NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2021 IL App (3d) 190063

Order filed December 7, 2021

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2021 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

NISSAN S. BLAKES, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Peoria County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-19-0063 

Circuit No. 17-CF-493 

Honorable 

Paul P. Gilfillan, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Trial court properly considered the mitigating factors attendant to juvenile 

defendant’s youth in imposing a 25-year sentence. 

(2) Defendant’s postplea proceeding met the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 

604(d) notwithstanding counsel’s failure to include arguments in the written 

postplea motion that she eventually made at the hearing. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Nissan S. Blakes, pled guilty to aggravated battery and was sentenced to 25 

years in prison for an offense he committed when he was 16 years old. On direct appeal, he argues 

that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence by failing to consider the 
2 

mitigating factors attendant to his youth, as required by statute, and that his post-plea proceeding 

failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)), 

attempted first degree murder (id. § 8-4(a); § 9-1(A)(1)), and unlawful possession of a firearm (id.

§ 24-3.1(a)(2)). The indictment alleged that on June 1, 2017, defendant personally discharged a 

firearm at LaShawn Jones, causing great bodily harm to Jones, with the intent to kill him. 

Defendant was 16 years old at the time. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery, a Class X 

felony with a sentencing range of 6-30 years (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(h) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-25(a) (West 2016)), and the State agreed to dismiss all other charges. 

¶ 5 At the plea hearing, the factual basis presented by the State established that on June 1, 

2017, Detective Dave Smith responded to 1106 McClure on a call of a male shot in the chest. In 

front of the house near the sidewalk, officers were treating Jones for a gunshot wound to the base 

of his neck. Jones stated that defendant shot him. He was transported to the hospital where he again 

identified defendant as the shooter. While investigating the scene, Smith noticed bullet holes in a 

storm door on the front of the house, as well as holes through the main door. Smith recovered a 

fingerprint from the handle of the storm door, which was later identified as belonging to defendant. 

¶ 6 The factual basis also provided that, if called, Smith would testify that during his interview, 

defendant initially said he had nothing to do with the shooting but then stated that other individuals 

made him go to Jones’s house with them. Defendant told Smith that when he opened the door, 

someone fired shots over his shoulder, one of which hit Jones. Smith asked defendant what the 

motive was for shooting Jones, and defendant indicated that there was a $6,000 bounty on Jones’s 
3 

head that was “put out by some south end gang members.” The defense agreed to the factual basis, 

and the trial court accepted the plea. 

¶ 7 The presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that defendant had a history of 

juvenile misconduct. In December 2012, he was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of felony 

residential burglary and received two years’ probation. In 2013, he was adjudicated delinquent for 

committing residential burglary and aggravated robbery and was placed in a residential home for 

juveniles with 30 months’ probation. He violated probation by running away from the home. In 

December 2016, he committed a Class A misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of firearm 

ammunition and was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation for one year, ending on 

February 23, 2018. 

¶ 8 The PSI included a report from Peoria Public Schools District No. 150. It demonstrated 

that defendant had numerous conduct violations while attending high school. The report indicated 

that defendant had last attended 10th grade during the 2017 school year but dropped out before the 

end of the year. Defendant had behavioral issues in grade school as well. Beginning in 2010, 

defendant was disciplined, expelled, or suspended for various reasons, including acts of 

aggression, threats, bullying, trespassing, bringing a weapon to school (a BB gun), reckless 

conduct, insubordination, using inappropriate language, class disruption, disrespect, gang activity, 

cutting class, lying, dress code violations, and tardiness. In addition, both defendant’s mother and 

his father had criminal records. Defendant was a victim of physical abuse by his mother when he 

was a baby. He was raised by his father and his grandmother because his natural mother was “in 

and out of jail.” Defendant’s mother was not involved in his life until he was seven years old. He 

said his mother was his “best friend” and his father was “like a brother.” He stated that his father 

was his role model. 
4 

¶ 9 The PSI noted that following defendant’s juvenile adjudications, he was placed in 

Kemmerer Village, a juvenile home for teenagers. While in custody, defendant was diagnosed with 

oppositional defiant disorder and moderate attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He was 

prescribed medication and participated in individual and psychotherapeutic counseling weekly 

until he was discharged. He was referred to the Children’s Home for services but did not participate 

in any further counseling. 

¶ 10 According to the PSI intake officer, defendant only took “partial blame for the offense.” 

During his interview, defendant stated that it should not have happened because guns were not 

supposed to be involved. He claimed he was “just selling weed to a person” and that he was not 

there when it happened. He said he wanted to see his daughter again, and he hoped to be sentenced 

to 13 years or less. 

¶ 11 At sentencing, the court stated that the sentencing range for a Class X felony was 6 to 30 

years, with 85% of the sentence to be served. The State argued that, even in light of new sentencing 

legislation for juvenile offenders, defendant deserved a severe sentence. It emphasized the 

aggravating factors, including that defendant initially denied involvement and that he was 

motivated by money and requested a sentence at or near the maximum.

¶ 12 In mitigation, defense counsel urged the court to consider defendant’s unstable upbringing, 

his lack of a positive role models, and the need for emotional support. She reminded the court that 

the victim in this case survived the incident and that defendant was already punished for this 

offense by being charged as an adult. She requested a sentence of eight to ten years. 

¶ 13 Neither the State nor the defense presented evidence in aggravation or mitigation. In 

allocution, defendant stated that he took “full responsibility for what [he] did.”
5 

 Initially, the trial court stated that it had considered the PSI, counsels’ arguments, and the 

defendant’s statement in allocution, as well as the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, 

the history and character of the defendant, and the circumstances and nature of the offense. It then 

noted that several factors in aggravation weighed heavily against the defendant, including the 

threat of serious physical harm despite the victim’s recovery, defendant’s history of prior 

delinquency and criminal activity, and his failure to complete counseling and services that 

provided tools for rehabilitation. 

¶ 14 In mitigation, the court made the following statement: 

“In terms of factors in mitigation. I don’t find many, if any, that apply. I will count on

one that doesn’t apply. As a trial court, I’ll comment on the factor in mitigation that doesn’t 

apply at my discretion. And the factor of the defendant’s criminal conduct was a result of 

circumstances unlikely to occur and needs to be underscored. That does not apply in this 

case. You are headed down a torturous path of unlawful activity. This was the highlight.

 *** 

 Maybe it’s because you’re a juvenile. Maybe it’s because the Supreme Court of the 

country, let alone the state, requires us to consider as additional factors in mitigation in 

determining an appropriate sentence your youthful age. Everyone recognizes, as does this 

Court, a 16-year-old’s impetuosity, lack of complete maturity, and full brain development, 

peer pressure in doing things with others that you’d never do on your own, arguably not to 

this extent. Your family background. You lived it. I [sic] doesn’t look good on paper. That 

could have some impact on why you chose to do what you did. Your potential for 

rehabilitation is arguably better than a hardened 35-year-old criminal.
6 

So, I want it known that I’ve specifically taken into account those juvenile factors that 

now must be in sentencing of this type.”

The trial court then sentenced defendant to 25 years in the Department of Corrections, finding that 

such a term was appropriate and consistent with the ends of justice and necessary to deter others 

from similar acts. 

¶ 15 Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence and withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his 

sentence was excessive and the court failed to properly weigh the factors in mitigation and 

aggravation. Defendant also claimed that the court failed to properly consider the factors relative 

to sentencing a juvenile. In defendant’s written motion, counsel stated that she had requested the 

transcripts and would review them and consult with defendant in compliance with Supreme Court 

Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 16 Five months later, counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. It confirmed that she had met 

with defendant, that she had examined the trial court file and report of proceedings in the plea 

hearing and in the sentencing hearing, and that she had made “any amendments to the motion 

necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in the proceedings.” Counsel did not file an 

amended motion. At the hearing, counsel argued that defendant’s plea should be withdrawn 

because he was pressured into taking it based on his fear that prosecutors might offer Jones a deal 

to testify against him. She also argued that defendant’s sentence was excessive and that the trial 

court inappropriately emphasized defendant’s school disciplinary records.

