[Cite as State v. Tinsley, 2024-Ohio-2157.]

Atty. Vito Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor, and Atty. Shelley M. Pratt, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. James R. Wise, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: June 4, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMES A. TINSLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 CO 0050

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 21 CR 647

BEFORE:

Katelyn Dickey, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
– 2 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

DICKEY, J.

{¶1} Appellant, James A. Tinsley, appeals from the October 24, 2023 nunc pro 

tunc judgment of the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an 

indefinite prison term for felonious assault, failure to comply with an order or signal of a 

police officer, aggravated possession of drugs, possession of cocaine, and OVI following 

a guilty plea.1 On appeal, Appellant takes issue with his sentence. Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On February 10, 2022, Appellant was indicted by the Columbiana County 

Grand Jury on six counts: counts one and two, felonious assault, felonies of the first 

degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); count three, failure to comply with an order or 

signal of a police officer, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B); 

count four, tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 

2921.12(A)(1); count five, obstructing official business, a felony of the fifth degree in 

violation of R.C. 2921.31(A); and count six, failure to disclose personal information, a 

misdemeanor of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2921.29(A)(1). Appellant was 

appointed counsel, pled not guilty at his arraignment, and waived his right to a speedy 

trial. 

{¶3} On January 11, 2023, a superseding indictment was filed against Appellant 

charging him on 12 counts including three specifications: counts one and two, felonious 

assault, felonies of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); count three, failure 

to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, a felony of the third degree in violation 

of R.C. 2921.331(B); count four, tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree in 

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); count five, obstructing official business, a felony of the 

fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A); count six, failure to disclose personal 

information, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2921.29(A)(1); count 

1 Am. Sub. S.B. No. 201, 2018 Ohio Laws 157, known as the “Reagan Tokes Law,” significantly altered the 

sentencing structure for many of Ohio’s most serious felonies by implementing an indefinite sentencing 

system for those non-life felonies of the first and second degree, committed on or after March 22, 2019. 
– 3 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

seven, aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A); count eight, possession of cocaine, a felony of the fourth degree in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A); count nine, aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth 

degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); count ten, OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree

in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); count 11, OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(vii); count 12, OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ii); and three specifications for forfeiture of money in a 

drug case. 

{¶4} Appellant subsequently entered into plea negotiations with Appellee, the 

State of Ohio. A change of plea hearing was held on July 14, 2023. Appellant withdrew 

his former not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea pursuant to the superseding indictment 

to counts one and two, felonious assault; count three, failure to comply with an order or 

signal of a police officer; count seven, aggravated possession of drugs and the 

accompanying forfeiture specification; count eight, possession of cocaine and the 

accompanying forfeiture specification; count nine, aggravated possession of drugs and 

the accompanying forfeiture specification; and count ten, OVI. The trial court accepted 

Appellant’s guilty plea after finding it was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

manner pursuant to Crim.R. 11. The court dismissed the remaining counts, ordered a 

PSI, and deferred sentencing.

{¶5} A sentencing hearing was held on October 20, 2023. After considering the 

record, the oral statements, the victim impact statement, the PSI, the purposes and 

principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors 

under R.C. 2929.12, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite prison term: four 

years (minimum) to six years (maximum) on count one; four years (minimum) to six years 

(maximum) on count two; 24 months on count three; two years (minimum) to three years 

(maximum) on count seven; ten months on count eight; ten months on count nine; and 

180 days on count ten. The court ordered “[t]hese sentences shall be served concurrently

with each other but consecutively with Count Three by operation of law.” (Emphasis sic) 

(10/24/2023 Nunc Pro Tunc Sentencing Entry, p. 2). The court notified Appellant that 

post-release control is mandatory for a period of five years.

{¶6} Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises one assignment of error. 
– 4 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO 

MULTIPLE INDEFINITE SENTENCES PURSUANT TO THE REAGANTOKES ACT.

{¶7} This court utilizes R.C. 2953.08(G) as the standard of review in all felony 

sentencing appeals. State v. Michaels, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0122, 2019-Ohio497, ¶ 2, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, 

¶ 1. 

{¶8} R.C. 2953.08(G) states in pertinent part:

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section 

shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or 

modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b).

{¶9} “Applying the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), [the Supreme Court of 

Ohio held] that an appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only 

if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial
– 5 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

Marcum, supra, at ¶ 1. 

{¶10} In this case, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in imposing multiple 

indefinite sentences on the qualifying felonies, specifically taking issue with the two year 

(minimum) to three year (maximum) sentence on count seven, aggravated possession of 

drugs, a felony of the second degree. See (2/20/2024 Appellant’s Brief, p. 3). Appellant 

believes the court was only permitted to impose a single indefinite sentence under R.C. 

2929.144, “Determining maximum prison term,” which states in part:

(B) The court imposing a prison term on an offender under division (A)(1)(a) 

or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a qualifying felony of 

the first or second degree shall determine the maximum prison term that is 

part of the sentence in accordance with the following:

(1) If the offender is being sentenced for one felony and the felony is a 

qualifying felony of the first or second degree, the maximum prison term 

shall be equal to the minimum term imposed on the offender under division 

(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent 

of that term.

(2) If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one or 

more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, and 

if the court orders that some or all of the prison terms imposed are to be 

served consecutively, the court shall add all of the minimum terms imposed 

on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the 

Revised Code for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree that are 

to be served consecutively and all of the definite terms of the felonies that 

are not qualifying felonies of the first or second degree that are to be served 

consecutively, and the maximum term shall be equal to the total of those 

terms so added by the court plus fifty per cent of the longest minimum term 

or definite term for the most serious felony being sentenced.
– 6 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

(3) If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one or 

more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, and 

if the court orders that all of the prison terms imposed are to run 

concurrently, the maximum term shall be equal to the longest of the 

minimum terms imposed on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) 

of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a qualifying felony of the first or 

second degree for which the sentence is being imposed plus fifty per cent 

of the longest minimum term for the most serious qualifying felony being 

sentenced.

R.C. 2929.144(B)(1)-(3).

{¶11} “However, while R.C. 2929.144 governs the calculation of the maximum 

term, R.C. 2929.14(A) governs the imposition of indefinite sentences.” State v. McLoyd, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112107, 2023-Ohio-3971, ¶ 65, citing State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 111755, 2023-Ohio-1042, ¶ 68. 

{¶12} R.C. 2929.14 states in part:

(A) Except as provided in division (B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3), (B)(4), (B)(5), (B)(6), 

(B)(7), (B)(8), (B)(9), (B)(10), (B)(11), (E), (G), (H), (J), or (K) of this section 

or in division (D)(6) of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code and except in 

relation to an offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment is 

to be imposed, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a 

felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender pursuant 

to this chapter, the court shall impose a prison term that shall be one of the 

following:

(1)(a) For a felony of the first degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, 

the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum 

term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or 

eleven years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 

2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes 

the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or 
– 7 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in 

determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the 

minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be 

considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed 

under this division.

* * *

(2)(a) For a felony of the second degree committed on or after March 22, 

2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated 

minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or 

eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 

2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes 

the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or 

penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in 

determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the 

minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be 

considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed 

under this division.

R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a).

{¶13} In Wilson, the appellant similarly argued that the trial court could only 

impose a single maximum term under R.C. 2929.144(B)(3). Wilson, supra, at ¶ 68. Our 

sister Court found the appellant’s argument lacked merit, holding:

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), for a qualifying felony offense, the trial 

court is required to impose a stated minimum term and a maximum term 

determined by the mathematical formula set forth in R.C. 2929.144 * * * 

[and] the court * * * complied with the statutory requirements when imposing 

indefinite sentences on the four concurrent counts.

Id. at ¶ 69.
– 8 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

{¶14} Like Wilson, the record in the case at bar also reflects no sentencing error. 

Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant on counts one, two, and seven to indefinite terms 

under the Reagan Tokes Law. On counts one and two, felonies of the first degree, the 

court imposed stated minimum sentences of four years and calculated maximum terms 

of six years (four times 50 percent equals two, four plus two equals six). On count seven, 

a felony of the second degree, the trial court imposed a stated minimum sentence of two 

years and a calculated maximum term of three years (two times 50 percent equals one, 

two plus one equals three). The counts were ordered to be served concurrently. 

Appellant argues that the court can only impose a single maximum term under R.C. 

2929.144(B)(3), which again states in pertinent part:

If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one or more 

of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, and if the 

court orders that all of the prison terms imposed are to run concurrently, the 

maximum term shall be equal to the longest of the minimum terms * * * plus 

fifty per cent of the longest minimum term for the most serious qualifying 

felony being sentenced.

R.C. 2929.144(B)(3). 

{¶15} “By using the singular noun ‘term,’ the statute appears to require the trial 

court to impose only one maximum term for all the concurrent counts.” Wilson, supra, at 

¶ 68. “However, while R.C. 2929.144 governs the calculation of the maximum term, R.C. 

2929.14(A)(1)(a) [and (2)(a) govern] the imposition of indefinite sentences.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. 

{¶16} Again, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a) state in pertinent part:

(1)(a) For a felony of the first degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, 

the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum 

term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or 

eleven years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 

2929.144 of the Revised Code * * *.

* * *
– 9 –

Case No. 23 CO 0050

(2)(a) For a felony of the second degree committed on or after March 22, 

2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated 

minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or 

eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 

2929.144 of the Revised Code * * *. 

R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a).

{¶17} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a), for qualifying felony offenses 

of the first and second degree, the trial court imposed stated minimum terms and 

maximum terms determined by the mathematical formula set forth in R.C. 2929.144, 

within the statutory ranges. The court complied with the statutory requirements in 

imposing indefinite sentences on the concurrent counts. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

sentence is not contrary to law. See R.C. 2953.08(G).

CONCLUSION

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The October 24, 2023 nunc pro tunc judgment of the Columbiana County Court 

of Common Pleas sentencing Appellant to an indefinite prison term for felonious assault, 

failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, aggravated possession of 

drugs, possession of cocaine, and OVI following a guilty plea is affirmed. 

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Tinsley, 2024-Ohio-2157.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.