1 Na t ur al mo t he rPa t r icia D. is no t pa r t o f t his a pp ea l. No. 2-10- 0044 File d: 7-27-10

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ In re HA LEY D ., a Mi

nor ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) ) No. 07-- JA--14 ) ) Ho no r ab le (The People of

the State of Il l i noi s, Peti tion er- ) Thomas J. Riggs, Ap pel l ee, v . Ral ph L ., Res

ponde nt-A ppel l an t). ) Judge, Presi din

g.

___ _____ ________________________________________________________________________ _ JU STI CEMc LA

RE N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Re sp on den

t, Ralph L. , a ppe als fro m the o rd er s o f the tria l courtden y i n g h i s p eti ti on to v ac ate a defa ult j udgme

nt and h is motion to amen

d hi s petiti on. We reverse and rem and. On A pri l 11 , 20 07 , th e S tatef

i l ed a p eti ti on a l l eg i ng tha t Hal ey D. w asa n

eg l ec ted m i nor pur sua nt to se cti

on 2- -3(1)(c) o f the J

uven il e Court Act o f 1987 (A

ct) (705 ILCS 405/2--3( 1)(c) (W est 20 06 ) )
. Ha ley w as pla ce d in she lt er ca r e t ha t da y. N at ur al fa t he rRa lph L. r ec eiv ed ab od e servi ce of th e s um m on s, whi

ch was l eft wi th hi s m ot her at the home

they shared. 1 The

tria l court su bse qu en t ly

fou nd Ha ley to be a negl

ected mi nor and, on August 14, 2007, adjudi catedhe r a wa rd of the c ourt. Th e c ourt g

ran ted the De pa rtm en t of Children a nd Family Service s (D CFS) cus t od y and gu ar dia nsh ip of Haley

and set the per

manenc y goal

of return home

in 12 months . The case was continue d to February

12, 2008.No. 2-- 10--0044

-2-

On Febr ua r y 1 9, 200 8, t he t rial co ur t co nt inued g uar dianship a nd cu st od y with DC FS a nd ag ain set the

perm anency goal as re turn h ome i n 12months . O n O ctober 8, 2008, Haley < s f oster pa re n ts fi le d a m ot ion to be granted i

ntervenor status. The trial court granted

the moti on on

October 14. On t hat same d ay, t he co ur t chang ed t he perman ency goal (over

Ra l ph' s ob j ec ti on) to sub sti

tute care pendi ng termi nation of parental ri

ghts and gran

ted th e S tate

l ea v e to f i l e a peti ti on to ter m i n ate those righ ts. The Stat e then sai

d: "We have a perma

nen cy review date of Feb

ruary 17, 2009. And no w, we ha ve lea ve t o file
a peti tion to termi na te, whi ch we' l l be doi ng, y our Honor. A

nd th at wil l gen erate a new date." The Sta te f i l ed a p eti ti on to ter m i n ate pa re n tal ri gh ts on Februa

ry 5, 2009 . The

record
co nt ains no not ice o f mot ion o r a ny ot her not ice o f when t he peti ti on wa s to be br ou ght befo re t he court . An order

f rom the Fe br ua ry 17 p erm an en cy he ari ng sh owe d th at R al ph wa s n ot pre sent on t ha t da t e. T he o r de rals o sho we d t ha t t he ca se wa s c o nt inu ed t o Ap r il 14, 2009, for a perm

anen cy heari ng. On Fe br ua ry 20 , t he St at e file d a n a ffida vit fo rse rvic e b y pu blica t io n, st at ing t ha t Pa t r icia
co uld n ot b e l

oca te d and coul d n ot be

serv ed pe rs ona l l y or by certif i ed mai l wi th th e term i na ti on pet itio n. The St at e at t empt ed t o s er ve a s ummons on Patrici a for the Apri l 14 court date, but it was returnedun serv ed

wi th th e e xp l an ati on that Pat rici

a's m ot her had told the deputy

that Pat rici

a had
move d t o C hicago and was i

n "reh ab." No m

ention was m

ade of an atte m pt to s erv e a su m mons on Ralph o r o f an inabili

t y to loca t e him. The re co rd co nt ains nothi ng r egard i ng s ervi ce on

Ral ph. A notice, whi

ch statedthat t he case

was set for Apri

l 14, was subse quently

publ is hed in t he Da ily He r ald newspape r on March 3, 10, and 17, 2009.No. 2-- 10--0044

-3-

On Febr uar y 24, 200 9, t he o ffi ce o f the publ

ic defen der fi le d a m ot ion to withdraw

as counsel for Patricia and set

t he ca se fo rAp r il

14. On that date, Pat rici a appeared i

n court; however, Ral

ph did n ot appear. The f

oll owing c oll

oquy too k pla

ce: "THE COURT: Now, where do we st and vis-a- vis nat ur al fat her , Mr . O gan [ assist ant State's Attorne y]? MR. OGA

N: Your Ho nor, I beli

eve we h ave serv ic e on hi m. I'm lookin g fo r it , th oug h . I k n ow w e'v e a

ttem pte d s er v i ce , y our Hon or. I ' m j us t l ooki n g f or p roof of th at. T HE CO UR T : Ok ay. MR. OGAN: I h ave fo und pr o o f, obv i ousl y , of the natural

mother' s se

rvi ce. If not-- I don' t see a rece i pt, your Honor, al

though I do see num erous-- THE COUR

T: Oka y . Th ere has b een p

ub l i ca ti on c onc ern

i ng the pe ti ti on to ter m i n ate parental rights. MR. OGAN: I ask, then, that t he n atural f ather be def

aul ted. T HE CO UR T : Ok ay. MR . OG AN : A nd t ha t we se t ** * M ay 1 2t h a s a pr o ve - up da t e fo rhim. THE CO URT: Okay . So th e n atu ral f ather on the Stat e's m

ot ion wi ll be def aul ted, he ha ving fail ed to appear, answer or otherwise pl ead to t he peti

tion to t ermi

nate parental ri ghts . We

wil l set i t for prov e-up a s to natur

al mother on

that sa me date." On May 12, 2009, Ralph

appeared wit h an at t or ney, D iana Vizc aino, who fi le d her appearan

ce th at day. Ral

ph wa s g ra n ted ti me to f i l e a moti on to vaca t e t he de fault judg ment, and t he case was con ti nu ed to Ju ne 2. R al ph f i l ed a m oti on to v ac atepur suan

t to se cti on 2- -1 301 (e ) o f the Code of Civil Procedure (Co de) (735 ILCS 5/2--1301(e) ( W est 20 08 )). The S tate su b se qu en tl y m ov ed toNo. 2-- 10--0044

-4-

strikeRalph's mot ion, ar guing that it was not tim el y f il ed. On October 16, Ralph was gr ant ed lea ve to fi le a petition to vacate under se ction 2--1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2--1 401 (W est 200 8)). The trial court deni

ed th e s ub se qu en t se cti on 2- -1 40 1 p eti

ti on an d R al ph' s or al moti on f or l ea v e to fi le an am ended peti

tion. Thi s appeal

fol lowed. Ral ph first co nt ends t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in deny ing his p et it io n t o va ca t e t he de fau lt judgm ent. Ralph

brought hi s petiti on under section 2--1401 of the Code, whi ch provides f or reli ef f rom f i na l ordersand j udgments after 30 days but bef ore 2 years f

rom entry. See 735 I LCS 5/2--1401 (West 2008). Generally

, such a peti

tion i s di rected to t he so und d iscre t ion o f the t rial co ur t , a nd t he court 's deci

si on wil l n ot be disturbed on reviewunl ess the c ourt has

abuse d i ts di scre tion
. Eng el v. Loyf ma n , 383 Il l . Ap p. 3d 19 1, 194 ( 2008)
. Thi s can b e so even w here an is sue addressed

by the trial courtis a question of

la w. See Engel , 3 83 I ll. App. 3d a t 194 . T he gr ant ing o f the pet itio n must be supported by

a prep onderance of

the e vi den ce. Smi th v. Ai roo m, Inc . , 114 Il

l . 2d 209 , 223 (1 986). In ge ne r al, t o be en t it led t o r elie f un de rse ct io n 2
- - 14 01 , a p et it io ne rmus t affir mat ive ly se t f orth sp ec ific factual

alle gations supportin

g: (1) the exi stence of a m eritorious def

ense or clai

m;(2) due dil ige nce in p r es en t ing t ha t de fen se o rcla im t o t he trial court in the origi nal action; and (3) due dil ige nce in fi li ng the section 2--1401 p eti ti on . Sm i th , 11 4 Il l . 2d at 2 20- 21. How ever, a p eti ti on brought pursuant to section 2--1401(f ) to vacate a

vo id o r de ris not amen

abl e to t he due di

li gence, me ritorious def

ense, and two-year ti

me requ i rem en ts. Coo k v . B ur

n ette , 341 Ill . App. 3d 652, 660 (2003 ). In a

ddi tion , equi tabl e power s ma

y requi re that a judgm

ent be set asi

de even in the absen ce of due diligence bythe petitione r. See Sala

zar v. W i l ey San de rs Tru ck

i ng Co. , 216 Ill . App. 3d 863, 871 (19 91) . On

e of the gui di ng pri nc i plesi n th e adm i ni stra ti on of se cti on 2--1401 relief

is tha t t heNo. 2-- 10--0044

-5-

pe ti ti on invok es t he eq uit able po wer s o f the court, whic h sho uld pr eve nt t he e nfo rc eme nt o f a j udgm en t when i t woul d be

unf ai r, un j ust, or un

cons cionab l e. Sm

i th , 114 Ill . 2d at 225. Our suprem e court hel d in Pe o ple v. V incent , 226 I ll . 2d 1 ( 2007), that a t rial cour t's sua sp on te dis mi ssal of a cri mi nal defen dant's se ction 2--1401 petiti on was "th e f un cti ona l eq ui va l en t of
a dismissal for failure t o s t at e a c aus e o f act ion" s uch t hat , a s wit h any dismissal or judg ment o n t he pleadi ngs, the di sm i ss al of the pe ti ti on wassu

bj ec t to de no vo revi ew. Vincent , 226 Ill . 2d at 14. Vincent sta

ted th at it is "ina cc ur at e" t o co nt inu e t o vie w t he r elie f o ffer ed by se ct io n 2
- - 14 01 in

" st r ict ly eq ui ta ble terms." Vincent , 22 6 I ll. 2 d a t 16
. Sin ce t he r elie f is no lo ng er "p ur ely di scre tion ary," i t ma kesl i ttle s en se to app l

y the a bus e-of -di scre tion stan dard of revi ew. Vincent , 226 I ll. 2 d a t 16
. Ho we ve r , wh ile t he co ur t sa id that t he r elie f affo r de d b y a s ec t io n 2
- - 14 01 pe t it io n is not "strictly" equitabl e or "pu rely " discretionary, we conclude that this language d o es no t st r ict ly pr ec lud e e qu it able o r d iscr et io nar y eleme nt s o f re lief. In hi s petiti on, Ralph

stated t hat he was un

abl e to appear in c o ur t o n Ap r il 15 , 2009, because "h is car had

mech anical problem

s and had broken down because he had incur re d a flat ." In a ddit ion, he h ad f our oth er ch i l dr en "a n d w as un ab l e to o b tai

n th e c are a n d a ss i sta n ce f or th ei r c are on th e date in question ." Ral

ph also all eged that hi s atto rney, Vizca in o, had mul

tiple sclerosis s

uch that she had to emp lo y ano t her at t o rn ey, Mich ae l Riva s, t o dr aft le gal docum en ts. Her s y m ptoms were "ep i sodic," and "each da y [w as ] un pr ed ict ab le. " As a r es ult , Viz ca ino "w as no t ph ysic ally c ap ab le t o p re par e t he pro per do cuments to have the default judgm ent vacated" within 30 day s. Both Ralph and Vizcai

no att ached to the pet ition af fi davi ts along tho se li

nes. Both referred to t he co ur t da t e a s s ch ed ule d fo rAp r il 15 , 2009, i nstead of Apri l 14. Vizca ino also st at ed t hat she arriv ed l ate f or court on A

pril 15. In a rg uin g the petition to the court , both Vizcai no and Ri vasNo. 2-- 10--0044

-6-

argued that t he State had fa

il ed to pr ovide

evi dence that i

t had atte m pte d to s er

v e R al ph wi th a copy of t he t er minatio n pet itio n. In denying t he pet itio n, t he t rial co ur t not ed t he impro per dat e allege d in t he pe t itio n and t he affid av it s. The co ur t t he n fou nd t hat t he pe t itio n "fails ut t er ly to set for t h any fact s t o e st ablish a
me ritorious de f

ense to the un de rl y i ng pe ti ti on to termi na te parental

ri ghts ." Likew ise, t he co ur t fou nd
no al l eg ati on s e sta b l i sh i n g d ue di l i gen ce "i n pu rsui n g th e def ense , i f an y ," to t he t er minatio n pet itio n. The court den

i ed th e peti

tion and Ral ph' s oral motion to ame nd i t. Ral ph f i rs t ar gu es th at t he trial cou rt lac ke d pe

rs ona l j urisd i cti on ov er h i m be ca us e of im proper servi ce . A cc ordi

ng to Ral ph , a p eti ti on t o c hange a pe rmanenc y goa l "is a new p ro cee ding whi ch dem ands n otice to all parties. 7 50 IL CS 50/1." Thus, t he St at e's failure t o s er ve him with t he pe ti ti on t o t er minat e p ar en t al r igh t s r es ult ed in t he t r ial c o ur t 's la ck o f pe r so na l jur isd ict io n o ve rhim such that, as a m

atter of law, the defaul

t judgm ent agai nst hi m was voi d ab init io . We di sagree. We fi rst no te t hat Ralph' s citation to section 1 of the Adopt ion Act (750 ILCS 50/ 1 (West 2008) ) is inapt . N ow her e in tha t ra t her lengt hy sect ion d id t he legislat ur e make suc h a provision. In add itio n, Ra

l ph re ce i v ed pr oper s er

v i ce of su m mon s u pon th e f i l i n g of th e neglec t pet itio n. Ju ri sd i cti on ov er a res pon de nt n ee d n ot be reestabl

is hed once i

t has been properly establ is hed i n an exi st ingj uve

ni l e ca se. In re D.J. , 36 1 I ll. A pp . 3d 11 6, 12 4 ( 20 05 )
. T he t r ial c ourt d i d n ot l os e per so nal jurisdict ion o ver Ralph. Howev er, the fac t t hat the trial co ur t st ill ha d j ur isd ict io n o ve rRa lp h d o es no t en d t he inq ui ry. Much co nfusion a rises fro m sect ion 2
-- 15( 3) of t he Act , w hich pr ovid es in pa rt t hat t he sum mons i ssued i n a cas e i nv olv i ng a n a bus ed, n egl ected, or depen

den t mi nor:No. 2-- 10--0044

-7-

"s ha ll co nt ain a n o t ice t ha t t he pa r t ies will no t be en t it le d to f urth er w ri tten noti ce s or publ i ca ti on not ices o f pro cee dings in t his case , includ ing t he fi li ng of an am en de d pe ti ti on or a m otion to termi na te parental

ri ghts , except as requi

red by Supreme C our t Ru le

11 ." (Em phasi s ad ded.) 7 05 IL CS 40 5/2--1 5(3) (W est 200 8). The sum mons served on Ral

ph contai ned a notice, in subs

tantiall y the sam e word s, pr int ed in bo ld type. Ho we ve r , t he St at e' s p o sit io n in t his ca se , an d t he o pin io ns o f t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in two cases, negl ect the Supreme Court Rule 11 (Of fi ci al Reports Advance

Sheet No. 1 (January 13, 2010), R. 11, eff . Decem ber 29, 2009) port ion of

the warni

ng requi red by sec t ion 2- -1 5( 3) . In

re ach i n g i ts con cl us i on t hat jurisd ictio n ove r a re spo ndent need not be r ees t ablishe d once i t h as be en pr o pe r ly establ is hed in an exist ing juvenile cas e, t he co ur t in In re D.J. reli ed ext ensively on t he ana lysis in In
re Ab ner P. , 347 Ill . App. 3d 90 3 (2004 ). Bo t h co ur t s co nclude d t hat , since pr ior ser vice o n t he respondents contain

ed the req ui red se cti on 2 --1 5(3 ) lan

gua ge , th e re sp ond

en ts w ere not en ti tl ed to notice of the f

il in g of petiti ons to t ermi

nate parental

righ ts. See In re D.J. , 361 Ill . App. 3d at 124; In re Ab ner P. , 347 Ill . App. 3d at 908. Howev er, no a nalysis was mad e o f the ser vice "r equ ired by Supreme Court Ru

l e 11." Su pr eme Court Rul e 11 add re sses t he "Ma nner of S er vingPap er s Ot her Tha n Pr oc ess a nd Co mplainton

Par ti esNot in Defa ult i n the Tri al

and Rev ie win g Court s." Of

fi ci al Reports Advance Sheet No. 1 (Ja nua ry 13, 2010), R. 11, eff. Decem ber 29, 2009. Rul e 11 l ay s out o n wh om serv ic e sha ll be made and t he ac cep t able met hod s o f service , d epe nding o n whet her a pa rt y is repr ese nt ed by counsel o rno t . Su pr eme co ur t rule s a r e n o t su gg es t io ns; they hav e t he fo rc e o f law, a nd t he pre su m ption mus t be that the y wil l be obey ed an d en f orced a s wri

tten. Village o f Lake Villa v. Sto kovic h , 21 1 I ll. 2d 106, 116 (20 04) . Se cti on 2 --1 5(3 ) doe s n

ot i n a ny wa y exem pt the Sta te f romNo. 2-- 10--0044

2 Ru le 366 gr

an ts thi s court b

road discre

tion ary po wer s, includ ing "t he po wer s o f amendment of the trial

court " and to "enter

any judgm ent and m ake any order t hat

ough t to ha ve be en gi ve n or made." (155 Il

l . 2d Rs . 366 (a

)(1), (a)( 5)). -8- not ify inga p ar t y abo ut an yt hing it migh t file in a case af ter it has serv

ed that party

wi th proce ss. To t he extent that In

re D.J. and In re A

bn er P. hold otherwise, we reject t hei r holdin gs and anal

yses . The Sta te was requi

redto pro vide Ralph wi

th not ice of the petition to t ermi nate his parental ri

ghts. Our reviewof

th e rec ord

i n th i s c as e rev

ea l s th at, co nt ra ry t o t he St at e's a sser t ions a nd t he trial cou rt' s f i nd i ng s, th e Sta te m ad e n o atte m pt to gi ve Ral ph an y noti ceof the f i l i ng of the pe ti ti on to t er minat e h is p ar en t al r igh t s. While t his l ac k of noti cedi d n ot depri ve the trial cou rt of j urisd i cti on over Ra lph , we co nc lud e t ha t it vi olated Ral ph ' s r i gh t to due p roc es s. The p ri n ci pl e th at p aren ts possess th e f

un da men tal ri gh t to make d ecisio ns about the care, custo dy, an d contro l of

their ch il dren withoutun wa rr an t ed st at e in t rus io n is "emb edded in our juris prudence." In re

So phia G.L. , 22 9 I ll. 2d 143, 171 ( 20 08 )
. T he int er es t o f pa r en t s int he ca re , c ust od y, and co nt ro l of t heir childr en is o ne of the oldest of

the fun dam ental li berty i nterests recognize d, and thi s i nterest is protected by the due pro cess claus e. In re K .S. , 365 Il l . Ap p. 3d 56 6, 577 ( 2006)
. The pr oc edu re s involved in ter minating parental rights must compl

y wi th the req uirem

ent of pro cedural due pro cess . In re A .W. , 39 7 I ll. App. 3d 868, 872 (201 0). Fairnessi s the core m ean i ng of due process . Peo ple v. Co lli ns , 33 3 I ll. App. 3d 20, 26 (2002). We conclude th at w e m

us t re ver se t he tri al

cou rt' s den i al of Ral ph's se cti on 2--1401 petition, v

acate its def

aul t jud gm en

t term inating Ralph's par ent al right s, a nd r emand t he cause for further pr oceedings. 2 We fi nd an anal ogous situ at ion in t he r ealm of civil law. Whe n a pa rt y in a civi l case s eek ing dam ages i s def aul ted:No. 2-- 10--0044

-9-

"[I]f re l i ef i s s oug h t, whether by

am endm ent, counterclai

m, or otherwise, be

yond tha t prayed in t he ple ad ing t o wh ic h th e party i s i n def aul t, not ic e shal

l b e gi ven the defa ulted party as provi ded b y rule." 7 35 IL CS 5/2 --604 (W est 200 8). The content of the required n ot ic e, along wi

th the acceptable m

ethods of servi

ce, is in cl uded in Supreme Court Rule 105 (134 Ill. 2d R. 105). I n a caseof def aul t, a courtt ha t gr an t s a n a wa r d in
excess of the ad dam

num withoutprior notice to the defen dant exceeds

its authority, and thatporti on of the decree i

n excess of the ad dam

num i s void
. Cook , 341 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 663. While t he dissent canno t subs cr ibe to t his analo gy, w e find it p ar t icular ly apt. The reli ef that the Stat e i

ni tial ly sought was that of an

ad j udi ca ti on of ne glec t. The Sta

te then sough t term i na ti on of parental

righ ts, additional

reli ef ("e xcess dam ages") thatwas not in

herent i n the origi

nal negl ect petition. Thi

s addi tional re l i ef wa s n ot m erel y mon ey da mag es ; th e S tate

so ught t o int er fere wit h a fun dam ental li berty i nterest that is protect ed by the due process cl ause. The Stat e cann ot seek withoutnotice wh

atev er ad ditional

reli ef i t wants, merel

y b ecause the trial

court has persona

l j uri sdi cti on ove r the re spon

den t. Atri al cou rt i s n ot all owed t o awar d damages greater t han those
o r igin ally requested in

the absen

ce of requi

red notice; we

ca nn ot allow the termi

nation of parental ri ghts i n the ab sen

ce of requi red n otice
. The Sta te a ttem pte d to pe r so na lly

serv e Patri cia wi th a s um mons on Feb ruary 20. The rec ord
co nt ains proof of

the a ttempt ma de b y a Du P age C ounty

sherif f 's depu ty. H owev er, the

re is not hing of re cord to sh

ow a si m i l ar a ttem pt to s erv e R al ph . The Sta

te' s af f i da vi t f orservi ceby

publ i ca ti on sta ted tha t Patr i ci a' s addr es s c oul d n ot "b e a sc erta

i ne d up on d

i l i ge nt i nq ui ry " s uc h th at " proc es s ca nn ot be served upon hi s [ sic ] e i th er pers on al l y or b y certif i ed mai l ." How ev

er , there isno suc h affid av it atte sti

n g to a di l i gen t i n qui ry i n to an d a n i n ab i l i ty to as certai

n Ra l ph' s a dd re ss . In an y ev en t,No. 2-- 10--0044

-10-

such an af fi davi t would, upon revi ew, be suspe ct, as the record shows that Ralph stil l res ide d at t he addr es s th

at th e S tate l i sted f or hi m on the term i na tion peti tion i tself . In i ts b rief , the S tate as se rts that i t uns ucce ssf ull y attem pted to serv

e Ra lph, a nd it d isingenuo usly follow s t he as ser t ion wit h a cita t ion, n ot to e v i den ce

of re cord sh owi

n g a n atte m pt a t se rvi ce , but to ano t her of t he Stat e's f il in gs in whi ch the State asserts, without citation to evide nce of rec ord, t hat it attempted servi ce. The Sta te' s b rief i s rep l ete wi th such i n cor re ct ref eren ce s to th e rec ord . Th

e S tate as se rtsthat Ral ph wa s pre se

n t on Oc tob er 14 , 20 08 , w

h en th e S tate wa s g ra n ted l ea v e to f i l e th e p eti ti on to ter m i n ate and t ha t "t he ne xt co ur t da t e o n t his ma t t er wa s s et fo rFe br ua ry 17 , 20 09
. " T he St at e fa ils to ac kn owl edgetha t the Fe br ua ry 17 d atef orperman

ency review had al

ready be en set an d tha t Mr. Oga n, the assi stant Stat e's A tt orney, stated in

Ral ph's presence that the f

i l i n g of th e p eti ti on to term i na te "wi l l gen erate a new date." The State t hen wai ted alm ost four month

s to f i l e i ts p eti ti on and s et no ne w da t e. Ho w Ra lph was t o k now when, if ever, t he St at e wo uld file the pet itio n t o termi nate, and what the new date was to be, i s l eft uns ai d. The St at e go es o n t o a rg ue t hat , a t t he Feb ruary 17 hear ing, " t he A

pri l 14 , 20 09 , hea

ri n g to c on si

der the p eti

ti on to pe rm an en tl y ter m i n ate [Ralph' s] parental ri

ghts as to Haley

D. was set ." Ho weve r, t he o rd er t o w hich the Stat e ci tes shows that the ma

tt er was set on Apri

l 14 , 2009, f

or a " Per man en cy He ari ng " a nd tha t the box f or "Term i na tion of Pa ren tal Ri ghts Hear i ng" wasnot checke d. Thes e t er m i n ati on pr oce ed i n gssta rte d i m pr ope rl y wh en th e S tate n ev er ev en atte m pte d to serve Ralph

with notice of the petition. Things onl y got wo rse when , on Apri l 14, 2009, th e court granted t he de fault judg ment ev en as t he St at e d ug t hr o ug h it s r ec o r ds an d c o uld not f i nd an y proof of an attempt to serve Ralph . The def aul t judgm en t e nt er ed a gainst Ralph w as u nfair, unjust , a nd
un co nsc io na ble (see Sm

i th , 114 Ill . 2dat 225 ) a nd ca nnot be al l owe d to s tan

d. Dueproc es s doesnotNo. 2-- 10--0044

-11-

allow parental

righ ts to be termi

nated via suc h slipsho d and unfair p ro cee dings. We concl ude that the trial court erredin d en ying Ra lph 's s ec t io n 2
- - 14 01 pe t it io n t o va ca t e t he de fau lt judg ment, and
we reverse th at j udgm

en t, vac ate the defa ult j udgme

nt, and rem

and the caus e for f

urther proceedings on the peti tion to termi na te parental

ri ghts
. For thes e rea sons , the j udgm

en t of the ci rcui t court of D u P age Co unt y is rever sed , a nd t he cause is rem

anded for further pro ceedings. Reversed a

nd rem anded; defaul

t judgm ent vacated. HUTC HINSO

N, J., c oncu

rs. PRESIDING JUSTICE ZENOFF, dis senti ng: While I a gree with the m aj ority that the trial

court did n

ot lose personal

jurisdi ction over Ralph, I disagree with the maj ority's anal ysi s and the ul tim ate res ul t it rea ches. A ccordi ngl y , I
re sp ec tf ul l y di ss en t. While t he maj ori

ty ci testo Peo ple v. Vincent , 22 6 I ll. 2 d 1 ( 20 07 ) , an d t he su pr eme co ur t 's ad m oni ti on that under

t he procedural c ircum

stances h ere a de novo st an da r d o f r ev iew ap plie s, it reaches a re sul t base d on equ itable p rinciples r at her t han t he ap plic ab le s t at ut o ry re qu ire men t s. T his appro ach i s, in my

view, incons iste nt wit h t he analysis in Vincent an d t his c o ur t 's r ec en t o pin io n in Mills v. Mc Du ffa , 393 Ill . App. 3d 940 (200 9). I t is well

sett led that an appell

ate co urt must

f ol l ow t he la was s et f orth by the s uprem e court. Ne l son

v. A urora Eq ui pm en t Co. , 391 Ill . App. 3d 1036, 1038 ( 2009)
. Vincent ex

pl i ci tl y sta testha t i t i s i nc orre ct f or cou rts to continue

to view section 2--1401 pet itio ns as a matter o f j udicial discretion, su b j ec t to an ab

use-of-di scretion rev

ie w on appeal
. Vincent , 226 Ill . 2d at 15. Th e a ppl i ca ti on of the ab us e-of -discreti on sta n da rd i s a re su l t of appe l l ateNo. 2-- 10--0044

-12-

cou rtsmaintaining t he bel

ie f that secti on 2--1401 petitions rem ai n root ed in equit able pr inciples. As the Vincent court stated:

"[T ]he op er at ion o f the ab

us e of di screti on s tan da rd is th e re sul t of an erroneous bel

ie f that a se ct ion 2
-- 140 1 pe t itio n 'invok es t he eq uit able po wer s o f the co ur t *** .' [ Ci tation .]
*** Whe n t he leg isla t ur e a bo lishe d t he wr it s in fa vo ro f t o da y's s t at ut o ry re med y, it be ca me i n ac cu ra te t o co nt inu e t o vie w t he r elie f in strictly equi table terms. *** Because

reli ef is no l ong er p ure l y di screti ona ry, i t makesl i ttl e s en se to con ti nu e to a ppl y an ab us e of di screti on standard o n review." Vincent , 226 Il l . 2d at 15 -16. Fo llowing Vincent , in Mills , we als o emphasi zed the chan

ge i n section 2--1401 r elie f fr o m eq uit ab le to statutory. Mills , 393 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 947, 949("W

hen the legi slatureabolis

hed the comm

on-law
wri ts i n f av or of the statutory

remedy [of section 2--1401], i

t becam e i naccurate to co ntin

ue to view t he r elie f in st r ict ly eq uit ab le terms" an d "i t is n ot appropriate to viewse ct io n 2
- - 14 01 r elie f in st r ict ly equi tabl e term s"). The Vincent co ur t es se nt ially h eld th at the standard by whi ch we sh ould revi ew the trial
co ur t 's dis positi on of a section 2--1401 petition depen ds upon the ma

nne rin whi ch i t was disposed. See Vincent , 226 Il

l . 2d at 15 -17. Five t ypes o f fi nal dispo sitio ns are possible in section 2--1401 litigat ion: "the trial

judge ma y di sm is s the petiti on; the trial

j udg e m ay gra nt or de ny the pe ti ti on on the ple adi ngs al one (sum ma ry j udgme nt); or the tr ia

l judge m ay grant or deny rel

ie f after holdin

g a he ar in g at wh ich

factual di sputes ar e resolved." Vincent , 22 6 Il l . 2d at 9 , re l y i ng on D . Si m ko, Up da t in g th e S tan

da rd of Rev i ew f or P eti ti on s to Vaca

te F i n al Judgmen ts , 86 Il l . B.J. 3 4 (1998 ) (li st ingthe fi

ve possi ble di spositions as di sm

is si ng, granti ng rel ie f wi thout an ev

ide ntiary hea ring , denying reli

ef without an

evi dentia ry h earin g, grantin g reli ef af ter anevident iary hear ing, a nd de nyingNo. 2-- 10--0044

-13-

reli ef af ter an evi den tia ry he ari ng)
. Vincent ma

ndates that, wh

ere a tria l courten ters a j udg men t on t he pl eadi ngs or asummary judg ment in a s ect ion 2
-- 140 1 pr oc eed ing, t hat judg ment w ill be reviewed de novo on ap

peal
. Vincent , 2 26 I ll. 2d a t 18. Altho ugh Vincent deal t with the dis

mi ssal of a s ec ti on 2--1401 pe ti

ti on (possi bi l i ty n um ber one), th

e court state d tha

t futur e anal y ses regar di ng th e stan dard of revi ew for a grant or deni al

of a section 2--1401 petition sh ould be "grounded i

n the n ot ion that each o f t he dis po sit io ns a va ilable in a se ct ion 2
-- 140 1 ac t ion is bo rr ow ed fr om o ur civil pract ice and pleadi ngs." Vincent , 226 Il

l . 2d at 17
. In this case, the trial

court deni

ed Ral ph's se cti on 2 --1 401 pe ti

ti on b as ed on t he plea dings a nd aff idav its; the re wasno e

vi de nti ary he ari ng . There f

or e, jus t as we would revi ew de novo the trial
co ur t 's grant of a m

ot ion f or summ ary judgme

nt, we should review de novo t he trial court 's den

ia l of R al ph' s se cti on 2--1 401 pe

titi on. Ral ph con ten dstha t hi s s ec ti on 2-
- 14 01 pe t it io n sh o uld have been granted because

the trial courtl ac ke d pe

rs ona l j urisd i cti on ove r him due t o t he St at e's f ai l ur e to s er v e h i m wi th th e p eti ti on to ter m i n ate h i s p aren tal ri gh ts. A cc ordi

n g to Ralph, beca use t he t r ial c o ur t lac ke d ju r isd ict io n o ve rhim, the defa ult j udgme

nt termi natin g hi s parental

righ ts was void. Ge ne r ally, to succeed on a se ction 2--1401 petiti on, a par t y mus t de mo ns t r at e, by a preponderanceof the evi

dence, t he ex ist en ce o f a " de fen se o rcla im that woul d ha ve precl uded en try of the judgm

ent in the origi nal action an

d dil ige nce i n both di scoveri

ng the def

en se or clai

m and pr ese nt ing

the pet ition." Vincent , 226 Il l . 2d at 7 -8. In

addi ti on, the se cti on 2--140 1 petition must be br ou ght wit hin tw o yea rs o f the ent ry o f judgment , e xcluding a ny time du ring wh ich t he pa r t y is under leg al d isa bilit y o rdu r es s o rdu r ing wh ich t he gr o un d fo rr elie f is f raudu l en tly conc eal ed. 735 ILCS 5/2--1 401(c ) (We st 2008 ).No. 2-- 10--0044

3 Ral ph also contends (in

a footnot e) that t he trial

court erredby no t allo win g h im t o a mend his sec t ion 2
-- 140 1 pe t itio n. Ac co rd ing t o R alph, t his was e rr or beca use t he t rial co ur t did no t deny his se cti on 2--140 1 petition "with prejudice." T he au t ho r it y Ra lph cit es fo rt his p r o po sit io n me r ely states that where a trial

court dis mi sses a s ection 2--1401 petiti on "wi thout prejudi

ce," the trial

court in vi tes a refi li ng. See Romo v. Al

li n Express Service, Inc. , 219 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 41 8, 419 ( 1991)
. It do es not necess aril

y f oll ow that a t rial

court errs where i

t do es not pe rm i t the f i l i ng of an am en de d pe ti ti on anytime it fails to include t he langu age "wit h pr ejudice " in its d enial of t he o riginal pe t itio n. -14- Where, however, a defendant brin gs a section 2--14 01 pet ition b ased on voidness grounds, he or she needs

to nei ther all ege a m eri toriousde f

en se , demons

trate due di l i ge nc e, n orf i l e the p eti ti on wit hin two ye ars of

the e ntry of j udgm en t. Sar kissian v. Ch

i cago B oard

of Educa ti on , 201 Ill . 2d 95, 104 ( 20 02 )
. " ' Ju dg men t s e nt er ed in a civ il pr o ce ed ing may be co llat er ally a t t ac ke d a s vo id o nly wh eret her e is a t ot al want of jur isdict ion in t he court whi ch en tered t he j udgme

nt, either as t o t he subj ect matt er or as t o t he part ies.' " I n r e M ar r iag e o f Mit ch ell , 1 81 I ll. 2d 1 69, 174 (1 998 ), quo t ing Joh ns ton v . Ci ty of Bl oom i ng ton , 77 Il l . 2d 108 , 112 (1 979). As pr ev io us ly

men ti one d, Iagree

wi th th e m aj ori ty's an al y sis of whether the trial

court had personal jurisd ictio n ove r Ra lph and c onc ur in the con cl us i on tha t the f ai l ure to serv e R

al ph di d n ot dep rive the

tri al cou rt of pe rs ona l j urisd i cti on over R al ph. Th i s, I be lieve , is w he r e t he an alys is s ho uld end, h owever. Havi

ng f ai le d to establ

is h that the defa

ult order was void f

or lack of per so na l jurisd ictio n, Ralph mak es no ar gument that t he def aul t o rderwas void f

or any other r eason. He also
ma kes n o ar

gu m en t th at his s ec t io n 2- -1 401 pet itio n pr ese nt ed a merit or iou s de fense a nd dem onstrated du e d ilige nc e in dis coverin g and presen

ting the m

eritorious def

ense. Ac co r din gly, in my opinion, Ralph ha s failed t o e st ablish any err or in the t rial co ur t 's de nial of his pet itio n. 3No. 2-- 10--0044

-15-

Nevertheless, t he majo r it y co nc lud es t ha t t he failu r e t o se rve Ra lph wit hth e p eti ti on to ter m i n ate h i s p aren tal ri gh ts violated due process and requi res the reversal

of the trial

co ur t 's de cision. Any due pr oc ess vio latio n t hat Ralph may have s uffere d as a r esu lt o f not be in g served w ith t he pe ti ti on to termi nate would ren

der the defaul

t o rder merel

y v oidab le , n ot void, as the due pro cess vio lat io n w o uld no t de pr ive t he t r ial c o ur t o f jur isd ict io n. A vo id order i s one

en tered wh ere there is a "tot al want of j urisdi

ction," whi

le a voi dabl e order is one erroneousl

y e ntered b y a c ourt wi

th jurisd ictio n. Mit ch ell , 181 Ill . 2d at 174. "O nc e a co ur t ha s a cq uir ed jur isd ict io n, an o r de rwill not be rendered

voi d m ere l y be ca us e of an err oror impro pr iety in t he issuing co ur t 's de t er minatio n of t he l aw." Mit ch ell , 181 Ill . 2d at 174, quo ting Vulc an Ma teri als C o. v . Be e C ons

tructi on , 96 Ill . 2d 159, 165 (1983) . Here, the maj ority deter mi nes, and I agree, thatt he t rial co ur t had jur isdict ion; t hus, any due process vi

olation woul

d have rendered the def

aul t o rder only

voida ble, not void. Because the defa

ult orderwas not void , t o s ucc eed on his s ect ion 2
-- 140 1 pe t itio n, Ral ph was required to presen t a meri torious def en se a nd d em onstra te due d i l i gen ce. Vincent , 226 Ill . 2dat 7-8. The maj ori

ty doe s n ot expl ai n how the due process v

iolation consti

tut es ei ther a meri

to rious defense
ordu e d ilig en ce o n R alp h's pa r t . I ns t ea d, t he majo r it y decl ares that t he al l eg ed due proc es s v i ol ati on requires reversal o f t he t r ial c o ur t 's d ec isio n be ca us e a liber t y int er es t is inv o lve d a nd t he de fau lt jud gme nt ag ain st Ra lph is "unf ai r" and "un

conscionabl

e." Sli p op. at 10. Even

und er pre- Vincent
case authority

, to which the m aj ority sub scri be s, a se cti on 2- -1 40 1 p eti

ti on er wa s req ui re d to sh ow a meri torious def en se or cl

ai m and due dil i gen ce i n pr ese nti ng th at def en se or cl

ai m . Smith v. Air o o m, Inc. , 11 4 I ll. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986). Yet , in reversi ng the trial

court , the maj ority m

akes
n o m en ti on of th es e req ui re m en ts a n d w h eth er th ey weremet.No. 2-- 10--0044

-16-

The maj ori

ty atte m pts to bolst er its c onc lusion by ana log izing t he si tuati on here to one

wh ere se cti on 2- -6 04 o f the Code of

Ci vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--604 (West 2008)) requires that notice shal l b e gi ven as pr o vid ed by r ule when addi tional rel ief (ot her than that pleaded) is sought ag ainst
a defau lting p ar t y. Su pr eme Co ur t Rule 1 05 p ro vides t hat "[i] f new o r a ddit ional r elief *** is so ught
*** notice shall b e giv

en *** as herein

pro vided." 134 Ill . 2dR. 105. Rule 105 goes on t o est abl ish t he ma nne r in whi ch such servi ce shal l b e provided. Thus , sect i on 2--6 04 prov i desthat, wh

ere addi tional reli ef i s sought agai

nst a def aul ting party, notice i s requi

red and, further, notice s

hal l b e as provided by Rule 10 5 ( which its elf mandat es t hat no ti c e be g iven wher e ad dit ional r elief is sou ght agai nst a def aul tin g party ). T his sche me is n

ot an al ogou s to th e rel

ati on sh i p b etw een

se cti on 2- -1 5( 3) of

th e A ct an d Su pr eme Court Rul e 11. Indeed, rather than requi rin g that not ic e be g i v en

to a re sp ond

en t to a pe ti ti on to termi nate parental

righ ts, s ec ti on 2--15(3) pro vi

des that the in

itial sum mons in an ab use, n eg l ec t, o rde pe nd en cy p r o ce ed ing sha ll inclu de a n o t ice t ha t t he r es po nd en t is not entitled to further notice of proceedi

ngs i n the case , " in

cl udin g the fi li ng of *** a m

oti on to ter m i n ate pa re n tal ri gh ts , except as requi red b y Supreme Court Ru

l e 11." (Emphasi s added.) 7 05 ILCS 405/ 2--15( 3) (West 20 08). The m

aj ori ty as se rtsth at " [s ]e cti

on 2- -1 5( 3) doe s n

ot i n an y wa y exem pt th e S tate f ro m not ify inga party ab out any

thin g it m igh t file in a case af ter it has serv

ed that pa r t y wit h p r o ce ss . " S lip op. at 7-8. I respectful

ly dis agree, as the p l ai

n l anguag e of

section 2--15(3 ), thou

gh ad m i ttedl y not
an ex pr es s ex em

pti on to th e S tate , do es

re qui reth at p ar

ti es b e n oti f i ed th at th ey are n ot en ti tl ed to addi tional notice. The majo r it y dis cu ss es Ru le 1 1 a s la ying o ut "o n w ho m se rvic e s ha ll be ma de a nd t he
ac ce pt ab le me

thods of servi

ce" and n ot es t hat sup re me co ur t ru les have t he for ce o f law and mus t beNo. 2-- 10--0044

-17-

followed. Sli

p op. at 7. W

i th tha t I do not di sag

ree. Ho we ve r , Ru le 11 does not require servi ce; rathe r, it simply

pr ovid es fo r t he manner in which ser vice shall be effec t ed be yond t he ser vice o f the
com pl ai n t. In othe r wor ds , i f the State were to vo lun t ar ily

serv e n oti ceof addi ti ona l f i l i ng s or procee di ngs , i t woul d ne ed to com

pl y wi th Ru l e 11. Mo re ove r, t he major ity cit es no au thor i ty f or t he pr opos i

ti on th at f ai l ur e to c om

pl y wi th Ru l e 1 1 r en dersan ord er v oi d. I n con tra st, in the se cti

on 2--604/Rule 105 s chem

e, the maj ority ci

tes Co ok v. Bu

rnette , 3 41 I ll. App. 3d 6 52 ( 200 3) , fo r t he pr opos i ti on th at f ai l ur e to provide n

ot ic e to a defaul

ting def endan t t hat addi tional reli ef was so ught
renders void a n award i n excess of the ad dam

num claus e. As co mpelling as t he major ity's ar gument mightbe , I ca nno t su bs cr ibe t o it s a na lo gy, giv en the di ff erence i n the l aw under se cti on 2 --1 5(3 ) of the A ct, where n

otice i s ex pres sl y not requ i red. Ac co r di ng ly, I would af

f i rm the tri al co ur t 's denial o f Ralph's se ct ion 2
-- 140 1 pe t itio n and his m otion to ame nd h i s se cti on 2--1 401 pe

titi on.