[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12478

Non-Argument Calendar

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LOLA M. SMITH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00333-RAH-SRW

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12478

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lola Smith, a pro se plaintiff, alleged that the U.S. Army 

forced her into early retirement, rather than accommodate her 

medical need for a job with less time spent at the computer. But 

she did not contact the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission about the Army’s decision until almost five months 

later. Due to that delay, the district court dismissed her complaint. 

We agree and affirm.

In Smith’s account, she was working as a civilian employee 

in the U.S. Army Medical Command when, late in the spring of 

2012, she began experiencing health problems. She decided to seek 

early retirement under the federal government’s Voluntary Early 

Retirement Authority, but withdrew her application when she 

learned that she would not receive an incentive payment for 

retiring early. But her health problems did not subside. In June 

2012 her central retinal vein became occluded, and she went on sick 

leave until August 1, 2012. She also requested and took additional 

leave under the Family Medical Leave Act—leave that the Army 

eventually approved retroactively.

While Smith was on leave, and without her knowledge, the 

Army filed and then approved an early retirement application on 

her behalf. She wanted to keep her job, though, so she withdrew 

the application on August 10 and returned to work on August 15. 

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21-12478 Opinion of the Court 3

But she continued to struggle. After her first day at work using the 

computer, her eyes hurt so much that she called in sick the next 

day. She continued to experience health problems over the next 

month, and on September 19, applied again for early retirement. 

That day the Army told her that, if she could be off the 

payroll by September 30, her earlier approval would carry over to 

the new application. Seven days later, however, she withdrew this 

application too. She noted that she had considered accepting early 

retirement for medical reasons, but had concluded that retiring 

would not be “best for [her] family financially.” She also asked for 

a job that did not involve looking at computers all day. The Army 

said no such job was available. It also denied her request to 

withdraw her early retirement application on the ground that she 

had signed a document saying that she would not withdraw. Her 

early retirement began on September 30, 2012.

Several months later—in February 2013—she contacted the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that the 

Army had engaged in disability discrimination against her. After 

seven years of proceedings in several agencies, the EEOC gave 

Smith a letter affording her a right to sue.

Smith then filed a pro se suit against the Secretary of the 

Department of the Army in federal district court. But the district 

court soon dismissed that suit, concluding that Smith had not 

contacted the EEOC in time, and thus had failed to timely exhaust 

her administrative remedies. This appeal followed.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12478

We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, accepting 

any factual allegations in it as true and construing them in the 

plaintiff’s favor. See Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 

942 F.3d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the complaint 

is pro se, we construe those allegations liberally. Mitchell v. 

Peoples, 10 F.4th 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2021). We can also consider 

a document attached to a motion to dismiss when the document is 

undisputed and central to a plaintiff’s claim. Day v. Taylor, 400 

F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005).

Under a liberal construction of Smith’s complaint, we treat 

her claim against the Secretary as one under the Rehabilitation 

Act,1 which “prohibits federal agencies from discriminating in 

employment against individuals with disabilities.” Ellis v. England, 

432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To

bring such a claim, a plaintiff must begin administrative review of 

the alleged discriminatory conduct with the relevant agency—

here, the EEOC—“within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory 

act.” Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008); see 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Beyond that time, the claim usually “is 

barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Shiver, 549 

F.3d at 1344.

1 Smith checked a box stating that she brought her claim under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, but that Act does not cover discrimination claims against 

the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i). 

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21-12478 Opinion of the Court 5

If the “discriminatory act results in a personnel action,” like 

the forced retirement here, the clock starts ticking on that action’s 

effective date. Id. That date was September 30, 2012, which 

occurred much more than 45 days before Smith contacted the 

EEOC in February 2013.

Smith notes that this deadline can be extended if “she did not 

know and reasonably should not have [] known that the 

discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1614.105(a)(2). But she knew of both alleged discriminatory 

actions—the refusal to accommodate her request for a job with less 

screen time and the forced retirement—when they occurred. 

True, she asserts that she did not realize those actions were 

discriminatory until the end of January 2013, when she was denied 

Social Security Disability Insurance. Only then, she says, did she 

begin to research her other legal rights—such as her possible 

eligibility for disability retirement. Yet her failure to investigate her 

legal options sooner does not mean that she did not know that the 

Army had forced her into retirement or failed to accommodate her 

alleged disability. We therefore have no reason to excuse her 

failure to contact the EEOC within its 45-day time limit.

The district court’s dismissal is AFFIRMED. 

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