[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Grant v. Collins, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4281.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of De cisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O . 2018-O HIO -4281
T HE S TATE EX REL . G RANT , A PPELLANT , v . C OLLINS , J UDGE , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Grant v. Collins, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4281.]
Prohibition

— Megan’s Law provisions remain in effect for those who committed their offenses before enactm ent of the Adam Walsh Act

— Judgment dismissing writ action affirmed. (No. 2017-0686—Submitted February 13, 2018—Decided October 24, 2018.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2016-L-106,
2017-Ohio-1338.

________________ K ENNEDY , J. {¶ 1} Scott A. Grant appeals from a judgme nt of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Richard L. Collins Jr. from proceeding with a hearing to determine whether Grant should be designated a sexual predator pursuant to Megan’s Law. Grant’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 complaint alleged that since the Gene ral Assembly enacted 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”), Megan’s Law has been repealed and cannot be applied to him. Our caselaw, however, hol ds that when a new law cannot be applied retroactively, the legislature’s repeal of the former version of that law is a nullity. For this reason, our holding in 2011 that th e retroactive application of the AWA is unconstitutional means that Megan’s Law con tinues to apply to offenders convicted before 2008, including Grant. Consequent ly, Judge Collins does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to conduct a sexual-predator adjudication hearing relating to Grant’s 1986 convictions for kidnapping and involuntary manslaughter, and Grant has an adequate remedy in the or dinary course of law to challenge Judge Collins’s exercise of jurisdiction. We theref ore affirm the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dis missing Grant’s prohibition action. Facts and Procedural Background {¶ 2} In September 1985, a grand jury indicted Grant on one count each of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and rape for the killing of a 17-year-old female.
State v. Grant , 11th Dist. Lake No. 11-252, 1987 WL 26720, *1. After the trial court dismissed the rape count at the close of the state’s case-in-chief, the jury found Grant guilty of kidnapping and the less er-included-offense of involuntary manslaughter, and the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 to 25 years in prison. Id . Grant remains in prison. {¶ 3} On August 24, 2016, Judge Collins scheduled a sexual-offenderclassification hearing to determine whether Grant should be classified as a sexual predator pursuant to Megan’s Law. {¶ 4} Grant petitioned the Eleventh District Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition, alleging that Me gan’s Law had been repealed and that the scheduling order was therefore unauthorized by law. The court of appeals granted Judge Collins’s motion to dismiss, explaining that he did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed because the hearing provisions of Megan’s LawJanuary Term, 2018

3 required the judge imposing sentence or the judge’s successor to determine whether an offender is a sexual predator. 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-106, 2017-Ohio-1338, ¶ 9. The court concluded that Grant had an adequate remedy by way of a direct appeal and therefore could not show entitlement to a writ of prohibition. Id . at ¶ 11-12. {¶ 5} Grant appealed to this court as of right. Law and Analysis {¶ 6} Megan’s Law, enacted in 1996 in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560 (“H.B. 180”) and subsequently amended in 2003 by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558 (“S.B. 5”), established a comprehensive system of sex-offender cla ssification and registration that expressly applies retroactively regardless of when the offender committed the underlying sex offense. Former R.C. 2950.04(A), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2609-2610; see also 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6657-6661. H.B. 180 took effect on January 1, 1997. 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2668. {¶ 7} We have upheld the General Assemb ly’s decision to apply Megan’s Law to those offenders who committed a sexually oriented offense before the law’s effective date, concluding that Megan’ s Law is remedial and not punitive and therefore does not violate constitutional protections against retroactive laws. E.g ., State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 412, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998); State v. Ferguson , 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 40. {¶ 8} Relevant here, the former version of R.C. 2950.09(C) in effect under
both the H.B. 180 and S.B. 5 versions of Megan’s Law applied to any person
convicted of and sentenced for an unexe mpt sexually oriented offense before January 1, 1997. 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2620-2621 and 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6691-6712. Those statutes required th e Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) to notify the senten cing court of particular offenders who had committed specific sexually oriented offenses or posed an identifiable risk toS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 society, and upon notification from DRC, di rected the court to conduct a sexualpredator adjudication hearing be fore the offender’s release. Id

. {¶ 9} In 2007, the General Assembly passed the AWA, repealing former R.C. 2950.09’s hearing provisions. See State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 41 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). In place of Megan’s Law, the AWA created a system under which offenders are classified as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offenders based solely on the offense. Id .; R.C. 2950.01(E), (F), and (G). In Williams , however, we concluded that the provisions of the AWA are punitive and therefore cannot be applied retroactively. Williams at ¶ 22. {¶ 10} Grant’s petition for a writ of prohib ition asserted that because the AWA repealed Megan’s Law, and because the AWA cannot be applied retroactively to him, Judge Collins lacks jurisdiction to determine whether he is a sexual predator. This analysis is flawed. {¶ 11} In State v. Brunning , 134 Ohio St.3d 438, 2012-Ohio-5752, 983 N.E.2d 316, we considered whether a sex offender who had been convicted of rape in 1983, classified as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law in 1997, and
reclassified as a Tier III sex offender pursuant to the AWA in 2008 could be prosecuted for failing to give the sheriff notice of an address change after Megan’s Law had been repealed by the AWA. We explained that in enacting the AWA and repealing Megan’s Law, the General A ssembly had not in tended to relieve
offenders classified under the earlier la w of their registration and notification
duties. Id . at ¶ 21. Rather, we noted:

“When a court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional, and the offending statute replaced an existing law that had been repealed in the same bill that enacted the offending statute, the repeal is also invalid unless it clearly appears that the General Assembly meantJanuary Term, 2018

5 the repeal to have effect even if the offending statute had never been passed.”

Id., quoting State v. Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d 502, 739 N.E.2d 788 (2001), paragraph two of the syllabus. Noting that the AWA was “more onerous” than Megan’s Law,
this court declared it “self-evident” that the General Assembly would not have repealed Megan’s Law if the AWA had not been enacted: “It is unimaginable that the General Assembly would have intended offenders or iginally classified under Megan’s Law to be free from any reporting requirements if the AWA were to be
struck down.” Brunning at ¶ 22. Accordingly, we concluded that the registration and notification provisions of Megan’s Law continued to apply to offenders subject
to that law. {¶ 12} And in State v. Howard , 134 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, ¶ 29, we explained that not only does a sex offender classified pursuant to Megan’s Law remain subject to its re gistration and notifica tion provisions after January 1, 2008, but also the penalty provisions enacted as part of Megan’s Law to punish violations of its provisions continue to apply as well. We recognized that

Ohio has, in effect, separate statutory schemes governing sex offenders depending on when they committed their underlying
offense. Those who committed their offense before the effective date of the AWA are subject to the provisions of Megan’s Law;
those who committed their offense after the effective date of the AWA are subject to the AWA.

Id . at ¶ 17. {¶ 13} Megan’s Law’s separate statutory scheme continues to apply to offenders who committed a sexually oriented offense prior to the effective date ofS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 the AWA, and the repeal of the hearin g provisions required to classify those offenders is ineffective as it affects offenders subject to Megan’s Law. Accordingly, former R.C. 2950.09(C) app lies to Grant, and Judge Collins has subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct a sexual-predator adjudication hearing to classify Grant before his release from prison. {¶ 14} Grant maintains that Megan’s La w cannot be applied to him, however, because he has never been classified as a sexually oriented offender. This assertion misunderstands the statute, because as we explained in State v. Hayden
, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 15, an offender is “automatically classified as a sexually oriented offender” upon conviction for a sexually oriented offense. {¶ 15} Grant was convicted of kidnapping and involuntary manslaughter arising from the 1985 slaying of a 17-year-old. Although the trial court acquitted Grant of rape, kidnapping a minor was a se xually oriented offense under the H.B. 180 version of Megan’s Law, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2601-2602, 2618-2619, and kidnapping was a sexually oriented offe nse pursuant to the S.B. 5 amendments to Megan’s Law if committed with a sexual motivation, regardless of the age of the victim, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 6634-6635. Grant admits in his brief that he killed a minor while having sexual intercourse with her, and it is possible that his kidnapping conviction resulted in his automatic classification as a sexually oriented
offender. {¶ 16} Accordingly, there is at least a factual question regarding whether Grant committed a sexually oriented offense, and Judge Collins does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to conduct a sexual-predator adjudication hearing to decide that factual question in the first instance. Grant has an adequate remedy by way of appeal from any erro neous exercise of that jurisdiction. See State v. Clayborn , 125 Ohio St.3d 450, 2010-Ohio-2123, 928 N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 16 (aJanuary Term, 2018

7 sexual-offender classification may be appeale d, and the appeal must be filed within 30 days after judgment is entered). {¶ 17} Lastly, Grant’s reliance on cases upholding the finality of criminal sentences is misplaced, because classification as a sex offender under Megan’s Law is a civil, remedial consequence of th e conviction and not a punitive component of criminal sentencing. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d at 417, 700 N.E.2d 570; State v.
Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 32; Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, at ¶ 36. Sex-offender classification and registration laws therefore do not affect the finality of Grant’s convictions and

sentence. {¶ 18} Here, Grant’s allegations are insufficient to establish either that Judge Collins patently and unambiguously l acks jurisdiction to proceed or that appeal from any erroneous exercise of that jurisdiction would not be an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this prohibition action. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and O’D ONNELL , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and
D E G ENARO , JJ., concur.

_________________ Scott A. Grant, pro se. Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

_________________