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2015 JAN 12 AM S-3j

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DOUGLAS S. BRYSON and

NETTI M. BRYSON,

Appellants,

v.

STEWART TITLE GUARANTY CO.,

a wholly owned subsidiary of Stewart

Information Services Corp.,

Respondents,

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; and

NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES,

INC.,

Defendants.

No. 71003-6-1

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: January 12, 2015

Becker, J. — Douglas and Netti Bryson sued Stewart Title Guaranty

Company (Stewart Title) for an accounting. The trial court dismissed the claim

under CR 12(b)(6). Because the Brysons cannot demonstrate any set of facts,

consistent with their complaint, that would impose an obligation on the former

trustee of a deed of trust to provide the debtor with an accounting, we affirm.

FACTS

The Brysons have not provided this court with a record of the

circumstances leading up to their action. Although we are mindful that they are

acting pro se, we will hold pro se litigants to the same standard as an attorney.

In re Marriage of Olson. 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
No. 71003-6-1/2

The Brysons filed this action against Stewart Title, JPMorgan Chase Bank

(Chase), and Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. (NWTS) on July 15, 2013. The

complaint sought to enjoin NWTS, the successor trustee of the deed of trust, and

Chase from pursuing a nonjudical foreclosure of the Brysons' property scheduled

for July 19, 2013. The complaint also requested "a verified accounting."1 The

foreclosure sale was eventually cancelled.

On September 25, 2013, the trial court granted Stewart Title's motion to

dismiss the Brysons' claim under CR 12(b)(6). The trial court later dismissed the

claims against Chase and NWTS.

The Brysons sought timely review of the order dismissing Stewart Title.

But theydid not file a notice ofappealfrom the subsequent orders dismissing

their claims against Chase and NWTS. When the Brysons soughtto include the

claims against Chase and NWTS within the scope of review, both Chase and

NWTS moved to dismiss. A commissioner of this court granted the motions to

dismiss, and a panel denied the Brysons' motion to modify. Accordingly,

although the Brysons' briefs include arguments directed at Chase and NWTS,

only the claim against StewartTitle is before us on appeal.

ANALYSIS

An appellant's brief must contain "argument in support of the issues

presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to

1 Clerk's Papers at 158.
No. 71003-6-1/3

relevant parts of the record." RAP 10.3(a)(6). Many of the Brysons' arguments

on appeal consist solely of sweeping allegations of misconduct, unsupported by

any reference to the record, citation to relevant authority, or coherent legal

argument. We therefore decline to considerthem. See Saunders v. Lloyd's of

London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) (appellate court will decline to

review an issue that is unsupported by cogent argument and briefing). Nor will

we consider issues and arguments raised for the first time in the Brysons' reply

brief. Cowiche Canvon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d

549 (1992).

The Brysons' reliance on lengthy quotations from court decisions and

materials involving other parties orjurisdictions is equally misplaced. Most of the

decisions involve claims arising outofalleged misconduct during the course of

foreclosure proceedings. None of these materials provide any support for the

Brysons' claims against Stewart Title.

We review CR 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. FutureSelect Portfolio Mqmt.,

Inc. v. Tremont Gro. Holdings. Inc., 180Wn.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014).

Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if it "'appears beyond doubt'" that

the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would justify recovery. Burton v.

Lehman, 153Wn.2d 416, 422, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005), quoting Tenore v. AT&T

Wireless Servs.. 136 Wn.2d 322, 330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998). We accept all facts

alleged in the complaint as true, and we "'may consider hypothetical facts not

included in the record.'" Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d at 422, quoting Tenore,
No. 71003-6-1/4

136 Wn.2d at 330. But "if a plaintiff's claim remains legally insufficient even

under his or her proffered hypothetical facts, dismissal pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) is

appropriate." Gorman v. Garlock, Inc., 155 Wn.2d 198, 215, 118 P.3d 311

(2005). Contrary to Bryson's assertion, CR 12(b)(6) imposes no obligation on the

trial court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The precise basis for the Brysons' claim against Stewart Title is unclear.

The complaint alleges a claim for an accounting in conjunction with Stewart

Title's role as a trustee under the deed of trust. In their opening brief, the

Brysons assert that the "trigger event. . . that a verified accounting must be

produced, was an attempted invasion and theft ofland, under color of perceived

authority, via a non-judicial fraudclosure action outside ofjudicial review."2 They

further allege that StewartTitle, Chase, and NWTS conspired to commit extortion

during the course of a "sham Trustee Sale."3

But the complaint repeatedly acknowledges that StewartTitle is no longer

a trustee and that NWTS was the successor trustee pursuing the nonjudicial

foreclosure. The Brysons fail to allege any facts suggesting that StewartTitle, as

a former trustee, had a fiduciary duty or an interest in the propertyduring the

course ofthe nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding that would give rise to an

obligation to provide some type of accounting to the debtor. Cf, RCW

61.24.010(3) ("The trustee orsuccessor trustee shall have no fiduciary duty or

2 Br. of Appellant at 2.

3 Br. of Appellant at 24.

-4-
No. 71003-6-1/5

fiduciary obligation to the grantor or other persons having an interest in the

property subject to the deed of trust").

The Brysons also appear to allege that their claim for an accounting is

based on Stewart Title's actions as a trustee at some point prior to the nonjudicial

foreclosure proceeding. Butthey have not identified any facts or legal theory to

support such a claim. Nor have they made any showing that StewartTitle, as a

trustee of the deed of trust, had an obligation to provide an accounting under

Washington's general probate and trust laws. See former RCW 11.97.010(3)

(2011); RCW 11.106.040.

In summary, the Brysons have failed to demonstrate anyfacts establishing

Stewart Title's obligation to provide an accounting. The trial court properly

dismissed their claim under CR 12(b)(6).

Affirmed. feksfi

WE CONCUR:

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