IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 3, 2017

IN RE TRAVIS H.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County

No. 16-00424 Dennis Roach, II, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2016-02250-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of: (1) failure to 

substantially comply with permanency plans; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a 

suitable home; (3) persistence of conditions, (4) abandonment by an incarcerated parent 

for wanton disregard; and (5) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to 

support. We vacate the trial court’s determination regarding the ground of abandonment 

by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to support, but otherwise affirm the trial 

court’s determinations regarding the remaining grounds for termination. We likewise 

affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Vacated in 

Part and Affirmed in Part

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Daniel Hellman, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Travis H.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jordan K. Crews, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

James D. Hutchins, Dandridge, Tennessee, Guardian ad Litem.

OPINION

Background

05/05/2017
- 2 -

The child at issue in this appeal was born in October 2013 to unmarried parents 

Travis H. (“Father”) and Bobbie S.S (“Mother”).1 On May 16, 2015, the child and his 

half-sister (“half-sister”)2 were removed from parents’ home due to allegations of 

nutritional neglect, drug exposure, and environmental neglect. On July 1, 2015, Father 

signed the Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights. On August 19, 

2015, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and they were 

placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). 

DCS developed three permanency plans for the child, all of which were ratified by 

the trial court. The first plan, developed in June 2015, required that Father obtain and 

maintain appropriate drug-free housing for a period of three to four months, have stable 

income and pay child support, have a means of transportation or a plan for transportation, 

complete parenting classes, obtain mental health and alcohol and drug assessments and 

follow all recommendations, and submit to random drug screens and pill counts. In 

addition, with regard to many of the requirements above, Father was required to submit 

proof that he had met these requirements to DCS. In the six months following the 

development of the plan, Father completed a mental health assessment and an alcohol and 

drug assessment. DCS alleges, however, that Father failed to follow the recommendations 

that resulted from the assessments or otherwise complete any of the plan’s additional 

requirements. The second plan, developed in September 2015, added only one additional 

requirement—that Father follow the recommendations of his mental health assessment. A 

final plan was developed in March 2016. This plan changed the goal from reunification to 

adoption, but did not alter Father’s responsibilities. 

In January 2016, Father was arrested on three counts of theft and thirteen counts of 

fraudulent use of a credit card. Father was eventually sentenced to eleven months, 

twenty-nine days, of which he served forty-five days in confinement. After Father’s 

release from confinement in February 2016, he was soon arrested on additional charges. 

First, Father was arrested in April 2016 for failure to pay child support. Father posted a 

$100.00 bond on this charge to secure his release. On or about May 3, 2016, Father was 

again arrested, this time for violating his probation. It appears from the record that Father 

was sentenced to thirty days with “two for ones.” Father was again arrested in June 2016 

for violating his probation and was sentenced to serve the remainder of his sentence. 

While incarcerated, Father was charged with an additional crime after he walked away 

from a work detail. It appears that Father was sentenced to serve sixty days consecutive 

for the crime of escape. Father also pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended license in 

July 2016. It appears Father was sentenced to six months incarceration for this crime, 

again consecutive to the violation of probation Father was serving at the time of the plea.

 

1

In termination of parental rights cases, it is the policy of this Court to remove the names of 

minor children and other parties in order to protect their identities.

2 The child and half-sister share the same mother but have different fathers.
- 3 -

In the meantime, on May 20, 2016, while Father was incarcerated, DCS filed a 

petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to substantially 

comply with permanency plans; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; 

(3) persistence of conditions, (4) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton 

disregard; (5) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to support; and 

(6) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to visit.3 DCS later 

withdrew its allegations concerning willful failure to visit. A trial occurred on September 

14, 2016. At the time of trial, Father remained incarcerated and was expected to be 

released in March 2017.

Mother, Father, the half-sister’s father, a DCS case worker, and the children’s 

Foster Mother testified at trial. Because this appeal only involves Father, we will only 

discuss the testimony that is relevant to his appeal. Father testified that DCS had been 

previously involved with the family due to marijuana use. The family at that time had 

participated in DCS Services, but, soon after DCS ceased involvement with the family, 

drug use again became an issue. Father admitted that the children had been removed from 

his home in May 2015 but denied that their removal was the result of his drug use. There 

is no dispute that Mother and two other persons living in the home at the time of the 

removal tested positive for illegal drugs. A drug screen performed on May 12, 2015, also 

showed that Father was positive for “BUP.”

4

Father testified, however, that he was 

prescribed Suboxone, a form of BUP, by a physician and that he only began taking the 

drug shortly after the removal of the children. According to Father, when he could no 

longer afford physician’s visits, he purchased his Suboxone from “the street.” Father also 

admitted that he tested positive for methamphetamine in August 2015 but claimed that he 

only used that drug once. Father likewise admitted to using marijuana when he was not 

incarcerated and that he had previously attended drug rehabilitation. A drug screen 

performed on Father in October 2015 showed that Father tested positive for marijuana. 

Father testified without dispute, however, that he had taken a drug screen the day of trial, 

which had come back “clean.”

Father testified that he was currently incarcerated with an anticipated release date 

of March 2017. Father stated, however, that he hoped to be released earlier if he is 

approved for drug court. According to Father, he was arrested in January 2016 on three 

theft charges, as well as thirteen fraudulent use of a credit card charges. Father had no 

criminal history prior to January 2016. Father also admitted that the credit card belonged 

to his sister. Eventually, Father pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 

 

3

The petition also sought the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the children, as 

well as the termination of parental rights of half-sister’s father. The trial court terminated 

Mother’s and the half-sister’s father’s parental rights, but they have not appealed. 

4 By “BUP” we assume that Father tested positive for buprenorphine, “a synthetic opioid 

agonist-antagonist . . . administered . . . for the relief of moderate to severe pain and . . . used . . . 

to treat opioid dependency.” Mosby’s Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, & Health Professions

258 (9th ed. 2013). 
- 4 -

eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, suspended to forty-five days. Father 

testified that he was released from jail in late February, only to return to jail in April for 

failure to pay child support. Father testified, however, that he was immediately released 

from incarceration after making a purge payment of $100.00, which Father testified 

represented ten $10.00 monthly payments based upon a previous child support order. In 

April, Father returned to jail for approximately fifteen days for a violation of probation. 

Father again returned to jail in June 2016, where he remained at the time of trial.

Father next testified regarding his efforts to pay support, establish a home, and 

meet his obligations under the permanency plans. Father acknowledged that he was 

aware of his requirements under the permanency plans. According to Father, he 

attempted to meet those requirements when he was not incarcerated. Father testified that 

prior to January 2016, he was employed at several different locations, but that he never 

had difficulty finding a job. According to Father, he used his income for rent, food, gas, 

and hygiene; the little money that was left over went toward attempting to find suitable 

housing and sometimes cigarettes. Father testified that prior to his current incarceration, 

he was attempting to get a job in roofing to maintain a more stable income for the child. 

Father testified that he put in two applications for housing but that he never heard back. 

As such, Father testified that he moved around considerably following the removal of the 

children. Father admitted that DCS was unable to perform a home study on at least one of 

the residences because he “never followed up with that.” The instability of Father’s 

housing had been ameliorated, however, according to Father, as he testified that he and 

the child would live in a home provided by his father upon his release from incarceration. 

Father also testified that, although he did complete both a mental health and an 

alcohol and drug assessment, he had been unable to complete the recommendations of 

either. Specifically, Father testified that he could not complete the requirements of the 

alcohol and drug assessment because he was incarcerated. With regard to the mental 

health assessment, Father testified that he refused the recommendation to be placed on 

medication management because he had witnessed others go through withdrawal after 

taking similar drugs. Father testified, however, that he would participate in counseling 

regarding his pain management. 

Katharyn Way, the child’s DCS caseworker, testified regarding her involvement in 

the case. Ms. Way had been involved with the case since the summer of 2015. According 

to Ms. Way, the children were removed from the home due to drug use by several adults 

in the home, the lack of utilities in the home, and questions regarding malnourishment of 

the child’s half-sister. Ms. Way testified regarding Father’s visits with the child. In 

general, Father made an effort to visit with the child prior to becoming incarcerated in 

January 2016. 
- 5 -

Ms. Way testified that she attempted to help Father obtain stable housing by 

giving Father a brochure of possible housing options and providing a letter for Father to 

attach to his housing applications. In addition, Ms. Way testified that she informed Father 

that DCS would help with rental payments once housing was secured. Because Father 

never provided proof to DCS that he had secured housing, however, this service was 

never used. Instead, Ms. Way testified that Mother and Father often informed her that 

they were moving or had recently moved. Often, the addresses provided to Ms. Way were 

inaccurate. As a result, Ms. Way was unable to perform a home study on any home that 

Father allegedly resided in. Ms. Way also testified that she had difficulty contacting 

Father, who had given her as many as eight different telephone numbers during her 

tenure on the case. 

Ms. Way testified that DCS developed three permanency plans for Father. After 

giving Father six months on each plan with Father making little to no progress, DCS 

decided to go forward with termination. Indeed, Ms. Way testified that Father’s living 

situation was worse at the time of trial than when the children were originally taken, as 

Father was now incarcerated. 

Foster Mother testified that the child and half-sister have been residing in the

home since July 28, 2015.5 According to Foster Mother, the child is doing well in the 

home. Although the child suffers from anxiety in large groups, Foster Mother testified 

that the child has bonded with the church family where her husband is a pastor. The child 

refers to Foster Mother and her husband as mommy and daddy. According to Foster 

Mother, the child has never asked about Father. Foster Mother further testified that it is 

her and her husband’s desire to have the children become permanent members of their 

home, either as legal guardians or by becoming approved to adopt the children. 

The trial court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the child. 

The trial court first noted that DCS conceded that they could not prove willful failure to 

visit at trial. The trial court concluded, however, that clear and convincing evidence of 

abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard was established, as 

Father had engaged in drug use and criminal activity throughout the child’s life, leading 

him to be incarcerated. Next, the trial court concluded that DCS had shown that Father 

failed to establish a suitable home for the child, given DCS’s evidence about the efforts 

its agents expended in helping Father to find a home and Father’s admissions that rather 

than find a home, he engaged in further criminal activity and failed to keep in touch with 

DCS concerning his living arrangements. The trial court also concluded that the ground 

of substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan had been met, as Father failed to 

obtain stable housing or employment and failed to follow the recommendations resulting 

from his mental health and alcohol and drug assessments. In addition, the trial court 

 

5

Foster Mother testified that she also provided temporary care for the child and half-sister for 

five days at the end of June 2015, but that the children did not begin to continuously reside in her home 

until late July. 
- 6 -

concluded that DCS had proven the ground of persistent conditions, in that Father had 

failed to remedy the lack of suitable home that led to the child’s removal and appears to 

have made little progress toward achieving the stability necessary to return the child to 

him. The trial court also found that Father failed to pay any support in the period of time 

from September 6, 2015, to January 6, 2016. Although the trial court noted that Father 

made a $100.00 payment in April 2016, the trial court determined that this payment was 

token. Finally, the trial court ruled that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in 

the child’s best interest. Father now appeals.

Issues Presented

Father presents five issues for our review, which are taken from his brief and 

reordered:

1. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was appropriate based upon the 

ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.

2. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was appropriate based upon the 

ground of abandonment by incarcerated parent by wanton disregard.

3. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was appropriate based upon the 

ground of abandonment by incarcerated parent for failure to support.

4. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was appropriate based upon the 

ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

5. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was appropriate based upon the 

ground of persistent conditions.

6. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to meet the clear and 

convincing standard that the termination was in the best interest of the 

child.

Analysis 

According to the Tennessee Supreme Court:

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the 

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected 

by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v. 

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 

(1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re 

Adoption of Female child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547–48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. 

Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578–79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although 
- 7 -

fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela 

E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty 

to protect minors . . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority 

as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent 

serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re 

Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky 

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. 

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522–23 (Tenn. 2016) (footnote omitted).

Our termination statutes identify “those situations in which the state’s interest in 

the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting 

forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 

S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B., Nos. M2004-00999-COAR3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 

2005)). A person seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the existence of 

one of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 

2003); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). 

Because of the fundamental nature of the parent’s rights and the grave 

consequences of the termination of those rights, courts must require a higher standard of 

proof in deciding termination cases. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. Consequently, both the 

grounds for termination and the best interest inquiry must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(c)(1); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 

546. Clear and convincing evidence “establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is 

highly probable . . . and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness 

of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2004). Such evidence “produces in a fact-finder’s mind a firm belief or 

conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established.” Id. at 653. 

As our supreme court opined:

The trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination 

of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d [387,] 

393 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)] (quoting In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 

S.W.3d [793], 810 [(Tenn. 2007)]). Additionally, all other questions of law 

in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

Carrington H., 2016 WL 819593, at *12. 
- 8 -

When the resolution of an issue in a case depends upon the truthfulness of 

witnesses, the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their 

manner and demeanor while testifying, is in a far better position than this Court to decide 

those issues. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1995); 

Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The weight, faith, 

and credit to be given to any witness’s testimony lies in the first instance with the trier of 

fact, and the credibility accorded will be given great weight by the appellate court. 

Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997). 

Accordingly, we must determine whether clear and convincing evidence in the 

record supports the grounds for termination found by the trial court. We begin first with 

abandonment. 

Grounds for Termination

Abandonment Generally

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) provides that abandonment 

may constitute a ground for termination. In turn, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

1-102(1)(A) provides various situations wherein abandonment may be found. Here, DCS 

pursued three types of abandonment against Father: (1) abandonment by failure to 

establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton 

disregard; and (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to pay 

support. We will first consider whether the ground of abandonment by failure to establish 

a suitable home was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

I.

According to section 36-1-102(1)(A):

For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a parent or 

parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in order to make

that child available for adoption, “abandonment” means that:

* * *

(ii) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or parents or 

the guardian or guardians as the result of a petition filed in the juvenile 

court in which the child was found to be a dependent and neglected child, 

as defined in § 37-1-102, and the child was placed in the custody of the 

department or a licensed child-placing agency, that the juvenile court 

found, or the court where the termination of parental rights petition is filed 

finds, that the department or a licensed child-placing agency made 

reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or that the circumstances 
- 9 -

of the child's situation prevented reasonable efforts from being made prior 

to the child's removal; and for a period of four (4) months following the 

removal, the department or agency has made reasonable efforts to assist the 

parent or parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home 

for the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians 

have made no reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have 

demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears 

unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an 

early date. The efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or 

guardian in establishing a suitable home for the child may be found to be 

reasonable if such efforts exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian 

toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is 

in the custody of the department; . . . .

