Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Jaros v. Illinois Court of Claims, 2021 IL App (2d) 200397

Appellate Court 

Caption

ARTHUR G. JAROS JR. and THE PEOPLE ex rel. ARTHUR G.

JAROS JR., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE ILLINOIS COURT OF 

CLAIMS, Respondent-Appellee.

District & No. Second District 

No. 2-20-0397

Filed

Rehearing denied

July 23, 2021

August 25, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 19-MR-1362; 

the Hon. James D. Orel, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Arthur G. Jaros Jr., of Oak Brook, appellant pro se.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, 

Solicitor General, and Paul Racette, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices McLaren and Zenoff concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Petitioner, Arthur G. Jaros Jr., appeals from the circuit court’s refusal to grant him writs of 

mandamus and prohibition against the Illinois Court of Claims. Jaros sought the writs to 

compel the Court of Claims to reverse an adverse judgment against him. Because those writs 

were not available to Jaros to challenge the merits of the Court of Claims’ judgment, the circuit 

court correctly dismissed this case, and we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 We take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (In re Estate of Shelton, 2017 

IL 121199, ¶ 35), although here the relevant facts are not in dispute. In addition, we have 

considered several items of correspondence that were attached as exhibits to Jaros’s petition, 

as they provide some context for this case. 

¶ 4 Jaros has been licensed to practice law since 1975. His primary area of focus has been 

trusts and estates. In 2002, Jaros and several members of his family established their own 

Christian-based charitable trust. At one point, the trust held some 60 acres of land in 

Woodboro, Wisconsin, and roughly $5 million in cash. The land, more than half of which was 

donated by Jaros personally, was intended for use as a Bible camp and to eventually be 

developed into a permanent structure named “The Eagle Cove Camp and Conference Center.” 

A not-for-profit organization (Eagle Cove) was established to oversee the development, and 

Jaros held the positions of president, cotrustee, and attorney for Eagle Cove. The costs 

estimated to build the project were around $10 million.

¶ 5 In July 2013, the administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 

(ARDC) filed a complaint asking that Jaros be disciplined for misconduct. More specifically, 

in December 2013, the administrator filed an amended one-count complaint alleging that Jaros 

engaged in a conflict of interest and exerted undue influence over his longtime client, Jean 

Cooney. 

¶ 6 According to the complaint, beginning in October 2006, Jaros drafted a third restatement 

to Jean’s trust, which designated several large cash gifts to specific charitable endeavors upon 

Jean’s death. One section of the restatement designated a death-time gift of $300,000 to Jaros’s 

not-for-profit organization that eventually became Eagle Cove. In February 2007, Jaros drafted 

a fourth restatement, which increased Jean’s gift to Eagle Cove to $425,000. Jaros drafted, and 

Jean executed, six more restatements and amendments to her trust, all of which preserved the 

gift. By the final version of the trust, Jean had allocated $470,000 to be split among nine 

nonprofit organizations; however, $425,000 of the bequest was directed solely to Eagle Cove. 

In January 2010, Jean resigned from her trust, and Jaros became the successor trustee. Jean 

passed in October 2010. At the time of Jean’s death, her estate was valued at around $3.25 

million. As trustee of Jean’s estate, Jaros transferred the $425,000 to Eagle Cove.

¶ 7 Although in the amended complaint, the administrator made a number of allegations—

including that Jaros never disclosed the potential conflict of interest to Jean, never obtained 

Jean’s waiver, and never advised Jean to obtain independent legal advice regarding the gift—

it appears that the administrator narrowed those allegations prior to the hearing. The only 

remaining claim was that Jaros’s representation of Jean may have been materially limited by 
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his own interests as president, cotrustee, and attorney for Eagle Cove. Cf. Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct 

R. 1.7(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1990); Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 1.7(a)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010).

¶ 8 A hearing was held before a three-member hearing board of the ARDC. See In re Jaros, 

No. 2013PR73 (Hearing Board Sept. 9, 2014). There, the administrator presented evidence 

that, in a 2006 zoning application for a conditional use permit for the camp and conference 

center, Jaros stated that the organization had solicited and secured significant cash donations 

for the project’s financing and that one of his clients had “already executed an amendment to 

her estate planning providing for a $300,000 trust distribution to [Eagle Cove] upon her death.” 

The application further stated that Jaros, using either his own funds or money from the Jaros 

trust to secure a mortgage, would personally cover any shortfalls in the financing of the first 

$3 million for the project. 

¶ 9 Jaros testified that a significant number of his clients are Christians who are interested in 

supporting Christian ministries, including Eagle Cove. Jaros noted that Eagle Cove had 

received roughly $830,000 in cash donations since its inception. Jaros testified that Jean’s 

trust’s donation to Eagle Cove did not create “a legal expectancy” because he knew that she 

could revise her trust documents and eliminate the gift to Eagle Cove at any time. Jaros 

acknowledged that Jean’s gift “potentially lessened” the amount he had to personally guarantee 

toward Eagle Cove’s initial $3 million capital goal.

¶ 10 The hearing board heard evidence that Jaros had known the Cooney family and Jean for 

decades and began representing Jean and her husband in 2001. Jaros considered himself a 

family friend. Jaros advised Jean that she could reduce or eliminate her estate’s tax obligations 

by making charitable distributions upon her death. Through the years, Jaros often spoke with 

Jean about the camp and what eventually became the Eagle Cove project. Jaros also showed 

Jean the plans for the conference center. Jean knew of Jaros’s involvement in Eagle Cove. 

Jaros testified that he never solicited nor sought to influence her to make a donation. Rather, 

the decision to make a charitable bequest to Eagle Cove was Jean’s idea because she thought 

it was a good cause. It was also Jean’s idea to increase her donation from $300,000 to $425,000. 

¶ 11 Jaros testified that he did not ask Jean about her donation while drafting the restatements 

and amendments to her trust. Jaros stated that he viewed himself merely as a “ ‘scrivener’ ” 

and felt that it was not his role to persuade or dissuade Jean from making any death-time 

charitable donation. Jaros did not feel that there was a conflict of interest because he believed 

that Jean’s decision regarding which charities to leave her money to was a personal matter. As 

Jaros did not see a conflict of interest, he never sought a waiver from Jean. However, Jaros did 

have three of the amendments to Jean’s trust notarized by other attorneys and staff with whom 

he shared office space and he had them consult with Jean outside of his presence.

¶ 12 In addition, two of Jean’s family members testified that Jaros was Jean’s longtime friend. 

Jean’s family members testified that she was a “ ‘strong-willed’ ” and determined woman. 

They had a high opinion of Jaros and testified that he had been honest about the circumstances 

of Jean’s donation to Eagle Cove. 

¶ 13 Two members of the hearing board found that Jean’s decision to leave money to Eagle 

Cove “was well-informed and based on [her] longtime friendship with [Jaros].” Accordingly, 

the majority found that Jean had consented by implication and effectively waived any conflict 

of interest. One member of the hearing board dissented. She noted that the rule against conflicts 

was rigid and that the facts presented a serious danger of divergent interests. Specifically, the 

dissent noted that Jaros had referenced Jean’s expected bequest all the way back in Eagle 
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Cove’s 2006 application for a conditional use permit and further noted that Jaros had 

committed his personal finances to that early part of the venture. Thus, the potential for 

divergent interests was more than theoretical: Every dollar Jean’s estate spent on Eagle Cove 

was one less dollar that Jaros had to come up with. The dissent found that, while Jaros had 

displayed the “utmost integrity” before the hearing board, it was simply unreasonable for him 

to deny the existence of a conflict or that his representation of Jean may have been materially 

limited by his own interests. The dissent found clear and convincing evidence that Jaros had 

violated the rules and, after considering mitigation, suggested that Jaros be reprimanded.

