J-S05013-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

GORDON LOUIS PERRY, II, :

:

 Appellant : No. 488 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 20, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Blair County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0001853-2009 

and CP-07-CR-0001855-2009 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, SHOGAN and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2015 

 Gordon Louis Perry, II (“Perry”) appeals from the February 20, 2014 

order entered by the Blair County Court of Common Pleas denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, counsel for Perry (“PCRA Counsel”) has 

filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a “no-merit” brief pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). Upon review, 

we affirm and grant PCRA Counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

 On January 20, 2010, a jury convicted Perry of two counts each of 

possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance 

with intent to deliver, and criminal use of a communications facility. The 

convictions were based on evidence that Perry sold crack cocaine to a 
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confidential informant on July 6 and 7, 2009. Perry appealed his conviction 

and this Court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum on December 6, 

2010. On November 23, 2011, Perry filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.1 

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on 

June 7, 2012, raising four issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for 

failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress statements made by the 

confidential informant; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting 

to the Commonwealth’s failure to provide all discovery; (3) ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to properly cross-examine the police 

witnesses and confidential informant; and (4) trial court error for appointing 

a public defender to represent Perry on direct appeal, as this precluded him 

from raising his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. The PCRA 

court held hearings on the amended PCRA petition on February 8 and April 

19, 2013. 

On April 19, 2013, the PCRA court issued an order for appointed 

counsel to file upon receipt of the PCRA hearing transcripts “a summary of 

his position with some detail as to the individual issues.” PCRA Court Order, 

4/19/13. On May 9, 2013, appointed counsel filed a post-hearing 

memorandum, including therein two issues that arose through testimony 

provided at the PCRA hearing: (1) an abuse of discretion by the trial court 

 

1

 This petition appears as having been filed on the criminal docket, but is 

listed as “missing” thereon and is not contained in the certified record on 

appeal. See Criminal Docket at 8. 
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for failing to appoint new counsel to represent Perry at trial upon learning 

that trial counsel had also represented the confidential informant in an 

unrelated criminal matter and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to obtain the arresting officer’s disciplinary records.2

 On August 20, 2013, the Honorable Jolene Grubb Kopriva, President 

Judge of Blair County, issued an order appointing PCRA Counsel to represent 

Perry.3 On February 20, 2014, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order 

denying Perry’s amended PCRA petition. Perry filed a timely notice of 

appeal, followed by a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 18, 2014, the PCRA 

court filed a statement in lieu of a written opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a), referring this Court to the existing record for the reasoning behind 

its decision. 

 On February 4, 2015, upon finding that the brief filed by PCRA Counsel 

neither advocated on Perry’s behalf nor complied with the Turner/Finley

 

2

 In its opinion denying Perry’s request for PCRA relief, the PCRA court 

references a letter filed by originally appointed counsel “supplementing” the 

amended PCRA petition that reportedly raised the issue of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to request the arresting officers’ disciplinary files. 

See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, at 8. This document does not appear of 

record. As all of the issues raised were properly preserved through other 

means, however, it does not hamper our review on appeal. 

3

 According to the PCRA court, appointment of PCRA Counsel occurred after 

originally appointed counsel sustained an injury during an unrelated criminal 

trial. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/21/14, at 7. 
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requirements to withdraw as counsel, we remanded the case for PCRA 

Counsel to file a revised brief on appeal. PCRA Counsel timely complied. 

 Prior to addressing the issue raised on appeal, we must first determine 

whether PCRA Counsel satisfied the requirements set forth in 

Turner/Finley for this Court to grant him permission to withdraw as 

counsel. 

The holdings of [Turner/Finley] mandate an 

independent review of the record by competent 

counsel before a PCRA court or appellate court can 

authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. The necessary 

independent review requires counsel to file a “nomerit” letter detailing the nature and extent of his 

review and list each issue the petitioner wishes to

have examined, explaining why those issues are 

meritless. The PCRA court, or an appellate court if

the no-merit letter is filed before it, then must 

conduct its own independent evaluation of the record 

and agree with counsel that the petition is without

merit. See [Commonwealth v.] Pitts, [981 A.2d 

875, 876 (Pa. 2009)]. 

In Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) abrogated in part by Pitts, supra, this 

Court imposed additional requirements on counsel 

that closely track the procedure for withdrawing on

direct appeal. Pursuant to Friend, counsel is 

required to contemporaneously serve upon his client

his no-merit letter and application to withdraw along 

with a statement that if the court granted counsel’s 

withdrawal request, the client may proceed pro se or 

with a privately retained attorney. Though [then-

]Chief Justice Castille noted in Pitts that this Court is 

not authorized to craft procedural rules, the Court

did not overturn this aspect of Friend as those 

prerequisites did not apply to the petitioner in Pitts.

See Pitts, supra at 881 (Castille, C.J., concurring). 
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After the decision in Pitts, this Court held in 

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), that the additional procedural 

requirements of Friend were still applicable during 

collateral review. 

Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 774-75 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 

2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013)). 

In the case at bar, PCRA Counsel has fulfilled the procedural 

requirements of Turner/Finley. PCRA Counsel states that he reviewed the 

memorandum filed by prior counsel, transcripts from the case, the PCRA 

court’s decision, and “applicable case law,” and “does not see any basis for 

reversing the trial court’s decision.” Turner/Finely Brief at 2. He then lists 

each issue raised in the amended PCRA petition and post-hearing 

memorandum filed by prior counsel appointed to represent Perry and states 

(albeit briefly) why he believes the issues are meritless. Id. at 3. PCRA 

Counsel appended a request to withdraw as counsel and the letter he sent to 

Perry, in which he informed Perry of his right to retain new counsel or 

proceed pro se, and which also indicated that he sent Perry a copy of his nomerit letter. Perry neither responded to Counsel’s letter nor filed anything in 

this Court.4

 

4

 We note that in the letter sent to Perry, PCRA Counsel informed Perry that 

he had forty-five days to file in this Court a response in support of his 

appeal. PCRA Counsel’s Letter, 2/20/15. We awaited the expiration of that 

timeframe before deciding this appeal. 
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Having found that PCRA Counsel complied with the Turner/Finley

requirements, we now turn to our review of the issues raised on appeal, 

which, as stated above, mirror those raised in the amended PCRA petition 

and the post-hearing memorandum. We review a PCRA court’s decision to 

determine whether it is supported by the record and to ensure it is free of 

legal error. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 99 A.3d 11, 50 (Pa. 2014). “We 

cannot disturb the factual findings of the PCRA court, which hears evidence 

and passes on the credibility of witnesses, if they are supported by the 

record, even where the record could support contrary findings.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the PCRA court’s findings and the 

evidence presented at the PCRA hearing, which we view in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party. Id. at 50-51. 

In resolving a question of counsel’s effectiveness, we begin with the 

presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth 

v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome that

presumption, the petitioner must establish: “(1) the underlying claim has 

arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure 

to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation 

omitted). If the petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, the claim is 

subject to dismissal. Id. 
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The first issue raised was a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for 

failing to file a motion to suppress the statements made by the confidential 

informant obtained through an allegedly illegal wiretap. See Amended PCRA 

Petition, 6/7/12, ¶¶ 19-25. The PCRA court found this issue meritless, as 

the wiretap in question was lawfully obtained. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, 

at 5-6. We agree. 

Pursuant to section 5704 of the Wiretapping and Electronic 

Surveillance Control Act, it is not unlawful, and no court approval is required, 

for: 

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or

any person acting at the direction or request of an

investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept 

a wire, electronic or oral communication involving 

suspected criminal activities, including, but not 

limited to, the crimes enumerated in section 5708 

(relating to order authorizing interception of wire, 

electronic or oral communications), where: 

* * * 

(ii) one of the parties to the communication has 

given prior consent to such interception. However, 

no interception under this paragraph shall be made 

unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney 

general designated in writing by the Attorney 

General, or the district attorney, or an assistant 

district attorney designated in writing by the district 

attorney, of the county wherein the interception is to 

be initiated, has reviewed the facts and is satisfied 

that the consent is voluntary and has given prior 

approval for the interception; however, such 

interception shall be subject to the recording and 

record keeping requirements of section 5714(a) 

(relating to recording of intercepted 
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communications) and that the Attorney General, 

deputy attorney general, district attorney or 

assistant district attorney authorizing the 

interception shall be the custodian of recorded 

evidence obtained therefrom[.] 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2)(ii). 

 At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that he reviewed the 

paperwork attendant to the wiretap and found no reason to file a 

suppression motion on that basis, as “everything had been done properly[.]” 

N.T., 4/19/13, at 6. The trial record supports that conclusion, as police 

testified that the confidential informant, Donna Boore (“Boore”), consented 

to the wiretap and that the police had Boore meet with the prosecutor to 

comply with the above requirements. N.T., 1/20/10, at 136. 

 Perry testified at the PCRA hearing to his belief that Commonwealth 

v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. 1987) (en banc), aff’d per curiam 

without opinion by an equally divided court, 652 A.2d 294 (Pa. 1994), 

compels a finding that the wiretap in question was illegal. N.T., 2/8/13, at 

8-9. The Schaeffer case, however, is inapposite to the case at bar. As 

aptly stated by the PCRA court, 

In Schaeffer, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held 

that warrantless electronic monitoring of 

conversations in the suspect’s home, even one-party

consensual monitoring, violates Pennsylvania’s 

[c]onstitutional protections in Article I, § 8 against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. [Schaeffer, 

536 A.2d at 355]. However, [Perry]’s reliance on 

Schaeffer is misguided; the interceptions at issue 

were not obtained in [Perry]’s home and one-party 
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consensual interceptions pursuant to [s]ection 

5704(2)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and 

Electronic Surveillance Control Act are not unlawful. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, at 5-6. 

“[A]lthough the failure to file a suppression motion may be evidence of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, if the basis for the motion is meritless 

counsel cannot be deemed ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Costanzo, 455 

A.2d 153, 155 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citing Commonwealth v. Ransome, 402 

A.2d 1379, 1381 (Pa. 1979)). As such, this claim provides no basis for 

relief. See Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188. 

Perry next raised a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for not 

objecting to the Commonwealth’s failure to provide discovery in this case. 

See Amended PCRA Petition, 6/7/12, ¶¶ 26-29. Perry contends he did not 

receive the following: (1) Boore’s criminal history; (2) records of the 

authorization by the prosecutor for the wiretap; (3) lab analysis regarding 

the crack cocaine tested; (4) phone records confirming that Perry was the 

individual recorded with the wiretap; and (5) the arresting officers’ 

disciplinary files. The PCRA court found that each claim was meritless. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, at 7-12. Again, we agree. 

Beginning with Boore’s criminal history, the record reflects that at trial, 

counsel extensively cross-examined Boore regarding her criminal history, 

belying Perry’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to turn over her criminal 

record in discovery. Trial counsel questioned her about cases that were 
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pending at the time of her testimony, N.T., 1/20/10, at 228-29, 255, as well 

as prior criminal convictions on her record, id. at 255-56. There is therefore 

no support in the record for Perry’s claim that the Commonwealth withheld 

this information. 

Nor is there support for his claim that the Commonwealth did not 

provide in discovery records supporting the authorization of the wiretap by 

the prosecutor. To the contrary, trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing: 

“I was provided documentation regarding the wire taps [sic][.]” N.T., 

4/19/13, at 6. The PCRA court found this testimony credible. PCRA Court 

Opinion, 2/20/14, at 8. 

 Regarding the lab analysis of the crack cocaine, the record reflects that 

trial counsel stipulated at trial that the controlled substance recovered by 

police from Boore following the controlled buys was crack cocaine. N.T., 

1/20/10, at 115-18. The Commonwealth read the stipulation into the 

record, which contained a lengthy and detailed explanation of the testing 

procedures, the expert testimony that would have been provided by the 

Commonwealth, the results of the testing, and that the lab reports were 

received by police. Id. There is nothing in the record to support a claim

that the Commonwealth did not provide this information to the defense in 

advance of trial, and neither the PCRA petition nor the testimony at the 

PCRA hearing establishes a basis for us to conclude otherwise. Perry thus 
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failed to satisfy his burden of proof on this issue. See Bomar, 104 A.3d at 

1188. 

 Perry also claims a discovery violation in the Commonwealth’s failure 

to turn over phone records confirming that the phone to which Boore placed 

a call was Perry’s or that it was Perry’s voice on the other end of the line. As 

Perry admitted at the PCRA hearing, however, the police never obtained 

such records. N.T., 2/8/13, at 28, 32. The trial record reflects that counsel 

cross-examined the police on the failure to obtain these records and used 

this in his summation to argue to the jury that it may not have been Perry’s 

voice they heard in the wiretapped conversations. N.T., 1/20/10, at 142-43; 

N.T., 1/21/10, at 45. There is no discovery violation if the Commonwealth 

fails to disclose evidence that it does not possess. Commonwealth v. 

Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 253 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). 

 Lastly, Perry believed the Commonwealth was required to provide in 

discovery the arresting officers’ internal disciplinary files. At the PCRA 

hearing, Perry testified that he did not know of anything in the files that 

would be helpful to his case, but that he wanted to review them to see if 

there was any information he could use for impeachment purposes. N.T., 

2/8/13, at 33. In his argument in support of this claim contained in his 

post-hearing memorandum, Perry relied upon Commonwealth v. French, 

611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992). 
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In French, the defendant alleged that her assault on a police officer 

occurred in response to that officer’s use of excessive force on her boyfriend 

and friend. Id. at 176-77. The internal affairs division of the police 

conducted an investigation of the events giving rise to the defendant’s 

charges, and the officer’s personnel file contained statements of witnesses 

who testified at the defendant’s trial regarding the events of the day. Id. at 

179. The Commonwealth contended that the files were confidential, and 

following an in camera review, the trial court agreed and prohibited defense 

counsel from reviewing the witnesses’ statements. Id. On appeal, this 

Court found, and our Supreme Court agreed, that remand was required for 

defense counsel to examine the statements contained in the internal affairs 

files to determine whether the witness statements contained therein would 

have been beneficial to the defense, and if so, for a new trial. Id. at 179-

80. 

French is wholly inapposite to the case before us. Unlike the 

defendant in French, Perry does not contend that the arresting officers’ 

disciplinary files contain any information related to the case, and instead 

seeks to review them in a proverbial fishing expedition to see if he could find 

any evidence of past police misconduct. This is impermissible. To be 

entitled to review a police officer’s disciplinary files, “a defendant must be 

able to articulate a reasonable basis for his request[.]” Commonwealth v. 
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Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d 870, 876 (Pa. Super. 1999). Having failed to do so, 

Perry is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

 As none of Perry’s discovery-related claims have any support in the 

record, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to these meritless 

allegations of discovery violations by the Commonwealth. Thus, no relief is 

due on this issue. 

 Perry further claimed that trial counsel failed to effectively crossexamine Boore and the arresting officers. Amended PCRA Petition, 6/7/12, 

¶¶ 30-33. Regarding trial counsel’s cross-examination of Boore, Perry 

testified at the PCRA hearing that trial counsel failed to “delve into” Boore’s 

bias in testifying for the Commonwealth while facing multiple charges for her 

own drug sales and possession; that she was testifying “under pretenses of 

trying to get herself out of trouble”; and properly challenge her credibility. 

N.T., 2/8/13, at 16. The PCRA court found, and our review of the record 

confirms, that this claim is entirely meritless. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, 

at 12-13. Trial counsel questioned Boore at length regarding her multiple 

pending criminal charges – one of which related to her concealment from 

police of crack cocaine purchased during a controlled buy with Perry – and 

the benefits she hoped to receive at sentencing in those cases by serving as 

a Commonwealth witness in Perry’s case. N.T., 1/20/10, at 228-29, 254-55, 

260-61. Trial counsel attacked her credibility, repeatedly reminding the jury 

of prior crimin falsi charges she had on her record, that she lied to police 
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about using drugs while serving as a confidential informant, concealed crack 

she obtained during a controlled buy with Perry, and that she further lied to 

police about what she was going to do with the stolen crack cocaine. Id. at 

249-50, 255-57. Thus, there is no merit to this contention. 

 Regarding trial counsel’s cross-examination of the arresting officers, 

Perry testified at the PCRA petition to his belief that counsel failed to 

question the officers regarding conflicts in their testimony, why police did 

not arrest Boore when she stole the crack cocaine during the controlled buy, 

and why police allowed Boore to drive without a license during her time as a 

confidential informant. N.T., 2/8/13, at 17, 30. Again, the PCRA court 

found, and our review of the record confirms, that trial counsel questioned 

the arresting officers in all of these areas, rendering this claim meritless. 

See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/14, at 14-15; N.T., 1/20/10, at 160, 184-86, 

248; N.T. 1/21/10, at 40. 

 Perry further raised two claims of trial court error based on: (1) its 

appointment of another assistant public defender to represent him on direct 

appeal, thus foreclosing his ability to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on 

direct appeal, and (2) its failure to appoint new counsel once trial counsel 

disclosed, as the inception of trial, that trial counsel briefly represented 

Boore in an unrelated criminal matter. Beginning with the first argument, it 

is clear that Perry was not prejudiced by the inability to raise claims of trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal, as he had the opportunity to raise 
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them in his timely filed PCRA petition and have them reviewed by this Court 

in the instant appeal. Therefore, this argument does not entitle him to 

relief. 

His second argument relating to the trial court’s error in failing to 

appoint new counsel to represent Perry at trial likewise affords him no relief. 

The record reflects that at the beginning of trial, trial counsel stated the 

following: 

Your Honor, ... approximately some time in mid to 

late July, the confidential informant in this case[,] 

Donna Boore[,] had a case at Central Court in 

Altoona ... for a DUI[.] [S]he made an application to 

the Public Defender’s Office [and] she was accepted

[for representation.] I personally was the one who

met with her, constructed a plea agreement and 

went ahead and waived her case. When [I] came 

back to my office[,] they realized that she was a 

confidential informant on an open case that we got 

[sic] on [] Perry. At that time[,] probably a week or 

two later[,] she was conflicted out and given a court 

appointed attorney. ... [A]ll [of] this information was 

related to Mr. Perry approximately ten minutes ago 

and I guess we can just see how he feels about me 

continuing to represent him with that newfound 

knowledge. 

N.T., 1/20/10, at 4. 

Perry requested that the trial court appoint new counsel to represent 

him. Id. at 5. The trial court questioned trial counsel about his ability to 

continue in his representation of Perry, and trial counsel responded that his 

brief representation of Boore would not influence his performance, but that 

he was concerned that Perry’s confidence in trial counsel’s ability to 
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represent him would be diminished. Id. Thereafter, the prosecutor 

questioned trial counsel on the record about his ability to continue 

representing Perry at trial. See id. at 104-09. Through this questioning, 

trial counsel stated that he derived no financial benefit from his 

representation of Boore; he did not represent Boore in any matter that 

related in any way to Perry’s case; he met Boore on only one occasion and 

the conversation was limited to discussing her driving under the influence 

charge then pending; and he did not obtain any confidential or privileged 

information from Boore that would be helpful in his cross-examination of her 

as a witness in this matter. Id. 

Prior to testifying, Boore was also questioned by the Commonwealth 

without the jury present. See id. at 201-03. She indicated that although 

she recalled that trial counsel represented her at the preliminary hearing 

stage on a DUI charge, she spoke with him for a total of two minutes and 

the conversation was limited solely to the pending charges. Id. at 201-02. 

She did not share any personal or privileged information with trial counsel 

and waived any potential conflict of interest that might exist. Id. at 203. 

Addressing the burden of proof related to a claim of a conflict of 

interest by counsel, our Supreme Court recently held: 

[A] petitioner “cannot prevail on a conflict of 

interest claim absent a showing of actual prejudice.” 

Commonwealth v. Weiss, [81 A.3d 767, 794 (Pa. 

2013)]; see also Commonwealth v. Hawkins, [] 

787 A.2d 292, 297 (2001) (offering that petitioner 
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must demonstrate that counsel’s prior representation 

of Commonwealth witness adversely affected 

counsel’s representation of petitioner under PCRA).

... [A]lthough prejudice is presumed when there 

exists an actual conflict of interest, this presumption 

is only applicable when counsel actively represented 

conflicting interests. Weiss, [81 A.3d at 795 n.16]. 

Where counsel does not actively represent conflicting 

interests, a claim based upon the appearance of a 

conflict of interest lacks merit. Id.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 442-43 (Pa. 2014). 

 Perry failed to satisfy his burden of proving that an actual conflict of 

interest existed based upon trial counsel’s brief representation of Boore in an 

unrelated criminal matter. At both the PCRA hearing and in his post-hearing 

memorandum, Perry pointed only to his personal discomfort with the fact 

that trial counsel previously represented Boore. See N.T., 2/8/13, at 14-15; 

Memorandum of Law, 5/9/13, at 6, 7-8. The record, however, does not 

support a finding that trial counsel was actively representing conflicting 

interests or that Perry suffered any prejudice by trial counsel’s prior 

representation of Boore. See Reid, 99 A.3d at 442-43. To the contrary, as 

stated hereinabove, trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined Boore, bringing 

to light her history of lying, lengthy criminal history, pending criminal 

charges, and bias motivated by her hope for leniency at sentencing in her 

own criminal matters. N.T., 1/20/10, at 228-29, 249-50, 254-57, 260-61; 

see Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 754-55 (Pa. 2014) (finding 

no actual bias in trial counsel’s prior representation of jailhouse informants 
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where the appellant does not show a “nexus” between the prior 

representation and counsel’s performance at trial, i.e., that counsel 

“restricted his cross-examination” of his prior clients because of the conflict 

of interest). We therefore find no error in the trial court’s failure to appoint 

new counsel at trial. 

 Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw as counsel granted. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/15/2015