A suitable home “requires more than a proper physical living location.” In re Hannah 

H., No. E2013-01211-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 

2014) (quoting State v. C.W., No. E2007-00561-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 4207941, at *3 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2007)). “It requires that the home be free of drugs and domestic 

violence.” Id. 

Here, the trial court found that the child was removed from Father’s home in May 

2015 due to malnutrition, lack of utilities, and drug use. Thereafter, the children were 

adjudicated dependent and neglected. The trial court further noted that DCS had 

attempted to assist Father in providing a suitable home in the four months following the 

child’s removal. Despite this help, the trial court found that Father had made little effort 

to establish a suitable home for himself and his child. Rather, he moved several times, 

providing inaccurate addresses to DCS on a number of occasions, all the while “living the 

lifestyle of a criminal” by using illegal drugs and engaging in criminal activity. Given 

that Father remained incarcerated at the time of trial, the trial court concluded that DCS 

established that Father failed to establish a suitable home. 

Nothing in the record preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact with 

regard to this ground. The record shows that the children were removed from Father’s 

home and adjudicated dependent and neglected as required by section 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii). 

Additionally, Father’s DCS caseworker, Ms. Way, testified that in the four months 

following the removal of the child, she drafted a letter for Father to use in applying for 

housing, as well as provided Father a resource guide for finding appropriate housing. 

According to the Ms. Way, Father would often state that he had stable housing but failed 

to disclose an accurate address where he was living, so no home study was ever able to be 

accomplished. Additionally, Ms. Way informed Father that DCS could help with rental 

payments once housing was secured. Because Father never provided any proof to DCS 

that he had secured housing beyond his multiple unsubstantiated claims, however, this 

assistance was never utilized. The evidence therefore does not preponderate against the 
- 10 -

trial court’s finding that DCS expended reasonable efforts in the four months following 

the child’s removal. Despite these efforts, the record is clear that Father has not 

established a home for the child; instead, he continued to engage in criminal behavior and 

drug use, leading him to be incarcerated at the time of trial. Even prior to Father’s current 

incarceration, he made little effort to establish a suitable home; instead, as Ms. Way’s 

testimony shows, Father moved frequently and failed to provide DCS with accurate 

addresses so that home studies could be conducted. 

In his brief, however, Father asserts that he undertook various efforts to establish a 

suitable home, including seeking better employment and putting applications in to 

various housing locations. Even taking this evidence as true, however, Father cannot 

deny that he continued to engage in criminal activity and drug use that prevented him and 

continues to prevent him from establishing a home for the child. Indeed, this Court has 

previously held that “[i]n parental rights matters, the court does not look to the 

protestations of affections and expressed intentions of the parent, but rather the parent’s 

course of conduct.” State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. J.M.F., No. E2003-03081-

COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 94465, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005). Here, the evidence 

concerning Father’s intentions therefore does not outweigh the evidence concerning 

Father’s conduct after the removal of the children, which illustrates that he made no 

reasonable effort toward establishing a suitable home for his child. The record therefore 

contains clear and convincing evidence to support this ground for termination.

Consequently, the trial court’s determination with regard to this ground is affirmed.

II.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(a)(iv) provides additional 

mechanisms by which abandonment may be proven when the parent is incarcerated at or 

shortly before the filing of the termination petition. Section 36-1-102(a)(iv) provides that 

abandonment may be shown by proving that:

A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an 

action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child, or the 

parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) 

months immediately preceding the institution of such action or proceeding, 

and either has willfully failed to visit or has willfully failed to support or 

has willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the 

child for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding such parent's 

or guardian's incarceration, or the parent or guardian has engaged in 

conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the 

welfare of the child. . . .

As stated by this Court in In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005):

The General Assembly’s decision to provide two additional tests for 

abandonment for incarcerated or recently incarcerated parents reflects, in 
- 11 -

part, the difficulties inherent in proving that a parent has willfully failed to 

visit or support a child for four consecutive months when the parent was 

incarcerated during all or part of that time. Incarceration necessarily 

restricts a prisoner’s freedom of movement, and many prisoners have no 

resources with which to continue paying child support once their crimes 

and resulting imprisonment have forced them to forfeit their regular jobs. 

Thus, the parent’s incarceration provides a ready-made excuse for his or her 

failure to visit or support the child during the four-month period made 

relevant by the first statutory definition of abandonment. However, the 

strong public interest in providing procedures for terminating the parental 

rights of unfit parents does not dissipate simply because a parent’s 

irresponsible conduct has reached the level of criminal behavior and 

incarceration.

* * *

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) also reflects the 

commonsense notion that parental incarceration is a strong indicator that 

there may be problems in the home that threaten the welfare of the child. 

Incarceration severely compromises a parent's ability to perform his or her 

parental duties. A parent’s decision to engage in conduct that carries with it 

the risk of incarceration is itself indicative that the parent may not be fit to 

care for the child. [James G. Dwyer,] Taxonomy of Children’s Rights, 11 

Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. [845,] at 958 [(2003)]. However, parental 

incarceration is not an infallible predictor of parental unfitness.

Id. at 865–66 (footnotes omitted).

Here, Father does not dispute that he was incarcerated at or in the four months 

preceding the filing of the termination petition. Rather, Father argues that clear and 

convincing evidence has not been shown to support either wanton disregard or willful 

failure to support under this definition. We begin with wanton disregard. 

A.

With regard to the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through 

wanton disregard, this Court has explained:

Incarceration alone is not conclusive evidence of wanton conduct 

prior to incarceration. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 866 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2005). Rather, “incarceration serves only as a triggering mechanism 

that allows the court to take a closer look at the child’s situation to 

determine whether the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is 

part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a 

risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child.” Id. The statutory 
- 12 -

language governing abandonment due to a parent’s wanton disregard for 

the welfare of a child “reflects the commonsense notion that parental 

incarceration is a strong indicator that there may be problems in the home 

that threaten the welfare of the child” and recognizes that a “parent’s 

decision to engage in conduct that carries with it the risk of incarceration is 

itself indicative that the parent may not be fit to care for the child.” Id.

Numerous cases have held that a parent’s previous criminal conduct, 

coupled with a history of drug abuse, constitutes a wanton disregard for the 

welfare of the child. See, e.g., State v. J.M.F., No. E2003-03081-COA-R3-

PT, 2005 WL 94465, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005); In re C. LaC., 

No. M2003-02164-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 533937, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Mar. 17, 2004); State v. Wiley, No. 03A01-9903-JV-00091, 1999 WL 

1068726, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1999); In the Matter of Shipley, 

No. 03A01-9611-JV-00369, 1997 WL 596281, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 

29, 1997). 

In re C.A.H., No. M2009-00769-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 5064953, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Dec. 22, 2009). 

Here, the trial court found that Father had engaged in illegal drug use as a late as 

August 2015. In addition, the trial court noted that Father had been arrested multiple 

times in 2016, for crimes ranging from theft, driving violations, escape from 

incarceration, and thirteen counts of fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court 

therefore concluded that the ground of wanton disregard had been shown by clear and 

convincing evidence. Father argues, however, that his criminal record does not extend to 

years prior to the children’s removal and his clean drug screen at trial illustrate that he did 

not exhibit wanton disregard for the child sufficient to support this ground for 

termination. 

Respectfully, we cannot agree. “[P]robation violations, repeated incarceration, 

criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to provide adequate support or 

supervision for a child can, alone or in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a 

wanton disregard for the welfare of a child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 867–68. 

Here, Father admitted to multiple arrests since the children were removed. Indeed, at the 

time of trial, Father was currently incarcerated due to a violation of his probation, driving 

on a suspended license, and escape. Although Father’s criminal history is not lengthy, he 

appears to have engaged in a multitude of criminal activity in just a short period of time. 

Moreover, all of Father’s charges occurred after the child was removed, when Father was 

supposed to be working toward reunification. Rather than making effort in this regard, 

Father chose to engage in theft and then could not abide by the conditions of his release, 

leading to his current incarceration. Father was well aware of what was required of him to

reunify with the child; instead, he chose to engage in criminal conduct that pushed that 

reunification date even further into the future with little regard for what that separation 

meant for the child. 
- 13 -

Additionally, Father’s clean drug screen at trial is of little relevance, as he was 

incarcerated at the time the drug screen was performed and admitted to using illegal 

drugs well after the removal of the children. Indeed, the record shows that DCS had 

previously been involved with the family due to drug use, but that Father and those living 

in the home soon returned to using drugs after DCS was no longer involved with the 

family. Father’s decision to use drugs when it was the very reason for DCS’s repeated 

involvement in the case shows that he had little regard to whether the drug use was likely 

to impact his child. Under these circumstances, we conclude that clear and convincing 

evidence in the record supports the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. 

B.

DCS also alleged that Father willfully failed to support the child under section 36-

1-102(1)(A)(iv). As previously discussed, section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) provides that 

abandonment may be proven by showing that the parent “has willfully failed to support 

or has willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for 

four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding such parent’s or guardian’s 

incarceration.” Accordingly, this Court must first determine the appropriate four-month 

period in which we must judge Father’s efforts to support the child. 

As is evident in this case, the determination of the proper four-month period is 

complicated by the fact that Father was in and out of jail in the months prior to the filing 

of the termination petition. The trial court in this case therefore utilized the first 

consecutive four month period prior to Father’s initial incarceration or September 6, 2015 

to January 6, 2016. In 2016, however, the Tennessee General Assembly amended 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102 to provide a different method of calculating 

the four-month period for purposes of determining willful failure to visit or support for an 

incarcerated parent. As Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(a)(iv) now explains:

If the four-month period immediately preceding the institution of the action 

or the four-month period immediately preceding such parent’s incarceration 

is interrupted by a period or periods of incarceration, and there are not four 

(4) consecutive months without incarceration immediately preceding either 

event, a four-month period shall be created by aggregating the shorter 

periods of nonincarceration beginning with the most recent period of 

nonincarceration prior to commencement of the action and moving back in 

time. Periods of incarceration of less than seven (7) days duration shall be 

counted as periods of nonincarceration. Periods of incarceration not 

discovered by the petitioner and concealed, denied, or forgotten by the 

parent shall also be counted as periods of nonincarceration. A finding that 

the parent has abandoned the child for a defined period in excess of four (4) 

months that would necessarily include the four (4) months of 
- 14 -

nonincarceration immediately prior to the institution of the action, but 

which does not precisely define the relevant four-month period, shall be 

sufficient to establish abandonment; . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(a)(iv), effective July 1, 2016. Because this amendment was 

applicable at the time of the final hearing on this cause, we believe it should have been 

applied in this case. Accordingly, rather than look to the first consecutive four-month 

period in which Father was not incarcerated, the trial court was required to determine the 

four-month period by piecing together Father’s periods of non-incarceration prior to the 

filing of the termination petition. In failing to utilize this calculation, it therefore appears 

that the trial court utilized an inappropriate four-month period. 

This Court has indicated that where the grounds of abandonment by an 

incarcerated parent for willful failure to support is properly alleged in the termination 

petition, but the trial court relied on the wrong four-month period, the “omission . . . 

require[s] us to [vacate and] remand for findings on that issue.” In re Abbigail C., No. 

E2015-00964-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 6164956, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015). 

Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s determination with regard to these grounds. 

State v. McBee, No. M2003-01326-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 239759, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2004) (noting that when a trial court fails to make findings of fact on an issue “we 

cannot simply review the record de novo and determine for ourselves where the 

preponderance of the evidence lies”). As discussed throughout this Opinion, however, 

other grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. In addition, as discussed, infra, 

we have affirmed the trial court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. Thus, a determination that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the 

grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through failure to visit and support is 

not necessary to uphold the termination of Father’s parental rights. Under these 

circumstances, remanding for reconsideration of these grounds would only further 

prolong these proceedings without altering the outcome. Accordingly, we decline to 

remand this issue to the trial court for reconsideration. See In re Abbigail C., No. E2015-

00964-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 6164956, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015) (vacating 

but not remanding under similar circumstances).

Substantial Non-Compliance with Permanency Plans

DCS also alleged that a ground for termination existed under Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2), which provides a ground for termination where 

“[t]here has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement 

of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, 

part 4[.]” Further, Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-2-403 provides, in relevant part:

Substantial noncompliance by the parent with the statement of 

responsibilities provides grounds for the termination of parental rights, 

notwithstanding other statutory provisions for termination of parental 
- 15 -

rights, and notwithstanding the failure of the parent to sign or to agree to 

such statement if the court finds the parent was informed of its contents, 

and that the requirements of the statement are reasonable and are related to 

remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care placement. 

The determination of whether there has been substantial noncompliance with a 

permanency plan is a question of law, to be reviewed on appeal de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 548 (Tenn. 2002). 

Termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2) 

“requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the 

permanency plan.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). To 

succeed under section 36-1-113(g)(2), DCS “must demonstrate first that the requirements 

of the permanency plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that 

caused the child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place.” In re M.J.B., 

140 S.W.3d at 656–57 (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 547; In re L.J.C., 124 

S.W.3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). Second, DCS must show that “the parent’s 

noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance 

of the particular requirement that has not been met.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 657 

(citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548–49; In re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-

JV, 2003 WL 21266854, at * 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2003)).

The record on appeal contains three permanency plans ratified by the trial court. 

Each plan contains a statement of responsibilities applicable to Father, which are largely 

identical across all three plans. Specifically, Father was required to participate in an 

alcohol and drug assessment and follow recommendations, maintain safe, stable, drugfree housing and provide proof to DCS thereof, to attend parenting classes and provide 

proof to DCS of completion, to submit to random drug screens and pill counts, have a 

means of transportation or a plan for transportation, obtain and maintain stable 

employment and provide proof to DCS, and to participate in a mental health assessment 

and follow recommendations. 

Here, Father does not dispute that he was informed of his requirements under the 

various permanency plans. Father also does not argue that the requirements of the 

permanency plans were unreasonable or unrelated to the conditions that caused the child 

to be removed from the home. Rather, Father argues that he substantially complied with 

the applicable permanency plans by completing alcohol and drug and mental health 

assessments, participating in parenting classes, and establishing that he had “ready access 

to housing.” Father also cites the fact that he tested negative for illegal substances on the 

date of trial. 

The trial court agreed that Father had completed drug/alcohol and mental health 

assessments, as well as parenting classes. The trial court disagreed, however, that these 

actions constituted compliance with the permanency plans, as Father failed to follow the 
- 16 -

recommendations from the assessments, failed to establish a suitable home, and was 

incarcerated due to criminal activity at the time of trial. 

Based on the record before us, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial 

court’s findings of fact with regard to this ground. As previously discussed, Father had 

not established a suitable home at the time of trial, much less provided DCS with proof of 

such. Indeed, even taking Father’s unsubstantiated testimony that he could secure 

appropriate housing upon his release from incarceration, there is simply no evidence that 

Father ever provided documentation to DCS to support his claims. Instead, the record 

shows that Father often provided inaccurate addresses to DCS, which prevented DCS 

from performing a home study on Father’s various homes throughout the proceedings. 

Additionally, Father admitted that he abused illegal drugs even after the removal of the 

child and points to only a single clean drug screen as evidence that he no longer abuses 

drugs. This drug screen, however, was performed while Father had been incarcerated for 

several months. Because of Father’s incarceration, he was also unable to obtain and 

maintain stable employment. 

While we agree with Father that he did complete parenting classes and 

assessments, evidence also shows that Father failed to follow the recommendations from 

the assessments. For example, Father testified that as a result of his mental health 

assessment, it was recommended that Father be placed on medication. Father flatly 

refused this advice, in clear violation of his responsibilities under the permanency plans. 

In addition, Father admitted that he was unable to complete the recommendations from 

the mental health assessment because he was soon sent back to jail. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Father’s 

noncompliance with the permanency plans was substantial. 

Persistence of Conditions

Finally, DCS alleged that Father’s parental rights should be terminated based upon 

persistence of conditions. Persistence of conditions requires the trial court to find, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that:

The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by 

order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other conditions 

that in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be 

subjected to further abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the 

child’s safe return to the care of the parent(s) or guardian(s), still 

persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at 

any early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent(s) 

or guardian(s) in the near future; and
- 17 -

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship 

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a 

safe, stable and permanent home.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).

“A parent’s continued inability to provide fundamental care to a child, even if not 

willful, . . . constitutes a condition which prevents the safe return of the child to the 

parent’s care.” In re A.R., No. W2008-00558-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4613576, at *20 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008) (citing In re T.S. & M.S., No. M1999-01286-COA-R3-

CV, 2000 WL 964775, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2000)). The failure to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal need not be willful. In re T.S. & M.S., 2000 WL 

964775, at *6 (citing State Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Smith, 785 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 

1990)). “Where . . . efforts to provide help to improve the parenting ability, offered over a 

long period of time, have proved ineffective, the conclusion is that there is little 

likelihood of such improvement as would allow the safe return of the child to the parent 

in the near future is justified.” Id. The purpose behind the “persistence of conditions” 

ground for terminating parental rights is “to prevent the child’s lingering in the uncertain 

status of foster child if a parent cannot within a reasonable time demonstrate an ability to 

provide a safe and caring environment for the child.” In re A.R., No. W2008-00558-

COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 461675, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008) (quoting In re 

D.C.C., No. M2007-01094-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 588535, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 

2008)).

In this case, it is undisputed that the child was removed from Father’s care by an 

order of dependency and neglect for over six months. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(3). As such, the trial court concluded that clear and convincing evidence 

supported the ground of persistent conditions, noting that Father remained incarcerated 

due to engaging “in a series of crimes in 2016,” did not have stable living arrangements 

prior to his incarceration, has not paid significant child support for the child, and had not 

followed the recommendations of his mental health assessment and alcohol drug 

assessment. Because the trial court concluded that these factors were unlikely to be 

remedied at an early date and continuing a relationship with Father prevented the child 

from integrating into a suitable and permanent home, the trial court concluded that the 

ground of persistence of conditions had been shown by clear and convincing evidence. 

Father argues on appeal, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that 

clear and convincing evidence supports this ground. Specifically, Father again points to 

his clean drug screen at the time of trial as evidence that there are no longer “drug and 

alcohol concerns.” Father also cites his testimony concerning the stable home he 

anticipates once he is released from incarceration and his completion of parenting classes. 
- 18 -

Again, however, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports this 

ground for termination. First, we cannot agree that Father’s single clean drug screen at 

the time of trial is sufficient to show that he is likely to stop using drugs in the future, as 

Father was incarcerated at the time of trial and therefore unable to use drugs. Indeed, this 

Court has previously recognized that the cessation of drug use while a parent is 

incarcerated is insufficient to show that the parent’s drug issues have been put behind him 

or her. See In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (“Although 

Mother testified that she has not used cocaine since February 26, 2015, this cessation was 

unquestionably aided by the fact that she became incarcerated the following day and was 

incarcerated through trial.”). Additionally, Father admitted at trial that he had previously 

attended drug rehabilitation, only to again engage in illegal drugs during the events at 

issue in this case. Indeed, despite the fact that Father was aware that drug use was a 

reason that his child was removed from his home, he continued to use illegal drugs even 

after the removal. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the concerns regarding 

Father’s drug use have been remedied so as to allow the child to return to the home at this 

time. 

Furthermore, regardless of Father’s testimony concerning his anticipated housing 

upon his release from incarceration, there can be no dispute that Father was unable to 

provide a home for the child at the time of trial because he remained incarcerated. Indeed, 

as Ms. Way testified at trial, rather than remedy the conditions that led to the removal of 

the child, Father’s own decision to engage in criminal behavior resulting in his 

incarceration has made Father’s situation even less hospitable for the child. Because of 

Father’s incarceration and ongoing concerns regarding his ability to find a suitable home 

for the child and to refrain from engaging in further criminal activity or drug use, we 

cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that the child could not be 

successfully reintegrated into Father’s life at an early date. The trial court’s determination 

regarding persistence of conditions is therefore affirmed. 

Best Interest

When at least one ground for termination of parental rights has been established, 

the petitioner must then prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the 

parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 192 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). When a parent has been found to be unfit (upon establishment of 

ground(s) for termination of parental rights), the interests of parent and child diverge. In 

re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 877. The focus shifts to the child’s best interest. Id. 

Because not all parental conduct is irredeemable, Tennessee’s termination of parental 

rights statutes recognize the possibility that terminating an unfit parent’s parental rights is 

not always in the child’s best interest. Id. However, when the interests of the parent and 

the child conflict, courts are to resolve the conflict in favor of the rights and best interest 

of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d). Further, “[t]he child’s best interest must be 

viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 

194.
- 19 -

The Tennessee Legislature has codified certain factors that courts should consider 

in ascertaining the best interest of the child in a termination of parental rights case. These 

factors include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s 

best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to affect a lasting adjustment 

after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such 

duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear 

possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or 

other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent 

or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or 

psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult 

in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is 

healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether 

there is such use of alcohol or controlled substances as may render the 

parent or guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and 

stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status 

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with 

the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 

36-5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). This Court has noted that, “this list [of factors] is not 

exhaustive, and the statute does not require a trial court to find the existence of each 

enumerated factor before it may conclude that terminating a parent’s rights is in the best 
- 20 -

interest of a child.” In re M. A. R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 

Depending on the circumstances of an individual case, the consideration of a single factor 

or other facts outside the enumerated, statutory factors may dictate the outcome of the 

best interest analysis. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 877. As explained by this Court: 

Ascertaining a child’s best interests does not call for a rote examination of 

each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)’s nine factors and then a 

determination of whether the sum of the factors tips in favor of or against 

the parent. The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the 

unique facts of each case. Thus, depending upon the circumstances of a 

particular child and a particular parent, the consideration of one factor may 

very well dictate the outcome of the analysis. 

In re Audrey S., 182 S .W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

Here, the trial court found that Father had not made an adjustment of 

circumstances despite efforts by DCS to assist him and that it was unreasonable to 

conclude that Father would be able to make such an adjustment in the near future. In 

addition, the trial court found that the child is well-adapted to his stable, pre-adoptive 

home. Finally, the trial court found that changing caretakers at this stage would likely 

have a negative impact on the child. 

Father argues, however, that clear and convincing evidence does not illustrate that 

termination is in the child’s best interest, citing again his single negative drug screen 

taken on the day of trial, his testimony regarding his anticipated housing, and his ability 

to obtain employment. Respectfully, however, we conclude that clear and convincing 

evidence supports a determination that termination is in the child’s best interest. Based 

upon the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Father has struggled to make an adjustment 

of circumstances, conduct, or conditions so as to make it safe and in the child’s best 

interest to be in his care. First, as previously discussed, Father’s single negative drug 

screen while incarcerated is insufficient to show that he has made an adjustment of 

circumstances that would allow the child to be returned to him. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-1-113(i)(1). Indeed, Father admitted that DCS had previously been involved with the 

family due to drug use in the past and that he had previously attended drug rehabilitation, 

all to no avail, as the children were thereafter removed, in part, due to drug use in the 

home. Instead of remedying the conditions that led to the child’s removal by working to 

complete his requirements under the permanency plan, Father thereafter chose to engage 

in criminal conduct that made reunification even less likely. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(i)(7).

Father’s incarceration provides another barrier to reunification, as it prevents him 

from providing a safe and stable home for the child, despite DCS’s efforts. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2). Indeed, Father’s testimony that he will have stable housing 

upon his release from incarceration is not persuasive, as Father repeatedly made similar 
- 21 -

claims to Ms. Way throughout this case, all the while failing to provide any proof that 

those claims were substantiated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(7). 

Although Father does appear to have maintained visitation with the child during 

the brief periods that he was not incarcerated, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(3), we 

note that the evidence in the record supports a finding that no meaningful relationship 

exists between Father and the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(4). Here, the 

child was removed from Father’s custody when he was not yet two years old. According 

to Foster Mother, the child has never inquired about Father and refers to herself and her 

husband as his parents. Given that the child is bonded to Foster Mother and her husband 

and appears to be thriving in their care, we agree with the trial court that a change in 

caretakers at this point would have a detrimental effect on the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 36-1-113(i)(5). Consequently, we agree with the trial court that clear and convincing 

proof establishes that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the Jefferson County Juvenile Court is vacated in part and 

affirmed in part. The termination of Father’s parental rights is affirmed. This cause is 

therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as may be necessary and are 

consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Travis H., for 

which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE