1 

2023 IL App (5th) 220266-U 

NO. 5-22-0266 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19-CF-257 

 ) 

PERCY FREEMAN, ) Honorable 

 ) Nancy S. Fahey, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and where no argument for the defendant could possibly have 

arguable merit, the defendant’s court-appointed appellate attorney is granted leave 

to withdraw as counsel, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial in 2021, the defendant, Percy Freeman, was found guilty of 

intentional first degree murder, under an accountability theory. Subsequently, he was sentenced 

to imprisonment for 40 years. He now appeals from the judgment of conviction. His appointed 

attorney on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this 

appeal lacks arguable merit. On that basis, OSAD has filed with this court a motion to withdraw 

as counsel, along with a brief in support thereof. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

OSAD has served the defendant with a copy of its Anders motion and brief. In response, the 

NOTICE

Decision filed 06/12/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

defendant has mailed to this court a letter that amounts to an objection to OSAD’s Anders motion. 

Having examined OSAD’s motion and brief, the defendant’s written objection, and the entire 

record on appeal, this court agrees with OSAD that this appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, OSAD 

is granted leave to withdraw as counsel on appeal, and the judgment of conviction, entered by the 

circuit court of Vermilion County, is affirmed.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The defendant was charged with four counts of first degree murder—intentional (720 ILCS 

5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)), knowing (id.), strong-probability (id. § 9-1(a)(2)), and felony (id. § 9-

1(a)(3))—and one count of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(c)). The predicate felony for felony 

murder was “robbery or mob action.” The aggravating factor in the battery was that it occurred 

on a public way. Roosevelt Anderson was the named victim in each of the five counts. Anderson 

was shot once in the head, at very close range, resulting in his death. The State’s theory of the 

case was that the defendant had worked in concert with Denzel Aldridge, Tariq Wilson, Tavares 

Mitchell, and Micah Hatcher, and that Aldridge was the one who had actually fired the shot.

¶ 5 Pretrial

¶ 6 At first, the public defender was appointed to represent the defendant in this case. 

However, every attorney in the public defender’s office had a conflict of interest, and that office 

filed for the appointment of a conflicts public defender. A conflicts public defender was appointed

as defense counsel. Through counsel, the defendant filed a notice of affirmative defense, stating 

that, at trial, he intended to rely on the defense of self-defense.

¶ 7 The case was placed on Judge Hall’s docket. On December 23, 2020, shortly afterward, 

the defendant, by counsel, filed a motion for substitution of judge. In that motion, the defendant 

claimed that Judge Hall was so prejudiced against him that he could not receive a fair trial, and he 
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requested an automatic substitution. See 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2020). The case was 

reassigned to Judge Fahey. No additional motion for substitution of judge was filed.

¶ 8 Pretrial: Waiver of Right to Trial by Jury 

¶ 9 On January 11, 2021, the defendant, defense counsel, and two prosecutors appeared before 

the circuit court, Judge Fahey presiding. Defense counsel announced that the defendant would be 

waiving his right to a trial by jury and wanted a bench trial. The court proceeded to admonish the 

defendant regarding his jury-trial right. 

¶ 10 Placed under oath, the defendant stated his name, and that he was 28 years old and lived in 

Chicago, where he had lived his whole life. He indicated that he had graduated from high school, 

that he could read and write the English language, that he was unaware of any disabilities, that he 

was not taking any medication, that he was thinking clearly and was able to make an important 

decision in this case, and that he had had sufficient time to discuss, with his attorney, the issue of 

waiving a jury trial.

¶ 11 The court asked the defendant to define jury trial, and the defendant answered, “12 people 

decide guilty or not guilty, give a verdict.” The court then asked the defendant to define bench 

trial, and the defendant answered, “Leave that to the judge to decide the verdict.” The court 

informed the defendant that he, at either type of trial, had the right to be present with his attorney 

and that he could cross-examine the State’s witnesses, call his own witnesses, and present his own 

evidence, but could not be forced to testify against himself. “And the State has to prove the charges 

by [sic] beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court stated. “Do you understand that concept?” The 

defendant answered, “Yes, yes.” The court asked a second time whether the defendant understood 

that if he waived his right to a jury, the court would be “the one making the decision in your case,” 

and the defendant answered in the affirmative.
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¶ 12 Finally, the defendant indicated, in answer to the court’s questions, that no one had 

promised him anything in order to persuade him to waive a jury trial, that no one had forced him 

to waive, that he was doing so freely and voluntarily, and that he did not have any questions about 

waiver. The defendant signed a jury waiver. The case was scheduled for bench trial.

¶ 13 Trial

¶ 14 In April 2021, the case was called for bench trial. Judge Fahey presided. 

¶ 15 The crimes charged here were allegedly committed in a public-housing complex called Fair 

Oaks, located on the east side of Danville, Illinois. Maps and other evidence admitted at trial 

showed that Fair Oaks was a fairly small, rather compact housing complex. To the south, the Fair 

Oaks property was bounded by an east-west roadway named Fairchild Street. To the west, the 

property was bounded by a north-south roadway named Fowler Avenue. (It was in the 

southwestern quadrant of Fair Oaks that most of the key activity relevant to the alleged crimes 

occurred.) From the corner of Fairchild Street and Fowler Avenue, and moving east on Fairchild

Street, one encountered Hubbard Lane, Redden Court, and Lewis Lane, in that order. Hubbard 

Lane, Redden Court, and Lewis Lane were very small streets, no larger than alleyways, and they 

extended straight north into the Fair Oaks property, but dead-ended at Fairchild Street. Clyman 

Lane was an east-west roadway in the northern reaches of Fair Oaks, which intersected Fowler

Avenue and the three smaller streets, i.e., Hubbard Lane, Redden Court, and Lewis Lane. A blocklong rectangular parking lot was in the southwestern quadrant of Fair Oaks. The parking lot was

approximately one-half block north of Fairchild Street, and it was between Hubbard Lane (to the 

west) and Redden Court (to the east). The housing in Fair Oaks consisted of approximately 26 

long, narrow, two-story brick buildings. Each building contained five or six two-story apartments. 
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Sometimes, the fronts of these rectangular buildings faced one another, at a distance, thus forming 

courtyards, which were covered in grass. 

¶ 16 At the bench trial, the State called several witnesses. However, the star “witness” turned 

out to be the Fair Oaks video surveillance system, the fruits of which will be described in detail

infra. 

¶ 17 Trial: The State’s Case in Chief: Witnesses, and Other Non-Video Evidence

¶ 18 Jada Coley testified, for the State, that she knew the defendant, and that she recalled the 

day that a man named Roosevelt Anderson was shot in Fair Oaks. On that day, she was driving 

her burgundy-colored car. At one point, she was in her burgundy car along with a male cousin. 

Her car was stopped on Fairchild Street when the defendant asked Coley to take him to Casey’s, 

on Main Street, where they had a special price on cigarettes. The defendant got into her car through 

a back door. Coley drove her cousin and the defendant to a parking lot on the Fair Oaks property. 

(That is, the parking lot that was one-half block north of Fairchild Street, between Hubbard Lane

and Redden Court.) She stopped the car in the lot, without actually parking it. Coley’s cousin got 

out of her car through the front passenger door and went to an apartment to fetch his identification 

card. However, the cousin did not soon return, and Coley finally decided to park her car. The 

defendant was sitting in the back seat. Then, the defendant, without saying anything to her, got 

out of her car. Coley did not know why the defendant had gotten out. Sometime thereafter, Coley

herself got out of her burgundy car and “sat inside.” Later, she heard that a person had been shot

at Fair Oaks, and that a dead body was lying on the ground. Coley did not see the defendant for 

the remainder of the day. 

¶ 19 Monty Schroeder testified for the State that he performed repairs and maintenance at the 

properties of the Vermilion County Housing Authority, including the Fair Oaks apartment 
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complex. On April 24, 2019, at approximately 1:45 p.m., he was at Fair Oaks, installing weather 

stripping on the back door of an apartment. He was standing very near the apartment’s doorway

when he saw a group of four men on a sidewalk. “[A]bout 20 feet” separated Schroeder from that 

group of four men. Three of these men “was [sic] kind of coming around” the other man, who 

was holding something close to his midsection, clutching it with both hands. Schroeder continued 

working. The man who was clutching something to his midsection “kept saying no.” He said 

other things, and there was “some shouting coming from them,” but all of that was unintelligible 

to Schroeder, due to his distance from the men and due to traffic noise from nearby Fairchild Street. 

Schroeder could not identify any of these four men. However, one of the men—not the one holding 

something close to his midsection—was wearing “a white hooded sweatshirt with red dots on it.” 

As these four men were “messing around,” another man, wearing “a long black coat,” walked up 

to them, saw what was happening, and then walked away, out of Schroeder’s sight. 

¶ 20 According to Schroeder, the man wearing the white hooded sweatshirt then stood apart 

from the other three, who continued grappling. He saw this man “raise a gun up.” One of those 

three men who were grappling—though not the man who held something to his midsection— 

stepped away. Schroeder, for fear of the gun, retreated into the apartment, locked the door, and 

called 911. He walked into a bathroom very near the backdoor, looked out the window, and 

described for the 911 operator all that he saw. At this point, Schroeder saw just three men—the 

man wearing the white hoodie, who held the gun, and two others, one of whom was “on” the other. 

The three men had moved onto the roadway by then. “[T]hey started hitting him in the back of 

the head with the gun.” The three men together moved behind Schroeder’s truck, blocking his 

view of them. Then, Schroeder heard a single, loud gunshot. He saw a man’s legs lying in the 

roadway, but he could not see the rest of the man’s body due to his truck. He also saw the two 
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men who were with the victim at the time of the gunshot “back up the sidewalk.” The man who 

was lying in the roadway was the man who had been holding something close to his midsection

and repeatedly saying “no.” He never saw this man make any threatening moves.

¶ 21 Testimonial and other evidence at trial showed that Danville police arrived on the scene 

almost immediately after the shooting. A black man, later identified as Roosevelt Anderson, was 

lying supine in the middle of a roadway. Anderson was breathing but was nonresponsive. On his 

person, he carried a standard magazine of a firearm, full of what appeared to be live rounds of .45-

caliber. When Anderson’s body was lifted from the roadway, a spent shell casing—an RP brand 

.380-caliber—was observed in the roadway where his body had been. Also found at the scene, 

near Anderson’s head, was a black Moto cell phone. Anderson later died.

¶ 22 Approximately two hours after Anderson was shot, Danville police executed a search 

warrant for the apartment at 911 Fowler Avenue in Fair Oaks. On the first floor of that apartment, 

inside a baby stroller, police found a pair of black athletic pants. Nearby, at the bottom of a plastic 

trash can, they found a black T-shirt and a distinctive white hoodie sweatshirt that was adorned, 

throughout, with small red-white-and-blue circular NASA logos. On the second floor of that 

apartment, in the bathroom, they found a SIG Sauer .380-caliber handgun. It was lying at the 

bottom of a small trash can, underneath a trash liner.

¶ 23 At trial, the parties stipulated that the shell casing found underneath Anderson’s body had 

been fired from the SIG Sauer handgun found in the second-floor bathroom at 911 Fowler Avenue. 

There was a stipulation that this handgun had the DNA of Denzel Aldridge on it. There was also 

a stipulation that Anderson had died from a gunshot wound to the head. As for the Moto cell 

phone, the defendant later admitted that it was his.
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¶ 24 Detective Patrick Carley, of the Danville Police Department, testified for the State. 

According to Detective Carley, he reviewed surveillance video that was recorded by cameras 

positioned throughout the Fair Oaks public-housing complex. All of that surveillance video was 

recorded on April 24, 2019, the date that Roosevelt Anderson was shot. From the surveillance 

video, Carley pulled video clips that showed activity relevant to the shooting. These video clips 

were admitted into evidence and published to the court. The clips were essentially in chronological 

order, and they will be discussed in that same manner here. The surveillance video was timestamped, but it did not include audio.

¶ 25 Detective Carley further testified that prior to the day Anderson was shot, he had seen the 

defendant, as well as Denzel Aldridge, Tariq Wilson, Tavares Mitchell, and Micah Hatcher, on 

numerous occasions at the Fair Oaks complex. He had spoken with all five of them. All five either 

lived at Fair Oaks or would “hang out” there. When the prosecutor asked Carley whether all five 

would “hang out together,” Carley answered in the affirmative. In regard to the defendant in 

particular, Carley had had fewer contacts with him—approximately “five to ten”—and had spoken 

with him on fewer occasions—“three or four”—than with those other four men. 

¶ 26 Detective Carley identified a still photograph, captured from surveillance video on the day 

Anderson was shot. This photo was time-stamped 11:57:57 a.m. The source of the photo was a 

camera positioned a few yards north of Fairchild Street itself and pointed southward (and slightly 

to the west). Depicted in the photo was a portion of Fairchild Street—the two-lane, east-west 

roadway that forms the southern boundary of Fair Oaks. The photo showed Fairchild Street from 

its intersection with Redden Court (to the east, or left, in the photo) to the area approximately 

halfway between Redden Court and Hubbard Lane (to the west). The photo also showed the area

on the opposite side (i.e., the south side) of Fairchild Street, where Netta’s convenience store was 
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located (at the upper-right of the photo) along with Netta’s parking lot (to the east, or left, of 

Netta’s itself).

¶ 27 In the photo, seven younger men were standing near one another on the sidewalk of 

Fairchild Street, on the Fair Oaks side (nearer the camera). Among those seven younger men were

three whom Detective Carley identified as the defendant, Tariq Wilson, and Denzel Aldridge. The 

defendant was dressed in a black hoodie, black jeans, and dark shoes. Wilson was dressed in a 

black hoodie, faded blue jeans, and darker-colored shoes. Aldridge was dressed in a distinctive 

white hoodie with designs throughout, and ankle-length black athletic pants, with a pair of kneelength black gym shorts, with a white stripe down each side, over the longer athletic pants. 

Aldridge also wore white gym shoes. Of the seven young men present on the sidewalk, Aldridge 

was clearly the tallest. In the photo, the defendant and Wilson were only about six feet apart, 

facing one other. 

¶ 28 Detective Carley testified that the defendant was on that portion of Fairchild Street, just 

milling about, for almost all of a 90-minute time period that day. Aldridge and Wilson, as well as 

Tavares Mitchell, were also milling about on that portion of Fairchild Street at the time.

¶ 29 Trial: The State’s Case in Chief: Surveillance Video

¶ 30 Next, Detective Carley identified the first of many video clips that the State showed at trial. 

The first clip started at 12:33:32 p.m. It showed the same portion of Fairchild Street that was 

depicted in the photograph, with Netta’s convenience store and parking lot on the opposite side

(i.e., the south side) of the street. At its start, the video showed a group of three men—the 

defendant, Tariq Wilson, and another man—standing very near one another on the sidewalk of 

Fairchild Street, on the Fair Oaks side of that street, nearer the camera. The defendant, Wilson, 

and the other man appeared to be talking to one another. At one point, the defendant appeared to 
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remove a cell phone from a pocket of his black hoodie and look at it for a few seconds. Six seconds 

into this video, another group of three men—including Denzel Aldridge, with his distinctive white 

hoodie—walked west (i.e., to the right in the video) down the sidewalk on Fairchild Street, and 

they joined the defendant, Wilson, and the other man. A second later, a gray passenger car, 

described by Detective Carley as a Pontiac G6, drove east (i.e., to the left in the video) on Fairchild 

Street and pulled into the parking lot of Netta’s convenience store, where it stopped. Apparently, 

the defendant noticed the gray car, for he immediately walked across Fairchild Street to Netta’s 

parking lot and got into the car through the front passenger door. Five seconds later, the car drove 

off the parking lot and headed east (left) on Fairchild Street. Nobody inside the gray car was 

visible on video. This clip lasted exactly one minute, ending at 12:34:32 p.m.

¶ 31 A video clip starting at 1:37:51 p.m. was recorded by a camera positioned on a building in 

the northwestern part of Fair Oaks and pointing to the northwest. The clip showed a long stretch 

of Fowler Avenue, the north-south street that forms the western boundary of Fair Oaks. According 

to Detective Carley, this clip included the first glimpse of Roosevelt Anderson on the Fair Oaks

surveillance-camera system. The clip showed the defendant walking south on Fowler Street near 

its intersection with English Street, a bit north of the Fair Oaks complex. A gray Pontiac G6, 

traveling south on Fowler Avenue, pulled up next to Anderson, and Anderson stopped for the gray 

car. Anderson and the gray car were paused near one another for approximately 15 seconds—

from approximately 1:38:10 p.m. to approximately 1:38:25 p.m. Afterward, the car continued its 

southbound drive, and Anderson continued his southbound walk. The car drove out of camera 

range at 1:38:36 p.m. Anderson walked out of camera range at approximately 1:39:06 p.m. This 

clip ended at 1:39:35 p.m. 
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¶ 32 Two short video clips—one starting at 1:38:38 p.m., and the other ending at 1:39:02 p.m.—

showed a gray car moving south on Fowler Avenue. (Nobody inside the car was visible in the 

video.) Detective Carley testified that this gray car was the same gray Pontiac G6 that had recently 

stopped near Anderson on Fowler Avenue, and that the defendant had entered Netta’s parking lot, 

a little more than one hour earlier. At the intersection of Fowler Avenue and Fairchild Street, the 

gray car slowed, then turned left (i.e., east) onto Fairchild Street, at approximately 1:38:58 p.m.

¶ 33 A video clip starting at 1:38:53 p.m. showed again that portion of Fairchild Street at its 

intersection with Redden Lane (to the east, or left in the video), with Netta’s convenience store on 

the other side of the street. At the start of that video, a burgundy-colored passenger car was stopped 

on Fairchild Street, in the east-bound lane, just next to Netta’s parking lot. The defendant was at 

the driver’s door, but he soon entered the burgundy car through the rear door on the driver’s side. 

(In this clip and in all subsequent clips, the defendant was wearing white shoes. In previous clips, 

he had been wearing dark shoes. Otherwise, his clothing—a black hoodie and black jeans—

remained the same.) The burgundy car took off and immediately turned to its left (i.e., north) onto 

Redden Court. As the burgundy car departed the east-bound lane of Fairchild Street, for its turn 

onto Redden Court, a gray car drove east (i.e., to the left in the video) on Fairchild Street and onto 

the parking lot of Netta’s. The gray car appeared on Fairchild Street at about 1:39:04 p.m. 

According to Detective Carley, it was the same gray Pontiac G6 seen in previous videos. The 

driver’s door of the gray car opened, but nobody exited. Again, nobody inside the car was visible

on video. A small group of people standing on Fairchild Street, on the Fair Oaks side, had been 

largely obscured by trees. Then, one member of this group, Tariq Wilson, stepped out from the 

trees and appeared to talk with the gray car’s driver, across the street. Tariq Wilson, Denzel 

Aldridge, and Tavares Mitchell then walked away from the small group they were with, and the 
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three began to walk west (i.e., to the right) on Fairchild Street, toward Hubbard Lane, as the gray 

car drove off Netta’s lot and appeared to turn around and head west on Fairchild Street. The pace 

of the action picks up at this point. This video lasted 50 seconds, ending at 1:39:43. 

¶ 34 A video clip starting at 1:39:46 p.m. was taken by a camera on Hubbard Lane, pointing 

south onto Fairchild Street. Hubbard Lane is a very narrow street, entirely within the Fair Oaks 

property. Hubbard Lane is one (short) block east of Fowler Avenue; Redden Court is one block 

east of Hubbard Lane. Tariq Wilson, Denzel Aldridge, and Tavares Mitchell are seen on this video 

less than five seconds after they left their small group on Fairchild Street and began to walk west. 

First, Wilson was seen running west on Fairchild Street. Then, about four seconds into the clip—

i.e., at about 1:39:50—Aldridge is seen walking west on Fairchild Street and turning north (right)

onto Hubbard Lane. At 1:39:54 p.m., Aldridge starts running northbound on Hubbard Lane. 

Finally, Tavares Mitchell was seen walking west on Fairchild Street, but as he crossed Hubbard 

Lane, he began to run. 

¶ 35 In a clip starting at 1:39:52 p.m., and lasting just about 25 seconds, Tariq Wilson is first 

seen walking west on Fairchild Street, toward Fowler Avenue. A gray car—the same gray Pontiac 

G6 that appeared in other clips, according to Detective Carley—is driving west on Fairchild, at 

approximately Wilson’s speed. When Wilson reaches the intersection with Fowler Avenue, he 

turns north (right) onto Fowler, and the gray car does likewise. After the turn, Wilson begins to 

run up Fowler Avenue. Three seconds after Wilson is out of sight, Tavares Mitchell is seen 

running west on Fairchild Street. At the intersection with Fowler Avenue, he stopped and looked 

north, where Wilson had run. A second later, he turned around and walked east on Fairchild Street. 

This video clip ended at 1:40:18. 
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¶ 36 The clip starting at 1:40:18 p.m. was taken by the camera positioned in Hubbard Lane and 

pointing south onto Fairchild Street. It showed Tavares Mitchell walking east on Fairchild Street 

and crossing Hubbard Lane. However, Mitchell then stops, looks north, up Hubbard Lane, and 

begins to walk north on Hubbard, apparently waving or pointing at someone for just a moment. 

This clip ended at 1:40:46. 

¶ 37 A clip starting at 1:39:21 p.m. showed the block-long rectangular parking lot between 

Hubbard Lane (to the west) and Redden Court (to the east). The parking lot was a half-block north 

of Fairchild Street. The camera was positioned south of the parking lot, and it pointed northwest. 

The clip began with a view of the back end of the apartment building at Hubbard Lane—i.e., the 

apartments with front doors and addresses on Fowler Avenue, but with their back doors on 

Hubbard Lane—and two rows of apartment building, between Hubbard Lane and Redden Court,

which faced one another at a distance and formed a courtyard, covered in grass with numerous 

trees. Near the start of this clip, a burgundy-colored passenger car drove west across the parking 

lot, from Redden Court toward Hubbard Lane, and stopped near the row of apartments at Hubbard 

Lane. Detective Carley described it as the same burgundy car that the defendant had entered

through a rear door near the beginning of the video that started at 1:38:53 p.m. (So, the burgundy 

car on Fairchild Street had turned left onto Redden Court, proceeded north on Redden Court, and 

crossed the parking lot in approximately 15 seconds.) A young man got out of the front passenger 

seat of the burgundy car and ran south toward the camera, out of the camera’s range. About 37 

seconds into the video—or at about 1:39:58 p.m.—Denzel Aldridge was seen running north on 

Hubbard Lane. He ran to the back door of an apartment, and he entered the apartment through that 

back door at approximately 1:40:05 p.m. Detective Carley testified that that apartment’s address 

was 911 Fowler Avenue. Approximately six seconds later, Tariq Wilson was seen running from 
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the west (i.e., away from Fowler Avenue) along the south end of the apartment building, where he 

turned north (i.e., to his left) onto Hubbard Lane. He entered that same apartment through the 

same back door. That clip ended at 1:40:21 p.m. 

¶ 38 A camera positioned on Hubbard Lane gave a much closer view of Aldridge and Wilson 

as they entered the apartment at 911 Fowler Avenue through the back door. In a clip starting at 

1:39:58 p.m., Aldridge was seen running north on Hubbard Lane and then entering the back door 

of the apartment at approximately 1:40:05 p.m. Several seconds later, Wilson entered the same 

apartment. In addition, this clip showed Aldridge and Wilson as they departed from the apartment, 

approximately 30 seconds after Wilson had entered it. In other words, Aldridge and Wilson exited

the apartment at approximately 1:40:40 p.m., walking out the back door and walking southbound 

on Hubbard Lane. Aldridge continued to wear his distinctive white hoodie, along with black pants, 

black shorts, and white shoes, and Wilson wore his same black hoodie and faded blue jeans. This 

video ended at 1:40:50 p.m. 

¶ 39 At 1:39:39 p.m., another clip showed the alleged victim, Roosevelt Anderson, as he walked 

southbound on Fowler Avenue, the western boundary of Fair Oaks. Anderson is walking past the 

northern part of Fair Oaks. He is dressed all in black, including a black hat. He has a distinctive 

stride, with arms swinging. When Anderson reaches the intersection of Fowler Avenue and 

Clyman Lane, he turns east (i.e., left) onto Clyman Lane. Thus, Anderson enters the Fair Oaks 

property through Clyman Lane, on the property’s north side. As Anderson approached Clyman 

Lane, and as he turned east onto it, a gray car headed north on Fowler Avenue and passed him. 

Detective Carley testified that it was the same gray Pontiac G6 observed in other video clips. The 

gray car passed Anderson at approximately 1:40:16 p.m.
15 

¶ 40 A clip starting at 1:40:21 p.m. again showed the block-long parking lot between Hubbard 

Lane (to the west) and Redden Court (to the east), a little north of Fairchild Street. It, too, was 

recorded by a camera positioned south of the lot, facing northwest. The burgundy-colored 

passenger car remained stopped at Hubbard Lane, facing Hubbard Lane. Two seconds later, the 

car starts to back up and heads into a parking space on the southwest side of the lot. Just after the 

burgundy car is parked—which is to say, at 1:40:40 p.m.—Denzel Aldridge and Tariq Wilson are 

seen walking out the back door of the apartment they had entered and heading south on Hubbard 

Street. After walking approximately 40 feet to the end of the apartment building, they (more or 

less) stop in the grassy area to the south of the building. After a few seconds, Aldridge and Wilson 

are joined by Tavares Mitchell. At approximately 1:41:14 p.m., Wilson, Mitchell, and Aldridge 

start running eastward across the middle of the parking lot (i.e., from Hubbard Lane toward Redden 

Court). They ran past the burgundy car, to their right. Wilson turned around for a couple of 

seconds, facing in the direction of the car, while continuing to run eastward. Then, they slow to a 

walk a bit more than halfway through the lot. As those three slowed to a walk, the defendant 

reappeared when he got out of the burgundy car, using the driver’s side rear door—at 

approximately 1:41:23 p.m.—and ran eastward after Wilson, Mitchell, and Aldridge. This clip 

ended at 1:41:30 p.m. 

¶ 41 At approximately 1:40:42 p.m., a video showed Roosevelt Anderson striding eastward 

across a playground on the Fair Oaks property. The playground was situated between Hubbard 

Lane (to the west) and Redden Court (to the east), and was just a little south of Clyman Lane, the 

route that Anderson had used to enter Fair Oaks property. Anderson was dressed all in black, 

including a black hat with his black hood up.
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¶ 42 A video clip starting at 1:41:18 p.m. was recorded on a camera positioned to the north of 

the Hubbard Lane—Redden Court parking lot, facing south. In that clip, Wilson, Mitchell, 

Aldridge, and the defendant completed their eastward walk-run across the parking lot (moving 

from right to left in the video). By the end, they were all walking eastbound (i.e., to the left). 

Mitchell was the first to cross Redden Court, a very narrow street. The other three men—Wilson, 

Aldridge, and the defendant—were walking side-by-side as they crossed Redden Court. This clip 

ended at 1:41:40 p.m.

¶ 43 A clip starting at 1:41:28 p.m. showed the four men as they continued their eastbound walk

(from right to left, in the video). The camera that recorded this clip was positioned to show the 

southern part of Redden Court, Redden Court’s intersection with Fairchild Street (approximately 

one-half block to the south), and Netta’s convenience store and parking lot beyond Fairchild Street

to the south. With Tavares Mitchell leading the way, and the other three men—Wilson, Aldridge, 

and the defendant—walking side-by-side, a few feet behind Mitchell, they all crossed Redden 

Court. Then they passed by the narrow end of an apartment building. (By examining one of the 

maps of Fair Oaks that were admitted into evidence, it becomes clear that the men, at this point, 

were actually walking through the rather-narrow-and-short space between two different apartment 

buildings.) Then, the defendant raised his arm and pointed toward the south, toward Fairchild 

Street; Wilson walked back toward Redden Court and looked south for a moment, but then 

continued eastward with the other men. This clip lasted only 22 seconds, ending at 1:41:50 p.m. 

This clip provided the last (good) look at Tariq Wilson on video. Each of the other three men—

the defendant, Denzel Aldridge, and Tavares Mitchell—clearly appears in subsequent videos, but 

Wilson does not.
17 

¶ 44 Reference to a map of Fair Oaks, admitted into evidence, also makes clear that after 

walking through the rather-narrow-and-short space between two apartment buildings, one enters 

into the southwestern portion of a rectangular courtyard that stretches approximately 21⁄2 blocks 

north-to-south, and is approximately half-a-block wide. This courtyard is formed by apartment 

buildings that face one another. The courtyard is between Redden Court (to the west) and Lewis 

Lane (to the east), and between Fairchild Street (to the south) and Clyman Lane (to the north). A 

sidewalk runs down the middle of the courtyard, north to south. A surveillance camera was located 

in the southeastern portion of the courtyard, and it pointed to the northwest. 

¶ 45 A video clip starting at 1:41:12 p.m. showed this courtyard. That is, it showed most of this 

courtyard, which was covered in grass with only one tree visible. The space between apartment 

buildings, which one could use to enter this courtyard at the southwest, was not in the camera’s 

range. Approximately 25 seconds into this video—that is, at about 1:41:37 p.m.—Roosevelt 

Anderson can be glimpsed in the northwestern part of the courtyard, as he walked in a southeasterly 

direction, across the grass. Eventually, he made his way onto the sidewalk that ran down the 

middle of the courtyard, and he strode southward, swinging his arms. At 1:41:57 p.m., with 

Anderson still walking south on the sidewalk, the defendant appeared, walking northward on that 

same sidewalk. A second or two after the defendant appeared on the video, Denzel Aldridge 

appeared. Aldridge, too, was walking north, but he was far to the left of the defendant, staying 

close to the apartment building that helped to delimit the left (i.e., west) side of the courtyard. 

Seven or eight seconds after the defendant appeared (on video) in the courtyard, Tavares Mitchell 

appeared; he was walking north on the same sidewalk that the defendant was walking on, but about 

30 feet behind him. They headed toward Anderson, who continued southbound on that sidewalk.
18 

¶ 46 When the defendant, walking north on the sidewalk, and Anderson, walking south on it, 

were approximately eight feet apart, the defendant stopped. That happened at approximately 

1:42:12 p.m. Anderson continued striding to the south, briefly raising both forearms to a position 

parallel to the ground, in an apparent gesture. Anderson continued his walk south, as the defendant 

turned toward the south and followed him. Mitchell continued walking north on the sidewalk and 

eventually passed the defendant and Anderson. After passing them, he turned and walked a bit to 

his left (i.e., west). Shortly after Mitchell passed the defendant and Anderson, Anderson was a 

few feet ahead of the defendant. Anderson briefly turned toward the defendant, who was 

continuing to follow him, and he briefly pointed either toward the defendant or simply to the north. 

Then, Anderson stepped off the sidewalk and walked in a southeasterly direction. The defendant, 

who was a few feet behind Anderson, walked south. The defendant and Anderson walked out of 

camera range at approximately 1:42:34 p.m. In the seconds that followed, Aldridge and Mitchell 

regrouped in the courtyard. They were joined by a man whom Detective Carley identified as 

Micah Hatcher. Hatcher walked from an apartment building that helped to delimit the right (i.e., 

east) side of the courtyard. Hatcher wore a lighter-gray hoodie and very faded blue jeans. 

Aldridge, Mitchell, and Hatcher walked to the south. In the final seconds of the video, Mitchell 

continued southward; Aldridge and Hatcher headed southwest, just as Anderson had done 

moments earlier. Just before they went off camera, Aldridge began to run. Two to three seconds 

later, this video ended at 1:42:55 p.m.

¶ 47 All five men—Roosevelt Anderson, the defendant, Denzel Aldridge, Micah Hatcher, and 

Tavares Mitchell—exited the large, rectangular courtyard at its southeast, by walking on a 

walkway that ran between the small space between two apartment buildings. The space between 

these two apartment buildings was, in large part, not subject to video surveillance; the space 
19 

amounted to a blind spot in the Fair Oaks’s video surveillance system. The system did not show 

the men as they entered into the space. However, as the five men were emerging from this space, 

the videorecording of them resumed. 

¶ 48 The video clip starting at 1:42:55 p.m. shows the denouement of this story. It was 

recorded on a camera that was positioned on Lewis Lane, approximately one-half block north of 

Fairchild Street. The camera was facing north, and slightly west. The clip showed Lewis Lane as 

little more than a north-south alleyway. The events shown in this clip occurred on or about Lewis 

Lane, less than one block north of Fairchild Street. Two seconds into this clip, Roosevelt Anderson 

and Denzel Aldridge begin to appear. They are on their feet, close together, and moving slowly 

out of the unsurveilled space between the two buildings. Anderson and Aldridge were moving to 

the east (that is, from left to right in the video). Anderson has his left hand at his own midsection, 

and Aldridge has his left hand at Anderson’s midsection. Each man’s right hand was free. They 

took another step or two eastward and were then completely past the two buildings, out in the 

open. Both men were then using both their hands in an apparent struggle over some item at 

Anderson’s midsection. A couple of steps behind Anderson and Aldridge, Micah Hatcher 

appeared, emerging from the unsurveilled space between the two buildings. Hatcher got behind 

Anderson and Aldridge and joined the struggle. A second later, the defendant appeared (also from 

the unsurveilled space), and he also joined the struggle. As Anderson, Aldridge, Hatcher, and the 

defendant were all in a tight circle, Tavares Mitchell appeared from the unsurveilled space. He 

walked up to the four men, observed them as they struggled, and then walked west, back to the 

unsurveilled space. (Mitchell was not seen clearly again in video.) As the four men continued to 

grapple in a circle, their focus seemed to be on something at Anderson’s midsection. They took a 
20 

couple of steps to the west, toward the unsurveilled space between the two buildings, and their 

struggle became more intense. 

¶ 49 At 1:43:43 p.m., Aldridge stepped away from the other men and pointed a handgun toward 

them, but for only a second. He then lowered the gun. The three continued their struggle, with 

Anderson in the middle, the defendant on Anderson’s right, and Hatcher on Anderson’s left. 

Aldridge returned to this group and tried to pull on Anderson’s right arm. By this point, the men 

were on the western edge of Lewis Lane, a very narrow north-south street. Hatcher took seven 

wild swings at Anderson. Then, Hatcher stepped away from the three remaining men, heading 

west (left, in the video) until he was standing near the space between the two buildings, where he 

watched events transpire. In the middle of Lewis Lane, the defendant, Anderson, and Aldridge 

continued their struggle. The defendant and Anderson were crouched down, struggling face-toface, as Aldridge stood behind the defendant and reached over him, repeatedly striking Anderson 

over the head with the gun. The men move slightly south on Lewis Lane as Aldridge struck 

Anderson. Then, Aldridge, while holding the gun very near the defendant’s left ear, fired the gun 

point-blank at Anderson’s head. The shooting occurred at 1:44:05 p.m.

¶ 50 Anderson instantly fell into the middle of Lewis Lane, on his back. The defendant tumbled 

on top of him. As a result, the defendant seemed to lose his cell phone; it fell not far from 

Anderson’s head. The defendant started to get up, off of Anderson, but as he arose, he took a 

handgun from Anderson’s midsection. The defendant stood up. Hatcher, Aldridge, and the 

defendant immediately started to run away from Anderson’s motionless body. They ran through 

the same unsurveilled space between two buildings that they had used to reach Lewis Lane from 

the large, grassy courtyard. This video clip ended at 1:44:13 p.m. 
21 

¶ 51 In a video clip that started at 1:44:03 p.m., the view was of Redden Court, looking south 

toward Fairchild Street, which was about a half-block from the camera. The defendant was seen 

at approximately 1:44:25 p.m., as he walked westbound (i.e., from left to right, in the video) toward 

Redden Court. He then crossed Redden Court and continued walking westbound on the sidewalk 

that bordered the southern end of the Hubbard Lane—Redden Court parking lot. As the defendant 

approached and crossed Redden Court, a few people are seen running westbound (left to right) on 

Fairchild Street. (Among them could have been Tariq Wilson, in a black hoodie and faded blue 

jeans, Tavares Mitchell, in his knee-length black jacket, and Micah Hatcher, in his gray hoodie 

and very faded blue jeans, though nobody at trial was asked about this aspect of the video.) This 

clip ended at 1:44:40 p.m.

¶ 52 A clip starting at 1:44:22 p.m. shows the same block-long parking lot that was seen in two 

previous video clips. The parking lot is between Hubbard Lane (to the west) and Redden Court

(to the east). The clip was recorded by a camera just to the south of the parking lot, pointing 

northwest. The courtyard with multiple trees is immediately north of the parking lot, and to the 

west of that courtyard is Hubbard Lane, which has on its western side the back of an apartment 

building that includes 911 Fowler Avenue. (Fowler Avenue is one short block west of Hubbard 

Lane.) A burgundy-colored car, apparently the same one that the defendant had exited at 1:41:23 

p.m.—which was just three minutes earlier—remained in the parking space on the southwest side 

of the lot. One second into that clip—that is, at 1:44:23—Denzel Aldridge wasseen running across 

the parking lot from the east to the west (that is, from right to left, in the video). He was wearing 

his distinctive white hoodie. He ran to the burgundy car for a moment, without stopping, and then 

proceeded running westward to the apartment at 911 Fowler Avenue, which he entered through 

the back door on Hubbard Lane. Aldridge entered the apartment at about 1:44:39 p.m. About 
22 

three seconds later, the defendant approached a silver car with a sunroof, which was parked in a 

space on the south side of the lot. He got into the car, through the front passenger door, at 

approximately 1:44:46 p.m. For several seconds, the car remained parked. Then at 1:45:10 p.m., 

the silver car backed up, headed west across the parking lot, and then turned right (i.e., north) onto

Hubbard Lane, where it drove out of sight at approximately 1:45:31 p.m. While the silver car was 

in motion across the parking lot and on Hubbard Lane, a man who resembled Micah Hatcher, with 

his gray jacket and very faded blue jeans, walked north on Hubbard Lane, from the direction of 

Fairchild Street, and crossed the parking lot at its western edge, then walked onto the courtyard 

that is to the north of the parking lot. However, nobody at trial was questioned about this man. 

This clip ended at 1:45:32 p.m.

¶ 53 A clip beginning at 2:18:31 p.m. showed the same block-long parking lot, recorded by the 

same northwest-facing camera, as the last video. Two Danville police detectives, Phillip Wilson

and Chelsey Miller, were standing on the driver’s side of a red SUV that was parked, front-sidein, on the southern end of the parking lot. The detectives were looking over the SUV, toward the 

northwest, in the direction of Hubbard Lane and the apartment building that had back doors 

opening onto Hubbard Lane. A uniformed Danville patrol officer stood north of the parking lot, 

on the southwestern edge of the courtyard; he was facing west, toward Hubbard Lane and that 

same apartment building. At the start of the video, Detective Miller raised an arm over the SUV, 

pointing toward the apartment building on Hubbard Street. At approximately 2:18:45 p.m., a tall, 

thin black man, whom Detective Carley identifies as Denzel Aldridge, stepped out of the back 

door of the apartment at 911 Fowler Avenue and stepped onto Hubbard Lane. Aldridge was not 

wearing his distinctive white hoodie; he wore a two-tone, long-sleeve shirt or jacket, with black 

jeans and white gym shoes. He continued walking the very short distance to the western edge of 
23 

the parking lot, where he talked with a woman. Then, Aldridge and the woman walked off to the 

southwest, out of view. Detective Miller raised her arm again, apparently pointing toward 

Aldridge and the woman. This clip ended at 2:19:11 p.m.

¶ 54 Trial: The State’s Case in Chief: Additional Live Witnesses

¶ 55 Phillip Wilson, another Danville police detective, testified that during the afternoon of 

April 24, 2019, he heard a 911 dispatcher announce a shooting at Fair Oaks. He responded 

immediately, along with Detective Miller. Upon their arrival at Fair Oaks, a man later identified 

as Roosevelt Anderson was lying in a roadway. The detectives started looking for witnesses. A 

police officer was looking at surveillance video taken at Fair Oaks, and he reported that “the 

suspect” had entered the apartment at 909 Fowler Avenue. They set up a perimeter and watched 

that apartment. Nobody came out of the apartment at 909 Fowler Avenue. However, a tall, thin, 

black man—identified as Denzel Aldridge—came out of the apartment at 911 Fowler Avenue. 

The officer viewing surveillance video had misstated the address. (This information apparently 

was the basis for the search warrant that was executed at 911 Fowler Avenue, two hours after the 

shooting. See supra.) As Detective Wilson continued his investigation into Anderson’s shooting, 

he determined that he wanted to speak with the defendant. Later, the defendant was taken into 

custody on a warrant in an unrelated case.

¶ 56 Detective Wilson further testified that he and Detective Miller interrogated the defendant

at the county jail on May 11, 2019. The interrogation was audio-and-video-recorded. Prior to the 

interrogation, the interrogators had viewed key portions of the surveillance videotape from Fair 

Oaks, but the defendant had not viewed them. The recording of the interrogation was admitted 

into evidence and published to the court. 
24 

¶ 57 During the police interrogation, the defendant, age 26, said that his address was in a 

municipality outside Chicago, but when in Danville, he stayed with his girlfriend. In regard to the 

shooting of Roosevelt Anderson, the defendant seemed unsurprised that his cell phone had been 

found near Anderson’s body. “I knew that was coming,” he said. Detective Wilson asked, “So ... 

so what happened? I mean what caused all that to start?” The defendant answered, “Honestly, I 

don’t know, ya feel me. I told you I been left ... feel me ... I gave my phone to Denzel ... ya feel 

me ... I been left out. I just ... I don’t know ... I don’t know. I honestly don’t know.” (Throughout 

the interrogation, the defendant referred to Denzel Aldridge by his first name or by a nickname, 

“Chief D.”) 

¶ 58 The police interrogators stated specifically that they had seen surveillance video of the 

defendant exiting a car and meeting with others in a courtyard and had seen subsequent video of 

the defendant as part of group fighting, but that they wondered what had happened between those 

two scenes. The defendant replied, “I’m not the one doin’ none of that.” One of the police 

interrogators stated, “You fought him.” The defendant replied, “Naw.” When asked to confirm 

that he was denying participation in a fight, the defendant replied, “I really don’t know what the 

situation was.” When asked to confirm that he did not know what had started the fight, the 

defendant replied, “I don’t know none of that.” The interrogators asked whether Anderson had 

“threaten[ed] you guys.” The defendant stuttered for a moment, then answered, “they literally 

called me over there.” Apparently, the defendant was referring to the men who would become 

involved in the fight. The interrogators asked specifically about a videotaped scene in which “you 

get out of the car and they’re running, and you just start running with them.” To this, the defendant 

replied, “Yes, cuz I’s trying to see what’s the fuck happening, bro.”
25 

¶ 59 At that point, the interrogators asked about what had happened in the space that amounted 

to a blind spot in the Fair Oaks’s video surveillance system. “They just started tussling,” the 

defendant replied. “I wanna say Denzel started it, though. But I didn’t, ya feel me, my mind was 

somewhere else.” Eventually, the defendant said, “Somebody shot him. Denzel shot him.” 

Detective Wilson asked, “So you just, basically those are your friends that were fighting so you 

were just fighting?” The defendant answered, “Yeah. That’s it that’s all.” The defendant seemed 

to say that Denzel Aldridge was wrong to shoot Anderson. “That was uncalled for,” he said, and 

he repeatedly described Aldridge’s shooting of Anderson as “bogus.” The interrogators expressed 

amazement over how close the defendant was to the gun when it was fired at Anderson. Detective 

Miller said, “You were still fighting with him when that gun went off.” The defendant replied, 

“That’s why I’m literally clueless about what happened.”

¶ 60 After a break, the police interrogators showed the defendant photographs and asked him to 

identify the people depicted in them. He identified one person as “Chief D,” the shooter. He 

identified a second person as Tariq Wilson or Wallace and confirmed that his nickname was 

“Shorty Ri.” Finally, he identified a third person as Tavares Mitchell. According to the defendant, 

Tariq Wilson and Tavares Mitchell were merely fighting. “All of us was just fighting,” with the 

exception of Aldridge, the defendant said. When asked whether he had pulled something from 

Anderson, the defendant answered that he had pulled from Anderson “his weapon that he was 

going to use.” He described the weapon as “some metal” and “like a crowbars [sic].” The 

interrogation of the defendant ended. 

¶ 61 Trial: The Defendant’s Case in Chief

¶ 62 For the defense, Dawn Hartshorn, a Danville police detective, testified that she participated 

in the Roosevelt Anderson death investigation. As part of that investigation, Hartshorn 
26 

interviewed Jessica Driver, who was Anderson’s girlfriend. Driver told Hartshorn that Anderson 

carried “a gun” for “protection.” Driver did not know what kind of gun it was, though; she had 

never seen it.

¶ 63 Tavares Mitchell testified that he recalled the day Roosevelt Anderson was shot. He had 

never met Anderson, and he never had heard of him, but after the shooting, he learned who 

Anderson was. Mitchell was at Fair Oaks on the day of the shooting. While watching Fair Oaks 

surveillance video of himself, Mitchell stated that he was walking north on a sidewalk in a 

courtyard of Fair Oaks. The defendant also was walking north on that sidewalk, ahead of Mitchell, 

and Denzel Aldridge was walking to Mitchell’s left. Meanwhile, Anderson was walking on that 

same sidewalk, southbound, directly toward the defendant and Mitchell as they walked north. As 

Mitchell and Anderson walked past each other, Mitchell saw that Anderson had “an extended 

magazine,” i.e., “a clip,” sticking out of the pocket of his hoodie. He could not see an actual gun, 

or even the handle of a gun, because Anderson “had his hand over it.”

¶ 64 Mitchell further testified that he walked toward Aldridge, and he and Aldridge were joined 

by a man whom Mitchell did not know. At the same time, the defendant and Anderson talked and 

walked south toward Fairchild Street. The defendant and Anderson walked into the area between 

two buildings, while Mitchell was behind them, still in the courtyard. The defendant and Anderson 

were out of Mitchell’s sight. Then, Mitchell heard the defendant yell “help.” He was familiar 

with the defendant’s voice, for he had bought “weed” from him on a few occasions. Mitchell 

continued walking, wanting to see what was happening. He soon saw the defendant and Anderson 

standing between the two buildings, with the defendant holding Anderson’s hands. Aldridge and 

the other man (i.e., the man unknown to Mitchell) went over to help the defendant, “so then they 

[sic] fighting.” Mitchell himself walked over to where the four men were tussling. He saw that 
27 

Anderson was holding “a gun” that was halfway out of his pocket; it had the same clip that Mitchell 

had seen previously. Meanwhile, the defendant was using his own hands to hold Anderson’s 

hands. When Mitchell saw the gun in Anderson’s possession, he “left.” He never saw the 

defendant hit or kick Anderson.

¶ 65 On cross-examination by the State, Mitchell admitted being in the company of the 

defendant, Denzel Aldridge, and Tariq Wilson, among others, earlier that day on Fairchild Street. 

He admitted that during his own trial in August 2020, he did not say anything about seeing “a clip” 

sticking out of the pocket of Roosevelt Anderson’s hoodie but explained that his attorney did not 

ask him about it. Also, he admitted to testifying during his own trial that he was unsure whether 

it was Anderson or the defendant who had yelled “help” from between the two buildings in Fair 

Oaks. Mitchell did not speak with the police on the day Anderson was shot. Even after his friend 

Denzel Aldridge was arrested for the murder of Anderson, Mitchell did not speak with the police.

¶ 66 The defendant, age 28 and a high-school graduate, testified in his own defense. On April 

24, 2019, the defendant was living at Fair Oaks. However, he was “barred” from Fair Oaks, and

the police would have taken him “to jail” if they ever found him on the premises. The defendant 

did not know Denzel Aldridge, by name or by nickname, though he had seen him around. The 

defendant did not know Tavares Mitchell on April 24, though he had seen him around, and he did 

know his nickname. He did not know Tariq Wilson on April 24. Subsequent to April 24, however, 

the defendant did learn the identities of those three men. The defendant also did not know 

Roosevelt Anderson and was completely unfamiliar with him. After April 24, the defendant 

learned who Anderson was.

¶ 67 The defendant further testified that on April 24, 2019, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the 

defendant was at Fair Oaks, “[m]oving around selling weed.” The defendant watched a video of 
28 

himself on that date at approximately 1:38 p.m., when he was on Fairchild Street, at Netta’s 

convenience store, and got into his friend Jada’s burgundy car. The defendant did not tell anyone 

else on Fairchild Street where he was going, but he asked Jada to take him to Casey’s convenience 

store, where the cigarettes were much cheaper than at Netta’s. Jada drove into the interior of Fair 

Oaks and drove onto “the parking lot behind Fairchild.” There, one of Jada’s friends got out of 

the car and ran to fetch his ID. The defendant waited in Jada’s car, still intending to go to Casey’s. 

Jada parked her car.

¶ 68 Then, the defendant observed Tariq Wilson, Tavares Mitchell, and Denzel Aldridge as they 

ran through the parking lot, past the rear of Jada’s car. The defendant did not know where these 

three men were headed. However, the defendant immediately got out of Jada’s car and pursued 

the three, for he wanted to try to “sell some weed” to them. The three men were still in the parking 

lot, headed toward the courtyard, when the defendant caught up with them. When he caught up, 

he asked them whether they wanted to purchase marijuana. The three men did not answer. To the 

defendant, the three seemed uninterested in buying marijuana. The defendant decided to go home, 

to Wakely Drive, which is within the Fair Oaks complex (to the east). He did not tell the other 

three men that he intended to go home, and the three did not tell him what they were doing.

¶ 69 In order to reach his home on Wakely Drive, the defendant needed to walk north. He 

headed north through the courtyard. Watching a video of himself walking northbound through the 

courtyard, the defendant identified Tavares Mitchell, who was walking several feet behind him, 

and Denzel Aldridge, who was walking considerably to his left. The defendant also identified 

Roosevelt Anderson, who was walking toward him, i.e., walking southbound. As the defendant 

reached Anderson, he asked Anderson whether he wanted to buy some weed. “[Anderson] start 

asking me questions, like, who I’m is [sic], who I hang with, who my peoples [sic] is. Just rambling 
29 

questions.” The defendant responded that he was “new down here” and that he was “the weed 

man.” By this time, the defendant had already stopped, turned around, and was walking 

southbound along with Roosevelt, “[b]ecause me and Roosevelt was actually talking” about “[t]he 

questions that he was asking me.” Tavares Mitchell, continuing to walk northbound on the 

sidewalk, passed both the defendant and Anderson. At that point, Anderson looked “agitated and 

angry” as he told the defendant, while “scowling,” that “you don’t want no problems.” The 

defendant “kept moving” and “left him alone,” while checking messages on his phone. Anderson 

continued walking toward the southeast, where there was a walkway between two buildings. 

Meanwhile, the defendant walked “[t]owards Fairchild,” the street to the south. At that point, the 

two men dropped out of the surveillance camera’s range. 

¶ 70 The following events were not recorded by video-surveillance cameras. The defendant

testified that he continued to walk south. The defendant saw that Anderson had stopped walking,

and he heard Anderson say to the defendant, “Hey, dude, check it out.” Anderson was 

approximately 10 to 15 feet from the defendant at that time. Figuring that Anderson had decided 

to purchase marijuana from him after all, the defendant walked until he was only one or two feet 

from Anderson. However, Anderson did not say anything to the defendant at that time. Instead, 

Anderson “squared up” to the defendant, i.e., he “fixed his whole posture” toward the defendant, 

and with a face expressing anger, he “started fumbling for something in his [hoodie] pocket.” The 

defendant could see that Anderson was attempting to pull out a gun. He had not previously seen 

a gun in Anderson’s possession. The defendant had not threatened Anderson or made any 

threatening gestures. The defendant felt “[s]cared” and thought that Anderson was “fitting to shoot 

[him].” Using both of his hands, the defendant grabbed both of Anderson’s hands, in order to stop 

him from pulling out the gun. Anderson said to the defendant, “Let me go. Let me go. I’m fitting 
30 

to shoot you.” The defendant did not say anything to Anderson, or punch or kick Anderson, but 

he “started yelling for help.” In answer to the defendant’s call for help, Denzel Aldridge arrived. 

While the defendant still had his hands on Anderson’s hands, Aldridge “grabbed” Anderson. At 

about that same time, the defendant “just lost [his] grip” on Anderson, in part because the defendant 

was still holding his cell phone. At this point, the video recording of events resumed. 

¶ 71 The defendant further testified that Aldridge continued “tussling” with Anderson as they 

emerged from the unsurveilled space between the two apartment buildings. Micah Hatcher, whom 

the defendant did not know at the time, and the defendant followed Aldridge and Anderson into 

camera range. At that point, the defendant wanted to help the people who had come to his aid. He 

“started tussling” some more with Anderson. Aldridge stepped away from the group and pointed 

a gun toward the defendant. The defendant had been unaware that Aldridge was armed. The 

defendant looked at Aldridge’s gun, but he maintained his primary focus on Anderson’s gun. He 

again placed his hands on Anderson, fearing for his life. Micah Hatcher “[w]alk[ed] off.” Then, 

the defendant “heard a loud pop” very close to his left ear. Anderson and the defendant fell to the 

ground. The defendant did not know that Anderson had been shot in the head; he was unsure of 

whether Anderson had been shot at all, or how badly he was injured. Not wanting Anderson to be 

able to shoot him, the defendant “disarmed” Anderson. That is, he pulled a .45-caliber gun off of 

him. He held Anderson’s gun in his hand as he “ran” away from Anderson. He “looked back” as 

he ran, to make sure that Anderson was not chasing him.

¶ 72 The defendant recalled speaking to Detectives Wilson and Miller. At the time of that 

conversation, the defendant was already aware that Denzel Aldridge had been charged with 

murder. He remembered telling the detectives that he had given his phone to Aldridge, but that 

statement was a lie; instead, he lost his phone “during this time.” The defendant also remembered 
31 

telling the detectives that he took a crowbar or a piece of metal from Anderson, but that statement, 

too, was a lie. The defendant lied to the detectives because he “was scared of being charged with 

murder.” 

¶ 73 On cross-examination by the State, the defendant admitted that the three men he had seen 

running past Jada’s car—Aldridge, Wilson, and Mitchell—were three of the same men in whose 

company he had been on Fairchild Street, just a couple of minutes beforehand. When the defendant 

caught up with the three, and asked them whether they wanted to buy marijuana, “they said they 

[sic] cool, they [sic] not interested, they [sic] all right.” As for Aldridge, the defendant testified 

that he thought Aldridge was a hero, who had helped to save the defendant’s life. Nevertheless, 

he did not remain at Fair Oaks to tell the police about Aldridge’s heroic actions. Also, the 

defendant did not go home to Wakely Drive in Fair Oaks. Instead, he got into a car and asked for 

a ride, to someplace other than his home. The defendant admitted that he did not return to his 

friend Jada’s car, despite the fact that he had asked Jada to drive him to Casey’s. Instead, he simply 

decided to “skip it.” During his interrogation by police detectives, the defendant admitted that he 

did not say anything about Roosevelt Anderson’s having a gun.

¶ 74 Trial: The State’s Rebuttal

¶ 75 In rebuttal, the State produced certified copies of the defendant’s Cook County convictions 

for burglary and felony resisting a peace officer. Detective Wilson testified that during his 

interrogation of the defendant, the defendant never said that Roosevelt Anderson had made any 

threatening statements or movements. The defendant never made reference to self-defense.
32 

¶ 76 The Verdict

¶ 77 After hearing closing arguments, the court took the case under advisement. On May 5, 

2021, the court rendered its verdict. It found the defendant guilty of all five counts—the four 

counts of first degree murder and the one count of aggravated battery.

¶ 78 Posttrial, Presentencing

¶ 79 On June 1, 2021, the defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial. The defendant claimed 

(1) that on May 13, 2019, the circuit court failed to appoint the public defender for the defendant; 

(2) that trial counsel “failed to investigate or perform certain pretrial functions” and, along with 

the court, failed to “fully admonish [the] defendant as to the undisclosed conflicts; (3) that the 

defendant was not brought before the court at a critical stage of the proceeding; (4) that the trial 

court and the state’s attorney violated the statutory procedures on arraignment, thus depriving the 

defendant of a fair trial; (5) that the trial court and the state’s attorney failed to provide a proper 

preliminary examination, thus depriving the defendant of a fair trial; (6) that trial counsel, in the 

motion for substitution of judge, fabricated the claim that the defendant believed that Judge Hall 

was prejudiced against him, thus depriving the defendant of a fair trial; (7) that “the concealment 

of the removal of Judge Nancy Fahey claimed done on December 16, 2020,” deprived him of a 

fair trial; (8) that Judge Fahey’s “concealment of her removal” and her “failure to admonishment 

[sic] of the conflicts that now has [sic] been discoverd [sic]” deprived the defendant of a fair trial; 

(9) that the “cumulative effect” of the foregoing errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and 

(10) that the defendant was deprived of counsel “to advise him of his rights during the states [sic] 

proceeding of seeking an [sic] bill of indictment at a critical stage.”

¶ 80 On June 2, 2021, trial counsel filed on the defendant’s behalf a motion for the circuit court 

to conduct an inquiry into the allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel presented in the 
33 

defendant’s pro se motion for new trial, pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). 

Also on June 2, 2021, trial counsel filed on the defendant’s behalf a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. He claimed, essentially, that the 

defendant had not been proved guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 81 After several delays, on March 1, 2022, the court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry 

into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. With the defendant 

under oath, the court asked him to elaborate on any claim that concerned ineffective assistance. 

First, the defendant said that he asked for the discovery in his case “multiple times,” but counsel 

never allowed him to have it, though counsel “went over certain things” in discovery with him. 

Second, he provided counsel with the names and contact information of “multiple people” who 

could testify on his behalf, but “he did not do none of that either.” Third, counsel did not inform 

him that he was filing a motion for substitution of judge, merely informing him that the motion 

already had been ruled upon. At that point, trial counsel was given an opportunity to respond to 

the defendant’s allegations. Counsel stated that he and the defendant “went over all his discovery,” 

including videos, which they reviewed on counsel’s laptop computer. They reviewed discovery 

on “numerous occasions” and during “numerous telephone calls.” As for not providing the 

defendant with his own copy of discovery, counsel stated that the defendant never asked for his 

own copy. In regard to potential witnesses, counsel stated that he “investigated any name that he 

gave me,” and he tried to find witnesses who could help the defense, but after investigation, he 

learned that they would not be helpful. As for the motion for substitution of judge, counsel stated 

that he discussed the matter in advance with the defendant, who “absolutely wanted” to substitute 

Judge Hall. After the motion was granted, the defendant was “very pleased” that the case would 
34 

return to Judge Fahey’s docket, counsel stated. At the end of the Krankel inquiry, the court found 

that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 82 On March 28, 2022, the defendant appeared with a new attorney for a hearing on a posttrial 

motion. The new attorney adopted the motion for new trial that the defendant’s trial counsel had 

filed on June 2, 2021, wherein it was claimed, essentially, that the State had failed to prove the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In his argument to the court, posttrial counsel argued 

that there was no evidence that the defendant was a party to any kind of agreement, or a common 

design, to rob or otherwise accost Roosevelt Anderson. It was uncontroverted that Denzel 

Aldridge, alone, had shot Anderson, counsel argued, and the defendant could not be held 

accountable for that shooting. In the end, the court rejected counsel’s arguments. The court denied 

the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion 

for new trial.

¶ 83 Sentencing

¶ 84 The presentence investigation report showed that the defendant had a record of 

delinquency, and his prior criminal convictions included a conviction for residential burglary in 

2012 and a conviction for felony resisting a peace officer in 2015. Both of these felony convictions 

were entered in Cook County, Illinois. 

¶ 85 For sentencing, the State called Ralph Dunham, a Danville police detective. He testified 

that he examined reports compiled during a police investigation of a home invasion that occurred 

at Fair Oaks in February 2019. A man named Juan Quinn reported that a few people had burst 

into his apartment at Fair Oaks and had stolen hundreds of dollars in cash. One of these people 

was the defendant, with whom Quinn was familiar. The defendant had a handgun with an extended 
35 

magazine, and he pistol-whipped Quinn in the head and face. The police were summoned. They 

observed “knots” on the front of Quinn’s face and head, and a laceration on the back of his head.

¶ 86 The defense called two witnesses in mitigation. James Flowers, the defendant’s stepfather, 

testified that the defendant was a hard worker at Flowers’s construction company, and he was an 

excellent father to his children. Jennifer Lacy, the defendant’s older sister, testified that she missed 

the defendant. Lacy said their mother missed the defendant terribly, to the point where she suffered 

depression, which contributed to heart problems.

¶ 87 The State recommended a sentence of imprisonment for 55 years, plus restitution for 

Roosevelt Anderson’s mother and girlfriend, for funeral expenses. Defense counsel recommended

imprisonment for 35 years. No statement in allocution was given. The court found no mitigating 

factors. Aggravating factors included the defendant’s history of delinquency and criminality, and 

the need to deter others from committing similar crimes. For the crime of intentional first degree 

murder, the court imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 40 years, plus 3 years of 

mandatory supervised release, and ordered the defendant to pay fines, fees, and restitution. (The 

other counts all merged into that one count.) The court noted that its sentence was on the lower 

end of the 35-to-75-year sentencing range, due to the defendant’s not being the actual shooter. 

Finally, the court admonished the defendant as to his right to appeal, and the defendant indicated 

his understanding. 

¶ 88 A notice of appeal was filed, thus perfecting the instant appeal. OSAD was appointed to 

represent the defendant on appeal.

¶ 89 ANALYSIS

¶ 90 The defendant appeals from his conviction of intentional first degree murder. As noted 

previously, the defendant’s appointed attorney on appeal, OSAD, has filed an Anders motion to 
36 

withdraw as counsel, along with a supporting brief. The defendant has filed an objection to 

OSAD’s motion.

¶ 91 In his objection, the defendant states that (1) he had a conflict of interest with the public 

defender, but the public defender nevertheless represented him at two court appearances early in 

these proceedings, and (2) the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty. A conflict 

did exist between the defendant and the public defender. However, early in the proceedings, the 

public defender filed a motion for the appointment of a conflicts public defender. The conflicts 

public defender was appointed, and from that moment on, there was no further talk or intimation 

of a conflict of interest. There is no indication that the public defender’s office, during the brief 

time that it represented the defendant, somehow obtained information that somehow harmed the 

defendant at these proceedings. As for the alleged insufficiency of the evidence, it will be 

discussed infra. 

¶ 92 In its brief filed in support of its Anders motion, OSAD discusses five potential issues in 

this appeal. This court will discuss each of the five.

¶ 93 For its first potential issue, OSAD discusses whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to 

prove the defendant guilty of intentional first degree murder. A defendant cannot be found guilty 

of a crime unless he is proved guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of every fact necessary to 

constitute the crime with which he is charged. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. When the 

sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, a reviewing court must view all of the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and then must determine whether any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). The weight to 

be given a witness’s testimony, the credibility of witnesses, the resolution of evidentiary 
37 

inconsistencies or conflicts, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from testimony are all the 

responsibility of the trier of fact. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). “A criminal 

conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates 

a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).

¶ 94 Here, nobody disputed that Denzel Aldridge was guilty of intentional first degree murder. 

“A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in 

performing the acts which cause the death *** he *** intends to kill or do great bodily harm to 

that individual or another.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018). On video, Aldridge was seen 

firing a handgun pointed at Roosevelt Anderson’s head, at extremely close range. The question at 

the defendant’s trial was whether the defendant was accountable for Aldridge’s actions. A person 

is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when “either before or during the 

commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she 

solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of 

the offense.” Id. § 5-2(c). To prove that a defendant possessed the intent to promote or facilitate 

the crime, the State may present evidence that either (1) the defendant shared the criminal intent 

of the principal or (2) there was a common criminal design. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, 

¶ 13. “Evidence that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with 

knowledge of its design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain 

his conviction for an offense committed by another.” In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 338 (1995).

¶ 95 At the defendant’s trial, surveillance video recordings were crucial. It is impossible to 

guess how the trial might have gone without those recordings, which are described in detail supra. 

Detective Carley testified that the surveillance video showed that for almost all of a 90-minute 

time period in the middle of the day of Anderson’s shooting, the defendant, Denzel Aldridge, Tariq 
38 

Wilson, and Tavares Mitchell were milling about on a portion of Fairchild Street between Redden 

Court and Hubbard Lane. This certainly indicates that the men knew one another, to some extent. 

¶ 96 The video evidence established that Roosevelt Anderson was shot in the head at 1:44 p.m. 

During the five minutes preceding the shooting, Fair Oaks surveillance video suggested that 

Aldridge, Wilson, Mitchell, and the defendant developed a keen interest in Anderson’s 

whereabouts within Fair Oaks. Aldridge, Mitchell, and the defendant tracked Anderson to a 

courtyard in Fair Oaks. They entered and moved through that courtyard in a type of formation. It 

was in that courtyard that the defendant first accosted Anderson. When Anderson continued his 

walk out of the courtyard, the defendant followed him. Subsequently, Aldridge, Mitchell, and a 

man named Micah Hatcher regrouped, and they also followed him. It was evident that the 

defendant and his associates planned to overpower Anderson.

¶ 97 All of the men entered into a small space between two apartment buildings that, for the 

most part, was not subject to video surveillance. That is, this small area between apartment 

buildings amounted to a blind spot for the video-surveillance system. The men again became 

visible as they emerged from thisspace between buildings. First, Anderson and Aldridge emerged, 

each with his left hand at Anderson’s midsection. Next, Hatcher came along, and joined in as 

Aldridge and Anderson struggled. Finally, the defendant joined the struggle. Tavares Mitchell 

also reappeared, but only for a moment, then walked back to the unsurveilled space. Aldridge, 

Hatcher, and the defendant seemed focused on Anderson’s midsection. The four men fought in a 

tight circle.

¶ 98 By 1:43 p.m., the fighting had become more intense. Aldridge stepped away from the other 

men and pointed a gun at them, for only a second. He returned to the group. Hatcher took several 

wild swings at Anderson, then he stepped away. In the end, only the defendant, Aldridge, and 
39 

Anderson were fighting. As Anderson and the defendant struggled face-to-face, Aldridge 

repeatedly struck Anderson with the gun. Finally, at 1:44 p.m., Aldridge pointed the gun directly 

at Anderson’s head and fired it. Anderson immediately collapsed into the middle of Lewis Lane. 

At that point, the reason for the focus on Anderson’s midsection became clear, as the defendant 

took a handgun from that part of Anderson’s motionless body. Immediately, the defendant, 

Aldridge, and Hatcher ran away. The defendant soon found a ride out of Fair Oaks.

¶ 99 The defendant clearly cooperated with Aldridge in the attack on Anderson, to the bitter 

end. As OSAD states in its Anders brief, “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State, there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that [the defendant] was 

accountable for Aldridge’s shooting of Anderson under the common design rule.” 

¶ 100 Also, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State disproved the defendant’s 

defense of self-defense. “Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once a defendant raises it, 

the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 

self-defense, in addition to proving the elements of the charged offense.” People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 

2d 218, 224 (2004). A person is justified in using force that is intended or likely to cause death or 

great bodily harm “only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent 

death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.” 720 

ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2018). Shooting someone point-blank in the head surely constitutes force 

intended or likely to cause death. Therefore, the State had the burden of proving that the defendant, 

or rather Aldridge, did not reasonably believe that firing into Anderson’s head was necessary to 

prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another.

¶ 101 At trial, the only evidence that Anderson posed a threat to anyone came primarily from the 

testimony of the defendant himself, with corroborating testimony from Tavares Mitchell. 
40 

However, the defendant was thoroughly impeached with his prior statements to police 

interrogators—statements that he made before he knew what the surveillance videotape showed. 

At trial, the defendant testified that Anderson looked “angry” as he told the defendant, “you don’t 

want no problems,” and that Anderson subsequently “squared up” to the defendant and attempted 

to pull a gun from his clothing. However, during interrogation, the defendant never mentioned 

self-defense, or anything related to self-defense. Indeed, when a police interrogator specifically 

asked about possible threats made by Anderson, the defendant changed the subject. During the 

interrogation, the defendant first tried to distance himself from the entire situation, saying that he 

did not even know what had started the fight with Anderson, or why it started. Later in the 

interrogation, the defendant actually seemed to fault Aldridge for Anderson’s death, saying that 

the shooting of Anderson was “uncalled for” and “bogus.” This description of the shooting was 

completely at odds with the defendant’s trial testimony, which portrayed the shooting as necessary

to prevent the imminent death of the defendant or another. As OSAD states in its brief: “Thus, in 

the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the evidence was insufficient 

to show that Aldridge actually and reasonably believed that he needed to shoot Anderson to defend 

himself, [the defendant], Hatcher, or Mitchell from Anderson.” 

¶ 102 In addition, portions of the defendant’s in-court testimony did not make any sense or were 

inconsistent with the video recordings. For example, the defendant testified that after he and 

Anderson had walked into the small, unsurveilled space between two buildings, the defendant 

“squared up,” with a face expressing anger, and “started fumbling” for a gun in his hoodie pocket, 

and the defendant responded by grabbing both of Anderson’s hands with his own and “yelling for 

help,” a cry that was answered by Denzel Aldridge. However, in a video recording, Anderson and 

Aldridge are seen emerging from the unsurveilled space, and Aldridge appears to be the aggressor, 
41 

attempting to grab at Anderson. Aldridge and Anderson are soon followed out of the unsurveilled 

space by Micah Hatcher and the defendant, who make the struggle a three-on-one fight against 

Anderson. The events that went unrecorded lasted only a few seconds. It is difficult to imagine 

that the scenario described by the defendant at trial could have resulted in the scenario shown on 

the videotape, and in so brief a time. 

¶ 103 The second potential issue raised by OSAD in its brief is whether the defendant validly 

waived his right to a trial by jury. The defendant had a constitutional right to a jury trial. See U.S. 

Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13. He also had an opportunity to waive 

trial by jury. The right to a trial by jury may be waived if it is “understandingly waived by 

defendant in open court.” 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2020). An “understanding” waiver is both 

knowing and voluntary. People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1997). Here, the circuit court was 

thorough in its efforts to ensure that the defendant’s jury waiver was knowing and voluntary. The 

court placed the defendant under oath and asked him questions aimed at determining that he was 

generally competent, and clear-headed on that occasion. It asked him to define a jury trial and a 

bench trial, which he did. Then, the court admonished him as to his rights at either type of trial, 

and the State’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which the defendant stated he 

understood. The court also asked him if he understood that a waiver of jury trial would mean that 

the judge alone would “mak[e] the decision” in his case, and the defendant answered affirmatively. 

The defendant indicated that no promises had been made, or force applied, to persuade him to 

waive a jury trial, and that he was waiving freely and voluntarily. Finally, the defendant signed a 

written jury-waiver form. Only then did the court accept the defendant’s jury waiver and schedule 

the case for a bench trial. There would be no basis for an argument that the defendant’s jury waiver 

was not understandingly made.
42 

¶ 104 The third potential issue raised by OSAD is whether any error was committed in the 

handling of the defendant’s motion for substitution of judge. On December 23, 2020, the defendant 

filed his motion for substitution of judge, as of right, under section 114-5(a) of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2020)). In that motion, the defendant 

claimed that Judge Hall was so prejudiced against him that he could not receive a fair trial, and he 

requested an automatic substitution. “Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no 

further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion.” Id. At the time 

the motion was filed, this case had been on Judge Fahey’s docket for more than a year, but due to 

a scheduled rotation of judicial duties, it was recently placed on Judge Hall’s docket. Judge Hall 

was substituted, and the case was reassigned to Judge Fahey. From the record, it is unclear on 

whose order this was accomplished. However, since the defendant received the relief that he 

sought—i.e., the substitution of Judge Hall—there can be no meritorious argument for the 

defendant in regard to this issue.

¶ 105 The fourth potential issue raised by OSAD is whether the circuit court properly handled 

the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which he made shortly 

after the trial. When a defendant raises a pro se, posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, the circuit court must address and resolve that claim in accordance with the procedures 

established by People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny. The first step is for the 

court to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the factual basis for the claim. People v. Jolly, 2014 

IL 117142, ¶ 29. If the court determines that the claim lacks merit, or pertains only to trial strategy, 

the court may deny the pro se motion. Id. If, on the other hand, the allegation shows possible 

neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. Id. When evaluating the ineffectiveassistance claim, “some interchange” between the court and counsel is “permissible and usually 
43 

necessary.” People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003). “Trial counsel may simply answer 

questions and explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations.” Id. 

Whether the circuit court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry presents a legal 

question that is subject to de novo review. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28. “[T]he operative concern 

for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se

defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 

125 (1994).

¶ 106 Here, the court placed the defendant under oath and asked him to elaborate on his 

ineffective-assistance allegations. The defendant discussed three such items—one relating to 

discovery, one relating to witnesses, and one relating to a motion for substitution of judge. 

Afterward, the court turned to trial counsel for his response to those allegations. Counsel, 

essentially, refuted each and every one of them. The circuit court handled the pro se allegations 

of ineffective assistance in exactly the manner prescribed by our supreme court. Its inquiry was 

certainly adequate. This issue would be without merit.

¶ 107 For its fifth (and final) potential issue, OSAD raises the issue of whether any error was

committed during sentencing. The sentencing court has broad discretion when fashioning a 

sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 

2d 205, 212 (2010). Sentences within the permissible statutory range may be deemed an abuse of 

discretion only if they are greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or they are 

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. The defendant was sentenced to 40 

years in prison. The sentencing range was 35 to 75 years. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1), 5-8-

1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2022). As the court noted, the defendant’s sentence was on the lower end of 

this range. It certainly was not at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law, or manifestly
44 

disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Furthermore, nothing in the record even intimates 

that the court considered any improper fact or factor in sentencing the defendant. This argument 

would have no merit.

¶ 108 CONCLUSION

¶ 109 This court’s complete and thorough examination of the record has not revealed any issue 

of arguable merit in this appeal. Certainly, none of the five potential issues raised by OSAD in its 

Anders brief has any arguable merit. Accordingly, OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

granted, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

¶ 110 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.