In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00051-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 10

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1553148

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

TANISHA LARACHEAL ROEBUCK, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In one point, Tanisha Laracheal Roebuck challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support her conviction for criminal trespass at a hospital. Roebuck’s 

challenge hinges on testimony describing her as a “patient” at the hospital, arguing that 

because she was then under treatment, she must have had the hospital’s consent to be 

present. But the jury could have disbelieved this evidence and instead placed its 

confidence in testimony that Roebuck was not undergoing treatment of any kind;

multiple witnesses testified that Roebuck was at the hospital solely to contest a prior 

trespass warning. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the element of lack of 

consent, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Roebuck was charged with criminal trespass in connection with the events of 

July 11, 2018, when she was arrested and removed from John Peter Smith Hospital 

(JPS) in Fort Worth.1 At a jury trial, the evidence established as follows:

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1Roebuck was also charged with resisting arrest. However, the jury found 

Roebuck not guilty of that offense, and it is not at issue in this appeal. 

2Consistent with our standard of review, we recite the background facts in the 

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving conflicting inferences in favor of 

the verdict. Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. 

State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
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A. Officer McQuade’s Testimony

Officer Andrew McQuade testified that on July 1, 2018, he observed Roebuck, 

a homeless woman, sitting in the lobby of JPS with her dog, watching a video on her 

phone. Officer McQuade had seen her around JPS several times in the preceding days, 

but he did not believe that she was receiving treatment. After interviewing her, Officer 

McQuade found that she did not have business at JPS. Roebuck said that someone on 

hospital staff—she did not say who—had “given her permission to hang out at the 

hospital.” In Officer McQuade’s view, no one on staff was authorized to do such a 

thing. Officer McQuade gave Roebuck a criminal trespass warning and explained to 

her that she could not be on hospital grounds for any reason other than medical 

treatment. Roebuck stated that she understood. He then escorted her off the property 

without incident. 

B. Norma Rodriguez’s Testimony

Norma Rodriguez, who worked in patient relations at JPS, testified that Roebuck 

came to the hospital again on July 11, 2018. Roebuck inquired whether the trespass 

warning could be lifted. Rodriguez explained that it would not be lifted and that under 

the trespass warning, she could not be at JPS unless she was there for treatment. 

However, Roebuck gave no indication that she was there for treatment. Instead, 

Roebuck asked if she could get ice or use the restroom at the hospital. Rodriguez made 

clear that this would be inconsistent with the warning. Because Roebuck did not seem 
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to understand, Rodriguez asked for and received Roebuck’s permission to have an 

officer come and explain the warning to her. 

C. Officer J. Taylor’s Testimony

Officer J. Taylor testified that when he arrived, he attempted to explain the 

boundaries of the trespass warning to Roebuck and that it would not be lifted. Roebuck 

became combative, claiming that a social worker had given her permission to be at JPS. 

However, Officer Taylor contacted the social worker, who explained that she had not 

given Roebuck permission to be there. After Officer Taylor exhausted all avenues of 

explaining the situation to Roebuck, he asked her to leave the property. Roebuck said 

she would not leave and began walking farther into the hospital. Officer Taylor stepped 

in front of her. Officer Taylor testified that he gave her another opportunity to leave, 

but Roebuck refused, so he arrested her for criminal trespass. 

D. Erica Smith’s Testimony

Erica Smith, a social worker at JPS, testified that she regularly worked with the 

local homeless population, and she estimated that she had seen Roebuck several times 

between February and July 2018. According to Smith, when she learned that Roebuck 

had been issued a trespass warning, she advised Roebuck that she could visit the 

hospital’s patient relations department to address the issue. However, Smith agreed 

that she did not have the authority to override the trespass warning. 
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E. Roebuck’s Testimony

Roebuck testified that after she became ill, she began seeking medical attention, 

first at various hospitals in Dallas and then at JPS. According to Roebuck, her first visit 

to JPS was on February 17, 2018, when she received treatment for severe, chronic pain 

stemming from a past car accident. Roebuck testified that between February and July 

of 2018, she checked herself into JPS many times for various medical conditions. 

In Roebuck’s version of events, she was having digestive problems on July 1, 

2018, so she was staying near the bathroom in JPS’s lobby when Officer McQuade 

approached her and gave her a trespass warning. By Roebuck’s account, she was 

confused because Smith, JPS’s own social worker, had given her permission to be there. 

Nonetheless, Roebuck testified that she complied with the warning. She explained that 

the next day, she emailed Smith about how to address the warning, and Smith instructed 

her to visit the patient relations department. 

Roebuck claimed that when she visited the patient relations department on July 

11, 2018, Rodriguez reviewed her records and agreed that Roebuck had a number of 

health conditions under treatment, so Rodriguez “didn’t see what the problem was.” 

According to Roebuck, Rodriguez said, “[L]et me call an officer down here and see if 

we can get this rectified.” 

Roebuck testified that when Officer Taylor arrived, he was immediately 

belligerent and disbelieved that Smith had given Roebuck permission to enter the 

hospital. Roebuck stated that after he finished his call with Smith, Officer Taylor 
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instructed Roebuck to leave the hospital. According to Roebuck, she agreed to do so 

but told Officer Taylor that she was going to get some food at a restaurant within the 

hospital before leaving. Roebuck testified that as she walked down the hall, Officer 

Taylor roughed her up and arrested her. However, Roebuck agreed that when she was 

instructed to the leave the hospital, she did not go toward the exit. 

F. Jury’s Verdict

When the State rested, Roebuck moved for directed verdict. The trial court 

denied the motion. 

After the close of the evidence, the jury found Roebuck guilty of criminal 

trespass. The trial court assessed punishment at sixty days in jail with credit for time 

served. Roebuck appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

In her sole point, Roebuck challenges the denial of her motion for directed 

verdict. Citing evidence that she was a “patient” at the hospital, she argues that the 

evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that she lacked the hospital’s effective consent 

to be present on the day of her arrest. 

We treat a point of error complaining about a trial court’s denial of 

directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith v. State, 499 

S.W.3d 1, 6 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In our sufficiency review, we view all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational 

factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 

S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s 

responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 

S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Thus, when performing an 

evidentiary-sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and 

credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. 

Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the 

evidence’s cumulative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. 

Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 

227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not 

engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all 

the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting 

inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Murray, 457 

S.W.3d at 448–49. “Under this standard, evidence may be legally insufficient when the 

record contains either no evidence of an essential element, merely a modicum of 

evidence of one element, or if it conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Queeman, 

520 S.W.3d at 622 (quoting Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
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A person commits the offense of criminal trespass if the person enters or remains 

on or in property of another without effective consent and the person (1) had notice 

that the entry was forbidden or (2) received notice to depart but failed to do so. Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a).

Roebuck argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that she lacked the 

hospital’s effective consent. As Roebuck points out, it is undisputed that the trespass 

warning she received was conditional: it did not apply if she was receiving medical 

attention. Roebuck underscores testimony that, in her view, suggests she was receiving 

medical attention on the day of her arrest. For instance, Officer McQuade agreed that 

Roebuck “was a patient from time to time” at the hospital. Similarly, Roebuck testified 

that she had been intermittently receiving treatment at JPS since February. Finally, and 

most importantly, Rodriguez described her as a “current patient” at certain points 

during her testimony:

Q. Let me ask you, when you say patient was—was she a current 

patient, was she a former patient, was she a future patient?

A. I’ve never come to counter—encounter this patient before. Just 

looking at her record I could see that she was a current patient. 

As we understand her argument, Roebuck contends that this testimony conclusively 

establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether she had the hospital’s consent to be on the 

property. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

However, the jury could have disbelieved this testimony—or rather, viewed it in 

the context of subsequent testimony clarifying that the use of the term “patient” did 
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not mean that Roebuck was receiving treatment on the day of her arrest. For example, 

Rodriguez later made clear that she had been using the phrase “current patient” to refer 

to anyone with a recent medical file at the hospital, not just those who were presently 

being treated. To the contrary, Rodriguez believed that Roebuck did not have an 

appointment on the day she was arrested; Rodriguez attested that Roebuck was not a 

“patient” in that sense. Similarly, Officer Taylor testified that when he spoke with 

Roebuck, she “stated she was not a patient” in that sense. 

Rather, according to multiple witnesses, Roebuck was not at the hospital to 

receive medical treatment but to contest her trespass warning. By Rodriguez’s account, 

Roebuck never indicated that she was actually at the hospital for treatment on July 11, 

and it did not appear that Roebuck was having any kind of medical emergency. 

According to Rodriguez, it appeared that Roebuck was there for the purpose of 

contesting the trespass warning. Likewise, Officer Taylor testified that he did not 

believe Roebuck was there for medical reasons; in his view, Roebuck’s sole aim was to 

contest the criminal trespass warning. And even according to Roebuck’s own version 

of events, she was present at the hospital on July 11 to contest the trespass warning 

through the patient relations department, and she never mentioned any further 

intention to seek medical aid. 

From this testimony, the jury could have rationally inferred that protest, not 

treatment, was the purpose of Roebuck’s visit, and treatment was the only path by 

which Roebuck had JPS’s consent to pass onto hospital property. See Murray, 457 
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S.W.3d at 448–49. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, then, 

we conclude the cumulative force of the record evidence would have enabled any 

rational jury to find a lack of effective consent. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622; Ray v.

State, No. 03-14-00538-CR, 2016 WL 1317941, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 30, 2016, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding, in a prosecution for 

trespass at a hospital, that the evidence was sufficient to show lack of consent because 

the appellant professed that his reason for being at the hospital was to protest a trespass 

warning similar to the one issued here, and because there was no evidence that the 

appellant was seeking medical treatment). Aside from consent, Roebuck has not 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support any other element of her 

conviction. We therefore overrule her sole point.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 10, 2019