F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A BD U L H. A LO CO ZY ,

Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.
U NI TED S T A T ES C I TI Z EN S HI P AND I MMI GR ATI ON S ER VI CE S ; A L EJ ANDR O M AYOR K AS , Direc tor, United States Citiz enship & I mmi g ratio n Se rv ic e s; M I CH A EL C. B I GGS , Field Dir ector

of United States Citi zenship & Immigration Se rv ic e s; J AN E T A. N AP OL I TANO , Secre tary of the De partment of H o m e l an d

S e c u r i t y, Respondents-A

ppellees

. No. 11-16557

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01597- JA M

- K JN

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia J ohn A. Mende z, Dist rict Judge, Pre siding Argued and Submitted De c e mbe r 6 , 2 01 2— San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed De cembe r 28, 2012A L OC OZ Y V

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2

T h e H on or abl e Fr ede r i c B l ock , Se n i or U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or * t he E ast ern D i st ri ct of N ew Y o rk, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. Be fore : Stephen S. Trott and J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, Circuit J udg es, and F rede ric B lock, District J udg e. *

Op ini on by Judg e Tr ottA L OC OZ Y V

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T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Im m igration The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s sum mary judgme nt in favor of

the United States Cit i zenship and I mmigration Service s, in Abdul H. Alocozy ’s action challeng ing the USCI S’ determination finding him ineligible for
natur a lizatio n d

ue to h is f

e lony c on victio n for

a ssa ult wi th intent to commit rape. The pa nel held that the gover

nment’s prior g rant of I

NA § 212(c) relief

to Alocozy

did not c onstitut e a w aiver by the g ov e rnme nt o f 8 U. S.C. § 110 1(f )( 8) ' s p e rm ane nt b ar t o natura liz ation. The pa

nel also held that I I RI RA’s addition of “cr ime of violence ” off

enses to the list of ag g ravated fe lonies that bar natura liz ation was not a n improper ret roactive application of the statute.

CO UN SEL Stephen Shaiken, San F ranc isco, California, for PetitionerAp pe lla nt.
Audre y B. Hemesath, De partment of Justice, Sacra mento, Ca lif or nia , f or Re sp on de nts -A

pp e lle e s.A L OC OZ Y V

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OP IN ION TROTT, Circuit J udg e: Abdul H. Alocozy

appea ls a dec ision by

the district court denying his pe tition for review of a de termination by the United S t ates Citiz enship and Immigration Services (“ USC I S” ) t

hat his fe lony c on vic tio n of a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o commit r ape rende rs him ineligible to bec ome natura liz ed as
a Un ite d St a te s c iti zen . We have jur isd ic tio n purs uant to 28 U. S.C. § 1 29 1, and

we a ff ir m.
I
The fa cts and c ircu m s t ances surroundingthis case a re larg ely undisputed. Alocozy , a native a nd citizen of Afg hanistan, ca

me to the United States i n 1983. On Octobe r 15, 1984, his status was adjusted pursua nt to section 209(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“I NA”) to “lawf

ul pe rm ane nt r e sid e nt. ” On

Oc tob e r 3 , 1 99 0, he wa s c ha rg e d in Alameda County , California with ra pe, in violation of California P enal Code section 261. He subsequently pleade d
no lo c on te nd

e re on Janu ary 9, 19 91 to f e lon iou s a ssa

ult wi th the intent to commit rape, i n violation of California Penal Cod e se c tio n 2 20 , as a stip ulate d re late d o ff e ns e to t he c ri me orig inally char g ed.

I n 1999, the I mmigration and Natura liz at i on Service (“I NS”) initi at ed remova l proce eding s ag ainst Alocozy on acc ount of hi s conviction of an agg ravated fe lony as def ined in section 101(a) (43) of

the I NA. On Ma

y 27, 2004, an immigration judge ( “I J ”) g rante d his application for a discretionar

y waiver of depor tation unde r former

I NA sec tionA L OC OZ Y V

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S ee a lso 8 C

. F.R

. § 3 1 6

. 1 0 (b)(1). 1 212(c) , and re mov al proce eding s ag ainst him were terminated.
Fi v e mo n th s late r , o n O c to b e r 6 , 2 0 0 4 , h e a p p li e d to the USC I S f o r n a tu r a li zati o n a s a U n it e d St a te s c it iz e n
. On S ep tember 28, 2005, the USCI S’s District Direc tor denied A lo c o zy ’ s a

p p li c a ti o n o n th e g r o u n d th a t h is c o n v ic tion on Janu ary 9, 19 91 of

an a g g ra

vate d f e lony a uto matic a lly preve nted h im from establishing the g ood moral cha rac ter re qu ir e d b y

law t o s up po rt

his app lic a tio n, thu s b a

rr inghim from natur alization. Alocozy ’s administrative appe al of the District Direc tor’s decision wa s unsucce ssful, and he then filed a petition for de novo revie w in the d i s t ri ct cour t pursuant to the I

NA. 8 U. S

. C

. § 1421(c) . On cr oss-motions for summary jud g me nt, the c ourt

g ra nte d ju dg me nt t o th e USC I S.
Ba sed upon t he litiga

nts’ ag ree ment that Alocozy was c o n v i c t e d o nJ anu ar

y 9 , 1 9 9 1 o f

ana g g r a v a t e d

f e l o n y, 8 U .S. C. § 11 01 (a )( 43 ), the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a s f oll ow s: 1) I n 1996, Congr ess added “a c rime of violenc e” to the list of ag g ravated felonies in 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a) (43) a s part of the I lleg al I mmigration Re form and I mmigra nt Responsibili ty

Act (“ I I RI RA”). 2) I n s e c tio n 3 21 (b ) o f I I RI RA , Co ng re ss i nte nd e d th is
a dd iti on to a pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly

to t he a g g ra vate d fe lon

y ba r t o natura liz ation established by the Immigration Act o f 1990 (“I MMACT 90”). 1A L OC OZ Y V

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6 3) Be cause I MMACT 90 is n o t retroactive, the g ood moral cha rac ter ba r “a pplies only

to ag g ravated fe lonies [s uch as Alocozy ’s] entered on or afte r Nove mber 29, 1990,” the eff ective da te of I MMACT 90. 4) Be cause Alocozy ’s ag g ravated fe lony conviction po std a te s N ov e mbe r 2 9, 19 90 , it “ pe rmanen tly

ba r[s ] him from esta blishing g ood moral cha

rac ter for natura liz ation.”

II
Al oc ozy do e s n ot d isp ute the fi rs t thre e of the se conclusions. Howe ver, he asser ts neverthe less that the g rant to him of former I

NA sec tion 212(c) r elief f rom deportati on (now re moval) constituted a wa iver by the Gover

nment of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) ’s per manent bar

to naturalization. He bolsters this contention with the argument that b ecause the crime of which he w as convic ted was not a n “ag g ravated f e lo n y ” in 1 9 9 1 a t t

h e ti me o f

h is p le a, INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289 (2001) preclude s the application to him “of a n a dv e rs e imm ig ratio n c on se qu e nc e no t f o r e s e e a b le ” a t th e tim e he ente red his plea . Thus, he conte nds, ev en though “ the definition of ag g ravated felony is applied retr oactively , the
c r e a t i o no f

a n e w i m m i g r a t i o nc o n s e qu e n c e i s b ar r e d b y St. Cyr .” Rely ing in pa

rt on the Secon d Circuit’s opinion in Chan v. Gantner , 464 F.3d 289, 294 ( 2 d Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the district court dismissed these a rguments, noting that section 212(c )’s shield in the context of deportation/remova l does not permit him to use it “as a swor d in the natura liz ation context to bar the Gover

nment’s re liance on his a g g ravated fe lony c on vict ion

in d e nyinghim

the wh oll y

se pa ra te imm ig ratio n b e ne fi t of

natur a lizatio n. ” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lsoA L OC OZ Y V

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held that Alocozy

“could not have had a s et tled expectation at the time o f his conviction that a potential discr etionary g ra nt o f 2 12 (c ) r e lie f w ou ld a lso re nd e r h im e li gible to natur a lize , a

nd thu s INS v. St. Cyr [] does not requir e that the former Section 212(c) [] waiver be honore d in the natura liz ation context.” (internal c itation omit ted).

III Alocozy ’s waive r arg ument is easily answe red. “ Waiver” is the i ntentional relinquishment of a known rig ht. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). The re is nothing in th is r e c o r d e v e n r e mo te ly s u g g e s ti n g th a t w hen a
remova ble alien is g rante d discretionar y relief in the form of
a wa iver of de portation, the Gove rnment wa ives any ob je c tio n b a se d on

the g ro un d f

or wh ic h h e wa s r e mov a

ble to his nat u ra l i z at ion as a c itiz en. “I ndeed, a finding of ‘g ood moral cha

rac ter,’ w as not a statutory prer equi s i t e or nece ssarily

a conside ration for

relief under se ction 2 1 2 (c) .” Chan , 464 F.3d at 295. L eg ally , Alocozy offe rs no prec edent or principle suppor

ting his cla im of waiver , nor do we see how there could be a

ny . I n this respec t, we agree with the Second Circuit: “[N]o authority supports the proposition that the g overnme nt is fore closed by a wa iver of de portation from consideringa conv iction when dete rmining the unrelated question of fitness for naturalization.” Id. at 294. Moreove r, w e h a v e h e l d , a s r e c o g n i z e d b y Chan , “that a wai v er unde r section 212(c ) d o es n o t prec lude the I NS or the cour

ts from relying on the underlying of fense to bar othe r for

ms of immigration r elief or benef its.” Id. a t 29 5; Molina-Ame zcua v . I NS , 6 F.3d 646, 647 ( 9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (a
c on vic tio n f

or a c ri me of mo ral tu rp itu de c an b e us e d a s a g r o u n d f o r d e p o rt a t i o ne v e nt h o u g h t h e I N S h a d p r e v iou sly waived its rig ht to deport based in pa rt on that conviction).A L OC OZ Y V

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IV St. Cyr also is unhelpful to Alocozy

. The issue there was whether in 1997 section 304(b) of I I RI RA, which re peale d
se c tio n 2 12 (c), ret roac ti vel y ex ti ngui sh ed an ali en’s e lig ibi lit y fo r d isc re tio na

ry se c tio n 21 2( c ) re lie f wh e n a t th e tim e of his previous convic tion before that date he would have be en elig ible for suc h consideration. 533 U.S. at 292–93.

I n ta c kli ng thi s qu e sti on , the Court fi rs t in dic a te d th at “ it is be y on d dis pu te that, w ith in c on sti tut ion a l li mit s, Con g re ss has the powe r t o enac t laws wit h retrospe ctive ef fec t.” Id. at 31 6. Th e Cou

rt qu ali fi e d th is s tate me nt, saying , “ A s tatut e may not be applied r etroa ctively , howeve r, abse nt a clea r indication from Cong ress that it intended such a r esult.” Id. The Court noted that the “ standard f or findingsuch unambig uous direction is a de manding one,” a nd that it can
on ly be satis fi e d b y

statut or y langua g e “ ‘s o c le ar t

hat it c ou ld sustain only

one interpr etation.’” Id. at 316–17 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)) . The Court the n u se d th is d e mand ing te st to de te rm ine that Co ng re ss d id “not communicate with unmist akable clar ity ” an in t en tion retroa ctively

to repe al § 212(c ). Id. at 318. Most notably for our case , the Court in St. Cyr chose f or comparative and illustrative purpose s to highlig ht other
se c tio ns of I I RI RA , sec tio ns 32 1( b) and (c ), wh e re Con g re ss did adequately

and unmistakably

express its int ent re tr oa c tiv e ly

to a pp ly the pr ov isi on s o f t

ho se se c tio ns
. Another r eason f

or declining to acce pt the I NS’ invitation to rea d § 309(c) (1) as dictating the te mpo ra l r e a c h o f I I RI RA § 3 04 (b ) i s provided by

Congr ess’ will ingne ss, in otherA L OC OZ Y V

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se c tio n s o f

I I R I R A , t o i n d i c a te un a mbi g uo us ly its int e nti on to a pp ly sp e c if ic provisions ret r o a c ti v e ly

. I I RI RA’s amendment of

t h e definition of “ag g ravated f e l o n y , ” f o r e xamp l e , c l e ar l y s t a t e s t h a t it applies with respe ct to “convic tions entered befor e, on, or a fter” the statute’s e nactment date . § 32 1( b) . A s th e Cour t of Ap pe a ls
no te d, the fa c t th at Cong re ss m a de so me provis ion s o f I I RI RA e xpre ssl y a pp lic a ble to prior convic tions, but di d not do so in reg ard to § 30 4( b) , is an ind ic a tio n th a t Co ng re ss d id not de finitively decide the issue of § 3 04’s retroa ctive application to pre-ena ctment c on vic tions . T he “ savin g pr ov isi on ” is there fore no more sig nificant than the specific ation of an e ffe ctive date

. Id. a t 31 8– 20 (i nte rn a l qu ota tio n ma rk s, c itatio n, a lte ra

tio ns , and footnote omitted). The Court’s analy sis forec loses any argument that section 321(b) is not retroac tive.
Moreove r, the Court in St. Cyr relied in lar g e mea sure on what it considere d to be an a lien i n S t. Cy r’s situation’s “settled expectations,” i.e., that a plea of g uilty to a fe lony would not make him ineligible for sec tion 212(c) r elief f rom deportation. Id. at 3 21, 323. Even if we wer e to conc lude that section 321(b) is not retroa ctive, which we do not, we ar e convince d that a person in Alocozy ’s s ituation could not have had any “settled” or even rea sonable belief or e x pectation that a plea to a serious felony would not impair any future attempt to pursue natur alization as a United States citiz en. Where as the Court found consider able a uthoritative support in St. Cyr for the rea sonablene ss of St. Cy r’ s ex pectations, id. at 322A L OC OZ Y V

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10 (c i t i n g inte r a lia Ma

ga na -P iza no v . I

NS , 200 F.3d 603, 612 (9th Cir. 1999)), Aloc ozy offe rs nothing similar.
The require ments of becoming a natura liz ed citizen and the gro u nds for avoiding de portation as a f elon ar e as di fferent a s c ha lk i s f

ro m c he e se . T o q

uo te the Sup re me Court , When the Gover

nment seeks to strip a person of citi zen sh ip a lr e a dy

a c qu ir e d, or

de po rt a re sid e nt a lie n a

nd se nd him from o ur

sh or e s, it c arr ie s th e he avy burd e n of p ro vin g its c a se by clea r, unequivocal, and c onvincing
e vid e nc e . B ut whe n an alie n s e e ks to o bta in the privileg es and be nefit s o f citizenship, the shoe is on the other f

oot. He i s t h e moving pa rt y , af fi rm a tiv e ly

a sk ingthe Go ve rnme nt t o endow him with al l the adva ntag es of citizenship. Beca

use that status, once g rante d, cannot lightly be taken awa y , the Gover

nment has a strong and leg itimate interest in ensuring that only qualified persons are g rante d citizenship.
Be re ny i v . D ist . D ir. , I

NS , 385 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1967) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s and fo otn ote s omi tte d)

. Any do ub ts re g ard ingan a lie n’ s e lig ibi lity fo r c iti zen sh ip a

re “ re so lve d in f a v o r o f th e U n it e d St a te s an d a g a in s t th e c la im an t.” Id. at 637 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Also, unlike the g rounds for se ction 212(c) relief from de po rt a tio n, 8 U .S. C. § 14 27 (a )’ s st a tut or y pr ov ision s do include a require ment of demonstration by the applica

nt that he “ha s been a

nd still is a perso n of g ood moral cha rac ter.”A L OC OZ Y V

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8 U .S. C. § 14 27 (a )( 3) . No one c on vic te d by a ple a of g uil ty to a fe lony i n v o l v i ng assault with the intent to commit rape and ther eby

becominga re g istered se x offe nder in his state of residenc e could r easona

bly b el i eve that his moral char acte r would not be seriously

impaired.
CO NC LU SION
The district court ’s gra

nt of summary

judgme nt to the USC I S a s a

matter of law w a s ju sti fi e d. Con tr ary to Alocozy ’s claims, he has not been deprived of due proc ess of law or be en the victim of t he improper retroa ctive application of a statut e . A lth ou g h h e is b arr ed from n a tur a lizatio n a s a c iti zen , h is status a s a le g a l pe rm ane nt re sid e nt re ma ins in f ull forc e.
AF F IRMED.