2018 WI 103

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2016AP299

COMPLETE TITLE: SECURA Insurance, A Mutual Company,

 Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-

 Petitioner,

 v.

Lyme St. Croix Forest Company, LLC, Lyme St. 

Croix Land Company LLC, St. Croix Forest 

Products LLC, American Family Mutual Insurance 

Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America,

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Wisconsin 

Mutual Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Group, 

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, USAA Casualty 

Insurance Company, Western National Insurance 

Company p/k/a Western National Assurance 

Company, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Farmers 

Insurance Exchange, Sentry Insurance Company, a 

mutual company, Jeremiah Nelson, Amy Nelson, 

Steigerwaldt Tree Farms, LLC, Steigerwaldt Land 

Services, Inc., LFF III Timber Holding, 

Frankenmuth Insurance Company, General Casualty 

Company of Wisconsin, Regent Insurance Company, 

Continental Western Insurance Company, Foremost 

Insurance Company of Grand Rapids Michigan, 

Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance 

Company, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, 

American Family Home Insurance Company, 

Integrity Mutual Insurance Company,

 Defendants-Respondents,

Hanover Insurance Company,

 Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 740, 905 N.W.2d 843

(2017 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED: October 30, 2018

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:

ORAL ARGUMENT: September 5, 2018

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit

COUNTY: Douglas

JUDGE: Kelly J. Thimm

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED:
2

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the plaintiff-appellant—cross-respondent-petitioner, 

there were briefs filed by Patryk Silver and Borgelt, Powell, 

Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument 

by Patryk Silver.

For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 

brief filed by Douglas M. Raines, Heidi L. Vogt, and von Briesen 

& Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, with whom on the brief were Timothy F. 

Casey, Patrick D. Crandell, and Collins Einhorn Farrell PC, 

Southfield, Michigan.

For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 

Nicholas D. Harken, Eugene M. LaFlamme, and McCoy Leavitt Laskey 

LLC, Waukesha, with whom on the brief were Erik J. Pless and 

Everson, Whitney, Everson & Brehm, S.C., Green Bay. There was 

an oral argument by Eugene M. LaFlamme.

An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 

Insurance Alliance by Linda S. Schmidt, James A. Friedman, and 

Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison.
2018 WI 103

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2016AP299

(L.C. No. 2014CV174 & 2014CV361)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

SECURA Insurance, A Mutual Company,

 Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-

 Petitioner,

 v.

Lyme St. Croix Forest Company, LLC, Lyme St.

Croix Land Company LLC, St. Croix Forest 

Products LLC, American Family Mutual Insurance 

Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America, 

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Wisconsin

Mutual Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Group, 

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, USAA Casualty 

Insurance Company, Western National Insurance 

Company p/k/a Western National Assurance

Company, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Farmers

Insurance Exchange, Sentry Insurance Company, a 

mutual company, Jeremiah Nelson, Amy Nelson, 

Steigerwaldt Tree Farms, LLC, Steigerwaldt Land 

Services, Inc., LFF III Timber Holding, 

Frankenmuth Insurance Company, General Casualty 

Company of Wisconsin, Regent Insurance Company,

Continental Western Insurance Company, Foremost 

Insurance Company of Grand Rapids Michigan, 

Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance 

Company, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company,

American Family Home Insurance Company,

Integrity Mutual Insurance Company,

 Defendants-Respondents,

Hanover Insurance Company,

 Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.

FILED

OCT 30, 2018

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court
2

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and 

cause remanded.

¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, SECURA 

Insurance, A Mutual Company, seeks review of an unpublished, per 

curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit 

court's interlocutory order that determined the fire at issue 

constituted multiple occurrences instead of a single occurrence.

1 

The court of appeals reasoned that under Secura's commercial 

general liability (CGL) policy there was an occurrence each time 

the fire spread to a new piece of real property and caused 

damage. Therefore, the court concluded that the $2 million 

aggregate limit applies rather than the $500,000 per-occurrence 

limit for property damage due to fire arising from logging and 

lumbering operations.

¶2 Secura asserts that the court of appeals erred, and 

that pursuant to the "cause theory," the fire constitutes a 

single occurrence. Despite the fact that the fire crossed 

several property lines, Secura contends it was a single, 

uninterrupted cause of the alleged damages.

 

1 SECURA Ins. v. Lyme St. Croix Forest Co., LLC, No. 

2016AP299, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017) 

(affirming in part and reversing in part an order of circuit 

court for Douglas County, Kelly J. Thimm, Judge).
No. 2016AP299

3

¶3 We conclude that the fire at issue constitutes a 

single occurrence pursuant to the CGL policy. Consequently, the 

$500,000 per-occurrence limit for property damage applies.

¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 

remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I

¶5 On May 16, 2013, a fire broke out on forest land owned 

by Lyme St. Croix Forest Company (Lyme St. Croix). Known as the 

"Germann Road Fire," it burned 7,442 acres over the course of 

three days. Real and personal property belonging to many 

individuals and businesses sustained damage.

¶6 The fire allegedly began in the cutting head of a 

piece of logging equipment known as a feller buncher, owned by 

Ray Duerr Logging, LLC (Duerr). Flames quickly spread from dry 

grass to a pile of recently felled jack pine and subsequently 

into the surrounding forest.

¶7 At the time of the fire, Secura insured Duerr under 

both a CGL policy and an umbrella policy. The CGL policy 

contained a $2 million general aggregate policy limit, and a $1 

million per-occurrence limit. However, the CGL policy also 

incorporated a "Logging and Lumbering Operations Endorsement." 

Pursuant to this endorsement, the per-occurrence policy limit is 

reduced to $500,000 for property damage "due to fire, arising 

from logging or lumbering operations . . . ."
No. 2016AP299

4

¶8 Secura brought this declaratory judgment action to 

determine its coverage obligations with respect to Duerr.2 

Moving for declaratory judgment and partial summary judgment, 

Secura argued that the Germann Road Fire was a single 

occurrence. Consequently, it advanced that the $500,000 policy 

limit from the Logging and Lumbering Operations Endorsement was 

applicable, rather than the $2 million aggregate limit. Secura 

also contended that the umbrella policy afforded no coverage for 

the damage from the fire.

¶9 The circuit court rejected Secura's argument regarding 

the applicable policy limit. Relying on Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Falk, 2014 WI 136, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 857 N.W.2d 156, the circuit 

court concluded that "although there was one uninterrupted cause 

of the fire, each 'seepage' of fire onto another's property 

constitute[d] a separate occurrence for purposes of the policy." 

However, the circuit court agreed with Secura that its umbrella 

policy provided no coverage for any damages.

¶10 Two parties sought leave to appeal the circuit court's 

order, and the court of appeals granted an interlocutory appeal.3 

 

2 Secura initially filed its complaint in Outagamie County. 

Venue was transferred to Douglas County, where the action was 

ultimately consolidated with a related suit filed by two 

property owners who alleged damage from the Germann Road Fire.

3 See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) (2015-16) (explaining that the 

court of appeals will grant an interlocutory appeal if an appeal 

will "[m]aterially advance the termination of the litigation or 

clarify further proceedings in the litigation; [p]rotect the 

petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or [c]larify 

an issue of general importance in the administration of 

justice").
No. 2016AP299

5

Secura appealed the circuit court's determination as to the CGL 

policy limit. Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover), Lyme St. 

Croix's insurer, challenged the circuit court's conclusion that 

the umbrella policy provided no coverage.

¶11 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 

part. It affirmed the circuit court's determination regarding 

the CGL policy, concluding that the circuit court properly 

applied the $2 million aggregate policy limit. SECURA Ins. v. 

Lyme St. Croix Forest Co., LLC, No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip 

op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017). Like the circuit court, 

the court of appeals relied principally on Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 

determining that "there was an 'occurrence' each time the fire——

fueled and expanded by the consumption of new materials——spread 

to a new piece of real property and caused damage." SECURA 

Ins., No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip op., ¶17.

¶12 However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 

court's determination that the umbrella policy provided no 

coverage.4 Neither party, however, petitioned this court for

 

4 Before the court of appeals, Hanover argued against the 

application of an exclusion in the umbrella policy stating that 

the liability policy did not apply to "'Property damage' arising 

out of injury or damage to or destruction of standing timber or 

timberlands, including the loss of use thereof, caused by fire 

and arising out of operations performed by or on behalf of any 

insured." SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip op., 

¶22. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's grant of 

summary judgment as to the umbrella policy, and remanded for a 

factual determination of what damages, if any, were sustained to 

an approximately 30 to 40 yard segment of real property that 

burned before the fire became a standing timber fire. Id., ¶29.
No. 2016AP299

6

review of the portion of the court of appeals' decision 

regarding the umbrella policy. Accordingly, we do not address 

the issue.5

II

¶13 We are asked to review the determination of Secura's

motions for declaratory and summary judgment, which requires us 

to interpret the parties' written insurance contract. 

Interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of 

law. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 

WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.

¶14 When a ruling on a motion for declaratory judgment 

depends on questions of law, we review the ruling independently 

of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 

appeals. Gister v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 86, 

¶8, 342 Wis. 2d 496, 818 N.W.2d 880.

¶15 Similarly, we review a summary judgment decision 

independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 

court. Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶17, 380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 

N.W.2d 402. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

 

5 See Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶65, 309 

Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544 (a party that fails to file a 

petition for cross-review does not preserve those issues for 

supreme court review); Priesler v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 

WI 135, ¶59, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136 (explaining that 

this court regularly "decline[s] to consider issues not raised 

in petitions for review").
No. 2016AP299

7

III

¶16 This case presents the issue of whether the Germann 

Road Fire constitutes a single occurrence for purposes of the 

CGL policy, or whether there was instead a new occurrence each 

time the fire crossed a property line. Initially, we set forth 

the language of the CGL policy. Next, we adduce the principles 

of law that guide our analysis. Finally, we apply the language 

of the policy and those principles of law to the facts of this 

case.

A

¶17 We begin with the language of the insurance policy. 

Generally, we interpret a policy's terms as they would be 

understood from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 

position of the insured. Shugarts, 380 Wis. 2d 512, ¶20 (citing 

Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶20, 257 

Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225). Specifically, in the context of 

determining the number of occurrences, we have framed this query 

in terms of the "average person." Welter v. Singer, 126 

Wis. 2d 242, 251, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Falk, 

360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶¶66-67; Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶38, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.

¶18 The CGL policy covers "bodily injury" or "property 

damage" that is "caused by an 'occurrence' . . . ." An 

"occurrence" is defined in the policy as "an accident, including 

continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 

general harmful conditions."
No. 2016AP299

8

¶19 As relevant here, the policy contains two monetary 

limits. First, there is a general aggregate limit of $2 

million. This limit applies regardless of the number of covered 

occurrences. Second, the policy's "Logging and Lumbering 

Operations Endorsement" contains a $500,000 per-occurrence limit 

that applies "as respects 'property damage' due to fire, arising 

from logging or lumbering operations . . . ."

¶20 We must determine which of the two policy limits 

applies. If the Germann Road Fire is a single occurrence, then 

the lesser $500,000 limit applies. On the other hand, if there 

is a new occurrence each time the fire crosses a property line, 

as the court of appeals concluded, then the $2 million limit 

applies.

B

¶21 We turn next to adduce the principles of law that 

guide our analysis. In determining whether an event constitutes 

a single occurrence or multiple occurrences, we look to the 

"cause theory." Olsen v. Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 349-51, 202 

N.W.2d 236 (1972); Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶66 (citing Plastics 

Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶35). Pursuant to the cause theory, 

"where a single, uninterrupted cause results in all of the 

injuries and damage, there is but one 'accident' or 

'occurrence.'" Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 250. If "cause and 

result are 'so simultaneous or so closely linked in time and 

space as to be considered by the average person as one event,'" 

then only a single occurrence has taken place. Falk, 360 

Wis. 2d 67, ¶66 (citing Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 251). "If, 
No. 2016AP299

9

however, that cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause 

the chain of causation is broken and more than one accident or 

occurrence has taken place." Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 349.

¶22 By following the cause theory, Wisconsin courts 

disavow the opposing "effect theory." Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 351; 

see also Arnold P. Anderson, Anderson on Wisconsin Insurance Law

§ 2.66 (7th ed. 2015). The effect theory suggests that the 

wording "each accident" "must be construed from the point of 

view of the person whose property was injured." Anchor Cas. Co. 

v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1949); see Olsen, 56 

Wis. 2d at 347 (explaining that "[a] small number of 

jurisdictions subscribe to the 'effect theory' of liability").

¶23 Accordingly, pursuant to the effect theory, there is 

an occurrence when the separate property of each claimant is 

damaged. Anchor Cas. Co., 178 F.2d at 324-25. Under this 

theory, "[i]f one cause operates upon several at one time, it 

cannot be regarded as a single incident, but the injury to each 

individual is a separate accident." Id. at 325.

C

¶24 Finally, we apply the language of the policy and the 

above principles of law to this case. Both the circuit court 

and court of appeals purported to apply the cause theory. Each 

relied heavily on Plastics Eng'g Co. and Falk to reach the 

conclusion that the Germann Road Fire constituted multiple 

occurrences, with a new occurrence arising each time the fire 

crossed a property line. Those two cases, along with Welter, 

126 Wis. 2d 242, are particularly instructive.
No. 2016AP299

10

¶25 In Plastics Eng'g Co., the insured manufactured and 

sold asbestos-containing products for over twenty years. 315 

Wis. 2d 556, ¶6. Multiple claimants sued the insured, asserting 

causes of action for bodily injury or wrongful death that arose 

from exposure to asbestos-containing products. Id. "In 

general, the claimants allege[d] that they were injured by their 

first exposure to asbestos, but their asbestos-related injuries 

did not manifest until long after their exposure to asbestos." 

Id. "The claimants' exposures allegedly occurred at different 

times and at different geographical locations." Id.

¶26 This court determined that multiple occurrences arose. 

Id., ¶40. We explained that "each individual claimant's 

injuries stem from the continued and repeated exposure to 

asbestos-containing products. Thus, under the policy language 

and the cause theory, each claimant's repeated exposure is one 

occurrence." Id., ¶39.

¶27 Arriving at this result, the Plastics Eng'g Co. court 

contrasted the facts of that case with those of Welter, 126 

Wis. 2d 242. Plastics Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶¶37-38. In 

Welter, a driver struck a bicyclist, stopped, and then drove 

forward, dragging the bicyclist beneath the car. 126 Wis. 2d at 

246. The driver stopped again, then moved the car forward about 

a foot. Id. Finally, the driver got out of the car and a 

second driver got in, who attempted to free the bicyclist from 

under the car by backing up about ten feet. Id.

¶28 The court of appeals in Welter determined the entirety 

of this event to be a single occurrence. Id. at 245. Applying 
No. 2016AP299

11

the cause theory, it wrote that "[i]f cause and result are so 

simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be 

considered by the average person as one event," there is only 

one occurrence. Id. at 251. "The fact that there were multiple 

injuries and that they were of different magnitudes and that 

injuries extended over a period of time does not alter our 

conclusion that there was a single occurrence. As long as the 

injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single 

occurrence." Id. at 250-51 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982)).

¶29 In contrast, the exposures to asbestos at issue in 

Plastics Eng'g Co. were not closely linked in either time or 

space. 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶6. There, numerous individuals 

sustained injuries at varying geographic locations over a period 

of years. Id.

¶30 More recently, in Falk, the insured spread liquid cow 

manure on farm fields as fertilizer. 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶5. 

Several neighbors alleged that the manure contaminated their 

wells. Id., ¶6.

¶31 Applying the cause theory, this court determined that 

"[b]ecause the occurrence under the . . . policy is well 

contamination, not manure application, there was an occurrence 

each time manure seeped into a unique well." Id., ¶67. "As 

such, an 'average person' would not consider the well 

contamination to be one event because manure had to seep into 

each individual well for the alleged contamination to occur." 

Id. "Further, because the manure had to seep into each 
No. 2016AP299

12

individual well, rather than seep into one well which 'fed' the 

other wells, it cannot be said the seepage was 'so simultaneous 

or so closely linked in time and space as to be considered by 

the average person as one event.'" Id.

¶32 Here, the court of appeals concluded that Falk

controlled. It analogized the fire at issue to the seepage of 

manure that occurred in Falk. The court of appeals' approach is 

unpersuasive for several reasons.

¶33 First, there are significant factual differences 

between a forest fire and the seepage of manure into a well. 

When determining whether there is one occurrence or multiple 

occurrences, we must take into account elements of time and 

geography. Specifically, a single occurrence takes place if the 

cause and result were "so simultaneous or so closely linked in 

time and space as to be considered by the average person as one 

event . . . ." Plastics Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶38

(quoting Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 251).

¶34 In Falk, the manure seeped over the course of an 

unspecified period of time.6 Conversely, the fire in this case 

burned continuously for three uninterrupted days. A three-day 

fire in a discrete area caused by a single precipitating event 

would reasonably be considered by the average person to be one 

 

6 The Falk decision explains that the insured spread the 

manure in "early 2011" and the DNR notified the insured of well 

contamination complaints by letter dated May 23, 2011. Wilson 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶¶5-6, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 857 

N.W.2d 156.
No. 2016AP299

13

event. Regardless of how many property lines the fire crossed,

the damage closely follows the cause in both time and space.

¶35 Rather than being analogous to Falk, this case is more 

akin to Welter. In Welter, there may have been "multiple 

injuries" that were of "different magnitudes" over a short 

period of time, but that fact did not alter the court's 

conclusion that there was a single occurrence. See Welter, 126 

Wis. 2d at 250 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61). 

"As long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is 

a single occurrence." Id. at 250-51. The same is true here. 

In both cases, an average person would view the cause and result 

as a single event.

¶36 Second, the court of appeals' analysis, although 

purporting to apply the cause theory, in practice presents an 

application of the effect theory rejected by this court. 

According to the court of appeals, "the fire had to spread to 

each piece of real property for another property owner to suffer 

property damage due to the fire." SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, 

unpublished slip op., ¶21. By focusing not on the cause of the 

damage, but on the effect on individual property owners, the 

court of appeals strayed from this court's established 

methodology for determining the number of occurrences. See

Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 349-51.

¶37 Third, the court's focus in Falk was primarily on the 

insurance policy's pollution exclusion, which the court 

determined to bar coverage, rather than the number of 

occurrences that took place. Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶3. The 
No. 2016AP299

14

record in Falk lacked detail regarding the spreading of the 

manure and the eventual seepage. Id., ¶¶5-6; see supra ¶32 n.6. 

Accordingly, the Falk court devoted only two paragraphs to the 

cause theory analysis. See Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶¶66-67.

¶38 Finally, the court of appeals' decision appears to 

occasion arbitrary and unreasonable consequences. It is 

arbitrary to determine the number of occurrences solely from the 

number of owners whose property is damaged. Under the court of 

appeals' analysis, the fire could have burned exactly the same 

amount of land over exactly the same amount of time, but if all 

the land were owned by one person instead of several, the fire 

would constitute but one occurrence. Such a result would force 

the insurer to pay more in the event that the same amount of 

land burned is split among several owners.

¶39 Further, the court of appeals determined that "there 

was an 'occurrence' each time the fire——fueled and expanded by 

the consumption of new materials——spread to a new piece of real 

property and caused damage." SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, 

unpublished slip op., ¶17. This premise appears to lead to 

unreasonable results. It is the nature of a fire to "fuel and 

expand by the consumption of new materials." If it is an 

occurrence each time a fire refuels and expands, then a fire, 

which is constantly refueling and expanding, will necessarily 

result in an unfathomably large number of occurrences regardless 

of how many property lines it crosses. A court's interpretation 

of an insurance policy should avoid unreasonable results. 
No. 2016AP299

15

Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 73, ¶43, 356 Wis. 2d 63, 

850 N.W.2d 138.

¶40 Our conclusion that the fire here constitutes a single 

occurrence is buttressed by decisions from other jurisdictions 

likewise determining a fire destroying the property of multiple 

claimants to be a single occurrence. See Denham v. La SalleMadison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1948) (explaining 

that a fire that damaged property in numerous hotel rooms was a 

single occurrence); Barrett v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 264 

F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1959) (concluding that there is "no 

merit" to the contention that a single fire that damaged 

property owned by seven different tenants in a building was 

seven accidents within the meaning of the policy); Tri-State 

Roofing Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 139 F. Supp. 193, 198 

(W.D. Pa. 1955) (determining, on rehearing, that a fire damaging 

eleven properties that began with an overturned pot of tar was a 

single occurrence); Travelers Indem. Co. v. New England Box Co., 

157 A.2d 765, 769 (N.H. 1960) (concluding that a fire spreading 

to several properties is a single occurrence because "reasonable 

persons would regard [it] as one accident, no matter how many 

persons should become involved") (citation omitted).

¶41 In sum, we conclude that the Germann Road Fire 

constitutes a single occurrence pursuant to the CGL policy. 

Consequently, the $500,000 per-occurrence limit for property 

damage applies.
No. 2016AP299

16

¶42 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 

remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 2016AP299

1