COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judge Annunziata, Se nior Judge Duff and Judge Clements * Argued at Alex andria, Virginia

SHOHREH GHASEM MEMORANDUM OPINION ** BY v. Record No. 2537-99-4 JUDGE CHARLE S H. DUFF MAY 9, 2000 FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge (Charles J. Swed ish, on br ief), for appellant. Ap pellant submitti ng on brief. Thomas P. So telo, Substi tute Assistant County Attorney (Keegan & Sote lo, PLC, onbrief), for appellee. (W. Kip Wood, on brief), Guardian ad litem for Saman Ghasem, an infant.

* Judge Jean Harrison Clements took part in the consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01.

** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. Shohreh Ghasem ("appellant") ap peals the decisi on terminating her parental rights to Saman Ghasem ("Sama n"). The issue on appeal is whethe r the evidence was suffic ient to meet the clear and convincing standa rd required for term ination of parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). We find that th e evidence was sufficient and affirm th e trial judg e's ruling.FACTS Saman was born on December 11, 1989. In September of 1995, the Fairfax Coun ty Department of Fa mily Services ("the Department") removed Sa man, then four years old, from appellant's care because appellant left Saman unsupervisedand locked out of their hotel room for seven hour s. Saman was returned to appellant's care , but removed ag ain on July 29, 1996 because appellant viol ated a preliminary protective order which prohibited her having contact with a frie nd who had phys ically abused appellant's ot her son. The De partment later re turned Saman to appellant. On December 11, 19 97, appellant signed a service agreement with the Department stating Saman wo uld not be le ft alone or unsupervised at any time or fo r any reason. The Department explained to appellan t that Saman sufferedfrom mild mental retardation and ha d special needs. Appellant's therapist also explained the ag reement to her. On that same day, a social worker for the Department telephoned the Ghasem home and found Saman was there alone. Th e Department removed him from appellant's care again on Decemb er 11, 1997.

- 2 - Appellant signed additional service agreemen ts with the Department on De cember 24, 1997, and Janu ary 9, 1998, stating she would not leave Sa man alone or unsupervised for any amount of time or for any reason. Si nce 1995, the De partment provid ed the family with various services , intervention s and financia l assistance,including: prot ective supervision of Saman and hi s brother; coordination with th e mental health cent er and Mult icultural Clinical Center for individual and home based therapy; and coordination withSaman's school and health clinics. The Center for Multicultura l Human Services had worked wi th the family "intensively" since April of 1997, provid ing individual therapy, parental education, nutritional educ ation, and social skills training for appellant two times per we ek. Despite the repeated attempts to educ ate appellant conc erning Saman's special needs, and despite attend ing parenting cl asses, appellan t continued to deny Saman had any pr oblems. Evidence was presen ted that appellant suffer s from depression an d a brain dy sfunction. Appellant again le ft Saman alone for about one hour and fifteen minutes onJanuary 29, 1998 when she was late returning from a doctor's appoin tment. The De partment removed Saman from her care and initiate d proceedings to terminate her residual parental rights to Saman.

- 3 - On July 28, 1999 , a hearing was held in circuit court concerning the terminat ion of appellant's pare ntal rights. At the hearing, the depositi on of Dr. Ronald Fe derici, a clinical neuropsycholog ist, was admitted into evidence. Dr. Federici conducted a compre hensive neurop sychological eval uation of Saman dated January 21, 1999. He testif ied Saman, who at the time of the evaluation was nine years old, suffers from profound cognitive and learning disabilities, sp eech, language and hearingdeficiencies, mi ld mental retardation, brain dysf unction and various mental and emot ional disorders. He is phys ically small for his age, and his ment al development is equi valent to that of a five year old. Sama n also suffers from a reactive attachment disorder and fear of ab andonment. Dr . Federici stat ed that Saman will likely require ad ult supervision and a controlled environment into adulthood. Sama n's prospect for future development is very poor. Dr. Federici further opined th at if Saman is to reach his developmental potential, he re quires a parental figure with significant de dication and intelligence to address his needs. On September 27, 1999, the trial judge entere d an order terminating appellant's resi dual parental rights . The trial judge found that it wa s in the best interest of Saman to "live in a controlled environment with adults who unders tand and can meet his special needs." He also found the De partment clearly and convincingly proved th e requirements of Code § 16 .1-283(C)(2), stating that, desp ite attending pa renting classes and receiving a "host of other servic es," appellant's "inh erent disa bilities demonstrate that she is unable to remedythe conditions which led to Saman's placem ent in foster care." Appellant ap peals that order. ANALYSIS

- 4 - "When addressing ma tters concerni ng a child, including the termination of a parent 's residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Where the tr ial judge hears the evidence ore tenus , his decision is entitled to gr eat weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plai nly wrong or without evidence to support it. See Lowe v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare , 231 Va. 277, 282, 343 S. E.2d 70, 73 (1986). Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the pa rental rights of a child placed in foster care may be termin ated if the court finds by clear and convin cing evidence that it is in the best interests of the child and that [t]he parent . . ., without good cause, [has] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent . . . without good cause, [has] failed or been unable to make substantial progress towards elimination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement in accordance with [the parent's] obligations under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of this condition. "'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly se vered but are to be respected if at all consonan t with the best interests of the child.'" Ward v. Faw , 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E. 2d 658, 661 (1979) (citation omitte d). The termin ation of parent al rights is

- 5 -a grave, drastic, and irreversible action. "When a cour t orders termination of parental rights, the ti es between th e parent and child are severed forever and the pa rent becomes 'a legal stranger to the child.'" Lowe , 231 Va. at 280, 343 S. E.2d at 72 (citation omitted). Appellant cont ends that she was firs t diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded afte r Saman was remo ved from her ho me on January 29, 1998. She assert s that this conditio n led to the child's foster care placemen t and that, after Ja nuary 29, 1998, the Department has offered he r no services in an ef fort to remedy this condition or any other condition which led to Saman's foster care placement. Ho wever, the record indi cates that appellant's psychological co ndition had beenan issue th roughout the Department's periodof involvement with the family, not just on or after January 29, 1998. Moreover, appellant's diag nosis of mild mental retardation was not the sole condition which led to Saman's placement in a foster home. The evidence pr oved that Saman had numerous physical, ment al, and emotiona l special need s that were not being met un der appellant's care. Furthermore, appellant repeatedly left the child alone an d unsupervised despite the Department's continuing attempts to advise her of his special needs.

- 6 - In addition, the De partment worked wi th the family and offered numero us counseling and medical services to the family since 1995, but noted little progress or improv ement inappellant's parenting skills. For example, appe llant received a psychological ex amination in January 1997, parent al/child interaction asse ssments in March 1997 and February 1998, and parenting classe s. The Decemb er 14, 1998 Foster Care Service Plan states that appe llant received psychiatric medication fr om October 1995 to December 14, 1998. The plan also states that despite "intensive services and intervention s" appellant did not make "much progress and continually engages in the behavior that resulted in Sama n going into the custody of the Department in September 1995." In addition, appe llant received a ne uropsychological evaluation in Fe bruary 1998. Th e Foster Care Se rvice Plan dated March 3, 1998 in dicates that appellant wa s diagnosed as suffering from "an emotional co ndition" and "brain dysfunction." Her emotional develo pment was diagno sed as that of a child and characteristic of Borderline Personality Disorder. The report further stated she "displays si gnificant cognit ive weaknesses which represent impairment of several brain ar eas which are generally imperv ious to change." At the time of the report, and as stated above, appe llant had receiv ed "intensive home-based services" for over two years, but she co ntinued to leave Saman unsupervised, and she continued to deny that he had any special developmental, cognitiv e, mental or physical needs or problems.

- 7 - Thus, the record indicates that the Depa rtment was aware from the time it first became involved with the family that appellant'smental health status was an issue in the ma tter. Moreover, the Department was also aware of and concer ned for th e mental, physical, and emot ional well being of Saman, a chil d with numerous special needs. The record is replete with instances of "reasonable and ap propriate effo rts" made by th e Department and other agencies ov er a period of several years in an attempt to work with appell ant and remedy the numero us conditions which led to the foster care plac ement of Saman. Howe ver, the record also indicates that appellan t made very little, if any, progress in remedying these conditions, notwithstanding the efforts of the Department and ot her agencies. Therefore, the recordsupports the trial judge's find ing that the termination of appellant's resi dual parental rights was in Saman's best interest and his finding th at the Department presented clear an d convincing evidence to meet the re quirements of Code § 16.1-2 83(C)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the decision. 1 Affirmed.

- 8 - 1 Because we decide the evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge's holding, the point raised by appellee regarding Code § 16.1-283(B) is moot.