NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LES HELGESON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TILLAMOOK COUNTY; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 14-35459 

D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01222-PK 

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2017 

Portland, Oregon

Before: FISHER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN,** District 

Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Les Helgeson appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Tillamook County, 

Tillamook County Sheriff Andy Long, and former County Sheriff Todd Anderson 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the 

District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

(collectively, “Defendants”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we affirm.1

1. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on 

Helgeson’s substantive due process claim because he had not established a 

constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Even assuming a cognizable 

property or liberty interest, however, Helgeson cannot meet his “‘exceedingly high 

burden’” of showing executive action that “rises to the level of the constitutionally 

arbitrary.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Matsuda v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 512 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

Specifically, Helgeson cannot show that Defendants’ conduct “amount[ed] to an 

‘abuse of power’ lacking any ‘reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 

governmental objective.’” Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 

846 (1998)). Based on the information available to them, Defendants acted to 

protect the public from a perceived risk, as permitted by Oregon law. See OR. REV.

STAT. § 166.293(2), (3)(a) (2016). Reasonable minds might disagree about 

whether that perception was justified, but no reasonable juror could conclude that 

there was no legitimate governmental objective at stake or that there was not a 

 

1

In addition to asserting the substantive due process and equal protection claims 

we address here, Helgeson initially alleged that Defendants had contravened his 

Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Helgeson has elected not to 

pursue that claim further in light of Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
 3 

reasonable relation between that objective and the sheriffs’ actions. Accordingly, 

we conclude that summary judgment was warranted.2 See Shanks, 540 F.3d at 

1088-89.

2. The district court also granted summary judgment for Defendants on 

Helgeson’s claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws because he was 

singled out for differential treatment as a “class of one.” As an initial matter, 

Helgeson’s claim fails as to the individual Defendants because there is no evidence 

that the sheriffs personally participated in the alleged differential treatment. See 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor has Helgeson shown 

that he was treated differently than similarly situated persons. See Gerhart v. Lake 

Cty., 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011). To the contrary, Helgeson argues that 

he was treated differently than a person who was dissimilarly situated. Cf.

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Evidence of 

different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim.”). 

In any event, a class-of-one claim cannot be based on executive actions that “by 

their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on . . . subjective, 

individualized assessments,” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603-04 

 

2 To the extent Helgeson’s claim could be construed as a procedural due process 

challenge, he explicitly waived any such claim in his reply brief. Moreover, 

Helgeson successfully availed himself of the state’s appeal process and obtained a 

new CHL. 
 4 

(2008), as did the challenged decisions in this case.

AFFIRMED.