[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-15348

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61537-WPD

EDUARDO FLORES, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEVRY UNIVERSITY, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 28, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Eduardo Flores, a Hispanic American male and a former full-time professor 

at DeVry University, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of DeVry University, in his civil rights suit alleging retaliation in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Flores’s suit sprung up from an e-mail complaint he sent to one 

DeVry official (a statement alleging racist conduct on the part of DeVry) and from

his subsequent firing (allegedly for working simultaneously at a competing 

institution contrary to University policy). On appeal, Flores expressly argues that 

the district court erred in granting DeVry’s motion for summary judgment because 

he established a prima facie claim for retaliation; we suppose he implicitly 

challenges the court’s determination that he did not show pretext. 

We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Moton v. 

Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). In doing so, we draw all inferences 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. “[I]f the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law,” then summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, “[a]ll persons ... shall have the same right ... to 

make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens,” which in an 

employment context means protection against discrimination based on race and 

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color. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 protects individuals who seek to 

enforce their rights thereunder from retaliation. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. 

Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 1961, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008) 

(retaliation claims permitted under § 1981); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 

140 F.3d 1405, 1411–13 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).

Absent direct evidence, when analyzing claims for retaliation brought under 

§ 1981, we employ the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Bryant v. 

Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). Under this framework, a plaintiff 

alleging retaliation may establish a prima facie case by showing, among other 

things, that a causal link exists between a protected activity he engaged in and an

adverse act, such as a firing. Id. 1307-08. 

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation and the defendant 

articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse act, the plaintiff 

must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a pretext 

to mask retaliatory acts. See id. at 1308. 

To create a genuine issue about a causal connection, the plaintiff has to show 

(1) “that the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct” and (2) “that 

the protected activity and the adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” See

Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) . 

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Actual knowledge is required. Furthermore, “temporal proximity [between the 

employee’s protected conduct and the adverse employment action] alone is 

insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to causal connection where there is 

unrebutted evidence that the decision[-]maker did not have knowledge that the 

employee engaged in protected conduct.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,

231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000).

To establish that a defendant’s explanation was pretextual, the plaintiff may 

point to “concrete evidence in the form of specific facts which show[ ] that the 

defendant’s proffered reason was mere pretext[;] [m]ere conclusory allegations and 

assertions [do] not suffice.” Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308 (alterations omitted). We

must evaluate whether the plaintiff’s evidence has demonstrated “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s 

proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find 

them unworthy of credence.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 

771 (11th Cir. 2005) . 

A reason is pretextual if it is false and the true reason is impermissible. St. 

Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 

407 (1993). “The plaintiff must meet the reason proffered [by his employer] head 

on and rebut it.” Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th 

Cir. 2007) .

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Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we see no 

reversible error.

On this record, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in 

favor of DeVry. Flores failed to establish a prima facie claim for retaliation 

because the evidence indicated that the decision-makers (Spano and Padron) for his

termination were not aware of the racism complaint he had sent to another DeVry 

official. Furthermore, Flores failed to show that DeVry’s reason for firing him was 

pretextual: DeVry had a policy against full-time professors teaching at competing 

institutions, and it was undisputed that Flores violated this policy. Accordingly, 

we affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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