[Cite as Brown v. Brown, 2021-Ohio-1932.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

UNION COUNTY 

 

JASON R. BROWN, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 14-20-24 

 v. 

MEAGHAN J. BROWN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 16DR0141 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: June 7, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Rocky Ratliff for Appellant 

 Natalie J. Bahan for Appellee 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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SHAW, J.

{¶1} Father-appellant, Jason R. Brown (“Jason”), brings this appeal from the 

September 22, 2020, judgment of the Union County Common Pleas Court 

designating mother-appellee, Meaghan Brown1

, residential parent for school 

placement purposes of the parties’ child, J.B. On appeal, Jason argues that it was 

not in J.B.’s best interest to modify a term of the shared parenting plan (“SPP”) and 

designate Meaghan as residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. 

Further, Jason also appeals the award of $622.50 in attorney’s fees to Meaghan for 

an “eleventh hour” continuance requested by Jason’s attorney, which moved an 

impending supplemental hearing date. 

Background

{¶2} The parties were married in Tennessee in June of 2014. They had one 

child together, J.B., born in February of 2015. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, 

the parties’ marriage was terminated by a decree of divorce on February 7, 2017. 

At that time the parties also entered into an agreed SPP, which was approved and 

adopted by the trial court. 

{¶3} The SPP designated both parties as residential parent of J.B. Further, 

the SPP provided parenting time two days each week to Meaghan, two days each 

week to Jason, then alternating three-day weekends for each parent. As J.B. was 

 

1

 Meaghan has remarried and her last name has changed; however, the case is still styled with her name as 

Brown. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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too young to be in school when the SPP was entered, the SPP provided that the 

parties should cooperate with regard to schooling when J.B. came of school age. 

{¶4} In addition, under the SPP, if one of the parties relocated, that party was 

required to promptly notify the trial court. In the event that a party did relocate, the 

trial court could schedule a hearing on its own motion or at the request of the nonrelocating party to determine whether it was in J.B.’s best interest for the SPP to be 

revised. 

{¶5} At the time of the divorce, Jason and Meaghan were living 

approximately fifteen minutes apart, with Meaghan residing in Marysville, Ohio, 

and Jason residing with his parents in Raymond, Ohio. Jason’s parents owned a 

large home and he used the lower level as his residence. Prior to the relationship 

ending, Meaghan resided with Jason and his parents as well. 

{¶6} In February of 2018, Meaghan filed a notice of intent to relocate from 

Raymond, Ohio, to West Chester, Ohio, in the Cincinnati area. Meaghan was in a 

relationship with a man who lived in the area. After she initially moved, Meaghan 

was commuting to a nursing job in Marion, so the parenting schedule still worked. 

Eventually, Meaghan finished her nursing degree and got a job in the West Chester 

area. At that point, exchanges with J.B. were conducted at a halfway point between 

the parties, in Springfield, Ohio. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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{¶7} On December 5, 2018, Meaghan filed a motion to modify the SPP, 

stating that a modification of the SPP was in J.B.’s best interest. Meaghan stated 

that she had moved from Marysville to West Chester for employment-related 

reasons. The motion stated that since Meaghan had moved the parties had continued 

executing the SPP; however, Meaghan believed it was in J.B.’s best interest to be 

enrolled in pre-school. The motion stated that given the distance between the 

residences, pre-school enrollment would necessitate a revision to the terms of the 

SPP. Meaghan desired to be designated residential parent for school placement 

purposes; however, she noted that she did not want to limit Jason’s parenting time 

more than necessary, and that she would consider increases in Jason’s parenting 

time during periods when J.B. was not in school. 

{¶8} On January 8, 2019, Jason filed his own motion for modification and/or 

termination of the SPP. After both parties had filed their motions, a GAL was 

appointed for J.B. 

{¶9} A hearing was held before a magistrate on the parties’ motions on July 

9, 2019. During the hearing, the parties narrowed the issue before the court. Despite 

both parties having filed motions to modify the SPP, the parties clarified that they 

wished the SPP to remain in place. The parties indicated that they simply wanted 

the trial court to determine who should be residential parent for school placement 

purposes only. The GAL had recommended a change in the parenting time schedule 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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that would coincide with J.B. attending school, and both parties seemed to be fine 

with the schedule; however, both parties wished the schooling to be done in their 

area. Given that the parents lived nearly two hours apart, a decision would have to 

be made as to where J.B. would attend school. 

{¶10} The GAL testified at the hearing and reiterated her position from her 

written report, stating that she felt Jason was the better option as residential parent 

for school placement purposes due to consistency of living in the Raymond area. 

She also felt that Jason had a good family support system around him. 

{¶11} Meaghan then testified at the hearing that J.B. was adjusted to her 

residence in West Chester just as she was to the home in Raymond. Further, 

Meaghan testified that she had remarried and that she had a good family support 

system in her area through her in-laws, which she felt the GAL did not take into 

account in her written report. In addition, Meaghan testified that she was going to 

be undertaking “PRN” status at work, which meant she only had to work two days 

out of every six weeks to keep her license active. She indicated that she could 

schedule those days when Jason had parenting time, and effectively be a stay-athome parent for J.B. 

{¶12} Meaghan also detailed some issues that she had with Jason over the 

years, such as Jason excessively taking J.B. to the doctor. She testified that Jason 

did not tell her about many of the visits as they happened, and that she only learned 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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of them when she received an “explanation of benefits” from insurance. In fact, she 

testified that at one point J.B. had a catheter for a urinary tract infection and 

Meaghan was not informed. 

{¶13} In addition, Meaghan testified that Jason did not offer her the right of 

first refusal for parenting time pursuant to the SPP even though he should have based 

on the wording of the SPP. Nevertheless, Meaghan testified she thought Jason was 

a good father and she did not want to limit his parenting time unnecessarily, she just 

wanted J.B. to be in school. 

{¶14} The hearing was continued to a second day: August 16, 2019. On the 

second day of the hearing Jason provided testimony that he had lived in the home 

with his parents in Raymond since around 2000. He indicated his parents were 

available to care for J.B. if necessary and that his sister only lived ten minutes away. 

Further, he testified that he went to North Union schools and he wanted J.B. to go 

there. In addition, Jason testified he had gotten a new job with work hours of 7:30 

a.m. to 4:30 p.m. However, he testified that he could work from home at times, 

which would allow him to be there for J.B. if she had any issues. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the parties submitted written closing arguments. 

{¶15} On December 27, 2019, the magistrate issued a lengthy written 

recommended decision on the matter that contained numerous enumerated factual 

findings leading to the magistrate’s conclusions of law. Ultimately the magistrate 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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disagreed with the GAL’s recommendation that Jason was the better option to be 

residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes because Meaghan could 

modify her schedule as a nurse to only work when J.B. was with Jason, thus allowing 

her to care for J.B. at all hours. The magistrate also felt that Meaghan had a strong 

support system around her. The magistrate felt that the GAL restricted a support 

system to only blood relatives, which did not reflect the reality of many families. 

Therefore Meaghan was recommended to be residential parent of J.B. for school 

placement purposes. 

{¶16} On January 10, 2020, Jason filed objections to the magistrate’s

decision. In his objections, Jason gave responses to each of the magistrate’s 

enumerated factual findings. He did not contest many of the magistrate’s broader 

factual findings; however, he did argue that the evidence disputed Meaghan’s claim 

that her work schedule could be such that she was effectively a stay-at-home mother. 

Further, and more importantly, Jason disagreed with the magistrate’s 

recommendation that Meaghan should be named residential parent of J.B. for school 

placement purposes. 

{¶17} On January 22, 2020, Meaghan filed a response to Jason’s objections 

to the magistrate’s decision. In the response Meaghan brought to light two new 

issues: that her employment status had officially been altered so she was on “PRN” 

status, and that the home Jason had lived in with his parents in Raymond had burned 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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down. The home, which Jason argued J.B. was adjusted to, was a “total loss” and 

resulted in Jason and his parents moving to Huntsville.2

{¶18} After reviewing the objections to the magistrate’s decision and the 

response to the objections, the trial court filed an order stating that the new issues 

raised in Meaghan’s response necessitated a further, supplemental hearing as the 

issues raised were germane to the trial court’s ruling on the objections. Thus the 

trial court set the matter for a hearing on those limited issues to supplement the prior 

hearing. However, due to, inter alia, covid-related restrictions, the supplemental 

hearing was delayed for several months. 

{¶19} The hearing on the supplemental issues was scheduled to convene

June 29, 2020. However, on June 26, 2020, Jason filed a motion to continue, stating 

that J.B. had disclosed she had been inappropriately touched by Meaghan’s 

husband. Because of this, Jason requested a continuance of the supplemental 

hearing. He also requested that the GAL be reappointed and that time be provided 

to allow the GAL to investigate the matter.3

 

{¶20} According to the record, the magistrate orally granted the motion to 

continue the hearing immediately; however, a magistrate’s order was not filed until 

July 27, 2020. In that order, the magistrate stated that Jason’s motion had been 

granted, and that the GAL should supply a supplemental report seven days before 

 

2

 On January 29, 2020, Jason filed a notice of intent to relocate to Huntsville, Ohio. 

3

 Notably, the motion’s certificate of service was addressed to the wrong attorney. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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the final hearing. However, the magistrate stated that due to the eleventh hour of 

Jason’s request, Jason would be required to pay Meaghan’s attorney’s fees for 

preparation for the hearing as a result of having to continue the hearing. The 

magistrate stated that Meaghan’s attorney had ten days to file a request for fees 

incurred in preparing specifically for the June 29, 2020 hearing that did not occur. 

Finally, the magistrate reiterated that the supplemental hearing in this matter would 

be limited to only the two issues set forth in the trial court’s January 27, 2020 order.4

{¶21} On August 6, 2020, Meaghan’s attorney filed a request for attorney’s 

fees consistent with the magistrate’s order. A motion attached stated that Jason’s 

continuance request was calculated to delay review of the magistrate’s decision and 

to prevent the trial court from adopting the magistrate’s decision. Further, 

Meaghan’s attorney argued that the allegations against Meaghan’s husband had 

been investigated by multiple sources and were found to be unsubstantiated. 

Meaghan stated that her husband had taken and passed a polygraph examination, 

and that a law enforcement investigation was closed on the matter. As to the 

attorney’s fees, Meaghan’s attorney attached an invoice for the hours billed with 

regard to the June 29, 2020 hearing. The invoice established that 4.5 hours had been 

worked for a total bill of $810. An additional .5 hours was worked with no bill. 

 

4

 Jason filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on July 27, 2020, setting terms for the continuance. The 

trial court overruled the objections the next day, finding that they were filed late outside of the rule, and that 

the filing was not appropriate in any event. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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Meaghan’s attorney filed an affidavit stating that the bill was true and accurate to 

the best of her knowledge. 

{¶22} On August 12, 2020, the magistrate filed an order awarding 

Meaghan’s attorney $622.50 in attorney’s fees. The magistrate stated the fees were 

being awarded “based upon Father’s unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse 

regarding the parties’ minor daughter.” (Doc. No. 102). The magistrate reduced 

the amount requested for attorney’s fees by one billed hour because that hour was 

unrelated to preparing for the June 29, 2020 hearing, which is the only issue the 

magistrate felt Meaghan should be compensated for. 

{¶23} On August 17, 2020, the GAL filed a written supplemental report

indicating that Meaghan’s husband had in fact taken, and passed, a private and a 

regular polygraph examination. The GAL’s report also noted that in the alleged 

disclosures made by J.B., she referred to her stepfather as “monkey boy,” which was 

a name that Jason—and perhaps only Jason—used for the stepfather. The GAL 

recommended that the court’s prior orders remain in place, but she added that 

stepfather should remain away from J.B. until all investigations were completed. 

{¶24} On August 24, 2020, Jason filed a motion to “set aside” the 

magistrate’s order granting Meaghan’s counsel’s attorney’s fees in the amount of 

$622.50. He argued, inter alia, that no evidentiary hearing had been held with 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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regard to J.B.’s disclosures, thus the magistrate’s determination that the allegations 

were “unsubstantiated” was improper at that time. 

{¶25} The trial court reviewed Jason’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s 

order with regard to the attorney’s fees and found that the “unsubstantiated” finding 

related to the allegations against the stepfather was supported by the record and that 

the attorney’s fees were appropriate and equitable for the limited purpose they were 

given in this matter. 

{¶26} The supplemental hearing that the trial court had ordered in January of 

2020 was finally held August 21, 2020, before the magistrate. Following the 

hearing, the magistrate filed a supplemental decision, stating that the evidence 

established that Jason had been living with his parents, that the home had burned 

down, and that Jason was currently residing in a different school district than the 

one he wanted to send J.B. to initially. However, Jason had open-enrolled J.B. in 

North Union and wanted her to attend that school. Further, the magistrate 

determined that the evidence showed that J.B. had been going to “Lakota” schools 

in the area where Meaghan lived. In addition, the evidence showed that Meaghan’s 

employment schedule had been altered so that she could be home with J.B. No 

objections were filed to the supplemental decision. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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{¶27} On August 24, 2020, Jason filed a new request to modify custody and 

for an evidentiary hearing, stating that J.B. was unsafe in Meaghan’s home due to 

the allegations made against Meaghan’s husband. 

{¶28} On September 22, 2020, following the supplemental hearing, with all 

the evidence now before it, the trial court filed an entry denying Jason’s objections 

to the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶29} Also on September 22, 2020, the trial court filed a lengthy written final 

judgment entry and order on the matter. The trial court independently reviewed the 

matter and ultimately concurred with the magistrate, finding that it was in J.B.’s best 

interest that Meaghan be designated residential parent of J.B. for school placement 

purposes. It is from this judgment that Jason appeals, asserting the following 

assignments of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. 1 

The trial court erred when it denied the Plaintiff/Appellant’s 

Motion for Custody and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. 

Assignment of Error No. 2 

The trial court erred when it failed to award custody of the minor 

child to the Plaintiff/Appellant. 

Assignment of Error No. 3 

The trial court erred when it awarded defendant attorney fees. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶30} In his first assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court erred 

in this matter by “denying” his August 24, 2020 motion for custody and his request 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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for a related evidentiary hearing. In the alternative, he argues that there is no final 

appealable order here because his newly filed motion for custody remains 

outstanding. 

{¶31} Importantly, the trial court specifically addressed Jason’s newly filed 

motion for custody in a footnote on page 8 of its final judgment entry. “The Court 

notes that subsequent to the trial, while awaiting the objection period to pass, Father 

filed separate Motion for Custody and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. That matter 

will be set in due course as it raises issues not litigated in the present action.” (Doc. 

No. 119). 

{¶32} Jason argues that the trial court’s order leaves an issue open for 

litigation, rendering this action incomplete. However, Jason’s new custody claim is 

independent of the current litigation related to which parent would assume the role 

of residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. Instead, his new motion 

represents a claim for modification of custody as a whole. See Denkewalter v. 

Denkewalter, 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0082-M, 2015-Ohio-3171, ¶ 9 (“A parent 

can always invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the domestic relations court to 

consider reallocation of parental rights.”). 

{¶33} Importantly, the matter before us, namely who should be residential 

parent for school placement purposes, has concluded. The separate and newly filed 

custody matter will be litigated in the future, if appropriate and necessary, and it can 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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be appealed at the conclusion of that litigation. The new, separate issue does not 

render the current judgement incomplete, or make it a non-final order. Barton v. 

Barton, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2016-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-980, ¶ 52, Carpenter v. 

Carpenter, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-05-083, 2013-Ohio-4980, ¶ 8. (“ 

‘Final orders are those that dispose of the whole case or 

some separate and distinct subdivision of it while leaving nothing for future 

determination.’ ”). For these reasons, we find that Jason’s new motion has not been 

denied and it is still pending for future, separate action. Therefore, Jason’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court erred 

when it selected Meaghan as residential parent of J.B. for school placement 

purposes. 

Standard of Review 

{¶35} This Court reviews a decision regarding parental rights for an abuse 

of discretion. King v. King, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-11-23, 2012-Ohio-1586, ¶ 9, 

citing Ralston v. Ralston, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–08–30, 2009–Ohio–679, ¶ 13, 

citing Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 1997–Ohio–260. An abuse of 

discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “The 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge has the best opportunity to 

view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does 

not translate well on the written page.” Davis at 418. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

has stated that this standard “is even more crucial in a child custody case.” Id. at 

419. 

Relevant Authority 

{¶36} When making a determination regarding parental rights, the domestic 

relations court must follow statutory guidelines. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 

74 (1988). “Revised Code 3109.04 governs court awards of parental rights and 

responsibilities, as well as the modification of shared parenting 

agreements.” Ralston at ¶ 16. This Court has previously determined that R.C. 

3109.04(E)(2)(b) applies when the domestic relations court modifies the 

designation of a residential parent for school purposes, but otherwise maintains both 

parents as residential parents with the same parental rights and 

responsibilities. Id. at ¶ 17. Revised Code 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides: 

The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting

approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared 

parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court 

determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the 

children or upon the request of one or both of the parents under 

the decree. Modifications under this division may be made at any 

time. The court shall not make any modification to the plan under 

this division, unless the modification is in the best interest of the 

children. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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{¶37} When determining the child’s best interest, the court should consider 

the factors in R.C. 3901.04(F)(1), which include: 

(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; 

(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant 

to (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as 

to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning 

the child, the wishes, and concerns of the child, as expressed to the 

court; 

(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s 

parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child's best interest; 

(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and 

community; 

(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the 

situation; 

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate courtapproved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship 

rights; 

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support 

payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that 

parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent 

is an obligor; 

(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of 

either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty 

to any criminal offense involving an act that resulted in a child 

being an abused or a neglected child * * *; 

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject 

to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied 

the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance with an 

order of the court; 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is 

planning to establish a residence, outside this state. 

Analysis 

{¶38} At the outset, we note that this is not a case where the parents regularly 

disparage each other. Both parents get along well enough to continue to engage in 

a SPP and both parents want the SPP to continue. However, due to the distance 

between the parents, a decision had to be made as to where J.B. would attend school. 

Both parents wanted J.B. to attend school in their respective area, thus the trial court 

had to make a difficult decision between two capable and loving parents. 

{¶39} In order to make its determination, the trial court analyzed the 

statutory best interest factors in R.C. 3901.04(F)(1). Under its analysis, the trial 

court determined that both parents sought to be named residential parent for school 

placement purposes (factor (a)). The trial court noted that J.B. was not interviewed 

in camera (factor b); however, the GAL initially expressed that Jason would be the 

better option for residential parent for school placement purposes. The trial court 

conducted the following analysis in disagreeing with the GAL. 

The GAL has recommended that Father be named school 

residential parent with Mother being given liberal parenting time. 

The GAL’s recommendation is based primarily upon two 

considerations (1) consistency; and (2) family support. The GAL 

found that consistency is important in this child’s life. In the 

GAL’s analysis, [J.B.] has lived in Father’s house all her life. The 

GAL finds this consistency to be a determining factor. Mother 

astutely points out that since the child was three, she has lived in 
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both Father’s home and Mother’s home an equal amount of time. 

Accordingly, consistency as it relates to residence, would be 

equivalent regardless which parent is named school residential 

parent. 

 The GAL finds that Father has a better support system in 

the event of emergencies. He lives [or lived] in the lower level of 

his parent’s home. Consequently, paternal grandparents are 

always there to watch [J.B.]. His sister also lives nearby. In the 

GAL’s analysis, Mother’s support system is comprised of 

individuals who may be significant in Mother’s life, but are not 

blood relatives. Apparently, this factor weighs heavily in the

GAL’s analysis. 

 The Court agrees that a support system is significant when 

parenting children. The Court is not as focused as the GAL on 

whether that support system is comprised of blood relatives. 

Excellent support systems comprised of caring, competent and 

loving adults are as effective as those comprised of blood relatives. 

Quite often parents rely on neighbors, friends, work mates or 

church members to comprise effective support systems. Mother’s

support system is comprised of her Husband, who is home most 

of each day. Mother’s support system also includes her 

Husband’s parents and nearby family. The Court finds that both

parents have acceptable support systems each can rely upon in 

the event of exigent circumstances. 

(Doc. No. 119). 

{¶40} With regard to factor (c), the trial court noted that J.B. had a good 

relationship with both parents and extended families, and with regard to factor (d) 

the trial court’s analysis indicated J.B. was adjusted to both homes. Further, both 

parents were determined to be in good physical and mental health5

 (factor (e)). 

 

5

 Jason disputes this due to issues Meaghan has had in the past with, inter alia, anorexia but there are no 

indications of any current issues. 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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{¶41} With regard to factor (f), and the parent more likely to honor and 

facilitate parenting time, the trial court noted some issues with Jason failing to offer 

Meaghan the right of first refusal for parenting time. The trial court found that this 

failure on Jason’s behalf illustrated some continuous denial of Meaghan’s rights 

(factor i). The trial court found that factors (g), (h), and (j) were not relevant here. 

{¶42} After reviewing the evidence and the appropriate legal factors, the trial 

court found that 

The determining factor in the Court’s analysis is that Mother 

stands ready to modify her work schedule so she can essentially

become a stay at home mom. With Mother as school residential 

parent, she will be home to care for her daughter at all hours. 

Mother will be home in the event the child becomes ill at school, 

or cannot go to school due to illness. She will be there to take her 

to school and pick her up. She will be available to monitor her 

daughter’s progress both educationally and socially. Although 

Father testified that he has more flexibility in his new job, the 

Court finds Father’[s] testimony less credible regarding his 

availability. Father’s testimony was that he spends 4-6 hours per 

day out of the house at work. Father’s testimony appears 

contrived in order to justify not offering his ex-Wife first refusal. 

If Father were designated school residential parent, there is a

substantial likelihood that parenting of this child would be 

delegated to paternal Grandparents. In this instance, everyone

agrees that both Mother and Father are good, loving and suitable 

parents. The Court finds that despite being loving Grandparents, 

there is no need to delegate parental responsibility when a 

perfectly suitable parent is available 24/7 to raise her daughter. 

The Court finds that it is in [J.B.]’s best interest that Mother be 

designated school residential parent. Despite designating Mother 

school residential parent, the Court finds Father is deserving of a 

prominent place in his daughter’s life. He will have substantial 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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parenting time so as to maintain the strong Father/Daughter 

bond. 

(Doc. No. 119). 

{¶43} Jason now argues that the trial court’s determination was an abuse of 

discretion because he was “not the reason” that this matter was before the court, 

blaming Meaghan’s move. Further, he argues that the trial court failed to consider 

the living arrangements of J.B., the bond J.B. had with her grandparents, and the 

“constant” work changes of Meaghan. 

{¶44} However, in our review of the trial court’s lengthy entry, we find that 

the trial court carefully weighed the factors at issue and came to a difficult decision 

between two good parents. There was never going to be a “winner” in this scenario, 

just the parent designated to be the residential parent for school placement purposes. 

{¶45} Moreover, by all indications the trial court did consider J.B.’s living 

situation and her bonds. In fact there was a supplemental hearing that established 

that the home Jason is claiming J.B. was so attached to has since burned down. 

Further, the supplemental hearing showed that Meaghan had gone to PRN status as 

she stated she would. Importantly, the trial court was persuaded by the fact that 

Meaghan would be available at all times to J.B. and the trial court specifically found 

Jason’s claims regarding his availability specious. 

{¶46} A trial court’s determination regarding custody must be given the 

“utmost respect.” Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). Given the trial 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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court’s clear analysis of the issues and factors presented in this case, we cannot find 

that there was an abuse of discretion by naming Meaghan residential parent of J.B. 

for school placement purposes. Evidence was presented that supports the trial 

court’s difficult decision in this matter. Therefore, Jason’s second assignment of 

error is overruled. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶47} In Jason’s third assignment of error he argues that the trial court erred 

by awarding Meaghan attorney’s fees related to the “eleventh hour” continuance of 

the supplemental hearing. More specifically, he argues that this case did not contain 

an allegation of frivolous conduct or a finding of frivolous conduct. 

Standard of Review 

{¶48} A determination as to whether to award attorney fees in a domestic 

relations case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed 

on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Graham v. Graham, 3d Dist. Union No. 

14-19-18, 2020-Ohio-1435, ¶ 20, Cichanowicz v. Cichanowicz, 3d Dist. Crawford 

No. 3-13-05, 2013-Ohio-5657, ¶ 92. 

Analysis 

{¶49} A total of $622.50 was awarded to Meaghan in attorney’s fees in this 

case pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B), which reads as follows. 

In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an 

action for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment of 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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marriage or an appeal of that motion or proceeding, the court 

may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation 

expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable. In 

determining whether an award is equitable, the court may 

consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the parties, and any 

other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not 

consider the parties’ assets. 

According to R.C. 3105.73(C), “The court may make an award of attorney’s fees 

and litigation expenses under this section in addition to making an award of 

attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under any other provision of the Revised 

Code or of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶50} Based on the plain statutory language, attorney’s fees can be awarded 

under R.C. 3105.73 separate from, or in addition to, other statutory subsections and 

the civil rules. Thus on appeal where Jason claims that the trial court needed to find 

frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 before awarding attorney’s fees, he is 

mistaken. That statute provides an additional, separate method for awarding 

attorney’s fees. Therefore this argument is not well-taken. 

{¶51} As to the attorney’s fees that were awarded in this case under R.C. 

3105.73, Meaghan’s attorney filed a request for fees at the direction of the 

magistrate. The fees were specifically limited to preparation for the June 29, 2020, 

supplemental hearing that had to be continued due to Jason’s late motion. As part 

of her motion, Meaghan’s attorney submitted an itemized invoice for $810. The 

magistrate reviewed the invoice and found that one hour was spent on issues 
Case No. 14-20-24 

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unrelated to preparation for the June 29, 2020 supplemental hearing, thus the bill 

was reduced by that hour of billing to the amount of $622.50. 

{¶52} Jason objected to the magistrate’s award of attorney’s fees and the trial 

court reviewed the matter under R.C. 3105.73(B). The trial court found that the 

award was equitable, conducting the following analysis. 

The backdrop upon which this action proceeds must be 

considered. The contentious nature of the proceedings, including 

testimony regarding Paternal Grandparent interference, the fact

that the trial date had been set months in advance with 

participation by counsel, coupled with an unsubstantiated 

eleventh hour allegation of sexual abuse, all weighed in favor of 

granting the award. Under the particular circumstances of this

case, the Chief Magistrate found it inequitable for Mother to pay 

twice for trial preparation. Considering the equities involved, the 

Court finds it equitable for Father to pay the attorney fees as

Ordered. Father’s motion to set aside the Magistrate’s Order is 

without merit. 

(Doc. No. 117). 

{¶53} On appeal, Jason seems to largely take issue with the trial court’s 

determination that the allegations against the stepfather were unsubstantiated when 

a hearing on the matter had not been held. He claims that when the continuance was 

requested, this information was unknown. However, after reviewing the matter, the 

trial court found that the claims had been investigated and were found to be 

unsubstantiated. Further, the trial court found that the late hour of the allegation and 

the ongoing legal animosity necessitated an award here. In addition, the 

supplemental hearing had been set for a long time and it was covering limited issues, 
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begging the question of why a continuance was necessary for those limited purposes 

based on an unrelated issue. 

{¶54} To the extent that Jason argues that Meaghan did not present testimony 

that her fees were “reasonable” in this case, Ohio Appellate Courts awarding 

attorney’s fees under R.C. 3105.73 have generally held that “ ‘[a] trial court may 

also use its own knowledge and experience when evaluating the nature of the 

services rendered and the reasonableness of the fees charged.’ ” Miller v. Miller, 6th 

Dist. Sandusky No. S-16-27, 2017-Ohio-7646, ¶ 33, quoting Falk v. Falk, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 08AP-843, 2009-Ohio-4973, ¶ 39 (analyzing attorney’s fees under 

R.C. 3105.73(A) rather than (B)). “Further, of these cases, those in which an award 

of attorney’s fees was found to be inappropriate involved situations where no 

supporting documentation—such as an invoice, a billing statement, or records of 

hourly rates—was submitted for the trial court to evaluate.” Id. citing, inter alia, 

Miller at ¶ 34. Here an invoice was submitted and evaluated by the trial court. 

{¶55} Given the broad discretion trial courts are vested with to award 

attorney’s fees, particularly in domestic relations cases, we cannot find that there 

was an abuse of discretion in this case. Attorney’s fees were awarded under a very 

specific statute for a very limited purpose. See Graham, supra, at ¶ 21. For all of 

these reasons, Jason’s third assignment of error is overruled. 
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Conclusion

{¶56} For the foregoing reasons Jason’s assignments of error are overruled 

and the judgment of the Union County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur. 

/jlr