*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 99-20024

Summary Calendar

_____________________

LEON JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY;

UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT

AGENCY; HOUSTON POLICE NARCOTIC

DIVISION; YELLOW CAB COMPANY;

ASHLEY HARPER; THE TEXAS EDUCATION

AGENCY; LONGVIEW HIGH SCHOOL;

JOHN CORNYN, Attorney general,

State of Texas; LISA MILLARD,

TEXAS STATE DISTRICT JUDGE; FRANK

ROSS; TERRY HAMILTON; GULF COAST

LEGAL FOUNDATION; NELSON JONES;

JAMES GILLIES; BETTY HOMINGA,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-98-CV-3800

_________________________________________________________________

January 27, 2000

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this appeal, Leon Johnson challenges several of the

district court’s interlocutory orders in his civil suit seeking

judicial review of a decision by the Board for the Correction of
2

Military Records and asserting other claims. Johnson seeks to

appeal the district court’s orders denying him leave to amend his

complaint, denying his “Emergency Motion for Protective Order to

DEA and HPD Narcotics,” denying his motion for a temporary

restraining order, and dismissing the Texas Education Authority and

Longview High School from the suit. Johnson has also filed with

this court a motion to correct a purported error in the case

caption. 

It is axiomatic that, as a court of limited jurisdiction, we

are obliged to examine the basis of our own jurisdiction. Thompson

v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985). A timely notice of

appeal is a prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

United States v. Adams, 106 F.3d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over

appeals only from: (1) final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) orders

that are deemed final due to jurisprudential exception or that have

been properly certified as final pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);

and (3) interlocutory orders that fall into specific classes, 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a), or that have been properly certified for appeal

by the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Dardar v.

Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1988); Save the

Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir.

1981). 

Because Johnson failed to file a notice of appeal from the

district court’s order granting Longview High School’s motion to
3

dismiss, this court is without jurisdiction to review that order.

See Adams, 106 F.3d at 647. While Johnson did file notices of

appeal from the other orders at issue, none of those orders are

final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The orders have not been certified

by the district court as appealable under either Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and they do not fall into 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)’s specific classes of appealable orders. Finally, none

of the orders is encompassed by the jurisprudential exception to

the final-order rule known as the collateral-order doctrine. See

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
4

In the light of the foregoing, we are without jurisdiction to

review the district court’s interlocutory orders. This appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, and Johnson’s motion to correct

the case caption is DENIED as moot.

APPEAL DISMISSED;

MOTION DENIED.