[Cite as State v. Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-7930.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

DARRYL FERGUSON 

Defendant-Appellant

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C.A. CASE NO. 27032 

T.C. NO. 14CR2059/3 

(Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O PI N I O N 

Rendered on the ___29th __ day of _____September_____, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

LYNNE R. NOTHSTINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0061560, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. 

Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

FRANCISCO E. LUTTECKE, Atty. Reg. No. 0082866 and CHARLYN BOHLAND, Atty. 

Reg. No. 0088080, Assistant State Public Defenders, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Darryl Ferguson was found guilty after a bench trial in the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, of aggravated assault, an inferior 

offense of felonious assault, and voluntary manslaughter, an inferior offense of murder. 
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The trial court merged the two charges and sentenced D.F. to a mandatory term of eleven 

years in prison, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F), for voluntary manslaughter. D.F. was 16 

years old at the time of the offense, and 18 years old when he was convicted. 

{¶ 2} Ferguson appeals from his conviction, raising five assignments of error.1 He 

claims that (1) the trial court erred in using a prior juvenile adjudication to impose a 

mandatory prison term, (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements that he 

made to the police; (3) the trial court erred in imposing a maximum sentence, (4) the trial 

court erred in failing to sentence him in accordance with R.C. 2152.121, and (5) the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that he was not amenable to treatment in 

the juvenile system. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be reversed, 

and the matter will be remanded to the trial court for resentencing and compliance with 

R.C. 2152.121. 

I. Background and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} In its verdict following the bench trial, the trial court found the following facts. 

{¶ 4} In the early morning hours of June 8, 2014, 35-year-old Ryan Adams 

approached Ferguson’s mother and his fifteen-year-old sister as they stood outside their 

home in Dayton. Adams stated to them that “everybody needs a playmate, do you want 

to play with me?” or similar sexually-suggestive words. Ferguson’s mother and sister 

 

1 On May 19, 2017, without addressing Ferguson’s specific assignments of error, we 

vacated his conviction and remanded the matter to the juvenile court. State v. D.F., 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 27032, 2017-Ohio-2882. We relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

decision in State v. Aalim, Ohio S.Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8278 (Aalim I) and our 

court’s interpretation of R.C. 2152.12(I). After the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered its 

decision in Aalim I, the State filed an application for reconsideration in this case. In light 

of State v. Aalim, Ohio S.Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2956 (Aalim II), we granted the 

State’s application and vacated our May 19, 2017 Opinion and Judgment.
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indicated they did not, and Adams walked some distance away, but stopped, turned 

around with his arms folded, and stared at them. Ferguson’s mother and sister became 

“worried and anxious,” and the sister proceeded to call Ferguson (her sixteen-year-old 

brother), Harley Farrell (the boyfriend of her maternal aunt)2, or both, requesting that 

Ferguson and Farrell return to the area. Ferguson, Farrell, and the aunt had walked 

down the street to see some “commotion” that was occurring there. 

{¶ 5} Ferguson and Farrell arrived separately but at approximately the same time, 

and Ferguson began questioning his mother and sister regarding the nature of their 

concern. Upon learning that Adams had made suggestive remarks and had yet to leave 

the neighborhood, Ferguson became “angry and furious,” and he and Farrell attempted 

to locate Adams. Ferguson and Farrell found Adams nearby, and Adams returned 

voluntarily with Ferguson and Farrell to Ferguson’s home. When Ferguson’s sister 

confirmed that “he was the guy” who had made the sexually-suggestive remarks, 

Ferguson became even more enraged and furious, and he demanded that Adams leave 

the neighborhood and never disrespect his family again. 

{¶ 6} Adams “did not take kindly” to Ferguson’s demands. Rather, Adams pulled 

off his shirt and challenged Ferguson, a “much younger and smaller” individual, to a fight; 

Adams called Ferguson a “punk” and spewed a stream of profanity and epithets. 

Ferguson and Adams, “in mutual combat, squared off in the street.” Ultimately, 

Ferguson struck Adams several times in the face, dropping Adams to his buttocks on the 

grass next to the street. Adams was down only momentarily and regained his feet. 

 

2 The aunt is the sister of Ferguson’s mother. On June 8, 2014, the aunt and Harley 

Farrell lived with Ferguson’s family, which consisted of Ferguson, his parents, and his two 

younger sisters.
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Then, after the two combatants “exchanged further epithets and other unpleasantries,” 

Adams did not re-engage Ferguson, but instead turned and walked away from Ferguson, 

ending the mutual combat. (The trial court expressly rejected, as not credible, testimony 

that Adams did not walk away and disengage.) 

{¶ 7} As Adams walked away, a still-enraged Ferguson came up behind Adams, 

striking Adams with a right-handed haymaker which landed against Adams’s right temple 

area. Adams was immediately rendered unconscious, and Ferguson then grabbed 

Adams around the waist and flipped him backward, driving him head first into the 

pavement. With Adams “unconscious and defenseless on the pavement,” Ferguson 

struck Adams in the face and head several more times. Farrell, who had not been 

involved in the altercation up to this point, kicked Adams’s head as Adams lay 

unconscious on the ground. 

{¶ 8} At approximately 4:30 a.m., the police were dispatched to the scene on a 

“medical assistance” call. Officer Harry Dilley found Adams unconscious on the 

sidewalk, and he initially did not know if Adams’s condition was the result of an assault or 

a seizure. Adams was transported to Miami Valley Hospital, where he had surgery to 

remove pressure on his brain. Adams remained in a coma and had respiratory failure, 

both due to damage to his brain stem. The right side of Adams’s skull, Adams’s nose, 

and the left side of Adams’s jaw and eye socket were also broken, and he had various 

scrapes and bruises. Adams never regained consciousness. 

{¶ 9} After his stay at Miami Valley Hospital, Adams was treated at Drake Hospital 

in Cincinnati, then transported to Liberty Nursing Facility. He ultimately was transferred 

to Hospice. Adams died on August 27, 2014 as a result of the blunt force trauma to the 
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right side of his head. The trial court rejected, as “utterly incredible,” Ferguson’s 

argument that Farrell’s kick to Adams’s head as Adams lay unconscious was, alone, the 

fatal blow. 

{¶ 10} Dayton Police Detective Rod Roberts, a member of the homicide squad, 

began an investigation into the assault on Adams at approximately 7:30 p.m. on June 8, 

the day of the assault. Within a couple days, Roberts identified Farrell and Ferguson as 

suspects. On the morning of June 10, 2014, Roberts asked Officer Mitch Olmsted, who 

had worked for approximately 20 years in the neighborhood where the assault occurred, 

to locate Ferguson and Farrell. Olmsted did so, and he (Olmsted) and Officer Edmond 

Trick brought Ferguson and Farrell to the police department for interviews. 

