*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 18, 2006*

Decided November 13 , 2006

Before

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2519

JAMES E. McROY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL SHEAHAN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 03-C-6756

Ruben Castillo,

Judge.

O R D E R

James McRoy brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) infringed upon his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely exercise his Muslim faith while he was

incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and

we affirm. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2519 Page 2

Between August 2003 and September 2004, the time frame of McRoy’s

complaint, the CCDOC instituted a religious services schedule for security

purposes, so that it could control the times when outside ministers entered the

prison and also prepare proper measures for prisoner gatherings. The schedule

allotted time for Muslim services every Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday. Some

of the Muslim services, however, were canceled. The CCDOC canceled services if a

imam, or Muslim minister, did not come to the prison to lead the service. The

CCDOC also cancelled services for security concerns when it was short-staffed and

did not have the personnel to safely transport prisoners and supervise gatherings. 

Lastly, the CCDOC cancelled services when the prison was on lockdown, a time

when movement within the prison was kept to a minimum so that personnel could

thoroughly search the premises to locate security breaches and uncover contraband. 

Under these three circumstances, all services of all faiths were cancelled.

Sometimes, however, McRoy was prohibited from attending a service even

when it was not cancelled. The CCDOC had a policy of not mingling prisoners from

different “pods” (smaller units of cells into which each of the CCDOC’s divisions is

further divided). Indeed, it used the pods to keep certain groups apart from one

another to avoid altercations. The CCDOC also avoided the congregation of too

large a group of prisoners because of the difficulty in controlling them all. 

Therefore, only one pod at a time was allowed to attend any event, whether it was

religious or not and without regard to denomination. Even with this restriction, if

two imams arrived to conduct services, they could accommodate all four pods in

McRoy’s division in the allotted time frame. Certain pods were prohibited from

attending services only on days when just a single imam was available. As an

additional security measure, the CCDOC strip-searched all prisoners leaving their

pods for any reason, in order to control the movement of contraband and weapons

throughout the prison. Attendees of any religious service were subject to the

searches. In addition to allowing services for inmates, the CCDOC also had

learning and religious “tiers” to which prisoners could apply in order to focus on

faith or reading during their incarceration. These areas were non-denominational

and open to all prisoners including McRoy. Prisoners were allowed to keep religious

material in their cells, and all ministers were allowed to bring religious material for

distribution to prisoners.

On appeal, McRoy essentially renews the arguments he made in the district

court and asserts generally that unspecified material facts remain in dispute, and

that his claims should be allowed to proceed to trial. McRoy reiterates that the

CCDOC infringed upon his free exercise rights by canceling Muslim services at the

prison, limiting the times and frequency of Muslim services, limiting the number of

prisoners who can attend each service, strip-searching attendees of Muslim

services, restricting the ability of imams to bring publications to the prisoners, and

not having a Muslim-specific living area within the prison. 
No. 05-2519 Page 3

Although we take the facts in the light most favorable to McRoy, his

conclusory denials of the defendant’s facts and his own conclusory allegations

unsupported by specific facts will not suffice. See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,

770, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888

(1990)). McRoy’s claims fail for substantially the same reasons expressed in the

district court’s thorough thirty-page opinion. In considering the cancellations and

limitations of Muslim services and the strip-searches, the district court applied the

standards set out by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 64-85, 89

(1987), and this court in Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1987), and

correctly held that the CCDOC had a legitimate security justification for any

infringement on McRoy’s exercise of his faith. McRoy has not pointed to anything

in the record to suggest that the CCDOC’s asserted security reasons were

pretextual or that the measures were applied in a discriminatory manner. The

district court’s opinion also properly notes the lack of evidence in the record to

support McRoy’s claims that imams are prevented from providing prisoners with

religious materials or that adherents of any other faith enjoy faith-based religious

living units or learning resources that are denied to Muslims.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.