IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven Conrad, :

Petitioner :

: No. 557 C.D. 2022

v. :

: Submitted: March 31, 2023

Department of Transportation :

(Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board), :

Respondent

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: February 26, 2024

In this workers’ compensation case, Steven Conrad (Claimant) petitions 

for review of the May 12, 2022 opinion and order of the Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the October 8, 2021 decision and order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). Therein, the WCJ (1) granted the Department 

of Transportation’s (Employer) Modification Petition, (2) modified Claimant’s 

disability status for his July 5, 2005 work injury to temporary partial disability effective 

August 11, 2020, (3) found that Employer is entitled to a credit for the weeks of 

temporary partial disability benefits paid from September 20, 2011, through November 

1, 2016, and (4) ordered Employer to deduct 20% from the wage loss benefits payable 

to Claimant and pay the same directly to Claimant’s Counsel in satisfaction of the 

approved attorney fee agreement. Upon review we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On July 27, 2005, Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable 

(NCP) accepting liability for a July 5, 2005 work-related injury sustained by Claimant 
2

in the nature of a lower back strain; thereafter, Claimant began receiving temporary 

total disability benefits. (WCJ Findings of Fact (FOF) 1.) On September 20, 2011, 

Claimant underwent an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) provided for in Section 

306(a.2) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act),1 which resulted

in an impairment rating of less than 50%. (FOF 2; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 41a46a.) Based on the results of the IRE, the WCJ modified Claimant’s disability status 

from total to partial effective September 20, 2011, for a period of 500 weeks. Id; R.R.

at 30a-34a.

On November 1, 2016, before 500 weeks of payment of partial disability 

benefits expired, Claimant filed a Reinstatement Petition alleging that his impairment

rating was invalid and unconstitutional, based on Protz v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017), and its progeny 

declaring the IRE section of the WC Act2 unconstitutional. (Board Op. at 1.); R.R. at 

22a-29a.

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710. Former Section 

306(a.2), formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, was added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350 and was repealed 

by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111 (Act 111), 77 P.S. § 511.3. 

2

In Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 124 A.3d 

406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (Protz I), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) 

(Protz II), this Court declared former Section 306(a.2), formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, to be an 

unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the extent that it proactively approved versions 

of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA 

Guides) “beyond the Fourth Edition without review.” Id. at 416. In Protz II, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court held that the General Assembly, in authorizing the application of future versions of 

the AMA Guides without review, had unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking authority in 

violation of the non-delegation doctrine. 161 A.3d at 840-41. The Protz II Court invalidated Section 

306(a.2) in its entirety. Id. at 841.

Thereafter, Section 306(a.2) was repealed by Act 111 and replaced by Section 306(a.3), 77 

P.S. § 511.3. Former Section 306(a.2) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

On January 31, 2018, a WCJ reinstated Claimant’s total disability benefits

as of September 20, 2011. (R.R. at 22a-29a.). On April 26, 2019, the Board affirmed 

the reinstatement to total disability status but amended the effective date to November 

1, 2016, the date Claimant filed his Reinstatement Petition. (R.R. at 35a-40a.)

On August 11, 2020, Claimant underwent a new IRE pursuant to Act 111, 

which resulted in an impairment rating of 11%. (R.R. at 49a-58a.) Consequently, on 

September 10, 2020, Employer filed the instant Modification Petition seeking (1) to 

change Claimant’s benefit status back to partial disability based on the new IRE, and 

(2) a credit for the partial disability benefits previously paid. (FOF 4.) 

(1) When an employe has received total disability compensation pursuant to 

clause (a) for a period of [104] weeks . . . the employe shall be required to 

submit to a medical examination . . . to determine the degree of impairment 

due to the compensable injury, if any . . . . The degree of impairment shall be 

determined based upon an evaluation by a physician . . . pursuant to the most 

recent edition of the [AMA Guides] . . . .

(2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that meets a threshold 

impairment rating that is equal to or greater than [50%] . . . the employe shall 

be presumed to be totally disabled and shall continue to receive total disability 

compensation benefits. . . . If such determination results in an impairment 

rating less than [50%] impairment . . . the employe shall then receive partial 

disability benefits under class (b) . . . .

Former 77 P.S. § 511.2(1), (2).

Section 306(a.3) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) When an employe has received total disability compensation pursuant to 

clause (a) for a period of [104] weeks . . . the employe shall be required to 

submit to a medical examination . . . to determine the degree of impairment 

due to the compensable injury, if any . . . . The degree of impairment shall be 

determined based upon an evaluation by a physician . . . pursuant to the 

[AMA Guides], [Sixth] edition (second printing April 2009).

(2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that meets less than 

[35%] under the [AMA Guides], [Sixth] edition (second printing April 

2009), the employe shall then receive partial disability benefits under class 

(b) . . . .

77 P.S. § 511.3(1), (2) (emphasis added).
4

On November 24, 2020, before the WCJ, Claimant presented his sworn 

testimony. (FOF 7; R.R at 6a-21a.) The WCJ summarized his testimony in pertinent

part as follows:

At the time of the hearing, Claimant was 68 years old. He 

injured his lower back while working for Employer on July 

5, 2005. Since the injury, Claimant had two back surgeries 

performed by Dr. [Balint] Balog. Claimant had ongoing 

problems with his lower back. He was treating for those 

problems with Dr. [Jean] Santo [who] was prescribing a

narcotic. Claimant had a cane he used when walking because 

he would lose the feeling in his legs and fall. He had been 

using the cane for five to eight years. He felt his symptoms 

were worse since he came under Dr. Santo’s care. He had 

stabbing pain in his back with each step. His legs and back 

were weaker. Dr. Santo suggested Claimant use a walker 

during an October 2, 2020 appointment. Dr. Santo mentioned 

a possible fusion surgery “down the road, but to put it off as 

long as” possible. Dr. Santo mentioned the possible fusion 

surgery “years ago,” perhaps in 2010. Claimant was only 

treating with Dr. Santo. He had not had any recent surgical 

consultations. In the five years prior to the hearing, 

Claimant’s treatment had been the same, although his 

medication changed.

Claimant had extreme, constant, toothache-like pain in his 

lower back all day long. His legs worsened as the day went 

on. In the evenings, his mobility was bad and his legs were 

shaky. He had pain down his legs all the way to his toes, as 

well as numbness and tingling. Claimant did not believe there 

was any kind of work he could perform. He had not worked 

since 2005.

Claimant took his narcotic before the IRE with Dr. [John] 

Kline. Dr. Kline performed an examination and asked 

questions. The entire appointment lasted 15 minutes. The

physical examination lasted five minutes.

(FOF 7.) The WCJ found Claimant’s testimony to be credible “regarding the work 

injury he sustained and the treatment he pursued thereafter.” Id. 9(a). However, the 

WCJ noted that Claimant is not qualified to render a medical opinion. Id. 
5

Employer submitted (1) the Impairment Rating Determination Face Sheet 

and Report relative to the September 20, 2011 IRE performed by Jill D’Amico, D.O. 

(Dr. D’Amico), which found Claimant had a whole-person impairment rating of 15% 

as a result of his work-related injury based upon Chapter 17 of the Sixth Edition of the

AMA Guides, (2) the May 2, 2012 Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation 

Disability Status that was completed subsequent to Dr. D’Amico’s September 20, 2011 

IRE, and (3) the January 25, 2012 deposition testimony of Dr. D’Amico, wherein she 

confirmed her opinion that Claimant was at maximum medical improvement and had 

a whole-person impairment rating of 15% as a result of his work-related injury. Id. 6.

Employer also presented the December 22, 2020 deposition testimony of 

John A. Kline, M.D. (Dr. Kline), who performed the August 11, 2020 IRE utilizing the 

Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides and the Act 111 regulations. (FOF 8; R.R. at 71a172a.) The WCJ summarized Dr. Kline’s testimony in pertinent part as follows:

Dr. Kline obtained a history of injury and subsequent 

treatment from Claimant. Dr. Kline also reviewed medical 

records pertaining to Claimant’s treatment for his work

injury. Those records included diagnostic studies of 

Claimant’s lumbar spine, as well as Dr. D’Amico’s prior 

IRE. 

Dr. Kline physically examined Claimant on August 11, 2020. 

Claimant was morbidly obese, but he was able to move about 

the room without a cane. There were no abnormalities to 

structure or posture. There was no evidence of atrophy of the 

lower limbs. Claimant walked normally. He could stand on 

his tiptoes and his heels. Based upon Claimant’s body 

habitus, Dr. Kline did not have Claimant walk on his tiptoes 

or heels, nor did Dr. Kline have Claimant tandem walk. 

Claimant had full range of motion of his low back but 

reported pain. There was some limitation to internal rotation 

and external rotation of both hips. There was tenderness to 

palpation over the area of the post-operative scar in the L4-

5, L5-S1 region of the lower back. There was no tenderness

in the sacroiliac joints, buttocks area, hip area, or coccyx. 
6

There were no spasms or trigger points. Neurological testing 

of muscles in the lower limbs was normal. Claimant had 5

out of 5 strength. Reflex of the left patella was sluggish 

compared to the right, but otherwise reflexes were equal. 

There was diminished sensation on the outer portion of the

right calf and foot, but sensation was otherwise normal. 

Straight leg raise testing was positive on the right and 

negative on the left in a seated position. In a supine position,

straight leg raise testing was negative bilaterally. Claimant 

reported pain with Patrick’s or Berber’s test. Pelvic 

distraction and compression tests of the SI joint were 

negative. Four out of five Waddell’s tests were positive, 

which indicated a non-anatomic reason for some of the pain 

or implied symptom magnification.

Based upon his history, records review, and physical 

examination, Dr. Kline diagnosed the July 5, 2005 work 

injury as a recurrent L4-5 disc herniation for which Claimant 

had operative decompression, as well as radicular symptoms. 

Arachnoiditis was a complication of Claimant’s work injury. 

It caused radicular findings and symptoms, and it was 

included in the diagnoses and symptoms Dr. Kline used to 

perform his impairment rating evaluation. Dr. Kline opined 

Claimant had clearly reached maximum medical 

improvement [(MMI)] from his July 5, 2005 work injury. Dr. 

Kline noted it was 15 years after the work injury. Claimant’s 

condition was not likely to change for better or worse 

throughout the course of the year, with or without additional 

medical treatment. Dr. Kline utilized his diagnosis of 

Claimant’s work injury in determining the degree of wholebody impairment, given Claimant’s recurrent L4-5 disc

herniation, Dr. Kline noted that Claimant fell into category 

2, which generally carries whole[-]person impairment

[rating] of 10% to 15%. Dr. Kline then addressed the grade 

modifiers based upon physical examination, clinical studies, 

and functional history. Claimant’s pain behavior

questionnaire and his objective score of 108 yielded a 

functional history grade modifier of three. The physical 

examination findings of diminished sensation within the

distribution of a nerve root and depressed deep tendon 

reflexes yielded a physical examination grade modifier of 

two. [The Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)] study 

demonstrating recurrent disc herniation was used to place 
7

Claimant in category 2 and could not be used again as a

clinical studies grade modifier. As there were no 

electrodiagnostic studies available, Claimant’s clinical 

studies grade modifier was 0. After the grade modifiers, Dr. 

Kline calculated the net adjustment score, wherein he began 

with Claimant in category 2 and applied the grade modifiers 

for an adjustment score of negative one. A negative one

adjustment score placed Claimant in the grade B category 

and resulted in a whole[-]person impairment rating of 11 % 

relative to the L4-5 disc herniation.

Dr. Kline reviewed Dr. Santo’s October 2, 2020 report. He 

noted Dr. Santo did not truly contest the calculation of the 

impairment rating, which is based on factual information. 

Rather, Dr. Santo opined that Claimant was fully disabled, 

and she was against the idea of an impairment rating. Dr. 

Kline noted that Dr. Santo’s opinion that Claimant was fully, 

completely, and permanently disabled meant Claimant was 

at [MMI]. His functional impairment could not get any worse

than fully, completely, and permanently disabled. Dr. 

Santo’s report did not change Dr. Kline’s opinion regarding 

Claimant’s whole[-]person impairment rating. Dr. Kline 

agreed he had records from Dr. Santo from December 2006 

through April 2017 at the time he performed his [IRE]. He 

later received the October 2, 2020 report Dr. Santo authored, 

but he did not receive Dr. Santo’s records between April 

2017 and October 2, 2020. Dr. Kline did not believe those 

records could demonstrate a worsening indicating Claimant 

was not at [MMI]. [MMI] typically occurs two years 

following surgical intervention.

(FOF 8.) The WCJ found Dr. Kline’s testimony “logical, internally consistent, and 

well supported by his records review and physical examination.” Id. 9(c).

On October 8, 2021, the WCJ granted Employer’s Modification Petition 

under Act 111, concluding that Employer met its burden of proof for a modification of 

Claimant’s disability status from total to partial effective August 11, 2020. (WCJ

Conclusion of Law (COL) 7). The WCJ also concluded that Employer is entitled to a 

credit for the weeks of partial disability paid pursuant to the first IRE between 

September 20, 2011, and November 1, 2016. Id. The WCJ recognized that Claimant 
8

challenged Act 111’s constitutionality but concluded that he lacked the power to 

adjudicate that challenge. (COL 8).

Claimant appealed from the WCJ’s decision to the Board arguing that the 

WCJ erred in modifying Claimant’s disability status to partial disability based on the 

August 11, 2020 IRE when Employer failed to give Claimant the statutory notice of 

modification. (Board Op. at 3.) Claimant also argued that Employer failed to meet its 

burden of proof for a modification because the IRE physician, Dr. Kline, did not have 

an adequate evidentiary foundation or sufficient understanding of the facts for the IRE 

or his opinion regarding MMI to be competent. Id. at 5. Claimant’s final argument 

before the Board was that Act 111 is unconstitutional and void because it was passed 

as a special law to provide relief to employers based on an impairment concept 

unrelated to a claimant’s earning power, which does not comply with the legislative 

scheme of the general WC Act. Id. at 11. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision and 

order. Claimant now petitions for review in this Court.

II. Issues

On appeal,3 Claimant presents two issues: (1) whether Act 111 of 2018, 

which purports to reinstitute the IRE procedure under the WC Act for injuries occurring 

prior to October 24, 2018, is unconstitutional and cannot be applied to injuries before 

that date; and (2) whether the IRE evaluation that does not consider the most recent 

three years of medical records from Claimant’s treating doctor nor the most recent 

seven years of diagnostic studies can be competent evidence sufficient to support

modification of benefits.

3 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported by 

substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights were 

violated. Phoenixville Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830, 838 (Pa. 

2013).
9

III. Discussion

Act 111 

In his first issue, Claimant argues that Act 111 is unconstitutional and 

violates article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

4

 Claimant contends 

that Act 111 is a special law regulating labor because it treats injured claimants who 

have been entitled to total disability benefits for more than two years differently than 

those who have been eligible for total disability benefits for a lesser period of time. 

(Claimant’s Br. at 16.) Claimant asserts that Act 111 created a systemic approach to 

changing claimants’ disability benefits by focusing on impairment rather than 

disability.

Employer responds that this Court has rejected Act 111 constitutionality

challenges in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2019), Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Consol Pennsylvania Coal 

Company LLC), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), and more recently in Hutchinson

v. Annville Township (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), 260 A.3d 360 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2021). Given this precedent, Employer asks the Court to affirm the Board’s 

order.

This Court has addressed various constitutional challenges to Act 111. 

First, in AFL-CIO, we held Act 111, unlike its predecessor, was not an unconstitutional 

delegation of legislative authority. 219 A.3d at 319. In Pierson, we rejected an 

argument that the IRE a claimant underwent was premature because fewer than 104 

weeks had passed between the enactment of Act 111 and the IRE. In that case, the 

4 Article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The General Assembly 

shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law 

and specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: . . . 7. Regulating labor, 

trade, mining or manufacturing[.]” Pa. Const. art. III, § 32.
10

claimant underwent an IRE and had his disability status modified to partial after the 

enactment of Act 111. Citing Rose Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Espada), 238 A.3d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), the Court explained that Act 111 

plainly provides for credit of weeks of temporary total and partial disability benefits 

previously paid and that the General Assembly explicitly provided the credit provisions 

were to be given retroactive effect. Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1179-80. Rose Corporation

also holds that the plain language of Section 3 of Act 111 explicitly gives employers 

credit for previous weeks of disability benefits paid. 238 A.3d at 563. The claimant in 

Pierson also asserted the vested rights argument, which was rejected. The Court held 

that the claimant’s “‘vested rights’ have not been abrogated by Act 111,” id. at 1180, 

because “there are reasonable expectations under the Act that benefits may change.” 

Id. at 1179. We explained that Act 111 did not automatically strip a claimant of any 

rights; rather, Act 111 provided employers with a mechanism to modify a claimant’s 

disability status from total to partial. Id. In Hutchinson, the Court reaffirmed these 

holdings. 260 A.3d at 366-67. We note that other claimants have invited the Court to 

revisit these holdings, but we have declined to do so. See, e.g., Sochko v. National 

Express Transit Service (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), 276 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2022); Hender-Moody v. American Heritage Federal Credit Union (Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board), 274 A.3d 778 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022); and Dohn v. Beck N’

Call (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), 264 A.3d 830 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

Claimant relies on Duffey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Trola-Dyne, Inc.), 152 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2017), which notably was decided before Protz

II, in support of his argument that Act 111 created a systemic approach to changing 

claimants’ disability benefits by focusing on impairment rather than disability. 
11

Specifically, in his brief, Claimant quotes the following excerpt from the case:

5

“the

approach of tying the continuation of disability benefits to impairment rating protocols 

has been described by many physicians and characterized as ‘unappealing, if not 

Orwellian’ in commentary. . . .” Id. at 995 n.18; Claimant’s Br. at 20. However, 

Claimant conveniently fails to include the rest of the language from the footnote, where 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated “[w]e make this observation not as an adoption 

of such viewpoint, but rather, to add perspective to our adherence to the specific 

statutory directives embodying the legislative policy choices that have been made in 

the impairment-rating arena.” Id. 

Claimant’s argument6that Act 111 is a special law enacted in violation of 

article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has not been specifically

5 The full language from the case is as follows:

In this regard, we note that the approach of tying the continuation of disability 

benefits to impairment rating protocols has been decried by many physicians 

and characterized as “unappealing, if not Orwellian” in commentary. David B. 

Torrey & Andrew E. Greenberg, West’s Pa. Prac., Workers’ Compensation 

§6.51 (2008 & July 2016 Supp.) (quoting Nortin M. Hadler, Impairment Rating 

in Disability Determination for Low Back Pain: Placing the AMA Guides and 

the Quebec Institute Report in Perspective, in John F. Burton, Jr. & Timothy 

P. Schmidle, Workers’ Compensation Desk Book I-132 (LRP Pubs. 1992)); 

see also [id.] §6:48:50 (discussing controversy surround the AMA Guides, 

including the criticism that they lack any empirical basis). We make this 

observation not as an adoption of such viewpoint, but rather, to add perspective 

to our adherence to the specific statutory directives embodying the legislative 

policy choices that have been made in the impairment-rating arena.

Duffey, 152 A.3d at 995 n.18.

6 Claimant specifically argues:

[G]iven that [] Employer received a credit for ‘partial disability’

benefits paid from September 20, 2011 to November 1, 2016 and his 

benefits were modified effective August 11, 2020, his indemnity 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
12

addressed by this Court in the past. However, we find the argument without merit

because Act 111 did not create an arbitrary classification, and Claimant’s equal 

protection rights are not violated.

Pennsylvania’s proscription against local or special laws is currently 

found in article III, section 32, and was first adopted in the Pennsylvania Constitution 

of 1874. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 899 

A.2d 1085, 1094 (Pa. 2006). Like many constitutional provisions, it was adopted in 

response to immediate past abuses. Id. The main purpose behind article III, section 32 

was “to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for 

private purposes which was common in 1873.” Id. (quoting Haverford Township v. 

Siegle, 28 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 1942)). Over the years, the underlying purpose of article 

III, section 32 has been recognized to be analogous to federal principles of equal 

protection under the law, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and, thus, special legislation 

claims, and equal protection claims have been reviewed under the same jurisprudential 

rubric. Id. The common constitutional principle at the heart of the special legislation 

proscription and the equal protection clause is that like persons in like circumstances 

should be treated similarly by the sovereign. Id.; Kramer v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Rite Aid Corp.), 883 A.2d 518, 532 (Pa. 2005). Nonetheless, it is settled 

that equal protection principles do not “vitiate the Legislature’s power to classify, 

which necessarily flows from its general power to enact regulations for the health, 

safety, and welfare of the community,” nor do these principles “prohibit differential 

treatment of persons having different needs.” Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 899 

benefits will soon run out. There is no rational reason why [Claimant] 

should be treated differently regarding his right to receive ongoing 

workers’ compensation indemnity benefits under the law than another 

injured worker who has not yet received 104 weeks of benefits.

(Claimant’s Br. at 21.) 
13

A.2d at 1094. There are a legion of cases recognizing that a legislative classification 

which appears to be facially discriminatory may nevertheless be deemed lawful if the 

classification has a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 1095.

Furthermore, legislative classifications must be founded on “real distinctions in the 

subjects classified and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of 

evading the constitutional prohibition.” Id. (quoting Harrisburg School District v. 

Hickok, 761 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. 2000)). Finally, in analyzing a special

legislation/equal protection challenge, a reviewing court is free to hypothesize reasons 

the General Assembly might have had for the classification of certain groups. Id.

The WC Act is remedial legislation designed to compensate claimants for 

earnings loss occasioned by work-related injuries. City of Erie v. Worker’s 

Compensation Appeal Board (Annunziata), 838 A.2d 598, 601 (Pa. 2003). As 

previously discussed, Act 111 was enacted simply to repeal Section 306(a.2) of the WC 

Act invalidated by the Supreme Court and reenact the language clarifying the 

guidelines to be used for IREs without proposing any substantive changes. Rose 

Corporation, 238 A.3d at 552-53. The legislative intent behind Section 306(a.2) was 

to ensure efficiency within the worker’s compensation system. Diehl v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (I.A. Constr.), 607 A.3d 230 (Pa. 2010). 

Claimant’s constitutional argument is asserted without supporting 

references to legal authority or facts that Act 111 unconstitutionally violates his right

to equal protection. Not only were the cases cited by Claimant in his brief decided 

prior to Protz II, his assertion that Act 111 is a special law passed in direct violation of 

article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is not supported by any relevant 

authority. There is no evidence that Claimant was treated differently than anyone else 

who is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits; therefore, his equal protection 
14

rights could not have been violated. Any employee who has received total disability 

compensation pursuant to the WC Act for a period of 104 weeks is required to submit 

to an IRE to determine the degree of impairment due to compensable injury. 77 P.S. § 

511.3(1). If the degree of impairment is determined to be less than 35 % pursuant to 

the AMA Guides, the employee shall then receive partial disability benefits. 77 P.S. § 

511.3(2). The change in disability status does not change the amount of compensation

during the 500 weeks of partial disability. 77 P.S. § 511.3(3). 

Here, Claimant underwent an IRE which resulted in an impairment rating 

of 11%, therefore his disability status was modified to partial disability. Employer then 

properly received credit for the weeks of partial disability paid between September 20, 

2011 and November 1, 2016, pursuant to the plain language of Section 3 of Act 111. 

Rose Corporation, 238 A.3d at 563. Therefore, nothing in the record supports the 

assertion that Claimant was somehow treated differently, and his argument is without 

merit.

IRE

Claimant argues that because Dr. Kline failed to obtain and review 

Claimant’s medical records of treatment for the most recent three years immediately 

before the IRE and the diagnostic studies in the seven years immediately before the 

IRE violates foundational requirements for an IRE by the AMA Guides. (Petitioner’s 

Brief at 24.) Even though Claimant submits that the AMA Guides do not set forth 

specific medical records physicians must obtain, review, or consider, the AMA Guides 

state that the IRE should include a comprehensive, accurate medical history and a 

review of all pertinent records. Id. Claimant also asserts that the AMA Guides also 

state that the physician needs to review and document actual studies and findings from 

relevant diagnostic studies, including laboratory tests, x-rays, Computed Tomography 
15

(CT) scans, MRI scans, ultrasound exams and Electromyography/Nerve Conduction 

Studies (EMG/NCS). Id. Claimant argues that Dr. Kline did neither, resulting in

inadequate foundation for the IRE testimony. Id. 

It is well established that the WCJ is the factfinder, and it is solely for the 

WCJ to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hawbaker v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kriner’s Quality Roofing Services & 

Uninsured Employer Guaranty Fund), 159 A.3d 61, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Neither

the Board nor this Court may reweigh the evidence or the WCJ’s credibility 

determinations. Id. In addition, it is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, to determine 

what weight to give to any evidence. Id. As such, the WCJ may reject the testimony of 

any witness in whole or in part. Id. In this regard, “[d]etermining the credibility of the 

witnesses is . . . not an exact science, and the ultimate conclusion comprises far more 

than a tally sheet of its various components.” Dorsey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Crossing Construction Co.), 893 A.2d 191, 195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) 

(declining to “dissect and analyze each of the WCJ’s reasons for his credibility 

determination”). For purposes of appellate review, it is irrelevant whether there is 

evidence to support contrary findings; if substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s 

necessary findings, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Verizon 

Pennsylvania Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Mills), 116 A.3d 1157, 

1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

In this case, Employer submitted the testimony of Dr. Kline, who is board 

certified in physical medicine, rehabilitation, and pain management and performed the 

IRE of Claimant on August 11, 2020. Dr. Kline took Claimant’s history, reviewed 

medical records and diagnostic studies, and performed a physical examination. Dr. 

Kline understood that Claimant’s 2005 work injury was a recurrence of an earlier L4-
16

5 disc herniation with radicular symptoms, for which he underwent decompression 

surgery. The work injury also included arachnoiditis. Dr. Kline testified that based on 

the work injury, Claimant had a whole person impairment rating of 11% under the 

AMA Guides. Dr. Kline opined that Claimant was at MMI, explaining that Claimant 

was 15 years out from the injury and had undergone surgery, and that his condition was 

stable and not likely to change for the better or worse throughout the course of the next 

year, with or without additional medical treatment. Dr. Kline reviewed an October 2, 

2020 report from Claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Santo, who believes that Claimant 

is fully and completely disabled despite any impairment rating, and that his condition 

is steadily worsening. Dr. Kline testified that Dr. Santo’s report did not change his 

medical opinion and that Dr. Santo appears to have limited knowledge of the AMA 

Guides’ definition of MMI. On cross-examination, Dr. Kline testified that the most 

recent diagnostic test he reviewed was an MRI from 2013. In addition, Dr. Kline 

reviewed Dr. Santo’s records from 2006 to 2017, as well as the October 2020 report, 

but there were three years of records, from 2017 to 2020, that Dr. Kline did not see. 

Nevertheless, Dr. Kline testified that he discussed Claimant’s current treatment and 

symptoms with him and had enough information to perform the IRE. Dr. Kline also

reiterated his opinion that Claimant “is truly at [MMI] . . . I don’t really think that’s 

even debatable, at this point. I mean - - even two years following the surgical 

intervention, it would generally render you at [MMI]. At this point, he is now 15 years 

out from the injury[.]” (Dr. Kline Dep., 12/22/2020 at 10-11, 13-33, 36, 38-39, 41-48,

55-60, 62-63, 108; R.R. at 121a.) The WCJ accepted as credible Claimant’s testimony 

regarding his work injury, the treatment he received thereafter, the fact that it has been 

years since he discussed possible surgery with Dr. Santo, and the fact that except for a 

change in medication, his treatment has not changed over the past five years. (FOF 
17

9(a).) The WCJ accepted Dr. Kline’s testimony as credible and consistent with the 

AMA Guides, including his opinion that Claimant was at MMI. Id. 9(c). The WCJ 

found there was no medical evidence of record indicating that Claimant was not at 

MMI under the AMA Guides. Id. Based on the credible evidence, the WCJ found that 

Dr. Kline conducted the August 11, 2020, IRE in accordance with the AMA Guides 

and that Claimant was at MMI relative to his work injury and had a whole person 

impairment rating of 11 %. Id. 9(d).

Upon review, we determine that the WCJ did not err in granting 

Employer’s Modification Petition based on Dr. Kline’s IRE. We find Claimant’s 

second argument without merit.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review, we affirm the Board.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven Conrad, :

Petitioner :

: No. 557 C.D. 2022

v. :

:

Department of Transportation :

(Workers’ Compensation :

Appeal Board), :

Respondent

ORDER

AND NOW, this 26th day of February, 2024, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, dated May 12, 2022 is AFFIRMED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge