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Filed 7/15/21 P. v. Debase CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DERRICK RON DEBASE,

Defendant and Appellant.

E074501

(Super.Ct.No. FWV19002994)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Kyle S. Brodie, 

Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorney Generals, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. 

Sevidal, Collette C. Cavalier and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury found defendant and appellant Derrick Ron Debase guilty of being a felon 

in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1))1 and two counts of assault 

with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury found true the allegations that defendant 

personally used a firearm, in particular a revolver, during the two assaults. (§ 12022.5, 

subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 16 years four 

months.

Defendant raises four issues on appeal. First, defendant contends substantial 

evidence does not support the “present ability” element of his assault convictions. 

Second, defendant asserts the trial court erred by imposing the upper term for the 

firearm enhancement in Count 2. Third, defendant contends the trial court erred by 

imposing fines without evidence of defendant’s ability to pay. Fourth, defendant asserts 

the abstract of judgment contains errors. We reverse in part and affirm in part. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. PROSECUTION’S CASE

Shaqwenya Davis and Eric Labella lived together in Labella’s car. Davis and 

Labella often spent time in Cabrillo Park in Upland (the park). Defendant also spent 

time in the park. Defendant drove a red Lexus. Labella first met defendant in October 

2018; Labella saw defendant in the park smoking a cigarette and asked him for one. 

After that, Labella and defendant spoke to one another approximately 15 times, having 

20- to 30-minute conversations.

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 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
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On September 10, 2019, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Davis, Labella, and two or 

three of their friends (collectively, the group) were sitting on a bench in the park. 

Defendant rode past the group on a bicycle. Labella recognized the bicycle as 

belonging to another person, Dennis. One of the friends, Paul, asked defendant, “ ‘Hey, 

did you steal that bike or did [Dennis] let you use it?’ ” Defendant ignored the question. 

Paul repeated the question in a louder voice. Defendant “jumped off the bike and 

started cussing him out.” Defendant and Paul argued. Defendant was angry and told 

Paul he would “blow a hole in his head.” 

Dennis arrived, retrieved his bicycle, and said he lent the bicycle to defendant. 

Defendant told the group “to get out of his park.” The group told defendant to leave. 

Defendant walked away. The group left for their respective homes.

Approximately one hour later, Labella sat in the driver’s seat of his car playing a 

game on his phone, while Davis sat in the front passenger seat of the car reading a book 

on her phone. The front passenger window of the car was down. Defendant walked to 

within four feet of the front passenger door. Defendant pointed a gun at Davis and said, 

“ ‘If I ever catch you in my park again, I’ll bust a cap in your ass.’ ” Davis described 

the gun as a silver revolver.

Defendant walked toward the back of the car. Davis called the police. Labella

exited the car. Defendant placed the gun in his pocket. Defendant and Labella argued 

in the middle of the street. Defendant walked to a sidewalk and pulled the gun out of 

his pocket.
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Defendant moved back and forth and carelessly swung the gun in a waving 

motion from right to left. Defendant pointed the gun at Labella and said “ ‘You’re 

going to be the first one I kill with this gun.’ ” Defendant and Labella were standing 

approximately 50 feet apart when defendant made that statement. Defendant then 

wrapped the gun in a green “rag,” placed it in his pocket, and ran away. Labella

described the gun as a silver revolver. A bystander who witnessed the incident also 

described the gun as a silver revolver.

City of Upland Police Officer Robert Castaneda found a home address for 

defendant approximately one and one-half miles from the park. Castaneda drove past 

the home and saw a red Lexus parked in the carport. Later, during the night of 

September 10, Castaneda heard a dispatch announcement concerning a disturbance at 

defendant’s home. Castaneda contacted Officer Quinn Hanley, who was responding to 

the disturbance, to inform him of the firearm incident in the park. Due to the firearm 

involved in the park incident, Hanley waited near defendant’s home for other officers to 

arrive. As Hanley waited, defendant, in the red Lexus, drove past. Hanley followed 

defendant and made a traffic stop. Hanley searched the Lexus and found a silver 

revolver wrapped in a green towel on the floorboard behind the passenger seat. The gun

was loaded with “five 9-millimeter bullets inside the cylinder.” 

A photograph was admitted at trial that showed the revolver with loose cartridges

underneath it, resting on a green towel. Three cartridges are partially visible sticking 

out from underneath the gun’s frame, barrel, and trigger guard. It appears two more 

cartridges may be resting underneath the gun’s barrel, but it is difficult to discern due to 
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them being almost entirely obscured by the barrel. The barrel of the revolver is 

engraved with the words “UNDERCOVER .38 SPL.” 

B. DEFENDANT’S CASE

Defendant testified at trial. Defendant met Davis and Labella in August 2017. 

At that time, defendant was going through a divorce and was living in his vehicle. The 

friendly relationship between the three ended when Labella became jealous of the time 

that Davis and defendant spent together while Labella was at work. Labella would 

chase defendant out of the park by using profanities toward defendant.

On September 10, 2019, defendant went to the park to exercise. Defendant 

borrowed Dennis’s bicycle and rode past the group on the bench. Paul asked whether 

defendant stole the bicycle. Defendant was 60 years old and alone; he would not have 

confronted the group by himself. Defendant did not threaten to shoot Paul. Defendant 

stayed in the park and sat on a bench to “kind of gather [him]self” due to the group’s 

argumentative and threatening statements. 

Defendant decided to go home. Twenty to 30 minutes after the initial 

confrontation with the group, defendant was walking in the middle of the street on his 

way home, trying to avoid the group, when he saw Davis and Labella outside of their 

car. Defendant heard Davis on the phone claiming that defendant had attacked her and 

Labella. Defendant did not approach their car. Defendant did not handle a gun on 

September 10 and did not point a gun at Davis or Labella. Defendant went home.

Defendant’s wife owned the red Lexus. The firearm in the red Lexus was 

defendant’s wife’s undercover .38 special. Defendant’s wife was “an avid target 
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shooter.” Defendant had a light green and white bandana with him in the park when he 

was exercising. Defendant did not recognize the green towel covering the gun in the 

car. In August 2019, the police were investigating defendant for stealing the revolver 

from his wife, but defendant did not steal the gun. 

DISCUSSION

A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Defendant contends there is not substantial evidence to support the present 

ability element for the assault convictions because the .38-caliber gun was loaded with 

nine-millimeter ammunition and there was no evidence indicating the gun would fire 

with that ammunition. 

“An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a 

violent injury on the person of another.” (§ 240.) “A long line of California decisions 

holds that an assault is not committed by a person’s merely pointing an (unloaded) gun 

in a threatening manner at another person.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 

11, fn. 3 (Rodriguez).) When a gun is unloaded “the defendant lacks the present ability 

to commit [a] violent injury.” (People v. Fain (1983) 34 Cal.3d 350, 357, fn. 6.) The 

same is true if the firearm is inoperable. (People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 962.) 

The evidence concerning the caliber of the ammunition was uncontradicted. 

During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Officer Hanley, the following exchange 

occurred:

“[Prosecutor:] And the gun, was the revolver loaded?

“[Hanley:] It was.
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“[Prosecutor:] With what?

“[Hanley:] It had five 9-millimeter bullets inside the cylinder.” 

It is the jury’s role to decide what evidence is true and which evidence is false. 

(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) A trier of fact does not have to accept 

uncontradicted testimony as true. (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1231-

1232; People v. Woods (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 246, 248.) Uncontradicted testimony 

rejected by the trier of fact can be credited on appeal if, “ ‘ “in view of the whole record, 

it is clear, positive, and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be disbelieved.” ’ ” (In 

re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 1112-1113.)

It appears, from the jury’s guilty verdicts, that the jury discredited Hanley’s 

testimony that the gun was loaded with nine-millimeter ammunition, and instead found 

that the gun was loaded with .38-caliber ammunition. Although a photograph of the gun 

and cartridges was admitted, the cartridges are only partially visible because they are 

underneath the firearm. Additionally, the cartridges are angled so that one cannot see 

the base of the cartridges, which means one cannot read the imprint of the cartridges’ 

size. 

From the photograph, it would be difficult for a layperson to discern whether the 

cartridges were .38-caliber or nine-millimeter. Officer Hanley’s testimony about the 

caliber of the ammunition was the only direct evidence offered regarding the 

ammunition’s caliber. Officer Hanley found the loaded gun in the car, and his 

testimony on the subject was clear and positive. As a result, there was no rational basis 

for the jury to discredit Hanley’s testimony regarding the caliber of the ammunition. 
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Accordingly, we will credit Hanley’s testimony that the gun was loaded with ninemillimeter ammunition. 

We now turn to the sufficiency of the evidence. “In assessing a claim of 

insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to review the whole record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) 

Hanley found a silver revolver, wrapped in a green towel, inside the car 

defendant was driving. In the photograph of the firearm and cartridges, one can see 

engraved on the barrel of the gun the words “UNDERCOVER .38 SPL.” That

evidence, coupled with his description of the caliber of the ammunition, reflects the .38-

caliber revolver was loaded with nine-millimeter ammunition.

A layperson can be expected to know that a firearm is typically operable when 

loaded with the correct size of ammunition. However, a layperson cannot be expected 

to know whether a .38-caliber gun loaded with nine-millimeter ammunition would 

successfully fire. (See generally People v. Kainzrants (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 

1079 [gun loaded with wrong ammunition jammed]; see also People v. Jasmin (2008) 

167 Cal.App.4th 98, 104-105 [gun loaded with wrong ammunition would fire one shot, 

then jam].)

Because the .38-caliber firearm was loaded with nine-millimeter ammunition, the 

prosecutor needed to provide more evidence in order to establish that the gun was 
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operable. As examples, the prosecutor could have had an expert testify that a .38-

caliber gun will fire with nine-millimeter ammunition; or the prosecutor could have had 

a person test fire defendant’s gun with the 9-millimeter ammunition and testify about 

that successful test fire. (See People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103 [expert may 

testify when “the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of 

an expert would assist the trier of fact”]; see also e.g., People v. Jasmin, supra, 167 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 104-105 [firearm evidence].) Without some evidence of whether a 

.38-caliber gun operates with nine-millimeter ammunition, there is a gap in the evidence 

regarding the “present ability” element, which means substantial evidence does not 

support defendant’s two assault convictions. 

The People contend one can reasonably infer from defendant’s words and 

conduct that the gun was operable. A jury may rely upon circumstantial evidence, such 

as the defendant’s statements and behavior, to find that a gun is loaded and operable at 

the time of an alleged assault. (Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 12.) “For example, in 

People v. Montgomery (1911) 15 Cal.App. 315, . . . the Court of Appeal, in the absence 

of direct evidence the gun used in the offense was loaded, and despite the defendant’s 

own testimony it was not, held the jury was entitled, under the circumstances of the 

case, to reject contrary testimony and find the gun was loaded. [Citation.] The court 

noted the defendant was enraged when he left a fight and that he returned with a gun he 

leveled at the victim, declaring, ‘ “I have got you now.” ’ [Citation.] These words, the 

court reasoned, would be meaningless unless the weapon were loaded.” (Rodriguez, at 

pp. 12-13.) 
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When arguing about the bicycle, defendant told Paul that defendant would “blow 

a hole in [Paul’s] head.” When confronting Davis, defendant pointed the gun at her and 

said, “ ‘If I ever catch you in my park again, I’ll bust a cap in your ass.’ ” When 

confronting Labella, defendant pointed the gun at him and said, “ ‘You’re going to be 

the first one I kill with this gun.’ ”

Defendant’s words and actions support the finding that the gun was loaded, in 

that one can reasonably infer defendant would not have made such threatening 

statements with an unloaded firearm. However, the jury cannot determine the caliber of 

the ammunition from defendant’s words and actions. Because there was no rational 

basis for the jury to reject Hanley’s testimony that the gun was loaded with ninemillimeter ammunition, one cannot, without further evidence, conclude that the .38-

caliber gun would fire. 

In sum, defendant’s two convictions for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. 

(a)(2)) (Counts 2 & 3) are not supported by substantial evidence. We will reverse the 

two convictions and the associated firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). (See 

People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1142 [enhancements attach to substantive 

offenses].)

B. UPPER TERM

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper 

term for the gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in Count 2. We have concluded 

that defendant’s assault conviction in Count 2 must be reversed, which will include 

reversal of the firearm enhancement. Accordingly, this issue is moot because we can 
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provide defendant no further relief on this issue. (People v. Rish (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380 (Rish).)

C. FINES AND FEES

Defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) imposing and not staying a $5,000 

restitution fine (§ 1202.4), and (2) imposing a $5,000 a parole revocation fine 

(§ 1202.45) without first determining defendant’s ability to pay. When sentencing 

defendant, the trial court deemed the Count 2 assault conviction to be the principal 

count. The trial court ordered that the sentence for Count 1 (felon in possession of a 

firearm) be served concurrently with the Count 3 assault sentence. Given that Counts 2 

and 3 will be reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence, we will direct the trial court 

to resentence defendant. As a result, the issue of fines and fees is moot because we can 

provide defendant with no further relief on the issue. (Rish, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1380.)

D. ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT

Defendant contends the abstract of judgment needs to be corrected. The People 

agree. Due to the reversal of Counts 2 and 3, the trial court will need to resentence 

defendant. Therefore, the abstract of judgment will be changed thus rendering this issue 

moot. (Rish, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380.)

DISPOSITION

The two convictions for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2))

(Counts 2 & 3) and the associated firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) are 

reversed. The entire sentence is reversed. The trial court is directed to resentence 
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defendant on the remaining conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm 

(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (Count 1). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.