### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON
A ssi gne d on Brie fs Marc h 10 , 200 5
STATE OF TENNESS EE ex rel . WI LLI AM L. GI BBO NS, DIST RICT

ATT ORN EY GEN ERA L v. C LUB UN IVER SE An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County CT-005010-04 Rita L. Stott s, Jud ge An Appeal f

romthe G eneral Sessions En vironm ental Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 1040665 Larry P otte r, Judge

No. W2004-02761-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 26, 2005

This is a public nuisance c ase. TheShelby Countydistrict attorney

g ener al filed a pe tition i n g ener al sessions court, asking the court to declar e a loc al nig htclub a public nuisanc e and to e njoin the nightc lub from furthe r oper ation. This divisi on of the g ener al sessions court wa s desig nated a s an environmenta l court pursua nt to Tennessee statute. After a hearing , the environmental court found that the nig htclub was a

public nuisance and permanently enjoined operation of t he nightclub. The n i gh t cl u b ap p ea l ed t h i s ru l i n g t o b o t h t h e c i rc u i tco u rt , re q u es t i n g de novo re vie w, a ndto this Cou rt

. Th e c ir c uit

c ou rt he ld that it did no t hav e jurisd ic tio n to he ar the app e a l be c aus e theapp e a l w ou ld l ie wi th this Cou rt

. B e c aus e the e nv ir on me nta l c ou rt ha d c on c ur re nt j urisd ic tio n w iththec ir c uit c ou rt , we a ff irm th e tria l c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that th e app e a l f ro m e nv ir on me nta l c ou rt lie s inthi s Co urt. Further, we aff

irm the environmenta l c ourt’s finding that the nightc lub is a public nuisance and the g rant of a perma nent injunction. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; the De cision of

the Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed ; th e De c isi on o f theEnvi r onm e nt al C our t i s A ffirm e d.
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Jef fr e y Jone s, B art le tt, fo r r e sp on de nt/ app e llant C lub Un ive rs e
Ly ndsay Fuller Hood, Assistant Attorney Gene ral a nd Steven A. Ha rt, Special Counsel, Off

ice of the Tenne ssee Attorne y

Gene ral, Na shville, for petitioner/appe llee State of Te nnesseeT he T en ne ssee st atute d efi ne s nuisanc e a s: 1 any p l ace i n or up o n whi ch l ewd ness , ass i gnat i o n, p rom o t i o n o f pro st i t ut i o n, pa t ronizi ng pro st i t ut i o n, un l awf ul s al e of

i nt oxi cat i ng l i quors , un l awf ul s al e of

an y r egu l at ed l ege nd d rug , na r cot i c or ot her cont r ol l ed s ubs t anc e, un l awf ul ga mb l i ng , an d s al e, ex hi bi t i on or po s s e s s i on of an y mat er i al det er mi ned to b e o b sc e n e o r p o rn o g ra p h ic w ith inte n t to e x h ib it, se ll, d e live r, o r d istrib u te m a tter o r m a te ria ls, .

. . quar r el i ng , dru nk enn es s , f i gh t i ng or brea che s of

t he peace ar e car r i ed on or per mi t t ed, an d pers onal p rop ert y , c on t en t s , f

u r n i t u r e, f

i x t u r es , e qu i pmen t a n d s t ock u s ed i n or i n c on n ec t i on w i t h t he
c o n d u c ting a n d m a inta inin g a n y su c h p la c e fo r a n y su c h p u rp o se
. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 9 -3 -1 0 1 (2 ) (2 0 0 0 ).

B y a g re e m e n t o f t h e p a rtie s, the m a tter w a s c o n tinu e d un til A u g u st 1 1 , 2 0 0 4

. 2
-2- OP IN ION
J uan Cantu (“ C an t u ”) owned a nig htclub located in Me mphis, Tennessee , Respondent/Appellant Club Universe . On J uly 24, 2004, the Petitioner/Appellee , the S t at e of Tenne ssee ( “State”) by Shelby County District Attorney Gene ral Willi am L . Gibbons (“Gibbons” ), filed a Petition for Abatement of Nuisanc e in the Shelby County Gene ral Sessions Court. The pe tition alleg ed that Club Universe was a nuisance as define d under section 29-3-101 of the Te nnessee Code Annotated. The pe t i t i o n s t ated that law enfor ceme nt officials ha d been inve stigating a ctivities at

1 Club Universe ove r many months, in which there we re num er ous sales of c ocaine to underc over police off icer s as well as r epeated sales of liquor to minors. During the t ime in question, there we re multipl e ar

rests at or near Club Universe for mult ifarious offenses, inc luding possession and sa le of na rc oti c s a ndc on tr oll e d s ub stanc e s, un la wf ul po sse ssi on of

we apo ns , p hy sic a l a ssa

ult s, sh oo tin g s, c arj a c kin g s, the ft , andpe rm itt ing juv e nil e s in the nig htc lub . T he pe tit iona sse rt e d th a t Clu b U niv e rs e was c onnecte d to gang activity and was “mar

ked” by g raf

fiti a s a g ang g athering place

. The pe tition soug ht a judg ment decla

ring Club Universe to be a public nuisance

. T h e p et i t i o n wa s fi l ed i n Di v i s i o n XIV o f t h e S h el b y C o u n t y Ge n er al S es s i o n s C o u rt , J u d ge L arry Potte r, wh ic h h a d b e e n de c lare d an e nv ir on me nta l cou rt (“ En vir on me nta l Court” ) pur su a nt t o se c tio n 2 9- 3- 10 2 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d. Se c tio n 2 9- 3- 10 2 s tate s:
Th e jurisd ic tio n is he re by c on fe rr e d u po n t he chan cery , c ir c uit , andc ri min a l c ou rt s and any court de signat ed as an envir onmental court pursuant to Chapter 426 of the Public Acts of 1991 to a

bate the public nuisance s define d in § 29- 3-101, upon petition in the name of

the state, upon re lation of . . . any district attorney

g ener al. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-102 (2000)

. On J uly 23, 2004, the Environmental Court ente red a temporary injunction that allowed law enfor ceme nt officials to close and padlo ck C l u b Un i v erse . The orde r set a he aring on the State’s reque st for a pe rmane nt injunction on J uly 30, 2004. The Stat e fi l ed an affidavit by I nvestig ator 2 Ronnie Wi lkinson (“Wilki nson”) of the Sh el b y C o u n t y

Attorney Gene ral’s O fficestating that he, along with members of the Shelby CountyMetro Gang Unit, se rved notice of the injunction on Cl ubP erti ne nt secti o ns o f sec t i o n 2 7

- 5

- 1 0 8 o f

t he T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated are as fo l l o w s: 3
(a)( 1 ) Any part y m ay ap p eal f rom an ad vers e d eci si o n o f t he general ses si o ns co urt t o t he ci rcui t co urt o f t he co unt y wi t hi n a pe ri o d of t en (10 ) days on co m p l y i ng wi t h t he p rovis i o ns o f t hi s chap t er. * * * ( c) An y a ppea l s h al l be h ea r d de no vo in the c irc u it c o u rt.

T

. C

. A

. § 2 7

- 5

- 1 0 8 (a), (c) (20 0 0 ). -3- Universe on J uly

23, 2004. Wil kinson state d that Club Unive rse’ s owner, Ca ntu, personally rec eived notice of the injunction and was notified of the date of

the hea ring on the matter. On Aug ust 10, 2004, Club Universe filed a response to the Petition asserting, inte r a lia , that a permanent shutdown of Club Universe was not war rante d and that Club Universe should be g iven an opportunity

to abate the nui sance . Club Universe c ontended that the E nvironmental Court did not have the authority

under Te nnessee law to permanently enjoin operation of the Club.
The Environme ntal Court hear d testimony on the m atter on A ug ust 11, 2004. After a rg ument by the attorne y s on the authority of the Environme ntal Court, the court he ld that it had bee n g iven the auth ority to g rant a pe rm a ne nt i nju nc tio n u nd e r s e c tio n 2 9- 3- 10 2, in that th e statut e sp e c if ic a lly g rants the Environmental Court jur i s d i cti on to “abate the public nuisanc es def ined in Section 29-3-101.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-102. I n an order dated Aug ust 19, 2004, the Environmental Court noted the on g oin g sa le of ill e g a l na

rc oti c s a nd br e a c he s of the pe a c e a t Clu b U niv e rs e . It f ou ndthat th e se c urity at Club Universe “ has not and will not solve the problems” and that “any continuation of the ope ration as it exi sts would constitut e a c ontinuing nuisanc e.” In light of this , the Environmental Court conclude d that Club Universe wa s a public nuisance . It gr ant ed t h e S t ate a permanent injunction, enjoining Club Univer se or any succe ssor business entity from oper ating a nig htclub or si milar business at that location.
OnAu g us t 27 , 2 00 4, Clu b U niv e rs e app e a le d th e Au g us t 19 or de r of the En vir on me nta l Co urt. Be cause the Environmental Court in S h el b y C o unty is a Division of Gene ral Sessions Court, and ap p e a l s f r o mG e n e r a l S e s s i o n s C o u rtar e n o r m a l l y de novo app e a ls t o Ci rc uit Cou rt , Clu b U niv e rs e

3
was unc erta in whether

the appe al from the Environmental C ourt’s order would lie in Circuit Court or thi s Co urt. C on se qu e ntl y , Cl ub Un ive rs e fi le d simu ltane ou s app e a ls in the Cir c uit Cou rt a ndin this Court.
I n Shelby

CountyCircuit C o u rt , Club Universe filed a motion to vacate the or der of the Environmental Court. Club Universe asserted that the Environmental Court er red in finding that it had the authority

to issue a permanent injunction in case s of public nuisance

. Club Unive rse also asserted that, since the he aring in the Environmental Court, it had learned that the State obtained the tempora ry injunction on July 23, 2004 and shut dow n Club Universe late r that eve ning, but did not file its Petition until J uly 26, 2004. I n light of that fac t, Club Universe arg ued, the Environme ntal Court did not have jurisd ic tio n to c los e th e Cl ub on J ul y23 . Cl ub Un ive rs e the n r e qu e ste d a he ari ng on its motionto vacate.C l ub U ni vers e d o es not ap p eal t he subst ant i ve f i nd i ng that it s o p erat i o n co nst i t ut ed a pub l i c nui sance, and t he 4
te stim o n y su p p o rting this find ing is no t i n c lud e d in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l.

S ec t i o n 1 6

- 1 5

- 7 2 9 o f

t he T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated st ates: 5

N o ci vi l ca s e, ori gi nat i ng i n a gen er al s es s i ons cour t an d car r i ed t o a hi gh er cour t , s hal l be di s mi s s ed by s u ch c ou r t for a n y i n for mal i t y w h at ev er , bu t s h al l be t r i ed on i t s me r i t s ; a n d t h e cou r t s h al l a l l ow al l am end m ent s i n t he fo rm o f act i o n, t he p art i es t h e re to , o r the st at em ent of t he cause of act i o n, n ec es s ar y t o r ea ch t h e mer i t s , u pon s u ch t er ms as ma y be de eme d j u s t a n d pr oper
. T h e t r i al s h al l be d e no v o , i n c lud ing d a m a g e s. T en n
. Code An n
. § 16- 15- 729 ( 1994)

. Se ct i on 27- 5- 108( a) of t h e T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed s t at es t h at appe al s f r om general s ess i o ns co urt s l i e i n t he ci rcui t co urt s. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 7

- 5

- 1 0 8 (a) (20 0 0 ).

-4- I n r e sp on se, th e S tat e fi le d a motionto d ism iss Clu b U niv e rs e ’s motionin C ir c uit Cou rt , ma int a ini ng that th e Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt, a s the de sig nate d Env ir on me nta l Co urt, h a d th e auth ority under Te nnessee statutes to issue a permanent inj unction. The State a rg ued that, bec ause Te nnessee statut e s p ro vid e that th e En vir on me n t al C o u r t h a s j urisd ic tio n c on c ur

re nt w iththat of

theCir c uit

Cou rt , theCir c uit

Cou rt do e s n ot h a ve jurisd ic tio n to re vie w a de c isi on of

theEn vir on me nta l Co urt. By order dated October 10, 2004, the C ircuit Court ag ree d with the arg ument of the State a nd ruled that the G ener al Sessions Court, when act i n g as an E nvironmental Court pursuant to statute, e xer c ise d c on c ur

re nt o r e qu a l ju ri sd ic tio n w iththeCir c uit Cou rt . A c c or din g ly , th e Cir c uit Cou rt he ld that it didno t ha ve jurisd ic tio n to he ar the app e a l.
I n this Court, C lub Universe f irst appea ls the Circuit Court’s decision t hat it did not have jurisdiction to hear the a

ppeal. Club Universe asserts as well that the E n v i ronmental Court did not ha ve theauth ority

to i ssu e a

pe rm a ne nt i nju nc tio n a g a ins t Clu b U niv e rs e . Fina lly , Cl ub Un ive rs e asserts on a

ppeal that the State’s failure to file its petition for abatement of the nuisanc e “prior to the issuance of the temporary injunction wa s unlawful and must re sult in dismiss al of t h e p er m anent injunction.” 4
Since this case w as t ri ed b ythe trial court sitt ing w ithout a jury , we r eview the trial court’ s fa c tua l f ind ing s de novo on the re cord a ccompanied by a pre s u m p t i o n of cor

rec tness unless the preponde ra n ce of the evide nce is other wise. Cam pbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996) ; Tenn. R

. App. P

. 13(d). The trial court’s leg al conc lusions are re viewed de novo wi th no presumption of cor

rec tness. Campb e ll , 919 S.W .2d at 35. On appe al, Club Universe f irst arg ues that the Circuit Court erre d in refusing to hear its appeal from the Ge nera l Sessions C ourt. Club Unive rse notes that appea ls f rom judgme nts f

rom a Ge nera l Sessions Court are ordina rily g rante d de novo revie w i n Circuit Court pursuant to s ection 16-15- 729. 5 Club Universe states that absent leg al authority depriving Club Universe of its rig ht t o a de novo app ea l as set forth in section 16-15-729, the Circ uit Court shoul d have he ld a de novo tr i a l

. In-5-

response , the State asserts that, in an abate ment action such as this, the Environment Court functions as the e quivalent of a

circ uit, chanc ery , or criminal court, and thus an appeal from the Environmental Cou rt , li ke thee qu iva le nt c ou rt s, wo uldlie in this Cou rt

. Circumstance s analog ous to those in this case wer e pre sented in Co o p e rv . T hom pson , 710 S.W .2d 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). In Cooper , th e plaintif f f ile d a petitio n intheJuve nil e Cou rt , se e kin g a de c laratio n th a t hewa s th e natur a l f a the r o f a c hil d b orn to a

wo ma n w ho wa s ma

rrie d to another man at the time of the birth. Cooper , 710 S.W .2d at 944. Afte r an e vident iary hearing, the J uvenile Court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition. Id . T he plaintif f a pp e a le d th e dis mis sa l to Cir c uit Court, seeking a de novo trial. Id. I n Cir c uit Cou rt , th e de fe nd a nts mov e d to dis mis s th e c omp la int , asserting that the a

ppeal would lie with the Court of Appea ls rather than with the Circuit Court. Id

. at 945. This motion was overr uled. Id. The Circuit Court held a de novo trial, ultimately holding that the plaintiff did not have sta nding to f ile the petition. Id. a t 94 4. Th e plaintif f the n a pp e a le d to thi s Court. Id. at 945. The de fendants cross-a ppeale d, and ar g ued on appe al th at t h e appea l from the J uvenile Court should have be en filed in this Court instead of in the Circuit Court. Id.
Onapp e a l, this Court noted in Cooperthat, g e ne ra lly , an a pp e a l f ro m a n o rd e r o f the Juve nil e Court is made to the Circuit Court. Id. ; See T. C.A .§ 37 -1 -1 59 (2 00 1)

. Ho we ve r, theTe nn e sse e statut e g overning the leg itimation of children confe rre d on the J uvenile Court c oncurr ent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court. Id . The Coopercourt observ ed that there was no e x press statutory provision for appea ls in legitimation case s. Id. Ho we ve r, ba se d o n th e fa c t th a t th e jurisd ic tion o f the Juve nil e Cou rt in le g iti matio n ca se s wa s con c ur re nt with the jurisd ic tio n of the Cir c uit Cou rt , this Cou rt he ld that th e app e a l f

ro m a Juve nil e Cou rt

de c isi on on le g iti matio n w ou ld lie wi th the Cou rt of Ap pe a ls. Id. The Coopercourt stated, “[w] ithout express statutory authority to the contra ry , we c annot envision an appea l be tween two courts exercising concur rent jurisdiction whic h would enable a party to have two trials of equal stature on the same matter.” Id . at 945 -4 6. Con se qu e ntl y , th e app e llate c ou rt he ld that the defendants’ moti on to dismi ss the proce eding s in Circuit Court shoul d have be en g rante d. Id. at 946. Clearly

the situation in the case at bar is analog ous to the circumstances presente d in Cooper

. I n the instant case , the court which happe ns to b e d esig nated the E nvironmental Court in Shelby Countyis a division of the Shelby CountyGene ral Sessions Court. As in Cooper , ap p ea l s fr om Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Cou rt are no rm a lly to Cir c uit Cou rt , fo r a tria l de novo . Howeve r, in this case, the Gene ral Sessions functioned as the Environmental Court, w hich by statute has bee n g iven conc urre nt jurisdiction with the C ircuit Court in an ac tion to abate a public nuisa nce. A s in Cooper , there is no express statutory

provision for an a

ppeal f rom an a batement de cision by

a Ge nera l Sessions C ourt which has been desig nated the E nvironmental Court. The r easoning in Cooper is ap pli c able he re ; in the abse nce of express statutory authority to the contrary , “we cannot envision an appe al betwe en two courts exerc ising c oncurr ent jurisdiction which would ena ble a party to have two trials of equa l stature on the same matter.” Cooper , 710 S.W .2d at 945-46.
This rea soning is consis t en t with this Court’s holding in King of Club s, Inc ., v . G ibb ons , 9 S.W .3d 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). In Kin g of Clubs , the District Attorney Gene ral filed an abatementS ec t i o n 2 9

- 3

- 1 0 3 st ates: 6

W hen a pu bl i c n u i s an ce , as def i n ed i n § 29- 3- 101 i s k ept , mai n t ai n ed, ca r r i ed on , or ex i s t s i n any co unt y , a b i l l o r p et i t i o n m ay b e f i l ed in any chance ry , ci rcui t , or cri m i nal co urt of such count y , i n t he
n ame of t h e s t at e, by a n d u pon t h e r el at i on of t h e r es pec t i v e of f i ce r s or pe r s on s n ame d i n § 29- 3- 102, agai nst t h e per s on k ee pi n g , ma i n t ai n i n g , or c ar r y i n g on s u ch n u i s an ce , a n d a l l a i der s a n d a bet t ors t herei n, and t he o wners, pro p ri et o rs , or agent s o r p ers o ns o r co rpo rat i o ns i n c harge o r co nt rol o f t he bu i l di n g or pl ac e wh er ei n s u ch n u i s an ce e x i s t s , for t h e pu r pos e of h av i n g s u ch n u i s an ce a bat ed and p e rm a n e n tly d isc o n tinu e d

.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 1

- 1 0 3 (20 0 0 ). -6- action in Criminal Court a g ainst a nightc lub, a lleg ing that the nig htclub was a public nuisance

. Id . at 79 6. I n r e sp on se , th e nig htc lub fi le d a se pa rate la ws uit a g a ins t the Di stric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l in Cir c uit Court, alleg ing that the club’s ac tiviti es we re pr otected by the First Amendment to the United States Constit ution and seeking to enjoin the Dis trict Attorney Gene ral from pursuing the abatement ac tion in C ri min a l Co urt. Id . at 799. T h e C ircuit Court issued a tempora ry injunction ag ainst the District Attorney Gene ral, enjoining him f rom seeking an injunction to close the nig htclub. Id

. at 798. The Di stric t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l th e n f

ile d a n in te rl oc uto ry

app e a l of theCir c uit Cou rt ’s ru lin g to thi s Co urt. Id. a t 79 7. Th e Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls a

pp lie d th e “ c on c ur

re nt j urisd ic tio n r

ule ” a ndva c a te d th e Cir c uit Court injunction, st ating that a litigant “should not be permitted t o ru n fr o m one court of equa l jurisdiction to another of t he same jurisdiction and there relitig ate the same matter.” Id . at 799 (c iting Gree nlaw v. Kernahan , 36 Tenn. 371, 380 (1857) ).
Cl u b U n iv e r s e a tt e mp ts to d is ti n g uish Co ope r fr om the c a se a t ba r b y no tin g that a

Juve nil e Court is a court of rec ord, wherea s the Genera l Sessions Court is not, arg uing that a suit originating in G e n e r a l S e s s i o n s C o u rtc a n n o tc o m p l y w i t h R u l e 2 4 ( a ) o f

t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f A p p e l la te Procedur e, which r equire s that the appellant provide a r ecor d. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 4( a ). We mus t a ssu me that theL e g isl a tur e un de rs too d th a t th e Ge ne ral Se ssi on s Co urt is no t a c ou rt of re c or d in enac ting leg islation that provides for the de signation of the Environmental Court. It doe s not render the concurre nt jurisdiction rule inapplicable i n this case. Conseque ntly , we a ffirm the Circ uit Court’s dis mis sa l of

theClu b U niv e rs e app e a l f ro m th e En vir on me nta l Co urt.
Clu b U niv e rs e arg ue s n e xt that th e En viro nm ental Cou rt didno t ha ve theauth ority to perma nently

enjoin the oper ation of the Club. Club Universe asserts that, under se ction 29-3-103 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d, on ly a c ha nc e ry , cir c uit , or crimi na l cou rt ha s th e auth ority

to “ abate and permanently

discontinue” a n uisance

. Club Universe a lso asserts that the a ct that cr eate d the 6 En vir on me nta l Co urt, C ha pte r 4 26 of th e P ub lic A c ts o f 1 99 1, a lso fails to g rant the auth ority to perma nently

enjoin the club fr om operating.
Under Section 29-3-102, the Environmental Court is granted jurisdiction to declar e a nuisa nce. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 3-102 (2000) . Section 29-3-110 o f t h e T en nessee Code Annotated the n pr ov ide s th a t if

a c ou rt fi nd s th a t a

nu isanc e e xists , th e n “ thejud g me nt o r d e c re e sh a ll p e rm a ne ntl y enjoin the defe ndant from eng ag ing in, c onducting , continuing, or maintaining such nuisance .” Te nn.-7-

Cod e An n. § 2 9- 3- 11 0. Se c tio n 2 9- 3- 10 2 a lso state s th a t the En vir on me nta l Co urt ha s ju ri sd ic tio n “ to abate the public nuisance s.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-102 ( 2000). To “a bate” is to elimi nate or nullify

. Black’s Law Dictionary 2 (7th ed. 1999). Clearly , to eliminate a public nuisance such as that which wa s fo u n d i n this case, e njoining oper ation of the Club is nece ssary , and the statutes pr ovide the Environmental Court with the authority to do so. This conclusion is supported by the lang uag e in Chapter 426 of the Public A cts of 1991, which cre ated the e nvironmental court. The pertinent portion of the ac t s t ates that “ the judg e of the [ E n v i r o n m e n tC o u rt ] i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d t h e p o w e r t o i s s u e i n j u n c t i o n s , b o t h m a n d at o r

y an d p r o h i b i t o r y, s u c h p o w e r

to b e e xe r c is e d a s p r o v id e d f o r inRu le6 5 o f

th e T e n n e s s e e Ru le s o f

Ci v il Pr ocedur e.” 1991 Tenn. Public Acts 426. In this case, onc e t h e E n v i ronm ental Court determined that Club Universe constituted a public nuisance , it had the authority to permane ntly

enjoin its operation. Finally , Club Unive rse arg ues that closing the club was illegal be cause the club was c losed and padlocke d on J uly

23, 2004, pursuant to an or der sig ned on Jul y 23, 2004, but not filed until J uly 26, 20 04 . Cl ub Un ive rs e a c kn ow le dg e s th a t it didno t r aise thi s is su e to the En vir on me nta l Co urt. Consequently , we must c onsider this issue waived on a ppeal. Se e Simpso n v . Fr ont ie r Co mm . Cr

e dit Union , 810 S.W .2d 147 (Tenn. 1991)

. Th e de c isi on of

theCir c uit Co urt , dis mis sin g theapp e a l f ro m th e En vir on me nta l Co urt, i s aff irmed. The de cision of the Environmental Court is aff irmed as well. Costs of t his appea l are taxed t o A p p e l l a n t , C l u b U n i v e r s e , a n d i t s s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

_______________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE