Filed 5 / 30 / 24 Casa Blanca Beach Estates etc. v. County of Santa Barba ra CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

CASA BLANCA BEACH ESTATES OWNERS ’ ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, et al

,

Defendants and Respondents. 2d Civ. No. B314102 (Super. Ct. No. 18CV04772 ) ( Santa Barbara County)

In the midst of administrative proceedings, Casa Blanca
Beach Estates Owners ’ Association (Casa Blanca) sought declaratory relief against the County of Santa Barbara (County) and the California Coastal Commission (Commission) regarding the timing of its obligation to construct a beach access walkway pursuant to an offer to dedicate recorded in 1990. The trial court2

correctly found Casa Blanca failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and entered judgment in favor of respondents. We will
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
More than 30 years ago, the County of Santa Barb ara Planning Commission approved the development of a 12

- lot
oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria

. Casa Blanca is the non

profit homeowner ’ s association formed to manage the development

. It has owned the common area within the development since the 1990 s. The development ’ s approval was subject to multiple conditions. Condition 20 required Casa Blanca ’ s predecessor

- in

interest to “ provide an irrevocable offer to dedicate a lateral
access easement five feet in width . . .” for public beach access
and to construct a concrete walkway along the entire easement length within 180 days after acceptance of the offer to dedicate. Casa Blana’s predecessor recorded a n Irrevocable Offer to
Dedicate Easement ( o ffer to d edicate) includ ing terms requiring the applicant to construct a concrete walkway within “[180] days after the last to occur of the following: [ ¶ ] (i) recordation of said Notice of Acceptance, or [ ¶ ] (ii) issuance of any required land use permit or other governmental app roval needed to permit construction of the accessway, including approval by the State Lands Commission, if required. ” The County accepted the offer to dedicate in 2011

. I n 2017
, the County and Commission sent Casa Blanca a n otice of

v iolation alleging t he deadline to construct the walkway had3

passed

. 1 In response, Casa Blanca submitted walkway construction plans to the County, but was told it must obtain a coastal development permit from the Commission. It applied to the Commission for the permit, but the Commission deemed the application incomplete

. Over the next few years, Casa Blanca
and t he Commission unsuccessfully worked together to complete the permit application. In September 2018, Casa Blanca filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the County and Commission and petition ed for writ of mandate against the County , alleging it h ad exhausted all administrative remedies and had no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. In May 2019, as litigation proceeded, Casa Blanca appealed
the Commission staff

’ s determination that its application was incomplete but then withdrew the appeal at the Commission ’ s request, stating it would examine the feasibility of two alternative construction options. It subsequently determined further study of the alternatives was not worthwhile and declined to submit the requested analysis to the Commission

. In November 2019, the court heard cross motions for summary judgment and/or adjudication from the County and Casa Blanca. The Commission opposed Casa Blanca’s motion but did not move for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County’s motion on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca’s. As to the first and third causes of action, the court found the o ffer

1 The County authorized the Commission to assume primary responsibility for resolving Casa Blanca’s alleged violation. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30810, subd. (a)(1).)4

to d edicate had been timely accepted by the County. 2 As to the second cause of action seeking a determination regarding “the deadline for Casa Blanca to meet any obligation

. . . to construct a walkway within the land described in

. . . the Offer to Dedicate” i t found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
One month later

, t he Commission

, acting alone

, issued a

“ Notice of Intent to Record Notices of Violation of the Coastal Act
and Notice of Intent to Commence Cease and Desist Order and Administrative Civil Penalty Action Proceedings ” ( n otice of
i nten t ). Ten months after that

, Casa Blanca filed a Statement of Defense and Objections to Recordation of Notices of Violation

. After the State Lands Commission issued a preliminary determination showing portions of the promised walkway
encroached on tidal lands , t he C ommission rescinded the portion
of its n otice of i ntent regarding its intent to record the n otice of

v iolation

. In December 2019, the court stayed litigation to provide Casa Blanca an opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies. The stay was lifted in November 2020. In February 2021, Casa Blanca filed a s econd a mended

c omplaint adding allegations against the Commission. The
Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer
without leave to am end and entered judgment in favor of the County and Commission. 3

2 Casa Blanca has not appealed the trial court’s rulings on the first and third causes of action.

3 We deny Casa Blanca’s request for judicial notice of a summons and complaint entitled State Lands Commission v.5 DISCUSSION
Casa Blanca contends its claim is ripe because it has
exhausted all available administrative remedies or is excused from doing so. It seeks remand directing the trial court to
de termine whether it is currently obligated to construct the walkway. 4 Standard of Review
An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo.

“ Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘ where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. ’ [Citation.]” ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal. 5th 607, 618 .) We

Casa Blanca Beach Owners Assoc., et al , case no. 23CV03115, filed with the Superior Court of the County of Santa Barbara on July 20 , 2023. It seeks notice under Evidence Code sections 459 and 452, subdivision (d), which covers “Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” (See Evid. Code § 459, subd. (a ), italics added [“The reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452”].) Casa Blanca asserts the summons and complaint are relevant to this appeal because the State Lands Commission will be unable to finalize its boundary line determination until the boundary issue is resolved through settlement or judgment. We deferred ruling on this request pending consideration of the merits of the appeal. We now conclude the summons and complaint are not relevant to our analysis and accordingly, decline to take judicial notice. The motion is denied.

4 Casa Blanca maintains the offer to dedicate contains conditions precedent that must be satisfied before it is obligated to construct the walkway.6

review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo

. 5 ( Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 ( Blank ) .) Administrative Proceedings Have Not Been Exhausted
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies when there is an administrative remedy to questionable government action. It assures certain prerequisites are met before legal action is taken. ( Redevelopment Agency v. Superior
Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1492

- 93.) Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must first be sought from the administrative body. ( Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 2 92.) This is a fundamental rule of procedure “followed under the doctrine of stare decisis , and binding upon all courts.” ( Id . at p. 293.) A court’s intervention before an administrative agency has resolved the claim constitutes jurisdictional interfere nce. ( Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 372, 383.) Courts “have no discretion to relax the exhaustion doctrine.” ( Park Area Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax (1994) 29 Cal.App. 4th 1442, 1449.) Casa Blanca has the burden of proof to s how it has exhausted its
administrative remedies. ( North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin

5 A demurrer sustained without leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Blank , supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) I t is appellant’s responsibility to support claims with colorabl e arguments and citations to legal authority. If an argument is not made on a particular point, we may treat it as forfeited. ( Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) Casa Blanca did not assert an error by the trial court in denying leave to amend. As such, we will discuss the court ’s granting County’s motion for summary judgment and sustaining Commission’s demurrer but decline to analyze the court’s denial of leave to amend.7

Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th

614 , 624.)
A concept distinct from but similar to the exhaustion requirement is that there be a “ripe controversy.” Ripeness looks at whether a controversy is “’definite and concrete.’” The ripeness doctrine prevents courts “‘from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative po licies,’” and protects administrative agencies from “ judicial interference until
an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties

. ” ( Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 171.) Here, the questions of whether Casa Blanca has presented a ripe controversy and whether it has exhausted its administrative remedies overlap.
An administrative decision is final , i.e., ripe, “when the agency has exhausted its jurisdiction and possesses ‘no further power to reconsider or rehear the claim.’” ( Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 169.) “Until a public agency makes a final decision, th e matter is not ripe for judicial review.” ( California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal .A pp.4th 1464, 1485, italics
added. See also, Santa Barbara County Flower & Nursery Growers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (2004) 12 1 Cal.App.4th 864, 875 [ “ In the context of administrative proceedings, a controversy is not ripe for adjudication until the administrative process is completed and the agency makes a final decision that results in a direct and immediate impact on the parties. ” ].) Casa Blanca’s action is not ripe because it has failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies.8 Casa Blanca contends the controversy is ripe because
Commission staff threat en s “millions of dollars in fines and penalties for an alleged delay in construction of a walkway.” But
threats are not formalized or final decisions. Neither t he
Commission nor the County has made a final decision whether to impose any fines or penalties or even whether they agree with Casa Blanca that the obligation to con struct the walkway is subject to conditions precedent. Citing Sackett v. EPA (2012) 566 U.S. 120, Casa Blanca

argues the Commission’s notice of violation

, notice of intent

, and refusal to commence administrative hearings are the equivalent of an agency fin al action proper for judicial review. But Sackett is distinguishable because the challenged agency compliance order

was a final decision, subject to no further agency review

, and
from which the Sacket t s were legally obligated to take specified
actions. ( Id . at p. 127.) The same is not true here. There has been no final agency decision

. Casa Blanca alleges it was excused from obtaining a final administrative decision because the process has been unreasonably delayed or halted by Commission staff’s refus al to set a hearing on the permit application. (See e.g., Hollon v.
Pierce (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 468, 476.) However, the Commission is not obligated to schedule a hearing on the application until Casa Blanca completes it. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13062). Moreover, Casa Blanca has not but could (as it did previously) appeal the determination its application is incomplete and a hearing would then be required. ( Id. § 13056 subd. (d).)
Casa Blanca similarly alleges the Commission has delayed by fail ing to provide a public hearing on the notice of intent pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30812. Public9

Resources Code section 30812 provides for a public hearing if a timely objection to the recording of a notice of violation is
submitted but it also states the notice of violation procedures may not be invoked “until all existing administrative methods fo r resolving the violation have been utilized.” (Pub. Res. Code §30812, subds. (c), (g). ) Here it appears Casa Blanca ’s objection was not timely 6 but also the Commission rescinded its intent to record the notice of violation, ending that portion of the enforcement proceedings. Casa Blanca also relies upon the f utility exception to the
exhaustion requirement

. The futility exception requires a p arty

to affirmatively state “ ‘“ the [agency] has declared what its ruling will be on a particular case. ”’ ” ( Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations
Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080

- 1081.) Casa Blanca asserts the futility exception applies because the Commission’s decision is
“certain to be adverse.” Nothing in the record supports this
assertion. Instead, the facts show the Commission’s ongoing efforts to resolve the application’s deficiencies

. Casa Blanca’s belief the Commission would agree with its staff’s “adverse decision” is unavailing. ( Bennett v. Borden, Inc. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 706, 710 [“preconception of the futility of administrative action did not permit [ plaintiff ] to bypass the
administ rative remedy”].)

6 Casa Blanca waited 10 months to object, yet the code

req uires the objection be submitted within 20 days of the postmarked mailing of the notification. (Pub. Res. Code § 30812, subd. (b).)10 Code of Civil Procedure Section 1060 Does Not Entitle Casa Blanca to Declaratory Relief as a Matter of Law Casa Blanca argues the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1060. We disagree. Section 1060 “authorizes a party ‘who desires a declaration of [their] rights or duties with respect to another’ to bring an original action ‘for a declaration of [their] rights and duties,’ and permits the court to issue ‘a binding de claration of these rights or duties.’” ( Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154.) A party, however, “ may not evade the exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. ” ( Contractors ’ State License Bd. v. Superior
Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 771, 780.)
DISPOSITION
T he j udgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALT O DANO, J.11 Pauline Maxwell , Judge Donna Geck, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Gaines & Stacey, Sherman L. Stacy, Lisa A. Weinberg, Rebecca A. Thompson, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Santa Barbara County Counsel ’ s Office, Brian Pett it, Senior Deputy, for Defendant and Respondent, County of Santa
Barbara

. Rob Bonta , Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas , Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christina Bull Arndt , Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Elizabeth S. St. John, Deputy
Attorne y General, for Defendant and Respondent, California
Coastal Commission

.