UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 ) 

SHERYL WULTZ, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 08-cv-1460 (RCL) 

 ) 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. Introduction. 

On April 17, 2006, a Palestinian suicide bomber allegedly attacked a restaurant in Tel 

Aviv, State of Israel (“Israel”) (“Tel Aviv bombing”). 1st Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Jan. 13, 2009, ECF 

No. 12 [hereinafter FAC]. Daniel Wultz allegedly suffered severe physical injuries, resulting in 

his death, further resulting in economic injuries to his estate. Id. ¶¶ 87, 100. Daniel’s father also 

allegedly suffered physical injuries in the attack. Id. ¶¶ 88, 101. Finally, several of Daniel’s 

family members allegedly also suffered emotional and financial injuries. Id. ¶¶ 101–02. 

In the wake of the bombing, Mr. Wultz’s estate and family members (“plaintiffs”) have 

brought suit against several defendants, including the Syrian Arab Republic (“Syria”), the Syrian 

Ministry of Defense, Syrian Military Intelligence, and the Syrian Air Force Intelligence 

Directorate (collectively, “Syrian defendants”). See FAC. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the 

Syrian defendants are liable under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act for their provision of material support and resources to the PIJ. FAC ¶ 96 (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A). 
2 

The Syrian defendants have moved the Court to dismiss all claims against them. Mot. of 

Syria Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) to Dismiss the 1st Am. Comp. for Lack of 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Legal Insufficiency, Nov. 16, 2009, ECF No. 60.1

 The Syrian 

defendants make four arguments: (1) that the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act (FSIA) violates the principle of sovereign equality of nations enumerated in 

Article 2.1 of the United Nations Charter, (2) that this case presents nonjusticiable political 

questions, (3) that the FSIA terrorism exception unconstitutionally violates separation-of-powers 

principles, and (4) that plaintiffs have not adequately pled causation. 

The Court will address each of these arguments in turn. The first three arguments are 

utterly meritless, as the salient issues have already been dispensed with by the Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit. They will be summarily rejected. Concerning the only 

remaining argument, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have adequately pled a causal chain. 

II. Discussion. 

Despite the Syrian defendants’ arguments to the contrary, which have been repeatedly 

rejected by the courts of this Circuit, the FSIA terrorism exception does not violate the principle 

of sovereign equality, does not raise political questions, and does not violate the separation of 

powers. Concerning causation, plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Syrian defendants’ 

provision of material support and resources to the PIJ caused plaintiffs’ injuries. 

 1

Although this motion was originally made only by Syria, all Syrian defendants have 

stipulated that the motion “is made by and on behalf of defendants the Syrian Ministry of 

Defense, Syrian Military Intelligence[,] and Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate, as well as 

the Syrian Arab Republic.” Stipulation, Dec. 1, 2009, ECF No. 61. 
3 

A. The FSIA Terrorism Exception Does Not Violate the United Nations 

Charter. 

The FSIA terrorism exception provides that a foreign state shall not be afforded 

immunity from civil suit where, inter alia, the foreign state allegedly provided material support 

or resources for the commission of an act of extrajudicial killing that caused personal injury or 

death for which money damages are sought. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Relatedly, the FSIA also 

provides that a court “shall hear a claim” under § 1605A if, inter alia, the foreign state in 

question was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the alleged provision of material 

support occurred. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The United Nations Charter declares that the 

“Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” U.N. 

Charter art. 2, para. 1. 

The Syrian defendants argue that the terrorism exception to the general rule of sovereign 

immunity violates the U.N. Charter by denying Syria its sovereign equality, because the United 

States only selectively identifies some states as sponsors of terrorism and thus only deprives 

some states of immunity under the FSIA. Syria’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Syria’s Rule 

12(b) Mot. 1–26, Nov. 16, 2009, ECF No. 60-1 [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem.]. The Court of Appeals 

has already heard and dispensed with this argument under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), the 

jurisdictionally similar predecessor to § 1605A: “[E]ven if Article 2.1 does demand strict 

equality across states, the provisions are not in conflict because § 1605(a)(7) does not treat Syria 

(and the other terrorism states) unequally. Any country can come within § 1605(a)(7)’s 

exception so long as the Secretary of State designates it a terrorism sponsor.” Wyatt v. Syrian 

Arab Republic, 266 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

The Syrian defendants argue that the Circuit was wrong: “[U]ntil all are designated, those 

designated are denied equal sovereignty.” Defs.’ Mem. 11; see also Defs.’ Reply 4–5. This 
4 

Court emphatically rejects the Syrian defendants’ invitation to reconsider the clear—and clearly 

binding—decision of the court above. Other courts of this District have also dispensed with 

identical arguments made by Syrian defendants in two other cases, including one decision issued 

three months before the Syrian defendants filed their motion in this case—a decision 

conspicuously absent from the Syrian defendants’ briefs. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 08-

cv-502, 2010 WL 3501826, at *5 n.8 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2010); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 

F. Supp. 2d 79, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2009). The Syrian defendants’ argument, utterly without merit 

and having been repeatedly ruled against in this Circuit, now flirts with frivolity. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11(b)(2). The Court therefore rejects the Syrian defendants’ arguments concerning the 

U.N. Charter. 

B. This Case Does Not Raise Political Questions. 

The Syrian defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ claims raise political questions. Defs.’ 

Mem. 27–42. The political question doctrine “excludes from judicial review those controversies 

which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for 

resolution” by the executive and legislative branches. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean 

Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). Thus, the doctrine makes nonjusticiable those “political 

decisions that are by their nature ‘committed to the political branches to the exclusion of the 

judiciary.’” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Antolok v. 

United States, 873 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Two considerations guide a court’s testing 

for nonjusticiable political questions: “the appropriateness under our system of government of 

attributing finality to the action of the political departments” and “the lack of satisfactory criteria 

for a judicial determination.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 

307 U.S. 433 (1939)). 
5 

Based on those considerations, the Supreme Court in Baker identified “six independent 

tests for the existence of a political question”: 

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 

coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 

manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without 

an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] 

the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an 

unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 

[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 

various departments on one question. 

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217) (internal quotation 

marks removed). 

 The Syrian defendants argue that the deprivation of sovereign immunity under the FSIA 

terrorism exception “fails all six Baker tests.” Defs.’ Mem. 35–37. Just as with their argument 

concerning the U.N. charter, this argument has been considered and rejected by the Court of 

Appeals under § 1605(a)(7); the same logic applies to § 1605A. Gates, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 87 

(citing Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[I]f the political 

branches decide tort suits against a foreign sovereign are contrary to the foreign policy of the 

Nation, then they may by law remove them from [the court’s] jurisdiction.”), rev’d in part on 

other grounds sub nom. Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009)). And again, the 

Syrian defendants lost the same argument only three months before filing this motion, see Gates, 

646 F. Supp. 2d at 87, which they neglect to mention in their briefs. See also Wyatt, 2010 WL 

3501826, at *5 n.8. The Court therefore rejects the Syrian defendants’ arguments concerning 

political questions. 
6 

C. The FSIA Terrorism Exception Is Not Unconstitutional. 

 The Syrian defendants third argue that the FSIA terrorism exception unconstitutionally 

violates separation-of-powers principles because final judgments made under § 1605A may be 

subject to rescission by Congress or the President. Defs.’ Mem. 42–48. As with the Syrian 

defendants’ other arguments, this argument has been previously considered and rejected. Gates, 

646 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citing Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); 

Wyatt, 2010 WL 3501826, at *5. Moreover, the previous examples cited by the Syrian 

defendants where actions and judgments under the FSIA terrorism exception were extinguished 

relate to the Republic of Iraq (“Iraq”) and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 

(“Libya”). Defs.’ Mem. 43. As plaintiffs correctly point out, “that result was accomplished 

through legislation specifically tailored to Iraq and Libya,” not the FSIA more generally. Pls.’ 

Opp’n. 15; see Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 110-301, 122 Stat. 2999 (2008); 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(d), 122 

Stat. 3, 343 (2008). “[A] constitutional attack based on a violation of separation of powers is 

properly launched against the executive or legislative action that effects the reopening of a 

judgment, and not against the law pursuant to which the final judgment was made.” Wyatt, 2010 

WL 3501826, at *5 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995)). The 

Syrian defendants’ separation-of-powers argument is therefore misplaced when directed at the 

FSIA. Any such argument must be directed at the executive or legislative acts rescinding a final 

judgment—such as the Iraq- or Libya-specific legislation—not the FSIA itself. The Court 

therefore rejects the Syrian defendants’ arguments concerning FSIA’s constitutionality. 
7 

D. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled Causation. 

Plaintiffs must plead a short and plain statement showing they are entitled to relief. The 

Syrian defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted because they have failed to adequately allege a causal link between Syria and the Tel 

Aviv bombing allegedly giving rise to plaintiffs’ injuries. The Court disagrees; plaintiffs have 

alleged the requisite causal chain. 

1. Plaintiffs Must Plead a Short and Plain Statement Showing They Are 

Entitled to Relief. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007)). The Rule 8 standard is not satisfied where a pleading offers only “labels and 

conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the element of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s] 

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557) (emphasis added). Twombly’s facial plausibility standard is satisfied when “the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

Therefore, based on the factual allegations within the plaintiff’s complaint, a court must 

conclude that it is not merely possible, but also plausible, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id.

(“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). This 
8 

determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–158 (2d 

Cir. 2007)). 

When considering whether dismissal of a complaint is appropriate for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must “assume all the allegations in the complaint 

are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans 

Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks omitted). The Court, however, 

need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts 

alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Browning v. 

Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 

1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

2. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Alleged That the Syrian Defendants 

Caused Plaintiffs’ Injury. 

“[T]here is no ‘but-for’ causation requirement” for claims made under the FSIA. In re 

Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2009). In Kilburn v. 

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a case which interpreted the substantially similar 

§ 1605(a)(7) that is now § 1605A, this Circuit noted that in the FSIA, “the words ‘but for’ simply 

do not appear; only ‘caused by’ do.” 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Adopting the 

Supreme Court’s approach to a different but similarly worded jurisdictional statute, the Circuit 

interpreted the causation element “to require only a showing of ‘proximate cause.’” Id. (citing 

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536–38, (1995)). 

“Proximate cause exists so long as there is ‘some reasonable connection between the act or 

omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered.’” Brewer, 664 F. 
9 

Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (construing causation element in § 1605A by reference to cases 

decided under § 1605(a)(7)) (quoting Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128). Significantly, proximate 

causation may be shown by general support not tied to a specific terrorist act: “[A] plaintiff need 

not establish that the material support or resources provided by a foreign state for a terrorist act 

contributed directly to the act from which his claim arises . . . .” In re Islamic Republic of Iran 

Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Syrian defendants argue that plaintiffs make merely conclusory and implausible 

allegations of causation. Defs.’ Mem. 48–54. The Court disagrees; there are several reasonable 

alleged connections between the resources provided to the Syrian defendants and plaintiffs’ 

injuries. Plaintiffs allege that the Syrian defendants provided the PIJ with, inter alia, “financial 

support”; “military-grade explosives, military firearms[,] and other weapons and matériel”; 

“specialized and professional military training for the planning and execution of terrorist 

attacks”; “means of electronic communication and electronic communications equipment”; 

“financial services, including banking and wire transfer services”; and “lodging, safe haven[,] 

and shelter.” FAC ¶¶ 49–52. The Syrian defendants even allegedly provided the PIJ with a 

headquarters in Damascus, including land, buildings, and utilities. Id. ¶ 53. 

These allegations are substantially similar to those made against Syria in Wyatt. In that 

case, the plaintiffs pled that 

Syria provided a variety of forms of material support to the PKK [the Kurdistan 

Workers’ Party], including: (1) weapons, ammunition, and false passports; (2) the 

establishment and maintenance of PKK headquarters and offices in Syria; (3) safe 

haven and shelter in Syria to senior PKK commanders; (4) establishment and 

maintenance of PKK training and military bases near Damascus, in northern 

Syria, along Syria’s border with Turkey, and in the Syrian-controlled Beka’a 

Valley of Lebanon; (5) military and terrorist training . . . by members of the 

Syrian armed forces and intelligence agencies; and (6) the establishment of the 

PKK’s logistical infrastructure in Syria. 
10 

Wyatt, 2010 WL 3501826, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because allegations of 

“support facilitat[ing a] terrorist group’s development of the expertise, networks, military 

training, munitions, and financial resources necessary to plan and carry out [an] attack” suffice to 

allege proximate causation, Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67 

D.D.C. 2008), the court in Wyatt concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged proximate 

cause, 2010 WL 3501826, at *4. 

The Court reaches the same conclusion in this case. The alleged provision of resources 

and services no doubt contributed to PIJ operational and tactical ability to carry out terrorist 

attacks, including the one alleged here. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that these resources 

and services proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries. The Court therefore rejects the Syrian 

defendants’ arguments concerning causation. 

III. Conclusion. 

For the reasons set forth above, the Syrian defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. A 

separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date. 

 Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on October 20, 2010.