1 IN TH E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion N um ber: 3 F ili ng D at e: Ja nu ar y 26 , 201 7 4 N O. S -1 -S C -3 5508 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 MA RC OS SU AZ O, 9 D ef

en da nt- Appe llant.
10 CER TIFIC ATION FR OM T HE N EW ME XIC O C OUR T OF AP PE ALS 11 Je ff F . M cE lr oy, D ist ri ctJu dg e
12 Bennett J. Ba

ur, C hief Public De fender 13 W illiam

A. O’ Connell, Assistant Appellate D efender 14 San ta Fe, NM 15 fo r Appe llant
16 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 17 John Kloss, A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 18 San ta Fe, NM 19 for Appellee18 N MS A 197 8, U JI Cr im

. 2. 11 ( 1981 ), c om m itt ee c om

m en tary ( “ E le m en t 2 of 1 19 U JI 2. 10 and o f U JI 2. 11 w er e . . . r ev is ed in 1981 to b e co nsi ste nt w iththe 198 0 20 am en dm en t t o S ec tio n 30 -2 -1 N MS A 197 8. ”) ; se e als o UJI 14-211 NMRA (1989). 1 OPIN ION 2 CHÁ VEZ , Just ice. 3 { 1} D ef

en da nt M ar co s Sua zo be cam e agi ta te d whi le ro ughh ousi ng wi th his fr ie nd 4 Matthew V igil

. Su az o retrieved his shotg un and po inted it at Vigil. V igil grabbed 5 the sho tgun and p la ce d th e ba rr el in his m outh. Su az o pul le d the tr igg er , kil lin g V igi l 6 and severely injuring his f riend Roger Ga ge, who wa s standin g behind Vigil. A key 7 contested issu e in this ca se wa s whether Suazo knew the shotgun was loaded when 8 he pulled th e trigger. 9 { 2} Tw o potent ially rever sible errors occurr ed during trial. Fir st, at tr i al Suazo 10 soug ht t o in tr oduc e te sti m ony fr om tw o wi tne sse s who sawhim appr oxi m at el y

one 11 hour after the sho oting and heard him claim that he did no t know the shotg un was 12 loa de d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt e xc lud ed the te sti m ony a s in adm iss ibl e he ar say . S ec ond, 13 ove r Su az o’ s ob

j ec tio n, the pr ose cu tio n per sua de d th e co urt t o de pa rt f ro m the 14 uniform

j ury instruction regar ding second-degree m urder, which has existed since 15 1981 , by

m odi fy ing the m en s r ea e le m en t. I nst ea d of

r equir ing the jury to f

ind 1 16 be y ond a re as ona

ble doub t tha t “ [S ua zo ] kne w tha t his ac ts cr eate d a st rong 17 pr oba bil ity of de ath or gr eat bo dil y

harm , ” the m odi fi ed ins tr uc tio n ch an ge d the m en s2

1 rea elem ent to “ knew or should have kn own.” See UJI 1 4- 21 0 NM RA. 2 { 3} A m ong oth er

c ri m es , S ua zo was co nvict ed of se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r an d 3 aggravated battery

with a d ea d l y we apon. H e appealed his second-degree m urder 4 co nvi ct ionto the Co urt of Appe al s, c on te ndi ng tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by 5 ex cl udi ng the w itn es s te sti m ony a nd b y m odi fy ing the uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or 6 se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r. T he Co urt of Appe al s ce rt if ie d his ca se to thi s C ourt purs ua nt 7 to R ule 12- 606 N MR

A a nd N MS A 197 8, S ec tio n 34 -5 -1 4( C) ( 1996 ) due to the 8 si gn ifi can t publ ic im

po rta nc e o f th e jury ins tru ct io n i ss ue . Sta te v . Suazo , or de r at 3 9 (N

. M. Ct
. App. S ep t. 4 , 2015) ( non- pr ec ed en tia l)

. W e ac ce pte d c er tif ic at iona nd 10 ad dr es s bo th i ssu es . 11 { 4} Fi rs t, w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xc lus ion of the he ar say e vid en ce be ca

use 12 the district court did n ot abuse its d iscretion in findin g that Suazo’ s statem ents, w hich 13 w er e ove rh eard

one hour af

te r the sho oti ng, w er e ne ith er ex ci te d utte ranc es nor 14 pr es en t se nse im

pr es sio ns. S ec ond, w e hol d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt er

re d by m odi fy ing 15 the uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r be ca

use in 1980 the 16 Le gislature am ended the definition of s econd-degree m urder to specifically

require 17 pr oof that the a cc use d kn ewthat hi s or he r ac ts cr eate d a str ong pr oba bil ity of de ath 18 or gr eat bodi ly ha rm . 1980 N
. M. L aw s, c h. 21; see NMS A 1978, § 30-2-1(B) (1980).3

1 Be ca u s e t h e mod i fi ed i n s tru ct i o n m i s s t at ed an es s en t i al el emen t , we re v er s e S u az o ’s 2 co nv ic ti o n f

o r s eco nd -d eg ree m

ur de r an d re m an d fo r a n ew tr ia l. See State v. 3 D ow lin g , 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 17, 150 N. M. 110, 257 P. 3d 93 0 (“ When a j ury 4 ins tr uc tio n is f

ac ia lly e rr one ous, a s w he n it

dir ec ts the j ur

y to fi nd g uil t ba se d up on 5 a m isstatem ent of the law , a finding o f j uror m isdirection is u navoid able.” ). 6 I. BACKGRO UND 7 { 5} S u a z o h a ds p e n tmo s t o f t h e d a y d r i n k i n g a n dv i s i t i n g w i t h h i s l o n g t i me 8 fr ie nds, V igi l an d G ag e, at the tr ai le r w he re he liv ed an d in oth er loc at io ns in and 9 ar ound T al pa , N ewMe xic o. V igi l and S ua zo w er e ro ughh ousi ng thr ough out m ost of 10 the day

. The tw o friends often wr estled this way when they

we re together. 11 { 6} So m et im e in t

he e ar ly a ft er noon , V igi l re m ar

ke d tha t Su az o ha d a nic e shot gun, 12 an d G ag e as ke d to se e it. Whe n S ua zo br ought ou t the sho tgun, G ag e ope ne d it to 13 m ak e su re th at it

w as not loa de d. A t G ag e’ s r eque st, S ua zo dis as se m ble d and 14 reassem

ble d th e gun. Whe n th ey f ini she d w iththe gun , G ag e sawS ua zo pla ce it 15 against the wall near

the back door of the trailer. G age w as certa in that the gun was 16 not loa de d a t tha t po int

. 17 { 7} L at er

that a ft er noon , S ua zo a nd V igi l w er e w re stl ing out sid e ag ai n. S ua zo tol d 18 V igi l no t t o m es s w it h hi m be ca use he ha d j ust

los t hi s br oth er . T he r ough hous ing4

1 co nti nue d. V igi l tri ed to pushS ua zo a ga ins t a c ar , a nd the n S ua zo r

ushe d in to the 2 tr ai le r. S ua zo ’ s gi rl fr ie nd, S ha nia L uj an , he ar d hi m

c oc k th e shot gun. A t tri al she 3 t es t i fi ed t h at s h e t o l dSu az o t o b e c ar ef u l wi t h t h e g u n an dt h at h e r es p o n d ed “ Do n ’t 4 worr y , it’s not loaded.” How ever, she had previousl y given a st atem ent that Suazo 5 ha d on ly

r es pond ed “ L eave m e al one . ” S he te sti fi ed that S ua zo the n he ld the sho tgun 6 w ithone hand and p oin te d it a t V igi l w hil e standi ng i n th e door w ay of the tr ai le r. S he 7 sa id tha t V igi l l au ghe d and the n gr ab be d th e ba rrel of th e gun an d st uc k it int o hi s 8 own m outh

. At this point , Ga g e wa s standin g alm ost directly behind Vigil. Suazo 9 pul le d th e tr igg er

a nd the gun fi re d. V igi l w as kil le d and G ag e w as se ri ousl y inj ur ed

. 10 It is not c le ar w he n th e gun w as loa de d and w ho l oa de d it

. 11 II. DISC US SION 12 A . Th e di st ri ctc ou rtd id n ot ab us e it s d isc re ti on b y e xc lu di ng c er ta in 13 st at em en ts b y S ua zo as h ea rs ay 14 { 8} Su az o so ught

to el ic it te sti m ony

f ro m tw o w itn es se s a t tri al r eg ar din g 15 sta te m en ts h e m ad e ap pr oxi m at el y a n ho ur a ft er the sho oti ng, be tw ee n 4: 40 and 5 :00 16 p.m . Elaine M edina and Rosem ary Cr u z, Su azo’ s stepm other, testified that Suaz o 17 tol d them

he ha d ki lle d hi s be st f

ri en d, he did

not kno wthe gunw as loa de d, a nd h e 18 did not und er stand w ha t ha d ha

ppe ne d. Medi na te sti fi ed tha t wh en Su az o m ad e the se 19 statem ents he was curled up in a ball and cry ing hard, and she had never seen him cry5

1 li ke th at . Si m il arl y , Cru z te st ifi ed th at he ap pe ared drun k, he s eem ed“ ve ry up se t,” 2 an d he was cr

y ing “ a lot ” w he n he m ad e the state m en ts. T he S ta te obj ec te d to the 3 w itn es se s’ state m en ts a s he ar say , but de fe nse c ouns el a rg ue d tha t the state m en ts 4 shou ld b e adm itt ed

und er the e xc ite d utte ranc e an d pr es en t se nse im pr es sio n 5 ex cep ti on s t o t h e h e a r s a y rul e. See Rule 11-803(1)-(2) N MRA
. The district court 6 sustain ed the State’ s objections and excluded the evid ence. 7 { 9} A lth oughthe Co urt of Appe al s on ly

c er tif ie d th e j ur

y ins tr uc tio n is sue to this 8 Court, we take this opportun ity to r esolve S uazo’ s claim that the d i s t ri ct court 9 er ro ne ousl y ex cl ude d th e w itn es s te sti m ony about state m en ts tha t he m ad e af te r the 10 sh oo ti ng . See State v. Orosco , 1992 -N MS C- 006, ¶ 2 n. 2, 113 N
. M. 780, 833 P. 2d 11 1146 (stating that thi s Court has jurisdiction over the entire case following acceptance 12 of c er tif ic at ion ). “ W e exam ine the adm iss ion or ex cl usi on o f ev ide nc e fo r ab use of 13 discretion, a n d the trial court’ s determ ination will not be disturbed absen t a clear 14 abuse of that discretion.” State v. Stanley , 200 1- N MS C- 037, ¶ 5, 131 N
. M. 368 , 37 15 P. 3d 8 5. “ A n a

buse of dis cr et ionoc curs w he n th e ru lin g is c le ar ly a ga ins t the log ic 16 and effe ct of t h e facts and cir cum stances of the case. W e cannot say the trial court 17 ab use d it s di sc re tio n by it s r uli ng unle ss w e can c hara ct er iz e [the r uli ng] a s c le ar ly 18 untenable or not j ustified byrea son.” Sta te v . R ojo , 1999-NMS C-001, ¶ 41, 126 N. M.6

1 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). W e conclude that 2 there w as no abuse of discretion in this case. 3 { 10} Ther e is no dou bt that Suazo’ s anguis hed statem ents to Medina and Cruz we re 4 hearsay

because they

we re out-of-c ourt statem en ts offere d to prove what they 5 as se rt ed

—tha t S ua zo did

not re al iz e the shot gun w as loa de d an d he did not m ean to 6 ki ll Vig il

. See Ru le 11- 801 N MR A ( de fi nin g a s he ar say

out -o f- co urt st at em en ts 7 of fe re d to pr ove the tr

uthof w ha t they as se rt)

. S uc h st at em en ts are ina dm iss ibl e 8 un le ss an ex cep ti on ap pl ie s. Ru le 11 -8 02 NMRA. 9 { 11} A statem ent that would otherwise be hearsay can be adm itted und er the e xcited 10 utt er an ce e xc ep tio n w he n it “ re la t[ es ] to a start lin g e ve nt o r co ndi tio n” a nd i s “ m ad e 11 w hil e . . . unde r the str es s or ex ci te m en t” ca use d by tha t ev en t or co ndi tio n. Ru le 11- 12 803( 2)

. “ [T ] he the or

y und er ly ing the e xc ite d ut te ranc e ex ce pti on i s th at the e xc iti ng 13 event indu ced the declar ant’ s surprise, shock, or ner v o u s excitem ent which 14 te m por ar ily sti lls c ap ac ity

f or c on sc iou s f

ab ri catio n and m ak es it

unl ike ly that the 15 speaker w ould relate other than the truth.” State v. F lores , 2010 -N MS C- 002, ¶ 47, 16 147 N
. M. 542 , 226 P
. 3d 6 41 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and cit at ion s om itt ed ). T hus, 17 “ to c onst itu te a n e xc ite d ut te ranc e, the de cl ar at ion shou ld b e spon tane ous, m ad e 18 before there is tim e for f abrication, a n d m ad e u nder the stress of the m om ent.” Id

.7

1 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and ci ta tio ns om itt ed ). In de te rm ini ng wh ethe r to adm it a 2 sta te m en t un de r the e xc ite d ut te ranc e ex ce pti on, the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d c onsi de r the 3 tot al ity of the c ir cu m stanc es a nd 4 co nsi de r a va ri ety of fa ct or s inor de r to a sse ss the de gr ee of r ef le ct ionor 5 spon tane ity unde rl y ing the sta te m en t. T he se fa ct or s in cl ude , but a re not 6 lim ite d to , howm uc h ti m e pa sse d be tw ee n th e start lin g e ve nt and the 7 sta te m en t, a nd w he the r, in tha t t im e, the de cl ar an t ha d an op portun ity f or 8 re fl ec tio n an d fa br ic at ion ; how m

uc h pa in, co nf

usi on, ne rv ousnes s, or 9 em ot io na l stri fe the de cl ar an t w as e xpe ri en ci ng a t the ti m e of the 10 sta te m en t; w he the r the st at em en t w as se lf -s er vin g[ ; and w he the r the 11 st at em en t was ] m ad e in res po ns e to an in qu iry[.] 12 St at e v. Bal de ra ma , 2004 -N MS C- 008, ¶ 51, 135 N
. M. 329, 88 P. 3d 845 (a lte ratio ns 13 in origin al) (inter

nal quot ation m arks and citations om itted). 14 { 12} U nde r the tot al ity of the c ir cum st an ces , in thi s c as e the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t 15 ab use it s di sc re tio n by e xc lud ing te sti m ony re ga rd ing Su az o’ s sta te m en ts to M ed ina 16 an d Cr

uz a ft er the sho oti ng. P ri or

to m ak ing the state m en ts, S ua zo dr ove a w ay f ro m 17 the crim e scene w ith his girlfriend and asked her to take the batteries out of his ph one. 18 H e tol d he r dur ing the dr ive that he w as “ gonn a go aw ay fo r a long ti m e. ” H e m ad e 1 9 s e v e r a l s t o p s , i n c l u d i n g a t h i s s t e p m o t h e r ’ s h o u s e , w h e r e h e h i d t h e s hot gun. T he 20 ap pr oxi m at el y

one hour tha t e la

pse d be tw ee n th e shoo ti ng and th e sta te m en ts, 21 co upl ed

w ithS ua zo ’ s i nt erveni ng a ct ion s and s ta te m en ts, c oul d r ea sona bly be 22 int er pr et ed to ind ic at e tha t he r ef

le ct ed on w ha t ha d ha

ppe ne d and the gr av ity

of his8

1 situatio n, and theref

ore his later statem ents wer e not sufficiently spont aneous so as 2 to a ssure the ir

r el ia bil ity a nd qua lif

y the m a s e xc ite d utte ranc es . 3 { 13} W e lik ew ise re

j ec t Sua zo ’ s cla im tha t i t w as e rr or f or the dis tr ic t c ourt no t t o 4 adm it the state m en ts unde r the pr es en t se ns e im pr es sio n he ar say

e xc ep tio n. T he 5 pr es en t se nse im

pr es sio n e xc ep tio n a

ppl ie s to state m en ts “ de sc ribi ng or e xpl ai nin g 6 an ev en t o r co nd it io n, m ad e whi le or i m m ed ia te ly after t he d ecl aran t p erce iv edit .” 7 Ru le 11- 803( 1)

. A ga in, giv enthe le ngth of ti m e an d S ua zo ’ s in te rv en ing a ct ion s 8 be tw ee n th e shoo tin g and the state m en ts, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rlye xe rc ise d it s 9 di sc ret io n to refu se to ap pl y th is ex cep ti on an d e xc lu de th e te st im on y as h ears ay . See 10 Flores , 201 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ ¶ 51- 53 ( ex pla ini ng tha t the c ont em por an ei ty of the e ve nt 11 with the tim ing of the statem ent is the c ritical consideration in analy zing whether a 12 hearsay

statem ent qualifies as a present sense im pression). 13 B. The d istrict c ourt e rred by includ ing “should have know n” in th e ju ry 14 instruc tion for sec ond-d egree m urde r 15 { 14} At the c onclusi on o f Suaz o’ s trial, the State tendere d a m odified jury 16 ins tr uc tio n f or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r. N ew Mex ic o’ s un if orm j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or 17 second-degree m

urder would require the j ury to find bey ond a reasonable doub t that 1 8 S u a z o “kn e w t h a t h i s a c t s c r e a t e das t r o n g p r o b ab i l i t y o f d e a t h o r g r e a tb o d i l y h a rm” 19 to V igi l or

a nothe r. UJI 14-210
. T he S tate ’ s m odi fi ed j ur y ins tr uc tio n inthi s c as e9

1 inserted “ knew or should have kn own” in p l ac e o f t h e word “ knew, ” but was 2 oth er w ise co nsi ste nt w ith the m ode l instru ct ion

. T he dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n “ kne w ” an d 3 “ shou ld have kno wn” w as central to this case bec ause if t h e j urors believed that 4 Suazo did not realize that th e sh otgu n wa s loaded and the sho oting wa s therefore an 5 accident, as he claim ed, they could have reasonably

found that he shou ld have known 6 of the pr oba bil ity of de ath or gre at bodi ly

harm to V igi l be ca

use he obv iou sly

did not 7 i n s p ec tt h e g u n t o d et er m i n e i f i twa s l o ad ed . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt g av e t h e S t at e’s 8 pr opos ed

j ur y ins tr uc tio n ove r de fe nse co unse l’ s obj ec tio n. S ua zo c ont en ds tha t the 9 dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by a ddi ng the phr as e “ or

sho uld ha ve kno w n” in ins tr

uc tin g th e 10 j ury on the m ens rea r equired for second-degree m urder. 11 { 15} W e re view the j ury instructio n in this case for re versible error because Suazo 12 pr es erv edhi s o bjec ti on at t ria l. Sta te v . Ca be zue la , 2011 -N MSC- 041, ¶ 21, 150 N. M. 13 654, 2 65 P.3d 705. W e conclude that there is rever sible error w hen the jury 14 ins tr uc tio ns, take n a s aw hol e, c au se j ur or c onf usi on b y “ fa il[ ing ] to pr ov ide the 15 j uror[s] with an accurate rendition of the relevant law .” Id

. ¶ 22 (in te rn al quo ta tio n 16 m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ); se e als o Rule 5-608(A) NMR A (“ The court m

ust ins truct 17 the j ury upon all questio ns of l aw essential for a convictio n of any crim e subm itted 1 8 to t h e j u ry . ” )

. “ Wh e n a j u ry i n s t r u c t i o n i s f

a c i a l l y e rr o n e o u s , a s w h e n i t d i r e c t s th e10

1 j ur y to fi nd gui lt ba se d upon a m iss ta te m en t of the law , af

ind ing of j ur or m isd ir ec tio n 2 is unavo idable.” D ow lin g , 201 1- N MS C- 016, ¶ 17. To as certa in whe the r the 3 ch al le nge d in str

uc tio n inthi s c as e ac curate ly state d the la w, w e m

ust de te rm ine 4 w he the r the re qui sit e m en s re a fo r se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r is sa tis fi ed by a j ur

y f ind ing 5 tha t S ua zo sho uld

ha ve kno w n th at hi s act s c re at ed astr ong pr oba

bil ity of de ath or 6 great bodily

harm to Vigil. T his i n q u i ry requires us to interpret the m ens rea 7 com ponent of our second-degree m urder statute. “ Our prim ary g o al when 8 interpreting a

statute is to determ ine and give effec t to the Legislature’ s intent.” Co ok 9 v. A ndi ng , 200 8- N MS C- 035, ¶ 7, 144 N
. M. 400 , 188 P
. 3d 1 151. 10 { 16} W e beg i n with the plain language of the statute, w hich is “ [t] he prim ary 11 indicator of l egislative intent.” Sta te v . J ohns on , 2009-NMS C-049, ¶ 10, 147 N. M. 12 177, 218 P.3d 863

. Pursuant to Section 30-2-1(B), 13 Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden qu arre l 14 or

in the he at

of pa ss io n, ape rs on w ho k ill s anothe r hum anbe ing 1 5 w ith o u tl a w f

u l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r e x c u s e c o m

m i t s m u r d e r i n t h e s e co nd 1 6 d eg re e i f i n p er fo rmin g t h e a ct s wh i ch ca u s e t h e d ea t h h e [ o r s h e] knows 17 that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm 18 to that ind ividu al or another. 19 (E m pha sis a dde d. ) U nde r the statut e, ade fe ndant m ust kno wthat hi s or

he r ac ts 20 cr eate astr ong pr obabi li ty o f death or gr eat bo dil y

harm ; the re is no e xpr es s 21 re q u i rem ent that a defendant “ shou ld have kno wn. ” Id

. ; se e als o U J I 1 4

- 21011

1 (i nstru ct ing j ur or s th at

the y m ust f ind that “ [t ] he de fe ndant k

ne w tha t his [or he r] a ct s 2 created a strong probabi lity of death or bodily

harm ” to convi ct fo r second-degree 3 m ur de r)

. T he statut e’ s pl ai n langua ge a nd N ewMe xic o’ s u ni fo rm j ur y ins tr uc tio n 4 re qui re that the de fe ndant p oss es s know le dge of the pr oba ble c onse que nc es of

his or 5 he r act s. See § 30-2-1(B); U JI 14-210. By contrast, neither the statute nor the jury 6 ins tr uc tio n expl ic itl y m en tio ns wh ethe r a re as ona ble pe rs on “ shou ld h av e known” of 7 the pr oba

ble c onse que nc es a s am en s r ea standard

. W e m

ust giv e ef fe ct to this pla in 8 langua ge unl es s w e de te ct s om e am big uity in the statut e tha t r equir es adif fe re nt 9 in te rp ret at io n. St a t e v . M a e s t as , 2 00 7- N MS C- 001, ¶ 14, 140 N
. M. 836 , 149 P
. 3d 10 933. 11 { 17} W e ar e not pe rs ua de d by the S ta te ’ s r el ianc e on State v. B rown as asourc e of 12 am big uity in the st at ut e tha t r equir es us t o r ea d th e sta tut or y te rm “ know s” to 13 en co m

pa ss an ob

j ec tiv e know le dge of

the r isk thr ougha “ shou ld h av e known” 14 standard

. 199 6- N MS C- 073, ¶ 16, 122 N
. M. 724 , 931 P. 2d 6 9. I n Brown , this Court 15 determ ined that a j ury m ay consider e vidence of intoxi cation when a def endant has 1 6 b ee n ch ar g ed wi t h fi rs t -d eg re e d ep ra v ed m i n d m u rd er b ec au s e th e d e f

e n d an t ’s 17 “subj ec tiv e or a ctual

k now le dge of the hig h de gr ee of ri sk i nvol ve d inhis c ondu ct ” 18 is an ess en ti a l ele m en t o f th atoff en se . Id

. ¶ ¶ 13, 19, 35. A s part

of our a na ly sis in12

1 Brown , w e dis tin gui she d be tw ee n th e cu lpa ble m en ta l st at es r equir ed by f ir st- a nd 2 se co nd -d eg ree m

ur de r. Id. ¶¶1 4 , 1 6 . To t h at en d , we o p i n ed t h at a d ef en d an t ’s 3 “ subj ec tiv e know le dge ” of the r isk und er de pr av ed m ind m

ur de r co nst itu te d pr oof

of 4 a “ w ic ke d or

m al ign an t he ar

t” a nd “ utt er

dis re ga rd

f or hum anlife,” w hil e se co nd5 de gr ee m

ur de r onl y re qui re d an “ obj ec tiv e know le dge of the r isk ” w ith out

a ny 6 sh owi ng th atth e act was p erfo rm edwit h a wick edor m al ig na nt he art . Id

. ¶ 16 7 (in t e rna l qu ot a t i on m a rks om i t t e d)

. O ur C ourt ’ s di sc us si on of t he m e ns rea 8 re qui re m en t f

or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r in Brown w as unn ec es sary to the r es olu tio n 9 of that case and was theref ore dicta. 10 { 18} O ur

dif fe re nti at ionbe tw ee n ade fe ndant’ s su bj ec tiv e an d ob

j ec tiv e know le dge 11 of the risk wa s intended to drawa principled distin ction between fir st-degree 12 de pr av ed m in d m

ur de r an d s eco nd -d eg ree m ur de r. Se e id. ¶ 16. This issue has vexed 13 N ewMe xic o c ourts s inc e 1980 , w he n N ewMe xic o’ s curr en t sta tut or y de fi nit ion s of 14 the m ens reas f

or m urder in the first- and second -d egree we re e nacted. 1980 N. M. 15 Laws, ch. 21. T he am ended statute changed th e m ens rea for second-degree m urder 16 fr om “ m al ic e af

or et ho ug ht ” to know le dge that a de fe ndant’ s a ct s c re at ed astr ong 17 pr ob ab il it y of

de at h o r gr eat bo di ly harm

. Co m pare id. wi th NMS A 1953 , § 40A-2-1 18 (1963). Af

ter this new language w as enacted, courts and com m entators alike noted13

1 the difficulty

in disti ngui shing betwee n the knowledge requirem ents for first-degre e 2 de pr av ed

m ind m ur de r (k no wled ge that ana ct is gr eatly

dange ro us t o th e liv es of 3 others, indicating a depraved m ind withou t regard for hum an life) and second -degree 4 m ur de r (kno wledge that an a ct c re at es astr ong pr oba

bil ity of de ath or gr eat bo dil y 5 ha rm to th e v ic ti m

or a no th er p ers on ). See Leo M . Rom ero , Unintention al Homic ides 6 Caused by Risk- Creating Conduct: Problems in Distinguis hing Be tween D epraved 7 M ind M urde r, Se co nd D egre e M

urde r, In vo lun tar

y M anslaugh te r, and No nc rim ina l 8 Hom icide in New M

exico , 20 N .M. L. Rev. 55, 61-69 (1990 ) (identify ing po tential 9 dis tin ct ion s be tw ee n de pr av ed m ind m ur de r an d se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r an d 10 discuss ing th e ef

forts of N ewMexico courts to differentiate betw een the two)

. 11 { 19} T his Co urt f

ir st g ra ppl ed w iththi s th or

ny di st incti on i n Sta te v . M cC rar y , 12 w hic h w as de ci de d m or e than a de ca de pr ior to Brown
. M

cC rar y , 198 4- N MS C- 005, 13 100 N
. M. 671 , 675 P
. 2d 1 20. I n M cC rar ywe determ ined that first-degree depraved 14 m ind m

urder re quired proof of t he defendant’ s subjective kn owledge th at his or her 15 a c t w a s g r e a t l y

da ng ero us to th e li ve s o f ot he rs . Id

. ¶ ¶ 8

- 1 0
. W e r e l i e do n t he 16 co m m itt ee c om

m en tary to the uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n on fi rs t- de gr ee de pr av ed m ind 17 m urder w hich existed at that tim e, which asserted that second-degree m urder re quired 18 anobj ect ive t es t of

ade fe ndant’ s kn ow le dge , pr es um ab ly im ply ing that a

“ shou ld14

1 have known” standard would satisfy the m en s rea

requirem ent for second-degree 2 m ur de r. Id

. ¶ 8, ref erring to NMS A 1978, U JI Crim . 2. 05, com m ittee com

m entary 3 (Repl. Pam

p. 1982). 4 { 20} H ow ev er , the c om m itt ee c om

m en ta ry to a

j ur y ins tr uc tio n is onl y

pe rs ua siv e 5 to th e ex te nt th at it co rrec tl y st at es th e la w. Se e Sta te v . J ohns on , 200 1- N MS C- 001, 6 ¶ 16, 130 N. M. 6, 15 P
. 3d 1 233 (d isa ppr ovi ng o f a uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n and i ts 7 co m m en ta ry be cau se it was a “ m is st at em en t of [t he ] la w”), hold ing limited o n other 8 gr ou nd s b y Sta te v. Si ms , 2010 -N MS C- 027, ¶¶ 31- 32, 148 N
. M. 330 , 236 P
. 2d 6 42. 9 The passage in the com m entary relied on by

t he M cC rar yCo urt i s “ doub tf

ul 10 au tho ri ty ” tha t ob

j ec tiv e know le dge is s uf

fi ci en t f or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r. R om er o, 11 supra , a t 65 ; see U JI Cr im

. 2. 05, c om m itt ee c om

m en tary ( Re pl. P am

p. 198 2) ( ci tin g 12 W ayne R. LaFav e & Au st in W . Sco tt , H andb ook O n C rim ina l L aw54 4 (1 97 2) ). As 13 Profe ssor Rom ero has noted, it appears th at t he drafter s of t he com m ittee com

m entary 14 “ lifted a sentence out of context and m istakenly assum ed that the treatise supports an 15 ob jecti ve st an da rdforsec on d d eg ree m ur de r.” Ro m ero , supra , at 65- 67. I nst ea d, the 16 quot ed

po rti on of L aF av e an d S co tt sta te s th at und er f ir st- de gr ee de pr av ed

m ind 17 m urder, it is “unus ual” that a defendant’ s subjective realization o f the risk w ill be at 18 iss ue , a nd arg ue s th at a tte ndant c ir cu m stanc es kno w n to ar ea sona ble pe rs on w ill15

1 often be sufficient to establish t h at t h e d efendant knew that his or her a cts we re 2 gr eat ly dan ge ro us to th e li ve s o f ot he rs . Id

. ; se e als o UJI Crim . 2. 05, com m ittee 3 co m m en tary ( quot ing L aF av e & Sco tt a t 54 4)

. I nde ed , in the ne xt p ar ag ra ph the 4 treatise argues that a subjec tive realiza tion o f the risk should be required to convict 5 for any d eg re e o f m

urder due to the drastic penal consequences of a m urder 6 co nv ic ti on . LaFav e & Sc ot t, supra , a t 54 4. 7 { 21} To f

urther confuse m atters, a little over a y ear after M cC rar ywas d eci de d, we 8 he ld i n State v. B each that se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r co nta ine d aspe ci fi c “ el em en t of 9 su bjec ti ve kn owl ed ge .” 19 85 -NMSC -0 43 , ¶ 12 , 10 2 N.M. 64 2, 6 99 P.2d 11 5. Be ach 10 w as la te r ove rr

ule d in Brown “ [t]o t he ex te nt th at. . . Be ach

. . . hol ds tha t se co nd11 degree m

u rd er c ontains the sam e ‘ subjective knowledge’ elem ent as [fir st-degree] 12 depraved m ind m

urder. ” Brown , 199 6- N MS C- 073, ¶ 16. 13 { 22} The Brown Co urt ov er ru le d Be ach in dicta, w h i ch likely explains why

since 14 Brown w as de ci de d, ne ith er our c as e lawnor

our uni fo rm j ur y ins tr uc tio ns h av e 15 applied the Brown di ct a to sec on d- de gr ee m ur de r cas es . B ut c

f. State v. R eed , 16 2005 -N MS C- 031, ¶

81, 138 N
. M. 365 , 120 P
. 3d 447 (S er na , J. , co nc ur

ri ng in pa rt

a nd 17 dissent ing in part) (advocating for a “ shou ld have kno wn” standard to be incorporated 18 int o th e uni fo rm j ur

y ins tr uc tio n fo r se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r ba se d on B row n in a c as e16

1 di sc us si ng fir st -d eg ree d ep rav edm ind m ur de r) ; State v. B aca , 199 7- N MS C- 059, ¶ 35, 2 124 N. M. 333 , 950 P. 2d 776 (ref erring to the objec tive test for second-degree m urder 3 in ana ly zi ng an in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of co unse l cla im in the co nte xt of a c onvi ct ion 4 fo r ai di ng an d ab et ti ng fir st -d eg ree de pr av edm in d m ur de r). Re ed

c lari fi ed that f ir st5 degree depraved m ind m urder can be differe ntiated fr o m second-degree m

urder 6 because depraved m ind m urd er requ ires a j ury

finding th at the defendant’ s act 7 “ ind ic at ed

ade pr av ed

m ind w ith out r eg ar d f or hum anli fe

. ” 2005 -N MS C- 031, ¶ 21. 8 W e la id o ut s ev er al ind ic at or s of ade pr av ed

m ind in Re ed , includ ing (1) th e num ber 9 of persons subjected to the risk, (2) subjective knowledge that the defe ndant’s ac t wa s 10 gr eatly

dange ro us t o hu m anli fe , a nd ( 3) a n el em en t of “ int en sif ie d m al ic e or

e vil 11 i nte nt.” Id. ¶

¶ 22- 24 ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). N ota bly , the 12 m aj or ity

opi nio n in Re ed did not ad opt the subj ec tiv e- obj ec tiv e dic hot om y ur ge d by 13 the dissent in that case and th e Brown di ct a. See R eed , 2005-NMS C-031, ¶ 81 (Serna, 14 J., concurring in part and diss enting in part). H owever , the Re ed m aj or ity stay ed tr ue 15 to Brown by cl ar if

y ing how the kno w le dge standard f or f ir st- de gr ee de pr av ed

m ind 16 m ur de r was di st in ctfro m

th e kn owl ed ge st an da rd fo r se co nd -d eg ree m ur de r. Re ed , 17 200 5- NMSC -0 31, ¶

21; see Brown , 1996-NMS C-073, ¶ 16. T he uniform j ury 18 instructio n s have since been revised to elaborate upon the m eaning of a “ depraved17

1 m ind” and further disting uish first

- de gr e e depraved m ind m urder fr om

second-degree 2 m ur de r; how ev er , the se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r ins tr

uc tio n ha s ne ve r be enr ev ise d to 3 in co rp or at e an ob

jecti ve “ sh ou ld ha ve kn own ” kn owl ed ge st an da rd

. See U JI 14- 203, 4 14 -2 10 to -21 3 NM RA. 5 { 23} This Court’ s hesitancy to adopt th e m ens re a for second-degree m urder 6 advocated by

the Brown dic tais co m

m en sur at e w ithour

c onsi ste nt s ta te m en ts tha t a 7 negligent or acc idental kill ing coul d not satis fy the elem ents of seco nd-degree 8 m ur de r. Se e, e . g. , Sta te v . O rte ga , 199 1- N MS C- 084, ¶

25, 112 N
. M. 554, 817 P. 2d 9 1196 ( hol din g th at

a n “ uni nte nti ona l or ac ci de nta l kill ing w ill not suf fi ce ” to e sta

bli sh 10 the m en s r ea

e le m en t of

se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r), a b roga tion recogn ized on ot her 11 grou nds by Sta te v. Marquez , 2016 -N MS C- 025, ¶ 14, 376 P
. 3d 8 15; Sta te v . Ca m pos , 12 1996 -N MSC- 043, ¶ 18, 122 N .M. 148, 921 P.2d 126 6 (“ [A ] negligent o r ac cidental 13 kil lin g w oul d no t c onst itu te se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r . . . . ”) ; see also Sta te v. 14 McG ruder , 19 97 -NMSC -0 23 , ¶ 21 , 12 3 N.M. 30 2, 9 40 P.2d 15 0 (s am e), abro gated 15 on other grou nds by State v . C havez , 2009 -N MS C- 035, ¶ 26, 146 N
. M. 434, 211 P. 3d 16 891. O ur

lon gst an din g r ef

usa l t o e ndor se a the or

y of ne gli ge nt m

ur de r fo re cl ose s th e 17 im pli catio n in Brown tha t t o c onvi ct of se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r it w oul d be suf

fi ci en t 18 for the j ury

to find that a defendant shou ld have kno wn of the r isk of his o r her18

1 conduct withou t anything m ore, because that is essentially a civil negligence 2 st an da rd

. Se e Sta te v . Co nsau l , 201 4- N MS C- 030, ¶ 39, 332 P
. 3d 8 50 ( not ing the 3 cl o s e asso ciation between the phrase “ knew or should have kn own” and principles 4 of c ivi l ne gli ge nc e (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks o m itt ed )) ; se e als o Ro m ero , supra , a t 65 5 (“ To say

that a person should have kn own of the risk im poses a neglig ence standard 6 ba se d ona n ob

j ec tiv e te st of w ha t the re as ona ble pe rs on wo uld ha ve kno w n un de r the 7 circum stances.”)

. Indeed, it is a “ concept firm l y ro o t ed in our jurisprudence [ that 8 w] hen a crim e is p u n i s h ab le as a f elony , c ivil negl igence ordinarily is an 9 ina ppr opr ia te pr ed ic at e by

w hic h to de fi ne suc h cr im ina l c ondu ct ” in the abse nc e of 1 0 s o me c o n t r a ry i n d i c a t i o n f r o m the Legi sl at

ur e. S a n t i l la n e s v . Sta te , 199 3- N MS C- 012, 11 ¶¶ 30- 31, 115 N
. M. 215 , 849 P
. 2d 3 58. 12 { 24} Further, if we we re to a dopt a “ shou ld have kno wn” standard f or second-degree 13 m urder, we would render inconsi stent the culpabilit y requirem ents u n d er Ne w 14 Mexico’ s various ho m icide statutes. For exam ple, the lesser offense of involunt ary 15 m an sla

ughter req ui re s th at

ade fe ndant h av e ac te d “ w ith out due c au tio n and 16 ci rc um spe ct ion

. ” N MS A 197 8, § 30 -2 -3 (B ) (1 994)

. I n Sta t e v . Y a r boro ugh , we 17 cl ar if ie d th at “ the S ta te m

ust sho wa t l ea st c ri m ina l ne gli ge nc e to c onvi ct . . . of 18 inv olun ta ry m an sla

ught er . ” 199 6- N MS C- 068, ¶ 20, 122 N
. M. 596 , 930 P
. 2d 1 31.19

1 T he uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or inv oluntary

m an sla ught er r equir es pr oof

that a 2 de fe ndant “ shou ld h av e known of the dange r inv olv ed ” in his or he r ac tio ns an d a lso 3 “ ac te d w ithaw ill fu l di sr eg ar d f or the sa fe ty of oth er s. ” U JI 14- 231 N MR A
. I t w oul d 4 be inc ongr

ue nt t o in te rp re t our se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r sta tut e to r eq

uir e a l e s s c ulp ab le 5 m en ta l st at e (o rd inary ne gli ge nc e) than th e m ini m um le ve l of c ulp ab ili ty

r equir ed by 6 i n vo lu nt ary m an sl au gh te r (cri m in al ne gl ig en ce). Se e Sta te v . Ni ck R. , 7 2009 -N MS C- 050, ¶

11, 147 N
. M. 182 , 2 18 P.3 d 868 ( “ W e m ust take c ar e to avoi d 8 ad opt ionof

ac onstru ct ionthat w oul d r en de r the statut e’ s a ppl ic at io n absurd

or 9 unr ea sona

ble o r le ad

to inj ust ic e or

c ontra dic tio n. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and 10 citation om itted)). 11 { 25} W e detect no am bigu ity in Section 30-2-1(B) that w ould require us to interpret 12 the kno w le dge re qui re m en t to exte nd to situatio ns wh er e a def en da nt did not k

now 13 of the risk created by his or her act, but ins tead m erely shoul d hav e k n o wn of that 14 risk. D espite som e confusing lang uage in our case lawregar di n g first-degre e 15 de pr av ed

m ind m ur de r, w e ha ve ne ve r inc or por at ed a n ob j ec tiv e “ shou ld h av e 16 known” standard int o our ca se s an al y zi ng se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r, or o th er

w ise 17 im pli ed that or din ar

y ne gli ge nc e co uld

be a suf fi ci en tly c ulp ab le m en ta l st at e to 18 supp ort any kin d of m ur de r co nvi ct ion

. O ur uni fo rm j ur y ins tr uc tio ns, to w hic h th e18 W e note that the current com m ittee com

m entary to UJI 14-203 states that 2 19 se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r re qui re s pr oof

of obj ec tiv e k

n o w l e d g e , c iti ng Re ed

a nd Brown
. 20 The c omm ittee should revisit this comm entary in ligh t of our opini on in th is case. 20 1 St at e’ s te nde re d in str

uc tio n a dde d a“ should ha ve kno w n” c om pone nt, ha ve a lso 2 never incorporated an ordinary n eg ligence standard for second-degree m urder. 3 A cc or din gly , the ins tr

uc tio n inthi s c as e m iss ta te d th e m en s r ea e lem en t of

se co nd4 de gr ee m

urde r, a nd i t w as the re fo re e rr or f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o pr ovi de thi s 5 i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e ju ry. 2 6 C . The dist ri ctc ou rt ’s m iss ta te m en t of t he e sse nt ial m en s r ea e le m en t is 7 re ve rs ib le e rr or r eq ui ri ng a n ew tr ial 8 { 26} “ [I ] f anins tr

uc tio n is fa ci al ly er

ro ne ous it pr es en ts an inc ur ab le pr obl em a nd 9 m andates re v ersal. ” Sta te v . P ari sh , 199 4- N MS C- 073, ¶

4, 118 N
. M. 39, 878 P
. 2d 10 988; se e als o State v . E lli s , 2 0 0 8

- N M S C

- 0 3 2 , ¶ 1 4 , 1 4 4 N
. M
. 2 5 3 , 1 8 6 P
. 3 d2 4 5 ( “A 11 j ury instruction which does not ins tru ct t h e j ury upon all question s of lawessential 12 for a c on vi c t i on of a ny c r i m e su bm i t t e d t o t he j ur

y i s r e ve r si bl e e rr or . ” (internal 13 quot ation m arks and citations om itted)). 14 { 27} O ur

r ule s r equir e law y er s to obj ec t to e rr one ous ins tr uc tio ns, a s de fe nse 15 counsel did in this case. Rule 5 -608(D). The purpos e of this requirem ent is to alert 16 the trial cou rt t o t he problem with the instruction and to allow the court an 17 op po rtu ni ty to co rrec t t he erro r. Id

. In this case, a u niform

j ury instruction has been21

1 av ai la ble f or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r sin ce 198 1. N MS A 1978 , U JI Cr im

. 2. 10 ( 1981 ) 2 (“ Second De gree Murder : volu ntary m anslaugh ter lesser included offense; essential 3 elem ents”); UJI Crim . 2. 11 (1981) (“ Second De gree Murder : volu ntary m anslaugh ter 4 not le sse r inc lud ed

of fe nse ; e sse nti al e le m en ts” ). “ [W ] he n auni fo rm ins tr uc tio n is 5 provided for the ele m ents of a cr im e, . . . the uniform instruction shoul d be used 6 w i t h o u t s ub s t a n t i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n . . . [ u n l e s s ] a l t e r a t i o n i s a d e qu a t e l y s up p or te d by 7 bin din g pr ec ed en t . . . a nd w he re the a lte ratio n is ne ces sa ry in or de r to a cc ur at el y 8 convey the law to the j ury .” Uniform Jury Instructions—Crim inal, Contents, G eneral 9 Use N ote (2015). For the essential elem ents of crim es not contained in a uniform j ury 10 ins tr uc tio n, the c ourt m

ust draft an ins tr

uc tio n, a nd o rd inari ly

that i nstru ct ionis 11 ad eq ua te if i t s ub st an ti al ly foll ows th e la ng ua ge of t h e s t a t u t e. Se e Sta te v . D oe , 12 1983 -N MS C- 096, ¶ 8, 10 0 N.M. 481 , 672 P
. 2d 6 54 ( “ [I ] f the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns 13 subs tantially follow th e lang uage of t he statute or u se eq uivalent language, th en they 14 are s uf

fic ie nt .”), h o l d ing modified b y B each , 198 5- N MS C- 043, ¶ 12. T he 15 m odi fi catio n of

the uni fo rm

j ur y ins tr uc tio n inthi s c as e w as not supp orte d by bin din g 16 pr ec ed en t, a nd i t ne ith er a cc ur at el y

c onve y ed

the lawto the j ur

y nor sub stanti al ly 17 followed the language of Section 30-2-1(B). This w as not a case w here the m ens rea 18 elemen t wa s not at issu e or w here the e vidence was undisput ed and indis putable.22

1 In s t ru ct i n g t h e ju ry wi t h a n o n -u n i fo rm jur y i n s t ru ct i o n co mp ro m i s ed Su az o ’s 2 “ fundam en ta l r igh t . . . to ha ve the j ur y de te rm ine w he the r ea che le m en t of the 3 charged offe nse has been proved by the state bey ond a reasonable doub t,” and it was 4 th eref or e rev ers ib le erro r. Ca be zue la , 201 1- N MS C- 041, ¶ 39 ( int er na l qu ota tio n 5 m arks and citations om itted). 6 { 28} T he S ta te a rg ue s that w e shou ld not re ve rs e bec au se the j ur y f ound be y ond a 7 re as ona

ble doubt tha t Sua zo “ int en de d to inj ur e Rog er G ag e or an oth er , ” w hic h th e 8 State c ontend s no reasonable juror would have found while also finding that Suazo 9 did not kno wof the str ong pr oba bil ity of de ath or

gr eat bo dil y

harm to V igi l. I nde ed , 10 in a pr ior ca se w e he ld tha t a fa ilure to ins tr uc t on an es se nti al el em en t of a n of fe nse 11 doe s no t w ar

rant re ve rs al unde r a re ve rs ibl e er ro r standard

“ [w ] he n th er e can be no 12 dispu te that the essential elem ent was e stablish ed.” Sant illan es , 199 3- N MS C- 012, 13 ¶ 3 2 (concluding that in conductin g its analy sis, a court m ust cons ider w hether there 14 is som e evidence, no m atter how sligh t, or a reasonable inference from such evidence, 15 tha t pr ove s th e el em en t i n is sue ) (c iti ng Orosco , 1992-NMS C-006, ¶¶ 10-12)). 16 { 29} In Sant illan es we upheld th e defe ndant’s conviction for child a b u s e under a 17 re ve rs ibl e er

ro r standard

de spi te a j ur

y ins tr uc tio n er ro ne ousl y re qui ri ng the j ur or s to 18 fi nd a c ivi l ne gli ge nc e m en s r ea r athe r than th e re qui sit e sta tut or y m en s r ea

of23

1 crim in al n eg ligence. 1993-NMS C-012, ¶¶ 32-34. In that case , the def endant was 2 accused of cutting his seven-y ear- old nephew’ s throat with a knife during a scuffle, 3 but he c la im ed

that hi s ne phe wha d in

jure d him se lf

by j um pin g in to a

f ish ing li ne 4 strung betw een two trees, and notably did not argue that he had inadvertently caused 5 t h e b o y’s t hr oa t t o b e cu t. Id

. ¶ ¶ 2 , 3 3
. T h e c o n t e s t e d i s s u e w a s w h e t h e r the 6 de fe ndant c ut h is n ep he w ’ s th ro at , not w he the r he c ut h is n ep he w ’ s th ro at w ith 7 crim inal or civil neglig ence. W e relied on the j ury ’ s finding that the defendant had 8 cut his nephew’ s throat with a knife, and concluded that under those facts “ no rational 9 j ur y ” co uld ha ve de te rm ine d th at

the ne phe w ’ s th ro at ha d be enc ut “ w ith out sa tis fy ing 10 th e st an da rd of cri m in al ne gl ig en ce” th at sh ou ld ha ve be en ap pl ie d in th atcas e. Id

. 11 ¶ 34. Pu t an oth er w ay , the el em en t at iss ue in Sant illan es w as w he the r the de fe ndant 12 ha d c om

m itt ed a sp eci fic act , not his m en s r ea . T hus, the j ur y ’ s f ind ing be y ond a 13 re as ona

ble doubt tha t th e de fe ndant c ut h is n ep he w ’ s th ro at w ithakni fe w as a lso 14 ne ce ssari ly

af ind ing be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t the de fe ndant ac te d w itha t l ea st 15 a m en ta l st at e of

c ri m ina l ne gli ge nc e in s o do ing

. 16 { 30} A cc or din g to the dis se nt and the S ta te , w e shou ld v ie wthi s c as e sim ilarl y 17 be ca use the j ur

y fo und be y ond a re as ona ble doubt tha t S ua zo int en de d to inj ur e G ag e 18 or a n o t h er by

shoot ing a shot gun in Vigil’ s m outh , which the State contends was24

1 effe ctively

a finding bey ond a reasonable doub t that Suazo k new the gun wa s loaded 2 and that sho oting it would crea te a strong p robabilityof death or grea t bodi ly harm 3 to Vigil. T hat Suazo p ulled the trigger of the shotg un was not at issue in the case. 4 Instead, the issue w as whether he pu l l ed t h e t ri g ger of a shotg un that he kn ewwa s 5 loa de d. T he re fo re , unl ike in Sant illan es , wher e the instructional error re lated to what 6 w as es se nti al ly an unc ont es te d issue , the m en s re a el em en t wa s a cen tr al a spe ct of thi s 7 ca se . W e cannot

say w ithc er ta inty w he the r the j ur

y f ound that S ua zo kne wthe 8 sh o t g u n was lo ad ed , or wh et he r juro rs m erel y fou nd th athe sh ou ld ha ve kn own 9 b ec au s e a sim

ple inspection of the shotgu n would have revealed w hether it wa s 10 loa de d. T he la tter fi nd ing cannot sup port a

se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r co nvi ct ion 11 be ca use , a s w e ha ve pr ev iou sly dis cu sse d, m er e ne gli ge nc e is n ot e noug h to pr ove 12 se co nd- de gr ee m

ur der. T he m iss ta te m en t of the m en s r ea

e le m en t m isd ir ec te d th e 13 j ur y , pot en tia lly

a llo w ing the j ur or s to c onvi ct Su az o base d upon af ind ing that c oul d 14 not sup port a se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r co nvi ct ion unde r the ap pr opr ia te le ga l st an da rd

. 15 { 31} It is tem

pting to agree w ith the dis sent and the State that the i n t en t to injure 16 elem ent of aggravated battery satisfies the m ens rea requirem ent for second-degree 17 m ur de r be cau se New Mex ic o c riminal iz e s i nt en t-t o- in jure ba tt ery, see State v. 18 Vasquez , 1971-NMC A- 182, ¶ 12, 83 N .M. 388, 492 P.2d 1005 (re cognizing that25

1 ag gr av at ed

ba tte ry r equir es pr oof of an in te nt t o in j ur e)

. I f a j ur

y f ind s th at a 2 de fe ndant i nte nde d to in jure a pe rs on b y

pul lin g th e tr igg er

of af ir earm , it is 3 reasonable to conclude that the jury found that th e defe ndant kn ew t h at the firearm 4 w as loa de d, that i t w oul d di sc ha rg e, an d th at pullin g th e tr igg er c re at ed astr ong 5 pr oba bil ity of gr eat bo dil y ha rm or de ath. A lte rn at ive ly , if the j ur y w as m isl ed

int o 6 believing that the intent to injure elem ent of aggravated battery is satisfied if the j ury 7 fi nds tha t the de fe ndant s houl d have kno w n th at pul lin g th e tr igg er

c re at ed astr ong 8 probabilit y

of great bodily

harm or death, then it cannot b e indispu table that the j ury 9 fo und tha t the de fe ndant k ne wthe fir earm

w as loa de d and w oul d di sc ha rg e. T he 10 la tte r sit

ua tio n is w ha t oc curre d inthi s c as e. Whe n di sc uss ing the ins tr uc tio n f or 11 ag gr av at ed

ba tte ry , the pr ose cu tor

tol d th e j ur or s, 12 If y ou believe that [S u az o ] com m itted second-degree m

urder, and that 13 he knew or should have known that his ac tions created great bodily harm 14 or

de ath, tow ar ds M atthe wV igi l, inj ur ing Ma tth ew V igi l, an d as a r es ult 15 he inj ur es Ro ge r G ag e, that’ s tr an sf er re d int en t. T ha t’ s w he re w e ge t t o 16 that elem ent on Roger Gage. 1 7 ( Emp h a s i s a d d e d

. ) Th u s , n o to n l y d i dt h e p r o s e c u t i o n

— p e rh ap s n e g l i g e n t l y— 18 m isl ea d th e dis tr ic t cour t into iss uin g an e rr one ous ins tr uc tio n, the pr ose cu tio n a lso 19 m isled the jury

into believing that the e rroneous m ens rea e lem ent for second-degree 2 0 m u rd er

—n eg l i g en ce

—wa s s u ff

i ci en t t o s up p o rt a fi n d i n g o f a g g ra v at ed b at t er y. W e15 A lth oughw e cannot state w ithc er

ta int yhowthe j ur or s de lib er at ed w ith 3 16 respect to eac h offense, there is at lea st a p o s s i b i l i t y that the j urors first considered 17 the se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r ch ar ge , a nd d et er

m ine d Sua zo ’ s guilt

pr ior to co nsi de ri ng 18 the ba tte ry

c ha rg e. T he re fo re , the e rr one ous ins tr uc tio n m ay

ha ve inf lue nc ed the ir 19 think ing w ith r espect to batter y . Af ter all, once the j urors concluded that S uazo 20 com m itted second-degree m

urder, how could t h ey n o t convict him of the lesser 21 of fe nse of inj ur ing G ag e w iththe sa m e shot ? 26 1 need not decide whether Ne w Mexico recognizes the crim e of cr im inal-negligence 2 ba tte ry be ca use in thi s c as e the pr ose cu tio n di d no t try to m ak e a ca se f

or c ri m ina l3 ne gli ge nc e ba tte ry ; i nst ea d, the pr ose cu tio n arg ue d a cas e fo r ne gli ge nc e ba tte ry . T he 4 prosecution ’ s errant statem ent to the j ury further underm ines the State’ s prem ise that 5 the j ur or s m

ust ha ve be lie ve d th at

S ua zo kne wthat the gunw as loa de d to c onvi ct him 6 of a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry ag ai nst G ag e. D es pit e the S ta te ’ s c ont en tio ns i n th is c as e, the 7 j ur y ’ s in te nt f

ind ing und er

a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry is sim

ply not en oughf

or us t o say w ith 8 certa inty

that the j ury

necessar i l y fo und a different, and high ly contested, m ens rea 9 for the offe nse of second-degree m urder. 3 10 { 32} H av ing c onc lud ed that the e rr or

in thi s ca se m an da te s r ev er sa l, to av oid double 11 j eo pa rdy

c onc er ns, w e m ust e xa m ine w he the r suf

fi ci ent e v i d e n ce in thi s c as e supp orts 12 re t r yi n g Su azo . D ow lin g , 201 1- N MS C- 016, ¶ 18. U nde r a suf

fi ci en cy of the 13 ev ide nc e te st, w e vie wthe e vid en ce in the light m ost f av or ab le to the ve rd ic t and 14 drawall infere nces in favor o f th e v erdict to determ ine “ whether subs tantial evidence27

1 of e ith er adir ec t or cir cu m stanti al na tur e exi sts to suppo rt a ver dic t of guil ty be y ond 2 a re asonable dou bt with respect to every elem ent essential to a convictio n.” State v. 3 Sam ora , 201 6- N MS C- 031, ¶ 34, ___ P
. 3d ___ ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio ns 4 om itted). In this case, to re try Suazo for second-degree m urder w ith m anslaugh ter as 5 a le sse r- inc lud ed

of fe nse , sub stant ia l ev idenc e m ust e xis t t o su

ppor t the f oll ow ing 6 el em en ts : ( 1 ) S u a z o k i l l e dV i g i l , ( 2 ) S u a z o kn e wt h a th i s a c t s c r e a t e das t r ong 7 probabilit y

of death or grea t bodi ly

harm to Vigil or any

other hum an being, (3) S uazo 8 did not a ct a s ar es ult

of suf fi ci en t pr ovoc at ion , a nd ( 4) thi s ha ppe ne d inN ewMe xic o. 9 Se ct ion30- 2- 1( B) ; U JI 14- 210. T he fi rs t an d f ourth e le m en ts w er e undi sput ed in thi s 10 ca se , so the onl y

iss ue is w he the r the m en s rea and la ck of suf fi ci en t pr ovoc at ion 11 co m pone nts of

the S ta te ’ s c as e w er e m et . 12 { 33} Viewi ng th e ev id en ce i n t he li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to a gu il ty verd ic t, we 13 co nc lud e tha t the re w as suf fi ci en t evi de nc e to suppo rt ar ea sona ble j ur y ’ s c onc lus ion 14 that the m ens rea and lack of sufficient provocation elem ents wer e m et in this case. 15 First , th e jury cou ld ha ve reas on ab ly infe rred fro m Su azo ’s st at em en ts , th e am big uous 16 evidence regar ding who l oaded the gun and when it w as loaded, and the steps Suazo 17 too k a ft er

the c ri m e to c onc ea l e vid en ce , that S ua zo kne wthe gunw as loa de d and 18 knew th at pul lin g th e tr igg er w oul d c au se gr eat bo dil y harm or de ath to V igi l.28

1 Second, the j urors could have reasonably concluded that th e roughho using betwee n 2 Suazo and Vigil, an activity in which they

fre quentlyengaged and had been engaged 3 in throug hout that day , w as not enou gh to constitute suffic ient provocation to reduce 4 th e cri m e to m an sl au gh te r. See UJI 14 -2 2 2 NMRA ( “ ‘ Sufficie nt provo cation’ can 5 be any action, conduct or cir cu m stances which ar ouse anger, r age, fear , sudden 6 re se ntm en t, te rr or

or oth er ex tr em e em oti ons. T he pr ovoc at ionm ust be suc h a s w oul d 7 affe ct the abi lity to reason and to cause a tem porary loss of s elf cont rol in an ordinary 8 person of average dispositi on. T he ‘ provocation ’ is not su fficient i f an ordinary 9 person would have cooled o ff bef ore ac ting.”). 10 III. CON CLU SION 11 { 34} Suazo’ s evidentiary argum ents lack m erit. T he second-degree m urder 12 instructio n m isstated the m ens rea elem ent for second -degree m urder, and it therefore 13 re qui re s r ev er sa l. W e re ve rs e Su az o’ s co nv ic tio n f or se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r an d 14 re m an d f

or ane wtr ia l. 15 { 35} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

16

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 17 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Justice29

1 WE CONCUR:

2 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 3 CH ARLES W. DA NIEL S, Ch ief Justice

4 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 5 PE TRAJIMEN EZMA ES, Justice

6 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 7 BA RBA RAJ. V IGIL, Just ice
8 JUD ITH K. NA KAM UR A, Justice, concu rring in p art and d issenting in p art30

1 NA KAM UR

A, Justice ( concur ring in part ; dissent ing in part )
. 2 { 36} T his c as e is d es tin ed f or the c ri m ina l l awtr eatis es . Asho ots C. B is s tandi ng 3 be twee n A an d C . In o rd er fo r A to sh o o t C , A mu s t f i r e th ro ug h B ’s hea d. If we 4 ac ce pt the se f

ac ts a s tr ue , w ha t m

ust A ha ve kno w n w er e the li ke ly c onse que nc es f

or 5 B of A ’ s shoo ting C? T here c an be o n l y one conclus ion: A m ust have kn own that 6 the re w as astr ong pr oba bil ity B wou ld di e. T he se , of c our se , a re the f

ac ts o f thi s 7 case. 8 { 37} Su az o po int ed

the sho tgun at V igi l, an d V igi l ine xpl ic ab ly pla ce d the barr el of 9 the sho tgun in to h is m outh. G ag e w as standi ng beh ind V igi l. Whe n S ua zo pul le d th e 10 trigger and fired the shotg un, the shotg un pellets explod ed from the cartr idge, fir ed 1 1 o u to f t h e b ar re l o f t h e s h o t g u n , t ra v el ed i n t o Vi g i l ’s m o u t h , p as s ed t h ro u g h Vi g i l ’s 12 he ad kil lin g hi m , a nd e nte re d G ag e’ s bo dy c au sin g G ag e se riou s inj ur ie s. F or 13 pe rp etratin g th is a ct

a ga ins t G ag e, S ua zo w as c on vi ct ed of a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry w ith 14 a de ad ly

w ea pon. S ua zo did

not c ha lle nge the pr opr ie ty of ei ther the a ggr av at ed

1 5 b a t t e ry i n s t r

u c t i o n o r h i s c o n v i c t i o n f

o r a g g r a v a t e db a t t e ry. 16 { 38} At tria l, the j ury wa s instructed that 17 Fo r y ou to f ind [ Su az o] gui lty

of a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry w ithade ad ly 18 w ea

pon . . . the [S]tat e m

ust pr ove to y our

sa tis fa ct ionbe y ond a 19 reasonable doubt each of the following elem ents of the crim e:31

1 1. [Suazo] touched or a p p lied force to Roger Ga ge by shoot ing at 2 h i m w i t h af i r e a rm. 3 [S ua zo ] use d a12 g au ge sho tgun. 4 2. [Suazo] intended to injure Roger G age or another; 5 3
. Th i s h ap p e n e di n Ne wM e x i c o o n o r ab o u t t h e 2 1 s t d a y o f M a y, 6 2013
. 7 Thi s i ns tru ct io n m irr or s t he un ifo rm in st ru ct io n. See UJI 1 4- 32 2 NM RA. 8 { 39} Agg rav at ed b a t t e r y is a sp eci fic in te nt cri m e. Sta te v . Cr es pin , 9 1974 -N MCA -104, ¶ 8, 86 N. M. 689, 526 P. 2d 12 82. “ Sp ec i fi c i n t ent to injure a 10 pe rs on i s an es se nti al el em en t of the cr im e. T he sta te m ust pr ove be y ond a re as ona

ble 11 doub t tha t the de fe ndant k now ing ly c om m itt ed a n a ggr av at ed

batt ery , pur

pose ly 12 intendi ng to v iolate the law. ” Id

. ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). A fi re ar m is a de ad ly w ea pon. 13 NMS A 1978, § 30-1-12(B) ( 1963 ) (“ ‘ deadly we apon’ m eans any

firearm . . . . ”). 14 When, as in this case, aggravated battery is c omm itted w ith a deadly we apon, the j ury 15 ne ed not be ins tr uc te d th at the w ea pon use d w as li ke ly

to ca use de ath or

gr eat bo dil y 16 ha rm . Se e Sta te v . M

uri llo , 2015 -N MC A -0 46, ¶ 21, 347 P. 3d 284 (e xpl ai nin g tha t the 17 j ur y ne ed not f ind that a sw itc hbl ad e co uld

c au se de ath or gr eat bo dil y harm be ca use 18 a switchblade is per se a deadly we apon). D eadly we apons necessarily

inflict great 19 bodi ly harm or f at al w ound s. 20 { 40} I ag re e w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e i n s t r

u c t i o n s ub m i t t e d t o S u a z o ’ s j u ry on32

1 se co nd -deg re e m

ur de r w as inc or

re ct . Ma j

. O p. ¶ 25. B ut w e ha ve pr ev iou sly 2 recognized that requiring reversal in ever y circum stance w here a j ury is m isins tructed 3 wou ld no t o nl y

be un wis e b ut wou ld le ad to un de si rab le res ul ts . See State v. Orosco , 4 1992 -N MS C- 006, ¶ 13, 113 N
. M. 780, 833 P
. 2d 1 146 (“ Appl y ing ar ule of auto m at ic 5 re ve rs al is not re qui re d by the re le va nt co nst itu tio na l pr inc ipl es an d fa ils to ta ke int o 6 account our role as an appellate tribunal.” ). A ccordingly , we h av e h eld that, even 7 wher e a j ury

is m isins tructed, the convi ction m ay be aff irm ed so long as the om itted 8 orm is st at edele m en t was p r o p e r l y a n d i nd is pu tabl y est ab li sh ed

. Id

. ¶ 12; se e als o 9 Sant illanes v . Sta te , 199 3- N MS C- 012, ¶ 32, 115 N
. M. 215 , 849 P
. 2d 3 58. 10 { 41} T he j ur

y ’ s de ci sio n to co nvi ct Su az o of ag gr av at ed ba tte ry ag ai ns t Ga ge 11 ind isp uta

bly e sta bli she s th at

the j ur y m ust a lso ha ve fo und tha t Su az o ac te d w iththe 12 re qui re d m en s r ea fo r seco nd- de gr ee m ur de r. S ua zo ne ce ssari ly kne wthat, if

he 13 co m m it te d a gg rav at edba tt ery ag ai ns t Gag e wit h t he sh ot gu n, t he n Vi gil w oul d a lm ost 14 certa inly

die. This m

ust be t ru e b ec au s e, in order to com m it aggravated battery 15 ag ai nst

G ag e, S ua zo ha d to f

ir e the sho tgun in to V igi l’ s m outh and thr ough his he ad

. 16 Be ca use S ua zo ne ce ssari ly

a ct ed w iththe m en s r ea

r equir ed to co nvi ct

him of se co nd 17 degree m

urder, the error

in the second-degree m

urder instruction was not reversible. 18 Sant illan es doe s no t c om pe l a dif fe re nt r es ult

.33

1 { 42} In Sant illan es , the j ur y w as m isi nstru ct ed on the m en s re a re qui re m en t for c hil d 2 ab us e, id. ¶¶ 29 , 3 2, bu t we co nc lu de d th at th e erro r was no t re ve rs ib le

. Id

. ¶ 3 4
. We 3 not ed that “ the de fe ndant cu t his ne phe w ’ s thr oa t w ithakni fe ” fr om “ j ust be lowhis 4 ri ght e ar a cr oss to the le ft sid e of his ne ck be low his j aw , ” and tha t the j ur y fo und the 5 de fen da nt cu t th e b oy du rin g a scu ffl e. Id

. ¶¶ 33-34 . W e concluded that “ no rational 6 j ur y ” co uld ha ve c onc lud ed

that the de fe ndant pe rp etr at ed the se a ct s w ith out

a lso 7 ne ce ssari ly

c onc lud ing tha t the de fe ndant ac te d w ithc ri m ina l ne gli ge nc e, the m en s 8 rea r eq ui rem en t t ha t t he st at e was req ui redto est ab li sh

. Id

. 9 { 43} A s the m aj or ity obse rv es , Ma j

. op. ¶ 29, w e ex pr es sly

not ed in Sant illan es that 10 th e d efen da nt “ di d no t argu e th at he in ad ve rte nt ly caus edth e b oy’ s t hr oa t t o b e cu t.” 11 1993 -N MSC -0 1 2 ¶ 33. A ccording to th e m aj ority , this indicates that the m ens rea 12 el em en t of

the of fe nse f or w hic h th e de fe ndant i n Sant illan es w as c onvi ct ed w as not 13 co nte ste d. Maj

. op. ¶¶ 29- 30. By co ntr as t, Su az o m ai nta ine d at tri al that he did not 14 know the gun h e fire d into Vigil’ s m outh and throug h his head was loaded, w hich was 15 an attem

pt to sh ow he did not po ssess t h e n ecessary m ens rea f

or second-degree 16 m ur de r. Forth e m ajor it y , th is di st in ct io n i s cruc ia l. Id

. ¶ 29. T he m aj or ity

c ont en ds 1 7 t h a tS u a z o ’s t r i a l t h e o ry s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s c a s e f r o m Sant illan es a nd 18 pr ecl ud es thi s C ourt f ro m r es olv ing “ w he the r the j ur y f ound that S ua zo kne wthe34

1 sh ot gu n was lo ad ed , or wh et he r juro rs m erel y fou nd th athe s h o u l d h av e kno wn 2 because a s i m

p le inspection o f the shotgu n would have revealed w hether it wa s 3 loaded.” Id

. ¶ 30. I do not concur. 4 { 44} U nli ke in Sant illan es , S uazo wa s convicted of m ultip le offenses. Suazo’ s jur y 5 wa s correc tly

in s t ru ct ed that it had to find th at the aggravated battery wa s 6 intentio nally

com m itted, and it so found

. Ther efore, the j ury necessarily

rej ected 7 Su az o’ s th eo ry

of the c as e. O nly

one sho t w as fir ed ; it ki lle d V igi l and g ri ev ousl y 8 inj ur ed G ag e. T ha t si ngl e shot

c oul d no t be both in te nti ona l and ac ci de nta l. T hus, 9 if S ua zo int en tio na ll y fir ed the sho t w hic h in j ur ed G ag e, he c oul d no t have 10 ac ci de nta lly

sho t V igi l. B ec au se S ua zo ’ s j ur y f ound that S ua zo int en tio na lly

f ir ed the 11 shot that i nj ur ed

G ag e, the j ur

y ne ce ssari ly re

j ec te d Su az o’ s cl ai m tha t he a cc ide nta lly 12 kil le d V igi l. 13 { 45} La stly , I see no r eason to c onclud e that the erroneous second-degr ee m u rder 14 instructio n s o m eh o w infected the j ury ’ s deliberation with respect to aggravated 15 ba tte ry . Ma

j op. ¶ 31 n
. 3. T he dis tr ic t c ourt prop erl y ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y on 16 ag gr av at e d b a t te ry . See Sta te v . P riv et t , 198 6- N MS C- 025, ¶ 9, 104 N
. M. 79, 717 17 P. 2d 55 (i nstru ct ing dis tr ic t co urts to u se uni fo rm ins tr uc tio ns whe n th ey

e xis t)

. “ T he 18 j ury is presum ed to follow t h e court’ s instructio ns.” State v. G onza les ,35

1 19 92 -NMSC -0 03 , ¶ 35 , 1 13 N.M. 22 1, 8 24 P.2d 10 23 , ov errul ed on oth er gro unds 2 by State v. M

onto ya , 2013 -N MS C- 020, 306 P. 3d 426. A nd a s no te d, S ua zo did not 3 challenge the propriety of the agg ravated-batter

y instructio n or his conv iction for that 4 of fe nse . N or

a m I pe rs ua de d th at

the pr ose cu tio n’ s st at em en t a bout tr an sf er re d in te nt 5 m isl ed the j ur

y . Ma j op. ¶ 31. S ua zo did

not obj ec t t o th e pr ose cu tor ’ s st at em en t and 6 the issue w as not ar gued on appeal. Moreover, instructio n num ber on e i nform ed 7 Suazo’ s jur

y that “ [t] he law governin g this case is contained in instruction s that I am 8 ab out to giv e y ou. I t i s y our duty to fo llo w th e la wa s c ont ai ne d inthe se 9 ins tr uc tio ns. ” I f m isd ir ec tio n oc curr ed , it w as c ur ed

by pr ope r ins tr

uc tio ns. 10 { 46} For the re asons set ou t above, I would affir m Su az o ’s second-degree m urder 11 co nvi ct ion

. I c onc ur

that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not abuse it s di sc re tio n ine xc lud ing 12 the state m en ts S ua zo m ad e af te r the sho oti ng.

13

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 14 JUD ITH K. NA KAM UR A, Justice