# Jurnalul Oficial C 95/2010

| | ISSN 1830-3668
  doi:10.3000/18303668.C_2010.095.ron |
| --- | --- |
| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | C 95 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Comunicări şi informări | Anul 5315 aprilie 2010 |

ISSN 1830-3668

doi:10.3000/18303668.C_2010.095.ron

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

C 95

Ediţia în limba română

Comunicări şi informări

Anul 5315 aprilie 2010

---

| Informarea nr. | Cuprins | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Rezoluții, recomandări și avize |
| | AVIZE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/01 | Avizul Comisiei din 14 aprilie 2010 privind planul modificat de eliminare a deșeurilor radioactive provenite de la clădirea 443.26, operată de General Electric Healthcare Ltd (fosta Amersham plc), situată în cadrul Harwell International Business Centre din Regatul Unit, în conformitate cu articolul 37 din Tratatul Euratom | 1 |

Informarea nr.

Cuprins

Pagina

I   Rezoluții, recomandări și avize

AVIZE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/01

Avizul Comisiei din 14 aprilie 2010 privind planul modificat de eliminare a deșeurilor radioactive provenite de la clădirea 443.26, operată de General Electric Healthcare Ltd (fosta Amersham plc), situată în cadrul Harwell International Business Centre din Regatul Unit, în conformitate cu articolul 37 din Tratatul Euratom

1

| | II   Comunicări |
| --- | --- |
| | COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/02 | Autorizație pentru ajutoarele de stat acordate în conformitate cu articolele 107 și 108 din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene – Cazuri față de care Comisia nu prezintă obiecții | 2 |

II   Comunicări

COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/02

Autorizație pentru ajutoarele de stat acordate în conformitate cu articolele 107 și 108 din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene – Cazuri față de care Comisia nu prezintă obiecții

2

| | IV   Informări |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/03 | Rata de schimb a monedei euro | 5 |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA STATELE MEMBRE |
| 2010/C 095/04 | Decizie de deschidere a procedurilor de redresare pentru KD Life Asigurări S.A. (Publicare realizată în conformitate cu articolul 6 din Directiva 2001/17/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 19 martie 2001 privind reorganizarea și lichidarea întreprinderilor de asigurare) | 6 |

IV   Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/03

Rata de schimb a monedei euro

5

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA STATELE MEMBRE

2010/C 095/04

Decizie de deschidere a procedurilor de redresare pentru KD Life Asigurări S.A. (Publicare realizată în conformitate cu articolul 6 din Directiva 2001/17/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 19 martie 2001 privind reorganizarea și lichidarea întreprinderilor de asigurare)

(Publicare realizată în conformitate cu articolul 6 din Directiva 2001/17/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 19 martie 2001 privind reorganizarea și lichidarea întreprinderilor de asigurare)

6

| | V   Anunțuri |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/05 | Cerere specifică de propuneri – EAC/19/10 – Carta Universitară Erasmus 2011 | 7 |
| | PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII COMERCIALE COMUNE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/06 | Aviz de expirare iminentă a unor măsuri antidumping | 9 |
| | PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/07 | Ajutor de stat – Țările de Jos – Ajutor de stat C 11/09 [asociat NN 2/10 (ex N 429/09) și N 19/10] – Măsuri de recapitalizare în favoarea FBN și a grupului ABN Amro – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| | ALTE ACTE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2010/C 095/08 | Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 6 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 al Consiliului privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare | 29 |
| 2010/C 095/09 | Publicarea unei cereri de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 8 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006 al Consiliului privind specialitățile tradiționale garantate din produse agricole și alimentare | 34 |

V   Anunțuri

PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/05

Cerere specifică de propuneri – EAC/19/10 – Carta Universitară Erasmus 2011

7

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII COMERCIALE COMUNE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/06

Aviz de expirare iminentă a unor măsuri antidumping

9

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/07

Ajutor de stat – Țările de Jos – Ajutor de stat C 11/09 [asociat NN 2/10 (ex N 429/09) și N 19/10] – Măsuri de recapitalizare în favoarea FBN și a grupului ABN Amro – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene (
  1
  )

1

10

ALTE ACTE

Comisia Europeană

2010/C 095/08

Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 6 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 al Consiliului privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare

29

2010/C 095/09

Publicarea unei cereri de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 8 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006 al Consiliului privind specialitățile tradiționale garantate din produse agricole și alimentare

34

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE |

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(1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE

1

| RO | |
| --- | --- |

RO

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I Rezoluții, recomandări și avize

AVIZE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/1

---

AVIZUL COMISIEI

din 14 aprilie 2010

privind planul modificat de eliminare a deșeurilor radioactive provenite de la clădirea 443.26, operată de General Electric Healthcare Ltd (fosta Amersham plc), situată în cadrul Harwell International Business Centre din Regatul Unit, în conformitate cu articolul 37 din Tratatul Euratom

(Numai textul în limba engleză este autentic)

2010/C 95/01

La 11 noiembrie 2009, Comisia Europeană a primit de la guvernul britanic, în conformitate cu articolul 37 din Tratatul Euratom, date generale privind planul modificat de eliminare a deșeurilor radioactive provenite de la clădirea 443.26 operată de General Electric Healthcare Ltd (fosta Amersham plc).

Pe baza acestor informații și în urma consultării Grupului de experți, Comisia a formulat următorul aviz:

| 1. | distanța dintre instalație și cel mai apropiat stat membru, în acest caz, Franța, este de aproximativ 225 km; |
| --- | --- |

1.

distanța dintre instalație și cel mai apropiat stat membru, în acest caz, Franța, este de aproximativ 225 km;

| 2. | modificarea preconizată vizează o creștere preconizată a limitei autorizate a deversărilor de radon-222 în suspensie în aer; |
| --- | --- |

2.

modificarea preconizată vizează o creștere preconizată a limitei autorizate a deversărilor de radon-222 în suspensie în aer;

| 3. | în condiții de funcționare normală, modificarea preconizată nu va cauza o expunere susceptibilă să afecteze sănătatea populației din alt stat membru; |
| --- | --- |

3.

în condiții de funcționare normală, modificarea preconizată nu va cauza o expunere susceptibilă să afecteze sănătatea populației din alt stat membru;

| 4. | în cazul unor scurgeri neprevăzute de efluenți radioactivi, care ar putea rezulta în urma unui accident de tipul sau de amploarea celor prevăzute în datele generale, dozele pe care populația din alte state membre le-ar putea primi nu ar fi semnificative din punct de vedere al sănătății. |
| --- | --- |

4.

în cazul unor scurgeri neprevăzute de efluenți radioactivi, care ar putea rezulta în urma unui accident de tipul sau de amploarea celor prevăzute în datele generale, dozele pe care populația din alte state membre le-ar putea primi nu ar fi semnificative din punct de vedere al sănătății.

În concluzie, Comisia consideră că implementarea planului modificat de eliminare a deșeurilor radioactive sub orice formă, provenite de la clădirea 443.26, operată de General Electric Healthcare Ltd (fosta Amersham plc), situată în cadrul Harwell International Business Centre din Regatul Unit, nu poate provoca, nici în timpul funcționării normale și nici în cazul unui accident de tipul și amploarea celor luate în considerare în datele generale, o contaminare radioactivă a apei, a solului sau a spațiului aerian al unui alt stat membru.

Adoptat la Bruxelles, 14 aprilie 2010.

Pentru Comisie

Günther OETTINGER

Membru al Comisiei

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II Comunicări

COMUNICĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/2

---

Autorizație pentru ajutoarele de stat acordate în conformitate cu articolele 107 și 108 din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene

Cazuri față de care Comisia nu prezintă obiecții

2010/C 95/02

| Data adoptării deciziei | 15.1.2010 |
| --- | --- |
| Numărul de referință al ajutorului | N 178/08 |
| Stat membru | Spania |
| Regiune | Castilla y Léon |
| Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului) | Ayuda a la reestructuración de Primayor Elaborados, S.L.U |
| Temei legal | Proyecto de Plan de Reestructuración a favor de la sociedad «Primayor Elaborados, S.L.U.» |
| Tipul măsurii | Ajutor individual |
| Obiectiv | Ajutor pentru restructurarea unei IMM |
| Forma de ajutor | Garanție de stat pentru o operațiune de credit bancar |
| Buget | Buget: 2 324 000 EUR |
| Valoare | 100 % |
| Durată (perioadă) | Durata ajutorului este de 5 ani. |
| Sectoare economice | Agricultură |
| Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului | Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla y León |
| Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería |
| Calle Rigoberto Cortejoso 14, 4a planta |
| 47014 Valladolid |
| ESPAÑA |

Data adoptării deciziei

15.1.2010

Numărul de referință al ajutorului

N 178/08

Stat membru

Spania

Regiune

Castilla y Léon

Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului)

Ayuda a la reestructuración de Primayor Elaborados, S.L.U

Temei legal

Proyecto de Plan de Reestructuración a favor de la sociedad «Primayor Elaborados, S.L.U.»

Tipul măsurii

Ajutor individual

Obiectiv

Ajutor pentru restructurarea unei IMM

Forma de ajutor

Garanție de stat pentru o operațiune de credit bancar

Buget

Buget: 2 324 000 EUR

Valoare

100 %

Durată (perioadă)

Durata ajutorului este de 5 ani.

Sectoare economice

Agricultură

Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului

Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla y León

Consejería de Agricultura y Ganadería

Calle Rigoberto Cortejoso 14, 4a planta

47014 Valladolid

ESPAÑA

Alte informații

Scheme precedente: Ajutorul pentru redresare NN 16/08 (fost N 518/07)

Textul deciziei în limba (limbile) originală (originale), din care au fost înlăturate toate informațiile confidențiale, poate fi consultat pe site-ul:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_ro.htm

| Data adoptării deciziei | 19.2.2010 |
| --- | --- |
| Numărul de referință al ajutorului | NN 01/09 ex CP 154/08 |
| Stat membru | Țările de Jos |
| Regiune | Provincie Overijssel |
| Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului) | Steun voor advisering in verband met het varkensclusterproject, provincie Overijssel |
| Temei legal | Provinciewet; Begroting van de provincie Overijssel |
| Tipul măsurii | Ajutoare pentru serviciile de consultanță |
| Obiectiv | Subvenționarea unui proiect în vederea facilitării și explorării posibilităților de realizare a unei grupări durabile de întreprinderi familiale care își desfășoară activitatea în producția primară de porcine. |
| Forma de ajutor | Subvenție unică |
| Buget | 214 358 EUR |
| Valoare | Maximum 50 % |
| Durată (perioadă) | 2005, ajutor unic |
| Sectoare economice | Producția primară de porcine |
| Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului | Provincie Overijssel |
| NEDERLAND |

Data adoptării deciziei

19.2.2010

Numărul de referință al ajutorului

NN 01/09 ex CP 154/08

Stat membru

Țările de Jos

Regiune

Provincie Overijssel

Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului)

Steun voor advisering in verband met het varkensclusterproject, provincie Overijssel

Temei legal

Provinciewet; Begroting van de provincie Overijssel

Tipul măsurii

Ajutoare pentru serviciile de consultanță

Obiectiv

Subvenționarea unui proiect în vederea facilitării și explorării posibilităților de realizare a unei grupări durabile de întreprinderi familiale care își desfășoară activitatea în producția primară de porcine.

Forma de ajutor

Subvenție unică

Buget

214 358 EUR

Valoare

Maximum 50 %

Durată (perioadă)

2005, ajutor unic

Sectoare economice

Producția primară de porcine

Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului

Provincie Overijssel

NEDERLAND

Alte informații

—

Textul deciziei în limba (limbile) originală (originale), din care au fost înlăturate toate informațiile confidențiale, poate fi consultat pe site-ul:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_ro.htm

| Data adoptării deciziei | 10.2.2010 |
| --- | --- |
| Numărul de referință al ajutorului | N 34/10 |
| Stat membru | Belgia |
| Regiune | Flandra |
| Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului) | Beperkte steun voor primaire producenten die getroffen zijn door de financiële crisis |
| Temei legal | Besluit van de Vlaamse regering betreffende steun aan de investeringen en aan de installatie in de landbouw (1) |
| Tipul măsurii | Schemă de ajutoare |
| Obiectiv | Ajutor destinat remedierii unor perturbări grave ale economiei |
| Forma de ajutor | Garanții și subvenții la dobânzi |
| Buget | Buget total de 2,73 milioane EUR |
| Valoare | — |
| Durată (perioadă) | 31.12.2010 |
| Sectoare economice | Agricultură |
| Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului | Vlaams Landbouwinvesteringsfonds (VLIF) |
| Ellipsgebouw 4e verdieping |
| Koning Albert II-laan 35 bus 41 |
| 1030 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Data adoptării deciziei

10.2.2010

Numărul de referință al ajutorului

N 34/10

Stat membru

Belgia

Regiune

Flandra

Titlu (și/sau numele beneficiarului)

Beperkte steun voor primaire producenten die getroffen zijn door de financiële crisis

Temei legal

Besluit van de Vlaamse regering betreffende steun aan de investeringen en aan de installatie in de landbouw (1)

Tipul măsurii

Schemă de ajutoare

Obiectiv

Ajutor destinat remedierii unor perturbări grave ale economiei

Forma de ajutor

Garanții și subvenții la dobânzi

Buget

Buget total de 2,73 milioane EUR

Valoare

—

Durată (perioadă)

31.12.2010

Sectoare economice

Agricultură

Numele și adresa autorității de acordare a ajutorului

Vlaams Landbouwinvesteringsfonds (VLIF)

Ellipsgebouw 4e verdieping

Koning Albert II-laan 35 bus 41

1030 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Alte informații

—

Textul deciziei în limba (limbile) originală (originale), din care au fost înlăturate toate informațiile confidențiale, poate fi consultat pe site-ul:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_ro.htm

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(1)  Besluit van de Vlaamse regering van 20 november 2000 betreffende steun aan de investeringen en de installatie in de landbouw, BS, 14.2.2001.

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IV Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/5

---

Rata de schimb a monedei euro (1)

14 aprilie 2010

2010/C 95/03

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Rata de schimb |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dolar american | 1,3615 |
| JPY | yen japonez | 127,42 |
| DKK | coroana daneză | 7,4431 |
| GBP | lira sterlină | 0,88140 |
| SEK | coroana suedeză | 9,7327 |
| CHF | franc elvețian | 1,4368 |
| ISK | coroana islandeză | |
| NOK | coroana norvegiană | 7,9955 |
| BGN | leva bulgărească | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroana cehă | 25,048 |
| EEK | coroana estoniană | 15,6466 |
| HUF | forint maghiar | 262,65 |
| LTL | litas lituanian | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats leton | 0,7082 |
| PLN | zlot polonez | 3,8549 |
| RON | leu românesc nou | 4,1440 |
| TRY | lira turcească | 2,0162 |
| AUD | dolar australian | 1,4583 |
| CAD | dolar canadian | 1,3571 |
| HKD | dolar Hong Kong | 10,5665 |
| NZD | dolar neozeelandez | 1,9089 |
| SGD | dolar Singapore | 1,8734 |
| KRW | won sud-coreean | 1 514,11 |
| ZAR | rand sud-african | 9,9682 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi chinezesc | 9,2932 |
| HRK | kuna croată | 7,2570 |
| IDR | rupia indoneziană | 12 257,63 |
| MYR | ringgit Malaiezia | 4,3575 |
| PHP | peso Filipine | 60,615 |
| RUB | rubla rusească | 39,4845 |
| THB | baht thailandez | 43,922 |
| BRL | real brazilian | 2,3744 |
| MXN | peso mexican | 16,5400 |
| INR | rupie indiană | 60,2190 |

Moneda

Rata de schimb

USD

dolar american

1,3615

JPY

yen japonez

127,42

DKK

coroana daneză

7,4431

GBP

lira sterlină

0,88140

SEK

coroana suedeză

9,7327

CHF

franc elvețian

1,4368

ISK

coroana islandeză

NOK

coroana norvegiană

7,9955

BGN

leva bulgărească

1,9558

CZK

coroana cehă

25,048

EEK

coroana estoniană

15,6466

HUF

forint maghiar

262,65

LTL

litas lituanian

3,4528

LVL

lats leton

0,7082

PLN

zlot polonez

3,8549

RON

leu românesc nou

4,1440

TRY

lira turcească

2,0162

AUD

dolar australian

1,4583

CAD

dolar canadian

1,3571

HKD

dolar Hong Kong

10,5665

NZD

dolar neozeelandez

1,9089

SGD

dolar Singapore

1,8734

KRW

won sud-coreean

1 514,11

ZAR

rand sud-african

9,9682

CNY

yuan renminbi chinezesc

9,2932

HRK

kuna croată

7,2570

IDR

rupia indoneziană

12 257,63

MYR

ringgit Malaiezia

4,3575

PHP

peso Filipine

60,615

RUB

rubla rusească

39,4845

THB

baht thailandez

43,922

BRL

real brazilian

2,3744

MXN

peso mexican

16,5400

INR

rupie indiană

60,2190

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(1)  Sursă: rata de schimb de referință publicată de către Banca Centrală Europeană.

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INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA STATELE MEMBRE

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/6

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Decizie de deschidere a procedurilor de redresare pentru KD Life Asigurări S.A.

(Publicare realizată în conformitate cu articolul 6 din Directiva 2001/17/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 19 martie 2001 privind reorganizarea și lichidarea întreprinderilor de asigurare)

2010/C 95/04

| Întreprinderea de asigurare | KD Life Asigurări S.A. |
| --- | --- |
| Calea Giulești nr. 8D, et. 3, sector 6 |
| București |
| ROMÂNIA |

Întreprinderea de asigurare

KD Life Asigurări S.A.

Calea Giulești nr. 8D, et. 3, sector 6

București

ROMÂNIA

Data, intrarea în vigoare și natura deciziei

Decizia nr. 190/3 martie 2010

Data intrarii in vigoare 3 martie 2010

Procedura de redresare financiară prin administrare specială

Autoritățile competente

Comisia de Supraveghere a Asigurărilor

Autoritatea de supraveghere

Comisia de Supraveghere a Asigurărilor

Administratorul special desemnat

| Nicolae Eugen Crișan |
| --- |
| Calea Giulești nr. 8D, et. 3, sector 6 |
| București |
| ROMÂNIA |

Nicolae Eugen Crișan

Calea Giulești nr. 8D, et. 3, sector 6

București

ROMÂNIA

Legea aplicabilă

Legea nr. 503/2004 privind redresarea financiară și falimentul societăților de asigurare

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V Anunțuri

PROCEDURI ADMINISTRATIVE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/7 |
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15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/7

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CERERE SPECIFICĂ DE PROPUNERI – EAC/19/10

Carta Universitară Erasmus 2011

2010/C 95/05

1.   OBIECTIVE ȘI DESCRIERE

Carta Universitară Erasmus oferă cadrul general pentru activitățile de cooperare europene pe care le poate desfășura o instituție de învățământ superior în cadrul programului Erasmus ca parte a Programului de învățare de-a lungul vieții (Lifelong Learning Programme – LLP). Carta Universitară Erasmus trebuie să fie acordată ca o condiție preliminară pentru ca instituțiile de învățământ superior să organizeze programe de mobilitate pentru studenți, cadre didactice și alte tipuri de personal, să realizeze cursuri de limbi străine intensive și programe intensive în cadrul programului Erasmus, să prezinte candidaturi pentru proiecte multilaterale, rețele și măsuri adiacente, precum și să organizeze vizite pregătitoare. Carta Universitară Erasmus se bazează pe decizia LLP (1) care acoperă perioada 2007-2013. Obiectivele specifice ale LLP sunt enumerate la articolul 1 alineatul (3) din decizie.

2.   CANDIDAȚI ELIGIBILI

Carta Universitară Erasmus se aplică tuturor instituțiilor de învățământ superior definite la articolul 2 alineatul (10) din decizia menționată.

Candidații trebuie să fie stabiliți pe teritoriul uneia dintre următoarele țări:

| — | cele 27 de state membre ale Uniunii Europene; |
| --- | --- |

—

cele 27 de state membre ale Uniunii Europene;

| — | țările AELS-SEE: Islanda, Liechtenstein, Norvegia; |
| --- | --- |

—

țările AELS-SEE: Islanda, Liechtenstein, Norvegia;

| — | țările candidate: Turcia, Croația, Fosta Republică Iugoslavă a Macedoniei; |
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—

țările candidate: Turcia, Croația, Fosta Republică Iugoslavă a Macedoniei;

| — | Elveția (2). |
| --- | --- |

—

Elveția (2).

3.   TERMENUL LIMITĂ DE DEPUNERE A CANDIDATURILOR

Termenul limită de depunere a candidaturilor pentru Carta Universitară Erasmus este 30 iunie 2010.

4.   INFORMAȚII COMPLETE

Informațiile referitoare la programul Erasmus și la Carta Universitară Erasmus pot fi consultate la următoarea adresă de internet: http://ec.europa.eu/llp

Candidaturile trebuie prezentate în conformitate cu orientările puse la dispoziție de Agenția Executivă pentru Educație, Audiovizual și Cultură la adresa: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/index_en.htm

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(1)  Decizia nr. 1720/2006/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 15 noiembrie 2006 de stabilire a unui program de acțiune în domeniul învățării continue. A se vedea http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:L:2006:327:0045:0068:EN:PDF

(2)  Participarea Elveției se bazează pe Acordul între Uniunea Europeană și Confederația Elvețiană de stabilire a clauzelor și condițiilor de participare a Confederației Elvețiene la programul „Tineretul în acțiune” și la programul de acțiune din domeniul învățării de-a lungul vieții 2007-2013 (semnat la 15 februarie 2010 – nepublicat încă).

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PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII COMERCIALE COMUNE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/9 |
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15.4.2010

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Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/9

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Aviz de expirare iminentă a unor măsuri antidumping

2010/C 95/06

1.   În conformitate cu articolul 11 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1225/2009 al Consiliului din 30 noiembrie 2009 privind protecția împotriva importurilor care fac obiectul unui dumping din partea țărilor care nu sunt membre ale Comunității Europene (1), Comisia Europeană face cunoscut faptul că dacă nu se inițiază o reexaminare în conformitate cu procedura următoare, măsurile antidumping menționate în continuare expiră la data menționată în tabelul de mai jos.

2.   Procedură

Producătorii din Uniune pot depune o cerere scrisă de reexaminare. Cererea trebuie să conțină probe suficiente care să susțină faptul că expirarea măsurilor ar determina probabil continuarea sau reapariția dumpingului și a prejudiciului.

În cazul în care Comisia decide să reexamineze măsurile în cauză, importatorii, exportatorii, reprezentanții țării exportatoare și producătorii din Uniune vor avea posibilitatea de a dezvolta, de a respinge sau de a comenta chestiunile expuse în cererea de reexaminare.

3.   Termen

Pe baza celor de mai sus, producătorii din Uniune pot transmite o cerere scrisă de reexaminare la adresa Comisia Europeană, Direcția Generală Comerț (unitatea H-1), N-105 4/92, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË (2), oricând după data publicării prezentului aviz, dar cel târziu cu trei luni înainte de data menționată în tabelul de mai jos.

4.   Prezentul aviz este publicat în conformitate cu articolul 11 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1225/2009.

| Produs | Țara (țările) de origine sau de export | Măsuri | Trimitere | Data de expirare |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Produse laminate plate din oțeluri electrice cu siliciu cu grăunți orientați | Statele Unite ale Americii | Taxă antidumping | Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1371/2005 al Consiliului (JO L 223, 27.8.2005, p. 1) | 28.8.2010 |
| Angajament | Decizia 2005/622/CE a Comisiei (JO L 223, 27.8.2005, p. 42) |

Produs

Țara (țările) de origine sau de export

Măsuri

Trimitere

Data de expirare

Produse laminate plate din oțeluri electrice cu siliciu cu grăunți orientați

Statele Unite ale Americii

Taxă antidumping

Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1371/2005 al Consiliului (JO L 223, 27.8.2005, p. 1)

28.8.2010

Angajament

Decizia 2005/622/CE a Comisiei (JO L 223, 27.8.2005, p. 42)

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(1)  JO L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

(2)  Fax +32 22956505.

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PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/10 |
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15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/10

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AJUTOR DE STAT – ȚĂRILE DE JOS

Ajutor de stat C 11/09 [asociat NN 2/10 (ex N 429/09) și N 19/10] – Măsuri de recapitalizare în favoarea FBN și a grupului ABN Amro

Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene

(Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)

2010/C 95/07

Prin scrisoarea din data de 5 februarie 2010, reprodusă în versiunea lingvistică autentică în paginile care urmează acestui rezumat, Comisia a comunicat Țărilor de Jos decizia sa de a iniția procedura prevăzută la articolul 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE privind măsura menționată anterior.

Părțile interesate își pot prezenta observațiile privind măsura pentru care Comisia inițiază procedura în termen de o lună de la data publicării prezentului rezumat și a scrisorii de mai jos, la adresa:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greiffe |
| Building/Office, J-70 03/225 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greiffe

Building/Office, J-70 03/225

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Aceste observații vor fi comunicate Țărilor de Jos. Păstrarea confidențialității privind identitatea părții interesate care prezintă observațiile poate fi solicitată în scris, precizându-se motivele care stau la baza solicitării.

REZUMAT

I.   PROCEDURĂ

| 1. | La 8 aprilie 2009, Comisia a inițiat procedura prevăzută la articolul 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE în ceea ce privește presupusul ajutor pentru Fortis Bank Nederland (FBN) și pentru activitățile din Țările de Jos ale ABN Amro (ABN Amro N). Comisia se îndoiește că statul olandez a acordat împrumuturi pentru FBN în condițiile pieței atunci când a preluat împrumuturile acordate de Fortis Holding pentru FBN, imediat după dezintegrarea suferită de Fortis Holding. De asemenea, Comisia are îndoieli în legătură cu faptul că statul olandez a plătit prețul pieței către FBN, atunci când a achiziționat ABN Amro N de la FBN, în decembrie 2008. |
| --- | --- |

1.

La 8 aprilie 2009, Comisia a inițiat procedura prevăzută la articolul 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE în ceea ce privește presupusul ajutor pentru Fortis Bank Nederland (FBN) și pentru activitățile din Țările de Jos ale ABN Amro (ABN Amro N). Comisia se îndoiește că statul olandez a acordat împrumuturi pentru FBN în condițiile pieței atunci când a preluat împrumuturile acordate de Fortis Holding pentru FBN, imediat după dezintegrarea suferită de Fortis Holding. De asemenea, Comisia are îndoieli în legătură cu faptul că statul olandez a plătit prețul pieței către FBN, atunci când a achiziționat ABN Amro N de la FBN, în decembrie 2008.

| 2. | La 17 iulie 2009, Țările de Jos au notificat Comisiei o recapitalizare în valoare de 2,5 miliarde EUR în favoarea activităților din Țările de Jos ale ABN Amro. Întrucât măsurile incluse în acest plan au fost implementate între timp, fără aprobarea Comisiei, aceasta consideră măsurile respective ca fiind un ajutor nenotificat. La 15 ianuarie 2010, Țările de Jos au notificat măsuri suplimentare în valoare de 4,39 miliarde EUR. |
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2.

La 17 iulie 2009, Țările de Jos au notificat Comisiei o recapitalizare în valoare de 2,5 miliarde EUR în favoarea activităților din Țările de Jos ale ABN Amro. Întrucât măsurile incluse în acest plan au fost implementate între timp, fără aprobarea Comisiei, aceasta consideră măsurile respective ca fiind un ajutor nenotificat. La 15 ianuarie 2010, Țările de Jos au notificat măsuri suplimentare în valoare de 4,39 miliarde EUR.

II.   DESCRIERE

| 3. | Măsurile de recapitalizare notificate la 17 iulie 2009 constau în două măsuri: un swap pe risc de credit și emiterea unor titluri de valoare convertibile în mod obligatoriu. Prin intermediul unui swap pe risc de credit (credit default swap – CDS), guvernul olandez a vândut protecția creditului asupra unui portofoliu ipotecar olandez în valoare de 34,5 miliarde EUR al ABN Amro N, reducând astfel nevoile de capital ale acesteia cu 1,7 miliarde EUR. Pentru instrumentul său de protecție a creditului, statul olandez primește un comision anual de 51,5 puncte de bază (calculat ca un procent din valoarea portofoliului la începutul fiecărei perioade de referință). În plus, statul olandez a subscris un titlu de valoare de rang 1 (Tier 1) convertibil în mod obligatoriu (MCS) cu un cupon de 10 % pentru o valoare nominală de 0,8 miliarde EUR. Aceste două măsuri erau necesare pentru a acoperi deficitul de capital din cadrul ABN Amro Z (care reunește activele ABN Amro Holding care nu fuseseră împărțite între cei trei membri ai consorțiului care dețineau acest grup, și anume Santander, Royal Bank of Scotland și statul olandez) și pentru a acoperi un prim set de costuri de scindare. |
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3.

Măsurile de recapitalizare notificate la 17 iulie 2009 constau în două măsuri: un swap pe risc de credit și emiterea unor titluri de valoare convertibile în mod obligatoriu. Prin intermediul unui swap pe risc de credit (credit default swap – CDS), guvernul olandez a vândut protecția creditului asupra unui portofoliu ipotecar olandez în valoare de 34,5 miliarde EUR al ABN Amro N, reducând astfel nevoile de capital ale acesteia cu 1,7 miliarde EUR. Pentru instrumentul său de protecție a creditului, statul olandez primește un comision anual de 51,5 puncte de bază (calculat ca un procent din valoarea portofoliului la începutul fiecărei perioade de referință). În plus, statul olandez a subscris un titlu de valoare de rang 1 (Tier 1) convertibil în mod obligatoriu (MCS) cu un cupon de 10 % pentru o valoare nominală de 0,8 miliarde EUR. Aceste două măsuri erau necesare pentru a acoperi deficitul de capital din cadrul ABN Amro Z (care reunește activele ABN Amro Holding care nu fuseseră împărțite între cei trei membri ai consorțiului care dețineau acest grup, și anume Santander, Royal Bank of Scotland și statul olandez) și pentru a acoperi un prim set de costuri de scindare.

| 4. | Măsurile suplimentare, care reprezentau o sumă de 4,39 miliarde EUR, vizau ABN Amro și FBN. Pentru a acoperi nevoile de capital ale FBN, statul va realiza un swap de 1,35 miliarde EUR cu FBN, între împrumuturile sale de capital de rang 2 (Tier 2) și capitalul de rang 1 (Tier 1) al FBN. Celelalte măsuri se referă la activitățile ABN Amro deținute de stat. Statul va subscrie emisiuni suplimentare de titluri de valoare convertibile în mod obligatoriu (MCS) pentru a acoperi costurile de scindare suplimentare, deficitul de capital care rezultă din vânzarea sub valoarea contabilă a New HBU și costurile de integrare. De asemenea, statul va plăti 740 de milioane EUR în numerar pentru a-și achita obligațiile față de ceilalți doi membri ai consorțiului. În plus, va fi dezvoltat un mecanism de garantare pentru obligațiile reciproce care rezultă, de asemenea, din vânzarea New HBU, aceasta din urmă fiind o precondiție pentru autorizarea fuziunii dintre FBN și ABN Amro N în temeiul normelor UE privind concentrările economice. Acest mecanism implică constituirea de către stat a unei contragaranții de 950 de milioane EUR pentru ABN Amro. ABN Amro va plăti o remunerație pentru această garanție de stat. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Măsurile suplimentare, care reprezentau o sumă de 4,39 miliarde EUR, vizau ABN Amro și FBN. Pentru a acoperi nevoile de capital ale FBN, statul va realiza un swap de 1,35 miliarde EUR cu FBN, între împrumuturile sale de capital de rang 2 (Tier 2) și capitalul de rang 1 (Tier 1) al FBN. Celelalte măsuri se referă la activitățile ABN Amro deținute de stat. Statul va subscrie emisiuni suplimentare de titluri de valoare convertibile în mod obligatoriu (MCS) pentru a acoperi costurile de scindare suplimentare, deficitul de capital care rezultă din vânzarea sub valoarea contabilă a New HBU și costurile de integrare. De asemenea, statul va plăti 740 de milioane EUR în numerar pentru a-și achita obligațiile față de ceilalți doi membri ai consorțiului. În plus, va fi dezvoltat un mecanism de garantare pentru obligațiile reciproce care rezultă, de asemenea, din vânzarea New HBU, aceasta din urmă fiind o precondiție pentru autorizarea fuziunii dintre FBN și ABN Amro N în temeiul normelor UE privind concentrările economice. Acest mecanism implică constituirea de către stat a unei contragaranții de 950 de milioane EUR pentru ABN Amro. ABN Amro va plăti o remunerație pentru această garanție de stat.

III.   EVALUARE

| 5. | Comisia prelungește procedura demarată la 8 aprilie 2009 și va lărgi sfera de aplicare a investigării pentru a include noile măsuri. Comisia consideră că unele măsuri sau toate ar putea constitui ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 107 alineatul (1) din TFUE. De asemenea, Comisia are îndoieli în legătură cu faptul că planul de restructurare pe care l-a propus societatea este conform cu Comunicarea privind restructurarea. |
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5.

Comisia prelungește procedura demarată la 8 aprilie 2009 și va lărgi sfera de aplicare a investigării pentru a include noile măsuri. Comisia consideră că unele măsuri sau toate ar putea constitui ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 107 alineatul (1) din TFUE. De asemenea, Comisia are îndoieli în legătură cu faptul că planul de restructurare pe care l-a propus societatea este conform cu Comunicarea privind restructurarea.

| 6. | Din considerente de stabilitate financiară, Comisia consideră că toate măsurile sunt compatibile cu articolul 107 alineatul (3) litera (b) din TFUE ca ajutoare pentru salvare, până la 31 iulie 2010. |
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6.

Din considerente de stabilitate financiară, Comisia consideră că toate măsurile sunt compatibile cu articolul 107 alineatul (3) litera (b) din TFUE ca ajutoare pentru salvare, până la 31 iulie 2010.

IV.   OBSERVAȚII FINALE

| 7. | Pentru a se evita confuzii, vă rugăm să țineți seama de faptul că, datorită reorganizării întreprinderii, denumirile unora dintre entitățile menționate în decizie s-au modificat de la data luării deciziei, la 5 februarie 2010. Denumirea oficială a ABN Amro II este acum ABN Amro Bank NV, ABN Amro Bank NV se numește acum The Royal Bank of Scotland NV, iar ABN Amro Holding NV se numește acum The Royal Bank of Scotland Holding NV. |
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7.

Pentru a se evita confuzii, vă rugăm să țineți seama de faptul că, datorită reorganizării întreprinderii, denumirile unora dintre entitățile menționate în decizie s-au modificat de la data luării deciziei, la 5 februarie 2010. Denumirea oficială a ABN Amro II este acum ABN Amro Bank NV, ABN Amro Bank NV se numește acum The Royal Bank of Scotland NV, iar ABN Amro Holding NV se numește acum The Royal Bank of Scotland Holding NV.

TEXTUL SCRISORII

„The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measures referred to above in favour of its ABN Amro activities and in favour of Fortis Bank Nederland (hereafter “FBN”), it has decided to extend the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1) (“TFEU”) to these measures. Meanwhile, the Commission has decided to authorise these measures as rescue aid until 31 July 2010 based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | On 8 April 2009 (2), the Commission initiated the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU with respect to alleged aid to FBN and the ABN Amro assets owned by the Dutch State. |
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1.

On 8 April 2009 (2), the Commission initiated the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU with respect to alleged aid to FBN and the ABN Amro assets owned by the Dutch State.

| 2. | On 16 June 2009, the Dutch Ministry of Finance informed the Commission that it was preparing a EUR 2,5 billion recapitalisation plan enabling the separation of ABN Amro Holding into three parts. The Dutch authorities also indicated that at a later stage additional measures might be necessary, without being able to quantify these. |
| --- | --- |

2.

On 16 June 2009, the Dutch Ministry of Finance informed the Commission that it was preparing a EUR 2,5 billion recapitalisation plan enabling the separation of ABN Amro Holding into three parts. The Dutch authorities also indicated that at a later stage additional measures might be necessary, without being able to quantify these.

| 3. | On 17 July 2009, the Netherlands formally notified a plan with recapitalisation measures worth EUR 2,5 billion: a credit default swap (CDS) (with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion) and a Mandatory Convertible Security (MCS) of EUR 800 million. The MCS and the CDS were implemented on respectively 30 July 2009 and 31 August 2009. Given that the measures were implemented before the Commission took a decision on them, the case was moved from the register of notified aid into the non-notified aid register under number NN 2/10. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 17 July 2009, the Netherlands formally notified a plan with recapitalisation measures worth EUR 2,5 billion: a credit default swap (CDS) (with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion) and a Mandatory Convertible Security (MCS) of EUR 800 million. The MCS and the CDS were implemented on respectively 30 July 2009 and 31 August 2009. Given that the measures were implemented before the Commission took a decision on them, the case was moved from the register of notified aid into the non-notified aid register under number NN 2/10.

| 4. | By letter dated 24 July 2009, the Commission asked for more information, which the Dutch government provided on 19 August 2009 and on 2 September 2009. |
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4.

By letter dated 24 July 2009, the Commission asked for more information, which the Dutch government provided on 19 August 2009 and on 2 September 2009.

| 5. | On 8 September 2009, the Commission asked for more information on the outstanding hybrids capital instruments of FBN and ABN Amro, which the Dutch government provided on 24 September 2009. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 8 September 2009, the Commission asked for more information on the outstanding hybrids capital instruments of FBN and ABN Amro, which the Dutch government provided on 24 September 2009.

| 6. | On 1 September 2009, the Dutch government sent a non-paper in which it updated its ABN Amro plans. In an addendum to this non-paper sent on 10 November 2009, the Dutch government indicated that its new plan contained State support measures worth in total EUR 6,89 billion (3). Further details were provided in an explanatory note on 13 November 2009. |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 1 September 2009, the Dutch government sent a non-paper in which it updated its ABN Amro plans. In an addendum to this non-paper sent on 10 November 2009, the Dutch government indicated that its new plan contained State support measures worth in total EUR 6,89 billion (3). Further details were provided in an explanatory note on 13 November 2009.

| 7. | On 4 December 2009, the Dutch government submitted a first draft of a business plan for the new entity that will result from the merger between FBN and the State's ABN Amro activities. |
| --- | --- |

7.

On 4 December 2009, the Dutch government submitted a first draft of a business plan for the new entity that will result from the merger between FBN and the State's ABN Amro activities.

| 8. | On 15 January 2010, the Dutch government formally notified a complete restructuring plan including additional State aid measures worth EUR 4,39 billion that were not notified in July 2009. This notification was registered under number N 19/10. |
| --- | --- |

8.

On 15 January 2010, the Dutch government formally notified a complete restructuring plan including additional State aid measures worth EUR 4,39 billion that were not notified in July 2009. This notification was registered under number N 19/10.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The Beneficiary

Context

| 9. | In the Spring of 2007, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Banco Santander and Fortis Holding created a new legal entity “RFS Holdings” to acquire ABN Amro Holding (4). The members of the consortium set out the arrangements for dividing up the operations of ABN Amro Holding in a so-called consortium and shareholders’ agreement (hereafter “CSA”). |
| --- | --- |

9.

In the Spring of 2007, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Banco Santander and Fortis Holding created a new legal entity “RFS Holdings” to acquire ABN Amro Holding (4). The members of the consortium set out the arrangements for dividing up the operations of ABN Amro Holding in a so-called consortium and shareholders’ agreement (hereafter “CSA”).

| 10. | The consortium partners intended to split up ABN Amro Holding in three parts. In order to facilitate this break-up, the consortium members created so-called “tracking shares” representing the economic ownership of the businesses of each consortium member. As a result, Royal Bank of Scotland, Banco Santander and Fortis Holding became the economic owner of respectively the R-share, S-share and N-share (hereafter “ABN Amro R”, “ABN Amro S” and “ABN Amro N”). ABN Amro R comprised inter alia the Business Units (BU) Global Business and Markets, Global Transaction Services and the international network, ABN Amro S comprised inter alia BU Latin America and BU Antoveneta (Italy), while ABN Amro N comprised BU Netherlands (including the International Diamond and Jewelry Group) and BU Private Banking. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The consortium partners intended to split up ABN Amro Holding in three parts. In order to facilitate this break-up, the consortium members created so-called “tracking shares” representing the economic ownership of the businesses of each consortium member. As a result, Royal Bank of Scotland, Banco Santander and Fortis Holding became the economic owner of respectively the R-share, S-share and N-share (hereafter “ABN Amro R”, “ABN Amro S” and “ABN Amro N”). ABN Amro R comprised inter alia the Business Units (BU) Global Business and Markets, Global Transaction Services and the international network, ABN Amro S comprised inter alia BU Latin America and BU Antoveneta (Italy), while ABN Amro N comprised BU Netherlands (including the International Diamond and Jewelry Group) and BU Private Banking.

| 11. | Items that were not allocated to the individual consortium members were brought together in the so-called ABN Amro Z-share (hereafter ABN Amro Z), together with e.g. head office functions. Each consortium member holds a pro-rata stake (5) in ABN Amro Z. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Items that were not allocated to the individual consortium members were brought together in the so-called ABN Amro Z-share (hereafter ABN Amro Z), together with e.g. head office functions. Each consortium member holds a pro-rata stake (5) in ABN Amro Z.

| 12. | On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State acquired FBN from Fortis Holding, thereby also becoming the indirect owner of ABN Amro N and of 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z, since, within the Fortis Group, FBN was the legal owner of these shares. |
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12.

On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State acquired FBN from Fortis Holding, thereby also becoming the indirect owner of ABN Amro N and of 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z, since, within the Fortis Group, FBN was the legal owner of these shares.

| 13. | On 17 December 2008, the Dutch State became the direct owner of those shares after acquiring them from FBN. On 24 December 2008, RBS, Santander and the Dutch State signed an amendment to the CSA, by which the Dutch State officially took the place of Fortis Holding in the CSA. After the purchase of FBN by the Dutch State on 3 October 2008, Fortis Holding had remained formally a party to the CSA. However, the Dutch State committed to indemnify Fortis Holding for any charge it would face as a consequence of the continuation of its participation in the CSA. |
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13.

On 17 December 2008, the Dutch State became the direct owner of those shares after acquiring them from FBN. On 24 December 2008, RBS, Santander and the Dutch State signed an amendment to the CSA, by which the Dutch State officially took the place of Fortis Holding in the CSA. After the purchase of FBN by the Dutch State on 3 October 2008, Fortis Holding had remained formally a party to the CSA. However, the Dutch State committed to indemnify Fortis Holding for any charge it would face as a consequence of the continuation of its participation in the CSA.

| 14. | In November 2008, the Dutch State announced already that it wished to combine ABN Amro N (which had yet to be hived off) with FBN. Before this can happen, ABN Amro N needs to be split off in accordance with the provisions of the CSA. First a new division will be created (ABN Amro II) which will take place in the beginning of February 2010. The shares in this company (with a banking licence) would then need to be transferred to the Dutch State at the end of March 2010. Then ABN Amro II and FBN can merge and a new entity “ABN Amro Group NV” will be created. The legal merger is currently scheduled for 1 July 2010. |
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14.

In November 2008, the Dutch State announced already that it wished to combine ABN Amro N (which had yet to be hived off) with FBN. Before this can happen, ABN Amro N needs to be split off in accordance with the provisions of the CSA. First a new division will be created (ABN Amro II) which will take place in the beginning of February 2010. The shares in this company (with a banking licence) would then need to be transferred to the Dutch State at the end of March 2010. Then ABN Amro II and FBN can merge and a new entity “ABN Amro Group NV” will be created. The legal merger is currently scheduled for 1 July 2010.

| 15. | The Commission decided (6) that a merger between ABN Amro N and FBN would create concentration problems in the Dutch banking market, especially in the segments of commercial banking and factoring. The Dutch government decided to sell a number of activities which were grouped in a new entity “New HBU” (7). On 19 October 2009, the Dutch State and Deutsche Bank concluded a Heads of Agreement document with regard to the sale of new HBU. A Share Purchase Agreement with Deutsche Bank was signed on 23 December 2009. |
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15.

The Commission decided (6) that a merger between ABN Amro N and FBN would create concentration problems in the Dutch banking market, especially in the segments of commercial banking and factoring. The Dutch government decided to sell a number of activities which were grouped in a new entity “New HBU” (7). On 19 October 2009, the Dutch State and Deutsche Bank concluded a Heads of Agreement document with regard to the sale of new HBU. A Share Purchase Agreement with Deutsche Bank was signed on 23 December 2009.

| 16. | The Dutch State will remain the owner of 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z but wants to limit the resources needed to manage this participation. Therefore, the Dutch State will probably transfer its stake in ABN Amro Z to ABN Amro II.
  The following table (Table I) explains the current structure of ABN Amro Holding and the anticipated de-merger of ABN Amro II. |
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16.

The Dutch State will remain the owner of 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z but wants to limit the resources needed to manage this participation. Therefore, the Dutch State will probably transfer its stake in ABN Amro Z to ABN Amro II.

The following table (Table I) explains the current structure of ABN Amro Holding and the anticipated de-merger of ABN Amro II.

Image

| 17. | The most likely future structure of ABN Amro according to the Dutch State is represented on the diagram in Table 2 below. |
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17.

The most likely future structure of ABN Amro according to the Dutch State is represented on the diagram in Table 2 below.

Image

Economic activities represented by ABN Amro N and ABN Amro Z

| 18. | As indicated above, ABN Amro N consists of the Business Unit (BU) Netherlands (including the International Diamond and Jewelry Group) and the Business Unit Private Banking. |
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18.

As indicated above, ABN Amro N consists of the Business Unit (BU) Netherlands (including the International Diamond and Jewelry Group) and the Business Unit Private Banking.

| 19. | BU Netherlands focuses on retail clients and small- to medium-sized enterprises. It offers a broad range of commercial and retail banking products and services. The company has a multi-channel service model, which consists of a network of approximately 600 branches, Internet banking facilities, customer contact centres and ATMs. |
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19.

BU Netherlands focuses on retail clients and small- to medium-sized enterprises. It offers a broad range of commercial and retail banking products and services. The company has a multi-channel service model, which consists of a network of approximately 600 branches, Internet banking facilities, customer contact centres and ATMs.

| 20. | In 2008, BU Netherlands had a balance sheet total of EUR 158,9 billion, risk-weighted assets (RWA) of EUR 83,9 billion and a net operating profit of EUR 306 million. For comparison, in 2007 the corresponding figures were EUR 141,7 billion, EUR 78,7 billion and EUR 882 million. BU Netherlands includes the results of the International Diamond and Jewelry Group, which reported a net operating profit of EUR 28 million in 2008. |
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20.

In 2008, BU Netherlands had a balance sheet total of EUR 158,9 billion, risk-weighted assets (RWA) of EUR 83,9 billion and a net operating profit of EUR 306 million. For comparison, in 2007 the corresponding figures were EUR 141,7 billion, EUR 78,7 billion and EUR 882 million. BU Netherlands includes the results of the International Diamond and Jewelry Group, which reported a net operating profit of EUR 28 million in 2008.

| 21. | BU Private Banking offers private banking services to individuals with net invested assets of more than EUR 1 million. It has built up a network, through organic growth in the Netherlands and France and through acquisitions in Germany (Delbrück Bethmann Maffei) and Belgium (Bank Corluy). This BU also includes the insurance joint venture Neuflize Vie. |
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21.

BU Private Banking offers private banking services to individuals with net invested assets of more than EUR 1 million. It has built up a network, through organic growth in the Netherlands and France and through acquisitions in Germany (Delbrück Bethmann Maffei) and Belgium (Bank Corluy). This BU also includes the insurance joint venture Neuflize Vie.

| 22. | In 2008, BU Private Banking had total assets of EUR 18,2 billion, RWA of EUR 7,8 billion, assets under management of EUR 102 billion and a net operating profit of EUR 165 million. The corresponding figures over 2007 were EUR 19,6 billion, EUR 8,2 billion, EUR 140 billion and EUR 298 million. |
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22.

In 2008, BU Private Banking had total assets of EUR 18,2 billion, RWA of EUR 7,8 billion, assets under management of EUR 102 billion and a net operating profit of EUR 165 million. The corresponding figures over 2007 were EUR 19,6 billion, EUR 8,2 billion, EUR 140 billion and EUR 298 million.

| 23. | The most recent audited financials of ABN Amro indicated that ABN Amro N was marginally profitable in the first nine months of 2009 (net profit of EUR 45 million compared with EUR 629 million in the first nine months of 2008). The drop in net profits was mainly attributable to lower net interest income (EUR 2 141 million in the first nine months of 2009 compared with EUR 2 407 million in the first nine months of 2008) and an increase of loan loss provisions (EUR 838 million in 2009 compared with EUR 383 million in 2008). |
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23.

The most recent audited financials of ABN Amro indicated that ABN Amro N was marginally profitable in the first nine months of 2009 (net profit of EUR 45 million compared with EUR 629 million in the first nine months of 2008). The drop in net profits was mainly attributable to lower net interest income (EUR 2 141 million in the first nine months of 2009 compared with EUR 2 407 million in the first nine months of 2008) and an increase of loan loss provisions (EUR 838 million in 2009 compared with EUR 383 million in 2008).

| 24. | ABN Amro Z contains tax assets, a number of participations (amongst others in the Saudi Hollandi Bank) and the remaining private equity portfolio. On the liabilities side there is a provision to settle obligations in respect of the U.S. Department of Justice, other provisions (partly personnel related) and inter-company financing of company assets. As stated above, the stake owned by the Dutch State represents 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z. |
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24.

ABN Amro Z contains tax assets, a number of participations (amongst others in the Saudi Hollandi Bank) and the remaining private equity portfolio. On the liabilities side there is a provision to settle obligations in respect of the U.S. Department of Justice, other provisions (partly personnel related) and inter-company financing of company assets. As stated above, the stake owned by the Dutch State represents 33,81 % of ABN Amro Z.

Fortis Bank Nederland

| 25. | At the end of 2008, FBN had total assets of EUR 184 billion and RWA of EUR 45,9 billion. While the company realised a net loss of EUR 18 billion in 2008 because of the goodwill write-down of its participation in ABN Amro Holding, its net operating profit amounted to EUR 604 million. The net result also suffered because of a credit provision of EUR 922 million (after tax) related to the Madoff fraud. At the end of 2008, FBN's Tier 1 ratio was 11,1 %. |
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25.

At the end of 2008, FBN had total assets of EUR 184 billion and RWA of EUR 45,9 billion. While the company realised a net loss of EUR 18 billion in 2008 because of the goodwill write-down of its participation in ABN Amro Holding, its net operating profit amounted to EUR 604 million. The net result also suffered because of a credit provision of EUR 922 million (after tax) related to the Madoff fraud. At the end of 2008, FBN's Tier 1 ratio was 11,1 %.

| 26. | FBN is active in both the retail market and the wholesale market (commercial banking, corporate and public banking) and a number of specialized niches. |
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26.

FBN is active in both the retail market and the wholesale market (commercial banking, corporate and public banking) and a number of specialized niches.

| 27. | Fortis Retail (representing roughly 27 % of total RWA of FBN) combines retail and private banking. In retail banking, the company has 156 branches, 2,1 million individual customers and 52 000 SME clients. With a market share of 5 %, Fortis Retail is the fourth largest bank in the Netherlands, after ING, Rabobank and ABN Amro. In private banking, the company (under the “Mees Pierson” brand name) has a leading position especially in the prime segment (customers with assets greater than EUR 1 million). |
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27.

Fortis Retail (representing roughly 27 % of total RWA of FBN) combines retail and private banking. In retail banking, the company has 156 branches, 2,1 million individual customers and 52 000 SME clients. With a market share of 5 %, Fortis Retail is the fourth largest bank in the Netherlands, after ING, Rabobank and ABN Amro. In private banking, the company (under the “Mees Pierson” brand name) has a leading position especially in the prime segment (customers with assets greater than EUR 1 million).

| 28. | Fortis Wholesale (representing roughly 73 % of total RWA of FBN) contains “commercial banking”, which has 23 business centres in the Netherlands to serve companies with a turnover up to EUR 250 million. Companies with a turnover of more than EUR 250 million and the public sector are serviced in another subdivision i.e. “Corporate & Public Banking”. The Wholesale division also includes a number of specialized niches (financial markets, securities financing, M&A advisory, equity capital markets, acquisition finance, private equity, syndications, export and project finance, trade services, transaction banking, factoring, brokerage, clearing and custody, fund administration etc.). |
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28.

Fortis Wholesale (representing roughly 73 % of total RWA of FBN) contains “commercial banking”, which has 23 business centres in the Netherlands to serve companies with a turnover up to EUR 250 million. Companies with a turnover of more than EUR 250 million and the public sector are serviced in another subdivision i.e. “Corporate & Public Banking”. The Wholesale division also includes a number of specialized niches (financial markets, securities financing, M&A advisory, equity capital markets, acquisition finance, private equity, syndications, export and project finance, trade services, transaction banking, factoring, brokerage, clearing and custody, fund administration etc.).

| 29. | In the first half of 2009, FBN realised a net profit of EUR 338 million. However, this profit included an exceptional capital gain of EUR 362,5 million. This profit could be broken down as follows: retail banking (+ EUR 62 million), private banking (– EUR 3 million), merchant banking (+ EUR 39 million) and other profit of + EUR 240 million. |
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29.

In the first half of 2009, FBN realised a net profit of EUR 338 million. However, this profit included an exceptional capital gain of EUR 362,5 million. This profit could be broken down as follows: retail banking (+ EUR 62 million), private banking (– EUR 3 million), merchant banking (+ EUR 39 million) and other profit of + EUR 240 million.

ABN Amro Group NV (ABN Amro N + FBN)

| 30. | ABN Amro Group NV, the entity which will integrate ABN Amro N and FBN, will mainly focus on the Dutch market. The new group should have assets of around EUR 380 billion and once the merger has been fully completed, its revenues should be around EUR 8 billion. |
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30.

ABN Amro Group NV, the entity which will integrate ABN Amro N and FBN, will mainly focus on the Dutch market. The new group should have assets of around EUR 380 billion and once the merger has been fully completed, its revenues should be around EUR 8 billion.

| 31. | The new company will cover both “retail and private banking” and “commercial and merchant banking”. In retail banking, the company is expected to retain market shares of respectively 17,7 % and 18,8 % in “Mass Retail” and “Preferred Banking” (8). In private banking, the new group will have approximately 38 % of the Dutch market and the market share in “commercial and merchant banking” will be around 22,3 % (9). |
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31.

The new company will cover both “retail and private banking” and “commercial and merchant banking”. In retail banking, the company is expected to retain market shares of respectively 17,7 % and 18,8 % in “Mass Retail” and “Preferred Banking” (8). In private banking, the new group will have approximately 38 % of the Dutch market and the market share in “commercial and merchant banking” will be around 22,3 % (9).

| 32. | In terms of revenues, retail and private banking (with revenues of respectively EUR 3,2 billion and EUR 1,3 billion) should be slightly more important than commercial and merchant banking (with revenues of EUR 3 billion). The main focus will be on the Netherlands (with revenues of EUR 6,4 billion (or 80 % of the total)) versus EUR 1,5 billion abroad. |
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32.

In terms of revenues, retail and private banking (with revenues of respectively EUR 3,2 billion and EUR 1,3 billion) should be slightly more important than commercial and merchant banking (with revenues of EUR 3 billion). The main focus will be on the Netherlands (with revenues of EUR 6,4 billion (or 80 % of the total)) versus EUR 1,5 billion abroad.

| 33. | ABN Amro Group NV will no longer include “New HBU” which will be divested in the framework of the merger remedy (10). New HBU contains the commercial bank Hollandsche Bank-unie, some ABN Amro sales offices (13 out of 78) and some ABN Amro Corporate Client Units (2 out of 5) and ABN Amro's factoring division IFN Finance. At the end of 2008, New HBU had total assets of EUR 12,5 billion and it employed 1 200 full time equivalents. |
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33.

ABN Amro Group NV will no longer include “New HBU” which will be divested in the framework of the merger remedy (10). New HBU contains the commercial bank Hollandsche Bank-unie, some ABN Amro sales offices (13 out of 78) and some ABN Amro Corporate Client Units (2 out of 5) and ABN Amro's factoring division IFN Finance. At the end of 2008, New HBU had total assets of EUR 12,5 billion and it employed 1 200 full time equivalents.

2.2.   Description of the State measures

| 34. | In July 2009, the Dutch State notified several measures. The Dutch State granted a capital relief instrument (measure A with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion) and a mandatory convertible security (measure B1 of EUR 500 million) in order to fill a capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro Z of EUR 2,2 billion. At the same time, the Dutch State subscribed to another tranche of MCS (measure B2 of EUR 300 million) to cover a first tranche of separation costs. |
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34.

In July 2009, the Dutch State notified several measures. The Dutch State granted a capital relief instrument (measure A with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion) and a mandatory convertible security (measure B1 of EUR 500 million) in order to fill a capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro Z of EUR 2,2 billion. At the same time, the Dutch State subscribed to another tranche of MCS (measure B2 of EUR 300 million) to cover a first tranche of separation costs.

| 35. | In January 2010, the Dutch State notified extra measures worth EUR 4,39 billion. The Dutch State will subscribe to additional MCS-instruments to cover additional separation costs (measure B3), the capital shortfall resulting from the sale of New HBU (measure B4) and integration costs (measure B5). The Dutch State will also swap its Tier 2 instruments in FBN into Tier 1 capital to improve the capital position of FBN (measure C). Finally the Dutch State will also pay consortium partners EUR 740 million in cash (measure D) and provide a guarantee to cover cross liabilities resulting from the sale of New HBU (measure E). |
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35.

In January 2010, the Dutch State notified extra measures worth EUR 4,39 billion. The Dutch State will subscribe to additional MCS-instruments to cover additional separation costs (measure B3), the capital shortfall resulting from the sale of New HBU (measure B4) and integration costs (measure B5). The Dutch State will also swap its Tier 2 instruments in FBN into Tier 1 capital to improve the capital position of FBN (measure C). Finally the Dutch State will also pay consortium partners EUR 740 million in cash (measure D) and provide a guarantee to cover cross liabilities resulting from the sale of New HBU (measure E).

2.2.1.   Credit protection instrument to cover part of the capital shortfall of ABN Amro Z (Measure A, EUR 1,7 billion)

| 36. | The Dutch mortgage portfolio covered by the CDS granted by the State represents around 39 % of ABN Amro N's total home loan portfolio. Mortgages are only included in the portfolio if they meet well-defined criteria (11). |
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36.

The Dutch mortgage portfolio covered by the CDS granted by the State represents around 39 % of ABN Amro N's total home loan portfolio. Mortgages are only included in the portfolio if they meet well-defined criteria (11).

| 37. | The portfolio insured by the State contains loans of 178,569 borrowers with an average net loan balance of EUR 193,478 and an average loan-to-foreclosure-value ratio of 92,4 %. The average maturity of a loan in the portfolio is 338 months. |
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37.

The portfolio insured by the State contains loans of 178,569 borrowers with an average net loan balance of EUR 193,478 and an average loan-to-foreclosure-value ratio of 92,4 %. The average maturity of a loan in the portfolio is 338 months.

| 38. | For this credit protection instrument, the Dutch State receives an annual fee of 51,5 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the portfolio value in the beginning of each reference period). |
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38.

For this credit protection instrument, the Dutch State receives an annual fee of 51,5 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the portfolio value in the beginning of each reference period).

| 39. | This fee was based on the capital equivalent cost: the Dutch State wanted a 10 % return on the capital released as a result of the CDS (i.e. 10 % on EUR 1,7 billion), which is equivalent to 51,5 basis points of the initial portfolio of EUR 34,5 billion. |
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39.

This fee was based on the capital equivalent cost: the Dutch State wanted a 10 % return on the capital released as a result of the CDS (i.e. 10 % on EUR 1,7 billion), which is equivalent to 51,5 basis points of the initial portfolio of EUR 34,5 billion.

| 40. | Each year, ABN Amro N keeps a first loss tranche of 20 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio value), but the State has a claw-back clause, which is triggered if years with credit losses of less than 20 basis points were to follow years with credit losses of more than 20 basis points. Since the first loss clause is calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio value, when clients start to repay their mortgage loan it will represent an increasing percentage of the outstanding portfolio value. |
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40.

Each year, ABN Amro N keeps a first loss tranche of 20 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio value), but the State has a claw-back clause, which is triggered if years with credit losses of less than 20 basis points were to follow years with credit losses of more than 20 basis points. Since the first loss clause is calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio value, when clients start to repay their mortgage loan it will represent an increasing percentage of the outstanding portfolio value.

| 41. | ABN Amro N also keeps a vertical slice of 5 % of the remaining risk. |
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41.

ABN Amro N also keeps a vertical slice of 5 % of the remaining risk.

| 42. | The pricing of the credit protection instrument will not be adjusted once ABN Amro N fully adopts Basel II capital rules (12), even though the capital relief effect of the CDS will be smaller then. |
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42.

The pricing of the credit protection instrument will not be adjusted once ABN Amro N fully adopts Basel II capital rules (12), even though the capital relief effect of the CDS will be smaller then.

| 43. | In principle, the CDS-contract has a maturity of 7 years. ABN Amro N has however call options enabling the early termination of the contract on a number of reference dates (November 2009, January 2010, April 2010, July 2010, October 2010, January 2011 and January 2012). The State also has a call to terminate the transaction on the condition that the termination of the contract does not endanger the capital position of ABN Amro N. |
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43.

In principle, the CDS-contract has a maturity of 7 years. ABN Amro N has however call options enabling the early termination of the contract on a number of reference dates (November 2009, January 2010, April 2010, July 2010, October 2010, January 2011 and January 2012). The State also has a call to terminate the transaction on the condition that the termination of the contract does not endanger the capital position of ABN Amro N.

2.2.2.   Mandatory Convertible Security to cover part of the capital shortfall of ABN Amro Z (Measure B1, EUR 500 million)

| 44. | The Mandatory Convertible Security (MCS) (13) qualifies as hybrid Tier 1 capital, will carry a coupon of 10 % and will automatically convert into shares of ABN Amro II at the time of the separation of ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Holding. At that point in time, it will qualify as core Tier 1 capital.
  If, at the time of conversion, the Dutch State is still the only shareholder of ABN Amro II, the conversion price for the MCS will be equal to its nominal value. If there are new shareholders involved, the State and ABN Amro II management will ask a third party to determine the fair value of the newly created entity and the conversion will take place at the fair value price. If the regulatory ratios of ABN Amro Holding would fall below certain thresholds before the separation, the MCS would convert into Non-cumulative Modified Securities. The only difference with the original securities is that the coupon payments would no longer be cumulative. Under IFRS rules however, these new securities would qualify as equity. |
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44.

The Mandatory Convertible Security (MCS) (13) qualifies as hybrid Tier 1 capital, will carry a coupon of 10 % and will automatically convert into shares of ABN Amro II at the time of the separation of ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Holding. At that point in time, it will qualify as core Tier 1 capital.

If, at the time of conversion, the Dutch State is still the only shareholder of ABN Amro II, the conversion price for the MCS will be equal to its nominal value. If there are new shareholders involved, the State and ABN Amro II management will ask a third party to determine the fair value of the newly created entity and the conversion will take place at the fair value price. If the regulatory ratios of ABN Amro Holding would fall below certain thresholds before the separation, the MCS would convert into Non-cumulative Modified Securities. The only difference with the original securities is that the coupon payments would no longer be cumulative. Under IFRS rules however, these new securities would qualify as equity.

2.2.3.   Mandatory Convertible Security to cover separation costs (Measures B2 and B3, EUR 1,08 billion)

| 45. | The Dutch State will subscribe to extra MCS to cover separation costs. A first tranche (measure B2) was already notified in July 2009 (roughly EUR 300 million), with the remainder being notified in January 2010 (measure B3). A description of the instrument is set out in paragraph 44 above. The full amount of EUR 1,08 billion (i.e. measure B2 and measure B3 together) includes well-defined separation costs of EUR 480 million, costs of EUR 90 million related to the set-up of a money market desk and a buffer of EUR 500 million. |
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45.

The Dutch State will subscribe to extra MCS to cover separation costs. A first tranche (measure B2) was already notified in July 2009 (roughly EUR 300 million), with the remainder being notified in January 2010 (measure B3). A description of the instrument is set out in paragraph 44 above. The full amount of EUR 1,08 billion (i.e. measure B2 and measure B3 together) includes well-defined separation costs of EUR 480 million, costs of EUR 90 million related to the set-up of a money market desk and a buffer of EUR 500 million.

| 46. | The Dutch State estimates that the separation of ABN Amro II from its former parent company will cost in total EUR 480 million. This includes cross liabilities exposure (EUR 45 million), unwinding of risk allocation letters (EUR 37 million), repurchase of securitization notes (EUR 57 million), the transfer from ABN Amro R of trading-related market risk related to ABN Amro II clients (EUR 47 million), discontinuation of capital relief instruments (EUR 64 million) and general separation and unwinding costs (EUR 230 million). |
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46.

The Dutch State estimates that the separation of ABN Amro II from its former parent company will cost in total EUR 480 million. This includes cross liabilities exposure (EUR 45 million), unwinding of risk allocation letters (EUR 37 million), repurchase of securitization notes (EUR 57 million), the transfer from ABN Amro R of trading-related market risk related to ABN Amro II clients (EUR 47 million), discontinuation of capital relief instruments (EUR 64 million) and general separation and unwinding costs (EUR 230 million).

| 47. | After the separation from the parent company, ABN Amro II also needs EUR 90 million of extra capital if it is to set up a money market desk on its own. |
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47.

After the separation from the parent company, ABN Amro II also needs EUR 90 million of extra capital if it is to set up a money market desk on its own.

| 48. | Additionally, the Dutch State will inject an extra EUR 500 million, as a buffer covering unexpected needs in the course of what is a very complex disintegration process. |
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48.

Additionally, the Dutch State will inject an extra EUR 500 million, as a buffer covering unexpected needs in the course of what is a very complex disintegration process.

2.2.4.   Mandatory Convertible Security to cover capital shortfall due to sale of New HBU (Measure B4, EUR 300 million)

| 49. | Under the 2007 merger decision (14), FBN can be integrated with ABN Amro N only if New HBU is sold. The Share Purchase Agreement was signed with Deutsche Bank on 23 December 2009. This sale has a negative capital impact on ABN Amro N of EUR 470 million. Since ABN Amro N does not have sufficient means to compensate for this, the State expects that it will have to contribute EUR 300 million. This contribution will be made by subscribing to additional MCS for this amount. |
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49.

Under the 2007 merger decision (14), FBN can be integrated with ABN Amro N only if New HBU is sold. The Share Purchase Agreement was signed with Deutsche Bank on 23 December 2009. This sale has a negative capital impact on ABN Amro N of EUR 470 million. Since ABN Amro N does not have sufficient means to compensate for this, the State expects that it will have to contribute EUR 300 million. This contribution will be made by subscribing to additional MCS for this amount.

2.2.5.   Mandatory Convertible Security to cover integration costs (Measure B5, EUR 1,2 billion)

| 50. | The Dutch authorities claim that the merger between FBN and ABN Amro N will ultimately lead to synergies of EUR 1 billion per year (before tax). In order to reap the full benefit of these synergies, the merger will have to be implemented and this will lead to upfront integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion (after tax). Since these entities do not have sufficient capital to bear these costs, the State will subscribe to additional MCS for this amount. |
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50.

The Dutch authorities claim that the merger between FBN and ABN Amro N will ultimately lead to synergies of EUR 1 billion per year (before tax). In order to reap the full benefit of these synergies, the merger will have to be implemented and this will lead to upfront integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion (after tax). Since these entities do not have sufficient capital to bear these costs, the State will subscribe to additional MCS for this amount.

2.2.6.   Swap of Tier 2 hybrid capital instruments of FBN into core Tier 1 capital (Measure C, EUR 1,3 billion)

| 51. | In order to comply with the capital requirements of the DNB (15), FBN needs to rebalance its capital structure. This requires an increase of core Tier 1 capital of EUR 1,26 billion. In addition, the separation from Fortis Holding, its former Belgian parent company, leads to extra costs of EUR 90 million, which relate to the set-up of a treasury desk, Basel models, licenses and consultancy services. |
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51.

In order to comply with the capital requirements of the DNB (15), FBN needs to rebalance its capital structure. This requires an increase of core Tier 1 capital of EUR 1,26 billion. In addition, the separation from Fortis Holding, its former Belgian parent company, leads to extra costs of EUR 90 million, which relate to the set-up of a treasury desk, Basel models, licenses and consultancy services.

| 52. | Measure C thus rebalances the capital structure of FBN. FBN needs more Tier 1 capital. The State, which purchased some Tier 2 loans to FBN from Fortis Holding at the time of the acquisition of FBN (16), will provide the Tier 1 capital needed by exchanging some of these Tier 2 loans into Tier 1 capital. According to the Dutch authorities, this is equivalent to a scenario in which FBN repays to the State the Tier 2 capital instruments at par, followed by a Tier 1 capital injection by the State of the EUR 1,35 billion amount. The transaction does not involve any cash. |
| --- | --- |

52.

Measure C thus rebalances the capital structure of FBN. FBN needs more Tier 1 capital. The State, which purchased some Tier 2 loans to FBN from Fortis Holding at the time of the acquisition of FBN (16), will provide the Tier 1 capital needed by exchanging some of these Tier 2 loans into Tier 1 capital. According to the Dutch authorities, this is equivalent to a scenario in which FBN repays to the State the Tier 2 capital instruments at par, followed by a Tier 1 capital injection by the State of the EUR 1,35 billion amount. The transaction does not involve any cash.

2.2.7.   Payment obligations towards other consortium members (Measure D, EUR 740 million)

| 53. | Certain payment obligations have become apparent during the de-merger process of ABN Amro Holding. The CSA contains a number of general principles to resolve such issues but the exact amounts result from a negotiating process in which the Dutch State (and Fortis Holding before it) participated. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Certain payment obligations have become apparent during the de-merger process of ABN Amro Holding. The CSA contains a number of general principles to resolve such issues but the exact amounts result from a negotiating process in which the Dutch State (and Fortis Holding before it) participated.

| 54. | The total amount of EUR 740 million relates to the following:






  — | a payment of EUR 271 million to RBS and Santander to settle obligations in connection with the allocation of assets and liabilities among the consortium partners, |
| --- | --- | --- |

54.

The total amount of EUR 740 million relates to the following:

—

a payment of EUR 271 million to RBS and Santander to settle obligations in connection with the allocation of assets and liabilities among the consortium partners,

| — | a payment of EUR 97 million to ABN Amro Bank NV enabling it to meet its private equity obligations, |
| --- | --- |

—

a payment of EUR 97 million to ABN Amro Bank NV enabling it to meet its private equity obligations,

| — | a payment of EUR 13 million to RFS Holdings for RFS Holdings’results and head office dismantling costs, |
| --- | --- |

—

a payment of EUR 13 million to RFS Holdings for RFS Holdings’results and head office dismantling costs,

| — | miscellaneous purchase price settlements between consortium members with a total worth of EUR 390 million. |
| --- | --- |

—

miscellaneous purchase price settlements between consortium members with a total worth of EUR 390 million.

These cash outflows will partly be compensated by the fact that the Dutch State will receive EUR 31 million from the other consortium partners related to stranded costs.

| 55. | The balance of the payment obligations in respect of other consortium shareholders (i.e. EUR 740 million) will be paid in cash, part of it directly to the other consortium members, part of it to ABN Amro Z. |
| --- | --- |

55.

The balance of the payment obligations in respect of other consortium shareholders (i.e. EUR 740 million) will be paid in cash, part of it directly to the other consortium members, part of it to ABN Amro Z.

2.2.8.   Cross liabilities (Measure E, EUR 950 million)

| 56. | Even after the divestment of New HBU, ABN Amro II will remain liable towards creditors of New HBU if New HBU is unable to meet its obligations towards its own creditors (and vice versa for new HBU which will also face cross liabilities). The Dutch State and Deutsche Bank (i.e. the purchaser of New HBU) agreed that new HBU and ABN Amro II would indemnify each other for these cross liabilities and provide to each other collateral, so as to reduce the induced regulatory capital requirements to a desired 20 %. As a result of this agreement, ABN Amro II will have to provide collateral to New HBU for an amount up to EUR 950 million (which will decline over time as liabilities mature) for the liabilities of New HBU towards ABN Amro II and towards ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV). Since ABN Amro II does not have enough capital to provide the collateral needed in respect of the liability towards ABN Amro Bank NV, the State will provide a counter-indemnity for the entire amount (EUR 950 million). |
| --- | --- |

56.

Even after the divestment of New HBU, ABN Amro II will remain liable towards creditors of New HBU if New HBU is unable to meet its obligations towards its own creditors (and vice versa for new HBU which will also face cross liabilities). The Dutch State and Deutsche Bank (i.e. the purchaser of New HBU) agreed that new HBU and ABN Amro II would indemnify each other for these cross liabilities and provide to each other collateral, so as to reduce the induced regulatory capital requirements to a desired 20 %. As a result of this agreement, ABN Amro II will have to provide collateral to New HBU for an amount up to EUR 950 million (which will decline over time as liabilities mature) for the liabilities of New HBU towards ABN Amro II and towards ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV). Since ABN Amro II does not have enough capital to provide the collateral needed in respect of the liability towards ABN Amro Bank NV, the State will provide a counter-indemnity for the entire amount (EUR 950 million).

| 57. | The Dutch State has priced this risk as if it was a State guarantee on ABN Amro Bank NV subordinated debt. The pricing methodology of the Dutch State is based on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendation i.e. 200bp plus the median CDS-spread (17).









  State support measures | Description | Size
  (in EUR billion) | Reason | Legal entity to which the measure is granted |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Capital measures notified in June 2009 and implemented in July/August 2009 |
| Measure A | Capital relief instrument | CDS-protection on a EUR 34,5 billion portfolio (having a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion) | Filling the capital shortage at the Z-share level | ABN Amro Bank NV (18) |
| Measure B1 | MCS | 0,5 |
| Measure B2 | MCS | 0,3 | First tranche of separation costs | ABN Amro Bank NV |
| Additional capital measures notified in January 2010 |
| Measure B3 | MCS | 0,78 | Second tranche of separation costs | ABN Amro Bank NV |
| Measure B4 | MCS | 0,3 | Capital impact from sale of new HBU | ABN Amro Bank NV |
| Measure B5 | MCS | 1,2 | Integration costs | ABN Amro Bank NV |
| Measure C | Exchange Tier 2 into Tier 1 | 1,35 | Tier 1 shortage at the level of FBN | FBN |
| Measure D | Cash payment to consortium partners | 0,74 | Payment obligations resulting from the CSA | Other consortium partners/ABN Amro Bank NV |
| Measure E | Guarantee on a liability of EUR 950 million | 0,95 | Cross liabilities resulting from sale of new HBU | ABN Amro II |

57.

The Dutch State has priced this risk as if it was a State guarantee on ABN Amro Bank NV subordinated debt. The pricing methodology of the Dutch State is based on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendation i.e. 200bp plus the median CDS-spread (17).

State support measures

Description

Size

(in EUR billion)

Reason

Legal entity to which the measure is granted

Capital measures notified in June 2009 and implemented in July/August 2009

Measure A

Capital relief instrument

CDS-protection on a EUR 34,5 billion portfolio (having a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion)

Filling the capital shortage at the Z-share level

ABN Amro Bank NV (18)

Measure B1

MCS

0,5

Measure B2

MCS

0,3

First tranche of separation costs

ABN Amro Bank NV

Additional capital measures notified in January 2010

Measure B3

MCS

0,78

Second tranche of separation costs

ABN Amro Bank NV

Measure B4

MCS

0,3

Capital impact from sale of new HBU

ABN Amro Bank NV

Measure B5

MCS

1,2

Integration costs

ABN Amro Bank NV

Measure C

Exchange Tier 2 into Tier 1

1,35

Tier 1 shortage at the level of FBN

FBN

Measure D

Cash payment to consortium partners

0,74

Payment obligations resulting from the CSA

Other consortium partners/ABN Amro Bank NV

Measure E

Guarantee on a liability of EUR 950 million

0,95

Cross liabilities resulting from sale of new HBU

ABN Amro II

2.3.   Description of presented business plan

| 58. | In its business plan, the new ABN Amro Group has provided relatively detailed financial projections for the period 2009-2012 in both a base case and a best case scenario. For 2012, the company has also calculated a run-rate (19) profit. The company also presented information on its exit strategy and on the measures it has taken in terms of burden sharing/limits to distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

58.

In its business plan, the new ABN Amro Group has provided relatively detailed financial projections for the period 2009-2012 in both a base case and a best case scenario. For 2012, the company has also calculated a run-rate (19) profit. The company also presented information on its exit strategy and on the measures it has taken in terms of burden sharing/limits to distortion of competition.

Base case
   (20)

| 59. | Both ABN Amro N and FBN are expected to report losses at the end the fiscal year 2009 of respectively of — EUR 1,509 million and — EUR 108 million. This is partly due to extraordinary costs related to the separation from their respective former parent companies. The decline in the net interest income and the increase in the provisions for bad loans contribute also to this negative result. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Both ABN Amro N and FBN are expected to report losses at the end the fiscal year 2009 of respectively of — EUR 1,509 million and — EUR 108 million. This is partly due to extraordinary costs related to the separation from their respective former parent companies. The decline in the net interest income and the increase in the provisions for bad loans contribute also to this negative result.

| 60. | In a base case scenario, the new ABN Amro Group expects to return to profitability in 2011 after another negative year in 2010 (net profit of — EUR 838 million, EUR 504 million and EUR 1,391 million in respectively 2010, 2011 and 2012). The company indicates that its run-rate profits in 2012 should amount to EUR 1,627 million. This profitability increase is due to better revenues (21) which improve on the back of higher net interest income and higher other revenues. At the same time, direct costs (22) should decrease on the back of synergies and also loan loss provisions should drop after peaking in 2009/2010. |
| --- | --- |

60.

In a base case scenario, the new ABN Amro Group expects to return to profitability in 2011 after another negative year in 2010 (net profit of — EUR 838 million, EUR 504 million and EUR 1,391 million in respectively 2010, 2011 and 2012). The company indicates that its run-rate profits in 2012 should amount to EUR 1,627 million. This profitability increase is due to better revenues (21) which improve on the back of higher net interest income and higher other revenues. At the same time, direct costs (22) should decrease on the back of synergies and also loan loss provisions should drop after peaking in 2009/2010.

| 61. | Starting from the 2012 run-rate figures, the new ABN Amro Group would have a return on equity (RoE) of 11,4 % and a cost/income ratio of 63 %. |
| --- | --- |

61.

Starting from the 2012 run-rate figures, the new ABN Amro Group would have a return on equity (RoE) of 11,4 % and a cost/income ratio of 63 %.

Best case

| 62. | The best case scenario changes two key assumptions. The interest margin is 10 % higher than in the base case (23), while personnel costs rise by 2 % (rather than by 3,75 %). |
| --- | --- |

62.

The best case scenario changes two key assumptions. The interest margin is 10 % higher than in the base case (23), while personnel costs rise by 2 % (rather than by 3,75 %).

| 63. | The profits in the best case scenario are somewhat higher than in the base case scenario (EUR 130 million in 2010, EUR 260 million in 2011 and EUR 390 million in 2012). This scenario would lead to a 2012 run-rate return on equity of 13,5 % and a cost/income ratio of 59 %. |
| --- | --- |

63.

The profits in the best case scenario are somewhat higher than in the base case scenario (EUR 130 million in 2010, EUR 260 million in 2011 and EUR 390 million in 2012). This scenario would lead to a 2012 run-rate return on equity of 13,5 % and a cost/income ratio of 59 %.

Exit

| 64. | In its business plan, the Dutch State also provides more information on its exit strategy. The Dutch State contends that it does not see itself as a long-term investor in financial institutions, which implies that it will sell its shareholding in new ABN Amro Group at the appropriate time. The Dutch State indicates that the timing of the exit will take place once 1. the new group has been able to show a positive track record (especially in terms of synergies); and 2. market valuations for large financial groups have further normalized. |
| --- | --- |

64.

In its business plan, the Dutch State also provides more information on its exit strategy. The Dutch State contends that it does not see itself as a long-term investor in financial institutions, which implies that it will sell its shareholding in new ABN Amro Group at the appropriate time. The Dutch State indicates that the timing of the exit will take place once 1. the new group has been able to show a positive track record (especially in terms of synergies); and 2. market valuations for large financial groups have further normalized.

| 65. | The Dutch State already plans a gradual repayment of the support provided to new ABN Amro Group before the full divestment of its shareholding. In the current projections, new ABN Amro Group would call the capital relief instrument in January 2011. The Dutch State also indicates that it will manage closely the capital position of the group encouraging it to pay out any capital above a prudential limit agreed with the DNB. As the only shareholder of new ABN Amro Group, the State can steer the dividend policy (obviously within the limits set by the capital requirements of the financial supervisor). |
| --- | --- |

65.

The Dutch State already plans a gradual repayment of the support provided to new ABN Amro Group before the full divestment of its shareholding. In the current projections, new ABN Amro Group would call the capital relief instrument in January 2011. The Dutch State also indicates that it will manage closely the capital position of the group encouraging it to pay out any capital above a prudential limit agreed with the DNB. As the only shareholder of new ABN Amro Group, the State can steer the dividend policy (obviously within the limits set by the capital requirements of the financial supervisor).

Divestments

| 66. | The Dutch State underlines that the aided banks have already divested a number of businesses. |
| --- | --- |

66.

The Dutch State underlines that the aided banks have already divested a number of businesses.

| 67. | First, to sort out concentration problems resulting from the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN, the Dutch State implemented a merger remedy. It sold New HBU to Deutsche Bank thereby reducing the presence of the new merged entity in “commercial banking” and “factoring”. |
| --- | --- |

67.

First, to sort out concentration problems resulting from the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN, the Dutch State implemented a merger remedy. It sold New HBU to Deutsche Bank thereby reducing the presence of the new merged entity in “commercial banking” and “factoring”.

| 68. | In addition, in September 2009, FBN (and its partner BGL (24)) decided to sell Intertrust to private equity company Waterland. Intertrust is one of the largest players in global trust and corporate management, helping its clients with corporate financial planning, management and operational issues, administration and accounting and asset planning services. Intertrust employs 1 000 experts in 19 countries. Intertrust's income and RWA in 2008 amounted to respectively EUR 170 million and EUR 800 million. |
| --- | --- |

68.

In addition, in September 2009, FBN (and its partner BGL (24)) decided to sell Intertrust to private equity company Waterland. Intertrust is one of the largest players in global trust and corporate management, helping its clients with corporate financial planning, management and operational issues, administration and accounting and asset planning services. Intertrust employs 1 000 experts in 19 countries. Intertrust's income and RWA in 2008 amounted to respectively EUR 170 million and EUR 800 million.

| 69. | In 2008, New HBU (including IFN) reported income of EUR 460 million and RWA of EUR 10,3 billion. |
| --- | --- |

69.

In 2008, New HBU (including IFN) reported income of EUR 460 million and RWA of EUR 10,3 billion.

| 70. | In 2008, New HBU and Intertrust together had revenues of EUR 630 million and RWA of EUR 11,1 billion. This represents respectively 8 % (revenues) and 7 % (RWA) of the new ABN Amro Group. |
| --- | --- |

70.

In 2008, New HBU and Intertrust together had revenues of EUR 630 million and RWA of EUR 11,1 billion. This represents respectively 8 % (revenues) and 7 % (RWA) of the new ABN Amro Group.

| 71. | In addition, exclusive negotiations have been started with Credit Suisse (25) to sell the FBN division PFS (“Prime Fund Solutions”). PFS provides fund services to the alternative asset management industry allowing clients to focus fully on their investment process. PFS services include: administration, banking, custody and financing and its clients range from boutique asset managers to large scale global institutions such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. The EUR 922 million provision related to the Madoff-fraud which FBN registered in 2008 stemmed from this division. |
| --- | --- |

71.

In addition, exclusive negotiations have been started with Credit Suisse (25) to sell the FBN division PFS (“Prime Fund Solutions”). PFS provides fund services to the alternative asset management industry allowing clients to focus fully on their investment process. PFS services include: administration, banking, custody and financing and its clients range from boutique asset managers to large scale global institutions such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. The EUR 922 million provision related to the Madoff-fraud which FBN registered in 2008 stemmed from this division.

| 72. | On 31 July 2009, FBN acquired Fortis Clearing Americas from Fortis Bank Belgium for a price of approximately USD 120 million. This transaction was necessary to correct a misalignment which resulted from the break-up of Fortis Holding. FBN owned the BU Brokerage, Clearing and Custody and all the offices related to this business except the Chicago office (i.e. Fortis Clearing Americas) were within the legal scope of FBN. |
| --- | --- |

72.

On 31 July 2009, FBN acquired Fortis Clearing Americas from Fortis Bank Belgium for a price of approximately USD 120 million. This transaction was necessary to correct a misalignment which resulted from the break-up of Fortis Holding. FBN owned the BU Brokerage, Clearing and Custody and all the offices related to this business except the Chicago office (i.e. Fortis Clearing Americas) were within the legal scope of FBN.

3.   POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| 73. | The Dutch State argues that the Commission should take into account that the Dutch State was obliged to buy FBN in very special circumstances. When Fortis Holding encountered important problems in September 2008, the Dutch State had no choice but to step in, to preserve financial stability. By acquiring FBN (including ABN Amro N and 33,8 % of ABN Amro Z), the Dutch State became de facto a partner in the CSA, so that it took over a number of contractual obligations. This obliged the Dutch State to implement the de-merger process as described in the CSA and is for instance at the basis of the obligation to fill the regulatory capital shortfall in ABN Amro Z (measure A) and the obligation to settle remaining issues with other consortium shareholders (measure D). |
| --- | --- |

73.

The Dutch State argues that the Commission should take into account that the Dutch State was obliged to buy FBN in very special circumstances. When Fortis Holding encountered important problems in September 2008, the Dutch State had no choice but to step in, to preserve financial stability. By acquiring FBN (including ABN Amro N and 33,8 % of ABN Amro Z), the Dutch State became de facto a partner in the CSA, so that it took over a number of contractual obligations. This obliged the Dutch State to implement the de-merger process as described in the CSA and is for instance at the basis of the obligation to fill the regulatory capital shortfall in ABN Amro Z (measure A) and the obligation to settle remaining issues with other consortium shareholders (measure D).

| 74. | The Dutch State claims to have based the ABN Amro recapitalisation plan on the principles set forward in the Banking Communication (26) and the Recapitalisation Communication (27) of the Commission. In general, the Dutch State argues that the measures it has implemented were well-targeted, proportionate to the challenges faced and designed in such a way to minimize negative spill-over effects to competitors. |
| --- | --- |

74.

The Dutch State claims to have based the ABN Amro recapitalisation plan on the principles set forward in the Banking Communication (26) and the Recapitalisation Communication (27) of the Commission. In general, the Dutch State argues that the measures it has implemented were well-targeted, proportionate to the challenges faced and designed in such a way to minimize negative spill-over effects to competitors.

| 75. | The Dutch State argues that the financial means granted to ABN Amro N (measure A and measure B1) to cover the capital shortage of the Z-share is not State aid. The Dutch State indicates that the CSA implied that it had no choice but to fill the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z. It argues that the available capital position of ABN Amro N did not change as a result of the intervention, which implies that its relative position versus competitors has not changed because of these measures. According to the Dutch State, it has merely used ABN Amro N as an intermediate vehicle to sort out the ABN Amro Z capital shortfall, which was actually the responsibility of the Dutch State as a shareholder of ABN Amro Z. |
| --- | --- |

75.

The Dutch State argues that the financial means granted to ABN Amro N (measure A and measure B1) to cover the capital shortage of the Z-share is not State aid. The Dutch State indicates that the CSA implied that it had no choice but to fill the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z. It argues that the available capital position of ABN Amro N did not change as a result of the intervention, which implies that its relative position versus competitors has not changed because of these measures. According to the Dutch State, it has merely used ABN Amro N as an intermediate vehicle to sort out the ABN Amro Z capital shortfall, which was actually the responsibility of the Dutch State as a shareholder of ABN Amro Z.

| 76. | If the Commission were to consider measures related to the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z as State aid, the Dutch State argues that the Impaired Asset Communication (28) does not apply to the credit protection instrument of ABN Amro N. According to the Dutch State, the protected assets cannot be considered “impaired” as that term is used in the Communication, while there is also no uncertainty as to their valuation. Should the Commission not share this point of view, the Dutch government contends that ABN Amro N's CDS still complies with the general principles put forward in that Communication. Besides, it argues that the credit protection instrument is necessary and proportional, while it keeps competition distortions to the minimum. |
| --- | --- |

76.

If the Commission were to consider measures related to the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z as State aid, the Dutch State argues that the Impaired Asset Communication (28) does not apply to the credit protection instrument of ABN Amro N. According to the Dutch State, the protected assets cannot be considered “impaired” as that term is used in the Communication, while there is also no uncertainty as to their valuation. Should the Commission not share this point of view, the Dutch government contends that ABN Amro N's CDS still complies with the general principles put forward in that Communication. Besides, it argues that the credit protection instrument is necessary and proportional, while it keeps competition distortions to the minimum.

| 77. | Practical and legal obstacles explain why the Dutch State favours the current solutions (with inter alia a CDS in combination with a mandatory convertible security) over, for instance, a classic cash capital injection. Any cash injected in ABN Amro Holding cannot be ring-fenced and might potentially become available to businesses that are not owned by the Dutch State. In this regard, the Dutch government points out that ABN Amro R is also not sufficiently capitalised and that the unwinding of ABN Amro Holding can only go ahead once also this problem has been addressed by RBS. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Practical and legal obstacles explain why the Dutch State favours the current solutions (with inter alia a CDS in combination with a mandatory convertible security) over, for instance, a classic cash capital injection. Any cash injected in ABN Amro Holding cannot be ring-fenced and might potentially become available to businesses that are not owned by the Dutch State. In this regard, the Dutch government points out that ABN Amro R is also not sufficiently capitalised and that the unwinding of ABN Amro Holding can only go ahead once also this problem has been addressed by RBS.

| 78. | On the Credit Protection Instrument, the Dutch State underlines that the first loss tranche of 20 basis points exceeds the provisions made by ABN Amro N on the covered portfolio, which reflect the credit losses expected by ABN Amro N. |
| --- | --- |

78.

On the Credit Protection Instrument, the Dutch State underlines that the first loss tranche of 20 basis points exceeds the provisions made by ABN Amro N on the covered portfolio, which reflect the credit losses expected by ABN Amro N.

| 79. | The Dutch State also points out that the Credit Protection Instrument becomes relatively unattractive after the full implementation on Basel II. |
| --- | --- |

79.

The Dutch State also points out that the Credit Protection Instrument becomes relatively unattractive after the full implementation on Basel II.

| 80. | The Dutch State considers the remuneration of the MCS to be higher than is required in paragraph 27 of the Recapitalisation Communication, underlining that the coupon is 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

80.

The Dutch State considers the remuneration of the MCS to be higher than is required in paragraph 27 of the Recapitalisation Communication, underlining that the coupon is 10 %.

| 81. | The Dutch State claims that the separation costs and the capital shortfall related to the HBU-divestment (measures B2, B3 and B4) are obligations of the State as a shareholder of ABN Amro N and that ABN Amro N in the end will not have more financial means. The Dutch State argues that it is merely complying with a number of obligations it inherited from Fortis Holding. It argues that Fortis Holding took the decision to de-merge ABN Amro N and to merge the two entities and that the Dutch State now has to bear the costs of these decisions of Fortis Holding. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Dutch State claims that the separation costs and the capital shortfall related to the HBU-divestment (measures B2, B3 and B4) are obligations of the State as a shareholder of ABN Amro N and that ABN Amro N in the end will not have more financial means. The Dutch State argues that it is merely complying with a number of obligations it inherited from Fortis Holding. It argues that Fortis Holding took the decision to de-merge ABN Amro N and to merge the two entities and that the Dutch State now has to bear the costs of these decisions of Fortis Holding.

| 82. | The Dutch State indicates that the State money granted to finance integration costs (measure B5) should be seen as a rational investment, leading to healthy returns in the form of synergies. The Dutch government estimates these synergies at around EUR 1 billion a year (pre-tax). |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Dutch State indicates that the State money granted to finance integration costs (measure B5) should be seen as a rational investment, leading to healthy returns in the form of synergies. The Dutch government estimates these synergies at around EUR 1 billion a year (pre-tax).

| 83. | The Dutch State acknowledges that FBN will benefit from the injection of Tier 1 capital (measure C). At the same time however, the Dutch State underlines that the Commission should also take into account that FBN will repay the existing Tier 2 instruments at par, while the market now typically prices this type of instruments at a discount. The Dutch State claims, based on market data, that the repayment at par implied a benefit of EUR 200 million for the State, i.e. that the market value of these instruments was EUR 200 million below their nominal value. This would imply that the State aid component in this measure amounted to EUR 1,15 billion (rather than EUR 1,35 billion). |
| --- | --- |

83.

The Dutch State acknowledges that FBN will benefit from the injection of Tier 1 capital (measure C). At the same time however, the Dutch State underlines that the Commission should also take into account that FBN will repay the existing Tier 2 instruments at par, while the market now typically prices this type of instruments at a discount. The Dutch State claims, based on market data, that the repayment at par implied a benefit of EUR 200 million for the State, i.e. that the market value of these instruments was EUR 200 million below their nominal value. This would imply that the State aid component in this measure amounted to EUR 1,15 billion (rather than EUR 1,35 billion).

| 84. | The Dutch State indicates that the payment of EUR 740 million (measure D) is not a payment to ABN Amro N. It underlines that the payment stems from its contractual obligations under the CSA. |
| --- | --- |

84.

The Dutch State indicates that the payment of EUR 740 million (measure D) is not a payment to ABN Amro N. It underlines that the payment stems from its contractual obligations under the CSA.

| 85. | Also with respect to the State counter guarantee on the cross liabilities linked to the divestment of New HBU, the Dutch State claims that these resulted from the merger decision which was already taken by Fortis Holding in 2007. It contends that the underlying business of ABN Amro N will not benefit from the support provided to cover these costs (measure E). |
| --- | --- |

85.

Also with respect to the State counter guarantee on the cross liabilities linked to the divestment of New HBU, the Dutch State claims that these resulted from the merger decision which was already taken by Fortis Holding in 2007. It contends that the underlying business of ABN Amro N will not benefit from the support provided to cover these costs (measure E).

| 86. | The Dutch State considers the cross liabilities solution to be in line with the Commission Communications and it underlines that is has based its pricing on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

86.

The Dutch State considers the cross liabilities solution to be in line with the Commission Communications and it underlines that is has based its pricing on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendations.

| 87. | The Dutch State also attracts the attention of the Commission to the fact that the sale of New HBU has been very burdensome for the Dutch State and for ABN Amro N. New HBU was sold below book value and ABN Amro N also accepted a credit umbrella in which it took a 75 % of the credit losses of the existing loan portfolio up to a maximum of EUR 1,6 billion. The Dutch State underlines that the HBU transaction led to an economic loss of EUR 1,2 billion, while it also had a negative capital impact of EUR 470 million. |
| --- | --- |

87.

The Dutch State also attracts the attention of the Commission to the fact that the sale of New HBU has been very burdensome for the Dutch State and for ABN Amro N. New HBU was sold below book value and ABN Amro N also accepted a credit umbrella in which it took a 75 % of the credit losses of the existing loan portfolio up to a maximum of EUR 1,6 billion. The Dutch State underlines that the HBU transaction led to an economic loss of EUR 1,2 billion, while it also had a negative capital impact of EUR 470 million.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Existence of aid

| 88. | According to Article 107(1) TFEU, a State measure can be classified as State aid when 1. it gives a selective economic advantage; 2. it is financed by State resources; 3. it distorts or threatens to distort competition; and 4. it affects the trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

88.

According to Article 107(1) TFEU, a State measure can be classified as State aid when 1. it gives a selective economic advantage; 2. it is financed by State resources; 3. it distorts or threatens to distort competition; and 4. it affects the trade between Member States.

| 89. | The Commission observes that all the measures which are the object of this decision clearly involve State resources since they are directly financed by the State (condition 2). As regards condition 4, the Commission observes that all the measures threaten to affect trade between Member States since both ABN Amro N and FBN are active on foreign markets, while subsidiaries of companies from other Member States compete with ABN Amro N and FBN on the Dutch market. The reinforcement of these two banks also threatens to discourage entry by foreign banks on the Dutch market. Because of the aid allowing the separation from the respective mother company and then the merger, ABN Amro N and FBN are stronger companies on the market, which distorts competition (condition 3). The following paragraphs will discuss more in detail whether the State measures described above represent a selective advantage to ABN Amro N and FBN (condition 1). |
| --- | --- |

89.

The Commission observes that all the measures which are the object of this decision clearly involve State resources since they are directly financed by the State (condition 2). As regards condition 4, the Commission observes that all the measures threaten to affect trade between Member States since both ABN Amro N and FBN are active on foreign markets, while subsidiaries of companies from other Member States compete with ABN Amro N and FBN on the Dutch market. The reinforcement of these two banks also threatens to discourage entry by foreign banks on the Dutch market. Because of the aid allowing the separation from the respective mother company and then the merger, ABN Amro N and FBN are stronger companies on the market, which distorts competition (condition 3). The following paragraphs will discuss more in detail whether the State measures described above represent a selective advantage to ABN Amro N and FBN (condition 1).

| 90. | As regards measures A and B1 they seem to convey an advantage to ABN Amro N since they provide it with a guarantee and capital that it could not have found on the market. The Dutch State claims that these measures were granted to cover the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, which has only limited economic activities. The Dutch State argues that this was an obligation of the State as a shareholder of the Z-share and as partner under the CSA. The Dutch State indicates that this obligation was not linked to ABN Amro N and therefore does not provide any advantage to ABN Amro N, i.e. the lines of business which will be transferred to ABN Amro II. According to the Dutch State, ABN Amro N is only used as an intermediate vehicle to settle the obligation of the State with respect to ABN Amro Z. At separation, ABN Amro N will have to leave EUR 2,2 billion to fill the shortage of ABN Amro Z and will therefore not receive any advantage. The Commission observes however that ABN Amro N and Z do not have separate legal status and that the Dutch State manages its ABN Amro activities (both ABN Amro N and Z) as a single economic entity. The Dutch authorities have provided no proof that ABN Amro N and Z are clearly ring-fenced from one other. On the contrary, there are indications that the profits and cash flows of the two units have not been clearly separated, especially in the past. In 2008, the consortium shareholders decided for instance to transfer EUR 1 billion in Unicredito shares from ABN Amro Z to the other entities (ABN Amro R, S and N), without any compensation. The Commission also notes that ABN Amro Z incurs the costs of head office functions, thereby providing a clear advantage to ABN Amro N apparently without any compensation. In other words, it seems that the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z partially stems from the transfer of net assets to ABN Amro N and from the provision of head office functions to ABN Amro N. By filling the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, the Dutch State seems therefore to pay the remuneration for an advantage granted to ABN Amro N. It seems therefore that ABN Amro N should be seen as a beneficiary of the measures, since, if the Dutch State did not fill the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, the two other consortium members would try to repatriate assets obtained by ABN Amro N to ABN Amro Z or directly to ABN Amro R and S. At this stage, the Commission can therefore not take a final view on the existence of an advantage to ABN Amro N financed by State resources. The Dutch government is invited to provide more evidence of its claim that the capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro Z existed already when it acquired FBN and its ABN Amro assets on 3 October 2008 and to precisely quantify the different causes of this capital shortage. |
| --- | --- |

90.

As regards measures A and B1 they seem to convey an advantage to ABN Amro N since they provide it with a guarantee and capital that it could not have found on the market. The Dutch State claims that these measures were granted to cover the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, which has only limited economic activities. The Dutch State argues that this was an obligation of the State as a shareholder of the Z-share and as partner under the CSA. The Dutch State indicates that this obligation was not linked to ABN Amro N and therefore does not provide any advantage to ABN Amro N, i.e. the lines of business which will be transferred to ABN Amro II. According to the Dutch State, ABN Amro N is only used as an intermediate vehicle to settle the obligation of the State with respect to ABN Amro Z. At separation, ABN Amro N will have to leave EUR 2,2 billion to fill the shortage of ABN Amro Z and will therefore not receive any advantage. The Commission observes however that ABN Amro N and Z do not have separate legal status and that the Dutch State manages its ABN Amro activities (both ABN Amro N and Z) as a single economic entity. The Dutch authorities have provided no proof that ABN Amro N and Z are clearly ring-fenced from one other. On the contrary, there are indications that the profits and cash flows of the two units have not been clearly separated, especially in the past. In 2008, the consortium shareholders decided for instance to transfer EUR 1 billion in Unicredito shares from ABN Amro Z to the other entities (ABN Amro R, S and N), without any compensation. The Commission also notes that ABN Amro Z incurs the costs of head office functions, thereby providing a clear advantage to ABN Amro N apparently without any compensation. In other words, it seems that the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z partially stems from the transfer of net assets to ABN Amro N and from the provision of head office functions to ABN Amro N. By filling the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, the Dutch State seems therefore to pay the remuneration for an advantage granted to ABN Amro N. It seems therefore that ABN Amro N should be seen as a beneficiary of the measures, since, if the Dutch State did not fill the capital shortage of ABN Amro Z, the two other consortium members would try to repatriate assets obtained by ABN Amro N to ABN Amro Z or directly to ABN Amro R and S. At this stage, the Commission can therefore not take a final view on the existence of an advantage to ABN Amro N financed by State resources. The Dutch government is invited to provide more evidence of its claim that the capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro Z existed already when it acquired FBN and its ABN Amro assets on 3 October 2008 and to precisely quantify the different causes of this capital shortage.

| 91. | The recapitalisation granted to finance the separation costs of EUR 1,08 billion (measure B2 and B3) seems to constitute State aid to ABN Amro N. By supporting these costs for ABN Amro N, the State provides an advantage to ABN Amro N. It is the Commission's understanding that the Dutch State had to inject capital because ABN Amro N could not self-finance these costs. The Commission also observes that the use of a significant fraction of the total amount (i.e. the extra precautionary buffer of EUR 500 million) is not specified and remains rather unclear. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The recapitalisation granted to finance the separation costs of EUR 1,08 billion (measure B2 and B3) seems to constitute State aid to ABN Amro N. By supporting these costs for ABN Amro N, the State provides an advantage to ABN Amro N. It is the Commission's understanding that the Dutch State had to inject capital because ABN Amro N could not self-finance these costs. The Commission also observes that the use of a significant fraction of the total amount (i.e. the extra precautionary buffer of EUR 500 million) is not specified and remains rather unclear.

| 92. | The sale of New HBU (measure B4) leads to a capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro N. ABN Amro N is able to cover only part of this. The fact that the State has to make up the balance (i.e. approximately EUR 300 million) represents therefore an advantage to ABN Amro N. The Dutch authorities claim that the sale of New HBU was an obligation of the State as a successor of Fortis Holding, following from the Commission's merger decision of 2007 (29); the support granted to ABN Amro N only covers the costs caused by this sale without granting any net advantage to ABN Amro N. The Commission cannot accept this claim at this stage. It observes that the aid finances the consequences of the sale of New HBU, a condition sine qua non for the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN. In other words, this aid allows a merger which will make ABN Amro N a stronger bank on the Dutch market. Moreover, the Commission notes that it was the decision of the Dutch State to merge FBN and ABN Amro N. When the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN Amro N and 33,8 % of ABN Amro Z), there was no legal obligation to pursue a merger. The Dutch State could for instance also have chosen to manage the two companies as separate entities. The Dutch State has chosen to pursue the merger and therefore the claim that it inherited the obligation to sell New HBU from Fortis Holding is only partially correct. The same reasoning holds for the guarantee given for cross liabilities stemming from the sale of New HBU (measure E): there was no legal obligation to merge FBN and ABM Amro N and the cross liabilities are a cost stemming from the sale of New HBU, a sale had to be implemented following the decision to merge both banks in order to make them a stronger competitor on the Dutch market. |
| --- | --- |

92.

The sale of New HBU (measure B4) leads to a capital shortage at the level of ABN Amro N. ABN Amro N is able to cover only part of this. The fact that the State has to make up the balance (i.e. approximately EUR 300 million) represents therefore an advantage to ABN Amro N. The Dutch authorities claim that the sale of New HBU was an obligation of the State as a successor of Fortis Holding, following from the Commission's merger decision of 2007 (29); the support granted to ABN Amro N only covers the costs caused by this sale without granting any net advantage to ABN Amro N. The Commission cannot accept this claim at this stage. It observes that the aid finances the consequences of the sale of New HBU, a condition sine qua non for the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN. In other words, this aid allows a merger which will make ABN Amro N a stronger bank on the Dutch market. Moreover, the Commission notes that it was the decision of the Dutch State to merge FBN and ABN Amro N. When the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN Amro N and 33,8 % of ABN Amro Z), there was no legal obligation to pursue a merger. The Dutch State could for instance also have chosen to manage the two companies as separate entities. The Dutch State has chosen to pursue the merger and therefore the claim that it inherited the obligation to sell New HBU from Fortis Holding is only partially correct. The same reasoning holds for the guarantee given for cross liabilities stemming from the sale of New HBU (measure E): there was no legal obligation to merge FBN and ABM Amro N and the cross liabilities are a cost stemming from the sale of New HBU, a sale had to be implemented following the decision to merge both banks in order to make them a stronger competitor on the Dutch market.

| 93. | The Commission considers that the capital injection of EUR 1,2 billion capital (measure B5) to finance integration costs provides an advantage to ABN Amro N. Indeed, it provides additional resources to the company and without this capital injection the merger could not be financed. |
| --- | --- |

93.

The Commission considers that the capital injection of EUR 1,2 billion capital (measure B5) to finance integration costs provides an advantage to ABN Amro N. Indeed, it provides additional resources to the company and without this capital injection the merger could not be financed.

| 94. | As regards the swap of EUR 1,35 billion of Tier 2 hybrid loans to FBN for Tier 1 capital (measure C), it seems to be an advantage to FBN. FBN needs more Tier 1 capital to meet the capital requirements of the DNB and it is not able to finance these by its own means (including retained earnings). The Dutch authorities claim that the amount of State aid implied in this measure is not 100 % since it should take into account the fact that this exchange of an existing subordinated claim is equivalent to FBN repaying the State's Tier 2 instruments at par, which seems to be above current market price of similar hybrid instruments. The Commission observes in this respect that several banks have indeed been able to repurchase their subordinated debt instruments at a significant discount in the last quarters. Based on a preliminary assessment, the claim of the Dutch government that the State aid implied in this measure amounts to EUR 1,15 billion seems a reasonable estimation. |
| --- | --- |

94.

As regards the swap of EUR 1,35 billion of Tier 2 hybrid loans to FBN for Tier 1 capital (measure C), it seems to be an advantage to FBN. FBN needs more Tier 1 capital to meet the capital requirements of the DNB and it is not able to finance these by its own means (including retained earnings). The Dutch authorities claim that the amount of State aid implied in this measure is not 100 % since it should take into account the fact that this exchange of an existing subordinated claim is equivalent to FBN repaying the State's Tier 2 instruments at par, which seems to be above current market price of similar hybrid instruments. The Commission observes in this respect that several banks have indeed been able to repurchase their subordinated debt instruments at a significant discount in the last quarters. Based on a preliminary assessment, the claim of the Dutch government that the State aid implied in this measure amounts to EUR 1,15 billion seems a reasonable estimation.

| 95. | As for the settlement of payment obligations as regards other consortium members (measure D), the Commission can only accept that it is not State aid if it does not imply a transfer of net assets or another advantage to ABN Amro N. At first sight, it seems that the EUR 740 million payment to the other consortium members based on CSA provisions mainly relates to adjusted purchase prices for existing assets and does not stem from the transfer of new assets to ABN Amro N, in which case there would be an advantage to the latter. This payment of EUR 740 million does not seem to convey an advantage to the consortium members either, since the State is contractually obliged to pay this amount under the CSA and if it does not pay it, consortium members could sue the State to make these payments or prevent the transfer of the BU Nederland and BU Private Banking to the Dutch State. At this stage, it seems that measure D does not convey any advantage. The Commission can however not exclude that a more in-depth analysis of the case will reveal that there is nevertheless an advantage. It can therefore not take a final position on the absence of advantage at this stage. The Dutch State is invited to provide more information ensuring that there is no transfer of net assets in favour of ABN Amro N involved in measure D. |
| --- | --- |

95.

As for the settlement of payment obligations as regards other consortium members (measure D), the Commission can only accept that it is not State aid if it does not imply a transfer of net assets or another advantage to ABN Amro N. At first sight, it seems that the EUR 740 million payment to the other consortium members based on CSA provisions mainly relates to adjusted purchase prices for existing assets and does not stem from the transfer of new assets to ABN Amro N, in which case there would be an advantage to the latter. This payment of EUR 740 million does not seem to convey an advantage to the consortium members either, since the State is contractually obliged to pay this amount under the CSA and if it does not pay it, consortium members could sue the State to make these payments or prevent the transfer of the BU Nederland and BU Private Banking to the Dutch State. At this stage, it seems that measure D does not convey any advantage. The Commission can however not exclude that a more in-depth analysis of the case will reveal that there is nevertheless an advantage. It can therefore not take a final position on the absence of advantage at this stage. The Dutch State is invited to provide more information ensuring that there is no transfer of net assets in favour of ABN Amro N involved in measure D.

| 96. | The Commission observes that the Dutch authorities claim that certain of the measures constitute rational business decisions, increasing the value of the banks owned by the Dutch State. In particular, these measures are necessary to allow the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN, which will generate annual synergies larger than EUR 1 billion. Based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission considers that the private investor test cannot be applied to the present case. The State became the owner of FBN and ABN Amro N and Z on 3 October 2008 in the framework of a transaction aiming at rescuing these banks and which would not have been acceptable to a private investor, as concluded in paragraph 50. of the decision of 3 December 2008 on the aid to Fortis Bank S.A. (30). In other words, all the State measures which are assessed in the present decision that aim at preserving or increasing the value of ABN Amro N and FBN are the consequence of an aid measure, i.e. the rescue of these banks on 3 October 2008. Since these State measures are the direct consequence of an aid measure and since they are taken in framework of the restructuring of these two entities which directly follows from this purchase, the behaviour of the State cannot be compared to that of a private investor. A private investor would not have found itself in the situation of the State, i.e. without the State aid of 3 October 2008 Fortis Holding including its subsidiary FBN would have disappeared. |
| --- | --- |

96.

The Commission observes that the Dutch authorities claim that certain of the measures constitute rational business decisions, increasing the value of the banks owned by the Dutch State. In particular, these measures are necessary to allow the merger between ABN Amro N and FBN, which will generate annual synergies larger than EUR 1 billion. Based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission considers that the private investor test cannot be applied to the present case. The State became the owner of FBN and ABN Amro N and Z on 3 October 2008 in the framework of a transaction aiming at rescuing these banks and which would not have been acceptable to a private investor, as concluded in paragraph 50. of the decision of 3 December 2008 on the aid to Fortis Bank S.A. (30). In other words, all the State measures which are assessed in the present decision that aim at preserving or increasing the value of ABN Amro N and FBN are the consequence of an aid measure, i.e. the rescue of these banks on 3 October 2008. Since these State measures are the direct consequence of an aid measure and since they are taken in framework of the restructuring of these two entities which directly follows from this purchase, the behaviour of the State cannot be compared to that of a private investor. A private investor would not have found itself in the situation of the State, i.e. without the State aid of 3 October 2008 Fortis Holding including its subsidiary FBN would have disappeared.

| 97. | In conclusion, based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission cannot exclude that the measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C, D and E constitute State aid. Measure C benefits FBN, while the other measures provide an advantage to ABN Amro N. Any aid contained in these measures would come on top of any aid contained in the measures covered by the opening decision of 8 April 2009. |
| --- | --- |

97.

In conclusion, based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission cannot exclude that the measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C, D and E constitute State aid. Measure C benefits FBN, while the other measures provide an advantage to ABN Amro N. Any aid contained in these measures would come on top of any aid contained in the measures covered by the opening decision of 8 April 2009.

| 98. | The Commission invites the Dutch authorities and the parties concerned to submit their comments on these preliminary conclusions concerning the existence of aid. |
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98.

The Commission invites the Dutch authorities and the parties concerned to submit their comments on these preliminary conclusions concerning the existence of aid.

4.2.   Compatibility of the alleged aid measures as restructuring aid

4.2.1.   Legal basis for the assessment of compatibility

| 99. | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In this regard, it is however important to underline that the Court of First Instance has emphasized that this provision should be applied restrictively (31), which implies that the economic disturbance should have nation-wide implications and not just regional. |
| --- | --- |

99.

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In this regard, it is however important to underline that the Court of First Instance has emphasized that this provision should be applied restrictively (31), which implies that the economic disturbance should have nation-wide implications and not just regional.

| 100. | The Commission notes that ABN Amro N and FBN are leading Dutch banks with a nation-wide branch network and top market positions in a wide range of segments on the Dutch retail and SME banking market. In the context of the various uncertainties surrounding the current recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, the discontinuity of these banks would create a serious disturbance for the Dutch economy and therefore State aid from the Dutch government can be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

100.

The Commission notes that ABN Amro N and FBN are leading Dutch banks with a nation-wide branch network and top market positions in a wide range of segments on the Dutch retail and SME banking market. In the context of the various uncertainties surrounding the current recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, the discontinuity of these banks would create a serious disturbance for the Dutch economy and therefore State aid from the Dutch government can be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

| 101. | The Commission has explained in the Restructuring Communication how it will assess restructuring aid to banks in the current crisis: (i) the Member State should commit to implement a restructuring plan restoring the long-term viability of a bank without reliance on State support; (ii) the bank and its capital providers should contribute to the financing of the restructuring costs as much as possible with their own resources thereby limiting the total amount of State aid necessary; and (iii) the plan should contain sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition, which is most relevant in business segments where the bank's relative position remains strong (32). |
| --- | --- |

101.

The Commission has explained in the Restructuring Communication how it will assess restructuring aid to banks in the current crisis: (i) the Member State should commit to implement a restructuring plan restoring the long-term viability of a bank without reliance on State support; (ii) the bank and its capital providers should contribute to the financing of the restructuring costs as much as possible with their own resources thereby limiting the total amount of State aid necessary; and (iii) the plan should contain sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition, which is most relevant in business segments where the bank's relative position remains strong (32).

| 102. | In addition to complying with the Restructuring Communication, the form of the aid measure has to comply with the corresponding Communication: the State guarantee measures (measure E) have to comply with the Banking Communication and the recapitalisation measures (measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C and D) have to comply with the Recapitalisation Communication. |
| --- | --- |

102.

In addition to complying with the Restructuring Communication, the form of the aid measure has to comply with the corresponding Communication: the State guarantee measures (measure E) have to comply with the Banking Communication and the recapitalisation measures (measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C and D) have to comply with the Recapitalisation Communication.

| 103. | As regards measure A, the guaranteed portfolio is not made of impaired assets. However, the Commission considers that it should be assessed by analogy on the basis of the principles laid down in the Impaired Assets Communication. The principles developed in that Communication aim at ensuring that State guarantees on bank assets are done under conditions which ensure that these aid measures are well-targeted, that the aid is limited to the minimum and that distortions of competitions are limited. Since measure A is a State guarantee on a portfolio of loans held by ABN, the same principles should be applied to it. |
| --- | --- |

103.

As regards measure A, the guaranteed portfolio is not made of impaired assets. However, the Commission considers that it should be assessed by analogy on the basis of the principles laid down in the Impaired Assets Communication. The principles developed in that Communication aim at ensuring that State guarantees on bank assets are done under conditions which ensure that these aid measures are well-targeted, that the aid is limited to the minimum and that distortions of competitions are limited. Since measure A is a State guarantee on a portfolio of loans held by ABN, the same principles should be applied to it.

4.2.2.   Assessment of measure A under the principle laid down in the Impaired Assets Communication

| 104. | Based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission acknowledges that the credit protection instrument has been developed to sort out a very particular problem, namely the need to address the shortage of regulatory capital identified by the Dutch supervisor. The latter will not authorise the separation of ABN Amro N before this shortage is solved. As such, the credit protection measure is intrinsically linked to the spin-off schedule. Within this specific framework, the Commission notes that the choice of the Dutch State to grant a credit protection instrument instead of a standard recapitalisation has been only dictated by the fact that the N-share represents per se only economic rights but not a separate legal entity; in case of a standard capital injection in ABN Amro, the Dutch State runs the risk that the money injected would benefit other parts of the group, i.e. the other consortium members. The credit protection instrument provides a capital relief and therefore covers the capital shortage without implementing a standard capital increase. |
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104.

Based on a preliminary assessment, the Commission acknowledges that the credit protection instrument has been developed to sort out a very particular problem, namely the need to address the shortage of regulatory capital identified by the Dutch supervisor. The latter will not authorise the separation of ABN Amro N before this shortage is solved. As such, the credit protection measure is intrinsically linked to the spin-off schedule. Within this specific framework, the Commission notes that the choice of the Dutch State to grant a credit protection instrument instead of a standard recapitalisation has been only dictated by the fact that the N-share represents per se only economic rights but not a separate legal entity; in case of a standard capital injection in ABN Amro, the Dutch State runs the risk that the money injected would benefit other parts of the group, i.e. the other consortium members. The credit protection instrument provides a capital relief and therefore covers the capital shortage without implementing a standard capital increase.

| 105. | Moreover, at this stage, the Commission has no reason to believe that the protected portfolio contains “impaired” assets. Indeed, it seems that expected losses of the guaranteed portfolio are very low and that all the underlying assets are currently performing without any exception. They are also considered as safe by the market. In conclusion, the Commission acknowledges that the situation is different to that of other cases with impaired assets. In spite of this, as explained in paragraph 103. above, the Commission thinks that the measure should comply with the general principles underlying the Impaired Asset Communication. In addition, when assessing measure A as a restructuring measure lasting longer than six months, the guiding principles of the Impaired Asset Communication should be complied with. |
| --- | --- |

105.

Moreover, at this stage, the Commission has no reason to believe that the protected portfolio contains “impaired” assets. Indeed, it seems that expected losses of the guaranteed portfolio are very low and that all the underlying assets are currently performing without any exception. They are also considered as safe by the market. In conclusion, the Commission acknowledges that the situation is different to that of other cases with impaired assets. In spite of this, as explained in paragraph 103. above, the Commission thinks that the measure should comply with the general principles underlying the Impaired Asset Communication. In addition, when assessing measure A as a restructuring measure lasting longer than six months, the guiding principles of the Impaired Asset Communication should be complied with.

| 106. | Sections 5.1 and 5.5 of the Impaired Asset Communication require that the assets covered by the State guarantee should be valued. Section 5.1 sets out in particular that such a valuation should be certified by recognized independent experts. The purpose of this valuation is to identify the “real economic value” of the assets covered. Section 5.5 indicates that the assets should not be transferred at a price larger than their real economic value. In the case of a guarantee, it means that the expected credit losses on the guaranteed assets should be calculated and these expected losses should be borne by the bank, the State only indemnifying the credit losses exceeding that level. As regards the level of the guarantee fee, Annex IV to that Communication indicates that it could be inspired by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures having the same capital effect. Indeed, asset relief measures should not be used by recapitalised banks to pay a lower remuneration than the minimum remuneration required by the Recapitalisation Communication. |
| --- | --- |

106.

Sections 5.1 and 5.5 of the Impaired Asset Communication require that the assets covered by the State guarantee should be valued. Section 5.1 sets out in particular that such a valuation should be certified by recognized independent experts. The purpose of this valuation is to identify the “real economic value” of the assets covered. Section 5.5 indicates that the assets should not be transferred at a price larger than their real economic value. In the case of a guarantee, it means that the expected credit losses on the guaranteed assets should be calculated and these expected losses should be borne by the bank, the State only indemnifying the credit losses exceeding that level. As regards the level of the guarantee fee, Annex IV to that Communication indicates that it could be inspired by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures having the same capital effect. Indeed, asset relief measures should not be used by recapitalised banks to pay a lower remuneration than the minimum remuneration required by the Recapitalisation Communication.

| 107. | In the present case, the Commission observes that the Dutch government has only provided information coming from ABN Amro N on the expected credit losses. At this stage, there is no analysis made by recognized economic experts. |
| --- | --- |

107.

In the present case, the Commission observes that the Dutch government has only provided information coming from ABN Amro N on the expected credit losses. At this stage, there is no analysis made by recognized economic experts.

| 108. | Based on the current information, the Commission tends to believe that the pricing of the capital protection instrument is in line with the Impaired Assets Communication (which itself refers to the Recapitalisation Communication as regards the detailed arrangements for remuneration). The pricing is based on the assumption that the Dutch government wants to realise a return of 10 % on the capital relief effect of the provided credit protection. The Commission is however not sure whether other contractual features (e.g. the claw-back mechanism, the vertical slice) will not have a significant impact on the ultimate return that the government will achieve, so the Dutch authorities are invited to provide reassurance on this subject. |
| --- | --- |

108.

Based on the current information, the Commission tends to believe that the pricing of the capital protection instrument is in line with the Impaired Assets Communication (which itself refers to the Recapitalisation Communication as regards the detailed arrangements for remuneration). The pricing is based on the assumption that the Dutch government wants to realise a return of 10 % on the capital relief effect of the provided credit protection. The Commission is however not sure whether other contractual features (e.g. the claw-back mechanism, the vertical slice) will not have a significant impact on the ultimate return that the government will achieve, so the Dutch authorities are invited to provide reassurance on this subject.

| 109. | The Commission observes that the credit protection instrument includes a number of clauses which seem to encourage an early exit, but at the same time do not ensure that this exit will really will take place. These clauses include:






  — | no price adjustment when ABN Amro starts with the full implementation of Basel II, which entails that the measure will probably become more expensive for the bank, |
| --- | --- | --- |

109.

The Commission observes that the credit protection instrument includes a number of clauses which seem to encourage an early exit, but at the same time do not ensure that this exit will really will take place. These clauses include:

—

no price adjustment when ABN Amro starts with the full implementation of Basel II, which entails that the measure will probably become more expensive for the bank,

| — | a fixed first loss tranche of 20bp (calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio), |
| --- | --- |

—

a fixed first loss tranche of 20bp (calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio),

| — | call options, which allow ABN Amro to terminate the CDS, the last one being January 2012. |
| --- | --- |

—

call options, which allow ABN Amro to terminate the CDS, the last one being January 2012.

| 110. | In conclusion, at this stage, the Commission cannot confirm that the measure A complies with the relevant principles laid down in the Impaired Asset Communication. |
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110.

In conclusion, at this stage, the Commission cannot confirm that the measure A complies with the relevant principles laid down in the Impaired Asset Communication.

4.2.3.   Assessment of the measures B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C and D under the Recapitalisation Communication

| 111. | The Commission observes that the Dutch authorities strive for a minimum return of 10 % on their capital injections. For the MCS (measure B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5), the Dutch State will get a 10 % coupon until conversion into ordinary equity. This figure of 10 % is in line with the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication, which, by reference to the Recommendation of the ECB, requires an interest rate equal to at least the risk-free rate plus 600 basis points for capital injections and provides an indicative range of 7 % to 9,3 %. |
| --- | --- |

111.

The Commission observes that the Dutch authorities strive for a minimum return of 10 % on their capital injections. For the MCS (measure B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5), the Dutch State will get a 10 % coupon until conversion into ordinary equity. This figure of 10 % is in line with the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication, which, by reference to the Recommendation of the ECB, requires an interest rate equal to at least the risk-free rate plus 600 basis points for capital injections and provides an indicative range of 7 % to 9,3 %.

| 112. | The Commission observes that since the MCS will be converted into ordinary shares of ABN Amro II, the remuneration of the State will eventually depend on how many shares it receives and the price at which the Dutch State will be able to sell its shares. The same is true for measure C which will be an injection of capital in FBN. As regards the price at which ordinary shares should be subscribed, the Annex to the Recapitalisation Communication indicates that “For non-quoted banks, as there is no quoted share price, Member States should come to an appropriate market-based approach, such as full valuation.” In other words, in exchange for its investment, the State should receive shares allowing it to expect a sufficient remuneration in the form of dividend payments and increase of the share price. The Commission considers that, since the State already owns 100 % of the capital of ABN Amro II and FBN, the number of shares it will receive is not relevant (since if it receives more shares, it will simply dilute itself). Instead, what matters is whether the new capital translates into an increase of the value of the banks. In this respect, the Commission observes that without the injection of capital in FBN (measure C), FBN will no longer comply with regulatory capital requirements so that it will no longer be able to operate and will be worth nothing. Since the value of FBN is clearly higher than the size of measure C (in October 2008, Lazard estimated its value to be between EUR 3,1 and 3,6 billion), this measure, which allows the Dutch State to preserve the value of the bank, offers a sufficient remuneration. The Commission also observes that the business plan implies that the ABN Amro Group would realise a run-rate RoE of 11,4 % in 2012 and the Commission sees at this stage no reason to doubt that figure. A sufficiently high RoE indicates that ABN Amro Group should be able to remunerate its shareholders in an appropriate way (in the form of dividends and capital appreciation). |
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112.

The Commission observes that since the MCS will be converted into ordinary shares of ABN Amro II, the remuneration of the State will eventually depend on how many shares it receives and the price at which the Dutch State will be able to sell its shares. The same is true for measure C which will be an injection of capital in FBN. As regards the price at which ordinary shares should be subscribed, the Annex to the Recapitalisation Communication indicates that “For non-quoted banks, as there is no quoted share price, Member States should come to an appropriate market-based approach, such as full valuation.” In other words, in exchange for its investment, the State should receive shares allowing it to expect a sufficient remuneration in the form of dividend payments and increase of the share price. The Commission considers that, since the State already owns 100 % of the capital of ABN Amro II and FBN, the number of shares it will receive is not relevant (since if it receives more shares, it will simply dilute itself). Instead, what matters is whether the new capital translates into an increase of the value of the banks. In this respect, the Commission observes that without the injection of capital in FBN (measure C), FBN will no longer comply with regulatory capital requirements so that it will no longer be able to operate and will be worth nothing. Since the value of FBN is clearly higher than the size of measure C (in October 2008, Lazard estimated its value to be between EUR 3,1 and 3,6 billion), this measure, which allows the Dutch State to preserve the value of the bank, offers a sufficient remuneration. The Commission also observes that the business plan implies that the ABN Amro Group would realise a run-rate RoE of 11,4 % in 2012 and the Commission sees at this stage no reason to doubt that figure. A sufficiently high RoE indicates that ABN Amro Group should be able to remunerate its shareholders in an appropriate way (in the form of dividends and capital appreciation).

| 113. | As regards B1, B2 and B3, they finance the costs of separating ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Bank. The Commission considers that these investments give rise to a sufficient remuneration because the Dutch State is obliged under the CSA to separate ABN Amro N. If the Dutch State did not carry out the separation, the other consortium member would sue it and try to recover these costs through litigation or by seizing ABN Amro N, which would result in a loss at least equal to the amount invested now. |
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113.

As regards B1, B2 and B3, they finance the costs of separating ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Bank. The Commission considers that these investments give rise to a sufficient remuneration because the Dutch State is obliged under the CSA to separate ABN Amro N. If the Dutch State did not carry out the separation, the other consortium member would sue it and try to recover these costs through litigation or by seizing ABN Amro N, which would result in a loss at least equal to the amount invested now.

| 114. | Measures B4 and B5 finance the integration costs of FBN and ABN Amro N. The Commission observes that this integration will generate synergies of at least EUR 1 billion per year. This will therefore dramatically increase the value of the shares held by the Dutch State (this increase will be around EUR 4 billion according to the Dutch State). The Commission therefore considers that the costs of the sale of HBU and the integration costs are lower than the increase in the value of the shares which will result from this merger. The Commission therefore considers that these investments will offer a sufficient remuneration. |
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114.

Measures B4 and B5 finance the integration costs of FBN and ABN Amro N. The Commission observes that this integration will generate synergies of at least EUR 1 billion per year. This will therefore dramatically increase the value of the shares held by the Dutch State (this increase will be around EUR 4 billion according to the Dutch State). The Commission therefore considers that the costs of the sale of HBU and the integration costs are lower than the increase in the value of the shares which will result from this merger. The Commission therefore considers that these investments will offer a sufficient remuneration.

| 115. | The Commission concludes that the remuneration of these measures is in accordance with the Recapitalisation Communication. |
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115.

The Commission concludes that the remuneration of these measures is in accordance with the Recapitalisation Communication.

4.2.4.   Compatibility of measure E with the Banking Communication

| 116. | The Commission observes that the government has given a counter-indemnification for cross-liabilities which might potentially arise from the de-merger of New HBU. More precisely, the Dutch State has given a protection to New HBU against the risk it runs towards the current senior and subordinated creditors of ABN Amro Bank NV (the current operational entity of ABN Amro Holding, to be renamed RBS NV). As a result, if ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV) were to go bankrupt, its senior and subordinated creditors would have a claim against New HBU. The Dutch State agrees to indemnify New HBU for any payments it would have to make under this claim. The Commission tends to accept that this counter-indemnity is comparable with the risk of guaranteeing subordinated debt of ABN Amro Bank NV, since as soon as the subordinated creditors of ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV) faced a credit loss, they would have recourse against New HBU. The recommendation of the ECB of October 2008 about the pricing of State guarantees on bank liabilities only concerns guarantees on senior bank liabilities. In order to find guidance on subordinated risk, it is necessary to use the recommendation of the ECB on the pricing of recapitalisation, to which the Recapitalisation Communication refers. The Commission considers that pricing retained by the Dutch authorities (200 basis points plus the historical CDS of ABN Amro Bank (33) during the period 1 January 2007 until 31 July 2008) is in line with the recommendation of the ECB and is therefore acceptable. |
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116.

The Commission observes that the government has given a counter-indemnification for cross-liabilities which might potentially arise from the de-merger of New HBU. More precisely, the Dutch State has given a protection to New HBU against the risk it runs towards the current senior and subordinated creditors of ABN Amro Bank NV (the current operational entity of ABN Amro Holding, to be renamed RBS NV). As a result, if ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV) were to go bankrupt, its senior and subordinated creditors would have a claim against New HBU. The Dutch State agrees to indemnify New HBU for any payments it would have to make under this claim. The Commission tends to accept that this counter-indemnity is comparable with the risk of guaranteeing subordinated debt of ABN Amro Bank NV, since as soon as the subordinated creditors of ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV) faced a credit loss, they would have recourse against New HBU. The recommendation of the ECB of October 2008 about the pricing of State guarantees on bank liabilities only concerns guarantees on senior bank liabilities. In order to find guidance on subordinated risk, it is necessary to use the recommendation of the ECB on the pricing of recapitalisation, to which the Recapitalisation Communication refers. The Commission considers that pricing retained by the Dutch authorities (200 basis points plus the historical CDS of ABN Amro Bank (33) during the period 1 January 2007 until 31 July 2008) is in line with the recommendation of the ECB and is therefore acceptable.

4.2.5.   Assessment of the restructuring plan under the Restructuring Communication

Restoring viability

| 117. | The Dutch State and the companies involved have provided financial projections for the combined ABN Amro Group for the coming years. The fact that FBN and ABN Amro N are currently still managed as separate entities has made this exercise more complex than in other cases. |
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117.

The Dutch State and the companies involved have provided financial projections for the combined ABN Amro Group for the coming years. The fact that FBN and ABN Amro N are currently still managed as separate entities has made this exercise more complex than in other cases.

| 118. | The data provided so far seem to indicate that the profitability of the new ABN Amro Group is sufficiently high to integrally cover its costs and realise an appropriate return on equity (34). The Commission has observed however that the recovery of profits is to a large extent dependent from the realization of cost synergies and the improvement of the net interest margin. Becoming cost-efficient is key for the viability of the company and also the realised interest margins should improve quite markedly. More detail is necessary to judge whether the assumptions used are realistic. |
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118.

The data provided so far seem to indicate that the profitability of the new ABN Amro Group is sufficiently high to integrally cover its costs and realise an appropriate return on equity (34). The Commission has observed however that the recovery of profits is to a large extent dependent from the realization of cost synergies and the improvement of the net interest margin. Becoming cost-efficient is key for the viability of the company and also the realised interest margins should improve quite markedly. More detail is necessary to judge whether the assumptions used are realistic.

| 119. | The Commission observes also that the current business plan only contains projections for a base case scenario and a best case scenario. Paragraph 13 of the Restructuring Communication clearly indicates that the company should also be able to prove that it can survive in a worst-case scenario. In addition, the company should also provide the results of a number of stress tests which consider a range of scenarios, including a combination of stress events and a protracted global recession. |
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119.

The Commission observes also that the current business plan only contains projections for a base case scenario and a best case scenario. Paragraph 13 of the Restructuring Communication clearly indicates that the company should also be able to prove that it can survive in a worst-case scenario. In addition, the company should also provide the results of a number of stress tests which consider a range of scenarios, including a combination of stress events and a protracted global recession.

| 120. | The current business plan also does not provide sufficient detail on a divisional and sub-divisional level (35). At this stage the Commission has not sufficient evidence to conclude that all viability issues at divisional level have been adequately tackled. A good illustration of this is the division “Prime Fund Solutions” (part of FBN), which reported a major Madoff-related loss in 2008. It is not clear to the Commission whether this business will be able to post decent profits in the coming years, even though the Commission understands that FBN is considering an outright sale of this business. |
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120.

The current business plan also does not provide sufficient detail on a divisional and sub-divisional level (35). At this stage the Commission has not sufficient evidence to conclude that all viability issues at divisional level have been adequately tackled. A good illustration of this is the division “Prime Fund Solutions” (part of FBN), which reported a major Madoff-related loss in 2008. It is not clear to the Commission whether this business will be able to post decent profits in the coming years, even though the Commission understands that FBN is considering an outright sale of this business.

| 121. | Paragraph 14 of the Restructuring Communication explains that it is key for long-term viability that any State aid is either redeemed over time or is remunerated according to normal market conditions. As indicated above, the Commission at this stage cannot confirm that the bank will generate a sufficient return to remunerate adequately its shareholders. |
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121.

Paragraph 14 of the Restructuring Communication explains that it is key for long-term viability that any State aid is either redeemed over time or is remunerated according to normal market conditions. As indicated above, the Commission at this stage cannot confirm that the bank will generate a sufficient return to remunerate adequately its shareholders.

| 122. | Finally, the Commission observes that since the take-over of FBN and ABN Amro N from Fortis Holding in October 2008, the Dutch State has several times revised upwards the amount of aid expected to be necessary to finance the separation of these banks from their parent company and to finance the sale of New HBU, arguing that unexpected costs had been identified. Given these circumstances, the Commission cannot realistically ascertain that no further aid measures will be necessary to finance the restructuring before ABN Amro N has been effectively separated from ABN Amro Holding and before the closing of the sale of New HBU has effectively taken place. |
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122.

Finally, the Commission observes that since the take-over of FBN and ABN Amro N from Fortis Holding in October 2008, the Dutch State has several times revised upwards the amount of aid expected to be necessary to finance the separation of these banks from their parent company and to finance the sale of New HBU, arguing that unexpected costs had been identified. Given these circumstances, the Commission cannot realistically ascertain that no further aid measures will be necessary to finance the restructuring before ABN Amro N has been effectively separated from ABN Amro Holding and before the closing of the sale of New HBU has effectively taken place.

| 123. | In conclusion, based on a preliminary assessment of the information available, the Commission cannot establish that the restructuring plan will restore long-term viability and that no further aid will be necessary. In this regard, the Commission observes that the Dutch State has also granted an extra prudential margin of EUR 500 million, which it deemed necessary “considering general uncertainties and the uncertainties arising from the separation process”. |
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123.

In conclusion, based on a preliminary assessment of the information available, the Commission cannot establish that the restructuring plan will restore long-term viability and that no further aid will be necessary. In this regard, the Commission observes that the Dutch State has also granted an extra prudential margin of EUR 500 million, which it deemed necessary “considering general uncertainties and the uncertainties arising from the separation process”.

Minimum necessary/own contribution

| 124. | It is clear from the Restructuring Communication that banks should try to sort out capital problems with their own means and only use State aid as a solution of last resort. Aid should be limited to the minimum necessary and should only cover costs which are necessary for the restoration of viability. |
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124.

It is clear from the Restructuring Communication that banks should try to sort out capital problems with their own means and only use State aid as a solution of last resort. Aid should be limited to the minimum necessary and should only cover costs which are necessary for the restoration of viability.

| 125. | The Commission understands that part of the measures might have a temporary character to allow for the separation of ABN Amro N and FBN from their former parent groups. At this stage however, it is not clear to the Commission when and how these measures will be reversed, once they are no longer strictly needed from a viability point of view. |
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125.

The Commission understands that part of the measures might have a temporary character to allow for the separation of ABN Amro N and FBN from their former parent groups. At this stage however, it is not clear to the Commission when and how these measures will be reversed, once they are no longer strictly needed from a viability point of view.

| 126. | The Commission has taken note of the fact that measure A is structured in such a way that it might become relatively unattractive once the new group will fully apply Basel II. It is however not clear when the new group will start the full implementation of Basel II and when precisely the capital relief instrument would be called, since there is no obligation to call it. |
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126.

The Commission has taken note of the fact that measure A is structured in such a way that it might become relatively unattractive once the new group will fully apply Basel II. It is however not clear when the new group will start the full implementation of Basel II and when precisely the capital relief instrument would be called, since there is no obligation to call it.

| 127. | It is also the understanding of the Commission that the total State aid amount contains a prudential buffer of EUR 500 million. The Commission understands that this might be useful and even necessary to complete a rather complex disintegration process, but it is not clear to the Commission why this extra prudential buffer would still be needed once all the separation/integration issues have been settled. In order to limit the aid to the minimum and not leave excess capital in ABN Amro Group, it seems that the Dutch State and ABN Amro Group should for instance develop a repayment mechanism, thereby ensuring that on an on-going basis any excess capital is returned to the State. |
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127.

It is also the understanding of the Commission that the total State aid amount contains a prudential buffer of EUR 500 million. The Commission understands that this might be useful and even necessary to complete a rather complex disintegration process, but it is not clear to the Commission why this extra prudential buffer would still be needed once all the separation/integration issues have been settled. In order to limit the aid to the minimum and not leave excess capital in ABN Amro Group, it seems that the Dutch State and ABN Amro Group should for instance develop a repayment mechanism, thereby ensuring that on an on-going basis any excess capital is returned to the State.

| 128. | The Dutch State also claims that it needs to inject EUR 1,2 billion in the new group to cover integration costs. The Dutch State sees this as an investment pre-financing the synergies which will be realised in the coming years. It is not clear to the Commission whether the returns on the integration investment will be repaid as soon as they are realised (i.e. when the synergies take place) or whether these will be accumulated within the new ABN Amro Group, giving it excessive capital and means to expand. |
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128.

The Dutch State also claims that it needs to inject EUR 1,2 billion in the new group to cover integration costs. The Dutch State sees this as an investment pre-financing the synergies which will be realised in the coming years. It is not clear to the Commission whether the returns on the integration investment will be repaid as soon as they are realised (i.e. when the synergies take place) or whether these will be accumulated within the new ABN Amro Group, giving it excessive capital and means to expand.

| 129. | The Commission also notes that the capital requirements related to the credit umbrella (36) granted to New HBU will gradually decline as the guaranteed loans are progressively redeemed, which might make part of the aid related to New HBU superfluous. It is not clear at this stage whether the Dutch State has put in place sufficient measures to get repayment of the State aid which would become superfluous in the future. |
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129.

The Commission also notes that the capital requirements related to the credit umbrella (36) granted to New HBU will gradually decline as the guaranteed loans are progressively redeemed, which might make part of the aid related to New HBU superfluous. It is not clear at this stage whether the Dutch State has put in place sufficient measures to get repayment of the State aid which would become superfluous in the future.

| 130. | It seems that a small percentage of FBN capital (i.e. the preferred shares) is held by two private shareholders other than the State. This relates to the so-called FBNH Preferred Shares, which have been issued to a SPV (controlled by the Dutch State) in which two former holders of ABN Amro Holding preference shares participate. At this stage, the Commission doubts that these holders of preference shares have participated and will participate in the financing of the restructuring costs and whether this participation is sufficient. It invites the Dutch authorities to provide more information on that issue. |
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130.

It seems that a small percentage of FBN capital (i.e. the preferred shares) is held by two private shareholders other than the State. This relates to the so-called FBNH Preferred Shares, which have been issued to a SPV (controlled by the Dutch State) in which two former holders of ABN Amro Holding preference shares participate. At this stage, the Commission doubts that these holders of preference shares have participated and will participate in the financing of the restructuring costs and whether this participation is sufficient. It invites the Dutch authorities to provide more information on that issue.

| 131. | The Commission is also not sure whether the aid is only used to cover costs related to the restoration of viability. It is the Commission's understanding that the new ABN Amro Group wants to re-develop a number of activities, which do no longer exist in ABN Amro N or in FBN as they remain respectively with the ABN Amro R (now owned by RBS) and with other parts of the former Fortis Holding (i.e. Fortis Bank Belgium (currently owned by BNP Paribas) or Fortis Holding which groups a number of insurance assets). Apparently the new group does not exclude small add-on acquisitions, for instance to rebuild an international network. In this regard, the Commission would refer to paragraph 23 of the Restructuring Communication. State aid cannot be used to finance market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process. Acquisitions or new investments cannot be financed through State aid unless this is essential for restoring an undertaking's viability. It seems therefore necessary that the Dutch authorities provide a detailed list of activities that ABN Amro Group expects to rebuild internally or to acquire in the framework of the restructuring plan and that it precisely justifies why these activities are necessary for the restoration of viability. At this stage, it seems that the Dutch authorities should commit that the bank will not make any acquisition other than acquisitions aiming at rebuilding those activities which are identified in that list as necessary for restoring viability. |
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131.

The Commission is also not sure whether the aid is only used to cover costs related to the restoration of viability. It is the Commission's understanding that the new ABN Amro Group wants to re-develop a number of activities, which do no longer exist in ABN Amro N or in FBN as they remain respectively with the ABN Amro R (now owned by RBS) and with other parts of the former Fortis Holding (i.e. Fortis Bank Belgium (currently owned by BNP Paribas) or Fortis Holding which groups a number of insurance assets). Apparently the new group does not exclude small add-on acquisitions, for instance to rebuild an international network. In this regard, the Commission would refer to paragraph 23 of the Restructuring Communication. State aid cannot be used to finance market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process. Acquisitions or new investments cannot be financed through State aid unless this is essential for restoring an undertaking's viability. It seems therefore necessary that the Dutch authorities provide a detailed list of activities that ABN Amro Group expects to rebuild internally or to acquire in the framework of the restructuring plan and that it precisely justifies why these activities are necessary for the restoration of viability. At this stage, it seems that the Dutch authorities should commit that the bank will not make any acquisition other than acquisitions aiming at rebuilding those activities which are identified in that list as necessary for restoring viability.

Measures limiting distortions of competition

| 132. | Paragraph 28 of the Restructuring Communication indicates the type of distortion of competition which may occur when State aid is provided in order to support financial stability in times of systemic crisis: “Where banks compete on the merits of their products and services, those which accumulate excessive risk and/or rely on unsustainable business models will ultimately lose market share and, possibly, exit the market while more efficient competitors expand on or enter the markets concerned. State aid prolongs past distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business models by artificially supporting the market power of beneficiaries. In this way it may create a moral hazard for the beneficiaries, while weakening the incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate.” |
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132.

Paragraph 28 of the Restructuring Communication indicates the type of distortion of competition which may occur when State aid is provided in order to support financial stability in times of systemic crisis: “Where banks compete on the merits of their products and services, those which accumulate excessive risk and/or rely on unsustainable business models will ultimately lose market share and, possibly, exit the market while more efficient competitors expand on or enter the markets concerned. State aid prolongs past distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business models by artificially supporting the market power of beneficiaries. In this way it may create a moral hazard for the beneficiaries, while weakening the incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate.”

| 133. | As explained in the decision of 3 December 2008, the difficulties of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A. followed from excessive risk taking in two well-identified areas: (i) Fortis Bank S.A. invested a large amount of money in structured credit; and (ii) Fortis Holding decided to purchase ABN Amro N at a very high price. As described in paragraph 28 of the Restructuring Communication, such banks accumulating excessive risk should normally lose market share and possibly exit the market. State aid granted to rescue such banks frustrate that normal functional of the market and create a moral hazard. In order to authorise aid to such banks, the Commission therefore requires a significant reduction of the market presence of the beneficiary. In this respect, the Commission observes that Fortis Holding has been cut into four: the Belgian and international insurance assets are still part of the listed Fortis Holding; Fortis Bank S.A. and GBL have been acquired by BNP Paribas; the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN Amro N); and the Dutch also acquired the insurance activities (37). In other words, Fortis Holding has been split in smaller entities and Fortis Bank S.A. itself has been cut into two parts. In its decisions of 3 December 2008 and 12 May 2009, the Commission observed on that basis and on the basis of other commitments that sufficient measures had been implemented to limit the distortion of competition created by the aid to Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A. |
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133.

As explained in the decision of 3 December 2008, the difficulties of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A. followed from excessive risk taking in two well-identified areas: (i) Fortis Bank S.A. invested a large amount of money in structured credit; and (ii) Fortis Holding decided to purchase ABN Amro N at a very high price. As described in paragraph 28 of the Restructuring Communication, such banks accumulating excessive risk should normally lose market share and possibly exit the market. State aid granted to rescue such banks frustrate that normal functional of the market and create a moral hazard. In order to authorise aid to such banks, the Commission therefore requires a significant reduction of the market presence of the beneficiary. In this respect, the Commission observes that Fortis Holding has been cut into four: the Belgian and international insurance assets are still part of the listed Fortis Holding; Fortis Bank S.A. and GBL have been acquired by BNP Paribas; the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN Amro N); and the Dutch also acquired the insurance activities (37). In other words, Fortis Holding has been split in smaller entities and Fortis Bank S.A. itself has been cut into two parts. In its decisions of 3 December 2008 and 12 May 2009, the Commission observed on that basis and on the basis of other commitments that sufficient measures had been implemented to limit the distortion of competition created by the aid to Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A.

| 134. | The Commission observes that the measures in favour of FBN and ABN Amro N assessed in the present decision have specific features which differ from other restructuring cases it had to deal with during the current crisis, including the aforementioned aid to Fortis Bank S.A. and Fortis Holding. In the present case, FBN and ABN Amro N do not need State aid because they took wrong management decisions, i.e. the need for State aid does not stem for instance from the accumulation of excessive risks in their investments or in their lending policy, or because they had undertaken an unsustainable pricing policy. As indicated above, the difficulty of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A. did not stem from risky lending or pricing policies in the retail banking, private banking or commercial banking activities, which were on the contrary profitable units (in other words, the activities of FBN and ABN Amro N were not at the basis of the problems of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A.). |
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134.

The Commission observes that the measures in favour of FBN and ABN Amro N assessed in the present decision have specific features which differ from other restructuring cases it had to deal with during the current crisis, including the aforementioned aid to Fortis Bank S.A. and Fortis Holding. In the present case, FBN and ABN Amro N do not need State aid because they took wrong management decisions, i.e. the need for State aid does not stem for instance from the accumulation of excessive risks in their investments or in their lending policy, or because they had undertaken an unsustainable pricing policy. As indicated above, the difficulty of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A. did not stem from risky lending or pricing policies in the retail banking, private banking or commercial banking activities, which were on the contrary profitable units (in other words, the activities of FBN and ABN Amro N were not at the basis of the problems of Fortis Holding and Fortis Bank S.A.).

| 135. | The need for State aid stems from the fact that, when separated from Fortis Bank S.A., these business units had a small capital base and could therefore not finance their separation costs and the costs related to the merger (merger remedies and integration costs). As indicated above, these investments will preserve and increase the value of the banks. In other words, they are rational from a financial point of view, as is confirmed by the fact that Fortis Bank S.A. intended to incur all these costs, which is a factor that the Commission should take into account when establishing the appropriate form of measures limiting distortions of competition. |
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135.

The need for State aid stems from the fact that, when separated from Fortis Bank S.A., these business units had a small capital base and could therefore not finance their separation costs and the costs related to the merger (merger remedies and integration costs). As indicated above, these investments will preserve and increase the value of the banks. In other words, they are rational from a financial point of view, as is confirmed by the fact that Fortis Bank S.A. intended to incur all these costs, which is a factor that the Commission should take into account when establishing the appropriate form of measures limiting distortions of competition.

| 136. | It cannot therefore be said that the aid “prolongs past distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business model”. Similarly, it does not “create moral hazard for the beneficiaries” since the beneficiaries (FBN and ABN Amro N) did not take excessive risk in the past. Consequently, the Commission considers that the aid to FBN and ABN Amro N is significantly less distortive than the aid approved in favour of financial institutions which had accumulated excessive risks. Since these banks did not take excessive risks and since the aid is necessary only to finance costs which are rational to incur in order to preserve and increase the value of these entities, the Commission considers on the basis of the information on the aid measures submitted at this stage that further divestitures for FBN or ABN Amro N (or from the entity which will result from their merger) are unlikely to be necessary. |
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136.

It cannot therefore be said that the aid “prolongs past distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business model”. Similarly, it does not “create moral hazard for the beneficiaries” since the beneficiaries (FBN and ABN Amro N) did not take excessive risk in the past. Consequently, the Commission considers that the aid to FBN and ABN Amro N is significantly less distortive than the aid approved in favour of financial institutions which had accumulated excessive risks. Since these banks did not take excessive risks and since the aid is necessary only to finance costs which are rational to incur in order to preserve and increase the value of these entities, the Commission considers on the basis of the information on the aid measures submitted at this stage that further divestitures for FBN or ABN Amro N (or from the entity which will result from their merger) are unlikely to be necessary.

| 137. | However, it needs to be ensured that the aid is not used by FBN and ABN Amro N to grow at the expense of competitors, for instance by implementing an unsustainable pricing policy or by acquiring other financial institutions. In that case, the aid would “weaken the incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate” and could undermine “incentives for cross-border activities” by discouraging entry in the Dutch market. |
| --- | --- |

137.

However, it needs to be ensured that the aid is not used by FBN and ABN Amro N to grow at the expense of competitors, for instance by implementing an unsustainable pricing policy or by acquiring other financial institutions. In that case, the aid would “weaken the incentives for non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate” and could undermine “incentives for cross-border activities” by discouraging entry in the Dutch market.

| 138. | Accordingly, it seems that behavioural measures to limit distortions of competition should be introduced. The Restructuring Communication (paragraph 44) states clearly that State aid should not be used to offer rates or conditions that cannot be matched by other competitors. In other words, it seems advisable to respect a price leadership commitment also in the restructuring phase (i.e. also after 31 July 2010). It is also clear that State aid should not be used to acquire competing businesses (paragraph 40). |
| --- | --- |

138.

Accordingly, it seems that behavioural measures to limit distortions of competition should be introduced. The Restructuring Communication (paragraph 44) states clearly that State aid should not be used to offer rates or conditions that cannot be matched by other competitors. In other words, it seems advisable to respect a price leadership commitment also in the restructuring phase (i.e. also after 31 July 2010). It is also clear that State aid should not be used to acquire competing businesses (paragraph 40).

| 139. | Moreover, given the repeated and massive intervention of the Dutch State in favour of Fortis Bank S.A., FBN and ABN Amro N, the public, and depositors in particular, might consider that the State will intervene again if further difficulties occur. Consumers might perceive the new entity ABN Amro Group to be a very safe bank, which might make it easier for the group to collect deposits. The Dutch government apparently wants to end this distortion of competition by selling the group to private investors as soon as this is practically feasible. The Dutch authorities have however not yet provided details on their exit strategy. |
| --- | --- |

139.

Moreover, given the repeated and massive intervention of the Dutch State in favour of Fortis Bank S.A., FBN and ABN Amro N, the public, and depositors in particular, might consider that the State will intervene again if further difficulties occur. Consumers might perceive the new entity ABN Amro Group to be a very safe bank, which might make it easier for the group to collect deposits. The Dutch government apparently wants to end this distortion of competition by selling the group to private investors as soon as this is practically feasible. The Dutch authorities have however not yet provided details on their exit strategy.

Conclusion on the compatibility under the Restructuring Communication

| 140. | The Commission doubts at this stage that the aid measures and the restructuring plan fulfil all the conditions laid down in the Restructuring Communication. The Dutch authorities are invited to present an updated plan which addresses the issues raised in this decision. |
| --- | --- |

140.

The Commission doubts at this stage that the aid measures and the restructuring plan fulfil all the conditions laid down in the Restructuring Communication. The Dutch authorities are invited to present an updated plan which addresses the issues raised in this decision.

4.3.   Compatibility of the alleged aid measures as rescue aid

| 141. | When assessing the measures as rescue aid, it needs to be verified whether they comply with the general principle of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. In particular, paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication indicates that all support measures have to be:






  — | well-targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy, |
| --- | --- | --- |

141.

When assessing the measures as rescue aid, it needs to be verified whether they comply with the general principle of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. In particular, paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication indicates that all support measures have to be:

—

well-targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy,

| — | proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what is required to attain this effect, and |
| --- | --- |

—

proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what is required to attain this effect, and

| — | designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill-over effects on competitors, other sectors and other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

—

designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill-over effects on competitors, other sectors and other Member States.

| 142. | The Commission considers the aid to be well-targeted. These measures are intrinsically linked to specific problems arising during the de-merger process of ABN Amro N and FBN from their respective parent companies and their subsequent merger. Without the aid, these operations cannot be effectuated. The de-merger of FBN from Fortis Holding was part of the rescue operation of the Fortis Holding approved by decision of 3 December 2008. The de-merger of ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Holding was already committed by Fortis Holding in the CSA in 2007 and the Dutch State, which took the place of Fortis Holding in the CSA, had no possibility to reverse this decision. The CSA obliges the consortium partners to take the measures needed to pursue the split of ABN Amro Holding in three parts. As regards the decision of the Dutch State to merge FBN and ABN Amro N, the Commission observes that the intention of Fortis Holding announced in 2007 when taking over ABN Amro N was to merge it with FBN. This illustrates that this integration is rational from an economic point of view. |
| --- | --- |

142.

The Commission considers the aid to be well-targeted. These measures are intrinsically linked to specific problems arising during the de-merger process of ABN Amro N and FBN from their respective parent companies and their subsequent merger. Without the aid, these operations cannot be effectuated. The de-merger of FBN from Fortis Holding was part of the rescue operation of the Fortis Holding approved by decision of 3 December 2008. The de-merger of ABN Amro N from ABN Amro Holding was already committed by Fortis Holding in the CSA in 2007 and the Dutch State, which took the place of Fortis Holding in the CSA, had no possibility to reverse this decision. The CSA obliges the consortium partners to take the measures needed to pursue the split of ABN Amro Holding in three parts. As regards the decision of the Dutch State to merge FBN and ABN Amro N, the Commission observes that the intention of Fortis Holding announced in 2007 when taking over ABN Amro N was to merge it with FBN. This illustrates that this integration is rational from an economic point of view.

| 143. | As regards limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the Commission considers that the current measures are strictly necessary to spin off ABN Amro N and pursue the merger. The Commission understands that there are a number of measures which might have a temporary character (e.g. Capital Protection Instrument + buffer of 500 million + part of the HBU-related State aid). The Commission accepts that the current measures are the minimum necessary to enable the de-merger, but this does not pre-judge the position that the Commission will take after 31 July 2010 on the issue of whether the aid is the minimum necessary in the restructuring phase and for instance whether it should not be reimbursed when synergies will translate into increased profits. |
| --- | --- |

143.

As regards limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the Commission considers that the current measures are strictly necessary to spin off ABN Amro N and pursue the merger. The Commission understands that there are a number of measures which might have a temporary character (e.g. Capital Protection Instrument + buffer of 500 million + part of the HBU-related State aid). The Commission accepts that the current measures are the minimum necessary to enable the de-merger, but this does not pre-judge the position that the Commission will take after 31 July 2010 on the issue of whether the aid is the minimum necessary in the restructuring phase and for instance whether it should not be reimbursed when synergies will translate into increased profits.

| 144. | State aid should not lead to undue distortions of competition. The Commission believes that safeguards against possible abuses and distortions of competition are necessary. The Commission notes that FBN and ABN Amro have repeatedly received State support in the past few months and that the total amount of State measures has become large (i.e. EUR 6,89 billion). In this context, it needs to be ensured that the banks are not using the State support to grow at the expense of competitors (38). Against this background, a price leadership clause seems warranted. The Commission has noted that ABN Amro N and FBN have taken the commitment to respect the following restrictions in terms of their pricing policy. ABN Amro N and FBN committed to a price leadership clause which implies that they will not be the market leader in a large number of products. A monitoring trustee will monitor whether the companies involved comply with these commitments. Moreover, the company has agreed to make a best effort to achieve the projections (including projected net interest revenues as presented to the Commission in the restructuring plan) (39). This should ensure that the bank does not implement unsustainable pricing policy at the expense of competitors, since the financial projections of the restructuring plan indicate an increasing net interest margin over time. |
| --- | --- |

144.

State aid should not lead to undue distortions of competition. The Commission believes that safeguards against possible abuses and distortions of competition are necessary. The Commission notes that FBN and ABN Amro have repeatedly received State support in the past few months and that the total amount of State measures has become large (i.e. EUR 6,89 billion). In this context, it needs to be ensured that the banks are not using the State support to grow at the expense of competitors (38). Against this background, a price leadership clause seems warranted. The Commission has noted that ABN Amro N and FBN have taken the commitment to respect the following restrictions in terms of their pricing policy. ABN Amro N and FBN committed to a price leadership clause which implies that they will not be the market leader in a large number of products. A monitoring trustee will monitor whether the companies involved comply with these commitments. Moreover, the company has agreed to make a best effort to achieve the projections (including projected net interest revenues as presented to the Commission in the restructuring plan) (39). This should ensure that the bank does not implement unsustainable pricing policy at the expense of competitors, since the financial projections of the restructuring plan indicate an increasing net interest margin over time.

CONCLUSION

| 145. | The Commission observes that the State measures are immediately necessary to allow the separation of FBN and ABN from their respective mother company. If this is not done, the Dutch State would be subject to high litigation risk from the consortium members, which are already complaining about the multiple delays. Above all, prolonging the current transition period, which has already been long, is destabilizing for ABN Amro N and FBN. It is therefore urgent to separate these banks from their mother companies and to clarify their structure, in order to allow these banks to fulfil their important role of financing of the Dutch economy. The Commission therefore considers that the measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C, D and E can be allowed as temporary rescue aid until 31 July 2010 on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

145.

The Commission observes that the State measures are immediately necessary to allow the separation of FBN and ABN from their respective mother company. If this is not done, the Dutch State would be subject to high litigation risk from the consortium members, which are already complaining about the multiple delays. Above all, prolonging the current transition period, which has already been long, is destabilizing for ABN Amro N and FBN. It is therefore urgent to separate these banks from their mother companies and to clarify their structure, in order to allow these banks to fulfil their important role of financing of the Dutch economy. The Commission therefore considers that the measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C, D and E can be allowed as temporary rescue aid until 31 July 2010 on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

5.   DECISION

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU, requests the Netherlands to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the measures, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission regrets that the Netherlands have put into force the measures subject to the NN 2/10, in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU.

The Commission has come to the conclusion that the measures which the Dutch authorities granted and intend to grant in the framework of the de-merger of ABN Amro N and FBN and in the framework of their merger (measures A, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C, D and E) are compatible with the internal market until 31 July 2010 as temporary rescue aid pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

The Netherlands have exceptionally accepted to receive the text of this Decision only in English.

The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty have become Articles 107 and 108 respectively of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The two sets of provisions are, in substance, identical. For the purposes of this Decision, references to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU should be understood as references to Articles 87 and 88 respectively, of the EC Treaty where appropriate.

1

(2)  Alleged aid to Fortis Bank Nederland and the ABN Amro Asset (OJ C 124, 4.6.2009, p. 19).

2

(3)  This figure includes the measures of EUR 2,5 billion which were notified in June 2009.

3

(4)  ABN Amro Holding is a financial holding company, which conducts its business almost entirely through its wholly owned subsidiary ABN Amro Bank NV or this company's own subsidiaries. For a detailed flowchart, please see paragraph 16 and 17.

4

(5)  RBS (38,28 %), Santander (27,91 %) and Fortis Holding (33,81 %).

5

(6)  For more details see the Commission decision dated 3 October 2007 in the merger case Fortis/ABN Amro Assets, case COMP/M.4844 (OJ C 265, 7.11.2007, p. 2).

6

(7)  New HBU contains the commercial bank HBU (Hollandsche Bank Unie), some ABN Amro sales offices (13 out of 78), some ABN Amro Corporate Client Units (2 out of 5) and the factoring subsidiary IFN.

7

(8)  “Preferred Banking” will target the mass affluent segment including households with annual income higher than EUR 50 000 and/or disposable assets between EUR 50 000 and EUR 1 million.

8

(9)  The latter already takes into account the divestment of New HBU.

9

(10)  For more details see the Commission decision dated 3 October 2007 in the merger case Fortis/ABN Amro Assets, case COMP/M.4844 (OJ C 265, 7.11.2007, p. 2).

10

(11)  For example, loans with a loan-to-foreclosure-value of more than 130 % or loans with an outstanding principal of more than EUR 1,5 million are excluded.

11

(12)  In their exchanges with the Commission, the Dutch authorities stated that DNB, on the basis of “the possibilities it has in case of acquisitions have permitted ABN Amro to work during a transition period towards the Basel II regimes of the acquiring entities” and that ABN Amro still worked under Basel I but only for capital requirements. This would not be in compliance with Article 157 of Directive 2006/48/EC. In light of the information provided by the Dutch authorities, the Commission will examine the matter and send an administrative letter asking them to indicate the basis on which this permission was given.

12

(13)  Measures B2, B3, B4 and B5 use the same MCS but the instrument will only be explained here.

13

(14)  See footnote 10.

14

(15)  In a letter dated 17 December 2009, the DNB wrote to the Commission that it informed FBN on 3 September 2009 on the results of its “Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 2009”. The DNB decided — based on the results of a stress test and taking into account the RWA-impact of the earlier rejection of PD and LGD-models — that FBN had a Tier 1 capital shortage of EUR 1,26 billion as at 31 December 2008. Simultaneously, the DNB has also set FBN a minimum Tier 1 ratio at 11,2 %.

15

(16)  See paragraph 17 of the decision of 8 April 2009 (see footnote 2).

16

(17)  http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_pricing_for_recapitalisationsen.pdf the CDS reference period is January 2007-August 2008

17

(18)  Note that ABN Amro N and ABN Amro Z have no separate legal status, which implies that the measures are still implemented at the level of ABN Amro Bank (which itself is a 100 % subsidiary of ABN Amro Holding).

18

(19)  The run-rate profit excludes transition costs and assumes that cost synergies were already accounted for the full year.

19

(20)  In a base case scenario, the net interest margin recovers to close to the 2008-level, while volumes increase in line with inflation. Personnel costs rise by 3,25 %, while other costs are up by 1,75 %. The base case assumes that all the planned capital injections of the State take place as agreed and it assumes no dividend payments.

20

(21)  Starting from a pro-forma figure of EUR 5,971 million, total revenues improve to EUR 6,751 million, EUR 7,362 million and 7,870 million in respectively 2010, 2011 and 2012. Net interest revenues move from EUR 3,896 million (pro forma 2009) over EUR 4,470 million and EUR 4,596 million in respectively 2010 and 2011 to EUR 4,751 million in 2012. In this context, it should be noted that net interest revenues for the combined group in 2008 still amounted to EUR 4,349 million. Also the accounting line “other revenues” is expected to increase substantially in the coming years (from EUR 46 million (2009 pro forma)) to EUR 232 million and EUR 569 million in 2010 and 2011 to EUR 781 million in 2012.

21

(22)  Direct costs should gradually decrease as a result of the synergies (EUR 5 293 million (pro forma 2009)), EUR 5 386 million (2010) and EUR 5,226 million (2011) and EUR 5 105 million (2012). Run-rate direct costs in 2012 should be even somewhat lower (i.e. EUR 4,956 million). Provisions should drop to EUR 1,141 million and EUR 729 million in respectively 2011 and 2012, down from EUR 1,153 million in both 2009 and 2010.

22

(23)  The company claims that this is in line with actual interest margins on new business.

23

(24)  BGL is one of the largest banks in Luxembourg and used to be a sister company of FBN in Fortis Holding. Since May 2009, BGL has become a member of the BNP Paribas group.

24

(25)  http://www.fortis.nl/dnn_site/Portals/0/Press-Release_PFS_18-12.pdf

25

(26)  Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8).

26

(27)  Communication from the Commission — The Recapitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2).

27

(28)  Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1).

28

(29)  See footnote 10.

29

(30)  Restructuring Aid to Fortis S.A./N.V. (OJ C 80, 3.4.2009, p. 8).

30

(31)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167.

31

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen

Commission

(32)  Cfr. paragraph 32 of the Restructuring Communication.

32

(33)  The Dutch authorities have shown that if the historical CDS of RBS is used, the results are the same. Using the historical CDS of RBS at first sight seems more appropriate, since ABN Amro Bank NV (to be renamed RBS NV) will be part of RBS and its probability of default depending on that group.

33

(34)  In line with paragraph 13 of the Restructuring Communication.

34

(35)  In line with paragraph 12 of the Restructuring Communication.

35

(36)  The sale of New HBU to Deutsche Bank included a so-called credit umbrella, which basically implies that ABN Amro II accepted — as part of the sale agreement with Deutsche — to guarantee 75 % of net credit losses on the existing loan portfolio (up to a maximum of EUR 1,6 billion). Obviously, this guarantee translates in additional capital requirements. Since a relatively large part of the loan portfolio (60-75 %) matures in the next five years (40 % even in the next year), the credit portfolio on which the credit umbrella applies will gradually decrease in size and so will the associated capital requirements.

36

(37)  These last two businesses are managed as separate entities and the Dutch authorities announced in November 2008 that they will not integrate them.

37

(38)  One competitor, commenting on the opening decision of 8 April 2009, has claimed that the two banks were using the State support to offer higher interest rates to depositors, at the expense of competitors. That will be part of the investigation during the opening.

38

(39)  Fortis Bank Nederland and ABN AMRO Bank (N-Share, ABN AMRO NL) and in future the relevant legal entity which will control both banks after their proposed concentration (“the Bank”) will each commit to the following behavioural constraints:

39

1.   Price leadership

Price leadership

Retail savings and deposit market:

Retail savings and deposit market:

Without prior authorisation of the Commission, among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch retail savings market, the Bank will not rank first (i.e. offer the most attractive price), with respect to standardised products in any of the following segments:

| 1. | saving accounts not accessible through branches (i.e. only accessible through Internet, phone and/or mail); |
| --- | --- |

1.

saving accounts not accessible through branches (i.e. only accessible through Internet, phone and/or mail);

| 2. | saving accounts accessible through branches; |
| --- | --- |

2.

saving accounts accessible through branches;

| 3. | term accounts with maturities up to 5 years not accessible through branches (i.e. only accessible through Internet, phone and/or mail); |
| --- | --- |

3.

term accounts with maturities up to 5 years not accessible through branches (i.e. only accessible through Internet, phone and/or mail);

| 4. | term accounts with maturities up to 5 years accessible through branches. |
| --- | --- |

4.

term accounts with maturities up to 5 years accessible through branches.

In case three financial institutions jointly rank first among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch retail savings market, the Bank is allowed to match the rate of these three financial institutions with respect to standardised products in the corresponding segment.

Residential mortgage market:

Residential mortgage market:

Without prior authorisation of the Commission, among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch retail mortgage market, the Bank will not rank first (i.e. offer the most attractive price) with respect to any standardised type of mortgage.

In case three financial institutions jointly rank first among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch retail mortgage market, the Bank is allowed to match the rate of these three financial institutions with respect to the corresponding standardised type of mortgage.

Private banking: savings and deposits

Private banking: savings and deposits

Without prior authorisation of the Commission, among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch private banking market, the Bank will not rank first (i.e. offer the most attractive price) with respect to standardised products for which public rates are available in any of the following segments:

| 1. | saving accounts; |
| --- | --- |

1.

saving accounts;

| 2. | term accounts with maturities up to 5 years. |
| --- | --- |

2.

term accounts with maturities up to 5 years.

This limitation will apply separately for each of the following categories of customers: customers with investable assets between EUR 1 million and EUR 10 million, and customers with investable assets of more than EUR 10 million.

In case three financial institutions jointly rank first among the ten financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the Dutch private banking market, the Bank is allowed to match the rate of these three financial institutions with respect to standardised products for which public rates are available in the corresponding segment.

Compliance

Compliance

The Bank shall on a permanent basis and at least every week monitor the conditions offered by the nine other financial institutions having the largest market share in volume on the respective Dutch market, to the extent these conditions are available in the public domain. As soon as the Bank detects that it offers a price for any of its products which is more favourable than the price to which it has committed for that product, the Bank shall immediately start the process of adjustment of the price of that product to a level in accordance with the commitments set out above and implement it as soon as possible. The adjustment will have been implemented no later than ten business days from the date at which the Bank detected the deviation from its commitments, unless the deviation concerns products for which the price can only be amended at the end of a month and the period between detection of the deviation by the Bank and the end of the month is less than ten working days, in which case the adjustment will be made prior to the end of the subsequent month at the latest.

2.   Projections

Projections

The Bank commits to make its best effort to achieve the projections (including net interest revenues) as presented to the Commission in the restructuring plan. On a quarterly basis, or within two weeks after the publication of quarterly financial results, the Bank will submit to the Commission a report explaining whether the achieved net interest revenues are in line with the aforementioned projections and, in case of deviations, which measures are contemplated by the Bank to correct that situation.

3.   Term and condition

Term and condition

The Bank will comply with the above described commitments during the period up to and including 28 February 2010.

The Bank will comply with the above described commitments in the period from 28 February 2010 until the end of the calendar year 2010, from the date a formal decision or formal statement from the Commission is received by the Bank reiterating the position of the Commission as previously communicated by the Commission to the Dutch State that the Commission will not request or impose any restructuring measures other than divestment of the HBU and IFN Divestment Businesses in connection with the acquisition of Fortis Bank Nederland and N-Share by the Dutch State from Fortis Bank SA/NV and the State aid, if any, provided by the Dutch State to ABN AMRO Bank since the acquisition by the Dutch State, provided that such State aid has been notified by the Dutch State to the Commission at the date of these commitments.

The commitments will expire at the date at which a definitive State aid decision is adopted.

4.   Monitoring Trustee

Monitoring Trustee

The Bank shall pre-select, in consultation with the Dutch State, and the Bank and the Dutch State shall appoint, subject to European Commission’s approval, a trustee in charge of the overall task of monitoring and ensuring, under European Commission’s instructions, compliance with the commitment set out under 1 (the “Monitoring Trustee”).

For that purpose the Bank shall invite two parties for pre-selection. The Bank will submit the selected Monitoring Trustee to the European Commission for approval, no later than one month from the decision date. The Monitoring Trustee shall be appointed within one week of the European Commission's approval in accordance with the mandate approved by the European Commission and shall report to the European Commission as to the Bank's compliance with the Commitments at least once every two months from the decision date.

The Bank shall provide and cause its advisors to provide to the Monitoring Trustee all such co-operation, assistance and information as it may reasonably require to perform its tasks, including the possibility to appoint advisors. The Monitoring Trustee shall be remunerated by the Bank, in a way that does not impede the independent and effective fulfilment of its mandate.

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ALTE ACTE

Comisia Europeană

| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/29

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Publicarea unei cereri în temeiul articolului 6 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 al Consiliului privind protecția indicațiilor geografice și a denumirilor de origine ale produselor agricole și alimentare

2010/C 95/08

Prezenta publicare conferă dreptul de opoziție la cererea de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 7 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 510/2006 al Consiliului (1). Declarațiile de opoziție trebuie să parvină Comisiei în termen de șase luni de la data prezentei publicări.

DOCUMENT UNIC

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 510/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

„SALZWEDELER BAUMKUCHEN”

NR. CE: DE-PGI-0005-0733-15.12.2008

IGP ( X ) DOP ( )

1.   Denumire:

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”

2.   Statul membru sau țara terță:

Germania

3.   Descrierea produsului agricol sau alimentar:

3.1.   Tip de produs:

| Clasa 2.4 | Produse de panificație, patiserie, cofetărie și biscuiți |
| --- | --- |

Clasa 2.4

Produse de panificație, patiserie, cofetărie și biscuiți

3.2.   Descrierea produsului căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 1:

Prăjitură cilindrică stratificată, alcătuită din straturi individuale inegale și prezentând o margine dantelată neregulată. Una dintre caracteristicile produsului „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” o constituie dispunerea aluatului copt în straturi succesive, fapt care conferă prăjiturii, la tăiere, aspectul unor „inele de copac”. Înălțimea unei „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” poate fi de cel mult 90 cm, iar diametrul de până la 40 cm. Pe dinăuntru, de-a lungul axei longitudinale, produsul „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este gol, diametrul cavității putând ajunge la 20 cm. Greutatea unei prăjituri variază între 2 și 5 kg.

În general, „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” nu se servește ca o bucată întreagă, ci tăiată în inele individuale, a căror înălțime se situează de obicei între 5 și 50 cm, iar greutatea între 200 și 4 000 g. Cel mai adesea, greutatea variază între 300 și 500 g. Există, de asemenea, și așa-numitele „Baumkuchenspitzen”, adică mici bucăți trapezoidale cu latura cea mai lungă de aproximativ 4 cm și grosimea de 1 cm.

În funcție de tipul de glazură folosit, există următoarele tipuri de astfel de prăjitură:

| — | „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură fondantă; |
| --- | --- |

—

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură fondantă;

| — | „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată neagră; |
| --- | --- |

—

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată neagră;

| — | „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată albă; |
| --- | --- |

—

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată albă;

| — | „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată cu lapte și |
| --- | --- |

—

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” cu glazură din ciocolată cu lapte și

| — | „Baumkuchenspitzen” acoperite cu ciocolată (neagră, albă sau cu lapte). |
| --- | --- |

—

„Baumkuchenspitzen” acoperite cu ciocolată (neagră, albă sau cu lapte).

Compoziția

1 kg de unt sau unt concentrat, 1 kg de făină, pudră de grâu, amidon de grâu sau amidon de porumb, pentru compoziția utilizată la fabricarea industrială

Între 0,8 și 1 kg de gălbenuș de ou sau un număr echivalent de gălbenușuri de ou

Între 0,8 și 1 kg de albuș de ou sau un număr echivalent de albușuri de ou

Între 0,8 și 1 kg de zahăr

Arome naturale (în funcție de practica firmei producătoare)

Gem de caise (opțional)

Glazură fondantă sau glazură din ciocolată

Fără conservanți

Fără praf de copt sau agenți de coacere.

Prin folosirea ingredientelor de mai sus, se obține un produs final cu o greutate variind între aproximativ 3,5 și 4 kg.

Criterii de calitate

| Aspect extern | : | formă atrăgătoare, margine ușor dantelată (cu excepția produsului „Baumkuchenspitzen”); glazură netedă, bine întinsă, lucioasă și curată. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Formă (unei prăjituri întregi) | : | lungimea între 60 și 90 cm, diametrul exterior între 12 și 40 cm, diametrul interior între 6 și 20 cm |
| Glazură | : | glazură fondantă din zahăr, ciocolată neagră, ciocolată cu lapte sau ciocolată albă |
| Culoare | : | alb-crem, cafeniu deschis sau cafeniu închis, în funcție de glazură |
| Consistență | : | textură pufoasă regulată, cu bucățele de miez ușor însiropate |
| Aspect intern | : | straturi de culoare maro-auriu, de dimensiuni regulate |

Aspect extern

:

formă atrăgătoare, margine ușor dantelată (cu excepția produsului „Baumkuchenspitzen”); glazură netedă, bine întinsă, lucioasă și curată.

Formă (unei prăjituri întregi)

:

lungimea între 60 și 90 cm, diametrul exterior între 12 și 40 cm, diametrul interior între 6 și 20 cm

Glazură

:

glazură fondantă din zahăr, ciocolată neagră, ciocolată cu lapte sau ciocolată albă

Culoare

:

alb-crem, cafeniu deschis sau cafeniu închis, în funcție de glazură

Consistență

:

textură pufoasă regulată, cu bucățele de miez ușor însiropate

Aspect intern

:

straturi de culoare maro-auriu, de dimensiuni regulate

3.3.   Materii prime (numai pentru produsele prelucrate):

—

3.4.   Hrană pentru animale (numai pentru produsele de origine animală):

—

3.5.   Etape specifice ale producției care trebuie să se desfășoare în aria geografică delimitată:

Produsul „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” trebuie produs în întregime în aria geografică delimitată.

3.6.   Norme specifice privind felierea, răzuirea, ambalarea etc.:

—

3.7.   Norme specifice privind etichetarea:

Pe eticheta produsului comercializat trebuie să se indice ingredientele, greutatea și producătorul, precizându-se codul poștal, localitatea și strada unde acesta își are sediul.

3.8   Delimitare concisă a ariei greografice:

Aria geografică acoperă teritoriul orașului Salzwedel, în limitele sale din 2006.

4.   Legătura cu aria geografică:

4.1.   Specificitatea ariei geografice:

În 1807, cofetarul Johann Andreas Schernikow a scris o rețetă pentru prăjitura „Baumkuchen”. Tehnica de obținere și compoziția descrise de acesta stau și astăzi la baza procesului de fabricare a acestei prăjituri de către cea mai veche fabrică de „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”. În jurul anului 1812, Schernikow a primit titlul de cetățean de onoare al orașului Salzwedel.

Conform unor documente datând din prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, în Salzwedel se fabrica o prăjitură cilindrică, sub forma unui trunchi de copac. Anul 1843 marchează prima mențiune oficială a produsului „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”.

Industrializarea accelerată din cea de a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea a dus la creșterea numărului celor care făceau parte din clasa mijlocie bogată și care își permiteau să cumpere delicatese culinare provenind din alte regiuni. În Salzwedel, un grup de brutari și cofetari întreprinzători au profitat de ocazie și, beneficiind de experiența locală în fabricarea „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”, au început să producă acest tip de prăjitură cu intenția să o exporte către regiuni mai îndepărtate (Berlin, Hanovra, regiuni ale Germaniei centrale și chiar Viena și Sankt Petersburg). Astfel a început fabricarea în cantități semnificative a prăjiturii „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”, faima sa răspândindu-se în întreaga Germanie și dincolo de teritoriul acesteia. Chiar dacă nu există informații concludente în acest sens, un lucru este sigur – niciun alt oraș din Germania nu ar fi putut produce o cantitate atât de mare din această prăjitură în perioada care a marcat sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea și începutul Primului Război Mondial, precum și în perioada interbelică. Majoritatea producției era destinată exportului, între 80 și 90 % din cantitatea produsă fiind livrată către alte regiuni.

Încă de pe atunci, consumatorii considerau „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” ca fiind un produs deosebit, care nu putea proveni decât din orașul Salzwedel și care era foarte diferit de prăjiturile sub formă de trunchi de copac fabricate în alte regiuni, datorită caracteristicilor sale specifice rezultate în urma metodei speciale de fabricare și a folosirii unei anumite compoziții.

După pauzele de producție generate de cele două războaie mondiale, fabricarea prăjiturii „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” a fost reluată treptat în perioada ulterioară celui de Al Doilea Război Mondial. Experiența producătorilor și lunga tradiție a orașului Salzwedel în fabricarea acestui produs au făcut ca „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” să își recâștige faima, în pofida exproprierii din 1958 a celui mai important producător în domeniu. Cu excepția crizei ingredientelor, care a condus la necesitatea de a înlocui o parte din unt cu margarină, compoziția și metoda de producție nu s-au schimbat în niciun fel. La fel ca în perioada precedentă, producția de „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” era în mare parte destinată exportului. Sub denumirea de „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”, zeci de mii de asemenea prăjituri au luat calea exportului, în special în țările vestice.

4.2.   Specificitatea produsului:

Prăjitura „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este o specialitate regională de patiserie cu tradiție îndelungată, deosebit de apreciată de consumatori și binecunoscută în afara regiunii Salzwedel.

Timp de aproape 200 de ani, prăjitura „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” a fost fabricată în Salzwedel și, începând cu a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea, comercializată în întreaga Germanie și dincolo de granițele acesteia (a se vedea Deutschland Spezialitätenküche, ed. Christine Metzger, 1999, p. 46). Ingredientele și procesul de fabricare foarte costisitoare situează produsul în gama produselor scumpe. Metoda de fabricare era aceeași în toate patiseriile: „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este o prăjitură stratificată, coaptă la foc deschis. Aluatul se aplică cu un polonic, strat peste strat, pe un ax rotativ. De asemenea, principalele ingrediente sunt aceleași în toate patiseriile producătoare.

Prăjitura se servește și astăzi la ocazii speciale, precum Crăciunul, Paștele sau la aniversarea zilelor de naștere. Calitatea superioară a ingredientelor a făcut ca, în timpul celor două războaie mondiale, respectiv între 1914-1918 și între 1939-1948, producția de „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” să fie periodic sistată.

Ingredientele și metoda de fabricare au rămas neschimbate timp de aproximativ 150 de ani. Conservanții, pasteurizarea și congelarea sunt în continuare evitate, „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” fiind un produs de patiserie proaspăt.

Deja în 1883, Dietrichs și Parisius scriau (în Bilder aus der Altmark, ed. J. F. Richter, Hamburg): „Amatorii de delicatese preferă de departe «Salzwedeler Baumkuchen» prăjiturilor cu același nume fabricate în alte regiuni, această prăjitură fiind deja pe cale să își stabilească o reputație mondială. Mii de lăzi cu această prăjitură delicioasă părăsesc deja patiseriile pentru a lua calea poștei spre a fi astfel expediate nu doar în întreaga Germanie, ci și, deseori, în Rusia și America, unde fac deliciul consumatorului autohton.”

Într-un articol intitulat Was weiß man vom Salzwedeler Baumkuchen? (Ce știm despre „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”?) și apărut în publicația aniversară 100 Jahre Salzwedeler Wochenblatt (1932, p. 113), se regăsește următorul citat:

„Dacă le spuneți oamenilor că sunteți din Salzwedel, în 99 de cazuri din 100 aceștia vor replica «Așadar sunteți din același oraș ca și prăjiturile Baumkuchen!»”

Tradiția și buna reputație de care s-a bucurat fără întrerupere această prăjitură reies și din rezultatele unui chestionar cu privire la „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” desfășurat în 2005, cu ocazia Săptămânii Verzi Internaționale de la Berlin. Din cei 500 de respondenți, 60,6 % auziseră sau citiseră despre denumirea „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”, iar 92 % dintre aceștia din urmă credeau că „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este produsă în exclusivitate în Salzwedel, afirmând totodată, în 81 % dintre cazuri, că acordă o importanță deosebită originii acestui produs atunci când îl achiziționează.

„Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este parte integrantă din tradițiile și obiceiurile regionale de aproape 100 de ani încoace. S-au compus cântece și s-au scris poezii având ca subiect „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”, această prăjitură ocupând un rol primordial în diversele ceremonii desfășurate la nivel regional. Astăzi, „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” reprezintă o importantă atracție turistică, turiștii având posibilitatea de a asista la procesul de obținere în cadrul anumitor patiserii care organizează vizite în acest sens. Începând din 2004, în cinstea „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” se organizează un festival, și tot de atunci se alege anual și așa-numita Baumkuchenkönigin (regina „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen”).

De asemenea, ghidurile turistice naționale (ca de exemplu Baedecker Deutschland, 1998, p. 98) și materialele publicitare prezintă „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” ca specialitate tradițională specifică orașului Salzwedel.

4.3.   Legătura cauzală dintre aria geografică și calitatea sau caracteristicile produsului (pentru DOP) sau o calitate anume, reputația sau alte caracteristici ale produsului (pentru IGP):

Reputația deosebită de care se bucură prăjitura „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” se bazează, mai presus de toate, pe tradiția îndelungată de fabricare a acestui produs în orașul Salzwedel, pe iscusința dobândită de producători și pe calitatea superioară a produsului, la care se adaugă legătura inextricabilă cu viața culturală a orașului, cunoscut și sub denumirea de orașul „Baumkuchen” (a se vedea Deutschland Spezialitätenküche, op. cit.) Așadar, „Salzwedeler Baumkuchen” este o specialitate regională a cărei reputație se datorează în mare parte legăturii strânse pe care o are cu orașul de origine, Salzwedel.

Trimitere la publicarea caietului de sarcini:

Caietul de sarcini este publicat în întregime în:

Markenblatt Vol. 28 din 11.7.2008, Partea 7a-aa, p. 42842

(http://publikationen.dpma.de/DPMApublikationen/dld_gd_file.do?id=581)

---

(1)  JO L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12.

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| 15.4.2010 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 95/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2010

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 95/34

---

Publicarea unei cereri de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 8 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006 al Consiliului privind specialitățile tradiționale garantate din produse agricole și alimentare

2010/C 95/09

Prezenta publicare conferă dreptul de opoziție la cererea de înregistrare în temeiul articolului 9 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006 al Consiliului (1). Declarațiile de opoziție trebuie să parvină Comisiei în termen de șase luni de la data prezentei publicări.

CERERE DE ÎNREGISTRARE A UNEI STG

REGULAMENTUL (CE) NR. 509/2006 AL CONSILIULUI

„SPIŠSKÉ PÁRKY”

NR. CE: SK-TSG-0007-0051-18.1.2007

1.   Denumirea și adresa grupului solicitant:

| Denumire: | Slovenský zväz spracovateľov mäsa |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Kukučínova 22 |
| 831 03 Bratislava |
| SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA |

Denumire:

Slovenský zväz spracovateľov mäsa

Adresă:

Kukučínova 22

831 03 Bratislava

SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA

Tel.

+421 255565162

Fax

+421 255565162

E-mail:

slovmaso@slovmaso.sk

| Denumire: | Český svaz zpracovatelu masa |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Libušská 319 |
| 142 00 Praha 4 – Písnice |
| ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA |

Denumire:

Český svaz zpracovatelu masa

Adresă:

Libušská 319

142 00 Praha 4 – Písnice

ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA

Tel.

+420 244092404

Fax

+420 244092405

E-mail:

reditel@cszm.cz

2.   Statul membru sau țara terță:

Republica Slovacă

Republica Cehă

3.   Caietul de sarcini al produsului:

3.1.   Denumirea (denumirile) care urmează să fie înregistrată (înregistrate):

„Spišské párky” (SK, CS)

3.2.   Denumirea:

| | este specifică în sine |
| --- | --- |
|  | exprimă caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar |

Image

este specifică în sine



exprimă caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar

Denumirea „Spišské párky” este specifică în sine deoarece este cunoscută și utilizată atât pe teritoriul Republicii Cehe, cât și pe teritoriul Republicii Slovace, și deoarece se bucură de notorietate și de o tradiție îndelungată care o asociază unui tip specific de „párky”.

3.3.   A se indica dacă s-a solicitat rezervarea denumirii solicitate în conformitate cu articolul 13 alineatul (2) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 509/2006:

| | Înregistrare cu rezervarea denumirii |
| --- | --- |
|  | Înregistrare fără rezervarea denumirii |

Image

Înregistrare cu rezervarea denumirii



Înregistrare fără rezervarea denumirii

3.4.   Tip de produs:

| Clasa 1.2. | Produse din carne (preparată, sărată, afumată etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clasa 1.2.

Produse din carne (preparată, sărată, afumată etc.)

3.5.   Descrierea produsului agricol sau alimentar căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 3.1:

„Spišské párky” sunt crenvurști în intestine de oaie cu diametrul de maximum 24 mm, segmentați prin răsucire. Crenvurștii cântăresc aproximativ 50 g fiecare și sunt de culoare roz înspre roșu, deoarece conțin boia; se caracterizează prin gustul ușor iute.

Proprietăți fizice

Șir de crenvurști, segmentați prin răsucire, lung de câțiva metri.

Proprietăți chimice

Conținut de grăsime: maximum 24 % ± 4 %

Conținut de sare: maximum 2 % ± 0,4 %

Conținut de proteine în masa musculară de minimum 10 % din greutate.

Caracteristici organoleptice

—   aspect exterior și culoare: produsul este un șir de crenvurști, în membrană naturală de oaie, cu diametrul de maximum 24 mm, dimensionați prin răsucire; membrana este netedă sau ușor încrețită, de culoare cărămizie, lucioasă sau mată;

—   aspect și culoare la feliere: culoare roz înspre roșu, datorată condimentării cu boia; sunt admise particule mici de colagen;

—   miros și gust: aromă plăcută de produs de mezelărie proaspăt afumat, ușor picant, potrivit de sărat suculent, atunci când este încălzit;

—   consistență: moale până la compactă.

3.6.   Descrierea metodei de producție a produsului agricol sau alimentar căruia i se aplică denumirea de la punctul 3.1:

Pentru obținerea produsului „Spišské párky” se folosesc următoarele ingrediente: carne proaspătă de vită cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 %, carne proaspătă de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 %, carne proaspătă de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 50 %, șorici, apă potabilă, amestec de sărare cu nitrit, boia dulce (100 ASTA), boia iute, polifosfați E 450 și E 451 (3 g/kg ca P2O5), acid ascorbic E 300 (0,5 g/kg) și membrane naturale (intestin subțire de oaie).

Pentru 100 kg de produs finit, compoziția este următoarea:

| — | carne de vită cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 % | 21,2 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | carne de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 % | 21,0 kg |
| — | carne de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 50 % | 38,0 kg |
| — | șorici | 12,0 kg |
| — | apă potabilă | 21,0 kg |
| — | amestec de sărare cu nitrit (pentru carne) | 2,1 kg |
| — | boia dulce (100 ASTA) | 0,62 kg |
| — | boia iute | 0,62 kg |
| — | polifosfați (E 450 și E 451) | 0,30 kg |
| — | acid ascorbic (E 300) | 0,05 kg |
| — | membrană – intestin de oaie | |

—

carne de vită cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 %

21,2 kg

—

carne de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 10 %

21,0 kg

—

carne de porc cu un conținut de grăsime inferior sau egal cu 50 %

38,0 kg

—

șorici

12,0 kg

—

apă potabilă

21,0 kg

—

amestec de sărare cu nitrit (pentru carne)

2,1 kg

—

boia dulce (100 ASTA)

0,62 kg

—

boia iute

0,62 kg

—

polifosfați (E 450 și E 451)

0,30 kg

—

acid ascorbic (E 300)

0,05 kg

—

membrană – intestin de oaie

Procedeul de preparare

Se fasonează carnea de vită și carnea de porc, apoi se toacă fin cu o mașină de tocat sau se taie mărunt cu o mașină de tăiat carne. După ce se adaugă șoriciul, materiile prime se malaxează pentru a forma un amestec omogen cu granulația foarte fină. Se adaugă apoi un amestec format din boia dulce și boia iute și un amestec de sărare cu nitrit în care se pun aditivi (polifosfați E 450 și E 451, precum și acid ascorbic E 300). Amestecul se introduce în membrană naturală de oaie cu diametrul inferior sau egal cu 24 mm. Crenvurștii se dimensionează prin răsucire, în așa fel încât fiecare crenvurșt să cântărească aproximativ 50 g. Șirurile de crenvurști se agață pe niște tije, în afumătoare, pentru uscarea și afumarea produsului. Afumarea se efectuează la cald, la o temperatură maximă de 68 °C și durează cel mult 45 de minute. Crenvurștii afumați sunt apoi aduși la o temperatură de 71-76 °C pentru ca în interiorul produsului temperatura să ajungă la minimum 70 °C, temperatură care trebuie menținută cel puțin 10 minute. După acest tratament termic, crenvurștii se clătesc cu apă rece și se lasă să se răcească până când temperatura din interiorul produsului ajunge la maximum 4 °C.

3.7.   Caracterul specific al produsului agricol sau alimentar:

Caracterul specific al produsului „Spišské párky” este dat de următorii parametri:

| — | compoziție, proporția de materii prime și proporția de condimente; |
| --- | --- |

—

compoziție, proporția de materii prime și proporția de condimente;

| — | consistența fină și omogenă a amestecului; |
| --- | --- |

—

consistența fină și omogenă a amestecului;

| — | utilizarea membranei naturale de oaie; |
| --- | --- |

—

utilizarea membranei naturale de oaie;

| — | proprietățile fizice și chimice, proprietățile organoleptice. |
| --- | --- |

—

proprietățile fizice și chimice, proprietățile organoleptice.

Compoziția, proporția de materii prime și proporția de condimente, consistența fină și omogenă a amestecului

Caracterul specific al produsului „Spišské párky” este rezultatul utilizării materiilor prime conform unei rețete foarte vechi, și anume: carne de vită și carne de porc malaxată cu șoriciul pentru a forma un amestec omogen și fin, cu o consistență mult mai fină decât cea a amestecurilor folosite pentru alte tipuri de crenvurști. O altă caracteristică a rețetei este utilizarea unui amestec de boia dulce și iute.

Utilizarea membranei naturale de oaie

Faptul că „Spišské párky” sunt prezentați în intestine de oaie constituie o particularitate care îi deosebește de la bun început de alți crenvurști.

Proprietățile fizice și chimice și proprietățile organoleptice

Respectarea tuturor etapelor de producție stabilite în caietul de sarcini asigură obținerea unor crenvurști cu savoare inimitabilă.

Pentru pregătirea la cald a crenvurștilor înainte de a fi consumați trebuie respectate cerințe specifice. Apa în care se fierb nu trebuie să clocotească, deoarece s-ar putea rupe membrana naturală și atunci produsul nu mai are suculența care îi este caracteristică. Trăsătura caracteristică a crenvurștilor „Spišské párky” fierți este că sunt suculenți și că au un gust ușor picant datorită condimentării cu boia. Atunci când sunt respectate cu strictețe proporțiile necesare de materii prime, „Spišské párky” produc un sunet caracteristic atunci când sunt rupți în bucăți sau când se mușcă din ei, ceea ce îi deosebește de toate celelalte tipuri de crenvurști.

3.8.   Caracterul tradițional al produsului agricol sau alimentar:

În Slovacia, producția de „Spišské párky” datează de mai bine de o sută de ani. Această tradiție a intrat în istorie atunci când măcelarul Štefan Varsányi din Spišské Podhradie, profitând de faptul că nobilimea maghiară venea frecvent la marile târguri care aveau loc la castelul Spiš, a luat hotărârea să vândă cu această ocazie „Spišské párky”. Rețeta lui, care se baza pe un amestec subtil de mirodenii, de boia dulce și iute, a avut fără îndoială succes, deoarece Štefan Varsányi a început să-și vândă crenvurștii în Ungaria și în Polonia.

Exportul crenvurștilor „Spišské párky” a fost facilitat, printre altele, de construirea căii ferate Košice-Bohumín, precum și a ramificației care ducea la Spišské Vláchy și la Spišské Podhradie. Crenvurștii erau ambalați în zori în cutii speciale și erau expediați la Spišské Podhradie cu primul tren, astfel încât, la Budapesta, consumatorii pofticioși îi puteau avea în farfurie după-amiaza. [František Žifcák, Kronika mesta Spišské Podhradie slovom i obrazom („Cronica orașului Spišské Podhradie în cuvinte și imagini”), Mesto Spišské Podhradie, 1988].

Un cunoscut scriitor slovac, Emo Bohúň, veritabil amator de „Spišské párky”, îi descria astfel: „«Spišské párky» erau niște pușlamale răutăcioase care îți jucau tot felul de feste. Nu trebuiau în nici un caz mâncați cu furculița și cuțitul, nici nu trebuia să îi rupi ca pe ceilalți crenvurști („viršle”). Trebuia să îi iei între degete și să îi aduci în gură, apucându-i bine cu buzele înainte să poți mușca din ei. Aveau atât de mult suc de boia sub pieliță, încât dacă îi rupeai, îi tăiai sau îi înțepai cu furculița ar fi țâșnit din ei un jet de suc roșu înalt de o sută de metri. Ar fi putut tot atât de bine servi drept furtunuri de stropit sau stingătoare pentru pompieri.” [Žáry, Štefan, Zlatoústi rozprávači („Povestitori care vorbeau despre aur”) Bratislava, Slovenský spisovateľ 1984].

Până în 1938, în afară de Štefan Varsányi mai produceau „Spišské párky” măcelari cum ar fi: Grieger și Blaško la Spišské Podhradie, Slavkovský la Spišské Vlachy, Schretter, Schmiedt, Patrilla și Lešňák la Levoča etc. În anii '40 ai secolului trecut, la Spišské Podhradie aveau loc, în fiecare joi, renumite târguri de porci și se obișnuia ca, după încheierea vânzărilor și cumpărărilor, neguțătorii și clienții să meargă la vreuna din cârciumile (care aparțineau măcelarilor) și să comande „viršle”, cum erau numiți în acea vreme „Spišské párky”. Aceștia se vindeau de asemenea în toate gările. De îndată ce trenul se oprea la peron se și auzeau vânzătorii strigând: „Spišské pááááááááááááárky, viršle, viršličky ...!” („Viršle, viršlièky, spišské ...”, cotidianul SME, Bratislava, Petit Press, 7.9.1996, p. 7).

„Spišské párky” sunt renumiți nu numai în regiunea Spiš, în Slovacia și în Republica Cehă, ci și în străinătate („Viršle, viršlièky, spišské ...”, cotidianul SME, Bratislava, Petit Press, 7.9.1996, p. 7). Președintele cehoslovac T. G. Masaryk și contele Albín Csáky, președintele senatului ungar și ministru al educației și al culturii, obișnuiau să consume „Spišské párky”. Persoană cu influență, contele avea grijă ca la întrunirile guvernului din Ungaria să fie serviți întotdeauna „Spišské párky” (http://www.internet.sk/mediakurier/cei/44.htm). Se găseau întotdeauna, și se găsesc și astăzi, „Spišské párky” în localurile din Cehia [http://www.inzine.sk/article.asp?art=4214 Pišťanek Peter, Ako som kupoval zámok („Cum am cumpărat un castel”) Zámockým pánom rýchlo ľahko a rýchlo. 26.10.2000)]. De asemenea, se consumau de obicei „Spišské párky” cu ocazia Zilei Internaționale a Muncii [Upršaný Prvý máj na košickom sídlisku železiarov („Un 1 Mai ploios în orașul muncitorilor siderurgiști Košice”), cotidianul SME, Bratislava, Petit Press, 2.5.1997, p. 1], aceștia începând să apară la diferite târguri, cum este târgul de artă populară de la Spišská Nová Ves („Trh ľudových remesiel”), unde erau prezentați nu numai „Spišské párky”, ci și vesela ingenioasă, aproape uitată, în care se serveau aceștia. Este vorba de un recipient din ceramică, dotat cu fund dublu în care se punea apă fierbinte astfel încât crenvurștii să stea calzi mai mult timp [Česť spišských remeselníkov zachraňovali Košičania na stoloch („Locuitorii orașului Košice au salvat, la masa lor, onoarea meșterilor artizani din Spiš”) cotidianul SME, Bratislava, Petit Press, 23.9.1997, p. 1].

După cel de Al Doilea Război Mondial, în cadrul standardizării și păstrării calității produselor tradiționale, pe întreg teritoriul cehoslovac a fost adoptată o normă prin care se stabilea compoziția crenvurștilor și se limitau modurile de producție ale acestora (Standardul de calitate TP, 8.9.1954, Ministerul Industriei Alimentare).

Se poate constata, pe baza surselor istorice, că rețeta produsului a evoluat întrucâtva, prin adăugarea cărnii de vită, dar acest lucru nu a schimbat nici natura produsului, nici modul în care este consumat; dimpotrivă, această nouă combinație de ingrediente i-a ameliorat gustul (ÚNK 57 7260, 1964).

Suculența după încălzire, precum și gustul ușor picant rezultat din condimentarea cu boia constituie caracteristicile constante ale produsului. Rețeta este utilizată încă și astăzi de producătorii de „Spišské párky” (standardul CSN 57 71 34 din 1977 și apoi standardul STN 57 71 34).

Pentru produsul „Spišské párky” se utilizează tradițional intestine de oaie (măcelarul Štefan Varsányi, standardul de calitate TP, 8.9.1954, Ministerul Industriei Alimentare), care sunt foarte fragile față de alte membrane naturale. Acestea sunt renumite nu numai în Slovacia și în Republica Cehă, ci și în străinătate.

3.9.   Cerințele minime și proceduri pentru verificarea caracterului specific:

Controlul obligatoriu include:

| — | verificarea respectării proporțiilor stabilite pentru carnea de vită, carnea de porc și șorici; pentru producerea crenvurștilor „Spišské párky” trebuie controlată prepararea cărnii de vită și de porc, în sensul alegerii materiilor prime, precum și cantitatea de carne în funcție de procentul de grăsime; |
| --- | --- |

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verificarea respectării proporțiilor stabilite pentru carnea de vită, carnea de porc și șorici; pentru producerea crenvurștilor „Spišské párky” trebuie controlată prepararea cărnii de vită și de porc, în sensul alegerii materiilor prime, precum și cantitatea de carne în funcție de procentul de grăsime;

| — | după fasonarea cărnii de vită și de porc, are loc controlul adaosului de șorici; |
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—

după fasonarea cărnii de vită și de porc, are loc controlul adaosului de șorici;

| — | controlul consistenței și omogenității amestecului; este vorba de un control vizual și tactil al omogenității și al consistenței fine ale amestecului obținut; |
| --- | --- |

—

controlul consistenței și omogenității amestecului; este vorba de un control vizual și tactil al omogenității și al consistenței fine ale amestecului obținut;

| — | respectarea proporției stabilite pentru boia dulce și boia iute, cu intensitatea culorii de 100 ASTA; se verifică adăugarea cantității de amestec format din boia dulce (100 ASTA) și boia iute, a amestecului de sărare cu nitrit, inclusiv aditivii (polifosfați E 450 și E 451 și acid ascorbic E 300) și cantitatea necesară de apă; |
| --- | --- |

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respectarea proporției stabilite pentru boia dulce și boia iute, cu intensitatea culorii de 100 ASTA; se verifică adăugarea cantității de amestec format din boia dulce (100 ASTA) și boia iute, a amestecului de sărare cu nitrit, inclusiv aditivii (polifosfați E 450 și E 451 și acid ascorbic E 300) și cantitatea necesară de apă;

| — | controlul utilizării membranei naturale de oaie; acesta se efectuează pe baza notei de livrare de la furnizor; |
| --- | --- |

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controlul utilizării membranei naturale de oaie; acesta se efectuează pe baza notei de livrare de la furnizor;

| — | proprietățile organoleptice ale produsului finit (aspect exterior și culoare, aspect și culoare la feliere, consistență, miros și gust): este vorba de un control vizual și de o analiză senzorială, efectuate după terminarea procesului de producție pentru a verifica trăsăturile specifice menționate la punctul 3.5. din caietul de sarcini; |
| --- | --- |

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proprietățile organoleptice ale produsului finit (aspect exterior și culoare, aspect și culoare la feliere, consistență, miros și gust): este vorba de un control vizual și de o analiză senzorială, efectuate după terminarea procesului de producție pentru a verifica trăsăturile specifice menționate la punctul 3.5. din caietul de sarcini;

| — | proprietăți fizice și chimice ale produsului finit: diametrul maxim al membranei naturale de oaie și greutatea unui crenvurșt; valorile trebuie să corespundă celor specificate la punctul 3.5 din caietul de sarcini. |
| --- | --- |

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proprietăți fizice și chimice ale produsului finit: diametrul maxim al membranei naturale de oaie și greutatea unui crenvurșt; valorile trebuie să corespundă celor specificate la punctul 3.5 din caietul de sarcini.

Autoritatea sau organismul care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini efectuează controale o dată pe an.

4.   Autoritățile sau organismele care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini:

4.1.   Denumirea și adresa:

Autorități sau organisme care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini în Republica Slovacă

| Denumire: | BEL/NOVAMANN International, s r.o. |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Továrenská 14 |
| 815 71 Bratislava |
| P.O. BOX 11 |
| 820 04 Bratislava 24 |
| SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA |

Denumire:

BEL/NOVAMANN International, s r.o.

Adresă:

Továrenská 14

815 71 Bratislava

P.O. BOX 11

820 04 Bratislava 24

SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA

Tel.

+421 250213376

E-mail:

tomas.ducho@ba.bel.sk

 Public Image Privat

| Denumire: | Štátna veterinárna a potravinová správa SR |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Botanická 17 |
| 842 13 Bratislava |
| SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA |

Denumire:

Štátna veterinárna a potravinová správa SR

Adresă:

Botanická 17

842 13 Bratislava

SLOVENSKO/SLOVAKIA

Tel.

+421 260257427

E-mail:

buchlerova@svssr.sk

Image Public  Privat

Autorități sau organisme care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini în Republica Cehă

| Denumire: | Státní zemedelská a potravinárská inspekce |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Kvetná 15 |
| 603 00 Brno |
| ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA |

Denumire:

Státní zemedelská a potravinárská inspekce

Adresă:

Kvetná 15

603 00 Brno

ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA

Tel.

+420 543540111

E-mail:

sekret.oklc@szpi.gov.cz

Image Public  Privat

| Denumire: | Státní veterinární správa ČR |
| --- | --- |
| Adresă: | Slezská 7 |
| 120 00 Praha 2 |
| ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA |

Denumire:

Státní veterinární správa ČR

Adresă:

Slezská 7

120 00 Praha 2

ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA

Tel.

+420 227010137

E-mail:

hygi@svscr.cz

Image Public  Privat

4.2.   Sarcini specifice ale autorității sau organismului respectiv:

| — | organism sau entitate care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini în Republica Slovacă și în Republica Cehă; |
| --- | --- |

—

organism sau entitate care verifică respectarea caietului de sarcini în Republica Slovacă și în Republica Cehă;

| — | organismele de inspecție specificate sunt responsabile cu controlul întregului caiet de sarcini. |
| --- | --- |

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organismele de inspecție specificate sunt responsabile cu controlul întregului caiet de sarcini.

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(1)  JO L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12.

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