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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

VAUGHN DANTE TYNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3780 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0003314-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 04, 2018

Vaughn Dante Tyner appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

seventy-two hours to six months imprisonment, plus community service, 

fines, and costs, after he was convicted of driving under the influence 

(“DUI”). Appellant’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw and a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We deny 

counsel’s application to withdraw and remand for counsel to file an 

advocate’s brief. 

The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows.

On February 19, 2016, Trooper [Tyrone] Bradley was 

working the 11 pm to 7 am shift along with his partner Trooper 

Woody. Trooper Bradley was patrolling I-95 southbound in a 

marked state police vehicle, when he observed a red mustang in 

the middle lane, traveling at [a] high rate of speed in the area of 

Exit 3, which is located in Chester, Delaware County, 

Pennsylvania. Further, Trooper Bradley observed that the 
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vehicle weaved within its lane of travel before crossing over the 

dotted white lines with the passenger-side tires, and then began 

driving in between the middle and right lanes. Trooper Bradley 

followed the vehicle and clocked it going 83 miles per hour in a 

55 mile[-]per[-]hour zone.1

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1 [The Commonwealth offered into evidence] a 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles certificate of speedometer accuracy. 

[Trooper Bradley] further explained that his vehicle’s 

speedometer was tested and calibrated on September 2, 

2015.

Trooper Bradley subsequently noticed the red mustang, 

which was still traveling at a high-rate of speed, cross the white 

line a second time. At this time Trooper Bradley activated his 

lights and sirens and initiated a traffic stop on South I-95 at mile 

marker 0.3, which is located in Lower Chichester Township, 

Delaware County, Pennsylvania. The driver complied by pulling 

over. 

Next, Trooper Bradley, along with Trooper Woody 

approached the red mustang. Trooper Bradley approached the 

driver, who he learned to be [Appellant], and introduced himself 

as a Pennsylvania State Trooper. Trooper Bradley asked 

Appellant for his driver’s license, registration, and insurance 

card, while proceeding to explain to Appellant his reasoning for 

pulling him over. Trooper Bradley observed that Appellant did 

not appear to be focused when locating the requested 

documents. Moreover, Appellant asked Trooper Bradley to 

repeat the documents needed. 

While speaking with Appellant, Trooper Bradley detected 

an odor of alcohol on his breath. Additionally, Trooper Bradley 

detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from within 

the vehicle, and observed that Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot,

red, glassy, and that his pupils were dilated. When asked about 

the odor of marijuana, Appellant stated that there was no 

marijuana in the vehicle, but that he had smoked it in the car 

with some friends earlier that evening. When asked if he had

consumed any alcoholic beverages that evening, Appellant 

stated that he had one tequila sunrise and then one double-shot 

of rum and coke. 
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At this point, Trooper Bradley asked Appellant to exit the 

vehicle to perform standardized field sobriety tests. Trooper 

Bradley started with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Next, 

Trooper Bradley asked Appellant to perform the walk-and-turn 

test. In regard to the walk-and-turn test, while giving Appellant 

the instructions, Trooper Bradley observed that Appellant visibly

swayed, could not keep his balance. During the first series of 9 

steps, Trooper Bradley observed that Appellant lost his balance, 

did not walk in a straight line, raised his arms, did not touch 

heel-to-toe, and completed an improper turn. On the second 

series of steps, there was no heel-to-toe, Appellant raised his 

arms for balance, did not walk in a straight line, and did not 

count aloud as instructed. 

Next, Trooper Bradley conducted the on[e]-legged stand 

test. Again, he walked through the instructions with Appellant. 

During the test, Trooper Bradley observed that Appellant visibly 

swayed, put his foot down several times, could not keep his 

balance and raised his arms. At this point, Trooper Bradley

stopped the administration of the field sobriety tests.

Based on Trooper Bradley’s observations of Appellant on 

the road, his contact of Appellant’s person, Appellant’s 

performance on the field sobriety tests, and Appellant’s

admission to consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, Trooper 

Bradley believed that Appellant was incapable of safe driving and 

placed him under arrest for driving under the influence. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/6/17, at 2-4 (citations omitted). 

Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial on DUI—general impairment, 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), and DUI—controlled substance (impairment), 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2),1 as well as several summary offenses. The trial court 

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1 The Commonwealth had originally charged Appellant with a violation of 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(iii) (DUI—controlled substance (metabolite)), but did 

not proceed on that count after the trial court excluded blood test results 

under Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
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found Appellant guilty of both DUI charges.

2 Appellant was sentenced as 

indicated above, and filed a timely post-sentence motion. After its denial, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

In this Court, Appellant’s counsel filed both an Anders brief and an 

application to withdraw as counsel. Accordingly, the following principles 

guide our review of this matter.

Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly 

frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth 

issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any 

other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation 

thereof . . . .

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any 

additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.

If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical 

requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to 

withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions 

(e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an 

advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s 

petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our 

own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If 

the appeal is frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and 

affirm the judgment of sentence. However, if there are nonfrivolous issues, we will deny the petition and remand for the 

filing of an advocate’s brief. 

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2 Appellant was also convicted of exceeding the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit 

by 28 miles per hour and fined accordingly. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(2), (c). 
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Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Pa.Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified portions of the Anders

procedure:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra, at 361.

Based upon our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

Anders brief, we conclude that counsel has substantially complied with the 

technical requirements set forth above.3 Therefore, we now have the 

responsibility “‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an 

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (quoting Santiago, supra, at 354 n.5).

In the Anders brief, counsel presents the following issue of arguable 

merit: “[t]he evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant] of the offenses 

at issue herein since the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that a 

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3 Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s application.
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reasonable trier of fact would not have been satisfied of his guilt.” Anders 

brief at 6. 

We review this issue mindful of the following. “Our standard of review 

of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Sales, 173 A.3d 

825, 828 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for the fact–finder. In addition, we note 

that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. 

Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

fact–finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be 

evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. 

Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 153 A.3d 372, 375 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.Super. 

2014)). 

Appellant was convicted under the following provisions of the Vehicle 

Code:
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(a) General impairment.—

(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of a vehicle after 

imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the 

individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating 

or being in actual physical control of the movement of the 

vehicle.

. . . .

(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

. . . . 

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the 

individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802. 

Hence, to meet its burden of proof under subsection 3802(a)(1), the 

Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Appellant’s substantially-impaired ability to drive safely was caused by 

alcohol consumption. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 

(Pa.Super. 2011). To establish that Appellant was guilty of violating 

subsection 3802(d)(2), the Commonwealth similarly had to prove causation, 

i.e., that Appellant’s inability to drive safely was caused by the influence of a 

drug or combination of drugs. Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 

345 (Pa.Super. 2012). Upon review of the record, we find that Appellant is 
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able to make a non-frivolous argument that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish the causation. 

Expert testimony is not always required to establish that impairment 

was caused by a controlled substance; rather, the necessity for such 

evidence depends on the specific facts of the case. Commonwealth v. 

Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011). 

Relevant to our review is Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), a case decided after counsel filed her Anders

brief. In Gause, the Commonwealth offered evidence that, when Gause was 

stopped for a traffic violation, the officer smelled alcohol, and Gause 

admitted to having consumed beer. Id. at 535. Gause also exhibited eyelid 

tremors, which the officer indicated was indicative of marijuana use. Id. at 

536. Another officer who had administered sobriety tests opined that Gause 

was impaired by both alcohol and marijuana. Id. at 537. 

On appeal, this Court vacated Gause’s convictions under subsections 

(a)(1) and (d)(2) of the DUI statute, which are the same two offenses at 

issue in the instant case. This Court first held that the lay opinion testimony 

offered by the officers as to causation was improper. We determined that, 

based upon the lack of physical evidence of marijuana use, and “no 

admission from Gause that he had recently smoked marijuana,” the officer’s 

“observations did not obviate the necessity of an expert to explain whether 

‘eye tremors,’ or ‘body tremors,’ would indicate that someone was under the 
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influence of marijuana and that this impaired his ability to safely drive[.]” 

Id. at 539 (emphasis omitted). Without the improperly-admitted lay opinion 

testimony, “there was a total lack of proof that Gause was under the 

influence of a drug to a degree that his ability to safely drive was impaired.” 

Id. at 540. Further, this Court concluded that the record did not support a 

finding that Gause was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that 

rendered him incapable of driving safely. Id. at 541-42. Accordingly, we 

vacated Gause’s convictions under both subsections 3802(d)(2) and 

3802(a)(1). 

Here, the only witness offered by the Commonwealth was Trooper 

Bradley. Although he testified to having personal and professional 

experience observing people under the influence of alcohol, controlled 

substances, or both, and that he has received extensive training in 

administering field sobriety tests, Trooper Bradley was neither offered nor 

accepted as an expert witness. N.T. Trial, 8/15/16, at 6-8.

As detailed above, Trooper Bradley offered extensive testimony that 

Appellant was not sober. He also opined, based upon Appellant’s physical 

condition and “basically his admissions of consuming alcoholic beverages 

and smoking marijuana,” that Appellant was incapable of safely driving. Id. 

at 17. However, the record is not clear that Trooper Bradly offered, or was 

necessarily qualified to offer, opinion testimony that Appellant independently 

was impaired by alcohol and or independently impaired by marijuana. 
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Appellant was neither tried nor convicted for violating the portion of 

the DUI statute that prohibits a person from operating a vehicle if “[t]he 

individual is under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug or 

combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to 

safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the 

vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3). A violation of that subsection could be 

present where neither the alcohol nor drug effects alone caused substantial 

impairment. As this Court has recognized, “a person may consume a small 

amount of alcohol which by itself would not cause the person to violate [the 

DUI statute] and yet when combined with a controlled substance would 

render that same person incapable of safe driving in violation of” the 

subsection addressing the combined influence of drugs and alcohol. 

Commonwealth v. Plybon, 421 A.2d 224, 226 (Pa.Super. 1980). 

Rather, to sustain his respective subsection 3802(a)(1) and (d)(2) 

convictions, the record must contain evidence sufficient to establish that 

Appellant was incapable of safe driving because of alcohol impairment, and 

unable to drive safely due to impairment by a drug or combination of drugs. 

It is not readily apparent that the Commonwealth did so. Given that the 

only evidence as to the amount of intoxicants consumed by Appellant is his 

admission that he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle with some friends 

“earlier that night,” and that, at some unspecified time in the past “he had 

one tequila sunrise and then one double shot of rum and coke,” N.T. Trial, 
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8/15/16, at 13, it is arguable that the Commonwealth could not prove the 

violations without expert testimony differentiating and quantifying the 

effects of the substances Appellant consumed. 

By no means are we convinced that the evidence was insufficient to 

support Appellant’s convictions. However, a sufficiency challenge is not so 

clearly devoid of merit to warrant classifying this appeal as frivolous, 

especially in light of the Gause decision that was addressed by neither 

party. From our review, it appears that counsel has the factual and legal 

bases to put forward a good-faith argument that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the DUI convictions.4

Accordingly, we deny counsel’s application for leave to withdraw and 

remand the case for counsel to file an advocate’s brief within 60 days of the 

date of this memorandum. The Commonwealth may file a brief in response 

within 30 days thereafter.

Nicholena A. Iacuzio, Esquire’s application to withdraw appearance 

denied. Case remanded with instructions. Panel jurisdiction retained. 

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4 Due to our conclusion that the issue identified by counsel is not frivolous, 

we need not examine the record for additional non-frivolous issues. See 

Commonwealth v. Blauser, 166 A.3d 428, 434 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(requiring counsel to file merits brief due to a finding that one of the issues 

set forth in the Anders brief was not wholly frivolous; panel did not proceed 

to independently examine record for additional issues). We also note that 

our order directing a merits brief “does not represent sub silentio a 

conclusion that no other arguably meritorious issues exist.” 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 176 A.3d 355, 362 (Pa.Super. 2017).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/4/18