[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2020-Ohio-6996.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109463 

 v. : 

 

MICHAEL WILLIAMSON, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 31, 2020

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-01-406972-ZA 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Michael Williamson, pro se. 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant Michael Williamson (“Williamson”) appeals 

from the trial court’s January 10, 2020 judgment denying his motion to quash the 

indictment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
The record shows that in 2001, Williamson was convicted of 12 

counts of rape of a minor after a jury trial. He was sentenced to consecutive life 

prison terms. Williamson challenged his convictions before this court; the 

convictions were upheld. State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80982, 

2002-Ohio-6503. In the years since, Williamson has mounted numerous 

challenges to his convictions and sentence. With the exception of a limited remand 

for resentencing to properly impose postrelease control1 and to mandate the trial 

court to consider Williamson’s request for DNA testing,2 his appeals have been 

unsuccessful.3 

In January 2020, Williamson filed a motion to quash the 

indictment, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the indictment 

 

1See State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99473, 2013-Ohio-3733; State v. 

Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100563 and 101115, 2014-Ohio-3909. 

2 See State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105320, 2017-Ohio-4192. 

3See State v. Williamson, 137 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2013-Ohio-5678, 999 N.E.2d 697, 

discretionary appeal not accepted; State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102320, 2015-Ohio-4482, counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders granted; limited 

remand for imposition of postrelease control was properly executed; State v. 

Williamson, 143 Ohio St.3d 1545, 2015-Ohio-4633, 40 N.E.3d 1181, discretionary 

appeal not accepted; State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102320, 2015-Ohio5135, reopening denied; State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104294, 2016-

Ohio-7053, denial of petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence 

aff’d; State v. Williamson, 148 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2017-Ohio-905, 71 N.E.3d 299, 

discretionary appeal not allowed; State v. Williamson, 2018-Ohio-2226, 114 N.E.3d 

323 (8th Dist.), denial of postconviction relief for DNA testing; State v. Williamson, 153 

Ohio St.3d 1497, 2018-Ohio-4092, 108 N.E.3d 1105, discretionary appeal not accepted; 

State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107117, 107162, and 107916, 2019-Ohio1985, denial of motion for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial and petition for 

postconviction relief aff’d; State v. Williamson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2019-Ohio-3148, 

2019, 128 N.E.3d 245, discretionary appeal not accepted. 
was defective. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal ensues, with 

Williamson raising the following two assignments of error: 

I. The trial court erred in the denial of Williamson’s delayed motion 

to quash indictment, for cause of lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

where the faulty attempted indictment fails to designate parties to 

a lawsuit in the title of action and fails to name Williamson as the 

accused in the statement charging an offense to R.C. 2941.03(C) 

and Crim.R. 7(B). 

II. The trial court erred in the denial of Williamson’s delayed motion 

to quash indictment, for cause of lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

where the faulty attempted indictment fails to comply with R.C. 

2941.03(D). State v. Luna, 96 Ohio App.3d 207. 

Under these two assignments of error, Williamson contends that the 

2001 indictment against him was defective, and the trial court was therefore 

without jurisdiction to try and convict him. Williamson requests that this court 

reverse his convictions “with an order instructing [the trial] Court to immediately 

vacate [his] void attempted indictment” and order “his immediate release from 

custody.” 

For the reasons that follow, we find that Williamson’s claim is 

barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 

The doctrine of res judicata establishes that 

a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted defendant from 

raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that 

judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was 

raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which 

resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that 

judgment. 

State v. D’Ambrosio, 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 143, 652 N.E.2d 710 (1995), quoting State 

v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). Thus, “[p]ostconviction 
review is a narrow remedy, because res judicata bars any claim that was or could 

have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” State v. Dean, 187 Ohio App.3d 495, 

2010-Ohio-1684, 932 N.E.2d 918 (2d Dist.), ¶ 11 

Whether an indictment is defective is an issue that could have been 

raised on direct appeal. Williamson did not challenge the sufficiency of his 

indictment at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, res judicata bars his attempt to 

raise the issue of a defective indictment now, 19 years after his conviction. See 

State v. Tucker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23408, 2010-Ohio-2642, ¶ 6 (“Whether 

the indictment was defective is an issue that could have been raised by Defendant 

in his direct appeal. It was not. Therefore, res judicata bars Defendant from now 

raising that issue as a ground for post-conviction relief.”). 

Williamson contends that the issue of a defective indictment based 

on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. In State v. 

Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E.2d 416 (1953), the Supreme Court of Ohio held 

that “[a] judgment of conviction based on an indictment which does not charge an 

offense is void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter and may be successfully 

attacked either on direct appeal to a reviewing court or by a collateral proceeding.” 

Id. at paragraph six of the syllabus. 

However, the Supreme Court later clarified the holding in Cimpritz. 

In State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 178 N.E.2d 800 (1961), the court stated: 

As stated in paragraph six of the syllabus of [Cimpritz], “an 

indictment,” such as that in the instant case, “which does not charge 

an offense is void * * * and may be successfully attacked * * * by a 
collateral proceedings [sic].” However, after a judgment of conviction 

for the crime sought to be charged in such indictment, such a 

collateral attack would no longer be effective because the judgment of 

conviction necessarily binds a defendant, where the court rendering it 

had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and also jurisdiction of 

the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime 

for which he was convicted. Such a judgment of conviction is 

necessarily binding as between the state and the defendant and can 

only be set aside by a direct and not a collateral attack. 

Id. at 522-523.4

Thus, even assuming there was a defect in Williamson’s indictment 

(which we do not think there was), he cannot raise the issue “at any time” based on 

the trial court’s alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Williamson raises no 

argument that the trial court lacked either personal jurisdiction over him or 

jurisdiction to try him for the crime for which he was convicted. In fact, the trial 

court had personal jurisdiction over Williamson and jurisdiction over the crimes of 

which he was convicted. 

In light of the above, Williamson’s two assignments of error are both 

without merit and are overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

 

4See also Midling v. Perrini, 14 Ohio St.2d 106, 107, 236 N.E.2d 557 (1968). (“[T]he 

Cimpritz case involved a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and not a 

collateral attack on such a judgment. Hence, it would have been sufficient to use the 

word ‘voidable’ instead of ‘void’ in [paragraph six of the syllabus]. Also, no question 

with respect to a collateral attack was involved in the case, so that any statement with 

respect thereto may be disregarded.”). 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this 

entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR