AFFIRM; Opinion Filed October 31, 2013.

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01049-CR

No. 05-12-01050-CR

No. 05-12-01051-CR

No. 05-12-01052-CR

No. 05-12-01053-CR

No. 05-12-01054-CR

No. 05-12-01055-CR

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F09-24069-Q, F09-24070-Q, F09-24081-Q, F09-24091-Q,

F09-40606-Q, F09-40635-Q, F10-63192-Q

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Moseley, Lang, and Brown

Opinion by Justice Moseley

Lorenzo Demon Hicks appeals the adjudication of his guilt on six burglary offenses and 

his conviction on an unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (UUMV) offense. In each case, 

appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication of his guilt on the 

burglary cases and to support the new UUMV conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
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BACKGROUND

Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation in six cases. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (West 2011). The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt 

and placed appellant on ten years’ community supervision in each case. The State later filed 

amended motions to adjudicate, alleging appellant violated condition (a) by committing the

UUMV and an assault involving family violence offense, condition (f) by failing to work at 

suitable employment, condition (h) by failing to pay court costs and fines, condition (k) by 

failing to pay Crime Stoppers, and condition (o) by failing to pay restitution. In a hearing on the 

motions to adjudicate and the new UUMV offense, appellant pleaded not true to all of the 

allegations in the motions to adjudicate, and not guilty to the new offense.

Dallas police officer Kerry Willis testified that on November 25, 2010, he was on a call 

with a trainee at an apartment complex when a black Nissan Altima collided with his patrol car. 

Appellant, who was alone in the Altima, said the vehicle belonged to a friend of his who had let 

him drive it. When Willis checked appellant’s identification, he learned appellant had several 

outstanding warrants. Willis arrested appellant, then checked the vehicle’s ownership. Willis 

discovered the vehicle was registered to Selena Ponce, and she had reported it stolen on 

November 21, 2010. Willis testified there was only very minor damage done to the vehicle, and 

he did not recall seeing any items inside the vehicle.

Selena Ponce testified she owned a black Nissan Altima. The vehicle had a push-button 

ignition that worked as long as a “key pad” was within five feet of the vehicle. On the evening 

of November 20, 2010, she attended a party and returned home late. She parked her car in her 

driveway rather than pulling it into the garage. The next morning, she discovered her car was 

missing. She immediately called the police and reported it stolen. Ponce testified she may have 
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left the key pad inside the unlocked car. A few weeks later, Ponce was able to get the car from 

impound. Ponce testified several items that were inside the car when she parked it in her 

driveway were missing, including a laptop computer that was on the backseat, a cooking pan and 

toaster that were in the trunk, and her deceased brother’s rosary that had hung on the rearview 

mirror. Ponce testified that while she waited outside the courtroom before the hearing began, 

appellant walked up to a woman who had accompanied Ponce to the hearing and said, “Your 

boyfriend Jose let me borrow your car.” Ponce testified she does not know Jose; her boyfriend’s 

name is Luis Perez, who drove his own vehicle, a Lincoln Navigator; and Perez did not live with 

her. Ponce testified she had never seen appellant before and never gave appellant consent to use 

her car, and Perez did not have authority to loan her car to anyone.

Appellant testified he got permission to drive the Altima from Ponce’s boyfriend “Jose 

Perez.” Appellant testified he is a barber and had been cutting Jose’s hair since 2007. He had 

seen Jose drive the Altima and had also seen Ponce drive it. According to appellant, he went to 

Jose’s house sometimes to cut Jose’s hair, and Jose would tell Ponce to stay in the house. 

Appellant would cut Jose’s hair in the garage and never went inside the house. Appellant 

admitted he was driving the vehicle on November 25, 2010 when he collided with a patrol car at 

his apartment complex.

During cross-examination, the trial judge announced she would take judicial notice of a 

letter that appellant wrote to her in which appellant stated, “My friend, Jose Lopez, let me use his 

car to take care of some things that I put off due to not having my own vehicle.” The judge 

questioned appellant as to why his letter names the person who allegedly gave him permission to 

use the car Jose Lopez and his testimony said the person’s name was Jose Perez? Appellant 

responded that he was in jail at the time he wrote the letter and simply wrote the wrong name. 
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Appellant testified Jose gave him permission to use the car on November 21, 2010, but Jose 

never said to return the car on a specific date. Appellant testified a friend gave him a ride to 

Jose’s house and the vehicle was parked in the driveway in front of the garage. The key pad was 

on the side of the garage on the ground, which is where Jose said he would put it for appellant. 

When asked by the trial court to describe Jose, appellant described Jose as being in his twenties, 

wore Versace glasses, had “weight on him,” had black hair and mustache, wore his hair in a 

“bald fade,” and stood about five feet, seven inches tall.

Ponce was recalled and questioned by the trial judge about her boyfriend Luis Perez. 

Ponce testified Perez was five feet, eight inches tall, wore his hair in a “fade,” wore prescription 

eyeglasses had a mustache, and was twenty-four years old. Ponce testified that Perez never lived 

with her, and at the time her vehicle was stolen, Perez lived with his mother. Ponce testified her 

brother Thomas always cut Perez’s hair either at their mother’s home or at Thomas’s house. 

Ponce also testified that a few times Thomas came to Ponce’s house and cut Perez’s hair in the 

dining room. Ponce testified no one ever cut hair in her garage.

Community supervision officer Harold Martin testified that at the time the motions to 

adjudicate were filed, appellant was delinquent in paying fees and restitution, and he was not 

employed. Brittany Metzger testified about an alleged assault where appellant threatened her 

with a knife.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty of the UUMV and 

found the allegations regarding the UUMV and failure to pay restitution true. The trial court 

sentenced appellant to two years’ confinement in a state jail on the UUMV, and twenty years’ 

imprisonment on each of the burglary cases.
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LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY

In his one issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove he was 

guilty of UUMV. Appellant asserts there was no evidence he intentionally and knowingly drove 

Ponce’s vehicle without her permission; Ponce’s boyfriend gave him permission to use the 

vehicle; and he raised a “plausible defense of mistake of fact” because he believed he had the 

owner’s permission to use the vehicle. The State responds that the evidence is legally sufficient 

to support appellant’s UUMV conviction.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We must defer to the jury’s 

credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or 

knowingly operated another’s motor vehicle without the effective consent of the owner. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a). Thus, the State was required to show not only that appellant 

intentionally or knowingly operated the vehicle, but that appellant knew he did not have the 

owner’s consent. McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

Testimony that the owner did not give consent to operate his vehicle can be sufficient to 

support a finding that an appellant knew he did not have consent to operate the vehicle. Id. at 

604–605. When an appellant asserts a mistake-of-fact defense concerning the circumstances 

surrounding the operation of a vehicle, the fact finder is free to reject the evidence. Id.; see also 
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Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding trier of fact is the judge of 

the facts, credibility of witnesses, and weight to be given testimony).

Here, the trial court heard Ponce’s testimony that she had never before seen appellant and 

did not give him consent to take her vehicle. Ponce testified she may have left the key pad in her 

unlocked vehicle the day it was stolen. Appellant, conversely, testified that Ponce’s boyfriend 

Jose gave him permission to use the vehicle, he often cut Jose’s hair in the garage where the 

vehicle was parked, and he found the key pad to the vehicle on the side of the garage on the 

ground, which is where Jose said he would leave it for appellant.

It was the trial judge’s role, as the fact-finder, to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. See 

Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Viewing the evidence under the proper 

standard, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

operated the motor vehicle without the owner’s effective consent. Thus, the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the conviction for UUMV. We resolve appellant’s issue against him.

REVOCATION AND ADJUDICATION OF GUILT

In each case, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his 

community supervision and adjudicating his guilt because the evidence is legally insufficient to 

prove he was guilty of committing the UUMV offense.

Appellant review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would 

create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763–64.
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We have already determined the evidence is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to 

support the conviction for UUMV. We likewise conclude the State proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence that appellant committed the new UUMV, in violation of condition (a) of his 

community supervision. See id. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is 

sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1980). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating 

appellant guilty. We overrule appellant’s six issues challenging the adjudication of his guilt.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in each case.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

121049F.U05
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01049-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-24069-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01050-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-24079-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
-10-

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01051-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-24081-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01052-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-24091-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01053-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-40606-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01054-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F09-40635-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE
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Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT

LORENZO DEMON HICKS, Appellant 

No. 05-12-01055-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

F10-63192-Q).

Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, 

Justices Lang and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered October 31, 2013.

/Jim Moseley/

JIM MOSELEY

JUSTICE