United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 21, 2019*

Decided November 26, 2019 

Before 

 DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

 DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1310 

AHMED MOHAMED, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WESTCARE ILLINOIS, INC., et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 17 C 07492 

Virginia M. Kendall, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Ahmed Mohamed, a former inmate at Cook County Jail, sued jail employees for 

violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to protect him from 

another inmate’s attack. Mohamed did not identify any of these employees by name. 

 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-1310 Page 2 

Three years after the attack, and after his retained counsel, Robert Ryan Arroyo, 

conceded that he had not used discovery to ascertain their names, the district court 

granted motions for a judgment on the pleadings. Because the court correctly reasoned 

that the defense of the two-year statute of limitations blocked Mohamed’s federal 

claims, we affirm. 

Based on Mohamed’s allegations, which we take as true, see Kemp v. Liebel, 

877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2017), the attack occurred at the jail on November 1, 2015. 

Mohamed lived in an open-space dormitory where he participated in a program that 

treated substance abuse, run by WestCare Illinois, Inc. On November 1, another 

participant in that program beat Mohamed viciously. This attacker, who had a history 

of violence, left Mohamed disfigured and in need of plates and screws in his face. 

Shortly before the two-year anniversary of the attack, Mohamed sued under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the defendants—"unknown employees”—had knowingly 

endangered him by housing him near a violence-prone inmate in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. If Mohamed prevailed against these employees, he alleged that under 

state law he could seek indemnification from their employers, WestCare, Cook County, 

and its Sheriff. (Mohamed also brought federal constitutional claims against the 

employers, but the district court dismissed those claims because they were based on the 

unavailable theory of respondeat superior, see Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978), and the Sheriff, sued in his individual capacity, had no personal knowledge 

of the events. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). Mohamed does not 

challenge that ruling, nor does he challenge the dismissal of his claim against the 

attacker, whom Mohamed never served with process.) 

Over the next year, Mohamed’s counsel, Arroyo, never tried to obtain through 

discovery the names of the “unknown employees.” When discovery closed about a year 

after Mohamed had filed suit, and about three years after the attack, the named 

defendants—the employers—moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued that 

the statute of limitations barred the claims against their employees because Mohamed 

had not named them within the two-year time limit. Mohamed responded one month 

later by asking the district court to extend the time for discovery. In doing so, Arroyo 

conceded that he had not initiated any discovery, let alone discovery to learn the 

employees’ names, during the life of the case. 
No. 19-1310 Page 3 

The district court denied the request for more discovery and granted the motions 

for judgment on the pleadings. It ruled that the statute of limitations for claims against 

the unknown employees expired on November 1, 2017, and because Mohamed had not 

named them a year later, his claims were time-barred. The court added that Mohamed 

offered no valid reason for tolling or extending the statute of limitations. 

On appeal, Mohamed’s brief fails to engage with the district court’s analysis or 

otherwise argue why the court erred. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a). Even so, we have 

reviewed the record and conclude that the court was correct. 

A district court may enter judgment on the pleadings if the pleadings show that 

the statute of limitations blocks the plaintiff’s claims. See Easterling v. Thurmer, 880 F.3d 

319, 322–23 (7th Cir. 2018). For claims arising under § 1983 in Illinois, as here, the statute 

of limitations is two years. Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2002). 

During that two-year period, a plaintiff ordinarily must name in his complaint any 

defendant he wishes to sue; otherwise his claim is time-barred. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 

F.3d 859, 864 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Mohamed concedes that he did not name the 

individual employees within two years (indeed three) of the attack. 

Although a complaint need not anticipate a response to a limitations defense, 

Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2012), Mohamed cannot 

respond to the defense under either of the two theories that he suggested to the district 

court—equitable tolling or estoppel. To ask a court to toll the limitations period, a 

plaintiff must argue that, despite exercising reasonable diligence, he was unable to 

discover the identities of the unknown defendants within two years. See Wilson v. 

Battles, 302 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2002). But Mohamed’s retained counsel, Arroyo, 

admitted to exercising no diligence; he conceded to the district court that, during the 

first year of the litigation, he did not pursue any discovery. See id. at 748–49. And even if 

Arroyo expected the employers to disclose the names voluntarily under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), when they did not do so, he needed to show diligence on 

Mohamed’s behalf by moving the district court to compel that disclosure, but he never 

did. Finally, Mohamed has not suggested to us that any defendant stopped Arroyo 

from asking the district court to assist him in discovering the employees’ names. Thus 

Mohamed also could not invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Rosado v. 

Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2016). 
No. 19-1310 Page 4 

Finally, although Mohamed contends that his attorney, Arroyo, was deficient, 

even if that is true the shortcomings of a plaintiff’s lawyer in litigating a civil case are 

not a basis to shift liability to the defendants. See Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 580–

81 (7th Cir. 2001). The proper remedy for inadequate representation lies in a malpractice 

action. Id. at 81. 

AFFIRMED