IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

December 1, 2020 Session

JACK W. GIBBONS ET AL. v. KYLE BENNETT ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 186806-I John F. Weaver, Chancellor

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No. E2019-02188-COA-R3-CV

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This case involves the sale of a closely held corporation among family members and 

enforcement of the parties’ agreement relative thereto. The trial court determined, inter 

alia, that certain assets were the personal assets of the former corporate shareholders and 

did not pass with the sale of the corporation. The trial court also determined that the new 

sole shareholder of the corporation could not recover expenditures of corporate funds that 

were allegedly for the former shareholders’ personal use when they owned the 

corporation. The trial court further determined that although one of the former 

shareholders had violated a covenant not to compete contained in the parties’ sale 

agreement, the plaintiffs had failed to prove that such violation was the cause of the 

corporation’s lost profits following the sale. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning 

no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.

BENNETT and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.

Dudley W. Taylor, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jack W. Gibbons and Top 

Gun Customz, Inc.

Lewis S. Howard, Jr., and Erin J. Wallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Kyle 

Bennett and Kenneth Bennett.

02/08/2021
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OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On January 23, 2014, the plaintiffs, Jack W. Gibbons and Top Gun Customz, Inc. 

(“Top Gun”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in the Knox County Chancery 

Court (“trial court”), naming as defendants Kyle Bennett; Rhonda Bennett; Burkhalter & 

Associates, P.C.; Burkhalter & Yoder, P.C.; Burkhalter & Ryan, P.C.; Ted A. Burkhalter, 

Jr.; Courtney J. Yoder; and Kenneth Bennett.1 In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that on 

November 7, 2012, Mr. Gibbons had entered into a Stock Transfer Agreement (“STA”) 

wherein two of the defendants, Kyle and Rhonda Bennett, had agreed to sell all of their 

respective shares of stock in Top Gun to Mr. Gibbons. Prior to the STA, Kyle and 

Rhonda Bennett were the sole owners of Top Gun. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Yoder and 

her firm prepared the STA and represented Plaintiffs in the transaction.

Pertinent to this appeal, paragraph six of the STA provides in relevant part:

Sellers agree that all assets purchased by or on behalf of Top Gun Customz,

Inc. or used in conducting the business of Top Gun Customz, Inc., 

regardless of whether such assets are held, owned by, or titled in the 

personal name of Sellers, shall be deemed to be the assets of Top Gun 

Customz, Inc. and shall not be considered a personal asset or marital asset 

of Sellers (“Corporate Assets”). The Corporate Asset[s] shall include, 

without limitation, those assets identified on Exhibit A hereto.

Exhibit A to the STA lists the following ten vehicles: (1) a 2006 Ryno; (2) a 2010 

Razer; (3) a 2005 Keystone Challenger; (4) a 1967 Ford Mustang; (5) a 2004 Dodge 

truck; (6) a 1994 Dodge truck; (7) a 1997 Dodge truck; (8) a 1984 Toyota truck; (9) a 

1965 Ford Mustang; and (10) a 2006 Dodge Viper. Exhibit A also lists the following: 

several trailers; “[c]ertain real property located at 2019 Regal Drive, Alcoa, Blount 

County, Tennessee” (“Regal Drive Property”); “all leasehold and property interests in the 

real property located at 3026 North Park Boulevard, Alcoa, Blount County Tennessee”; 

and “[a]ll tangible personal property and commercial personal property purchased by or 

on behalf of Top Gun Customz, Inc. or used in conducting the business of Top Gun 

Customz, Inc.” In the complaint, Plaintiffs further alleged that after the sale, Kyle and 

Rhonda Bennett had failed to execute documents transferring various assets to Top Gun 

that were subject to the STA.

Paragraph four (“Hold Harmless Clause”) of the STA provides:

 

1

Inasmuch as certain parties share the same surname, we will refer to those parties by first and last name, 

as necessary, to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
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Buyer agrees to hold harmless Sellers for all current or potential liabilities

or expenses incurred by the Corporation for any and all past, current and 

future operations of the business. Furthermore, Buyer agrees to be 

responsible for the payment of all taxes owed by the Corporation incurred 

on or after the transfer date of this document.

Plaintiffs averred that Mr. Gibbons had paid off some $350,000 in debt, which Kyle and 

Rhonda Bennett and Ms. Yoder represented as belonging to Top Gun. However, 

Plaintiffs stated that they had learned after the debt was paid that approximately $150,000 

of the debt was personal in nature.

Paragraph nine (“Noncompete Clause”) of the STA provides: “Sellers agree notto-compete against Buyer or Top Gun Customz, Inc. in the vehicle suspension system 

industry within a one hundred (100) mile radius of Blount County for sixty (60) months 

from and after date of this agreement, based upon Buyer’s assumption of all liabilities 

and obligations of the company.” In the complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that Kyle Bennett 

was operating a competing business, Boost Performance, within Blount County. 

Plaintiffs alleged that Kenneth Bennett, Kyle Bennett’s father, was his partner in the 

competing business. Plaintiffs averred, inter alia, that Kyle and Rhonda Bennett had 

breached the STA and that Kenneth Bennett had induced such breach. Plaintiffs sought 

declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to an award of damages. Plaintiffs attached a 

copy of the STA and Exhibit A, which contains a list of assets.

On September 12, 2014, the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal 

with respect to defendants Burkhalter & Associates, P.C.; Burkhalter & Yoder, P.C.; 

Burkhalter & Ryan, P.C.; Ted A. Burkhalter, Jr.; and Courtney J. Yoder based upon 

Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal. Following various discovery motions filed by 

the parties, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to amend their complaint in April 2015,

adding, inter alia, averments that Kyle and Kenneth Bennett had removed certain

vehicles from the garage where the vehicles were stored. Plaintiffs also sought an award 

of damages from Kyle and Kenneth Bennett as a result of their alleged conversion of 

numerous assets belonging to Top Gun. 

On May 6, 2015, Kyle Bennett filed an affidavit, wherein he explained that he was 

married to Rhonda Bennett, who is the stepdaughter of Mr. Gibbons, but that he and his 

wife were in the process of divorcing. Kyle Bennett further explained that when Rhonda 

Bennett and he separated and filed for divorce in 2012, he was the owner of a number of 

vehicles, including three Dodge Vipers, and various items of personal property, including 

tools. Kyle Bennett stated that later in 2012, without his knowledge or permission, 

Rhonda Bennett and Mr. Gibbons, along with Mr. Gibbons’s wife and son, caused 

several of the vehicles to be transferred out of Kyle Bennett’s name and into their names 

and then removed the vehicles to other locations. Kyle Bennett further stated that 
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Rhonda Bennett, Mr. Gibbons, and others removed various items of personalty that 

belonged to him without his knowledge. 

With regard to the STA, Kyle Bennett indicated that the STA was negotiated by 

Rhonda Bennett and Mr. Gibbons, who both represented to Kyle Bennett that the only 

assets being transferred were those listed in Exhibit A to the STA. Kyle Bennett further 

stated that in October 2013, the presiding judge in his divorce action entered an order 

requiring Rhonda Bennett to return his personal property to him and to provide an 

accounting of all marital property taken by her. According to Kyle Bennett’s affidavit, he 

had filed a previous lawsuit in January 2013 against Mr. Gibbons, Rhonda Bennett, Troy 

Bull (Mr. Gibbons’s son), and Jeff Browning (an employee of Top Gun who was later 

dismissed from the lawsuit). Kyle Bennett explained that he had alleged in the earlier 

action, inter alia, that the named defendants committed conversion and trespass to 

chattels concerning certain vehicles that were not listed in Exhibit A to the STA: a 1997 

Dodge Viper, a 1993 Dodge Viper, a 2005 Ford Excursion, a 1998 Toyota Supra, a 2006 

Chevrolet Corvette, and a 1996 Dodge Ram (collectively, “the contested vehicles”). 

Kyle Bennett also stated that in May 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order signed 

by all parties to the previous lawsuit ruling that all of the contested vehicles were the 

marital property of Kyle and Rhonda Bennett and should be returned to their marital 

estate.

The parties concede that this action was consolidated with Kyle Bennett’s 

previously filed lawsuit in May 2015. Although the appellate record does not contain an 

order of consolidation, later orders reflect such consolidation in the captions of the 

pleadings. On June 8, 2015, Kyle and Kenneth Bennett filed an answer to the amended 

complaint along with a counterclaim against Mr. Gibbons, a cross-claim against Rhonda

Bennett, and a third-party complaint against Mr. Gibbons’s wife and Mr. Bull. 

During the summer of 2015, the trial court conducted evidentiary hearings 

spanning four non-consecutive days concerning the rights of ownership to the contested 

vehicles. The court delineated the three issues to be considered during the hearings as 

follows: 

1. Whether Kyle Bennett signed and/or otherwise authorized the filing 

of tax returns for Top Gun, which return or returns claimed 

depreciation deductions for any of the contested vehicles.

2. Whether Kyle Bennett and/or Rhonda Bennett accepted payment 

from Top Gun for storage of the contested vehicles at the garage 

adjacent to their residence in Friendsville, Tennessee; and

3. Whether the contested vehicles were deemed to be the property of 

Top Gun under the STA.
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On October 9, 2015, the trial court entered an order on the evidentiary hearings, 

accompanied by a memorandum opinion, finding as follows in pertinent part: 

After hearing testimony of witnesses, including Kyle Bennett, 

Rhonda Cox (formerly Rhonda Bennett), and Jack Gibbons, the Court 

issued its Memorandum Opinion, a copy of which is attached hereto as 

Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. As more fully set forth in 

the Memorandum Opinion, the Court found the first issue in favor of Mr. 

Gibbons and Top Gun as to the 1993 Dodge Viper, 1994 Toyota Supra, and 

2006 Corvette, the Court found the second issue in favor of Mr. Gibbons 

and Top Gun, and the Court found the third issue in favor of Kyle Bennett 

and Kenneth Bennett.

Following a hearing on a motion filed by Plaintiffs seeking to temporarily enjoin

Kyle Bennett from competing against Top Gun, the trial court entered an order on April 

6, 2016, finding that Plaintiffs had established by clear and convincing evidence their 

right to a temporary injunction. The court therefore enjoined Kyle Bennett from 

competing against Top Gun in the vehicle suspension system industry within a 100-mile 

radius of Blount County, Tennessee, for sixty months, retroactive to November 7, 2012. 

On June 30, 2016, the court denied a motion filed by Kyle Bennett to dissolve the 

temporary injunction.

On July 5, 2016, Kyle and Kenneth Bennett filed a motion to exclude evidence 

regarding financial damages, asserting that although they had served Plaintiffs with 

discovery requests concerning calculation and itemization of damages that Plaintiffs had 

alleged in the amended complaint, the requests were returned with vague information or 

no information at all. On July 27, 2016, Kyle and Kenneth Bennett also filed a motion in 

limine regarding damages, requesting that Plaintiffs be prevented from entering evidence 

regarding financial damages in part because of their lack of complete discovery responses 

and in part because of Top Gun’s status as a “Subchapter S Corporation.” Concerning 

these motions, the trial court entered an order on August 11, 2016, requiring Plaintiffs to 

respond to Kyle and Kenneth Bennett’s discovery requests by August 5, 2016. The court

further ordered: “To the extent any information is not provided regarding damages, such 

information shall be precluded from being presented at the trial of this case[.]” In this 

order, the court also reserved ruling on Kyle and Kenneth Bennett’s motion in limine

regarding damages and affirmed the finality of its prior ruling of September 15, 2015, 

concerning ownership of the contested vehicles.

Over the next several months, the trial court granted several continuances, and the 

parties filed a plethora of motions, ranging from discovery motions to motions seeking 

deadline extensions, none of which are particularly relevant to the issues on appeal. On 

May 5, 2017, Kenneth Bennett filed a motion for summary judgment along with a 
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statement of undisputed material facts. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. On July 

20, 2017, the trial court entered an agreed order granting summary judgment to Ms. 

Gibbons. Subsequently, on August 14, 2017, the trial court entered an agreed order 

finding Kyle Bennett in civil contempt of the previously entered temporary injunction. 

On November 9, 2017, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion denying Kenneth 

Bennett’s motion for summary judgment.

On December 7, 2017, Rhonda Bennett, now Rhonda Cox (hereinafter, “Ms. 

Cox”), filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Jeff Browning as to the 

financial condition of Top Gun when he was employed there. Kyle and Kenneth Bennett 

concomitantly filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of Jeffrey Day, a 

certified public accountant, regarding any damages allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs. 

Relative thereto, Kyle and Kenneth Bennett averred that Plaintiffs had disclosed for the 

first time in September 2016 that Mr. Day planned to offer an opinion that Top Gun had 

lost profits in excess of two million dollars. The Bennetts asserted that because the 

August 5, 2016 discovery deadline had expired, the trial court should not allow Mr. Day 

to testify regarding these damages. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion seeking to 

modify the court’s prior order, requesting that the court extend the aforementioned 

discovery deadline. The trial was subsequently continued after the parties agreed to a 

continuance during a December 11, 2017 hearing.

On June 7, 2018, Kyle Bennett filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without 

prejudice as to his claims against Ms. Cox, Jack and Kathleen Gibbons, and Mr. Bull. On 

June 26, 2018, the bench trial commenced in this matter, spanning four non-consecutive 

days. Witnesses included Mr. Gibbons, Kyle Bennett, Ms. Cox, and Mr. Day, who 

testified both as a fact witness and an expert witness. Portions of the depositions of 

Kenneth Bennett and Jeff Browning were also read into the record. Following Mr. Day’s 

testimony, the Bennetts’ attorney moved for an involuntary dismissal of all claims 

relating to the Noncompete Clause, arguing that there was a lack of proof of causation. 

The trial court denied the motion.

On August 13, 2019, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion containing 

extensive findings of fact and an order reflecting its final judgment. In its order, the court 

awarded to Plaintiffs nominal damages in the amount of $50 against Kyle Bennett due to 

his breach of the STA’s Noncompete Clause. The court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ 

remaining claims related to the STA, including inducement to breach, and dismissed all 

claims related to expenditures by Top Gun prior to the execution of the STA. The court

further awarded to Top Gun the proceeds from the sale of the Regal Drive Property and 

dismissed any pending motions and remaining claims. The court taxed court costs 

equally between Plaintiffs and Kyle Bennett. 
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Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to amend or make additional findings of 

fact, which the trial court denied via an order entered on November 15, 2019. Plaintiffs 

timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Plaintiffs present the following issues for this Court’s review, which we have 

restated slightly:

1. Whether the trial court erred by determining that certain vehicles 

were not assets of Top Gun pursuant to the terms of the STA.

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Top Gun the right to recover 

expenditures made by it with respect to certain personal vehicles.

3. Whether the trial court erred by declining to consider the expert

testimony of Mr. Day concerning damages sustained as a result of 

Kyle Bennett’s breach of the Noncompete Clause.

4. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim against 

Kenneth Bennett for inducement of breach of contract without 

accompanying its dismissal with findings of fact or conclusions of 

law.

5. Whether the trial court erred in its allocation of court costs.

III. Standard of Review

Our review of the trial court’s judgment following a non-jury trial is de novo upon 

the record with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s findings of fact unless 

the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Rogers v. 

Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn. 2012). “In order for the evidence to 

preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence must support another 

finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 

291, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). We review questions of law, including questions 

involving interpretation of a contract, de novo with no presumption of correctness. See

Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000); Cummings Inc. v. Dorgan, 320 

S.W.3d 316, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The trial court’s determinations regarding 

witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 

426 (Tenn. 2011); Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).
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IV. Ownership of Vehicles

In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims of ownership of certain vehicles by 

Top Gun, including the contested vehicles listed above, as well as a 2006 Lamborghini 

Gallardo, a 1994 Toyota Supra, a 2004 Dodge truck, a 2007 GMC Denali, a 1965 Ford 

Mustang, a 1967 Ford Mustang, and a 1989 Jeep Cherokee. As Plaintiffs concede, the 

six contested vehicles were the subject of Kyle Bennett’s first lawsuit and a May 2013 

agreed order executed by all parties (except Top Gun), determining the contested vehicles 

to be the marital property of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox. Plaintiffs contend, however, that 

Top Gun cannot be bound by this order because it was not a party to the order. Plaintiffs 

further assert that this agreed order was “the deciding factor for the trial court, 

notwithstanding the language of the STA and proof introduced in the evidentiary 

hearings.” Following our thorough review of the record and the trial court’s order, we

conclude that the trial court properly determined ownership of the vehicles at issue.

In its August 13, 2019 memorandum opinion entered following the trial in this 

matter, the trial court expressly stated in pertinent part:

The final stages of this litigation concerned the claims of Mr. 

Gibbons and [Top Gun], for damages against [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox, 

as well as the other defendants, relating to [Kyle] Bennett’s breach of the 

noncompetition provision of the STA and relating to expenditures made by 

Top Gun in connection with six (6) vehicles determined not to be the 

property of Top Gun but the marital property of [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. 

Cox. This litigation stems back to an agreed order entered into by [Kyle] 

Bennett, as the plaintiff, and Mr. Gibbons and Ms. Cox, as well as others, 

as the defendants, in case number 184469-1. The agreed order declares the 

vehicles to be the marital property of [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox. 

Although the agreed order was entered into on May 7, 2013, after Mr. 

Gibbons had become the sole shareholder of Top Gun, Mr. Gibbons and 

Top Gun subsequently asserted in case number 186806-1 that the order was

not binding upon Top Gun and was subject to relitigation. Next, after this 

Court in the consolidated litigation redetermined that the six (6) vehicles 

were the marital property of [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox, per this Court’s 

ORDER ON EVIDENTIARY HEARING entered October 9, 2015, 

adopting its bench opinion announced September 14, 2015, Top Gun 

claimed damages for expenditures made by it relating to the vehicles. Top 

Gun also claims damages from such expenditures relating to a 2006 

Lamborghini Gallardo. The expenditures were made by Top Gun while 

[Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox were its sole shareholders, directors and 

officers, prior to the transfer of their stock to Mr. Gibbons under the STA. 

By one of their amended complaints, Mr. Gibbons and Top Gun alleged
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that [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox had made the expenditures for their 

personal benefit from the funds of Top Gun prior to the STA.

Plaintiffs posit that the trial court erred by failing to find that all of the vehicles 

referenced above belonged to Top Gun because they were used in connection with Top 

Gun’s business and/or were maintained by Top Gun. As Plaintiffs point out, paragraph 

six of the STA provides that “all assets purchased by or on behalf of [Top Gun] or used in 

conducting the business of [Top Gun]” would be deemed corporate assets of Top Gun

“regardless of whether such assets are held, owned by, or titled in the personal name of 

Sellers” and “shall not be considered a personal asset or marital asset of Sellers”

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs claim that not only were the vehicles used in “conducting 

the business” of Top Gun, but certain of the vehicles were also maintained and improved 

by Top Gun and depreciated on Top Gun’s income tax returns. In addition, Plaintiffs 

argue that Top Gun paid Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox monthly rental payments for the use 

of their garage to store some the vehicles.

As such, Plaintiffs’ claim is actually two-fold—first, Plaintiffs assert that the 

language of the STA requires that any vehicle used in “conducting the business” of Top 

Gun should be deemed Top Gun’s property, regardless of the manner in which the 

vehicle was titled. Second, Plaintiffs argue that vehicles that were treated as belonging to 

Top Gun, in that Top Gun expended monetary sums to maintain them, should be deemed 

the property of Top Gun. We will address each argument in turn.

Plaintiffs contend that the language of the STA requires a finding that the vehicles 

previously described were assets of Top Gun because they were used in “conducting the 

business” of Top Gun. Concerning interpretation of a contract such as the STA herein, 

our Supreme Court has previously explained:

In “resolving disputes concerning contract interpretation, our task is to 

ascertain the intention of the parties based upon the usual, natural, and 

ordinary meaning of the contractual language.” Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 

S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). This determination of the intention of the 

parties is generally treated as a question of law because the words of the 

contract are definite and undisputed, and in deciding the legal effect of the 

words, there is no genuine factual issue left for a jury to decide. 5 Joseph 

M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts, § 24.30 (rev. ed. 1998); Doe v. HCA 

Health Services of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tenn. 2001).

A court’s initial task in construing a contract is to determine whether 

the language of the contract is ambiguous. Once found to be ambiguous, a 

court applies established rules of construction to determine the parties’

intent. “Only if ambiguity remains after the court applies the pertinent 

rules of construction does [the legal meaning of the contract] become a 
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question of fact” appropriate for a jury. Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. 

Co., 639 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1981). . . .

The central tenet of contract construction is that the intent of the 

contracting parties at the time of executing the agreement should govern. 

Empress Health & Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn.

1973). The intent of the parties is presumed to be that specifically 

expressed in the body of the contract. “In other words, the object to be 

attained in construing a contract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of 

the parties as expressed in the language used and to give effect to such 

intent if it does not conflict with any rule of law, good morals, or public 

policy.” 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 245, quoted in Turner, 503 S.W.2d at 

190. If clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of the language controls 

the outcome of contract disputes.

Nonetheless, a contractual provision may be susceptible to more 

than one reasonable interpretation, which renders the terms of the contract 

ambiguous. Memphis Housing Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 512 

(Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 823, 122 S. Ct. 59, 151 L. Ed. 2d 27 

(2001). “A contract is ambiguous only when it is of uncertain meaning and 

may fairly be understood in more ways than one.” Turner, 503 S.W.2d at 

190-91. Where the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the intention of the 

parties cannot be determined by a literal interpretation of the language, and 

the courts must resort to other rules of construction.

Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889-90 (Tenn. 

2002).

Our Supreme Court has further explained: “An ambiguous provision in a contract 

generally will be construed against the party drafting it.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 

S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tenn. 2006). Moreover, “when a contractual provision is ambiguous, a 

court is permitted to use parol evidence, including the contracting parties’ conduct and 

statements regarding the disputed provision, to guide the court in construing and 

enforcing the contract.” Id.

With regard to the STA herein, the trial court determined in its adopted findings 

that although Ms. Yoder prepared the STA at the behest of Ms. Cox, Ms. Yoder 

represented Plaintiffs with regard to the STA transaction.2 The court found that none of 

the contested vehicles were specifically listed on Exhibit A to the STA and that none of 

the vehicles were corporate assets of Top Gun as of the date of the STA’s execution. 

 

2

In its memorandum opinion issued on September 2, 2015, the trial court adopted certain findings 

proposed by both sides while stating that the facts were “largely uncontroverted.” 
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Although the trial court did not make any specific findings concerning the ambiguity of 

the STA’s language that “all assets purchased by or on behalf of [Top Gun] or used in 

conducting the business of [Top Gun]” would be considered corporate assets, the court 

made numerous findings concerning the parties’ conduct surrounding execution of the 

STA and the sale of Top Gun. Insofar as the trial court considered parol evidence, 

including the parties’ statements and conduct concerning the STA transaction, we 

conclude that the trial court implicitly found the phrase, “assets used in conducting the 

business of [Top Gun],” to be ambiguous. We agree, determining that the language in 

dispute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 

As Plaintiffs suggest, the phrase, “assets used in conducting the business of [Top 

Gun],” could refer to any assets used in connection with the promotion of Top Gun’s 

business even if those assets were solely featured in advertising, trade shows, or 

otherwise. On the other hand, this phrase could refer to those assets used in the actual 

production of Top Gun’s products, such as tools, machinery, parts, and so on. Because 

the language in dispute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the 

language is ambiguous, and the trial court properly considered parol evidence when 

interpreting it. See Planter’s Gin Co., 78 S.W.3d at 889-90; Allstate, 195 S.W.3d at 612.

The evidence presented in this matter demonstrated that Kyle Bennett did not 

intend for the disputed language to include assets that were used solely for advertising or 

promoting the business of Top Gun. Kyle Bennett testified that the contested vehicles 

were purchased by him and Ms. Cox with their personal funds, with some of them having 

been purchased before Top Gun existed. He further testified that none of the vehicles 

were ever titled to Top Gun. Kyle Bennett related that he often placed Top Gun stickers 

on his and Ms. Cox’s personal vehicles and used those vehicles in advertising materials 

and at trade shows, as he likewise did with other individuals’ personal vehicles. He 

explained, however, that it was not his intent for any of the vehicles in dispute to be 

considered assets of Top Gun. He further stated in an affidavit his understanding that the 

only assets that would transfer with the sale of the business were those specifically listed 

on Exhibit A to the STA.

As previously explained, the trial court found and Mr. Gibbons acknowledged that

Ms. Yoder drafted the STA and represented Plaintiffs with regard to the STA transaction. 

Mr. Gibbons also acknowledged that he did not consider the disputed vehicles to be 

assets of Top Gun at the time the STA was executed. Rather, he adopted that view after a 

subsequent consultation with legal counsel who had reviewed the STA’s language

following its execution. Mr. Gibbons had, in the months leading up to the STA’s 

execution, treated several of the vehicles as Kyle Bennett’s and Ms. Cox’s marital assets 

by helping Ms. Cox prevent her then-husband from taking those assets or disposing of 

them during the divorce proceedings. Mr. Gibbons admitted that he allowed Ms. Cox to 

title some of the vehicles in his name and store them on his property during her divorce 

proceedings, and he testified that this was done to preserve them as marital assets. Mr. 
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Gibbons indicated that he was only keeping the vehicles for Ms. Cox and that he “never 

touched them.” Moreover, he testified that when he undertook these actions, he believed 

the vehicles to be marital assets of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox. 

Mr. Gibbons further acknowledged that he consented to entry of the May 2013 

agreed order designating the contested vehicles as marital assets of Kyle Bennett and Ms. 

Cox after signing the STA and upon consultation with his then-counsel. Mr. Gibbons 

later signed documentation to transfer titles to the vehicles back to Kyle Bennett and Ms. 

Cox. Likewise, Ms. Cox, the other party to the STA, testified that she considered those 

vehicles to be marital assets at that time rather than assets of Top Gun. Ms. Cox admitted 

that the vehicles were bought with personal funds and were not titled to Top Gun. She 

further explained that she asked her parents and brother to “hold” the contested vehicles 

“in trust” as marital assets pending her divorce so that they would not “walk off.” 

The trial court found in its memorandum opinion issued on September 2, 2015, 

inter alia, that in 2012, “Rhonda Cox conspired with Jack Gibbons, Kathleen Gibbons 

and Troy Bull to transfer the titles to [the contested vehicles] without Kyle Bennett’s 

knowledge and to hide [the contested vehicles] from Kyle Bennett.” The court also 

found that Mr. Gibbons testified under oath that he was “safekeeping” the vehicles on 

behalf of Ms. Cox during her divorce from Mr. Bennett because the vehicles were marital 

assets. Based on the parties’ conduct and statements, the trial court determined that the 

contested vehicles were “not intended by any of the parties to the [STA] to be the 

property of Top Gun and not intended to be subject to the [STA].” In addition, the trial 

court specifically stated:

[T]his Court concludes that the taking of the vehicles by the owners of the 

vehicles to promotional events for the corporate business of Top Gun also 

owned by them as its sole shareholders did not render the vehicles owned 

by the two individuals into assets used in conducting the business of the 

corporation [Top Gun].

Based on our thorough review of the evidence presented, we agree. 

The parol evidence regarding the parties’ conduct and statements at the time of the 

STA’s execution clearly demonstrates that the parties did not intend for the STA’s 

disputed language to be interpreted as including as corporate assets Kyle Bennett’s and 

Ms. Cox’s personal vehicles that were used in advertising or promoting the business of 

Top Gun. See Allstate, 195 S.W.3d at 612. At the time of the STA’s execution, none of 

the parties to the STA believed that (1) the vehicles at issue were anything other than 

personal assets of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox or (2) their ownership was transferred to 

Top Gun pursuant to the STA. It was not until sometime later when Mr. Gibbons 

consulted with legal counsel that he first formed a belief that the vehicles at issue could 

be subject to the STA’s provisions. As such, the parol evidence supports the 
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interpretation that the parties’ intent at the time of entering into this contract was for these 

vehicles to remain the property of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox. We further note that 

because the STA was drafted by Mr. Gibbons’s representative, the language used must be 

construed against Mr. Gibbons. See id. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

interpretation of the STA determining that the vehicles in dispute were not subject to the 

STA and were not assets of Top Gun based on the STA’s provisions. 

