### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 2, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP1591-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF3225 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT I

S TATE OF W ISCONSIN ,
P LAINTIFF -R ESPONDENT ,

V .
A SMAR M. Y OUNG ,
D EFENDANT -A PPELLANT .

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Kessler, Brennan and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).No. 2018AP1591-CR

2 ¶1 PER CURIAM. Asmar M. Young entered pleas to four crimes committed over five days. Young filed a postconviction motion to wi thdraw his pleas, arguing that: (1) his pleas were not knowingly and intelligent ly entered
because the circuit court failed to establish a factual bas is for one of the convictions; (2) his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent ly entered because (a) he was not advised of and did not understand the elem ents of the crimes and the maximum penalties, and (b) his original tr ial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising Young to enter the pleas, and by not adequately explaining the elements of the crimes and the maximum penaltie s; and (3) his replacement counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these issues in his presentencing plea withdrawal motion. The court denied Yo ung’s postconviction motion without a hearing. Young makes the same arguments on appeal. As we explain, we reject Young’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND
¶2 The criminal complaint described the following five crimes:

• On the afternoon of July 8, 2015, two men, Z.D. and D.S., were sitting in the front seat of a car when a male entered the car , pointed a pistol at them, and took the keys to the car, cash, and a c ell phone belonging to one of the men. A second male took a wristwatch from one of the men. A third male accompanied the other two. The t hree
males left in a red four-door car with tinted windows and a temporary license plate.

• At about midnight on July 9, 2015, Z.D. and D.S., who had been robbed on July 8, saw the same red four-door car with a temporar yNo. 2018AP1591-CR

3 license plate, followed the car, and were shot at by the same males
who had robbed them.

• At about 4:00 a.m. on July 9, 2015, L.A. (misidentified in the criminal complaint as L.J.) died of a single gunshot wound sustained as he drove away from two gunmen who had emerged from a red
four-door car with tinted windows and who had fired at him at close

range.

• On July 11, 2015, a male armed with a handgun robbed D.K. of his car keys and stole his car from an apartment complex parking lo t. A red car with a temporary license plate was seen in the c omplex at the
time of the theft and was located near the stolen car when the st olen
car was later recovered.

• On July 13, 2015, a video recording showed an altercation between Young and J.T. as Young left a gas station, and the video showed Young then shooting with a handgun at a car into which J.T. had withdrawn. Young was wearing a T-shirt with the logo “LRG” on the front and was accompanied by two minor females.
¶3 According to the criminal complaint, the two men robbed in their car on July 8 identified Young as one of the males who robbed them at gunpoint. Also according to the criminal complaint, D.K. told police that Young is his cousin and that, on the day D.K.’s car was stolen, Young came to his ap artment, told D.K. that D.K’s car window had been smashed, and stayed in the apartment while D.K. went to check on his car. At that point D.K.’s car was stolen at gunpoint as described above, and Young left when D.K. returned to the apartment.No. 2018AP1591-CR

4 ¶4 According to the criminal complaint, on July 16, 2015, law enforcement officers located Young inside a residence; he was wear ing a T-shirt with the logo “LRG” on the front; two minor females were present; and a 9 millimeter semi-automatic pistol was located in a couch. For ensic testing showed that the casing from that pistol matched the casings recovered from the scene of the shooting shortly after midnight on July 9, the scene of the shooting of L.A. at 4:00 a.m. on July 9, and the scene of the shooting of J.T. on July 13.
¶5 The State initially charged Young with two counts of armed robbe ry as a party to a crime for the July 8 robbery, one count of ar med robbery as a party to a crime for the July 11 stealing of the car, and first-degree r ecklessly endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon and possession of a fi rearm by a felon for the July 13 shooting. The State subsequently filed se veral amended informations, ultimately adding one count of first-degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime with use of a dangerous weapon for the July 9 shooting death of L.A. and three additional counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.
¶6 On the day the case was scheduled for trial, the parties told the circuit court that Young would enter pleas, and the court schedule d a plea hearing for two days later. At the plea hearing, Young pleaded no contest to one count of first-degree reckless homicide and guilty to one count of armed r obbery, one count of first-degree recklessly endangering safety, and one count of poss ession of a firearm by a felon.
¶7 Subsequently, Young told the circuit court he wanted to withdraw his pleas because his trial counsel pressured him into enteri ng the pleas. The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and Young’s replacement counsel fi led a motion to withdraw Young’s pleas. The court held a hearing at which Y oung andNo. 2018AP1591-CR

5 trial counsel testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Young’s plea withdrawal motion.
¶8 After a competency examination determined that Young was competent to proceed and was malingering, the case proceeded to sentencing.
¶9 Postconviction, Young’s competence was again evaluated and he was found competent to proceed. Young then filed a motion to withdraw hi s pleas, and the circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Young appeals.
¶10 We will relate additional facts, including details of the ple a hearing and the hearing on Young’s presentencing plea withdrawal motion, in the
discussion that follows.

DISCUSSION
¶11 Young argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea to the hom icide count as not knowingly and intelligently entered because the circuit court failed to establish a factual basis for his plea to that count. Young als o argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his argument that his plea s were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because: (1) he wa s not advised of and did not understand the elements of the crimes and the maximum pena lties; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising Young to enter the pleas and by not adequately explaining the elements of the crim es and the maximum penalties; and (3) replacement counsel provided ineffec tive assistance by failing to raise these issues in his presentencing plea withdrawal motion. We address and reject each argument in turn.No. 2018AP1591-CR

6 I. Failure to Establish Factual Basis for Homicide Plea 1

¶12 When a defendant moves to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing, “the defendant carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the [circuit court] should permit the defenda nt to withdraw the plea to correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Thomas , 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a circuit court fails to establish a factua l basis” for a plea, as required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 971.08(1)(b) (2017-18), 2 “manifest injustice has
occurred.” Thomas , 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶17. The establishment of a factual basis is necessary for a plea to be knowing and intelligent. See State v. Lackershire , 2007 WI 74, ¶¶34-35, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (stating that “establishing a factual basis under § 971.08(1)(b) is necessary for a valid plea” and “helps ensure that the defendant’s plea is knowing and intelligent” (citation omitt ed)). Pertinent here, establishing the factual basis for a plea means estab lishing “that a crime has been committed and it is probable that the defendant committed it.” State v. Payette , 2008 WI App 106, ¶7, 313 Wis. 2d 39, 756 N.W.2d 423.

1 This challenge implicates the circuit court’s duty in the plea colloquy to establish a factual basis for a plea. Challenges that a court has not fulfilled its plea colloquy duties are typically addressed under the analysis set forth in State v. Bangert , 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). However, our supreme court has acknowledged that “applying the Bangert procedure for failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement is a n awkward fit.” State v. Lackershire , 2007 WI 74, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23. Accordingly, we address Young’s factual -basis challenge in this section separately from the Bangert analysis that we apply to his other plea colloquy defect challenges in the section that follows.

2 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 971.08(1)(b) provides that before a court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall “[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it tha t the defendant in fact committed the crime charged.” All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2018AP1591-CR

7 ¶13 Here, the circuit court relied on the criminal complaint to es tablish the factual basis for the plea. “Whether the complaint alle ges sufficient facts to establish probable cause that [the defendant] committed the c rimes charged is a question of law which we review de novo .” Id. , ¶14. 3

¶14 Young does not argue that the criminal complaint contains insufficient facts to establish that the crime of first-degre e reckless homicide occurred. Rather, Young argues that there is no factual basis for t he homicide plea because the criminal complaint does not contain facts connecting Young to the homicide described in the criminal complaint. That is, Young argue s that the

3 As the parties note, in State v. Thomas , 2000 WI 13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836, the supreme court, in reviewing a factual-basis claim , stated, “A court’s decision to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter of discretion, s ubject to the erroneous exercise of discretion standard on review.” Id. , ¶13. However, the court in that case appeared to resolve the factual-basis claim as a matter of law based on its own independent review of the record:

We conclude ... that Thomas has not demonstrated the “manifest injustice” required to withdraw his guilty plea. A factual basis supporting the plea was established, because w hen the record is viewed under the totality of the circumstances, i t is evident that Thomas assented to the facts as his counsel stipulated to them. Since a proper factual basis was esta blished, the guilty plea does not result in manifest injustice.

Id. , ¶27. Independent review is consistent with the supreme cour t’s more recent statement in State v. Sulla , 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659, that:

When examining a defendant’s postconviction motion for plea withdrawal, we employ the following standard of review. “[W]hether a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea ‘on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defe ndant to relief’ and whether the record conclusively demonstrates t hat the defendant is entitled to no relief” are questions of law that we review de novo

. (citation omitted) (italics added). Accordingly, we proceed with de novo review here.No. 2018AP1591-CR

8 criminal complaint does not establish that “it is probable that the defendant
committed” the homicide. See id. , ¶7. The record refutes Young’s argument.
¶15 The criminal complaint here states the following. On the a fternoon of July 8, 2015, Young used a gun to rob Z.D. and D.S. and then left in a red fourdoor car with tinted windows and a temporary license plate. Lat er, around midnight, Young fired gunshots at Z.D. and D.S. from the same red four-door car with a temporary license plate. Still later, at 4:00 a.m. on July 9, 2015, two men emerged from a red four-door car with tinted windows and fatally sh ot L.A. Then, on July 13, 2015, Young fired a gun at J.T. and injured him. The same gun was used in each of the three shootings, and that gun was found on July 16, 2015, in the residence where Young was located.
¶16 These facts suffice to establish that it was probably Young who used the same gun to shoot at Z.D. and D.S. around midnight on July 9, to fatall y shoot L.A. around 4:00 a.m. on July 9, and to shoot J.T. on July 13. See id. (a sufficient factual basis requires a showing that the defendant probably co mmitted the crime, not that the defendant’s guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶17 On appeal, Young argues that the criminal complaint could not provide a factual basis for the plea because he was not charge d with the homicide in the criminal complaint, but was rather charged in the amended i nformation. However, Young cites no legal authority in support of his argument , and we need
not consider it further. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing,
Inc. , 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 (“Arguments unsupported by legal authority will not be considered, and we will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments.” (internal citation omitted) ). Moreover, the question is not whether the defendant was charged with the crime in the criminalNo. 2018AP1591-CR

9 complaint, but whether the facts in the complaint constitute the crime with which the defendant was ultimately charged and to which the defendant pl eaded. See
Lackershire , 301 Wis. 2d 418, ¶48 (“[f]actual basis cases typically involve the question of whether undisputed facts actually constitute the crim e charged” at the plea hearing).
¶18 In sum, Young fails to show the absence of a factual basis for his nocontest plea to first-degree reckless homicide.
II. Defective Plea Colloquy and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Coun sel
¶19 As stated, “When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty ple a after sentencing, he [or she] must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, tha t a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would result in ‘manif est injustice.’” State
v. Brown , 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (quoted source omitted). “One way for a defendant to meet this burden is to show t hat he [or she] did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea.” Id. (citations omitted).
¶20 A defendant may show that the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered under one of two lines of c ases: (1) the Bangert line of cases, State v. Bangert , 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), when the plea colloquy is defective; or (2) the Nelson/Bentley line of cases,
Nelson v. State , 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), and State v. Bentley , 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), when “some factor extrinsic to the ple a colloquy, like ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion, renders a plea infirm.”
State v. Howell , 2007 WI 75, ¶¶2, 74, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.No. 2018AP1591-CR

10 ¶21 Young argues that the circuit court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his ple as based on (1) the circuit court’s failure to inform him of the elements of and maximum penalties for the crimes, and (2) ineffective assistance of couns el. To warrant an evidentiary hearing, Young must satisfy the requirements of Bangert or Nelson/Bentley

. See id. , ¶24. We analyze Young’s first challenge to the validity of his pleas under Bangert , and his second challenge under Nelson/Bentley

. A. Young’s First Challenge—The Circuit Court Failed to Explain the El ements

and the Maximum Penalties of the Crimes
¶22 “A defendant may invoke Bangert only by alleging that the circuit court failed to fulfill its plea colloquy duties.” Id. , ¶27. The court’s duties include establishing that the defendant understands the elements and the maxim um penalties of the crimes. Bangert , 131 Wis. 2d at 267; Brown , 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35; W IS

. S TAT

. § 971.08(1)(a). 4 A Bangert motion warrants an evidentiary hearing if the defendant (1) shows specific defects in the plea colloquy and (2) “alleges that in fact the defendant did not know or understand the information that should have been provided at the plea colloquy.” Howell , 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶27; see also State v. Pegeese , 2019 WI 60, ¶26, __ Wis. 2d __, 928 N.W.2d 590. Whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Bangert motion is a question of law that we review independently. Howell , 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶¶30-31; Pegeese , __ Wis. 2d __, ¶17 (whether defendant has shown that the plea colloquy was deficient such that a plea hearing requirement was violated i s a question of law that this court reviews independently).

4 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 971.08(1)(a) provides that before a court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall determine that the plea is made “with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted.”No. 2018AP1591-CR

11 ¶23 Young alleges that the circuit court failed to explain, and that he did not understand, the elements and the maximum penalties of the cri mes. We resolve this appeal by addressing only the first Bangert prong, whether the court failed to meet its plea colloquy duties with respect to expl aining and ascertaining Young’s understanding of the elements and maximum penalties of th e crimes. See Pegeese , __ Wis. 2d __, ¶28 n.6 (addressing only whether the circuit court met its obligations in conducting the colloquy where the defendant alleged that he did not understand what he alleged the court did not adequately explain).
¶24 Young first alleges that the circuit court failed to explain a nd ascertain that he understood the elements of the crimes, but the r ecord shows to the contrary. Specifically, the plea colloquy transcript shows that the court read each element of each crime to Young and asked Young if he understood, and t hat each time, Young answered that he understood. Young also signed a ple a questionnaire that stated that his attorney had explained to him the elements that the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if he went to trial.
¶25 Young acknowledges that the circuit court explained the legal elements of the four crimes to which Young agreed to plead but argue s that the court’s explanation was too cursory to satisfy legal requirements . Young acknowledges that he indicated that he understood the elements of each c rime but argues that his mere answering each question “yeah” does not suffi ce to demonstrate that he understood the elements.
¶26 However, Young cites no legal support for the proposition that the circuit court must do more than what the court did here, namely, read each ele ment of each crime and obtain Young’s affirmation that he understood. A ccordingly,No. 2018AP1591-CR

12 we do not further consider his argument as to the elements of the crime. See
Industrial Risk Insurers , 318 Wis. 2d 148, ¶25.
¶27 Second, Young alleges that the circuit court failed to explain and ascertain that he understood the maximum penalties for each crim e, but the record refutes this argument as well. At the plea hearing, the court c orrectly told Young the maximum penalty for each crime, including any penalty enhanc ers, and Young told the court that he understood. In addition, the plea questionnaire tha t Young signed and that the court referenced at the plea hearing also i dentified the correct maximum penalties. Young fails to cite any legal authority sup porting the proposition that the court was required to do more, and, therefore , we do not further consider his argument as to the maximum penalties. See id.
¶28 In sum, the record establishes that the circuit court fully and correctly explained the elements and maximum penalties of the crimes, and Young fails to present any legal authority supporting the propositio n that the court was required to do more. Accordingly, Young is not entitled to an evidentiary he aring
on his Bangert

challenge.
B. Young’s Second Challenge—Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶29 A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Nelson/Bentley if the defendant’s motion fails to allege sufficient facts that , if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, or presents only conclus ory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to
relief. Howell , 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶75. This court reviews independently whether a defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea “‘on its face alleges fa cts which would entitle the defendant to relief,’ and whether the record conclusivel y demonstrates
that the defendant is entitled to no relief.” Id. , ¶78 (citation and footnote omitted).No. 2018AP1591-CR

13 ¶30 A Nelson/Bentley claim based on ineffective assistance requires a defendant to prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Bentley , 201
Wis. 2d at 311-12. If we determine that the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one of those two prongs, we need not examine the other. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). We resolve this appeal based on the deficient performance prong.
¶31 To prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that, unde r all of the circumstances, counsel’s specific acts or omiss ions fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. We review counsel’s strategic decisions with great deference, because a strong pres umption exists that counsel was reasonable in his or her performance. Id. at 689. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made t o eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspect ive at the
time.” Id. A defendant’s burden is to show that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the def endant by the
Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687.
¶32 “Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Maday , 2017 WI 28, ¶25, 374 Wis. 2d 164, 892 N.W.2d 611. The circuit court’s findings of fact will be uphel d unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “‘[T]he circumstances of the case and ... counsel’s conduct and strategy’ are considered findings of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, whether those facts constitute defi cient performance and whether such deficient performance was prejudicial are que stions of law that we review independently. State v. Kimbrough , 2001 WI App 138, ¶27, 246 Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752.No. 2018AP1591-CR

14 ¶33 Young argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assista nce by advising Young to enter the pleas and by not adequately explaining the elements of the crimes and the maximum penalties. We address and reject Young’s arguments in turn.

1. Improperly advising Young to enter the pleas
¶34 In Young’s postconviction motion, Young alleges that he told his trial counsel before the plea hearing that he wanted new repr esentation, and that counsel told him that he could seek new representation only after ent ering a plea. Young alleges that he then entered his pleas with the understanding tha t he could withdraw them after receiving a new attorney, but that the circ uit court denied the plea withdrawal motion filed by replacement counsel. Thus, Young alleges, trial counsel improperly advised him to enter the pleas.
¶35 Young testified as to these allegations in his presentencing p lea withdrawal motion, and after an evidentiary hearing on that motion the circuit court rejected Young’s testimony as not credible. Trial counsel testified that: counsel did not coerce Young into entering a plea; counsel told Young t hat no one could force him to enter a plea and he did not have to if he did not want to; Young “wanted to delay” entering a plea and they discussed Young’s concerns and “he ultimately decided to go ahead and enter the plea”; if Young had not wanted to proceed with the plea hearing they would not have proceeded; and Young “certainly knew what was happening” with respect to the plea hearing. The court found counsel’s testimony credible. Given the court’s findings of credi bility and fact at the presentencing plea withdrawal motion hearing, Young fai ls to show that trial counsel was deficient in advising him to enter the pleas and not withdrawing before the plea hearing.No. 2018AP1591-CR

15 2. Failure to adequately explain elements and maximum penalties
¶36 Young also alleges in his postconviction motion that his trial couns el failed to “adequately” explain the elements and maximum penalti es of the crimes and that he did not have enough time to ask trial counsel his questions a bout the elements and maximum penalties. However, Young does not identify wha t unanswered questions he had or what more trial counsel should have tol d him about the elements and maximum penalties. Thus, his motion fa ils to allege sufficient facts to “allow the reviewing court to meaningfully as sess [his] claim.”
See Bentley , 201 Wis. 2d at 314.
¶37 Moreover, the record refutes Young’s allegations. At the presentencing plea withdrawal motion hearing, Young testified gener ally that he did not understand what was going on in court but did not testify as to what specifically he did not understand, or that trial counsel failed to explain the elements and maximum penalties of the crimes to him. Young al so testified that he never read or signed the plea questionnaire that contained his signa ture. Trial counsel testified that Young did not tell him that Young did not understand any aspect of the plea proceedings, and that they met the day of the plea hearing for at least an hour discussing Young’s concerns. The circuit court found t hat trial counsel’s testimony was more credible than Young’s, that Young had me t with trial counsel at least five or six times before the plea hea ring, that Young signed the plea questionnaire as did counsel, and that Young understood the procee dings. The court also noted that Young had told the court at the plea heari ng that his plea was voluntary and knowing after discussing it with trial counsel. The circuit court found that “nothing interfered with [Young] entering the plea.”No. 2018AP1591-CR

16 ¶38 In sum, Young fails to show that he is entitled to a hearing on his
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Replacement Counsel
¶39 Finally, Young argues that replacement counsel provided ineffecti ve assistance by failing to raise all of the claims addressed above in the presentencing plea withdrawal motion, when the claims would have been reviewed under a more lenient standard. This allegation fails for two reasons. Firs t, replacement counsel did raise Young’s challenge to the plea colloquy as to the eleme nts of the crimes, as well as Young’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as to improperly coercing him to enter his pleas. Second, we have explained above why Young’s remaining claims—his claim of the lack of a factual basis for the plea, his challenge to the plea colloquy as to the maximum penalties, and hi s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel as to counsel’s explanation of the elements and maximum penalties—lack merit. Counsel is not deficient for fa iling to present
claims that we have determined to lack merit. See State v. Wheat , 2002 WI App 153, ¶14, 256 Wis. 2d 270, 647 N.W.2d 441 (“Failure to raise an issue of law i s not deficient performance if the legal issue is later determi ned to be without merit.”).
¶40 Accordingly, Young fails to show that he is entitled to a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of replacement counsel.

CONCLUSION
¶41 For the reasons stated, we affirm.
By the Court .—Judgment and order affirmed.No. 2018AP1591-CR

17 This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5.