UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LILA ADAMS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. No. 14-4135 (D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00760-BSJ) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and GORSUCH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Lila Adams applied for disability benef its claiming that back and leg pain and other medical problems kept her from worki ng. Following a hearing and with the benefit of testimony from a vocational expert, an administrative law judge determined that Ms. Adams retained th e residual functional capacity to perform sedentary-to-light work. At step four of the Social Security Administration’s five-step evaluation process fo r cases like this one, the ALJ further held that in light

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 of Ms. Adams’s residual functional capacity sh e was able to resume her past work as an electronic scanner operato r — at least under the cond itions generally associated with that type of job in the national economy. See Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining th e five-step process). Altern atively, at step five in the evaluation process the ALJ conclude d that Ms. Adams’s residual functional capacity and the skills she de veloped while working as a cashier supervisor also enabled her to obtain employment as a pe rsonnel scheduler, timekeeper, or order clerk. For both reasons, the AL J denied her claim for disab ility benefits. Later, the Appeals Council denied revi ew, the district court affi rmed the ALJ’s order, and Ms. Adams appealed to this court. Now before us, Ms. Adams challenges th e ALJ’s determinations at both steps four and five. But most of the argumen ts Ms. Adams seeks to present on appeal weren’t raised before the dist rict court. For example, in the district court she didn’t challenge the ALJ’s determination that she is able to perform sedentary-to-light work. Neither did she challe nge the sufficiency of the AL J’s findings regarding the physical and mental demands of her relevant past work. And because Ms. Adams has offered no compelling reason to excuse her fa ilure to present thes e arguments earlier, they are forfeited and we limit our review “to the i ssues the claimant properly preserve[d] in the district court.” Berna v. Chater , 101 F.3d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). What remains? Ms. Adams preserved in the district court and has briefed here only two claims of error. Fi rst, she contends there is in sufficient evidence to support3 the ALJ’s determination at step four that she is able to retu rn to work as an electronic scanner operator. Second, she disputes the ALJ’s finding that she acquired skills during her time as a cashier th at she might now transfer to other available jobs. Turning to the first argum ent, at step four it is Ms. Adams’s burden to establish that she is unable to perform he r past relevant work as a scanner operator both as she actually performed that work in the past and as it is generally performed in the national economy. See O’Dell v. Shalala , 44 F.3d 855, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1994); Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993). The ALJ found — based on Ms. Adam s’s description of her past job duties and the vocational expert’s testimony — that her past wo rk as a scanner operator with the Salt Lake City poli ce fell within the definition of “scanner operator,” as that job is defined by the Dictionary of Occ upational Titles (DOT). In categorizing Ms. Adams’s work as he did, moreover, th e ALJ was presumptivel y entitled to rely on the DOT. See Andrade , 985 F.2d at 1051-52. The ALJ then proceeded to find that Ms. Adams had the residual functional capacity to perform the work typically required of a scanner operator, at least as that job is performed in the national economy. And at that point it became incu mbent on Ms. Adams to show either that she couldn’t perform that work or that th e duties of her past j ob were “sufficiently distinct” from those “described in the Dictionary [as] to constitute a different line of work” altogether. Id. at 1052 (internal quotation ma rk omitted). This much, however, Ms. Adams has not done. For she has given no pers uasive reason to conclude that despite the ALJ’s findings about her residual functional capacity she’s4 incapable of performing the duties of a sca nner operator as it’s generally performed in the national economy — or that this pos ition is sufficiently more challenging or burdensome than her past j ob that it might qualify as a different line of work. Because we discern no grounds for overtur ning the finding of no disability at step four, we need not r each the ALJ’s alternative st ep-five determination. Lax v.
Astrue , 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (“If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evalua tion under a subsequent step is not necessary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (same). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Neil M. Gorsuch Circuit Judge