REL: 12/05/2014

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015

_________________________

1131152

_________________________

Ex parte Linda Faye Manning

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Shannon Richardson

v.

Linda Faye Manning)

(Macon Circuit Court, CV-14-900034)

WISE, Justice.

Linda Faye Manning, the defendant below, filed a petition

for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct the
1131152

Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to

transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to

enter an order granting the motion. We grant the petition and

issue the writ. 

Facts and Procedural History

On February 28, 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a

complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating

claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motorvehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County on October

3, 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by

ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the

accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the

accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times,

Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning

was a resident of Macon County. 

On March 25, 2014, Manning filed a motion to transfer the

action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non

conveniens, as codified in § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975. On

April 1, 2014, Richardson filed a response in opposition to

the motion to transfer. On June 4, 2014, the trial court

denied the motion to transfer. This petition followed.

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Standard of Review

"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the

appropriate 'method for obtaining review of a denial

of a motion for a change of venue' pursuant to §

6–3–21.1. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.

2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998). ...

"'....'

"'A party moving for a transfer under § 6–3–21.1

has the initial burden of showing, among other

things, one of two factors: (1) that the transfer

is justified based on the convenience of either the

parties or the witnesses, or (2) that the transfer

is justified "in the interest of justice."' Ex

parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 539

(Ala. 2008). Although we review a ruling on a

motion to transfer to determine whether the trial

court exceeded its discretion in granting or denying

the motion, id., where 'the convenience of the

parties and witnesses or the interest of justice

would be best served by a transfer, § 6–3–21.1, Ala.

Code 1975, compels the trial court to transfer the

action to the alternative forum.' Ex parte First

Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 912

(Ala. 2008) (emphasis added)."

Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570, 573 (Ala. 2011). 

Discussion

Manning argues that the trial court exceeded its

discretion in denying her motion to transfer the action from

Macon County to Montgomery County. Specifically, she contends

that Montgomery County has a strong connection to the case

because all the material events that gave rise to Richardson's

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claims occurred there. In contrast, Manning asserts that

Macon County has, at best, only a tenuous connection to the

case -- namely, the fact that she resides there. After noting

that the court deciding the transfer issue must consider "the

burden of piling court services and resources upon the people

of a county that is not affected by the case and ... the

interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises

in their county tried close to public view in their county,"

Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala.

2007), Manning asserts that the interest-of-justice prong of

Alabama's forum non conveniens statute mandates a transfer to

Montgomery County.

Section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent

part:

"With respect to civil actions filed in an

appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction

shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,

or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil

action or any claim in any civil action to any court

of general jurisdiction in which the action might

have been properly filed and the case shall proceed

as though originally filed therein."

(Emphasis added.) 

"Historically, the plaintiff has had the initial

choice of venue under the system established by the

legislature for determining venue. Before the

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enactment of § 6–3–21.1 by the Alabama Legislature

in 1987, a plaintiff's choice of venue could not be

disturbed on the basis of convenience to the parties

or the witnesses or in the interest of justice. 

With the adoption of § 6–3–21.1, trial courts now

have 'the power and the duty to transfer a cause

when "the interest of justice" requires a transfer.'

Ex parte First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d

658, 660 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added). In First

Family, this Court noted that an argument that trial

judges have almost unlimited discretion in

determining whether a case should be transferred

under § 6–3–21.1 'must be considered in light of the

fact that the Legislature used the word "shall"

instead of the word "may" in § 6–3–21.1.' 718 So.

2d at 660. This Court has further held that

'Alabama's forum non conveniens statute is

compulsory.' Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 905

n.9 (Ala. 2004)."

Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 748-49

(Ala. 2010). 

"The 'interest of justice' prong of § 6–3–21.1

requires 'the transfer of the action from a county

with little, if any, connection to the action, to

the county with a strong connection to the action.' 

Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d [788,]

790 [(Ala. 1998)]. Therefore, 'in analyzing the

interest-of-justice prong of § 6–3–21.1, this Court

focuses on whether the "nexus" or "connection"

between the plaintiff's action and the original

forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the

plaintiff's forum with the action.' Ex parte First

Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 911

(Ala. 2008). Additionally, this Court has held that

'litigation should be handled in the forum where the

injury occurred.' Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414,

416 (Ala. 2006). Further, in examining whether it

is in the interest of justice to transfer a case, we

consider 'the burden of piling court services and

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resources upon the people of a county that is not

affected by the case and ... the interest of the

people of a county to have a case that arises in

their county tried close to public view in their

county.' Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982

So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."

Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 540 (Ala.

2008). 

The parties do not dispute that the complaint was filed

in an appropriate venue, namely, Macon County. Likewise, they

do not dispute that the action could properly have been filed

in Montgomery County. However, they do dispute whether the 1

interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires a transfer of

this case from Macon County to Montgomery County. 

With regard to venue of actions against individuals, §

1

6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against

individuals: 

"....

"(3) All other personal actions [i.e.,

those not identified in subparagraphs (1)

and (2)] if the defendant or one of the

defendants has within the state a permanent

residence, may be commenced in the county

of such residence or in the county in which

the act or omission complained of may have

been done or may have occurred."

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As Manning points out in her reply brief, this Court

recently addressed a factually similar case and similar

arguments in Ex parte Morton, [Ms. 1130302, August 29, 2014]

___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2014). In Ex parte Morton, Watkins, a

resident of Jefferson County, filed a complaint in the Greene

Circuit Court against Morton, a resident of Greene County,

asserting claims that arose out of an automobile accident that

had occurred in Jefferson County. After the accident, Watkins

was treated at a hospital in Jefferson County and later

received medical treatment at four health-care facilities

located in Jefferson County. Morton filed a motion to

transfer the case to Jefferson County based on the doctrine of

forum non conveniens; the trial court denied that motion, and

Morton petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. 

This Court granted Morton's petition and issued the writ,

reasoning, in relevant part:

"In reviewing this case under the

interest-of-justice prong of § 6–3–21.1(a), we must

'determine whether "the interest of justice"

overrides the deference due the plaintiff's choice

of forum' in the present case. [Ex parte] J & W

Enters., [LLC, [Ms. 1121423, March 28, 2014]] ___

So. 3d [___,] ___ [(Ala. 2014)]. We hold that it

does.

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"In Ex parte Wachovia [Bank, N.A., 77 So. 2d 570

(Ala. 2011)], this Court thoroughly discussed the

application of the interest-of-justice prong of §

6–3–21.1(a) in several cases involving facts similar

to those presented in this case:

"'In its petition for the writ of

mandamus, Wachovia relies solely on the

interest-of-justice prong as a ground for

transfer.

"'"'[I]n analyzing the

interest-of-justice prong of §

6–3–21.1, this Court focuses on

whether the "nexus" or

"connection" between the

plaintiff's action and the

original forum is strong enough

to warrant burdening the

plaintiff's forum with the

action.' Ex parte First

Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994

So. 2d [906,] 911 [(Ala.

2008)].... Further, in examining

whether it is in the interest of

justice to transfer a case, we

consider 'the burden of piling

court services and resources upon

the people of a county that is

not affected by the case and ...

the interest of the people of a

county to have a case that arises

in their county tried close to

public view in their county.' Ex

parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth.,

982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."

"'Ex parte Indiana Mills [& Mfg., Inc.], 10

So. 3d [536] at 540 [(Ala. 2008)]. Thus,

the dispositive question is whether the

nexus between this action and Macon County

is "strong enough to warrant burdening"

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1131152

Macon County with this action. For the

following reasons, we hold that it is not.

"'Lee County is the situs of all the

alleged acts or omissions giving rise to

the plaintiffs' claims. Any allegedly

unauthorized withdrawals were made from a

Wachovia branch in Lee County. Police

investigation of the matter was conducted

in Lee County. Lee County is Floyd's place

of residence, as well as the location of

Unique [Image Pro Car Care, Floyd's

business]. Thus, Lee County is the place

where all the injury alleged in the

complaint occurred. Although it is not a

talisman, the fact that the injury occurred

in the proposed transferee county is often

assigned considerable weight in an

interest-of-justice analysis. See Ex parte

Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d

745, 748 (Ala. 2010) ("'[T]his Court has

held that "litigation should be handled in

the forum where the injury occurred."'"

(quoting Ex parte Indiana Mills, 10 So. 3d

at 540)); Ex parte McKenzie Oil, Inc., 13

So. 3d 346, 349 (Ala. 2008) (same).

"'In short, nothing material to this

case transpired in Macon County. Macon

County's sole material contact with this

case is that the two individual defendants

... reside there. Recent cases decided

under the interest-of-justice prong are

dispositive.

"'In Ex parte Autauga Heating &

Cooling, LLC, for example, this Court

issued a writ of mandamus directing the

Montgomery Circuit Court -- in the interest

of justice -- to transfer the action to

Elmore County. 58 So. 3d at 747. That

case arose out of an automobile accident

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1131152

involving Lori Lee Wright, a resident of

Elmore County, and Richard Alexander

Rogers, a resident of Montgomery County. 

The vehicle being operated by Rogers at the

time of the accident was owned by Autauga

Heating & Cooling, LLC ("Autauga"), which

had its principal place of business in

Autauga County. The accident occurred in

Elmore County, and Wright received

treatment at the scene of the accident from

emergency medical personnel who lived in

Elmore County. 58 So. 3d at 749. When an

action was brought against Rogers in the

county of his residence, Rogers sought the

removal of the action to Elmore County, the

situs of the alleged acts or omissions and

the place of the injury.

"'This Court concluded that a transfer

of the case was required. In so doing, we

said:

"'"Although we agree with

Wright that the case has a

connection with Montgomery County

because Rogers is a resident of

Montgomery County and [Autauga]

may have some business

connections there, ... the

overall connection between

Montgomery County and this case

is weak and ... the connection

between the case and Elmore

County is strong.

"'"... Besides the fact that

Rogers is a resident of

Montgomery County, there was no

other evidence before the trial

court indicating a connection

between the case and Montgomery

County.

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"'"....

"'"The accident underlying

this action occurred in Elmore

County, and the emergency

personnel who responded to the

accident were from Elmore County. 

The plaintiff herself is a

resident of Elmore County. This

Court sees no need to burden

Montgomery County, with its weak

connection to the case, with an

action that arose in Elmore

County simply because the

individual defendant resides in

Montgomery County and the

corporate defendant does some

business there."

"'58 So. 3d at 750 (emphasis added).

"'In so holding, this Court relied on

and discussed Ex parte Indiana Mills &

Manufacturing, Inc.:

"'"This Court addressed similar

facts in Ex parte Indiana Mills &

Manufacturing, Inc., supra. In

Indiana Mills, the decedent was

driving a garbage truck in Lee

County owned by his employer when

the raised rear door of the truck

struck an overhead railroad

trestle, causing the truck to

crash. The decedent was killed

when he was ejected from the

truck. His widow filed a

complaint in Macon County against

the manufacturers of the garbage

truck and the seat belts in the

truck and three employees of the

decedent's employer. The

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employer's principal place of

business was in Tallapoosa

County. The employer conducted

business in Macon County, and one

of the individual defendants

lived in Macon County. The

defendants moved the trial court

to transfer the case to Lee

County based on the doctrine of

forum non conveniens. The trial

court denied that motion, and the

defendants petitioned this Court

for mandamus relief.

"'"This Court granted the

defendants' mandamus petition and

ordered the trial court to

transfer the case from Macon

County to Lee County based on the

'interest of justice' prong of §

6–3–21.1. In doing so, this

Court noted that the accident

occurred in Lee County, that the

law-enforcement and emergency

personnel who had responded to

the accident were based out of

Lee County, that the chief deputy

coroner who investigated the

decedent's death did his work in

Lee County, and that the records

and documents of the fire

department that responded to the

accident were located in Lee

County. Comparing this to the

fact that only one of the

individual defendants resided in

Macon County and that the

employer conducted business

there, there being no other

relevant facts involving Macon

County, this Court held that the

nexus between Lee County and the

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case was strong, that the nexus

between Macon County and the case

was weak, and that the trial

court thus had exceeded its

discretion in refusing to

transfer the case to Lee County."

"'Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, 58

So. 3d at 750 (discussing Ex parte Indiana

Mills) (emphasis added).

"'In this case, as in Autauga Heating

& Cooling and Indiana Mills, the injury

occurred in the county to which the

transfer is sought. Here, as in Autauga

Heating & Cooling and Indiana Mills, no

material act or omission occurred in the

forum county. As in Indiana Mills, the

official investigation of the incident was

in the county to which the transfer was

sought -- here, Lee County.'

"77 So. 3d at 573–75.

"As in Wachovia, Ex parte Autauga Heating &

Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala. 2010), and Ex

parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., 10 So. 3d

536 (Ala. 2008), Watkins's injury occurred in the

county to which transfer is sought -- Jefferson

County; Watkins is also a resident of Jefferson

County and received treatment in four separate

medical facilities located in Jefferson County.

Additionally, as in Wachovia and Indiana Mills, the

official investigation of the incident was conducted

in the county to which the transfer is sought.

Furthermore, as in Wachovia, Autauga Heating &

Cooling, and Indiana Mills, no material act or

omission occurred in Greene County.

"Watkins argues that Wachovia, Autauga Heating

& Cooling, and Indiana Mills are distinguishable

because each of those cases involved multiple

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defendants residing in both the forum and transferee

counties. Although the number and residency of the

defendants may affect an interest-of-justice

analysis under § 6–3–21.1(a), the fact that the

above cases involved multiple defendants does not

render them inapposite to the present case involving

only one defendant. Considering the similarities

between the above cases and the present one, that

factual distinction in this case -- that Morton is

the sole defendant -- is de minimis. See, e.g.,

Wachovia, 77 So. 3d at 575 ('As in [Autauga Heating

& Cooling and Indiana Mills], the only material

connection with the forum county is a defendant's

residence. To be sure, in this case two defendants

reside in the forum county, rather than one. Given

the posture of this case, however, that distinction

is inconsequential.').

"For the reasons explained above, Jefferson

County has a significantly stronger connection to

this case than does Greene County, which is

connected to this case only by the fact that Morton

resides there -- a connection this Court has

characterized as 'weak.' See Autauga Heating &

Cooling, 58 So. 3d at 750 ('This Court sees no need

to burden Montgomery County, with its weak

connection to the case, with an action that arose in

Elmore County simply because the individual

defendant resides in Montgomery County and the

corporate defendant does some business there.');

Indiana Mills, 10 So. 3d at 542 ('We see no need for

Macon County, with its weak connection with this

case, to be burdened with an action that arose in

Lee County simply because one of several defendants

resides there. Instead, Lee County clearly has a

strong connection with this case. See Ex parte

Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395, 400

(Ala. 2006) (holding that the "weak nexus" with the

county in which an action was filed did not "justify

burdening" that county with the trial of that

action; thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens

required the case be transferred to a county that

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had "a much stronger nexus").'). Accordingly, the

interest of justice overrides Watkins's choice of

forum. Therefore, Morton has a clear legal right to

the relief she seeks."

Ex parte Morton, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnote omitted). 

Based on the reasoning in Ex parte Morton and the cases

cited therein, Manning has established that Montgomery County

has a stronger connection to the claims in this case than has

Macon County. The accident occurred in Montgomery County;

law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked

in Montgomery County; Richardson was taken to a hospital in

Montgomery County after the accident; and Richardson was a

resident of Montgomery County. In contrast, Macon County's 2

only connection to the case was the fact that Manning is a

resident of Macon County. Because Macon County has only a

very weak overall connection to the claims and Montgomery

County has a much stronger connection to the claims, the

In her petition, Manning cites additional "facts" that 2

allegedly support a transfer to Montgomery County. However,

because those "facts" were "contained in 'statements of

counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments,' [they] cannot be

considered 'evidentiary material' and thus will not be

considered by this Court." Autauga Heating & Cooling, 58 So.

3d at 749-50. 

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interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute

requires that the action be transferred to Montgomery County.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the trial

court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for

a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of

the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, we grant

Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and direct the

trial court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order

transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the

Montgomery Circuit Court.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ.,

concur.

Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.

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