IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ricardo Morales-Vasquez, :

Petitioner :

: No. 253 M.D. 2019

v. :

: Submitted: February 28, 2020

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: July 28, 2020

In our original jurisdiction, Ricardo Morales-Vasquez (Vasquez) has filed 

a petition for review (PFR) in the nature of a complaint, against the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections (DOC) seeking remedies in both law and equity with regard 

to certain property that was allegedly confiscated from his cell located in a State 

Correctional Institution (SCI) by DOC employees due to suspected misconduct. In 

response, DOC filed Preliminary Objections (POs) in the nature of a demurrer, arguing 

that Vasquez has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Vasquez is an inmate who is serving a life sentence and is currently 

confined at SCI-Forest. (PFR ¶¶ 1-2.) Vasquez alleges that he was subjected to 

“violations of his personal rights” by numerous individuals within DOC; that they were 

“acting under the official employment of the [DOC]”; and thus, “in the interest in [sic] 
2

justice,” Vasquez has decided to name “the [DOC] as a whole” as a respondent in his 

suit. (PFR ¶¶ 5-6) (emphasis added).

In his PFR, Vasquez alleges that on May 18, 2018, he was housed in cell 

#1001, in the “Echo Bravo” unit, and on that day he returned to his cell and “came to 

the realization” that “someone had gone through his boxes and personal footlocker.” 

(PFR ¶¶ 12-13.) Vasquez brought his concern to the attention of Sergeant Bloss, who 

was on duty at the time, and Sergeant Bloss informed Vasquez that he had conducted 

a “cell inspection” while Vasquez was not in his cell. (PFR ¶ 14.) Vasquez alleges 

that Sergeant Bloss informed him that he conducted an inspection because certain items 

were out of place, and he thought Vasquez was “running a store” due to the large 

amount of food he observed. (PFR ¶ 18.) Vasquez explains that “running a store” 

violates DOC policy, and maintains that he [has] never engaged in “running a store” 

and did not have what he considered to be “extra food” in his cell. (PFR ¶¶ 19-20.) 

Vasquez alleges that Sergeant Bloss then proceeded to go back into his cell and retrieve 

his personal footlocker and other boxes located underneath his bunk and, again, 

accused him of “running a store” due to the excessive amount of food in the cell. (PFR 

¶ 21.) 

Vasquez maintains that the following day, May 19, 2018, Security 

Officers Caratelli and Evans entered his cell to conduct a search because of the amount 

of food that was previously observed in his cell. (PFR ¶¶ 23-24.) He alleges that he 

was told that a search would be performed of his cell and that anything exceeding 

$70.00 in value would be confiscated and he would be issued a “DC-141 Misconduct.” 

(PFR ¶ 24.) Vasquez maintains that he told the officers he had receipts to prove that 

he was merely “stocking up” and was not “running a store”; however, the officers 

persisted and advised him that he would be permitted to maintain $70.00 worth of 
3

merchandise, which included tobacco products. (PFR ¶¶ 25-28.) Vasquez alleges that 

subsequently his cell was searched and $195.45 “worth of food” was confiscated from 

his cell. (PFR ¶ 33.) Vasquez alleges that later that day he was served with a “DC-141 

Misconduct Report” charging him with two violations of “the Institution[’]s DC-ADM 

801 §1 Policy – Class 1 Charge #36 – Possession of Contraband; and, Class 1 Charge 

#45 – Failure to Report the [Presence] of Contraband.” (PFR ¶ 35.) 

Prior to the misconduct hearing, Vasquez alleges that on May 20, 2018, 

he submitted a “DC-135A” request seeking assistance in obtaining his property that 

was confiscated. (PFR ¶ 38.) He alleges that the Unit Manager, Ms. Crawthers, 

responded two days later explaining that Vasquez would have to “work with [s]ecurity 

[p]ersonal [sic] to obtain his property back.” (PFR ¶ 39; Exhibit C1.) Moreover, on 

May 20, 2018, Vasquez alleges that he sent a letter to the Lieutenant of Security, 

explaining the situation and requesting the return of his property, but he was given no 

recourse. (PFR ¶ 40; Exhibit C2.) 

Vasquez alleges that on May 23, 2018, he attended a formal misconduct 

hearing and pled not guilty, maintaining that he was never properly advised of a change 

in DOC policy resulting in the confiscation of his property. (PFR ¶ 41; Exhibit B1, 

D1.) Vasquez’s misconduct was dismissed. Id. Vasquez explains that he asked the 

hearing examiner how he could get his property back, and was told that he would have 

to “handle that through security” or submit a formal grievance. (PFR ¶ 42.) Vasquez 

maintains that he then informed a security officer that he wanted his property back, but 

was told that the officer needed to consult with his superiors. (PFR ¶¶ 43-44.) 

Vasquez filed a grievance pursuant to DOC Policy “DC-ADM 804” to the 

Grievance Coordinator, Lisa Reeher, which he alleges was denied because he failed to 

file the correct documentation. (PFR ¶¶ 48-50; Exhibit F1-2.) Vasquez alleges that he 
4

submitted another grievance, which he maintains contained all of the necessary 

documentation. (PFR ¶¶ 51-53; Exhibit F3.) He alleges that this grievance was denied 

because it was not presented in the proper format, and concerned a misconduct charge, 

which was not appropriately addressed through the grievance system, but should have 

been addressed through the inmate discipline or administrative custody procedures. 

(PFR ¶ 53; Exhibit F13.) He alleges that in response he filed a “DC-135A Inmate 

Request to Staff Member,” which was also denied. (PFR ¶¶ 54-55; Exhibit F14.) 

Vasquez maintains that he was advised to file an appeal through “801 [Program Review 

Committee] [(]PRC[)],” and did so on June 15, 2018. (PFR ¶¶ 55-56; Exhibit F14, 

G1.) He alleges that the PRC appeal was denied because he was not permitted to appeal 

a misconduct that was dismissed without prejudice, and thus, he filed an appeal to the 

Superintendent of SCI-Forest requesting financial relief because his edible property 

“ha[d] become to [sic] out-dated to be returned.” (PFR ¶¶ 57-58; Exhibit G2, H1.) He 

points out that his appeal was dismissed as both untimely and because his misconduct 

was dismissed without prejudice. (PFR ¶ 59; Exhibit H2.) 

Vasquez explains that he filed an appeal with DOC requesting relief in the 

amount of $195.45 because “all [the] food [that was] confiscated is stale and unedible 

[sic].” (PFR ¶ 60; Exhibit I1.) Vasquez alleges that his appeal was denied because 

there was no “prior record of receipt of an appeal . . . on this issue,” DOC records 

indicate that the misconduct was dismissed without prejudice, and there is no basis for 

the appeal. (PFR ¶ 64; Exhibit J3.) He alleges that he was encouraged to “continue to 

work with DOC staff regarding his property issues.” Id. 

Under the section of the PFR titled “Facts,” Vasquez alleges that he 

understands that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell, but he

maintains that cell searches cannot be used to harass an inmate or are not justified if 
5

there is no “penological [sic]” need. (PFR ¶¶ 65-66.) Vasquez alleges that DOC

officers went “outside of their official duties” by looking through his cell without 

justification, and wrongly took possession of his property valued at $195.45. (PFR ¶¶ 

67-68.) Vasquez maintains that his property was only to be held pending disposition 

of the hearing and that DOC staff provided him with erroneous information with regard 

to getting his property back. (PFR ¶¶ 69-71.) 

Vasquez alleges that DOC has cost him $226.48 and violated his due 

process rights. (PFR ¶¶ 72-76.) Specifically, he argues that under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution,1 he was deprived of his property without 

due process, but recognizes that due process can be satisfied by the existence of 

adequate post-deprivation state remedies “such as the grievance systems [and] the 

instant tort action.” (PFR ¶ 74.) Nevertheless, Vasquez maintains that his due process 

rights were violated because Ms. Reeher would not “accept” his grievance after 

numerous attempts, nor would the PRC “listen” to his appeals or explain why it never 

received them, and that his untimely appeals were timely. (PFR ¶ 76.)

In his “Statement of Law,” Vasquez alleges that under section 8852(b) of

what is known as the Sovereign Immunity Act,2 42 Pa. C.S. §8852(b), the General 

Assembly waived immunity for damages under nine specific circumstances and that 

the “property” exception applies in this case. (PFR ¶ 79.) Vasquez alleges that this 

 

1 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that 

no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV, §1.

2 42 Pa. C.S. §§8501-8502, 8521-8564.
6

action is brought under section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6),3

and that DOC falls within the definition of a “Government Unit” and is considered a 

“Commonwealth party” under section 8501 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §8501. 

(PFR ¶ 80.) Specifically, Vasquez alleges that DOC took control of his property and 

held it pending the disposition of his hearing, which constituted “nondelivery of [his] 

property” pursuant to section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6). (PFR 

¶ 85.) He also maintains that he “properly exhausted administrative remedies to the 

‘very best of his ability’” by continuing to file grievances and PRC appeals. (PFR ¶¶

91-93.) 

In the portion of the PFR titled “Legal Claims,” Vasquez alleges that 

because DOC “singl[ed] [him] out for no reason, confiscate[ed] his property, and failed 

to return it,” he is entitled to relief because DOC disregarded “facility policy, rules and 

regulations of the [DOC],” and otherwise violated his rights under the United States 

and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§5524(6). (PFR ¶ 95.) Vasquez argues that he has no adequate remedy at law. (PFR ¶

96.) With regard to the relief sought, Vasquez requests a declaration that DOC violated

his rights, a preliminary and permanent injunction precluding “retaliation” such as 

“harassment, frivolous misconducts, . . . ‘random cell searches,’ further confiscation of 

property [without] justification, destruction of property, transfer, isolation, work 

replacement, loss or late mail delivery, or [other action] not having a penological [sic]

or security interest.” (PFR ¶¶ 98-99.) He asks for “liquidated damages” in the amount 

of $195.45 and $31.03, for the cost of the confiscated items and for the copies and 

 

3 As we explain infra, we recognize that this section of the Judicial Code merely sets forth the 

limitations period for an action against “any officer of any government unit for the nonpayment of 

money or the nondelivery of property collected upon execution or otherwise in his possession.” 42 

Pa. C.S. §5524(6). Despite his attempt to set forth a claim under section 5524(6), Vasquez recognizes 

that this section sets forth a limitation period of two years. (PFR ¶ 86.)
7

postage involved with his grievances/appeals. (PFR ¶¶ 100-101.) Finally, Vasquez 

requests interest, a jury trial on triable issues, costs, and any additional relief the Court 

deems necessary. (PFR ¶¶ 102-105.) 

On June 21, 2019, in response to the PFR, DOC filed POs in the nature of 

demurrers. DOC argued to the extent that Vasquez is asserting a “constitutional claim 

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 [(Section 1983)],” he failed to state a claim because DOC is not 

a “person” under Section 1983 and therefore is not subject to suit. (PO ¶ 4.) DOC 

argued that Vasquez’s intentional tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity. (PO 

¶ 5.) DOC argued that to the extent that Vasquez attempted to assert a due process 

claim, he failed to state a claim. (PO ¶ 7.) Specifically, DOC argued that where a 

prison official confiscates property in an allegedly unauthorized way, due process is 

satisfied when there are post-deprivation remedies, which existed under DOC’s 

grievance system and the availability of state law tort actions. (PO ¶¶ 8-10.) Finally, 

DOC argued that because Vasquez fails to state claims under the U.S. Constitution, he 

fails to state claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution as the due process 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Constitution are indistinguishable from the due 

process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment.4

Vasquez filed an answer to the POs, alleging that he filed a complaint 

seeking redress due to the deprivations of his rights related to his property and that 

“[t]his is nearly a word-for-word rephrase meant [sic] of [42 Pa.C.S. §8522(b)(3),]

which is one of the nine exceptions to sovereign immunity.” (PO Answer ¶¶ 1-2.) 

Vasquez alleged that the only time sovereign immunity bars these actions is when the 

 

4 Subsequent to the filing of the POs, Vasquez filed a notice of motion for default judgment 

and a request for entry of default judgment which were dated June 24, 2016. This Court denied these 

motions as moot on July 2, 2019, because POs had been filed. 
8

property “involves the use of nuclear or other radioactive equipment,” and that this 

action is intended as a “state tort” arising under 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6). (PO Answer ¶¶ 

3-4.) Vasquez explains that he is “knowledgeable enough that if he intended to assert 

a claim under a [f]ederal statute such as [Section 1983] he would not have done so in 

this [Court] because [we] would lack jurisdiction over it and he hopes [DOC’s] Counsel 

would refrain from such frivolous objections.” (PO Answer ¶ 4.) Vasquez then goes 

on to make seemingly irrelevant allegations with regard to statutes of limitations and 

as far as this Court can discern, that under 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6), DOC is not subject to 

immunity. (PO Answer ¶¶ 8-12.) 

On July 23, 2019, this Court ordered that DOC’s brief in support of the 

POs was due on or before August 22, 2019, and that Vasquez had until September 23, 

2019, to file his brief in opposition. On August 22, DOC filed its brief in support of its 

POs. Due to numerous reasons, Vasquez requested an additional 90 days to file his 

brief in opposition and this Court granted his request on September 23, 2019, giving 

him until December 23, 2019, to file his brief. On January 6, 2020, this Court issued 

an order recognizing that Vasquez failed to file his brief in opposition by the extended 

December 23, 2019 deadline and gave him until January 21, 2020, to file a response, 

warning him that if he failed to do so, the Court would proceed without his brief. 

Because Vasquez failed to file his brief by the January 21, 2020 deadline, we are 

proceeding without a brief from him.

Discussion

First, we note that Vasquez’s PFR is largely unclear as to the precise 

nature of all the legal claims that he attempts to set forth and that he failed to file a brief 

in support of his claims or to otherwise clarify his legal positions. Nevertheless, as best 
9

as we can discern, Vasquez’s PFR sets forth the following legal claims based on the 

confiscation of his property. First, Vasquez sets forth a due process claim alleging that 

his constitutional rights were violated because DOC “singl[ed]” him out without 

reason, confiscated his property, and failed to return his property after numerous 

requests despite no misconduct being found. (PFR ¶ 95.) Second, Vasquez purports 

to raise a claim under section 5524(b)(6) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(b)(6) 

alleging that his rights were similarly violated. Id. Relatedly, it also appears that 

Vasquez sets forth facts tending to raise an intentional tort claim with regard to the 

confiscation of his property. (PFR ¶¶ 65-73.) 

In reviewing preliminary objections, all material facts averred in the 

petition for review, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, are 

admitted as true. Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hospital, Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1232 (Pa. 

1983); Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, 

914 A.2d 477, 479 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff’d, 985 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2009). However, 

a court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, 

argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Portalatin v. Department of 

Corrections, 979 A.2d 944, 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). “Preliminary objections should 

be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from doubt.” Pennsylvania AFL-CIO 

v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 917, 920 (Pa. 2000). 

Due Process Claims

With regard to his due process claim, DOC contends that to the extent

Vasquez is attempting to set forth a constitutional claim, the correct vehicle to do so is 
10

Section 1983,

5

and that even if he did assert a claim under Section 1983, DOC is not 

subject to suit thereunder. Significantly, in his answer to DOC’s POs Vasquez argues 

that he is “knowledgeable enough that if he intended to assert a claim under a [f]ederal 

statute such as [Section 1983] he would not have done so in this [Court] because [we] 

would lack jurisdiction over it . . . .” (Answer to POs ¶ 4.) Contrary to Vasquez’s

assertion, the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the duty of state courts to 

entertain Section 1983 actions. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).6 However, to 

the extent Vasquez necessarily raises a Section 1983 claim with respect to his alleged 

due process violations under the United States Constitution, we conclude that DOC is 

not subject to suit. 

We begin with the plain language of Section 1983 which provides, in 

relevant part, that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .

42 U.S.C. §1983 (emphasis added).

 

5

“Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but, rather, is the vehicle for vindicating 

rights conferred in the United States Constitution or in federal statutes.” Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802, 

809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citing Urbanic v. Rosenfeld, 616 A.2d 46, 52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)).

6 Section 1983 is enforceable in a state court because “[t]he Supremacy Clause makes [the 

Constitution and the laws enacted under it] ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state courts 

with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure.” 

