This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 JOSE RODRIGUEZ JR., 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,232 4 CARLOS VALDEZ and 5 MARIA VALDEZ, 6 Defendants-Appellants, 7 Consolidated with 8 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 9 JOSE M. RODRIGUEZ, Deceased. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY 11 J.C. Robinson, District Judge 12 Lopez, Dietzel & Perkins, PC 13 William John Perkins 14 Sliver City, NM 15 for Appellee 16 The Simons Firm, LLP 17 Daniel H. Friedman 18 Faith Lesley Kalman Reyes 19 Santa Fe, NM 202 Frederick H. Sherman 1 Deming, NM 2 for Appellants 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 GARCIA, Judge. 5
{1} Defendants-Appellants Carlos Valdez and Maria Rodriguez Valdez 6 (collectively referred to as “Daughter”) app eal the district court’s order setting aside 7 the will of their father, Jose M. R odriguez, Sr. (“the Deceased”). [DS 2] This Court 8 issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Daughter has filed a memorandum 9 opposing this Court’s proposed disposition, and has moved to amend the docketing 10 statement. Daughter’s motion to amend the docketing statement is denied, and having 11 given due consideration to Daughter’s arguments in opposition, we affirm. 12 A. Motion to Amend Docketing Statement 13
{2} As an initial matter, Daughter move s to amend the docketing statement to 14 “assist the [C]ourt in more fully understanding the issues on appeal, justify placing 15 this appeal on the [g]eneral [c]alendar, [and] eliminate certain appellate issues set forth 16 in the original [d]ocketing [s]tatement[.]” [MIO 13] In cases assigned to the summary 17 calendar, this Court will grant a motion toamend the docketing statement to include 18 additional issues if the motion (1) is timely, (2) states all facts material to a 19 consideration of the new issues sought to beraised, (3) explains how the issues were 203 properly preserved or why they may be raised for the first time on appeal, (4) 1 demonstrates just cause or excuse by expl aining why the issues were not originally 2 raised in the docketing statement, and (5) complies in other respects with the appellate 3 rules. State v. Rael , 1983-NMCA-081, ¶ 15, 100 N.M. 193, 668 P.2d 309. 4
{3} In the present case, Daughter does not seek to add an issue that was not raised 5 in the docketing statement. Accordingly, we deny Daughter’s motion to amend the 6 docketing statement. See generally State v. Munoz , 1990-NMCA-109, ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 7 118, 802 P.2d 23 (explaining that we deny mo tions to amend the docketing statement 8 if the issue that the appellant is seeking to raise is not viable). To the extent Daughter 9 seeks to add additional facts or legal arguments in support of her issues that were not 10 provided in the docketing statement, [MIO 13] we consider this information in the 11 context of Daughter’s issues as part of Daughter’s memorandum in opposition. 12
{4} We next address Daughter’s argument in her memorandum in opposition that 13 this case should be placed on the general calendar because a thorough review of the 14 transcripts is required for this Court to obtain a full picture of the facts. [MIO 1–2] We 15 disagree. “It has never been held that a co mplete verbatim transcript of proceedings 16 is necessary to afford ad equate appellate review.” State v. Talley , 1985-NMCA-058, 17 ¶ 23, 103 N.M. 33, 702 P.2d 353. In cases a ssigned to the summary calendar, the 18 docketing statement serves as “an adequate alternative toa complete transcript of 194 proceedings[,]” unless the assertions of the docketing statement are contradicted by 1 the record. Id. Under Rule 12-208 NMRA, it is trial counsel’s responsibility to provide 2 this Court with a full picture of the facts. Rule 12-208 sets forth the information that 3 must be included in the docketing statement, including “a concise, accurate statement 4 of the case summarizing all facts material to a consideration of the issues presented[.]” 5 Rule 12–208(D)(3). If this Court believes the facts that are contained in the docketing 6 statement or contained in the record are suff icient to enable us to resolve the issues 7 raised on appeal, we will assign the case tothe summary calendar, which we did in 8 this case. See Udall v. Townsend, 1998-NMCA-162, ¶ 3, 126 N.M. 251, 968 P.2d 341. 9 We have determined that we can resolve this case on the summary calendar, and 10 accordingly, we proceed below to addre ss the arguments in Daughter’s memorandum 11 in opposition. 12 B. Sufficiency of Evidence (Issues A, C, D, F, and H) 13
{5} Daughter maintains that there is insu fficient evidence to support the district 14 court’s determination that th e Deceased lacked testamentarycapacity to execute a will. 15 [MIO 2–6; DS 21–23, 26–27] In support of her contention, Daughter asserts that the 16 testimony of Felix Jaramillo, a former atto rney and witness to the signing of the 17 Deceased’s will, establishes th at the Deceased was in a peri od of lucidity at the time 18 he signed his will. [MIO 1–3] In this Court’s notice of proposed summary disposition, 195 we pointed out that sufficient evidence was presented, in the form of testimony from 1 Dr. Jennifer Agosta, the Deceased’s personal physician, as well as from Martha Noel, 2 another daughter of the Deceased, to indi cate that Deceased had decreased cognitive 3 function, and to support the district court’s finding that the Deceased lacked 4 testamentary capacity to execute a will. [CN 2–4] 5
{6} We note, as an initial matter, that contrary to Daughter’s assertion, [MIO 2–3] 6 Mr. Jaramillo’s testimony does not establis h that the Deceased experienced a lucid 7 interval. [MIO 3] Mr. Jaramillo’s testimony merely states his opinion that, at the time 8 of the execution of the will, the Deceasedunderstood what hewas doing. [MIO 3] 9 Nevertheless, even if Mr. Jaramillo’s te stimony could be viewed to support the 10 proposition that the Deceased experienced lu cid intervals, the district court was 11 entitled to weigh Mr. Jaramillo’s tes timony, along with the rest of the 12 testimony—namely the opinion of Dr. Agosta , the CT scan results, and the testimony 13 of Martha Noel—when making its determin ation about the Deceased’s testamentary 14 capacity. The district court was in the bestposition to weigh the credibility of all of 15 the witness and determine whether or not the will contestant (in this case, Jose 16 Rodriguez, Jr. (“Son”)) met his burden of proof to establish the Deceased’s lack of 17 testamentary capacity by clear and convincing evidence. Chapman v. Varela , 2009- 18 NMSC-041, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 680, 213 P.3d 1109 (stating that, on appeal, our Court 196 defers to the district court’s assessment of witness credibility and resolution of 1 conflicting evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 2 party and disregarding any evidence and inferences to the contrary); seeNMSA 1978, 3 § 45-3-407 (1975) (“Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of 4 testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake or 5 revocation.”). Accordingly, we affirm. 6 C. Cross-Examination of Dr. Agosta (Issue E) 7
{7} Daughter continues to assert that the di strict court erred by refusing to allow 8 cross-examination of a witness (Dr. Agosta) for a second time, after the district asked 9 clarifying questions, for the asserted reas on that Dr. Agosta changed her position 10 regarding the Deceased’s testamentary capacity. [MIO 7; DS 24; RP v.2/158, 198] 11 Our notice observed that the district court’s questions were of a clarifying nature, and 12 because Daughter already had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Agosta, any 13 further cross-examination was discretionary with the district court. [CN 7] In her 14 memorandum in opposition, Daughter states th at the district court’s questions were 15 not of a clarifying nature, [MIO 7] but rais ed a new issue that warranted further cross16 examination by Daughter’s attorney. [MIO 9] 17
{8} We are unpersuaded that Dr. Agosta’s prior testimony was inconsistent with her 18 response to the district court’s questions . The questioning of Dr. Agosta up until that 197 point [MIO 4–5] indicated that Dr. Agos ta thought that, in 2011, the Deceased had 1 age-associated cognitive changes. [MIO 5] When Dr. Agosta was asked by Son’s 2 attorney directly for her opinion as to th e Deceased’s capacity toexecute a will, she 3 stated that she had no reason to think that the Deceased possessed the required 4 capacities. [MIO 4] When the district court re-asked the question, Dr. Agosta gave a 5 differently-worded response that maintained the same position that she previously had 6 taken. The district court’s question did not delve into subject matter that had not 7 already been explicitly examined by the parties, and Dr. Agosta did not change her 8 position. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 9 by not allowing Daughter’s attorney to c onduct additional cross-examination of Dr. 10 Agosta. See Empire W. Companies, Inc. v. Albuquerque Testing Laboratories, Inc. , 11 1990-NMSC-096, ¶ 8, 110 N.M. 790, 800 P.2d 725 (explaining that “after the right 12 to cross-examination has been substantiallyexercised[,]. . . the right to further 13 examination become[s] discretionary”). 14 D. Cross-Examination of Felix Jaramillo (Issue G ) 15
{9} Daughter continues to argues that the di strict court improperly permitted Son’s 16 attorney to cross-examine a witness, FelixJaramillo, with respect to a disciplinary 17 complaint with the New Me xico Bar. [MIO 10] Daughter argues that the line of 18 questioning about the disciplinary complaint was inappropriate because “counsel’s 198 questions shed no light on Mr . Jaramillo’s truthfulness or untruthfulness, a necessary 1 requirement of [Rule 11-608 NMRA].” [MIO 11] Further, Daughter argues that as a 2 result of the improper admission of Mr. Jaramillo’s statement that he resigned from 3 the practice of law due to disciplinary actions, the district court erroneously 4 discounted Mr. Jaramillo’s te stimony about the D eceased’s mental capacity at the time 5 of the execution of his will. [MIO 12] 6
{10} We are unpersuaded. The memorandum in opposition indicates that Son’s 7 attorney discontinued his questioning of Mr. Jaramillo upon Mr. Jaramillo’s statement 8 that he voluntarily resigned from the practi ce of law, at which poi nt it became evident 9 that the New Mexico Bar did not specifically find Mr. Jaramillo to have committed 10 an act of untruthfulness. [MIO 11] See Rule 11-608 NMRA (permitting, on cross11 examination, inquiry into specific instances of a witness’ conduct if they are probative 12 of the witness’ character for truthfulness) . Because the district court needed to hear 13 some information about the nature of th e disciplinary proceeding, and whether it 14 resulted in any finding of untruthfulness, in order to determine whether such inquiry 15 was even admissible, we see no error. See State v. Pickett , 2009-NMCA-077, ¶ 13, 16 146 N.M. 655, 213 P.3d 805 (explaining that in a bench trial, “we generally presume 17 that a judge is able to properly weigh th e evidence, and thus the erroneous admission 18 of evidence in a bench trial is harmless unless it appears that the judge must have 199 relied upon the improper evidence in renderi ng a decision” (internal quotation marks 1 and citation omitted)). 2
{11} However, even assuming that this line of cross-examination was improper, there 3 is nothing to indicate that the district court inappropriately used this information in 4 making its ultimate findings. See id. Although Daughter argues that the district court’s 5 finding that “Defendants provided no evidence sufficient to rebut Dr. Agosta’s 6 evaluation of [the Deceased’s] diminishedmental capacity due to dementia/age7 associated cognitive impairment” indicates that the district court improperly 8 discounted Mr. Jaramillo’s testimony about the Deceased’s testamentary capacity, 9 [MIO 12 (emphasis in original)] we disagree. It was within the district court’s purview 10 to consider Mr. Jaramillo’s testimony, along with all of the other testimony presented, 11 and assign relative weight and credibility toall of the testimony, to determine that 12 Daughter did not provide testimony sufficient to rebut that given by Dr. Agosta. 13 Chapman v. Varela , 2009-NMSC-041, ¶ 5 (stating that , on appeal, our Court defers 14 to the district court’s assessment of witn ess credibility and resolution of conflicting 15 evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and 16 disregarding any evidence and inferen ces to the contrary). We affirm. 17
{12} Lastly, we note that Daughter specifically abandons issues B, I, and J, relating 18 to notice, telephonic testimony, and fraud on the court, and as such, we do not address 1910 these issues. [MIO 13] See State v. Johnson , 1988-NMCA-029, ¶ 8, 107 N.M. 356, 1 758 P.2d 306 (holding that when a case is d ecided on the summary calendar, an issue 2 is deemed abandoned where a party fails torespond to the proposed disposition of the 3 issue). 4
{13} In sum, we affirm for the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of 5 proposed disposition, and deny Daughter’s motion to amend the docketing statement. 6
{14} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________________ ______________ 8 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 9

WE CONCUR: 10

_______________________________ 11 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 12

_______________________________ 13 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 14