J-A31010-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC PAGAN-AFANADOR,

Appellant No. 3493 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001065-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 04, 2017

Appellant, Eric Pagan-Afanador, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence of 24 to 48 months’ incarceration, imposed after a 

jury convicted him of carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6106(a)(1). Herein, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to exclude 

certain evidence, and he also argues that the verdict was contrary to the 

weight of the evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court concisely summarized the facts and procedural history 

of Appellant’s case, as follows:

This case arises out of an assault that occurred on 

December 13[], 2012. [Appellant] pistol[-]whipped the victim on 

the head causing serious injury and[,] during the encounter, the 

firearm discharged and the victim sustained a through[-]and[-] 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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through gunshot wound to his shoulder. [Appellant] was 

arrested and[,] at trial[,] the Commonwealth proceeded on two 

counts of [a]ggravated [a]ssault and one count of [carrying a 

firearm without a license]. On February 7, 2014[,] after a two[-] 

day jury trial, the jury acquitted [Appellant] on the [a]ggravated 

[a]ssault charges and found him guilty of [the firearm offense]. 

On April 2[2], 2014[, Appellant] was sentenced to 24 to 48 

months[’] confinement in a State Correctional Facility. 

[Appellant’s] direct appeal rights were restored by the [Post 

Conviction Relief Act] [c]ourt and [Appellant] timely appealed.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/26/16, at 1 (footnote omitted).

Appellant timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement, and the court filed a responsive opinion. Herein, 

Appellant sets forth three issues for our review, which we have re-ordered 

for ease of disposition:

1. Did the trial court err by failing to admit and publish to the 

jury [Appellant’s] License to Carry a Firearm?

2. Is Appellant ... entitled to a mistrial?

3. Is the jury’s verdict ... against the weight of the evidence ... 

specifically in light of exculpatory evidence present[ed] by [] 

Appellant in his pro se Motion for Judgment of Acquittal?

Appellant’s Brief at 14.

In the Argument section of Appellant’s brief, he combines his first two 

issues, averring that he “is entitled to a mistrial insofar as the trial court 

committed error in refusing to admit [Appellant’s] license to carry a firearm.” 

Id. at 19 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted). Appellant is 

essentially challenging the court’s decision to exclude certain evidence; thus, 

we review his claim as follows:

The standard of review employed when faced with a challenge to 

the trial court's decision as to whether or not to admit evidence 
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is well settled. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence 

lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing 

court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill 

will. 

Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

Here, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not permitting 

him to admit into evidence a copy of a license to carry a firearm, that was 

issued by the Delaware County Sheriff’s Department on August 22, 2008 

(hereinafter “the August license”). On the face of the August license, it 

states an expiration date of August 22, 2013, which was after the incident 

underlying Appellant’s conviction in this case. See Attachment to 

“Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence,” 4/24/14 (Docket 

Entry 30). According to Appellant, the August license proves that he 

possessed a valid license to carry a firearm on the date of the incident and, 

thus, the court erred by not allowing him to admit it at trial. 

However, our review of the record reveals that the August license was 

admitted into evidence by the Commonwealth as Exhibit C-17. That exhibit 

contains an exact replica of the August license that Appellant later sought to 

admit, but with a handwritten notation on the license stating, “Revoked on 

7/23/2009.” Notably, Appellant did not object to the admission of Exhibit C17, nor challenge the authenticity of the handwritten notation. Instead, he 
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waited until his recross-examination of Detective Brad Ross, the lead 

investigator in the case, to attempt to admit an un-notated copy of the very 

same firearm license. Because Appellant failed to object to the admission of 

the notated license as Exhibit C-17, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by precluding him from later admitting an un-notated copy of the 

same document.1 

 In Appellant’s final issue, he challenges the weight of the evidence to 

sustain his convictions. However, his entire argument is premised on his 

assertion that the trial court erred by not admitting his copy of the August 

license. Because we have already concluded that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in that regard, we also ascertain no abuse of discretion in the 

court’s decision to reject Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

1 Moreover, Appellant fails to explain how Detective Ross, who was not a 

member of the Sheriff’s Department that issued the August license, would 

have been able to testify as to the authenticity of Appellant’s un-notated 

copy of that document. See Pa.R.E. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of 

authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must 

produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 

proponent claims it is.”); Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1) (stating that a piece of evidence 

may be authenticated through the “[t]estimony of a [w]itness with 

[k]knowledge ... that an item is what it is claimed to be”) (emphasis 

omitted). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to admit Appellant’s copy of the August license on this basis, as 

well.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/4/2017