[Cite as State v. Moreland, 2024-Ohio-22.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

TASK MORELAND

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29724

Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 03009

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on January 5, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

ADAM J. ARNOLD, Attorney for Appellant

 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Task Moreland appeals from his conviction on one count of murder with a 

three-year firearm specification.1

1 A jury found Moreland guilty on two counts of murder and two counts of felonious 

assault, each with a firearm specification. At sentencing, the trial court merged all counts 

and specifications into a single count of murder with an accompanying firearm 

specification. 
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{¶ 2} Moreland contends the trial court erred in designating the State’s firearms

witness as an expert where she lacked sufficient experience and her accreditation no 

longer existed. He challenges the legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the State’s 

evidence, and he contests a ruling precluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent 

tendencies. Finally, he asserts that severe juror misconduct requires a new trial.

{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating the 

State’s firearms witness as an expert. The jury’s verdicts were supported by legally 

sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence. The trial court also 

did not abuse its discretion in precluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent tendencies, 

and Moreland’s juror-misconduct claim fails because it depends on evidence outside the 

record. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 4} On April 14, 2019, Moreland was with his wife, Tiffany, in their apartment. 

According to Moreland, they began arguing about her intent to leave and spend time with 

another man, Kraig Rakestraw, who was the father of two of her children. Moreland 

claimed that Tiffany had threatened him with a loaded handgun during the argument. He 

attempted to disarm her, and she accidentally shot herself in the chest while struggling

over the weapon. Tiffany could be heard breathing in the background when Moreland 

called 911 and reported the shooting. She was pronounced dead when police and 

medical personnel arrived. 

{¶ 5} An investigation followed Tiffany’s death. The coroner’s office ruled that the 

cause of death was a gunshot wound to the chest, but the manner of death was 
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“undetermined.” Based on evidence gathered during the investigation, however, a grand 

jury indicted Moreland in November 2021 on two counts of murder and two counts of 

felonious assault with firearm specifications. 

{¶ 6} Prior to trial, Moreland filed a motion in limine to obtain a ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence concerning prior violent acts by Tiffany. Among other things, the 

alleged acts involved her shooting at him and striking a vehicle, attempting to hit him with 

a car, threatening to shoot him, and sending him threatening and harassing messages.

Moreland sought to use this “character evidence of Tiffany’s past violent behavior toward 

him * * * to show she was likely the person who was the aggressor and gun handler.” The 

trial court conditionally overruled the motion, finding the evidence inadmissible unless 

Moreland argued self-defense.

{¶ 7} The first witness at Moreland’s July 2022 jury trial was forensic pathologist 

Susan Brown from the coroner’s office. Brown described the fatal gunshot wound as 

being from Tiffany’s “front to back, right to left, and downward.” As for the manner of death 

being undetermined, Brown noted the absence of markings on Tiffany’s skin around the 

entrance wound—such as a muzzle imprint, stippling, soot, or gunpowder—that might 

have helped her determine how close the gun had been to Tiffany when it discharged. 

Brown acknowledged that a clothing barrier could explain the absence of any markings. 

She was unable to determine who had fired the weapon. 

{¶ 8} The next two witnesses were police officers Keri Lightle and Taylor 

Gianangeli, who responded to the scene of the shooting. Upon entering the apartment, 

they saw Tiffany lying on her back on the living-room floor. She was unresponsive. 
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Moreland was on the ground holding her. Both officers described him as being very 

emotional. Gianangeli escorted Moreland outside while Lightle remained inside with 

police officer Dan Hall, who was putting on gloves. 

{¶ 9} Evidence technician Ronald Christophers also testified as a prosecution 

witness. He observed the victim lying on the floor wearing a black bra and pants. He also 

saw a semi-automatic handgun in a chair. Christophers testified that one of the officers 

had moved the weapon, which originally had been on the ground to the right of Tiffany. 

Christophers found a nine-millimeter shell casing on the living-room floor near a closet on 

the side of a couch. The shell casing was located approximately 14.5 feet away from 

Tiffany’s body. Christophers recovered a nine-millimeter bullet from the kitchen floor that 

had gone through the living-room wall. The bullet hole was 2.33 feet from the ground in 

the living room and 2.2 feet from the ground on the other side of the wall in the kitchen. 

Finally, Christophers collected a black shirt that that was on a chair. The shirt did not have 

any bullet holes in it. On cross-examination, he testified that he could not say where 

Moreland had been standing at the time of the shooting. 

{¶ 10} The next witness was forensic scientist Mary Barger. She testified about 

conducting DNA testing of the handgun involved in Tiffany’s death. Although Barger 

detected DNA on the barrel of the weapon, the quantity was insufficient to make a 

comparison with anyone. She was able to develop a profile, however, from DNA found 

on the handgrip. The profile revealed a DNA mixture coming from more than one person. 

Most of the DNA, which Barger described as “a major component,” matched a DNA 

standard taken from Tiffany. Barger could not exclude Moreland as a contributor to the 
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mixed profile. She explained that only “one in every 2,944,000 individuals” could not be 

excluded from the profile. Based on her analysis, Barger agreed that either Tiffany or 

Moreland could have been holding the handgun. 

{¶ 11} Detective David House also testified as a prosecution witness. He arrived 

at the scene after Tiffany had been declared dead and paramedics had left. He saw her 

body just inside the front door. He noted an apparent gunshot wound on the upper portion 

of her right breast. He did not see any evidence of charring, stippling, or soot around the 

wound. He also noticed the shell casing on the far side of the room near a closet. 

{¶ 12} Detective House participated in an interview of Moreland later that day. 

During the interview, Moreland stated that Tiffany had gone outside with two of her 

children because their biological father, Kraig Rakestraw, had arrived to take the children

out for the day. Moreland claimed an argument had ensued when Tiffany reentered the 

apartment, and she requested her car keys and her gun. After obtaining the gun, Tiffany 

went into a bathroom and racked the slide of the semi-automatic weapon. According to 

Moreland, she exited the bathroom and charged toward him with the gun in her left hand 

and a cell phone in her right hand, threatening to shoot him. The gun discharged when 

he tried to take it from her. 

{¶ 13} During his interview, Moreland provided differing accounts about whether 

Tiffany had retrieved the weapon from a closet herself or whether he had obtained it for 

her. He also claimed that the weapon had been stored in a steel-toed boot in the closet, 

but investigators never found a steel-toed boot in the apartment. According to House, 

Moreland provided inconsistent statements about whether Tiffany took the cell phone with 
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her into the bathroom, whether she actually was holding the cell phone when she charged 

him, and whether she took a black shirt into the bathroom with her. Moreland also 

provided inconsistent statements about whether Tiffany was angry when she returned 

from outside. According to House, Moreland initially denied Tiffany was angry with 

Rakestraw outside. Moreland then stated that she had been angry about something. He

suggested that Tiffany and Rakestraw may have been outside the apartment plotting 

against him. At one point during the interview, Moreland stated that he had told Tiffany 

he was not going to allow her to leave again with another man. He then claimed to have 

told Tiffany that she could spend time with Rakestraw.

{¶ 14} During the interview, Moreland stated that Tiffany had been wearing a black 

shirt at the time of the shooting. He claimed to have pulled the shirt down below her breast 

after she was shot. Moreland described the shirt as a black shirt with gray writing on the 

front. Investigators found the shirt inside the apartment. It was “laid out over a chair where 

you could see the design and the writing on front of it.” Moreland later identified the shirt 

and confirmed that it was the one he claimed Tiffany had been wearing. However, the 

shirt did not have a bullet hole or blood on it. 

{¶ 15} With regard to a struggle over the handgun, Moreland claimed he had 

grabbed the gun and turned it back toward Tiffany, who shot herself. According to House, 

Moreland demonstrated how he had both hands on the gun with one of them over the top 

of the slide. House testified that if Moreland’s claim were true the gun either would not 

have operated properly, and the spent casing would have gotten caught in the gun, or 

Moreland would have sustained an injury to his hand when the slide ejected the casing. 
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But Moreland did not have an injured hand, and the ejected casing was found across the 

room. Based on Moreland’s demonstration of how the shooting occurred, House 

estimated that the muzzle would have been about 12 inches from Tiffany’s body. Despite 

this close distance, House did not see any stippling, soot, or charring on her body or on 

the bra she was wearing. As a result, he sought additional testing of the bra. 

