Filed 5/30/24 Casa Blanca Beach Estates etc. v. County of Santa Barbara CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CASA BLANCA BEACH 

ESTATES OWNERS’

ASSOCIATION, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA 

BARBARA, et al,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

2d Civ. No. B314102

(Super. Ct. No. 18CV04772)

(Santa Barbara County)

In the midst of administrative proceedings, Casa Blanca 

Beach Estates Owners’ Association (Casa Blanca) sought 

declaratory relief against the County of Santa Barbara (County) 

and the California Coastal Commission (Commission) regarding

the timing of its obligation to construct a beach access walkway 

pursuant to an offer to dedicate recorded in 1990. The trial court
2

correctly found Casa Blanca failed to exhaust its administrative 

remedies and entered judgment in favor of respondents. We will 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

More than 30 years ago, the County of Santa Barbara 

Planning Commission approved the development of a 12-lot 

oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria. Casa Blanca is the nonprofit homeowner’s association formed to manage the 

development. It has owned the common area within the 

development since the 1990s.

The development’s approval was subject to multiple

conditions. Condition 20 required Casa Blanca’s predecessor-ininterest to “provide an irrevocable offer to dedicate a lateral 

access easement five feet in width . . .” for public beach access 

and to construct a concrete walkway along the entire easement 

length within 180 days after acceptance of the offer to dedicate.

Casa Blana’s predecessor recorded an Irrevocable Offer to 

Dedicate Easement (offer to dedicate) including terms requiring

the applicant to construct a concrete walkway within “[180] days 

after the last to occur of the following: [¶] (i) recordation of said 

Notice of Acceptance, or [¶] (ii) issuance of any required land use 

permit or other governmental approval needed to permit 

construction of the accessway, including approval by the State 

Lands Commission, if required.” 

The County accepted the offer to dedicate in 2011. In 2017,

the County and Commission sent Casa Blanca a notice of 

violation alleging the deadline to construct the walkway had 
3

passed.

1 In response, Casa Blanca submitted walkway

construction plans to the County, but was told it must obtain a 

coastal development permit from the Commission. It applied to 

the Commission for the permit, but the Commission deemed the 

application incomplete. Over the next few years, Casa Blanca 

and the Commission unsuccessfully worked together to complete 

the permit application. 

In September 2018, Casa Blanca filed a complaint for 

declaratory relief against the County and Commission and 

petitioned for writ of mandate against the County, alleging it had 

exhausted all administrative remedies and had no plain, speedy, 

or adequate remedy at law. 

In May 2019, as litigation proceeded, Casa Blanca appealed 

the Commission staff’s determination that its application was 

incomplete but then withdrew the appeal at the Commission’s 

request, stating it would examine the feasibility of two 

alternative construction options. It subsequently determined 

further study of the alternatives was not worthwhile and declined 

to submit the requested analysis to the Commission. 

In November 2019, the court heard cross motions for 

summary judgment and/or adjudication from the County and 

Casa Blanca. The Commission opposed Casa Blanca’s motion but 

did not move for summary judgment. The trial court granted the 

County’s motion on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca’s. 

As to the first and third causes of action, the court found the offer 

1 The County authorized the Commission to assume 

primary responsibility for resolving Casa Blanca’s alleged 

violation. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30810, subd. (a)(1).) 
4

to dedicate had been timely accepted by the County.2 As to the 

second cause of action seeking a determination regarding “the 

deadline for Casa Blanca to meet any obligation . . . to construct a 

walkway within the land described in . . . the Offer to Dedicate” it 

found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies. 

One month later, the Commission, acting alone, issued a 

“Notice of Intent to Record Notices of Violation of the Coastal Act 

and Notice of Intent to Commence Cease and Desist Order and 

Administrative Civil Penalty Action Proceedings” (notice of 

intent). Ten months after that, Casa Blanca filed a Statement of 

Defense and Objections to Recordation of Notices of Violation.

After the State Lands Commission issued a preliminary 

determination showing portions of the promised walkway 

encroached on tidal lands, the Commission rescinded the portion 

of its notice of intent regarding its intent to record the notice of 

violation. In December 2019, the court stayed litigation to 

provide Casa Blanca an opportunity to exhaust administrative 

remedies. The stay was lifted in November 2020. 

In February 2021, Casa Blanca filed a second amended 

complaint adding allegations against the Commission. The 

Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer 

without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the 

County and Commission.3

2 Casa Blanca has not appealed the trial court’s rulings on 

the first and third causes of action. 

3 We deny Casa Blanca’s request for judicial notice of a 

summons and complaint entitled State Lands Commission v. 
5

DISCUSSION

Casa Blanca contends its claim is ripe because it has 

exhausted all available administrative remedies or is excused 

from doing so. It seeks remand directing the trial court to 

determine whether it is currently obligated to construct the 

walkway.4

Standard of Review

An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

“Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable issue of 

material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Regents of University of 

California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) We 

Casa Blanca Beach Owners Assoc., et al, case no. 23CV03115, 

filed with the Superior Court of the County of Santa Barbara on 

July 20, 2023. It seeks notice under Evidence Code sections 459 

and 452, subdivision (d), which covers “Records of (1) any court of 

this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any 

state of the United States.” (See Evid. Code § 459, subd. (a), 

italics added [“The reviewing court may take judicial notice of 

any matter specified in Section 452”].) Casa Blanca asserts the 

summons and complaint are relevant to this appeal because the 

State Lands Commission will be unable to finalize its boundary

line determination until the boundary issue is resolved through 

settlement or judgment. We deferred ruling on this request 

pending consideration of the merits of the appeal. We now 

conclude the summons and complaint are not relevant to our 

analysis and accordingly, decline to take judicial notice. The 

motion is denied.

4 Casa Blanca maintains the offer to dedicate contains 

conditions precedent that must be satisfied before it is obligated 

to construct the walkway. 
6

review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo.

5 (Blank v. 

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).)

Administrative Proceedings Have Not Been Exhausted

The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies 

when there is an administrative remedy to questionable 

government action. It assures certain prerequisites are met 

before legal action is taken. (Redevelopment Agency v. Superior 

Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1492-93.) Where an 

administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must first be 

sought from the administrative body. (Abelleira v. District Court 

of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292.) This is a fundamental rule 

of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and 

binding upon all courts.” (Id. at p. 293.) A court’s intervention 

before an administrative agency has resolved the claim 

constitutes jurisdictional interference. (Plantier v. Ramona 

Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 383.) Courts “have 

no discretion to relax the exhaustion doctrine.” (Park Area 

Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1449.) 

Casa Blanca has the burden of proof to show it has exhausted its 

administrative remedies. (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin 

5 A demurrer sustained without leave to amend is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) It is 

appellant’s responsibility to support claims with colorable 

arguments and citations to legal authority. If an argument is not 

made on a particular point, we may treat it as forfeited. (Allen v. 

City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) Casa Blanca 

did not assert an error by the trial court in denying leave to 

amend. As such, we will discuss the court’s granting County’s 

motion for summary judgment and sustaining Commission’s 

demurrer but decline to analyze the court’s denial of leave to 

amend.
7

Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 

614, 624.)

A concept distinct from but similar to the exhaustion 

requirement is that there be a “ripe controversy.” Ripeness looks 

at whether a controversy is “’definite and concrete.’” The 

ripeness doctrine prevents courts “‘from entangling themselves in 

abstract disagreements over administrative policies,’” and 

protects administrative agencies from “judicial interference until 

an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt 

in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” (Pacific Legal 

Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 

171.) 

Here, the questions of whether Casa Blanca has presented 

a ripe controversy and whether it has exhausted its 

administrative remedies overlap.

An administrative decision is final, i.e., ripe, “when the agency 

has exhausted its jurisdiction and possesses ‘no further power to 

reconsider or rehear the claim.’” (Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. 

v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 169.) “Until a 

public agency makes a final decision, the matter is not ripe for 

judicial review.” (California Water Impact Network v. Newhall 

County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1485, italics 

added. See also, Santa Barbara County Flower & Nursery 

Growers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 121 

Cal.App.4th 864, 875 [“In the context of administrative 

proceedings, a controversy is not ripe for adjudication until the 

administrative process is completed and the agency makes a final 

decision that results in a direct and immediate impact on the 

parties.”].) Casa Blanca’s action is not ripe because it has failed to 

exhaust its administrative remedies.
8

Casa Blanca contends the controversy is ripe because 

Commission staff threatens “millions of dollars in fines and 

penalties for an alleged delay in construction of a walkway.” But 

threats are not formalized or final decisions. Neither the 

Commission nor the County has made a final decision whether to 

impose any fines or penalties or even whether they agree with 

Casa Blanca that the obligation to construct the walkway is 

subject to conditions precedent.

Citing Sackett v. EPA (2012) 566 U.S. 120, Casa Blanca

argues the Commission’s notice of violation, notice of intent, and 

refusal to commence administrative hearings are the equivalent 

of an agency final action proper for judicial review. But Sackett is 

distinguishable because the challenged agency compliance order 

was a final decision, subject to no further agency review, and 

from which the Sacketts were legally obligated to take specified 

actions. (Id. at p. 127.) The same is not true here. There has 

been no final agency decision.

Casa Blanca alleges it was excused from obtaining a final 

administrative decision because the process has been 

unreasonably delayed or halted by Commission staff’s refusal to 

set a hearing on the permit application. (See e.g., Hollon v. 

Pierce (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 468, 476.) However, the 

Commission is not obligated to schedule a hearing on the 

application until Casa Blanca completes it. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

14, § 13062). Moreover, Casa Blanca has not but could (as it did 

previously) appeal the determination its application is incomplete

and a hearing would then be required. (Id. § 13056 subd. (d).) 

Casa Blanca similarly alleges the Commission has delayed 

by failing to provide a public hearing on the notice of intent 

pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30812. Public 
9

Resources Code section 30812 provides for a public hearing if a 

timely objection to the recording of a notice of violation is 

submitted but it also states the notice of violation procedures 

may not be invoked “until all existing administrative methods for

resolving the violation have been utilized.” (Pub. Res. Code 

§30812, subds. (c), (g).) Here it appears Casa Blanca’s objection 

was not timely6 but also the Commission rescinded its intent to 

record the notice of violation, ending that portion of the 

enforcement proceedings. 

Casa Blanca also relies upon the futility exception to the 

exhaustion requirement. The futility exception requires a party 

to affirmatively state “‘“the [agency] has declared what its ruling 

will be on a particular case.”’” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & 

Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations 

Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080-1081.) Casa Blanca asserts the 

futility exception applies because the Commission’s decision is 

“certain to be adverse.” Nothing in the record supports this 

assertion. Instead, the facts show the Commission’s ongoing 

efforts to resolve the application’s deficiencies. Casa Blanca’s 

belief the Commission would agree with its staff’s “adverse 

decision” is unavailing. (Bennett v. Borden, Inc. (1976) 56 

Cal.App.3d 706, 710 [“preconception of the futility of 

administrative action did not permit [plaintiff] to bypass the 

administrative remedy”].)

6 Casa Blanca waited 10 months to object, yet the code 

requires the objection be submitted within 20 days of the 

postmarked mailing of the notification. (Pub. Res. Code § 30812, 

subd. (b).)
10

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060 Does Not Entitle Casa 

Blanca to Declaratory Relief as a Matter of Law

Casa Blanca argues the exhaustion doctrine does not apply 

to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1060. We disagree.

Section 1060 “authorizes a party ‘who desires a declaration 

of [their] rights or duties with respect to another’ to bring an 

original action ‘for a declaration of [their] rights and duties,’ and 

permits the court to issue ‘a binding declaration of these rights or 

duties.’” (Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014)

223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154.) A party, however, “may not evade the 

exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or 

injunctive relief.” (Contractors’ State License Bd. v. Superior 

Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 771, 780.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their 

costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
11

Pauline Maxwell, Judge

Donna Geck, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Gaines & Stacey, Sherman L. Stacy, Lisa A. Weinberg, 

Rebecca A. Thompson, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Santa Barbara County Counsel’s Office, Brian Pettit, 

Senior Deputy, for Defendant and Respondent, County of Santa 

Barbara.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Christina Bull Arndt, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Elizabeth S. St. John, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent, California 

Coastal Commission.