F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT July 22, 20 08 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK

Honora ble Wm. Terre ll Hodge s, U.S. District J udg e for the Middle District of F lorida, * sitti ngby desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1579 3

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 92-00230 -CR- DMM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A,
Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us FRED DE LA MATA, MANUEL A. CALA S, etal.,
D ef en dants -Appe llants .

____ _ ____ _ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Southern D istrict of Florida

____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 22 , 200 8) Before TJO FL AT and CAR NE S, Circuit Judges, and HO DG ES , District Judge. * TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:This was a supe rce ding indictment. The initial indi ctment was r eturne d on April 14, 1 1992, and conta ined seve nty -eight counts. The de fenda

nts used the cor

porate defe ndants in car

rying out their

scheme to defra

ud 2 Republic National B ank of Miami, the pr incipal ac tivity for whic h they

wer e indicted. See United States v. De L a Mata , 266 F.3d 1275, 1279, 1281 ( 11th Cir. 2001). 2 T his c as e ill ustrate s th e pr obl em s th e G ove rn m en t e nc ount er s w he n it deviates from

the procedural and substant ive rules governing crim inal forfeiture by obt ai nin g th e de fe ndants ’ pr om ise s to c onve y c er ta in i nte re sts in pr ope rty

to the Uni te d S ta te s, i n l ie u o f a fo rfei tu re t ria l an d s en te nc e, an d t he de fen da nt s re ne ge . I. A. O n D ec em

be r 16, 199 2, aS outhe rnD istri ct of F lor ida gr an d j ur y r et ur ne d a fifty -nine count in dictm ent against Fred D e L a Mata, Manuel A. Calas, Oscar 1 Ca sti lla , E nr iqu e Fe rn an de z (the “ de fe ndants ”) , Re al E state P ar tne rs , I nc . , and H ia le ahP ro pe rt ie s, I nc . ( the “ co rp or at e de fe ndants ”)
. T he ind ic tm en t c harg ed the defendants with, am ong o ther crim es, r acketeer ing, 18 U. S. C. § 196 2(c), rack et eeri ng co ns pi racy, 18 U.S.C. § 19 62 (d ), m on ey lau nd eri ng , 18 U.S.C. § 1956 , and bankfra

ud, 18 U. S. C. § 134 4. T he corporate def endants, which w ere
w hol ly ow ne d by

the de fe ndants , w er e ch ar ge d w ithr ac ke te er ing and r ac ke te er ing
c o n s p i r a c y. 2 T he ind ic tm en t a lso c ont ai ne d af or fe iture c ount

in w hic h th e G ove rn m en tSe c tio n 1 96 3( a ) p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , th at w ho e ve r e ng a g e s in ra c ke te e ri ngin 3 v i o l at i o no f 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 1 9 6 2 “s h al l fo rf ei tt o th e U n i t edS t at es ” t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) a ny interest the pe rson has a cquire d or maintained in violation of section 1962 . . . and (3) a ny proper ty constituting, or de rived fr om, any proce eds which the pe rs on ob ta ine d, dir e c tly

or ind ir e c tly , f

ro m r a c ke te e ri nga c tiv ity

. . . in violation of section 1962. Section 982(a) (1) pr ovides that a pe rson who eng ag es in money launder ing in violation 4 of 18 U. S.C. § 1 95 6 s ha ll “ fo rf e it t o th e Un ite d St ate s a

ny pr op e rt y , r e a l or pe rs on a l, i nv olv e d in su c h o ff e ns e , o r a ny pr op e rt y tr a c e a ble to s uc h p ro pe rt

y .” Se c tio n 9 82 (a )( 2) pr ov ide s th at a person who e ng ag es in bank fr aud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 shall “forfe it to the United States any proper ty constituting, or de rived fr om, proce eds that per son obtained direc tly or indirectly , as the re sult of such violation.” The Gove rnment also soug ht the defe ndants’ intere sts in the shares of othe r 5 corpor ations, that were not named as de fenda nts in the indictment. The de fenda

nts used these c ompanies to establish bank a ccounts in which the y 6 deposited funds de rived fr om their offe nses. 3 soug ht f or fe iture , und er

18 U
. S. C. § 19 63( a) and 1 8 U
. S. C. § 98 2( a) , of the 3 4 de fe ndants ’ int er es ts i n vari ous pie ce s of pr ope rty : se curi tie s, inc lud ing the de fe ndants ’ int er es t i n th e share s of the c or por at e de fe ndants ; r ea l e state ; and 5 bank accounts h eld in the nam es of com panies (not the corporate defendants) that
w er e w hol ly

ow ne d by

the de fe ndants . T he G ove rn m en t a lso sou ght f or fe iture of 6 th e co rp or at e d efen da nt s’ in te res ts in two ba nkacco un ts he ldin th ei r na m es . Im m ed ia te ly a ft er the ind ic tm en t w as r et

ur ne d, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e Gov ern m en t’s m ot io n fo r a res tra in in g o rd er p ur su an t t o 1 8 U.S.C. §18 U. S.C. § 1 96 3( d) (1 )( A) pr ov ide s: 7 (d)( 1) Upon a

pplication of the United States, the c ourt may enter a re straining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory perf ormanc e bond, or take a ny other a ction to preser

ve the availability

of prope rty

descr ibed in [18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)] for for feiture under [§ 1963(a) ] – (A) upon the filing of

an indictment or infor

mation char g ing a

violation of section 1962 of this chapter

and alleg ing that the proper ty with respec t to which the orde r is s o u g h t w o u ld , in

th e e v e n t o f

c o n v ic ti o n , b e s u

b je c t t o f o r f e it ur e un d e r [§ 1963(a) ] . . . . The c ourt enter ed the r estrainingorder on April 14, 1992, on the re turn of the initial indictment in t he c a se . T he or de r r e ma ine d in e ff e c t f oll ow ingthe re tur

n o f t he su pe rc e din gind ic tme nt. The pa rties settled the for feiture issues by enter ing into agree ments, which they ref err ed 8 to as “stipulations.” De L a Mata and F erna

ndez entere d into separate agree ments with the Gover nment; Calas and Castilla rea ched a joint agr eeme nt with the Governme nt. 4 1963 (d )( 1) (A ), e nj oin ing the de fe ndants and c or por at e de fe ndants f

ro m usi ng, 7 tr an sf er ri ng, a lie na tin g, or

oth er w ise e nc um

be ri ng the ir

int er es ts i n th e pr ope rty li st edin th e fo rfei tu re co un t. The c ase against both th e defe ndants andcorporate def endants, which w ere not r ep re se nte d by

c ouns el , pr oc ee de d to tr ia l onO ct obe r 14, 199 2. T w o and a ha lf m onths l at er , on D ec em

be r 30, the j ur

y f ound the de fe ndants and c or

por at e de fen da nt s g ui lt y

on ne arl y

all co un ts of t he in di ct m en t. Un it edSta te s v . De La Mat a, 26 6 F .3d12 75 , 12 85 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). Af ter re ceiving the jury ’ s verdicts, the court declared a r ecess until January 4 , 1 9 9 3 , w h e n th e tr i a l o n th e f o r f e i tu r e c o u n tw o u l d

b e g i n . D u r i n g th e i n t e r i m, the de fe ndants and the G ove rn m en t se ttl ed the f or fe iture iss ue s. I n e xc hange f or 8The prose cutor told the cour t that “a c onservative estimate” of the total amount forf

eited 9 under the ag ree ments was $7,627,908.07. Without t he agree ments, the prosec utor stated, the total value of the forf

eiture w ould approa ch appr ox imately $9,500,000. The pa rties agree d that if a de fenda nt’s conviction wer e re verse d on appea l, the 10 forf eiture of interests that depe nded on the va lidity of the c onviction would be “null and void.” 5 the G ove rn m en t’ s r el ea se of the de fe ndants ’ int er es ts i n so m e of the pr ope rty lis te d inthe f

or fe iture c ount , the de fe ndants a gr ee d to the f or fe iture of

the ir int er es ts i n th e re m ai nin g pr ope rty , inc lud ing the ir int er es ts i n th e share s of the
co rp or at e de fe ndants and the bank a cc ount s he ld i n th e co rp or at e de fe ndants ’
na m es . T he c or

por at e de fe ndants and the G ove rn m en t r ea ch ed no a gr ee m en t on forfe iture. T he G ove rn m en t and the de fe ndants inf orm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt of

the
se ttl em en ts the y

ha d r ea ch ed

on J anuary

4, j ust be fo re the f

or fe iture phr as e of

the trial w as to begin, and asked the court to approv e the agre em ents. T hey
re pr es en te d th at

the se ttl em en ts w er e m

utu al ly be ne fi ci al to the de fe ndants and the G ove rn m en t. T he se ttl em en ts w oul d be ne fi t the de fe ndants be ca use the G ove rn m en t w oul d be a cquir ing le ss than w ha t i t so ught in the f or fe iture c ount . 9 They would benefit the Governm ent because a tr ial on the forfeiture c ount , which the pr ose cu tor

e sti m at ed

c oul d take ove r a y ear, w oul d be a voi de d. 10 T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a

ppr ova l of

the se ttl em en ts d ep en de d onw he the r the defendants had entered into them fre ely and volu ntarily
. The c ourt thereforeThe c ourt labele d this order, “ J udg ment and Or der of For feiture .” 11 18 U. S.C. § 1 96 3( a ) r e qu ir e s th at “ [t]he c ourt , in imp os ingse nte nc e . . . s ha ll o rd e r, in 12 addition to any

other sente nce imposed pur suant to [§ 1963(a)], that the [ defe ndant] forfeit to the United States all proper

ty descr ibed in [§ 1963(a)].” Simi larly , 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) require s that “[t] he cour

t, in impos ing se ntence on a per son convicted of an off ense in violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1956 . . . shall order that the per son forfe it to the United States any proper ty , rea l or persona l, involved in such offe nse, or a ny proper ty trac eable to such proper

ty .” Section 982(a) (2) r equire s that “[t] he cour t, in impos ing se ntence or a pe rson convicte d of a violation of .

. . [18 U .S. C. § 13 44 ] sha ll o rd e r t hat th e pe rs on

fo rf e it t o th e Un ite d St ate s a

ny pr op e rt y constituting, or de rived fr om, proce eds the pe rson obtained dire ctly or indirec tly , as the re sult of such violation.” 6 ex am ine d th e de fe ndants and the ir a tto rn ey s a s it

w oul d ine nte rt ai nin g aple a of gui lty und er F ed er al Ru le of

Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 11. A ft er he ar ing the ir
r e s p o n s e s , th e c o u rtf

o u n dth a tth e d e f

e n d a n t s h a dv o l u n t a r i l y a g r e e dt o th e t e rms of the se ttl em en ts. O n January 7, 199 3, it

e nte re d an or de r ap pr ovi ng the part ie s’ ag re em en ts. 11 B. Un d er1 8 U.S .C . § § 1 9 6 3 (a ) a n d9 8 2 (a )( 1 ), i f aco n v i ct ed d ef en d an t ’s int er es t i n pr ope rty

is to b e fo rf

ei te d to the G ove rn m en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust pr ovi de f or the f or fe iture a s part

of the de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e. I n th is c as e, the 12
co urt di d no t i nc lud e the f or fe iture it

ha d a ppr ove d onJanuary

7, 199 3, a s part

of its pr onounc em ent of

the de fe ndants ’ se nte nc es , w hic h th e co urt i m pose d f ro m the be nc h onApr il 23, 199 3. T he c ourt m em or ia liz ed the de fe ndants ’ se nte nc es in j udgm en ts o f co nvi ct ione nte re d onApr il 30, 199 3. T he se j udgm en ts a lsoHer nandez also appe aled his sentenc es. See 18 U .S.C. § 37 42 (a ). Th e Go ve rnme nt d id 13 no t c ro ss- a

pp e a l H e rn and e z’s se nte nc e s o n th e g ro un d th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto or de r f or fe iture a s p art

of He rn and e z’s se nte nc e s, no r d id i t a pp e a l th e oth e r d e fe nd ants ’ sentenc es on the same g round. See 18 U .S.C. § 3742(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 292(b). 14 7 contained no m ention o f forf eiture. The district court sentenced the corporate defendants on May 6, 199 3, pla ci ng the m

on n on- re portin g pr oba tio n f or thr ee y ears . T he j udgm en ts o f
co nvi ct ionin the ir

c as es , w hic h w er e en te re d th e sam e day , c ont ai ne d no m en tio n of for fei tu re. T he de fe ndants f

ile d ti m el y

appe al s of

the ir c onvi ct ion s. Whil e the ir

13 appeals we re pending, the defendants separately m oved the dis trict court for a new tr ia l onthe gr ound

that the j udge w ho p re sid ed a t the ir tr ia l and s en te nc ing sho uld ha ve r ec use d. T he de fe ndants ’ appe al s w er e he ld i n a be y an ce pe ndi ng r es olu tio n of the m oti ons. Adis tr ic t j udge , sittin g by de sig na tio n, gr an te d th e m oti ons, and

14
a pane l of thi s c ourt a ff

irm ed
. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ce rc ed a, 139 F
. 3d 8 47, 852 -5 5 (1 1thCi r. 199 8)
. O n r eh eari ng e n banc , the de fe ndants ’ j udgm en ts o f co nvi ct ion
an d se nte nc e w er e re ins ta te d, U nit ed S ta te s v. Ce rc ed a, 172 F
. 3d 8 06, 817 ( 11th Ci r. 19 99 ), an d o n J an ua ry 4, 2 00 0, t he de fen da nt s’ app eal s wen t fo rward
. T he de fe ndants ’ c onvi ct ion s w er e af fi rm ed , e xc ep t f

or tw o bank f

ra udAl so a ff ir me d w e re He rn and e z’s se nte nc e s. 15 Th e c or po rate de fe nd ants did

no t a pp e a l th e ir

c onvic tio ns or

se nte nc e s. Th e ir 16 convictions and sente nces the ref ore be came final on May

17, 1993, the eleve nth day following the district court’s e ntry

of the judg ments of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides the proc edura l frame work unde r which third pa rties may 17 a sse rt c la ims to a

n inte re st f

or fe ite d und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 63 (a ). I t a llo ws fo r a thi rd pa rt y wi sh ingto a sse rt

su c h a c la im t o “ pe tit ion

the c ourt fo r a he ari ngto a dju dic ate the va lid ity of his alleg ed intere st in the property .” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(2) . The third par ty must file this petit ion wi thi n 3 0 d ay s o f t

he Go ve rnme nt’ s f

ina l pu bli c atio n o f a

no tic e to d isp os e of

the int e re st forf eited under

the def endant’ s sentence . I d. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) provides the “ judicial or administrative” pr ocedur es used in adjudicating f orfe iture authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 982, see 18 § U.S.C. 982(b)(1), a

nd it authorizes third party proce eding s identical to those of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l). In th is c a se , b e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t make fo rf

e iture pa rt of the de fe nd ants ’ se nte nc e s, the de fe nd ants ’ i nte re sts we re ne ve r f or fe ite d to the Un ite d St ate s a nd the 30 -d ay

tim e c l o c k f o r f i l i n gth i r d p arty p e t i t i o n s d i d

n o tb e g i nt o r

un . T h e m e mb e r s o f

D e L a M at a ’ s f am i l y, Oce an B ank, and Re public National B ank nonethe less filed petitions. 8 co unt s. D e L a Mata , 266 F
. 3d at 13 04- 05. T he m an da te iss ue d onD ec em be r 4, 15 2001 , thu s br ing ing the c ri m ina l c as es a ga ins t the de fe ndants to ane nd. 16 Whil e the de fe ndants ’ appe al s w er e ongo ing , the G ove rn m en t, on M ay 24, 1 9 9 3 , p ub l i s h e dn o t i c e o f th e d e f e n d a n t s ’ p u r

p o rt e df o r f e i tu r e s i n th e M i a mi Re vie w . I n June and July 199 3, O ce anBank, Re publ ic N at ion al Bank o f Mi am i, De La Mata’ s wife , L ourdes De L a Mata, and the De La Matas’ four children pe ti ti on edth e d is tri ctco ur t p ur su an t t o 1 8 U.S.C. § 19 63 (l) an d 2 1 U.S.C. § 853( n) to hol d anc ill ar

y he ar ing s to a dj udi cate the va lid ity of the ir c la im s to the 17 pr ope rty int er es ts the de fe ndants ha d su ppos ed ly f or fe ite d to the G ove rn m en t under the district court’ s order of January 7, 1993. T hese ancillary hearings wer e9

ne ve r he ld, how ev er , be ca use the G ove rn m en t se ttl ed the ir c la im s. T he la st
se tt le m en t, i nv ol vi ng Ocean Ban k’s cl ai m , occ urredon Decem be r 2, 2 00 2. C. T o r ec ap itu la te , thi s w as the status of the pr ope rty

int er es ts the de fe ndants ha d a gr ee d to f

or fe it to the U nit ed

S ta te s inJanuary

199 3. T he ir

int er es ts h ad

not actually been forf eited to the United States by operation of law bec ause the district
co urt ha d no t or de re d th ei r fo rf ei tur e as part

of the de fe ndants ’ se nte nc es in
co nf orm an ce w iththe r eq

uir em en ts o f 18 U
. S. C. §§ 1 963( a) and 9 82( a)
. A nd unl es s th e de fe ndants ha d vo lun tari ly c onve y ed

suc h in te re sts to the U nit ed S ta te s, which they

had not, they

still retained title to the interests. T his retention was subj ec t, of

c our se , to the te rm s of

the a gr ee m en ts the y

ha d e nte re d in to w iththe Gov ern m en t i n J an ua ry

19 93
. T o e nsur e ag ai nst

the pos sib ili ty

that, notw ith standi ng those a gr ee m en ts, the de fe ndants m igh t se iz e the int er es ts the y ha d a gr ee d to f

or fe it – f or e xa m ple , by withdraw ing fund s from

the bank accounts heldin the nam es of various com panies which they

owned – the Governm ent m ade sure that the re straining o rder the c ourt
en te re d f oll ow ing the r et

ur n of the ind ic tm en t r em ai ne d inpla ce . P re sum ab ly , the
re str ai nin g or de r co uld

r em ai n inf

or ce ind ef

ini te ly , but

that w oul d no t gi ve the Governm ent what it needed to take title to som e of the properties, such asTh e Go ve rnme nt s e rv e d th e de fe nd ants by ma ili nga c op y of its mot ion

to t he ir 18 atto rn e y s. As ind ic ate d in fr a , th e Go ve rnme nt’ s mo tio n s ou g ht t he c or po rate de fe nd ants ’ int e re sts in t

wo ba nk a c c ounts , b ut t

he Go ve rnme nt d id n ot s e rv e its mot ion on the c or po rate defe ndants. At the c on c lus ion

of the anc ill ary

pr oc e e din g s a

uth or ize d und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 63 (l ) 19 and 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), a s discussed in note 17, supra, the district court will enter a final orde r of forf eiture, a djudicatingthe Gover nment’s owner ship of the forf eited intere sts vis-a-vis those of the pe tit ion ingthi rd

pa rt ie s. 18 U. S.C. § 1 96 3( l) (6 ); 21 U. S.C. § 8 53 (n )( 6) ; F e d. R. C ri m. P
. 32.2(c) (2) ( 2000) (“ When the ancillar y proce edingends, the c ourt must enter a final orde r of forf eiture by amendingthe pre liminary order as nec essar

y to acc ount for any

third-par ty rig hts.”) Since no anc illary

hear ings oc curr ed in this case, a s the third parties se ttled with the Gover nment, there was no ne ed for the district court to ente r a f inal order of for feiture
. 10 se curi tie s, he ld i n th e de fe ndants ’ nam es , and b an k a cc ount s he ld i n th e na m es of
co m panie s w hic h th ey

ow ne d. Wha t the G ove rn m en t ne ed ed to obt ai n ti tle to the int er es ts s ubj ec t t o th e re str ai nin g or de r w er e am en dm en ts t o th e de fe ndants ’
se nte nc es e xpl ic itl y

f or fe iti ng s uc h in te re sts to the U nit ed S ta te s. T he G ove rn m en t atte m

pte d to f ulf ill that ne ed

on D ec em

be r 13, 200 2. II. A. O n F ri day , D ec em

be r 13, 200 2, the G ove rn m en t f ile d, and s er

ve d onthe de fe ndants by

m ai l, am oti on f

or a“ fi na l or de r of

f or fe iture . ” A s th e au tho ri ty 18 19 for its m otion , the G overnm ent cited 18 U. S. C. §§ 19 63 and 98 2, subsections (a) of w hic h r equir e that the f

or fe iture of

ade fe ndant’ s in te re st i n pr ope rty be m ad e part of the de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e, and a ske d th e co urt t o or de r fo rf ei te d to theThe Gove rnment re prese nted in the motion that it di d “not cove r all of the a ssets listed 20 in the preliminary

order of for feiture . The re maining a ssets will be addre ssed in a subseque nt motion.” Th e mot ion

re qu e ste d th at th e c ourt ’s or de r r e c ite that su c h “ a sse ts . . . are fo rf e ite d to 21 the United States” a

nd that “the United States ha s clea r title to the proper

ty which has be en forf eited to the United States pursua nt to the order of

forf eiture a nd may war rant g ood title to any subsequent purc haser

or transf ere e in ac corda

nce w ith 18 U.S.C . §§ 1963 and 982.” L ocal Rule 7.1(C) states that “[e]ach par ty opposing a

motion shall serve an opposing 22 memorandum of la

w not later tha

n ten day s after

service of the motion.” S.D. Fla . R. 7.1(C). 11 U nit ed S ta te s so m e of

the int er es ts l ist ed

in the January

199 3 a gr ee m en ts. T he 20 21
m oti on i nc lud ed

the tw o bank a cc ount s he ld i n th e co rp or at e de fe ndants ’ nam es , al tho ugh it did

not c ove r the de fe ndants ’ int er es ts i n th e co rp or at e de fe ndants ’
s t o c k
. Th e d i s t r i c tc o urtg r a n t e dth e Go v e rn men t ’s mo t i o n th e f o l l o w i n g Tu e s d a y, D ec em be r 17, e nte ri ng a

f ina l or de r of

f or fe iture that f

or fe ite d th e int er es ts pr eci se ly as th e m ot io n h adreq ue st ed
. On D ecem

ber 23, D e L a Mata and his wife m oved the dis trict court to set aside the De cem

ber 17 order. T hey

argued that they

had an unsp ecified legal cl ai m to tw o of the “ am ount s of

m oni es ” lis te d inthe f

ina l or de r of

f or fe iture and had intend ed to opp ose the Governm ent’ s m otion but had been deniedan oppo rtunity

to be heard in violatio n of Loca l Rule 7.1(C) , which required the court to g ive the m

te n day s to r es pond

to the G ove rn m en t’ s m oti on b ef or e iss uin g a ruling. T heir m otion did no t cite the rule of pr ocedure under w hich they we re 22The F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e conta in no provision authorizi nga def endant 23 to move the district court to re consider the sentenc e it has imposed. B y statute, a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e must be appe aled pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) within ten day s of its imposi tion, see Fe d. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)( A), unless the time for filing the notice of a

ppeal is extended as pr ovided in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (4). F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 59 (e ), “ Mo tio n to Al te r o r Ame nd Judg me nt, ” state s: 24 “Any motion to alter or amend a judgme nt shall be filed no later than 10 day s after

entry of the judgme nt.” The D e L a Mata s’ motion for re consideration was filed we ll within t his ten day period. 12 pr oc ee din g. 23 T he G ove rn m en t r es pond ed to the D e L a Mata s’ m oti on o n D ec em be r 26, 2002
. It chara cterize d the m otion as a m otion for r econsideration tim ely filed pur suant t o F ed er al Ru le of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 59( e) and the re by r ep re se nte d to the 24 dis tr ic t c ourt tha t the pr oc ee din g be fo re it c onst itu te d ac ivi l c as e. T he r es pons e labe le d t he m ot io n g ro un dl es s, as itfai le d t o s pe ci fy th e le ga l b as is forth e De La M at as ’ cl ai m

t o th e p ro p er t y, an do v erb ro ad , a s i ts o u g h tt o s et as i d e t h e c o u rt ’s
en ti re o rd er, b ut on ly referre d t o t wo o f th e p ro pe rty int eres ts th e o rd er l is te d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt sum

m ar ily de nie d th e D e L a Mata s’ m oti on f or reconsideration on Janu ary 16, 2003. In doing so , the c ourt apparently agree d
w iththe G ove rn m en t tha t the c as e w as ac ivi l m atte r, inv olv ing ac la im by the G ove rn m en t t o e nf

or ce the se ttl em en t a gr ee m en ts the c ourt ha d a ppr ove d on January 7, 199 3. D e L a Mata , a lon e, f ile d anot ic e of

appe al on J anuary

27, 200 3,Th e no tic e of a pp e a l w a s f

ile d w ith in s ixty

da y s o f b oth or de rs . Se e F e d. R. A

pp . P. 25 4(a) (1)( B)
. I f the c ase be fore the De L a Mata I Icourt wa s a cr iminal procee ding, i.e ., the 26 Gover nment had aske d the district court to ame nd the def endants’ se ntence s and De L a Mata was appea ling f

rom the district court’ s order amendingthem, the cour t would have dismissed the a pp e a l f or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n b e c a

us e De L a

Mata ha d n e ith e r f

ile d h is n oti c e of

a pp e a l w ith in te n d ay s o f t

he De c e mbe r 1 7 f

ina l or de r o f f

or fe iture no r o bta ine d a

n e xten sio n o f t

he tim e to f

ile it. See Fe d. R. App. P. 4(b)(1) Th e pa ne l a lso no te d th at a

mot ion fi le d und e r “ [F e d. R. C iv. P.] 6 0( b)
. . . a lso wo uld 27 seem to provide a

basis for De L a Mata ’s motion as it permits relief fr om a judg ment for ‘ any . . . rea son justify ing r elief.’ ” United States v. De L a Mata , No. 03-10546, at 6 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). 13 ch al le ngi ng the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de rs of D ec em be r 17 and J anuary

16. 25 B. On O ctober 2, 2003, this court dispo sed of De La Mata’ s appeal in an unpu bli she d de ci sio n. U nit ed S ta te s v. D e L a Mata( “ D e L a MataI I” ), N o. 03- 1054 6, a t 8 (1 1thCi r. S ep t. 3, 200 3)
. B ef or e tur nin g to D e L a Mata ’ s arg um en t fo r re ve rs al , the c ourt qu es tio ne d w he the r it ha d j ur isd ic tio n ov er the appe al and, if so, w he the r D e L a Mataha d st an din g to pr ose cu te it
. I d. a t 2 n. 1. I t answ er ed the j ur isd ic tio na l qu es tio n inthe a ff irm at ive by

tr eatin g th e co ntr ove rs y

a s ac ivi l
ca se . I d. I n so doi ng, the c ourt no te d th at the G ove rn m en t, in re spon din g to the 26 D e L a Mata s’ D ec em

be r 23 m oti on, ha d tr eate d th e ca se a s ac ivi l pr oc ee din g by considering De La

Mata’ s m otion as having been filed pursu ant to Rule 59(e). 27Had the district c ourt order ed for feiture as par t of De L a Mata ’s sentenc es on April 30, 28 1993, and ther eaf

ter c onducted a

ncillary proce eding s under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) a nd 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), De L a Mata

would have la cked sta

nding to oppose the Gover nment’s motion for a f

inal order of for feiture , beca

use the disposition of his int ere sts would have bee n final at sente ncing
. Se e 18 U. S.C. § 1 96 3( l) (2 ) ( statin gthat “ any pe rs on oth e r t ha n th e de fe nd ant” is a

uth or ize d to file a third pa

rty claim to the intere sts forfe ited to the United States.); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (s tatin gsame ); Yo un gv. Un ite d St ate s, 48 9 F .3 d 3 13 , 3 15 (7 th C ir . 2 00 7) (“ Yo un g ’s int e re st i n the disputed funds wa s resolved through the jury ’s ver dict, the ‘pre liminary ’ orde r of f orfe iture, and the judg ment of convic tion.”). 14 Id
. a t 5- 6. T he c ourt answ er ed the standi ng que sti on i n th e af fi rm at ive a s w el l. 28 Id
. a t 2 n. 1. T he c ourt, a ddi tio na lly , r ec ogni ze d th at the c ontro ve rs y

a t hand
co nc er ne d th e “ sti pul at ion ” the G ove rn m en t and D e L a Mataha d su bm itt ed to the district court prior to the comm encem ent of forfe iture proceedings, w hich stated

“ as to the it em s sp ec if

ie d inthe ind ic tm en t, w ha t D e L a Mataw oul d and w oul d not f or fe it to the gov er

nm en t, ” id. a t 3, and the G ove rn m en t’ s e ff ort t o e nf or ce the stipu lation desp ite the fac t that the district court had no t ordered forf eiture as part of De La Mat a’s se nt en ce. Id . at 3 -4
. Having determ ined that all parties wer e properly before it, the court therefore proceeded to the issue De L a Mata had raised: whether the district court ha d a buse d it s di sc re tio n by

r uli ng o n th e G ove rn m en t’ s m oti on w ith out a ff or din g him te n day s to r es pond

to the m oti on, a s r equir ed by L oc al Ru le 7. 1( C)
. I d. a t 6- 8. T he court rea dily

concluded that an abus e had occurre d and therefore vac ated the district court’ s final order of f orfeiture and rem anded the case for furtherUnited States v. Gilbert, 244 F .3d 888, 924-26 (11th Cir. 2001), holds that 18 U.S.C. § 29 1963(a) require s forfe iture to be imposed at se ntencingor title to a defe ndant’s intere st will not transfe r to the Gove rnment. United States v. Pease , 331 F.3d 809, 813 ( 11th Cir. 2003), holds that “[t] he United States c annot ac quire a convicted de fenda

nt’s interest in prope rty

under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) [which authorizes forf eiture a s punishment for nar cotics off enses] unless and until the dist rict cour

t orders the interest for feited a s part of its judg ment in the defe ndant’s ca se.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231 gives the district c ourts “orig inal jurisdiction . . . of all offe nses 30 ag ainst the laws of the United States.” 15 pr oc eed in gs . Id. at8. C. O n O ct obe r 22, 200 3, a ft er the c as e ha d be enr em an de d, D e L a Mataf ile d a
re spon se to the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13, 200 2 m oti on f

or af ina l or de r of fo rf ei tur e. C iti ng o ur

de ci sio ns i n U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ea se , 331 F
. 3d 8 09, 813 ( 11th Ci r. 200 3) , and Unit ed

S ta te s v. G ilb er

t, 244 F
. 3d 8 88, 924 -2 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 1) , he
ar gue d th at

be ca use the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no t or de re d f or fe iture a s part

of his
se nte nc es ( on the ir

im posi tio n onApr il 30, 199 3) , no f or fe iture ha d oc curr ed
. 29 Mor eo ve r, onc e he w as se nte nc ed and the re af

te r ap pe al ed

his c onvi ct ion s, the
co urt no lon ge r ha d su

bj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n un de r 18 U
. S. C. § 32 31 to am en d 30 his se nte nc es , a s th e G ove rn m en t w as r eque sti ng. Ac onse que nc e of thi s la ck of j ur isd ic tio n, he sug ge ste d, w as that the c ourt ha d no law fu l ba sis f or c ont inu ing to hol d hi s in te re sts und er

it s po st- ind ic tm en t r es tr ai nin g or de r; he the re fo re sou ght (a s part of his r es pons e to the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13 m oti on) the r et

ur n ofF e d. R. C ri m. P . 4 1( g ), “ Mo tio n to Re tur n Pr op e rt y ,” state s, in r e le va

nt p art : 31 A per son ag g rieve d by

an unlawf

ul searc h and seizure of

proper ty or by the deprivation of proper

ty may move for the proper

ty ’s re turn. . . . I f it g rants the mot ion , th e c ourt

mus t r e tur

n th e pr op e rt

y to t he mov ant, but ma

y imp os e rea sonable c onditions t o protec t acc ess to the prope rty and its use in later proce eding s. Implicit in De L a Mata ’s demand that the interests at issue be returne d was a reque st that the court va cate the re strainingorder
. The c ourt’s orde r simply reinstated its De cembe r 17 orde r g rantingthe Gover nment’s 32 motion. 16 his int er es ts unde r the a eg is o f Fe de ra l R ule of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 41( g)
. T he 31 oth er de fe ndants f

ile d si m ilar re spon se s, a dopt ing D e L a Mata ’ s arg um en ts and
as kin g f or the r et ur n of the ir int er es ts. T he c or

por at e de fe ndants , w ho, havin g ne ve r be ense rv ed

w ithpr oc es s, ha d no t be enpart ie s to the pr oc ee din gs u p to thi s poi nt, appe ar ed

w ithc ouns el and r es pond ed ( w ith out opp osi tio n f

ro m the G ove rn m en t) to the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13 m oti on. A s part

of the ir
re spon se , the y

a ske d f or the r et ur n of the ir bank a cc ount s, a s de sig na te d inthe Gov ern m en t’s m ot io n, p ur su an t t o R ul e 4 1( g)
. T he G ove rn m en t f

ile d ar es pons e in o ppos iti on t o a ll of the se r es pons es on N ove m be r 14, 200 3, and, on D ec em be r 1, 200 3, the de fe ndants and c or por at e defendants filed a j oint reply
. On Se ptem ber 28, 2005, the district court issued an
or de r gr an tin g th e G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13, 200 2 m oti on f

or af ina l or de r of forfe iture. In its order, the court first addressed the question o f w hich of the

3217

de fe ndant p ar

tie s w er e be fo re the c ourt. I t he ld tha t si nc e D e L a Mataw as the onl y de fe ndant who h ad

appe al ed f ro m it s D ec em

be r 17, 200 2 or de r gr an tin g th e G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em

be r 13 m oti on, onl y

D e L a Mataw oul d be he ar d. T he
re m ai nin g de fe ndants , by not appe al ing that or de r, ha d w ai ve d th ei r ri ght to be heard in oppo sition to the Governm ent’ s m otion
. Having said this, the court
re j ec te d a s m er itl es s D e L a Mata ’ s op posi tio n to the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13
m otion
. It m ade no m ention o f D e L a Mata’ s request for Rule 41(g) r elief, presum ably

because its decision to g rant the G overnm ent’ s m otion rendere d such request m oot. T he defendants and corporate defendants now appeal the district
co ur t’s Se pt em

be r 28 , 20 05 rul in gs . III
. T he de fe ndants and c or

por at e de fe ndants ( “ ap pe llants ” unl es s othe rw ise ind ic at ed ) pr es en t the sam e ar gum en ts the y m ad e to the dis tr ic t c ourt i n op posi ng the G ove rn m en t’ s m oti on f or af ina l or de r of

f or fe iture and r eque sti ng R ule 41( g) relief. T he Governm ent, in re ply , c oncedes that forfeiture w as never order ed as p ar to f ap p el l an t s ’ se n t en ce s , b u tar g u es , n o n et h el es s , t h at th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s
ru lin g sh oul d be a ff

irm ed
. T he G ove rn m en t f ir st c ont en ds tha t on ly

D e L a Matais pr ope rl y be fo re thi s c ourt, on the gr ound that the r em ai nde r of

the appe llants
w ai ve d th ei r ri ght

to ch al le nge the c ourt’ s S ep te m be r 28, 200 5, f

ina l or de r ofTh e Go ve rnme nt, a s d id t he dis tr ic t c ourt , o ve rl oo ke d th e fa c t th at th e c or po rate 33 defe ndants could not have waived the ir rig ht to join De L a Mata in appea ling the district c ourt’s Dec ember

17, 2002 order , beca

use the Gove rnment had not brought them before the district c ourt . In advanc ing this position, the Governme nt appar ently views the district cour

t’s J anuar y 34 7, 1993, order

approvingthe settlement agree ments as the func tional equivalent of the inclusion of for feiture in the defe ndants’ sente nces, which would have barr ed the de fenda nts from contestingthe final orde r of f orfe iture. See 18 U .S.C. § 1963(l)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2); supra note 28. 18 fo rf ei tur e be ca

use the y ha d no t j oin ed

D e L a Matain ap pe al ing the D ec em be r 17, 2002 final order of forfe iture. T he Governm ent then argues that De L a Mata, or, 33 shou ld w e dis ag re e w ithit s in iti al c ont en tio n, a ll of the appe llants , la ck ed

standi ng to o ppos e the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13, 200 2 m oti on f

or af ina l or de r of fo rf ei tur e and tha t c onsi de ratio ns o f equity r equir ed that the dis tr ic t c ourt de ny 34 th e ap pe ll an ts ’ Ru le 41 (g ) m ot io n. A. As a thresholdm atter, we m ust determ ine whether all appellants are properly before this court. On r em and following ou r decision in De L a Mata II, the dis tr ic t c ourt l im ite d th e co ntr ove rs y to the dis put e be tw ee n th e G ove rn m en t
an d D e L a Mata , sin ce he w as the onl y de fe ndant t o have appe al ed f ro m the court’ s Dec em

