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### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 50 7- CV IN THE I NT EREST OF Y. B. , K.B ., and T.B ., Children Fr om the 37th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI -03913 Honora ble Andy Mireles, Judge Pre siding 

### OPI NIO N ON APPELLEE ’S MOT IO N FOR REHEARI NG Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: May 20, 2009 REVERSED AND REMANDED The motion for re hear ing f iled by appellee Tina B runo is denied. This court’s opinion and judgme nt dated Mar ch 18, 2009, ar e withdra wn, and this opinion and judg ment are substitut ed. David S wi ft ap p eals the trial court’s de termination that he ha s no standing unde r sec tion 102.003(a) (9) to br ing a SAPC R se eking manag ing conser vatorship. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 102.003(a) (9) ( Ve rn o n 2 0 0 8 ). B eca use a disputed f

act issue e x ists as to whether Swift met the
s t at u t e’ s six -month require ment, the trial cour t erre d in gr antingthe plea to the jur isdiction.04
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- 2- Acc ording ly , we r ever se the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand the ca use to the trial court for fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s. B ACKG ROUND Swift and Tina B runo have known ea ch other for over te n y ear s. In Dec ember of 2004, B ru no tr ave le d to the Uk

ra ine to a do pt thr e e g ir ls. B ru no is the g ir ls’ on ly le g a l par e nt. On Ap ri l 22, 2007, Swift a

nd Br uno marrie d. On J anuar

y 21, 2008, Swift moved out of Br uno’s house. He filed a suit af

fec ting the pa

rent-c hild relationship (“SAPCR”) on Marc h 1 0 , 2 0 0 8
. A wee k later, Br uno filed a ple a to the jurisdi ction and motion to dism iss, challeng ing Swift’s standingto bring a SAPCR; a hea

ringwas he ld the same day
. Conflicting testimony was pre sented re g ardingwhether Swift met the requisite amount of time required to establish standing under the Family Code. The trial court grante d Br

uno’s plea to the jur isdiction and motion t o dismiss , and aw arde d Br uno $4,000 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s. In its f ind ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d th at Sw if

t di d not have a ctual ca

re, c ontrol, and possession of the c hildren for at least six m onths. The trial cour t
co n cl u d edth atS wi ftl ac k eds t an d i n g un d er s ec t i o n1 0 2
. 0 0 3 (a )( 9 ) o f t h e F am i l y C o d e t o b ri n g a SAP CR. Swi ft

no w a pp e a ls. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW Th e qu e sti on

of wh o ha s st and ingto b ri ngan o ri g ina l su it a ff e c tin gthe pa

re nt- c hil d relationship seekin g m an agi ngconser vatorship is a threshold issue. In re SSJ -J , 153 S.W .3d 132, 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). Standing is a component of subje ct matter jurisdiction and is a constit utional prer equisite to maintaining a lawsuit under Te x as law. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W .2d 440, 443-44 (Tex
. 1993). Whether a c ourt has subjec t matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. De p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda, 133 S.W .3d04
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- 3- 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)

. The plaintiff ha s the burden to a lleg e fa cts demonstratingjurisdiction and we construe the pleading s liberally in its favor. Id. When a plea to the jurisdiction c halleng es t he exis tence of jurisdictional fac ts, the trial court re views the re levant evide nce to de termine whe ther a fa ct issue exist s. See id. at 227. I f the e vidence raises a fac t question on jurisdiction, t he trial c ourt cannot grant the ple a and the iss u e m u s t b e re s o l v ed by the trier of

fac t. Id. at 227-28. I f the evidenc e is undisputed or fails to r aise a fac t question, the trial court must rule on the ple a as a matter of law. Id. at2 2 8
. W e r ev i ew th e t ri al co urt ’s ru l i n g de novo. I d. We take as true all evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant and indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e in its favor. Id. When the trial court make s and files finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, a s in this case, we revie w the trial court’s f indings unde r the suff

iciency of t he evidence standard, a nd the trial cour

t’s conclusions of law ar e re viewed de novo
. Lonza AG v. Blum , 70 S.W .3d 184, 189 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)
. D I S CUS S I ON In his pleading s, Swift a l l ege d t h at he had standing to bring suit pursuant to section 102.003(a) (9) of

the Texas Family

Code. SeeT EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 102.003(a) (9) ( Ver non 2008). Section 102.003(a) (9) provides that, “a person, other than a f oster par ent, who has ha d actua l car e, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 day s prec eding the date of

the filing of the pe tition” may file an orig inal suit reque sting manag ing c onservatorship. Id. In computing the time nece ssary for standing under subsection (a) (9), “the court may not require that the time be continuous and uninter rupted but shall consider the child’s princ ipal residenc e duringthe re levant time prec edingthe date of commence ment of the suit.” Id
. § 102.003(b) ( Ver non 2008). The pur

pose of se ction 102.003(a) (9) is to cre ate standing for those who have develope d and04
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- 4- maintained a r elationship w i t h a ch i l d o v er time. T.W .E. v. K.M.E., 8 2 8 S. W. 2 d 8 0 6 , 8 0 8 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 92 , n o wri t) (e xami nin gfo rm e r Fami ly Cod e se c tio n 1 1. 03 (a )( 8) ); Coo ns Andersen v . Andersen , 104 S.W .3d 630, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). A de termination of standing under this sec tion is nece ssarily fac t spe cific and resolved o n an ad hoc basis. In re M.P.B., 2 5 7 S
. W
. 3 d

8 0 4 , 8 0 9 (T ex . Ap p . —Da l l as 2 0 0 8 , n o p et . ) ( ci t i n g Donce r v. Di ck er son , 81 S.W .3d 349, 362 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.)). “ [S ]t andingdoes not mean the rig ht to win; it is onl y the rig ht to be hear d.” In re SSJ -J , 153 S.W .3d at 138. At the he ari ngon

the ple a to the jur isd ic tio n, B ru no te sti fi e d th at Sw if

t di d n ot i mme diate ly move in with her a

nd the childre n afte r t hey

wer e mar ried in April 2007, but waited until August 24, 2007. Fr om April to Aug ust, Swift would st ay at his home duringthe wee k and spend F riday and Saturday nights at he r home with he r and the g irls; it was easier for Swift to stay

at his house during the we e k b e c a

us e it wa s c los e r t o h is o ff ic e . Pr ior to m ov ingin, Swi ft

wo uld oc c a sio na lly

ba by sit the g ir ls whil e sh e wa s o ut w ithfr ie nd s o r o ut of to wn on bu sin e ss. He us ua lly

ate dinne r w ith Br uno and the g irls. After Swift moved in , h e drove the oldest child to and fr om school in New Br aunfe ls f

or nine wee ks. After he picked her up, he would take her back to his office wh er e she worke d on her home work. B runo aske d the g irls to call Swift “Dad” and stated that he “wa s an important part of the ir li[ ves].” At the time of the hea ring , Br uno and Swift wer e still married a nd there was no pe nding la

wsuit for divorce
. Swift testified that prior to moving in with B runo, he ate dinner with the family almost every night a nd spent time with the g irls be fore they went to bed. He stated that he move d in to Bruno’ s home immediately

afte r their mar

riag e on Apr il 22, 2007, and that he spent most nights ther e. He k ept his separ ate r esidenc e bec ause he and B runo planne d to build a house in New B raunf els and04
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1 ... B r u n o c on t en ds t h at , e v en t ak i n g a s t r u e Sw i f t ’ s “ s el f

- s er v i n g ” t es t i mon y t h at h e r es i ded wi t h t h e g i r l s f or over s i x mont hs , he admi t t ed t hat he ha d no act ual cont r o l o ve r the gi r l s f or a t l eas t s i x mont hs , an d t her ef ore no f act i s s ue was r ai s ed t o prev ent t he t r i al cour t f r om gr ant i ng t he pl ea t o t he j ur i s di ct i on. W e d i s agr ee t hat S wi f t made s uch an adm i s s i on. B r un o i s r ef er r i ng t o t es t i mo ny el i ci t ed un der cr oss - exa mi nat i on, wh er e Swi f t s t at ed t hat B r un o cont r ol l ed h i s i n t er ac t i on s w i t h t h e g i r l s an d con t r ol l ed t h ei r di s ci pl i n e; how ev er , Swi f t l at er s t at ed t h at he di d n ot r el i n qu i s h c on t r ol o f t he girl s t o B run o , b ut rather a l l o w ed B run o t o d i scip l i ne t he ch i l d ren i n the m an ne r i n w hich t he girl s’ t he rap i st a d v ise d the y b e d isc ip line d . F u rth e rm o re , a s S w ift n o te s, th e s ta tute d o e s n o t re q u ire tha t t h e p e tit io n e r’s c a re , co n tro l, o r p o sse ssio n o f t h e c h ild re n b e e x c lus ive
. S e e T

. W. E. , 828 S. W
. 2d a t 808.

- 5- then sell both of their houses. The g irls started ca lling him “Da d” or “Da ddy ” im mediately afte r he and B runo we re ma

rried. H e helpe d to prepa re the g irls’ brea

kfast, helpe d wi t h homework, took them fishing, bathed the young est child, and stated that he and B runo shar ed the r esponsibility of
c ari ngfo r t

he g ir ls. Swi ft , ho we ve r, dis a g re e d wi th the mann e r i n whic h B ru no dis c ipl ine d th e g ir ls and believe d she punished them too seve rely
. In a dd iti on , B ru

no ’s mot he r and fo ur fr ie nd s te sti fi e d th at th e y of te n v isi te d B ru

no ’s ho me and ra rely saw Swift there , except on holiday s. Swift’s former employ ee testified that Swift moved in with Bruno a

month after the y

marrie d. Takin ga s tr

ue a ll ev ide nc e fa

vo ra ble to the no nmo va

nt, we c on c lud e thi s e vid e nc e ra ise s a fac t issue a s to whether Swift me t the six -month require ment pursuant to se ction 102.003(a) (9). Two wit n es s es t es tified that Swift lived with the gir ls for over six months. Additi onally , the evidenc e showed that Swift’s intera ction with the children from April to J anuar y was substantial, and that the children thoug ht of him as their father. B eca use there is d i s p u t ed evide nce c reating a fac t issue reg ardingthe leng th of t ime that Swift had ac tual car e, contr ol, and possession of the g irls, the trial
c o urt c an n o t g r an t th e p l e a an d th e i s s u e mu s t b e r e s o l v e d b y th e tr i e r o f f a c t. 1 See M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28. Swift’s first issue is sustained.04
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- 6- In his second issue, Swift appe als the trial cour t’s awa rd of attorney ’s fees t o Br uno. Br uno reque sted sanctions under Rule 13 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure and Chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedie s Code. SeeT EX . R. C IV . P. 1 3; T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § § 1 0. 00 1, 10 .0 04 (V e rn on 20 08 ). B e c a

us e we have c on c lud e d th at th e tr ial cou rt e rr e d in g rantingthe plea to the jur isdiction, we ca nnot ag ree that Swift’s pleading s w er e gro u n d l ess or b rought in bad fa ith or for the pur pose of ha

rassment. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 3; T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § § 1 0. 00 1, 10 .0 04
. Ac c or din g ly , Swi ft ’s se c on d iss ue is su sta ine d, and we a lso
reve rse the por

tion of the trial cour

t’s judgme nt awar ding $4,000 in attorney ’s fe es to Br uno. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the for eg oing a

naly sis, we conc lude the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting the pl ea to the jurisdiction and dismiss ing Swift’s SAPC R for lack of standing
. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt a

nd re mand the c a us e to t he tr ia l c ourt fo r furt

he r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice