No. 2-- 06--0485 Fil ed: 2-13-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF ILLINOIS, ) o f Ka ne Co un t y. ) Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 05-- CM--2556 ) CHARL ES E. ROBINSON, ) Ho no r ab le ) Jam es C. Hal lock, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

________________________________________ _____ ___________________________________ _ MODIFIED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JU STI CEO' MA

LL EY de l i v ered th e op i ni on of th e c our t: Fo llowing a b en

ch trial i n th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Kan e C oun ty , de f en da n t, Charl es E. Ro binson, was found gui

lty of domestic ba

tt ery (720 I LCS 5/12-- 3.2 (a) (2) (Wes t 200 4)) an d s en ten ce d to a two-y ear term of condi

tional dis charge. He argues on appea l that hi s convi ction was b ased o n impr o pe r ly

adm itted hearsay

and that th e S tate f ai l ed to prov e h

i s g ui l t b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t. We affir m. The record o n appeal

con tai ns a b y sta nd er' s rep ort of

the bench trial , at which the sole wi tness was Lyle Net t les, t he A

urora pol i ce of f i cer w h o ar re ste d def en da n t. Ne t t les t es t ified t ha t o n Ap r il 30, 20 05 , he wa s d isp at ch ed t o an ap ar t men t in Au r o r a in r es po nse t o a r ep o r t o f a d o mes t ic dist ur bance . Whe n he ar rived , he spo ke w ith T ra visa Co nner , w ho w as c rying and app ear ed t o be very upset. Nett le s obs erv

ed tha t a h ol e h ad be en pun ch ed i n on e of the walls of the apartmen

t. HeNo. 2-- 06--0485

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also saw a sh attered m i rror and br

o ken g lass fro m a sliding do or . B loo d wa s sp at t er ed in t he ap ar tmen t. Net t les enco unt er ed d efenda nt at t he ap ar t men t . De fen da nt "w as irr at io na l, was y elli ng, scr eaming and a ct ingou t of c ont ro l." I n add itio n, d efenda nt 's right han d was bl eedi ng he avi ly . He was taken to t he h

ospital , where he was treated for a brokenhan d. Nett le s asked Conn

er what had happen ed. Nettl es testif

i ed, o ve r def endan t's h ears ay obj ection, tha

t Conn er res ponde d, "[M ]y boyf rien d punch ed me in the cheek area , Mr. Rob i

ns on i s m y boy f ri end, m y boy f ri end f l i pped out." Nettles di d n o t o bs er ve an y i n juries t o C onne r. Co nner re fused t o s ign a co mplaint, and no pho t og ra phs of he r w er e t ake n. Al though Conner was

under sub

poena to appear at trial , she f ai le d to do s o. Defend ant argues that Conner 's out- of -c our t sta tem en t to Ne ttl es wa s h ea rs ay an d th at, contrar y to the tr ial

cour t's rulin

g, t he statement was not admiss ib leunder the "exci ted utt erance" exce ption t o t he hea rsa y rule. Defend ant alte rna t ively argu es t hat re gar dless o f whet her t he st at ement wa s a dm i ss i b l e, th e S tate

f ai l ed to prov e h

i s g ui l t b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t. I t ca nno t be ga insa id t ha t Co nne r 's s t at eme nt t o Ne t t les wa s he ar sa y. " He ar sa y evid en ce is an out-of -cou rt s ta t eme nt o ffer ed t o pr o ve t he t rut h o f t he mat t er as se r t ed , an d is ge ne r ally in admissible un

less i t fall s withi n a recognized exception." Peo ple v. Clout ie r , 178 Ill . 2d 141, 154 (1997 ). At is sue here is whether the ev ide nce was adm is si ble under the "exc i ted utter an ce " exc ep ti on to the hearsay

rule. A s thi s court has recently noted: "Thr ee fac t or s have be en

de em ed ne ce ss ary

to l ay the f oun da ti on f or th e adm

i ss i on of a statement under

the exci ted utt erance ex

ception to the hearsay

rule. [Ci tation.] They are: (1 ) a n oc cur re nce s ufficiently st ar t ling to pr od uce a sp ont aneo us a nd unr eflect ing sta tem en t; (2) an abs ence of

tim e to fabricate; and (3) a relation of the sta tem en t to th eNo. 2-- 06--0485

-3-

ci rcumstances of the occu

rren ce. [Ci tation .] In

de t er mining wh et he ra h ea r sa y st at eme nt is ad miss ible und

er this ex cepti on, courtsuse

a total i ty of the c i rcum stan ces anal y si s. [Ci tation .] 'T his anal ys is in volv es the consideration of se

veral fact or s, includ ing t ime, "t he nat ur e o f the ev en t, the me ntal a nd phy si cal co ndi ti onof

the de cl ara nt, an d the p res en

ceor ab senc e of sel f -i ntere st." ' [Citations.] No one factor is determi native, as each case m

ust rest on

i ts own facts. [ Cit at io n .] W

h eth er a statement qual

if ie s as an exci ted utt erance is wi

thin the trial cour t's discretion." Peo ple v. Gwinn , 366 Il l . Ap p. 3d 50 1, 517 ( 2006) . The rationale f

or ad mi tt in g an exci ted ut terance has been expl ain ed as foll ows:

" 'The ad m i ss i bi l i ty of su ch ex cla mat io n is based on our experi ence that, under certain

external ci rcumstances of p hysical or menta l shoc k, a st re ss o f nervo us e xcite ment may be produced in a s pe cta torwh ich st ills t he r eflect ive facult ies and re moves t heir co nt ro l, so t hat t he utt erance wh

ic h then occ ur s is a sp on tan eou s a n d s i n cerere sp on se

to t he ac t ual se nsat ions and perceptions al

ready produced

by t he ex t er na l sho ck . Sin ce t his u t t er an ce is ma de under t he imm ediat e and unco nt ro lled do minatio n of t he sense s, r at her t han r eas on a nd r eflect ion, and du r in g t he br ief per iod when c ons ider at ion o f self-inte re st co uld no t have be en f ull y bro ught to bear, the utterance may be taken as

expressi ng the real

bel ie f of th e s pe aker as to t he fact s just obs er ved by him.' " Peo ple v. Dam en , 28 Ill . 2d 464, 471 (1963), quot in g Kee fe
v . Sta te , 50 A riz. 293 , 297-9 8, 72 P.2 d 425, 4 27 (19 37). "[T ]he trial

court 's ev

ide ntiary ruli ng m ay not be reversed ab sent an abuse of discretion." Peo ple v. Ri ch ardson, 348 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 79 6, 801 ( 2004) . Defend ant ar gue s t hat a pu nch in the f ace that ca use d no ph

y sical i nj ury is no t a s uffic ien t ly st ar t ling event to pro duce a spont aneous, unr ef l ecti ng s tatem en t. Def endan t al so con tend s tha t thereNo. 2-- 06--0485

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wa s no ev ide nc e o f ho w mu ch t ime el apsed f rom when Conner was pun

ched to when sh

e m ade her statement. Thus, def

endan t argues that the Stat e di d not establish the ab sence of tim e to fabricate. In addi tion, def endan t mai ntain s that in order t o admi

t a stat emen

t as an exc ited ut t er ance , t he st ar t ling occurrence that produced t he statemen t must be corroborat ed

by in dependen t evide nce. See People v . Leon

ard , 83 Il l . 2d 411 , 418 (1 980). The Sta te res pon ds , i n pa rt, th at th e star tli n g ev en t was not li

mi ted to the punch

itsel f, b ut compri sed

defend ant 's o ngo ing violent ou t bur st . We agr ee. Net t les o bser ved firs t hand t he ap par ent re su l ts o f t he o ut bu r st : a ho le punc hed in a wall, b roken glas s, spattered blood, and defe ndan t's own bleeding ha

nd. Nettle s al

so obs erved de f

endan t "y el l i ng, s crea m i ng a nd a cti ng out of control ." Defend ant 's out burst qualif ie s as a startli

ng occurrencef

or purposes of the exci

ted utt erance exce pt ion. The trial court could reasonably conclude that t he out burst was suffi cien t t o pr oduce "a stress of ne rvo us e xcite ment" t hat wo uld inh ibi t Co nner 's "r eflect ive facult ies." Given Co nner 's em ot iona l stat e, t he trial court co uld also reasonabl y c oncl ude that she wasunder the i nf lue nce of tha t stress when

she s poke to Nettles and that sh e therefore lacked tim

e to fabricate. Th e th i rd f ac torof th e te st f or th e adm i ss i b i l i ty of a statemen

t as an exc ited utterance l ooks to t he r ela t io nsh ip bet wee n t he st at ement and t he st ar t ling ev en t th at is c l ai

med to h av e p rod uc ed i t. Even th oug h Con n er di d n ot s tate precis el y w hen defen dant punch

ed her, her stateme

nt--when taken as a who le and view ed in light of t he su rr ou nding cir cumst ance s-- st ro ngly im plies t hat defend ant punch ed he rco nt emp o r an eo us ly

wit h his ou t bur st . We believe t hat defend ant 's o ut bur st and C onne r's st at ement are suf

fi ci ently connected

t o e st ablish the rel

ati ons hi p c onte m pl ate d by the thi rd f ac tor of the test , but we also re emphas ize t hat no si ngl e f actor i s determ

i na tiv e. Gwinn , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 517. The element s o f the t est "ar e t ake n as a w ho le , not as i n di v i du al pr ec on di ti on s n ec es sa ry toNo. 2-- 06--0485

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establ i sh the existen

ce of the h ears ay ex cepti on." (E m phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Pe opl e v . Sm i th , 15 2 I ll. 2d 229, 260 (1992). Lo oking a t t he ev ide nce as a whole , we concl

ude that the tr ia

l c ourt acted wi th i n i ts d i scre ti on i n ad m i tti n g C on n er ' s state men t. The remai ni ng i ssuei s w

h eth er th e S tate prov ed de f en da n t gui l ty b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t. Wh en a defe ndan t challe ngesthe s uf f i ciency of the ev i den ce, " 'the relevan

t question i s whether, af

ter viewing th e ev i den ce

i n th e l i gh t m ost f av ora b l e to the prosecu

tion , any rational t r ier o f fac t co uld have f ound th e es sen tia l elem en ts of th e cri me b ey ond a reas onab l e doubt.' " (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Pe o ple v. C ollins , 106 Ill . 2d 237, 261 (1985), quo ting Ja ck so n v. Vir gin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S . Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Defenda nt fi rst contends that ba t t er y is a sp ec ific intent crim

e and that the evi

dence doe s n ot es tab l i sh th at h e acte d w i th th e req ui si te intent in str iking Conn er. Ac co r di ng t o de fe nd an t , it is mo r e lik ely t ha t an y b low h e struck was an acci dent that o cc ur r ed wh ile his be ha vio rwa s o ut o f co nt r o l. I nit iall y, a f

ew rem arks a re i n or de r on de fen da nt 's c ha r ac t er iza t io n o f ba t t er y as a s pe cific intent cr ime. As de fendant co rr ect ly obser ves, t his co ur t has r efer re d t o ba t t er y and aggravated ba ttery as s peci f i c i nten t cri mes on a n um ber of occ asi

ons. Se e People v. Tro ss , 281 Ill . App. 3d 146, 150 (19 96) ; Pe o ple v. Ru ss ell , 234 Ill . App. 3d 6 84, 688 (19 92) ; Pe o ple v. Sa t t er field , 19 5 I ll. App. 3d 1 087 , 10 95 ( 199 0); People v . Baczkowski , 180 I ll . App . 3d 17, 21 ( 198 9); Peo ple v. Leon ard , 171 Ill. App. 3d 3 80, 390 (19 88) ; Peop l e v . Ta y l or , 139 Ill . App. 3d 779, 782 (1985). On t he ot her han

d, several report ed deci si ons f

rom other appell

ate di s t rict s su gge st t hat bat t er y and aggravated

battery do not require proof of a speci fi c i ntent. See Pe o ple v. R

odgers , 335 Ill . App. 3d 429, 433 (20 02) ; Peo ple v. Burrage , 269 Ill . App. 3d 67, 73 (19 94) ; People v . Brown , 250 Ill . App.No. 2-- 06--0485

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3d 767, 772 (19 93) ; Peop l e v . F ox , 11 4 Ill. App. 3d 5 93, 596 (19 83) ; Peo ple v. Hancock , 83 Ill . App. 3d 700 , 704 (1 980). The confl ict among these dec is ions

ma y ref le ct inc onsi stency

in what co ur t s mean by

"s pe cific in tent"--a concept t hat the General Asse mbly tried to eli

mi nate when

it ena cted the Crim

in al Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/1--1 et seq. (2004)) (see Peop l e v . Bu rton , 201 Ill . App. 3d 116, 128 (1990) ( St eig man n, J. , co nc ur r ing in p ar t an d d iss en t ing in p ar t ) ) an d t ha t ha s be en ca lled an "a r ch aic re l i c[ ], pur

por ti n g to convey m

eani ng, but in f

act co nvey

in g none" ( Bu

rton , 201 Ill . App. 3d at 129 (1990) (St ei

gm an n , J ., c on cu

rri n g i n pa rt and diss e n

ti n g i n pa rt)) . Th e te rm i s s om eti mes us ed to refer si m pl y to a me ntal state of knowl edge

or in tent. Tha t app ear s t o be t he way t his co ur t use d t he term in Sa t t er field and Tay

l or . Under another vi

ew, "sp ecific intent " has e ssent ially t he sa me meaning as " int ent." Compare Peo ple v. Gar land , 25 4 I l l . A pp . 3d 82 7, 8 32 (1 99 3) (" Sp ec i f i c i n ten t ex i sts wh erefrom

the ci rcumstances t he o ffen de rmus t ha ve su bje ct ive ly de si re d th e p roh i b i ted re su l t") wi th 720 ILCS 5/4--4(West 20 04 ) (" A pers on i n ten ds , or a cts i n ten ti on al l y or w i th i n ten t, to accomplish a resul t o r engage i

n conduct describe d b y t he statute defi ni ng the off

ense, wh en h is conscious objec t iveor purpo se i s to accomplish that resul t o r engage i

n that conduct"). Unde r this v i ew, a general intent exist s whe n a pr ohibit ed r esu lt may re aso nably beexpectedt o fo llow fro m the defend ant 's v ol

un tar y act, a n d a gen eral i n ten t cr i me does n ot h av e a n y pa rti cul ar men tal sta te as an ess en tia l elem en t. Gar land , 254 Ill . App. 3d at 832. Un fo r t un at ely, these us ag esare out of step with the way the ter m "speci fi c in tent" has most co mmo nly

be en us ed in

Am erica n l aw: "to designa

te a specia l m ental el em ent whi ch i s requi red abo ve and bey ond any me ntal st at e r eq uir ed wit h r es pe ct t o t he ac t us r eu s o f t he cr ime ." (Em phasi s ad ded.) 1 W. LaF ave, Substantive

Crim in al Law §5.2(e), at 354 (2003). For exampl e, "comm on la wbur glaryNo. 2-- 06--0485

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requires a breaki ng a nd entry i n to th e d we l l i n g of an oth er , but i

n addi ti on to th e m

en tal sta te connected

wit h t he se ac t s it m

us t al so b e e sta b l i sh ed th at th e def en da n t acted ' wi th int en t t o co mmit a felony t her ein.' " 1 W. La Fave, Su bst ant ive Criminal Law § 5. 2( e) , a t 354 (2 003 ). At lea st one I llino is decisi

on expresses asi

mi la r view. See People v. Verkru yss e , 261 Ill . App. 3d 972, 975 (1994) ( "G en er ally, sp ec ific int en t is ma de up of two elem

ents: the cri

mi nal defen dant mus t have (1) i

ntended to engage in cert ain act s t hat co nst itu t e t he actus reus and (2) perform ed those acts with an

in tended cri m i na l resu l t"). Our cas es r efer ring t o ba t t er y as a sp ecific intent cr ime are correct in sofar as they

hold that a knowin g or intentional

act i s req ui red. Howe

ver, i t is pref erab l e to reserve

the term "s pe ci f i c i n ten t" f orcr imes t ha t do no t r eq ui r e me r ely a k now i ng or in tentional act but that r equi

re proo f of

an addi tional special men tal el em en t. Ba ttery , as ch arg ed he re, doe s n ot fi t t hi s descri

ption. The actus reus of t he cr ime is "mak[ing] physical co nt act of a n insulting or provoki ng n ature wi th an i ndi vi dual," a nd the me ntal e le me nt of the off

ense i s that the offen

der performe d the actus reus kn o win gl y o r int en t io na lly. 720 IL CS 5/1 2--3(a )(2) (W est 200 4). The re is no a ddit ional sp ecial ment al element required. Th ere f

ore, ba ttery pre dica ted on phy si cal con tac t of an i ns ul tin g or provoki

ng n aturei s n ot a "s peci f i c i nten t cri me" accordi

ng to the stan dard u sag e of

the term. Regardless of w het her one calls bat t er y a spe cific int ent crim e o r a general

in tent crim e, however, the crim

in ality of def endan t's conduct depe nd s on

whether h

e acte d kn

owi ngl y or int en t io na lly, or whetherhi s conduct was acc ident al. D et er mini ng whe t her t he co nduc t was kno wing or i n ten ti on al, or was

ac ci den tal, w as th e res ponsi b i l i ty of th e tr i er of f act. In su ppor t of the arg um en t tha t he stru ck Con ne r ac ci denta l l y , de f en da nt n ot es the l ac k of evi dence that Conner

suf fered an y i nj ury. He poi

nts out t hat he used great f orce when

punc hing t heNo. 2-- 06--0485

1 We note tha

t therewas ar guab l

y som e i nde pen den t corroborati

ve evi den ce to sup port defend ant 's co nvictio n. Nettles testif ie d that d efendan

t was "irrat ional " and his hand b loody. These obs er vat ions ar e co nsist ent wit h Co nner 's hear say st at ement . H ow ever , e ven as suming this evi dence doe s n ot ad d cre den ce

to Co n n er ' s state men t, w e n ev er th el es s rej ect de f

en da n t' s a rgum en t. -8- wa ll, the m

i rr or, an d th

e g l as s d oor, an d h e a ss er ts th at h e w oul d l i ke l y h av e u se d c om

mensu ra te for ce a gainst Co nner , ha d he actuall y pun ched h er. This is a po ss ible in

feren ce from the evi dence, buti t is no m ore than t ha t . T he t r ial c o ur t co uld r at io na lly co nc lud e t ha t de fen da nt ac t ed kn o win gly or intentionally

, but was ab l e to re sist u si ng the sa me a m oun t of force agai

nst Conner that he us ed ag ai n st i n an i mate ob j ects i n th e a pa rtm en t. Citing Jones v . Uni

ted St ates , 23 1 F . 2d 24 4 ( D. C. Cir . 19 56 ) , de fen da nt ar gu es t ha t his con vi cti on ma y n ot be sustaine d based s olel y on a n out -of-co urt st atemen

t admi tt ed as an e

xci ted utt erance. 1 In Jones , t he defen dant was c onvi cted of tak ing indece nt libert ies wit h a child. The con vi cti on rested upon hearsay

statements b

y the chi ld to her m

ot her that she h

ad been molest ed by a man i n th e l au n dr y room of th e b ui l di n g w h ere sh e res i de d. Th e state men ts were not cor roborat ed by ev ide nc e o f bo dily inju r y o r an y o ther physi cal evi dence. The Jones co ur t ru led t hat t he stat emen ts, al though properly

adm itted, were not suff

ic ie nt to establ

is h the corpus de l i cti . The

court noted that t he ex

ception to the hearsay

rule f or spontaneous stat em

ents or dec la rations "h

as co mmo nly

been applie d only

where there has been

in dependen t evide nceof an exci

ting even t. " Jones , 231 F.2d at 245, citin

g Brown v. Uni

ted St ates , 152 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The Jones court also cite d it s de cision in Smi th v. Uni ted St ates , 215 F. 2d 6 82 (D.C . Ci r. 1 954 ), w

he re a con vi cti on of t aking inde cent libert ies wit h a child wa s re ver sed . As in Jones , t he co nvictio n in Sm i th was based on t he he arsa

y statem en ts of a chi l d to her m

other. The Sm

i th cou rt c on cl uded th at, un der the f actsNo. 2-- 06--0485

2 Jones als o r eli ed o n another case, Di ckey v . Sta te , 147 Tex. Crim. 588, 183 S.W.2d 469 (1944 ), in which the court approved hearsay evi dence of a chi ld' s statemen

t t hat " 'a m

an pl ay ed wi th her' " but nev

ertheles s reversed the de fen dant's convi

ction be cause, accordin

g to the Jones cou

rt, "the re was nothing shown to pr ove the mi streat men t o f the chi

ld." Jones , 231 F .2d at 24 6. Howev er, t he co ur t in Dic

key did not rest it s d ec isio n o n an y re qu ire ment o f pr o o f o f co r pu s d elic t i i

n a ddi ti on to a hearsay

st at ement but , r at her , o n t he pr op os itio n t hat "t he t est imony *** [w as] so indefinite a nd un ce r t ain t hat it [ did] not re move e ver y reas ona ble do ubt save t hat [t he de fendant ] fo nd le d [ t he all eged victim

]." Dic key , 147 Tex. Crim. at 590, 183 S .W.2d at 470. -9- presented, the statement was n ot spontaneous. Not abl

y, h owever, the Sm

i th cou rt di d n ot mer ely
r ev er se t he co nvic t io n, bu t als o r ema nd ed t he ca se fo ra n ew t r ial. Al thoughthe Jones court i

ndi cated th at the chi l d's adm i ssi bl e statem en ts were insufficientto establi sh the cor pu s del i cti, t he court reste d i

ts dec i sion m

ai nl y on two dec i sions- - Brownand Sm i th
-- wh erethe statements were ina dmis sible . 2 Ind eed, as the Jones court appears to have drawn a n anal ogy wit h Brownbased on the absence i n each caseof i

ndepen dent evi dence of th e star tli n g ev en t, it i s puzzl i n g th at Jones f ound th at the chi l d's statem en ts were , i n f act, adm i ssi bl e. Nei ther Brownnor Sm i th addressed the question of whether statements properly adm itted as exci

ted utt erances c an establi sh the cor pu s del i cti . Inasm

uch as Jones relies on tho se cases i n support of its hol

din g, we do not f i nd i ts reas oni ng to b e pers

uas i ve . Jones is also co nt ra ry t o mo re re cent au th ori ty re ject ing t he prop osi ti on that "a crim

in al convi ction, secured ex

cl usi vel y on the basis of ev

ide nce adm itted pur sua nt t o a hear say exce pt ion, can ne ver be affirmed in t he absen ce of inde pend ent co rr obo ra t ing evidence." Williams v . Sta te , 7 14 S o. 2d 4 62, 466 (Fla. App. 199 7) (su st aining co nvictio ns basedNo. 2-- 06--0485

-10-

on out- of -c our t sta tem en ts adm itted as exci ted utt erances e

ven though the decl arants' testim ony a t tria l contrad i cted those s tatem

en ts). Co nner 's statement was properly adm itted a s a n e xc it ed utter ance, an d that stat em

ent was suf fi ci ent to est abl

is h the cor pu s del i cti and s ust ain defend ant 's co nvictio n. For the foregoing reas ons, the judgm ent of the ci

rcuit court o f K

ane County

is aff irm ed. Af fi rmed. BYR NE, P.J., a

nd G ROMETER, J., c oncu

r.