IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs May 22, 2019

PAMELA DIANE STARK v. JOE EDWARD STARK

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-002958-18 Robert Samual Weiss, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2019-00901-COA-T10B-CV

___________________________________

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her 

motion to recuse the trial judge in her divorce case. Specifically, Wife argues that the trial 

court’s rulings demonstrate a bias against her because the trial court purportedly ruled in 

favor of Husband in excess of the relief requested. We affirm the trial court’s denial of 

Wife’s motion to recuse. 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit 

Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., and ANDY D. BENNETT, JJ., joined.

Pamela Diane Stark, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro se.

Melissa C. Berry, Cordova, Tennessee, for the appellee, Joe Edward Stark.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff/Appellant Pamela Diane Stark (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce 

against Defendant/Appellee Joe Edward Stark (“Husband”) on June 29, 2018. Wife is a 

licensed attorney working for the District Attorney General of the Thirtieth Judicial 

District. Husband works as a police officer for the Memphis Police Department. On 

November 28, 2018, Wife, after obtaining leave of court, filed an amended complaint to 

assert that Husband had committed battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

against her. According to Wife, the battery allegations result from an incident of 

domestic violence that occurred on June 17, 2018. Although Wife’s employer recused 

06/18/2019
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from the matter and a special prosecutor was appointed, Wife asserts that the Memphis 

Police Department continues to investigate the matter.

In support of the divorce and tort actions, Wife caused six subpoenas to be issued 

for the depositions of Husband and other witnesses, including a lieutenant from the 

Memphis Police Department. The notices indicated that five of the depositions, including 

Husband’s, would be taken at the marital residence. The final deposition was to take 

place in Missouri where the witness resided. On January 9, 2019, Husband filed a motion 

for a protective order seeking that all in-person depositions be taken at the Shelby County 

courthouse, that a bailiff be present for Husband’s deposition, and that the out-of-state 

deposition take place remotely. 

A hearing on Husband’s motion was held on January 25, 2019. No transcript or 

statement of the evidence from this hearing is included in the record.1 On February 13, 

2019, the trial court ruled that Husband’s motion was “reasonable under the 

circumstances.” As such, the trial court ordered that the depositions of Husband, as well 

as well as Sgt. Mote, Anthony Mullins, Daniel Cordero, and James Erwin would take 

place at the Shelby County Courthouse and that a bailiff would be present for Husband’s 

deposition.2The trial court denied, however, Husband’s request that the deposition of the 

out-of-state witness be taken remotely, ruling that the deposition would take place in 

Missouri unless the witness agreed to be deposed in Shelby County. 

In the meantime, on January 15, 2019, Husband filed a petition for a restraining 

order under rule 65.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Therein, Husband 

alleged that Wife was posting on her personal Facebook page allegations against 

Husband with regard to domestic violence. Additionally, Husband alleged that Wife 

“disparaged the Memphis Police Department’s internal handling and investigation of said 

case.” Husband argued that such dissemination of these allegations could cause 

immediate irreparable harm to Husband’s reputation and employment. As such, Husband 

requested that the trial court enter an immediate temporary restraining order requiring 

Wife to remove the posts and to refrain from making similar posts or comments in the 

future. Wife responded in opposition to Husband’s petition on May 21, 2019. Therein, 

 

1 Wife asserts that access to the transcript was blocked by Husband. Husband counters that he is 

not required to provide Wife with a copy of the transcript as she did not share in its cost, citing Beef N’

Bird of Am., Inc. for Use & Benefit of Galbreath v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 803 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1990) (“A party who does not join in the engagement and payment of a stenographer has no contract 

right to require the stenographer to transcribe the record which is therefore unavailable to him unless and 

until made available to him on terms satisfactory to the stenographer and the party or parties who engaged 

the stenographer.”). This dispute is not within the scope of this limited accelerated appeal, nor has it been 

raised as an issue by Wife. 

2 The trial court noted that Husband requested in the alternative to a bailiff, that his deposition be 

taken “audiovisually.” The trial court ruled that this request was considered in its order that the 

depositions be taken at the Shelby County Courthouse but did not specifically allow this deposition to be 

taken “audiovisually.”
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Wife admitted to making the posts, but asserted that her comments concerned a matter of 

public concern protected by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Finally, Wife 

asserted that Husband’s motion was an attempt to harass Wife and “bias [the trial judge] 

into a belief that ‘contentiousness’ exists between the parties.”

A hearing on Husband’s petition was held on February 7, 2019. Husband testified 

that Wife had engaged in various alleged harassing behavior, including notifying his 

lieutenant of the allegations and posting about the domestic violence allegations on her 

personal Facebook page. According to Husband, these posts were visible to his coworkers and clearly suggested that he was a domestic abuser. Likewise Husband testified 

that after filing his petition, Wife informed his counsel that she had also sent a letter to 

Memphis Mayor Jim Strickland concerning alleged corruption in the Memphis Police 

Department; the letter specifically referenced Husband and the allegations against him. 

Husband explained that an investigation into the allegations was ongoing, but that the 

allegations alone could be injurious to his reputation with his employer. Finally, Husband 

indicated that Wife’s actions were harassing and done in an effort to intimidate him. Wife 

chose not to testify; rather she provided only legal argument that her statements were 

protected by the First Amendment. In contrast, Husband’s counsel argued that the 

mandatory injunction in place at the time the divorce complaint was filed prohibited the 

parties from harassing or making disparaging comments about each other, including to 

employers, and that the injunction should be extended to force Wife to remove the 

offending posts. 

Following the argument of the parties, the trial court ruled that Wife’s argument 

regarding the First Amendment was not well-taken because her allegations did not refer 

to corruption generally as a matter of public concern, but with regard to the allegations 

against Husband specifically, which action was prohibited by the mandatory divorce 

injunction. As such, the trial court ruled that Wife was to remove the offending posts the 

same day and that “a mandatory injunction will go into effect that there will be no 

communication with employers.” The trial court also ruled that “making any further 

allegations in social media is completely inappropriate and is being enjoined.” Thereafter 

the following exchange occurred:

[Wife]: Well, Your Honor, I will just with all candor to the Court say 

you might as well take me into custody right now. I have contacted the FBI 

as well as having contacted the mayor of Memphis to try and get this 

addressed. I am saying that I am a victim of corruption from the Memphis 

Police Department, and I am going to pursue every course of action I have 

and –

THE COURT: Ms. Stark, are you going to remove that post, yes or 

no?
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[Wife]: I am not.

THE COURT: Officer Houston, take her into custody.

We’ll stand in recess.

(Short break.)

THE COURT: Ms. Stark, please stand. Are you going to comply 

with this Court’s orders?

[Wife]: No, I’m not.

THE COURT: All right. I’m making a finding that you are in direct 

contempt of court by willfully refusing to comply with this Court’s orders. 

You . . . will be held in custody until such time that you decide that you 

want to change your position and you apologize to this Court. We’ll stand 

in recess until that time.

On February 13, 2019, the trial court entered its written order granting Husband’s 

petition for a restraining order. Therein, the trial court noted the existence of the 

mandatory injunction restraining each party “from harassing, threatening, assaulting or 

abusing the other and from making disparaging remarks about the other in the presence or 

to either party’s employer.” The trial court found that in spite of this injunction, Wife 

sent correspondence to Husband’s supervisors and posted on social media regarding the 

domestic violence allegations. The trial court further found that Wife was aware of the 

potential ramifications of her actions and “the sole purpose of making the post and 

contacting his employer was to harass the Petitioner directly in contravention of the 

mandatory injunction.” As such, the trial court ruled that Husband’s petition was granted, 

Wife was to remove the offending Facebook post, and Wife was enjoined “from making 

any other public allegations against [Husband] on social media (on any platform) or to his 

employer which may affect Petitioner’s reputation or employment.”

On March 29, 2019, the trial court entered its order finding Wife in “direct civil 

contempt.” The order noted that Wife was taken into custody “until such time as she 

agreed to remove the [] post in question.” The order stated that Wife agreed to comply 

with the trial court’s restraining order approximately four hours after being taken into 

custody and had therefore purged her contempt. 

Also on March 29, 2019, the parties appeared before the trial court on several 

unrelated matters. After the trial court ruled on various motions by Husband, Wife 

informed the trial court that she had a motion to recuse that had yet to be filed. The trial 

judge directed Wife to file her motion, set it for hearing, and that he would rule on it in 
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due course. Wife filed her motion on the same day. Wife’s recusal motion alleged that the 

trial court’s actions in granting Husband’s motion for protective order and petition for 

restraining order, as well as finding Wife in contempt showed an appearance of bias that 

warranted recusal. Additionally, Wife alleged that the trial judge had shown “disdain” for 

pro se litigants. The motion was accompanied by Wife’s affidavit stating that the facts 

contained in the motion were “true to the best of my knowledge.” 

On April 5, 2019, Husband filed a motion to have argument on the motion to 

recuse, alleging that Wife had refused to set a hearing on her own motion. According to 

Husband, despite refusing to set her motion, Wife objected to the entry of orders on 

matters decided by the trial court prior to the filing of the recusal motion. As such, 

Husband alleged that he “cannot reasonably proceed with trial preparation until and 

unless the Motion to Recuse is disposed of, as Wife is using said pending motion as both 

a shield and a sword.” Husband therefore requested that the trial court set a hearing on 

the motion to recuse or issue a written order on the motion. 

Despite Wife’s objection, the trial court entered an order on April 9, 2019, 

adjudicating the motions that had been heard on March 29, 2019, prior to the filing of the 

recusal motion. In response, Wife filed a motion to set aside the April 9 order on April 

16, 2019. Wife argued that the trial court’s entry of this order violated Rule 10B of the 

Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. See Tenn. Supt. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.02 (“While the motion 

is pending, the judge whose disqualification is sought shall make no further orders and 

take no further action on the case, except for good cause stated in the order in which such 

action is taken.”). On the next day, Wife filed a supplemental motion to recuse noting the 

trial court’s violation of Rule 10B. Again, the supplemental motion was accompanied by 

an affidavit stating that the facts were “true to the best of my knowledge.”

No oral argument was ever had on the motion to recuse. Instead, the trial judge 

entered a lengthy written order denying the motion on May 3, 2019. Therein, the trial 

judge ruled that Wife’s motion was procedurally deficient in that it was not accompanied 

by an affidavit stating that the facts contained therein were based on personal knowledge 

and the motion was untimely. Nevertheless, the trial judge went on to consider the merits 

of Wife’s motion, finding that there was no basis for recusal either subjectively or 

objectively. In support, the trial judge noted that its rulings “have been confined to the 

matters specifically before the [c]ourt and the [c]ourt has not prejudged any of the 

allegations raised by [Wife].” In particular, the trial court noted that its decision to grant 

the protective order relating to the location of the deposition was based on the allegations 

of domestic abuse contained in Wife’s pleadings; the taking of depositions in a public 

place rather than Wife’s home was therefore “in everyone’s best interest.” The trial court 

denied that its decision was based on any finding crediting Husband’s allegation that 

Wife had engaged in “unpredictable and inappropriate behavior.”
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Wife thereafter filed a timely accelerated petition for recusal appeal to this Court 

pursuant to Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. On May 24, 2019, we 

directed Husband to file a response to Wife’s petition. Husband complied on June 10, 

2019. We now exercise our discretion to decide this recusal appeal without oral 

argument. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 10B, § 2.06 (“The appellate court’s decision, in the 

court’s discretion, may be made without oral argument.”).

ISSUE PRESENTED

This appeal involves a single issue: whether the trial judge erred in denying Wife’s 

motion to recuse.3 Recusal should be granted “whenever the judge has any doubts about 

his or her ability to preside impartially” or “when a person of ordinary prudence in the 

judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable 

basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.” Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (footnote omitted). The trial judge in this case expressly ruled 

that it had “no actual bias, prejudice, or favor for or against any party or attorney in this 

matter.” As such, the dispositive issue is whether a reasonable person would question the 

judge’s impartiality under the circumstances of this case. We review the trial judge’s 

denial of a motion to recuse “under a de novo standard of review.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 

10B, § 2.01.

ANALYSIS

I. Procedure

The parties first dispute whether the appropriate procedure was followed in this 

case. Recusal issues are governed by Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. 

Pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, a litigant is entitled 

to seek disqualification of a trial judge by filing a motion that: (1) is supported by an 

affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury by personal knowledge or 

by other appropriate materials; (2) states, with specificity, all factual and legal grounds 

supporting disqualification of the judge; and (3) affirmatively states that it is not being 

presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 

needless increase in the cost of litigation. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.01.

Upon filing of such motion, “the judge whose recusal is sought shall either grant 

or deny the motion in writing.” Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2014). If the motion is denied, the judge shall state in writing the grounds for the 

denial. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.03. Additionally, if the motion is denied, the movant 

 

3

In the trial court, Wife also took issue with the trial court’s action in entering two orders while 

the motion to recuse was pending. Wife does not raise this argument on appeal and we therefore do not 

address it. 
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may file an accelerated interlocutory appeal of the denial. According to Section 2.02 of

Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court:

To effect an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a 

motion for disqualification or recusal of the trial court judge, a petition for 

recusal appeal shall be filed in the appropriate appellate court within 

twenty-one days of the trial court’s entry of the order. In civil cases, a bond 

for costs as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 6 shall be filed with the petition. 

A copy of the petition shall be promptly served on all other parties, and a 

copy also shall be promptly filed with the trial court clerk. For purposes of 

this section, “appropriate appellate court” means the appellate court to 

which an appeal would lie from the trial court’s final judgment in the case.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.02. The movant is also required to include copies of “all 

supporting documents filed in the trial court, a copy of the trial court’s order or opinion 

ruling on the motion, and a copy of any other parts of the trial court record necessary for 

determination of the appeal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.03. 

Here, the trial court ruled that Wife’s motion was procedurally defective in two 

aspects. First, the trial court found that the affidavit accompanying Wife’s motion did not 

state that it was based on personal knowledge. Additionally, the trial court ruled that 

Wife’s motion was untimely. We will address each alleged defect in turn. 

A.

As previously discussed, Rule 10B states that a motion to recuse must be 

accompanied by “an affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on 

personal knowledge and by other appropriate materials.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.01. 

Here, Wife’s accompanying affidavit stated only that the information contained therein 

was “true to the best of my knowledge.” The trial court ruled that this statement did not 

meet the high standard required of Rule 10B. Husband agrees with the trial court’s

assessment of Wife’s affidavit, arguing that the affidavit in this case closely resembles 

the affidavit that was held insufficient in Berg v. Berg, No. M2018-01163-COA-T10BCV, 2018 WL 3612845 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2018). As the panel in Berg explained: 

[The affidavit] clearly does not meet the standard set forth in Rule 10B. 

Instead of being made under oath on “personal knowledge” as is required, 

the affidavit filed in this case includes an oath attesting that the statements 

included are “true to the best of [Mother’s] knowledge, information and 

belief.” Averring that something is true to the best of one’s knowledge, 

information, and belief does not signify that it is based on personal 

knowledge. See Bridgewater v. Adamczyk, No. M2009-01582-COA-R3-

CV, 2010 WL 1293801, at * 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (noting that 
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personal knowledge is knowledge gained through firsthand experience or 

observation); Seals v. Tri-State Defender, Inc., No. 02A01-9806-CH00172, 1999 WL 628074, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1999) (noting that 

an affidavit stating a fact “to my best knowledge and ability” was not made 

on personal knowledge); see also Edward J. Levin, “Best” Is Not Always 

Best When it Comes To Knowledge, 30 Prob. & Prop. 44, 45 (Jan./Feb. 

2016) (noting that the term “best knowledge” embodies a level of 

uncertainty and that a statement made to the “best knowledge” of a person

does not mean that the statement is based on that individual’s personal 

knowledge).

Berg, 2018 WL 3612845, at *3. As such, the Berg opinion holds that in light of the 

deficiencies in the affidavit, the trial court was not required to address the substantive 

merits of the recusal motion. 

Another panel of this Court came to the opposite conclusion in Beaman v. 

Beaman, No. M2018-01651-COA-T10B-CV, 2018 WL 5099778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 

19, 2018). Therein, the panel concluded that use of “magic words” was not necessary 

where “[a] fair interpretation of Wife’s counsel’s declaration in this case demonstrates 

that it was based on personal knowledge even though it did not expressly state that it was 

based “on personal knowledge.’” Id. at 13. The court distinguished the affidavit at issue 

with the affidavit in Berg, noting that “[u]nlike the affidavit at issue in Berg, the 

declaration in this case did not include qualifying language necessarily negating the 

conclusion that it was based on personal knowledge.” As such, the Beaman panel went 

on to address the merits of the recusal motion. Id. at *14–*15. 

The statement in Wife’s affidavit is substantially similar to that utilized in Berg,

however, the affidavit itself and the recusal motion at issue both readily reveal that 

Wife’s allegations are based on hearings where she was present and orders to which she 

was a party. In a similar situation, this Court has considered whether “it [was] apparent 

from the substance of the disputed affidavits [] that they [were] based on the personal 

knowledge of the affiants.” Ueber v. Ueber, No. M2018-02053-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 

WL 410703, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019) (involving an affidavit “the same” as 

that filed in Berg). Likewise, even a limited and surface-level inspection of Wife’s 

motion reveals that it is indeed based on personal knowledge. Moreover, Wife’s affidavit 

in support of her petition for recusal appeal specifically states that the facts contained in 

both her motion and appeal are based on personal knowledge. Finally, despite the trial 

court’s finding that Wife’s motion was defective, it did expressly and thoroughly 

consider the merits of Wife’s motion and both parties have briefed the merits of the 

motion to this Court. As such, we conclude that the best practice in this case is to proceed 

to consider the remaining issues in this case notwithstanding Wife’s failure to strictly 

comply with Rule 10B. We caution litigants, however, that we may not be so forgiving in 

the future. 
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B.

The trial court also found that Wife’s motion was untimely. “Courts frown upon 

the manipulation of the impartiality issue to gain procedural advantage and will not 

permit litigants to refrain from asserting known grounds for disqualification in order ‘to 

experiment with the court . . . and raise the objection later when the result of the trial is 

unfavorable.’” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting 

Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. 754 (Tenn. 1882)). Consequently, “recusal motions must be 

filed promptly after the facts forming the basis for the motion become known, and the 

failure to seek recusal in a timely manner results in a waiver of a party’s right to question 

a judge’s impartiality.” Davis v. Tennessee Dep’t of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 

313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

Here, the basis of Wife’s recusal motion results from two requests filed by Husband. 

The first request, a motion for a protective order regarding the taking of depositions, was 

filed on January 9, 2019, with a hearing that took place on January 25, 2019. The second 

request, a petition for a restraining order related to social media posts, was filed on 

January 15, 2019, and heard on February 7, 2019. The trial court entered orders on both 

motions on February 13, 2019. Wife filed her recusal motion on March 29, 2019.

Although Wife waited until the trial court had ruled on some of Husband’s motions 

before bringing the recusal motion to the trial court’s attention, it appears that Wife 

generally agreed to Husband’s requests during the March 29 hearing. As such, the record 

does not demonstrate that Wife’s decision to hold the recusal motion was 

“experiment[al]” or strategic. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228.

Although we agree that Wife’s decision to wait until the conclusion of the March 29, 

2019 hearing is perplexing and serves to undermine her argument that she believes that 

the trial judge has an impermissible bias against her, we are reluctant to conclude that a 

delay of six weeks between the entry of the written order at issue and the recusal motion 

results in a waiver of her arguments. Rule 10B does not place a brightline rule on the 

timeliness of recusal motions, nor has this Court ever adopted such a rule. In another 

case, this Court proceeded to consider the merits of the appellant’s recusal motion despite 

the fact that the motion was filed seven months after the divorce decree and over two 

months after an order on attorney’s fees, both of which served as the basis for the recusal 

motion. See Ueber v. Ueber, No. M2018-02053-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 WL 410703, at *3 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019). Although we acknowledged that the appellant’s motion 

was “arguably somewhat untimely[,]” we exercised our discretion to nevertheless 

consider the merits of the recusal issue. Id. (“Tennessee law concerning appeals filed 

under Rule 10B gives this Court some discretion to waive certain procedural deficiencies 

in order to reach the merits of a motion filed under Rule 10B.”). We have held, however, 

that a delay of over four months from when an appeal of the trial court’s ruling has been 

filed does render a recusal motion untimely. See Kershaw v. Kershaw, No. M2009-

00151-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4039262, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009). We are 
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not necessarily persuaded that the six week delay in this case renders Wife’s motion 

untimely. In any event, however, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this 

appeal notwithstanding any allegations of delay. 

II. Merits

Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 provides that “[a] judge shall 

disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned[.]” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 10, § 2.11. It is well-settled that “‘[t]he 

right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a fundamental constitutional right.’” 

Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 

447, 470 (Tenn. 2002)). Article VI, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution, Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 17-2-101, and the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit a judge 

from presiding over a matter in which the judge has an interest in the outcome or where 

the judge is connected to either party. The purpose of the prohibition is to “guard against 

the prejudgment of the rights of litigants and to avoid situations in which the litigants 

might have cause to conclude that the court [] reached a prejudged conclusion because of 

interest, partiality, or favor.” Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 470 (citation omitted). Additionally, 

we have emphasized that “the preservation of the public’s confidence in judicial 

neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be 

perceived to be impartial.” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1998) (citations omitted). Accordingly, even in cases wherein a judge sincerely believes 

that she can preside over a matter fairly and impartially, the judge nevertheless should 

recuse herself in cases where a reasonable person “‘in the judge’s position, knowing all 

the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s 

impartiality.’” Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564–65 (Tenn. 2001) 

(quoting Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 820). It is an objective test designed to avoid actual bias 

and the appearance of bias, “since the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of 

the judicial system as actual bias.” Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 565 (citation omitted). 

Under Rule 2.3 of the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct, “[a] judge shall 

perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or 

prejudice.” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 10, § 2.3(a). As such, 

A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 

limited to the following circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 

party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the 

proceeding. . . . 

Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 10, § 2.11(A)(1). 
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Generally, the terms “bias” and “prejudice” refer to a state of mind or attitude that 

works to predispose a judge for or against a party. Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 821. “‘However, 

not all unfavorable dispositions toward an individual or case can be properly described by 

those terms. The words suggest a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is 

somehow wrongful or inappropriate because it is excessive, undeserved, or rests on 

knowledge the subject should not possess.’” Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79, 89 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2016), perm. app. denied (Apr. 12, 2017) (quoting Groves v. Ernst-W. 

Corp., No. M2016-01529-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 5181687, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Sept. 16, 2016)). Bias is often divided into two types, each of which implicates a different 

standard for determining whether recusal is warranted. Where a bias stems from an 

extrajudicial source, rather than from events or observations during litigation of a case, it 

is may be sufficient to justify recusal if the judge’s behavior raises “reasonable questions 

about the judge’s impartiality.” Groves, 2016 WL 5181687, at *5; see also McKenzie v. 

McKenzie, No. M2014-00010-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 575908, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Feb. 11, 2014) (quoting Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 821) (“To disqualify, prejudice must be of a 

personal character, directed at the litigant, ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and 

result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from 

participation in the case.’”) Where, however, “the bias is alleged to stem from events 

occuring in the course of the litigation of the case, the party seeking recusal has a greater 

burden to show bias that would require recusal, i.e., that the bias is so pervasive that it is 

sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial.” McKenzie, 2014 WL 575908, at *3. Nothing in 

Wife’s petition for recusal appeal suggests that the alleged bias of the trial judge results 

from any extrajudicial source. As such, Wife must meet the higher standard to show a 

bias so pervasive as to deny her the right to a fair trial.4

Here, Wife asserts that the trial judge’s rulings with regard to Husband’s motion 

for a protective order and petition for a restraining order show a pervasive bias against 

her sufficient to necessitate recusal. As an initial matter, we note whether the trial judge 

erred in his rulings on Husband’s motions is not an issue in this limited, interlocutory 

appeal. Indeed, Wife does not dispute that our jurisdiction in this appeal extends only to 

the question of whether a bias or appearance of impropriety exists that necessitates 

recusal of the trial judge. See Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) 

(“In a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B appeal, the only order we may review is the 

trial court’s order that denies a motion to recuse. Pursuant to the rule, we may not review 

the correctness or merits of the trial court’s other rulings[.]”). But see Krohn v. Krohn, 

No. M2015-01280-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 5772549, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 

2015) (no perm. app. filed) (considering the propriety of a discovery order in determining 

whether recusal was warranted). Neither does Wife dispute that complaints regarding the 

 

4

In the trial court, Wife “suggest[ed]” in her recusal motion that the trial judge was biased against 

all pro se litigants. Wife has apparently abandoned this argument, as she does not address it in any fashion 

in her petition for recusal appeal. As such, this argument is not before us.
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“contentiousness of the proceedings nor any of the trial court’s rulings do not constitute 

‘a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” See In re Conservatorship 

of John Daniel Tate, No. 2012-01918-COA-10B-CV, 2012 WL 4086159, at *3 (quoting 

State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 73 (Tenn. 2010)). We note that it is well-settled that 

adverse rulings, “even if erroneous, numerous and continuous,” may not be sufficient to 

necessitate recusal. Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 

Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that adverse rulings are necessary 

byproducts of the adversarial process and the trial judge’s role in “assess[ing] the 

credibility of those who testify before them.” Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 

560, 565 (Tenn. 2001). 

Rather than take issue with the trial court’s substantive rulings, Wife contends that 

the trial court’s “rulings have repeatedly exceeded the relief sought by opposing counsel 

and create an appearance of both bias and prejudice which require his recusal.” Wife also 

asserts that the trial court’s decisions show that he has prejudged the issues remaining in 

the case. As an initial matter, we note that throughout her petition for recusal appeal, 

Wife takes issue with several inferences and implications that she asserts are evident 

from the trial court’s rulings. We agree that trial court orders may sometimes contain 

both express rulings and necessary implications. See Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 

401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn. 2013) (holding, in the context of an arbitration action, 

“when construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly 

implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated”). As this Court has previously 

explained, however, “[w]e start our analysis of the grounds for recusal understanding that 

a party challenging the impartiality of a judge ‘must come forward with some evidence 

that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 671 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2002)). As such, we will consider whether the evidence in the record would cause a 

reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances. In order 

to analyze this issue, we will consider each of the allegedly offending rulings made by the 

trial judge.

Wife first asserts that the ruling on the motion for protective order went beyond 

the relief requested by the motion by ordering that all depositions would take place in the 

Shelby County Courthouse. Specifically, Wife’s petition for recusal appeal states as 

follows: “Per the Order on Motion for Protective Order, Judge Weiss ruled that all 

depositions must be held at the Shelby County Courthouse. However, this form of relief 

was only sought as it pertained to the deposition of [Husband] within the Motion for 

Protective Order.” (Record citations omitted). Such statement is categorically false. 

Rather, Husband’s motion contains the following request: “Husband would request that 

this Court enter a protective order requiring Wife to take the depositions of Sgt. Mote, 

Anthony Mullins, Daniel Cordero, and James Erwin at the Shelby County Courthouse or 

some other conference room in a public place.” Thus, the trial court’s decision to require 
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these depositions to take place at the courthouse was not outside of the relief requested.5

Accordingly, Wife’s claim that the trial court’s decision to provide Husband with more 

relief than requested, thereby illustrating a bias against her, fails with regard to this order. 

Wife’s other issues with the trial court’s order on this topic are also unsupported 

by the record. Specifically, Wife states that 

The Order on Motion to Recuse states that there was not a finding of 

“unpredictable and inappropriate” behavior on the part of Ms. Stark, but 

based on “it [being] in everyone’s best interest.” However, this is neither 

the language included within the order entered, nor the appropriate legal 

standard for such a ruling. TN. R. Civ. Pro. 26.03. Instead, said Order, in 

relevant part held that “Husband’s Motion was well taken” and “that 

Husband’s request that his deposition be taken audiovisually, or in the 

presence of a bailiff is reasonable under the circumstances which factors 

into the Court’s ruling that said deposition be had only at the Shelby 

County Courthouse.” The well-taken motion referenced was supported with 

allegations of “unpredictable and inappropriate” behavior and under a 

future, cold and inanimate review of the record, should an appellate court 

be asked to review a final judgment, said court would likely view the order 

as indeed making such a finding. Further, as previously mentioned, counsel 

for [Husband] submitted no evidence at the hearing on the Protective Order 

but relied solely on legal argument. Said legal argument consisted mainly 

of “sometimes she’s a victim and sometimes she’s a prosecutor” and 

“personally I do not want to go to [Wife’s] house.” 

Thus, it is not the Court’s holding as to where the depositions must be 

held that gives rise to this Motion to Recuse, but the implication associated 

with the court exceeding the request of the opposing counsel. Additionally, 

the court’s order incorporating and approving a motion based on 

“unpredictable and inappropriate” behavior as a reason to necessitate the 

close proximity of bailiffs, creates an extremely negative picture of Ms. 

Stark for future review. This negative inference was never supported, either 

by allegation or evidentiary proof, of any potentially dangerous conduct on 

Ms. Stark’s part and the complete gratuitousness of the finding create a 

reasonable appearance of bias and prejudice.

(Record citations omitted).

 

5 With regard to the deposition of the out-of-state witness, Husband requested that the deposition 

be taken remotely. The trial court denied this relief, ruling that the deposition would be taken in Missouri 

as requested by Wife unless the witness agreed to be deposed in Shelby County. 
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Respectfully, Wife’s argument on this issue is difficult to discern. As Wife readily 

admits, nothing in the order suggests that the trial court found Wife guilty of 

“unpredictable and inappropriate” behavior. Rather, the trial court appears to have 

exercised its discretion to rule that the depositions should not be taken in Wife’s home 

given the nature of the allegations in this case. The fact that the trial court granted 

Husband’s motion does not mean that he necessarily credited all of Husband’s 

allegations. Simply put, we decline Wife’s invitation to infer some inappropriate motive 

from the trial court’s ruling that is not evident from the face of the order or a thorough 

review of the record as a whole. 

Moreover, again we note that we are not tasked with reviewing the correctness of the 

trial court’s rulings, nor does an alleged incorrect ruling, standing alone, provide 

evidence of a bias sufficient to warrant recusal. Indeed, reviewing the trial court’s ruling 

would be difficult in the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence to 

substantiate Wife’s allegations regarding the evidence presented at this hearing. Cf. In re 

M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“When no transcript or statement 

of the evidence is included in the record on appeal, we conclusively presume that the 

findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by the evidence and are correct.”). 

Having determined that the trial court did not rule in excess of the relief requested, we 

must conclude that this order provides no evidence of a bias so pervasive as to deny Wife 

a fair trial. 

The same is true with regard to the ruling on Husband’s petition for a protective order 

concerning the social media posts. With regard to this request, Wife takes issue with the 

fact that Husband’s petition did not allege that Wife violated the mandatory injunction 

put in place upon the filing of the divorce, while the trial court’s order finds that Wife’s 

actions were “directly in contravention of the mandatory injunction.” While we agree that 

Husband’s motion was not in the nature of a contempt action seeking redress for Wife’s 

alleged violation of the mandatory injunction, the existence of the mandatory injunction 

was cited in the hearing on Husband’s petition without objection and was subject to 

judicial notice by the trial court. See generally Tenn. R. Evid. 201 (governing judicial 

notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute”). Moreover, the trial court did not 

impose any penalty on Wife for the alleged violation of the mandatory injunction other 

than to explicitly extend the injunction to cover Wife’s social media and other postings 

concerning Husband and the Memphis Police Department. This is exactly the relief that 

Husband sought in his motion. The simple fact that the proof at trial, in the trial court’s 

view, indeed showed that Wife had violated the injunction already in place is simply not 

evidence of a pervasive bias against Wife, nor does it create an appearance of 

impropriety. 

Likewise, the trial court’s ruling that Wife’s purpose in making the social media posts 

was to harass Husband is not evidence of bias or impermissible prejudgment. Here, Wife 

chose not to submit any evidence to dispute Husband’s testimony that Wife was 
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harassing him through the dissemination of her allegations. Generally, the trial court’s 

ruling after hearing evidence is simply not a basis for this Court to conclude that the trial 

court impermissibly prejudged the other issues remaining in this case. The trial court may 

often be called upon to hear evidence concerning preliminary matters in a case. This may 

lead the trial court to make rulings that affect future litigation or to the trial court having 

an unfavorable impression of a party. If this alone were evidence of impermissible 

prejudgment, any rulings by the trial court on preliminary matters would subject the trial 

court to removal efforts. Cf. C.D.B. v. A.B., No. M2018-00532-COA-T10B-CV, 2018 

WL 1976119, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018) (“A trial court’s decision to exercise 

its authority under Rule 35.01 to move for or order a mental or psychological evaluation 

of a party based on knowledge learned during the proceedings is simply insufficient to 

show that the trial court had prejudged the disputed issues in the case; were that true, all 

trial courts who had ordered Rule 35 examinations would be required to thereafter recuse 

from hearing the merits of the dispute.”). Instead, as previously discussed, even where a 

trial judge actually develops a bias from in-court interactions, such a bias must be so 

pervasive as to deny the litigant the right to a fair trial to warrant recusal. See McKenzie, 

2014 WL 575908, at *3. Here, the record simply does not demonstrate any bias on the 

part of the trial judge, much less a bias of a pervasive nature. 

Finally, Wife takes issue with the trial court’s ruling finding her in contempt. Wife 

concedes, however, that the propriety of this ruling is not at issue in this appeal. Rather, 

Wife appears to dispute the procedure utilized by the trial court, as Wife was not 

permitted a separate hearing before a different judge. Tennessee, however, recognizes 

several types of contempt, including direct summary contempt, which may be found 

without the benefit of a separate hearing. See Daniels v. Grimac, 342 S.W.3d 511 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2010) (“A trial judge has the authority to punish direct contempt summarily 

when necessary to protect the authority and integrity of the court and to prevent 

obstruction of the administration of justice. Direct contempt may be punished summarily 

if the judge certifies that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting contempt.”). 

While the correctness of the trial court’s contempt decision may be evaluated by this 

Court in another proceeding, the only question in this case is whether the record shows 

sufficient evidence of bias or an appearance of impropriety to necessitate recusal. 

We conclude that the transcript of this hearing contains no such evidence. Following 

the trial court’s oral ruling on the motion for restraining order, Wife essentially invited 

the trial court to find her in contempt after stating that she would not follow the trial 

court’s order. The trial court gave Wife another opportunity to comply after a break in the 

proceedings. Still, however, Wife refused to comply. The trial court thereafter held Wife 

in contempt. The transcript at issue reflects no disdain toward Wife or even the hint of a 

heated manner exhibited by the trial judge. As such, nothing in the record supports 

Wife’s claim that these events create an appearance of impropriety or suggest that the 
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trial judge has impermissibly prejudged the remaining issues in this case such that recusal 

is warranted.6

In sum, after reviewing Wife’s filing to this Court and the supporting documents, we 

conclude that Wife has failed to show a reasonable basis for questioning the trial judge’s 

impartiality. In general, a trial court’s unfavorable or even erroneous rulings are 

insufficient to show bias. Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that a trial 

judge’s decision to grant more relief than requested by a party was a basis to question the 

judge’s impartiality, the record does not show that this scenario occurred in this case. 

Here, the trial court’s decision to require depositions to take place in a public forum was 

based on the fact that Wife raised serious allegations of domestic violence in her 

complaint. Likewise, the trial court’s decision to grant Husband’s request for a restraining 

order resulted from Husband’s testimony that Wife’s decision to disseminate those 

allegations in her chosen manner could affect his employment. Finally, the trial court’s 

decision to hold Wife in contempt, regardless of whether it proves erroneous, occurred

after Wife essentially invited the trial court to take that action. Wife has not shown that 

the any of these decisions were the product of pervasive bias or prejudgment. Simply put, 

nothing that occurred in this case would lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s 

impartiality. As such, the trial court’s denial of Wife’s motion to recuse is affirmed. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Shelby County Circuit Court is affirmed and this cause is 

remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant Pamela 

Diane Stark, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

 

6

For example, Wife asserts because the trial court’s granted Husband a restraining order 

concerning Wife’s statements, “it is reasonable to belief [sic] that [the trial judge] has formed an opinion” 

as to her tort claims against Husband. Neither the trial court’s written order nor its oral ruling in any way 

suggests that the trial court has determined these issues; rather, the trial court specifically notes that an 

investigation into the allegation has not concluded.