[Cite as Brown v. Brown , 2021-Ohio-1932.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

JASON R. BROWN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 14-20-24

v. MEAGHAN J. BROWN, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 16DR0141 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: June 7, 2021

APPEARANCES: 

### Rocky Ratliff for Appellant 

### Natalie J. Bahan for AppelleeCase No. 14-20-24

-2- SHAW, J. {¶1} Father-appellant, Jason R. Brown (“Jason”), brings this appeal from the September 22, 2020, judgment of the Union County Common Pleas C ourt designating mother-appellee, Meaghan Brown 1 , residential parent for school placement purposes of the parties’ child, J.B. On appeal, Jaso n argues that it was not in J.B.’s best interest to modify a term of the shared pare nting plan (“SPP”) and designate Meaghan as residential parent of J.B. for school plac ement purposes. Further, Jason also appeals the award of $622.50 in attorney’s fees to Meaghan for an “eleventh hour” continuance requested by Jason’s attorney, w hich moved an impending supplemental hearing date. Background {¶2} The parties were married in Tennessee in June of 2014. They ha d one child together, J.B., born in February of 2015. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the parties’ marriage was terminated by a decree of divorce on February 7, 2017. At that time the parties also entered into an agreed SPP, which was approved and adopted by the trial court. {¶3} The SPP designated both parties as residential parent of J.B. Further, the SPP provided parenting time two days each week to Meaghan, two days each week to Jason, then alternating three-day weekends for each par ent. As J.B. was

1 Meaghan has remarried and her last name has changed; however, the case is still styled with her name as Brown.Case No. 14-20-24

-3- too young to be in school when the SPP was entered, the SPP pro vided that the parties should cooperate with regard to schooling when J.B. cam e of school age. {¶4} In addition, under the SPP, if one of the parties relocated, th at party was required to promptly notify the trial court. In the event that a party did relocate, the trial court could schedule a hearing on its own motion or at th e request of the nonrelocating party to determine whether it was in J.B.’s best int erest for the SPP to be

revised. {¶5} At the time of the divorce, Jason and Meaghan were living approximately fifteen minutes apart, with Meaghan residing in M arysville, Ohio, and Jason residing with his parents in Raymond, Ohio. Jason’s parents owned a large home and he used the lower level as his residence. Prior to the relationship ending, Meaghan resided with Jason and his parents as well. {¶6} In February of 2018, Meaghan filed a notice of intent to reloca te from Raymond, Ohio, to West Chester, Ohio, in the Cincinnati area. Meaghan was in a relationship with a man who lived in the area. After she initi ally moved, Meaghan was commuting to a nursing job in Marion, so the parenting sche dule still worked. Eventually, Meaghan finished her nursing degree and got a job i n the West Chester area. At that point, exchanges with J.B. were conducted at a h alfway point between the parties, in Springfield, Ohio.Case No. 14-20-24

-4- {¶7} On December 5, 2018, Meaghan filed a motion to modify the SPP, stating that a modification of the SPP was in J.B.’s best inter est. Meaghan stated that she had moved from Marysville to West Chester for employme nt-related reasons. The motion stated that since Meaghan had moved the pa rties had continued executing the SPP; however, Meaghan believed it was in J.B.’s b est interest to be enrolled in pre-school. The motion stated that given the dista nce between the residences, pre-school enrollment would necessitate a revision to the terms of the SPP. Meaghan desired to be designated residential parent for s chool placement purposes; however, she noted that she did not want to limit Jas on’s parenting time more than necessary, and that she would consider increases in J ason’s parenting time during periods when J.B. was not in school. {¶8} On January 8, 2019, Jason filed his own motion for modification and/or termination of the SPP. After both parties had filed their mot ions, a GAL was appointed for J.B. {¶9} A hearing was held before a magistrate on the parties’ motions on July 9, 2019. During the hearing, the parties narrowed the issue be fore the court. Despite both parties having filed motions to modify the SPP, the partie s clarified that they wished the SPP to remain in place. The parties indicated that they simply wanted the trial court to determine who should be residential parent f or school placement

purposes only . The GAL had recommended a change in the parenting time sched uleCase No. 14-20-24

