ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

October 31,2006 

The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield 

Hunt County Attorney 

Post Office Box 1097 

Greenville, Texas 75403-1097 

OpinionNo. GA-0480 

Re: Whether a deputy sheriff may use a county 

patrol vehicle to perform off-duty security work 

@Q-0482-GA) 

Dear Mr. Littlefield: 

You inform us that Hunt County “deputy sheriffs working off duty security used county 

patrol vehicles, in the course and scope of that off duty employment, without reimbursing the county 

for the use of the county patrol vehicle.“’ Consequently, you ask four questions about the authority 

of a deputy sheriff to use the county’s vehicle in this manner. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. 

Specifically, you ask: 

(1) May a deputy sheriff who is engaged in working off duty 

(security) employment, use a county patrol vehicle in the course and 

scope ofthat offduty (security) employment, without reimbursing the 

county for the use of the county patrol vehicle? 

(2) May a Sheriff allow a deputy sheriff, who is engaged in 

working off duty (security) employment, to use a county patrol 

vehicle in the course and scope of that off duty (security) 

employment, without providing reimbursement to the county for the 

use of the county patrol vehicle? 

(3) Should reimbursement of the county vehicle be required 

for its use in the above, which individual or agency sets the amount 

to be reimbursed to the county for its use-the sheriff or the 

commissioner’s court? 

‘Letter from Honorable Joel D. Littlefield, Hunt County Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General 

of Texas at 1 (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also availabfe af http://www.oag.state.tx.us) 

[hereinafier Request Letter]. 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 2 (GA-0480) 

(4) May the Commissioner’s Court prevent patrol vehicles, 

which were assigned to the sheriffs office, from being used in off 

duty (security) employment by deputy sheriffs? 

Id. at l-2. Because your first two questions raise related questions of law, we treat them together, 

Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution provides that the “[llegislature shall have 

no power to authorize any county to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in 

aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever.” TEX. CONST. art. III, $52(a). 

This provision is not violated if the public receives consideration for granting a thing of value. Tex. 

Mun. League Intergov’tl Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. 

2002). This provision, moreover, does not prohibit a grant of a public thing of value that incidentally 

benefits a private party if the grant is made to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. Walker v. City 

of Georgetown, 86 S.W.3d 249,260 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). To satisfy this public 

purpose exception, the grant’s predominant purpose must be to accomplish a public purpose, not to 

benefit private parties; there must be public control over the assets to ensure that the public purpose 

is accomplished and to protect the public’s investment; and the public must receive a return benetit. 

Tex. Mun. League Intergov’tl RiskPool, 74 S.W.3d at 384. 

A sheriff is required to conserve the peace within the sheriffs county. See TEX. CODE CRLM. 

PROC. ANN. art. 2.17 (Vernon 2005). Because no statute prescribes the manner in which a sheriff 

is to conserve the peace, it is for the sheriff, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, to determine 

howbestto accomplishthisduty. Weberv. CityofSachse, 591 S.W.2d563,567(Tex.App.-Dallas 

1979, writ dism’d). The patrol vehicles allocated to a sheriff by a commissioners court are tools to 

be used by the sheriff to perform the sheriffs law enforcement duties. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 

GA-0158 (2004) at 4 (“The sheriff’s vehicles belong to the county, which acts through its 

commissioners court.“). By extension, then, a sheriff has discretion over the vehicles allocated to 

the sheriff, including the discretion to determine how the sheriffs deputies are to use those vehicles 

in providing law enforcement within the county. 

But a sheriff is bound by the constitution and other laws of this state. See T&x. Lot. GOV'T 

CODE ANN. 5 85.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (requiring sheriff to take official oath). Texas 

Constitution article III, section 52(a), and the case law interpreting that article, circumscribes a 

sheriffs discretion over county patrol vehicles, but it leaves to the sheriff the authority to permit the 

use of the county’s patrol vehicles in a manner that satisfies the public purpose doctrine, subject to 

judicial review. See Barrington v. Cokinos, 338 S.W.2d 133, 142 (Tex. 1960) (“[A] court has no 

right to substitute its judgment and discretion for the judgment and discretion of the governing body 

upon whom the law visits the primary power and duty to act.“). Therefore, in answer to your first 

two questions, the sheriff may authorize deputy sheriffs to use county patroi vehicles during off-duty 

security employment without the deputies reimbursing the county for that use only if the 

predominant purpose ofthe off-duty use is to conserve the peace within the county, the sheriff retains 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 3 (GA-0480) 

control over the vehicles in a manner that ensures the peace will be conserved, and the county 

actually receives this public benefit.’ 

You next ask: “Should reimbursement of the county vehicle be required for its use in the 

above, which individual or agency sets the amount to be reimbursed to the county for its use-the 

sheriff or the commissioners court?” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. This question presupposes 

that, for circumstances in which the sheriff determines that use of the county patrol vehicle does not 

accomplish a legitimate public purpose, a deputy may use the vehicle as long as the county is 

reimbursed for such use. This presupposition is incorrect. 

It is well established that a sheriff has no authority to enter into contracts binding the county 

except where specifically authorized by statute. Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (Tex. 

194 1). We have found no statute that authorizes a sheriff to bind the county in a lease of its vehicles 

to deputy sheriffs for the deputies to use in a private capacity. Therefore, the sheriff may not set the 

amount of money that would reimburse the county for the use of its vehicles because that would be 

a contract term. And a commissioners court, although it is the entity with jurisdiction over all county 

business, ‘&x. CONST. art. V, 5 18(b), and “although [it] may exercise broad discretion in conducting 

county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded in the constitution or 

statutes.” Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. 1993) (citation omitted). 

Consequently, a commissioners court’s authority to contract on behalf ofthe county is limited to that 

authority conferred either expressly or by necessary implication by the constitution and the laws of 

this state. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0085 (2003) at 2. As it is with a sheriff, we can find no 

statute that expressly authorizes a commissioners court to lease the county’s personal property in 

this way. Indeed, Local Government Code chapter 263, which specitically authorizes a 

commissioners court to sell or lease county property under certain conditions, makes no provision 

for the lease of county personal property in the manner described here. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE 

ANN. 33 263.001-,251 (Vernon 2005). Thus, a commissioners court may not lease the county’s 

vehicles to the county’s deputy sheriffs to use in a private capacity. Cf: Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 

GA-0085 (2003) at 4-5 (determining that a commissioners court could sell county-owned dirt 

provided that the dirt fell under a Local Government Code chapter 263 provision authorizing a 

county to sell surplus property). Accordingly, we need not answer your question as to who 

determines reimbursement amounts, because the county may not lease its vehicles for private use 

in the first place. 

You last ask: “May the Commissioner’s Court prevent patrol vehicles, which were assigned 

to the sheriffs office, from being used in off duty (security) employment by deputy sheriffs?” 

Request Letter, supva note 1, at 2. 

‘We note that Government Code section 6 12.005 requires the gowning body ofapolitical subdivision to insure 

its law enforcement officers against liability to third persons arising out of the officer’s operation of a vehicle owned, 

leased, or otherwise controlled by the political subdivision “at any time that the officer is authorized to operate the 

vehicle, including times that the officer is authorized to operate the vehicle while off duty.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 

612.005(b) (Vernon 2004). 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 4 (GA-0480) 

“It is the law in Texas that an elected officer occupies a sphere of authority, which is 

delegated to him by the Constitution and laws, within which another officer may not interfere or 

usurp.” Renken v. Harris County, 808 S.W.2d222,226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14thDist.] 1991, no 

writ). Based on this statement of the law, this office has said: 

A commissioners court, which sets the budgetary priorities of 

a county and can decide generally how much of the county’s funds to 

dedicate to each of the county’s purposes, has thereby a considerable 

ability to shape the ways in which an elected county official uses the 

resources of his office. But it cannot make those decisions for him. 

It may, in effect, tell that official what resources it will place at his 

disposal. But it may not micro-manage his decisions as to the use of 

those resources. 

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0214 (2000) at 3. And, as a court has elaborated, “[a] sheriff is under 

as much obligation to conduct his office lawfully as is the commissioners’ court its duties.” Tammt 

County v. Smith, 81 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ refd). Thus, the 

sheriff, and not the commissioners court, is responsible for seeing that the sheriffs deputies use 

patrol vehicles only for lawful purposes. 
The Honorable Joel D. Littlefield - Page 5 (GA-0480) 

SUMMARY 

Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution prohibits 

the state and its political subdivisions from granting a thing of value 

for private use. An exception is made where the grant’s predominant 

purpose is to accomplish a public ~purpose, not to benefit private 

parties; where there is public control over the assets to ensure that 

the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the public’s 

investment; and where the public receives a return benefit. Thus, ~a 

sheriff may authorize the sheriffs deputies to use county patrol 

vehicles for off-duty employment without reimbursing the county 

only if the predominant purpose is to conserve the peace within the 

county, the sheriff retains control over the vehicles in a manner that 

ensures the peace will be conserved, and the county actually receives 

this public benefit. 

There is no authority for a sheriff or a commissioners court to 

contract with a deputy sheriff to guarantee reimbursement to the 

county for the deputy’s private use of a county patrol vehicle. Thus, 

neither a sheriff nor a commissioners court may set a rate for 

reimbursement. 

The sheriff, and not the commissioners court, is responsible 

for seeing that the sheriffs deputies use patrol vehicles only for 

lawful purposes. 

Very truly yours, 

Attorn w eneral of Texas 

RENT C. SULLIVAN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

ELLEN L. WITT 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Daniel C. Bradford 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee