IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

June 23, 2015 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANNY SANTARONE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S60198 Robert H. Montgomery, Jr., Judge

No. E2014-01551-CCA-R3-CD – Filed October 1, 2015

_____________________________

Defendant, Danny Santarone, was convicted of possession of dihydrocodeinone, 

oxycodone, cocaine, and heroin within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or 

deliver. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions and that application of the school zone enhancement violates public policy. 

Based upon a thorough review of the record, authorities, and arguments, we conclude that 

the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and that his argument 

regarding the public policy behind the school zone enhancement is without merit. We 

therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, J., joined. NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., concurred in results only.

Stephen M. Wallace, District Public Defender; William A. Kennedy, Assistant Public 

Defender (on appeal); and David Crockett, Elizabethton, Tennessee (at trial), for the

appellant, Danny Santarone.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Counsel;

Barry Staubus, District Attorney General; and Kent Chitwood, Assistant District Attorney 

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
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This is Defendant’s direct appeal from his Sullivan County convictions for 

possession of various controlled substances within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to 

sell or deliver. 

On February 15, 2012, the Sullivan County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for 

possession of dihydrocodeinone within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or 

deliver, a Class C felony; possession of oxycodone within 1000 feet of a school with the 

intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A 

misdemeanor; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school 

with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony; and possession of heroin within 1000 

feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. Defendant was tried 

before a jury on March 5 and 6, 2013.

Factual Background

On Saturday, July 16, 2011, Matthew Henriksen, an operations manager with 

Federal Express (“FedEx”) in Blountville, was monitoring a conveyor belt of newlyarrived packages when he noticed an envelope that was bulging open, revealing what 

appeared to be a large prescription bottle. The package was addressed to Defendant at an 

address in Johnson City. Upon further inspection, the label on the bottle appeared to be 

worn, and the packaging was inconsistent with a shipment from a pharmacy. Suspicious, 

Mr. Henriksen contacted Detective Burk Murray of the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office. 

Detective Murray asked Mr. Henriksen to try to identify the pills in the bottle. Mr. 

Henriksen pulled out of the bottle some brown paper, a clear bag with white powder in it, 

and some yellow pills that appeared to be consistent with Vicodin. Detective Murray 

then came and took possession of the package. Mr. Henriksen suggested that he could

tell the intended recipient that the package had been delayed because the truck it was on 

had broken down.

After the scheduled delivery time of noon had passed, Defendant contacted FedEx 

and inquired about the package. The employee who spoke with him informed Defendant 

that the package had been delayed. Mr. Henriksen instructed the employee to let 

Defendant know that they would stay open thirty minutes after their normal closing time

if he wanted to pick up the package that day, otherwise it would be delivered the 

following business day. Defendant insisted on picking the package up that day and asked 

for directions to the FedEx facility. 

Mr. Henriksen called Detective Murray to let him know that Defendant would be 

coming to pick up the package. Detective Murray did not have time to set up a controlled 

delivery in a different county, so he brought the package back to the FedEx facility and

Mr. Henriksen repackaged it. Detective Murray had patrol units set up on either side of 

the FedEx facility so that they would be able to intercept Defendant if he left in either 
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direction. Detective Murray parked in the parking lot next door so that he could observe 

when Defendant arrived.

Around 3:30 p.m., Defendant arrived with his daughter, Rachael Santarone.1 The 

FedEx employees unlocked the door for them. Defendant signed for the package, took 

possession of it, and left. Mr. Henriksen called Detective Murray to let him know that 

Defendant left with the package. Detective Murray was able to identify Defendant from 

the driver’s license photo that corresponded to the name and address on the package. 

Officer Jessie Nunley of the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Office parked his vehicle 

where he could observe Defendant’s vehicle if he left the FedEx facility and headed 

toward the airport. Another officer set up on the other side of the FedEx facility in case 

Defendant left traveling in that direction. Detective Murray radioed that Defendant had 

left toward the airport and described his vehicle as a green Isuzu. Officer Nunley saw the 

vehicle pass his position, turned out behind it, and initiated a traffic stop. Defendant 

stopped his vehicle on Highway 75, and Officer Nunley directed him to pull over on a 

side street out of traffic. Both the initial stop location and the side street were within 

1000 of the real property of Holston Elementary School.

Both Defendant and his daughter were removed from the vehicle and arrested. 

When the police officers searched the vehicle, they recovered the FedEx package from 

the center console, an ibuprofen bottle from the driver’s side floorboard, and a Tylenol 

bottle, a small prescription bottle, a set of brass knuckles, and a cut off straw in Rachael’s 

purse. The FedEx package contained a large prescription bottle in the name of Sabrina 

Fisher, two small baggies containing white powder, and a broken yellow pill. Agent Carl 

Smith, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, tested the various 

pills and powders found in Defendant’s vehicle. Within the FedEx package, Agent Smith 

identified 110 tablets of dihydrocodeinone, 1.3 grams of cocaine, .14 grams of heroin, 

and 43 tablets of oxycodone; Agent Smith did not identify the broken yellow pill. The 

small prescription bottle found in Rachael’s purse, which was labeled as a prescription of 

oxycodone for Linda Santarone, contained 59 and a half tablets of hydromorphone. The 

Tylenol bottle found in Rachael’s purse contained 33 tablets of oxycodone. The 

ibuprofen bottle found on the driver’s side floorboard contained 69 tablets of a different 

brand of oxycodone. 

Rachael Santarone, Defendant’s daughter and codefendant, testified for the State 

at trial. In December of 2010, when Rachael was eighteen years old, she came to live 

with her father and stepmother in Tennessee. Prior to that, she was living in Florida with 

her mother. She admitted that she was addicted to oxycodone and that her drug problem 

 

1 Due to witnesses having the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names for 

clarity. No disrespect is intended.
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was the reason her parents decided that she should move away from Florida. However, 

Rachael would obtain pills from her father and her drug problem got worse while she 

lived with him. After their arrest, she moved out to live with her boyfriend.

Rachael testified that Defendant, her stepmother, and her adult stepsister were

unemployed from the time she moved in in December 2010 until she and Defendant were

arrested in July 2011. During this time, Defendant and her stepmother traveled to Florida

about once a month. Upon their return, Rachael would notice both an increase in the 

number of visitors to their home as well as an improvement in the family’s finances. The 

visitors would occasionally go to a back bedroom for a few minutes and then leave. On 

one occasion, Rachael was in the car with Defendant when he exchanged pills with a man 

for money, but she did not know the man’s name or how many pills Defendant gave him. 

Rachael recognized the pills as oxycodone because she was addicted to them at the time. 

Rachael also recalled that Defendant often received packages from Florida. Some of 

these packages were addressed to Rachael, and she became upset with Defendant and 

asked him to tell his friends to no longer address the packages in her name. 

On July 16, 2011, Defendant woke Rachael from a nap and asked her to go with 

him to the FedEx office to pick up a package. She was suspicious that the package 

contained drugs. Rachael entered the FedEx facility with Defendant. Defendant signed 

for the package, then brought it back to the car. He placed the package in the center 

console without opening it. Also in the center console were three smaller pill bottles. 

When Defendant was being pulled over by the police, he told Rachael to put the smaller 

bottles in her purse. She described the situation as “chaotic,” and one of the bottles did 

not end up in her purse. She denied that the pill bottles were hers or that she knew they 

were in the car. She admitted that the brass knuckles and the straw found in her purse 

were hers and that she used the straw to ingest oxycodone.

Rachael made a statement to the police the day after her arrest. She denied that 

the police made her any promises in exchange for her statement. In exchange for her 

truthful testimony, Rachael pled to the reduced charges of possession of 

dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony, and of possession of oxycodone, a Class C felony, 

as well as misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a prohibited 

weapon. The charges of possession of cocaine and heroin for sale or delivery within 

1000 feet of a school were dismissed. Rachael received a probationary sentence.

