Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 1, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00739-CV

YIGAL BOSCH, Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY, THE HARRIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

EDUCATION, THE PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY OF HARRIS 

COUNTY, THE HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, THE 

HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, HOUSTON INDEPENDENT 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, HOUSTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM, 

GREATER SHARPSTOWN MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, and CITY OF 

HOUSTON, Appellees

On Appeal from the 165th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2012-48002

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The clerk’s record in this appeal was filed September 12, 2013. According to 

the record, the underlying case is a suit for delinquent ad valorem property taxes. 

Appellant filed a pro se answer on behalf of Y.B. & S.J. Enterprises, Inc., one of 
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the defendants named in the suit. Appellees filed a motion in the trial court 

requesting appellant to show authority to act on behalf of the corporation. See Tex. 

R. Civ. P. 12. The trial court granted the motion and directed the corporation to 

proceed with a person authorized to appear on its behalf to defend the suit. 

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal in an attempt to appeal the trial court’s 

August 5, 2013, order granting appellees’ motion to show authority. 

Appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments and such 

interlocutory orders that the Legislature deems appealable by statute. Bally Total 

Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); see, e.g., Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. The trial court’s August 5, 2013, interlocutory order 

is not an order that is made appealable by statute. An order to show authority 

pursuant to Rule 12 is not appealable until it is merged into a final judgment. State 

Bd. of Ins. v. Williams, 736 S.W.2d 259, 260–61 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no 

writ); Sewell v. Hardriders, Inc., No. 14-11-01023-CV, 2012 WL 170952, *1 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

On September 16, 2013, notification was transmitted to all parties of the 

court’s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 

42.3(a). On September 20, 2013, appellant filed a response in which he argues that 

the corporation is defunct and has no assets to hire an attorney. He asserts that 

Section 51.014(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code should apply to 

allow his appeal. Section 51.014(f) governs permissive interlocutory appeals. The 

statute provides that the trial court may grant permission, by written order, to 

appeal an order that is not otherwise appealable if the order meets certain criteria. 

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d). When a trial court has permitted 

such an appeal, the party seeking to appeal must petition the court of appeals for 

permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(a). The petition must be filed within 15 
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days after the order to be appealed is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 28.3(c). Appellant 

has not complied with the requirements for a permissive appeal by obtaining an 

order granting permission to appeal from the trial court and filing a timely petition 

seeking permission from this court. Accordingly, appellant may not appeal from an 

interlocutory order pursuant to Section 51.014(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code.

The record does not contain an appealable order, and we lack jurisdiction 

over this attempted appeal. Accordingly, we order the appeal dismissed without 

prejudice to appellant’s right to appeal from a subsequent final judgment.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Brown, Christopher, and Donovan.