1

Filed 12/2/20 P. v. Black CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RANDY D. BLACK,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A157331

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. SCN225591)

A jury convicted appellant Randy D. Black of one count of robbery and 

one count of attempted robbery. On appeal, he argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after a sheriff’s 

deputy disclosed to the jury during deliberations that appellant was being 

housed in a “psych unit.” He also contests the court’s partial denial of his 

motion to strike two prior felony convictions under our “Three Strikes” law. 

We find no merit to these claims and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Offense

On the evening of February 7, 2016, Co Lu left his work in San 

Francisco and walked to a nearby bus stop on Bryant Street. Lu was 

carrying his backpack, which contained no valuables. As he approached the 

bus stop, Lu noticed a man already seated on the bench inside the bus 

shelter. The man was much larger than Lu, who is five feet three inches tall 
2

and weighs around 110 pounds. Lu sat a few seats away and placed his 

backpack on the ground. He took his cell phone from his pocket and began 

checking his messages. At some point, he raised his hand to his face and 

coughed. 

As Lu perused his phone, the larger man suddenly approached and 

started punching him on the head, neck and shoulder. Lu tried to run away 

but fell face down on the sidewalk as the man continued to hit him. While on 

the ground, Lu felt the man reaching for his wallet in his left front pants 

pocket. Lu clasped his own hand over his pocket to maintain control of his 

wallet as he struggled to get up. The man managed to remove from Lu’s rear 

pockets some small pieces of paper, which he threw to the ground. 

Douglas Daily was driving down Bryant Street when he saw the attack 

in progress. Daily honked his horn while his passenger yelled out and 

motioned for Lu to get in the car. Lu ran to the car and got inside. The 

attacker picked up Lu’s backpack and swung it at the car, leaving a large 

dent. The assailant then opened the backpack and dumped everything on the 

ground. Daily drove off while his passenger called 911. As he made a 

U-turn, he saw the attacker strike another man who then ran away. 

Officer George Tano was dispatched to the crime scene. Another

witness pointed out the suspect, who was later identified as appellant. A 

video of the incident captured by a nearby surveillance camera was played for 

the jury. Lu later recovered his backpack and the papers taken from his 

pockets. 

Following the incident, appellant was charged in a second amended 

information with second degree robbery (Pen. Code,

1 § 211; count one), 

attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211; count two), assault with force 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts three and four), 

and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A).) The information also 

alleged that appellant was ineligible for probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), that 

he had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) &(e), 1170.12, 

subd. (c)), and that he had two serious prior felony convictions (§ 667, 

subd. (a)(1)). 

B. Appellant’s Competency and First Trial

In July 2016, the trial court suspended proceedings and ordered a 

competency evaluation. Appellant was found incompetent to stand trial and 

was committed to Napa State Hospital in December 2016. In March 2017, 

the trial court found competency had been restored and reinstated criminal 

proceedings. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts. 

Appellant was tried twice in this matter. His first trial commenced in

May 2017, resulting in guilty verdicts on counts three, four, and five. The 

trial court declared a mistrial as to counts one and two after the jury was 

unable to reach a verdict. A retrial on counts one and two commenced in

June 2018. 

C. Appellant’s Second Trial

The prosecution presented evidence of the underlying offense described 

above. Appellant did not offer evidence in his defense. Defense counsel 

argued in closing that appellant was not guilty of robbery or attempted 

robbery because he lacked the specific intent to permanently deprive Lu of 

his property. He suggested that appellant’s assault on the victim was

prompted by his underlying emotional issues and a delusional perception 

that Lu had intruded on his space and behaved disrespectfully when he 

coughed. Counsel also asserted that appellant did not steal Lu’s backpack, 

arguing he only used it to hit Daily’s car. 
4

On July 11, 2018, the jury found appellant guilty as charged on counts 

one and two. The trial court found the charged enhancements true at a

subsequent bench trial. On May 17, 2019, the trial court granted appellant’s 

Romero2 motion to dismiss a 1990 conviction for first degree robbery, but 

denied his request to dismiss a 2005 conviction for armed bank robbery. 

Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 17 years in state prison. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Misconduct Claim

During deliberations, the trial court learned through a jury note that a

sheriff’s deputy had relayed to the jury that appellant was being held in a 

“psych unit.” Appellant contends that the trial court prejudicially 

mishandled the proceedings by failing to interview individual jurors to 

determine whether any juror was affected by the misconduct and by denying 

his motion for mistrial. He further asserts that the court’s limited inquiry 

into the matter and corrective action failed to dispel the “presumption of 

prejudice.” We find no error in the trial court’s handling of the jury note or 

the denial of mistrial. 

a. Relevant Proceedings

During deliberations, the sheriff’s deputy charged with supervising the 

jury relayed to the jurors that appellant was housed in the “psych unit.” 

Shortly thereafter, the jury sent a note to the court stating: “We have become 

aware that the defendant is being held in a psych unit. We have taken a poll 

of the room and don’t believe that this changes any of our minds because we 

all feel capable of ignoring it.” 

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
5

When questioned by the trial court, the sheriff’s deputy stated that he 

had entered the jury room to answer a question about the cutoff time for 

deliberations and returning a verdict. The deputy reported to the court that 

he told the jurors, “ ‘You know, it takes a long time to get a person down. 

This guy is kind of a mental person and he’s in the psych unit,’ which I 

should not have stated.” The deputy expressed embarrassment about what 

he had said and he informed the court that appellant was not housed in a 

psych unit but was rather in an administrative segregation unit. He 

explained that administrative segregation is not a psych unit, although 

“there are people with mental problems in custody that are housed in [that 

unit.]” 

After discussing the jury’s note with the prosecutor and defense counsel 

off the record, the court sent the following written response to the jury: “The 

defendant is not ‘being held in a psych unit.’ You’re not to consider anything 

that is not in evidence, including the defendant’s custodial status.” 

The next day, defense counsel objected to the court’s response and 

moved for a mistrial. Counsel asserted that the trial court’s response had 

impermissibly introduced extrinsic evidence, namely, that appellant was not 

being held in a psych unit. Seemingly in contradiction to his objection, 

counsel asked the court to clarify to the jury that appellant was being held “in 

administrative segregation alone in a single cell.” The court overruled the 

objection, noting that defense counsel had acceded to the proposed answer 

before the response was sent. 

The trial court also denied the motion for a mistrial, stating: “I think 

one of the main reasons why the Court has quite a bit less concern than what 

would have been apparent is in the actual statement read to the Court on the 

question, they did specifically indicate that the jurors felt that they were 
6

capable of setting aside the statement and not using it against the defense. 

Or against anyone. [¶] So that gives some alleviation to the Court with 

regards to any prejudice to either side with regards to the statement and that 

I—and in connection with the response the Court gave and their own 

response that the Court doesn’t believe that there’s any prejudice to either 

party based on the jury’s ability to set it aside and listen to the instructions 

by the Court.”

The jury reached its verdict, finding appellant guilty of robbery and 

attempted robbery. 

b. The Trial Court Appropriately Addressed the Jury’s Note

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to interview 

individual jurors to determine whether any of them were affected by the 

deputy’s statement that appellant was a “mental person” being held in a 

“psych unit.” He claims the statement constituted extrinsic evidence that 

was potentially prejudicial, arguing the jury “may have been afraid that if 

appellant was a ‘mental case,’ the failure to convict him would turn loose a 

dangerous person capable of committing more violent attacks.” He also 

contends that the court’s response to the jury’s note exacerbated the 

misconduct because the response introduced facts that were outside the 

record while simultaneously directing the jury not to consider anything that 

was not in evidence, thus leaving open the possibility the jury might still

believe that appellant was being held in a psych unit. 

i. Applicable Legal Principals

“ ‘An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. 

[Citations.] An impartial jury is one in which no member has been 

improperly influenced [citations] and every member is “ ‘capable and willing 
7

to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hensley

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 824.)

A juror’s receipt of information about a party or the case that is not a 

part of the evidence received at trial is misconduct that raises a presumption 

of prejudice, even if such information was received passively or involuntarily. 

(People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 507 (Cowan).) The trial court has a 

duty to investigate when it becomes aware of the possibility a juror has

committed misconduct or has been exposed to improper influences. (People v. 

Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1213.) The court must make whatever inquiry 

is reasonably necessary to determine whether to discharge the juror and 

whether the impartiality of other jurors has been affected. (Ibid.; People v. 

Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 535.)

“However, ‘ “not every incident involving a juror’s conduct requires or 

warrants further investigation.” ’ ” (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 506; see 

People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 290 (Williams).) “ ‘ “ ‘The decision 

whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or 

misconduct—like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror—rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The court does not 

abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any and all new 

information obtained about a juror during trial.’ ” [Citation.] A hearing is 

required only where the court possesses information which, if proved to be 

true, would constitute “good cause” to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his or 

her duties and would justify his or her removal from the case.’ ” (Williams, at 

pp. 289–290.)

ii. Discussion

We conclude the trial court took reasonable measures to investigate 

and address the misconduct. The jury note made clear that the jurors had 
8

been exposed to extrinsic information from the sheriff’s deputy about 

appellant’s custodial status that might bear upon his mental health. The 

trial court called the deputy sheriff to testify concerning what information he 

had specifically conveyed to the jury. Although the jury had already stated in 

its note that it was prepared to ignore this information, the trial court’s 

written response—crafted in consultation with both counsel—informed the 

jurors that appellant was not “being held in a psych unit” and they were not 

to consider anything that is not in evidence, including defendant’s custodial 

status.

The court was justifiably reassured that the jury would follow its 

instructions and acted within its discretion in deciding not to interview 

individual jurors. The jury note reflected that the jurors themselves had 

recognized that the deputy’s remarks were inappropriate, and they had taken 

the initiative to discuss the matter and confirm that the information would 

not influence their deliberations. There was no information that would cast 

doubt on the jury’s ability to remain impartial, and therefore no good cause 

basis for further investigation into the matter. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th 

at pp. 289–291.) 

We also disagree with appellant’s assertion that the trial court’s 

response to the jury was confusing or inconsistent. The trial court concluded 

that it was more important to correct the false impression that appellant was 

being housed in a “psych unit” than to leave the remark unaddressed and 

risk the possibility that the jury might find the statement to be true. At the 

same time, the court reminded the jury that it was not to consider evidence 

outside the record, including appellant’s custodial status. Under the 

circumstances, the trial court struck an appropriate balance between 
9

correcting an inaccuracy and reminding the jury of its obligations. We find 

the court’s actions reasonable, and certainly not an abuse of discretion.3 

iii. Any Error Was Harmless

Even if the trial court erred in its handling of the jury note, we find

that the error is harmless. Appellant contends the deputy’s “psych unit” 

statement was “intrinsically prejudicial” because it fatally tainted the jury. 

He further asserts the error is subject to automatic reversal as a structural 

defect. We disagree with both contentions.

“[O]nly a ‘very limited class of cases’ are subject to per se reversal.”

(People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 (Aranda), quoting Johnson v. 

United States (1997) 520 U.S. 461, 468.) Most errors “are ‘ “trial error[s],” ’

occurring ‘during the presentation of the case to the jury.’ [Citation] They 

are amenable to harmless error review because they can be ‘quantitatively 

assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine 

whether [their] admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’

[Citation.] ‘Structural defects,’ on the other hand, ‘defy analysis by 

“harmless-error” standards’ [citation] because they are not ‘simply an error in 

3 To the extent a “presumption of prejudice” has been raised by the 

misconduct in this matter, we conclude there is no reasonable probability of 

prejudice. (See In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296 [“Any presumption 

of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire 

record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other 

event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable 

probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors 

were actually biased against the defendant.”].) As discussed above, appellant 

has not pointed to any evidence in the record indicating actual bias by the 

jury or an inability to follow the court’s instructions and remain impartial. 

On the contrary, the jury brought the matter to the court’s attention, assured 

the court that it could ignore the extrinsic information, and raised no further 

concerns with the court’s written response, indicating it understood and 

applied the court’s instructions. 
10

the trial process,’ but rather an error ‘affecting the framework within which 

the trial proceeds.’ ” (Aranda, at pp. 363–364, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante

(1991) 499 U.S. 279.)

Here, even if the deputy sheriff’s statement to the jury introduced 

extrinsic evidence of appellant’s mental health status that was potentially 

inflammatory, this affected only the information received by the jury, which 

is an error amenable to assessment in light of the other evidence presented. 

That the misconduct occurred during deliberations, rather than during the 

presentation of evidence, is of no consequence. The deputy’s remark

constituted “an error in the trial process,” and is readily distinguishable from

errors that have been viewed as structural, such as “denial of counsel or of 

self-representation, racial discrimination in jury selection, and trial before a 

biased judge.” (Aranda, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 364.) 

Nor does appellant demonstrate that any error was prejudicial under 

either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt standard] or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 

[reasonable probability that the error did not affect the outcome standard]. 

“[W]hen misconduct involves the receipt of information from extraneous 

sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by a review of the entire record, 

and may be found to be nonprejudicial. The verdict will be set aside only if 

there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias. Such bias can appear in 

two different ways. First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged 

objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror. 

[Citations.] Second, we look to the nature of the misconduct and the 

surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely the 

juror was actually biased against the defendant. [Citation.] The judgment 
11

must be set aside if the court finds prejudice under either test.” (In re 

Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653 (Carpenter).) 

We conclude that the deputy sheriff’s statement about appellant being 

“kind of a mental person” who is housed in the “psych unit” was clearly 

misguided but not so inherently prejudicial that it fatally tainted the jury’s 

view of appellant. The statement itself does not suggest that appellant is 

violent or has harmed others, and the jury assured the court that it could

continue deliberating in an impartial manner. 

Additionally, nothing in the surrounding circumstances demonstrates 

that the deputy’s statement resulted in actual bias. The jury did not seek out 

this prohibited information. Rather, the offhand statement was offered in 

response to an unrelated question about the cutoff time for jury deliberations, 

and the jury promptly informed the court about the deputy’s statement. (See

Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 656 [“But to the extent [juror’s inadvertent 

receipt of outside information] was misconduct, it was also passive” and was 

not indicative of actual bias].) Moreover, the jury was admonished by the 

trial court that the deputy’s statement was inaccurate and that the jury was 

not to consider appellant’s custodial status. We presume jurors followed the 

trial court’s instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) The 

admonition was sufficient to cure any potential prejudice. (People v. Price

(1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 428.) “It is only in the exceptional case that ‘the 

improper subject matter is of such a character that its effect . . . cannot be 

removed by the court’s admonitions.’ ” (People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 

924, 935.) 

Appellant argues the deputy’s statements were prejudicial because they 

raised the specter of turning loose a dangerous, mentally ill person if the jury 

did not return guilty verdicts. The cases appellant relies upon in support of 
12

his claim of prejudicial error, however, are distinguishable because they 

address prosecutorial misconduct in cases involving a defense of not guilty by 

reason of insanity. For example, in People v. Mallette (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 

294, 299, the prosecutor argued at the sanity phase that “it is a theory of our 

law that an insane person cannot commit a crime, so the crime requires the 

operation of a sane mind, and therefore [the defendant] will walk out free if 

you find she was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.” The 

appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding it was prejudicial 

misconduct to suggest that the criminally insane, however violent, are 

immediately set free to prey upon society. (Id. at pp. 299–300.) Similarly, in 

People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, disapproved on another ground in 

Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383, fn. 8, our Supreme Court 

called it “obvious misconduct” for the prosecution, in reference to a 

defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, to tell the jury “that, if 

the defendant were found insane at the time he committed the offense, he 

would be ‘turned loose’ ” (Modesto, at p. 708.) This appeal involves neither a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct nor a defense of not guilty by reason of 

insanity. And as noted above, the deputy sheriff’s statement makes no 

mention of appellant being turned loose or of his propensity for violence. In 

short, we conclude that any error in the trial court’s handling of the 

misconduct was harmless under any standard because there is no substantial 

likelihood that any juror was actually biased against appellant. 

c. The Denial of the Motion for Mistrial Was Not an Abuse of

Discretion

For the same reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial. Appellant makes no 

showing that the deputy’s comment violated his due process rights or 

irreparably damaged his chances of receiving a fair trial. (See People v. 
13

Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 555 [mistrial denied based on brief reference to 

defendant’s parole status; no due process violation].)

“A court should grant a mistrial ‘ “only when a party’s chances of 

receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.” ’ [Citation.] This 

generally occurs when ‘ “ ‘ “the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges 

incurable by admonition or instruction.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Johnson (2018) 

6 Cal.5th 541, 581.) “Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is 

by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with 

considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.” (People v. Haskett

(1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854; see People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 39–40, 

disapproved on another point in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 

1216.) “ ‘Juries often hear unsolicited and inadmissible comments and in 

order for trials to proceed without constant mistrial, it is axiomatic the 

prejudicial effect of these comments may be corrected by judicial 

admonishment; absent evidence to the contrary the error is deemed cured.’ ” 

(People v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428–1429.) “We review the 

trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” (Johnson, at 

p. 581.) 

As discussed above, any prejudice resulting from the deputy sheriff’s 

misguided comment that appellant was being held in a “psych unit” was 

cured by the trial court’s admonishment to the jury that it should disregard 

any information regarding appellant’s custodial status and base its 

deliberations solely on the evidence presented at trial. Because any potential 

for prejudice had been abated, the court did not err in denying appellant’s 

motion for mistrial.
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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying 

Appellant’s Romero Motion

a. Background

Appellant was charged with having suffered two prior strike 

convictions. The first stemmed from a 1990 robbery conviction in which

appellant robbed a taxicab driver at gunpoint and shot at the taxi as it drove 

away. He was sentenced to four years in state prison. The second strike was 

a result of a 2005 federal bank robbery conviction. In that case, appellant 

held a bank teller at gunpoint and threatened to kill her unless she turned 

over the money in her drawer. He escaped with $2,265. He pleaded guilty 

and was sentenced to 81 months in federal prison. 

Before sentencing, appellant filed a Romero motion, inviting the court 

to exercise its discretion to strike (or dismiss) both of his prior strike 

convictions. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497; § 1385, subd. (a).) He argued 

that he did not have an extensive criminal history because the two strikes 

were his only convictions. He also stressed that the convictions were remote 

in time, were, in part, attributable to an undiagnosed mental health 

condition, and that the offenses did not result in serious bodily injury. He 

also noted he faced a long sentence even if the court exercised its discretion to 

strike the priors. The prosecution opposed the motion, noting that appellant 

had suffered several other arrests for violent and assaultive crimes. 

Additionally, he had committed multiple assaults on corrections officers while 

in custody on the present matter, and his future prospects were poor. 

After reviewing the pleadings and hearing argument, the trial court 

elected to strike appellant’s 1990 conviction for armed robbery and dismiss 

the associated five-year prior (§ 667, subd. (a)), while retaining the 2005 

federal bank robbery conviction as a strike for sentencing purposes. The 

court concluded that appellant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strike law, 
15

but only in part. The court observed that the 1990 strike was almost 30 years 

old and occurred when appellant was just 19 years old, circumstances that 

weighed in favor of dismissing that conviction. In contrast, appellant was a 

mature adult of 34 years at the time of the bank robbery in 2005, and he 

committed the present offense in 2016 when he was 45 years old. While the 

court declined to dismiss the 2005 felony strike conviction, the court noted

appellant did not use a weapon in the commission of the current offense and 

agreed he did not cause injury to either of the victims in the prior cases, 

although Lu did suffer a minor injury in the present case. The court also 

found that his criminal conduct was partially excusable due to his mental 

health condition, while also noting that he had consistently refused 

treatment, medication, or any assistance to address his mental health issues. 

Following its analysis, the trial court sentenced appellant to 17 years in 

state prison, comprised of the upper term of five years on count one, doubled 

to 10 years due to the 2005 prior strike (§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)), a consecutive 

terms of one year on count four, doubled to two years (ibid.), and a

consecutive five-year term imposed for the 2005 prior serious felony 

conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) Sentencing on counts two and three was 

stayed pursuant to section 654. Appellant was also sentenced to one year in 

county jail on count five, with credit for time served. 

On appeal, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to dismiss the 2005 prior strike conviction. We find no abuse of 

discretion.

b. Analysis

A trial court has the discretion to grant a motion to dismiss a strike 

allegation. (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) 

In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, the court is to “ ‘consider 
16

whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present 

felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the 

particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may 

be deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, 

and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted 

of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).)

We review a trial court’s denial of such a motion for an abuse of 

discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 373.) Where the record 

demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant factors and reached 

an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm 

the court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first 

instance. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).)

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

appellant’s Romero motion. The court applied the correct legal standard, 

fairly considered appellant’s arguments, and thoughtfully exercised its 

discretion in partially denying the motion.

Appellant urges us to reverse the trial court because it did not give 

sufficient weight to several ameliorative factors, including that the 2005 

strike conviction was remote in time, that none of his prior offenses resulted

in serious injuries, that no weapon was used in the current offense, and that

his mental illness significantly contributed the instant proceedings. He also 

asserts that all the factors that the trial court relied upon to strike his 1990 

robbery conviction should have been applied to strike the 2005 conviction. 

Because the trial court considered all of these factors, appellant is essentially 

asking us to reweigh the factors and come to a different conclusion. This we 

cannot do. (Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 309–310 [“It is not enough to 
17

show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or 

more of [a defendant’s] prior convictions.”].)

Appellant also cites to People v. Banks (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 20, In re 

Saldana (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 620, and People v. Bishop (1997) 

56 Cal.App.4th 1245. But all three cases are distinguishable: Banks reversed 

the denial of a motion to strike because the trial court misunderstood that it 

had discretion to grant relief (Banks, at pp. 23–24), and Saldana and Bishop 

affirmed the grant of a motion to strike (Saldana, at pp. 626–627; Bishop, at 

pp. 1248–1251). If anything, these cases emphasize the limited nature of our 

review when a trial court exercises its discretion. Given those limits, we have 

no basis to disturb the court’s ruling in this case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
18

_________________________

Sanchez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

A157331 People v. Black