PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

Nos. 19-1254, 19-2770

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

C.S.,

 Appellant

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-18-cr-00376-001)

District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion

_____________

Argued April 14, 2020 

_____________

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: May 15, 2020)

_____________

Kim D. Daniel [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney
2

Middle District of Pennsylvania

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellee

Quin M. Sorenson [ARGUED]

Office of Federal Public Defender

100 Chestnut Street

Suite 306

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellant

_____________

OPINION

_____________

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

C.S., a seventeen-year old, was adjudicated delinquent 

as a result of threats he made in an Internet chatroom dedicated 

to discussing terroristic attacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 875(c). During several conversations, C.S. made threats 

against a local church. Although juvenile proceedings are 

usually sealed, the District Court permitted the Government to 

notify the church that it was the subject of a threat and that the 

party who communicated the threat had been prosecuted. The 

order did not identify C.S.
3

C.S. appeals the judgment and the notification order, 

arguing that the District Court: (1) erred in finding that his 

statements qualified as threats under § 875(c), and (2) violated 

the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile and Delinquency 

Prevention Act of 1974 (“JDA”), Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 

1109 (codified as amended in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 5031-5038), in allowing the Government to notify the 

church of the threats. Because the evidence proved that C.S.

made threats that violated § 875(c) and the District Court acted

well within its discretion in issuing the notification order, we 

will affirm.

I

A

C.S. participated in online group chats. One of those 

chats was dedicated to discussing the Islamic State. The 

Islamic State is a terrorist organization, often referred to as 

“ISIS,” an acronym for the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.” 

App. 135. 

In the chatroom, C.S. used a screenname that evoked 

allegiance to Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas, and he shared 

a photo of himself wearing a headscarf and a headband of 

another terrorist organization, Hamas. He had conversations 

with, among others, “Zubair,” who lived outside Pennsylvania. 

App. 137. C.S. and Zubair discussed obtaining ISIS weaponry

and conducting ISIS-inspired attacks. One of their 

conversations proceeded as follows:

Zubair: are you planning an attack in the future

Zubair: or willing to
4

C.S.: I’ll be willing to I don’t have any plans

Zubair: I need help for one I’m planning

C.S.: Ah

C.S.: Ok

. . . 

C.S.: Anyways

I’m going to bed soon

So can we discuss the help

Zubair: DC1

C.S.: hmm

Zubair: u calling cops now Lol

C.S.: No

C.S.: I don’t have a reason to

App. 627-30. 

Later, after exchanging pictures of themselves in 

Islamic fighter garb, Zubair sent a photo of the Washington 

Monument. App. 633. The conversation continued:

C.S.: Washington

Zubair: yes

. . .

Zubair: would that not be amazing

. . .

C.S.: It would be

. . .

C.S.: Ok going to try to reflect on how ISIS did on 

Paris

They did damage yes

But there were a lot

1

“DC” refers to Washington, DC.
5

Washington definitely has more security and 

agencies that have military grade weapons that 

will respond quick

I’ll recommend maybe a group of 6

With bomb or weapon

Maybe both

. . .

C.S.: Yes the Washington memorial sounds like a 

great target

. . .

Zubair: Is [the White House] to far away to shoot at 

[from the top of the Washington Monument]?

C.S.: Mmm

Perhaps not

If the bullet isn’t too heavy it should

Be shootable

App. 634-42. 

The two then discussed the appropriate weapons and 

their experience with them. The conversation thereafter 

turned to a discussion of churches in their respective areas:

Zubair: disgusting they brainwash children

C.S.: It’s very big 

And tomorrow there will [be] a bunch of 

Christians 

Yes

The Church has a daycare center too

 They are blind

App. 649-50.

The conversation continued about various targets:
6

C.S.: I brought a gun to [school] but I [didn’t] pull it

out

Zubair: yea

good because we can do bigger things

C.S.: yes

. . .

Or Wait for a riot in Harrisburg

. . .

Or if Christians trigger me then I go at the 

church

. . .

Too bad the Military and agencies deploy and 

are plentiful in DC

Deploy quickly

Zubair: we can go inside [the Washington Monument]

C.S.: Yea

And snipe from the top

. . .

Zubair: we should meet sometime

the few mujahideen here should stick together

C.S.: Yes

May allah guide us

. . . 

Zubair: would you help me attack america under the 

caliphate flag

C.S.: Yes

. . .

Zubair: we should meet somewhere near DC and plan 

it

C.S.: Yes

We should recruit very many 

. . .
7

Zubair: we will kill many crusaders

C.S.: I hope

. . .

C.S.: I’m going to a arts and craft store and I’ll try 

to buy 

pipes, latches and model rocket engines

App. 655-71.

The next day, the two returned to their discussion about 

targeting Christians and a church:

Zubair: I’m thinking of throwing [a Molotov cocktail]

on someone’s house

C.S.: That’s what I want to do

Zubair: a catholic family

or lutheran

C.S.: The church [is nearby].

. . .

I’ll try not to get caught

Maybe I can sabotage their vans

App. 697-99.

In addition to the conversations with Zubair, C.S. made 

statements in the chatroom to a confidential informant that 

echoed his statements to Zubair. When asked in the group chat 

if he lived close to Washington, C.S. replied that he lived close 

to Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and Harrisburg and 

that “there is a big ass church” near him. App. 511. The 

confidential informant asked C.S. if he would attack soon and 

what he wanted to target. C.S. replied that he was “still 

preparing and gathering equipment” and “I haven’t decided 

since I’m of similar distance from DC, NYC, and Philadelphia. 
8

And slightly further Pittsburg [sic] . . . . And there is a church

[is nearby] . . . . I need to choose carefully.” App. 383-85.

Law enforcement thereafter searched C.S.’s home and

cell phone. In his home, agents discovered assault rifles, 

ammunition, a crossbow, a headscarf, smoke bombs, grenade 

casings, military-style ammunition vest and gear, and a longbladed knife. His cell phone revealed Internet searches,

literature about making explosives, Islamic Jihadi propaganda 

videos depicting beheadings, and photos of C.S. posing with 

his assault rifle while wearing military gear and head scarf. 

B

The Government charged C.S. with making interstate 

threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and filed a 

certification to proceed under the JDA because C.S. was under 

eighteen years old.2 The District Court held a delinquency 

hearing, where the Government presented the chatroom

transcripts, the results of the searches, and C.S.’s post-arrest 

statements to law enforcement. For his part, C.S. testified that 

2

Juvenile proceedings under the JDA differ from adult 

criminal proceedings. Juveniles who are found to have 

committed a crime are deemed delinquent, rather than guilty. 

United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1355, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994). 

See generally United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 

(10th Cir. 1990) (“Under [the JDA], prosecution results in an 

adjudication of status—not a criminal conviction.”). In 

addition, juveniles are not entitled to indictment by a grand jury 

or a jury trial, but rather receive a bench trial. See United 

States v. Doe, 627 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1980) (collecting 

cases).
9

he made the statements to impress others in the chatrooms, to 

make friends, and to have others believe that he was serious 

about his statements, but that he never intended to carry out the 

attacks.

The District Court found C.S. delinquent. The Court

held that, despite C.S.’s testimony about his underlying 

motivations, C.S. intended that his statements be taken as 

meaningful threats, so they qualified as threats under § 875(c). 

The Court also found that C.S. possessed equipment and 

materials that showed that he intended his statements to be 

taken seriously. After the hearing, the Court released C.S. to 

the custody of his mother and placed him on house arrest 

pending final disposition. 

After the adjudication, the Government moved under 

the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771,

to notify the church and the local police department of his 

threats and placement on house arrest. The Court held that 

the local police were not “crime victims” under the CVRA, but 

that the church was a “crime victim.” App. 11. The Court, 

relying on our precedent in United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353 

(3d Cir. 1994), then observed that while the JDA provides that 

juvenile proceedings are generally confidential, it had the 

discretion to issue an order permitting the Government to 

notify the leader of the church that:

a. a threat was made against the Church by a 

juvenile, who was arrested;

b. the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for 

communicating interstate threats against the 

Church;
10

c. the juvenile is currently under G.P.S. 

surveillance on house arrest; and

d. the juvenile’s dispositional hearing will take 

place on a date yet to be determined.

App. 13-14. C.S. appealed that notification order, and, at his 

request, the Court stayed the notification pending appeal. The 

Court thereafter sentenced C.S. to time served and juvenile 

delinquent supervision until his twenty-first birthday. C.S.

appealed the final disposition, and we consolidated the appeals.

II3

We have two tasks in this case: first, to examine the 

sufficiency of the evidence and, second, to evaluate whether 

the District Court had the discretion to lift the confidentiality 

that shields juvenile proceedings by permitting notification to 

the victim of the threats.

 

We consider “a sufficiency challenge de novo,” and 

“review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the 

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3231 and 5032. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. When C.S. first appealed the District Court’s 

notification order, the final judgment had not been entered, 

making the appeal interlocutory. There is now a final 

judgment, and because “interlocutory orders . . . merge with 

the final judgment in a case,” we have jurisdiction to review 

the notification order. Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 

221, 228 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 

520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
11

prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 97 n.2 (3d Cir. 

2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 

banc)). In reviewing a conviction or adjudication for violating 

§ 875, we are mindful that “[w]hether a speaker’s language 

constitutes a threat is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact,” 

and the factfinder’s decision is “entitled to great deference by 

this [C]ourt.” United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 555 (3d 

Cir. 1991).4

4 Although C.S. suggests that we must decide 

“[w]hether a statement may qualify as a ‘threat’ as a matter of 

law” and conduct a plenary review of the record, Appellant’s 

Br. at 16 n.5 (citing, e.g., United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287,

298 (3d Cir. 2013)), his arguments actually challenge whether 

the evidence satisfies the legal test for a threat. “[W]hether a 

communication constitutes a threat or a true threat ‘is a matter 

to be decided by the trier of fact,’” that warrants deference. 

Stock, 728 F.3d at 298 (quoting Kosma, 951 F.2d at 555). In a 

rare case, it may be clear as a matter of law that a certain 

category of speech falls outside the statute’s definition of 

“threat.” See id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 

707-08 (1969), where “the Supreme Court held as a matter of 

law that the defendant’s statement was merely ‘political 

hyperbole’ that did not fit within the definition of the phrase 

‘true threat’”). Because the threats here do not fall into such a 

category and the parties’ arguments appropriately focused on 

the evidence and inferences that can be drawn from them, we 

apply the standard of review for sufficiency challenges and do 

not engage in plenary consideration of the record.
12

We review the District Court’s notification order for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Under Seal, 853 F.3d 706, 

725 (4th Cir. 2017) (reviewing order disclosing juvenile 

records under the JDA for abuse of discretion); In re W.R. Huff 

Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(examining “a district court’s determination under the 

CVRA . . . for abuse of discretion”); A.D., 28 F.3d at 1361 

(holding that disclosure of juvenile records under the JDA is 

within the district court’s discretion). 

III

A

We first examine whether there is sufficient evidence to 

sustain the adjudication that C.S. violated § 875(c). Section 

875(c) provides: “Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign 

commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap 

any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall 

be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, 

or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). “Section 875(c) contains both a 

subjective and objective component, and the Government must 

satisfy both in order to convict a defendant under the statute.”5 

5 The threat need not be transmitted to the threatened 

individual. Rather, “in the age of social media . . . the recipient 

of the communication may be a defendant’s Facebook 

followers or even the general public.” United States v. Elonis

(Elonis III), 841 F.3d 589, 597 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016). “For 

example, if a defendant transmits a communication on 

Facebook, he violates Section 875(c) if the communication is 

objectively threatening and the defendant transmitted it for the 
13

United States v. Elonis (Elonis III), 841 F.3d 589, 596 (3d Cir. 

2016).6 The Government adduced sufficient evidence to prove

both components.

1

To satisfy the objective component, the Government 

must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

transmitted a communication that a reasonable person would 

view as a threat.” Id. This “requires the [factfinder] to consider 

the context and circumstances in which a communication was 

made to determine whether a reasonable person would 

purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that it would be 

viewed as a threat by his Facebook followers.” Id.

6 There are three Elonis cases. In the first case, our 

Court held that a § 875(c) conviction requires only that the 

Government prove the objective component. Elonis v. United 

States (Elonis I), 730 F.3d 321, 330-32 (3d Cir. 2013). The 

Supreme Court reversed and held that the Government must 

also prove a subjective component, that is, that the defendant 

communicated his statements with the purpose that they would 

be viewed as threats or knew that his statements would be 

viewed as threats. Elonis v. United States (Elonis II), 135 S. 

Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015). On remand from the Supreme Court, 

we explained that the Supreme Court’s reversal focused only 

on the subjective component and acknowledged that § 875(c) 

has both an objective and subjective component. Elonis III, 

841 F.3d at 596 & n.5. Thus, Elonis I’s discussion of the 

objective component remains good law.
14

consider the communication to be a serious expression of an 

intent to inflict bodily injury on an individual.”7 Id. at 597.

C.S. argues that a reasonable person would not view his 

statements as threats because they were too speculative or 

conditional. This is not a basis to disturb the adjudication. 

There is no rule that conditional statements, statements 

“convey[ing] a vague timeline or condition,” or even wishes 

can never be a true threat. Elonis v. United States (Elonis I), 

730 F.3d 321, 334 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Stock, 728 

F.3d 287, 301 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Kosma, 951 F.2d at 554 

n.8 (stating even if the Court found the statements were “truly 

conditional,” they would still be true threats). Rather, the focus 

is on whether the statements reflect, to a reasonable person, “a 

7 To avoid violating the First Amendment, threat 

statutes can only criminalize “true threats.” Stock, 728 F.3d at 

293-94 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708). “[T]he plain meaning 

of a ‘threat’ under § 875(c) is distinct from the constitutional 

meaning of a ‘true threat’ under the First Amendment,” as 

“‘true threats’ are a specific subset of ‘threats.’” Id. at 294. 

Accordingly, there can be separate inquiries into whether a 

statement is a “threat” under § 875(c) or a “true threat” under 

the First Amendment. Id. C.S. argued to the District Court 

that his statements were neither “true threats” nor “threats.” 

App. 209-13. Neither we nor the Supreme Court has explained 

all the differences between the two phrases. Stock, 728 F.3d 

at 293-94; see also Elonis II, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This Court has not 

defined the meaning of the term ‘threat’ in § 875(c) . . . .”). We 

need not attempt to do so here because C.S.’s delinquency 

adjudication stands under both the case law governing “true 

threats” and that governing “threats.”
15

serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury on an 

individual.” Elonis III, 841 F.3d at 597. 

A rational factfinder could find that a reasonable person 

could consider C.S.’s statements to be “a serious expression of 

an intent to inflict bodily injury.” Id. For example, after stating 

that he had previously brought a gun to school but was waiting 

for a better occasion to engage in violence, C.S. stated: “Or if 

Christians trigger me then I go at the church.” App. 655-56. 

This statement is similar to a statement the Elonis I Court found 

to objectively be a threat: “Try to enforce [a] [protective] 

Order . . . . And if worse comes to worse [sic] [/] I’ve got 

enough explosives to take care of the state police and the 

sheriff’s department.” Elonis I, 730 F.3d at 334. The Elonis I

Court held that “taken as a whole, a jury could have found 

defendant was threatening to use explosives on officers who 

‘[t]ry to enforce an Order’ of protection that was granted to his 

wife.” Id. Similarly, C.S. threatened to attack the church if 

“Christians trigger[ed]” him. App. 655-56. Thus, the 

conditional nature of his statements and absence of definite 

plans do not foreclose a finding by a rational factfinder that the 

statements were objectively threats.

Moreover, “the context and circumstances” in which 

C.S. made his statements about violence and terrorist attacks 

could allow a reasonable person to view them as serious. 

Elonis III, 841 F.3d at 597. C.S. possessed an extensive 

collection of weaponry, and he posted photos displaying those

items to Zubair and other chatroom participants. Accordingly, 

a reasonable person could perceive C.S.’s statements about 

violence and terrorist attacks as serious because he had the 
16

means to act on them.8 Put differently, a reasonable person 

could infer that the seriousness with which C.S. pursued and 

displayed his interest in violence and terrorism shows that 

C.S.’s statements on those subjects were not jokes, hyperbole, 

or throwaway remarks. Therefore, given the context of the 

statements and the statements themselves, a rational factfinder 

could find that a reasonable person would view C.S.’s

statements as a serious expression of an intent to inflict injury.9

2

“[T]o satisfy the subjective component of [§] 875(c), the 

Government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant transmitted a communication for the purpose of 

8 We have held that defendants’ statements about using 

explosives or guns were threats even though there was no 

evidence that the defendants owned explosives or guns or knew 

how to use them. Elonis I, 730 F.3d at 334; Kosma, 951 F.2d 

at 554. Here, C.S. not only made statements about weapons, 

but the search of his house revealed that he had the means to 

do harm, reflecting that his statements show a “serious 

expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury,” Elonis III, 841 

F.3d at 597. 

9 As a final argument, C.S. argues that his statements 

could not be threats because he was merely agreeing with 

Zubair’s threatening statements. The text of the conversations, 

however, shows that C.S. was not simply engaged in polite 

active listening. Rather, he both responded in agreement to 

threats by others and many of his statements reflected his own 

intentions. App. 655-56 (“[I]f Christians trigger me then I go 

at the church[.]”).
17

issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication 

would be viewed as a threat.” Elonis III, 841 F.3d at 596. 

C.S. argues that the subjective component was not 

satisfied because he testified that he “had not intended to join 

any terrorist group or activity” and that he had participated in 

the conversations “because he enjoyed ‘pretend[ing]’ to be a 

‘radical’ and wanted to earn ‘respect’ from other participants.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 22 (quoting App. 183-89, 194-97). Viewing 

all the evidence, however, a rational factfinder could conclude 

that C.S. had the requisite intent. For example, the evidence 

showed that he: (1) performed Internet searches on “mass 

shootings, bomb making, explosives, ISIS fighters, [and] 

videos depicting how to make terroristic items” around the 

same time as he was making the statements, App. 211; see, e.g., 

App. 206-07 (C.S.’s testimony regarding Internet research and 

knowledge of ISIS), 857-83 (catalogue of C.S.’s Internet 

searches and research); (2) was well-versed in the “ISIS 

vernacular” that was used in conjunction with terrorist acts and 

displayed that familiarity in the group chats, e.g. App. 655-71 

(conversation between C.S. and Zubair using ISIS vernacular), 

and this “show[ed] a determined action to assimilate with those 

who use these words as a threat,” App. 212; and (3) possessed 

“head scarves,” e.g. App. 591 (evidence of C.S.’s possession 

of headscarf), and “ISIS insignias,” App. 211. Together, this 

evidence was sufficient to prove that C.S. knew that his 

communications would be viewed as threats and that he wanted 

the listeners to view him as an ISIS-ready fighter. 

C.S.’s argument that he lacked intent because he was 

pretending to be a warrior for respect or acceptance is 

irrelevant to the subjective inquiry. The Government must 

show that C.S. had “knowledge that the communication would 
18

be viewed as a threat.” Elonis III, 841 F.3d at 596. Thus, what 

matters here is whether C.S. knew the other chatroom 

participants would view his statements as threats, not the 

underlying reasons why he participated in the chat. Moreover, 

even if considered, C.S.’s motive revealed that he wanted the 

participants to believe he was serious about their shared

interests, and thereby accept him. Thus, the evidence was 

sufficient to satisfy the subjective component, and the District 

Court’s finding that it was proved must be upheld. See United 

States v. Hoffert, 949 F.3d 782, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2020) (“A 

jury’s verdict must be upheld unless it falls below the threshold 

of ‘bare rationality.’” (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 

650, 656 (2012))); id. at 791 (rejecting defendant’s sufficiency 

challenge based on the absence of witness testimony or direct 

evidence to find he had the requisite state of mind because his 

course of conduct provided sufficient evidence on the intent 

element). 

Because the evidence supports the objective and 

subjective components required for a violation of § 875(c), we 

reject C.S.’s sufficiency challenge.

B

We next examine whether the District Court had the 

authority to enter an order permitting the Government to notify 

the church of the threat directed against it pursuant to the 

CVRA and whether the order was sufficiently tailored to 

protect C.S.’s identity. As we explained in A.D., 28 F.3d at 

1355, the JDA gives district courts the discretion to disclose 

information concerning juvenile proceedings. Here, the 

District Court soundly exercised that discretion in entering the 
19

notification order, and we are satisfied that the order more than 

adequately protects C.S.’s privacy. 

1

The JDA governs proceedings involving persons who 

violate federal law before reaching their eighteenth birthday. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5038; A.D., 28 F.3d at 1355. JDA 

proceedings are “closely analogous to criminal proceedings,” 

but they “are not generally regarded as criminal proceedings.” 

A.D., 28 F.3d at 1358. One core difference is that juvenile 

delinquency proceedings are usually confidential. Id. This is 

because the primary purpose of juvenile proceedings is 

rehabilitation, and “[p]ublic access . . . would embarrass and 

humiliate juveniles, make it difficult to obtain evidence about 

delicate matters, and adversely affect the rehabilitation of 

juveniles by publicly labelling them as criminals.” Id. at 1361.

To that end, the JDA “contains several confidentiality 

provisions.” Id. at 1356. The key provision here is § 5038, 

which provides in relevant part:

(a) Throughout and upon the completion of the 

juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records 

shall be safeguarded from disclosure to 

unauthorized persons. The records shall be 

released to the extent necessary to meet the 

following circumstances:

(1) inquiries received from another court 

of law;

(2) inquiries from an agency preparing a 

presentence report for another court;
20

(3) inquiries from law enforcement 

agencies where the request for 

information is related to the investigation 

of a crime or a position within that 

agency;

(4) inquiries, in writing, from the director 

of a treatment agency or the director of a 

facility to which the juvenile has been 

committed by the court;

(5) inquiries from an agency considering 

the person for a position immediately and 

directly affecting the national security; 

and

(6) inquiries from any victim of such 

juvenile delinquency, or if the victim is 

deceased from the immediate family of 

such victim, related to the final 

disposition of such juvenile by the court 

in accordance with section 5037.

Unless otherwise authorized by this section, 

information about the juvenile record may not be 

released when the request for information is 

related to an application for employment, 

license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege. 

Responses to such inquiries shall not be different 

from responses made about persons who have 

never been involved in a delinquency 

proceeding.
21

. . .

(e) Unless a juvenile who is taken into custody is 

prosecuted as an adult[,] neither the name nor 

picture of any juvenile shall be made public in 

connection with a juvenile delinquency 

proceeding.

§ 5038(a), (e). 

In A.D., we examined whether § 5038 barred press 

access to juvenile proceedings and records. 28 F.3d at 1355. 

We concluded that § 5038 does not mandate closure of all 

juvenile proceedings and sealing of juvenile records because 

the statutory text speaks of only preventing disclosure to 

“unauthorized persons.”10 Id. at 1359 (quoting § 5038(a)). 

Thus, the language contemplates that authorized persons may 

have access to juvenile records. We also explained that 

subsections (a)(1)-(6) mandate disclosure to certain 

individuals, stating that such persons “have a right to access 

the records of the judicial proceeding on request.” Id. (citing 

§ 5038(a)(1)-(6)) (emphasis omitted). We observed that only 

the last paragraph of § 5038(a) bars disclosure. Specifically, 

that paragraph states that “information about the juvenile 

record may not be released when the request for information is 

10 We also rejected the interpretation that the JDA 

barred all disclosure of records or access to proceedings 

because “an across-the-board ban on access to juvenile

proceedings under the Act would pose a substantial

constitutional issue” under the First Amendment. A.D., 28

F.3d at 1358.
22

related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or 

any civil right or privilege.” Id. at 1356 (citing § 5038(a)). 

Reading together § 5038(a)’s opening paragraph, its listed 

situations in (a)(1)-(6), and its final paragraph, we concluded 

that “§ 5038(a) implicitly recognizes that there are situations 

other than those described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) 

and its concluding paragraph in which access could be 

authorized.” Id. at 1359-60. Outside the disclosures mandated 

by (a)(1)-(6) and those barred by the concluding paragraph, 

release of records is within the district court’s discretion, 

weighing “the interests of juveniles” and “objectives of the 

Act” against “the interests of the . . . public.” Id. at 1361.

11

A.D. did not consider the interaction between the JDA 

and the CVRA, as it was decided prior to the latter’s enactment. 

Nor did A.D. identify every interest that would support 

disclosure or “all the factors to be weighted in determining 

whether access [to juvenile proceedings] is appropriate.” Id. at 

1361 n.7 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 

589, 599 (1978)). Rather, we held that “the decision as to 

access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” 

Id. Thus, although A.D. dealt with a press request for access 

to a juvenile proceeding and the associated First Amendment 

interests, it did not limit disclosure to situations involving

constitutional or statutory interests. Instead, we left it to the 

district court’s discretion to identify interests that support 

11 Other Courts of Appeals agree with our interpretation 

of § 5038. Under Seal, 853 F.3d at 727; United States v. 

Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on 

other grounds, 564 U.S. 932 (2011) (per curiam); United States 

v. Eric B., 86 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 

Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1995).
23

disclosure and to balance them against the juvenile’s interest 

in confidentiality. Id. at 1360-61. 

Because disclosure need not be explicitly authorized by 

a constitutional or statutory provision, the District Court could

have cited a general interest in victim notification without 

reference to the CVRA. See Under Seal, 853 F.3d at 714, 727-

28 (explaining that A.D.’s interpretation of the JDA recognized 

that “permissive disclosure authority . . . has the virtue of 

allowing district courts to accommodate disclosure requests in 

the event that the Constitution requires or at least arguably 

requires disclosure”). The victim’s interest in being notified 

about the proceedings is a public interest that is proper to 

balance against the juvenile’s interest in confidentiality and 

may warrant disclosure.

2

While a specific statutory or constitutional interest is 

not required to permit disclosure, here the notification was 

authorized under the CVRA. The CVRA “guarantees to the 

victims of federal crimes an array of substantive and 

participatory rights.”12 In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 174 

(2d Cir. 2009); see also § 3771(a). As relevant here, subsection 

(a) of the CVRA guarantees victims “[t]he right to be 

reasonably protected from the accused,” “[t]he right to 

reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court 

proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or 

of any release or escape of the accused,” and “the right to be 

12 “The term ‘crime victim’ means a person directly and 

proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal 

offense[.]” § 3771(e)(2)(A). 
24

informed for the rights under this subsection.” § 3771(a)(1), 

(2), (10). The CVRA: (1) obliges courts, “[i]n any court 

proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim,” to 

“ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in 

subsection (a),” § 3771(b)(1); and (2) requires the Government 

“make [its] best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, 

and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a),” 

§ 3771(c)(1). The rights are enforceable by motion of the 

crime victim or the Government. § 3771(d)(1), (3).

C.S. argues that notification was not permitted under 

subsection (a)(1) because it did not serve the “[t]he right to be 

reasonably protected from the accused.” § 3771(a)(1). 

However, the church was one of the targets of C.S.’s threats, 

and the District Court concluded that it qualified as a “crime 

victim.” App. 11. Thus, the Court reasonably found that 

notifying the church of C.S.’s threats and house arrest would 

serve its “right to be reasonably protected from the accused.”13 

§ 3771(a)(1).

C.S. asserts that the District Court did not view him as 

a danger. He relies on a statement the Court made in evaluating 

conditions of release or detention pending final disposition, in 

which it noted that, while C.S.’s statements constituted threats, 

“it was clear . . . that the defendant did not have the capability 

nor the intent to actually carry out those threats.” App. 224. 

Subsection (a)(1), however, gives a crime victim the textually 

13 Indeed, as the proceedings have been under seal, it 

would be impossible for the church to avail itself of its right to 

inquire about C.S.’s final disposition under § 5038(a)(6) 

without notification by the Government. 
25

broad right to reasonable protection from the accused. The 

District Court’s ruling comported with that right.

C.S. also argues that his proceeding was not a “public 

court proceeding,” so the notification order cannot serve as a 

“notice of any” such proceeding under subsection (a)(2). 

Appellant’s Br. at 25. He is mistaken for several reasons.

First, whether and the degree to which a juvenile 

proceeding or its records are public are left to the discretion of 

the district court. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1359. When applying the 

CVRA here, the District Court here concluded that the records 

should be public to some degree, so a portion of this proceeding 

could qualify as a “public court proceeding.” See United States 

v. L.M., 425 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954-55, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2006) 

(deciding a CVRA motion filed in a juvenile proceeding by 

first concluding, per A.D., that the records should be made 

public, then concluding that they fell within the CVRA).

Second, the text and structure of subsection (a)(2) 

indicate that crime victims have a right to notice of an 

accused’s release even if the accused’s proceedings were not 

“public court proceedings.” The subsection begins with the 

subject phrase “[t]he right to reasonable, accurate, and timely 

notice” and is followed with two parallel prepositional 

phrases14 separated by the disjunctive (“or”): (1) “of any public 

14 “A prepositional phrase is composed of ‘[a] 

preposition and its object and modifiers [and] may be used as 

a noun, an adjective, or an adverb.’” Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. 

v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 107 F.3d 451, 455 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting William A. Sabin, The Gregg Reference Manual 476 
26

court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the 

crime,” and (2) “of any release or escape of the accused.” 

§ 3771(a)(2). When a subject is followed by two prepositional 

phrases, the phrases can each modify the subject. See Int’l 

Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 

U.S. 72, 80 (1991) (holding that a statute permitting removal if 

the defendant is “[a]ny officer of the United States or [of] any 

agency thereof” “permits removal by anyone who is an 

‘officer’ either ‘of the United States’ or of one of its agencies” 

(alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1))). 

Accordingly, subsection (a)(2) provides for “notice” either “of 

any public court proceeding” or “of any release or escape of 

the accused.” Indeed, it makes sense to provide a right to 

notification of release or escape untethered to a public court 

proceeding because the victim of a criminal-at-large convicted 

in a sealed proceeding is in equal danger as a victim of a 

criminal-at-large convicted in a pubic proceeding. See United 

States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 

89, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (instructing that we avoid interpretations 

that create inconsistency with the statute’s purpose). This 

interpretation of subsection (a)(2) demonstrates that the 

District Court properly granted the Government’s CVRA 

motion because it furthered the church’s “right to reasonable, 

accurate, and timely notice . . . of any release . . . of the 

accused.” § 3771(a)(2).

3

Indeed, the JDA contemplates the disclosures at issue

here. As stated previously, the JDA sets forth several 

(7th ed. 1992)). “Of” is a preposition. “Of,” Oxford English 

Dictionary (online ed. 2020).
27

circumstances in which juvenile records “shall be released to 

the extent necessary to meet” those circumstances. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 5038(a). One circumstance is to respond to “inquiries from 

any victim of such juvenile delinquency, or if the victim is 

deceased from the immediate family member of such victim, 

related to the final disposition of such juvenile by the court in 

accordance with section 5037.” § 5038(a)(6). This concept,

receiving an inquiry from a victim, presupposes that the victim 

had notice of the crime. Notice to the victim, in other words,

ensures that he can make the inquiries and receive the 

responses envisioned under subsection (a)(6).15 The JDA itself 

contemplates notification to the victim, and thus supports 

disclosure.

4

C.S.’s argument that the notification order is overly

broad also fails. C.S. asserts that the order could enable the 

church-leader to identify him and that the order does not 

restrict the leader’s ability to disseminate the information he or 

she receives. C.S.’s first contention, that the order could allow 

the church-leader to identify him, fails because the District 

15 Some crimes may occur before a victim has 

knowledge of the offense, such as identity theft, in which a 

defendant commits a theft or deception using a person’s 

identity and the person does not learn about the crime until 

sometime thereafter. The fact that the person is unaware of the 

crime at the moment that it is committed, however, does not 

make him any less entitled to information about the disposition 

of the case. Notice to that person would ensure that he could 

make the inquiries necessary to obtain that dispositional 

information.
28

Court directed that “the Government’s notification shall not 

provide any information revealing [C.S.] as the source of the 

threats; this includes information that could allow someone to 

deduce that [C.S.] is the juvenile, such as identifying [where]

the minor lives” in relation to the church. App. 12. Thus, the 

Court’s instructions protect C.S. from identification. 

We recognize the considerable importance of protecting 

the juvenile’s identity, but here C.S.’s argument that the 

church-leader should not be able to share the information at all 

makes little sense because restricting how the leader can use 

the information would hamper his ability to protect the church, 

as that protection could include sharing the information with 

others. The order is also appropriately circumscribed because 

it (1) does not allow disclosure of C.S.’s name or photo, which 

§ 5038(e) forbids; and (2) is more limited than the 

Government’s request, as it did not permit disclosure to the 

local police, because, under the facts of this case, they were not 

“crime victims” entitled to notification. By focusing on the 

church-leader, the Court reasonably concluded that he was in 

the best position to determine what, if any, responses were 

necessitated by the information. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 

of delinquency and the notification order.