-5- that would coincide with J.B. attending school, and both partie s seemed to be fine with the schedule; however, both parties wished the schooling t o be done in their area. Given that the parents lived nearly two hours apart, a d ecision would have to

be made as to where J.B. would attend school. {¶10} The GAL testified at the hearing and reiterated her position fr om her written report, stating that she felt Jason was the better opti on as residential parent for school placement purposes due to consistency of living in t he Raymond area. She also felt that Jason had a good family support system aroun d him. {¶11} Meaghan then testified at the hearing that J.B. was adjusted to her residence in West Chester just as she was to the home in Raymon d. Further, Meaghan testified that she had remarried and that she had a goo d family support system in her area through her in-laws, which she felt the GAL did not take into account in her written report. In addition, Meaghan testified that she was going to be undertaking “PRN” status at work, which meant she only had t o work two days out of every six weeks to keep her license active. She indicat ed that she could schedule those days when Jason had parenting time, and effectiv ely be a stay-athome parent for J.B. {¶12} Meaghan also detailed some issues that she had with Jason over the years, such as Jason excessively taking J.B. to the doctor. Sh e testified that Jason did not tell her about many of the visits as they happened, and that she only learnedCase No. 14-20-24

-6- of them when she received an “explanation of benefits” from ins urance. In fact, she testified that at one point J.B. had a catheter for a urinary t ract infection and Meaghan was not informed. {¶13} In addition, Meaghan testified that Jason did not offer her the right of first refusal for parenting time pursuant to the SPP even thoug h he should have based on the wording of the SPP. Nevertheless, Meaghan testified she thought Jason was a good father and she did not want to limit his parenting time unnecessarily, she just

wanted J.B. to be in school. {¶14} The hearing was continued to a second day: August 16, 2019. O n the second day of the hearing Jason provided testimony that he had lived in the home with his parents in Raymond since around 2000. He indicated hi s parents were available to care for J.B. if necessary and that his sister onl y lived ten minutes away. Further, he testified that he went to North Union schools and h e wanted J.B. to go there. In addition, Jason testified he had gotten a new job wi th work hours of 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. However, he testified that he could work fro m home at times, which would allow him to be there for J.B. if she had any issue s. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties submitted written closing arguments

. {¶15} On December 27, 2019, the magistrate issued a lengthy written

recommended decision on the matter that contained numerous enum erated factual findings leading to the magistrate’s conclusions of law. Ultim ately the magistrateCase No. 14-20-24

-7- disagreed with the GAL’s recommendation that Jason was the bett er option to be residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes becaus e Meaghan could modify her schedule as a nurse to only work when J.B. was with Jason, thus allowing her to care for J.B. at all hours. The magistrate also felt th at Meaghan had a strong support system around her. The magistrate felt that the GAL re stricted a support system to only blood relatives, which did not reflect the reali ty of many families. Therefore Meaghan was recommended to be residential parent of J .B. for school placement purposes. {¶16} On January 10, 2020, Jason filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. In his objections, Jason gave responses to each of t he magistrate’s enumerated factual findings. He did not contest many of the ma gistrate’s broader factual findings; however, he did argue that the evidence dispu ted Meaghan’s claim that her work schedule could be such that she was effectively a stay-at-home mother. Further, and more importantly, Jason disagreed with the magistr ate’s recommendation that Meaghan should be named residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. {¶17} On January 22, 2020, Meaghan filed a response to Jason’s object ions to the magistrate’s decision. In the response Meaghan brought to light two new issues: that her employment status had officially been altered so she was on “PRN” status, and that the home Jason had lived in with his parents i n Raymond had burnedCase No. 14-20-24

-8- down. The home, which Jason argued J.B. was adjusted to, was a “total loss” and resulted in Jason and his parents moving to Huntsville. 2 {¶18} After reviewing the objections to the magistrate’s decision and the response to the objections, the trial court filed an order stat ing that the new issues raised in Meaghan’s response necessitated a further, supplement al hearing as the issues raised were germane to the trial court’s ruling on the o bjections. Thus the trial court set the matter for a hearing on those limited issue s to supplement the prior hearing. However, due to, inter alia , covid-related restrictions, the supplemental hearing was delayed for several months. {¶19} The hearing on the supplemental issues was scheduled to convene June 29, 2020. However, on June 26, 2020, Jason filed a motion to continue, stating that J.B. had disclosed she had been inappropriately touched by Meaghan’s husband. Because of this, Jason requested a continuance of the supplemental hearing. He also requested that the GAL be reappointed and tha t time be provided to allow the GAL to investigate the matter. 3 {¶20} According to the record, the magistrate orally granted the moti on to continue the hearing immediately; however, a magistrate’s order was not filed until July 27, 2020. In that order, the magistrate stated that Jason ’s motion had been granted, and that the GAL should supply a supplemental report s even days before

2 On January 29, 2020, Jason filed a notice of intent to relocat e to Huntsville, Ohio. 3 Notably, the motion’s certificate of service was addressed to the wrong attorney.Case No. 14-20-24

-9- the final hearing. However, the magistrate stated that due to the eleventh hour of Jason’s request, Jason would be required to pay Meaghan’s attor ney’s fees for preparation for the hearing as a result of having to continue t he hearing. The magistrate stated that Meaghan’s attorney had ten days to file a request for fees incurred in preparing specifically for the June 29, 2020 hearin g that did not occur. Finally, the magistrate reiterated that the supplemental hearin g in this matter would be limited to only the two issues set forth in the trial court’ s January 27, 2020 order. 4 {¶21} On August 6, 2020, Meaghan’s attorney filed a request for attor ney’s fees consistent with the magistrate’s order. A motion attached stated that Jason’s continuance request was calculated to delay review of the magis trate’s decision and to prevent the trial court from adopting the magistrate’s decis ion. Further, Meaghan’s attorney argued that the allegations against Meaghan’ s husband had been investigated by multiple sources and were found to be unsu bstantiated. Meaghan stated that her husband had taken and passed a polygrap h examination, and that a law enforcement investigation was closed on the matt er. As to the attorney’s fees, Meaghan’s attorney attached an invoice for the hours billed with regard to the June 29, 2020 hearing. The invoice established t hat 4.5 hours had been worked for a total bill of $810. An additional .5 hours was wo rked with no bill.

4 Jason filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on July 27 , 2020, setting terms for the continuance. The trial court overruled the objections the next day, finding that they were filed late outside of the rule, and that the filing was not appropriate in any event.Case No. 14-20-24

-10- Meaghan’s attorney filed an affidavit stating that the bill was true and accurate to the best of her knowledge. {¶22} On August 12, 2020, the magistrate filed an order awarding Meaghan’s attorney $622.50 in attorney’s fees. The magistrate stated the fees were being awarded “based upon Father’s unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse regarding the parties’ minor daughter.” (Doc. No. 102). The m agistrate reduced the amount requested for attorney’s fees by one billed hour bec ause that hour was unrelated to preparing for the June 29, 2020 hearing, which is the only issue the magistrate felt Meaghan should be compensated for. {¶23} On August 17, 2020, the GAL filed a written supplemental report indicating that Meaghan’s husband had in fact taken, and passed , a private and a regular polygraph examination. The GAL’s report also noted tha t in the alleged disclosures made by J.B., she referred to her stepfather as “mo nkey boy,” which was a name that Jason—and perhaps only Jason—used for the stepfathe r. The GAL recommended that the court’s prior orders remain in place, but she added that stepfather should remain away from J.B. until all investigation s were completed. {¶24} On August 24, 2020, Jason filed a motion to “set aside” the magistrate’s order granting Meaghan’s counsel’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $622.50. He argued, inter alia , that no evidentiary hearing had been held withCase No. 14-20-24

