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to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS 

Nos. 20-FM-0739, 20-FM-0740, 21-FM-0068, 21-FM-0069 & 21-FM-0127 

ASLI CAROME, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE, 

v. 

PATRICK CAROME, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT. 

Appeals from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2018-DRB-001768)

(Hon. William W. Nooter, Trial Judge)

(Argued February 8, 2023 Decided May 11, 2023) 

Ayesha N. Khan for appellant/cross-appellee. 

Steven P. Lehotsky for appellee/cross-appellant. 

Before BECKWITH and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, Senior 

Judge. 

MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant/cross-appellee Asli Carome and 

appellee/cross-appellant Patrick Carome challenge several rulings by the trial court 

relating to the interpretation of a premarital agreement. We affirm in part, reverse 

in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
2

I. Background

The following facts appear to be undisputed for current purposes. The parties 

were married in 2010. They each entered the marriage with significant assets. Ms. 

Carome initially took care of the parties’ children from prior marriages, but she 

obtained a position as an attorney with the federal government in 2012. Mr. Carome 

was a partner at a private law firm throughout the marriage, earning over one million 

dollars a year. 

The parties entered into a premarital agreement to govern the treatment of 

their assets before, during, and after the marriage. With specified exceptions, the

agreement requires the parties to pay their earnings during the marriage into a joint 

marital account. The parties contributed to a joint account pursuant to the agreement

until September 2013, when Mr. Carome closed the account. 

The parties formally separated in November 2017. Ms. Carome subsequently

filed a petition for divorce, and Mr. Carome filed a counter-petition. The trial court 

issued a divorce decree and resolved numerous contested issues. The present 

appeals focus entirely on claims relating to the premarital agreement.
3

After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Mr. Carome had breached 

the premarital agreement by failing to deposit earnings into the joint account

between 2013 and the parties’ separation in 2017. Both parties introduced expert 

testimony regarding the amount of the underpayment by Mr. Carome. The trial court 

ultimately awarded Ms. Carome more than $440,000 in damages.

II. Earnings “During the Marriage”

As previously noted, the premarital agreement generally requires the parties 

to contribute their earnings to a joint account “during the marriage.” Agreement 

§§ 1.5, 1.7. Specifically, § 1.7(A) of the agreement provides, in relevant part:

Each party agrees that he or she shall transfer to a Marital 

Account the entire portion (if any) of his or her earnings 

acquired during the marriage which is not applied towards 

or otherwise set aside to satisfy the obligations and 

arrangements described in items (i) through (vii) of this 

Paragraph A.

The parties dispute the meaning of the phrase “during the marriage” in that 

provision. Ms. Carome argues that the phrase should be interpreted to mean until 

the date of divorce, so that Mr. Carome was obliged to make contributions to the 
4

joint account until the divorce. Mr. Carome argues that the phrase should be 

interpreted to mean until the date of separation. 

Noting that neither party had sought consideration of extrinsic evidence, the 

trial court ruled as a matter of law that “during the marriage” under § 1.7(A) does 

not include the period after the parties’ separation.

We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of the phrase “during the 

marriage” in § 1.7(A). See, e.g., Abdelrhman v. Ackerman, 76 A.3d 883, 887-88 

(D.C. 2013) (Where extrinsic evidence is not at issue, “[t]he proper interpretation of 

a contract . . . is a legal question, which this court reviews de novo.”) (italics and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Our task is to “determine what a reasonable 

person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language 

meant.” Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 355 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We “look[] to the entire language of the agreement, not merely a portion 

thereof,” and we consider “the customary, ordinary and accepted meaning of the 

language used.” James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 340 

(D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5

Although the agreement is not entirely clear on the point, we agree with the 

trial court that the agreement is better read to establish the date of separation as the 

end point of the parties’ obligation to contribute earnings to the joint account.

We acknowledge that a number of considerations support Ms. Carome’s 

contrary interpretation. First, in ordinary language, marriage is understood to end at 

the moment of divorce, not at the moment of separation. Compare, e.g., Divorce, 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 664 (2002) (“1: a legal dissolution in whole 

or in part of a marriage relation . . .”), with, e.g., Separation, id. at 2070 (“4a(1): 

cessation of cohabitation between husband and wife by mutual agreement”). 

Second, the ordinary legal understanding is the same. See Divorce, Black’s Law 

Dictionary 582 (10th ed. 2014) (“The legal ending of a marriage . . . .”); Separation, 

id. at 1572 (“1. An arrangement whereby a husband and wife live apart from each 

other while remaining married . . . .”); see also D.C. Code § 16-920 (final decree of 

divorce dissolves bonds of matrimony); Powell v. Powell, 457 A.2d 391, 393 (D.C. 

1983) (approving trial court’s treatment of property acquired after separation and 

before divorce as property acquired “during the marriage”). Third, several other 

provisions of the agreement seem to indicate that marriage under the agreement 

continued after separation. See, e.g., Agreement § 3.2(A) (requiring parties to 
6

designate each other as survivor beneficiary of portions of retirement plans derived 

from contributions made “during the marriage and before separation”). 

In our view, however, those considerations are outweighed by strong 

indications to the contrary that the obligation to contribute to the joint account ends 

at the point of separation. First, Recital H to the agreement refers to separation as a 

form of “dissolution of the[] marriage.” Agreement Recital H. The agreement 

expressly incorporates the recitals, which therefore are an operative part of the 

agreement. See Agreement § 12.16 (“The Recitals set forth above are hereby 

incorporated by reference as part of this Agreement.”); Goldman v. Lustig, 237 So. 

3d 381, 384 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (recitals incorporated into agreement are 

binding); First Bank & Tr. Co. of Ill. v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 787 N.E.2d 300, 308 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[P]reliminary recitals in [an] agreement of themselves are not 

binding unless referred to in [the] operative portion of [the] agreement [so] as to 

show a design that they should form a part of it[.]”) (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted); cf. Trilon Plaza, Inc. v. Comptroller of N.Y., 788 A.2d 146, 151

(D.C. 2001) (rejecting argument that recital “can never be treated as an operative 

part of a contract”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recital H clearly treats 

separation as the end of the marriage.
7

Second, Recital F to the agreement describes the parties as “self-supporting”

and states that the parties “desire to waive any rights or claims to support from the 

other in the event of a separation or divorce.” Agreement Recital F. That provision 

undermines the theory that the parties would be obliged to continue contributing to 

a joint account during a period of separation.

Third, various other provisions in the agreement appear to indicate that 

marriage for purposes of the agreement ended at the moment of separation. See, 

e.g., Agreement § 2.4(E) (successor home may be sold during marriage or “disposed 

of upon a separation or divorce”). 

Fourth, the agreement in a number of places draws the line between marital 

property and separate property by focusing on the date of separation rather than the 

date of the divorce. See, e.g., Agreement § 1.5(iv)-(v) (certain retirement benefits 

attributable to contributions from date of marriage until separation are marital 

property); id. § 1.6(ii) (retirement benefits earned after separation are separate 

property). Those provisions support the view that money earned after separation 

should not be viewed as marital property to be contributed to a joint account. 
8

Finally, the agreement provides that separation triggers the obligation to 

divide marital property, and the value of the marital property is to be assessed as of 

the date of separation. See Agreement § 5.2(A) (“In the event of the parties’ 

separation, the parties’ marital property shall be disposed of . . . ,” and “[e]ach party

shall receive one-half of the net value of all marital property owned by the parties as 

of the date of separation.”). That provision strongly undermines the idea that the 

parties would continue creating substantial amounts of new marital property after 

the date of separation, particularly given that the agreement contains no direction 

about how to divide such post-separation marital property.

The foregoing considerations on both sides lead us to the following 

conclusions. The agreement is not carefully drafted, and it is internally inconsistent 

on the general question whether the marriage should be understood to end at the 

moment of separation or at the moment of divorce. The answer to that question 

under the agreement might well vary depending on the specific provisions at issue. 

Focusing on the provisions most directly at issue here, however, we agree with the 

trial court that the agreement is better understood to establish separation as the end 

point of the obligation to contribute to the joint account.
9

We are not persuaded by Ms. Carome’s additional arguments to the contrary. 

First, Ms. Carome refers in passing to extrinsic evidence concerning the 

interpretation of the agreement. The trial court ruled, however, that neither party 

had asked the court to consider extrinsic evidence in interpreting the contract. Ms. 

Carome has not challenged that ruling in this court. We therefore decline to consider 

extrinsic evidence.

Second, Ms. Carome argues that the phrase “during the marriage” must be 

given the meaning that phrase is given in District of Columbia statutes and the 

decisions of this court. We disagree. It is true that the agreement provides that the 

“interpretation of th[e] [a]greement shall be determined and governed by the laws of 

the District of Columbia.” Agreement § 12.13. The law of the District of Columbia, 

however, is that terms in a contract ordinarily should be interpreted based on the 

wording of the contract and applicable principles of contract interpretation, not 

simply by relying on definitions that can be found in a statute or a decision of this 

court. See generally, e.g., Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1114-15 (D.C. 2009) 

(when interpreting contract, court follows “established rules of contract 

interpretation,” looking first to language of contract) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To be clear, we agree with Ms. Carome that definitions of the phrase 

“during the marriage” in statutes and the decisions of this court are relevant. See, 
10

e.g., Parker v. U.S. Tr. Co., 30 A.3d 147, 152 (D.C. 2011) (stating that where 

contract provided that it would be interpreted in accordance with laws of District of 

Columbia, argument that contractual term should be given statutory definition has

“some force and is, at a minimum, reasonable”); Morgenstern v. Nationwide

Agribusiness Ins. Co., 78 F. App’x 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[S]tatutory definitions 

can be relevant in construing a contract . . . .”). We do not, however, view such 

definitions as necessarily dispositive, at least in the absence of contractual language 

explicitly adopting a particular definition taken from statute or case law. Cf., e.g., 

Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Godwin, 361 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (App. Div. 1974) (“[W]e are 

here interpreting a policy of insurance, and [the insured] is entitled to have it 

construed as a contract and not necessarily according to the statutory definition.”). 

For the reasons we have stated, we do not find the definition of “during the marriage” 

in statute and case law to be dispositive in this case. 

Finally, Ms. Carome argues that ambiguities in the agreement should “be 

construed strongly against the drafter,” who was Mr. Carome. Intercounty Constr. 

Co. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). That consideration favors Ms. Carome, but we do not view the 

consideration as determinative. The rule disfavoring the drafter of an agreement 

comes into play only if other principles of contract interpretation leave the court 
11

unable to give the contractual language at issue a definite meaning. See id.

(explaining that if, after court attempts to determine what reasonable person would 

have thought contract meant, “a contract and its terms are still not subject to one 

definite meaning, the ambiguities remaining in the contract will be construed 

strongly against the drafter”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. v. L’Enfant Plaza Props., Inc., 655 A.2d 858, 863 (D.C. 

1995) (canon of construction disfavoring drafter of agreement “is a secondary 

standard of interpretation . . . inferior to . . . other authority revealing [the parties’] 

understanding”) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons we have 

explained, we conclude that the agreement, read as a whole, can be given a definite 

interpretation.

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Carome was not required by 

the agreement to contribute to the joint account after the parties separated in 

November 2017.

III. Payments to Defined-Benefit Retirement Plan

As previously mentioned, the agreement provides for exceptions to the 

parties’ obligation to contribute their earnings to the joint account. Agreement 
12

§ 1.7(A). One of those exceptions is for “contributions to retirement plans or 

accounts.” Id. § 1.7(A)(iii). That exception is limited, however, by § 1.7(D), which 

caps such deductions for a given year to a percentage of the amount that the party 

contributed to the joint account that year. Id. § 1.7(D) (“During the marriage, the 

total amount of current earnings that either party may contribute in any calendar year 

to retirement plans or accounts shall not exceed . . . one-half (50%) of the total 

amount that he or she contributes from current earnings to Marital Accounts during 

the same calendar year.”).

Relying on those provisions, Ms. Carome argues that Mr. Carome could not 

properly deduct any amounts relating to retirement contributions in years in which 

Mr. Carome did not pay any earnings into the joint account. To put the point 

mathematically, Ms. Carome argues that 50% of $0 = $0. 

Mr. Carome does not dispute that argument with respect to some retirement 

payments, such as payments to his 401(k) retirement plan. Mr. Carome does dispute 

that argument, however, with respect to payments into his law-firm defined-benefit 

retirement plan. Mr. Carome makes two principal points. First, he argues that his 

defined-benefit plan is separate property under the agreement. See Agreement 

§ 1.6(iii) (Mr. Carome’s defined-benefit plan and certain other retirement plans are 
13

separate property, “notwithstanding that [Mr. Carome] may make contributions to 

such plans or accounts during the marriage from his earnings”). Second, he argues 

that he did not make contributions to the defined-benefit plan, but rather his law firm 

did. The trial court ruled for Mr. Carome on this issue. We review that ruling de 

novo, Abdelrhman, 76 A.3d at 887-88, and we come to a contrary conclusion.

