14-908 

Lin v. Lynch

BIA 

Cheng, IJ 

A200 748 222

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

1st day of February, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

DENNIS JACOBS,

PETER W. HALL, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

FENG LIN, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 14-908 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, New 

York. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Melissa 

Neiman-Kelting, Senior Litigation 
2

Counsel; Anthony J. Messuri, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Feng Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of a March 6, 2014, decision 

of the BIA affirming a May 24, 2012, decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Feng Lin, No. A200 748 222 (B.I.A. Mar. 6, 2014), 

aff’g No. A200 748 222 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 24, 2012). We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s decision “for the sake of 

completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 

2008). The applicable standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin 
3

Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Lin does not 

challenge the finding that his asylum application was untimely 

or the agency’s denial of CAT relief; accordingly we review the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination only as it relates 

to Lin’s application for withholding of removal. 

 For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, such 

as Lin’s, the agency may, considering the totality of the 

circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum 

applicant’s “demeanor, candor or responsiveness,” the 

plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his 

statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of 

the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu 

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). We “defer 

to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality 

of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 

534 F.3d at 167. 

 Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that 

Lin’s claim that he was persecuted on account of his Christian 

faith was not credible. In so finding the IJ relied on Lin’s 

internally inconsistent testimony, inconsistencies between his 
4

testimony and his documentary evidence, and Lin’s demeanor when 

testifying. Lin originally testified that he was baptized 

around Easter, in April 2011, but when confronted with his 

baptism certificate, he confirmed that he was baptized in 

October of that year. Further, his explanation for failing to 

remember changed: he first stated that he could not remember 

the date because he was experiencing a good deal of stress in 

the United States; he later testified that he intentionally did 

not remember his baptism date because he felt that baptism was 

just a ritual. 

 Lin’s testimony also conflicted with his evidence. He 

testified that he was hospitalized after he was released from 

detention in China and that a doctor issued a certificate saying 

that he had soft tissue contusions. However, he omitted this 

entirely from his asylum application, and his parents did not 

mention either his hospitalization or their search for the 

hospital certificate in the letter they wrote in support of 

Lin’s application. Further, Lin testified that his parents 

paid a fine upon his release from detention, but the fine receipt 

he submitted lists Lin himself as the payer. 
5

 A finding concerning a party’s demeanor is 

“paradigmatically the sort of evidence that a fact-finder is 

best positioned to evaluate.” Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 

140 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we give an IJ’s demeanor 

finding “particular deference.” Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the record 

supports the specific example the IJ cited in making that 

finding – Lin’s long pause followed by a failure to answer a 

question regarding his baptism. 

 The totality of the circumstances support the agency’s 

adverse credibility determination. Because Lin’s claim for 

withholding of removal depends upon his credibility, the 

finding that he is not credible is dispositive of his petition. 

Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2010). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk