THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Don Weaver, Appellant, 

v. 

Recreation District, Recreation Commission of Richland 

County, Paul Brawley, as Auditor of Richland County and 

David A. Adams, as Treasurer of Richland County, 

Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2019-000920 

Appeal from Richland County 

L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27991 

Heard February 11, 2020 – Filed September 2, 2020 

AFFIRMED 

John E. Schmidt III and Melissa J. Copeland, of Schmidt 

& Copeland, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant. 

Charles H. McDonald and William C. Dillard Jr., of Belser 

& Belser, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents Recreation 

District and Recreation Commission of Richland County; 

and Bradley T. Farrar, of Richland County Attorney's 

Office, of Columbia, for Respondents Paul Brawley and 

David A. Adams. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Don Weaver ("Appellant") brought this 

declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. 

section 6-11-271 (2004), which addresses the millage levied in certain special 

purpose districts. The circuit court found Appellant failed to meet his burden of 

establishing any constitutional infirmity. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

 Appellant owns property and is a taxpayer in the Recreation District, a special 

purpose district created to fund the operation and maintenance of parks and other 

recreational facilities in the unincorporated areas of Richland County. The 

Recreation Commission of Richland County, which oversees those facilities, is 

governed by an appointed board of commissioners. Richland County's Auditor and 

Treasurer administer the levy and collection of taxes for the Recreation District, as 

well as Richland County. 

 Appellant instituted this action in 2017 against the Recreation District, the 

Commission, the Auditor, and the Treasurer (collectively, "Respondents"), seeking 

a declaration that Act No. 397, 1998 S.C. Acts 2389, in particular the part that added 

section 6-11-271, violates several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, 

including article X, section 5 (prohibiting taxation without representation); article 

III, section 34 (prohibiting special legislation); and article VIII, section 7 (regarding 

Home Rule by counties), as well as the Home Rule Act, S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-

9-10 to -1230 (1986 & Supp. 2019). 

 Section 6-11-271 was added by the South Carolina General Assembly for the 

stated purpose of clarifying the authority of certain special purpose districts—those 

without elected governing bodies—to levy millage and provide governmental 

services after this Court found another provision, Act No. 317, 1969 S.C. Acts 382, 

was unconstitutional. In Weaver v. Recreation District, a case that was also 

instituted by Appellant, the Court held Act No. 317 violated the prohibition on 

taxation without representation because it authorized the levying of taxes on 

property in a special purpose district without any oversight by an elected body. 328 

S.C. 83, 87, 492 S.E.2d 79, 81–82 (1997) (citing S.C. Const. art. X, § 5). 

 The Court held "the legislative power to tax may not be conferred on a purely 

appointive body but must be under the supervisory control of elected bodies . . . ." 

Id. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned "the power to fix 

and levy a tax should only be conferred upon a body which stands as the direct 

representative of the people, to the end that an abuse of power may be directly 
corrected by those who must carry the burden of the tax." Id. (quoting Crow v. 

McAlpine, 277 S.C. 240, 244–45, 285 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981)). The Court concluded 

Act No. 317 was an impermissible delegation of legislative authority because it gave 

"the Recreation Commission the complete discretion to determine its annual budget, 

and to levy anywhere from one to five mills taxes to meet its budget." Id. at 87, 492 

S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The Court recognized that its holding could disrupt 

the financial operation of numerous special purpose districts, boards, and 

commissions throughout the state, so it applied the decision prospectively 

(beginning December 31, 1999), "to give the General Assembly an opportunity to 

address this problem." Id. at 87–88, 492 S.E.2d at 82. 

 In response to Weaver, the General Assembly added section 6-11-271 of the 

South Carolina Code in 1998. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-271 (2004) ("Millage levy 

for special purpose district."). Subsection (A) defines the term "special purpose 

district" to mean any special purpose district or public service authority, however 

named, created by the General Assembly prior to March 7, 1973. Id. § 6-11-271(A). 

 Subsections (B) and (C) apply only to special purpose districts whose 

"governing bodies . . . are not elected but are presently authorized by law to levy 

[millage] for operations and maintenance." Id. § 6-11-271(B)(1), (C)(1). Subsection 

(B) concerns districts that were then authorized to levy millage up to a certain limit, 

and (C) concerns districts then having no limit as to the millage amount. Id. The 

General Assembly instructed that, beginning in fiscal year 1999, "[t]here must be 

levied annually in each special purpose district described" (i.e., those described in 

(B)(1) and (C)(1)), tax millage equal to the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998. 

Id. § 6-11-271(B)(2), (C)(2). 

 The General Assembly outlined several methods for a special purpose district 

to attempt to alter this tax millage. Subsection (D) provides a special purpose district 

may request that the county election commission conduct a referendum proposing a 

modification of the millage. Id. § 6-11-271(D). If the voters approve, the 

"modification in tax millage shall remain effective until changed in a manner 

provided by law." Id. 

 Subsection (E) authorizes all special purpose districts located wholly in one 

county to modify their millage limits, "provided the same is first approved by the 

governing body of the district and by the governing body of the county in which the 

district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Id. § 6-11-271(E)(1) (emphasis 

added). However, any modification is only temporary, as the General Assembly 
stipulated that "[a]ny increase in millage effectuated pursuant to this subsection is 

effective for only one year." Id. (emphasis added). 

 Appellant alleged in his complaint in the current action that the addition of 

section 6-11-271 still imposes taxation without representation because it allows the 

Commission, an appointed body, to levy taxes on property within the Recreation 

District without any oversight from elected representatives, and he further alleged 

the statute is special legislation that violates Home Rule. The circuit court ruled 

Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity, 

finding the statute (1) does not impose taxation without representation, (2) is not 

special legislation, and (3) does not violate Home Rule. Appellant challenges all 

three findings by the circuit court.1

 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 "This Court has a very limited scope of review in cases involving 

a constitutional challenge to a statute." Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State, 

338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999). "All statutes are 

presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them 

valid." Id. "A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its 

repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing 

Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't. of Revenue, 321 S.C. 59, 467 S.E.2d 739 (1995)). "A 

possible constitutional construction must prevail over an unconstitutional 

interpretation." State v. Neuman, 384 S.C. 395, 402, 683 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2009) 

(citation omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Taxation without Representation 

 Appellant first argues section 6-11-271 is unconstitutional because it violates 

the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition on taxation without representation. 

 

1

 The Auditor and the Treasurer filed a joint brief taking no position on the statute's 

validity and stating they would abide by the Court's decision in the performance of 

their ministerial duties. Accordingly, references to the arguments of Respondents 

hereinafter shall refer to the Recreation District and the Commission, which filed a 

joint brief supporting the circuit court's ruling. 
 Article X, section 5, of our state constitution provides, in relevant part: "No 

tax . . . shall be established . . . without the consent of the people or their 

representatives lawfully assembled." S.C. Const. art. X, § 5. 

 Appellant argues the General Assembly's passage of section 6-11-271 "is 

inconsistent in part with Weaver" and should, therefore, be invalidated. He notes 

subsection (B)(1) refers to unelected bodies that "are presently authorized by law to 

levy for operations and maintenance," but under Weaver, "unelected bodies are not 

authorized to levy taxes," so the General Assembly's enactment "did not correct the 

taxation without representation issue . . . and instead reiterated and relied on the very 

provisions that were struck by the Court as unconstitutional." 

 Appellant further argues subsections (B)(2) and (C)(2) "initially appear to 

have millage rates set by statute and, consequently, by the General Assembly," but 

they use the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998, which is the rate impermissibly 

imposed prior to Weaver, so "the taxation without representation by the Commission 

is made permanent by statute." 

 Appellant asserts that, in addition to the problem of using the millage amounts 

originally set by the unelected bodies, an additional problem exists in subsection 

(E)(1) because it states millage limitations may be modified "provided the same is 

first approved by the governing body of the district and by the governing body of 

the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Appellant 

maintains subsection (E)(1) "therefore provides that the unelected bodies previously 

setting millage rates are kept in a position of authority as to require that these 

unelected bodies first approve any change in the millage rates." Appellant states, 

"This makes the authorized, governing body of a district directly responsible to the 

very unelected bodies that are not authorized to set millage rates due to such being 

a violation of taxation without representation." 

 Finally, Appellant contends "[t]he special legislation continues the current 

[funding] rate to infinity" because "taxpayers have no recourse to seek to reduce this 

funding and they have no public, elected body to seek redress for grievances related 

to the use of those levied funds." 

 We hold Appellant has not met his heavy burden of proving section 6-11-271 

imposes taxation without representation in violation of article X, section 5, of the 

South Carolina Constitution. See Bodman v. State, 403 S.C. 60, 66, 742 S.E.2d 363, 

366 (2013) ("The party challenging the statute bears the heavy burden of proving 

that 'its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
(quoting In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 134–35, 568 S.E.2d 

338, 344 (2002)). 

 In enacting the statute, the General Assembly, not the Commission, created 

the (initial) tax to be imposed in special purpose districts. There can be no question 

that the General Assembly is a body of duly elected, direct representatives of the 

people of South Carolina. See, e.g., Crow v. McAlpine, 277 S.C. 240, 244, 285 

S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981) ("The taxing power is one of the highest prerogatives of the 

General Assembly. Members of this body are chosen by the people to exercise the 

power in a conscientious and deliberate manner. If this power is abused, the people 

could, at least, prevent a recurrence of the wrong at the polls."); Trs. of Wofford Coll. 

v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. 315, 321, 23 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1942) (stating "[t]he 

power of taxation is a legislative power, and knows no limitations, except those 

imposed expressly or by plain implication in the State or Federal Constitution," and 

noting "[t]he legislative power of the people of the State of South Carolina is vested 

in the General Assembly"). 

 Appellant's assertion that the General Assembly somehow created a 

permanent situation of taxation without representation because it chose to implement 

the rates previously used in the various districts is without merit. In electing to set 

the initial millage at an amount equivalent to the most-recent fiscal year levels, the 

General Assembly exercised its own authority to impose the taxes based on a logical 

starting point, and it was a decision made by an elected body whose members are 

the direct representatives of the people.2

 See Crow, 277 S.C. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 

358 (stating an abuse of the General Assembly's taxing power is subject to the 

response of taxpayers at the polls); accord Weaver, 328 S.C. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81. 

 

2

 To the extent Appellant also more narrowly maintains section 6-11-271 improperly 

continues the millage rate "fixed by legislators elected by taxpayers from counties 

other than Richland County," because "every member of the legislature elected by 

Richland County taxpayers could have voted against Section 6-11-271 and it would 

have passed," we note Appellant did not plead this assertion as a basis for relief in 

his complaint, and it was not ruled on by the circuit court. Consequently, it is not 

properly before this Court. Although not bearing on our decision, the assertion is 

without merit, in any event, as the enactment of section 6-11-271 affects all similarly 

situated special purpose districts—and their taxpayers—throughout the state, not 

just those in Richland County. As noted above, members of the General Assembly 

are the duly elected, direct representatives of the people, and there is direct recourse 

by taxpayers for any abuse of this legislative authority. 
 Further, as noted by Respondents, "[t]he reference in § 6-11-271(B)(1) to 

unelected special purpose districts 'presently authorized by law to levy for 

operations' was clearly nothing more than a reasonable means to identify the class 

of entities affected by the opinion." Respondents correctly observe, "[T]he 

prospective application of Weaver had not yet taken effect when the statute was 

enacted," and "[t]he Weaver opinion itself [328 S.C. at 85, 492 S.E.2d at 80] used 

similar language, stating that 'Act No. 317 authorizes the Recreation Commission, 

in pertinent part . . . [t]o levy upon all the taxable property in the District a tax.'" We 

agree that the statutory language simply identified the relevant entities that were 

affected by the Weaver decision. The reference to special purpose districts with 

unelected boards is clearly warranted and comprises a proper class that may be 

distinguished from elected special purpose districts because elected special purpose 

districts retained their constitutional authority to levy taxes on property within their 

boundaries. Thus, the statute necessarily addresses the issues affecting districts with 

unelected governing boards. 

 As to Appellant's contention that the statute allows the approval of temporary 

millage modifications by the Commission along with county council, Respondents 

concede that subsection (E)(1) "does provide unelected governing bodies a limited 

procedural role in decisions to temporarily modify millage rates, [but] per the statute 

this can only be done with the approval of the elected governing body of the county 

in which the district is located." Respondents state: "In other words, any increase 

in the rate must be approved by the county council initially and then again on a 

recurring annual basis. An unelected special purpose district has no power to 

unilaterally increase the rate or preserve such an increase without the consent of 

county council." 

 Although Appellant asserts subsection (E)(1) of the statute requires unelected 

bodies to first approve any change in millage rates, we find Appellant's argument on 

this point is misleading. Subsection (E)(1) does not state that the Commission must 

first approve a change in millage rates, without further qualification or restriction. 

Rather, it provides a special purpose district located entirely in one county is 

authorized to temporarily modify its millage limitation for one year "provided the 

same is first approved [1] by the governing body of the district and [2] by the 

governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly 

adopted." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-271(E)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, any 

modification sought by a special purpose district must first be approved by both the 

governing body of the district and the county council. A district may not unilaterally 

make any modifications; any modification requires the approval of county council, 

a duly elected, representative body. 
 While the statute could have been worded to perhaps state that any 

modification requested by a district may not be implemented without the approval 

of county council, we recognize that if there is any way to construe a statute in a way 

that is constitutional, it is a court's task to do so. See Joytime Distribs. & Amusement 

Co., 338 S.C. at 640, 528 S.E.2d at 650 ("All statutes are 

presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them 

valid."). With this directive in mind, we believe the reference to the district in this 

context merely reflects the reality that the Recreation District is an entity that can 

act only through its governing body, the Commission, and if the Commission would 

like to modify the millage (i.e., the governing board of the Recreation District 

approves of a modification), the modification can be implemented only with the 

oversight and approval of Richland County Council. 

 The General Assembly's manifest intent is that a special purpose district must 

obtain the approval of the elected governing body of the county, e.g., county council, 

before any modification in millage may occur. Cf., e.g., Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer 

Dist. v. City of Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 74, 321 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1984) ("In the 

construction of statutes, the dominant factor is the intent, not the language of the 

legislature. Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548 (1956). A statute must be 

construed in light of its intended purposes, and, if such purpose can be reasonably 

discovered from its language, the purpose will prevail over the literal import of the 

statute."); S.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Breeland, 208 S.C. 469, 480, 38 S.E.2d 

644, 650 (1946) ("We have recently held that choice of language in an act 'will not 

be construed with literality when that would defeat the manifest intention of the 

lawmakers' and that the court will reject the ordinary meaning of words used in a 

statute 'when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not 

possibly have been intended by the Legislature.'" (citation omitted)). 

Because no change may actually occur without the express approval of county 

council, an elected body, the prohibition against taxation without representation is 

not implicated here, as any rate change is, in fact, subject to the supervision of an 

elected body, and no modification may be made without the approval of that elected 

body. See Weaver, 328 S.C. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (stating "the legislative power 

to tax may not be conferred on a purely appointive body but must be under the 

supervisory control of elected bodies" (emphasis added)). 

 The South Carolina Constitution expressly requires a liberal construction of 

the constitution and laws governing local government, and it provides the "[p]owers, 

duties, and responsibilities granted local government subdivisions by this 

Constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this 
Constitution." S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 17. In this case, there has been no evidence 

that Richland County Council has been precluded in any way from fully exercising 

any powers fairly implied and not prohibited by the state constitution, including the 

power of taxation. Subsection (E)(1) operates as a restriction on the ability of certain 

special purpose districts to seek or obtain a temporary modification in millage; it 

does not purport to be a limitation on the powers of a county's governing body. See

S.C. Code Ann § 6-11-271(E)(1) ("All special purpose districts located wholly 

within a single county . . . are authorized to modify their respective millage 

limitations, provided the same is first approved by the governing body of the district 

and by the governing body of the county . . . ." (emphasis added)). 

 Moreover, as found by the circuit court, taxpayers in the Recreation District 

(and in other districts receiving funding under section 6-11-271), do have additional 

means of recourse if they disagree with any modifications made in millage. 

Taxpayers may seek a referendum on whether to dissolve a special purpose district 

or to establish an elected board to govern a special purpose district.3

 For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude Appellant has not shown the 

circuit court erred in finding Appellant failed to prove section 6-11-271 violates the 

constitutional prohibition on taxation without representation. 

B. Special Legislation 

 Appellant next contends section 6-11-271 does not affect all counties equally 

and is, therefore, special legislation that is prohibited by the South Carolina 

Constitution. 

 Article III, section 34, provides the General Assembly shall not enact local or 

special laws concerning an enumerated list of subjects (several specific subjects are 

set forth therein). S.C. Const. art. III, § 34(I to VII). Section 34 further provides: 

"In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall 

be enacted." Id. § 34(IX). However, section 34 additionally states that "[n]othing 

contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assembly from enacting special 

provisions in general laws." Id. § 34(X). 

 "A general law is one that applies to the entire State and operates wherever 

the specified conduct takes place." Town of Hilton Head Island v. Morris, 324 S.C. 

 

3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-2020 (2004) (procedure for referendum on dissolution 

of a special purpose district); id. § 6-11-350 (procedure for referendum on whether 

to elect members of the governing body of a special purpose district). 
30, 34, 484 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1997). "A law is general when it applies uniformly to 

all persons or things within a proper class, and special when it applies to only one or 

more individuals or things belonging to that same class." Kizer v. Clark, 360 S.C. 

86, 92, 600 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2004). The overall purpose of the prohibition on 

special legislation "is to prevent discrimination and to assure that all persons are 

treated equally." Thompson v. S.C. Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 

463, 471, 229 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1976). 

 "The language of the Constitution which prohibits a special law where a 

general law can be made applicable[] plainly implies that there are or may be cases 

where a special Act will best meet the exigencies of a particular case, and in no wise 

be promotive of those evils which result from a general and indiscriminate resort to 

local and special legislation." Horry Cty. v. Horry Cty. Higher Educ. Comm'n, 306 

S.C. 416, 419, 412 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1991) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. 

Serv. Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 90, 284 S.E.2d 395, 400 (1985)). "In other words, the 

General Assembly must have a 'logical basis and sound reason' for resorting to 

special legislation." Id. (quoting Gillespie v. Pickens Cty., 197 S.C. 217, 225, 14 

S.E.2d 900, 904 (1941)). 

 Appellant highlights the language in subsections (B)(1) and (C)(1)—which 

state subsections (B) and (C) apply "only to those special purpose districts, the 

governing bodies of which are not elected"—and argues that, because they apply 

only to certain classes of special purpose districts in South Carolina (i.e., those with 

unelected governing bodies), the provisions are unconstitutional special legislation. 

See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-271(B)(1), (C)(1). 

 Noting the far-reaching and disruptive effect the lack of funding could have 

on special purpose districts following Weaver, this Court intentionally made the 

application of the decision prospective only to enable the General Assembly to 

implement appropriate responsive legislation. We agree with the circuit court that 

the special purpose districts with unelected governing boards affected by the Weaver

decision "are clearly a proper class subject to the enactment of uniformly applicable 

general legislation." As noted by the circuit court, after Weaver, "elected special 

purpose districts, unlike unelected districts such as the Recreation Commission, 

retained constitutional authority to levy taxes on duly represented constituents." As 

a result, targeting the special purpose districts with unelected governing boards in 

section 6-11-271 was a necessary and logical basis on which to make a distinction, 

and the General Assembly treated all districts with this characteristic as a uniform 

class. 
 The General Assembly was clearly justified in its enactment of this remedial 

legislation, and it did not cross constitutional boundaries. This general legislation 

affects all special purpose districts with unelected governing bodies throughout the 

state, so the legislation is applied uniformly to a valid class of entities. As a result, 

we hold section 6-11-271 is not impermissible special legislation.4

 See Kizer, 360 

S.C. at 92, 600 S.E.2d at 532 (stating a law that applies uniformly to all things within 

a proper class is a general law); cf. Bd. of Trs. for Fairfield Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 

409 S.C. 119, 125–26, 761 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2014) (observing "where a special law 

will best meet the exigencies of a particular situation, it is not unconstitutional" 

(footnote omitted)). 

C. Home Rule 

 Appellant lastly argues section 6-11-271 is void because it violates Home 

Rule as set forth in the state constitution and the Home Rule Act. See generally S.C. 

Const. art. VIII, § 7 (organization of counties); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-9-10 to -1230 

(1986 & Supp. 2019) (Home Rule Act). 

 Article VIII of the South Carolina Constitution was revised in 1973 and 

"reflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to 

restore local government to the county level." Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 

568–69, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1974). Section 7 of article VIII required the General 

Assembly (1) to pass general laws delineating "the structure, organization, powers, 

duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties, including the power to tax 

different areas at different rates of taxation related to the nature and level of 

governmental services provided"; and (2) to set forth no more than five alternative 

forms of county government. S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7; see also James Lowell 

Underwood, The Constitution of South Carolina, Vol. II: The Journey Toward Local 

Self-Government 165 (1989) (discussing the impact of the amendment and Home 

Rule). Section 7 prohibits the enactment of special laws affecting "a specific 

county": "No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no county shall be 

 

4

 While Appellant also posits assertions as to S.C. Code Ann. section 6-11-70 (2004) 

(regarding the election dates for special purpose districts with elected governing 

bodies), we find this statute is not relevant to his constitutional arguments 

concerning section 6-11-271 and note it was not pled as a basis for relief in 

Appellant's complaint. 
exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to the selected alternative form 

of government."5

 S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7. 

 The Home Rule Act passed by the General Assembly, which went into effect 

in 1975, dealt with these issues in a comprehensive manner. Underwood, supra, at 

165; see also Graham v. Creel, 289 S.C. 165, 166, 345 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1986) 

(stating the General Assembly passed Act No. 288, 1975 S.C. Acts 692, the Home 

Rule Act, to advance the aims of the 1973 constitutional amendment). The Home 

Rule Act provides, for example, that counties have the authority "to assess property 

and levy ad valorem property taxes and uniform service charges, including the power 

to tax different areas at different rates related to the nature and level of governmental 

services provided . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-30(5)(a) (Supp. 2019). 

 The circuit court found the Home Rule Act sets forth the organization and 

powers of county government,6

 but it does not attempt to restrict general legislation 

regarding special purpose districts. In fact, section 4-9-80 of the Home Rule Act 

specifically states the Act does not alter the functions of existing special purpose 

districts or the authority of the General Assembly to pass legislation regarding such 

districts: 

 The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed 

to devolve any additional powers upon county councils 

with regard to public service districts, special purpose 

districts, water and sewer authorities, or other political 

subdivisions by whatever name designated, (which are in 

existence on the date one of the forms of government 

provided for in this chapter becomes effective in a 

particular county) and such political subdivisions shall 

continue to perform their statutory functions prescribed in 

 

5

 "Historically, the vast majority of special purpose districts in South Carolina were 

created [by the General Assembly] in order to provide water or sewer services in 

areas within [a] county," but this power is now given to the counties by article VIII, 

so "there is no longer a need for special state laws to create this type of district." 

Knight, 262 S.C. at 574, 206 S.E.2d at 878–89. 

6 See S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-310 (1986) (outlining the authority of alternative forms 

of county government). 
laws creating such districts or authorities except as they 

may be modified by act of the General Assembly . . . . 

S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-80 (1986). 

 The circuit court observed that, in section 6-11-271, "the General Assembly 

merely enacted another general law regarding this form of local government." The 

circuit court concluded, "The Home Rule Act does not affect the [General 

Assembly's] authority to enact such general laws affecting special purpose districts. 

Likewise, the Home Rule constitutional amendment, Art. VIII, § 7, allows the 

General Assembly to enact general legislation affecting existing special purpose 

districts." 

 Appellant summarily argues that this Court has held the Home Rule Act's 

prohibition on special legislation does not operate retroactively to abolish all special 

legislation that was in effect prior to the enactment of the Home Rule Act, but it does 

void special legislation passed thereafter, citing Graham.

7

 Appellant maintains 

section 6-11-271 violates the Home Rule Act and is unconstitutional and thus, void, 

because under Home Rule the governing and taxing power for Richland County is 

found in the elected members of its county council, not special legislation that affects 

only a specific county. 

 The wording in Graham was a recognition that a particular county cannot be 

singled out for exemption from the general law. We agree with the circuit court that 

in section 6-11-271, the General Assembly simply enacted a general law regarding 

special purpose districts, and Home Rule does not restrict the power of the General 

Assembly to enact general laws governing existing special purpose districts. We 

find the statute does not affect only a particular county (or district), as alleged by 

Appellant, because it applies to a broad class of districts having similar 

characteristics. Moreover, contrary to Appellant's contention, the Richland County 

Council does retain its authority over taxation, as no modification in millage can be 

made by the Recreation District without its approval, as previously discussed in 

Section III(A) of this opinion. Consequently, section 6-11-271 does not violate the 

provisions of Home Rule. 

 

7 See Graham, 289 S.C. at 168, 345 S.E.2d at 719 ("The Home Rule Act, while 

preventing the General Assembly from enacting 'special legislation' and voiding any 

'special legislation' which contradicts the general law, does not operate retroactively 

to abolish all 'special legislation' which was in effect in South Carolina prior to the 

enactment of the Home Rule Act."). 
IV. CONCLUSION

 Appellant has failed to show the circuit court erred in its analysis or its 

determination that section 6-11-271 does not violate the constitutional prohibitions 

on taxation without representation and special legislation, nor does it violate Home 

Rule. As a result, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 

AFFIRMED. 

 KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.