In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18‐1724

DYLAN SINN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BRUCE LEMMON, Commissioner, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15‐cv‐01394 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED DECEMBER 14, 2018

____________________

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellant Dylan Sinn was

incarcerated within the Indiana Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) from June 2011 to February 2015. In 2014, while an

inmate at Putnamville Correctional Facility (“Putnamville”),

he suffered injuries from two separate assaults by other in‐

mates. Sinn filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against defendants‐appellees, various prison officials, alleg‐
2 No. 18‐1724

ing deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amend‐

ment. Sinn appeals the district court’s decision to grant judg‐

ment on the pleadings as to Putnamville Sergeant Scott Rodg‐

ers1 and Putnamville Correctional Officer Paul Hoskins, as

well as the district court’s decision to grant summary judg‐

ment as to John Brush, former Putnamville Unit Manager,

Stanley Knight, former Putnamville Superintendent, and

Bruce Lemmon, former IDOC Commissioner. We affirm the

judgments of the district court in all respects except one: we

reverse and remand the district court’s grant of summary

judgment as to Brush.

I. Background

A. Factual Background2

Sinn suffered two attacks by fellow inmates during his in‐

carceration at Putnamville. The IDOC had transferred Sinn to

the facility in 2014 after his good behavior made him eligible

for a lower security level. His initial placement was an open

dorm in 17 South. After moving through several other dorms,

Sinn moved to 11 South in April 2014.  

While imprisoned at these various dorms, Sinn witnessed

daily fights between other inmates, and he noticed that

guards were rarely present when fights began. The record

shows that Putnamville struggled to deal with overcrowding

                                                 

1 The district court and the parties have inconsistently spelled this defend‐

ant’s last name as either “Rogers” or “Rodgers.” According to one of de‐

fendants’ filings below, “Rodgers” is the correct spelling, and we therefore

use this version.

2 These facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.  
No. 18‐1724 3

of inmates and understaffing of guards. The facility was de‐

signed for 1,650 inmates, but it had a recorded average daily

population of 2,490 state prisoners in 2013. Putnamville was

also unable to fill correctional officer vacancies in a timely

manner; in April 2014, there were 27 vacancies at the facility

out of 350 positions. Additionally, at his deposition, Sinn said

he rarely saw more than one guard at any of the dorms, except

maybe once or twice a week.  

Sinn felt affected by gang activity as soon as he arrived at

Putnamville, but he did not report any threats until his April

2014 assaults. Sinn acknowledges that he received infor‐

mation from the IDOC encouraging inmates to report illegal

activity, including “security threat groups” (i.e. gangs).  

The first attack on Sinn occurred on April 24, 2014, and it

was partially captured on video. Several inmates stole Sinn’s

property box and hauled it into the bathroom to divvy up the

contents. When Sinn realized what happened, he ran into the

bathroom to retrieve the box, at which point several inmates

attacked him by grabbing him from behind, restraining his

arms, and punching him in the face several times.3 Sinn only

                                                 

3 Although defendants note that “[t]he alleged attack does not appear on

the surveillance video,” this footage does support some of Sinn’s narra‐

tive. The footage shows two inmates holding a property box walk into the

bathroom off‐screen. Shortly after those two inmates set the box down in‐

side the bathroom (mostly out of view), several others walk in. Sinn then

runs into the bathroom; while he is in there, an inmate in the hallway out‐

side the bathroom gets punched in the face by another inmate. Sinn comes

out of the bathroom, and the inmate who just threw a punch comes back

into view and punches a second inmate. Sinn pulls that inmate away from

the punching inmate. A correctional officer arrives, and the area mostly

clears. The second inmate gets handcuffed and taken off‐screen. This en‐
4 No. 18‐1724

sustained minor injuries: he “split [his] hand,” “had some

scrapes,” and “[m]aybe [had] a busted lip or something.” No

guards were present at the time of the attack. After the attack,

though, Correctional Officer Paul Hoskins and Sergeant Scott

Rodgers arrived. They handcuffed Sinn and the two other in‐

mates who had been attacked, took them to a back office for

questioning, and reviewed the surveillance footage.  

At his deposition, Sinn said he was “pretty sure” the in‐

mates who attacked him were members of the “Vice Lords”

gang, “or real good friends of them,” in part because Hoskins

told Sinn the attackers were Vice Lords. Sinn believed he was

targeted because he was an “unaffiliated[] [w]hite, clean‐cut,

tall, nerdy guy with glasses.” He believed an inmate “be‐

come[s] a pretty easy target when [he’s] unaffiliated.”  

After reviewing the surveillance footage, Rodgers and

Hoskins decided to move Sinn and the other two inmates to

new dormitories; they transferred Sinn to 18 South. Sinn com‐

plained to Rodgers and Hoskins that they were not moving

the attackers, and he told them that he was still concerned for

his safety because “this isn’t going to stop. This is going to

escalate.” In response, Sinn says Rodgers and Hoskins told

him to talk to his counselor.

Within a few hours of arriving at 18 South, Sinn said he

“was met by other gang members of the same gang letting me

know that it wasn’t over yet; that they were going to get me

                                                 

tire sequence of events lasts less than five minutes. Though the surveil‐

lance footage does not show any inmates attacking Sinn, it is reasonable

to infer that for the seconds he is in the bathroom, but just off‐screen, some

inmates attacked him.
No. 18‐1724 5

when [the] time came and when they saw fit.” He did not re‐

port those threats. Instead, when he went to breakfast the next

morning, April 25, he talked to Unit Manager John Brush

about what had happened. Sinn had interacted with Brush be‐

fore this incident and trusted him, in part because Brush had

facilitated a relocation request for Sinn in the past and in part

because Sinn felt Brush genuinely cared about his wellbeing.  

Brush already knew about the first attack when they met

that morning, according to Sinn, and he asked Sinn how he

was doing. Sinn told Brush his concerns; specifically, he testi‐

fied that he told Brush, “I know I’m going to get it again here

soon. I’m going to be back in trouble, you know.” Sinn did not

tell Brush the specific names of any people he was concerned

might attack him because he did not know any of their names

at that point. He did tell Brush that he wanted to be moved to

a different dorm. Brush told Sinn to send him a written re‐

quest and he would “look over it as soon as he [could].”4  

Per these directions, Sinn wrote Brush a letter dated April

26, 2014, describing his concerns. In this letter, Sinn does not

use the specific words “gangs” or “Vice Lords” but focuses on

the racial difference between the attackers (who were all

black) and those attacked on April 24 (who were all white):

On 4‐24‐14 @ approx 5:30 pm in 11 South I was

jumped and robbed for all my property.

...  

                                                 

4 At his own deposition, Brush did not recall this interaction, but he did

not deny that it happened.
6 No. 18‐1724

I was pulled out by officers and taken to medi‐

cal to be inspected. Following the incident I was

moved to another dorm.

Officers stated to me that they saw who was in‐

volved and who robbed my property. They said

the camera clearly showed it. Yet no actions

were taken due to inconvenience of time and

housing overcrowdedness.  

In the day that followed this incident the other

two white people moved with me were assulted

[sic] again and jumped. Further showing that

the incident followed them to the new dorms. I

have yet to be assulted [sic] again. But I know

it’s coming.

...  

These black inmates had the wide open ability

to have the other two people besides myself

jumped less than 24 hrs after the incident, and

custody again took no action.  

When I am moved from 18 South to BMU or an‐

other idle unit I will be subjected to these assults

[sic]. Assults [sic] I know through experience

that won’t be caught or addressed with proper

attention.  

I will not let myself be put in that vulnerable sit‐

uation. I’m not affaliated [sic]. I am by myself

and I’m a white minority... .  
No. 18‐1724 7

Sinn either placed this letter in Brush’s box or slipped it

under the counselor’s door. The record does not establish ex‐

actly when Brush read Sinn’s letter. Brush does not remember

receiving or reading the letter, but he conceded at his deposi‐

tion that the letter “probably came to [him].” Sinn estimated

that it typically took “two or three days” for a letter to be pro‐

cessed through the prison mail system.

Sinn also communicated his safety concerns in two other

ways. He told Putnamville Sergeant Myers that he was in

danger and needed protection from being assaulted again.

Sinn says Myers told him to simply “deal with it.” Sinn also

filled out a grievance, dated April 28, which stated that he had

been assaulted and robbed on April 24 in 11 South by a “num‐

ber of black gang members” and the “other people involved

[were] being retaliated against.” However, the record does

not establish who received this grievance or when they re‐

ceived it.  

On April 30, 2014, two inmates attacked Sinn in the bath‐

room area of 18 South; as with the earlier assault, no officers

were present. Sinn believed his attackers were gang members

and that they intended to retaliate against him for defending

himself in the first attack. As a result of this assault, Sinn sus‐

tained a broken nose, jaw, and leg. Investigators identified the

assailants as Chauncey Davenport and Marquette Neal; the

IDOC had previously identified Davenport as a gang mem‐

ber. The IDOC placed Davenport and Neal in disciplinary

segregation and referred the case to the internal disciplinary

board as well as the Putnam County Prosecutor. Sinn was ul‐

timately released from IDOC custody in 2015.  
8 No. 18‐1724

B. Procedural Background

Sinn originally filed this action against eighteen defend‐

ants in Marion County Superior Court on May 27, 2015. De‐

fendants removed the case to federal court on September 3,

2015. As relevant here, Sinn alleged Rodgers, Hoskins, Brush,

Knight, and Lemmon all violated the Eighth Amendment by

failing to protect him from gang violence at Putnamville.

While Sinn alleged Rodgers, Hoskins, and Brush were indi‐

vidually responsible for their personal involvement in these

events, he alleged that Lemmon and Knight (as Commis‐

sioner of IDOC and Superintendent of Putnamville, respec‐

tively) were individually liable because they ignored rampant

overcrowding, understaffing, and gang problems at the facil‐

ity.

Approximately six months after Sinn filed the complaint,

all defendants except Brush moved for judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

On January 24, 2017, the district court granted in part and de‐

nied in part this motion. The court dismissed all official ca‐

pacity claims and all individual capacity claims except those

against Brush, Knight, and Lemmon. Relevant here, the court

granted judgment on the pleadings as to Rodgers and

Hoskins because they raised the affirmative defense of quali‐

fied immunity, and Sinn argued “absolutely nothing in re‐

sponse.” The court thus reasoned that Sinn “presumably con‐

cede[d] that [Rodgers and Hoskins were] entitled to qualified

immunity.” On June 22, 2017, Sinn moved for reconsideration

of the dismissal of Rodgers and Hoskins as individual defend‐

ants. The district court denied this motion on October 12,

2017, leaving Brush, Knight, and Lemmon as the only remain‐

ing defendants in the case.
No. 18‐1724 9

On July 14, 2017, these defendants moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted that motion on March 6,

2018. On appeal, Sinn challenges the district court’s decision

to grant judgment on the pleadings as to Rodgers and

Hoskins, and the district court’s decision to grant summary

judgment as to Brush, Knight, and Lemmon.

II. Discussion

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

We review the district court’s grant of judgment on the

pleadings de novo, asking whether the well‐pleaded factual

allegations viewed in favor of the nonmoving party state a fa‐

cially plausible claim for relief. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850

F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017).  

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their con‐

duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu‐

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified im‐

munity is an affirmative defense, and once raised, the plaintiff

bears the burden of defeating it by showing: (1) the defendant

violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation. Archer v.

Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2017). “A failure to show

either is fatal for the plaintiff’s case.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236).  

Sinn admits his brief in response to defendants’ Rule 12(c)

motion did not have a section devoted to the qualified im‐

munity issue. Nevertheless, he argues his brief sufficiently ad‐

dressed the constitutional deprivations Rodgers and Hoskins
10 No. 18‐1724

allegedly caused, and therefore, his claims against these de‐

fendants should not have been dismissed on the pleadings.  

We disagree. In support of their motion for judgment on

the pleadings, Rodgers and Hoskins argued they were not de‐

liberately indifferent to Sinn’s safety and that they were enti‐

tled to qualified immunity. Sinn only responded to the former

argument. The district court granted defendants’ motion spe‐

cifically because Sinn made no attempt to respond to the qual‐

ified immunity point. Sinn moved for reconsideration of this

decision, but again he made no substantive argument about

Rodgers’s and Hoskins’s entitlement to qualified immunity;

instead Sinn argued that this determination was inappropri‐

ate at the Rule 12(c) stage.

Once defendants raised the qualified immunity defense,

even at the pleading stage, it was Sinn’s burden to overcome

it. Archer, 870 F.3d at 613; cf. Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 549

(7th Cir. 2018) (allowing for defendants to assert a qualified

immunity defense at the pleading stage, though noting at this

stage the defense is subject to a more challenging review). De‐

spite Sinn’s arguments on appeal, simply pointing to his com‐

plaint’s allegations was insufficient to meet this burden. Even

assuming the complaint stated a claim that Rodgers’s and

Hoskins’s conduct in transferring Sinn after the first attack vi‐

olated the Constitution, Sinn did not address the “clearly es‐

tablished” prong of qualified immunity in the district court.

See Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 723–24 (7th Cir.

2013) (a plaintiff can show that law is clearly established and

defeat qualified immunity “either by identifying a closely

analogous case or by persuading the court that the conduct is

so egregious and unreasonable that, notwithstanding the lack

of an analogous decision, no reasonable officer could have
No. 18‐1724 11

thought he was acting lawfully”). Sinn may not relitigate this

issue on appeal because he failed to respond to defendants’

arguments on it before the district court. See Ennin v. CNH In‐

dus. Am., LLC, 878 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2017).  

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of judgment

on the pleadings as to Rodgers and Hoskins.

B. Summary Judgment

Sinn also challenges the district court’s conclusions at

summary judgment that Brush, Knight, and Lemmon were

not deliberately indifferent. We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo, interpreting all facts

and drawing allreasonable inferences in favor of the nonmov‐

ing party. Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo‐

vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a).  

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unu‐

sual punishments” obligates prison officials to “take reasona‐

ble measures to guarantee the safety of ... inmates.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amend‐

ment violation, an inmate must show that a defendant was

deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety[.]” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir.

2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

This includes two components: (1) “the harm to which the

prisoner was exposed must be an objectively serious one”;

and (2) judged subjectively, the prison official “must have ac‐

tual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk.” Id.
12 No. 18‐1724

For this second element, “the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan‐

tial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in‐

ference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Defendants do not dispute that the injuries Sinn suffered

from the attack on April 30, 2014 constituted an objectively

serious harm. They instead dispute the second element:

whether Brush, Knight, and Lemmon each had the requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk of that harm to rise to the level

of deliberate indifference.

1. Brush’s Deliberate Indifference

Sinn argues that he complained to Brush about the risk to

his safety and that Brush ignored those complaints. It is un‐

disputed that Brush had an in‐person conversation with Sinn

on April 25 about the first attack and Sinn’s resulting con‐

cerns. Likewise, it is also undisputed that per Brush’s instruc‐

tions, Sinn wrote Brush a letter the next day to further de‐

scribe his concerns and relocation request. Given that Sinn es‐

timated it would take about two days for the letter to arrive

and that Brush was expecting the letter, it is reasonable to in‐

fer that Brush received the letter with enough time before the

second attack on April 30 to read and respond to it. As such,

we may impute knowledge of the April 25 conversation and

the details in Sinn’s letter to Brush in analyzing the reasona‐

bleness of his response. By contrast, there is no evidence to

support any knowledge on Brush’s part of Sinn’s April 28
No. 18‐1724 13

grievance, and we do not address that grievance for purposes

of this analysis.  

According to Sinn, Brush already knew about the attack

by the time the two spoke on the morning of April 25. More‐

over, Sinn told Brush about his concern “[o]f getting beat up

or having to get in an altercation.” He informed Brush that he

wanted to “be moved out of there” soon because he feared an

attack “coming any second” and worried it was “just a matter

of time before they feel like they’re going to move in on [him]

when they see the time is right.” Sinn further emphasized that

Brush “knew the system well enough to know what was

messed up about it” and he knew “how much authority”

gangs had at Putnamville. Indeed, at his deposition, Brush

acknowledged that gangs, including the Vice Lords, were ac‐

tive in Putnamville.

Sinn’s April 26 letter provides even more detail. Sinn no‐

tified Brush that the two other inmates attacked on April 24

were assaulted again after the IDOC relocated them and sug‐

gested that such attacks “show that the incident followed

them to the new dorms.” The swiftness of the second attack

on the other two inmates makes Sinn’s fear of another attack

more credible. See Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481 (noting that the iden‐

tification of “a specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious

harm” helps “support an inference that the official to whom

the complaint was communicated had actual knowledge of

the risk”). Defendants contend that Sinn never referenced

gang activity or gang violence in this letter. However, while

the words “gang” and “Vice Lords” do not appear, Sinn does

mention the “racial diferential [sic] of conflicts here at PCF”

and indicates his status as a “white minority” who is “not af‐
14 No. 18‐1724

faliated [sic]” makes him vulnerable to attack. Sinn’s refer‐

ence to his unaffiliated status in particular shows his fear was

more specific than a general complaint about racial tensions

in prison.5 In short, it is reasonable to infer, based on Brush’s

admitted understanding of gang violence at Putnamville, that

Brush understood Sinn’s letter as describing a fear of retalia‐

tion by the same gang that attacked him on April 24. In re‐

sponse, however, Brush did nothing.  

Nevertheless, Brush insists he did not have the requisite

knowledge to act with deliberate indifference because Sinn’s

complaints lacked sufficient specificity. Although “we have

often found deliberate indifference where custodians know of

threats to a specific detainee posed by a specific source,” we are

not “constrained by this fact pattern.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d

904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[i]t is well settled” that plain‐

tiffs can adequately establish deliberate indifference in cir‐

cumstances where “the specific identity of the ultimate assail‐

ant is not known in advance of assault.” Id. (emphasis added)

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843; Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027,

1032 (7th Cir. 2000); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1238–39

(7th Cir. 1996); Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 549–50 (7th

Cir. 1992); Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1988)).  

This is plain from Farmer’s foundational principles. Farmer

states that an official cannot escape Eighth Amendment liabil‐

ity merely by showing he did not know the inmate “was es‐

pecially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who

eventually committed the assault.” 511 U.S. at 843. This is so

                                                 

5 As defendants’ counsel conceded at oral argument, it is difficult to come

up with a reason for Sinn to say “I’m not affaliated” [sic] in his letter if he

was not alluding to a risk from a gang at Putnamville.  
No. 18‐1724 15

because “it does not matter whether the risk comes from a sin‐

gle source or multiple sources, any more than it matters

whether a prisonerfaces an excessive risk of attack forreasons

personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face

such a risk.” Id. Rather, what matters is the relevant defend‐

ant’s subjective awareness, which includes the inmate’s com‐

plaints along with any other information that defendant may

have. See id. at 842 (a defendant’s actual knowledge “is a ques‐

tion of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, includ‐

ing inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder

may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk

from the very fact that the risk was obvious” (citations omit‐

ted)); see also Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996) (jury

could rely on both testimonial and documentary evidence in

record that defendant‐official had received report of a threat

against plaintiff‐inmate, yet had done nothing in response, to

find deliberate indifference).

To support his argument, Brush relies on several cases in

which we held that inmates’ articulations of perceived threats

were too vague or generalized to establish defendants’ sub‐

jective knowledge. See, e.g., Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569

(7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s statements that other inmates were

“‘pressuring’ him and ‘asking questions’ were simply inade‐

quate to alert the officers to the fact that there was a true threat

at play”); Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir.

2008) (inmate’s statements to guards expressing fear for his

life without identifying who was threatening him or what the

threats were and requesting a relocation were insufficient to

alert guards to specific threat); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d

763, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2008) (deliberate indifference claim did

not prevail on summary judgment despite inmate’s four trips

to emergency room for injuries consistent with assaults and
16 No. 18‐1724

despite inmate’s requests for relocation to a “safer” block be‐

cause inmate never told prison officials about “a tangible

threat to his safety or wellbeing”); Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d

549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) (inmate did not show defendants had

specific knowledge of threat where, after first attack and be‐

fore second attack, he did not “specifically seek protection

from the two inmates who assaulted him ..., identify the

twenty gang members who threatened him ..., or inform au‐

thorities of the threats which were made against him”). How‐

ever, our analysis in those cases about the specificity of the

inmate’s complaint was but one part of the greater analysis

regarding the defendants’ subjective knowledge.  

Here, Sinn presented evidence that Brush was aware of the

general patterns of gang violence at Putnamville and had in‐

dependent knowledge of the April 24 gang‐member attack on

Sinn. The morning of April 25, Sinn and Brush discussed the

attack and Sinn explained his desire to be moved for fear of

another attack. And on April 26, Sinn sent Brush a letter ex‐

plaining that the other two inmates attacked on April 24 were

attacked again in their new dorms and reiterating his desire

for an immediate transfer given his fear of attack based on his

unaffiliated status. It is thus reasonable to infer that Brush

knew about a specific risk Sinn faced of the Vice Lords attack‐

ing him again. This is so even though Brush may not have

known who the individual attackers would be. Sinn has there‐

fore raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Brush had sub‐

jective knowledge that Sinn faced a substantial risk of harm

before the second attack on April 30, 2014.

2. Brush’s Qualified Immunity

Brush argues that he is still entitled to qualified immunity

because “no reasonable official in [his] position would have
No. 18‐1724 17

known that not immediately responding to Sinn’s letter vio‐

lated the Eighth Amendment.” He contends Sinn’s com‐

plaints were too generalized and “contained none of the hall‐

marks” of successful failure‐to‐protect claims.  

This argument takes too narrow a view of failure‐to‐pro‐

tect claims. The reason the specificity of an inmate’s complaint

matters is because that complaint is often the only infor‐

mation a prison official has of the treatment or conditions the

inmate is experiencing. Failure‐to‐protect claims are predi‐

cated on a prison official’s subjective knowledge, though, not

just the ability of an inmate to write detailed complaints. See

Brown, 398 F.3d at 915–16 (claims that custodial officers knew

about inmate’s violent propensities and history of attacking

other inmates were sufficient to allege that they “were aware

of an excessive risk” posed to the plaintiff who was ultimately

attacked by that inmate). Framed this way, it is clearly estab‐

lished that a prison official’s knowledge of prevalent gang vi‐

olence, a prior attack on an inmate by gang members, and the

victim’s fear of a retaliatory attack by other gang members in

a new dorm, supported by evidence that related victims from

the first attack had already been attacked a second time after

being relocated, necessitates that the prison official reasona‐

bly respond to abate that risk of harm to the victim. See, e.g.,

Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481–82 (plaintiff adduced sufficient evi‐

dence of prison official’s actual knowledge by testifying he in‐

formed defendants of the identity of the person who threat‐

ened him, the nature of the threat, and enough context to ren‐

der the threats plausible). Here, it is reasonable to infer that

Brush had such knowledge but took no responsive action. It

is well‐settled, clearly established law that such a failure con‐

stitutes deliberate indifference. See id. at 484–85 (rejecting a

qualified immunity defense). Thus, construing all facts in
18 No. 18‐1724

Sinn’s favor, Brush is not entitled to qualified immunity, and

we reverse and remand the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Sinn’s deliberate indifference claim as to Brush.  

3. Knight’s and Lemmon’s Deliberate Indifference

Sinn acknowledges that Stanley Knight and Bruce Lem‐

mon—the former Putnamville Superintendent and former

IDOC Commissioner—may not have known about his indi‐

vidual circumstances. Notwithstanding this fact, he argues

they should be held liable as supervisors for deliberate indif‐

ference because they were aware of unsafe conditions at Put‐

namville and did nothing to remedy those issues or to ensure

that prison officials followed policy. Putnamville had several

systemic issues: overcrowding and understaffing, lack of sur‐

veillance monitoring, and rampant gang activity. Sinn argues

that the combined effect of these issues made the prison a fer‐

tile ground for violence, and that the risk of harm to inmates

in open dormitories was so obvious that Knight and Lem‐

mon’s failure to abate that risk with policy enforcement or de‐

velopment constituted deliberate indifference.

Individual defendants like Knight and Lemmon, who are

responsible for setting prison policy, can be held liable for a

constitutional violation if they are “aware of ‘a systematic

lapse in enforcement’ of a policy critical to ensuring inmate

safety” yet fail to enforce that policy. Steidl v. Gramley, 151

F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d

646, 652 (7th Cir. 1988)). But an inmate cannot show a “wide‐

spread practice of an unconstitutional nature,” such as a cus‐

tom of ignoring prison policy, by pointing to “isolated inci‐

dents of inmate‐on‐inmate brutality.” Palmer v. Marion

County, 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003); see Smith v. Sangamon

Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t, 715 F.3d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A risk
No. 18‐1724 19

of serious harm may be shown ... by evidence of ‘a series of

bad acts’ that ‘the policymaking level of government was

bound to have noticed,’ like a pervasive pattern of assaults or

the existence of an identifiable group of prisoners at particular

risk of assault.” (quoting Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v.

County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000)) (citing Walsh

v. Brewer, 733 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1984))).  

We agree with defendants that Sinn did not present evi‐

dence of a history or pattern of violence at Putnamville such

that a jury could infer a level of gang violence so pervasive

that Knight and Lemmon actually knew of a substantial risk

of harm to inmates. Sinn offers only limited evidence on this

topic: (1) his own affidavit about observing regular violence

in the absence of guards; (2) the affidavit of Mitchell Barnes,

an inmate at Putnamville for some unknown time that in‐

cluded April 24–30, 2014, who similarly saw daily fights and

a dearth of correctional officers; and (3) a report by Sinn’s ex‐

pert, who concluded that policy failures and bad practices

caused Sinn’s injuries.6 Evidence of what Sinn observed and

experienced over the course of his time at Putnamville, how‐

ever, even when bolstered by Barnes’s similar observations

and an expert report that determined a causal link between

the alleged failures and harm, is more akin to evidence of iso‐

lated incidents than it is proof of widespread unconstitutional

practices. See Smith, 715 F.3d at 192; Palmer, 327 F.3d at 597.  

                                                 

6 Sinn also included a declaration of Matthew Dunham, who worked at

Putnamville from 2009 to 2012, and a declaration of Kandi Northcutt, who

trained at Putnamville for one month in 2016; however, neither individual

has knowledge of the relevant time period here.
20 No. 18‐1724

Moreover, as defendants point out, even if Sinn could es‐

tablish that Knight and Lemmon were aware that prison over‐

crowding, gang violence, and understaffing created unsafe

prison conditions, there is evidence that reasonable steps

were being taken to address these issues. Namely, the IDOC

continues to recruit qualified personnel to fill its vacancies;

the IDOC’s zero‐tolerance policy on gang activity requires

staff to be trained on procedures to identify and monitor gang

members so that housing assignments can be made accord‐

ingly; Putnamville has an STG (gang) coordinator; and the

IDOC informs inmates how to report gang problems.

Therefore, no reasonable jury could infer that Knight and

Lemmon were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

harm to inmates like Sinn. We affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment as to these defendants.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of judg‐

ment on the pleadings as to Rodgers and Hoskins, AFFIRM the

grant of summary judgment as to Knight and Lemmon, but

REVERSE and REMAND the grant of summary judgment as to

Brush.