[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1703.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1703

THE STATE EX REL. BOYD, APPELLANT, v. TONE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1703.]

Prohibition—Inmate had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to raise

alleged defect in plea colloquy—Trial court did not patently and 

unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him—Court of 

appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed.

(No. 2023-1140—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 7, 2024.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County,

No. E-23-0022, 2023-Ohio-2802.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Deonta Boyd, is an inmate at the Richland Correctional 

Institution. He appeals the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte 

dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition against appellee, Erie County 

Common Pleas Court Judge Tygh M. Tone (“the trial court”). We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} In 2006, Boyd pleaded guilty in two consolidated cases to aggravated 

murder with a firearm specification, felonious assault, and aggravated burglary. 

The trial court accepted Boyd’s pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate sentence 

of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 41 years. The trial court informed 

Boyd of his right to appeal at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entries.

{¶ 3} Boyd did not appeal his convictions or sentence. He has attempted 

unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty pleas multiple times. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 

6th Dist. Erie No. E-20-006, 2020-Ohio-6866 (affirming denial of Crim.R. 32.1 

motion to withdraw guilty plea), appeal not accepted, 162 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2021-

Ohio-961, 165 N.E.3d 328; State v. Boyd, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-22-044 and E-22-

045, 2023-Ohio-2618 (same), appeal not accepted, 171 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2023-

Ohio-3789, 218 N.E.3d 973. And we affirmed the Sixth District’s sua sponte 

dismissal of two prior extraordinary-writ actions, in which Boyd sought to vacate 

his convictions and sentence. State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 173 Ohio St.3d 170, 2023-

Ohio-3832, 227 N.E.3d 1246.

{¶ 4} In March 2023, Boyd filed this complaint for a writ of prohibition in 

the Sixth District, claiming that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their 

counterparts in the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, Boyd claims that the trial court 

failed to inform him that he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory 

process at the 2006 plea hearing and thereby failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c). Boyd alleges that his guilty pleas were “not equally voluntary and 

knowing” and that they were “obtained in violation of due process and [are]

therefore void.” Boyd seeks a writ of prohibition “as means to void” his guilty 

pleas and the trial court’s sentencing entries.

{¶ 5} The Sixth District sua sponte dismissed Boyd’s prohibition complaint. 

The court held that Boyd could have challenged any defect in the plea colloquy on 
January Term, 2024

3

direct appeal and that any issue concerning the trial court’s alleged failure to advise 

him of his right to compulsory process is therefore barred by res judicata. 2023-

Ohio-2802, ¶ 11, 14.

{¶ 6} Boyd has appealed the dismissal of his complaint.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 7} A court of appeals may sua sponte dismiss a complaint “if the 

complaint ‘is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged 

in the complaint.’ ” State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 159 Ohio St.3d 317, 2020-Ohio411, 150 N.E.3d 907, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 

324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. “Such a dismissal is appropriate only 

if, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the petition and 

making all reasonable inferences in the claimant’s favor, it appears beyond doubt 

that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested 

extraordinary relief in prohibition.” Id. When reviewing a sua sponte dismissal of 

a complaint without notice to the parties, we determine whether the appellant’s 

claims are frivolous or obviously meritless. State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 11.

{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Boyd must show that (1) the 

trial court has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 

unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 

other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.

Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 165 Ohio St.3d 22, 2021-Ohio-1122, 175 N.E.3d 495, 

¶ 14. If the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, Boyd need 

not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Schlegel v. Sweeney, 171 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6.

{¶ 9} Because a criminal defendant waives several constitutional rights by 

entering a guilty plea, due process requires that the defendant’s decision to enter a 

guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Brinkman, 165 Ohio 
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St.3d 523, 2021-Ohio-2473, 180 N.E.3d 1074, ¶ 10; Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 

28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Prior to accepting a guilty plea from 

a criminal defendant, a trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving 

certain constitutional rights, including the right to have compulsory process for 

obtaining witnesses in his favor as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution. See State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 

473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 10 (“the party accused shall be allowed * * * to have 

compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf”). Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c) requires the court in felony cases to inform the defendant personally 

and determine whether the defendant understands that he is waiving his

constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea. See also State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11-12.

{¶ 10} Boyd claims in his complaint that he is entitled to a writ of 

prohibition because the trial court failed to inform him during the plea colloquy that 

by entering his guilty pleas, he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory 

process. But Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law to raise 

this claim, including a direct appeal, a petition for postconviction relief, and a 

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court 

of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St.3d 328, 2023-Ohio-4569, 229 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 17, 

citing State ex rel. Parker v. Russo, 158 Ohio St.3d 123, 2019-Ohio-4420, 140 

N.E.3d 602, ¶ 21; Bell v. McConahay, 171 Ohio St.3d 564, 2023-Ohio-693, 218 

N.E.3d 926, ¶ 10.

{¶ 11} Boyd contends that he need not show the lack of an adequate remedy 

in the ordinary course of the law, because the trial court patently and 

unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict him. In support of this contention, 

Boyd relies on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 
January Term, 2024

5

(1938), in which the United States Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s jurisdiction 

at the hearing of trial may be lost ‘in the course of the proceedings’ due to failure 

to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment requires—by providing counsel 

for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived 

this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake,” id. at 468. Boyd 

argues, by comparison, that the trial court “lost” jurisdiction when it accepted his 

guilty pleas without informing him that he was waiving his constitutional right to 

compulsory process. Even assuming that a waiver of the right to compulsory 

process stands on equal footing with a waiver of the right to counsel, Boyd’s 

argument is mistaken because “the United States Supreme Court no longer treats a 

violation of the right to counsel * * * as an error divesting the trial court of 

jurisdiction,” State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 173 Ohio 

St.3d 118, 2023-Ohio-3534, 227 N.E.3d 1202, ¶ 18; see id. at ¶ 20, citing Waley v. 

Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942).

{¶ 12} The trial court unquestionably had subject-matter jurisdiction over 

Boyd’s criminal cases. See R.C. 2931.03 (vesting courts of common pleas with 

jurisdiction over all felony cases). Accordingly, Boyd’s claim alleges an error only

in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. “An error in the exercise of 

jurisdiction ‘renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.’ And extraordinary 

relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment.” (Emphasis sic.) Davic at 

¶ 15, quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 

248, ¶ 26; see Boyd, 173 Ohio St.3d 170, 2023-Ohio-3832, 227 N.E.3d 1246, at 

¶ 16 (violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights may be reversible 

error on appeal, but it does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction), 

citing Ogle at ¶ 21.

{¶ 13} Because Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the 

law to challenge the alleged defect in the 2006 plea colloquy and because the trial 

court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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him, Boyd is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. The Sixth District correctly 

dismissed the prohibition action.

CONCLUSION

{¶ 14} We affirm the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte 

dismissing Boyd’s complaint for a writ of prohibition.

Judgment affirmed.

KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 

and DETERS, JJ., concur.

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Deonta Boyd, pro se.

Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerhard R. Gross, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

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