2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-30-2007

Price v. Chaffinch

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 06-4086

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Price v. Chaffinch" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 478.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/478
PRECEDENTIAL

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Case No: 06-4086

*SERGEANT CHRISTOPHER D. FORAKER, individually

and in his official

capacity as Superintendent of the Delaware State Police

 v.

COLONEL L. AARON CHAFFINCH; LIEUTENANT

COLONEL

THOMAS F. MACLEISH, individually and in his official

capacity as Deputy Superintendent of the Delaware

State Police; DAVID B. MITCHELL, in his official capacity

as

Secretary of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security

of the State of Delaware; DIVISION OF STATE POLICE

DEPARTMENT

OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATE OF

DELAWARE

 (D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01207)

CORPORAL B. KURT PRICE; CORPORAL WAYNE

WARREN

*SERGEANT CHRISTOPHER D. FORAKER
2

 v.

COLONEL L. AARON CHAFFINCH, individually and in his

official capacity as Superintendent of the Delaware

State Police; LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS F.

MACLEISH,

individually and in his official capacity as Deputy

Superintendent of the Delaware State Police; DAVID B.

MITCHELL, in his official capacity as the Secretary

of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security of

the State of Delaware; DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,

DEPARTMENT

OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY, STATE OF

DELAWARE

 (D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00956)

 B. Kurt Price, Wayne Warren,

 *Christopher D. Foraker,

 Appellants

*Dismissed Per the Court’s Order of 11/7/06

_____________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

District Court Nos.: 04-cv-1207, 04-cv-0956

District Judge: The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

_____________________
 The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for *

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 

3

Argued June 8, 2007

Before: SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges,

and POLLAK, District Judge*

(Filed: August 30, 2007 )

Counsel:

Martin D. Haverly

Thomas S. Neuberger

Stephen J. Neuberger (argued)

The Neuberger Firm

2 East 7th Street, Suite 302 

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellants

Edward T. Ellis (argued)

Carmon M. Harvey

Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads

123 South Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19109

Counsel for Appellees

_____________________

OPINION OF THE COURT
4

_____________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Corporal B. Kurt Price and Corporal Wayne

Warren, both former Delaware State Troopers and instructors in

the Delaware State Police Firearms Training Unit, appeal from

the District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Price and

Warren present two principal issues for review: (1) whether the

activities they engaged in were protected by the Petition Clause,

and (2) whether their speech is protected after the Supreme

Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, --- U.S. ---, 126 S. Ct.

1951 (2006). We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

The origins of this case date to September 1998, when the

Delaware State Police (“DSP”) opened an indoor firing range in

Smyrna, Delaware. The range became the locus of operations

for the Firearms Training Unit (“FTU”), the unit to which Price

and Warren were assigned as instructors during the time period

relevant to this case. The range and those who used it

encountered a number of difficulties from the outset, including

problems with the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

(“HVAC”) system. 

Price and Warren were long-term members of the DSP at
5

the time of the events giving rise to this case. Price had been

part of the FTU since 1996 and Warren had been assigned to the

unit in 2001. Sergeant Christopher Foraker was the Section

Chief of the FTU from August 1, 2001 through April 8, 2002, at

which point he was moved to another unit. Foraker sued Colonel

L. Aaron Chaffinch on April 24, 2002 for First Amendment

retaliation, and won a jury verdict in his favor. The parties later

agreed that Foraker would be reinstated to his position with the

FTU and that the monetary judgment against Chaffinch would

be vacated. Foraker returned to the firing range on December 1,

2003. 

Price, Warren, and Foraker considered the range

conditions intolerable, and were specifically concerned with

health and safety issues there. The HVAC system did not work

properly, the bullet trap was malfunctioning, and officers and

students at the range were suffering the physical manifestations

of contamination, including elevated levels of heavy metals in

their blood. Foraker sent a number of e-mails regarding the

deteriorating conditions at the range to his superiors, including

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. MacLeish, Captain Greg Warren,

and Lieutenant Ralph Davis. In an e-mail dated December 19,

2003 he explained that, due to a broken drive chain and

damaged sprocket on the conveyor, the dredging system had

been brought to a complete stop. He also outlined concerns

about Price’s and Warren’s elevated blood levels. 

In early December, Price, Warren, and Foraker decided
 Foraker also filed a separate action on August 30, 2004 1

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was consolidated with this suit

for discovery purposes only on February 1, 2005. Foraker’s

independent action settled and was dismissed on October 11,

2006. 

6

to suspend certain bullet trap maintenance because they

considered carrying it out to be unsafe. At trial, Warren

explained that their objective was to limit their exposure to lead

and other unsafe metals. They continued to perform other forms

of range maintenance, including removal of spent casings and

trash. The three men had meetings to discuss the range with

MacLeish, Captain Greg Warren, and the Division of Facilities

Management. In March 2004, the DSP closed the range. 

Following the closing of the range, the State Auditor

reviewed the issues surrounding the closing. Price, Warren, and

Foraker met with the Auditor on May 12, 2004. Their attorney

later read their statements to the Auditor, verbatim, to the

Delaware State News, a local newspaper. As troopers, Price,

Warren, and Foraker were not permitted to speak to the press

without the approval of superior officers. On May 13, 2004, they

were ordered to submit to a hearing examination to determine

whether they were fit for duty. On June 25, 2004, Price and

Warren were placed on light duty. On August 19, 2004, Price,

Warren, and Foraker filed this action. Price, Warren, and 1

Foraker amended their complaint on October 14, 2005 to

include the two counts at issue here. Count One of the amended
7

complaint alleged a violation of the plaintiffs’ Free Speech

rights, and Count Two alleged Petition Clause violations. Price

and Warren retired from the DSP on April 7, 2006.

During discovery, Price, Warren, and Foraker sought to

discover e-mail messages stored on Chaffinch’s hard drive.

Chaffinch retired in May 2005. Pursuant to routine DSP

procedure, a technician at the DSP re-imaged the hard drive,

destroying any messages saved there. The plaintiffs requested

default judgment or an adverse inference instruction on the basis

of spoliation of evidence. The District Court denied both

motions. 

Trial began on May 15, 2006. The District Court charged

the jury on May 30, 2006, the same day that the Supreme Court

decided Garcetti v. Ceballos. The next day, the jury returned a

verdict for Price, Warren, and Foraker. 

After the District Court entered judgment on the verdict

for Price, Warren, and Foraker, appellees Chaffinch, MacLeish,

David Mitchell, and the DSP (“DSP defendants”) moved for

judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(b). On August 14, 2006, the District Court granted

the motion. The Court held that the First Amendment Speech

and Petition Clauses did not protect Price and Warren because

their reports up the DSP chain of command and statements to

the Auditor were part of their official duties as Troopers and

they had been ordered to cooperate. The Court denied the
8

motion of Price, Warren, and Foraker to amend the complaint to

conform to the evidence at trial under Rule 15(b). Foraker

settled with the DSP defendants shortly after the filing of this

appeal, and the District Court entered an order of dismissal of

his claims on October 11, 2006. 

II.

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the grant of a

Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. DiBella v.

Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). In

evaluating the grant of judgment as a matter of law, “we must

look at the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the verdict

winner[s], and draw all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.”

Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061,

1072 (3d Cir. 1996). In Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4

F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993), we explained that “although the court

draws all reasonable and logical inferences in the nonmovant’s

favor, we must affirm an order granting judgment as a matter of

law if, upon review of the record, it is apparent that the verdict

is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 1166. 

III.

Price and Warren assert that their actions in bringing the

problems at the firing range to the attention of the government
9

constitute protected petitioning activity under the First

Amendment. In their amended complaint, they alleged that they

suffered adverse employment action as a result of their petitions

to the government for redress of grievances. The Petition Clause

provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I,

cl. 6. The first question for our review is whether Price and

Warren’s expressions are petitions within the meaning of the

First Amendment. 

The history of the Petition Clause is instructive. Petitions

were first utilized in America during the colonial era, when

colonists petitioned the colonial assemblies for resolution of

private disputes as well as for legislative action. See Stephen A.

Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition

Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142,

144-55 (1986). By the time the Framers penned the First

Amendment and the states ratified the right of people to petition

the government, petitioning was already a firmly

established–and highly valued–right in the common law

tradition, and one that included the right to governmental

consideration of the petition. See id. at 155-56 & n.92 (quoting

the Declaration of Independence: “In every stage of these

Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble

terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by

repeated injury.”); see also James E. Pfander, Sovereign

Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment
10

Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91

NW. U. L. REV. 899, 909 & n.36 (1997) (“Early practice on the

‘petition of right,’ which came to be seen as an important

element of the common law, included a variety of features that

would later characterize prerogative practice.”); Julie M.

Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government

for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21

HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22-34 (1993). 

James Madison included the right to assemble and to

“apply[] to the Legislature by petitions” in his draft amendments

of June 8, 1789, and separated these rights from the freedoms of

religion, speech, and the press. See 1 Annals of Cong. 451

(Joseph Gales, ed. 1789); Spanbauer, supra at 39-40. In his

endorsement of the amendments before the House, he called

upon the representatives to “expressly declare the great rights of

mankind secured under this constitution.” 1 Annals of Cong. 449

(Joseph Gales, ed. 1789). The House of Representatives

combined these rights into a single amendment in their

modifications, and substituted the word “government” for

“legislature.” Spanbauer, supra at 39-40; 1 U.S. House Journal

85 (Aug. 21, 1789). The Senate changed the right of

“application” to protect the right to “petition.” Spanbauer, supra

at 42; 1 U.S. Senate Journal 70-71 (Sept. 4, 1789).

Acknowledging these historical roots, the Supreme Court stated:

We have recognized this right to petition as one of

“the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by
11

the Bill of Rights,” and have explained that the

right is implied by “[t]he very idea of a

government, republican in form.”

BE & K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002)

(internal citations omitted); see also Adderley v. Florida, 385

U.S. 39, 49 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (recounting a

brief history of the right to petition in both Britain and

America). However, the right to petition has undergone a

significant transformation since its inclusion in the Bill of

Rights. See Higginson, supra at 165 (“Despite the clear colonial

practice that linked petitioning to a corollary duty of legislative

response, the Southern ‘gag’ proponents [of states’ rights with

respect to slavery] successfully challenged this link and

subsumed the right [to petition] within free expression.”);

McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (“The right to

petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that

Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of

expression.”); id. at 485 (ignoring the varied histories of the

right to petition and the freedoms of speech, religion, and the

press, and stating that “[t]he Petition Clause ... was inspired by

the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the

freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble.”); WMX Techs., Inc.

v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“The

protections afforded by the Petition Clause have been limited by

the Supreme Court to situations where an individual’s

associational or speech interests are also implicated.”). 
 In San Filippo, we wrote that 2

As applied to communications that are not

petitions, the Connick rule means that a public

employee who goes public–e.g., by writing to The

New York Times–with an employment dispute that

is not of “public concern” runs the risk of being

disciplined by her public employer for

undertaking to draw public attention to a private

dispute. 

Id. at 442.

12

In San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir.

1994), we concluded that a public employee who has petitioned

the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing

of a lawsuit or grievance is protected under the Petition Clause

from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition concerns a

matter of solely private concern. In discussing the distinct origin

of the Petition Clause, we distinguished the rule laid out in

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) with respect to

speech , and explained that “when one files a ‘petition’ one is 2

not appealing over government’s head to the general citizenry:

when one files a ‘petition’ one is addressing government and

asking government to fix what, allegedly, government has

broken or has failed in its duty to repair.” Id. at 442. Moreover,

we noted that the argument that 

the scope of the petition right depends upon the
13

context in which the right is exercised is

particularly persuasive because the scope of the

free speech right–a right that, like the petition

right, is stated in unqualified terms in the first

amendment–depends on the context in which that

right is exercised.

Id. at 438. 

Formal petitions are defined by their invocation of a

formal mechanism of redress. Thus, “[l]awsuits, grievances,

[and] workers compensation claims” are all examples of formal

petitions. Id. at 439 n.18. Contrary to the requirements for

speech protection discussed below, when a formal petition is

made, the employee need not show that the subject matter of the

petition involved a matter of public concern. Id. at 442. This

distinction is legitimate because the Petition Clause is not

merely duplicative of the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 441-42

(“[W]e believe that there is an independent reason–a reason of

constitutional dimension–to protect an employee lawsuit or

grievance if it is of the sort that constitutes a ‘petition’ within

the meaning of the first amendment.”); see also Brennan v.

Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 417 (3d Cir. 2003) (contrasting the

requirements for proof of retaliation for free expression with

those for petitioning activity and noting that “a plaintiff need

only show that his/her lawsuit was not frivolous in order to

make out a prima facie claim for retaliation under the Petition

Clause”). 
14

The Supreme Court has explained that “the values in the

right of petition as an important aspect of self-government are

beyond question.” McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483. Although the

Free Speech Clause also serves the interests of democracy, it

does so in a unique manner. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 93 n.127 (1976) (“[T]he central purpose of the Speech and

Press Clauses was to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited,

robust, and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of

public interest would thrive, for only in such a society can a

healthy representative democracy flourish.” (quoting New York

Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). Whereas the

Free Speech Clause protects the right to “wide-open” debate, the

Petition Clause encompasses only activity directed to a

government audience. This distinction correlates to the separate

analysis for each clause. Accordingly, the argument of the DSP

defendants that because Garcetti v. Ceballos, --- U.S. ---, 126 S.

Ct. 1951 (2006) bars plaintiffs’ claims as speech, it also bars

them as petitions is inaccurate–petitions are not synonymous

with speech for purposes of constitutional analysis. 

There are less formal mechanisms by which a petition

may be made. San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439-40. Informal petitions

may include letters such as those at issue in McDonald and

Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990) (per

curiam). Petitions made through informal channels may

occasion a lesser degree of constitutional protection than their

formal counterparts. See, e.g., San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 439

(paraphrasing the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Schalk that when
15

“the ‘petition’ at issue [is] simply a letter imposing on the

government no obligation to respond, it [is] properly analyzable

under the conventional Connick rubric applicable to speech”);

id. at 442; see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight,

465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (“Nothing in the First Amendment or

in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to

speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers

to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public

issues.”).

In Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.

2006), we addressed the First Amendment claim of a former

borough manager who made reports to the Borough Council that

led to retaliation from the mayor, which eventually culminated

in Hill’s resignation. Id. at 230-32. We explained in a footnote

that, although “[w]e have never held ... that a report of a

superior’s misconduct to a legislative body when the legislative

body is also the reporter’s employer constitutes ‘petitioning

activity,’” the complaints Hill made to the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Commission and the EEOC “might well qualify as

‘petitioning.’” Id. at 242 n.24. However, we declined to make

this determination because Hill had not alleged retaliation based

on his complaints to the PHRC or EEOC. 

The distinction drawn in Hill between Hill’s report to his

employer and his complaints to the administrative bodies

illustrates why the plaintiffs’ complaints up the chain of

command did not constitute petitioning activity. Price and
16

Warren complained internally; they did not petition a state

agency qua agency. They appealed to their employer, which also

happened to be a state agency, through informal channels. See

generally Herr v. Pequea Twp., 274 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir.

2001) (questioned on other grounds by Mariana v. Fisher, 338

F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2003); United Artists Theatre Circuit,

Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir.2003));

see also Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th

Cir. 2000) (“[T]he right to petition for redress of grievances

[does not] imply a duty of the government to make every

government employee [or entity] a petition receiver.”). Thus,

they cannot seek solace in the Petition Clause.

 Price and Warren further assert that their speech to the

State Auditor qualifies for protection under the Petition Clause.

However, as the District Court found, although their statements

to the State Auditor may be characterized as invoking a formal

mechanism, “they were ordered to cooperate.” Statements made

under compulsion do not comport with the basic principle of

freedom underlying the Petition Clause. Therefore, these

statements do not fall within the constitutional protections for

petitions to the government. 

IV.

Price and Warren allege that they were retaliated against

for their speech about hazardous conditions at the FTU and

governmental corruption, misconduct, and mismanagement. In
 Price and Warren also raise an argument as to spoliation of 3

evidence. We have considered this argument, and conclude that

it is without merit and compels no separate discussion.

17

particular, Price and Warren assert that their speech up the chain

of command and to the State Auditor was protected by the First

Amendment because it exposed serious health and safety

concerns and exposed government incompetence and

wrongdoing. They assert that the holding of Garcetti v.

Ceballos, --- U.S. ---, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) does not affect

their claims because their job duty as expert firearms instructors

was to teach students how to fire weapons, and speaking out

about health and safety problems at the firing range was not part

of their job function. They maintain that the District Court’s

grant of judgment as a matter of law was in error. The DSP 3

defendants claim that the speech in question is not protected

because Price’s and Warren’s complaints up the chain of

command fell within the scope of their duties as troopers in the

FTU, and were thusforeclosed by Garcetti. The DSP defendants

assert that Price and Warren’s speech to the State Auditor was

also within the scope of their job duties.

As noted above, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in

Garcetti on May 30, 2006, the same day that the jury was

charged in this case. After hearing argument on the DSP

defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), the District Court
 In Garcetti, the Court applied the rule it enunciated to 4

Ceballos’ claims. Thus, the rule announced was not purely

prospective, and the District Court properly applied it in this

case, which was pending at the time of the Garcetti decision.

See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). 

18

correctly held that Garcetti must be applied in this case.4

In Garcetti, the Supreme Court addressed the question of

“whether the First Amendment protects a government employee

from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the

employee’s official duties.” Id. at 1955. Ceballos was a deputy

district attorney in Los Angeles. While performing that role, a

defense attorney approached him about inaccuracies in an

affidavit that had been used to obtain a critical search warrant.

Ceballos investigated and determined that there were

inaccuracies that were still unresolved after consultation with

the affiant. He informed his supervisors, composed a memo

which recommended dismissal of the case, and met with his

supervisors and the affiant to discuss the case. The prosecution

proceeded, and Ceballos was called as a witness for the defense.

Following the trial, Ceballos was reassigned, transferred to

another courthouse, and denied a promotion. He filed an

unsuccessful employment grievance, and then filed an action in

federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Focusing on the distinction between employee-speech
 In rejecting “the notion that the First Amendment shields 5

from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to

their professional duties,” the majority opinion noted that the

“powerful network of legislative enactments–such as whistleblower protection laws and labor codes–available to those who

seek to expose wrongdoing,” protects employees. Id. at 1962.

The Court embraced the notion that–at least in the context of

statements made by “a public employee ... in the course of doing

his or her job”–protection from retaliation and protection under

the First Amendment are mutually exclusive considerations. 

19

and citizen-speech, the Court held that “when public employees

make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees

are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and

the Constitution does not insulate their communications from

employer discipline.” Id. at 1960. The Court emphasized the

importance of allowing government employers “sufficient

discretion to manage their operations.” Id.; see also Waters v.

Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“We

have never explicitly answered this question, though we have

always assumed that its premise is correct–that the government

as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the

government as sovereign.”). The Court relied on the undisputed 5

fact that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to his job

responsibilities in explaining that “[w]e ... have no occasion to

articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of

an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious

debate. ... The proper inquiry is a practical one.” Id. at 1961.
20

Accordingly, Price and Warren argue that they were not

functioning within the scope of their employment duties either

when they made their statements to the State Auditor or

complained up the chain of command.

We briefly addressed the impact of Garcetti in Hill v.

Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006). Hill, a

Borough Manager, allegedly suffered retaliation following his

reports of misconduct by the mayor to the Borough Council. He

admitted to issuing this report “pursuant to his official duties”

to protect Borough employees. Id. at 242. Accordingly, we

concluded that “he was not speaking ‘as a citizen’ when he

made these reports, and thus, as a matter of law, the reports are

not protected speech [under Garcetti].” Id.

However, we reversed the dismissal of Hill’s First

Amendment retaliation claim to the extent that it concerned

Hill’s advocacy of ideas, principles and projects disfavored by

the mayor on the grounds that “we cannot determine in this

procedural posture whether the speech involved a matter of

public concern.” Id. We explained that “[t]hat determination

must be made after an examination of ‘the content, form, and

context of [the] statement, as revealed by the whole record.’” Id.

at 243 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)).

Thus, the Hill opinion followed the Garcetti approach by

remanding to the District Court for an inquiry into whether the

employee spoke as a citizen and, if so, “whether the [mayor] had

an adequate justification for treating the employee differently
21

from any other member of the general public.” Garcetti, 126 S.

Ct. at 1958. In contrast to Hill, Price and Warren’s claims were

presented in detail at a jury trial, giving both the District Court

and this Court comprehensive information from which to answer

the question of whether Price and Warren spoke pursuant to

their official duties. 

Precedent in the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of

Appeals also points to the conclusion we reach here. In Williams

v. Dallas Independent School District, 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir.

2007) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit applied Garcetti to

foreclose the retaliation claim of a high school athletic director

who was discharged after writing a memo to his principal

concerning the handling of school athletic funds. Noting

Garcetti’s injunction that First Amendment protection “does not

invest [employees] with a right to perform their jobs however

they see fit,” the Court held that it was within Williams’ “daily

operations” to manage the athletic department, and because he

needed information on the athletic accounts in order to be able

to do that, his memorandum to his superior concerning accounts

was necessary for him to complete his job. Id. at 694. The Court

noted that this outcome was dictated by the fact that “Williams

had special knowledge that $200 was raised at a basketball

tournament,” and that he was “experienced with standard

operating procedures for athletic departments.” Id. (emphasis

added). Applying the Fifth Circuit’s understanding, Price and

Warren were acting within their job duties when they expressed

their concerns up the chain of command because they needed to
 We recognize that Price and Warren did not have the sort of 6

specialized knowledge required to perform certain hazardous

maintenance work on the bullet trap. The special knowledge and

experience referenced here is their daily interaction with the

equipment, which put them in the position to know when

problems arose. 

22

have a functioning bullet trap to conduct their educational

programs and it was their special knowledge and experience

with the bullet trap that demonstrated their responsibility for 6

ensuring its functionality by reporting problems to their

superiors. 

Our result is also consistent with Freitag v. Ayers, 468

F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1918 (Apr. 2,

2007). In Freitag, a female corrections officer was terminated

after filing reports documenting sexual harassment by prisoners

and inaction on the part of her superiors. Applying Garcetti to

her First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit explained that

the reports she submitted were pursuant to her official duties. Id.

at 546. However, the Court declined to hold that a letter she

wrote to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation explaining the hostile work

environment she had encountered was within her job duties, and

remanded that issue to the District Court. Id. Apart from the

minor factual distinctions between a prison guard’s duty to write

internal reports about prisoner misconduct and her supervisors’

dilatory response and Price and Warren’s responsibility to report
 The Sixth Circuit did not believe that the Garcetti inquiry

7

required district court involvement. In Haynes v. City of

Circleville, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007), the Court rejected a K9 unit police officer’s contention that his complaints regarding

cuts to the K-9 program were protected following Garcetti.

Characterizing the memo Haynes wrote to the Police Chief as

“reflect[ing] nothing more than ‘the quintessential employee

beef’: management has acted incompetently,” the Court

23

required bullet trap maintenance, Freitag helps to illustrate the

connection between Price and Warren’s speech and their job

duties. 

The Ninth Circuit’s remand of the question whether

Freitag’s letter of complaint to the Director was within her job

duties illustrates the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry. Unlike

the question of whether speech is protected by the First

Amendment, the question of whether a particular incident of

speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a

mixed question of fact and law. Thus, as the Ninth Circuit held,

the proper resolution of challenges to the designation of such

speech is to defer to the district court, because “having presided

over this and related litigation for several years, [it] may be in a

better position to make the relevant factual determinations....”

Freitag, 468 F.3d at 546. Accordingly, Price and Warren’s

claims of retaliation based on the First Amendment are

foreclosed because, as the District Court found, reporting

problems at the FTU was within their official job duties.7
explained that “[i]n lodging his protests to Chief Gray against

the training cutbacks, Haynes was acting as a public employee

carrying out his professional responsibilities.” Id. at 364-65

(citation omitted). However, the Sixth Circuit also said that

“[t]he fact that Haynes communicated solely to his superior also

indicates that he was speaking ‘in [his] capacity as a public

employee....’” Id. at 364 (quoting Mills v. City of Evansville,

Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 646 (7th Cir. 2006)). As Garcetti explained,

the inquiry is nuanced: the fact that an employee speaks

privately is not conclusive as to whether the speech is within the

scope of his or her job duties. 

In Mills, the Seventh Circuit made a similar ruling. 452

F.3d at 648. The Court explained that: 

Mills was on duty, in uniform, and engaged in

discussion with her superiors, all of whom had

just emerged from Chief Gulledge’s briefing [on

personnel changes]. She spoke in her capacity as

a public employee contributing to the formation

and execution of official policy. Under Garcetti

her employer could draw inferences from her

statements about whether she would zealously

implement the Chief’s plans or try to undermine

them; when the department drew the latter

inference it was free to act accordingly.

Id. The Court further held that “[p]ublic employers must be able

to change assignments in response to events (including

statements) that reveal whether employees will be faithful agents

of the decisions made by the politically accountable managers.”

Id.

24

As the Court explained in Garcetti, the facts that
25

“Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than

publicly,” and that his memo concerned the subject matter of his

employment, were non-dispositive. 126 S. Ct. at 1954. Thus, the

controlling fact in the case at bar is that Price and Warren were

expected, pursuant to their job duties, to report problems

concerning the operations at the range up the chain of command.

Price and Warren spoke internally with respect to the health

conditions at their workplace. They were required to speak up

the chain of command and were prevented from speaking to the

press without prior approval. Price and Warren were likewise

expected to report truthfully to the State Auditor upon being

ordered to do so. 

The result required by Garcetti illustrates how that

opinion narrowed the Court’s jurisprudence in the area of

employee speech. Although under Garcetti an employee’s right

to protest matters of public concern is not automatically

forfeited by his or her choice of a workplace forum, that right is

limited. Compare Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8

(1983), with Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (identifying the

“controlling factor” in removing speech from the First

Amendment as being that the expressions were made pursuant

to employment duties); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch.

Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979). 

Reporting problems at the firing range was among the

tasks that Price and Warren were paid to perform. Their

positions in the DSP required them to report up the chain of
26

command, and their positions as instructors who regularly used

and performed light maintenance on the equipment at the range

on a daily basis put any environmental concerns there within the

scope of their routine operations. As the District Court noted,

their annual performance reviews suggest that Price and Warren

were involved in workplace safety issues–Price’s report explains

that he “aided his supervisors in identifying safety issues at the

facility,” and “reached out to experts in the field of ventilation

[and] firing range design along with heavy metal exposure and

contamination [experts] and established a rapport with these

professionals to search out the root cause and contributing

factors surrounding the dangers we face in exposure to heavy

metal contamination.” There is some suggestion in the record

that Price’s search for external assistance may have been

motivated by personal concerns, but the fact that Price may have

exceeded the expectations of his formal job description as a

firearms instructor does not mean that they were not within the

scope of his duties. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961-62 (“Formal job

descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an

employee actually is expected to perform....”). Warren admitted

at trial that he regularly dealt with the water in the bullet trap,

unclogged the pumps, and replaced the filters.

Although voluntary efforts to engage in public discourse

do not automatically remove internal workplace speech from

constitutional protection, Price and Warren were required by the

terms of their employment to maintain a safe learning

environment at the FTU. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960
 In support of their contention that such reporting was not 8

within the scope of their employment, Price and Warren direct

us to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Lindsey v. City of Orrick,

--- F.3d ---, 2007 WL 1814943 (8th Cir. June 26, 2007). Lindsey

was the public works director for the City. In that role he

maintained the City’s parks, water systems, streets, and sewers

27

(“Refusing to recognize First Amendment claims based on

government employees’ work product does not prevent them

from participating in public debate. The employees retain the

prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to

the civic discourse. This prospect of protection, however, does

not invest them with a right to perform their jobs however they

see fit.”). In his evaluation, Price was “tasked” with “the safe

execution of the Academy Patrol Procedures Program” and the

creation of “a new and more applicable set of Firing Range

Safety Rules.” Similarly, one of Warren’s “objectives” for the

next evaluation period was “conduct[ing] a safe Firearms

Training Program” for which the plan of action was identified

to include “[e]nsur[ing] all students and instructors practice

approved safety procedures.” Warren’s performance appraisal

justification noted that one of the “accomplishments of the

Firearms Training Unit” during the period from October 1, 2002

through September 30, 2003 was that the unit “[c]ompleted the

alterations and modifications to the Bullet Recovery system.”

With respect to work habits, Price and Warren were both given

high marks for their care of the equipment related to firearms

training. Notably, the plaintiffs did not identify anyone else 8
and reported about public works at City Council meetings. After

attending a training session that included information on state

sunshine law compliance, Lindsey questioned the Council’s

compliance with the open meetings requirement at a number of

public meetings. He was later fired. The Court differentiated

Garcetti, and held that Lindsey’s speech was made “both as a

citizen and on a matter of public concern.” Id. at *5. The opinion

in Lindsey, however, does not suggest that Price and Warren’s

speech should be protected by the First Amendment as the Court

explained that “there is no evidence Lindsey’s job duties even

arguably included sunshine law compliance.” Id. at *3. As

demonstrated above, there is sufficient evidence that Price and

Warren’s jobs included reporting health and safety problems at

the firing range. 

28

whose job might have included the sort of maintenance they

performed, or who might have had responsibility to ensure the

safety of the range. 

We recognize that giving statements to the State Auditor

was not part of their everyday duties and that Garcetti leaves

open the possibility that speech within the workplace relating to

non-job issues is protected. However, Price explained that he

spoke to the auditors because “[i]t was my duty to speak to the

auditors. The order came down from the executive office of the

State of Delaware, meaning the Governor’s office. I am bound

by that order.” Although this speech was compelled by their

employer, this fact alone does not locate the speech within the

realm of Price and Warren’s job duties. Rather, what is
29

dispositive is that the prior statements of Price and Warren

within the chain of command prompted the order to speak with

the State Auditor. Because the speech that motivated the order

was within their job duties, the responsibility to respond to the

subsequent order was also within the scope of their duties. 

Because we agree with the District Court that Price and

Warren were acting pursuant to their job duties when they made

their complaints up the chain of command and gave their reports

to the State Auditor, we need not examine whether their speech

passes the remainder of the test established by Pickering and its

progeny. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);

Givhan, 439 U.S. at 410; Connick, 461 U.S. at 138; see also

Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004).

As the Seventh Circuit explained, “Garcetti requires that before

analyzing whether an employee’s speech is of public concern, a

court must determine whether the employee was speaking ‘as a

citizen’ or, by contrast, pursuant to his duties as a public

employee.” Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 509-10

(7th Cir. 2007); see also Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks

Charter Academy, --- F.3d ---, 2007 WL 2007546, at *5 (10th

Cir. 2007). In making their voices heard up the chain of

command and reporting to the State Auditor under order, Price

and Warren spoke pursuant to their duties as government

employees at the FTU.

Price and Warren also assert that the release of their

statements to the Auditor by their attorney was speech that was
30

not pursuant to their job duties, and therefore not foreclosed as

a basis for recovery by Garcetti. As Garcetti explained,

“[e]mployees who make public statements outside the course of

performing their official duties retain some possibility of First

Amendment protection because that is the kind of activity

engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.” Id.

at 1961 (citing writing a letter to a local newspaper or discussing

politics with a co-worker as examples of speech that falls

“outside the scope of official duties”). They raised this argument

before the District Court in regard to their motion to amend the

complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 15(b). Although the release of their statements may

have been outside the scope of their duties, and perhaps even in

contravention of those duties, we need not reach this question

because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion to amend. See Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226,

1235 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We review for abuse of discretion the

district court’s granting of leave to amend the complaint.”).

Moreover, the media speech theory was not presented to the

District Court as a defense to the motion for judgment as a

matter of law, but only in conjunction with their Rule 15(b)

motion. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,

539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (“We generally refuse to

consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

In their brief to the District Court challenging the motion

for judgment, Price and Warren argued that their speech was

internal, but still protected after Garcetti because it was not
31

pursuant to their job duties. They also argued that they had not

received notice of any defense that their speech to the Auditor

was not within their job duties because, if they had, they would

have shown that “it was their attorneys, who also spoke out to

the press on their behalf after the first Auditor meeting, who

arranged the actual meeting with the Auditor on their clients’

behalf so their clients could blow the whistle on DSP

wrongdoing.” Their brief to the District Court also alleged that

their “speech to the Auditor was the means of responding to

[the] gag order; responding to the defamatory attack on

plaintiffs; and of informing the public of governmental

mismanagement and corruption through the Auditor and the

media.” (emphasis added). They concluded that “plaintiffs

engaged in protected speech when they raised their health and

safety concerns to the State Auditor.” (emphasis added). 

We recognize that the parties did not have the benefit of

the Garcetti opinion at the time of trial. See North River Ins. Co.

v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 n.39 (3d Cir.

1995) (“[W]here a previously ignored legal theory takes on new

importance due to an intervening development in the law, it is

appropriate to exercise discretion to allow a party to revive that

theory.” (internal citations omitted)). However, Price and

Warren did not ask the District Court for a partial new trial on

the ground that Garcetti had changed the legal landscape,

pursuant to Rule 59(a). See FED. R CIV. P. 59(a) (“A new trial

may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of

the issues ... for any of the reasons for which new trials have
32

heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the

United States....”); Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454 (3d

Cir. 2001). Instead, they requested an amendment to conform

the complaint to the evidence. The District Court correctly

denied that request.

Price and Warren did not meet the requirements for an

amendment pursuant to Rule 15(b), which allows amendment of

pleadings if the claim was tried by the express or implied

consent of the parties. The record makes clear that the DSP

defendants did not give their express consent. In order to

ascertain whether they gave implied consent, we look to

“whether the parties recognized that the unpleaded issue entered

the case at trial, whether the evidence that supports the

unpleaded issue was introduced at trial without objection, and

whether a finding of trial by consent prejudiced the opposing

party’s opportunity to respond.” Douglas, 50 F.3d at 1236

(quoting Portis v. First Nat’l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 332 (5th

Cir.1994)); see also Evans Prods. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 736

F.2d 920, 924 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The primary consideration in

determining whether leave to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b)

should be granted is prejudice to the opposing party. The

principal test for prejudice in such situations is whether the

opposing party was denied a fair opportunity to defend and to

offer additional evidence on that different theory.” (citation

omitted)). 

Price and Warren identify a May 14, 2004 newspaper
 The following sidebar colloquy is illustrative: 9

The Court: What are you offering? 

Mr. S. Neuberger: The fact that the FTU, that the

conditions at the FTU were all over

the media in the beginning of

2004.... I am not offering, for

example, Captain [Greg] Warren’s

quote that the FTU was, quote, the

absolute epitome of a project from

hell since its very inception, end

quote – Captain Warren can testify

about that in a couple of days when

he is in here....

Mr. Ellis: If that is the case, it is really

misleading, because the evidence

33

article that indicates that their counsel read their statements

verbatim to the Delaware State News, and point to trial

testimony regarding the article as support for the unpleaded

issue. Admitted without objection, the newspaper article was

relevant to and admitted for the purpose of proving Price and

Warren’s theory of retaliation and their defamation claim. Their

attorney explained in a proffer to the District Court “why I am

offering this,” i.e., that the article “goes to the motive of the

defendants to retaliate.” He did not argue the possibility that the

article might show that Price and Warren used their attorney to

take their otherwise internal speech public. Indeed, in response

to concerns raised by opposing counsel, he disclaimed altogether

any connection his clients had with the article.9
would make it seem like these three

people were responsible for what’s

in the paper. That is really

misleading because it’s not the

case. 

The Court: That is a concern, the concern

outlined by Mr. Ellis. 

Mr. T. Neuberger: I will be happy to have Corporal

[Wayne] Warren testify that there is

overlap in the subject matter, but it

wasn’t him speaking to the media

and giving them this information.

[emphasis added]

* * *

Mr. T. Neuberger: I think we are missing something

that we are saying on motivation. ...

This is a backdrop of pressure and

concern about the range, which,

even if that pressure is not talking

about our clients, it is talking about

the fact that the state has a brokendown facility. And we are saying

that the motive to retaliate is

because all this is going public. So

any news story of any nature about

the range contributes ... to a motive

to retaliate. It doesn’t have to be

about our guys. ... Simply the [fact

that the] range is now being

34
covered again [by the news media

shows the defendants’ displeasure

about the publicity].

* * *

The Court: Albeit these particular plaintiffs

were not the source --

Mr. T. Neuberger: No. 

In direct examination of Warren, the plaintiffs introduced the

news article in the following manner: 

Q. What were you concerned about?

A. Being blamed for the downfall of the operation [at

the FTU].

Q. Do you recall seeing any news media coverage

discussing your meetings with the auditors?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall what newspapers that coverage was

in?

A. I believe it was in both the News Journal and the

State News.

Following this exchange, Warren identified the headline of the

article in which their lawyer’s reading of their statements was

reported. Warren did not refer to the article again in his

testimony. Several other references were made to the article

during the plaintiffs’ case, all in the context of showing the

animosity of the defendants toward Price and Warren. 

35

The sole occasion on which it is even arguable that Price
36

and Warren introduced unchallenged evidence of their media

speech theory was during the direct examination of Major David

Baylor, which came after the plaintiffs’ explanation that the

article was evidence of motivation for retaliation. Plaintiffs’

counsel asked Baylor if it was correct “that both Lieutenant

Colonel MacLeish and Colonel Chaffinch became angry about

the newspaper reporting on statements my office had made on

behalf of my clients?” Baylor responded that “[t]here was a level

of frustration, yes.” The subsequent line of inquiry focused on

the frustration of MacLeish and Chaffinch about the news

stories and their angry feelings toward Price and Warren. This

single question is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule

15(b). See, e.g., Farfaras v. Citizens Bank and Trust of Chicago,

433 F.3d 558, 568 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s

admission on cross-examination in an employment

discrimination case that she did not go to work right away was

“not sufficient to demonstrate that the defense had raised the

issue of failure to mitigate”). 

As we explained in Douglas, “an issue has not been tried

by implied consent if evidence relevant to the new claim is also

relevant to the claim originally pled, because the defendant does

not have any notice that the implied claim was being tried.” 50

F.3d at 1236. Having disclaimed any attempt to introduce the

article for the purpose of showing that they were responsible for

the statements or the release to the press, Price and Warren

cannot now assert that they entered the unpleaded issue of media

speech into the trial. 
37

Nor did the defendants implicitly agree to the inclusion

of the unpleaded issue in their testimony. Chaffinch testified that

“I was not upset that your clients were talking to the auditors

because, like I said, we were going to comply with the Auditor’s

Office in any way they needed to complete their investigation.

I was not upset that they were talking to the auditors, no. I was

upset that it was bringing a negative light to the Division of

State Police in the media.” Although Price and Warren now

point to Chaffinch’s testimony as evidence that the DSP

defendants impliedly agreed that the issue of speech to the

media was being tried, Chaffinch did not testify as to how the

statements got into the media. Both he and MacLeish expressed

their dismay at the negative coverage that the situation at the

FTU had received, but neither stated that they were upset with

Price and Warren for going to the media via their attorney and

circumventing the universal DSP order prohibiting officers from

talking to the media without approval. 

The fact that there was no objection to the hearsay

contained in the article further indicates that the defendants

understood the introduction of the article and testimony

regarding it to relate only to the adverse action prong of Price

and Warren’s retaliation claim. The DSP defendants did not

implicitly consent to the trial of a claim that Price and Warren

engaged in protected speech to the media. Accordingly, their
 We note that, although Price and Warren’s Rule 15(b) 10

motion fails, they may have had a valid claim under Rule 59(a)

or Rule 60(b)(6) on the basis of the changed legal landscape

after Garcetti. See, e.g., Stanton by Brooks v. Astra Pharma.

Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 557, 576 (3d Cir. 1983) (confirming

that a change in the law is an appropriate basis for a partial retrial); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (“On motion and upon such terms

as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ...

any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment.”); but see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239

(1997) (“Intervening developments in the law by themselves

rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for

relief under Rule 60(b)(6)....”). However, Price and Warren did

not seek a partial re-trial on the issue of media speech or relief

from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). They sought only

reinstatement of the verdict or default judgment as relief. 

Although we are mindful that Rule 54(c) requires that

“every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in

whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not

demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings,” we note that the

rule “addresses and cures a limited formal problem. It is not

designed to allow plaintiffs to recover for claims they never

alleged.” USX Corp. v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir.

2004). Thus, we are unable to assist Price and Warren in

salvaging their potentially meritorious, but unpleaded and

untried, claims. 

38

motion under Rule 15(b) fails on the merits.10
39

V.

Price and Warren’s Petition Clause claim does not

withstand scrutiny. Their complaints within the chain of

command were not directed to the DSP as a governmental

agency, but rather were directed to the DSP as their employer.

Such complaints are not petitioning activity entitled to

protection under the First Amendment. 

The holding in Garcetti controls our analysis of the First

Amendment speech claims. Under the rule established in

Garcetti, Price and Warren spoke out about the maintenance of

the bullet trap “pursuant to their official duties.” First

Amendment protection extends to government employees

speaking as citizens, but it does not extend to workers who

speak in the course of fulfilling their employment

responsibilities. Price and Warren were speaking pursuant to

their employment duties when they made their concerns known

through the chain of command and when they spoke with the

State Auditor. Accordingly, their First Amendment claims are

foreclosed. 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Price and Warren’s motion under Rule 15(b). 

We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
We quote this language characterizing the majority opinion in 11

San Filippo from Judge Becker’s concurring and dissenting opinion

in that case. 

40

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Though I agree with the result the majority reaches on Price’s

and Warren’s petition claim, I write separately to note my hesitation

in finding that their e-mail complaints up the chain of command (as

distinguished from their communications to the State Auditor), did

not constitute petitioning activity. Rather, I would assume, arguendo,

that the e-mails were petitioning activity, but conclude that the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951,

1960 (2006), barred their petitioning claim given that they sent their

complaints up the chain of command “pursuant to their official

duties.” See majority opinion at 25.

The majority finds that because Price’s and Warren’s

“complaints within the chain of command were not directed to the

DSP as a governmental agency, but rather were directed to the DSP

as their employer,” Price and Warren cannot seek solace now in the

Petition Clause. Majority opinion at 39; see also id. at 16 (noting

Price and Warren “appealed to their employer, which also happened

to be a state agency, through informal channels”). In San Filippo v.

Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 449 (3d Cir. 1994), we held “that a public

employee is protected under the Petition Clause against retaliation for

having filed a petition . . . addressing a matter of purely private

concern.” We explained that the reason for our conclusion was 11
In Connick, the Supreme Court held that a government employee 12

who goes public with an employment dispute that is not a “matter of

public concern” does not have first amendment immunity against

subsequent employer discipline. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S. Ct.

at 1690. 

41

“[t]he first amendment’s petition clause imposes on the United States

an obligation to have at least some channel open for those who seek

redress for perceived grievances. Through its incorporation of the

first amendment, the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee of ‘liberty’

imposes the same obligation on the states.” Id. at 442. Thus:

[W]hen government–federal orstate–formally adopts

a mechanism for redress of those grievances for which

government is allegedly accountable, it would seem to

undermine the Constitution’s vital purposes to hold

that one who in good faith files an arguably

meritorious ‘petition’ invoking that mechanism may

be disciplined for such invocation by the very

government that in compliance with the petition

clause has given the particular mechanism its

constitutional imprimatur.

Id. Additionally, we distinguished retaliation claims based on speech,

which are subject to the rule announced by the Supreme Court in

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983),12

as follows: “[W]hen one files a ‘petition’ one is not appealing over

government’s head to the general citizenry: when one files a ‘petition’

one is addressing government and asking government to fix what,

allegedly, government has broken or has failed in its duty to repair.”
This discussion assumes that e-mail was the typical means by 13

which their employer expected Price and Warren – as well as other

DSP employees – to communicate their concerns to it. 

Notably, although we observed in Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 14

455 F.3d 225, 242 n.24 (3d Cir. 2006), that “[w]e have never held .

42

San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442.

Notwithstanding the above, both San Filippo and the majority

concede that there also exist “less formal mechanisms by which a

petition may be made,” although they “may occasion a lesser degree

of constitutional protection than their formal counterparts.” Majority

opinion at 14; see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 480, 105

S.Ct. 2787, 2788 (1985) (recognizing letters sent to President of

United States by defendant charged with defaming plaintiff as

petitions). The majority concludes, however, that because Price and

Warren, in their capacity as public employees, “appealed to their

employer, which also happened to be a state agency,” their e-mails

cannot constitute petitioning activity. Majority opinion typescript at

16. I find the result reached somewhat troubling. Specifically, given

our broad characterization of a public employee’s right to petition in

San Filippo, it is unclear to me why Price’s and Warren’s complaints

would constitute petitioning activity if they had contacted “a state

agency qua agency,” id., rather than the same agency as their

employer. Indeed, if in both cases plaintiffs are asking government

to fix what it “has broken or has failed in its duty to repair” through

means the government has deemed acceptable, San Filippo, 30 F.3d 13

at 442, why should the activity be stripped of its constitutional

protection in one instance but not the other? 

14
. . a report of a superior’s misconduct to a legislative body when the

legislative body is also the reporter’s employer constitutes

‘petitioning activity,’” so far as I am aware we similarly never have

held to the contrary. 

Obviously, a public employee can petition his governmental 15

employer regarding a matter completely unrelated to his employment

and be in the position of any other petitioner for constitutional

purposes. But that situation is not present here. 

43

 We can avoid the need to resolve the difficult question of

whether a public employee ever can “petition” the government when

the government is also the public employee’s employer by looking,

instead, to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos. In 15

Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that when public employees speak

“pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as

citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not

insulate their communicationsfrom employer discipline.” 126 S. Ct.

at 1960. While the Supreme Court did not address the question of

whether the rule it announced in Garcetti applies to First Amendment

retaliation claims based on a public employee’s petitioning activities,

as distinguished from his speech, there is good reason to believe that

it does.

To be sure, “[t]he petition clause of the first amendment was

not intended to be a dead letter–or a graceful but redundant

appendage of the clauses guaranteeing freedom of speech and press.”

San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442. Rather, the right to petition “is an

assurance of a particular freedom of expression,” McDonald, 472

U.S. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 2789, and “has a pedigree independent

of–and substantially more ancient-than the freedoms of speech and
44

press.” San Filippo, 30 F.3d at 443. Nonetheless, “[t]he right to

petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that

Amendment.” McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 2789. To

this end, the Supreme Court has plainly recognized that:

The Petition Clause . . . was inspired by the same

ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the

freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. . . . These

First Amendment rights are inseparable . . . and there

is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional

protection to statements made in a petition . . . than

other First Amendment expressions.

Id. at 485, 105 S. Ct. at 2791 (internal citations omitted); see also San

Filippo, 30 F.3d at 450 (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting

“even if all petitions now constitute speech (given the broad

interpretation the Supreme Court has given to speech), I do not see

why it matters that the guarantees overlap”). Given the above, it

certainly would be plausible for us to believe that, if presented with

the question, the Court is likely to find that when public employees

petition the government pursuant to their official duties, the

Constitution does not insulate such petitions from employer

discipline. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960; see also D’Angelo v.

School Bd. of Polk County, Fla., No. 06-13582, F.3d , 2007 WL

2189099, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2007) (noting that, after Garcetti,

the court must ask “whether the public employee made his petition

both on a matter of public concern and as a citizen” and “[i]f the

petition fails this threshold question, it is not protected under the First

Amendment”).
45

Assuming, arguendo, that Price and Warren’s complaints up

the chain of command did constitute petitioning activity, because I

believe that Garcetti applies to their claim, I similarly would uphold

the district court’s order granting judgment against them as a matter

of law for this reason. For the reasons the majority thoughtfully sets

forth, it seems plain that Price and Warren acted “pursuant to their

official duties,” Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960, in voicing their

complaints up the chain of command. Accordingly, their complaints

cannot be the basis underlying a First Amendment claim against

defendants. 
46

POLLAK, District Judge, concurring:

I join the opinion and judgment of the court.

The opinion explains with precision that the free speech

aspect (as distinct from the Petition Clause aspect) of this case

dealing with the rights of public employees is squarely governed

by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,

--- U.S. ---- , 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006): “The result required by

Garcetti illustrates how that opinion narrowed the Court’s

jurisprudence in the area of employee speech. Although under

Garcetti an employee’s right to protest matters of public concern

is not automatically forfeited by his choice of a workplace

forum, that right is limited.” As the court further observes,

under Garcetti, “the ‘controlling factor’ in removing speech

from the First Amendment [is] that the expressions were made

pursuant to employment duties.” In the case at bar, it is not

surprising that reports made by Corporal B. Kurt Price and

Corporal Wayne Warren within the chain of command of the

Delaware State Police were regarded as “made pursuant to

employment duties.” Less clear is that the statements Price and

Warren made to the State Auditor—statements ordered to be

made to a high state official beyond the chain of state police

command—were part of their employment duties. As the court

notes, “giving statements to the State Auditor was not part of

[appellants’] everyday duties.” But, given the statements Price

and Warren had made to their senior officers, it was not clear

error for the District Court to find that the directive to Price and
47

Warren to aid the State Auditor’s inquiry broadened the scope

of their employment duties. See Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d

895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002).

It may be expected that Garcetti will, to some extent,

inhibit federal judicial micromanaging of public employment

practices. It also may be expected that Garcetti will, to some

extent, inhibit dissemination of information of arguable public

interest about the operations of government agencies. How the

balance will be struck may be expected to depend, to some

extent, on the nuanced judgments of public employees and their

superiors, and also of courts, on the scope of a public

employee’s employment duties. Compare Garcetti, 126 S. Ct.

at 1961–62, with id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. at

1965, 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).