2016 IL App (1st) 140030

No. 1-14-0030 

Fifth Division

March 4, 2016 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

DARRYL CHRISTIAN, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

)

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 89 CR 15497 

The Honorable 

Diane Cannon, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The instant appeal arises from a postconviction proceeding pursuant to the Illinois 

Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act (Act) (775 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2010)). In 

2011, defendant Darryl Christian filed a petition before the Torture Inquiry and Relief 

Commission (Commission), claiming that he had been tortured into confessing to the murder 

of his stepmother in 1989, a crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to 55 years in 

the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), even though he claimed he was innocent. 

After reviewing defendant’s petition, the Commission determined that sufficient evidence 

existed to warrant judicial review pursuant to the Act. Defendant’s petition was assigned to a 
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2 

judge in the circuit court of Cook County, where an evidentiary hearing occurred. After the 

evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that there was no credible evidence that defendant 

was entitled to any relief on his torture claim and, accordingly, denied defendant’s petition.

Defendant appeals, raising an issue of first impression in this court, namely, whether the 

findings of the Commission are entitled to any preclusive effect before the circuit court.

Alternatively, defendant argues that the circuit court’s findings were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The instant appeal concerns a question of law about the effect of the Commission’s 

findings, as well as review of the circuit court’s finding that there was no credible evidence 

to support defendant’s torture claim. The evidence before the circuit court included all of the 

prior court proceedings in defendant’s case, so we set them forth here in order to properly 

analyze whether the circuit court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We provide only the detail that is necessary for resolution of the instant appeal. 

¶ 4 In summary, in 1989, defendant was charged with first degree murder in connection with 

the death of his stepmother. After being arrested, defendant allegedly made a statement to a 

police detective and an assistant State’s Attorney confessing to the crime. Defendant filed a 

motion to suppress the statement, claiming that the detectives interrogating him had struck 

him in the jaw and threatened to further abuse him if he did not confess. Defendant’s motion 

to suppress was denied, and defendant was ultimately convicted of the murder and sentenced 

to 55 years in the IDOC. Defendant unsuccessfully filed a direct appeal, two postconviction 

petitions, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the federal district court. In 2011, 

defendant filed a claim of torture before the Commission. After conducting a formal inquiry, 
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3 

the Commission concluded that there was sufficient evidence to merit judicial review and 

referred the claim to the circuit court for further consideration. The circuit court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing, after which it concluded that defendant was not entitled to any relief 

under the Act. 

¶ 5 I. Defendant’s Arrest and Trial

¶ 6 On July 20, 1989, defendant was indicted for first degree murder in connection with the 

death of his stepmother on June 24, 1989. According to the police report,1 Officer Roland

Hunter was called to the scene by the Chicago fire department and, upon his arrival, was met 

by defendant. Defendant informed Hunter that he had left for work at 10 p.m. on June 23, 

1989, and had returned home at approximately 10 a.m. and discovered his stepmother dead in 

the living room. Detective Michael Cummings also interviewed defendant, who told 

Cummings that he had been at a neighbor’s house all night watching television with friends, 

arriving there between 10 and 11 p.m. on June 23 and leaving at 8 a.m. on June 24 to 

exercise in a nearby park, returning home at 10 a.m. and discovering his stepmother’s body.

Cummings interviewed the neighbors, one of whom stated that defendant came to his home 

between 10 and 11 p.m. and smoked cocaine with the neighbor and the neighbor’s sister until 

2 to 2:30 a.m., at which point defendant left. 

¶ 7 According to the police report, defendant agreed to accompany Cummings to Area 2 

Violent Crimes headquarters to be questioned further. Cummings read defendant his Miranda

rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), which defendant said he understood.

Defendant chose to speak with Cummings and confessed to Cummings that he had killed his 

stepmother during an argument. Defendant told Cummings that he and his stepmother had 

 1 The parties stipulated to the admission of the police report during the evidentiary hearing before the 

circuit court on defendant’s torture claim.
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4 

argued because she wanted him to move out because he was not doing any chores around the 

house. Defendant stated that he was not leaving and his stepmother said that she would force 

him out, going to the kitchen and obtaining a large kitchen knife. Defendant grabbed her 

wrist and removed the knife from her hand, then began stabbing her. He pushed her away and 

she fell to the floor. Defendant dropped the knife and left. Defendant later returned to the 

house and retrieved the knife and also kicked out the basement window to make it look like 

someone had broken into the house. Defendant drove away and threw the knife into some 

bushes while he was driving, then drove back home and called the police. Before the police 

arrived, he removed his bloodied gym shoes and hid them under the rear porch.2

¶ 8 According to the police report, after giving that account, defendant was placed under 

arrest and the felony review unit of the State’s Attorney’s office was notified. Assistant 

State’s Attorney (ASA) Dave Fischer interviewed defendant, who gave him a written 

statement.

¶ 9 Defendant’s statement stated, in relevant part:

“Darryl said that he’d been down the block watching TV with his friends when he 

decided to go home. He went to his home and got into an argument with his 

mother;[3] she wanted him to leave because he did not do housework that she thought 

he should do. Darryl said that he refused to leave, and the argument continued. His 

mother went into the kitchen and got a large knife; she then came back to where 

they’d been arguing. Darryl took the knife from his mother, stabbed her once with it, 

and pushed her away. She fell to the floor, and the knife was dropped beside her. 

 2 The knife was never recovered, but a pair of gym shoes was recovered from underneath the rear porch. 

The parties stipulated that the gym shoes had human blood on them. 3 The victim is referred to both as defendant’s stepmother and as his mother throughout the record. 

According to his presentence investigation report, defendant stated that he had been adopted by the victim and her 

husband, and that defendant’s adoptive father passed away in 1974.
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5 

Darryl said that he then left the house, returned for a while to his friend’s house 

down the street, and then went walking. He returned to the house he’d shared with his 

mother around 9:30 and took her car for a ride, throwing the knife he’d stabbed her 

with into weeds at 76th St. and South Chicago. Darryl also broke a window at the 

house and then called the Chicago police. 

Darryl is 33 years old and received his G.E.D. in the United States Army. He 

reads, writes, and speaks English. Darryl has been well treated while in police 

custody. Det. Cummings has given him cigarettes and lunch and coffee. No one has 

threatened Darryl nor promised him anything in return for this statement. Darryl 

appears and sounds free from alcohol and drugs and tells us that he is in fact sober 

and in control of his thoughts at this time. Darryl has told us that he is sorry about 

what happened between himself and his mother last night.” 

¶ 10 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he had allegedly made 

confessing to the crime, claiming, inter alia, that “the statements sought to be suppressed 

were obtained as a result of physical coercion illegally directed against the defendant and that 

such statements were, therefore, involuntary in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to 

the United States Constitution.” Specifically, the motion claimed that “[defendant] was hit by 

one of the *** Detectives.”

¶ 11 At the suppression hearing, ASA Fischer testified that on June 24, 1989, he was working 

in the felony review unit at the State’s Attorney’s office and was called to Area 2 to speak 

with Detective Cummings. After he spoke with Cummings, he reviewed paperwork and then 

had a conversation with defendant in an interview room. Fischer entered the room with 

Cummings and observed defendant sitting on a bench in the interview room. Fischer 
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6 

introduced himself, explaining that he was an attorney with the State’s Attorney’s office and 

did not represent defendant. He then advised defendant of his Miranda rights, which 

defendant stated he understood. Defendant then spoke to Fischer about the crime for 

approximately 15 minutes. At the end of that conversation, Fischer asked defendant whether

he wished to have a court reporter take his statement or if he would rather have a summarized 

statement written by Fischer. Defendant chose the written statement, so Fischer and 

Cummings left the interview room and Fischer drafted a three-page summary of defendant’s 

confession. 

¶ 12 After he had drafted the statement, Fischer and Cummings returned to the interview 

room, where Fischer showed the draft to defendant. While Fisher had previously established 

that defendant had obtained a GED, he nevertheless asked defendant to read the beginning of 

the document out loud, which defendant did. Defendant then signed the written Miranda

warnings at the beginning of the document and was asked to read the rest of the statement 

silently. On the second page, defendant pointed out that there was an incorrect time written in 

the summary, so Fischer corrected the time and Fischer, Cummings, and defendant initialed 

the correction. After defendant had finished reviewing the statement, Fischer, Cummings, 

and defendant signed each page of the statement. When Fischer and Cummings were exiting

the interview room, Fischer waved Cummings away and stuck his head back into the 

interview room to ask defendant if everything was all right; defendant responded that it was.

Fischer testified that he had also asked defendant if everything was all right prior to taking 

his statement and defendant responded that it was. 

¶ 13 Fischer testified that at no time did he or anyone in his presence strike defendant or use 

any type of physical coercion on him. Fischer also observed defendant eating a lunch from 
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7 

McDonald’s. Fischer further testified that he did not observe any injuries on defendant and 

that defendant did not ask him for medical attention. 

¶ 14 Detective Lawrence Nitsche testified at the suppression hearing that on June 24, 1989, he 

was employed as a detective in the Chicago police department, assigned to Area 2 Violent 

Crimes. He was assigned to investigate the victim’s homicide and arrived at the scene at 

approximately 12:15 p.m. He observed the crime scene for 10 to 15 minutes, then left with 

defendant and Detective Cummings in an unmarked police vehicle and returned to Area 2 

headquarters. They returned to Area 2 about 10 to 15 minutes later and defendant was placed 

in an interview room on the second floor, after which Nitsche began working on paperwork 

for an unrelated assignment. Nitsche did not have any contact with defendant until 

approximately 4:15 p.m. when he assisted Cummings in escorting defendant to the lockup. 

Nitsche testified that neither he nor anyone in his presence struck defendant. 

¶ 15 Detective Cummings testified at the suppression hearing that on June 24, 1989, he was a 

detective assigned to Area 2 Violent Crimes and at approximately 11:30 a.m. received an 

assignment to investigate the victim’s homicide. When he arrived, he observed the scene, 

spoke to the beat officer, and spoke with defendant. He also spoke with some other 

individuals living nearby, after which he returned to the scene and asked defendant to 

accompany him to Area 2; they left at approximately 12:30 p.m., along with Detective 

Nitsche. When they arrived at Area 2 at approximately 12:45 p.m., he and Nitsche escorted 

defendant to the second floor and Cummings asked defendant to sit in one of the interview 

rooms. A few minutes later, Cummings entered the interview room where defendant was 

sitting and advised him of his Miranda rights, which defendant indicated that he understood.

Defendant and Cummings then had a conversation for approximately 10 minutes, after which 
No. 1-14-0030 

8 

Cummings told defendant he was under arrest, left the room, and called the felony review 

unit of the State’s Attorney’s office. While they were waiting for the felony review unit, 

Cummings gave defendant coffee, smoked a cigarette with him, and took him to the 

bathroom. He asked defendant if he was hungry and when defendant responded that he was, 

Cummings gave defendant a lunch purchased from McDonald’s.

¶ 16 Cummings testified that ASA Fischer arrived at approximately 1:30 p.m., and they both 

went into the interview room. Fischer introduced himself to defendant and again advised 

defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant stated he understood. Defendant then had a 

conversation with Fischer for approximately 5 to 10 minutes, then Fischer asked defendant 

whether he would be willing to give a handwritten or court-reported statement. Defendant 

stated that he wished to provide a handwritten statement and Cummings and Fischer left the 

room and Fischer wrote out the statement. Cummings and Fischer then reentered the 

interview room at approximately 2:15 p.m. and gave the statement to defendant. Fischer 

asked defendant to read the heading and Miranda warnings out loud, which defendant did.

Defendant then continued reading the statement and pointed out an error, which Fischer 

corrected, and all three initialed the correction. After defendant finished reviewing the 

statement, he, Fischer, and Cummings all signed each page. Fischer and Cummings then left 

the room, and Fischer motioned Cummings away and stuck his head back into the interview 

room. Cummings testified that he and Fischer were the only ones who ever entered the 

interview room and that neither he nor anyone in his presence ever struck defendant in any 

manner.
No. 1-14-0030 

9 

¶ 17 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that “he was not in fact 

physically coerced in any way. He was not beaten, hit, kicked or whatever by any of the 

police officers or by the assistant state’s attorney.”

¶ 18 The matter proceeded to a jury trial, where defendant was convicted of first degree 

murder and was sentenced to 55 years in the IDOC. At trial, ASA Fischer testified 

consistently with his testimony at the suppression hearing. Officer Hunter testified 

consistently with the account stated in the police report that defendant had informed him that 

he had been at work from 10 p.m. on June 23 until 10 a.m. the following morning. Detective 

Cummings also testified consistently with the account stated in the police report and with his 

testimony at the suppression hearing. Defendant did not present any evidence and did not 

testify on his own behalf.

¶ 19 II. Prior Appeals

¶ 20 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to ask prospective jurors two questions about defendant’s drug use and the victim’s 

age; (2) the prosecutor made improper remarks during rebuttal argument which deprived 

defendant of a fair trial; and (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new 

trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Christian, No. 1-91-0758, at 1 

(1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. Christian, No. 1-91-0758, at 1. 

¶ 21 With respect to defendant’s argument concerning improper remarks during rebuttal 

argument, defendant argued that “the prosecutor made improper rebuttal to defense counsel’s 

argument that the defendant’s confession was induced by police coercion.” Christian, No. 1-

91-0758, at 4. We rejected defendant’s argument, finding that “[w]ithin the context of the 
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10 

trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s comments do not represent remarks so prejudicial that 

defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial was violated. The strongest evidence against 

defendant was his signed statement. The circumstances surrounding the statement do not hint 

of police abuse. The defendant voluntarily went to the police station, ate lunch one hour later, 

and signed a statement within the next hour. When asked, defendant stated he was free from 

drugs and alcohol and did not complain to Assistant State’s Attorney Fischer about 

mistreatment by the police. Most importantly, defense counsel failed to offer any evidence of 

police abuse. He only argued police abuse in closing argument.” Christian, No. 1-91-0758, at 

5. 

¶ 22 With respect to defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, defendant argued 

that trial counsel should have called alibi and character witnesses to testify on his behalf. 

Christian, No. 1-91-0758, at 5. We rejected defendant’s argument, finding that defense 

counsel’s decisions were matters of trial strategy, and noting that “[i]n this case, defense 

counsel interviewed Tiwana Alexander, an alleged alibi witness, and the trial judge was 

aware of the interview. Ms. Alexander was also available during the trial. Yet, defense 

counsel chose not to call her as a witness. Defense counsel further chose not to call character 

witnesses. Decisions whether character and alibi witnesses will be called are matters which 

defense counsel must decide for every trial as a part of strategy. We believe that the trial 

court understood these matters clearly pertained to trial strategy.” Christian, No. 1-91-0758, 

at 6.

¶ 23 On February 15, 1994, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which was 

dismissed by the trial court at the first stage. On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a 

motion for leave to withdraw as appellate counsel and filed a brief in support of the motion 
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11 

pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), in which appellate counsel stated 

that he had reviewed the trial record and concluded that there were no arguable bases for 

collateral relief. People v. Christian, No. 1-94-1595, at 1-2 (1995) (unpublished order under 

Supreme Court Rule 23). After reviewing the record and the briefs, we found no issues of 

arguable merit and, consequently, permitted appointed counsel to withdraw and affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court. Christian, No. 1-94-1595, at 2. 

¶ 24 On July 24, 1997, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal 

district court, in which he claimed that his “involuntary confession to the police on June 24, 

1989 was in violation of his fifth amendment right to the federal constitution and therefore 

the confession should have been suppressed.” On April 7, 1998, defendant’s petition was 

denied by the district court.

¶ 25 On October 17, 2003, defendant filed a pro se successive postconviction petition, which 

was supplemented on November 1, 2006, after appointment of counsel. One of the claims in 

the successive petition was that defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding 

police misconduct that coerced his confession, because the state of the law had changed since 

defendant’s trial and there was newly discovered evidence. The successive petition claimed 

that since the appellate court decision on defendant’s first postconviction petition, there was 

new case law concerning police brutality claims at Area 2, citing People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 

2d 93 (2000), and People v. Cannon, 293 Ill. App. 3d 634 (1997); defendant’s pro se petition 

also referred to an Office of Professional Standards (OPS) report finding a systemic practice 

of torturing suspects at Area 2. The petition also pointed to two appellate court decisions in 

which the conduct of detectives Cummings and Nitsche had been at issue. The petition 

argued that “[b]ased upon petitioner’s sworn assertions against Cummings and Nitsche, 
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changes in applicable law, and [the] backgrounds of Cummings and Nitsche at Area Two, a 

new hearing on the voluntariness of the confession attributed to petitioner is now needed.”

Defendant’s petition was dismissed at the second stage. On appeal, defendant’s appointed 

counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw as appellate counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v. 

Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and we granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the trial court. 

People v. Christian, No. 1-07-2482 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 

23). 

¶ 26 III. Torture Claims Under the Act

¶ 27 A. Commission Proceedings 

¶ 28 On May 2, 2011, defendant filed a claim of torture before the Commission. Defendant

claimed that on June 24, 1989, “I was struck extremely hard in the face, dazed and confused 

while being screamed at to give a false confession to the [assistant] States Attorney, and 

threaten[ed] [that] if I did not do it, the abuse would continue. So I gave the false statement to 

end the abuse. Which is the only evidence used to convict me. I am an innocent man falsely 

incarcerated.” (Emphasis in original.) 

¶ 29 On June 13, 2012, the Commission issued its case disposition, which stated that “it is the 

decision of the Commission that, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is sufficient 

evidence of torture to conclude the Claim is credible and merits judicial review for 

appropriate relief.” The Commission stated that its decision was based on the following 

findings of fact. 

