A ft erexami ni ng t he br i efs and appe l l at e r ecor d, t hi s panel has det erm i ned * unani m ous l yt hator al ar gum entw oul d notm at er i al l yas s i s tt he det erm i nat i on of th is a p p e a l. See F e d . R . A p p . P . 3 4 (a )(2 ); 1 0 th C ir. R . 3 4 .1 (G ). T h e c a se is th e re fo re o rd e re d su b m itt e d w ith o u t o ra l ar g u m e n t. T h is o rd e r a n d ju d g m e n t is notbi ndi ng pr ece dent , exce ptundert he doctr i nes of l aw of the ca s e, r es j udi cat a, and col l at er al es t oppel . T he courtgener al l ydi s favor s t he ci t at i on of or der s and j udgm ent s ; nevert hel es s , an or derand j udgm entm aybe ci t ed undert he t erm s and c o n d itio n s o f

1 0 th C ir . R . 3 6 .3 . T he H on orabl e W esl eyE . B row n, S eniorD i stri ctJudg e, D i stri ctof K ansas, ** s i t t i ng bydes i gnat i on. 

## F I LED United States C ourt of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### N ove m b e r24,2006 Elisab eth A. Shumaker C l erk of C ourt UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS F O R T H E T E N T H C IR C U IT S U S A N K N A P P , an in d iv id u a l, P lain tiff-A p p e llan t, v. A M ER I CA W EST A I RL I N ES, a D el aw ar e corpor at i on, D efe ndant - A ppel l ee. N o. 05- 4322 ( D. C. No . 2 : 0 1 - CV- 7 9 3 - TC)

( D . U t ah)

ORDE R AND J UDGM EN T * B efor e O’ BR I EN and BROR BY , C i r cui tJ udges , and B R O WN , D i s tr i ctJ udge. **

S u sa n K n a p p a p p e a ls th e d istric t co u rt’s g ra n t o f su m m a ryju d g m e n t to A m e ric a W e st A irline s o n M rs. K n a p p ’s c laim s a lleg in g v io latio n s o f th e F a m ily-2-

and M edi cal L eave A ct( FM L A ) , 29 U . S. C . §§ 2601- 2654. W e have j ur i s di ct i on u n d e r2 8 U. S . C. § 1 2 9 1 , a n d we AFF I RM . I. M r s . K napp w as a pi l otforA m er i ca W es t . I n 1995, s he and he rhus band no t i ced thatt heirel destson, bo rn i n 1 98 6, dis play ed sym ptom s of fetal dis tres s s yndr om e, i ncl udi ng vi s i on pr obl ems. I n 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, M rs. K n ap p m ad e p eriod ic req u ests u n d er the F M L A an d A m erica W est’s p erso n al l ea v e p o li cyfo r l ea v e to tak e h er so n to v ariou s h ea lth ca re p rov iders a n d to p ro v id e a t- h o m e v is io n th e ra p y . In 1 9 9 9 , M rs. K n a p p b e g a n m a k in g m o re f re q u e n t F M L A lea v e re q u e sts to pr ovi de hers on w i t h m or e i nt ens i ve tr eatm ent . I n the fa l l of 1999, s he r eques t ed i nt erm i t t entl eave forO ct ober13, 14, and 15, O ct ober28 and 29, and N ovember 5 , 6 , 1 2 , a n d 1 3 . O n O c to b e r 1 2 , A m e ri c a W e s t g ra n te d le a v e fo r O c to b e r 1 3 -1 5 . I tl at erdeni ed the otherFM L A l eave r eques t s , as w el l as addi t i onal FM L A l eave r eques t s forFebruaryand J ul y2000. A s i ttur ned out , on N ovember5, 1999, M r s . K napp fl ew s ever al s chedul ed fl i ghtl egs , then ca l l ed i n s i ck bec aus e s he coul d notcont i nue due t o herow n m edi cal condi t i on. T her eaf t er , s he w as on m edi cal l eave as hercondi t i on di d notperm i thert o fl y . U l t i m at el y , M r s . K napp l eftA m er i ca W es t ’ s empl oyi n A ugus t2000. In 2 0 0 1 , M rs. K n a p p b ro u g h t su it fo r v io latio n o f h e r F M L A lea v e rig h ts fort he deni al s of l eave t o car e forhers on. T he di s tr i ctcour thel d M r s . K napp-3-

w as n o t el igible fo r F M L A leav e b ec au se sh e h ad n o t acc rue d at l ea st 1,25 0 h o u rs o f s e rv ic e in th e tw e lv e m o n th s p ri o r t o th e re q u e s te d le a v e . See 2 9 U. S . C. § 2611( 2) ( A ) ( i i ) ; 29 C . F. R . § 825. 110( a) ( 2) . Speci fi cal l y , the courteval uat ed fourcat egor i es of al l eged w or ki ng t i m e: act i ve- dutyt i m e, tr ai ni ng t i m e, l ay over t i m e, and r es erve- dut yt i m e. I thel d thatact i ve- dutyand tr ai ni ng t i m e count ed as hour s w or ked, and as s um ed the s ame forl ay overhour s , fora t ot al of a p p ro x im a tely7 6 4 h o u rs. It f u rth e r h e ld , tho u g h , tha t M rs. K n a p p ’s r e se rv e -d u ty t i m e di d notcountas hour s of s ervi ce. W i thoutthe r es erve- dutyt i m e, M r s . K napp di d notm eett he 1, 250- hourthr es hol d, s o the di s tr i ctcourtdeni ed M rs. K n ap p ’s m o ti o n fo r pa rt ial su m m aryjud g m en t and g ran ted s u m m ary jud g m en t t o A m erica W est. M rs. K n ap p ap p ea ls. W e re v iew a g ran t of su m m ary ju d g m e n t d e n o v o . Jon es v. D enver P ub . Sch s. , 4 2 7 F . 3 d 1 3 1 5 , 1 3 1 8 (10 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ). II. T he part i es di s agr ee on M r s . K napp’ s t ot al hour s of s ervi ce i n the tw el ve m ont hs pr ece di ng herl eave r eques t s , w i th A m er i ca W es tcl ai m i ng s he s houl d be cr edi t ed w i t h appr oxi m at el y440 hour s and M r s . K napp cl ai m i ng s he had ove r 1 ,9 0 0 h o u rs. F o r p u rp o se s o f th is a p p e a l, th o u g h , the d e ter m in a tiv e q u e stio n is w hetherM r s . K napp’ s r es erve dutyt i m e s houl d be count ed as hour s of s ervi ce.

“ W h e th e r a n e m p lo y e e h a s w o rk e d th e m in im u m 1 ,2 5 0 h o u rs o f se rv ice is det erm i ned ac cor di ng t o t he pr i nci pl es es t abl i s hed underthe Fai rL aborSt andar ds-4-

Ac t( F LS A) fo rd e t e r mi n i n g c o mp e n s a b l e h o u r s o f wo r k . ” 2 9 C. F . R. § 825. 110( c) . U ndert he FL SA , “[w ] hetherw ai t i ng t i m e i s t i m e w or ked undert he A ctdepends on par t i cul arci r cumst ance s . . . . ‘ Fact s m ays how thatthe empl oy ee w as engage d t o w ai tort heym ays how thathe w ai t ed t o be enga ged. ’ ” Id. § 785. 14 ( quot i ng Ski dm or e v. Sw i f t& Co. , 32 3 U . S . 13 4, 13 7 (194 4)) . T he tes t i s w hethert he t i m e i s s pentpr edomi nant l yforthe empl oy er ’ s benef i torforthe em ploy ee’s . Skidm ore , 3 2 3 U .S . at 1 3 8 ; A r m our& Co. v. Want ock , 323 U . S. 126, 133 ( 1944) . R el evantfac t or s i ncl ude “c ons i der at i on of the agr eementbetw een the par t i es , t he natur e and e xt entof the r es tr i ct i ons , the r el at i ons hi p betw een the s e rv ic e s re n d e re d a n d th e o n -c a ll tim e , a n d a ll s u rr o u n d in g c ir c u m s ta n c e s .” B oehm v. Kan. C i t

y Pow er& LightC o. , 868 F. 2d 1182, 1185 ( 10th C i r . 1989) ( ci t i ng Skidm ore , 3 2 3 U .S . at 1 3 7 ); s ee als o 29 C . F. R . § 785. 14. W her e, as her e, t he empl oy ee i s notr equi r ed t o r emai n on the empl oy er ’ s pr emi s es , the cr i t i cal i n q u i r yi s wh e t h e rt h e e mp l o y e e i s a b l e t o u s e th e t i me e ffe c t i v e l yfo rh e ro wn p u rp o s e s . R e n

fro v . C ity o

f E mp o ria , 9 4 8 F . 2 d 1 5 2 9 , 1 5 3 7 (10 th C ir . 1 9 9 1 ); 2 9 C .F .R . § 7 8 5 .1 7 . M rs. K n ap p init ial lyco n tend s tha t th is case is no t app rop ri ate fo r sum m ary j udgm entbeca us e the ques t i on of how s he s pentherr es erve t i m e i s a ques t i on of fac t . W hi l e court s have i ndi cat ed that“[w ] hetherand t o w hatext entempl oy ees ar e abl e t o us e on- cal l t i m e forper s onal act i vi t i es i s a ques t i on of fa ct , ” theyhave a lso sta ted , “w h e th e r lim itatio n s o n th e e m p lo y e e s’ p e rso n a l ac tiv iti e s w h ile-5-

o n -c a ll are su c h th a t o n -c a ll w a iti n g tim e w o u ld b e c o n sid e re d c o m p e n sa b le o v e r t i me u n d e rt h e F L S A i s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w wh i c h we r e v i e w de novo . ” B erry v . Co u n t y o f S o n o ma , 3 0 F .3 d 1 1 7 4 , 1 1 8 0 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 4 ); s ee als o B i r dw el lv. C i t y of G ads den , 9 7 0 F .2 d 8 0 2 , 8 0 8 (1 1 th C ir. 1 9 9 2 ) (“ It is fo r th e c o u rt to d e ter m in e if

a se t o f fa c ts, if fo u n d b ya fa c t fin d e r, w ill g iv e rise to liab ili ty u n d er the F L S A w h il e o ther se ts of fa cts w il l no t. ”). H ere , itw as M rs. K n ap p ’s bur den t o “s etfor t h s peci fi c fa ct s s how i ng ther e i s a genui ne i s s ue fortr i al . ” Fed. R . C i v. P. 56( e) . She coul d have pr oduced a ddi t i onal evi dence conce rni ng the re stric tio n s o n h e r a c tiv iti e s d u rin g re se rv e -d u tyh o u rs, b u t in ste a d h e r a rg u m e n ts gener al l yfocus ed on the fa ct or s di s cus s ed bythe di s tr i ctcour t– t he pr ohi bi t i on o n d rin k in g a lco h o l an d th e re q u ire m e n ts to a n sw e r th e tele p h o n e a n d to b e a b le t o r epor tt o t he ai rpor tw i t hi n one hour . W e hol d thats um m aryj udgm enti s not in a p p ro p ri a te o n th is re c o rd . See a lso R enfr o , 948 F. 2d at1536 ( i n gr ant i ng s um m aryj udgm ent , di s t r i ctcour tm ade no factual fi ndi ngs , butr el i ed on u n d isp u ted fa c ts); G ill ig a n v . C ity o f E mp o ria , 986 F. 2d 410, 413 ( 10th C i r . 1993) (affirm ing g ran t of

su m m aryjud g m en t t o em p loy er). V i ew ed i n t he l i ghtm os tfavor abl e t o M r s . K napp, the r ecor d s how s that w hen M r s . K napp w as on r es erve, s he coul d notdr i nk al cohol , s he had t o be avai l abl e byand ans w ert he t el ephone, and s he had t o be abl e t o r eportt o the a irp o rt w ith in o n e h o u r o f b e in g c a lled . S h e c o u ld b e a t h o m e (o r a p p a re n tly a n yw h e re e lse sh e w a s re a c h a b le b ytele p h o n e ), so lo n g a s s h e c o u ld a n sw e r a c a ll-6-

an d then rep o rtto the airpo rtw ith in o n e h o u r. T h e re p o rtreq u ir em en t, h o w ev er, nece s s ar i l yent ai l ed bei ng abl e t o dr es s i n uni form , tr avel t o the ai rpor t , park, and pas s t hr ough s ecur i t yw i t hi n one hourof a c al l . D ur i ng herdepos i t i on, s he t est i fi ed thatshe cou l d n ot dr i nk al coh ol, scuba d i ve, m ake o r att end do ct ors’ appoi nt m ent s , go on fi el d t r i ps w i th herchi l dr en, orm ake appoi nt m ent s forher chi l dr en. A pl t . A pp. at207. O n appea l , s he cont ends thatthe r es tr i ct i ons e ffe c tiv e lyc u rta iled h e r p e rso n a l p u rsu its: “th ro u g h o u t h e r ‘re se rv e ’ d u ty as s i gnm ent s s he had t o be cont i nual l ypr epar ed t o i m m edi at el ydr op everythi ng, in o rd e r to a c c o m p lish a ll o f th e th in g s [ n e c e ss a ryto re p o rt] a n d still b e a b le to r epor tfordut yw i t hi n one hour . ” A pl t . B r . at23. T hus , “[s ] he coul d notgo pl ay n in e h o les o f

g o lf, sh e c o u ld n o t g o to th e m o v ies , sh e c o u ld n o t d o h e r w e e k ly gr ocerys hoppi ng, s he coul d notgetherhai rornai l s done, s he coul d notdo anyt hi ng t hatw oul d pr ecl ude herfr om i m m edi at el ydr oppi ng everythi ng i n or der t o m eett he one- hourcal l out. . . . ” Id. I n FL SA cas es pr es ent i ng s i m i l ar , oreven mor e r es tr i ct i ve, ci r cumst ance s t han i n thi s case, t his cou rthas held that the em ploy ees’ act i vit i es w ere notso cur t ai l ed as t o r equi r e the on- cal l t i m e t o be cons i der ed compens abl e w or ki ng tim e . See Andre w s v. Tow n of Ski at ook , 1 2 3 F . 3 d 1 3 2 7 , 1 3 2 9 -30 , 1 3 3 2 (10 th C ir . 1997) ( i nvol vi ng r es t r i ct i ons s uch as cons t antavai l abi l i tybypager , cl ean a nd appr opr i at e dr es s , i nabi l i t yt o dr i nk al cohol , and abi l i tyt o be i n the ambul ance re sp o n d in g to a c a ll w ith in fiv e to ten m in u tes ); G i l l igan , 986 F. 2d at411, 413-7-

( i nvol vi ng r es t r i ct i ons s uch as cons t antavai l abi l i tybypager , i nabi l i tyt o dr i nk alco h o l, an d ab il ityto rep o rtw ith in thirtym inu tes o r on e h o u r of a c all ); A rm ita g e v . C ity o

f E mp o ria , 982 F. 2d 430, 432- 33 ( 10th C i r . 1992) ( i nvol vi ng req u ir em en ts th at de tecti v es o n ca ll rem aine d so b er, co u ld b e re ac h ed b yb ee p er, a n d c o u ld re p o rt to d u tyw ith in tw e n tym in u tes ); No r to n v . Wo r th e n Va n S e r v ., Inc. , 839 F. 2d 653, 654- 56 ( 10t h C i r . 1988) ( i nvol vi ng r equi r ementthatdr i ver s be abl e t o r epor tt o fac i l i t yw i t hi n t w entym i nut es ) . T hi s pr ece denti ndi cat es that M r s . K napp’ s r es erve- dut yt i m e w as nothour s of s ervi ce forpurpos es of det erm i ni ng FM L A el i gi bi l i t y . T he pr om i nentexce pt i ons ar e P a b s tv . Ok la h o ma G as & El ectr i c C o. , 228 F. 3d 1128, 1134- 35 ( 10th C i r . 2000) , and R enfr o , 948 F. 2d at1535, i n w hi ch thi s cour tfound on- cal l t i m e compens abl e. T he p iv o ta l fa c to r o f

th o s e c a s e s , h o w e v e r, w a s th e f re q u e n c yo f

c a llb a c k s . See P ab st , 2 2 8 F .3 d a t 1 1 3 4 ; R enfr o , 948 F. 2d at1537- 38. T he r ecor d does nots how w hetherM r s . K napp r ece i ved fr equentcal l s dur i ng herr es erve- dutyper i ods , but s he does notar gue thi s i s s ue. M rs . K nap p p oint s t o h er em ploym ent cont ract , i n w hich A m eri ca W est agr eed t o payhera guar ant eed mi ni m um forr es erve- dutyt i m e, and ar gues that becau se she actuall yw as com pen sat ed fo r r eserve-dutyt i m e, such h ou rs m ust c o u n t a s h o u rs o f

s e rv ic e fo r F M L A p u rp o s e s . See 29 C . F. R . § 785. 14 ( pr ovi di ng t hatt he agr eement s betw een the part i es ar e r el evantt o det erm i ni ng w hether w a iti n g tim e is tim e w o rk e d u n d e r th e F L S A ). C o m p e n sa tio n is b u t o n e fa c to r to-8-

be cons i der ed, how ever , and i tdoes notnece s s ar i l yr equi r e on- cal l t i m e t o be c o n s id e re d h o u rs w o rk e d . See Arm i tage , 9 8 2 F .2 d a t 4 3 1 -3 3 (d e tec tiv e s o n c a ll w e re p a id $ 3 0 p e r w e e k p lu s o v e rtim e fo r tim e a c tu a llyw o rk e d , y e t th e c o u rt h e ld th e ir o n -c a ll t im e w a s n o t co m p e n sa b le u n d e r th e F L S A ); s ee als o P ani agua v. C i t y of G alves t on , 9 9 5 F . 2 d 1 3 1 0 , 1 3 1 7 (5th C ir . 1 9 9 3 ) (st ati n g that the c ity ’s a g re e m e n t to p a ye m p lo y e e c e rta in a m o u n t o f o v e rtim e p a yfo r sta n d b ytim e d id notal t ert he court ’ s concl us i on t hatthe t i m e w as notcompensa bl e underthe F L S A ). A ll the c ir cu m stan ce s are to b e c o n side red , an d as d iscu ssed ab o v e, he re t he ci r cumst ance s i ndi cat e thatM r s . K napp’ s r es erve- dutyt i m e s houl d notcount a s h o u rs o f

s e rv ic e fo r F M L A e lig ib ility. M r s . K napp al s o r el i es on 29 C . F. R . § 825. 110( d) , w hi ch pr ovi des that havi ng confi r m ed an e m pl oy ee’ s el i gi bi l i tyforFM L A l eave , an empl oy erm aynot re tro a c tiv e lyc laim th a t an e m p lo y e e w a s n o t F M L A -e lig ib le. S e v e ra l circ u it c o u r t s , h o we v e r , h a v e i n v a l i d a t e d § 8 2 5 . 1 1 0 ( d ) a s c o n tr a d i c t o ryt o th e p l a i n t e r ms o f th e F M L A , as it aw a rd s F M L A lea v e to e m p lo y e e s w h o d o n o t sta tu to rily qual i fyforFM L A pr ot ect i on. See Woodf or d v. C om m un. A ct i on of G r eene C ount y, Inc. , 2 6 8 F .3 d 5 1 , 5 6 -5 7 (2 d C ir. 2 0 0 1 ); B ru n g a rt v . B e llSo u th Tel ecom m s . , Inc. , 2 3 1 F . 3 d 7 9 1 , 7 9 7 (11 th C ir . 2 0 0 0 ); D or m eye rv. C om er i ca B a n k-Illin o is , 22 3 F . 3d 57 9, 58 2-83 (7t h C i r. 20 00 ). W e agree w i th these court s’ cr i t i ci s m s of § 825. 110( d) , and thus w e dec l i ne t o appl yi ti n thi s cas e.-9- II I. M r s . K napp’ s r es erve- dut yhour s di d notqual i fyas hour s of s ervi ce for purpos es of det erm i ni ng herel i gi bi l i tyforFM L A l eave , and thus the j udgm entof t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r ti s AF F I RMED . E n tered fo r th e C o u rt W ade Brorby C i r cui tJ udge