### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 1, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LA RR Y P ORT ER

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 03-03876 Ber nie Weinm an, Jud ge

No. W2004-01584-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 30, 2005

The De fenda nt, L arry Porter, was convicted of ag g ravated assault, and the tria l court sentenc ed the Def endant to eig ht y ear s, as a multiple offe nder. O n appea l, the Def endant c on t en d s that: (1) the

e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s us ta in his c on vic tio n; a nd(2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

se nte nc e d h im. Finding no reve rsible err or in the judgme nt of the trial court, we aff irm the Def

endant’ s conviction and sente nce.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J
., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Donna J. Armstard (a t trial), and Ga rland Er g üden (on a

ppeal) , Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, L arry

Porter.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T ur ne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; Emily

Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION I. F acts

This case arises f

rom a c rime committed ag ainst the victim, J erry Robinson, on S eptember 7, 2 0 0 2

. Wi th r e g ar d to th is c r im e , th e Sh e lb y Co u n ty G r a n d Ju r y in d ic te d th e D efe ndant for

e sp e c ia lly a g g ra va te d ro bb e ry . A t tr ia l, a jury c on vic te d th e De fe nd a nt o f the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of ag g ravated assault, and the trial court se ntence d him to eight y ear s in prison. At the Def endant’ s trial, the following evidenc e wa s prese nted: J erry Robinson, the victim, t estified that he ha d known the De fe nd a nt f

or “ y e ars .” Rob ins on sa id tha t hewo rk ed as a bai l bond sma n a ndha d p re vio us ly “bailed” the Def

endant out of ja il. He said that, on September 7, 2002, he wa s at home, in a rooming house at 1115 Patton Street, whe n the Def endant a nd two other men ca me into his room. Robi nson

rec alled that the De fenda nt and two other men surrounde d him and demanded to know “W here

. .-2-

. the money [was] ? ” Robinson said that he asked the t hree men what they meant, and, suddenly , the three men s tarted hitt ing him. He r eca lled that all three men dra g g ed him out to the front porc h of the rooming house and c ontinued to beat him. Robinson st ated that Roderick Har ris, one of the two men with the Def

endant, took Robinson’s red a nd whi t e cane a nd beg an striking him with it . He

rec alled that the De fenda nt picked up a stick a nd beg an hi t t i n g Robinson on the back. Robinson testified that all three men bea t, kicked, an d s t o mped him, kicking him at lea st once in the e y e. Robinson said that, following the beating, the three men got into a red car , driven by the unidentified third man, and drove awa y

.

Robinson testi fied that he walked dow n the stree t, and a woma n named Shirley Crump drove him to the hospital. Robinson stated t hat he suffe red severe injuries as a result of the beating. He

sa id that his ri g ht e y e wa s too sw oll e n fo r do c tor s to e xami ne , a nd su rg e ry is re qu ir e d to re sto re his vision. Robi nson said that he had w elts and bruises on his body . Robinson further e x plained that he suff ere d a lac eration on his head that requir ed stitches. Robinson testified that, afte r spending the night at the hospital, he retur ned hom e and called the police . He sa id that office rs ca me to the boarding house, phot og raphe d his injuries and the crime scene, and collected t he st ick with which the Defenda nt struck Robinson repe atedly . Robinson reca lled that, at an e arlier hearing in this ca se, the Def endant a pologized to him.

Rob ins on te sti fi e d that w he n th e thr e e me n f ir st c a me to h is r oo m he wa s n ot a fr a id b e c a us e he knew that these men w ere friends w ith his l andlord, but he be came afr aid when the men attac ked him. He re called tha t he had $300 in his bac k pocket b ef o re t h e at tack, a nd, althoug h he wa s

uncertain whether

he had the money

im m ed i ately

following the attac k, he no long er ha d the $300 when he was re lease d from the hospital.

On cr oss-examination, Robi nson testified t hat t he hallway throug h which the Defe ndant and the oth e r t wo me n d ru g Rob ins onis na rr ow , bu t wi de e no ug h fo r thr e e pe op le to w a lk at th e sa me tim e

. He sa id tha t he kn e w m os t of the fi ve re sid e nts a t th e ro omi ng ho us e , a ndhe de nie d th a t H arris

w a s a r e s id e n t at th e r o o mi n g h o u s e

. H e te s ti f ie d th a t s o me o f

h is f e ll o w r e s id e n ts a n d n eig hbors

wer e home a nd witnessed the a ttack, but he did not y ell for he lp. Robinson admit ted that Roderick Har ris worke d for Robinson’s landlord. He denied that the thr ee me n came to his room attempting to collect Robinson’s past-due r ent. Robinson reca lled that the Def endant hit him wit h the stick and Har ris beat him with a ca ne. He could not say how many

times either man struc k him, be cause the three men wer e beating him a ll at onc e. He admitted that he previously testified that the De fenda nt d i d n o th av e awe ap o n an d o n l y k i ck ed R o b i n s o n i n t h e ey e, b u t h e ex p l ai n ed t h at , at t h at h ea ri n g, he did not rec all the events clea rly

. He denied that there was any arg ument befor e the th re e men attacke d him, and he denied striking t he first blow with his cane

. He sa id that he walke d about two blocks befor e Crump picked him up. Robinson said that he bega n walking beca use t he phone in the

ro omi ng ho us e did no t alw a y s wor k, a nd he did no t thin k an y on e ins ide wo uld he lp him . H e sa id that th e a tta c k o c c ur

re d b e tw e e n 9 :00 p. m. a nd10 :00 p. m., a nd he arrive d a t the ho sp ita l in thi s sa me time frame

. Robinson said that the hospital gave him the name and numbe r of a doctor’s office to contact-3-

f o r a f o l l o w

- u p e x a m i n a t i o n

. H e s a i d t h a th e r e t u r n e d t o th e h o s p i t a l w h e n t h e s w e l l i n g i n h i s e ye lessened, but he could not reme mber whether this wa s later the same wee k, or the following wee k. He admitted that the ey e doctor diag nosed his ey e proble m, in part, as g laucoma, but he denied that h e h ad b een diag nosed with g laucoma prior to the attac k. Robinson said that the hospital refer red him to a clinic, but
, due to financ ial constraints, he went to see the ey e specialist for whom his sist er

w o rk s

. H e c o u l d n o t r e c a l l w h e n h e f i r s t w e n t t o s e e t h e e ye s p e c i a l i s t

. R o b i n s o n s a i d t h a tt h e e ye

s p e c i a l i s tr e f

e rr e dh i mt o a

s e c o n d s p e c i a l i s t f

o r s u r g e r y, b u t h e h a s b e e n u n ab l e t o a f f o r d t h e s u r g e r y. On re dir ect e xami natio n, Rob ins on e xpla ine d th a t hi s v isi on wa s c le ar b e fo re he wa s b e a te n, bu t, following the bea ting, he is unable to see out of his right e y e. On re-cr oss examination, he said that he has w orn g lasses since he was twe nty y ear s old.

Se rg e a nt C ha m Pa y ne , o f the Me mph is Pol ic e De pa rt me nt, te sti fi e d that he wo rk e d th e c ri me

scene at Robinson’s addre ss on September 8, 2002, the day afte r the incide nt. He re called that, when he arrive d, he no tic e d a

sti c k lying on the g ro un d on the fr on t po rc h of the ro omi ng ho us e . H e a lso noted that there wer e blood stains prese nt on the porch. The serg eant sa id that he took photogr aphs of the sce ne and Robinson’s injuries, and he also collec t ed t h e stick as evidenc e. On

cross-e x amination, Serg eant Pay ne s ai d that he did not g o inside the rooming house whe n he
proce ssed the sce ne bec ause he was informed that the incident took pla ce outside on the front por ch. The ser g eant r eca lled that, when he arrived, a pa trol office r wa s alrea dy at the sce ne.

Detec tive Terry Thompson testified t hat, i n September 2002, he was a n investigator in the robbery division of the Memphis Police Depa rtment, and he was assig ned to investig ate Robinson’s

case . The de tective r eca lled that he interviewe d Robinson and, based on this interview , the detec tive develope d three suspects: the De fenda nt, Rode rick Har ris, and an unidentified third man. Detec tive Thompson said that he showed Robinson a photog raphic line-up appr ox imately three we ek s afte r Robinson was attacke d, and Robinson identified the De fenda nt without hesitation.

The Defen d a n t t e s ti f

ie d th a t h e k n o w s Ro b in s o n , a n d h e k n o w s H arr is

. T h e D e f e n d a nt

rec alled that, at around 8:00 p.m., on September 7, 2002, he, Har ris, and a third man n am ed Zoe,

we re dr inking be e r and “ ha ng ing ou t” a t a roo min g ho us e ow ne d by Rob ins on ’s la nd lor d. He sa id that Z oe re c e ive d a

te le ph on e c a ll a ndre qu e ste d th a t H arris a ndthe De fe nd a nt a c c ompany him to the l andlord’s other roomi ng house, on Patton Street. He said that Robinson and Harris both li ved at the Patton Street ho u s e. He recalled that, a fter H arris opened the f ront door with his key , the Def endant f ollowed Zoe and Har

ris into the building. He e x plained that Z oe and H arris entere d Robinson’s room to question him about over due rent money , while t he De fenda nt remaine d in the hallway

. He state d that Robinson “jumped up and said ‘I alre ady talked to [the landlord],’ and [R obinson] was shouting at t hem and the nex t thing that I kn[ew] he swung his cane .” He rec ounted that Robinson struck Zoe with the cane, Zoe g rabbe d Robinson, and the men beg an “tussling .” He

re c a lle d th a t Ro bin so n d ro pp e d th e c a ne a nd“ br ok e tow ard[the De fe nd a nt]. ” Th e De fe nd a nt s a id that he watched these events fr om outs i d e R o b i n s o n’s room, and he did not enter the r oom. He testified that, when Robinson ran towards him, he pushed Robinson awa y , and R obinson ran out the front door w ith Zoe and Ha rris running afte r him. Th e De fe n d ant said that whe n he we nt outside Robinson was alrea dy

on the g round. He rec alled that Z oe was beating Robinson with t he ca ne, and-4-

Har ris was kicking and stomping Robinson. He state d that he “g ot on out of the way .” He sa id that Har ris took a shoe a nd struck Robinson repe atedly i n t h e fa ce. The De fenda nt said that the alterc ation lasted a brief time, and then all three men drove awa y toge ther. He said that he did not attempt to stop the beating or to ca ll the police.

On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, the De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t Z oe liv e d in a nd ra n the ro omi ng ho us e wher e the thre e men we re be fore the incident. He ex plained that Z oe re ceive d a ca ll from the landlord re g arding Robinson’s rent money . The De fenda nt testified that, when the othe r two men

e n t e r e d R o b i n s o n ’ s r o o m , h e w a t c h e d f r o m t h e o p p o s i t e e n d o f t h e t e n t o f i f t e e n f o o tl o n g h a l l w a y. He sa id that he watc hed, but did not participate in the fig hting. He t estified that he pushed Robinson when Robi nson ran past him, but he denied “slam[ming] [R obinson’s] fac e into a door.” He de nied that any one dra g g ed Robinson outside. The Def endant denied that any one struck Robinson with a stick, and he sa id th a t h e d id n o t e v e r h it o r k ic k Ro b in s o n

. H e s a id th a t n o o n e to o k a n y money fr om R ob ins on . H e re c a lle d th a t, a ft e r Z oe a nd Ha rris be a t Rob ins on , the De fe nd a nt r e turne d w ith the other two me n to the other rooming house, whe re H arris called to chec k on Robinson. He de nied that he apolog ized to R obinso n at a p revious court proce eding . On re direc t examination, t he Def endant testified tha t, when Ha rris called to chec k on Robinson’s condition, Harris wa s told that Robinson was “fine.”

Following this evidence the jury convicted the Def

endant o f aggravated a ssault. At the Def endant’ s sentencing hearing, based on the evidence presented at trial and the D efe ndant’s pre

sentenc e re port, the trial court found that six enhanc ement fa ctors we re a pplicable. The trial court stated:

The Court finds that the [D] efe ndant is in fact a Rang e Two multiple offe nder, a nd that he ha s a

his tory , a c ri min a l hi sto ry

that far, fa

r exc e e ds the ne c e ssa

ry c ri me s to est ab l i sh the appropriate ra ng e. He has many , many , many convictions, pag es of them.

Th e vic tim , a s th e Cou rt recal ls

. . . w a s h urt [a nd ] ha d e xtre me inj ur ie s, in fac t, to the point of he say s his e y e s i gh t o r h e’ s lost si g ht in one ey e and ha d not

re c ov e re d a t th e tim e of

the tr ia l.

The [D]efendant ha s a history of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions

o f b e in g r e le a s e d in to th e c o mm u n it y

. H e ’ s v io late d p r o b a ti o n b e f o r e , th a t the [D]e fe nd a nt h a s n o he sit a tio n in be ing inv olv e d in c ri me s th a t – w he re se ri ou s b od ily injury could be involved.

An d a lso ba se d o n te sti mon y , the Cou rt is of the – I thi nk the re c or ds wo uld ref lect the [D]efenda nt had bee n rele ased on pro b ati on at the time this was committed. He wa s out on probation when this crime w as committed.

So the Court is of the opinion that a sentenc e of eig ht y ear s and a fine of $500-5-

would be appr opriate in this matter . . . .

II. Ana lys is

A. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence

The De fenda nt contends that the e vidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
ag g ravated assault, bec ause the evidenc e consisted sol el y o f the victim’s testimony , which the Def endant claims lacks credibility

. When an accuse d challeng es t he sufficiency of t he evide nce, a n

app e llate c ou rt ’s sta nd ardof r evi ew is w he the r, a ft e r c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t favor able to the pr osecution, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13( e); J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); State v

. C ar t er , 121 S.W .3d 579, 588 (Tenn. 2003) ; State v. Smi th, 24 S.W .3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000) . This rule applies to finding s o f guilt based upon dire ct evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a

combination of both direc t and circ umstantial evidenc e. State v. Pender g rass, 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999).

I n de te rm ini ng the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , this Cou rt sh ou ld not re -w e ig h o r r e -e va luate the evidenc e. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). This Court may

no t su bs titute its inf

e re nc e s f or tho se dr a wn by

the tr ie r of fa c t fr om the e vid e nc e

. Sta te v. B ug g s, 995 S.W .2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999); L iakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). Que stions

c on c e r n i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s , t h e w e i g h t a n d v a l u e o f t h e e v i d e n c e , a s we ll a s a ll fac tual issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. L iakas, 286 S.W.2 d at 859. This Court must aff

ord the State of T ennesse e the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence contained in the r ecor d, as we ll as all rea sonable infe renc es which may be drawn from the evidenc e. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). B eca use a verdic t of g uilt aga inst a defe ndant

remove s the presumption of innoce nce a n d raises a presumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to s us ta in a

g uil ty verdic t. I d.; see State v. Car ruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000)

. Ag g ra va te d ass a ult is “i nte nti on a lly

. . . k no wi ng ly

. . . o r r e c kle ssl y

c omm it[ti ng ] an a ssa

ult ” and either “ca us[i ng ] ser ious bodily injury ” or “us[ing] or display ing a deadly wea pon.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102 ( 2003). Assault is define d as occ urring when a person:

(1) Intentionally , knowing ly or re cklessly

cause s bodilyinjury

to another;

(2 ) I nten tio na lly

or kn ow ing ly

c a us e s a no the r t o r e a so na bly fe ar i mmi ne nt b od ily injury ; or

(3 ) Inte nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly c a us e s ph y sic a l c on ta c t wi th a no the r a nd a re a so na ble person would r eg ard the contac t as extremely offe nsive or provoc ative.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-101 (2003)

.-6-

The victim
, Robinson, testified t hat the De fendant and two other me n came to his home and surrounde d him. He testified that the three men beg an beating him a nd drag g ed him outside, where the three men beat Robinson wit h a stick and a cane and kicke d him repeatedly . Robinson identified
t h e De fe n d an t an d t es t i fi ed t h at t h e De fe n d an t b ea t h i m wi t h a st i ck

. As a re s u l t o f t h e b e at i n g, Robinson suffere d multipl e lacerations and bruises, and lost the sight in his rig ht ey e. Althoug h the Def endant c laims that he was mer ely a by stand er an d not a participant in the crime, the jury ob vio us ly c re dit e d th e vic tim ’s te sti mon y on thi s p oin t. T he refore, we c on c lud e thi s e vid e nc e is sufficie nt to sustain the Defe ndant’s convic tion for ag g ravated assault.

B. Se nt e nc ing

The De fenda nt asserts that the tria l court’s a pplication of sentenc e enhancing fac tors was imp ro pe r i n li g ht o f the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt ’s de c isi on in B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 5 24 U. S. ____, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004).

When a def

endant c halleng es the leng th or manner of ser vice of

a sente nce, it is the duty

of this Court t o conduct a de novo re view of the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat “the de terminations made by the co u rt fr o m which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). This pre sumption is “‘c onditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial

c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a nda ll r e le vant f a c ts a nd c ir c ums ta nc e s. ’” Sta te v. Ros s, 49 S.W. 3d 83 3, 84 7 (T e nn . 200 1) (q uo tin g Sta te v. Pe ttu s, 98 6 S. W.2 d 5 40 , 5 43 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ); Sta te v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Te n n

. 1 991). The pr esumption does not apply to the leg al conclusions re ache d by the trial court in se ntencing a defe ndant or to the de terminations made by the trial court whic h are predic ated upon uncontrove rted fa cts. State v. Dea n, 76 S.W .3d 352, 377 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Sta te v. B utl e r, 90 0 S. W.2 d 3 05 , 3 11 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ); Sta te v . Sm ith 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . I n conducting a de novo r eview of a se ntence , we must consider: (a) any evidenc e rece ived at the t rial and/or se ntencing hearing; ( b) the pre sentenc e report; (c) the pr i nciples of se ntencing ; (d) the a rg uments of counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives; (e) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of

fense ; (f) a ny

mitigating or statutory enhanc ement fa ctors; (g ) any statements m ade by the def endant on his or he r own be half; and ( h) the defe ndant’s potential or la ck of pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210 (2003); State v. Ta y lor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) . The pa rty challeng ing

a se nte nc e imp os e d by the tr ia l cou rt ha s the bu rd e n of es ta bli sh ing that the se nte nc e is e rr on e ou s. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ), Se nte nc ing Com m’ n Cm ts.

I n the ca se under

submissi on, we c onclude that ther e is am p l e evide nce that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and all re levant fa cts and c ircumstance s. There fore , we r eview its decision d e n o v o w ith a p r e s u mp ti o n o f

c o rr e c tn e s s

. A c c o r d in g ly
, s o lo n g a s th e tria l c ourt complie d w ith th e p u rp o s e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s o f th e 1 9 8 9 Se n te n c in g A c t a n d it s f in d ing s are support ed bythe fa ctual re cord, this Court may not disturb this sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts; S tate v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).-7-

The United States Supre me Court’s re cent opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct

. 2531 (2004), calls into que stion the continuing va lidityof our c urre nt sentencing scheme

. I n that case
, t h e C o u rt , applying the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2000),
str uc k d ow n a

pr ov isi on of

the Washi ng ton se nte nc ing g uid e lin e s th a t pe rm itt e d a tr ia l ju dg e to impose an “e x ceptional se ntence ” upon the findi ng of ce rtain statutorily enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. 124 S. Ct . at 2537. The Court obser ved that “the ‘statut o ry m ax i m u m ’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentenc e a judg e may impose so le ly on the ba sis of the fac ts re fle c te d in the jury ve rdict or admitted by the defe ndant .” I d. Fi n al l y , t h e Court concluded that “eve ry de fe nd a nt h a s a

ri g ht t o in sis t tha t th e pr os e c uto r p ro ve to a jury [be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t] a ll f

a c ts leg ally essential to the punishment.” I d. at 2539.

Th e De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t hi s se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve in l ig ht o f the Un ited S tat e s Su pr e me Court decision in Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S.
__, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The State c ounters that the Def

endant ha s waived this ar g ument by not raising the i ssue at his sentenc ing he aring , and

a l t e r n a t i v e l y, t h a tt h e D e f e n d a n t ’ s s e n t e n c e d o e s n o tv i o l a t e t h e m a n d a t e s e tf o r t h i n B l a k e l y.

Fi rst, we note tha t the Def endant ha s not waived this issue. I n State v. Chester Way ne Wal te rs , w e he ld tha t, b e c a us e B lake ly a nn ou nc e d a

ne w r ule , a ny de fe nda nt w ho se c a se wa s st ill on direc t appea l c ould r aise this issue. State v. Chester Way ne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCAR3-CD, 2004 WL 2726034, at *19 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2004). We explained that, althoug h Blakely was the Supreme Court’s explanation of i ts prior dec ision in Apprendi v. New J erse y , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Tennesse e Supreme Court had pre viouslyannounce d that the

ru le in A pp re nd i di d n ot af fe c t our Sta te ’s se nte nc ing sc he me

. As a re su lt, the ma nd a te of B lake ly

cre ated a new r ule in Tenne ssee. F urthermor e, in Walters, this Court hel d t h at Bl akely could be raised in all case s on direc t appea l, beca use a violation of t his mandate w as plain er ror a rising f rom the d e p r iv a ti o n o f th e Co n s ti tu ti o n a l r ig h t to a ju r y tria l. Se e a ls o St a te v

. Ch ar le s Be nson, No. M2003-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2266801, at *7–10 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oc t. 8, 2004).

Thus, the question b ec o m es whe ther the se ntence imposed by the trial court violates the United States Supreme Court manda te in B lakely

. At the Def endant’ s sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the following enhanc ement fa ctors applied: (2) the defe ndant has a previous history of criminal co n victions or criminal beha vior in addition to those necessa ry to establish the

app ro pr ia te ra ng e ; ( 6) the de fe nd a nt t re a te d o r a llo we d a

vic tim to b e tr e a te d withe xce pti on a l c ru e lty during the commission of the offe nse; (7) the persona l injuries inflicted upon or the amount of damag e to property sustained by or t aken from t he victim was pa rticularly g reat; (9) the def

endant ha s a pr e vio us his tory of un wi lli ng ne ss to co mpl y wi th the c on dit ion s o f a

se nte nc e inv olv ing re le a se in the c omm un ity ; ( 11 ) the de fe nd a nt h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me wh e n th e ri sk to human life was h i gh ; an d (1 4) the fe lony was c ommitt ed while on pr obation from a prior felony conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (6), (7), (9), (11), (14). The trial court then sentenc ed the Def endant to eig ht y ear s in prison, as a Rang e I I multipl e off

ender

.

The sente nce r ang e for

a Class C felony , Rang e I I offe nder is six to ten y ear s. Tenn. Code-8-

Ann. § 40-35-112 ( 2003). I n calc ul at i n g t he sente nce f or a Class C felony

conviction, the presumptive sentence is the statutory minimum for a

Rang e I I offe nder if the re a

re no e nhance ment or mitiga ting f

actor s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f t h er e ar e enha nceme nt but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set the sentenc e above the minimum, but still within the rang e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d). A sentenc e involving both e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s require s an assig nment of relative weight for the enhanceme nt fac tors as a me ans of incr easing the

s en t en ce

. T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5 -2 1 0 (e ). T h e s en t en ce m u s tt h en b e r ed u ce d wi t h i n t h e r an ge by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ).

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

pr op e rl y fo un d that the De fe nd a nt ha s a pr ior his tor y of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns , and this finding doe s not violate Blake ly . None of the other enhanc ement fa ctors used by the trial court to enha nce the Def

endan t ’s sentenc e, howe ver, w ere submitt ed to a jury or admitted by

the Def endant. The ref

ore, the rule in B lakely

prec ludes applica tion of any of these f

actor s except the

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor ba se d on the De fe nd a nt’ s pr ior c ri min a l c on vic tio ns . B e c a us e the re wa s o nly

one en h an ce m ent factor prope rly applied by

the trial court, the Def

endant’ s sentence must be

mo d if ie d
, u n le s s th e e rr o r

w a s h ar ml e s s b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t. Se e Walte r s , 2 0 0 4 WL 2726034, at *22.

I n Wa lte rs , th is C ou rt

he ld tha t B lake ly

vio la tio ns are su bje c t to a Con sti tut ion a l ha rm le ss

e rr or a na ly sis

. I d. a t *2 4. “ Whil e it is true that B lake ly c on c e rn s the inv iol a te ri g ht t o a jury tr ia l, the cornerstone upon w hich our criminal j ustice sy stem was constructed, we cannot sa y that a jury ’s fa ilu re to d e te rm ine a n e nh a nceme nt f a c tor ‘n e c e ssa ri ly re nd e r[s ] a c ri min a l tria l f un da me nta lly unfair or an unre liable vehicle for de termining g uilt or innocence .’” I d. (quoting Nee der v. U nited States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)). Thus, befor e we modify the Def endant’ s sentence , we will “r eview the B lakely

err ors to deter mine whether th ey we re h ar m less bey ond a re asonable doubt.” I d.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U .S. 18, 24 (1967).

First, we examine the trial cour t ’s applica tion of enhanc ement fa ctor (9) , conce rning the Def endant’ s prior unwil lingne ss to comply with the t erms or conditions of probation or re lease . The

rec ord re flec ts that the Defe ndant violated the terms or conditions of his relea se on more than one

oc c a sio n. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s p re se nte nc e re po rt de ta ils that he wa s c on vic te d o f v iol a tin g his probation on four

separ ate oc casions: May 28, 1998; November

30, 1994; October 1 6
, 1991; and Ma rc h 2 2, 19 91

. F urthe r, the re wa s n o e vid e nc e pr e se nte d to c on tr a dic t th is f a c t. T he re fo re , w e ho ld that the trial court’s application of e nhance ment fac tor (9) w as harmless error

. Conversely , we hold that the tria l court’s a pplication o f en h ancement fa ctor (14) , that the Def endant wa s on probation from a prior felony conviction at the time he committed the off ense, w as not harmless er

ror. Base d on the record before us, we a re una ble to conclude that the Def endant wa s on probation for a felony when he committed the offense in this case

. The presentenc e re port shows that the Def

endant ha s only

two prior fe lony

convictions, the most rec ent i n 1996 for whic h he

rec eived a two y ear sentenc e. The most rec ent prior offe nse not ed in the Defenda nt’s prese ntenceT h e pr es en t en ce r epor t s h ows t h at t h e D ef en dan t w as c h ar g ed wi t h a g g r av at ed bu r g l ar y , bu t e n t er ed a 1

gu i l t y pl ea t o “ cr i mi nal at t emp t mi s dem ean or. ”

-9- re po rt is a mis de me a no r c on vic tio n f ro m Jan ua

ry 14 , 2 00 2. Th us , th e app lic a tio n o f f a c tor (9 ) i s 1 not harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt.

Ne xt, w e turn to the app lic a ti on of fac tor (6 ), that th e De fe nd a nt t re a te d th e vic tim

wi th exceptional crue lty . “Exceptional crue lty ” is too conclusory for this Court to say

that the application of this fac tor was ha

rmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. W e conc lude that this is the ty pe of

s u b j e c t i v e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t m u s t b e l e f t w i t h i n t h e j u r y’ s p r o v i n c e p u r s u a n tt o B l a k e l y. A c c o r d i n g l y, the trial court’s application of this fa ctor is not harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. L ikewise, we

c on c lud e that th e app lic a tio n o f f a c tor (7 ), that th e inj ur ie s su ff

e re d b y thevic tim

we re pa rt ic ula rl y g reat, was not ha

rmless err or. Although the jury implicitl y found that the Def endant c aused “ serious b o d i l y i n jury ” whe n it found him guilty of ag g ravated assault, “pa rticularly g reat” is a subjective conclusion best left to the province of the jury

. Finally , enhanc ement fa ctor (11) , that the Def endant did not hesitate to commit a crime whe n the risk to human life wa s high, w as not found by the jury or admit ted by the Defenda nt. This fac tor, like fac tors (6) and (7), r equire s a subjective c onclusion that must be left to the jury

. Thus, we hold that the tria l court’s a pplication of this fac tor was not harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt.

I n summary , the t rial court improperly applied enhance ment fac tors (6), (7), (11), and (14), bu t it pr op e rl y c on sid e re d f

a c tor (2 ), re g ard ing the De fe nd a nt’ s hist ory of pr ior c ri min a l c on vic tio ns

. Ac c or din g ly , b e c a us e fa c tor (2 ) w a s p ro pe rl y app li ed bythe tr ia l c ou rt , th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y

e nh a nc e d th e De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e fr om s ix y e ars to e ig ht y e ars . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

III

. Conclusion

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoning and aut h o ri ties, we a ffirm the D efe ndant’s conviction and se ntence

.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE