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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 16-BG-838

IN RE CHRIS C. YUM, PETITIONER.

A Disbarred Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 424602)

On Report and Recommendation 

of the Board of Professional Responsibility

(BDN 67-15)

(Argued May 23, 2017 Decided July 12, 2018) 

Chris C. Yum, pro se.

William R. Ross, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Hamilton P. Fox, III, 

Disciplinary Counsel, Jelani Lowery and Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant 

Disciplinary Counsels, were on the brief, for respondent.

Before GLICKMAN and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior 

Judge.

PER CURIAM: On May 12, 2011, petitioner Christopher C. Yum was 

disbarred by consent following his 2006 conviction for making a false statement in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001. In re Yum, 19 A.3d 367 (D.C. 2011) (per 

curiam). On June 14, 2015, he filed a petition for reinstatement, which 
2

Disciplinary Counsel opposed. The parties appeared before an Ad Hoc Hearing 

Committee (“Hearing Committee”), which recommended reinstatement. 

Disciplinary Counsel took exception to the recommendation, and brought the 

matter before this court. Following oral argument, we referred the matter to the 

Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) for its recommendation as to 

whether petitioner should be reinstated, and as to evidentiary issues related to

Board Rule 9.8. On December 22, 2017, the Board issued a report recommending

denial of the petition. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition. 

“Although we place great weight on the recommendations of the Board and 

Hearing Committee, this court has the ultimate authority to decide whether to grant 

a petition for reinstatement.” In re Sabo, 49 A.3d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 2012)

(quotation and citation omitted). A petitioner seeking reinstatement must prove by 

clear and convincing evidence “(a) [t]hat the attorney has the moral qualifications, 

competency, and learning in law required for readmission[,] and (b) [t]hat the 

resumption of the practice of law by the attorney will not be detrimental to the 

integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive 

to the public interest.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 (d)(1); In re Mance, 171 A.3d 1133, 

1136 (D.C. 2017). We consider the following “Roundtree factors” in determining 
3

whether a petitioner has made these required showings: (1) the nature and 

circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined; (2) 

whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the 

attorney's conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to 

remedy past wrongs and prevent future ones; (4) the attorney’s present character; 

and (5) the attorney’s present qualifications and competence to practice law. In re 

Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985).

The first Roundtree factor is “of primary importance in considering the 

petition for reinstatement.” In re Bettis, 644 A.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C. 1994). Here, 

petitioner acknowledges the seriousness of remaining willfully blind to a false 

statement in an INS application submitted on behalf of a client. We apply 

“heightened scrutiny” to the other Roundtree factors where, as here, petitioner’s 

misconduct “is so closely bound up with [his] role and responsibilities as an 

attorney.” See Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1224; In re Borders, 665 A.2d 1381, 1382 (D.C. 

1995) (quotation omitted). Because the Hearing Committee heard petitioner 

testify, we, like the Board, accept its conclusion that he is genuinely remorseful 

and recognizes the seriousness of his misconduct. Nevertheless, when viewed with 

heightened scrutiny, the fourth and fifth Roundtree factors counsel against 
4

reinstatement and lead us to conclude that petitioner has failed to prove his fitness.

1

“Under the fourth Roundtree factor, a petitioner is required to prove that 

those traits that led to disbarment no longer exist and, indeed, that he is a changed 

individual having full appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct and a new 

determination to adhere to the high standards of integrity and legal competence 

which the Court requires.” Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation omitted). In support 

of this factor, petitioner testified to his reflections about his misconduct and 

presented two character witnesses. The Hearing Committee viewed petitioner’s 

testimony as “demonstrat[ing] that he is a changed individual,” but accorded little 

weight to the character witnesses, finding that neither witness knew the details of 

his misconduct. The Board found the evidence on this factor to be lacking, citing

the witnesses’ unfamiliarity with the misconduct. In his brief, petitioner contends 

that the witnesses’ testimony demonstrates their familiarity with his misconduct, 

and therefore deserves significant weight. 

A petitioner is “expected to put on live witnesses familiar with the 

 1 We find that petitioner’s post-discipline conduct weighs against

reinstatement, but focus our analysis on the fourth and fifth Roundtree factors, 

which are stronger determinants of our judgment. 
5

underlying misconduct who can provide credible evidence of petitioner’s present 

good character.” Sabo, 49 A.3d at 1232 (quotation and alteration omitted). We 

concur with the Hearing Committee and Board that petitioner’s witnesses were 

unfamiliar with the details of his misconduct.

2 Although petitioner provided

assurances of his new character, he offered no examples of post-discipline conduct 

from which his personal growth can be reasonably inferred. Applying heightened 

scrutiny, we deem the lack of evidence regarding petitioner’s present character to 

weigh against reinstatement. See, e.g., In re Tinsley, 668 A.2d 833, 838 (D.C. 

1995) (per curiam) (appending Board report) (petitioner failed to prove his present 

good character where his two character witnesses lacked substantial knowledge 

regarding his misconduct).

As to the fifth Roundtree factor, the Hearing Committee found that 

petitioner established his present qualifications and competence to practice law 

because he attended a D.C. Bar course, adequately represented himself in these

reinstatement proceedings, and worked as a law clerk, translator, and document 

 2 Mr. Yi believed that petitioner’s misconduct related to attorney’s fees.

Ms. Osnos testified that petitioner’s misconduct arose from “miscommunications” 

with a client and, later in the hearing, petitioner conceded that she did not know 

“the details” of his conviction. 
6

reviewer after his disbarment. The Board cited petitioner’s failure to explain 

whether his work required legal analysis or call witnesses who could testify to his 

competence in the work he described.

A petitioner’s post-disbarment legal work may demonstrate his competence 

to practice. See, e.g., Bettis, 644 A.2d at 1030 (petitioner established his 

competence where he “worked as a law clerk . . . and improved his legal research 

and writing skills”). However, like the Board, we deem significant petitioner’s

failure to explain whether his post-disbarment work required legal analysis or 

otherwise improved his legal knowledge or skills. See, e.g., Tinsley, 668 A.2d at

838 (appending Board report) (petitioner failed to demonstrate his competence 

where he provided no details concerning his legal teaching experiences). Nor did 

petitioner call witnesses who could testify to the quality or nature of his work. See, 

e.g., In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425, 427 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam) (petitioner failed to 

prove his competence where no supervisory lawyer testified to his work). 

Applying heightened scrutiny, we find that the remaining evidence is too meager to 

establish his competence to practice, and therefore conclude that this Roundtree

factor weighs against reinstatement. 
7

For these reasons,

3 the petition for reinstatement is denied. 

So ordered.

 3 Given our disposition, we need not address whether the Hearing 

Committee should have considered the additional unfavorable evidence, proffered 

by Disciplinary Counsel, related to petitioner’s conviction.