IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RESPECT THE PROMISE IN OPPOSITION TO R-14-02-NEIGHBORS FOR 

A BETTER GLENDALE, an Arizona political committee; NO MORE BAD 

DEALS FOR GLENDALE IN OPPOSITION TO R-14-03-NEIGHBORS FOR 

A BETTER GLENDALE, an Arizona political committee, GARY HIRSCH, 

an individual, 

Plaintiffs/Appellants

v. 

PAM HANNA, in her official capacity as City Clerk of the City of Glendale, 

Arizona; CITY OF GLENDALE, ARIZONA, a municipal corporation, 

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0801

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2014-011334

The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix

By Mary O’Grady, John L. Blanchard

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix

By Keith Beauchamp, Roopali H. Desai, Melissa A. Soliz

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maurice Portley and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Gary Hirsch, as chairman of two neighborhood political 

committees, appeals the superior court’s denial of his application for a writ 

of mandamus requiring the Glendale City Clerk to accept and file 

referendum petitions challenging the Glendale City Council’s approval of 

a resolution and related settlement agreement. Hirsch argues the City 

Council’s acts were referable and the City Clerk lacked discretion to refuse 

to follow the statutory requirements for processing referendum petitions. 

Because we conclude that neither the resolution nor the settlement 

agreement were legislative acts, they are not subject to the power of 

referendum. We therefore affirm the court’s order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2001, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 

2229, which purported to annex a parcel of land contiguous to the City’s 

border, known as Area 137. After an Area 137 landowner filed a petition to 

set aside the annexation, however, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 

2258, which abandoned the annexation. Approximately one year later, the 

Tohono O’odham Nation (“the Nation”) purchased 134 acres of land (“the 

Property”) located within Area 137. 

¶3 In 2009, the Nation applied to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 

have the Property taken in trust by the federal government, which would 

allow the Nation to conduct gaming activity on the Property. In response 

to the Nation’s application, the City Council passed Resolution No. 4246, 

“voicing” its opposition to the Nation’s application and corresponding 

efforts to establish gaming on the Property. The resolution also directed the 

Glendale City Manager and City Attorney “to take all reasonable, necessary 

and prudent actions to oppose” the Nation’s application. The City Council 

further adopted Ordinance No. 2688, which stated that Ordinance No. 2258 

“was ineffective and a nullity” and declared that Area 137 was indeed 

annexed as of December 27, 2001. The Nation, however, successfully 
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Opinion of the Court

3

challenged the City’s attempted annexation. Tohono O’odham Nation v. City 

of Glendale, 227 Ariz. 113 (App. 2011).

¶4 In July 2010, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior 

approved the Nation’s application and accepted the Property in trust under 

the federal Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, 100 Stat.

1798 (1986). The City, and other entities opposing the gaming facility,

challenged the Secretary’s decision in federal district court, which upheld 

the decision. The City appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

vacated the district court’s ruling in part and remanded, directing the 

Secretary to consider whether the land was “within the corporate limits of 

any city or town.” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 

1150-51 (9th Cir. 2013). Additional litigation ensued, stemming from the 

legislature’s adoption of a statute in 2010 to facilitate annexation of land on 

a county island when an application to have the land taken into federal trust 

is pending. The Nation sued the State of Arizona and the City, challenging 

the constitutionality of the new law. The federal district court struck down 

the law, prompting the State and the City to appeal.

¶5 Meanwhile, Representative Trent Franks of Arizona

introduced in Congress the Keep the Promise Act of 2013 (“the Franks 

Bill”), designed to prevent the construction of new casinos on trust lands 

within the Phoenix metropolitan area. On March 25, 2014, the City Council 

passed Resolution No. 4783, declaring its opposition to the Franks Bill.

Interested parties attempted to refer the resolution to voters, but the City 

Clerk rejected the referendum petitions, explaining the matter was 

administrative and therefore not referable. The City Clerk’s decision was 

not challenged.

¶6 On July 3, 2014, the Secretary determined the Property was 

not within the corporate limits of any city or town and therefore took the 

Property in trust. On July 15, 2014, the City Council approved Resolution 

No. 4828, which repealed Resolution No. 4246 (opposing the Nation’s 

efforts to establish gaming on the Property) and recognized that City staff 

had been directed to commence negotiations with the Nation. No 

referendum petitions were filed challenging Resolution No. 4828. 

¶7 On August 14, 2014, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 

4840. To provide context, the resolution recounted the passage of 

Resolution 4246 (annexation resolution), state and federal litigation, the 

introduction of the Franks Bill, passage of Resolution No. 4783 (opposing 

the Franks Bill), the final decision of the Secretary, passage of unchallenged 

Resolution No. 4828 (repealing opposition to gaming on the Property), and 
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

prior settlement negotiations between the City and the Nation. The 

resolution then (1) reaffirmed the City Council’s “support” for gaming on 

the Property; (2) declared it was in the best interests of the City to enter into

a settlement agreement (“the Settlement Agreement”) with the Nation; (3) 

directed the mayor to execute the Settlement Agreement on the City’s 

behalf; (4) directed the city attorney to withdraw from ongoing litigation;

(5) declared support for the Secretary’s decision to take the Property in 

trust; (6) declared support of the Nation’s gaming project; (7) urged the 

State not to challenge the Secretary’s decision and to withdraw from 

ongoing litigation; (8) urged the State’s congressional delegation to oppose 

any legislation aimed at limiting the Nation’s ability to conduct gaming on 

the Property; and (9) reaffirmed Resolution No. 4783 (opposing the Franks 

Bill). 

¶8 On the same day, the City, the Nation, and the Tohono 

O’odham Gaming Enterprise entered into the Settlement Agreement, which 

recognized that the City had undertaken steps to oppose the Nation’s 

proposed casino project by instituting litigation and pursuing state and 

federal legislation. The Settlement Agreement thus confirmed the parties’ 

intentions to settle all disputes relating to the Property, including the 

dismissal of pending litigation. The Settlement Agreement also provided 

that the Nation would (1) fund all on-site infrastructure improvements and 

reimburse the City for costs it incurs for off-site infrastructure

improvements; (2) make a one-time payment of $500,000 to the City within 

ten days of execution of the agreement; and (3) make various payments to 

the City and to the Glendale Convention and Visitors Bureau totaling more 

than $25 million over the next twenty years. 

¶9 On August 25, 2014, the City was dismissed from the only 

remaining litigation, the appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit. Soon 

thereafter, Hirsch submitted separate petitions for referendum to the City 

Clerk challenging Resolution No. 4840 and the Settlement Agreement. The 

City Clerk rejected the petitions, explaining that both the Resolution and 

the Settlement Agreement were administrative, rather than legislative in 

nature, and therefore not subject to referendum. 

¶10 Following the City Clerk’s rejection, Hirsch applied for a writ 

of mandamus in the superior court to compel the City Clerk to process and 

file the referendum petitions. Following briefing and oral argument, the 

court entered judgment denying Hirsch’s application, finding that neither 

Resolution No. 4840 nor approval of the Settlement Agreement were 

legislative acts subject to referendum. The court reasoned that (1) the 

provisions of Resolution No. 4840 unrelated to the Settlement Agreement 
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

do not “qualify as legislation;” and (2) the City’s decision to settle its 

disputes with the Nation by entering the Settlement Agreement was an 

administrative act. Finally, the court held that the City Clerk had the 

authority to reject Hirsch’s referendum petitions because they failed to meet 

the constitutional limitation that only legislative acts are referable. Hirsch 

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional Right of Referendum 

¶11 Hirsch contends Resolution No. 4840 and the Settlement 

Agreement created new a policy and are therefore legislative acts subject to 

referendum. Whether a particular action taken by the governing body of a 

municipality is subject to the referendum power is a question we review de 

novo. See Redelsperger v. City of Avondale, 207 Ariz. 430, 432, ¶ 7 (App. 2004)

(reviewing de novo the trial court’s finding that a city council acted in a 

legislative capacity, and thus subject to referendum, when it approved a 

conditional use permit).

¶12 The Arizona Constitution reserves the power of referendum 

to the people, Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1, and thus “permits qualified 

electors to circulate petitions and refer to a popular vote legislation [that] has 

been enacted by their elected representatives.” Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 

169 Ariz. 485, 488 (1991) (emphasis added). As relevant here, the 

constitution reserves the referendum power “to the qualified electors of 

every incorporated city, town, and county as to all local, city, town, or 

county matters on which such incorporated cities, towns, and counties are 

or shall be empowered by general laws to legislate.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 

1, § 1(8) (emphasis added).

¶13 Municipal corporations “act in several capacities: legislative, 

executive, administrative, and quasi-judicial.” Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 

488. Voters may challenge only legislative actions via referendum because 

permitting “referenda on executive and administrative actions would 

hamper the efficient administration of local governments.” Id. In 

Wennerstrom, our supreme court adopted a general test for evaluating 

whether a particular act is legislative, and thus referable, or administrative, 

and not referable:

Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general 

character are usually regarded as legislative, and those 

providing for subjects of a temporary and special character 

are regarded as administrative. In this connection an 
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

ordinance which shows an intent to form a permanent rule of 

government until repealed is one of permanent operation.

. . . . 

The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative 

proposition, with respect to the initiative or referendum, has 

further been said to be whether the proposition is one to make 

new law or to execute law already in existence. The power to 

be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new 

policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it 

merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative 

body itself, or some power superior to it. Similarly, an act or 

resolution constituting a declaration of public purpose and making 

provision for ways and means of its accomplishment is generally 

legislative as distinguished from an act or resolution which merely 

carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative 

body.

169 Ariz. at 489 (quoting 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 

16.55 at 266 (3d rev. ed. 1989) (“McQuillin”)). As noted by the supreme 

court, the test is “far easier stated than applied,” and the “plethora of cases” 

applying the test are “often irreconcilable.” Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 489. 

¶14 In this case, the referendum power is applicable only if the 

City Council’s passage of Resolution No. 4840 and approval of the 

Settlement Agreement were legislative acts as contemplated by the Arizona 

Constitution. See Stop Exploiting Taxpayers v. Jones, 211 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 9 

(App. 2005) (“Although the constitutional right to referendum is broadly 

construed, only legislative acts are subject to referendum.”) (internal 

citation omitted). Because different considerations are involved in 

ascertaining the legal nature of Resolution No. 4840 and the Settlement 

Agreement, we address them separately. 

A. Resolution 4840

¶15 As a threshold matter, we analyze whether the provisions of 

Resolution No. 4840 that are unrelated to the Settlement Agreement 

constitute “legislation.” The power of referendum applies only to matters 

on which the governing body is empowered “to legislate.” See Ariz. Const. 

art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(8). “Legislation, whether by the people or the legislature, is 

a definite, specific act or resolution.” Saggio v. Connelly, 147 Ariz. 240, 241 

(1985). “[L]egislatures do not enact general principles,” rather, to be 

considered legislation, a “measure must enact something.” Id.; see also
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

Black’s Law Dictionary 1037-38 (10th ed. 2009) (defining legislation as “[t]o 

make or enact law” and the “attempt to control (something) by 

legislation”). Thus, only substantive acts pertaining to subject matter over 

which the legislative body has authority to regulate constitute legislation. 

See McQuillin, § 16.52 (noting that the right to a referendum is “restricted 

to legislation within the power of the municipality to enact or adopt”). As 

such, the reference to “actions” set forth in Wennerstrom presupposes that a 

legislative body has adopted a substantive measure addressing a matter 

over which the legislative body has the power to regulate. See Wennerstrom, 

169 Ariz. at 489. 

¶16 As a general matter, “courts have jurisdiction and authority 

to determine whether the proposed initiative or referendum measure is of 

the type authorized to be placed on the ballot.” McQuillin § 16.52. In Winkle 

v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 416 (1997), the supreme court explained that 

voter initiatives, and by extension referenda challenging the actions of 

municipal corporations, may be rejected as procedurally defective on two 

bases: (1) structural noncompliance with the statutory requirements, such 

as a petition lacking the requisite number of signatures; and (2) the text of 

the initiative, or the challenged measure, “fails to enact anything.” Thus, 

measures setting forth the “thought processes” of a municipal corporation 

and the give-and-take of the political process, devoid of any substantive 

enactment, are not subject to referendum. Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 491. 

¶17 Applying these principles to Resolution No. 4840, and putting 

aside for the moment the provisions relating to approval of the Settlement 

Agreement, the remaining provisions: (1) affirm or acknowledge prior 

resolutions; (2) express support for the Nation’s casino project; and (3) urge 

the State and its representatives to withdraw their opposition to the project.

Mere expressions of support, and encouraging other entities or individuals 

to share the same viewpoint, are not substantive measures. Rather than an 

enactment, Resolution No. 4840 reflects the City Council’s position on a 

matter over which it has no legislative authority to regulate. Accordingly, 

the council’s expressions of support for the gaming project and related 

“urging” that other entities and individuals withdraw their opposition, do 

not constitute legislation. 

¶18 Our analysis is consistent with an analogous California case,

Worthington v. City Council of City of Rohnert Park, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 63-64 

(App. 2005). In that case, a city council and a tribe entered an agreement 

memorializing the city’s “non-opposition” to the tribe’s plans to build a 

casino and resort on property near the city’s boundaries, as well as the 

tribe’s commitment to pay the city approximately $200 million over a 
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

8

twenty-year period. Id. Local citizens petitioned to place a referendum on 

the ballot regarding the city decision to approve the agreement. Id. at 61. 

In concluding that approval of the agreement was a non-referable 

administrative act, the court concluded that a “legislative act necessarily 

involves more than a mere statement of policy” and a policy statement, 

devoid of any enforcement power, “is not an exercise of legislative power.” 

Id. at 67. The court reasoned further that “[w]hether a local government 

approves or chooses to voice its disapproval is not legislation and therefore 

is not subject to referendum.” Id. 

¶19 Similar to the circumstances in Worthington, the City 

Council’s approval of Resolution No. 4840 merely reflected its changed 

position as to how a majority of the council viewed the Nation’s proposed 

gaming project. Because the council’s approval was untethered to any 

legislative power, the superior court properly concluded the council’s 

approval of Resolution No. 4840 was not a legislative act. Cf. Cota-Robles v. 

Mayor and Council of City of Tucson, 163 Ariz. 143, 146 (App. 1989) 

(concluding Tucson voters could not hold a referendum election to vote on 

proposed alignment of a state highway because the city had no “authority 

to legislate on the matter”); Citizens for Responsible Transp. v. Draper City, 190 

P.3d 1245, 1249, ¶ 13 (Utah 2008) (holding a city’s resolution in support of 

commuter rail system was not subject to referendum because construction 

would proceed without the resolution). 

B. Settlement Agreement

¶20 Unlike the City Council’s changed position regarding the 

Nation’s gaming project, the provision of Resolution No. 4840 approving 

the Settlement Agreement does constitute a substantive measure that 

authorizes, among other things, the expenditure and receipt of funds. Thus, 

the Settlement Agreement is “legislation” in the sense that it does “enact 

something.” See Saggio, 147 Ariz. at 241. 

¶21 Consistent with the principles confirmed in Wennerstrom, 

however, a sound rationale exists that favors recognizing a municipality

has the authority to enter a binding settlement agreement without the cloud 

of uncertainty that would exist if the action approving the settlement 

agreement were subject to referendum. See Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 488 

(“The sound rationale for limiting the referendum to legislative actions is 

that to permit referenda on executive and administrative actions would 

hamper the efficient administration of local governments.”). Stated 

differently, if the terms of a settlement agreement were ultimately subject 

to the approval of voters, the ability of municipalities to act in their 
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

9

executive and administrative capacities to effectively negotiate and resolve 

litigation with other parties would be substantially undermined. Allowing 

a city’s voters to share the ability to control litigation with a city council 

would result in chaotic, if not absurd, results. In addition, the effectiveness 

of the judicial system would be compromised if the parties’ settlement 

agreements and corresponding withdrawals from litigation could later be 

rejected by voters. 

¶22 We agree with Hirsch that merely labeling a contract a 

“settlement agreement” is not dispositive as to whether the contract is 

referable. An agreement that settles pending litigation, however, is, by any 

measure, a settlement agreement. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1582 

(defining a settlement agreement as “an agreement ending a dispute or 

lawsuit”). The City Council determined, after years of litigation costing the 

City more than $3 million in legal fees, it was no longer in the City’s best 

interests to challenge the Nation’s proposed gaming facility, through 

litigation or otherwise, and to end the disputes between them. Contrary to 

Hirsch’s argument, exempting settlement agreements from challenge by 

referenda is not inconsistent with Wennerstrom, which specifically held that 

that executive and administrative acts of a municipal corporation are not 

referable. Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 488; see also McQuillin, § 16.51 (“While 

the power of the people to legislate directly through referenda is a 

constitutionally guaranteed right, that right exists only when the law or 

ordinance the voters seek to challenge was enacted legislatively as opposed 

to administratively.”). 

¶23 Hirsch fails to cite any case in any jurisdiction holding that a 

settlement agreement is referable, and our research reveals only contrary 

authority. See McQuillin, § 16.55 (“[T]he following have been deemed not 

subject to initiative or referendum: . . . settlement of claims in litigation.”); 

Oakman v. City of Eveleth, 203 N.W. 514, 517 (Minn. 1925) (holding the city’s 

settlement of certain claims brought against city officials was the “exercis[e] 

of an administrative function” that involved “investigation and discretion” 

and was not subject to referendum); Phillips v. City of Whitefish, 330 P.3d 442, 

456 (Mont. 2014) (determining a settlement agreement was “principally 

administrative in nature” and, because “the legislative function did not 

predominate,” it was not subject to referendum); Okerson v. Common Council 

of City of Hot Springs, 767 N.W.2d 531, 536 (S.D. 2009) (concluding the 

settlement of litigation is an “administrative” matter appropriately left to 

the city council, not voters); cf. Worthington, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 67 (“The giveand-take involved when a government entity negotiates an agreement with 

a sovereign Indian tribe is not legislation, but is a process requiring the 

consent of both contracting parties.”).
RESPECT et al. v. HANNA et al.

Opinion of the Court

10

¶24 Furthermore, to the extent Hirsch argues the City’s obligation 

to construct offsite infrastructure renders the Settlement Agreement subject 

to referendum, Hirsch has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any 

authority supporting the proposition that a government expenditure for a 

public improvement is, by definition, subject to referendum. To the 

contrary, the Arizona Constitution provides that laws “for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions” are not 

referable. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(3). 

¶25 Construing this provision, our supreme court held “that the 

framers of the constitution and the people who voted for its adoption 

understood and intended that appropriations for the support and 

maintenance of the departments of the state government and state 

institutions were not to be subject to the referendum.” Garvey v. Trew, 64 

Ariz. 342, 351, 355 (1946) (explaining that appropriations are exempt from 

the referendum power “when made in support and maintenance of the 

existing functions of the department or institution”); cf. Stop Exploiting 

Taxpayers, 211 Ariz. at 579-80, ¶¶ 12-15 (holding that a measure increasing 

utility rates did not create a new tax and thus was not subject to 

referendum). Hirsch does not argue that the funds the City committed to 

use to front the costs of offsite infrastructure improvements were 

unauthorized nor does he dispute that the Nation is obligated to reimburse 

the City for all actual costs of the improvements. Cf. Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. 

at 493 (explaining that “[i]f a city makes unauthorized expenditures, the law 

may provide a remedy, but the expenditures do not convert a non-referable 

resolution into a referable one”). 

¶26 Accordingly, the superior court properly concluded that the 

City Council’s approval of Resolution No. 4840 and the Settlement 

Agreement are not legislative acts that can be challenged by referendum.

II. Authority to Reject Petitions

¶27 Hirsch argues the City Clerk lacked the statutory authority to 

reject petitions challenging acts the City Clerk deemed administrative. “We 

interpret statutes de novo, attempting to give effect to the intent of the 

legislature.” Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 226 Ariz. 345, 347, 

¶ 7 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Generally, when the 

language of the statute is clear, we follow its direction without resorting to 

other methods of statutory interpretation.” Pinal Vista Prop., L.L.C. v. 

Turnbull, 208 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 10 (App. 2004). Statutes relating to the same 

subject or having the same general purpose, however, “should be read in 

connection with, or should be construed with other related statutes, as 
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Opinion of the Court

11

though they constituted one law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Equally important, every statute must be read in light of related 

constitutional provisions. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 62 Ariz. 

398, 407 (1945). 

¶28 Title 19 sets forth the procedural framework for challenging a 

legislative measure via referendum. First, a person or organization seeking 

a referendum files an application with the city clerk and then collects 

signatures. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 19-111(A); see A.R.S. § 19-141(A) 

(defining “secretary of state” as used in Title 19 to include “city or town 

clerk”). After collecting the requisite signatures, the applicant files a 

petition with the city clerk by “tender[ing]” the petition sheets. A.R.S. § 19-

121(B). Within twenty days of the applicant’s tender of the petition sheets, 

the city clerk “shall” review the petition sheets for statutory compliance 

and, if the total number of compliant signatures equals or exceeds the 

constitutional minimum, the city clerk “shall” randomly select five percent 

of the signatures for verification. A.R.S. § 19-121.01(B). The city clerk then 

transmits the signatures in the random sample to the county recorder. 

A.R.S. § 19-121.01(C). 

¶29 Hirsch argues that these statutes governing a city clerk’s 

duties in response to a petition, couched in terms of “shall,” afford a city 

clerk no discretion to reject a petition on the basis that the challenged 

measure is not legislative in nature. However, read in light of the relevant 

constitutional provisions from which the referendum power originates, 

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(8), the statutory

scheme presupposes that a challenged measure is legislative. This 

interpretation is consistent with A.R.S. § 19-122(A), which provides that if 

a city clerk refuses to accept and file a petition for referendum, the clerk 

must provide the applicant “with a written statement of the reason for the 

refusal,” but does not limit the basis for such refusal to technical 

noncompliance. 

¶30 Likewise, this interpretation is supported by well-established

case law upholding the rejection of petitions for referenda challenging nonlegislative acts. See e.g., Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 487, 495 (noting city clerk 

refused to process petitions because the resolutions involved were not 

subject to referendum); Saggio, 147 Ariz. at 240 (noting city clerk refused to 

place a measure on the ballot for a general election); Garvey, 64 Ariz. at 355 

(upholding the secretary of state’s “refus[al] to file the referendum 

petitions” because the challenged appropriation was not subject to the 

referendum power); Stop Exploiting Taxpayers, 211 Ariz. at 578, ¶ 3 (noting 

the city clerk refused to transmit a referendum petition because the 
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Opinion of the Court

12

challenged measure was an administrative act not subject to referendum). 

Furthermore, accepting Hirsch’s argument would create the illogical result 

of requiring municipalities to incur the expense of conducting referendum 

elections on non-legislative measures, even though the outcome would 

have no practical effect because only a legislative act is referable. See 

Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 209 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 12 (2004) 

(explaining we interpret statutes “to give them a fair and sensible meaning 

and to avoid absurd results”). Therefore, we conclude the superior court 

did not err in rejecting Hirsch’s claim that the City Clerk lacked the 

authority to reject Hirsch’s petitions.

¶31 Finally, Hirsch requests attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348(A)(2), which provides for an award of 

attorneys’ fees to any party “that prevails by an adjudication on the merits”

in any proceeding reviewing a city, town, or county decision. Because 

Hirsch has not prevailed on appeal, we deny his request.

CONCLUSION

¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

denial of Hirsch’s application for writ for mandamus.