THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Don Weaver, Appellant,

v.

Recreation District, Recreation Commission of Richland County, Paul Brawley, as A uditor of Richland County and David A. Adams, as Treasurer of Richland County, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000920

Appeal from Richland County L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27991 Heard February 11, 2020 – Filed September 2, 2020

AFFIRMED

John E. Schmidt III and Melissa J. Copeland, of Schmidt & Copeland, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Charles H. McDonald and Willia m C. Dillard Jr., of Belser & Belser, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents Recreation District and Recreation Commission of Richland County; and Bradley T. Farrar, of Richland County Attorney's Office, of Columbia, for Respondents Paul Brawley and

David A. Adams.CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Don Weaver ("Appellant") brought this declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. section 6-11-271 (2004), whic h addresses the millage le vied in certain special purpose districts. The circuit court found Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing any constitutiona l infirmity. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Appellant owns property and is a taxpa yer in the Recreation District, a special purpose district created to fund the opera tion and maintenance of parks and other recreational facilities in the unincorpora ted areas of Richland County. The Recreation Commission of Richland County, which oversees those facilities, is governed by an appointed board of commissi oners. Richland County's Auditor and Treasurer administer the levy and collecti on of taxes for the Recreation District, as well as Richland County.

Appellant instituted this action in 2017 against the Recreation District, the Commission, the Auditor, and the Treasurer (collectively, "Respondents"), seeking a declaration that Act No. 397, 1998 S.C. Acts 2389, in particular the part that added section 6-11-271, violates several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, including article X, section 5 (prohibiting taxation without representation); article III, section 34 (prohibiting special legislati on); and article VIII, section 7 (regarding Home Rule by counties), as we ll as the Home Rule Act, S. C. Code Ann. sections 4- 9-10 to -1230 (1986 & Supp. 2019).

Section 6-11-271 was added by the Sout h Carolina General Assembly for the stated purpose of clarifying the authority of certain special purpose districts—those without elected governing bodies—to le vy millage and provide governmental

services after this Court found another provision, Act No. 317, 1969 S.C. Acts 382,

was unconstitutional. In Weaver v. Recreation District , a case that was also instituted by Appellant, the Court held Act No. 317 violated the prohibition on taxation without representation because it authorized the levying of taxes on property in a special purpose district with out any oversight by an elected body. 328 S.C. 83, 87, 492 S.E.2d 79, 81–82 (1997) (citing S. C. Const. art. X, § 5).

The Court held "the legislative power to tax may not be c onferred on a purely appointive body but must be under the supervisory control of elected bodies . . . ."

Id. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned "the power to fix and levy a tax should only be conferred upon a body which stands as the direct representative of the people, to the end th at an abuse of power may be directlycorrected by those who must carry the burden of the tax." Id. (quoting Crow v. McAlpine , 277 S.C. 240, 244–45, 285 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981)). The Court concluded Act No. 317 was an impermissible delegation of legislative author ity because it gave

"the Recreation Commission the complete discretion to determine its annual budget, and to levy anywhere fro m one to five mills taxe s to meet its budget." Id. at 87, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added) . The Court recognized that its holding could disrupt the financial operation of numerous sp ecial purpose districts, boards, and commissions throughout the state, so it applied the decision prospectively (beginning December 31, 1999), "to give the General Assembly an opportunity to address this problem." Id. at 87–88, 492 S.E.2d at 82.

In response to Weaver , the General Assembly adde d section 6-11-271 of the

South Carolina Code in 1998. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-271 (2004 ) ("Millage levy for special purpose district."). Subsecti on (A) defines the term "special purpose district" to mean any special purpose dist rict or public service authority, however named, created by the General Asse mbly prior to March 7, 1973. Id. § 6-11-271(A).

Subsections (B) and (C) apply only to special purpose districts whose "governing bodies . . . are not elected but are presently authorized by law to levy [millage] for operations and maintenance." Id. § 6-11-271(B)(1), (C)(1). Subsection (B) concerns districts that we re then authorized to levy millage up to a certain limit, and (C) concerns districts then havi ng no limit as to the millage amount. Id. The General Assembly instructed that, beginning in fiscal year 1999, "[t]here must be levied annually in each special purpose distri ct described" (i.e., those described in (B)(1) and (C)(1)), tax millage equal to the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998.

