NO. PD-1275-15

IN THE 

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

________________________________________________

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Petitioner

v.

TOM BENSON, Respondent

________________________________________________

No. 03-15-00121-CR 

In the Court of Appeals for the 

Third District of Texas at Austin

No. C-1-CV-14-002294

County Court at Law No. 7

Travis County, Texas

________________________________________________

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:

The State of Texas files this Motion for Rehearing, respectfully 

requesting that the Court reconsider its order refusing the State’s petition 

for discretionary review because articles 22.13(a)(5) and 22.13(b) of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure constitute an unconstitutional reduction 

in the liability of the surety and principal to the State for a bond forfeiture 

in violation of Article III, § 55 of the Texas Constitution.

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 1 

PD-1275-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 12/28/2015 9:54:15 AM

Accepted 12/28/2015 12:49:55 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
Relying on articles 22.13(a)(5)(A) and 22.13(b)1 of the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure, Tom Benson, the surety, asserts that his liability to the 

State under Chapter 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the forfeiture 

of a bail bond he made with Brian Whipple, the principal, should be greatly 

reduced because Mr. Whipple was allegedly incarcerated in Las Vegas 

within 180 days after he failed to appear in Travis County. This statutory 

reduction in liability, however, violates Article III, § 55 of the Texas 

Constitution, which provides:

The Legislature shall have no power to release or extinguish, or 

to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, 

the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or 

individual, to this State or to any county or defined subdivision 

thereof, or other municipal corporation therein, except 

1 These statutes provide:

(a) The following causes, and no other, will exonerate the defendant and his 

sureties, if any, from liability upon the forfeiture taken:

. . .

5. The incarceration of the principal in any jurisdiction in the United 

States:

 (A) in the case of a misdemeanor, at the time of or not later than the 

180th day after the date of the principal's failure to appear in 

court[.]

(b) A surety exonerated under Subdivision 5, Subsection (a), remains obligated to 

pay costs of court, any reasonable and necessary costs incurred by a county to 

secure the return of the principal, and interest accrued on the bond amount from 

the date of the judgment nisi to the date of the principal's incarceration.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. articles 22.13(a)(5)(A) & 22.13(b).

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 2

 
delinquent taxes which have been due for a period of at least 

ten years.

Tex. Const. Art. III, § 55.

The courts have construed this provision to prohibit the Legislature 

from releasing or diminishing an obligation to the State unless there is 

consideration for doing so.2 Over forty years ago, the Texas Supreme Court 

was faced with the issue of whether another statutory reduction of a 

surety’s liability for a bond forfeiture violated Article III, § 55. Robinson v. 

Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1974) (a copy of this opinion is attached to this 

motion). The statute at issue3 authorized a court to remit at least fifty 

percent of the amount paid on a judgment of bond forfeiture where the 

principal had, as a result of money spent or information furnished by the 

surety, been rearrested and returned to the county within 120 days after 

the date of final judgment on the bond forfeiture. The Court found that this 

reduction in liability was supported by consideration (i.e., the principal 

was arrested as a result of money spent or information furnished by the 

2 See City of Beaumont v. Fertitta, 415 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. 1967); State v. City of 

Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737, 742 (1960) (“After the occurrence of events which 

under the law then existing give rise to an obligation on the part of an individual or 

corporation to the state, the Legislature has no power to release or diminish that 

obligation without consideration.”)

3 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2372p-3, § 12(a), which has since been repealed.

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 3

 
surety), and thus, did not violate Article III, § 55. Robinson v. Hill, 507 

S.W.2d at 526.

Unlike the statute at issue in Robinson, article 22.13(a)(5) and article

22.13(b) do not require the surety to engage in any conduct that leads to the 

arrest of the principal. The Legislature has not required the surety to even 

look for the principal after the failure to appear, let alone provide any type 

of assistance to law enforcement in returning the principal to the criminal 

justice system. Indeed, the surety need not even know about the principal’s 

arrest at the time it occurs to have his or her liability reduced. Absent any 

requirement that the surety do anything that contributes to the principal’s 

arrest, a reduction of the surety’s liability under article 22.13(a)(5) and

article 22.13(b) for a fortuitous arrest of the principal is not supported by 

consideration. Thus, this statutory reduction in the liability of the principal 

and surety to the State for a bail bond forfeiture is unconstitutional.

In significant contrast to article 22.13(a)(5) and article 22.13(b), the 

discretionary remittitur provisions in articles 22.16(b) and 22.17(a) require 

the surety’s participation in the principal’s arrest before the court can 

reduce the surety’s liability. McKenna v. State, 247 S.W.3d 716, 719 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2008)

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 4
So that the Texas Constitution might be upheld and that the State 

might be protected from an unconstitutional reduction in a liability owed 

to it, the State of Texas respectfully requests that this Court grant this 

motion for rehearing, grant its petition for discretionary review, reverse the 

decision of the Third Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID A. ESCAMILLA

TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

By: /s/ Tim Labadie

Assistant Travis County Attorney

State Bar No. 11784853

P.O. Box 1748

Austin, Texas 78767

(512) 854-5864

(512) 854-9316 (fax)

tim.labadie@traviscountytx.gov

Attorneys for the State of Texas, Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that, pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 79.2(c), the foregoing 

Motion for Rehearing is grounded on substantial intervening 

circumstances or on other significant circumstances that are specified in the 

motion and that the motion is made in good faith and not for delay.

/s/ Tim Labadie

Tim Labadie

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 28, 2015, and in accordance with 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing was emailed to Mr. Tom Benson at tomrbenson@gmail.com.

/s/ Tim Labadie

Tim Labadie

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing Page 6
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

	
	


	

	
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Class action was brought against officials

of Harris County and of state to challenge

constitutionality of statute providing for

licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen.

The District Court No. 55,Harris County,

Compton, J., denied plaintiffs' application for a

temporary injunction, and plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court, Walker, J., held that such

statute does not violate constitutional provision

that no bill shall contain more than one subject

which shall be expressed in its title, that

such statute is a general law, and is not an

unconstitutional special and local law, and that

$500 fee that must accompany the original

application for a license and $250 renewal fee

are license fees imposed in exercise of police

power, and are not occupational taxes.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (10)

[1] Constitutional Law

Presumptions and Construction

as to Constitutionality

Constitutional Law

Burden of Proof

It is to be presumed that

the legislature has not acted

unreasonably or arbitrarily, and

the burden is on one who

challenges an act to establish its

unconstitutionality.

51 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Statutes

Subjects and titles of statutes

Statutes

Acts Relating to One or More

Subjects; Single-Subject Rule

Both constitutional provision that no

bill shall contain more than one

subject which shall be expressed

in the title and questioned statute

are to be liberally construed in

favor of constitutionality. Vernon's

Ann.St.Const. art. 3, § 35.

19 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Statutes

In general; construction of title

A statute will not be held

unconstitutional, as failing to comply

with requirement that no bill shall

contain more than one subject which

shall be expressed in its title,

where its provisions relate, directly,

or indirectly, to the same general

subject, have a mutual connection,

and are not foreign to the subject

expressed in the title. Vernon's

Ann.St.Const. art. 3, § 35.
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

12 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] Statutes

What Constitutes Sufficient or

Insufficient Title

Statutes

Comprehensiveness

Constitutional provision that no bill

shall contain more than one subject

which shall be expressed in its title

requires only that the title state the

general subject; it need not explain

the details. Vernon's Ann.St.Const.

art. 3, § 35.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[5] Bail

Sureties

Statutes

Trade or business

Statute providing for licensing and

regulation of bail bondsmen does not

violate constitutional requirement

that no bill shall contain more than

one subject which shall be expressed

in its title. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art.

2372p–3; V.A.T.S. Insurance Code,

art. 21.14; Vernon's Ann.St.Const.

art. 3, § 35.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[6] Statutes

General laws compared and

distinguished

Primary and ultimate test of whether

a law is general or special is whether

there is a reasonable basis for the

classification it makes and whether

the law operates equally on all within

the class. Vernon's Ann.St.Const. art.

3, § 56.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[7] Bail

Sureties

Statutes

Trade or business

Statute providing for licensing and

regulation of bail bondsmen, which

may not apply to counties having

a population of less than 150,000,

does not constitute an unreasonable

classification by reason of alleged

fact that counties just on either

side of population line are similarly

situated, or that there are excluded

counties constituting part of same

metropolitan area as included

counties. Vernon's Ann.St.Const. art.

3, § 56; Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art.

2372p–3, §§ 3, 3(c), 5, 13.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

[8] Bail

Sureties

Statutes

Trade or business

Statute providing for licensing and

regulation of bail bondsmen is a

general law, and does not violate

Constitution as a special and local
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

law, even if the statute does not

apply to counties having a population

of less than 150,000. Vernon's

Ann.St.Const. art. 3, § 56; Vernon's

Ann.Civ.St. art. 2372p–3, §§ 3, 3(c),

5, 13.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

[9] Bail

Sureties

$500 original application fee and

$250 renewal fee, provided for in

statute relating to the licensing of

bail bondsmen, are license fees

imposed in exercise of police

power and are not occupation taxes

in contravention of Constitution.

Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 1738a,

2372p–3; Vernon's Ann.St.Const.

art. 8, §§ 1, 2.

Cases that cite this headnote

[10] States

Rights and remedies of state on

contracts in general, and debts due

state

Statute providing for licensing and

regulation of bail bondsmen, insofar

as it authorizes the court to remit

at least 50% of amount paid on a

judgment of bond forfeiture where

the principal has, as the result

of money spent or information

furnished by the surety, been

rearrested and returned to the county

within 120 days after the date of final

judgment on the bond forfeiture,

does not violate constitutional

provision prohibiting the legislature

from releasing or extinguishing

the liability or obligation of any

corporation or individual to the

state or to any county or municipal

corporation. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.

art. 2372p–3, § 12; Vernon's

Ann.St.Const. art. 3, § 55.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*523 Heath & Associates, Bob Heath,

Houston, for appellants.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Calvin Botley, Asst.

Atty. Gen., Austin, Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty.,

Joe S. Moss, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for

appellees.

Opinion

WALKER, Justice.

This is a direct appeal as authorized by Article

1738a, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St. Suit was filed

by J. W. Robinson et al, appellants, as a

class action against several officials of Harris

County and of the State of Texas, appellees, to

challenge the constitutionality of Article 2372p

—3, V.A.T.S., which provides for the licensing

and regulation of bail bondsmen. The suit

was brought on behalf of lawyers, insurance

agents and others who had previously written

bail bonds to obtain a judgment declaring the

statute unconstitutional and enjoining appellees

from implementing, administering or enforcing
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

its provisons. Appellants' application for a

temporary injunction having been denied by the

trial court, they perfected their appeal to this

Court. We affirm.

Article 2372p—3 declares that the business of

executing bail bonds is a business affecting

the public interest. It further declares that the

policy of the State is to provide reasonable

regulation to the end that the right of bail

be preserved and implemented by just and

practical procedures governing the giving or

making of bail bond and other security to

guarantee appearance of the accused. A county

bail bond board is created in each county

having a population of $150,000 or more

according to the last preceding federal census.

The board is authorized to promulgate rules and

regulations relative to the making of bail bonds

by bondsmen within the county. ‘Bondsman’ is

defined as any person who, for compensation

and as many as five times in any 12-month

period, deposits cash or securities or executes

as surety any bond to assure appearance.

Subject to certain exemptions, no person may

act as a bondsman unless licensed by the board

under the Act. The following are exempted

from the license requirements: (1) members of

the State Bar who personally execute bonds

for persons they actually represent in criminal

cases; (2) persons executing bonds in counties

having a population of less than 150,000

according to the last preceding federal census;

and (3) persons who execute bonds as cosureties with a licensed bondsman.

An application for an original license, which

expires 24 months after the date of its issuance,

must be accompanied by a fee of $500.00.

The license may be renewed for a period of

12 months upon application and the payment

of a $250.00 renewal fee. Upon notice from

the board that an original application has been

tentatively approved, the applicant is required

to deposit $5,000.00 in cash or its equivalent

with the county treasurer to be held as a special

bond security fund and also to execute in

trust to the sheriff a deed to non-exempt real

property of the value of at least $10,000.00. The

cash deposit and any money realized from the

trust may be used to pay any judgments of bail

forfeiture for which the licensee is liable and

that are not satisfied within 30 days.

*524 A corporation otherwise authorized to

act as a surety must meet the same requirements

as an individual before being acceptable as a

‘personal surety’ on a bail bond. Its certificate

to do business issued by the State Board

of Insurance is not conclusive as to the

sufficiency of the security or the solvency

of the corporation. Before acting as a surety,

moreover, the company is required to file with

the county clerk of the county where the bond

is to be given a power of attorney designating

an agent or agents to execute bail bonds, and

any agent so designated may execute bail bonds

for his company even though he is not licensed

as a local recording agent in accordance with

Article 21.14 of the Texas Insurance Code.

[1] In passing upon the constitutionality

of a statute, we begin with a presumption

of validity. It is to be presumed that

the Legislature has not acted unreasonably

or arbitrarily, and the burden is on

one who challenges an act to establish

its unconstitutionality. Smith v. Craddick,

Tex.Sup., 471 S.W.2d 375; Smith v. Davis,

Tex.Sup., 426 S.W.2d 827, and authorities

there cited. Appellants contend that Article

2372p—3 violates several provisions of the

Texas Constitution. They say, in the first place,
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5

that the caption does not comply with the

requirement of Art. III, Sec. 35, that no bill

shall contain more than one subject which shall

be expressed in its title. The statute now in

question was adopted by the 63rd Legislature

in 1973. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1520, ch. 550.

The title of the Act reads as follows:

An Act relating to the licensing

and regulation of persons

or corporations who engage

in the business of executing

bail bonds and establishing a

County Bail Bond Board in

certain counties; providing for

the composition, organization

and powers, duties, and

procedures of the board;

providing forms and content

of applications for licenses and

for fees, deposits and deeds

in trust to secure payment

of judgments; making certain

requirements of corporations

acting as sureties; providing

for renewal of licenses,

renewal fees and identifying

number of license; providing

procedures for and reasons

for refusal to issue or

for revocation of licenses;

providing for judicial review;

providing for remittitur to

principal in certain situations;

providing special powers and

duties of sheriff; providing

extra-county authority of

licensed bondsmen; prohibiting

execution of bonds or

advertising as a bondsman by

unlicensed persons; prohibiting

certain recommendations or

suggestions as to an attorney or

particular bondsman; providing

penalties; and declaring an

emergency.

Appellants insist that this title contains the

following four subjects: (1) county bail bond

board; (2) special powers and duties of sheriffs;

(3) corporations acting as sureties; and (4)

amending Article 21.14 of the Insurance Code.

We do not agree. The author of the interpretive

commentary in Vernon's Annotated Texas

Constitution, states that the purpose of Art. III,

Sec. 35, is threefold:

First, it is designed to prevent log-rolling

legislation, I.e., to prevent the writing of several

subjects having no connection with each other

in one bill for the purpose of combining various

interests in support of the whole.

Second, it prevents surprise or fraud upon

legislators by means of provisions in bills of

which the titles give no intimation, and which

might therefore be overlooked and carelessly

and unintentionally adopted.

Third, it permits the people to be fairly

apprised of the subjects of legislation under

consideration, so that they may have an

opportunity of being heard if they so desire.

[2] [3] Both the constitutional provision

and the questioned statute are to be liberally

construed in favor of constitutionality. The

statute will not be held unconstitutional

*525 where its provisions relate, directly or

indirectly, to the same general subject, have
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6

a mutual connection, and are not foreign to

the subject expressed in the title. See Hayman

Const. Co. v. American Indem. Co., Tex.Sup.,

471 S.W.2d 564; Key Western Life Ins. Co.

v. State Bd. of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d

839; Central Ed. Agency v. Independent School

Dist. of City of El Paso, 152 Tex. 56, 254

S.W.2d 357; Adams v. San Angelo Waterworks

Co., 86 Tex. 485, 25 S.W. 605; Continental

Bus System, Inc. v. Carney, Tex.Civ.App.,

310 S.W.2d 676 (wr. ref). In this instance the

several matters that appellants say are different

subjects actually relate to the same general

subject, i.e. the licensing and regulation of bail

bondsmen, and that general subject is expressed

in the title.

[4] [5] There is no merit in appellants'

contention that the caption is fatally deficient in

that it fails to disclose that the Act's provisions

do not apply to the execution of bail bonds

in counties having a population of less than

150,000 according to the last preceding federal

census. See Tarrant County Water Control and

Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Fowler, 142 Tex. 375, 179

S.W.2d 250; Austin v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co., 45

Tex. 234. See also Pottorff v. El Paso-Hudspeth

Counties Road Dist., 5th Cir., 62 F.2d 498.

Art. III, Sec. 35, requires only that the title

state the general subject; it need not explain

the details. State v. Spartan's Industries, Inc.,

Tex.Sup., 447 S.W.2d 407. In our opinion the

statute does not violate Art. III, Sec. 35.

Appellants also contend that the statute is a

special and local law and, as such, contravenes

Art. III, Sec. 56, of our Constitution in a number

of respects. We do not agree. It is not entirely

clear to us that the statute has no force or effect

whatsoever in counties having a population of

less than 150,000. Section 3(c) declares that

the provisions of the Act do not apply ‘to

the execution of bail bonds' in such counties,

and it could be argued with considerable force

that several provisions of the statute deal with

matters other than the execution of bail bonds.

See, for example, Section 13. Be that as it

may, the statute is not a special and local law

even though Section 3(c) means that none of

its provisions shall apply in counties having

a population of less than 150,000. Although

appellants argue to the contrary, the words

‘last preceding federal census' in Sections 3

and 5 refer not to the 1970 census but to the

last census prior to the time the applicability

and effect of the law is to be determined in

a particular situation. See City of Ft. Worth

v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 470, 41

S.W.2d 228. At the present time the statutory

provisions covered by the limitation set out

in these two sections apply only in eleven

counties, but changes in population may bring

additional counties under these provisions and

exclude others that are now governed thereby.

[6] [7] [8] Assuming as we do at this

point that the statute by its terms does not

apply throughout the State, the primary and

ultimate test of whether the law is general or

special is whether there is a reasonable basis

for the classification it makes and whether

the law operates equally on all within the

class. See Board of Man. of Harris Co. Hosp.

Dist. v. Pension Bd., Tex.Sup., 449 S.W.2d

33; Smith v. Davis, Tex.Sup., 426 S.W.2d

827; Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 148 Tex. 537,

227 S.W.2d 791, and authorities there cited.

The Legislature in this instance may well have

concluded that bail bondsmen in the more

populous counties should be regulated and

required to secure their obligations because of
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7

the high incidence of crime and the difficulties

involved in enforcing bond forfeitures and

determining the net worth of persons engaged

in the business of writing bonds, but that

the same safeguards and procedures were not

necessary and would be unduly burdensome

in more sparsely populated areas. There is a

reasonable basis for the classification made by

the law, and the classification is broad enough

to include a substantial class. The fact that

counties just on either side of the population

line are similarly situated, or that *526 there

are excluded counties constituting part of the

same metropolitan area as included counties,

does not make the classification unreasonable.

Any classification on the basis of population is

subject to this complaint, and that circumstance

alone is not a sufficient basis for holding the

statutory classification unconstitutional. The

Legislature has rather broad power to make

classifications for legislative purposes, and

there is nothing here to suggest that the line

drawn is arbitrary or capricious or a mere

device used for the purpose of giving a local

law the appearance of a general law. See Miller

v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d

1000. In our opinion the statute is a general law

and does not violate Art. III, Sec. 56, of the

Texas Constitution.

[9] Appellants further contend that the

$500.00 fee that must accompany an original

application for a license and the $250.00

renewal fee are occupation taxes. They insist

that as such these fees contravene Art. VIII,

Sections 1 and 2, of the Texas Constitution,

because no occupation tax has been levied by

the State on the business of writing bail bonds.

The fees in question are prescribed by a statute

that is regulatory in nature. They are presumed

to be license fees, and there is nothing in the

present record indicating that they are not.

We accoridngly hold that, for purposes of this

appeal, the exactions are license fees imposed

in the exercise of the police power and are

not occupation taxes. See Brown v. City of

Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488.

As previously indicated, it is our opinion that

there is a reasonable basis for the Legislature's

regulating and requiring additional security

from bondsmen in the more populous counties

without making the same requirements with

respect to bail bondsmen in the counties having

a smaller population. Since the classification is

reasonable, the statute does not deny appellants

equal protection of the law.

[10] By their point of error No. 7, appellants

attack the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act

which authorize the court to remit at least 50

per cent of the amount paid on a judgment of

bond forfeiture where the principal has, as a

result of money spent or information furnished

by the surety, been rearrested and returned to

the county within 120 days after the date of

final judgment on the bond forfeiture. They

say that these provisions violate Art. III, Sec.

55, of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits

the Legislature from releasing or extinguishing

the liability or obligation of any corporation

or individual to the State or to any county

or municipal corporation. In our opinion the

provisions in question do not contravene Art.

III, Sec. 55, because the court is authorized

to order the remittitur only when the principal

was rearrested as a result of money spent

or information furnished by the surety. The

remittitur is thus supported by a consideration

deemed adequate by the Legislature, and we

cannot say it is so inadequate that the provision
Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (1974)

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for a remittitur is unconstitutional. See City

of Beaumont v. Fertitta, Tex.Sup., 415 S.W.2d

902; State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331

S.W.2d 737.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

All Citations

507 S.W.2d 521

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.