United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 8, 2017*

Decided March 8 2017

Before

 WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3792

MATTHEW TYLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STEPHANIE WICK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

No. 14-cv-68-jdp

James D. Peterson,

Judge.

O R D E R

Matthew Tyler, a Wisconsin civil detainee, appeals the grant of summary 

judgment to the defendants on his claim that they disposed of his property in violation 

of his right to due process and access to the courts. The district court reasoned that 

adequate post-deprivation remedies defeated his due process claim and he identified no 

legal claim that he lost because of the discarded property. We agree with the district 

court’s reasoning and thus affirm the judgment. 

 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-3792 Page 2

Because this appeal arises from a ruling at summary judgment, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Tyler, the opposing party. See Dunderdale v. 

United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015). Tyler describes two events. The 

first is the revocation of his extended supervision. Tyler served seven years in prison for 

sexually assaulting a child. Before his term of extended supervision began, the state 

civilly committed him as a sexually violent person and transferred him to the Sand 

Ridge Secure Treatment Center. While there, Center officials determined that Tyler

violated facility rules by having sex with another resident. In response, a state court 

revoked his extended supervision. Tyler was then incarcerated in the Dodge 

Correctional Institution for four months after which he returned to Sand Ridge. 

The second event is Tyler’s lack of access to his property as he shuttled between 

these two facilities. When he left Sand Ridge, officers sent his belongings to a relative. 

Tyler’s relative sent that property back to Sand Ridge when Tyler returned there, but

officials allowed Tyler to keep only some items (clothing, footwear, and legal papers). 

Sand Ridge deemed the rest (electronics, other paperwork, and photographs)

prohibited. After Tyler and Sand Ridge employees disagreed about what to do with the 

remaining items, the employees discarded them.

As relevant to this appeal, Tyler sued officials in state court for discarding his 

property. Defendants removed the suit to federal court and moved for summary 

judgment. After discovery limited to “immunity” issues, the district court granted the 

motions. The court explained that the claim about the discarded property failed, both 

under due-process and access-to-courts theories. Tyler suffered no violation of due 

process because, although he alleged that the defendants discarded his property in 

breach of the Center’s rules, he had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Wis. 

Stat. § 51.61(1)(v). (The court ruled, though, that Tyler could no longer bring an action 

under that law because he did not timely comply with its notice-of-claim requirement.) 

The defendants also did not deny him access to the courts, the court ruled, because 

Tyler did not identify any meritorious legal claim that he lost from not having those 

materials. Finally sovereign immunity barred any official-capacity claims.

In this court Tyler challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims regarding 

his discarded property. He repeats that the defendants denied him due process by 

disposing of his property. But because, as Tyler asserts, the defendants breached the 

Center’s rules for handling his property, the availability of a post-deprivation remedy

under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(v) for their unauthorized disposal of his property provides

adequate process. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Tenny v. Blagojevich, 
No. 16-3792 Page 3

659 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2011). And that remedy was available to him, even if, as the 

district court decided, he failed to pursue that remedy properly. See Stachowski v. Town 

of Cicero, 425 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2005). Tyler replies that the district court should 

have remanded to state court the question whether he complied with the 

notice-of-claim requirement of Wis. Stat. § 51.61. But the district court had supplemental 

jurisdiction to address whether he complied with the state law’s notice requirements.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Tyler also argues, irrelevantly, that he sued defendants in their official capacities. 

He believes that they lack sovereign immunity because Lapides v. Board of Regents of 

University System of Georgia ruled that “a State’s voluntary appearance in federal court 

amount[s] to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002). 

But Tyler loses on the merits of his due-process claim, so his argument goes nowhere. 

And Lapides applies only to state-law claims for which the State has waived its 

immunity in state court. 535 U.S. at 617. But Wisconsin has not waived sovereign 

immunity for tort suits in state court. Wis. Stat. § 775.01.

Tyler next contends that by withholding his property the defendants denied him 

access to the courts. He argues that he could have better defended himself in his 

revocation hearing (where he had counsel) if he had his property. But any claim for 

damages that necessarily questions the validity of his revoked extended supervision is 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 

544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005). Moreover Tyler does not explain what legal material he lacked 

but needed for his defense to the revocation proceeding. In re Maxy, 674 F.3d 658, 

660-61 (7th Cir. 2012). Tyler replies that discarding his property prevented him from 

complying with the time limits of Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim requirement for his 

state-law claim. But he has not submitted any evidence that his filing delay resulted 

from not having his belongings. 

Tyler’s last argument is that the district court erred by limiting discovery to 

“immunity” issues. This limitation was proper because the adequacy of his suit did not 

turn on any facts that broader discovery from the defendants might facilitate. 

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Until th[e] threshold immunity 

question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.”); Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 

515–16 (7th Cir. 2002).

We have considered Tyler’s remaining arguments, but none has any merit. 

AFFIRMED.