[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11445

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60059-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAUL ANTONIO ZAPATA CALDERON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(February 24, 2020)

Before GRANT, LUCK and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Raul Antonio Zapata Calderon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals 

the district court’s denial of his motion for early release under the Second Chance 

Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657, as amended by the First Step Act 

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194. Calderon contends the

district court erred in denying his motion because he met the revised criteria for 

early release. Additionally, Calderon asserts the district court’s denial was a 

violation of his Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. After 

review,1 we affirm the district court. 

The Second Chance Act requires the Attorney General “conduct a pilot 

program to determine the effectiveness of removing eligible elderly offenders . . . 

from Bureau of Prisons [BOP] facilities and placing [them] on home detention 

until the expiration of the prison term to which the offender was sentenced.” 34 

U.S.C. § 60541(g)(1)(A). In executing the program, the Second Chance Act 

provides that “the Attorney General may release some or all eligible elderly 

offenders . . . upon written request from either the [BOP] or an eligible elderly 

offender.” Id. § 60541(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 

The First Step Act amended aspects of the Second Chance Act relating to the 

fiscal years during which the program was to be carried out and the criteria for 

1

 We review a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. United States v. 

Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998). Questions of constitutional law are 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2013). 

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eligibility for removal for “elderly offenders.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, §§ 504, 603, 

132 Stat. 5194. No provision of the First Step Act altered the Second Chance 

Act’s language conferring the Attorney General with the discretionary authority to 

release an eligible elderly offender upon written request by the offender or the 

BOP. See generally id. 

The district court did not err in denying Calderon’s motion because it lacked 

jurisdiction to grant the relief he sought. Specifically, the Second Chance Act does 

not authorize a federal court to order the BOP to release a prisoner—the Act only 

states the Attorney General “may” release eligible elderly offenders. 34 U.S.C. 

§ 60541(g)(1)(B). Moreover, the Second Chance Act makes no mention of federal 

courts and does not grant any authority to the federal courts. The proper process 

for Calderon to seek relief was to file a request with the Warden, which he did. 

See id. The Warden’s response stated he was awaiting further guidance from the

BOP on how to implement the changes in the First Step Act. Thus, Calderon’s 

efforts with the Warden reflected the extent of the relief he could seek under the 

Second Chance Act. 

Additionally, Calderon’s argument the district court’s denial of his motion 

violated his equal protection and due process rights is unpersuasive, because the 

Supreme Court has held prisoners do not have a constitutional right to be released 

before the expiration of a valid sentence. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal 

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and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (stating there “is no constitutional or 

inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the 

expiration of a valid sentence”). Accordingly, we affirm.2

AFFIRMED. 

2

 We need not address the Government’s argument that Calderon does not meet certain

criteria in the Second Chance Act because that determination lies outside the district court’s 

jurisdiction. See 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g)(1)(B). Similarly, we need not address the district court’s 

alternative conclusions regarding Calderon moving for compassionate release as that issue was 

explicitly abandoned by Calderon in his brief on appeal. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 

874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed 

abandoned). 

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