Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

SC-2022-1061

_________________________

Ex parte MUSA Properties, LLC 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

(In re: R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc.

v. 

MUSA Properties, LLC) 

(Calhoun Circuit Court, CV-22-900138)

MENDHEIM, Justice.
SC-2022-1061

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MUSA Properties, LLC ("MUSA"), and R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc. 

("Allen Oil"), entered into a real-estate sales contract ("the sales 

contract") in which MUSA agreed to purchase from Allen Oil a gasoline 

service station and convenience store ("the property"). The terms of the 

sales contract were not fulfilled, and the property was not transferred to 

MUSA. Allen Oil filed a lawsuit in the Calhoun Circuit Court ("the 

circuit court") against MUSA, alleging various causes of action based on

the sales contract; MUSA filed various counterclaims in response. MUSA 

also filed in the Calhoun Probate Court ("the probate court") a notice of 

lis pendens describing the property. In an interlocutory order, the circuit 

court later determined that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in 

the property, and, upon the motion of Allen Oil, the circuit court entered 

an order expunging the lis pendens notice. MUSA now petitions this 

Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its 

order expunging the lis pendens notice. We grant the petition and issue 

the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, MUSA agreed to 

purchase the property from Allen Oil for $1,250,000 and to close on the 
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sale on May 31, 2021; $50,000 of the purchase price was to be deposited 

with the closing attorney as earnest money upon execution of the sales 

contract, with the remainder of the purchase price due upon closing. The 

sales contract includes the following relevant provisions:

"[MUSA] shall be responsible for obtaining a title 

examination, survey of the property and purchasing title 

insurance, if desired. The cost of survey shall be paid by 

[MUSA]. If there are objections to title, environmental 

problems or defects in the improvements same will be 

communicated to [Allen Oil] promptly upon discovery. [Allen 

Oil] shall have at least thirty (30) days to cure said defects, 

but no more than sixty (60) days. The terms of this agreement 

shall be extended, if necessary, to accommodate this period of 

correction. This contract is contingent upon a satisfactory 

survey, environmental inspection and building inspection. In 

the event title defects or other problems cannot be cured, all 

earnest money shall be refunded to [MUSA] and this 

agreement shall become null and void. [MUSA] shall have the 

right to access the property to inspect it, but such inspection 

shall not change the purchase price.

"....

" This contract is contingent upon the following:

"1. [MUSA's] satisfaction with the results of a title 

examination and survey.

"2. [MUSA's] satisfaction with the results of any and all

environmental inspections including but not limited to 

geological surveys, groundwater sampling, Phase I and

Phase II environmental site assessments, etc.

"....
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"In the event [MUSA] fails to carry out and to perform 

the terms of this agreement, any funds paid by [MUSA] to 

[Allen Oil] shall be forfeited as liquidated damages at the 

option of [Allen Oil] (provided [Allen Oil] agrees to the 

cancellation of this contract). In the event [Allen Oil] fails to 

carry out and to perform the terms of this agreement or fails 

to cure any title defects within a reasonable time, [MUSA] 

may avail itself of one of the following remedies: (1) [MUSA] 

will receive a refund of earnest money plus reimbursement for 

any sums expended by [MUSA] in conjunction with this 

transaction including but not limited to expenses for title 

examination, attorney's fees, appraisal, credit reports, survey, 

environmental studies, etc. Upon payment by [Allen Oil] of 

such expenses, the contract will become void; or (2) [MUSA] 

may elect to proceed with specific performance."

The parties also entered into a lease agreement "in order to allow [MUSA] 

to take possession of the [property], operate the business located thereon, 

and to otherwise prepare for the purchase of [the property]."

Subsequently, MUSA hired Karst Environmental to conduct a 

"Phase II Environmental Site Assessment" of the property "to determine 

whether the historical operation of the underground storage tanks 

(gasoline and diesel) on the ... property has adversely impacted the soil 

and groundwater onsite." Karst Environmental conducted its 

assessment on April 21, 2021, and produced a report on April 30, 2021, 

summarizing the findings of its assessment ("the report"). The report 

noted that "[t]here is one previous petroleum incident reported for [the 
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property] in the regulatory agency database. That incident, UST96-11-

05, was resolved with a No Further Action (NFA) in April, 1995. The 

report stated, in pertinent part, as follows (there are some terms and 

abbreviations used in the report that are not defined by the report):

"The findings of this Phase II Environmental Site 

Assessment conclude that, 1) BTEX, MTBE, and Naphthalene 

concentrations in the soils exceeded the [Alabama 

Department of Environmental Management ('ADEM')] Initial 

Screening Limits, 2) BTEX, MTBE, and Naphthalene 

concentrations in the groundwater exceeded the ADEM 

Initial Screening Limit, 3) No liquid phase hydrocarbons 

(LPHs) were identified in either the soils or groundwater, and 

4) if current compliance is maintained, the facility is eligible 

for participation through the [Alabama Tank Trust Fund] (in 

the event of a future petroleum release).

"The findings of this investigation should be discussed 

with ... Allen Oil .... The release should be reported to the 

ADEM in a timely manner by forwarding this report to the 

ADEM Corrective Action Unit for review. The ADEM office in 

Montgomery, Alabama will determine whether further 

investigation will be required under the Alabama Tank Trust 

Fund ...."

On May 4, 2021, the report was submitted to the Alabama 

Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") for review. After 

reviewing the report, ADEM sent a letter to Allen Oil on May 11, 2021, 

stating that, 

"[b]ased on the previous release incident UST96-11-05 and 

the submitted report, [ADEM] has determined that no further 
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investigative or corrective actions will be required for [the 

property] at this time. [ADEM] is not making a determination 

as to contamination which may or may not exist at [the 

property] and will review any additional information that 

may warrant further consideration should it become 

available."

(Emphasis in original.)

After receiving the report and ADEM's May 11, 2021, letter, 

MUSA's trial attorney, Drew Senter, and Allen Oil's trial attorney, 

Charles Gaines, communicated through emails and letters concerning 

the sales contract and whether to proceed with the sale of the property. 

On May 21, 2021, Senter sent Gaines the following email:

"I suspect by now you have seen the ... report and letter 

from ADEM. We seem to be at an impasse. The ... report 

shows significant contamination. Our environmental folks 

believe that the contamination is active and have warned us 

about taking the property without a clean-up. In a first for me, 

ADEM has issued a very weak letter stating that 'no 

corrective action is required at this time.' They do state, 

however, that they are making no opinions about 

contamination at the site and will review additional 

information.

"That letter provides us with no comfort, especially in 

light of the warnings from our environmental experts.

"[MUSA] cannot buy the property without some 

remedial action. [Is Allen Oil] willing to go back to ADEM to 

see if we can get them to take a more serious look and require 

remediation in accordance with their plan? I know this all 

sounds counterintuitive for [Allen Oil], but [MUSA] is not in 
SC-2022-1061

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a position to request any more from ADEM on a property 

[MUSA] does not own. If we cannot get the contamination 

cleaned in accordance with an ADEM remediation plan, I do 

not think [MUSA] will be able to go forward with the 

purchase."

In response, on June 15, 2021, Gaines sent the following letter to 

Senter:

"I fear we may have a problem between our clients. 

[Allen Oil] has consulted an attorney/expert who specializes 

in the gasoline and motor fuel industry. He has advised that 

anyone who is in the industry for any length of time knows a 

no further action (NFA) letter from ADEM is its 'blessing' that 

no further investigative or remedial action on a site need be 

done. Even if remedial work is performed ADEM never issues 

a letter saying the property is 'clean' but instead, gets an NFA 

even after cleanup has been completed. Since that is the 

industry standard [Allen Oil] takes the position remedial 

action is not warranted or necessary and even if it did take 

place, it would only receive another NFA letter from ADEM.

"In light of that we would like to move forward with the 

sale and I would like to discuss this with you further."

(Emphasis in original.)

On June 21, 2021, Senter sent Gaines the following email: "Since 

Allen Oil will not agree to clean up the property, [MUSA] must terminate 

the [sales] contract and demand a release of its earnest money. [MUSA] 

will also be vacating the [property] on the first day [it is] permitted to 

under the lease." (Emphasis in original.)
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At some point thereafter, Sameer Mousa, the president of MUSA, 

apparently offered to purchase the property in "as is" condition if Allen 

Oil would agree to a reduction in the price of $100,000. On October 11, 

2021, Gaines sent Senter the following letter:

"Mr. M[o]usa recently contacted [Allen Oil] and told 

them [MUSA] would close on the purchase of the property if 

[Allen Oil] would reduce the price by $100,000. That proposal 

certainly negates [MUSA's] excuse for termination of the 

[sales] contract which [Allen Oil] didn't think was legitimate 

anyway in light of what had been received from ADEM.

"I have been instructed to proceed with filing a 

complaint for specific performance as I believe we can now 

show there was no legitimate basis for the termination notice. 

...

"Please discuss this situation with [MUSA] and see if 

[MUSA] will reconsider [its] position. If not, [Allen Oil is] 

going to proceed with filing the complaint later this month. I 

would like to avoid doing so if possible and that is why I am 

reaching out to you at this time."

On April 5, 2022, Allen Oil sued MUSA for specific performance of 

the sales contract. The complaint states, in pertinent part: 

"11. In terminating the [sales] contract, [MUSA] stated 

that it was terminating the [sales] contract 'since Allen Oil 

will not agree to clean up the property.' Said excuse was a 

pretext for the purpose of trying to obtain a reduction in the 

purchase price as [MUSA] subsequently stated that [it] would 

close on the purchase for an offset of One Hundred Thousand 

Dollars and Zero Cents ($100,000.00).
SC-2022-1061

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"12. [Allen Oil] has fully performed its obligations under 

the sales contract and contends [MUSA's] refusal is 

unjustified and without any legitimate basis for doing so.

"13. [Allen Oil] is ready, willing and able to [perform]

under said contract.

"WHEREFORE, [Allen Oil] request[s] that this 

honorable [court] enter an[] order for Specific Performance 

ordering [MUSA] ... to specifically perform ... [its] duties 

under the [sales] contract, pay damages, and grant such other 

relied as the court deems just and proper."

On April 8, 2022, MUSA filed an answer to Allen Oil's complaint 

and also asserted various counterclaims against Allen Oil. MUSA 

asserted a declaratory-judgment counterclaim requesting that the circuit 

court enter a judgment declaring the parties' rights under the sales 

contract. Specifically, MUSA requested a judgment declaring that it had 

the right to cancel the sales contract and that its right to cancel the sales 

contract was "contingent, inter alia, on its satisfaction with the results of 

a Phase II environmental site assessment." MUSA stated in its 

counterclaim that it "elected not to proceed with concluding the sales

[contract]" and that "counsel for MUSA communicated to counsel for ... 

Allen [Oil] that MUSA was dissatisfied with the contents of the ... report 

and would not move forward with the purchase." MUSA also asserted 

counterclaims alleging breach of the sales contract and seeking specific 
SC-2022-1061

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performance of the sales contract. Although MUSA did not plead its 

breach-of-contract or specific-performance counterclaims with much 

specificity, MUSA did state that Allen Oil "committed a default under the 

terms of the sales [contract] by refusing to cure the contamination" noted 

in the report. MUSA alleged that, as a result of Allen Oil's alleged breach 

of the sales contract, MUSA is entitled to receive "reimbursement for any 

sums expended by MUSA including but not limited to expenses for title 

examination, attorney's fees, appraisal, credit reports, survey, 

environmental studies, etc."

Also on April 8, 2022, pursuant to § 35-4-131, Ala. Code 1975, 

MUSA filed in the probate court a lis pendens notice describing the 

property. MUSA stated that it "claims a right, title, interest or claim in 

and to the ... property." The probate court recorded the lis pendens notice 

on the same day.

On May 31, 2022, Allen Oil filed an amended complaint in which it 

"specifically waive[d] and withdr[e]w[] its claim for 'specific performance' 

...." Instead, Allen Oil asserted a breach-of-contract claim against MUSA 

based on MUSA's failure to perform under the sales contract and 

requested compensatory damages for "loss of sales, loss of income, and 
SC-2022-1061

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any other form of damage recoverable for the breach of the [sales] 

contract ...."

On November 16, 2022, Allen Oil filed a "motion for summary 

judgment, or in the alternative partial summary judgment ...." In its 

summary-judgment motion, Allen Oil argued that MUSA, in the June 21, 

2021, email that Senter sent to Gaines, repudiated the sales contract. As 

a result, Allen Oil argues, it was discharged from its duty to perform 

under the sales contract and, thus, MUSA cannot prevail on any of its 

counterclaims. On December 12, 2022, MUSA filed a response to Allen 

Oil's summary-judgment motion. Among other things, MUSA argued 

that Allen Oil, and not MUSA, repudiated the sales contract.

On December 14, 2022, Allen Oil filed in the circuit court a motion 

to expunge the lis pendens notice filed by MUSA in the probate court. 

Allen Oil stated in its motion that it "is in active negotiations with a third 

party to purchase the ... property that is the subject of this litigation." 

Allen Oil argued that MUSA cannot have a right to or interest in the 

property based on MUSA's alleged repudiation of the sales contract. 

Accordingly, Allen Oil requested that the circuit court enter an order 

expunging the lis pendens notice filed by MUSA and allow Allen Oil to 
SC-2022-1061

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proceed with the sale of the property to the third party. On the same day, 

MUSA filed a response to Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens 

notice. MUSA argued that it holds equitable title to the property based 

on its execution of the sales contract and, thus, is entitled to the lis 

pendens notice throughout the pendency of this litigation.

On December 20, 2022, the circuit court entered an order granting 

Allen Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment. The circuit court 

concluded that Senter's June 21, 2021, email to Gaines "specifically 

terminated" the sales contract. The circuit court stated:

"In sum, [MUSA's] breach of contract claim against 

[Allen Oil] has no merit because [MUSA], by its own 

admission, repudiated the contract. Likewise, since [MUSA] 

repudiated the sales contract, it cannot seek specific 

performance of the sale of the subject real property since 

specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of a party 

who has not fully and fairly performed all the conditions 

precedent on his part to the obligation of the other party. 

Stated another way, [MUSA] cannot maintain a claim to the 

subject real property under the terms of a contract that it has 

expressly repudiated."

As a result, the circuit court concluded:

"1. [Allen Oil's] motion for partial summary judgment as 

to [MUSA's] breach of contract claim is hereby GRANTED; 

said breach of contract claim is hereby dismissed.
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"2. [Allen Oil's] motion for partial summary judgment as 

to [MUSA's] specific performance claim is hereby GRANTED, 

said specific performance claim is hereby dismissed.

"3. [Allen Oil's] motion for summary judgment as to 

[MUSA's] counterclaim for declaratory judgment is hereby 

DENIED."

The circuit court further stated that "the breach of contract claim 

plead[ed] by [Allen Oil] as to damages suffered as a result of [MUSA's] 

alleged breach of contract and [MUSA's] counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment regarding the same remain[] in dispute between the parties."

Also on December 20, 2022, the circuit court entered an order 

granting Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens notice filed by 

MUSA. The circuit court noted that, based on its order granting Allen 

Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment, MUSA's only counterclaim

remaining against Allen Oil is its counterclaim requesting a declaratory 

judgment as to the parties' rights under the sales contract. The circuit 

court defined MUSA's declaratory-judgment counterclaim as requesting 

whether MUSA "was within its rights to cancel the sales [contract] 

because of its dissatisfaction with the ... report ...." As a result, the circuit 

court stated that "[t]he declaratory judgment claim of [MUSA] is not 

claiming 'a right, title, interest or claim in and to' the ... property that is 
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subject to this circuit court action" and, thus, expunged the lis pendens

notice. (Emphasis in original.)

MUSA then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing 

the circuit court to vacate its December 20, 2022, order expunging the 

lis pendens notice.

Standard of Review

"'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary 

writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear 

legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 

(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to 

perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the 

lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly 

invoked jurisdiction of the court.'

"Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)."

Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 886 So. 2d 817, 820 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2003).

Discussion

The only issue properly raised in MUSA's mandamus petition is 

whether the circuit court erred in expunging the lis pendens notice filed 

by MUSA.1 A recitation of the principles underlying Alabama's doctrine 

1This Court has previously considered the propriety of a lis pendens 

notice on mandamus review. See Ex parte Wallace & Wallace Chem. & 

Oil Corp., 417 So. 2d 940, 944 (Ala. 1982) (conditionally granting the 
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of lis pendens is helpful in analyzing the issue before us. Generally, "[t]he

doctrine of lis pendens is for the purpose of preserving the property 

involved in the suit ...." Willis v. Lewis, 25 Ala. App. 369, 370, 148 So. 

330, 331 (1933). In Alabama, the majority of the common-law doctrine of 

lis pendens applies, with one significant statutory change, as explained 

in Jesse Evans's treatise on property law:

"Under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens, the 

filing of an action respecting a right, title, interest in or claim 

to property placed the property in custodia legis, or in the 

custody of the court in which the action was commenced. 

Nothing else was required to be done to give notice of the 

pendency of the action other than the commencement of the 

action. ... Under Alabama decisions, two things were required 

in order for the doctrine to have effect: the litigation must 

have been about specific property, and the property must be 

so pointed out in the proceedings as to warn the world of the 

pending litigation.

"Once the action was filed the property became in 

custodia legis, purchasers pendente lite were bound by the 

result of the litigation as it affected the property, though they 

might never have been joined as parties to the action or have 

known of the existence of the litigation. This principle 

petitioner's "application for writ of prohibition, or in the alternative, writ 

of mandamus" seeking to have the at-issue lis pendens notice stricken 

and determining that "there was simply no jurisdictional basis for [the 

trial court's] order to the clerk to direct the Probate Judge to file a notice 

of lis pendens"); see also Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 886 So. 2d 817, 

823 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (in which the Court of Civil Appeals denied a 

petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the striking of certain names 

from a lis pendens notice).
SC-2022-1061

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operated not only during the pendency of the action but 

afterwards as well, that is, the result of the litigation bound 

subsequent purchasers.

"The statutory doctrine of lis pendens, as it presently 

exists in Alabama, differs from the common-law doctrine only 

with respect to the requirement of the filing in the office of the 

judge of probate of a pendency of the action. The enactment of 

the lis pendens statute has been said to have substituted the 

statutory constructive notice requirements for the commonlaw doctrine, that is, the common-law doctrine remains in full 

force and effect, but only if the notice and filing requirements 

set out in the statute are complied with."

1 Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 5.13 (5th 

ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted).

Alabama's lis pendens statutes were originally adopted in 1915 and 

are currently codified at § 35-4-130 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. This Court 

has stated that

"[t]he manifest purpose of the statute was to provide a means 

whereby one desiring to purchase land may ascertain if there 

is any pending suit which affects the title by examining the 

lis pendens record; that is, substitution of constructive notice 

rather than the rule of the common law as to pending suits."

Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bank, 233 Ala. 522, 528, 172 So. 662, 669 (1937). See 

also Scott v. Hales, 575 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Ala. 1991) ("The sole purpose 

of a lis pendens notice is to afford notice to a bona fide purchaser who 

might purchase the property during the pendency of the action."). This 
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Court has also stated that "the doctrine of lis pendens is based on 

considerations of public policy and convenience, which forbid a litigant to 

give rights to others, pending the litigation, so as to affect the proceedings 

of the court then progressing to enforce those rights." Reed v. Skeen, 591 

So. 2d 51, 52 (Ala. 1991).

Section 35-4-131(a), Ala. Code 1975, requires the filing of a 

lis pendens notice and states:

"When any civil action or proceeding shall be brought in any 

court to enforce any lien upon, right to or interest in, or to 

recover any land, or where an application has been made to 

the probate judge of any county for an order of condemnation 

of land, or any interest therein, the person, corporation, or 

governmental body commencing such action or proceeding or 

making such application shall file with the judge of probate of 

each county where the land or any part thereof is situated a 

notice containing the names of all of the parties to the action 

or proceeding, or the persons named as those having an 

interest in the land in the application for an order of 

condemnation, a description of the real estate and a brief 

statement of the nature of the lien, writ, application, or action 

sought to be enforced. The judge of probate shall immediately 

file and record the notice in the lis pendens record and note 

on it and in the record the hour and date of the filing and the 

place and date of recording."

Section 35-4-135, Ala. Code 1975, states that,

"[i]f the notice required by [§] 35-4-131 ... shall not be 

entered in the lis pendens record, the action, proceeding, or 

application shall not affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser, 

lessee, or mortgagee of any interest in such land or any person 
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then or thereafter asserting a lien against such land unless he 

or they have actual notice of the action, proceeding, levy, or 

application."

These statutes, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly 

construed. Stephens v. Huie, 37 So. 3d 776, 779 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).

Of course, a lis pendens notice need not last forever. In fact, this 

Court has stated that "[t]he doctrine of lis pendens ... is based upon the 

necessity that there be an end of litigation." Willis, 25 Ala. App. at 370, 

148 So. at 331. This Court, relying upon Evans's treatise, has stated that

"'[g]enerally, the doctrine of lis pendens commences 

with the filing of an action and the contemporaneous 

recordation of a notice of lis pendens, and continues for the 

duration of the litigation until it is terminated by judgment 

and the expiration of any appropriate period for appeal, or 

appellate determination, if an appeal is taken.'"

Walden v. Hutchinson, 987 So. 2d 1109, 1121 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Jesse 

P. Evans III, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 5.18 (3d ed. 

2004)).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts and 

arguments in the case at hand. As set forth above, MUSA and Allen Oil 

entered into the sales contract, which, among other things, required 

MUSA to pay to Allen Oil $1,250,000 in exchange for Allen Oil's 

conveying the property to MUSA. Neither of those things occurred. As a 
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result, Allen Oil sued MUSA for specific performance, requesting that the 

circuit court require MUSA to perform on the sales contract. MUSA, in 

turn, filed a counterclaim for specific performance, requesting that the 

circuit court require Allen Oil to perform on the sales contract. As stated 

in Ex parte State Department of Revenue, "[§] 35-4-131(a) requires a 

notice of lis pendens to be filed with the probate judge in the county where 

the real property lies in civil actions seeking 'to enforce any lien upon, 

right to or interest in, or to recover any land' ...." 886 So. 2d at 820. In 

the present case, a civil action was commenced in which both parties 

sought to enforce a "right to or interest in" the property.2 § 35-4-131(a). 

Accordingly, pursuant to § 35-4-131(a), a lis pendens notice was required 

to be filed with the probate court, which MUSA did upon filing its 

counterclaim against Allen Oil. It appears that MUSA met all the 

requirements of § 35-4-131(a) in drafting its lis pendens notice (there is 

2Allen Oil later dismissed its specific-performance claim and 

asserted a breach-of-contract claim seeking only money damages, see 

Stephens v. Huie, 37 So. 3d 776, 779 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) ("The doctrine 

of lis pendens has no application when the action involved seeks the 

recovery of a money judgment. McCollum v. Burton, 220 Ala. 629, 127 So. 

224 (1930) ...."), but the fact remains that, at the outset of this 

proceeding, both parties sought to enforce a right to or interest in the 

property and MUSA has maintained its specific-performance claim, even 

if Allen Oil has abandoned its own.
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no argument otherwise), and the probate court recorded the filed lis 

pendens notice on April 8, 2022. The lis pendens notice was valid, and 

the doctrine of lis pendens applies in this case. In other words, with the 

commencement of the underlying action and the filing of the lis pendens 

notice, the property was placed in the custody of the circuit court and 

anyone who purchases the property during the course of this litigation 

will be bound by the result of the litigation, including any disposition on 

appeal, as it affects the property.

The circuit court, however, expunged the lis pendens notice before 

the conclusion of the litigation, thereby essentially removing the property 

from the custody of the circuit court and allowing any future purchasers 

to take the property free of the results of the current litigation. In its 

order expunging the lis pendens notice, the circuit court reasoned that,

in its declaratory-judgment claim, MUSA "is not claiming 'a right, title, 

interest or claim in and to' the ... property that is subject to this ... 

action." (Emphasis omitted.) The circuit court further reasoned that it

had "previously entered an order granting [Allen Oil's] motion for partial 

summary judgment that dismisses [MUSA's] claims of breach of contract 

and specific performance that directly relate to the ... property. 
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Accordingly, [MUSA] does not have 'a right, title, interest or claim in and 

to' the ... property." (Emphasis omitted.) The circuit court concluded 

that, because it had entered an interlocutory, partial summary judgment 

in favor of Allen Oil disposing of MUSA's counterclaims for breach of 

contract and specific performance -- a claim which clearly seeks to enforce 

a right to or interest in the property -- there is no longer a need to hold 

the property in its custody and to provide notice of the litigation to future 

purchasers, essentially allowing a purchaser of the property to take the 

property free of the results of this litigation during its pendency. We 

disagree.

As noted above, "the doctrine of lis pendens is based on 

considerations of public policy and convenience, which forbid a litigant to 

give rights to others, pending the litigation, so as to affect the proceedings 

of the court then progressing to enforce those rights." Reed, 591 So. 2d 

at 52. In filing its motion to have the lis pendens notice expunged, Allen 

Oil stated that it "is in active negotiations with a third party to purchase 

the ... property that is the subject of this litigation." In other words, Allen 

Oil is attempting "to give rights to others, pending the litigation." Id. By 

expunging the lis pendens notice, it appears that the circuit court intends 
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to allow that sale to go through. The problem, of course, is that MUSA 

may appeal the circuit court's partial-summary-judgment order in favor 

of Allen Oil once there is a final, appealable judgment entered in the case 

below. The circuit court may have concluded that MUSA's specificperformance counterclaim has no merit, but that determination has not 

yet been presented to this Court for review, and we cannot now consider 

the circuit court's partial summary judgment in favor of Allen Oil on 

mandamus review because an adequate remedy exists by way of appeal. 

See Ex parte Griffin, 4 So. 3d 430, 435 (Ala. 2008). Until this litigation 

"'is terminated by judgment and the expiration of any appropriate period 

for appeal, or appellate determination, if an appeal is taken,'" the 

lis pendens notice must remain in effect. Walden, 987 So. 2d at 1121 

(emphasis omitted). To conclude otherwise would subvert the purpose of 

the doctrine of lis pendens. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court 

erred in granting Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens notice.

We note that Allen Oil makes extensive argument concerning 

whether MUSA repudiated the sales contract. Allen Oil takes the 

position that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in the property to 

enforce because MUSA repudiated the sales contract. It follows, Allen 
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Oil argues, that, if MUSA does not have a right to or interest in the 

property based on its repudiation of the sales contract, MUSA is not 

entitled to a lis pendens notice concerning the property. Allen Oil is 

correct in noting that the circuit court's order expunging the lis pendens 

notice is based on the circuit court's holding that MUSA no longer has a 

right to or interest in the property based on its repudiation of the sales 

contract. However, that particular holding was made by the circuit court 

in granting Allen Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment on some 

of MUSA's counterclaims. The circuit court specifically stated that its 

order expunging the lis pendens notice was based on the fact that it had 

"previously entered an order grating [Allen Oil's] motion for partial 

summary judgment that dismisses [MUSA's] claims for breach of 

contract and specific performance ...." (Emphasis added.) In other

words, the circuit court's expungement order is expressly based on its 

partial-summary-judgment order in which the circuit court held that 

MUSA had repudiated the sales contract. Therefore, any argument 

pertaining to whether MUSA repudiated the sales contract is an 

argument directed at the merits of the circuit court's partial-summaryjudgment order and cannot now be considered on mandamus review. The 
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lis pendens notice must remain in effect for the duration of the litigation 

until it is terminated by judgment and the expiration of any appropriate 

period for appeal, or an appellate determination, if an appeal is taken. 

Allen Oil's argument does not provide a convincing basis for this Court to 

suspend application of the doctrine of lis pendens and deny MUSA's 

mandamus petition.

Allen Oil also argues that MUSA had another adequate remedy 

besides filing a petition for a writ of mandamus. Allen Oil argues that 

MUSA could have filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), 

Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate 

its order expunging the lis pendens notice. Allen Oil is incorrect. 

Rule 59(e) does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as the circuit 

court's order expunging the lis pendens notice. Ex parte Troutman 

Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Ala. 2003) ("By its express terms, 

Rule 59(e)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] applies only where there is a 'judgment.'

That term is specifically defined in Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(a), as 'a decree and 

any order from which an appeal lies.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 59 does not 

apply to interlocutory orders, because such orders remain 'within the 

breast of the court.' Rheams v. Rheams, 378 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Ala. Civ.
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App. 1979). A 'Rule 59 motion may be made only in reference to a final 

judgment or order.' Malone v. Gainey, 726 So. 2d 725, 725 n.2 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1999); see also Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Momar, Inc. v. Schneider, 823 So. 2d 701, 704 (Ala. Civ. App.

2001) (a Rule 59(e) 'motion may be taken only from a final judgment')."). 

This Court alone may provide MUSA with its only adequate remedy by 

granting its petition and issuing the requested writ.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition and issue the writ of 

mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the 

lis pendens notice; the lis pendens notice is to be reinstated.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, Mitchell, 

and Cook, JJ., concur.