United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 14, 2013

*

Decided February 15, 2013

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 12-1815

DENISE L. GATTO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INDIAN PRAIRIE SCHOOL DISTRICT 204,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court forthe Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 6405

James F. Holderman,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Denise Gatto appeals the dismissal of her employment-related claims against Indian

Prairie School District 204, a public school district located in the western suburbs of Chicago.

We affirm the judgment.

Gatto sued District 204 in September 2011, seeking $12 million in damages and a

teaching job. After college she had worked in the district as a teacher’s aide for about eighteen

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

*

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 12-1815 Page 2

months before resigning in March 2006. In her amended complaint Gatto alleges (and at this

stage we accept her allegations as true) that District 204 forced her to resign and afterward

retaliated (for what, we are not told) by providing negative employment references. She also

says that District 204 reneged on a promise to give her a teaching position, breached an oral

contract by disclosing confidential information from her personnel file, and hindered her

efforts to find a teaching job elsewhere by lying to other school districts about her suitability

for employment. Her last communication with District 204 occurred in early 2011, when the

headof HumanResources refusedtoassist withGatto’s job search andrecommendedthat she

pursue a career path other than teaching.

The body of Gatto’s amended complaint identifies no federal claim, but she attached

a right-to-sue letter authorizing suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. A charge of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleges discrimination based on her Italian heritage and

retaliation (again, without saying for what). From this the district court understood Gatto to

be claiming discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, along with claims under

Illinois law for defamation and breach of contract.

In dismissing the suit on District 204's motion, the district court first concluded that

Gatto’s discrimination claim is time-barred because she had resigned in March 2006 but did

not fileher administrative charge withtheEEOC until June 2011. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Moreover, the court reasoned, the complaint fails to state a claim for discrimination because,

even if giving negative employment references about a former employee can constitute an

adverse employment action, Gatto’s amended complaint does not identify her membership in

a protected group. As for retaliation, the court recognized that a negative reference can

constitute retaliatory conduct actionable under Title VII, see Szymanski v. County of Cook, 468

F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006), but Gatto does not allege that she suffered retaliation on

account of engaging in protected activity, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). On the state claims, the

district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the alleged contract breach

involving Gatto’s personnel file. But the court dismissed the two other state claims on the

merits, reasoning that Gatto’s amended complaint fails to state a claim for defamation, and

that District 204's alleged breach of a promise to hire her as a teacher falls outside the 5-year

statute of limitations for oral contracts.

On appeal, Gatto contends that her Title VII claims must be timely and also have merit

because she demanded andreceiveda right-to-sue letter. But Gatto misunderstands the point

of that letter, which simply ended the EEOC’s involvement without a resolution of her

allegations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(1); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002);

Gorbitz v.Corvilla,Inc., 196 F.3d879, 881 (7th Cir. 1999). Having the letter could not salvage her

discrimination claim because, as district court observed, she had waited more than five years
No. 12-1815 Page 3

after herresignation to file a charge with the EEOC, long past the 300-day deadline applicable

to claimants in Illinois. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 2006). And though

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, Laouini v. CLM Freight

Lines, Inc., 586 F.3d473, 475 (7thCir. 2009),thedefense in this instance is obvious fromthe face

of Gatto’s amended complaint, see Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d

382, 383 (7th Cir. 2010). The outcome of Gatto’s retaliation claim also is apparent, because

nowhere in her complaint or EEOC charge does she allege that District 204 gave negative

references in retaliation for a protected act, such as complaining about discrimination.

Plaintiffs need not plead in great detail, see Benuzzi v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652,

664 (7th Cir. 2011), but they must allege sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief

and to notify defendants of the claims against them, see McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d

611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2009). Gatto failed to meet

that burden.

On her state-law claims, Gatto repeats her allegations of a breach of contract arising

fromdisclosures ofinformationcontainedinherpersonnelfile, but shedoesnot argue that the

district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction after dismissing her federal

claims. See Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 990 (7th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d

392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007). Neither does Gatto argue that it was error to dismiss her defamation

claim,whichamounts tonothingmore thanathreadbareaccusationthat District 204liedabout

her. See Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[Plaintiff’s] failure to allege

anything more than that the defendant lied in herletter, without even stating what those lies

are, is simply not enough to state a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.”).

In this court Gatto does try to flesh out her contention that District 204 reneged on a

promise to give her a teaching job. That promise, she tells us, was in writing and thus is

governed by the 10-year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, see 735 ILCS

5/2-606, not the 5-year statute cited by the district court, see 735 ILCS 5/13-205. What Gatto

really means, however, is that District 204 had a written agreement with her university

promising to help successful student teachers receive permanent teaching positions.

Gatto does not allege in her complaint, and does not say here, that she was an intended

beneficiary of the agreement between District 204 and her university, and thus she cannot sue

to enforce that agreement. See Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 266 F.3d 598, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2001);

Advanced Concepts Chicago, Inc. v. CDW Corp., 938 N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Estate of

Willis v. Kiferbaum Constr. Corp., 830 N.E.2d 636, 642–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

We have reviewed Gatto’s remaining contentions and conclude that none has merit.

AFFIRMED.