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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,163

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

JOLENE ROBERTS,

Appellee,

v.

MARGARET GOLDIZEN,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Dickinson District Court; RYAN W. ROSAUER, judge. Opinion filed December 17,

2021. Affirmed.

Margaret Goldizen, appellant pro se. 

No appearance by appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GREEN and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Margaret Goldizen brings this interlocutory appeal under the 

Kansas Public Speech Protection Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320, which allows a party 

to file a motion to strike a claim because it restricts his or her right of free speech, right to 

petition, or right of association. The Act also allows the movant to file an interlocutory 

appeal from a district court's denial of a motion to strike. Here, the district court granted 

Goldizen's motion to strike in part and denied it in part. In particular, the district court 

dismissed a defamation claim filed against Goldizen by Jolene Roberts but allowed a 

tortious interference with contract claim to go forward. Finding no error, we affirm the 

district court's ruling on Goldizen's motion to strike.
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FACTS 

By way of background, this action relates to an ongoing dispute between Goldizen 

and other members of her family relating to their mother's assets. The underlying facts

related to this unfortunate dispute between family members relating to their mother's 

property were recently set forth by another panel of this court in Belmore v. Goldizen, 

No. 121, 978, 2021 WL 4127194, at *1 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion). In the 

prior case, the district court invalidated a transfer of a house owned by the mother in 

Abilene to Goldizen and her husband. On appeal, the panel affirmed a judgment entered 

against Goldizen for breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence, conversion, and breach 

of contract. Belmore, 2021 WL 4127194, at *1. 

While the appeal of the prior case was pending, the mother's house in Abilene was 

listed for sale with Roberts, who is a real estate agent. Shortly thereafter, Goldizen began 

posting comments on Facebook page about the house listed with Roberts. With slight 

variations, Goldizen posted messages on Facebook stating:

"Jolene Roberts of Sells MHK has recently listed a property for sale at . . . in Abilene 

Kansas, this property is currently involved in Appeals Court over ownership in Kansas. 

BUYER BEWARE" 

In addition, Goldizen posted on Facebook that the house "shouldn't be listed at 

all." Around the same time, Goldizen filed a complaint with the Kansas Real Estate 

Commission regarding the house being listed for sale. 

On March 19, 2020, Roberts filed a petition against Goldizen asserting claims for

defamation and tortious interference with contract. Roberts also sought a restraining order 

against Goldizen seeking to stop her from posting messages online about Roberts, her 

business, or the listed real estate. On June 29, 2020, Goldizen moved to strike the claims 
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asserted by Roberts under the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 

60-5320.

On August 5, 2020, the district court issued a memorandum decision granting 

Goldizen's motion in part and denying it in part. After discussing the respective burdens 

of the parties under the Act, the district court determined that Roberts has "no chance" of 

prevailing on her defamation claim because the comments written by Goldizen on 

Facebook were not false. However, the district court also found that Roberts has made a 

sufficient showing to survive dismissal on her tortious interference with contract claim. 

In the memorandum decision, the district court did not order attorney fees or impose 

sanctions against either party. 

Two days later, on August 7, 2020, the district court also denied Roberts' motion 

for a restraining order. In so ruling, the district court considered the fact that there are 

"First Amendment implications" in this case. The district court also found it to be 

significant that the comments posted by Golizen were neither libelous nor illegal. 

Thereafter, Goldizen filed this interlocutory appeal. 

ANALYSIS

There are two primary issues presented in this interlocutory appeal. First, whether 

the district court erred in failing to also strike Roberts' tortious interference with contract 

claim as it did her defamation claim. Second, whether the district court erred in failing to 

award Goldizen attorney fees or sanctions for partially prevailing on her motion to strike 

the claims asserted by Roberts. We note that Roberts has chosen not to file a brief in 

support of her position with this court. Moreover, we note that Goldizen is representing 

herself on appeal.
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As the district court found, the purpose of the Kansas Public Speech Protection 

Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320(b) "is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional 

rights of a person to . . . speak freely . . . in connection with a public issue or issue of 

public interest to the maximum extent permitted by law while, at the same time, 

protecting the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury." For 

these reasons, the Act involves a balancing of the respective rights of the parties. In other 

words, the district court was required to balance Goldizen's right to free speech with 

Roberts' right to seek recourse in the courts for her alleged injury. 

A review of the district court's well-reasoned and well-analyzed memorandum 

decision—granting in part and denying in part Goldizen's motion to strike under the 

Act—reveals that the district court appropriately balanced the respective rights of the 

parties. Likewise, the district court properly applied the shifting burden of proof set forth 

in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320(d). In particular, the district court recognized that the 

initial burden is on the party moving to strike to make "a prima facie showing the claim

. . . concerns a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition or right of 

association." If the movant meets his or her burden, it becomes incumbent upon the 

responding party "to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the claim by presenting 

substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case." K.S.A 2020 Supp. 60-

5320(d).

In doing so, the district court correctly found in favor of Goldizen on the 

defamation claim because the statements she posted about the listing of her mother's 

house were truthful on their face. See PIK Civ. 4th 127.51. On the other hand, the district 

court also correctly found in favor of Roberts on the tortious interference of contract 

claim because there is substantial evidence in the record to support a prima facia case. 

See PIK Civ. 4th 124.92. As a result, we conclude that the district court appropriately 

dismissed the defamation claim while allowing the tortious interference with contract 
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claim to go forward. Even so, we take no position on whether Roberts will ultimately 

prevail on this claim.

Next, Goldizen contends that the district court erred in failing to award her 

attorney fees and sanctions. Specifically, Goldizen asserts that she "put in approximately 

over 1000 hours in defending this case to Appeal, as she is not an attorney" and claims 

that she "should be reimbursed for her time, her lack of time with her family, her not 

being allowed any time off to visit friends or for vacations while dealing with this matter 

and also for the stress and heartache she and her family has endured because of this 

lawsuit." The issue of the district court's authority to award attorney fees is a question of 

law over which appellate review is unlimited. In re Estate of Oroke, 310 Kan. 305, 317, 

445 P.3d 742 (2019).

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320(g) provides: 

"The court shall award the defending party, upon a determination that the moving 

party has prevailed on its motion to strike, without regard to any limits under state law: 

(1) Costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees; and (2) such additional relief, 

including sanctions upon the responding party and its attorneys and law firms, as the 

court determines necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by others similarly situated. 

If the court finds that the motion to strike is frivolous or solely intended to cause delay, 

the court shall award to the responding party reasonable attorney fees and costs related to 

the motion."

A review of the record confirms that Goldizen only prevailed on part of her 

motion to strike under the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-

5320. Regardless, pro se litigants—like Goldizen—may not be entitled to recover 

attorney fees in Kansas. See Baker v. Hayden, 313 Kan. 667, 676, 490 P.3d 1164 (2021). 

Goldizen has also failed to show what costs—if any—she has incurred. Nevertheless, if 

she has incurred costs that might be recoverable under Kansas law, she can always 
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present her claim to the district court at the end of this action. At this point, we conclude 

that Goldizen has failed to establish that she is entitled to any costs that may be 

recoverable for partially prevailing on her motion to strike. 

Finally, turning to the question of sanctions, we find that the district court 

appropriately analyzed this issue under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320(g), which provides 

that "additional relief, including sanctions" are to be awarded "as the court determines 

necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by others similarly situated." Here, the district 

court found that the award of additional relief was unnecessary as a deterrent. In reaching 

this decision, the district court explained: 

"While [Goldizen's] actions might not meet the definition of defamation, that is not the 

same as saying that she has behaved appropriately in this matter. Defendant knows what 

she is doing. Namely, she is trying to prevent the sale of land, either hoping she gets the 

economic benefit down the road or hoping she denies economic benefit to the relatives 

with whom she has been feuding for years. Perhaps both are her motives. The purpose of 

awarding sanctions . . . is to deter repetition of conduct of those similarly situated. This 

court sees no need to deter Plaintiff or those similarly situated in her position. Granted, 

Plaintiff is not going to be able to show defamation. But she did not file the defamation 

suit in bad faith. Defendant's actions are causing stress and bother to her, and all Plaintiff 

did was list a piece of property. In other words, she did her job with no motives other 

than to do that job and make a living. She has done nothing wrong, or at least there is no 

evidence to this point that she has done anything wrong." 

We agree with the district court and affirm its memorandum decision addressing 

Goldizen's motion to strike brought pursuant to the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act, 

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5320. 

Affirmed.