¶ 30 1. Commission’s Findings of Fact 

¶ 31 On June 24, 1989, defendant telephoned the Chicago police and ambulance from his 

stepmother’s home and stated that he had arrived at the home and discovered that she had 
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been stabbed to death. Area 2 detectives Michael Cummings and Lawrence Nitsche were 

among the police personnel responding to the scene; while Jon Burge had been transferred 

from Area 2 to Area 3 the year before, the detectives had worked at Area 2 while Burge was 

there. While at the scene, defendant was questioned concerning his activities prior to 

discovering the body and was then taken to Area 2 after being informed that the people he 

mentioned did not support his account. “During the questioning of [defendant] at Area 2, the 

Detectives screamed and yelled at [defendant], and Cummings struck [defendant] very hard 

in the face. [Defendant] was also threatened with further beatings if he did not agree to 

confess.” Defendant signed a three-page confession written by an ASA and was later indicted 

for the murder of his stepmother in the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 32 Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession, “alleging that he was struck and 

confessed as a result.” Although he swore to the contents of the motion, defendant was not 

called as a witness at the hearing, nor did the defense present any other witnesses or evidence 

in support of the motion. The ASA who had taken defendant’s statement testified at the 

hearing that within a period of 45 to 60 minutes after arriving at Area 2, he was briefed by 

the detectives about the case; interviewed defendant, who orally confessed; wrote up the 

confession from memory because he had not taken any notes; and reviewed the written 

confession with defendant, which was then corrected and signed.

¶ 33 According to the Commission: 

 “Since the motion to suppress was heard, the following evidence has emerged: 

 a. In 1990 the Office of Professional Standards of the Chicago Police 

Department concluded after an internal investigation that there had been systemic 
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14 

abuse at Area 2 for over 10 years. The Report was not released publicly until 

 1992. 

 b. On November 12, 1991, Jon Burge was suspended, and on February 11, 

1993, the Police Board of the City of Chicago separated him from his position as 

a Commander with the Department of Police after finding him guilty of abusing 

 Andrew Wilson at Area 2 in 1982. 

 c. In 2002 Chief Cook County Criminal Court Judge Paul Biebel appointed a 

Special State’s Attorney to investigate allegations of torture by police officers 

under the command of Burge at Areas 2 and 3 to determine if any criminal 

prosecutions were warranted. Although the 2006 Report concluded that the statute 

of limitations barred any criminal prosecutions, the Report found that ‘[t]here are 

many other cases which lead us to believe that the claimants were abused’. 

[Citation.] On the occasion of the Report’s release, the Special State’s Attorney 

stated that he believed the abuse was an ‘ongoing’ practice, and had occurred in 

 approximately half of the 148 cases which were investigated. [Citation.]” 

¶ 34 At trial, “the prosecution’s case against [defendant], apart from the confession, was very 

weak.” The Commission pointed to the appellate court order affirming defendant’s on direct 

appeal, in which we noted that “ ‘[t]he strongest evidence against defendant was his signed 

statement.’ ” (quoting People v. Christian, No. 1-91-0758 (1993) (unpublished order under 

Supreme Court Rule 23)). The Commission also specifically noted that it was “not finding 

that [defendant] is necessarily factually innocent of the offense, only that the weakness of the 

case against [defendant] gave added incentive to coerce a confession to bolster that case.”

The Commission noted that there were no eyewitnesses to the offense; the murder weapon 
No. 1-14-0030 

15 

was not recovered; and the only physical evidence of note was a pair of gym shoes recovered 

from under the front porch, which had a small amount of blood on the outside of the left heel. 

Although the serology analysis was able to classify it as human blood, it was not identified as 

the blood of either the victim or defendant, and the shoes were not even identified as 

defendant’s other than through the confession. Defendant did not testify at trial and the 

defense presented no evidence on his behalf. 

¶ 35 The Commission found that there were “major inconsistencies between the confession 

and other evidence in the case.” For instance, the confession did not mention the gym shoes; 

the confession stated that defendant stabbed the victim one time, but the medical examiner’s 

report stated that she was stabbed 24 times; and the confession stated where the murder 

weapon was supposedly left but the police did not recover the knife, even though the 

confession was made only about 14 hours after the murder occurred. The Commission also 

found that “[t]here is a question whether the police even tried to recover [the murder 

weapon]. Although the police testified at trial that they did, none of the police reports 

document any attempt to do so.” 

¶ 36 The Commission also found that “[t]here [were] other problems with the prosecution’s 

case.” The police took custody of the clothes defendant was wearing at the house, but there 

was no blood on them even though the victim was stabbed 24 times and there was testimony 

she was discovered lying in a pool of blood; the clothes were also not introduced at the trial. 

The Commission noted that “[a]lthough [defendant] could have changed his clothes after 

committing the stabbing, the confession makes no mention of this.” The Commission further 

noted that the confession stated that defendant broke a window in the basement to make it 

look like an intruder committed the murder, but there was no blood or glass in the victim’s 
No. 1-14-0030 

16 

vehicle, although the confession stated that defendant drove the vehicle afterward to the spot 

where he said he threw the knife, and there was also no blood on the glass from the basement 

window. 

¶ 37 The Commission found that at the sentencing hearing, defendant spoke for the first time 

in the entire case and challenged the prosecution’s theory that he stabbed the victim because 

he was angry that she wanted him to move out because he was not doing housework.

Defendant stated that he had not been angry or argued with the victim and had in fact paid for 

her funeral and burial expenses himself. The Commission noted that “[a]lthough that 

statement was not investigated or corroborated at the time, the [Commission’s] investigation 

has revealed that [defendant] did pay the sum of $2,198.00 for funeral and burial expenses.”

The Commission found that “[a]lthough it could be argued that [defendant] paid out of guilt 

and remorse for what he had done, this is a very large sum of money in 1989 for somebody in 

[defendant’s] economic situation who was in jail to boot. It seems highly unlikely that

somebody who had done what [defendant] was convicted of doing would be bothered so 

much by guilt and remorse that he would pay a funeral bill of that amount.” 

¶ 38 The Commission found that defendant presented a version of the same coercion claim he 

was making before the Commission in his first pro se postconviction petition filed in 1994, in 

which he argued that the use of an involuntary confession violated due process and that his 

confession was contradicted by other evidence in the case. The Commission noted that the 

petition was denied on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the argument. 

Defendant presented the claim again more fully in his second pro se postconviction petition 

filed in 2003, citing the Office of Professional Standards reports and the decisions of the 

Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Patterson, and the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. 
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17 

Cannon. The pro se petition was later supplemented by a petition filed by appointed counsel, 

but these were also dismissed on procedural grounds without an evidentiary hearing and 

without reaching the merits of the claim.

¶ 39 2. Commission’s Conclusions 

¶ 40 Based on the above findings of fact, the Commission found that “[t]his Claim exhibits 

many of the standard characteristics of coerced, false confession cases. The confession itself 

is very cursory in nature: it only totals three pages, including the advice of rights, and only a 

little over one page even relates to the facts of the case. The testimony of the ASA 

concerning the manner in which the confession was obtained is far from convincing. The 

confession omits any reference to important facts, such as the gym shoes, and conflicts with 

others, such as the number of times the victim was stabbed.” 

¶ 41 The Commission further found that “[t]he prosecution’s case without the confession is 

almost nil. There were no eyewitnesses. There was no physical evidence other than the gym 

shoes, and the small amount of blood on them was not linked to either the victim or 

[defendant]. There was no blood on [defendant’s] clothing.” 

¶ 42 The Commission found that “[t]he quality of [defendant’s] legal representation was very 

poor. For no apparent reason, [defendant] did not testify at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress and no other evidence was introduced, so other than cross-examination there was 

nothing presented to support the motion. [Defendant] did not testify at trial and no evidence 

was introduced on his behalf. There is no indication that any investigation was conducted to 

discover exculpatory evidence, such as the funeral home information. This was obtained over 

20 years later, indicating that a contemporary investigation would likely have produced 

additional exculpatory evidence.”
No. 1-14-0030 

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¶ 43 The Commission noted that “[defendant] has consistently asserted his coercion Claim 

from the time of his motion to suppress, which was filed in February of 1990, through his 

present filing with the [Commission] in May, 2011.” 

¶ 44 The Commission concluded that “the Claim is credible based upon a preponderance of 

the evidence, and merits judicial review for consideration of appropriate relief.” 

¶ 45 B. Circuit Court Proceedings 

¶ 46 On June 20, 2013, defendant filed a petition for relief under the Act based on the 

Commission’s finding that defendant’s claims of torture were credible, which he 

supplemented on July 1, 2013, with the legislative history of the Act. 

¶ 47 Prior to the hearing on defendant’s petition, defendant gave a discovery deposition, in 

which he testified that both detectives Cummings and Nitsche interrogated him, with “a lot of 

accusations, screaming and hollering, and profanity, accusing me of it.” Defendant denied 

committing the crime and “after a while—it’s been like maybe a few hours going backwards 

and forth with the bickering, hollering and screaming. I just shut up. It was like around 

maybe 10 or 15 minutes after that, they were still hollering and then bam. Cummings hit me. 