¶ 17 In denying the motion, the court stated that the additional statutory factors for sentencing 

a juvenile had been considered. The court noted that it evaluated defendant’s school records and 

the PSI specifically in consideration of those factors. It also emphasized that defendant’s crime 

was “horrendous” and “but for an inch here or there, the victim could have died and [defendant] 
7 

would be facing murder charges.” The court concluded that it decided not to impose the maximum 

sentence of 30 years in consideration of defendant’s youth.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 A. Mitigating Sentencing Factors

¶ 20 Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to consider 

the mitigating factors attendant to his youth as required by section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified 

Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016)). 

¶ 21 A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's sentencing decision absent an abuse of 

discretion. People v. Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 130438, ¶ 134. The trial court abuses its discretion 

when its decision is “fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person 

would agree with it.” People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137 (2004). A sentence within the 

appropriate sentencing range is generally accorded great deference. People v. Colon, 2018 IL App 

(1st) 160120, ¶ 65. Where, as here, the defendant's sentence falls within the prescribed statutory 

limits, the reviewing court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the sentence is greatly at 

variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the offense. 

People v. Means, 2017 IL App (1st) 142613, ¶ 14.

¶ 22 Here, the sentencing range for the offense of aggravated battery was 6 to 30 years. 

Defendant’s 25-year sentence falls within that range and was not a de facto life sentence. See 

People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36. The trial court considered the factors in aggravation and 

mitigation, and defendant’s sentence is presumed to be proper. We will not reweigh the factors or 

substitute our judgment for the trial court’s because we would have weighed them differently. See 

People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 20. 
8 

¶ 23 Alternatively, defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him because it failed to “meaningfully consider” the additional mitigating factors for juvenile 

defendants announced in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, and codified in section 5-4.5-105(a) 

of the Code.

¶ 24 The United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., 

amend. VIII. Inherent to the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is 

the concept of proportionality. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 33. Proportionality concerns are 

heightened when it comes to children. In the case of a juvenile offender accused of a serious 

offense, “there is a genuine risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. Thus, the United States 

Supreme Court has advised that, for purposes of sentencing, juveniles are constitutionally different 

from adults. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). Compared to adult offenders, 

juvenile offenders have less moral culpability and greater rehabilitative potential. Id.; see also 

People v. Luna, 2020 IL App (2d) 121216-B, ¶ 21. They lack maturity, have a higher vulnerability 

to negative influences and outside pressures, and exhibit impulsive and impetuous characteristics.

Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 16 

¶ 25 The Illinois Supreme Court has considered the effects of Miller v. Alabama and has held 

that both mandatory and discretionary juvenile sentences violate constitutional rights unless the 

sentencing court considers, as mitigation, “a juvenile defendant’s youth and its attendant 

characteristics.” Id. ¶ 36 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 45-46). In Holman, the court listed 

several mitigation factors that should be considered in addressing the characteristics of youth.

Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 45-46. Our legislature has since codified those factors in the 

sentencing statute. Section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code now provides that when a person commits an 
9 

offense and is under the age of 18, the trial court must consider the following additional factors in 

mitigation in determining an appropriate sentence: 

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including 

the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive 

or developmental disability, or both, if any;

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial 

pressure, or negative influences;

(3) the person's family, home environment, educational and social background, including 

any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;

(4) the person's potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

(6) the person's degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the level 

of planning by the defendant before the offense;

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;

(8) the person's prior juvenile or criminal history; and

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of 

remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make 

a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an 

aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016).

¶ 26 As the statute requires, trial courts must consider additional factors in mitigation in 

sentencing juvenile defendants. The trial court did so in this case. We agree with defendant’s 

underlying premise: simply stating that defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances have 

been considered does not fulfill the spirit of the statute. Here, however, the record shows that the 
10 

trial court carefully and explicitly considered the mitigating factors listed in section 5-4.5-105(a). 

In imposing the defendant’s sentence, the trial court spoke at length and noted repeatedly the 

defendant’s youth, family background, prior juvenile history, and educational background. The 

court also evaluated defendant’s rehabilitative potential and determined that defendant failed to 

take advantage of probation sentences and social services. 

¶ 27 In addition, the court evaluated the factors in aggravation, noting the brutal nature of the 

crime and the disturbing motive behind the shooting. The trial court is not required to articulate 

every factor it considers in rendering a sentence. And its failure to do so does not mean that it did

not take all the relevant factors into account. See People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 54 

(when mitigating factors have been presented to the trial court, it is presumed the court considered 

those factors, absent a contrary indication). Further, the trial court’s contemplation of defendant’s 

sentence as a juvenile is highlighted by the fact that the court did not impose the maximum 

sentence for aggravated battery, explicitly stating that it chose a lesser sentence based on 

defendant’s youth. The record before us negates defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to 

consider the relevant mitigating factors in section 5-4.5-105(a) in determining the appropriate 

penalty. We find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed by the trial court. 

¶ 28 B. Postplea Proceedings 

¶ 29 Defendant argues that his postplea proceedings failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 

604(d) because the written postplea motion filed by counsel did not include several issues she 

raised at the postplea hearing. 

¶ 30 Supreme Court Rule 604(d) requires that no appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea 

of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant files a motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the 

judgment within 30 days of the sentencing order. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). 
11 

Additionally, Rule 604(d) requires defense counsel to file a certificate with the trial court verifying 

that counsel has consulted with the defendant to ascertain contentions of error, has examined the 

trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea and the sentencing hearing, and has 

made “any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those 

proceedings.” Id. 

¶ 31 Rule 604(d) is designed to ensure defendants are provided their due process rights and to 

eliminate unnecessary appeals. People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 362 (1998). Thus, “strict 

compliance with Rule 604(d) is required.” People v. Prather, 379 Ill. App. 3d 763, 768 (2008). 

Generally, we consider the certificate itself to evaluate compliance with Rule 604(d). People v. 

Neal, 403 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (2010). Courts may consider the record where it undermines the 

certificate filed by counsel. Id. Whether defense counsel complied with Rule 604(d) is reviewed 

de novo. People v. Grice, 371 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815 (2007).

¶ 32 The proper remedy for counsel’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) is to remand 

the cause to the trial court to file a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea and for a new hearing 

on the motion. See People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶¶ 6, 12. However, where the 

defendant is afforded a full and fair postplea hearing, there is “limited value in requiring a repeat 

of the exercise, absent a good reason to do so.” Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 369. 

¶ 33 Here, defense counsel’s certificate stated that: (1) she “consulted with defendant in person, 

by mail, by phone or by electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the 

entry of the plea of guilty and in the sentence,” (2) she “examined the trial court file and report of 

proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing,” and (3) 

she “made any necessary amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of 

any defects in those proceedings.” The language in her certificate comports with the language of 
12 

the statute and is nearly identical to the terms and conditions imposed by the legislature. It strictly 

complies with Rule 604(d). 

¶ 34 Moreover, defense counsel’s arguments at the postplea hearing substantiated the claims 

she made in her Rule 604(d) certificate and no amendments were necessary. The issues she argued 

at the hearing related to the viability of the guilty plea and the court’s failure to consider mitigating 

factors in imposing defendant’s sentence. Those issues were properly preserved by the original 

written motion to reconsider the sentence and withdraw the guilty plea that counsel filed. 

¶ 35 In this case, defendant was afforded the due process Rule 604(d) seeks to provide, and 

counsel’s certificate strictly complied with the statutory requirements. Following her compliance, 

a hearing was held and arguments were heard. All of the issues raised by counsel were considered 

by the trial court, and defendant’s contentions of error were preserved for our review. Defendant 

was afforded a full and fair opportunity to challenge his guilty plea and his sentence. Under these 

circumstances, we find that counsel complied with Rule 604(d) despite her decision not to amend 

the postplea motion. There is no reason to remand this matter for a new hearing. See Shirley, 181 

Ill. 2d at 369 (court declined to remand for a new hearing where certificate filed on remand 

complied with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) and defendant received a full and fair hearing on his 

postplea motion).

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed. 

¶ 38 Affirmed.