SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, as Trustee for STANWICH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST A,
Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v. JENNIFER HARTNET T , MR. HARTNETT, husband of JENNIFER HARTNETT, and MRS. PETER GALE, his wife,
Defenda n t s , and PETER GALE,
Defendant

- Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted September 10, 2019

– Decided
Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

- 3.

September 19, 20192 A

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002057

- 14. Peter Gale, appellant pro se.
Hill Wallack LLP, a ttorneys for r espondent (Sean Dennis Adams, of counsel and on the brie f).
PER CURIAM In this residential foreclosure action, defendant Peter Gale appeal s the
M ay 8, 2015 order granting summary judgment to plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB

. 1 After a review of defendant ' s contentions in light of the
record and a pplicable legal principles, we affirm. In 2008, Gale and defendant Jennifer Hartnett 2 executed a note to First Interstate Financial Corp. ( First Interstate) for $487,971. The note was secured by a mortgage held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),
as nominee for First Interstate. In September 2011, MERS assigned the mortgage to BANA

. 3 In July 2016, the mortgage was assigned by BANA to the

1 Summary judgment was entered in favor of Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). Plaintiff was subsequently substituted in t he foreclosure action for BANA.

2 Hartnett did not appeal the final judgment order.

3 Bank of America was a successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing LP , formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP.3 A

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Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and, in November 2016, HUD assigned the mortga ge to plaintiff. In October 2011, Gale defaulted on his obligations under the note and mortgage.
I n January 201 4 , BANA filed a complaint for foreclosure. Gale filed a contesting answer

. Summary judgment was granted to BANA in 2015. In 2017 plaintiff was substituted in for BANA

. Plaintiff 's motion for final judgment was granted on March 29, 2018. On appeal, Gale contests plaintiff's right to foreclose and standing, specifically whether plaintiff was in possession of the original note, whether the

ass ignment was proper and whether plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to foreclose (NOI). We are unconvinced by these arguments.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and a trial court's ruling is owed no special deference. Templo Fuente De V ida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).
It is well

- established that in order to have standing in a foreclosure action,
the " party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying
debt." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford , 418 N.J. Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis , 418 N.J. Super. 323, 327

- 28 (Ch.
Div. 20 10)). Standing is conferred by " either possession of the note or an4 A

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assignment of the mortgage that p redated the o riginal complaint." Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles , 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012) (citing
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell , 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 2011)). Here, we are satisfied plaintiff established a prima facie ca se for
foreclosure. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated its standing to foreclose on the property because the assignment of the mortgage from MERS to BANA predated
the January 201 4 filing of the foreclosure complaint. Upon that assignment, and underlying transfer of possession, BANA became the holder of the instrument. BANA also provided copies of the original note and NOI to the trial judge as exhibits supporting its summary judgment motion. Plaintiff then was subst ituted for BANA under the court's order of March 6, 2017. In addressing Gale's argument concerning the validity of the assignment,
we have stated that "[a] valid assignment must contain evidence of the intent to transfer one's rights, and ' the subject mat ter of the assignment must be described sufficiently to make it capable of being readily identified. '" K. Woodmere Assocs., L.P. v. Menk Corp. , 316 N.J. Super. 306, 314 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting
3 Williston on Contracts § 404, at 4 ( Jaeger 3d ed. 1957 ))

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Here, we are satisfied MERS, as nominee, properly assigned First
Interstate's mortgage and note to BANA in September 201 1

. An agent of MERS executed the assignment , demonstrating the intent to transfer. See N.J.S.A.
46:14

- 4.2 . In addition, the subject m atter of the assignment is "readily
identified" because it includes the p roperty's address, the amount loaned to defendants, and where the mortgage was recorded

. See Menk Corp. , 316 N.J. Super. at 314. The subsequent assignments to HUD and plaintiff were also properly recorded. Gale's contention pertaining to the NOI lacks merit. The record reflects
BANA mailed an NOI letter to Gale in June 2013. The certified mail number and letter were included with BANA's summary judgment exhibits.
Affirmed.