And then I just dropped my head.” He testified that Cummings told him that “you better tell 

[the ASA] that you did this,” and “went to go do it again, threatening.” When the ASA 

entered the room, defendant told the ASA “[y]eah, I did it,” and the ASA and the detectives 

left. Defendant testified that the bulk of the statement was fabricated and “I didn’t say 

anything like that.” 

¶ 48 The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s torture claim on 

October 9, 2013. Defendant testified on his own behalf that he was incarcerated for the first 

degree murder of his stepmother. Defendant testified that on the morning of June 24, 1989, 
No. 1-14-0030 

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he came home from spending the night at a friend’s house and discovered the victim lying on 

the floor in a pool of blood. It appeared that she was not breathing, so defendant

“[i]mmediately” called the police and paramedics. A short time after the police and 

paramedics arrived, detectives Cummings and Nitsche also arrived on the scene. The two 

detectives took defendant to the kitchen and asked defendant where he had been overnight. 

Defendant explained that he had been up the street at his friend’s house, and the detectives 

left. The detectives returned approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, telling him that they had 

spoken with his friend, who denied that defendant had been there. The detectives asked 

defendant why he was lying to them, which defendant denied, and they placed defendant in 

handcuffs. 

¶ 49 After defendant was placed in handcuffs, he was placed in a police vehicle and driven to 

Area 2 headquarters, where he was taken to a small room and handcuffed to a ring on the 

wall. When the detectives returned a few minutes later “it was like *** their whole demeanor 

had changed.” The detectives screamed at defendant and accused him of committing the 

crime for 45 minutes to an hour, after which Detective Cummings “reared back and he hit 

me, he hit me so hard I almost passed out.” The detectives then continued with their 

accusations and Cummings informed defendant that “a guy outside [in] the hall is a state’s 

attorney and if you don’t tell him you did this it will continue.” Defendant testified that by 

“it,” he understood the detective to mean “[t]he beating.”

¶ 50 Defendant testified that a man then entered the room and identified himself as working in 

the State’s Attorney’s office. Defendant confirmed to the ASA that he was able to read and 

write and had a GED. The ASA asked defendant what had happened, and defendant “looked 

up, and [the detectives] were just standing there behind him.” Defendant informed the ASA
No. 1-14-0030 

20 

“yeah, I did it,” and everyone left the room, returning approximately 20 to 30 minutes later 

with some papers that they instructed defendant to sign. Defendant testified that he had never 

described the situation written up in the papers as his statement to either the detectives or to 

the ASA. Defendant admitted to signing the statement, but testified that he was not given the 

opportunity to read it over and was not advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant testified that 

he would not have signed the statement if he had not been hit by the detective. 

¶ 51 Defendant testified that he was held in Area 2 for over four hours, during which time he 

had not been given anything to eat or drink, had not been given an opportunity to use the 

washroom, and had not been given any cigarettes to smoke.

¶ 52 On cross-examination, defendant admitted that his attorney had filed a motion to suppress 

defendant’s statement on February 26, 1990, but that the motion did not claim that the 

detectives had threatened defendant for over an hour. However, his motion to suppress did 

claim that defendant had been hit by one of the detectives, but did not specify where.

Defendant further admitted that he had filed a direct appeal of his conviction, which did not 

challenge his statement as being the product of coercion, but testified that he had not 

reviewed the appellate brief and had no “say-so in what they file. It was just sent to me after 

the fact.” Defendant also admitted that his postconviction petition had no allegations 

concerning the detectives threatening him or hitting him, nor did the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus that he filed in federal court. On redirect examination, defendant testified that 

his postconviction petition and petition for writ of habeas corpus included allegations that his 

confession was involuntary. Defendant also admitted on cross-examination that he had 

written several letters to the then-State’s Attorney indicating that some individuals in the 

IDOC had fabricated torture claims.
No. 1-14-0030 

21 

¶ 53 Defendant also testified that he never testified before the Commission and did not call 

any witnesses before the Commission, nor was he present for any such hearing. Defendant 

testified that the proceeding before the circuit court was the first time he had appeared in 

court since his 1990 trial. 

¶ 54 After defendant’s testimony, the circuit court admitted the following defense exhibits into 

evidence: (1) a notice of filing and certificate of service of the Commission’s findings; (2)

defendant’s written statement; (3) a copy of the medical examiner’s postmortem report; (4) 

four crime scene photos; (5) the police report completed by detectives Cummings and 

Nitsche, to which the State stipulated; (6) defendant’s written allocution at the time he was 

sentenced; and (7) a copy of every postconviction petition filed by defendant. The defense 

then rested.

¶ 55 In the State’s case in chief, Fischer, the former ASA who had taken defendant’s 

statement, testified that in June 1989, he was an ASA assigned to the felony review unit. On 

June 24, 1989, at approximately 12:30 or 1 p.m., he received an assignment to go to Area 2 

and speak with Detective Cummings. When he arrived at Area 2, he spoke with Detective 

Cummings, reviewed some reports, and then went to an interview room to speak with 

defendant; defendant, Cummings, and Fischer were the only individuals present in the room.

Fischer introduced himself to defendant and read defendant his Miranda rights, which 

defendant indicated he understood. Fischer then asked defendant whether he wanted to 

discuss the case, and defendant gave him a verbal statement. Fischer then left the room and 

drafted a written summary of defendant’s statement; the initial meeting with defendant took 

approximately 10 to 15 minutes. When he finished writing the summary, Fischer again met 

with Detective Cummings, who accompanied him into the interview room. 
No. 1-14-0030 

22 

¶ 56 Fischer gave defendant the written summary that Fischer had prepared, and asked him to 

read it and make any corrections that were necessary. He asked defendant to read the 

beginning of the statement out loud in order to verify defendant’s literacy, which he did.

Fischer identified a copy of the written statement, which had his, defendant’s, and Detective 

Cummings’ signatures on it. Fischer also identified an area of the statement in which 

defendant had made a correction; he testified that defendant brought the error to his attention

and he struck out the incorrect language and inserted the correct language. Fischer testified 

that all of the information contained within the statement came from defendant. 

¶ 57 Fischer testified that Detective Cummings had taken McDonald’s food in to defendant 

prior to Fischer’s meeting with defendant. He further estimated that he was standing three to 

five feet from defendant and did not notice any bruising or marks on defendant’s face. After 

Fischer spoke with defendant, Detective Cummings left the room and once he was out of 

earshot, Fischer asked defendant whether “everything [was] all right” and defendant made a 

positive verbal response. 

¶ 58 Fischer testified that he had testified as to the circumstances surrounding the statement 

both at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress and at defendant’s trial. He confirmed 

that his testimony at both of those proceedings was truthful and accurate. Fischer testified 

that he had not been contacted by the Commission concerning defendant’s torture claim. 

¶ 59 After Fischer’s testimony, the circuit court admitted the following State exhibits into 

evidence, all of which were admitted without objection: (1) defendant’s written motion to 

suppress his statement; (2) defendant’s direct appeal; (3) defendant’s 1994 postconviction 

petition; (4) defendant’s 1997 petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court; (5)

defendant’s statement; (6) and (7) November 2005 correspondence between defendant and 
No. 1-14-0030 

23 

the then-Cook County State’s Attorney; (8) a transcript of Fischer’s testimony at defendant’s

suppression hearing; (9) a transcript of Detective Nitsche’s testimony at defendant’s 

suppression hearing; (10) a transcript of Detective Cummings’ testimony at defendant’s 

suppression hearing; (11) a transcript of Fischer’s trial testimony; (12) defendant’s torture 

claim form that was filed with the Commission on May 2, 2011; and (13) a transcript of 

defendant’s September 17, 2013, deposition concerning his torture claims. The State then 

rested. 

¶ 60 On November 25, 2013, the circuit court denied defendant relief on his torture claim. The 

court’s order provided: 

“This court finds there is absolutely no credible evidence that Darryl Christian is 

entitled to any relief whatsoever on his claim of torture.

Darryl Christian gave four different versions of his actions with regard to the 

murder of Lottie Anderson prior to being charged. He testified under oath he never 

made the statement he signed. No credible evidence exists that Mr. Christian was ever 

slapped before he gave his final version of the events leading up to the murder. It 

should be noted that final statement made by Mr. Christian minimizes his actions.

Any relief would be a miscarriage of justice. Based on the evidence heard and 

received, relief is denied.”

This appeal follows. 

¶ 61 ANALYSIS

¶ 62 On appeal, defendant raises an issue of first impression in this court, namely, whether the 

findings of the Commission are entitled to any preclusive effect before the circuit court. 
No. 1-14-0030 

24 

Alternatively, defendant argues that the circuit court’s findings were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

¶ 63 I. Effect of the Commission’s Findings 

¶ 64 We first consider defendant’s arguments concerning the effect of the Commission’s 

findings on the circuit court, an issue of first impression before this court. Defendant argues 

that the Commission’s findings are granted preclusive effect based on the doctrines of 

collateral estoppel and law of the case. In order to analyze this issue, it is first necessary to 

discuss the Act and its provisions. 