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367.
11

Significantly, Vasquez alleged that although his “personal rights” were 

violated by DOC employees, who are “personally named” within the PFR, all of these 

employees were “acting under the official employment of DOC,” and “therefore in the 

interest in [sic] justice [he] has decided to collectively bring this action against the DOC 

as a whole.” (PFR ¶ 6.) Vasquez’s allegation is determinative of his due process claims 

because this Court has explained that 

[a] state or state agency, however, is not a “person” under 

Section 1983 and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for 

violation of federal constitutional rights. Will v. Michigan 

Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71 (1989); 

Flagg v. International Union, Security, Police, Fire 

Professionals of America, Local 506, 146 A.3d 300, 305-07 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation 

Judges Professional Association v. Executive Board of 

Commonwealth, 39 A.3d 486, 493 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), aff’d,

[] 66 A.3d 765 (Pa. 2013); Association of Settlement 

Companies v. Department of Banking, 977 A.2d 1257, 1264 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc); Verrichia v. Department of 

Revenue, 639 A.2d 957, 962-64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). 

Because the DOC is a Commonwealth agency, [an inmate]

as a matter of law has no cause of action against the DOC. 

Will, 491 U.S. at 64-71; Shore v. Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections, 168 A.3d 374, 386-87 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017); Association of Settlement Companies, 977 A.2d at 

1264.

Watkins v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 196 A.3d 272, 274-75 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018). 

Our decision in Shore, is instructive on this issue. There, the inmate 

asserted constitutional claims against DOC “as the sole respondent” under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 378. We concluded 

that because the inmate brought federal constitutional claims admittedly against DOC
12

only, and not an officer/employee, his claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment7

and/or traditional state immunity. Id. at 386 n.8.8 As we concluded in Shore, we 

conclude here, that because Vasquez unmistakably brought this action solely against 

DOC, any federal constitutional claim brought pursuant to Section 1983 fails as a 

matter of law.

To the extent that Vasquez claims a due process violation on other 

grounds, we also conclude that his due process rights were not violated. DOC argues 

that Vasquez’s due process claim should be dismissed because he has an adequate postdeprivation remedy through DOC’s internal inmate grievance system or a state tort law 

action. In fact, Vasquez recognizes this same principle in his PFR stating,

 

7 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in full, that “[t]he 

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 

or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.

8

 See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“[A] suit 

in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by 

the 11th Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.”); 

accord Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) 

(concluding that injunction to restrain violation of federal law under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 

(1908), has “no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless 

of the relief sought”); Warren v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 616 A.2d 140, 142 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1992) (concluding that the Department is not subject to suit for constitutional violations 

under 42 U.S.C. §1983); Lavia v. Department of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(“Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the executive

department of the Commonwealth . . . it shares in the Commonwealth’s [11th] Amendment 

immunity.”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57, (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity 

shields States from private suits in state courts pursuant to federal causes of action); Quern v. Jordan, 

440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that Section 1983 does not abrogate the States’ 11th Amendment 

immunity); Palmer v. Penn–Ohio Road Materials, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 312, 315 (W.D. Pa. 1978)

(noting that Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute especially preserved the Commonwealth’s 

11th Amendment immunity); Sections 8521 and 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521, 8522

(preserving the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity and waiving it for only eight specified 

instances of negligent conduct).
13

“unfortunately, Supreme Court precedent has determined that [d]ue [p]rocess may be 

satisfied by the existence of adequate post-deprivation state remedies (such as 

grievance systems o[r] the instant tort action).” (PFR ¶ 74.) 

To maintain a due process challenge, a party must initially establish a 

deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest; only if the party establishes the 

deprivation of a protected interest, will this Court consider what procedural mechanism 

is required to satisfy due process. Miller v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Pavex, Inc.), 918 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). For present purposes, we assume 

that DOC deprived Vasquez of a legitimate property interest and turn to the issue of 

whether sufficient procedural protections were available. We again turn to our decision 

in Shore, where we explained that

[w]hen a prison official confiscates a prisoner’s property in 

an allegedly unauthorized way, whether it be negligently or 

intentionally, due process requires only the existence of an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy because it is not feasible 

for a prison to provide a hearing prior to taking property that 

is perceived to be contraband or against prison regulations. 

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1984).

168 A.3d at 383 (emphasis added). Thus, under Shore, as Vasquez recognizes, the only 

due process protection he was entitled to is a post-deprivation remedy. In Shore, we 

went on to explain that “[i]n addressing the issue, the courts have repeatedly held that 

inmate grievance systems are an adequate post-deprivation remedy . . . and this includes 

the [DOC’s] tiered grievance procedure outlined in DC-ADM 804.”9 168 A.3d at 384. 

 

9

In a string of unreported decisions, this Court has concluded that the Department’s grievance 

procedure in DC-ADM 804 is a constitutionally sufficient remedy with respect to inmates’ claims 

that the Department unlawfully withheld and/or confiscated personal property. See, e.g., Bullock v. 

Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 241 M.D. 2016, filed May 12, 2017) (unreported), slip 

op. at 9 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 318 M.D. 2015, filed September 9, 

2016) (unreported); Fennell v. N.D. Goss (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1198 C.D. 2015, filed February 5, 2016) 
14

However, this is not the only way that Vasquez’s post-deprivation due process rights 

may be satisfied. An inmate’s ability to file a state law tort action to seek relief for the 

deprivation of personal property is an adequate post deprivation remedy. Shore, 168 

A.3d at 385 n.6 (citing Hawkins v. Coleman Hall, C.C.F., 453 F. App’x 208, 211 (3d 

Cir. 2011); Austin v. Lehman, 893 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1995)). “In 

Pennsylvania, a tort law remedy is available for the possession and/or destruction of 

non-contraband personal property by virtue of section 8522(b)(3) of . . . the Sovereign 

Immunity Act . . . .” Shore, 168 A.3d at 385 n.6 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(b)(3)); see

Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 

In Fennell, slip op. at 7, we explained that according to the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), inmates are 

unable to state cognizable procedural due process claims for deprivation of property by 

prison officials where a state tort action is available. Thus, even if the inmate grievance 

process was constitutionally infirm, our precedent establishes that Vasquez has an 

adequate remedy available through a state law tort action.10 Because Vasquez has this 

remedy available to him, we conclude that he was not deprived of his due process rights 

following the deprivation of his property. As such, the Court grants DOC’s POs and 

dismisses Vasquez’s due process claims. We turn our attention to Vasquez’s tort claim.

Vasquez contends that he is bringing this action under “[s]ection 5524(6) 

of the Judicial Code,” and that his claims “meet the necessary requirements to be 

 

(unreported)). Under section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, an unreported 

opinion may be cited for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).

10 The facts as alleged by Vasquez are that DOC attempted to thwart his efforts, or at least 

increase the difficulty of seeking redress through the grievance system. Because we have concluded 

that Vasquez’s rights were not violated due to the availability of a state tort law action, we need not 

address these allegations further, except to caution DOC as to the serious nature of the alleged 

circumstances were they proven to be true.
15

‘against any officer of any government unit’ . . . [42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6)].” (PFR ¶¶ 80-

81.) More specifically, he argues that “because the [DOC] had taken control over [his] 

food and . . . transferred it to security to be held pending the disposition of his hearing 

where it remains despite [his] demands and the dismissal of his misconduct, the 

‘nondelivery [sic] of property . . . in [the goverments [sic] unit officer’s] possession’ 

requirement of [s]ection 5524(6) of the Judicial Code is met. [42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6)].” 

(PFR ¶ 85.) Nevertheless, Vasquez points out that section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code 

sets forth a limitations period of two years. (PFR ¶ 86.) 

Section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code provides, in full, that 

[t]he following actions and proceedings must be commenced 

within two years:

(6) An action against any officer of any government 

unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery 

of property collected upon [] execution or otherwise in 

his possession.

42 Pa. C.S. §5524(6). Contrary to Vasquez’s assertions, section 5524(6) of the Judicial 

Code does not set forth any independent cause of action, but merely prescribes, as his 

pleading recognizes, the limitations period11 for an action against “any office of any 

government unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected 

upon [] execution or otherwise in his possession.” 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6). As such, to 

the extent that Vasquez sets forth a claim with regard to his property under section 

5524(6) of the Judicial Code, his claim fails as a matter of law. 

 

11 “[Statutes of limitations are] legislative enactments . . . expressive of the feeling of mankind 

that where there are wrongs to be redressed, they should be redressed without unreasonable delay, 

and where there are rights to be enforced, they should be enforced without unreasonable delay.” 

Ulakovic v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 16 A.2d 41, 43 (Pa. 1940).
16

However, to the extent that Vasquez attempts to set forth a tort claim that 

may be subject to the statute of limitations under section 5524(6) of the Judicial Code, 

DOC argues that such a claim, specifically for conversion, is barred by the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity. Although Vasquez does not name a specific tort in his PFR, it is 

clear from the face of his allegations that Vasquez alleges only intentional acts, and 

thus, we agree with DOC that his tort claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity. 

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been reaffirmed12 under article I, 

section XI of the Pennsylvania Constitution,13 is statutorily governed by 1 Pa. C.S. 

§2310, and has been waived only in the instances enumerated in the Sovereign 

Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8522. Section 2310 explains that the “Commonwealth, 

and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to 

enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except 

as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S. §2310. 

The Sovereign Immunity Act, governs waiver of sovereign immunity. Specifically, 

[s]ection 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act waives

‘immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth 

parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where 

the damages would be recoverable under the common law or 

a statute creating a cause of action if the injury [was] caused 

by a person not having available the defense of sovereign 

immunity, for specifically enumerated categories of acts. 

 

12 The doctrine of sovereign immunity existed at common law; however, our Supreme Court 

in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978), abrogated it, but the 

legislature subsequently reinstated it. See Act of September 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152, §2, 42 

Pa.C.S. §5110 reenacted at 42 Pa.C.S. §8522.

13 Article I, Section XI of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in relevant part, provides that “[s]uits 

may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the 

Legislature may by law direct.” Pa. Const. art. I, §11.
17

Paluch v. PA Department of Corrections, 175 A.3d 433, 437-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)

(quoting 42 Pa. C.S. §8522)). Section 8501 of the Sovereign Immunity Act defines a 

“Commonwealth party” as “a Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but 

only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or employment.” 42 Pa. C.S. 

§8501. Thus, “sovereign immunity may be overcome where the party can establish: 

(1) a common law or statutory cause of action under which damages could be 

recoverable if not for the immunity defense, and (2) the alleged negligent act falls 

within one of the nine specific exceptions provided in 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(b).” 

Department of Corrections v. Tate, 133 A.3d 350, 359 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

However, “sovereign immunity is not waived for intentional acts

committed by a Commonwealth employee acting within the scope of his or her 

employment.” Paluch, 175 A.3d at 438 (emphasis added) (citing La Frankie v. 

Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)). Thus, sovereign immunity is only 

waived for negligent acts, not intentional acts. Immunity is waived under section 

8522(b)(3) of the Sovereign Immunity Act as follows: 

(3) Care, custody or control of personal property.—The care, 

custody or control of personal property in the possession or 

control of Commonwealth parties, including 

Commonwealth-owned personal property and property of 

persons held by a Commonwealth agency, except that the 

sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth is retained as a 

bar to actions on claims arising out of Commonwealth 

agency activities involving the use of nuclear and other 

radioactive equipment, devices and materials.

42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3). The conduct by DOC employees in this case may be activity 

that would fit the requirements of section 8522(b)(3); however, assuming that Vasquez 

has established a cause of action that entitles him to relief but for the immunity defense, 

Vasquez has failed to allege, implicitly or otherwise, that the conduct was negligent. 
18

To the extent Vasquez makes any averment concerning the actions of DOC employees 

with regard to his property, he alleges intentional actions, which are clearly not 

actionable due to sovereign immunity. Moreover, to the extent he alleges a specific 

claim for conversion, DOC argues, and we agree, that such a claim is an intentional 

tort and DOC is immune from such a claim. Intentional tort claims that are not outside 

the scope of an employee’s duties are barred by sovereign immunity, including 

“conversion.” Paluch, 175 A.3d at 438. See also Palmer v. Doe (Pa. Cmwlth., No.

2451 C.D. 2015, filed May 5, 2016) (unreported), slip op. at 5-6 (“applying [the 

principles of sovereign immunity] the [DOC employees] are immune from [a] 

conversion claim”); Stokes v. Gehr, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 332 C.D. 2011, filed Oct. 19, 

2011) (unreported). Accordingly, we grant DOC’s POs on these grounds and dismiss 

Vasquez’s tort claims because he has not pled sufficient facts to set forth a prima facie

case.

Finally, to the extent that Vasquez alleges that the confiscation of his 

property was “in complete disregard to facility policy, rules and regulations of the 

department of corrections,” (PFR ¶95), we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction 

over this claim. Even though DOC has not raised this as a preliminary objection, 

“whenever a court discovers that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or a cause 

of action, it is compelled to dismiss the matter under all circumstances . . . .” Seitel 

Data, Ltd. v. Center Township, 92 A.3d 851, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Hughes 

v. Pennsylvania State Police, 619 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)). Vasquez seems 

to allege that the facility failed to follow DOC policy DC-ADM 815. (PFR ¶¶ 30, 45, 

Exhibit E1-E5.) In Xavier v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 331 M.D. 2016, filed February 8, 2017) (unreported), we explained that under 

Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 359-360 (Pa. 1998), 
19

“unless an inmate can identify a personal or property interest . . . not limited by [DOC] 

regulations and which has been affected by a final decision of the [DOC],” this Court 

lacks original jurisdiction in matters involving internal prison proceedings.14 See

Shore, 168 A.3d at 380-82. Vasquez points to DC-ADM 815, which states that “[t]his 

policy is applicable to all [DOC] facilities with regard to inmate person [sic] property, 

basic and state issued items, inmate commissary privileges, outside purchase, and the 

operation of a commissary, or contracting for the operation of a commissary.” (PFR 

Exhibit E1.) Obviously, this applies to Vasquez’s property interests, and he has 

otherwise, outside of the claims addressed above, failed to identify a personal or 

property interest not limited by DC-ADM 815 that was affected by a final decision of 

DOC. Accordingly, we do not have the requisite jurisdiction to hear this claim.15

 

14 Recently, in Williams v. Wetzel, __ A.3d __ (Pa., No. 95 MAP 2019, filed June 16, 2020), 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated this principle. Specifically, the Court considered this 

Court’s “original jurisdiction over prisoner litigation, where the inmate attempting to invoke the 

judicial process has failed to identify a constitutionally protected interest that would give rise to dueprocess protections.” __ A.3d __, slip op. at 1. The Court reiterated that this Court lacks original 

jurisdiction to entertain a prisoner’s due process challenge to the actions of prison officials, where the 

inmate fails to assert a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. 

15 Even if we did have jurisdiction over these claims, the failure to comply with prison policy 

is not a basis for a cause of action, nor do administrative rules and regulations create enforceable 

rights in prison inmates. See Rawlings v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 562 M.D. 2016, filed Oct. 20, 

2017) (unreported), slip op. at 7 (citing Africa v. Horn, 701 A.2d 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)); Tindell v. 

Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). We explained in Shore that 

“[i]n general, allegations that [DOC] failed to follow its regulations or internal policies cannot support 

a claim based upon a vested right or duty because these administrative rules and regulations, unlike 

statutory provisions, usually do not create rights in prison inmates.” 168 A.3d at 386 (citing Tindell, 

87 A.3d at 1035; Bullock v. Horn, 720 A.2d 1079, 1082 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)). Thus, even though 

DOC did not raise it as a preliminary objection, we determine that this issue is not one over which we 

have jurisdiction, and thus, Vasquez’s allegations that he is entitled to relief due to DOC’s failure to 

follow facility policy are not subject to this Court’s review. 
20

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, the Court sustains DOC’s preliminary 

objections and dismisses Vasquez’s petition for review.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ricardo Morales-Vasquez, :

Petitioner :

: No. 253 M.D. 2019

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of July, 2020, the preliminary objections to 

the petition for review filed by Ricardo Morales-Vasquez in this Court’s original 

jurisdiction are hereby SUSTAINED and the petition for review is DISMISSED. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge