[Cite as State v. Matthews, 2024-Ohio-1863.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

GERMAN MATHEWS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL NO. C-240016

TRIAL NO. B-2301853

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause 

Remanded in Part 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 15, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norbert Wessels, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

KINSLEY, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant German Mathews appeals from the trial court’s 

judgment convicting him of felonious assault, kidnapping, and rape. In four 

assignments of error, Mathews argues that his pleas were not entered knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently; that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive 

sentences without making the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); that his 

convictions for kidnapping and rape were subject to merger; and that the trial court 

failed to give the required notifications under the Reagan Tokes Law (“RTL”).

{¶2} We hold that although the trial court failed to substantially comply with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2) by not explicitly informing Mathews that he was subject to a 

mandatory prison term, the trial court’s failure to do so did not prejudice Mathews. 

We further hold that the trial court was not required under Crim.R. 11 to inform 

Mathews of RTL notifications and his eligibility for judicial release or other earned 

credit at his plea colloquy. Therefore, we overrule Mathews’s first assignment of error. 

We similarly overrule Mathews’s third assignment of error, because we hold that his 

convictions for kidnapping and rape were not subject to merger.

{¶3} But we sustain Mathews’s second assignment of error, because the trial 

court failed to make the required proportionality finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), 

either at the sentencing hearing or in its sentencing entry. And we sustain Mathews’s 

fourth assignment of error, because the trial court failed to provide Mathews with the 

required notifications under the RTL. 

{¶4} Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse it in 

part as to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences and with regard to the 

lack of RTL sentencing notifications, and remand this cause for resentencing.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶5} The charges against Mathews relate to the tragic attack against M.F., a 

developmentally disabled woman. During the early morning hours of April 29, 2023, 

M.F. was on her morning walk to work when she encountered Mathews. As Mathews 

began walking closer to M.F., she moved to the side so he could pass her, given that 

she walked slower due to her disability. At that point, Mathews attacked M.F., dragged 

her to a nearby wooded area, took away her phone, and raped her. A passerby 

witnessed this and alerted the police. Mathews was found fleeing on foot with his 

hands still covered in M.F.’s blood. M.F. suffered multiple fractures on her face, which 

indicated that she would have struggled to escape on her own.

{¶6} Mathews was indicted for one count of felonious assault in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) with a sexual motivation specification, one count of kidnapping in 

violation of R.C. 2925.01(A)(4) with a sexual motivation specification, and two counts 

of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). 

{¶7} At the October 17, 2023 plea hearing, the trial court was concerned that 

Mathews was not entering his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently when 

Mathews asserted that he had not read his plea form. Mathews’s counsel maintained 

that the form was read to Mathews with an interpreter. But because Mathews insisted 

that he did not read the form personally, the trial court continued the plea hearing.

{¶8} On October 25, 2023, the trial court held another plea hearing. At this 

hearing, Mathews confirmed he read the plea form himself. Mathews pled guilty as 

charged. 

{¶9} The trial court sentenced Mathews on December 20, 2023. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court determined pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B)(1) and (2) 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

that Mathews’s conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting his 

offenses because the injuries suffered by the victim as a result of the offenses were 

exacerbated by her physical or mental condition and because the victim suffered 

serious physical and psychological harm. The court also considered a number of 

factors under R.C. 2929.12(D) weighing both for and against the likelihood that 

Mathews would commit future criminal offenses. These included the fact that 

Mathews has previously been charged with sex offenses, that he had a demonstrated 

pattern of alcohol abuse that precipitated the offenses in this case, that he had not 

responded favorably to previous efforts at rehabilitation, and that he accepted 

responsibility for the crimes against M.F. by pleading guilty.

{¶10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Mathews to a 

prison term of eight years on count one for felonious assault, 11 years on count two for 

kidnapping, 11 to 16.5 years on count three for rape, and 11 years on count four for 

rape. Counts two and four were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and 

concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts one and three. Counts one and 

three were ordered to be served consecutively to each other. Mathews was sentenced 

to a total prison term of 19 to 24.5 years and classified as a Tier III sex offender. 

{¶11} Mathews now appeals.

Plea Colloquy

{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Mathews argues that his pleas were not 

entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, because he was not advised that the 

rape charges carried a mandatory prison sentence, that all of the charges were subject 

to indeterminate sentences under the RTL, or that he was not eligible for judicial 

release or other earned credit. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

{¶13} “An appellate court determining whether a guilty plea was entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily conducts a de novo review of the record to 

ensure that the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural 

safeguards.” State v. Brigner, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA19, 2015-Ohio-2526, ¶ 8. In 

State v. Foster, we explained the trial court’s obligations to a defendant in a plea 

colloquy under Crim.R. 11(C):

The trial court must inform the defendant that by pleading guilty 

or no contest, he is waiving the following constitutional rights: the 

privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to 

confront his accusers, and the right of compulsory process of witnesses. 

The trial court must also inform the defendant of certain 

nonconstitutional rights, including the nature of the charges, the 

maximum penalty involved, the eligibility of the defendant for 

probation or community control, and the effect of the plea. 

A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 when it

explains the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). When 

a trial court fails to explain these rights, the guilty or no-contest plea is 

invalid under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and 

unknowingly. 

A trial court, however, need only substantially comply with 

Crim.R. 11 when explaining the nonconstitutional rights set forth in 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Substantial compliance means that under 

the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands 

the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. When a trial 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

6

court fails to comply with Crim.R. 11 with regard to a non-constitutional 

right, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant shows prejudice. 

The test for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been 

made. 

(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) State v. Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, 

121 N.E.3d 76, ¶ 14-16 (1st Dist.). 

{¶14} Mathews challenges the trial court’s alleged lack of explanation of what 

he concedes are nonconstitutional rights: the right to notice of a mandatory prison 

sentence, certain statutory explanations under the RTL and his eligibility for judicial 

release or other earned days of credit. We consider each in turn.

{¶15} If a defendant is convicted of charges that carry a mandatory prison 

sentence, “the court must, before accepting the plea, determine the defendant’s 

understanding that the defendant is subject to a mandatory sentence and that the 

mandatory sentence renders the defendant ineligible for probation or community 

control sanctions.” State v. Morgan, 2018-Ohio-319, 104 N.E.3d 941, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). 

A trial court may meet this requirement by either expressly informing the defendant,

or by confirming the defendant’s subjective understanding, of the mandatory nature 

of the prison term from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Wyatt, 2017-Ohio8391, 99 N.E.3d 938, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). 

{¶16} We affirmed the focus on the defendant’s subjective understanding, 

given the entirety of the information being communicated regarding the available 

sentencing options, in Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, 121 N.E.3d 76. There, the defendant’s 

plea form did not indicate that the rape offense carried a mandatory prison term. Id. 

at ¶ 20. And at the defendant’s sentencing hearing, he was incorrectly advised that the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

7

rape offense did not carry a mandatory prison sentence. Id. at ¶ 21. But the trial court 

did expressly inform the defendant that community control was not a sentencing 

option and that it planned to impose a prison sentence on him. Id. Regardless, the 

trial court proceeded to read from the community control explanation in the plea form. 

Id. We held that despite the error in the plea form and the trial court’s recitation of 

the community control portion of the plea form, the defendant could not demonstrate 

prejudice from the trial court’s statements. Id. at ¶ 22. This was because the trial court 

repeatedly and expressly told the defendant during the plea colloquy that community 

control was not a sentencing option and that it intended to impose a prison term. Id. 

{¶17} Conversely, in Brigner, the defendant’s rape convictions carried a 

mandatory prison term, but he was affirmatively informed by the trial court that a 

prison sentence was only presumed and that the trial court could impose community 

control sanctions instead. Brigner, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA19, 2015-Ohio-2526, at 

¶ 12, 14. This misrepresentation reinforced the parties’ misunderstanding regarding 

the availability of community control for the defendant’s rape convictions. Id. at ¶ 14. 

Relying on this misrepresentation, the defendant and his counsel requested 

community control in lieu of prison, even though Brigner’s rape convictions carried a 

mandatory prison sentence. Id. Unlike Foster, these circumstances indicated that 

Brigner was prejudiced by the trial court’s mistake in informing the parties that it 

could impose a community control sanction. Id. Because Brigner sought community 

control rather than prison at sentencing, it was questionable whether he would have 

made the plea without the trial court’s statements regarding community control. Id. 

{¶18} Here, Mathews’s plea form incorrectly stated that his rape convictions 

did not carry a mandatory prison sentence. The trial court similarly failed to inform 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

8

Mathews of the mandatory nature of his prison sentences at his sentencing hearing. 

But neither the plea form nor the trial court at sentencing made any representations 

regarding Mathews’s eligibility for community control or non-prison sanctions. 

Instead, the trial court informed Mathews that he “would at least, at a bare minimum, 

have to serve three to four and a half years” of incarceration. Mathews confirmed his 

understanding of this statement. 

{¶19} By not informing Mathews that he was subject to a mandatory prison 

term which would make him ineligible for community control in lieu of prison time, 

the trial court failed to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). But Mathews 

cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this omission. Unlike in Brigner, the 

trial court never told Mathews that it was authorized to impose community control. 

But the trial court did inform Mathews that, at a bare minimum, he would be required 

to serve several years in prison. While it did not explicitly use the word “mandatory,” 

this instruction by the trial court apprised Mathews that prison time, rather than 

community control, would be a part of his ultimate sentence. We therefore cannot say, 

on this record, that Mathews would not have pleaded guilty had he been correctly 

apprised of the requirement of mandatory prison time. Mathews’s claim under 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) regarding the mandatory nature of his sentences therefore fails. 

{¶20} We next consider Mathews’s assertion that the trial court was obligated 

to explain certain RLT notifications and his eligibility for judicial release or other

earned days of credit at his plea colloquy. A trial court must advise the offender of 

certain notifications under the RTL at sentencing. State v. Searight, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-230060, 2023-Ohio-3584, ¶ 6. But, as the state notes, there is no 

obligation for the trial court to provide these notifications at the plea colloquy. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

9

Likewise, Crim.R. 11 does not require a trial court to notify a defendant that he is 

ineligible for judicial release or that his sentence may or may not be reduced by the 

statutory provisions for earned days of credit. Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, 121 N.E.3d 

76, at ¶ 24, 26. 

{¶21} We accordingly overrule Mathews’s first assignment of error. 

Consecutive Sentences

{¶22} Next, Mathews argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive 

sentences where it failed to make the appropriate findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶23} In State v. Bonnell, the Ohio Supreme Court outlined appellate review 

of consecutive sentences:

On appeals involving imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs the appellate court to review the record, 

including the findings underlying the sentence and to modify or vacate 

the sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not 

support the sentencing court’s findings under division (C)(4) of section 

2929.14 of the Revised Code. But that statute does not specify where 

the findings are to be made. Thus, the record must contain a basis upon 

which a reviewing court can determine that the trial court made the 

findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(2) before it imposed consecutive 

sentences. 

When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state 

the required findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so 

it affords notice to the offender and to defense counsel. And because a 

court speaks through its journal, the court should also incorporate its 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

10

statutory findings into the sentencing entry. However, a word-for-word 

recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as 

the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the 

correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to 

support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld. 

(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 

209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 28-29. 

{¶24} More recently, in State v. Gwynne, the Ohio Supreme Court held that 

“[t]he plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a 

trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be 

upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the 

record.” State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5. But as the court in 

State v. Sprague noted, if a defendant argues that the trial court completely failed to 

make the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), then Bonnell still applies. State 

v. Sprague, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1060, L-23-1061, and L-23-1062, 2023-Ohio4343, ¶ 14-15. Because Mathews argues that the trial court failed to make these 

required findings, and not that the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings were not 

supported by the record, we apply the holding and reasoning in Bonnell in considering 

Mathews’s challenge to his consecutive sentences. 

{¶25} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that a court may impose consecutive prison 

terms:

if the court finds that consecutive service is necessary to protect the 

public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

11

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the 

court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while 

the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the 

Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one 

or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the 

courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime by the offender. 

{¶26} The trial court’s entry sentencing Mathews to consecutive sentences as 

to counts one and three stated the following:

The Court also finds that consecutive sentences are appropriate 

pursuant to 2929.14(C)(4) of the Ohio Revised Code in that the Court 

finds that these offenses were committed as part of one or more courses 

of conduct, and the harm caused was so great that a single prison term 

does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

* * *
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

12

The Court also finds the offender’s criminal history 

demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the 

public from future crimes by the offender.

{¶27} Importantly, the trial court omitted from its sentencing entry the 

required finding that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of Mathews’s conduct and to the danger he posed to the public. It was 

similarly silent as to these findings at the sentencing hearing. While a word-for-word 

recitation of the language of the statute is not required, the trial court must still use 

the language from which a reviewing court can discern that it made all of the required 

findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). And here, the trial court did not expressly 

reference or even allude to the proportionality finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

{¶28} In State v. Hoy, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 

23AP-42, 23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, and 23AP-47, 2024-Ohio-1555, ¶ 14, 

the court reversed the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences where the trial 

court failed to use language of proportionality or seriousness and failed to engage in 

any analysis that suggested consideration of the defendant’s conduct when it imposed 

consecutive sentences. There, the court reasoned that even the trial court’s reference 

to the escalation in number and frequency of incidents by the defendant and his 

possession of a gun during the last incident was insufficient to constitute a 

proportionality review under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Id. at ¶ 19. And in State v. Schaus, 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1146, 2024-Ohio-1515, ¶ 17, the court rejected the state’s 

argument that the trial court’s consideration of the seriousness and recidivism factors

contained in R.C. 2929.12 also supported the required proportionality review, because 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

13

the court’s findings under R.C. 2929.12 related only to individual sentences and the 

determination of whether the offender was more or less likely to commit future crimes. 

{¶29} Similarly, here, we cannot discern that the trial court engaged in any 

proportionality analysis that suggested the trial court weighed the imposition of 

consecutive sentences against the seriousness of Mathews’s conduct and the danger 

he posed to the public. See Hoy at ¶ 14. Further, we hold that the trial court’s 

consideration of the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 did not support the 

required proportionality review under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See Schaus at ¶ 17. 

{¶30} Thus, because the trial court did not make a finding, either expressly or 

impliedly, under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that consecutive sentences were not 

disproportionate to Mathews’s conduct and to the danger he posed to the public and 

incorporate that finding into its sentencing entry, we sustain Mathews’s second 

assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. 

We remand this cause for resentencing consistent with the requirements of R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). 

Merger

{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Mathews argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to merge the charges of kidnapping and rape when they were allied 

offenses of similar import. Mathews also asserted this argument at the sentencing 

hearing, before the trial court rendered its judgment. 

{¶32} “We review a trial court’s decision regarding allied offenses de novo.” 

State v. Savage, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190756, 2022-Ohio-3653, ¶ 24. We 

explained the concept of merger in Savage:
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

14

Allied offenses of similar import are those offenses whose 

elements correspond to such a degree that the commission of one 

offense will result in the commission of the other. State v. Luff, 85 Ohio 

App.3d 785, 621 N.E.2d 493 (6th Dist.1993); State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 448, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992). If a defendant is indicted for 

the same conduct that can constitute two or more allied offenses of 

similar import, the defendant may be convicted of only one. R.C. 

2941.25(A). But a defendant may be convicted of all counts where a 

defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses. R.C. 2941.25(B). 

Courts should consider three questions to determine whether a 

defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) whether the 

offenses were dissimilar in import or significance, (2) whether the 

offenses were committed separately, and (3) whether the offenses were 

committed with separate animus and motivation. State v. Ruff, 143 

Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31. An affirmative 

answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. Id. The 

analysis must focus on the defendant’s conduct because an offense may 

be committed in a variety of ways and the offenses committed may have 

different import. Id. at ¶ 30. No bright-line rule can govern every 

situation. Id. 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 26-27. 

{¶33} In Savage, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and rape. Id. at 

¶ 30. We reasoned that, “When the movement or restraint of a victim happens because 

of the rape, there cannot be separate convictions.” Id. at ¶ 28. But if “the restraint is 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

15

prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the movement is substantial to 

demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there exists a separate 

animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.” Id. Additionally, 

we reasoned that “a defendant may be convicted for both kidnapping and rape when 

the transportation or restraint of a victim subjects the victim to a substantial increase 

of risk of harm, separate from the harm caused by the rape itself.” Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶34} Although the distance and time of confinement in Savage was not long, 

we noted that the defendant’s act of dragging the victim by the neck subjected her to 

an additional risk of harm beyond the rape itself. Id. at ¶ 32. Further, we noted that 

the alley in which the incident occurred was outside of the public view and once the 

defendant completed the rape, he told the victim not to leave for another ten minutes. 

Id. Thus, we held that the charges of rape and kidnapping were not allied offenses. Id. 

at ¶ 33.

{¶35} Similarly, here, Mathews brutally attacked M.F. before sexually 

assaulting her, and she suffered multiple fractures on her face, which indicated that 

she would have struggled to escape on her own. Mathews also dragged M.F. to a 

secluded area. And he took away M.F.’s phone and told her that no one would help 

her. As the responding officer who testified at the sentencing hearing stated, Mathews 

left M.F. for dead in the woods. Given these facts, the trial court found that the 

kidnapping and rape were committed with a separate animus. We agree with the trial 

court’s findings and therefore overrule Mathews’s third assignment of error. 

Reagan Tokes Law

{¶36} Lastly, in his fourth assignment of error, Mathews argues that the trial 

court erred by failing to comply with the sentencing requirements of the RTL. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

16

{¶37} “When sentencing an offender to a nonlife felony indefinite prison term 

under the Reagan Tokes Law, a trial court must advise the offender of the five 

notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v) at the sentencing hearing to fulfill 

the requirements of the statute.” Searight, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230060, 2023-

Ohio-3584, at ¶ 6. As the state concedes, the trial court failed to provide these 

notifications at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, we also remand this cause for the 

limited purpose of providing the sentencing notifications required under R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(c). See id. at ¶ 9. 

Conclusion

{¶38} In conclusion, we hold that although the trial court failed to 

substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) by not informing Mathews that he was 

subject to a mandatory prison term, the trial court’s failure to do so did not prejudice 

Mathews. We further hold that the trial court was not required under Crim.R. 11(C)(2) 

to inform Mathews of RTL notifications and his eligibility for judicial release or other

earned credit at his plea colloquy. Therefore, we overrule Mathews’s first assignment 

of error. We also overrule Mathews’s third assignment of error, because the offenses 

of kidnapping and rape were committed with a separate animus and therefore were 

not subject to merger. 

{¶39} However, we sustain Mathews’s second assignment of error because the 

trial court failed to make the required proportionality findings under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) to justify consecutive sentences. We also sustain Mathews’s fourth 

assignment of error, because the trial court failed to provide Mathews with the 

required notifications under the RTL.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

17

{¶40} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse it

in part as to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, and remand the 

cause for resentencing consistent with this opinion and the law.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

BERGERON, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.