### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A pr i l 22, 2008 S e s s i on
W A Y FO R D D EM O N BR EU N , J R
. v . STA TE O F TEN N ESSEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 94-B-1131 Cher yl Blackb urn, Jud ge

No . M 20 07 -0 19 34 -C CA -R 3- HC 

### - F il e d Jun e 24, 200 8

In 1997, a Da

vidson County

jur y co n v i ct ed the Petitioner, Way ford De monbreun, Jr., of one count of second deg ree murder and one count of ag g ravated assault, and the tri al co u rt s entenc ed him to an effe ctive sente nce of twenty -five year s in prison. T h e P et i t i oner f iled a petition for habea s corpus re lief, his third such petition, alleg ing that his con v i ct i o n is void because : (1) the t ri al court never c onducted a hear ing on his motion for ne w trial and, the ref ore, ne ver pe rfor

med his du ty a s a th i rt e e n thj ur o r ; an d

( 2 ) th e tr i a l c o urtl a c k e d s t a tu t o r y a u th o r i ty t o r e n d e r a v a lid judgme nt pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 17- 1 -305. The ha beas c ourt denied the p et i t i o n

. On appea l, the Petitioner contends that the ha beas c ourt err ed. F inding no e rror , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he ha be a s c ourt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D A V I D H. W ELLES and J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Theodora A. Pappas, Na shville, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, Way ford De monbreun, Jr.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic hael E. Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; Eliz abeth B . Marne y , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Johnson, I I I , District At t o rney Gene ral; B ret Gunn, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. F acts The Petitioner pled guilty to second de g ree murd er an dag g ravated assault and r ece ived an ef fec tive twenty -five year

sentenc e. He fi l ed an appea l, challeng ing the sufficie ncy of the evide n ce, and this Court affirmed the convictions. Sta tev . W ay for d D e mo nb re un J

r. , No. M1998-00239-CCA-WRM-PC , 2000 WL236458, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar . 3,-2-

2000), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . Se pt. 25 , 2 00 0). Th e P eti tio ne r t he n f ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief, alleg ing that he re ce i v ed t h e ineffec tive assistance of counse l at trial and on
a pp e a l. T he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , a nd thi s Co urt affirm e d th a t ju dg me nt. W ay for d D e mo nb re un , J

r. v . S tate , No. M2002 -0 2 1 9 5 -CCA-R3-PC, 2003 W L22663212, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 7, 2003), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Ma r. 8, 2004).
The P e ti ti o n e r

f il e d h is f ir s t p e ti ti o nf

o r h a b e a s c o r p u s r e li e f in O c to b e r 2 0 0 4 , ma king two arguments: (1) that he should be gr anted ha beas c orpus re lief bec ause he did not rece ive a hearing or disposition on hi s motion for a newtrial; and (2) that his sentence s were un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y e n h an c e d i nv i o l at i o no f

h i s r i g h t s t o a

j ur y tr i a l a s p r o s c r i b e d

b y Blakely

v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The habea s corpus c ourt dismissed the petiti o n for habeas corpus r eli ef

, an dthis Court affirmed. W ay for d D e mo nb re un , J

r. v . S tate , M2004-03037-CCAR3-HC , 2 0 0 5 WL1541873, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 30, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. O ct. 31, 2005). In our opinion, we he ld:

The pe titioner’s argument relating to the lac k o f h ea ri n g and disposition of his moti on for a

new tria l is n o t a co gn izable claim entitling him to habea s corpus relief . First, it is our view that a motion for a new t ri al is a proce dural require ment, any

defe ct of whic h would rende r a judg ment voidabl e n o t void. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ). F ur the rm or e, th is i ssu e wa s a dd re sse d b y thi s Co ur

t in both the petitioner’s di rect and post-convic tion appeals. As we explained, the petitioner had no c onstit utional rig ht to be prese nt at a hea ringon his moti on for new tria l. See D emonbre un , 2 0 0 3 WL 2 2 6 6 3 2 1 2 , a t * 3

. “ [T ]h e la c k o f a he aring itself aff orded no c onstitu tional peril to the petitioner” be cause the only issue prese n t ed in hi s motion for new trial wa s the sufficie ncy of the c onvicting evid ence which wa s resolved on dire ct appe al. Id. There fore , the petitioner
c ann ot n owre surr e c t an is su e la id t o r e st b y thi s Co ur

t by atte mpt ingto r e fr ame it on collater al attack

. E v en assuming a rguendo, that the pe titioner had a
con stitut ion a l r ig ht t o a

he ari ngon

his mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l, w e have pr e vio us ly he ld t hat c on sti tut ion a l in fi rm iti e s c re a te vo ida ble jud g me nts no t vo id j ud g me nts unless the fa ce of t h e re co rd establishes that the tr ial court did not have jurisdiction to convict o r s en t ence the petitioner. Se e Lut tre ll v . S tate , 644 S.W .2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)

. Demonbre un , 2005 WL1541873, at *2 (some c itations omi tted). We also co n cl u d ed in t hat op ini on that th e Pe tit ion e r’ s Blakely argument failed.
The Petitioner filed a

second pe tition for habea s corpus re lief in M ar ch 2005, alleg ing that hi s c onvic tio n w a s v oid be c a us e the g ra

nd jur y ind ic ted hi m on

a c ha rg e of atte mpt e d f

ir st deg ree murder not a g g ravated assault. The habeas corpus c ourt dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appea led. Ultimately , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court decide d this ca s e, an dit held that the Petitioner eff

ectivel y ag ree d to amend the indictment to include a g g ravated assault whe n he reque sted that the jury

be instructed on this o ffense. De mo nb re un v . B e ll , 226 S.W .3d 321, 322 (Tenn. 2007)

.T h i s w as t h e s t at u t e i n e f f ec t a t t h e t i me t h e Pet i t i on er c ommi t t ed t h e of f en s es f or w h i ch h e wa s c on v i ct ed. 1
-3- Before the af

oreme ntioned Tenne ssee Supre me Court decision wa s relea sed, the Pe tit ion e r f

ile d a thi rd pe tit ion fo r h a be a s c or pu s r e lie f. In th is p e tit ion he a ll eged his jud g me nts wer e void for two r easons. First, the judg ments were void beca use he ne ver r ece ived a he aring
on his mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, whe re the tr ia l ju dg e wo uld have pe rf

or me d hi s rol e as th e thi rt e e nth juror. Th e Pe tit ion e r a sse rt e d th at th e jud g e ’s ro le a s a thi rt e e nth

jur or is a ne c e ssa ry pr e re qu isi te to the imposit ion of a va lid judgment, and, a s the t ri al co u rt failed to pe rfor m this role, it lacked the authority

to enter a v ali d judgme nt in the Petiti oner’ s case . Second, the Petitioner a sserted that the trial cour

t l ac ked the statutory

authority to enter a

valid judgme nt pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 17-1-305 ( 1993), which re quires the tria l court to g rant t h e P etitioner a 1
ne w tri a l si nc e his mot ion fo r n e w tri a l w a s p e ndin g wh en th e tr ia l ju dg e wh o p re sid e d o ve r h is trial died.
The h ab ea s corpus c ourt held that this issue was pre viously litigated in the Petitioner’ s first p et i t i o n for ha

beas c orpus re lief. I t then followed the same re asoningwhen it denied the Petitioner’s petition on this g round. The habea s corpus court examined whether the petitioner
was e ntitled to relief pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 17-1-30 5

. T h e habea s court relied upon the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s d ec i sion on the Petiti oner’ s second ha beas c orpus claim to deny

the P et i t i o n er re lief. In that opinion, the Court stated, “The c onviction is not voi d, and the pe titioner is not entitl ed to habe as cor pus relief .” Demonbre un , 226 S.W .3d at 327.

I t is fr om t

his jud g me nt t

hat th e Pe tit ion e r n owa

pp e a ls.

II. Ana lys is On appe al, the De fenda

nt contends that his conviction is void beca use: (1) the trial court
ne ve r c on du c te d a

he ari ngon

his motio n f

or ne w t ri a l, a nd thi s is su e wa s n ot p re vio us ly lit ig a te d; a

nd (2 ) t he tr ia l c ourt

la c ke d s tatut or

y a uth or ity to r e nd e r a

va lid jud gment purs ua

nt t o Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 17-1-305.
Article I , section 15 of the T ennesse e Constituti on g uara ntees the r ight to see k habea s corpus r elief. Se e Fa ulk

ne r v . S tate , 2 2 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 5 8 , 3 6 1 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 7 )

. A l th o u g h th e r ig ht i s g uara nteed in t h e T en n essee Constit ution, the rig ht is gove rned by statute. T.C.A. § 29-21-101 (2006) et seq . The de termi n ation of whe ther ha beas c orpus re lief should be g rante d is a question
o f l aw a nd is acc ording ly

g iven de novo r eview. Sm ith v . Le wis , 2 0 2 S. W. 3 d 1 2 4 , 1 2 7 (Tenn. 20 06 ); Ha rt v . S

tate , 2 1 S. W.3 d 9 01 , 9 03 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . A lth ou g h th e re is n o s tatut or y tim e limit ation preve nting a

habea s corpus pe tition, t he g rounds upon which r elief w ill be gr anted a re very narr ow. Tay lor

v . S tate , 995 S.W .2d 78 , 8 3 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9). It is the burden of the petitioner to dem o n s t ra t e by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that “the sentenc e is void or that the
c o n f in e me n t is il le g a l. ” W

yat tv . S tate , 24 S.W .3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000) . In other wor ds, the very narr ow g rounds upon which a habea s corpus pe tition can be base d are as follows: (1) a claim there was a

void judgment whic h was fa cially invalid beca

use the convictingcourt wa s wit h o u t jurisdiction or authority to sentence the def

endant; or ( 2) a c laim the defe ndant’s-4-

sentenc e has e x pired. Stephenson v . Carlton , 2 8 S. W.3 d 9 10, 91 1 (Ten n. 20 00 ); Arc he r v . S tate , 85 1 S. W.2 d 1 57 , 1 64 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . “A n il le g a l se nte nc e , o ne wh os e imp os iti on dir e c tly contravenes a

statue, is considere d void and may be set a side at any

time.” M

a y v

. Carlton , 240 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 0 , 3 4 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g S ta te v . B urk

ha rd , 5 6 6 S

. W

. 2 d

8 7 1 , 8 7 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 8 ) )

. In contra st, a voidable judg ment is “one that is fa cially valid and re quir es the introduction of pr oof beyond t h e fa ce o f the re cord or judgme nt to establish its invalidity .” Taylor , 995 S.W .2d at 83;
se e Sta tev . R ic hie , 20 S.W .3d 624, 633 (Tenn. 2000)

. A. Mot ion f

or a Ne w T rial
The Peti t i o n er fi rs t asserts that his judg ments are void beca use the trial c ourt lacke d jurisdictio n t o re n d er the judg ments. He a sserts that he wa s denied a hear ing on his motion for a new tria l, where the trial cour t would have pe rfor

med its duty

as the thirt ee n t h j u ro r. Fur ther, he
asserts th a t t

h e tr ia l c o urt’ s a

p p r o v a l o f

th e v e r d ic t a s th e th ir te e n th ju r o r is a n e c e s s ary prer equisite to the impositi on of a va lid judgment. The ref ore, he asser

ts, t h e t ri al co u rt’s fa ilure to fulfill t h i s du t y

rende rs the Petitioner’s judg ements void. The State c ounters that the tria l
cour t co rre ctly

noted that this issue was pre viously litigated in the Petitioner’ s first petition for habea s corpus re lief.
To the extent that the Petiti oner a ppeals that h e wa s d enied a hear ing on his motion for new tri al , we c onclude the issue w as pre viously litigated. See D emonbre un , 2005 WL1541873,
a t *2 . We a g re e wi th t

he Pe tit ion e r t

hat th e sp e c if

ic iss ue of

wh e the r t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to pe rf or m it s d uty a s a thi rt e e nth

jur or e nti tle s h im t o h a

be a s c orp us re lie f w a s n ot p re vio us ly litigated. We, howe ver, c onclude that a n y fa i l u re b y the trial cour

t in this reg ard doe s not affor d him the relief he seeks. This Court has pre viously square ly addre ssed this issue. See Ra yDa rri s Thompson v. Raney , No. 01C01-9608-CC-00249, 1997 WL643578, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. A p p., at J ackson, O ct. 20, 1997), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Sept. 14, 1998) . In t h at ca s e, we stated, “I f a trial judg e fa ils to ex erc ise his role as thirtee nth juror, the appe llant’s conviction would be voidable and he would be entitled to a ne w trial. T h er ef o re , t h e appellant fails to alleg e a cog nizable claim for h abea s corpus re lief.” Id. Ac c or din g ly , th e Pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to relief on this ground. B. Statutory Authority
The Petit io n e r n e xt c o n te n d s th a t th e tr ia l c o urt la c k e d th e s tatuto r y a u th o r it y to e n te r the jud g me nts a g a ins t hi m. T he Pe tit ion e r n ot es that, at th e tim e he c omm itt e d th e se of fe ns e s, November

3, 1993, Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 17-1-305 re quir ed t h at a defenda nt be g rante d a new

trial if the trial judg e died while a motion fo r n ew t ri al wa s pending . The Petitioner ag ree s that, at t h e t i m e of his conviction, Fe bruar y 28, 1997, the statute had be en amende d to provide t h at i f a t ri al j udg e died while a defe ndant’s motion for new trial was pendi n g, t he trial judg e’s suc cessor should rule on the motion after revie wingthe re cord. The Petitioner asserts that the la w in eff ect at the time of the off enses i s ap p l i ca b l e t o his case a nd that th is l aw r e nd e rs his jud g me nt v oid . T he State fa ils to a dd re ss t he Pe tit ion e r’ s a

rgume nt.Ju dg e D ozi er me n t i on s t h e dea t h i n a f oot n ot e i n a n or der c or r ec t i n g t h e r ec or d. 2
-5- T h e j u d gm en ti nth i s ca s e w as en t er edo nFe b ru ary 2 8 , 1 9 9 7 , an d

s i gn edb y

J u d ge Shriver. Th e r e is s o me in d ic ati o nin th e r e c o r d

th a t Ju d g e Shr iv e r

d ie d in O c to b e r 1 9 9 7 , and

2 J udg e Dozier wa s appointed to the pos i t i on. There is further indication that J udg e Shriver’ s death oc curr ed while the D efe ndant’s motion for a ne w trial wa s pending

. We c o n c lu d e th at w e n e e d n o t a d dr e s s w h ic hv e r s io no f T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o ta ted section 17-1- 305, the 1993 ver sion or the amende d version, applie s t o t h e P etitioner’s c ase. A s previously

stated, a v o i d ab le judg ment is “one that is fa cially valid and re quires the introduc tion of proof beyond the fa ce of

the re cord or

judgme nt to establish its invalid ity .” Taylor , 995 S.W. 2d a t 83 ; se e Ri c hie , 20 S.W. 3d at 63 3. A c la im that th e tr ia l ju dg e die d b e fo re ru lin g on his
m o t i o n fo r new tria l is one that would make the judg ment voidable and not void bec ause pr oving the judg e’s de ath re quires proof beyo n d the fa ce of

the re cord. The Petitioner’s judg ment is not void on its face, a

nd he is not entitled to habea s corpus re lief.

III. Conclusi on
Ba sed on the fore g oing rea soning and authorities, we aff irm the judgme nt of the habeas
c or pu s c ourt

.

______________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE