J-A17020-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PARKTOWN PARTNERSHIP, L.P., BY ITS 

GENERAL PARTNER: P.T. DINNOCENTI 

LLC C/O PALLADINO DEVELOPMENT 

GROUP, INC.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROYERSFORD RECOVERY

APPEAL OF: JOHN LEONARD

No. 3228 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-25761

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2016

John Leonard appeals, pro se, from the trial court’s order denying his 

petition to strike a judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Parktown 

Partnership, L.P. (Parktown), in this confession of judgment action. We 

dismiss the appeal.

Parktown is a Pennsylvania limited partnership; its general partner is 

Appellee, P.T. Dinnocenti LLC, c/o Palladino Development Group, Inc. 

(Palladino). Royersford Recovery (Royersford) is a Pennsylvania non-profit 

organization. In December 2014, Royersford entered into a ten-year lease 

agreement for the rental of 2,300 square feet of commercial space from 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Parktown at Parktown Plaza, located at Lewis Road and Oak Street, in 

Limerick, Pennsylvania. The lease contains a confession of judgment clause, 

for both money damages and possession, which states in part:

Tenant hereby knowingly, intentionally, voluntarily and 

irrevocably agrees that, if fixed minimum rent or any charges 

hereby reserved as additional rent or liquidated damages, or any 

other sum payable hereunder shall remain unpaid when the 

same is due beyond any applicable grace period (if any), tenant 

hereby empowers any Prothonotary or attorney of any court of 

record to appeal for tenant in any and all actions which may be 

brought for such rent, liquidated damages or other charges or 

expenses agreed to be paid by tenant, hereunder, and to confess 

judgment against tenant in any competent court for the recovery 

of such rent, liquidated damages or other charges or expenses[.]

Park Town Plaza Lease Agreement, 12/4/14, at Section 18:06(i). Leonard 

executed the lease on behalf of Royersford, which included initialing the 

Confession of Judgment clause. 

On September 22, 2015, Parktown filed a confession of judgment 

action1against Royersford claiming that it breached the lease by defaulting 

on its monthly lease payments, including payment of its security deposit. 

On September 22, 2015, the court entered judgment in the amount of 

$15,068.28,2 plus possession of the leased premises, in favor of Parktown. 

____________________________________________

1 The complaint also sought ejectment of Royersford from the leased 

premises. See Plaintiff’s Complaint (Count II), 9/22/15, at 5. The lease 

also contains a confession of judgment clause for ejectment. See Park Town 

Plaza Lease, 12/4/14, at Section 18:06(ii).

2 Royersford’s monthly rent totaled $1,404.92, plus common area 

maintenance and sewer charges. At the time the complaint was filed, 

Royersford was allegedly $10,068.28 in default under the lease.
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On October 2, 2015, Leonard filed a petition to strike the judgment, which 

was denied after a hearing. This timely pro se appeal follows.

Due to the substantial deficiencies in Leonard’s appellate brief, which 

greatly impair our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we are 

constrained to dismiss this appeal. To begin, we refer Leonard to the 

general rule requiring that briefs conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Rule 2101 states:

Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material 

respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the 

circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they 

may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or 

reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the 

appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.

Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (emphasis added). We also bring Rule 2111 to Leonard’s 

attention. That rule provides:

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant

General rule. The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matter, separately and distinctly entitled and in 

the following order:

(1) Statement of jurisdiction.

(2) Order or other determination in question.

(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review.

(4) Statement of the questions involved.

(5) Statement of the case.

(6) Summary of argument.

(7) Argument for appellant.

(8) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

(9) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions 

(b) and (c) of this rule.
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(10) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of 

the matters complained of on appeal filed with the 

trial court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment 

that no order requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement 

was entered.

Pa.R.A.P. 2111. Leonard has completely failed to comply with the 

requirements of Rule 2111(a). His brief contains no statement of 

jurisdiction, statement of scope and standard of review, statement of the 

questions involved, statement of the case, summary of argument, argument, 

or conclusion stating his sought-after relief. 

Rather, Leonard’s brief consists of “general rambling discourse.” See 

Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982). Under 

such circumstances, dismissal of the appeal is appropriate. See Branch 

Banking & Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appeal 

dismissed where numerous defects in pro se brief prevented court from 

conducting meaningful appellate review). 

Appeal dismissed.

GANTMAN, P.J., Joins the memorandum.

PLATT, J., Concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2016