i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 50 6- CV R. L owell and Paula E
. GA UT ,

Ap pe lla nts
v . Migue l R. And Gloria R. DA NI EL , a nd Anna G. Go nza le z, Ind ivi du a lly and a s Represe ntative of the Estates of Alice L . Gar cia a nd Abelar do G. Gar cia, De cea sed, Appellee s Fr om the 229th J udicial District Court, Duval County , Texas

Trial Court No. DC-06-249 Honora ble Alex W illiam Gabert, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 24, 2009 REVERSED AND RENDERED We withdraw our opinion and judgment dated Ma y 20, 2009 and issue the f

ollowing opinion and judg ment in their stead. R. L owell and Paula E . Gau t ap p ea l the trial court’ s judgme nt rende ringtheir dee d to 47.71 acr es void. The Ga uts raise seve n issues on appe al ; h o we v er, we ad d re s s only

the first issue, which r equire s us to rever se the trial c ourt’s judg ment and re nder jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he Ga uts
.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND In th is tre sp a ss t o tr

y tit le laws uit , M igue l R. and Gl or ia R. D anie l so ug ht t o e sta

bli shtit le by deed to 28 acr es i n Duval C ounty , Texas. The Daniels sued Anna Gonzalez indivi dually

and as Repres en t at i v e o f t he Estates of her pa rents, Alice and Abe lardo Ga rcia ; the Gar cias we re the g rantors of

the 28-a cre deed to the Daniels. The D aniels also sued L owell and Paula G aut, who claim owner s h i p o f a 4 7
. 7 1 -ac re tra ct under a wa rra nty deed a nd as bona f

ide purc haser s. The Daniels c laim their 28 ac res is w ithin the acr eag e purc hased by the Gauts. Anna

Gonzalez was the g ra nto r o f t he 47 .7 1- a c re de e d to the Ga uts
. Followinga benc h trial, the t rial court held t he description of t he land in the Danie ls’ 28-ac re deed w as sufficie nt to convey title, awar ded attorne y s’ fe es to the Da niels, canc elled the Ga

uts’ deed, and denied all other relief
. Finding s of fac t a

nd conclusions of law wer e issued indicatingthe 28-
ac re d ee d t o th e Da n i el s wa s s u ff

i ci en t l y ce rt ai nt o co n v ey

th e p ro p erty

t o th em . Ad d i t i o n al fi n d i n gs and conclusions were enter ed which g ener ally favor ed the Ga

uts over Anna

Gonzalez; however, no
new or amende d judgme nt was ente red. The Ga uts filed a motion for new trial, and soug ht modifi ca t i o n an d correction of the judgme nt. The motion was over ruled; this appea l followed. S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE D A N I ELS ’ 28-A C R E D EED In their first issu e, t h e Gauts cha lleng e the suff iciency of the Da

niels’ 28-a cre deed. T he Gauts ar g ue the deed is void as a matter of law be cause the land ca nnot be locate d by

the desc ription in the deed, a

nd the dee d does not ref

ere nce a ny exis ting e x trinsic d o cu m en t to supply nece ssary specific ity . There fore , t h ey co n cl ude ther e wa s insufficient evide nce to support the tr ial court’s finding that the dee d was va lid. W e agree .04
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- 3- In order to obtain a j udg ment in a tre spass-to-try -title action, the plaintiff must usually do one of the following : “(1) prove a regular c hain of c onvey ance s from the sover eig n, (2) e stablish superior title out of a co m m o n s o urce , (3) pr ove title by limit ations, or (4) pr ove title by prior possession coupled with pr oof that possession was not aba ndoned.” Martin v. Ame rman , 133 S.W .3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004)
. The Daniels contend the land in dispute was conveyed to them by a dee d dated Oc tober 22, 1990 from the Gar cias. This land wa s part of a larg er pa rce l of 47.71 ac res sold to the Ga uts by Gonzalez, the Garcias’ daug hter, in 2006. The Gauts contend the leg al cha in of title shows the land purportedly

conveyed to the Da

niels in 1990 was ac tually

leg ally conveyed to Gonzalez by

deed f rom her pa rents in 1991. Review of

the re cord r evea ls that how much property Gonzalez actually owned,
as we ll as t he location of t hat property , are matters of dispute. Rega rdless, the que stion raised by the Gauts re g ards the suf

ficienc y of the Da niels’ 28-a cre deed. To be su ff ic ie nt, a wr iti ng c onve ying tit le mus t pro vid e wi thi n it se lf , o r b y re fe re nc e to s ome other e x isting writingin exi stence at the time of the de ed, t h e m ea n s or information by which the land being convey ed can be identified with rea sonable c erta inty
. W illiams v. Ellis on , 493 S.W .2d 7 3 4 , 7 3 6 ( T e x . 1 9 7 3 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )
. T h i s h a s b e e nt e r m e d th e “ nu c l e u s o f d e s c r i p t i o n ” th e o r y. Id. Under th is th e o r