It is true that Mr. Carome’s defined-benefit plan is separate property under the 

agreement. Agreement § 1.6(iii). That is an entirely separate question, however, 

from the question whether Mr. Carome was entitled under the agreement to a 

deduction from his earnings for payments made into the defined-benefit plan. The 

latter question is governed by § 1.7(D) of the agreement, which places a cap on the 

amount that can be deducted from earnings for “contributions to retirement plans.” 

Id. § 1.7(D). Nothing in the language of that provision suggests that the cap is 

limited to retirement-plan payments that are marital property rather than separate 

property. Cf. id. § 1.7(A)(iii) (acknowledging that parties may use earnings to 

satisfy separate obligations, including, “except as limited in Section 1.7(D), 

contributions to retirement plans”) (emphasis added). To the contrary, as Mr. 

Carome acknowledges, the obvious purpose of the cap is to limit the amount of 

income a party can shelter in a given year from the obligation to make contributions 

to the joint marital account. That purpose applies equally to all retirement payments, 
14

whether those payments went to retirement accounts that would be marital property 

or to retirement accounts that would be separate property. 

Mr. Carome does not dispute that the payments into the defined-benefit plan 

came from his earnings. Thus, the sole remaining issue is whether those payments 

were “contributions” within the meaning of § 1.7(D) of the agreement. We conclude 

that the payments were contributions. Section 1.6(iii) of the agreement implies as 

much, stating that Mr. Carome “may make contributions to such plans or accounts 

[including the defined-benefit plan] during the marriage from his earnings.” 

Agreement § 1.6(iii). Section 3.2(A) of the agreement is clearer on the point, 

providing that during the marriage Mr. Carome was obliged to name Ms. Carome as 

the survivor beneficiary of all portions of the defined-benefit plan “derived from 

contributions of earnings that [Mr. Carome] made during the marriage and before 

separation.” Id. § 3.2(A). Those provisions of the agreement in our view make clear 

that payments to the defined-benefit plan were understood to be contributions.

We are not persuaded by Mr. Carome’s arguments to the contrary. Mr. 

Carome argues that the defined-benefit payments were mandatory, but nothing in 

the language or logic of § 1.7(D) turns on whether Mr. Carome could unilaterally 

determine the amount of the payment at issue. Mr. Carome also argues that 
15

payments to the defined-benefit plan were directly implemented by his law firm, 

rather than through transactions that Mr. Carome himself made. We are 

unconvinced by that distinction. It is undisputed that the payments were from Mr. 

Carome’s earnings and went to his defined-benefit plan. We do not see why it is 

relevant that the law firm automatically conducted those transactions on Mr. 

Carome’s behalf. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling permitting Mr. Carome to 

deduct payments to the defined-benefit plan during the years when Mr. Carome 

failed to make required payments into the joint account. We remand for further 

proceedings to revise the damages award accordingly.

IV. 2017 Partnership Compensation

The parties separated in November 2017. They dispute whether, under the 

agreement, Mr. Carome’s earnings during the marriage should include a prorated 

amount of the compensation Mr. Carome received from his law firm for that year. 

Mr. Carome argues that his law firm’s profits were “speculative and contingent”

until after the end of 2017, and thus Mr. Carome did not earn anything “concrete[]” 

between January and November 2017, except for the right to a share of the firm’s 
16

profits paid out after the end of 2017, by which time the parties had separated. Mr.

Carome therefore contends that all of his 2017 compensation should be treated as 

separate property under the agreement. 

The trial court concluded that Mr. Carome’s earnings from his law firm from 

January to November 2017, even if not known in their exact amount at the time of 

separation, were marital property under § 1.3 of the agreement, which includes

“accrued but unpaid compensation” in the definition of “earnings.” Agreement 

§ 1.3; see also id. § 1.7(A) (requiring parties to transfer earnings to marital account, 

subject to exceptions). In support of that ruling, the trial court pointed out that the 

agreement treats a prorated estimate of Mr. Carome’s 2010 law-firm compensation 

as having accrued in July 2010 and thus as being a premarital asset rather than a 

marital asset. See Agreement, Exh. B, at 2-3 n.16 (treating “[v]ery rough estimate” 

of prorated 2010 law-firm compensation as “pre-marital asset”). We review the trial 

court’s ruling de novo, Abdelrhman, 76 A.3d at 887-88, and we affirm. 

Whatever meaning might reasonably be given to the words “accrued but 

unpaid compensation” in a different agreement, this agreement treats a prorated

portion of Mr. Carome’s compensation in 2010 as an asset of Mr. Carome’s in July 

2010, even though the amount of Mr. Carome’s 2010 compensation would not be 
17

precisely known until 2011. We see no justification under the agreement for treating 

Mr. Carome’s 2017 compensation differently. We therefore agree with the trial 

court that a prorated amount of Mr. Carome’s 2017 law-firm compensation should 

be treated as “accrued but unpaid compensation.” 

V. Mr. Rollinger’s Expert Report

Ms. Carome argues that the trial court erred by permitting an expert, Eric 

Rollinger, to testify on Mr. Carome’s behalf at trial, even though Mr. Carome did 

not provide Ms. Carome with an adequate written report from the expert, as required 

by Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B). We agree. We conclude, however, that the 

error was harmless.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Rollinger testified for Mr. Carome as an expert concerning the calculation 

of damages, if any, owed based on Mr. Carome’s failure to make payments into the 

joint account. Under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B), Mr. Carome was required 

to provide Ms. Carome with a written report from Mr. Rollinger before trial. Such 

reports must contain “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express 
18

and the basis and reasons for them” and “the facts or data considered by the witness 

in forming them.” Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

Mr. Carome provided a written report from Mr. Rollinger, apparently first in 

February 2019 and then in revised form in March 2019. The report does not contain 

a single complete sentence. Rather, the first page of the report is a chart reflecting 

Mr. Rollinger’s overall conclusions as to how much Mr. Carome earned during the 

marriage; what amounts were appropriately subtracted from those earnings under 

various provisions of the premarital agreement; the amounts of Mr. Carome’s 

“Contributions to the Marriage” in various categories, such as “[Mr. Carome] Direct 

Contribution”; and the amounts of Mr. Carome’s payments of “Other Necessary 

Expenses” in various categories, such as “Business Expense.” The chart concludes 

that Mr. Carome “over-contributed” to the marriage by more than $350,000. 

The second page of the report is a graph depicting Mr. Carome’s cumulative 

contributions to the marriage on a monthly basis. The third page of the report is a 

slightly expanded version of the first page, adding a list of the amounts of various 

“Non-Counted Items,” such as “Other Living Expenses.” The report then contains

month-by-month breakdowns of the chart on the first page of the report. 
19

Finally, the report contains a spreadsheet of approximately 300 pages. That 

spreadsheet reflects over 20,000 individual transactions, identified by date, account, 

and amount. The spreadsheet also has boxes labeled “Description,” “Memo,”

“Category,” and “Tag.” For many transactions, one or more of those boxes are not 

filled in. Examples of the comments in the “Memo” box include “Non-joint portion 

of 11/02/10 Invoice,” “Transfer – all joint,” and “Misuse of credit card by [Ms. 

Carome].” The “Category” box often either is empty or says “Misc.” The “Tag”

box is empty for many transactions. Some of the entries in that box (such as “[Mr. 

Carome] Contribution”) do indicate how Mr. Rollinger viewed the transaction for 

purposes of the damages calculation, although the entries do not explain why Mr. 

Rollinger reached his conclusions. Other of the entries in that box (such as “[Ms. 

Carome] to Explain”) are not clear. For each transaction, there is also a box labeled 

“Classification,” indicating how Mr. Rollinger categorized the transaction on his 

chart. In some instances, the box refers to a provision of the premarital agreement, 

suggesting without further explanation that the provision was the basis for the 

categorization. In other instances (such as “Payments for Credit Cards” and “Not 

Included in Calculation to Avoid Double Counting”), the rationale for the 

categorization is not specified. 
20

At no place does the report explain the criteria used to define the various 

categories reflected in the report. The report also does not state what methods or 

sources of information Mr. Rollinger used in preparing the report. 

In the joint pretrial statement, which was filed in May 2019, Ms. Carome 

formally objected to Mr. Rollinger’s report, arguing that the report did not comply 

with Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B). Specifically, Ms. Carome argued that the 

report did not indicate what documents Mr. Rollinger was relying on and did not 

explain Mr. Rollinger’s opinions and his reasons for those opinions. Ms. Carome 

asked that the report be excluded from evidence and that Mr. Rollinger be precluded 

from testifying at trial. In the alternative, Ms. Carome asked the court (1) to require 

Mr. Rollinger to supplement his report with the information required by Super. Ct. 

Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B); and (2) to permit Ms. Carome to designate a rebuttal 

expert and submit a rebuttal expert report. 

In the joint pretrial statement, Mr. Carome responded by arguing that Ms. 

Carome’s objection to Mr. Rollinger’s report was belated, the report was adequate, 

and any deficiency in the report did not prejudice Ms. Carome. 
21

On the first day of trial, Ms. Carome renewed her objection to Mr. Rollinger’s 

report. The trial court overruled Ms. Carome’s objection without explanation. 

Mr. Rollinger testified at length at trial. His expert report was also admitted 

into evidence. During the first three days of his testimony, Mr. Rollinger explained

(1) the materials he relied on in reaching his conclusions (which included various 

documents, oral conversations with Mr. Carome, and notes kept by Mr. Carome); 

(2) the meaning of various of the terms used in the report (such as “Non-Counted 

Items”); and (3) the methods and reasoning used in reaching the conclusions 

reflected in the report. Ms. Carome cross-examined Mr. Rollinger extensively at 

that point on the bases for his opinions. 

There was a two-month break in the trial, and Ms. Carome then resumed her 

cross-examination of Mr. Rollinger, which extended for parts of two additional days. 

Ms. Carome presented two reports from her own expert, who also testified at 

trial. Ms. Carome’s expert concluded that Ms. Carome was entitled to over $2.6 

million in damages. 
22

In returning its verdict, the trial court largely accepted the legal framework 

advocated by Mr. Carome, assessing damages by calculating Mr. Carome’s earnings 

between 2013 and November 2017 and then subtracting “authorized subtractions”—

those falling within the exceptions enumerated in § 1.7(A) of the agreement—as 

well as other amounts that were “necessary expenses” paid by Mr. Carome for the 

benefit of Ms. Carome. The trial court accepted some of Mr. Rollinger’s factual 

conclusions but also made substantial adjustments to Mr. Rollinger’s calculations, 

for a variety of reasons, including that Mr. Rollinger had a “quite flimsy” basis for 

categorizing certain expenses as having been for Ms. Carome’s benefit. The trial 

court ultimately found damages of approximately $440,000 due to Mr. Carome’s 

breach of his obligation to make payments into the joint account. 

On appeal, this court sua sponte remanded the record for the trial court to 

explain its decision to overrule Ms. Carome’s objection to Mr. Rollinger’s report. 

On remand, the trial court concluded that the report complied with the requirements 

of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Specifically, the trial court stated that the report “sets forth a 

very detailed and comprehensive statement of Mr. Rollinger’s conclusions and sets 

forth minutely specific bases for the opinions.” In the alternative, the trial court 

ruled that any deficiencies in the report were substantially justified and harmless. 
23

B. Compliance with Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B)

We review the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Rollinger’s report met the 

requirements of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B) deferentially, to determine 

whether the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion. See generally, e.g., 

Weakley v. Burnham Corp., 871 A.2d 1167, 1179 (D.C. 2005) (“We review 

discovery orders for abuse of discretion.”). See also, e.g., Harmon v. Ga. Gulf Lake 

Charles L.L.C., 476 F. App’x 31, 36 (5th Cir. 2012) (trial court rulings under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. 

R. 26(a)(2)(B) is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), so we give weight to cases 

interpreting the federal rule. See generally, e.g., Segreti v. DeIuliis, 263 A.3d 441, 

444 (D.C. 2021) (when interpreting Superior Court rule, court looks for guidance to 

federal cases interpreting “substantially identical” federal rule) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

As previously noted, Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B) generally requires 

expert reports to include, among other things: “(i) a complete statement of all 

opinions the [expert] will express and the basis and reasons for them; [and] (ii) the 

facts or data considered by the [expert] in forming them.” This court does not appear 
24

to have issued any opinions interpreting either that language or identical language in 

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(a)(2)(B). We therefore consider pertinent federal authority. 

“When interpreting a Superior Court rule, we frequently find guidance in the 

advisory committee’s notes to the corresponding federal rule.” C.R. Calderon 

Constr., Inc. v. Grunley Constr. Co., 257 A.3d 1046, 1059 (D.C. 2021) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The language at issue was added to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(2) in 1993. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1993 

amendment. The advisory committee explained that the amended rule “imposes an 

additional duty to disclose information regarding expert testimony sufficiently in 

advance of trial that opposing parties have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for 

effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other 

witnesses.” Id. The advisory committee stated that disclosure under the prior rule 

had often been “sketchy and vague.” Id. The new rule, in contrast, required “a 

detailed and complete report, stating the testimony the witness is expected to present 

during direct examination, together with the reasons therefor.” Id. In other words, 

the report should “set forth the substance of the direct examination.” Id.

In our view, Mr. Rollinger’s report fell well short of the requirements of 

Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B). The report has no complete sentences, says
25

nothing explicit about the sources of information Mr. Rollinger relied upon, does not 

explain the methods Mr. Rollinger used in making calculations, and contains a 

number of unexplained or cryptic terms and categories. Mr. Carome cites no case 

holding that a comparable report was adequate, and we are aware of no such case. 

To the contrary, comparable reports appear to have consistently been found 

inadequate. See, e.g., Martinez v. Sw. Cheese Co., No. CV 12-0660, 2013 WL 

12180705, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 4, 2013) (finding expert report inadequate because 

report contained “several pages of charts and calculations without any context” and 

failed to “fully explain[] [the charts’] relevance, their calculations, or their sources”);

Great White Bear, LLC v. Mervyns, LLC, No. 06 CV 13358, 2008 WL 2220662, at 

*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008) (“A damage figure in an expert report cannot satisfy 

[federal] Rule 26(a)(2)(B) simply by stating a conclusory figure and then attaching 

documents that purportedly support that figure. Rather, the report must supply actual 

calculations with detailed and complete information elucidating how the expert 

arrived at the damage figure.”). See generally, e.g., R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU 

Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding exclusion of expert 

report that failed to adequately explain expert’s “line of reasoning”; “[e]xpert reports 

must include how and why the expert reached a particular result, not merely the 

expert’s conclusory opinions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26

In sum, we conclude that the trial court acted outside its discretion in 

concluding that Mr. Rollinger’s report met the requirements of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. 

R. 26(a)(2)(B).

C. Harmlessness

Mr. Carome’s failure to comply with Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a)(2)(B) is 

not a basis for relief if that failure was harmless. Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 37(c)(1) 

(failure to comply with Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 26(a) precludes admission of 

testimony of witness unless failure was “substantially justified or harmless”). See 

generally Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 61 (“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error 

in admitting . . . evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial, or for vacating, 

modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the 

proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any

party’s substantial rights.”); Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546, 

567 (D.C. 2001) (error does not affect substantial rights if court can “say[] with fair 

assurance” that “judgment was not substantially swayed by the error”) (quoting 

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). The burden of establishing 

harmlessness is on the party who failed to comply with the rule. See, e.g., Wilson v. 

Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the obligation 
27

of the party facing sanctions for belated disclosure to show that its failure to comply 

with [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)] was either justified or harmless . . . .”); Hinton v. United 

States, 979 A.2d 663, 686 (D.C. 2009) (en banc) (under Kotteakos test for 

harmlessness, burden of showing harmlessness “is on the beneficiary of an error”).

As noted, the trial court ruled on remand that any deficiencies in Mr.

Rollinger’s report were harmless. It is not entirely clear whether our review of that 

ruling is de novo or deferential. Compare Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 42 

(D.C. 1989) (en banc) (in context of constitutional error, court concludes that 

appellate court “owe[s] no deference to the trial court’s views concerning 

harmlessness”), with Prisco v. Stroup, 947 A.2d 455, 462 (D.C. 2008) (court of 

appeals reviews for abuse of discretion trial court’s determination whether to impose 

sanction under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 37(c)), and Bresler v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 

855 F.3d 178, 190 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), 

“[d]istrict courts are accorded broad discretion in determining whether a party’s 

nondisclosure or untimely disclosure of evidence is substantially justified or 

harmless”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not explicitly address 

that question, and we need not decide it. Rather, even assuming favorably to Ms. 

