UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1330

AMSALE TEFERA ASFAW,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: September 16, 2010 Decided: November 10, 2010

Before KING, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

E. Dennis Muchnicki, Dublin, Ohio, for Petitioner. Tony West,

Assistant Attorney General, Anthony W. Norwood, Senior 

Litigation Counsel, Lisa M. Damiano, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, 

D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Amsale Tefera Asfaw, a native and citizen 

of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying her applications for 

asylum, withholding of removal and withholding under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Asfaw challenges the 

adverse credibility finding.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes 

the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(a), (b) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person 

unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 

“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death, 

torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one 

of the enumerated grounds[.]” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 

171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility 

for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 

2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2010), and can establish 

refugee status based on past persecution in her native country 

on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) 

(2010). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can 
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establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected 

ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 

2004). 

“Withholding of removal is available under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(b)(3) if the alien shows that it is more likely than not 

that her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of 

removal because of her race, religion, nationality, membership 

in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Gomis v. 

Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1048 (2010). “This is 

a more stringent standard than that for asylum . . . . [and], 

while asylum is discretionary, if an alien establishes 

eligibility for withholding of removal, the grant is mandatory.” 

Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353-54 (4th Cir. 

2006) (internal citation omitted) (alteration added). 

For asylum applications filed after the passage of the 

REAL ID Act of 2005, a trier of fact, “[c]onsidering the 

totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,” may 

base a credibility determination on any inconsistency, 

inaccuracy, or falsehood “without regard to whether [it] goes to 

the heart of the applicant’s claim[.]” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). “[I]n evaluating an asylum 

applicant’s credibility, an [Immigration Judge] may rely on 

omissions and inconsistencies that do not directly relate to the 
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applicant’s claim of persecution as long as the totality of the 

circumstances establish that the applicant is not credible.” 

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 164 (2d Cir. 2008). 

Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial 

evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony 

on credibility grounds must offer a “specific, cogent reason” 

for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of specific and 

cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory 

evidence, and inherently improbable testimony[.]” Tewabe v. 

Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

This court accords broad, though not unlimited, 

deference to credibility findings supported by substantial 

evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 

2004). If the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding 

is based on speculation and conjecture rather than specific and 

cogent reasoning, however, it is not supported by substantial 

evidence. Tewabe, 446 F.3d at 538. Likewise, “the immigration 

judge cannot reject documentary evidence without specific, 

cogent reasons why the documents are not credible.” Kourouma v. 

Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009). 

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or 

withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial 
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evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) 

(2006). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence 

. . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder 

could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 

n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).*

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

adverse credibility finding and the record does not compel a 

different result. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED

 * Asfaw fails to challenge the denial of her request for 

protection under the Convention Against Torture. She has 

therefore waived appellate review of this claim. See Ngarurih, 

371 F.3d at 189 n.7 (finding that failure to raise a challenge 

in an opening brief results in abandonment of that challenge); 

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 

1999) (same).