United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 02-2765

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Howard Dale Morris, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

No. 02-2767 District Court for the

___________ Western District of Missouri.

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Charles Jacob Davis, also known as *

Charlie Parker, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

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Submitted: January 16, 2003

Filed: April 30, 2003

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*

The Honorable James B. Loken became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2003.

**The HONORABLE E. RICHARD WEBBER, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

1

The HONORABLE SCOTT O. WRIGHT, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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Before LOKEN*

 and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and

WEBBER,** District Judge.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Howard Dale Morris and Charles Jacob Davis appeal their convictions of

conspiring to manufacture and distribute five hundred grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. On appeal, Davis

argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy

conviction. Morris argues that the district court1

 abused its discretion when it

excluded the plea agreements of two government witnesses. We affirm. 

Davis. Gwendolyn Hopkins was an important government witness in the

multi-defendant trial. Hopkins testified that she began selling methamphetamine for

Morris in June of 1998. Through Morris, Hopkins met Warren Barton and eventually

became Barton’s girlfriend. Hopkins testified that on a trip to California with Barton

in February 2001, she saw Barton take cash into the back room of Davis’s residence

and return with a large quantity of methamphetamine. Hopkins testified that she and

Barton returned to Davis’s residence on March 13, 2001, where she saw Barton

purchase $11,500 worth of methamphetamine from Davis. Agents watched Barton

visit the home; Barton and Hopkins were arrested in possession of methamphetamine

the following day. On cross-examination, Hopkins admitted that her trial testimony

was inconsistent with information she gave at the time of her arrest and with the first
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proffer she made to the government prior to her guilty plea. She also acknowledged

that she never saw methamphetamine change hands between Davis and Barton. 

Though acknowledging we must view the trial evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, Davis argues that a reasonable fact-finder could not

believe Hopkins’s self-serving, inconsistent, and largely uncorroborated testimony,

and that the government’s other evidence proved at most that he was a

methamphetamine user. But the issue of Hopkins’s credibility is virtually

unreviewable on appeal because it is “preeminently the job of the finder of fact.”

United States v. E.R.B., 86 F.3d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1996). The jury clearly credited

her testimony, and our review of that testimony and the corroborating testimony of

numerous other witnesses gives us no reason to doubt the jury’s credibility

determination. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict Davis of

methamphetamine conspiracy. See United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 155 (8th Cir.

1995) (sufficiency standard of review). 

 

Morris. Morris argues the district court abused its discretion in refusing to

admit the written plea agreements of Hopkins and Larry Youngblood, another

government witness. “In this circuit, a confederate’s guilty plea or plea agreement

is admissible on the government’s direct examination of the witness as evidence of

the witness’ credibility or of his acknowledgement of participation in the offense.”

United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989). Morris urges the converse

proposition: that a plea agreement may also be offered into evidence by the defense

to cast doubt on a witness’s credibility. He argues that excluding the plea agreements

limited his ability to demonstrate to the jury that the testimony of Hopkins and

Youngblood should not be believed because of “the inherent coercive effect” of the

cooperation provisions in their agreements. 

This is an issue committed to the district court’s discretion. See Drews, 877

F.2d at 12. Here, the district court initially overruled the government’s objection to
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the admission of Hopkins’s plea agreement into evidence, but then sustained the

objection of another defendant who sought to have the agreement excluded. The plea

agreements contained information that might have implicated one defendant, and

sentencing calculations that the jury might have taken as substantive evidence of the

defendants’ guilt. The court permitted thorough cross-examination of both Hopkins

and Youngblood as to the details of their agreements to cooperate. Both readily

admitted they had entered into plea agreements and hoped to receive favorable

sentencing recommendations for their cooperation. In these circumstances, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that any additional probative

value of the written plea agreements was “substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice,” that is, an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper

basis.” FED. R. EVID. 403 & advisory committee’s note. 

The judgments of the district court are affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.