SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3650-21 

NOE PEREZ, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

POLICE AND FIREMEN'S 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

 Respondent-Respondent. 

____________________________

Submitted May 1, 2024 – Decided May 15, 2024 

Before Judges Currier and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the 

Treasury, PFRS No. xx5525. 

Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Arthur J. Murray, on the brief). 

Nels J. Lauritzen, Deputy Director, Legal Affairs, 

attorney for respondent (Juliana C. DeAngelis, Legal 

Counsel, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3650-21

 Petitioner Noe Perez injured his toe during a physical struggle with a 

suspect while working as a Camden County Police Department officer on 

September 11, 2016. Perez's application for accidental disability retirement 

benefits (ADRB), pursuant to N.J.S.A 43:16A-7, was denied in an initial 

decision by the Board of Trustees (Board), Police and Firemen's Retirement 

System of New Jersey (PFRSNJ). On further appeal, an Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) concluded Perez "failed to demonstrate that the event which caused 

his disability was undesigned and unexpected" and affirmed the denial. On June 

15, 2022, the Board issued a final administrative determination adopting the 

ALJ's initial decision denying Perez's application for ADRB. Based on our 

careful review of the record and prevailing New Jersey law, we affirm. 

I.

 The parties do not dispute Perez was rendered totally and permanently 

disabled as a result of the injury. Instead, the parties disagree whether the event 

leading to Perez's disability was "undesigned and unexpected" as articulated in 

Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 192 

N.J. 189, 212-13 (2007), and required under N.J.S.A 43:16A-7(a)(1) to qualify 

for ADRB. 
3 A-3650-21

We glean the salient facts from the record developed at the Office of 

Administrative Law (OAL) hearing. Perez testified he began working as an 

officer with the Paterson Police Department in 2005. Throughout his career, 

Perez attended training at the police academy in Paterson as well as the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Academy (the Federal Academy). In 2013, Perez 

transferred to the Camden County Police Department (CCPD) and was assigned 

to the Metro Division—Neighborhood Response Team. 

 Perez testified at the time he joined the CCPD, law enforcement in 

Camden County was experiencing an increase in problems stemming from drug 

use within the city, specifically the use of marijuana or tobacco cigarettes dipped 

in phencyclidine (PCP) referred to as "wet." When asked if there were any other 

issues facing Camden County at that time, Perez responded: 

 Many. High drug. It was—PCP was big. It was 

so bad, you could smell PCP. We learned about the 

superpowers that these guys would get under that 

influence. There's no—pain compliance is big. If you 

don't have pain compliance when you're trying to 

subdue the subject, I mean, you can get knocked out 

and anything could happen. 

Perez explained he first learned of pain compliance at the Federal 

Academy. Using this method, law enforcement was able to target "pressure 

point[s]" on a suspect in order to "create pain" which would cause the suspect 
4 A-3650-21

to "give in" and allow themselves to be apprehended by officers. However, 

when a suspect is under the influence of drugs, specifically PCP, they are much 

less responsive to pain compliance techniques, which makes them harder to 

subdue. 

On September 11, 2016, Perez was on-duty and the majority of his shift 

had been a "normal day." Toward the end of his shift, Perez noted "it was kind 

of warm and when the weather is good, people tend to just get high in the city 

and use substances." He then heard a call through dispatch that "officers were 

asking for assistance" at a particular location. 

Perez responded to the scene. Once there, he saw the "suspect [was] 

clearly . . . under the influence of 'wet.'" Perez questioned other officers as to 

why the suspect had not yet been apprehended. He felt the other officers may 

have been afraid of the suspect, and he determined he "had to face the beast," 

meaning he would attempt to apprehend the suspect "alone." Though Perez 

noted typically multiple officers would work as a team to subdue a suspect they 

believed to be under the influence of drugs, there was "[n]othing [he] could do" 

to "get into the other officers' bodies and tell them come help." 

After unsuccessfully attempting to verbally calm the suspect, the 

interaction became physical. The suspect "tried to elbow strike" Perez, but Perez 
5 A-3650-21

was "able to gain control and get under him, get under his armpits specifically, 

and try to do a takedown, which was difficult." 

Once the suspect was on the ground, another officer on the scene used a 

taser gun on him. Because Perez was in physical contact with the suspect, he 

also felt the effects of the taser, although the suspect did not respond to the 

tasing. Perez did not find the suspect's failure to respond surprising, because of 

his experience with PCP users not responding to pain in the same manner as 

sober people. 

Perez began "trying to secure [the suspect] as fast as [he] c[ould]." Other 

than an officer tasing the suspect, Perez testified he received no help from other 

officers while he attempted to subdue the suspect. Perez and the suspect 

engaged in a physical struggle on the ground where the suspect continued 

"twisting his body," "resisting" and "pivoting." Perez described the suspect as 

having "the strength of a bull" as "[h]e was throwing his torso, his upper body 

towards [Perez] to put weight and prevent being pinned down." 

At that point, Perez began "trying to use leverage to pin" the suspect which 

he found to be "very challenging." The suspect "reared back and [Perez] had to 

compensate" by using his left leg and foot as leverage to pin the suspect to the 

ground. Despite his prior training and experience, Perez testified he had 
6 A-3650-21

received "no training" and "no preparation" for an interaction of this nature with 

a suspect. 

Perez did not identify the precise moment during his struggle with the 

suspect that his injury occurred. Nor did he present medical reports to 

demonstrate the injury resulted from the force of the suspect's actions. Rather, 

Perez stated he had to extend his leg and exert additional pressure for leverage 

because of the suspect's "movement." 

I was losing control at that moment . . . so I needed 

leverage for that precise moment, to attempt to not—I 

didn't want to reverse this where he had total gain of the 

situation because then I would be out of the fight. He'll 

have control of it. 

Perez testified: "As far as the injury, I can't say whether that was the very 

moment or not." Ultimately, the suspect was subdued, handcuffed, and detained. 

As Perez began stepping away after the altercation was over, he realized he "was 

having a hard time walking" and "couldn't put any pressure whatsoever on [his 

left] foot." 

Perez's toe "sustained a full thickness tear of the medial collateral 

ligament of the first MTP joint, . . . [and] a very prominent partial thickness tear 

of the lateral collateral ligament." He attempted to return to work, but, even 
7 A-3650-21

after treatment, his injury rendered him unable to perform his duties. Because 

there was no opportunity for a reduced assignment, Perez applied for ADRB. 

Detective Eddie Pineiro, who worked for the CCPD for twenty-five years, 

also testified before the ALJ. Pineiro explained officers are trained to determine 

if a suspect is under the influence of drugs and how to apprehend individuals 

with excited delirium or a suspect under the influence of drugs such as PCP. 

Pineiro also testified officers are trained as to how to respond to emotionally 

disturbed people (EDPs). He testified the appropriate practice is to have more 

than one officer apprehend such suspects so the person does not harm themself 

or others. 

After the hearing concluded, the ALJ found Perez had "received training 

on how to handle individuals who resisted arrest or who attempted to flee and 

learned techniques on how to handle and restrain individuals who were bigger, 

stronger, and faster than himself." Further, the ALJ concluded Perez's extensive 

experience as a police officer demonstrated that he was aware suspects could 

"act erratically and violently, exhibit excessive strength and resist being 

detained." 

As to the September 11, 2016 incident, the ALJ found Perez "responded 

to a call for backup assistance for an irate emotionally disturbed male," but it 
8 A-3650-21

was never medically established if the suspect in question was under the 

influence of PCP or other drugs or "whether the suspect's behavior was due 

solely to his mental status and lack of medications for a period of time." The 

ALJ found that upon arriving on the scene, Perez concluded he was going to 

subdue the suspect himself. 

The ALJ summarized the findings of the Board that Perez "met the 

Richardson criteria [to receive ADRB] with one exception—the incident giving 

rise to his disability was not a traumatic event, as it was not undesigned and 

unexpected" because "there was no external force, happening or accident in this 

case." Instead, the ALJ concluded Perez "was injured while restraining a suspect 

by using his body as leverage in accordance with his training and experience." 

Accordingly, the ALJ determined "it was the work of force or work effort by 

[Perez] himself while attempting to leverage his body to secure the suspect that 

caused his injury" so "[t]here was no external force, external happening or 

accident." 

As a result, the ALJ concluded Perez "failed to demonstrate that the event 

which caused his disability was undesigned and unexpected" and recommended 

"that the Board's denial" of Perez's ADRB application be affirmed. The Board 
9 A-3650-21

accepted the ALJ's determination and adopted the entirety of the initial decision. 

This appeal follows. 

II. 

 On appeal, Perez argues the Board was incorrect in determining the 

September 11, 2016 struggle with the suspect was not "undesigned and 

unexpected." Specifically, he asserts his prior training and experience were 

insufficient for him to have anticipated the events that unfolded, especially as 

he subdued the suspect largely without the assistance of other officers. Further, 

Perez contends the Board utilized an impermissibly narrow definition of 

"undesigned and unexpected" in its consideration of his ADRB application. We 

disagree. 

Appellate "review of [an] administrative agency action is limited." Russo 

v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). "[A]gencies 

have 'expertise and superior knowledge . . . in their specialized fields.'" Hemsey 

v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (alteration 

in original) (quoting In re Suspension or Revocation of the License Issued to 

Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006)). "A reviewing court '"may not substitute its 

own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a 
10 A-3650-21

different result.'" In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194-95 (2011) (quoting In re 

Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). 

"[A]n appellate court ordinarily should not disturb an administrative 

agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the 

agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In 

re Application of Virtua-W. Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 

194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). Review of an agency's interpretation of the law is de 

novo. Russo, 206 N.J. at 27. 

III. 

A PFRSNJ member is entitled to ADRB if 

the member is permanently and totally disabled as a 

direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and 

as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned 

duties and that such disability was not the result of the 

member's willful negligence and that such member is

mentally or physically incapacitated for the 

performance of his usual duty and of any other 

available duty in the department which his employer is 

willing to assign to him.

[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1).] 

The Court clarified the factors for our consideration of this analysis in 

Richardson, 192 N.J. at 212-13, providing new guidance to unify the disparate 
11 A-3650-21

tests that had previously been applied to ADRB determinations. Under the 

Richardson standard, in order to qualify for ADRB, an applicant must prove: 

1. [they are] permanently and totally disabled; 

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is 

a. identifiable as to time and place, 

b. undesigned and unexpected, and 

c. caused by a circumstance external to the 

member (not the result of pre-existing disease 

that is aggravated or accelerated by the work); 

3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a 

result of the member's regular or assigned duties; 

4. that the disability was not the result of the member's 

willful negligence; and 

5. that the member is mentally or physically 

incapacitated from performing [their] usual or any other 

duty. 

[Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 

233 N.J. 402, 421 (2018) (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J. 

at 212-13).] 

In Richardson, the Court found the "undesigned and unexpected" prong 

requires either "an unintended external event" or "an unanticipated 

consequence" of an intended event that "is extraordinary or unusual in common 

experience." 192 N.J. at 201 (quoting Russo v. Tchrs' Pension & Annuity Fund, 
12 A-3650-21

62 N.J. 142, 154 (1973)). "Injury by ordinary work effort," when "the employee 

was doing [their] usual work in the usual way" does not qualify. Ibid. (quoting 

Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). In short, "work effort itself . . . cannot be the traumatic 

event." Id. at 211. 

As set forth by the Court in Richardson, the following constitute potential 

undesigned and unexpected events: 

A policeman can be shot while pursuing a 

suspect; a librarian can be hit by a falling bookshelf 

while re-shelving books; a social worker can catch her 

hand in the car door while transporting a child to court. 

Each of those examples is identifiable as to time and 

place; undesigned and unexpected; and not the result of 

pre-existing disease, aggravated or accelerated by the 

work. Thus, each meets the traumatic event standard. 

So long as those members also satisfy the remaining

aspects of the statute, including total and permanent 

disability, they will qualify for accidental disability 

benefits. 

In sum, the fact that a member is injured while 

performing his ordinary duties does not disqualify him 

from receiving accidental disability benefits; some

injuries sustained during ordinary work effort will pass 

muster and others will not. The polestar of the inquiry 

is whether, during the regular performance of his job, 

an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing 

disease alone or in combination with the work, has 

occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and

total disability of the member.

[Id. at 214.] 
13 A-3650-21

In Richardson, a corrections officer was injured while attempting to 

subdue an inmate. Id. at 193. While the officer straddled him, the inmate kicked 

and punched the officer. Ibid. Eventually, the inmate broke free of the officer's 

control. Ibid. The inmate jerked up from the ground and knocked the officer 

backward, injuring him. Ibid. The Court found the officer's injury was caused 

by a "traumatic event" because the event "was (a) identifiable as to time and 

place; (b) unexpected and undesigned; and (c) not caused by a pre-existing 

condition . . . alone or in combination with work effort." Id. at 214-15. See also 

Moran v. Bd. of Trs. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J. Super. 346, 353-55

(App. Div. 2014) (where this court determined a firefighter's injury was caused 

by an "undesigned and unexpected" event because he was in an unusual 

circumstance as there were trapped victims and the team that was supposed to 

handle the situation was delayed); Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps Ret. Sys., 

425 N.J. Super. 277, 279-83 (App. Div. 2012) (reversing the Board's 

determination it was not "undesigned and unexpected" when a school custodian 

injured his shoulder after students dropped a 300-pound bench he was helping 

them carry because it was not part of his regular job duties and the incident was 

without warning). 
14 A-3650-21

We are satisfied the ALJ did not err in distinguishing Perez's 

circumstances from Richardson and its progeny. Perez was trained on how to 

apprehend volatile and unpredictable suspects as part of a core aspect of his job. 

Through his own testimony, Perez recognized prior to September 11, 2016 he 

had experience and training on how to restrain individuals who were under the 

influence of drugs or experiencing a mental health crisis and were actively 

resisting arrest. Further, he testified to previously using the same maneuver to 

lodge his foot against another suspect to gain leverage on a different occasion. 

Under Richardson, an undesigned and unexpected event must either be 

"an unintended external event or . . . "an unanticipated consequence of an 

intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in 

common experience." 192 N.J. at 201 (quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). "Injury 

by ordinary work effort . . . although unexpected by the individual afflicted, is 

not an extraordinary or unusual consequence in common experience." Ibid. 

(quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). 

Perez did not testify to a specific external event or identifiable action by 

the suspect that caused his injury. We conclude Perez has not demonstrated 

there was an undesigned or unexpected traumatic event as required and defined 

under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1) and Richardson. 
15 A-3650-21

We need only briefly address Perez's argument the ALJ adopted an unduly 

narrow view of the "undesigned and unexpected" requirement in determining he 

was trained to subdue suspects under the influence of drugs or otherwise 

experiencing a mental health disturbance. Perez's reliance on Gable v. Board of 

Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, 115 N.J. 212, 223-24 

(1989), for support of his argument is misplaced. 

 Preliminarily, Gable predates the guidance set forth in Richardson and its 

progeny. And, unlike the circumstances in Gable, where the petitioner 

corrections officer was attacked by inmates in three separate occurrences, Perez 

has not explained how a police officer using their own physical force to subdue 

a suspect resisting arrest is unexpected. Rather, Perez testified the environment 

for policing Camden was "a volatile situation" while he was on-duty. We see 

no reason to find the ALJ, and the Board through adopting the decision, applied 

an unduly narrow interpretation of "undesigned and unexpected" when 

rendering the decision to deny Perez's ADRB application. 

Finally, Perez argues his past interactions with suspects who were under 

the influence of drugs or experiencing a mental health crisis were insufficient to 

prove the incident on September 11, 2016 was not undesigned and unexpected. 

Perez is correct the determination of whether an incident is undesigned and 
16 A-3650-21

unexpected cannot be "resolved merely by reviewing the member's job 

description and the scope of his or her training." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427. 

However, he does not proffer any specifics as to how the September 11, 2016 

incident constitutes unusual circumstances or anything beyond the typical 

course of work he was trained to do and regularly performed or that his own 

force in subduing the suspect did not cause the injury. 

Although an incident may be "devastating" to the applicant who has been 

injured, careful review of governing case law sets forth an injury which 

culminated from a "sequence of events" that was not "undesigned and 

unexpected" will not suffice to establish an entitlement to ADRB. Id. at 430-31 

(finding "based on [an experienced hostage negotiator's] training, [petitioner] 

had reason to anticipate that, without prior warning to him, a tactical entry might 

be made," so he had not experienced an "undesigned and unexpected" event 

entitling him to ADRB when the suspect was killed by police while on the phone 

with him). 

We are satisfied the Board's adoption of the ALJ's decision denying 

Perez's application for ADRB was based on the applicable statute and prevailing 

law as applied to the credible evidence in the record. 

Affirmed.