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MALKIE WIEDERMAN v. ISSAC HALPERT ET AL.

(SC 20066)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*

Argued December 20, 2018—officially released December 17, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

fiduciary duty, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where

the named defendant et al. filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the action was withdrawn as against the defendant Judah Liberman; subsequently, the defendant 58

North Walnut, LLC, et al. were defaulted for failure to

appear; thereafter, the named defendant et al. were

defaulted for failure to appear at a trial management

conference; subsequently, following a hearing in damages, the court,Brazzel-Massaro, J., rendered judgment

for the plaintiff, and the named defendant et al. appealed

to the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon

and Mihalakos, Js., which reversed in part the trial

court’s judgment and vacated the award of punitive

damages, and the named defendant et al., on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Kerry M. Wisser, with whom, on the brief, was Sarah

Black Lingenheld, for the appellants (named defendant

et al.).

Taryn D. Martin, with whom, on the brief, wasRobert

A. Ziegler, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Malkie Wiederman, commenced this action arising out of a real estate investment agreement with the defendants Issac Halpert and

Marsha Halpert,1

seeking, inter alia, to recover damages

for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, and

violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices

Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. After

the trial court rendered a judgment of default against the

defendants for failing to appear at a trial management

conference, it held a hearing to determine damages. On

the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff at

that hearing, at which the defendants also failed to

appear, the trial court awarded the plaintiff $600,892.58

in compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees

and costs. Thereafter, the defendants moved to open

the judgment rendered against them and to enjoin the

plaintiff from enforcing it. The trial court, noting both

that the defendants received multiple notices to new

and old addresses and that Issac Halpert failed to appear

and to testify at the hearing on damages despite being

personally served by subpoena, denied their motion.

The defendants then appealed from the trial court’s

denial of their motion to open, claiming, inter alia, that

the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s claims because the alleged injuries sustained by her were derivative of the harm suffered by

the limited liability companies of which she and the

defendants were members, and, as such, the plaintiff

lacked standing to recover directly. See Wiederman v.

Halpert, 178 Conn. App. 783, 793, 176 A.3d 1242 (2017).

The Appellate Court rejected the defendants’ claim,

concluding that, because the plaintiff sufficiently

alleged an injury that was separate and distinct from

that suffered by the limited liability companies2—as she

alleged, among other things, that the defendants forged

her signature on certain financial documents3—the trial

court had properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction

over her direct claims. See id., 797–98. We granted the

defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited

to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly

uphold the determination of the trial court that the

plaintiff had standing to sue?’’ Wiederman v. Halpert,

328 Conn. 906, 177 A.3d 1161 (2018).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,

we have determined that the appeal in this case should

be dismissed on the ground that certification was

improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices Palmer, McDonald,

D’Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker. Although Justice Palmer was not present

when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs and

appendices, and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.
1 The operative complaint also named several other defendants; they are

not parties to this appeal. See Wiederman v. Halpert, 178 Conn. App. 783,

785 n.1, 176 A.3d 1242 (2017). All references herein to the defendants are

to Issac Halpert and Marsha Halpert.

2 We have explained that, ‘‘where an injury sustained to a [shareholder]

. . . is peculiar to him alone, and does not fall alike upon other shareholders,

the shareholder has an individual cause of action.’’ Yanow v. Teal Industries,

Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 282 n.9, 422 A.2d 311 (1979). Consequently, we observe

that the circumstances in this case differ from the situation in which a

member of a closely held limited liability company attempts to bring otherwise derivative claims in a direct action. See Saunders v. Briner, 334 Conn.

, , A.3d (2019) (adopting rule permitting trial courts to treat

otherwise derivative claims in direct action when brought by sole member

of limited liability company if it finds that certain criteria are met).

3 We observe that the plaintiff introduced evidence at the hearing in damages that, through forging her signature on various documents, the defendants created a situation in which the plaintiff, rather than the limited

liability companies, was held personally liable to repay refinance debt on

at least two of the development properties. The trial court found that ‘‘[t]he

exhibits provide[d] abundant support for damages as to [several counts

including] count . . . four,’’ which alleged forged financing documents.