[Cite as Massa v. Westfield, 2014-Ohio-2805.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

ROBERT MASSA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 vs. 

WESTFIELD GROUP, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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APPEAL NO. C-130639 

TRIAL NO. A-1207242 

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 27, 2014 

Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., LPA, Jay R. Langenbahn and Thomas J. Blatz, Jr., 

for Plaintiff-Appellant, 

McCaslin, Imbus & McCaslin, Thomas J. Gruber and Michael P. Cussen, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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HILDEBRANDT, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Robert Massa appeals from the trial court’s judgment 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Westfield Group 

(“Westfield”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

{¶2} Massa was injured in an automobile accident while he was a passenger in 

a car driven by his son-in-law, Peter Hammer. The accident was caused by another 

driver, Eric Rozier. Rozier’s insurance paid Massa the limits of Rozier’s policy. Rozier’s 

policy limit of $100,000, however, did not fully compensate Massa for his injuries. 

Massa therefore was awarded underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage through his 

own insurance policy. Believing that he still had not been fully compensated for his 

injuries, Massa then sued Hammer’s insurance company, Westfield, seeking to recover 

UIM coverage under Hammer’s automobile and umbrella insurance policies. Westfield 

moved for summary judgment on the ground that Massa did not meet the definition of 

an “insured” and was therefore not entitled to coverage. The trial court granted 

Westfield’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. This appeal followed. In one 

assignment of error, Massa argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 

Westfield policy. 

{¶3} Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Brown v. Lincoln Hts., 195 

Ohio App.3d 149, 2011-Ohio-3551, 958 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Grafton v. 

Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), 

summary judgment is appropriate when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor 

of the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 

317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶4} In pertinent part, the Westfield automobile policy defines “insured” as 

“[a]ny other person occupying your covered auto who is not a named insured or insured 

family member for underinsured motorist coverage under another policy.” Westfield’s 

umbrella policy provides that umbrella coverage as it pertains to UIM is excluded 

unless the underlying automobile insurance affords UIM coverage. 

{¶5} Here, it is undisputed that Massa does not meet the definition of “family 

member” under the Westfield policy. Massa argues that, applying the last antecedent 

rule of construction, the phrase “for underinsured motorist coverage under another 

policy” only modifies “family member.” Since he is not a family member, Massa argues, 

the Westfield policy should be construed to include UIM coverage for him even though 

he had UIM coverage through his own insurance policy. Interpreting the exact same 

language, and analyzing the language using the exact argument that Massa now 

advances, the Ohio Supreme Court in Wohl v. Slattery, 118 Ohio St.3d 277, 2008-Ohio2334, 888 N.E.2d 1062, held otherwise. In Wohl, the court determined that, viewing 

the insurance policy as a whole, the definition of “insured” at issue was unambiguous 

and narrowly defined, and that therefore the last antecedent rule did not apply. Id. at ¶ 

23. The court determined that “for underinsured motorist coverage under another 

policy” modified both “family member” and a “named insured.” 

{¶6} Likewise, in this case, and viewing the policy as whole, it is evident that 

the definition of “insured” for purposes of UIM coverage is unambiguous and narrowly 

defined. The last antecedent rule does not apply. Massa does not meet the definition of 

“insured” because he was a named insured in another insurance policy that provided 

UIM coverage. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶7} Because there are no issues of material fact, and because Westfield was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Wohl, Massa’s sole assignment of error is 

overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

HENDON and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.