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Filed 2/21/23 Quality First Home Improvement v. Williams CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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QUALITY FIRST HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DASHENA WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095316

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-

00241333-CU-BC-GDS)

Respondent Quality First Home Improvement, Inc. (QFHI) filed suit against 

appellant Dashena Williams, seeking to recover the balance owed on a home 

improvement contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of QFHI following a 

court trial.

On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying her oral request to 

continue the trial. Appellant contends we may presume the trial court abused its 

discretion because the record does not show it considered the factors affecting a motion 

to continue trial. Appellant further avers the trial court failed to consider whether she 
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qualified for referral under the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, Government Code 

section 68650 et seq.

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(Shriver Act).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment and deny QFHI’s request for sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Appellant contracted with QFHI to install a concrete deck and patio cover at her

residence for $35,000. QFHI completed the project, but appellant paid only $1,000. 

After failed efforts to collect payment, QFHI recorded a mechanic’s lien2 against 

appellant’s home. It also sued appellant for breach of contract and sought to foreclose the 

mechanic’s lien.

Appellant appeared in propria persona at the court trial. Both appellant and QFHI 

allege in their briefs that appellant orally requested a continuance in order to obtain 

counsel, which the trial court denied. The record does not contain appellant’s 

continuance request or the trial court’s ruling on the request. But we treat QFHI’s

allegations as factual admissions because, while briefs are outside the record, they are 

reliable indications of a party’s position on the facts, and we may use statements therein 

as admissions against a party. (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 

1125, 1152; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 586, fn. 2 [“A factual statement 

in a brief may be treated as an admission or stipulation when adverse to the party making 

it.”].)

At trial, appellant claimed QFHI’s work was substandard, and she had an oral 

agreement with QFHI to reduce the contract price to $17,000. The trial court ruled for

QFHI on both causes of action. Appellant timely appealed.

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

2 Civil Code section 8400 et seq.
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DISCUSSION

Appellant raises two claims on appeal. First, she contends the matter must be 

remanded because the trial court’s ruling provided no evidence that it considered factors 

affecting its decision on her request to continue trial. Second, appellant argues the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying her request because nothing in the record shows the 

trial court considered her qualification for appointed counsel under the Shriver Act. We 

disagree.

I

Trial Continuance

On appeal, we presume a trial court’s judgment to be correct. (Nielsen v. Gibson 

(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “ ‘ “All intendments and presumptions are indulged 

to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be 

affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) It is the 

appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record to show reversible error on appeal. 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record 

on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.)

Here, the record is silent on the reasons behind the trial court’s denial of 

appellant’s request. It contains no reporter’s transcript, or any written order by the trial 

court denying appellant’s continuance request. Appellant contends a silent record 

supports the conclusion that the trial court failed to consider relevant factors and abused 

its discretion. As stated above, established law holds otherwise. Appellant fails to carry 

her burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal. We must therefore presume 

the trial court properly considered and weighed the factors affecting trial continuances, 

and correctly denied appellant’s request. Appellant’s pro. per. status in the trial court 

does not lower her burden of proof on appeal. (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 

91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1285 [“propria persona litigants are not entitled to any special 

treatment from the courts”].)
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II

The Shriver Act

In 2009, the Legislature enacted the Shriver Act, creating a pilot project to provide 

legal counsel to “low-income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting 

basic human needs.” (§ 68651, subd. (a); Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. 

Bill No. 590 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 12, 2009, p. 1.) These issues 

include housing-related matters such as evictions and foreclosures where low-income 

individuals face the loss of their homes. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1); Sen. Rules Com., 3d 

reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 330 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 9, 

2019, pp. 1, 6; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 590 (2009-2010 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 12, 2009, p. 4.)

The Shriver programs are available at selected courts approved by the Judicial 

Council. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1).) These courts refer low-income persons to legal 

services agencies, which in turn determine the individuals’ eligibility for counsel. 

(§ 68651, subd. (b)(4), (7).) Due to scarce funding, “eligibility for representation shall be 

limited to clients whose household income falls at or below 200 percent of the federal 

poverty level.” (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1).)

The record does not show that the Shriver program was available at Sacramento 

County Superior Court at the time of the trial. The trial court could not make a Shriver 

program referral when it was not a participating court selected by the Judicial Council.

In any event, this is not a housing-related matter under the Shriver Act. It involves 

a dispute over the improvement to appellant’s home, not an eviction or foreclosure of 

appellant’s house. The record contains no evidence showing QFHI’s allegedly 

unsatisfactory work affected appellant’s basic human needs or put appellant at risk of 

losing her home.

Moreover, the record shows appellant ordered a $35,000 upgrade to her residence. 

At trial, Williams argued she had an oral agreement with QFHI to pay $17,000, and that 
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QFHI’s substandard work was not worth $35,000. Appellant made no claims, however, 

that she could not afford the payment or that she was indigent. Based on the record, even 

if the Shriver program were available, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude 

appellant was not indigent and did not qualify for referral under the Shriver Act. (See

Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [all presumptions are indulged to support 

the trial court’s judgment on a silent record].)

Appellant’s requests that we extend the application of the Shriver Act to require 

trial courts to “address the merits of the court requiring or permitting a court appointed 

counsel for civil litigants (a ‘Gideon’ Attorney) when a pro-se litigant requests an 

attorney and where the case effects [sic] the pro-se litigant’s shelter, sustenance, safety, 

health, and/or child custody.” This directly contradicts the plain language of section 

68651, subdivision (b)(4). Under this subdivision, legal services agencies authorized by 

the Judicial Council, rather than trial courts, are responsible for making determinations of 

eligibility and providing representation. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(4).) When the statutory 

language is clear, we must follow its plain meaning. (Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy 

Grinding Co., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1118, 1125.)

III

Motions for Sanctions

By written motion, QFHI requests monetary sanctions consisting of attorney’s fees 

it incurred on appeal and an additional $15,000. It contends both of appellant’s 

arguments on appeal are frivolous, showing a bad faith intent to delay the effect of the 

trial court’s adverse judgment.

On motion of a party or on its own motion, an appellate court may impose 

sanctions on a party or an attorney for taking a frivolous appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).) “[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only 

when it is prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the 

effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any 
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reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.” 

(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) But “[a]n appeal that is simply 

without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions.” (Ibid.)

Here, appellant’s arguments are meritless, but this alone does not give rise to

sanctions. The record contains no evidence that this appeal was made to harass QFHI or 

to delay the effect of the trial court’s judgment. The appeal was timely filed, and 

appellant did not seek an extension of time to file her briefs. Based on the record, the 

high standard of sanctions has not been met.
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DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment. QFHI’s request for sanctions is denied. QFHI shall 

recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) This matter is remanded 

to the trial court to determine the amount of costs. On remand, QFHI may file a motion 

to seek attorney’s fees it incurred in defending this case on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 3.1702(c).)

 \s\ ,

MCADAM, J.*

We concur:

 \s\ ,

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

 \s\ ,

KRAUSE, J.

*

 Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.