Filed 7/18/16 P. v. Everett CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD EVERETT JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B262099

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. YAO84595)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Scott T. Millington, Judge. Affirmed. 

Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________
2

Ronald Everett Jr., along with two confederates, John Ross Craig and Trevon 

Deshawn Tresvant, was charged in an information with five counts of kidnapping for the 

purpose of robbery (Pen. Code, § 208, subd. (b)(1)),1one count of attempted robbery 

(§§ 211, 664) and seven counts of second degree robbery (§ 211). The information 

specially alleged as to all 13 counts that a principal had personally used a firearm in 

committing the offenses (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)) and that each offense was

committed to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The information 

also specially alleged that Everett had suffered one prior serious or violent felony 

conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) 

and section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and had served one prior prison term for a felony 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Everett pleaded not guilty to the charges and denied the special 

allegations. 

On January 15, 2015 Everett agreed, orally and in writing, to plead no contest to 

two counts of second degree robbery and to admit the firearm-use allegations as to both 

counts, as well as the prior conviction allegations.2 At the time he entered his plea, 

Everett was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of the 

plea, which he stated he understood. Everett’s counsel joined in the waivers of his 

constitutional rights. The trial court expressly found Everett’s waivers, plea and 

admissions were voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The court sentenced Everett in 

accordance with the negotiated plea agreement to an aggregate state prison term of 

23 years, consisting of consecutive terms of six years (the three-year middle term doubled 

under the three strikes law) and two years (one-third the middle term doubled) for the two 

counts of robbery, plus 10 years for one of the firearm-use enhancements and five years 

for the prior serious felony enhancement. The court awarded presentence custody credit 

of 1,088 days and ordered Everett to pay statutory fines, fees and assessments. The 

 

1

Statutory references are to this code.

2 Everett’s codefendants entered into similar plea agreements.
3

remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed pursuant to the negotiated 

agreement.3

On January 27, 2015 Everett filed a notice of appeal from the “judgment entered 

following a plea of conviction.” Everett did not request a certificate of probable cause. 

On March 6, 2015 Everett filed an amended notice of appeal in which he checked the 

preprinted boxes indicating his appeal was based on “the sentence or other matters 

occurring after the plea” and “the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal 

Code section 1538.5.” Everett did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. 

We appointed counsel to represent Everett on appeal. After examination of the 

record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. 

On October 14, 2015 we advised Everett he had 30 days within which to 

personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. After granting 

Everett two extensions of time, on January 13, 2016 we received a partially typed,

partially handwritten 13-page supplemental brief with multiple attachments that 

presented three issues. First, Everett argues his admission of the section 12022.53 

firearm-use enhancements was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent and his trial 

attorney provided ineffective assistance because Everett was not advised a principal who 

had not personally used a firearm was not subject to the enhancement pursuant to section 

12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), unless it was pleaded and proved the subject offense had 

been committed to benefit a criminal street gang. Here, the gang allegations were 

dismissed under the negotiated plea agreement. Second, Everett argues the prosecutor 

failed to disclose videotape evidence to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland 

(1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215]. Finally, Everett asserts trial counsel

 

3 The negotiated plea agreement contemplated imposition of a single 10-year 

firearm use enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), although Everett 

admitted personal use of a firearm in the commission of both robbery counts as to which 

he had pleaded no contest. This aspect of the plea agreement and sentence appears to 

violate section 12022.53, subdivision (h), which provides, “Notwithstanding Section 

1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this 

section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.”
4

was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a motion to contest portions of the 

probation officer’s report.4

Everett’s claims lack merit. As to his first argument, although the information 

specially alleged Everett and his two codefendants were liable as principals under 

section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1), which requires pleading and proof the 

underlying offense was gang-related, as part of his plea agreement Everett admitted he 

had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). 

Imposition of the 10-year enhancement was entirely proper based on that admission even 

though the court dismissed the criminal street gang allegations as part of the parties’ plea 

agreement.

Neither of Everett’s other two arguments is cognizable on appeal. A criminal 

defendant who appeals following a plea of no contest or guilty without obtaining a 

certificate of probable cause can only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence or raise grounds arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect the plea’s 

validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1).) To the extent Everett is challenging the 

validity of his plea (because of the purported Brady violation) and the sentence imposed 

as part of that plea (because of errors in the probation report), his appeal is inoperative. 

Furthermore, Everett did not file a motion to suppress evidence; and the record fails to 

demonstrate defense counsel provided ineffective assistance for any of the reasons 

asserted in Everett’s supplemental brief. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 

686 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) With respect to other potential sentencing or 

post-plea issues that do not in substance challenge the validity of the plea itself, we have 

examined the record and are satisfied Everett’s appellate attorney has fully complied with 

the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issue exists. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 

 

4 On January 12, 2016 Everett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel on grounds different from those asserted in his 

supplemental brief. We issued an order to show case on April 27, 2016 in that 

proceeding. (In re Ronald Everett Jr., B269458.)
5

528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 

40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur: 

ZELON, J. 

SEGAL, J.