Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the purpose 

of establishing the defense of res 

judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law 

of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

K.T. GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.T., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 20A03-1311-JV-453

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge

The Honorable Deborah Domine, Magistrate

Cause No. 20C01-9606-JD-380

September 30. 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
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Case Summary

K.T. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment 

regarding his 1996 delinquency adjudication for what would have been Class C felony 

child molesting if committed by an adult. We affirm. 

Issue

K.T. raises several issues. The dispositive issue we address is whether K.T.’s 

motion for relief from judgment was timely. 

Facts

In 1996, K.T. was adjudicated delinquent for what would have been Class C 

felony child molesting if committed by an adult based upon his admission that he had a 

seven or eight-year-old child touch his penis. In September 2013, K.T. filed a motion for 

relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). K.T. alleged that his 1996 

adjudication was improper because he did not have legal representation at the hearing, the 

State violated the guilty plea, and he was not properly advised of his rights. The trial 

court denied the motion for relief from judgment. The trial court noted that a motion for 

relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) must be sought within a reasonable amount 

of time and found that the seventeen-year delay was not reasonable. The trial court also 

noted that some of K.T.’s allegations were based on fraud and misrepresentation and that 

relief under those circumstances must be sought within one year. Consequently, the trial 

court denied K.T.’s motion. K.T. also filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the 

delay was due to “extenuating circumstances.” Appellant’s Br. p. 33. According to K.T., 

he believed that he had only admitted to battery and incorrigibility and learned of the 
3

child molesting adjudication in 2008. K.T. alleged that his juvenile adjudication was 

used “to enhance [his] sentence of [his] current case.” Id. at 34. The trial court denied 

the motion for reconsideration, finding that the seventeen-year delay was unreasonable 

and that the defense of laches was also applicable. K.T. now appeals.

Analysis

Post-conviction procedures are not available to challenge a juvenile delinquency 

adjudication, which is civil in nature. A.S. v. State, 923 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). Thus, Trial Rule 60(B) is the appropriate means to challenge an adjudication of 

delinquency. J.A. v. State, 904 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. A 

Trial Rule 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal, nor can it be 

used to revive an expired attempt to appeal. Id. Trial Rule 60(B) provides: 

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may 

relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, 

including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including 

without limitation newly discovered evidence, which 

by due diligence could not have been discovered in 

time to move for a motion to correct errors under Rule 

59;

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 

an adverse party;

(4) entry of default or judgment by default was entered 

against such party who was served only by publication 

and who was without actual knowledge of the action 

and judgment, order or proceedings;
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(5) except in the case of a divorce decree, the record fails 

to show that such party was represented by a guardian 

or other representative, and if the motion asserts and 

such party proves that 

(a) at the time of the action he was an infant or 

incompetent person, and

(b) he was not in fact represented by a guardian or 

other representative, and

(c) the person against whom the judgment, order or 

proceeding is being avoided procured the 

judgment with notice of such infancy or 

incompetency, and, as against a successor of 

such person, that such successor acquired his 

rights therein with notice that the judgment was 

procured against an infant or incompetent, and

(d) no appeal or other remedies allowed under this 

subdivision have been taken or made by or on 

behalf of the infant or incompetent person, and

(e) the motion was made within ninety [90] days 

after the disability was removed or a guardian 

was appointed over his estate, and

(f) the motion alleges a valid defense or claim;

(6) the judgment is void;

(7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 

longer equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application; or

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment, other than those reasons set forth in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons 

(5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the 
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judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for 

reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for 

reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious 

claim or defense. 

The burden is on the movant to establish the ground for Trial Rule 60(B) relief. In re 

Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). A trial court’s ruling on a Trial 

Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment will be disturbed only for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 740-41. An abuse of discretion will be found only when the trial court’s 

action is clearly erroneous, that is, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and 

the inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Id. at 741.

The trial court determined that K.T.’s motion was not filed within a reasonable 

time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8) or within one year for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). 

Clearly, K.T. did not file his motion within one year; thus, the issue is whether he filed 

his motion within a reasonable time. The determination of what period constitutes a 

reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. D.D.J. v. State, 640 N.E.2d 

768, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. In making its determination, the court must 

consider the length of time that elapsed from the date of the judgment to the date of the 

filing of the Trial Rule 60 motion, the circumstances of the delay, the diligence exercised 

by the movant, and the possibility of prejudice to the opposing party. Jordan v. State, 549 

N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. 

Seventeen years elapsed from the time of the delinquency adjudication until K.T. 

filed his Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Even if we accept K.T.’s assertion that he was 

unaware of his child molesting adjudication until 2008, K.T. still waited another five 
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years before challenging the adjudication. Further, K.T.’s attorney in 1996 is now 

deceased, the juvenile court judge is no longer on the bench, and the child victims are 

now adults. The State clearly would be prejudiced by the substantial delay. We conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying K.T.’s motion for relief from 

judgment under Trial Rule 60(B). See, e.g., D.D.J., 640 N.E.2d at 770 (holding that the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for relief from judgment 

after a two-year delay); Jordan, 549 N.E.2d at 384 (holding that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying a motion for relief from judgment after a twenty-threeyear delay). 

Conclusion

The trial court properly denied K.T.’s motion for relief from judgment, which was 

brought seventeen years after his juvenile adjudication. We affirm.

Affirmed.

BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.