No. 90-595 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

WILLIAM A. BLASKOVICH, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

-vsDUANNA F. BLASKOVICH, 

Respondent and Appellant. CL~ 3nLrtd 

CLERK CF SUPRErkqf 

S'f'A'iE OF MOru ;PANA 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Douglas G. Skjelset; Skjelset Law Off ices, Missoula, 

Montana. 

For Respondent: 

Christopher Daly, Missoula, Montana. 

Filed: 

Submitted on briefs: April 25, 1991 

Decided: July 23, 1991 

Clerk 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Respondent and appellant, Duanna F. Blaskovich, filed a motion 

to set aside a default decree of dissolution obtained by the 

petitioner and respondent, William A. Blaskovich, in the Fourth 

Judicial District Court, Missoula County. When the District Court 

failed to rule on the motion within 45 days, the motion was deemed 

denied. Duanna appeals. We reverse and remand. 

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in failing to set aside the default decree of dissolution and 

property settlement as void for lack of personal jurisdiction over 

Duanna due to insufficient service of process. 

Duanna and William Blaskovich were married in Missoula on 

October 14, 1981. During the marriage, the parties acquired 

various items of property. They had no children. 

On January 25, 1990, William filed a petition for dissolution. 

The following day at the office of William's attorney, Duanna was 

shown a copy of the petition and an acceptance of service form, 

which she refused to sign. She informed William and his attorney 

that she would be moving to Roy, Utah. Later that day, she phoned 

the attorney to give him her Utah address, 5463 South 2775 West, 

as well as a post office box number. 

On January 30, 1990, William sent the summons and petition to 

the sheriff of Weber County, Utah, the county in which the town of 

Roy is located. The papers were accompanied by a letter directing 

the sheriff to serve Duanna at 5563 South 2775 West in Roy, an 
address that differed from the one given him by Duanna by only one 

digit. Unable to locate Duanna because no such address could be 

found, the sheriff did not complete service and returned the papers 

to William. 

William then forwarded copies of the petition and a notice and 

acknowledgment of service by mail form to Duanna's post off ice box. 

In response, Duanna sent a letter to William, acknowledging that 

she had received "divorce papers1' and refusing to sign any 

documents. At the hearing to set aside the default, Duanna 

claimed that the summons was not included with these papers. 

On March 27, 1990, the hearing on the dissolution was held. 

At the hearing, William claimed that he was unable to personally 

serve Duanna because she had supplied him with a "bogus" address. 

He told the court that he had then attempted service by mail but 

that Duanna had refused to sign the acknowledgment form. Based 

upon William's assertion of due diligence in attempting personal 

service, as well as his assertion that Duanna had deliberately 

concealed her true address, the court found that Duanna's reply 

letter constituted proof of constructive or substituted service. 

The court thereupon entered the default dissolution and distributed 

the property of the parties. 

Upon learning of the court's ruling, Duanna filed a motion to 

set aside the decree under Rules 4D and 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. The 

motion, filed within 180 days after rendition of the decree, was 

timely under Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. 
The court heard testimony but failed to rule on the motion 

until the 45-day jurisdictional time limit elapsed. The motion was 

therefore deemed denied. Nevertheless, the court issued an 

advisory opinion, stating that, although it had lost jurisdiction 

over the matter, it was of the opinion that the default judgment 

should be set aside for lack of personal jurisdiction over Duanna 

due to insufficient service of process. The court found that it 

was reasonable to infer that Duanna supplied William with a correct 

street address rather than a I1bogusu and deliberately fraudulent 

address and that William made an error in transcribing the address 

when he asked the Weber County Sheriff to personally serve her. 

The court found that Duanna did not deliberately conceal her 

address and that Williamls failure to personally serve her was due 

to his own error and lack of diligence. 

Duanna now appeals. 

Personal jurisdiction may be obtained only through strict 

compliance with the Rule 4D, M.R.Civ.P., which governs service of 

process. Sink v. Squire, 236 Mont. 269, 273, 769 P.2d 706, 708 

(1989); Shields v. Pirkle Refrigerated Freightlines, Inc., 181 

Mont. 37, 45, 591 P.2d 1120, 1125 (1979). When service is flawed, 

it I1conf er [s] no jurisdiction and the default judgment entered 

therein [is] void.I1 Shields, 181 Mont. at 45, 591 P.2d at 1125. 

Personal service may be obtained outside of the state of 

Montana in the same manner provided for service within the state. 

Rule 4D(3), M.R. Civ.P. Thus, in conformity with Rule 4D(2) (a), 
M.R. Civ. P., a plaintiff may serve a competent adult who resides 

outside of this state by delivering a copy of the summons and 

complaint to her personally. A plaintiff may also serve a 

competent adult by sending a summons, complaint, and notice and 

acknowledgment of service through the mail, provided the defendant 

signs and returns the notice and acknowledgment form. Rule 

4D(l) (b) , M.R.Civ.P. 

In the present case, William attempted to personally serve 

Duanna in accordance with Rule 4D(2)(a), M.R.Civ.P. Service could 

not be completed, however, because William gave the Weber County 

Sheriff the wrong address. 

When personal service was ineffective, William attempted to 

serve Duanna by mail in accordance with Rule 4D(l)(b), M.R.Civ.P. 

Duanna admitted that she received the complaint and the notice and 

acknowledgment form. She contended, however, that William did not 

include the summons with the other papers. 

If William failed to send the summons to Duanna, service was 

ineffective. However, even if William did send the summons with 

the other papers, the court did not have jurisdiction over her. 

Jurisdiction cannot be obtained simply by mailing a copy of the 

summons and complaint to the defendant. Service by mail is not 

complete until the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons 

is signed by the defendant. Rule 4D(1) (b) (iii) , M.R.Civ.P. If the 

defendant refuses to sign and return the acknowledgment, the 

plaintiff is required to personally serve the defendant. Rule 

4D(1) (b) (i) , M.R.Civ.P. 
The notice and acknowledgment received by Duanna provided as 

follows: 

You mav complete the acknowledgment part of this form 

and return one copy of the completed form to the sender 

within 20 days after the date it was mailed to you as 

shown below. 

If you do not complete and return this form to the sender 

within 30 days after the date it was mailed to you as 

shown below, you may be required to pay any expenses 

incurred in serving a summons and petition in any other 

manner permitted by law. 

If you do complete and return this form, you must answer 

the Petition within 20 days after the date of signature 

which you place on the acknowledgment below. If you fail 

to answer the Petition within the foregoing 20 day 

period, judgment by default will be taken against you for 

the relief demanded in the Petition. (Emphasis added.) 

The acknowledgment informed Duanna, in conformity with Rule 

4D(l) (b) (ii) , M.R. Civ.P., that the only penalty she would suffer 

if she chose not to sign and return the acknowledgment would be 

liability for the costs of other methods of service of process. 

It further informed her that if she signed the acknowledgment and 

then failed to answer the petition, she would be in danger of 

default. It did not inform her that by sending a letter in which 

she explicitly refused to sign the acknowledgment she could also 

suffer a default. 

Duanna acted within her rights when she refused to sign and 

return the acknowledgment of service. Although she had actual 

knowledge of the impending suit, actual knowledge without proper 

service is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, William was not left without a method in which 

to achieve service. He could have served Duanna by publication 

under Rule 4D(5), M.R.Civ.P., or he could have undertaken further 

efforts to find her correct address in Utah. 

William did not properly serve Duanna. Consequently, the 

District Court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over her and 

the default decree of dissolution is void. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

We Concur: 

J"c-7-p- Chief Justice 

\ Justices