¶ 14 The administrator did not file exceptions to the hearing board’s report and terminated its 

prosecution of Jaros before the ARDC. Jaros, however, filed a motion before the ARDC 

demanding expenses of roughly $104,000. Specifically, Jaros asserted that the ARDC 

proceedings cost him some $54,000 in attorney fees for his defense and that he had lost nearly 

$50,000 in expected income due to the time he took defending himself. (Jaros included over 

100 pages of invoices detailing his attorney fees, litigation expenses, and projected lost 

income.) Jaros then filed exceptions to the hearing board’s report, seeking reimbursement and 

sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013). The administrator denied 

Jaros’s request for costs and the hearing board granted the administrator’s motion to strike 

Jaros’s fee petition. 

¶ 15 Jaros then attempted to file original actions for mandamus in the Supreme Court and the 

Second District. Both petitions were denied. See Jaros v. Jablonksi, No. 118528 (Ill. Dec. 10, 

2014); Jaros v. Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, No. 2-14-1177 (Jan. 26, 

2015) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Jaros then filed 

a complaint against the ARDC in the Court of Claims. 

¶ 16 Jaros’s complaint asserted that the ARDC was an “agency” covered by the Illinois 

Administrative Procedures Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)). Section 1-20 of the 

Administrative Procedures Act defines “agency” as including “each officer, department, board, 

commission, agency, institution, authority, university, and body politic and corporate of the 

State.” Id. § 1-20. If Jaros’s assertion is correct that the ARDC is subject to the Administrative 

Procedures Act, then, under section 10-55(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act, he might 

be entitled to seek compensation pursuant to the statute’s fee-shifting provision, which 

provides for attorney fees incurred in defense of “any allegation made by the agency without 

reasonable cause and found to be untrue.” Id. § 10-55(a). Both the Administrative Procedures 

Act and the Court of Claims Act provide that jurisdiction for any dispute over an agency’s 

failure to award litigation expenses lies with the Court of Claims. Id. § 10-55(b); 705 ILCS 

505/8(i) (West 2016). 

¶ 17 The Court of Claims, however, rejected Jaros’s request and granted summary judgment in 

the administrator’s favor. See Jaros v. State, 72 Ill. Ct. Cl. 135 (2019). The Court of Claims 

held that the ARDC was not an “agency” of the State that was covered by the fee-shifting 

provision of the Administrative Procedures Act. See id. The Court of Claims found instructive 

the decision in Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Cronson, 183 Ill. App. 3d 710 (1989), which held that the 

state auditor general lacked the authority to audit the ARDC’s funds under the Illinois State 

Auditing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 15, ¶ 301-1 et seq.). The Court of Claims noted that the 

Administrative Procedures Act had a similar statutory structure. Moreover, it continued, 

separation-of-powers principles militated that the ARDC, which was created by rule of the 

Illinois Supreme Court (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 751 (eff. Jan. 17, 2013)) and acts only as that court’s 
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agent in administering discipline, was excluded from the Administrative Procedures Act’s feeshifting provision under an exception for “ ‘[t]he justices and judges of the Supreme and 

Appellate Courts.’ ” Jaros, 72 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 137-38 (quoting 5 ILCS 100/1-20(3) (West 2016)). 

A unanimous four-justice opinion (see 705 ILCS 505/16 (West 2016)) denying Jaros’s claim 

was issued on June 17, 2019 (Jaros, 72 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 137-38), and on November 12, 2019, four 

justices voted to deny his petition for rehearing (id. at 139-40).

¶ 18 That brings us at last to the case at hand. Before the circuit court, Jaros filed a “Petition for 

Orders of Mandamus and Prohibition.” In it, Jaros sought a writ of mandamus to compel the 

Court of Claims to “expunge its June 17 2019 Opinion and November 12, 2019 Order to the 

extent they ruled that the ARDC is not an agency of the State of Illinois under the 

[Administrative Procedures Act] and dismissed the Case.” Jaros further sought a writ of 

prohibition “forbidding” the Court of Claims “from permitting the June 17, 2019 Opinion and 

November 12, 2019 Order to remain of record and from making any determinations that the 

ARDC is not a ‘commission of the State of Illinois’ within the meaning of the [Administrative 

Procedures Act].” 

¶ 19 The Court of Claims, represented by the Attorney General, filed a combined motion to 

dismiss Jaros’s petition. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). The Court of Claims asserted 

that Jaros had failed to state a claim for mandamus or prohibition to issue. See id. § 2-615. 

Furthermore, the Court of Claims asserted that Jaros was essentially seeking a review of the 

Court of Claims’ decision on the merits, which is impermissible. See id. § 2-619(a)(9). Citing 

Reichert v. Court of Claims, 389 Ill. App. 3d 999 (2009), the court contended that Jaros could 

seek review in the circuit court only by filing a writ of certiorari on the basis of a due process 

violation. The Court of Claims noted that Jaros filed a complaint before the claims court, a 

response to the ARDC’s motion for summary judgment, and a petition for rehearing, so he was 

given an opportunity to be heard before the claims court. Thus, because Jaros had not alleged 

that he was denied due process before the Court of Claims, his claim was barred in the circuit 

court. 

¶ 20 After hearing argument, the circuit court granted the Court of Claims’ motion to dismiss. 

Jaros has timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, Jaros contends that the circuit court took an overly narrow approach regarding 

his petition for mandamus and prohibition and that relief should have been granted. As in the 

circuit court, Jaros would like us to proceed headlong into the nuances of his argument and 

ultimately reverse the Court of Claims’ decision on the merits. We affirm.

¶ 23 As noted, the Court of Claims filed its motion pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)), which permits a defendant to seek 

dismissal based on both section 2-615 (id. § 2-615 (dismissal based on failure to state a claim)) 

and section 2-619 (id. § 2-619 (dismissal based on defects, defenses, or other affirmative 

matter)) of the Code. See, e.g., Jaros v. Village of Downers Grove, 2020 IL App (2d) 180654, 

¶ 16. When a petition is dismissed under either section, our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 35 (citing 

Lutkauskas v. Ricker, 2015 IL 117090, ¶ 29). In addition, we review de novo a circuit court’s 

denial of writs of mandamus (People ex rel. Glasgow v. Carlson, 2016 IL 120544, ¶ 16) and 

prohibition (Decatur Park District v. City of Decatur, 2016 IL App (4th) 150699, ¶ 15). 
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¶ 24 The Court of Claims is not a “court” within the meaning of article VI of the Illinois 

Constitution of 1970; it is instead a fact-finding body of limited jurisdiction to hear claims 

against the State. Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d 72, 78-80 (1985). 

Accordingly, decisions of the Court of Claims are generally not subject to external judicial 

review. Id. at 79-80. A narrow exception exists that allows a party to file a writ of certiorari in 

the circuit court when the Court of Claims acts in such a manner that it deprives the party of 

due process rights. Id. at 78-79. “Requirements of due process are met by [a tribunal] 

conducting an orderly proceeding in which a party receives adequate notice and an opportunity 

to be heard.” Reichert v. Court of Claims, 203 Ill. 2d 257, 261 (2003). A writ of certiorari, 

however, “may not be used to review the correctness of a decision by the Court of Claims 

based upon the merits of the case before it.” Id.

¶ 25 As an initial matter, the Court of Claims asserts that our supreme court’s holdings in 

Reichert and Rosetti regarding the availability of certiorari review for due-process claims 

militate that a party cannot file a petition for mandamus or prohibition against the Court of 

Claims. We acknowledge that there is at least some support for the Court of Claims’ position. 

See Hastings v. State, 2015 IL App (5th) 130527, ¶¶ 24-25 (acknowledging Reichert’s 

discussion of “the scope of certiorari review [was] obiter dictum” but finding the discussion 

binding because “[t]he plaintiff has not cited and we have not found any supreme court 

authority that is contrary to Reichert concerning the proper scope of review for certiorari

actions seeking review of a decision of the Court of Claims”); Reichert, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 

1003 (finding “no contrary authority exists from the supreme court concerning the proper scope 

of review for certiorari actions seeking review of Court of Claims decisions” and “[t]hus, the 

obiter dictum from Reichert is binding”). However, the value of that position is necessarily 

tempered by the fact that, in Reichert and Rosetti, the supreme court was not asked to decide 

about the availability of any writ other than a writ of certiorari to review a final judgment of 

the Court of Claims. Although the Court of Claims does not address it, there is authority 

suggesting that a writ of mandamus would be proper to direct the Court of Claims to issue a 

final ruling in a case that had been pending for so long that the petitioner was arguably denied 

his right to due process. See Dupree v. Patchett, 361 Ill. App. 3d 789, 791 (2005) (finding 

circuit court had jurisdiction to order mandamus directing a judge of the Court of Claims to 

rule on petition that allegedly had been pending for 12 years).

¶ 26 But, here, the Court of Claims has issued a final decision. Jaros would like us to reverse it, 

but plainly we cannot. Even assuming that mandamus relief is available against the Court of 

Claims generally, mandamus “cannot be used to direct a public official or body to reach a 

particular decision or to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, even if the judgment or 

discretion has been erroneously exercised.” Hyde Park Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. Court of

Claims, 259 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894 (1994). In Hyde Park for example, the First District upheld 

the denial of a mandamus petition directing the Court of Claims to award postjudgment 

interest. Id. To issue the order would not merely direct the Court of Claims to “ ‘abide by [its] 

statutory duties’ ” but would plainly attempt to strong-arm the claims court to make a particular 

award in a particular way. See id.

¶ 27 Jaros’s request for mandamus was no different than the one in Hyde Park. He would like 

us to compel the Court of Claims to view the ARDC as a state agency subject to the 

Administrative Procedures Act in his case before the claims court. Like the circuit court, we 

determine that we simply cannot grant mandamus relief under such circumstances.
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¶ 28 It is also abundantly clear that a writ of prohibition cannot be issued in this case. “ ‘A writ 

of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial process whereby a superior court may prevent 

inferior tribunals or persons from exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been 

vested by law.’ ” Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Chicago State 

University v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 78 Ill. 2d 143, 149-50 (1979) 

(quoting People ex rel. Town Court of Cicero v. Harrington, 21 Ill. 2d 224, 226 (1961)). The 

writ is used to “restrain” the lower court “from further action in the cause *** when damage 

and injustice are likely to result.” Maloney v. Bower, 113 Ill. 2d 473, 477 (1986). Here, Jaros 

is not asserting that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over him such that it must be 

“prohibited” from continuing to hear his case. See, e.g., id. The Court of Claims has already 

heard Jaros’s case and adjudicated its merits, and it was the only court that could have.

¶ 29 Jaros’s creative procedural maneuvers notwithstanding, we simply have no power to grant 

him any relief. While it is understandable why he disagrees with the Court of Claims’ decision, 

we cannot review the correctness of its decision in his case. Certiorari is the only mechanism 

that allows us to even consider a final judgment of the Court of Claims, but, even then, our 

review is only for due-process violations; “certiorari may not be used to review the correctness 

of a decision by the Court of Claims based upon the merits of the case before it.” (Emphasis 

added.) Reichert, 203 Ill. 2d at 261.

¶ 30 So, even if we agreed with Jaros that the Court of Claims misapplied the Administrative 

Procedures Act in his case, it would be of no moment. A party would not be deprived of due 

process merely because the Court of Claims misapplied the law or otherwise committed an 

error in its reasoning. “Due process does not guarantee against erroneous or unjust decisions 

by courts which have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter [citation] and a 

constitutional question is not presented where a court may have misconstrued the law or 

committed an error for which its judgment should be reversed.” Reyes v. Court of Claims, 299 

Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1105 (1998). Jaros’s pleadings demonstrate that he was given notice and the 

opportunity to be heard before the Court of Claims. As the circuit court found, due process 

does not entitle him to anything further. See Reichert, 203 Ill. 2d at 261; see also Krozel v. 

Court of Claims, 2017 IL App (1st) 162068, ¶ 18; Reyes, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1104-05 (1998); 

Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505-06 (1997).

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Du Page County 

dismissing Jaros’s complaint.

¶ 33 Affirmed.