IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–1147

Submitted September 15, 2022—Filed October 28, 2022

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

MAURICE EDWARD SALLIS,

Appellant.

______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F. 

Staudt (suppression and limited appearance hearings), George L. Stigler (limited 

appearance hearing), and David P. Odekirk (trial), Judges.

A criminal defendant who was represented by appointed counsel appeals,

challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, the refusal of the trial court to 

permit a retained attorney to enter a limited appearance on his behalf, and the 

denial of a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. AFFIRMED.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson

(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

I. Introduction.

This drug case requires us to decide whether an officer’s recollection that 

a motorist had a driving status of “barred” as of several months before amounted 

to reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. We are also called upon to 

address the extent to which trial courts may regulate limited appearances of 

retained counsel in cases with appointed counsel. 

An officer pulled over the defendant’s vehicle. The officer had checked the 

defendant’s driver’s license status two to six months earlier and determined it 

was barred, but he did not recheck that status before making the stop. Cocaine 

was found, and the driver was determined to be under the influence; he was

charged with several offenses. Because of his indigency, the defendant received 

appointed counsel. Later, during the lengthy pretrial proceedings, a retained 

attorney sought to enter two limited appearances for certain pretrial matters,

without getting involved in the trial itself. The district court refused to allow these 

limited appearances. The court also overruled the defendant’s motion to 

suppress.

Following a trial in which he was represented by appointed counsel, the 

defendant was convicted of all charges. On appeal, the defendant asserts error 

in the denial of his motion to suppress and the denial of his retained attorney’s 

requests to enter limited appearances.

On our review, we disagree. The officer’s information about the defendant’s 

driver’s license status, although several months old, gave the officer reasonable 
3

suspicion to believe that the defendant was presently engaged in criminal activity 

by operating a vehicle. 

On the limited-appearance issue, we decline to decide definitively whether 

a criminal defendant with appointed counsel has some constitutional right to 

have a retained attorney enter a limited appearance. Instead, we conclude that 

if such a right exists, it is subject to reasonable regulation by the district court. 

Under the circumstances of the case, given the extent to which pretrial 

proceedings had been prolonged and the potential for further delay and 

disruption, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

requested limited appearances. 

Having affirmed these rulings, and because we also affirm the district 

court’s ruling denying a mistrial, we uphold the defendant’s convictions and 

sentence. 

II. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

A. The April 23, 2016 Stop and Resulting Charges. On April 23, 2016,

at around 7:30 p.m., Waterloo officers responded to a noise complaint from an 

individual who resided on Mosely Street. The caller reported what he described 

as an “ongoing problem” involving a man wearing a backward-facing baseball 

hat who was loudly playing music from his black Kia Soul. 

Two officers, Thomas Frein and Jarid Hundley, responded separately to 

the call. While they were en route, the dispatcher informed them that the car in 

question had left the scene. Nonetheless, Officer Frein decided to continue 

toward the location of the complaint. On his way, he spotted a vehicle and driver 
4

matching the description that had been provided by dispatch. From previous 

encounters, Officer Frein could identify the driver as defendant Maurice Sallis.

Officer Frein had first learned that Sallis was barred from driving in 2012 

as part of a criminal investigation. Officer Frein had updated that information by 

conducting a license check on Sallis two to six months before the date of this 

encounter. To the best of Officer Frein’s recollection, that check confirmed that 

Sallis’s driving privileges were barred.

1

Officer Frein turned on his flashers to initiate a traffic stop. As Sallis was 

turning, and before he came to a stop, Officer Frein saw a bag containing a white, 

powdery substance—later identified as 24.23 grams of cocaine salt—being 

thrown from the passenger-side window. According to Officer Frein, “It’s very 

common when that happens to be either in the middle of a turn or while 

completing a turn.” 

While Officer Frein pulled over Sallis, Officer Hundley retrieved the 

jettisoned bag containing cocaine. He then joined Officer Frein at the traffic stop.

Officer Frein had Sallis get out of the Kia, handcuffed him, and read him

his Miranda rights. Officer Frein asked Sallis if he had a license, and he said he 

didn’t have one. Officer Frein located $1,020 in cash on Sallis’s person in the 

form of ten one-hundred-dollar bills and one twenty-dollar bill. Officer Frein also 

spotted a half-empty bottle of Remy Martin—an alcoholic beverage—in the 

1After Officer Frein stopped Sallis, he had Officer Hundley check the current status of 

Sallis’s license. Following the completion of that check, Officer Frein can be heard on the 

bodycam asking, “Is it barred?” Officer Hundley replies, “Yup.” Officer Frein can then be heard 

saying, “I thought it was.”
5

passenger seat. He further detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on Sallis’s 

breath and noted that “Mr. Sallis had bloodshot, watery eyes.” 

Sallis was arrested. On June 6, a five-count trial information was filed in 

the Black Hawk County District Court charging Sallis with enhanced possession 

of cocaine with intent to deliver, a class “C” felony; failure to affix a drug stamp, 

a class “D” felony; unlawful possession of a prescription, a serious misdemeanor;

driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor; and operating while 

intoxicated, a serious misdemeanor. Sallis applied for court-appointed counsel. 

Attorney Ted Fisher from the public defender’s office was appointed. Sallis 

pleaded not guilty and subsequently waived speedy trial.

B. Pretrial Proceedings. Approximately six months later, on 

December 19, 2016, Robert Montgomery of the Parrish Law Firm filed a limited 

appearance on behalf of Sallis. Montgomery limited his representation to 

“[p]retrial proceedings including discovery/discovery depositions, and any and 

all motions or applications relating thereto and/or arising therefrom, and 

motions to continue trial and continue pretrial.” The scope was not to include 

“pretrial conference, trial-related motions in limine, or trial, particularly since 

[Montgomery] is unavailable at times currently scheduled for pretrial and trial.” 

Montgomery also filed motions for depositions; for the appointment of an 

investigator at state expense; and to extend the timelines for discovery, pretrial, 

and trial. The district court denied these motions because the public defender’s

office had an existing allowance for funding depositions, the office already had

an in-house investigator which eliminated the need for an additional 
6

investigator, and Montgomery’s limited appearance provided that he would not 

participate in either pretrial conferences or trial. Montgomery also filed a motion 

to suppress on Sallis’s behalf.

On February 8, 2017, Fisher filed his first motion to withdraw, citing 

Montgomery’s involvement in the case. A hearing was held on the motion, at 

which the State expressed concern about Fisher’s potential withdrawal. The 

prosecutor pointed out that if Fisher were relieved from the case and 

Montgomery’s appearance remained limited in scope, then defendant Sallis could 

be without counsel by the date of trial. In that event, “someone will have to be 

reappointed and get back up to speed on this case,” which could potentially 

cause delays and difficulties in the proceedings. 

Following the hearing, the district court ordered Montgomery to withdraw 

his limited appearance and to enter a general appearance by March 3 if he 

wished to continue in the case; otherwise, Fisher would remain Sallis’s counsel.

Montgomery did not enter a general appearance. Instead, Fisher remained 

Sallis’s counsel. On June 26, Fisher handled the evidentiary hearing on the

motion to suppress. At the hearing, Officer Frein testified, and his dashcam video 

and Officer Hundley’s bodycam video were received into evidence.

On June 30, Fisher asked again to withdraw from the case, citing an 

“irreparable breakdown” in the attorney–client relationship.2 During the hearing 

on this second motion to withdraw, Fisher told the district court that Sallis had 

2At the same time, Fisher also filed a motion asking the district court to withhold ruling 

on the motion to suppress pending the appointment of new counsel. The court granted this 

motion.
7

sent him “an e-mail requesting some very specific legal things, [from] which it 

was pretty clear . . . that was driven by Mr. Montgomery.” In addition, Fisher

stated that he and Montgomery were “not on the same page” as to strategy and 

did not “see eye-to-eye” on the legal issues. In one instance, according to Fisher, 

Montgomery had requested specific actions from Fisher, threatening that if

Fisher did not comply with the request, then Montgomery would engage in steps 

consistent with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Fisher added, “In [fifteen]

years, I haven’t experienced this type of situation, Judge, and I don’t believe I 

can effectively continue to represent Mr. Sallis because of this breakdown for 

which . . . Montgomery is in the mix . . . .” 

After hearing from the interested parties, the district court granted Fisher’s 

second motion to withdraw and appointed contract attorney Donna Smith to 

represent Sallis. On November 11, Smith filed a written “closing argument brief”

on the still-pending motion to suppress. One month later, on December 11, the 

district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court 

reasoned that the traffic stop could be sustained on two independent grounds:

Here the officer had reasonable belief that the defendant was the 

individual operating the motor vehicle in the loud music complaint. 

He had reasonable belief that the driver of the Kia was the individual 

involved in the loud music complaint and wanted to investigate said 

complaint. An officer is able to stop a motor vehicle concerning 

criminal activity that has occurred or is occurring.

The officer had an additional reasonable reason to investigate 

the driver of the Kia. He knew the driver on sight and believed the 

defendant’s license was barred. Most barments are for from two to 

six years and as such the officer had a reasonable belief the 

defendant would remain barred even 60 days after the last time he 

checked the official record.
8

Meanwhile, on December 8, Montgomery had filed a second application for 

a limited appearance. Here, his scope of representation would be limited to 

“the already-filed Motion To Suppress, including submitting brief and offering 

argument thereon—exclusively on the Motion To Suppress only.” Attached to the 

application was an additional brief in support of the motion to suppress. 

That same day, Smith filed a motion to compel production of any prior 

requests Officer Frein had made for Sallis’s driving record. On December 19, the 

motion to suppress now having been denied, Smith filed a motion to reopen the 

record on that motion to allow for additional briefing and evidence, including 

evidence derived from the recently-filed motion to compel.

On December 20, the district court held a lengthy, nearly two-hour hearing 

on Montgomery’s second application for a limited representation of Sallis. The 

court heard from Montgomery, Smith, and the prosecutor. Montgomery clarified

that he would have preferred to make a general appearance rather than a limited

one, but his schedule did not allow for it. Montgomery added that initially he had

been working under a retainer provided by Sallis’s family members, but due to 

the exhaustion of funds, his representation had become pro bono. 

During the give and take of the hearing, the district court indicated it 

would not have a problem with Montgomery simply filing a separate brief in 

support of the motion to suppress. The court’s concerns, rather, were that 

Montgomery was unwilling to actually limit his representation to that specific 

matter, that he would be continuing to have contact with Sallis, and that he was 

reserving the right to assist with Sallis’s representation in the future—while not 
9

actually entering a general appearance. Montgomery, meanwhile, challenged the 

court’s overall authority to regulate limited appearances unless they affected the 

fairness or integrity of a court proceeding or involved cost to the State.

The district court deferred ruling on Montgomery’s application for a second 

limited appearance because an application for interlocutory appeal from the 

denial of the motion to suppress was pending. Our court ultimately denied the 

application. Procedendo issued in early March 2018, and the scene shifted back 

to the district court.

On April 19, the district court entered an order denying Montgomery’s 

limited appearance.3 The court explained:

On its face, a limited appearance appears somewhat harmless. Mr. 

Montgomery and Ms. Smith stated that they were in agreement as

to strategy and procedure concerning Mr. Sallis’ case; that they were 

working well together. The Court, however, must review this matter 

in terms of whether limited appearances are appropriate on an 

overall basis concerning criminal cases with court-appointed 

counsel.

If Ms. Smith were independently retained by the defendant,

should a dispute concerning strategy arise between her and 

Mr. Montgomery, she could merely withdraw. Mr. Sallis could then

retain new counsel with similar ideas as Mr. Montgomery. Ms. Smith 

has been appointed to represent Mr. Sallis as he remains indigent. 

Should Ms. Smith inform Mr. Sallis that she does not agree with Mr. 

Montgomery’s strategy, Mr. Sallis could request that the Court allow 

Ms. Smith to withdraw and that new counsel be appointed. The right 

to counsel as an indigent defendant is circumscribed. The defendant 

is not allowed to fire various court-appointed counsel because of 

disagreements in strategy or personality. The defendant is not 

guaranteed counsel of his choice. . . .

. . . .

3That same day, the district court also entered an order denying Smith’s motion to reopen 

the record on the motion to suppress. 
10

When a pro bono attorney enters a limited appearance,

various consultations between counsel are necessary. The indigent 

defendant, initially at the state public defender’s expense, is 

required to pay additional fees to court-appointed counsel for 

consultation with the pro bono limited appearance attorney. . . .

Strategy among two lawyers assigned to the same case is seldom 

without problems. Each experienced counsel has his or her own 

beliefs concerning strategy and appropriate procedures in the 

defense of any criminal case. To force court-appointed counsel to 

always converse with, confide in, and discuss strategy with counsel 

on a limited appearance would be inappropriate. Any counsel on a 

limited appearance, pro bono basis may have ideas about a case that 

are not in agreement with court-appointed counsel. Once those 

ideas are exposed to the defendant, he or she may not wish to 

continue with the strategy of court-appointed counsel. 

Unfortunately, counsel who has entered his or her limited 

appearance can then easily withdraw after having caused turmoil 

and upheaval in court-appointed counsel’s strategy. . . .

The next concern the Court has concerning limited

appearances is what limitations must be put in place to avoid the 

illogical conclusion to which limited appearances could proceed. An 

attorney could attempt to enter a pro bono limited appearance for 

purposes of arguing motions in limine, opening statement, or direct 

or cross-examination of any one witness. The possibilities are 

endless as are the problems created with limited appearances.

It is certainly possible that pro bono limited appearance

counsel may wish to proceed with issues that may not be in the

defendant’s best interests concerning his defense strategy as a

whole. Counsel whose limited duty is to represent the defendant on 

a singular issue may not be able to provide the best advice to the 

defendant concerning his or her overall strategy. Counsel entering a 

limited appearance will only have reviewed the necessary 

documentation to proceed concerning his or her limited issue. 

Additional evidence or witnesses may be involved that might lead 

regular counsel to believe that proceeding on a limited issue would 

be inappropriate. This could easily occur concerning potential plea 

agreements or agreements to testify against a codefendant. Counsel 

entering a limited appearance and promoting his or her viewpoint 

concerning the limited issue, may not provide advice in the 

defendant’s best interests. Conflict would ensue between counsel for 

no reason other than the interference of counsel on a limited 

appearance basis.
11

Discovery could also prove to be a nightmare concerning

limited appearances. Competing strategies and methods could be

detrimental to the defendant’s case. Timing of depositions and other 

discovery could prove perilous. Costs for the defendant and initially 

the state public defender’s office could be substantial should an 

attorney be allowed to enter a limited appearance for discovery 

purposes.

The defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel that

have met the various guidelines established by the state public

defender’s office. Appointed counsel are licensed, competent

attorneys who have established the criteria necessary to allow them

to participate in the state public defender court-appointed counsel 

system.

All rights that we enjoy are circumscribed. In the 

above-captioned matter, the Court finds that for the above-stated

reasons that limited appearance by pro bono or paid counsel in a

case in which the defendant has court-appointed counsel is

inappropriate.

Montgomery filed an application for interlocutory appeal from this order, 

which our court denied.

Meanwhile, Sallis failed to appear for pretrial hearings in May 2018. A

warrant was issued for his arrest, and bond was forfeited. A year and a half later, 

in January 2020, Sallis was rearrested and brought before the court. Sallis’s 

criminal case went through several other attorneys, two of whom were permitted 

to withdraw because of a “breakdown in the attorney–client relationship,” before 

it reached John Standafer, the attorney who actually tried the case in 

June 2021.4

4Standafer did not get to try the entire case. After the presentation of evidence had 

concluded, Standafer notified the court of his intention to withdraw from the case, and Sallis 

asked the court to let him deliver a pro se closing argument. After fully informing Sallis of the 

potential risks of this course of action, the district court allowed Sallis to deliver a pro se closing 

argument. Standafer was not removed from the case, however, and represented Sallis for 

purposes of posttrial motions and sentencing.
12

C. Trial and Appeal. During the trial, the State asked Officer Frein, on 

direct examination, why he had opened the driver’s door and removed Sallis from 

the Kia immediately after stopping it. The exchange went as follows: 

Q. When we see here, when we stop at one minute into the 

video, what are you doing? 

A. I’m getting Mr. Sallis out of the car. 

Q. Okay. Now, did you open that door? 

A. I did. 

Q. And why were you opening that door and getting him out 

immediately? 

A. He’d already discarded evidence out of the car and since I 

was out of my car, I didn’t want to give him the opportunity to drive 

off. 

Q. What do you mean drive off? 

A. It’s common that when—if a subject is going to flee from 

the police in their car, that they’ll wait for the officer to get out of the 

car to kind of give themselves a head start and then they’ll take off 

from there. 

Q. And were you concerned about Mr. Sallis being a flight risk 

at that time? 

A. Yes. 

MR. STANDAFER: I object before the answer is in. I need to 

approach. I ask for a mistrial.

The defense’s motion for a mistrial was denied, and the trial continued.

Two of the charges were resolved without a jury verdict: the prescription 

drug charge was dismissed shortly before trial, and Sallis pleaded guilty to the 

OWI charge during trial. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1) (2016). Following the 

presentation of evidence and closing argument, the jury returned verdicts of 

guilty on the remaining counts of cocaine possession with intent to deliver, 
13

failure to attach a drug stamp, and driving while barred. See id.

§ 124.401(1)(c)(2)(b); id. § 453B.12; id. § 321.561. Sallis stipulated to the 

enhancement on the cocaine possession with intent to deliver charge. See id. 

§ 124.411. 

On August 20, Sallis was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment 

of twenty years on the enhanced cocaine possession with intent to deliver charge, 

five years on the drug stamp charge, two years on the driving while barred 

charge, and one year on the OWI charge. See id. § 124.411(1); id. § 902.9(1)(d);

id. §§ 903.1(1)(b), (2). Sallis appealed, and we retained the appeal.

Sallis raises three claims on appeal. First, Sallis argues that the district 

court erred in overruling his motion to suppress all evidence from the traffic stop

because neither a completed misdemeanor (the noise ordinance violation) nor 

allegedly stale information (prior knowledge of barred driving privileges) were 

sufficient to justify the traffic stop. Second, Sallis contends that the district court 

violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution by denying 

Montgomery’s requests for a limited appearance in the case. And third, Sallis

claims that the district court incorrectly failed to grant a mistrial after the State 

elicited testimony allegedly depicting him as a flight risk. 

III. Standard of Review. 

When a defendant challenges the denial of a motion to suppress based on 

an asserted constitutional violation, we review the district court ruling de novo. 

State v. Hunt, 974 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2022). We also review de novo claims
14

alleging denial of a constitutional right to counsel. State v. Sewell, 960 N.W.2d 

640, 642 (Iowa 2021). Lastly, we review the denial of a mistrial based on alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 

327–28, 335 (Iowa 2019).

IV. Analysis.

A. Should Sallis’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Have Been Granted? 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 

of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures by the government. Sallis makes the same arguments under both 

constitutions.

A recognized exception to the warrant requirement “allows an officer to 

stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes for a brief detention 

based only on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is 

occurring.” State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 610 (Iowa 2019). “The purpose of an 

investigatory stop is to allow a police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of 

criminal activity through reasonable questioning.” Id. (quoting State v. Kreps, 

650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002)). “The stop is for a brief detention, and 

therefore ‘[a]n officer may make an investigatory stop with “considerably less 

than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” ’ ” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642).

Sallis asks us to consider whether a completed misdemeanor, such as a 

noise ordinance violation, can ever justify a traffic stop if it occurred outside the 

presence of the officer. We need not address that argument, though. Instead, we 
15

conclude that the stop may be upheld on an independent ground—namely,

Officer Frein’s recognition of Sallis and his prior information that Sallis was 

barred from operating a vehicle. In our view, Officer Frein had reasonable 

suspicion to stop Sallis, given that he had checked Sallis’s driving status as part 

of a separate investigation two to six months earlier and, to his recollection, 

determined that Sallis was barred.

Sallis urges that Officer Frein’s information was “stale” because it was 

several months old. Staleness arguments often arise in the warrant context, 

where probable cause is required. See, e.g., State v. Bracy, 971 N.W.2d 563, 

566–67 (Iowa 2022) (applying probable cause standard to issue warrant). We 

have said that “[w]hether information is stale depends on the circumstances of 

each case.” State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 1996). We have not 

previously addressed a staleness argument in this context.

In support of his position, Sallis directs us to Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 

754 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam). That case involved a stop based on suspicion that 

the defendant had a suspended license. Id. at 755. The Florida Supreme Court 

noted that it could have been as long as three years since the officer had last 

checked the defendant’s driving status. Id. at 758. Finding that information too 

outdated, the court invalidated the stop. Id. As the court put it:

[The defendant] could have easily obtained a valid license before [the 

officer] stopped him on May 23, 1994. Based on these facts, it cannot 

be said that [officer] had fresh knowledge concerning [the defendant] 

or the status of his driver’s license at the time of the traffic stop on 

May 23, 1994. 

Id. 
16

This case is different and falls within a time range that courts have 

generally found acceptable. Recently, for example, the Florida District Court of 

Appeal distinguished Moody and upheld a traffic stop where the officer had 

previously arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license on two 

other occasions, the most recent of which took place three months prior to the 

stop. Valero v. State, 301 So. 3d 1021, 1022–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). The 

Florida court noted that “several federal and out-of-state courts have concluded 

that lapses of between three-and-a-half and five months did not make an officer’s 

information stale.” Id. (citing cases). The court also emphasized that the deputy 

was “not required to know that [the defendant’s] license was in suspension; what 

was required was a reasonable articulable suspicion that [the defendant] might 

be driving on a suspended license.” Id. at 1023 (quoting Anderson v. State, 

592 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ga. 2004)).

As the district court observed in this case, driving bars in Iowa typically 

run from two to six years. See Iowa Code § 321.560(1) (describing a period of 

“not less than two years nor more than six years”). This length of time is relevant

in determining how up-to-date the officer’s information must be. As the Hawaii 

Supreme Court has noted, we ought to consider “the freshness of the officer’s 

information . . . combined with the nature of the license revocation or 

suspension.” State v. Spillner, 173 P.3d 498, 509 (Haw. 2007). Here the stop 

occurred within two to six months of Officer Frein’s latest determination that 

Sallis was barred from driving.
17

Other out-of-state authority also supports the district court’s 

determination that Officer Frein had reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop 

Sallis’s vehicle. In State v. Nunez, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a traffic 

stop where the officer recognized the defendant and “knew that Defendant had 

his driver’s license revoked several months earlier.” 455 S.W.3d 529, 531 

(Mo. Ct. App. 2015). The court pointed out that in Missouri, “[a] driver whose 

license has been revoked cannot obtain a new license for at least one year.” Id.

at 532. The court concluded that this law, when combined with the knowledge 

that several months earlier the defendant had had his license revoked, tallied up

to reasonable suspicion. Id. The court cited with approval an earlier Missouri 

case where the court of appeals had upheld a stop after the officer recognized 

the defendant and “had personal knowledge that eight months earlier 

[the defendant’s] driver’s license was under revocation.” Id. (quoting State v. 

Spurgeon, 907 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)); see also United States v. 

Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that police officer had reasonable 

suspicion to pull over a driver he recognized as having had a license suspension 

five months earlier); State v. Harris, 513 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) 

(holding the officer’s stop was proper where he knew the driver’s license was 

suspended three weeks ago and some suspensions last up to five years); 

Commonwealth v. Deramo, 762 N.E.2d 815, 817, 819 (Mass. 2002) (“[B]ased on 

his observation of the defendant’s vehicle and his knowledge that the defendant’s 

license had, as of two months earlier, still been subject to two lengthy periods of 

revocation, [the officer] reasonably suspected that the defendant was committing 
18

the crime of operating a motor vehicle without a valid license.”); State v. 

Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 866–68 (Minn. 1981) (finding the officer’s stop 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he had personal knowledge the 

driver’s license was suspended one month earlier); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 

626, 633 (Tenn. 1997) (upholding a stop where “the officer had personal 

knowledge that [the defendant’s] driver’s license had been revoked for a period 

of one year, and that only six months had passed since the revocation”); State v. 

Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1983) (upholding a stop where the officer 

knew as of approximately three months prior that defendant’s license had been 

revoked).

Sallis argues that the traffic stop was invalid because during the interim 

two to six months since Officer Frein’s last check, he could have had his license 

restored or obtained a temporary restricted license. Sallis also argues that Officer 

Frein could have run a new check to verify his current driving status. These 

possibilities and alternative courses of action do not undermine the existence of 

reasonable suspicion in this case. Officer Frein was within his rights in stopping

Sallis to determine whether his driving privileges were still barred. Because both 

the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 allow traffic stops based on 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, see, e.g., State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d 

90, 95–96 (Iowa 2021), we believe the foregoing disposes of Sallis’s challenge to 

the stop under both constitutions. 

For these reasons, we hold that the district court properly denied Sallis’s 

motion to suppress.
19

B. Did the District Court Violate Sallis’s Constitutional Right to 

Counsel by Refusing an Attorney’s Requests to Enter Limited Appearances? 

Sallis next contends that the district court violated his right to counsel under 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 

of the Iowa Constitution by turning down Montgomery’s limited appearance 

requests filed in December 2016 and December 2017. The United States 

Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. 

VI. And the Iowa Constitution states, “In all criminal prosecutions, . . . the 

accused shall have a right . . . to have the assistance of counsel.” Iowa Const. 

art I § 10. As before, Sallis does not urge us to deviate from federal precedent in 

interpreting the state constitutional guarantee. 

1. Limited appearances and the constitutional right to counsel. Both federal 

and state constitutions afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel of choice, 

provided the counsel is not obtained with state funds. United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144–46 (2006); State Pub. Def. v. Amaya, 977 

N.W.2d 22, 30 (Iowa 2022); State v. Smith, 761 N.W.2d 63, 69–70 (Iowa 2009). 

We have added that “no reason exists for depriving an indigent of the same right 

of choice as a person of means when the indigent is able to obtain private counsel 

without public expense.” English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1981). 

On the other hand, with court-appointed counsel, a defendant does not 

have a right to choose their attorney. State v. McKinley, 860 N.W.2d 874, 879 

(Iowa 2015). If a defendant desires a different court-appointed attorney, they
20

“must show sufficient cause to justify the appointment of substitute counsel.” 

State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). Justifications 

include a complete breakdown in communications between the attorney and the 

defendant, irreconcilable conflict, or a conflict of interest. Id.

This case presents the question of whether an attorney may have hybrid 

representation consisting of court-appointed primary counsel, not selected by 

the defendant, and retained limited-purpose counsel, not paid for by the State.

Each of the parties has staked out a position that leaves little room for 

accommodating the interests of the other side. Sallis argues that “[a] defendant 

has the right to the assistance of counsel of his choice if that counsel is not 

court-appointed”—even if the counsel would only make a limited appearance. 

The State argues that there is no right to have the services of appointed counsel 

supplemented by the services of retained counsel even if the State is paying 

nothing for the retained counsel. 

Both positions are, in our view, overstated. The State’s position fails to 

account for the State’s limited interest in dictating aspects of a defendant’s legal 

representation as to which the State isn’t footing the bill. Why should the State 

care if an indigent defendant is getting advice on particular matters from a pro 

bono attorney so long as the State is not paying for that advice? In State Public 

Defender v. Amaya, we recently reiterated the general principle that an indigent 

defendant should have the option of retaining counsel at no expense to the State, 

while leaving the State to pay other necessary costs of defense that the State 

would otherwise have to pay and for which the defendant has no available funds. 
21

977 N.W.2d 22, 32, 38 (Iowa 2022). Sallis argues that this case is simply a logical 

extension of that principle. Here, as in Amaya, an indigent defendant is providing

part of their defense through an outside arrangement, and the issue is whether 

the defendant should be free to do that while having the State cover other costs 

of defense it would have to cover anyway. See United States v. Zelenka, 

112 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Simply because private counsel is 

assisting a federal defender in representing an indigent defendant, does not 

mean that public funds are being misspent.”); Knapp v. Hardy, 523 P.2d 1308, 

1312 (Ariz. 1974) (en banc) (“It is, of course, not improper for a relative of the 

defendant to hire people to help and assist, and the fact that the indigent 

defendant already has the aid of the public defender’s office does not limit the 

help a defendant may receive. We feel that it is preferable to have counsel thus 

assisting to be associated and made a counsel of record with reciprocal rights 

and duties under our Rules of Criminal Procedure and subject to the direction 

of the court as to the particular case in which he is involved.”).

On the other hand, Sallis overlooks the potentially disruptive effects of 

limited appearances in criminal cases, especially when the primary counsel has 

been court appointed. For instance, it may become necessary to 

compartmentalize proceedings in the case to accommodate the presence of 

limited-purpose counsel. There may need to be consultations between primary

counsel, limited-purpose counsel, and the defendant. These hearings and

consultations can result in delays and extra expense. 
22

Where both primary counsel and limited-purpose counsel are retained, the 

bottom line is that the client chose both counsel. In that circumstance, there is 

an incentive among the client and both counsel to work with each other to 

minimize client expense. And typically, if there is disagreement, primary counsel 

would be expected to have the final say as the attorney ultimately responsible 

for the case. 

But when primary counsel is appointed, the situation may be somewhat 

different. The defendant did not select their primary counsel and is not paying 

for their services. Thus, the defendant may not particularly care whether primary

counsel is incurring additional time and expenses. They might not even care 

whether appointed counsel remains in the case or is replaced by another primary 

counsel. Also, the path for resolving disagreements between limited-purpose 

counsel and primary counsel is less clear. Limited-purpose counsel may have a 

better relationship with the client than primary counsel. But does that mean 

court-appointed counsel should yield to limited-purpose counsel because of the 

relationship with the defendant?

In a related vein, we have said that there is no constitutional right to hybrid 

representation consisting of a mix of self-representation and representation by 

appointed counsel. See Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779, 788–89 (Iowa 2021)

(collecting cases with a similar holding). Some of the same concerns about 

duplicative proceedings and disagreements concerning how to defend the case 

are present there. See State v. Mott, 759 N.W.2d 140, 147 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) 

(“The court, however, is not required to permit this form of hybrid representation 
23

where both the pro se defendant and standby counsel are actively participating 

as defense counsel at trial.”).

2. Limited appearances under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. As 

currently framed, the Iowa rules do not shed much light on when limited 

appearances are permitted in criminal cases. The State cites a case from next 

door in Nebraska—State v. Dixon, 835 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 2013). In Dixon, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court sustained a trial court’s refusal to allow a limited 

appearance in a criminal case where the defendant had regular, court-appointed 

counsel. Id. at 649. A private attorney, paid for by the defendant’s fiancé, sought 

to appear for the “limited purpose of attempting immediate resolution of [the] 

case without necessity of a trial or complex hearings.” Id. at 646. As in the 

present case, the trial court in Dixon instructed the attorney that he needed to 

“fully represent [the defendant] or not represent her at all.” Id. The Supreme 

Court of Nebraska upheld this ruling, noting that the Nebraska Rules of 

Professional Conduct at the time prohibited limited appearances: “[A] limited 

appearance may be entered by a lawyer only when a person is not represented.” 

Id. at 648–49 (quoting Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.2(d)). 

Dixon’s holding is of limited value here because Iowa does not have a 

similar rule. Instead, Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.2(c) provides, 

“A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable 

under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.” But saying that 

an attorney may ethically undertake a limited representation in Iowa is not the 

same as saying that it is permitted in every criminal case. To the contrary, as 
24

noted in the preamble, “The rules [of Professional Conduct] presuppose a larger 

legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context includes . . . substantive 

and procedural law in general.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct ch. 32 pmbl. [15].

The State notes that the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure contain only 

three references to limited appearances, all in connection with expungement 

proceedings. See Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.80(1) (expungement of dismissed cases or 

acquittals), 2.81(1) (expungement of eligible misdemeanor convictions), 2.82(1) 

(expungement of public intoxication, possession of alcohol under the legal age, 

and certain prostitution cases). The State relies on the canon expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius to argue that limited appearances are not permitted in other

criminal contexts. See, e.g., Struve v. Struve, 930 N.W.2d 368, 376–77 

(Iowa 2019) (applying the canon).

5

By way of contrast, the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure provide blanket 

authority for limited appearances. Rule 1.404(3) states: 

Pursuant to Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(c), an attorney’s role may 

be limited to one or more individual proceedings in the action, if 

specifically stated in a notice of limited appearance filed and served 

prior to or simultaneously with the proceeding. If the attorney 

appears at a hearing on behalf of a client pursuant to a limited 

representation agreement, the attorney shall notify the court of that 

limitation at the beginning of that hearing.

5The proposed amendments to the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure that were circulated 

for public comment in March 2020 and again in June 2022 would expressly prohibit a limited 

appearance in a case like this. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, Request for Public Comment 

on Proposed Amendment to Chapter 2, Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure (Mar. 2020), proposed

rule 2.28(2) (“Limited appearances are not allowed in criminal cases where there is appointed 

counsel.”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Accepting Further Public Comment 

on the Proposed Revised Chapter 2 Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 2022), proposed rule 

2.28(2) (same). Final action has not been taken on these proposed amendments.
25

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.404(3). The civil rules, however, do not apply to criminal 

proceedings. State v. Russell, 897 N.W.2d 717, 725 (Iowa 2017) (“[O]ur rules of

civil procedure do not apply to criminal matters . . . .”); State v. Wise, 697 N.W.2d 

489, 492 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (“The Rules of Civil Procedure have no applicability 

in criminal cases, unless made applicable by statute.”).6

In the end, we do not think the Iowa court rules offer much guidance here. 

The three expungement-related rules each contain identical wording:

“The application may be filed by an attorney of record in the case, by an attorney 

who enters a limited appearance for the expungement proceedings, or by a 

self-represented defendant.” See Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.80(1), 2.81(1), 2.82(1). 

These passing references to limited appearances in the expungement context are

a weaker basis for invoking expressio unius than a rule devoted to limited 

appearances would be. The reference clearly opens the door to limited 

appearances for expungement purposes, but we do not read it as closing the 

door to limited appearances in criminal cases for other purposes.

3. There is no unlimited constitutional right to a limited appearance in a case 

with retained counsel. Sallis argues that regardless of what the Iowa court rules 

might or might not say, he has a Sixth Amendment and article I, section 10 right 

to have counsel of his choice enter a limited appearance (or multiple limited 

appearances). He cites no on-point authority. To the contrary, in Dixon, the court 

6Sallis contests this point somewhat. He notes that Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.101

states, “The rules in this chapter shall govern the practice and procedure in all courts of the 

state, except where they expressly provide otherwise or statutes not affected hereby provide 

different procedures in particular courts or cases.” Yet Sallis fails to acknowledge the 

countervailing language in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.1(1): “The rules in this section 

provide procedures applicable to indictable offenses.”
26

rejected the defendant’s Sixth Amendment argument that he had a right to 

limited-representation counsel of his choice in a case where he was represented 

by court-appointed counsel. 835 N.W.2d at 648. Likewise, in People v. Aceval, 

the Michigan Court of Appeals found no Sixth Amendment violation when the 

trial court ordered the defendant’s retained trial counsel to remain in the case, 

rejecting his motion to withdraw, and refused to allow another retained counsel 

to continue in the case on a limited basis. 764 N.W.2d 285, 291–92 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2009). As originally occurred here with attorney Fisher, the primary counsel

in Aceval sought to withdraw “because of a breakdown in the attorney–client 

relationship that he attributed to [the limited-appearance counsel’s] increased 

involvement.” Id. at 290. 

Thereafter, in Aceval v. MacLaren, the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Sixth Circuit denied the same defendant’s challenge to his conviction on 

federal habeas review. 578 F. App’x 480, 481 (6th Cir. 2014). Applying the 

deferential standard of review that applies to federal habeas collateral review of 

state court legal determinations, the court declined to overturn the defendant’s 

conviction. Id. at 482. It noted the absence of any Supreme Court precedent 

establishing a defendant’s entitlement “to a second, ‘limited’ attorney responsible 

for only discrete aspects of the representation.” Id.

A number of jurisdictions prohibit or sharply restrict limited appearances 

in criminal cases, either expressly or by direct implication. See Conn. Prac. Book

§ 3-8(b) (“A limited appearance may not be filed in criminal or juvenile cases, 

except that a limited appearance may be filed pursuant to Section 79a-3(c)(1) 
27

[which governs “Filing of the Appeal” in child protection matters].”); Mich. Ct. R. 

6.001(D) (“The provisions of the rules of civil procedure apply to cases governed 

by [the rules of criminal procedure], except . . . with regard to limited 

appearances and notices of limited appearance.”); Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond.

§ 3-501.2(d) (“[A] limited appearance may be entered by a lawyer only when a 

person is not represented.”); Nev. Dist. Ct. R. 26 (omitting criminal proceedings 

when it lists the areas where “[l]imited scope representation shall be permitted”); 

N.C. 21 Jud. Dist. Crim. P. R. 2.0 (local rule of Forsyth County stating that 

“[l]imited appearances in Superior Court will be discouraged”); N.C. 14 Jud. Dist. 

Case Mgmt. Sys. R. 3.1 (local rule of Durham County stating that (“[d]iscovery 

material shall not be distributed to defense counsel entering only a limited 

appearance” and “[l]imited appearances are discouraged as they typically result 

in unnecessary delay”). These out-of-state examples tend to undermine the view 

that there is a blanket constitutional right to limited counsel so long as the State 

doesn’t have to pay anything.

Given Sallis’s inability to cite any directly relevant legal authority, we are 

not persuaded that either the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 10 

guarantees a defendant who already has primary, court-appointed counsel an 

unlimited right to deploy secondary, limited-representation, retained counsel. 

Likewise, for the reasons we have already stated, we are not persuaded that the 

Iowa court rules recognize limited appearances in criminal cases apart from 

expungements.
28

4. No abuse of discretion in this case. Thus, to the extent any right to 

engage limited-representation counsel in the pretrial phases of a criminal case 

exists—a matter we do not decide today—it must be tempered by the trial court’s 

legitimate interest in managing the proceedings before it. See, e.g., State v. 

Johnson, 756 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2008) (holding that “a trial court has the 

discretion to limit standby counsel so long as those limitations are reasonable”); 

State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Iowa 1979) (“[T]he right to choice of 

counsel by both indigent and non-indigent defendants is limited by trial court 

discretion to maintain an orderly trial process.”).7

In this case, the court had legitimate reasons for denying Montgomery’s 

two applications to enter a limited appearance. The first was coupled with an 

application by the primary attorney, Fisher, to withdraw. Fisher could not, or 

would not, work with Montgomery. Thus, allowing Montgomery to enter only a 

limited appearance would have resulted in a new primary counsel having to be

appointed and further delay in the proceedings.

The second application was explicitly for the purpose of supplementing the 

briefing and record on “the already-filed Motion To Suppress.” At the hearing on 

the second application, Montgomery also asserted a right to be involved in the 

case in unspecified ways in the future. Yet at the time Montgomery filed this 

second application, it had been approximately six months since the motion to 

7This case presents an attorney requesting to enter an appearance for a limited purpose 

in a case that already has court-appointed counsel. We are not addressing the situation where 

advice might be sought from another counsel—such as immigration or otherwise specialized 

counsel—without that attorney entering an appearance of any kind. See e.g., Diaz v. State, 896 

N.W.2d 723, 732 (Iowa 2017) (discussing the obligation of defense counsel to provide certain 

immigration advice).
29

suppress had been heard. Sallis’s closing brief in support of the motion was 

already on file. Again, allowing Montgomery to enter a limited appearance would 

have prolonged the proceedings, in this instance on an already-filed, 

already-briefed, and already-heard motion to suppress.

Under these circumstances, no reversible error occurred when the district 

court denied the applications for limited appearance. We agree with the district 

court that it “has the ability to control limited appearances.” In its order, the 

district court raised concerns about additional consultations, duplication of 

proceedings, competing strategies, and the potential that court-appointed 

counsel would seek to withdraw. We do not necessarily agree with the district 

court that those problems would arise in every case where an attorney seeks to 

make a limited appearance and the defendant already has court-appointed 

counsel. But they existed in this case, and that is enough to sustain the court’s 

denial of the applications under the abuse of discretion standard that we apply.

We do not question Montgomery’s good faith, his devotion to his client’s 

best interests, or his legal strategies. We simply conclude that under the 

circumstances of this case, the district court acted within its discretion to 

manage the proceedings by denying the applications. For these reasons, we 

affirm the district court’s orders denying the applications for limited appearance.

C. Should the District Court Have Excluded the Officer’s Testimony 

About Why He Got Sallis Out of His Car Immediately? Sallis claims he was 

unfairly tarnished by Officer Frein’s testimony that he got Sallis out of the Kia 

right away because he was concerned about Sallis being a flight risk. We see no 
30

abuse of discretion. This line of testimony was designed to explain Officer Frein’s 

aggressive course of action as shown on video. Jurors might otherwise have 

wondered what was going on because the typical traffic stop does not result in 

an order to exit the vehicle and immediate handcuffing.

Officer Frein testified that he had seen Sallis discard something from the 

car. He testified that based on his general experience—i.e., not his experience 

with Sallis specifically—it is common for a subject who wants to flee to wait for 

the officer to get out of their patrol car and then drive off. We agree with the 

district court that this somewhat generic testimony about police methods was 

unlikely to have been of much consequence in the case. An adverse effect became 

even less likely after Sallis’s trial counsel clarified on cross-examination that 

Officer Frein had never arrested Sallis before.

Sallis points us to State v. Wilson, where we described the chain of 

inferences necessary to establish evidence of flight as probative of the

defendant’s guilt. 878 N.W.2d 203, 212–13 (Iowa 2016). Wilson has no bearing 

here because Sallis did not flee the scene and the State was not attempting to 

argue that any inference of guilt should be drawn from how the stop was 

conducted.

Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Sallis’s motion 

for a mistrial. 

V. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated, we affirm Sallis’s conviction and sentence. 

AFFIRMED.