[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 1 (Thursday, January 2, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 121-136]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: X97-10102]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice


Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses 
Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

    Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular 
biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to 
publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, 
under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants 
the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective 
any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the 
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards 
consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a 
request for a hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from December 9, 1996, through December 19, 1996. 
The last biweekly notice was published on December 18, 1996.

Notice Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility 
Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation 
of the facility in accordance with the

[[Page 122]]

proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for 
each amendment request is shown below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received 
before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will 
publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for 
opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that 
the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules 
Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and 
Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the 
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. 
Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint 
North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 
p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be 
examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for a hearing and 
petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.
    By February 3, 1997, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public 
document room for the particular facility involved. If a request for a 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, 
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by 
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will 
issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and 
Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC, 
by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of 
the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so 
inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 
1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union 
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the 
following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name 
and

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telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication 
date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the 
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the 
attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will 
not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the 
presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for 
the particular facility involved.

Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 
50-529, and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 
Units 1, 2, and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona

    Date of amendments request: November 6, 1996
    Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment would 
modify the technical specifications (TS) to require manual blocking of 
one train of fast bus transfer (FBT) within the first hour of degraded 
switchyard voltage should the switchyard voltage fall below the level 
necessary for the electrical distribution system (EDS) degraded voltage 
protection to maintain compliance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 
17. The proposed amendment would further require the starting, 
paralleling with the grid, loading, and then separating from the grid 
the other train's emergency diesel generator (EDG) within the first 
hour, rather than the current TS which allows two hours after onset of 
a degraded switchyard voltage condition to start the EDG. 
Alternatively, fast bus transfer can be blocked in both trains within 
the first hour. The proposed amendment includes changes to the 
applicable notes to reflect that these changes are no longer temporary, 
but will remain as part of the long-term solution to this issue.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee provided 
its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
NRC staff's analysis is presented below:
    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change reduces the amount of time the second train of 
electrical equipment is allowed to remain in nonconformance with GDC 17 
in the TS action statement. This change only affects equipment used to 
mitigate an event, and does not affect equipment assumed to initiate 
any event. Thus the probability of an accident previously evaluated is 
not affected.
    The proposed change brings the second EDS train into compliance 
with GDC 17 at least one hour sooner than the current TS. Once in 
conformance with GDC 17, the consequences of accidents previously 
evaluated conform to the current analysis. Thus the proposed change 
does not increase the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change only affects equipment designed to mitigate the 
effects of an accident. The proposed change ensures that safety 
equipment is configured as assumed in the current accident analysis. 
The proposed change does not affect the conditions of structures, 
systems, or components assumed in the safety analysis beyond the 
existing design basis as maintained by the current TS. The proposed 
change does not, therefore, create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The margin of safety affected by the proposed change is based on 
calculated offsite dose consequences for postulated transients and 
accidents for which the EDS provides power for equipment required to 
mitigate. The proposed change reduces the time that one train of the 
EDS is allowed to remain in nonconformance with GDC 17, thus 
increasing the availability of the EDS prior to the onset of a 
postulated accident compared to the current TS. Thus the proposed 
change does not increase thecalculated offsite dose, and therefore 
the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the amendments request involve no significant hazards 
consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, 1221 
N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85004
    Attorney for licensee: Nancy C. Loftin, Esq., Corporate Secretary 
and Counsel, Arizona Public Service Company, P.O. Box 53999, Mail 
Station 9068, Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
    NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318, 
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert 
County, Maryland

    Date of amendments request: November 26, 1996
    Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment will 
adopt Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, to require Type B and 
Type C containment leakage rate testing to be performed on a 
performance-based testing schedule. Containment leakage rate testing is 
currently performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, 
Option A, ``Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-
Cooled Power Reactors.'' Appendix J specifies containment leakage 
testing requirements, including the types of tests required, frequency 
of testing, and reporting requirements. Containment leakage test 
requirements include performance of Integrated Leakage Rate Tests, also 
known as Type A tests, which measure overall leakage rate of the 
containment; and Local Leakage Rate Tests, also known as Types B and C 
tests, which measure the leakage through containment penetrations and 
valves. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has amended the 
regulations to provide an alternate performance-based option, Option B, 
to the existing Appendix J. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE) 
received approval to adopt Option B for Type A testing only. At this 
time, BGE plans to adopt Option B for Types B and C testing, as well.
    BGE is revising the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for 
Type A testing to implement Types B and C testing of the containment as 
required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B. 
The revised program will be developed in accordance with the guidelines 
contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163 ``Performance-Based Containment 
Leak-Rate Test Program,'' dated September 1995, including errata.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability 
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

[[Page 124]]

    Containment leakage rate testing is performed in accordance with 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, ``Primary Reactor Containment Leakage 
Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.'' The Appendix J 
containment leakage test requirements include performance of Type A 
tests, which measure the overall leakage rate of the containment, 
and Types B and C tests, which measure the leakage through 
containment penetrations and valves. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has amended the regulations to provide a performance-
based alternative, Option B, to the existing Appendix J. Baltimore 
Gas and Electric Company adopted Option B for Type A testing during 
the Unit 1 refueling outage earlier this year. At this time, BGE 
plans to adopt Option B for Types B and C testing.
    Implementation of Option B involves no physical or operational 
changes to the plant structures, systems, or components. 
Furthermore, leakage rate does not contribute to the initiation of 
any postulated accidents; therefore, this proposed change does not 
involve an increase in the probability of any previously evaluated 
accidents.
    Types B and C testing is necessary to demonstrate that leakage 
through the containment penetrations is within the limits assumed in 
the accident analyses. The only potential effect of the proposed 
change to the Types B and C test frequency is the possibility that 
containment penetration leakage would go undetected between tests. 
To provide assurance that containment penetration leakage remains 
within the limits of the Technical Specifications, BGE plans to 
implement the performance-based leakage testing program in 
accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.163, dated September 1995 
(including errata), with no exceptions.
    By adopting Option B, BGE will no longer require an exemption 
from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which was granted to accommodate 
24-month operating cycles. The exemption increased the surveillance 
interval to a maximum of 30 months, while proportionately decreasing 
the combined Types B and C leakage rate acceptance criteria. Option 
B to Appendix J provides the regulation necessary to accommodate an 
extended fuel cycle, while maintaining the original combined Types B 
and C leakage rate testing limit. Therefore, BGE has requested 
revocation of the exemption to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, as 
adoption of Option B for Types B and C testing will enable a return 
to full compliance with Appendix J. As the facility will be in full 
compliance with the regulations, this change does not increase the 
consequences of any previously evaluated accidents.
    Implementation of Option B does not change the total allowable 
containment leakage rate acceptance criteria, nor does it change the 
total leakage assumed in the accident analyses. Option B allows the 
implementation of a performance-based testing program to ensure that 
resources are concentrated on the components most likely to exceed 
administrative limits. Similarly, the changes to relocate the 
procedural details, including test frequency, performance and data 
conversion methodology, for containment leakage rate testing from 
the Technical Specifications to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing 
Program will have no effect on the total containment leakage allowed 
by the Technical Specifications, or assumed in the accident 
analyses. Relocating the allowable leakage rate conversions 
(Standard Cubic Centimeters per Minute) to the Technical 
Specification Bases does not change the allowable leakage rates (as 
a percentage of the containment air volume) specified in the 
Technical Specifications. Furthermore, relocation of the 
programmatic controls for Types B and C testing, including the 
allowable leakage rates, to the Administrative Controls section of 
the Technical Specifications ensures an adequate level of regulatory 
control of these criteria is retained.
    Additionally, the Calvert Cliffs Individual Plant Examination 
considered the effects associated with severe accidents which could 
lead to containment failure. It was concluded that adopting a 
performance-based testing interval will not significantly affect the 
containment failure probabilities calculated for the Individual 
Plant Examination. Altogether, adoption of a performance-based 
testing frequency, as specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, 
Option B, will not significantly decrease the confidence in the 
leak-tightness of the containment, including containment 
penetrations. Therefore, this change will not result in a 
significant increase in the probability of undetected containment 
penetration leakage in excess of that allowed by the Containment 
Leakage Rate Testing Program, or assumed in the accident analysis, 
or in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Would not create the possibility of a new or different type 
of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed Technical Specification change adopts a 
performance-based approach to containment penetration leakage rate 
testing. This change does not add any new equipment, modify any 
interfaces with any existing equipment, or change the equipment's 
function, or the method of operating the equipment. The proposed 
change does not affect normal plant operations or configuration, nor 
does it affect leakage rate test methods. As the proposed change 
would not change the design, configuration or operation of the 
plant, it could not cause containment penetration leakage rate 
testing to become an accident initiator.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    The purpose of the existing schedule for Types B and C tests is 
to provide assurance, on a regular basis, that the release of 
radioactive material will be restricted to those leak paths and 
leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses. The margin of safety 
associated with containment penetration leakage rates is not reduced 
if containment leakage does not exceed the maximum allowable leakage 
rate defined in the Technical Specifications. Implementation of 
Option B does not change the total allowable containment leakage 
rate acceptance criteria, nor does it change the total leakage 
assumed in the accident analyses. Option B only allows the 
implementation of a performance-based testing program to ensure that 
resources are concentrated on the components most likely to exceed 
administrative limits. Similarly, the changes to relocate the 
procedural details for containment leakage rate testing from the 
Technical Specifications to either the Containment Leakage Rate 
Testing Program or the Technical Specification Bases will have no 
effect on the total containment leakage allowed by the Technical 
Specifications, or assumed in the accident analyses. Furthermore, 
relocation of the programmatic controls for Types B and C testing, 
including the allowable leakage rates, to the Administrative 
Controls section of the Technical Specifications ensures that the 
same regulatory control of these criteria is retained.
    Elimination of the exemption to Appendix J which reduced the 
amount of combined Types B and C testing allowable leakage 
redistributes that portion of the total containment leakage which 
may be attributed to local leakage rate testing, but does not affect 
the maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L<INF>a. The 
proposed change does not affect a safety limit, a Limiting Condition 
for Operation, or the way in which the plant is operated.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Calvert County Library, Prince 
Frederick, Maryland 20678.
    Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silbert, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, 
Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
    NRC Project Director: S. Singh Bajwa, Acting Director

Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi-2, Monroe County, 
Michigan

    Date of amendment request: December 2, 1996 (NRC-96-0134)
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.4.3, Rod Block Monitor, and 
Tables 3.3.6-1 and 4.3.6-1 in TS 3.3.6, Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation, to expand the range of conditions under which the rod 
block monitor must be operable. These changes are required to ensure 
that all fuel limits are met for the core that has been loaded for 
Cycle 6.

[[Page 125]]

    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. The proposed changes provide requirements that are more 
restrictive than the existing requirements for operation of the 
facility. These changes provide assurance that the Rod Block Monitor 
system is operable when necessary to prevent or mitigate transients 
that could potentially threaten the integrity of the fuel cladding. 
There will be no adverse impact on the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated since the change provides additional assurance 
that fuel thermal and mechanical design bases will be satisfied and 
has no effect on any accident initiating mechanism. The additional 
restrictive conditions on plant operation also ensure that the 
consequences of anticipated operational occurrences are no more 
severe than the most limiting conditions using the current Technical 
Specifications. Therefore these changes do not involve any increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. The proposed changes will not involve any physical changes to 
plant systems, structures, or components (SSC). The changes in Rod 
Block Monitor operability requirements are consistent with the 
current safety analysis assumptions. These requirements provide 
assurance that the Rod Block Monitor will be operable if necessary 
to terminate a rod withdrawal error so that fuel thermal and 
mechanical design limits are satisfied. The change does not cause a 
physical change to the plant or introduce a new mode of operation. 
Therefore, the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. These changes maintain current assumptions within the safety 
analyses and design basis. The changes provide assurance that the 
Rod Block Monitor will be operable if necessary to terminate a rod 
withdrawal error so that fuel thermal and mechanical design limits 
are satisfied. Therefore, these changes do not involve a reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Monroe County Library System, 
3700 South Custer Road, Monroe, Michigan 48161
    Attorney for licensee: John Flynn, Esq., Detroit Edison Company, 
2000 Second Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48226
    NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and 
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, 
Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: November 6, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the technical specifications to permit an increase in the 
allowable leak rate for the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and 
delete the Penetration Valve Leakage Control System (PVLCS) and Main 
Steam-Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) requirements.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    (1) The operation of River Bend Station, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed amendment to delete Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 
and 3.6.1.9 involves eliminating the PVLCS and MS-PLCS leakage 
control requirements from the Technical Specifications. As described 
in Sections 9.3 and 6.7 respectively, of the USAR [Updated Safety 
Analysis Report], the PVLCS and MS-PLCS are manually initialed about 
20 minutes following a design basis LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident].
    Since the PVLCS and MS-PLCS are operated only after an accident 
has occurred, this proposed amendment has no effect on the 
probability of an accident.
    Since MSIV leakage and operation of the PVLCS and MS-PLCS are 
included in the radiological analysis for the design basis LOCA as 
described in Section 15.6.5 of the USAR, the proposed amendments 
will not affect the precursors of other analyzed accidents. The 
PVLCS and MS-PLCS are not initiators of any previously analyzed 
accident. The proposed amendments result in acceptable radiological 
consequences of the design basis LOCA previously evaluated in 
Section 15.6.5 of the USAR.
    The proposed amendment to Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 does 
not involve a change to structures, components or systems that would 
affect the probability of an accident previously evaluated. A plant-
specific radiological analysis has been performed to assess the 
affects of the proposed increase to the allowable MSIV leak rate and 
deletion of the PVLCS and MS-PLCS in terms of Control Room and off-
site doses following a postulated design basis LOCA. This change 
required a revision to the existing LOCA dose analysis due to the 
potential leakage from the MSIVs and those valves served by the 
PVLCS. Additional changes were also included in the revised dose 
analysis to account for changes in regulatory guidance and dose 
methodology. Leakage from the drywell to the atmosphere through the 
PVLCS (secondary containment bypass valves) are both assumed to 
begin at time zero. The model conservatively assumes that one 
inboard MSIV fails open at time zero and the MSIVs associated with 
the remaining three main steam lines are assumed to begin leakage at 
2 hours with a total leak rate of 200 scfh for all four main steam 
lines. The design basis leak rate of the primary containment 
(excluding main steam lines and lines sealed by the PVLCS) is 0.26% 
of the containment volume by weight per 24 hours for the duration of 
the accident and is assumed to be released entirely to the 
environment initially or the secondary containment later into the 
accident. The leakage of 170,000 cc/hr (4298 sccm) at P<INF>a 
through the containment isolation valves served by the PVLCS is 
considered as bypass leakage circumventing the secondary 
containment. The on-site and off-site doses were determined using 
the TRANSACT computer code which included the ICRP 30 dose 
conversion factors. The total off-site and on-site LOCA doses for 
both the airborne and liquid release pathways resulting from the 
proposed change are bounded by the applicable regulatory limits.
    The analysis demonstrates that dose contributions from the 
proposed combined MSIV leakage rate limit of 200 scfh and from the 
proposed deletion of the PVLCS and MS-PLCS result in values bounded 
by the applicable regulatory limits as compared to the LOCA doses 
previously evaluated for the off-site and Control Room doses as 
contained in 10CFR100 and 10CFR50, Appendix A (General Design 
Criteria 19), respectively. The LOCA doses previously evaluated are 
discussed in Section 15.6.5 of the USAR.
    The whole body (DDE [Deep Dose Equivalent]) doses at the Low 
Population Zone (LPZ) is 2.82 Rem and the Control Room is 0.43 Rem. 
These values are acceptable since the revised doses are bounded by 
the Regulatory Guidelines (2.82 versus 25 Rem at the LPZ and 0.43 
versus 5 Rem at the Control Room). The associated whole boy (DDE) 
dose at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) is 4.69 Rem which also 
remains bounded by the Regulatory Guideline of 25 Rem.
    The thyroid CEDE [Committed Effective Dose Equivalent] dose at 
the LPZ is 62.58 Rem. This is acceptable since the revised dose of 
62.58 Rem is significantly less than the Regulatory Guideline (300 
Rem). The EAB thyroid CEDE dose is 37.53 Rem, whereas the Control 
Room thyroid CEDE dose is 11.18 Rem. These values are also 
acceptable since the revised doses are well within the Regulatory 
Guidelines (37.53 versus 300 Rem at the EAB and 11.18 versus 30 Rem 
at the Control Room). The Control Room beta (SDE [Shallow Dose 
Equivalent]) dose is 9.15 Rem which also remains bounded by the 
Regulatory Guideline of 30 Rem.
    In summary, the proposed changes do not result in an increase to 
the radiological consequences of a LOCA previously evaluated in the 
USAR. The revised LOCA doses are bounded by the Regulatory 
Guidelines. The effectiveness of the proposed request even for 
leakage rates greater than the

[[Page 126]]

proposed MSIV allowable leak rate ensures that off-site and Control 
Room dose limits are not exceeded.
    There is no physical change to the ADS/SRVs [Automatic 
Depressurization System/Safety Relief Valve]. The PVLCS accumulator 
tanks remain the backup air supply to the ADS/SRV accumulators. A 
qualified long-term backup air supply remains but is supplied from a 
difference source. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed change deletes the requirements for the LCS 
[Leakage Control System] isolation valves which are non-PCIVs. These 
valves are eliminated and will not be performing a safety function. 
The LCS lines that are connected to the PCIVs and process piping 
will be welded and/or capped closed to assure primary containment 
integrity is maintained. The welding and post-weld examination 
procedures will be in accordance with the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section XI requirements. These 
welds and/or caps will be periodically tested as part of the primary 
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) program in accordance 
with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J. The proposed change 
does not involve an increase in the probability of equipment 
malfunction previously evaluated in the USAR. In fact, the proposed 
change reduces the probability of equipment malfunction since, upon 
implementation, RBS will be operated with fewer process line 
isolation valves and associated support equipment subjected to 
postulated failure. The affected LCS MOVs [Motor Operated Valves] 
will be eliminated or retained as normal system isolation or 
maintenance valves having no safety or leakage control function thus 
requiring no bypassing of their thermal overloads. This proposed 
change has no effect on the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated since the LCS lines will be welded and/or capped closed, 
thus assuring that primary containment integrity, isolation and leak 
test capability are not compromised.
    Therefore, as discussed above, the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
any accident previously evaluated.
    (2) The operation of River Bend Station, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed amendment to Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 does 
not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated. The BWROG (Boiling Water 
Reactors Owners Group) evaluated MSIV leakage performance and 
concluded that MSIV leakage rates up to 200 scfh will not inhibit 
the capability and isolation performance of the valve to isolate the 
primary containment. There is no new modification which could impact 
the MSIV operability. The LOCA has been reanalyzed at the proposed 
maximum combined leakage rate of 200 scfh. Therefore, the proposed 
change does not create any new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated in the USAR.
    The proposed amendment to delete Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 
and 3.6.1.9 does not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the 
removal of the PVLCS and MS-PLCS does not affect any of the 
remaining systems at RBS [River Bend Station) and the LOCA has been 
reanalyzed with LOCA doses resulting from the proposed change 
remaining bounded by the applicable regulatory limits.
    The PVLCS and MS-PLCS are of low safety significance as 
discussed in NUREG-1273, Technical Findings and Regulatory Analysis 
for Generic Safety Issue II.E.4.3, ``Containment Integrity Check,'' 
and NUREG/CR-3539, ``Impact of Containment Building Leakage on LWR 
Accident Risk.''
    The proposed change to eliminate the LCS does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated because the removal of the LCS does not 
adversely affect any of the remaining RBS systems or change system 
inter-relationships. The associated proposed changes to delete the 
LCS isolation valves does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident. The affected LCS MOVs will be eliminated 
or retained as normal system isolation or maintenance valves having 
no safety or leakage control function thus requiring no bypassing of 
their thermal overloads. The PVLCS and MS-PLCS connections to the 
process piping will be welded and/or capped closed to assure that 
primary containment integrity, isolation and leak testing capability 
are not compromised, therefore eliminating the possibility for any 
new or different kind of accident.
    Therefore, as discussed above, the proposed changes do not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.
    (3) The operation of River Bend Station, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    The proposed amendment to Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 does 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The 
allowable leak rate limit specified for the MSIVs is used to 
quantify a maximum amount of bypass leakage assumed in the LOCA 
radiological analysis. Results of the analysis demonstrate 
calculated doses, assuming the two single active failures of one 
MSIV to close and one diesel generator to respond are bounded by the 
requirements of 10CFR100 for the off-site doses and 10CFR50, 
Appendix A (General Design Criteria 19) for the Control Room doses. 
The calculated whole body doses are significantly reduced at the 
LPZ, the Control Room, and the EAB. The calculated thyroid dose is 
significantly reduced at the LPZ, the Control Room, and the EAB.
    The proposed amendment to delete Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 
and 3.6.1.9 for the PVLCS and MS-PLCS, does not reduce the margin of 
safety. In fact, the overall margin of safety is increased. The 
method is effective to reduce dose consequences of MSIV and the 
PVLCS leakage over an expanded operating range and will, thereby, 
resolve the safety concern that the PVLCS and MS-PLCS will not 
function at leakage rates higher than their design capacity. The 
method is consistent with the philosophy of protection by multiple 
leak-tight barriers used in containment design for limiting fission 
product release to the environment. Therefore, the proposed method 
is highly reliable and effective for MSIV leakage and deletion of 
the PVLCS and MS-PLCS.
    The calculation shows that MSIV leakage rates up to 100 scfh per 
steam line would not exceed the regulatory limits. Therefore, the 
proposed method provides a substantial safety margin for mitigating 
the radiological consequences of MSIV leakage beyond the proposed 
Technical Specification leak rate limit of 200 scfh for all four 
main steam lines (combined maximum pathway).
    Minor increases in containment leakage such as the leakage 
through the MSIVs, as identified in NUREG-1273, NUREG/CR-3539, and 
NUREG-1493 have been found to have no significant impact on the risk 
to the public. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The proposed change to delete the LCS isolation valves does not 
reduce the margin of safety. Welded and/or capped closure of the LCS 
lines assure that primary containment integrity and leak testing 
capability are not compromised. The affected LCS MOVs will be 
eliminated or retained as normal system isolation or maintenance 
valves having no safety or leakage control function thus requiring 
no bypassing of their thermal overloads. The PVLCS and MS-PLCS 
connections to the process piping will be welded and/or capped 
closed to assure that primary containment integrity, isolation and 
leak testing capability are not compromised, therefore eliminating 
the possibility for a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    Therefore, as discussed above, the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Government Documents 
Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803
    Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 
1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
    NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

[[Page 127]]

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and 
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, 
Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: November 15, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the technical specifications to allow the performance of the 24-
hour emergency diesel generator (EDG) maintenance run while the unit is 
in either Mode 1 or Mode 2. This test for the River Bend Station (RBS) 
is currently prohibited in Mode 1 and Mode 2 and allowed in Modes 3, 4, 
and 5.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. The proposed change does not significantly increase the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The RBS SAR [Safety Analysis Report] assumes that the AC 
[Alternating Current] electrical power sources are designed to 
provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy and reliability 
to ensure that the fuel, reactor coolant system and containment 
design limits are not exceeded during an assumed design basis event. 
Specifically, the SAR assumes that the onsite EDGs provide emergency 
power in the event offsite power is lost to either one or all three 
EDF [Engineered Safety Features]
    buses. In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF 
electrical loads are automatically connected to the EDGs in 
sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate 
the consequences of a design basis accident such as a LOCA [Loss of 
Coolant Accident].
    The proposed change to permit the 24-hour testing of the EDGs 
during power operation does not significantly increase the 
probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident. 
The capability of the EDGs to supply power in a timely manner will 
not be compromised by permitting performance of EDG testing during 
periods of power operation. Design features of the EDGs and 
electrical systems ensure that if a LOCA or LOP [Loss of Offsite 
Power] signal, either individually or concurrently, should occur 
during testing, the EDG would be returned to its ready-to-load 
condition (i.e., EDG running at rated speed and voltage separated 
from the offsite sources) or separately connected to the ESF bus 
providing ESF loads. An EDG being tested is considered to be 
operable and fully capable of meeting its intended design function. 
Additionally, the testing of an EDG is not a precursor to any 
preciously evaluated accidents.
    If, during the test period, the EDG were to receive a normal 
operation protective trip resulting in the actuation of a generator 
lockout signal, the lockout could be reset by the operators 
monitoring the test. The resulting delay does not present an 
immediate challenge to the fuel cladding integrity, reactor water 
level control or to containment parameters, as demonstrated by the 
bounding four-hour station blackout coping analysis contained in 
RBS's station blackout conformance report.
    Therefore, the proposed change allowing testing of EDGs during 
power operation will not significantly increase the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    As previously discussed, the proposed change to permit the 
performance of EDG testing during power operation will not affect 
the operation of any system or alter any system's response to 
previously evaluated design basis events. The EDGs will 
automatically transfer from the test configuration to the ready-to-
load configuration following receipt of a valid signal (i.e., LOCA 
or LOP). In the ready-to-load configuration the EDG will be running 
at rated speed and voltage, separated from the offsite source and 
capable of automatically supplying power to the ESF buses in the 
event that preferred power is actually lost.
    The proposed change is also the same configuration currently 
used for the monthly one-hour test. Therefore, testing during power 
operation will not create the possibility of a new or different kind 
of event from any previously evaluated.
    [Surveillance Requirement] SR 3.8.1.16 demonstrated that the EDG 
will automatically override the test mode following generation of a 
LOCA signal. In addition, the ability of the EDGs to survive a full 
load reject is verified by the performance of SR 3.8.1.9. These 
existing surveillance requirements, along with system design 
features, ensure that the performance of EDG testing during power 
operation will not create the possibility of a new or different kind 
of accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide 
sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to 
ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that 
the fuel, reactor coolant system and containment design limits are 
not exceeded. Specifically, the EDGs must be capable of 
automatically providing power to ESF loads in sufficient time to 
provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences 
of a design basis accident in the event of a loss of preferred 
power.
    Testing of EDGs during power operation will not affect the 
availability or operation of any offsite source of power. In 
addition, the EDG being tested remains capable of meeting it 
intended design functions. Therefore, the proposed change to the 
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.13 will not 
result in a reduction in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Government Documents 
Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803
    Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 
1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
    NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and 
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, 
Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: November 15, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
increase the two recirculation loop Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) 
limit from 1.07 to 1.10 and the single recirculation loop MCPR limit 
from 1.08 to 1.12. This change request is the result of a non-
conservative calculation identified by the fuel vendor.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    The request does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The revised Safety Limit MCPR and the cycle-specific thermal 
limits that are based on the revised SLMCPR have been calculated 
using the methods identified in the ``Supplemental Reload Licensing 
Report For River Bend Station Reload 6 Cycle 7'' (Reference 1). 
These methods are within the existing design and licensing basis and 
cannot increase the probability or severity of an accident. The 
basis of the MCPR Safety Limit calculation is to ensure that greater 
that [than] 99.9% of all fuel rods in the core avoid transition 
boiling and fuel damage in the event of a postulated accident.
    The SLMCPR is used to establish the Operating Limit Minimum 
Critical Power Ratio (OLMCPR). Neither the SLMCPR nor the OLMCPR can 
initiate an event, therefore[,] a change to the SLMCPR does not 
increase the probability of a accident previously evaluated. 
Maintaining the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) at or above the 
OLMCPR during normal operations precludes fuel failure due to 
overheating of the fuel clad during an anticipated operational 
occurrence (AOO), thus limiting the consequences of an AOO. The 
proposed change will increase the SLMCPR, which will require the 
OLMCPR to be increased,

[[Page 128]]

which in turn will ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR [Part] 100 
are met for an AOO. Therefore, there is no increase in the 
consequences of an accident previously analyzed.
    The request does not create the possibility of occurrence of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The MCPR Safety Limit is a Technical Specification numerical 
value designed to ensure that fuel damage from transition boiling 
does not occur as a result of the limiting postulated accident. It 
cannot create the possibility of any new type of accident.
    Neither the SLMCPR or the OLMCPR can initiate an event, 
therefore, a change to the SLMCPR does not create the possibility of 
occurrence of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    The request does not involve a significant reduction in the 
margin of safety.
    The MCPR Safety Limit is a Technical Specification numerical 
value designed to ensure that fuel damage from transition boiling 
does not occur as a result of the limiting postulated accident. This 
new Safety Limit MCPR is calculated using the methods identified in 
the reference. These methods are within the existing design and 
licensing basis and based on RBS specific inputs.
    The margin of Safety resides between the SLMCPR and the point at 
which fuel fails. The proposed change to SLMCPR (and the OLMCPR) 
will in fact restore the margin of safety associated with GE's 
SLMCPR methodology.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Government Documents 
Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803
    Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 
1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
    NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner
    Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam 
ElectricStation, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
    Date of amendment request: December 2, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed Technical 
Specification (TS) Change Request will permit the use of 10CFR50 
Appendix J, Option B, Performance-Based Containment Leakage Testing for 
Type A, B and C leak rate testing. TSs 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.6.1.3, 
4.6.1.6 and 4.6.1.7 are revised and Section 6.15 is added establishing 
the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The Bases are revised to 
reflect this change. Minor editorial changes are included in this 
request. Waterford Steam Electric Station is planning to have a 
Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program in place prior to the next 
scheduled refueling outage. This program will be in accordance with the 
guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, ``Performance-Based 
Containment Leak-Test Program,'' dated September 1995.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    The proposed change will not affect the assumptions, design 
parameters, or results of any accident previously evaluated. The 
proposed change does not add or modify any existing equipment. The 
proposed changes will result in increased intervals between 
containment leakage tests determined through a performance based 
approach. The intervals between such tests are not related to 
conditions which cause accidents. The proposed changes do not 
involve a change to the plant design or operation. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of 
any accident previously evaluated.
    NUREG-1493, ``Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program,'' 
contributed to the technical bases for Option B of 10 CFR 50 
Appendix J. NUREG-1493 contains a detailed evaluation of the 
expected leakage from containment and the associated consequences. 
The increased risk due to lengthening of the intervals between 
containment leakage tests was also evaluated and found acceptable. 
Using a statistical approach, NUREG-1493 determined the increase in 
the expected dose to the public from extending the testing frequency 
is extremely small. It also concluded that a small increase is 
justifiable due to the benefits which accrue from the interval 
extension. The primary benefit is in the reduction in occupational 
exposure. The reduction in the occupational exposure is a real 
reduction, while the small increase to the public is statistically 
derived using conservative assumptions. Therefore, this change does 
not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any 
accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed change does not involve modifications to any 
existing equipment. The proposed change will not affect the 
operation of the plant or the manner in which the plant is operated. 
The reduced testing frequency will not affect the testing 
methodology. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    The proposed change does not change the performance methodology 
of the containment leakage rate testing program. However, the 
proposed change does affect the frequency of containment leakage 
rate testing. With an increased frequency between tests, the 
proposed change does increase the probability that a increase in 
leakage could go undetected for a longer period of time. Operational 
experience has demonstrated the leak tightness of the containment 
buildings has been significantly below the allowable leakage limit.
    The margin of safety that has the potential of being impacted by 
the proposed change involves the offsite dose consequences of 
postulated accidents which are directly related to containment 
leakage rates. The limitation on containment leakage rate is 
designed to ensure the total leakage volume will not exceed the 
value assumed in our accident analysis. The margin of safety for the 
offsite dose consequences of postulated accidents directly related 
to containment leakage is maintained by meeting the 1.0 La 
acceptance criteria. The proposed change maintains the 1.0 La 
acceptance criteria. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: University of New Orleans 
Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122
    Attorney for licensee: N.S. Reynolds, Esq., Winston & Strawn 1400 L 
Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
    NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal 
Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 
50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, 
Appling County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: September 19, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to Plant 
Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications would revise the 
Surveillance Requirements (SRs) addressing the reactor vessel pressure 
and temperature (P/T) limits. The affected SRs are 3.4.9.1, 3.4.9.2, 
3.4.9.3, 3.4.9.4, 3.4.9.5, 3.4.9.6, and 3.4.9.7, and the corresponding 
Units 1 and 2 Figures 3.4.9-1, 3.4.9-2, and 3.4.9-3, which show P/T 
limit curves for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, non-nuclear 
heatup and cooldown, and criticality, respectively.
    The P/T curves would be changed to allow separate monitoring of the 
three major regions of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (i.e., the 
upper vessel and flange region, the beltline region, and the bottom 
head region), and to extend the validity of the Unit 1 curves to 32

[[Page 129]]

Effective Full Power Years (EFPY). Separate monitoring would alleviate 
the difficulties with meeting certain temperature requirements due to 
the artificial limits imposed by the current P/T curves.
    In support of the proposed changes, General Electric (GE) prepared 
and issued GENE-523-A137-1295, ``E. I. Hatch Nuclear Power Station, P-T 
Curve Modification for Unit 1 and Unit 2,'' which is provided in the 
submittal.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration which is presented below:
    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Pressure and temperature (P/T) limits for the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) are established to ensure brittle fracture of the 
vessel does not occur.
    A. The proposed changes merely clarify the Applicability of the 
P/T limits for each of the low pressure conditions by replacing the 
word ``performed'' with ``met'', adding Notes to Surveillance 
Requirements, incorporating the requirements of Notes into the 
Surveillance Requirements, and modifying the Frequency statements. 
Conditions 2, 3, and 4, discussed in Enclosure 1 ``justification of 
changes'', [of the licensee's application] have their own 
Surveillance Requirements. Temperature requirements for Condition 1 
are specified in the Bases. This proposed change only clarifies 
which Surveillance Requirement applies to each operating 
configuration. No reduction in Surveillance Frequencies is proposed.
    B. The proposed revisions to the operating limits curves for 
inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and the heatup and cooldown 
allow independent monitoring of the three RPV regions; i.e., the 
bottom head, the upper vessel and flange, and the core beltline. The 
three Unit 1 curves, including the criticality curve, were extended 
to 32 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY), and a correction to the 
Unit 1 criticality curve was made. Operating limits for each of the 
curves were evaluated in accordance with the methodology given in 
the applicable ASME Codes; Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2, and 
Appendix G of 10 CFR [Part] 50.
    The actual limits in the inservice leak and hydrostatic testing 
curves, and the heatup and cooldown curves were not relaxed. 
Therefore, segregating the curves into the three affected vessel 
regions does not represent a reduction in the actual P/T 
requirements. The current P/T curves represent a composite of the 
three regions, with each point representing the limiting region. 
Regions of the vessel that are not limiting at a specific point are, 
therefore, artificially restrained. Upon implementation of the 
proposed changes, each vessel region will have its own curve, with 
its own true limit.
    Since the proposed changes do not affect the recirculation 
piping, the probability and the consequences of a loss of coolant 
accident are not increased. Likewise, no other previously evaluated 
accidents or transients, as defined in Chapters 14 and 15 of the 
Units 1 and 2 Final Safety Analysis Reports, are affected by the 
proposed changes.
    In summary, the proposed changes do not represent a relaxation 
of any actual operating limit and do not reduce the Frequency of any 
Surveillance. Three of the four operating configurations of the RPV 
are covered by Surveillance Requirements. Temperature limitations 
for the head removed from the vessel are given in the Bases. The 
operating limits were developed using the approved methodology 
contained in 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix G. Therefore, the 
probability and consequences of a brittle fracture of the RPV are 
not increased.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different type of accident from any previously evaluated.
    Implementing the low pressure changes, or the new operating 
limit curves, does not alter the design or operation of any system 
designed for the prevention or mitigation of accidents. The proposed 
changes do not introduce any new type of normal or abnormal 
operating mode or failure mode. All P/T limits for the Unit 1 and 
the Unit 2 reactor vessels continue to be monitored per the 
requirements of 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendices G and H. Therefore, the 
proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new type of 
accident.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in 
the margin of safety?
    The purpose of the P/T limits is to ensure a brittle fracture of 
the RPV does not occur. The proposed Technical Specifications 
changes for the low pressure conditions are made for clarification 
purposes. No operating limits or Surveillance Requirements are 
relaxed. The wording of current Technical
    Specifications SRs 3.4.9.1, 3.4.9.2, 3.4.9.5, 3.4.9.6, and 
3.4.9.7 could result in overly conservative application of the 
requirements. The proposed amendment is written to remove the 
ambiguity in that the Applicability and Frequency of each 
Surveillance Requirement are clear. Neither the acceptance criteria 
nor the Surveillance Frequency of any Surveillance is reduced. 
Furthermore, the four possible RPV configurations are all adequately 
monitored. As a result, the margin of safety for the low pressure 
conditions is not significantly reduced due to the proposed changes.
    The Unit 1 operating curves were extended to 32 EFPY using 
approved methodologies. More operational margin is provided, because 
the three vessel regions (upper vessel and flange, beltline, and 
bottom head) are being separated for the inservice leak and 
hydrostatic testing curve, and the heatup and cooldown curve. 
Although this separation results in more operating margin for 
certain vessel regions, it does not represent a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety. As described previously, the 
current Technical Specifications curves represent a composite of the 
three regions. Thus, the curves represent the temperature for the 
limiting region at a particular point. The regions that are not 
limiting at a particular point are artificially restricted. 
Separating the three regions, as proposed, eliminates false limits. 
The true limit for each region is preserved and uncompromised, based 
on the use of approved methodologies.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Appling County Public Library, 
301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513
    Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, 
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037
    NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal 
Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 
50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, 
Appling County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: October 7, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to Plant 
Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) would revise 
Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.1.7.7 and 3.4.3.1, and Limiting 
Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.4.3, 3.5.1, and 3.6.1.6, to increase 
the nominal mechanical pressure relief setpoints for all of the 11 
safety/relief valves (SRV) to 1150 psig and allow operation with one 
SRV and its associated functions inoperable. The proposed changes would 
reduce the potential for SRV pilot leakage and the potential for forced 
outages due to an inoperable SRV during a fuel cycle.
    The existing TS require that during continuous operation, all of 
the 11 SRVs remain OPERABLE in the safety mode, 7 in the Automatic 
Depressurization System (ADS) mode, and 4 in the Low-Low Set (LLS) 
mode. If one SRV is inoperable for longer than the duration specified 
in the applicable Action Statements, the plant must be placed in a Cold 
Shutdown Condition. Analyses have been completed which show that, with 
one SRV out of service, all transient/accident criteria can still be 
met. Increasing the nominal mechanical relief setpoints will increase 
the simmer margin (i.e., the difference between the SRV setpoints and 
the vessel steam dome pressure), thereby potentially reducing SRV pilot 
leakage which may occur during a typical operating cycle.

[[Page 130]]

As a result of increasing the mechanical relief setpoints for the SRVs, 
the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System pump test discharge pressure is 
increased to 1232 psig. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and 
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems are capable of operating 
at this increased pressure.
    In support of the proposed changes, General Electric (GE) prepared 
NEDC-32041P, ``Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant 
Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve Performance Requirements,'' 
Revision 2, dated April 1996, which was included in the submittal.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration which is presented below:
    1. The changes do not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The SRVs serve to mitigate postulated transients and accidents; 
the proposed changes do not alter the function or mode of operation 
of the SRVs. The probability of an OPERABLE or an INOPERABLE SRV 
inadvertently opening or failing to open or close is not affected by 
these changes. Therefore, the probability of an accident is not 
increased. Analysis<SUP>(a) has been performed which considers the 
consequences of the various transients and accidents with the 
increased setpoints and with one SRV inoperable. The analysis also 
considers the impact on ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] 
performance, including HPCI and RCIC. The analysis has shown that 
the consequences of an accident with the increased SRV setpoints and 
with one SRV inoperable are not increased.
    2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
    Revising the nominal SRV setpoint only changes when the SRV 
opens in its mechanical relief mode; the operation of the SRV and 
any other existing equipment is not altered. Operation with one SRV 
inoperable was evaluated<SUP>(a) and does not introduce any new 
failure modes. The impact on the operation and design of other 
systems and components has been evaluated,<SUP>(a) including ECCS 
and SLC. No new operating modes or failure modes are introduced. 
Thus, these changes do not contribute to a new or different type of 
accident.
    3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety.
    The change in SRV setpoint and operation with one SRV inoperable 
was evaluated relative to the applicable safety system settings and 
found to remain acceptable. For example, the proposed changes were 
evaluated against peak clad temperature limits, ECCS operation, ASME 
Code overpressurization limits, the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO 
Safety Limit, and containment design limits; no significant 
reduction in the margin of safety was identified<SUP>(a).
    (a) GE Report NEDC-32041P, ``Safety Review for Edwin I. Hatch 
Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Safety/Relief Valve 
Performance Requirements, Revision 2 (Proprietary), April 1996''.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Appling County Public Library, 
301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513
    Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, 
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037
    NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal 
Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 
50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, 
Appling County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: October 29, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would 
change the Technical Specifications (TS) for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 
associated with the installation of a digital Power Range Neutron 
Monitoring (PRNM) system and the incorporation of long-term stability 
solution hardware.
    In response to Generic Letter 94-02, ``Thermal-Hydraulic 
Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors,'' Georgia Power Company (GPC) 
selected General Electric (GE) Option III as the long-term stability 
solution. Option III detects core instabilities and provides a reactor 
scram signal to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The long-term 
stability solution, GE Option III, is supported by the BWR Owners' 
Group Topical Report NEDO-31960-A submitted to the NRC for approval in 
May 1991, and NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, submitted to the NRC for 
approval in March 1992. The NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) 
for NEDO-31960-A and Supplement 1 in July 1993. BWR Owners' Group 
Topical Report NEDO-32465, submitted to the NRC in June 1995, provides 
additional analysis for the detection and suppression methodology 
(Option III).
    To execute the stability solution software, the Average Power Range 
Monitor (APRM) and Rod Block Monitor (RBM) electronics would be 
replaced with a PRNM system based on digital GE Nuclear Measurements 
Analysis and Control NUMAC modules. Implementation of the PRNM would 
affect the RPS and Control Rod Block TS 3.3.1.1, 3.3.2.1, 3.4.1 and 
3.10.8.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration which is presented below:
    1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The purpose of the proposed amendment is to incorporate the 
Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) retrofit and Oscillation Power 
Range Monitor (OPRM) installation. The types of Average Power Range 
Monitor (APRM) Functions that are credited to mitigate accidents 
were previously evaluated. The proposed OPRM Upscale Function is 
implemented in the same hardware that implements the APRM Functions. 
The change to a two-out-of-four RPS [Reactor Protection System] 
logic was analyzed and determined to be equal to the original logic.
    The modification involves equipment that is intended to detect 
the symptoms of some accidents and initiate mitigating action. The 
worst case failure of the equipment involved in the modification is 
a failure to initiate mitigating action (scram), but no failure can 
cause an accident. As discussed in the bases for proposed changes, 
the PRNM replacement system is designed to perform the same 
operations as the existing Power Range Monitoring (PRM) system and 
to meet or exceed all of its operational requirements. Therefore, it 
is concluded that the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated is not increased as a result of replacing the existing 
equipment with the PRNM equipment.
    * * * *
    Human-machine interface (HMI) failures in the current system 
could be related to incorrectly adjusted settings, incorrect reading 
of meters, and failure to return the equipment to the normal 
operating configuration. There are comparable failure modes for some 
of these problems in the digital system where an erroneous 
potentiometer adjustment in the current system is equivalent to an 
erroneous digital entry in the replacement system. Certain potential 
``failure to reconfigure errors'' in the current system have no 
counterpart in the replacement system, because any reconfiguration'' 
is automatically returned to normal by the system. Also, since 
parameters are available for review at any time, even if an error, 
such as a digital entry error occurs, it is more likely that the 
error would be almost immediately detected by recognition that the 
displayed value is not the correct one.
    The failure analysis of the current system assumes certain rates 
of human error. The rates for the replacement system will be lower 
and, hence, are bounded by the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] 
analysis.
    Therefore, GPC [Georgia Power Company] concludes the proposed 
changes do not

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involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The APRM Trip Functions credited in the accident analyses are 
retained in the PRNM retrofit. The response time of the new 
electronics meets or exceeds the required response criteria. No new 
interfaces or interactions with other equipment will introduce any 
new failure modes.
    The modification involves equipment that is intended to detect 
the symptoms of some accidents and initiate mitigating action. The 
worst-case failure of the equipment involved in the modification is 
a failure to initiate mitigating action (scram), but no failure can 
cause an accident. This is unchanged from the current system.
    Software common-cause failures can at most cause the system to 
fail to perform its safety function. In that case, it could fail to 
initiate action to mitigate the consequences of an accident, but 
would not cause one.
    The new system is a digital system with software (firmware) 
control. As such, it has ``central'' processing points and software 
controlled digital processing where the current system had analog 
and discrete component processing. The result is that the specific 
failures of hardware and potentially common-cause software failures 
are different from the current system. Also, automatic self-test 
results in some cases in a direct trip as a result of a hardware 
failure where the current system may have remained ``as-is''. 
However, when these are evaluated at the system level, there are no 
new effects. In general, FSARs assume simplistic failure modes 
(relays for example) but do not specifically evaluate such effects 
as self-test detection and automatic trip or alarm.
    The effects of software common-cause failure are mitigated by 
hardware design and system architecture. The replacement equipment 
is fully qualified to operate in its installed location and will not 
affect other equipment.
    Therefore, GPC concludes the proposed changes do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The replacement equipment provides the same function as the 
original electronics. Response time and operator information are 
either maintained or improved. The equipment was qualified, where 
appropriate, to assure its intended safety function is performed. 
The replacement system has improved channel trip accuracy compared 
to the current system and meets or exceeds system requirements 
assumed in setpoint analysis. The channel response time exceeds the 
requirements. The channel indicated accuracy is improved over the 
current system, and meets or exceeds system requirements. The 
replacement system meets or exceeds all system requirements.
    The BWROG [BWR Owners' Group] Stability Option III was developed 
to meet the requirements of GDC [General Design Criterion] 10 and 
GDC 12 by providing a hardware system that detects the presence of 
thermal-hydraulic instabilities and automatically initiates the 
necessary actions to suppress the oscillations prior to violating 
the MCPR [maximum critical power ratio] Safety Limit. The NRC has 
reviewed and accepted the Option III methodology described in 
Licensing Topical Report NEDO-31960 and concluded this solution will 
provide the intended protection. Therefore, it is concluded that 
there will be no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the 
Technical Specifications as a result of the installation of the OPRM 
system and the simultaneous removal of the operating restrictions 
imposed by the ICAs [item control areas].
    Therefore, GPC concludes the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: Appling County Public Library, 
301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513
    Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, 
Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037
    NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun 
Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: November 20, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the technical specifications (TS) to allow the Vice President to 
designate the Safety Audit and Review Committee (SARC) Chairperson, to 
change the work hours limitation in accordance with guidance in GL 82-
12, ``Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours;'' to change radioactive 
shipments record retention requirements to comply with recent 10 CFR 
Part 20 changes; and other editorial changes.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. The changes requested are administrative in nature. Paragraph 
3.D was placed in the License by Amendment No. 155 to authorize 
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) to increase the storage capacity 
of the FCS spent fuel pool. Amendment No. 155 stated that the TS as 
issued would be effective when the last new rack was installed. 
Since the last new rack was installed on

    August 8, 1994, Paragraph 3.D is no longer necessary and should

    be deleted from the License.
    Table of Contents, Section 6.0, ``Interim Special Technical 
Specifications,'' Subsections 6.1 through 6.4 are proposed for 
deletion because all of the Specifications referred to have been 
deleted by previous Amendments.
    The revision proposed for TS 2.15 (Item 2C of Table 2-3 & Item 
1C of Table 2-4) will insert the correct terminology (Pressurizer 
Low/Low Pressure) into the Functional Unit description.
    The revision proposed for TS 5.2 will require the control of 
overtime worked by personnel to be in accordance with the NRC Policy 
Statement on working hours (Generic Letter 82-12) in lieu of stating 
the specific times requirements from the Policy as the current TS 
does. This option is in accordance with NUREG-1432, Standard TS for 
Combustion Engineering Plants, Specification 5.2.2e, and will allow 
work groups to be on twelve hour shifts.
    The revision proposed for TS 5.5.2.2 will replace the specific 
title of the Chairperson of the Safety Audit and Review Committee 
and replace it with ``Member as appointed by the Vice President.'' 
This will allow the flexibility to change chairmanship of the 
committee amongst the members.
    The revision to TS 5.10 concerning retention of records of 
radioactive shipments will update the TS to current 10 CFR 20 
requirements. Plant procedures already comply with current 10 CFR 20 
record retention requirements. The addition of the Section 5.0 title 
corrects a minor format discrepancy.
    These proposed revisions are administrative in nature. The 
proposed revisions have no effect on any initial assumptions or 
operating restrictions assumed in any accident, nor do these changes 
have any effect on equipment required to mitigate the consequences 
of an accident. Therefore the proposed revisions do not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed revisions correct minor errors, remove outdated 
information, are consistent with changes in organizational 
structure, 10 CFR Part 20, or NUREG-1432, ``Combustion Engineering 
Standard Technical Specifications (STS). These changes will not 
result in any physical alterations to the plant configuration, 
changes to setpoint values, or changes to the application of 
setpoints or limits. No new operating modes are proposed as a result 
of these changes. Therefore the proposed changes do not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.

[[Page 132]]

    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The revisions listed above correct minor errors, remove outdated 
information, or are consistent with changes in organizational 
structure, 10 CFR Part 20, or Standard TS. These changes will not 
result in any physical alterations to the plant configuration, 
changes to setpoint values, or changes to the application of 
setpoints or limits. Therefore the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: W. Dale Clark Library, 215 
South 15th Street, Omaha, Nebraska 68102
    Attorney for licensee: Perry D. Robinson, Winston & Strawn, 1400 L 
Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005-3502
    NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland 
Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

    Date of amendment request: October 28, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.8.1, ``A.C. Sources,'' 
TS Section 3/4.8.2, ``Onsite Power Distribution Systems,'' TS Table 
4.8.1, ``Battery Surveillance Requirements,'' and the associated bases. 
Surveillance requirements would be modified to account for the increase 
in the fuel cycle, consistent with Generic Letter 91-04, ``Changes in 
Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-
month Fuel Cycle,'' dated April 2, 1991. Administrative changes are 
also proposed.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    Toledo Edison has reviewed the proposed changes and determined 
that a significant hazards consideration does not exist because 
operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, in 
accordance with these changes would:
    1a. Not involve a significant increase in the probability of an 
accident previously evaluated because no such accidents are affected 
by the proposed revisions to increase the surveillance test 
intervals from 18 to 24 months for the A.C. Offsite Sources, the 
Emergency Diesel Generators and the Station Batteries or the 
proposed revision to remove the ``during shutdown'' restriction for 
conduct of the battery performance test.
    Results of the review of historical 18 month surveillance data 
and maintenance records support an increase in the surveillance test 
intervals from 18 to 24 months (and up to 30 months on a non-routine 
basis) because no potential for a significant increase in a failure 
rate of a system or component was identified during these reviews.
    These proposed revisions are consistent with the NRC guidance on 
evaluating and proposing such revisions as provided in Generic 
Letter 91-04, ``Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance 
Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle,'' dated April 2, 
1991.
    Initiating conditions and assumptions remain as previously 
analyzed for accidents in the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Report.
    These revisions do not involve any physical changes to systems 
or components, nor do they alter the typical manner in which the 
systems or components are operated.
    The proposed revision to reflect that the battery charger 
performance test will continue to be conducted on a[n] 18 month 
surveillance interval is an administrative change and does not 
affect previously analyzed accidents.
    The proposed revision to the Bases to reflect that a change to a 
24 month surveillance test interval is an exception to current 
guidance is an administrative change and does not affect previously 
analyzed accidents.
    1b. Not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated because the source term, containment 
isolation or radiological releases are not being changed by these 
proposed revisions. Existing system and component redundancy is not 
being changed by these proposed changes. Existing system and 
component operation is not being changed by these proposed changes 
and the assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences 
in the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Report are not invalidated.
    2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated because these 
revisions do not involve any physical changes to systems or 
components, nor do they alter the typical manner in which the 
systems or components are operated.
    No changes are being proposed to the type of testing currently 
being performed, only to the length of the surveillance test 
interval and to restrictions on conducting testing only during 
shutdown conditions.
    Results of the review of historical 18 month surveillance data 
and maintenance records support an increase in the surveillance test 
intervals from 18 to 24 months (and up to 30 months on a non-routine 
basis) because no potential for a significant increase in a failure 
rate of a system or component was identified during these reviews.
    The proposed revision to reflect that the battery charger 
performance test will continue to be conducted on a[n] 18 month 
surveillance interval is an administrative change and does not alter 
testing currently being performed.
    The proposed revision to the Bases to reflect that a change to a 
24 month surveillance test interval is an exception to current 
guidance is an administrative change and does not alter testing 
currently being performed.
    3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety 
because the results of the historical 18 month surveillance data and 
maintenance records review identified no potential for a significant 
increase in a failure rate of a system or component due to 
increasing the surveillance test interval to 24 months. Existing 
system and component redundancy is not being changed by these 
proposed changes.
    There are no new or significant changes to the initial 
conditions contributing to accident severity or consequences, 
consequently there are no significant reductions in a margin of 
safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo, William 
Carlson Library, Government Documents Collection, 2801 West Bancroft 
Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606
    Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, 
Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037
    NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339, 
North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County, 
Virginia

    Date of amendment request: November 26, 1996
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would 
eliminate the records retention requirements from the administrative 
section of the Technical Specifications (TS) in accordance with NRC 
Administrative Letter95-06, ``Relocation of Technical Specifications 
Administrative Controls Related to Quality Assurance.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    Specifically, operation of the ... North Anna Power [Station] in 
accordance with the proposed Technical Specifications changes will 
not:

[[Page 133]]

    (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed 
administrative changes do not affect equipment or its operation. 
Therefore, the likelihood that an accident will occur is neither 
increased nor decreased by relocating record retention requirements 
from the Technical Specifications to the Operational Quality 
Assurance Program. This TS change will not impact the function or 
method of operation of plant equipment. Thus, a significant increase 
in the probability of a previously analyzed accident does not result 
due to this change. No systems, equipment, or components are 
affected by the proposed changes. Thus, the consequences of any 
accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety 
Analysis Report] are not increased by this change.
    (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change 
does not alter the design or operations of the physical plant. Since 
record retention requirements are administrative in nature, a change 
to these requirements does not contribute to accident initiation, an 
administrative change related to this activity does not produce a 
new accident scenario or produce a new type of equipment 
malfunction. [These] changes do not alter any existing accident 
scenarios. The proposed administrative change does not affect 
equipment or its operation, and, thus, does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident. Therefore, the 
proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident.
    (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. 
Section 6.0 of the North Anna ... Technical Specifications does not 
have a basis description. The proposed administrative change does 
not affect equipment or its operation, and, thus, does not involve 
any reduction in the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room location: The Alderman Library, Special 
Collections Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 
Virginia 22903-2498.
    Attorney for licensee: Michael W. Maupin, Esq., Hunton and 
Williams, Riverfront Plaza, East Tower, 951 E. Byrd Street, Richmond, 
Virginia 23219.
    NRC Project Director: Mark Reinhart, Acting

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf 
Creek Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

    Date of amendment request: December 3, 1996
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request proposes 
to revise the technical specifications associated with the inspection 
of the reactor coolant flywheel to provide an exception to the 
recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, ``Reactor Coolant 
Pump Flywheel Integrity.'' The proposed exception would allow either an 
ultrasonic volumetric examination or surface examination to be 
performed at approximately 10-year intervals. In addition, a correction 
of the issuance date of a referenced regulatory guide is included.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is p presented below:
    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The safety function of the RCP [reactor coolant pump] flywheels 
is to provide a coastdown period during which the RCPs would 
continue to provide reactor coolant flow to the reactor after loss 
of power to the RCPs. The maximum loading on the RCP flywheel 
results from overspeed following a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. 
The maximum obtainable speed in the event of a LOCA was predicted to 
be less than 1500 rpm. Therefore, a peak LOCA speed of 1500 rpm is 
used in the evaluation of RCP flywheel integrity in WCAP-14535. This 
integrity evaluation shows a very high flaw tolerance for the 
flywheels. The proposed change does not affect that evaluation. 
Reduced coastdown times due to a single failed flywheel is bounded 
by the locked rotor analysis, therefore, it would not place the 
plant in an unanalyzed condition. Therefore, these changes do not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated since 
the proposed amendments will not change the physical plant or the 
modes of plant operation defined in the facility operating license. 
No new failure mode is introduced due to the proposed change, since 
the proposed change does not involve the addition or modification of 
equipment, nor do they alter the design or operation of affected 
plant systems, structures, or components.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The operating limits and functional capabilities of the affected 
systems, structures, and components are basically unchanged by the 
proposed amendment. The results of the flywheel inspections 
performed have identified no indications affecting flywheel 
integrity. As identified in WCAP-14535, detailed stress analysis as 
well as risk analysis have been completed with the results 
indicating that there would be no change in the probability of 
failure for RCP flywheels if all inspections were eliminated. 
Therefore these changes do not involve a significant reduction in 
the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room locations: Emporia State University, 
William Allen White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 
66801 and Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 
66621
    Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and 
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
    NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50-482, Wolf 
Creek Generating Station, Coffey County, Kansas

    Date of amendment request: December 3, 1996
    Description of amendment request: This amendment request proposes 
to correct the reference to the Action Statement for Item 7.b, RWST 
Level - Low-Low Coincident with Safety Injection, Table 3.3-3, 
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, from 
Action 16 to Action 28.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Changing the reference from Action Statement 16 to Action 
Statement 28 for Functional Unit 7.b. of Table 3.3-3 will reduce the 
probability for an automatic switchover from the RWST [refueling 
water storage tank] to an empty containment sump to occur, while an 
RWST level channel is inoperable or is being tested with its 
bistable tripped, should an inadvertent safety injection signal 
occur concurrent with a single failure of a second RWST level 
channel. The design of these channels does not allow for operation 
or testing in bypass, so Action Statement 16 is not applicable. 
Changing to Action Statement 28 will limit

[[Page 134]]

the duration that a channel could be inoperable or be in test with 
its bistable bypassed. This change does not involve any design 
changes or hardware modifications, and does not introduce any new 
potential accident initiating conditions. The increase in allowed 
outage time for this item was evaluated and the associated 
unavailability and risk was shown to be equivalent to, or less than, 
that of other functional units evaluated in WCAP-10271, Supplement 
2, Revision 1. Therefore, this proposed change does not increase the 
probability of any accident previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change does not result in any hardware changes and 
does not result in a change in the manner in which the ESFAS 
[engineered safety features actuation system] provides plant 
protection. This change does not alter the functioning of the ESFAS. 
Rather, the likelihood or probability of the ESFAS functioning 
properly is affected as described above. This change will not change 
the method by which any safety-related system performs its function. 
Therefore, this proposed change will not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    This proposed change will not result in a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety defined for any technical specification 
since it does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting 
safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are 
determined.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Local Public Document Room locations: Emporia State University, 
William Allen White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 
66801 and Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 
66621
    Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and 
Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037
    NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Notice Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies 
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The 
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the 
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set 
forth in the license amendment.
    Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility 
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these 
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an 
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, 
it is so indicated.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) the 
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's 
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as 
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for 
the particular facilities involved.

Arizona Public Service Company, et al., Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 
50-529, and STN 50-530, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 
Units 1, 2, and 3, Maricopa County, Arizona

    Date of application for amendments: June 28, 1996
    Brief description of amendments: The amendment would modify the 
technical specifications (TS) to increase the minimum required amount 
of anhydrous trisodium phosphate (TSP) in the containment baskets. TSP 
is used to ensure that following a postulated design basis loss of 
coolant accident (LOCA), the containment sump pH is maintained greater 
than or equal to seven.
    Date of issuance: December 10, 1996
    Effective date: December 10, 1996, to be implemented within 45 days 
from the date of issuance.
    Amendment Nos.: Unit 1 - 110; Unit 2 - 102; Unit 3 - 82
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74: The 
amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 11, 1996 (61 
FR 47962) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 10, 1996.No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No.
    Local Public Document Room location: Phoenix Public Library, 1221 
N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

    Date of application for amendments: June 21, 1996
    Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the term 
``lifting loads'' used in Technical Specification 3.9.6b.2, Manipulator 
Crane, to ``lifting force.'' This revision will clarify that the static 
loads associated with the lifting tool, drive rod, and control rod 
weights are not included in the lifting force limit.
    Date of issuance: December 12, 1996
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
30 days
    Amendment Nos.: 171 and 153
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17: Amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 11, 1996 (61 
FR 47977) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 12, 1996.No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Atkins Library, University of 
North Carolina, Charlotte (UNCC Station), North Carolina 28223

Illinois Power Company and Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc., Docket 
No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, 
Illinois

    Date of application for amendment: February 22, 1996, and as 
supplemented by letters dated July 4 and September 20, 1996
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Clinton Power 
Station Technical Specification 3.3.4.1, ``End of Cycle Recirculation 
Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation,'' by deleting Surveillance 
Requirement 3.3.4.1.6 which requires the RPT breaker interruption time 
to be determined at least once per 60 months.
    Date of issuance: December 13, 1996
    Effective date: December 13, 1996
    Amendment No.: 111

[[Page 135]]

    Facility Operating License No. NPF-62: The amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 24, 1996 (61 FR 
18169) The supplemental letters of July 4 and September 20, 1996, 
provided clarifying information and did not include significant changes 
relative to the original Federal Register notice.The Commission's 
related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation 
dated December 13, 1996.No significant hazards consideration comments 
received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: The Vespasian Warner Public 
Library, 120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois 61727

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile 
Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1, Oswego County, New York

    Date of application for amendment: July 12, 1996, as 
supplementedOctober 30, 1996.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises TS 6.2.2.h 
regarding the administrative controls for the normal working hours of 
unit staff who perform safety-related functions, and TS 6.2.2.i 
regarding an organizational change. The changes authorize (1) 
establishment of unit staff work schedules that average 40 hours per 
week using shifts as long as 12 hours, and (2) elimination of the 
positions of General Supervisor Operations and Supervisor Operations.
    Date of issuance: December 12, 1996
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
30 days.
    Amendment No.: 158
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-63: Amendment revises the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 14, 1996 (61 FR 
42280) The October 30, 1996, letter provided supplemental information 
that did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration 
determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 12, 1996.No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents 
Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New 
York 13126.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile 
Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Oswego County, New York

    Date of application for amendment: July 12, 1996
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical 
Specification Section 6.2.2.i regarding the administrative controls for 
the normal working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related 
functions. The change allows the establishment of unit staff work 
schedules that average 40 hours per week using shifts as long as 12 
hours.
    Date of issuance: December 12, 1996
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
30 days.
    Amendment No.: 78
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revises the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 14, 1996 (61 FR 
42281) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 12, 1996.No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents 
Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New 
York 13126.

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388 
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of application for amendments: July 28, 1995, as supplemented 
October 25, 1995, and August 9, 1996
    Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the 250 volt 
DC profiles in the Technical Specifications for the two units to 
reflect new load profile calculations.
    Date of issuance: December 17, 1996
    Effective date: Unit 1, as of date of issuance, to be implemented 
within 30 days; Unit 2, as of date of issuance, to be implemented prior 
to Startup following the Eighth Refueling and Inspection Outage for 
Unit 2, which is scheduled for the Spring of 1997.
    Amendment Nos.: 162 and 133
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22. The amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 13, 1995 (60 
FR 47622) The supplemental letters provided clarifying information that 
did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination nor the Federal Register notice.The 
Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a 
Safety Evaluation dated December 17, 1996.No significant hazards 
consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library, 
Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James 
A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

    Date of application for amendment: June 12, 1992, as supplemented 
September 17, 1992, March 17, 1993, August 17, 1993, August 18, 1993, 
December 29, 1993, June 29, 1995, August 15, 1996, October 3, 
1996,October 23, 1996, November 14, 1996, November 20, 1996 (JPN-96-
045), November 20, 1996 (JPN-96-046), and November 27, 1996.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 and the James A. FitzPatrick 
Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP) Technical Specifications (TSs) to 
authorize an increase in the maximum power level of JAFNPP from 2436 
MWt to 2536 MWt. The amendment also approves changes to the TSs to 
implement uprated power operation.
    Date of issuance: December 6, 1996
    Effective date:
    As of the date of issuance to be implemented upon plant startup 
following the refueling outage cycle 13.
    Amendment No.: 239
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 2, 1994 (59 FR 
4943) The letters dated September 17, 1992, March 17, 1993, August 17, 
1993, August 18, 1993, December 29, 1993, June 29, 1995, August 15, 
1996,October 3, 1996, October 23, 1996, November 14, 1996, November 20, 
1996, (JPN-96-045), November 20, 1996, (JPN-96-046), and November 27, 
1996, provided clarifying information that did not change the initial 
proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The 
Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a 
Safety Evaluation dated December 6, 1996.No significant hazards 
consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents 
Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New 
York 13126.

[[Page 136]]

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-311, Salem 
Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, Salem County, New Jersey 
Date of application for amendment: September 20, 1996, as 
supplemented September 30, 1996

    Brief description of amendment: The amendment changes Technical 
Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.b.4 for the Auxiliary 
Building Exhaust Air Filtration System, and its associated Bases, to 
indicate that the specified flowrate applies only to system testing.
    Date of issuance: December 12, 1996
    Effective date: As of date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 
days.
    Amendment No. 168
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-75: This amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 23, 1996 (61 FR 
55040) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 12, 1996.No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public Library, 112 
West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-
311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem 
County, New Jersey

    Date of application for amendments: August 27, 1996, as 
supplemented October 24, 1996
    Brief description of amendments: The amendment to Unit 2 deletes 
License Condition 2.C.(24)(a) which required establishment by June 3, 
1981, of regularly scheduled 8-hour shifts without reliance on routine 
use of overtime. The amendments to both Units 1 and 2 revise Technical 
Specification 6.2.2 to delete the reference to Generic Letter 82-12, 
``Nuclear Plant Staff Working Hours,'' and require that administrative 
controls be established which will ensure that adequate shift coverage 
is maintained without heavy use of overtime for individuals.
    Date of issuance: December 17, 1996
    Effective date: Both units, as of date of issuance, to be 
implemented within 30 days.
    Amendment Nos. 186 and 169
    Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75. The amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications for both units and License for 
Unit 2 only.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 12, 1996 (61 
FR 48175) The October 24, 1996, letter provided clarifying information 
that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination or the original notice.The Commission's 
related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety 
Evaluation dated December 17, 1996.No significant hazards consideration 
comments received: No
    Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public Library, 112 
West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079

Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-361 and 
50-362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, 
San Diego County, California

    Date of application for amendments: May 29, 1996
    Brief description of amendments: These amendments revise Technical 
Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.4 to increase the 
minimum boron concentration in the safety injections tanks from 1850 
ppm to 2200 ppm.
    Date of issuance: December 6, 1996
    Effective date: December 6, 1996, to be implemented within 30 days 
from the date of issuance.
    Amendment Nos.: Unit 2 - 135; Unit 3 - 124
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-10 and NPF-15: The amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 31, 1996 (61 FR 
40029) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 6, 1996. No significant 
hazards consideration comments received: No.Temporary
    Local Public Document Room location: Science Library, University of 
California, P. O. Box 19557, Irvine, California 92713

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee 
Nuclear Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

    Date of application for amendment: September 27, 1996, as 
supplemented on October 25, and November 18, 1996
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Kewaunee 
Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification requirements related to the 
low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) system. Specifically, 
the LTOP curve is modified to define 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G 
pressure temperature limitations for LTOP evaluation through the end of 
operating cycle (EOC) 33. In addition, the LTOP enabling temperature 
and the temperature required for starting a reactor coolant pump have 
been changed consistent with the design basis for the LTOP system. 
Finally, the TS bases were changed consistent with the changes 
described above.
    Date of issuance: December 13, 1996
    Effective date: December 13, 1996, to be implemented within 30 
days.
    Amendment No.: 130
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-43: Amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 7, 1996 (61 FR 
52472) The October 25 and November 18, 1996, submittals provided 
supplemental information that did not change the initial proposed no 
significant hazards consideration determination.The Commission's 
related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation 
dated December 13, 1996.No significant hazards consideration comments 
received: No.
    Local Public Document Room location: University of Wisconsin, 
Cofrin Library, 2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54311-7001
    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of December 1996.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects - I/II, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation
[Doc. 96-33254 Filed 12-31-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-F