FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

L. F., in his individual capacity and 

as parent of K.S.F (Student 1) and 

K.S.F. (Student 2); K. S. F., 

Student 1; K. S. F., Student 2,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL 

DISTRICT #414,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-35792

D.C. No.

2:17-cv-00375-

TSZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2019

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 17, 2020

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Gregory A. Presnell,

* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Presnell

* The Honorable Gregory A. Presnell, United States District Judge 

for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
2 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of Lake Washington School District in an 

action brought by a parent who alleged that the District 

violated his First Amendment rights by imposing a 

“Communication Plan,” which limited his communications 

with School District employees regarding his daughters’ 

education.

The panel first rejected plaintiff’s contention that the 

district court failed to apply the proper standard at summary 

judgment. The panel stated that a district court’s obligation 

at the summary judgment stage to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant does not require that 

it ignore undisputed evidence produced by the movant.

The panel held that the School District did not violate 

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by requiring him to 

communicate only with particular staff members or do so 

only at a specified time and place. The panel noted that 

members of the public do not have a constitutional right to 

force the government to listen to their views, and the First 

Amendment does not compel the government to respond to 

speech directed toward it. 

The panel held that even assuming that the 

Communication Plan restricted plaintiff’s speech, it agreed 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 3

with the district court that the Plan did not violate plaintiff’s 

First Amendment rights. The panel held that the classrooms 

and other government property at issue in this case must be 

considered non-public fora, and that the Communication 

Plan was a reasonable effort to manage a parent’s relentless 

and unproductive communications with School District 

staff. 

COUNSEL

Shannon McMinimee (argued), Laura Hruska, and Michelle 

Mentzer, Cedar Law, Seattle, Washington, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Taki V. Flevaris (argued), Carlos A. Chavez, and Sarah C. 

Johnson, Pacifica Law Group LLP, Seattle, Washington, for 

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

PRESNELL, District Judge:

L.F. is the divorced father of two daughters who, at all 

relevant times, attended school within the Lake Washington 

School District (the “District”). After a series of contentious 

interactions, the District imposed a “Communication Plan,” 

which set limits on communications between L.F. and 

District employees regarding his daughters’ education. L.F. 

sued, alleging inter alia that the Communication Plan 

infringed on his First Amendment rights. The district court 

granted summary judgment to the District on that claim on 

the grounds that the Communication Plan did not burden 

L.F.’s speech or, alternatively, that the Communication Plan 
4 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. This 

appeal followed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.

I. Background

L.F. contends that his daughters suffer from anxiety and 

behavioral disorders that adversely affect their educational 

performance. He has had a number of disagreements with 

District personnel regarding (1) the best ways to address 

these issues and (2) what he sees as discrimination against 

him as a divorced father.

For its part, the District contends that, beginning in 

March 2015, L.F. engaged in a pattern of “sen[ding] 

incessant emails to staff accusing them of wrongdoing; 

ma[king] presumptuous demands; level[ing] demeaning 

insults; ... and in face-to-face interactions, act[ing] in an 

aggressive, hostile, and intimidating manner.” District 

employees complained that L.F.’s extraordinarily timeconsuming communications made District staff feel 

threatened and intimidated.

In early November 2015, L.F. attended a meeting with a 

“guidance team” of District employees to evaluate whether 

one of his daughters would benefit from a plan under Section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, to 

accommodate her anxiety. L.F. had advocated for such a 

plan; his daughter and ex-wife argued that no such plan was 

needed. After the meeting, the guidance team concluded that 

an accommodation plan was not necessary.

On November 10, 2015, L.F. was informed of the 

guidance team’s decision by his daughter’s principal, Robert 
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 5

Johnson. L.F. vehemently disagreed with the decision, and 

he repeatedly communicated his disagreement to District 

employees via email. He replied to Johnson that “[i]t is clear 

you have failed to properly consider the very excessive 

length of time [his daughter] has taken to complete 

homework, plus the panic attack [she] suffered at the bus 

stop, and other matters.” He also stated he wished to appeal 

the decision. In an email two days later, he informed 

Johnson that he was “very concerned regarding clear, 

deliberate omissions of evidence” by the guidance team and 

requested “an urgent meeting” with Johnson and his superior 

due to L.F.’s belief that “this is likely a case of 

discrimination by the school against [him].” That same day, 

he asked his daughter’s guidance counselor to “initiate the 

appeals process immediately” regarding the Section 504 

plan decision. He also told her he had “serious concerns” 

regarding Johnson’s “impartiality and competence” and 

asked that she “take that into consideration as [she] decide[s] 

on who should appropriately be involved.”1 Johnson 

described the number of communications L.F. demanded 

regarding this and other issues as “many times more than is 

typical.”

On November 23, 2015, citing “the unproductive 

communication pattern that has developed” and “the tone 

and manner of some of [L.F.’s] communication and 

interaction with District staff and administrators, [which] 

has regrettably made several of these individuals feel 

intimidated and bullied,” the District imposed the 

Communication Plan. The terms of the plan were spelled 

out in an email to L.F. from Sue Anne Sullivan, a District 

administrator. Under the plan, L.F.’s substantive 

communications with the District about his daughters’ 

1 Ultimately, L.F. opted not to appeal the Section 504 plan decision.
6 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

education would be limited to bi-weekly, in-person meetings 

with Sullivan and another administrator. L.F. was advised 

not to “email or attempt to communicate (in any form) with 

any District employees” aside from the bi-weekly meetings, 

“as they will not respond to [his] emails or attempts to 

communicate.”

The Communication Plan’s restrictions did not apply in 

the event of an emergency, did not affect L.F.’s right to 

appeal the decision regarding the Section 504 plan, and did 

not bar him from attending school activities or accessing 

school records. L.F. was told that he had a right to challenge 

the Communication Plan by filing an appeal in state court.2

Sullivan asked the principals at the schools attended by 

L.F.’s daughters to send an email to staff members who 

worked directly with the girls. The email, which contained 

language drafted by Sullivan, included the following:

The communication plan prohibits [L.F.] 

from having any further direct 

communication or contact with any District 

administrators or staff. As of this date and 

time, all of [L.F.]’s communication with the 

District shall occur at biweekly meetings 

with Directors of School Support Sue Anne 

Sullivan and Matt Livingston. Just to be 

clear, [L.F.] has been specifically directed by 

the District not to contact any of his students’ 

teachers, school staff or administrators.

The email also explained other details of the Communication 

Plan, including that it did not apply in the event of an 

2 L.F. did not file such an appeal.
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 7

emergency and did not prevent L.F. from attending normal 

parent activities on campus.

L.F. followed the requirements of the Communication 

Plan for a few weeks after its imposition. However, the 

District determined that he violated the terms of the plan at 

a January 2016 meeting with his daughter’s math teacher and 

Johnson. The District had approved the meeting based on 

L.F.’s request for a parent-teacher conference regarding his 

daughter’s performance in math. After the math discussion 

concluded, L.F. produced printouts about his daughter’s 

grades in other subject areas and, according to Johnson, 

spent ten minutes discussing topics with him that had been 

discussed at the Section 504 plan meeting in November. 

Around this same time, the District also found that L.F. had 

violated the plan by directly contacting staff members at his 

other daughter’s school. As a result of these findings, the 

District further restricted the meetings between L.F. and 

District administrators, cutting back from bi-weekly to once 

a month. Over the succeeding months, L.F. made requests 

that the District lift or modify the Communication Plan, but 

the District refused to do so.

In March 2017, L.F. filed the instant suit. He asserted 

three claims: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the 

Communication Plan violated his First Amendment rights; a 

retaliation claim pursuant to Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act; and a claim that the District had 

discriminated against him in violation of the Washington 

Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Wash. Rev. Code 

§ 49.60.010 et seq.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

In July 2018, the district court granted the District’s motion, 

dismissing all of L.F.’s claims with prejudice. As to the 

§ 1983 claim, the district court found that the 
8 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

Communication Plan, rather than restricting L.F.’s speech, 

instead regulated which types of communication District 

staff would respond to, and therefore it did not violate L.F.’s 

First Amendment rights. In the alternative, assuming that 

the Communication Plan did restrict L.F.’s speech, the 

district court found that the Communication Plan did not 

violate the First Amendment because it was a reasonable, 

viewpoint-neutral restriction in a non-public forum. L.F. 

appeals only the decision regarding his § 1983 claim.

II. Standard of Review

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 

2018). “We determine, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are 

any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district 

court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Wallis 

v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 

1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001)).

III. Discussion

L.F. contends that the district court erred by failing to 

apply the proper standard at summary judgment and by 

concluding that the Communication Plan did not burden his 

speech. We will address these arguments in turn.

A. Summary Judgment

L.F. contends that the district court viewed the relevant 

evidence in the light most favorable to the District when 

reviewing the District’s motion for summary judgment. He 

bases this argument on the fact that the “Background” 

section of the district court opinion included numerous facts 
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 9

drawn from declarations provided by District employees.3 

But a court’s obligation at the summary judgment stage to 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant does not require that it ignore undisputed evidence 

produced by the movant. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of 

Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 

(9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court was 

obligated to review evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in 

support of their own motion for summary judgment before 

ruling on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment).

L.F. also contends that the district court failed to 

consider three items in the proper light at the summary 

judgment stage: the portion of Sullivan’s email (quoted 

above) stating that the Communication Plan “prohibits [L.F.] 

from having any further direct communication or contact 

with any District administrators or staff”; the District’s 

decision to reduce the meeting frequency from bi-weekly to 

monthly after L.F. attempted to engage the principal in an 

unauthorized conversation4; and his contention that the 

Communication Plan itself sought to regulate his speech 

because of an “unproductive communication pattern” 

between L.F. and District employees. Taken in context, 

3 L.F. does not argue that any of the facts included in the Background 

section were disputed.

4 There is no evidence that the principal “allowed” this conversation, 

as L.F. asserts – only that L.F. attempted to speak with the principal 

about topics that the District had not agreed to discuss in that forum and 

that this attempt lasted approximately ten minutes. Although L.F. says 

his ability to communicate with the District was reduced to one email per 

month as a result of his ten-minute discussion with his child’s principal, 

this is also not correct. The District only decided to stop meeting in

person with L.F. months later after he continued a “pattern of extremely 

negative, intimidating, argumentative and threatening communication.”
10 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

however, these facts do not give rise to a genuine issue of 

material fact. The Communication Plan on its face restricts 

only the District’s speech and asks – but does not require –

L.F. to honor it. Sullivan’s statement to District employees 

that the Communication Plan “prohibits [L.F.] from having 

any further direct communication or contact” with them was 

an internal communication that could not have been 

perceived by L.F. as a restriction on his ability to speak. And 

the Communication Plan’s purpose of cultivating more 

productive exchanges with L.F. and the District supports an 

inference that the District was encouraging communication 

from L.F., not chilling it.

B. First Amendment

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 

provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make no law 

... abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the 

people ... to petition the Government for a redress of 

grievances.” It is applicable to the states by virtue of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 

(1996).

L.F. contends that the Communication Plan violated his 

First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from 

communicating with his children’s teachers and by 

precluding him from challenging District decisions.5 

Factually, this is an overstatement. The Communication 

Plan did not entirely prohibit such communication or such 

5 The Communication Plan only applied to communications 

between L.F. and District employees. It had no effect on L.F.’s ability 

to communicate with, for example, other government entities or the 

media.
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 11

challenges; rather, it limited L.F. to specified channels – the 

bi-weekly meetings – for any communications to which he 

wanted a response.

In any event, the District was within its rights to impose 

such a limitation. Members of the public do not have a 

constitutional right to force the government to listen to their 

views. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 

465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984). And the First Amendment does 

not compel the government to respond to speech directed 

toward it. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., 

Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam) (“The 

public employee surely can associate and speak freely and 

petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendment 

from retaliation for doing so. But the First Amendment does 

not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to 

listen, [or] to respond . . . .” (citations omitted)). Because 

government entities such as the District do not have to listen 

to parents’ views, it is not a constitutional violation to 

require that parents, if they wish to be heard, communicate 

only with particular staff members or do so only at a 

specified time and place. And because the government is 

under no constitutional obligation to respond to such views, 

there is no violation where a government entity such as the 

District ignores (or threatens to ignore) communications 

from outside the specified channels.

L.F. argues that the District went beyond simply 

regulating the speech to which it would respond. He points 

out that the terms of the Communication Plan set limits on 

the amount of communication he could have with District 

employees and threatened him with sanctions if he exceeded 

those limits. But the plan only set a limit on the amount of 

communications to which the District would respond. The 

only so-called “sanction” set forth in the plan for unapproved 
12 L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

communications was that District employees “[would] not 

respond to [L.F.’s] emails or attempts to communicate.”6 In 

short, the Communication Plan regulated the District’s 

conduct, not L.F.’s. Therefore, it did not violate L.F.’s First 

Amendment rights.

And even assuming that the Communication Plan 

restricted L.F.’s speech, we agree with the district court that 

it did not violate his First Amendment rights. Regulation of 

speech on government property that has traditionally been 

available for public expression or has been designated as a 

public forum is subject to the highest scrutiny, but 

limitations on expressive activity on other types of public 

property – so-called “non-public fora” – are subject to much 

more limited review. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 

Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992). The property at 

issue here falls into the latter category.

School facilities may be deemed to be forums for public 

expression “only if school authorities have by policy or by 

practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the 

general public or by some segment of the public, such as 

student organizations.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 

484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). There is no evidence that any District 

property has been opened to this sort of indiscriminate use. 

6 In the email establishing the Communication Plan, Sullivan also 

informed L.F. that if he ignored its terms the District could seek an 

antiharassment order, which “would formally prohibit [him] from having 

any contact with District staff or administrators.” L.F. does not argue 

that the threatened imposition of such a court order violated his First 

Amendment rights.
L.F. V. LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 13

Accordingly, the classrooms and other government property 

at issue here must be considered non-public fora.7

Regulation of expressive activity in non-public fora need 

only be reasonable, so long as the regulation is not an effort 

to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with 

the speaker’s view. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 

Inc., 505 U.S. at 679. L.F. does not explain how the 

Communication Plan imposed unreasonable restrictions on 

his ability to share his concerns about his daughters’ 

educational needs or any other topic. And as the District 

Court pointed out, the Communication Plan addressed the 

manner in which L.F. communicated with the District – not 

the content of his speech or any viewpoints he wished to 

convey. We agree with the trial court that the 

Communication Plan was a reasonable effort to manage a 

parent’s relentless and unproductive communications with 

District staff. As such, it did not violate L.F.’s First 

Amendment rights even if it restricted his speech.

AFFIRMED.

7 L.F. contends that the District’s email system should be considered 

a designated public forum because the District uses the system as its 

primary method of contact with the public rather than just for 

communication between teachers and District staff. But access alone is 

not enough to transform public property into a public forum. Greer v. 

Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (holding that public’s ability to freely 

visit property owned or operated by the Government does not turn that 

property into a public forum for purposes of the First Amendment). 

Traditional public fora are those places, such as public streets and parks, 

which “by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 

assembly and debate.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 

Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). L.F. has not produced any evidence that 

the general public uses (or has been authorized to use) the District’s 

email system for such purposes.