J-S38015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES FOY BULLARD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 251 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003341-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2023

James Foy Bullard appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after the trial court

convicted him of persons not to possess firearms,

1

firearms not to be carried

without a license,2 and carrying firearms on public streets or public property 

in Philadelphia.

3 After careful review, we affirm the convictions, but vacate 

the judgment of sentence as illegal, and remand for resentencing.

On January 19, 2019, police responded to a report of a gunpoint robbery 

outside a pharmacy located on Lancaster Avenue in Philadelphia. Detective 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

2 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

3 Id. at § 6108. 
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Jonathan Eves interviewed the complainant and subsequently reviewed 

pharmacy surveillance footage as part of his investigation. The footage 

revealed an individual with a gun taking a passerby’s backpack. Following 

circulation of a still image from the surveillance footage, investigators 

reviewed photos of possible suspects and determined that Bullard’s 

photograph was consistent with the individual depicted in the footage. 

On February 26, 2019, Detective Eves interviewed Bullard about the 

alleged robbery. On that day, Bullard was in the Philadelphia Industrial 

Correctional Center (PICC) on another unrelated matter and was transported 

by police to a police station located at 5510 Pine Street, in Philadelphia, to be 

interviewed by Detective Eves. Bullard’s interview was recorded. 

At the beginning of the interview, Detective Eves advised Bullard of his 

Miranda4rights. Bullard acknowledged that he understood his rights both 

verbally and in writing. Detective Eves showed Bullard video of the interior 

and exterior of the pharmacy where the alleged robbery took place. Bullard 

identified himself in the video, but answered no further questions when 

Detective Eves asked if Bullard committed a robbery. Detective Eves ended 

the interview and Bullard was subsequently charged with robbery and related 

offenses. The next day, Detective Eves executed a search warrant at Bullard’s 

home, but was unable to recover any proceeds from the alleged robbery. 

____________________________________________

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Also of significance, on February 5, 2019, approximately two and a half 

weeks following the instant alleged robbery, a search warrant had been 

executed at Bullard’s home following an unrelated gunpoint robbery on the 

same day. The search warrant yielded a silver firearm and two boxes of 

ammunition. On or about that day, Bullard was charged with robbery, and 

related offenses. Ultimately, the charges against Bullard in the February 5, 

2019 robbery were eventually withdrawn on April 5, 2019. 

Prior to the commencement of trial in the instant case, Bullard requested 

to represent himself pro se. On October 23, 2019, the trial court held a 

Grazier5 hearing and determined that Bullard’s decision to waive his right to 

counsel was done knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and of his own free will.

See N.T. Grazier Hearing, 10/23/19, at 12. On November 12, 2019, 

Bullard filed a multi-part motion to suppress on the theories that the search 

of his residence was done without probable cause, that he was denied his right 

to counsel, and that his trial was unnecessarily delayed. On February 11, 

2020, the Honorable Roxanne Covington held a hearing on Bullard’s motion. 

During the hearing, the motion court heard testimony from Detective 

Eves about Bullard’s interview and watched the corresponding video. See

N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 24-27. Detective Eves testified that when 

Bullard arrived for questioning, Detective Eves explained that Bullard was 

there to answer questions about a robbery and that he first had to be 

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5 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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Mirandized. Id. at 30. Detective Eves further testified that he was not 

informed by other officers that Bullard had requested counsel during 

transport, neither did Bullard make mention of his desire for counsel before 

entering the interrogation room. Id. at 32. 

The court also heard testimony from Bullard, who stated that he was 

taken from the jail to a police station, but was not informed why he was being 

taken to the station. Id. at 34. Before arriving at the police station, Bullard 

testified that he asked the officers transporting him to call his attorney, but 

the officers informed him that he did not need an attorney. Id. at 35. On 

cross-examination, however, Bullard testified that he did not request an 

attorney prior to speaking with Detective Eves. Id. at 38. At the conclusion 

of argument, Judge Covington denied Bullard’s suppression motion, stating

that “[a]fter careful review of the testimony and evidence presented in this 

case, [Bullard’s] motion to suppress [his] statement of self-identification is 

denied as evidence[d] by video [showing Bullard was] properly [M]irandized 

and waived [his] right to counsel.” Id. at 41. 

On September 20, 2021, while represented by counsel,

6 Bullard’s nonjury trial commenced before the Honorable Kai N. Scott. The court heard 

testimony from Detective Eves as to his investigation of the robbery. See

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6 During a hearing on August 26, 2021, Bullard expressed that he would like 

to be represented by counsel at his non-jury trial, particularly Joel Krantz,

Esquire, his stand-by counsel during pre-trial procedures. See N.T. Motion 

Hearing, 8/26/21, at 49-53. The trial court confirmed that Bullard wished to 

proceed with counsel at the outset of the non-jury trial. See N.T. Non-Jury 

Trial, 9/20/21 at 4-5. 
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N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 9/20/21 at 11-12. Detective Eves also testified that he 

knew Bullard was represented by counsel in the unrelated February 5, 2019

robbery case for which Bullard had been in custody at the time Detective Eves 

sought to interview Bullard about the instant case. Id. at 22. Detective Eves 

stated that, despite knowing that information, he still had Bullard brought to 

the police station for an interview. Id. The court also heard from Detective 

Idris Amir, who was involved in the investigation of the unrelated gunpoint 

robbery and conducted a search of Bullard’s residence, pursuant to a search 

warrant, wherein he recovered, among other items, a handgun and two boxes 

of live rounds. Id. at 26-28. At the close of argument, Judge Scott found 

Bullard guilty of the three aforementioned gun-related charges.7 Sentencing 

was deferred for a presentence investigation report and mental health 

evaluation. 

On November 18, 2021, the court sentenced Bullard to 6 to 23 months’ 

incarceration for persons not to possess firearms, with no credit for time 

served, two years’ reporting probation for firearms not to be carried without 

a license, and no further penalty for carrying firearms on public streets or 

public property in Philadelphia. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/18/21, at 

23-24. 

Bullard filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence nunc pro tunc on 

December 17, 2021. On the same day, the trial court vacated Bullard’s

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7 Judge Scott found Bullard not guilty of robbery, theft, receiving stolen 

property, possession of the instrument of a crime, and simple assault.
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sentence and scheduled a hearing on the motion.

8

 Following a hearing, the 

court denied Bullard’s motion and reimposed his sentence on January 13, 

2022. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 1/13/22, at 14-15.

On January 12, 2023, Bullard was before Judge Scott again for a hearing 

on a violation of probation (VOP) in the instant matter. Bullard stated that, 

after his sentence was reimposed following the denial of his reconsideration 

motion, he believed that his trial attorney, who had not represented him at 

his motion for reconsideration,9 was going to file a direct appeal. See N.T. 

VOP Hearing, 1/12/23, at 6-8. During the VOP hearing, the court instructed 

the Defender Association of Philadelphia to file a motion to reinstate Bullard’s 

appellate nunc pro tunc rights due to no appeal being filed during the 

appropriate time period. See id. at 22. Judge Scott reappointed the Defender 

Association, who had represented him during trial, to represent Bullard. See 

id.; see also Short Certificate, 1/12/23. Subsequently, counsel made an oral 

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8 Bullard’s post-sentence motion was not filed within the 10-day limit required

by Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). However, the trial court expressly granted 

Bullard’s request to file a nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion within 30 days 

of the imposition of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 

1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2015) (time for filing notice of appeal tolled where 

trial court expressly granted filing of nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion 

within 30 days of imposition of sentence). Accordingly, Bullard’s nunc pro 

tunc post-sentence motion was timely.

9 Bullard was represented by private counsel at the reconsideration hearing. 

However, that counsel did not inform Bullard as to the outcome of the hearing 

and did not represent him beyond that hearing. See N.T. VOP Hearing, 

1/12/23, at 5-6.
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motion to reinstate Bullard’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc. See N.T. VOP 

Hearing, 1/12/23, at 23. The court accepted the oral motion, and, on January 

13, 2022, the court ordered that Bullard’s appellate rights be reinstated nunc 

pro tunc. See Order, 1/18/23. 

On January 23, 2023, Bullard filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal.10 

Bullard raises the following issue for our review:

Did not the court err in failing to suppress Bullard’s subsequent 

statement despite his Miranda waiver where Bullard, was 

incarcerated on an unrelated offense and asked transporting 

police to allow him to call his lawyer before taking him to be 

questioned by detectives, and officers refused and told him that 

he did not need a lawyer? See Miranda, supra (right to counsel

under Fifth Amendment when person in custody and subjected to 

police interrogation). 

Appellant’s Brief, at 3 (reworded for clarity; footnote omitted). 

Bullard’s claim that the court erred in denying his motion for suppression 

is two-fold. First, he claims that the court erred because he had already 

invoked his right to an attorney prior to questioning by Detective Eves. Id.

at 18-19. Second, he claims that the court erred by not placing findings of 

fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion of the suppression 

hearing. Id. at 21-22.

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10 It does not appear that the trial court ordered Bullard file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Moreover, a

review of the docket indicates that no concise statement was filed. Judge 

Scott is no longer on the bench in Philadelphia. On February 22, 2023, the 

appeals unit of the trial court sent a letter that no Rule 1925(a) opinion would 

accompany the file. 
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Initially, we note our standard of review of the denial of a suppression 

motion. In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion,

[w]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions 

drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not 

bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 456 (Pa. Super. 2019). Such 

an inquiry must take into account the totality of the circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Additionally, it is exclusively within the province of the trial court to determine 

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. 

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 666 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. Super. 1996). If 

the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such 

findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are 

erroneous. Id. 

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that: 

in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that in 

order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination from the inherently compelling pressures of 

custodial interrogation, “if an individual states that he wants an 

attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 

present.” 384 U.S. at 473 []. In Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 

477, 484 (1981)], the Court determined that additional 

safeguards for the Miranda right to counsel were necessary and 

held that once a suspect asserts the right, he may not be further 

interrogated “until counsel has been made available to him [].”

[I]n Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)], the 
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Court clarified the Edwards rule by holding that “when counsel is 

requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not 

reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not 

the accused has consulted with his attorney.”

Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 690 A.2d 203, 215 (Pa. 1997). Specifically, 

Edwards is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into 

waiving his previously[-]asserted Miranda rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 401 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Minnick, 498 U.S. at 150).

In the present case, Bullard testified at the suppression hearing that on 

February 26, 2019, while incarcerated on an unrelated matter at PICC, two 

officers told him to get dressed and transported him to a police station located 

at 5510 Pine Street in Philadelphia. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 34. 

Upon arriving to the station, Bullard was placed in a holding cell until Detective 

Eves moved him to an interrogation room. Id. at 35. Bullard testified that,

prior to being questioned by Detective Eves, he asked for an attorney. Bullard 

stated that he asked the officers who retrieved him from PICC, when he met 

them in the receiving room at PICC, if he could contact an attorney, to which 

he was told that he did not need an attorney.11 Id. Specifically, Bullard 

testified that he asked Officer Jeremy Duff if he could contact an attorney

while in the receiving room at PICC. Id. On cross-examination at the 

suppression hearing, however, the following exchange occurred:

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11 Bullard also stated that he did not make any statements to the officers while 

in transport from PICC to 5510 Pine Street. See id.
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[Commonwealth:] Sir, let me try this again. I asked you very 

simple question. Did you ask for a lawyer? I’m not talking about 

going in your house[.]

[Bullard:] Okay.

[Commonwealth:] Did you ask for a lawyer on this day prior to 

talking to the detectives?

[Bullard:] Did you just see what I said and signed?

[Commonwealth:] It’s a yes or no question.

[Bullard:] No.

Id. at 38.

Bullard, pro se at the suppression hearing, presented no additional 

evidence to support his motion. Detective Eves testified on behalf of the 

Commonwealth and stated that he had Bullard brought to 5510 Pine Street 

for questioning about the instant case. Id. at 25-26. Detective Eves testified 

that prior to questioning Bullard, he provided Bullard with his Miranda

warnings, showed Bullard a video purporting to show a robbery, and that 

Bullard identified himself in the video. Id. at 26. At that point, the 

Commonwealth played the recording of the interview to the suppression court. 

Id.; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 1, at 26. A review of this video shows 

Detective Eves and a second detective interviewing Bullard. At the outset, 

Bullard asked both detectives for business cards and then stated they may 

“proceed.” Interrogation Video, 2/26/19, at 11:52:51. Detective Eves 

informed Bullard he was investigating a robbery on Lancaster Avenue and 

wanted to speak with Bullard about it. Before asking him any questions, 
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Detective Eves stated that he had to “Mirandize [Bullard] first.” Id. at 

11:53:00. Detective Eves then presented a written statement and read the 

statement to Bullard, at the conclusion of which he asked Bullard if he 

understood “everything that [he] just read to [him].” Id. at 11:53:01-

11:54:05. Bullard verbally acknowledged that he understood everything and 

then signed the acknowledgement. Id. at 11:54:15. 

Detective Eves then placed a laptop in front of Bullard, with surveillance

video of the alleged robbery cued-up. Id. at 11:54:40. Detective Eves 

explained where the surveillance video was from and, at that moment, Bullard 

voluntarily stated “that’s me” several times. Id. at 11:54:48-11:55:02. 

Detective Eves attempted to ask Bullard several more questions about the 

alleged robbery for the next five minutes. Bullard declined to answer 

Detective Eves’s questions and the interview concluded at 12:00:18.

During cross-examination, Detective Eves stated that the officers who 

transported Bullard to the police station never informed him that Bullard had 

requested counsel prior to arrival. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 32. 

In addition, Detective Eves testified that Bullard never made “mention of any 

counsel” prior to entering the interrogation room. Id. Neither of the two 

officers who transported Bullard from PICC to the police station testified at the 

suppression hearing. Id. at 32-33.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court stated: “After 

careful review of the testimony and evidence presented in this case, the 
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defendant’s motion to suppress [his] statement of self-identification is denied 

as evidence[d] by video [that the defendant was] properly [M]irandized and 

waived [his] right to counsel.” Id. at 41. 

Our review of the record confirms that the trial court’s findings are 

supported by the record, and its ruling is sound. See Hampton, supra. The 

only evidence that Bullard may have invoked his Fifth Amendment right to 

counsel was Bullard’s own testimony, to which, evidently, the court accorded 

little weight, and was contradictory on cross-examination. Moreover, Bullard 

conceded, on cross-examination, that he did not at any time request counsel. 

See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 38. Bullard was clearly informed of his 

Miranda rights, acknowledged such, and told law enforcement to “proceed” 

with their questions. Bullard identified himself on the video before Detective 

Eves even had the opportunity to pose a question, and continued to identify 

himself in the video throughout questioning. Thus, we conclude that Bullard, 

without provocation or improper questioning from the police, voluntarily and 

knowingly relinquished his Miranda rights. See Champney, supra; see 

also Marinelli, supra. Accordingly, we do not grant Bullard relief on this 

claim.

The second portion of Bullard’s claim is that the court erred by not 

placing findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion 

of the suppression hearing, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 21-22. Rule 581(I) states:
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on the 

record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to 

whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s 

rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute, and shall make 

an order granting or denying the relief sought.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). 

This issue has been addressed by our Supreme Court in 

Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2005):

[I]t is not uncommon for suppression judges to fail to comply with 

[Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I)], and the lapse is then belatedly accounted 

for, if at all, either in the court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion filed after 

an appeal is taken by the aggrieved party . . . or by the 

[Commonwealth v. Kichline, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (Pa. 1976)] 

standard of review—a standard which came into existence 

precisely because of such lapses. 

Millner, supra at 688. Placing findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 

record at the conclusion of the suppression hearing serves two purposes. One, 

“it permits the losing party to make a more intelligent assessment of whether 

or not to burden the appellate justice system with an appeal of the suppression 

ruling, particularly in cases of contested evidence.” Id. Two, “it is often the 

case (for example, where a waiver trial occurs) that the suppression judge is 

different from the trial judge yet, if there is a conviction, it will be the trial 

judge who will be responsible for preparation of the Rule 1925 opinion for 

appeal.” Id. at 689. Thus, in instances where the suppression court has failed 

to make specific findings of fact on the record, this Court has instead relied 

on the record and the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740, 742-43 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
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Here, there is no Rule 1925(a) opinion, and the trial judge was not the 

same judge who heard the suppression motion. Still, while we disapprove of 

the suppression court’s failure to place specific findings of fact and conclusions 

of law on the record, “remand for compliance would not serve the interests of 

judicial economy or justice.” Millner, 888 A.2d at 689. The evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing, discussed in detail above, established 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Bullard’s statement was voluntary,

and that the waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. See 

Kichline, 361 A.2d at 290. Thus, the record is sufficient to allow meaningful 

appellate review. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Bullard’s 

suppression motion. See Milner, supra; see also Kichline, supra. 

However, in our review of the record it became apparent that the trial 

court failed to award time credit to Bullard. Such an error constitutes an illegal 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166-67 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (trial court’s failure to award credit for time served implicates 

legality of sentence). It is well-settled that an illegal sentence must be 

vacated and that we can raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.

Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010). The 

Pennsylvania Sentencing Code provides that credit “shall be given to the 

defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for 

which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of conduct on which such a 

charge is based.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) (emphasis added). This includes

“credit for the time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending 
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sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.” Id. “The principle 

underlying [section 9760] is that a defendant should be given credit for time 

spent in custody prior to sentencing for a particular offense.” 

Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723, 725 (Pa. Super. 1992).

There is no dispute that Bullard did not receive credit for his time 

incarcerated related to this crime prior to his conviction. See N.T. Sentencing 

Hearing, 11/18/21, at 19-20, 23-24; see also Sentencing Order 11/19/21. 

The sentencing court acknowledged that Bullard had been in custody 

approximately two years and eight months prior to sentencing on these 

charges. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/18/21, at 7-8, 19. Placing her 

sentence on the record, Judge Scott stated that she did not “want to send 

[Bullard] upstate . . . . [because he does not] do well upstate.” Id. at 23. 

The court sentenced Bullard to an aggregate term of 6 to 23 months’ 

incarceration “with no credit for time served” and two years’ reporting 

probation. Id.

The sentencing court’s failure to give Bullard credit for time served, 

amounting to almost three years, is illegal pursuant to section 9760(1). While 

we understand the court’s reasoning for the sentence it imposed, we are 

constrained to vacate Bullard’s sentence and remand for resentencing in 

accordance with the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code.

12

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12 We recognize the sentencing court’s desire for Bullard to serve his sentence 

in county jail, rather that state prison, to better his chances of rehabilitation 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded 

for resentencing in accordance with the dictates of this decision. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Date: 12/20/2023

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and lessen his likelihood of re-offending. However, we note a sentencing 

court’s ability to designate a defendant to serve a term up to five years in 

county jail. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(a). Finally, our review of the record 

indicates that Bullard was released from county jail after six months and has

been on supervision since his release.