If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ESTATE OF JOYCE PATTON, by EDWARD 

PATTON, Personal Representative,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 20, 2020

v No. 345637

Wayne Circuit Court

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, LC No. 17-016986-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and GADOLA and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Edward Patton filed a complaint against Farmers Insurance Exchange seeking first-party 

no-fault benefits allegedly owed to Joyce Patton, his deceased mother. The complaint averred that 

Edward had been appointed the personal representative of Joyce’s estate. He had not. An estate 

was not opened until about six weeks later, and April Nash was named as its personal 

representative. 

Farmers moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5), contending that Edward 

lacked standing and the capacity to sue. At the outset of the parties’ oral arguments in the circuit 

court, Farmer’s counsel advised that Edward had been named as the successor personal 

representative of Joyce’s estate. Nevertheless, defense counsel insisted, summary disposition was 

required because Edward lacked standing to sue when the case was brought and any amended 

pleading would not relate back. 

The circuit court contemplated aloud the possibility of permitting an amended complaint, 

(“I suppose he could amend the complaint to name the proper party at this point, which is the 

estate”), but ultimately denied without explanation Edward’s request to do so. The court granted 

summary disposition, ruling that the matter was “just sort of a mess” without specifically 

elucidating any additional reasoning. 

Edward now appeals. Our review is de novo, as the question presented is one of law. Cruz 

v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002).
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We sympathize with the court’s befuddlement, as the law governing the issue was barely 

mentioned by Edward’s counsel, and in an inapposite legal context. Nevertheless, a statute his 

counsel cited is dispositive and directly on point. MCL 700.3701 provides:

A personal representative’s duties and powers commence on appointment. 

A personal representative’s powers relate back in time to give acts by the person 

appointed that are beneficial to the estate occurring before appointment the same 

effect as those occurring after appointment. Subject to [MCL 700.3206 to MCL 

700.3207], before or after appointment, a person named as personal representative 

in a will may carry out the decedent’s written instructions relating to the decedent’s 

body, funeral, and burial arrangements. A personal representative may ratify and 

accept an act on behalf of the estate done by another if the act would have been 

proper for a personal representative. [Emphasis added.]

Under the italicized and plain language of MCL 700.3701, Edward’s subsequent 

appointment as the personal representative of Joyce’s estate relates back to the date Edward filed 

the complaint, as long as “acts occurring before appointment” benefitted the estate. They did. The

complaint tolled the statute of limitations and also preserved the estate’s ability to seek PIP benefits 

one year back from the date of its filing. See MCL 500.3145(2). Accordingly, Edward’s

subsequent appointment as the personal representative of Joyce’s estate relates back to the date he 

filed the complaint. 

This Court considered a similar relation-back issue in Tice Estate v Tice, 288 Mich App 

665, 669; 795 NW2d 604 (2010). There, the decedent’s estate was opened and closed before a 

quiet title action was filed in the name of the decedent’s son. Id. at 667. In response to a motion 

for summary disposition, the decedent’s son reopened the estate and filed an amended complaint, 

but the trial court granted summary disposition in the defendant’s favor. Id. We applied MCL 

700.3701 and reversed, explaining that “[u]nder this statute, it appears that [the son’s] act of 

commencing the suit should have been given the same effect as if, [on the date the complaint was 

first filed], he had been the personal representative of the decedent.” Id. at 670. 

Because the appointment relates back, Edward had standing to bring the estate’s claim and 

must be permitted to file an amended complaint identifying himself as the successor personal 

representative. See also MCL 700.3703(3) (“Except as to a proceeding that does not survive the 

decedent’s death, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at death has the 

same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and the courts of another jurisdiction 

as the decedent had immediately prior to death.”).

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Anica Letica