Reversed and Rendered and Opinion filed May 17, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00235-CV

WILLIAM MARSH RICE UNIVERSITY AND GARY SPEARS, Appellants

V.

RASHEED REFAEY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 11th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-25730

O P I N I O N

A man arrested by a private-university peace officer sued the officer and the 

university asserting various tort claims based on the allegedly unlawful arrest. The 

peace officer asserted official immunity. Both the officer and the university moved 

for summary judgment on that ground. In this interlocutory appeal from the trial 

court’s denial of their motion, we conclude that the peace officer and the university 

proved their entitlement to summary judgment based on the peace officer’s 

official-immunity defense. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and 
2

render judgment granting the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and ordering 

that the plaintiff take nothing by his claims.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At all times material to this case, appellant/defendant Gary Spears was a 

peace officer employed and commissioned by appellant/defendant William Marsh 

Rice University. On the night in question, Officer Spears was on duty working for 

Rice University as a police officer.1 Clad in uniform, he was driving a marked 

Rice University Police Department sports-utility vehicle, equipped with emergency 

lights and a siren. At about 2:30 a.m., while on patrol checking the Rice 

University Bioscience Research Collaborative property near 6500 Main Street, 

Officer Spears saw two cars, one behind the other, one block from campus. The 

two cars were stopped in the right-hand lane of a public street that crosses Main 

Street and part of which is adjacent to Rice University’s Bioscience Research 

Collaborative. This part of the street is a two-way road with two lanes in each 

direction. There were “No Parking” signs posted along the road. This part of the 

street is in the Texas Medical Center, and Officer Spears had seen emergency 

vehicles, at all hours of the day and night, proceed through the Texas Medical 

Center.

A woman was leaning into the driver’s-side window of the second vehicle. 

Appellee/plaintiff Rasheed Refaey was in the driver’s seat of the second vehicle. 

Both cars had their headlights on and their engines running. Refaey and the 

woman appeared to be kissing. Officer Spears believed that the vehicles were 

obstructing the roadway because the lane in which the vehicles were stopped was 

 

1

The facts recited in this section are based on the summary-judgment evidence considered in the 

light most favorable to appellee/plaintiff Rasheed Refaey under the applicable legal standard. 

See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). 
3

impassable. A motorist would not have been able to turn right onto Main Street 

without having to go into a different lane of traffic. Officer Spears considered 

Refaey and the woman to be engaging in suspicious activity.

Officer Spears drove around the block and pulled up behind the vehicles. 

He thought that by doing so, Refaey and the woman would move along and clear 

the roadway. When he first pulled up behind the vehicles, the woman was still 

leaning into the driver’s-side window, but after about twenty seconds, she noticed 

Officer Spears, returned to her car, and drove off.

The traffic light facing Refaey’s car turned green, but Refaey did not depart. 

The light turned red, but Refaey did not move his car. After watching for about 

thirty seconds more, Officer Spears pulled closer to Refaey’s car and activated the 

emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. Officer Spears left his vehicle to 

approach Refaey’s car, but as Officer Spears began to approach, Refaey drove 

away and turned left onto Main Street. 

Refaey testified that after the woman left, he checked about sixteen emails

on a hand-held device in his car, and the Rice University police vehicle was still 

behind him. According to Refaey, when he drove off, he did not look at the police 

vehicle in his rearview mirror, and Refaey did not notice whether the police officer 

had activated the emergency lights. 

According to Officer Spears, he returned to his vehicle and began following 

Refaey using emergency lights and attempting to stop Refaey. Travelling south on

Main Street at approximately thirty miles per hour, Refaey evaded Officer Spears’s 

attempts to stop him, continuing to drive for about two miles.

Refaey testified that about three-quarters of a mile into this drive, he knew 

that the Rice University police vehicle was behind him on Main Street with its 
4

emergency lights activated. According to Refaey, about one mile into this drive, 

he realized that the police officer following him was the same Rice University 

police officer who had stopped behind him earlier. At that point Refaey noticed 

that the Rice University police officer was motioning to him to pull over. 

Nonetheless, Refaey did not pull over; instead, he continued to drive with the 

police vehicle following behind him. Refaey drove for about one more mile before 

he turned right and pulled over. Refaey testified that Rice University is a private 

university with which he had no association and that he had not been on Rice 

University property, so he did not see how Officer Spears had any reason or right 

to stop him.

After Refaey finally pulled over, he left his car on his own initiative and 

walked to the back of the vehicle. According to Refaey, Refaey “threw [his] hands 

up” and said “What the f*** do you think you’re doing pulling me over?” Refaey 

then saw that Officer Spears had his weapon drawn and pointed at Refaey. When 

he was confident that Refaey was not armed, Officer Spears holstered his weapon. 

Refaey argued with Officer Spears for about five minutes. During this time Refaey 

admitted that he had not stopped his vehicle, despite Officer Spears’s attempts to 

detain him, and Refaey stated that he did not do so because he did not know of any 

reason Officer Spears had to stop Refaey. During this argument, Officer Spears 

noticed that Refaey’s eyes were red and watery and that he had a strong odor of 

alcohol on his breath. Refaey stated that he told the officer that the officer did not 

smell alcohol on his breath and that he said this because, given the amount of 

alcohol Refaey had consumed, Officer Spears was not in a position to detect 

alcohol on Refaey’s breath. 

Officer Spears placed Refaey in handcuffs and arrested him on suspicion of 

having committed the offenses of evading arrest and driving while intoxicated. 
5

Officer Spears contacted the Harris County District Attorney’s Office and relayed 

the facts. The Harris County District Attorney’s Office accepted the charges, and 

Officer Spears turned Refaey over to the custody of the Harris County Sheriff’s 

Department. Later, all charges against Refaey were dismissed.

Refaey filed this lawsuit against Officer Spears and Rice University, 

asserting negligence, false-imprisonment, assault, and intentional-infliction-ofemotional-distress claims based on his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention. 

Officer Spears and Rice University (hereinafter the “Rice Parties”) moved for 

summary judgment based on their affirmative defense of official immunity. The 

trial court denied the summary-judgment motion, and the Rice Parties appealed 

under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(5). See Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(5) (West Supp. 2015). 

This court concluded that Officer Spears was not an officer or employee of 

the state and that he was not entitled to be treated as if he were such an officer or 

employee for the purposes of section 51.014(a)(5) and thus dismissed the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction. See William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Refaey, 417 S.W.3d 667, 

670–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), rev’d, 459 S.W.3d 590, 594–95 

(Tex. 2015) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of Texas, addressing an issue of first 

impression in that court, reversed, concluding that private-university peace officers 

fall within the common meaning of the phrase “officer . . . of the state” in section 

51.014(a)(5). William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Refaey, 459 S.W.3d 590, 594–95 (Tex. 

2015) (per curiam). Adopting a broad reading of the statute, the high court 

concluded that the common meaning of the word “officer” is “[s]omeone who 

holds an office of trust, authority, or command.” Id. at 595 (internal quotations 

omitted). The Supreme Court of Texas noted that private-university peace officers 

are charged with enforcing state law on private-university campuses and must take 
6

an oath of office to “faithfully execute the duties of the office of [peace officer] of 

the State of Texas.” Id. at 594–95 (citations omitted). The high court stated that 

private-university peace officers have the authority to enforce state law and a duty 

to preserve the peace, which benefits a public purpose. Id. at 595. After 

concluding that this court had appellate jurisdiction, the high court remanded the 

case for this court to consider the merits of the Rice Parties’ appeal.

II. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS

Under their first issue, the Rice Parties assert that the trial court erred in 

denying their motion for traditional summary judgment based on Officer Spears’s 

official immunity. To dispose of this argument, we must determine whether 

Officer Spears may assert the official-immunity defense, and, if so, whether the 

summary-judgment evidence conclusively proves that he is entitled to official 

immunity.

In a traditional motion for summary judgment, if the movant’s motion and 

summary-judgment evidence facially establish its right to judgment as a matter of 

law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine, material fact issue 

sufficient to defeat summary judgment. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. 

Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). In our de novo review of a trial court’s 

summary judgment, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors 

could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. 

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). The evidence 

raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in 

their conclusions in light of all of the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire 

& Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). 
7

A. Is the private-university peace officer entitled to assert official 

immunity?

We first address whether Officer Spears, a private-university peace officer, 

may assert the official-immunity defense against claims based on allegedly tortious 

conduct that did not occur on property under the private university’s control and 

jurisdiction. The parties have not cited, and research has not revealed, any Texas 

case addressing this issue. 

Private institutions of higher education, such as Rice University, may 

employ and commission peace officers for the purpose of enforcing (1) state law 

on the campuses of the institution, and (2) state and local law, including applicable 

municipal ordinances, at other locations, as permitted by section 51.212(b) or 

section 51.2125 of the Texas Education Code.2See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 

51.212(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The applicable version of Texas 

Education Code section 51.212(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:

Any officer commissioned under the provisions of this section is 

vested with all the powers, privileges, and immunities of peace 

officers if the officer:

(1)is on the property under the control and jurisdiction of the 

respective private institution of higher education or is 

otherwise performing duties assigned to the officer by the 

institution, regardless of whether the officer is on property 

under the control and jurisdiction of the institution, but 

provided these duties are consistent with the educational 

mission of the institution and are being performed within a 

county in which the institution has land; or

Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 258, § 15.01, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 367, 

 

2

The summary-judgment evidence does not raise any issue regarding the existence of a mutual 

assistance agreement under Texas Education Code section 51.2125, so we do not consider that 

statute in our analysis. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.2125.
8

389 (amended 2015) (current version at Tex. Educ. Code § 51.212(b)).

3

 We 

review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of applicable statutes. See Johnson 

v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 1989). In construing a 

statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See 

Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). If possible, 

we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute 

and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. Id. If 

the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation 

supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words. St. Luke’s Episcopal 

Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). We must not engage in forced 

or strained construction; instead, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the 

Legislature chose. See id. 

The summary-judgment evidence proves as a matter of law that at all times 

relevant to Refaey’s claims, Rice University employed Officer Spears as a 

commissioned peace officer in the Rice University Police Department. None of 

Officer Spears’s allegedly tortious conduct occurred on property under Rice 

University’s control and jurisdiction. Therefore, for Officer Spears to be vested 

with all the powers, privileges, and immunities of a peace officer under Texas 

Education Code Section 51.212(b), (1) Officer Spears must have been performing 

duties assigned to him by Rice University; (2) these duties must have been 

consistent with Rice University’s educational mission; and (3) these duties must

have been performed in a county in which Rice University has land. See Act of 

 

3

Effective September 1, 2015, the Legislature amended Texas Education Code section 

51.212(b)(1) to delete the requirement that the duties be consistent with the educational mission 

of the institution if the officer is not on the property under the control and jurisdiction of the 

respective private institution of higher education. See Act of May 19, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 

300, § 1, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1417, 1417–18 (codified at Tex. Educ. Code § 51.212(b)). 

This amendment does not apply to Refaey’s claims, which accrued before the Legislature 

amended the statute.
9

May 28, 2007, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws at 389.

The summary-judgment evidence proves as a matter of law that when he 

engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct, Officer Spears was performing duties 

assigned to him by Rice University and that these duties were performed in Harris 

County, Texas, a county in which Rice University has land. Refaey argues that 

Officer Spears’s duties were not consistent with Rice University’s educational 

mission. The term “educational mission” is not defined in the statute, and it does 

not have a technical or particular meaning. Accordingly, we construe this term 

based on its ordinary meaning. See City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 

667, 672, n.19 (Tex. 2006). 

In the summary-judgment evidence, the Rice Parties submitted copies of 

Rice University’s mission statement and the Rice University Police Department’s 

mission statement. Rice University’s mission statement provides as follows:

As a leading research university with a distinctive commitment to 

undergraduate education, Rice University aspires to pathbreaking 

research, unsurpassed teaching, and contributions to the betterment of 

our world. It seeks to fulfill this mission by cultivating a diverse 

community of learning and discovery that produces leaders across the 

spectrum of human endeavor.

The Rice Parties rely in part on the Rice University Police Department’s 

mission statement. Though this statement may reflect the Rice University Police

Department’s mission, this document does not address Rice University’s 

educational mission. 

Refaey argues that Rice University’s mission statement says nothing about 

patrolling public, off-campus streets, investigating the amorous activities of private 

citizens, or otherwise providing police services to the City of Houston. In this 

argument, Refaey suggests that the duties of a peace officer employed by a private 
10

institution of higher education must be stated in that institution’s mission statement 

for those duties to be “consistent with the educational mission of the institution” 

under Texas Education Code section 51.212(b)(1). But, this argument conflicts 

with the unambiguous language of the statute. The statute requires that the duties 

be “consistent with the educational mission of the institution.” Act of May 28, 

2007, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws at 389. The statute does not require that the duties be 

“consistent with the mission statement of the institution,” nor does the statute 

require that the duties be “listed in the mission statement of the institution.” See id. 

Though the institution’s mission statement may be relevant to a determination of 

the institution’s educational mission, the mission statement is not a comprehensive 

definition of that educational mission. A peace officer’s duties may be consistent 

with the institution’s educational mission even if those duties are not mentioned in 

the institution’s mission statement.

The Rice Parties submitted a summary-judgment affidavit from their expert 

witness, Steven G. McGee, the police chief of Texas Christian University’s Police 

Department. McGee reviewed Rice University’s mission statement and attached it 

to his affidavit. McGee testified that when an officer with the Rice University 

Police Department investigates possible traffic violations the officer is ensuring the 

health and welfare of the students, faculty, staff, and visitors on campus, which 

furthers Rice University’s educational mission. McGee noted that Refaey’s car 

was stopped across the street from part of the Rice University campus. McGee 

opined that Officer Spears “acted consistent with the educational mission of Rice 

University” when he attempted to stop Refaey one block from campus. 

Refaey did not submit any summary-judgment evidence as to whether 

Officer Spears’s duties were consistent with Rice University’s educational mission. 

Refaey suggests that McGee is biased because a ruling against Rice University in 
11

this case would have a direct impact on the police department of Texas Christian 

University, a private institution of higher learning. But, a summary judgment may 

be based on the uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness if the 

evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from 

contradictions and inconsistencies, and readily could have been controverted. Tex. 

R. Civ. P. 166a(c). McGee’s testimony was clear, positive and direct, otherwise 

credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and readily could have 

been controverted. Refaey offered no controverting testimony. Therefore, even if 

McGee was an interested witness, the trial court was entitled to base its summary 

judgment on McGee’s testimony. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Coterill-Jenkins v. 

Texas Medical Ass’n Health Care Liability Claim Trust, 383 S.W.3d 581, 588–89 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).

Refaey contends on appeal that, arguably, it is contrary to Rice University’s 

educational mission for the university to take on the duties of policing the City of 

Houston because the Rice University Police Department has limited personnel and 

thus cannot protect students on campus if the university’s officers are patrolling off 

campus all over Houston. As stated above, Refaey did not submit any summaryjudgment evidence on this issue, and no summary-judgment evidence supports this 

argument. And, notably, when Officer Spears first saw Refaey’s car, Officer 

Spears was travelling north on Main Street, patrolling a street adjacent to part of 

the Rice University campus. Refaey’s car was one block from the campus. Thus, 

this case does not present the issue of whether performing duties in a part of Harris 

County far from any part of the campus would be consistent with the university’s 

educational mission. 

To determine whether the summary-judgment evidence proves as a matter of 

law that Officer Spears’s duties were consistent with Rice University’s educational 
12

mission, we need not and do not delineate specifically Rice University’s 

educational mission or the common meaning of the term “educational mission.” 

After reviewing the summary-judgment evidence under the applicable standard of 

review, we conclude that the evidence conclusively proves that (1) at the time of 

his allegedly tortious conduct, Officer Spears was performing duties assigned to 

him by Rice University; (2) these duties were consistent with Rice University’s 

educational mission; and (3) these duties were performed in a county in which Rice 

University has land. See Act of May 28, 2007, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws at 389. 

Therefore, as a matter of law under Texas Education Code Section 51.212(b), 

Officer Spears was vested with all the powers, privileges, and immunities of a 

peace officer, which includes the ability to assert the affirmative defense of official 

immunity.4See William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Thomas, No. 01-14-00908-CV, 2015 

WL 3522915, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. 

op.). 

B. Does the summary-judgment evidence conclusively prove each essential 

element of the official-immunity defense?

To be entitled to summary judgment on the official-immunity defense the 

summary-judgment evidence must prove conclusively that when Officer Spears 

engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct (1) he was performing discretionary 

duties (2) in good faith and (3) within the scope of his authority. See Telthorster v. 

Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. 2002); City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 

14, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Thomas, WL 3522915, at 

*4. To establish good faith, the Rice Parties must show that a reasonably prudent 

 

4

Because we determine that Officer Spears was entitled to assert the affirmative defense of 

official immunity based on the applicable version of Texas Education Code section 51.212(b), 

we need not and do not address the Rice Parties’ arguments that private-university peace officers 

have a direct right to assert this defense under Texas common law and that other statutes allow 

Officer Spears to assert this defense.
13

officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that Officer 

Spears’s conduct was justified based on the information Officer Spears possessed 

when the conduct occurred. See Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465. The Rice Parties 

need not prove that it would have been unreasonable not to engage in the conduct, 

or that all reasonably prudent officers would have engaged in the same conduct. 

See id. Rather, they must prove only that a reasonably prudent officer, under 

similar circumstances, might have reached the same decision. See id. That Officer 

Spears may have been negligent will not defeat good faith; this test of good faith 

does not inquire into “what a reasonable person would have done,” but into “what a 

reasonable officer could have believed.” Id. (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). If the Rice Parties met this burden, then to raise a fact issue, Refaey must 

have done more than show that a reasonably prudent officer could have reached a

different decision. See id. Instead, Refaey must have offered evidence that no

reasonable officer in Spears’s position could have believed that the facts were such 

that they justified his conduct. See id. If officers of reasonable competence could 

disagree on this issue, then Officer Spears acted in good faith as a matter of law.

See id. 

McGee’s affidavit proves that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same 

or similar circumstances, could have believed that Officer Spears’s conduct was

justified based on the information Officer Spears had when he engaged in the 

allegedly tortious conduct. See id. at 465–67; Thomas, WL 3522915, at *4–6. 

Refaey argues that his kissing a woman is not suspicious behavior and did not 

warrant investigation by Officer Spears. But, in his affidavit, McGee states that 

Refaey was exhibiting suspicious behavior based on the totality of the 

circumstances, not just because Refaey was kissing a woman. In any event, 

Refaey did not submit evidence that no reasonable officer in the same position 

could have believed that the facts were such that they justified the conduct. See
14

Telthorster at 465–67; Thomas, WL 3522915, at *4–6. Refaey asserts that Officer 

Spears did not act in good faith because his conduct was negligent, but, under the 

legal standard, any negligence by the officer does not raise a fact issue as to 

whether the officer acted in good faith. See Telthorster at 465–67; Thomas, WL 

3522915, at *4–6. 

Refaey argues that Officer Spears was acting outside the scope of his 

authority because he was not on property under Rice University’s control and 

jurisdiction and his duties were not consistent with Rice University’s educational 

mission. We already have rejected this argument. An officer acts within the scope

of the officer’s authority if the officer is discharging duties generally assigned to

the officer. See Thomas, WL 3522915, at *4–6. The summary-judgment evidence 

conclusively proves that Officer Spears was discharging the duties assigned to him. 

Under the applicable standard of review, the summary-judgment evidence, 

including the affidavits of Officer Spears and McGee, conclusively proves that 

when Officer Spears engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct (1) he was 

performing discretionary duties (2) in good faith and (3) within the scope of his 

authority. See Telthorster at 465–67; Thomas, WL 3522915, at *4–6. Therefore, 

the trial court erred by not granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Spears 

as to official immunity. See Telthorster at 465–67; Thomas, WL 3522915, at *4–6. 

Refaey’s claims against Rice University are based solely on the university’s

alleged vicarious liability for Officer Spears’s conduct. If Officer Spears is entitled 

to summary judgment based on official immunity, then Rice University likewise is 

entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity. See DeWitt v. Harris 

County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995); Thomas, 2015 WL 3522915, at *7. 

Thus, the trial court also erred by not granting summary judgment in favor of Rice 

University. See DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 654; Thomas, 2015 WL 3522915, at *7. 

Accordingly, we sustain the Rice Parties’ first issue.
15

III. CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, Texas Education Code section 51.212(b) vested Officer 

Spears with all the powers, privileges, and immunities of a peace officer, which 

includes the ability to assert the affirmative defense of official immunity. The 

summary-judgment evidence conclusively proves that when Officer Spears 

engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct he was performing discretionary duties,

in good faith, and within the scope of his authority. Therefore, the trial court erred 

in denying the Rice Parties’ summary-judgment motion. We reverse the trial 

court’s order and render judgment granting the Rice Parties’ motion and ordering 

that Refaey take nothing by his claims against the Rice Parties.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jamison.