-11- regard to J.B.’s disclosures, thus the magistrate’s determinati on that the allegations were “unsubstantiated” was improper at that time. {¶25} The trial court reviewed Jason’s motion to set aside the magist rate’s order with regard to the attorney’s fees and found that the “un substantiated” finding related to the allegations against the stepfather was supported by the record and that the attorney’s fees were appropriate and equitable for the limi ted purpose they were given in this matter. {¶26} The supplemental hearing that the trial court had ordered in Ja nuary of 2020 was finally held August 21, 2020, before the magistrate. Following the hearing, the magistrate filed a supplemental decision, stating that the evidence established that Jason had been living with his parents, that t he home had burned down, and that Jason was currently residing in a different scho ol district than the one he wanted to send J.B. to initially. However, Jason had op en-enrolled J.B. in North Union and wanted her to attend that school. Further, the magistrate determined that the evidence showed that J.B. had been going to “Lakota” schools in the area where Meaghan lived. In addition, the evidence sho wed that Meaghan’s employment schedule had been altered so that she could be home with J.B. No objections were filed to the supplemental decision.Case No. 14-20-24

-12- {¶27} On August 24, 2020, Jason filed a new request to modify custody and for an evidentiary hearing, stating that J.B. was unsafe in Mea ghan’s home due to the allegations made against Meaghan’s husband. {¶28} On September 22, 2020, following the supplemental hearing, with all the evidence now before it, the trial court filed an entry deny ing Jason’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. {¶29} Also on September 22, 2020, the trial court filed a lengthy wri tten final judgment entry and order on the matter. The trial court indepe ndently reviewed the matter and ultimately concurred with the magistrate, finding th at it was in J.B.’s best interest that Meaghan be designated residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. It is from this judgment that Jason appeals, asserti ng the following assignments of error for our review. Assignment of Error No. 1 The trial court erred when it denied the Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion for Custody and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. Assignment of Error No. 2 The trial court erred when it failed to award custody of the mi nor child to the Plaintiff/Appellant. Assignment of Error No. 3 The trial court erred when it awarded defendant attorney fees. First Assignment of Error {¶30} In his first assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial c ourt erred in this matter by “denying” his August 24, 2020 motion for cust ody and his requestCase No. 14-20-24

-13- for a related evidentiary hearing. In the alternative, he argu es that there is no final appealable order here because his newly filed motion for custod y remains outstanding. {¶31} Importantly, the trial court specifically addressed Jason’s new ly filed motion for custody i n a f ootnote o n page 8 of its final judgmen t entry. “The Court notes that subsequent to the trial, while awaiting the objectio n period to pass, Father filed separate Motion for Custody and Request for Evidentiary H earing. That matter will be set in due course as it raises issues not litigated in the present action.” (Doc. No. 119). {¶32} Jason argues that the trial court’s order leaves an issue open for litigation, rendering this action incomplete. However, Jason’s new custody claim is independent of the current litigation related to which parent w ould assume the role of residential parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. I nstead, his new motion represents a claim for modification of custody as a whole. See Denkewalter v.

Denkewalter , 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0082-M, 2015-Ohio-3171, ¶ 9 (“A pare nt can always invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the domestic r elations court to consider reallocation of parental rights.”). {¶33} Importantly, the matter before us, namely who should be residen tial parent for school placement purposes, has concluded. The separ ate and newly filed custody matter will be litigated in the future, if appropriate and necessary, and it canCase No. 14-20-24

-14- be appealed at the conclusion of that litigation. The new, sep arate issue does not render the current judgement incomplete, or make it a non-final order. Barton v.

Barton , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2016-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-980, ¶ 52, Carpenter v. Carpenter , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-05-083, 2013-Ohio-4980, ¶ 8. (“ ‘Final orders are those that dispose of the whole case or some separate and distinct subdivision of it while leaving noth ing for future determination.’ ”). For these reasons, we find that Jason’s ne w motion has not been denied and it is still pending for future, separate action. Th erefore, Jason’s first assignment of error is overruled. Second Assignment of Error {¶34} In his second assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court erred when it selected Meaghan as residential parent of J.B. for scho ol placement

purposes. Standard of Review {¶35} This Court reviews a decision regarding parental rights for an abuse

of discretion. King v. King , 3d Dist. Union No. 14-11-23, 2012-Ohio-1586, ¶ 9, citing Ralston v. Ralston, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9–08–30, 2009–Ohio–679, ¶ 13, citing Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 1997–Ohio–260. An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “TheCase No. 14-20-24

-15- reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, s omething that does

not translate well on the written p age.” Davis at 418. The Supreme Court of Ohio

has stated that this standard “is even more crucial in a child custody case.” Id. at

419. Relevant Authority {¶36} When making a determination rega rding parental rights, the dome stic relations court must follow statutory guidelines. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). “Revised Code 3109.04 governs court awards of paren tal rights and responsibilities, as well as the modification of shared parenti ng agreements.” Ralston at ¶ 16. This Court has previously determined that R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) applies when the domestic relations court modi fies the designation of a residential parent for school purposes, but ot herwise maintains both parents as residential parents with the same parental rights an d responsibilities. Id. at ¶ 17. Revised Code 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides: The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court determines that the modifications are in the best interest of t he children or upon the request of one or both of the parents unde r the decree. Modifications under this division may be made at an y time. The court shall not make any modification to the plan und er this division, unless the modification is in the best interest of the children.Case No. 14-20-24

-16- {¶37} When determining the child’s best interest, the court should co nsider the factors in R.C. 3901.04(F)(1), which include: (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concern s as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities conce rning the child, the wishes, and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court; (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest; (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate courtapproved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights; (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that paren t is an obligor; (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilt y to any criminal offense involving an act that resulted in a chi ld being an abused or a neglected child * * *; (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully den ied the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance with a n order of the court;Case No. 14-20-24

-17- (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state. Analysis {¶38} At the outset, we note that this is not a case where the parent s regularly disparage each other. Both parents get along well enough to co ntinue to engage in a SPP and both parents want the SPP to continue. However, due to the distance between the parents, a decision had to be made as to where J.B. would attend school. Both parents wanted J.B. to attend school in their respective a rea, thus the trial court had to make a difficult decision between two capable and loving parents. {¶39} In order to make its determination, the trial court analyzed th e statutory best interest factors in R.C. 3901.04(F)(1). Under i ts analysis, the trial court determined that both parents sought to be named residenti al parent for school placement purposes (factor (a)). The trial court noted that J. B. was not interviewed

in camera (factor b); however, the GAL initially expressed that Jason wo uld be the better option for residential parent for school placement purpo ses. The trial court conducted the following analysis in disagreeing with the GAL.

The GAL has recommended that Father be named school residential parent with Mother being given liberal parenting ti me. The GAL’s recommendation is based primarily upon two considerations (1) consistency; and (2) family support. The GA L found that consistency is important in this child’s life. In t he GAL’s analysis, [J.B.] has lived in Father’s house all her life . The GAL finds this consistency to be a determining factor. Mother astutely points out that since the child was three, she has liv ed inCase No. 14-20-24

-18- both Father’s home and Mother’s home an equal amount of time. Accordingly, consistency as it relates to residence, would be equivalent regardless which parent is named school residential parent. The GAL finds that Father has a better support system in the event of emergencies. He lives [or lived] in the lower lev el of his parent’s home. Consequently, paternal grandparents are always there to watch [J.B.]. His sister also lives nearby. I n the GAL’s analysis, Mother’s support system is comprised of individuals who may be significant in Mother’s life, but are no t blood relatives. Apparently, this factor weighs heavily in the GAL’s analysis. The Court agrees that a support system is significant when parenting children. The Court is not as focused as the GAL on whether that support system is comprised of blood relatives. Excellent support systems comprised of caring, competent and loving adults are as effective as those comprised of blood rela tives. Quite often parents rely on neighbors, friends, work mates or church members to comprise effective support systems. Mother’s support system is comprised of her Husband, who is home most of each day. Mother’s support system also includes her Husband’s parents and nearby family. The Court finds that both parents have acceptable support systems each can rely upon in the event of exigent circumstances. (Doc. No. 119). {¶40} With regard to factor (c), the trial court noted that J.B. had a good relationship with both parents and extended families, and with regard to factor (d) the trial court’s analysis indicated J.B. was adjusted to both homes. Further, both parents were determined to be in good physical and mental healt h 5 (factor (e)).

5 Jason disputes this due to issues Meaghan has had in the past with, inter alia , anorexia but there are no indications of any current issues.Case No. 14-20-24

-19- {¶41} With regard to factor (f), and the parent more likely to honor and facilitate parenting time, the trial court noted some issues wi th Jason failing to offer Meaghan the right of first refusal for parenting time. The tri al court found that this

failure on Jason’s behalf illustrated some continuous denial of Meaghan’s rights (factor i). The trial court found that factors (g), (h), and ( j) were not relevant here. {¶42} After reviewing the evidence and the appropriate legal factors, the trial

court found that The determining factor in the Court’s analysis is that Mother stands ready to modify her work schedule so she can essentially become a stay at home mom. With Mother as school residential parent, she will be home to care for her daughter at all hours. Mother will be home in the event the child becomes ill at schoo l, or cannot go to school due to illness. She will be there to ta ke her to school and pick her up. She will be available to monitor he r daughter’s progress both educationally and socially. Although Father testified that he has more flexibility in his new job, t he Court finds Father’[s] testimony less credible regarding his availability. Father’s testimony was that he spends 4-6 hours per day out of the house at work. Father’s testimony appears contrived in order to justify not offering his ex-Wife first re fusal. If Father were designated school residential parent, there is a substantial likelihood that parenting of this child would be delegated to paternal Grandparents. In this instance, everyone agrees that both Mother and Father are good, loving and suitabl e parents. The Court finds that despite being loving Grandparent s, there is no need to delegate parental responsibility when a perfectly suitable parent is available 24/7 to raise her daught er. The Court finds that it is in [J.B.]’s best interest that Mothe r be designated school residential parent. Despite designating Moth er school residential parent, the Court finds Father is deserving of a prominent place in his daughter’s life. He will have substanti alCase No. 14-20-24

-20- parenting time so as to maintain the strong Father/Daughter bond. (Doc. No. 119). {¶43} Jason now argues that the trial court’s determination was an ab use of

discretion because he was “not the reason” that this matter was before the court, blaming Meaghan’s move. Further, he argues that the trial cour t failed to consider the living arrangements of J.B., the bond J.B. had with her gra ndparents, and the “constant” work changes of Meaghan. {¶44} However, in our review of the trial court’s lengthy entry, we f ind that the trial court carefully weighed the factors at issue and came to a difficult decision between two good parents. There was never going to be a “winne r” in this scenario, just the parent designated to be the residential parent for sch ool placement purposes. {¶45} Moreover, by all indications the trial court did consider J.B.’ s living situation and her bonds. In fact there was a supplemental hear ing that established that the home Jason is claiming J.B. was so attached to has sin ce burned down. Further, the supplemental hearing showed that Meaghan had gone to PRN status as she stated she would. Importantly, the trial court was persuad ed by the fact that Meaghan would be available at all times to J.B. and the trial c ourt specifically found Jason’s claims regarding his availability specious. {¶46} A trial court’s determination regarding custody must be given t he “utmost respect.” Miller v. Miller , 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). Given the trialCase No. 14-20-24

-21- court’s clear analysis of the issues and factors presented in t his case, we cannot find that there was an abuse of discretion by naming Meaghan residen tial parent of J.B. for school placement purposes. Evidence was presented that sup ports the trial court’s difficult decision in this matter. Therefore, Jason’s second assignment of

error is overruled. Third Assignment of Error {¶47} In Jason’s third assignment of error he argues that the trial c ourt erred by awarding Meaghan attorney’s fees related to the “eleventh ho ur” continuance of the supplemental hearing. More specifically, he argues that th is case did not contain an allegation of frivolous conduct or a finding of frivolous co nduct.

Standard of Review {¶48} A determination as to whether to award attorney fees in a domes tic

relations case is left to the sound discretion of the trial cou rt and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Graham v. Graham , 3d Dist. Union No. 14-19-18, 2020-Ohio-1435, ¶ 20, Cichanowicz v. Cichanowicz , 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-13-05, 2013-Ohio-5657, ¶ 92. Analysis {¶49} A total of $622.50 was awarded to Meaghan in attorney’s fees in this case pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B), which reads as follows. In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an action for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment ofCase No. 14-20-24

-22- marriage or an appeal of that motion or proceeding, the court may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigat ion expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable . In determining whether an award is equitable, the court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the parties, and a ny other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not consider the parties’ assets. According to R.C. 3105.73(C), “The court may make an award of a ttorney’s fees and litigation expenses under this section in addition to making an award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under any other provision of the Revised Code or of the Rules of Civil Procedure .” (Emphasis added.) {¶50} Based on the plain statutory language, attorney’s fees can be a warded under R.C. 3105.73 separate from, or in addition to, other stat utory subsections and the civil rules. Thus on appeal where Jason claims that the tr ial court needed to find frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 before awarding attorney’s fees, he is mistaken. That statute provides an additional, separate method for awarding attorney’s fees. Therefore this argument is not well-taken. {¶51} As to the attorney’s fees that were awarded in this case under R.C. 3105.73, Meaghan’s attorney filed a request for fees at the dir ection of the magistrate. The fees were specifically limited to preparation for the June 29, 2020, supplemental hearing that had to be continued due to Jason’s la te motion. As part of her motion, Meaghan’s attorney submitted an itemized invoice for $810. The magistrate reviewed the invoice and found that one hour was spe nt on issuesCase No. 14-20-24

-23- unrelated to preparation for the June 29, 2020 supplemental hea ring, thus the bill was reduced by that hour of billing to the amount of $622.50. {¶52} Jason objected to the magistrate’s award of attorney’s fees and the trial court reviewed the matter under R.C. 3105.73(B). The trial cou rt found that the award was equitable, conducting the following analysis. The backdrop upon which this action proceeds must be considered. The contentious nature of the proceedings, includi ng testimony regarding Paternal Grandparent interference, the fact that the trial date had been set months in advance with participation by counsel, coupled with an unsubstantiated eleventh hour allegation of sexual abuse, all weighed in favor of granting the award. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Chief Magistrate found it inequitable for Mother to p ay twice for trial preparation. Considering the equities involved , the Court finds it equitable for Father to pay the attorney fees as Ordered. Father’s motion to set aside the Magistrate’s Order i s without merit. (Doc. No. 117). {¶53} On appeal, Jason seems to largely take issue with the trial cou rt’s determination that the allegations against the stepfather were unsubstantiated when a hearing on the matter had not been held. He claims that when the continuance was requested, this information was unknown. However, after review ing the matter, the trial court found that the claims had been investigated and wer e found to be unsubstantiated. Further, the trial court found that the late hour of the allegation and the ongoing legal animosity necessitated an award here. In add ition, the supplemental hearing had been set for a long time and it was co vering limited issues,Case No. 14-20-24

-24- begging the question of why a continuance was necessary for tho se limited purposes

based on an unrelated issue. {¶54} To the extent that Jason argues that Meaghan did not present te stimony that her fees were “reasonable” in this case, Ohio Appellate Co urts awarding attorney’s fees under R.C. 3105.73 have generally held that “ ‘ [a] trial court may also use its own knowledge and experience when evaluating the n ature of the services rendered and the reasonableness of the fees charged.’ ” Miller v. Miller , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-16-27, 2017-Ohio-7646, ¶ 33, quoting Falk v. Falk , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-843, 2009-Ohio-4973, ¶ 39 (analyzing attorney ’s fees under R.C. 3105.73(A) rather than (B)). “Further, of these cases, th ose in which an award of attorney’s fees was found to be inappropriate involved situa tions where no supporting documentation—such as an invoice, a billing statemen t, or records of hourly rates—was submitted for the trial court to evaluate.” Id . citing, inter alia , Miller at ¶ 34. Here an invoice was submitted and evaluated by the t rial court.

{¶55} Given the broad discretion trial courts are vested with to awar d attorney’s fees, particularly in domestic relations cases, we c annot find that there was an abuse of discretion in this case. Attorney’s fees were awarded under a very specific statute for a very limited purpose

. See Graham , supra , at ¶ 21. For all of these reasons, Jason’s third assignment of error is overruled.Case No. 14-20-24

-25- Conclusion {¶56} For the foregoing reasons Jason’s assignments of error are over ruled and the judgment of the Union County Common Pleas Court is affi rmed. Judgment Affirmed WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur. /jlr