J-S08029-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TAHREEL MALEEK TOWNSEND

Appellant No. 2112 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order of July 1, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-39-CR-0003136-2008

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2015

Tahreel Maleek Townsend appeals the July 1, 20141order that 

dismissed his pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The PCRA court provided the following history of this case:

On October 1, 2009, following a jury trial that was conducted 

from September 28, 2009, through October 1, 2009, [Townsend] 

was found guilty of Murder of the First Degree[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2502(a),] and Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Criminal 

Homicide[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1).] Thereafter, on October 

30, 2009, [Townsend] was sentenced to a term of life 

imprisonment in a state correctional institution on the charge of 

Murder of the First Degree. On the same date, [Townsend] was 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten (10) 

____________________________________________

1 Although the order was dated June 26, 2014, it was not filed and 

docketed until July 1, 2014. We have amended the appeal paragraph

accordingly.
J-S08029-15

- 2 -

years nor more than twenty (20) years on the charge of Criminal 

Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Homicide. This sentence was 

ordered to run consecutively to the sentence[] imposed on the 

charge of Murder of the First Degree. Subsequently, on 

November 19, 2009, [Townsend] filed a notice of Appeal with 

the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. By Order dated August 11, 

2011, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this Court’s 

judgment of sentence. Then, on or about September 12, 2011, 

[Townsend] filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. On March 

15, 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied 

[Townsend’s] petition. Subsequently, [Townsend] filed a timely 

pro se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief. 

Consequently, on June 25, 2012, [the PCRA court] appointed 

Robert Long, Esquire, to represent [Townsend] on his Motion for 

Post Conviction Collateral Relief. On July 27, 2012 and October 

11, 2012, Attorney Long filed an Amended Petition for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief and a Second Amended Petition for 

Post Conviction Collateral Relief, respectively. An evidentiary 

hearing relative to [Townsend’s] motion was conducted before 

[the PCRA court] on October 18, 2012. On November 9, 2012, 

[the PCRA court] denied [Townsend’s] Motion for Post Conviction 

Collateral relief.[2] Then, on May 27, 2014, [Townsend] filed a 

second Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief. . . .

PCRA Court Opinion , 8/4/2014, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).

On June 2, 2014, the PCRA court filed and served a notice of intent to 

dismiss Townsend’s second PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The 

basis for the notice was that Townsend’s petition was untimely. Townsend 

filed a response in which he asserted that he had invoked the newly-

____________________________________________

2 On November 29, 2012, Townsend appealed the denial of his PCRA 

petition to this Court. On September 25, 2013, we affirmed the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Townsend, 3271 EDA 2012 (Pa. Super. September 25, 

2013) (unpublished memorandum). On October 23, 2013, Townsend filed a 

petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. On 

March 25, 2014, it was denied. Commonwealth v. Townsend, 87 A.3d 

816 (Pa. 2014).
J-S08029-15

- 3 -

discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar. On July 1, 2014, the PCRA 

court dismissed Townsend’s petition.

On July 14, 2014, Townsend filed a notice of appeal. On July 18, 

2014, the PCRA court ordered Townsend to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 30, 2014, 

Townsend timely complied. On August 4, 2014, the PCRA court issued its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, which incorporated the rationale set forth in its 

June 2, 2014 Rule 907 notice.

Townsend raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 

filing a defective P.C.R.A. Brief which did not support or 

substantiate the legal claims in which [Townsend] sought 

relief on as well as the raising of ineffective assistance of 

counsel which is guaranteed by the U.S. Const. and the 6th

Amend. and Art. 1 Sec. 9 of the Pa Const.

2. Whether trial counsel provided [Townsend] ineffective 

assistance of counsel during trial and at sentencing.

3. Whether [the] sentencing court erred when it sentenced 

[Townsend] to an illegal sentence of life in prison without 

parole under 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 9715 without any statutory 

authorization to impose and add a sentence condition which 

was illegal.

4. Whether [the] trial court violated [Townsend’s] procedural

and substantive due process violation [sic] when it failed to 

follow the mandated rules and provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 

9715(B), 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 9711, 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 9721(A), 18 

Pa.C.S. sec. 1102(a) and Pa.R.Crim.P. rule 802 and 

Pa.R.Crim.P. rule 808.

5. Whether [the] trial court erred when it sentenced [Townsend] 

to an illegal sentence of life imprisonment which is to be 

illegally carried out immediately in the state corr. without a 

signed notarized authenticated or even an “existing” 
J-S08029-15

- 4 -

sentencing order specifying the sentence imposed pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S. sec. 9764.

6. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for giving erroneous 

advice to withdraw [a plea to] 3

rd degree murder because 

he’d guaranteed and assure [Townsend’s] freedom but 

instead [Townsend] ended up getting a life sentence plus 10-

20 yrs.

7. Whether [Townsend] had raised and established a clear cut 

case of manifest injustice when here he shows he’d invoked 

the exception and met all of the requirements that were

needed to invoke the exception to the timeliness rule under 

Pa.R.A.P. 720(C) after discovered evidence where he showed 

and has presented abundance of facts and evidence pursuant 

to the Lehigh County own clerk’s admission that the 

documents requested “does not even exist” as mandated 

triggering the provision of 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(B)(1)(ii) which 

were indeed unknown to him during sentencing.

Townsend’s Brief at 12 (minor modification to capitalization, spelling, and 

punctuation for clarity).

Before reaching the merits of Townsend’s appeal, we must ensure that 

we have jurisdiction.

The filing mandates of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and 

are strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 

306, 309 (Pa. 2008). The question of whether a petition is 

timely raises a question of law. See Commonwealth v. Fahy,

959 A.2d 312, 316 (Pa. 2008). Where the petitioner raises 

questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review plenary. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 

A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010). An untimely petition renders this 

Court without jurisdiction to afford relief. Commonwealth v. 

Gandy, 38 A.3d 899 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

modified).

To be filed timely, a petition must comply with the following criteria:
J-S08029-15

- 5 -

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively.

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) 

shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.

(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in 

the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545.

On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Townsend’s 

petition for allowance of appeal on March 15, 2012. He did not seek review 

in the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, his judgment of sentence 

became final on June 13, 2012 when time to seek such review expired. 

Thus, he had until on or about June 13, 2013 to file a timely PCRA petition. 

Townsend filed his second PCRA petition on May 27, 2014 and, therefore, it
J-S08029-15

- 6 -

is facially untimely. To invoke the PCRA court’s and our jurisdiction, 

Townsend must plead and prove one of the exceptions to the time bar 

enumerated in section 9545(b). See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 

759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Townsend argues that he has satisfied the newly-discovered fact

exception pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Townsend asserts that,

sometime after March 25, 2014, he discovered that no signed sentencing 

order existed in his case. Townsend also asserts that he could not have 

discovered this fact earlier and that he filed his petition within sixty days of 

learning that there was no signed sentencing order. 

First, Townsend is factually mistaken that there are no signed 

sentencing orders in the record. The certified record contains two signed 

and dated sentencing sheets3reflecting Townsend’s sentence.4 Further, the 

sentence was pronounced in open court. Notes of Testimony, 10/30/2009, 

at 20-21. The docket reflects the same sentence. There is no question that 

Townsend was sentenced, even if no order existed. See Joseph v. Glunt, 

96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2014) (finding sufficient authority to maintain 

____________________________________________

3 Although titled a sentencing sheet, the documents have all the 

hallmarks of an order. Each lists a charge for which Townsend was convicted 

and his related sentence. They are dated and bear the signature of the 

presiding judge. They are also docketed as sentencing orders.

4 While the documents appear to be photocopies, each is signed and 

stamped by the clerk of judicial records, attesting that it is a true and 

correct copy of the original.
J-S08029-15

- 7 -

a prisoner’s detention, even in the absence of a sentencing order, when 

docket and sentencing transcript reflect sentence). 

Further, our Supreme Court has held that, “for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), information is not ‘unknown’ to a PCRA petitioner when the 

information was a matter of public record.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 

895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006). The record in Townsend’s case is a public 

record and is available for inspection. He could have discovered at any time 

that the sentencing sheets were in the record along with the docket and 

transcript that reflect his sentence. 

To meet this exception, the newly-discovered fact could not have been 

discoverable earlier through the exercise of due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). Townsend contends that he did not became aware of the 

lack of sentencing order until he received a copy of his sentencing sheet with 

a post-it stating that there was no sentencing order. Townsend does not 

explain why he could not have discovered this alleged flaw prior to his 

current PCRA petition. 

Finally, Townsend has the burden to demonstrate that he filed his 

claim within sixty days of its discovery. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

Townsend baldly asserts that he filed his PCRA petition within sixty days of 

the receipt of his sentencing sheet, but he does not provide any information 

about the date of receipt or proof, such as a copy of the note or post-marked 

envelope. Therefore, Townsend has not met his burden to prove that the 

newly-discovered fact exception to the time bar applies. Thus, his PCRA 
J-S08029-15

- 8 -

petition was untimely and this Court is without jurisdiction to review its 

merits.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/20/2015