DAN MORALES 

ATTORNEY GENERAI. 

QBffice of ttp !ZWmtep QBeneral 

&ate of ?Itexae 

January 341992 

Honorable Bill Turner 

Braxos County District Attorney 

300 East 26th Street, Suite 310 

Bryan Texas 77803 

Opinion No. DM-79 

Re: Whether a juvenile board created 

pursuant to chapter 152 of the Human 

Resources Code has the power to hire 

and discharge employees of a juvenile 

probation department after it has 

employed a chief juvenile probation 

officer (RQ-136) 

Dear Mr. Turner: 

You have asked whether the Braxos County Juvenile Board (the “juvenile 

board”) has the authority to hire and discharge employees of the Brazes County 

Juvenile Probation Department (the “juvenile probation department”) after the 

juvenile board has employed a chief juvenile probation officer. As we understand 

your request, your concern is whether juvenile probation department personnel 

decisions, including hiring and firing of subordinate employees, are solely within the 

authority of the chief juvenile probation officer, or whether the juvenile board has 

the authority to exercise control over these decisions. 

The juvenile board was created under chapter 152 of the Human Resources 

Code.’ Section 152.0007 of subchapter A of that chapter, which defines the duties of 

the juvenile board, provides: 

The juvenile board shalh 

(1) establish a juvenile probation department and employ 

personnel to conduct probation services, including a chief 

probation officer and, if more than one officer is necessary, 

‘Chapter 152 of the Human Resources Code was enacted as part of legislation recodi&iq the 

juvenile board provisions. See Acts 1989,71st Lq., ch. 352,s 6, at 1430. 

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assistant offkers, who meet the standards set by the Texas 

Juvenile Probation Commission; and 

(2) operate or supervise juvenile services in the county and 

make recommendations as to the need for and purchase of 

services. 

Hum. Res. Code 9 152.0007. Section 152.0008 provides: 

(a) The chief juvenile probation officer may appoint 

necessary personnel with the approval of the board. 

(b) Juvenile probation officers serve at the pleasure of the 

appointing authority. 

Id. 9 152.0008. In addition, section 152.0271, which applies solely to the Brazes 

County Juvenile Board, provides in pertinent part that “[t]he chief juvenile 

probation officer may set the salaries and allowances of juvenile probation 

personnel with the approval of the board.” Id. $ 152.0271(e). 

You suggest that these provisions may conflict. Specifically, you contend that 

whereas section 152.0007( 1) appears to vest the juvenile board with the authority to 

hire juvenile probation department personnel, sections 152.0008 and 152.0271(e) 

appear to vest authority over personnel matters with the chief juvenile probation 

officer. You state that under this statutory scheme, “it is not clear whether the 

board or chief probation officer is required to employ other members of the 

department, or if that duty may vary at the juvenile board’s discretion.” We consider 

the authority to hire and fire juvenile probation department personnel separately 

below. 

As noted above, section 152.0007(l) vests the juvenile board with the duty to 

establish a juvenile probation department and employ personnel, including assistant 

juvenile probation officers and other employees, but section 152.0008(a) vests the 

chief juvenile probation officer with the authority to “appoint necessary personnel 

with the approval of the board.” We believe that section 152.0008(a) delegates to 

the chief juvenile probation officer the authority to interview and select applicants, 

and to hire assistant juvenile probation officers and other employees subject to the 

juvenile board’s approval. Thus, the juvenile board’s authority with respect to hiring 

of personnel is limited to approving or rejecting the chief juvenile probation officer’s 

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hiring decisions. We believe that this interpretation of section 152.0008(a) does not 

conflict with section 152.0007(l) because the term “to employ” in the latter provision 

does not necessarily mean to hire, but may simply mean to provide compensation2 

Subchapter A of chapter 152 is even less straightforward with respect to the 

authority to terminate assistant juvenile probation officers and other employees. 

The critical question in interpreting subchapter A in this respect is the meaning of 

“appointing authority” in section 152.0008(b), which provides that “uluvenile 

probation officers serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.” Section 

152.0008(a) suggests that the chief juvenile probation officer is the “appointing 

authority” for all personnel. The predecessor statute for the Brazes County Juvenile 

Board, section 8(a) of former article 5139EEEEE,s however, provided as follows: 

The director of juvenile services may appoint necessary 

personnel and set their salaries and allowances with the 

approval of the board. The director and other juvenile probation 

officers serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. 

(Emphasis added.) 

We conclude from the language highlighted above that under former section 8(a), 

the “appointing authority” was the juvenile board rather than the director of juvenile 

services, because the legislature obviously did not intend the director to serve at his 

own pleasure. 

In the current statute, section 152.0008, the “chief juvenile probation officer” 

is analogous to “director of juvenile services.” Thus, section S(a) of the predecessor 

statute and section 152.0008(b) would be in conflict if the chief juvenile probation 

officer were held to be the “appointing authority” for purposes of the latter 

*We further note that the predecessor provisions to sections 152.0007 and 152.COO8, sections 7 

and 8 of article 5139EEEEE, V.T.C.S., were enacted as part of the same legislation adopted in 1983. 

See Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 1062, at 5621; see also note 3, infra. Therefore, sections 1.52.ooO7(1) and 

152.0008(a) mast be read in harmony if at all possible. Ciry of Wesf Lake Hills v. Wrsfwood Legal 

Defense Fund, 598 S.W.2d 681,684 (Tex. App.--Waco 1980, no writ). 

3Prior to 1989, each juvenile board was governed by a separate statute. In recodifying the 

juvenile board provisions, the legislature attempted to cull from the many juvenile board provisions the 

characteristics common to all and to recodify them in subchapter A of chapter 152. Acts 1989, 71st 

Leg., ch. 352,s 1, at 1323. Thus, in construing subchapter A as it applies to the Brazes County Juvenile 

Board, we must look to the former statute which governed that particular juvenile board. 

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provision. The implicit definition of “appointing authority” found in former section 

S(a) must control in determining the authority of the Braxos County Juvenile Board 

because chapter 152 was enacted as part of a nonsubstantive recodification of the 

juvenile board provisions, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 352, 8 6. See Johnson v. City of 

Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1989). Therefore, we conclude that the 

juvenile board is the “appointing authority” for purposes of section 152.0008(b), and 

thus has the authority to terminate the chief and assistant juvenile probation 

officers. 

With respect to all other employees, subchapter A is silent regarding the 

delegation of the authority to terminate, as was its predecessor. As noted above, we 

believe section 152.0008(b) expressly authorizes the juvenile board to terminate 

juvenile probation officers. By implication, this procedure does not apply to other 

employees. For this reason, and based on the requirements set forth in section 

152.0008(a) for appointments, we believe that the legislature intended to delegate 

the authority to terminate all other employees to the chief juvenile probation 

officer, subject to the approval of the juvenile board. As with appointments, we 

believe that the juvenile board’s authority with respect to terminating employees 

other than juvenile probation officers is limited to approving or rejecting the chief 

juvenile probation officer’s decisions. 

In sum, in section 152.0008(a) the legislature has delegated to the chief 

juvenile probation officer the authority to appoint personnel, both assistant juvenile 

probation officers and other employees, subject to the approval of the juvenile 

board. Pursuant to section 152.0008(b), the juvenile board has the authority to 

terminate the chief and assistant juvenile probation officers, despite the fact that it 

has hired a chief juvenile probation officer. We also conclude that subsection (b), 

by implication, authorizes the chief juvenile probation officer to terminate all other 

employees, subject to the approval of the juvenile board. 

SUMMARY 

Pursuant to sections 152.0007 and 152.0008 of the Human 

Resources Code, the chief juvenile probation officer of the 

Brazes County Juvenile Probation Department has the authority 

to appoint juvenile probation department personnel, subject to 

the approval of the Brazos County Juvenile Board. The chief 

juvenile probation officer and assistant juvenile probation 

officers serve at the pleasure of the juvenile board, and the 

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juvenile board has the authority to terminate their employment. 

The chief juvenile probation offker has the authority to 

terminate other juvenile probation department employees, 

subject to the approval of the juvenile board. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

WILL PRYOR 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY KELLER 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.) 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RENEA HICKS 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Mary R. Crouter 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 399