Interim Decision #1972 

MATTER or SURZYCKI 

In Deportation Proceedings 

" A-13968349 

Decided by Board April 23, 1969 

Since section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 

does not encompass restraints on freedom of speech of an alien in his native country, a native and citizen of Poland who contends that if, upon return to his native country, he expresses himself freely, he would incur the 

displeasure of the authorities and probably be subjected to some sort of 

punitive treatment, has not established thereby that he would be subjected 

to persecution within the meaning of section 243 (h) of the Act. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2)]—Nonimmigrant—exchange visitor—remained longer. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

Norman von Rosenvinge, Esquire 

21 Beacon Street 

Boston, Maaaachueetta 02108 

(Brief filed) 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

It A. Vielhaber 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

The proceedings come forward on appeal from the decision of 

the special inquiry officer who found respondent deportable as 

charged, and ordered his deportation to Poland after .respondent 

declined to apply for the privilege of voluntary departure. Respondent's application for temporary withholding of deportation 

to Poland pursuant to section 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was denied. He concedes that he is deportable as 

charged. 

The respondent is a 33-year-old married male alien, a native 

and citizen of Poland, who was admitted to the United States on 

or about October 10, 1964 as an exchange visitor and was authorized to remain until October 9, 1967. He remained in the country 

thereafter without permission. 

The special inquiry officer in his decision reviewed at length all 

of the evidence presented to show that respondent feared persecu261 
Interim Decision #1972 

tion if he should return to his native country. He came to the 

conclusion, as do we, that respondent has not sustained the burden of proving that he would be subjected to persecution because 

of his race, religion or political opinion and is entitled to relief 

from deportation under section 243 (h) of the Act. 

It is not necessary for us to again set forth in detail the evidence submitted. We conclude that as far as the record shows this 

respondent is in no different position than any other Polish person in Poland, and there is nothing here to show he would in any 

way be singled out for persecution as claimed. He is a highly educated person, and his studies in the United States were, for the 

most part of his stay here, financed by the Polish authorities. He 

came here as an exchange visitor under the Soviet and Eastern 

European Exchange Program of the United States Department of 

State. The object of this program is that those persons selected 

come to the United States for advanced studies and research and 

then they are to return to their countries where such education 

will be of benefit to their nations. 

The gist of respondent's argument is that there now prevails in 

Poland an anti-intellectual climate in which the Polish authorities 

discourage and take a dim view of scientists and other educated 

intellectuals who try to speak freely in their chosen fields, where 

such speech contravenes the political philosophy of the government. The respondent contends that in view of this anti-intellectual climate, which has intensified recently, if he went back to 

Poland and expressed himself freely, he would incur the displeasure of the authorities and probably be subjected to some sort of 

punitive treatment. 

There is no indiciation that the Congress enacted section 

243 (h) of the Act with a view of guaranteeing an alien freedom 

of speech in the country of his nativity, and if he is-not afforded 

this by his government, then it could be considered that he was 

being persecuted. We do not interpret section 243(h) as covering 

this situation. -There are many totalitarian governments in the 

world today which do not brook dissent of any nature. We do not 

hold that an alien who feels compelled to espouse in his native 

country beliefs which are looked upon with disfavor by his government is thereby being persecuted if the government acts 

against him. 

The respondent has not met the burden of proving that he 

would be singled out as an individual and persecuted upon his re262 
Interim Decision #1972 

turn to his native country. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is 

hereby dismissed. 

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