NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 210131-U

Order filed February 15, 2023

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

BARNEY WILLIS, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-21-0131 

Circuit No. 02-CF-27 

Honorable 

Katherine S. Gorman, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Peterson and Brennan concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition at the first

stage.

¶ 2 Defendant, Barney Willis, appeals from the first-stage dismissal of his postconviction 

petition. Defendant argues that his petition made an arguable showing that appellate counsel 

provided ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the Peoria County circuit court’s ruling on 

his motion to suppress. We affirm.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A grand jury indicted defendant with aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) 

(West 2002)). The indictment alleged that “[defendant,] a person over the age of 18 years 

knowingly caused great bodily harm to [A.W.,] a child under the age of 13 years *** in that he 

repeatedly pushed [A.W.’s] body against the mattress of her crib causing brain damage.”

Defendant retained private counsel. 

¶ 5 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the videotaped statement he made to police arguing 

that he did not have a lawyer present; he was interrogated at length at a time when he was 

physically and emotionally exhausted; the police made misleading promises to him; the police 

bullied and coached him; he made several statements but the police only recorded the incriminating 

statement; and unless the totality of the interrogation could be shown, which included the police 

tactics and his original answers, the recording was misleading and prejudicial. 

¶ 6 At the hearing on the motion, Detective Michael Eddlemon testified that he responded to 

the hospital where other detectives informed him of an infant—A.W.—admitted to the intensive 

care unit with a subdural hematoma. Eddlemon spoke with A.W.’s parents, Gale Hoskins and

defendant. Eddlemon asked to interview defendant at the Peoria Police Department. Defendant 

agreed. The interview began at 10:55 p.m. Eddlemon informed defendant of his Miranda rights. 

Defendant said he understood his rights and wanted to speak with the detectives. 

¶ 7 Eddlemon asked defendant what happened to A.W. Defendant told Eddlemon 

approximately five different stories concerning what happened to A.W., and none were consistent 

with A.W.’s injuries. Eddlemon took a 15-minute break from interviewing defendant. Eddlemon 

resumed the interview, advised defendant his Miranda warnings were still in effect, and asked 

defendant if he still agreed to speak with him. Defendant agreed. Defendant told Eddlemon another 
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version regarding what happened to A.W. Eddlemon informed defendant that he did not have to

continue speaking with him. Eddlemon asked defendant to tell him the truth. Defendant told 

Eddlemon a final version of events which was more consistent with A.W.’s injuries than the prior 

versions. 

¶ 8 Defendant agreed to provide a videotaped statement and signed an authorization for 

recording form and a video Miranda waiver. Eddlemon testified that he did not threaten, coach, 

bully, nor promise defendant anything for his recorded statement. Eddlemon also observed that 

defendant responded appropriately to the questions asked. The State played defendant’s 

videotaped statement.

¶ 9 In the video, defendant acknowledges that he is being recorded. Defendant states that he

understands his Miranda rights and then waives those rights. Defendant states that no officer 

physically harmed him nor promised him immunity for his statement. Defendant admits that he 

was able to use the bathroom, eat, and drink throughout the duration of the interview. Defendant 

states he can read and write. Defendant states his name, date of birth, address, and telephone 

number. 

¶ 10 Eddlemon asks defendant to tell him what happened to A.W. Defendant states that his 

mother-in-law picked up A.W. earlier that day and they returned at approximately 3:30 p.m. At 

approximately 4 p.m., defendant placed A.W. in her crib. Defendant said he played “too rough” 

with A.W. by “bouncing” her “like a basketball” in the crib. Defendant “bounc[ed]” A.W. 

approximately four to five inches off the mattress. A.W. started crying so defendant stopped. A.W. 

began making a bicycle motion or a running motion. A.W. started twitching. Defendant says he 

did not take A.W. to the doctor because he was scared. A.W. stopped twitching at approximately
4 

7 p.m. A.W. started twitching again at approximately 12 or 1 a.m. Defendant took A.W. to the 

doctor. 

¶ 11 Defendant states he “screwed up” and “hurt [A.W.]” Defendant admits his previous stories 

were lies because he was scared. Defendant apologizes for his actions, states he did not know what 

came over him, and he would never hurt A.W.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Eddlemon testified that Detective Matthew Ray observed the 

interrogation. The interrogation ended at approximately 2:24 a.m. the following morning. The 

interrogation was 31⁄2 hours long. Eddlemon only recorded defendant’s statement because that was 

department protocol. Eddlemon did not suggest answers to defendant or offer defendant a deal for 

his statement.

¶ 13 Ray testified that he observed defendant’s interrogation. Eddlemon did not offer defendant 

a deal or any form of leniency for his statement or suggest answers to defendant. Ray did not find 

defendant’s early versions regarding A.W.’s injuries credible because they did not account for the 

lack of external injury.

¶ 14 Defendant testified that he dropped out of high school his senior year. Defendant worked 

at a fast food restaurant. He was awake approximately 40 hours prior to his interrogation because 

he did not sleep the night before. During the interrogation, defendant was worried about A.W. and 

eager to return to the hospital. Defendant initially lied to the officers because he thought they 

would leave him alone. Defendant fabricated the story about bouncing A.W. on the bed. Defendant 

did not bounce A.W. on the bed. Eddlemon offered defendant a deal for his confession. Eddlemon 

said he would speak with the state’s attorney handling the case. Eddlemon offered probation, anger 

management, and parenting classes. Defendant said that Eddlemon coached him through the 

videotaped statement. Ray left the interrogation room before Eddlemon offered defendant a deal.
5 

¶ 15 On cross-examination, defendant testified he did not consider the fabricated stories lies 

because he was concerned about A.W. and was willing to do anything to return to her. Defendant 

testified that he never hurt A.W. Defendant also testified that he lied to the police.

¶ 16 In its ruling, the court found the State’s witnesses credible and defendant incredible. The 

court found that no promises, threats, coercion, or force were used to obtain defendant’s statement. 

The court found that defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights, understood those rights, 

and waived those rights. The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 17 The matter proceeded to a bench trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found 

defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a child. The presentence investigation report indicated 

that defendant was 34 years old and had no prior convictions. The court sentenced defendant to 28 

years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove that he acted 

knowingly and that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him. We affirmed 

defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Willis, No. 3-04-0194 (2006) (unpublished order 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 18 Defendant, as a self-represented litigant, filed a postconviction petition wherein he argued 

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the denial of his motion 

to suppress his videotaped statement. The court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition. 

Defendant appeals.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 Defendant argues that the court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition 

because his petition raised an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 

failing to challenge the court’s denial of his motion to suppress his videotaped statement on direct 

appeal.
6 

¶ 21 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) sets out a threestage proceeding in which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction resulted from a 

substantial denial of his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or 

both. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). At the first stage, the court must accept as true and 

liberally construe all the allegations in the petition unless contradicted by the record. People v. 

Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). A defendant need only allege sufficient facts to state the 

“gist” of a constitutional claim for his petition to be forwarded to the second stage. Hodges, 234 

Ill. 2d at 9. The circuit court may summarily dismiss a first-stage petition as frivolous or patently 

without merit where it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Id. at 16. “A petition which lacks an 

arguable basis either in law or in fact is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal 

theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. “An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory 

is one which is completely contradicted by the record.” Id. The dismissal of a postconviction 

petition is reviewed de novo. Id. at 9.

¶ 22 “Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the test 

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).” People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 

185 (2010). “A postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may not be 

dismissed at the first stage of the proceedings if: (1) counsel’s performance arguably fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the petitioner was arguably prejudiced as a result.”

Id. “Normally, appellate counsel’s choices concerning which issues to pursue are entitled to 

substantial deference.” People v. Johnson, 205 Ill. 2d 381, 406 (2002). “Appellate counsel is not 

obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to 

refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel’s 

appraisal of the merits is patently wrong.” People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000). Defendant 
7 

suffered no prejudice if the underlying issue lacks merit. Johnson, 205 Ill. 2d at 406. “[F]ailure to 

establish either prong is fatal to the claim.” People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 318 (2010).

¶ 23 Defendant’s first-stage petition failed because he cannot make an arguable showing of 

prejudice because a challenge to the motion to suppress ruling would have been meritless. In 

reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we substantially defer to the circuit 

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, and we reverse only if those findings are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). However, we 

review de novo whether the confession was voluntary. Id.

¶ 24 The circuit court found Eddlemon’s and Ray’s testimony credible and defendant’s 

testimony unreliable. This testimony established that defendant was provided with the Miranda 

warnings before submitting to the videotaped interview and that the police made no promises, 

threats, or coercion to procure defendant’s consent to the videotaped statement. We defer to these 

evidence-based findings since a contrary finding is not patently obvious. People v. Relwani, 2019 

IL 123385, ¶ 18 (“A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if ‘the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the 

evidence presented.’ ” (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)).

¶ 25 Next, we must determine whether these facts establish that defendant’s videotaped 

statement was voluntarily given. Whether a statement is voluntarily given depends on the totality 

of the circumstances. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54. “The test of voluntariness is whether [defendant] 

‘made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or 

whether [defendant’s] will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.’ ” Id. (quoting People 

v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996)). “Factors to consider include [defendant’s] age, 

intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the 
8 

time of questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the presence of Miranda warnings; 

the duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence 

of threats or promises.” People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 253-54 (2009). 

¶ 26 We begin by noting the following factors weigh against a finding of voluntariness. 

Defendant had little to no prior experience with the criminal justice system, he was suffering from

sleep deprivation at the time of the interrogation, and he was in a distraught emotional state. 

However, the circuit court did not find defendant credible, so we provide little weight to 

defendant’s testimony that he suffered sleep deprivation and a weakened emotional state. 

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the duration of the interrogation weighs against admission. However, 

defendant’s interrogation was only approximately 31⁄2 hours long; police gave him a 15-minute 

break; and defendant admitted that he was allowed to use the bathroom, eat, and drink throughout 

the duration of the interview. See People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 199 (1989). Accordingly, we 

find that this factor neither weighs for nor against a finding of voluntariness.

¶ 28 Defendant next argues that his intelligence, education, and background also weigh against 

admission. However, intelligence in this context means the ability to understand the words used in 

the Miranda warnings. People v. Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, ¶ 42. From our review, the 

record establishes that defendant had the intelligence, education, and background to comprehend 

the Miranda warnings and with this information, he made several Miranda waivers during the 

interview.

¶ 29 The following factors further favor finding defendant’s statement to be voluntary: 

defendant was an adult at the time of the interrogation; defendant freely agreed to be interrogated 

and never requested counsel; Miranda warnings were given at numerous stages; defendant 

consistently waived and understood his Miranda rights; and there was no evidence of any 
9 

promises, threats, coercion, or force used to obtain defendant’s confession. Based on the totality 

of this evidence, defendant’s confession was voluntary. Accordingly, appellate counsel did not 

arguably provide ineffective assistance because defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudice 

as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to raise a meritless challenge to the court’s ruling on his 

motion to suppress. See Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 318.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. 

¶ 32 Affirmed.