If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

KATHRYN MACEWEN CONTI,

Claimant

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED September 24, 2019

v No. 343180

Washtenaw Circuit Court DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROJECT, INC

. , LC No. 17

- 000783

- AV

Appellee,

and

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AGENCY,

Appellant.

Before: M URRAY

, C .J., and M ETER and F ORT H OOD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Appellant, Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA), appeals by leave granted 1
an opinion and o rder of the circuit court finding that claimant, Kathryn Mac E wen Conti , was eligible for employment benefits

. The circuit court ’s order reversed the decision of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) and an administrative law judge (ALJ ), concluding that the MCAC and the ALJ misapplied MCL 421.29(5). W e agree with the circuit court and affirm its opinion and order.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROU ND

Claimant began working for Domestic Violence Project, Inc. (Domestic Violence Project) , in May 2014. On July 18, 2016, Ezbake Technologies (Ezbake) offered claimant

1 Conti v Domestic Violence Project

, Inc , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered

October 2, 2018 (Docket No. 343180 ).- 2

- permanent full

- time employment, and claimant accepted the offer. Claimant prov ided Domestic Violence Project with a resignation letter on July 20, 2016

, stating that she was leaving D omestic Violence Project for personal reasons, and that her resignation would be effective on August 5,

2016

. Despite the effective date of h er resignation, claimant’s actual last day in the office was August 2, 201 6. Between the effective date of her resignation and her last day in the office

— o n August 4, 2016

— claimant received an employment offer from Court Innovations and subsequently withdrew her acceptance of Ezbake ’s offer and accepted the offer from Court

Innovations

. C laimant worked for Court I nnovations from September 2016 until she was discharged in January 2017. Claimant then ap plied for unemployment benefits with the UIA.

The UIA issued a notice of determination and concluded that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment ben efits under MCL 421.29(1)(a) because she voluntarily left her employment with Domestic Violence Project. Claimant contested the notice of determination

, and t he UIA subsequently issued a notice of redetermination that reached the same conclusion

. Claimant again contested the determination

, contending that, although individuals that voluntarily leave their employers are generally not entitled to unemployment benefits, an exception to that rule

— found in MCL 421.29(5)

— applied because claimant left Dom estic Violence Project to pursue another full

- time job.

After holding a hearing, an ALJ ruled that the exception di d not apply to claimant because MCL 421.29(5) only applies where a person leaves one employer for another and actually provides services to that employer. The ALJ found that, i n claimant’s case, while she

left her job at Domestic Violence Project for another opportunity at Ezbake, claimant ultimately

with drew her acceptance and did not provide services to Ez b a ke

. Additionally, although

claimant did provide services to Court Innovations, her offer from Court Innovations did not

come until after claimant ’s last day in the office , and t hus, it could not be said that claimant left Domestic Violence Project for the jo b at Court Innovations

. The ALJ affirmed the UIA’s determination that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits , and

c laimant then appeal ed the ALJ’s decision to the MCAC . The MCAC affirmed the ALJ’s decision, determining that the ALJ’s findings of fact were supported by the record and that the ALJ properly applied the law.

C laimant thereafter appealed the MCAC decision to the Washtenaw Circuit Court

. In its written opinion and or der, the circuit court held that, under the requir ed liberal construction of MCL 421.29(5), claimant was not “formally separated” from Domestic Violence Project until August 5, 2016

. Accordingly, for the purposes of claimant’s eligibility for unemployment benefits, it was sufficient that claimant accepte d a full

- time position with Court Innovations on August 4, 2016, and thereafter performed services for that employer. The circuit court also determined that the plain language of MCL 421.29(5) did not require that the employer whose offer predicates an in dividual’s resignation be the same employer for which an individual ultimately accepts and performs work. 2 Accordingly, t he circuit court reversed the decision of

2 The court noted, “[t]here is no specific language in [MCL 421.29(5)] that nullifies application of the exception where an employee has multiple job offers and resigns to accept one of them.”- 3

- the MCAC and ALJ , determining that the exception for disqualification from benefits found in MCL 421.29(5) applied

.

The UIA argues on appeal that the circuit court did not apply the correct legal principles and misapplied the substantial

- evidence test. We dis agree.

II. ANALYSIS

“ This Court reviews a lower court ’ s review of an administrative decision to determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehende d or misapplied the substantial[

- ] evidence test to the agency ’ s factual findings, which is essentially a clearly erroneous standard of review .” VanZandt v State Employees’ Retirement Sys , 266 Mich App 579, 585; 701 NW2d 214 (2005). A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id

. Additionally, t his Court review s de novo questions of statutory interpretation. McQueer v Perfect Fence Co , 502 Mich 276, 285

- 286; 917 NW2d 584 (2018).

A circuit court reviews an administrative decision under Const 1963, art 6, § 28 and MCL

24.306. Dignan v Mich Pub Sch Employees R etirement Bd , 253 Mich App 571, 576; 659 NW2d 629 (2002). Const 1963, art 6, § 28 provides:

All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi

- j udicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be

conclusive in the absence of fraud unless ot herwise provided by law.

“ ‘ Substantial ’ means evidence that a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a

conclusion. ” Dignan , 253 Mich App at 576.

The Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA), MCL 421.1 et seq ., serves a remedial purpose by providing benefits to persons who are involuntarily unemployed. Korzowski v

Pollack Indus , 213 Mich App 223, 228

- 229; 539 NW2d 741 (1995). Although MESA is generally to be construed liberally, disqualification provisions a re to be construed narrowly. Id

. at 229. MCL 421.29 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she:

(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to t he employer or employing unit. An individual who left work is presumed to have left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing

unit

. . . .- 4

- * * *

(5) If an individual leaves work to accept permanent full

- time work w ith another employer or to accept a referral to another employer from the individual’s union hiring hall and performs services for that employer, or if an individual leaves work to accept a recall from a former employer, all of the following apply:

(a) Su bsection (1) does not apply.

Ordinarily, a claimant who leaves his or her employment without good cause attribu table to his or her employer is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. MCL 421.29(1)(a); Logan v Manpower of Lansing, Inc , 304 Mich App 550, 557; 847 NW2d 679 (2014). However, a claimant who voluntarily leaves his or her employment may qualify for unemployment benefits if he or she leaves work to accept permanent full

- time work with another employer and subsequently provides services to that employer

. MCL 421.29(5); Logan , 304 Mich App at 557.

The UIA’s primary argument is that MCL 421.29(5) requires individuals that leave employment for other full

- time opportunities perform services for the particular employer for which they origina lly left. The UIA contends that, because claimant left Domestic Violence Project for a job with Ezbake but subsequently never performed work at Ezbake, instead accepting a job at Court Innovations and performing work there, claimant is ineligible for

bene fits. However, we need not address whether MCL 421.29(5) prohibits benefits under those circumstances because the UIA’s argument is premised on the idea that claimant left her job at Domestic Violence Project on August 2, 2016, when in fact, she left on August 5, 2016.

Because claimant accepted her position with Court Innovations on August 4, 2016, the true issue in this case was the meaning of “leaves” within MCL 421.29(5). The ALJ implicitly found that claimant “left” Domestic Violence Project on Aug ust 2, 2016, because that was claimant’s “last day in the office.” The circuit court disagreed, concluding that, as a matter of law, a liberal construction of MCL 421.29(5) provides that claimant did not “leave” Domestic Violence Project until the “effect ive date of her resignation”

— on August 5, 2016. Because claimant did not officially leave Domestic Violence Project until she had already accepted full

time employment with Court Innovations, and because claimant subsequently performed services

for Court Innovations, the circuit court determined that plaintiff was eligible for benefits. We agree with the circuit court’s reasoning.

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Mich E d Ass’n v Secretary of State ( On Rehearing ) , 489 Mich 194, 217; 801 NW2d 35 (2011). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 491 Mich 200, 205

- 206; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). C lear

statutory language must be enforced as written. Velez v Tuma , 492 Mich 1, 16

- 17; 821 NW2d 432 (2012). “When a term or phrase is not defined in a statute, the court may consult a dictionary to ascertain its commonly accepted meaning.” Motycka v Gen Motors Corp

, 257 Mich App 578, 581

- 582; 669 NW2d 292 (2003).

As stated earlier, MCL 421.29(1)(a) provides that “an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the- 5

- employer or employing unit .” MCL 421.29(5) provides, however, that Subsection(1)(a) does not apply “[i] f an individual leaves work to accept permanent full

- time work with another employer

. . . and performs services for that employer

. . . .” The common definition of “leave”

mean s “to go away from: depart; desert, abandon; to terminate association with; withdraw from.”

Merriam

- Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). “To leave” has also been defined as “[t]o depart; voluntarily go away; [or to] quit (a place).” Black’s Law Di ctionary (11th ed). We find no legal support for the ALJ, MCAC, and UIA’s contention that claimant left her employment within the meaning of the statute at the moment she stopped performing services as opposed to

the moment that was designated as her offi cial date of resignation

.

Claimant provided a letter to Domestic Violence Project indicating that her resignation would be effective August 5, 2016, and nothing in the record suggests that claimant ever intended to change that date. Moreover, at the hea ring before the ALJ, testimony from a representative of Domestic Violence Project, Barbara Niess

- May, strongly suggested that the company understood claimant to have been employed through August 5, 2016:

Q

. And the last day

— and the last day that [claiman t] was actually on the job working for the company?

A

. The last day paid was August 5, 2016.

* * *

Q

. Ms. Niess

- May, is it accurate to say that [claimant] was

— her last day of actual work was [not] August 5, it was August 2, correct?

A

. August 2 was the last day in the office and beyond that, because there

wasn’t

— things had been wrapped up, we decided to go ahead and pay through that Friday as a salaried employee

.

The representative even went so far as to note that claimant initially offered to stay with Domestic Violence Project through August 31, 2016, but that Domestic Violence Project chose August 5 , 2016, allowing claimant to commence terminal paid leave thereafter. It is also worth noting that the ALJ explicitly found that, alth ough claimant “did not perform services for [Domestic Violence Project] after August 2, 2016,” “[t]he employer considered [claimant] employed through August 5, 2016 because the employer paid” claimant through that date. (Emphasis added.)

There was simpl y no evidence to suggest anything other than the fact that, although

claimant did not perform services after August 2, she was still employed with Domestic Vio lence Project through August 5, 2016. Given that the ALJ seemed to agree with that fact, c laiman t’s association with the company did not terminate until that date, and as a matter of law, a person has not “left” their employment under MCL 421.29(5) if that person is still, in fact, employed. Accordingly, claimant “ left ” her job at Domestic Violence Project on the effective date of her resignation

— August 5, 2016

— after having accepted full

- time employment with Court Innovations on August 4, 2016. Thereafter, claimant perform ed services for Court Innovations, and accordingly, t he circuit court was correct that MCL 421.29(5) applied. T he ALJ and the MCAC misapplied the law in rendering their decisions.- 6

- Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood