IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 10, 2016 Session1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KENNETH MCCORMICK

 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for White County

No. CR5719 David A. Patterson, Judge

_____________________________

No. M2013-02189-SC-R11-CD – Filed May 10, 2016

_____________________________

We granted this appeal to reconsider our decision in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 

(Tenn. 2013), which held that the community caretaking doctrine is not an exception to 

the federal and state constitutional warrant requirements. Having concluded that Moats

was wrongly decided, we overrule Moats and hold that the community caretaking 

doctrine is analytically distinct from consensual police-citizen encounters and is instead 

an exception to the state and federal constitutional warrant requirements which may be 

invoked to validate as reasonable a warrantless seizure of an automobile. To establish 

that the community caretaking exception applies, the State must show that (1) the officer 

possessed specific and articulable facts, which, viewed objectively and in the totality of 

the circumstances, reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action 

was needed; and (2) the officer‟s behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably 

restrained and tailored to the community caretaking need. We conclude, based on the 

proof in the record on appeal, that the community caretaking exception applies in this 

case. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals 

declining to grant the defendant‟s motion to suppress are affirmed on the separate 

grounds stated herein. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal 

Appeals Affirmed on Separate Grounds 

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SHARON G. LEE,

C.J., and JEFFREY S. BIVINS and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined.

William A. Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kenneth McCormick.

 

1 We heard oral arguments in this appeal at the Nashville School of Law.
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Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; Leslie E. Price, Senior Counsel; Michelle L. Consiglio-Young, Assistant 

Attorney General; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; Philip Hatch, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On August 27, 2012, Kenneth McCormick, the defendant, was indicted by the 

White County Grand Jury for first offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant

(“DUI”). On December 13, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

against him, arguing, as pertinent to this appeal, that the warrantless seizure of his parked 

vehicle and the ensuing field sobriety tests were not supported by reasonable suspicion. 

After a pretrial hearing on February 14, 2013, the trial court denied the defendant‟s 

suppression motion by an order entered on April 23, 2013. The defendant filed a motion 

for reconsideration, and the trial court allowed the defendant a jury-out hearing on his

reconsideration motion during the defendant‟s trial, which occurred on May 10, 2013. 

The proof offered at both suppression hearings and at trial is summarized below.

At approximately 2:45 a.m. on April 8, 2012, Sergeant Daniel Trivette (“Sgt. 

Trivette”) of the White County Sheriff‟s Department was on routine patrol on Highway 

111 when he saw a tan Chevrolet Tahoe that, “from where [he] was traveling, appeared to 

be sitting in the roadway in front of the Save-A-Lot Food Store on Knowles Drive.” Sgt. 

Trivette “pulled onto Knowles Drive, pulled behind the vehicle, [and] realized it was 

actually sitting in the entrance to the parking lot” of the Save-A-Lot, blocking about 75%

of the entrance. The shopping center was closed. The back left wheel and rear portion of 

the parked vehicle were “partially in the roadway,” while the “other three wheels w[ere] 

at an angle.” Sgt. Trivette parked his patrol car “in the roadway” behind the vehicle and 

activated the patrol car‟s “back blue lights” for “safety” reasons, specifically to prevent 

his vehicle or the parked vehicle from being rear ended during the stop. 

Sgt. Trivette then exited his patrol car “to do a welfare check on the subject in the 

vehicle.” The headlights of the vehicle were on and its engine was running. Sgt. Trivette 

walked up to the driver‟s side door of the vehicle and observed a man, later identified as 

the defendant, “slumped over the wheel.” Sgt. Trivette attempted to rouse the defendant 

by “tapping on the window,” but “loud music” was blaring from inside the vehicle. The 

defendant did not respond. Sgt. Trivette then opened the door and “detected a strong 

odor of alcoholic beverage on [the defendant‟s] breath and person.” Sgt. Trivette noticed 

“McDonald‟s food in [the defendant‟s] lap,” “an open beer bottle” in the center console, 

and “some sort of sauce all over [the defendant‟s] face,” as if “he had been eating.” Sgt. 

Trivette tried to wake the defendant for about a minute before the defendant finally 
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responded. After making sure the defendant was “okay,” Sgt. Trivette turned down the 

radio, turned off the engine, and asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. The defendant 

complied, and Sgt. Trivette removed the keys from the ignition and placed them in the 

driver‟s seat.

By the time the defendant exited the vehicle, a White County Sheriff‟s deputy, 

Scott O‟Dell (“Deputy O‟Dell”), had arrived at the scene in response to Sgt. Trivette‟s 

call for assistance with a welfare check. Both officers described the defendant upon

exiting his vehicle as “very unsteady on his feet,” “swaying,” “stumbling,” and having 

“difficulty standing still.” The defendant stated that he had consumed three to four beers. 

When Sgt. Trivette asked the defendant if he thought he should be driving, the defendant

responded, “Not necessarily.” Sgt. Trivette then administered four field sobriety tests, 

and Sgt. Trivette and Deputy O‟Dell testified about the defendant‟s performance on these

tests.

2

 Additionally, a video recording of the defendant performing the tests was admitted 

into evidence.

After the defendant failed three of the four field sobriety tests,

3

Sgt. Trivette asked 

the defendant how much alcohol he had consumed and when he had begun drinking that 

evening. The defendant replied that he had begun drinking at approximately 7:00 p.m. 

and had consumed five or six beers. When Sgt. Trivette asked the defendant for the 

current time, the defendant responded 11:30 p.m., when, according to Sgt. Trivette, it was 

actually 3:00 a.m. Sgt. Trivette then arrested the defendant for DUI.

After Sgt. Trivette advised the defendant of the implied consent law, the defendant

refused a blood test. While the defendant was in the back seat of the police car, another 

vehicle attempted to enter the shopping center parking lot through the entrance the 

defendant‟s vehicle was obstructing. When Sgt. Trivette asked the defendant if he knew 

the person driving the vehicle, the defendant responded, “No, I sure don‟t. I‟m sorry. 

I‟ve had too much to drink.” During the ensuing inventory search of the defendant‟s 

vehicle, Sgt. Trivette found four unopened, cold beers in the back seat and a bottle 

containing the defendant‟s prescription Xanax. 

Testifying at trial for the defense, Lance Wyatt explained that he and the defendant 

had spent the evening preceding the arrest at a golf club lounge. The defendant had

agreed to serve as the designated driver for the evening. Mr. Wyatt had observed the 

defendant have one or possibly two drinks at the golf club lounge that evening, but at trial 

Mr. Wyatt maintained that the defendant had not been intoxicated when they left the 

 

2

Specifically, Sgt. Trivette administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn 

test, the one-leg stand test, and the Romberg test. The defendant did not object to the officer‟s testimony 

about his performance on these tests and has not raised any complaint about the admission of this 

testimony as an issue on appeal.

3

The defendant failed the walk and turn test, the one leg-stand test, and the Romberg test.
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lounge to drive to Mr. Wyatt home‟s between 12:15 and 12:30 a.m. Mr. Wyatt 

acknowledged, however, that his own judgment had been impaired from drinking that 

evening. Mr. Wyatt denied seeing beer in the console of the defendant‟s car when he 

exited the vehicle, but he conceded not knowing what or how much the defendant drank 

after he left the defendant‟s vehicle around midnight.

The trial court refused to grant the defendant‟s motion for reconsideration of his 

motion to suppress, explaining that if the seizure of the defendant in his parked vehicle 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion, it was nevertheless valid as an exercise of 

Sgt. Trivette‟s community caretaking function. In so ruling, the trial court emphasized 

Sgt. Trivette‟s consistent testimony at the initial suppression hearing and at the 

reconsideration hearing that he had approached the defendant‟s vehicle to conduct a 

welfare check and had turned on his rear blue lights for safety reasons.

The trial court submitted the criminal charge to the jury, which convicted the 

defendant of first offense DUI. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (2012).

4

 The trial 

court imposed an eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence and ordered the defendant to 

serve ten days, with the remainder to be served on probation. In his motion for new trial, 

the defendant raised a single issue, arguing that Sgt. Trivette‟s actions in pulling behind 

him in his parked vehicle and activating the patrol car‟s rear blue lights amounted to a 

seizure that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied the motion 

for new trial, and the defendant appealed, raising the same single issue he had raised in 

his motion for new trial. State v. McCormick, No. M2013-02189-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 

WL 1543325, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2015), appeal granted (Tenn. Sept. 25, 

2015). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court‟s judgment, concluding 

that Sgt. Trivette‟s activation of his patrol car‟s rear blue lights was an exercise of the 

community caretaking function and not a seizure. Id. at *5. 

 

4

This statute provides:

It is unlawful for any person to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or 

other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state, or on any 

streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park or any 

apartment house complex, or any other premises that is generally frequented by the 

public at large, while:

(1) Under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, controlled substance, controlled 

substance analogue, drug, substance affecting the central nervous system or combination 

thereof that impairs the driver‟s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle by depriving the 

driver of the clearness of mind and control of oneself which the driver would otherwise 

possess; or

(2) The alcohol concentration in the person‟s blood or breath is eight-hundredths of one 

percent (0.08 %) or more.
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In this Court, the defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 

application for permission to appeal arguing that the courts below erred by denying his 

motion to suppress. We granted the application, and in addition to the issue the 

defendant raised, directed the parties to brief and argue the question of “whether th[is]

Court should revisit its holding in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), and 

prior Tennessee decisions that limited the community caretaking doctrine to third-tier 

consensual police-citizen encounters.” State v. McCormick, No. M2013-02189-SC-R11-

CD (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015) (order granting application and directing supplemental 

briefing).

II. Standard of Review 

The standards governing appellate review of trial court decisions on motions to 

suppress are well established. A trial court‟s findings of fact after a suppression hearing 

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates otherwise. State 

v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). As a general rule, “[q]uestions of credibility 

of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the 

evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. A trial court‟s 

application of law to facts is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. State 

v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 

(Tenn. 1999); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)).

III. Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right 

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause.”5 Likewise, article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution 

ensures that “the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, 

from unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that “general warrants” lacking 

particularity and evidentiary support “ought not to be granted.” Neither the text of the 

Fourth Amendment nor that of article 1, section 7 specifies when a search warrant must 

be obtained, but the United States Supreme Court “has inferred that a warrant must 

generally be secured.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). The same general 

rule applies to article I, section 7. See State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) 

(“[T]he Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee prohibit 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, as a general matter, law enforcement officials 

cannot conduct a search without having first obtained a valid warrant.” (internal citations 

omitted)). While searches and seizures conducted pursuant to warrants are presumptively 

reasonable, State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 616-17 (Tenn. 2006), warrantless 

 

5

The Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. 

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable. King, 563 U.S. at 459; State v. 

Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tenn. 2014). Nevertheless, “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the 

Fourth Amendment is „reasonableness.‟” King, 563 U.S. at 459 (quoting Brigham City v. 

Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 722. Accordingly, 

courts have recognized certain reasonable exceptions to the warrant requirement and have 

held that a warrantless search or seizure is reasonable if it falls within one of these

exceptions. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 722 (listing some of the “commonly recognized 

exceptions to the requirement of a warrant”).

Of course, the warrant requirements of the federal and state constitutions are

implicated only when a search or seizure actually occurs, and not every police-citizen

interaction results in a search or seizure. See State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tenn. 

2008); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). This appeal involves an 

alleged seizure. Regarding seizures, Tennessee courts have generally recognized three 

levels of police-citizen interactions: (1) the full-scale arrest, which must be supported by 

probable cause; (2) the brief investigatory detention, which must be supported by 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) the brief, consensual police-citizen 

encounter, which does not amount to a seizure and need not be supported by any level of 

individualized suspicion or objective justification. Day, 263 S.W.3d at 901. “Of the three 

categories, only the first two rise to the level of a „seizure‟ for constitutional analysis 

purposes.” Id.

The first relevant question for purposes of this appeal then is whether Sgt.

Trivette‟s actions in parking behind the defendant‟s vehicle and activating his patrol car‟s 

rear blue lights amounted to a warrantless seizure or was merely a consensual interaction 

between the defendant and the officer. If the latter, then the state and federal 

constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are not implicated. 

Id. However, if Sgt. Trivette‟s actions amounted to a seizure, then the warrantless seizure 

is presumed unreasonable, but the presumption may be overcome, and suppression of 

evidence avoided, if the State demonstrates that the seizure was conducted pursuant to 

one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. King, 563 U.S. at 460; Day, 263 

S.W.3d at 901 n.9; State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006); Yeargan, 958 

S.W.2d at 629. 

A. Seizure

In this appeal, the defendant argues that Sgt. Trivette‟s actions amounted to a 

warrantless seizure and that the seizure was not based upon reasonable suspicion or any 

other exception to the warrant requirement. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629. Therefore, the 

defendant argues that the courts below erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
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The State responds to the defendant‟s arguments in two ways. First, the State 

argues that Sgt. Trivette‟s activation of the rear facing blue lights on his patrol car did not 

amount to a seizure because the defendant was unconscious and was, therefore, unable to 

yield to any show of authority by Sgt. Trivette.6 This aspect of the State‟s argument is 

premised on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), in which the Supreme 

Court held that a seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment only when an 

officer uses physical force to detain a person or where a person submits or yields to a 

show of authority by the officer. In so holding, the Supreme Court limited United States 

v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), which had held that a seizure occurs when a 

reasonable person, under the totality of the circumstances, would not feel free to leave. 

The State acknowledges that this Court implicitly rejected the Hodari D. standard when it 

reaffirmed the Mendenhall standard in State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tenn. 

2002). Nevertheless, the State contends that, because the protections afforded by article 

I, section 7 are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth Amendment, this Court 

should revisit the issue and adopt the Hodari D. definition of seizure. The State also 

relies upon a portion of the analysis in Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 187, which purported to 

distinguish between an officer‟s activation of blue lights to effectuate a seizure and an 

officer‟s activation of blue lights to perform a community caretaking function. 

Alternatively, the State argues that if Sgt. Trivette‟s actions amounted to a seizure, 

this Court should overrule Moats, hold that the community caretaking doctrine is an 

exception to the warrant requirement under the federal and state constitutions, and 

conclude that the seizure in this case was appropriate under the community caretaking 

exception. We agree with the State that Moats should be reconsidered and overruled. 

Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will presume that Sgt. Trivette‟s actions in 

parking behind the defendant‟s vehicle and activating his rear facing blue lights 

constituted a seizure. As a result, we need not reach the issue in this case of whether we 

should revisit the Hodari D. standard for determining if a seizure has occurred. We turn 

our attention next to analyzing and reconsidering the community caretaking doctrine and 

Moats. 

 

6 During oral argument, the State asserted that even if a seizure occurred, it was justified based 

upon reasonable suspicion. This assertion is not listed as a separate issue in the State‟s brief in this Court, 

nor did the State raise this argument in the courts below. It is well settled that issues not listed in the 

appropriate section of an appellate brief and arguments raised for the first time on appeal may be deemed 

waived. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 334-35 (Tenn. 2012). We decline to address this argument.
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B. Community Caretaking Doctrine

The community caretaking doctrine originated in the United States Supreme 

Court‟s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, Chicago police 

officer Chester Dombrowski, while on a visit to Wisconsin, reported to local authorities 

that he had been involved in an automobile accident. Under the mistaken impression that 

Chicago police officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times and 

having found no revolver on Dombrowski‟s person, one of the responding officers looked 

for the weapon in the front seat and glove compartment of his disabled vehicle but found 

nothing. Id. The vehicle was then towed to a privately owned garage, where it was left 

in an unsecured area. Id. After Dombrowski was arrested for drunken driving and taken 

to a local hospital, one of the officers returned to the vehicle without a warrant to search 

again for the revolver in order “to protect the public from the possibility that [it] would 

fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443. In the trunk of the vehicle, 

the officer found and seized numerous items that linked Dombrowski to a recent 

homicide, id. at 437, and ultimately these items were used as evidence to obtain his 

conviction for first-degree murder, id. at 438-39. Dombrowski argued these items were 

illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and should have been excluded 

from evidence.

Rejecting Dombrowski‟s constitutional argument, the United States Supreme 

Court upheld the warrantless search of Dombrowski‟s vehicle as reasonable because it 

was undertaken pursuant to the officer‟s “community caretaking functions, totally 

divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 

violation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 441. The Court also emphasized the lesser 

expectation of privacy associated with motor vehicles, explaining: 

Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, 

and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become 

disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of 

police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater 

than police-citizen contact in a home or office. . . . 

. . . .

The Court‟s previous recognition of the distinction between motor 

vehicles and dwelling places leads us to conclude that the type of 

caretaking “search” conducted here . . . was not unreasonable solely 

because a warrant had not been obtained.

Id. at 441, 447-48; see also id. at 442 (“The constitutional difference between searches of 

and seizures from houses and similar structures and from vehicles stems both from the 

ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal 
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contact with automobiles will bring local officials in „plain view‟ of evidence, fruits, or 

instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.”).7

The United States Supreme Court has not revisited the community caretaking 

doctrine since its decision in Cady.

8

 However, an overwhelming majority of lower 

federal courts and state courts have consistently described and applied the doctrine as an

exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s warrant requirement.9 This widespread adoption

 

7

There is a split of authority among state and federal courts as to whether the community 

caretaking doctrine should extend beyond the context of automobiles to residences. Macdonald v. Town 

of Eastham, 946 F.Supp.2d 235, 241-42 (D. Mass. 2013) (collecting cases); Gregory T. Helding, Stop 

Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights: Reshaping the Community Caretaking Exception with the 

Physical Intrusion Standard, 97 Marq. L. Rev. 123, 140-48 (2013) (collecting and analyzing state and 

federal cases). We need not concern ourselves with that issue because this appeal involves only a parked 

vehicle.

8

The Supreme Court has twice applied Cady to hold that reasonable warrantless inventory 

searches of impounded vehicles are permissible. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); 

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 375-76 (1976).

9

See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering “whether the 

impoundment and subsequent inventory search of [the defendant‟s] vehicle were justified by the 

community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s warrant requirement”); Ray v. Twp. of 

Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174-77 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the community caretaking doctrine as an 

exception to the warrant requirement but refusing to apply it to justify warrantless searches of homes); 

Lockhart-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2007) (observing that the question is not “whether 

there was a seizure” because, “under the community caretaking doctrine, police action can be 

constitutional notwithstanding the fact that it constitutes a seizure”); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 

233, 237-38 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, “including the 

community caretaking exception”); United States v. Garner, 416 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(discussing the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement); United States v. Johnson, 

410 F.3d 137, 144-45 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying the “community caretaking exception” to uphold a 

warrantless search of a vehicle‟s glove compartment); Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 216 (Del. 2008) 

(recognizing the “„community caretaker‟ or „public safety‟ doctrine” as an “exception” to the warrant 

requirement); Hawkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 216, 221-22 (D.C. 2015) (recognizing the community 

caretaking exception and adopting a four-part test to determine whether the exception applies); People v. 

Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 198-99 (Ill. 2006) (“[T]he „community caretaking‟ doctrine is analytically 

distinct from consensual encounters and is invoked to validate a search or seizure as reasonable under the 

[F]ourth [A]mendment.”); State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2003) (“Implicit in any 

community caretaking case is the fact that there has been a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. Otherwise there would be no need to apply a community caretaking exception.”); In re 

J.M.E., 162 P.3d 835, 839 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the community caretaking doctrine as an 

“exception” to the Fourth Amendment); Poe v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54, 56-59 (Ky. Ct. App. 

2005) (recognizing the community caretaking exception); Wilson v. State, 975 A.2d 877, 891 (Md. 2009) 

(recognizing that the community caretaking doctrine functions as an exception and enunciating a test for 

its application); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 13 N.E.3d 629, 632-34 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (discussing the 

purpose, application, and importance of the community caretaking doctrine as an exception to the warrant 

requirement); People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich. 2011) (describing the community 

caretaking doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement); Trejo v. State, 76 So. 3d 684, 689 (Miss. 
- 10 -

of the community caretaking doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement reflects 

the reality that modern society expects police officers to fulfill various responsibilities. 

See Ullom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120 (W.Va. 2010) (“[L]aw enforcement personnel 

are expected to engage in activities and interact with citizens in a number of ways beyond 

the investigation of criminal conduct. Such activities include a general safety and welfare 

role for police officers in helping citizens who may be in peril or who may otherwise be 

in need of some form of assistance.”).

Police officers wear many hats: criminal investigator, first aid provider, 

social worker, crisis intervener, family counselor, youth mentor and 

peacemaker, to name a few. They are charged with the duty to protect 

 

2011) (recognizing “the community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement); State v. Graham, 

175 P.3d 885, 890 (Mont. 2007) (“The community caretaker doctrine . . . is a recognized exception to the 

Fourth Amendment‟s and [the Montana Constitution‟s] prohibitions against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.”); State v. Bakewell, 730 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Neb. 2007) (“[W]e hereby adopt the community 

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Rincon, 147 P.3d 233, 237 (Nev. 2006) 

(adopting the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment); State v. Boutin, 13 A.3d 334, 

337-38 (N.H. 2010) (discussing prior New Hampshire cases applying the community caretaking 

exception); State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737, 752 (N.J. 2012) (“The community-caretaking doctrine is an 

exception to the warrant requirement . . . .”); State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1041 (N.M. 2005) 

(acknowledging that its earlier description of community caretaking as a form of consensual encounter 

“was wrong” and cautioning that certain prior decisions should “not be viewed as limiting the community 

caretaker exception to voluntary or consensual police-citizen encounters”); State v. Smathers, 753 S.E.2d 

380, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing the community caretaking doctrine as an exception to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); State v. Dunn, 964 N.E.2d 1037, 1042 (Ohio 2012) 

(recognizing “the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement”); Coffia v. State, 191 P.3d 594, 597-98 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008) (discussing the community 

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment); State v. Wood, 149 P.3d 1265, 1267-68 (Or. Ct. App. 

2006) (describing an Oregon statute as a community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement); 

State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (S.D. 2009) (recognizing and applying the community caretaking 

exception); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (describing Cady as 

recognizing “a community caretaking function of law enforcement as a reasonable exception to the Fourth 

Amendment‟s warrant requirement” and acknowledging “the existence of the community caretaking 

function in Texas”); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a 

“seizure” as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the community caretaking doctrine); State 

v. Ford, 998 A.2d 684, 689 (Vt. 2010) (recognizing “community caretaking” as a separate “exception” to 

the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); Knight v. Commonwealth, 734 S.E.2d 716, 720 (Va. Ct. 

App. 2012) (“Virginia recognizes a „community caretaker‟ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement.”); State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668, 676 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (“The community caretaking 

function exception recognizes that a person may encounter police officers in situations involving not only 

emergency aid, but also involving a routine check on health and safety.”); Ullom v. Miller, 705 S.E.2d 

111, 120 (W. Va. 2010) (“The „community caretaker‟ doctrine is a widely recognized exception to the 

general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); State v. 

Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 603-06, 608-12 (Wis. 2009) (discussing and applying the community 

caretaking exception).
- 11 -

people, not just from criminals, but also from accidents, natural perils and 

even self-inflicted injuries. We ask them to protect our property from all 

types of losses—even those occasioned by our own negligence. They 

counsel our youth. They quell disputes between husband and wife, parent 

and child, landlord and tenant, merchant and patron and quarreling 

neighbors. Although they search for clues to solve crime, they also search 

for missing children, parents, dementia patients, and occasionally even an 

escaped zoo animal. They are society‟s problem solvers when no other 

solution is apparent or available. 

State v. Matalonis, 875 N.W.2d 567, 576-77 (Wis. 2016) (quoting Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 

3d 596, 607 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Torpy, J., concurring and concurring 

specially)).

C. Reconsideration of Moats

Despite its widespread adoption and laudatory purpose, at one time four states, 

Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Tennessee, “confined the community caretaking 

doctrine to consensual police-citizen encounters.” Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 190 (Clark and 

Koch, JJ., dissenting) (citing People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 197 n.4 (Ill. 2006)). 

By 2013, however, the supreme courts of Illinois and New Mexico had “explicitly 

abandoned” this limitation and abrogated prior decisions confining the community 

caretaking doctrine to consensual police-citizen interactions. Id. (citing Luedemann, 857 

N.E.2d at 198-99; State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1041 (N.M. 2005)). However, three 

years ago in Moats, a three-to-two decision, this Court reaffirmed prior decisions that had 

limited the community caretaking doctrine to third-tier “consensual police-citizen 

encounters that do not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whereas the 

requisite level of probable cause or reasonable suspicion must be satisfied when a seizure 

has taken place.” Id. at 182.

The Moats majority grounded this limitation in the Tennessee Constitution, id. at 

187 n.8, even though the defendant had neither relied upon the state constitution nor 

argued that it provided greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, and even though 

this Court had “long held” that article I, section 7 “is identical in intent and purpose to the 

Fourth Amendment,” State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State 

v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000); Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 

1968)); see also State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tenn. 2012) (“[I]n the context of 

traffic stops, the protections afforded by article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution 

[are] coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment as defined in 

[Whren, 517 U.S. at 813].” (citing State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734, 736 (Tenn.

1997))).

 
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Two justices, including the undersigned, filed a joint dissenting opinion in Moats, 

asserting that prior Tennessee decisions limiting the community caretaking doctrine to 

consensual police-citizen encounters had been wrongly decided and should be overruled 

and that the community caretaking doctrine should be recognized “as an exception to the 

Fourth Amendment‟s warrant and probable cause requirements.” Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 

188 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting). The dissenting justices would have held:

that a warrantless seizure of a parked car is justified under the community 

caretaking exception if the State establishes that (1) the officer possessed 

specific and articulable facts which, viewed objectively and in the totality 

of the circumstances, reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community 

caretaking action was needed, such as the possibility of a person in need of 

assistance or the existence of a potential threat to public safety; and (2) the 

officer‟s behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained 

and tailored to the community caretaking need.

Id. at 195 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting). The dissenting justices explained that 

“[d]etermining whether police action is objectively reasonable in light of the 

circumstances requires careful consideration of the facts of each case[,]” including “the 

nature and level of distress exhibited by the citizen, the location, the time of day, the 

accessibility and availability of assistance other than the officer, and the risk of danger if 

the officer provides no assistance.” Id. at 195-96 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting) (citing

Salinas v. State, 224 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Pinkard, 785

N.W.2d 592, 605 (Wis. 2010)).

Having now fully reconsidered Cady, state and federal decisions applying it, and

the majority and dissenting opinions in Moats, we conclude that Moats should be 

overruled. We recognize that “[s]tare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 

consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 

contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 

(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like the United States Supreme Court, “we 

approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution,” but we also 

emphasize that “stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Id. at 233 (quoting State 

Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). Although the power to overrule former decisions “is very sparingly exercised 

and only when the reason is compelling,” Edingbourgh v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 337 

S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tenn. 1960), “[o]ur oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate error,” Jordan 

v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Montgomery 

v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich. 1960)). As a result, stare decisis does not 

constrain this Court to maintain erroneous, “unworkable,” or “badly reasoned” precedent. 

Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)); see also In 

re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that “obvious error” 
- 13 -

in precedent justifies overruling it). Thus, “if an error has been committed, and becomes 

plain and palpable, th[is] [C]ourt will not decline to correct it . . . .” Arnold v. City of 

Knoxville, 90 S.W. 469, 470 (Tenn. 1905); see also, e.g., Rye v. Women‟s Care Ctr. of 

Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 262-64 (Tenn. 2015) (overruling a seven-year-old 

decision because the summary judgment standards it adopted were unworkable and 

inconsistent with Tennessee law), petition for cert. docketed, 477 S.W.3d 235 (U.S. Mar. 

17, 2016) (No. 15-1168); State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530, 556 (Tenn. 2012) 

(overruling a sixteen-year-old decision because the state constitutional test it adopted was 

unworkable and lacked textual or historical support); Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 

S.W.3d 121, 129-30 (Tenn. 2004) (overruling an eight-year-old decision that had adopted 

a minority rule and adopting instead the “better-reasoned” majority rule); Jordan, 984 

S.W.2d at 600 (abrogating a ninety-six-year-old decision even though the statutory 

language it had interpreted remained the same). Indeed, we have “a special duty” to 

correct erroneous court-made rules and would relinquish our own function by refusing to 

do so. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 263-64 (citing Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn. 

1991); Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. 1991)); see also State v. Menzies, 

889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (“The general American doctrine as applied to courts of 

last resort is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the 

rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule 

was originally erroneous . . . and that more good than harm will come by departing from 

precedent.” (citing John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.

Rev. 367, 367 (1957)).

We are persuaded that Moats was erroneous when initially decided and that more 

good than harm will be accomplished by overruling it. First, the holding in Moats is 

contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority in this country, which recognizes the 

community caretaking doctrine as an exception to federal and state constitutional warrant 

requirements. Of the three other states that at one time limited the doctrine to consensual 

police-citizen encounters, only North Dakota continues to impose this limitation. See

State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454, 458 (N.D. 2008). Second, the authority on which Moats

relied to limit the community caretaking doctrine to consensual police-citizen encounters 

provides no support for the limitation. As noted by the dissenting justices in Moats, the 

limitation originated with State v. Hawkins, 969 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), 

was adopted by this Court without independent analysis in Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 315, 

and was subsequently repeated as dicta in a footnote in Day, 263 S.W.3d at 901 n.10. In 

Hawkins, the Court of Criminal Appeals supported the limitation with a citation to United 

States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982). See Hawkins, 969 S.W.2d at 939. In 

Williams, this Court cited only Hawkins and Cady in support of the limitation. See

Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 315. Finally, in Day this Court repeated the limitation, citing 

only Williams as support and noting that Williams had relied upon Hawkins and Cady. 

See Day 263 S.W.3d at 901 n.10. Neither Berry nor Cady support limiting the 

community caretaking doctrine to third-tier consensual encounters. Although Berry

discusses the three tiers of police-citizen interactions, it contains no language limiting 
- 14 -

community caretaking to consensual encounters. Indeed, the word “community” does 

not even appear in Berry. See Berry, 670 F.2d 583. Furthermore, Cady provides no 

support for limiting the community caretaking doctrine to consensual police-citizen 

encounters. See Cady, 413 U.S. 433. To the contrary, the Court in Cady applied the 

doctrine to uphold the warrantless search of the defendant‟s vehicle as reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 441, 447. The Cady Court nowhere limited the 

community caretaking doctrine to consensual police-citizen encounters. Finally, contrary 

to the suggestion by the majority in Moats, the Tennessee Constitution does not require 

limiting the community caretaking doctrine to consensual interactions between citizens 

and police. This Court has long held that article I, section 7 “is identical in intent and 

purpose to the Fourth Amendment.” Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 315 (emphasis added); see 

also Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d at 92 (“[I]n the context of traffic stops, the protections 

afforded by article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution [are] coextensive with the 

protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment as defined in [Whren, 517 U.S. at 813].” 

(citing Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 734, 736)). Having exposed the faulty foundation on 

which the Moats holding was based, we exercise our special duty to overrule Moats and 

disavow any other prior or subsequent Tennessee decisions limiting the community 

caretaking doctrine to consensual police-citizen encounters. We emphasize that the

community caretaking doctrine “is not relevant to determining whether police conduct 

amounted to a seizure in the first place.” Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d at 198-99. Rather, the 

community caretaking doctrine “is analytically distinct from consensual encounters and 

[may be] invoked to validate a search or seizure as reasonable” under the Fourth 

Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. See Id.

D. Defining the Community Caretaking Exception in Tennessee

Having recognized the community caretaking exception, we turn our attention 

next to fashioning a test for its application which strikes a proper balance between the 

public‟s interest in having police officers assist citizens in need and the individual‟s 

interest in being free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Surprisingly, despite its 

widespread adoption, “[n]o single set of specific requirements” has emerged as the 

majority rule for applying the community caretaking exception. Ullom, 705 S.E.2d at 

122; see also Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 237-39 (discussing the various tests); Michael R. 

Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and 

Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1485, 1498-1512 (2009) 

(discussing various community caretaking tests).

Some of the disagreement among courts as to the proper test focuses on the 

relevance of an officer‟s subjective motivations in determining whether the exception 

applies. Smathers, 753 S.E.2d at 385 (providing citations to cases exemplifying each 

approach). Some courts view the following language from Cady as requiring 

consideration of a police officer‟s subjective motivations:
- 15 -

Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle 

accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in 

what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking 

functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition 

of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. 

Cady, 413 U.S. at 441; see, e.g., State v. O‟Neill, 62 P.3d 489, 507 (Wash. 2003). We do 

not interpret this language as requiring consideration of a police officer‟s subjective 

intentions. Rather, in this passage, the Cady Court was distinguishing between the roles 

of state and federal law enforcement agents concerning automobiles. 

Our framing of a test for the community caretaking exception must begin with the 

foundational principle that “[a]n action is „reasonable‟ under the Fourth Amendment [and 

article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution], regardless of the individual officer‟s 

state of mind, „as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.‟ The 

officer‟s subjective motivation is irrelevant.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 (quoting 

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)); see also Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 736 

(holding that a traffic stop may be justified by probable cause under article I, section 7 

“without regard to the subjective motivations of police officers”). As the dissenting 

justices in Moats noted, “[r]equiring the State to prove that a police action was motivated 

solely by community caretaking concerns would inappropriately shift the focus to the 

officer‟s (irrelevant) subjective motivations.” Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 195 (Clark and 

Koch, JJ., dissenting). As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, “to interpret . . . Cady

to mean that an officer could not engage in a community caretaker function if he or she 

had any law enforcement concerns would, for practical purposes, preclude police officers 

from engaging in any community caretaker functions at all. This result is neither sensible 

nor desirable.” Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 609 (Wis. 2009). As the Appeals Court of 

Massachusetts succinctly explained,

The law does not demand that an alert police officer must suppress 

his or her training and investigatory experience in carrying out the myriad 

of community caretaking functions society expects police officers to 

undertake for its protection. So long as the officer‟s conduct at the outset 

and throughout the course of exercising a community caretaking function is 

justified by the doctrine, the law does not attach significance to the officer‟s 

subjective motives.

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 13 N.E.3d 629, 633 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (internal citations 

omitted).
- 16 -

Having considered the tests developed in other jurisdictions, we adopt the test 

advanced by the dissenting justices in Moats. Specifically, we hold that the community 

caretaking exception will justify a warrantless seizure so long as 

the State establishes that (1) the officer possessed specific and articulable 

facts which, viewed objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, 

reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was 

needed, such as the possibility of a person in need of assistance or the 

existence of a potential threat to public safety; and (2) the officer‟s behavior 

and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the 

community caretaking need. 

Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 195 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting); see also Kramer, 759 

N.W.2d at 608. “Determining whether police action is objectively reasonable in light of 

the circumstances requires careful consideration of the facts of each case[,]” including 

“the nature and level of distress exhibited by the citizen, the location, the time of day, the 

accessibility and availability of assistance other than the officer, and the risk of danger if 

the officer provides no assistance.” Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 195-96 (Clark and Koch, JJ., 

dissenting) (citing Salinas, 224 S.W.3d at 756; Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 605). We 

emphasize that when the community caretaking exception is invoked to validate a search 

or seizure, courts must meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the exception 

in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse. Smathers, 753 S.E.2d at 386.

E. Applying the Community Caretaking Exception 

Having set out an analytical framework that properly balances the public‟s interest 

in having police officers assist citizens in need and the individual‟s interest in remaining 

free from unreasonable governmental intrusions, we turn next to applying this test to the 

facts of this case and determining whether Sgt. Trivette‟s actions fall within the 

community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. 

Here, Sgt. Trivette was on routine patrol at 2:45 a.m., when he observed a vehicle 

that appeared to be parked in the roadway in front of a grocery store that was not open. 

Sgt. Trivette approached the car to do a welfare check, realized it was parked in a manner 

that blocked 75% of the entrance into the grocery store parking lot and that resulted in its 

left wheel protruding partially into the public roadway. The vehicle‟s engine was running 

and its lights were on. Sgt. Trivette parked on the roadway behind the defendant‟s 

vehicle and activated his patrol car‟s rear facing blue lights for safety reasons, so that 

neither the defendant‟s vehicle nor his own patrol car would be rear ended. Sgt. Trivette 

exited his patrol car, approached the driver‟s side door of the vehicle, and observed the 

defendant slumped over the steering wheel, despite a blaring radio, running engine, and 

headlights activated. After taps on the window failed to rouse the defendant, Sgt. 

Trivette opened the door to try again. Only then did he detect a strong odor of alcohol on 
- 17 -

the defendant‟s breath and person and observe an open beer bottle in the center console. 

Sgt. Trivette tried to wake the defendant for about a minute before the defendant ever 

responded. Sgt. Trivette then asked the defendant to exit the vehicle, believing that the 

defendant was under the influence of some substance. The specific and articulable facts, 

viewed objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted Sgt. 

Trivette‟s conclusion that a welfare check community caretaking action was necessary 

and appropriate. The facts confronting Sgt. Trivette suggested either a person in need of 

assistance or a potential threat to public safety, or both. Additionally, Sgt. Trivette‟s

behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the 

community caretaking need. The defendant was slumped over the steering wheel, with 

his car partially protruding into a public roadway and substantially blocking an entrance 

to a grocery store, albeit one not open at the time. Given the time, 2:45 a.m., location,

and limited accessibility and availability of assistance from sources other than the officer, 

the risk of danger had the officer provided no assistance was substantial. Indeed, Sgt. 

Trivette would have been “derelict in his duty as a police officer” had he failed to take

steps to determine the defendant‟s welfare. See Fisher, 13 N.E.3d at 633. Again, the 

defendant was slumped over the steering wheel, either asleep or unconscious, with his 

vehicle protruding partially onto the public roadway, placing him at risk of injury or 

death from a rear end collision. Having carefully considered the relevant facts, we 

conclude that Sgt. Trivette‟s actions were well within the community caretaking 

exception. By the time Sgt. Trivette asked the defendant to exit the vehicle and perform 

the field sobriety tests, he possessed at least reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 

under the influence of an intoxicant. Sgt. Trivette‟s actions thus were initially justified 

by the community caretaking exception and subsequently based upon reasonable 

suspicion.

IV. Conclusion

We overrule Moats, hold that the community caretaking doctrine is an exception 

to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the 

Tennessee Constitution, and conclude that the seizure in this case was valid under the 

community caretaking doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude, on the separate grounds 

herein stated, that the courts below properly refused to suppress the evidence obtained as 

a result of the seizure. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore 

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the defendant, Kenneth McCormick, for which 

execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

 CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUSTICE