1

Filed 7/5/22 In re C.J. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re C.J., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164646

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J21-00140)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

C.J. (Father), father of minor C.J., appeals from orders denying his 

petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3882 and terminating 

his parental rights under 366.26. Father’s sole contention on appeal is that 

the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) 

1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California 

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia

(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)

2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

failed to comply with its duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C., 

§ 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and related California law (§ 224 et seq.) to conduct an 

initial inquiry into whether C.J. was an Indian child.

C.J. was the subject of an April 2021 dependency petition alleging he 

was at risk of serious physical harm due to the chronic substance abuse of his 

mother, T.H. (Mother). (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Mother indicated in her ICWA020 form that she had no Indian ancestry. Father did not complete an ICWA020 form and indicated that he did not know if he had Indian ancestry. 

Based on these statements from the parents, the Bureau recommended in its 

disposition report that the juvenile court find that ICWA does not apply. At 

the June 2021 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found 

that C.J. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and 

that “there is no reason to believe or know the child is an Indian child and 

ICWA does not apply.” After further proceedings, the juvenile court denied 

Father’s section 388 petition requesting reunification services and terminated 

Mother and Father’s parental rights.

3

On appeal, Father contends the Bureau did not comply with its duty to 

conduct an initial inquiry into whether C.J. was an Indian child because the 

Bureau failed to inquire with extended family members, such as paternal 

grandmother and maternal great aunt, both of whom were in contact with 

the Bureau during the proceedings. In a responsive letter, the Bureau 

concedes “there is not a record of a proper initial ICWA inquiry regrading 

C.J.” Accordingly, the Bureau does not oppose a conditional reversal and 

remand to permit ICWA compliance.

3 The Bureau’s section 366.26 hearing report discussed no further 

inquiries regarding C.J.’s possible Indian heritage and merely repeated the 

juvenile court’s inapplicability finding made at the jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. 
3

ICWA and related California law require notice to be given to relevant 

Indian tribes of the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights 

to, an Indian child where the juvenile court knows or has reason to know that 

an Indian child is involved. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5; see 25 

U.S.C. § 1912(a), § 224.3, subd. (a).) “Because it typically is not self-evident 

whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate 

certain inquiries to be made in each case. These requirements are sometimes 

collectively referred to as the duty of initial inquiry.” (In re Benjamin M. 

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741.)

Under state law, juvenile courts and child welfare agencies are “under 

‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may 

be an Indian child.’ ” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290, citing 

§ 224.2, subds. (a)–(c).) The duty of initial inquiry requires the agency to ask 

“the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting 

child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and 

where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 244.2, 

subd. (b).) “If the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or the agency ‘reason 

to believe’ that an Indian child is involved, then the juvenile court and the 

agency have a duty to conduct ‘further inquiry’ [citation], and if the court or 

the agency has ‘reason to know’ an Indian child is involved, ICWA notices 

must be sent to the relevant tribes.” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at p. 742.) The agency “must on an ongoing basis include in its 

filings a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has 

undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s Indian 

status.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)
4

We conclude the juvenile court’s finding of ICWA inapplicability is not 

supported by substantial evidence. While the record reflects that Father and 

Mother were asked about Indian ancestry, the record does not disclose any 

further and ongoing efforts by the Bureau to discharge its duty of initial 

inquiry in compliance with ICWA and state law, and the Bureau’s reports did 

not include “detailed description[s]” of any inquiries made of extended family 

members, such as paternal grandmother and maternal great aunt. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1), (5).) Furthermore, the record fails to 

affirmatively show that the juvenile court asked the Bureau to describe its 

efforts to ascertain C.J.’s possible Indian ancestry. Thus, the juvenile court 

did not meet its duty to ensure the Bureau adequately investigated C.J.’s 

possible Indian ancestry before finding ICWA inapplicable. (See In re J.C.

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 79–80 [although parents’ ICWA-020 forms stated 

no known Indian ancestry and one parent told agency she had no Indian 

ancestry, juvenile court did not meet its ICWA duty where it did not ask 

whether agency made relevant ICWA inquiry of extended family members 

and did not ask agency to describe its efforts to ascertain child’s ancestry].) 

This was reversible error. (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 432, 

435 [where agency fails to discharge its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA 

and California law and juvenile court finds ICWA does not apply, error is “in 

most circumstances” prejudicial and reversible].)

DISPOSITION

The orders denying Father’s section 388 petition and terminating 

parental rights are conditionally reversed, and the case is remanded to the 

juvenile court with directions to order the Bureau to comply with the inquiry 

(and if appropriate, notice) provisions of ICWA and state law. If, after 

compliance with the law, the court finds that ICWA does not apply, the 
5

orders shall be immediately reinstated. If, on the other hand, the court finds 

there is reason to believe or know that C.J. is an Indian child, the court shall 

conduct a new section 366.26 hearing, as well as further proceedings

(including giving notice to the relevant tribes), in compliance with ICWA and 

state law.

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Petrou, J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

In re C.J. (A164646)