SECOND DIVISION

							DECEMBER 12, 2000

No. 1-99-4076

SHAW INDUSTRIES, INC.,				)	APPEAL FROM THE

a Georgia Corporation,				)	CIRCUIT COURT 

								)	OF COOK COUNTY

			Plaintiff-Appellant,	)

								)	

v.								)

								)	No. 98 L 9642

COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 515,	)	

also known as Prairie State College,	) 

a body politic and corporate,			)	THE HONORABLE 

								)	SHELDON GARDNER

			Defendant-Appellee.		)	JUDGE PRESIDING.

	JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff, subcontractor Shaw Industries, Inc. (Shaw), filed

an amended complaint against defendant, Community College

District No. 515, also known as Prairie State College (Prairie

State College), alleging breach of contract arising from Prairie

State College's failure to require the procurement of a payment

bond from its contractor, now bankrupt, Prairie State Associates,

Inc. (PSA), pursuant to the Illinois Public Construction Bond Act

(30 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1998)) (Bond Act).  Prairie State College filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant

to Section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615

(West 1998)), which the trial court granted without prejudice. 

Thereafter, Shaw filed a motion to reconsider.  The trial court

denied Shaw's motion and dismissed Shaw's cause with prejudice

without leave to amend.  Shaw appealed.  

	On appeal, Shaw, the subcontractor, principally contends

that the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing its amended complaint because (1) plaintiff was a third-party

beneficiary authorized to bring the cause of action pursuant to

Section 1 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/1 (West 1998)), and (2)

plaintiff's breach of contract suit against the defendant, a

public entity, is not subject to the six-month limitations period

in Section 2 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/2 (West 1998)).  Shaw

also alleges that it is entitled to recover from Prairie State

College pursuant to the Local Government Prompt Payment Act

(Prompt Payment Act) (50 ILCS 505/9 (West 1998)).    

	BACKGROUND

	In its amended complaint, Shaw states that it is in the

business of manufacturing and selling materials, including

carpeting.  PSA, now bankrupt, was in the business of selling and

installing carpeting and other materials manufactured by other

companies.  In December 1996, PSA ordered carpeting and related

materials from Shaw so that PSA could fulfill its obligation to

Prairie State College pursuant to purchase order number 31974,

dated August 21, 1996. 

	The purchase order was for 465 yards of carpet, including

installation.  The cost listed on the purchase order was $14,800.

It was addressed to Don Sullivan of PSA, Inc., from Ray Marthaler

of Prairie State College.  Shaw also alleges that Prairie State

College had prior dealings with PSA and was familiar with the

fact that PSA purchased, as opposed to manufactured, carpeting.   

	Additional allegations by Shaw include the following: that

it fully performed all of its obligations and that it last

furnished material to PSA on or about February 21, 1997; that

Prairie State College claims to have paid PSA all public funds

appropriated for the project; that PSA owes Shaw $25,877.28 plus

interest; and that, pursuant to the Bond Act, Prairie State

College, a political subdivision, was obligated to require a

payment bond from PSA to ensure payment to all of PSA's

subcontractors that furnished labor and/or materials in

connection with purchase order number 31974. 

	On August 1, 1997, Shaw served Prairie State College and PSA

with a "Notice Of Claim For Lien Against Public Funds And Claim

On Contractor's Bond."  In a letter dated August 4, 1997, Prairie

State College advised Shaw that no payment bond had been

obtained.  

	Shaw also contends that had Prairie State College obtained a

payment bond from PSA, as required by Section 1 of the Bond Act

to guarantee payment for the materials used in connection with a

public improvement, then Shaw would have been able to recover

under said bond for the materials it provided to the now-bankrupt

PSA.  Shaw further contends that it should be able to recover

under the Prompt Payment Act.  

	Prairie State College moved to dismiss Shaw's amended

complaint alleging that plaintiff's complaint asserted a cause of

action for breach of contract yet also implied violations under

the Bond Act. Specifically, defendant's motion asserted that: (1)

plaintiff cannot assert a breach of contract claim as [it is] not

in privity of contract for the contract at issue; (2) plaintiff

has exceeded the statute of limitations to file for payment under

the Bond Act; (3) the Prompt Payment Act does not apply to claims

brought by subcontractors against public bodies; and (4) the

doctrine of laches should apply here as Prairie State College has

already completed its budget and levy and paid the contractor for

the work at issue and, therefore, should not be required to pay a

claim that did not come in a timely manner.  On appeal, Shaw

contests allegations (1), (2) and (3). 

	We affirm.  

ANALYSIS

	I

	When a complaint is dismissed pursuant to Section 2-615 of

the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)), the

standard of review is de novo.  Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d

338, 344, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1997).  The question presented

by a Section 2-615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations

of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which

relief can be granted.  Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344, 688 N.E.2d at

1175.  A cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings

unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved

under the pleadings that entitle the plaintiff to recover. 

Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344, 688 N.E.2d at 1175.

	A

	Shaw contends that the trial court committed reversible

error in dismissing its amended complaint under section 2-615 of

the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West

1998)), because Shaw was a third-party beneficiary authorized  to

bring the cause of action pursuant to Section 1 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/1 (West 1998)), and also because its breach of

contract suit against the defendant, a public entity, is not

subject to the six-month limitations period in section 2 of the

Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/2 (West 1998)).    

	Section 1 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/1 (West 1998))

provides:

			"Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all 

officials, boards, commissions or agents of this State,

		or of any political subdivision thereof in making 

contracts for public work of any kind to be performed 

for the State, or a political subdivision thereof shall

require every contractor for such work to furnish, 

supply and deliver a bond to the State, or to the 

political subdivision thereof entering into such

contract, as the case may be, with good and sufficient

sureties.  The amount of such bond shall be fixed by

such officials, boards, commissions, commissioners or

agents, and such bond, among other conditions, shall be

conditioned for the completion of the contract, for the

payment of material used in such work and for all labor

performed in such work, whether by subcontractor or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 550/1 (West

1998).

	Here, section 1 of the Bond Act provides that the public

entity "shall require every contractor for such work to furnish,

supply and deliver a bond to the State *** with good and

sufficient sureties."  (Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 550/1 (West

1998).  This language is clear and unambiguous.  

	The use of the word "shall" generally connotes a mandatory

reading.  North Shore Community Bank & Trust Co. v. Kollar, 304

Ill. App. 3d 838, 846-47, 710 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (1999). 

Moreover, a court must construe a statute as it is written and

may not, under the guise of construction, supply omissions,

remedy defects, annex new provisions, substitute different

provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or

otherwise change the law so as to depart from the plain meaning

of language employed in the statute.  Superior Structures Co. v.

City of Sesser, 292 Ill. App. 3d 848, 852, 686 N.E.2d 710, 713

(1997). 

	Further, as a remedial statute, the Bond Act is liberally

construed to effectuate the General Assembly's intent to

encourage and protect artisans, materialmen, and tradesmen.  East Peoria Community High School District No. 309 v. Grand Stage

Lighting Co., 235 Ill. App. 3d 756, 759-60, 601 N.E.2d 972, 974

(1992).  Because the Bond Act was established to achieve the same

remedial goal as the mechanic's lien in a public works situation,

it follows that the Bond Act should be read into public works

contracts between the public entity and the general contractor

requiring the procurement of a payment bond.  Western

Waterproofing Co. v. Springfield Housing Authority, 669 F. Supp.

901, 904 (C.D. Ill. 1987); East Peoria, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 760,

601 N.E.2d at 974.    

	In Western Waterproofing, subcontractors brought an action

against the housing authority asserting their rights as third-

party beneficiaries of a provision of the general contract that

required the general contractor to provide a performance bond. 

Western Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. 901.  The ultimate issue in

Western Waterproofing was "[w]hether a third-party beneficiary

contract action could be asserted by an unpaid subcontractor

against a public entity where such entity has failed to procure

from the general contractor a payment bond as required by the

Illinois Bond Act."  Western Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. at 902. 

The court answered that question affirmatively   

	In that case, plaintiffs were subcontractors for a federally

funded construction project for defendant, Springfield Housing

Authority (SHA).  SHA entered into an agreement with Bildoc, the

general contractor, for waterproofing and weatherizing of five

high-rise apartment buildings.  The general contractor then

entered into contracts with various subcontractors, which

included plaintiff Western Waterproofing Company and plaintiff

Mid-Continental Restoration Company, Inc.  Both plaintiffs

contributed labor and materials toward the completion of the

project.  Both plaintiffs were to receive payment 63 days from

completion of the project.  The work was completed and final

payment, minus retainage, was made to Bildoc.  Western

Waterproofing was to receive $129,000 under its agreement with

Bildoc and Mid-Continental was to be paid $22,456 pursuant to its

agreement with Bildoc, but neither received payment for the work

performed.  

	Plaintiffs filed a complaint and secured a default judgment

against Bildoc but were unable to collect.  Plaintiffs resumed

proceedings against SHA.  Counts of plaintiffs' complaint which

alleged that the plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries of

SHA's contract with Bildoc were the subject matter of cross- motions for summary judgment in the case.  Western Waterproofing,

669 F. Supp. at 902.  

	The plaintiffs based their claim that they were third-party

beneficiaries of the contract between SHA and Bildoc on a

provision in the general contract:

	"PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BOND

 		A performance bond in the amount of total amount of

contract for cost of installation of windows will be

furnished to the authority as a separate cost item and

will be added to the contract price.  After the first

shipment of windows and payment thereof by SHA, the

Contractor shall provide SHA with a Waiver of Lien

against all materials on site."  Western Waterproofing,

669 F. Supp. at 902-03.  

	SHA failed to procure a payment bond or a performance bond

from Bildoc.  The Western Waterproofing court found that "[t]he

Act contains mandatory language directing the requirement  of a

payment bond to protect materialmen and subcontractors."

(Emphasis added.)  Western Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. at 903. 

The court further stated that, "[u]nder Illinois law, 'statutory

provisions applicable to a contract are deemed to form a part of that contract and must be construed in connection therewith.'"

Western Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. at 903, quoting DC

Electronics, Inc. v. Employers Modern Life Co., 90 Ill. App. 3d

342, 348, 413 N.E.2d 23 (1980). 

	In determining that plaintiffs were third-party

beneficiaries under the contract to procure a bond where no bond

had been procured, the court in Western Waterproofing stated that

the general rule is well settled: "If the contract is entered

into for the direct benefit of a third person, not a party to the

contract, such third person may sue for breach thereof.  The test

is whether the benefit to the third person is direct or

incidental.  If direct, he may sue on the contract. If

incidental, there is no right of recovery."  Western

Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. at 904, citing Carson Pirie Scott &

Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 257, 178 N.E.2d 498 (1931).

	The Illinois Appellate Court, in East Peoria, followed the

ruling in Western Waterproofing.  In East Peoria, subcontractors,

who were working on school remodeling projects, sued the school

district to collect on amounts unpaid by the general contractor.  

The circuit court entered judgment for the subcontractors and the

school district appealed.  East Peoria, 235 Ill. App. 3d 756, 601 N.E.2d 972.  

	In East Peoria, the plaintiff school district contracted

with the general contractor, Tousley-Iber, to oversee a life   

safety survey and related improvements of some high school

buildings.  The general contractor hired defendant Union Roofing

for roof work, defendant PIPCO Company, Ltd., for plumbing work,

defendant Grand Stage Lighting for stage renovation work, and

defendant Shick Supply & Equipment Company for locker

replacement.  All of the subcontractors performed the work under

their respective contracts.  Plaintiff made progress payments to

the contractor but the contractor did not make payments to

defendant Grand Stage Lighting or defendant Shick.  The

contractor paid Union Roofing and PIPCO for part of the work they

performed.  East Peoria, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 758, 601 N.E.2d at

973.  

	Litigation ensued between the parties.  At issue in East

Peoria were the claims by the subcontractors that they were

third-party beneficiaries of the agreement between plaintiff and

the contractor and also that the Bond Act mandated that plaintiff

require the contractor to obtain a payment bond.  The trial court

granted each defendant's motion for summary judgment and held, inter alia, that the contract was subject to the Bond Act and

that the subcontractors were third-party beneficiaries of the

contract between plaintiff and the contractor.  East Peoria, 235

Ill. App. 3d at 758, 601 N.E.2d at 973.  As a result of the

court's subsequent order entered pursuant to the parties'

stipulations, defendants Union Roofing, Grand Stage, and PIPCO

received partial payment against their lien claims but monies

were still due.  The plaintiff appealed.  East Peoria, 235 Ill.

App. 3d at 759, 601 N.E.2d at 973-74.  

	On appeal, the appellate court held, inter alia, that the

Bond Act mandated that the school district require the general

contractor to provide a payment bond covering subcontractors and

also that subcontractors were third-party beneficiaries of the

payment bond provided for in the contract.  East Peoria, 235 Ill.

App. 3d at 759-62, 601 N.E.2d at 974-75.  The East Peoria court

also stated that it would be meaningless to read the Bond Act

requirements into the construction manager agreement, where the

contractor agreed to pay all amounts due the trade contractors

upon receipt of payment from the plaintiff and to submit

satisfactory evidence that all indebtedness had been paid,

without reading in third-party rights to enforce the statute.  East Peoria, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 601 N.E.2d at 975.

	In our view, Western Waterproofing and East Peoria are

instructive but are not analogous to the instant case because,

although no bond was obtained in either of those cases, both

Western Waterproofing and East Peoria held that the contracts

entered into by the parties in those cases were entered into for

the direct benefit of a third person.  Western Waterproofing, 669

F. Supp. at 904; East Peoria, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 761-62, 601

N.E.2d at 975-76.  Thus, the contracts in both of those cases

constituted a basis for adjudging the subcontractors in those

cases to be third-party beneficiaries.  In the instant case, in

contradistinction to those cases, the contract between PSA and

Prairie State College does not contain any provision indicating

that the contract is entered into for the direct benefit of a

third person.  

	Because of this distinction, Prairie State College in the

instant case contends that Shaw was not an anticipated

beneficiary under the contract and, therefore, has no standing to

bring the actions.  We agree that Shaw is not a direct

beneficiary under the contract pursuant to the purchase order

contract between PSA and Prairie State College. However, in the instant case, Shaw alleges in the amended complaint in pertinent

part:

	"(10) Pursuant to section 1 of the Illinois Public

Construction Bond Act, [citation], the College was obligated

to provide a payment bond to assure payment to all

subcontractors of PSA [including Shaw Industries] that would

furnish labor or materials to be used in connection with

PSA's performance of its obligations under the College's

purchase order no. 31974."

	While Prairie State College argues that Shaw was not a

third-party beneficiary contemplated under the purchase order

contract, "[t]he College does not contest that the provisions of

the Bond Act are read into, and deemed a part of, every contract

in Illinois in which the requirements apply."  Thus, no issue

exists in the instant case that a third-party beneficiary

contract action can be asserted by an unpaid subcontractor

against a public entity where such public entity has failed to

procure from the general contractor a payment bond as required by

the Bond Act. See Western Waterproofing, 669 F. Supp. at 902.  

Shaw's complaint alleges that Shaw was a third-party beneficiary

authorized to bring the cause of action pursuant to the Bond Act.  We hold that the court erred in dismissing Shaw's complaint for

failure to state a cause of action.  Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344,

688 N.E.2d at 1175.  

	B

	Prairie State College contends that, even as a third-party

beneficiary, however, Shaw is required to file the cause of

action within the time constraints set forth in the Bond Act and

that Shaw has failed to assert its claim in a timely manner. 

However, Shaw contends that because Prairie State College failed

to procure a bond as mandated by section 1 of the Bond Act (30 

ILCS 550/1 (West 1998)), it was not required to comply with the

six-month limitations period mandated under section 2 of the Bond

Act.  We disagree with Shaw's contention.  

	Section 2 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/2 (West 1998))

provides, in pertinent part: 

		"that any person having a claim for labor, and material

as aforesaid shall have no such right of action unless

he shall have filed a verified notice of said claim

with the officer, board, bureau or department awarding

the contract, within 180 days after the date of the last item of work or the furnishing of the last item of

materials, and shall have furnished a copy of such

verified notice to the contractor within 10 days of the

filing of the notice with the agency awarding the

contract.

	* * *

			Provided, further, that no action shall be brought

until the expiration of 120 days after the date of the

last item of work or the furnishing of the last item of

materials, * * * nor shall any action of any kind be

brought later than 6 months after the acceptance by the

State or political subdivision thereof of the building

project or work." (Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 550/2 (West

1998).  

	Shaw alleges that it last furnished material to PSA on or

about February 27, 1997.  On August 1, 1997, Shaw served Prairie

State College and PSA with its "Notice Of Claim For Lien Against

Public Funds And Claim On Contractor's Bond."  On August 4, 1997,

Prairie State College's director of business services and

controller responded to Shaw by advising Shaw, in a letter, that

no bond existed: "This letter confirms that no bond was obtained for the Prairie State Associates carpet installation project at

Prairie State College (6616-621)."  The record does not indicate

what "6616-621" denotes.  Shaw filed suit against Prairie State

College on August 18, 1998, for breach of contract as a third-

party beneficiary under the college's contract with PSA. 

	Relative to Shaw's contention that its breach of contract

claim is not subject to the six-month limitations period, Shaw

cites no Illinois cases.  Rather, Shaw urges our court to follow

a 1992 decision by the Court of Appeals of Minnesota in Green

Electric Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 486

N.W.2d 819 (Minn. App. 1992).  However, for the following

reasons, we decline to do so.  

	In Green Electric, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota

affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in the

subcontractor's, Green Electric's, favor because the public

entity, Metropolitan Airports Commission, failed to obtain a

payment bond as required under Minnesota's equivalent of the Bond

Act.  Green Electric, 486 N.W.2d at 823.  The Green Electric

court reasoned that, because the public entity failed to obtain a

payment bond as required under Section 574.28 of the Minnesota

bond act (Minn. Stat. §574.28 (1990)), Green Electric was not required to perform the preconditions for a bond that did not

exist.  Green Electric, 486 N.W.2d at 823.  In a majority

decision, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the grant of

summary judgment in Green Electric's favor but remanded the case

on the limited issue of determining whether Green Electric

sustained a loss.  Green Electric, 486 N.W.2d at 823-24.  The

Court of Appeals of Minnesota stated that a loss could be shown

by proving that the contractor was insolvent and unable to pay

the debt at the time of default.  Green Electric, 486 N.W.2d at

823-24.  

	However, we note that, at the time Green Electric was

written, a provision of Section 574.28 of the Minnesota statute

provided that, if a bond were not obtained, the public body would

be liable for any loss.  Section 574.28 (Minn. Stat. §574.28

(1990)) then provided: 

		"If such bond be not taken, the corporation or body for

which work is done under the contract shall be liable

to all persons furnishing labor, skill or material to

the contractor thereunder for any loss resulting to

them from such failure.  No assignment, modification,

or change of the contract, or change in the work covered thereby, nor any extension of time for

completion of the contract, shall release the sureties

on the bond."  (Emphasis added.)  

Green Electric, 486 N.W.2d at 821 n.2, citing Minn. Stat.  

§574.28 (1990).  Green is inapposite because no provision similar

to Section 574.28 of the Minnesota bond act has been presented in

the Illinois Bond Act.  Moreover, Section 574.28 of the Minnesota

bond act was amended in 1994, effective August 1, 1995, and the

language on which Shaw has placed reliance has been deleted.  See

Minn. Stat. §574.28 (2000).

	Finally, an instructive case on the limitation issue is

Concrete Structures of the Midwest, Inc. v. Fireman's Insurance

Company of Newark, New Jersey, a Corporation, 790 F.2d 41 (7 Cir.

1985).  In  Concrete Structures, a subcontractor brought an

action for lost profits against the surety on a payment and

performance bond for a public works project.  The surety moved to

dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the Illinois

Bond Act's six-month limitations provision.  The United States

District Court, Northern District of Illinois, granted the

motion.  The subcontractor appealed.  The Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed and held that the action was barred by the six-month limitations period, notwithstanding the fact that the

bond provided coverage in addition to that mandated by Act. 

Concrete Structures, 790 F.2d at 43. 

	In Concrete Structures, the court wrote: 

		     "The 'Act provides for the procedure which must be

followed by a person seeking to enforce liability under

the bond which a contractor must give.  Such procedure

is specifically detailed in plain language in Section 2

of the Act.' [Citation] (compliance with §2 is a

jurisdictional requirement for suit on a bond furnished

pursuant to §1). "  Concrete Structures, 790 F.2d at

43. 

	In the instant case, Shaw's third-party beneficiary action

is predicated solely upon section 1 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS

550/1 (West 1998)).  However, the Bond Act must be read as a

whole.  In particular, section 1 of the Bond Act must be read in

conjunction with section 2 of the Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/2 (West

1998)).  Section 2 sets forth the procedure which must be

followed by a person seeking to enforce liability under section 1

of the Bond Act.  Compliance with the limitation period in

section 2 of the Bond Act is a jurisdictional requirement.  Concrete Structures, 790 F.2d at 42.  Shaw failed to comply with

the six-month limitations period to file suit in section 2 of the

Bond Act.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing

the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 

		II

	In addition to the foregoing issues, Shaw has asserted that

it is entitled to recover against Prairie State College pursuant

to section 9 of the Prompt Payment Act (50 ILCS 505/9 (West

1998)).  However, in our view, Shaw has no claim under the Prompt

Payment Act.    

	Section 9 of the Prompt Payment Act, in pertinent part,

provides: 

		"If the contractor, without reasonable cause, fails to

make any payment to his subcontractors and material

suppliers within 15 days after receipt of payment under

the public construction contract, the contractor shall

pay to his subcontractors and material suppliers, in

addition to the payment due them, interest in the

amount of 2% per month, calculated from the expiration

of the 15-day period until fully paid."  (Emphasis

added.)  50 ILCS 505/9 (West 1998).  

	Shaw contends that it is entitled to the same relief against

Prairie State College as would be available under Shaw's contract

with PSA.  Shaw also states that PSA received final payment from

Prairie State College "in or about" December 1996, but failed to

make any payments to Shaw.   

	In interpreting a statute, a court's role is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature, which is

determined in the first instance by examining the language of the

statute.  Superior Structures, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 850-51, 686

N.E.2d at 712.  Moreover, if the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, then the court must enforce it as written and may

not resort to other aids for construction.  Superior Structures,

292 Ill. App. 3d at 851, 686 N.E.2d at 712.

	In our view, as contended by Prairie State College, the Act

limits the rights of subcontractors working on the public bodies

to seek payment from the contractor, not the public body.   

	In the instant case, Prairie State College paid PSA all

amounts due it.  All of the cases cited by Shaw to support its

claim on this issue are inapposite because they either involve

direct actions brought on a contract by contractors or actions

brought by others on a contractor's surety bond seeking payment.  United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 1 L. Ed.

2d 776, 77 S. Ct. 793 (1957) (action by trustees of health and

welfare fund against surety on contractor's bond); D&L

Construction Co. v. Triangle Electric Supply Co., 332 F.2d 1009

(8 Cir. 1964) (action by subcontractor's project supplier to

recover on contractor's Capehart bond); Superior Structures, 292

Ill. App. 3d 848, 686 N.E.2d 710 (contractor hired to resurface

city streets brought breach of contract action against city

seeking monies owed on contract and interest under the Prompt

Payment Act).   

	For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's dismissal of

Shaw's amended complaint is affirmed.  

	Affirmed.  

	McBRIDE, J., and McNULTY, P.J., concur.