IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 9, 2013

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TOMMIE PHILLIPS 

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 09-05231 W. Mark Ward, Judge

No. W2012-01126-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 13, 2013

The defendant, Tommie Phillips, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of

four counts of first degree felony murder, one count of reckless homicide, two counts of

attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual

battery, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially

aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the four counts of felony murder and one count

of reckless homicide into one felony murder conviction and merged the aggravated sexual

battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction. The trial court also merged the six

counts of especially aggravated kidnapping into three convictions – one per victim – and

merged the two especially aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction. He was

sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus sixty years. On appeal, he argues

that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement to police and

the photographic and subsequent identifications of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court’s

erroneous jury charge on especially aggravated kidnapping deprived him of a fundamentally

fair trial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we

remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty

years, which was omitted, and we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in

Count 16 and remand for resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary

in that count. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

ALAN E. GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., and

JERRY L. SMITH, J., joined.

Stephen C. Bush, District Public Defender; Tony N. Brayton, Assistant Public Defender (on

appeal); and Gerald D. Skahan and Robert H. Gowen, Assistant Public Defenders (at trial),

for the appellant, Tommie Phillips.
Robert E. Cooper,Jr., Attorney General and Reporter;Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney

General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Patience R. Branham, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

The defendant was charged in an eighteen-count indictment with four counts of first

degree felony murder, one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of

attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated rape, six counts of especially

aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of especially aggravated burglary, as a result of his

multiple actions against multiple victims on December 9, 2008, in Memphis.

State’s Proof at Trial

M.L. testified that on December 9, 2008, she lived in Memphis with her eighty-five1

year-old mother, F.G.; son, C.L.; and daughter, M.J.L. M.L. planned to go to her job at the

post office that day and usually left for work around 12:30 p.m. M.L. and her mother were

hanging curtains for Christmas when M.L. realized, at 12:20 p.m., that she was going to be

late for work. She went into her bedroom and put her lunch bag on her bed, where her work

clothes and phone were already sitting. M.L. got into the shower and had been in there for

about ten minutes, when she heard someone open the bathroom door and say, “[G]et out of

the shower.” Thinking it was her son, M.L. responded, “[W]hat did you open the door for,

you know I’m taking a shower,” and continued to shower.

M.L. testified that the voice again commanded her to get out of the shower and that

fear came over her as she realized it was not her son. She saw a man wearing a white bubble

coat with the hood up and pulled low so that she could only see his nose and mouth, and he

had a sawed-off shotgun pointed at her. She turned off the water and got out of the shower,

naked.

M.L. recalled that the intruder told her to put her robe on and come out. She

complied, wondering how the man got into her house. As she came out of the bathroom, she

It is the policy of this court to identify victims of sex crimes only by their initials. To further

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protect the identity of the victim, we have used initials to identify the victim’s family members, who were

victims themselves of other crimes committed by the defendant.

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felt a draft and noticed that the window air conditioner had been removed, the curtain was

halfway down, and her night stand had been pushed away from the window and everything

had been knocked off it. She, therefore, surmised that he had entered through her window.

The intruder asked if anyone else was in the house, and she responded that her mother was.

He asked where, and M.L. told him that her mother was in her room. He told M.L. to go get

her, and she went down the hallway to her mother’s room and went in. Her mother asked,

“[W]ho is that?” and M.L. told her not to panic.

M.L. testified that the intruder ordered her to take her mother “to the back,” and they

went into M.L.’s bedroom and sat on the bed. The intruder demanded their money and

expensive jewelry. M.L. told him that she did not have any expensive jewelry or money,

aside from the ten or eleven dollars that she had. He insisted that she had money because of

the vehicles she and her family members drove. She offered to go to the bank and withdraw

what money she had.

M.L. testified that the intruder told her to pull the drawers out of her dresser, which

she did until he ordered her to stop. He then ordered M.L. to take her mother back to her

bedroom. Once there, the intruder ordered her to tie her mother’s hands and feet with some

shoelaces, and M.L. complied. The intruder told M.L. that he was going to separate them,

and he ordered her to go back into her bathroom, take off her robe, and get into the bathtub.

Once she was in the bathtub, the intruder bound her hands with some tape that he grabbed

off her VCR and bound her feet with a belt.

M.L. testified that, after she was bound, she heard things falling all over the floor in

her bedroom and saw the intruder throwing things out of her drawers and ransacking the

house. She heard him in her mother’s room, going through her jewelry box and knocking

things onto the floor. The intruder then returned to the bathroom and asked where her son

kept his clothes. She called to her mother to tell him where the clothes were and then heard

scissors as if the intruder were cutting up the clothes.

M.L. testified that she heard the intruder talking, like he was on the phone. She heard

him say, “I got your momma and your grandmomma. . . . You got thirty minutes.” The

intruder returned to the bathroom, and M.L. asked him if her son owed him money. He told

her that her son’s friends, “Main and Nick,” had robbed his friend the night before and that

her son was “going [to] be the pawn for it.” The intruder left the room and continued to

rummage through the house, and then she heard him get on the phone again and tell whoever

was on the other line that he had fifteen minutes. M.L. estimated that the intruder had been

in her home for about an hour.

M.L. testified that the intruder came back into the bathroom and, grabbing her head,

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forced her to stand. The intruder “took his fingers and he stuck his fingers up in [her] vaginal

area.” She noted that he was wearing gloves. She pleaded with the intruder not to rape her,

saying that she just had surgery. He pushed her back down, “rubbed [her] across there, and

he said, oh, that feels good[,]” and left the bathroom. She noted that her hands and feet were

still tied, and the intruder had the gun with him the entire time. When he came back into the

bathroom, he had taken off his coat. She did not recognize him and said that she had never

seen him before that time, but she identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator.

M.L. testified that, upon returning to the bathroom, the defendantsaid that he now had

two problems: they had seen his face and he had to kill them. He left the bathroom again,

and she saw him pouring dishwashing liquid on the floor of her bedroom. He came back into

the bathroom, saying to himself, “I’m getting paranoid, getting paranoid now, I got to show

him I mean business[.]” He left the room again, and she heard him tell someone that he had

ten minutes and then heard him talking to what sounded like somebody else, saying that he

was “going to kill his momma and grandmomma and Chris and Main and Nick, too.” M.L.

sat in the bathtub, terrified and praying. She asked the defendant if he had called her son,

and he said that he had. She said that her son would have been there by now or called the

police.

M.L. testified that the defendant came back into the bathroom with a knife. She said

to him, “[Y]ou just told my son he had ten minutes. . . . [I]t hasn’t even been two minutes.”

The defendant replied, “I got to show him I mean business.” He stepped behind her in the

bathtub and said, “I’m going to cut you right here.” She put her face down when he started

to cut her, which kept him from cutting her throat but not from cutting her. She tried to trick

him by telling him that he had cut her throat and that she could not breathe, but he did not

believe her. He pushed her head back and then stabbed her, digging into her chest. She was

screaming, and she heard her mother calling out to her. She tried to reassure her mother.

The defendant was about to stab her a third time when she threw up her arms and he stopped.

M.L. testified that blood started pouring from her wounds, and she lost control of her

bladder and bowels. She felt her body getting weaker and shutting down. The defendant

stepped out of the bathtub, smiled at her, and went back into her bedroom. Knowing that she

had to stop the bleeding, M.L. grabbed a soapy rag from the bathtub to try to stop the blood

that was “pouring out of [her].” The defendant came back into the bathroom, threw her

bathrobe to her, and said, “[P]ack it down, you’ll live.” He told her that if her son arrived

in fifteen minutes, he could call the paramedics to save her. He said, “I do this all the time,”

then smiled and left the bathroom.

M.L. testified that she was still in the bathtub with her hands and legs bound, and she

tried to ball up the robe and put it on her shoulder and the other places she was bleeding. A

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few minutes later, she heard her mother scream, “[P]lease, don’t kill me.” M.L. called out

to her mother, and the defendant told her, “[S]hut up or I’ll kill her.” She called out to her

mother again and got no response. After that, M.L. heard the defendant walking around the

house.

M.L. testified that, after hearing the front door open about ten minutes later,she heard

C.L. say, “[M]an, what you doing in my house,” then heard “some tussling,” and knew the

two men were fighting. M.L. was able to loosen her bindings and slowly get out of the

bathtub. She went into her bedroom to try to get a phone to call 911 and then into the kitchen

where she found one. However, the defendant had disconnected the phone line.

M.L. testified thatshe went back into the bathroom and heard the defendant command

her son to bind himself. She tried to put the phone back so the defendant would not see that

she had tried to call for help and kill them all. The defendant saw her and trained his gun on

her. He accused her of calling someone, but she denied it. He tested the phone to see if it

had a signal and, as he did so, she tried to back into the bathroom. He stuck his gun in the

door to prevent her from closing it. The defendant cocked the gun and pulled the trigger, but

it did not fire. He tried two more times, but the gun did not fire. He stuck a knife through

the door while M.L. held the door, trying to keep him from stabbing her. The defendant

moved the gun out from the door and said, “[Y]ou just killed your son” and went into the

kitchen.

M.L. testified that she heard her son screaming and begging for his life, so she went

down the hallway pleading for her son’s life. The defendant picked up his gun, which was

on the floor, and ordered her into the hall bathroom. She saw her son lying on her mother’s

bed, bound and bleeding, and the defendant stabbing him. In the hall bathroom, M.L. saw

her mother lying unmoving on the floor with her head between the commode and the wall.

She asked to go back to her bathroom to relieve herself, and the defendant walked her to her

bathroom at gunpoint.

M.L. testified that the defendant went back to stabbing her son. She saw a hammer

sitting on her dresser, so she picked it up and went back down the hallway. She went into

the room where the defendant was with her son, and the defendant trained his gun on her and

ordered that she put the hammer down. She kept walking toward him with the hammer,

begging him not to kill her son. Her son was on the floor.

M.L. testified thatshe then saw her daughter, M.J.L.,stick her head in F.G.’s bedroom

door and scream. C.L. told M.J.L. to run, and the defendant ran after her. M.L. heard M.J.L.

fall and the defendant commanding her not to move. M.L. saw C.L. work his way loose from

his ties, and he jumped up and went into the living room behind the defendant. C.L. and

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M.J.L. attacked the defendant from both sides, and M.L. advanced and tried to hit him with

the hammer. The defendant slung C.L. and M.J.L. from side to side, but C.L. managed to

get the front door open and the struggle spilled out onto the porch. C.L. collapsed on the

porch, while M.J.L. kept a hold of the defendant’s shirt and M.L. tried to hit him with the

hammer. The defendant pulled out of M.J.L.’s grasp and jumped off the porch. With a

smile, the defendant said, “[H]ey, main, I’m gone” and ran down the street.

M.L. testified that she collapsed onto a chair in the living room and told M.J.L. to call

911. M.J.L. asked M.L. if the defendant had raped her, and M.L. said, “[N]o.” M.L. told her

to go check on her grandmother, and M.J.L. reported back that her grandmother appeared to

be dead. M.J.L. ran next door and returned with a neighbor, Vella Powell, to help. M.L. said

that she thought that she was dying because she felt herself getting weaker and weaker and

was barely breathing. Paramedics arrived and took her to the Regional Medical Center, “the

Med,” where she spent four days. While at the Med, police visited her and showed her a

photographic array, from which she identified the defendant as her attacker.

On cross-examination, M.L. acknowledged that one of the crime scene photographs

of the interior of her house showed a bag of marijuana near a jacket that belonged to C.L. but

said that the marijuana did not belong to him. She said that, prior to the day of the incident,

she had never seen the defendant, even though he had apparently been to the house with C.L.

On redirect examination, M.L. stated that she was stabbed twice and cut across her

face and chest. She reiterated that she felt her body shutting down like she “was just barely

there.”

C.L. identified the defendant in court. At the time of the incident, he had known the

defendant for about three and a half or four years through mutual friends known as “Nick and

Main,” who were the victims’ neighbors. C.L. testified that he got home around 2:30 p.m.

the day of the incident and saw the defendant standing in the dining room. He did not

recognize the defendant immediately but realized who he was when they “began to tussle.”

The defendant hit C.L. in the head with his gun. C.L. asked the defendant why he was doing

what he was doing and if he wanted money. The defendant said that he wanted money and

made C.L. kneel at the foot of his grandmother’s bed. He took C.L.’s keys and cell phone.

He then bound C.L.’s feet with a belt and ordered him to bind his own hands with another

belt. The defendant also “gagged [his] mouth.”

C.L. testified that the defendant heard M.L. trying to call the police and went to stop

her. When the defendant returned, he was armed with a knife and told C.L., “[Y]our mother

just got you killed[.]” The defendant put down his gun and began stabbing C.L. in the back.

C.L. rolled over, and the defendant stabbed him in the chest and arm. When C.L. tried to

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kick the defendant away, he stabbed him in the leg.

C.L. testified that he heard his mother moving again and that the defendant went to

see what she was doing. C.L. heard the defendant “cocking” the shotgun, apparently trying

to shoot her but the gun did not fire. While the defendant was with M.L., C.L. saw his sister,

M.J.L., at the door. M.J.L. screamed and ran, but she fell down as she was trying to get out

of the house. The defendant caught her, and they began to struggle. C.L. was able to free

himself and ran into the living room to help his sister fight the defendant. He saw his mother,

armed with a hammer, coming toward the defendant, but she could not “get a good shot at

him[.]” C.L. managed to open the front door, and the struggle spilled out onto the porch.

He “flip[ped]” the defendant off the porch, and the defendant ran away,saying, “[I’m] gone.”

C.L. testified that the defendant stabbed him thirteen times and that he spent five days

in the hospital due to his injuries. Police visited him in the hospital and showed him a

photographic array, from which he identified the defendant as his attacker. C.L. maintained

that the marijuana found in the house did not belong to him.

On cross-examination, C.L. denied telling the police that he could not identify his

attacker when he was interviewed at the scene shortly after the attack. He explained, “I

actually couldn’t talk at the time, because I was stabbed in my lung, I couldn’t talk, I was

losing breath. So, I actually didn’t tell them anything.” On redirect examination, C.L. said

that the defendant did not call him on the day of the incident. He also said that the defendant

cocked his gun and pointed it at him when he was tied up, but the gun did not discharge.

M.J.L., who was a high school senior at the time of the incident, testified that, on that

day, she got out of school at 2:15 p.m. and ran a few errands before going home. When she

arrived, she noticed that her mother’s car was still there, even though she should have been

at work, and that no lights were on in the house. M.J.L. entered the house and walked to her

grandmother’s bedroom. She opened the door and saw her brother, C.L., sitting on the floor

with a shirt tied around his mouth and clothing bloody. She screamed, and C.L. told her

“through the shirt” to get out of the house. She turned around and saw the defendant coming

down the hallway with a gun. She noted that she had seen the defendant two or three times

prior to that day and recognized him. She identified him in court as the perpetrator.

M.J.L. testified that she turned to run but fell and that the defendant caught her at the

front door. He told her to “shut up” or he would kill both her and her mother. She saw C.L.

untie himself and charge at the defendant. C.L. and the defendant began fighting, and M.J.L.

hit the defendant in the head. She saw her naked mother coming from the back of the house

with a hammer. C.L. pushed the defendant out the front door, and they continued to fight.

The defendant rolled off the porch “and was like, okay, I’m gone.” C.L. collapsed on the

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stairs, and her mother collapsed on a chair in the living room. M.J.L. called 911 and also

went to a neighbor’s house to get help. She checked on her grandmother, whom she found

lifeless lying in the bathroom with a bandana around her neck and with her feet bound.

Vella Powell, the victims’ neighbor, testified that she went to the victims’ house to

offer assistance. She administered CPR to F.G. even though it sounded like she was not

breathing. F.G. had a bandana around her neck.

Chad Smart and Robert Mabe, firefighter paramedics with the Memphis Fire

Department at the time of the incident, were among the paramedics who responded to the

scene. Smart was assigned to care for F.G., whom he determined to be dead in the bathroom.

She had a blue bandana wrapped tightly around her neck, apparently strangling her. Mabe

was assigned to care for C.L., who “had a very serious set of injuries,” including a lifethreatening stab wound to his upper chest that penetrated through the chest wall into the

space for the heart and lungs. Mabe noted that such an injury could lead to death within two

to five minutes if untreated. He said that C.L. was transported to the trauma unit at the Med

in critical condition.

Jeffrey Garey, a crime scene investigator with the Memphis Police Department,

photographed and processed the scene, as well as collected evidence. One piece of evidence

collected from the scene was a Mossberg shotgun. Officers discovered a shotgun round of

the incorrect gauge jammed inside the barrel of the gun, which caused it to misfire.

Officer Jimmy Moore with the Memphis Police Department responded to the scene.

He spoke to M.J.L., who told him that the perpetrator was a friend of her brother, but she did

not know his name. He tried to obtain the suspect’s identity from C.L. but did not get a

name.

Detective Tim Reynolds with the Memphis Police Department also responded to the

scene and noted that a crowd was gathering. Some of the people in the crowd told Detective

Reynolds that the defendant was responsible and that he drove a white pickup truck.

Someone also gave Detective Reynolds the defendant’s cell phone number. Detective

Reynolds ran the information through the police database and located the defendant. The

next day, Detective Reynolds called the defendant on his cell phone and told him that they

needed to talk to him. Officers went to the defendant’s address, but he left before they

arrived. The defendant’s mother assisted officers in locating the defendant, and he finally

turned himself in. Officers took the defendant and his mother to the police station and,

during the drive, Detective Reynolds heard the defendant explaining his side of the story to

his mother. The defendant told her that F.G. was having a heart attack and he put a pillow

under her head.

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On cross-examination, Detective Reynolds acknowledged that the defendant also told

his mother that he and C.L. got into a fistfight over a debt. The defendant said that C.L.

pulled a shotgun on him and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not go off. The two then

fought each other with knives.

Sergeant Anthony Mullins, a homicide detective with the Memphis Police

Department, testified that he was involved in the investigation of the case. As part of his

involvement, Sergeant Mullins interviewed the defendant at the police station the day after

the incident, after advising him of his rights. The officers asked the defendant if he wanted

to talk to them, and he said that he did.

Sergeant Mullins recalled that the defendant told them “a long story about what

happened leading up to this event.” However, they did not take a formal statement from the

defendant because, “[d]uring the course of the interview, . . . [the defendant] said he didn’t

have anything else to say to us without his attorney.” Upon the defendant’s request for an

attorney, the officersstopped the interview and then, with belief that they had probable cause,

booked him into jail on a forty-eight-hour hold.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Mullins acknowledged that the defendant told him

that he and C.L. had been friends since 2001 and were involved in dealing drugs together.

According to the defendant, he fronted C.L. some drugs four or five days before the incident

and a disagreement developed over money. On the day of the incident, he knocked on the

door to C.L.’s house, and C.L. let him in. A shotgun was offered as a trade for the money

owed between the two, but that was not accepted and they got into a fistfight. They fought

around the house, and C.L. got a shotgun and pointed it at the defendant. The defendant

grabbed a knife and defended himself. C.L.’s mother then got involved, with a hammer.

Thereafter, the defendant heard F.G. complaining about her heart, so he got a pillow and put

it under her head and she lay down on the bathroom floor.

On redirect examination, Sergeant Mullinsreiterated that the defendant admitted being

in the house and stabbing C.L. and M.L. but claimed that he did so in self-defense.

Sergeant Vivian Murray testified that she was the case coordinator on the case and

recalled that the defendant was originally brought to the office on December 10, the day after

the incident, and spoke with two other investigators. She first came into contact with the

defendant on December 11 when she and Lieutenant Mason interviewed him, after advising

him of his rights. The defendant then gave a statement.

At the beginning of his statement, the defendant acknowledged that, the previous day,

he had agreed to speak with Sergeant Mullins and Lieutenant Mason without an attorney but

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then, during the interview, decided that he wanted to speak with an attorney and the officers

stopped the interview. He further acknowledged that, on the present day, he informed

Deputy Jailer Robinson that he wanted to speak with the detectives and was brought to an

interview room where he was again advised of his rights and agreed to speak with the

officers without an attorney.

In his statement, the defendant admitted that he was responsible for F.G.’s death and

the injuries to M.L. and C.L. He acknowledged that he had known C.L. since 2001 and said

that he was at C.L.’s house because C.L. owed him money. On that day, he knocked on the

door and C.L. answered it. He and C.L. began arguing about money and “who owed who.”

C.L. “got aggressive” and punched him, sparking a fight.

The defendant stated that they separated and that he began going through drawers

looking for money. He heard the shower turn off and heard M.L. call C.L.’s name. He then

turned and saw that C.L. had a gun pointed at him. He said that C.L. pulled the trigger, but

the gun did not fire, so he grabbed a knife and began stabbing C.L. Thereafter, he stabbed

M.L. when she tried to attack him with a hammer. He bound C.L.’s and M.L.’s hands and

attempted to put something around M.L.’s mouth to keep her from yelling. He heard F.G.

yelling and grabbed a bandana and wrapped it around her mouth. He was putting something

around C.L.’s mouth when he heard F.G. yelling again. He went into the bathroom to retie

the bandana around F.G.’s mouth but, when he heard M.J.L. screaming, “pulled the bandana

ends too tight real fast.” He left the bathroom, and M.J.L. saw him so he picked up the gun

and ran for the front door. As he was running, C.L. came around the corner behind him and

tried to tackle him. He then thwarted M.L.’s attempt to hit him with a hammer. He broke

free, ran out the door, and escaped.

The defendant said that, when he stabbed M.L., “she was kind of running through the

house naked.” He also said that he bagged up the clothes he was wearing during the incident

and threw them into the back of a stranger’s truck. He acknowledged that he was treated

fairly during the investigation and that he gave his statement freely and voluntarily. He said

that he told each of the victims that he did not want to kill them and that he gave F.G. a

pillow because her chest was hurting.

Sergeant Murray testified that, after the defendant gave his statement, he was arrested

and charged with murder.

Medical examiner, Dr. Lisa Fuente, performed an autopsy on F.G. She determined

that the cause of death was ligature strangulation from the bandana that “was very tightly

encircling her neck.”

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Defendant’s Proof at Trial

Rachael Geiser, a private investigator for the defense, testified that the defense team

went to the medical examiner’s office and interviewed Dr. Fuente about the autopsy. She

said that they reviewed autopsy and crime scene photos, as well as the autopsy report. They

did not review any tissue samples because Dr. Fuente told them that none were taken.

Dr. O’Brian Cleary Smith, a forensic pathologist, testified regarding alternate means

by which F.G. could have died, as well as posited a theory that the petechiae located on her

body could have been caused by her medications. Dr. Smith was of the opinion that the

autopsy performed by Dr. Fuente did not conform to the lowest level of medically acceptable

proof. On cross-examination, Dr. Smith acknowledged that he could not say that F.G. did

not die of ligature strangulation. He admitted that he was asked to leave the medical

examiner’s office in 2004.

Rebuttal Proof

Dr. Fuente stated that the petechiae noted on F.G. was not post-mortem petechiae.

Regardless, she thought the presence of “a tight ligature encircling [F.G.’s] neck” was the

“significant thing,” not the presence or absence of petechiae. She said that petechiae was

typically seen in only a minority of cases; often “the only thing that’s present is a ligature.”

Dr. Fuente did not think it would have made any difference had Dr. Smith looked at tissue

samples.

Following the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the defendant of four counts

of first degree felony murder, one count of reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of

first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of

aggravated rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of

aggravated rape,six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially

aggravated burglary. The jury acquitted the defendant on one count of especially aggravated

burglary. The trial court merged the following convictions: the four felony murder and the

reckless homicide convictions into one felony murder conviction; the aggravated sexual

battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction; the six especially aggravated

kidnapping convictions into three convictions, one per victim; and the two especially

aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction.

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Suppress

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Prior to trial, the defendant filed motions to suppress his statement to police and the

photographic identification of him. He argued that his statement should have been

suppressed because he was improperly questioned after invoking his right to counsel and

ultimately was coerced into giving a statement because the police threatened to arrest his

girlfriend and mother. He argued that the photographic array from which the witnesses

identified him was unduly suggestive because the background of his photograph was lighter

than the background of the other photographs.

On February 19, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motions.

At the hearing, Sergeant Vivian Murray, a homicide detective with the Memphis Police

Department, testified that the defendant was developed as the suspect in the case and brought

to the homicide office by Lieutenant Barham. Sergeant Murray identified the advice of rights

form that she discussed with the defendant and he signed on December 11, 2008, at 7:25 p.m.

before giving his statement.

Sergeant Murray also identified another advice of rights form dated December 10,

2008, indicating that the defendant was advised of his rights by Sergeant Mullins and

Lieutenant Mason. On that form, the defendant indicated that he had a tenth grade education.

Sergeant Murray explained that a suspect is advised of his rights before each time he is

interviewed, although she was not sure why the defendant was interviewed twice. She said

the defendant may have been interviewed by Sergeant Mullins and Lieutenant Mason, but

there was no typed supplement of any interview conducted on December 10. She also said

that it was normal to interview a witness and then take a formal statement if the individual

agreed to give one.

Sergeant Murray testified that the defendant agreed to give a statement on December

11, did not ask for an attorney, and appeared to understand what was happening. She

informed the defendant of the possible charges against him, and he seemed to understand.

He spoke with her voluntarily, and she reviewed his rights again at the start of the statement.

Sergeant Murray stated that the eight-page statement was taken in the robbery office by

herself and Lieutenant Mason. The defendant was not deprived of food or bathroom breaks,

and he was not threatened with any harm to his mother or girlfriend. He did not hesitate in

answering questions.

Sergeant Murray testified that she reviewed with the defendant all of the charges he

faced, and he understood them. After giving the statement, the defendant was allowed to

make handwritten corrections, and then he signed and initialed the statement. Sergeant

Murray testified regarding what she could remember of the substance of the defendant’s

statement. She confirmed that at no point during the giving of the statement did the

defendant request an attorney. She did not threaten him at any time to get him to say what

-12-
he said in his statement. She said that the defendant’s statement was corroborated by

evidence at the scene.

On cross- and recross-examination, Sergeant Murray denied that Rimilia Taylor was

in the homicide office, handcuffed to a table, when the defendant gave his statement. She

said that the defendant was not provided an attorney after he advised that he wanted to speak

with one during the interview on December 10, but the interview stopped immediately.

Sergeant Murray stated that the defendant was arrested and placed on a forty-eight-hour hold

on December 10, 2008, at 12:40 p.m. as a suspect in a homicide but was not formally charged

at that point. She prepared an affidavit of complaint and swore to the facts stated in it before

a commissioner on December 12.

Sergeant Murray identified copies of the photographic array from which the witnesses

identified the defendant. She noted that the defendant’s picture “in black and white is lighter

than the other pictures” in the array. She agreed that his picture was noticeably lighter but

said, “This is a black and white copy. I don’t know if there was anything going on with the

printer. The actual photo spread should ha[ve] been in color. So I . . . would have to see that

to see if it’s that much of a difference.”

Sergeant Murray testified that the probable cause to arrest the defendant came from

C.L.’s telling officers, when he was questioned while in the hospital, that the defendant was

the person who attacked his family. She stated that, after this, Lieutenant Mason contacted

the defendant’s mother in an attempt to locate the defendant. Sergeant Murray testified that

the day after the defendant’s invocation of his right to an attorney, officers were informed

by “deputy jailer Robinson” that the defendant “wanted to speak with someone in homicide.”

She said that the defendant was questioned on December 11 only because he “made it aware

that he wanted to speak with [them].”

Rimilia Taylor, the mother of the defendant’s child, testified that she and the

defendant were in a relationship on December 10, 2008. She said that, shortly after the

defendant turned himself in, officers requested that she come to the police station for

questioning. Taylor claimed that the officers kept her in a small room, chained by her ankle

to a bench that was nailed to the floor, for eleven hours. She was two and a half months

pregnant at the time. She recalled that the officers opened the door and brought the

defendant by the room, and she heard the defendant telling them that they should let her go.

While the defendant was standing in the door, the officers told her that she was “going to jail

too, you’[re] accessory.” The officers had her sign something they claimed were her “arrest

papers.” However, they did not arrest her.

Taylor testified that the police allowed he to see the defendant one more time before

-13-
she left. She said that it had been five or six hours since she saw him last. Officers told her

that they were going to bring the defendant’s mother in for questioning if needed.

On cross-examination, Taylor acknowledged that the police advised her of her rights

and that she never told the police she did not understand her rights or what was happening.

Taylor claimed that she spoke with Sergeant Murphy and another woman and that they

2

threatened that her children would enter the Department of Children’s Services’ custody if

she went to jail. She said she had no information about the defendant’s crimes or where he

was on December 9. She knew nothing about what the defendant said in his statement to

police.

On redirect examination, Taylor identified an advice of rights form that she signed on

December 11 at 12:25 p.m. She said that she arrived at the police station at 11:30 a.m. and

left at approximately 11:50 p.m. She stated that she was still in custody, chained by her ankle

to a table, at 9:25 p.m. when the defendant evidently gave his statement. She recalled that

the police sent her father home around 1:00 p.m., saying they would call him when they were

finished questioning her.

Patrina Wilson, the defendant’s mother, testified that she drove the defendant to the

police station to be questioned and was advised not to wait because “they were going to take

awhile with him.” Wilson went home but talked to Sergeant Murray later that night by

telephone. She said that Sergeant Murray never threatened her directly, but the defendant

told her that the police were coming to arrest her. However, she was not certain of the exact

date of this conversation with the defendant, and no one ever came to arrest her. She recalled

that the defendant told her that he gave and signed a statement on December 11, but he was

brought back the next day to resign the statements because he had not “sign[ed] all the

documents.”

On cross-examination, Wilson stated that the defendant told her that “he had gotten

into it with his friend Chris . . . and he had actually stabbed Chris.” She brought the

defendant to the police station because he wanted to tell his side of the story. Wilson said

she never contacted an attorney.

The twenty-three-year-old defendant testified that his mother brought him to the

police station around noon on December 10. He was told that he was not under arrest but

was coming in for questioning. When he arrived, he was met at the elevators by Lieutenant

Caroline Mason and Sergeant Tony Mullins, who took him to an interview room, put an

ankle bracelet on him, and left him sitting in the room for thirty or forty minutes before

 We assume Taylor meant Sergeant Murray, not Murphy. 2

-14-
coming to speak to him.

The defendant testified that he signed an advice of rights form and expected to give

a statement immediately, but Sergeant Mullins began trying to “coerce” him and give him

details about the case. He asked for an attorney because Sergeant Mullins was making him

feel “uncomfortable” and telling him, “[Y]ou did this.” He said that the officers would leave

for a couple of hours and then come back in. He “kept telling [them] [he] want[ed] to talk

to [an] attorney.”

The defendant recalled that the officers told him that other officers had gone to the

hospital and taken statements from M.L. and C.L. After the statements came back, the

officers asked him if he was ready to go to intake and took his shoes. As he was being

booked, Lieutenant Mason gave him a card with her telephone number on it in case he

changed his mind and wanted to talk. He was afforded the opportunity to make a fifteenminute phone call and called his mother. However, he did not know the number of an

attorney to call and did not know what offense he was charged with at the time.

The defendant testified that, when he woke up the next day, he was told he had a visit

from detectives, so he talked to Officer Robinson who told him that two detectives were

coming to see him. He denied telling Officer Robinson or anyone else at the jail that he

wanted to talk. He said that he told Sergeant Murray and the officer with her that he wanted

to speak with an attorney. However, the officers brought him to the homicide floor and

showed him Rimilia Taylor chained up in a room. He claimed that he asked the officers if

they wanted him to say that he had committed the crimes, and they responded, “[T]he truth’s

on you.” He again asked to speak with an attorney but was denied.

The defendant testified that he was taken to an interview room in the robbery office.

He asked if he could be provided with a public defender, but Sergeant Murray told him that

an attorney was not going to be appointed “at this time of night.” He was also told that he

could not talk to his mother “until after you give us what we want.” He recalled that the

officers told him, “[W]e got your girl, we’re fixing to go get your mom too. We got a squad

car on the way there right now.” He said that he felt he had to cooperate and give a

statement. He said the majority of the statement was made up. However, he acknowledged

that he told his mother that he got into a fight with and stabbed C.L., which was a true

statement.

On cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that he signed the advice of rights

form on December 10 but said he did so because the officers were not exerting pressure on

him at the time. He admitted that he was aware of his rights, having been through the

criminal justice system before. However, when the actual questioning began, he asked for

-15-
an attorney. He was taken from the homicide office to the jail and called his mother.

However, he did not ask her to call an attorney because they did not have the money to hire

one.

The defendant claimed that he did not sign the second advice of rights form, the one

given on December 11, voluntarily because he was forced to choose between Rimilia

Taylor’s freedom and going to jail himself. He denied that the initials, signature, and

corrections on the statement were his. He then attempted to clarify that he did sign and initial

some pages on December 11, but not the exact eight-page document presented at the

suppression hearing which was a document that had been “reprinted” by an officer on the

12th. He acknowledged that his statement on the 11th was “basically the same thing” as the

December 12 statement but that the officers had “broke[n] it down into individual questions,”

and he refused to sign the new document. He maintained that the information in the

statement was nevertheless untrue because he had been coached on what to say.

The defendant denied responsibility for F.G.’s death, explaining that he only said he

was responsible because he was under pressure. He admitted that he was responsible for

M.L. and C.L.’s stab wounds. He acknowledged that the statement contained some truths.

He said that the officers told him that Rimilia Taylor would be released once he finished his

statement. The defendant admitted that he used Taylor’s car to drive to the victims’ house

the day of the incident.

The motion to suppress hearing continued on May 19, 2010, and the State recalled

Sergeant Murray to testify. Sergeant Murray stated that, on December 11, she called the jail

to have the defendant brought up for a detective visit. She was aware that Sergeant Mullins

and Lieutenant Mason had interviewed the defendant the previous day when he turned

himself in, but she was not present during that interview and did not know that he had asked

for an attorney during that interview. She knew that the officers had placed the defendant

on a forty-eight-hour hold in the jail later that night. When the officers who interviewed the

defendant the previous day came into the office, they informed her that the defendant had

asked for an attorney so they could not talk to him. She called back to cancel the detective

visit and was told that the defendant was in transit to Old Release but that once he arrived,

he would be told the visit was canceled and sent back.

Sergeant Murray testified that, a short time later, she received a call from Deputy

Jailer Robinson, telling her that the defendant was in Old Release for the detective visit. She

told Deputy Jailer Robinson that she had called to cancel the detective visit because the

defendant had requested an attorney. However, Deputy Jailer Robinson told her that the

defendant wanted to talk with them, so they went down and got the defendant. Prior to

talking to him, the officers read the defendant his rights again, specifically referring to the

-16-
fact he had previously requested an attorney and ensuring whether he still wanted to talk.

Sergeant Murray stated that the defendant wanted to talk, so they questioned him. The

defendant gave a statement, implicating himself in the crimes.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Murray testified that she did not recall what time she

left for the day on December 10, the day the defendant invoked his right to an attorney during

his interview with Sergeant Mullins and Lieutenant Mason. She said she did not give

instructions to the officers during the time they were talking to the defendant. Asked how

she was able to recall her conversation with Deputy Jailer Robinson on December 11 if it was

not noted in her supplement, Sergeant Murray explained, “I remembered the conversation.

Some things about certain cases just stand out to you, you just remember certain cases and

then some things.” Sergeant Murray said that the officer in Old Release when she picked up

the defendant on December 11 was an African-American female, whom she believed to be

Deputy Jailer Robinson.

Sergeant Murray testified that she called Rimilia Taylor and asked her to come into

the office on December 11, but she did not know what time Taylor arrived or how long she

was there. She said that Taylor was in an interview room, but she did not “remember her

being shackled at all.” She stated that Taylor was brought in to verify an alibi given by the

defendant. She thought she spoke with Taylor, but she could not remember any specific

questionsthat were asked. After reviewing Lieutenant Mason’ssupplement,she recalled that

both she and Lieutenant Mason spoke with Taylor and that Taylor was in the homicide office

for “a little over four hours.” However, she could not recall when Taylor was actually

released. Sergeant Murray acknowledged that the background of the defendant’s photograph

in the array shown to the witnesses was different than the background for the other five

individuals in the array. However, she did not think the array was suggestive.

On redirect examination, Sergeant Murray stated that Taylor was never in custody or

arrested, nor was she shackled or handcuffed. Sergeant Murray noted that the defendant, in

his statement, confirmed that he told Deputy Jailer Robinson that he wanted to speak with

the detectives.

Lieutenant Caroline Mason with the Memphis Police Department testified thatshe and

Sergeant Mullins interviewed the defendant on the day he turned himself in to the police,

December 10, 2008. Sergeant Murray was present and directed them to interview the

defendant, but Sergeant Murray did not come into contact with the defendant. The defendant

was read his rights and appeared to understand them. The defendant indicated, without any

force or coercion, that he wanted to talk to them and did not indicate that he wanted an

attorney.

-17-
Lieutenant Mason testified that the defendant first told them that F.G. had not been

stabbed. The officers had not mentioned who the victims were at that point. The defendant

acknowledged that he knew C.L. and had stopped by his house with regard to a debt. He told

the officers that he and C.L. got into a struggle, which spilled into other rooms of the house.

Feeling like C.L. was “getting the best of him,” the defendant picked up a knife to try to

defend himself. He said that, by this point, C.L.’s mother also started to attack him, so he

stabbed her in self-defense. He also said that he heard a “thump” from F.G.’s bathroom, as

though she may have fallen, and tried to render aid. The defendant told them that he had to

tie up C.L. to keep from being attacked and, after M.J.L., C.L.’s sister, arrived, he had to

break away and escape.

Lieutenant Mason testified that the defendant appeared to know the layout of the

victims’ house and told them that he went there three or four times a week. She said that the

defendant “was quite a talker” and that “[i]t was kind of like he wanted to . . . get it off his

chest.” However, she recalled that, when she and Sergeant Mullins started asking the

defendant questions, he asked for an attorney and the interview stopped. They booked the

defendant into jail on a forty-eight-hour hold. They did not talk to Sergeant Murray during

any of this.

Lieutenant Mason testified that, when she arrived at work the next day, she learned

that Sergeant Murray had ordered a detective visit with the defendant, as she had not been

present when the defendant requested an attorney the previous night. Upon learning this,

Sergeant Murray called and canceled the interview, but someone called back to say that the

defendant wanted to speak with them. Lieutenant Mason said that she was present when the

defendant was brought up, read his rights, and gave a statement. She recalled that the

defendant said that he wanted to talk and that Sergeant Murray went over with him that he

had asked for an attorney but now said that he wanted to talk. Lieutenant Mason said that

she was present when the defendant was asked whether he had told Deputy Jailer Robinson

that he wanted to speak with the detectives, and the defendant implied that he had. She was

also present when the defendant signed and initialed his statement. Lieutenant Mason stated

that she showed a photographic array to M.J.L. who identified the defendant without

hesitation.

On cross-examination, Lieutenant Mason acknowledged thatshe and Sergeant Mullins

put Rimilia Taylor in an interview room and questioned her. However, she did not know

how long Taylor was in the interview room. She said that the defendant told them that he

had given Taylor some clothing to get rid of, which possibly implicated her as an accessory

after the fact.

On redirect and recross examinations, as well as examination by the court, Lieutenant

-18-
Mason testified that Taylor was not under arrest or not free to leave. Taylor was not

shackled, and her presence was not used to threaten or coerce the defendant. Lieutenant

Mason did not know what time Taylor left the homicide office. Lieutenant Mason stated that

Sergeant Murray could have shackled Taylor, but she maintained that Taylor was not

shackled. She said that, even though the door to the interview room was closed and locked,

Taylor could have asked to leave but did not. She stated that the defendant and Taylor were

never allowed to see or speak to each other while Taylor was at the police station. Lieutenant

Mason said that no statements were made to the defendant that they were going to arrest his

mother, and she did not consider placing Taylor under arrest.

Officer Evelyn Robinson, a deputy jailer at the Shelby County Jail, testified that she

was working at the jail on December 10 and 11, 2008, but she did not have an independent

recollection of those days. She did not recall any conversation with the defendant. She said

that, if an inmate did not want to leave the facility, he did not have to, even if the police

wanted to talk to him.

Lieutenant Bart Ragland with the Memphis Police Department testified that he was

directed to compile a photographic array in this case. He testified concerning the process for

creating an array and that the goal was to find photographs that are “similar and alike” to the

suspect. He acknowledged that the background of the defendant’s picture was a little lighter

than the background behind the other individuals but explained “[t]hat’s the way the photos

were taken that day or the way that this person’s photo turned out.” He said that the

backgrounds sometimes looked different on the computer screen than when printed. He

denied trying to draw attention to the defendant’s photograph, as his intention was to create

as “unbiased” array as he could. He stated that his emphasis in compiling an array was on

the physical attributes of the subjects rather than the background of the photographs. He said

that he rejected other photographs of the defendant because they contained attributes that

would have unnecessarily drawn attention to them.

Sergeant David Parks, a homicide investigator with the Memphis Police Department,

testified that he showed a photographic array to C.L., who immediately identified the

defendant as the man who stabbed him. Sergeant Parks acknowledged that the background

of the defendant’s photograph was obviously lighter than the backgrounds of the other

photographs in the array. He said that he showed C.L. the array as a formality or “extra

step,” even though C.L. knew the perpetrator. He showed the array to M.L. as well, and she

immediately identified the defendant “as the person who harmed her.”

Sergeant Parks testified that he took a statement from M.L. and that she said she knew

the perpetrator but did not know his name. He also took a statement from C.L. who told him

that the defendant was responsible for F.G.’s death. Sergeant Parks acknowledged that he

-19-
memorialized in the written supplement of his interview of C.L. in the hospital that C.L. said

that he did not know who was responsible for F.G.’s death. Sergeant Parks said that “it was

obvious that he didn’t want to tell what had happened. . . . It was obvious he knew and he

wanted to get revenge himself.”

The motion to suppress hearing continued on June 18, 2010, and the State first called

C.L. to testify. C.L. stated that he had known the defendant since 2002 or 2003 and that he

saw him once every two or three months. He said that he identified the defendant from a

photographic array while he was in the hospital and that there was no doubt in his mind that

the defendant was the perpetrator. No one suggested someone or told him whom to pick out

of the array. C.L. acknowledged that he initially told the police he did not know who stabbed

him but explained that he was distracted trying to get medical attention for his stab wounds.

C.L. testified that the defendant had visited his house socially four or five times and

had met his sister but not his mother. He clarified that his sister had “seen [the defendant’s]

face a couple of times . . . [but] [t]hey never officially met each other,” and his sister did not

know the defendant’s name. With regard to the day of the incident, C.L. stated that he did

not realize that the defendant was the intruder at first but that he recognized both the

defendant’s voice and face during their altercation. He said that he did not recognize the

defendant at first because the house was dark and he could not see. C.L. estimated that the

defendant was in his presence for approximately thirty minutes that day. He again admitted

that he initially told the police, while waiting on the porch for an ambulance, that he did not

know who was responsible for the attack.

M.J.L. testified that she recognized the defendant as the perpetrator “as soon as [she]

saw him,” because he was friends with her brother. She said that daylight was coming in the

windows, allowing her to see the defendant’s face clearly, even though no lights were on

inside the house. She had seen the defendant “around” a lot and recognized him

immediately. She knew the defendant’s name but “would get his name confused.” Police

officers showed her a photographic array, from which she identified the defendant.

M.L. testified that she was able to see the perpetrator’s face when he took off his coat.

She said that she was in the house with him from about 12:30 p.m. until after 3:00 p.m. and

that he took his coat off after about two hours. She did not know the defendant prior to the

incident but was able to see him throughout the ordeal. She said that the light was on in the

bathroom so that she could see the defendant clearly. The police showed her a photographic

array, from which she identified the defendant as the person who attacked her. She said that

the only reason she picked the defendant out of the array was because she recognized him

as her attacker. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that the background of the

defendant’s photograph was much lighter than the backgrounds of the other photographs.

-20-
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the

defendant’s motions. On appeal, a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to

suppress are conclusive unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Reid, 213

S.W.3d 792, 825 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001)). Any

question about the “credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and a

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of

fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the

suppression hearing is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith,

978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998). Thus, unless the defendant demonstrates that “the

evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court, this court must defer to the

ruling of the trial court.” Reid, 213 S.W.3d at 825 (citing State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773,

795 (Tenn. 1998)). However, the application of the law to the facts found by the trial court

is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. See State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629

(Tenn. 1997).

A. Statement

Again, the defendant argues that his statement should have been suppressed because

he was improperly questioned after invoking his right to counsel and ultimately was coerced

into giving a statement because the police threatened to arrest his girlfriend and mother.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person

. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const.

amend. V. The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution states “[t]hat in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against

himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Thus, to be admissible at trial, a confession made while

under custodial interrogation must be shown to have been freely and voluntarily given, after

the defendant’s knowing waiver of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have an

attorney present during questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The

State has the burden of proving the waiver by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing

on the motion to suppress. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997). In determining

whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights, courts look to the totality of the

circumstances. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992). If a suspect

invokes his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment, he or she “is not subject to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the

accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the

police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

-21-
Under the Fifth Amendment, a confession is involuntary when it is the result of

coercive action on the part of the State. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986).

Our supreme court has concluded that “the test of voluntarinessfor confessions under Article

1, § 9 is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under

the Fifth Amendment.” State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1992). In order for a

confession to be considered voluntary in Tennessee, it must not be the result of “‘any sort of

threats or violence, . . . any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion

of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

(quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). Courts look to the totality of

the circumstances to determine whether a confession is voluntary. State v. Smith, 933

S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996).

As to whether the defendant was improperly questioned after invoking his right to

counsel, the court found that the defendant’sstatement was “knowingly and voluntarily given

after [the] defendant re-initiated contact with police; revoked his previous invocation of his

right to counsel; and, voluntarily waived his rights.” The defendant testified that Sergeant

Murray initiated the discussions on December 11, 2008, and that he had not asked to speak

with officers that day. However, the court specifically found that the defendant’s credibility

was “highly suspect” and resolved conflicts in the testimony against the defendant.

The trial court observed, and the record shows, that both Sergeant Murray and

Lieutenant Mason testified that Sergeant Murray canceled the scheduled detective visit after

learning that the defendant had invoked his right to counsel the previous evening but that

Sergeant Murray was subsequently contacted by jail personnel informing her that the

defendant wanted to speak with them. Both officers testified that the defendant was again

advised of his rights and voluntarily waived those rights. The contents of the defendant’s

statement include an acknowledgment that the defendant initiated the contact. The court

noted that Sergeant Murray’s testimony was at sometimes “confused” and that she did not

seem to have a good recollection of the case, but that Lieutenant Mason had “a good

recollection of the details of the investigation” and that her testimony was entitled to

“substantial credit.” The question of whether the defendant initiated the discussions with the

officers after invoking his Miranda rights the previous day turns on the court’s determination

of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court resolved conflicts in the testimony against

the defendant. We will not second-guess this determination and, therefore, conclude that the

defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

With regard to his claim of coercion, the defendant testified that the officers showed

him Rimilia Taylor, his girlfriend at the time, shackled to a table in an interview room, and

also threatened to arrest his mother. He stated that he only gave a statement, which he

claimed to be in large part made up, because he felt that he had to choose between going to

-22-
jail himself and Taylor’s freedom. He said that his repeated requests for an attorney were

ignored. Taylor testified that she was held in an interview room with her ankles shackled for

eleven hours and that the defendant was paraded by her interview room and told that she was

going to jail. The defendant’s mother, Patrina Wilson, testified that the defendant told her

at some point that the police had told him they were going to arrest her, but she was never

arrested or threatened with arrest by any officers.

Sergeant Murray testified that the defendant was not threatened with any harm to his

mother or girlfriend. She said that Taylor was in an interview room but was not shackled.

Lieutenant Mason testified that Taylor was not shackled and that her presence was not used

to threaten or coerce the defendant. She said that no statements were made to the defendant

that they were going to arrest his mother, and she did not consider placing Taylor under

arrest. She stated that the defendant and Taylor were never allowed to see or speak to each

other while Taylor was at the police station. She explained that the defendant told them that

he had given Taylor some clothing to get rid of, which possibly implicated her as an

accessory after the fact. Lieutenant Mason stated that, on December 11, the defendant did

not indicate that he wanted an attorney.

As to this issue, the court noted that it did not question Lieutenant Mason’s

recollection of the events and did not “find Taylor’s testimony particularly credible.” It also

did not find the defendant’s testimony regarding Taylor and his mother “particularly

credible” in light of Sergeant Murray’s and Lieutenant Mason’s testimony. The court

concluded that it did not find the “defendant’s claims that his confession was the subject of

coercive tactics by the police to be credible.” We will not second-guess the credibility

determinations of the trial court and, therefore, conclude that the defendant is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

Moreover, the trial court also noted that, even had the police told the defendant that

Taylor might be charged, such was not unconstitutionally coercive because the officers had

at least probable cause to charge Taylor as an accessory after the fact. The evidence supports

this finding. Threats to arrest members of a suspect’s family may cause a confession to be

involuntary, but the question turns upon whether the threat could have been lawfully carried

out. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 262-263 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the

defendant told the police that he had given Taylor some items of clothing to dispose of. An

accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that the

offender has committed a felony, provides or aids in providing the offender with any means

of avoiding arrest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-411(a). Thus, the defendant’s confession

was not coerced by any threat to arrest Taylor, even had there been such threat.

Furthermore, even if the court erred in notsuppressing the defendant’sstatement,such

-23-
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury heard testimony from three

witnesses, all of whom identified the defendant as the perpetrator and one of whom had

known the defendant socially for several years. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

B. Photographic Identifications

The defendant arguesthat the victims’ identification of him from a photographic array

should have been suppressed because the array was unduly suggestive in that the background

of his photograph was lighter than the background of the other photographs.

Each officer acknowledged that the background of the defendant’s photograph was

lighter than the other photographs in the array. Lieutenant Bart Ragland, who created the

array, testified that he went through one to two hundred photographs before choosing the

photographs to include in the array. He said that his emphasis in compiling an array was on

the physical attributes of the subjects rather than the background of the photographs and that

his intention was to create as “unbiased” array that he could. He rejected one or two other

photographs of the defendant because of attributes that would have drawn attention to the

defendant.

Due process is violated if an identification procedure is: (1) unnecessarily or

impermissibly suggestive and (2) gives rise to a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). In Neil v. Biggers,

409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test to

determine when a defendant’s due process rights have been violated by a pretrial

identification. Under this test, the court first considers whether the identification procedure

itself was unduly or unnecessarily suggestive. Id. If the identification procedure is found

to have been suggestive, the court next considers “whether under the totality of the

circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was

suggestive.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302

(1967) (stating that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a

confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it”).

The factors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of an identification obtained

as part of a suggestive identification procedure include: (1) the opportunity of the witness

to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the

accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the

crime and the confrontation. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. The corrupting effect of the

suggestive procedure is weighed against these factors. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.

98, 114 (1977).

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There is, however, no need for the court to apply the totality of the circumstances test

outlined in Biggers if it first determines that the identification procedure itself was neither

unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive nor likely to create a substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification. See State v. Biggs, 211 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2006) (citations omitted).

“Photographs contained in a photographic array do not have to mirror the accused.

Instead, the law simply requires that the police refrain from ‘suggestive identification

procedures.’” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 153 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S.

at 196). Accordingly, “a photographic identification is admissible unless, based upon the

totality of the circumstances, ‘the confrontation conducted . . . was so unnecessarily

suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the accused] was denied

due process of law.’” Id. (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02). The risk of irreparable

mistaken identification is heightened if one of the photographs in the photographic lineup “is

in some way emphasized,” or if “the police indicate to the witness that they have other

evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383.

The trial court reviewed the photographic arrays that were shown to the witnesses and

determined that they were not “so unnecessarily suggestive as to preclude either the

admission of the photographic line-ups at trial or any in-court identification by the

witnesses.” However, the court also reviewed the Biggers factors and determined that the

identifications should be admitted.

We have likewise reviewed the photographic array in question and note that the

background of the defendant’s photograph is noticeably lighter, albeit perhaps not as stark

as the defendant suggests. Regardless, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling

not to suppress the photographic identifications because the totality of the circumstances

shows that the identifications were reliable.

The record shows that each victim had ample opportunity to view the defendant at the

time of the crime. The victims’ testimony made clear that they were attentive for at least

portions of the incident, conversing with the defendant and struggling with him face-to-face.

The record also shows that the victims’ prior descriptions of the assailant were accurate and

that one of the victims knew the defendant prior to the incident and another victim had

previously met the defendant. The record further shows that the victims immediately, and

with certainty, identified the defendant from the array and that the length of time between the

crime and the confrontation was within hours. The record does not preponderate against the

trial court’s finding that the totality of the circumstances shows that the identifications were

reliable.

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II. Jury Charge

The defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on

especially aggravated kidnapping. He asserts that the court did not charge the jury in line

with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012).

In White, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that “trial courts should specifically

require a determination of whether the removal or confinement is, in essence, incidental to

the accompanying felony or, in the alternative, is significant enough, standing alone, to

support a conviction.” Id. The court emphasized that it was not creating a new standard for

kidnapping but instead was “merely providing definition for the element of the offense

requiring that the removal or confinement constitute a substantial interference with the

victim’s liberty” and, thus, that its ruling in the case did not “articulate a new rule of

constitutional law or require retroactive application.” Id. To provide guidance, our supreme

court set forth the following instruction to be issued by trial courts until an appropriate

pattern jury instruction is developed:

To establish whether the defendant’s removal or confinement of the

victim constituted a substantial interference with his or her liberty, the State

must prove that the removal or confinement was to a greater degree than that

necessary to commit the offense of [insert offense], which is the other offense

charged in this case. In making this determination, you may consider all the

relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including, but not limited to, the

following factors:

• the nature and duration of the victim’s removal or

confinement by the defendant;

• whether the removal or confinement occurred during the

commission of the separate offense;

• whether the interference with the victim’sliberty wasinherent

in the nature of the separate offense;

• whether the removal or confinement prevented the victim

from summoning assistance, although the defendant need not

have succeeded in preventing the victim from doing so;

• whether the removal or confinement reduced the defendant’s

risk of detection, although the defendant need not have

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succeeded in this objective; and

• whether the removal or confinement created a significant

danger or increased the victim’s risk of harm independent of that

posed by the separate offense.

Id. at 580-81 (footnote omitted).

Although White was decided after the trial in this case and the defendant, therefore,

neither requested nor received the jury instructions mandated by that case, our supreme court

has clarified that retroactive application was intended with respect to cases that were already

in the “appellate pipeline” at the time White was decided. See State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d

599, 608 (Tenn. 2013). The defendant’s case falls into this category.

The opinions of several panels of this court have indicated that before a case should

be retried due to the failure to give a White instruction, there should be an analysis to

determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v.

Curtis Keller, No. W2012-00825-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3329032, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 27, 2013); State v. Jonathan Kyle Hulse, No. E2011-01292-CCA-R3-CD, 2013

WL 1136528, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 12,

2013); State v. David Earl Scott, No. E2011-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5503951, at *13-

14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013).

We conclude that the evidence in this case overwhelmingly shows that the victims’

removal or confinement went beyond that necessary to accomplish any of the underlying

felonies. Similarly to the scenario in Curtis Keller, where the court concluded that the

instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was “clear that the

movement and confinement of the victims was not done for purposes of accomplishing

assaults upon them,” 2013 WL 3329032, at *5, the defendant repeatedly moved, confined,

and bound M.L., C.L., and F.G., at gunpoint, before and after and in a manner unnecessary

to commit the other offenses against them. In addition, had the jury been given the White

instruction, it would have been told to consider, among other things, the nature and duration

of the victims’ removal or confinement by the defendant; whether the removal or

confinement occurred during the commission of the separate offenses; whether the

interference with the victims’ liberty was inherent in the nature of the separate offenses; and

whether the removal or confinement prevented the victims from summoning assistance.

Analysis of these factors, in light of the evidence recited above, leads us to conclude that the

jury would not have reached a different conclusion had a White instruction been given. The

omission of a White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant lastly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of

felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated rape, and especially

aggravated burglary.

In considering this issue, we apply the rule that where sufficiency of the convicting

evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in

criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is

insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”);

State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600,

604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given

the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the

trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in

favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our

supreme court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and

the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212

Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523 (1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of

innocence with which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that

on appeal a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is

insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

A. Felony Murder

The defendant argues that F.G.’s death “was a senseless and tragic act” but that “there

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is insufficient proof, for the reasons argued in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

of each offense, that he perpetrated or attempted to commit any of the alleged felonies.”

Felony murder is defined as “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of

or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, . . . rape, . . . burglary, [or] kidnapping[.]”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2010). “No culpable mental state is required . . . except

the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts.” Id. § 39-13-202(b). The evidence

shows that the incident resulted in the death of F.G., who was strangled with a bandana. This

establishes the “killing of another” requirement for felony murder and, as will be shown

below, the evidence also establishes that the killing occurred during the commission of

attempted first degree murder, rape, burglary, and kidnapping.

3

B. Attempted First Degree Premeditated Murder

First degree murder is defined as “[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2010). An intentional act requires that the person have

the desire to engage in conduct or cause the result. Id. § 39-11-106(a)(18). “Premeditation”

is

an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. “Premeditation”

means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is

not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for

any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the

accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to

determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and

passion as to be capable of premeditation.

Id. § 39-13-202(d).

Whether premeditation is present is a question of fact for the jury, and it may be

determined from the circumstances surrounding the killing. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651,

660 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation include declarations of the intent to

kill, procurement of a weapon, the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the fact

that the killing was particularly cruel, infliction of multiple wounds, the making of

preparations before the killing for the purpose of concealing the crime, destruction or

secretion of evidence, and calmness immediately after the killing. State v. Jackson, 173

The defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence of his especially aggravated 3

kidnapping convictions.

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S.W.3d 401, 409 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Nichols, 24 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tenn. 2000). A

defendant’s failure to render aid to a victim can also indicate the existence of premeditation.

State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

In cases where the defendant has been charged with the attempted commission of a

crime, there must be evidence that the defendant acted “with the kind of culpability otherwise

required for the offense” and acted “with intent to cause a result that is an element of the

offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the

person’s part.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a), (a)(2). Criminal attempt also occurs when

the defendant “acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would

constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person

believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of

the offense.” Id. § 39-12-101(a)(3).

The evidence shows that the defendant stabbed M.L. in the chest and attempted to cut

her throat. Blood poured from her wounds, she lost control of her bladder and bowels, and

she felt her body getting weaker and shutting down. The defendant told her that if her son

arrived within fifteen minutes, he could call the paramedics to save her, implying that she

would die if he did not. Previously, the defendant told M.L. that he had to kill her and F.G.

because they had seen his face. M.L. also heard the defendant on the phone saying that he

was “going to kill his momma and grandmomma and Chris.” The defendant told M.L., just

prior to trying to cut her throat, that he had to show C.L. that “I mean business[.]” After

M.L. tried to reach a phone to call for help, the defendant attempted, unsuccessfully, to shoot

her three times. He then told M.L. that “[she] just killed [her] son.” The defendant explicitly

threatened to kill C.L. before stabbing him a total of thirteen times. The defendant also tried

unsuccessfully to shoot C.L. Paramedics responding to the scene determined that C.L. “had

a very serious set of injuries,” including a life-threatening stab wound to his upper chest that

penetrated through the chest wall into the space for the heart and lungs that could lead to

death within two to five minutes if untreated. The sum of this evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the State, shows that the defendant attempted to kill M.L. and C.L. in a

premeditated fashion.

C. Aggravated Rape

Aggravated rape is “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the

defendant by a victim” when “[f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the

defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the

victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a)(1).

“Sexual penetration” includes “ any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s

body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s . . . body.” Id. § 39-13-

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501(7).

M.L. testified that the defendant grabbed her head and forced her to stand, then

inserted gloved fingers “up in [her] vaginal area.” The defendant was carrying a gun while

he did this. The defendant points out that there was no physical evidence of penetration, but

such is not required for a jury conviction of aggravated rape to be upheld on appeal. See

State v. Bonds, 189 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005). The defendant also points

out that M.L. told her daughter, M.J.L., that she had not been raped. However, this is only

evidence that M.L. thought of the word “rape” in the lay sense, forced sexual intercourse,

rather than penetration with a digit, which satisfies the legal definition of rape. In the light

most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction

for aggravated rape.

D. Especially Aggravated Burglary

The State concedes that the defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary

should be modified to aggravated burglary, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section

39-14-404(d), because he was also prosecuted for especially aggravated kidnapping and

attempted first degree murder. See State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1993). We, accordingly, modify the defendant’s conviction in Count 16 to aggravated

burglary.

Aggravated burglary occurs when one enters the habitation of another, without

consent, with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-401;

-402; -403. The defendant asserts that the evidence fails to show that he entered the

residence without the effective consent of the owner. However, the circumstantial evidence

showed that the defendant entered the victims’ home through a bedroom window, not the

typical means of entry for one invited into another’s home. M.L. testified that she wondered

how the intruder got into her house and noticed that she felt a draft and saw that the window

air conditioner had been removed, the curtain was halfway down, and that her nightstand had

been pushed away from the window and everything had been knocked off it. In the light

most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the defendant’s entrance into the

victims’ home was non-consensual. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the

defendant’s conviction for aggravated burglary.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we remand for entry of a corrected

judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty years, which was omitted, and

we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in Count 16 and remand for

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resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary in that count. In all other

respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

_________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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