The Honor able J ames G. Carr, Senior United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Northe rn District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

File Na me: 11a0121n.06 No. 08-2111 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,
v. DERI C D. BALARK, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

OPI NI ON

Before: BOGG S and COOK, Cir cuit Judges; and CARR, D istrictJudge. * JAMES G. C ARR, Senior Distr ict Judge. De fe nd a nt D e ri c D. B a lark a pp eals h is

c on vic t i o n a n d m a n d a t o r y l i f e s e n t e n c e f

o r c o n s p i r a c y t o d i s t r i b u t e a n d p o s s e s s w i t h i n t e nt t o distribute coca ine, coc aine ba se, and othe r drug s. The sole issue o n ap p ea l i s whether the district court’s jury

instructions were so confusing or inade quate a s to constitute plain error

. For the re asons below, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. BACK GR OUND On Novembe r 7, 2007, a g rand jury returne d a superseding indictment char g ing B alar k and fi ve c o- de fe nd a nts wi th c on sp ir a c y to d ist ri bu te and po sse ss w ithint e nt to dist ri bu te fi ve kil og ra

ms or more of

coca ine, fifty

g rams or more of coc aine ba se, her oin, an d m ar i j u ana in violation of 212

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) , 841(b)( 1)(A) (ii) and ( iii), 841(b)(1) (C), and 841( b)(1) (D). The indictment lis te d te n o the r c o- c on sp ir a tor s. Four defe ndants pled g uilty pursuant to ple a ag ree ments. Ba lark and Anthony L loy d went to t ri a l. Be fore trial, the g overnme nt submit ted p ro p o s ed jury instructions. Bala

rk’s a nd L loy d’s

a tto rn e y s a c c e pte d th e se ins tr uc tio ns wi tho ut obj e c tio n. Ne ith e r te nd e re d an y pr op os e d in str uc tio ns . The e ight- day

trial beg an Apr il 22, 2008. Eightee n witness testified ag ainst Ba lark, stating the y ha d p ur c ha se d c oc a ine fr om h im o r h a d s e e n h im c oo kin g or se lli ngc oc a ine . M os t of the se wi t n es s es h ad m u l t i p l e pr i o r st at e co u rt co n v i ct i o n s ; s ev er al we re i n p ri s o n fo r f e d e r a l d ru gtr a ff ic kin g of fe ns e s. Many wi tne sse s a nti c ipate d that the g ov e rn me nt wo uld mov e to re du c e the ir sentenc es in retur

n for their trial testimony

. Two co- defe ndants, L arr

y Hooks and Sandra

J ones, testified for

the governme nt. During Hooks’s direc t examination, t he prose cutor a sked: Q. I n th a t a g re e me nt, did y ou pr omi se to c oo pe rate wi th t he Un ite d St a te s? A. Ye s. Q. And what— In y our mind, what does c ooperation mean? A. To tell my

part in this conspirac y , to tell the truth. Q. All rig ht. And what is y our under standing if y ou fail to tell the truth? A

. That m y plea w il l b e p u ll e d b a c k a n d Iw il l b e c h a r g e d

w it h th e o r ig in al crime. Q. And what e lse could y ou be cha rg ed with if y ou wer e to lie? A. Perjury

.3

Th e g ov e rn me nt a lso e sta bli sh e d th a t H oo ks ho pe d th e pr os e c uto r w ou ld f ile a mot ion to reduc e his sentenc e. A s imi lar c oll oq

uy oc c ur re d d ur ingJone s’ s d ir e c t e xami natio n: Q. An d w e c a me to a ple a a g re e me nt; is t

hat c or re c t? A. Ye s. Q. An d a s p a rt

of y ou r a g re e me nt, wh a t is y our un de rs tand ing that y ou have to do? A. Tell what I

know. Q. And is that tell the truth? A. Rig ht. Q. An d i n co n s i d er at i o n fo r th at , I l et y o u p l ea d t o a ch ar ge th at i s a le s s er ch ar ge tha n y ou we re or ig ina lly

c ha rg e d w ith , c or

re c t? A. Yes. The g overnme nt introduced Hooks’ s and Jones’s p l ea agreements without objection. Def ense c ounsel cross- examined both witnesses about their motivation to testify and bene fits they expected to re ceive

. Seven unindicted c o-conspirators also testified as go v er nment witnesses ag ainst Ba lark. El e ve n oth e r wi tne sse s pr ov ide d a dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n r e g a rd ingbo th d e fe nd a nts ’ i nv olv e me nt i n the B enton Har

bor drug trade. Most of t hese witnesses wer e lower -leve l drug deale rs who said they boug ht drug s from B alar

k or L loy d. Tw o w itn e sse s, Col lin s B oo ke r a nd B os ton Sa ms, a dmi tte d b e ingc ra c k u se rs and a dd ic ts. Both ha d g iven information to law e nforc ement about their drug source s after

being arr ested.4

During closing arguments, the prosec utor acknow ledg ed that the ca se wa s witness intensive and told the jury , “You g et to decide , y ou are fre e to believe ever y thing that a

witness say s, some of what that witness say s, or not hing that witness say s at all. Ag ain, y ou are the j udg e of the facts, y ou decide how cr edible the witnesse s are .” Th e pr os e c uto r m a de on e re fe re nc e duri ng c los ingargume nt t o th e c oo pe ratio n a g re e me nts : [Tomm y Ellis] worke d out a plea a g ree ment with the s tate invol ving the cra ck he ha d in his possession, and then he we nt to the gr and jury , and he was told if he tells the tr uth , n oth ingwo uld

be us e d a g a ins t hi m, t

hat h e wo uld

be a wi tne ss a

nd no t a de fe nd a nt. An d y ou

a re g oin g to b e ins tr

uc te d by the Judg e that th e re is a

bs olute ly nothing wr ong with that. That’s [sic] perf ectly acc eptable for the g overnme nt to offer deals to coope rate

. Ba lark’s counsel char acte rized the g overnme nt’s witnesses as “ convicted dr ug deale rs” a

nd urg ed the jury

to “think about whether they are cre dible or not, think about why they are here , what their [sic] b en efitting .” He also argued, “A ll of these g uy s are here to help themselves out. And

may be Di rt y M, our m a n M r. Cart e r, sa id it bes t, le t’ s fr y the g uy fr om Chic a g o, he is not on e of us . We don’t have a

ny loy alty to him.” Ba lark’s attorney pointed out that se vera l w itnesses had bee n in the same jails and sug g ested,

“ T h e y g e tt h e i r s t o r i e s t o g e t h e r . T h e y a l m o s t s o u n d l i k e t h e y s h a r e d s c r i p t s a tt i m e s , d i dn ’ tt h e y ?” L loyd’ s c ounsel c los e d a lon g sim ila r l ine s, de sc ri bin g the c oo pe ra tin g wi tne sse s a s “ mur de re rs , attempted murde rer s, robber s, users, abusers, m anipulators, perpetrators and predators” whom the g overnme nt had g iven “a license to lie.” Af te r c los inga rgume nts , th e jud g e ins tr uc te d th e jur

y . H e re min de d th e jur or s o f t he ir du ty to find the fac ts and to follow the law. The judge explained, “The la wy ers have talked a

bout the law5

duri ngthe ir

a rgume nts . Bu t if

wh a t th e y

sa id i s d if

fe re nt f ro m w hat I

sa y , y ou mus t f oll owwh a t I say . What I say

about the law c ontrols.” The judge ad v i sed that the indictment wa s not evidence of g uilt, and the defe ndants wer e presumed to be innocent unless and until the go v er nment prese nted evidenc e over coming the presumption of innoce nce. Th e jud g e e xpla ine d tha t the e vid e nc e in the c a se inc lud e d only wh a t the wi tne sse s sai d w hil e te sti fy ingun de r o a th, the e xhibi ts i n e vid e nc e , th e sti pu la tio ns of the lawy e rs , a

nd the fa c ts j ud ic ia lly noticed. The judge emphasized that “[n] othing e lse is evidence . The law y ers’ statements and

ar gu m en t s ar e n o tev i d en ce . T h ei r qu es t i o n s an d o b j ec t i o n s ar e al s o n o t ev i d en ce . M y l ega l ru l i n gs

are not evidence . And my comments and que stions are not evide nce.” Th e jud g e a lso a dd

re sse d f ind ing s o f c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne sse s, te lli ngthe jur or s to : Ask y ourself if the witness had a ny relationship t o the g overnme nt or the def endant or any thing e lse t o gai n o r l ose fr om the case that might influenc e the witness’ s t e s t i m o n y. Ask y ourself if the witness had any bias or prejudice or r eason f or testifying that mig h t c a u s e th e w it

n e s s to li e o r to s la

n t th e te s ti mo n y in f

a v o r o f o n e s id e or the other. Th e jud g e sp e c if

ic a lly a dd re sse d th e te sti mony of the g ov e rn me nt’ s c oo pe ra tin g wi tne sse s: You have hear d the testimony of num erous witnesse s who the g overnme nt has pr omi se d w ill no t be pr os e c ute d f or a dd iti on a l c ri me s in

e xch a ng e fo r t

he ir cooper ation. I t is permissible for the g overnme nt to make such a promise. B ut y ou should consider this test imony with more ca

ution than the testimony of other wi tn e s s e s . A n a d d ic t ma y h a v e a c o n s ta

n t n e e d f o r dr u g s , a n d f

o r mo n e y to buy drug s, and he ma

y also have — and m ay

also have a g reater fe ar of imprisonment beca use his supply

of drugs may be cut off. Think about these thing s and consider whether their testimony

may have be en influenc ed by

the g overnme nt’s promise. Do no t c onvic t th e de fe nd a nt b a se d o n th e un su pp or te d te sti mony of su c h a

wi tne ss standing alone, unless y ou believe the ir testimony bey ond a re asonable doubt.6

After instructing the j u ry , the judg e ca lled for a sidebar to a sk counsel if ther e we re a ny objections to the jury

instructions. There wer e none. Th e jur y re tur ne d g uil ty

ve rd ic ts f

or bo th d e fe nd a nts fo r c on sp ir a c y to d istri bu te a nd

to po sse ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te a c on tr oll e d s ubst ance. The jur y fo un d B a lark

c on sp ir e d to dis tr ibute a nd

to p os se ss w ithint e nt t o distri bu te fi ve kil og ra ms or mor e of c oc a ine , an d f if ty g ra ms or more of

coca ine base

. On Au g us t 18, 200 8, the c ourt se nte nc e d Ba lark to a mand a tor

y te rm of lif e imp ri so nme nt. He f iled a timely

notice of a

ppeal. DI SCU SSIO N I. Stand ard of Review A re viewing court may

reve rse a judgme nt only

if the jury instructions, vie wed as a w hole,

wer e conf using, misleading , and pre judicial. United St ates v. Gray , 521 F.3d 514, 540 ( 6th Cir. 2008). F ailure to objec t to instructions w aives the rig ht to asser t error on appea l. United States v. Hughes , 5 05 F .3 d 5 78 , 5 97 (6 th C ir . 200 7) . Thu s, we c a n r e vie w the jur y ins tr uc tio ns in t

his c a se only for plain e rror . Fe d. R. Crim. P . 52(b). E.g. , United States v. Thomas , 11 F. 3d 62 0, 62 9 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Simi larly , wher e counse l fails to reque st a jury instruction, we re view the omission for plain err or. United States v. Newsom , 452 F.3d 593, 605 ( 6th Cir. 2006). To demonstrate plain err or, B alar k must show: “1) an e rror 2) that is plain and 3) that seriously aff

ects his fundamental r ights.” United States v. Aaron , 590 F.3d 405, 408 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (c i t i n g United States v. Vasque z , 5 60 F .3 d 461 , 470 (6 th Cir . 200 9) ). I f he satis fi e s th e se c on dit ion s, thi s c ourt ha s d isc re tio n to “ c or

re c t th e e rr or

on ly if the e rr or se ri ou sly a ff e c te d the fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty

or public reputation of the judicial proce eding s.” Id. “ An ins tr uc tio n is no t pl a inl y

e rr on e ou s unle ss7

th e r e w a s a n e g r e g io u s e r r o r , o n e th a t d ir e c tl y le a d s to a mi s c a r r ia g e o f ju s ti c e . ” Un i t ed

States v. Y ang , 28 1 F .3 d 53 4, 55 1 (6 th Cir . 2 00 2) ; United States v. King , 169 F.3d 1035, 1040 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (q u o t i n g United States v. Busac ca , 863 F.2d 433, 435 ( 6th Cir. 1988)). Ba lark a sserts three bases f or finding plain err or: 1) the a ddict and ac complice/informa nt instructions were err oneous, conf using, a nd misleading ; 2) the cour t failed to provide a

cautionar y instruction reg arding“truthful testimony ag ree ments”; and 3) the jury instructions denied his rig ht to have the jur

y instructed on his theory

of the c ase. II. Add ic t a nd A c c om plic e -I nfor m antTe st im onyIns tr uc ti ons Ba lark c ontends that the district court mistakenly g ave a n addict-infor

mant instruction and failed to tell the jury

to view ac complice testimony with special c aution. Ba lark relies on a Ninth Circ uit case, Un ite d S tat es v . B urro ws , 36 F.3d 875 ( 9th Cir. 1994), to support his claim that it is err or t o g ive an addict ins truction absent evidence that witnesses we re drug addicts at the time of tr ial. B a lark mis re a ds Bu rro ws and the r ecor d. I n Bu rro ws , the wit ness t o whom the addict instruction re lated wa s the defe ndant. Id. at 878- 880. The c ourt noted that there was no indication that the def endant wa s a cur

rent drugaddict, rather than a r ecove ring addict. Id. The court found that the instruction risked unfa irly prejudicingthe jury ag ainst the defe ndant, but conclude d the er ror wa s harmless. Id. at 880. I n this case, the r ecor d showed that two witnesses, C ollins Booke r and Boston Sams, wer e addicts whe n they

we re arr ested a

nd beg an coope rating with law enf orce ment. They , not the defe ndant, as in Bu rro ws , wer e the subjec ts of the addict- informant instruction.Sixth C ir c uit Pa tte rn Cr imi na l Jur

y I ns tr uc tio n 7 .0 8 s ta te s: 1 (1) You have hear d the t estimony of _____. You have also hea rd that he w as involved with the same c rime that the de fenda nt is charg ed with committing. You should consider _____’s te stimony with more ca

ution than the testimony

of other witnesses. (2) Do not c onvict the def endant ba sed on the unsupported testimony of such a wi tne ss, sta

nd inga lon e , unle ss you

be lie ve his te sti mony

be y ond a

re a so na ble doubt. (3) The fac t that _____ has pleade d g uilty to a cr ime is not evidence that the d e f e n d a n ti s g u i l t y , a n d

yo uc a n n o tc o n s i d e r

t h i s a g a i n s tt h e d e f

e n d a n ti n an y w a y. 8 The re ading of the a ddict-informa nt instruction thus was prope r. This is so despite Ba lark’s

c on te nti on that B oo ke r a nd Sa ms we re so fa r re mov e d fr om the str e e t li fe that th e fe a r o f l os ingthe ir dr ugsu pp ly c ou ld n o lo ng e r a ff

e c t th e ir te sti mony . In a

ny e ve nt, thi s in str

uc tio n, wh ic h at m os t c a st

a sh a do w o ve r t

he se tw o w itn e sse s, a nd

no t th e de fe nd a nt, po se d n o d a ng e r o f p re jud ic e to h im. B a lark c la ims the dis tr ic t c ourt , inst e a d o f g ivi ngthe a dd ic t- inf or mant i ns tr

uc tio n, sh ou ld h av e re ad the Six th Circuit’s acc omplice-infor mant instruction. He a sserts that abse nt this ex act 1 ins tr uc tio n, the jur

y may have g ive n c o- c on sp ir a tor te sti mony imp ro pe r we ig ht a nd de c ide d h is guil t ba se d o n c o- c on sp ir a tor

a dmi ssi on s o f guil t. Neither the g overnme nt nor defe nse counse l r equeste d an ac complice- informant instruction. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio n to the jur

y no ne the le ss co mmunic a te d muc h, tho ug h ce rt a inl y no t a ll, that is in t he Pa tte rn

I ns tr uc tio n. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e tol d th e jur or s: Yo u h a v e h e a r d th e te s ti mo n y o f n u me r o u s w it n e s s e s th a t b e f

o r e th is trial wer e convicted of

a cr ime. This ear lier convic tion was broug ht to your attention only as a wa y of helping y ou decide how believable their testimony was. Do not use it for any other purpose . I t is not evidence of any thing e lse. The c ourt pointed out the relationship of a witness’s conviction to cre dibilit y . I t made cle ar that e vid e nc e a

bo ut t he wi tne sse s’ g uil ty

ple a s wa s no t e vid e nc e of a ny thi ng e lse

. Th is n e c e ssa

ri ly

e nc omp a sse s th e de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t.9

Nonethele ss, Ba lark, c iting dec isions by the Second a

nd Tenth C i rc u i ts, claims the court committed plain error

by failing to give Pattern Instruction 7.08. I n United States v. J

ones , 46 8 F .3 d 70 4, 70 9– 10 (1 0th Cir

. 20 06 ), th ree co -d e fe nd a nts chang ed their ple as to gu i l t y af t er six day s of testimony

and testified a g ainst the defe ndant. The Te nth Cir c uit no te d th a t a

dis tr ic t c ourt

may inf or m th e jur y of the c ha ng e of ple a an d a llo w this testimony , but “[ i ] n su c h c as es . . . c a uti on a ry ins tr uc tio ns lim iti ngthe jur

y ’s us e of the g uil ty plea to per

missibl e purpose s are critica l.” Id. at 709 (empha sis added). The need f or this cautionar

y i n s t r u c t i o n i s i n d e e d

c r i t i c a l w h e r e t h e c o - d e f

e n d a n t s ’ g u i l t y p l e a s a

r e s o s qu a r e l y b e f

o r e t h e j u r

y. The situation in Jones be a rs lit tle re se mbl a nc e to o ur c a se . H e re , th e dis tr ic t ju dg e e xpre ssl y

no tif ie d the jur

y of the re str ic tio ns on its c on sid e ratio n of the wi tne sse s’ g uil ty pleas . T he S ix th Circuit, moreover , has found that absent extraordinary circ umstances ( such as those in Jones ), more detailed instructions ar e not nece ssary wher e the court, as here , otherwise adequately instructed the jury to treat the w itnesses’ testimony with caution for othe r re asons. E.g. , Un ite d S tat es v . Ca rr , 5 F.3d 986, 992 ( 6th Cir. 1993). I n the S econd Circuit opinion to which the defe ndant points, Un ite d S tat es v . P ra wl , 168 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1999), counse l had re q u es t ed and the c ourt had de clined to g ive an instruction te lli ngjur or s n ot t o co ns ide r a c o- c on sp ir a tor ’s g uil ty

ple a a s e vid e nc e of

the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t. Thus, in light of c ounsel’s re quest and objec tion, the court applied a differ ent standard of revie w than the plain-e rror

standard w e apply

here

. This case more re sembles this court’s dec ision in United St a t es v. W h eaton , 517 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2008), which likewise i nvolved pl ain-e rror revie w. There, the de fenda nt challeng ed jury10

instructions nearly

identical to those at issue i n t h i s ca s e, ar g uing that the court should have highlig hted compensation paid to informants and included the acc omplice instruction. Id. at 363. The c ourt in W

heaton c ite d the us a g e no te s fo r the Pa tte rn I ns tr uc tio n 7. 08 , w hic h e xplic itl y state an a ccomplice instruction “ is not nece ssary if the jury has bee n instructed to treat the witness’s testimony with caution for othe r re asons.” Id. The court found no plain err or in the fa ilure to g ive

an unre quested a ccomplice -informa nt instruction because the district court “ clea rly instruct[ed] the jury that it was to view their testimony ‘with more c aution than the testimony of other w itnesses,’” Id. As noted, much that Ba lark c laims was missing wa s, in essence , in the court’s instruc tion. Juro rs we re on

no tic e a bo ut t he limit ed ut ili ty

of pr oo f o f w itn e sse s’ ple a s— name ly , to a sse ss

cre dibilit y

alone. The instructions, taken as a whole, f airly and ade quately

informed the jur

y of the various conside rations that it should take into ac count in weig hing te stimony . Thus, it is not err or, much less plain err or, for a court not to highlig ht mor e expli citly the cr edibility problems inhering i n a c c o mp l i c e t e s t i m o n y. B a lark ’s fi na l c on te nti on on thi s po int is that the dis tr ic t c ourt pla inl y e rr e d by fa il in g to instruct the jurors that some of the witnesses testified under a g rant of immunity

and they should not convict base d on those witnesses’ te stimony unless they

believed it beyond a re asonable doubt. Were ther e no other

instructions de scribing g rounds for assessing cre dibilit y , the def endant’ s contention might ha

ve some mer it. The district court, howe ver, told the juror s they had “he ard the testimony of numerou s wi tnesses who the g overnme nt has promised will not be prosec uted for

a dd iti on a l c ri me s in

e xch a ng e fo r t

he ir c oo pe ra

tio n” a nd the y

sh ou ld “ c on sid e r t

his te sti mony

wi th

more c aution than the testimony of other w itnesses.”11

The district cour

t further instruct ed t h e jury , “Do not convic t the defe ndant base d on the unsupported testimony

of such a witness standing alone, unless y ou believe the ir testimony bey ond

a re asonable doubt.” Th es e i n s t ructions g ave the jury ample g uidance about eva luating the cre dibilit y of the g overnme n t’s witnesses. The district c ourt’s instructions on addict and a ccomplice /informant testimony wer e not er

roneous, pr ejudicial, or misleading . I ts failure, in the fac e of silenc e on the pa rt of def ense c ounsel, to reque st an ac complice- informant instruction also wa s not plain error

.

III . I m plic it Vo uc hing or Bol st e r ing Ba lark a lleg es that the district cour t plainly err ed by failing to provide ca utionary instructions reg ardingthe prosec ution’s use of w i t n es s plea a g ree ments, proffe rs, immunity g rants, and the expe c tati o n o f f

u tu r e 5 K 1

. 1 o r Ru le 3 5 mo ti o n s . B a la r k d o e s n o t a

p p e a l o n g r o u n d s of improper

v o u c h in g , b u t r a th e r

a r g u e s th a t r e p e a te d

r e f e r e n c e s to th e r e qu ir e me n t t h a t w it n e s s e s “ te stify truthfully ” r e qu ir e d , a t a mi n im u m, a c a u ti o n a r y in s tr u c ti o n th a t t

h e ju r y

— a n d n o t t he g overnme nt—determines the c redibility of ea ch witness. As the Six th Circ uit r ec o gn i z ed in Un ite d S tat es v . Tr uji llo ,“[i] mproper vouc hing oc curs wh e n a pr os e c uto r su

pp or ts the c re dib ili ty

of a wi tne ss b y

ind ic a tin g a

pe rs on a l be lie f i n th e wi tne ss’

cre dibilit y

there by placing the pre stige of the off ice of the United States Att o rn ey behind that wi t n es s . ” 3 7 6 F. 3 d 5 9 3 , 6 0 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( q u o t i n g United States v. Martinez , 253 F.3d 251, 253–54). I mproper vouchi ng includes both “blunt comments [and] comments t hat imply that the prosec utor has spec ial knowledg e of f acts not in front of the jury .” Id. at 607–608

. S i m i l a r l y, “b o ls te r in g o c c u r s w h e r e th e p r o s e c u to r im p li e s th a t t

h e w it n e s s ’ te s ti mo n y

is c o r r o b o r a te d by12

evidenc e known to the g overnme nt but not known to the jury .” Id. at 6 0 8 (q u o t i n g Martinez , 253 F.3d at 253–54). The g overnme nt has the rig ht to inform the jury of agr eeme nts made with the witnesse s and their obl i gati ons under suc h ag ree ments. E.g. , United States v. Townsend , 796 F.2d 158, 162–63 (6th Cir. 1986). Refer

ring to such agr eeme nts in appropr iate cir cumstance s allows the prosec utor to deflec t defe ndant’s use of a plea ag ree ment to at t ac k the witness’s cr edibility

. United States v. Tocco , 200 F.3d 401, 416–17 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Al t h o u g h t h e g o v e r

n m e n tm a y

p r e s e n te v i d e n c e a

b o u ti t s w i t n e s s e s ’ p l e a

a g r e e me nts , including the ag ree ments themselves and the quid pro quo that testimony be truthful, the g overnme nt may not make “unne cessa rily repe titive refe renc es to truthfulness.” United States v. Thornton , 197 F.3d 241, 252 ( 7th Cir. 1999). I n Thornton , the Seventh Circuit ex p re s s ed co n ce rn about the duplicative admission of pro ffe r letters a nd plea a g ree ments where those documents conta ined repe ated ref

ere nces to the require ment of truthfulness. Id. Th e c ourt wa rn e d p ro se c uto rs to “ a vo id

un ne c e ssa

ri ly re pe tit ive re fe re nc e s to tr uth fu lne ss, ” no tin g“ [t]he re may c ome a da y in a no the r c a se when we find excessive the a dmission of proffer letters.” Id. Ex cessive r efe renc es t o a witness’s a g ree ment to tell the truth—particular ly wher e the conseque nces of ly ing are highlig hted—ca n have the same harmful e ffe cts as a pr osecutor’ s persona l observation or opinion of cre dibilit y or implication of corr oborating evidenc e. The implication of such refer ence s to truthfulness i s clea r: the witness testifying ha s not lost t he bene fit of the bar g ain, so the prosec utor wo u l d n o t al l o w t he testimony if she did not believe he was telling the truth. Cross-examination cannot eff ectively d i s p el this im plication, as pointing out the be nefits to show motive to lie sim ply

confirms the f

act that the w itness is sti ll rece iving the be nefit of the ba rg ain.Def ense c ounsel sug g ested at oral arg ument that juries be instructed that “the g overnme nt 2 has no spec ial knowledg e of the witness’s t ruthfulness” where plea ag ree ments with truth provisions have be en introduce d into e vidence

. I n such case s, it is g ood prac tice for a district judg e to deliver such a ca utionary instruction, expl aining that “truthful testimony ” provisions in plea a g ree ments are no t pr oo f a

nd sh ou ld n ot be c on sid e re d a s pr oo f that a wi tne ss is in f a c t te sti fy ingtr uth fu lly in w ho le 13 Repeating, a s with a drumbeat of i ncre asing intensity , the t ruthfulness provision wit ness by witness by

witness, and also i n t ro d u ci ng plea a g ree ments, proffe rs, and Rule 35 motions, might drown out other e vidence . But this was not a c ase in whic h the prosec utor, in eff ect, play ed Rave l’s Bo le ro . The prose cutor fe ature d the truthfulness provisions of p l ea agreements duringdirec t

e xami na tio n o f t wo of the wi tne sse s, Ho ok s and Jone s. I n c los ing , th e pr os e c uto r d id n ot r e fe r t o wi tne sse s’ a g re e me nts to c oo pe rate tr uth fu lly , b ut i ns te a d e mph a size d tha t it wa s th e jur

y ’s ro le to judge the cr edibility

of the witnesse s. I n Tru jil lo , in c ontrast, the prosec utor not only elicited testimony from witnesses re g arding their ag ree ments to tell the truth, but also stated i n her c losing that those same witnesses “ promised to be truthful and pr ovide complete inf ormation.” 376 F.3d at 608. One of the witnesses volunteer ed that she would be w illing to take a poly g raph te st to prove her truthfulness. The prose cutor in Tru

jil lo came far closer to making excessive re fer ence to truthfulness than the pros ec u t o r h er e. Even so, the c ourt in Tru jil lo , revie wing , as we do, for plain e rror , found no improper vouc hing or

bolstering . 197 F.3d at 252. Th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e fe re nc e s to tr uth fu lne ss in thi s c a se we re no t so re pe tit ive a s to c on sti tut e improper vouc hing. Plea ag ree ments cut both w ay s and can offe r usef ul opportunities for impugning witnesses who have sig ned them. See United States v. Townsend , 7 9 6 F. 2 d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1986). The pr osecutor’ s remar ks and exhibit s here serve d only to maintain the balanc e. 2or

in p a rt

. Had de fense counsel re quested such an instruction, and had the district c ourt ref used to g ive it, a differ ent result may have been war rante d. But althoug h it mig ht be g ood prac tice to offe r such an instruction, the district cour t’s failure to do so su a s

po ntedoes not constitute err or in this case. 14 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio ns c le a rl y

c on ve ye d t h a t th e de te rm inatio n o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty belong s to the jury alone. Nothing in the trial rec ord indicate s err or, let alone a plain er ror a ffe cting the defe ndant’s substantive rig hts or the fairne ss, integ rity , or public reputation o f t h e j u d i cial pr oc e ss. IV. Defense Theory Ba lark a rg ues that the district cour t’s instr u ct i ons denied him his rig ht to have the jury instructed as to his theory of the c ase. That theory , as cle arly expressed in his counsel’s c losing statement, is that “all of the cooper ating witnesses fr om Be nton Harbor , many of whom we re house d toge ther, g ang ed up on the outsider f rom Chicag o . . . and fa bricated their testimony .” Counsel prese nted this theory

during opening statement, cr oss-examinations, and closing a rg ument. Ba lark’s counsel did not reque st a jury instruction on this t heory

. B a lark no w ta ke s is su e wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio n r e g a rd ingthe lawy e r’ s argume nts

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y , “ Th e lawy e rs have ta lke d a bo ut t he law d ur ingthe ir

a rgume nts

. But if what they

said is differ ent from what I say , y ou must follow what Isay . What I say about the law contr ols.” Ba lark contends that this instruction impermissibly minimi zes the signific ance of any

a rgume nt o r c la im m a de by de fe ns e c ouns e l. The instruction, take n direc tly from the Six th Ci rc u i t ’s P at tern Jury I nstruction 1.02, is an ind isp uta bly c or re c t st a te me nt o f t

he law. I t di d n ot u

nd e rcut th e a

bil ity of B a lark ’s a tto rn e y

to prese nt his theory

of the c ase. I t fairly

and ade quately

instructed the jury

on the applica

ble law.15 CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment.