VIRGINIA:

 In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 

Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 15th day of 

September, 1995. 

Norton Bowman, Appellant, 

 against Record No. 941911 

 Circuit Court No. 125CH93003286-00 

Wintergreen Property Owners Association, Inc., Appellee. 

 Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the 

Circuit Court of Nelson County on the 12th day of 

August, 1994. 

 Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 

counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the 

judgment appealed from. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

The appellant shall pay to the appellee thirty dollars damages. 

JUSTICE WHITING, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KEENAN join, 

concurring in part, and dissenting in part. 

 Unlike the majority, which decides this case without stating 

the facts or giving a reason for its decision, I think there was 

error in the chancellor's judgment and I believe that some 

explanation should be given to the litigants. Accordingly, I find 

it necessary to state the facts in order to explain my reasons for 

dissenting to a part of the majority's order. 

 This appeal arises from Norton Bowman's display of certain 

articles of personal property outside his house in the Wintergreen 

Resort residential subdivision (Wintergreen) in Nelson County. 

The display in question included three cow skulls, two pairs of 

cow horns, three neon signs reading "Aspen," "Key West," and 
"Margaritaville," and a bar and murals attached to the outside of 

Bowman's residence. Also, either on the outside deck of his house 

or in his yard, Bowman displayed a lighted Christmas tree 

silhouette, the statues of two deer, five pastel, beach-style 

umbrellas, eight lighted wicker deer structures, seven lighted 

artificial cactus and palm plants, eight wooden figures 

representing cowboys and Indians, two lighted pink flamingos, and 

two wooden owls. 

 Wintergreen Property Owners Association, Inc. (the 

association) sued Bowman to enjoin his display of these and other 

articles without its permission or approval as violations of the 

following Wintergreen restrictive covenants:1

 1. No building, fence or other structure shall be 

erected, placed or altered nor shall a building permit 

for such improvement be applied for on any property in 

Wintergreen until the proposed building plans and 

specifications, showing floor plans, the front 

elevation, exterior color or finish, a plot plan 

detailing the proposed location of such building or 

structure, drives and parking areas, a landscape plan, a 

pollution control plan . . . and the construction 

schedule shall have been filed with and approved in 

writing by [the association], its successors or assigns. 

 Refusal of approval of plans, location or specification 

may be based by [the association] upon any ground, 

including purely aesthetic conditions, which in the sole 

and uncontrolled discretion of [the association] shall 

seem sufficient. No alteration in the exterior 

appearance of any building or structure shall be made 

without like approval by [the association]. . . . 

 5. No signs shall be erected or maintained on any 

property by anyone including, but not limited to, the 

owner, a realtor, a contractor or subcontractor, except 

with the written permission of [the association] or 

except as may be required by legal proceedings. If such 

permission is granted, [the association] reserves the 

right to restrict size, color and content of such signs. 1

The association is the successor to the developer which 

imposed these restrictions. 
 Residential property identification and like signs not 

exceeding a combined total of more than one (1) square 

foot may be erected without the written permission of 

[the association]. 

 6. It shall be the responsibility of each property 

owner and tenant to prevent the development of any 

unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of buildings or 

grounds on such property. No outside burning of wood, 

leaves, trash, garbage or other refuse shall be 

permitted on any Property. 

 Following an ore tenus hearing, the chancellor agreed with 

the association's construction of the restrictive covenants 

regarding the above articles and required Bowman to remove them 

unless he obtained association approval. Bowman appeals.2

 The controlling principles are set forth in Friedberg v. 

Riverpoint Bldg. Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 239 S.E.2d 106, 110 

(1977), as follows: 

 Valid covenants restricting the free use of land, 

although widely used, are not favored and must be 

strictly construed and the burden is on the party 

seeking to enforce them to demonstrate that they are 

applicable to the acts of which he complains. . . . 

Substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved against 

the restrictions and in favor of the free use of 

property. . . . 

 But if it is apparent from a reading of the whole 

instrument that the restrictions carry a certain meaning 

by definite and necessary implication, then the thing 

denied may be said to be clearly forbidden, as if the 

language used had been in positive terms of express 

inhibition. . . . (Citations omitted). 

 Bowman argues that his neon signs did not require association 

approval under the provisions of restriction 5 because they were 

not "advertisement[s]" but a "display of neon art," reflecting 

 2

The association has not assigned cross error to the 

chancellor's judgment that Bowman did not violate the restrictive 

covenants in locating a hot tub and twelve globe lights outside 

his residence. 
places he had visited and the signs were intended to be 

illuminated only during his occupancy of the premises. I agree 

with the association that the plain language of restriction 5 

specifically covers Bowman's sign display even if it could be 

considered "neon art." Thus, I would affirm that part of the 

chancellor's opinion. 

 Turning to restriction 1, particularly its language that 

"[n]o alteration in the exterior appearance of any building or 

structure shall be made without like approval by [the 

association]," I disagree with Bowman's claim that, as used in 

this sentence, the word "alteration" limits association approval 

to those changes that are structural modifications of the exterior 

of any building or structure. Instead, I agree with the 

association's contention that, consistent with the context of this 

sentence and the remaining language of restriction 1, the word 

"alteration clearly encompasses any change or alteration in the 

exterior of Bowman's residential structure." The requirement of 

association approval of building plans and specifications, front 

elevations, and exterior colors and finishes in the first sentence 

of restriction 1 makes it plain that a similar approval is 

required for an alteration or change in the exterior appearance of 

any residence by the attachment of personal property thereto. 

Hence, I agree that association approval was required for those 

items of display attached to Bowman's house. 

 However, I disagree with the association's contention that 

Bowman's display of the other personal property in his yard and on 

the deck of his residence was subject to restriction 1. The 
chancellor held that these objects "come within the terms of the 

[restriction 1]" because they "alter the exterior appearance of 

the structure" and, thus, their display requires association 

approval. On the contrary, I would hold that Bowman's yard 

display was not an alteration in the appearance of his residential 

structure requiring association approval, but an alteration in the 

appearance of his yard, clearly not subject to such approval. 

 Nor do I agree with the association's contention that a 

prohibition of "alteration[s] in the exterior appearance of any 

building or structure" unambiguously requires association approval 

of Bowman's placement of pastel umbrellas and other personal 

property on the deck of his residence. If restriction 1 is 

unambiguous, there is no need for construction and we simply apply 

the language as written. Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

248 Va. 432, 435-36, 448 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1994). Yet, instead of 

applying the restriction as written, the association construes "no 

alteration in" to mean "no items which alter." And even this 

"amended" language needs further construction to permit the 

conclusion that nothing may be displayed on the residence or its 

deck without association approval, although not attached to either 

the residence or the deck. Thus, the association itself 

demonstrates that the language is ambiguous and merely advances 

one construction of that language. 

 I think a better construction of this provision of 

restriction 1 is that association approval is limited to those 

articles which are attached to the residence or deck and thus 

alter the appearance of the structure. This construction is 
reinforced when this provision is considered in context with the 

earlier provisions in restriction 1 requiring association approval 

for the construction of buildings, fences, structures, drives, 

parking areas, landscape plans, and pollution control plans. In 

any event, any doubt or ambiguity in the scope of any restrictive 

covenant is to be resolved against the restriction and in favor of 

the free use of property. Williams v. Brooks, 238 Va. 224, 228, 

383 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989); Friedberg, 218 Va. at 665, 239 S.E.2d 

at 110. Hence, I think the chancellor erred in requiring 

association permission for Bowman's display of the articles of 

personal property that were simply placed on the deck of his 

residential structure. 

 Next, I consider the chancellor's alternative ground for 

enjoining Bowman's display. The chancellor also held that 

Bowman's display was an "unsightly condition" "in relation to the 

general appearance and scheme of development at Wintergreen," and 

hence a violation of restriction 6. Although the chancellor gave 

no further explanation for his ruling, the association claims the 

following additional language from the restrictive covenants 

supports his holding: "The primary purpose of these covenants and 

restrictions and the foremost consideration in the origin of same 

has been the creation of a community which is aesthetically 

pleasing and functionally convenient." 

 However, the specific purpose of restriction 6 is "to prevent 

the development of any unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of 

buildings or grounds." I do not think that this language can be 

converted into a restriction against the creation of a display 
some people may consider aesthetically displeasing. In extending 

the scope of the restriction beyond its clear purpose, I think 

that the chancellor read the word "unsightly" out of context for 

the reasons which follow. 

 First, I consider that the purpose of restriction 6 is "to 

prevent neglect in the subdivision by requiring lot owners to take 

action "to prevent the development of any unclean, unsightly or 

unkept conditions." Stated another way, restriction 6 is aimed at 

a lot owner's neglect or failure to act in maintaining his 

property. 

 On the other hand, an aesthetically displeasing display 

usually is the result of some affirmative act; it does not occur 

by neglect. It is not usually regarded as a "condition[]," which, 

in relation to an inanimate object, usually alludes to the state 

of its cleanliness or repair. And the language of restriction 1 

requiring association approval of "the proposed building plans and 

specifications," a "plot plan," a "landscaping plan," and a 

"pollution control plan," and subjecting such approval to "purely 

aesthetic conditions," demonstrates a familiarity, not only with 

the difference between a neglected property and one that is 

aesthetically displeasing, but also with the method of subjecting 

certain parts of the lot owner's property to the aesthetic 

judgment of the association. 

 My second reason for concluding that the chancellor read the 

word "unsightly" out of context is that the enumeration of 

"unclean," "unkept," and "unsightly" as common modifiers of the 

word "conditions" requires that the three modifiers be construed 
consistently with each other under the well-established maxim of 

noscitur a sociis. Under this maxim, "when general and specific 

words are grouped, the general words are limited by the specific 

and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 

those things identified by the specific words." Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 302, 295 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1982). Or, 

as stated by another authority, "[t]he meaning of a word is or may 

be known from the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of 

'noscitur a sociis', the meaning of questionable or doubtful words 

or phrases . . . may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of 

other words or phrases associated with it." Black's Law 

Dictionary 1060 (6th ed. 1990). 

 And, as pertinent to the prevention of "the development of 

any unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of buildings or 

grounds," "unclean" is defined as "dirty, filthy," Webster's New 

International Dictionary 2485 (3rd ed. 1986) and "unkept" is 

defined as "neglected." Id. at 2502. Accordingly, I do not think 

that one can define "unsightly," in the context of these 

restrictions, as an "aesthetically displeasing" display. 

 In sum, and consistent with Friedberg and Williams, I read 

the word "unsightly" in harmony with the remaining language of 

restrictions 1 and 6. Thus, I would construe restriction 6 as 

dealing solely with a lot owner's responsibility to keep his 

buildings and grounds in good condition. And the evidence is 

uncontradicted that Bowman was doing so. 

 Finally, I do not agree with the association's contention 

that restriction 6, considered in context with all the other 
restrictive covenants, "carr[ies] a certain meaning by definite 

and necessary implication," Friedberg, 218 Va. at 665, 239 S.E.2d 

at 110, that association approval is required for such a display 

of articles outside Bowman's house. Indeed, a review of the other 

restrictive covenants indicates otherwise. 

 When the author of the restrictive covenants intended to 

restrict a lot owner's use of the lot itself, specific language 

was employed to require that (1) the association approve building, 

plot, landscaping, and pollution control plans, as noted above, 

(2) lot owners not park or maintain any "vehicle of any type other 

than conventional automobiles, jeeps and pickup trucks" on their 

lots, (3) "[t]opographic and vegetation characteristics of 

properties within Wintergreen shall not be altered by removal, 

reduction, cutting, excavation or any other means without the 

prior written approval of the [association]," (4) "[n]o trees, 

shrubs or other vegetation may be removed without the written 

approval of the [association]," (5) individual landscaping plans 

of lots adjacent to the golf fairway and the ski slopes "shall be 

in general conformity with the overall landscaping pattern" for 

the golf course and ski slopes and subject to association 

approval. 

 Applying the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio

alterius articulated in Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 127, 418 

S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992), I think that the enumeration of the 

instances of association approval of a lot owner's use of the lot 

excludes any implication that association approval is required for 

the display of unattached personal property outside of its 
buildings or structures. Therefore, I infer that if the developer 

had intended to impose this restriction upon the lot owners, it 

would have been specific in doing so, just as it had been in these 

other instances. 

 Accordingly, I would enter a final judgment affirming those 

parts of the final judgment that required association approval of 

the neon signs and the articles attached to the building and 

reversing those parts that required Bowman to remove the specified 

items of personal property from his deck and yard. 

 This order shall be certified to the said circuit court and 

shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 

 A Copy, 

 Teste: 

 David B. Beach, 

 Clerk