Id. § 6-11-271(B)(2), (C)(2).

The General Assembly outlined several methods for a special purpose district to attempt to alter this tax millage. Subsection (D) provi des a special purpose district may request that the county election co mmission conduct a referendum proposing a modification of the millage. Id. § 6-11-271(D). If the voters approve, the "modification in tax millage shall rema in effective until changed in a manner provided by law." Id.

Subsection (E) authorizes all special purpose districts located wholly in one county to modify their millage limits, "pr ovided the same is first approved by the governing body of the district and by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Id. § 6-11-271(E)(1) (emphasis added). However, any modifi cation is only temporary, as the General Assemblystipulated that "[a]ny increase in millage effectuated pursuant to this subsection is

effective for only one year ." Id. (emphasis added).

Appellant alleged in his complaint in the current action that the addition of section 6-11-271 still imposes taxation wit hout representation because it allows the Commission, an appointed body, to levy taxes on property within the Recreation District without any oversight from electe d representatives, and he further alleged the statute is special legislation that viol ates Home Rule. Th e circuit court ruled Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing any constitutional infirmity, finding the statute (1) does not impose taxa tion without representation, (2) is not special legislation, and (3) does not viol ate Home Rule. Appellant challenges all three findings by the circuit court. 1

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court has a very limited sc ope of review in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute." Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State

, 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999). "All statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possibl e, be construed so as to render them

valid." Id. "A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is cl ear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't. of Revenue , 321 S.C. 59, 467 S.E. 2d 739 (1995)). "A possible constitutional construction mu st prevail over an unconstitutional interpretation." State v. Neuman , 384 S.C. 395, 402, 683 S. E.2d 268, 271 (2009) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Taxation without Representation

Appellant first argues section 6-11-271 is unconstitutional because it violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibiti on on taxation without representation.

1 The Auditor and the Treasurer filed a jo int brief taking no position on the statute's validity and stating they would abide by th e Court's decision in the performance of their ministerial duties. Accordingly, references to the arguments of Respondents

hereinafter shall refer to the Recreation Di strict and the Commission, which filed a joint brief supporting the circuit court's ruling.Article X, section 5, of our state constitution provides , in relevant part: "No

tax . . . shall be establis hed . . . without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled. " S.C. Const. art. X, § 5.

Appellant argues the General Assembly 's passage of s ection 6-11-271 "is inconsistent in part with Weaver " and should, therefore, be invalidated. He notes subsection (B)(1) refers to unelected bodies that "are presently authorized by law to levy for operations and maintenance," but under Weaver , "unelected bodies are not authorized to levy taxes," so the General Assembly's enactment "did not correct the taxation without representation issue . . . a nd instead reiterated a nd relied on the very provisions that were struck by the Court as unconstitutional."

Appellant further argues subsections (B)(2) and (C)(2) "initially appear to have millage rates set by st atute and, consequently, by the General Assembly," but they use the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998, which is the rate impermissibly imposed prior to Weaver , so "the taxation without re presentation by the Commission is made permanent by statute."

Appellant asserts that, in addition to the problem of using the millage amounts originally set by the unelected bodies, an additional problem exists in subsection (E)(1) because it states mill age limitations may be modified "provided the same is first approved by the governing body of th e district and by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly a dopted." Appellant maintains subsection (E)(1) "t herefore provides that the unelected bodies previously setting millage rates are kept in a position of authority as to require that these unelected bodies first approve any change in the millage rates." Appellant states, "This makes the authorized, governing body of a district directly responsible to the very unelected bodies that are not authorized to set millage rate s due to such being a violation of taxation without representation."

Finally, Appellant contends "[t]he special legislation continues the current [funding] rate to infinity" because "taxpayers have no recourse to seek to reduce this funding and they have no public , elected body to seek redre ss for grievances related

to the use of those levied funds."

We hold Appellant has not met his heavy burden of proving section 6-11-271 imposes taxation without representation in vi olation of article X, section 5, of the

South Carolina Constitution. See Bodman v. State , 403 S.C. 60, 66, 742 S.E.2d 363, 366 (2013) ("The party challenging the stat ute bears the heavy burden of proving that 'its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt.'"(quoting In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh , 351 S.C. 122, 134–35, 568 S.E.2d 338, 344 (2002)).

