Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-428 | September 14, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Daniel I. Hageman

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Courtney L. Staton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carl Murray,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 14, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-428

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1908-F3-32467

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-428 | September 14, 2020 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Carl Murray (“Murray”) appeals his convictions for two counts of Attempted 

Murder, Level 1 felonies,1 and one count of Domestic Battery, as a Class A 

misdemeanor.2 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Murray presents two issues for review:

I. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for the attempted murder of Y.H.; and

II. Whether instructing the jury on transferred intent was 

fundamental error because it conflicted with an instruction 

on the State’s burden of proof.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the summer of 2019, Murray presented his wife, Y.H., with dissolution 

documents. Y.H. did not sign the documents but the couple separated. Their

estrangement was partially due to Murray’s accusations that Y.H. was sexually 

involved with their neighbor and friend, J.J. After the separation, Murray 

1

Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.

2

I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
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would sometimes return to Y.H.’s Indianapolis residence to socialize with 

friends on the porch or to visit his stepchildren.

[4] On the day of August 10, 2019, Murray was in and out of the residence. He 

transported his stepdaughter to her friend’s house. Atypically, he asked his 

stepson if he would like to go to his biological father’s house, and then drove

him there. Around 11:00 p.m., Y.H. and J.J. left to buy cigarettes. When they 

returned, Y.H. backed her vehicle into her driveway. The pair sat in Y.H.’s 

vehicle for about twenty-five minutes, drinking and listening to music. Y.H.

saw Murray drive his vehicle through an alley and park behind her vehicle.

[5] Murray approached the driver’s side of Y.H.’s vehicle, holding a rifle. He

opened the door and said, “you mother******* thought this was a game.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, pg. 221.) Y.H. saw that the rifle was pointed toward J.J.’s head and she 

grabbed the barrel. Murray shot through Y.H.’s right hand pinky finger and 

Y.H. yelled “mother****** you just shot my finger off.” (Id. at 222.) Murray 

continued shooting, until Y.H. was hit with three bullets and J.J. was hit with 

six bullets.

[6] Inside the residence, Y.H.’s friend Steven Seals (“Seals”) had been watching 

television when he heard Y.H. cry out “no Carl don’t” followed by gunshots. 

(Id. at 138.) Seals looked in vain for a weapon, then went outside to confront 

Murray. Murray approached Seals, rifle in hand, but Seals tackled Murray and 

flipped him over a porch railing. Seals got Murray into a headlock and used his 

fists and a brick to strike blows to Murray’s head. Seals was able to get control 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-428 | September 14, 2020 Page 4 of 8

of Murray’s rifle at some point but when Seals tried to fire it, he discovered that 

it was either empty or jammed. During the struggle, Murray protested that he 

loved Y.H. and was sorry. When Seals was injured by a brick and lost his grip, 

Murray escaped the headlock, ran to his truck, and drove off.

[7] Police and emergency medical personnel arrived to find Y.H. and J.J. each in a 

critical condition. One bullet had struck an artery in Y.H.’s leg. She underwent 

surgery and was given 5.5 liters of blood, essentially a replacement of her full 

blood supply. Y.H. was hospitalized for five days. J.J. was placed in a 

medically induced coma, having suffered injuries to his colon, spleen, 

diaphragm, spine, and kidney. J.J. endured multiple surgeries, received five

liters of blood, and was hospitalized for nineteen days.

[8] On January 6, 2020, Murray was brought to trial before a jury on two counts of 

Aggravated Battery, Level 3 felonies,3two counts of Attempted Murder, Level 

1 felonies, and one count of Domestic Battery, as a Level 5 felony. The jury 

found Murray guilty as charged but, due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial 

court declined to enter judgments of conviction upon the Aggravated Battery 

counts and reduced the Domestic Battery conviction to a misdemeanor. 

Murray received consecutive sentences of thirty years and twenty-five years for 

the attempted murders of J.J. and Y.H., respectively. He was given a 

concurrent one-year sentence for Domestic Battery. Murray now appeals. 

3

I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
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Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Murray does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction for the attempted murder of J.J. However, he contends that the 

State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to kill Y.H. He points to a 

lack of testimony that he deliberately aimed the rifle at Y.H. or verbally 

threatened Y.H. in particular.

[10] In order to convict Murray of the attempted murder of Y.H., the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Murray, acting with the 

specific intent to commit murder, engaged in an overt act that constituted a 

substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Davis v. State, 558 N.E.2d 

811, 812 (Ind. 1990). 

[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we will 

consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the 

conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The requisite intent to commit murder 

may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely 

to cause death. Davis v. State, 558 N.E.2d 811, 812 (Ind. 1990). Discharging a 

weapon in the direction of a victim is substantial evidence from which a jury 

can infer intent to kill. Leon v. State, 525 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind. 1988).
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[12] Y.H. testified that Murray, armed with a rifle, approached her vehicle, opened 

the door, and stated “you mother******* thought this was a game.” (Tr. Vol. 

II, pg. 221.) After Murray fired the first shot, which severed Y.H.’s pinky, and 

Y.H. cursed at him, Murray did not desist. Rather, he continued firing his 

weapon into the vehicle until it was either empty or jammed. Y.H. was 

ultimately struck by three bullets. From this evidence, the jury could 

reasonably conclude that Murray intended to kill Y.H. 

Instruction on Transferred Intent

[13] “The purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to 

the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 

clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 

1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001). Jury instruction is a matter assigned to trial court 

discretion, and an abuse of that discretion occurs when instructions, taken as a 

whole, mislead the jury as to the applicable law. Ham v. State, 826 N.E.2d 640, 

641 (Ind. 2005).

[14] Here, the jury was instructed, in accordance with Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 

948, 950 (Ind. 1991), that the jury could convict Murray of Attempted Murder 

only if it found that he had specific intent to kill. The jury also received an 

instruction on transferred intent:

Under the doctrine of Transferred Intent, the intent to harm one 

person may be treated as the intent to harm a different person 

when, through mistake or inadvertence, violence directed toward 

one person results in injury to a different person.
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In a situation where there is an intent to kill one person, but a 

different person suffers the injury and dies, the intent to kill the 

first person may serve as proof of the intent to kill the actual 

victim.

Murray lodged a vague objection: “I have a problem with it because if there’s 

an accident then where’s the transferred intent? ... For the record, I’m objecting 

to it.” (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 71.) On appeal, he relies upon grounds not asserted at 

trial, that is, he argues that the transferred intent instruction conflicts with the 

instruction on specific intent to kill and the State could have secured a 

conviction upon a lessened burden of proof.

[15] It is well-settled that a defendant may not object to an instruction upon one 

ground at trial and present a different ground upon appeal. See Morgan v. State, 

755 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Ind. 2001). Murray has therefore waived any such 

error and may prevail only upon showing fundamental error. Fundamental 

error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant 

faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to 

the defendant’s rights as to “make a fair trial impossible.” Benson v. State, 762 

N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).

[16] Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant’s intent to kill one person 

is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third 

person; thus, the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person 

who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another. Blanche v. 

State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998). “This doctrine also applies to the intent 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-428 | September 14, 2020 Page 8 of 8

necessary for attempted murder.” Id. Murray has shown no conflict or error in 

the instructions given to the jury, much less fundamental error.

Conclusion

[17] Sufficient evidence supports Murray’s conviction for the attempted murder of 

Y.H. He has not established fundamental error in the instruction to the jury.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Baker, Sr. J., concur.