COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Annunziata, Senior Judge Duff and Judge Clements*

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SHOHREH GHASEM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY 

v. Record No. 2537-99-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 MAY 9, 2000 

FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

 FAMILY SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 

 (Charles J. Swedish, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Thomas P. Sotelo, Substitute Assistant County 

Attorney (Keegan & Sotelo, PLC, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 (W. Kip Wood, on brief), Guardian ad litem 

for Saman Ghasem, an infant. 

 

 * Judge Jean Harrison Clements took part in the 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01. 

** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 Shohreh Ghasem ("appellant") appeals the decision terminating 

her parental rights to Saman Ghasem ("Saman"). The issue on 

appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to meet the clear 

and convincing standard required for termination of parental 

rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). We find that the evidence was 

sufficient and affirm the trial judge's ruling. 
FACTS

 Saman was born on December 11, 1989. In September of 1995, 

the Fairfax County Department of Family Services ("the 

Department") removed Saman, then four years old, from appellant's 

care because appellant left Saman unsupervised and locked out of 

their hotel room for seven hours. Saman was returned to 

appellant's care, but removed again on July 29, 1996 because 

appellant violated a preliminary protective order which prohibited 

her having contact with a friend who had physically abused 

appellant's other son. The Department later returned Saman to 

appellant. 

 On December 11, 1997, appellant signed a service agreement 

with the Department stating Saman would not be left alone or 

unsupervised at any time or for any reason. The Department 

explained to appellant that Saman suffered from mild mental 

retardation and had special needs. Appellant's therapist also 

explained the agreement to her. On that same day, a social worker 

for the Department telephoned the Ghasem home and found Saman was 

there alone. The Department removed him from appellant's care 

again on December 11, 1997. 

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 Appellant signed additional service agreements with the 

Department on December 24, 1997, and January 9, 1998, stating she 

would not leave Saman alone or unsupervised for any amount of time 

or for any reason. Since 1995, the Department provided the family 

with various services, interventions and financial assistance, 
including: protective supervision of Saman and his brother; 

coordination with the mental health center and Multicultural 

Clinical Center for individual and home based therapy; and 

coordination with Saman's school and health clinics. The Center 

for Multicultural Human Services had worked with the family 

"intensively" since April of 1997, providing individual therapy, 

parental education, nutritional education, and social skills 

training for appellant two times per week. Despite the repeated 

attempts to educate appellant concerning Saman's special needs, 

and despite attending parenting classes, appellant continued to 

deny Saman had any problems. Evidence was presented that 

appellant suffers from depression and a brain dysfunction. 

 Appellant again left Saman alone for about one hour and 

fifteen minutes on January 29, 1998 when she was late returning 

from a doctor's appointment. The Department removed Saman from 

her care and initiated proceedings to terminate her residual 

parental rights to Saman. 

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 On July 28, 1999, a hearing was held in circuit court 

concerning the termination of appellant's parental rights. At the 

hearing, the deposition of Dr. Ronald Federici, a clinical 

neuropsychologist, was admitted into evidence. Dr. Federici 

conducted a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation of Saman 

dated January 21, 1999. He testified Saman, who at the time of 

the evaluation was nine years old, suffers from profound cognitive 

and learning disabilities, speech, language and hearing 
deficiencies, mild mental retardation, brain dysfunction and 

various mental and emotional disorders. He is physically small 

for his age, and his mental development is equivalent to that of a 

five year old. Saman also suffers from a reactive attachment 

disorder and fear of abandonment. Dr. Federici stated that Saman 

will likely require adult supervision and a controlled environment 

into adulthood. Saman's prospect for future development is very 

poor. Dr. Federici further opined that if Saman is to reach his 

developmental potential, he requires a parental figure with 

significant dedication and intelligence to address his needs. 

 On September 27, 1999, the trial judge entered an order 

terminating appellant's residual parental rights. The trial judge 

found that it was in the best interest of Saman to "live in a 

controlled environment with adults who understand and can meet his 

special needs." He also found the Department clearly and 

convincingly proved the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), 

stating that, despite attending parenting classes and receiving a 

"host of other services," appellant's "inherent disabilities 

demonstrate that she is unable to remedy the conditions which led 

to Saman's placement in foster care." Appellant appeals that 

order. 

ANALYSIS

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 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 

409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Where the trial judge hears the 

evidence ore tenus, his decision is entitled to great weight and 

will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. See Lowe v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 231 

Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986). 

 Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a 

child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds 

by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests 

of the child and that 

[t]he parent . . ., without good cause, 

[has] been unwilling or unable within a 

reasonable period of time not to exceed 

twelve months from the date the child was 

placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child's foster 

care placement, notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of 

social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof 

that the parent . . . without good cause, 

[has] failed or been unable to make 

substantial progress towards elimination of 

the conditions which led to or required 

continuation of the child's foster care 

placement in accordance with [the parent's] 

obligations under and within the time limits 

or goals set forth in a foster care plan 

filed with the court . . . shall constitute 

prima facie evidence of this condition. 

 "'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are 

to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of the 

child.'" Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658, 661 

(1979) (citation omitted). The termination of parental rights is 

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a grave, drastic, and irreversible action. "When a court orders 

termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and 

child are severed forever and the parent becomes 'a legal stranger 

to the child.'" Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72 (citation 

omitted). 

 Appellant contends that she was first diagnosed as mildly 

mentally retarded after Saman was removed from her home on January 

29, 1998. She asserts that this condition led to the child's 

foster care placement and that, after January 29, 1998, the 

Department has offered her no services in an effort to remedy this 

condition or any other condition which led to Saman's foster care 

placement. However, the record indicates that appellant's 

psychological condition had been an issue throughout the 

Department's period of involvement with the family, not just on or 

after January 29, 1998. Moreover, appellant's diagnosis of mild 

mental retardation was not the sole condition which led to Saman's 

placement in a foster home. The evidence proved that Saman had 

numerous physical, mental, and emotional special needs that were 

not being met under appellant's care. Furthermore, appellant 

repeatedly left the child alone and unsupervised despite the 

Department's continuing attempts to advise her of his special 

needs. 

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 In addition, the Department worked with the family and 

offered numerous counseling and medical services to the family 

since 1995, but noted little progress or improvement in 
appellant's parenting skills. For example, appellant received a 

psychological examination in January 1997, parental/child 

interaction assessments in March 1997 and February 1998, and 

parenting classes. The December 14, 1998 Foster Care Service Plan 

states that appellant received psychiatric medication from October 

1995 to December 14, 1998. The plan also states that despite 

"intensive services and interventions" appellant did not make 

"much progress and continually engages in the behavior that 

resulted in Saman going into the custody of the Department in 

September 1995." 

 In addition, appellant received a neuropsychological 

evaluation in February 1998. The Foster Care Service Plan dated 

March 3, 1998 indicates that appellant was diagnosed as suffering 

from "an emotional condition" and "brain dysfunction." Her 

emotional development was diagnosed as that of a child and 

characteristic of Borderline Personality Disorder. The report 

further stated she "displays significant cognitive weaknesses 

which represent impairment of several brain areas which are 

generally impervious to change." At the time of the report, and 

as stated above, appellant had received "intensive home-based 

services" for over two years, but she continued to leave Saman 

unsupervised, and she continued to deny that he had any special 

developmental, cognitive, mental or physical needs or problems. 

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 Thus, the record indicates that the Department was aware from 

the time it first became involved with the family that appellant's 
mental health status was an issue in the matter. Moreover, the 

Department was also aware of and concerned for the mental, 

physical, and emotional well being of Saman, a child with numerous 

special needs. The record is replete with instances of 

"reasonable and appropriate efforts" made by the Department and 

other agencies over a period of several years in an attempt to 

work with appellant and remedy the numerous conditions which led 

to the foster care placement of Saman. However, the record also 

indicates that appellant made very little, if any, progress in 

remedying these conditions, notwithstanding the efforts of the 

Department and other agencies. 

 Therefore, the record supports the trial judge's finding that 

the termination of appellant's residual parental rights was in 

Saman's best interest and his finding that the Department 

presented clear and convincing evidence to meet the requirements 

of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the decision.1

 Affirmed.

 

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1

 Because we decide the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial judge's holding, the point raised by appellee 

regarding Code § 16.1-283(B) is moot.