[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-14805

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60028-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ROBERT JACKSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(June 23, 2017)

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Robert Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion to modify several conditions of his supervised release pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to modify because it failed to provide adequate 

reasoning for the denial, and because it failed to consider the appropriate factors 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Jackson also argues that several of the conditions he 

sought to have modified or removed were substantively unreasonable or 

unconstitutional and were levied in a procedurally unreasonable manner. Upon 

review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I.

We have not yet addressed the standard of review for an appeal of the 

district court’s order regarding a modification of supervised release, pursuant to 

§ 3583(e)(2). But we review an analogous statute—the denial of a motion to 

modify a condition of probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c)—for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Because modifications of supervised release are similar to modifications of 

probation, we apply the same abuse of discretion standard here. “We will reverse 

only if we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a 

clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” United States v. Taylor, 338 

F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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II.

Jackson first argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release because it failed to 

consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors and it failed to adequately explain the 

denial. A district court may modify the conditions of a term of supervised release 

after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). It 

is sufficient if the record shows that the district court considered the § 3553(a)

factors, even if the court failed to explicitly mention them. See United States v.

Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court 

necessarily considered the § 3553(a) factors by virtue of considering the 

defendant’s objections and motion, regardless of the district court’s failure to 

explicitly articulate that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motion to 

modify the conditions of his supervised release. Though the district court’s short 

order makes no reference to the § 3553(a) factors, it was not required to state that it 

had explicitly considered them so long as the overall record reflected the court’s 

consideration of the factors, which it did here. See Dorman, 488 F.3d at 944. 

III.

Jackson also claims—for the first time on appeal—that the district court not 

only imposed unconstitutional and substantively unreasonable supervised release 

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conditions, but also that the district court imposed said conditions in a procedurally 

unreasonable manner. We have not yet addressed whether a defendant may 

substantively challenge the legality of the conditions of his supervised release 

through a motion to modify under § 3583(e)(2). However, the Second, Fifth, and 

Ninth Circuits have all held that § 3583(e)(2) may not be used in that way. See 

United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the plain 

language of § 3583(e)(2) indicates that illegality is not a proper ground for 

modification of a condition of supervised release); United States v. Hatten, 167 

F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court did not have 

jurisdiction to modify a condition of supervised release on illegality grounds);

United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that illegality 

was not a proper ground for modification of a supervised release term).1

Because Jackson failed to challenge the legality of the conditions below, his 

argument is subject to plain error review, a standard that he cannot overcome. See 

United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015). Regardless of 

whether we have jurisdiction to entertain Jackson’s arguments regarding the 

reasonableness and legality of the conditions of his supervised release, in the form 

of a motion to modify under § 3583(e)(2), the district court did not plainly err 

 1 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Gross, Congress intentionally limited the manner in which a 

defendant may challenge the legality of a supervised release condition to: (1) direct appeal; (2) § 

2255 relief; and (3) a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) filed within 14 days of the district 

court’s decision. Gross, 307 F.3d at 1044.

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because there is no precedent substantiating his arguments. See United States v. 

Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“An error is not plain 

unless it is contrary to . . . on-point precedent”). Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion to modify the conditions of his 

supervised release.

AFFIRMED.

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