SIXTH DIVISI ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2010

No. 1-09-2774

IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS FIRS T JUDI CIAL

DISTRICT

ELIZABETH ZDEB, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff -Appella nt, ) Co ok Co un ty.

) v. ) No. 09 CH 16099 ) ALL STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) an Illinois Corporation, ) Honorab le ) Mary K. Rochf

ord, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presi ding.

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON d elivere d the opini on of the c ourt: Plaintiff Elizabeth

Zdeb, a policy holder, f iled a de clarato

ry judgmen t action in the circ uit court of Cook County seeking a determination that defendant, Allstate I nsurance Company (Allstate), was not entitled to a setoff on underinsured motorist coverage with monies paid to her for automobile med

ical pay ments coverage . Allstate

moved for

summary judgmen t pursuan t to section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 I LCS 5/2-1005 (West 2008)), claiming that the provisions of her automobile insurance policy permitted the setoff. Plaintiff filed a r esponse t o Allstate ’s motion, a

nd a cros s-motion f

or summar

y ju dgment, claiming

that aNo. 1-09-2774

2

setoff is allowed only whe n a policyholder obtains double r ecovery . The trial court found the policy unambiguously

permitted the setoff, granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, and denied pl aintiff’ s cross- motion for summary judgmen t Plaintiff

appeals and we affirm. BACKGROUND The underlying

facts are not in dispute. On October 19, 2006, plaintiff was a pe destrian on a public sidewalk in Chicago when she was struck by an automobile driven by Ka mil A. Scislowic z (Scislowi cz). As a r esult, pla intiff sustained se

rious injur

ies, cla iming da mages i n excess of $200,000. Scislowicz’s vehicle was insured by State Farm Insuranc e Company (State F arm) under an automobile insurance policy that provided liability covera ge limits of $50,000 per person for bodily injury . Plaintiff settled with State Farm for the full policy limit of $50,000. Plaintiff’s policy with Allstate provided underinsure d motorist (UIM) coverage with a limit of $10 0,000 for

bodily injury and autom

obile med ical pay ments (MP)covera

ge with a limit of $50,00 0. Plaintif

f paid se parate premium a

mounts for

the UI M and MP coverag es, as is normally done in an automobile insuranc e policy. Part 2 of the policy declaration explains “automob ile medic al pay

ments coverage ” as follows: “Allstate will pay to *** an insured pe rson all reasonable expenses actually incurr

ed for necessary

medical treatment, medical services or medical prod ucts a ctua lly provided to the insur ed pe rson . Hosp ital, medic al, su rgic al, xray , dental, orthoped

ic and pr osthetic d evices, pharmac euticals , ey eglass es, hearing aids, and professional nursing services *** are covered.No. 1-09-2774

3 Payments will be made only when bodily injury

is caused by a

n accident involving an auto or when [the insured] *** is struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle ***.” Part 6 of the policy dec laration contains provisions concerning UI M coverage. That part contained a “Limits of L

iability”section that included the following applicable setoff provision: “D am ag es pa yab le wi ll be re du ce d b y: 1. all amounts paid by or on beha lf of the owner or operator of the uninsure d auto or a

nyone else r

esponsibl e. This inc ludes all s ums paid under the bodily injury

or property da

mage liability c overage of this or any ot he r a ut o i ns ur an ce po li cy. 2. all amo

unts pay able unde r any workers’ compe

nsation la w, disabil ity benefits law, or any

similar automobile medical payments coverage

. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff submitted a UIM claim for her injuries to Allstate in the amount of $50,000, which eq ualed he r UIM covera

ge limit m

inus the se

ttlement a mount she r

eceive d from Sta

te Farm. Allstate had paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP coverage

. Allstate calculated plaintiff’s UI M claim as follows: $100,000 would be setoff by the $50,000 se

ttlement she rece ived from State Fa rm and the

$38,952.5 3 that Allstate had paid her in MP coverage, for a total setoff a mount of $88,952.53. Allstate tendered the balance of $11,047.47 to plaintiff. On Apr il 23 , 2009 , plai ntiff filed a decla rator y judgment actio n again st Al lstat e seeki ng aNo. 1-09-2774

4

declaration that she was entitled to $50,000, which represents the f ull UIM limit for bodily

injury less the settlement amount she received from State Farm. On July 1, 2009, Allstate filed a motion for summary judg

ment claiming that it was entitled to setoff the MP paid to plaintiff in the amount of $38,952.53. On August 14, plaintiff filed a response to Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judg ment. Plaintiff responded that summary judg ment in favor of Allstate was improper because the MP coverage is a separate and distinct portion of plaintiff’s in su ra nc e p ol ic y an d c la im ed th at a s et of f i s o nl y al lo we d t o p re ve nt a d ou bl e r ec ov er y. After hearing arg

uments from both parties, the trial court issued a written memorandum and ord er f

in di ng t hat th e po li cy pr ovi si ons una mb igu ous ly al lo wed All st ate to set off th e UIM coverage by

any settlement amount and pa yments made under

the MP coverage. Furthermore, the trial court found that the purpose of U IM coverage is to place a policyholder in the same position had the unde rinsured motorist carried liability insura nce in the same amount as the policyholde r. The trial court concluded that in allowing Allstate to set off the UIM c overage by

Scislowic z’s settle

ment amou

nt and the amount pa

id to plaint

iff unde r her MP coverage placed plaintiff in the sa me position had she recovered $100,000 liability coverage from Scislowicz. As a result, the trial court entered an order g ranting summary

judgment in favor of Allstate a nd denied plaintiff ’s cross -motion for summary judgmen t. This appeal followed. ANA LYSIS On appea l, plaintif f claims t hat the tr ial cour t erred in gran ting summa

ry judgmen t inNo. 1-09-2774

5

favor of Allstate and deny ing her cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that Allstate v iolated p ublic polic

y w hen it re duced its

underins ured motorist cove

rage by a mounts paid for medical pay

ments although the insurance policy unambiguously allowe d for such a reduction. A trial c ourt is pe

rmitted to grant s ummary judgmen t only “if the p leading s, deposit ions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any , show that there is no genuine issue as to any material f

act and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 IL CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2006). Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and whether the policy comports with statutory requirements are questions of law properly decided on a motion for summary judg

ment. See Librizzi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 236 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1992 ). The sta

ndard of review f rom the g ranting of summar

y ju dgment i s de novo

. Wea ther-Tite

, Inc. v. University of St. Fr ancis , 233 Ill. 2d 385, 3 89 (2009)(“We re view app eals from summa

ry judgmen t ruling s de novo ”). When the language of an insuranc e policy is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing cour t will give effect to those terms. Grevas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. , 152 Ill. 2d 407, 410 (1992 ); Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423-24 (1980). Here, the underinsured motorist coverage in the insuranc e policy provided, in per tinent part, that defendant’s liability to plaintiff shall be r educed by

the amount paid on behalf of the underinsured driver and “any similar medical payments” pa id on behalf of defendant. The trial court found this language clea r and unambiguous, and, on appeal, the parties do not conte nd that any ambigui ty e xists in the la

nguag e of the i

nsuranc e policy . “Partie s to a cont ract may agree toNo. 1-09-2774

6

any terms they

choose unless their agreement is contrar y to public policy .” Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d 548, 559 (1992). Underin sured mot

orist coverage

is a statut

ory creatio n. Section 143a-2( 4) of the Illinois Insuranc e Code (Code ) requi res aut omob ile i nsure rs to i nclud e unde rinsu red-m otori st cov erage in policies that they issue. 215 I LCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2004). Section 143a-2(4) of the Code defines an “unde rinsure d motor ve

hicle” as one whic

h has res ulted in bo dily

injury or death to the insur ed, and “ for whic

h the sum of

the limits of

liability under al l bodily

injury liability insurance policies or under bonds or other security ” be maintained by

the person responsible for the vehicle is less than the limits of underinsured coverage provided the insured under his policy at the time of the accident. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2004). Section 143a-2(4) f urther provides for the in surer’ s limits of li ability as follow s: “The limits of liabil ity f

or an insu rer providing un

derinsur ed motorist

covera ge sha ll be the li

mits of such covera

ge, les s those amounts act ually recovered under the applicable bodily injury insurance policie s, bonds or other security maintained on the underinsured motor vehicle.” 215 I LCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2004). In Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d 548 (1992), our supreme cour t examined the public policy behind the underinsure d motorist statute. In Sulser , plaintiff’s husband was killed in a motor vehicle accident involving an under insured motorist. Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 551. Defendant insuranc e company soug ht to reduce the plaintiff’s UI M coverage by workers’ compensations benefits plaintiff receive d on behalf of the husband. Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d atNo. 1-09-2774

7

553. The s

upreme c ourt construed the legisla tive inten t for providing un

derinsur ed motorist

co ve ra ge wa s “ to pl ac e t he in su re d i n t he sa me po si ti on he wo ul d h av e o cc up ie d i f i nj ur ed by a motorist wh

o carri ed liabili

ty in surance

in the same

amount as

his [under

insured motorists coverage].” Sulser , 147 I ll. 2d at 55 8. The co urt further const

rued the public pol icy

embodied

in the underinsured motorist provision was “designed to offer insura nce to ‘fill the gap’ between the claim and the torfe asor’s in surance ” and “not intende d to allow t he insure d to recover amou nts from the insurer over and above the cove rage provided by

the underinsured motorist policy.” Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 556. The supreme court c oncluded that an automobile insurance policy provision allowing a setoff of worke rs’ comp ensation

benefit s from und

erinsur ed motorist coverage was not contrar

y as to public policy

and concluded that the insurance company was entitled to the setoff. Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 559. In Adolphson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 187 Ill. App. 3d 718 (1989), the Third District of the Illinois Appellate Court examined whether medica l payments could be a se

toff from underinsured motorist coverage. I n Adolphson , as in the case at bar, the plaintiff-insured filed a declaratory

judgment action seeking a declar ation that her insurer, Country Mutual Insu rance C ompany

(Country Mutual), was not e

ntitled to s etoff UI

M covera ge with MP coverage amounts paid to her. Adolphson , 187 I ll. App. 3d at 719. Pla

intiff’s automobile insuranc e policy

included a provisi on that al lowed a s etoff of UIM c overage by

any amounts pa

id by the underinsure d driver and any MP amounts paid to her by Country Mutual. Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719. The plain tiff’s po licy

containe d a $100,0 00 UIM covera ge limit a nd an unsp ecified

limitNo. 1-09-2774

8

in MP coverage. Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719. The plaintiff suffer ed injuries in an automobile accident and claimed damage s in the amount of $113,200. The tortfeasor’s insurer settl ed wit h the p laint iff fo r $30, 000. C ount ry Mutual paid p laint iff $1 3,111 .43 i n MP co verage and pai d t he $ 56, 888 .57 bal anc e in UIM c ove rag e. In to tal , pl ain ti ff r ece iv ed h er $ 100 ,00 0 UIM coverage limit minus the amount recovered by the tortfeasor’s insurer ($30,000) and minus the amount the Country Mutual paid to plaintiff under its MP covera ge ($13,111.43). Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 719. In interpreting the unde

rinsured motorist statute, the Adolphson court found that the statute do es not enu

merate a ll deduct ions which

may be claime d by

an insure r, but ra ther sets a “maximum, or ceiling” the insurer must pay

. Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721. I n addition, the court found that “[n]othing in the statute prevents the insurer from reducing its liability by amounts paid under other coverage s in the same policy.” Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721. The

cou rt f oun d t he i nsu ran ce p ol icy a t i ss ue u nam bi guo usl y all owe d su ch a red uct io n i n UIM coverage by

amounts paid under MP coverage, and thus, conclude d that the insurer was entitled to the setoff. Adolphson , 187 Ill. App. 3d at 721-22. Simi larly, in the cas e at bar , plai ntiff purch ased an autom obil e insu rance p olicy th rough Allstate which contained a $100,000 UI M coverage limit and $50,000 in MP coverage . The insurance policy

also contained a provision under UI M coverage that allowed Allstate a se toff of any MP pay

ments paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, and sustained damages in excess of her UI M coverage limit. The driver’s insurance company settled with the plaintiff for the driver’s liability coverage limit of $50,000. Plaintiff recovere d the remainingNo. 1-09-2774

9

$50,000 difference when Allstate paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP covera ge and the $11,047.47 balance. As with the Adolphson court, we find nothing in the statute that prevents Allstate from reducing its liability by

amounts paid under other coverage s in the same policy since the policy authorizes the credits. In addition, under Sulser , Allstate’s setoff provision is not contrary to any known public policy. The re duction did not prevent plaintiff from receiving the diffe rence between the underinsured driver’s insuranc e and the amount of UIM cove rage provided in her policy. See Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Accordingly, we find that the setoff provision in the Allstate policy was consistent with the under insured motorist statute and the public policy behind the statute and, therefore, was valid. Plaintiff relies on Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 148 Ill. 2d 272 (1992 ), in support of her argume nt that all owing a

setoff w hen ther e is no dan

ger of double

recove ry violates p

ublic polic

y a nd that the

pay ment of mul

tiple pre miums cre ates a r

easonab le expectation of multiple coverages in the insured. Hoglund was consolidated with Greenawalt v. State Farm Insurance Co. , 210 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1991), as both cases involved similar facts. I n each consolidated case, the plaintiff was injured in an automo

bile acc ident with

a motorist

who was in sured wh

ile she was a passe

nger in a vehicle driven by

a motorist who was not insured. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 274. Both drivers were at fault, and the plaintiff suffere d injuries that exceeded the combined coverage limits of the insured driver and her uninsured motorist coverage. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 274-75. The plaintiff settled with the insured driver and received the insured dr iver’s liability covera

ge limit ofNo. 1-09-2774

10

$100,000. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 275. The plaintiff then sought to obtain the limit of the uninsured motorist coverage under her ow n automobile insurance policy of $100,000. Hoglund , 148 I ll. 2d at 27 4-75. Plai ntiff’s p olicy

also cont ained a s etoff pr

ovision sta

ting tha t any amounts paid or pa ya ble to the insured “ by or for an

y pe rson or or ganizat ion who is or may

be held le gally liable for the bodily injury to the insured.” (Emphasis omitted.) Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 275. The defendant insurance company claimed that the setoff for the uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 by the $100,000 paid by the insured motorist, left nothing available. Hoglund , 148 I ll. 2d at 276. The supreme court in Hoglund first considered that the public policy behind the uninsured motorist provision was to place the insured in “substantially the same position as if the wrongful uninsured driver had been minimally insured.” Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 277, citing Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. , 48 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1970) and Glidden v

. Farmers Automobil

e Insurance Ass’n , 57 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1974). The court found that the litera l interpretation of each policy’s setoff pr

ovision warranted the complete setoff. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 278. However, the court found that each setoff provision could not be rea d in isolation, but must be considered in conjunc

tion with e ach plai

ntiff’s r easonab le expect

ation of r eceivin g uninsu red motor ist

covera ge bec ause she

paid a pr emium for

it, the pub lic policy

behind the

uninsure d motorist statute, the coverage intended by the insurance policy , and the facts of the case. Hoglund , 148 I ll. 2d at 279. In vie wing the setoff provisions

in that wa

y, t he court found tha

t each pl aintiff r

easonab ly expected to receive coverag e for damages caused by an uninsured motorist, but the policiesNo. 1-09-2774

11

allowed the insurance company a setoff of monies paid by the insured motorist for that driver’s fault in the accident, which was unrelated to the fa ult of the uninsured motorist. Hoglund , 148 I ll. 2d at 279. The court also found that a literal interpretation frustrate d the public policy behind the uninsured motorist statute because the plaintiffs would not be placed in the same position if the uninsured driver had liability c overage. Hoglund , 148 I ll. 2d at 27 9-80. The court re asoned that if the uninsu

red driver had be en insure d, plaintif f would re ceive c ompensat ion from b oth drive

rs’ liability coverage. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 280. However, the litera l interpretation allowed the insurance company

to setoff the monies paid to plaintiff by the insure d driver against the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist coverage effe ctively nullified the uninsured motorist cover age. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 280. As a result, the court found that the se toff provision denied the plaintiff the “very

insurance protection” for which she had pa id premiums and thus created a latent ambiguity. Hoglund , 148 Ill . 2d at 280. T he cou rt con strue d the p olicy in favor o f cover age to the insured and concluded that the insurance company was entitled to a setoff against the uninsured motorist coverage only to the extent necessary to pr event double recovery

. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 280. Based on the decision in Hoglund , plaintiff in the case at bar claims that Allstate is not entitled t o a setof f becau se there

is no danger of dou

ble rec overy

even if she rece ived the l imits of both her UIM cover

age and MP coverag e. We agre e with pla

intiff tha t Hoglund

is not limited to uninsured motorist cases. See Banes v. Western States Insurance Co. , 247 Ill. App. 3d 480, 483 (1993). However, we find that plaintiff’s reliance on Hoglund is misplaced.No. 1-09-2774

1 Plaintiff claims tha

t the appe llate cou

rt in Banes v. Western States Insurance Co. , 247 Ill. App. 3d 480, 482 (1993), “stated that ‘it would be a violation of public policy to allow a 12 In Hoglund , the concern for double recover y arose be cause there was more than one tortfea sor in ea

ch acci dent, as t

he monies

paid by one tortf easor a cted to r educe the recoverable damages from the remaining tortf easor. See Banes , 247 Ill. App. 3d at 483 citing Greenawa lt , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 547 and Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 272. “Without such a reduction, a plaintiff could receive damages in excess of he r injuries, resulting in double recovery .” Greenawa lt , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Plaintiff has not provided us any case authority wher e Hoglund

has been applied t o situations involving only one tortfeasor . Yet, several Illinois Appellate Court cases have found that Hoglund

does not apply in situations involving a single tortfeasor. See, e.g. , State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Coe , 367 Ill. App. 3d 604, 615 (2006) (“relianc e on Hoglund is misplac ed. *** I

n the pre sent cas e, there

is only one tortf easor” ); Banes , 247 Ill. App. 3d at 484-85; Darwish v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. , 246 Ill. App. 3d 903, 907-08 (1993); Marroquin v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. , 245 I ll. App. 3d 406, 408 ( 1993); Obenland v. Economy Fire &

Casualty Co. , 234 I ll. App. 3d 99, 110-1 1 (1992). In the case at bar, the re is only one tortfea sor. In addition, there is no latent ambiguity in the plaintiff’s policy as applied that req uires us to

construe covera ge in fa vor of pla intiff. Accordin

gly , we find

that Hoglund do es no t a pp ly. Plaintiff also has n

ot provide d us any

case au thority that would

show a vio lation of p

ublic policy to allow a setoff w here there is no double recovery by the plaintiff. 1 Points raised but notNo. 1-09-2774

setoff where there is no double recove ry by the plaintiff.’ ” This is incorrect. The Banes court made this statement only in the context of discussing wha t the trial court found. 13 argued or supported with authority in a party’s br

ief are deemed waived. Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc ., 367 Ill. App. 3d. 559, 568 (2006) (by failing to offer supporting leg al authority or “any re asoned argument,” plaintiffs waived conside ration of their argument); People v . War d , 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (“point raised in a brie f but not supported by citation to releva nt authority *** is ther

efore f orfeite d”); In re Marriage of Bates , 212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (“A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited”); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc. , 302 I ll. App. 3d 61,78 (19 98) (“it i s not nece ssary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue” by failing to offer case citation or other sup port as Supreme Cour

t Rule 341 r

equires ); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341 (h)(7)(argu ment in appellate brief must be supported by citation to legal authority and factual record). Plaintiff’s argument that allowing setoffs wher e there is no double recovery violates public pol icy

is not persuasive. The public policy consider ations the supreme court ma de in Hoglund do not deviate from its determination of the public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute in Sulser . The supreme court in Sulser construe d the publi c policy embodied

in the under insured motorist sta

tute was t o not only to offer insuranc e betwe en an insu red’s c laim and the tortfeasor’s insurance, but also to prevent the insure d from recovering “amounts from the insurer over and above the covera ge provided by

the underinsured motorist policy.” Sulser , 147 Ill. 2 d at 556. T

he supre me court inHoglund

reflected that la

tter concern by

allowing a setoff to the extent necessary

to prevent double recovery . If the plaintiffs in Hoglund suffered damagesNo. 1-09-2774

14

that did not amount to the full liability limit of both tortfeasors’ policies, then a setoff was necessary to prevent plaintiffs from recovering a mounts from the insurer over and above the

covera ge provided by

their und erinsur ed motorist policies

. Here, double recovery

from two or more tortfeasors was not at issue. Moreover, the setoff provision in the Allstate policy is in accorda nce with the well-established public policy behind the underinsured motorist statute, which is to “fill the gap” between the amount recovered from th e u nd er in su re d d ri ve r’ s i ns ur an ce an d t he am ou nt of co ve ra ge pr ov id ed in th e i ns ur ed ’s po li cy. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d 548, 556 (1992). Plaintiff contracted for $100,000 in UIM coverage and was entitled to a total recovery of that amount. Plaintiff received $50,000 from State Farm and recovered the remaining $50,000 when Allstate paid plaintiff $38,952.53 in MP coverage and the $11,047.47 balance . As applied, the setoff provision here does not conflict with the underinsured motorist statute or the public policy embodied in that statute and was, therefore, valid. Pl ain ti ff a ls o cl aim s t hat she had a re aso nab le e xp ect ati on o f co ver age und er b ot h UIM and MP coverages because she paid premiums on both. Again, plaintiff relies on Hoglund , where the supreme court considered in its analy sis that each plaintiff paid a premium for the uninsured motorist c overag e and fou nd that a p olicy

holder would be de

nied subst

antial ec onomic va

lue in return for the premiums that he or she paid if a setoff pr ovision eliminated that coverage. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 279. We find that argument not persuasive. I n Hoglund , the supreme court found that the policyholders “be lieved that he was purchasing uninsured motorist protection,” but the setof fNo. 1-09-2774

15

provision, as applied, nullified that coverage. Hoglund , 148 Ill. 2d at 278. As applied, the policy holders e ssentiall

y pa id for und erinsur ed motorist covera

ge pre miums withou

t any benefit

. In the case at a bar, however, the setof f provisio n did not nul lify

plaintiff ’s UI M covera ge or MP coverage. Plaintiff rece ived amounts from both coverages for which the total amount equaled the difference between the under insured motorist’s liability and her UI M coverage, which is the purpose o f the UI

M covera ge that she purc hased. Se e 215 I

LCS 5/1 43a-2(4 ) (West 200 4); Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Plaintiff further argues that she should be entitled to rec over separately under UIM and MP coverages because she pa id separate premiums for those coverages. Plaintiff relies on Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n , 57 I ll. 2d 330 ( 1974), for support
. In Glidden , the plai

ntiff wa s able to r

ecover under the uninsure d motorist provision o f his three separate automobile insurance policies purc hased from the same insurance company

. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 336. The policies contained the provision that if there is “other insurance” the insurance company

was liable for only a pro rataportion of the dama ges fr om the tota

l of all coverages available to the insure d. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 333-34. The defendant insurance company argued that its obligation to the plaintiff under eac h of the three policies would be prorated to take into account monies paid to plaintiff unde r the other two policies. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 334. Thus, the insurer arg ued that its obligation was $3,333.33 under each policy

because each policy

had a coverage limit of $10,000. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 334. Plaintiff , on the other hand, argue d that he should rec over the full amoun

t of uninsu

red motor ist coverage under ea

ch policy for a

total of $30,000. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 332. The supreme courtNo. 1-09-2774

16

agreed and held that an ambig uity existed with respect to the “other insura nce” clause as applied to the multiple policies and resolved that ambiguity in favor of the plaintiff. Glidden , 57 Ill. 2d at 336. In the case at ba

r, plaintiff observes in her appellate brief that the Adolphson court consider ed the sa me arg ument. In Adolphson , the court distinguished Glidden for the following reasons: (1) Glidden involved the stacking of multiple policies with the same coverag e; (2) there existed an ambiguity in the extent of covera ge and exclusions in the policy; a nd (3) the plaintiff pa id se pa ra te pr em iu ms in ea ch of hi s t hr ee po li ci es as op po se d t o o ne po li cy. Those same distinguishing factors in Adolphson court ar e prese nt in the c ase at a

bar. This case does not involve the stacking of multiple policies; the policy is clear and unambiguous; and plaintiff paid for one policy. Pl aintiff f

urther a rgues t hat Adolphson is not appl icable b ecause it was decided before Hoglund . However, plaintiff does not explain how Hoglund prevents us from considering the same distinguishing fa ctors that the third district considered in Adolphson

. Moreover, separate premium pay ments for separate coverages in the same policy do not per se entitle an insured to recover under both covera ges. Costello v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 263 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1058 (1993). An automobile insurance policy is a contract between the policyho lder and

the insur ance company, and the p olicy holder is bound by the policy’ s terms so long as those terms do not violate public policy

. Stryker v. State F

arm Mutua l Automobile Insurance Co. , 74 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978). In the case at ba

r, plaintiff contracted for $100,000 in UI M coverage, with a setoff provision that allowed Allstate to reduce that coverag e by any amount received by

theNo. 1-09-2774

17

underinsured driver and any MP monies that Allstate paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured by an underins ured dri ver and s ettled wi

th the driver’s insu

rance c ompany

for $50,0 00. The I

llinois underinsured motorist statute required Allstate to “fill the gap” be tween the amount the plaintiff recovered from the underinsured dr iver and the amount of coverage provided in her insurance policy, i.e. , $50,000. See 215 I LCS 5/1 43a-2(4 ) (West 200 4); Sulser , 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Plaintiff recovered from Allstate $38,952.53 in MP coverag e and $11,047.47 in UIM covera ge for a total of $50,000. Under the terms of her insurance policy and statutory provisions, plaintiff rec eived the full a mount of UI

M covera ge to wh ich she was entitle d. Thus, we find no v iolation of

public policy here. T

herefore, we conclude that trial c ourt properly g ranted summary judg

ment in favor of Allsta te and de nied plai ntiff’s c ross-moti on for sum

mary judgmen t. CONCLUSIO

N For the foregoing r

easons, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County in granting Allstate’s motion for summary judg ment and denying

plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgmen t. Affirmed. J. GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.