1

Filed 9/18/23 P. v. Young CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRIAN YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164845

 (Contra Costa County

 Case No. 50811471)

Brian Young was convicted by a jury of second degree murder (Pen.

Code, § 187; all further statutory references are to this code) and was 

sentenced on that conviction. Young sought resentencing under section 

1172.6.

1 After issuing an order to show cause on Young’s petition and 

conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the People had 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Young could still be convicted of 

second degree implied malice murder and denied his resentencing petition. 

We affirm.

1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to 

section 1172.6, with no substantive changes in the statute. (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 10 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) Throughout this opinion, we cite to 

section 1172.6 for ease of reference.
2

BACKGROUND

The procedural summary through Young’s 2011 trial and direct appeal 

is taken from our prior opinion in Young’s direct appeal (People v. Young 

(Mar. 28, 2014, A134248) [nonpub. opn.] (Young I)) and our more recent 

opinion on Young’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage (People 

v. Young (Mar. 30, 2021, A159116 [nonpub. opn.] (Young II)).

The factual summary, however, is based on the evidence adduced at 

Young’s trial which was considered by the trial court and is limited to those 

facts relevant to the issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial court erred in 

denying Young’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition.2 

General Overview

On the evening of April 3, 2008, a Dodge and a Pontiac were traveling

westbound on Interstate 80 through Pinole. The Dodge was being driven by 

Tiana Sheppard; her boyfriend Aaron Myers was in the front passenger seat 

and their friend Young was in the rear seat. The Pontiac was being driven by 

Rhonda White, who was a good friend of Sheppard and a close friend of Myers 

and Young. Also in White’s car were D., S., C., and A., mostly all of whom 

knew and were friends with Sheppard, Myers and Young. White, D., S., C., 

and A. were out for the evening, headed for a bowling alley. 

At some point while driving on the freeway, White or D. recognized 

Sheppard’s Dodge. White moved to get closer and then White waved and D. 

flashed peace signs to the people in the Dodge. Multiple shots were fired 

from the Dodge into the Pontiac. White was killed, and D. – seated in the 

front passenger seat – was wounded.

2 For the purposes of our analysis, we, like the trial court, do not take 

from or rely on the factual histories set forth in either of our prior opinions. 

(See People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th, 276, 292–293.)
3

Sheppard and Myers were charged with the same offenses as Young: 

murder (White) (§187) and attempted murder (one count per passenger in 

White’s car) (§§ 187, 664), with related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, 

subds. (b)–(d)), and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). Sheppard entered 

into a plea agreement. Myers was tried and found guilty of one count of 

voluntary manslaughter and four counts of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter, together with a firearm enhancement and shooting at an 

occupied motor vehicle. Myers’ conviction was affirmed on appeal.

Young’s jury trial took place in October 2011.

Relevant Testimony from Select Prosecution Witnesses from 2011 Trial

Tiana Sheppard

Sheppard testified that White was a good friend whom she had known 

for seven years, having met her through Myers, her ex-boyfriend. White and 

Myers had been neighbors; the backyards of their childhood homes abutted. 

White was the godmother of Sheppard and Myers’ eldest child. 

On the evening White was killed, Sheppard had picked up Myers and 

Young in Sacramento in her Dodge. Myers had a backpack, which he placed 

in the trunk, before getting into the front passenger seat. Young had a darkcolored duffle bag, roughly three feet long, which stayed with him in the 

backseat. Sheppard did not see Myers, who was seated next to her in the car,

with a gun or a rifle. She did not see if Young (seated in the backseat) had 

any weapon either, noting she did not really look in the backseat during the 

drive. Sheppard never looked inside the duffle either. 

It was close to 9 p.m. and getting dark outside as they made their way 

to Richmond via Interstate 80. As they prepared to exit the freeway, a car 

pulled alongside her car. Sheppard looked over but could not make out any 

faces, only shadows. She was startled but did not see anything that was 
4

threatening. She did not recognize the car as her friend Rhonda White’s 

Pontiac. 

Myers asked her about who was in the other car and Sheppard

responded that she did not know. Nothing inside the other car appeared 

threatening to her, nor had the car swerved into her lane or cut her off. 

Myers suddenly told Sheppard to “watch out” and grabbed her head and 

pushed it down. Sheppard next heard “shots and glass and a boom.” She had 

no idea where the shots were coming from as she kept her head down the 

entire period. Nor was she able to tell whether two different types of shots 

were being fired. She just heard glass shatter and felt glass flying. She

never felt anything on her body consistent with a rifle being set on top of her.

After they pulled over, the trio got out of the Dodge, crossed a freeway 

railing, and walked to the top of an adjacent slope. Young had a jacket over 

his shoulder. Sheppard could see something hanging out from under his 

jacket that looked metallic and like the end of a pole but was not sure what it 

was. She had previously seen rifles, and the object could have been the 

barrel of a rifle. They left the scene not knowing who, if anyone, had been 

shot. 

C.

On the evening White was killed, C. had planned to go bowling with 

White, D., S., and A.; White was driving. He sat behind White, while D. was 

in the front passenger seat; S. sat in the backseat behind D., and A. occupied 

the middle backseat. On the way to the bowling alley, White recognized 

Sheppard’s Dodge. When White caught up with the Dodge, C. recognized 

Sheppard driving and Myers in the passenger seat. C. could also tell 

someone was in the backseat of the Dodge but could not identify who it was.
5

When White pulled up parallel to Sheppard’s Dodge and their cars 

were “neck and neck,” White waved. After White waved, “[t]hey started 

shooting.” C. saw a muzzle flash from the front of the car. He ducked and 

everybody in the backseat crouched down too, while D. in the front seat slid 

down. He heard over 20 shots. D. exclaimed he was hit, and White tried to 

gasp for air but soon after went quiet. Eventually, S. figured out how to take 

control of the Pontiac and managed to pull the emergency brake to bring the 

car to a stop. C. checked on D., who was slumped down in the front seat,

could not move, and stated, “ ‘Don’t let me die.’ ” White did not say anything

and appeared stiff. 

With respect to the gunfire, C. stated that he heard two different guns. 

First, he heard a handgun associated with the front passenger seat from 

where the initial shots were fired. He explained that he had previously heard 

handguns being fired and was aware they sounded different from assault 

rifles. Two or three seconds after four or five shots from the handgun were 

fired, he heard rapid fire shots which sounded like they came from a fully 

automatic machine gun. He did not see any shots coming from the backseat 

of the Dodge, since he was down at the time. At Myers’ trial in 2009, C. had 

testified that he could not tell from the sound of gunfire whether there was 

one weapon or two. He acknowledged that since the 2009 case, he had heard

that two separate casings were found as part of the investigation. 

S.

S. testified that on the evening White was killed, he and his friends 

were in White’s car on the way to a bowling alley. He was in the backseat in 

the middle, while C. was to his left behind White, and A. was to his right

behind D. At some point on the freeway, D. recognized another car. S. was 

able to see Sheppard’s face clearly but could not make out the other two male 
6

passengers. He could see the person in the backseat moving around. As soon 

as White waved to the car, the shooting started. S. saw lights from the firing 

of a weapon. After the first few sparks, he put his head down. There were 

more than 10, possibly more than 20 shots fired. When they exited the car, 

he saw more than 20 shots had been directed towards them. He could not tell 

if he had heard multiple types of gunfire. Once the shooting stopped, S. sat 

up, grabbed the steering wheel, and slowed the car down. There were no 

weapons in White’s car that night.

D.

D. testified that on the night White was killed, he and his friends were 

in the carpool lane of the freeway when he noticed Sheppard’s car. When D.

looked over at the Dodge, he could clearly see Sheppard driving, Myers in the 

front seat, and Young awake in the backseat behind Sheppard. D. gestured a 

peace sign to them with both hands. Myers looked over at Sheppard and 

within a few seconds he lifted a gun and was shooting. D. saw a muzzle flash 

from the front seat, indicating shots initially coming from Myers. In a span

of two or three seconds, he saw another muzzle flash from the backseat and 

heard gunfire. The gunfire was loud, and the shots all sounded similar.

Based on the sounds, he could not say if there were multiple types of guns.

In response to the shots, D. ducked to the side and moved towards 

White after seeing more muzzle flashes. He felt bullets strike him. 

Following the shooting, he was in a coma for a month. D. stated that prior to 

the shooting, no one in his car (the Pontiac) had acted angrily towards the 

people in the Dodge. There were no weapons in the Pontiac, and he never 

saw any of his friends with a gun. 
7

Detective Michael Pistello

Detective Pistello of the Pinole Police Department investigated White’s 

murder and went to the crime scene the night White was killed. Inside the 

Dodge (Sheppard’s car), he saw several expended casings, including a .380

shell casing and another 7.62x39mm rifle shell casing. As to the Pontiac 

(White’s car), he saw 14 bullet holes in the passenger side of the car, all 

passenger windows shattered, and a small amount of blood in the vehicle. He 

did not observe any weapons in the Pontiac. 

Detective Pistello interviewed C., S., D., and A. (the surviving 

passengers of the Pontiac). He first interviewed C. the night of the shooting, 

but C. was shaken up and reluctant to talk. C. returned to the police 

department the next day and, while still hesitant, was more willing to talk. 

C. told the detective the following: The car involved in the shooting belonged 

to Sheppard and Myers and he knew the car from the neighborhood. 

Sheppard was the driver, Myers was in the passenger seat, and Young (whom 

C. had only known and identified by his nickname Bow Wow) was in the 

backseat. He was able to see the gun Myers had and demonstrated how 

Myers held the gun prior to shooting it, holding his right hand from his 

shoulder area, and using his index finger on a trigger. He used only one hand 

for the demonstration. He was unable to describe the gun, however, because 

he could not see it. Detective Pistello did not ask C. if he could tell if the

weapon was a handgun or a rifle because, based on C.’s motion, he knew one 

did not shoot a rifle in that manner and it was clear in his mind he was 

describing a handgun. He did not recall asking C. if he saw anyone else shoot 

a gun from the back of the car. 

After Sheppard surrendered to police, she told Detective Pistello the 

following: She was present during the shooting and had been driving the 
8

Dodge. She first saw Young’s firearm as they were fleeing the scene. They 

were running up a hill and when she looked up and saw Young had a gun 

slung over his left shoulder, underneath his jacket. She saw the nose of the 

gun hanging from beneath the jacket and estimated with her hands that it 

was 2.5 feet long. She remembered Young having the gun because his was 

“the bigger gun.” She did not use the term “rifle” when discussing the 

firearm, referring to it as a “gun.” Detective Pistello had referred to the 

firearm as a “rifle,” but Sheppard never corrected him or stated it was not a 

rifle. 

Detective Pistello met D. briefly at the hospital the month after the 

shooting. There, a nurse provided him a plastic container with an expended 

round from what the detective suspected was a 7.62x39mm rifle round, which 

was marked as People’s exhibit 11a. He learned the round had been removed 

from D. during surgery and sent it to the county crime lab for analysis.

Deputy Sheriff Donald Finley

Deputy Sheriff Finley, a criminalist at the Contra Costa Sheriff’s Crime 

Lab, was designated a firearms expert. In processing the Dodge for evidence, 

he did not find any firearm in the car but did locate multiple cartridges from 

two different calibers of firearms. There were two expended .380 cartridge 

cases which were likely fired from an automatic pistol and located in the 

front of the vehicle, and fourteen expended 7.62x39mm cartridge cases which 

were likely fired from an AK-47 assault rifle and located throughout the 

inside of the vehicle. It was impossible to say with certainty whether any

particular cartridge case was fired from the front or back of the car. One of 

the 7.62x39mm cartridge cases was found inside the unzipped green duffle 

behind the driver’s seat. He explained that .380 cartridge cases are fired 
9

from small pistols or handguns, while 7.62x39mm cases are typically fired 

from rifles, most commonly AK-47s. 

Deputy Sheriff Finley reviewed the damage to White’s Pontiac from the 

gunfire. All four passenger windows of the car were shattered. There were 

also 13 bullet holes in the passenger doors and apparent bullet damage inside 

the car as well. Generally, it was not possible to determine the caliber of the 

bullet that created the damage, i.e., a particular hole in the car, so they 

looked at actual recovered bullets to determine the caliber. For instance, he 

found at least three, possibly four, .380 bullets lodged inside the front 

passenger door which did not penetrate the door completely. There were also 

bullet fragments found under the front passenger floor carpet which 

appeared to be from a rifle. He also determined that another bullet which the 

crime lab received from the Pinole Police Department, marked as People’s 

exhibit 11a, had been fired through a rifle. 