{¶ 11} During Ferguson’s interview (at approximately 9:30 a.m.), Ferguson initially 

stated that Farrell was the primary aggressor and that Farrell had assaulted Adams due 

to statements Adams had made about Farrell’s mother. Detective Roberts stopped the 

interview with Ferguson and went back to Ferguson’s neighborhood to interview people 

about the events. Roberts concluded that Ferguson’s statements were inaccurate. 

{¶ 12} Detective Roberts returned to the police department and interviewed 

Farrell. The interview led Roberts to believe that Ferguson was the primary suspect. 

Roberts re-interviewed Ferguson at approximately 3:00 p.m., at which time Ferguson 

admitted to hitting Adams, picking Adams up and “dunking” him while Adams was 

unconscious, and hitting Adams a few more times after Adams hit the ground. Ferguson 

wrote a written statement and gave written responses to Roberts’s written follow-up 

questions. Roberts took photographs of injuries to Ferguson’s hands (cuts, scrapes, and 

swollen fingers and knuckles) and left elbow (a scrape that Ferguson said occurred when 
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he slammed Adams to the sidewalk). Ferguson was placed under arrest. 

{¶ 13} The following day (June 11), Ferguson was charged by complaint with 

felonious assault in juvenile court. On June 27, 2014, the State filed a motion, pursuant 

to R.C. 2152.10(B) and 2152.12(B), to transfer the matter to the General Division so that 

Ferguson could be tried as an adult. On July 30, the juvenile court held a probable cause 

hearing, at which time Ferguson waived his right to present testimony on probable cause. 

In an August 4, 2014 decision, the juvenile court concluded that Ferguson was more than 

14 years old at the time of the offense, that the act alleged would be a felony if committed 

by an adult, that sufficient evidence exists within the statement of facts as detailed by the 

State to find probable cause, and that there was probable cause to believe that Ferguson 

committed felonious assault. The trial court ordered a mental examination of Ferguson 

and that the probation department prepare a social history. An amenability hearing was 

scheduled for September 17, 2014. 

{¶ 14} On September 8, 2014, after Adams’s death, the State filed an amended 

complaint, charging Ferguson with felonious assault and murder. Contemporaneously, 

the State filed another motion to transfer the matter to adult court. The amenability 

hearing on the felonious assault charge was continued to October 31, 2014. 

{¶ 15} On October 31, 2014 the juvenile court held a probable cause hearing 

regarding the murder charge and an amenability hearing regarding the felonious assault 

charge. The juvenile court concluded that there was probable cause to believe that 

Ferguson had committed murder, an unclassified felony, and the court transferred that 

charge to adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a), the 

mandatory transfer provisions. The same day, the juvenile court filed a written entry, 
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finding probable cause and granting the State’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction and 

transfer the murder charge to adult court under the mandatory transfer provisions. 

{¶ 16} With respect to the amenability hearing for the felonious assault charge, the 

parties stipulated to the psychological report; no testimony was presented. Upon 

considering the factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), the juvenile court concluded 

that Ferguson was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and 

that the safety of the community required that he be subject to adult sanctions. By 

separate entry, the juvenile court certified Ferguson to the adult court for prosecution for 

the felonious assault under the discretionary transfer provisions. 

{¶ 17} For both the murder and felonious assault charges, the juvenile court 

ordered that Ferguson be detained by the juvenile court until the proceeding in adult court 

was concluded. 

{¶ 18} On December 23, 2014, Ferguson was indicted for felonious assault and 

murder. Ferguson entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 

{¶ 19} In April 2015, Ferguson moved to suppress the statements he had made to 

the police, arguing that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his 

Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntarily made. The disputed 

statements consisted of those given on June 10 during his interviews with Detective 

Roberts, as well as statements heard by other officers in connection with court 

proceedings in the juvenile court on December 23, 2014, and January 15, 2015. In 

response to certain testimony provided at the first hearing on the motion to suppress, 

Ferguson filed a supplemental motion to suppress, arguing that his statements on June 

10, 2014 were the result of an unlawful arrest, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
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{¶ 20} Testimony on the motions to suppress was taken on three dates: June 12, 

2015, July 10, 2015, and August 7, 2015. On November 3, 2015, the trial court granted 

in part and overruled in part the motion to suppress. Of relevance here, the trial court 

denied the portion of Ferguson’s motion to suppress related to the statements he had 

made on June 10, 2014. 

{¶ 21} Ferguson waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter was tried to the court 

on February 1 and 2, 2016. The trial court further found that, throughout the altercation, 

Ferguson “[w]as under the influence of sudden passion or in sudden fit of rage owing to 

serious provocation by Mr. Adams that was reasonably sufficient to incite Defendant into 

using deadly force in the heat of blood without time to reflect or for passions to cool and 

2) Mr. Adams’[s] provocation was sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person 

beyond the power of his or her control, particularly given Defendant’s emotional and 

mental state and the conditions and circumstances that surrounded Defendant at the time 

of his acts.” The trial court found Ferguson guilty of aggravated assault and voluntary 

manslaughter, inferior offenses of felonious assault and murder, respectively. 

{¶ 22} The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and the aggravated 

assault at sentencing, and sentenced Ferguson to a maximum prison term of eleven 

years for the voluntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony; pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F), 

the court imposed a mandatory prison term. The court ordered Ferguson to pay 

restitution of $2,884.75 and court costs. 

{¶ 23} Ferguson appeals from his conviction, challenging his bindover from the 

juvenile court on the felonious assault charge, the trial court’s ruling on his motion to 

suppress, and his sentence. We will address his assignments of error in that order. 
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II. Transfer from Juvenile Court 

{¶ 24} In his fifth assignment of error, Ferguson claims that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it determined that Ferguson was not amenable to treatment in the 

juvenile system following an amenability hearing on the felonious assault charge. 

{¶ 25} R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 govern the transfer from juvenile court to the 

appropriate adult court for criminal prosecution. Two types of transfer exist under Ohio’s 

juvenile justice system: discretionary and mandatory. The mandatory transfer provisions 

remove discretion from the juvenile judge in the transfer decision in certain 

circumstances, including when the child is 16 or 17 years old and there is probable cause 

to believe that the child committed aggravated murder, murder, or attempted murder. 

See R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a); State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 

N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 26} R.C. 2152.12(B) grants the juvenile court discretion to transfer a case to the 

common pleas court for prosecution if the child is delinquent for committing an act that 

would be a felony if committed by an adult and the court finds (1) the child was age 14 or 

older at the time of the act charged, (2) there is probable cause to believe that the child 

committed the act charged, and (3) the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation 

within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be 

subject to adult sanctions. R.C. 2152.12(B); see also Juv.R. 30(C). 

{¶ 27} In addition, R.C. 2152.12(I) provides: 

Upon the transfer of a case under division (A) or (B) of this section, the 

juvenile court shall state the reasons for the transfer on the record, and shall 

order the child to enter into a recognizance with good and sufficient surety 
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for the child’s appearance before the appropriate court for any disposition 

that the court is authorized to make for a similar act committed by an adult. 

The transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the 

delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further 

proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be discontinued in the 

juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court 

to which it is transferred as described in division (H) of section 2151.23 of 

the Revised Code. 

{¶ 28} As stated above, the trial court transferred Ferguson to adult court on the 

murder charge based on the mandatory transfer provisions. The juvenile court held an 

amenability hearing regarding the felonious assault charge and transferred that charge 

under the discretionary transfer provisions. On appeal, Ferguson focuses on the 

discretionary transfer. 

{¶ 29} At the outset, we consider whether the juvenile court’s entry is sufficient to 

allow us to review its amenability determination. Although not cited by Ferguson, we 

note that the juvenile court’s judgment entry is substantially similar to the entry reviewed 

by this court in State v. D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26383, 2015-Ohio-3259. 

{¶ 30} In D.H., a 17-year-old youth with no history in the juvenile system was 

bound over to adult court for prosecution of two counts of robbery, both felonies of the 

second degree. As here, the juvenile court in D.H. held an amenability hearing, during 

which the parties stipulated to the report filed by the court psychologist, which indicated 

that she had interviewed D.H. and reviewed numerous other reports. The principal of 

the youth’s school also testified that D.H. had been expelled as a freshman after more 
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than 40 incidents of skipping class and leaving the building during school hours. 

{¶ 31} On review, we held in D.H. that the juvenile court did not provide a “sufficient 

explanation” for us to review its decision that D.H. was not amenable to care or treatment 

in the juvenile system. We noted the juvenile’s court’s entry did not identify the reports 

and records reviewed by the psychologist (only the content of the psychologist report was 

admitted), and it did not identify or discuss what programs were available in the juvenile 

system to satisfy D.H’s health and educational needs, as identified in the psychologist 

report. We further noted that D.H.’s age at the time of the amenability hearing would 

have given him more than 3 years for rehabilitation in the juvenile system, and yet the 

juvenile court’s findings contained no discussion of what rehabilitation goals could or 

could not be accomplished in the juvenile system in that period, or what programs were 

or were not available in the juvenile system to accomplish these goals. The psychologist 

report did not include a recommendation of whether D.H. could be rehabilitated in the 

juvenile justice system. 

{¶ 32} Although the judgment entries in this case and D.H. are similar, D.H. is 

readily distinguishable. In D.H., our inability to review the juvenile court’s amenability 

determination stemmed in large part from the fact that D.H. had no prior history in the 

juvenile justice system. The juvenile court had information that D.H. had a poor school 

attendance record, which ultimately resulted in his expulsion, but there was no indication 

that the juvenile court had information about how those behaviors and punishments would 

translate to the services and sanctions available through the juvenile court. Neither the 

psychologist’s report nor the juvenile court entry discussed any of the programs or 

structure available in the juvenile justice system that could address D.H.’s needs, and the 
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psychologist made no recommendation as to whether D.H. could be rehabilitated in the 

juvenile justice system. 

{¶ 33} In contrast, Ferguson’s involvement with the juvenile justice system began 

in 2011. The dispositional investigative report (DIR) indicates that Ferguson’s prior 

delinquent behaviors included aggravated menacing, unruly/runaway (7 times), 

VCO/EHM (9 times), bicycle rules, domestic violence (3 times), felonious assault (2 

times), resisting arrest, criminal damaging (4 times), jaywalking, receiving stolen property, 

theft, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. Ferguson’s mother reported that he set fire to 

a bed when he was 3-4 years old. The psychologist’s report noted that Ferguson had 

been provided “a wide array of intervention opportunities” through the juvenile court, yet 

Ferguson continued to incur charges and “engaged in a pattern of defiant and assaulting 

actions.” 

{¶ 34} The psychologist’s report provided substantial details about Ferguson’s 

family situation and his educational, substance abuse, and legal history. The 

psychologist stated that Ferguson had reported having serious anger problems since he 

was three years old. Ferguson has had four mental health/substance abuse 

assessments, the first of which occurred in August 2011. Ferguson had previously 

received intensive therapeutic services in a secured, structured environment due to 

delinquency adjudications. Nevertheless, Ferguson had made several statements which 

reflected “a reckless disregard for societal rules or authority, a blatant disrespect for the 

rights of others, and seemingly no concern for how his actions affect anyone.” When 

asked what he had learned from his therapeutic experiences, Ferguson responded, 

“Nothing. I didn’t care. I didn’t listen. I didn’t want to change and didn’t care.” 
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{¶ 35} Accordingly, we find that we are able to review the juvenile court’s 

amenability determination in this case, and we turn to whether the juvenile court erred in 

transferring the felonious assault count to adult court. Again, in light of Aalim II, the 

juvenile court was required to transfer the murder charge to adult court under the 

mandatory transfer provisions. 

{¶ 36} We have repeatedly interpreted R.C. 2152.12(I) to mandate the transfer of 

a discretionary-transfer offense when it is founded on the same course of conduct as 

another offense which must be transferred. See State v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 25853, 2014-Ohio-1971; State v. Henderson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

21866, 2007-Ohio-5368; State v. Washington, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20226, 2005-

Ohio-6546, ¶ 25. 

{¶ 37} In Washington, the juvenile-defendant was charged in juvenile court with 

carrying a concealed weapon and aggravated robbery involving use of a deadly weapon. 

The juvenile court determined that the aggravated robbery was a mandatory-bindover 

offense, and it transferred the case to adult court. Washington moved in the adult court 

to dismiss the CCW charge, arguing that the juvenile court acted improperly when it 

ordered him bound over on that charge. We rejected Washington’s argument, 

reasoning: 

None of the [mandatory bindover] provisions cited above apply to the 

CCW charge, which is a non-category offense. However, R.C. 2152.12(I) 

provides that when a “case” is transferred pursuant to division (A) of that 

section “[t]he transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with 

respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the 
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transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be 

discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the 

jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred as described in division (H) 

of section 2151.23 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.23(H) likewise 

terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile division after a transfer is ordered. 

There is no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile. Rather, 

recognizing the value of treating juveniles differently, the General 

Assembly, acting pursuant to the authority conferred on it by Article IV, 

Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution to determine the jurisdiction of the 

court of common pleas and its divisions, has conferred exclusive jurisdiction 

over alleged juvenile offenders on the juvenile division of the court of 

common pleas. R.C. 2151.26. [sic] Statutory provisions creating 

exceptions to that jurisdiction through transfer to the general division, 

whether discretionary or mandatory, likewise represent an exercise of the 

General Assembly’s power. R.C. 2[1]52.12(I), which mandates transfer of 

a “non-category” offense charge when it is founded on the same course of 

conduct as another offense which must be transferred, is such a 

jurisdictional provision. Its object is judicial economy; to prevent dual 

proceedings in the two divisions. Presumably, the General Assembly has 

found that the value of judicial economy in that regard outweighs any benefit 

that would otherwise accrue by treating the alleged offender as a juvenile. 

Because the alleged aggravated robbery and CCW offenses 

underlying Defendant’s two delinquency charges arose from a common 
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nucleus of operative facts, and the juvenile division having properly ordered 

proceedings on the aggravated robbery charge transferred to the general 

division pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1(b) [sic], all further proceedings in the 

juvenile division on the CCW charge in the “case” were thereafter 

discontinued per R.C. 2152.12(I) and the juvenile division’s jurisdiction was 

terminated. The juvenile division court was then relieved of any 

requirement that R.C. 2152.12(F) otherwise imposes to conduct further 

hearings or to make findings with respect to Defendant’s eligibility to be tried 

as a juvenile on the CCW offense before transferring proceedings on that 

charge to the general division. The juvenile division’s bind-over order 

operated to confer exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate those charges on the 

general division court. 

Washington at ¶ 24-26. 

{¶ 38} We have applied Washington on several occasions. In Henderson, we 

concluded, citing Washington, that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over two discretionary 

bindover charges (abduction and kidnapping) was terminated upon properly ordering that 

proceedings on the mandatory-bindover offenses (aggravated robbery and aggravated 

burglary) be transferred to the general division of the common pleas court pursuant to 

R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b). We further stated that, “because the juvenile court had 

appropriately transferred all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged, it was not 

required to make findings pursuant to [R.C.] 2152.12(B) as to whether Henderson was 

amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, or whether the safety of the 

community required that he be subject to adult sanctions.” Henderson at ¶ 14. 
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{¶ 39} More recently, in Brookshire, the defendant asked us to “revisit our 

interpretation and application of R.C. 2152.12(I) in Washington and Henderson.” 

Brookshire at ¶ 16. We declined to do so, concluding that “we will continue to interpret 

R.C. 2152.12(I) to mandate the transfer of a discretionary transfer offense when it is 

founded on the same course of conduct as another offense which must be transferred.” 

Brookshire at ¶ 21. 

{¶ 40} This conclusion is consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent opinion 

in State v. D.B., Ohio Sup.Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-6952, which noted that “[c]ases 

of juvenile defendants that fall into these [mandatory-transfer] categories are transferred 

out of the juvenile system without any judicial finding of the juvenile’s amenability to care 

or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.” (Emphasis added.) D.B. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 41} Here, once the trial court determined that it was required to transfer the 

murder charge to adult court pursuant to the mandatory bindover statutes, the juvenile 

court was required to transfer the felonious assault charge, which was founded on the 

same course of conduct as the murder charge. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over both 

charges terminated, and the juvenile court was not required to conduct an amenability 

hearing with respect to the felonious assault charge. Although the juvenile court, in fact, 

held an amenability hearing on the felonious assault charge, that hearing and the juvenile 

court’s subsequent discretionary transfer order has no import. 

{¶ 42} Even if we were to evaluate whether the juvenile court abused its discretion 

in finding that Ferguson was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system, we would 

find no abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 43} Before a discretionary transfer, the juvenile court must “order an 
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investigation into the child’s social history, education, family situation, and any other factor 

bearing on whether the child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental 

examination of the child.” R.C. 2152.12(C). In determining whether a juvenile should 

be bound-over on a discretionary transfer charge, the juvenile court must consider the 

statutory factors (and any other relevant factors) in favor of and against transfer. R.C. 

2152.12(B), (D), and (E). 

{¶ 44} “[A]n amenability hearing is a broad assessment of individual circumstances 

and is inherently individualized and fact-based. Thus, a juvenile court’s determination 

regarding a child’s amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system is reviewed by an 

appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 

2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 45} At Ferguson’s amenability hearing, counsel for the State and Ferguson 

waived their right to present evidence concerning amenability, and the parties agreed that 

the juvenile court would make its determination solely on “the file the [juvenile court] has 

received, the updated DIR, as well as the psychological report presented to the [juvenile 

court].” In its oral findings, the juvenile court discussed the psychological report in detail, 

including the mental health and substance abuse assessments Ferguson has had and 

Ferguson’s continued problem with drugs. The court further discussed the services 

Ferguson had previously received through the juvenile court, including probation and 

placement at CAS and JCARE. The juvenile court concluded that, “through all the 

services that have been supplied to [Ferguson], he simply didn’t care and doesn’t care, 

by his own words.” The juvenile court found that Ferguson had shown no remorse for 

his actions toward Adams and that Ferguson had “decided that socially inappropriate 
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behaviors, such as hitting or choking other people,” are acceptable ways to respond to 

problems. The juvenile court’s written judgment entry made findings on each of the 

factors to be considered in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). 

{¶ 46} On appeal, Ferguson argues that, in determining that he was not amenable 

to treatment in the juvenile system, the juvenile court did not consider why the array of 

available juvenile dispositions would not rehabilitate him or how he would fare in the 

criminal justice system. Ferguson emphasized that he had “nearly four years to be 

rehabilitated in the juvenile justice system,” and that he could have received long-term, 

structured mental health programming at DYS. He further noted that, in adult prison, he 

would not receive any of the treatment that is available in the juvenile justice system and 

at DYS institutions, and that transferring him to adult prison would likely not increase 

public safety. 

{¶ 47} The record reflects that, in considering whether Ferguson was amenable to 

care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the juvenile court considered Ferguson’s 

“extensive disposition investigative report” and the services that Ferguson had previously 

received in the juvenile court. The DIR summary section indicated that, since being 

placed on probation in 2011, Ferguson “has been placed under the Court’s supervision 

on five separate charges, has received a Violation of Court Order seven times and he 

received a Violation of EHM on four occasions. In regards to services, the youth has 

been in Detention eleven times, Corrections Once, EHMN six times, CAS on two 

occasions, and JCARE on two occasions. Additionally, this youth had three 

unsuccessful stints with LIFE and JCARE aftercare.” The juvenile court spoke 

extensively about Ferguson’s indifference to the services and treatment options available 
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to him, noting that Ferguson had come to accept his violent behavior as normal and that 

Ferguson had repeatedly stated that he “didn’t care” and “didn’t want to change” his 

behavior. 

{¶ 48} Although the juvenile court did not expressly address why placement with 

the Department of Youth Services would be an inadequate sanction, it is clear that the 

juvenile court considered Ferguson’s extensive history in the juvenile court, the 

circumstances of the current offense, Ferguson’s attitude to the current offense and to 

rehabilitation, and Ferguson’s maturity. The juvenile court did not indicate that it had 

considered how Ferguson would fare in the adult criminal system, but the juvenile court 

was not statutorily required to consider that factor, to the extent that it differs from 

consideration of whether Ferguson was emotionally, physically and psychologically 

mature enough for the transfer. Based on the record, the juvenile court reasonably 

concluded that there was not sufficient time to rehabilitate Ferguson within the juvenile 

system and that the level of security available in the juvenile system does not provide a 

reasonable assurance of public safety. 

{¶ 49} Accordingly, even if we were to consider the issue, we would find no abuse 

of discretion in the juvenile court’s finding, with respect to the felonious assault charge, 

that Ferguson was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and 

that the safety of the community required that he be subject to adult sanctions. 

{¶ 50} Ferguson’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Motion to Suppress 

{¶ 51} Ferguson’s second assignment claims that the trial court “erred when it 

failed to suppress the statements made by Darryl Ferguson, as a result of officers illegally 
-20-

arresting him.” 

{¶ 52} The State’s evidence presented at the suppression hearing consisted of the 

testimony of five law enforcement officers – Detective Rod Roberts, Officers Mitch 

Olmsted and Edmond Trick, and Deputies Douglas Olt and Jerry Schwartz – and several 

exhibits. Ferguson testified on his own behalf. The trial court found the officers’ 

testimony to be credible, and it found Ferguson’s “self-serving testimony to be completely 

incredible insofar as it would contradict the testimony of the law enforcement officers.” 

Based on the State’s evidence, the trial court found the following facts. 

{¶ 53} During the investigation into the assault on Adams, the Dayton Police 

Department received tips from two identified individuals, from Miami Valley Crime 

Stoppers, and from an anonymous telephone call placed to Officer Olmsted; each of the 

tips implicated Farrell and Ferguson. Specifically, the witnesses stated that Farrell and 

Ferguson had bragged about beating Adams. 

{¶ 54} On or about June 10, 2014, Detective Roberts asked Officer Olmsted to 

locate Ferguson and Farrell, both of whom Olmsted knew from the neighborhood, and to 

bring them to the Safety Building to speak with him (Detective Roberts). At 

approximately 8:45 a.m., wearing the uniform of the day, Officer Olmsted drove his 

marked cruiser to Ferguson’s address. En route, Olmsted asked for backup, and Officer 

Trick responded. When Olmsted knocked on the front door to Ferguson’s home, the 

individual who answered told Olmsted that Ferguson was at his girlfriend’s house, which 

was on the same street. The officers walked down the block to the girlfriend’s house. 

{¶ 55} At the girlfriend’s house, an adult unknown to Officers Olmstead and Trick 

answered the door with a large dog. The officers indicated that they were looking for 
-21-

Ferguson and asked the man if they could enter. The man answered affirmatively, 

restrained the dog, and directed the officers to a bedroom occupied by Ferguson and his 

girlfriend. Upon encountering Ferguson, the officers informed him that Detective Roberts 

wished to speak with him; Ferguson “freely and voluntarily consented to do so.” 

{¶ 56} Thereafter, the officers and Ferguson walked out of Ferguson’s girlfriend’s 

house and toward Ferguson’s residence, where the officers’ cruisers were parked. 

Ferguson was not handcuffed and was wearing a white t-shirt, basketball shorts, and 

sandals. As they walked together, Officer Olmsted asked Ferguson where Farrell was, 

and Ferguson replied at his (Ferguson’s) house. The officers placed Ferguson in the 

rear of Trick’s cruiser and, after locating Farrell, placed Farrell in the rear of Olmsted’s 

cruiser. Ferguson and Farrell were separately transported, without handcuffs, to the 

Safety Building. The officers brought Ferguson and Farrell through the non-public 

entrance and placed in separate interview rooms. 

{¶ 57} Detective Roberts interviewed Ferguson twice on June 10, 2015. At 

approximately 9:26 a.m., Detective Roberts, along with Detective Rebecca Rasor, began 

the first interview. Before asking questions, Detective Roberts obtained Ferguson’s 

“identifiers” and explained to Ferguson that he was being interviewed regarding an 

allegation of felonious assault; Ferguson indicated that he had been Mirandized before. 

Roberts informed Ferguson of his Miranda rights using a pre-interview form, on which 

Ferguson “placed his initials next to each delineated right, reading the first right aloud, 

and signing the form at the bottom after agreeing to be interviewed.” Ferguson indicated 

that he had completed ten years of schooling. Additionally, when Detective Roberts read 

aloud the Waiver of Rights section, Roberts asked Ferguson if he understood the term 
-22-

“coercion”, and when Defendant indicated that he did not, Roberts explained the meaning 

of the term. 

{¶ 58} Ferguson subsequently made statements that implicated Farrell in the 

assault. At the conclusion of the interview, Ferguson consented to giving a DNA sample 

to Detective Roberts. Ferguson requested to use the restroom, and the detectives 

granted that request. The first interview ended at approximately 10:33 a.m. 

{¶ 59} Ferguson was taken to a smaller interview room while Detective Roberts 

interviewed Farrell and further investigated the matter at the crime scene. While 

Ferguson waited in the interview room, Officer Trick checked in on Ferguson 

approximately every 20 minutes, asking him (Ferguson) if he needed food, water, or to 

use the restroom. 

{¶ 60} Ferguson was again interviewed by Detective Roberts at approximately 

2:59 p.m., approximately 41⁄2 hours after the conclusion of the first interview. Roberts 

asked Ferguson if he remembered going over his Miranda rights prior to the first interview, 

and Ferguson responded affirmatively. Roberts also inquired as to whether Ferguson 

still understood his rights, and Ferguson responded that he did. Detective Roberts told 

Ferguson that he had further investigated the matter and had spoken with numerous 

individuals, including Farrell. Roberts told Ferguson that he believed Ferguson had been 

untruthful during his interview. Ferguson subsequently made incriminating statements. 

The second interview concluded at approximately 3:28 p.m. 

{¶ 61} Detective Roberts asked Ferguson if he would provide a written statement, 

and Ferguson agreed. Detective Roberts and Detective Tom Cope, who also 

participated in the interview, left the room while Ferguson wrote his statement. After 
-23-

Ferguson completed his written statement, he knocked on the door and Detective Roberts 

returned to the interview room. Roberts then asked three “yes or no” follow-up 

questions, which Roberts wrote below Ferguson’s written statement; Ferguson 

responded yes to each question and initialed next to each response. Ferguson was 

arrested for felonious assault. 

{¶ 62} The trial court also heard testimony about statements that Ferguson made 

on December 23, 2014, and January 15, 2015. On December 23, Deputy Schwartz, 

while providing security for the juvenile court, overheard a statement made by Ferguson 

to his father. On January 15, Deputy Olt conversed with Ferguson while walking 

Ferguson from the “juvenile jail” to the courthouse. 

{¶ 63} Ferguson testified on his own behalf regarding the June 10 interviews. 

According to Ferguson, Officer Olmsted arrived at his girlfriend’s residence at 6:30 a.m. 

and knocked on the door. Ferguson’s girlfriend answered the door. Olmsted asked if 

he could speak with Ferguson, and Ferguson walked over. Olmsted then told Ferguson 

that he (Ferguson) had to go with him (Olmsted). Ferguson responded that he did not 

want to go with the officer, but Olmsted said that Ferguson had to. Ferguson 

acknowledged that he was not handcuffed and that Olmsted did not say that he 

(Ferguson) was under arrest. However, Olmsted had said that Ferguson had to go with 

him, and Ferguson was placed in the back of a cruiser. Ferguson testified that Detective 

Roberts treated him well and provided him food, water, and opportunities to use the 

restroom. Ferguson also stated that he gave his written statement voluntarily. As 

stated above, the trial court found Ferguson’s testimony to be not credible to the extent 

that it conflicted with the officers’ testimony. 
-24-

{¶ 64} In its suppression ruling, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that 

Detective Roberts never instructed Officer Olmsted to arrest Farrell or Ferguson and that 

Olmsted did not do so on the morning of June 10, 2014. The court further found, as a 

matter of fact, that Ferguson “freely and voluntary came with Offs. Olmstead [sic] and 

Trick to the Safety Building and that neither Defendant nor Mr. Farrell were told they were 

under arrest nor were they, despite the fact that DPD certainly had probable cause to 

arrest them based upon the state of DPD’s ongoing investigation into the Adams’ 

beating.” Additionally, the court found, as a matter of fact, that Ferguson was not free to 

leave the Safety Building following his first interview with Detective Roberts. 

{¶ 65} The trial court denied Ferguson’s motion to suppress the June 10 

statements. It concluded that Ferguson was not in custody when he was transported to 

the police department on the morning of June 10, 2014, and regardless, Ferguson was 

properly notified of his Miranda rights. The court further stated that those warnings were 

not stale for Ferguson’s second interview. The court also found that Ferguson did not 

invoke his Miranda rights, and there was no evidence that Ferguson’s statements were 

involuntary. 

{¶ 66} The court further concluded that, even if Ferguson did not voluntarily 

accompany Officers Olmsted and Trick to the police department, the police had probable 

cause to arrest him. The court stated that, “pursuant to New York v. Harris and State v. 

Cranford, preexisting probable cause in this case provided DPD with a legitimate basis 

for Defendant’s arrest and his statements after being properly Mirandized cannot be the 

fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Emphasis in original.) 

{¶ 67} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress the statements overheard 
-25-

by Deputy Schwartz, as they were not the product of custodial interrogation. The court 

suppressed the statements to Deputy Olt “in an abundance of caution.” 

{¶ 68} On appeal, Ferguson argues that (1) he was placed under arrest when 

Officers Olmsted and Trick took him to the police station on the morning of June 10, 2014, 

(2) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him, and (3) the attenuation doctrine 

does not apply. Ferguson does not argue that his Miranda rights were not properly 

provided, that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, or that his statements were 

involuntarily given. Rather, he asserts that, since he was unlawfully arrested on the 

morning of June 10, his subsequent statements should have been suppressed as fruit of 

the poisonous tree. 

{¶ 69} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the 

trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate 

the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 

N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Curley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27104, 2016-Ohio7624, ¶ 9. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial 

court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford

at 592. “Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of 

law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable 

legal standard.” Id. 

{¶ 70} Whether Ferguson was under arrest when he was interviewed at the police 

station and whether he was in custody at that time for Miranda purposes are equivalent 

questions. “Custodial interrogation” means questioning initiated by the police after the 

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom to the degree 
-26-

associated with a formal arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 

16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Engle, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25226, 2013-Ohio-1818, 

¶ 24. The inquiry whether a person is subject to custodial interrogation focuses upon 

how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation. 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). We 

have considered factors, such as the location of the interview, whether the defendant was 

a suspect, whether the defendant’s freedom to leave was restricted in any way, and 

whether there were threats or intimidation. State v. Hatten, 186 Ohio App.3d 286, 2010-

Ohio-499, 927 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Estepp, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 16279, 1997 WL 736501, *4 (Nov. 26, 1997). The subjective views of the 

interviewing officer and the suspect are immaterial to the determination of whether a 

custodial interrogation was conducted. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 

S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Hatten at ¶ 50. 

{¶ 71} In this case, at 8:45 a.m., two officers went into a bedroom occupied by 

Ferguson and his girlfriend, and they told Ferguson that a detective wanted to talk with 

him. Officer Trick testified that he asked Ferguson if he (Ferguson) was willing to come 

downtown and that Ferguson had agreed. Based on the testimony of Olmsted and Trick, 

the trial court expressly found that Ferguson voluntarily agreed to go with the officers to 

the station. (The trial court also expressly rejected the suggestion that Ferguson was 

told that he did not have a choice.) The officers waited while Ferguson looked for shoes 

to wear. Ferguson was not handcuffed, nor was he told that he was under arrest. He 

walked down the block to the cruisers. No weapons were drawn, and no threats were 

made. Although Ferguson was transported to the police station in a cruiser and was 
-27-

taken to an interview room through a non-public entry, the officers’ conduct toward 

Ferguson was not the functional equivalent of placing Ferguson under arrest. Contrast 

State v. Armstead, 2015-Ohio-5010, 50 N.E.3d 1073 (2d Dist.) (affirming the suppression 

of statements made to the police after the defendant, based on a “suspect locator hit,” 

was removed from a stopped vehicle, patted down, placed in a cruiser, and taken to the 

station, without probable cause). 

{¶ 72} Although Ferguson was not under arrest when he was taken to the police 

station, the record demonstrates that he was detained by the police for a lengthy period 

of time between his first and second interview. After Detective Roberts terminated the 

first interview, he did not inform Ferguson that he (Ferguson) was free to leave. In fact, 

Roberts testified that he would not have permitted Ferguson to leave the premises. 

Rather, Roberts placed Ferguson in a smaller interview room while he (Roberts) spoke 

with Farrell and conducted additional investigation. The detective instructed Officer Trick 

to check on Ferguson periodically and to offer food and water. Ferguson remained in 

the interview room, alone, for 41⁄2 hours. 

{¶ 73} We question whether Ferguson voluntarily remained at the police station 

after his first interview. However, Ferguson has not specifically argued – either in the 

trial court or on appeal ̶ that, after the first interview, he was unlawfully arrested or 

unlawfully held as part of an investigatory detention. Accordingly, we conclude that this 

argument has been waived, and we will not address it in the first instance. 

{¶ 74} In light of our conclusion that Ferguson voluntarily came to the police station 

and was not under arrest, we need not address Ferguson’s derivative arguments that the 

police officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the attenuation doctrine does 
-28-

not apply. Ferguson’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Imposition of Maximum Sentence 

{¶ 75} In his third assignment of error, Ferguson claims that the trial court erred 

when it sentenced him to the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony. 

{¶ 76} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of 

review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather than an abuse of discretion standard. See 

State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it 

may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it “clearly and convincingly” 

finds either (1) that the record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the 

sentence imposed is contrary to law. 

{¶ 77} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the 

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its 

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-

Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in exercising its discretion, a trial 

court must consider the statutory criteria that apply to every felony offense, including 

those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App.3d 

500, 2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38. 

{¶ 78} R.C. 2929.11 requires trial courts to be guided by the overriding purposes 

of felony sentencing. Those purposes are “to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court 

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state 
-29-

or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). The court must “consider the need 

for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, 

rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, 

or both.” Id. R.C. 2929.11(B) further provides that “[a] sentence imposed for a felony 

shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony 

sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the 

offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed 

for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” 

{¶ 79} R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth nine factors indicating that an offender’s conduct 

is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense; R.C. 2929.12(C) sets forth 

four factors indicating that an offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense. R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) each lists five factors that trial courts 

are to consider regarding the offender’s likelihood of committing future crimes. Finally, 

R.C. 2929.12(F) requires the sentencing court to consider the offender’s military service 

record. 

{¶ 80} At sentencing, the trial court did not orally provide an explanation for its 

maximum sentence (and restitution). However, the trial court explicitly stated that it had 

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing “set forth in the Code, including 

avoiding unnecessary burden on government resources, the seriousness and recidivism 

factors of the Code, the dictates of 2929.13 and as otherwise set forth in the Revised 

Code including Mr. Ferguson’s present and future ability to pay financial sanctions 

including any restitution.” Upon review of the record, Ferguson’s sentence was neither 

contrary to law nor clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. 
-30-

{¶ 81} Ferguson’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

V. “Reverse” or “Return” Bindover 

{¶ 82} Ferguson’s fourth assignment of error claims that the trial court erred when 

it failed to sentence Ferguson in accordance with R.C. 2152.121. 

{¶ 83} R.C. 2152.121(B) governs what the adult court must do once a juvenile who 

has been transferred from juvenile court pursuant to the mandatory transfer provisions 

has been found guilty of an offense in adult court. Under these provisions, the adult court 

must determine if the offense(s) of which the juvenile has been found guilty would have 

required mandatory transfer or discretionary transfer from the juvenile court to adult court. 

R.C. 2152.121(B)(1). “In other words, the trial court must determine what the juvenile 

court would have been required to do with the case if the juvenile had been charged with 

only those offenses for which convictions were obtained.” (Emphasis in original.) D.B., 

Ohio Sup.Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-6952, ¶ 12. Three options are possible: 

 If mandatory transfer would have been required for the case, the adult court 

proceeds to sentence the juvenile as usual. R.C. 2152.121(B)(4); see D.B. at ¶ 

19. 

 If mandatory transfer would not have been required and discretionary transfer 

would not have been allowed, the adult court must transfer jurisdiction of the case 

back to the juvenile court. R.C. 2152.121(B)(2). 

 If the court determines that mandatory transfer would not have been required but 

that discretionary transfer would have been allowed, the adult court must 

“determine the sentence it believes should be imposed upon the child under 

Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, shall impose that sentence upon the child, 
-31-

and shall stay that sentence pending completion of the procedures specified in this 

division. Upon imposition and staying of the sentence, the court shall transfer 

jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court that initially transferred the case 

and the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this division.” R.C. 

2152.121(B)(3). 

{¶ 84} Upon transfer back to the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2152.121(B)(3), 

the juvenile court is required to impose a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence. 

R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(a). However, within 14 days of the transfer, the prosecuting 

attorney may file a motion objecting to the imposition of such a sentence and asking for 

the adult sentence to be invoked. R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(b). If such a motion is filed, the 

juvenile court must conduct an amenability hearing. Id. If the juvenile court grants the 

prosecutor’s motion, the juvenile court must transfer jurisdiction of the case back to the 

adult court in which the juvenile was convicted, and the sentence that was imposed but 

stayed by the adult court will be invoked. Id. 

{¶ 85} On appeal, Ferguson contends that the trial court was required to stay his 

sentence for voluntary manslaughter and transfer the case back to juvenile court, 

pursuant to R.C. 2152.121(B)(3). He argues: 

In this case, voluntary manslaughter is not a mandatory transfer 

offense because Darryl was not alleged to have used a firearm and Darryl 

had not previously been committed to the Department of Youth Services; 

therefore, Darryl was only eligible for discretionary transfer for that offense. 

Compare R.C. 2152.10(A)(2) with R.C. 2152.10(B). As such, R.C. 

2152.121(B)(3) was triggered, and the criminal court was required to stay 
-32-

Darryl’s sentence, and return his case to the juvenile court to receive a SYO 

disposition or an amenability hearing. R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(a)-(b). But, 

the proceedings required by R.C. 2152.121 did not occur in this case. 

At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that the reverse waiver 

statute was not triggered because the juvenile court conducted an 

amenability hearing on the felonious assault charge. * * * But, as this Court 

noted in 2014, 

the fact that the juvenile court properly transferred the cases 

to adult court does not end our analysis. Whether all of the 

charges were properly transferred from the juvenile court to 

the adult court is a different question than whether the adult 

court could subsequently impose sentences on all six of the 

offenses. R.C. 2152.121(B) governs what the adult court 

must do once a juvenile has been found guilty of an offense 

in adult court that previously was transferred from juvenile 

court. 

State v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25859, 2014-Ohio-4858, ¶ 

18. In that case, this Court held that because some of the child’s offenses 

were not subject to mandatory transfer, the sentencing court must comply 

with R.C. 2152.121. Brookshire at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 86} The State responds that Brookshire is distinguishable, because the youth 

in Brookshire was transferred to adult court under the mandatory transfer provisions, and 

no amenability hearing was conducted in the juvenile court. The State argues that, 
-33-

because “the juvenile court had already determined Ferguson was not amenable to 

treatment and supervision in the juvenile system, the reverse bindover provision in the 

Revised Code did not apply in this case.” 

{¶ 87} Our opinion in Brookshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25859, 2014-Ohio4858, concerned whether the adult court erred in sentencing Brookshire on both the 

mandatory bindover offenses and the discretionary bindover offenses to which he had 

pled guilty. We held that R.C. 2152.121 required the adult court to transfer the 

discretionary-transfer offenses back to juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 28, as amended by State 

v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25859, 2014-Ohio-5368. 

{¶ 88} The Ohio Supreme Court recently reversed our judgment in Brookshire.

See D.B., supra. It held that the adult court was required to sentence the juvenile “for all 

the convictions in the case” if the juvenile were convicted of at least one offense that was 

subject to mandatory transfer. D.B. at ¶ 19. The Supreme Court reasoned that R.C. 

2152.121(B) governs how a juvenile’s case, not the individual offenses, should be treated 

by the adult court for sentencing. 

{¶ 89} The issues raised in Brookshire have little relevance to this case, given 

Ferguson was not found guilty of both mandatory transfer and discretionary transfer 

offenses. Accordingly, even if Brookshire had not been reversed, we would find it 

inapposite. 

{¶ 90} We nevertheless find the State’s arguments unpersuasive for two reasons. 

First, the procedures set forth in R.C. 2152.121 are clear and unambiguous, and the adult 

court does not have the discretion to ignore its mandates. Pursuant to the mandatory 

bindover provisions, Ferguson was bound over to the General Division (adult court) on 
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the murder charge, and he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary 

manslaughter is a Category Two offense, as defined by former R.C. 2152.02 (CC)(1) (now 

R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1)), and under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2), a child charged with a Category 

Two offense (other than kidnapping) is subject to mandatory transfer only if the child was 

16 years old or older at the time of the offense and either 

(a) The child previously was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing 

an act that is a category one or a category two offense and was committed 

to the legal custody of the department of youth services on the basis of that 

adjudication[, and/or] 

(b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child’s person 

or under the child's control while committing the act charged and to have 

displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the 

firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged. 

{¶ 91} Ferguson did not meet all of the necessary criteria under R.C. 

2152.10(A)(2), and therefore voluntary manslaughter was not a mandatory bindover 

offense for Ferguson. However, pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B), Ferguson was eligible for 

discretionary transfer for the offense. Accordingly, pursuant to R.C. 2152.121, the trial 

court was required to impose a sentence for voluntary manslaughter, stay the sentence, 

and transfer the matter back to the juvenile court for proceedings in accordance with R.C. 

2152.121(B)(3). 

{¶ 92} Second, we reject the State’s argument that a “reverse bindover” was not 

required, because the juvenile court had already conducted an amenability hearing with 

respect to the felonious assault charge and, in the exercise of its discretion, had 
-35-

determined that Ferguson was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile 

system or that the safety of the community required that he be subject solely to adult 

sanctions. As stated above, because the juvenile court was required to transfer 

Ferguson under the mandatory transfer provisions, the amenability hearing had no legal 

import. 

{¶ 93} Moreover, the juvenile court’s amenability hearing was held in October 

2014; Ferguson was sentenced in February 2016. Although we infer from the State’s 

brief that it would choose to file a motion for invocation of the adult sentence if the matter 

were remanded to the juvenile court, it is possible that the State’s opinion of Ferguson 

could have changed in the intervening sixteen months since his amenability hearing and 

that it would elect not to file a motion under R.C. 2152.121(B)(3)(b). 

{¶ 94} Similarly, it is possible that, with sixteen additional months of maturity and 

experience, a second amenability hearing might include additional information that could 

alter the juvenile court’s determination of Ferguson’s amenability to care or rehabilitation 

in the juvenile system or on his dangerousness to the community. At sentencing, 

Ferguson’s counsel stated: “[W]hen I met Darryl, he was – it was about two years ago. 

He was an immature little guy. But in the time that he’s spent in the Juvenile Court he 

has grown and he has matured to some degree. I think hi[s] being with the supervision 

in the Juvenile Court, I think he’s learned a lot from the adults there, from the staff. And 

I think he’s matured. And I think you’ll see that that [sic] he has grown, matured, and he 

is remorseful for what he’s done.” Ferguson made similar statements at his sentencing: 

I would like to say I’m sorry for my actions. I would like to ask if Mr. Adams’ 

family will forgive me for what I did and the pain that I caused for I know 
-36-

what I did was wrong and nobody deserved to lose their life over some 

words that can’t hurt you. Before I got locked up I was very immature and 

now I feel like I have matured a lot. I got a different perspective on life. 

Before I didn’t care about life and now I realize that, in a matter of minutes, 

I could be facing a long time over a bad choice. I would like to thank you 

for allowing me to speak today in court. I would like to ask one more time 

that Mr. Adams’ family will forgive me for my actions for I know what I did 

was wrong. 

{¶ 95} We recognize that the adult court’s presentence investigation report 

indicates that Ferguson admitted to being in at least five physical altercations while being 

held in detention while this case was pending. The last altercation was over Ferguson’s 

not being passed a ball in a game of kickball. This information would also be available 

for the juvenile court to consider in an amenability hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.121. 

{¶ 96} Ferguson’s fourth assignment of error is sustained. 

VI. Imposition of Mandatory Sentence – State v. Hand

{¶ 97} In his first assignment of error, Ferguson claims that the trial court erred in 

imposing a mandatory prison term, based on his prior juvenile adjudication. Specifically, 

Ferguson states that the trial court erroneously used Ferguson’s prior juvenile 

adjudication for felonious assault, a second-degree felony, as a prior conviction and made 

Ferguson’s sentence mandatory, pursuant to R.C. 2901.08(A) and R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). 

Ferguson asks that his sentence be vacated and the matter be remanded for 

resentencing. 

{¶ 98} R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) requires a mandatory sentence for a first or second 
-37-

degree felony if the offender had been previously convicted of or pleaded guilty to any 

first or second degree felony. R.C. 2901.08(A) reads: 

If a person is alleged to have committed an offense and if the person 

previously has been adjudicated a delinquent child * * * for a violation of a 

law or ordinance, except as provided in division (B) of this section, the 

adjudication as a delinquent child * * * is a conviction for a violation of the 

law or ordinance for purposes of determining the offense with which the 

person should be charged and, if the person is convicted of or pleads guilty 

to an offense, the sentence to be imposed upon the person relative to the 

conviction or guilty plea. 

{¶ 99} In State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, the 

Ohio Supreme Court held that “R.C. 2901.08(A) violates the Due Process Clauses of 

Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution because it is fundamentally unfair to treat a juvenile adjudication as a 

previous conviction that enhances either the degree of or the sentence for a subsequent 

offense committed as an adult.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Hand further held 

that, “[b]ecause a juvenile adjudication is not established through a procedure that 

provides the right to a jury trial, it cannot be used to increase a sentence beyond a 

statutory maximum or mandatory minimum.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 100} The State agrees that Hand has the effect of changing Ferguson’s 

mandatory sentence for voluntary manslaughter into a non-mandatory term. However, 

it argues that, because Hand does not change the length of the prison term, there is no 

reason for the matter to be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. It argues that 
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the proper remedy is for this Court to modify Ferguson’s sentence and to order the trial 

court to issue an amended termination entry removing the language that makes 

Ferguson’s prison term mandatory. 

{¶ 101} Especially in light our disposition of Ferguson’s fourth assignment of error 

concerning R.C. 2152.121, the appropriate resolution is to reverse Ferguson’s sentence 

and remand to the adult trial court for resentencing. At that time, the trial court may 

reconsider the length of Ferguson’s sentence prior to staying its sentence and remanding 

the matter back to the juvenile court. Nothing in this Opinion prevents the trial court from 

imposing the same prison term as a non-mandatory term. 

VII. Conclusion 

{¶ 102} In light of our disposition of Ferguson’s first and fourth assignments of 

error, Ferguson’s sentence will be reversed, and the matter will be remanded to the trial 

court for resentencing and compliance with R.C. 2152.121. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

DONOVAN, J., concurs. 

HALL, P.J., concurring in judgment only. 

Copies mailed to: 

Lynne R. Nothstine 

Francisco E. Luttecke 

Charlyn Bohland 

Hon. Steven K. Dankof 

Hon. Anthony Capizzi