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13-2925-cr 

United States v. Baghoumian 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE 

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 5th day of September, two thousand fourteen. 

 

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, 

 REENA RAGGI, 

DENNY CHIN, 

 Circuit Judges. 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

v. No. 13-2925-cr 

 

HERAYER BAGHOUMIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 5, aka 

Vazken, 

Defendant-Appellant,

ARMEN KAZARIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 1, aka Pzo, 

aka Qerop, aka Armen Kazarin, DAVIT MIRZOYAN, aka 

Sealed Defendant 2, ROBERT TERDJANIAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 3, aka Robik, aka Robert Vovk, ALEKSANDR 

AVETISYAN, aka Sealed Defendant 4, aka Vladimir 

Arushunyan, POGOS SATAMYAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 6, ARTUR YEPISKOPOSYAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 7, aka Butania, VAGAN STEPANIAN, aka 

Sealed Defendant 8, VARUJAN AMROYAN, aka Sealed 
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Defendant 9, aka Varush, JACOB POGOSIAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 10, KAREN SIMONIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 

11, VARTAN BOYZADZHYAN, aka Sealed Defendant 

12, aka Levon Papikan, aka Ararat Bedrousian, ARTUR 

MANASARIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 13, GOURGEN 

MIRIMANIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 14, aka Edo, 

MANUK MURADAKHANYAN, aka Sealed Defendant 

15, aka Manch, LIANA SOGHOYAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 16, TIKRAN TAKVORYAN, aka Sealed 

Defendant 17, GAYANE KHATCHATURYAN, aka 

Sealed Defendant 18, GAGIK KYURKCHYAN, aka 

Sealed Defendant 19, ANNA ZAICHIK, aka Sealed 

Defendant 20, ARON CHERVIN, aka Sealed Defendant 

21, KAREN AHARONIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 22, 

ARMEN GRIGORIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 23, 

KAREN MARKOSIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 24, ANNA 

TERMARTIROSYAN, aka Sealed Defendant 25, 

MICHAEL DOBRUSHIN, aka Sealed Defendant 26, 

SAMVEL HAKOPYAN, aka Sealed Defendant 27, 

RAFIK TERDJANIAN, aka Sealed Defendant 28, 

Defendants.*

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FOR APPELLANT: James M. Branden, ESQ., New York, 

New York. 

FOR APPELLEE: Harris Fischman, Brent S. Wible, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, 

United States Attorney for the Southern District 

of New York, New York, New York. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York (Paul G. Gardephe, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment entered on April 15, 2013, is AFFIRMED.

 

*

 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above. 
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Defendant Herayer Baghoumian, who stands convicted on a guilty plea of 

racketeering conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), asserts that the district court committed 

procedural and substantive error in sentencing him to 135 months’ imprisonment. In 

reviewing the challenged sentence for “reasonableness,” “a particularly deferential form of 

abuse-of-discretion review,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) 

(en banc), we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior 

proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

1. Procedural Reasonableness 

 Baghoumian asserts that the district court committed procedural error by not 

adequately considering mitigating circumstances, relying instead only on (1) the fact that 

his participation in Medicare fraud affected the nation’s health care system, which the 

court characterized as an extremely “important issue in this country,” A. 184, and (2) the 

need to promote general deterrence. We disagree.1

 We entertain “a strong presumption” that a sentencing judge has considered all 

arguments properly presented, “unless the record clearly suggests otherwise.” United 

States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 

the record shows that the district court considered not only the nature of Baghoumian’s 

crime and the need for general deterrence, but also numerous potentially mitigating factors, 

 

1 Because we identify no error, we need not consider whether Baghoumian’s failure to 

raise his entire inadequate consideration argument in the district court limits our review to 

plain error. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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including Baghoumian’s role in the offense, his limited criminal history, his family ties, 

and the possible immigration consequences of his conviction. Indeed, the district court 

expressly referenced some of these factors in granting Baghoumian a downward variance 

from Criminal History Category III to Category II. In such circumstances, we identify no 

procedural error in sentencing. See United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 

2010) (“The District Court here considered all arguments of counsel and fully stated the 

reasons for the sentence imposed, and that was all that was required.”); cf. United States v. 

Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 376 (2d Cir. 2013) (identifying error where district court provided 

only “passing mention to any of the section 3553(a) factors,” instead justifying maximum 

sentence “by relying almost exclusively on one word—‘deterrence’”). 

2. Substantive Reasonableness 

 In challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, Baghoumian bears a 

heavy burden because we will set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in 

exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision “cannot be located within the range of 

permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing 

that broad range of sentences can be reasonable in particular case). Thus, we do not 

substitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing court; we ask only whether the 

challenged sentence is so “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as 

a matter of law,” that allowing it to stand would “damage the administration of justice.” 
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United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009); accord United States v. 

Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012). That is not this case. 

 Baghoumian asserts that his 135-month prison sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because any sentence above 121 months—the upper end of the Guidelines 

range calculated in his plea agreement, which did not account for his then undisclosed prior 

convictions—is improper in light of his role in the offense, personal history, and possible 

deportation. Where, as here, the district court explicitly considered such facts in imposing 

sentence, we will not second guess the weight it assigns them “as long as the sentence 

ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United 

States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “weight to be 

afforded any given argument made pursuant to one of the § 3553(a) factors is a matter 

firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge” and generally is beyond 

appellate review). In light of Baghoumian’s substantial participation in a Medicare fraud 

scheme that resulted in loss between $7 million and $20 million, we cannot conclude that a 

135-month sentence—within the 108-to-135 month Guidelines range resulting from the 

district court’s downward variance—is outside the range of substantive reasonableness. 

See id. at 27 (stating that “overwhelming majority” of Guidelines sentences are 

substantively reasonable); see also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 174. 

Accordingly, Baghoumian’s sentencing challenges fail on the merits. 
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We have considered Baghoumian’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

CATHERINE O=HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court