[Cite as Madison Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Hambden Sportsman Inc., 2023-Ohio-3694.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAKE COUNTY

MADISON TOWNSHIP

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

- vs -

HAMBDEN SPORTSMAN INC.

d.b.a. C-4 SHOOTING & 

TRAINING CENTER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

CASE NO. 2023-L-052

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas

Trial Court No. 2022 CV 000908

M E M O R A N D U M

O P I N I O N

Decided: October 10, 2023

Judgment: Appeal dismissed

Gary L. Pasqualone, Curry & Pasqualone, 302 South Broadway, Geneva, OH 44041, 

and Andrea K. Ziarko, Baker Dublikar, 400 South Main Street, North Canton, OH 44720 

(For Plaintiffs-Appellees).

Christopher M. Corrigan, Seeley, Savidge, Ebert & Gourash, Co., LPA 26600 Detroit 

Road, Suite 300, Westlake, OH 44145 (For Defendant-Appellant, Hambden Sportsman 

Inc. d.b.a. C-4 Shooting & Training Center).

Christopher M. Corrigan, Seeley, Savidge, Ebert & Gourash, Co., LPA 26600 Detroit 

Road, Suite 300, Westlake, OH 44145 and Luca A. Viglione, 29948 Regent Road, 

Wickliffe, OH 44092 (For Defendant-Appellant, C-4 Shooting and Training Academy, 

Inc.).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

{¶1} On May 11, 2023, appellants, Hambden Sportsman Inc. d.b.a. C-4 Shooting 

& Training Center (Hambden) and C-4 Shooting and Training Academy, Inc. (the 
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Academy), filed a notice of appeal from an entry of the Lake County Court of Common 

Pleas.

{¶2} Appellees, Madison Township Board of Trustees and Madison Township 

Zoning Inspector Max Ungers, filed a complaint requesting a temporary restraining order, 

preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against Hambden and Neil Harrison 

alleging violations of the township zoning code. Appellees sought a permanent injunction 

to enjoin the property owners and business from shooting pistols, rifles, or other weapons 

other than trap or skeet shooting from the range and to remove any structure not in 

existence at the time the property was conveyed. Harrison was dismissed as a party, and 

the Academy intervened as a defendant and filed a counterclaim. After a hearing, the trial 

court issued a March 31, 2023 entry, where it indicated that it was only dealing “with the 

Township’s motion for preliminary injunction.” In that entry, the court granted the 

preliminary injunction to prevent the Academy from allowing target shooting on the 

property it controls other than trap and skeet shooting. The court filed an amended entry 

on May 2, 2023. This appeal ensued.

{¶3} On July 13, 2023, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging 

that the judgment is not a final appealable order. Appellants filed opposition to the motion 

to dismiss.

{¶4} Pursuant to Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, a judgment 

of a trial court can be immediately reviewed by an appellate court only if it constitutes a 

“final order” in the action. Germ v. Fuerst, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-116, 2003-Ohio6241, ¶ 3. If a lower court’s order is not final, then an appellate court does not have 
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jurisdiction to review the matter, and the matter must be dismissed. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. 

Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989). 

{¶5} A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that is considered 

interlocutory and impermanent in nature. Clean Energy Future, LLC v. Clean Energy 

Future-Lordstown, LLC, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-T-0110, 2017-Ohio-9350, ¶ 4.

Thus, a judgment entry granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not automatically 

qualify the order as final and appealable. Id.

{¶6} According to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), an order that grants or denies a 

provisional remedy is a final appealable order when both of the following apply:

{¶7} “(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional 

remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect 

to the provisional remedy.

{¶8} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective 

remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and 

parties in the action. * * *”

{¶9} A “provisional remedy” is defined as “a proceeding ancillary to an action,

including, but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary injunction.” R.C. 

2505.02(A)(3). For an order to be final in a preliminary injunction case, both prongs of 

R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) must be met. 

{¶10} In the case at hand, the first prong has been met because the trial court’s 

March 31 entry granted a preliminary injunction. That entry determined the action with 

respect to the provisional remedy and prevented judgment in favor of appellants regarding

that provisional remedy. R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a).
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{¶11} The problem is with the second prong. Appellants have to be deprived of a 

“meaningful and effective remedy” if they cannot immediately appeal.

{¶12} This court has stated that when a trial court grants a preliminary injunction 

in a matter in which the ultimate relief sought is a permanent injunction there is generally 

no final appealable order. Fatica Renovations, LLC v. Bridge, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 

2017-G-0106, 2017-Ohio-1419, ¶ 13. Courts in Ohio have also held that a preliminary 

injunction that maintains the status quo pending a ruling on the merits of the case is not 

a final appealable order. Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶13} As to the second prong, pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), we find that 

appellants would not be denied a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following 

a final judgment as to all proceedings in this matter. In general, if a permanent injunction 

is sought, this allows for a remedy at the conclusion of the proceedings. 

{¶14} This is a preliminary injunction case that is subject to further order of the 

court, and the requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B) have not been satisfied. Appellants will 

have an opportunity to litigate the merits of their claims with the trial court. 

{¶15} Accordingly, appellees’ motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is 

hereby dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.

{¶16} Appeal dismissed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.