J-A12041-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

BRINGKOP ARIYAMITR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SANIYA ARIYAMITR,

Appellant No. 2639 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order July 28, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2012-04861

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2016

Saniya Ariyamitr (“Appellant”) seeks review of the orders entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, which denied both her 

petition to vacate/rescind the divorce decree ending her marriage with 

Bringkop Ariyamitr (“Appellee”) and her subsequent motion for 

reconsideration. We affirm.

The trial court summarizes pertinent case history as follows:

On May 6, 2015, a divorce decree was entered in this matter 

which divorced Plaintiff/Appellant Saniya Ariyamitr [“Appellant”] 

and Defendant/Appellee Bringkop Ariyamitr. [“Appellee”] from 

the bonds of matrimony. The May 6, 2015 divorce decree 

granted no further relief, as requested by Appellee in the April 

29, 2015 Praecipe to Transmit Record.1

1

Plaintiff/Wife began this matter by filing a 

Complaint for Custody on February 27, 2012. 

However, Defendant/Husband filed the Divorce 

Complaint on June 25, 2014 listing himself as 
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Plaintiff. Because he is listed as Defendant on 

docket 2012-04861 the court shall refer to him in 

this opinion as Defendant, although he is 

Plaintiff/Complainant for purposes of the divorce 

complaint.

On June 3, 2015, [28 days after the entry of the divorce decree] 

Appellant filed a Petition to Vacate/Rescind Divorce Decree. On 

June 10, 2015, the court scheduled argument on Appellant’s 

petition to occur on July 16, 2015. On July 16, 2015, Appellant 

was represented by Jerry Schuchman, Esquire and Appellee was 

represented by Michael P. Gottlieb, Esquire. Appellant’s counsel 

stated that Appellant did not “understand” “papers that were 

served on her...when she was under prescribed medication for 

pain as a result of a trauma incurred in a work[-]related injury.” 

N.T. July 16, 2015, at 3. Appellant’s counsel stated a “doctor 

had prescribed pain medication...his report is attached to...the 

brief and reply that indicates that she did not have the relevant 

mindset to understand what was happening due to the 

medication.” N.T. at 3. Appellant’s counsel argued that 

Appellant suffered from “temporary diminished capacity.” N.T. 

at 3. Appellant did not present any medical or psychological 

evidence, nor did Appellant testify.

On July 28, 2015, the court issued an order denying Appellant’s 

June 3, 2015 petition. On August 7, 2015, Appellant filed a 

Petition for Reconsideration of Order. On August 18, 2015, the 

Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On August 26, 

2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania of the July 28, 2015 Order. On August 31, 2015, 

the trial court ordered Appellant to file her Concise Statement of 

Errors Complained of on Appeal within twenty one days of the 

date of the order. On September 16, 2015, Appellant filed a 

“Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925” [which raised nine separate issues].

Trial Court Opinion, filed November 6, 2015, at 1-2.

Appellant presents the following two questions for our review:

A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

IN DENYING WIFE’S PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

WHICH REQUESTED THAT TESTIMONY OF HER AND HER 
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PHYSICIAN BE TAKEN ON THE ISSUES OF SEPARATION 

AND TEMPORARY DIMINISHED CAPACITY[?]

B. WHETHER THE COURT ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO 

ESTABLISH SAFEGUARDS, ACCESSIBILITY AND 

ACCOMMODATION STANDARDS WITHIN THE RULES OF 

CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHERE THE PRO SE SPOUSE WITH 

POTENTIAL TEMPORARY MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND 

LANGUAGE BARRIER, WHILE RECEIVING APL AND 

CONDITIONED TO RECEIVE EARLIER NOTICES TO 

APPEAR IN COURT, ACTUALLY RECEIVED NO NOTICE 

TO APPEAR AT A FINAL HEARING IN DIVORCE, IS A 

VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE AMERICANS 

WITH DISABILITIES ACT AS AMENDED[?]

Appellant’s brief at 4.

Initially, we consider whether the order from which Appellant appeals 

is a final order or immediately appealable. Generally, only final orders are 

appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (a final order is any order that 

disposes of all claims and of all parties); Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 (Pa. 

1985) (issues in divorce are reviewable after entry of divorce decree and 

resolution of all economic issues). However, a bifurcated divorce decree is 

immediately appealable. See Curran v. Curran, 667 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Super. 

1995).

Here, Appellee filed his complaint seeking a No Fault Divorce under 

Section 3301(D) of the Divorce Code on June 25, 2014. In his complaint, 

Appellee sought no economic relief, a position reiterated in his subsequent 

Praecipe to Transmit Record of April 29, 2015, in which he indicated that no 

related claims were pending and that he sought a “decree in divorce with no 

other relief granted.” Nor is there any indication in the record that either 
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party sought equitable distribution of the marital estate or that any ongoing 

economic negotiations existed between the parties at the time. Accordingly, 

because the court entered a divorce decree with no accompanying order of 

bifurcation, and we otherwise discern no outstanding economic issues or 

negotiations that were before the court at the time of its decree, we deem 

the Order of July 28, 2015, a final order subject to our review.

In addressing Appellant’s first issue, we note that this Court has 

previously declared:

We begin by observing that “[a] major premise of the Divorce 

Code is to effectuate economic justice between the parties.” 

Wang v. Feng, 888 A.2d 882, 892 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting 

Wagoner v. Wagoner, 538 Pa. 265, 269, 648 A.2d 299, 301 

(1994)). Additionally, case law instructs that the equitable 

purposes which underlie the Divorce Code allow for liberal 

interpretation of its provisions. Id. (citing Wagoner, supra). 

The Divorce Code has long authorized the severance of economic 

issues from the divorce itself. See, e.g., Prall v. Prall, 698 

A.2d 1338, 1340 (Pa.Super. 1997)(explaining that bifurcation is 

permitted within the discretion of the trial court based on a 

thorough review of the record). Significantly, the legislature 

very recently amended the Divorce Code to allow for bifurcation 

based merely on consent of both parties. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3323(c.1).2 See Bonawits v. Bonawits, 2006 PA Super 238, ¶ 

7, 907 A.2d 611 (observing that this subsection statutorily 

providing for bifurcation with the consent of both parties 

changed the standard for granting bifurcation).

Lowers v. Lowers, 911 A.2d 553, 555 (Pa.Super. 2006). However, we also 

observed in Lowers that there is a 30-day time limitation on the trial court's 

authority to open or vacate a divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 602 (repealed; 

see now 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332). Id. at 556.
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Appellant first contends the court erred in denying her June 2, 2015, 

petition to vacate/rescind, and her subsequent motion for reconsideration, in 

which she requested the opportunity to provide the testimonies of both 

herself and her physician as to her diminished capacity to comprehend 

Appellee’s Praecipe to Transmit due to the effects of her prescribed 

medications. As a consequence of the decree, she claims, her Alimony 

Pendente Lite has been terminated and she will be effectively “relegated to 

living a sub-standard existence.” For its part, the trial court notes that 

Appellant failed to make this argument at the July 16, 2015 hearing on the 

petition, and she elected, through counsel, not to testify at the hearing. 

N.T. 7/16/15 at 2. 

Consistent with our discussion of precedent in Lowers, we conclude 

there was no basis for the court to vacate/rescind the order after the 

expiration of the 30-day period. In Lowers, we held that since the trial 

court acted within 30 days of entry of the parties' divorce decree, the court 

had the authority to modify the decree, by appointing a master, in order to 

effectuate economic justice between the parties. In so doing, we rejected 

the wife/appellant’s reliance on inapposite jurisprudence discussing instances 

where the court acted outside Section 3332’s 30-day time period. 

Wife's first argument is that Husband's failure to assert any 

economic claims in his complaint or file a petition to open or 

vacate the divorce decree precludes any consideration of those 

issues. She cites to various sections of the Divorce Code as well 

as Justice v. Justice, 417 Pa.Super. 581, 612 A.2d 1354 

(1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 635, 621 A.2d 581 (1993)....
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***

The Justice case is also inapposite. There, the husband filed a 

complaint in divorce in March 1990 which did not assert 

economic claims. The wife failed to respond to the complaint, 

and a decree was entered in May 1990. The wife immediately 

sought to vacate the decree, which the trial court eventually 

granted but outside of the 30-day period permitted for 

modification pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. After appeal by 

the husband to this Court, wherein we found the trial court 

lacked the authority to act beyond the 30-day period, the trial 

court accordingly rescinded its order vacating the divorce decree. 

After the decree was reinstated, the wife appealed, claiming that 

economic justice required consideration of economic issues. The 

wife conceded that the reason she did not make any such claims 

was inadvertence of her counsel. As in Fenstermaker [v. 

Fenstermaker, 348 Pa.Super. 237, 502 A.2d 185 (1985)] we 

observed in Justice the general power of the trial court to 

effectuate a fair and just determination of property rights but 

explained that extrinsic fraud must be established in order for 

the court to act beyond 30 days. Since the wife did not even 

suggest any wrongful conduct on the part of the husband, there 

was no basis for a finding of fraud which would permit the court 

to vacate the divorce decree. 612 A.2d at 1360. We therefore 

affirmed.

Lowers, 911 A.2d at 555, 557.

Even where the appellant in Justice immediately sought to vacate the 

decree for consideration of newly raised economic issues, the analysis still 

turned on whether the court acted within the 30-day period. Here, Appellant 

waited until Day 28 to file her petition to vacate, which, under the 

circumstances, pushed the hearing date on the petition to beyond the 30-

day period and left the court with no authority to vacate without a showing 

of extrinsic fraud. As we agree with the lower court, moreover, that 

Appellant failed to establish extrinsic fraud in advancing her petition, we 

reject Appellant’s first issue as meritless.
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In her remaining issue, Appellant contends that the court violated the 

Americans with Disabilities Act through its policies governing receipt of 

notices and scheduling of hearings. This claim, however, was raised in 

neither Appellant’s petition to vacate/rescind the divorce decree nor her 

motion for reconsideration. As such, Appellant's attempt to raise this issue 

for the first time on appeal results in waiver, as Appellant has not preserved 

the issue for our review. See Commonwealth v. Oliver, 128 A.3d 1275, 

1284 (Pa.Super. 2015) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)); 

Pa.R.A.P.1925(b)(4)(vii).

Order is AFFIRMED.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2016