PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOEL FRANCIS; ANTHONY ROMANO; 

KEVIN CLARK,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.  No. 08-1908 RODNEY GIACOMELLI; DAVID ENGEL;

STEPHEN MCMAHON; CARL

GUTBERLET; RALPH TYLER; MARTIN

O’MALLEY,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.

(1:07-cv-03034-WDQ)

Argued: September 23, 2009

Decided: December 2, 2009

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

Mark S. DAVIS, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Davis joined.
COUNSEL

Neal Marcellas Janey, Sr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Kathryn Widmayer Sullivan, BALTIMORE CITY

DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland; Matthew

Wade Nayden, BALTIMORE CITY SOLICITOR’S OFFICE,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we evaluate the legal sufficiency of a complaint, applying the standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937 (2009) — i.e., whether the complaint on its face

states plausible claims upon which relief can be granted.

Following highly public exchanges between Baltimore City

Mayor Martin O’Malley and Baltimore City Police Commissioner Kevin Clark about Clark’s performance as Commissioner, Mayor O’Malley terminated Commissioner Clark’s

employment, as well as the employment of two of his top deputies, Joel Francis and Anthony Romano. Mayor O’Malley

explained in a press conference that the eroding perception of

Commissioner Clark’s leadership had made it "impossible"

for Clark to remain Commissioner. Implementing the termination, the Mayor and Baltimore City Solicitor Ralph Tyler dispatched members of the Baltimore Police Department to the

Commissioner’s offices to retrieve from the Commissioner

and his deputies their badges, police identifications, firearms,

computers, and other official property, and to escort them

from the building.

Commissioner Clark promptly filed suit against Mayor

O’Malley and the City Council of Baltimore in state court,

2 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
seeking reinstatement and damages, based on an alleged violation of § 16-5(e) of the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (governing the removal of Police Commissioners)

and breach of contract. The Maryland Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that, despite Commissioner Clark’s contract

with the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, which authorized the Mayor to discharge the Commissioner without

cause, Clark had not been discharged in accordance with Baltimore City Public Local Law, which required cause. See

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Clark, 944 A.2d 1122

(Md. 2008).

In addition to his state suit, Commissioner Clark and his

deputies commenced this action, alleging that the Mayor, the

City Solicitor, and several members of the Baltimore City

Police Department violated their constitutional rights by seizing property from the Commissioner and his deputies and by

seizing them and removing them from Police Department

offices. Commissioner Clark and his deputies alleged that the

defendants’ conduct amounted to unreasonable searches and

seizures and to a deprivation of due process because they

were not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before

being removed from their positions. Finally, Commissioner

Clark and Francis, who are African-American, alleged that

their firings were racially motivated, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981.

By order dated July 16, 2008, the district court granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that the complaint did not state

plausible claims for relief and that, with respect to Commissioner Clark’s allegations that Mayor O’Malley denied Clark

due process, the Mayor was entitled to qualified immunity.

Reviewing the district court’s ruling de novo, we conclude

that based on the facts alleged in the complaint—taken in context and as true—the complaint fails to articulate any claim

for relief "that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 3
1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). We also conclude

that Mayor O’Malley, against whom the allegations of dueprocess violations were directed, is entitled to qualified

immunity. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

The facts in this case are stated in two pages of the complaint, but additional background facts and context are provided by further allegations sprinkled throughout the

complaint, as well as by allegations of the same events made

in the state court complaint. While we evaluate only the allegations of the complaint in this federal case when considering

the district court’s ruling dismissing it, we nonetheless understand them in the context of the facts alleged in the state court

complaint and restated by the Maryland Court of Appeals in

Clark, 944 A.2d 1122, which the plaintiffs concede is the

proper context in which to consider plaintiffs’ allegations in

this case. When questioned by the court during oral argument,

plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that the events described in the

complaint were the same events underlying the state court litigation.

As background, Commissioner Clark alleged in state court

that he was "induced" to leave his high-ranking and prestigious position as a Commander in the New York City Police

Department to become the Baltimore City Police Commissioner. Clark entered into a contract with Baltimore City, entitled "Police Commissioner Memorandum of Understanding,"

which provided that he would hold his appointment for a term

expiring June 30, 2008. He was thereafter confirmed as Police

Commissioner by the Baltimore City Council. The Memorandum of Understanding between Commissioner Clark and Baltimore City provided:

Either party may terminate this contract at any time,

by giving forty-five (45) days prior written notice to

the other. Notwithstanding the above sentence the

4 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
provisions of Section 2B [relating to additional compensation/severance pay] remain in force.

After Commissioner Clark took office, he and Mayor

O’Malley exchanged letters and accusations relating to a

domestic relations problem involving Commissioner Clark

and Clark’s internal investigation into Baltimore City Police

Department activities, and the exchanges became public.

Mayor O’Malley thereupon terminated Commissioner Clark’s

employment, and City Solicitor Tyler provided Clark with a

letter of termination, dated November 10, 2004, which stated:

This notice is sent on behalf of the Mayor and City

Council of Baltimore (the "City") pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between you and the City dated

February 19, 2003. This notice shall serve as the

City’s 45-day notice of termination of your employment. Thus, your employment shall terminate 45

days from today. However, as the Mayor announced

this morning, you have been relieved of all official

duties as of 8:30 a.m., November 10, 2004, and

therefore, your further access, if any, to Police

Department facilities, equipment, or documents will

be subject to the specific, prior authorization of Acting or Interim Police Commissioner Hamm.

The complaint in this case focuses on the facts relating to

how Mayor O’Malley effected Commissioner Clark’s discharge. It alleges that members of the Baltimore City Police

Department, "with the assistance of over 50 additional and

heavily armed members of the [Baltimore City Police Department] including all S.W.A.T. Team members, broke into and

entered, and directed other members of the [Baltimore City

Police Department] to break into and enter, the executive

offices of Clark, Francis and Romano on the premises of the

[Baltimore City Police Department]. They ransacked desks,

credenzas and file cabinets. They seized and removed files,

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 5
papers, documents, computers and other personal property in

the lawful possession and custody of Plaintiffs." The complaint also alleges that members of the Baltimore City Police

Department seized the plaintiffs themselves, ordering them

"to remove or surrender their weapons, badges, identification

cards and other items of personal property lawfully in the possession of Plaintiffs during the periods of detention." Finally,

the complaint alleges that these acts "were committed either

on the instructions of defendants O’Malley and Tyler, or with

the knowledge and consent of defendants O’Malley and

Tyler, or were thereafter approved and ratified by defendants

O’Malley and Tyler."

Resting on these factual allegations, the complaint purports

to state four claims in four counts. Count I alleges that the

plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated insofar as the searches of the plaintiffs’ offices and the

seizures of the plaintiffs and their personal property were not

justified by any criminal charges or any warrant and were,

therefore, unreasonable. In Count II, Clark and Francis, who

are African-American, claim conclusorily that they were

removed from their offices and terminated from their positions because of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Romano, who is white, is not a party to this count. In Count

III, the plaintiffs complain that they were denied due process

insofar as their employment was terminated without prior

notice and a prior hearing. (Only Commissioner Clark appeals

the dismissal of this claim.) Finally, in Count IV, the plaintiffs

allege conclusorily that the defendants conspired to violate

their civil rights based on the acts otherwise alleged, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.

6 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
II

Commissioner Clark and his deputies contend on appeal

that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion

to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

arguing that such a motion must be denied unless "‘it is clear

that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the [well-pleaded] allegations’ in the Complaint," quoting from Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).1 They assert further

that it was error to dismiss a complaint alleging civil rights

violations unless it appears "to a certainty that the plaintiff[s]

would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which

might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged," quoting

from Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The defendants contend that "[b]ecause the Complaint in

this case is short on facts and long on legal conclusions, the

district court correctly granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6)," citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.

A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal

sufficiency of a complaint, Jordan v. Alternative Resources

Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006), considered with the

assumption that the facts alleged are true, Eastern Shore Mkts,

Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.

2000). And the legal sufficiency of a complaint is measured

by whether it meets the standards for a pleading stated in Rule

8 (providing general rules of pleading), Rule 9 (providing

rules for pleading special matters), Rule 10 (specifying pleading form), Rule 11 (requiring the signing of a pleading and

stating its significance), and Rule 12(b)(6) (requiring that a

1The standard that the plaintiffs quoted from Swierkiewicz, however,

was explicitly overruled in Twombly. 550 U.S. at 562-63 (noting that this

standard, first articulated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),

"has earned its retirement"). 

