[Cite as State v. Hindman, 2023-Ohio-1974.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112026

v. :

ROBERT HINDMAN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 15, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-22-670360-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. 

Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Maxwell Martin, for appellant. 

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

Defendant-appellant Robert Hindman appeals from his judgment of 

conviction, which was rendered after a plea by way of information. After a careful 

review of the record and pertinent law, we vacate the plea.
After negotiations with the state, in May 2022, Hindman executed a 

waiver of indictment and presentment to the grand jury pursuant to R.C. 2941.021. 

The assistant prosecuting attorney placed the parties’ agreement on the record. 

Under the agreement, Hindman pled guilty to a bill of information consisting of two 

counts of sexual battery, felonies of the second degree, and one count of endangering 

children, a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

In his first assignment of error, Hindman contends that his plea is 

invalid because the trial court failed to inform him at the plea hearing of the 

maximum penalty. Specifically, the trial court failed to inform Hindman that if he 

pled guilty to sexual battery he would be classified as a sex offender and be subject 

to certain registration requirements. 

“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 11. The rule 

requires the court to advise the defendant of certain constitutional and statutory 

rights, among those the maximum penalty involved. See Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 

The record here demonstrates that the trial court complied with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advised Hindman before accepting his felony plea 

that the plea waived his constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses 

against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 

require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial. 
The record further demonstrates that the trial court complied with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and orally advised Hindman of his nonconstitutional rights. 

Specifically, the court advised him of the nature of the charges, eligibility for 

community-control sanctions, and the effect of his plea. The trial court also advised 

Hindman as to the prison time he faced for each of the three counts, as well as the 

prison time he was subject to on the sexual battery counts under the Reagan Tokes 

Law. At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court failed to fully advise Hindman 

of the maximum penalty involved given that it failed to advise him that his plea 

would result in him being a Tier III sex offender and of the accompanying 

registration requirements. 

In State v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-527, 132 N.E.3d 176 (8th Dist.), this court 

considered a situation where the trial court failed to mention that the defendant 

would be labeled a sex offender by virtue of his plea and the consequences of being 

labeled a sex offender. This court found that the omissions “constitute a complete 

failure to comply with Crim.R. 11” and vacated the plea. Id. at ¶ 13, 16.

The state acknowledges Brown and concedes the error. 

Notwithstanding its concession, the state notes a subsequent decision from this 

court, State v. Fisher, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109276, 2021-Ohio-1592, in which 

two judges on this court called into question Brown’s holding (see Sean C. Gallagher, 

P.J., concurring; and Kathleen Ann Keough, J., concurring with majority and Judge 

Sean C. Gallagher’s separate concurring opinion).
In Fisher, the defendant pled guilty to burglary and sexual battery, a 

crime for which a conviction of mandates a sex-offender classification. At the 

defendant’s plea hearing, the trial court informed the defendant that “any plea to 

this case would render you as a Tier III sex offender which the Court will review with 

you at your sentencing.” Id. at ¶ 4. The defendant indicated he understood. Id.

On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court “failed

completely” to advise him of the maximum penalty he faced as required by 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) when he entered a guilty plea to a charge of sexual battery. Id. at 

¶ 10. This court disagreed, noting that at the plea hearing the trial court advised him 

of the possible prison sentence, the fine he faced, and that he would be classified as 

a Tier III sex offender. Id.

This court noted that “[b]eing labeled a Tier III sex offender and the 

implications of that classification are punitive in nature.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing State v. 

Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16. This court 

reasoned, however, that while Williams found that the entire statutory scheme of 

the sex offender laws, found in R.C. Chapter 2950, as a whole are punitive, no single 

provision taken alone is punitive. Fisher at id., citing Williams. This court therefore 

found that “failing to advise the defendant of any individual ramification of his [or 

her] plea does not rise to the level of a complete failure.” Fisher at id., citing State 

v. Dornoff, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-16-072, 2020-Ohio-3909, ¶ 17.

Under the “totality of the circumstances,” this court found that the 

defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his plea and that the trial 
court did not “completely fail” to inform him of the maximum penalty he faced. 

Fisher at ¶ 12. The Fisher Court found that prior to accepting the defendant’s plea, 

the trial court specifically informed the defendant that “he would be classified as a 

Tier III sex offender, which would be further discussed with him at sentencing.” Id. 

This court reasoned that, “[b]y explaining that being classified a 

Tier III sex offender would be further discussed at sentencing, the trial court 

indicated that the classification was part of his punishment, even though it did not 

inform him of his specific obligations flowing from that classification.” (Citations 

omitted.) Id. Further, at the plea hearing, prior to the court’s colloquy with the 

defendant, the prosecutor explained that the punishment for the sexual battery 

count includes “a Tier III sex offender registration which is every 90 days for life 

registration. There are community residential requirements as well.” Id.

The Fisher panel distinguished Fisher from another Eighth District 

case, State v. Baker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108301, 2020-Ohio-107. In Baker, the 

trial court merely advised the defendant that the count to which he was pleading 

guilty was “‘a Tier 3 sex offense, and we’ll go into that later.’” Fisher at ¶ 13, quoting 

Baker at ¶ 22. This court found that the trial court “did nothing to indicate that ‘the 

fact that Baker would be pleading guilty to a Tier 3 sex offense had any additional 

penalties or consequences.’” Fisher at id., quoting Baker at id. Further, there was 

no indication in Baker that “‘anyone else’” informed the defendant that his guilty 

plea would result in him being classified as a Tier III sex offender or that he would 

face penalties as a result. Fisher at id., quoting Baker at id. 
Moreover, in Fisher, this court, citing State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 

1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, found that Baker “is no longer valid law.” 

Fisher at ¶ 14. In Dangler, prior to accepting the defendant’s guilty plea to sexual 

battery, the trial court advised him, “[y]ou would also be obligated to register as a 

Tier III sex offender which means you would have an obligation to register for your 

lifetime.” Id. at ¶ 4. The defendant indicated that he understood. Id. The defendant 

was sentenced and labeled a sex offender. 

On appeal, the defendant sought to vacate his plea on the ground that 

it was invalid because the trial court failed to fully explain the obligations and 

requirements associated with being a sex offender. The Supreme Court noted that, 

traditionally, when a defendant seeks to have his or her conviction reversed on 

appeal, he or she must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings 

and that he or she was prejudiced by that error. Id. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Perry, 101 

Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15; State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio 

St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); Crim.R. 52. 

The court noted that it has made an exception to the prejudice 

requirement, that being, a trial court’s failure to explain the constitutional rights a 

defendant would be waiving by a guilty plea. Dangler at ¶ 14. However, when a trial 

court fails to fully cover the nonconstitutional rights a defendant would be waiving 

by pleading guilty, a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to invalidate a 

plea. Id.
But the Supreme Court noted there is “one additional exception to the 

prejudice requirement: a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of 

Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) 

Id., citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, 

¶ 22 (holding that the trial court completely failed to comply with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty when the 

court made no mention of postrelease control in the plea colloquy, despite the fact 

the defendant was subject to a mandatory five years of postrelease control).

The Dangler Court went on to consider whether a sex-offender 

classification and its accompanying obligations constitute a “penalty” imposed on a 

defendant. Id. at ¶ 18. The court noted its prior decision in Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 

344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, wherein it considered whether the sexoffender statutes could be applied retroactively without violating the prohibition on 

retroactive laws contained in the Ohio Constitution. To answer that question, the 

court had to consider whether the statutory scheme is remedial or punitive. The 

Williams Court concluded that the scheme is “‘so punitive that its retroactive 

application is unconstitutional.’” Dangler at ¶ 19, quoting Williams at ¶ 21. 

Dangler noted that Williams did not address whether the sexoffender-registration scheme constitutes a penalty for purposes of Crim.R. 11. In 

Dangler, the state urged the court to reconsider Williams, but the court declined 

because “to do so would be beyond the scope of the certified question and is 

unnecessary for purposes of deciding this case. Instead, based on the rationale of 
Williams, we proceed with the assumption that the scheme as a whole constitutes a 

penalty for purposes of Crim.R. 11.” Dangler at ¶ 20.

We note, as the state also notes in this case, the Supreme Court’s 

choice of the word “assumption” in Dangler. While it does not connote a ringing 

endorsement that the sex-offender classification scheme is a penalty for purposes of 

Crim.R. 11, it also is not a flat-out rejection of that notion. Thus, the prevailing law 

at this time is that Ohio’s sex-offender classification scheme is a penalty for purposes 

of Crim.R. 11. The trial court therefore was required to provide some advisement 

about the classification prior to accepting Hindman’s plea. 

Brown, 2019-Ohio-527, 132 N.E.3d 176, Baker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 108301, 2020-Ohio-107, and Dangler mandate that Hindman’s plea be vacated, 

specifically because no advisement whatsoever as to the sex-offender classification 

was given to him prior to his plea. See Dangler at ¶ 15. Further, Fisher is 

distinguishable from this case because in Fisher, some advisement was given to the 

defendant, causing this court to consider the prejudice requirement, which the court 

found the defendant failed to demonstrate.

The first assignment of error is sustained. The remaining assignments 

of error, which are relative to sentencing, are moot, and we decline to address them. 

See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

Plea vacated.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and

MARY J. BOYLE, J.,