Filed 4/1/21 Datomi v. Huntington Memorial Hospital CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

FARNAZ DATOMI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL

HOSPTIAL,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B295054

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC683329)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Victor L. George, Victor L. George and 

Wayne C. Smith; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Shea S. Murphy for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Littler Mendelson, Monica M. Quinn, and Jacob Krall for 

Defendant and Respondent.

___________________________________
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Farnaz Datomi sued her employer, Pasadena Hospital 

Association dba Huntington Memorial Hospital (Huntington or 

the hospital) for wrongful termination, alleging the hospital 

discharged her in retaliation for her complaints about improper 

practices. The trial court concluded no triable issue existed as to 

whether Datomi’s discharge was retaliatory, and granted the 

hospital’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. Datomi’s Employment

Datomi worked as Huntington’s Director of Risk 

Management from April 2012 until her termination on July 17, 

2017. Her duties included resolving patient complaints and 

reporting potential safety issues and regulatory noncompliance to 

her supervisors and the California Department of Health. 

Datomi was never disciplined during her tenure at Huntington, 

but on the contrary received positive performance reviews and 

merit bonuses. 

The hospital adopted administrative polices and procedures 

with which its employees were obligated to comply. Policy No. 

156 restricted access to patient records to the patient and her 

authorized representative. Policy No. 013 prescribed ethical and 

professional standards. Policy No. 840.3 established a code of 

conduct and demanded compliance with patient privacy laws. 

On June 22, 2017, L.M., Datomi’s friend, was admitted to 

the hospital’s emergency department. On June 23, L.M. asked 

Datomi for her medical records, and signed a release form to 

obtain them. Datomi conversed with Charlotte Landon, a nurse, 

about obtaining the records.

Stephanie Garcia, a nurse, later complained to Terence Ou, 

the hospital’s Compliance Officer, that Datomi had tried to coerce 
3

Landon into obtaining L.M.’s medical records, a violation of both 

hospital policy and the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act (HIPAA). 

On June 29, 2107, Ou opened an investigation into the 

allegation. A week later, on July 6, 2017, Huntington suspended 

Datomi pending the outcome of Ou’s investigation. 

Ou interviewed Datomi on July 6, 2017, who reported that 

Landon had refused to facilitate L.M.’s request for medical 

records. When L.M. asked Landon for help in obtaining the 

records, Landon dismissively said, “we don’t do that.”

On July 17, 2017, Huntington terminated Datomi’s 

employment for violation of hospital policies concerning patient 

privacy.

B. Summary Judgment

Datomi sued Huntington, asserting causes of action for

retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.1 

She alleged that the hospital discharged her because she had 

made complaints about Landon, Garcia, and a Dr. Verrette. 

Huntington moved for summary judgment, arguing it 

discharged Datomi for abusing her authority and intimidating 

hospital staff in order to obtain L.M.’s medical records in 

violation of hospital policies.

Huntington supported the motion with copies of hospital 

polices and excerpts from the deposition testimony of Datomi, Ou, 

Sylvia Montes, and Gloria Sanchez-Rico. Policy No. 156 required 

that a patient’s request for medical records go through the 

hospital’s Medical Records Department. Policy No. 013 directed 

1 Datomi also asserted a cause of action for national origin 

discrimination, but abandons it on appeal. 
4

employees to avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of a 

conflict of interest. Policy No. 840.3 directed employees to 

demonstrate respect to one another, and to refrain from 

intimidating employees or using condescending language. 

Ou testified that he was informed Datomi sought to obtain 

a copy of L.M.’s CT scan. Landon told him that Datomi tried to 

intimidate her, and other staff said Datomi tried to leverage her 

position as a hospital director to obtain L.M.’s records. Ou 

testified that the decision to terminate Datomi’s employment for 

violation of Polices Nos. 156, 013 and 840.3 was made collectively 

by Gloria Sanchez-Rico, the hospital’s Senior Vice President and

Chief Nursing Officer, Jim Noble, the Chief Operating Officer, 

and Steve Ralph, the Chief Executive Officer. The group 

considered imposing lesser discipline, but in the end concluded

that because Datomi was a director, she should be held to a high 

standard. 

Datomi argued in opposition to Huntington’s motion that 

the hospital terminated her employment due to her 

complaints about Landon, Garcia and Varrette. She argued 

that she did not attempt to obtain L.M.’s medical records, and 

never possessed or reviewed them. She merely helped L.M.

obtain them for herself, and never coerced Landon to obtain

them. 

The trial court found that Huntington articulated a 

nonretaliatory reason for discharging Datomi, and Datomi failed 

to rebut this showing or present evidence supporting a nexus 

between any protected action and her discharge. The court 

stated that Huntington “has established the investigation into 

[Datomi] was opened on June 29, 2017[, but it] was undisputed 

that on that date plaintiff had not made any complaint to a 

person with authority over any employee with the authority to 
5

investigate the incident of June 23.” Accordingly, the court 

granted Huntington’s motion and entered judgment for the 

hospital.

DISCUSSION

Observing that the adverse employment action in this case 

occurred not on June 29, 2017, when Ou opened the hospital’s

investigation, but July 17, 2017, when she was fired, Datomi 

contends the evidence raised a triable issue as to whether a 

causal link existed between her protected activity and the 

adverse employment action. This is so, she argues, because the 

evidence indicated that she complained to Ou about Landon on 

July 7, 2017, and had made several previous complaints about 

other employees.

A. Legal Principles

Labor Code section 1102.5 makes it unlawful for an 

employer to “retaliate against an employee for disclosing 

information . . . to a person with authority over . . . another 

employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or 

correct the violation or noncompliance, . . . if the employee has 

reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a 

violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or 

noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or 

regulation . . . .” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)

Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 makes it unlawful 

for a health facility to retaliate against an employee for having 

“[p]resented a grievance, complaint, or report to the facility.” 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1278.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) 

she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she was subjected to an 

adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link 
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between the protected activity and the adverse action. (Gov. 

Code, § 12940, subd. (h); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 

Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)

Because direct evidence of an unlawful retaliation is 

seldom available, courts use a system of shifting burdens to aid in 

the presentation and resolution of such claims at trial. (See Guz 

v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee must 

demonstrate that the employer had a retaliatory motive for an 

adverse employment action. The employer may rebut the 

showing by producing admissible evidence that it discharged the 

employee for a legitimate nonretaliatory reason. If it does so, the 

burden shifts to the employee to produce substantial evidence 

that the employer’s justification for its decision is either untrue 

or pretextual or that the employer acted with retaliatory animus. 

(See id. at pp. 355-356.)

In the context of a motion for summary judgment, “ ‘the 

employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present 

admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of 

plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse 

employment action was based upon legitimate, [nonretaliatory] 

factors.’ ” (Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 

Cal.App.5th 549, 558-559.) A legitimate reason is one that is 

facially unrelated to retaliation, and which, if true, “would thus 

preclude a finding of [retaliation].” (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 

p. 358.) Making this showing is “ ‘not an onerous burden 

[citation], and is generally met by presenting admissible evidence 

showing the defendant’s reason for its employment decision 

[citation].’ ” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 

232 Cal.App.4th 954, 965 (Swanson).) 
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When the employer satisfies its initial burden with 

evidence that negates the plaintiff’s prima facie case or 

establishes a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, 

the burden shifts to the employee to offer substantial evidence 

that the employer’s stated reasons are “ ‘untrue or pretextual, or 

evidence the employer acted with a [retaliatory] animus, or a 

combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could 

conclude the employer engaged in intentional [retaliation].’ ” 

(Swanson, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 966.)

To satisfy this burden, the employee may not “simply deny 

the credibility of the employer’s witnesses” or speculate as to 

retaliatory motive. (See Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 830, 862.) Nor is it enough to show that the 

employer’s reasons were unsound, wrong, or mistaken; the 

employee has brought an action for retaliation, not general 

unfairness. (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 

Cal.App.4th 997, 1005.) Rather, the employee “ ‘must 

demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered 

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 

could rationally find them “unworthy of credence,” ’ ” and hence 

infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nonretaliatory 

reason. (Ibid.) If, “considering the employer’s innocent 

explanation for its actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient 

to permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive 

was [retaliatory],” the employer is entitled to summary judgment. 

(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361.) 

But “evidence that the employer’s claimed reason is false—

such as that it conflicts with other evidence, or appears to have 

been contrived after the fact—will tend to suggest that the 
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employer seeks to conceal the real reason for its actions, and this 

in turn may support an inference that the real reason was 

unlawful.” (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 686, 715.) 

On appeal, we apply an independent standard of review to 

determine whether a trial is required—whether the evidence 

favoring and opposing the summary judgment motion would 

support a reasonable trier of fact’s determination in the plaintiff’s 

favor on the cause of action or defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In doing so we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

summary judgment. (Id. at p. 843; Alexander v. Codemasters 

Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 139.) We accept as 

true the facts shown by the evidence offered in opposition to 

summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be 

drawn from them. (Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 

Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385-1386.)

B. Application

As discussed above, an employer has the initial burden on 

summary judgment to establish either that one or more elements 

of plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse 

employment action was based on a nonretaliatory reason. Here, 

Huntington adduced evidence that Datomi engaged in no 

protected activity and that her complaint to Ou had no causal 

nexus to her termination. It also presented evidence that its 

reason for discharging Datomi was nonretaliatory.

1. Protected Action

Labor Code section 1102.5 makes it unlawful for an 

employer to “retaliate against an employee for disclosing 

information . . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe 
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that the information discloses a violation of state or federal 

statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or 

federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the 

information is part of the employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, 

§ 1102.5, subd. (b).) 

Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 makes it unlawful 

for a health facility to retaliate against an employee for having 

“[p]resented a grievance, complaint, or report to the facility.” 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1278.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

Datomi argues she told Ou that Landon refused to help 

L.M. obtain her medical records, but the evidence she cites in 

support indicates only that Datomi testified she “thinks” she 

“might” have told Ou that Landon was dismissive of L.M.’s 

request. When asked in her deposition whether Landon had 

refused to facilitate L.M. obtaining her medical records, Datomi 

testified, “I think I might have said [Landon] was dismissive 

because of—like ‘we don’t do that.’ So not—you know, not 

compassionate. . . . Not helpful.” Datomi cites no statute or 

regulation obligating a nurse to be solicitous of requests for 

medical records.

Nor does Datomi’s statement to Ou constitute a “grievance, 

complaint, or report” for purposes of Health and Safety Code 

section 1278.5. Setting aside that Datomi only “thinks” she 

“might” have told Ou about Landon, she relayed nothing that 

Landon actually said to L.M. The phrase “like ‘we don’t do that’ ” 

characterized only Landon’s attitude, not any statement she 

made. And Datomi made the characterization not as part of any 

report, but only to explain her own actions to Ou.

Datomi argues she made several disclosures to her 

supervisors about patient health and safety concerns going back 
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10 years before her termination. She notified the hospital of

patient safety issues stemming from a patient’s death in Garcia’s 

unit in April 2007, when Garcia violated Huntington’s policy by 

failing to advise risk management about the death. And earlier 

in 2017 Datomi reported issues concerning Garcia to the 

Department of Public Health related to hospital acquired 

pressure injuries. Datomi referred to a pediatric patient issue as 

a “sentinel event” to Dr. Verrette, who became upset at the use of 

the term, and raised patient safety issues about Dr. Verrette 

regarding hospital acquired conditions and the accuracy of the 

reporting. Datomi complained to Ortega about infections from 

endoscopes regarding a procedure called ERCP, and raised 

concerns with Ortega about Dr. Verrette.

Datomi’s position as Director of Risk Services was to 

resolve patient complaints and report potential safety issues and 

regulatory noncompliance to her supervisors and the California 

Department of Health. Routine reports made as part of one’s job 

duties arguably qualify as protected activity under Labor Code 

section 1102.5, but not for purposes of Health and Safety Code 

section 1278.5. (See Melamed v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center

(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1289 [routine reports fail to satisfy 

Health & Saf. Code, § 1278.5].)

We conclude a triable issue exists as to whether Datomi’s 

reports as part of her job duties qualified as protected activity for 

purposes of Labor Code section 1102.5, but not Health and Safety 

Code section 1278.5, and no triable issue exists as to whether her 

statements to Ou constituted protected activity under either 

statute.
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2. Nexus

No triable issue exists regarding a causal connection 

between any report made by Datomi—either to Ou or as part of 

her job duties—and her termination. Her earlier reports to 

supervisors about patient health and safety concerns resulted not 

in disciplinary action, but in positive reviews and performance 

bonuses. And Datomi’s report to Ou about Landon’s unhelpful 

attitude came only after she was already under investigation for 

violating patient privacy policies. Nothing suggests that the 

course of Ou’s investigation changed when Datomi told him (if 

she did so) that Landon had been unhelpful.

Ou’s report and deposition testimony indicated that the 

hospital discharged Datomi because it determined that she 

violated hospital policy by calling on a nurse to make a copy of 

L.M.’s CT scan. Ou testified he received a complaint about 

Datomi’s attempt to access L.M.’s medical records, found the 

allegation was well grounded, and recommended, with several 

others, that Datomi’s employment be terminated.

Even if this decision was incorrect, it was not unlawful. 

(See Hersant v. Department of Social Services, supra, 57 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 [a showing that the employer’s reasons 

were unsound, wrong, or mistaken raises no triable issue; the 

employee has brought an action for retaliation, not general 

unfairness].) Datomi presents no evidence that if credited would 

establish that the hospital’s rationale for her discharge was so 

weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent or contradictory as to 

give rise to a reasonable inference that the explanation is 

unworthy of credence. (Ibid.)
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We conclude no triable issue exists as to whether Datomi’s 

reports to Ou and others caused her termination. Therefore, 

summary judgment was appropriate.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to receive its 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

FEDERMAN, J.*

*

Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.