Defendant’s wife, Linda Santarone, testified on her husband’s behalf. She 

explained that she and Defendant had legitimate prescriptions for oxycodone to cope with 

the pain associated with various injuries. Even though they had been living in Tennessee 

for five years, Linda and Defendant still obtained their prescriptions from a pain 

management doctor in Florida. In 2011, they were each prescribed 360 oxycodone pills
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and 90 Xanax per month. She explained that the couple drove to Florida every month to 

obtain their pills as well as visit family and friends.

Linda testified that Defendant, who had made his living as a carpenter, was unable 

to work due to his various injuries. She explained that they were able to pay for their 

medications and trips to Florida with money that Defendant received as an inheritance 

after his father passed away, as well as from buying and selling cars and jewelry and 

from back child support payments. She denied that either she or Defendant sold any of 

their pills. 

Linda explained that a lot of friends came to help around the house after 

Defendant broke his leg. She denied that there would be an increase in visitors after the 

couple returned from Florida or that they would meet anyone privately in a back 

bedroom. Even though Linda had earlier testified that she and Defendant always took all 

of their prescribed medication, she testified that both she and Defendant would regularly 

give pills to friends who said they were in pain, and the friends would repay them in kind

once their own prescriptions had been filled. She also testified that she noticed some of 

her pills would go missing in large quantities after Rachael moved in with the family. 

On cross-examination, Linda admitted that Defendant was obtaining pain 

medication from a doctor in Tennessee after he broke his leg as well as continuing to 

obtain medication from the doctor in Florida. By the time of trial, she and Defendant 

were no longer seeing the doctor in Florida and were obtaining their pills from a pain 

management doctor in Knoxville. She denied that Defendant received regular packages 

from Florida but stated that Rachael often received packages. Linda explained that they 

put the oxycodone pills in the Tylenol and ibuprofen bottles to try to hide them from 

Rachael. She denied that the hydromorphone in the old oxycodone prescription bottle 

belonged to her. Linda testified that Sabrina Fisher, the name on the large prescription 

bottle in the FedEx package, was the girlfriend of John Balmer, a friend of Defendant’s 

from Florida.

Amber Phelps, Linda Santarone’s daughter and Defendant’s stepdaughter, also 

testified for the defense. Ms. Phelps testified that she was the only one in the household 

who did not use drugs. She admitted that her parents had a drug problem and that they 

would exchange pills with others who had prescriptions. She denied that they ever 

bought or sold pills. Ms. Phelps testified that she had seen her stepsister Rachael steal 

pills from her parents on a few occasions. She said that Rachael was using both 

oxycodone and cocaine and that Rachael was getting the drugs in packages sent from 

Florida by Rachael’s mother. She characterized Rachael as a habitual liar.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that he had various injuries 

from his years of working as a carpenter and that he could no longer work due to his 
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injuries. He was prescribed medication by a pain management doctor in Florida. Both he 

and his wife were prescribed 360 oxycodone pills per month. Defendant testified that he 

has since started seeing a doctor in Tennessee and that his prescription had been reduced 

to 148 pills per month.

Defendant testified that in July 2011, a friend of his from Florida named John 

Balmer was coming to Tennessee to visit Defendant. Defendant was expecting a package 

to be delivered to his house prior to Mr. Balmer’s arrival. Defendant knew that the 

package was to be delivered on Saturday and that Mr. Balmer would be arriving a day or 

two after. When the package did not arrive as scheduled, Defendant called FedEx. He 

was told that the package could not be delivered because the truck had broken down and 

that he would have to pick up the package. Defendant drove to the FedEx facility with 

his daughter, Rachael, following the directions given to him over the phone. On crossexamination, Defendant testified that he was insistent on picking up the package that day 

because the FedEx employee did not provide a redelivery date and he wanted to be sure 

that he had the package when Mr. Balmer arrived.

Defendant denied that he put the drugs in Rachael’s purse when they were pulled 

over, but admitted that he did have a bottle of oxycodone in the center console of the car. 

He stated that he had not opened the FedEx package and that he did not know what was 

inside of it. He explained that he intended to take the package home and store it until Mr. 

Balmer arrived. Defendant denied that he used heroin or hydrocodone. He admitted that 

he had been convicted of selling cocaine over 15 years ago but denied that he currently 

uses cocaine. Defendant admitted knowing that there would be prescription medication 

in the package, but denied knowing that the cocaine or heroin would be in there. He 

denied ordering any of the contents of the package.

The jury convicted Defendant as charged of possession of dihydrocodeinone 

within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of oxycodone

within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of cocaine within 

1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of heroin within 

1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver.2 After a sentencing hearing, the 

trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 6 years for the 

dihydrocodeinone conviction, 12 years for the oxycodone conviction, and 25 years for 

both the cocaine and the heroin convictions. On July 11, 2014, the trial court denied 

Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant then filed a notice of appeal.3

 

2

Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia.

3 The State notes that Defendant’s notice of appeal was filed one day late, but recognizes that this 

Court may waive the requirement for a timely notice of appeal “in the interest of justice.” See Tenn. R. 

App. P. 4(a).
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Analysis

On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions and argues that application of the school zone enhancement in this case was

against public policy because the location of Defendant’s arrest4 was chosen by law 

enforcement. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s 

convictions and that the enhancement of Defendant’s sentences was consistent with the 

Drug-Free School Zone Act. We will address each issue in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged 

to review that claim according to certain well-settled principles. The relevant question is 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of 

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The jury’s verdict replaces the presumption of innocence with 

one of guilt; therefore, the burden is shifted onto the defendant to show that the evidence 

introduced at trial was insufficient to support such a verdict. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 

247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). The prosecution is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of 

the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom.” State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. 

Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). It is not the role of this Court to reweigh or 

reevaluate the evidence, nor to substitute our own inferences for those drawn from the 

evidence by the trier of fact. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277. Questions concerning the 

“credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 

reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of 

fact.” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting State v. Campbell, 

245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial 

court, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution’s theory.” Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 

S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)). The standard of review is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of 

the two. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Hanson, 279 

S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009).

Defendant was convicted of four counts of possession of various controlled 

substances within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver. Under 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(a)(4), it is an offense for a person to 

knowingly possess a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver 

 

4

In his appellate brief, Defendant phrases this issue as the “location of the sale.” However, we 

note that there was no actual sale in this case.
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the controlled substance. If that possession occurs within 1000 feet of the real property 

of a school, the offense is punished one classification higher. T.C.A. § 39-17-432(b)(1). 

Dihydrocodeinone is a Schedule III controlled substance. See T.C.A. § 39-17-410. 

Oxycodone and cocaine are Schedule II controlled substances. See T.C.A. § 39-17-408. 

Heroin is a Schedule I controlled substance. See T.C.A. § 39-17-406. 

In order to convict Defendant, the State was required to prove: (1) that he 

knowingly possessed the controlled substances; (2) that he possessed the controlled 

substances with the intent to sell or deliver them; (3) that he possessed the controlled 

substances within 1000 feet of the real property of a school5; and (4) with regard to the 

cocaine, that it weighed more than .5 grams. We note that a person may possess 

contraband alone or jointly with others, State v. Richards, 286 S.W.3d 873, 885 (Tenn.

2009) (citations omitted), and that possession of a controlled substance may be either 

actual or constructive, State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001).

6

 “One’s mere 

presence in an area where drugs are discovered, or one’s mere association with a person 

who is in possession of drugs, is not alone sufficient to support a finding of constructive 

possession.” Id. “Proof that a possession is knowing will usually depend on inference 

and circumstantial evidence. Knowledge may be inferred from control over the vehicle 

in which the contraband is secreted.” State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1995) (citing United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377, 392 (5th Cir. 1991)). By proving that 

a defendant possessed drugs he intended to sell or deliver, the State necessarily proves

knowing possession. See T.C.A. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (“intentional” includes “knowing”); 

see generally State v. Marshall, 870 S.W.2d 532, 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (“By 

alleging that the defendant possessed cocaine which he intended to sell, the indictment 

necessarily implied that it was a knowing possession.”).

Defendant does not contest that he knowingly possessed the various drugs found 

in his car; rather his argument on appeal is that the State failed to prove that he intended 

to sell or deliver those drugs. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419, the 

jury may infer “from the amount of a controlled substance or substances possessed by an 

offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled 

substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise 

dispensing.” The statutory definition of “deliver” includes “the actual, constructive, or 

 

5 The State need not prove that Defendant knew that he was committing an offense within 1000 

feet of a school. State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Jenkins, 15 

S.W.3d 914. 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

6 A person constructively possesses a drug when the person has both the power and intention to 

exercise dominion and control over the drugs either directly or indirectly through others. See State v. 

Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 444-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). In other words, constructive possession is 

the ability to gain actual possession over an object. State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996).
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attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not 

there is an agency relationship.” T.C.A. § 39-17-402(6); see State v. Anthony Brown, No. 

W2010-01764-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1154284, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 

2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). 

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that Mr. Henriksen, an 

operations manager at FedEx, noticed that a package addressed to Defendant had burst 

open and that it contained a large prescription bottle with a worn and out of date label not 

in Defendant’s name. Mr. Henriksen notified Detective Murray about the suspicious 

package. Upon inspection, Mr. Henriksen discovered that the bottle contained a large 

amount of pills as well as some powder. The contents of the bottle were determined to be 

110 tablets of dihydrocodeinone, 1.3 grams of cocaine, .14 grams of heroin, and 43 

tablets of oxycodone. 

Defendant called the FedEx facility inquiring about the package when it did not 

arrive as scheduled. An employee at FedEx told Defendant that the package had been 

delayed and that he could wait to have it delivered or pick it up from the facility that day. 

Defendant chose to pick up the package and asked for directions to the facility. A FedEx 

employee had to unlock the door for Defendant when he arrived because it was thirty 

minutes after their usual closing time. Detective Murray had officers posted on either 

side of the FedEx facility so that they would be able to stop Defendant regardless of 

which way he left. Officer Nunley pulled over Defendant after he left the FedEx facility, 

and the location of the stop was within 1000 feet of Holston Elementary School. 

Defendant’s car was searched, and officers found three smaller bottles containing 

prescription pills in addition to the FedEx package.

Defendant’s daughter, Rachael Santarone, was a passenger in the vehicle and was 

charged as a codefendant. She testified for the State that Defendant frequently made trips 

to Florida with his wife to obtain large quantities of prescription pain killers, which was 

confirmed by both Defendant and his wife. Rachael testified that the number of visitors 

to the house would increase after these trips and that the visitors would go to a back 

bedroom for a few minutes before leaving. Rachael also testified that on one occasion, 

she observed Defendant exchange a bag of oxycodone pills with a man for money.

Defendant and his wife denied selling pills but admitted exchanging pills with friends on 

a regular basis. Rachael testified that, after they were pulled over by the police, 

Defendant attempted to throw the smaller pill bottles which had been in the center 

console into her purse and that, in the chaos, one did not make it in. Defendant admitted 

that he knew the FedEx package contained prescription medication and that he intended 

to hold the package until his friend arrived from Florida. Defendant denied knowing that 

the package contained cocaine or heroin.
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Defendant’s argument on appeal is that the only evidence establishing his intent to 

sell was the testimony of his daughter and codefendant, Rachael Santarone, who 

Defendant asserts was not a credible witness.7 However, the assessment of the credibility 

of the witnesses and the weight and value of the evidence are entrusted to the jury as the 

trier of fact and will not be reevaluated on appeal. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277. Additionally, 

the jury could infer Defendant’s intent to sell from the amount and variety of drugs 

contained in his vehicle along with other relevant factors. See State v. Belew, 348 S.W.3d 

186, 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (citing T.C.A. § 39-17-419). Inside Defendant’s 

vehicle were over 300 prescription pills in multiple containers, including two different 

types of oxycodone pills, and neither of the prescription bottles were either current or in 

Defendant’s name. Agent Smith testified that the packet of heroin contained a sufficient 

amount to produce multiple doses; the FedEx package also contained more than a gram 

of cocaine. Defendant denied that the drugs were for his personal use, and the only drug 

paraphernalia found in the car was a straw in Rachael’s purse, which she admitted was 

hers. Defendant admitted that he gave pills to friends on a fairly regular basis, though he 

attempted to characterize these transactions as casual exchanges rather than sales. 

Rachael observed Defendant selling pills to a man in his car on one occasion and noticed 

an improvement in the family’s finances after Defendant’s many trips to Florida to obtain 

prescription pills. Defendant admitted that he knew the FedEx package contained 

prescription medication but denied that he knew it contained cocaine and heroin. A jury 

is free to accept portions of a witness’s testimony and reject others. See State v. Adams, 

45 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Finally, Defendant admitted that he intended 

to hold the package until Mr. Balmer’s arrival, thereby delivering the contents of the 

package to Mr. Balmer. From this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably conclude 

that Defendant possessed this vast and varied pharmacopeia with the intent to sell or 

deliver it. 

II. Enhancement under the Drug-Free School Zone Act

Defendant argues that the enhancement of his sentences under the Drug-Free 

School Zone Act was inappropriate and against public policy because the location of his 

arrest was chosen by law enforcement. The State responds that the statute does not 

mandate the tactics of law enforcement and foreclose the use of enhanced punishment 

when law enforcement tacitly allows drugs to enter a school zone. Moreover, the State 

 

7 We note that while Defendant challenges the credibility of Rachael’s testimony, he does not 

argue that it is uncorroborated accomplice testimony. See State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 888 (Tenn. 

2014) (holding that “the uncorroborated testimony of one or more accomplices . . . is insufficient to 

sustain a conviction as a matter of law,” but noting that “corroborative evidence may be direct or entirely 

circumstantial, and it need not be adequate, in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet 

the requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the crime charged.”) We conclude that Rachael’s testimony was adequately corroborated 

by the testimony of other witnesses. See State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001).
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argues that the evidence does not support Defendant’s claim that law enforcement lured 

him into the school zone. We agree with the State.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432, also known as the Drug-Free 

School Zone Act, states:

A violation of § 39-17-417, or a conspiracy to violate the section, that 

occurs on the grounds or facilities of any school or within one thousand feet 

(1,000’) of the real property that comprises a public or private elementary 

school, middle school, secondary school, preschool, child care agency, or 

public library, recreational center or park shall be punished one (1) 

classification higher than is provided in § 39-17-417(b)-(i) for such 

violation.

T.C.A. § 39-17-432(b)(1). Rather than creating a separate criminal offense, this statute 

“merely imposes a harsher penalty for violations of Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated 

section] 39-17-417 occurring within a school zone.” State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 168 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); see T.C.A. § 39-17-432(b). 

Defendant argues that because the General Assembly’s goal in creating the DrugFree School Zone Act was to keep illegal drugs off school grounds, any act by law 

enforcement that tacitly allows drugs to enter a school zone forecloses the use of the 

school zone enhancement. An appellate court’s role in construing a statute is to give 

effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage 

beyond its intended scope. See State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1998). This 

Court should derive legislative intent from the natural and ordinary meaning of the 

statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle 

construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning. Id. This Court will refer to 

the legislative history of a statute only when faced with ambiguous language. State v. 

Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2013). Moreover, this Court “will not apply a 

particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation will yield an absurd result.” 

State v. Fleming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432 plainly and unambiguously states 

that the Act is intended “to serve as a deterrent” in order “to create drug-free zones for 

the purpose of providing vulnerable persons in this state an environment in which they 

can learn, play and enjoy themselves without the distractions and dangers that are 

incident to the occurrence of illegal drug activities” by imposing “enhanced and 

mandatory minimum sentences.” T.C.A. § 39-17-432(a). The State is not required to

prove that the defendant knew that he was committing an offense within 1000 feet of a 

school, nor even that school was in session at the time of the offense. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 

at 169. A defendant may be convicted under the Act if he was merely traveling through 
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the school zone while in possession of controlled substances, even if he was arrested 

elsewhere. See State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 523 (Tenn. 2007). This Court has 

explained the rationale for this rule:

[R]egardless of a defendant’s intent to distribute drugs within a school 

zone: “the mere presence of substantial quantities of drugs increases the 

risk of gunfire and other violence. . . . In addition, a person possessing 

drugs may abandon them while fleeing from the police. . . . The drugs may 

also be lost or stolen near a school and may then find their way into 

students’ hands.”

Smith, 48 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d 

Cir. 1992)); see also State v. Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, No. M2009-00891-CCA-R3-CD, 

2010 WL 5343286, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

May 31, 2011). 

Defendant has pointed to no authority that the legislature meant to foreclose the 

use of the school zone enhancement when law enforcement officers fail to prevent an 

offender from entering a school zone while in possession of drugs, and any interpretation 

of the statute in that manner would yield an absurd result. Defendant’s argument would 

require the State to prove that he chose to be in the school zone while in possession of 

illegal drugs, which would require a showing of knowledge on Defendant’s part. 

However, this Court has rejected that argument: “a requirement that the dealer know that 

a sale is geographically within the prohibited area would undercut [the] unambiguous 

legislative design [to create drug-free school zones].” Smith, 48 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting 

United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 50 (2nd Cir.1985)) (alteration in original). The Act is 

intended “to serve as a deterrent” to the “unacceptable conduct” of violating Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 39-17-417 within a school zone by imposing “enhanced and 

mandatory minimum sentences,” not by mandating the tactics of law enforcement. See

T.C.A. § 39-17-432(a).

Indeed, it appears that Defendant is simply making a “backdoor attempt” to argue 

entrapment, a defense which was specifically waived by Defendant at trial. See State v. 

Jermaine Rashad Carpenter, No. E2007-02498-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 331330, at *4 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). While “[i]t 

is a defense to prosecution that law enforcement officials, acting either directly or 

through an agent, induced or persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an 

unlawful act when the person was not predisposed to do so,” T.C.A. § 39-11-505, the 

defense must be “fairly raised” by the evidence before the trial court is required to give a 

jury instruction on entrapment. State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 331 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 2001). We recognize that proof that the State lured a defendant into the school zone 

would “fairly raise” an entrapment defense; however, there was no such proof in this 
- 13 -

case, and defense counsel specifically asked the trial court to remove entrapment from the 

jury instructions because it had not been raised by the proof.8 See State v. Charles 

Lincoln Faulkner, No. E2006-02094-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2242531, at *16 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. June 2, 2008). The evidence in this case demonstrates that Defendant insisted 

on picking up his package full of illegal drugs from the FedEx facility rather than wait for 

it the be delivered on a later date. Detective Murray, who was unaware of the route 

Defendant would travel, instructed officers to station themselves on either side of the 

FedEx facility. Detective Murray did not instruct the FedEx employee on which route to 

suggest to Defendant should he ask for directions. Defendant chose the route that he 

travelled after leaving the FedEx facility. Defendant argues that Detective Murray could 

have arrested him in the parking lot of the FedEx facility, which was not in a school zone. 

However, Detective Murray was conducting surveillance while other officers were

prepared to stop and arrest Defendant’s vehicle. And, as noted above, Defendant has 

pointed to no authority that the Drug-Free School Zone Act requires law enforcement 

officers to actively attempt to prevent a defendant from bringing illegal drugs into a

school zone. Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

_________________________________

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

 

8 Notice of an entrapment defense had been properly filed before trial. See T.C.A. § 39-11-505.