IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0521

Filed November 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JISSEL MAGALI GOMEZ-TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel, 

District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated following 

the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Jissel Gomez-Torres appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated 

(OWI), arguing that the court should have granted her motion to suppress. 

Because we find that there was reasonable suspicion that Gomez-Torres was 

operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on her driving, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

At approximately 2:34 a.m. on September 22, 2022, Story County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Matthew Massaro observed a vehicle drive over the dashed white center 

line on the westbound Highway 30 exit ramp (the flyover or overpass) coming off 

of Interstate 35 and noted the driver continued driving in the middle of the two lanes

on the second portion of that flyover. As he continued behind the vehicle, he also 

saw it weave within its lane and vary its speed from sixty-five miles per hour (mph)

on the flyover to forty-five and back up to fifty-five mph on Highway 30, even though 

the speed limit was sixty-five mph. After the driver activated the turn signal late, 

the deputy noted the driver appeared to almost miss the turn onto the University 

Boulevard exit ramp off of Highway 30, and the vehicle drove over the exit ramp’s 

solid white lines and the gore1in the process. It was at that point that Deputy 

Massaro initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Once stopped, Deputy Massaro 

identified the driver of the vehicle from her driver’s license and insurance 

information as Gomez-Torres. 

The State charged Gomez-Torres via trial information with OWI, first 

offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(A) (2022), a serious 

1 The gore is the triangular part of a highway in between the highway’s lanes and 

an exit ramp. See Gore, Merriam-Webster (3rd ed. 2002).
3

misdemeanor, in October 2022. Gomez-Torres moved to suppress the evidence 

obtained following the stop of her vehicle, arguing that Deputy Massaro stopped 

her vehicle without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 

At the hearing on the motion to suppress in February 2023, Deputy Massaro 

testified that he did not observe Gomez-Torres exceed the speed limit of sixty-five 

mph or fall below the minimum speed limit. He also confirmed he did not begin 

following her vehicle based on any observation of a traffic violation. In fact, he 

stated he was not “entirely sure” what caused him to begin following the vehicle. 

In all, he opined that his observations encompassed four or five minutes of 

following her vehicle for a distance of about three or four miles. As additional 

evidence, the State offered and the district court admitted Deputy Massaro’s 

dashboard camera footage. The dash cam footage begins after Deputy Massaro 

observed the vehicle drive in the middle of the two lanes on the flyover from 

Interstate 35 to Highway 30 westbound. Beginning at 2:34 a.m. and ending at 2:38 

a.m. when Deputy Massaro initiates a traffic stop, the footage shows the driving 

maneuvers of Gomez-Torres. Because Deputy Massaro was pacing the vehicle, 

the footage also demonstrates—based on the patrol vehicle’s speed—that 

Gomez-Torres’s vehicle varied its speed from sixty-five mph down to forty-five mph

and back up to fifty-five. Deputy Massaro testified to observing the same driving 

behaviors depicted in his dash camera video.

Gomez-Torres argued at the suppression hearing that the deputy’s video 

“captured what happened here.” Then, Gomez-Torres emphasized there was no 

traffic violation that led the deputy to start following her. In her view, a person 
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viewing the footage would find a driver who was not speeding, was driving 

smoothly and mostly straight with only one or two occasions where she may have 

crossed a line, but certainly not in any manner to raise a reasonable suspicion of 

impairment. The district court disagreed.

At the hearing, the district court orally denied the suppression motion, 

finding that Deputy Massaro had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 

Gomez-Torres was operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on GomezTorres driving down the middle of two lanes over the dashed line dividing them, 

weaving in her lane, varying her speed, almost missing her exit, and driving over 

the gore area while crossing the solid white line. Ultimately, the district court 

concluded,

[W]hen this court looks at the totality of the circumstances, that the 

officer did have reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal 

activity was afoot. Maybe while none of these things individually 

would cause the court to make that determination, the court doesn’t 

look at each of these as an individual event.

Gomez-Torres agreed to the OWI charge being submitted to the court for a 

bench trial on the minutes of testimony.2 The district court found Gomez-Torres 

guilty as charged and sentenced her to two days in jail and a fine of $1250. 

Gomez-Torres now appeals. 

II. Standard of Review.

We review constitutional claims like this challenge to the denial of the 

suppression motion de novo. State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa 

2 The minutes of testimony reflected Gomez-Torres provided a chemical breath 

sample that tested at .185 blood alcohol level, which is over the legal limit. See 

Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2022).
5

2021); see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. In doing so, we conduct 

an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. State v. McIver, 

858 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]e do not evaluate reasonable suspicion 

based on each circumstance individually, but determine the existence of 

reasonable suspicion by considering all the circumstances together.”).

III. Analysis.

“A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure . . . .” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d

288, 292 (Iowa 2013). Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a 

seizure. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). To make a 

warrantless traffic stop of a vehicle, police must have probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop. Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “When a peace officer observes any type of traffic 

offense, the violation establishes both probable cause to stop the vehicle and 

reasonable suspicion to investigate.” State v. Pennington, 881 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2016); see also McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 702. Furthermore, “[r]easonable 

suspicion to stop a vehicle for investigative purposes exists when articulable facts 

and all the circumstances confronting the officer at the time give rise to a 

reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 

197, 204 (Iowa 2004). On the other hand, “[m]ere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of 

criminal activity is not enough.” Id. Because Gomez-Torres is only challenging 

the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop of her vehicle, we only address 

reasonable suspicion in our analysis. 
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Our supreme court established the bright-line rule that a single incident of 

briefly crossing the edge line of a divided highway, absent more, is not enough to 

raise reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 205–06; see also State v. 

Murphy, No. 21-0938, 2022 WL 1100904, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2022)

(applying Tague and stating, “we do not believe Murphy's one-time act of crossing 

the fog line with his truck’s passenger side tires gave rise to a reasonable suspicion 

that he was driving while intoxicated”).

However, in interpreting Tague, we have repeatedly found that a vehicle 

that does more than cross the edge line once for a couple of seconds may raise 

reasonable suspicion that the driver is intoxicated. See State v. Lobo, No. 17-

1768, 2019 WL 762192, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019) (collecting cases

finding reasonable suspicion based on crossing of center and edge lines along 

with time of night); see State v. Keith, No. 17-1044, 2018 WL 2174089, at *2 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (collecting cases finding reasonable suspicion based on 

swerving, weaving, and crossing of center and edge lines). In fact, when 

considering a set of similar circumstances, we determined that the stopping officer 

had reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop. See State v. Sorenson, 

No. 14-1101, 2016 WL 718984, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (finding 

reasonable suspicion when a vehicle made a wide turn on a corner, crossed “the 

center line on occasion,” and weaved over the fog line before “crossing a rumble 

strip, leaving the travel portion of the highway and driving on the shoulder until” 

coming to a stop sign). Even more, our supreme court has clarified the Tague

standard to add that “[w]eaving within one’s own lane and changing speeds without 

exceeding the speed limit do not violate any statute, but they do provide evidence 
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of impairment.” State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d 90, 104 (Iowa 2021). And we consider 

the totality of all observed driving behaviors in determining whether reasonable 

suspicion of impaired driving existed. McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 702.

Here, Deputy Massaro observed more than a single crossing of the white 

edge line of the highway. Instead, he testified to—and the dash camera footage

supported—“something more”: Gomez-Torres driving down the middle of two 

lanes over the dashed line dividing the lanes, weaving in her lane and touching the 

dashed center line and solid edge line in the process, varying her speed to twenty 

miles below the speed limit, almost missing her exit and activating her turn signal 

only after doing so, and driving over the gore area next to the exit while crossing 

the solid white line separating the exit from the highway lanes. Taken together, 

these actions rise above the level of a single isolated incident of briefly touching 

the edge line. Therefore, Deputy Massaro had sufficient evidence of impairment 

to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, namely, that 

Gomez-Torres was driving while intoxicated, and the warrantless traffic stop was 

not a violation of her constitutional rights.

IV. Conclusion.

Because Deputy Massaro’s stop of Gomez-Torres’s vehicle was supported 

by reasonable suspicion based on more than a single, isolated incident of touching 

the edge line of the road, we find, like the district court, that Gomez-Torres’s motion 

to suppress should be denied, and we affirm her conviction for OWI, first offense.

AFFIRMED.