¶ 65 A. Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act

¶ 66 The Act became law on August 10, 2009, and took effect the same day; it has not been 

amended since its enactment. 775 ILCS 40/99 (West 2010). The purpose of the Act is to 

“establish[] an extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine factual claims of torture 

related to allegations of torture.” 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2010). Under the Act, a “ ‘[c]laim of 

torture’ means a claim on behalf of a living person convicted of a felony in Illinois asserting 

that he was tortured into confessing to the crime for which the person was convicted and the 

tortured confession was used to obtain the conviction and for which there is some credible 

evidence related to allegations of torture committed by Commander Jon Burge or any officer 

under the supervision of Jon Burge.” 775 ILCS 40/5(1) (West 2010). The Act applies to 

claims of torture filed not later than August 10, 2014—five years after the effective date of 

the Act. 775 ILCS 40/70 (West 2010). 

¶ 67 The Act established the Commission, which is an independent commission under the 

Illinois Human Rights Commission for administrative purposes. 775 ILCS 40/15(a) (West 

2010). The Commission consists of eight voting members: one is to be a retired circuit court 
No. 1-14-0030 

25 

judge, one is to be a former prosecuting attorney, one is to be a law school professor, one is

to be engaged in the practice of criminal defense law, one is to be a former public defender, 

and three are to be members of the public who are not attorneys and are not officers or 

employees of the judicial branch. 775 ILCS 40/20(a) (West 2010). The members of the 

Commission are appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, for 

three-year terms. 775 ILCS 40/20(a), 25(a) (West 2010). The Commission’s duties include 

establishing the criteria and screening process to be used to determine which cases are 

accepted for review by the Commission; to conduct inquiries into claims of torture; to 

coordinate the investigation of cases accepted for review by the Commission; and “[t]o 

prepare written reports outlining Commission investigations and recommendations to the trial 

court at the completion of each inquiry.” 775 ILCS 40/35 (West 2010). 

¶ 68 A claim of torture may be referred to the Commission by any court, person, or agency.

775 ILCS 40/40(a) (West 2010). The Commission may, in its discretion, either informally 

screen and dispose of a case summarily or grant a formal inquiry of the claim. 775 ILCS 

40/40(a) (West 2010). The Commission may only conduct a formal inquiry if the convicted 

person first signs an agreement waiving his or her procedural safeguards and privileges, 

including the right against self-incrimination; agrees to cooperate with the Commission; and 

agrees to provide full disclosure regarding inquiry requirements of the Commission. 775 

ILCS 40/40(b) (West 2010). If a formal inquiry regarding the torture claim is granted, the 

Commission’s director shall use all due diligence to notify the victim, explain the inquiry 

process, and notify the victim that he or she has the right to present his or her views or 

concerns throughout the Commission’s investigation. 775 ILCS 40/40(c) (West 2010). 
No. 1-14-0030 

26 

¶ 69 In conducting its inquiry, the Commission “may use any measure provided in the Code of 

Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to obtain information necessary 

to its inquiry.” 775 ILCS 40/40(d) (West 2010). The Commission may also issue subpoenas 

or other process to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence; 

administer oaths; petition the circuit court for enforcement of process or for other relief; and 

prescribe its own rules of procedure. 775 ILCS 40/40(d) (West 2010). 

¶ 70 At the completion of the Commission’s inquiry, the director reports the results and his or 

her recommendation to the full Commission. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.375(i), adopted at 35 Ill. 

Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011).4 The director’s written report is to summarize all the 

relevant evidence, include the reasons for the recommendation, and present any other matters 

necessary for the Commission to make an informed decision regarding the claim. 2 Ill. Adm. 

Code 3500.375(i), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). After “all relevant 

evidence” is presented to the full Commission, the Commission may, in its discretion, 

conduct a hearing. 775 ILCS 40/45(a) (West 2010). 

¶ 71 At the hearing, “all relevant evidence from the formal inquiry shall be presented to the 

full Commission in summary form as part of the Director’s report and recommendation.” 2 

Ill. Adm. Code 3500.380(a)(1), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). The 

director shall also present any additional evidence the Commission has elected to consider, 

unless the Commission orders otherwise. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.380(a)(2), adopted at 35 Ill. 

Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). 

¶ 72 After the hearing, the full Commission votes “to establish further case disposition.” 775 

ILCS 40/45(c) (West 2010). “If 5 or more of the 8 voting members of the Commission 

 4 The Act’s regulations have been amended once. 38 Ill. Reg. 18988 (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). However, we cite 

the regulations that were in effect at the time of defendant’s torture claim and the Commission’s disposition of that 

claim. 
No. 1-14-0030 

27 

conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient evidence of torture to 

merit judicial review, the case shall be referred to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of 

Cook County by filing with the clerk of court the opinion of the Commission with supporting 

findings of fact, as well as the record in support of such opinion, with service on the State’s 

Attorney in non-capital cases and service on both the State’s Attorney and Attorney General 

in capital cases.” 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 2010). “If less than 5 of the 8 voting members of 

the Commission conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient 

evidence of torture to merit judicial review, the Commission shall conclude there is 

insufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial review. The Commission shall document that 

opinion, along with supporting findings of fact, and file those documents and supporting 

materials with the court clerk in the circuit of original jurisdiction, with a copy to the State’s 

Attorney and the chief judge.”5 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 2010). 

¶ 73 With respect to postcommission judicial review, the Act provides: “If the Commission 

concludes there is sufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial review, the Chair of the 

Commission shall request the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County for 

assignment to a trial judge for consideration. The court may receive proof by affidavits, 

depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the 

petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. Notwithstanding the status of any other 

postconviction proceedings relating to the petitioner, if the court finds in favor of the 

petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the 

former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail 

or discharge, or for such relief as may be granted under a petition for a certificate of 

 5 According to the Commission’s website, it has received over 200 claims. State of Illinois Torture Inquiry 

and Relief Commission, Mission and Procedure Statement, http://www.illinois.gov/tirc/Pages/default.aspx (last 

visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
No. 1-14-0030 

28 

innocence, as may be necessary and proper.” 775 ILCS 40/50(a) (West 2010). The State’s 

Attorney or the State’s Attorney’s designee shall represent the State at the hearing before the 

assigned judge. 775 ILCS 40/50(b) (West 2010). 

¶ 74 The Act provides that, “[u]nless authorized by this Act, the decisions of the Commission 

are final and are subject to review as final decisions under the provisions of the 

Administrative Review Law, and shall only be overturned if the court finds that they are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” 775 ILCS 40/55(a) (West 2010). In the case at 

bar, the State did not appeal the Commission’s findings. 

¶ 75 B. Preclusive Effect of the Commission’s Findings 

¶ 76 As noted, on appeal, defendant argues that the Commission’s findings of fact must be 

given preclusive effect under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case. We note 

that the Act has never been interpreted by any court in this State, so our analysis on this issue 

is a matter of first impression.6

¶ 77 In the case at bar, defendant primarily argues that “[u]nder the collateral estoppel 

doctrine, the state is precluded from re-litigating issues that have been determined by a final 

and valid judgment and thus the court may not revisit the finding by the [Commission] that 

the Defendant was tortured.” As an initial matter, it is important to clarify exactly what the 

Commission found. In his brief, defendant repeatedly states that the Commission found that 

he was tortured by the police officers. However, the Commission actually found only that 

“there is sufficient evidence of torture to conclude the Claim is credible and merits judicial 

review for appropriate relief.” Thus, the Commission found that there was sufficient evidence 

 6 In People v. Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, this court considered a petition that combined a 

postconviction petition with a petition for relief under the Act. However, we disposed of the issue based on the 

postconviction petition and did not analyze the Act. See Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 111 (“Because we have 

determined that Whirl is entitled to a new suppression hearing under the Postconviction Act, we need not address 

Whirl’s claim for the identical relief under the TIRC Act.”).
No. 1-14-0030 

29 

to move forward with the case, as is its duty under the Act. See 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 

2010) (“If 5 of more of the 8 voting members of the Commission conclude by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial 

review, the case shall be referred to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County 

***.”).

¶ 78 While the Act is unusual in that a claim of torture is considered first by the Commission 

and then by the circuit court, an analogy that is helpful in understanding the framework is 

drawn by the Commission itself on its website. There, the Commission states that “[i]f a 

matter is referred to [the circuit] court, a claimant can receive what is referred to in Illinois as 

a ‘third stage post-conviction hearing.’ This means that the claimant can have a full court 

hearing before a judge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his confession was 

coerced.” State of Illinois Torture and Relief Commission, Mission and Procedure Statement, 

http://www.illinois.gov/tirc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). See also Whirl, 

2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 51 (in its motion to dismiss, “[t]he State conceded that the 

judicial review contemplated under the TIRC Act is akin to a third-stage evidentiary hearing 

under the Postconviction Act”). Thus, thinking about the process of a torture claim through 

the lens of the more common postconviction process shows that the initial screening of the 

claim is roughly comparable to the first stage, the Commission’s inquiry and 

recommendations are the second stage, and the circuit court hearing is the third stage 

evidentiary hearing. Each stage serves a type of gatekeeping function, screening out claims 

until the circuit court is presented with those claims that are most likely to be meritorious.

¶ 79 Thus, when the Commission issues a disposition of a torture claim, it is simply finding 

that there is sufficient evidence to proceed to the next step, namely, a hearing before the 
No. 1-14-0030 

30 

circuit court. The Commission is not asked to make a final determination as to whether a 

claimant in fact proved that he was tortured, as defendant implies. The question we must 

determine is whether this finding is entitled to any preclusive effect at the next stage of the 

proceedings before the circuit court.

¶ 80 “The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues resolved in earlier 

causes of action.” State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (2010). Its 

applicability is a question of law that we review de novo. State Building Venture, 239 Ill. 2d 

at 158. De novo consideration means we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would 

perform. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011). 

¶ 81 “Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine and its application is governed by certain 

general principles.” Gumma v. White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 38 (2005). Our supreme court has 

explained that “the minimum threshold requirements for the application of collateral estoppel 

are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the 

suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) 

the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 

adjudication.” Gumma, 216 Ill. 2d at 38. 

¶ 82 Here, defendant argues that the “prior adjudication” in question was the Commission’s 

disposition of his torture claim. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to prior decisions 

by administrative agencies that are adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-judicial.” Pedersen v. 

Village of Hoffman Estates, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 42; Lelis v. Board of Trustees of the 

Cicero Police Pension Fund, 2013 IL App (1st) 121985, ¶ 30. “The party claiming collateral 

estoppel has the burden of establishing it by clear, concise, and unequivocal evidence.” 
No. 1-14-0030 

31 

Pedersen, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 42. In the case at bar, we cannot find that defendant 

satisfied this burden and find that collateral estoppel does not apply for several reasons. 

¶ 83 1. Not a Judicial Decision 

¶ 84 First, the Commission’s decision is not the type of adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-judicial

decision to which collateral estoppel applies. For instance, in Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 

3d 488, 491 (1991), the court found that the proceedings underlying the decision of the Board 

of Review were judicial in nature after examining the procedures for adjudicating disputed 

unemployment claims and concluding that “[t]he administrative determination of plaintiff’s 

claim was reached after a sufficiently extensive and adversarial hearing, conducted under 

oath and on the record.” See also John O. Schofield, Inc. v. Nikkel, 314 Ill. App. 3d 771, 783 

(2000) (finding that the decision of the Department of Mines and Minerals as to the 

plaintiff’s ownership interest was made in a proceeding that was adjudicatory, judicial, or 

quasi-judicial in nature, after examining the Department’s statutory authority and the 

procedures utilized at the hearing). By contrast, the court in Edmonds v. Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 2012 IL App (5th) 110118WC, ¶ 27, found that the decision of a 

district director with respect to claims under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act (30 U.S.C. 

§ 901 et seq. (2000)) was investigative or administrative in nature rather than adjudicatory, 

due to “[t]he informal nature at the initial stage of the federal proceeding, coupled with the 

constraints placed on the nature of evidence that a claimant can initially submit in support of 

a claim for federal benefits.”

¶ 85 In the case at bar, the Act describes an investigative function for the Commission, not an

adjudicatory or judicial one. The Act provides that the Commission’s duties include 

“conduct[ing] inquiries into claims of torture” (775 ILCS 40/35(2) (West 2010)), and 
No. 1-14-0030 

32 

“prepar[ing] written reports outlining Commission investigations and recommendations to 

the trial court at the completion of each inquiry” (775 ILCS 40/35(5) (West 2010)). Once the 

claim form has been submitted, as well as the claimant’s waiver of rights, the Commission’s 

director conducts an informal inquiry into the claim, “consisting of taking all reasonable 

steps to interview the convicted person, interview any witnesses identified by the convicted 

person, and review any documents provided by the convicted person.” 2 Ill. Adm. Code 

3500.360, adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). At the completion of the 

informal inquiry, the director may recommend that the Commission forego a formal inquiry 

and instead refer the case directly to the circuit court for appropriate relief. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 

3500.370(a), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). 

¶ 86 If the matter proceeds to a formal inquiry, the director, acting on behalf of the 

Commission, may use any measure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 

5/101 et seq. (West 2010)) and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/101-1 

et seq. (West 2010)) “to obtain information necessary to the inquiry,” including issuing and 

serving subpoenas or other process to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production 

of evidence; administering oaths; issuing written interrogatories; conducting oral depositions; 

conducting physical and/or psychological examinations of the convicted person to ascertain 

evidence of torture; hiring experts or other specialists as needed to assist the Commission in 

its inquiry; and conducting on-site visits to detention centers or other locations where torture 

is alleged to have taken place. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.375(a), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 

(eff. Aug. 25, 2011). The director then reports the results and his or her recommendation to 

the full Commission in a written report that “summarize[s] all the relevant evidence, 

includ[ing] the reasons for the recommendation, and present[s] any other matters necessary 
No. 1-14-0030 

33 

for the Commission to make an informed decision regarding the claim.” 2 Ill. Adm. Code 

3500.375(i), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). The Commission may vote to 

decide the disposition of the case at that point or may choose to conduct an “evidentiary 

proceeding” to receive additional evidence. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.375(i), adopted at 35 Ill. 

Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). 

¶ 87 If the Commission chooses to conduct an evidentiary hearing, “all relevant evidence from 

the formal inquiry shall be presented to the full Commission in summary form as part of the 

Director’s report and recommendation.” 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.380(a)(1), adopted at 35 Ill. 

Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). Additionally, “[t]he Director shall present the additional 

evidence the Commission has elected to consider, unless the Commission orders otherwise.” 

2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.380(a)(2), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). All 

testimony is to be taken under oath or affirmation, and all proceedings are to be recorded by 

audio and transcribed as part of the record. 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.380(a)(3), 3500.380(c), 

adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011). After hearing the evidence, the 

Commission votes to establish further case disposition, either referring the case to the circuit 

court or concluding there is insufficient evidence to merit judicial review. 775 ILCS 40/45(c) 

(West 2010). 

¶ 88 Examining the procedures set forth by the Act and its regulations, we cannot find that the 

Act sets forth a judicial proceeding for purposes of collateral estoppel. The Act does not 

describe an adversarial proceeding but describes an investigation conducted by the 

Commission after the claimant has filed a claim of torture. While the Act provides that the 

claimant is entitled to an attorney prior to signing a waiver of his or her procedural rights and 

“throughout the formal inquiry” if such a formal inquiry is granted, the Act does not provide 
No. 1-14-0030 

34 

either the claimant or the State any other rights. A hearing on the claimant’s torture claim is 

purely discretionary, and the Commission may refer a claim to the circuit court without such 

a hearing. See 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.370(a), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 

2011) (referring a claim directly to the circuit court after an informal inquiry by the director);

2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.375(i), adopted at 35 Ill. Reg. 15125 (eff. Aug. 25, 2011) (referring a 

claim to the circuit court based on the director’s recommendation after conducting a formal 

inquiry). Furthermore, if a hearing is conducted, it is the director who presents evidence, not 

any party. Indeed, the State is not even entitled to notice of the Commission’s proceedings 

until after the Commission has issued a decision. See 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 2010) 

(providing for service on the State’s Attorney of the Commission’s opinion with supporting 

findings of fact). Thus, defendant’s claims in his brief that the Commission “hears opening 

and closing arguments from counsel” and “both the Defendant and the prosecution had an 

adequate opportunity to present witnesses and evidence” are without support in the language 

of the Act or its regulations. In fact, in the case at bar, the Commission heard no additional 

evidence prior to issuing its decision, much less argument from the parties. We cannot find 

that this is the kind of adjudicatory or judicial decision to which collateral estoppel applies.

¶ 89 In support of his argument that the Commission’s decision was a judicial one, defendant 

relies primarily on Crot v. Byrne, 646 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1986), a federal district court 

case interpreting whether the Illinois Industrial Commission acted in a judicial capacity when 

denying the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. We first note that, as a decision by a 

federal court interpreting Illinois law, Crot is at most persuasive authority and is not binding 

on this court.7 In re Estate of Opalinska, 2015 IL App (1st) 143407, ¶ 26. More importantly, 

 7 Curiously, on this issue, defendant’s brief relies almost entirely on federal law, with only one citation to 

an Illinois case.
No. 1-14-0030 

35 

however, the procedures described in that case differ greatly from the procedures described 

in the Act at issue in the instant case. 

¶ 90 The district court there noted that it was required to determine whether the agency’s 

procedures entailed the essential elements of an adjudication, including “adequate notice, the 

right of parties to present evidence on their own behalf and rebut evidence presented by the 

opposition, a formulation of issues of law and fact, a final decision, and the procedural 

elements necessary to conclusively determine the issue in question.” Crot, 646 F. Supp. at

1255. Considering these factors, the court found that “[t]he rules and procedures utilized by 

the Illinois Industrial Commission to resolve workers’ compensation claims clearly entail the 

essential elements of an adjudication,” pointing to rules providing that (1) all parties receive 

notice of the hearing and an opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf and rebut 

evidence presented by the opposition; (2) only attorneys licensed to practice in Illinois may 

appear on behalf of parties; (3) parties may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of 

witnesses and the production of documents at the hearings; (3) the Illinois Rules of Evidence 

apply in all proceedings; (4) evidence depositions may be taken pursuant to stipulation of the 

parties or order of the arbitrator; (6) attorneys are entitled to make opening and closing 

statements; and (7) arbitrator decisions are required to clearly state the legal and factual 

issues presented for resolution by the parties and state findings of fact and conclusions of law 

with regard to each issue presented. Crot, 646 F. Supp. at 1255-56. The court concluded that 

“[g]iven the procedural and evidentiary safeguards afforded claimants before the Industrial 

Commission, this Court has no doubt that the procedure utilized allows claimants a full and 

fair hearing.” Crot, 646 F. Supp. at 1256. 
No. 1-14-0030 

36 

¶ 91 By contrast, in the case at bar, the Act provides no such procedural and evidentiary 

safeguards, and does not entail the essential elements of an adjudication. As explained above, 

the parties are not entitled to present evidence on their own behalf or rebut evidence 

presented by the opposition; the State is not even afforded notice of any Commission 

proceedings until they have concluded. Furthermore, there is no indication that any 

evidentiary rules apply, with the Commission able to consider “all relevant evidence.” 775 

ILCS 40/45(a) (West 2010). The only evidentiary safeguard in place is the provision that 

“[a]ll State discovery and disclosure statutes in effect at the time of formal inquiry shall be 

enforceable as if the convicted person were currently being tried for the charge for which the 

convicted person is claiming torture.” 775 ILCS 40/40(f) (West 2010). Accordingly, the 

analysis in Crot is not applicable to the statute in the instant case, as the provisions of the two 

statutes are significantly different.

¶ 92 We are also not persuaded by defendant’s attempt to minimize the State’s argument by 

claiming that the State “waived its right to contest the procedures of the commission when it 

failed to petition for an administrative review of the commission’s findings.” Defendant fails 

to recognize that the State is not challenging the procedures of the Commission or the 

propriety of its findings; those challenges would properly be brought in an administrative 

review action, as defendant notes.8 Instead, the State is simply highlighting the 

 8 We note that the State pointed out at oral argument that it is not entirely clear whether the State has the 

right to appeal the Commission’s decision under section 55 of the Act (775 ILCS 40/55 (West 2010)) since, as we 

explain below, the State was not a party to the Commission’s proceedings. “ ‘[T]he interests that will justify an 

appeal by one not a party must be direct, immediate and substantial. It must be an interest which would be 

prejudiced by the judgment or benefit from its reversal.’ ” People v. Pine, 129 Ill. 2d 88, 95 (1989) (quoting In re 

Estate of Tomlinson, 65 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1976)) (Secretary of State had standing to appeal trial court’s order 

directing it to issue judicial driving permits). See also In re O.H., 329 Ill. App. 3d 254, 257-58 (2002) (Department 

of Children and Family Services had standing to appeal trial court’s probation orders in delinquency cases); People 

v. White, 165 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253 (1988) (Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities had 

standing to appeal trial court’s order requiring it to monitor compliance with conditions imposed on an individual 

found not guilty by reason of insanity who is conditionally released). But see Braglia v. McHenry County State’s 
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37 

Commission’s procedures in an attempt to argue that the procedures do not result in an 

adjudicatory or judicial proceeding. After our independent review of the procedures, we 

agree with the State. Accordingly, collateral estoppel would not apply to the Commission’s 

findings and the circuit court properly considered whether defendant was able to prove that 

he had been tortured by the police. 

¶ 93 2. Elements of Collateral Estoppel

¶ 94 Furthermore, even if the Commission’s decision was the type of judicial or adjudicatory 

decision to which collateral estoppel could apply, defendant fails to demonstrate that the 

required elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. As noted, our supreme court has 

explained that “the minimum threshold requirements for the application of collateral estoppel 

are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the 

suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) 

the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 

adjudication.” Gumma, 216 Ill. 2d at 38. In the case at bar, none of these requirements is 

satisfied.

¶ 95 First, the issue decided by the Commission was not identical to the one presented to the 

circuit court, nor did it represent a final judgment on the merits. As noted, after either an 

informal or a formal inquiry, the Commission votes to determine, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, whether “there is sufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial review.” 775 ILCS 

40/45(c) (West 2010). If so, the case is referred to the circuit court. 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 

2010). The case is then assigned to a circuit court judge “for consideration” of the torture 

 

Attorney’s Office, 371 Ill. App. 3d 790, 795 (2007) (Department of State Police did not have standing to appeal trial 

court’s order directing it to issue a firearm owner’s identification card to the plaintiff). We have no need to decide 

whether the State would have had a right to appeal the Commission’s decision in the instant case, however, since 

the State did not seek such an appeal and the resolution of the question does not impact our analysis.
No. 1-14-0030 

38 

claim. 775 ILCS 40/50(a) (West 2010). The circuit court may receive additional evidence 

and, if it “finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order.” 775 ILCS 

40/50(a) (West 2010). Thus, while the Commission is asked to determine whether there is 

enough evidence of torture to merit judicial review, the circuit court is asked to determine 

whether defendant has been tortured. These are two different issues determined by two 

different entities.

¶ 96 Defendant claims that “[t]here is nothing in the [Act], or in the legislative history of the 

act, which indicates that the Illinois General Assembly wanted the claimants to have to go 

through yet another round of proving their claims, when these claims had already been 

investigated, evaluated, analyzed, and ruled upon by the commission appointed by the 

governor and with the advice and consent of the Illinois State Senate.” However, we agree 

with the State that the Commission’s decision did not relieve defendant of the burden of 

proving before the circuit court that he had been tortured. 

¶ 97 Defendant’s argument would render section 50 of the Act, which provides for 

postcommission judicial review, to be superfluous. “Statutes should be read as a whole with 

all relevant parts considered, and they should be construed, if possible, so that no term is 

rendered superfluous or meaningless.” In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001) 

(citing Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990), and Advincula v. United Blood 

Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17, 26 (1996)). Section 50 specifically provides that, once the case 

is assigned to the circuit court, “[t]he court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral 

testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought 

before the court for the hearing.” 775 ILCS 40/50(a) (West 2010). If, as defendant argues, the 

issues before the Commission and the circuit court are identical and the circuit court is barred 
No. 1-14-0030 

39 

from deciding the question, there would be no need for a hearing in which the court could 

receive additional evidence. Defendant’s interpretation of the Act flies in the face of the 

express language of the statute and we will not interpret the Act in that way. 

¶ 98 The process of considering the torture claim set forth under the Act also demonstrates 

why the Commission’s decision referring the case to the circuit court was not a final 

judgment on the merits for the purposes of collateral estoppel. “A final judgment is a 

determination of the issues presented which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the 

rights of the parties.” Gallaher v. Hasbrouk, 2013 IL App (1st) 122969, ¶ 23 (citing 

Hernandez v. Pritikin, 2012 IL 113054, ¶ 47). In the case at bar, the Commission’s 

disposition did not finally ascertain or fix the rights of any of the parties. The Commission’s 

disposition simply sent the case onto its next step in the circuit court. While the Act is 

somewhat unusual in that the proceedings before the Commission were concluded but the 

case itself was not, reaching back to the analogy to a postconviction petition is helpful. What 

the Commission did was analogous to finding that a postconviction petition could advance to 

the third stage. No one argues that the second-stage finding is a final judgment on the merits 

that precludes the consideration of the merits of the issue at the third stage. Likewise, here, 

the Commission’s finding that the case should proceed to the circuit court does not bar the 

circuit court from conducting its evidentiary hearing. 

¶ 99 Additionally, the State, the party against whom the estoppel is asserted, was not a party to 

the Commission’s proceeding. As noted, the first time that the Act mentions notice to the

State is when the Commission has issued its disposition. 775 ILCS 40/45(c) (West 2010).

The Act also provides that the State is represented at the hearing before the circuit court, but 

contains no such provision for any hearing before the Commission. 775 ILCS 40/50(b) (West 
No. 1-14-0030 

40 

2010). Thus, the State was not a party during any of the Commission’s proceedings and 

collateral estoppel cannot apply. We again note that defendant’s claims that “both the 

Defendant and the prosecution had an adequate opportunity to present witnesses and 

evidence” are not supported by the language of the Act or its regulations, which do not afford 

any of these rights.

¶ 100 Defendant argues that since the Commission is a creation of the State, “[i]f it is a state 

agency that is conducting the investigation and making the findings, then it is impossible to 

say that the state was not part of the proceeding.” This argument fundamentally 

misunderstands the nature of the Commission. The Commission is an independent 

commission, categorized under the Illinois Human Rights Commission for administrative 

purposes. 775 ILCS 40/15(a) (West 2010). The Commission is not a part of the State’s 

Attorney’s office and does not act on behalf of either party when it conducts its investigation.

If we accepted defendant’s argument, we would be saying that the State is a party to every 

decision issued by an administrative agency in this State, regardless of whether the State had 

any interest in the matter at hand or was even notified about the issue. That is a broad 

proposition we are not willing to accept, nor has defendant provided any legal authority for 

this sweeping generalization. Instead, courts have consistently found that the mere fact that 

two entities are both State agencies does not mean that they are in privity for purposes of res 

judicata or collateral estoppel, and at least one court has rejected an argument similar to 

defendant’s. See Hayes v. State Teacher Certification Board, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1164 

(2005) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), 

who issued the decision being appealed, and the State Superintendent were in privity, finding 

that the School Code required the ISBE to perform certain neutral and ministerial functions 
No. 1-14-0030 

41 

with regard to employment-dismissal proceedings and that the ISBE was not an adversarial 

or interested party in its cases); People v. Jones, 301 Ill. App. 3d 608, 611 (1998) (finding the 

State was not estopped from pursuing a criminal prosecution where it was not a party to the 

Department of Corrections’ disciplinary proceeding and it was not afforded a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue). See also, e.g., Pedersen, 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, ¶ 46 

(“The fact that both a municipality and a pension board are public entities is not enough to 

establish they are the same parties or are in privity for the purpose of collateral estoppel.”); 

Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1076 (1992) (“We are not prepared to accept 

the plaintiff’s argument that the parties are the same because [the University of Illinois and 

the State Universities’ Retirement System] were both State agencies.”). But see Gumma v. 

White, 345 Ill. App. 3d 610, 618 (2003) (finding the State was a party at both proceedings for 

collateral estoppel purposes where the State participated in both proceedings, once through 

the State’s Attorney’s office and once through the Secretary of State’s office). Thus, none of 

the three requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied.

¶ 101 As a final matter, in addition to all of the reasons set forth above, collateral estoppel 

would not apply in the instant case because “the doctrine extends only to the facts and 

conditions that existed when the original judgment was entered.” Gallaher, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 122969, ¶ 26 (citing Consiglio v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 

2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 44). In the case at bar, after the Commission issued its 

disposition, the case was referred to the circuit court, which conducted an evidentiary 

hearing. At the hearing, the circuit court heard the testimony of two witnesses, including 

defendant, who had not testified before the Commission and who had never testified during 

the proceedings leading up to his conviction. Thus, the Commission’s decision could not act 
No. 1-14-0030 

42 

as collateral estoppel with respect to evidence that was not before it. See Gallaher, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 122969, ¶ 26 (where a statute had been amended since the first case, “[t]he 2010 

order could not act as collateral estoppel with respect to a statute it did not construe”).

¶ 102 For all of the reasons set forth above, we find that collateral estoppel did not apply to the 

Commission’s disposition of defendant’s torture claim.

¶ 103 3. Law of the Case 

¶ 104 For similar reasons, we find defendant’s arguments concerning law of the case to be 

equally unpersuasive. Defendant argues that “[a]s law of the case, the [Commission’s] 

finding that Defendant was tortured controls all of [defendant’s] post-conviction relief.”

“[T]he law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same 

case.” Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 552 (2006). However, in the case at bar, as we 

have explained above, the issue before the Commission was not the same issue that was 

before the circuit court. The Commission was required to determine whether sufficient 

evidence existed for the torture claim to proceed to the circuit court for a hearing. By 

contrast, the circuit court was required to consider whether defendant had proven that he was 

tortured by the police officers. Since these are not the same issues, there can be no 

“relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case.” Krautsack, 223 Ill. 2d at 552.

Consequently, the law of the case doctrine is not applicable. 

¶ 105 II. Propriety of Circuit Court’s Findings 

¶ 106 As his second basis for appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court’s order denying 

him relief under the Act was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The parties agree 

that we should review the circuit court’s decision under the manifestly erroneous standard, 

which “represents the typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial 
No. 1-14-0030 

43 

judge.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998). This deference reflects “the 

understanding that the post-conviction trial judge is able to observe and hear the witnesses at 

the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, occupies a ‘position of advantage in a search for the 

truth’ which ‘is infinitely superior to that of a tribunal where the sole guide is the printed 

record.’ ” Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 384 (quoting Johnson v. Fulkerson, 12 Ill. 2d 69, 75 

(1957)). A circuit court’s decision is manifestly erroneous if it contains an error that is 

“ ‘ “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” ’ ” People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 

(2004) (quoting People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2002), quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 

Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997)).

¶ 107 In the case at bar, after an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order finding 

that “there is absolutely no credible evidence that Darryl Christian is entitled to any relief 

whatsoever on his claim of torture.” The court further found: 

“Darryl Christian gave four different versions of his actions with regard to the 

murder of Lottie Anderson prior to being charged. He testified under oath he never 

made the statement he signed. No credible evidence exists that Mr. Christian was ever 

slapped before he gave his final version of the events leading up to the murder. It 

should be noted that final statement made by Mr. Christian minimizes his actions.

Any relief would be a miscarriage of justice. Based on the evidence heard and 

received, relief is denied.”

We cannot find that the circuit court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

¶ 108 First, defendant argues that the circuit court’s finding that defendant “gave four different 

versions of his actions” concerning the murder was “absolutely without any basis in the 
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44 

record whatsoever.” However, as the State points out, (1) Officer Hunter testified at 

defendant’s trial that defendant told him that he had left for work at 10 p.m. on June 23 and 

did not return until 10 a.m. the next morning; (2) Detective Cummings testified at 

defendant’s trial that defendant told him at the scene that he had been with friends from 10 

p.m. until 8 a.m.; (3) Detective Cummings testified at defendant’s trial that after questioning 

at Area 2, defendant admitted that he had an argument with his mother that resulted in his 

stabbing her more than once; and (4) ASA Fischer testified at defendant’s trial that defendant 

told him that defendant and his mother had argued and that, while trying to take the knife his 

mother held away, his mother received one stab wound. Thus, there is a basis in the record 

for the circuit court’s finding and we cannot find that it was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence.

¶ 109 Defendant next challenges the circuit court’s finding that defendant “testified under oath 

he never made the statement he signed.” While defendant admits that “this is technically 

true,” he argues that “[t]here is much more to it.” Defendant argues that he testified before 

the circuit court that he admitted that he killed the victim after being abused, but that all of 

the facts included in the statement were fabricated by others, which he says is consistent with 

the testimony from his discovery deposition concerning the torture claim, which was 

admitted into evidence by the circuit court at his hearing. However, as the State points out, it 

is not only these two places where defendant made representations under oath about the 

statement. For instance, defendant attached an affidavit to his habeas corpus petition in 

which he stated that he did not make an incriminating statement when he spoke with 

Detective Cummings. Thus, there is a basis in the record for the circuit court’s finding and 

we cannot find that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
No. 1-14-0030 

45 

¶ 110 Next, defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously found that “[i]t should be noted 

that [the] final statement made by Mr. Christian minimizes his actions.” Defendant argues 

that the only thing arguably “minimizing” in the statement is the statement that defendant 

was sorry. However, defendant overlooks the fact that his statement makes the victim into the 

aggressor, indicating that she was the one who retrieved a knife from the kitchen. “It is 

unlikely that a person whose will was overborne would be unable to resist confessing, yet at 

the same time attempt to mitigate the effect of a confession.” People v. Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d 

107, 120 (1981). Thus, we cannot find that the circuit court’s finding was erroneous or 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 111 Finally, defendant challenges the circuit court’s finding that “no credible evidence exists 

that Mr. Christian was ever slapped before he gave his final version of the events leading up 

to the murder” and its ultimate conclusion that “there is absolutely no credible evidence that 

Darryl Christian is entitled to any relief whatsoever on his claim of torture.” Defendant 

argues that he has continually maintained that he was abused by the police since 1990 and 

that his testimony at the evidentiary hearing was unrebutted. Defendant also argues that his 

testimony that the written statement was fabricated was corroborated by inconsistencies 

between the statement and the actual facts, pointing to examples such as the number of stab 

wounds. While defendant is correct that Detective Cummings was not called to testify before 

the circuit court, a transcript of his testimony from defendant’s suppression hearing was 

admitted into evidence. In that transcript, Detective Cummings testified that he did not strike 

defendant. Thus, defendant’s testimony was not unrebutted. Furthermore, “the reviewing 

court does not retry the defendant, and the trier of fact remains responsible for making 

determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, 
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46 

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 

255, 272 (2008). We cannot find that the circuit court’s determination that defendant was not 

credible was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 112 CONCLUSION

¶ 113 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s 

claim for relief under the Act. Collateral estoppel did not apply to the Commission’s finding

and the circuit court’s conclusion that defendant was not entitled to any relief was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 114 Affirmed.