### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 22, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA UR ICE D AR NEL L TY LER

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-A- 432 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2005- 00500-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 1, 2006

Th is i s a dir e c t app e a l a s o f ri g ht f ro m c on vic tio ns e nte re d o n a jury ve rd ic t of

g uil ty of tw o f ir st deg ree preme ditated murder s. The jury sentenc ed the De fendant to life wi t h o u t the possibili ty of parole for one conviction, and he rec eived a life sentenc e for the other. On appe al, the De fendant advanc es five a

rg uments: (1) the state violate d his equal protection rig hts by striking thre e Af

rica n Americ ans during jury

selec tion; (2) the court erre d by admitting into evidenc e a photog raph of one of the victims; (3) the co u rt erred by admitting into evidenc e a thr eate ning statement made by the Def endant thre e y ear s prior to the date of the crimes at issue in this case ; ( 4) the court erre d by failing to declar e a mistrial whe n the State made a statement duri n g cl o s ing a rg ument which wa s

un su pp orte d by th e evide nc e ; a nd(5 ) the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the jury ’s g uil ty verdic ts. W e af

firm the judg ments of the court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Paul J . Br uno, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Maruic e Da

rnell Ty ler.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Repo r

ter ; Pr e s to nSh ip p , A s s istant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson, District Attorney Gene ral; and Kathy Morante, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

The c onvictions at issue in this appeal stem from a n appar ent re veng e killing in which the Def endant, Maurice Darnell Ty ler, fir ed twenty -eig ht shots int o a vehic le par ked outside the Oute r L imi ts n ig ht c lub in N a sh vil le du ri ng the e arl y mornin g ho ur s o f N ov e mbe r 2 5, 20 02 . T he oc c up a ntsW h i l e M r

. J oh n s on i n i t i al l y r epor t ed t o t h e pol i ce t h at t h e s h oot er g ot i n t o t h e dr i v er ’ s s i de of t h e ca r , u pon 1

f urt her ref

l ect i o n, he reali zed it w as t he p ass enger’ s si d e, a nd he c al l ed the d et ect i ve i n c harge a nd a m end ed his s t at em ent
to re flec t t h e sh o o te r e n te rin g the p a sse n g e r sid e o f t h e ge t-aw a y ve h ic le

.

T h e r e c o r d re v e a ls tha t M r. J o h n so n w a s a n a m a te u r v id e o g ra p h e r w h o o ften ke p t a v id e o c a m e ra in h is 2

veh i cl e. T he vi deo o f t he pur s ui t , t aped t hr ough t he f r ont wi nds hi el d of

M r

. John s on’ s ve hi cl e a s he fol l owed t he s hoot er flee ing fro m the c rim e sc e n e , w a s e n te re d into e v id e n c e a n d p la ye d fo r th e ju ry.

-2- of the ve hic le , v ic tim s Cayra Caru th andMo nte Ca mpb e ll, we re kil le d. B a se d o n e y e -w itn e ss

acc ounts, the Defe ndant was de emed a s u s pect a nd a wa rra nt was issued for

his arre st. After

rec eiving attention in the news media , the Def endant turne d himself in. I n Marc h of 2003, he a nd his c o- de fe nd a nt, Christ op he r S c hu ltz, we re ind ic te d b y a Da vid so n Coun ty g randjury on tw o c ou nts of first deg ree preme ditated murder and one c ount of felony

murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 20 2( a )( 1) a nd(a )( 2) . M r. Sc hu ltz e nte re d g uil ty ple a s, a ndthe De fe nd a nt e le c te d to g o to tr ia l.

At tr i al
, the State’s lea ding w itness, Mr. J are d J ohnson, testified that on the nig ht of the murders h e was e mploy ed as the night mana g er f or the Oute r Limit ni g ht club in Nashville. At approximately

2:30 on the morning of November 25, 2002, he was standing outside the club when he first he ard multiple g unshots, then saw muz zle fire, and s ubsequently witnessed a ma n shooting into the passeng er side of a silver Merc ury Couga r par ked in an a djace nt parking lot. Mr. J ohnson 1

re c a lle d in iti a lly

thi nking he wa s witn e ssi ng a n a c t of va nd a lis m be c a us e he c ou ld n ot s e e the vic tim s lay ing in the car and beca

use t he shooter “ looked pre tty calm” a s he shot, reloa ded, shot some more, and then c asually

walked to a

waiting car

which drove off.

Acc ording to Mr

. J o h n s on’s testimony , the shooter e ntere d the passeng er side of a blac k, four- door Saturn drive n by another man, and the two fled the scene

. Mr. J ohnson followed the c ar in h is ow n ve hic le

. Du ri ng a rathe r le ng thy a nd of te n hig h- sp e e d c ha se , Mr

. John so n pla c e d a c a ll on his cellular phone to the 911 dispatcher to report the c rime and a lso video ta p ed much of the pu rs uit

. Mr . Joh ns on e ve ntu a lly br ok e -o ff

his pu rs uit

wh e n th e fl e e ing su sp e c ts e nte re d a sma ll 2 side-stree t in Antioch, which he f ear ed may

have be en a de ad-e nd. Howeve r, during the chase he ob ta ine d th e lic e ns e plate nu mbe r o f the Sa turn. He a lso sa w the sh oo te r’ s fa c e on tw o o c c a sio ns ;

once at the very

beg inning of

the cha se whe n the shooter turne d around in t h e passeng er se at and looked direc tly

at him, and once again mid-way throug h the pursuit when Mr. Johnson pulled up along side the passe ng er’ s side of the Saturn on Interstate 24 and “go t another g ood look at the shooter.”

After he terminated the pursuit, Mr. Johnson returned to the Outer L imit and reported to the police, who we re a lrea dy

on the sce ne. He described the shooter as a lig ht-complec ted Hispanic or Afric an-A merica n male with short, black hair, pointed ea rs, appr ox imately

five fe et ei gh t or nine inches tall, and wearing a bl ack jacket. He f urther inf ormed the police that he re membere d seeing the same ma n hang ing around the pa rking lot before the shooting. L ater , when Mr. Johnson saw the De fe nd a nt’ s p ho to i n the ne ws me dia a s o ne of se ve ra l su sp e c ts i nv olv e d inthe c a se , h e imm e diate ly called the police and ide ntified the De fendant as the shooter. O n cross-e x amination, Mr. J ohnson admitted that he neve r saw the driver of the g et-a way

vehicle.-3-

Ms. Tashiba Ha zelitt testified t hat s he had been f riends with victim Cayra Car uth for fifte en or six teen y ear s and had know n victim Monte Campbell for six or seve n y ear s. The nig ht of the shooting, she and Ms. Ca ruth met Mr. Campbell at the Outer L imit. Ms. Hazelitt further te stified that sh e ob se rv e d th e De fe nd a nt w a lk b y he r andthe vic tim s “ a t le a st thr e e tim e s” th at nig ht w ith his hand in his pocket, looking at them. L ater , Ms. Caruth and Mr. C ampbell l eft the club and went outside. The shooting occur red shortly

there afte r. Mr. Ha zelitt also stated that whe n the Def endant’ s photogr aph wa s shown on television she i mmediately rec og nized him as the man who walke d by her and the victims sever al times, and she c ontacted the police to re port this information.

Ms. Quaneishe ia Wigg ins testified that on the nig ht of the murder s she and se vera l friends

wer e st anding in the parking lot of t he night club and witnesse d the shooting. She obse rved a man shoot into t he passe ng er side w indow of a car , stop, bend down, then c ontinue to shoot more, and
eventua lly

flee in a black, f

our-door Saturn. She testified that she sa w only the side prof

ile of the shooter, but could tell that he ha d black ha ir and a “dar k complexion

. ” M s . Wigg ins further explained the shooter’s skin color w as darker tha n that of the Assistant District Attorney prese nting
t h e S t at e’ s ca s e, wh o ms h e d es cr i b ed as “w h i t e, ” b u t l i gh t er t h an h er o wn co m p l ex i o n , co n cl u d i n g: “he c ould ha v e b e e n [H ]i s p a n ic

. H e c o u ld h a v e b e e n mi xe d

. H e c o u ld h a v e b e e n y e ll o w

. ” On

cross-e x amination, Ms. Wi g g ins denied s h ein it ia lly reported to the police that the shoote r wa s white, insist in g s h e s a idh e w a s “ li g h t- c o mp le c te d

. ” A v id e o ta p e o f M s

. Wi g g in s ’ in te r v ie w w ith the po lic e , co nd uc te d the sa me nig ht the mur de rs oc c ur re d, wa s p la y e d f

or the jury . In th is v ide o M s. Wigg ins clearly

described the shooter a s a “w hite g uy .”

Detec tive J ohnny

Ray Crumby
, J r., of the N ashville Police Homicide Division, testified that he wa s the lead detec tive in this case , and upon his a rrival at the crime scene he intervie wed e ight
to t e n w itn e sse s, inc lud ing Mr . Joh ns on wh o p ro vid e d h im w ith the lic e ns e plate nu mbe r of the g e taway vehicle. B ased on this information, D etec tive Crumby was able to lea rn that the blac k, fourdoor Saturn used to fle e the sc ene w as reg istered to Mrs. Penelope Tafoy a, the De fendant’s mother. The De tective a lso stated that when Mr. Christopher Schultz tur n ed h imself in, he provided the information that eve ntually led to the d i s covery

of the c ar at an apa

rtment complex in Madison. Whe n the po lic e fo un d the c ar, it h a d b e e n w a sh e d a nd“ wi pe d d ow n” on the ins ide . N o f ing e rp ri nts

wer e re cover ed, but a f

ly er a dvertizing a m u s i ca l gro up, which had be en distributed to all the vehicles in the pa

rking lot of the Outer L

imit t he nig ht of the murder s, was found in the c ar.

On cr oss-examination, Detective Crumby stated t hat M r. J ohnson called and identified the De fe nd a nt a s th e sh oo te r o nly a ft e r the De fe nd a nt wa s show n on tel e vis ion wh e n h e turne d h ims e lf in. Whe n q ue sti on e d a

bo ut the ph y sic a l de sc ri pti on s o f the sh oo te r h e re c e ive d f ro m th e wi tne sse s, De te c tiv e Crumb y

state d th a t th e de sc ri pti on s w e re a ll “ in lin e wi th e a c h oth e r” wi th re g ardto h e ig ht, weig ht, clothing, ha ir color, ha ir sty le, and g ender

. Furthermore , the Dete ctive testified that a ll the witness acc ounts describe d a similar seque nce of events.

Offic er Warr en F leak, of the N ashville Police Depa rtment Crime Scene I nvestig ation I dentification Unit, testi fied that he investigated and documented the crime sc ene, and collecte d and-4-

labeled e vidence . He s t at ed t h at he found twenty -eig ht .40 caliber shell casing s and a nine -round mag azine or clip fr om a Glock ha ndg un.

Of fi c e r C h ar l e s B l a c k w o o d
, Jr

. , o f t h e N a s h v i l l e P o l i c e D e p ar t m e n tI d e n t i f i c a t i o n Un it,
t es t i fi ed t h at h e p ro ce s s ed t h e v i ct i m ’s v eh i cl e a ft eri twa s t o we d t o t h e p o l i ce Fi el d Of fi ce Bu i l d i n g. The car’s passeng er w indow was shatter ed, and the re w ere three projec tile holes on the outside passeng er side door and door post and “multiple” projec tile holes throug hout the interior of the vehicle. O ffice r B lackwood stated that he c ounted ninetee n bul l et strikes inside the vehicle , not counting those in the bodies of the two vic tims, and he remove d twenty projec tiles from the interior of the vehicle. Offic er Blac kwood also testified t hat he found the male victim lay ing a cross the f ront pa sse ng e r s ide se a t w ith his fe e t a g a ins t th e do or a ndhis he a d in the ba c k s e a t. H e fo un d th e fe ma le victim seated in the drive r’s seat.

Offic er K endall Yae g er, of the Nashville Police Depa rtment For ensic Section, was c ertified by the court as an ex pert in fire arms and tool mar k identification. Off

icer Yae g er te stified that the empty shell casing s remove d from the scene wer e all .40 caliber, a nd the tool marking s indicated that they had bee n fired by

either a Glock or a Smith and Wesson. The g rooves c ut into the projectiles

c oll e c te d in dic a te d th a t the y ha d be e n fi re d by e ith e r a Gl oc k, He c kle r or Ko c h f ir e arm . T he e mpty Glock mag azine rec overe d at the sce ne wa s capa ble of holding nine rounds. Of fice r Ya eg er surmised that if only

nine-round ma g azines were used, to fire all twenty -eig ht sh o t s t he shooter would have ha d to start with one fully -loade d mag azine and one round in the chambe r, fire all ten rounds, then re load another nine-round ma g azine and fire all nine s hots, then re load y et ag ain and fire nine more times.

Dr . F e ng L i, o f the Me dic a l E xaminer’ s Off ic e , w a s c e rt if

ie d b y the c ou rt a s a n e xpe rt

in f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g y

. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e p e r f

o r m e d t h e a u t o p s i e s o n t h e t w o m u r d e r v i c t i m s D r

. Li stated that Ms. Caruth suffe red e ight gun s h o t wounds, one of whic h enter ed her neck and passed thr ou g h he r br a in. Dr . Li e xpla ine d th a t a ny on e of he r mult ipl e g un sh ot w ou nd s w e re po te nti a lly fata l, e sp e c ia lly

the he a d w ou nd s. Dr

. L i te sti fi e d that Ms . Ca ru th’ s “ c a us e of

de a th [w a s] mu lti ple g un sh ot wo un ds .” Dr

. L i a lso te sti fi e d that Mr

. Ca mpb e ll su ff e re d sixte e n g un sh ot woun ds
, including multiple wounds to the che st and one wound w hich seve red his spinal cor d. Dr. Li stated that Mr. Campbell’s “c ause of death [was] mult iple g unshot wounds.”

Pur su a nt t o a

sti pu la tio n o f f

a c t, e vid e nc e wa s a dmi tte d whic h s ta te d th a t vi c tim Mo nte Campbell rec eived parole and was rele ased from prison on Aug ust 8, 2002. A fter a brief jury -out discussion, Office r Christopher Steele, formerly of the L ewisburg Police Depa rtment, was a llowed
to te sti fy

. Of

fi c e r Ste e le state d that he kn e w of vic tim Mo nty Ca mpb e ll a ndthe De fe nd a nt f ro m a previous alter cation that had oc curr ed seve ral y ear s prior to the m urder s in the case at hand. Officer Steele stated that he had be en pre sent at a pr eliminary hearing f or a home invasion case in which Mr. Campbel l was the de fenda nt, and the De fendant in this case was the vic tim. W hile standing in a hallway outside the courtr oom, Office r Steele he ard the Def endan t s t at e he w as “g oing to g et Mr. Campbell, g et him back whe n he . . . g ot out of jail.” Of fi ce r S t ee l e t es t ified that he ha d hear d vic tim s b low of

f s te a m in s uc h mann e r b e fo re , s o h e sa id t o th e De fe nd a nt, y ou do no t me a n th a t,-5-

to which the De fenda nt replied: “[ n ] o , I wi l l get him back.” Offic er Stee le stated that whe n he learned of the murders in this case and the pa rties involved, he c ontacted the Homicide De partment of the Na sh vil le Pol ic e De pa rt me nt. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Of fi c e r S te e le a dmi tte d th a t a t th e tim e the statements were ma de he did not think anything of it, and he did not file a r eport a bout the incident.

The de fense called Mr. Robert Sherrill, who testified that on the nig ht of the murder s he and the De fe nd a nt dr ov e to the Ou te r L imi t nig ht c lub in h is c ar, a Che vr ole t L

umi na , a rrivi ng sh ortly afte r midnight. He then stated t h at ap p ro x i mately one and a

half hours be fore the shooting, the Def endant asked for the key s to his car , and lef t the club. Mr. Sherrill st ated that f riends later

drove him home, and when he arrived hom e som etime after 3:00 am, the De fendant was at his house. On

cross-e x amination, Mr. Sherrill admitted that he was close friends wit h the Defenda nt, and that he did not know where the Def endant wa s from 12:30 am, when the Def endant took the ke y s to his car, until 3:00 am, when he saw the Def endant at his house.

Ms. Qu ini sh a

Willi a ms t e sti fi e d th a t in No ve mbe r of 20 02 , she a nd he r ch ild re n li ve d w ith Mr. Sherrill, and she knew the D efe ndant to be a friend of Mr. Sherrill. Ms. Williams stated that she

sa w th e D e f

e n d a n t o n th e n ig h t o f th e mu r d e r s a t ap p r o xim a te ly 1 :2 0 a m, w h ic h s h e re membere d

c le ar l y b e c a u s e s h e h a d b e e n r e s t i n g o n t h e c o u c h w h e n t h e D e f e n d a n tl e th i m s e l f

i n t o h e r h o me with a key

. Ms. Wi lliams was expecting Mr . Sherrill and noted the time on a clock ne ar the door. Ms. Willi a ms a dmi tte d th a t it wa s u nu su a l f

or the De fe nd a nt t o h a ve a ke y to h e r h ome . M s. Willi a ms f

urthe r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e a ndthe De fe nd a nt the n w a tc he d a mov ie un til Mr . Sh e rrill
returne d home at appr ox imately 3:00 am. On cross-e x amination, Ms. Wi lliams admitt ed that she did not tell the po l i ce t h at t h e Def endant wa s with her at he r home during the time the murder s

occur red. Ms. W illiams explained that no one asked her, and so she did report her story until the Def endant’ s preliminary

hearing, c onducted some te n day s after the crime took place.

Ms. Sha dric ka

B os tic k a ndMs. De a nd ra She lto n te sti fi e d tha t th e y , a lon g wi th M s. Wig g ins
, wer e in the par

king lot the nig ht of the murders and witnessed the shooting. Ms. B ostick described the shooter as “lig ht-colore d” with a low-cut hair sty le, and dr essed in a bla ck jac ket. At trial, she clarified that he w as a “ light” ma n, mix ed, white or black, but admitted that she ha d initiallyreported
to the po lic e that th e sh oo te r w a s a wh ite ma n. Ms. De a nd ra She lto n sta te d tha t th e sh oo te r w a s a white male w ith s h o r t h a ir a n d a b la c k le a th e r ja c k e t. Sh e a d mi tt e d th a t w h e n s h e w a s s hown a photogr aphic lineup, she identified the wr ong person. Ms. Shelton also stated that she ne ver did see the shooter’ s fac e the night of the m urder s, but from what she di d see, she initiallybelieved it wa s a white male, but clarified at trial that it was also possible that the shooter wa s a lig ht-complec ted Afric an American male

.

Mr. Ch r is to p h e r Sc h u lt z, w h o is a w h it e ma le
, te s ti f ie d a t th e tria l th a t h e s h o t the two vic tim s. Mr . Sc hu ltz te sti fi e d th a t he was a g oo d f ri e ndof the De fe nd a nt, a ndthat so me of his pr op e rt y ha d b e e n s tol e n b y

Mr . Ca mpb e ll i n th e ho me inv a sio n sever al y ears e arl ie r. Mr . Sh ult z fi rs t st a te d th a t he arrive d at th e Ou te r L imi t nig ht cl ub a t 2:00 a .m. the nig ht o f the mur de rs in h is friend’ s dark blue Saturn. Mr. Schultz t hen testi fied that the S aturn wa s “primarily ” his ca r, but thatT he r ecor d re f l ect s t hat M r

. Schu l t z s t at ed t o t he po l i ce t hat hi s f r i end, E ar l
, had r ece nt l y been ki l l ed an d was 3

the re fo re un a v a ilab le to c o rr o b o ra te his sto ry.

-6- it was reg istered to the De fenda nt’s mother because she had good credit and could g et a car loan, and he ma de c a sh pa yme nts to he r fo r the c ar. He a lso state d th a t othe r p e op le , in c lud ing the De fe nd a nt, fre quently

drove his ca

r.

Mr. Shultz testified that on the night in question he was in the parking lot near the night c lub do ing c oc a ine wh e n h e ha pp e ne d to se e Mr . Campb e ll, wh om h e re c og nize d a s h a vin g sto le n h is property sever al y ear s prior. The two “had a few words,” and then Mr. Campbell walked over to a silver ca r and g ot into the passeng er’ s side. Mr. Schultz s tated that he had in his possession a Gloc k .40 caliber handg un and two extra clips, which he car ried for protec tion from other drug deale rs. Mr. Sc hu ltz w a lke d o ve r t o the c ar that Mr. Ca mpb e ll ha d just e nte re d, a nd wh ile he c ou ld not se e int o it due to window tinting, he started firing into the passeng er side window “to kill MontyCampbell.” Mr. Shultz first stated that he had four rounds in the gun w hen he sta rted firing, but late r testified that he in it ia ll y h a d f

o u r te e n r o u n d s , th e n r e lo a d e d a n d s h o t n in e r o u n d s , a n d th e n r e lo a d e d a g a in and fi re d f ive mor e sh ots

. Mr

. Sc hu ltz te sti fi e d tha t wh e n the wi nd ow fe ll i n a ndhe sa w f or the fi rs t time that there w as a w oman in the car, whom he had acc idently shot, it “made him even ma dder,” and he f ired more rounds, including more at Ms. Caruth because he be lieved she w as trying to drive off. Mr. Shultz stated t hat he was wearing a black coat at the time of the shooting s, and af ter he had fi ni sh ed he go t in to the Sa turn a ndhis frie nd , E arl , d ro ve of f. Mr . Sc hu ltz s a id h e e ve ntu a lly 3 disposed of the jac ket he wa s wea ring and thre w the g un into the Cumberland river

.

Mr. Schultz pled g uiltyto two counts of first deg ree murder f or his role in the c rimes at issue in this case appr ox imately one month befor e the De fendant’s trial. At the De fendant’s t ri al, M r. Schultz explained that he initiallytold police that he was not the shooter , but subsequently chang ed his min d wh e n “ too ma ny pe op le we re g e tti ng c a ug ht up in it that di dn ’t ha ve a nythi ng to d o w ith it.” He a lso state d that while he e ntere d g uiltypleas ba sed on a stipulation of fa cts which stated that he wa s the drive r an d t h e De fendant was the shooter , he did so only beca use he did not know he could object to those facts and still plead g uilty . At trial, Mr. Schultz i nsisted that the Def endant wa s not involved in the m urder s at i ssue i n any way . Howeve r, on cr oss-examination he admitted that his entire first statement to the pol ice was a li e, and he also lied in his second statement to the police when he stated he w as alone in the g et-a way car

. Mr. David Spenc e, of the S o u t h ea stern Institut e of F orensic Scie nce, w as ce rtified as an expert in gunshot re sidue ana ly sis and testified on beha lf of the De fendant. Mr. S pence stated that he a na ly zedthe bla c k le athe r ja c ke t that the De fe nd a nt ha d be e n we ari ng wh e n he turne d him se lf in

a ft e r the mur de rs , a ndhe c on c lud e d th a t th is j a c ke t di d n ot c on ta in any g un sh ot r e sid ue pa

rt ic le s. On cr oss-examination, Mr. Spence a dmitted that some guns pr oduce le ss residue than othe rs, that a “simple brushing or wiping ” would re move residue particle s, and that he ha d no way of knowing whether the jacke t he tested wa s the same one worn by the shooter.S e e B a tso n v. K e n tuc k y, 4 7 6 U .S . 7 9 (1 9 8 6 ). 4

T he reco rd reveal s t hat at s o m e p o i nt i n t he jur y s el ect i o n pro cess af t er t h e B a tso n chal l enge, one m o re 5

A f r i can

- A meri can pot ent i al j ur or w as s t r uck for “ l ack o f candor, ” a nd i n t he end, onl y one Af r i can

- A meri can was s eat ed

a s a m e m b e r o f t h e ju ry in this c a se

.
-7- Th e Sta te re c a lle d M r. John so n a s a re bu tta l w itn e ss. Mr . Joh ns on te sti fi e d th a t Mr . Sc hu ltz
was too tall to be the shooter he saw, concluding that Mr. Schultz was “def initely not the shooter.”

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returne d g uiltyverdic ts on all three c ounts. The trial

c ou rt me rg e d th e fe lon y

mur de r c on vic tio n f

or the kil lin g of

Ms. Caru th i nto the pr e me dit a te d f ir st deg ree murder c onviction for the kill ing of Ms. Caruth, and a sentenc ing he aring was c onducted, at the conc lusion of which the jury found the De fendant should be sentenced t o life without the possibili ty

of par ole for the murder of Ms. Caruth. The De fenda n t al so rec eived a concur rent life
sentenc e for

the first deg ree murder of Mr. Campbell. I n April of 2004, the De fendant timelyfiled

a motion for new trial, and in January of 2005, he f

iled an ame nded motion for new trial. Following a hea ring , the trial court denied the De fendant’s motion. This appeal followed.

AN AL YSI S On appe al the De fenda nt outlined five specif ic claims in his a

ppellate brief: ( 1) the trial c ourt

err ed i n o verr

uling his B atson cha lleng e whe n the State struck thre e Af rica n-Americans in a r ow du ri ng the jury

se le c tio n; ( 2) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng int o e vid e nc e a ph oto g ra ph of vic tim Cay ra Car uth; ( 3 ) the trial c ourt err ed in allowing Offic er Stee le to testify reg arding a stateme nt alleg edly made by the Def endant thre e y ear s prior to the crimes at issue in this case; (4) the trial court

err ed in not decla

ring a mistrial when the pr osecutor stated in her c lo s i n g argume nt that the Def endant s ai d he would “kill” the vic tim, as opposed to “g et” the vic tim, as ordere d by the trial

c o u r t ; a n d ( 5 ) t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a ttr i a l w a s i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s u p p o r tt h e j u r y’ s v e r d i c t s o f g u i l t y. We find the Def

endant’ s arg uments unpersua sive as to ea ch cla im.

I. Batson Chal lenge I n the Def endant’ s first claim, he asserts that the trial court e rre d when, a fter an evidentiary hearing on the issue, it overruled his B atson motion pertaining to the St at e’ s u s e of peremptory 4 challeng es to strike three potential Afric an-A mericans jurors. According to the Def endant, his equa l protec tion right, a s g uara nteed unde r Article I , section 8 of the T en n es s ee Constit ution and the Fourteenth Amendme nt to the United States Consti tution, was violated by the State’s actions. To support his c laim, the Def

endant arg ues that eac h individual Africa n-American potential juror struck by the State was “ of the same rac e as the [Defe ndant], who himself is African- Americ an.” Further, beca use the State: 1) struc k all three potential juro rs i n a row, 2) did not strike a ny non-AfricanAmeric an potential jurors, and 3) struck 100% of the A frican-Americans sele cted f rom the jury

pool at that time, the Def

endant a sserts that the “ma nner” in which the State u s ed it s pere mptory 5 challenges i n d i cate s a discriminatory intent to “exclude potential jurors on ac count of their r ace .” The De fenda nt also arg ues that the State fa iled to provide ra cially -neutra l rea sons for striking the three Afric an-A merica n potential jurors. The State a rg ues that the trial court properly ruled that the prosec utor did provide ra ce- neutra l rea soning f or the e x clusion of all three potential jurors.-8-

The re cord e stablishes that the Def endant, a s well as b o t h victims, are Af rica n-American. During the two rounds of per emptory challeng es, the prose cution excluded three Afric an-A merican perspe ctive jurors: Ms. Matthews, Ms. Kwani, and Mr. Wittington. Def ense c ounsel objecte d to the prosec utor’s cha lleng es as possibly based on r ace and moved f or a Ba t s o n challeng e. The prosec ution provided the court with a rac e-ne utral re ason for eac h of t he thre e potential jurors struc k, and the c ourt overr

uled the objec tion.

I n Batson v. Kentucky , the United States Supreme Court he ld that a state’s use of pe remptory

c ha lle ng e s to int e nti on a lly e xclu de jurors of

the de fe nd a nt’ s r a c e vio la te s th e de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht t o equal p r o te c ti o n

. 4 7 6 U

. S. 7 9
, 8 9 ( 1 9 8 6 )

. T h is Co u r t h a s e mp h a s iz e d a th r e e p r o n g test for evaluating a

claim of ra cial discrimination in jury selec tion under a B atson cha lleng e:

B a tso n p ro vid e s a

thr e e ste p p ro c e ss f

or thee va luatio n o f r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n c la ims in jury s election. First, the def

endant must make a

prima fa cie showing that the pr os e c uto r h a s e xer c ise d p e re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s o n th e ba sis of ra c e . Pu rk e tt v . E le m, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct

. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L .Ed.2d 834 (1995); B atson, 476 U. S. at 96 -9 8, 10 6 S. Ct. 17 12 , 1 72 2- 24

. [ S econ d, ] [i]f th e de fe nd a nt s a tis fi e s th is initial burden, the burde n then s hifts to the prosecutor to articulate a ra ce- neutra l explanation for excluding the ve nire member i n question. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct . 1769, 1770-71; Ba tso n , 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct . 1712, 1721. Third, the trial court must determine whether the def endant ha s me t his burden of pr oving purposef ul discri m i nation. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct . 1712, 1723-24; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L .Ed.2d 395 (1991). I n making its determination of whe ther use of a per emptory challeng e wa s discriminatory , the trial court must articulate spec ific re asons for e ach of its fac tual finding s. Woodson [ v. Porter B rown Limestone Co.]
, 9 16 S.W .2d [896,] 906. The trial c ourt’s finding s are imperative f or ra rely will a trial rec ord alone provide a leg itimate basis from which to substitute an appellate court’s opinion for that of the trial c ourt. Thus, on appea l, the trial court's f inding that the State e x cused

a ve nir e me mbe r for ra c e -n e utr a l r e a so ns wi ll n ot b e re ve rs e d u nle ss i t is c le arl y

err oneous. See Woodson, 916 S.W .2d at 906 (c itations omi tted).

State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319-20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).

As to the first step we note that, as in Car ro l l
, the trial court in this case did not make an express finding for the rec ord that the Def endant made a prima f

acie showing of discrimination. See Carroll, 3 4 S. W. 3 d a t 3 2 0

. N e v e r th e le s s , th e c o u r t w o u ld n o t h a v e d e e me d it n e c e s s ar y f o r the prosec utor to provide ra ce- neutra l expl anations for all three of the pe remptory challeng es had it not determined that the Def

endant did indee d make a p ri m a fa cie showing of disc rimination. See Woodson, 916 S .W.2d at 905. Acc ording ly
, we will “assume that the court impli citly found that [the Def endant] had satisfied the f irst prong of the B atson test.” Carr oll, 34 S.W .3d at 320.-9-

The Supreme Court has held that the de terminative issue in the s ec o n d s t ep of the Batson examination is the “facia l validity ” of the prosecutor’s ra ce- neutra l expl anation for the exclusion. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. The Court explained that a “ neutra l expl anation” simply “mea ns an

e xpla natio n b a se d o n s ome thi ng ot her th a n th e ra c e of the jur or .” I d. F urthe rm or e , u nle ss “discriminatory

intent is inherent in the prosec utor’s explanation,” we are instructed to presume “the

rea son offe red [] be deemed race neutra l.” I d. Put another way , the B atson requir ement for a ra ceneutra l expl anation does not re quire the e x pl anation to be “ minimallypersua sive” or e ven “plausible,” but simpl y

a re ason that does not deny equal protection. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69.

I n this case, the trial court found that the prosec utor provided r ace -neutra l expl anations for excluding all thre e Af

rica n-American potential juror s. To support this conclusion, the court

art ic ulate d th e fo llo wi ng sp e c if ic re a so ns fo r i ts f

ind ing :

The fir st one that we’ re at now is Mr. Whi ttington. And I -- I
, clea rly , ag ree with [ the prosec utor] about him. Imean he seeme d to be upset almost to the point of being bitter about the sy stem . . . . Ms. Matthews was a lady y ou would notice. . . .[ She] had a hat on, kind of

a lar ge whi te hat, w ith su ng la sse s o n. She wo uldha ve br ou g ht s ome a tte nti on to he rs e lf a ndhe r ans we rs we re lik e [the pr os e c uto r] h as su gg est ed, a lit tle bit questionable, I g uess, from one standpoint. So I think ther e’s a n explanation for her

. And t h en fi n ally , Ms. Kwani, she w as, re ally , sort of unusually short and tentative and quic k, just g ive one or t wo-wor d answe rs, and tentative in that, even.

L ike the trial c ourt, we find the prosec utor met its burden of pr oviding r ace -neutra l expl anations for

e xclu din g the thr e e po te ntial jur or s in qu e sti on . M or e ov e r, bo th the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s a ndits dismiss al of the D efe ndant’s B atson cha lleng e demonstrate that the court a lso impl icitly determined that the Def

endant f ailed to meet his burde n of proving purposef ul discrimination, as re quired in step three of a B atson cha lleng e.

We c onclude the prosec utor’s basis for the use of the three pere mptory cha l l en ges we re

s u f f ic ie n tl y r a c e

- n e u tr a l t o w ith s tan d a B a ts o n c h a ll e n g e

. T h e p r o s e c u to r e xp lain e d th a t M r. Wit tington wa s dismis sed bec ause he stated that his sister had been murdere d and he was a ng ry at the police f

or their inept handling of his sister’ s case

. Ms. Matthews was struck beca use she wor e a lar g e hat a nd sung lasses in the courtroom, for having what the prosec utor described as “ a bit of an attitude,” and be causeshe wa s not responsive to questioning . Ms. Kwani wa s struck b eca use she

wa s v e ry te ntativ e a ndtim id, a ndthe pr os e c uto r be lie ve d sh e la c ke d the fo rt itu de to s it a s a jur or in a violent murder

case

. Acc ording ly , the prosec utor articulated valid, ra ce- neutra l rea sons for ea ch of t he jurors that it struck via pere mptory challeng e. The trial court found eac h rea son leg itimate and non-discriminatory . We conclude that the Def endant ha s failed to de monstrate that the tria l court

err ed in ac cre dit i n g the prosec utor’s ra ce- neutra l expl anations for striking the thr ee pr ospective jur or s. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.-10-

II. Adm iss ion of P hot og r aph The De fenda nt next claims the trial court erre d in allowing into evide nce a ph o t o gra p h of vic tim Ca yra Caru th. To su pp ort th is c la im the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t th e ph oto g ra

ph wa s “ c le arl y . . . g ruesome” and therefor e prejudicial, and any probative value was “minimal.” Addit ionally , the Def endant a rg ues that evide nce that Ms

. C ar u t h h ad been shot to death was introduce d by the medical e x aminer’ s testimony , and ther efor e the photog raph w as at most “cumulative” evidenc e and there fore unnece ssary

. The State arg ues that the photogr aph in que stion wa s “not over ly g ruesome,” and wa s probative of

the eleme nt of preme ditation in the first deg ree murder c harg e.

The issue of the admissibili ty of the photog raph in que stion in t his ca s e i s go verne d by Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 403 and we ll established case law. Our rule s of evidenc e provide that “[a]lt houg h rele vant, evidenc e may be excluded if its probative va lue is substantiallyoutweig hed by the dang er of

unfair prejudice
, confusion of the i ssues, or m isleading the jury . . . .” Te nn. R. Evid. 403. Howeve r, Tenne ssee courts have “consistently followed a

policy of libera lityin the admission of photog raphs in both civil and criminal case s.” State v. Carter
, 114 S.W .3d 895, 902 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State v. Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978) ). Our supr eme c ourt has further stated that the “ g e ne ra l rule
, a nn ou nc e d in B a nk s, is that ph oto g ra ph s o f a mur de r v ic tim ’s bo dy

are a dmi ssi ble if they are ‘re levant to the i ssues on trial, notwithstanding their gr uesome a nd horrifying c hara cter .’” I d. (q uo tin g B a nk s, 56 4 S. W.2 d at 950 -5 1)

. Whe the r to a dmi t ph oto g ra ph s in to e vid e nc e is w ith in the dis c re tio na

ry a uth ority

of the tr ia l c ou rt , a ndsu c h r

uli ng s w ill no t be re ve rs e d b y app e llate c ou rt s absent a cl ear showing of abuse of discre tion. See State v. Dicker son, 885 S.W .2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

I n this case, the rec ord reve als that a jury -out hea ring on the admissibilit y

of the photog raph

wa s h e ld i n w hic h th e tr ia l c ou rt ru le d th e ph oto g ra

ph re le va nt. Th e c ou rt

fu rthe r f ou ndthat it s probative va lue o u t weig hed any dang er of

prejudicia l effe ct. As noted by the trial court, the p h o t o gra p h wa s re l ev an t i n t h at i t s h o we d t h e l o ca t i o n o f t h e v i ct i mi n t h e v eh i cl e, t h e c l o s e r an ge of the victim to the shooter, a nd the number of shots f ired-- all fac tors rele vant to prove a n intentional and pre meditated killing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(a )(1)

.

We f urthe r c on c lud e that th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of t he p ho tog ra ph wa s n ot s ub stanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf

a ir pr e jud ic e . We do no t c on sid e r the ph oto g ra ph e xce ssi ve ly g ruesome o r

s h o c k in g , e s p e c ia ll y

in li g h t o f

th e te s ti mo n y

d e s c r ib in g th e e ig h t g u n s h o t w ounds inflicted upon the victim. Whil e it is true the photogr aph corroborated t estimony prese nted by other witnesses at trial, a

rele vant photog raph is not re ndere d inadmissible merely beca use it is cumulative. Se e Cart e r, 11 4 S .W .3d at 90 4. Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its discretion in admitting the photog raph into evide nce. T his issue is without merit.

III . A dm iss ion of P r ior

St at e m e nt The De fenda nt also claims that the trial court erre d in a llowing Offic er Steele to te stify at trial reg arding a thre atening statement he w itnessed the De fendant make ag ainst the victim three y ear s prior to the m urder s. This statement, the De fendant arg ues, should have be en excluded “pur suant to T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e 40 2, 40 3, a nd40 4. ” To su pp ort the se c laims , th e De fe nd a nt a rg ue s:-11-

1) the stateme nt w as made three y ear s befor e the incident at issue in this case, 2) no report was made at the time of the state ment, and 3) O ffice r Steele could not r emember the exact words used by the Def endant. The State arg ues that the statem en t wa s properly admitted to demonstrate “ motive, identity , and intent.”

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 402 provid es “[ a] l l rele vant evidenc e is admissible except as provided by

the Constitut ion of the United States, the Constit ution of Tenne ssee, these rules, or othe r rules or la ws of g ener al application in the courts of Tenne ssee. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissi b le.” Te nn. R. Evid. 402. Rul e 403 states that “ [a] lthough r eleva nt, evidence may be exclude d if its probative value is substantiallyoutweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, confusion of the issues, or m isleading the j ury , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time,

o r n ee d less prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” Te nn. R. Evid. 403. Rul e 404(b) states that

“ [e]v ide nc e of oth e r crime s, wr on g s, or a c ts is n ot a dmi ssi ble to p ro vethe c ha ra c te r o f a

pe rs on in order to show action in conformity with the char acte r trait. It may , howeve r, be a dmissibl e for other purposes.” Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermor e, our supr eme c ou rt h as re cog nized that “other purposes” may

in c lu d e p r io r

a c ts “ a d mi tt e d to p r o v e s u c h is s u e s a s mo ti v e , in te n t, k n o w le dg e,

ab s e n c e o f

m i s t ak e o r

a c c i d e n t , c o m m o n s c h e m e o r p l a n , i d e n t i t y, c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e s t o r y, op po rtun ity , a ndpr e pa

ratio n. ” Sta te v. Mo rris, 24 S.W. 3d78 8, 81 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (c iti ng Ne il P. Cohen et al., Te nnessee L aw of Evidence § 404.6).

Prior to trial, the Def

endant, throug h counsel, submitted a motion to ex clude the te stimony of Of fi c e r S te e le , w ho wa s sc he du le d to te sti fy that he he ardthe De fe nd a nt thr e a te n to “g e t” vic tim Monte Campbell. The issue wa s aga i n raised during a jury -out hea ring at trial, and the trial court ruled that the prior threatening statement wa s relevant to show “the previous threat or hostility

. . . g oing to the motive, g oing to ide ntity

. . . and also, intent.” Moreove r, in its order d en y i n g a n ew trial, the court further

stated that the “Defe ndant’s st atement, and the circumstances in which it was made, were particula

rly rele vant t o the i ssue of preme ditation.” The trial c ourt also found that the probative va lue of the state ment outweig hed the risk of unfair pr ejudice.

The re cord r evea ls that the Defe ndant was charg ed with first deg ree preme ditated murder for shooting the vic tims t o death a pproxi mately

three months after vic tim Mont e Campbell was re lease d from prison. Thre e y ears prior, immediately befor e the victim was imprisoned f or robbing the De fe nd a n t , t h e D e f

e n d a n t t h r e a t e n e d h e w o u l d “ g e t ” t h e v i c t i m w h e n t h e v i c t i m g o t o u t o f ja il. Thus, thi s th r e a te n in g s tate me n t w a s h ig h ly r e le v a n t to th e is s u e o f mo ti v e , in te n t, id e n ti ty , and preme ditation.

Furthermore , the statem e n t’ s p r o b ati v ev a lu eo utweig hed any dang er of unfair pr ejudice. T he fac t that three y ea rs t ranspire d betwee n the threat and the crime “af fec ts onlythe weig ht, not the admissibili ty

of the e vidence .” State v. Smith, 868 S .W.2d 561, 575 (Tenn. 1993). I t matters not that an officia l r eport was never made at the time of the threat, and as to r eliability , the trial court

e xpre ssl y ru le d th a t it

wa s “ c on vinced b y

c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e ” that O ff ic e r S te e le witnessed the De fenda nt threate n to “g et” the vic tim, “or something . . . of this nature wa s s aid.” Acc ording ly , we hold that the tria l court prope rly found t he testi mony conce rning the Def

endant’ s-12-

prior thre atening statement direc ted at the victim was a dmis s i b l e p u rsuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

IV F ailure to declar e a Mistr ial I n the Def endant’ s fourth claim, he asserts that the trial court erre d in not declaring a mistrial wh e n the pr os e c uto r state d in her c los ing arg ume nt that the De fe nd a nt thr e a te ne d to “ kil l” the vic tim

. To su pp ort this c la im the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t e ve n th ou g h th e tr ia l c ou rt ha d ma de a n e xpre ss evidentiary

ruling excluding the pr osecution’s use of the word “ k i l l ” as i t perta ined to the prior threatening st atement made by the Def endant a g ainst victim Monte Campbell, the prosecutor

no ne the le ss u se d the wo rd “ kil l” in he r c los ing arg ume nt. Th is, the De fe nd a nt arg ue s, wa s “ hig hly inflammatory ,” pre

judicial, and wa s not supported by the evidenc e pre sented at trial. As such, the De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to “ de c lare a mi st ri al upon the [De fe nd a nt’ s] objection to such ar g ument.” The State arg ues that the use of the word “ kill” was an unintentional slip-of-the- tongue , and in no way aff ecte d the ver dict or mandated a mistrial.

A mistrial should be decla red in a criminal trial only

in the event of

“manife st nece ssity ” that require s such an a ction. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121
, 1 47 (Tenn. 1998) . “The purpose f or decla ring a mistrial is to c orre ct damag e done to the judicial proc ess when some event ha s occur red which pre cludes a n impartial verdic t.” S tate v. Wil liams, 929 S.W .2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The determination of whether to g rant a mistrial rests within the “sound discretion” of the trial court. State v. Smith, 871 S.W .2d 667, 672 (Tenn. 1994) . The re viewing court s h o u l d not
overturn that decision absent “a clea r abuse of discretion on the rec ord.” State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 24 7, 27 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . A dd iti on a lly
, the bu rd e n o f e sta bli sh ing the ne c e ssi ty

fo r m ist ri a l li e s w ith the party seeking it. W illiams, 929 S .W.2d at 388. Furthermo re , n o ab stract f ormula should be

me c ha nic a lly

app lie d in makin g thi s det e rm inatio n, a nda ll c ir c ums ta nc e s sh ou ld b e take n in to

acc ount. State v. Mounce, 859 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn. 1993).

Th e re c or d re ve a ls that du ri ng a jury -o ut dis c us sio n, the tr ia l c ou rt inq uir e d o f O ff

ic e r S te e le wh e the r the thr e a t he wi tne sse d th e De fe nd a nt m ake a g a ins t the vic tim wa s that he wo uld “ g e t hi m” or “kill him,” noting there was a differe nce. The witness responde d that he was not certain of the exact words but was c erta in of the threa t. Accor dingly , the trial court made the ruling that the word “g et,” but not “kill,” would be allowed into e vidence pursuant to T ennesse e R u l e o f E vidence 40 4( b) . T he te sti mon y

su bmi tte d b y

Of fi c e r S te e le a t tria l wa s tha t the De fe nd a nt thr e a te ne d to “ g e t” th e v i ct i m

. Howeve r, during closing arg uments, the prosec utor stated: “The re w ere a lot of coincidenc es in this case. . .

. You have to be lieve that it’s a c oincidence that [t he De fendant] swore to kill the vic tim

thr e e y e ars a g o a nd the n that vic tim is kil le d jus t a sh ort tim e a ft e r - - a ft e r h e g e ts out of prison. That’s q u i te a c oincidence .” De fense counsel objec ted, moving to strike the prosec utor’s ar g ument perta ining to a thr eat to kill, arg uing that it “never came into evidence ” and

wa s “no t ac c ur a te .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt re pli e d th a t th e jury

ha d “ he ardthe e vid e nc e ,” a ndit w a s u p to them “to d ec i d e what [the evidenc e] is.” At no point during this exchang e did def ense c ounsel reque st a mistrial. Howeve r, now on a ppeal, the D efe ndant ar g ues that the trial c ourt should have sua sponte dec lare d a mistrial upon the def ense c ounsel’s objec tion.-13-

Ou r sup re me c ou rt ha s long re c og nize d tha t c los ing arg ume nt i s a va lua ble privi le g e fo r b oth
t h e S t a t e a n d t h e d e f

e n s e a n d h a v e a l l o w e d w i d e l a t i t u d e t o c o u n s e l i n ar g u i n g t h e i r c a s e s t o t h e j u r y. See State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 737 (Tenn.1998). H oweve r, ar g uments must be “temper ate, ba se d up on the e vid e nc e int ro du c e d a t tr ia l, re le va nt to the iss ue s be ing tr ie d, and no t o th erw ise improper unde r the fa cts or law.” State v. Goltz, 111 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (c iting Coker v. State, 911 S.W .2d 357, 368 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995)). T he esta blished test for dete rmining wh e the r p ro se c uto ri a l mi sco nd uc t ba se d o n impr op e r c omm e nts a mou nts to r e ve rs ibl e e rr or is whether t h e conduct was so improper or the ar g ument so inflammatory that it affe cted the ve rdict
t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s d e tr i m e n t

. S e e H arr i n g t o n v

. S t a t e , 3 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 7 5 8
, 7 5 9 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; S t a t e v

. S e a y, 945 S.W .2d 755, 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . I n measuring t h e p rejudicia l impact of alleg ed prosec utorial misconduct, courts have be en instructed to c onsider the f ollo wi n g fa ctors: (1) the conduct c omplained of view ed i n t h e context of the fac ts and circ umstances of the ca se; (2) any

c ur a tiv e me a su re s u nd e rt ake n b y the c ou rt a ndthe pr os e c uto r; (3 ) th e int e nt o f the pr os e c uti on in making the statement at issue; (4) t he cumulative eff ect of the i mproper conduct and any other e rror s in the rec ord; and (5) the re lative streng th or wea kness of the case

. J udg e v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App.1976) . See also Goltz, 111 S.W .3d at 5-6.

I n this case, the c ircumstance s sugg est that the prose cutor, in the proce ss of adva ncing the State’s r e v e n g e k il li n g th e o r y , w a s a tt e mp ti n g to r e mi n d th e ju r y o f O f f ic e r St e e le ’ s te s ti mo ny

c on c e rn ing the De fe nd a nt’ s th re a t th a t he wo uld “ g e t” the vic tim , but the pr os e c uto r e rr e d a ndsa id “kill.” Additionally , the cur ative mea sures unde rtook by the trial court were la cking ; the court

mere ly stated that the jury

was re sponsible f

or reme mbering what was actua lly admitted as evide nce. Whil e th e ju r y

w a s p r o v id e d w ith a

g e n e r a l i n s tr

u c ti o n th a t c o u n s e ls ’ s tate me n ts d u r in g c losing arg uments were not evidence , the court should have provided a prompt curat i v e i n struction. See,

e .g ., Sta te v. Ma thi s, 96 9 S.W. 2d 41 8, 42 2 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Ho we ve r, the re is n oth ing in the re cord be fore this Court t o sug g est that the prose cutor’s misstatement wa s anything other than an unintentional mistake. I n the jury -out hea ring , the witness had init ially stated that the De fenda nt thr e a te ne d to “ kil l” the vic tim . M or e ov e r, the re c or d is de vo id o f any oth e r p ros ecut oria l e rr or s; clea rly there was no pattern of inflammatory or improper

arg ument. Finally , taken a s a whole, the State prese nted a strong case : there w as evidence of a mot ive t o harm victim Monte Campbell; the Def endant stated that he would “ge t” the victim; there w as ey e-w itness testimonythat the Def endant

wa s th e sh oo te r; a ndthe re wa s subs ta nti a l for e ns ic a nd ph y sic a l evi de nc e lin kin g the De fe nd a nt t o the c ri me s. We a g a in n ote that th e De fe nd a nt d id n ot re qu e st a mis tr ia l.

We conclude the evidence establishes that the prosec utor’s misstatement during her c losing

arg ume nt w a s n ot s o impr op e r o r i nf la mmatory so a s to a ff

e c t th e jury ’s ve rd ic t in thi s c a se . T hu s, the er ror wa s not so eg reg ious as t o war rant a mistrial. Acc ording ly
, we conclude that the trial court did not err in fa iling to dec lare a mistrial. See M at h i s , 9 6 9 S

. W

. 2d at 422 (holding that the trial
court wa s not require d t o gra n t a mistrial based on a witness’ re fer ence to a prior thre at); State v. Br ewe r, 932 S.W.2d 1, 27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that a mistrial was not re quired a fter a witness made a stateme nt that the Def endant ha d been bankrupt
, ev en t h oug h there had bee n a pretria l order that the defendant’s bankruptcy was not to be mentioned at t rial). This issue is without merit.-14-

V. Insuf fi cient Evidence I n th e De fe nd a nt’ s fi na l iss ue on app e a l, he a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y the State

a t tr ia l wa s ins uf

fi c ie nt to su pp ort his tw o c on vic tio ns fo r fi rs t de g re e mur de r. To su pp ort th is c la im, the Def endant e ssentially

arg ues t h at t h e evide nce pr esente d by the def ense w ould not allow any

ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t to fi nd the De fe nd a nt w a s th e pe rp e tr a tor of the mur de rs be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt, pointing spec ifically to the testimonyof Ms. Wil liams that the Def endant wa s with her during the time the crimes took place, Mr . Schultz ’s conf ession to the murders, a nd the expert testimony that there was no g unshot residue on the D efe ndant’s coat.

Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Procedure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of g uilt in criminal actions whe ther by

the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convic ted criminal defenda nt who cha lleng es the suff

iciency of the e vidence on appea l bear s the burde n of demonstrating why the evidenc e is insufficient to su p p ort the ver dict, beca use a ve rdict of g uilt destroy s the presumption of i nnocenc e and imposes a presumption of guilt. See State v. Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W .3d 516, 557-58 (Te nn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Te n n

. 1 9 8 2 )

. T h is Co u r t mu s t r e je c t a c o n v ic te d c r im in a l d e f

e n d a n t’ s c h a ll e n g e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a light most favora ble to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te view o f th e e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces w hich may be draw n there from. See Carruthe rs, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uiltyverdic t by the trier of

fac t acc redits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 199 7 ). Questions about the cr edibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence are r esolved by the trier of

fac t, and thi s Court will not re-w eig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Nor w ill thi s Court substi t u t e i t s own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

First deg ree murder as char g ed in this case is the “ preme ditated and intentional killing of another .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (1). In the ca se at ha nd, the Def endant doe s not challeng e the f

act that the two vic tims were murde re d o r t hat the killings we re pr emeditated and intentional, rather the Defenda nt arg ues t hat t heir was insufficient evidence prese nted at trial that he was the pe rson who committed the murde rs. Th e re c or d in dic a te s th a t se ve ra l y ears pri or to the mur de rs a t is su e in this c a se , M on te Campbell robbed the D efe ndant and was sent to jail for approxi mately three y ear s. The De fendant was witnesse d threatening to “g et” Mr. Ca mpbell when he w as release d from prison. Sever al months

a ft e r M r. Ca mpb e ll wa s re le a se d fr om priso n, he a ndMs. Caru th w e re sh ot t o d e a th. Ms. Ha zel itt-15-

witness ed t h e De fe ndant walk by and look at the two victims sever al times shortly befor e the murders. Mr . J ohnson witnessed the shooting and identified the Def endant the shoote r.
F urthe rm or e , th e De fe nd a nt’ s r e lia nc e on Ms. Willi a m’ s te sti mon y c on c e rn ing a n a lib i f

a ils
to acc ount for the f

act that the jury

hear d Ms. Wi ll i am s ad m it that while she was a war e the Def endant ha d been c harg ed with murder , she nonethe less did not tell the police t h at h e had be en with her until approximately ten day s afte r the murde rs. The D efe ndant also wishes to re ly on the confe ssion of Mr. Shultz
, but he fails to a cknowledg e that Mr. Schultz admitted in front of the jury that he repe atedly lied to police
, he was heavily involved with dr ug s and other c riminal activity , and he had alre ady pled g uilty to and been sentenc ed to life sentenc es for his involvement in the murders pursuant to a f

actua l stipul ation that indicated he was the driver a nd the Defenda nt was the shooter

. The De f e n d a n t a ls o r e li e s o n th e e xp e r t te s ti mo n y th a t n o g u n s h o t r e s id u e w a s f o u n d o n the Def endant’ s coat. How ever , the jury hear d the expert testify that he had no w ay

of knowing if the jacke t he tested wa s the one used by t h e s h o o t er, and eve n if it was, a simple brushing or wiping would remove any

evidenc e of g unshot residue.

I n short, the Def

endant a rg ues that this Court should discount the testimony of Mr. Johnson and that of the other witnesse s prese nted by the State, acc redit the testimony of Mr. Shultz and the other witnesse s called by

the Def endant at trial, and ove rturn the ve rdict of the jury . Howeve r, as stated above , this Court wil l not re-we igh or re- evaluate the evide nce. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236. Furthermore
, questions a bout the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e,

a s w e l l a s a l l f

a c t u a l i s s u e s r a i s e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e ar e r e s o l v e d b y t h e tr i e r o f f a c t

. Id

. A c c o r d i n g l y, afte r considering a ll the evidence in a li g ht most favora ble to the prosec ution, we determine that the Def endant ha s failed to demonstrate that the jury was pr es en t ed with i nsufficie nt evidence at trial fo r any ratio na l t ri er of fact to f indhim g uil ty of bo th f ir st d e g re e mur de rs be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. T hu s, thi s is su e is w ith ou t me ri t

CO NC LU SION
B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g a nd a uth oriti e s, we a ff ir m the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE