This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
LOUIS A. LEYBA, 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 32,153 4 MARTHA LEYBA, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 7 Freddie J. Romero, District Judge 8
Louis A. Leyba 9 Roswell, NM 10 Pro Se Appellee 11 Martha Leyba 12 Roswell, NM 13 Pro Se Appellant 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 KENNEDY, Judge. 162 Respondent, Martha Leyba (Mother), appeal s pro se from the district court’s 1 judgment and order regarding child support. [RP 186] We proposed to affirm in a 2 notice of proposed summary disposition and, after receiving an extension to August 3 15, 2012, Mother filed an untimely memorandum in opposition on August 16, 2012. 4 After reviewing Mother’s memorandum inopposition, we remain unpersuaded by her 5 arguments and thus affirm the district court’s judgment and order. 6 As her first and second issues, Mother cl aimed that the district court erred in 7 failing to dismiss the claim of Petitioner, Louis Leyba (Father), for retroactive child 8 support because Father waited five years beforefiling his claim and, at that point, the 9 parents’ youngest children had already attained the age of ma jority, so that any claim 10 for retroactive child support needed to be brought by the children, not by Father. [DS 11 unnumbered page 1-3] We proposed to affirm because child support payments 12 become final judgments at the time theyare due, each monthly installment is a 13 separate final judgment not subject to retroactive modi fication, and the limitations 14 period applicable to an action founded upon a judgment applies. See Britton v. 15 Britton , 100 N.M. 424, 428-29, 671 P.2d 1135, 1139-40 (1983); see also NMSA 1978, 16 § 37-1-2 (1983) (providing in part that “[a]ctions founded upon any judgment of any 17 court of the state may be brought within f ourteen years from the date of the judgment, 18 and not afterward”). Given that Fath er was seeking unpaid child support from 2003 193 forward, we proposed to agree with the di strict court that hi s claim was not barred 1 because less than fourteen years had passed on all accrued support owed. [RP 181] 2 We also proposed to disagree with Moth er’s contention that any recovery had 3 to be sought by the children, not Father, b ecause the children had attained the age of 4 majority by the time Father sought the past due child support. [DS 2-3] We directed 5 Mother’s attention to our Supreme Court’s decision in Brannock v. Brannock , 104 6 N.M. 385, 386, 722 P.2d 636, 637 (1986), whic h recognized that a parent who 7 provides support for a child may file a clai m for past due child support because the 8 right to seek such payments belongs tothe person who supported the child at the 9 relevant time period. The Court in Brannock recognized that a parent or other person 10 who has already provided support “has the right to claim reimbursement from the 11 [other] parent, the same as any other past debt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 12 citation omitted). 13 In her memorandum in opposition, Mother challenges our proposed disposition 14 by citing to out-of-state and fe deral authority on contracts, debtor/creditor relations, 15 and unfair practices. [MIO unnumbered page s 1-5] We are unpersuaded because the 16 New Mexico authority cited above and disc ussed in our notice of proposed disposition 17 supports the district court’s decision to aw ard Father retroactive child support despite 18 the fact that the children had reached their age of majority and despite the fact that 194 Father waited five years to bring this ac tion. We are also unpersuaded by Mother’s 1 contention that she was somehow denied a fair hearing [MIO 4] because the district 2 court held a hearing before entering judgment, and Mother participated in that hearing. 3 [RP 180] 4 In our notice, we also proposed to re ject Mother’s reliance on the Uniform 5 Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-11-1 to - 23 (1986, repealed effective January 1, 6 2010), and the New Mexico Uniform Pare ntage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-11A-101 to 7 -903 (2009), in support of her contention thatthe right to claim retroactive support 8 belongs to the children, not Father. [DS 3, 6] We observed that those acts are 9 applicable when there is an adjudication as to parentage. They have no application 10 in a case such as this one when a parentis attempting to collect amounts of child 11 support that are past due based upon a distri ct court’s previous order awarding child 12 support. See, e.g. , § 40-11A-103(A) (stating that the New Mexico Uniform Parentage 13 Act “applies to determination of parentage in New Mexico”); cf. NMSA 1978, § 40-4- 14 7 (1997) (discussing a district court’s authority to award child support upon the 15 dissolution of marriage)

. 16 In light of the fact that neither the Uniform Parentage Act nor the New Mexico 17 Uniform Parentage Act is applicable to Mo ther’s case, we are not persuaded by her 18 reliance on this Court’s opinion in Diamond v. Diamond, 2011-NMCA-002, 149 N.M. 195 133, 245 P.3d 578, rev’d, 2012-NMSC-022, 283 P.3d 260, to support her contention 1 that, because the children had attained th e age of majority, Father was no longer 2 entitled to retroactive child support. Diamondconcerns pre-emancipation and post3 emancipation support of a child under the Uniform Parentage Act, not support 4 awarded to a parent in a domestic relations matter. [MIO 6-7] See id. ¶¶ 3-6, 11-16, 5 27-33. Moreover, in that case, the mother was being sued for support by the child 6 who had been supporting herself, not by th e other parent who had been providing 7 support. Id. ¶¶ 27-33. Finally, as to the denial of post-emancipation support, [MIO 8 7] our Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the child was 9 entitled to support for periods after she became an emancipated minor. Id. ¶¶ 42-51. 10 Finally, we turn to Mother’s third i ssue. In her docketing statement, Mother 11 claimed that the district court erred in failing to offset the amount of past due child 12 support she owed by subtracting other types of payments made by her. [DS 2-3] We 13 acknowledged that parents can agree to waiv e child support arrears, and we observed 14 that we review the district court’s findings as to whether such anagreement exists and 15 whether it should be enforced for abuse of discretion. Klinksiek v. Klinksiek , 16 2005-NMCA-008, ¶¶ 4, 13, 20, 136 N.M. 693, 104 P.3d 559. We then proposed to 17 affirm because the record indicated that the district court considered Mother’s 18 contentions that the parties had agreed towaive past due child support and found that 196 Father never agreed to waive, or to acqui esce in not collecting, past due child support. 1 [RP 180-181] We also proposed to affirm the district court’s findings that Mother was 2 not entitled to credit for the school-related items and the $6,000 vehicle she provided 3 because these were voluntary acts. [RP 181-182] See Britton , 100 N.M. at 429-30, 4 671 P.2d at 1140-41 (holding that, in the absence of a petition to modify his child 5 support obligation, the father was not entitle d to offset the expenditures he voluntarily 6 undertook when one child began living with him against the child support arrearages 7 he owed); Hopkins v. Hopkins , 109 N.M. 233, 237, 784 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1989) 8 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the 9 amount realized from the sale of livestockto the father’s liability for accrued child 10 support given the lack of evidence of an ag reement between the mo ther and the father 11 that the proceeds would replace child support payments). 12 In her memorandum in opposition, Mother again claims that the parties agreed 13 that Father would take these payments in lieu of child support. [MIO 7-8] However, 14 in so claiming, Mother is asking us to re weigh the evidence introduced at the hearing. 15 We decline to do so. See Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces , 1997- 16 NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177 (“[W]e will not reweigh the evidence 17 nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.”). 18 CONCLUSION 197 For the reasons set forth above, as we ll as those discussed in our notice of 1 proposed summary disposition, we affirm the district court’s order and judgment 2 regarding child support. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

_______________________________ 5 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 6

WE CONCUR: 7

___________________________ 8 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 9

___________________________ 10 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 11