NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14

- 1589

___________ FRANK ROY,

Appellant

v.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 13

- cv
- 05143 ) District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 3, 2014
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and GARTH , Circuit J udges

(Opinion filed : September 8, 2014 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Pro se litigant Frank Roy , proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the District Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss his second amended complaint. Fo r the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2

Roy maintained a tenant insurance policy with Travelers Insu rance that covered the period from July 7, 2010 , through July 7, 2011. Roy claimed that on July 30, 2010, a taxi dri ver left the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Philadelphia with $20,000 worth of Roy’s luggage and clothing in the back of the car

. Roy said that he reported the theft to the Philadelphia Police Department and to Travelers, but that Travelers refused to pay the
clai m. Roy also alleged that approximately two months later, in September 2010, his apartment in King of Prussia was burglarized and $65,000 worth of his property was
stolen. H e reported the loss to Travelers, but they once again denied the claim. Roy file d th is action against Travelers in the Distric t of New Jersey on August 27, 2013, arguing that Travelers had breached the contract by refusing to pay the two claims

. Travelers moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely under the limitation period that

wa s set forth in Roy’s insurance contract. The District Court granted that motion with prejudice , and Roy filed a timely notice of appeal

. 1 At the outset, we note that the parties appear to dispute which state’s law applies. Roy poi nts to Pennsylvania st atutes to support his appeal, while Travelers cites to New Jersey law in its brief . A choice

- of

- law analysis is unnecessary, however, as the complaint fails under either s tate’s law

.

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of review over the District Court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist. , 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013)

.3

A clause in Roy’s insuranc e contract with Travelers , entitled “Suits Against Us,” 2

state s that Roy could not bring an action against Travelers unless he initiated that action within two years after the date of loss. 3 Roy’s suit is clearly untimely as it was filed in August 2013, more than two years after both the July 2010 loss and the September 2010
loss. But Roy argues that the time limitations establish ed in the Pennsylvania statutes

— 42 Pa. C on s
. S tat

. A nn. § 5525 (for contracts) and § 5527 (a catch

- all provision)

— should control instead , and t hese sections provide a plaintiff four years and six years , respectively, in which to file suit

. This argument is unavailing , because the very same chapter also provides that shorter limit s are enforceable if they are reasonable and prescribed by written agreement. See 42 Pa. C ons
. S tat

. A nn . § 5501 (“ An action

. . . must be commenced within the time specified in or pursuant to this chapter unless

. . . a shorter time which is not manifestly unreasonable is prescribed by written agreement.”).
The two

- year time period in quest ion was indeed prescribed by written agreement, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an even shorter one

- year limitation period
is reasonable in this context. See Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co. , 231 A.2d 740 , 741

- 43

2 The relevant language is located in Section I

– Prop erty Coverages

– Conditions

– Paragraph 9. See Supp. App’x at 68.

3 Roy was on notice of the contents of this insurance policy, and indeed relied on it as the basis of his complaint. The District Court could then consider the contents of the policy, wh ich was attached to Travelers’ motion to dismiss, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. , Inc. , 998 F.2d 1192, 1196

- 97 (3d Cir. 1993).4

(Pa. 1967)

. Accordingly , t he two

- year time limitation in the contract is valid, and Roy’s suit is barred under Pennsylvania law. 4 See id. ; 42 Pa. C ons
. S tat

. A nn . § 5501. The analysis under New Jersey law yields the same result. “A lthough the statutory
limitation in [New Jersey ] for actions in contract is six years, .

. . such a limitation may be waived by express agreement of the parties. ” A.J. Tenwood Assocs. v . Orange Senior
Citizens Hous. Co. , 491 A.2d 1280, 1284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)

. A contractual stipulation limiting the time for suit will be uph eld if it is reasonable , see i d. , a nd t he New Jersey Supreme Court “has routinely upheld contract provisions that create a one

- year time limitation in which claimants may bring suit.” E agle Fire Prot. Corp. v. F irst Indem.
of Am. Ins. Co. , 678 A.2d 699, 704 (N.J. 1996)

. The more
- generous two

- year limitation
in this insurance contract is therefore valid, and Roy’s suit is barred under New Jersey
law. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’ s order granting t he motion to dismiss with prejudice. Appellee’s motion to submit a supplemental appendix is granted.
The motion to strike Appellee’s brief is denied because contrary to Appellant’ s assertion, Appellee did properly serve its brief.

4 Roy has not stated a tolling claim with r espect to this limitation period, and any such argument at this stage would thus be waived. See DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas , 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).