United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 17, 2019*

Decided June 3, 2019

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐2989

MILAN KNOX,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

TONY CURTIS and   

JACLYN M. LENTING,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 18 C 723

Gary Feinerman,

Judge.

O R D E R

After he was convicted of improperly communicating with a witness to his

alleged criminal activity, Milan Knox sued the witness and a police officer, blaming

their false statements for his arrest and ultimate conviction. The district court dismissed

Knox’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations or the defendants’ witness

immunity. Because, under recent case law, Knox has a timely Fourth Amendment claim

for wrongful pretrial detention, we partially vacate the judgment and remand to the

district court for further proceedings.

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐2989    Page 2

In February 2014, Knox was arrested and detained for harassing a witness in a

drunk‐driving case pending against him. Jaclyn Lenting complained to police that she

received a phone call from a person claiming to be prosecutor, questioning her about

the car accident that led to Knox’s prosecution. Knox denies calling Lenting, but, the

next month, he was indicted by a grand jury for communicating with a witness. At the

grand jury proceeding, the arresting officer, Tony Curtis, testified that he had traced the

suspicious phone call to a number, which, when dialed, connected to a voicemail

message in which Knox identified himself by name.

At a pretrial hearing in November 2015, the state court denied Knox’s motion to

quash his arrest, concluding that Curtis had probable cause to arrest him based on

Lenting’s complaint and the police investigation. The court issued a no‐bail order, and

Knox remained in custody until he was released on bond in August 2017. Three months

later, Knox was convicted of communicating with a witness and was sentenced to two

years’ imprisonment. He was granted a one‐year term of parole in March 2018.

In January 2018, Knox sued Curtis and Lenting under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his

amended complaint, filed March 2018, he alleges that they conspired to present false

testimony and did present false testimony at his grand jury proceedings and bench trial,

which led to his pretrial detention and conviction. He states that he spent “3 years 5

months in the county jail and 1 year [on] parole.”   

Lenting filed a motion to dismiss, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that she is

entitled to immunity for her testimony. Curtis also moved to dismiss on immunity

grounds; he further argued that any claim related to Knox’s arrest or prosecution was

untimely or barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court granted

both defendants’ motions to dismiss in August 2018. It explained that they were

absolutely immune from suit based on their testimony and that Knox’s “false arrest”

claim was time‐barred because he was arrested nearly four years before he filed suit.

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state‐law malicious‐

prosecution claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Knox appeals, and we review de novo the dismissal of his complaint, accepting

his factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475–76 (7th Cir. 2019).
No. 18‐2989    Page 3

The district court properly dismissed Knox’s claim that Curtis and Lenting

falsely testified at his criminal proceedings and conspired to do so. Both defendants

have absolute immunity from a § 1983 damages suit based on their testimony. See

Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 327, 341–45

(1983). This immunity protects both law‐enforcement and lay witnesses who testify at

grand jury proceedings, trials, or any other adversarial pretrial hearing. See Rehberg,   

566 U.S. at 369; Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345; Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 284–85 (7th Cir.

1995). It also extends to Knox’s conspiracy claim, lest the immunity be frustrated by

artful pleading. See Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369.   

Knox contends that his “false arrest” claim against Curtis1 “should have not

been dismissed for time barred reasons.” Based on legal developments that post‐date

the district court’s judgment, we agree with Knox that he stated a timely claim under

the Fourth Amendment. About three weeks after the district court dismissed Knox’s

suit, this court decided Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2018), pet. for cert.

filed (Feb. 21, 2019) (“Manuel II”), clarifying the nature and date of accrual of various

Fourth Amendment claims. Under Manuel II, if a plaintiff complains about “a search or

seizure [that] causes injury independent of time spent in custody,” then his or her claim

accrues at the time of the “pre‐custody event[].” Id. at 669. But when a plaintiff

challenges “the propriety of his time in custody,” id., the Fourth Amendment claim

accrues only “when the detention ends.” Id. at 670; see also Lewis, 914 F.3d at 478.

Knox falls into the latter category, which renders his suit timely. Although he

asserts that “there was no probable cause for [the] arrest,”2 Knox does not complain

about any pre‐custody injury. Based on his allegations as a whole, it is clear that the real

problem is the loss of liberty—specifically, “the absence of probable cause that would

                                                 

1 We construe this claim as against Curtis only; Lenting is a private actor, and

Knox has not alleged any facts that suggest joint action between the two defendants. See

Wilson v. Warren Cty., Illinois, 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016) (“For a private actor to act

under color of state law [and thus be suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] he must have had a

meeting of the minds and thus reached an understanding with a state actor to deny

plaintiffs a constitutional right.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 In their brief, the defendants‐appellees contend that Knox “failed to allege in

his amended complaint ... that he was arrested without probable cause.” However, we

have recognized that a plaintiff may “supplement” the complaint with “extra

assertions” in a memorandum opposing a motion to dismiss. Albiero v. City of Kankakee,

122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997). Knox did so here.
No. 18‐2989    Page 4

justify [his] detention.” Manuel II, 903 F.3d at 670. Therefore, Knox’s claim that he was

arrested and detained without probable cause accrued either in August 2017 (when he

was released on bond), see id., or in November 2017 (when he was convicted). See

Mitchell v. City of Elgin, 912 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting we have yet to decide

whether pretrial‐release conditions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure). Either

way, Knox’s original complaint, submitted in January 2018, was filed well within the

two‐year limitations period, and thus, his Fourth Amendment claim is timely. See Lewis,

914 F.3d at 478 (two‐year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Illinois).

We reject Curtis’s alternate argument that even if Knox’s claim is timely, it is

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). To the extent that Knox challenges his

post‐conviction detention, Heck indeed bars his § 1983 suit. See id. at 486–87. However,

Knox also challenges his pretrial (pre‐bond) detention, the unlawfulness of which does

not have “any necessary effect on the validity of [his] conviction.” Mordi v. Zeigler, 870

F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Manuel II, 903 F.3d at 670 (plaintiff’s claim that

“police hoodwinked the judge” at probable‐cause detention hearing was not Heck‐ 

barred once plaintiff was released from custody). Therefore, dismissal of Knox’s suit at

this stage was improper.

For these reasons, we VACATE the judgment to the extent that it dismissed

Knox’s Fourth Amendment claim of wrongful pretrial detention as untimely and

REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order. In all

other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.