NO. 4-01-0421 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

KODY SKY MEFFORD,

	Plaintiff-Appellant,

	v.

JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State for

the State of Illinois,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)

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)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County

No. 00MR720

Honorable

Donald M. Cadigan,

Judge Presiding.

		JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

		Plaintiff appeals the order of the circuit court of

Sangamon County affirming the decision of defendant, Jesse White,

Secretary of State for the State of Illinois (Secretary), to deny

the driver's license application of plaintiff, Kody Sky Mefford,

when plaintiff refused to provide his social security number on

his application, citing his religious beliefs.  Plaintiff chal

lenged the statute and rule requiring the Secretary to request a

social security number as unconstitutional for interposing a

burden on his free exercise of religion.  We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

		Early in 2000, plaintiff, born May 16, 1983, applied to

the Secretary for an Illinois driver's license, supplying all

personal information required by section 6-106(b) of the Illinois

Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-106(b) (West 1998))

except his social security number.  Based on section 6-106(b) and

an administrative rule promulgated by the Secretary (92 Ill. Adm.

Code §1030.63 (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002)) plaintiff requested relief from the submission of his social security

number based on his religious beliefs.  On February 3, 2000, the

director (Director) of the Driver Services Department (Depart

ment) denied plaintiff's application, determining that neither

section 6-106(b) of the Vehicle Code nor the rule allows plain

tiff to obtain a license without providing a social security

number.  The Director observed that plaintiff had not shown he

was a member of a religious faith that did not permit its members

to obtain social security numbers, as required by the statute and

rule.

		Following the denial, plaintiff sought an administra

tive hearing.  At the April 18, 2000, hearing, the hearing

officer heard testimony from plaintiff, then a full-time high

school student, and from his father, Dan Mefford.  Plaintiff

testified that he had a social security number, but that his

Christian religious beliefs forbade him from revealing it to the

Secretary.  The number had been obtained for him by his father

several years earlier before either plaintiff or his father

arrived at the specific religious beliefs that forbid the use of

the social security number.

		According to plaintiff, the social security number can

be used as a "universal identifier" and thus become the "mark of

the beast," about which the Bible's Book of Revelation warns. 

Plaintiff further testified that he is a member of the Church of

the Nazarene, which permits its members to "seek out [their] own

philosophical and religious readings in the scripture," but does not prohibit the use of social security numbers by its members. 

According to plaintiff, his views reflected his individual

conclusion, shared with his father, that the social security

number should generally not be used in areas outside of the

administration of the social security system.

		Based on the evidence presented, plaintiff argued that

he had met the requirements of the religious exception set forth

in the statute and the rule.  Alternatively, plaintiff argued

that to deny him a driver's license based on the statute and rule

would deny his right to free exercise of religion under the

United States and Illinois Constitutions.

		On July 11, 2000, the hearing officer issued a recom

mendation setting forth his findings and conclusions.  Among

these conclusions, the hearing officer determined that plaintiff

professed a "bona fide religion" and that his religious convic tions were sincere.  The hearing officer further found that

plaintiff's demeanor was "polite and sincere" and that his

testimony was "credible," making a similar finding as to plain

tiff's father.  However, the hearing officer found that plaintiff

failed to satisfy the administrative rule requirements of Title

92, section 1030.63, which implements the exception to the

provision of section 6-106(b) of the Vehicle Code based on

religious belief.  The hearing officer found that the Church of

the Nazarene permits its members to obtain social security

numbers and that "most, if not all" of the members of plaintiff's

church have provided social security numbers on driver's license applications.

		Despite his findings that plaintiff had not met the

requirements of the statute and rule, the hearing officer recom

mended that plaintiff's request be granted.  According to the

hearing officer, the statute and rule violated the free exercise

clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. I), in that the requirement that plaintiff

provide a social security number did not meet the "compelling

state interest" test.  The hearing officer recommended that the

Secretary grant plaintiff's request for an exception to the

social security number requirement for issuance of a license.

		On September 15, 2000, the Secretary issued a final

decision denying plaintiff's request for a driver's license.  The

Secretary declined to adopt a number of the hearing officer's

findings and conclusions and his recommendation to grant plain

tiff's request for an exception to the social security number

requirement for licensure.  Specifically, the Secretary adopted

only the hearing officer's factual background and finding that

plaintiff's testimony was credible.  Further, the Secretary

adopted only those conclusions of the officer that plaintiff

professed bona fide religious beliefs and that those beliefs were sincere.

		The Secretary made additional findings and conclusions,

most critically, that plaintiff had not satisfied the require

ments of the administrative rule implementing section 6-106(b) of

the Vehicle Code.  According to the Secretary, plaintiff failed to satisfy the rule because plaintiff's "religious faith [did]

not prohibit its members from obtaining a social security num

ber."  Further, the Secretary concluded that "the religious

belief of the petitioner is a tenet that is essential to the

practice of his religion."

		Next, the Secretary declined to resolve plaintiff's

constitutional challenges to the statute and rule, finding that

such challenges were "beyond the scope of authority of the

administrative hearing."  According to the Secretary, the scope

of the hearing was "to determine whether the law and rules were

followed based on the facts of the case."  Finding that the

administrative rule was a validly adopted regulation with the

force of law, the Secretary found that plaintiff failed to meet

the rule's requirements for a religious exemption from the

requirement of providing a social security number and denied

plaintiff's request.

		Plaintiff then filed a complaint for administrative

review of the Secretary's decision in the Sangamon County circuit

court.  The complaint requested a "driver's license with full

driving privileges without providing a social security number on

the application.”  Before the circuit court, plaintiff no longer

argued that he had satisfied the requirements of section 6-106(b)

of the Vehicle Code and the administrative rule implementing that

section; rather, he argued that the application of the statute

and rule denied his right to free exercise of religion under the

United States and Illinois Constitutions.  After the parties briefed the issue, the circuit court entered its judgment in a

docket entry, finding that, "the decision of [the Secretary] is

not arbitrary or capricious or against the manifest weight of the

evidence and is accordingly affirmed."  This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

		The issue on appeal is a narrow one.  Plaintiff has

only argued that the statute and rule giving the Secretary the

discretion to allow or refuse an applicant for a driver's license

to submit his social security number is unconstitutional. 

Plaintiff has only argued that the application of the statute and

rule violates his right to free exercise of religion under the

United States and Illinois Constitutions.  No issue is raised

regarding plaintiff's compliance with the requirements of the

statute and rule.  Insofar as the statute and rule are neutral

laws of general applicability that merely have the incidental

effect of burdening religious exercise, we affirm the circuit

court's judgment affirming the Secretary's denial of the plain

tiff's request for a driver's license without providing a social

security number.

A. Statute and Rule Providing Religious Exemption 

to Social Security Number Requirement

		At issue between the parties is the constitutional

effect of a single statute and the administrative rule implement

ing it.  Section 6-106(b) of the Vehicle Code requires all

applicants for an Illinois driver's license to provide, inter alia, their social security number.  625 ILCS 5/6-106(b) (West 1998).  That section further provides that the Secretary may:

		"in his discretion substitute a federal tax

number in lieu of a social security number,

or he may instead assign an additional dis

tinctive number in lieu thereof, where an

applicant is prohibited by bona fide reli

gious convictions from applying or is exempt

from for applying for a social security number. 

The [Secretary] shall, however, determine

which religious orders or sects have such

bona fide religious convictions."	625 ILCS 5/6-106(b) (West 1998).

The Secretary may only disclose an applicant's or licensee's

social security number without the applicant's or licensee's

consent for law enforcement and other limited purposes.  625 ILCS

5/2-123(h) (West 1998).

		Pursuant to section 6-106(b), the Secretary has promul

gated regulations at Title 92, section 1030.63, of the Illinois

Administrative Code, which provide that "[m]embers of religious

groups whose faith will not permit them to obtain social security

numbers may request the social security number be omitted on

their driver's license application."  92 Ill. Adm. Code

1030.63(b) (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002).  The regulations

further provide that the applicant must state the reasons why the

use of the social security number conflicts with the applicant's

religious beliefs, and provide an affidavit from the applicant's

minister or religious leader "attesting that the use of a social security number is against the religious convictions of the

applicant's faith."  92 Ill. Adm. Code §1030.63(g) (Conway Green

CD-ROM 2002).

B. Standard of Review

		This case is before us in the context of an appeal

under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through 3-

113 (West 2000)).  In general, courts should not interfere with the discretionary authority of an administrative agency unless

the agency has exercised its power in an arbitrary and capricious

manner, or the agency's action was contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence.  Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272-73, 673 N.E.2d 251, 254 (1996).  However, plaintiff's appeal

to the circuit court challenged the constitutionality of the

statute and administrative rule applied by the Secretary. 

Judicial review of agency decisions extends to all questions of

law and fact presented by the record.  735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000); Du Page County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 284 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652, 672 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (1996).  Further, our review is of the administrative agency's decision,

and not the decision of the circuit court.  XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d 202, 207, 709 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1999).

		As the facts of the case are undisputed and present

only questions of law, we review plaintiff's constitutional

challenges to section 6-106(b) of the Vehicle Code and the

Secretary's administrative rule de novo.  See People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 638, 727 N.E.2d 200, 203 (2000); In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (2001).  In so doing, our

review of a statute's or rule's constitutionality includes a

"strong presumption of constitutionality."  Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441, 701 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (1998).  Thus, we are bound to uphold the constitutionality of a

statute or rule if reasonably possible.  People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 123, 703 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1998).  Pursuant to these standards, a party challenging a statute or

rule has the burden of "clearly establish[ing]" the unconstitu

tionality of the statute or rule.  Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 31, 759 N.E.2d 533, 540 (2001).

C. Plaintiff's Constitutional Challenges

		Plaintiff makes but a single challenge to the statute

and rule requiring submission of a social security number on a

driver's license application.  Plaintiff argues that both the

statute and rule inhibit his free exercise of religion under the

first amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,

section 3, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (U.S. Const.

Amend I; Ill. Const. 41970, art. I, §3).

1. The Statute and Rule Requiring Driver's License Applicants

To Submit a Social Security Number is Valid Under the 

United States Constitution

		The first amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab

lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 

U.S. Const., amend. I.  The first amendment is applicable to the

states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend ment.  U.S. Const., amend. XIV; People v. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d 352, 356, 721 N.E.2d 546, 549 (1999); see also Cantwell v. Connecti cut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1217-18, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1940).

		From 1963 until 1990, the United States Supreme Court

determined whether a state law violated the free exercise clause

of the first amendment under the "compelling state interest" test

of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 971-72, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795-96 (1963).  See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 25, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1532-33 (1972); Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 7176-18, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624, 6343- 354, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1431-32 (1981).  Under this test, a party

claiming that a state law burdened his right to free exercise

carried the burden of proving that (1) his religious beliefs were

sincerely held and (2) enforcement of the state law would

impermissibly burden his right to free exercise.  Sherbert,  374 U.S. at 406-07, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 971-72, 83 S. Ct. at 1795-96.  Once these threshold burdens have been met, the burden then shifts to the state to prove that the law is based on a compel

ling state interest that cannot be served by less-restrictive

means.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 971-72, 83 S. Ct. at 1795-96.

		Plaintiff argues that such a test could properly be 

applied in this case.  However, this argument ignores the last 12

years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In 1990, the Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 885-86, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (1990), severely restricted the applicability of the Sherbert test.  In that case, the Court rejected the free exercise claims of two Native Americans who ingested peyote for

sacramental purposes whose employment had been terminated at a

drug rehabilitation center.  Under state law, the ingestion of

peyote was illegal, and when the employees petitioned the state

for unemployment benefits, their claims were denied on the basis

of having committed work-related "misconduct."  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 882-83, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.

		Reviewing the Court's previous jurisprudence in the

free exercise context, the Court recognized two basic free

exercise principles.  First, the government is prohibited from

regulating religious beliefs.  This principle prohibits the

government from compelling the affirmation of religious beliefs,

punishing religious expression thought to be false, or using

religious doctrine as a basis for judicial decisions.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 877, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 884, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.  Second,

and more critically to the case at bar, the Court held:

		"t[T]he right of free exercise does not re

lieve an individual of the obligation to

comply with a 'valid and neutral law of gen

eral applicability on the ground that the law

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his

religions prescribes (or proscribes).'"  Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 886, 110 S. Ct. at 1600, quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3, 71 L. Ed. 2d 127, 136 n.3, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).

See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624, 635, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997) ("Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious

practices even when not supported by a compelling government

interest").

		Critical to this determination was the Court's belief

that any other rule would seriously hinder the government's

ability to enforce generally applicable laws by requiring excep

tions for religious practices of every conceivable character. 

Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 892, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.

  The result of such a standard would be "constitutionally

required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost

every conceivable kind."  City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 648, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.

		Despite plaintiff's attempts to characterize Smith as a  "recent" Supreme Court case that "questions" whether the

"[Sherbert] standard is the applicable standard in cases such as this one," the Supreme Court has not wavered in its commitment to

the Smith standard since 1990.  See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 635, 117 S. Ct. at 2161; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472, 489, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).  While the Sherbert standard is more favorable to plaintiff, the Supreme Court's definitive analysis of free exercise claims

applies.

		But the Supreme Court's decision in Smith did not completely deny the applicability of the Sherbert test.  Accord ing to the Court in Smith, a law must still be justified by a compelling state interest if it is not neutral or generally

applicable.  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 489, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.  Thus, we need only consider whether section 6-106 of the Vehicle Code or the administrative rule implementing

it are neutral or generally applicable.  We find both the statute

and rule to be neutral and generally applicable.

		According to the Supreme Court, a law is not "neutral"

if the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict prac

tices because of their religious motivation.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 885-86, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1600; see also Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 490-91, 113 S. Ct. at 2226-27.  In the case at bar, we fail to see how the

statute and rule at issue could not be seen as neutral.  Fa

cially, the statute and rule do not target religious practice and

are not aimed at regulating any activity that could be even

considered religious.  Certainly, applying for a driver's license

is not among traditional religious practices.  Further, the statute and rule cannot be said to be a "covert suppression of

particular religious beliefs'  [Citation.].."  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 491, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.  Plaintiff's beliefs notwithstanding, we are not persuaded that requiring an

applicant for a driver's license to prove his identity as fully

as possible has, as its primary purpose, some form of "religious

gerrymander."  Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 491, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.  In sum, we find section 6-106(b) of the Vehicle Code and Title 92, section 1030.63, of the Illinois

Administrative Code to be neutral.

		Similarly, we are not persuaded that the statute and

rule at issue are not generally applicable.  While the Supreme

Court has not defined with precision the standard used to evalu

ate whether a law is of general application (see 5 R. Rotunda &

and J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law--Substance & Proce

dure, §21.8, at 133 n.20 (3d ed. 1999)), we do not find, and

plaintiff has not offered, any reason why the statute and rule

[are] not [be] generally applicable.  Every applicant for a driver's license must supply his social security number, unless he has not

obtained a social security number on the basis of religious

belief or is exempt from obtaining a social security number.  625

ILCS 5/6-106(b) (West 1998) ("Every application shall state the *** social security number *** of the applicant ***" (emphases

added.)).  The only exemption from providing the social security

number is not based on any religious classification but on the

mere fact that an applicant has not obtained a social security

number.  This demonstrates no animosity by the legislature to any

religious group or practice, and may, in fact, reflect an ac knowledgment that religious practice may involve a conscious

choice to not apply for a social security number.  Overall, the

statute and rule have only an incidental effect on religious

practice.

		Having determined the statute and rule to be a neutral

law of general applicability, we see no need to apply the strict-

scrutiny standard of Sherbert.  In our view, the facts of this case fall squarely within the scope of Smith; the law requiring a driver's license applicant to provide a social security number if

the applicant has one is religiously neutral and generally

applicable to all driver's license applicants.  Insofar as

plaintiff did not fall within the limited exception to this rule,

as he had previously obtained a social security number, the

Secretary simply applied the law as written.  Thus, the applica

tion of the statute and rule to plaintiff did not burden plain

tiff's right to free exercise of religion under the United States

Constitution.

		We are further persuaded that our decision to uphold

the statute and rule under a federal constitutional analysis is

bolstered by two cases with similar facts decided after Smith.  In Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1999), the court was presented with facts nearly identical to the case at

bar:  the plaintiff, who had already obtained a social security

number, refused to submit it on a driver's license renewal form,

claiming a conflict with his religious beliefs.  Citing Smith and Hialeah, the court found that the law requiring the submission of the social security number was religiously neutral and generally applicable and refused to find that the requirement violated the

plaintiff's right to free exercise.  Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206-08.

A federal district court upheld a similar challenge based on the

free exercise clause.  See Stoianoff v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 107 F. Supp. 2d 439, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd without pub. op. 208 F.3d 204 (2nd Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.   , 151 L. Ed. 2d 266, 122 S. Ct. 352 (2001).

		Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in a case

predating Smith, held that the use of social security numbers in the administration of government programs is not susceptible to a

free exercise challenge.  In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735, 744-45, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2152-53 (1986), the Court was presented with a challenge to the use of social secu

rity numbers in federal welfare programs.  The plaintiffs had

been denied benefits because the obtaining and submission of a

social security number was a condition to the receipt of the

benefits, and the plaintiff had refused to submit her number,

citing her Native American religious beliefs.  The Court declined

to apply a compelling-interest test and further declined to

recognize a free exercise claim based on the government's use of

the social security number to administer the program, stating

that the free exercise clause "affords an individual protection

from certain forms of governmental compulsion [but] does not

afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the

[g]overnment's internal procedures."  Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 744-45, 106 S. Ct. at 2152; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 975, 83 S. Ct. at 1798 (the free

exercise clause is "written in terms of what the government

cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual

can extract from the government") (Douglas, J., concurring).

		We are only further persuaded by the reasoning of

Bowen.  Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Bowen on several grounds, the strongest of which is that the Court in Bowen declined to address the question of whether an applicant may be

compelled to supply a social security number as a condition of receiving government benefits.  While plaintiff's argument is

correct, it has little bearing on our application of Bowen to the instant case.  The Court in Bowen failed to address the issue of whether a federal requirement that a person obtain and provide a

social security number as a condition for receiving aid violated

the free exercise clause, because the statute under consideration

there did not provide an exemption for persons whose sincerely

held religious beliefs prevented them from meeting that condi

tion.  Bowen, 476 U.S. at 702-03, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 746-47, 106 S. Ct. at 2153-54.  That is not the case here.  Both section 6-106

of the Vehicle Code and its accompanying administrative rule

provide an exemption for those who have not obtained a social security number.  The challenged statute and rule in no sense

compel the applicant to obtain a social security number.  Rather, the statute and rule simply condition the grant of a driver's

license on the submission of a social security number for those who have one.

		Plaintiff's right to free exercise of religion under

the United States Constitution has not been unconstitutionally

burdened by the Secretary's requirement that he submit his

existing social security number.  The statute and rule are

religiously neutral laws of general applicability that have only

an incidental effect of burdening plaintiff's particular reli

gious practice.  Under the federal Constitution, then, we are

bound to uphold the validity of such laws.		

2.  The Statute and Rule Requiring Driver's License Applicants

To Submit a Social Security Number Is Valid Under the 

Illinois Constitution

		Plaintiff also argues that the statute and rule violate

article I, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which

provides:

			"The free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship, without

discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed,

and no person shall be denied any civil or

political right, privilege[,] or capacity, on

account of his religious opinions; but the

liberty of conscience hereby secured shall

not be construed to *** justify practices

inconsistent with the peace or safety of the

State."  Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §3.

While the text of Illinois' constitutional guarantee of free

exercise is different from that in the United States Constitu tion, the resulting analysis is the same.  Under the Illinois

Constitution, we still find that plaintiff's right to free

exercise of religions was not unconstitutionally burdened by the

Secretary's application of section 6-106 of the Code and its

accompanying administrative rule.

		We note at the outset that Illinois courts typically

apply the "lockstep" doctrine, which dictates that provisions of

the Illinois Constitution should be construed in the same manner

as similar provisions of the United States Constitution.  People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 77, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1162-63 (1988).  We adhere to this manner of interpretation unless we find an

indication that the drafters intended otherwise (Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 77, 521 N.E.2d at 1162-63) or a "clear indication from the

Illinois Supreme Court to the contrary."  People v. Russell, 165 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573, 519 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1987).

		 While the plain language of article I, section 3,

indicates that the drafters intended protection of religious

practice in Illinois to be more expansive than that guaranteed by

the United States Constitution, our supreme court has determined

otherwise.  In Falbe, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the lockstep approach to article I, section 3, finding that the

protections of religious practice afforded by that section are

coextensive with those of the first amendment to the United

States Constitution.  Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 645, 727 N.E.2d at 707, citing People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 3-4, 305 N.E.2d 129, 130 (1973).  According to the court, "any statute which is valid under the first amendment is also valid under the

Constitution of Illinois."  Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d at 645, 727 N.E.2d at 707.

		In light of this positive statement from our supreme

court, we are constrained to mirror our federal constitutional

analysis in our analysis of the Illinois Constitution's

protections of religious exercise.  Insofar as we have held that

section 6-106 of the Vehicle Code and the administrative rule

implementing it are valid under the United States Constitution

and that the Secretary's application of those laws to plaintiff

was not unconstitutional, we hold that the plaintiff's right to

free exercise of religion under the Illinois Constitution was

similarly not burdened by the Secretary's refusal to exempt him

from the requirement that plaintiff submit his social security

number on his driver's license application.

		Our judgment in that regard is only further supported

by case law from our supreme court and this court.  For example,

in Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d 267, 226 N.E.2d 4 (1967), our supreme court construed the predecessor to

article I, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution consistent

with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith.  In Warmbir, a woman whose religion prohibited her from obtaining a divorce claimed that a provision of the mental health code that

made spouses liable for services rendered to patients unable to

pay could not be constitutionally applied to her in light of the

Constitution's guarantees of free exercise of religion.  Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d at 268, 226 N.E.2d at 5.  In rejecting her claim, the

court concluded that although "[a] statute which had as its

object the promotion or discouragement of a particular religion

would be beyond the scope of government power," a statute that is

"concerned with a legitimate governmental purpose" is not invalid

"merely because as an incidental effect it may place at some

disadvantage persons of a particular religious faith."  Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d at 269-70, 226 N.E.2d at 56.  The court observed that

"[t]he difficulty encountered, or the benefit which one must

forego, is attributable not to the statute but to the religion or

to the individual's own choice."  Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d at 270, 226 N.E.2d at 6.

		More specifically, this court has held that there is

"no constitutional prohibition" against requiring an applicant

for a driver's license to supply a social security number. 

Schmidt v. Powell, 4 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38, 280 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1972).  In Schmidt, we upheld the social security number re quirement of a previous version of section 6-106 of the Vehicle

Code, further finding that the statute was intended, inter alia, to promote the safety of those using the highways of Illinois. 

Schmidt, 4 Ill. App. 3d at 38, 280 N.E.2d at 238.

		In light of these strong precedents, as well as our

supreme court's mandate to construe article I, section 3, of the

Illinois Constitution in the same manner as the first amendment,

we hold that plaintiff's right to free exercise of religion under

the Illinois Constitution was not burdened by the Secretary's application of section 6-106 of the Vehicle Code and Title 92,

section 1030.63, of the Illinois Administrative Code.

D.  Plaintiff Has Forfeited Any Argument Under the 

Religious Freedom Restoration Act

		Plaintiff's briefs also raise arguments under Illi

nois's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Restoration Act) (775

ILCS 35/1 through 99 (West 1998)).  We decline to address these arguments for two reasons.  First, we decline to address plain

tiff's argument insofar as it is unclear exactly what plaintiff

is arguing by raising the Restoration Act.  See Bank of Illinois v. Thweatt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 349, 362, 630 N.E.2d 121, 130 (1994) (holding argument waived because a "reviewing court is entitled

to have issues clearly defined").

		However, as a more fundamental matter, plaintiff did

not argue before the agency or the circuit court that the Secre

tary's application of the statute and rule requiring an applicant

for a driver's license to submit a social security number vio

lated the Restoration Act.  "It is well settled that issues not

raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised

for the first time on appeal."  Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 535-36, 662 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (1996).  This becomes especially critical insofar as the Restoration Act creates a

separate cause of action, and requires that a claim be brought in

a "judicial proceeding."  775 ILCS 35/20 (West 1998).  Since plaintiff failed to raise the Restoration Act in the agency and

circuit court, the issue is forfeited on appeal.

III.  CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's

judgment.		

		Affirmed.

		COOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.