Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1412-CR-445| June 30, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony S. Churchwood

Deputy Public Defender

Fort Wayne, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Reginald Gant,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 30, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1412-CR-445

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable John F. Surbeck, 

Judge

Cause No. 02D04-1404-FC-108

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Reginald Gant appeals his conviction for domestic battery, as a Class D felony. 

Gant presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented 

sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 11, 2014, Jennifer Fryback traveled with JaMarcus Sheffield to Gant’s 

home in Fort Wayne, where Gant lived with his mother, to pick up E.F., 

Gant’s eight-month-old son with Fryback. Fryback and Sheffield were in a 

relationship. When Fryback and Sheffield arrived at Gant’s home, Gant was 

outside with several friends. Fryback exited the vehicle, and Gant approached 

her. Immediately, Gant began asking Fryback questions about Sheffield. 

While Gant questioned Fryback, the two proceeded into Gant’s home so that 

Fryback could gather E.F. and his belongings. Sheffield remained in the 

vehicle.

[4] As Fryback collected E.F., Gant asked her if she and Sheffield were in a 

relationship, to which Fryback responded that Sheffield was “a friend of a 

friend.” Tr. at 85. Gant stated that he did not believe Fryback and exited the 

home, leaving Fryback inside. Gant entered the vehicle to ask Sheffield about 

his relationship with Fryback, and Sheffield responded that their relationship 

was sexual in nature. At Sheffield’s response, Gant, who had a firearm tucked 
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into his waistband, told Sheffield to exit the car because “[i]t’s about to get real 

wet.” Id. at 60. Undeterred, Sheffield exited the vehicle.

[5] Meanwhile, Fryback had begun putting E.F. into the car, and she heard Gant 

tell Sheffield to get out of the vehicle. In an attempt to avoid an escalation of 

the confrontation, Fryback asked Sheffield to leave the premises, and she got 

into the car with Gant and drove away. E.F. was sleeping in the backseat of the 

car.

[6] Fryback and Gant continued to argue as Fryback drove around Fort Wayne, 

and their argument continued when Fryback ultimately parked in a nearby 

neighborhood. While stopped, the two faced each other, and their discussion 

became increasingly heated. Gant, who held his gun in his right hand, then 

struck Fryback in her left jaw with his right hand. Fryback’s eyes were closed 

when Gant struck her, so she did not see the attack coming. E.F. woke when 

Gant hit Fryback. Soon thereafter, Fryback and Gant returned to Gant’s home, 

and Fryback left with E.F.

[7] Fryback suffered redness, swelling, and bruising to her left jaw, and, the next 

morning, Fryback called the Fort Wayne Police Department to report the 

incident. Later that day, Gant came to Fryback’s home, and Fryback again 

called the police, and Gant was arrested soon after. On April 17, 2014, the 

State charged Gant with criminal confinement, as a Class C felony; battery, as a 

Class C felony; pointing a firearm, as a Class D felony; and domestic battery, as 
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a Class D felony. Subsequently, the State dismissed the pointing a firearm 

charge.

[8] The trial court held Gant’s jury trial on October 21 and 22, 2014. At the 

conclusion of his trial, the jury acquitted Gant of criminal confinement and 

battery but convicted him of domestic battery. Following a sentencing hearing 

held on November 17, 2014, the trial court sentenced Gant to three years in the 

Department of Correction, with two years suspended to probation. This appeal 

ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[1] Gant contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for domestic battery. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the 

evidence claims is well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2000).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the 

verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh 

the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a 

conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved 

for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction 

unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).
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[2] To prove that Gant committed domestic battery against Fryback, as a Class D 

felony, the State was required to show: Gant (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) 

touched Fryback, an individual with whom he had a child in common; (3) in a 

rude, insolent, or angry manner; (4) in the physical presence of a child less than 

sixteen years of age; (5) knowing that the child was present and might be able to 

see or hear the offense; (6) which resulted in bodily injury to Fryback. See Ind. 

Code § 35-42-2-1.3.

[3] Gant does not contest that the evidence adduced at trial, if reliable, established 

each element of domestic battery, as a Class D felony. Instead, Gant asserts 

that Fryback, the victim, was the only witness against him, and “[s]he gave 

inconsistent testimony that was completely uncorroborated by any independent 

evidence. Further, he[r] testimony was not supported by any surrounding 

circumstances.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Specifically, Gant argues:

[Fryback] described the scene and said that she was in the 

driver’s seat[,] and Mr. Gant was on her right in the passenger’s 

seat. She stated that he struck her with the firearm in his right 

hand on the left-side [sic] of her face. The physical position in 

the vehicle described by Ms. Fryback is not realistic and goes 

against common sense. She had also claimed in prior statements 

that Mr. Gant had held the firearm to her head during the car 

ride when[,] at trial[,] she stated that he never pointed it at her.

Appellant’s Br. at 12-13. Gant also takes issue with photographs of the injuries 

to Fryback’s face, which he contends do not “portray any injury, save a small 

amount of redness. The redness, if any, is completely inconsistent and contrary 
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to her story of being struck with a firearm.” Id. at 13. Thus, Gant maintains 

that Fryback’s testimony was “incredibly dubious.” Id. at 12. 

[4] “The incredible dubiosity rule allows the Court to impinge upon a jury’s 

responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when confronted 

with inherently improbable testimony.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 

(Ind. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule should only be applied 

in very limited circumstances. Id. Indeed, as our supreme court has explained:

Under this rule, a court will impinge on the jury’s responsibility 

to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when it has 

confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced, 

equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible 

dubiosity. . . . A court will only impinge upon the jury’s duty to 

judge witness credibility where a sole witness presents inherently 

contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of 

coercion[,] and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of 

the appellant’s guilt.

Id. (emphasis in original; internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[5] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here, and Gant’s attempt to use the 

rule is merely an attempt to circumvent the ordinary rule that, in sufficiency 

challenges, we cannot reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of 

witnesses. Fryback testified that she and Gant faced each other in the car, as 

she sat in the driver’s seat and as Gant sat in the passenger’s seat. While in this 

position, Gant struck her in the left side of her face with his right hand, in 

which he held a firearm. Nothing about this testimony “goes against common 

sense,” Appellant’s Br. at 13, or is inherently contradictory such that we would 
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invoke the incredible dubiosity rule.1 Further, although Gant disputes the 

content depicted in the photographs of Fryback’s injuries, it was the province of 

the jury to weigh that evidence, and we will not impinge that power here. 

Finally, although it is true that, over the pendency of Gant’s case, Fryback first 

said that Gant pointed the gun at her and later stated that he did not do so, the 

State dropped Gant’s pointing a firearm charge prior to his trial. And, 

moreover, this inconsistency is irrelevant to whether Gant struck Fryback in the 

face, which provided the basis for his conviction for domestic battery.

[6] Gant also contends that the jury’s acquittal of Gant on the charge of battery is 

“suggestive that there was insufficient evidence” to convict him of domestic 

battery. Appellant’s Br. at 13. However, as Gant recognizes, “[j]ury verdicts in 

criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are 

inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 

649 (Ind. 2010). Therefore, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence 

to convict Gant of domestic battery, as a Class D felony.

[7] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.

 

1

 From Fryback’s testimony, the jury could infer that, although Gant held the firearm in his hand when he 

struck Fryback, he hit her only with his hand and not with the firearm itself.