In enacting the statute, the General Assembly, not the Commission, created the (initial) tax to be imposed in special purpose districts. There can be no question that the General Assembly is a body of duly elected, direct representatives of the people of South Carolina. See, e.g.

, Crow v. McAlpine , 277 S.C. 240, 244, 285 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981) ("The taxing power is one of the highest prerogatives of the General Assembly. Members of this body are chosen by the peopl e to exercise the power in a conscientious and deliberate manne r. If this power is abused, the people could, at least, prevent a recurre nce of the wrong at the polls."); Trs. of Wofford Coll. v. City of Spartanburg , 201 S.C. 315, 321, 23 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1942) (stating "[t]he power of taxation is a legislative pow er, and knows no limitations, except those imposed expressly or by plain implication in the State or Federal Constitution," and noting "[t]he legislative power of the people of the State of South Carolina is vested in the General Assembly").

Appellant's assertion that the Ge neral Assembly somehow created a permanent situation of taxation without re presentation because it chose to implement the rates previously used in the various dist ricts is without merit. In electing to set the initial millage at an amount equivalent to the most-recent fiscal year levels, the General Assembly exercised its own author ity to impose the taxes based on a logical starting point, and it was a decision ma de by an elected body whose members are the direct representatives of the people. 2 See Crow , 277 S.C. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 358 (stating an abuse of the General Asse mbly's taxing power is subject to the response of taxpayers at the polls); accord Weaver , 328 S.C. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81.

2 To the extent Appellant al so more narrowly maintains section 6-11-271 improperly continues the millage rate "fixed by legislators elected by taxpayers from counties other than Richland County," because "every member of the legislature elected by Richland County taxpayers coul d have voted against Sec tion 6-11-271 and it would have passed," we note Appellan t did not plead this assertion as a basis for relief in his complaint, and it was not ruled on by the circuit court. Consequently, it is not properly before this Court. Although not bearing on our decision, the assertion is without merit, in any event, as the enactment of section 6- 11-271 affects all similarly situated special purpose districts—and th eir taxpayers—throughout the state, not just those in Richland County. As noted above, members of the General Assembly are the duly elected, direct representatives of the people, and there is direct recourse by taxpayers for any abuse of th is legislative authority.Further, as noted by Respondents, "[t] he reference in § 6-11-271(B)(1) to unelected special purpose districts 'pre sently authorized by law to levy for operations' was clearly nothing more than a reasonable means to identify the class of entities affected by the opinion." Re spondents correctly observe, "[T]he prospective application of Weaver had not yet taken effect when the statute was enacted," and "[t]he Weaver opinion itself [328 S.C. at 85, 492 S.E.2d at 80] used similar language, stating that 'Act No. 317 authorizes the Recreation Commission, in pertinent part . . . [t]o levy upon all the ta xable property in the District a tax.'" We agree that the statutory language simply identified the relevant entities that were affected by the Weaver decision. The reference to special purpose districts with

unelected boards is clearly warranted and comp rises a proper class that may be distinguished from elected special purpose districts b ecause elected special purpose

districts retained their cons titutional authority to levy taxes on property within their boundaries. Thus, the statute necessarily addr esses the issues affecting districts with unelected governing boards.

As to Appellant's contention that the st atute allows the appr oval of temporary millage modifications by the Commission along with county council, Respondents concede that subsection (E)(1) "does prov ide unelected governing bodies a limited procedural role in decisions to temporarily modify millage rates, [but] per the statute this can only be done with the approval of the elected govern ing body of the county in which the district is located." Responde nts state: "In other words, any increase in the rate must be approved by the c ounty council initially and then again on a recurring annual basis. An unelected sp ecial purpose district has no power to unilaterally increase the rate or preserve such an increase without the consent of county council."

Although Appellant asserts subsection (E )(1) of the statute requires unelected bodies to first approve any change in milla ge rates, we find Ap pellant's argument on this point is misleading. Subsection (E)(1 ) does not state that the Commission must first approve a change in mill age rates, without further qua lification or restriction. Rather, it provides a special purpose distri ct located entirely in one county is authorized to temporarily modify its mill age limitation for one year "provided the

same is first approved [1] by the governing body of the district and [2] by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11-2 71(E)(1) (emphasis a dded). Thus, any modification sought by a special purpose district must first be approved by both the governing body of the district and the county council. A district may not unilaterally make any modifications; any modification requires the approval of county council, a duly elected, representative body.While the statute could have been worded to perhaps state that any

modification requested by a district may not be im plemented without the approval of county council, we r ecognize that if there is any way to construe a statute in a way that is constitutional, it is a court's task to do so. See Joytime Distribs. & Amusement

Co. , 338 S.C. at 640, 528 S.E.2d at 650 ("All statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possibl e, be construed so as to render them valid."). With this directive in mind, we be lieve the reference to the district in this context merely reflects the reality that th e Recreation District is an entity that can act only through its governing body, the Co mmission, and if the Commission would like to modify the millage (i.e., the gove rning board of the Recreation District approves of a modification), the modification can be implemented only with the oversight and approval of Richland County Council.

The General Assembly's manifest intent is that a special purpose district must obtain the approval of the elected governin g body of the county, e.g., county council, before any modification in millage may occur. Cf., e.g.

, Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. City of Spartanburg , 283 S.C. 67, 74, 321 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1984) ("In the construction of statutes, the dominant factor is the intent, not the language of the legislature. Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548 (1956). A statute must be construed in light of its intended purposes, and, if such purpose can be reasonably discovered from its language, the purpose w ill prevail over the literal import of the statute."); S.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Breeland , 208 S.C. 469, 480, 38 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1946) ("We have rece ntly held that choice of language in an act 'will not be construed with literality when that woul d defeat the manifest intention of the lawmakers' and that the court will reject the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute 'when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature.'" (citation omitted)).

Because no change may actually occur without the express approval of county council, an elected body, the prohibition ag ainst taxation without representation is not implicated here, as any rate change is, in fact, subject to the supervision of an elected body, and no modifica tion may be made without th e approval of that elected body. See Weaver , 328 S.C. at 86, 492 S.E.2d at 81 (stating "the legislative power to tax may not be conferred on a purel y appointive body but must be under the supervisory control of elected bodies" (em phasis added)).

The South Carolina Constitution expressl y requires a liberal construction of the constitution and laws governing local government, and it provides the "[p]owers, duties, and responsibilities granted lo cal government subdivisions by this Constitution and by law shall include those fa irly implied and not prohibited by thisConstitution." S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 17. In this case, there has been no evidence that Richland County Council has been precl uded in any way from fully exercising any powers fairly implied a nd not prohibited by the stat e constitution, including the power of taxation. Subsecti on (E)(1) operates as a restric tion on the ability of certain special purpose districts to seek or obtain a temporary modification in millage; it does not purport to be a limitation on the powers of a county's governing body. See S.C. Code Ann § 6- 11-271(E)(1) ("All special purpose districts located wholly within a single county . . . are authori zed to modify their respective millage limitations, provided the same is first approved by th e governing body of the district

and by the governing body of the county . . . ." (emphasis added)).

Moreover, as found by the circuit court, taxpayers in the Recreation District (and in other districts receiving funding un der section 6-11-271) , do have additional means of recourse if they disagree with any modifications made in millage. Taxpayers may seek a refere ndum on whether to dissolve a special purpose district

or to establish an elected board to govern a special purpose district. 3

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude Appellant has not shown the circuit court erred in finding Appellant fa iled to prove section 6-11-271 violates the constitutional prohibition on taxa tion without representation.

B. Special Legislation

Appellant next contends section 6-11- 271 does not affect all counties equally and is, therefore, special legislation that is prohibited by the South Carolina

Constitution.

Article III, section 34, provides the Gene ral Assembly shall not enact local or special laws concerning an enumerated list of subjects (several specific subjects are set forth therein). S.C. Const. art. III, § 34(I to VII). Section 34 further provides: "In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall

be enacted." Id. § 34(IX). However, section 34 ad ditionally states that "[n]othing contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assembly from enacting special provisions in general laws." Id. § 34(X).

"A general law is one that applies to the entire State and operates wherever the specified conduct takes place." Town of Hilton Head Island v. Morris , 324 S.C.

3 See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11 -2020 (2004) (procedure fo r referendum on dissolution of a special purpose district); id. § 6-11-350 (procedure fo r referendum on whether to elect members of the governing bo dy of a special purpose district).30, 34, 484 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1997) . "A law is general when it applies uniformly to all persons or things within a proper class, and special when it a pplies to only one or more individuals or things be longing to that same class." Kizer v. Clark , 360 S.C. 86, 92, 600 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2004). The overall purpose of the prohibition on special legislation "is to prevent discrimi nation and to assure that all persons are treated equally." Thompson v. S.C. Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse , 267 S.C. 463, 471, 229 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1976).

"The language of the Constitution which prohibits a special law where a general law can be made applicable[] plainly implies th at there are or may be cases where a special Act will best me et the exigencies of a par ticular case, and in no wise be promotive of those evils which result fro m a general and indisc riminate resort to local and special legislation." Horry Cty. v. Horry Ct y. Higher Educ. Comm'n , 306 S.C. 416, 419, 412 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1991) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub.

Serv. Comm'n , 284 S.C. 81, 90, 284 S.E.2d 395, 400 (1985)). "In other words, the General Assembly must have a 'logical basis and sound reason' for resorting to special legislation." Id. (quoting Gillespie v. Pickens Cty. , 197 S.C. 217, 225, 14 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1941)).

Appellant highlights the language in subsections (B)(1) and (C)(1)—which state subsections (B) and (C) apply "only to those special purpose districts, the governing bodies of which are not elected "—and argues that, because they apply only to certain classes of special purpose di stricts in South Carolina (i.e., those with

unelected governing bodies), the provisions are unc onstitutional special legislation.

See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-11 -271(B)(1), (C)(1).

Noting the far-reaching and disruptive effect the lack of funding could have on special purpose districts following Weaver , this Court intentionally made the application of the decision prospective onl y to enable the General Assembly to implement appropriate responsive legislation. We agree with the circuit court that the special purpose districts with une lected governing boards affected by the Weaver decision "are clearly a proper class subject to the enactment of uniformly applicable general legislation." As noted by the circuit court, after Weaver , "elected special purpose districts, unlike unelected dist ricts such as the Recreation Commission,

retained constitutional author ity to levy taxes on duly repr esented constituents." As a result, targeting the special purpose di stricts with unelected governing boards in section 6-11-271 was a necessary and logical basis on which to make a distinction, and the General Assembly trea ted all districts with this characteristic as a uniform

class.The General Assembly was clearly justif ied in its enactment of this remedial legislation, and it did not cross constituti onal boundaries. This general legislation affects all special purpose districts with unelected governing bodies throughout the state, so the legislation is applied uniformly to a valid class of entities. As a result, we hold section 6-11-271 is not impermissible special legislation. 4 See Kizer , 360 S.C. at 92, 600 S.E.2d at 532 (stating a law that applies uniformly to all things within a proper class is a general law); cf. Bd. of Trs. for Fairfield Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State

, 409 S.C. 119, 125–26, 761 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2014) (observing "where a special law will best meet the exigencies of a particular situation, it is not unconstitutional" (footnote omitted)).

C. Home Rule

Appellant lastly argues section 6-11- 271 is void because it violates Home

Rule as set forth in the state co nstitution and the Home Rule Act. See generally S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7 (organ ization of counties); S.C. C ode Ann. §§ 4-9-10 to -1230 (1986 & Supp. 2019) (H ome Rule Act).

Article VIII of the South Carolina Constitution was revi sed in 1973 and "reflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore local government to the county level." Knight v. Salisbury , 262 S.C. 565, 568–69, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1974). Section 7 of artic le VIII required the General Assembly (1) to pass general laws delinea ting "the structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties, including the power to tax

different areas at different rates of taxation related to the nature and level of governmental services provided"; and (2) to set forth no more than five alternative forms of county government. S. C. Const. art. VIII, § 7; see also James Lowell Underwood, The Constitution of South Carolina, Vo l. II: The Journey Toward Local Self-Government 165 (1989) (discussing the impact of the amendment and Home Rule). Section 7 prohibits the enactment of special laws affecting "a specific county": "No laws for a specific county sh all be enacted and no county shall be

4 While Appellant also posits assertions as to S.C. Code Ann. se ction 6-11-70 (2004) (regarding the election dates for special purpose districts with elected governing bodies), we find this statute is not re levant to his constitutional arguments concerning section 6-11-271 and note it wa s not pled as a basis for relief in Appellant's complaint.exempted from the general laws or laws app licable to the selected alternative form of government." 5 S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7.

The Home Rule Act passed by the Genera l Assembly, which went into effect in 1975, dealt with these issues in a comprehensive ma nner. Underwood, supra , at 165; see also Graham v. Creel , 289 S.C. 165, 166, 345 S. E.2d 717, 718 (1986) (stating the General Assembly passed Ac t No. 288, 1975 S.C. Acts 692, the Home Rule Act, to advance the aims of the 1973 constitutiona l amendment). The Home Rule Act provides, for example, that count ies have the authority "to assess property and levy ad valorem property taxes and uniform service ch arges, including the power

to tax different areas at diffe rent rates related to the natu re and level of governmental services provided . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9- 30(5)(a) (Supp. 2019).

The circuit court found th e Home Rule Act sets forth the organization and powers of county government, 6 but it does not attempt to re strict general legislation regarding special purpose districts. In fact, section 4-9-80 of the Home Rule Act specifically states the Act does not alter the functions of existing special purpose districts or the authority of the General A ssembly to pass legislation regarding such

districts:

The provisions of this chap ter shall not be construed to devolve any additiona l powers upon county councils with regard to public service districts, special purpose districts, water and sewer au thorities, or other political subdivisions by whatever name designated, (which are in

existence on the date one of the forms of government provided for in this chapte r becomes effective in a particular county) and such political subdivisions shall continue to perform their statutory functions prescribed in

5 "Historically, the vast majority of special purpose districts in South Carolina were created [by the General Assembly] in order to provide water or sewer services in areas within [a] county," but this power is now given to the c ounties by article VIII, so "there is no longer a need for special stat e laws to create this type of district." Knight , 262 S.C. at 574, 206 S.E.2d at 878–89.

6 See S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-31 0 (1986) (outlining the author ity of alternative forms of county government).laws creating such districts or authorities except as they may be modified by act of th e General Assembly . . . .

S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-80 (1986).

The circuit court observed that, in s ection 6-11-271, "the General Assembly merely enacted anothe r general law regarding this fo rm of local government." The circuit court concluded, "The Home Rule Act does not affect the [General Assembly's] authority to enac t such general laws affecti ng special purpose districts. Likewise, the Home Rule constitutional am endment, Art. VIII, § 7, allows the General Assembly to enact general legisl ation affecting existing special purpose

districts."

Appellant summarily argues that this Court has held the Home Rule Act's prohibition on special legislation does not ope rate retroactively to abolish all special legislation that was in effect prior to the enactment of the Home Rule Act, but it does void special legislation passed thereafter, citing Graham

. 7 Appellant maintains

section 6-11-271 violates the Home Rule Act and is unconstituti onal and thus, void, because under Home Rule the governing a nd taxing power for Richland County is found in the elected members of its county c ouncil, not special legislation that affects only a specific county.

The wording in Graham was a recognition that a particular county cannot be singled out for exemption from the general la w. We agree with th e circuit court that in section 6-11-271, the General Assembly simply enacted a general law regarding special purpose districts, and Home Rule doe s not restrict the power of the General Assembly to enact general laws governing existing special purpose districts. We find the statute does not affect only a partic ular county (or district), as alleged by Appellant, because it applie s to a broad class of districts having similar characteristics. Moreover, contrary to Appellant's contention, the Richland County

Council does retain its author ity over taxation, as no modification in millage can be made by the Recreation District without its approval, as previously discussed in Section III(A) of this opinion. Conseque ntly, section 6-11-271 does not violate the provisions of Home Rule.

7 See Graham , 289 S.C. at 168, 345 S.E.2d at 719 ("The Home Rule Act, while preventing the General Assembly from enacti ng 'special legislation' and voiding any 'special legislation' which contradicts the general law, does not operate retroactively to abolish all 'special legislation' which wa s in effect in South Carolina prior to the enactment of the Home Rule Act.").IV. CONCLUSION

Appellant has failed to show the circu it court erred in its analysis or its

determination that section 6-11-271 does not violate the constitutional prohibitions on taxation without representa tion and special legislation, nor does it violate Home Rule. As a result, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

AFFIRMED.

KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.