Dr. Ikechi Ogan

Dr. Ogan, a forensic pathology expert, conducted White’s autopsy. He 

testified that White died of multiple gunshot wounds. Based on the size of 

the entrance wounds, he could not identify the caliber of bullets which caused 

the wounds. He returned recovered fragments from the bullets to the police. 

Relevant Testimony from Select Defense Witnesses from 2011 Trial

Brian Young 

Young testified that he had known White for nine years, they lived in 

the same neighborhood, and she was like a sister to him. He was also friends 

with D. and C. and knew S. through the neighborhood. 

On the night White was killed, Sheppard had picked up him and his 

best friend Myers from Sacramento and they planned on driving to Richmond 

so that he and Myers could visit their fathers. They made the visit at night 
10

because they did not want to run into trouble. He suspected they might run 

into trouble because Myers had been shot approximately two months earlier, 

and he and Myers had been threatened. The day after Myers got shot, 

someone shot at him. He thought he was a target because others might think 

that he was intent on retaliating for his best friend.

Sheppard drove, Myers sat in the passenger seat, and he was in the 

backseat behind Myers next to a baby seat that was behind the driver. 

Before the shooting, he was dozing and was awakened by Myers sating, 

“[W]ho is that?” and “[W]atch out.” He then heard gunshots and glass 

hitting; he believed they were being shot at from another car, and he was 

scared for his life. He was armed with a handgun, 9mm .380, which was on

his right hip, and he reached for it. He chambered a round and fired as he 

was going towards the window with his head down in the car seat. He fired 

towards his left, towards the car be believed was attacking them, but could 

not see the car or what he was shooting since his head was down. He was not 

trying to kill anyone in particular; his only intention in firing was to get the 

car to back away. Their car hit something, and a tire went flat. He got out of 

the car, taking his gun with him. He did not see any other gun in the car at 

the time. Later, after he had left the scene, he learned White had been shot. 

Had he known who the occupants of the Pontiac were, he would have never 

shot at the car. Young owned the duffle bag found in the backseat of the 

Dodge. He acknowledged that the digital scale found in the bag was his and 

that marijuana residue was on the scale. He used marijuana but did not sell 

it. Myers sold marijuana. 

On cross-examination, Young acknowledged he was a felon at the time 

of the shooting and had previously been convicted of having a firearm on 

school grounds. As a felon, he was aware that he was not allowed to have a 
11

firearm and that carrying one was against the law. He also knew Myers was 

a drug dealer and kept firearms at his house, from where he sold drugs. On 

the night Sheppard drove him and Myers to Richmond, he was aware that 

Myers was transporting marijuana to Richmond. 

On the night of the shooting, Young had no idea the color of the car he 

shot at, as he recalled only seeing the outline of the car. He had not seen 

White or D. in the car and never saw White wave. He pointed his handgun in 

the direction of the car next to them but did not aim it at the people inside, 

intending only to scare them off. He did not remember how many shots he 

fired or how many times he pulled the trigger. Nor did he know if Myers was 

also firing a gun since his head was down, but he was aware of other 

gunshots. At the time, he really believed someone was firing at him and that 

he was in danger, even though subsequent reports have since made him 

realize that was not the case. He also admitted to being awake. 

Young wore a jacket that night but indicated it stopped at the waist so 

was not long enough to conceal a rifle. Any rifle would be visible underneath 

his jacket. Sheppard never saw him with a barrel hanging underneath his 

coat. He did not have a metal pole with him either. He denied that a rifle 

was in his duffle when he brought it inside Sheppard’s car. He denied firing 

multiple rounds from an AK-47 into White’s car.

After the shooting, Young fled to Louisiana because he feared 

prosecution as well as retaliation by the families of the victims. He did not 

return to California until he was captured nine months after White’s death.

Verdict and Sentence

The jury convicted Young of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle 

(§ 246) and second degree murder (§ 187), together with true findings on the 

firearm enhancements (during the commission of the murder defendant (1) 
12

personally used and discharged a firearm; and (2) personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or the death of 

the victim (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a); 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)) and the sentence 

enhancement (killing perpetrated by intentionally shooting a firearm from a 

motor vehicle at a person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict great 

bodily injury (§ 190, subd. (d)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on four 

counts of attempted murder; those counts were later dismissed. Young was

sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years, later modified to 73 years to life 

by the trial court.

Direct Appeal

On direct appeal, Young did not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence but instead argued purported instructional and sentencing errors. 

We affirmed the conviction but remanded the matter for resentencing. The 

Supreme Court denied Young’s petition for review. (July 14, 2014, S218266.) 

Young was resentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years to life.

Resentencing Proceedings

Prima Facie Stage

On February 20, 2019, Young, appearing in propria persona, filed a 

section 1172.6 form petition for resentencing. On the form petition, Young

averred that: (1) an information was filed against him that allowed the 

prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder based on “the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine”; (2) he was convicted of second degree 

murder; and (3) he could not now be convicted of second murder because of 

changes to section 188, effective January 1, 2019, together with

representations that he was not the actual killer and did not, with the intent 

to kill, aid or abet the murder. He attached to his petition several 

documents, including certain jury instructions and our Young I decision. The 
13

trial court appointed counsel for Young, and both Young’s appointed counsel 

and the People submitted additional briefing and portions of the trial 

testimony transcript.

On September 10, 2019, the trial court summarily denied the petition 

without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. 

The court found Young was not entitled to relief because he had not made a 

prima facie showing that he could not be convicted of murder under the new 

law. Young appealed.

We concluded the trial court erred in summarily denying Young’s 

resentencing petition without issuing an order to show cause and holding an 

evidentiary hearing. (Young II, supra, at p. 12.) In particular, the trial court 

erred in finding Young had failed to meet the third condition for a prima facie 

showing under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), namely, that he could not be 

convicted of second degree murder under the new law. (Young II, at p. 13.) 

We explained that the trial court had erroneously denied relief by (1) 

determining at the prima facie stage that there was substantial evidence 

from which a reasonable trier of fact could reach a guilty verdict of implied 

malice murder; and (2) engaging in judicial fact-finding at the prima facie 

stage rather than holding an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) 

We reversed the order denying the resentencing petition and remanded 

the matter to the trial court with direction to issue an order to show cause 

and to hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d) to 

determine whether to vacate Young’s second degree murder conviction, recall 

the sentence, and resentence him. (Young II, at p. 13.) We expressed no 

opinion on how the trial court should rule following the order to show cause 

hearing. (Id. at p. 16.)
14

Evidentiary Hearing

Following our remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause 

directing the People to show cause why Young’s resentencing petition should 

not be granted and scheduled a hearing. In advance of the hearing, the 

People submitted a memorandum of points and authorities compiling 

relevant testimony from Young’s 2011 trial, arguing that such evidence 

established beyond a reasonable doubt that Young could be convicted of 

second degree implied malice murder and was thus ineligible for 

resentencing. The People also submitted reporter’s transcripts from Young’s 

2011 trial, as well as photographs of White’s damaged Pontiac.

At the hearing, Young was represented by counsel. At the outset of the 

proceeding, the court noted that, in addition to the trial transcripts, all the 

exhibits from the original trial had also been transferred to the court. The 

court admitted the materials as well as the People’s additional photographs

into evidence and expressed the court’s understanding that they were to 

serve as the evidentiary basis for the court’s decision on the order to show 

cause. The court also heard counsel’s arguments. In an oral ruling, the court 

found the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 

crime of second degree implied malice murder of White by Young, 

summarized the trial evidence in support of this conclusion (including 

discrediting Young’s testimony), and denied Young’s resentencing petition. 

Once again, Young appealed. 

Young’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the authority of 

People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) which raised no 

specific contentions on appeal but suggested we conduct an independent 

review of the record at our own discretion in the interests of justice. Relying

on Delgadillo, we informed Young of his right to file a supplemental letter or 
15

brief raising any issues he chose to call to our attention. Young filed a 

supplemental brief.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437) “ ‘amend[ed] 

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 

as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was 

not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842 

(Gentile), superseded in other part by statute, as stated in People v. Williams 

(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1252, fn. 9.) The Legislature accomplished this 

in part by substantively amending sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lewis

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)

Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as 

stated in subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a 

principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be 

imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” 

(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

Section 189, subdivision (e), now limits the circumstances under which 

a person may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the 

perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) 

[defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder 

only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. 

[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, 

abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the 

actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The 
16

person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 

190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).) 

Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (SB 775) expanded 

eligibility for resentencing relief. (People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 

377, 388.) Those eligible for relief now include persons charged and/or 

convicted of attempted murder under a theory of felony murder or the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Porter 

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 650, 651–652 [observing SB 775 amended section 

1172.6 to “ ‘[c]larif[y] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder 

or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] 

probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those 

persons convicted of murder under the same theories’ ”].)

SB 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of 

felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of 

murder under the new law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

p. 843; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 

698, 708 (Strong).) “[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition 

containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met 

[citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of 

murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189 

made effective January 1, 2019.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708, fn. omitted.) “When the 

trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other 

required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine 

whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Ibid.) If the 

defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “the court 
17

shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Further, the court 

must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden 

of proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder 

or attempted murder” under state law as amended by Senate Bill 1437.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, 

the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the 

conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the 

remaining charges.” (Ibid.) 

Under Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, if a no-issues brief is filed in a 

section 1172.6 appeal and the defendant then “files a supplemental brief or 

letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments 

presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, at p. 232.) 

We are not required to conduct “an independent review of the entire record to 

identify unraised issues.” (Ibid.)

II. Young’s Supplemental Brief Contentions

In his supplemental brief, Young asserts the People failed to prove he 

was the actual killer since it was never determined that “the [d]eath shot 

[that killed White] came from [his] rifle.” This failure, according to Young, 

means there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

who was White’s actual killer. He further notes that Myers “took a plea deal 

of voluntary manslaughter for being the actual killer, not for aiding and 

abetting,” while Young went to trial and was “found guilty of aiding and 

abetting [and] for also being the actual killer,” which he claims violated his 

due process. None of these contentions undermine the trial court’s denial of 

Young’s resentencing petition.
18

A. Section 1172.6 Petitions May Not Be Used to Relitigate

Decided Issues

As an initial matter, Young may not use the procedures set forth in 

section 1172.6 to relitigate his conviction or the underlying trial. “ ‘The 

purpose of [section 1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended 

sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to 

provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ” 

(People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; see also People v. Coley

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549 [a section 1172.6 petition “is not a means by 

which a defendant can relitigate issues already decided”]; People v. DeHuff 

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner 

to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error”].) In his direct 

appeal, Young never challenged the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction,

asserting only instructional and sentencing errors. To the extent Young’s

current contentions seek to relitigate the evidence from his 2011 jury trial to 

challenge the validity of his original convictions or to raise due process 

concerns which were never raised in his direct appeal and which have no 

bearing on section 1172.6 relief, we decline to consider them at this juncture.3 

3 Among these contentions is Young’s argument that the prosecution did 

not sustain its burden of proof because it was not proven whether the shots 

fired from his firearm or Myers’ firearm resulted in White’s death. We note 

that “it has long been recognized that there may be multiple proximate 

causes of a homicide, even where there is only one known actual or direct 

cause of death.” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 846 (Sanchez).) In 

Sanchez, it was not established whether Sanchez or a rival gang member had 

fired the fatal shot that killed an innocent bystander. (Id. at pp. 838, 845.) 

The Supreme Court explained that “ ‘ “[t]here may be more than one 

proximate cause of death. When the conduct of two or more persons 

contributes concurrently as the proximate cause of death, the conduct of each 

is a proximate cause of the death if that conduct was also a substantial factor 

contributing to the result.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 847.) The Court concluded: “Although 
19

B. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding 

of Second Degree Implied Malice Murder

Young’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 

trial court’s finding of second degree implied malice murder are not 

persuasive. Based on the evidence from the 2011 trial, the People had proven

beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime of second degree 

implied malice murder. And even with the changes to section 188 and 189, 

Young would still be found guilty of this crime.

“[S]econd degree murder . . . is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being 

with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as 

willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction 

of first degree murder.’ [Citation.] Malice may be either express (as when a 

defendant manifests a deliberate intention to take away the life of a fellow 

creature) or implied. [Citation.] ‘Malice is implied when the killing is 

proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are 

dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who 

knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with 

conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 

507; People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96 [“A finding of express malice 

requires evidence of an intent to kill, whereas a finding of implied malice 

in this case it could not be determined who was the direct or actual shooter of 

the single fatal round, the evidence, with all reasonable inferences drawn in 

favor of the guilty verdicts, supports a finding that [Sanchez’s] commission of 

life-threatening deadly acts in connection with his attempt on Gonzalez’s life 

was a substantial concurrent, and hence proximate, cause of [the victim’s] 

death.” (Id. at pp. 848–849.) Here, too, the absence of evidence regarding

whether Young or Myers fired the fatal shot would not be grounds for 

reversing Young’s conviction.
20

requires only an ‘intent to do an act dangerous to human life with conscious 

disregard of its danger.’ ”].)

“ ‘[S]econd degree murder based on implied malice has been committed 

when a person does “ ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are 

dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who 

knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with 

conscious disregard for life” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘The concept of implied malice 

has both a physical and a mental component. [Citation.] The physical 

component is satisfied by the performance of “ ‘an act, the natural 

consequences of which are dangerous to life.’ ” [Citation.] The mental 

component . . . involves an act “ ‘deliberately performed by a person who 

knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with 

conscious disregard for life.’ ’ ” [Citations.] “ ‘In short, implied malice 

requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the 

life of another—no more, and no less.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 

Cal.App.5th 505, 512.) “ ‘It is unnecessary that implied malice be proven by 

an admission or other direct evidence of the defendant’s mental state; like all 

other elements of a crime, implied malice may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)

The amendments forged by SB 1437 maintained the viability of murder 

convictions based on implied malice and did not alter the definition of implied 

malice murder. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988–991 [implied 

malice remains a valid theory of second degree murder even after the changes 

to the law that section 1172.6 implements]; People v. Clements (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements) [SB 1437 amendments maintained viability 

of murder convictions based on implied malice].)
21

“We review the trial judge’s fact finding for substantial evidence. 

[Citation.] We ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, 

evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a 

rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in 

deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant 

evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to 

credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine 

whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to 

support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)

Here, the trial judge found the evidence supported Young’s second 

degree murder verdict under an implied malice theory. We conclude there 

was sufficient evidence to support its finding as the record contains 

substantial evidence that Young’s act of shooting into White’s car was 

deliberate and done with a conscious disregard of human life. There was 

evidence that Young brought an AK-47 assault rifle into Sheppard’s car as 

Sheppard testified that he carried a long duffle into her vehicle, while Myers 

entered the car empty-handed. Sheppard also testified that when she fled 

the crime scene, she had seen an object slung over his shoulder that looked to 

be a pole and was consistent with the barrel of a rifle. Detective Pistello’s 

testimony corroborated this report. The detective also testified that based on 

C.’s description of how Myers used his firearm, it was clear to him Myers had 

a handgun and not a rifle. The trial court as fact finder could have 

reasonably concluded Young had stowed a rifle in his duffle where it was 
22

easily accessible in the back seat, and he retrieved and used the rifle during 

the shootout. 

The physical evidence inside Sheppard’s Dodge and of White’s damaged 

Pontiac also supports the trial court’s implied malice finding. Detective 

Pistello testified he saw an expended 7.62x39mm rifle shell casing when he 

peered inside the Dodge. Deputy Finley explained he uncovered fourteen 

expended 7.62x39mm cartridge cases likely fired from an AK-47 inside the 

passenger compartment of the vehicle, including one inside Young’s unzipped 

duffle bag. White’s Pontiac suffered concentrated bullet damage with blown 

out windows and 13 bullet holes in the passenger side doors. Fragments of 

bullets from a rifle were also found inside the Pontiac and removed from D.’s 

body during surgery. There was also no evidence that anyone in the Pontiac 

had weapons or displayed any threatening conduct towards the Dodge. 

Hence, the trial court as fact finder could have reasonably concluded Young,

unprovoked, fired at least 12 rounds of an assault rifle towards a passenger 

vehicle on a freeway, targeting the passengers in the vehicle. This provides a 

sufficient basis for the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Young deliberately shot an assault rifle from one moving car at another 

moving car on a freeway and acted in conscious disregard of human life.

D. No Further Independent Review is Required.

We are not otherwise required to conduct an independent review of the 

record in an appeal from an order denying a petition for resentencing filed 

pursuant to section 1172.6 and we decline to do so. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at p. 226.)

DISPOSITION

The order denying Young’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition is 

affirmed.
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_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

A164845/People v. Young