NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KANSAS H., DANIEL Z., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, I.Z., A.Z., K.Z., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0222 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529107

The Honorable David King Udall, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant Kansas H.

H. Clark Jones, Attorney at Law, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant Daniel Z.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale 

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellee I.Z.

FILED 2-3-2022
KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Kansas H. (“Mother”) and Daniel Z. (“Father”) appeal the 

superior court’s order terminating their parental rights to I.Z., A.Z., and 

K.Z. (the “children”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) received a 

report that Mother and Father, who lived in California, had sent the 

children to stay with an aunt in Arizona without providing her the 

necessary paperwork to obtain medical treatment for them. The reporter

also alleged Mother and Father were homeless, using drugs, and engaging 

in acts of domestic violence.

¶3 When interviewed by DCS, both parents admitted they had 

untreated mental-health disorders and regularly used marijuana. Mother 

disclosed a history of methamphetamine use as well as a history of suicidal 

ideations and attempts. The children witnessed at least two suicide 

attempts, when Mother “jump[ed] out of a moving car going 70 mph” and 

“jump[ed] off a bridge.” Father disclosed he had previously been arrested 

for a domestic-violence incident involving Mother and that he was 

“wanted” in Arizona for violating probation on a firearm-related offense.

Mother described Father as having “anger issues.”

¶4 DCS filed a dependency petition alleging substance abuse, 

domestic violence, mental-health issues, and neglect. In early 2016, the 

superior court, exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, adjudicated 

the children dependent, set a case plan of family reunification, and ordered 

DCS provide both parents with a psychological evaluation, substance abuse 

treatment, and counseling with a domestic violence component.

¶5 DCS attempted to place the children with Mother and/or 

Father in California under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 

Children (“ICPC”). The ICPC application was denied due to unresolved 
KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al

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3

criminal matters involving both parents. The children have resided with a 

placement in Arizona since 2015.

¶6 In the summer of 2016, Mother and Father completed 

psychological evaluations with Dr. Mansfield-Blair. Dr. Mansfield-Blair 

diagnosed Mother with several mental disorders and recommended she 

participate in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (“DBT”). During Father’s 

evaluation with Dr. Mansfield-Blair, he blamed his extended family for 

DCS’s involvement, claiming they “made up” the allegations against him.

Dr. Mansfield-Blair diagnosed Father with several mental disorders and 

recommended that both parents participate in counseling, ongoing drug 

testing, and complete a second psychological evaluation after maintaining 

sobriety for at least one year.

¶7 DCS referred both parents to a therapist in California, but 

they never began services, claiming the office was too far away despite 

DCS’s willingness to provide transportation. Mother and Father also 

claimed their schedule conflicted with the therapist’s schedule. The 

therapist reported to DCS that this claim was not accurate. DCS then

attempted to assign Mother and Father to another therapist, but the 

assignment was delayed due to the indecision of the parents as to whether 

services should begin in California or Arizona.

¶8 Throughout the dependency, DCS provided the parents with 

supervised visitation. In the spring of 2018, DCS referred the family for 

therapeutic visitation after one child expressed discomfort during visits 

with the parents. All three children ultimately refused to attend visits citing 

their parents’ inability to change, and their happiness with their placement.

The children’s case manager encouraged the children to change their minds 

but was unsuccessful. 

¶9 In the fall of 2018, Mother was in a car accident and stopped 

participating in services. Mother consistently reported to DCS that she was 

physically incapable of participating in services, but in 2019 Mother was 

charged with manufacturing a controlled substance and a 2020 police 

report indicates Mother attended a party where she danced and drank 

excessively.

¶10 To his credit, Father completed additional psychological

evaluations as well as individual counseling. Nevertheless, he continued to 

deny any responsibility for DCS’s involvement and instead blamed others.

¶11 In the summer of 2020, DCS referred Father and the children 

for a bonding assessment with Dr. Bryce Bennett. Dr. Bennett concluded 
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further services would be unlikely to “alter [the children’s] willingness to 

engage in reunification” and that reunification would not be in the 

children’s best interests. Dr. Bennett also noted Father’s tone towards the 

children was so aggressive that he nearly ended the assessment early and 

opined that Father could be even more aggressive around the children 

when unobserved.

¶12 In 2021, after the children had been in care for nearly six years, 

the superior court changed the case plan from family reunification to 

severance and adoption. DCS then moved to terminate Mother and Father’s 

parental rights.

¶13 Following a termination trial, the superior court terminated 

parental rights based upon fifteen-months in an out-of-home placement, see 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), and found termination to be in the children’s best 

interests.

¶14 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶15 Parental rights are fundamental, but not absolute. Dominique 

M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97, ¶ 7 (App. 2016). A court may 

terminate a parent’s right in the care, custody, and management of their 

children “if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory 

grounds for severance, and also finds by a preponderance of the evidence 

that severance is in the best interests of the children.” Id. at 97-98, ¶ 7.

¶16 We review a termination order for abuse of discretion, 

accepting the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Mary Lou C. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004), and view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, Manuel 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). Because the 

superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” we 

will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence 

supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 

(App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, 

¶ 4 (App. 2004)).
KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al

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¶17 Fifteen months in an out-of-home placement is one statutory 

ground authorizing termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The superior court 

may terminate a parent-child relationship under that ground if DCS has 

made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services and:

The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant 

to court order or voluntary placement pursuant to [A.R.S.] 

§ 8-806, the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent 

will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental 

care and control in the near future.

Id.

¶18 Mother only challenges whether DCS made diligent 

reunification efforts. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (as a prerequisite to 

termination under the out-of-home placement ground, DCS must make “a 

diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services”). Mother does 

not challenge the superior court’s statutory findings, or that termination of 

the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interests. Christina

G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011) 

(recognizing the failure to develop an argument on appeal usually results 

in abandonment and waiver of the issue).

¶19 Mother claims DCS’s efforts were insufficient because, 

although DCS offered counseling, DCS did not refer her for DBT even 

though that service was recommended by Dr. Mansfield-Blair. The record 

shows, however, DCS referred Mother to a mental-health provider who 

could have enrolled her in DBT, but Mother chose not to engage, despite 

DCS’s willingness to provide transportation. DCS was then unable to refer 

Mother to another therapist due to Mother’s indecision as to whether 

services should begin in California or Arizona.

¶20 Mother also claims, based upon Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s 

recommendations, DCS should have provided her an additional 

psychological assessment. However, in 2018, prior to Mother’s accident,

DCS referred Mother for an additional psychological evaluation, but 

Mother did not participate. Lastly, Mother contends that following her 

accident, DCS should have consulted with its unit psychologist to 

determine appropriate services. Mother, however, was unwilling to 

participate in services following her accident. Because the requirement that 
KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al

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DCS provide reunification efforts “does not oblige the State to undertake 

rehabilitative measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999), the superior court did not err in 

finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother appropriate 

reunification services.

¶21 Father also challenges whether DCS made diligent 

reunification efforts. Father claims DCS’s efforts were insufficient because, 

although DCS offered numerous services, DCS failed to provide counseling 

services designed to help the children overcome their reluctance to reunify 

with him, failed to provide family counseling, and failed to ensure the 

children participated in therapeutic visits.

¶22 The record, however, demonstrates DCS offered services 

designed to help the children overcome their reluctance to reunify 

including referring the family for therapeutic visitation, which included a 

family counseling component, and individual therapy in which the 

children worked on overcoming the “current issues” in the case. DCS also 

referred Father and the children for a bonding assessment to determine 

whether additional services could assist in reunification. Dr. Bennett 

concluded that further services would be unlikely to “alter [the children’s] 

willingness to engage in reunification.” On this record, the superior court 

did not err in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide Father

appropriate reunification services. 

¶23 Father also challenges the superior court’s findings that 

Father has been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the children 

to be in an out-of-home placement and that there is a substantial likelihood 

that Father will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental 

care and control in the near future.

¶24 The superior court found Father failed to remedy the 

circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement 

because Father failed to resolve his anger problem and refused to accept 

responsibility for the trauma and neglect the children suffered in his care. 

Though Father sees it differently, reasonable evidence supports the court’s 

findings. See Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 18. Despite completing an 

anger-management class, Father was continually aggressive towards and

around the children. Further, during the approximately six years that the 

children were in care, Father refused to accept responsibility for the trauma 

and neglect the children suffered. The superior court did not err in finding 

Father had not remedied the circumstances causing the children to be in an 

out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial likelihood Father 
KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al

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would be unable to exercise proper and effective care and control in the 

near future.

CONCLUSION 

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

order terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights to I.Z., A.Z., and K.Z.