UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4848

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NAKIA MONICA BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00020-RLV-DSC-1)

Submitted: May 19, 2015 Decided: May 22, 2015

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Anthony 

J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nakia Monica Brown appeals her sentence for conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012), and 

aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1), (b) (2012). Brown argues that the district court 

lacked an adequate factual basis for determining the loss and 

restitution amounts and that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise this issue. The Government argues that Brown’s 

sentencing challenges are barred by the appeal waiver in her 

plea agreement. We dismiss the appeal.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive her

appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). United States 

v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 

S. Ct. 1579 (2015). A waiver will preclude an appeal of “a 

specific issue if . . . the waiver is valid and the issue . . . 

is within the scope of the waiver.” Id. Whether a defendant 

validly waived her right to appeal is a question of law that we 

review de novo. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 

(4th Cir. 2013). Our review of the record leaves us with no 

doubt that Brown knowingly and voluntarily waived her appellate 

rights and that the sentencing claims raised on appeal fall 

within the scope of her valid waiver.

The waiver, however, does not preclude our consideration of 

Brown’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Brown 
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asserts that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the 

loss and restitution amounts at sentencing. Unless an 

attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of 

the record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally 

addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 

238, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 215 (2015). 

Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion brought 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit 

sufficient development of the record. United States v. 

Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the 

record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 

(1984), we decline to review this claim in this direct appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED