GLD-067 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-3460

___________

DEBORAH M. YOUNG, NATURAL GUARDIAN OF C.D. AND B.D., 

MINORS, IN OUR OWN RIGHT,

Appellant

v.

ALICE BECK DUBOW, JUDGE, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY FOR CAUSING 

PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE BY FAILING TO ENFORCE HER VERY OWN 

"STANDING ORDER FOR COURTROOM H" RULES; ANGELE MARIE PARKER, 

CEO; CHEREL FERRELL, SOCIAL WORKER EMPLOYEE METHODIST 

SERVICES FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN ("METHODIST KINSHIP") IN THEIR 

INDIVIDUAL, AND FEDERAL GRANT FUNDED CAPACITIES AS 

BENEFICIARIES OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE; 

ANNE MARIE AMBROSE, COMMISSIONER DHS; KAREN S. REYNOLDS, 

SOCIAL WORKER; CARLA N. GARDNER, COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE 

PHILADEPHIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES ("DHS") IN THEIR 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AND COMPLICIT ACCESSORIES TO KIDNAP FOR 

PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE; MARY ANN TAYLOR, IN HER 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSER, AND 

ACCOMPLICE BENEFICIARY OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED 

CHILD ABUSE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05015)

District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 16, 1020

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
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(Opinion filed: January 3, 2011)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Deborah Young, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing 

her complaint. Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 

summarily affirm.

I

In November 2009, Young filed in the District Court a complaint against 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Alice Dubow, officials at the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”), employees of Methodist Kinship, an 

organization that provides child placement services for DHS, and Mary Ann Taylor, her 

children’s paternal grandmother. Her complaint stemmed from Judge Dubow’s order 

awarding custody of Young’s two children to their father and Taylor. Young alleged that 

Judge Dubow’s decision “ordered kidnap for profit and prolonged child abuse of [her 

children],” D. Ct. Doc. No. 3, 3, and accused the remaining defendants of contributing to 

the alleged kidnap and abuse of her children. Young sought the return of her children to 

her custody and $900,000 in punitive damages.

The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted. Young 

then filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily affirm the 
3

District Court’s order if Young’s appeal does not present a substantial question. See 3d 

Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s

order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 

F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). “The District Court's judgment is proper only if, accepting 

all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to 

[Young], we determine that [she] is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of 

the complaint.” Id. (quoting McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 

2009)). 

The District Court presented several alternative bases for dismissing Young’s 

complaint. We need only address two of these. First, we agree with the District Court 

that Young’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia 

Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 

(1923). “In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the RookerFeldman doctrine prohibits the district court from exercising jurisdiction.” Great W. 

Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010). 

There are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: 

“(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused 

by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit 

was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state 

judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 

280, 284 (2005)). Here, there is no question that these requirements are met. Young’s 

federal complaint stemmed from the adverse custody decision rendered in state court, 
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Young claims that she and her children have been harmed by that decision, and she 

expressly asks the District Court to reverse Judge Dubow’s custody award. See also

Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) (mother’s action for a declaratory 

judgment invalidating Office of Children and Youth’s findings concerning the absence of 

child abuse necessarily implied a finding that Court of Common Pleas made improper 

custody award, and was thus barred by Rooker-Feldman).

To the extent that Young raised claims that would not be barred by RookerFeldman, we also agree with the District Court that her allegations were insufficient to 

state a claim for which relief could be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. Here, Young raised a number of allegations against the Defendants, but failed to 

provide factual support for those allegations.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.