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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:19-CV-23792-KMW

ADRIEN RICHEMOND

MADELEINE RICHEMOND,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

EQUITY MAX INC., a Florida Corporation

TITLE QUEST INVESTMENTS LLC.,

a Florida Limited Liability Company,

UNITED FINANCIAL COUNSELORS, INC.,

a Florida Corporation, JASON WALOWITZ,

an individual and STAN L. RISKIN, an individual,

 Defendants. /

STAN L. RISKIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BASED ON JUDICIAL 

ESTOPPEL, LACK OF STANDING, AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 

WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION 

FOR A MORE DEFINITIVE STATEMENT [AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL]

WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Defendant Stan L. Riskin, moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint1 on the 

basis of Judicial Estoppel, Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim Upon 

Which Relief Can Be Granted or in the alternative, moves this court to Order the 

Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint such that it is legally sufficient and that it is not 

inconsistent, ambiguous and nonsensical and in support thereof, states as 

follows:

 

1

 After this matter was removed from Bankruptcy Court, the Plaintiff filed an Amended 

Complaint with the Bankruptcy Court on September 23, 2019. While there were some minor 

typos fixed and new counts added to the complaint targeting specific defendants, the issues for 

which Defendant Riskin seeks dismissal remain. As the Amended Complaint is not properly 

before this Court and the changes do not change Defendant Riskin's argument, this pleading 

remains targeted towards the original Complaint.

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PLAINTIFFS ARE JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM BRINING THIS ACTION

1. On March 1, 2019, the Plaintiff's filed a Petition under Chapter 13 in 

their underlying bankruptcy case in the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District 

of Florida, Case Number 19-12823-LMI.

2. The schedules in the underlying case were amended on April 30, 

2019 and again on May 28, 2019.

3. The original petition and all amended schedules in the underlying 

case bear the electronic signature of both of the Debtors/Plaintiffs just under the 

declaration that under the penalty of perjury, the documents have been read 

and are true and correct, making the original petition and subsequent 

amendments sworn statements.

4. The Debtors' Schedule B asks the following questions:

a. Question 33: "Claims against third parties, whether or not you 

have filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment".

b. Question 34: "Other contingent and unliquidated claims of 

every nature, including counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set 

off claims".

c. Question 35: "Any financial assets you did not already list".

5. The Debtors' sworn answers to the above questions were "NO" and 

never changed in any subsequent amendment.

6. Not only did the Debtors/Plaintiffs swear under oath that they had 

no claims against Defendant Riskin (or any other defendant for that matter), 

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they also failed to disclose the transfer of their real property as alleged in the 

Complaint.

7. Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, states that on August 30, 2017, 

which is less than 2 years before the filing of the underlying bankruptcy case, 

that they transferred title to their real property.

8. However, the Statement of Financial Affairs, Question 18 asks "Within 

2 years before you filed for bankruptcy, did you sell, trade, or otherwise transfer 

any property to anyone, other than property transferred in the ordinary course 

of business or financial affairs?", to which the answer NO was marked.

9. The Statement of Financial Affairs was signed by both Debtors under 

penalty of perjury that it was true and correct and has never been changed to 

list the transfer in any of the subsequent amendments.

10. The 11th Circuit following the mandate of the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001), which describes the 

concept generally, has spoken clearly and repeatedly has held that in the 

Chapter 13 proceedings, that the debtor has an ongoing duty to disclose his 

assets to the bankruptcy court. Robinson v. Tysor Foods, 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 

2010); DeLeon v. Comcar Industries, 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); Ajaka v. 

Brooks America Mortgage, 453 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006) and Waldron v. 

Brown, 536 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008).

11. The cases cited above are “Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and 

citing Burnes for the proposition that the duty to disclose is a continuing one that 

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does not end once the forms are submitted to the bankruptcy court: rather the 

debtor must amend (the) financial statements if circumstances change.” 

Robinson at 1274 citing Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).

12. As articulated by Robinson, supra, judicial estoppel will be rigorously 

applied where inconsistent positions are taken under oath and “shown to have 

made a mockery of the judicial system.” There, the debtor took inconsistent 

sworn positions and failed to disclose litigation claims that vested both prepetition and post-petition.2

13. “In considering judicial estoppel for bankruptcy cases, the debtor’s 

failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is inadvertent only when, in general, 

the debtor either lacks knowledge of undisclosed claims or has no motive for 

their concealment. While an estoppel parties’ contradictions must be 

intentional, such intent may be inferred from the record.” Barger v. City of 

Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2003). (citations omitted).

14. The Complaint makes no allegation that the Debtors learned of the 

claims post-petition and in fact the Debtors attempted to raise the matters 

before this Court in an earlier Case, 12-19784-LMI, Docket Entry #48 so there is no 

excuse for the Debtors to claim that they were not aware of the claims or issues 

when the underlying bankruptcy case was filed.

15. In fact it appears that the Debtors' sole motive in filing the 

underlying bankruptcy case was to save their real property so they can hardly 

 

2

If the Debtors genuinely assert the claims as asserted in the Complaint then their schedules constitute 

"false oaths" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1852.

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claim that omitting the potential claims against the Defendants multiple times 

was inadvertent as that seems to be their main reason for filing bankruptcy.

16. Accordingly, this Court should take the Debtors' repeated sworn 

statements that they have no claims against the Defendants and dismiss this 

case with Prejudice.

PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING

17. Paragraph 23 of the Complaint states that 8275 NW 1st Place LLC

(the "LLC") was the party that borrowed the money from Equitymax, not the 

Debtors.

18. In fact, all of the documents regarding the loan, including the Note, 

the Mortgage and the Settlement Statement make reference to the LLC, not 

the Debtors as the party to the loan transaction.

19. The entire basis of the Lawsuit is that the money from the LLC's 

Equitymax loan did not get to the Chapter 13 Trustee, it's intended recipient.

20. Accordingly, the aggrieved party with the damages is the 8275 NW 

1st Place LLC that borrowed the money, not the Debtors and it is the LLC who 

should have brought suit in a proper forum, not in this Bankruptcy Court

Adversary Proceeding.

21. [S]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be 

addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims." Dillard v. 

Chilton Cty. Comm'n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations 

omitted).

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22. If there is no standing, we must end there, too. University of S. Ala. v. 

American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Simply put, once a 

federal court determines that [the plaintiff has no standing], the court is 

powerless to continue.”).

23. Accordingly, since the Plaintiff's do not have standing to bring this 

action, their Complaint should be dismissed.

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM DUE TO INCONSISTENT PLEADING

AND VAGUE STATEMENTS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

24. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), incorporated though F.R.B.P 7012, makes a 

complaint subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if it is apparent from the 

face of the complaint that the allegations do not state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.

25. F.R.C.P 8(a), incorporated through F.R.B.P 7008, requires a claim to 

state enough facts to show the pleader is entitled to relief, which was not done 

in the Complaint.

26. F.R.C.P 9(b), incorporated through F.R.B.P 7009, requires a claim for 

fraud to be plead with particularity, which was not done in Count II of the 

Complaint for Fraud by Misrepresentation. “Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint 

sets forth (1) precisely what statements were made, and (2) the time and place 

of each such statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case 

of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of such statements and the 

manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtain as 

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a consequence of the fraud.” U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of 

America, Inc., 290 F. 3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). This Rule “serves an important 

purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with 

which they are charged and protecting defendants against spurious charges of 

immoral and fraudulent behavior." Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 

Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1997) quoting Durham v. Business Mgmt. 

Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

27. F.R.C.P. 12(e), allows a party to move for a more definite statement 

of a pleading ... which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 

reasonably file a response.

28. Nearly every allegation in the Complaint against a "defendant" is 

listed as being done by "Defendants" referring to all of the defendants 

collectively rather than to delineate the individual acts of each defendant, thus 

it is impossible to determine if Defendant Riskin is included in the collective 

"Defendants" as alleged.

29. An example of lumping all defendants together is in Paragraph 26 

of the Complaint, which says that "a warranty deed drafted by Defendants, 

signed and made effective that day transferring title from Debtors to the LLC", 

however the deed in question (a copy of which was filed with the Bankruptcy 

Court in the Debtors' prior case 12-19784-LMI at D.E. #51-2) clearly says at the 

top that it was prepared by Elizabeth Questell of Title Quest Investments LLC.

30. An example of vague pleading is In Count II for Fraud by 

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Misrepresentation, the Complaint makes the following vague assertions about 

the collective Defendants:

a. Paragraph 48 states that "Defendants had superior or 

exclusive knowledge of facts" but fails to state which defendants 

and which facts they knew.

b. Paragraph 49 states that "Defendants had a duty to disclose 

material facts to the defendants [sic]" but fails to state which 

Defendants failed to disclose what material facts and how failing to 

disclose any facts to another defendant is Fraud by

Misrepresentation against the Plaintiffs.

c. Paragraph 50 states that "Defendants voluntarily disclosed 

some information regarding the subject transaction but failed and 

refused even though they had a duty to make a full disclosure", this 

being the most vague allegation in the Complaint as it fails to say 

who said what, just that everyone said something but failed and 

refused to say other things.

31. An example of inconsistent pleading is in Count I - Negligence as to 

Stan Riskin, where the Debtors' allege:

a. In Paragraph 45(a), that Defendant Riskin failed to inform the 

Plaintiffs that "Their Chapter 13 Plan would not ultimately save their 

home ", meaning that the Debtors allege that the bankruptcy could 

not succeed in saving their home.

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b. In the second Paragraph 45(c) that "Riskin knew or should 

have known that it would not, represented them in the closing, and 

distribution of funds", which makes no sense as to who "it" is and it is 

unclear what "represented" in closing and distribution of funds 

means.

c. In Paragraph 46, "Riskin’s failure to use the necessary and 

required care damaged the Plaintiffs but competent representation 

would resulted in a more favorable result.", which is inconsistent with 

their assertion in Paragraph 45(a) that their home could not be 

saved so it is unclear how they were damaged or more competent 

representation would have resulted in a more favorable result as 

they allege that their home could not be saved.

d. Lastly in the Wherefore clause of Count I, demand (a), it is 

unclear what are "Form damages".

32. Rules 8 and 12 define the criteria for assessing the sufficiency of a 

pleading before discovery. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “that states a 

claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” If a complaint’s statement of a claim does 

not satisfy this requirement, it is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A claim satisfies the 

requirement of Rule 8(a)—and avoids dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—if the 

complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish that the claim is “plausible on its 

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face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

33. In this case, the Plaintiff has filed a shotgun pleading directed at all 

of the Defendants (except Count I, which has its own issues).

34. Shotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants, exact 

an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and 

unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the 

court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and resources. Moreover, justice is 

delayed for the litigants who are “standing in line,” waiting for their cases to be 

heard. The courts of appeals and the litigants appearing before them suffer as 

well. Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997).

35. F.R.C.P. 12(e) is the remedy to shotgun pleadings and if this Court 

declines to Dismiss the Complaint then in the alternate, Defendant Riskin 

requests this Court require the Plaintiff to re-plead the complaint such that he 

can reasonably form a response, which would include requiring the Plaintiff to 

only refer collectively to all Defendants when a count applies to all defendants 

and only incorporate general allegations in a count that actually apply to that 

count.

36. Accordingly, Count I against Mr. Riskin should be dismissed as by the 

Defendants own allegation that their property could not be saved shows that 

they have no damages and should the Court not dismiss Count I, it should 

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require an amended Complaint that is not vague as to who did what when and 

specify what the Plaintiffs' damages are, what would be a more favorable result, 

and what was not disclosed.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Stan L. Riskin, respectfully requests this Court 

Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Judicial Estoppel as the Plaintiffs have sworn 

under penalty of perjury that they have no claims against these defendants, 

that the Court Dismiss the Complaint as the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this 

Action, and that the Court Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim due to the vague allegations and lack of specificity due 

required by allegations of fraud, or in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(e) 

require the Plaintiffs amend the Complaint to fix all pleading errors and vague 

statements.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District Local Rule 9015-

1, Defendant Stan L. Riskin demands a trial by jury in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida, on all issues so triable.

STATEMENT OF LACK OF CONSENT TO ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS

AND ORDERS OF BANKRUPTCY COURT

In Accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b), Defendant Stan L. Riskin

stated that he declines to consent to the entry of Final Judgments and Orders of 

the Bankruptcy Court in this matter.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am admitted to the Bar of the United States District 

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Court for the Southern District of Florida and I am in compliance with the 

additional qualifications to practice in this Court as set forth in Bankruptcy Local 

Rule 2090-1(A).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 

served this 25th day of September, 2019 via electronic service through CM/ECF

to all parties entitled to electronic notice, including the parties listed below:

Natalie F Guerra Valdes on behalf of Defendant Title Quest Investments, LLC

nvaldes@valdeslawfirmpa.com

Julio C Marrero on behalf of Plaintiffs Adrien Richemond and Madeleine 

Richemond at Bankruptcy@marrerolawfirm.com, bkcmailecf@gmail.com;

r49991@notify.bestcase.com;eqramul@marrerorealestatelaw.com

Jerome L Tepps on behalf of Defendant Equitymax, Inc at 

courtpapers@teppslawfirm.com;, jerome@teppslawfirm.com;

william@teppslawfirm.com;G14314@notify.cincompass.com

Advantage Law Group, P.A.

20801 Biscayne Blvd. Ste. 506

Aventura, FL 33180 

Phone: 305-936-8844

By: /s/Stan L. Riskin

 Stan L. Riskin, Esq. 

Florida Bar No.: 129106

Stan.Riskin@gmail.com

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