2014 WI 126

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2012AP1827-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against John J. Carter, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

John J. Carter,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARTER

OPINION FILED: December 12, 2014

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: September 10, 2014

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT:

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED:

NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, ROGGENSACK, JJ., did not participate. 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Franklyn 

M. Gimbel, Kathryn A. Keppel, and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown 

LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Franklyn M. Gimbel.

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by 

Matthew J. Price, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 

argument by Matthew J. Price. 
2014 WI 126

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2012AP1827-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against John J. Carter, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

John J. Carter,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

DEC 12, 2014

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review a referee's report and 

recommendation concluding that Attorney John J. Carter violated 

the rules of professional conduct in connection with his 

representation of N.N. The referee recommended that this court 

impose a three-year suspension of Attorney Carter's law license 

and that it require Attorney Carter to pay full costs in 

connection with this matter, which total $6,680.62 as of 

September 24, 2014. We adopt the referee's findings of fact, 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

2

conclusions of law, and recommendation regarding discipline and 

costs.

¶2 Attorney Carter was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1974. He has no disciplinary history.

¶3 On August 16, 2012, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 

(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Carter alleging 11 

counts of professional misconduct arising out of his 

representation of his former client, N.N. Attorney Carter filed 

an answer and Christine Harris Taylor was appointed as referee 

in the matter.

¶4 Attorney Carter later entered a stipulation by which 

he withdrew his answer; pled no contest to the 11 counts of 

misconduct charged in the OLR complaint; and agreed that the 

referee could use the allegations of the complaint as a factual 

basis for the referee's determination of misconduct. Attorney 

Carter reserved his right to argue the appropriate sanction. 

After a hearing, the referee filed a report recommending the 

above-stated discipline and finding the following facts. 

¶5 Attorney Carter represented N.N. in the sale of her 

business. Attorney Carter and N.N. did not enter into any 

written fee agreement for this work. In January 2009, the buyer 

of N.N.'s business wired a significant portion of the sale 

price——$112,500——into Attorney Carter's trust account. Despite 

N.N.'s repeated requests, Attorney Carter did not release this 

amount to N.N. Over the course of the next few months, Attorney 

Carter converted a total of $72,053.59 of N.N.'s funds held in 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

3

trust: $32,400 to his own purposes and $39,653.59 attributable 

to third party purposes. 

¶6 In answer to N.N.'s repeated requests for her funds, 

Attorney Carter lied to N.N., telling her that he had placed her 

funds in various short-term investment instruments which had not 

yet matured. Attorney Carter maintained this lie for many 

months. 

¶7 Occasionally, Attorney Carter made payments to N.N. of 

her funds held in trust. These periodic payments totaled just 

over $90,000 by September 2009. 

¶8 During the first year of his work for N.N. related to 

the sale of her business, Attorney Carter did not send N.N. any 

bills for his work, despite N.N.'s several requests for a bill. 

Without informing N.N., Attorney Carter issued a $5,000 trust 

account check to himself. The check bore a notation that it was 

for a partial fee payment for the N.N. matter. Attorney Carter 

also requested and received from N.N. two checks totaling $7,000 

as payment for fees. 

¶9 In late October 2009, Attorney Carter sent N.N. a bill 

for his work. The bill listed a subtotal of $66,930 in fees, 

for 223.1 hours of work at $300 per hour. The bill then listed 

a 25% reduction in the number of hours worked, which reduced the 

total to $50,400. From that figure, Attorney Carter subtracted 

$7,000 for the two checks that N.N. had sent him for fees, for a 

total net due of $43,400. The bill was itemized by general 

categories of work ("Correspondence," "Meetings," "Telephone 

Conferences," "Draft/Review Documents," "Research") rather than 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

4

by specific entries. The billing statement made no reference to 

the $5,000 in fees that Attorney Carter had paid himself, 

without N.N.'s knowledge, out of his trust account. 

¶10 N.N. was surprised to receive the $43,400 bill from 

Attorney Carter, as she believed the two had never agreed to the 

terms of Attorney Carter's fees, and his $300 hourly rate was 

considerably higher than the rates he had charged her in 

previous legal matters. 

¶11 When N.N. objected to the bill, Attorney Carter became 

defensive and adversarial. He claimed that N.N. had 

strategically not insisted upon a written fee agreement so that 

she could later dispute his fees. He threatened to take the fee 

dispute to court. He refused to release the remainder of N.N.'s 

funds in his trust account until the fee dispute was resolved.

¶12 Ultimately, N.N. agreed to pay a total of $38,970 for 

Attorney Carter's work. N.N. and Attorney Carter agreed that 

Attorney Carter would offset that amount by the $7,000 in checks 

that N.N. had already sent him for fees, and by the amount of 

N.N.'s funds that remained in Attorney Carter's trust account. 

The amount of fees still owing after these offsets was 

$8,079.89. N.N. sent Attorney Carter a check for that amount. 

At the time she sent this check, N.N. was still unaware that 

Attorney Carter had unilaterally withdrawn $5,000 from his trust 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

5

account as a partial fee payment. The record is unclear as to 

whether N.N. ever became aware of this withdrawal.1 

¶13 Based on the stipulated facts set forth above, 

Attorney Carter pled no contest to the following seven counts of 

misconduct:

 Count 1: By failing to enter into a written fee 

agreement with N.N. for his representation of her in 

the sale of her business and other matters, Attorney 

Carter violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.5(b)(1).2 

 Count 2: By failing to promptly disburse N.N.'s 

$112,500 in sale proceeds pursuant to her requests, 

and by refusing to release the balance of such sale 

 

1 The parties have informed us that N.N. died before the OLR 

filed its complaint against Attorney Carter.

2 SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) provides: 

The scope of the representation and the basis or 

rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will 

be responsible shall be communicated to the client in 

writing, before or within a reasonable time after 

commencing the representation, except when the lawyer 

will charge a regularly represented client on the same 

basis or rate as in the past. If it is reasonably 

foreseeable that the total cost of representation to 

the client, including attorney's fees, will be $1000 

or less, the communication may be oral or in writing. 

Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or 

expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the 

client.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

6

proceeds to her until they had resolved their fee 

dispute, Attorney Carter violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).3 

 Count 3: By failing to respond to N.N.'s requests for 

the status of her funds, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).4 

 Count 4: By failing to advise N.N. that he had 

withdrawn $5,000 in fees without providing her any 

notice whatsoever, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:1.15(g)(1).5

 

3 SCR 20:1.l5(d)(1) provides:

Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 

received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 

identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 

contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 

or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this 

rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 

with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 

the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 

that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.

4 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 

comply with reasonable requests by the client for information."

5 SCR 20:1.15(g)(1) provides:

At least 5 business days before the date on which 

a disbursement is made from a trust account for the 

purpose of paying fees, with the exception of 

contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court order, 

the lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all 

of the following: 

a. an itemized bill or other accounting showing 

the services rendered; 

b. notice of the amount owed and the anticipated 

date of the withdrawal; and 

(continued)
No. 2012AP1827-D 

7

 Count 5: By failing to hold at least $72,053.59 of 

N.N.'s funds in trust and converting them to his own 

purposes or for third party purposes without her 

knowledge or consent, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)6 and SCR 20:8.4(c).7

 Count 6: By engaging in an ongoing scheme for months 

of making repeated misrepresentations to N.N. that he 

had invested on her behalf the balance of her $112,500 

in various investment instruments, when in fact he had 

never made any such investments and had already 

converted her funds for his own or third party 

purposes, Attorney Carter violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 

 

c. a statement of the balance of the client's 

funds in the lawyer trust account after the 

withdrawal.

6 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides:

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 

3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 

connection with a representation. All funds of 

clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 

in connection with a representation shall be deposited 

in one or more identifiable trust accounts.

7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit or misrepresentation."
No. 2012AP1827-D 

8

 Count 7: By failing to respond to N.N.'s requests for 

a billing statement, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).8 

¶14 During the course of the OLR's investigation into 

N.N.'s grievance, the OLR requested Attorney Carter's 2009 trust 

account records. The OLR's review of the records revealed 

deficiencies that led to the following four counts of 

misconduct, to which Attorney Carter also pled no contest:

 Count 8: In September 2009, Attorney Carter made an 

unidentified deposit to his trust account by telephone 

transfer in the amount of $2,500. Carter was unable 

to identify to the OLR the reason for this transfer, 

but his business account bank statements confirm the 

funds came from him. By making this telephone 

transfer to his trust account, Attorney Carter 

violated SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b.9 

 

8 SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) provides, "A lawyer shall promptly 

respond to a client's request for information concerning fees 

and expenses."

9 SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b. provides:

No deposits or disbursements shall be made to or 

from a pooled trust account by a telephone transfer of 

funds. This section does not prohibit any of the 

following: 

1. wire transfers. 

2. telephone transfers between non-pooled draft 

and non-pooled non-draft trust accounts that a lawyer 

maintains for a particular client.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

9

 Count 9: Another of Attorney Carter's clients, K.S, 

received $2,000 monthly payments related to K.S.'s 

sale of a business interest. Attorney Carter 

represented K.S. with respect to this sale. Rather 

than depositing the monthly payments in his trust 

account and then disbursing the funds to K.S. by 

issuing checks from the trust account, Attorney Carter 

channeled the funds through his own business account 

on at least ten occasions, thereby violating 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). 

 Count 10: By failing to maintain trust account 

records showing the required information, including a 

transaction register, subsidiary client ledgers, 

deposit records, canceled checks, and monthly account 

reconciliations, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:1.15(f)(1).10 

 

10 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) provides:

Complete records of a trust account that is a 

draft account shall include a transaction register; 

individual client ledgers for IOLTA accounts and other 

pooled trust accounts; a ledger for account fees and 

charges, if law firm funds are held in the account 

pursuant to sub. (b)(3); deposit records; disbursement 

records; monthly statements; and reconciliation 

reports, subject to all of the following: 

a. Transaction register. The transaction register 

shall contain a chronological record of all account 

transactions, and shall include all of the following: 

1. the date, source, and amount of all deposits; 

(continued)
No. 2012AP1827-D 

10

 

2. the date, check or transaction number, payee 

and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, 

wire transfer, or other means; 

3. the date and amount of every other deposit or 

deduction of whatever nature; 

4. the identity of the client for whom funds were 

deposited or disbursed; and 

5. the balance in the account after each 

transaction. 

b. Individual client ledgers. A subsidiary ledger 

shall be maintained for each client or 3rd party for 

whom the lawyer receives trust funds that are 

deposited in an IOLTA account or any other pooled 

trust account. The lawyer shall record each receipt 

and disbursement of a client's or 3rd party's funds 

and the balance following each transaction. A lawyer 

shall not disburse funds from an IOLTA account or any 

pooled trust account that would create a negative 

balance with respect to any individual client or 

matter. 

c. Ledger for account fees and charges. A 

subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for funds of the 

lawyer deposited in the trust account to accommodate 

monthly service charges. Each deposit and expenditure 

of the lawyer's funds in the account and the balance 

following each transaction shall be identified in the 

ledger. 

d. Deposit records. Deposit slips shall identify 

the name of the lawyer or law firm, and the name of 

the account. The deposit slip shall identify the 

amount of each deposit item, the client or matter 

associated with each deposit item, and the date of the 

deposit. The lawyer shall maintain a copy or duplicate 

of each deposit slip. All deposits shall be made 

intact. No cash, or other form of disbursement, shall 

be deducted from a deposit. Deposits of wired funds 

shall be documented in the account's monthly 

statement. 

e. Disbursement records. 

(continued)
No. 2012AP1827-D 

11

 

1. Checks. Checks shall be pre-printed and prenumbered. The name and address of the lawyer or law 

firm, and the name of the account shall be printed in 

the upper left corner of the check. Trust account 

checks shall include the words "Client Account," or 

"Trust Account" or words of similar import in the 

account name. Each check disbursed from the trust 

account shall identify the client matter and the 

reason for the disbursement on the memo line. 

2. Canceled checks. Canceled checks shall be 

obtained from the financial institution. Imaged checks 

may be substituted for canceled checks. 

3. Imaged checks. Imaged checks shall be 

acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse 

of the check and comply with the requirements of this 

paragraph. The information contained on the reverse 

side of the imaged checks shall include any 

endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and 

transaction dates that appear on the original. Imaged 

checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable 

without magnification and as close as possible to the 

size of the original check. 

4. Wire transfers. Wire transfers shall be 

documented by a written withdrawal authorization or 

other documentation, such as a monthly statement of 

the account that indicates the date of the transfer, 

the payee, and the amount. 

f. Monthly statement. The monthly statement 

provided to the lawyer or law firm by the financial 

institution shall identify the name and address of the 

lawyer or law firm and the name of the account. 

g. Reconciliation reports. For each trust 

account, the lawyer shall prepare and retain a printed 

reconciliation report on a regular and periodic basis 

not less frequently than every 30 days. Each 

reconciliation report shall show all of the following 

balances and verify that they are identical: 

1. the balance that appears in the transaction 

register as of the reporting date; 

(continued)
No. 2012AP1827-D 

12

 Count 11: By issuing numerous trust account checks 

without including the client matter and purpose of 

such checks on the memo line, Attorney Carter violated 

SCR 20:l.15(f)(l)e.1.

¶15 The referee held a one-day hearing on sanctions. 

Several witnesses testified as to Attorney Carter's good 

character and reputation, as well as his long-time community 

involvement. Attorney Carter also testified. He admitted that 

he used funds from N.N.'s legal matter as a way to relieve 

significant financial pressures caused by a failed business 

investment. He admitted that he erred in managing his trust 

account. He admitted that his trust account records reflect 

that he converted to himself at least $32,400 of N.N.'s funds 

and converted for third party purposes approximately $39,600 of 

N.N.'s funds. He admitted that his claim that he had invested 

N.N.'s funds was a lie. 

¶16 In her report, the referee recommended a three-year 

suspension of Attorney Carter's license. The referee wrote that 

Attorney Carter's misconduct ranged from trust account 

 

2. the total of all subsidiary ledger balances 

for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, 

determined by listing and totaling the balances in the 

individual client ledgers and the ledger for account 

fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and 

3. the adjusted balance, determined by adding 

outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance 

in the financial institution's monthly statement and 

subtracting outstanding checks and other deductions 

from the balance in the monthly statement.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

13

recordkeeping violations "to the most fundamental betrayals of 

the attorney-client relationship"——conversion of client trust 

funds. The referee noted that Attorney Carter covered up his 

conversion of N.N.'s funds by perpetuating a "phony story about 

his investment of those funds," and that "[o]nce exposed, Carter 

proceeded to hold hostage the distribution of [N.N.'s] trust 

funds until Carter and [N.N.] reached an agreement as to the 

amount and payment of Carter's attorney's fees." The referee 

noted that Attorney Carter "perpetuated his investment charade 

to OLR for months" before ultimately acknowledging that he never 

invested N.N.'s funds. The referee also found as an aggravating 

factor Attorney Carter's lengthy legal experience, particularly 

in matters of ethics and professional conduct. (Attorney Carter 

served on the Milwaukee County Ethics Board for 28 years; on a 

committee for the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 

for 20 years; and as a special investigator for the OLR for four 

years.) As mitigating factors, the referee noted that Attorney 

Carter ultimately pled no contest to all of the charged 

misconduct; owes no restitution; enjoys a very positive 

reputation in the Milwaukee area; suffers from blindness as a 

result of an injury incurred many years ago while on duty as a 

police officer; and has expressed genuine remorse for his 

actions.

¶17 There is no claim that any of the referee's findings 

of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. See

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 

¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

14

¶18 The only issue on appeal is whether the recommended 

discipline is appropriate. The court may impose whatever 

discipline it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 

recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶19 Attorney Carter asks for either a public reprimand or, 

at most, a suspension of less than six months. Attorney Carter 

claims that his misconduct, while admittedly significant, caused 

N.N. no monetary loss. He claims there is virtually no risk 

that he would repeat his misconduct given his personal history, 

his age, his acceptance of responsibility, and his remorse for 

his misconduct. He further claims that, given his solid 

reputation, a reprimand or short suspension will be enough to 

deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 

¶20 We disagree. By any measure, and by Attorney Carter's 

own admission, Attorney Carter engaged in very serious 

misconduct. As we have previously explained:

Misappropriation or conversion of client funds held in 

trust is one of the most serious acts of lawyer 

misconduct. It violates the fundamental principle of 

the lawyer-client relationship——the trust the client 

places in the lawyer and upon which the lawyer depends 

to properly represent the client. Further, it places 

the lawyer's personal pecuniary interest above the 

client's interests, which the lawyer has undertaken to 

protect and promote, and it does so at the client's 

expense. Accordingly, such misconduct should warrant 

the imposition of the most severe discipline——the 

license revocation. 

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bult, 142 Wis. 2d 885, 

890, 419 N.W.2d 245 (1988).
No. 2012AP1827-D 

15

¶21 Nonetheless, we have cautioned that "license 

revocation ought not be imposed indiscriminately in every case 

of misappropriation or conversion of client funds, as there are 

other factors to consider and no two disciplinary cases present 

precisely the same circumstances." Id. at 890-91.

¶22 Thus, the question before the court is whether this 

case presents sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit a 

sanction short of revocation. It is a close call.

¶23 There are many aggravating factors. Attorney Carter's 

conduct involved much more than simple negligence. His conduct 

was reckless and highly unprofessional. In answer to N.N.'s 

repeated requests for her funds——over $70,000 of which he had 

converted——Attorney Carter wove elaborate stories of investment 

instruments in which he had supposedly placed her money. These 

supposed investments were pure fiction. Not long after N.N. 

objected to Attorney Carter's supposed investment scheme, 

Attorney Carter took action to create leverage over N.N.: he 

sent her a $43,400 legal bill. He refused to release the 

remainder of N.N's funds in trust until they reached an 

agreement on his fees. He accused N.N. of trying to take 

advantage of him by not insisting that he prepare a written fee 

agreement listing his hourly rate. These forms of deception and 

subterfuge are highly damaging to the public's confidence in the 

integrity and trustworthiness of the bar.

¶24 There are mitigating factors as well. Attorney Carter 

has had no previous disciplinary troubles over the course of his 

long legal career. He has earned a solid reputation among his 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

16

peers and in the community. It appears he repaid most, and 

perhaps all, of the money he misappropriated from N.N. (The 

record is unclear as to whether he ever accounted for the $5,000 

fee payment he withdrew from his trust account without N.N.'s 

knowledge.) He has admitted his wrongdoing, pled no contest to 

all 11 counts of misconduct, and expressed shame and remorse. 

¶25 On balance, we find that there are sufficient

mitigating circumstances to call for a sanction short of 

revocation. We agree with the referee's recommendation of a 

three-year suspension. We find In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Goldstein, 2010 WI 26, 323 Wis. 2d 706, 782 N.W.2d 388 

instructive. There, a lawyer received a two-year suspension for 

misconduct that included converting nearly $70,000 from three 

probate estates for which the attorney served as special 

administrator or personal representative. This court noted that 

although it will "not hesitate to impose revocation when needed 

and many cases involving conversion of funds have warranted 

revocation," a two-year suspension was sufficient given the 

lawyer's lack of prior discipline over a long legal career, his 

acknowledgement of his wrongdoing, and his repayment of the 

converted funds to his clients. Id., ¶¶28-29. We agree with 

the referee's assessment that a suspension longer than the twoyear suspension imposed in Goldstein is appropriate here in 

light of Attorney Carter's "elaborate scheme specifically 

employed to avoid his client's demands for distributions of her 

trust funds," as well as the fact that he "[held] hostage the 
No. 2012AP1827-D 

17

distribution of her trust funds until he was successful at 

obtaining his attorney's fees."

¶26 We pause to remark briefly on Attorney Carter's claim 

that at his age (he was born in 1943), a three-year suspension——

which will require him to petition this court for reinstatement 

under SCR 22.28(3)——might effectively end his career. Attorney 

Carter generally maintains that it is sad for an otherwise 

untarnished career to potentially end this way. We agree with 

this sentiment: this is an unfortunate case involving anomalous 

behavior from an otherwise ethical lawyer, and we do not relish 

deciding it. But we decline to transform this sentiment into 

anything more than what it is——a sentiment, not a principle of 

law. This court cannot countenance a rule that would soft-pedal 

the discipline owed to attorneys who lie to and misappropriate 

funds from their clients so long as they do so in the twilight 

of their careers.

¶27 No restitution was sought and none is ordered in this 

proceeding. We note, however, that any attorney petitioning for 

reinstatement from a disciplinary suspension of six months or 

more is required to allege and demonstrate that the attorney 

"has made restitution to or settled all claims of persons 

injured or harmed by [the attorney's] misconduct . . . or, if 

not, the [attorney's] explanation of the failure or inability to 

do so." SCR 22.29(4m).

¶28 We agree with the referee's recommendation that 

Attorney Carter be required to pay the costs of this proceeding, 

which total $6,680.62 as of September 24, 2014.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

18

¶29 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John J. Carter to 

practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of three 

years, effective January 11, 2015.

¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, John J. Carter shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.

¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John J. Carter shall comply 

with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 

person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended.

¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.29(4)(c).

¶33 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, 

J., did not participate.
No. 2012AP1827-D 

1