Carome that our review is de novo, we conclude that the trial court’s error was 

harmless. 
28

Our reasoning differs from that of the trial court. In our view, the critical 

points are that Ms. Carome had a full opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Rollinger, 

the trial recessed for approximately two months, and Ms. Carome then had another 

full opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Rollinger. Granting a continuance can be an 

appropriate response to a party’s failure to provide required pretrial discovery. See, 

e.g., Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1310 n.5 (D.C. 1989) (“Exclusion of 

evidence is a severe sanction. Under [Super. Ct. Civ. R.] 37 the Superior Court may 

avail itself of a lesser sanction, such as a continuance, to allow the surprised party to 

examine the record, possibly resume discovery, and prepare some response to the 

unexpected testimony.”) (citation omitted); cf. Workman v. United States, 255 A.3d 

971, 976 (D.C. 2021) (under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16, “remedies for [a] discovery 

violation include [the] granting of [a] continuance”). In arguing that she was 

prejudiced by the inadequacies of Mr. Rollinger’s report, Ms. Carome lists various 

actions she could have taken if the report had been adequate, including possibly 

moving to exclude Mr. Rollinger’s report and testimony as unreliable, trying to track 

down original documentation of transactions, and presenting evidence of 

contributions she made to the marriage. Ms. Carome did ultimately move to strike 

Mr. Rollinger’s report and testimony as “subjective, unreliable[,] and riddled with 

errors.” Ms. Carome has not, however, renewed that challenge in this court, instead 

focusing solely on her discovery claim. We see no prejudice to Ms. Carome’s ability 
29

to challenge the substance of Mr. Rollinger’s testimony and report. As to Ms. 

Carome’s two other assertions of prejudice, the two-month break in the trial was 

seemingly ample to permit Ms. Carome to take whatever steps she wished to take to 

further investigate and respond to Mr. Rollinger’s report and testimony. Cf. Weiner, 

557 A.2d at 1310 n.5 (explaining that continuance can be sufficient remedy to

address discovery violation). 

We therefore conclude that the trial court’s error was not unfairly prejudicial 

to Ms. Carome, because in the circumstances of this case Ms. Carome had a full 

opportunity to address Mr. Rollinger’s report and testimony. 

VI. Proof of Actual Damages

Mr. Carome argues that Ms. Carome failed to prove that she suffered actual 

damages as a result of Mr. Carome’s breach of the premarital agreement. We are 

unpersuaded by that argument. 

To remedy a breach of contract, the trial court generally may award the nonbreaching party expectation damages: the amount that would place the nonbreaching party in the position the non-breaching party would have had if the 
30

breaching party had fulfilled its obligations under the contract. Caesar v. 

Westchester Corp., 280 A.3d 176, 191 (D.C. 2022). Under the premarital agreement

in this case, Ms. Carome was entitled to half of the assets contained in the joint 

account upon separation. Agreement § 5.2(A). The trial court thus arguably could 

have awarded Ms. Carome damages in an amount equal to half of the amount that 

Mr. Carome should have contributed to the joint account. The trial court did not 

take that approach, however, instead decreasing the amount of Ms. Carome’s 

damages to reflect payments that the trial court determined Mr. Carome had made 

toward “necessary joint expenses and for Ms. Carome’s benefit.” Ms. Carome has 

not challenged that ruling in this court, and we therefore have no reason to consider 

whether Ms. Carome actually was entitled to more extensive damages than she was 

awarded. 

For his part, Mr. Carome does not present a specific challenge to the trial 

court’s calculation of the amount of the offset to reflect payments Mr. Carome made 

for Ms. Carome’s benefit. Instead, Mr. Carome argues that Ms. Carome should have 

been required to prove specific additional concrete injuries she suffered as a result 

of Mr. Carome’s breach. We see no basis for that argument. See, e.g., Caesar, 280 

A.3d at 191 (actual costs suffered by non-breaching party “of no consequence” 

where non-breaching party was properly awarded expectation damages).
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In sum, (1) we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Carome’s obligation to 

contribute to the joint account ended on the date of separation; (2) we reverse the 

trial court’s ruling that Mr. Carome was entitled to deduct payments made to the 

defined-benefit plan in years when Mr. Carome did not contribute to the joint 

account; (3) we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Carome’s earnings under the 

agreement included a prorated share of Mr. Carome’s 2017 law-firm compensation; 

(4) we hold that the trial court acted outside its discretion in concluding that Mr. 

Rollinger’s report complied with the requirements of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R.

26(a)(2)(B); (5) we hold that that error was harmless; and (6) we uphold the trial 

court’s ruling that Ms. Carome was not required to prove actual costs she suffered 

as a result of Mr. Carome’s breach of the agreement, beyond the loss of the financial 

contributions Mr. Carome was required to make under the agreement. We therefore 

vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

So ordered.