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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION

In re: Case No. 19-15281-EPK

Chapter 7

HANS OTTO ALBERTSSON,

Debtor.

______________________________/

BARCLAY BRELAND 

FAMILY OFFICE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Adv. Proc. No. 19-01619-EPK

HANS OTTO ALBERTSSON,

Defendant.

______________________________/

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This adversary proceeding came before the Court for trial on February 10, 2022, upon 

the complaint [ECF No. 1] filed by Barclay Breland Family Office, LLC against Hans Otto 

Albertson, the debtor in this chapter 7 case. The Court considered the evidence presented at 

trial, the arguments of counsel, and post-trial briefs. The Court finds that Mr. Albertsson 

Erik P. Kimball, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

_____________________________________________________________________________

ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on July 12, 2022.

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knowingly and fraudulently omitted from his sworn schedules two sets of golf clubs and his 

membership in the Winged Foot Golf Club, and will grant the relief requested in Count I, 

denying Mr. Albertsson’s discharge in this case. The Court finds that the plaintiff failed to 

prove it actually relied on the misrepresentations alleged in Counts II and III, seeking 

exception from discharge of the plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Albertsson, and will deny all 

relief requested in those counts. The following constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.

Findings of Fact

Mr. Albertsson first played golf at the age of three. He excelled at the sport and 

received a full ride to Wake Forest University on the Worsham Scholarship, also known as 

the Arnold Palmer Scholarship. He graduated in 1994 and spent the next six years trying to 

make the PGA Tour. In the end, he only made it to the “AAA-baseball equivalent.” He then 

decided to pursue a career in finance.

Golf continued to play a major role in Mr. Albertsson’s life. He used golf to meet 

potential clients and to develop and maintain relationships with existing clients. Mr. 

Albertsson began his career at Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers before moving to UBS in 

2011. 

In 2012, Mr. Albertsson became a member of the Winged Foot Golf Club in 

Westchester County, New York. New members at Winged Foot Golf Club pay a $100,000 

initiation fee. Mr. Albertsson borrowed part of the initiation fee from his friend and client 

John Koo. This was not the only loan Mr. Albertsson obtained from Mr. Koo. Mr. Albertsson 

admitted that FINRA regulations prohibit borrowing money from clients.

Mr. Albertsson maintained his Winged Foot Golf Club membership through trial. 

Yearly dues are $10,000. He did not have the funds to pay the dues himself. For 2020 and 

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2021, a friend paid Mr. Albertsson’s dues. From the record, the identity of this friend is 

unclear. 

In February 2016, Mr. Albertsson left UBS and started working for Crane Capital 

where he earned $40,000 per month. At the same time, he began discussions with Chris Kelly, 

the plaintiff’s principal, about working with the plaintiff. Mr. Albertsson met Mr. Kelly 

through a mutual friend. 

When Mr. Albertsson left UBS, he had substantial debts. He owed roughly $850,000 

to UBS, $1,000,000 to Mr. Koo, $100,000 to Raleigh Rawls, and smaller debts to others, for a 

total of about $2,000,000 in financial obligations.

In May 2016, UBS sent a demand letter to Mr. Albertsson seeking repayment of the 

full amount he owed. Also in May 2016, Mr. Koo demanded repayment from Mr. Albertsson. 

The plaintiff alleges Mr. Koo’s demand included threats that he would report Mr. Albertsson 

to FINRA for improperly borrowing money from a client and for allegedly conducting 

unauthorized trades on Mr. Koo’s account. Mr. Albertsson did not deny that Mr. Koo made 

those threats, but he testified they did not occur until months later in late August or early 

September 2016, after Mr. Albertsson contracted with the plaintiff.

Discussions between Mr. Albertsson and Mr. Kelly eventually led to a June 2016 

consulting agreement between the plaintiff and Mr. Albertsson. As part of the consulting 

agreement, the plaintiff advanced $500,000 to Mr. Albertsson. Mr. Albertsson agreed to repay 

the advance from commissions on capital he would later bring to the plaintiff. Mr. Albertsson 

never brought any business to the plaintiff and never repaid the advance. 

Mr. Kelly testified that Mr. Albertsson requested the $500,000 advance so that Mr. 

Albertsson could pay regular living expenses. Mr. Albertsson testified credibly that he never 

discussed with Mr. Kelly how he would use the loan. Soon after entering into the consulting 

agreement with the plaintiff, by the end of July 2016, Mr. Albertsson used the entire loan to 

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pay $400,000 to Mr. Koo and $100,000 to Mr. Rawls. Mr. Kelly testified the plaintiff would 

not have made the loan if he knew how Mr. Albertsson would use the money. But the plaintiff 

did not meet its burden in convincing the Court that Mr. Albertsson ever said how he would 

use the plaintiff’s advance. 

The plaintiff alleges Mr. Albertsson made false representations in the consulting 

agreement itself. In the agreement, Mr. Albertsson represented that he owed no obligations 

to UBS, that UBS had not threatened litigation, that Mr. Albertsson was not obligated under 

any non-compete or non-disclosure agreements, and that Mr. Albertsson would devote his 

full professional effort to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that each of these representations 

was false when made, and Mr. Kelly testified the plaintiff would not have entered into the 

consulting agreement if it was aware of these facts.

Mr. Albertsson agrees that these representations in the consulting agreement were 

not true when he signed the agreement. He owed substantial obligations to UBS. UBS had 

sent Mr. Albertsson a demand letter threatening litigation against him. He remained subject 

to non-solicitation and non-disclosure agreements with UBS. Mr. Albertsson did not intend 

to and in fact did not devote his full time to the plaintiff’s business as he had obligations to 

another employer. However, Mr. Albertsson testified that Mr. Kelly knew all of this before 

the plaintiff and Mr. Albertsson entered into the consulting agreement. When Mr. Albertsson 

reviewed the proposed agreement, he informed Mr. Kelly of these inaccuracies. Mr. Kelly 

nonetheless encouraged Mr. Albertsson to sign the consulting agreement without any 

changes. The Court found Mr. Albertsson’s testimony credible on these issues. The plaintiff

did not meet its burden of convincing the Court that the plaintiff actually relied on these 

statements as the Court believes Mr. Albertsson’s testimony that Mr. Kelly knew the true 

facts when they signed the agreement. 

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Mr. Kelly testified that the plaintiff would not have entered into the consulting 

agreement if he knew of Mr. Albertsson’s “debt profile.” But Mr. Albertsson never made any

representation, written or otherwise, regarding his financial condition or his liabilities.

Indeed, in the consulting agreement Mr. Albertsson agreed to provide the plaintiff with a 

financial statement, but none was ever provided. The plaintiff could not have relied on such 

a representation because no such representation was made. 

The plaintiff alleges that when Mr. Albertsson entered into the consulting agreement 

he had no present intention to generate business for the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff 

argues that Mr. Albertsson entered into the consulting agreement solely to get the $500,000 

advance and did not intend to perform at all. To the contrary, Mr. Albertsson did try to bring 

in business for the plaintiff. Mr. Albertsson credibly testified that he reached out to and met 

with potential clients in attempts to bring their business to the plaintiff. Unfortunately,

nothing materialized. Mr. Albertsson’s lack of success does not mean he signed the consulting 

agreement under false pretenses.

Mr. Albertsson filed a chapter 7 petition on April 23, 2019. In his schedules of assets 

and liabilities, filed under oath with his bankruptcy petition, Mr. Albertsson omitted two sets 

of golf clubs and his membership in the Winged Foot Golf Club. Under the category labeled 

“Equipment for sports and hobbies,” which specifically includes “golf clubs” among a list of 

examples, Mr. Albertsson listed only “children’s sports equipment (basketball, football, 

baseball) – Owned as Tenants by the Entireties” with a value of $1.00. In response to the 

question “Do you have other property of any kind you did not already list?”, which lists 

“country club membership” among the examples, Mr. Albertsson answered “no”. Mr. 

Albertsson admits he failed to list his two sets of golf clubs and his golf club membership, but 

he contends he never intended to mislead anyone.

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Mr. Albertsson testified that he consulted with counsel about how to properly fill out 

his bankruptcy schedules because he wanted to avoid the situation he now finds himself in. 

Mr. Albertsson admits that he did not discuss with counsel specifically whether to list the 

golf clubs. Instead, he testified that his attorney told him that he needed to list only assets of 

material value. The Court did not find this testimony credible. Although not dispositive, the 

Court notes that Mr. Albertsson provided no independent corroboration that he received such 

advice, advice which would certainly be abhorrent to an experienced bankruptcy practitioner.

Mr. Albertsson’s own schedules undercut his testimony that he relied on legal advice to omit 

non-material items from his schedules. He scheduled several categories of items with a stated 

value of just $1.00, yet failed to list his golf clubs. 

In light of the clear provisions in the schedules themselves, and the fact that Mr. 

Albertsson’s entire professional career has relied on his golf skills, the Court does not believe 

Mr. Albertsson omitted the golf clubs from his schedules for any reason other than to mislead 

creditors and his trustee. It does not matter whether the golf clubs had a value that would 

nonetheless have been exempt from administration in this case. 

Mr. Albertsson testified that he had specific conversations with his counsel regarding 

whether he should schedule his membership in the Winged Foot Golf Club. Mr. Albertsson 

testified that he omitted the membership after discussions with his attorney and 

communications with the club itself because he determined he was a “privilege holder” rather 

than a member of Winged Foot Golf Club and his interest in the club held no value. The Court 

did not find this testimony credible, nor did Mr. Albertsson provide any evidence to 

corroborate his testimony. Whether Mr. Albertsson could sell or transfer his interest in the 

Winged Foot Golf Club is beside the point. The fact that he maintained, at least through trial 

in this adversary proceeding, a membership in an exclusive golf club in a location removed 

from his home in Florida, which membership requires payment of a substantial annual fee, 

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would raise a number of questions for the trustee and other parties in interest. How does Mr. 

Albertsson pay the annual fee and other charges at the club? If someone else pays the annual 

fee, what is their relationship with Mr. Albertsson? How does Mr. Albertsson afford travel to 

the club? In light of the fact that the schedules specifically required Mr. Albertsson to list 

any “country club membership,” the fact that Mr. Albertsson has relied on golf as a source of 

business his entire professional life, and the fact that revealing the Winged Foot Golf Club 

membership likely would have resulted in further investigation of his financial 

circumstances, the Court concludes that Mr. Albertsson omitted the membership from his 

schedules with the intent to deceive. 

Discussion

In Count I of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks an order denying Mr. Albertsson’s 

discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), alleging that he made false oaths in his schedules 

by knowingly and fraudulently omitting the golf clubs and Winged Foot Golf Club 

membership. In Counts II and III of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks an order excepting its 

claim against Mr. Albertsson from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and

523(a)(2)(B), alleging that Mr. Albertsson obtained the $500,000 loan by false representations 

or false pretenses. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on all claims by a preponderance of 

the evidence. 

Section 523(a)(2) Claims

Section 523(a)(2)(A) provides an exception to discharge for debts obtained through 

“false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting 

the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” Here, the plaintiff must show that Mr. 

Albertsson made a knowingly false representation not relating to his financial condition, that 

Mr. Albertsson intended to deceive the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff justifiably relied on 

the false representation. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides 

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an exception to discharge for debts obtained as a result of reasonable reliance on a materially 

false statement in writing regarding the debtor’s financial condition. Here, the plaintiff must 

show that Mr. Albertsson made a false written representation respecting his financial 

condition, that he did so with the intent to deceive, and that the plaintiff reasonably relied

on the false representation. As will be apparent from the Court’s analysis below, the 

distinctions between claims under sections 523(a)(2)(A) and 523(a)(2)(B) are not important 

in this case as the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving either that the alleged 

misrepresentations occurred at all or that the plaintiff actually relied on the alleged 

misrepresentations. 

The plaintiff alleges that it relied on the following representations in the consulting 

agreement:

• Recital C: Consultant [(Mr. Albertsson)] represents he [is] a former employee of UBS INC. 

and warrants that he is under no legal or contractual obligation to UBS or any of its parents, 

subsidiaries or related companies nor is there any litigation threatened or pending as 

between Consultant and UBS. 

• ¶ 1: The Consultant shall devote Consultant’s full business time, attention, efforts, and 

abilities to the Company’s [(Barclay Breland)] business at its Palm Beach Gardens location 

unless assigned elsewhere by its President.

• ¶ 21: The Consultant hereby represents and warrants that ... (d) the Consultant’s services 

hereunder will not conflict with, or result in, a breach of any agreement, understanding, 

order, judgment, or other obligation to which the Consultant is party or by which 

Consultant or Consultant’s property may be bound; and (e) the Consultant is not subject 

to, or bound by, any covenant against competition, confidentiality obligation, or any other 

agreement, or judgment, or other obligation that could conflict with, restrict, or limit the 

performance of the services to be provided by Consultant under this Agreement.

Mr. Albertsson agrees that these statements were false at the time he signed the consulting 

agreement, but testified credibly that the plaintiff knew this was the case and encouraged 

him to sign the agreement anyway. The plaintiff did not meet its burden in proving that it 

actually relied on these statements. 

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The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Albertsson stated he would use the $500,000 loan to pay 

living expenses and that he would bring his book of business with him to the plaintiff. Mr. 

Albertsson testified credibly that he never made these statements. The plaintiff alleges that, 

contrary to his promises in the consulting agreement, Mr. Albertsson did not ever intend to 

perform under the agreement. Mr. Albertsson testified credibly that he did intend to perform 

and detailed his actual attempts to perform. The plaintiff did not meet its burden to prove 

that Mr. Albertsson made any of these alleged misrepresentations. 

The plaintiff alleges that if Mr. Albertsson had disclosed his true “debt profile,” the 

plaintiff would not have made the $500,000 advance. There is no evidence that Mr. 

Albertsson made any representation, written or oral, regarding his “debt profile.” Indeed, 

while the consulting agreement required Mr. Albertsson to deliver a financial statement to 

the plaintiff, the plaintiff never obtained any financial statement from him. The plaintiff did 

not meet its burden to prove that Mr. Albertsson made any misrepresentation about his “debt 

profile.” 

The plaintiff failed to carry its burden on each of its theories for relief under sections

523(a)(2)(A) and 523(a)(2)(B). The Court will enter judgment in favor of Mr. Albertsson on 

Counts II and III. 

Section 727(a)(4)(A) Claim

Section 727(a)(4)(A) provides for denial of discharge to a debtor who knowingly and 

fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in connection with a case. Only material 

false oaths will result in denial of discharge. False oaths are material if they relate to a 

debtor’s financial affairs or the discovery or disposition of property. Chalik v. Moorehead (In 

re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984). Omissions from a debtor’s schedules can result 

in denial of discharge. Swicegood v. Ginn, 924 F.2d 230 (11th Cir. 1991). “Knowingly and 

fraudulently” requires that the debtor knew the statement was false and made it with the 

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intent to deceive. In re Kempff, 847 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2017). A pattern of errors may 

show a reckless disregard for the truth sufficient to support the inference of fraudulent 

intent. In re Retz, 606 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010). Good faith reliance on the advice of 

counsel may prevent a finding of bad intent. In re Zizza, 875 F.3d 728 (1st Cir. 2017). 

Mr. Albertsson admits that he omitted from his schedules two sets of golf clubs and 

his membership in the Winged Foot Golf Club. These are material omissions because their 

disclosure would have resulted in further investigation of his financial affairs. While 

inclusion of the golf clubs and country club membership likely would not have impacted the 

eventual distribution to creditors in this case, “the recalcitrant debtor may not escape a 

section 727(a)(4)(A) denial of discharge by asserting that the admittedly omitted or falsely 

stated information concerned a worthless” asset. In re Chalik, 748 F.2d at 618.

Mr. Albertsson testified that he relied on advice of counsel in omitting his golf clubs 

and country club membership from his schedules. The Court does not find his uncorroborated 

testimony credible. In addition to the other findings above, the Court notes that the lawyer 

who assisted Mr. Albertsson in filing his bankruptcy petition and schedules was not called to 

testify at trial. See In re Katsman, 771 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting failure of 

counsel to testify in support of an advice of counsel defense). 

Under the circumstances of this case, as more fully discussed above in the Court’s 

findings of fact, when Mr. Albertsson failed to disclose two sets golf clubs and his membership 

in an exclusive golf club, he knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths in violation of 

section 727(a)(4)(A). The Court will enter final judgment in favor of the plaintiff on Count I, 

denying Mr. Albertsson’s discharge in this case.

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Conclusion

The plaintiff met its burden of proof on Count I and failed to meet its burden of proof 

on Counts II and III. The Court will grant the relief requested in Count I, deny the relief in 

Counts II and III, and enter separate judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

# # #

Copy to:

All parties of record by the Clerk of Court.

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