COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Annunziata and Bumgardner 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

COROM MORRISETT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1296-98-1 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MAY 18, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Johnny E. Morrison, Judge 

Dianne G. Ringer, Senior Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 Corom Morrisett was convicted in a jury trial of two counts 

of robbery and two counts of use of a firearm in the commission 

of a robbery. On appeal, Morrisett contends the trial court 

erred by compelling him to appear before the jury in a jail 

uniform. Additionally, Morrisett contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. We find that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion, or violate Morrisett’s 

constitutional rights, by proceeding with the trial. 

Additionally, we find that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the convictions. 
BACKGROUND

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 

349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

 Morrisett and another individual entered a gas station 

convenience store as the cashiers prepared to change shifts. 

Morrisett, the taller of the two, wore a red hat with the flaps 

down and stated, “this is a hold-up.” The shorter man 

brandished a handgun. The two cashiers emptied their respective 

cash register drawers giving the contents to Morrisett and his 

accomplice who, thereafter, fled from the store. 

 Neither cashier could identify the defendant from a photo 

lineup, but both identified Morrisett at trial, and both 

identified a red hat officers found in Morrisett’s bedroom as 

the hat that Morrisett wore during the robbery. 

 While in custody, Morrisett viewed a surveillance tape from 

the store’s security camera. While watching the tape, without 

any provocation, the defendant pointed to the taller man with 

the hat and said, “that’s me.” At trial Morrisett denied making 

the statement, and denied owning the red hat. Additionally, 

Morrisett testified that he was in Baltimore when the crime 

occurred. His mother corroborated the alibi. 

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 Before the trial date, Morrisett discussed with his 

attorney the merits of requesting a jury trial or bench trial. 

Morrisett “wavered” between requesting a jury or a bench trial 

but on the day before trial he told his attorney he wanted to be 

tried by the court, and the case was set for a bench trial. 

About fifteen minutes before the judge called the case, 

Morrisett informed his attorney that he wanted a jury trial. 

Despite the late notice, the trial judge was able to accommodate 

Morrisett’s request because a jury was available. 

 However, when the trial judge asked if the defense was 

ready to proceed, counsel for Morrisett responded: 

 Judge the defense is not ready on this 

case. Mr. Morrisett just informed me . . . 

he wanted a jury trial. Seeing that that 

was the case, Judge, you can see that he is 

in a jail uniform, Portsmouth City Jail 

uniform. 

 If we’re going to have a jury case, I 

think it would be prejudicial for the client 

to be sitting at the defense table in jail 

clothes. 

 I did talk with my investigator to have 

him . . . check to see whether we had any 

clothes that would fit Mr. Morrisett. . . . 

He indicated to me that we didn’t have any 

. . . . 

 Based on that, judge, we’re not ready. 

 Morrisett indicated that he was otherwise ready to proceed, 

and the judge determined to proceed with the case. 

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ANALYSIS

 The conduct of a trial is left to the discretion of the 

judge, however, “it is incumbent upon the trial court to 

exercise that discretion with extreme caution to avoid 

infringing upon the rights of the accused to a fair and 

impartial trial.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 367, 371, 

373 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1988). 

 “Every procedure which would offer a 

possible temptation to the average man . . . 

to forget the burden of proof required to 

convict the defendant, or which might lead 

him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 

true between the State and the accused, 

denies the latter due process of law.” 

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 

273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 

 One of the “axiomatic and elementary” requirements of a 

fair trial is the presumption of innocence which “lies at the 

foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin 

v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); see Estelle v. 

Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976). As part of this 

presumption, defendants at trial are “entitled to be clothed 

with indicia of innocence” until such time as guilt is 

determined by the judge or jury. See Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 32, 40, 354 S.E.2d 68, 72 (citing Harrell v. Israel, 

672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1982)), aff’d en banc, 5 Va. App. 

59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987). Moreover, the accused is entitled to 

have his or her “‘guilt or innocence determined solely on the 

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basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of 

official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other 

circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.’” See id. (quoting 

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)). 

 The United States Supreme Court, in Williams, stated that a 

trial court violates a defendant’s due process right to the 

presumption of innocence when the trial court compels the 

accused to wear prison clothes before a jury during trial. See

Williams, 425 U.S. at 503-06; see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 

U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (discussing Williams); United States v. 

Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 580-82 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying 

Williams). Unlike the necessity to apply shackles or physical 

restraints to an unruly defendant, compelling a defendant to 

appear in jail clothing “furthers no essential state policy.” 

Williams, 425 U.S. at 504. “That it may be more convenient for 

jail administrators, a factor quite unlike the substantial need 

to impose physical restraints upon contumacious defendants, 

provides no justification for the practice.” Id. (footnote 

omitted). 

 We find that by proceeding with the trial over Morrisett’s 

objection, the trial court neither compelled Morrisett to stand 

trial in prison garb, nor abused its discretion. 

 Morrisett, who had earlier agreed to a bench trial, decided 

to request a jury trial approximately fifteen minutes before his 

trial was to begin. When the court accommodated that last 

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minute request, Morrisett then told the court that he was not 

prepared for trial because he wore prison garb. His counsel 

stated, “The defense is not ready in this case,” and proceeded 

to explain why. Morrisett made no motion for relief, other than 

to state that under the circumstances, the defense was not 

prepared to begin. The defendant made no motion for a recess or 

brief delay to obtain non-prison garb and did not propose any 

course of action to obtain non-prison garb. As the trial court 

noted, Morrisett’s mother was present at the trial and possibly 

could have obtained clothes for Morrisett, but he made no 

request or motion to be allowed to do so. 

 The record suggests that Morrisett was attempting to delay 

trial. He requested a jury trial at the last moment. When that 

request failed to delay the trial, he stated he was unprepared 

for trial due to the prison garb. When the court refused to 

continue the trial, Morrisett stated that he was dissatisfied 

with his lawyer due to a conflict of interest. 

 Under these circumstances, where the defendant informed the 

court that he was not prepared to proceed but did not move the 

court to accommodate any course of action to obtain non-prison 

garb, or for any other relief, the trial court did not err in 

proceeding to trial as scheduled. No motion having been made 

requiring a trial court ruling, the court did not “compel” 

Morrisett to wear prison garb at trial. 

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 Additionally, we find the evidence was sufficient to 

support the convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, the evidence proved that Morrisett confessed 

to being the taller individual in the videotape of the robbery. 

That confession, the two positive identifications at trial, the 

admission of the videotape and the admission of the identified 

red hat into evidence, entitled the jury to convict Morrisett. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

Affirmed. 

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