{¶ 16} The final witness was Jennifer Owens, a firearms and tool-mark examiner 

with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Owens had 

13 years of experience with the ATF, and she supervised the firearms and tool-mark unit. 

Most of her experience involved examining firearms, bullets, and casings. Owens had 

some training and experience in making “muzzle-to-target distance” determinations, 

which was the subject of her testimony. She had taken a five-day course on muzzle-totarget distance determinations as part of a broader year-long training program. The fiveday training involved lectures and at least a dozen “mock case scenarios.” She then 

underwent additional training in muzzle-to-target distance determinations at the ATF 

laboratory, where she worked on mock cases and underwent an oral proficiency 

examination. When Owens began working on Moreland’s case, the ATF laboratory was 

accredited in muzzle-to-target distance determinations. Due to the low number of such 

cases being submitted to the ATF, the agency subsequently decided not to renew its 

accreditation. Moreland’s case was the second time Owens had performed real muzzleto-target distance casework, and she had not previously testified as an expert in the field. 

{¶ 17} Over defense counsel’s objection to Owens’ qualifications, the trial court 

allowed her to testify as an expert. She began by describing muzzle-to-target distance 
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testing as follows:

Yes, so the muzzle-to-target distance determination or distance 

testing is, again, trying to detect a pattern of gunshot residue on a target—

which is, by and large, clothing that we receive—and then recreating that 

pattern, if one is developed, in the laboratory, under laboratory conditions, 

by test firing at different intervals from distance to the end of the muzzle, to 

the end of the barrel, to that target. 

Trial Transcript Vol. III at 482. 

{¶ 18} Owens performed her testing using the actual handgun and ammunition 

taken from Moreland’s apartment. She began by examining the bra Tiffany had been 

wearing when she was shot. Owens looked at the bra with her naked eye and using a 

stereo microscope. She noticed a hole near the top of the right cup but was unable to 

detect any smoke, soot, particulates, or gunpowder on the bra, either with her naked eye 

or using low-power magnification. 

{¶ 19} The next step was to perform chemical testing. The process, identified by 

Owens as a “Griess test,” involved placing a chemically-treated piece of photo paper on 

a garment, covering it with filter paper, and then heating the paper with an iron, causing 

any gunshot residue to adhere to the paper and become visible. Owens testified that 

Griess testing is widely accepted in her field and has “been around for decades.” The idea 

is to identify a pattern of residue, which then can be recreated by firing the test weapon 

at a control target from various distances, enabling the examiner to determine the 

distance from which the weapon had been fired at the garment. In Moreland’s case, 
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Griess testing of the bra did not detect the presence of any gunshot residue. A second 

test reacted positively to the presence of lead residue around the hole in the bra, which 

was expected given that a bullet had passed through it. 

{¶ 20} In addition to chemically testing the bra, Owens test fired the weapon at a 

control target of white cotton twill panels from different distances. When performing this 

test, she detected some gunshot residue at a distance up to 30 inches. Discernible 

patterns of residue were visible up to 24 inches away from the muzzle. Given that she did 

not find any gunshot residue on the bra, however, Owens could not compare any pattern 

on the bra to the patterns produced during her test firing. As a result, she could not make 

any muzzle-to-target distance determination for the bullet hole in the bra. Owens also 

explained that she did not subject the black shirt to Griess testing because there was no 

bullet hole indicating that a gun had been fired at it. 

{¶ 21} On cross-examination, Owens acknowledged that the presence of blood on 

a garment can “mask the gunshot residue,” potentially making it undetectible through 

visual observation or chemical testing. With regard to Griess testing, she noted that blood 

could cause gunshot residue not to come into contact with the chemical agents. Owens 

also acknowledged the presence of blood on the bra. She further agreed that soot, smoke 

rings, and gunshot residue typically are black or gray, making them relatively harder to 

detect by visual examination on a black bra. She also recognized that the double-layered 

nature of the bra material made visual examination more difficult and that the curved 

shape of the bra made ironing it harder for Griess testing. Finally, Owens agreed that 

gunshot reside potentially could have “fallen off” as the bra was moved and handled after 
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the shooting. 

{¶ 22} With regard to the shell casing found inside the apartment, Owens 

acknowledged that casings can end up several feet away from where they are ejected

and that they “absolutely” can bounce off of hard objects like walls. At one point, Owens 

stated: “Yes, I’ve had them bounce off the railing of our water tank before and end up in 

the corner of the room just on a normal test firing.” 

{¶ 23} Based on the evidence presented, a jury found Moreland guilty on two 

counts of murder and two counts of felonious assault, each with a firearm specification. 

Following the verdicts, Moreland unsuccessfully moved for acquittal and for a new trial. 

The trial court overruled the motions. After merging allied offenses, it imposed an 

aggregate sentence of 18 years to life in prison on one count of murder and a firearm 

specification. Moreland timely appealed, advancing four assignments of error. 

II. Expert Testimony

{¶ 24} In his first assignment of error, Moreland challenges the trial court’s 

qualification of Jennifer Owens as an expert on the issue of muzzle-to-target distance

determinations and gunshot-residue analysis. Moreland stresses Owens’ lack of prior 

qualification as an expert in muzzle-to-target distance testing and gunshot-residue

examination. He notes too that his case was only the second time she had performed 

actual casework on muzzle-to-target distance testing and that the ATF has foregone

accreditation in the field. 

{¶ 25} In a second part of his argument, Moreland questions the reliability of the 

muzzle-to-target distance testing procedure. He infers that the procedure is not widely 
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accepted because the AFT discontinued its accreditation as it had few requests for 

experts to testify about the process. He also questions whether the design of Owens’ 

testing reliably implemented the Griess test and whether her test was conducted in a way 

that yielded an accurate result. 

{¶ 26} Upon review, we note that Moreland’s objection at trial only encompassed 

Owens’ qualifications to testify as an expert. He did not challenge the Griess test itself on 

the basis that it was unreliable. In any event, we find no merit in either aspect of his

argument. 

{¶ 27} The admission of expert testimony is governed by Evid.R. 702, which 

provides:

A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:

(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge 

or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception 

common among lay persons;

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the 

testimony;

(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other 

specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports the result 

of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the 

following apply:

(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is 
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based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted 

knowledge, facts, or principles;

(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably 

implements the theory;

(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a 

way that will yield an accurate result.

{¶ 28} Where an objection was made at trial, we review a trial court’s decision to 

qualify a witness as an expert for an abuse of discretion. State v. Medford, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28281, 2019-Ohio-4800, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion occurs when a 

trial court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. State v. Darmond, 135 

Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34.

{¶ 29} With regard to Owens’ qualifications to testify as an expert, we see no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s decision. Her testimony certainly related to matters beyond 

the knowledge or experience of lay persons. The crux of Moreland’s challenge below 

addressed her degree of knowledge, experience, and training on the subject of her

testimony. In our view, however, she demonstrated sufficient qualifications in these areas 

to permit the trial court to allow her to testify as an expert.

{¶ 30} As set forth above, Owens had taken a five-day course on muzzle-to-target 

distance determinations as part of a broader training program. Her training involved 

lectures and “mock case scenarios.” She received additional training on the subject at the 

ATF laboratory, which was accredited in muzzle-to-target distance determinations when 

Owens began working on Moreland’s case. The ATF’s subsequent decision to 
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discontinue its accreditation did not affect Owens’ own qualifications. Moreover, the fact 

that the agency performed few muzzle-to-target distance determinations did not establish 

that the process for doing so was unreliable or invalid. Although Owens had performed 

little real-world casework using Griess testing to discern gunshot residue patterns, that 

fact went to the weight of her testimony rather than its admissibility. 

{¶ 31} As for the reliability of the Griess testing process itself, Moreland’s failure to 

object at trial limits us to plain-error review. But even if Moreland had objected, we would 

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s qualification of Owens as an expert based 

on the reliability of the testing she performed. With regard to Griess testing generally, 

Owens stated that the procedure was widely accepted and had been used for decades. 

The State’s appellate brief identifies cases from Ohio and elsewhere involving Griess 

testing and muzzle-to-target distance determinations, lending support to Owens’ 

testimony about widespread use of the process. 

{¶ 32} We note too that the procedure itself, as described by Owens, does not 

seem particularly complex. A firearm is discharged from various distances at a control 

target consisting of white cotton twill panels. The purpose is to identify patterns of gunshot 

residue. The subject garment also is subjected to examination for gunshot residue. The 

garment is examined with the naked eye, with a stereo microscope, and with chemical 

testing. If gunshot residue is found on the garment matching one of the patterns 

developed from the test shots, the examiner then can approximate the muzzle-to-target 

distance from which the garment was shot. In Moreland’s case, however, Owens did not 

detect gunshot residue on the bra she tested. Therefore, she was unable to match a 
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pattern on the bra to any of the patterns she developed when test-firing the handgun. We 

see nothing about the foregoing process that would render the admission of Owens’ 

testimony an abuse of discretion under Evid.R. 702. Accordingly, the first assignment of 

error is overruled.

III. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶ 33} In his second assignment of error, Moreland challenges the legal sufficiency 

and manifest weight of the evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. He notes that the 

primary source of DNA on the firearm belonged to Tiffany and that the DNA expert, Mary 

Barger, could not say who had fired the fatal shot. With regard to the lack of gunshot 

residue or other evidence of a close-range shooting on the bra, Moreland cites Jennifer 

Owens’ recognition that various factors could have masked the presence of gunshot 

residue or caused it not to be present, including the shape of the bra, the nature of the 

material, the masking effect of blood, touching of the bra by others at the scene, and 

packing and shipping the bra. Moreland notes too that Owens conducted muzzle-to-target 

distance testing in a laboratory and that she did not know how Tiffany and Moreland were 

positioned at the time of the shooting. He also points out that the representative of the 

coroner’s office, Susan Brown, ruled the manner of death undetermined because she did 

not know the “range of fire” or who had fired the weapon. Finally, Moreland asserts that 

his actions and emotional state immediately after the shooting were inconsistent with 

having an intent to kill his wife. 

{¶ 34} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 
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determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the 

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 35} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When 

a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an 

appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 36} With the foregoing standards in mind, we reject Moreland’s legal-sufficiency 

and manifest-weight challenges. In essence, the State’s case rested on three things: (1) 

statements Moreland made to police after the shooting; (2) the presence of a shell casing 

across the room from Tiffany’s body; and (3) the absence of gunshot residue or other 

evidence indicative of a struggle over the firearm and a close-range shooting. In our view, 

the combination of this evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts, which 

also were not against the weight of the evidence. 
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{¶ 37} With regard to his statements to the police, Moreland gave varying accounts 

of what had occurred inside the apartment. Among other things, he provided inconsistent 

statements about how Tiffany had obtained the firearm. During the first half of his 

interview, he repeatedly stated that he had retrieved the weapon from a living-room closet 

and had handed it to her. After he disclosed that Tiffany was upset and was planning to 

leave with Rakestraw, detectives asked why he would hand a loaded weapon to an angry 

woman. Moreland then changed his story and stated that Tiffany had retrieved the 

weapon from the closet herself. He later reverted back to his original statement that he 

had handed the weapon to her. He also repeatedly claimed she had been wearing a 

distinctive black shirt. Police later found the shirt, which did not have any blood on it or a 

bullet hole in it. Finally, Moreland acknowledged telling Tiffany that she was a married 

woman, that she previously had left him for seven days, and that he was not going to 

allow her to leave again with another man. This statement provided the jury with a motive 

for the shooting. 

{¶ 38} The discovery of a shell casing across the room also was relevant to 

Moreland’s location at the time of the shooting. Although the jury heard evidence that 

shell casings can bounce off of hard objects and land feet from where they were ejected, 

the fact that the shell casing was found approximately 15 feet from Tiffany’s body on the 

far side of a couch supported the State’s theory that Moreland had shot her from a 

distance. Tiffany’s body was found a few feet past one end of the couch, and the casing 

was found near a closet, where Moreland claimed the gun normally was stored, beyond 

the opposite end of the couch. The floor of the apartment was carpeted, so the casing 
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presumably would have needed to ricochet hard off of one or more walls or pieces of 

furniture to land where it did if Tiffany had been shot at close range. In our view, it was 

within the province of the jury to give the shell casing’s location some weight and to 

conclude instead that Moreland had retrieved the weapon from the closet and that he shot 

her from that location as she was preparing to leave with Rakestraw. 

{¶ 39} The absence of gunshot residue on Tiffany’s bra also provided support for 

the State’s theory. Although none of the State’s witnesses could identify the distance of 

the firearm from Tiffany when she was shot, firearms expert Owens test-fired the weapon 

and found discernible patterns of gunshot residue up to 24 inches away from the muzzle. 

Given that she did not find any gunshot reside on the bra, the State’s theory was that the 

muzzle had been farther than that away from Tiffany when she was shot. Although Owens 

noted other reasons why gunshot residue might not have been found, the absence of any 

residue under microscopic and chemical examination remained a relevant consideration. 

{¶ 40} The lack of an injury to Moreland’s hand also supported the State’s theory 

of the case. Detective House testified that if Moreland had had two hands around the gun 

as he claimed, the weapon either would not have operated properly, and the spent casing 

would have jammed in the gun, or Moreland would have sustained an injury to his hand 

when the slide ejected the casing. Notably, however, Moreland did not have an injured 

hand, and the ejected casing was found across the room. These facts supported an 

inference that Moreland was not struggling over the gun when it discharged. 

{¶ 41} We note too that Moreland’s emotional state after the shooting and his 

efforts to aid his wife were not inconsistent with a purposeful killing. The jury reasonably 
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could have found that Moreland was upset about Tiffany’s plan to leave with another man, 

that he intentionally shot her in the chest out of anger, and that he then regretted what he 

had done and attempted to save her life. As for the mixed DNA profile found on the 

firearm’s handgrip, Moreland told investigators that he and Tiffany both had fired the 

weapon outside on the previous New Year’s Eve. We note too that Moreland could not 

be excluded as a contributor to the DNA mixture found on the handgrip. 

{¶ 42} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury 

reasonably could have found the charges against Moreland proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The jury also did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of 

justice. This was not an exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against 

conviction. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Other-Acts Evidence

{¶ 43} In his third assignment of error, Moreland challenges the trial court’s 

conditional overruling of his pretrial motion in limine. The trial court stated that it would 

not allow evidence of Tiffany’s prior violent behavior unless Moreland pursued a selfdefense claim rather than arguing that she accidentally shot herself. While acknowledging 

that self-defense and accident typically are inconsistent theories, Moreland contends the 

evidence should have been allowed despite his failure to claim self-defense. He explains 

that his argument “is not of self-defense to the crimes in which he was indicted but is selfdefense in the attempted resistance and disarming of Mrs. Moreland during the physical 

altercation directly before the firearm was accidentally discharged, killing Mrs. Moreland.” 

In essence, Moreland claims the shooting was an accident that occurred while he was 
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defending himself by trying to wrest the gun away from Tiffany. Under these 

circumstances, he insists the challenged evidence was relevant to his mindset and should 

have been admitted despite his failure to pursue a self-defense strategy. 

{¶ 44} It is true that an incident potentially may involve both self-defense and 

accident. This court addressed such a situation in State v. Marbury, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 19226, 2004-Ohio-1817, reasoning:

The State argues that any error was harmless because Defendant 

was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. The State points out that the 

felonious assault charge to which the self-defense claim relates arises from 

the victim’s gunshot injury. Because the Defendant claims that the gun fired 

accidentally in the course of his struggle with the victim, according to the 

State the Defendant’s claim of accident negates his right to argue selfdefense.

Implicit in the State’s argument is a view that, because a person’s 

use of force in self-defense is necessarily a purposeful act, force that occurs 

accidentally doesn’t qualify for self-defense. We agree with that view. 

However, Defendant didn’t claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. 

Rather, he claims that he jumped into the victim’s car to take his gun away 

in order to defend himself from being shot. The fact that the gun discharged 

accidentally in the course of that affray, as Defendant claims, does not 

negate his right to claim self-defense with respect to the force he used that 

led to the claimed accidental discharge.
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Id. at ¶ 15-16.

{¶ 45} However, the fact that an incident may involve self-defense and accident 

does not help Moreland with regard to the evidentiary issue he raises. As an initial matter, 

he failed at trial to renew his pretrial argument regarding evidence of Tiffany’s prior violent 

behavior. “The granting or denial of a motion in limine does not determine the admissibility 

of the questioned evidence.” State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28977, 2021-Ohio3050, ¶ 57. Rather, “[a] decision on a motion in limine is a tentative, interlocutory, 

precautionary ruling by the trial court on the admissibility of evidence; as such, it cannot 

serve as the basis for an assignment of error on appeal.” State v. Tyra, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27040, 2017-Ohio-313, ¶ 28. “Failure to object to or proffer evidence at 

trial based on the disposition made in a preliminary motion in limine constitutes a waiver 

of any challenge,” and we are limited to plain-error review. Id. at ¶ 28-29. We see no error 

here, plain or otherwise, in excluding the evidence at issue. 

{¶ 46} In his motion in limine, Moreland did not seek to use evidence of Tiffany’s 

prior violence to establish his state of mind. Rather, he explicitly sought to use “character 

evidence of Tiffany’s past violent behavior towards him and her prior criminal conviction 

to show she was likely the person who was the aggressor and the gun handler.” In other 

words, Moreland sought to introduce evidence of Tiffany’s prior bad acts to prove that she 

acted in conformity with that prior conduct in the present case. This is a textbook example 

of “propensity” or “other acts” evidence that Evid.R. 404(B) prohibits. 

{¶ 47} To be admissible, the “evidence must prove something other than the 

defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.” State v. Sutherland, 2021-Ohio-2433, 173 
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N.E.3d 942, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). Here, however, Moreland proposed introducing evidence of 

Tiffany’s prior aggression and gun handling to establish that she was an aggressor who 

threatened him with a gun in this case. The trial court correctly refused to allow the 

evidence to be introduced for this purpose. Exclusion would have been proper even if 

Moreland had pursued a self-defense claim. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 

25, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002) (“Given the plain language of Evid.R. 404 and 405 and the 

weight of compelling persuasive authority, we hold that a defendant asserting selfdefense cannot introduce evidence of specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove 

that the victim was the initial aggressor.”). Accordingly, the third assignment of error is 

overruled.

V. Juror Misconduct

{¶ 48} In his fourth assignment of error, Moreland contends juror misconduct 

requires a new trial. This assignment of error involves his post-verdict motion for a new 

trial on the grounds that a black female juror may have felt threatened or pressured to 

change her vote to guilty. In his motion, Moreland argued:

Subsequent to the jury being dismissed Juror 2 (a white female) 

expressed anger towards Juror 5 (the sole black juror – a female) to the 

bailiff. Juror 2 informed the bailiff that Juror 5 indicated her vote was 

“innocent.” Juror 2 became very animated and loud in explaining what 

occurred and stated to the bailiff she (Juror 2) came unglued after Juror 5 

indicated her vote was “innocent” and the other jurors thought Juror 2 was 

going to punch Juror 5. 
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Taking Juror 2’s story as fact, her actions are troubling for a few 

reasons. First, her conduct during deliberations may have impacted another 

juror’s ability to make a free, voluntary decision about the verdict. Second, 

Juror 2’s admitted conduct towards Juror 5 (which she claims other jurors 

thought she was going to punch Juror 5) created a hostile environment 

which may have affected Juror 5’s decision to change her vote from 

innocent to guilty. Finally, the actions of Juror 2 towards Juror 5 affected 

[Moreland’s] right to an impartial jury under the 6th Amendment. 

(Footnotes omitted.) July 28, 2022 Motion for New Trial at 9.

{¶ 49} In support of the foregoing allegations, Moreland cited “[a]n email from the 

bailiff to the State and defense counsel” that Moreland’s counsel claimed he had received 

on July 22, 2022, two days after trial. Moreland did not attach the email to his new-trial 

motion, but he asked the trial court to make it part of the record. He also requested a 

hearing on his motion. 

{¶ 50} The trial court overruled Moreland’s motion in a January 29, 2023 written 

decision. It found no hearing necessary because the testimonial evidence upon which his 

motion depended would be inadmissible. The trial court reasoned that “to prove juror 

misconduct occurred, one or more jurors would have to testify as to statements or issues 

that occurred during jury deliberations, which is not permitted under Evid.R. 606(B)(1).” 

The trial court also determined that any testimony from court personnel, such as the bailiff, 

regarding statements of jurors following the jury deliberations would be inadmissible 

hearsay and also prohibited by Evid.R. 606(B)(1) as “evidence of any statement by the 

juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.” 
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Although the trial court was troubled at the prospect of jurors potentially being intimidated 

or pressured, it stated that “the sanctity of the jury room must be protected, and jurors 

cannot be permitted to change their vote after it is read in open court.” Finding no 

admissible testimony to support Moreland’s allegations, the trial court overruled his 

motion. 

{¶ 51} On appeal, Moreland fails to identify any error in the trial court’s legal 

analysis. Instead, he focuses on the substance of his allegations regarding a hold-out 

juror possibly feeling threatened or intimidated by another juror. He also contends the trial 

court erred in failing to investigate the matter and discuss it with the parties. Attached to 

Moreland’s appellate brief are (1) a copy of the July 22, 2022 email from the bailiff 

referenced above and (2) a July 18, 2023 affidavit from the bailiff that Moreland appears 

to have obtained in connection with his appeal. We struck both exhibits in a November 8, 

2023 order, noting that neither the e-mail nor the affidavit had been filed in the trial court 

and that they were not part of the record on appeal. 

{¶ 52} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s rejection of the jurormisconduct claim without a hearing. The trial court correctly ruled that evidence of 

tension, coercion, or pressure involving the jurors during deliberations would be 

inadmissible under Evid.R. 606(B)(1), which provides: 

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 

not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 

jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s 

mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
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verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in 

connection therewith. A juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 

juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 

testifying will not be received by the court for these purposes.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 53} Although Evid.R. 606(B)(2) identifies three exceptions, they do not apply. 

The only conceivable exception would be Evid.R. 606(B)(2)(c), which provides that a juror 

may testify about whether “any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe, or any 

improprieties of any officer of the court occurred.” But even if the purported hold-out juror 

may have felt threatened or intimidated by another juror, Moreland’s argument fails. The 

allegations in Moreland’s new-trial motion do not reveal the existence of any actual threat, 

regardless of how others in the room felt. 

{¶ 54} Moreland’s motion alleged that the offensive juror became loud, angry, and 

“unglued.” The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, however, that shouting, coercion, 

and even a “real blow up” in the jury room do not entitle a defendant to a hearing on 

allegations of juror misconduct. State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 

N.E.3d 616, ¶ 288-298. “ ‘The requirement of a unanimous decision * * * does not come 

without a price. Heightened emotions and intense feelings are part and parcel of this 

process. Experience tells us that during deliberations, it is not unusual to find heavyhanded influencing, browbeating, and even bullying to a certain extent.’ ” Id. at ¶ 297, 

quoting State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 120, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (2000). 

{¶ 55} We note too that the purported hold-out juror was polled and confirmed her 
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guilty verdict after deliberations. The purpose of polling is to “ascertain with certainty” that 

jurors have not been coerced into accepting verdicts with which they disagree. Id. at 

¶ 299. “[O]nce a poll of the jurors has been completed and all have assented to the 

verdict, a juror may not thereafter rescind or modify his or her vote.” State v. Williams, 99 

Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 38. Finally, we note that a new-trial 

motion alleging juror misconduct must be supported by an affidavit under Crim.R. 33(C). 

Moreland’s motion lacked an affidavit or any evidentiary support. For the foregoing 

reasons, the trial court did not err in overruling his motion grounded in allegations of juror 

misconduct. The fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

VI. Conclusion

{¶ 56} Having overruled Moreland’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.