y , if th e d e e d c o n ta in s a “ nu c le u s o f d e s c r ip ti o n , ” p ar o l e v id e n c e may be introduced to e x plain the desc riptive words in order to locate the land. Gates v. Ashe r , 154 Tex. 538, 541, 280 S.W .2d 247, 248 (1955) (citations omitted). “I f enough a ppear s in the descr iption so t hat a part y fa m i l i arwith the locality can ide ntify

the pre mises with reasona ble ce rtainty , it will be sufficie nt.” Id.04
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- 4- Extr ins ic e vid e nc e ma

y be us e d “ on ly

fo r t he purp os e of

ide nti fy ingthe [pr op e rt

y ] wit h
rea sonable c erta inty

from the data” contained in the contra ct, “not for the pur pose of supplying the location or de scription of the [property].” Pick v . Bartel , 6 5 9 S. W. 2 d 6 3 6 , 637 (Tex. 1 9 8 3 )
. “ [I ]f there appea

rs in the instrument en o u gh t o en able one by pursuing an inquiry

based upon the information containe d in th e deed to identify the par ticular prope rty

to the exclusion of others, the descr iption will be held suff icient.” Templ eton v . D re iss , 961 S.W .2d 645, 658 (Tex. App.—San An t o n i o 1 9 9 8 , p et
. d en i ed ). Ho we v er , i ti s i mp o rt an tt o n o t e t h e f o l l o wi n g: The c erta inty

of the c ontrac t may be aided by parol only with cer tain limit ations. The essential elem ents m ay never be sup p l i ed b y p arol. Th e de ta ils wh ic h me re ly explain or clarify

the essential ter

ms appea ringin t h e i nstrument may ordinarily

be shown by parol. B ut the parol must not constitute the framework or skeleton of the ag ree ment. That m ust be contained i n the writi ng . Thus, resor t to ex trinsic evidenc e, wher e prope r at a ll, is not for the pur pose of supply ing the location or de scription of the land, but only

for the pur

pose of identify

ing it with re asonable cer

tainty from the data in t he me mor and

um. W ilson v. Fisher , 144 Tex. 53, 57, 188 S.W .2d 150, 152 (1945) ( citation omitted) (emphasis adde d). The de ed in question first g ener ally ref ere nces the Duval C ounty survey s out of which the 28
acr es can be found. None of these survey s are part of the re cord. The deed a lso notes the 28 acr es
a s “ b e i n g o u to f

a c a l l e d 3 9 9
. 5 a c r e t r a c t d e s i g n a t e d a s S h ar e N o . 6 , a s s e ta s i d e t o A l i c e L. Gar cia . . . .” I t the n ref

ere nces sever al survey s of the partitioned land from which the 399.5 ac re tra ct was take n. Followingthe g ener al desc ription summariz ed above, the deed provides the f ollowing more particula r desc ription: BEG I NNI NG at the N W corner of

a 17 ac re trac t f

or the place of beg inning and NE c or ne r o f t his 28 a c re tr a c t; THENCE in a southeaster ly direc tion, 1173 fee t to point for the SE corner of this 28 a c re tr a c t;04
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- 5- TH EN CE i n a

so uthwe ste rl y

dir e c tio n, 76 0. 5 f

e e t to a po int fo r the SW c or ne r o f t his 28 a c re tr a c t; TH EN CE i n a no rt

hw e ste rl y dir e c tio n 88 1. 2 fe e t to a po int fo r t he NW c or

ne r o f t his 28 a c re tr a c t; THENCE in a nor

theaster ly direct i o n an d p arallel with Hwy 59, 1388.2 fee t to the NE co rn er

o f t h i s 2 8 ac re tra ctan d

p l ac e o f b egi n n i n g. The Ga uts supply sever al arguments supporting their contention that the above languag e wa s insufficient to conve y

title to the Daniels. First, the G auts contend the deed at t empt s to convey an unidentified portion of the 399.5 a cre s in Share 6. L ocation is an esse ntial element of a deed which cannot be supplied by

extrinsi c evide nce. See W ilson , 188 S.W .2d at 152. The la ng uag e above pr ov ide s n o r e fe re nc e to t he loc a tio n o f t

he 17 -a c re tr a c t men tio ne d in the fi rs t c a ll, no me ans wi thi n the dee d to locate the tr act, and no ref ere nce within the dee d to any exis ting e x trinsic writing which might assist in determiningthe location. See W illiams , 493 S.W .2d at 736. In addition, there is no evidenc e of a

ny deed to a 17-ac re tra ct within Share 6. The only extrinsi c docume nt the deed r efe rs to is the 1950 partition de ed for 399.5 acr es, which provides no information to a ssist i n locatingthe 28 acr es attempted to be conveyed for ty y ear s later. Ne xt, th e Ga

uts no te that th e Da

nie ls c la im the nu c le i of

de sc ri pti on

c on sis ts o f a ll f

our c a lls
and dis tanc e s; co ur se s, le ng ths , met e s, and bo un ds ; r e fe re nc e to a pa rt iti on de e d; a nd on e mon ume nt. The Ga uts refute this claim wit h the foll owing : 1) the distance s provided have no identified terminal po int s; 2 ) t

he c ours e s are de fi ne d only g e ne ra lly (s outhe a ste rl y , southw e ste rl y , etc .) wi tho ut a ng le s, so there a re no me tes and bounds (de fined a s boundary lines of land, with their terminal points and ang les), see Lefler v. City of Dallas, 177 S.W .2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1943, no wr it); 3) the ref ere nce to the “ northwest cor ner of a 17-a cre trac t” does not desc ribe a terminal point beca

use the location of the tra ct is not identified; 4) the par tition deed ref

ere nced in the 28- acr e dee d des cr ibes04
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- 6- sever al trac ts, on e o f which ( Share 6) is the 399.5 acr e tra ct, providingno information to fix the location of the 28 acr es within the acr eag e; 5) the deed ref ere nces a survey of the land out of which the 28 ac res is take n, but does not provide a c lue as to where within it the 28 ac res c an be f ound; 6) the only monument refe renc ed—a line pa rallel with Hwy

59—provides a directional orie ntation of one boundar

y line but no information about its location; and 7) the m onument the Danie ls’ surveyor found which he say s is the start point, at the edg e of 17 acr es owned by the Danie ls, is not refer ence d in the deed, a

nd the dee d does not make a ny ref ere nce to the D aniels as owne rs of c ontiguous a cre s
or state the 17 a c re s is a c tua lly a c omb inatio n o f t

wo tr a c ts. The Da nie ls p r e s e nte d parol e vidence showing taxi ng authorities, TxDOT, and oil expl oration companies ide ntified the Da niels as t h e o wn ers of the 28-ac re tra ct. They also introduced photos showing a fence Daniel said he rebuilt and a g ate he ere cted, a nd testified that “e veryone” kne w they
ow ne d th e land . H ow e ve r, no ne of thi s e vid e nc e is r e le va

nt t o th e su ff

ic ie nc y of the de e d b e c a

us e it was not re fer ence d within the deed. See W illiams , 493 S.W .2d at 736. The Ga uts criticize the Daniels’ r eliance on thei r surveyor’s testimony to prove suff

iciency
o f t h e d ee d
. The Da

niels’ surveyor surmised that the 17- acr e tra ct must be a c ombination of two trac ts previously

purcha sed by the Daniels. The survey or st ated it was logica l to assume the 28 acr es purcha sed by

the Danie ls were contig uous to their exis ting pr operty
. Howeve r, there is no refe renc e to thi s ef fe c t with in t

he de e d. Whil e the surv e y or wa s a ble to p lot wh a t he be lie ve d to be the 28 a c re s, he wa s able to do so only throug h the use of se vera l ext rinsic re source s, none of whic h are ref ere nced i n th e d e e d
. T h e s ur

v e y o r a g r e e d th a t th e 2 8
- a c r e d e e d w a s n o t i n t e r n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t , tha t th e c a ll “par allel with Hwy

59” did not say

how fa r the bounda

ry was fr om the highw ay , and that, fr om the04
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- 7- deed a lone without seekingoutside evidenc e, the a ng ulation of the lines or shape of the trac t cannot be dete rmined. The crux of t he Gauts’ argument is that the ext rinsic evidenc e and a ssumptions utiliz ed by the Da nie ls a nd the ir surv e y or we re c ri tic a l to s up ply

a loc a tio n f

or the 28 a c re s, no t to me re ly e xpla in the m eaning of t he words used i n the deed. See P ick, 659 S.W .2d at 637

. Ba sed on the assumptions that the 17 ac res r efe renc ed in the dee d wer e ac tually made up of

two plots owne d by

the Danie ls, that the 28 acr es wer e contig uous to the Daniels’ e x isting ac rea g e, that the be g inning point was on H wy 59 , a nd that a mon ume nt n ot r e fe re nc e d in

the de e d must have pr ov ide d o ne of the c or ne rs of the tr a c t, the surveyor testified he was a ble to complete his survey by rea ding the calls backwar d. Howeve r, he a lso te sti fi e d th a t w hil e the surv e y fi t th e de e d v e ry

we ll, if the de e d w e re re a d f

or wa rd , th e fi rs t distance is tra

nscribed incorre ctly and off by about 465 fe et. This differ ence incre ased the line from 1173 to 1638 fee t, resulting in a dditional acre ag e. None of the surve y or’s a ssumptions wer e base d on information provided w ithin the deed itself. The terms of deed itself, without a starting point and ang les, and with no re fer ence s to pe rtinent extrinsi c evide nce, w ere insufficient to desc ribe the la nd beingconveyed. Th e Da nie ls a rgue tha t th e de e d d oe s r e fe re nc e e xtri ns ic so urces in st ating that th e land is taken out of the A.B .&M. Surve y 412 [si c 413] and also out of a c alled 399.5 ac re tra ct. Howe ver, “a de ed purpor

ting to conve y

land, which describes it onl y by quantity and as be ing pa

rt of a la rg er trac t, wi t h n o t h i n g wher eby to identify

what spec ific portion of the la rg er tra ct is intended to be conveyed, is void for uncer tainty of desc ription.” Sm ith v . S or e lle , 126 Tex. 353, 358-59, 87 S.W .2d 703, 705 (1935).04
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- 8- T h e Da niels cite seve ral c ases in support of the ir contention that the 28-a cre deed w as
su ff ic ie nt and th ere fo re the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in f ind ingin t

he ir fa vo r; ho we ve r, e a c h o f t

he se
case s can be distinguished f rom the ca se at ba

r. In Knupp v. Miller , 858 S.W .2d 945 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, writ denied) , the deed involved included an err oneous first call in i ts description of the proper ty ; how ever , the calls used in the descr iption included direc tions, distance s, and ang les. Id. at 947-50. A differ ent surveyor made a map of the prope rty

based on r eleva

nt deeds whic h put the land
w h e r e th e f

ir s t s ur v e y o r p la c e d it a f te r c o r r e c ti n g th e amb igu o u s f

ir s t c a ll. Id. at 949-50. The distinction between Knupp and the c ase at bar is that whil e t h e fi rs t ca ll was err oneous, it was not mis sin g ; a ll o f t

he c a lls in t

he Da nie ls’ de e d a

re mis sin g e sse nti a l e le me nts
. The Da niels also cite a c ase f

rom th i s court, Te mp le ton v . D re iss , 9 6 1 S. W. 2 d 6 4 5 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 1998, writ denied)
. Templeton involved a disput e re gar d i ng an “undivided interest” in a

road de scribed in de eds as a 20-foot strip of land; no metes and bounds we re pr ovided. Id. a t 65 0, 65 6. Th e c ourt he ld t he re was a nu c le us of

de sc ri pti on

su ff ic ie nt t o lo c a te the land

in question, as the orig inal deed r efe rre d to a survey (attac hed to and incor

porate d in the deed) which located the road on the g round. Id. at 659. The distinction betwee n this case a nd the Danie ls’ is that the d eed in Templeton p r o v i d e d w i th i ni t s e l f

a s u f f i c i e n tm e an s o f

d e t e r m i n i n g th e p art i c u l ar

p r o p e rty; the Danie ls’ deed doe s not refe renc e extrinsic sources pr oviding identify ing inf ormation. An oth e r ca se re lie d on by

the Da nie ls, a lso fr om t

his c ourt , is Vela v. Pe nnzoil Producing Co. , 723 S.W .2d 199 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ). In Ve la there was a dispute reg ardingthe sufficie ncy

of desc riptions of g as unit desig nations. Id. at 201. The a ppellants appe aled a

summary judgme nt issued in favor of Pennzoil (the lessee) , claiming the starting call location required r esort to outside refe renc es; extrinsi c proof was ne eded to identify the location of the calls; the plat re fer red04
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- 9- to was not incorpor ated into the desig nations; and ref ere nces made to le ases and tra cts could not be located w ith reasona

ble ce rtainty
. Id. at 206-07. The D aniels support their a rgument with the fac t that in Ve la , this court held t h e gas u n i t desig nations were not insufficient as a matter of la

w; howeve r, one important f actor missing fr o m t h e Daniels’ ar g ument is that the court also stated materia l questions of fac t remaine d, which is why the summary judgme nt was re verse d. Id. at 207. B a se d o n th e a

bo ve , the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in fi nd ingthe Da

nie ls’ 28 -a c re de e d w a s su ff ic ie nt. Be cause nothing identifies which 28 ac res out of the 399.5 are beingconveyed, the de ed is void. The Gauts’ f irst issue is sust ained. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the a

bove, we conclude the 1990 deed c onveying 28 a cre s from the Ga rcia s to the Daniels is void for insufficient descr iption, and rende r judgme nt in f avor of the Gauts. B eca

use we
re ve rs e on

the fi rs t is su e , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss t he re ma ini ngiss ue s b ro ug ht f or th b y the Ga uts
.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice