[Cite as Faqi v. Pattin , 2020-Ohio-5115.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

Abdulmajid Faqi Court of Appeals No. L-19-1038 L-19-1107 Appellee Trial Court No. CVG-18-18571 v. Kymberly Pattin fka Kimberly Pattin Appellant DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: October 30, 2020 * * * * * Kymberly J. Pattin, pro se. * * * * SINGER, J. {¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, appellant, pro se, Kymberly Pattin , appeals the November 21 and 30, 2018 entries of the Toledo Municipal Court in case No. CVG-18- 1857, as well as the court’s August 1, 2019 judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.2. {¶ 2} Appellant does not articulate any formal assignments of error, but presents seven arguments in support of her appeal.
I. The trial court abused its discretion by willful neglect to vac ate case NO. CVG-18-1857 upon immediate request of defendant Kymber ly Pattin on November 13, 2018 at FED hearing.
II. [T]he trial court abused its discretion by allowing pro’ [sic] se plaintiff Abdulmajid Faqi to serve notice to vacate on Saturday October 13, 2018, this weekend day do not count when calculating three days of Ohio eviction notice.
III. Abdul [Faqi] filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint for past due rent and money damages prematurely on Thursday October 18, 2018[,] that was untimely and unlawful as well, as null. RC-19 23.04 [sic]
IV. The trial court abused its discretion and rendered an unlawful case filing from the Toledo Municipal Court of Lucas County, Oh io Civil Division against Kymberly Pattin that was void ab initio.
V. [T]he trial court abused its discretion by issuance of two unla wful writ of restitutions to plaintiff Abdul that was void ab initio being that Presiding Judge Howe never rendered a final judgement * * * .
VI. The trial court abused its discretion by issuance of an unlawfu l case filing to a Michigan LLC that was not registered in the st ate of Ohio case NO.CVG-18-12870 * * *. [sic]3. VII. [T]he trial court abused its discretion and rendered a fraudule nt default judgment against Kymberly Pattin stating she did not ap pear for a FED [forcible entry and detainer] hearing * * * [with] a Michig an LLC * * *. Toledo Municipal Court Case No. CVG-18-12870 {¶ 3} Appellant references this case in two of her arguments, althoug h the case is not before us on appeal. In order to assist in understanding h er arguments, we offer a brief background of that case. {¶ 4} On July 26, 2018, SGD Investments, LLC (“SGD”), a Michigan comp any, filed a complaint in forcible entry and detainer against Kymz K uttin Up (“Kymz”) with respect to commercial property located at 12 E. Bancroft, Suite 102, Toledo, Ohio (“property”). SGD alleged it owned the property, Kymz leased t he property, Kymz was in default in paying rent, and Kymz refused to vacate the prope rty. A hearing was held on August 13, 2018, with appellant in attendance. Toledo Municipal Court Case No. CVG-18-1857 {¶ 5} This is the case before us on appeal. On October 18, 2018, app ellee, Abdulmajid Faqi, filed a complaint in forcible entry and detain er and for past due rent against appellant in Toledo Municipal Court, case No. CVG-18-18 57. Appellee alleged he owns the property at 4515 W. Bancroft, #7, Toledo, Ohio (“th e premises”), appellant was in default of her lease due to her failure to pay rent in t he amount of $575 a month,4. and appellant retains possession of the premises. Appellee fur ther alleged appellant was served with a three-day notice to leave the premises on October 15, 2018. {¶ 6} On November 1, 2018, appellant filed a motion to stay or contin ue alleging she was putting money in escrow, she filed for bankruptcy and s he was seeking legal counsel. The motion to continue was granted. {¶ 7} On November 13, 2018, an eviction hearing was held before a mag istrate, with appellee present and represented by counsel, and appellant present but not represented by counsel. The magistrate issued a decision findi ng appellant in default of a written lease since October 1, 2018, and that notice to vacate had been lawfully served. The magistrate noted appellant complained about the condition o f the premises. The magistrate entered judgment in favor of appellee for possession of the premises, and a writ of restitution was to issue at appellee’s request. {¶ 8} On November 14, 2018, another hearing was held before a magistr ate, with appellee and his counsel, and appellant without counsel. The m agistrate issued an order staying the case, as appellant had filed for bankruptcy. Then, on November 16, 2018, the judge issued an entry denying appellant’s motion to stay as app ellant had not provided written notice to prove her bankruptcy predated the eviction ru ling. {¶ 9} On November 21, 2018, a praceipe for writ of restitution was fi led. Later that same day, the judge filed an entry and order noting appell ant had provided notice that she had filed for bankruptcy; the case was stayed.5. {¶ 10} Although the case was stayed, on November 26, 2018, appellant f iled a motion to recuse the magistrate and court reporter, and on Nove mber 27, 2018, appellant filed a motion to vacate the complaint and summons against her by appellee. On November 30, 2018, the trial court issued a judgment entry deny ing appellant’s motions and setting forth it was a final and appealable order. That s ame day, appellant attempted to appeal the November 21, 2018 issuance of the writ of restitu tion and the trial court’s November 30, 2018 judgment. 1 {¶ 11} On December 4, 2018, appellant filed an appeal of the November 30, 2018 judgment, in case No. L-18-1258. 2 {¶ 12} On January 25, 2019, appellee filed a notice of termination of bankruptcy stay, noting the bankruptcy court issued an order on January 11 , 2019, finding cause existed to grant appellee relief from the stay to pursue an evi ction. {¶ 13} On February 12, 2019, we reinstated the case to the trial court ’s docket. {¶ 14} On February 19, 2019, appellant filed a motion to recuse the tr ial judge and a motion for extension to modify the recusal of the magistrate and court reporter. The trial court denied the motions. {¶ 15} On February 26, 2019, the trial court issued a writ of restitut ion for set out of appellant.

1 Due to the bankruptcy stay, the appeal in case No. L-19-1107 was deemed filed on May 24, 2019.

2 We dismissed this appeal on February 14, 2019, finding there was no final appealable order and we did not have jurisdiction to hear the denial of a motion to recuse.6. {¶ 16} On May 14, 2019, an entry was made by the trial court affirming the November 13, 2019 magistrate’s decision, and stating it is a fi nal and appealable order. On May 23, 2019, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On June 1 3, 2019, we remanded the

case. {¶ 17} On June 20, 2019, the trial court issued an amended judgment en try. On July 2, 2019, appellant appealed. On July 31, 2019, we again r emanded the case. {¶ 18} On August 1, 2019, the trial court issued another judgment entr y adopting the November 13, 2019 magistrate’s decision, and entering judgm ent for appellee for possession of premises, and a writ of restitution to issue at a ppellee’s request. Appellant appealed, which is case No. L-19-1038. Arguments One Through Four {¶ 19} At the outset, we note that only one of the arguments set forth in appellant’s brief contains a reference to a statute. The remai nder of appellant’s arguments do not cite to legal authority or the record. We the refore find appellant’s arguments, save for one, do not comply with the requirements of App.R. 16(A)(7). Despite this lack of compliance, we will consider her arguments to the extent that we can discern her claims, the arguments are based on appealable order s and relate to the case on appeal. {¶ 20} Appellant’s first, second, third and fourth arguments are relat ed, and will be addressed together. Appellant asserts the trial court abuse d its discretion by not vacating case No. CVG-18-1857 immediately upon her request at t he November 13, 20187. forcible entry and detainer hearing. Appellant submits she liv ed in the premises for 16 years and shortly after appellee purchased the premises, which had a leaking roof and other defects, he improperly served her with a notice to vacate . Appellant contends appellee served the notice to vacate on a Saturday, but weekend days are not calculated in Ohio’s three-day notice to vacate. Appellant maintains appelle e’s complaint for forcible entry and detainer and past due rent and money damages was prem aturely filed and is null. Appellant cites to R.C. 1923.04 in support of this argum ent. Appellant also argues the trial court rendered an unlawful filing which was void ab i nitio, and issued two writ of restitutions to appellee which were void ab initio. Appella nt suggests appellee’s untimely filed complaint, due to the improperly served notice t o vacate, supports her arguments.
Law {¶ 21} R.C. 1923.04, the forcible entry and detainer statute, provides in relevant part: [A] party desiring to commence an action under this chapter sha ll notify the adverse party to leave the premises, for the possession of whic h the action is about to be brought, three or more days before beginning the action, by * * * handing a written copy of the notice to the defendant in pe rson, or by leaving it at the defendant’s usual place of abode or at the pr emises from which the defendant is sought to be evicted.8. {¶ 22} Civ.R. 6(A), which provides a method for computing time, states in pertinent part: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any court, by order of court, or b y any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the d esignated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last d ay of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When th e period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediat e Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computatio n. {¶ 23} Generally, the civil rules govern service of process in civil a ctions, yet “Civ.R. 1(C) specifically exempts forcible entry and detainer a ctions from their purview.”
Dobbins v. Kalson , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-831, 2008-Ohio-395, ¶ 10, citing Miele
v. Ribovich , 90 Ohio St.3d 439, 442, 739 N.E.2d 333 (2000); Civ.R. 1(C). Thus, the time computation provisions set forth in Civ.R. 6(A) are inapplicabl e in forcible entry and detainer actions, pursuant to Civ.R. 1(C). See Federal Property Management v. Daugherty , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 12591, 1991 WL 116640, *1 (June 28, 1 991). {¶ 24} “To prevail in a forcible entry and detainer action, plaintiff must prove: (1) that the plaintiff met the procedural requirements and properly served the tenant with notice of the eviction, (2) the plaintiff has the right to poss ess the premises, and (3) the9. tenant does not have the right to possession.” Garb-Ko v. Benderson , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-430, 2013-Ohio-1249, ¶ 54.
Standard of Review {¶ 25} The standard of review on appeal from a decision of a trial cou rt adopting a magistrate’s decision is whether the trial court abused its dis cretion. O'Brien v. O'Brien , 167 Ohio App.3d 584, 2006-Ohio-1729, 856 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; i t implies the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Analysis {¶ 26} The magistrate found appellant was in default under the lease since October 1, 2018, and appellee’s notice to vacate the premises was lawfu lly served. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision. {¶ 27} A review of the record shows appellee testified to the followin g at the November 13, 2018 hearing. When he purchased the premises, app ellant was a tenant, so he assumed the lease from the prior owner. He did not receive monthly rent from appellant for October 2018. He posted a notice to vacate on th e door on October 13, 2018, and he then talked to appellant, and she said she had rec eived the notice. He waited three days before he filed the action against appellant on October 18, 2018. Appellee did not accept any money from appellant after he serve d the notice on October10. 13, 2018. Appellee offered as evidence a copy of the notice to leave premises, which was attached as an exhibit to the complaint. {¶ 28} Appellant also testified at the hearing. She stated she was go ing through bankruptcy and the premises had code violations and did not pas s inspection. Appellant gave appellee 30 days to fix everything. Appellant insisted ap pellee did not file the threeday notice in the proper manner because she was given the notic e on a weekend, so October 15, 2018 is when he gave her the notice, and October 18 , 2018 is when he filed. {¶ 29} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discreti on in accepting the magistrate’s findings that appellant was in defau lt under the lease and appellee’s notice to vacate the premises was lawfully served, a s the evidence and law support these findings. Accordingly, appellant’s first, second , third and fourth arguments are not well-taken. Remaining Arguments {¶ 30} Appellant’s fifth argument is based on the writs of restitution issued by the trial court. We have held that appeals can only be taken from final orders or judgments of the trial court, and a writ of restitution issued by the cle rk of courts is not an order or judgment. Martin v. Reitz , 6th Dist. Erie No. E-96-012, 1996 WL 71010, *1 (Feb. 12, 1996). Only the underlying judgment supporting the writ is app ealable. Id. See also
Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Flowers , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-372, 2005-Ohio6615, ¶ 30.11. {¶ 31} Since appellant is attempting to appeal matters which are not a ppealable, we will not consider this argument. Accordingly, appellant’s fifth argument is not welltaken. {¶ 32} With respect to appellant’s sixth and seventh arguments, these arguments deal with case No. CVG-18-12870, the commercial property Kymz l eased from another party. As case No. CVG-18-12870 is not before us on appeal, we will not consider these arguments. Accordingly, appellant’s sixth and seventh argument s are not well-taken. {¶ 33} The judgments of the Toledo Municipal Court are affirmed. Appe llant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgments affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ______________________ _________ JUDGE Arlene Singer, J.

_______________________________ Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.