was working with to supply MMC. Moreover, there was 

no evidence presented by MMC that there are any unique FDA approvals that 

the Debtor has that requires the Debtor’s continued operations for the benefit of 

MMC.22 

36. A consequence of approval of the 9019 Motion apparently will expose 

MMC to litigation regarding patent infringement. That is not the Court’s concern.

21 This delay does not excuse the Trustee’s delay in failing to file a motion to reject the 

Manufacturing Agreement and the Services Agreement.

22 At the conclusion of the first day of the Evidentiary Hearing counsel made an ore tenus motion

to compel the Trustee to sell the inventory under the terms of the Manufacturing Agreement 

because “there are patients, pursuant to the FDA studies, that require and need these devices.” 

(Tr. of April 30,2021 Hearing at 231 (ECF #381.)) The Court directed the parties to determine if 

anyone was in danger, and if so, to file an emergency motion. No emergency motion was filed, 

and, until May 18, 2021, MMC did not file any motion seeking to compel the sale.

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The Court notes that Laura Perryman is in control of MMC.23 Ms. Perryman 

knows better than anyone that any intellectual property that she used to develop 

MMC’s devices, which intellectual property she had previously caused to be 

transferred to Stimwave, carried a risk.24 

The Other Objections Are Overruled

37. The objections filed by individuals who identify themselves as former 

employees and priority wage creditors – Maryam Amiri (ECF #269), Brandyn J. 

Perryman (ECF #270), Patrick Larson (ECF #271), Marlene Pena (ECF #272), 

Ronald Perryman (ECF #273), and Luis Fernandez (ECF #290) – are overruled 

because these objections do not contest any of the Justice Oaks factors; rather 

they raise an issue as to projected employment with an affiliate of the Debtor, 

which is wholly unrelated to the legal standard for approving a settlement. 

Finally, the Trustee has submitted unrebutted testimony that if the Settlement 

Agreement is approved, he anticipates these creditors’ unsecured priority claims

will be paid in full. Thus, these objections are overruled.

38. Gary Perryman filed an objection to the 9019 Motion based on his 

belief that the Debtor and MMC “will enable payment in full according to the 

restructure plan.” (ECF #274.) Gary Perryman did not submit any evidence to 

support his objection, nor did he participate in the Evidentiary Hearing. 

23 The fact that Ms. Perryman may or may not be an interest holder doesn’t seem to have any 

impact on her total control of MMC. She created MMC. (MMC Ex. 22.)

24 Whether or not MMC’s product is “better” than what Stimwave has or has not developed is not 

relevant to this Court’s decision. 

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Moreover, the Debtor has not advanced its Plan and has now acknowledged it 

cannot reorganize. Thus, this objection is overruled.

39. Cobalt Capital, LLC filed an objection to the 9019 Motion. (ECF 

#322.) As stated on the record at the Evidentiary Hearing on April 30, 2020,

Cobalt Capital, LLC is not a creditor of the estate, and has no standing to object 

to the 9019 Motion. (Tr. of April 30, 2021 Hearing at 53:23-54:2 (ECF #381.))

40. After the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, Laura Perryman 

filed an untimely objection to the 9019 Motion. (ECF #383.) Much of the 

objection sets forth arguments that were raised by others and are addressed in 

this Order. Some of the objections lay out facts that were never introduced into 

evidence. Ms. Perryman had the opportunity to present evidence at the 

Evidentiary Hearing but chose not to do so. Thus, this objection is overruled as 

well.

BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 

1. The Objections are OVERRULED and the 9019 Motion is GRANTED.

2. The Settlement Agreement25, as modified in ¶¶9 and 14 below, is 

APPROVED.

3. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363, upon entry of this Order and 

compliance with the requirements to close set forth under the Settlement 

Agreement, all of Debtor’s right, title, and interest in, to, and under the 

Transferred Assets shall be transferred by the Trustee to the Stimwave Parent 

25 All capitalized terms not defined in this Order shall have the meaning ascribed in the 

Settlement Agreement as corrected (Trustee Ex. 56). To the extent the defined meanings differ, 

the definitions in the Settlement Agreement shall control.

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(or its designee), or pursuant to Section 2.1(d) of the Settlement Agreement, a 

KLIM Party or its Affiliate, as the case may be free and clear of all encumbrances. 

The Transferred Assets consist of all of Debtor’s assets and properties of every 

type and description, including but not limited to tangible, intangible, 

intellectual, personal, and real, and Causes of Action (whether known or 

unknown and whether or not currently asserted, and whether based on tort, 

contract, statute, common, law of other authority or theory), including: (i) the 

Transferred Contracts; (ii) all technical information owned or co-owned by the 

Debtor, including all technical information, know how, masks, software, and 

other information or data related in any way to any medical device of any type; 

(iii) all communications with legal counsel providing advice in any way related to 

patents or patent applications in any form whatsoever, including paper, digital, 

electronic, however or wherever stored; and (iv) the assets described in Schedule 

1.1 to the Settlement Agreement, and in each case, all of Debtor’s rights with 

respect thereto, but excluding the Retained Assets and the Micron Assignment 

Documents. 

4. The transfer of the Transferred Assets will be in all respects a valid, 

legal, and effective transfer of property under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy 

Code. The transfer is being made at arm’s length and Stimwave and KLIM are 

good faith purchasers entitled to the protections of 11 U.S.C. §363(m).

5. At any time prior to the expiration of the Designation Right Deadline, 

the Stimwave Parties may designate any of the Debtor’s executory contracts or 

unexpired leases to be assigned to the Stimwave Parties by the Trustee pursuant 

to 11 U.S.C. §365. To exercise the designation rights provided in Section 2.1(e), 

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the Stimwave Parties shall file and serve a Designation Document on the Trustee 

and any counter-party to the executory contract(s) or unexpired lease(s) subject 

to the Designation Document. The Stimwave Parties shall assume all liabilities 

associated with a Designated Agreement assigned to the Stimwave Parties upon 

the exercise of any designation right in Section 2.1(d) of the Settlement 

Agreement.

6. Within three business days of the Effective Date, the parties shall

file a joint stipulation of dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment Action and 

Turnover Action with prejudice based on this Order. 

7. The following claims are subordinated to all other allowed claims in 

the Bankruptcy Case, but shall remain senior in priority to any equity interests 

in the Debtor: 

i. any legal fees awarded by the Bankruptcy Court to the 

Stimwave Parties or the KLIM Parties pursuant to ECF #135, 

136, 157, 163, or 174;

ii. Stimwave Parent’s Claim No. 18-1 in the amount of $67,929.07;

iii. Stimwave Parent’s Claim No. 19-2 in the amount of 

$3,772,073.00; 

iv. Stimwave Parent’s Claim No. 20-2 in the amount of 

$3,042,158.28.

v. KLIM’s Claim No. 22-3 in the amount of $21,193,481.45; and

vi. KLIM’s Claim No. 23-1.

The Trustee shall have a right to object to any of these claims other 

than the claims described in paragraph 7.i.

8. Effective as of the Effective Date, the Debtor Releasing Parties, the 

Stimwave Releasing Parties and the KLIM Releasing Parties are permanently 

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enjoined and barred from pursuing, commencing or continuing in any manner 

any action or other proceeding of any kind on account of any Causes of Action 

that are released pursuant to the releases set forth in Section 3.1 of the 

Settlement Agreement, as applicable.

9. The Debtor and any interested party purporting to act on behalf of 

the Debtor are hereby enjoined from taking any action (or failing to take any 

action) in violation or contravention of Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of the Settlement 

Agreement. This injunction applies to all interested parties that received notice 

of the 9019 Motion and this Order. However, nothing in this Order shall be 

interpreted as an injunction against any person who is not the Debtor or a party 

purporting to act on behalf of the Debtor. The Stimwave Parties and the KLIM 

Parties will have the right to pursue any other parties not falling within the 

description of the preceding sentence for injunctive or other relief in whatever 

fora are available under non-bankruptcy law.26

10. Any automatic stay in this case in favor of or for the benefit of Debtor 

or any of its employees or Affiliates shall be lifted in favor of the Stimwave Parties 

26 It appears that Section 4.1(d) of the Settlement Agreement could be interpreted to enjoin 

parties other than the Debtor and non-Debtor parties purporting to act on behalf of the Debtor.

At the Evidentiary Hearing the Court expressly raised concerns about whether the Movants took 

the position that the Settlement Agreement would enjoin non-Debtor parties. In fact, at some 

point during the hearing on May 7, 2020 the Court observed that approval of the 9019 Motion 

would apparently mean that the litigation would probably continue with respect to any alleged 

use by MMC of the assets subject of the Transfer Agreements. Counsel for KLIM, on behalf of the 

Movants, specifically stated that the Movants were not asking this Court to impose an injunction 

against non-Debtor parties. But notwithstanding that this Order will not act as an injunction of 

non-Debtor parties other than those purporting to act on behalf of the Debtor, and for the 

avoidance of doubt, MMC, the former employees who raised objections, and Ms. Perryman, as 

well as all other parties in interest who received notice, had the opportunity to participate in the 

Evidentiary Hearing and to raise objections to the admission of evidence, cross-examine the 

Movants’ witnesses, and present their own evidence to contradict the evidence that forms the 

basis for this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The fact that some chose not to do 

so does not mean they are not bound by the findings of this Court set forth in this Order; they 

are.

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and KLIM Parties to expressly authorize the Stimwave Parties and/or the KLIM 

Parties to provide written notice to any employee, agent, or other representative 

of the Debtor or anyone else purporting to act on behalf of the Debtor (i) to 

immediately cease (a) any development, manufacture, marketing, sales, 

commercial distribution or clinical trials of any Pain Product by Debtor, or any

other entity acting on behalf of the Debtor, including Micron Medical Delaware, 

Micron Medical Florida, or any other Person acting on behalf of the Debtor, and 

(b) any development, manufacture, marketing, sales, commercial distribution or 

clinical trials of any Pain Product on behalf of the Debtor or provide services on 

behalf of the Debtor to or otherwise assist or support any Affiliate of Debtor on 

behalf of the Debtor, including Micron Medical Delaware, Micron Medical Florida, 

Laura Perryman, Patrick Larson, or any other employee or former employee of 

Debtor or any of its Affiliates, or any other Person, in the development, 

manufacture, marketing, sales, commercial distribution or clinical trials of any 

pain relief product or system, or method, including without limitation the Pain 

Product or any other PNS wireless neurostimulator; and (ii) otherwise to proceed 

with, initiate or pursue any claim, demand, or Cause of Action against any NonReleased Parties.

11. The Trustee, Stimwave, and KLIM are authorized to take any and all 

action necessary to effectuate the Settlement Agreement.

12. The effect of this Order shall survive the conversion, dismissal 

and/or closing of the Debtor’s chapter 11 case, appointment of a chapter 11 

trustee, and/or confirmation of a plan of reorganization or liquidation.

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13. The Court reserves sole and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and 

enforce the terms of this Order and the Settlement Agreement between the 

parties and to enter further orders as necessary to implement the Settlement 

Agreement.

14. The Settlement Agreement shall include the following modifications:

i. A new section 4.9 of the Settlement Agreement shall provide as 

follows: The Stimwave Parties agree to and shall indemnify the 

Debtor’s estate in an amount up to $180,000 for any claims 

allowed by a final order of the Bankruptcy Court arising from 

the rejection of that certain Distribution Agreement between the 

Debtor and Miami Medtech, LLC. Stimwave is granted and shall 

retain sole authority to litigate or settle any claim with Miami

Medtech, LLC on behalf of the Debtor’s estate.

ii. The definition of “Retained Claims” in Article I, Section 1.1 of the 

Settlement Agreement shall be modified to provide as follows: 

“Retained Claims” means any Cause of Action of the Debtor (i) 

that the Debtor has against any licensed professional for 

professional negligence arising out of services performed for the 

Debtor; (ii) that are prohibited from being assigned under 

applicable law; or (iii) to enforce the terms of this Agreement or 

the Ancillary Agreements; provided, that for the avoidance of 

doubt, Retained Claims shall include any Cause of Action 

pursuant to chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code other than (x) 

Causes of Action involving turnover provisions of Bankruptcy 

Code sections 542 and 543 and (y) Causes of Action against the 

Stimwave Released Parties and KLIM Released Parties.

###

Copies to: 

Marc Barmat, Esq.

Julia Kefalinos, Esq. 

Eyal Berger, Esq. 

Patricia Redmond, Esq. 

Adam Skolnik, Esq.

Attorney Barmat is directed to serve a copy of this Order on interested parties who do not 

receive service by CM/ECF, and file a proof of such service within two (2) business days from entry 

of the Order. 

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