We will accordingly address Plaintiffs’ second argument, which is that vehicles 

“treated” as belonging to Top Gun, because Top Gun expended monetary sums to 

maintain them, should be deemed the property of Top Gun. The findings adopted by the 

trial court in its September 2, 2015 memorandum opinion included that the contested 

vehicles were purchased by Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox personally but that Top Gun paid 

for some work performed on the vehicles. The court found that the vehicles were not 

registered to Top Gun and that the insurance policies were maintained in the names of 

Kyle Bennett and/or Ms. Cox, although Top Gun paid some of the insurance premiums 

on occasion and also paid registration fees on the vehicles. The court also determined 

that at least one of the vehicles was listed as a depreciable asset on one final Top Gun tax 

return, but Ms. Cox testified that this vehicle was intended for use by their son and that 

she did not consider it a Top Gun asset.

Concerning rent, the trial court found that the vehicles were stored in a detached 

garage next to the former marital residence of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox, which garage 

also contained an office space utilized by Top Gun. The court additionally found that 

Top Gun paid rent to Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox for use of the garage and also stored 

tools and other items there. 

Despite the expenditure of funds by Top Gun with regard to certain vehicles 

personally owned by Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox, the trial court ultimately concluded that 

these vehicles were not assets of Top Gun. We agree. Plaintiffs have provided no 

authority for their contention that the expenditure of corporate funds by the sole 

shareholders of a corporation on those shareholders’ personal assets would convert those 

assets to corporate ownership. Although such commingling of corporate and personal 

assets could constitute a questionable business practice, Plaintiffs have cited no authority 

for the proposition that such action would automatically result in a change of asset 

ownership. We therefore determine this argument to be unavailing.

In support of their ownership contentions, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court 

determined the issue of the contested vehicles’ ownership based solely on the agreed 

order previously entered in Kyle Bennett’s related action. As the trial court elucidated in 

its September 2, 2015 memorandum opinion, Mr. Bennett had filed a previous lawsuit 

against Mr. Gibbons and other defendants, asserting ownership of the contested vehicles. 

The court noted that Mr. Gibbons was represented by counsel in that action. As the court 

determined, Mr. Gibbons authorized his attorney to enter into an agreed order decreeing 
- 14 -

that the contested vehicles were the marital property of Ms. Cox and Kyle Bennett. The 

court further found that Mr. Gibbons was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of 

Top Gun at that time; that he had knowledge of the STA, having signed it a few months 

prior; and that he had commonality of interest with Top Gun when he entered into the 

agreed order. 

In addition to the trial court’s numerous findings previously detailed herein 

regarding the parties’ conduct and statements concerning the STA, the court continued its 

findings as follows:

The most persuasive evidence in this case as to the intent of the 

parties to the stock transfer agreement is their conduct. 

While the Court did not find Ms. [Cox] to be a particularly credible 

witness and found her to be aligned with her stepfather, Mr. Gibbons, Ms. 

[Cox] did testify that she earlier had wanted the Court to deem the vehicles,

quote, “to be marital property to be split up the way -- however the other 

marital assets were split up,” close quotes. She also testified that when she 

transferred the vehicles to her stepfather that she believed them to be 

marital assets.

The Court finds and concludes that the evidence preponderates in 

favor of the finding and conclusion that the vehicles were marital property 

of Rhonda [Cox] and Kyle Bennett and not intended by any of the parties to 

the [STA] to be the property of Top Gun and not intended to be subject to 

the [STA]. The evidence as construed through the conduct of the parties to 

the [STA] clearly shows that all the parties to the [STA] intended for the 

vehicles in dispute to remain as the individual and marital property of 

Rhonda [Cox] and Kyle Bennett.

As demonstrated by the extensive findings detailed in the trial court’s 

memorandum opinion, we disagree with Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court “simply 

recited that it found [the ownership issue] in favor of Kyle [Bennett]” or that the court 

“essentially determined that the agreed order in the prior case was binding and overrode 

all factual evidence to the contrary.” The trial court clearly considered the totality of the 

evidence presented before rendering its judgment. Having conducted a thorough review 

of the record and the evidence presented in this matter, we conclude that the trial court’s

findings were supported by the preponderance of the evidence, and we accord appropriate 

weight to the trial court’s determinations with regard to witness credibility.

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Top Gun should be considered a third-party 

beneficiary of the STA such as to enable it to enforce the STA’s provisions. However, 

having determined that the STA’s language would not require that the disputed vehicles 
- 15 -

be considered Top Gun assets, this argument is moot. Based on the STA’s language and 

the parol evidence presented, we determine that the parties did not intend for the vehicles 

at issue to be considered assets of Top Gun pursuant to the STA. We further conclude 

that the actions of Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox in expending corporate funds to improve or 

maintain their personal vehicles would not result in a change in the ownership of those 

vehicles. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling concerning the ownership of the 

vehicles at issue.

V. Recovery of Corporate Funds Spent on Personal Assets

As an alternative to their ownership argument, Plaintiffs postulate that the trial 

court erred by declining to allow Top Gun to recover the corporate funds expended on 

vehicles owned personally by Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox. As the trial court determined

in its August 13, 2019 memorandum opinion, the “expenditures were made by Top Gun 

while Mr. Bennett and Ms. Cox were its sole shareholders, directors and officers, prior to 

the transfer of their stock to Mr. Gibbons under the STA.” The court further found:

The evidence establishes that Kyle Bennett and Rhonda Cox had a 

history of commingling personal and corporate income, expenses, assets 

and liabilities of themselves and Top Gun. [Plaintiffs] claim that 

expenditures by Top Gun, prior to the STA, relating to the vehicles 

previously determined by this Court to be the marital property of Kyle 

Bennett and Rhonda Cox, as well as the 2006 Lamborghini Gallardo, are 

improper and recoupable by Top Gun. If this claim were brought by Mr. 

Gibbons as a shareholders’ derivative action, it would be subject to 

dismissal because Mr. Gibbons was not a shareholder at the time of the 

challenged expenditures. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-17-401 and Tenn. R. 

Civ. P. 23.06.

Presently, Mr. Gibbons, as the sole shareholder of Top Gun, has 

caused it to bring its claim for expenditures made by Top Gun while [Kyle] 

Bennett and Ms. Cox were its sole shareholders, directors, and officers. 

Neither side has cited the Court to any case discussing whether a closed 

corporation, after the transfer of all its stock from its former sole 

shareholders to a new sole shareholder, can go back and sue its former sole 

shareholders, who were also its only directors and officers, for challenged 

expenditures.

This Court is of the opinion that the absence of any such case law is 

significant in two ways. First, the “[c]ourts recognizing the significant 

conceptual differences between the closed corporation and its publicly 

owned counterpart, hold where no competing minority interest appears, no 

fraud or apparent injury to the public or creditors is present, and no clearly 
- 16 -

prohibitory statutory language is violated, there is no valid reason for 

precluding the parties from reaching any arrangements concerning the 

management of the corporation which are agreeable to all.” 18A Am. Jur. 

2d, Corporations, § 629. If [Kyle] Bennett and Rhonda Cox had taken 

action as the sole shareholders and directors to formally authorize 

expenditures, as dividends or distributions to themselves, absent injury to a 

creditor, there could be no complaint. Since Top Gun is a closed 

corporation, the same criteria is applicable to such informal action. Id. 

Second, this is not a situation where a creditor is seeking to hold a sole 

shareholder liable for the acts or debts of the corporation injurious to the 

creditor. See Id. at § 732. Considering that [Kyle] Bennett and Ms. Cox 

were the sole shareholders, directors and officers, there is no way to 

conclude that Top Gun did not have knowledge of the expenditures and 

authorized or ratified them.

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in its determination because “[u]nder 

Tennessee corporation law, a corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities.” See 

Cambio Health Solutions., LLC v. Reardon, 213 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2006). 

Although we agree that a corporation and its shareholders are distinct entities, it does not 

logically follow that such principle would provide authority for allowing a purchasing 

shareholder to be able to hold a former shareholder liable for the expenditures of a 

closely held corporation that occurred prior to the corporation’s sale. In fact, we 

determine that such principle would be inapposite to the claim advanced by Plaintiffs.

Our Supreme Court has previously elucidated the following with regard to a 

corporate shareholder’s personal liability:

Ordinarily, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the 

acts of the corporation. See Oceanics Sch., Inc. v. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d 

135, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (“A corporation is presumptively treated as 

a distinct entity, separate from its shareholders, officers, and directors.”) 

(citing Schlater v. Haynie, 833 S.W.2d 919, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). In 

appropriate circumstances, however, the corporate veil may be pierced and 

the acts of a corporation attributed to a shareholder. CAO Holdings, Inc. v. 

Trost, 333 S.W.3d 73, 88 (Tenn. 2010). “The corporate entity generally is 

disregarded where it is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, to 

work an injustice, to defend crime, or to defeat an overriding public policy, 

or where necessary to achieve equity.” 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 57 

(2004) (footnotes omitted).

The party seeking to pierce the corporate veil has the burden of 

presenting facts demonstrating that it is entitled to relief. Barbour, 112 

S.W.3d at 140. In order to pierce the corporate veil, the proof must show 
- 17 -

that “the separate corporate entity ‘is a sham or a dummy’ or that 

disregarding the separate corporate entity is ‘necessary to accomplish 

justice.’” Trost, 333 S.W.3d at 88 (quoting Barbour, 112 S.W.3d at 140). 

The question of whether the corporation’s separate identity should be 

disregarded is dependent on the specific circumstances of the case and is a 

“‘matter . . . particularly within the province of the trial court.’” Barbour, 

112 S.W.3d at 140 (quoting Elec. Power Bd. of Chattanooga v. St. Joseph 

Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tenn. 1985)). When 

determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced, the following 

factors are applicable:

Factors to be considered in determining whether to disregard 

the corporate veil include not only whether the entity has 

been used to work a fraud or injustice in contravention of 

public policy, but also: (1) whether there was a failure to 

collect paid in capital; (2) whether the corporation was 

grossly undercapitalized; (3) the nonissuance of stock 

certificates; (4) the sole ownership of stock by one individual; 

(5) the use of the same office or business location; (6) the 

employment of the same employees or attorneys; (7) the use 

of the corporation as an instrumentality or business conduit 

for an individual or another corporation; (8) the diversion of 

corporate assets by or to a stockholder or other entity to the 

detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and 

liabilities in another; (9) the use of the corporation as a 

subterfuge in illegal transactions; (10) the formation and use 

of the corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of 

another person or entity; and (11) the failure to maintain arms

length relationships among related entities.

Trost, 333 S.W.3d at 88 n.13 (quoting FDIC v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386, 

397 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)). No single factor among those listed is conclusive, 

nor is it required that all of these factors support piercing the corporate veil; 

typically, courts will rely on a combination of the factors in deciding the 

issue. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d at 140. However, in all events, the equities 

must “substantially favor” the party requesting relief, Trost, 333 S.W.3d at 

89, and the presumption of the corporation’s separate identity should be set 

aside only “with great caution and not precipitately.” Schlater, 833 S.W.2d 

at 925.

Rogers, 367 S.W.3d at 214-15.
- 18 -

In this matter, Plaintiffs have not advanced a claim seeking to pierce Top Gun’s 

corporate veil in order to hold the individual shareholders liable for the corporation’s 

expenditures made prior to the sale of Top Gun to Mr. Gibbons. Assuming, arguendo, 

that such a claim had been advanced, the proof presented was insufficient to hold Kyle 

Bennett and Ms. Cox personally liable for such corporate expenditures made while they 

were Top Gun’s only shareholders. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the “corporate 

entity ‘[was] a sham or a dummy’ or that disregarding the separate corporate entity [was]

‘necessary to accomplish justice.’” See id. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

declination to disregard the corporation’s separate identity in order to hold Kyle Bennett 

and Ms. Cox personally liable for Top Gun’s corporate expenditures while they were its 

only shareholders.

VI. Testimony of Expert Witness

Plaintiffs’ next issue questions whether the trial court erred by “disregarding” the 

expert testimony of Mr. Day with regard to the damages sustained by Top Gun due to 

Kyle Bennett’s breach of the Noncompete Clause. We note that in the argument section

concerning this issue in their appellate brief, Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred 

by determining that both Mr. Gibbons and Kyle Bennett had breached the STA’s 

provisions. However, Plaintiffs did not raise an issue in their statement of issues 

concerning the trial court’s findings with regard to Mr. Gibbons’s breach. Inasmuch as 

issues not raised in the statement of issues may be considered waived, we decline to 

address this argument and will only address the issue presented with regard to proper 

consideration of Mr. Day’s testimony. See Ethridge v. Estate of Ethridge, 427 S.W.3d 

389, 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“Issues not raised in the statement of the issues may be 

considered waived.”).

The trial court stated as follows with regard to the proof of damages resulting from 

Kyle Bennett’s breach of the Noncompete Clause:

[W]hile both sides breached the STA, the evidence does not sustain that 

Mr. Gibbons or Top Gun suffered any actual damages from the defendant 

Kyle Bennett’s breach of the noncompetition provision. The testimony of 

the plaintiffs’ expert and fact witness, Jeffrey Day, CPA, was the only 

proof proffered, at the hearing commencing June 26, 2018, on the issue of 

damages from defendant Kyle Bennett’s breach of the noncompetition 

provision. Mr. Day testified that Top Gun began experiencing a 

diminishment in revenues immediately following Mr. Gibbons’ acquisition 

of the company and that the decline continued on a consistent basis of 

$413,425.00 per month. Mr. Day testified that Top Gun lost profits in the 

total amount of $2,371,898.00 during the period from November 8, 2012, 

through July 31, 2016. At the rate of $413,425.00 per month, as testified 

by Mr. Day, all of the damages would have accrued in the first six months 
- 19 -

of Mr. Gibbons’ operation of the business. However, the defendant Kyle 

Bennett did not begin conducting his competing business until the seventh 

month after Mr. Gibbons’ acquisition of Top Gun. Therefore, no damages 

could be attributable to the defendant Kyle Bennett’s operation of his 

competing business commencing in the seventh month following Mr. 

Gibbons’ acquisition of Top Gun.

Mr. Day’s opinion of lost profits was based upon his use of a 

“before-and-after method” comparing the profits before Mr. Gibbons 

assumed ownership with those after Mr. Gibbons’ ownership. However, 

Mr. Day was unable to attribute Mr. Gibbons’ decrease in profits to 

anything in particular. There was no evidence as to what caused any

particular customer to decrease or decline purchases. Mr. Day testified that 

he did not have any basis for asserting “what the cause was for the missing 

sales,” but that he could only observe the revenue trends. Conversely, 

Jeffrey Browning, the former general manager of Top Gun, testified, by 

deposition, that Top Gun lost business because of Mr. Gibbons’ bad 

business practices. Mr. Browning testified that Top Gun, under Mr.

Gibbons’ management, required more time to complete vehicles because 

Mr. Gibbons restricted the ordering of necessary parts, paid some of its 

parts vendors over a longer period of time, and failed to pay other parts 

vendors at all. Consequently, Top Gun’s vendors would not ship necessary 

parts until receipt of payment, all of which delayed the completion of its 

vehicle suspension work.

The evidence from Mr. Gibbons and Top Gun at the hearing on their 

application for a temporary injunction was likewise deficient as to the basis 

for determining why customers of Top Gun had declined or decreased their 

purchases from Top Gun. The operations of Top Gun had been shut down 

prior to the STA. Mr. Gibbons testified about the decrease in the gross 

revenues of Top Gun but had no personal knowledge about transactions 

between Top Gun’s customers or former customers and defendant Kyle

Bennett or his LLC. Furthermore, Mr. Gibbons did not testify in terms of 

Top Gun’s lost profits but only in terms of gross revenues, which would not 

be equivalent to actual damages. As set forth above, the testimony of the 

plaintiffs’ expert, Mr. Day, actually demonstrates that all of the decline 

occurred prior to the competition. Also, the testimony of Top Gun’s former 

general manager, Mr. Browning, indicates that the decline was due to 

mismanagement. In announcing its decision to grant the temporary 

injunction, the Court referred to the ground for injunctive relief that actual 

damages would be difficult to ascertain (leaving the plaintiff with no 

remedy other than nominal damages absent injunctive relief).
- 20 -

The plaintiffs have the burden of not only showing breach of the 

noncompetition provision but also the actual damages, “which are the 

natural and proximate results of the breach.” Johnson v. Jones, 1 Tenn. 

App. Rpts. 24, 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925). See also Baker v. Hooper, 50 

S.W.3d 463, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). This Court finds and concludes 

that the plaintiffs have been unable to meet their burden of proof as to any

actual damages from the defendant Kyle Bennett’s breach of the 

noncompetition provision.

Plaintiffs contend that the “only reasonable inference” to be drawn from the 

evidence presented was that the lost profits suffered by Top Gun were the result of Kyle 

Bennett’s competing business. We disagree. The evidence in the record from Mr. Day 

and Mr. Gibbons clearly demonstrates that Top Gun experienced a significant decline in 

business following its sale to Mr. Gibbons and that such decline occurred immediately 

after the sale. However, the evidence presented fell short of demonstrating that Kyle 

Bennett’s competition was the reason for such decline.

Mr. Gibbons acknowledged that he purchased Top Gun without performing any 

due diligence and having no familiarity with the vehicle suspension system industry. 

Furthermore, Mr. Gibbons stated that he believed Top Gun was financially successful 

because Ms. Cox and Kyle Bennett enjoyed a lavish lifestyle. According to the testimony 

of Mr. Gibbons at trial and the deposition testimony of Mr. Browning, Top Gun actually 

ceased operations prior to the STA’s execution because there was no money to pay 

employees or vendors. Mr. Gibbons asserted that he then began paying off Top Gun’s 

debts, ultimately expending over two million dollars on such payments.

Mr. Gibbons testified that following his purchase of Top Gun, the company lost 

the business of certain car dealers with whom Top Gun had previously done business. 

However, Mr. Gibbons could not say definitively whether this loss of business was the 

result of any competition by Kyle Bennett. Mr. Gibbons stated that Mr. Browning was 

untruthful in his deposition when Mr. Browning claimed that Top Gun failed to pay 

certain vendors after Mr. Gibbons purchased the company and thus could not acquire 

needed parts or complete orders in a timely fashion. 

Mr. Day testified that Top Gun lost significant profits following its sale to Mr. 

Gibbons and that such decline occurred immediately after the sale occurred. Notably, 

Mr. Day could not attribute the losses to any particular cause. Mr. Day opined that he did 

not believe the change in ownership would have caused the decline despite Mr. 

Gibbons’s lack of experience with Top Gun’s industry or with internet sales. However, 

Mr. Day, having previously performed accounting work for Top Gun when it was owned 

by Kyle Bennett and Ms. Cox, described Kyle Bennett as “brilliant,” a “shrewd 

businessman,” and an “enthusiast” in Top Gun’s industry of vehicle suspension systems. 
- 21 -

As proof concerning Kyle Bennett’s competition with Top Gun, Kenneth Bennett 

stated that Kyle Bennett had been working with a friend in Bristol, Tennessee, making 

suspension parts for “monster” and “baja” trucks when Kenneth Bennett decided to start 

a limited liability company physically located in Maryville, Tennessee, called, “KJB, 

LLC,” and operating as “Boost Performance” and later “Stealth Suspensions.”3 Kyle 

Bennett and Kenneth Bennett worked together in Stealth Suspensions thereafter, with 

Kenneth acting as chief manager and Kyle performing most of the day-to-day operations. 

Exhibits in the record demonstrate that the LLC was formed in July 2013, although a 

lessor’s letter entered as an exhibit at trial references a lease having been entered into by 

Stealth Suspensions in June 2013. Ergo, as the trial court found, Kyle Bennett’s 

acknowledged competition with Top Gun in violation of the Noncompete Clause began 

approximately seven months after the sale of Top Gun to Mr. Gibbons in contrast to Mr. 

Day’s testimony that Top Gun began to suffer significant losses immediately after Mr. 

Gibbons purchased the business. 

Based on the proof presented, we agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs failed to 

prove actual damages resulting from the breach of the Noncompete Clause. As this Court 

has previously clarified: “Lost or expected profits are recoverable as damages if they are 

shown to be a consequence of the breach [of a noncompete clause], provided the amount 

can be proved with reasonable certainty.” Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added). Additionally, “[a] plaintiff seeking lost profits bears 

the burden of proving the amount lost with reasonable certainty, and that the loss was a 

direct consequence of defendant’s breach.” Hurst Co., Inc. v. Bituminous Ins. 

Companies, No. 03A01-9707-CH-00304, 1998 WL 283069, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

28, 1998) (citing Lamons v. Chamberlain, 909 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). 

Moreover, “[w]hether a breach of contract was the proximate cause of lost profits is a 

question of fact.” See Hurst, 1998 WL 283069, at *5.

Although Mr. Day’s testimony did demonstrate that Top Gun suffered lost profits, 

it did not prove that those lost profits were the consequence of Kyle Bennett’s breach of 

the Noncompete Clause. Other facts were shown that also could have contributed to the 

losses, such as Mr. Gibbons’s unfamiliarity with the industry, Top Gun’s cash flow issues 

and lack of capital, and Kyle Bennett’s withdrawal from the business. Moreover, 

Plaintiffs failed to explain why Top Gun’s losses occurred immediately following the sale 

despite the fact that the Bennetts’ competing business in Blount County was not 

established for approximately seven months. Based on the lack of causation shown, we 

 

3 We note that the Noncompete Clause specified that only competition within 100 miles of Blount 

County, Tennessee, would be considered a breach thereof. No argument has been presented that work 

performed in Bristol would fall within the Noncompete Clause’s geographic parameters.
- 22 -

conclude that the trial court did not err in assessing only nominal damages for Kyle 

Bennett’s breach of the Noncompete Clause.

4

Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by ignoring evidence of Kyle 

Bennett’s alleged fraudulent conduct, such as Mr. Browning’s testimony that Kyle 

Bennett told him in October 2012 that he was going to run Top Gun’s business “into the 

ground” before the STA was executed. We note, however, that Plaintiffs’ attorney 

stipulated during the second day of trial that Plaintiffs had asserted no claims of fraud or 

misrepresentation by Kyle Bennett concerning the STA. 

Plaintiffs further contend that Kyle Bennett violated the duty of good faith and fair 

dealing with respect to the STA. See, e.g., Dick Broad. Co. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 

S.W.3d 653, 686 (Tenn. 2013) (“Tennessee law recognizes an implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing in every contract.”). Although the Bennetts posit that this claim 

was never mentioned until after the trial in this matter, Plaintiffs assert that the issue of 

good faith and fair dealing is not necessarily separate from a claim of breach of contract 

and does not have to be explicitly stated. Even assuming, arguendo, that such a claim 

was advanced at trial, it would not alter the fact that Kyle Bennett’s breach of the 

Noncompete Clause was not shown to be the proximate cause of Top Gun’s lost profits. 

We therefore find these arguments unavailing.

VII. Inducement of Breach of Noncompete Clause

Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred by dismissing their claim that 

Kenneth Bennett induced Kyle Bennett to breach the Noncompete Clause without 

making appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We note, however, that the 

trial court made the following findings and conclusions relevant to this claim:

This Court finds and concludes that the plaintiffs have been unable to meet 

their burden of proof as to any actual damages from the defendant Kyle 

Bennett’s breach of the noncompetition provision. Likewise, there is 

insufficient proof of any actual damages attributable to the tortious acts of 

defendant [Kenneth] Bennett in inducing or contributing to defendant Kyle

Bennett’s breach. Proof of damages is an inherent weakness in 

noncompetition cases often resulting in the issuance of injunctive relief as 

the preferable and only available remedy. See Johnson v. Jones, 1 Tenn. 

App. Rpts. 24, 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925) quoting Bradford & Carson v. 

Montgomery Furniture Co., 92 S.W. 1104, 1110 (Tenn. 1906) (quoting

“[t]he chief difficulty found in actions for breach of contract of this 

character is in ascertaining the damages which the plaintiff can recover, as 

 

4 As the trial court found, the Noncompete Clause had expired by the time of trial such that a grant of 

injunctive relief would have been ineffective.
- 23 -

they are generally uncertain, remote and speculative. For this reason, the 

most efficient remedy is an injunction inhibiting the defendant from again 

entering into the business he has contracted not to resume . . .”). However, 

the defendant Kyle Bennett has admitted that he violated the 

noncompetition provision, and previously in this case, admitted that he had

violated the temporary injunction issued in this case to prohibit him from 

violating the noncompetition provision. Since this litigation has been 

pending, the period of the noncompetition provision has expired rendering 

the injunctive relief moot. Without an award of nominal damages, the 

plaintiff, Jack Gibbons, will have suffered a wrong without a remedy. 

Accordingly, the Court will award nominal damages to the plaintiff, Jack 

Gibbons, from the defendant, Kyle Bennett, in the amount of $50.00. See 

Johnson v. Jones, 1 Tenn. App. Repts., at 28 (The plaintiff “must be 

prepared to prove such damages as the law recognizes or otherwise he can 

receive only nominal damages.”); see also Tenn. Juris., Damages, § 3. All 

other claims for breach or inducement to breach the STA, including but not 

limited to its noncompetition provision, will be dismissed.

Although the majority of the trial court’s findings pertain to Kyle Bennett and his 

breach of the Noncompete Clause, the trial court did clearly find, inter alia, that there 

was “insufficient proof of any actual damages attributable to the tortious acts of 

defendant [Kenneth] Bennett in inducing or contributing to defendant Kyle Bennett’s 

breach.” As the parties concede, the elements of a claim of inducement of breach of 

contract require proof of damages resulting from the breach much like the actual claim of 

breach. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 

Ergo, as with Plaintiffs’ assertion concerning Kyle Bennett’s breach of the Noncompete 

Clause, their claim that Kenneth Bennett induced such breach cannot be successful 

without evidence that the breach caused damages to Top Gun. Inasmuch as Plaintiffs 

failed to proffer sufficient proof, their claim of inducement to breach the Noncompete 

Clause must also fail. Based on our review of the record and the trial court’s findings and 

conclusions, we affirm the trial court’s ruling concerning this issue as well.

VIII. Allocation of Court Costs

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in its allocation of court costs by 

assessing fifty percent of the court costs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that Kyle Bennett 

should have borne all court costs because of his breaches of the STA and violation of the 

court’s temporary injunction concerning non-competition. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, 

however, “[t]axation of court costs are normally within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and [the court’s] action on these issues will not be disturbed unless the record 

discloses a clear abuse of discretion or where such discretion is superseded by statute.” 

Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 

1993). Plaintiffs characterize themselves as the prevailing parties in this matter, noting 
- 24 -

that a “successful party in all civil actions is entitled to full costs” pursuant to Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 20-12-101 (2009).

As our Supreme Court has explained: “A court abuses its discretion when it 

causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal 

standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 

515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). In the case at bar, Plaintiffs were only partially successful in their 

claims against Kyle Bennett, resulting in a judgment for the proceeds from the sale of the 

Regal Drive Property and nominal damages of $50. Based on our thorough review of the 

record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its allocation of 

court costs.5 

IX. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. We 

remand this matter to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment and collection of 

costs assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellants, Jack W. Gibbons 

and Top Gun Customz, Inc.

 s/ Thomas R. Frierson, II

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

 

5 We note that in the argument section of their reply brief, Plaintiffs complain that there were unnecessary 

delays in this matter, resulting in the case being “strung out” at the trial court level. However, because 

Plaintiffs did not raise an issue in their statement of issues concerning this argument, we decline to 

address it. See Ethridge, 427 S.W.3d at 395 (“Issues not raised in the statement of the issues may be 

considered waived.”).