NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS
D IVISION O NE

BRYAN WALTERS, Plaintiff/Appellant
,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant/Appellee

.
No. 1 CA-CV 23-0703

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2022-016758 The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Bryan Walters, Jacksonville, Florida Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Connie Totorica Gould, Rebecca Banes Counsel for Defendant/Appellee FILED 0 5-28-2024WALTERS v. STATE Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe deliver ed the decision of the court, in which Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

H O W E , Judge:

¶1 Bryan Walters appeals the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to dismiss his complaint. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Walters purports to be a studen t at Arizona State University (“ASU”) and claims to have had ru n-ins with ASU Police Department deputies in 2022. Sometime in Septem ber, he was questioned outside the ASU School of Life Sciences and as ked to leave. He alleged that on September 23, police detained and ques tioned him twice: once at ASU’s West campus, where an officer purpor tedly took his ASU identification card, and once outside the Herberger In stitute for Design and the Arts. On September 27, he was asked to leave the ASU downtown campus after he was found sitting outside the law colle ge building. And finally, he alleged that while sleeping outside the busi ness school in the early hours of September 29, an officer “stole” his backpack. ASU police contacted him later that morning to let him know hi s backpack, wallet, and phone were at ASU police’s lost and found. Hi s laptop, however, was missing.

¶3 Based on the officers’ alleged actions in these incidents, Walters sued the State in December 2022. He claimed theft, armed robbery, unlawful imprisonment, civil rights violations, and, inexplicably, employment discrimination. Fo r damages, Walters requested compensation in the form of a 4000 sq uare foot condominium in Phoenix, three luxury vehicles, his own Motor Grand Prix racing team, a four-year contract with the Arizona Diamondbacks, and $900 billion per week for the rest of his life.

¶4 Before serving the State with his complaint, Walters applied for default judgment. The court deni ed the application, finding it incomplete. Walters then filed seve ral more applications for default judgment before finally serving the State with his complaint in March 2023.WALTERS v. STATE Decision of the Court

3 After the State moved to dismiss Walters ’s complaint for failure to state a claim, he moved to continue hi s motion for default judgment.

¶5 The State moved to dismiss Walters’s complaint, arguing that Walters had not complied with Arizona’s notice of claim statute and that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim may not be brough t against the State or be based on vicarious liability. Shortly afterwards, in late April, Walters filed a notice of claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss. In granting the motion, the court deemed all other pending matte rs, including Walters’s motions for default judgment and motion for continuance, to be moot. It entered a final judgment, from which Walters timely appeals. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Walters presents two issues on appeal: first, whether the trial court erred in declining to enter default judgment against the State, and second, whether the court erred in dismissing Walters’s complaint.

I. Default Judgment

¶7 Walters argues that the trial court erred in failing to enter a default judgment against the State. The trial court may enter default judgment “[i]f a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1).

¶8 Though Walters filed his complaint in December, he did not serve the State until March 28, 2023. The State had twenty days under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) to file its resp onsive pleading. It did so. Because the State did “plead or otherwise defend” against the complaint, no basis for a default judgment existed. The trial court did not err.

II. Dismissal

¶9 This court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa
, 230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7 (2012). Dismissal is appropriate if “as a matter of law [ ] plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. at 356 ¶ 8 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶10 Walters brought both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State. The state law claims fail because he did not comply with Arizona’s notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12–821.01. Although the trialWALTERS v. STATE Decision of the Court

4 court did not expressly address Walters’s state law claims, this court “will affirm the court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.” Schooley v. Pena , 253 Ariz. 185, 188 ¶ 10 (App. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Walters based his stat e law claims on A.R.S. §§ 13-1303, - 1802, -1904, and 41-1463. 1

¶11 “Persons who have claims agai nst a public entity, public school or a public employee shall file cl aims . . . within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action a ccrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Walters alleged that the State violated his rights during incidents that took place between September 23 and October 3, 2022. One hundred eighty days after October 3, 2022, was April 1, 2023; but Walters did not file his notice of claim until April 28, in response to the State’s motion to dismiss. His notice of claim was thus untimely, and hi s state law claims were barred.

¶12 Section 1983 provides a federal remedy against a person who, acting under the color of state law, de prives another person of their federal constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walters’s claim fails because “a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Walters’s comp laint alleged vicarious liability, but “vicarious liability is ina pplicable to [ ] § 1983 suits.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Instead, “a pl aintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, thro ugh the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. Walters neither named specific officers as defendants nor communica ted how their actions violated his constitutional rights. He has thus shown no error.

1 On appeal, Walters attempts to add new claims based on A.R.S. §§ 13-2907, -2907.01, and 41-1442. “Generally, a party cannot argue on appeal legal issues and arguments that have no t been specifically presented to the [trial] court,” Alulddin v. Alfartousi , 255 Ariz. 436, 442 ¶ 20 (App. 2023), and we therefore decline to address these new claims.WALTERS v. STATE Decision of the Court

5 CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.