[Cite as Wright v. Brice, 2021-Ohio-2246.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Geria Wright, : 

 Defendant-Appellee, : 

 No. 20AP-320 

v. : (M.C. No. 20CVH-8760)

Village of Brice, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Plaintiff-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 30, 2021 

 

On brief: Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, LLC, Brian M. 

Zets, and Dale D. Cook, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Village of Brice, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Municipal Court dismissing the appeal of defendant-appellee, Geria Wright, from 

a hearing officer's finding of liability for a traffic ticket issued pursuant to appellant's 

speeding-camera civil-enforcement program. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} The facts and procedural history of this case were set forth in the municipal 

court's May 7, 2020 judgment entry as follows: 

This matter came before the Court for non-oral hearing upon 

the traffic law violation issued on 12/13/19 pursuant to Ohio 

Revised Code Section 4511.096. This is an alleged speeding 

violation as recorded by a photo-monitoring device. A record 

of the proceedings was not made. 

The Notice of Violation mailed to [appellee] contains citations 

to sections of the Ohio Revised Code which were amended, 

effective July 3, 2019. Under the former applicable code 
No. 20AP-320 2 

sections, namely O.R.C., sections 4511.093 et seq., there was a 

process in place for contested violations to be heard by an 

administrative hearing officer with the right to appeal the 

findings of that administrative hearing to the municipal or 

county court with territorial jurisdiction over the issuing 

authority. Under the current applicable code sections, the 

procedure was changed to require the local authority, if a 

ticket is issued, to file a certified copy of the ticket with the 

municipal or county court with jurisdiction over the civil 

action. ORC, Section 4511.096. Required procedure under 

the O.R.C. was not followed by [appellant]. 

* * * 

* * * The ticket mailed to [appellee] is deficient and does not 

comply with the current law. 

* * * 

In fact, according to [appellee] and the paperwork submitted, 

an administrative hearing was conducted, after which 

[appellee] came to this Court. It appears that [appellant] has 

completely ignored the current law, and is proceeding under 

the former statutes to avoid paying the filing fee at this Court, 

and also to continue to collect revenue illegally through a 

third-party vendor. 

As outlined above, [appellant] is not in compliance with 

several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code regarding traffic 

law photo-monitoring devices. Based upon the foregoing, and 

for good cause shown, it is hereby 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the [appellee] is found to be 

NOT LIABLE for the violation, and this case is hereby 

DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

(May 7, 2020 Jgmt. Entry at 1-2.) 

{¶ 3} The record in this case contains a copy of a traffic ticket issued to Christopher 

Wright, the owner of the vehicle appellee was operating on December 13, 2019, and a 

document entitled "Village of Brice Administrative Hearing Office," issued on January 22, 

2020. The administrative hearing officer found appellee "[l]iable" on her plea of no contest 

to a violation of R.C. 4511.21 and imposed a fine of $100. (Village of Brice Administrative 

Hearing Office at 1.) The record also contains a municipal court form wherein appellee 

indicates she appeared before a "[r]epresentative" of appellant and entered a plea of no 

contest to the violation alleged in the traffic ticket. (Mun. Ct. Form at 1.) In this document, 

signed by appellee, she claimed she asked the hearing officer for leniency, but he only 
No. 20AP-320 3 

lowered the fine from $125 to $100. Though a space reserved for a "Certificate of Service" 

appears at the bottom of the form, that portion of the form has been crossed out. 

{¶ 4} Following the issuance of the judgment entry on May 7, 2020, the municipal 

court clerk issued a "Notice of Court Order" to appellee, "Village of Brice c/o Brian Zets," 

and "John Mathys, Mayor of Brice." (Notice of Ct. Order at 1.) A copy of the May 7, 2020 

judgment entry is attached to each notice. 

{¶ 5} Appellant timely appealed to this court from the judgment entry of the 

Franklin County Municipal Court. Appellee has not participated in this appeal. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error: 

1. The trial court erred and violated the Village's procedural 

due process rights by declaring its photo enforcement 

program unlawful without giving the Village notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. 

2. The trial court erred in finding the Village's photo 

enforcement program unlawful without an evidentiary 

hearing or any evidence to support its judgment. 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. Appellant's Assignments of Error 

{¶ 7} In each of appellant's assignments of error, appellant argues that the 

municipal court committed reversible error in concluding appellant's speeding-camera 

civil-enforcement system is contrary to law. Appellant argues in support of the assignments 

of error that the municipal court violated its procedural due process rights. We find, 

however, a jurisdictional impediment precluded the municipal court from considering the 

merits of appellee's administrative appeal, including the question whether appellant's 

speeding-camera civil-enforcement system conflicted with existing statutory law. Thus, we 

agree with appellant the municipal court committed reversible error. However, in our view, 

the municipal court possessed inherent authority to vacate the administrative hearing 

officer's finding of liability but did not have jurisdiction to issue a judgment on the merits. 

{¶ 8} "Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power conferred on a court or adjudicative 

body to decide a particular matter on its merits and render an enforceable judgment over 

the action." Hulbert v. Buehrer, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-474, 2017-Ohio-844, ¶ 11, citing State 

ex rel. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-648, 2007-Ohio-3293, ¶ 22, 
No. 20AP-320 4 

citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. Subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. Gen. Elec. Co. at ¶ 15, 

citing State ex rel. Bond v. Velotta Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 418, 419 (2001). See also Rosen v. 

Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, ¶ 45; Burkart v. Burkart, 191 Ohio App.3d 

169, 2010-Ohio-5363, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). Furthermore, because a court cannot consider the 

merits of a case without subject-matter jurisdiction, it may raise the issue of subject-matter 

jurisdiction sua sponte. Hulbert at ¶ 11, citing Foreman v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common 

Pleas, 189 Ohio App.3d 678, 2010-Ohio-4731, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); State ex rel. White v. 

Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544 (1997) (subject-matter jurisdiction 

"may be raised sua sponte by an appellate court") (emphasis sic). 

{¶ 9} "A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void 

ab initio," and the "authority to vacate a void judgment * * * constitutes an inherent power 

possessed by Ohio courts." (Emphasis sic.) Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), 

paragraphs three and four of the syllabus. "[A] 'judgment' issued by a court that lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction is a nullity." Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Finney, 10th Dist. 

No. 13AP-198, 2013-Ohio-4884, ¶ 13, quoting Patton at 71. 

{¶ 10} In Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held municipalities may, pursuant to their home-rule authority under Article 

XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, impose civil liability on traffic violators through the use of 

automated red-light cameras. Id. at ¶ 3. The court ruled the ordinance in that case did not 

unlawfully usurp the jurisdiction of municipal courts over traffic violations. Id. at ¶ 22-25. 

The court further held that municipalities' home-rule authority permitted them to establish 

civil administrative proceedings that must be exhausted before traffic violators may pursue 

judicial remedies. Id. at ¶ 26-28. 

{¶ 11} The version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) that was in effect at the time Walker was 

decided did not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving trafficcamera citations. Id. at ¶ 1-3. Following the decision in Walker, the General Assembly 

passed H.B. No. 62, which amended R.C. 1901.20 along with numerous traffic-related 

provisions in R.C. Chapters 4511 and 5747. As amended, R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) now states that 

municipal courts have "exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action concerning a violation 
No. 20AP-320 5 

of a state traffic law or a municipal traffic ordinance." (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Magsig 

v. Toledo, 160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 12} In Magsig, relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the city of Toledo 

from conducting an administrative hearing to adjudicate her liability for violating a 

municipal traffic ordinance. Relator argued the city patently and unambiguously lacked 

jurisdiction to carry out its red-light and speeding-camera civil-enforcement system 

because R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) expressly vested exclusive jurisdiction over non-criminal 

traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts. The Magsig court held the city's 

ordinance, which permitted an administrative hearing officer to adjudicate non-criminal 

traffic-law violations, contravened the statute's plain language, and the city lacked authority 

to permit an administrative hearing officer to exercise quasi-judicial power in carrying out 

the city's red-light and speeding-camera civil-enforcement system. Id. at ¶ 8. In so holding, 

the Magsig court found as follows: "The current version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) clearly and 

unambiguously reserves for municipal courts exclusive authority to adjudicate every civil 

traffic-law violation. And that statutory grant of jurisdiction 'cannot be impaired or 

restricted by any municipal charter or ordinance provision.' " Id. at ¶ 11, quoting Cupps v. 

Toledo, 170 Ohio St. 144, 151 (1959). Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued the requested 

writ prohibiting the city of Toledo from conducting further administrative hearings because 

Toledo Municipal Code 313.12 contravened the plain language of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1). 

Magsig at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 13} In so ruling the Magsig court noted: 

Toledo does not claim that the exclusive-jurisdiction clause of 

R.C. 1901.20(A) itself violates the Constitution. To the 

contrary, the authority of the General Assembly to set the 

jurisdiction of the municipal courts is undisputed. 

Magsig at ¶ 16.1

1 Subsequent appellate court decisions have held the exclusive jurisdiction clause of R.C. 1901.20(A), as 

enacted by H.B. No. 62, does not violate either the home rule or one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. See

Newburgh Hts., et al. v. State, 8th Dist. No. 109106, 2021-Ohio-61, appeal accepted, 162 Ohio St.3d 1437, 

2021-Ohio-1399; Dayton v. State, 2d Dist. No. 28818, 2021-Ohio-967. We offer no opinion regarding the 

constitutionality of the exclusive jurisdiction clause of R.C. 1901.20(A). The question whether other 

substantive provisions of H.B. No. 62 are constitutional is pending in the Supreme Court. See Newburgh Hts.,

2021-Ohio-1399. 
No. 20AP-320 6 

{¶ 14} The reverse side of the traffic ticket issued to appellee sets forth the procedure 

for contesting liability, in relevant part, as follows: 

CONTESTING THE TICKET: The person * * * ticketed has 

the right to contest the ticket and right to due process. ORC 

4511.098(A)(5) You may contest the ticket by filing a 

written request for an administrative hearing to review the 

ticket. The person * * * shall file the written request not later 

than 30 days after the receipt of the ticket. The failure to 

request a hearing within this time period constitutes a waiver 

of the right to contest the violation and ticket, and is deemed 

to constitute an admission of liability and waiver of the 

opportunity to contest the violation. 

(Emphasis added.) (Dec. 13, 2019 Notice of Violation at 2.) 

{¶ 15} Appellant's speeding-camera civil-enforcement system permits an 

administrative hearing officer to adjudicate non-criminal traffic-law violations in 

contravention of the plain language of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), as amended by H.B. No. 62. 

Pursuant to amended R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) and the Magsig decision, appellant lacked 

authority to permit an administrative hearing officer to exercise quasi-judicial power in 

carrying out the speeding-camera civil-enforcement system. Thus, the administrative 

hearing officer who exercised quasi-judicial power in this case patently and unambiguously 

lacked jurisdiction to find appellant liable for the violation alleged in the ticket and impose 

a fine. Because the administrative hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to issue the January 

22, 2020 order, the order was a nullity without legal force and effect. Accordingly, we agree 

with the municipal court that appellee cannot be held liable on the ticket, albeit for different 

reasons than those expressed by the municipal court. 

{¶ 16} We nevertheless find the municipal court erred to the extent that it 

determined other substantive provision of appellant's speeding-camera civil-enforcement 

system were contrary to law. "Ohio courts have ' "inherent power to vacate a void judgment 

because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity." ' " 

Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Kramer, 193 Ohio App.3d 140, 2011-Ohio-1408, ¶ 31 (2d 

Dist.), quoting Ohio Receivables, LLC v. Landlaw, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0053, 2010-Ohio1804, ¶ 7, quoting Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St.2d 31, 36 (1966). Reviewing courts 

do not, however, have jurisdiction to address the merits of an appeal from a void judgment. 

See Ohio Receivables at ¶ 7. See also Hulbert, 2017-Ohio-844, ¶ 12; Foreman, 2010-Ohio-
No. 20AP-320 7 

4731, ¶ 12; White, 79 Ohio St.3d at 544. " 'When an appellate court determines that the trial 

court was without jurisdiction, it is not proper for the reviewing court to decide the merits 

of the case.' " Stancourt v. Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 164 Ohio App.3d 

184, 2005-Ohio-5702, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), quoting Eagle Fireworks, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 

Commerce, 4th Dist. No. 03CA28, 2004-Ohio-509, ¶ 7, appeal not allowed, 102 Ohio St.3d 

1472, 2004-Ohio-2830. See also Perfection Graphics v. Sheehan, 11th Dist. No. 93-G-1776 

(Mar. 3, 1995) ("once an appellate court determines that the trial court was without 

jurisdiction to hear the merits of a case, its own jurisdiction comes to an end," and "[the 

appellate court] cannot review the actual merits of a decision"). 

{¶ 17} In this case, appellee did not invoke the municipal court's exclusive 

jurisdiction under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1). Rather, appellee attempted to invoke the municipal 

court's jurisdiction by employing an administrative appeal procedure that had been 

previously superseded by the amendment to R.C. 1901.20(A)(1). Under the particular 

circumstances of this case, we believe appellee's purported appeal should have been 

construed as a common-law motion to vacate a void judgment. Green Tree Servicing at 

¶ 30 (treating a motion for reconsideration as a common-law motion to vacate a void 

judgment where it was filed after the trial court issued a void judgment); Columbus, Div. of 

Income Tax v. Yockey, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-559, 2020-Ohio-3290, ¶ 13 (common-law 

motion to vacate is the proper procedural device to challenge a void judgment after the 

appeal time has run). See also Patton, 35 Ohio St.3d at 70 ("[T]he authority to vacate a void 

judgment is not derived from Civ. R. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent power 

possessed by Ohio courts."). As such, the only relief the municipal court was authorized to 

provide appellee was a judgment vacating the hearing officer's order for the lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Stancourt at 192; Patton at paragraphs three and four of the syllabus. 

The municipal court was not authorized, in ruling on appellee's motion, to pass judgment 

on the validity of other substantive provisions of appellant's speeding-camera civilenforcement system. Green Tree Servicing at ¶ 31; Ohio Receivables at ¶ 7. Accordingly, 

to the extent that the May 7, 2020 judgment entry of the municipal court can be construed 
No. 20AP-320 8 

as a declaration that appellant's speeding-camera civil-enforcement program is contrary to 

law, the municipal court was without jurisdiction to issue such a declaration in this case.2

{¶ 18} Because we agree with appellant that the municipal court committed 

reversible error when it ruled on the merits of appellee's administrative appeal, we sustain 

appellant's two assignments of error without specifically addressing the due process 

arguments raised therein. The judgment of the municipal court shall be reversed, and the 

case shall be remanded for the municipal court to issue a new judgment vacating its May 7, 

2020 judgment entry and vacating the administrative hearing officer's order for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 19} Having sustained appellant's two assignments of error on jurisdictional 

grounds, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court. This cause is 

remanded for the municipal court to vacate its May 7, 2020 judgment entry and issue a new 

judgment entry vacating the administrative hearing officer's January 22, 2020 order for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

Judgment reversed; 

cause remanded with instructions.

DORRIAN, P.J., and BEATTY BLUNT, J., concur. 

_____________ 

2 "There is nothing in [R.C. 1901.18] which gives the Municipal Court the general power to render declaratory 

judgments or to determine the validity of an ordinance outside the exercise of its specific jurisdictional areas." 

State ex rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine Mun. Court, 12 Ohio St.2d 26, 27-28 (1967). Here, the municipal court 

did not obtain jurisdiction under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1), the specific jurisdictional area involved in this case.