UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4825

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICO ANTONIO GREEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:17-cr-00363-FL-1)

Submitted: September 24, 2019 Decided: October 1, 2019

Before WILKINSON and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON, STYERS & MAY, PLLC, Warrenton, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Rico Antonio Green appeals his 87-month sentence imposed after pleading guilty, 

without a plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). Green contends that the district court miscalculated his 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by applying a robbery cross-reference, see U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines §§ 1B1.5(a) & n.3, 2B3.1, 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1 (2016), which 

resulted in impermissible double counting, and that his sentence is unreasonable. We 

affirm.

“We ‘review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the 

Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. 

Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007)). Reviewing a sentence entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In determining

procedural reasonableness, we must consider whether the district court properly calculated 

the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, gave the 

parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence not based on clearly erroneous facts, and 

sufficiently explained the chosen sentence. Id. at 49-51. 

In determining whether a district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, 

we review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

novo. United States v. Oceanic Illsabe Ltd., 889 F.3d 178, 194 (4th Cir. 2018). Under the 

clear error standard, we may not reverse a district court’s findings simply because it would 
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have reached a different result. United States v. Charboneau, 914 F.3d 906, 912 (4th Cir. 

2019). Instead, we may only reverse if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Green contends that the district court improperly calculated his Guidelines range 

because there was insufficient evidence to support the robbery cross-reference and, by 

applying the cross-reference, the district court impermissibly engaged in double counting. 

We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the cross-reference. Ample evidence 

established that Green robbed the victim, including surveillance videos, physical evidence, 

and the victim’s statements regarding the carjacker’s clothing and type and color of the 

firearm used by the carjacker. Because our review of the evidence does not result in a 

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Charboneau, 914 F.3d 

at 912, the district court did not clearly err in finding the evidence sufficient to apply the 

robbery cross-reference.

With respect to double counting, Green did not raise this claim in the district court, 

and we therefore review this claim only for plain error. See United States v. Strieper, 666 

F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012). Here, there was no double counting, as the firearms 

enhancement about which Green complains was applied to the robbery cross-reference, 

which replaced the original firearms guideline. See USSG §§ 1B1.5(a) & n.3, 2B3.1, 

2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1. Thus, Green has not shown any error, let alone plain error.

Next, Green argues that the district court failed to sufficiently explain the sentence 

imposed. “The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that 

he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own 
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legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 

Although a district court need not explicitly “spell out” its explanation for a sentence when 

supported by context, we may not “guess at the district court’s rationale, searching the 

record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues that 

might explain a sentence.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 521 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the district court stated that it had considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553 and that a sentence of 87 months was sufficient but not greater than necessary. The 

court explicitly referenced Green’s statements on his skills and mental health in 

recommending mental health treatment and vocational training. The court also

recommended confinement at Federal Correctional Complex, Butner, in accordance with 

counsel’s wishes, and it expressly noted that Green did not have a good track record 

complying with the terms and conditions of probation or supervision. Additionally, the 

court also discussed Green’s offense conduct and his history and background as set out in 

the presentence report, and listened to nearly an hour of testimony and argument regarding 

Green’s actions surrounding a robbery and other criminal activity. In light of the court’s 

finding that Green had committed a carjacking, Green’s protestation that he was not a “bad 

guy” rings hollow and lends little support for a requested sentence at the bottom of the 

Guidelines. Ultimately, the court’s explanation in imposing a sentence of 87 months was 

legally sufficient. Rita, 551 U.S. at 358. To the extent that Green argues his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable, his within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable 

and Green fails to rebut the presumption afforded his Guidelines sentence. See United 

States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED