This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

1083 

Vol. 87, No. 6 

Monday, January 10, 2022 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–1078; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2020–01574–R] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bell Textron 

Canada Limited Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

Republication 

Editorial Note: Rule document 2021–28089 

was originally published on pages 73708 

through 73712 in the issue of Tuesday, 

December 28, 2021. At the bottom of page 

73711, Figure 3 to paragraph (g) was 

inadvertently split between pages 73711 and 

73712. The corrected document is 

republished in its entirety. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for 

certain Bell Textron Canada Limited 

Model 429 helicopters. This proposed 

AD was prompted by in-service reports 

of the loss of display and subsequent 

recovery of certain display units (DUs). 

This proposed AD would require 

revising the existing rotorcraft flight 

manual supplement (RFMS) for your 

helicopter and disabling the traffic alert 

and collision avoidance system (TCAS) 

POP-UP feature for certain DUs. The 

FAA is proposing this AD to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: The FAA must receive comments 

on this proposed AD by February 11, 

2022. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this NPRM, contact Bell Textron Canada 

Limited, 12,800 Rue de l’Avenir, 

Mirabel, Quebec J7J 1R4, Canada; 

telephone 1–450–437–2862 or 1–800– 

363–8023; fax 1–450–433–0272; email 

productsupport@bellflight.com; or at 

https://www.bellflight.com/support/ 

contact-support. You may view this 

service information at the FAA, Office 

of the Regional Counsel, Southwest 

Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 

6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222– 

5110. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2021–1078; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

NPRM, the Transport Canada AD, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Darren Gassetto, Aerospace Engineer, 

COS Program Management Section, 

FAA, Operational Safety Branch, 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, 

NY 11590; telephone (516) 228–7323; 

email Darren.Gassetto@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments about this proposal. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2021–1078; Project Identifier 

MCAI–2020–01574–R’’ at the beginning 

of your comments. The most helpful 

comments reference a specific portion of 

the proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. The FAA will consider 

all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this proposal 

because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to https://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. The 

agency will also post a report 

summarizing each substantive verbal 

contact received about this NPRM. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this NPRM 

contain commercial or financial 

information that is customarily treated 

as private, that you actually treat as 

private, and that is relevant or 

responsive to this NPRM, it is important 

that you clearly designate the submitted 

comments as CBI. Please mark each 

page of your submission containing CBI 

as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such 

marked submissions as confidential 

under the FOIA, and they will not be 

placed in the public docket of this 

NPRM. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Darren Gassetto, 

Aerospace Engineer, COS Program 

Management Section, FAA, Operational 

Safety Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, 

Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 

telephone (516) 228–7323; email 

Darren.Gassetto@faa.gov. Any 

commentary that the FAA receives 

which is not specifically designated as 

CBI will be placed in the public docket 

for this rulemaking. 

Background 

Transport Canada, which is the 

aviation authority for Canada, has 

issued Transport Canada AD CF–2020– 

18R1, dated November 27, 2020 

(Transport Canada AD CF–2020–18R1), 

to correct an unsafe condition for Bell 

Textron Canada Limited Model 429 

helicopters, serial numbers 57001 

through 57369, 57371, and 57373. 

Transport Canada advises that it has 

received in-service reports of the loss of 

display and subsequent recovery of the 

DU manufactured by Rogerson Kratos 

(RK). During an instrument flight rules 

approach, a Bell Textron Canada 


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1084 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

Limited Model 429 helicopter lost its 

center DU display, which then rebooted, 

and subsequently lost its right-hand side 

(RHS) DU display, which then also 

rebooted. Investigation revealed that the 

DUs’ power cycle occurred while in 

Map-Mode, which was caused by the 

RK DUs’ limited processing capability 

for excessive null waypoints generated 

by the Garmin GTN 750/650 GPS/NAV/ 

COMM/MFD. 

Transport Canada also advises that 

the use of Map-Mode to the center DU 

should be limited only for Bell Textron 

Canada Limited Model 429 helicopters 

equipped with RK DUs and Garmin 

GTN 750/650 main software version 

6.21 or later and that the use of MapMode should be prohibited on both the 

RHS DU and left-hand side DU, if 

installed. In addition, Transport Canada 

advises that a new emergency and 

malfunction procedure in the event of 

center DU failure should be 

implemented. 

If not addressed, a DU power cycle 

occurring during flight and consequent 

momentary loss of display information 

on the primary flight display and other 

DUs could result in the unexpected loss 

of display of important flight parameters 

to the pilots, including attitude, 

approach, airspeed, altitude, flight 

director information, navigation system 

cues, as well as engine and rotor drive 

system indications. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed Bell Alert Service 

Bulletin 429–20–51, Revision B, dated 

July 17, 2021, which specifies 

procedures for disabling the TCAS POPUP feature for certain DUs. This 

material is reasonably available because 

the interested parties have access to it 

through their normal course of business 

or by the means identified in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

FAA’s Determination 

These helicopters have been approved 

by the aviation authority of Canada and 

are approved for operation in the United 

States. Pursuant to the FAA’s bilateral 

agreement with Canada, Transport 

Canada, its technical representative, has 

notified the FAA of the unsafe condition 

described in its AD. The FAA is 

proposing this AD after evaluating all 

known relevant information and 

determining that the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop on other helicopters of the same 

type design. 

Proposed AD Requirements in This 

NPRM 

This proposed AD would require 

revising the existing RFMS for your 

helicopter and disabling the TCAS POPUP feature for certain DUs. 

Differences Between This Proposed AD 

and the Transport Canada AD 

Transport Canada AD CF–2020–18R1 

requires operators to ‘‘advise all flight 

crews’’ of the changes introduced by the 

RFMS revision. However, this proposed 

AD would not specifically require that 

action. 14 CFR 91.9 requires that no 

person may operate a civil aircraft 

without complying with the operating 

limitations specified in the RFMS. 

Therefore, including a requirement in 

this AD to operate the helicopter 

according to the revised RFMS would be 

redundant and unnecessary. Further, 

compliance with such a requirement in 

an AD would be impracticable to 

demonstrate or track on an ongoing 

basis; therefore, a requirement to 

operate the helicopter in such a manner 

would be unenforceable. The flight 

manual supplement changes proposed 

in this AD would also apply to the 

emergency and malfunction procedures 

section of the existing RFMS for your 

helicopter. FAA regulations mandate 

compliance only with the operating 

limitations section of the flight manual. 

Nonetheless, the FAA recommends that 

flight crews of the helicopters listed in 

the applicability operate in accordance 

with the revised emergency and 

malfunction procedures specified in this 

proposed AD. 

This proposed AD would also propose 

to require disabling the TCAS POP-UP 

feature for certain DUs, which is not 

required in Transport Canada AD CF– 

2020–18R1. The FAA has coordinated 

this requirement with Transport 

Canada, and Transport Canada stated 

that it is planning to include this action 

in a future rulemaking action. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD, if 

adopted as proposed, would affect 88 

helicopters of U.S. Registry. Labor rates 

are estimated at $85 per work-hour. 

Based on these numbers, the FAA 

estimates the following costs to comply 

with this proposed AD. 

Revising the RFMS for your helicopter 

takes about 1 work-hour for an 

estimated cost of $85 per helicopter and 

$7,480 for the U.S. fleet. 

Disabling the TCAS POP-UP feature 

for your helicopter takes about 0.5 workhours for an estimated cost of $43 per 

helicopter and $3,784 for the U.S. fleet. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

The FAA determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed, I certify 

this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Would not affect intrastate 

aviation in Alaska, and 

(3) Would not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2022 / Proposed Rules 1085 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

Bell Textron Canada Limited: Docket No. 

FAA–2021–1078; Project Identifier 

MCAI–2020–01574–R. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

The FAA must receive comments on this 

airworthiness directive (AD) by February 11, 

2022. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Bell Textron Canada 

Limited Model 429 helicopters, certificated 

in any category, serial numbers 57001 

through 57369 inclusive, 57371, and 57373. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 3100, Indicating/Recording System. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by in-service 

reports of the loss of display and subsequent 

recovery of certain display units (DUs). The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address a DU 

power cycle occurring during flight and 

consequent momentary loss of display 

information on the primary flight display and 

other DUs, which if not addressed, could 

result in the unexpected loss of display of 

important flight parameters to the pilots, 

including attitude, approach, airspeed, 

altitude, flight director information, 

navigation system cues, as well as engine and 

rotor drive system indications. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual 

Supplement (RFMS) 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD: Revise the Types of Operation— 

Limitations (section 1–3–A.) of the existing 

RFMS for your helicopter to include the 

information in the ‘‘Limitations’’ procedure 

specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this 

AD, revise the Configuration (section 1–5.) of 

the existing RFMS for your helicopter to 

include the information in the 

‘‘Configuration’’ specified in figure 2 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD, and revise the 

Emergency and Malfunction Procedures 

(section 3) of the existing RFMS for your 

helicopter to include the information in the 

‘‘CENTER DU FAILURE’’ specified in figure 

3 to paragraph (g) of this AD. 

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Figure 1 to paragraph (g) - Limitations procedure revision 

1-3-A. LIMITATIONS 

Safe Taxi® and Chart View, if installed, shall not be used as primary means for flight 

crews to orient themselves on the airport surface. 

Use of the GTN for primary navigation for latitudes above 89.00°N and below 89.00°S 

is not authorized. 

Use of MAP mode on the Pilot and Co-pilot (if installed) Rogerson Kratos (RK) DU is 

prohibited. Use of MAP mode may cause a power cycle of the DU. 

MAP mode on the center RK DU shall not be selected during a DME Arc approach, as 

this may cause a power cycle of the DU. 

MAP mode on the center RK DU shall not be selected during search pattern 

operations. Excessive search pattern legs in DU MAP mode may cause a power cycle 

of the DU. 

The SD card or Flight Stream 510 (MMC) shall be present in each unit at all times. 

Demo mode shall not be used in flight. 
1086 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2022 / Proposed Rules 

BILLING CODE 0099–10–C 

Note 1 to paragraph (g): The information 

in the ‘‘CENTER DU FAILURE’’ specified in 

figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD can be 

found in Bell 429 Rotorcraft Flight Manual 

Supplement BHT–429–FMS–19, Revisions 3, 

4, 5, and 6. 

(h) Disabling the Traffic Alert and Collision 

Avoidance System (TCAS) POP-UP Feature 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD: Disable the TCAS POP-UP mode, 

including those helicopters equipped with 

the TCAS kit, in the parameter setup page on 

all RK DUs, in accordance with paragraph 3. 

of the Accomplishment Instructions of Bell 

Alert Service Bulletin 429–20–51, Revision 

B, dated July 17, 2021. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, International Validation 

Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In 

accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the International Validation 

Branch, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR730-AMOC@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Darren Gassetto, Aerospace Engineer, 

COS Program Management Section, FAA, 

Operational Safety Branch, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 

telephone (516) 228–7323; email 

Darren.Gassetto@faa.gov. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bell Textron Canada 

Limited, 12,800 Rue de l’Avenir, Mirabel, 

Quebec J7J 1R4, Canada; telephone 1–450– 

437–2862 or 1–800–363–8023; fax 1–450– 

433–0272; email productsupport@

bellflight.com; or at https://

www.bellflight.com/support/contact-support. 

You may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, 

TX 76177. For information on the availability 

of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222– 

5110. 

(3) The subject of this AD is addressed in 

Transport Canada AD CF–2020–18R1, dated 

November 27, 2020. You may view the 

Transport Canada AD on the internet at 

https://www.regulations.gov in Docket No. 

FAA–2021–1078. 

Issued on December 16, 2021. 

Ross Landes, 

Deputy Director for Regulatory Operations, 

Compliance & Airworthiness Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. R1–2021–28089 Filed 1–6–22; 4:15 pm] 

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Figure 2 to paragraph (g) - Configuration revision 

1-5. CONFIGURATION 

Garmin GTN 750/650 main software shall be Version 4.00 with GPS software 5.00 or 

main software 6.21 with GPS software 5.2, or main software 6.62 with GPS software 

5.2. 

Flight Stream 510, if installed, shall be version 2.32 or later. 

Both GTN units shall have the same software versions. 

TCAS POP-UP mode shall be DISABLED on the Rogerson Kratos (RK) DU. 

Figure 3 to paragraph (g) - Emergency and Malfunction Procedures revision 

3-14-B. CENTER DU FAILURE 

• INDICATIONS: 

DU screen momentarily goes blank. 

Pilot and Co-pilot (if installed) DU goes into composite mode. 

• PROCEDURE: 

NOTE 

MAP mode on center DU is defaulted ON with Weather Radar (if installed). 

Center DU - Deselect MAP mode. 

Pilot/Copilot DU - Select flight mode, as desired.