# Uradni list C 66/2010

| | ISSN 1725-5244
  doi:10.3000/17255244.C_2010.066.slv |
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| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 66 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Zvezek 5317. marec 2010 |

ISSN 1725-5244

doi:10.3000/17255244.C_2010.066.slv

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 66

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Zvezek 5317. marec 2010

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| Obvestilo št. | Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolucije, priporočila in mnenja |
| | MNENJA |
| | Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov |
| 2010/C 066/01 | Mnenje evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov o predlogu uredbe Sveta o upravnem sodelovanju in boju proti goljufijam na področju davka na dodano vrednost (prenovitev) | 1 |

Obvestilo št.

Vsebina

Stran

I   Resolucije, priporočila in mnenja

MNENJA

Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov

2010/C 066/01

Mnenje evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov o predlogu uredbe Sveta o upravnem sodelovanju in boju proti goljufijam na področju davka na dodano vrednost (prenovitev)

1

| | II   Sporočila |
| --- | --- |
| | SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2010/C 066/02 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co) (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2010/C 066/03 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV) (
  1
  ) | 10 |

II   Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2010/C 066/02

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co) (
  1
  )

1

10

2010/C 066/03

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV) (
  1
  )

1

10

| | IV   Informacije |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2010/C 066/04 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 11 |
| 2010/C 066/05 | Sporočilo Komisije o določitvi količine nekaterih proizvodov v sektorju mleka in mlečnih proizvodov, ki so na voljo v drugi polovici leta 2010 v okviru nekaterih kvot, ki jih je odprla Skupnost | 12 |

IV   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2010/C 066/04

Menjalni tečaji eura

11

2010/C 066/05

Sporočilo Komisije o določitvi količine nekaterih proizvodov v sektorju mleka in mlečnih proizvodov, ki so na voljo v drugi polovici leta 2010 v okviru nekaterih kvot, ki jih je odprla Skupnost

12

| | V   Mnenja |
| --- | --- |
| | UPRAVNI POSTOPKI |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2010/C 066/06 | Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov v okviru delovnega programa 2010 Ljudje Sedmega okvirnega programa ES za raziskave, tehnološki razvoj in predstavitvene dejavnosti | 13 |
| 2010/C 066/07 | Razpis za oddajo predlogov za postopke prenos načina, pospeševalni, ukrepi za vzpostavitev pomorskih avtocest, ukrep izogibanje prometu ter za delovanje in skupno učenje v okviru drugega programa Marco Polo (Uredba Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1692/2006 – UL L 328, 24.11.2006, str. 1) | 14 |
| | POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2010/C 066/08 | Državne pomoči – Nemčija – Državna pomoč C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Dodatna pomoč za banko WestLB AG v zvezi z razdelitvijo sredstev – Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (
  1
  ) | 15 |

V   Mnenja

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropska komisija

2010/C 066/06

Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov v okviru delovnega programa 2010 Ljudje Sedmega okvirnega programa ES za raziskave, tehnološki razvoj in predstavitvene dejavnosti

13

2010/C 066/07

Razpis za oddajo predlogov za postopke prenos načina, pospeševalni, ukrepi za vzpostavitev pomorskih avtocest, ukrep izogibanje prometu ter za delovanje in skupno učenje v okviru drugega programa Marco Polo (Uredba Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1692/2006 – UL L 328, 24.11.2006, str. 1)

(Uredba Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1692/2006 – UL L 328, 24.11.2006, str. 1)

14

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

2010/C 066/08

Državne pomoči – Nemčija – Državna pomoč C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Dodatna pomoč za banko WestLB AG v zvezi z razdelitvijo sredstev – Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (
  1
  )

1

15

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| | (1)   Besedilo velja za EGP |

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(1)   Besedilo velja za EGP

1

| SL | |
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SL

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I Resolucije, priporočila in mnenja

MNENJA

Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov

| 17.3.2010 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 66/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2010

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 66/1

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Mnenje evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov o predlogu uredbe Sveta o upravnem sodelovanju in boju proti goljufijam na področju davka na dodano vrednost (prenovitev)

2010/C 66/01

EVROPSKI NADZORNIK ZA VARSTVO PODATKOV JE –

ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti in zlasti člena 286 Pogodbe,

ob upoštevanju Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah in zlasti člena 8 listine,

ob upoštevanju Direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 95/46/ES z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov (1),

ob upoštevanju Uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. decembra 2000 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov v institucijah in organih Skupnosti in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov ter zlasti člena 41 Uredbe (2),

SPREJEL NASLEDNJE MNENJE:

I.   UVOD

| 1. | Komisija je 18. avgusta 2009 sprejela predlog uredbe Sveta o upravnem sodelovanju in boju proti goljufijam na področju davka na dodano vrednost (DDV) (3). Predlog v bistvu pomeni spremembo Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 o upravnem sodelovanju na področju davka na dodano vrednost, ki je bila že večkrat spremenjena (4). Vendar pa se je Komisija odločila, da zaradi jasnosti in lažje berljivosti uporabi postopek prenovitve, kar pomeni, da bo uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 razveljavljena, če Svet sprejme ta predlog. |
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1.

Komisija je 18. avgusta 2009 sprejela predlog uredbe Sveta o upravnem sodelovanju in boju proti goljufijam na področju davka na dodano vrednost (DDV) (3). Predlog v bistvu pomeni spremembo Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 o upravnem sodelovanju na področju davka na dodano vrednost, ki je bila že večkrat spremenjena (4). Vendar pa se je Komisija odločila, da zaradi jasnosti in lažje berljivosti uporabi postopek prenovitve, kar pomeni, da bo uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 razveljavljena, če Svet sprejme ta predlog.

| 2. | V postopku prenovitve je zakonodajna razprava načelno omejena na vsebinske spremembe, ki jih je predlagala Komisija, in ne posega v „nespremenjene določbe“ (5). Vendar pa bo evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov (ENVP) v tem mnenju v celoti razpravljal o tej uredbi in predlaganih večjih spremembah v zvezi z njo. Taka celotna analiza je potrebna, da se ustrezno oceni vpliv na zakonodajo o varstvu podatkov. ENVP bo priporočil sprejetje prilagoditev, ki se nanašajo tudi na take nespremenjene določbe. ENVP poziva zakonodajalca, naj ta priporočila upošteva kljub omejenemu obsegu postopka prenovitve. V tem oziru se ENVP sklicuje na člen 8 medinstitucionalnega sporazuma o postopku prenovitve, v katerem je določena možnost spremembe nespremenjenih določb. |
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2.

V postopku prenovitve je zakonodajna razprava načelno omejena na vsebinske spremembe, ki jih je predlagala Komisija, in ne posega v „nespremenjene določbe“ (5). Vendar pa bo evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov (ENVP) v tem mnenju v celoti razpravljal o tej uredbi in predlaganih večjih spremembah v zvezi z njo. Taka celotna analiza je potrebna, da se ustrezno oceni vpliv na zakonodajo o varstvu podatkov. ENVP bo priporočil sprejetje prilagoditev, ki se nanašajo tudi na take nespremenjene določbe. ENVP poziva zakonodajalca, naj ta priporočila upošteva kljub omejenemu obsegu postopka prenovitve. V tem oziru se ENVP sklicuje na člen 8 medinstitucionalnega sporazuma o postopku prenovitve, v katerem je določena možnost spremembe nespremenjenih določb.

| 3. | Pravna podlaga predloga je člen 93 Pogodbe ES, ki Svetu omogoča, da sprejme ukrepe v zvezi z neposrednim obdavčevanjem. Svet se o predlogu Komisije odloči soglasno in po posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom ter Evropskim ekonomsko-socialnim odborom. Pravna podlaga in specifični postopek se po začetku veljavnosti Lizbonske pogodbe ne bosta spremenila. |
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3.

Pravna podlaga predloga je člen 93 Pogodbe ES, ki Svetu omogoča, da sprejme ukrepe v zvezi z neposrednim obdavčevanjem. Svet se o predlogu Komisije odloči soglasno in po posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom ter Evropskim ekonomsko-socialnim odborom. Pravna podlaga in specifični postopek se po začetku veljavnosti Lizbonske pogodbe ne bosta spremenila.

| 4. | ENVP ni bil zaprošen za mnenje, kot to zahteva člen 28(2) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. To mnenje zato temelji na členu 41(2) iste uredbe. ENVP predlaga, da se navedba tega mnenja vključi v preambulo predloga. |
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4.

ENVP ni bil zaprošen za mnenje, kot to zahteva člen 28(2) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. To mnenje zato temelji na členu 41(2) iste uredbe. ENVP predlaga, da se navedba tega mnenja vključi v preambulo predloga.

| 5. | ENVP se zaveda, da je treba krepiti učinkovitost ukrepov zoper čezmejne goljufije in zagotoviti boljše pobiranje DDV v čezmejnih primerih. Čeprav izmenjava informacij, ki je del upravnega sodelovanja in boja proti goljufijam na področju DDV, predvsem vključuje informacije v zvezi s pravnimi osebami, je jasno, da se obdelujejo tudi podatki o fizičnih osebah. ENVP priznava, da je zaradi doseganja teh namenov potrebna obdelava osebnih podatkov. Vendar poudarja, da mora biti obdelava takih podatkov skladna s predpisi Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov. |
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5.

ENVP se zaveda, da je treba krepiti učinkovitost ukrepov zoper čezmejne goljufije in zagotoviti boljše pobiranje DDV v čezmejnih primerih. Čeprav izmenjava informacij, ki je del upravnega sodelovanja in boja proti goljufijam na področju DDV, predvsem vključuje informacije v zvezi s pravnimi osebami, je jasno, da se obdelujejo tudi podatki o fizičnih osebah. ENVP priznava, da je zaradi doseganja teh namenov potrebna obdelava osebnih podatkov. Vendar poudarja, da mora biti obdelava takih podatkov skladna s predpisi Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov.

| 6. | Primeri, ki vključujejo čezmejno izmenjavo osebnih podatkov znotraj EU, zaslužijo posebno pozornost, saj pomenijo povečanje obsega obdelave podatkov, ki pa vedno povzroči pravno negotovost za posameznike, na katere se nanašajo podatki: lahko so udeleženi akterji iz vseh drugih držav članic, lahko se uporabijo zakoni teh drugih držav članic, ki se lahko rahlo razlikujejo od zakonov, ki so jih navajeni posamezniki, na katere se nanašajo podatki, ali se uporabijo v okviru pravnega sistema, ki ga ne poznajo. |
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6.

Primeri, ki vključujejo čezmejno izmenjavo osebnih podatkov znotraj EU, zaslužijo posebno pozornost, saj pomenijo povečanje obsega obdelave podatkov, ki pa vedno povzroči pravno negotovost za posameznike, na katere se nanašajo podatki: lahko so udeleženi akterji iz vseh drugih držav članic, lahko se uporabijo zakoni teh drugih držav članic, ki se lahko rahlo razlikujejo od zakonov, ki so jih navajeni posamezniki, na katere se nanašajo podatki, ali se uporabijo v okviru pravnega sistema, ki ga ne poznajo.

| 7. | Po analizi pravnega okvira, ki izhaja iz uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003 in predlaganih prilagoditev, je ENVP sklenil, da kljub dejstvu, da obstaja več pozitivnih elementov, niso izpolnjene vse zahteve, ki izhajajo iz pravil Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov. |
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7.

Po analizi pravnega okvira, ki izhaja iz uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003 in predlaganih prilagoditev, je ENVP sklenil, da kljub dejstvu, da obstaja več pozitivnih elementov, niso izpolnjene vse zahteve, ki izhajajo iz pravil Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov.

| 8. | Pred podrobnejšo obrazložitvijo tega stališča v delu III (veljavna pravila o varstvu podatkov) in delu IV (podrobna analiza predloga) bo ENVP v naslednjem delu najprej opisal kontekst tega predloga, obstoječi pravni okvir in predlagane prilagoditve. |
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8.

Pred podrobnejšo obrazložitvijo tega stališča v delu III (veljavna pravila o varstvu podatkov) in delu IV (podrobna analiza predloga) bo ENVP v naslednjem delu najprej opisal kontekst tega predloga, obstoječi pravni okvir in predlagane prilagoditve.

II.   SODELOVANJE EU NA PODROČJU DDV

II.1   Kontekst

| 9. | Ta predlog je rezultat razprav na ravni EU, ki so se uradno začele maja 2006 s sporočilom Komisije o boju proti davčnim goljufijam na notranjem trgu (6). Komisija je na pobudo Sveta in Evropskega parlamenta decembra 2008 objavila novo sporočilo o usklajeni strategiji za izboljšanje boja proti goljufijam na področju DDV v EU (7). V sporočilu je bilo napovedanih več sprememb splošne direktive o DDV (2006/112/ES), najavljena pa je bila tudi ta prenovitev uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 (8). |
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9.

Ta predlog je rezultat razprav na ravni EU, ki so se uradno začele maja 2006 s sporočilom Komisije o boju proti davčnim goljufijam na notranjem trgu (6). Komisija je na pobudo Sveta in Evropskega parlamenta decembra 2008 objavila novo sporočilo o usklajeni strategiji za izboljšanje boja proti goljufijam na področju DDV v EU (7). V sporočilu je bilo napovedanih več sprememb splošne direktive o DDV (2006/112/ES), najavljena pa je bila tudi ta prenovitev uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 (8).

| 10. | Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 je bila doslej referenčna uredba za upravno sodelovanje na področju DDV. Vendar pa je bilo v nedavni študiji, ki jo je izvedla Komisija in je bila objavljena 18. avgusta 2009 – isti dan, kot ta predlog –, ugotovljeno, da je intenzivnost upravnega sodelovanja med državami članicami za soočanje z utajo in goljufijami v zvezi z DDV znotraj Skupnosti nezadovoljiva (9). Glavni cilj tega predloga je zato taka prilagoditev uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003, ki bo omogočila povečanje učinkovitosti ukrepov proti čezmejnim goljufijam in boljše pobiranje DDV v čezmejnih primerih. |
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10.

Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 je bila doslej referenčna uredba za upravno sodelovanje na področju DDV. Vendar pa je bilo v nedavni študiji, ki jo je izvedla Komisija in je bila objavljena 18. avgusta 2009 – isti dan, kot ta predlog –, ugotovljeno, da je intenzivnost upravnega sodelovanja med državami članicami za soočanje z utajo in goljufijami v zvezi z DDV znotraj Skupnosti nezadovoljiva (9). Glavni cilj tega predloga je zato taka prilagoditev uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003, ki bo omogočila povečanje učinkovitosti ukrepov proti čezmejnim goljufijam in boljše pobiranje DDV v čezmejnih primerih.

II.2   Sedanji sistem sodelovanja: uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003

| 11. | Z uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 je EU uvedla skupni sistem upravnega sodelovanja in izmenjavo informacij med pristojnimi organi držav članic, da jim omogoči pravilno odmero DDV. Uredba vsebuje seznam pristojnih organov in državam članicam nalaga, da določijo enoten centralni urad za zvezo, ki bi bil odgovoren za stike z drugimi državami članicami na področju upravnega sodelovanja. |
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11.

Z uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 je EU uvedla skupni sistem upravnega sodelovanja in izmenjavo informacij med pristojnimi organi držav članic, da jim omogoči pravilno odmero DDV. Uredba vsebuje seznam pristojnih organov in državam članicam nalaga, da določijo enoten centralni urad za zvezo, ki bi bil odgovoren za stike z drugimi državami članicami na področju upravnega sodelovanja.

| 12. | Izmenjava informacij med pristojnimi organi poteka v treh primerih: izmenjava informacij na zaprosilo, izmenjava informacij brez predhodnega zaprosila (spontana izmenjava) in hramba podatkov v elektronski bazi podatkov, ki jo vzdržuje vsaka država članica in do katere imajo lahko pristojni organi drugih držav članic neposreden dostop. |
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12.

Izmenjava informacij med pristojnimi organi poteka v treh primerih: izmenjava informacij na zaprosilo, izmenjava informacij brez predhodnega zaprosila (spontana izmenjava) in hramba podatkov v elektronski bazi podatkov, ki jo vzdržuje vsaka država članica in do katere imajo lahko pristojni organi drugih držav članic neposreden dostop.

| 13. | Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 državam članicam nalaga tudi, da zagotovijo, da lahko osebe, vključene v dobavo blaga in opravljanje storitev znotraj Skupnosti, dobijo potrdilo o veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV katere koli določene osebe. Sistem, ki tem osebam omogoča navedeno, je sistem izmenjave podatkov s področja DDV (VAT information exchange system – sistem VIES). |
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13.

Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 državam članicam nalaga tudi, da zagotovijo, da lahko osebe, vključene v dobavo blaga in opravljanje storitev znotraj Skupnosti, dobijo potrdilo o veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV katere koli določene osebe. Sistem, ki tem osebam omogoča navedeno, je sistem izmenjave podatkov s področja DDV (VAT information exchange system – sistem VIES).

| 14. | Uredba na splošno predpisuje, da sporočanje informacij poteka elektronsko. S tem je Komisija odgovorna za razvoj skupnega komunikacijskega omrežja oziroma skupnega sistemskega vmesnika (CCN/CSI), kolikor je ta potreben, da se omogoči izmenjava informacij med državami članicami. Države članice so odgovorne za razvoj svojih sistemov, kolikor je to potrebno, da se omogoči izmenjava informacij z uporabo CCN/CSI. Uredba vsebuje dodatna pravila o sodelovanju s Komisijo, sočasnih kontrolah in izmenjavi podatkov, ki izvirajo iz tretjih držav. |
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14.

Uredba na splošno predpisuje, da sporočanje informacij poteka elektronsko. S tem je Komisija odgovorna za razvoj skupnega komunikacijskega omrežja oziroma skupnega sistemskega vmesnika (CCN/CSI), kolikor je ta potreben, da se omogoči izmenjava informacij med državami članicami. Države članice so odgovorne za razvoj svojih sistemov, kolikor je to potrebno, da se omogoči izmenjava informacij z uporabo CCN/CSI. Uredba vsebuje dodatna pravila o sodelovanju s Komisijo, sočasnih kontrolah in izmenjavi podatkov, ki izvirajo iz tretjih držav.

| 15. | Kakšne vrste informacij se lahko na zaprosilo ali spontano izmenjujejo med pristojnimi organi, ni določeno. Člen 1 uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 se nanaša samo na „kakršne koli informacije“, ki jim lahko pomagajo pri pravilni odmeri DDV. Elektronska baza podatkov vsebuje rekapitulacijska poročila davčnih zavezancev, identificiranih za namene DDV, ki se zberejo v skladu s splošno direktivo o DDV. Ta poročila vsebujejo identifikacijske številke za DDV različnih vključenih davčnih zavezancev in celotno vrednost dobav blaga s strani posameznega davčnega zavezanca. Sistem VIES omogoča le potrditev veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV. |
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15.

Kakšne vrste informacij se lahko na zaprosilo ali spontano izmenjujejo med pristojnimi organi, ni določeno. Člen 1 uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 se nanaša samo na „kakršne koli informacije“, ki jim lahko pomagajo pri pravilni odmeri DDV. Elektronska baza podatkov vsebuje rekapitulacijska poročila davčnih zavezancev, identificiranih za namene DDV, ki se zberejo v skladu s splošno direktivo o DDV. Ta poročila vsebujejo identifikacijske številke za DDV različnih vključenih davčnih zavezancev in celotno vrednost dobav blaga s strani posameznega davčnega zavezanca. Sistem VIES omogoča le potrditev veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV.

II.3   Predvidene splošne izboljšave

| 16. | Komisija s tem predlogom predvideva povečanje učinkovitosti sedanjega sodelovanja z določitvijo skupne odgovornosti za zaščito prihodkov iz DDV v vseh državah članicah, in sicer s spodbujanjem izmenjav informacij med pristojnimi organi ter z izboljšanjem kakovosti in doslednosti teh informacij (10). |
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16.

Komisija s tem predlogom predvideva povečanje učinkovitosti sedanjega sodelovanja z določitvijo skupne odgovornosti za zaščito prihodkov iz DDV v vseh državah članicah, in sicer s spodbujanjem izmenjav informacij med pristojnimi organi ter z izboljšanjem kakovosti in doslednosti teh informacij (10).

| 17. | Izboljšanje izmenjave informacij med državami članicami se doseže z opredelitvijo primerov, v katerih pristojni organi ne smejo zavrniti odgovora na zaprosilo za informacije ali za uradno preiskavo in z navedbo primerov, pri katerih se morajo informacije izmenjati spontano (11). Predlog zato uvaja strožje roke in daje večji poudarek uporabi elektronskih sredstev. |
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17.

Izboljšanje izmenjave informacij med državami članicami se doseže z opredelitvijo primerov, v katerih pristojni organi ne smejo zavrniti odgovora na zaprosilo za informacije ali za uradno preiskavo in z navedbo primerov, pri katerih se morajo informacije izmenjati spontano (11). Predlog zato uvaja strožje roke in daje večji poudarek uporabi elektronskih sredstev.

| 18. | Doslednost razpoložljivih informacij v elektronskih bazah podatkov se poveča, če se opredeli, katere vrste informacij morajo države članice vključiti v svoje baze podatkov. Poleg tega predlog pristojnim organom drugih držav članic omogoča povečan neposredni samodejni dostop do elektronskih baz podatkov. Informacije, ki so na voljo drugim davčnim zavezancem prek sistema VIES, se dopolnijo z imenom in naslovom osebe, ki je registrirana z identifikacijsko številko za DDV. |
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18.

Doslednost razpoložljivih informacij v elektronskih bazah podatkov se poveča, če se opredeli, katere vrste informacij morajo države članice vključiti v svoje baze podatkov. Poleg tega predlog pristojnim organom drugih držav članic omogoča povečan neposredni samodejni dostop do elektronskih baz podatkov. Informacije, ki so na voljo drugim davčnim zavezancem prek sistema VIES, se dopolnijo z imenom in naslovom osebe, ki je registrirana z identifikacijsko številko za DDV.

| 19. | Poleg tega predlog natančneje določa primere, ko imajo države članice možnost in ko morajo izvesti večstranske kontrole. Predlog Komisije ustvarja tudi pravno podlago za vzpostavitev skupne operacijske strukture za večstransko sodelovanje (Eurofisc). Ta sistem bi moral omogočiti hitro izmenjavo ciljnih informacij med vsemi državami članicami ter izvedbo skupnih analiz tveganja in strateških analiz. |
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19.

Poleg tega predlog natančneje določa primere, ko imajo države članice možnost in ko morajo izvesti večstranske kontrole. Predlog Komisije ustvarja tudi pravno podlago za vzpostavitev skupne operacijske strukture za večstransko sodelovanje (Eurofisc). Ta sistem bi moral omogočiti hitro izmenjavo ciljnih informacij med vsemi državami članicami ter izvedbo skupnih analiz tveganja in strateških analiz.

| 20. | Predlog uvaja obveznost sporočanja povratnih informacij, kar državam članicam omogoča, da ocenijo učinkovitost izmenjave informacij. |
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20.

Predlog uvaja obveznost sporočanja povratnih informacij, kar državam članicam omogoča, da ocenijo učinkovitost izmenjave informacij.

| 21. | Več zadev bo dodatno pojasnjenih v skladu s postopkom v odboru. Sem na primer sodijo standardni obrazci, ki se uporabijo, ko pristojni organi zaprosijo za informacije, način ureditve obveznosti sporočanja povratnih informacij, merila, ki se uporabijo pri določitvi, ali je treba v podatke, shranjene v elektronski bazi podatkov, vnesti spremembe, in vzpostavitev sistema Eurofisc. |
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21.

Več zadev bo dodatno pojasnjenih v skladu s postopkom v odboru. Sem na primer sodijo standardni obrazci, ki se uporabijo, ko pristojni organi zaprosijo za informacije, način ureditve obveznosti sporočanja povratnih informacij, merila, ki se uporabijo pri določitvi, ali je treba v podatke, shranjene v elektronski bazi podatkov, vnesti spremembe, in vzpostavitev sistema Eurofisc.

III.   VELJAVNA PRAVILA O VARSTVU PODATKOV

| 22. | V primeru obdelave osebnih podatkov je treba upoštevati zakonodajo Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov. V zakonodaji o varstvu podatkov so „osebni podatki“ široko opredeljeni kot „katera koli informacija, ki se nanaša na določeno ali določljivo fizično osebo“ (12). Kot je navedeno zgoraj se izmenjava informacij v tem kontekstu nanaša v glavnem na pravne osebe. Vendar pa se lahko te informacije nanašajo tudi na fizične osebe. Zdi se, da izraz „katera koli informacija“ iz člena 1(1) predlagane uredbe Sveta vsebuje tudi nadaljnje informacije o fizičnih osebah, ki delajo za pravne osebe ali so kako drugače povezane z njimi (glej tudi točko 31 spodaj). |
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22.

V primeru obdelave osebnih podatkov je treba upoštevati zakonodajo Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov. V zakonodaji o varstvu podatkov so „osebni podatki“ široko opredeljeni kot „katera koli informacija, ki se nanaša na določeno ali določljivo fizično osebo“ (12). Kot je navedeno zgoraj se izmenjava informacij v tem kontekstu nanaša v glavnem na pravne osebe. Vendar pa se lahko te informacije nanašajo tudi na fizične osebe. Zdi se, da izraz „katera koli informacija“ iz člena 1(1) predlagane uredbe Sveta vsebuje tudi nadaljnje informacije o fizičnih osebah, ki delajo za pravne osebe ali so kako drugače povezane z njimi (glej tudi točko 31 spodaj).

| 23. | Pri obdelavi podatkov morajo države članice uporabljati nacionalne predpise, s katerimi se izvaja direktiva 95/46/ES. Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 se dvakrat sklicuje na direktivo 95/46/ES, in sicer v uvodni izjavi 17 ter členu 41. ENVP ugotavlja, da se te določbe nanašajo samo na direktivo 95/46/ES v zvezi z možnostjo omejitve nekaterih pravic, ki so zagotovljene v tej direktivi. Navedena uvodna izjava in člen se ponovno pojavita v predlogu Komisije (kot uvodna izjava 35 in člen 57), vendar bosta nekoliko spremenjena, kar je podrobno opisano v točki 49 in v nadaljevanju. Na tej stopnji velja opozoriti na dejstvo, da Komisija predlaga, da se v člen 41 vstavi splošni stavek (novi člen 57), ki določa, da se za „vsako hranjenje in izmenjavo informacij iz te uredbe uporabljajo določbe o izvajanju direktive 95/46/ES“. ENVP pozdravlja to spremembo in spodbuja zakonodajalca, naj tak stavek vstavi tudi v uvodno izjavo. |
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23.

Pri obdelavi podatkov morajo države članice uporabljati nacionalne predpise, s katerimi se izvaja direktiva 95/46/ES. Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 se dvakrat sklicuje na direktivo 95/46/ES, in sicer v uvodni izjavi 17 ter členu 41. ENVP ugotavlja, da se te določbe nanašajo samo na direktivo 95/46/ES v zvezi z možnostjo omejitve nekaterih pravic, ki so zagotovljene v tej direktivi. Navedena uvodna izjava in člen se ponovno pojavita v predlogu Komisije (kot uvodna izjava 35 in člen 57), vendar bosta nekoliko spremenjena, kar je podrobno opisano v točki 49 in v nadaljevanju. Na tej stopnji velja opozoriti na dejstvo, da Komisija predlaga, da se v člen 41 vstavi splošni stavek (novi člen 57), ki določa, da se za „vsako hranjenje in izmenjavo informacij iz te uredbe uporabljajo določbe o izvajanju direktive 95/46/ES“. ENVP pozdravlja to spremembo in spodbuja zakonodajalca, naj tak stavek vstavi tudi v uvodno izjavo.

| 24. | Čeprav Komisija ni neposredno vključena v izmenjavo podatkov med pristojnimi organi, je iz člena 51(2) razvidno, da Komisija prejme „vse razpoložljive informacije, ki so pomembne za uporabo te uredbe“, „statistične podatke“ in „vse druge podatke“, ki bi lahko pripomogli k izvedbi pravilne odmere DDV iz člena 1 (13). Komisija je, kakor je to navedeno v točki 14, pristojna tudi za „kakršen koli razvoj CCN/CSI, ki je potreben“, da se omogoči izmenjava podatkov med državami članicami (člen 55). Kakor je razvidno iz člena 57(2), lahko ta odgovornost pod določenimi pogoji vključuje tudi dostop do podatkov, ki se izmenjujejo prek sistema. |
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24.

Čeprav Komisija ni neposredno vključena v izmenjavo podatkov med pristojnimi organi, je iz člena 51(2) razvidno, da Komisija prejme „vse razpoložljive informacije, ki so pomembne za uporabo te uredbe“, „statistične podatke“ in „vse druge podatke“, ki bi lahko pripomogli k izvedbi pravilne odmere DDV iz člena 1 (13). Komisija je, kakor je to navedeno v točki 14, pristojna tudi za „kakršen koli razvoj CCN/CSI, ki je potreben“, da se omogoči izmenjava podatkov med državami članicami (člen 55). Kakor je razvidno iz člena 57(2), lahko ta odgovornost pod določenimi pogoji vključuje tudi dostop do podatkov, ki se izmenjujejo prek sistema.

| 25. | Iz navedenega sledi, da bo Komisija obdelovala tudi osebne podatke. Zaradi tega je zavezana k predpisom o varovanju osebnih podatkov, ki se uporabljajo v institucijah in telesih EU, in so navedeni v uredbi (ES) št. 45/2001 ter zato pod nadzorom ENVP. ENVP zaradi jasnosti in da bi odpravili vse dvome glede uporabe uredbe, zakonodajalca poziva, naj v uvodne izjave in v bistvene določbe vključi sklicevanje na uredbo. |
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25.

Iz navedenega sledi, da bo Komisija obdelovala tudi osebne podatke. Zaradi tega je zavezana k predpisom o varovanju osebnih podatkov, ki se uporabljajo v institucijah in telesih EU, in so navedeni v uredbi (ES) št. 45/2001 ter zato pod nadzorom ENVP. ENVP zaradi jasnosti in da bi odpravili vse dvome glede uporabe uredbe, zakonodajalca poziva, naj v uvodne izjave in v bistvene določbe vključi sklicevanje na uredbo.

| 26. | Če gre za obdelavo osebnih podatkov, člena 16 in 17 direktive 95/46/ES in člena 21 in 22 uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001 predpisujeta, da je treba zagotoviti zaupnost in varnost obdelave podatkov. V zgoraj navedenemu členu 55 pa ni dovolj natančno določeno ali je Komisija tista, ki je odgovorna za vzdrževanje in varnost CCN/CSI (14). Da bi se izognili dvomom glede odgovornosti pri zagotavljanju takšne zaupnosti in varnosti ENVP zakonodajalca poziva, naj bolj natančno opredeli odgovornost Komisije v zvezi z navedenim, poveča obveznosti držav članic in vse to uskladi z zahtevami iz direktive 95/46/ES in uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. |
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26.

Če gre za obdelavo osebnih podatkov, člena 16 in 17 direktive 95/46/ES in člena 21 in 22 uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001 predpisujeta, da je treba zagotoviti zaupnost in varnost obdelave podatkov. V zgoraj navedenemu členu 55 pa ni dovolj natančno določeno ali je Komisija tista, ki je odgovorna za vzdrževanje in varnost CCN/CSI (14). Da bi se izognili dvomom glede odgovornosti pri zagotavljanju takšne zaupnosti in varnosti ENVP zakonodajalca poziva, naj bolj natančno opredeli odgovornost Komisije v zvezi z navedenim, poveča obveznosti držav članic in vse to uskladi z zahtevami iz direktive 95/46/ES in uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001.

| 27. | V zvezi z uvedbo Eurofisca je pomembno tudi, da se razjasni, kdo bo odgovoren za izpolnjevanje predpisov o varstvu podatkov (v terminologiji varstva podatkov „nadzornik“ (15)). V členu 35 je navedeno, da bodo Eurofisc sestavljali pristojni uradniki, katere bodo imenovali pristojni organi držav članic. Komisija bo Eurofiscu zagotovila tehnično, administrativno in operativno podporo. Predlagana struktura odpira vprašanja veljavne zakonodaje o varstvu podatkov (direktiva 95/46/ES ali uredba (ES) št. 45/2001) in odgovornosti za spoštovanje teh predpisov. Ali Komisija namerava ohraniti pristojnost držav članic, bodisi samih, bodisi v povezavi s Komisijo, ter ali bo Eurofisc sam ali morda v povezavi s Komisijo postal pristojni organ? ENVP zakonodajalca poziva, naj ta vprašanja pojasni in zagotovi, da bodo pristojnosti jasno določene. |
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27.

V zvezi z uvedbo Eurofisca je pomembno tudi, da se razjasni, kdo bo odgovoren za izpolnjevanje predpisov o varstvu podatkov (v terminologiji varstva podatkov „nadzornik“ (15)). V členu 35 je navedeno, da bodo Eurofisc sestavljali pristojni uradniki, katere bodo imenovali pristojni organi držav članic. Komisija bo Eurofiscu zagotovila tehnično, administrativno in operativno podporo. Predlagana struktura odpira vprašanja veljavne zakonodaje o varstvu podatkov (direktiva 95/46/ES ali uredba (ES) št. 45/2001) in odgovornosti za spoštovanje teh predpisov. Ali Komisija namerava ohraniti pristojnost držav članic, bodisi samih, bodisi v povezavi s Komisijo, ter ali bo Eurofisc sam ali morda v povezavi s Komisijo postal pristojni organ? ENVP zakonodajalca poziva, naj ta vprašanja pojasni in zagotovi, da bodo pristojnosti jasno določene.

IV.   PODROBNA ANALIZA PREDLOGA

IV.1   Opredelitev podatkov in namena ter zagotavljanje potrebnosti obdelave podatkov

| 28. | ENVP ugotavlja, da predlog ne opredeljuje dovolj natančno vrste podatkov, ki se izmenjujejo, in namenov njihove izmenjave. Predlog tudi ne določa dovolj jasno, da se osebni podatki izmenjujejo le, kadar je to potrebno. To je ponazorjeno v členu 1(1) predloga uredbe Sveta. |
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28.

ENVP ugotavlja, da predlog ne opredeljuje dovolj natančno vrste podatkov, ki se izmenjujejo, in namenov njihove izmenjave. Predlog tudi ne določa dovolj jasno, da se osebni podatki izmenjujejo le, kadar je to potrebno. To je ponazorjeno v členu 1(1) predloga uredbe Sveta.

| 29. | Člen 1(1) vsebuje skupni namen uredbe, ki je zagotavljanje skladnosti z nacionalno zakonodajo na področju DDV. To je treba doseči tako, da pristojni organi držav članic sodelujejo in si izmenjujejo kakršne koli informacije, ki lahko pomagajo, da se izvede pravilna odmera DDV, da se nadzira pravilna uporaba DDV, predvsem pri transakcijah znotraj Skupnosti, ter se bori proti goljufijam. |
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29.

Člen 1(1) vsebuje skupni namen uredbe, ki je zagotavljanje skladnosti z nacionalno zakonodajo na področju DDV. To je treba doseči tako, da pristojni organi držav članic sodelujejo in si izmenjujejo kakršne koli informacije, ki lahko pomagajo, da se izvede pravilna odmera DDV, da se nadzira pravilna uporaba DDV, predvsem pri transakcijah znotraj Skupnosti, ter se bori proti goljufijam.

| 30. | Člen 1(1) kot tak ne bi izpolnil zahtev, ki izhajajo iz predpisov Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, saj je zasnovan preveč široko in dopušča preveliko svobodo. To pa ustvarja tveganje za vsebinsko neizpolnjevanje pravil o varstvu podatkov v praksi. |
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30.

Člen 1(1) kot tak ne bi izpolnil zahtev, ki izhajajo iz predpisov Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, saj je zasnovan preveč široko in dopušča preveliko svobodo. To pa ustvarja tveganje za vsebinsko neizpolnjevanje pravil o varstvu podatkov v praksi.

| 31. | Prvič, pojem „vse informacije“ je zelo širok in povzroča tveganje nesorazmerne izmenjave informacij. Kot rečeno se zdi, da vključuje še dodatne informacije o fizičnih osebah, ki delajo za pravne osebe ali so z njimi kako drugače povezane. ENVP želi v zvezi s tem izpostaviti določbe, ki obravnavajo posebne kategorije podatkov ter vsebujejo posebna in bolj stroga pravila za obdelavo podatkov, povezanih s kaznivimi dejanji, obsodbami za kazniva dejanja, upravnimi kaznimi ali sodbami v civilnih zadevah (16). |
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31.

Prvič, pojem „vse informacije“ je zelo širok in povzroča tveganje nesorazmerne izmenjave informacij. Kot rečeno se zdi, da vključuje še dodatne informacije o fizičnih osebah, ki delajo za pravne osebe ali so z njimi kako drugače povezane. ENVP želi v zvezi s tem izpostaviti določbe, ki obravnavajo posebne kategorije podatkov ter vsebujejo posebna in bolj stroga pravila za obdelavo podatkov, povezanih s kaznivimi dejanji, obsodbami za kazniva dejanja, upravnimi kaznimi ali sodbami v civilnih zadevah (16).

| 32. | Drugič, nameni, v skladu s katerimi se informacije lahko izmenjajo, so zelo splošni, to pa je v nasprotju z zahtevo, da morajo biti ti nameni opredeljeni in jasno določeni (17). |
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32.

Drugič, nameni, v skladu s katerimi se informacije lahko izmenjajo, so zelo splošni, to pa je v nasprotju z zahtevo, da morajo biti ti nameni opredeljeni in jasno določeni (17).

| 33. | Tretjič, v skladu s členom 1(1) se informacije lahko izmenjajo, če to „lahko pomaga“ pristojnemu organu v drugi državi članici. Če so vključeni tudi osebni podatki, bi bilo to v nasprotju z zahtevo, da se podatki obdelujejo le, če je to potrebno za dosego določenih namenov (18). Brez natančnih informacij o vrsti vključenih osebnih podatkov in brez nadaljnje opredelitve namenov vsekakor ni mogoče oceniti potrebnosti izmenjave. |
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33.

Tretjič, v skladu s členom 1(1) se informacije lahko izmenjajo, če to „lahko pomaga“ pristojnemu organu v drugi državi članici. Če so vključeni tudi osebni podatki, bi bilo to v nasprotju z zahtevo, da se podatki obdelujejo le, če je to potrebno za dosego določenih namenov (18). Brez natančnih informacij o vrsti vključenih osebnih podatkov in brez nadaljnje opredelitve namenov vsekakor ni mogoče oceniti potrebnosti izmenjave.

| 34. | Zato je potrebna nadaljnja opredelitev namena in vrste informacij, ki se lahko ali se bodo izmenjale – vsaj v glavnih točkah ali kategorijah – da bi bila tako izmenjava skladna z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov. Zato bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti. |
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34.

Zato je potrebna nadaljnja opredelitev namena in vrste informacij, ki se lahko ali se bodo izmenjale – vsaj v glavnih točkah ali kategorijah – da bi bila tako izmenjava skladna z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov. Zato bi bilo treba zagotoviti, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti.

| 35. | ENVP v zvezi z uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 kot celoto in predlaganimi spremembami meni, da nadaljnja pojasnila niso zagotovljena oziroma so zagotovljena le delno. ENVP bo o tej točki podrobneje razpravljal v nadaljevanju. Zaradi tega bo v nadaljevanju uvedeno razlikovanje med različnimi postopki obdelave, ki se uporabljajo, in sicer: izmenjava podatkov na zahtevo, spontana izmenjava podatkov, dostopnost podatkov preko elektronske zbirke podatkov za pristojne organe, razpoložljivost podatkov za registrirane davčne zavezance za DDV (VIES) in obdelava podatkov s strani Eurofisca. |
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35.

ENVP v zvezi z uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003 kot celoto in predlaganimi spremembami meni, da nadaljnja pojasnila niso zagotovljena oziroma so zagotovljena le delno. ENVP bo o tej točki podrobneje razpravljal v nadaljevanju. Zaradi tega bo v nadaljevanju uvedeno razlikovanje med različnimi postopki obdelave, ki se uporabljajo, in sicer: izmenjava podatkov na zahtevo, spontana izmenjava podatkov, dostopnost podatkov preko elektronske zbirke podatkov za pristojne organe, razpoložljivost podatkov za registrirane davčne zavezance za DDV (VIES) in obdelava podatkov s strani Eurofisca.

Podatki na zahtevo

| 36. | V zvezi s podatki na zahtevo ni nadaljnjih opredelitev glede vrste izmenjanih podatkov ali namena, zaradi katerega se izmenjava izvrši. Člen 7 se sklicuje na „informacije iz člena 1“ in navaja, da to vključuje „informacije, ki se nanašajo na poseben primer ali primere“. Zahtevek za informacije lahko vodi do izvedbe uradne preiskave. V členu 9 so navedene tudi „ustrezne informacije“. Ni pa pojasnjeno za kakšne informacije naj bi šlo. Nameni, v skladu s katerimi se podatki lahko obdelajo, niso nadalje obrazloženi, pa tudi zahteva potrebnosti ni omenjena. |
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36.

V zvezi s podatki na zahtevo ni nadaljnjih opredelitev glede vrste izmenjanih podatkov ali namena, zaradi katerega se izmenjava izvrši. Člen 7 se sklicuje na „informacije iz člena 1“ in navaja, da to vključuje „informacije, ki se nanašajo na poseben primer ali primere“. Zahtevek za informacije lahko vodi do izvedbe uradne preiskave. V členu 9 so navedene tudi „ustrezne informacije“. Ni pa pojasnjeno za kakšne informacije naj bi šlo. Nameni, v skladu s katerimi se podatki lahko obdelajo, niso nadalje obrazloženi, pa tudi zahteva potrebnosti ni omenjena.

| 37. | ENVP poziva zakonodajalca, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da se omeji namene, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti. |
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37.

ENVP poziva zakonodajalca, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da se omeji namene, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti.

Spontana izmenjava informacij

| 38. | V zvezi s spontano izmenjavo informacij je določeno, v katerih primerih država članica posreduje informacije drugemu pristojnemu organu. Glede vrste informacij, ki se izmenjujejo, je ponovno navedeno sklicevanje na člen 1(1). Člen 14(1) navaja naslednje primere:






  1. | kadar se šteje, da je obdavčitev izvedena v namembni državi članici in so informacije, ki jih zagotovi država članica porekla, nujne za učinkovitost kontrolnega sistema namembne države članice; |
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38.

V zvezi s spontano izmenjavo informacij je določeno, v katerih primerih država članica posreduje informacije drugemu pristojnemu organu. Glede vrste informacij, ki se izmenjujejo, je ponovno navedeno sklicevanje na člen 1(1). Člen 14(1) navaja naslednje primere:

1.

kadar se šteje, da je obdavčitev izvedena v namembni državi članici in so informacije, ki jih zagotovi država članica porekla, nujne za učinkovitost kontrolnega sistema namembne države članice;

| 2. | kadar ima država članica razloge za domnevo, da je bila v drugi državi članici kršena zakonodaja o DDV ali obstaja verjetnost take kršitve; |
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2.

kadar ima država članica razloge za domnevo, da je bila v drugi državi članici kršena zakonodaja o DDV ali obstaja verjetnost take kršitve;

| 3. | kadar obstaja tveganje izgube davka v drugi državi članici. |
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3.

kadar obstaja tveganje izgube davka v drugi državi članici.

Čeprav sta zlasti drugi in tretji primer še vedno široko zastavljena, bi lahko ti trije primeri načeloma lahko služili kot nadaljnje opredelitve namenov izmenjave podatkov. Prvi primer celo vsebuje načelo potrebnosti. Vendar spontana izmenjava informacij ni omejena le na te tri primere. V členu 15 je navedeno, da se spontano posredujejo tudi informacije iz člena 1, ki jih hranijo pristojni organi in so „lahko koristne“ za pristojne organe drugih držav članic.

| 39. | Predlagane spremembe dejansko razširjajo določbe, ki so trenutno veljavne. Člen 18 uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003 navaja, da morajo biti točne kategorije informacij, ki se izmenjujejo spontano, opredeljene v skladu s postopkom v odboru. Komisija pa zdaj predlaga, da se ta določba črta. |
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39.

Predlagane spremembe dejansko razširjajo določbe, ki so trenutno veljavne. Člen 18 uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003 navaja, da morajo biti točne kategorije informacij, ki se izmenjujejo spontano, opredeljene v skladu s postopkom v odboru. Komisija pa zdaj predlaga, da se ta določba črta.

| 40. | ENVP ponovno poziva zakonodajalca, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da bi omejili namene, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti. |
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40.

ENVP ponovno poziva zakonodajalca, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da bi omejili namene, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti.

Dostopnost podatkov prek elektronske zbirke podatkov

| 41. | V zvezi s podatki, ki so pristojnim organom na voljo prek elektronske zbirke podatkov, je predlog bolj natančen glede vrste informacij, ki se nahajajo v zbirki podatkov. V členu 18 je naveden seznam informacij, ki se shranjujejo in obdelujejo v elektronski zbirki podatkov. To zadeva informacije iz splošne direktive o DDV 2006/112/ES, gre pa za informacije zbrane s pomočjo rekapitulacijskih poročil in informacije, ki jih zberejo nacionalni organi za registracijo davčnih zavezancev, ki nimajo sedeža in ki opravljajo elektronske storitve za osebe, ki niso davčni zavezanci. Druge informacije v zbirki podatkov zadevajo identiteto, dejavnost ali organizacijo oseb, ki so jim bile izdane identifikacijske številke za DDV in zgodovino izmenjav informacij na zahtevo ali spontano, ki se nanašajo na navedene osebe. Seznam in podrobnosti o podatkih, ki niso zbrani v skladu z direktivo o DDV, se sprejmejo v skladu s postopkom v odboru. |
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41.

V zvezi s podatki, ki so pristojnim organom na voljo prek elektronske zbirke podatkov, je predlog bolj natančen glede vrste informacij, ki se nahajajo v zbirki podatkov. V členu 18 je naveden seznam informacij, ki se shranjujejo in obdelujejo v elektronski zbirki podatkov. To zadeva informacije iz splošne direktive o DDV 2006/112/ES, gre pa za informacije zbrane s pomočjo rekapitulacijskih poročil in informacije, ki jih zberejo nacionalni organi za registracijo davčnih zavezancev, ki nimajo sedeža in ki opravljajo elektronske storitve za osebe, ki niso davčni zavezanci. Druge informacije v zbirki podatkov zadevajo identiteto, dejavnost ali organizacijo oseb, ki so jim bile izdane identifikacijske številke za DDV in zgodovino izmenjav informacij na zahtevo ali spontano, ki se nanašajo na navedene osebe. Seznam in podrobnosti o podatkih, ki niso zbrani v skladu z direktivo o DDV, se sprejmejo v skladu s postopkom v odboru.

| 42. | Od 1. januarja 2015 bodo v zbirko podatkov vnesene tudi informacije o osebah, ki opravljajo storitve, med drugim podatki o prometu teh oseb in informacije o njihovem spoštovanju davčnih obveznosti, kot so zapoznela predložitev obračuna DDV in davčni dolgovi (glej člen 18(3)). |
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42.

Od 1. januarja 2015 bodo v zbirko podatkov vnesene tudi informacije o osebah, ki opravljajo storitve, med drugim podatki o prometu teh oseb in informacije o njihovem spoštovanju davčnih obveznosti, kot so zapoznela predložitev obračuna DDV in davčni dolgovi (glej člen 18(3)).

| 43. | Člen 22 določa, da morajo države članice pristojnim organom iz drugih držav članic zagotoviti samodejen dostop do informacij iz elektronske zbirke podatkov. Nameni, v skladu s katerimi bo pristojnim organom zagotovljen dostop do zbirke podatkov, pa niso opredeljeni. To je sprememba glede na sedanje besedilo uredbe, kjer je določeno, da imajo pristojni organi neposreden dostop do omejenega dela informacij in „samo zaradi preprečevanja kršitve zakonodaje o DDV“ ter kadar „menijo, da je to potrebno, za kontrolo pridobitev blaga ali opravljanja storitev znotraj Skupnosti“ (glej sedanji člen 24). |
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43.

Člen 22 določa, da morajo države članice pristojnim organom iz drugih držav članic zagotoviti samodejen dostop do informacij iz elektronske zbirke podatkov. Nameni, v skladu s katerimi bo pristojnim organom zagotovljen dostop do zbirke podatkov, pa niso opredeljeni. To je sprememba glede na sedanje besedilo uredbe, kjer je določeno, da imajo pristojni organi neposreden dostop do omejenega dela informacij in „samo zaradi preprečevanja kršitve zakonodaje o DDV“ ter kadar „menijo, da je to potrebno, za kontrolo pridobitev blaga ali opravljanja storitev znotraj Skupnosti“ (glej sedanji člen 24).

| 44. | Zaradi večjih možnosti dostopa do zbirke podatkov s strani pristojnih organov, predlog povečuje tveganje v zvezi z varstvom podatkov. Vendar pa, če je število shranjenih osebnih podatkov kar najbolj omejeno, to s strani varstva podatkov ni problematično. ENVP v zvezi s tem pozdravlja opredelitev podatkov, ki se hranijo v zbirkah podatkov. Vendar pa predlog določa le, katere informacije države članice morajo hraniti v zbirki podatkov, ne omenja pa, ali se v bazo podatkov lahko vnesejo tudi drugi podatki in, ali imajo do teh podatkov dostop tudi drugi pristojni organi. ENVP zato zakonodajalcu priporoča, naj jasno navede, da v zvezi z osebnimi podatki v zbirko podatkov ne bodo vneseni nobeni drugi podatki ali vsaj zagotovi, da je samodejni dostop omejen na navedene kategorije podatkov. ENVP zakonodajalca tudi poziva, naj omeji namene, za katere je mogoč neposreden dostop do baze podatkov in zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti. |
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44.

Zaradi večjih možnosti dostopa do zbirke podatkov s strani pristojnih organov, predlog povečuje tveganje v zvezi z varstvom podatkov. Vendar pa, če je število shranjenih osebnih podatkov kar najbolj omejeno, to s strani varstva podatkov ni problematično. ENVP v zvezi s tem pozdravlja opredelitev podatkov, ki se hranijo v zbirkah podatkov. Vendar pa predlog določa le, katere informacije države članice morajo hraniti v zbirki podatkov, ne omenja pa, ali se v bazo podatkov lahko vnesejo tudi drugi podatki in, ali imajo do teh podatkov dostop tudi drugi pristojni organi. ENVP zato zakonodajalcu priporoča, naj jasno navede, da v zvezi z osebnimi podatki v zbirko podatkov ne bodo vneseni nobeni drugi podatki ali vsaj zagotovi, da je samodejni dostop omejen na navedene kategorije podatkov. ENVP zakonodajalca tudi poziva, naj omeji namene, za katere je mogoč neposreden dostop do baze podatkov in zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti.

| 45. | Del besedila o izmenjavi podatkov prek elektronskih zbirk podatkov vsebuje pravila, ki se nanašajo na kakovost podatkov. Člen 20 določa, da države članice zagotovijo, da se njihove zbirke podatkov sprotno posodabljajo, da so popolne in točne. Člen 23 predvideva redne kontrole informacij, da bi tako zagotovili kakovost in zanesljivost informacij v zbirki podatkov. Te zahteve so popolnoma v skladu z zahtevami glede kakovosti podatkov iz člena 6(1)(d) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(d) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Člen 20 poleg tega navaja, da se s pomočjo postopka v odboru opredelijo merila za ugotavljanje, katere spremembe niso ustrezne, bistvene ali koristne in zato niso potrebne. ENVP poudarja, da morajo biti ta merila v skladu z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov (glej tudi točke 57 do 59 spodaj). |
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45.

Del besedila o izmenjavi podatkov prek elektronskih zbirk podatkov vsebuje pravila, ki se nanašajo na kakovost podatkov. Člen 20 določa, da države članice zagotovijo, da se njihove zbirke podatkov sprotno posodabljajo, da so popolne in točne. Člen 23 predvideva redne kontrole informacij, da bi tako zagotovili kakovost in zanesljivost informacij v zbirki podatkov. Te zahteve so popolnoma v skladu z zahtevami glede kakovosti podatkov iz člena 6(1)(d) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(d) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Člen 20 poleg tega navaja, da se s pomočjo postopka v odboru opredelijo merila za ugotavljanje, katere spremembe niso ustrezne, bistvene ali koristne in zato niso potrebne. ENVP poudarja, da morajo biti ta merila v skladu z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov (glej tudi točke 57 do 59 spodaj).

| 46. | Člen 19 navaja, da je treba informacije iz elektronske zbirke podatkov hraniti najmanj pet let od konca prvega koledarskega leta, v katerem se odobri dostop do informacij. V zvezi s tem obdobjem hranjenja ni navedena nobena utemeljitev. Če gre za osebne podatke, je določitev najkrajšega obdobja brez sklicevanja na načelo potrebnosti v nasprotju z zahtevo iz zakonodaje o varstvu osebnih podatkov, ki določa, da se podatki ne smejo hraniti dlje, kot je to potrebno. ENVP se zato zavzema, da se to določbo ponovno preuči v skladu z zahtevami iz člena 6(1)(e) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(e) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001 ter določi najdaljše obdobje hranjenja osebnih podatkov z izjemami, ki so mogoče le v izjemnih okoliščinah. |
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46.

Člen 19 navaja, da je treba informacije iz elektronske zbirke podatkov hraniti najmanj pet let od konca prvega koledarskega leta, v katerem se odobri dostop do informacij. V zvezi s tem obdobjem hranjenja ni navedena nobena utemeljitev. Če gre za osebne podatke, je določitev najkrajšega obdobja brez sklicevanja na načelo potrebnosti v nasprotju z zahtevo iz zakonodaje o varstvu osebnih podatkov, ki določa, da se podatki ne smejo hraniti dlje, kot je to potrebno. ENVP se zato zavzema, da se to določbo ponovno preuči v skladu z zahtevami iz člena 6(1)(e) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(e) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001 ter določi najdaljše obdobje hranjenja osebnih podatkov z izjemami, ki so mogoče le v izjemnih okoliščinah.

Informacije, ki so na voljo prek sistema VIES

| 47. | Poglavje IX predloga obravnava podatke, ki so na voljo davčnim zavezancem. Kakor je to obrazloženo v točki 13, sistem VIES trenutno davčnim zavezancem omogoča, da pridobijo potrditev veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV, pod katero je oseba opravila ali prejela dobavo blaga ali storitev znotraj Skupnosti. Komisija predlaga, da se doda stavek, ki navaja, da se takšna potrditev zahteva za namene takšnih transakcij in zato, da prosilec pridobi ime in naslov, povezan z identifikacijsko številko za DDV. ENVP meni, da so ta pravila v skladu z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov. |
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47.

Poglavje IX predloga obravnava podatke, ki so na voljo davčnim zavezancem. Kakor je to obrazloženo v točki 13, sistem VIES trenutno davčnim zavezancem omogoča, da pridobijo potrditev veljavnosti identifikacijske številke za DDV, pod katero je oseba opravila ali prejela dobavo blaga ali storitev znotraj Skupnosti. Komisija predlaga, da se doda stavek, ki navaja, da se takšna potrditev zahteva za namene takšnih transakcij in zato, da prosilec pridobi ime in naslov, povezan z identifikacijsko številko za DDV. ENVP meni, da so ta pravila v skladu z zahtevami o varstvu podatkov.

Eurofisc

| 48. | Predlog Komisije ustvarja pravno podlago za vzpostavitev skupne operacijske strukture za večstransko sodelovanje (Eurofisc). Namen te strukture je omogočiti hitro izmenjavo ciljnih informacij med vsemi državami članicami. Struktura naj bi omogočila izvajanje analize tveganja in strateške analize, in sicer na podlagi tega, katera večstranska izmenjava podatkov se izvaja. Člen 36(2) navaja, da se ureditve za izmenjavo informacij v okviru strukture, določijo v skladu s postopkom v odboru. V poglavju, ki vzpostavlja to strukturo, ni navedbe zahtev o varstvu podatkov. ENVP želi poudariti, da je treba poleg veljavne zakonodaje, kot je navedeno v delu III, določiti vrsto uporabljenih osebnih podatkov, omejiti namene, za katere bodo osebni podatki preučevani in posredovani, ter zagotoviti, da bo spoštovano načelo potrebnosti. |
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48.

Predlog Komisije ustvarja pravno podlago za vzpostavitev skupne operacijske strukture za večstransko sodelovanje (Eurofisc). Namen te strukture je omogočiti hitro izmenjavo ciljnih informacij med vsemi državami članicami. Struktura naj bi omogočila izvajanje analize tveganja in strateške analize, in sicer na podlagi tega, katera večstranska izmenjava podatkov se izvaja. Člen 36(2) navaja, da se ureditve za izmenjavo informacij v okviru strukture, določijo v skladu s postopkom v odboru. V poglavju, ki vzpostavlja to strukturo, ni navedbe zahtev o varstvu podatkov. ENVP želi poudariti, da je treba poleg veljavne zakonodaje, kot je navedeno v delu III, določiti vrsto uporabljenih osebnih podatkov, omejiti namene, za katere bodo osebni podatki preučevani in posredovani, ter zagotoviti, da bo spoštovano načelo potrebnosti.

IV.2   Drugi elementi, ki so pomembni za varstvo podatkov

Člen 57: načelo omejitve namena

| 49. | Poglavje XV predloga obravnava pogoje, ki urejajo izmenjavo informacij. Poglavje vsebuje določbe, ki obravnavajo praktične vidike izmenjave informacij. En člen je posebej pomemben z vidika varstva podatkov, in sicer člen 57. Določa, da so osebe, ki obravnavajo podatke, posredovane v okviru uredbe, zavezane k varovanju uradne tajnosti. Čeprav peti odstavek vsebuje sklic na direktivo 95/46/ES (glej spodaj), obveznost varovanja uradne tajnosti ni navedena v luči pravil o varstvu podatkov. ENVP priporoča, da zakonodajalec v prvem odstavku doda tudi sklic na zakonodajo o varstvu podatkov. |
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49.

Poglavje XV predloga obravnava pogoje, ki urejajo izmenjavo informacij. Poglavje vsebuje določbe, ki obravnavajo praktične vidike izmenjave informacij. En člen je posebej pomemben z vidika varstva podatkov, in sicer člen 57. Določa, da so osebe, ki obravnavajo podatke, posredovane v okviru uredbe, zavezane k varovanju uradne tajnosti. Čeprav peti odstavek vsebuje sklic na direktivo 95/46/ES (glej spodaj), obveznost varovanja uradne tajnosti ni navedena v luči pravil o varstvu podatkov. ENVP priporoča, da zakonodajalec v prvem odstavku doda tudi sklic na zakonodajo o varstvu podatkov.

| 50. | Zdi se, da odstavek 1 člena 57 uvaja uporabo podatkov za namene, ki so drugačni od prej navedenih v uredbi. Odstavek 3 izrecno dovoljuje uporabo informacij v „druge namene“, če se na podlagi zakonodaje države članice zaprošenega organa informacije lahko uporabijo za podobne namene. V zvezi s tem ENVP opozarja na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. ENVP poudarja, da se v primeru, ko gre za osebne podatke, ti načeloma ne smejo uporabljati za namene, ki so drugačni od namena, zaradi katerega so bili zbrani, razen če so izpolnjeni strogi pogoji iz člena 13(1) direktive ali člena 20(1) uredbe (glej tudi točke 51–53). ENVP zato zahteva, da zakonodajalec ponovno preuči to določbo glede na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Zdi se, da odstavek 1 člena 57 uvaja uporabo podatkov za namene, ki so drugačni od prej navedenih v uredbi. Odstavek 3 izrecno dovoljuje uporabo informacij v „druge namene“, če se na podlagi zakonodaje države članice zaprošenega organa informacije lahko uporabijo za podobne namene. V zvezi s tem ENVP opozarja na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. ENVP poudarja, da se v primeru, ko gre za osebne podatke, ti načeloma ne smejo uporabljati za namene, ki so drugačni od namena, zaradi katerega so bili zbrani, razen če so izpolnjeni strogi pogoji iz člena 13(1) direktive ali člena 20(1) uredbe (glej tudi točke 51–53). ENVP zato zahteva, da zakonodajalec ponovno preuči to določbo glede na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001.

Člen 57(5): omejitev nekaterih posebnih pravic in obveznosti varstva podatkov

| 51. | V uvodni izjavi 35 je navedeno, da je za namene te uredbe ustrezno preučiti omejitve nekaterih pravic in obveznosti iz direktive 95/46/ES. Naveden je tudi člen 13(1)(e) direktive, ki omogoča take omejitve. Predlog uvodni izjavi dodaja, da so zaradi možnega izpada prihodkov za države članice in bistvenega pomena teh informacij za učinkovit boj proti goljufijam, te omejitve nujne in sorazmerne. |
| --- | --- |

51.

V uvodni izjavi 35 je navedeno, da je za namene te uredbe ustrezno preučiti omejitve nekaterih pravic in obveznosti iz direktive 95/46/ES. Naveden je tudi člen 13(1)(e) direktive, ki omogoča take omejitve. Predlog uvodni izjavi dodaja, da so zaradi možnega izpada prihodkov za države članice in bistvenega pomena teh informacij za učinkovit boj proti goljufijam, te omejitve nujne in sorazmerne.

| 52. | Uvodna izjava je podrobneje razložena v členu 57(5). Po navedbi, da se za vsako hranjenje in izmenjavo informacij iz te uredbe uporabljajo določbe o izvajanju direktive 95/46/ES (glej točko 23), sledi navedba, da „države članice za namene in pravilno uporabo te uredbe omejijo obseg obveznosti in pravic iz člena 10, člena 11(1), členov 12 in 21 direktive 95/46/ES toliko, kolikor je potrebno za zaščito interesov iz člena 13(e) navedene direktive“. Navedeni členi vsebujejo obveznost, da nadzornik obvesti posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo (člena 10 in 11), o pravici dostopa do njegovih lastnih podatkov (člen 12) in dolžnosti nacionalnega organa za varstvo podatkov, da vodijo javno evidenco o postopkih obdelave podatkov (člen 21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Uvodna izjava je podrobneje razložena v členu 57(5). Po navedbi, da se za vsako hranjenje in izmenjavo informacij iz te uredbe uporabljajo določbe o izvajanju direktive 95/46/ES (glej točko 23), sledi navedba, da „države članice za namene in pravilno uporabo te uredbe omejijo obseg obveznosti in pravic iz člena 10, člena 11(1), členov 12 in 21 direktive 95/46/ES toliko, kolikor je potrebno za zaščito interesov iz člena 13(e) navedene direktive“. Navedeni členi vsebujejo obveznost, da nadzornik obvesti posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo (člena 10 in 11), o pravici dostopa do njegovih lastnih podatkov (člen 12) in dolžnosti nacionalnega organa za varstvo podatkov, da vodijo javno evidenco o postopkih obdelave podatkov (člen 21).

| 53. | ENVP poudarja, da člen 13(e) direktive 95/46/ES omogoča odstopanja od nekaterih določb direktive in ga je treba strogo razlagati. ENVP priznava, da bi se v nekaterih okoliščinah lahko štelo za potrebno za namen preprečevanja in odkrivanja davčnih goljufij začasno odložiti obveznost vnaprejšnjega obveščanja posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo, o pravici pridobitve dostopa do podatkov. Vendar člen 13 direktive 95/46/ES zahteva, da (1) je taka omejitev določena v „zakonodajnem ukrepu“ in da (2) omejitev „predstavlja potreben ukrep za zaščito“ interesov na seznamu. Sedanje besedilo predlaganega člena 57(5) ne odraža prve zahteve, saj ni nikjer omenjena potrebna zakonska podlaga. ENVP zato poziva, naj zakonodajalec vključi to zahtevo v člen 57(5). Druga zahteva se lahko razbere iz fraze „v potrebni meri“. Vendar zaradi doslednosti ENVP priporoča, da se ta fraza nadomesti s „če predstavlja potreben ukrep“. Poleg tega ENVP poziva, naj zakonodajalec zavrne predlagani dodatni stavek v uvodni izjavi 35, ki pravi, da so vse omejitve potrebne in sorazmerne, saj je ta stavek preveč splošen in nima dodane pravne vrednosti. |
| --- | --- |

53.

ENVP poudarja, da člen 13(e) direktive 95/46/ES omogoča odstopanja od nekaterih določb direktive in ga je treba strogo razlagati. ENVP priznava, da bi se v nekaterih okoliščinah lahko štelo za potrebno za namen preprečevanja in odkrivanja davčnih goljufij začasno odložiti obveznost vnaprejšnjega obveščanja posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo, o pravici pridobitve dostopa do podatkov. Vendar člen 13 direktive 95/46/ES zahteva, da (1) je taka omejitev določena v „zakonodajnem ukrepu“ in da (2) omejitev „predstavlja potreben ukrep za zaščito“ interesov na seznamu. Sedanje besedilo predlaganega člena 57(5) ne odraža prve zahteve, saj ni nikjer omenjena potrebna zakonska podlaga. ENVP zato poziva, naj zakonodajalec vključi to zahtevo v člen 57(5). Druga zahteva se lahko razbere iz fraze „v potrebni meri“. Vendar zaradi doslednosti ENVP priporoča, da se ta fraza nadomesti s „če predstavlja potreben ukrep“. Poleg tega ENVP poziva, naj zakonodajalec zavrne predlagani dodatni stavek v uvodni izjavi 35, ki pravi, da so vse omejitve potrebne in sorazmerne, saj je ta stavek preveč splošen in nima dodane pravne vrednosti.

Preglednost

| 54. | Člena 10 in 11 direktive 95/46/ES vsebujeta obveznost, da nadzornik obvesti posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo, preden se podatki zberejo, ali če se podatki ne pridobijo od njega, ob evidentiranju podatkov. Te določbe se lahko štejejo kot razlage splošnega načela preglednosti, ki je del poštene obdelave, kot jo zahteva člen 6(1)(a) direktive 95/46/ES. ENVP ugotavlja, da predlog ne vsebuje nadaljnjih določb, ki obravnavajo načelo preglednosti, na primer o tem, kako se o sistemu obvesti javnost na splošno, ali kako se posamezniki, na katere se podatki nanašajo, obvestijo o obdelavi podatkov. ENVP zato poziva, naj zakonodajalec sprejme določbo, v kateri se obravnava preglednost sistemov sodelovanja in podpore. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Člena 10 in 11 direktive 95/46/ES vsebujeta obveznost, da nadzornik obvesti posameznika, na katerega se osebni podatki nanašajo, preden se podatki zberejo, ali če se podatki ne pridobijo od njega, ob evidentiranju podatkov. Te določbe se lahko štejejo kot razlage splošnega načela preglednosti, ki je del poštene obdelave, kot jo zahteva člen 6(1)(a) direktive 95/46/ES. ENVP ugotavlja, da predlog ne vsebuje nadaljnjih določb, ki obravnavajo načelo preglednosti, na primer o tem, kako se o sistemu obvesti javnost na splošno, ali kako se posamezniki, na katere se podatki nanašajo, obvestijo o obdelavi podatkov. ENVP zato poziva, naj zakonodajalec sprejme določbo, v kateri se obravnava preglednost sistemov sodelovanja in podpore.

Člen 52: Izmenjava podatkov s tretjimi državami

| 55. | V členu 52 je predvidena možnost izmenjave informacij s tretjimi državami. Navedeno je, da „se informacije, pridobljene po tej uredbi, lahko sporočijo navedeni tretji državi s soglasjem pristojnih organov, ki so dali informacije v skladu z njihovimi domačimi določbami, ki se uporabljajo za sporočanje osebnih podatkov tretjim državam“. ENVP je zadovoljen, da se zakonodajalec zaveda posebnih pravil, ki se uporabljajo za izmenjavo osebnih podatkov v države izven EU. Zaradi jasnosti bi se lahko v besedilo vključilo izrecno sklicevanje na direktivo 95/46/ES z navedbo, da mora biti tak prenos skladen z domačimi predpisi o izvajanju določb poglavja IV direktive 95/46/ES, ki obravnava prenos osebnih podatkov v tretje države. |
| --- | --- |

55.

V členu 52 je predvidena možnost izmenjave informacij s tretjimi državami. Navedeno je, da „se informacije, pridobljene po tej uredbi, lahko sporočijo navedeni tretji državi s soglasjem pristojnih organov, ki so dali informacije v skladu z njihovimi domačimi določbami, ki se uporabljajo za sporočanje osebnih podatkov tretjim državam“. ENVP je zadovoljen, da se zakonodajalec zaveda posebnih pravil, ki se uporabljajo za izmenjavo osebnih podatkov v države izven EU. Zaradi jasnosti bi se lahko v besedilo vključilo izrecno sklicevanje na direktivo 95/46/ES z navedbo, da mora biti tak prenos skladen z domačimi predpisi o izvajanju določb poglavja IV direktive 95/46/ES, ki obravnava prenos osebnih podatkov v tretje države.

| 56. | Predlog navaja le pristojne organe držav članic. Nejasno je, ali je posredovanje (osebnih) podatkov tretjim državam predvideno tudi na evropski ravni. To je tesno povezano z vprašanji iz dela III o zakonodaji, ki se uporablja za izvajanje Eurofisc-a. Prenos osebnih podatkov tretji državi s strani institucij ali organov Skupnosti mora biti skladen s členom 9 uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. ENVP želi, da zakonodajalec to pojasni. |
| --- | --- |

56.

Predlog navaja le pristojne organe držav članic. Nejasno je, ali je posredovanje (osebnih) podatkov tretjim državam predvideno tudi na evropski ravni. To je tesno povezano z vprašanji iz dela III o zakonodaji, ki se uporablja za izvajanje Eurofisc-a. Prenos osebnih podatkov tretji državi s strani institucij ali organov Skupnosti mora biti skladen s členom 9 uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. ENVP želi, da zakonodajalec to pojasni.

Komitologija

| 57. | Kot je razvidno iz zgornje analize, obstaja več za varstvo podatkov pomembnih problemov, ki bodo nadalje obrazloženi v predpisih, ki bodo sprejeti v postopku komitologije iz člena 60 predloga (glej točke 41, 45 in 48). Čeprav ENVP razume praktično potrebo za uporabo takega postopka, želi poudariti, da morajo biti glavna sklicevanja na varstvo podatkov in jamstva določena v temeljni zakonodaji. |
| --- | --- |

57.

Kot je razvidno iz zgornje analize, obstaja več za varstvo podatkov pomembnih problemov, ki bodo nadalje obrazloženi v predpisih, ki bodo sprejeti v postopku komitologije iz člena 60 predloga (glej točke 41, 45 in 48). Čeprav ENVP razume praktično potrebo za uporabo takega postopka, želi poudariti, da morajo biti glavna sklicevanja na varstvo podatkov in jamstva določena v temeljni zakonodaji.

| 58. | ENVP želi poudariti, da bi bilo treba pri obravnavi nadaljnjih predpisov prek komitologije, to storiti ob upoštevanju zahtev o varstvu podatkov, ki izhajajo iz direktive 95/46/ES in uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Poleg tega ENVP poziva Komisijo, naj vključi ENVP in zaprosi za njegov nasvet, če se bodo res obravnavala nadaljnja pravila, ki so pomembna za varstvo podatkov. To bi bilo na primer pri vzpostavitvi Eurofisc-a (glej točko 48). |
| --- | --- |

58.

ENVP želi poudariti, da bi bilo treba pri obravnavi nadaljnjih predpisov prek komitologije, to storiti ob upoštevanju zahtev o varstvu podatkov, ki izhajajo iz direktive 95/46/ES in uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Poleg tega ENVP poziva Komisijo, naj vključi ENVP in zaprosi za njegov nasvet, če se bodo res obravnavala nadaljnja pravila, ki so pomembna za varstvo podatkov. To bi bilo na primer pri vzpostavitvi Eurofisc-a (glej točko 48).

| 59. | Da se zagotovi vključitev ENVP v sprejemanje nadaljnjih za varstvo podatkov pomembnih pravil na podlagi postopka komitologije, ENVP predlaga, naj zakonodajalec v člen 60 vključi tretji odstavek, ki določa, da „kjer se izvedbeni ukrepi nanašajo na obdelavo osebnih podatkov, opravi posvetovanje z evropskim nadzornikom za varstvo podatkov“. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Da se zagotovi vključitev ENVP v sprejemanje nadaljnjih za varstvo podatkov pomembnih pravil na podlagi postopka komitologije, ENVP predlaga, naj zakonodajalec v člen 60 vključi tretji odstavek, ki določa, da „kjer se izvedbeni ukrepi nanašajo na obdelavo osebnih podatkov, opravi posvetovanje z evropskim nadzornikom za varstvo podatkov“.

V.   SKLEPI IN PRIPOROČILA

| 60. | ENVP se zaveda pomena krepitve učinkovitosti ukrepov zoper čezmejne goljufije in doseganja boljšega pobiranja DDV v čezmejnih primerih. ENVP nadalje priznava, da je zaradi doseganja teh namenov neobhodno potrebno, da se osebni podatki obdelujejo. Vendar poudarja, da mora biti obdelava takih podatkov skladna s predpisi Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov. |
| --- | --- |

60.

ENVP se zaveda pomena krepitve učinkovitosti ukrepov zoper čezmejne goljufije in doseganja boljšega pobiranja DDV v čezmejnih primerih. ENVP nadalje priznava, da je zaradi doseganja teh namenov neobhodno potrebno, da se osebni podatki obdelujejo. Vendar poudarja, da mora biti obdelava takih podatkov skladna s predpisi Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov.

| 61. | Po analizi pravnega okvira, ki izhaja iz uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003, in trenutno predlaganih prilagoditvah, je ENVP sklenil, da kljub dejstvu, da obstaja več pozitivnih elementov, vse zahteve, ki izhajajo iz pravil Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, niso izpolnjene. |
| --- | --- |

61.

Po analizi pravnega okvira, ki izhaja iz uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003, in trenutno predlaganih prilagoditvah, je ENVP sklenil, da kljub dejstvu, da obstaja več pozitivnih elementov, vse zahteve, ki izhajajo iz pravil Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, niso izpolnjene.

| 62. | V tem mnenju ENVP zakonodajalcu svetuje naslednje:






  — | glede vprašanja veljavne zakonodaje Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, naj pojasni ustrezne pristojnosti držav članic, Komisije in sistema Eurofisc glede skladnosti s temi pravili, |
| --- | --- | --- |

62.

V tem mnenju ENVP zakonodajalcu svetuje naslednje:

—

glede vprašanja veljavne zakonodaje Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, naj pojasni ustrezne pristojnosti držav članic, Komisije in sistema Eurofisc glede skladnosti s temi pravili,

| — | glede izmenjave podatkov med pristojnimi organi na zahtevo ali spontano, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da se omejijo nameni, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti, |
| --- | --- |

—

glede izmenjave podatkov med pristojnimi organi na zahtevo ali spontano, naj opredeli vrsto osebnih podatkov, ki se lahko izmenjajo, da se omejijo nameni, za katere se osebni podatki lahko izmenjajo in oceni potrebnost prenosa ali vsaj zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti,

| — | glede izmenjave podatkov prek neposrednega dostopa do elektronskih baz podatkov, naj izrecno navede, da se glede osebnih podatkov, razen že opredeljenih podatkov v baze podatkov ne daje nobenih drugih podatkov, ali da se vsaj zagotovi, da je samodejen dostop omejen na navedene kategorije podatkov. In poleg tega, naj se omejijo nameni, za katere se v baze podatkov lahko dostopa neposredno, zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti in določi najdaljše obdobje hranjenja za hranjenje osebnih podatkov v bazi podatkov, z možnimi izjemami v izjemnih okoliščinah, |
| --- | --- |

—

glede izmenjave podatkov prek neposrednega dostopa do elektronskih baz podatkov, naj izrecno navede, da se glede osebnih podatkov, razen že opredeljenih podatkov v baze podatkov ne daje nobenih drugih podatkov, ali da se vsaj zagotovi, da je samodejen dostop omejen na navedene kategorije podatkov. In poleg tega, naj se omejijo nameni, za katere se v baze podatkov lahko dostopa neposredno, zagotovi, da se spoštuje načelo potrebnosti in določi najdaljše obdobje hranjenja za hranjenje osebnih podatkov v bazi podatkov, z možnimi izjemami v izjemnih okoliščinah,

| — | Glede člena 57 (in uvodne izjave 35),






  — | v prvem odstavku naj doda sklic na zakonodajo Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov, |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Glede člena 57 (in uvodne izjave 35),

—

v prvem odstavku naj doda sklic na zakonodajo Skupnosti o varstvu podatkov,

| — | ponovno naj preuči odstavka 1 in 3 glede na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001, |
| --- | --- |

—

ponovno naj preuči odstavka 1 in 3 glede na načelo omejitve namena, ki je določeno v členu 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člena 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001,

| — | v odstavek 5 naj vključi zahtevo iz člena 13 direktive 95/46/ES, da je treba v zakonodajnem ukrepu določiti omejitev navedenih obveznosti in pravic, |
| --- | --- |

—

v odstavek 5 naj vključi zahtevo iz člena 13 direktive 95/46/ES, da je treba v zakonodajnem ukrepu določiti omejitev navedenih obveznosti in pravic,

| — | v odstavku 5 naj nadomesti besedno zvezo „v potrebni meri“ z besedilom „če predstavlja potreben ukrep“, |
| --- | --- |

—

v odstavku 5 naj nadomesti besedno zvezo „v potrebni meri“ z besedilom „če predstavlja potreben ukrep“,

| — | zavrne naj predlagani dodatni stavek v uvodni izjavi 35, |
| --- | --- |

—

zavrne naj predlagani dodatni stavek v uvodni izjavi 35,

| — | v zvezi z načelom preglednosti naj sprejeme določbo, v kateri se obravnava preglednost sistemov sodelovanja in podpore, |
| --- | --- |

—

v zvezi z načelom preglednosti naj sprejeme določbo, v kateri se obravnava preglednost sistemov sodelovanja in podpore,

| — | v zvezi z izmenjavo podatkov s tretjimi državami naj vključi izrecno navedbo poglavja IV direktive 95/46/ES v členu 52 in pojasni, ali je predvidena izmenjava osebnih podatkov tretjim državam prek Komisije in/ali Eurofisca, |
| --- | --- |

—

v zvezi z izmenjavo podatkov s tretjimi državami naj vključi izrecno navedbo poglavja IV direktive 95/46/ES v členu 52 in pojasni, ali je predvidena izmenjava osebnih podatkov tretjim državam prek Komisije in/ali Eurofisca,

| — | V zvezi s pravili, sprejetimi na podlagi komitologije naj k členu 60 doda tretji odstavek, ki pravi: „Če se izvedbeni ukrepi nanašajo na obdelavo osebnih podatkov, je potrebno posvetovanje z Evropskim nadzornikom za varstvo podatkov.“ |
| --- | --- |

—

V zvezi s pravili, sprejetimi na podlagi komitologije naj k členu 60 doda tretji odstavek, ki pravi: „Če se izvedbeni ukrepi nanašajo na obdelavo osebnih podatkov, je potrebno posvetovanje z Evropskim nadzornikom za varstvo podatkov.“

V Bruslju, 30. oktobra 2009

Peter HUSTINX

Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov

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(1)  UL L 281, 23.11.1995, str. 31.

1

(2)  UL L 8, 12.1.2001, str. 1.

2

(3)  COM(2009) 427 konč. z dne 18. avgusta 2009.

3

(4)  UL L 264, 15.10.2003, str. 1.

4

(5)  Glej Medinstitucionalni sporazum z dne 28. novembra 2001 o bolj sistematičnem ponovnem sprejemu pravnih aktov (UL C 77, 28.3.2002, str. 1).

5

(6)  Sporočilo COM(2006) 254 z dne 31. maja 2006 o potrebi po razvoju usklajene strategije za učinkovitejši boj proti davčnim utajam.

6

(7)  Glej sklepe Sveta z dne 4. decembra 2007 in 7. oktobra 2008 ter Resolucijo Evropskega parlamenta (2008/2033(INI)) z dne 2 septembra 2008. Glej Sporočilo COM(2008) 807 z dne 1. decembra 2008.

7

(8)  UL L 347, 11.12.2006, str. 1.

8

(9)  Poročilo COM(2009) 428 z dne 18. avgusta 2009 o uporabi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1798/2003.

9

(10)  Predlog zajema spremembe uredbe (ES) št. 1798/2003, ki jih predvideva uredba Sveta (ES) št. 143/2008 in se bodo uporabljale od 1. januarja 2015 (UL L 44, 20.2.2008, str. 1). Te spremembe uvajajo pravila v zvezi s krajem opravljanja storitev, posebne sheme in postopek vračila DDV.

10

(11)  Glej obrazložitveni memorandum k predlogu na str. 4.

11

(12)  Glej člen 2(a) direktive 95/46/ES in člen 2(a) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Za pojasnitev pojma „osebni podatki“ glej mnenje 4/2007 z dne 20. junija 2007 Delovne skupine iz člena 29 (dostopen na http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf).

12

(13)  Glej tudi točko 28 in naprej. V nadaljevanju tega mnenja se vsa sklicevanja na uvodne izjave in člene nanašajo na tiste iz predloga, razen če ni drugače navedeno.

13

(14)  Za ustrezne pripombe glej mnenje ENVP z dne 16. septembra 2008 o predlogu sklepa Sveta o vzpostavitvi Evropskega informacijskega sistema kazenskih evidenc (ECRIS) (UL C 42, 20.2.2009, str. 1), točka 23 in naprej.

14

(15)  Glej člen 2(d) direktive 95/46/ES in člen 2(d) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001. Obe določbi dopuščata možnost samostojnega in skupnega nadzora („... ki sam ali skupaj z drugimi ...“).

15

(16)  Glej člen 8(5) direktive 95/46/ES in člen 10(5) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001.

16

(17)  Glej člen 6(1)(b) direktive 95/46/ES in člen 4(1)(b) uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001.

17

(18)  Glej člen 7 direktive 95/46/ES in člen 5 uredbe (ES) št. 45/2001.

18

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II Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

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Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2010/C 66/02

Komisija se je 25. februarja 2010 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32010M5712. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32010M5712. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

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Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2010/C 66/03

Komisija se je 11. marca 2010 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v nemščina in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32010M5750. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32010M5750. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

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IV Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV IN TELES EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

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Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

16. marca 2010

2010/C 66/04

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,3723 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 124,22 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4407 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,90690 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 9,7242 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,4516 |
| ISK | islandska krona | |
| NOK | norveška krona | 8,0145 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka krona | 25,504 |
| EEK | estonska krona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 264,19 |
| LTL | litovski litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | latvijski lats | 0,7077 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 3,8865 |
| RON | romunski leu | 4,0893 |
| TRY | turška lira | 2,0944 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,5005 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,3944 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 10,6493 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,9477 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,9155 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 555,03 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 10,1320 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 9,3672 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,2570 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 12 581,48 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,5538 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 62,740 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 40,2510 |
| THB | tajski bat | 44,497 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 2,4197 |
| MXN | mehiški peso | 17,1894 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 62,4650 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,3723

JPY

japonski jen

124,22

DKK

danska krona

7,4407

GBP

funt šterling

0,90690

SEK

švedska krona

9,7242

CHF

švicarski frank

1,4516

ISK

islandska krona

NOK

norveška krona

8,0145

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

češka krona

25,504

EEK

estonska krona

15,6466

HUF

madžarski forint

264,19

LTL

litovski litas

3,4528

LVL

latvijski lats

0,7077

PLN

poljski zlot

3,8865

RON

romunski leu

4,0893

TRY

turška lira

2,0944

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,5005

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,3944

HKD

hongkonški dolar

10,6493

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,9477

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,9155

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 555,03

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

10,1320

CNY

kitajski juan

9,3672

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,2570

IDR

indonezijska rupija

12 581,48

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,5538

PHP

filipinski peso

62,740

RUB

ruski rubelj

40,2510

THB

tajski bat

44,497

BRL

brazilski real

2,4197

MXN

mehiški peso

17,1894

INR

indijska rupija

62,4650

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(1)  Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

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Sporočilo Komisije o določitvi količine nekaterih proizvodov v sektorju mleka in mlečnih proizvodov, ki so na voljo v drugi polovici leta 2010 v okviru nekaterih kvot, ki jih je odprla Skupnost

2010/C 66/05

Ob dodelitvi uvoznih dovoljenj za prvo polovico leta 2010 za nekatere kvote iz Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 2535/2001 (1) so bile količine v zahtevkih za dovoljenja za zadevne proizvode manjše od razpoložljivih količin. V skladu s tem je treba določiti količino, ki je na voljo za vsako kvoto v obdobju med 1. julijem in 31. decembrom 2010, ob upoštevanju nedodeljenih količin iz zahtevkov za uvozna dovoljenja, vloženih od 20. do 30. novembra 2009 za maslo s poreklom iz Nove Zelandije v okviru številk kvote 09.4195 in 09.4182 ter za mlečne izdelke s poreklom iz Republike Moldavije v okviru številke kvote 09.4210.

Količine, ki so na voljo v obdobju med 1. julijem in 31. decembrom 2010 za drugo polovico leta uvoza nekaterih kvot iz Komisije (ES) št. 2535/2001, se določijo v višini, navedeni v nadaljevanju.

---

(1)  UL L 341, 22.12.2001, str. 29.

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PRILOGA

| Proizvodi s poreklom iz Republike Moldavije |
| --- |
| Številka kvote | Količina (kg) |
| 09.4210 | 1 500 000 |

Proizvodi s poreklom iz Republike Moldavije

Številka kvote

Količina (kg)

09.4210

1 500 000

| Maslo s poreklom iz Nove Zelandije |
| --- |
| Številka kvote | Količina (kg) |
| 09.4195 | 26 494 400 |
| 09.4182 | 33 612 000 |

Maslo s poreklom iz Nove Zelandije

Številka kvote

Količina (kg)

09.4195

26 494 400

09.4182

33 612 000

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V Mnenja

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropska komisija

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Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov v okviru delovnega programa 2010 „Ljudje“ Sedmega okvirnega programa ES za raziskave, tehnološki razvoj in predstavitvene dejavnosti

2010/C 66/06

Objavijo se razpisi za zbiranje predlogov v okviru delovnega programa 2010 „Ljudje“ Sedmega okvirnega programa Evropske skupnosti za raziskave, tehnološki razvoj in predstavitvene dejavnosti (2007–2013).

Predlogi se predložijo za naslednje razpise. Roki za oddajo in razpisana sredstva so navedeni v razpisih, ki so objavljeni na spletni strani CORDIS.

Posebni program „Ljudje“:

| Naslov razpisa | Identifikacijska oznaka razpisa |
| --- | --- |
| Štipendije znotraj Evrope | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IEF |
| Mednarodne štipendije za raziskovalce, ki prihajajo v Evropo iz držav nečlanic | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IIF |
| Mednarodne štipendije za raziskave zunaj Evrope | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IOF |

Naslov razpisa

Identifikacijska oznaka razpisa

Štipendije znotraj Evrope

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IEF

Mednarodne štipendije za raziskovalce, ki prihajajo v Evropo iz držav nečlanic

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IIF

Mednarodne štipendije za raziskave zunaj Evrope

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IOF

Ti razpisi za zbiranje predlogov se nanašajo na delovni program 2010, sprejet s Sklepom Komisije C(2009) 5892 z dne 29. julija 2009.

Podrobnejše informacije o razpisih in delovnih programih ter navodila za vlagatelje glede oddaje predlogov so na voljo na spletni strani CORDIS: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/calls/

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Razpis za oddajo predlogov za postopke „prenos načina“, „pospeševalni“, ukrepi za vzpostavitev pomorskih avtocest, ukrep „izogibanje prometu“ ter za delovanje in skupno učenje v okviru drugega programa Marco Polo

(Uredba Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1692/2006 – UL L 328, 24.11.2006, str. 1)

2010/C 66/07

Evropska Komisija začenja s postopkom zbiranja ponudb za leto 2010 v okviru drugega programa Marco Polo. Zbiranje ponudb se zaključi 18. maja 2010.

Podrobnosti o zbiranju ponudb in navodila za predlagatelje o predložitvi projekta so na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/marcopolo/calls/2010_en.htm

Služba za pomoč programa Marco Polo je dosegljiva po elektronski pošti eaci-marco-polo-helpdesk@ec.europa.eu ali faksu št. +32 22979506.

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POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

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DRŽAVNE POMOČI – NEMČIJA

Državna pomoč C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Dodatna pomoč za banko WestLB AG v zvezi z razdelitvijo sredstev

Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2010/C 66/08

Z dopisom v verodostojnem jeziku z dne 22. decembra 2009 na straneh, ki sledijo temu povzetku, je Komisija uradno obvestila Nemčijo o svoji odločitvi, da sproži postopek na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije v zvezi z zgoraj navedeno pomočjo/ukrepom.

Zainteresirane strani lahko predložijo svoje pripombe o ukrepu, v zvezi s katerim Komisija sproža postopek, v enem mesecu od datuma objave tega povzetka in dopisa, ki sledi, na naslednji naslov:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ |
| Telefaks +32 22991242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ

Telefaks +32 22991242

Te pripombe se pošljejo Nemčiji. Zainteresirana stran, ki predloži pripombe, lahko pisno zaprosi za zaupno obravnavo svoje identitete in navede razloge za to.

POVZETEK

I.   POSTOPEK

| (1) | V zadevi C 43/08 je Komisija 12. maja 2009 pogojno odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje banki WestLB v obliki zaščite pred tveganjem v višini 5 milijard EUR za portfelj Phoenix. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

V zadevi C 43/08 je Komisija 12. maja 2009 pogojno odobrila pomoč za prestrukturiranje banki WestLB v obliki zaščite pred tveganjem v višini 5 milijard EUR za portfelj Phoenix.

| (2) | Nemčija je 10. decembra 2009 priglasila, da je (ta država) izvedla dokapitalizacijo v korist banke WestLB v višini 3 milijard EUR, javni delničarji pa so zagotovili jamstvo za banko WestLB v višini 1 milijarde EUR, kar omogoča ukrep finančne pomoči v obliki t. i. slabe banke. Slaba banka bo prevzela sredstva z nominalno vrednostjo 85,1 milijarde EUR. Ukrep finančne pomoči je bil predviden v odločitvi o prestrukturiranju z dne 12. maja 2009. Toda dodatna pomoč, ki se zdaj zahteva, ni bila prej niti priglašena niti odobrena. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Nemčija je 10. decembra 2009 priglasila, da je (ta država) izvedla dokapitalizacijo v korist banke WestLB v višini 3 milijard EUR, javni delničarji pa so zagotovili jamstvo za banko WestLB v višini 1 milijarde EUR, kar omogoča ukrep finančne pomoči v obliki t. i. slabe banke. Slaba banka bo prevzela sredstva z nominalno vrednostjo 85,1 milijarde EUR. Ukrep finančne pomoči je bil predviden v odločitvi o prestrukturiranju z dne 12. maja 2009. Toda dodatna pomoč, ki se zdaj zahteva, ni bila prej niti priglašena niti odobrena.

II.   OPIS UKREPA

| (3) | Banka WestLB namerava na slabo banko prenesti svojo slabo aktivo in nestrateška sredstva. Predviden je postopek v dveh korakih: v prvem koraku želi banka WestLB prenesti slabo aktivo z nominalno vrednostjo približno 23,8 milijarde EUR, v drugem koraku, načrtovanem za april 2010, pa želi razdeliti nestrateška sredstva z nominalno vrednostjo približno 61,3 milijarde EUR (skupaj torej: 85,1 milijarde EUR). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Banka WestLB namerava na slabo banko prenesti svojo slabo aktivo in nestrateška sredstva. Predviden je postopek v dveh korakih: v prvem koraku želi banka WestLB prenesti slabo aktivo z nominalno vrednostjo približno 23,8 milijarde EUR, v drugem koraku, načrtovanem za april 2010, pa želi razdeliti nestrateška sredstva z nominalno vrednostjo približno 61,3 milijarde EUR (skupaj torej: 85,1 milijarde EUR).

| (4) | Banka WestLB bo slabi banki namenila „varnostno zalogo lastniškega kapitala“ v višini 3 milijard EUR za kritje pričakovanih izgub. Ker banka WestLB nima zadostnega kapitala, bo sklad SoFFin vanjo vložil 3 milijarde EUR v obliki tihe udeležbe. Poleg tega bodo izgube krili delničarji banke WestLB z jamstvom v višini 1 milijarde EUR. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Banka WestLB bo slabi banki namenila „varnostno zalogo lastniškega kapitala“ v višini 3 milijard EUR za kritje pričakovanih izgub. Ker banka WestLB nima zadostnega kapitala, bo sklad SoFFin vanjo vložil 3 milijarde EUR v obliki tihe udeležbe. Poleg tega bodo izgube krili delničarji banke WestLB z jamstvom v višini 1 milijarde EUR.

| (5) | Nemčija je pojasnila, da se rešitev (z ustanovitvijo) slabe banke, predvidena v odločitvi z dne 12. maja, še ni začela izvajati. Za to rešitev je nadalje potreben precejšen znesek dodatne pomoči, kot je opisano zgoraj. Zato je Nemčija predstavila posodobljen načrt za prestrukturiranje, v katerem pa so predvidene le manjše spremembe. Nemčija je prav tako dala več zavez, ki omogočajo hitrejšo prodajo banke WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Nemčija je pojasnila, da se rešitev (z ustanovitvijo) slabe banke, predvidena v odločitvi z dne 12. maja, še ni začela izvajati. Za to rešitev je nadalje potreben precejšen znesek dodatne pomoči, kot je opisano zgoraj. Zato je Nemčija predstavila posodobljen načrt za prestrukturiranje, v katerem pa so predvidene le manjše spremembe. Nemčija je prav tako dala več zavez, ki omogočajo hitrejšo prodajo banke WestLB.

III.   OCENA UKREPA

| (6) | Ukrepi – dokapitalizacija, jamstvo in ukrep finančne pomoči – pomenijo državno pomoč banki WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Ukrepi – dokapitalizacija, jamstvo in ukrep finančne pomoči – pomenijo državno pomoč banki WestLB.

| (7) | Čeprav dokapitalizacija izpolnjuje pogoje iz Sporočila o dokapitalizaciji z dne 5. decembra 2008, pa se ukrep finančne pomoči, ki ga je treba ocenjevati na podlagi Sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih z dne 25. februarja 2009, na tej stopnji ne more šteti za združljivega. Ne izpolnjuje namreč pogojev preglednosti in razkritja, vrednotenja, porazdelitve bremena ter nadomestil. Poleg tega ukrep v skladu s Sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji z dne 22. julija 2009 zbuja tudi pomisleke glede možnosti banke za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja, porazdelitev bremena in ublažitev izkrivljanja konkurence. Ob upoštevanju navedenih pomislekov se je Komisija odločila, da sproži postopek na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije glede finančne pomoči v obliki ustanovitve slabe banke ter pomoči za prestrukturiranje banke WestLB. |
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(7)

Čeprav dokapitalizacija izpolnjuje pogoje iz Sporočila o dokapitalizaciji z dne 5. decembra 2008, pa se ukrep finančne pomoči, ki ga je treba ocenjevati na podlagi Sporočila o oslabljenih sredstvih z dne 25. februarja 2009, na tej stopnji ne more šteti za združljivega. Ne izpolnjuje namreč pogojev preglednosti in razkritja, vrednotenja, porazdelitve bremena ter nadomestil. Poleg tega ukrep v skladu s Sporočilom o dokapitalizaciji z dne 22. julija 2009 zbuja tudi pomisleke glede možnosti banke za ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja, porazdelitev bremena in ublažitev izkrivljanja konkurence. Ob upoštevanju navedenih pomislekov se je Komisija odločila, da sproži postopek na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije glede finančne pomoči v obliki ustanovitve slabe banke ter pomoči za prestrukturiranje banke WestLB.

| (8) | Ker bi bila finančna stabilnost brez ukrepov neposredno ogrožena, se je Komisija odločila, da začasno za šest mesecev odobri ukrep dokapitalizacije, jamstva in finančno pomoč kot nujno pomoč po členu 107(3)(b) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije. |
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(8)

Ker bi bila finančna stabilnost brez ukrepov neposredno ogrožena, se je Komisija odločila, da začasno za šest mesecev odobri ukrep dokapitalizacije, jamstva in finančno pomoč kot nujno pomoč po členu 107(3)(b) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.

BESEDILO DOPISA

„The Commission wishes to inform Germany that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1) since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the measures with the internal market.

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 12 May 2009, in Case C 43/08 (2) the Commission conditionally approved restructuring aid to WestLB AG (“WestLB”) in the form of a risk shield on the Phoenix portfolio of EUR 5 billion. It requires the sale of the bank by the end of 2011. |
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(1)

On 12 May 2009, in Case C 43/08 (2) the Commission conditionally approved restructuring aid to WestLB AG (“WestLB”) in the form of a risk shield on the Phoenix portfolio of EUR 5 billion. It requires the sale of the bank by the end of 2011.

| (2) | On 7 October 2009, in Case N 531/09 (3) the Commission approved as compatible emergency aid a risk assumption of EUR 6,4 billion (4) of the already protected Phoenix portfolio, which de facto further increased the initial risk shield. Germany committed to notify by 30 November 2009 a revised restructuring plan which would take into account any additional State aid not approved by the Decision of 12 May 2009 and therefore provide for additional restructuring. |
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(2)

On 7 October 2009, in Case N 531/09 (3) the Commission approved as compatible emergency aid a risk assumption of EUR 6,4 billion (4) of the already protected Phoenix portfolio, which de facto further increased the initial risk shield. Germany committed to notify by 30 November 2009 a revised restructuring plan which would take into account any additional State aid not approved by the Decision of 12 May 2009 and therefore provide for additional restructuring.

| (3) | An updated restructuring plan was submitted on 15 December 2009. |
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(3)

An updated restructuring plan was submitted on 15 December 2009.

| (4) | On 10 December 2009, Germany notified a recapitalisation of WestLB amounting to EUR 3 billion as well as a guarantee of EUR 1 billion, which are necessary for the establishment of a bad bank by WestLB. The bad bank will relieve WestLB from assets with a nominal value of EUR 85,1 billion. That asset relief measure was envisaged in general terms in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009 (5). |
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(4)

On 10 December 2009, Germany notified a recapitalisation of WestLB amounting to EUR 3 billion as well as a guarantee of EUR 1 billion, which are necessary for the establishment of a bad bank by WestLB. The bad bank will relieve WestLB from assets with a nominal value of EUR 85,1 billion. That asset relief measure was envisaged in general terms in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009 (5).

| (5) | Following discussions with the Commission, Germany provided several commitments and additional information by 16 December 2009. |
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(5)

Following discussions with the Commission, Germany provided several commitments and additional information by 16 December 2009.

| (6) | Given the urgency to get a Commission decision on these measures, Germany has exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this decision should be English. |
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(6)

Given the urgency to get a Commission decision on these measures, Germany has exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this decision should be English.

2.   DESCRIPTION OF THE AID

WestLB AG

| (7) | The beneficiary WestLB is a public limited company, with its registered headquarters in North Rhine-Westphalia. WestLB is a service provider for Germany's largest savings banks network and public-sector clients. WestLB has until recently offered a universal bank's range of products and services, including products for private clients, midmarket companies and corporate enterprises, partly in cooperation with savings banks, partly via subsidiaries specialised in consumer loans, private banking and commercial real estate finance. In line with a restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009, which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, WestLB is currently unbundling its core activities and abandoning non-core activities. WestLB's published balance-sheet total was EUR 288 billion on 31 December 2008, while its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 88,5 billion. As of 30 September 2009, the bank's published balance-sheet total was equal to EUR 258,8 billion and its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 84,2 billion. |
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(7)

The beneficiary WestLB is a public limited company, with its registered headquarters in North Rhine-Westphalia. WestLB is a service provider for Germany's largest savings banks network and public-sector clients. WestLB has until recently offered a universal bank's range of products and services, including products for private clients, midmarket companies and corporate enterprises, partly in cooperation with savings banks, partly via subsidiaries specialised in consumer loans, private banking and commercial real estate finance. In line with a restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009, which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, WestLB is currently unbundling its core activities and abandoning non-core activities. WestLB's published balance-sheet total was EUR 288 billion on 31 December 2008, while its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 88,5 billion. As of 30 September 2009, the bank's published balance-sheet total was equal to EUR 258,8 billion and its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 84,2 billion.

| (8) | WestLB is currently owned by the Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (WLSGV), which accounts for 25,03 % of its shares, the Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (RSGV), which owns 25,03 % and — both directly and indirectly, via the NRW.BANK (formerly known as Landesbank Nordhein-Westfalen) — the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (37,74 %), the Landschaftsverband Westfalen Lippe (LWL; 6,09 %), and the Landschaftsverband Rheinland (LVR; 6,09 %). |
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(8)

WestLB is currently owned by the Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (WLSGV), which accounts for 25,03 % of its shares, the Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (RSGV), which owns 25,03 % and — both directly and indirectly, via the NRW.BANK (formerly known as Landesbank Nordhein-Westfalen) — the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (37,74 %), the Landschaftsverband Westfalen Lippe (LWL; 6,09 %), and the Landschaftsverband Rheinland (LVR; 6,09 %).

2.1.   The restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009

| (9) | At the end of March 2008, WestLB's shareholders granted the bank an “impaired assets relief” measure through a risk shield of up to EUR 5 billion for a portfolio of structured securities with a nominal volume of approximately EUR 23 billion (“Phoenix”) in order to prevent bank resolution procedures. |
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(9)

At the end of March 2008, WestLB's shareholders granted the bank an “impaired assets relief” measure through a risk shield of up to EUR 5 billion for a portfolio of structured securities with a nominal volume of approximately EUR 23 billion (“Phoenix”) in order to prevent bank resolution procedures.

| (10) | WestLB is currently in the process of implementing the restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009 which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009. The implementation of the plan gives rise to significant divestures and a reshuffle of the bank's business model. In particular, WestLB will stop proprietary trading activities and, overall, reduce its assets by 50 %. The bank will focus on three core business areas: “transaction banking”; “medium-sized companies, savings banks partnership, and corporate banking”, and “capital market activities and structured finance” which all have to be structurally separated. |
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(10)

WestLB is currently in the process of implementing the restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009 which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009. The implementation of the plan gives rise to significant divestures and a reshuffle of the bank's business model. In particular, WestLB will stop proprietary trading activities and, overall, reduce its assets by 50 %. The bank will focus on three core business areas: “transaction banking”; “medium-sized companies, savings banks partnership, and corporate banking”, and “capital market activities and structured finance” which all have to be structurally separated.

| (11) | In order to achieve the targeted balance sheet reduction, the restructuring plan set out explicitly in Annex 2 point 3.3.l that the “reduction of the total balance sheet and the risk-weighted assets ... is based on the assumption that WestLB will fully dispose a number of assets grouped in an exit portfolio.” However, no additional aid was foreseen or authorised for this purpose. Regarding the exit portfolio it was planned from the very beginning to spin off both structured securities and non-strategic assets of approximately EUR 85 billion (the so-called “PEG” portfolio, of which the Phoenix portfolio is part) to a so-called bad bank, set up pursuant to the Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung, the German bad bank law (FMStFG). This transaction was initially scheduled to be completed well in advance of 31 December 2009, in order to meet the caps on the balance sheet total. Moreover, Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank's ownership structure through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011. |
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(11)

In order to achieve the targeted balance sheet reduction, the restructuring plan set out explicitly in Annex 2 point 3.3.l that the “reduction of the total balance sheet and the risk-weighted assets ... is based on the assumption that WestLB will fully dispose a number of assets grouped in an exit portfolio.” However, no additional aid was foreseen or authorised for this purpose. Regarding the exit portfolio it was planned from the very beginning to spin off both structured securities and non-strategic assets of approximately EUR 85 billion (the so-called “PEG” portfolio, of which the Phoenix portfolio is part) to a so-called bad bank, set up pursuant to the Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung, the German bad bank law (FMStFG). This transaction was initially scheduled to be completed well in advance of 31 December 2009, in order to meet the caps on the balance sheet total. Moreover, Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank's ownership structure through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011.

| (12) | The spin-off could not be carried out as initially planned since WestLB's shareholders did not agree upon the set-up of the bad bank. Furthermore, the capital required to enable the spin-off of risky and non-strategic assets had been substantially underestimated. |
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(12)

The spin-off could not be carried out as initially planned since WestLB's shareholders did not agree upon the set-up of the bad bank. Furthermore, the capital required to enable the spin-off of risky and non-strategic assets had been substantially underestimated.

2.2.   The Decision of 7 October 2009

| (13) | In October 2009, additional aid in the form of a further risk assumption for the Phoenix portfolio in the amount of EUR 6,4 billion was required to address an additional capital shortage that had not been made known previously and was therefore not addressed in the Commission Decision of 12 May 2009. Due to increasing losses and mounting risk weights, the risk shield for the Phoenix portfolio was no longer sufficient to achieve a risk transfer. Therefore, the portfolio became subject to regulatory capital requirements again. As a result, WestLB's overall capital ratio fell to [< 7 %] (6) and, therefore, significantly short of the regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without the provision of additional capital or State aid, the German regulator BaFin would have been obliged to initiate bank resolution procedures. |
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(13)

In October 2009, additional aid in the form of a further risk assumption for the Phoenix portfolio in the amount of EUR 6,4 billion was required to address an additional capital shortage that had not been made known previously and was therefore not addressed in the Commission Decision of 12 May 2009. Due to increasing losses and mounting risk weights, the risk shield for the Phoenix portfolio was no longer sufficient to achieve a risk transfer. Therefore, the portfolio became subject to regulatory capital requirements again. As a result, WestLB's overall capital ratio fell to [< 7 %] (6) and, therefore, significantly short of the regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without the provision of additional capital or State aid, the German regulator BaFin would have been obliged to initiate bank resolution procedures.

| (14) | This additional aid during the restructuring phase was temporarily approved for reasons of financial stability by the Commission in its Decision of 7 October 2009. However, that decision required a reassessment of the existing restructuring plan and the planned restructuring measures. Additionally, Germany provided a commitment that all shareholders would ensure the sale of the “core” bank, including establishing a core capital ratio of 7 %. |
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(14)

This additional aid during the restructuring phase was temporarily approved for reasons of financial stability by the Commission in its Decision of 7 October 2009. However, that decision required a reassessment of the existing restructuring plan and the planned restructuring measures. Additionally, Germany provided a commitment that all shareholders would ensure the sale of the “core” bank, including establishing a core capital ratio of 7 %.

2.3.   The new measures — Bad bank and additional recapitalisation

| (15) | At the end of November 2009, the risk assumption granted under the Decision of 7 October expired before the intended asset relief measure had been implemented. In addition, despite an explicit commitment by Germany that all shareholders had undertaken to inject the capital required to increase WestLB's Tier 1 capital so that it had a Tier 1 ratio of 7 %, the savings banks failed to do so. As a result, the overall capital ratio fell to [< 6,7 %] and, thus, again short of regulatory minimum capital requirements. |
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(15)

At the end of November 2009, the risk assumption granted under the Decision of 7 October expired before the intended asset relief measure had been implemented. In addition, despite an explicit commitment by Germany that all shareholders had undertaken to inject the capital required to increase WestLB's Tier 1 capital so that it had a Tier 1 ratio of 7 %, the savings banks failed to do so. As a result, the overall capital ratio fell to [< 6,7 %] and, thus, again short of regulatory minimum capital requirements.

(a)   The recapitalisation of WestLB

| (16) | On 24 November 2009, Germany and WestLB's shareholders agreed upon the details of the creation of the bad bank under the FMStFG. WestLB is at present not sufficiently capitalized to finance this transaction without external support. Therefore, SoFFin will inject overall EUR 3 billion in at least three partial payments, taking place between 18 December 2009 and 30 April 2010, in form of a silent participation that can be converted into ordinary shares after 1 July 2010 (7). |
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(16)

On 24 November 2009, Germany and WestLB's shareholders agreed upon the details of the creation of the bad bank under the FMStFG. WestLB is at present not sufficiently capitalized to finance this transaction without external support. Therefore, SoFFin will inject overall EUR 3 billion in at least three partial payments, taking place between 18 December 2009 and 30 April 2010, in form of a silent participation that can be converted into ordinary shares after 1 July 2010 (7).

(b)   The bad bank for WestLB

| (17) | WestLB intends to spin off its toxic and non-strategic assets into a bad bank under Section 8a of the FMStFG (8). Those assets have been assigned to two portfolios, the first called Phoenix portfolio, the second PEG portfolio. |
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(17)

WestLB intends to spin off its toxic and non-strategic assets into a bad bank under Section 8a of the FMStFG (8). Those assets have been assigned to two portfolios, the first called Phoenix portfolio, the second PEG portfolio.

| (18) | The Phoenix portfolio contains toxic assets, mainly structured securities, with a nominal value of approximately EUR 23,8 billion (as of 30 June 2009). The Phoenix portfolio will be transferred to the bad bank with the original risk shield of 5 billion. |
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(18)

The Phoenix portfolio contains toxic assets, mainly structured securities, with a nominal value of approximately EUR 23,8 billion (as of 30 June 2009). The Phoenix portfolio will be transferred to the bad bank with the original risk shield of 5 billion.

| (19) | The remaining portfolio comprises mainly non-strategic assets, in particular corporate, State, municipal and student loans, as well as collateralized debt obligations, and other structured securities. It has a nominal value of approximately EUR 61,3 billion (as of 30 June 2009). |
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(19)

The remaining portfolio comprises mainly non-strategic assets, in particular corporate, State, municipal and student loans, as well as collateralized debt obligations, and other structured securities. It has a nominal value of approximately EUR 61,3 billion (as of 30 June 2009).

| (20) | The combined nominal value of the two portfolios is EUR 85,1 billion. According to information provided by Germany, the book value of the assets is equal to EUR [65-75] billion and the estimated real economic value equal to EUR [60-70] billion. No market value of the portfolios was submitted although the Commission has repeatedly asked for it. |
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(20)

The combined nominal value of the two portfolios is EUR 85,1 billion. According to information provided by Germany, the book value of the assets is equal to EUR [65-75] billion and the estimated real economic value equal to EUR [60-70] billion. No market value of the portfolios was submitted although the Commission has repeatedly asked for it.

| (21) | Regarding the set-up of the bad bank WestLB proposes a two-step procedure: in a first step, to be implemented before 31 December 2009, the Phoenix portfolio will be split off, with the retroactive cut-off date set at 1 January 2009. In a second step, planned for April 2010, WestLB intends to spin off the remaining portfolio, to be implemented retroactively with effect as of 1 January 2010. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
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(21)

Regarding the set-up of the bad bank WestLB proposes a two-step procedure: in a first step, to be implemented before 31 December 2009, the Phoenix portfolio will be split off, with the retroactive cut-off date set at 1 January 2009. In a second step, planned for April 2010, WestLB intends to spin off the remaining portfolio, to be implemented retroactively with effect as of 1 January 2010. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (22) | After the spin-off, those assets and liabilities will be held by the bad bank. In order to ensure that expected losses of the assets are sufficiently covered, WestLB will equip the bad bank with equity of EUR 3 billion. It will provide the capital step-by-step, in line with the staggered spin-off of assets and the corresponding need for capital. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
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(22)

After the spin-off, those assets and liabilities will be held by the bad bank. In order to ensure that expected losses of the assets are sufficiently covered, WestLB will equip the bad bank with equity of EUR 3 billion. It will provide the capital step-by-step, in line with the staggered spin-off of assets and the corresponding need for capital. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (23) | Potential further losses will be covered by a guarantee by WestLB's shareholders in the amount of EUR 1 billion in total, provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (EUR 0,482 billion), by the savings banks associations RSGV and WLSGV (EUR 0,501 billion), and by the regional authorities LVR and LWL (EUR 0,017 billion). Germany also requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
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(23)

Potential further losses will be covered by a guarantee by WestLB's shareholders in the amount of EUR 1 billion in total, provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (EUR 0,482 billion), by the savings banks associations RSGV and WLSGV (EUR 0,501 billion), and by the regional authorities LVR and LWL (EUR 0,017 billion). Germany also requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (24) | Should the envisaged capital not suffice to cover the losses incurred in the future by the bad bank, such losses — pursuant to the FMStFG — must be covered by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. However, that obligation to compensate further losses is capped in this case as regards RSGV and WLSGV at an amount of EUR 4 billion in total (EUR 4,5 billion considering EUR 0,5 billion related to the guarantee given as former owners, the so-called “Alteigentümergarantie”). In order to provide these EUR 4 billion, RSGV and WLSGV are permitted to build up adequate reserves for this obligation over a period of 25 years. Any further losses exceeding the equity of the bad bank and the existing guarantees will be borne by FMSA and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, releasing RSGV and WLSGV from their corresponding obligations. |
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(24)

Should the envisaged capital not suffice to cover the losses incurred in the future by the bad bank, such losses — pursuant to the FMStFG — must be covered by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. However, that obligation to compensate further losses is capped in this case as regards RSGV and WLSGV at an amount of EUR 4 billion in total (EUR 4,5 billion considering EUR 0,5 billion related to the guarantee given as former owners, the so-called “Alteigentümergarantie”). In order to provide these EUR 4 billion, RSGV and WLSGV are permitted to build up adequate reserves for this obligation over a period of 25 years. Any further losses exceeding the equity of the bad bank and the existing guarantees will be borne by FMSA and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, releasing RSGV and WLSGV from their corresponding obligations.

(c)   Envisaged further recapitalisation of WestLB

| (25) | Finally, SoFFin and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia have agreed to provide further equity for WestLB if such additional support is required to enable the sale of WestLB even after the establishment of the bad bank. 51 % of the capital needs will be provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia in the form of a first-loss guarantee, and 49 % will be provided by SoFFin. SoFFin has restricted its commitment to EUR 1 billion; hence, an overall support of EUR 2 billion must not be exceeded. This potential additional measure is not the subject of Germany's request for temporary authorisation for 6 months. |
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(25)

Finally, SoFFin and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia have agreed to provide further equity for WestLB if such additional support is required to enable the sale of WestLB even after the establishment of the bad bank. 51 % of the capital needs will be provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia in the form of a first-loss guarantee, and 49 % will be provided by SoFFin. SoFFin has restricted its commitment to EUR 1 billion; hence, an overall support of EUR 2 billion must not be exceeded. This potential additional measure is not the subject of Germany's request for temporary authorisation for 6 months.

(d)   Key assumptions of the restructuring plan

| (26) | The revised restructuring plan — of which a summary was provided on 15 December 2009 — foresees that, as initially planned, WestLB will withdraw from the markets for real estate finance (except for services provided to the saving banks), retail banking, asset management, and private equity. A core feature of WestLB’s strategic orientation towards a client-focussed business model remains the withdrawal from proprietary trading. However, WestLB had to revise the targets for profit set in the initial plan, as general market conditions over the last months proved to be worse than expected by WestLB. |
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(26)

The revised restructuring plan — of which a summary was provided on 15 December 2009 — foresees that, as initially planned, WestLB will withdraw from the markets for real estate finance (except for services provided to the saving banks), retail banking, asset management, and private equity. A core feature of WestLB’s strategic orientation towards a client-focussed business model remains the withdrawal from proprietary trading. However, WestLB had to revise the targets for profit set in the initial plan, as general market conditions over the last months proved to be worse than expected by WestLB.

| (27) | The bank now plans to achieve a target of EUR 500 million in profit before taxes only in 2014 at the earliest, and not by 2012, as initially planned. That revision of targets is not only due to general market conditions, but also due to the fact that its rating was recently downgraded to BBB+. WestLB estimates that a Single-A-Rating will not be reached again before 31 December 2010. Consequently, WestLB now has reduced access to funding whilst simultaneously it is exposed to stricter capital requirements and a significant increase in impairment charges for credit losses. Nevertheless, WestLB’s strategic thrust remains unchanged as compared to the initial plan. Deconsolidation will be extended and produce additional saving effects. Sectors without strategic importance and low expertise are to be phased out. WestLB will liquidate or sell at least five more affiliate companies than originally planned. Its offices in Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile will be closed. WestLB plans to withdraw from the funds business, own issues of closed-end investment funds, the private equity business, and the leveraged finance business. With regard to the substance of the business model, the revised restructuring plan shows overall only minor changes. |
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(27)

The bank now plans to achieve a target of EUR 500 million in profit before taxes only in 2014 at the earliest, and not by 2012, as initially planned. That revision of targets is not only due to general market conditions, but also due to the fact that its rating was recently downgraded to BBB+. WestLB estimates that a Single-A-Rating will not be reached again before 31 December 2010. Consequently, WestLB now has reduced access to funding whilst simultaneously it is exposed to stricter capital requirements and a significant increase in impairment charges for credit losses. Nevertheless, WestLB’s strategic thrust remains unchanged as compared to the initial plan. Deconsolidation will be extended and produce additional saving effects. Sectors without strategic importance and low expertise are to be phased out. WestLB will liquidate or sell at least five more affiliate companies than originally planned. Its offices in Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile will be closed. WestLB plans to withdraw from the funds business, own issues of closed-end investment funds, the private equity business, and the leveraged finance business. With regard to the substance of the business model, the revised restructuring plan shows overall only minor changes.

| (28) | Germany agreed to the Commission's proposal to establish concrete parameters that will allow monitoring of WestLB's commitment, given in the context of the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, to cease proprietary trading activities. |
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(28)

Germany agreed to the Commission's proposal to establish concrete parameters that will allow monitoring of WestLB's commitment, given in the context of the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, to cease proprietary trading activities.

| (29) | On 16 December 2009, WestLB issued an ad hoc publication announcing that it might not be able to achieve a positive result in 2009 but probably record a loss. Therefore, it would not be able to pay dividends or coupons and such instruments would participate in the loss. |
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(29)

On 16 December 2009, WestLB issued an ad hoc publication announcing that it might not be able to achieve a positive result in 2009 but probably record a loss. Therefore, it would not be able to pay dividends or coupons and such instruments would participate in the loss.

3.   COMMENTS BY GERMANY

| (30) | Due to the fact that WestLB, a systemically relevant bank, would become subject to bank resolution procedures without State aid being granted, and the serious consequences that this event would entail for Germany's financial system and to the German economy, Germany requests an urgent temporary authorisation of the measures for six months. |
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(30)

Due to the fact that WestLB, a systemically relevant bank, would become subject to bank resolution procedures without State aid being granted, and the serious consequences that this event would entail for Germany's financial system and to the German economy, Germany requests an urgent temporary authorisation of the measures for six months.

| (31) | Germany agrees that the capital injection of EUR 3 billion by SoFFin constitutes State aid. Germany also does not dispute that the taking over of losses of the owners for the assets in the bad bank could constitute aid. However, in this particular case, Germany disputes the existence of elements of State aid. It claims that the spin-off of the assets would be accompanied by sufficient equity (the EUR 3 billion) to cover expected and unexpected losses. The additional explicit guarantee provided by the shareholders and their obligation to bear potential losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank should be considered as a mere safeguard for eventualities. Potential benefits stemming from State resources would be of theoretical nature only. Whereas Germany acknowledges that, in theory, this could be the case under very unrealistic assumptions as far as the guarantee is concerned, that possibility is entirely excluded as regards the shareholders obligation to bear losses potentially resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. |
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(31)

Germany agrees that the capital injection of EUR 3 billion by SoFFin constitutes State aid. Germany also does not dispute that the taking over of losses of the owners for the assets in the bad bank could constitute aid. However, in this particular case, Germany disputes the existence of elements of State aid. It claims that the spin-off of the assets would be accompanied by sufficient equity (the EUR 3 billion) to cover expected and unexpected losses. The additional explicit guarantee provided by the shareholders and their obligation to bear potential losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank should be considered as a mere safeguard for eventualities. Potential benefits stemming from State resources would be of theoretical nature only. Whereas Germany acknowledges that, in theory, this could be the case under very unrealistic assumptions as far as the guarantee is concerned, that possibility is entirely excluded as regards the shareholders obligation to bear losses potentially resulting from the resolution of the bad bank.

| (32) | Germany commits that WestLB shall pay a remuneration of 10 % p.a. which is to be paid retroactively for the EUR 3 billion recapitalisation. |
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(32)

Germany commits that WestLB shall pay a remuneration of 10 % p.a. which is to be paid retroactively for the EUR 3 billion recapitalisation.

| (33) | Germany furthermore commits to adjust the remuneration to bring it in line with the requirements of the Impaired Assets Communication should the valuation to be performed by the Commission reveal additional benefits to WestLB. |
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(33)

Germany furthermore commits to adjust the remuneration to bring it in line with the requirements of the Impaired Assets Communication should the valuation to be performed by the Commission reveal additional benefits to WestLB.

| (34) | Germany commits that the aid shall be limited to the minimum necessary by providing the recapitalisation pro rata and by implementing a redemption mechanism should future developments result in an overcapitalisation. |
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(34)

Germany commits that the aid shall be limited to the minimum necessary by providing the recapitalisation pro rata and by implementing a redemption mechanism should future developments result in an overcapitalisation.

| (35) | Additionally, Germany commits that SoFFin will receive proceeds resulting from the sale of WestLB or parts thereof prior to the other shareholders until the capital granted by it is paid back fully. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Additionally, Germany commits that SoFFin will receive proceeds resulting from the sale of WestLB or parts thereof prior to the other shareholders until the capital granted by it is paid back fully.

| (36) | Germany further commits that until the measures are terminated, WestLB will make payments on capital instruments only to the extent it is under an obligation to do so without releasing reserves or the special reserves pursuant to Section 340(g) of the German Commercial Code. Furthermore, these instruments shall participate in losses if losses could only be avoided through the release of such reserves. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Germany further commits that until the measures are terminated, WestLB will make payments on capital instruments only to the extent it is under an obligation to do so without releasing reserves or the special reserves pursuant to Section 340(g) of the German Commercial Code. Furthermore, these instruments shall participate in losses if losses could only be avoided through the release of such reserves.

| (37) | Germany commits to start the sales process of WestLB earlier than initially planned, i.e. [within the first half of] 2010. Furthermore, if the sale has not been concluded at the beginning of 2011, Germany commits to appoint, subject to a corresponding decision by the Commission, a divestiture trustee who has the power to sell WestLB or parts thereof. Germany, however, refuses to commit to additional restructuring or measures limiting distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Germany commits to start the sales process of WestLB earlier than initially planned, i.e. [within the first half of] 2010. Furthermore, if the sale has not been concluded at the beginning of 2011, Germany commits to appoint, subject to a corresponding decision by the Commission, a divestiture trustee who has the power to sell WestLB or parts thereof. Germany, however, refuses to commit to additional restructuring or measures limiting distortion of competition.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Existence of State aid

| (38) | Article 107(1) TFEU provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Article 107(1) TFEU provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

| (39) | In concurrence with the German authorities, the Commission considers first that the EUR 3 billion capital injection of SoFFin and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion by WestLB's shareholders constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (9). No market investor would grant WestLB the same support under the current circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

In concurrence with the German authorities, the Commission considers first that the EUR 3 billion capital injection of SoFFin and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion by WestLB's shareholders constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (9). No market investor would grant WestLB the same support under the current circumstances.

| (40) | Additionally, the Commission considers that the establishment of a bad bank under the FMStFG can comprise additional aid to the beneficiary bank which must be assessed under the Commission’s Impaired Asset Communication (10) (“IAC”). The IAC provides guidance on the treatment under Article 107(3)(b) EC of asset relief measures by Member States, including in particular bad bank solutions as indicated in Annex II to the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Additionally, the Commission considers that the establishment of a bad bank under the FMStFG can comprise additional aid to the beneficiary bank which must be assessed under the Commission’s Impaired Asset Communication (10) (“IAC”). The IAC provides guidance on the treatment under Article 107(3)(b) EC of asset relief measures by Member States, including in particular bad bank solutions as indicated in Annex II to the IAC.

| (41) | The Commission recalls that according to the IAC impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses. It defines asset relief as any measure whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. In the present case the main purpose of the bad bank is to provide relief from risky and non-strategic assets of WestLB. The bad bank solution is intended to protect WestLB against the risk of future devaluation of assets included in the portfolio. The bad bank, in its design as well in its effects, allows WestLB to avoid considerable write-downs and at the same time reduces the bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, the bad bank constitutes an asset relief measure and falls within the scope of the IAC (11). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Commission recalls that according to the IAC impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses. It defines asset relief as any measure whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. In the present case the main purpose of the bad bank is to provide relief from risky and non-strategic assets of WestLB. The bad bank solution is intended to protect WestLB against the risk of future devaluation of assets included in the portfolio. The bad bank, in its design as well in its effects, allows WestLB to avoid considerable write-downs and at the same time reduces the bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, the bad bank constitutes an asset relief measure and falls within the scope of the IAC (11).

| (42) | According to point 39 of the IAC an impaired asset measure constitutes State aid in so far as the transfer value exceeds the market value of the total portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

According to point 39 of the IAC an impaired asset measure constitutes State aid in so far as the transfer value exceeds the market value of the total portfolio.

| (43) | In this case, the assets will be spun off at the book value of EUR [65-75] billion. However, WestLB provides the bad bank with equity in the amount of EUR 3 billion. Providing equity to the bad bank is, from an economic perspective, equivalent to a write-down before a transfer. Therefore, this equity can be subtracted from the book value in order to obtain the transfer value. The transfer value is thus EUR [62-72] billion. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

In this case, the assets will be spun off at the book value of EUR [65-75] billion. However, WestLB provides the bad bank with equity in the amount of EUR 3 billion. Providing equity to the bad bank is, from an economic perspective, equivalent to a write-down before a transfer. Therefore, this equity can be subtracted from the book value in order to obtain the transfer value. The transfer value is thus EUR [62-72] billion.

| (44) | As no market value has been submitted, the market value can deemed to be zero. Hence, the Commission at this stage deems that the aid amount is EUR [62-72] billion. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

As no market value has been submitted, the market value can deemed to be zero. Hence, the Commission at this stage deems that the aid amount is EUR [62-72] billion.

| (45) | Finally, it shall be noted that apart from the risk shield of EUR 5 billion none of the aid to be received by WestLB has been subject to the final Decision of 12 May 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Finally, it shall be noted that apart from the risk shield of EUR 5 billion none of the aid to be received by WestLB has been subject to the final Decision of 12 May 2009.

4.2.   Application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (46) | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU empowers the Commission to decide that aid is compatible with the internal market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission acknowledges that, overall, the threat of a serious disturbance in the German economy persists and that measures supporting banks are suitable to address that threat. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU empowers the Commission to decide that aid is compatible with the internal market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission acknowledges that, overall, the threat of a serious disturbance in the German economy persists and that measures supporting banks are suitable to address that threat.

| (47) | Given the significance of its integration and cooperation with other public sector banks, the Commission accepts that WestLB is a systemically relevant bank. The Commission further notes that the measures which are linked to each other contractually and, therefore, interdependent, are suitable to address WestLB's breach of regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without these measures, the shortfall of regulatory minimum capital requirements would trigger bank resolution procedures by the competent regulatory authority. The Commission concludes that such a failure would entail serious consequences for the German financial sector and the real economy. The measures must therefore be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Given the significance of its integration and cooperation with other public sector banks, the Commission accepts that WestLB is a systemically relevant bank. The Commission further notes that the measures which are linked to each other contractually and, therefore, interdependent, are suitable to address WestLB's breach of regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without these measures, the shortfall of regulatory minimum capital requirements would trigger bank resolution procedures by the competent regulatory authority. The Commission concludes that such a failure would entail serious consequences for the German financial sector and the real economy. The measures must therefore be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

4.3.   Compatibility with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (48) | The Commission has already made a first assessment regarding compatibility of some restructuring aid received by WestLB in its Decision of 12 May 2009. However, that decision did not authorise the additional aid which is the subject of the present decision. The compatibility of that additional aid needs therefore to be assessed separately. The Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009 (12) states in point 27 that such additional aid during the restructuring can only be provided if it is justified for reasons of financial stability and is limited to the minimum necessary to restore viability. Pursuant to point 16 of the Restructuring Communication such measures cannot be approved under a scheme but must be authorised ex ante individually. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Commission has already made a first assessment regarding compatibility of some restructuring aid received by WestLB in its Decision of 12 May 2009. However, that decision did not authorise the additional aid which is the subject of the present decision. The compatibility of that additional aid needs therefore to be assessed separately. The Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009 (12) states in point 27 that such additional aid during the restructuring can only be provided if it is justified for reasons of financial stability and is limited to the minimum necessary to restore viability. Pursuant to point 16 of the Restructuring Communication such measures cannot be approved under a scheme but must be authorised ex ante individually.

4.3.1.   Recapitalisation

| (49) | As with any recapitalisation measure, the recapitalisation of WestLB in form of a silent participation by SoFFin amounting to EUR 3 billion needs to be examined in the context of the Communication of 5 December 2008 on the limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (Recapitalisation Communication) (13) independently of the fact that it is required and intended to establish a bad bank. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

As with any recapitalisation measure, the recapitalisation of WestLB in form of a silent participation by SoFFin amounting to EUR 3 billion needs to be examined in the context of the Communication of 5 December 2008 on the limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (Recapitalisation Communication) (13) independently of the fact that it is required and intended to establish a bad bank.

| (50) | The Recapitalisation Communication sets out that such measures are in principle appropriate if they prevent the insolvency of a bank and thereby serve financial stability as well as supporting the provision with credit of the real economy. However, such measures must limit distortions of competition to the minimum. To this end, section 2 of the Recapitalisation Communication requires an appropriate remuneration. As noted in point 11 of the Recapitalisation Communication, market-oriented pricing of capital injections would be the best safeguard against unjustified disparities in the level of capitalisation and improper use of such capital. Furthermore, section 2.3 of the Recapitalisation Communication explicitly states that such remuneration must be higher in the case of distressed banks, but pursuant to point 44 in any event as close as possible to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. The German rescue scheme requires at least 10 % on average for banks that are not fundamentally sound, according to the institution's risk profile. This was confirmed as a benchmark for distressed banks in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 615/08 (14). WestLB is considered to be a distressed bank since it would have been subject to bank resolution procedures without aid being granted. Thus, the capital provided must be remunerated with at least 10 % p.a. to be compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. According to the commitments provided by Germany, WestLB will pay 10 % p.a. This rate is in line with the above requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Recapitalisation Communication sets out that such measures are in principle appropriate if they prevent the insolvency of a bank and thereby serve financial stability as well as supporting the provision with credit of the real economy. However, such measures must limit distortions of competition to the minimum. To this end, section 2 of the Recapitalisation Communication requires an appropriate remuneration. As noted in point 11 of the Recapitalisation Communication, market-oriented pricing of capital injections would be the best safeguard against unjustified disparities in the level of capitalisation and improper use of such capital. Furthermore, section 2.3 of the Recapitalisation Communication explicitly states that such remuneration must be higher in the case of distressed banks, but pursuant to point 44 in any event as close as possible to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. The German rescue scheme requires at least 10 % on average for banks that are not fundamentally sound, according to the institution's risk profile. This was confirmed as a benchmark for distressed banks in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 615/08 (14). WestLB is considered to be a distressed bank since it would have been subject to bank resolution procedures without aid being granted. Thus, the capital provided must be remunerated with at least 10 % p.a. to be compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. According to the commitments provided by Germany, WestLB will pay 10 % p.a. This rate is in line with the above requirements.

| (51) | The recapitalisation must be seen in the context of the updated restructuring of WestLB which already provides for sufficient behavioural safeguards in line with point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication. Moreover, Germany has provided several commitments to ensure a restricted dividend policy and that the recapitalisation will be used only to implement the objectives of the original decision. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The recapitalisation must be seen in the context of the updated restructuring of WestLB which already provides for sufficient behavioural safeguards in line with point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication. Moreover, Germany has provided several commitments to ensure a restricted dividend policy and that the recapitalisation will be used only to implement the objectives of the original decision.

| (52) | Therefore, the recapitalisation is compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. However, pursuant to point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication, it can only be authorised temporarily for six months until the presentation of a revised restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Therefore, the recapitalisation is compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. However, pursuant to point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication, it can only be authorised temporarily for six months until the presentation of a revised restructuring plan.

4.3.2.   Asset relief measures

| (53) | Asset relief measures by Member States, irrespective of their form, need to be assessed under the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Asset relief measures by Member States, irrespective of their form, need to be assessed under the IAC.

—   Eligibility of assets

| (54) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. It notes that assets which have triggered the financial crisis and are subject to severe downward value adjustments appear to account for the bulk of uncertainty and scepticism concerning the viability of banks. In this respect, US mortgage backed securities and associated hedges and derivatives are mentioned. The IAC also notes, however, that an overly narrow relief measure would not be advisable and refers to a proportionate approach permitting the extension of eligibility to well-defined categories of other assets as well. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. It notes that assets which have triggered the financial crisis and are subject to severe downward value adjustments appear to account for the bulk of uncertainty and scepticism concerning the viability of banks. In this respect, US mortgage backed securities and associated hedges and derivatives are mentioned. The IAC also notes, however, that an overly narrow relief measure would not be advisable and refers to a proportionate approach permitting the extension of eligibility to well-defined categories of other assets as well.

| (55) | The bad bank does not only consist of structured securities but comprises also corporate, State, municipal, and student loans. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The bad bank does not only consist of structured securities but comprises also corporate, State, municipal, and student loans.

| (56) | While in principle it would be questionable whether a spin-off of such assets at a transfer price above the market value is compatible with State aid rules, the IAC recognises in point 34 the necessity of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the selection of asset types for impaired assets measures (15). The Commission notes that the range of asset classes affected by the financial crisis became broader due to spillover effects. In particular, student loans and securities related to shipping, aircraft and real estate in general, face illiquid markets and/or are subject to severe downward adjustments. Asset relief for such assets can help to achieve the objectives of the IAC, i.e. to increase transparency and to contribute to financial stability, even if such assets are not included in the assets classes that initially triggered the financial crisis. Therefore, the Commission has in previous cases accepted asset relief measures for those assets (16). As set out in point 36 of the IAC, however, the comparatively broad range of assets affected requires an increased depth of restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

While in principle it would be questionable whether a spin-off of such assets at a transfer price above the market value is compatible with State aid rules, the IAC recognises in point 34 the necessity of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the selection of asset types for impaired assets measures (15). The Commission notes that the range of asset classes affected by the financial crisis became broader due to spillover effects. In particular, student loans and securities related to shipping, aircraft and real estate in general, face illiquid markets and/or are subject to severe downward adjustments. Asset relief for such assets can help to achieve the objectives of the IAC, i.e. to increase transparency and to contribute to financial stability, even if such assets are not included in the assets classes that initially triggered the financial crisis. Therefore, the Commission has in previous cases accepted asset relief measures for those assets (16). As set out in point 36 of the IAC, however, the comparatively broad range of assets affected requires an increased depth of restructuring.

—   Transparency and disclosure

| (57) | As regards transparency and disclosure, section 5.1 of the IAC requires full ex ante transparency and disclosure of impairments on the assets which are covered by relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the competent supervisory authority. This valuation must be provided to the Commission according to point 37 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

As regards transparency and disclosure, section 5.1 of the IAC requires full ex ante transparency and disclosure of impairments on the assets which are covered by relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the competent supervisory authority. This valuation must be provided to the Commission according to point 37 of the IAC.

| (58) | In that respect, the Commission notes that information provided by Germany so far only covers some of the assets to be taken over by the bad bank. Moreover, no detailed evaluation performed by independent experts has yet been submitted to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In that respect, the Commission notes that information provided by Germany so far only covers some of the assets to be taken over by the bad bank. Moreover, no detailed evaluation performed by independent experts has yet been submitted to the Commission.

| (59) | Consequently, the Commission notes that the IAC's criteria regarding transparency and disclosure are not met and, therefore, questions the compatibility of the measures with the State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Consequently, the Commission notes that the IAC's criteria regarding transparency and disclosure are not met and, therefore, questions the compatibility of the measures with the State aid rules.

—   Management of assets

| (60) | As regards management of assets, section 5.6 of the IAC requires a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its shielded assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. In this respect, the Commission notes that a bad bank ensures a clear functional and organisational separation, and is thus sufficient to achieve compliance. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

As regards management of assets, section 5.6 of the IAC requires a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its shielded assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. In this respect, the Commission notes that a bad bank ensures a clear functional and organisational separation, and is thus sufficient to achieve compliance.

—   Valuation

| (61) | Section 5.5 of the IAC explains that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition and to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Section 5.5 of the IAC explains that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition and to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies.

| (62) | Germany, so far, has only submitted estimated and/or preliminary figures and not disclosed all relevant details of the portfolios concerned and the methodology used for the assessment. Therefore, the Commission has doubts about the valuation of the real economic value of the portfolio being EUR [60-70] billion. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Germany, so far, has only submitted estimated and/or preliminary figures and not disclosed all relevant details of the portfolios concerned and the methodology used for the assessment. Therefore, the Commission has doubts about the valuation of the real economic value of the portfolio being EUR [60-70] billion.

—   Burden-sharing

| (63) | As regards ex ante burden-sharing, section 5.2 of the IAC points out that banks ought to bear the losses associated with the impaired assets to the maximum extent. Burden sharing is usually achieved by a transfer at the real economic value and requires a corresponding write down of the book value. Accordingly, the beneficiary bank must disclose incurred and expected losses of the portfolio, and should limit the transfer price to the real economic value. However, if the beneficiary bank capitalises the bad bank with sufficient equity and thereby enables the bad bank to absorb future losses, the same economic effect is obtained. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

As regards ex ante burden-sharing, section 5.2 of the IAC points out that banks ought to bear the losses associated with the impaired assets to the maximum extent. Burden sharing is usually achieved by a transfer at the real economic value and requires a corresponding write down of the book value. Accordingly, the beneficiary bank must disclose incurred and expected losses of the portfolio, and should limit the transfer price to the real economic value. However, if the beneficiary bank capitalises the bad bank with sufficient equity and thereby enables the bad bank to absorb future losses, the same economic effect is obtained.

| (64) | As indicated above, the “transfer value” is EUR [62-72] billion. Germany claims that the equity to be provided to the bad bank (i.e. EUR 3 billion) is sufficient to cover so-called expected losses. In the absence of a proper valuation it remains unclear whether this equity is sufficient to cover the write down or first loss required under the IAC as no details regarding the methodology used have been revealed. However, aggregate figures provided by Germany reveal a difference between the book value and the real economic value of EUR [2,5-5,5] billion. Thus, the equity provided appears to be insufficient to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value, which is at odds with the requirements of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

As indicated above, the “transfer value” is EUR [62-72] billion. Germany claims that the equity to be provided to the bad bank (i.e. EUR 3 billion) is sufficient to cover so-called expected losses. In the absence of a proper valuation it remains unclear whether this equity is sufficient to cover the write down or first loss required under the IAC as no details regarding the methodology used have been revealed. However, aggregate figures provided by Germany reveal a difference between the book value and the real economic value of EUR [2,5-5,5] billion. Thus, the equity provided appears to be insufficient to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value, which is at odds with the requirements of the IAC.

| (65) | Moreover, the Commission notes that the shareholders have granted a guarantee amounting to EUR 1 billion which is already required to compensate for the shortfall of equity mentioned in point 62. Furthermore, the shareholders have an obligation to bear losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. Germany claims that both obligations will theoretically not be needed and do not have an economic value. This claim is however contradicted by the need felt by the parties concerned not only to notify the additional guarantee of EUR 1 billion but to cap the saving banks obligation to bear losses incurred by the bad bank. This is, in the view of the Commission, further evidence that the equity provided to the bad bank is not sufficient to cover all potential losses and, therefore, to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Moreover, the Commission notes that the shareholders have granted a guarantee amounting to EUR 1 billion which is already required to compensate for the shortfall of equity mentioned in point 62. Furthermore, the shareholders have an obligation to bear losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. Germany claims that both obligations will theoretically not be needed and do not have an economic value. This claim is however contradicted by the need felt by the parties concerned not only to notify the additional guarantee of EUR 1 billion but to cap the saving banks obligation to bear losses incurred by the bad bank. This is, in the view of the Commission, further evidence that the equity provided to the bad bank is not sufficient to cover all potential losses and, therefore, to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value.

| (66) | The Commission consequently has doubts that the measures amount to proper burden sharing in line with the IAC and reserves a final judgement on compatibility until the real economic value has been properly established. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that the additional explicit guarantee of EUR 1 billion is part of the asset relief measures and must therefore take part in its approval. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission consequently has doubts that the measures amount to proper burden sharing in line with the IAC and reserves a final judgement on compatibility until the real economic value has been properly established. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that the additional explicit guarantee of EUR 1 billion is part of the asset relief measures and must therefore take part in its approval.

—   Remuneration

| (67) | Point 21 of the IAC notes that correct remuneration is another element of the burden-sharing requirement. The Commission shall ensure, as noted in Annex IV to that Communication, that any pricing of the asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those projected in the determination of the real economic value. In line with the Commission's recent practice (17) this is based upon the capital relief effect resulting thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 21 of the IAC notes that correct remuneration is another element of the burden-sharing requirement. The Commission shall ensure, as noted in Annex IV to that Communication, that any pricing of the asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those projected in the determination of the real economic value. In line with the Commission's recent practice (17) this is based upon the capital relief effect resulting thereof.

| (68) | The notification does not indicate how WestLB will remunerate the asset relief measure. Instead, Germany claims there is no need to provide remuneration, because the equity provided to the bad bank was sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Apart from the fact that the Commission has doubts as to the establishment of the real economic value, it has not received any figures for the calculation of the capital relief effect. Since it is not in a position to verify whether the claim of Germany is correct, the Commission must reserve doubts in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The notification does not indicate how WestLB will remunerate the asset relief measure. Instead, Germany claims there is no need to provide remuneration, because the equity provided to the bad bank was sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Apart from the fact that the Commission has doubts as to the establishment of the real economic value, it has not received any figures for the calculation of the capital relief effect. Since it is not in a position to verify whether the claim of Germany is correct, the Commission must reserve doubts in this respect.

| (69) | Furthermore, the Commission highlights again the potential benefit stemming from the shareholders obligation to bear the losses of the bad bank and that apparently it was necessary to cap this obligation as regards the saving banks. This is further evidence that the equity may not be sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Nevertheless, no remuneration is envisaged. Therefore the Commission raises doubts regarding remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Furthermore, the Commission highlights again the potential benefit stemming from the shareholders obligation to bear the losses of the bad bank and that apparently it was necessary to cap this obligation as regards the saving banks. This is further evidence that the equity may not be sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Nevertheless, no remuneration is envisaged. Therefore the Commission raises doubts regarding remuneration.

4.4.   Revised restructuring plan

| (70) | The recapitalisation and the asset relief measures are provided with the aim of enabling the restructuring of WestLB. WestLB was already previously under the obligation to present a restructuring plan (18), which was recently submitted. Germany claims that its most recent update aims also at incorporating the current measures including the potential EUR 2 billion mentioned in recital 24. They will thus be subject to this preliminary assessment under the Commission's Restructuring Communication (19). |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The recapitalisation and the asset relief measures are provided with the aim of enabling the restructuring of WestLB. WestLB was already previously under the obligation to present a restructuring plan (18), which was recently submitted. Germany claims that its most recent update aims also at incorporating the current measures including the potential EUR 2 billion mentioned in recital 24. They will thus be subject to this preliminary assessment under the Commission's Restructuring Communication (19).

| (71) | The updated restructuring plan reveals that the original timetable for the asset relief measure has been delayed. Moreover, the currently assessed measures show that a significant amount of additional aid is required compared to the aid under assessment in the Decision of 12 May 2009. Therefore, in the context of the assessment of the revised restructuring plan, all aid measures, including those which were already examined in the Decision of 12 May 2009, will be considered when evaluating the restoration of viability of WestLB through the spin-off of assets into a bad bank and the sale of the remainder by the end of 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The updated restructuring plan reveals that the original timetable for the asset relief measure has been delayed. Moreover, the currently assessed measures show that a significant amount of additional aid is required compared to the aid under assessment in the Decision of 12 May 2009. Therefore, in the context of the assessment of the revised restructuring plan, all aid measures, including those which were already examined in the Decision of 12 May 2009, will be considered when evaluating the restoration of viability of WestLB through the spin-off of assets into a bad bank and the sale of the remainder by the end of 2011.

—   Return to viability

| (72) | The Commission first doubts whether WestLB can generate sufficient revenues that would enable the bank to pay an appropriate remuneration for the recapitalisation and the asset relief measures. Hence, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan is suitable to restore the viability of WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission first doubts whether WestLB can generate sufficient revenues that would enable the bank to pay an appropriate remuneration for the recapitalisation and the asset relief measures. Hence, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan is suitable to restore the viability of WestLB.

| (73) | Furthermore, the restructuring plan raises doubts that it is suitable to ensure that WestLB can be sold in a public tender in whole or in parts. As regards marketability, Germany anticipates that further capital will be required to enable the sale of the bank. The Commission takes this as an indication that Germany does not assume that the restructuring plan is apt to achieve the sale of the bank. According to the business plan, even in a medium-term perspective two of the three core business areas currently break even only because a considerable amount of costs has been accounted for in the Corporate Centre unit and has not been fully allocated to the three core business areas. The Commission therefore has doubts that these core business areas are marketable. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Furthermore, the restructuring plan raises doubts that it is suitable to ensure that WestLB can be sold in a public tender in whole or in parts. As regards marketability, Germany anticipates that further capital will be required to enable the sale of the bank. The Commission takes this as an indication that Germany does not assume that the restructuring plan is apt to achieve the sale of the bank. According to the business plan, even in a medium-term perspective two of the three core business areas currently break even only because a considerable amount of costs has been accounted for in the Corporate Centre unit and has not been fully allocated to the three core business areas. The Commission therefore has doubts that these core business areas are marketable.

| (74) | One of WestLB's core assumptions for the business plan — and a key factor for prospects of its profitability in the future — is that the bank will receive a Single-A rating again in the future. However, in May 2009 WestLB was downgraded to BBB+. Moreover, an analysis of a recent reporting by Standard & Poor's (dated 15 October 2009) shows that this rating agency is sceptical about the business model of WestLB, highlighting the weakness of focussing on cyclical wholesale business areas and the vulnerability to financial stress from recessions and difficult capital market conditions. Hence, the scepticism that is expressed in that report does not justify assuming that the bank's rating will improve in the short-term. Thus, the projected profit and loss figures are unlikely to be achieved as the current plan seems to significantly underestimate WestLB's cost of funding. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

One of WestLB's core assumptions for the business plan — and a key factor for prospects of its profitability in the future — is that the bank will receive a Single-A rating again in the future. However, in May 2009 WestLB was downgraded to BBB+. Moreover, an analysis of a recent reporting by Standard & Poor's (dated 15 October 2009) shows that this rating agency is sceptical about the business model of WestLB, highlighting the weakness of focussing on cyclical wholesale business areas and the vulnerability to financial stress from recessions and difficult capital market conditions. Hence, the scepticism that is expressed in that report does not justify assuming that the bank's rating will improve in the short-term. Thus, the projected profit and loss figures are unlikely to be achieved as the current plan seems to significantly underestimate WestLB's cost of funding.

—   Own contribution

| (75) | Germany has provided a commitment to limit payments on capital instruments in case of losses and to achieve loss contribution. According to an ad hoc publication dated 16 December 2009, WestLB will probably post a loss for 2009 and not release reserves to enable payment and coupons or prevent loss participation. Shareholders and other creditors of capital instruments will hence contribute to the restructuring. However, the notified measures limit the potential for losses and thus enable WestLB to serve these instruments in the future. Thus, burden-sharing by shareholders and holders of capital instruments will remain limited. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Germany has provided a commitment to limit payments on capital instruments in case of losses and to achieve loss contribution. According to an ad hoc publication dated 16 December 2009, WestLB will probably post a loss for 2009 and not release reserves to enable payment and coupons or prevent loss participation. Shareholders and other creditors of capital instruments will hence contribute to the restructuring. However, the notified measures limit the potential for losses and thus enable WestLB to serve these instruments in the future. Thus, burden-sharing by shareholders and holders of capital instruments will remain limited.

| (76) | In particular, the savings banks, instead of participating adequately in the burden-sharing, benefit significantly from the asset relief measure. As a result of the recapitalisation, they only contribute to the restructuring process of WestLB to a very limited extent. Furthermore, according to the FMStFG, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank should also compensate for losses that may occur at the resolution of the bad bank, corresponding to their stake. However, this obligation of the savings banks and consequently their participation in future losses of the bad bank has been capped at EUR 4,5 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In particular, the savings banks, instead of participating adequately in the burden-sharing, benefit significantly from the asset relief measure. As a result of the recapitalisation, they only contribute to the restructuring process of WestLB to a very limited extent. Furthermore, according to the FMStFG, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank should also compensate for losses that may occur at the resolution of the bad bank, corresponding to their stake. However, this obligation of the savings banks and consequently their participation in future losses of the bad bank has been capped at EUR 4,5 billion.

| (77) | On this basis the Commission has doubts that burden-sharing is sufficient. Moreover, should Germany not propose genuine measures for burden-sharing of the savings banks, the Commission would have to ask for recovery of any unlawful and incompatible aid from the savings banks. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

On this basis the Commission has doubts that burden-sharing is sufficient. Moreover, should Germany not propose genuine measures for burden-sharing of the savings banks, the Commission would have to ask for recovery of any unlawful and incompatible aid from the savings banks.

—   Measures limiting the distortion of competition

| (78) | According to point 30 of the Restructuring Communication, the nature and form of measures limiting the distortion of competition depends on the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted, as well as on the characteristics of the market or markets on which the beneficiary bank will operate. The Commission doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effect of the entire aid (original aid and present aid) are sufficient as no relevant additional measures have been proposed notwithstanding the substantial additional aid to be received by WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

According to point 30 of the Restructuring Communication, the nature and form of measures limiting the distortion of competition depends on the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted, as well as on the characteristics of the market or markets on which the beneficiary bank will operate. The Commission doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effect of the entire aid (original aid and present aid) are sufficient as no relevant additional measures have been proposed notwithstanding the substantial additional aid to be received by WestLB.

| (79) | Given the potential magnitude of the aid stemming from the original measures plus asset relief measures and the capital injection, the Commission, at this stage, cannot exclude that [...] WestLB might be the only alternative to make all the aid compliant with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Given the potential magnitude of the aid stemming from the original measures plus asset relief measures and the capital injection, the Commission, at this stage, cannot exclude that [...] WestLB might be the only alternative to make all the aid compliant with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

5.   CONCLUSION AND TEMPORARY AUTHORISATION OF THE MEASURES

| (80) | All measures in favour of WestLB constitute State aid, which can however not be authorised at this stage because the asset relief measure does not fulfil the conditions of transparency and disclosure, valuation, burden sharing, and remuneration and because of doubts regarding the chances of restoration of viability, burden sharing and the mitigation of distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

All measures in favour of WestLB constitute State aid, which can however not be authorised at this stage because the asset relief measure does not fulfil the conditions of transparency and disclosure, valuation, burden sharing, and remuneration and because of doubts regarding the chances of restoration of viability, burden sharing and the mitigation of distortion of competition.

| (81) | However, the Commission has established that it will authorise emergency measures temporarily if needed for reasons of financial stability (20), while it is not ready to take a definite decision given doubts on compatibility of the measures as restructuring aid. In the present case the supervisory authorities have confirmed that the aid is necessary in order to prevent of the initiation of bank resolution procedures of a systemically relevant bank. |
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(81)

However, the Commission has established that it will authorise emergency measures temporarily if needed for reasons of financial stability (20), while it is not ready to take a definite decision given doubts on compatibility of the measures as restructuring aid. In the present case the supervisory authorities have confirmed that the aid is necessary in order to prevent of the initiation of bank resolution procedures of a systemically relevant bank.

| (82) | It has first been established that the recapitalisation measures fulfil the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication. |
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(82)

It has first been established that the recapitalisation measures fulfil the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication.

| (83) | Second, as regards the asset relief measures, the Commission has doubts regarding their compatibility with the IAC. These doubts relate in particular to the real economic value, which could not be assessed at this stage. However, these doubts do not hinder a temporary approval for reasons of financial stability, because Germany committed that the measure would be brought in line with the IAC if the real economic value turned out to be lower than submitted. Moreover, the Commission has verified that the other criteria of the IAC are met (in particular eligibility and the management of assets) and that the recapitalisation and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion ensure some limited burden sharing at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Second, as regards the asset relief measures, the Commission has doubts regarding their compatibility with the IAC. These doubts relate in particular to the real economic value, which could not be assessed at this stage. However, these doubts do not hinder a temporary approval for reasons of financial stability, because Germany committed that the measure would be brought in line with the IAC if the real economic value turned out to be lower than submitted. Moreover, the Commission has verified that the other criteria of the IAC are met (in particular eligibility and the management of assets) and that the recapitalisation and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion ensure some limited burden sharing at this stage.

| (84) | Given the imminent threat of the initiation of bank resolution procedures in the absence of the measures, the Commission considers the recapitalisation measure and the asset relief to be temporarily compatible for six months with the internal market as emergency support under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Therefore, the Commission has at this stage temporarily no objection to the transfer of the assets to the bad bank. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Given the imminent threat of the initiation of bank resolution procedures in the absence of the measures, the Commission considers the recapitalisation measure and the asset relief to be temporarily compatible for six months with the internal market as emergency support under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Therefore, the Commission has at this stage temporarily no objection to the transfer of the assets to the bad bank.

| (85) | In light of the doubts regarding compatibility of the asset relief measure with the IAC and the failure of the current revised restructuring plan to demonstrate that it will ensure the sale of the beneficiary, proper burden sharing and mitigate the distortions of competition, the Commission needs to further investigate the measures and thus to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In light of the doubts regarding compatibility of the asset relief measure with the IAC and the failure of the current revised restructuring plan to demonstrate that it will ensure the sale of the beneficiary, proper burden sharing and mitigate the distortions of competition, the Commission needs to further investigate the measures and thus to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU.

6.   DECISION

The Commission concludes that the measures notified by Germany on 10 December 2009 concerning the recapitalisation of WestLB, the guarantee and the associated asset relief measure constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU regarding the asset relief in the form of the establishment of a bad bank concerning transparency and disclosure, valuation and burden sharing (including remuneration) as well as on the restructuring aid (asset relief, recapitalisation and guarantee) to WestLB.

On the basis of the commitments provided by Germany, and in order to secure financial stability the Commission authorises the asset relief in the form of the establishment of a bad bank, the recapitalisation by SoFFin in the amount of EUR 3 billion as well as the guarantee of the shareholders of EUR 1 billion temporarily for a period of six months.

Germany is required to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular:

—   transparency and disclosure including evaluation: the final composition of the portfolios and the evaluation of the assets to be spun off,

—   burden sharing and remuneration: detailed information regarding burden sharing and remuneration for the asset relief measure, based upon evaluation,

—   suitability of the restructuring plan to enable sale: a revised restructuring plan that takes into account the full amount of State aid granted, comprising adequate remuneration, additional in-depth restructuring, and measures limiting distortion of competition.

Should the Commission come to the conclusion that unlawful State aid was granted to savings bank which are members of Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband and Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband by releasing them from their obligation to contribute to the recapitalisation and by introducing a cap to their liabilities and thus their participation in losses of bad bank, such unlawful aid if incompatible will be recovered from the savings banks.

Germany is requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

The Commission wishes to remind Germany that Article 108(3) TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Germany that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.

The Commission notes, that for the reason of urgency Germany exceptionally accepts the adoption of the decision in the English language.“

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(1)  With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty have become Articles 107 and 108, respectively, of the TFEU. The two sets of provisions are, in substance, identical. For the purposes of this Decision, references to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU should be understood as references to Articles 87 and 88, respectively, of the EC Treaty where appropriate.

1

(2)  Cf. Commission Decision of 12 May 2009 in Case C 43/08, Restructuring of WestLB AG, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/C-43-2008-WLWL-en-12.5.2009.pdf

2

Restructuring of WestLB AG

(3)  Cf. Commission Decision of 7 October 2009 in Case N 531/09, Assumption of Risk for WestLB, not yet published.

3

Assumption of Risk for WestLB

(4)  According to information sent by Germany on 18 November 2009, the risk shield that was in the end contractually agreed upon was only EUR 5,9 billion, therefore lower than the amount initially notified.

4

(5)  Cf. point 1.1 and 3.3 of the Annex to Commission Decision of 12 May 2009 in Case C 43/08, Restructuring of WestLB AG, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/C-43-2008-WLWL-en-12.5.2009.pdf

5

Restructuring of WestLB AG

(6)  Confidential information.

6

(7)  It is contractually excluded that SoFFin can become majority shareholder.

7

(8)  The FMStFG in section 8a provides the possibility for the SoFFin to create a bad bank, a so-called “Bundesrechtliche Abwicklungsanstalt”. Its main objective is to take over — and subsequently to wind-up — risky and non-strategic assets. Usage of a bad bank requires that the requesting bank has a viable business model and is sufficiently capitalized. Upon request, the SoFFin will allow or reject the application after an assessment of the business concept for the bad bank and an evaluation of the assets to be taken over.

8

The bad bank's take-over of assets shall be accomplished in the form of an asset spin-off by the beneficiary bank which is released from any contingent liabilities (“Nachhaftung”) of the bad bank. Instead, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank remain liable for debts of the bad bank and are obliged to loss compensation (“Verlustübernahme”), if required, corresponding to their percentage of equity. The bad bank is an organisationally and economically autonomous entity within the Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FMSA) with the legal capacity to act and take legal action on its own behalf. If a bad bank is created, the SoFFin is responsible for its monitoring, coordination and liquidation, while the bad bank is autonomously responsible to cover its operating costs. Losses or surpluses after the wind-up of the bad bank's asset are allocated to the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. Therefore, the FMStFG requires that potential losses are borne by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank.

Additionally, according to section 8 point 4.5 FMStFG, a beneficiary bank has to disclose all risks associated with the respective assets prior to the asset relief measure. However, there is no obligation to evaluate the assets.

(9)  This also applies to the additional EUR 2 billion for the benefit of WestLB mentioned in point 25.

9

(10)  Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1.

10

(11)  As regards the application ratione temporis the Commission recalls that it has to apply law and guidelines in force at the time of the adoption of the decision, irrespective of the time at which the aid measures were designed or notified (cf. Case C 334/07 P Commission v Freistaat Sachsen, judgment of 11 December 2008, not yet reported) The IAC applies to the present bad bank, since it agreed to and notified after the publication of the IAC, notwithstanding its retroactive entering into force.

11

Commission

Freistaat Sachsen

(12)  Commission Communication on the return viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial crisis under State aid rules, OJ C 195, 14.8.2009, p. 9.

12

(13)  Communication from the Commission — Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2.

13

(14)  See point 16 in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 625/08, OJ C 143, 24.6.2009, p. 1.

14

(15)  Commission Decision of 22 October 2009 in Case C 29/09, HSH Nordbank, point 40, OJ C 281, 21.11.2009, p. 42.

15

(16)  Commission Decision of 22 October 2009 in Case C 29/09, HSH Nordbank, OJ C 281, 21.11.2009, p. 42, point 40. To some extent also Commission Decision of 15 December 2009 in Case C 17/09 — LBBW, not yet published.

16

(17)  Cf. Commission Decision of 15 December 2008 in Case C 17/08 LBBW, Commission Decision of 18 November 2009 in Case C 10/09 ING.

17

(18)  The Commission already noted in its Decision of 7 October 2009 that the need for additional aid in the restructuring phase required reassessment of the implementation of the existing restructuring plan.

18

(19)  Although the Decision of 12 May 2009 made reference to the 2004 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, the Commission has clarified in point 49 of the Restructuring Communication that all aid notified to the Commission before 31 December 2010 will be assessed as restructuring aid to banks pursuant to that Communication instead of the 2004 Guidelines.

19

(20)  Commission Decision of 13 November in Case C 15/08, Hypo RealEstate, not yet published, and Commission Decision of 31 March 2009 in Case C 10/09 ING, OJ C 158, 11.7.2009, p. 13.

20

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