NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0201 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD39129

The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 3-2-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Stephanie M. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to C.K. (“Child”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of Child, born in October 2009. 

The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother’s 

care after Mother was hospitalized for mental illness in February 2019. At 

that time, Mother warned that she and Child were being “hunted,” and 

reported that voices in her head told her to “cut her and [Child’s] wrist[s].” 

Child was placed in a foster home and Mother did not contest the 

dependency petition.

¶3 Over the next three years, DCS provided Mother with two 

psychological evaluations, two psychiatric evaluations, medication 

monitoring, individual therapy, three parent-aide referrals, parenting 

classes, and visitation. Mother closed out unsuccessfully from all three 

referrals for parent-aide services, and she never completed individual 

therapy. She often denied having mental health problems and refused to

take her prescribed medication.

¶4 Mother denied any history of mental illness at the first 

psychological evaluation in March 2019 and declined psychotropic 

medication. The psychologist concluded that Child was “at an elevated risk

for neglect, including failure to protect; emotional abuse; behavioral issues 

due to a dysfunctional milieu; involvement in delusions; [and] shared 

delusions,” adding that “physical harm” was possible “if the client acts on 

her hallucinations and/or delusions,” and psychiatric treatment “appeared 

to be critical” to Mother’s stability. That same month, a psychiatrist 

diagnosed Mother with borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic 

stress disorder. 

¶5 At the second psychological evaluation in April 2021, a 

psychologist reported that Mother had “significant thought dysfunction,”
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.

Decision of the Court

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generalized anxiety disorder, and “traits of schizoid and paranoid 

personality.” 

¶6 The psychologist recommended that Mother engage in 

Ph.D.-level counseling, which Mother started in February 2022. The 

Ph.D.-level therapist diagnosed Mother with paranoid personality and 

delusional disorders. Mother attended therapy for several months before 

the termination hearing, but she struggled to control her outbursts and did 

not recognize her delusions. 

¶7 In March 2022, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights on grounds of mental illness and fifteen-months out-of-home 

placement. The court held a termination hearing in June 2022 and 

terminated Mother’s parental rights on both grounds. The court also found 

DCS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. Mother 

appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), 

-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 A parent’s right to custody and control of her child is 

fundamental but not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248–49, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate parental rights, the superior 

court must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by 

clear and convincing evidence, and must find that termination is in the 

child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 249, ¶ 12. 

¶9 Moreover, when moving to terminate a parent-child 

relationship on grounds of out-of-home placement, DCS must prove it 

“made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). To satisfy this requirement, DCS must “undertake 

measures with a reasonable prospect of success” and “provide a parent 

with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to 

improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 34, 37 (App. 1999). 

¶10 Mother contends that DCS did not make diligent reunification 

efforts. We will affirm the court’s decision if supported by reasonable 

evidence, Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997), 

and accept the court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence supports 

them, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016).

¶11 The superior court found that Mother received ample services 

in this case, and that DCS has “made repeated, sincere and serious efforts 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.

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to provide [her] with the services needed for her to address her mental

health issues and parenting skills deficiencies,” but that “Mother has failed 

to take advantage of these opportunities and has failed to make significant 

progress.”

¶12 The record has reasonable evidence to support these findings. 

DCS provided Mother with a multitude of services over the three-year 

dependency, each designed to give Mother insight into her mental health 

and parenting issues. Mother resisted many of the services. She denied or 

minimized her mental illness, and either refused medication or took it 

inconsistently, which prevented her from being able to regulate her 

emotions. 

¶13 Mother stresses that she received only four months of 

Ph.D.-level counseling before termination, but we examine the services 

Mother received over the entire dependency. See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 26, ¶ 69 (App. 2019) (“[T]he court was required to 

examine not only the final months but the entire dependency.”). Beyond 

that, Mother was often erratic during those counseling sessions and refused 

to acknowledge her mental health issues. The Ph.D. therapist testified that 

Mother did not show progress.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.