J-S49020-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHAEL CHRISTIAN

Appellant No. 2 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-0006755-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019

Appellant Michael Christian appeals from the November 20, 2018 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 

County (“trial court”), following his jury convictions for burglary and criminal 

trespass.1 Upon review, we affirm. 

The facts and procedural history this case are undisputed. On 

September 27, 2017, Springfield Township Police Department charged 

Appellant with, inter alia, the above-mentioned crimes.2 The affidavit of 

probable cause accompanying the complaint provided in relevant part:

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1)(i), and 3503(a)(1)(i).

2 Appellant also was charged with disorderly conduct under Section 5503(a)(4) 

of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). That charge, however, was 

withdrawn. 
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On Wednesday, September 27, 2017, at 7:06 p.m., the 

Springfield Township Police Department received a report of a 

burglary interrupted at 233 Swarthmore Ave., Springfield 

Township. Officers Rick Christy and Scott Francis responded and 

spoke to Marie and Joseph Gousie, parents of the homeowners 

who were babysitting for their five and two year old grandchildren. 

Mrs. Gousie stated that she was upstairs in a bedroom when she 

noticed a man walk into her grandson’s bedroom. When she 

confronted the male, he turned around and headed down the 

staircase. She then yelled to her husband and he confronted the 

male at the bottom of the stairs. When Mr. Gousie asked the 

subject what he wanted, the response was “a glass of water.” The 

male was told to leave and he replied, “Yes sir.” The subject left 

through the open garage and fled the area on his bicycle. . . . A 

subject, later identified as [Appellant], was stopped by officers at 

Swarthmore and Yale Avenues, and positively identified by Mr. 

Gousie. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 9/8/17 (sic). Appellant was held for court on all 

charges. The case ultimately proceeded to a jury trial, at which the 

Commonwealth offered the testimony of Mr. Gousie, Fernando Gonzalez and 

Sergeant Patrick Fisher, Nether Providence Police Department. The trial court 

summarized the witness testimonies as follows, beginning with Mr. Gousie’s:

On September 27, 2017, Mr. Gousie and his wife, Marie, were 

babysitting their grandchildren at 233 South Swarthmore Avenue 

in Springfield, Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Gousie was watching television in the living room with the 

children, ages five and two, when he heard his wife yell to 

someone upstairs, “What are you doing here?” When he entered 

the hall to investigate, Mr. Gousie saw Appellant coming down 

from upstairs. Mr. Gousie asked Appellant what he was doing 

there. To which, Appellant responded that he wanted a drink of 

water. Mr. Gousie told Appellant to leave and asked his wife to 

call the police. He then watched Appellant leave through the 

garage door, get on a bicycle, and start riding away. Before 

getting far, Appellant was stopped by police and arrested. 

Mr. Gousie explained that if Appellant had come in the house 

through the garage, he would have been in direct view of the 

kitchen, but instead Appellant went upstairs where Mrs. Gousie 

found him exiting one of the bedrooms. Appellant did not tell the 

Gousies that people were trying to kill him nor did he ask them to 

call 911 for him. Mr. Gousie admitted that nothing was taken from 

the house and no one was harmed. Appellant presumably entered 

the house through the garage which was unlocked. 
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The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of [Mr.] 

Gonzalez, the homeowner of 233 South Swarthmore Avenue [and 

Mr. Gousie’s son-in-law]. Mr. Gonzalez testified that he did not 

give Appellant permission to enter the home. Additionally, Mr. 

Gonzalez explained that, when he appeared for a hearing in 

November of 2017, Appellant approached him and apologized 

explaining that people were trying to kill him so he entered the 

house to hide. 

Finally, Sergeant [] Fisher of the Nether Providence Police 

Department testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Sergeant 

Fisher was called to assist the Springfield Township Police with a 

robbery in progress at 233 South Swarthmore Avenue. Within a 

second or two prior to arriving at the residence, Sergeant Fisher 

observed a male, matching the description given by radio, riding 

a bike towards him. Appellant was waving his hands as if he was 

trying to flag the officer down. Sergeant Fisher stopped his vehicle 

and placed Appellant on the ground while another officer placed 

him under arrest. Appellant did not tell Sergeant Fisher that he 

was in fear of his life. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19 at 1-3 (unnumbered) (internal record citations 

omitted). Appellant did not testify in his own defense. On October 24, 2018, 

at the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of burglary and 

criminal trespass. On November 20, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to 54 to 108 months’ imprisonment for the burglary conviction.

3

 Appellant 

timely appealed. Both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review. “Whether the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for burglary where the 

Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] 

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3 For purposes of sentencing, the conviction for criminal trespass merged with 

burglary. As a result, the trial court imposed no additional penalty for criminal 

trespass. 
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entered the building with the intent to commit a crime therein?” Appellant’s 

Brief at 5. 

“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

“A person is guilty of burglary if he or she enters a building or occupied 

structure with the intent to commit a crime therein, unless he or she is licensed 

or privileged to enter. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).” Commonwealth v. 

Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc), appeal denied, 

805 A.2d 521 (Pa. 2002). In Lambert, we explained the jury may find the 

mens rea for burglary solely through circumstantial evidence.

The intent to commit a crime after entry may be inferred from 

the circumstances surrounding the incident. While this intent may 

be inferred from actions as well as words, the actions must bear 

a reasonable relation to the commission of a crime. Once one has 
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entered a private residence by criminal means, we can infer that 

the person intended a criminal purpose based upon the totality of 

the circumstances. The Commonwealth is not required to 

allege or prove what particular crime a defendant intended to 

commit after his forcible entry into the private residence.

Id. at 1022 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Instantly, based upon the evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

Appellant committed burglary. As the trial court explained:

In the case sub judice, the testimony of the three 

Commonwealth witnesses, when taken as a whole and viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for 

the jury to find that Appellant had the intent to commit a crime in 

the residence. Appellant entered the home surreptitiously, as 

evidenced by the fact that neither Mr. Gousie nor his wife noticed

him enter. Once inside, Appellant bypassed the kitchen directly 

in front of him, where he could have obtained a drink of water, 

and went upstairs. In doing so, Appellant presumably slipped

right past Mr. Gousie and the minor children. Appellant was first 

seen by Mrs. Gousie when she observed him exiting one of the 

upstairs bedrooms. Appellant could not have obtained a glass of

water in a bedroom, as was his explanation to Mr. Gousie 

regarding why he was in the house. Interestingly enough, 

Appellant then contradicted his own explanation for why he was 

in the residence when he told Mr. Gonzalez that he was being 

chased and entered the house to hide. These conflicting 

statements certainly affected Appellant’s credibility and supported 

the inference that Appellant entered the residence with the intent 

to commit a crime. All these circumstances, taken as a whole, 

were sufficient for the jury to infer that Appellant entered the

residence with the intent to commit a crime.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19 at 4-5 (unnumbered). Accordingly, Appellant is 

not entitled to relief.4 

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4 To the extent Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Wilamowski, 633 

A.2d 141 (Pa. 1993) for the proposition that he did not have an intent to 

commit a crime once he entered the Gousies’ residence, such reliance is 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/19

____________________________________________

misplaced. In Wilamowski, the defendant kicked in a person’s garage door 

and fled from the scene. Our Supreme Court reasoned that “there was no 

additional evidence to establish that he possessed an intent to commit a crime 

inside. He broke the door and apparently walked away from it without any 

showing that he entered the structure or attempted to enter.” Id. at 144. 

The Court further noted that the defendant’s “path into the structure was now 

unobstructed, but he chose to walk away and go to the neighbor’s house to 

ask for directions.” Id. Here, Appellant not only entered the Gousies’ 

residence, but he surreptitiously wandered all the way up to a second-floor 

bedroom past Mr. Gousie who was watching TV with his two grandchildren 

when Mrs. Gousie discovered him. As noted above, Appellant’s explanation 

for being in the house changed from wanting a glass of water to hiding out in 

the house because people allegedly were trying to kill him.