[Cite as State v. Goldsmith, 2015-Ohio-3767.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102290

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

TERRENCE GOLDSMITH

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-580138-A 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, A.J., and E.A. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 17, 2015 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Susan J. Moran 

55 Public Square 

Suite 1616 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Steven McIntosh 

 Brian R. Radigan 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant Terrence Goldsmith appeals his conviction for importuning in 

violation of R.C. 2907.07, entered following a jury trial. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

{¶2} Goldsmith volunteered at a community center. On November 11, 2014, an 

11-year-old girl alleged that Goldsmith propositioned her for sex in exchange for $10. 

The victim walked away, but immediately reported the incident to a supervisor at the 

community center. The police were contacted, and an investigation ensued. The victim 

provided a written statement for the community center’s records. 

{¶3} Goldsmith was arrested. Initially when speaking with detectives, in a 

statement that was recorded, he denied the allegations, claiming that he merely asked to 

buy ten $1 bracelets from the victim. Goldsmith claimed the victim had sold him one 

earlier. Eventually, he admitted to asking the victim for sex in exchange for money. 

Goldsmith maintained that the victim misconstrued the request. 

{¶4} The victim’s statement to the police during the investigation was also video 

recorded. Upon defendant’s request, made through counsel at trial during the victim’s 

testimony, the video recording was introduced as the state’s exhibit. The defendant 

attempted to impeach the victim by showing discrepancies between her recorded 

statement to the police and her trial testimony. The written statement the victim made to 

the community center, although authenticated at trial, was not introduced into evidence, 

nor were any of the contents read during any trial testimony. 
{¶5} The jury convicted Goldsmith of importuning, a felony of the third degree. 

The trial court sentenced Goldsmith to 18 months of incarceration and to postrelease 

control. Goldsmith timely appealed. 

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Goldsmith challenges the introduction of the 

victim’s written statement provided to the community center’s supervisor and the victim’s 

video-recorded statement to the police department, both as being admitted in violation of 

Evid.R. 802 and the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We summarily 

overrule both arguments. 

{¶7} According to the record on appeal, the victim’s written statement provided to 

the community center was not introduced as evidence. The only testimony offered 

regarding the statement came from the victim herself when she provided foundational 

testimony regarding the document itself. Tr. 229:23-231:21. The document was not 

admitted into evidence. Tr. 297.1

 In light of the fact that the statement was not admitted 

 1

Goldsmith also argues that the supervisor’s testimony, which described the fact that the 

victim told him about the incident, was not admissible. The supervisor did not testify to any details 

of the conversation he had with the victim, only that the victim was reporting the importuning and 

identified Goldsmith as the alleged offender. Tr. 182:15-24 (“[The victim and her friend] stated that 

someone had approached them for her to have sex and she went into detail how it happened.”). 

Hearsay is defined as an out of court statement being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 

Evid.R. 801(C). The supervisor was merely explaining how he came to speak with the victim and 

why he called the police. Further, even if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the 

supervisor’s testimony was limited to the allegation of importuning that the jury was well aware of 

anyway. Thus, any error in allowing the supervisor to relate the statement was harmless error. 

Crim.R. 52(A).
into evidence, we cannot consider any of the hearsay or Confrontation Clause issues 

raised on appeal.2

 

{¶8} Further, the video recording of the victim’s interview with the police was 

introduced by the defendant in an attempt to impeach the victim at trial. The victim’s 

recorded statements differed from some of her trial testimony. Even if we assume 

admitting the video-recorded statement was error, the defendant invited that error and 

cannot now predicate a reversal on his own conduct. “Under the invited error doctrine, 

‘a party is not entitled to take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced.’” 

State v. Doss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84433, 2005-Ohio-775, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. 

Kline v. Carroll, 96 Ohio St.3d 404, 2002-Ohio-4849, 775 N.E.2d 517. In Doss, a 

codefendant sought the introduction of the nontestifying defendant’s confession at trial. 

Id. at ¶ 1. That defendant specifically waived any constitutional issues with the 

admission of the codefendant’s recorded statement. Id. at ¶ 4. The Doss court held that 

but for the defendant’s action in waiving his constitutional rights, the error in admitting 

otherwise inadmissible material would not have occurred. 

{¶9} The same result must follow in this case. The trial court only had the state 

introduce the video recording as the state’s exhibit after the defense counsel sought to use 

the video to impeach the victim during the state’s case-in-chief.3

 Tr. 251:2-12. The trial 

 2

In light of our holding, we summarily overrule any claims that Goldsmith’s trial counsel was 

ineffective for allowing the introduction of the victim’s written statement to the community center.

3

We summarily overrule Goldsmith’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

cross-examine the victim with her prior inconsistent statements. The whole point of introducing the 
court initially indicated that only the relevant portions of the video would be played for 

the jury. Tr. 250:20-25. For reasons not evident in the record, the defense counsel 

played the entire video during the victim’s cross-examination. Tr. 265:21-22. The 

defendant invited the error as assigned. We additionally note that for the purposes of any 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is of no consequence that the trial defense 

counsel made a tactical decision to admit the video recording. Generally, appellate 

courts will not deem counsel ineffective for matters of trial strategy. See Doss at ¶ 9, 

citing State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157, 1998-Ohio-370, 694 N.E.2d 932. 

Accordingly, we overrule Goldsmith’s first assignment of error. 

{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Goldsmith contends that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call the psychiatrist performing the independent competency 

evaluation to determine whether Goldsmith’s waiver of his Miranda rights was 

knowingly and intelligently exercised before Goldsmith confessed to the importuning 

charge. 

{¶11} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

appellant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v. 

Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. 

 

video recording was to present evidence of prior inconsistencies in the victim’s story. Although 

defense counsel did not go into the details of the inconsistencies during the victim’s 

cross-examination, the arguments based on those inconsistencies that Goldsmith now contends were 

not made were in fact advanced during his closing argument. Tr. 320:7-25. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Judicial 

scrutiny of defense counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. Strickland at 689. 

 In Ohio, there is a presumption that a properly licensed attorney is competent. State v. 

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 1999-Ohio-102, 714 N.E.2d 905. The defendant has 

the burden of proving his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. State v. Perez, 124 

Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 223. 

{¶12} We cannot say that Goldsmith’s trial counsel was ineffective for not 

calling the psychiatrist who performed the independent competency evaluation, which 

included evaluating Goldsmith’s mental acuity. 

In State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 366, 2000-Ohio-182, 738 N.E.2d 

1208, the Ohio Supreme Court held that in determining whether a defendant 

understood and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights, a trial court 

should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, 

mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, 

intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical 

deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement. 

State v. Alhajjeh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93077, 2010-Ohio-3179, ¶ 43. According to 

the record, both the independent psychiatrist and the court psychiatric clinic both opined 

with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Goldsmith’s waiver of his Miranda 

rights, before confessing to the crimes, was knowingly and intelligently executed based 

on their evaluations of the defendant’s mental state. The entire police interrogation 

lasted less than 30 minutes, and there is no evidence that any threats or inducements were 

made to coerce the waiver. 4 The testimony from the independent psychological 

 4

Although Goldsmith claims that he did not sign the waiver until after the detective mentioned 
examination would have only confirmed that Goldsmith was competent to waive his 

rights even after acknowledging Goldsmith’s intellectual disability. Goldsmith’s expert 

would have simply corroborated the evidence presented at the hearing, and therefore, 

counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient. There is no other evidence that 

Goldsmith’s waiver was anything but knowingly and voluntarily entered. The second 

and final assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶13} Finding no error based on the arguments advanced, Goldsmith’s conviction 

is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The 

court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

she would return him to his cell unless he agreed to waive his rights, we find no support for this claim 

in the record. The video-recorded confession includes the questioning leading to the waiver. There 

are several instances in which the detectives told Goldsmith of his right to stop the questioning in 

order to seek legal counsel, in which case he would be returned to his cell. There was no threat to 

return him to the cell, only the practical explanation that ceasing the interrogation would result in his 

being returned to his cell until an attorney could be produced. 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., A.J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR