NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT 

PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BRYAN WALTERS, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendant/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0703 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2022-016758 

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Bryan Walters, Jacksonville, Florida 

 Plaintiff/Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Connie Totorica Gould, Rebecca Banes 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 05-28-2024
WALTERS v. STATE 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. 

H O W E, Judge: 

¶1 Bryan Walters appeals the trial court’s grant of the State’s 

motion to dismiss his complaint. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Walters purports to be a student at Arizona State University 

(“ASU”) and claims to have had run-ins with ASU Police Department 

deputies in 2022. Sometime in September, he was questioned outside the 

ASU School of Life Sciences and asked to leave. He alleged that on 

September 23, police detained and questioned him twice: once at ASU’s 

West campus, where an officer purportedly took his ASU identification 

card, and once outside the Herberger Institute for Design and the Arts. On 

September 27, he was asked to leave the ASU downtown campus after he 

was found sitting outside the law college building. And finally, he alleged 

that while sleeping outside the business school in the early hours of 

September 29, an officer “stole” his backpack. ASU police contacted him 

later that morning to let him know his backpack, wallet, and phone were at 

ASU police’s lost and found. His laptop, however, was missing. 

¶3 Based on the officers’ alleged actions in these incidents, 

Walters sued the State in December 2022. He claimed theft, armed robbery, 

unlawful imprisonment, civil rights violations, and, inexplicably, 

employment discrimination. For damages, Walters requested 

compensation in the form of a 4000 square foot condominium in Phoenix, 

three luxury vehicles, his own Motor Grand Prix racing team, a four-year 

contract with the Arizona Diamondbacks, and $900 billion per week for the 

rest of his life. 

¶4 Before serving the State with his complaint, Walters applied 

for default judgment. The court denied the application, finding it 

incomplete. Walters then filed several more applications for default 

judgment before finally serving the State with his complaint in March 2023. 
WALTERS v. STATE 

Decision of the Court 

3 

After the State moved to dismiss Walters’s complaint for failure to state a 

claim, he moved to continue his motion for default judgment. 

¶5 The State moved to dismiss Walters’s complaint, arguing that 

Walters had not complied with Arizona’s notice of claim statute and that a 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim may not be brought against the State or be based on 

vicarious liability. Shortly afterwards, in late April, Walters filed a notice of 

claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss. In granting the motion, the 

court deemed all other pending matters, including Walters’s motions for 

default judgment and motion for continuance, to be moot. It entered a final 

judgment, from which Walters timely appeals. This court has jurisdiction 

under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Walters presents two issues on appeal: first, whether the trial 

court erred in declining to enter default judgment against the State, and 

second, whether the court erred in dismissing Walters’s complaint. 

I. Default Judgment 

¶7 Walters argues that the trial court erred in failing to enter a 

default judgment against the State. The trial court may enter default 

judgment “[i]f a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1). 

¶8 Though Walters filed his complaint in December, he did not 

serve the State until March 28, 2023. The State had twenty days under Ariz. 

R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) to file its responsive pleading. It did so. Because the 

State did “plead or otherwise defend” against the complaint, no basis for a 

default judgment existed. The trial court did not err. 

II. Dismissal 

¶9 This court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 

230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7 (2012). Dismissal is appropriate if “as a matter of law 

[ ] plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the 

facts susceptible of proof.” Id. at 356 ¶ 8 (brackets in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

¶10 Walters brought both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims 

against the State. The state law claims fail because he did not comply with 

Arizona’s notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12–821.01. Although the trial 
WALTERS v. STATE 

Decision of the Court 

4 

court did not expressly address Walters’s state law claims, this court “will 

affirm the court’s ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason.” 

Schooley v. Pena, 253 Ariz. 185, 188 ¶ 10 (App. 2022) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Walters based his state law claims on A.R.S. §§ 13-1303, -

1802, -1904, and 41-1463.1

¶11 “Persons who have claims against a public entity, public 

school or a public employee shall file claims . . . within one hundred eighty 

days after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Walters 

alleged that the State violated his rights during incidents that took place 

between September 23 and October 3, 2022. One hundred eighty days after 

October 3, 2022, was April 1, 2023; but Walters did not file his notice of claim 

until April 28, in response to the State’s motion to dismiss. His notice of 

claim was thus untimely, and his state law claims were barred.

¶12 Section 1983 provides a federal remedy against a person who, 

acting under the color of state law, deprives another person of their federal 

constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walters’s claim fails because “a State 

is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Walters’s complaint alleged vicarious liability, 

but “vicarious liability is inapplicable to [ ] § 1983 suits.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Instead, “a plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. Walters neither named specific 

officers as defendants nor communicated how their actions violated his 

constitutional rights. He has thus shown no error. 

 

1 On appeal, Walters attempts to add new claims based on A.R.S. §§ 

13-2907, -2907.01, and 41-1442. “Generally, a party cannot argue on appeal 

legal issues and arguments that have not been specifically presented to the 

[trial] court,” Alulddin v. Alfartousi, 255 Ariz. 436, 442 ¶ 20 (App. 2023), and 

we therefore decline to address these new claims. 
WALTERS v. STATE 

Decision of the Court 

5 

CONCLUSION 

¶13 We affirm.