NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-695

MARIE E. COLEMAN & another1

vs.

CAMBRIDGE SAVINGS BANK.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs, Marie Coleman and Alda Soares, appeal from

a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Cambridge Savings 

Bank (CSB), on their employment discrimination claims brought 

pursuant to the antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 151B, and 

their promissory estoppel claims. The case arose from CSB's 

termination of the plaintiffs' employment after they violated 

CSB's bank vault security policy. We affirm the summary 

judgment.

Background. We briefly summarize the facts from the 

summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiffs, reserving certain facts for later discussion. See 

1 Alda V. Soares.
2

Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 

(2008). 

CSB hired Coleman as assistant vice-president, branch sales 

and service manager in 2013. She was an at-will employee, part 

of the management team, and "generally was responsible for the 

operations of [the Inman Square] branch" of CSB in Cambridge. 

Coleman is an African-American woman who was over the age of 

forty at all times relevant to the instant case.

CSB hired Soares in 1995, promoted her to retail operations 

manager in 1998, and promoted her again to assistant branch 

manager of its Inman Square branch (hereafter "Branch") in 1999. 

She was part of the management team at CSB and was always an atwill employee. Soares was over the age of forty at all times 

relevant to the instant case.

CSB had a security policy that set out requirements for 

bank vault access. The plaintiffs, "as part of their respective 

roles in Branch management," were responsible for ensuring 

compliance with the security policy, which included a "[d]ual 

[c]ontrol procedure" requiring two people to be present each 

time the bank vault was opened at CSB. Under the dual control 

procedure, CSB split the combination to the vault into an "A" 

combination and "B" combination, and CSB prohibited any single 

person from having access to the entire vault combination. 

Coleman, Soares, and the head teller, Nilsa Brita-Barbosa, held 
3

the A combination and the tellers at the Branch held the B 

combination to the vault. CSB also required the Branch to 

"maintain a log on which each person present when the vault was 

opened was to sign the log to attest that at least two people 

were present when the vault was opened." If the Branch needed 

to open the vault but individuals with the A or B combination 

were not present, staff "were required to call [CSB]'s 

Operations Department so that [it] could provide the missing 

portion of the vault combination and then reset the entire vault 

combination." Both plaintiffs knew of this requirement, and, in 

fact, had invoked the procedure and contacted CSB's Operations 

Department in January of 2016. 

On February 10, 2016, Coleman was present at the Branch 

when the vault was to be opened, but no person with the B 

combination was present. In an effort to open the Branch for 

business, Coleman contacted the employee with the B combination 

who was out sick that day and CSB's Operation's Department, but 

neither responded. Coleman then retrieved a copy of the B 

combination that she and Soares, who was not present at the 

Branch at the time, previously decided to store in Soares's 

office desk. The B combination was stored in Soares's desk for 

approximately one week. An employee with the B combination had 

placed the B combination inside of a sealed envelope that Soares 
4

never opened. Coleman and Soares knew that storing the B 

combination in that location and manner violated CSB policy. 

Aware that she was being filmed by the Branch's security 

system, Coleman used the stored B combination to open the vault 

in the presence of head teller Brita-Barbosa. All cash and 

negotiable instruments were secured in separate money vaults 

with different combinations that Coleman did not possess. Both 

Coleman and Brita-Barbosa signed the vault log to indicate their 

presence when the vault was opened, but Coleman did not contact 

the Operations Department to reset the vault's combination. CSB 

learned of the policy violation from Brita-Barbosa. 

On February 18, 2016, Carol Sexton and Christine Mauras of 

CSB's Operations Department met with Coleman to discuss the 

February 10 incident. Coleman was less than forthcoming and at 

one point provided a false explanation regarding some of the 

events at issue. Coleman later claimed that she had fallen down

the stairs at home the day before the meeting and felt dizzy 

during the meeting. 

On February 22, 2016, Mauras and David Walker, also of 

CSB's Operations Department, met with Soares to discuss the 

events of February 10. In that meeting, Soares admitted to 

storing the B combination to the vault in her desk and signing 

the vault log for the opening on February 10, even though she 

was not present for the vault opening that day. Soares knew 
5

that she was required to sign the vault log when the vault was 

opened, and not at some later time. 

On March 3, 2016, CSB terminated Coleman's employment for 

violating the security policy, in particular the dual control 

procedure. That same day, CSB also terminated Soares's 

employment for violating the security policy, in particular the 

dual control procedure, and for "falsifying the [v]ault [l]og." 

There was no evidence that any other CSB employee had violated 

the dual control procedure in any of CSB's branches. 

Coleman and Soares contend that CSB's decision to terminate 

their employment was an act of age discrimination. Coleman 

further claims that CSB's decision to terminate her employment 

was an act of race discrimination.2 

Discussion. Summary judgment is appropriate where "there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Mass. R. 

Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). In reviewing 

a grant of summary judgment, we assess the record de novo and 

2 In their brief, the plaintiffs assert that they "were subjected 

to a hostile work environment." We note that count five of the 

plaintiffs' complaint, in which Coleman alleged a "failure to 

supervise" that subjected her "to a hostile work environment," 

was previously dismissed upon CSB's motion to dismiss. In any 

event, as discussed infra, the evidence the plaintiffs cite in 

support of their age and race discrimination claims is 

speculative, conclusory, supported by citations to the record 

that do not stand for the propositions cited, and thus 

insufficient as a matter of law.
6

take the facts, together with all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 119 

(2010). "[T]he court does not 'pass upon the credibility of 

witnesses or the weight of the evidence [or] make [its] own 

decision of facts.'" Shawmut Worcester County Bank, N.A. v. 

Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 281 (1986), quoting Attorney Gen. v. 

Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 370, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).

1. Employment discrimination. An employee bringing a 

complaint under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, must demonstrate that: (1) 

the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee

was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) the employer 

bore discriminatory animus in taking that action; and (4) animus 

was the actual reason for that action (i.e., causation). See 

Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 680 (2016). As to 

both the race and age discrimination claims, there is no dispute 

that both plaintiffs are members of a protected class and were 

subject to an adverse employment action. Thus, this case turns 

on discriminatory animus. "Because . . . direct evidence [of 

the elements of discriminatory animus and causation] rarely 

exists, . . . an employee plaintiff [asserting discrimination] 

may also survive [a summary judgment motion] by . . . 

using . . . [a] three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm" 

(quotations and citations omitted). Id. at 680-681. At the 
7

first stage of this paradigm, plaintiffs bear the burden to 

demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by providing 

"evidence that: (1) [they are] a member of a class protected by 

G. L. c. 151B; (2) [they] performed [their] job at an acceptable 

level; [and] (3) [they were] terminated." Id. at 681, quoting 

Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 

437, 441 (1995). At the second stage, an employer "can rebut 

the presumption created by the prima facie case by articulating 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its [employment] 

decision." Blare, supra. At the third stage, "the burden of 

production shifts back to the plaintiff employee, requiring the 

employee to provide evidence that 'the employer's articulated 

justification [for the termination] is not true but a pretext.'"

Bulwer, supra at 681, quoting Blare, supra at 443.

The present case hinges on whether in the face of the 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action -- here, the violation of the dual control policy and 

Soares's falsification of the vault log -- the plaintiffs 

provided evidence that the employer's articulated justification 

"is not true but a pretext." Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 681. 

As to Coleman's race discrimination claim, she contends, 

inter alia, that the evidence of pretext included the following: 

during the course of her employment at CSB, there were "no 

individuals in upper management who were Black"; CSB's "lack of 
8

commitment to a diverse workforce and workplace culture made 

[her] very uncomfortable"; one of CSB's operations managers 

"would make racist comments concerning the dress of Black 

employees" but "would not make such comments concerning 

Caucasian employees"; "Coleman's termination, without warning, 

stands in stark contrast to the treatment of white male managers 

under similar circumstances"; and CSB replaced Coleman with a 

white male without considering any African-American candidates. 

As to the plaintiffs' age discrimination claims, Coleman and 

Soares contend, inter alia, that it was standard policy for CSB 

"to prefer younger employees for hiring and promotion to 

management positions"; that "older employees were encouraged to 

accept lower positions"; that CSB replaced them with younger 

employees; and that Soares was "subjected to ageist belittling." 

The plaintiffs' arguments suffer from a lack of evidentiary 

support. At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs claim that 

CSB refused to respond to discovery requests seeking to 

"identify each [CSB] employee aged [forty] or older that [CSB] 

discharged or laid off in the last ten years," the persons 

filling those positions, and "each African-American hired to a 

management position within the last ten (10) years." The 

plaintiffs make repeated refences to this alleged discovery 

violation and contend that it is "telling," and constitutes 

"unrefuted evidence" supporting their claims of age and race 
9

discrimination. We disagree. There are myriad reasons for a 

party to object to discovery requests. The Massachusetts Rules 

of Civil Procedure provide mechanisms, including motions to 

compel, to resolve discovery disputes. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 26, 

as amended, 474 Mass. 1401 (2016); Mass. R. Civ. P. 37, as 

amended, 423 Mass. 1406 (1996). Here, as plaintiffs 

acknowledged at oral argument, they did not file any motion to 

compel or otherwise avail themselves of any mechanism in the 

Superior Court to require production of such information. 

Having failed to do so, they cannot claim that the unprovided 

discovery constitutes "evidence." Indeed, they neither cite to 

any authority for this proposition nor are we aware of any.3 

Consequently, the record does not contain comparator or 

statistical evidence to support the plaintiffs' claims. 

Contrast Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, Mass., No. SJC-13352, 

slip op. at 21 (June 21, 2023) (statistical data indicated 

"layoffs had a disproportionate effect on employees over 

fifty").

3 The record before us does not reveal the propriety of CSB's 

objections or refusal to comply with all discovery requests and 

we do not speculate or opine as to the wisdom or fairness of 

CSB's actions. We merely note that to the extent that the 

plaintiffs believed that CSB withheld available relevant 

discovery, the plaintiffs had an obligation to act in the 

Superior Court to try to obtain such information and did not do 

so. 
10

Of course, statistical data is not available in all cases 

and, in any event, is not required to prove pretext in a 

discrimination claim. See Blare, 419 Mass. at 439 

(discriminatory intent "rarely is established by other than 

circumstantial evidence"). This brings us, however, to another 

shortcoming in the plaintiffs' claim: the lack of actual 

admissible evidence in the summary judgment record to support 

the plaintiffs' assertions. 

As evidence of pretext in their age discrimination claim, 

the plaintiffs contend that by 2015, CSB's standard policy was 

to prefer younger employees for hiring and promotion to 

management positions. As evidence of that claim, the plaintiffs 

cite to Soares's deposition transcript wherein she testified 

that "even the setup of [CSB] was" designed to "attract more 

younger people, the students from Harvard and MIT, things like 

that"; that "it feels like -- to me, it's like they were trying 

to put more of an age group that is more -- more that -- more 

comparable to what the new -- the people they're trying to 

serve"; that "it feels like [CSB did not] want . . . older 

people, like, to be a head of the department or a head of the 

branch." She further testified that "it was more like all these 

young crowds . . . they come at the lower pay than us, probably, 

I'm assuming. I -- that, I don't know for sure." Finally, she 

testified that she felt that her age was a factor. Far from 
11

demonstrating a standard policy, this testimony is speculative 

and does not rise the level of evidence of pretext. A 

plaintiff's feeling, suspicion, or unsupported statement does 

not constitute admissible evidence at summary judgment. See,

e.g., White v. University of Massachusetts at Boston, 410 Mass. 

553, 558 (1991); Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP, 71 Mass. App. 

Ct. 46, 56 (2008), quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 

Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Even in cases where elusive 

concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment 

may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon 

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 

speculation"). Contrast Adams, No. SJC-13352, slip op. at 20-23

(plaintiff established genuine issue of material fact whether 

employer had policy to remove older staff for younger hires 

where evidence showed that, inter alia, layoffs had a 

disproportionate effect on older employees and corporate 

executives repeatedly "expressed concern about the age of their 

workforce," "stressed the need to make room for . . . younger 

talent," and suggested strategies to change the "demographics

mix" through terminating older workers to hire younger college 

graduates). 

The plaintiffs also argue, citing the deposition of a 

former CSB employee, Nikolay Hristov, that CSB "made it a 

practice to hire white males under age [forty] to fill [CSB] 
12

management positions." Asked "[w]hat facts [he was] relying on 

to make that assertion," Hristov testified that Coleman and 

Soares were let go in favor of younger managers. He further 

testified that "there was a tendency [to] just promote white 

males, as far as I remember in [the] Newtonville branch, that's 

what I recall, it was younger guy got promoted, and I just don't 

remember the rest of it, but it was kind of obvious." In other 

words, as evidence of their claim that CSB's actions were 

pretextual, the plaintiffs cite to Hristov's testimony (1) 

repeating that the plaintiffs themselves were terminated in 

favor of younger managers, and (2) his uncertain recollection, 

unsupported by specific facts, of CSB's "tendency." Moreover, 

Hristov acknowledged that when he was under the age of forty, 

his manager at CSB had discouraged him from applying for 

promotions, yet, after he was over the age of forty, CSB 

promoted him.4 Asked again, in light of his promotion after he 

turned forty, to explain the basis for his claim that "it was 

the standard policy and procedure" of CSB to prefer white males 

under the age of forty, Hristov responded, "I mean, it looked 

that way." Here again, we note that mere statements of belief 

or bare allegations unsupported by actual evidence, are

4 Hristov further testified that he thought his promotion was not 

"about the age, it was about the experience," but when asked if 

he believed CSB makes promotion decisions based on candidates' 

experience, he responded that he did not "know what [CSB] does."
13

insufficient to defeat a moving party's motion for summary 

judgment. See White, 410 Mass. at 558; Brooks, 71 Mass. App. 

Ct. at 56. In any event, not only does Hristov's conclusory 

testimony fail to support the claim of CSB's alleged "standard 

policy"; it contradicts the claim as well. 

Another means of establishing that an employer's proffered 

reason for termination is a pretext for discrimination is to 

demonstrate that "similarly situated" employees "in terms of 

performance, qualifications and conduct" were treated 

differently. See Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 

Mass. 122, 129 (1997), quoting Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 

40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1994). Here, to support the claim that 

Coleman's termination was in "stark contrast to the treatment of 

white male managers under similar circumstances," the plaintiffs 

cite only to Coleman's deposition testimony stating that a white 

male manager "gave out money without a withdrawal slip" in 2014 

or 2015 and was promoted rather than terminated. Coleman's 

knowledge of this incident was based on hearsay statements told 

to her by others, and she could not recall any further details. 

This argument is thus unavailing. 

We note that the plaintiffs do not contend that BritaBarbosa was a similarly situated individual who was treated 
14

differently.5 That notwithstanding and viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, even assuming 

arguendo that the plaintiffs implicitly contend that BritaBarbosa is a similarly situated individual such that CSB's 

failure to discipline her demonstrates that the plaintiffs' 

termination was pretextual, the argument is unavailing. Putting 

aside that the record is silent as to Brita-Barbosa's age or 

race, her being "present" when Coleman opened the vault and 

signing the vault log to document her presence is not "of 

comparable seriousness" to the plaintiffs' conduct. Matthews, 

426 Mass. at 130. That Brita-Barbosa is the person who reported 

the incident to CSB further demonstrates that there are 

"differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would 

distinguish their situations" (quotation and citation omitted).6 

5 The plaintiffs state in their brief, without any further 

elaboration or legal argument, that "[a]lthough Ms. BritaBarbosa also signed the vault log and was present when the vault 

was opened she was not disciplined by [CSB]." Furthermore, not 

only did the plaintiffs not argue that Brita-Barbosa was a 

similarly situated individual for purposes of showing pretext; 

the plaintiffs disputed the inclusion of Brita-Barbosa's 

statements in the summary judgment record on the ground that 

they were inadmissible hearsay, and moved to strike them as 

well. 

6 While the plaintiffs disputed the inclusion of Brita-Barbosa's 

statements in Sexton's and Mauras's affidavits in the summary 

judgment record on the ground that they were inadmissible 

hearsay, they did not dispute the fact that Brita-Barbosa 

informed CSB of the incident.
15

Id. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' assertion that CSB did not 

discipline Brita-Barbosa is unsupported by the record.7 

As further evidence of alleged pretext to support her race 

discrimination claim, Coleman argued that one of CSB's 

operations mangers "would make racist comments concerning the 

dress of Black employees." Asked at her deposition to identify 

such comments, Coleman clarified that she was referencing one 

comment made by Sexton about the "undergarments" worn by a Black 

customer service employee who worked in the Harvard Square 

branch of CSB.8 

Coleman also contends that CSB replaced her with a white 

male without considering any African-American candidates, and 

that this action also constituted evidence of pretext. Even 

assuming an admissible basis exists for this conclusory claim, 

the record reflects that Coleman and Soares were terminated on 

the same day, and CSB hired an individual who "identifies as 

Black or African American" to replace Soares. 

Finally, asked to list each act of race discrimination, 

Coleman testified that there "was a lack of individuals who were 

7 As evidence that Brita-Barbosa was not disciplined by CSB, the 

plaintiffs cite only to Sexton's deposition testimony that she 

could not recall whether Brita-Barbosa was disciplined. 

8 Although Coleman's testimony is somewhat unclear, taken in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Sexton commented that 

the customer service employee's "skirt was so short you could 

see her panties." 
16

culturally diverse"; that another African-American woman was 

hired on the same day that Coleman was hired; and that there 

were no individuals in upper management who were Black. These 

allegations suffer from the same problem as the above-referenced 

claims. The plaintiffs raise broad allegations of age and race 

discrimination, but the cited record references underlying each 

assertion reveal conclusory, speculative, unsupported, and even 

contradictory evidence.9 Thus, even apart from the absence of 

comparator or statistical evidence, the plaintiffs offer 

insufficient anecdotal or other evidence to support their 

discrimination claims as a matter of law. "Against the 

preponderant information of the record, a finding of pretext 

would require a speculative leap well beyond the length of a 

reasonable inference." Chi Sang Poon v. Massachusetts Inst. of 

Tech., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 185, 199 (2009). 

2. Promissory estoppel. The plaintiffs also assert that a 

rational jury could find that the plaintiffs reasonably relied 

on CSB's promise to adhere to the progressive discipline policy 

in their employee handbook. We disagree. 

"An essential element under the promissory estoppel theory 

is that there be an unambiguous promise and that the party to 

9 We note that the excerpts from depositions included in the 

record are, as the motion judge highlighted below, "highly 

fragmented" and "appear to be purposefully missing pages that 

would have afforded more context." 
17

whom the promise was made reasonably relied on the 

representation." Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v.

Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 848 (1995), quoting Pappas Indus.

Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 599 (1987). 

Here, the progressive discipline policy states, inter alia, that 

"[p]rogressive discipline is a standard method of upgrading the 

performance and/or conduct of employees having difficulty 

meeting [CSB's] expectations"; that the policy is "not intended 

in any way to alter the employment at will relationship between 

[CSB] and its employees"; and that CSB "at all times retains the 

discretion to modify or eliminate any or all of the following 

procedures according to the circumstances of the disciplinary 

matter." Both plaintiffs testified during their depositions

that they understood that the policy did not alter their at-will 

employment relationship.10 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' 

promissory estoppel claim is insufficient as a matter of law 

where they can neither show that CSB made an unambiguous promise 

to adhere to the progressive discipline policy prior to 

10 Coleman understood that with respect to its progressive 

discipline policy, CSB was "not committing to following any 

particular steps." Similarly, when asked about the portion of 

the policy that states that "[t]he following progressive 

discipline procedures are not intended in any way to alter the 

employment-at-will relationship between [CSB] and its 

employees," Soares acknowledged that "you can still be terminate 

-- you know, that it's -- are not intended to -- that [the 

policy] is not like a contract." 
18

termination, nor that they reasonably relied on it. See 

Varadian, supra at 848-850.11

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Neyman & Smyth, JJ.12),

Clerk

Entered: August 17, 2023.

11 To the extent that we have not specifically addressed 

subsidiary arguments in the parties' briefs, they have been 

considered, and do not warrant further discussion. See 

Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.