SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

130 Nev., Advance Opinion Z 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

GABRIELA GONZALES-ALPIZAR, 

Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 

vs. 

EDWIN GRIFFITH, 

Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 

No. 59387 

FILED 

JAN 3 0 2014 

TH IE K LINDEMAN 

it fie H 

PUT R

Appeal and cross-appeal from a final determ iation r ' 

concerninga complaint for divorce. Second Judicial District Court, 

Washoe County;David A. Hardy, Judge. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

Richard F. Cornell, Reno, 

for Appellant/Cross-Respondent. 

Kristi Beth Luna, Reno, 

for Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 

OPINION 

Bythe Court, HARDESTY, J.: 

In this appeal, we address whether a spousal and child 

support order entered b ya familycourt in Costa Rica is enforceable in 

Nevada. The Uniform Interstate Famil ySupport Act (UIFSA), as enacted 

in Nevada, allows for the enforcement of a forei gn support order when the 

order is entered in a countr ythat is a recognized "state" under MRS 

Chapter 130. UIFSA sets forth three different methods b ywhich a foreign 

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country may be considered a "state" for purposes of enforcing that 

country's support orders. The first method clearly does not apply here, 

and we determine that neither of the other two methods authorizes the 

court to consider Costa Rica a state for UIFSA purposes. Pursuant to the 

second method, the Nevada Attorney General, under NRS 130.035(1), has 

not declared Costa Rica a foreign country in which reciprocal provisions 

will be made ensuring the enforceability of foreign support orders. 

Further, under the third method, the record fails to demonstrate, 

pursuant to NRS 130.10179(2)(a), that Costa Rica follows enforcement 

procedures that are "substantially similar" to those established under 

UIFSA. Accordingly, UIFSA does not require the district court to enforce 

the order. 

In addition to UIFSA, however, a foreign support order may be 

enforced under the doctrine of comity. We determine that, because the 

existence of the parties' premarital agreement was not disclosed to the 

Costa Rican court issuing the support order, the award for spousal support 

should not be recognized in Nevada as a matter of comity. The child 

support award may be recognized, however, and we remand for the district 

court to make factual findings on Griffith's claim that the child support 

was obtained through fraud because Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented 

Griffith's income and assets to the Costa Rican court. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Respondent/cross-appellant Edwin Griffith, a resident of Reno, 

met appellant/cross-respondent Gabriela Gonzales-Alpizar, a citizen and 

native of Costa Rica, when he went to Costa Rica to visit friends. In 1999, 

the two were married in Costa Rica. Prior to the marriage, the parties 

entered into a premarital agreement prepared by Griffith's counsel and 

signed by both Gonzales-Alpizar and her counsel Maria Fait-Shaw in 

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Costa Rica. Among other provisions, the premarital agreement waived 

any claim for alimony or spousal support, unless the divorce resulted in 

one party becoming eligible for public assistance support. It also provided 

that the laws of the State of Nevada would govern the premarital 

agreement's execution and performance, without regard to where the 

parties resided. 

After the parties were married, they returned to Reno with 

Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter Nicolle. Shortly thereafter, Gonzales-Alpizar 

gave birth to a son, Anthony Griffith-Gonzalez. Griffith and GonzalesAlpizar resided in Reno for over three years. In 2002, their relationship 

began to deteriorate. 

The family traveled to Costa Rica in February 2003, but 

Gonzales-Alpizar refused to return to Reno. Griffith returned alone, 

leaving Gonzales-Alpizar and the two children in Costa Rica. Griffith 

subsequently visited Costa Rica twice in 2003 and once in 2004. Griffith 

returned to Costa Rica one last time in February 2005, and the parties 

met to discuss a divorce settlement. 

Procedural history in Costa Rica 

2005 Costa Rican spousal and child support order 

At the commencement of the parties' divorce settlement 

discussions in Costa Rica, Griffith was allegedly served with notice and 

process of a Demand for Alimony, which as explained by Gonzales-Alpizar 

includes spousal and child support under Costa Rican law. The parties 

dispute what occurred and whether Griffith was actually served with 

process. According to Gonzales-Alpizar, after both she and her attorney 

explained to Griffith that he was being served with legal documents 

regarding alimony and child support, Griffith became very angry, threw 

the papers to the floor, and immediately left. According to Griffith, 

however, a stranger approached him in the waiting room of the attorney's 

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office and read aloud from paperwork in Spanish. Griffith did• not 

understand what the person was saying, and Gonzales-Alpizar refused to 

respond to his multiple requests to explain what was happening. He left 

the office with no paperwork and no explanation in English as to what was 

said. Gonzales-Alpizar's version is supported by a Costa Rican court 

officer's affidavit asserting that she served the• Demand for Alimony upon 

Griffith in an attorney's office, Griffith understood what the documents 

were, he refused to receive them, and he left immediately. 

Based on this alleged service and Griffith's failure to answer 

the complaint in a Costa Rican court, a default judgment was entered 

against Griffith in September 2005, which ordered him to pay $180 per 

month in spousal support, $235 per month in child support for Anthony, 

and an additional $235 per month in child support for Nicolle (2005 Costa 

Rican support order)) The support award was based on GonzalesAlpizar's representation of Griffith's earned income. Gonzales-Alpizar 

failed to disclose the terms of the premarital agreement to the court. 

2007 Costa Rican divorce decree 

In January 2006, Gonzales-Alpizar filed a complaint for 

divorce against Griffith in Costa Rica. After an initial, unsuccessful 

attempt to serve process of the divorce complaint, Gonzales-Alpizar 

obtained the Costa Rican court's permission to seek service of process 

upon Griffith through publication in Costa Rica, despite knowing that 

Griffith resided in Nevada and making no effort to notify him of the 

divorce proceedings. Gonzales-Alpizar's divorce complaint also failed to 

'Mc°lle is not Griffith's biological child. A dispute exists as to 

whether Griffith adopted Nicolle under Costa Rican law. 

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inform the Costa Rican court of the existence of the premarital agreement 

entered between the parties in August 1999. 

Griffith never responded to or appeared in the action, and in 

April 2007, the Costa Rican court entered a final divorce decree (2007 

Costa Rican decree), granting Gonzales-Alpizar's request for divorce and 

giving her custody of the two children with parental authority jointly held. 

The prior award of alimony and child support under the 2005 Costa Rican 

support order was confirmed. The parties were finally divorced under 

Costa Rican law in June 2007, when the decree was published in the 

"Boletin Judicial." 

Procedural history in Nevada 

Meanwhile, Griffith filed a complaint for divorce in Nevada in 

April 2007. 2Although a default divorce decree was initially entered, 

Gonzales-Alpizar successfully moved to set aside the default decree, and 

she filed an answer to Griffith's complaint for divorce in June 2010. At 

issue in the district court was whether the court had jurisdiction over the 

divorce proceeding, in light of the 2007 Costa Rican decree, and whether 

the court had authority to enforce the 2005 Costa Rican support order. 

The district court first found that because the parties had 

been effectively divorced under the 2007 Costa Rican decree, it was 

unnecessary to enter any decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony in 

Nevada. Nevertheless, the court determined that service of process was 

not valid in the Costa Rican divorce proceeding, and while the court had no 

2Griffith initially filed for divorce in Nevada in April 2006. 

However, the first divorce action was dismissed due to a lack of proper 

service. 

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authority to set aside that decree, the court would not enforce the spousal 

support and child custody provisions contained within it. 3 

As for the 2005 Costa Rican support order, the district court 

concluded that Griffith was served with notice and process in that 

proceeding. 4 The court found enforceable any support provision within 

that order, provided that the order is valid and enforceable under Costa 

Rican law. The district court also concluded that Costa Rica was the 

appropriate forum to determine the enforceability of the 2005 Costa Rican 

support order, including any defenses Griffith might have in that action, 

whether that order is still valid, or whether the 2007 divorce decree served 

to modify or vitiate it. The district court directed the parties to litigate 

those issues in Costa Rica, under the presumption that the district court 

would have authority to enforce the order once it was found to be valid and 

effective. The district court entered a final determination as to its 

jurisdiction over the matter, and both parties timely appealed. On appeal, 

Gonzales-Alpizar argues that the 2005 Costa Rican support order is 

enforceable in Nevada and that the support arrears should be reduced to 

3The parties do not challenge, and we do not address, the court's 

determination that the parties were effectively divorced under the 2007 

Costa Rican divorce decree. 

"The district court found that although Griffith 

certainly did not understand the Demand for 

Alimony because it was written in Spanish, he had 

resources with which to understand the document 

and retain legal assistance. [Griffith] was also on 

notice of the difficulties he could encounter. He 

married a woman from another country, in her 

country and acquiesced to her post-marriage 

presence in her home country. 

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judgment. 5Griffith asserts that the support order is unenforceable based 

on improper service of the Demand for Alimony and fraud in the 

procurement of the support order. 

DISCUSSION 

To resolve this appeal, we must determine whether the 2005 

Costa Rican support order is enforceable in Nevada either under the terms 

of UIFSA or under the doctrine of comity, both of which are issues of first 

impression. 

The 2005 Costa Rican support order is not enforceable under UIFSA 

UIFSA governs multiple jurisdiction involvement in child 

support issues, and its purpose is to ensure that only one child support 

order is effective at any given time. See Valle v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. , 

268 P.3d 1272, 1274 (2012). UIFSA has been codified in Nevada 

under NRS Chapter 130 and provides procedures for the enforcement and 

modification of a support order issued by another state. Under NRS 

130.10179(2), the term "state" is defined to include a foreign country if one 

of the following three conditions is met: (1) the country has been declared 

to be a foreign reciprocating country under federal law, (2) the state's 

attorney general has declared the country a "state" because it has 

reciprocal provisions ensuring the enforcement of support orders, or (3) the 

country has enacted law or established procedures for enforcing support 

orders that are substantially similar to those under UIFSA. See NRS 

130.10179(2). 

The parties do not dispute that Costa Rica has not been 

declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law. See NRS 

5Gonzales-Alpizar does not challenge the district court's finding that 

the 2007 Costa Rican decree is invalid as it relates to spousal and child 

support. 

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130.10179(2)(b). Thus, the first definition of "state" is not met. And, we 

turn to whether Nevada has declared Costa Rica a "state" for purposes of 

UIFSA. Gonzales-Alpizar argues that the 2005 Costa Rican support order 

is enforceable under UIFSA because Costa Rica constitutes a "state" 

pursuant to NRS 130.035(1). NRS 130.035(1) provides that "[w]hen the 

Attorney General is satisfied that reciprocal provisions will be made by 

any foreign country. .. . for the enforcement therein of support orders 

made within this State, the Attorney General may declare the foreign 

country . . . to be a state" as intended by NRS Chapter 130. 

We conclude that Nevada has not recognized Costa Rica as a 

"state" for purposes of UIFSA enforcement. The Attorney General has not 

declared Costa Rica to be a foreign country in which reciprocal provisions 

will be made to ensure the enforceability of foreign support orders, as 

required by NRS 130.035(1). Additionally, the Nevada Department of 

Health and Human Services provides that "Heciprocity is the mutual 

agreement between the United States or State of Nevada and a foreign 

country to process child support cases." See Nev. Dep't of Health and 

Human Servs., Div. of Welfare and Supportive Serv., Child Support 

Enforcement Manual (Manual), ch. II § 211 (March 1, 2011). Costa Rica is 

not a foreign country that maintains a reciprocal agreement with the 

United States or Nevada. Id. Nevada specifically provides reciprocity in 

child support cases with only four countries other than those recognized by 

the United States, and Costa Rica is not listed as one of those countries. 

See Manual, supra, § 211. 

We next consider whether Costa Rica meets the third 

definition of "state" by having procedures for the enforcement of support 

orders that are substantially similar to those under UIFSA. See NRS 

130.10179(2). Gonzales-Alpizar contends that Costa Rica has procedures 

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substantially similar to those under UIFSA, thereby meeting the 

definition of "state" and permitting Nevada to enforce the 2005 Costa 

Rican support order, but not to modify the terms of that judgment. See 

NRS 130.2055(2). The only support for Gonzales-Alpizar's "substantially 

similar" argument is a comparison of the laws for establishing and 

modifying child support in Nevada and Costa Rica. That comparison, 

however, is not the relevant inquiry. 

Rather, under NRS 130.10179(2), a foreign country may 

qualify as a state when it "[hi as enacted a law or established 

procedures ... which are substantially similar to the procedures 

established under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act." Thus, 

Costa Rica may be considered a "state" only if it can be shown that it has 

laws or procedures that allow for a foreign judgment to be recognized, i.e., 

laws on reciprocity, and that those laws are "substantially similar" to 

UIFSA. See NRS 130.10179(2); see also Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 547 

S.E.2d 127, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("UIFSA requires that 'a foreign 

nation must have substantially similar law or procedures 

to . UIFSA . . . (that is, reciprocity) in order for its support orders to be 

treated as if they had been issued by a sister State." (quoting Official 

Comment, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52C-1-101(19) (1999) (emphasis added))). 

The evidence presented by Gonzales-Alpizar, comparing 

Nevada's laws with Costa Rica's laws regarding child support awards, is 

irrelevant to the question of whether Costa Rica is a "state," and she 

makes no argument that Costa Rica has enacted procedures for 

interjurisdictional enforcement similar to those under UIFSA. Thus, 

because Gonzales-Alpizar did not establish that Costa Rica was a "state," 

we conclude that the 2005 Costa Rican support order is not enforceable 

under UIFSA. See Haker-Volkening, 547 S.E.2d at 131 (refusing to 

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enforce a foreign support order when the party seeking to enforce the 

order failed to establish on the record that Switzerland was a "state" for 

the purposes of UIFSA). 

The spousal support provision of the 2005 Costa Rican support order is not 

enforceable under the doctrine of comity 

Although UIFSA does not apply to the 2005 Costa Rican 

support order, we must still consider whether the order might be 

enforceable by a Nevada court under the doctrine of comity. This doctrine 

is a principle of courtesy by which "the courts of one jurisdiction may give 

effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction out of 

deference and respect." Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 

93, 98, 658 P.2d 422, 424-25 (1983). This court has not previously 

considered the circumstances under which a foreign spousal and child 

support order will be enforceable in Nevada under the doctrine of comity. 

In doing so, we consider the approach taken by the 

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which 

discusses reasons why a foreign judgment or order should not be enforced 

under comity. Section 482(1) provides: "[a] court in the United States may 

not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state" if "the judgment 

was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial 

tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law," or if "the 

court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the 

defendant." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 

States § 482(1) (1987). Section 482(2) further provides that a court "need 

not recognize" a foreign judgment if: 

(a) the court that rendered the judgment did 

not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 

action; 

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(b) the defendant did not receive notice of 

the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to 

defend; 

(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 

(d) the cause of action on which the 

judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is 

repugnant to the public policy of the United States 

or of the State where recognition is sought; 

(e) the judgment conflicts with another final 

judgment that is entitled to recognition; or 

(0 the proceeding in the foreign court was 

contrary to an agreement between the parties to 

submit the controversy on which the judgment is 

based to another forum. 

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Id. * 482(2). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the 

Restatement (Third) approach to enforcing foreign judgments, stating that 

it "provide[s] sound guidance for assessing legal judgments of other 

nations." Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Several state courts have also adopted Section 482 of the Restatement 

(Third) to analyze whether foreign orders should be recognized under the 

doctrine of comity. See Office of Child Support v. Sholan, 782 A.2d 1199, 

1203-04 (Vt. 2001) (adopting the Restatement approach in determining 

whether or not to enforce a foreign support order); see also Alberta Sec. 

Comm'n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121, 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Bondi v. 

Citigroup, Inc., 32 A.3d 1158, 1185-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 

We find the reasoning of Section 482 of the Restatement 

(Third) and these courts to be consistent with Nevada's jurisprudence 

under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as Nevada courts will refuse to 

recognize a judgment or order of a sister state if there is "a showing of 

fraud, lack of due process, or lack of jurisdiction in the rendering state." 

Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 573, 747 P.2d 230, 231 (1987). We 

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therefore adopt Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 

Relations Law of the United States to analyze whether a foreign support 

award for spousal and child support should be recognized by Nevada 

courts under the doctrine of comity. 

Griffith argues that the 2005 Costa Rican support order 

cannot be enforced by a Nevada court under the doctrine of comity based 

on lack of due process and fraud in the procurement of the order. We must 

consider whether Griffith's contentions are valid and thus prevent this 

court from recognizing the 2005 Costa Rican support order. 

First, as to the due process argument, although the parties 

offer differing versions of the service of the Demand for Alimony, the 

district court found that Griffith was served with notice and process of the 

2005 Costa Rican support order. Due process, in relation to comity, 

encompasses the idea that the order was granted after "proper service or 

voluntary appearance of the defendant." Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 This 

court has stated that "Uhl elementary and fundamental requirement of 

due process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 

and afford them the opportunity to present their objections." Browning v. 

Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217, 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) (quoting Mullane v. 

Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

Here, the record demonstrates that, at the very least, Griffith 

was reasonably made aware that Gonzales-Alpizar was serving him with 

some form of legal papers despite his inability to understand Spanish. 

Griffith was personally handed these papers while in an attorney's office 

to discuss a divorce settlement. Thus, substantial evidence supports the 

district court's determination that Griffith was properly served with the 

Demand for Alimony. Bedore v. Familian, 122 Nev. 5, 9-10, 125 P.3d 

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1168, 1171 (2006) (stating that this court will not disturb a district court's 

findings of fact "if they are supported by substantial evidence" (internal 

quotation omitted)). As such, lack of due process would not provide a basis 

to refuse to enforce the support order under the principle of comity. 

Second, Griffith argues that the spousal support award was 

procured through fraud because Gonzales-Alpizar failed to disclose to the 

Costa Rican court the existence of the premarital agreement, which 

precluded any award of spousal support. Gonzales-Alpizar does not 

appear to challenge this factual assertion, instead arguing that the 

premarital agreement was void as a matter of Costa Rican law such that 

the lack of disclosure is immaterial. 

Specifically, Gonzales-Alpizar argues that the parties' 

premarital agreement was unenforceable because she did not execute the 

agreement knowingly or voluntarily and because the agreement is 

unconscionable. See NRS 123A.080(1)(a) and (b). The validity of a 

premarital agreement is reviewed by this court de novo. See Fick v. Fick, 

109 Nev. 458, 463, 851 P.2d 445, 449 (1993); Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 108 

Nev. 308, 312, 832 P.2d 781, 783 (1992); see also NRS 123A.080(3). Our 

review of the record demonstrates that Gonzales-Alpizar did knowingly 

and voluntarily sign the premarital agreement, and Gonzales-Alpizar has 

failed to demonstrate how the agreement was unconscionable. Thus, we 

conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error in 

concluding that the parties' premarital agreement was enforceable. See 

NRS 123A.080(1) and (2); Sogg, 108 Nev. at 312, 832 P.2d at 783-84. 

Because the premarital agreement is enforceable, we decline 

to recognize and enforce the 2005 Costa Rican spousal support order under 

the doctrine of comity where a spouse purposefully failed to provide to the 

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foreign court the premarital agreement that governed the parties' 

agreement regarding spousal support. 

The child support portion of the 2005 Costa Rican support order might be 

entitled to enforcement under the doctrine of comity 

However, the failure to disclose the premarital agreement 

would not necessarily prevent the district court from enforcing the child 

support order because the agreement contained no provision concerning 

child support. The 2005 Costa Rican support order awarded child support 

for Griffith's biological son Anthony and Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter 

Nicolle. Griffith challenges any responsibility to support Nicolle because 

Griffith claims Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented Griffith's parental 

relationship with Nicolle to the Costa Rican court. Griffith also argues 

that the entire child support award was procured through fraud because 

Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his income and properties in procuring 

the award, and the award would render him destitute in violation of 

Nevada public policy. The district court failed to make any specific 

findings concerning Griffith's adoption of Nicolle or his fraud claim, 

instead concluding that 

[Griffith] may have had and may still have valid 

defenses to the alimony/child support proceedings. 

The questions of his responsibility for 

Nicolle, . .. and [Gonzales-Alpizar's] alleged fraud, 

in describing Plaintiffs resources to the Costa 

Rican court . . . are not resolved to [Griffith's] 

satisfaction. However, the only forum for 

resolving these issues is the Country of Costa 

Rica. 

Because the district court deferred ruling on Griffith's 

parental status in regard to Nicolle and his other defenses to the child 

support award to the Costa Rican court, this court is unable to determine 

whether comity should be granted or denied to the child support award. 

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J. 

Thus, we remand this issue to the district court to make appropriate 

findings of fact and conclusions of law under the Restatement (Third) 

approach adopted by this court, and to determine whether the child 

support portion of the 2005 Costa Rican support order should be enforced 

as a matter of comity. 

Because the district court erred in concluding that it may 

have to enforce the spousal support provision of the 2005 Costa Rican 

support order if it is determined valid and enforceable in a Costa Rican 

court, we reverse that portion of the district court's order, and we affirm in 

all other respects. 

J. 

Hardesty 

We conc 

Gibbon's 

Poem ti 

\ering 

Parr a guirr e 

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, C.J.