UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4624

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN DUJAN GARDIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00005-FDW-DCK-1)

Submitted: August 24, 2021 Decided: August 26, 2021

Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William D. Auman, AUMAN LAW OFFICES, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Dujan Gardin pled guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding 

and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; brandishing a firearm during and 

in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c) and 2, and discharging a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. The district court imposed an aggregate 220-

month sentence consisting of concurrent 16-month terms on the Hobbs Act robbery 

offenses, a mandatory consecutive 84 months on the brandishing offense, and a mandatory 

consecutive 120 months for discharging a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of 

violence. Gardin’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Gardin filed a pro se 

supplemental brief challenging his conviction and sentence for brandishing a firearm 

during a crime of violence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Citing United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (holding that § 924(c)’s 

residual clause is unconstitutional), Gardin challenges his brandishing conviction because 

he contends that he did not use force or violence during the commission of the offense. 

However, the predicate crime of violence for the brandishing conviction was Hobbs Act 

robbery, which qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. See United 

States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019). We therefore find no error in Gardin’s 

conviction for brandishing a firearm during the commission of Hobbs Act robbery.

We review Gardin’s sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first ensure that 
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the court “committed no significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the 

Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or 

inadequately explaining the sentence. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 

2014). If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we also review its substantive 

reasonableness under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The 

sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals 

of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly 

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Such a presumption can only be 

rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted).

Our review of the record convinces us that Gardin’s sentence is both procedurally 

and substantively reasonable. The district court imposed the statutorily-mandated

minimum sentences for the firearms offenses.* With respect to the sentence imposed for 

the Hobbs Act robbery convictions, the district court properly calculated the applicable 33-

to 41- month advisory Guidelines range, considered the parties’ sentencing arguments, and 

adequately explained its reasons for the downward variant, 16-month sentence imposed. 

* Gardin’s consecutive 7- and 10-year sentences for the firearms offenses do not 

violate the anti-stacking amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), because that amendment 

concerns only the enhanced 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for subsequent § 924(c) 

convictions.
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Gardin fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his below 

Guidelines sentence. Id. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have 

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Gardin, in writing, of the right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Gardin requests that a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may 

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state 

that a copy thereof was served on Gardin. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED