COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judge Frank and Senior Judge Bumgardner Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

SHAUN NEIL MARSHALL MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1829-08-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK JULY 14, 2009 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE Randall D. Smith, Judge Kathleen A. Ortiz, Public Defende r (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Alice T. Armstrong, Assistan t Attorney Genera l II (William C. Mims, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Shaun Neil Marshall, appellant, was convicted, in a bench trial, of grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95 and st atutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91. On appeal, he contends that the circumstantial evidence wa s insufficient to sustain his convictions. Specifically, he argues that he successfully rebutt ed the inference of guilt arising from his recent possession of stolen property. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND K.W. (victim) testified that on March 20, 2007, twenty tools worth approximately $800 were stolen from his garage. Late r that day, the victim’s son located five of the same stolen tools at a local pawnshop. By the time the victim arrive d at the shop, only four of the tools were still there. The victim valued those items between $103 and $118.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - During his investigation, Detective Torres spok e with appellant. Appellant stated to Torres that he bought the four power tools from B.C. for ten dollars on the morning of March 20, 2007, and he later sold them to the pawnshop on the same day. Torres arrested appellant for grand larceny and statutory burglary. The trial court pointed out that in appellant’s statement to Torres, he admitted possession of the property and offered an explanation as to how he obtaine d the property. The court concl uded that appell ant’s statement to Torres was “a self-serving statement” and did not find it to be a “true version or credible version to explain [appellant’s] recent possession of stolen merc handise.” The court convicted appellant based upon the inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen property. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evid ence, we “‘presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct’ and reverse only if the trial court’ s decision is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence’ to support it.” Kelly v. Commonwealth , 41 Va. App. 250, 25 7, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) ( en banc ) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)). A reviewing cour t does not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt bey ond a reasonabl e doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 30 7, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original). We ask only whether “any rational tr ier of fact coul d have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason able doubt.” Kelly , 41 Va. App. at 257, 584 S.E.2d at 447. “‘This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fa ct fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the ev idence, and to draw reas onable inferences from basic facts to ulti mate facts.’” Id. at 257-58, 584 S.E. 2d at 447 (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319). Thus, we do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact” even if our opin ion were to differ. Wactor v. Commonwealth , 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002).- 3 - Under Virginia law, upon proof of a breaking and entering and a theft of goods, and if the evidence warrants an inference that the breaking and entering and the thef t were committed at the same time by the same person and as part of the same transaction, “the exclusive possession of the stol en goods shortly thereafter, unexplained or falsely de nied, has the same efficiency to give rise to an inference that the possessor is guilty of the breaking and entering as to an inference that he is guilty of the larceny.” Bright v. Commonwealth , 4 Va. App. 248, 253, 356 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1987) (quoting Cannady v. Commonwealth , 210 Va. 533, 535, 172 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1970)). Appellant contends that because his stat ement to Torres was neither impeached nor contradicted, the trial court was obligated to accep t his exculpatory statement to Torres as true. Ordinarily, uncontradicted evid ence should be accepted as true and cannot be wholly discredi ted or disregarded if not opposed to probabilities, even though the w itness is an interested party. Uncontradicted evidence is not , however, necessarily binding on the court or the jury. It may be disbelieved where it is inherently improbable, inconsistent with circumstances in evidence, or somewhat contradictory in itself, especially where the witness is a party or is interested. Neither courts nor juries are required to believe that which they know fr om ordinary experience is incredible. Stegall v. Commonwealth , 208 Va. 719, 722, 160 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1968). The trial court was not obligated to accept appellant’s explanation as credible. Roberts v. Commonwealth , 230 Va. 264, 272, 337 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1985). It is well established that the trier of fact is not required to accept a witness’ testimony, but instead is free to “rely on it in whole, in part, or rej ect it completely.” Rollston v. Commonwealth , 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991). The record clearly supports the trial court’s rejec tion of appellant’s explanation for his possession of the tools. It is uncontested that on March 20, 2007, the victim’s garage was burglarized and $800 worth of tools were stolen. Appellant admitted to Torres that on the day of- 4 - the burglary, he was in possession of four of the stolen tools. By expl anation, appellant told Torres that be purchased the tools from B.C. for ten dollars and sold them at a local pawnshop. The trial court did not believe that appellant “wou ld just happen to be in the vicinity, that he would just happen to have purchased the stolen merchandise for a sum of $10, and then immediately go to [the pawnshop] and make a tid y profit.” “We have said many times that we are not required to accept as true that which we know from huma n experience is incredible.” Terry v. Commonwealth , 174 Va. 507, 515, 6 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1940). The court clearly rejected appellant’s story as too coinci dental. Essentially, the trial court disregarded appellant’s explanation as too “oppo sed to probabilities.” See Stegall , 208 Va. at 722, 160 S.E.2d at 568. Appellant argues that any evidence of a false denial must come from evidence extrinsic to appellant’s explanation. The language in Stegall belies this argument, as Stegall allows the fact finder to examine only the content of the purported explanation. We underscore that Stegall allows the fact finder to disbelie ve any statements that are “inh erently improbable, inconsistent with circumstances in evidence, or somewhat cont radictory in itself, especially where the witness is a party.” Stegall , 208 Va. at 722, 160 S.E.2d at 568; see also Servis v. Commonwealth , 6 Va. App. 507, 525, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988) (rej ecting defendant’s uncontroverted explanation for his possession of a large amount of cash, finding that defendant had no “satisfactory explanation for how he earned the money”). Appellant argues Schaum v. Commonwealth , 215 Va. 498, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975), supports his position. In Schaum , appellant was convicted of burglary. The evidence at trial proved that on the same night as the burglary, police recovered a television set and a pistol, items taken during the burglary, from another indivi dual who told police he purchased them from Schaum for $100. Id. at 500, 211 S.E.2d at 75. Schaum atte mpted to explain his possession of- 5 - the items, but the trial cour t rejected his explanation. Id. at 501, 211 S.E.2d at 75. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld Sc haum’s conviction, stating, The evidence given by Harrison th at the defendant sold him the television set and gun taken a short time before from the [victim’s] residence was, if accepted by the court, sufficient to sustain Schaum’s conviction. While Scha um attempted to explain his possession of these goods, this explan ation need not have been and obviously was not, accepted by the trial court. Id. After reviewing the evidence, the trial judge in this case found that appellant’s explanation was self-serving and not believable. See Marable v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998) (finding that “[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is en titled to disbelieve the self-ser ving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt”). The trial judge heard the testimony of the witnes ses and in light of a ll the evidence in the record, evaluated and rejected appellant’s explana tion to Torres as to how he came to possess the stolen property. Appellant’s explanation of how he purchased, then pawned, the tools was not plausible, and from all the circumstances here a reasonable man could not be expected to believe it. See Stegall , 208 Va. at 723, 160 S.E.2d at 569. Therefore, the court could rely on evidence of appellant’s falsely denied recent possession of the stolen tools as proof of his larceny and burglary. Montague v. Commonwealth , 40 Va. App. 430, 438, 579 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2003).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to convict appellant of grand larceny and statutory burglary. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.