J-S74045-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.A.Y., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.Y., FATHER No. 1789 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree and Order entered May 20, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile

Division, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000691-2013, CP-51-DP-0000656-2012, 

FID No. 51-FN-001207-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JANUARY 02, 2015

R.Y. (Father) appeals from the decree entered May 20, 2014, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which terminated 

involuntarily Father’s parental rights to his minor daughter, C.A.Y. (Child), 

born in February of 2012. Father also appeals from an order entered that 

same day, which changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this case as follows. 

On February 6, 2012, the Department of Human Services (DHS) 

received a General Protective Services (GPS) report due to 

[M]other testing positive for Oxycontin, cocaine and opiates 

while giving birth to [Child]. The report also alleged that [Child] 

was administered morphine to counter her Oxycontin withdrawal 

symptoms. The report was substantiated.

At birth, [Child] was diagnosed as suffering from low birth 

weight and prescribed a diet to gain weight. [Child] remained 

hospitalized until February 22, 2012. Upon discharge, [Child] 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
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was released to [M]other, who was enrolled in an intensive 

outpatient dual diagnosis treatment program.

On February 22, 2014, In-home Protective Service (IHIP) 

through DHS Northeast Treatment Center (NET) was 

implemented in the home of [Child’s] paternal grandmother. 

The [F]ather of the [C]hild resided in the paternal grandmother’s 

home.

On March 16, 2012, the IHIP’s social worker visited the home of 

the paternal grandmother. The IHIP worker found the home 

smelled of marijuana and observed fresh ashes in an ashtray. 

The [F]ather admitted to the IHIP’s social worker that he had 

been using synthetic marijuana.

In March 2012, [M]other and [Child] began residing with 

[Child’s] maternal grandmother. As of April 13, 2013, [M]other 

and [Child] were again residing in paternal grandmother[’s] 

home with [F]ather.

On April 18, 2012, DHS filed an urgent petition on behalf of 

[Child]. 

An adjudicatory hearing was held on May 1, 2012, before the 

Honorable Jonathan Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated ... [Child] 

dependent and awarded temporary legal custody to the maternal 

grandparents [(Grandparents)]. The [trial c]ourt specifically 

ordered [M]other and [F]ather of [Child] to the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (CEU) for forthwith drug screens, dual diagnosis 

and monitoring. The [C]hild ... was placed in care of family 

members. Mother and [F]ather were present at the hearing. 

Father tested positive for cocaine and benzodiazepines on May 1, 

2012. On May 9, 2012, [F]ather was evaluated at the CEU and 

again tested positive for cocaine. The [F]ather reported to the 

CEU that he had an extensive history of drug abuse. The drug 

abuse history is as follows: (1) seven years of cocaine abuse, (2) 

ten years of Valium and Xanax abuse, (3) a five year period of 

PCP abuse, (4) one year of heroin abuse (5) consistent

marijuana abuse and (6) a six year period of Percocet abuse.

Mother died of a drug overdose on June 30, 2012. 

[Grandparents] requested kinship care subsequent to [M]other’s 

death. 
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In July 2012, DHS temporarily suspended [F]ather’s visitation 

with [Child] due to his erratic behavior, inappropriate late night 

contact with [Child’s] caregivers and his failure to enroll in a dual 

diagnosis treatment program.

A permanency review hearing was held on August 2, 2012. The 

Honorable Jonathan Irvine vacated temporary legal custody and 

ordered [Grandparents] be referred for kinship assistance. A 

protective order was issued preventing [F]ather from contacting 

[Grandparents]. The [trial c]ourt incorporated [F]ather’s CEU 

report of non-compliance, which indicated positive screens for 

cocaine and benzodiazepines on 5/1/12 and 5/9/12. 

Additionally, the CEU reported that [F]ather was not compliant 

with the recommended intensive outpatient drug treatment. 

A Family Service Plan meeting was held by the Department of 

Human Services. The Family Service Plan objectives for [F]ather 

were (1) to maintain sobriety by attending drug treatment and 

complying with all recommendation[s], including CEU 

assessments, monitoring and random drug screens (2) to 

complete job training and/or maintain employment, (3) attend 

parenting classes.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/2014, at 1-3 (unnumbered pages).

On December 4, 2013, DHS filed a petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child involuntarily, as well as a petition for goal change to 

adoption. A termination and goal change hearing was held on May 20, 

2014. Following the hearing, the trial court entered a decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights. The court also entered a permanency review order 

changing Child’s goal to adoption. Father timely filed a notice of appeal, 

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).1

 

1

Father’s notice of appeal indicated that he was appealing both from the 

decree terminating his parental rights, as well as the order changing Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption. We observe that it was improper for Father to 
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Father now raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether the [t]rial [court] erred and/or abused its discretion 

as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 

2511(a)[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred or abused its discretion as a 

matter of law by terminating Father’s parental rights under 

2511(b) of the Adoption Act[?]

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred or abused its discretion by 

changing the goal from reunification to adoption[?]

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by failing to make a 

determination as to the credibility of Father’s testimony[?]

Father’s Brief at 3.

In his first two issues, Father argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by terminating his parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a) and (b).

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

 

file a single notice of appeal as to both the termination decree and the goal 

change order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note (“Where, however, one or more 

orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more 

than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.”). However, 

we decline to quash Father’s appeal. It is likely that, had Father correctly 

filed two notices of appeal, this Court would have consolidated both cases, 

and we discern no prejudice stemming from Father’s procedural misstep.
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previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Our courts apply a two-part analysis in reviewing an order terminating 

parental rights. As we explained in In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa. Super. 

2007),

[i]nitially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

Id. at 511 (citations omitted).

 Here, the trial court terminated Father’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). “This [C]ourt may affirm the trial 

court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a).” In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 992 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004)). For the 
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purposes of our analysis, we focus on Section 2511(a)(8). The statute 

provides, in relevant part, as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a) ... (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time 

frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the 

[child’s] removal by the court. Once the 12–month period has 

been established, the court must next determine whether the 
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conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist, 

despite the reasonable good faith efforts of [the child welfare 

agency] supplied over a realistic time period. Termination under 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a 

parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions 

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of 

[the child welfare agency’s] services.

In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197, 204-05 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 

A.3d 278 (Pa. 2014) (quoting In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 

2008)).

Instantly, the trial court concluded that Father’s parental rights should 

be terminated, and emphasized Father’s failure to remedy his history of drug 

abuse. Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/2014, at 4-5 (unnumbered pages). Father 

argues that the court abused its discretion in light of, inter alia, the efforts 

he made to meet his FSP objectives. Father asserts that he completed a 

parenting class, gained employment, visited with Child, and made diligent 

efforts to overcome his drug addiction. Father’s Brief at 12-15, 17-19. 

We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s decision. During 

Father’s goal change and termination hearing, DHS social worker Catherine 

Poczkowski testified that Child was adjudicated dependent after DHS 

received “safety alerts” concerning Father’s parenting and suspected drug 

use. N.T., 5/20/2014, at 27.2 Ms. Poczkowski explained that she had 

 

2

In his brief, Father claims that Child was not removed from his care, but 

that “[t]he facts demonstrate that the [C]hild was initially removed from her 

Mother’s care.” Id. This assertion is contradicted by Ms. Poczkowski’s 

testimony, supra, as well as the order adjudicating Child dependent, which 

adopted the factual allegations contained in the DHS dependency petition. 
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stressed to Father the importance of obtaining drug and alcohol treatment, 

and that this was “the main issue of the case.” Id. at 28-29, 39-40. 

However, Ms. Poczkowski indicated that Father did not take his drug problem 

seriously. Id. at 29, 43. For example, she testified that, following a Family 

Services Plan meeting on April 30, 2013, Father did not “talk about being 

serious about a treatment program” and made excuses for his positive drug 

screens. Id. at 29-30. Ms. Poczkowski agreed that Father would “still have 

to do intensive outpatient to completion, and outpatient to completion, and 

lack of relapse before DHS would feel that there had been significant 

progress concerning his chronic drug additions[.]” Id. at 62. 

Father’s failure to remedy his drug problem also was established by 

Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) reports, which are contained in the certified 

record on appeal, and which were presented by DHS during the termination 

and goal change hearing. See N.T., 5/20/2014, at 8-12. The reports reveal 

that Father underwent a drug and alcohol evaluation on May 9, 2012. DHS 

Exhibit 3, at 1. As a result of this evaluation, it was recommended that 

Father take part in an intensive outpatient dual diagnosis treatment 

program. Id. at 4. At first, Father engaged in treatment inconsistently. 

DHS Exhibit 4, at 1-4. By December of 2013, Father was maintaining good 

 

Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 5/1/2012, at 1. The dependency 

petition reveals that, at the time the petition was filed, Child was residing 

with Father and Mother in the home of her paternal grandmother. 

Dependency Petition, 4/18/2012, Statement of Facts at 1-2. Child was 

adjudicated dependent as a result of allegations that Father was using drugs, 

and that Child was being left alone in his care. Id. at 1-2. 
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attendance and participating in treatment. Id. at 5. However, Father had 

“regressed to active addiction,” as evidenced by a positive drug test for 

cocaine on September 18, 2013, and positive tests for opiates on November 

26, 2013, December 2, 2013, and December 12, 2013. Id. Father “was 

asked to develop a relapse prevention plan and was offered a higher level of 

care to which he refused.” Id. Father’s final positive drug tests took place 

on December 20, 2013, when he tested positive for cocaine and opiates, and 

on January 28 2014, when he tested positive for alcohol. DHS Exhibit 4 at 

6; DHS Exhibit 5 at 1-2. Father began to attend a different treatment

program in February of 2014. DHS Exhibit 4 at 6. As of May of 2014, his 

attendance was “sporadic.” Id.

Accordingly, the record confirms that Child has been out of Father’s 

care for a period in excess of 12 months, and that the conditions which led 

to Child’s placement continue to exist, as Father has failed to remedy his 

drug abuse problem. While Father testified that he was now making strides 

with regard to overcoming his drug issues, he acknowledged that he had 

only stopped using opiates since “the beginning of the year,” which Father 

stated was the longest he had gone without a relapse for most of his life. 

Id. at 139-41. Because Father’s most recent effort at conquering his drug 

addiction took place after DHS filed the petition to terminate his parental 

rights, the trial court was not permitted to consider it. See 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b) (“With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), 
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(6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”). 

Additionally, the record supports the other requirement under Section 

2511(a)(8), regarding the needs and welfare of Child. While Father claimed 

to have made progress with regard to his drug problem, he admitted that he 

did not know how much drug treatment he would need, and that he would 

be “battling this disease the rest of my life.” Id. at 170, 173. It is unclear 

when, if ever, Father will be able to care for Child. Conversely, Child is 

bonded with Grandparents, who already care for her and provide for her 

needs. Ms. Poczkowski testified that Child has lived with Grandparents for 

the last 21 months. N.T., 5/20/2014, at 45. Child and Grandparents have 

developed a “[v]ery strong” bond, and Child treats Grandparents “as if they 

were her parents.” Id. at 49. Child appears happy with Grandparents, and 

looks to them for affection. Id. Similarly, Grandparents “love and adore” 

Child. Id. Ms. Poczkowski opined that it would be in Child’s best interest to 

be adopted, and that it would cause Child “serious harm” to be removed 

from Grandparents. Id. Ms. Poczkowski’s testimony was confirmed by 

foster care case manager Ivy Lloyd, who agreed that Child is bonded with 

Grandparents, and that Child would suffer irreparable harm if she were 

taken from them. Id. at 117, 119-20, 122. We therefore conclude that the 
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS met its burden 

under section 2511(a)(8). 

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some 

citations omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded that termination would be in Child’s 

best interests because Child is in a stable environment with Grandparents, 

and because Child is bonded to Grandparents. Trial Court Opinion, 

7/18/2014, at 4-5 (unnumbered pages). The court also determined that 

“[Child] has not had an opportunity to bond with [F]ather due to [F]ather’s 

consistent drug abuse,” and that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Father’s rights were terminated. Id. at 5. Father argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion because, inter alia, Child is bonded to Father. Father’s 

Brief at 20-22. He also complains that a bonding evaluation should have 
J-S74045-14

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been conducted because “[t]he DHS worker and Agency worker witnessed 

less than three percent of the interactions between [Father] and his [C]hild. 

That is not enough of an observation to make a well[-]reasoned decision 

about the bond between [Father] and Child in this case.” Id. at 21. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to Section 2511(b). As 

noted, supra, Child is bonded with Grandparents. Further, Ms. Poczkowski 

testified that there was no parent/child bond between Father and Child. Id. 

at 57. She noted that Father’s interaction with Child “is somewhat guided” 

by Child’s extended family, and explained, “for example, [Father’s mother] 

would be like, [Child], go take a picture with your father. [Child], there’s 

your DaDa. There’s Daddy. It seems to be forced by outside individuals and 

not by the child, herself.” Id. at 58, 91-92. She also noted that Child did 

not seem excited to see Father following a period of six weeks during which 

he was unable to visit, reportedly due to his conflicting employment 

schedule. Id. at 59. Ms. Lloyd agreed that Father’s interaction with Child 

was poor and that “Father needs to be redirect[ed] by usually the person 

accompanying him to the visit to interact with [Child], more so.” Id. at 115-

17, 121. Both Ms. Poczkowski and Ms. Lloyd stated that Child would not 

suffer irreparable harm if the bond with Father were severed. Id. at 63, 

122.
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Father and his mother testified that Father and Child are bonded, and 

that Father does not require redirection during visits. Id. at 150, 152, 155-

57, 180-82. However, the trial court was free to reject this testimony, and 

to credit the statements and opinions of Ms. Poczkowski and Ms. Lloyd. 

Additionally, we observe that “[t]his Court has held that the trial court is not 

required by statute or precedent to order that a formal bonding evaluation 

be performed by an expert.” In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 611 (Pa. Super. 

2012) (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010)). Ms. 

Poczkowski and Ms. Lloyd witnessed a combined 9 or 10 visits between 

Father and Child. N.T., 5/20/2014, at 55, 89, 123. It was for the court to 

determine whether this was sufficient to reach an opinion concerning their 

parent/child bond, or lack thereof. No relief is due.

Father’s third claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by 

changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Father’s 

Brief at 22-23. We consider this issue mindful of the following.

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court's inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 

when considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent 

child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the 

continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; 

(2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the 
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extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement; (4) the 

appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for 

the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child 

might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the 

child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last 

twenty-two months. The best interests of the child, and not the 

interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. As this Court 

has held, a child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

With respect to this issue, Father contends that it was not in the best 

interests of Child to change her permanency goal to adoption. Father’s Brief 

at 23. Father argues that he was attempting to reunify himself with Child, 

and that the court “should have afforded [Father] the opportunity to reunify 

with his daughter given the fact that she had tragically lost her Mother two 

years earlier.” Id. Father also asserts, inter alia, that Child spends the 

majority of her time in daycare, that Grandparents “are older” and will be “of 

advanced age” during Child’s teen years, and that Child “will ultimately 

question her background and become curious as to where her natural Father 

is.” Id.

We again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As 

discussed supra, Father had ample opportunity to complete drug treatment 

over the course of 21 months, but he failed to do so. Further, Child 

presently resides with Grandparents, who have provided for Child, and with 
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whom Child is bonded. Grandparents are in their “[l]ate 50’s” and in 

“[g]ood” health, and there is no reason to conclude that they are too old or 

will be incapable of caring for Child. See N.T., 5/20/2014, at 107. While 

both Grandparents work outside the homeand Child spends time in daycare 

as a result, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that it would be in 

Child’s best interest to be adopted. To conclude otherwise would result in 

Child’s life continuing to be put on hold in favor Father, whose ability to 

overcome his drug addiction and care for Child remains speculative. Father 

is not entitled to relief.

Father’s final claim is that “the trial court erred by failing to make a 

determination as to the credibility of Father’s testimony.” Father’s Brief at 

24. Father argues that the trial court failed to make a “specific 

determination” of Father’s credibility as a witness and that, as a result, “it is 

impossible for the Appellate Court to determine whether findings of the 

[t]rial [c]ourt [are] supported by competent evidence.” Id. We disagree.

Tellingly, Father cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court 

must make written findings of credibility as to each witness in order for this 

Court to review a case. Moreover, to the extent the trial court’s decree and 

opinion contradict portions of Father’s testimony, it is clear that the court 

implicitly rejected that testimony. We see no basis on which to conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion.
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Accordingly, because we conclude that none of Father’s claims entitles 

him to relief, we affirm the decree and the order of the trial court.

Decree and Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/2/2015