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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

LAURA MONACO, Personal Representative of 

the ESTATE OF ALISON MONACO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

and 

COVENANT MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and 

MARY FREE BED REHABILITATION 

HOSPITAL, 

 Intervenors-Plaintiffs/Appellees, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

November 15, 2016 

9:10 a.m. 

v No. 329214 

Huron Circuit Court 

HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 13-105217-NF 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and MURPHY and RIORDAN, JJ. 

MURPHY, J. 

 In this dispute concerning the recovery of personal protection insurance benefits, 

commonly referred to as PIP benefits, under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant 

Home-Owners Insurance Company (HOIC) appeals as of right the judgment entered in favor of 

plaintiff Laura Monaco (hereafter “plaintiff” in the singular) and intervening plaintiffs Covenant 

Medical Center, Inc., and Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospital (jointly referred to as “the 

medical providers”).1

 The judgment reflected the verdict rendered by a jury following trial and 

certain stipulations between HOIC and the medical providers regarding the amount of damages. 

HOIC challenges the pretrial denial of its motion for summary disposition and the denial of its 

motion for a directed verdict. There is but one issue in this appeal that we must resolve. It 

concerns the legal question whether a person injured in a motor vehicle accident is barred from 

recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), which generally precludes coverage when a 

person used a vehicle that he or she had “taken unlawfully,” where the owner of the vehicle 

 

1

 Any reference in this opinion to “plaintiffs” in the plural shall pertain to plaintiff and the 

medical providers. 
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permitted, gave consent to, or otherwise authorized the injured person to take and use the 

vehicle, but where the injured person used the vehicle in violation of the law with the owner’s 

knowledge. We hold that PIP benefits are available in such circumstances, given that the phrase 

“taken unlawfully,” as employed in MCL 500.3113(a), does not encompass the unlawful use or 

operation of a motor vehicle, just the unlawful taking of a vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In July 2012, plaintiff’s daughter Alison, then 15 years old, sustained severe injuries 

when she lost control of a vehicle that she was driving and crashed into a roadside ditch. At the 

time, Alison had completed and passed a driver’s training course and obtained a permit to drive, 

but only if accompanied by a licensed parent, guardian, or 21-year-old, and she was not so 

accompanied when the accident occurred.2

 The motor vehicle was owned by plaintiff, 

customarily driven by plaintiff’s partner, and insured by HOIC. The medical providers treated 

Alison’s extensive injuries and assisted in her rehabilitation.

 Plaintiff filed a claim with HOIC for PIP benefits. In a recorded statement, plaintiff told 

HOIC’s insurance adjustor that Alison did not have permission to drive the vehicle when the 

accident took place. HOIC thus denied coverage under MCL 500.3113(a) and language in the 

insurance policy that tracked the statutory provision. Plaintiff then telephoned the adjustor 

inquiring if there would be coverage if her partner had permitted Alison to use the vehicle. 

According to HOIC’s adjustor, she informed plaintiff that HOIC would “reevaluate” the question 

of coverage in that event, but the adjuster never heard back from plaintiff in the matter. 

 Plaintiff, then acting as Alison’s next friend, filed suit challenging HOIC’s denial of PIP 

benefits. The medical providers, aligning themselves with plaintiff, intervened in the action, 

seeking reimbursement for costs associated with providing medical care to Alison. HOIC filed a 

motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff had admitted 

during her deposition that she had previously lied to HOIC’s adjuster when she stated that Alison 

lacked permission to drive the vehicle. HOIC argued that MCL 500.3113(a) barred Alison from 

obtaining PIP benefits because she took the vehicle unlawfully and did not reasonably believe 

that she had permission to use the car. HOIC maintained that “self-serving” deposition 

testimony given by plaintiff, her partner, and Alison, which contradicted plaintiff’s earlier 

recorded statement, was inadequate to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. HOIC 

additionally contended that Alison had taken the vehicle unlawfully regardless of any possible 

parental permission, considering that, in light of Alison’s age and the restricted nature of the 

driver’s permit, plaintiff had violated the law by allowing or authorizing Alison’s 

unaccompanied operation of the car. 

 

2

 MCL 257.310e(4) applied to Alison, and it provides that “[a] person issued a level 1 graduated 

licensing status may operate a motor vehicle only when accompanied either by a licensed parent 

or legal guardian or, with the permission of the parent or legal guardian, a licensed driver 21 

years of age or older.” 
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 Plaintiffs responded that Alison had taken the vehicle lawfully, citing the deposition 

testimony of plaintiff, her partner, and Alison, which indicated that Alison had permission to 

take and drive the car on her own at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs further asserted that 

Alison’s lack of a driver’s license that would have allowed her to drive on her own was 

irrelevant with respect to whether she took the car lawfully, as HOIC was conflating unlawful 

taking with unlawful use. The trial court denied HOIC’s motion for summary disposition, 

concluding that there was a factual issue regarding whether Alison had permission to take the 

vehicle and that the law supported plaintiffs’ proffered distinction between “taking” and “using” 

a vehicle for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). 

 At trial, plaintiff testified that her initial statement to the insurance adjustor was not 

truthful and that Alison actually had permission to take and use the vehicle on the day of the 

crash. Plaintiff admitted that she feared criminal liability for allowing her daughter to drive 

when she gave the statement to HOIC’s adjustor. Plaintiff’s partner testified that Alison had 

permission to take and use the vehicle on the day of the accident, and Alison indicated that she 

frequently drove the vehicle with plaintiff’s knowledge and consent.3

 Plaintiffs additionally 

produced witnesses who testified that they saw Alison driving the vehicle alone on several 

occasions, with one witness claiming that he observed plaintiff’s partner at times giving Alison 

the car keys. HOIC in turn elicited testimony from witnesses who questioned the credibility of 

plaintiffs’ witnesses, and one of HOIC’s witnesses testified that the partner had stated that he 

told Alison not to take the vehicle. 

 At trial, HOIC renewed its summary disposition arguments in moving for a directed 

verdict at the close of proofs, and the court again rejected them. HOIC and the medical 

providers had stipulated before trial to the amount of damages (outstanding medical charges plus 

penalty interest) should there be liability for PIP benefits, leaving for the jury to resolve the issue 

of liability. And the jury concluded that HOIC had failed to meet its burden of showing that 

Alison took the car without permission, effectively rendering HOIC liable for the stipulated 

sums. The jury, of course, reached the same conclusion on liability relative to plaintiff, and the 

jurors made additional findings in regard to the nature and amount of allowable expenses and 

interest to which plaintiff was entitled. A judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict and the 

stipulation was entered, and this appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GOVERNING TEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

AND DIRECTED VERDICT MOTIONS 

 “A trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition and a motion for a 

directed verdict are reviewed de novo[,]” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 192; 670 NW2d 

675 (2003), as is the question of statutory interpretation, Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 

 

3

 Tragically, Alison died in an unrelated house fire before trial; therefore, the trial court allowed 

her deposition testimony to be read into the trial record. 
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Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). The test with respect to a motion for summary 

disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is essentially the same in regard to a motion for a 

directed verdict, “namely, whether reasonable minds, taking the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the nonmovant, could reach different conclusions regarding a material fact.” 

Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 165 n 9; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). 

B. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 

 The Michigan Supreme Court in Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311-312; 831 

NW2d 223 (2013), set forth the well-established principles governing statutory construction, 

observing: 

 When interpreting a statute, we follow the established rules of 

statutory construction, the foremost of which is to discern and give effect to the 

intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable 

evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a 

statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no 

further judicial construction is permitted. Effect should be given to every phrase, 

clause, and word in the statute and, whenever possible, no word should be treated 

as surplusage or rendered nugatory. Only when an ambiguity exists in the 

language of the statute is it proper for a court to go beyond the statutory text to 

ascertain legislative intent. [Citations omitted.] 

C. DISCUSSION 

 HOIC contends on appeal that Alison necessarily took the vehicle unlawfully given her 

age and restricted license, precluding entitlement to PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3113(a). 

We note that HOIC does not challenge the jury’s factual determination that HOIC failed to 

satisfy its burden of showing that Alison took the car without permission. HOIC’s appellate 

argument is squarely one of law, entailing statutory construction. There is no genuine issue of 

material fact that Alison was only 15 years old when the accident took place and that in light of 

the limited nature of her license or permit, it was unlawful for her to drive the car 

unaccompanied by a licensed adult identified in MCL 257.310e(4). Thus, we must entertain the 

question whether those undisputed facts bar the recovery of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a) 

as a matter of law, such that an order granting summary disposition or a directed verdict should 

have entered in favor of HOIC. 

 “The Michigan no-fault act requires that owners and registrants of automobiles carry 

personal protection insurance to cover an insured’s medical care arising from injuries sustained 

in an automobile accident.” Krohn, 490 Mich at 155, citing MCL 500.3101(1) and MCL 

500.3105(1). At the time of Alison’s accident, MCL 500.3113(a) provided: 

 A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits 

for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following 

circumstances existed: 
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 (a) The person was using a motor vehicle . . . which he or she had taken 

unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to 

take and use the vehicle. [Emphasis added.] 

 This provision was subsequently amended pursuant to 2014 PA 489, but it still generally 

bars the recovery of PIP benefits by a person who operated a vehicle that he or she had “taken 

unlawfully[.]” The first level of inquiry when applying MCL 500.3113(a) always concerns 

whether the taking of a vehicle was unlawful, and if the taking was lawful, the inquiry ends as 

the statute is inapplicable. Henry Ford Health Sys v Esurance Ins Co, 288 Mich App 593, 599; 

808 NW2d 1 (2010). 

 In construing the language “taken unlawfully,” our Supreme Court in Spectrum Health 

Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 516-517; 821 NW2d 117 (2012), 

observed: 

 In determining the Legislature's intended meaning of the phrase “taken 

unlawfully,” we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we 

may consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the 

phrase. The word “unlawful” commonly means “not lawful; contrary to law; 

illegal,” and the word “take” is commonly understood as “to get into one's hands 

or possession by voluntary action.” When the words are considered together, the 

plain meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully” readily embraces a situation in 

which an individual gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law. 

[Citations omitted.] 

 The Spectrum Health Court further held that “any person who takes a vehicle contrary to 

a provision of the Michigan Penal Code—including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, informally 

known as the ‘joyriding’ statutes—has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 

500.3113(a).” Id. at 509. After analyzing the language of the two joyriding statutes, the Court 

concluded that both “make it unlawful to take any motor vehicle without authority, effectively 

defining an unlawful taking of a vehicle as that which is unauthorized.” Id. at 517-518. A taking 

does not have to be larcenous to qualify as unlawful, and MCL 500.3113(a) applies to any person 

who takes a vehicle without the owner’s authority, regardless of whether that person had the 

intent to steal the vehicle. Id. at 518. MCL 500.3113(a) examines the legality of a taking from

the perspective of the driver. Id. at 522. The following language from Spectrum Health 

effectively belies HOIC’s argument in this case: 

 The “authority” referred to in the joyriding statutes is obviously the 

authority of the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, for purposes of MCL 

500.3113(a), a vehicle is “unlawfully taken” if it is taken without the authority of 

its owner. . . . Therefore, MCL 500.3113(a) does not apply to the lawful owner of 

a vehicle, even if that person drives it under a circumstance that renders him or 

her legally unable to operate a vehicle. However, driving while legally unable 

may have implications under MCL 500.3113(a) for a person who has taken a 

vehicle unlawfully because as a matter of law, one cannot reasonably believe that 

he or she is entitled to use a vehicle when the person knows that he or she is 
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unable to legally operate the vehicle. [Id. at 518 n 25 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted; emphasis in original).] 

 As reflected in this language, the owner of a vehicle could never be barred from coverage 

under MCL 500.3113(a) because he or she would not be capable of taking the vehicle absent 

owner authorization; he or she is the owner. And, importantly, this is true even if the owner 

drives the vehicle “under a circumstance that renders him or her legally unable to operate a 

vehicle.” Id. This statement effectively signifies, in direct contradiction of HOIC’s theory, that 

the unlawful operation or use of a motor vehicle is irrelevant with respect to examining the 

“taken unlawfully” phrase in MCL 500.3113(a), otherwise the Supreme Court’s example 

concerning an owner would not hold water. Our view is buttressed by the final sentence in the 

quoted passage from Spectrum Health, which indicates that the unlawful operation or use of a 

motor vehicle is only relevant when the injured person had actually unlawfully taken the vehicle 

and was attempting to invoke the language in MCL 500.3113(a) allowing recovery where “the 

person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle,” despite the 

unlawful taking. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 518 n 25. Thus, the unlawful operation or use of

a motor vehicle is simply not a concern in the context of analyzing whether the vehicle was taken 

unlawfully. 

 The distinction between unlawfully taking a motor vehicle and unlawfully using a vehicle 

was recognized in Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 495 Mich 316, 331; 852 NW2d 34 (2014), wherein 

the Supreme Court stated that “the unlawful use of a vehicle . . . is not relevant under the 

unlawful taking language in MCL 500.3113[.]” And this Court has observed that, with respect to 

the language in MCL 500.3113(a), “[c]learly, the terms ‘take’ and ‘use’ are not interchangeable 

or even synonymous; obtaining possession of an object is very different from employing that 

object or putting it into service.” Amerisure Ins Co v Plumb, 282 Mich App 417, 428; 766 

NW2d 878 (2009), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rambin, 495 Mich at 323-324 n 7. 

 HOIC argues that it was unlawful for plaintiff to give Alison permission to drive the car 

under the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC), MCL 257.1 et seq.; therefore, there effectively was no 

recognizable authorization to operate the vehicle, resulting in the unlawful taking of the vehicle 

by Alison. MCL 257.326 provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly authorize or permit a motor 

vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven by any person in violation of any of the 

provisions of [the MVC].” (Emphasis added.) As noted earlier in this opinion, Alison was 

driving the car in violation of the MVC, particularly MCL 257.310e(4). Although it may have 

been unlawful for plaintiff, as owner of the car, to authorize or permit Alison to drive the vehicle

in violation of the law, it had no bearing on, nor did it negate, the authorization and permission 

given by plaintiff for Alison to take the vehicle. Alison did not “gain possession of [the] vehicle 

contrary to Michigan law[,]” Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517; rather, she unlawfully used the 

vehicle, i.e., Alison “put[] it into service” in violation of Michigan law, Plumb, 282 Mich App at 

428. Plaintiff was not in violation of MCL 257.326 by merely allowing Alison to take 

possession and control of the car; it was the permission allowing Alison to drive the car that 

implicated MCL 257.326. While plaintiff’s actions might have subjected her to prosecution 

under MCL 257.326, they did not turn an authorized or permitted taking into an unlawful taking. 

 
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III. CONCLUSION 

 Here, all of HOIC’s arguments are unavailing as they ultimately conflate the unlawful use 

or operation of a motor vehicle with the unlawful taking of a vehicle. Despite HOIC’s 

protestation to the contrary and our appreciation that a very fine line exists, “taking” and “use” 

are simply not synonymous or interchangeable for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), as reflected in 

the statute’s plain and unambiguous language and the caselaw interpreting the statute. The trial 

court did not err in denying HOIC’s motions for summary disposition and a directed verdict. 

 Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, plaintiffs are awarded taxable costs under 

MCR 7.219. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan