### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 305 -CR

Jo hn K . D av is J r . , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 1 OF C OMA L C OU N T Y NO. 2006 CR1644 , HO NORAB LE RANDAL C. GRAY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted J ohn K. Davis J r. of the of fense of drivingwhile intox icated. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04 (Wes t 2 003). Punishment was assesse d at 180 day s in jail and a $2,000 fine , but the trial court suspen d ed i m p o sition of the sentence and plac ed Davis on community

supervision for e ighte en months. I n three points of error, Davis asser ts that the trial cour

t abused its discre tion in refusing to admit a set of photog raphs, in admi t t i n g a 9 1 1 recording , and in denying D avis a jury i nstruction pursuant to ar ticle 38.23 of the c ode of c riminal proce dure. We w ill a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that in the ear ly morning hours of July

16, 2006, a woman
c la imi ngto b e Da

vis ’s g ir lf ri e nd ma de a 91 1 call. A r e c or din g of the c a ll w a s a dmi tte d in to
e vid e nc e , o ve r o bje c tio n b y de fe ns e c ouns e l. I n the c a ll, the wo man, ide nti fi e d a s L e and ra B e nn e tt,2

informed the 911 dispatcher that Davis was at her house being “ver bally abusive,” “in my

fac e,” a nd “drunk.” When the dispatcher asked Be nnett if Davis was intox icated, B ennett re plied, “Oh, y eah.” Be nnett then informed the dispatcher that Davis mig ht be leavingher house. When the dispatcher asked B ennett what Davis was dr iving, B ennett told her that he was driving either a Ha rley Davidson Road King or a F ord F -150.

Of fi c e r D us tin

Swe e t of the Ne w B ra

un fe ls Po lic e De pa

rtme nt w a s d isp a tc he d to B e nn e tt’ s re sid e nc e to inv e sti g a te the dis tur ba nc e . Th e dis patc he r a dv ise d O ff ic e r S we e t th a t D a vis
wa s “ e xtre me ly

10 56 ” and

mig ht b e le a vin g the re sid e nc e . Sw e e t te sti fi e d th a t “ 10 56 ” re fe rs to “an intoxicated per son.” As Swee t approa ched the subdivi s i o n wh ere Be nnett’s re sidence was located, he observe d a motorcy cle leaving the subdivision and decide d to follow it. S wee t testified that he ob se rv e d th e mot or c y c le “ sp e e din g a s we ll as sw ay ing , s ide -t o- sid e .” Whe n a sk e d h owfa st Davis wa s driving, Swe et testified that Davis was trave ling 50 miles per hour in a 40-miles-per -hour
zon e . Wh e n a sk e d w hat “ po sit ion ” the mot or c y c le wa s in on the ro a d, Swe e t te sti fi e d, “ He wo uld g o from the outside a

nd then swing into the center and then come back out.” Sweet adde d that the motorcy cle would “ g o[] from the outside [of the roa d] and kind of back a nd forth.” Offic er Swe et ac tivated his overhe ad lig hts and conduc ted a tra ffic stop. A videotaped r ecor ding of

the stop was admitted into e vidence and play ed for the jury . The re cording
was oc casiona lly

paused so th at S we et co uld expl ain to the jury what wa s happeningon the vid e ota pe . Swe e t te sti fi e d that wh e n Da vis g ot of

f of his mot or c y c le , he no tic e d t hat Da vis
wa s “ [v]e ry

un ste a dy

on his fe e t” a nd

wa s le anin g on

Swe e t’ s p a tr ol v e hic le . Sw e e t a lso testified that he c ould sme l l al cohol on Davis’s breath, that Da vis’s speec h was slurre d, and3

that Davis admitted to having “a f ew” drinks that night. Additionally , Sweet noticed that Davis was not wear i n g s h o es . Davis aske d Sweet, “D id L eandr a ca ll? ” Af ter de termining that L eandr a wa s Davis’s g irlfriend, Swe et re sponded, “Y eah. Y ou wer en’t supposed to be there , Ig uess? May be y ou
we re be inga

bu siv e ? ” Da

vis re pli e d, “ No , s ir . I

wa sn ’t be ing a bu siv e .” Swe e t pr oc e e de d to administer the standa

rd field sobrie ty

tests, specifica lly

the HGN test, the walk-a

nd-turn test, and the
on e -l e g g e d- sta

nd te st. Swe e t e xpla ine d that Da vis pe rf or me d po or ly on

a ll o f t he te sts . A ft e r D a vis fi nis he d atte mpt ingthe te sts , Sw e e t arr e ste d h im.

Offic er Swe et testified that he suspe cted Da vis was intox i ca t ed base d on the “totality of all the c lues that [he] observed and smelled.” These “ clues” included what Sweet ob se rv e d p ri or

to s top pin g Da

vis : [S wee t] : He wa s n o t d ri v ing to his side of the road. The road is not marke d,

per se , but y ou still need to sta y on half of the roa dway

while y ou are operating a

vehicle.

. . . . [ P ro s ec u t o r] : W as t h e D ef en d an ts p ee d i n g? [Swe e t]: Ye s. [P rosec utor]: Did y ou rec eive infor mation from dispatch? [ S w e e t ] : D i d

I— [P rosec utor]: Rece ive information fr om dispatch? [S wee t] : That he ha d left the sce ne and w as possibly intox icated.4 Af te r t he State re ste d, Da

vis te sti fi e d. He e xpla in ed th at he le a se d a ho us e wi th L eandr a B ennett and that she was his g irlfri en d
. W h en aske d by defe nse counse l if he hea rd Be nnett’s voice on the 911 tape, Da vis testified, “I

hear d her voice on the 911 tape. I can’ t be sure if that’s her

or that’s not her . I t sounds dist orted to me. I can’ t tell if it’s her or not.” Davis also desc ribed for

the jury his version of what happene d at B ennett’s house the
n ig h t o f h is ar

r e s t. A c c o r d in g to D a v is , w h e n h e w a lk e d in to th e h o u s e , B e n n e tt w a s drunk and “beg an to attac k” him. Davis recounted how Be nnett told him that she was “g oing to call the c ops.” At that point, Davis t estified, he left t he house. Davis added, “ Howeve r, beingthe vindictive ty pe of per son [Bennett] is, she went ahea d and ca lled the cops a nd, of cour se, had the m arre st me.” Davis denie d b ei ng intox icated w hen he le ft Be nnett’s house, a nd he also de nied sp e e ding . Wh e n D a vis wa s a sk e d if he e ve r l e ft

his “ lane of

tr a ff ic ” duri ngthe pe ri od

of tim e depicted on the videotape, D avis testified: No, sir; I didn’t. The only thing I did w hen I was drivingdown that roa d at that point in t ime wa s to a vo id ha zar ds in the ro a d. Th a t r oa d is no t na vig a ble on a mot or c y c le a t hi g h s pe e ds and

/or in ve ry da

rk c on dit ion s. I t’ s f

ill e d a nd ri dd le d w ithpo t- ho le s, sway s an d s w e r

v e s , dr o p - o f

f s to th e s id e , r o c k s a ll o v e r it
. I t’ s in v ery poor condition.
Da vis a tte mpt e d to int

ro du c e int o e vid e nc e ph oto g ra ph s of the ro a d. Th e State ob je c te d on the ba sis that the photog raphs we re taken two day s prior to trial and could mislead the j ury about t he condition of the roa d at the time of Da vis’s arr est almost one y ear befor e the photogr aphs we re taken. The trial court sustained the State’s objection.Ar tic le 38 .2 3 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , 1 No evidence obtained by an off icer or other pe rson in violation of any provisions of the Constitut ion or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constit ution or laws of the United States of Americ a, shall be admitted in evidence ag ainst the ac cused on the trial of any

criminal ca se. I n any c a s e w h e r e th e le g a l e v id e n c e r a is e s an is s u e h e r e u n d e r , th e ju r y s hall be instructed that if it believe s, or has a rea sonable doubt, that the e vidence was obtaine d in v iol a tio n o f t

he pr ov ision s of this A rt ic le , th e n a nd in s uc h e ve nt, the jur

y sh a ll disreg ard a

ny such evide nce so obta ined. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.23(a ) (West 2005). 5 At the c los e of

e vid e nc e , th e pa

rt ie s p ro c e e de d to di scu ss th e jur y c ha rg e . D a vis reque sted an a

rticle 38.23 instruction. The prose cutor a rg ued t h at Davis wa s not entitled to such 1 a cha rg e. The prosec utor explained:
Th e re is a 91 1 c a ll tha

t th e of fi c e r c ou ld r e ly

up on . Th e re wa s a

name d in div idu a l, g a v e h e r n a me an d

s a id th e r e w a s s o me b o dy

dr iv in g in to xic a te d [,] g ave a de sc ri pti on

of on e of tw o ty pe s o f v e hic le s th a t th is p e rs on wo uld be dr ivi ngin. Th is office r re ly ing on th at information, saw that vehicle. I t’s immaterial to the stop wh e t h e ro r n o th e w as s p ee d i n g, wh i ch i s a f ac ti s s u e, b ec au s e h e h aden o u gh inf or ma tio n. Th e re wa s so me bo dy le a vin g th e scene d

ri vin g thi s v e hic le and

is intox icated. . . . Offic er Swe et made a temporar y detention of this individual based on a kn ow n 9 11 c a ll.
Da vis argued

in r e sp on se that O ff

ic e r S we e t “ c ou ld n ot r e ly up on jus t th e 91 1 c a ll to stop thi s vehicle be cause the vehicle wasn’t suff iciently identified by

the 911 ca ll er, L e and ra B e nn e tt. ” Mor e ov e r, Da vis c on te nd e d, “ L e and

ra B e nn e tt d id n ot t e sti fy

in t his tr ia l. There ’s no furthe r identification of the 911 ca ller’s voice as L ea n d ra Be nnett. There ’s no trustworthiness or inher ent re liability in who’s making the ca ll on the phone.”6 The State re plied,
Th e 91 1 ca ll c anb e r e l i e d o n . I t ’ s w e l l

- e s t a

b l i s h e d l aw i nt h i s S t a t e t o g i v e t h is of fi c e r t he re a so na

ble su sp ic ion to sto p Mr. Da vis . The pe rs on

ide nti fi e d th e mse lve s, which is not nece ssary to g ive t he re asonable suspicion but neverthe less the per son did identify

herse l f. She said that he would be driving one of two ve hicles, either F or d F -1 50 or

Ha rl e y Da vid so n Ro a d K ingand

ind e e d th e of

fi c e r s po tte d [hi m] coming out of that subdivision .
. . driving a Har ley Davidson Road King . That’s the rea sonable suspicion we need.
Ov e r o bje c tio n b y

de fe ns e c ouns e l, t

he tr ia l c ourt

de c lin e d to inc lud e an art ic le 38 .2 3 ins tr uc tio n in the jury char g e. Davis wa s subsequently

found g uilty

of driving while into x i cate d and plac ed on community

supervision. This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S Art icle 38.23 instruction

We will first address Davis’s thi rd poi nt of err or, in which he asser ts that the trial court a

bused its discretion in not including an article 38.23 instruction “that would have allowed jur or s to c on sid e r i f t

he ini tia l stop by

the of fi c e r w a s r e a so na

ble .” Da vis c la ims that th e re wa s a fa c t is su e a s to wh e the r O ff ic e r S we e t ha d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to c on du c t a

tr a ff ic sto p. He po int s to his own testimony

in which he de nied sp ee ding a nd denied lea

ving his lane of traf

fic, a nd he contends that this testimony contra dicts Sweet’s t estimony that Davis wa s speedingand driving from one side of the road to the other. The State responds that pa rt of Swee t’s rea sonable suspicion for
c on du c tin g the sto p in c lud e d th e 91 1 c a ll, and the re wa s n o d isp ute d f

a c t is su e on

tha t po int
.7 The ter ms of article 38.23(a) are “mandatory , and wh en an is sue of f act is ra ised,
a d e f e n d an t h a s a s tatuto r

y r ig h t to h a v e th e ju

r y c h ar g e d a ccor dingly .” Ma dd e n v . S tat e , 2 4 2 S
. W
. 3 d

5 0 4 , 5 1 0 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Mu rp hy v . S tat e , 640 S.W .2d 297, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). Howe ver, “ [a] d ef endant’ s rig ht to the submiss ion of jury instructions under A rticle 38.23(a ) is limit ed to disputed issues of fa ct that ar e mater ial to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidenc e inadmissible.” Id
. As the court of criminal appe als has explained,
There must be a g enuine dispute a bout a material fac t. I f there is no disputed factua l issue, the leg ality of the conduct is dete rmined by the trial judg e alone , as a que stion of law. A nd if other facts, not in dispute, are sufficie nt to support the lawfulness of the cha lleng ed conduc t, then the disputed fac t issue is not su b m i t t ed to the jury beca use it is not material to the ul timate admissibili ty of t he evide nce. T he disputed fa c t mu st b e an e sse nti a l on e in d e c idi ngthe lawf uln e ss o f t

he c ha lle ng e d c on du c t.
Id . at 510-11. Th e c ha lle ng e d c on du c t in thi s ca se wa s the tr a ff ic sto p by Of

fi c e r Swe e t. Th e tr a ff

ic stop was law ful if Sw e e t ha d r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

to b e lie ve that D a vis wa s d ri vin g wh ile intox icated. Se e Fo rd

v . S tat e , 15 8 S.W. 3d 48 8, 49 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ) ( “ An of fi c e r c on du c ts
a lawf ul t e mpo ra

ry de te nti on wh e n h e ha s r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

to b e lie ve that an in div idu a l is violating the la

w.”) ; State v. Nelson , 228 S.W .3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (“Awar rantless a utomobile stop i s a F ourth Amendment seizure a nalog ous to a tempora

ry detention, and it must be justified by rea sonable suspicion.”) . Reasonable suspicion exi sts if the office r has specific , articula

ble fac ts that, when combined w ith rational infer ence s from those fa cts, would lead him to r e a so na

bly c on c lud e that a

pa rt ic ula r p e rs on a c tua lly is, ha s be e n, or

so on wi ll b e e ng a g e d inI n fac t, t h e v i d eotape d rec ording of Off icer Sweet following Davis cle arly shows the 2 motorcy cle moving from one side of the roa d to the other. 8 criminal ac tivity
. Cas tro v . S tat e , 2 2 7 S
. W
. 3 d

7 3 7 , 7 4 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Ga rc ia
v . S tat e , 43 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).

I n this case, Of

fice r Swee t articulate d three specific fac ts that led him to sus pect, pr ior to making the stop, that D avis was driving while intox icated. F irst, he re ceive d information from the 911 dispat ch er t h at Da v is “had lef t the scene and wa s possibly intox icated.” Second, Swee t observe d Davis spee ding. T hird, Sweet obser ved the motorc y cle “ sway ing, side to side.” Of those f

act s , there was no dispute about whe ther Of fice r Swee t rec eived the 911 dispatch. Ther e wa s also no dispute about whethe r Dav i s was “swaying, side to side” in the road. A lthough Da

vis denied “leaving his lane of traff ic,” he did not deny

Sweet’s testimony

that he wa s “ sw ay ing .” To the c on tr ary , D a vis e xpla ine d th a t th e ro a d w a s “ fi lle d a nd ri dd le d w ithpo tholes, sways and swerves , drop-of fs to the side, rocks all over it.” (Emphasis adde d). Davis testified,

“ Th e on ly th in g I di d whe n Iwa s d ri vin g do wn

that r oa d w a s to a vo id h a zar ds in t he ro a d. ” Th is t es t i m o n y i mp l i es t h ati n

o rd er t o av o i d t h es e h a z a r d s , Da v i s wa s s wa y i n g an d s we rv i n g. 2 Acc ord i n gly , the only

disputed fac t issue releva nt to the lawfulness of the traff ic stop was Da vis ’s rate of

sp e e d. Th e qu e sti on

the n b e c ome s w he the r, given th e a bo ve un dis pu te d f

a c ts, the disputed fac t was esse ntial “ in de ciding the lawfulne ss of the cha lleng ed conduc t.” See M adden , 242 S.W .3d at 511.

On thi s r e c or d, we c on c lud e that th e dis pu te d f a c t w a s n ot e sse nti a l. T he fa c tua l ba sis for stopping a vehic le nee d not arise f rom the off

icer ’s per sonal observations, but m ay be supplied by information ac quired fr om another pe rson, provided t h at t he information acquire d hasAl tho ug h D a vis dis pu te s w he the r t he c a lle r r e a lly wa s B e nn e tt, Da vis a c kn ow le dg e d in

his 3 testimony that, on the nig ht of his arre st, Benne tt “went ahe ad and c alled the c ops.” 9 sufficie nt “ indicia of re liability .” See A dams v. W illiams , 4 07 U. S. 1 43 , 1 47 (1 97 2) ; Br oth e r v . S tat e , 166 S.W .3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The r eliability of the infor

mation is determined by examining such fa ctors as w hether the witness identifies her self, provide s the authorities with her contac t information, and provide s a description and location of t he suspect’s vehicle. See B rother , 16 6 S. W.3 d at 2 58. H e re , th e 91 1 c a lle r i de nti fi e d h e rs e lf a s L e and

ra B e nn e tt, provided the

3 authorities with both her phone number and her addre ss, told the authorities that Davis was drunk and that he m ight be driving awa y from her residenc e intox icated, a

nd provided a

descr iption of two vehicles D avis might be driving—either a Har ley Davidson Road Kingor a bla ck F ord F -150. The 911 dispatche r rela

y ed this infor

mation to Offic er Sweet. The dispatcher added that Davis wa s “e xtr e me ly 1 0 5 6
. ” “ 1 0 5 6 , ” Sw e e t te s ti f ie d , r e f e r r e d to “ an in to xic a te d p e r s o n . ” A s Sw e e t w as approa ching the addr ess provided to him, he obser ved a motorcy cle leaving the subdivision where Be nnett’s residence was l ocate d. As Sweet followed the motorcy cle, he observe d it “swaying, side to side,” m ea n i n g t h at i t “would g o from the outside [of the roa d] and then swing into the c enter and then c ome bac k out.” These are specific , articu l ab l e facts that, when c ombined with rational inf e re nc e s f ro m th os e fact s, c ou ld l e a d Sw e e t to c on c lud e that th e dr ive r o f t he mot or c y c le was intox icated.

Thus, the di sputed fac t, Davis’s rate of speed, ma y have inc rea sed the likelihood that Davis w a s dr iv in g w h il e in to xic a te d , b u t i t w a s n o t “ e s s e n ti a l” to th e r e a s o n a b le

- s u s p ic ion deter mination. I n other wor ds, even if the jury had re solved the spee ding issue in Davis’s favor , the tr a ff ic sto p s til l w ou ld have be e n lawf ul, and , th e re fo re , th e e vid e nc e ob ta ine d f ro m th e sto p w ou ld10

have be en admissible. Acc ording ly , Davis wa s not entitled to an article 38.23 instruc tion. See, e .g., Me rri we ath e r v . S

tat e , 501 S.W .2d 887, 891 (T ex . C rim. App. 1973) (w hen spec ific fa cts used by c ourt to de te rm ine e xiste nc e of pr ob a ble c a us e we re un c on te ste d, de fe nd ant wa s not e nti tle d to jury instruction conce rning contested facts that did not defe at finding of proba ble ca use); Re y no sa
v . S tat e , 996 S.W .2d 23 8 , 2 4 0 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (de fenda nt not entitl ed t o ar ticle 38.23 instruction when he testified that he did not run stop sig n but did not dispute office r testimony

that defe ndant was speeding and failed to rema in in single lane of traf fic); Marke yv . S tat e , 996 S.W .2d 226, 230-31 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1999, no pet.) (d e fe nd ant n ot e nti tle d to art ic le 38 .2 3 in str uc tio n e ve n th ou g h h e de nie d s pe e din g be c a us e he did not contradic t other traf

fic violation that offic er r elied upon in pulling him over ). We overrule Davis’s third point of er ror.
Evid ence adm issib ility

I n h is f ir st p oin t of

e rr or , D a vis a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in ref using to a dmit the photogra phs alleg edly showing the conditi ons of t he roa d wher e Of fice r Swee t
c on du c te d th e tr a ff

ic sto p. I n h is se c on d po int of e rr or , Da vis a sse rt s that the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d i s cr et i o ni nad m i t t i n g t h e 9 1 1 re co rd i n g.

We rev ie w a tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n to a d mi t o r e xc lu d e e v id e n c e u n d e r an abuse of discretion standa

rd. Sh uff ie ld v . S tat e , 189 S.W .3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial c ourt abuses its discre tion only when the de cision lies “o u t side the zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” W alt e rs v . S tat e , 247 S.W .3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We first addre ss the admissibili ty of the ph o t o gra p h s of the roa d. The c ourt of criminal a p p ea l s h as o b serve d, “A pictur e is worth a thousa nd words. Ye t those words, in the11

context of a criminal trial, must be the r ight wor ds. Otherwise , the picture from whence the words flow is inadmissible.” Eraz o v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 487, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A photog raph is ina dmissibl e “if

it is subs tantially

more pre judicial than probative.” Id
. (citing Tex. R. Evi d. 403). I n making this determination, courts examine the prof fer ed evidence in lig ht of sever al fa ctors including the following : (1) the probative value of the evidence ; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, y et indelible, wa y ; (3 ) t he time nee ded to deve lop the evidenc e; and ( 4) the proponent’s ne ed for

the evidenc e. Id . at 489. I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt

wo uld no t ha ve a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

fi nd ingtha

t a t le a st thr e e of the a bo ve fa c tor s w e ig hed in fav or of e xclu din g the e vid e nc e . F ir st, the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld have fo un d th a t th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of the ph oto g ra

ph s wa s low , as the y we re take n a pp ro xima te ly
on e y e ar a ft e r D a vis ’s arr e st. Se c on d, the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld h a ve fo un d th a t th e tim e ne e de d to develop the photog raphic evidenc e woul d have be en hig h, as the a dmission of the photogra phs would have r equire d additional evidenc e about whe ther the road conditions ha d chang ed, and, if so, how much they

had cha ng ed, in the y ear following Davis’s arr est. Third, the trial cour t could have found that Davis’s need f

or the e vidence of roa d conditions one y ear afte r his arr est was low. Prior to attempting to admit the photogr aphs, Davis had a lrea dy testified about the r oad conditions at the time of his arre st. Additionally , ear lier duringthe trial, Off icer Sweet admitt ed t h at t he roa d conditions a few

blocks prior t o wher e he stoppe d Davis we re “ pretty bad.” T hus, Davis’s explanation for why

he wa s sw er v i n g on the roa d was a lrea dy befor e the jury , and the tria l court could have conclude d that photogr aphs t aken one y ear afte r Davis’s arr est wer e, at be st, unnece ssary and, at wor st, could have misled the jury into believi n g t h e road c onditions were wor se than they12

actua ll y w e r e . O n th is r e c o r d , w e c an n o t c o n c lu d e th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n to exclude the photogr aphs of the r oad wa s “outside the zone of re asonable disag ree ment.”

We overrule Davis’s fir st point of error
. We n e xt ad dr e ss t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to a dmi t the 91 1 re c or din g . At tr ia l, D a vis objected to a dmitti ng the rec ording on the g rounds that the re cordingcontained he arsa y and that the admission of the rec ording violated his rig ht to confront the witnesses ag ainst him. Se e Da v is v. W ashington , 5 47 U. S. 8 13 (2 00 6) ; Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Davis carr ies these a rg uments forwa

rd on appe al. I n response , the State argu es t h at t h e stateme nts on the 911 rec ording wer e not a dmitted f or the truth of the matter asser ted and, thus, a

re not he arsa

y . The State fu rt he r c on te nd s th a t th e state me nts on the re c or din g we re no n- te sti mon ia l and , th e re fo re , d id not violate the Confrontation Clause.

We first co n cl u d e t h at t he trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
r e c o r d in g o v e r

D a v is ’ s h e ar s ay

o b je c ti o n . H e ar s ay

is a s tate me n t, o th e r

th ano n e ma d e b y

the decla rant while te stify ing at the trial or hea ring , offe red in e vidence to pr ove the truth of the matter
asser ted
. T e x. R. E v id
. 8 0 1 ( d )
. St a te me n ts th at ar e o f f e r e d f o r th e p u r p o s e o f e xp la in in g how a defe ndant bec ame a

suspect and not f

or t h e truth of the matter asser ted ar e not hea

rsay . Dinkins

v . S tat e , 8 94 S.W. 2d

33 0, 34 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Da v is v . S tat e , 169 S.W .3d 673, 675 (T e x. App .— Fort Wor

th 2 00 5, no pe t.) . T his ty pe of te sti mony

is n ot h e ars ay

be c a us e it m e re ly “assists the jury ’s understanding of the events by providing context for the police of fice r’s a ctions.” Can o v . S

tat e , 3 S.W .3d 99, 110 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref’d) . Her e, the 911
rec ording was not off

ere d to prove the truth o f t h e m att er a sserted—na mely , that Davis wa s intox icated—but to explain the reason why Offic er Swe et was dispatc hed to the subdivision and one13

of the re asons why

Sweet suspected that Davis wa s intox icated. Se e Cor mi e r v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 161, 162 (Tex
. Ap p . —

Au s t i n1 9 9 7 , n o p et
. ) ( h o l d i n g th at ex t ra j u d i ci al s t at em en t s t h at d ef en d an twas “tra ffickinglarg e amounts of c ocaine ” we re not he arsa y beca use they wer e not “of

fer ed to prove that appellant wa s a drugdeale r but to expl ain why the drugtask forc e chose to investigate him.”). State me nts a dmi tte d f

or no n- he ars ay

purp os e s d o not r a ise Con fr on ta tio n Cl a us e
conce rns. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Te n n es s e e v . Street , 4 71 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). Howeve r, eve n if the statements we re he arsa y , we f urther c onclude that t h e statements wer e non-testimonial. Testimonial statements implicate the Confrontation Clause, while non-testimonial sta t ements do not. Se e Da v is , 547 U.S. at 821. I n Da v is , the Supreme Court e x plained the dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n te sti mon ia l and no n- te sti mon ia l he ars ay

state me nts :
Statements are nontestimonial when made i n the course of police interr og ation under c ir c ums tanc e s ob

je c tiv e ly ind ic a tin g that th e pr ima ry purp os e of

the int e rr og a tio n is to enable police assistance to meet an ong oing e merg ency . They are testimonial w h e nt h e c i r c u m s t an c e s o b j e c t i v e l y i n d i c a

t e t h a t t h e r e i s n o s u c h o n g o i n g e m e r g e n c y, and tha t th e pr ima

ry purp os e of the int e rr og a tio n is to e sta bli sh or pr ov e pa st e ve nts potentially

rele vant to later c riminal prosec ution.
Id . at 822. The Supre me Court went on to describe a non-e x haustive list of fac tors to consider whe n deter mining whe ther stateme nts were made dur ing a n ong oing e merg ency : (1) whe ther the situation was still in progr ess; (2) whe ther the que stions sought to deter mine what is prese ntly

happeningas opposed to what ha s happene d i n the past; (3) w hether the primary

purpose of

the interrog ation was to re nder a id rather

than to memorialize a possible crime; ( 4) whe ther the q u es tioning wa s
con d u ct ed in a separate room, aw ay from the a lleg ed attac ker; a nd (5) whe ther the e vents wer e deliberately

rec ounted in a step-by -step fa shion. Id
. a t 82 9- 30 ; Vi ns on v . S tat e , 252 S.W .3d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).I n fac t, Of fi ce r Swee t testified that he wa s dispatched in re sponse to a re port of a 4 “disturbanc e” a

nd his purpose wa s to “investigate and make sure e very thing [was] safe.” 14 He re , th e 91 1 re c or din g wa s ma de wh ile Da vis wa s st ill a t B e nn e tt’ s h ou se . B e nn e tt told the dispatcher that she had had Davis “remove d” fr om the house the da y befor e, but that he ha d returne d. I n the middle of the c all, althoug h Be nnett thought that Davis might be le aving the house, she later told the dispatcher that “he’ s b ac k
. ” Be n nett also told the dispatcher that Davis wa s

“ dr un k” and that he wa s be ing “ ve rb a lly a bu siv e ” and “ in my fa c e .” Th e se c ir c ums tanc e s o bje c tiv e ly indicate that the pr i m ar y p urpose of the statements made during the ca ll was to enable police assistance to meet an ong oing e merg ency , n am el y , a domestic disturbance involving at lea st one po ssi bly int oxic a te d in div idu a l. Ex amining the 911 call in light of the Da v is fac tors, the situation 4 was still in progr ess when the call wa s m ad e, t he questions by the dispatche r soug ht to determine wh a t w a s p re se ntl y ha

pp e nin g , the pr ima

ry purp os e of the inv e sti g a tio n wa s to re nd e r a id, B e nn e tt made the c all while Davis wa s at the house with her , and B ennett did n o t re co u n t what was happening in a deliberate, “step-by -step fashion.” Se e Da v is , 547 U.S. at 829-30. Ac cording ly , we hold that B ennett’s statements made during the 911 call wer e non-testimonial, and thus the trial cour t did not err in admitting the rec ording on the g round t h at i t s ad m i ssion did not vi olate the Confrontation Clause.

Howeve r, eve n if the statements we re te stimon i al i n nature , we c onclude that any err or in their admission was har mless. Be cause the alleg ed er ror implicates the Confrontation Clause, in order to find the err or har

mless , we “m u s t b e convinc ed, beyond a
rea sonable doubt, that the a dmissio n o f t he evide nce w ould probably not have ha d a signific ant impact on the mind of a n aver ag e juror.” Dav is v. Stat e , 203 S.W .3d 845, 85215

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Put another wa y , is there a

rea sonable possibility

that the Cra wfo rd

err or, within the context of the entire trial, ‘move d th e j u ry fr om a state of non- persua sion to one of persua sion’ on a particula r issue? ” Id
. at 852-53. I n order to answer

this question, we consider the following fac tors: (1) the importanc e of the hear say statements to the State’s ca se; (2) w hether the hear say evidenc e wa s cumulative of other evidenc e; (3 ) t h e pre sence or abse nce of evidenc e
c or ro bo ratin g or

c on tr a dic tin g the he ars ay te sti mony on ma te ri a l poin ts; and (4 ) the ov e ra ll s tr e ng th of the prose cution’s ca se. Id . at 852.

Setting aside the 911 re cording , the State’s evide nce in cl u d ed Offic er Swe et’s extensive a

nd detailed testimony about why he believe d Davis wa s intox icated ba sed on his persona l observ a ti o n s . Sw e e t t e s ti f ie d th a t h e p e r s o n a ll y

o b s e r v e d th e mo to r c y c le s p e e d in g an d s w a y ing from one side of t he roa d to the other. Swee t also testified that, when he stopped Davis, Da vis was “ver y unsteady on his feet,” was lea

ning ag ainst his patrol car , had slurre d speec h, and smelled of
a lc oh ol. Swe e t f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t D a vis pe rf or me d po or ly on thr e e sta

nd ard fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts , the HG N t e st, the wa lk- and -t

ur n te st, and the on e -l e g g e d- sta nd te st. Swe e t als o te sti fi e d th a t D a vis
a dmi tte d t o h a v i n g a

“ f e w ” dr i n k s t h a te v e n i n g . A d d i t i o n a l l y , S w e e tt e s t i f i e d t o t h e a b o v e fa c ts while the jury was watching a videotaped recording of t he traffic stop. I n other words, much of what Sweet obser

ved, the jury was a

ble to see f

or itself. The vide otape r efle cts the motorcycle swe rving p ri o r t o t h e s t o p , Da v i s ’s s l u rr ed s p ee ch an d u n s t ea d i n es s , h i s ad m i s s i o n t h at h e h adb ee ndri n k i n g,
and his po or pe rf or manc e on the fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts
. Fur thermor e, t h e st atements in the re cordingof which D avis complains wer e cumulative of other evidenc e that was admitted without objec tion. Davis specific ally co m p l ains
a bo ut the state me nts B e nn e tt ma de to the 91 1 dis patc he r t hat D a vis wa s d

ru nk and le a vin g he r h ou se16

intox icated. H oweve r, Davis did not object when Offic er Sweet testified that one of the re asons he believed D avis was intoxi cate d was because he rece ived i nformation fr om the 911 dispatcher that Davis had le ft the sce ne and w as possibly intox icated. On thi s r e c or d, we are c on vin c e d, be y on d a re a so nab le do ub t, t

hat any e rr or in admitting the 911 r ecor ding did not move t h e j u ry from a state of non-pe rsuasion to a state of persua sion on the issue of whether Davis wa s g uilty of the off

ense of driving while intox icated. There fore , the alleg ed er

ror wa s harmless. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(a)
. We overrule Davis’s sec ond point of err or.
CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d D a vis ’s po int s o f e rr or , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 20, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh