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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,


ex rel WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
 

Plaintiff,
 

v No. 117689
 

$176,598.00 UNITED STATES


CURRENCY, MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS,


THREE (3) FIREARMS, ONE (1) SAFE,


AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF JEWELRY,
 

Defendants,
 

and
 

NATHANIEL WILSON,
 

Claimant-Appellee,
 

v
 

CITY OF DETROIT,
 

Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

The issue raised in this appeal is whether statutory
 

interest under MCL 600.6013 is owed when money that was the
 
subject of a forfeiture proceeding under the controlled
 

substances laws is ordered returned to the owner. The Court
 

of Appeals held that statutory interest must be paid. 


We conclude that money ordered returned to its owner
 

under the forfeiture procedure does not constitute a “money
 

judgment recovered in a civil action,” and thus statutory
 

interest is not payable.
 

I
 

In December 1986, Detroit police officers responded to a
 

residential security alarm and entered the home of Nathaniel
 

Wilson on Corbett Street on the suspicion that a burglary was
 

in progress. The officers found no intruders, but they did
 

find $167,480 in cash. Circumstances suggested that the money
 

may have been related to drug trafficking. It was taken to
 

the police station, and dogs trained to detect controlled
 

substances indicated the presence of such scent on the
 

currency.
 

The Wayne County Prosecutor brought a civil forfeiture
 

action for the funds, as well as for $9,118 in cash that had
 

been seized earlier from another house (on Chalmers Street)
 

occupied by Wilson. Wilson defended and asked that the money
 

be returned to him.
 

A bench trial followed, and the circuit court ordered the
 

forfeiture. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
 

that the search of the house on Corbett had been illegal, and
 

2
 
 

that forfeiture proceedings regarding the property seized from
 

the house on Chalmers had not been properly instituted.1
 

However, we granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to
 

appeal, and reversed, holding that the entry and search of the
 

Corbett residence without a warrant2 was lawful because it was
 

supported by probable cause and occurred under exigent
 

circumstances.3 We remanded to the Court of Appeals for
 

further proceedings.
 

On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the order
 

of forfeiture, holding that the police had exceeded the scope
 

of their authority by searching a trunk where most of the
 

money was found.4 We denied leave to appeal.5
 

Having prevailed in the forfeiture proceeding, Wilson
 

brought a motion for return of the money, and asked for an
 

award of statutory judgment interest. There was some delay
 

because of liens filed by the United States government and the
 

Michigan Department of Treasury.6 Following a hearing, the
 

1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 7, 1991


(Docket No. 101884). 


2 The prosecutor had not appealed the Court of Appeals


ruling regarding the $9,118 seized from the house on Chalmers.
 

3 443 Mich 261; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).
 

4
 (On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam, issued


May 23, 1994 (Docket No. 168073).
 

5 447 Mich 980; 525 NW2d 451 (1994).
 

6
 Wilson had been sentenced to federal prison on a 1991


drug conviction. The United States lien was filed to recover
 

3
 
Wayne Circuit Court entered an order on February 25, 1997,
 

requiring the city of Detroit to return the money involved in
 

the forfeiture action, but denying Wilson’s claim for
 

statutory judgment interest.
 

Wilson filed a delayed application for leave to appeal,
 

which the Court of Appeals granted. It then reversed, holding
 

that the decree directing return of the funds was a money
 

judgment in a civil action, entitling Wilson to interest under
 

§ 6013(1). It directed the circuit court to calculate the
 

amount of interest, explaining that interest should not be
 

awarded for those periods of delay in the forfeiture
 

proceeding that were not attributable to the city.7
 

The city of Detroit has filed an application for leave to
 

appeal to this Court.
 

II
 

Whether RJA § 6013 applies in the circumstances of this
 

case is a question of statutory interpretation, which we
 

review de novo. Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich
 

368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000); Sands Appliance Services, Inc
 

v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). 


the costs of his incarceration. Eventually, $102,911.21 of


the money was paid to the U.S. government. The Michigan


Department of Treasury’s lien concerned Wilson’s lawyer. The
 

Treasury sought a portion of the attorney fee to help satisfy


a tax judgment against him, and $5,000 from the fund was paid


to the state on that judgment.
 

7 242 Mich App 342; 618 NW2d 922 (2000).
 

4
 
III
 

RJA § 6013(1) provides that “[i]nterest shall be allowed
 

on a money judgment recovered in a civil action,” as provided
 

in that section.8 For the purpose of the judgment interest
 

statute, a money judgment is one that orders the payment of a
 

sum of money, as distinguished from an order directing an act
 

to be done or property to be restored or transferred. Stewart
 

v Isbell, 155 Mich App 65, 80; 399 NW2d 440 (1986); Moore v
 

Carney, 84 Mich App 399, 404; 269 NW2d 614 (1978).9
 

The forfeiture statute itself is silent on the issue of
 

interest. However, its provisions make clear that an order
 

returning seized currency following a drug forfeiture trial is
 

not a money judgment, but rather an order for the return of
 

specific personal property.10 For example, MCL 333.7521(1)(f)
 

8 The remaining subsections specify the interest rates


applicable to various periods, cover the effect of offers of


settlement on entitlement to interest, and include specific


provisions applicable to medical malpractice cases.
 

9 This distinction reflects the purpose of § 6013, which


is “to compensate the prevailing party for the expenses


incurred in bringing an action and for the delay in receiving


money damages.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 541;


564 NW2d 532 (1997). 


10 The Michigan drug forfeiture statute is drawn from the


model of the federal drug laws, which treat seized currency in


the same manner as other seized personal property. In re
 

Forfeiture of $11,800 US Currency, 174 Mich App 727, 729; 436


NW2d 449 (1989). Under the federal statute, forfeiture


proceedings are in rem actions against the property. United
 

States v One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F2d 415, 419 (CA 9, 1990);


United States v Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47


F3d 1511, 1519 (CA 9, 1995), rev’d on other grounds Degen v
 

5
 
states:
 

The following property is subject to forfeiture:
 

Any thing of value that is furnished or


intended to be furnished in exchange for a
 

controlled substance . . . including, but not
 

limited to, money, negotiable instruments, or
 

securities. . . . Any money that is found in close


proximity to any property that is subject to


forfeiture under subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d) or


(e) shall be presumed to be subject to forfeiture


under this subdivision. This presumption may be


rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
 

[Emphasis added.]
 

Likewise, MCL 333.7523(1) decrees that “forfeiture
 

proceedings shall be instituted promptly” and sets forth the
 

“procedure (that) shall be used” where “property is seized
 

pursuant to section 7522.” (Emphasis added.)
 

Section 7523(1)(c) instructs an owner of seized property how
 

to seek recovery of the “property” in forfeiture proceedings.
 

Perhaps most significant is MCL 333.7523(2), which equates the
 

statutory recovery of anything seized as part of a drug
 

forfeiture with a civil action to recover “personal property”:
 

Property taken or detained under this article


or pursuant to section 17766a shall not be subject


to an action to recover personal property, but is


deemed to be in the custody of the seizing agency


subject only to this section or an order and


judgment of the court having jurisdiction over the


forfeiture proceedings. . . . [Emphasis added.]
 

United States, 517 US 820; 116 S Ct 1777; 135 L Ed 2d 102
 

(1996). The return of seized property is treated as an act of


restoration, rather than as an award of monetary compensation


for damages suffered by a party. See, e.g., United States v
 

One 1979 Cadillac, 833 F2d 994, 998 (CA Fed, 1987).
 

6
 
 In addition, the language of § 6013 itself indicates that
 

the proceeding here does not constitute a “civil action” for
 

the purpose of that rule. Subsections (2) through (6) suggest
 

that a complaint must be filed with the court by the person
 

who has recovered the money judgment. Each subsection begins
 

with the phrase, “for complaints filed,” or contains other
 

language referencing the filing of a “complaint.” Wilson did
 

not file any such complaint in this proceeding. Therefore,
 

rather than being the prevailing claimant in a civil action,
 

Wilson was merely the owner of property that the prosecutor
 

unsuccessfully sought to seize in a forfeiture action
 

initiated by the latter. The trial court’s order was not an
 

adjudication of an action for money damages, but rather one
 

for the delivery of property that had been the subject of a
 

forfeiture action.11
 

In other contexts, the case law has denied interest under
 

§ 6013 in proceedings that, like drug forfeitures, are not
 

typical civil actions preceding an award of a money judgment.
 

See, e.g., Reigle v Reigle, 189 Mich App 386, 392-393; 474
 

NW2d 297 (1991) (the statute does not apply to money awards in
 

divorce judgments); Oliver v State Police, 132 Mich App 558,
 

11 If Wilson thought that the police had behaved


unlawfully here (as opposed merely to having not prevailed),


he was free to bring a civil action for damages.


Alternatively, he had the option of suing in federal court


under 42 USC 1983. 


7
 
572-577; 349 NW2d 211 (1984) (no statutory interest on an
 

award of back pay in a circuit court review of an employee
 

discharge under civil service laws); In re Cole Estate, 120
 

Mich App 539, 548-551; 328 NW2d 76 (1982) (an order awarding
 

a forced share in an estate is not a “money judgment recovered
 

in a civil action” entitling a spouse to an award of judgment
 

interest).12
 

The Court of Appeals decision also creates the danger of
 

what the trial court called “imposing a penalty on the seizing
 

agency.” Michigan law prohibits law enforcement agencies from
 

depositing currency seized pursuant to a warrant into an
 

interest bearing bank account until the currency no longer is
 

needed as evidence in any trial. See MCL 780.655; In re
 

Forfeiture of $25,505 US Currency, 220 Mich App 572, 577; 560
 

NW2d 341 (1996). The decision of the Court of Appeals could
 

result in police departments being compelled to pay judgment
 

interest on money that they were statutorily prohibited from
 

depositing into an interest bearing account. 


12 There are some cases that award the prevailing party


the interest which the seizing governmental unit actually
 

earned on the property while it was in the governmental unit’s


possession. See, e.g., United States v $515,060.42 in US
 

Currency, 152 F3d 491, 504-506 (CA 6, 1998); In re Forfeiture
 

of $30,632.41, 184 Mich App 677, 678-680; 459 NW2d 99 (1990).


Those awards are based on the court’s traditional equity


powers to avoid a windfall to the governmental agency from its


possession of property. In this case, the funds were


deposited in an interest-bearing account for part of the time


they were in the city’s possession, and this interest earned


was, in fact, paid to Wilson under the circuit court’s order.
 

8
 
We conclude that the order directing return of the seized
 

funds to Wilson was not a money judgment in a civil action
 

under § 6013. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
 

Court of Appeals and reinstate the Wayne Circuit Court’s
 

February 25, 1997, order denying interest.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and
 

MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
 

9