IN THE COURTOFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OFWASHINGTON, Respondent,

JASON RAY LEE, Appellant. No. 68105-2-1 i—» uJO
•*— —f DIVISION ONE

r>o -T,>?1 

### UNPUBLISHED OPINION f^r js, corn,-, 

# FILED:April22,2013 ^ go Appelwick, J. — Lee appeals his conviction for felony violation of a no-contact order, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. However, the trial courtconcluded thatthe law enforcementofficerwho encountered Lee while attempting to execute an arrest warrant had a legitimate basis to temporarily detain Lee and ask 

### him to identify himself. Thatconclusion issupported bythe court's unchallengedfactual findings. Lee fails to demonstrate that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. FACTS 

### On May 13, 2011, several King County Sheriffs deputies went to Audrey 

### Sampson's apartment in Kenmore, Washington to execute arrest warrants issued for two suspects. The lead officer, Deputy JeffDurrant, knew that one ofthe individuals 

### subject to an arrest warrant was Sampson's boyfriend. All of the officers knew Sampson. Three officers went to the front door. The officers knocked and explained to 

### Sampson why they were there. Sampson toldthe officers thatthe two individuals they were looking forwere notthere and the only person with her in the apartmentwas herNo. 68105-2-1/2 

### girl friend, DarlaKelly. Sampson agreed to allowthe police to enter and verifythis, as long astheydid not "mess anything up." 

### OfficerTracey Dodd walked intoSampson's apartment knowing only the warrant 

### suspects'names andbirthdates.1 Sheasked Sampson againwhetheranyone besides herselfand Darla was inthe apartment, and Sampson said, "No." But, as Officer Dodd walked toward the back ofthe apartment, she encountered a male, later identified as 

### Jason Lee, pressed up againstthe kitchen pantry door, "obviously nervous, and visibly shaking." Lee appeared to be trying to conceal himself and Officer Dodd thought he might be one ofthe suspects they were looking for. She asked Lee to keep his hands visible, move to the kitchen table, and to identify himself. After initially giving a false name, Lee provided his name to Officer Dodd. Lee said he hadjustbeen released from prison the day before. The officer ran a check on Lee's name and discovered therewas a protection orderinplace prohibiting his contact with Kelly. After the other officers verified that the other person in the apartment was 

### Kelly, Officer Dodd placed Lee under arrest. Lee waived his Miranda2 rights and acknowledged that he knew about the protection order but said that "Darla was supposedto be getting it lifted."



### 1While itdoes notappearthatOfficerDoddtestified that she knewthe suspects' dates of birth at the pretrial hearing or at trial, the trial court's finding on that issue is unchallenged and ultimately irrelevantto Lee's argumenton appeal. 

### 2Mirandav. Arizona. 384U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 2No. 68105-2-1/3


### Lee was charged with felony violation of a no-contactorder. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest was unlawful, because the police had no basis to 

### detain and investigate him. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Officer Dodd had a reasonable basis to temporarily detain Lee and ask him to identify himself. Following a trial, thejuryconvicted Lee as charged.
DISCUSSION We review the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether substantial evidence supports thechallengedfindings offact and whetherthefindings of fact support the conclusions of law. State v. Garvin. 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). Where, as here, the findings offact are unchallenged, we considerthem verities on appeal. State v. Lohr. 164 Wn. App. 414, 418, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011). Accordingly, our review in this case is limited to a de novo determination ofwhetherthe 

### trial court's conclusions of law are supported by the unchallenged factual findings. Statev. Armenta. 134Wn.2d 1, 9, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997). 

### Lee argues that Officer Dodd's request for identification was an unconstitutional intrusion into his private affairs under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. On this basis, he claims thatthe trial court erred in denying his motion to 

### suppress. Lee points out that he was in a private residence when detained. He does 

### not, however, allege that the police officers executing the warrant were unlawfully present in Sampson's residence. Nor does he cite any authority in support of his suggestionthata heightened standard appliesto his investigatorydetention, becauseofNo. 68105-2-1/4 

### his location when the police encountered him. Ultimately, Lee acknowledges that his detention was constitutionally permissible if it was supported by individualized reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. And, here, thetrial court 

### found that Officer Dodd possessed only limited information about the men the officers were seeking to arrest. The court further found that having been told there were only two females inthe apartment, Officer Dodd came upon Lee who was obviously nervous and appeared to be trying to hide. These facts sufficiently support the court's conclusion thatthe officer had a specific articulable basis to temporarily detain Lee and askhim to identify himself. 

### Lee also points out that while Officer Dodd had minimal information about the arrestwarrant suspects, Deputy Durranttestified at trialthat he knewthe suspectsfrom 

### priorcontacts. Lee arguesthatDeputy Durrant wouldhave known upon seeing Lee that he was not one ofthe individuals the officers were looking to arrest. According to Lee, 

### under the "fellow officer rule" Deputy Durrant's knowledge is imputed to Officer Dodd. Therefore, Officer Dodd's articulated basis for detaining him is invalid in light of the information possessed by Deputy Durrant. 

### But, Lee did notraisethis argumentbelow. Instead, Lee specifically claimed only that Officer Dodd had no legitimate reason to ask him to identify himself, because the 

### individuals named in the arrestwarrantwere considerably olderthan hewas.3 Under RAP 2.5(a), "[t]heappellate court may refuseto review any claim of error which was not 

### 3One suspect was 7 years olderthan Lee and the other was 14yearsolder. 4No. 68105-2-1/5 

### raised in the trial court." As an exceptionto this general rule, an appellantmay raise an issue for the first time on appeal if it is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Kirkman. 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). A claim falls within this exception, if the defendant identifies a constitutional error and demonstrates that the alleged error actually affected the defendant's rights at trial. Kirkman. 159 Wn.2d at 926-27. RAP 2.5(a) does not mandate appellate review of a newly-raised argument where the facts necessary for its adjudication are not in the record, because in such a case the error is not manifest. State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 31, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). The record here is not sufficiently developed to resolve this issue. In opposing Lee's motion to suppress, the State called only Officer Dodd to testify. Contrary to Lee's assertion, the evidence at the suppression hearing and at trial did not establish 

### the extent of Deputy Durrant's familiarity with the arrest warrant suspects, or whether 

### Lee bore any resemblance to the suspects. Also, because Lee did not advance this theory, Officer Dodd was not asked whether she would have asked Lee to identify himselfbased solely on his behaviorand the fact that Sampson misinformed the police about who was present at the apartment. Without allthe facts relevantto this issue in the record, we cannotfairly resolve Lee's claim. The claimed error is not manifest and does notsatisfy RAP 2.5(a). 

### Even ifthefactual record were developed to allow review of this issue, thefellow 

### officer rule, also known as the police team rule, has not been recognized outside of theNo. 68105-2-1/6



### context ofprobable cause to make a warrantless felony arrest. See State v. Ortega, No. 85788-1, 2013 WL 1163954, at *4 (Wash. March 21, 2013). Nor does the rule 

### operate in the manner Lee advocates. Under the fellow officer rule, a court may considerthe cumulative knowledge of police officers indetermining whetherthere was probable cause to arrest a felony suspect without a warrant. kL; State v. Maesse. 29 Wn. App. 642, 647, 629 P.2d 1349 (1981). While an arresting officermay lack personal knowledge of the information that supplies probable cause to arrest, "cooperation between investigating officers or an arrest directive made by an officer possessing probable cause is sufficient to justify an arrest." State v. Alvarado. 56 Wn. App. 454, 456-57, 783 P.2d 1106 (1989). Lee relies on State v. Mance. 82 Wn. App. 539, 918 P.2d 527 (1996), to argue that the fellow officer rule applies equally to exculpatory information. Specifically, he claims that where one officer has information that calls into question another officer's 

### basis for detaining a suspect, that knowledge must be "imputed" to the investigating officer.Mance does not support this expansive and unwieldy proposition. In Mance. police stopped the defendant and arrested him, becausethe vehicle hewas drivingwas listed as stolen on the police department's "'hot sheet.'" ]dL at 540. In fact, the defendant had purchased the vehicle, and the car dealer had reported itstolen based 

### on a misunderstanding, ja\ at 540-41. Upon learning of his mistake, the dealercalled the police to cancel the report, jd. at 541. Nocancellation report was on file, however,

6No. 68105-2-1/7 when police arrested Mance two days later, jd. Mance resisted the arrest and in the 

### course oftheensuing struggle, spitouta large rock ofcocaine. Id. Hewas convicted of possession ofcocaineand appealed, arguing thatthetrialcourtshould havegranted his motion to suppress the cocaine, because his warrantless arrestwas unlawful. kL The appellate court determined that the arresting police officers were entitled to rely on the information contained in the police bulletin to establish probable cause to make the arrest. jd. at 542. The existence ofthe bulletin, however, did not insulatethe arrest from a challenge based on the insufficiency or inaccuracy of the information 

### underlying the bulletin. Id "If the issuing agency lacks probable cause, then the 

### arresting officer will also lack probable cause." jd. Thus, good faith reliance on information provided by a fellow officer does not prohibit a defendantfrom challenging 

### the validityoraccuracyofthe information relied upon to supportprobablecause. The Mance court relied on a factually analogous California case, People v. Ramirez. 34 Cal. 3d 541, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454, 668 P.2d 761 (1983). Mance. 82 Wn. 

### App. at 543. In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court held that an arrest was illegal where the arresting officerwas informed of an outstanding warrant forthe defendant's arrest, but later inquiry revealed the warrant had been recalled six months earlier. Ramirez, 34 Cal. 3d at 546. The Ramirez court reasoned that while the fellow officer rule allows an officer without personal knowledge to rely on information provided by 

### other law enforcement personnel, the rule also imposes on law enforcement a 

### Responsibilityto disseminate onlyaccurate information." jd. at 547.No. 68105-2-1/8 

### Both Mance and Ramirez involved the question of whether probable cause 

### supported awarrantless felony arrest.4 Mance and Ramirez donotremotely standfor the position that information notcommunicated to the investigating officer may serveto invalidate an investigatory stop, where the facts known to the officer were sufficientto 

### warrant the intrusion. The Mance court itselfsuggested that the rule would not apply, and that the ultimately incorrect information in the police bulletin may have been sufficient to support Mance's temporary detention. Mance, 82 Wn. App. at 545. We agree. Extending such a rule to investigatory detentions would be contrary to wellsettled principles. Our constitutional requirements are satisfied ifthe detaining officer can identify specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991). In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's determination, we look to totality ofthe circumstances known by the detaining officer at thetime ofthe stop. Id.: State v. Jones, 117Wn. App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110(2003). Importantly, even ifthefellow officerrule were applicableto an investigatorystop, the facts here are distinguishable from the cases applying it. Officer Dodd relied on the warrant, the representation of Sampson that only two women were present in the house, and the fact that Lee was present to stop and question him. The warrant



### 4 In Ortega, our Supreme Courtrecently declined to apply the fellow officer rule to warrantless misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor arrests because the rule is inconsistent with the unambiguous presence requirement of RCW 10.31.100. Ortega, 2013 WL 1163954, at *4-*5. 8No. 68105-2-1/9
information was not erroneous. Unlike Mance and Ramirez, no erroneous information was communicatedto or relied upon by Officer Dodd. Because Lee fails to demonstrate that the officer's request for his identification 

### violated his constitutional rights, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:



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