[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-11727

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00405-CAR

KRISTINE CORZINE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL INCORPORATED, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

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(December 18, 2014)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kristine Corzine claims that Little League Baseball, Inc. terminated her in 

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., 

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because Little League knew she had a potentially metastatic breast tumor or 

regarded her as such when it fired her. She further claims that Little League’s 

terminating her intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. The district 

court granted Little League summary judgment on all claims. We affirm.

A district court must grant summary judgment if the moving party 

demonstrates that the pleadings, discovery, and properly prepared and submitted 

affidavits reveal an absence of genuine issues of material fact and that, based on 

that absence, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-movant may 

not avoid summary judgment with speculation, conjecture, or simply by relying on 

her unsworn pleadings or presenting a mere scintilla of evidence in support of her 

claims. Rather, she must present evidence on the basis of which a jury reasonably 

could find in her favor. Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 

1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006); Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th 

Cir. 2005); Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). We review 

summary judgments de novo, examining in the non-movant’s favor all evidence 

and inferences from the evidence. Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 

(11th Cir. 2011).

The ADA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because she 

has a disability. Corzine contends that a potentially metastatic breast tumor was 

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her impairment (that is, the anatomical basis of her statutory “disability”) and that 

Little League fired her literally on the heels of learning that she had the tumor.1

 

Pretermitting whether such a tumor constitutes a “disability” under these or any 

other circumstances, there is absolutely no evidence that Little League fired 

Corzine because she had a lump in her breast. More particularly, Corzine did not 

present any evidence to the district court that anyone responsible for or who 

participated in the decision to fire her even knew that she had a potentially 

metastatic tumor. Beyond that, Little League articulated an unrefuted basis for 

discharging Corzine: poor performance. Before Corzine even knew she had a 

lump in her breast, metastatic or otherwise, Little League had decided to terminate 

her. That Little League communicating its termination decision to Corzine roughly 

coincided with her communicating that she needed time off for a mammogram 

does not raise a prima facie inference of disability discrimination.

Corzine’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fares worse. 

Considering the totality of the undisputed circumstances, no conduct of Little 

League, or any of those responsible for or participating in the decision to terminate 

Corzine, rose as a matter of law to the level of outrageousness or unconscionability 

necessary to prove an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See 

Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1222 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Georgia law); 

 1 Corzine does not contend that she had any reason to believe the lump was metastatic when 

Little League fired her on July 6 because the mammogram was not until July 8.

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Jarrard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 529 S.E. 2d 144, 146 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 

Nothing Corzine alleged or attempted to prove was “so extreme in degree[] as to 

go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious[] and 

utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Higdon, 323 F.3d at 1222 (quoting 

Kaiser v. Tara Ford, Inc.. 248 Ga. App. 481, 529 S.E. 2d 861, 868 (2001).

For the reasons stated by the district court and in this opinion, summary 

judgment in favor of Little League and against Corzine is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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