SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3278-14T1

JARROD KAUFMAN, RACHEL KAUFMAN,

WILLIAM QUICK and NANCY QUICK,

on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC. and

ROBERT M. LYNCH,

Defendants-Respondents.

_________________________________

Argued September 21, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket 

No. L-5358-14.

Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for appellants 

(The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wolf, 

Matthew S. Oorbeek, Henry P. Wolfe, Andrew W. 

Li and Daniel I. Rubin, on the briefs).

Brian E. O'Donnell argued the cause for 

respondents (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & 

Perretti, LLP, attorneys; Mr. O'Donnell, 

Michael P. O'Mullan, Jeffrey M. Beyer and 

Casey A. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

August 22, 2017
2 A-3278-14T1

Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for amicus 

curiae The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute 

and Chamber of Commerce of the United States 

of America (Lowenstein Sandler, LLP, 

attorneys; Mr. Rooney and Naomi D. 

Barrowclough, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Jarrod and Rachel Kaufman and William and Nancy 

Quick are two sets of consumers who filed a putative class action 

suit against defendant Lumber Liquidators, Inc. and its Chief 

Executive Officer, Robert M. Lynch. In their complaint, plaintiffs 

alleged they purchased "wood flooring and associated merchandise"

from Lumber Liquidators "several times from August 29, 2012 through 

October 20, 2012." The sales invoices defendants provided did not 

contain language promising plaintiffs that "the merchandise" they

ordered would be delivered by a specific date. (Emphasis added).

Plaintiffs claimed Lumber Liquidators' failure to include the

precise "delivery date" language on its sales invoices violated 

the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), 

N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18; the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A.

56:8-1 to -20; and the Delivery of Household Furniture and

Furnishings Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 to -5.4. Plaintiffs 

do not allege defects or deficiencies in the products they 

received. In fact, they suffered no actual damages. They seek 

only statutory civil penalties in the amount of $100 for each 
3 A-3278-14T1

alleged violation of the TCCWNA and reasonable attorney's fees 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

The Law Division granted defendants' motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of law for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. See R. 4:6-2(e). The 

dispositive issue is whether the hardwood flooring plaintiffs 

purchased from Lumber Liquidators constitutes "household 

furniture" under N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d), which provides as 

follows: "For purposes of this rule, 'household furniture'

includes, but is not limited to, furniture, major electrical 

appliances, and such items as carpets and draperies."

Applying the well-settled standards established by the 

Supreme Court in Printing-Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics

Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), Judge Andrea G. Carter concluded 

"a plain reading" of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d) shows the term 

"household furniture" does not include hardwood flooring. Judge 

Carter found no reason to include non-moveable improvements to 

real property, such as hardwood flooring or wall-to-wall 

carpeting, in the regulatory definition of "household furniture."

Plaintiffs argue Judge Carter erred in adopting such a narrow 

reading of the regulation. Defendants urge us to uphold Judge 

Carter's analysis and ultimate conclusion. The New Jersey Civil 

Justice Institute and the United States Chamber of Commerce filed 
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a joint brief as amici curiae, urging us to use this case as an 

opportunity to adopt "a rigorous standard" for defining what 

constitutes a "clearly established legal right of a consumer"

under the TCCWNA. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.

We agree with Judge Carter's analysis and affirm. The longestablished canon of ejusdem generis provides that "'where general 

words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general 

words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 

those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" Wilson 

ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 584 (2012)

(quoting Massachi v. City of Newark Police Dep't, 415 N.J. Super.

518, 543–44 (App. Div. 2010)). The objects provided to illustrate 

the limits of the regulation's reach clearly exclude items such 

as hardwood floors, which, as Judge Carter noted, constitute

permanent improvements to property. When "the plain language 

yields the meaning of the statute [or regulation], then our task 

is complete." State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014) (citing

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

We thus affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by 

Judge Carter in her oral opinion delivered from the bench on 

February 20, 2015. In this light, we decline Amici Curiae's 

invitation to go beyond the four corners of plaintiffs' pleading 
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to resolve the straightforward dispositive legal question 

presented here.

Affirmed.