to discuss his testimony by calling the North Las Vegas police department 

and informing them that the alibi witness had active traffic warrants. 

The witness was later arrested on those warrants and booked in jail. We 

agree that the State's conduct was improper. However, Norton has failed 

to explain how he was prejudiced by the State's conduct. The district court 

threatened to dismiss Norton's case if the witness did not appear in court 

to testify on Norton's behalf. At trial, the alibi witness appeared in court 

and testified that Norton was with him in another part of town at the time 

the robbery occurred. Therefore, we discern no prejudice arising from the 

State's improper conduct. We conclude that the district court did not err 

and Norton is not entitled to the reversal of his convictions on this 

ground. 2 

Second, Norton contends that he is entitled to the reversal of 

his conviction because the State referred to his in-custody status in three 

different ways. See Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. 285, 287, 809 P.2d 1272, 

1273 (1991) (explaining that references to defendant's in-custody status 

2To the extent that Norton attempts to argue for the first time in his 

reply brief that the State's conduct prejudiced him because it intimidated 

another female witness who did not testify at Norton's trial, we decline to 

consider this claim. See NRAP 28(c); see also Elvik v. State, 114 Nev. 883, 

888, 965 P.2d 281, 284 (1998) (explaining that arguments made for the 

first time in a reply brief prevent the respondent from responding to 

appellant's contentions with specificity). Furthermore, this new 

contention was not raised by Norton's counsel during his trial. Instead, 

the facts supporting this allegation were raised in Norton's post-verdict 

proper person Motion to Dismiss Counsel and Request a Mistrial which 

was denied by the district court. 

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are improper). The first objection occurred before opening statements. 

Norton objected to the admission of photos taken of his tattoos which 

Norton claimed showed him in a jail jumpsuit with the doors to the jail 

behind him. The district court stated, "I can't tell he's in custody." Norton 

has not provided copies of the photographs and we are not convinced that 

the district court erred by admitting them. The second and third 

references to Norton's in-custody 

statements. The State referred to a 

after [he] was taken into custody." 

appears to have read "shortly after 

status occurred during opening 

phone call made by Norton "shortly 

The PowerPoint presentation also 

being taken into custody." Norton 

objected and moved for a mistrial because the statements referred to his 

in-custody status. The district court overruled the objection noting that 

the incident referred to by the State occurred just after he was arrested. 

We conclude that the State's improper references to Norton's in-custody 

status were harmless, see State v. Carroll, 109 Nev. 975, 977, 860 P.2d 

179, 180 (1993); Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. at 288, 809 P.2d at 1273, and 

that the district court did not err by denying his motion for a mistrial. 

Third, Norton contends that the State shifted the burden of 

proof during opening statements by telling the jury, "I urge you to resist 

any urges to make this complicated." We conclude that this statement did 

not shift the burden of proof and therefore did not support Norton's motion 

for a mistrial. 

Fourth, Norton appears to contend that there was a late 

disclosure of photographs and fingerprint evidence. To the extent that the 

allegations contained in Norton's opening brief make out a cognizable 

claim for relief, Norton has not demonstrated error because he has not 

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supported his claim with sufficient argument or citation to any legal 

authority. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) 

("It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent 

argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court."). 

Fifth, Norton contends that the district court erred by 

allowing the State to refer to the contents of jail phone calls during 

opening statements because he made a timely objection and those phone 

calls were not admitted during trial and were later excluded based on the 

State's failure to comply with NRS 179.500. 3Even if the district court 

erred by allowing this evidence to be disclosed to the jury during opening 

statements, we conclude that Norton is not entitled to relief on this 

ground. See NRS 178.598. The jury was instructed to consider the 

evidence and that "statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not 

evidence." See Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 66, 17 P.3d 397, 405 (2001) 

(explaining that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions). 

Furthermore, the State did not refer to the content of the jail phone calls 

during closing arguments. In light of these circumstances and the 

presentation of other compelling evidence of Norton's guilt at trial, we 

conclude that the error was harmless. 

Having considered Norton's contentions and concluded that he 

is not entitled to relief, we 

3To the extent that Norton contends that the jail phone calls were 

erroneously admitted during the State's case in chief or on rebuttal, we 

conclude that Norton has failed to demonstrate that the jail phone calls 

were actually admitted into evidence by the district court. 

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ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 4 

—Lt J. 

Hardesty 

e-T 

J. 

Douglas 

CHERRY, J. dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent from the panel's decision because I 

believe that the retaliation against Norton's alibi witness, disclosure of 

Norton's jail phone call during opening statements, and discussion of 

Norton's in-custody status affected his substantial rights. See NRS 

178.598. I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new 

trial. 

J. 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Matthew D. Carling 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

4Norton's briefs fail to comply with NRAP 32(a)(4) because they do 

not contain 1-inch margins on all four sides. Counsel for Norton is 

cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the 

future may result in the imposition of sanctions. 

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