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 7
complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

This appeal reduces to the single question of whether the

complaint in this case meets these standards.

Even though the requirements for pleading a proper complaint are substantially aimed at assuring that the defendant be

given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being made

against him, they also provide criteria for defining issues for

trial and for early disposition of inappropriate complaints. See

5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure, § 1202, at 88 (3d ed. 2004). Overlooking the

broad range of criteria stated in the Federal Rules for a proper

complaint, some have suggested that the Federal Rules, when

adopted in 1938, simply created a "notice pleading" scheme,

pointing for support to Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only "a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief," and Rule 8(d)(1), which provides

that "[n]o technical form [for stating allegations] is required."

But the "notice pleading" characterization may itself be too

simplistic, failing to recognize the many other provisions

imposing requirements that permit courts to evaluate a complaint for sufficiency early in the process. Rule 8 itself

requires a showing of entitlement to relief. Rule 9 requires that

allegations of fraud, mistake, time, place, and special damages

be specific. Rule 11 requires that the pleading be signed and

provides that the signature "certifies" (1) that the claims in the

complaint are not asserted for collateral purposes; (2) that the

claims asserted are "warranted"; and (3) that the factual contentions "have evidentiary support." And Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss any complaint that does not state a

claim "upon which relief can be granted." The aggregation of

these specific requirements reveals the countervailing policy

that plaintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only

when their complaints are justified by both law and fact.

In recent years, with the recognized problems created by

"strike suits," see 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

8 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
Procedure, § 1296, at 46 & n.9,2

 and the high costs of frivolous litigation, the Supreme Court has brought to the forefront

the Federal Rules’ requirements that permit courts to evaluate

complaints early in the process. Thus, in Iqbal, the Court

stated that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’" 129 S. Ct. at

1949 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate

more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully." Id. It requires the plaintiff to articulate facts,

when accepted as true, that "show" that the plaintiff has stated

a claim entitling him to relief, i.e., the "plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

To emphasize the Federal Rules’ requirements for stating

claims that are warranted and therefore form a plausible basis

for relief, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint must

contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To discount such unadorned conclusory allegations, "a court considering a motion to dismiss

can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. This approach

recognizes that "naked assertions" of wrongdoing necessitate

some "factual enhancement" within the complaint to cross

"the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

2A "strike suit" is an action making largely groundless claims to justify

conducting extensive and costly discovery with the hope of forcing the

defendant to settle at a premium to avoid the costs of the discovery. See

id.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a strike

suit as one "based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or

as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement"). 

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 9
At bottom, determining whether a complaint states on its

face a plausible claim for relief and therefore can survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion will "be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not

‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’" as

required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (alteration in

original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

The Court noted that even though Rule 8 "marks a notable

and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors

of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id.

With these principles in hand, we now turn to the complaint

in this case to determine whether, on its face, it states a plausible claim for relief.

III

Count I of the complaint, where the plaintiffs most fully

articulate a claim, alleges that members of the Baltimore City

Police Department, under the direction of Mayor O’Malley

and City Solicitor Tyler, "broke into and entered" the Police

Commissioner’s offices, seized personal property, and "detained, held in custody and seized" the Police Commissioner

and his deputies while ordering them to "surrender their

weapons, badges, identification cards" and similar property —

all without the benefit of criminal charges or a warrant. The

complaint concludes that this conduct violated the plaintiffs’

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Considered in their context, these allegations describe the

conduct of Mayor O’Malley taken in furtherance of his decision to terminate the plaintiffs’ employment, directing mem10 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
bers of the Baltimore City Police Department to seize police

department property and escort the plaintiffs from the police

building. The plaintiffs’ complaint filed in state court somewhat fleshes this out, asserting that members of the Baltimore

City Police Department ordered the plaintiffs to surrender

their firearms and to clean out their desks of personal belongings and escorted them out of the building in relieving them

of their commands. And after they were physically removed,

the Mayor announced to the public:

For the good of this department and for crime reduction, I have relieved Commissioner Clark of his

command effective as of 8:30 this morning. . . .

Leadership involves the important element of perception and when that perception of leadership is

eroded it makes it impossible for that leader to continue on.

The Mayor also announced that he had appointed Leonard

Hamm as "Acting Police Commissioner."

Taking the facts in the complaint as true, we agree with the

district court that Count I nonetheless fails to set forth a plausible claim for relief. While the Commissioner and his deputies conclusorily alleged that the searches and seizures

violated their constitutional rights because no charges had

been filed against them, nor had any warrant issued, their

complaint did not allege that the defendants were engaged in

a law-enforcement effort. Indeed, the facts show to the contrary, that the defendants’ actions against the plaintiffs were

employment actions based on the Mayor’s perceived right to

fire the Police Commissioner without cause, as stated in the

Memorandum of Understanding between Commissioner

Clark and Baltimore City.

In O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723-26 (1987), the

Supreme Court held that special needs authorize warrantless

searches involving public employees for work-related reaFRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 11
sons. Noting that public employees’ expectations of privacy

are diminished for legitimate work-related reasons, the Court

approved a balancing test under which government interests

are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of

privacy. Id. at 717, 719-20. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,

which are related to law enforcement.

The plaintiffs’ complaint relies on the allegations that no

criminal charges had been filed and no warrant had issued in

order to state a violation of the Fourth Amendment. But this

assertion is both conclusory and erroneous, especially when

the complaint itself does not allege that the searches and seizures were law-enforcement related. On the contrary, the

complaint suggests throughout that the searches and seizures

were taken in furtherance of Mayor O’Malley’s employment

action of firing Commissioner Clark.

Whether he was authorized to do so, the Mayor purported

to terminate the employment of the Police Commissioner and

his deputies, and in furtherance of that decision retrieved government property and escorted the plaintiffs from their

offices. The plaintiffs allege nowhere that these actions were

inconsistent with the Mayor’s efforts to terminate the plaintiffs’ employment. Indeed, it is common practice for an

employer to take the employer’s property away from discharged employees and to deny them access to the place of

employment. While it is readily recognizable that Baltimore

City has an interest in protecting Baltimore City Police

Department property and in removing discharged employees

from the Department’s offices, the complaint fails to allege

any countervailing privacy interests that would outweigh the

City’s interests. Rather, the complaint relies simply on the

absence of any charges or any warrant, which is irrelevant in

the factual context of the complaint.

Commissioner Clark maintains that the Mayor did not have

authority to terminate the Police Commissioner’s employ12 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
ment, an allegation with which the Maryland Court of

Appeals agreed in part, see Clark, 944 A.2d at 1131-35, but

that fact does not change the Fourth Amendment analysis.

The fact that the Court of Appeals determined that Clark’s firing was inconsistent with the Public Local Law of Baltimore

City does not alone support the claim that the searches and

seizures conducted in connection with the Mayor’s effort to

terminate Clark’s employment violated the Fourth Amendment. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001)

(affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging an illegal

Fourth Amendment seizure during questioning concerning

federal employment misconduct).

In short, we conclude that Count I does not on its face state

a plausible claim for relief.

IV

Count II of the complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated against Commissioner Clark and Deputy Francis

because of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). But

the only factual allegations asserted in support of this count

are (1) that Commissioner Clark and Deputy Francis are

African-American males; (2) that the defendants are all white

males; and (3) that the defendants have never initiated or

undertaken the actions of terminating employment and physically removing the employee against white members of the

Police Department.

These allegations are not only conclusory and insufficient

to state a § 1981 claim, see Jordan, 458 F.3d at 345, they are

patently untrue, given that Deputy Romano, who is not

alleged to be within a protected class, complained of the exact

same treatment in every other count of the complaint, belying

any claim of discriminatory treatment.3See Johnson v.

3While the complaint alleges that the defendants "discriminated against

Plaintiffs on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,"

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 13
Caudill, 475 F.3d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 2007); Booth v.

Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003). The allegations

in this count are nothing more than the sort of unadorned allegations of wrongdoing to which Twombly and Iqbal are

directed. We thus conclude that Count II does not on its face

state a plausible claim for relief.

V

In Count III, the plaintiffs allege that Mayor O’Malley and

City Solicitor Tyler "deprived Plaintiffs of their protected

property interest without due process as guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment" because they were not given prior

notice and a prior hearing to challenge their dismissals.

The district court dismissed the claim on the ground that

Mayor O’Malley enjoyed qualified immunity insofar as it was

not well-established on November 10, 2004, that the plaintiffs

had any property interest in their employment. The court also

concluded that, with respect to City Solicitor Tyler, the only

allegation that could be made was that Tyler had "provided

legal advice to Mayor O’Malley on Clark’s termination" and

therefore he could not be responsible for the authority exercised by Mayor O’Malley. Only Clark appeals this portion of

the district court’s ruling.

We agree with the district court. Mayor O’Malley fired

Commissioner Clark in accordance with the Memorandum of

Understanding, which provided that the Mayor could discharge Clark without cause, thus indicating to the Mayor that

it only asserts that Clark and Francis "are African-American males," making no similar assertion about Romano. In Count II, where Clark and Francis allege a more particularized § 1981 claim based on racial

discrimination, only Clark and Francis are plaintiffs. The complaint thus

fails to allege that Romano is a member of a protected class. The defendants assert further in their brief, as they asserted in their motion to dismiss filed in the district court, that Romano is white, an assertion accepted

by the district court and not disputed by the plaintiffs. 

14 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
Clark had no assurances of continued employment so as to

give him a property interest in his employment. Although it

is true that the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided, over

three years later, that the Memorandum of Understanding was

subservient to the requirements of the Public Local Law of

Baltimore City, at the time that Mayor O’Malley fired Commissioner Clark, no law or decision had determined that the

contract between Clark and the City of Baltimore was not

enforceable.

Qualified immunity applies when the constitutional right

alleged to have been violated is not "clearly established."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). For a

right to be clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Preexisting law must

demonstrate the unlawfulness of the act to the government

official. Id. The denial of qualified immunity does not depend

on the "very action in question" having been found unlawful,

but it does require that "in the light of preexisting law the

unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. Moreover, we have held

that for purposes of qualified immunity, executive actors cannot be required to predict how the courts will resolve legal

issues. See Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 578-79 (4th

Cir. 2003).

In this case, it could not have been apparent to Mayor

O’Malley that his firing of Commissioner Clark was not

authorized by law until the Maryland Court of Appeals

handed down its decision in Clark in March 2008, over three

years after he fired Commissioner Clark. Because his actions

were not clearly unlawful when performed, Mayor O’Malley

is entitled to qualified immunity.

VI

In Count IV, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights, in violation of 42

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 15
U.S.C. § 1985. The count makes no other allegations and contains no facts to support the conspiracy alleged.

To plead a violation of § 1985, the plaintiffs must demonstrate with specific facts that the defendants were "motivated

by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus

to [ ] deprive the plaintiff[s] of the equal enjoyment of rights

secured by the law to all." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370,

1376 (4th Cir. 1995). Since the allegation in Count IV

amounts to no more than a legal conclusion, on its face it fails

to assert a plausible claim. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir.

1992) (en banc) (requiring plaintiffs alleging unlawful intent

in conspiracy claims under § 1985 to "plead specific facts in

a non-conclusory fashion to survive a motion to dismiss").

VII

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court abused

its discretion in denying them an opportunity to amend their

complaint.

In their papers opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

the plaintiffs included the following concluding statement: "In

the event that this Honorable Court decides to grant all or part

of the Motion, Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to amend

or to file an amended complaint." The plaintiffs filed no separate motion, and they attached no proposed amendment or

statement indicating how they might wish to amend their

complaint. Thus, their statement did not inform the court as

to what amendment was being sought.

Local Rule 103.6 of the District of Maryland requires that

a party requesting leave to amend provide a copy of the proposed amendment to the court. By violating this Rule, the

plaintiffs failed to provide the district court with a means by

which to determine whether the amendment would cure the

defects in the initial complaint. In the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fail16 FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI
ing to give the plaintiffs a blank authorization to "do over"

their complaint.

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint in context and as

true, we conclude that the complaint does not state any claim

for relief that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

FRANCIS v. GIACOMELLI 17