### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs a t Ja ck son Ma y 6, 200 8

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JASO N CLINARD

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Stewart County No. 4-1650-C R-05 G eorge Sexton, Jud ge

No. M2007- 00406-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 9, 2008

A Stewar t County Circuit Court jury

convicted the defe nd an t , J as o n Clinard, of first deg ree preme ditated m urder and im posed a sentence of life imprisonment. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202( a)( 1); -204 (2006) . I n this appeal, the de fenda nt asserts that the tri al court e rre d by (1) not suppre ssing photogr aphs of the vic tim, (2) allowing the State an indepe ndent psy cholog ical examination of the defe n d ant, (3) failing to disqualify the District Attorney

Gene ral’s O ffice , and (4) following the statutory sentenc ing sc heme that r esulted in the defendant’s life sentenc e. Disce rning no err or, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J. delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., and D AVI D G. H AYES , S R

. J ., joined.

Worth L ovett, Clarksville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, J ason Clinard.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mark

A. F ulk s, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Dan Mitchum Alsobrooks, District Attorne y Gene ral; and Car ey

J . Thompso n , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

On Marc h 2, 2005, the 14-y ear -old defe ndant s hot and kil led hi s school bus driver, J oy ce G reg ory , as she sat aboar d the bus in front of his house. On the day befor e the shooting , the vic timha d r e po rt e d to the vic e -p ri nc ipa l of Ste wa rt County Hi g h Sc ho ol, whe re the vic timwa s a fr e sh man, that th e de fe nd ant h a d be e n “ dip pin g snuf f on the bu s. ” As a re su lt o f t he vic tim ’s re po rt , the def endant r ece ived “in-sc hool suspension.” The e vidence established that the Ma rch 1, 2005 inc ide nt w a s n ot t

he fi rs t ti me the de fe nd ant ha d viol a te d the sc ho ol bus ru le s. He ha d p re vio us ly been suspe nded from riding the bus for f ightingand had only

returne d to riding the bus on Fe bruar y 25, 2005. Acc o rd i n g t o t h e defenda nt’s 16-y ear -old nephe ws, J oseph and B obby L ee F ulks, the defe ndant believed that the victim wa s “picking on him” and he “didn’t like [t he victim] t oo much.”Jo seph and B o b b y Fulks ’ s m o t her, Li sa, i s t he d ef end ant ’ s st ep

- si st er. Lis a Fulks
, her husband
, and her s o ns 1

ha d rec en t l y m o ve d i nto t he ho m e the d efen d an t share d wit h his p are nts.

-2- On the morning o f t h e shooting , the def endant r ose as usua l, rea died himself for school, and ate bre akfa st. As the three boy s walked to the bus, the de fenda nt insist ed that the F ulks brothers boa

rd the bus ahe ad of him. As the brothers walked to the ba ck of the bus, the defe ndant 1

a ime d a .4 5 c a lib e r s e mi- a

uto matic ha

nd g un and fi re d six ja c ke te d holl ow po int bu lle ts at the vic tim

. Three shots struck the victim in the torso. The first shot enter ed the upper right side of t he victim’s back a nd exit ed throug h t h e u p p er l ef t s ide of the ba ck. The second shot struck the victim in the ri ght side of

he r c he st a

nd tr a ve le d thro ug h h e r r ig ht l un g , tr a c he a , a nd le ft lun g be fo re c omi ngto rest in the upper

left side of he r bac k. The thi rd shot also struck the victim in the rig ht side of her

c he st a nd the n tr a ve le d thr ou g h he r r ig ht l un g , s pin a l c olumn, and a or ta be fo re be c omi nglod g e d in the per iaortic tissue.

After being shot, the victim attempted to radio for he lp but succumbed to her injuries be fo re sh e wa s a

ble to do so. Me anw hil e , the de fe nd ant ra n ar ound the ba c k o f h is h ou se and int o the woods as Joseph Fulks went inside to telephone 9- 1-1. Afte r the victim’s foot slipped fr om the br a ke , B ob by

F ulk s st e e re d th e bu s to wa rd a te le ph on e po ll t o ke e p it f ro m g oin g ov e r a

ste e p h ill

. Bobby Fu l k s an d o ther hig h school students helped the r emainder of the c hildren out of the

emer g ency

exit and into a nea

rby residenc e.
By the time the first police of fice r ar rived on the sc ene, the victim had died. Afte r the offic er c onfirmed t h at the victim was dea d, he sawthe def endant’ s father , Charlie Clinard, walking towar d the bus. Mr. Clinard told the offic er that the defe ndant had shot the victim and

re tr e a te d to the wo od s b e hin d th e fam il y res ide nc e . O ff ic e rs late r r e a c he d th e de fe nd ant o n h is cellular telephone, a

nd he ag ree d to surrende r. Shortly there afte r, the de fenda

nt emerg ed fr om the woods ca rry ing the .45 caliber

handgun in one hand and the mag azine in the ot her. He laid both on the g ro un d a

nd surr e nd e re d to the a

uth or iti e s.

At the conc lusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defe ndant of the single , char g ed offe nse of f

irst degr ee p reme ditated murder . Be cause the State had not soug ht a sentenc e of life imprisonment without t he possibility of p ar ole, the def

endant r ece ived the statutorily mandated sentenc e of life imprisonment. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202( a)( 1); -204 (2006)

. I. Photographs

The defe ndant firsts asser ts that the trial court err ed by admitting ph o t o gra phs depicting the vi ctim inside the s chool bus afte r she had died beca use “me dical testimony

could and did adequately

descr ibe the condition of the vic tim.” The State contends that the photog raphs we re rele vant and neither g raphic nor g ruesome and wer e, as a result, admissible. We a g ree with the State.

The a dmissibi lity

of photog raphs is g overne d by Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce 401 and 403. See State v . Banks
, 564 S.W .2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978). Under these rule s, the trial cour t-3-

mus t det e rm ine , fir st, wh e the r the ph oto g ra phis r e le va

nt. Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 1; Banks , 564 S.W .2d

a t 9 49

. Nex t, the tr ia l c ourt mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t he pr ob a tiv e va lue of

the ph oto g ra

phis

su bs tanti a lly ou tw e ig he d by the da ng e r of un fa ir pr e

jud ic e

. Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 3; Banks , 564 S.W .2d at 950-51. The term “unfa ir prejudice ” has be en def ined as “ [a] n undue tende ncy to sugg est dec ision

o n an improper

basis, commonly , though not ne cessa rily , an emotional one.” Banks , 564 S.W .2d

a t 95 1. Pho tog ra

ph s off e re d by the State mus t be re le va nt t o p ro ve so me pa

rt of its c a se and

mus t

no t be a dmi tte d s ole ly to inf lame the jur

y and pr e jud ic e it a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant. Id . Wh e the r t o admit the photogr aphs re sts within t he sound di scre tion of the trial cour t and will not be reve rsed absent a clea

r showing of an a

buse of that discr etion. Banks , 5 64 S.W. 2d a t 94 9; see also State v. Dicke rson , 885 S.W. 2d 90 , 92 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); State v. Allen
, 692 S.W .2d 651, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).

I n this case, the State introduc ed seve ral po s t- mo r te m p h o tog raphs of

the victim taken while she re mained inside the school bus. None of the pictures contains any depiction of the injuries suffe red by

the victim. I nstead, e ach of the photog raphs shows only the victim slumped over in her seat, he r seatbelt still fastene d. Be cause the phot og raphs do not ac tually depict any

of the victim’s injuries, the medica l testimony and the infor

mation conv ey ed within the photog raphs doe s not overla p. Fur ther, the purpose of the photogr aphs was not to depict her injuries but instead to c onvey the re latively

helpless position of the victim at the time of her death. Finally
, beca use none of the photogr aphs ca

n be cha rac terized as gra

phic, grue some, or cumulative, the t rial court did not err by admitting them into evidenc e.
II. Psy chiatric Evaluation

T h e d ef en d an tn ex tco n t en d s t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d b y p erm i t t i n g t h e S t at e to pursue a psy chiatric evaluation of the defe ndant af ter the de fenda

nt had u n d er go n e such a

n examination pursuant to the commitment order of the j u venile cour

t. The State asse rts that the eva luation conducte d pursuant to the juvenile cour t commitment order has no be aringon the State’s rig ht to an independe nt psychiatric evaluation of the defe ndant pursuant to Rule 12.2 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedur e. We ag ree

.

A s ho rt pr oc e dura l hi sto ry

re g ard ingthe va

ri ou s e va luati on s of the de fe nd ant i s in order

. Shortly afte r t he defenda nt’s arr est on Marc h 2, 2005, the j uvenile court order ed, base d upon an ag ree ment betwee n the prosec ution an d defe nse counse l, that the defe ndant be “ place d in a hospital or treatment r esourc e

. . . for the purposes of evaluation a nd for tre atment nec essar y to the evaluation fo r not more than 30 da y s . . . pursuant to T.C.A. 37-1-128.” Code section 37-1- 128 provides,

I f, duri ngthe pe nd e nc y of any pr oceedingun de r t

his chapte r,

. . . . the court deter mines that there is r eason to be lieve that the child:
(A) I s mentally ill; and-4- (B ) Poses an immediate substantial li kelihood of serious harm, as define d in title 33, chapte r 6, part 5, beca use of the

me nta l il lne ss;

the cour t may order the child place d i n a hospital or treatment

resour ce, a s defined in § 33- 1-101, for the purposes of eva luation and for tre atment necessar

y to the evaluation, for not more than thirty (30) da y s. I f a c hil d is pla c e d in

a state -s up po rt e d f

a c ili ty , th e c hil d s ha ll be in the custody

of the c ommissi oner.
T.C.A. § 37-1-128( e)( 1) (2006)

. After the completion of t he evaluation, the S tate requested, and was g rante d, acc ess to the re cords of the eva luation. L ater , at the tra nsfer hear ing, the defe ndant prima r il y c o n te s te d

tr an s f e r f r o m j u v e n il e to c ir c u it

c o u rt o nth e b a s is o f

h is d im in is h e d

mental capa city . Eventually , howeve r, the de fenda nt ag ree d to the transfe r.
Upon transf

er of the ca se to the circ uit court, the State, cog nizant of the defe ndant’s previous attempts to rely

on a mental- health-ba s ed d ef en se, soug ht an independe nt psy cholog ical examination of the defe ndant pursuant to Rule 12.2 of the T ennesse e Rules of Criminal Procedure

. That rule pr ovides that “[o] n motio n o f t he district attorne y g ener al, the cour

t may order the defe ndant to submit to a mental examination by a psy chiatrist or other

expert desig nated in the c ourt order .” Tenn. R. Crim. P . 12.2(c) (1). The defe ndant objecte d to the evaluation on the basis that he ha d p re vio us ly

be e n e xami ne d p ur su ant to th e co mmi tme nt o rd e r a nd by his ow n f

or e ns ic psy cholog ist. After a

hear ing, the trial court g rante d the State’s motion for indepe ndent psy cholog ical eva luation.

T h e d e f e n d an t h a s f

a il e d to c it e an y a

u th o r it y f o r h is ar g u me n t th a t th e St a te is not enti tl e d to s e e k a p s y c h o lo g ic a l e v a lu a ti o n u n d e r Ru le 1 2

. 2 w h e n a p r e v io u s e v a lu a ti o n has bee n conducte d pursuant to a juvenile c ourt commitment order. A lso he has cited no a uthority for the proposition that evaluation by the defe nse’s fore nsic psy cholog ist precludes a n independe nt mental

e xami na tio n o n mo tio n o f t

he State . “ I ssu e s w hic h a re no t su pp or ted by argume nt, c itatio n to

a uth or iti e s, or

a pp ro pr iate re fe re nc e s to the re c or d wi ll be tr e a te d a s wa ive d in thi s c ourt .” Te nn . Ct

. Crim. App. R. 10(b).

Perhap s more importantly , the def endant’ s alleg ation that “the State wa s shopping for a n expert who ag ree d with the State” is not factually supported in the re cord. The rec ord is clea r that the eva luation conducted pr ior t o the def endant’ s transfe r fr om juvenile court oc curr ed base d upon the orde r of that c ourt, not at the re quest of the State. Indeed, i t wa s the def endant who sug g ested that his compromised menta l health contributed to his commiss ion of the cr ime, leading the juvenile cour

t to order the e valuation. Once the ca se wa s transfe rre d to t h e ci rc u i t court, the pr os e c uti on

ma de on ly a sin g le re qu e st fo r an ind e pe nd e nt e va luatio n. Th e de fe nd ant ha s f a ile d to establish that the State was not e ntitled to thi s evaluation. Moreover
, he has failed to establish how he wa s prejudice d by the State’s beingg rante d the eva luation other than to alleg e that “a llowing a n additional mental examination allowed the State to put on evidence counter vailing the essenc e of the-5-

defe nse case.” The presentation of counter vailing proof by the parties is the s um and substance of our adve rsar

y sy stem of justice and doe s not repre sent a ba sis for re lief in this case.

III . Disqualifi cation of District Att orney G eneral’s O ffice

The de fenda

nt argues that the trial c ourt should have gr anted his motion to disqualify the entire district attorney g ener al’s off

ice o n t h e basis of a c onflict of intere st. Specifically , he alleg es that “a

person involved in defe nse strate g y and planningsessions, to include knowledg e of work produc t, obtained employ ment with the office of the District Attorne y Gene ral.” He c ontends that a new

trial is w arr anted beca

use “the State seeming ly

had adva nced know ledg e of a

ppellant’s strateg y .” The State asser ts that the defe ndant is not entitled to relief b ec au s e althoug h a for mer assistant district public defe nder obtained a position as an assistant district attorney g ener al during the pendency of t he defenda nt’s case , that individual did not participate in the def endant’ s case and, in any event, wa s scre ened f

rom participating in the de fenda nt’s case upon joining the district attorney g ener al’s off

ice. Be cause the defe ndant has failed to pr esent any evidenc e of a c onflict of interest re quiring disqualification beyond that of t he indi vidual prosec utor, he is not entitled to relief.

I t is clea r, in this case , that the disqualification of assistant district attorney g ener al Steve Powers wa s appropr iate g iven the fac t that he was employ ed as an assistant public defe nder at a time whe n the def

endant wa s repr esente d by that office

. See Sta te v . D av is , 141 S.W .3d 600, 6 1 3 (T en n

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . Cu lbr e ath
, 30 S.W .3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000) , and stating that even wher e there i s “no actual conflict of i ntere st, disqualification could also be ba sed on the a ppear ance of impropriety”). The question whether a conf lict exi sted that nec essitated disqualificati on of the

e n t i r e d i s t r i c ta t t o r

n e y g e n e r a l ’ s o f

f i c e , h o w e v e r , r e qu i r e s g r e a t e r s c r u t i n y.

I n Da v is , our supre me cour t, construing the disciplinary rules as the y

exis ted prior to the a do pti on of the Rul e s of Con du c t, ob se rv e d that wh e re “ dis qu a lif ic a tio n of a pr os e c uto r i s require d, the trial cour

t must determine whethe r to also disquali fy t h e enti re D istrict Attorney Gene ral’s of

fice .” Id. (c i t i n g Culbr e ath , 30 S.W .3d at 313). This dete rmination, the court he ld,

“ re qu ir e s an in qu ir

y int o w he the r t

he pr os e c uto r wh o h a s th e c on fl ic t of int e re st h a s p art ic ipate d in the ong oing pr osecution, including the disclosure of any confide nces, and whether the prosec ution has established that the prosec utor has bee n scre ened f rom the prose cution.” Id. Th e pa rt y “questioning the proprie ty of the re prese ntation” has the bur den of pr oof. Sta te v . W hite , 114 S.W .3d 46 9, 47 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 3)

. On a pp e a l, the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on wi ll n ot b e re ve rs e d a

bs e nc e an a

bu se of discre tion. Id.

I n this case, e vidence adduce d at the hear ing on the defe ndant’s motion to disqualify

e sta bli sh e d th a t Stev e Pow e rs wo rk e d a s a n a ssi sta nt p ub lic de fe nd e r at th e tim e the pu bli c defe nder’ s office was a

ppointed to repre sent the defe ndant. Shortly there afte r, Mr. Power s obtained employ ment as an assistant dist rict attorne y g ener al, and the de fenda

nt obtained private counsel. Mr. Powers testified that while e mploy ed as an as s i stant public defe nder he handled c ases in the Humphrey s County Circuit Court and had very littl e contac t w ith the defe ndant’s case . Acc ording to Mr. Powers, the only

contac t he had with the de fenda nt’s case occ urre d when he overhe ard-6-

another assistant public defe nder a nd an intern w ith whom he share d office space briefly discuss the

case . He c ould not reca ll any details of the conver sation and stated that he had no knowledg e about the ca se. He testified that since be ing e mplo y ed as an assistant district attorney , he has ha ndled “DUI case s in D ickson and Humphrey s Count[ ies].” Mr . Powers stated that he has ha d no contac t at all with the prosec ution of the defe ndant and did not eve n know which of the other a ssistant district attorney s had bee n assig ned to prosec ute the ca se. He testified that he had also re ceive d a le tte r f ro m th e dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l in str uc tin g him

to s c re e n h ims e lf

fr om t he c a se . T he State also introduced into evidence a l etter from the district attorney g ener al to the def

endant, infor

ming him of Mr. Powers’ e mploy ment and explaining the sc ree ning pr ocedur e.

At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court a ccr edited Mr. Power s’ testimony that h e wa s not personally

involved in the defe ndant’s ca se duringthe time he wor ked as a n assistant pu bli c de fe nd e r. Th e c ourt

a lso fo un d that the dis tr ic t atto rn e y ’s of fi c e ha d im

ple me nte d a de qu a te

scre ening proce dures to ensur e that Mr. Power s would have no contac t w ith the pr osecution of the defe ndant’s ca se. The tr ial court spec ifically acc redited Mr. Powers’ testimony that he did not have

acc ess to the def

endant’ s case file.

I n his appea l, the defe ndant does n o t a s s e r t t h a t Mr. Powers inappr opriately “switche d teams” during the pendenc y of the de fenda

nt’s case , but instead he a rg ues that the disqualification

o f th e d is tr ic t att o r

n e y g e n e r a l’ s o f

f ic e is n e c e s s ar

y to a v o id th e “ a p p e ar an c e o f im

p r o p r ie ty

. ” We disag ree . The Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which g overn in this instance, provide that a

law firm may

avoid the disqualification on the basis of a c o n fl i ct of intere st of the individual attorney

from being imputed to the firm as a w hole by : (1) assur ing that the disqualified attorney “is prohibited from pa

rticipating in the repr esentation of the curr ent client,” ( 2) conc luding that no other attorney

within the firm has acquired any materia l and conf idential information from the di squalified attorney
, (3) impl ementing “scr eening proce dures to eff ectively preve nt the flow of information about the matter betwee n the personally disqualified l awy er a nd the other la

wy ers in the firm,” a nd (4) “ad v i s [ i n g] t he for mer c lient in writing of the circ umstances that wa rra nted the implementation of the scr eening proce dures r equire d by

this Rul e and of the a ctions that have be en take n to c omply wi th t

his Rul e .” Te nn . Su

p. Ct. R. 8 , Ru le 1. 10 (c )( 1- 4) . T he Rul e a lso state s, howeve r, that imputed disqualification ca nnot be avoided when:
(1) The disqualified lawy er w as substantially involved in t he repr esentation of a for

mer c lient; and
(2) The lawy er’ s repr esentation of the former client was in connec tion with an adjudicative proce eding t h at i s directly adver se to the interests of a

curr ent client of the firm; and
(3) The proce eding betwee n the firm’s c urre nt c lient and the lawyer’ s fo rm e r c lie nt i s st ill pe nd inga t th e tim e the lawy e r c ha ng e s f ir ms.

Id. at (d).-7- Her e, the State c lear ly

complied with the mandate s of subsection ( c) r eg ardingthe

sc re e nin g of

the dis qu a lif

ie d atto rn e y

. Mo re ov e r, the de fe nd ant h a s f a ile d to e sta

bli shthat th is i s a situation where imputed disqualifica tion cannot be avoided by the implementation of scr eening proce dures. The trial court a ccr edited Mr. Power s’ testimony that his contact with the de fenda nt’s

case wh ile he wa s e mpl oy e d b y the pu bli c de fe nd e r’ s o ff

ic e wa s de minimus and that he ha d had absol u t el y

no contac t with the case since joining the attorne y g ener al’s off

ice. Althoug h the de fe nd ant c la ims that “ [t]he Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l’ s o ff

ic e is sm all e no ug h th a t a lmo st d a ily contac t betwee n attorney s will occur” and that “computer files will a lmost ce rtainly prove to be open to all members of the Gene ral’s staf f,” he has fa iled to support either c laim with ev i d en ce i n the

re c or d. Un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s, the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tion b y

re fu sin g to dis qu a lif y the of fi c e of the dis tr ic t atto rn e y

g e ne ra l.

IV. Sente ncing
As his last complaint, the defe ndant asser ts that the trial court e rre d by applying the statut or y se nte nc ing sch eme f

or fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th is c a se be c a us e that sc he me is unconstitutional as applied to the def endant. Spec ifically , he conte nds that the defe ndant’s sente nce of lif e imp ri so nme nt v iol a te s the fe de ra l con sti tut ion a l ban on c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt d

ue to t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s y o u t h

. T h e S t a t e s u b m i t s t h a tb e c a

u s e t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s s e n t e n c e i s n o t“ g r o s s ly disproportionate to his crime,” the Ei g hth Amendment ban on crue l and unusual punishment is not applicable

. Both the Eig hth A mendment to the United States Constit ution and Article 1, se ction 16 of the Te nn e sse e Co ns ti tutio n p ro hib it the inf lic tio n o f c ru e l and

unus ua l pu

nis hme nt. U. S. Const. amend. VI I I(“Excessive ba il shall not be require d, nor excessive fine s imposed, nor crue l and unusual punishm en t s i n fl i cted.”); Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 16 (“ That excessive ba il shall not be require d, nor excessive fine s imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments i nflicted.” ). De spite the

near ly identical wording of the two provisions, our supreme court has consistently aff orded a more expansive interpre tation to Article 1, § 16 than that a ffor ded to the Eig hth Amendment. Se e Sta te

v . H arris , 8 44 S.W. 2d

60 1, 60 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . A c c or din g ly , a lth ou g h th e Unite d St a te s Su pr e me Court has held that the Eig ht h Am en dment contains no propor tionality g uara ntee outside of sentenc i n g fo r a ca pital offense
, see Ru mm e l v . E ste lle , 445 U.S. 263, 274, 100 S. C t. 1133, 1139 (1980) ( rec og nizi ng that “for crimes c oncede dly

classified a

nd classifia b l e as felonies, that is, as punishable by

signific ant terms of imprisonm ent in a state pe nitentiary , the leng th of the sentenc e
a c tua lly imp os e d is pure ly

a matte r o f l e g isl a tiv e pr e ro g a tiv e ” ); Harmelin v. M ichigan , 501 U.S. 957, 994, 111 S. Ct . 2680, 2701 (1991) ( ref using to e x tend pro p o rt i o n al i ty revie w to non-ca

pital of fe ns e s) , o ur

su pr e me c ourt

ha s c on c lud e d th a t th e state c on sti tut ion pr ov ide s f

or t h e p r o p o r t i on a lity revie w of non-c apital sentenc es. Ha rri s , 844 S.W .2d at 602. Thus, despite the fac t t h at the de fe nd ant c ou c he s h is c la im in te rm s of the Ei g hth Am e ndme nt, that pr ov isi on do e s n ot a

va il h im the proportionality

revie w he de sires bec ause his is not a capital case

. Thus, he could be aff orded relief , if at all, only

under A rticle 1, § 16.-8- I n a do pti ng pr op or

tio na lity re vie w fo r n on -c a pit a l of fe ns e s, our s up re me c ourt a lso

a do pte d th e pr op or

tio na lity te st fa sh ion e d by Justi c e Ke nn e dy in h is Ha rm e lin c on c ur re nc e , th a t is
, [T]he sen te nc e imp os e d is ini tia lly c omp are d w iththe c ri me committed. Unless this thre shold c omparison leads to a n i nfer ence of g ro ss d isp ro po rt ion a lity , th e in qu ir y e nd s - the se nte nc e is constitutional. I n those rar e ca ses wher e this infere nce doe s arise, the analy sis pr ocee ds by compar ing (1) the sentenc es imposed o n o ther criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (2) t he sentences imposed for commission of the same cr ime in other jurisdictions.

Ha rri s , 844 S.W .2d at 602. The c ontours of this test were first establi shed by the Supreme Court in So le m v . H

e lm
, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010 (1983), ov e rru le d b yHa rm e lin , 501 U. S. at 9 65 , 111 S. Ct. a t 26 86 (h old ingtha t “ Solem was simply

wrong ; the Eig hth Amendment

c on ta ins no pr op or

tio na lity g ua

ra nte e ), and late r es po us e d by Justi c e Whit e in h is Ha rm e lin dis se nt,

se e Ha rm le in , 501 U.S. at 1018, 111 S. Ct . at 2714 (White, J ., dissenting)

.

Ev e n th is t e st, ho we ve r, do e s n ot a va il the pe tit ion e r t

he ty pe of re view he d e sir e s. He a sks this court to review the sentenc e imposed i n light of his ag e and circ umstances, and, on the basis of those fa ctors, conc lude that the life se ntence is disproportionate. S uch a r eview, how ever , is not permitted by

either f eder al or state jur isprudence . Ex amining the defe ndant’s sente nce unde r the cr iteria e stablished in Ha rri s , w e c on c lud e that a se nte nc e of lif e imp ri so nme nt i s n ot “ g ro ssl y disproportionate” to the crime of first deg ree preme ditated murder . Be cause we have conclude d that the sentenc e is not g rossly disproportionate to the c rime, we need not c o n s i der the other Ha rri s fac tors. I n conseque nce, the defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

CO NC LU SION

The trial c ourt did not err by admitting int o evidenc e post-mortem photog raphs of the victim, by allowi n g th e St a te a n in d e p endent psycholog ical examination of the def endant, by ref using to d isq ua lif y the dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l’ s of fi c e , or by imp os ing a

se nte nc e of

lif e imp ri so nme nt. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE