## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 0182- 07

FE R N A N D O LA N C O N , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE FOURTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

W EBB CO UNTY J OHNS ON , J ., filed a dissentingopinion in which P RI CE and H OL C OMB , J J ., joined.

D I S S E N T IN G O P I

N I O N Th e c o ur to f a p p e a l s , a f t e r th o r o u gh l y

r e v i e w i n ga l l o f

th e e v i d e n c e i na

n e utr a l l ig ht, conclude d that the jury ’s deter mination of guilt was “ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e,” a

nd there fore reve rsed the trial court’s judgment and rema nded the ca

use for a new trial. Lan c on v . S

tate , 220 S.W .3d 57 (Tex. App.–San Ant o n i o 2 006). B eca use I believe that the
c ourt of a pp e a ls c or

re c tly state d a nd pr op e rl y a pp lie d th e sta

nd ard of re vie w, Idis se nt.

“ Th e fa c tua l- c on c lus ivi ty c la us e in Ar tic le V, § 6, of

theTe xas C on sti tut ion , ma ke s a dir e c t-2

W a tso n v . S ta te , 2 0 4 S .W .3 d 4 0 4 (T e x . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 6 ). S e e a lso Ma rsh a ll v . S ta te , 210 S. W
. 3d 618, 1 6 2 5 (T ex. C ri m . A p p . 20 0 6 ).

“T h e se w e a k n e sse s a n d inc o n siste n c ie s in D o m ing u e z ’s an d D ia z ’s testim o n y c e rta inly d e tra c t f ro m it s 2 re liab ili ty. B u t, sta n d ing a lo n e , t h e se fac to rs w o u ld no t co n v inc e us tha t t h e e v id e n c e is f a c tua lly ins u ff

ic ie n t t o s uppo r t t he j ur y ’ s i mp l i ci t f i ndi ng t hatFer nan do , r at her t han [ hi s brot her ] E duar do , was t he s hoot er . . . . B ut wh at d o es c o nv i nc e u s t ha t t he ev i d en ce i s f ac t ua l l y i nsuff

i cien t t o sup p o rt t he jury’ s verd i ct i s viewing t he eyew i t ne sses’ t est i m o ny
– co m p l et e wi t h t he weakne ss es, i nco nsi st enci es, and eq ui vo cat i o ns o ut l i ned ab o ve– i n l i ght of t he co nsi st ent , de t ai l ed t est i m o ny s et f o rt h ab o ve f

rom t he d ef

ense wi t ness es, i ncl ud i ng t wo of t he t hree pa rt i ci p ant s who a d m itt e d the ir c o m p licity in the sh o o ting
. . . an d id e n tif ie d E d u a rd o L a n c o n a s the sh o o te r, a n d the a u n ts o f b o th E d u a rd o a n d F e rn a n d o . . ., e a c h o f wh o m tes tif ie d tha t she he a rd E d u a rd o a d m it to ha v ing b e e n the sh o o te r m o m e n ts af t er t h e s h oot i n g t ook pl ac e. B ot h f ac t or s , t ak en t og et h er , c on v i n ce u s t h at r ev er s i n g t h e j u dg men t a g ai n s t Fe r n an do Lanc on an d order i ng a n ew t r i al i s ‘ nec es s ar y t o ar r es t t he occur r enc e of a man i f es t i nj us t i ce. ’ ( C i t e omi t t ed. ) ” O t her t es t i mon y i n di ca t ed t h att h e s h oot er , l i k e Edua r do, w as r i g h t - h an ded, w h i l e Fe r n an do i s l ef t - h an ded. appea l court’s factua l-sufficie ncy decision final and conclusive upon this Court. W atson , at 439.[ ]

1 Th is C ourt ’s re vie w o f a dir e c t- a pp e a l court ’s fa c tua l- su ff

ic ie nc y de c isi on is l imi te d b y

thefa c tua lconclusivity

clause to det erm i n i n g only whether the direc t-appe al cour

t properly applied ‘r

ules of law.’” Ro be rts v . S

tate , 221 S.W. 3d 65 9, 66 2- 63 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). Our d isa gre e me nt w ith the cour t of appe als’ fa ctual-suf

ficienc y decision is simply

not a basis for r ever sing that decision. Although r eview of

fac tual sufficie ncy

has bee n, and contin u es t o b e, subj ect to much dispute, in W

atson a ma jority of thi s Co ur t r e ite ra te d th at, i n o rd e r fo r a

n a pp e llate c ourt

to r e ve rs e for factually

insufficienc y , it mustbe able to say , with some objective ba sis in the recor d, that the gre at we ight a

nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s guilty verdic t. In this case, that is precise ly

what the c ourt of appe als did. In its section entitled “Evidenc e Contrar y to the Ver dict,” it detailed a

great deal of e vidence , whi ch ad equately provides that objec tive basis for overturningthe jury ’s ver dict. Lancon , 220 S.W .3d at 63-66. 2 The majority

opinion a sserts that, beca

use the court of appea ls de termined that the testimony of two of the state’s witnesses was objectively unreliable , it had “conc luded that it was not
unre a s o n a

b le to d is tr

u s t th e ir e ye w it

n e s s te s ti mo ny g iv e n th e c ir c ums ta n c e s s ur r o un d ing the3

T he m ajo ri t y op i ni o n ass ert s t hat “ i t i s eq ual l y plaus i b l e t hat [t wo of t he st at e’ s wi t ness es] were t el l i ng t he 3 t rut h as i t i s t hat t hey were l y i ng when t hey t est i f i ed [, ]” and t hat “ i t i s f

o r t he jur y t o de t erm i ne i f t hey [s i c] beli eve t hat[ t hos e t wo wi t nes s es ] ar e l y i ng or t el l i ng t he t r ut h. ” Id ., sli p o p . at 1 4
. shooting.” Lan c on v . S

tate , No
. PD- 01 82 -0 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. de liv e re d _

__ __ __ __ __ , 2 00 8, slip op . at 12). Th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls’ s o pin ion

did no t art ic ulate any

pa rt ic ula r “ dis tr us t” of tho se witnesses, but rathe r dete rmined, af ter re viewingall of the e vidence in the requisite neutr al light, that the jury ’s implicit finding in its guilty verdic ts that a ppellant, rathe r than his br other Eduardo, w as the shooter, w as greatly

outweighed by

the contra

ry evidenc e. It theref

ore c oncluded that the evidenc e of appellant’ s guilt wa s fac tually insufficient. Lancon , 2 20 S.W. 3d at 66 -6 7. It r e a c he d th is
c on c lus ion a ft e r vie wi ng the state ’s e ye wi tne ss te sti mony , c omp le te wi th weaknes se s, inconsistencies, and equivocations, whic h it de tailed in its opini on, in light of the c onsistent, detailed testimony from the de fense witnesses, which it also deta iled in its opi nion. Id . at 68. It concluded “that re versingthe j udgment ag ainst [appellant] and orde ringa new trial is ‘nec essar

y to arre st the
occur renc e of a manife st injust ice.’ ” Id ., qu oti ng J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As the majority

opinion concede s, “the c ourt of appe als ac curately stated t h e s t an dard of revie w and a ddresse d all of the e vidence ” and “ included a de tailed des cripti on of the undisputed fac ts, as well as the evidence suppor ting a nd contra ry to the conviction.” Lan c on v . S tate , No. PD01 82 -0 7, slip o p. at 11 ). Th e ma jority a lso no te s th at “ [a]ppel lat e court s sh ou ld a ff or d a lmo st complete de fer enceto a jury ’s dec isio n wh en that dec ision is based upon an evaluation of
cre dibility .” Id
. But “ almost complete” is not “c omplete” or “total,” e ven whe n the jury ’s dec ision 3 is based upon a c redibility evaluation. The majority opinion seems to say

that, from now on, the level of de fer encedue a jur y ’s dec ision will be total def ere nce when the de cisi o nis based on an4

evaluation of cre dibility . This eviscer ates o ur ca s e l aw f or re viewingthe fa ctual suff iciency of evidenc e and e ffe ctively

prec ludes any

sufficie ncy

revie w when the jury ’s decision is based upon a n evaluation of cre dibility , which virtually eac h and ever y jury verdic t is to som e extent. “The le g al and fa ctual suff

iciency standards both re quir e t h e re v i ew ing c ourt to consider allof the e vidence
. . . . The diff

ere nce be tween the two standards is that the former re quires the r eviewingcourt to def er to t he jur y ’s c re dib ili ty and weight d e te rm inatio ns wh ile thelatte r p e rm its there vie wi ngc ourt to substitut e its judgme nt for the jury ’s on these questions ‘ albeit to a very limit ed degree .’” Ma rsh all
v . S tate , 2 1 0 S
. W
. 3 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 5 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 6 )( qu o t i n g W atson at 417)(e mphasis in origina l). The a naly sis by the cour t of appea ls is very much in line with our prior fa ctual-suf ficienc y
case law, and we should r espec t its decision, espec ially in light of the fa ct that its factua l-sufficie ncy de c isi o ni s f

i n a l an d c o n c l u s i v e u

p o nth i s C o urtp ur s u anto ur c o n s t i tut i o n ’ s f

a c tu a l

- c o n c l u s i vity clause . Be causethe cour t of appe als properly

applied our r

ules of law and beca

use this Court has
no jurisd ic tio n to re -e va luate fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.
Filed: May

14, 2008 Pub lis h