ber 17, 2002 final order of f orfeiture. In doing so , the c ourt ap pare ntl y

ove rl ooke d th e sc ope of

D e L a MataI I’ s m an da te . T ha t m an da te

“ vacat[e d] the final order of forfe iture and rem and[ed] ” the case “ for furtherIn th at D e L a Mata wa s th e so le a

pp e lla nt i n D e L a

Mata I I , N o. 03 -1 05 46 , at 8 ( 11 th 35 Cir. Sept. 3, 2003), the court, in vac atingthe Dec ember 17 final orde r of f

orfe iture, could have vacated the orde r only

as it applied to De L a Mata , in which eve nt the final orde r of f orfe iture would have r emained intac t as to the rema ining a ppellants. The c ourt, howeve r, did not limi t the vacatur in that way
. 19 proceedings.” D e L a Mata II, No. 03-1054 6, at 8 ( 11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). 35 T hus, the onl y

ple ad ing pe ndi ng o n r em an d w as the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13, 2002 m oti on, to w hic h a ll of the appe llants ( ex ce pt the c or por at e de fe ndants , w ho ha d y et to ap pe ar in the c as e) c oul d r es pond
. S ee 49 C
. J. S. Jud gm en ts § 357 (2 008) ( “ Whe re aj udgm en t i s va cate d or se t a sid e by

ava lid or de r or j udgm en t, it is entirely destroy ed and the rights of the parties are lef t as thoug h no su ch j udgm en t ha d e ve r be ene nte re d. ”)
. C onse que ntl y , and c ontrary to the G ove rn m en t’ s po sit ion , a ll of the appe llants ( inc lud ing the c or por at e de fe ndants )
we re p ro p er l y b ef

o re th e d i s t ri ct co u rt an d , n o w, a re p ro p er l y b ef o re u s . We
ac co rd ing ly

pr oc ee d to adis posi tio n of the se appe al s, w he the r to d ist ur b, in w hol e orin pa rt, t he di st ric t co ur t’s fi na l o rd er o f fo rfei tu re. B. W e first c onsid er a

ppellants’ principal ar gum ent – that the dist rict court la ck ed sub j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n to gr an t the G ove rn m en t’ s D ec em be r 13, 200 2
m oti on f or af ina l or de r of

f or fe iture . T he arg um en t a ssum es that i n gr an tin g th e
m oti on, the c ourt w as a m en din g a ppe llants ’ se nte nc es , to inc lud e fo rf ei tur e, andThe a rgument corr ectly

assumes that ame nding a defe ndant’s sente nce to include a 36 forf eiture or der w ould constitute a substantive amendme nt, i.e., a re -sentenc ing, a nd not the corr ection of a

cler ical er

ror unde r F ed. R. Crim. P. 36. S ee United States v. Pease, 331 F .3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2003) (holdingthat Rule 36 cannot be used to amend a sentenc e to include a forf eiture or der)
. At first blush, it appear ed that this is what the district court wa s doing in grantingthe 37 Gover nment’s motion (except as to the cor porate defe ndants, who we re not be fore the cour t). As we e xpla in i n th e te xt be low , h ow e ve r, the c ourt wa s n ot a

me nd ingDe L a

Mata ’s se nte nc e s; instead, it was, in ef

fec t, enforc ing the ag ree ment De L a Mata had made with the Gover nment and the c ourt had a

pproved on January

7, 1993. 18 U. S.C. § 3 74 2 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art : 38 (a) Appea l by

a def endant. – A de fenda

nt may file a notice of appe al in the district court for revie w of a

n otherwise f

inal sentenc e if the se ntence – (1) wa s imposed in violation of law . . . . See supra

note 23. 39 Since the district cour

t’s alleg ed er

ror c ould be asser

ted on direc t appea l, beca use the 40 g rounds for a

ppealingwer e a matter of r ecor d, it is doubt ful that De L a Mata could obtain re lief under 28 U .S.C. § 2255, si nce that provision does not serve a s substitute for a direc t appea l. 20 the re fo re w as e xe rc isi ng i ts j ur isd ic tio n un de r 18 U
. S. C. § 32 31, de spi te the 36 ab se nc e of

ape ndi ng c ri m ina l c as e. I f the dis tr ic t c ourt w as pur portin g to , and did , a m en d th e de fe ndants ’ se nte nc es , the lawpr ovi de d th em w iththe m eans t o 37 ch al le nge the c ourt’ s a ct ion ; the y c oul d a ppe al the c ourt’ s j udgm en ts unde r 18 U
. S. C. § 37 42( a)
. T he y ha d te n day s, unt il January 2, 200 3, to do s o; abse nt the 38 39 fi lin g of anot ic e of

appe al w ith in tha t pe ri od, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en ts w oul d be co m e fi na l. 40 De La Mata did appeal, but his notice of appeal w as not filed unti l January 27, 2003. The appeal wa s untim ely if he w as appealing a district court orderHad De L a Mata informed the D e L a Mata I Icourt that he was a

ppealingthe 41 amendment of

his sentence s in a criminal ca se, the c ourt would have dismiss ed his appe al as untimely
. Note that De L a Mata

treated the ca se as a

civil matter whe n he moved the district c ourt 42 for r econside ration of its Dec ember 17 order ; the Gover

nment, in response, c onsidered the motion as havingbeen f

iled pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 59(e) , as discussed in note 24, supra , and the De L a Mata

I Icourt did likewise. De L a Mata I I , No. 03-10546, at 5-6 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). 21 am en din g hi s se nte nc es , i. e. , an am en de d j udgm en t i n ac ri m ina l c as e. T he 41 appeal wa s tim ely , how ever, if D e L a Mata wa s appealing th e district court’ s final di sp os it io n o f a ci vi l ca se . The l at te r st ep is what he was t ak in g, i n t he vi ew of De La Mata I I court. T he court exerc ised jurisdiction over the appeal as civil m atter42 af te r obse rv ing that the c as e inv olv ed a“ sti pul at ion ” pr ovi din g f or the dis posa l of the it em s li ste d in

the ind ic tm en t’ s f

or fe iture c ount

and the G ove rn m en t’ s a tte m pt to have the stipu lation enforced. De La Mata I I, No. 03-1054 0, at 3 ( 11th Cir. Sep t. 3 , 20 03 ). In sum , a ppellants’ ar gum ent that the district court lacked sub j ect m atter j urisdictio n – because the Governm ent’ s m otion for a final order of f orfeiture soug ht relief in a c rim inal case via am ended sentences – fails. W hat the district
co urt ha d be fo re it

w as ac ivi l c as e, ins tit

ute d by a“ m oti on” that w as the func tio na l e qui va le nt o f a co m pla int in a ci vil c as e, a

c om pla int se ek ing the spe ci fi c en fo rc em en t of

f or fe iture a gr ee m en ts r ea ch ed be tw ee n th e G ove rn m en t28 U.S.C. § 1345 states, in relevant pa rt, that “the district c ourts shall have or igina l 43 jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or procee dings c ommenced by the United States.” In th is c a se , th e de fe nd ants ’ p ro mis e s w e re no t se lf -e xec uti ng ; th at is , th e de fe nd ants 44 promised to transfe r their inter ests to the Gover nment at some future date. Ha d the promises be e n s e lf -e xec uti ng , th e Go ve rnme nt w ou ld n ot h ave ins tit ute d th is l iti g atio n, wh ic h s ou g ht t o obtain clea

r title to such interests. 22 an d th e de fe ndants – i n ac ri m ina l c as e – bu t no t m ad e part of the de fe ndants ’
se nte nc es . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ha d su bj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n to pr oc ee d un de r 28 U
. S. C. § 13 45. 43 T he de fe ndants do n ot d isp ute that the y e nte re d in to the se a gr ee m en ts f re el y an d vo lun tari ly , a s th ey

r ep re se nte d to the c ourt whe n it que sti one d th em

on January 4, 199 3, nor

have the y

arg ue d th at

the lawsom eh owpr ec lud ed the G ove rn m en t and a

c ri m ina l de fe ndant f

ro m pr ovi din g f

or f or fe iture by

c ontra ct in advanc e of

the tr ia l onf

or fe iture . I n th e ab se nc e of any arg um en t f

ro m the 44 de fe ndants on this poi nt, w e se e no e rr or in the G ove rn m en t r ea ch ing thi s, a lbe it
som ewha t un co nve nti ona l, arr an ge m en t w iththe de fe ndants . S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Bank of N ewYork, 14 F.3d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting th at defendant had settled civil forfeiture suit by executing consent decre e); U nited States v White, No. 01-173-JJ B, 2008 W L 780667, at *1-2 (M. D. La . Mar. 19, 2008) (holdi ng that de fe ndant l ac ke d st an din g to e nj oinG ove rn m en t f ro m se iz ing pr ope rty

he forfe ited pursuant to a consent judgm ent, e ntered in lieu of norm al crim inalTh e de fe nd ants did pr omi se to g ive the Go ve rnme nt t he ir sh are s o f t

he c or po ra te 45 de fe nd ants (o f whic h th e de fe nd ants we re the so le owne rs ) i n th e ir Janu ary 4, 19 93 a g re e me nts , but th e Go ve rnme nt’ s D e c e mbe r 1 3 mo tio n d id n ot s e e k th e e nf or c e me nt o f t

hat pr omi se . H a d it do ne so , th e Go ve rnme nt, a s th e no w s ole sh are ho lde r i n th e c or po rate de fe nd ants , c ou ld presumably

have a cce ssed the def

endants’ a ccounts.

23 fo rf ei tur e pr oc ee din gs) ; c f. U nit ed S ta te s v. H ow le , 166 F
. 3d 1 166, 116 8 ( 11th Ci r. 199 9) ( “ A ple a ag re em en t i s, in es se nc e, ac ontra ct be tw ee n th e G ove rn m en t
an d ac ri m ina l de fe ndant. ”)
. Abse nt a le ga l i m pe dim en t t o th e se ttl em en t of fo rfei tu re i ss ue s i n t he m an ne r in whi ch th e se tt le m en ts oc cu rredin th is cas e, we h av e n o re as o n t o v ac at e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s “ fi n al o rd ero f f o rf ei tu re .” We th eref or e aff irm th e co ur t’s fi na l o rd er o f fo rfei tu re as itap pl ie s t o t he de fen da nt s. T he c or por at e de fe ndants w er e not part ie s to the a gr ee m en ts the Governm ent reac hed with the defendants on Janu ary 4, 1993, and the court ap p ro v ed th re e d ays l at er , o n J an u ary 7 . Ac co rd i n g l y, th e G o v ern m en t ’s D ec em be r 13, 200 2 m oti on, w hic h so ught , in es se nc e, the spe ci fi c en fo rc em en t of pr om ise s th e de fe ndants ha d m ad e in those a gr ee m en ts d id n ot, and c oul d no t, ha ve inv olv ed

the c or por at e de fe ndants . T he c or por at e de fe ndants , the n, sti ll 45 ha ve pos se ssi on o f the ir

int er es ts i n th e the ir

bank a cc ount s, sub

j ec t, of c our se to the district court’ s extant restraining order, and thu s we do no t affir m the final
or de r of f or fe iture to the e xte nt tha t i t pr ovi de s f or the tr an sf

er of the c or por at e de fe ndants ’ int er es ts24 C. As noted above, the district court’ s Septem ber 28, 2005 order, which
re ins ta te d th e D ec em

be r 17, 200 2 f

ina l or de r of

f or fe iture , did

not m en tio n ap pe llants ’ appl ic at ion s f or the r et ur n of int er es ts unde r Ru le 41( g)
. O ur af fi rm an ce of

the r ei nst at ed

f ina l or de r of

f or fe iture r en de rs m oot

the appl ic at ion s of the de fe ndants , but

it doe s no t r en de r m oot

the Ru le 41( g) appl ic at ion s of the corporate defe ndants. Rule 41(g) rulings are based on a balancing of the equities
an d are r ev ie w ed

und er the abuse of

dis cr et ionstandard
. U nit ed S ta te s v. Ma ch ad o, 465 F
. 3d 1 301, 130 7 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6)
. B al an ci ng the e qui tie s is a
m atte r fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt i n th e fi rs t i nst an ce . W e the re fo re va cate the portio n of the S ep te m

be r 28 o rd er

to the e xte nt tha t i t a

ppl ie s to the c or

por at e de fe ndants ’ Rule 41(g) applications andrem and the case to the district court for further pr oc ee din gs. A FF IRME D , in part ; V A CA T E D and RE MA N D E D , in part .