No. 86-552 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

JEAN A. REID, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

FRANK M. REID, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver Bow, 

The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Deirdre Caughlan, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Robert P. McGee, Butte, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 5, 1987 

Decided: March 12, 1987 

Filed: 1 3,1987 * &,& 

# 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Jean A. Holland, formerly Jean A. Reid (wife) , appeals 

the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of the 

Second Judicial District Court distributing marital property 

and awarding her maintenance. We affirm. 

The parties were originally married in 1953. That 

marriage was dissolved in 1979. Two months later the Reids 

remarried. The second marriage ended in 1986, when husband 

moved to Spokane. He was previously employed as a 

construction worker. Husband, who was 65 at the time of the 

hearing, is now retired. He has a pension fund with James 

Gilam and Company in the approximate amount of $25,000. He 

also receives a monthly pension of $567 from Teamsters and 

Social Security monthly payments of $600. 

Wife was 53 years of age at the time of the hearing. 

She was not employed outside the home during her married 

life. She worked as a homemaker and reared the parties' four 

children. She was trained in typing at the vocational school 

in Butte, Montana, and was employed as a food demonstrator at 

a grocery store for two days. The trial judge awarded wife 

maintenance payments of $350 a month for five years. 

Finding of Fact VII. 

That the Petitioner has no health problems, has 

obtained additional training through the vocational 

school at Butte, Montana and had worked within one 

week of the hearing on this matter* That she is 

therefore capable of retraining and returning to 

the work force, and to assist her should have the 

sum of Three Hundred Fifty and No/100 ($350.00) 

Dollars per month for the period of five (5) years 

for the purposes of retraining for employment. 

The parties jointly own a home in Butte. Wife, based on 

1986 tax appraisals, values the house at $25,000. Husband 
contends it is worth $50,000. Wife requested that she be 

awarded the house. The trial judge ordered that it be 

reappraised and sold, with each party receiving one-half of 

the proceeds. 

Other assets include an account at the Montana Bank of 

Butte in husband's name totalling $5,650; accounts at the 

Safeway Credit Union in wife's name totalling $11,092.40; a 

car worth approximately $500; $1,000 in household 

furnishings; and an IRA valued at approximately $1,100. The 

funds in wife's credit union account originated from the 

wife's award of one-half the marital property at the time of 

the first dissolution. Husband's half has been dissipated, 

but it is unclear when or on what the money was spent. 

The trial judge determined that all marital assets be 

liquidated and that the proceeds, together with all cash 

accounts, be divided equally between the parties. Wife 

appeals, raising three issues: 

1. Did the trial judge err in ordering the residence of 

the parties sold and in not awarding its use and occupancy to 

wife? 

2. Did the trial judge err in including in the marital 

estate the savings retained by wife from the first 

dissolution and in awarding husband one-half thereof? 

3. Did the trial judge disregard wife's present needs 

and future employability when determining her maintenance 

award to be $350 a month for five years? 

We find no error. Absent a clear abuse of discretion by 

the trial judge, this Court will overturn neither the 

distribution of marital property nor an award of maintenance. 

Grenfell v. Grenfell (1979), 182 Mont. 229, 596 P.2d 205. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, governs the distribution of 

marital property. It sets forth numerous factors to be 

considered: 
Division of property. (1) In a proceeding for 

dissolution of a marriage . . . the court, without 

regard to marital misconduct, shall . . . finally 

equitably apportion between the part'ies the 

property and assets belonging to either or both, 

however and whenever acquired and whether the title 

thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or 

both. In making apportionment, the court shall 

consider the duration of the marriage and prior 

marriage of either party; antenuptial agreement of 

the parties; the age, health, station, occupation, 

amount and sources of income, vocational skills, 

employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of 

each of the parties; custodial provisions; whether 

the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to 

maintenance; and the opportunity of each for future 

acquisition of capital assets and income. The 

court shall also consider the contribution or 

dissipation of value of the respective estates and 

the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to 

the family unit. In dividing property acquired 

prior to the marriage . . . the court shall 

consider those contributions of the other spouse to 

the marriage, including: 

(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; 

(b) the extent to which such contributions have 

facilitated the maintenance of this property; and 

(c) whether or not the property division serves as 

an alternative to maintenance arrangements. 

Section 40-4-203, MCA, controls the awarding of 

maintenance. It states: 

(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts 

and for such periods of time as the court deems 

just, without regard to marital misconduct, and 

after considering all relevant facts including: 

(a) the financial resources of the party seeking 

maintenance, including marital property apportioned 

to him, and his ability to meet his needs 

independently . . .; 

(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient 

education or training to enable the party seeking 

maintenance to find appropriate employment; 

(c) the standard of living established during the 

marriage; 

(d) the duration of the marriage; 

(e) the age and the physical and emotional 

condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and 
(f) the ability of the spouse from whom 

maintenance is sought to meet his needs while 

meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 

The lower court judge need not articulate each factor 

separately as long as the findings are sufficient to allow 

non-speculative review by this Court. In re the Marriage of 

Larson (1982), 200 Mont. 134, 139, 649 P.2d 1351, 1354. 

Our ultimate test for adequacy of findings of fact 

is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and 

pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for 

decision, and whether they are supported by the 

evidence presented. 

In re the Marriage of Jensen (1981), 631 P.2d 700, 703, 38 

St.Rep. 1109, 1113. 

Upon review, it is apparent that the trial judge 

attempted to distribute the property equitably and to support 

his distribution with adequate findings . He divided the 

marital estate, less husband's monthly pension and Social 

Security benefits, equally between the parties. He 

acknowledged wife ' s lack of employment training by providing 

maintenance payments for five years. He further recognized, 

by reducing wife's $600 request for maintenance to $350, that 

although wife's ability to earn income in the future was 

slight, it was better than that of husband, who was retired 

and apparently ill. Testimony at trial indicated that 

husband would be undergoing surgery in the near future. 

The trial judge also has considerable discretion in 

determining how to distribute property acquired prior to the 

marriage. It may be equitably apportioned between the 

parties with no regard to title or time of acquisition. The 

only requirement is that the court consider the contributions 

to the marriage of the spouse who did not acquire the 

property. In re the Marriage of Lewis (1982), 198 Mont. 51, 

643 P.2d 604. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
judge's decision to divide wife's remaining proceeds from the 

first dissolution equally with husband upon the second 

dissolution. Husband was, afterall, the sole source of 

marital income. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: