* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 15 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DARREN JAY DENNISON, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 98-3352

v. (D.C. No. 98-CV-3351) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Kan.) Respondent - Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining Petitioner-Appellant Darren Jay Den nison’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimo usly that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this app eal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is theref ore ordered submitted without oral argument. Before us is Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal along with his appeal of the district court’s denia l of his application for a writ of1 In addition to his application and an opening brief , Petitioner also has filed a pleading entitled “Motion,” which we construe as a motion for leave to file an appendix. Because the Government has not filed any objection to this motion, we now grant the motion.

2 Although Petitioner also raised claims alleging that he required protective custody at the Terre Haute facility, the district c ourt properly dismissed this claim because it does not have jurisdiction over the offi cers or staff of the Terre Haute facility. As the district court indicated, if Peti tioner wishes to seek judicial intervention regarding his entitlement to protectiv e custody in Terre Haute, he should file a Bivens complaint in the appropriate federal district court in Indiana. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). The district court also properly dismissed Petition er’s claims regarding his placement in administrative segregation at Leavenwo rth in December 1996. While “a § 2241 attack on the execution of a senten ce may challenge some matters that occur at prison,” McIntosh , 115 F.3d at 811, Petitioner has not alleged or shown the deprivation of any constitutio nal or federal statutory right in connection with this claim. Thus, habeas relief is unavailable on this claim. See -2- habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 1 To proceed in forma pauperis on appeal from the denial of a section 2241 petition, Petitioner must show “a financial inability to pay the required fees and th e existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in suppo rt of the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n , 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997). In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Petiti oner, who is currently confined in the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, complained of certain disciplinary actions taken against him whil e he was incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. 2 Specifically, Petitioner28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). -3-

alleged that he received a sanction of fifteen days of disciplinary segregation and a disciplinary transfer for possession of a contrab and walkman radio. Although Petitioner admitted to the charged offense, he clai med that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was coercedinto making a statement without being advised of his Miranda rights, he was denied assistance of counsel, he did not waive the presence of a staff representative, and he was unsuccessful in filing a disciplinary appeal. In dismissing the pe tition, the district court noted that before prison authorities may deprive a prison er of a protected liberty interest, the prisoner is entitled to due process. At a minimum, the prisoner is entitled to (1) advance notice of the charges at le ast twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing; (2) present evidence and witn esses in his defense; and (3) receive a written statement describing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipline imposed. See R., Doc. 11 at 2 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974)). The district court concl uded that because Petitioner’s punishment for his violation of prison rules did no t “‘impose[] atypical and significant hardship [on him] in relation to the or dinary incidents of prison life,’” id. at 3 (quoting Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)), it did not “give rise to a due process claim.” Id. The court went on to explain that even if Petitioner’s punishment had implicated a protected liberty interest, his “admission-4-

of the charged misconduct clearly is sufficient to support the disciplinary action” and “there is [no] allegation that [P]etitioner was denied the rights enumerated in Wolff.” Id. at 3-4. On appeal, Petitioner repeats much of what he alleg ed in his section 2241 petition. He also claims that the district court e rred in: (1) failing to focus on the “criminal element” of the prison officials’ actions in this case, as opposed to merely focusing on the procedural deprivations he a lleged; (2) finding that no Miranda violation occurred; (3) concluding that the disciplinary measures did not impose atypical and significant hardship; (4) deter mining that the Bureau of Prisons’ staff did not interfere in his administrat ive appeal; (5) failing to find that the Bureau of Prisons is acting arbitrarily and cap riciously against Petitioner; and (6) failing to find that Petitioner was deprived of any of the due process protections enumerated in Wolff

. We review the district court's dismissal of a secti on 2241 petition de novo.
See Bradshaw v. Story , 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, beca use plaintiff proceeds pro se, we construe his pleading s liberally. See Riddle v. Mondragon , 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). Having revi ewed Petitioner’s arguments, the district court’s order of dismissal, and the entire record on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner’s claims are meritless. First, there is no credible record support for the claim that any of the prison officials involved in this case-5-

engaged in any criminal activity with respect to th e disciplinary measures imposed against Petitioner, so there is no “criminal elemen t” to investigate. Second, while prisoners are entitled to certain procedural safegu ards in the context of disciplinary proceedings, see Wolff , 418 U.S. at 563-69, they are not entitled to Miranda warnings in connection with such proceeding s. See Rhodes v. Henman , 946 F.2d 901, 1991 WL 216808, at **3 (10th Cir. 199 1) (Table) (citing Tinch v. Henderson , 430 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (M.D. Tenn. 1977)). Thi rd, the disciplinary transfer and the fifteen-day disciplinary segregati on imposed by the Bureau of Prisons did not amount to “atypical and significanthardship” under Sandin because they did not “work a major disruption in [P etitioner’s] environment” nor did they “inevitably affect the duration of his sen tence.” Sandin , 515 U.S. at 486- 87. Thus, because Petitioner was not deprived of aprotected liberty interest, he was not entitled to the due process protections setforth in Wolff. See id. at 487. Fourth, there is no indication in the documentary e vidence in the record that any Bureau of Prisons personnel interfered with or othe rwise impeded Petitioner’s administrative appeal. Fifth, the record does not support Petitioner’s allegation that the Bureau of Prisons treated him arbitrarily and capriciously. Finally, even though we conclude that Petitioner did not have a d ue process claim entitling him to the Wolff

protections, he has not set forth any facts indicating that he was deprived of the safeguards in any event. Petitione r has not alleged that he was-6-

deprived of notice regarding the charges against hi m, that he was deprived of the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in hi s defense, or that the Bureau of Prisons failed to give him a written statement r egarding the evidence supporting and the reasons for the disciplinary act ion. Because Petitioner has not shown the existence of areasoned, nonfrivolous argument in support of the issues raised on appeal, we deny his motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and dismiss his appeal.
DENIED andDISMISSED

. Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge