RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 17a0022p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

K IRSTEN W ILLIAMS , Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v

.

AT&T M OBILITY S ERVICES LLC, Defendant-Appellee

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 16-6078

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. No. 2:15-cv-02150—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge. Decided and Filed: January 27, 2017 Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Steve Wilson, THE STEVE WILSON FIRM, Memphis, Tenneseeee, Matt Gulotta, THE GULOTTA FIRM, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Charles W. Hill, Meghan K. McMahon, GLANKLER BROWN, PLLC, Me mphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Kirsten Williams was employed by AT&T Mobility Services LLC (AT&T) as a Customer Service Representative (CSR). Williams suffered from depression and anxi ety attacks, which caused her to be frequently absent from work. AT&T terminated Williams in July 2014 for job abandonment and for violating the company’s attendance policy. Williams then filed a laws uit under the Americans with 

### >No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 2

Disabilities Act ( ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee

. She asserted claims against AT&T for failure to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, disparate treatment, and retaliation. AT&T moved for summary judgment, which th e district court granted as to all of Williams’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

I. BACKGROUND A. Job duties and attendance requireme nts for Williams’s CSR position Williams was employed as a CSR with AT&T from 2006 until she was terminated in July 2014. She worked at AT&T’s Memphis Call Cent er, where her job duties included answering incoming calls and assisting customers with tec hnical-support and billi ng issues. To answer calls, Williams had to be physically present at he r workstation and logged in to her computer. CSRs work eight-hour shifts, which rotate ev ery six months. During these shifts, CSRs are expected to remain at their workstations receiving calls, with the exception of breaks for lunch, two prescheduled 15-minute breaks per day, and unscheduled restroom breaks as needed. Although there is no requirement that a CSR field a cer tain number of calls per day, CSRs typically handle about 40 to 50 calls during each shift. If a CSR is not logged in to her workstation, any calls that would ha ve otherwise gone to her are rerouted to another CSR. Both Darc us Payne, the Area Manage r of the Memphis Call Center, and Laura McArthur, an AT&T Attendan ce Manager, submitted declarations explaining the consequences of a CSR’s unscheduled abse nces. Such conseque nces include potential increases in customer wait times and decreases in the quality and speed of customer service. Unscheduled absences can also cause increased workplace tensions and decreased morale among the CSRs. For these reasons, AT&T requires regul ar attendance by its CSRs. AT&T has Attendance Guidelines, under which CSRs accrue “attendance points” for unscheduled lateNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 3

arrivals to and absences from work. A CSR who accumulates eightor more attendance points is subject to being terminated. But leave under AT &T’s short-term disability (STD) policy, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), or an approved job accommodation under the ADA does not result in the accrua l of attendance points. AT&T handles all FMLA leave requests internally. STD leave and job-accommodation requests, however, are processe d by a third-party claims admi nistrator, Sedgwick Claims Management Services. Sedgwick manages AT&T ’s Integrated Disability Service Center (IDSC). CSRs therefore interact with the IDSC when seeking STD leave or job accommodations. If an accommodation appears to be medically necessary, the IDSC relays the request to the employee’s supervisors, who then confirm whether the requ est can be honored. B. Williams’s attendance prob lems and requests for leave Williams struggled with attendance throughout her employment with AT&T. From 2007 to 2014, she received written warnings every year about her accumulation of attendance points under the Attendance Guidelines. Williams was ab sent from work for most of 2013 due to her depression and anxiety attacks. Most notably, she did not work fr om January until July of that year, using a combination of STD leave and FMLA leave to cover this time period. She worked a few days in August 2013 before returning to STD leave in September, and she remained on such leave through all of October and for large parts of November and December. Williams’s absenteeism continued into 2014. She returned to work on January 20, 2014, after having been absent since December 3, 2013. Her supervisors discu ssed her poor attendance record with her in both January and February 2014, warning her that she had accumulated nearly enough points for termination. During these c onversations, Williams acknowledged that she understood the attendance policy. Later in Fe bruary 2014, Williams received a negative written evaluation of her 2013 performance, which stated that her attendance and punctuality “does not meet” expectations and that she needed to “mak [e] real efforts to improve her performance and attendance.”No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 4

Williams failed to heed these warnings a nd continued to miss work. She worked only sporadically after March 11, 2014. After April 9, 2014, she ceased to work entirely and did not return at any point before her termination on July 3, 2014. Williams requested a combination of FMLA leave, STD leave, and job accommodations in the form of leave to cover her absences af ter February 4, 2014. She was denied FMLA leave for all absences beginning in December 2013 because she failed to meet the threshold eligibility requirement of having worked 1,250 hours in the preceding year due to her numerous prior absences. Williams obtained STD leave for her ab sences from April 10 to April 27 (these and all dates hereinafter re fer to 2014 unless otherwise noted). For all dates after April 27, the IDSC initially denied STD leave on the ground that Williams had provided insufficient medical documen tation. AT&T then sent Williams a returnto-work letter, informing her that she would be terminated if she di d not either appear at work by May 12 or obtain approval for more leave. In response, Williams told AT&T Employee Relations Manager Priscilla Adams that she co uld not return during Ma y, and that she would send additional medical information to the IDSC. After such information was submitted, the IDSC approved STD leave for absences from April 17 to May 27, but denied STD leave for absences from May 28 onward, again finding that Williams had provided insufficient medical documentation. AT&T sent Williams another return -to-work letter, this time setting a June 10 deadline. Williams again failed to return to work. In response, her supervisors began the process of seeking approval to terminate her on the grounds that she had accrued mo re attendance points than the number allowed by AT&T’s policy, that she had abandoned her job, and that she had failed to return to work as directed. Her superv isors were careful to wait to take any action until Williams had submitted all of her medical information and the IDSC had evaluated the claim. Shortly thereafter, Williams’s treatment provide rs submitted additional medical information to the IDSC in support of her STD claim for absen ces after May 27. The claim was denied on the basis of insufficient medical information, but Wi lliams’s supervisors decided to “make one more attempt” to contact Williams and determine whether she intended to return to work.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 5

AT&T therefore sent Williams still another return-t o-work letter, requiring her to be present by June 30. Williams responded that she could not return to work on that date. Following Williams’s third failure to return to work, her supervisors began reconsidering termination. Williams was then in the process of appealing the IDSC’s denial of STD leave for all absences after May 27. But Area Manager Payne confirmed that even if the appeal were successful, Williams would still have 16 atte ndance points—double the amount constituting a terminable offense. After making this calculation, AT&T terminated Williams on July 3. C. Williams’s requests for flexible scheduling and additional breaks as accommodations under the ADA Williams argues that she could have performed her job if she had been given two accommodations: a flexible start time and additio nal breaks throughout the day. She first requested these accommodations in February 2014 during a conversati on with one of her supervisors, Monica Scruggs. Scruggs began w ith a discussion about at tendance issues. In response, Williams informed Scr uggs that she was suffering from depression and anxiety attacks, and mentioned that she needed “flexible sc heduling and additional breaks” as possible accommodations. Williams’s next accommodation request we nt through the IDSC. In March 2014, the IDSC informed another of Williams’s supervis ors, Chinna Prude-Ande rson, that Williams had requested “restrictions/accommodations” in the form of STD coverage for several absences in February and March, as well as “intermittent ti me off moving forward.” Williams now asserts that she intended her request for “intermittent time off” to mean that she could start her shift 30 to 60 minutes later each day. There is no indication in the record, however, that Williams explained this to anyone at the IDSC or at AT&T. Williams told Prude-Anderson that she needed an accommodation, but did not specify the reason for it, and also stated that the reason for her delay in submitting medical informati on to the IDSC was that she was waiting on her medical provider. The IDSC eventually cl osed the March accommodation request because Williams failed to timely submit medical information.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 6

After Williams had her first appointment with nurse-practitioner Laura Thompson in April 2014, Thompson submitted a report of the visi t to the IDSC later that month. Thompson diagnosed Williams with depression and anxiety. The medical report estimated that Williams needed 25 hours off of work per month from February 15, 2014 until August 15, 2014. Thompson also wrote that she was “unable to determine [the] time frame [for Williams’s recovery] at this time.” The report recommende d that Williams needed a “10 minute break every 2 hours,” a “flexible start time,” and “modified break time during anxiety attacks.” It also recommended that Williams not work at all from April 11 to April 27. In a written statement accompanying Thompson’s report, Williams requested “time for treatment of mental illness” and “flexible scheduling, leave for counseling, and modi fied break schedule.” But nowhere in the report did Thompson or Williams explain how th e proposed flexible-scheduling accommodation would actually work. Williams repeatedly informed the IDSC th at she was continuing to receive medical treatment and that she would submit additional paperwork. Her medical documentation indicated that, beginning in May, she was in therapy from at least 10:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. daily, which was expected to last until June 13. As of May 8, psychiatri st Dr. Madakasira opined that Williams was “not fit for work at this time ,” but that she could return at the end of the treatment program if rel eased to do so at that time. Bu t Dr. Madakasira did not identify any accommodations that would have allowe d Williams to perform her job. On June 11, another healthcare provider, th erapist Debra Butler from HealthQuest, sent documentation to the IDSC, concluding that Williams was “unable to work at this time due to cognitive impairment and mood disturbance.” Butler did not mention any accommodation requests, but estimated that Williams coul d return to work full-time on June 30. On June 13, however, Williams called Attendance Analyst Lisa Todd-Kyle, stating that she would not be able to return to work until her outpatient treatment program concluded eight weeks later. Williams called Todd-Kyle again on J une 24 to reiterate that she could not return to work by June 30 due to the ongoing trea tment program. Medical documentation sent from HealthQuest on June 20 confirmed that Williams’s treatment was projected to last until August 6.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 7

D. Procedural background After filing a charging document with the EEOC and receiving a right-to-sue letter, Williams filed a complaint against AT&T in the dist rict court. The complaint alleged that AT&T had violated the ADA by failing to provide W illiams with a reasonable accommodation, failing to engage in the interactive process of dete rmining such an accommodation, and terminating Williams based on unlawful disability discrimination and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. AT&T filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, Williams moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she wa s disabled under the ADA. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of W illiams, concluding as a matter of law that she was disabled. But in a later ruling the court gr anted summary judgment in favor of AT&T on all of Williams’s claims. This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district cour t’s grant of summary judgment. Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 840 F.3d 292, 301 (6th Cir. 2016). Summa ry judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving part y is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of ma terial fact exists “if th e evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We must view all evid ence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in making this determination. Tennial , 840 F.3d at 301.

B. Failure-to-accommodate claim Williams argues that AT&T violated the ADA by failing to provide he r with a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to continue working despite her depression and anxiety attacks. She sought accommodation in the form of leave from work fo r treatment, flexible scheduling, and additional br eaks during her shifts.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 8

The district court ruled that Williams was not qualified for her job as a CSR because she could not perform the essential function of attend ing work regularly and punctually. In addition, the court concluded that Williams’s proposed ac commodation was per se unreasonable because it sought to eliminate the essential job functi on of regular attendan ce and punctuality. 1. Without an accommodation, Williams was unqualified for her position because of her excessive absenteeism. Failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to a disabl ed, but otherwise qualified, person in the workplace is deemed unlawfu l discrimination under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. , 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007). As a threshold matter in every disability-discriminati on claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is disabled; and (2) she is “otherwise qualified for the position despite” her disability, either with or without a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 869 (quoting Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys. , 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2004)). An empl oyee is deemed qualified only if she can perform all of the essential functions of her job, whether accommodated or not. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). In the present case, Williams argues that she would have been qualified for the CSR position if a reasonable accommoda tion had been granted. AT&T responds that Williams’s poor attendance record shows that she was not qualifie d because she could not perform the essential function of regularly attending her job. Similarly, AT&T argues that the flexible scheduling and modified breaks that Williams proposed would not have enabled her to perform the essential function of regular attendance. We must first determine whether regular atte ndance is an essential function of Williams’s position. In making this determination, the ADA instructs us to consider evidence of the employer’s judgment, which can include any wr itten job descriptions prepared prior to advertising and interviewing app licants for the job at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Regular attendance is especially likely to qualify as an essential job function after this court’s recent en banc holding that “[r]egular, in-person attendance is an essential function . . . of most jobs, especially the interactive ones.” EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. , 782 F.3d 753, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2015)No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 9

(en banc) (concluding th at an employee who had excessive absences was not qualified for her job, and that her request to work from home as an accommodation was not reasonable).

The Ford decision was based in part on an analysis of the factors outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(iii) for determining whether a pa rticular job function is essential. Id. at 763. “Commonsense notions” that physical presence at work is important to most jobs, the court concluded, also supported this outcome. Id. at 762–63. Even before Ford , this court had held that plaintiffs with excessive absences were not qualified individuals when they failed to perform the essential function of regu larly attending their jobs. See Brenneman v. Me dCentral Health Sys. , 366 F.3d 412, 420 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that an em ployee who was terminated because of excessive absences that were unrelat ed to diabetes was not qualified, and would not be qualified due to these absences even if her accommodation request for medical leave were granted); Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. , 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an employee was not qualified because she had been on a year-long medical leave of absence, and her physician had not released her fo r work or specified a date on which she would be able to return).

The Ford decision leaves open the po ssibility that regular at tendance might not be an essential function of every job, but suggests that exceptions will be relatively rare. See EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 762–63. Here, AT&T’s judgment a nd much of the eviden ce in the record support the conclusion that regular attendance is an essential function of the CSR position. AT&T maintains strict Attendance Guidelines, under which absences and tardiness of as little as five minutes result in attendance points. An accumulation of eight attendance points can lead to a CSR’s termination. In addition, the Attendan ce Guidelines themselves state that regular attendance is an essential functi on of the CSR position. We regard this statement as persuasive evidence of AT&T’s evaluation of the job, especi ally because the Attendance Guidelines predate this litigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (providing that written job descriptions “shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job” when prepared prior to advertising openings or interviewing fo r the position at issue); see also EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 761–62 (explaining that job descriptions prepared prior to litigati on are properly considered).No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 10

In addition, the declarations of AT&T ma nagers Payne and McArthur support the point that regular attendance is essential to the func tioning of the Memphis Call Center for the reasons set forth in Part I.A. above. This court ha s previously considered similar testimony from employers as evidence that attend ance is an essential job function. See, e.g. , Brenneman , 366 F.3d at 420 (concluding that regular attenda nce was an essential function based on a supervisor’s affidavit that the “plaintiff’s ex cessive absences placed a great strain” on the workplace because other employees would have to fill in for the plaintiff, decreasing morale). Williams puts forth no competing evidence on these points. We therefore conclude that regular attendance is an essential function of the CSR position. Williams’s poor attendance record makes cl ear that, unless some accommodation was possible, she could not perform the essential function of regular ly attending her job. She was absent from work for entire months in 2013 a nd 2014. Most notably, she took a six-month leave from January to July 2013 and a nearly three- month leave from April 2014 until her termination in July 2014. Many of her unscheduled absences were not approved for STD leave. Williams accumulated 16 attendance points for these absences, double the 8 points meriting termination under AT&T’s Attendance Guidelines. This was clearly excessi ve absenteeism. Williams does not dispute that she was absent on the days documented by AT&T. Before the district court, she challeng ed only AT&T’s calculation of her attendance points, arguing that the code AT&T used to classify certain absenc es suggests that points were improperly assessed for some absences that were scheduled in adva nce. But AT&T produced evidence that the code was in fact properly applied, and Williams has not produced any competing evidence. Williams vaguely maintains on appeal that she disputes AT&T’s calculation of attendance points, but she does not explain how the calculation was incorrect, nor does she cite to any evidence in the record. Unless a reasonable accommodation coul d be instituted, Williams was not qualified for her job on the basis of her attendance record.

2. Williams failed to propos e any reasonable accommoda tion that would have allowed her to perform the essential functions of her job. Although this court concluded in Ford that excessive absenteeism was enough to render an employee not qualified, it did not stop there. The Ford court also evaluated whether theNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 11

employee had proposed a reasonable accommodati on that would allow her to perform the essential functions of her job. EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 763. It held that the employee’s proposed accommodation—a request to work from home—was unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. Here, Williams has alleged that she would have been able to perform her essential job functions using a combination of leave, flex ible scheduling, and modified break times. We therefore evaluate whether she would have been “otherwise qualified” for her CSR position with these proposed accommodations and, if so, whether these accommodations were reasonable.

a. Williams has not shown that she would have been otherwise qualified with flex ible scheduling and modified breaks. Williams’s accommodation requests for flexible scheduling and modified breaks were based on the following submissions: (1) Thompson’s evaluation, which stated that Williams needed a flexible start time and ten-minute breaks every two hours, (2) Williams’s accompanying statement that she was requesting a flexible start time and a modified break schedule, and (3) Williams’s verbal statements to Scruggs and Prude-Anderson that she needed accommodations. But none of these requests explain how the proposed accommodations would have enabled Williams to perform the essential functions of her job. Williams’s own deposition testimony reveals that she could not have worked on a regular basis even with her requested accommodations. Sh e explained in her deposition that she needed the modified break schedule to allow her to calm down after stressful calls. When these calls provoked anxiety attacks, Williams needed to log off of her workstation and cease taking further calls. In other words, Williams essentially ad mitted that she could not perform her job duties during her anxiety attacks.Williams provided no explanation for how Thompson’s specific recommendation of tenminute breaks every two hours would alleviate th is problem. Williams admitted in her deposition that she had no way of predicting when her anxiety attacks would occur or how many attacks she would have per da y. Breaks every two hours would therefore be inadequate if Williams suffered from an anxiety attack in between scheduled breaks.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 12

In addition, the medical evidence reveals that Williams could not work at all for significant periods of time. Dr. Madakasira opined that Williams was “not fit for work” while she was undergoing treatment in May 2014. On June 11, therapist Debr a Butler wrote that Williams was “unable to work at this time due to cognitive impairment and mood disturbance.” And Thompson noted that Williams was unable to work from April 11–30 and May 28–June 8. These excluded work days were listed in the same evaluation that recommended a flexible start time and break schedule, suggesting that Williams would have been unable to work on those dates even with the proposed accommodations. Finally, Williams herself stated in her appeal of the denial of STD leave that, from May 28 to June 9, she “could not function at work in a call center environment” and “could not focus mentally due to mental illness.” Williams has th us failed to make a prima facie showing that she would have been otherwise qualified even withthese accommodations. We therefore need not consider whether these accommodations, as framed by Williams, were reasonable. b. Williams’s request for additional leave as an accommodation was not reasonable. Williams also argues that her requests for STD-approved leave doubled as requests for reasonable accommodations under the ADA. This c ourt has previously held that medical leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr. , 155 F.3d 775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998). But even if we were to assume that Williams was qualified for her position with the accommodation of leave, her request for additional leave was unreasonable. An employer is not required to keep an employee’s job open indefinitely. This court has held that additional leave is an objectively unreasonable accommodation where an employee has already received significant amount s of leave and has demonstrated “no clear prospects for recovery.” Walsh v. United Parcel Serv. , 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000). A physician’s estimate of a return date alone doe s not necessarily indicate a clear prospect for recovery, especially where an employee has repeat edly taken leaves of unspecified duration and has not demonstrated th at additional leave will remedy her condition. See Maat v. County of Ottawa , 657 F. App’x 404, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2016) (c oncluding that where an employee had already received substantial leave, additional leave was not a reasonable accommodation becauseNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 13

her physician’s vague estimate of a return date wa s uncertain and indicated that she might need further treatment); Aston v. Tapco Int’l Corp. , 631 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that additional leave was not a reasonable accommodation wh ere an employee had already received a 26-week leave and had provided a physic ian’s estimate of a return date, but had also submitted evidence that she still needed another medical procedure which would require recovery time beyond that date). In the present case, AT&T provided Williams with retroactively approved STD leave and allowed her to retain her pos ition for many months before terminating her in July 2014. Williams submitted an evaluation from Thompson that provided a return date of August 15, 2014, but Thompson stated that this date was onl y an estimate. Given that Williams had a history of taking leaves, that her condition faile d to improve during those leaves, and that she repeatedly failed to return to work by dates on which her treatment pr oviders had previously estimated that she would be able to return, requiring AT&T to grant further leave as an accommodation would be unreasonable.

C. Williams’s claim that AT&T failed to engage in the interactive process Williams also asserts an ADA claim against AT&T for failure to engage in the interactive process. An employer is required “to initiate an informal, interactive process” when necessary to determine how an employee’s disability limits her ability to work and to identify appropriate reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). But an employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process is actionable only if th e employee can demonstrat e that she was qualified for the position. EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 766. In other words, if the employee fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact that a reasonable accommoda tion would have allowed her to perform the essential functions of her job, she cannot survive summary judgment on an interactive-process claim. Id. Because we conclude that Williams has failed to make a prima facie showing that she was qualified for her po sition as a CSR with or without a reasonable accommodation, we need not consider whether AT&T failed to engage in the interactive process.No. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 14

D. Disparate-treatment claim Williams further argues that her termination was the result of unlawful disability discrimination. We analyze disabili ty-discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Whitfield v. Tennessee , 639 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2011). To make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstr ate that (1) she has a disability, (2) she is “otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation,” (3) she “suffered an adverse employment decision,” (4) her employer “knew or had reason to know” of her disability, and (5) she was replaced or her position remained open. Id. (quoting Macy v. Hopkins Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 484 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 2007)). If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. The plaintiff must then show that the reason given by the employe r was actually a pretext designed to mask unlawful discrimination. Id. As discussed above, Williams failed to pr oduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was qualified for her position, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Because we conclude that Williams was not qualified as a matter of law, we need not proceed beyond the prima faci e stage. AT&T was th erefore entitled to summary judgment on Williams’s disability-discrimination claim.

E. Retaliation claim

Williams’s final contention is that AT&T term inated her in retaliation for requesting an accommodation under the ADA. AT&T responds thatit terminated Williams because of her excessive absenteeism, not because of her accommodation requests. Retaliation claims are also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework where, as here, there is no direct ev idence of retaliation. Rorrer v. City of Stow , 743 F.3d 1025, 1046 (6th Cir. 2014). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a pl aintiff must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in protected activity under the ADA, (2) her employer was aware of that activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) a “causal connec tion” existed between the protected activity an d the adverse action. Id. If the plaintiff does so, then the burden shifts toNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 15

the employer to articulate a le gitimate, nondiscriminatory reas on for the adverse employment action. A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff must then show that the reason given by the employer was actually a pretext designed to mask retaliation. Id. Williams contends that her proof was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. AT&T dis putes this, with the key question being the alleged causal connection between Williams’s requests for accommodation and the termination of her employment. Because we agree with the district court’s de termination that AT&T’s articulated reason for firing Williams was both legitimate and nondiscriminatory, we will as sume without deciding that Williams established her prima facie case. This a llows us to proceed dir ectly to the question of pretext. To establish pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate “ both that the employer’s proffered reason was not the real reason for its action, and that the employer’s real reason was unlawful.” EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 767 (emphasis in original). Williams has not created a genuine dispute of material fact under this standard. Although temporal proximity can demonstrat e a causal connection fo r the purposes of a prima facie case, it alone cannot establish pretext. Donald v. Sybra, Inc. , 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2012). Williams cannot create a genuine dis pute of material fact on her retaliation claim by simply asserting that she was terminated soon after asking for additional leave. And Williams has produced no other evidence of pretext. Ther e is ample evidence in the record that AT&T was poised to terminate Williams for legitimat e business reasons—her poor attendance record— well before late June of 2014. AT&T managers and human resources personnel, including Area Manager Payne and Attendance Analyst Todd-Kyle, discussed terminating Williams as early as June 11. And Payne testified that before term inating Williams, AT&T confirmed that she had enough attendance points for termination without rega rd to whether her appeal for absences from May 28 onward succeeded. A reasonable juror could not find that Williams ’s termination was pretexutal under any of the theories that she asserts. In the section of her brief on disparate treatment, Williams advancesNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 16

three theories to support her claim that AT&T’s use of the Attendance Guidelines to terminate her was pretextual: (1) AT&T failed to follow its own policies, (2) AT&T provided shifting reasons for terminating her, and (3) AT&T inconsistently applied the Attendance Guidelines to other employees. Williams’s brief does not explic itly make this argument with regard to her retaliation claim. But even assuming that Williams has not waived these arguments, she has not put forth sufficient evidence of pretext to create a genuine disput e of material fact. First, Williams does not cite to any evidence in the record to establish that AT&T failed to follow its policies in terminating her. W illiams cites AT&T’s IDSC Guide for the Guide’s explanation of how an employee can request time off as an acco mmodation, and she argues that AT&T terminated her despite her proper use of this procedure. But the policy that Williams cites addresses procedures for employees, not AT&T, to follow. Williams points to no other evidence of a policy that AT&T failed to follow. She insists that AT&T e ngaged in a pattern of denying STD leave, assessing attendance points agai nst her, retroactively approving STD leave, and ultimately “us[ing] the alleged incurred points to fire her.” The record in fact reflects that AT&T denied Williams’s STD leave requests on multiple occasions and then retroactively approved them. But this does not indicate a discriminatory or retaliatory motive. Whenever AT&T retroactively approved ST D leave, any attendance points that Williams incurred during the relevant time period were removed. And when calculating the attendance points needed to terminate Williams, her managers assumed that her final STD leave request, which had initially been denied, would be approved. They ultimately concluded that her absenteeism was a terminable offense even without the disputed points. Second, Williams has not created a genuine dis pute of material fact regarding her claim that AT&T provided “changing rati onales” for terminating her. She argues that AT&T’s final return-to-work letter provided her with an explanation of how she could obtain approval for additional leave and keep her j ob. Her termination after she followed those instructions, she contends, was inconsistent with this letter and occurred “without warning.” Williams argues that AT&T informed her that she was terminated eith er because she had failed to properly make an ADA request for leave as an accommodation or b ecause her request for leave had not been approved. She appears to be referring to her term ination letter, although she does not cite it. TheNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 17

“shift” in AT&T’s reasoning, according to W illiams, is its invocation of the Attendance Guidelines as an explanation for her te rmination after sending her this letter. A reasonable juror could not find that these alleged shifting reasons for termination were pretextual. True enough, the termination letter did state that Williams’s failure to properly request leave for her absences after May 27 wa s the reason for her termination. Attendance points were not mentioned in that letter. But the other evidence in the record overwhelmingly indicates that Williams’s managers at AT&T were careful to ensure that they did not factor absences meriting STD leave into Williams’s te rmination, gave Williams multiple chances to return to work before firing her, and decided to terminate her based on unscheduled absences that had resulted in attenda nce points. Evidence documenting this legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for termination predates the termina tion letter on which Williams so heavily relies.
Furthermore, the cases on which Williams re lies for the proposition that shifting reasons can constitute pretext are factually distinguishable from the present case. They involve situations where an employer’s proffered reason for termin ation changed after lit igation commenced, or where an employer claimed that an employee wa s terminated for alleged poor performance but had not previously informed the employee thathis or her performance was inadequate. See, e.g. , Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp. , 749 F.3d 530, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding that evidence of shifting reasons crea ted a genuine dispute of mate rial fact where the employer initially told the plaintiff that he was fired due to a reduction in the workforce, but later informed the plaintiff that his poor performance was the reason for termination when the plaintiff mentioned appealing the decision); Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc. , 280 F.3d 579, 589–92 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that there was a genuine dispute of ma terial fact regarding pretext where the employer claimed that an employee was fired for poor work performance, but repeatedly gave him merit-based bonuses, did not inform him of performance deficiencies until after terminating him, and did not mention poor performance as a rationa le for the termination until answering interrogatories for the purposes of litigation). In contrast to the plaintiffs in the above cases, Williams had been repeatedly warned about her attendance issues throughout the cour se of her employment. And AT&T produced evidence predating its termination decision to s how that Williams’s absenteeism was the actualNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 18

reason for her termination. We conclude that Williams has failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her excessive absenteeism was not the “real reason” for her termination. See EEOC v. Ford , 782 F.3d at 767. Finally, Williams asserts as evidence of pret ext that AT&T treated her differently from other employees under the Attendance Guidelines. She produced the attendance records of several other employees in support of this argument. The districtcourt noted that these records had not been properly authenticated, but concluded th at even if they were authenticated at trial, Williams had not provided enough context to establish that she was treated differently from similarly situated coworkers. We agree that the attendance records are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. To establish pretext, Williams must show that these coworkers were “similarly situated” to her, meaning that they had th e same supervisor, were governed by the same standards of conduct, and had committed the same Attendance Guidelines violations as Williams, without any “differentiating or mitiga ting circumstances” that would merit different
treatment. See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co. , 220 F.3d 752, 762 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)). Williams must also show that these coworkers were not fired despite engagi ng in conduct that was substantially similar to hers. Id. The attendance and discipli nary records in themselves do not provide any context about the types of absences at issue or the co workers’ circumstances. Williams offers her own unsubstantiated speculations about what the records show in her response to AT&T’s statement of facts, but this does not set out facts that would be admissibl e at trial and therefore is not sufficient evidence to create a genu ine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

III. CONCLUSION In the end, this case reflects the reality th at there are some jobs that a person with disabilities is simply unable to perform. A b lind person cannot be an airline pilot, nor can one with advanced Parkinson’s disease be a neur osurgeon. Similarly, a person like Williams who reacts to random customer calls with anxiety attacks that require her to log off of her workstationNo. 16-6078 Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. Page 19

is not capable of performing th e essential job functi ons of an AT&T CS R. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.