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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

 v.

JAZANE DAVID BROWN, and

MONIQUE DESIREE DUNCAN,

each of them,

Appellants.

 No. 84169-6-I

 (consolidated with 

 84248-0-I)

 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

COBURN, J. — After each pleading guilty to three counts of theft in the third 

degree and agreeing to pay restitution in full but disputing the amount, Monique Duncan 

and Jazane Brown, co-defendants, appeal their restitution orders. They claim a lack of

a causal connection between the losses and the crimes, that the court could only 

impose a maximum amount of restitution that was referenced in their guilty plea 

statements, and that their restitution amount violated their federal and state 

constitutional rights under the excessive fines, due process, and equal protection 

clauses. Substantial evidence supports a causal connection between the losses and 

the crimes, the equal protection claim is not ripe, and appellants waived the remainder 

of their claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
No. 84169-6-I/2

2

FACTS

The State initially charged Brown and Duncan each with organized retail theft in 

the first degree and also charged Brown with assault in the fourth degree. The theft 

charge was based on three different incidents that occurred at a Home Depot store in 

July, August, and September of 2019. The same loss prevention officer (LPO)

observed the thefts, unsuccessfully attempted to stop Brown and Duncan, and reported 

the thefts to police. The certifications of probable cause identified the value of the 

losses to be $4,416.20 (July), $7,363.95 (August), and $6,864.37 (September). 

Following plea negotiations, Brown and Duncan, in separate plea hearings,

pleaded guilty to three counts of theft in the third degree by way of second amended 

informations for the same July, August, and September thefts. For each of the incident 

dates, Duncan’s statement of guilt stated, “I entered Home Depot in Redmond . . . and I 

did take property from Home Depot in an amount not exceeding $750 and with the 

intent to deprive Home Depot of said property.” For each incident, Brown’s statement of 

guilt stated, “I entered Home Depot in Redmond . . . and I did take property from Home 

Depot in an amount not exceeding $750 and with the intent to deprive Home Depot of 

that property.” 

Brown and Duncan each agreed that the “defendant shall pay restitution in full to 

the victim(s) on charged counts” and “agrees to pay restitution in the specific amount of 

$TBD” and also agreed to pay the victim penalty assessment (VPA). Both Brown and 

Duncan stipulated that “the facts set forth in the certification(s) for determination of 

probable cause and prosecutor’s summary are real and material facts for purposes of 

this sentencing.” The probable cause certifications delineated the items taken and their 
No. 84169-6-I/3

3

value. At both plea hearings, the courts noted that the amount of restitution was yet to 

be determined. 

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend no additional jail 

time than what had already been served, unsupervised probation, and no additional 

legal financial obligations other than the mandatory VPA and restitution with the amount 

to be determined. 

Brown and Duncan each had separate sentencing hearings with different judges, 

who followed the agreed sentencing recommendation. Parties in both hearings agreed

that the amount of restitution would be determined at a future hearing. Both defendants 

waived their appearances at the future restitution hearing. 

Restitution hearings were held at different times in front of different judges and 

both Duncan and Brown were not present for the hearings. The State provided the 

same supporting restitution documents before each court. The documentation included 

reports from the LPO signed under penalty of perjury, copies of receipts, photographs, 

incident reports, and a transcription of a defense interview with the LPO who witnessed 

all three theft incidents. In the interview, the LPO explained that he determined what 

was taken based on a combination of direct observation, viewing security video footage, 

and working with coworkers to check the daily inventory of the items that were taken. 

The State requested a total of $18,644 in restitution in each hearing consistent with the 

initial amounts listed in the certifications of probable cause, and the trial court imposed 

that amount jointly and severally. Defense counsel in both hearings challenged the 

State’s evidence, but did not argue that the court was limited to a maximum of $750 in 
No. 84169-6-I/4

4

restitution on each count.1 Nor did defense counsel raise any constitutional claims. 

Brown and Duncan separately appealed. A clerk of this court then consolidated 

their appeals. Following consolidation, Brown and Duncan each filed notices adopting

each other’s claims identified in their respective briefs.

DISCUSSION

The amount of a restitution award is within the court’s discretion and will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse. State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965, 

195 P.3d 506 (2008). A court’s authority to impose restitution is statutory. Id. Under 

RCW 9.94A.753(5), restitution shall be ordered “whenever the offender is convicted of 

an offense which results in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property. . .” 

Restitution also “shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of 

property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages 

resulting from injury” and “shall not exceed double the amount of the offender’s gain or 

the victim’s loss from the commission of the crime.” RCW 9.94A.753(3)(a). While the 

claimed loss need not be established with specific accuracy, it must be supported by 

substantial credible evidence. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 965. 

The trial court is allowed considerable discretion in determining restitution. State 

v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 282, 119 P.3d 350 (2005). We review a court’s factual 

findings for substantial evidence. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 965. “Substantial evidence 

exists if the record contains evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational 

 1 The judge in Brown’s restitution hearing questioned whether there was any case law 

supporting that it could impose more than $750 in restitution on each count. The prosecutor 

explained that restitution was only limited by the facts themselves, not based on the level of 

crime to which the defendant pled. Defense counsel stated that she was not aware of any 

contrary authority. The trial court invited defense counsel to submit a motion for reconsideration 

if she could find legal authority holding otherwise. No motion was submitted.
No. 84169-6-I/5

5

person of the truth of the declared premise.” State v. Lowery, 15 Wn. App. 2d 129, 138, 

475 P.3d 505 (2020).

To support an order of restitution there must be a causal connection between the 

losses and the crimes charged. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 966 (citing State v. Tobin, 161 

Wn.2d 517, 524, 166 P.3d 1167 (2007)). Losses are causally connected if, but for the 

charged crime, the victim would not have incurred the loss. Id. “In determining whether 

a causal connection exists, we look to the underlying facts of the charged offense, not 

the name of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea.” Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 

966; see State v. Selland, 54 Wn. App. 122, 124, 772 P.2d 534 (1989) (holding that 

restitution is not limited by the definition of the crime of which defendant was convicted). 

When a defendant disputes a restitution amount, the State must prove the damages by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d at 285. 

Appellants contend that the restitution order must be vacated because the State 

did not prove a causal connection between appellants’ crimes and the specific amount 

of losses incurred by Home Depot. We disagree.

Specifically, they argue that the State failed to establish what the store inventory 

was prior to the theft and that the LPO only conducted an inventory audit for the 

September incident as reflected in his police statement. However, in the LPO’s defense 

interview, he explained that the store evaluates the on-hand inventory daily. He further 

explained that “whenever I go back and do an inventory search in – in this manner, I go 

and I look and see what, exactly, we have on stock, of that particular SKU. Then I 

partner with an associate, to see what inventory states on our first phone. And I back 

and I double check and verify and we – we both walk through it. We both validate what’s 
No. 84169-6-I/6

6

exactly there and what’s missing. That’s how I was able to come up with the particular 

item number.” He added, “I do not over estimate. I only estimated what I actually 

witnessed being removed from the shelf and placed into the bag.” The record 

establishes that the LPO or coworkers were able to observe defendants working 

together in removing items from the shelves or retaining those items. The LPO also 

identified the items and compared the store’s daily on-hand inventory to determine the 

value of the stolen merchandise. Substantial evidence supported a causal connection 

between the crimes and the losses incurred. The State proved Home Depot’s damages 

by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellants next contend that the maximum restitution the court could impose was 

$2,250 because each defendant pleaded guilty to taking property in an amount not 

exceeding $750 during each of the thefts. The State contends that appellants did not 

preserve this claim. 

“As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first 

time on appeal.” State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 332-33, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). A 

party may claim an error for the first time on appeal if it concerns “(1) lack of trial court 

jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, [or] (3) 

manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a). 

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, restitution 

is “‘part of an offender’s sentence.’” State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 155, 110 P.3d 

192 (2005) (quoting State v. Edelman, 97 Wn. App. 161, 166, 984 P.2d 421 (1999)). A 

defendant waives the right to challenge an alleged sentencing error for the first time on 

appeal if the error involves agreement to facts or the exercise of discretion. State v. 
No. 84169-6-I/7

7

Cosgaya-Alvarez, 172 Wn. App. 785, 790, 291 P.3d 939 (2013) (citing In re Pers. 

Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 874, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)). However, defendants 

can challenge a legal error in a sentence for the first time on appeal. Id. (citations 

omitted).

Whether appellants agreed to pay for losses in excess of $750 per count is a 

question of fact that they did not raise below. Thus, appellants waived this claim and 

did not establish a basis for review under RAP 2.5(a).2 

However, appellants also contend that the court did not have the authority to 

impose a restitution amount greater than the definition of the crime. Defendants’ 

statement of guilt reflected the definition of theft in the third degree. RCW 9A.56.050(a) 

provides that a “person is guilty of theft in the third degree if he or she commits theft of 

property or services which . . . does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars in value.” 

Because this claim is an alleged legal error, they can raise it for the first time on appeal.

Cosgaya-Alvarez, 172 Wn. App. at 790.

Appellants cite to State v. Taylor, 86 Wn. App. 442, 936 P.2d 1218 (1997) to 

support their proposition that restitution can be limited to the definition of the crime. 

However, Taylor did not involve a plea of guilty. A jury had to decide if the defendant 

committed welfare fraud in the first degree or the lesser included offense of welfare 

fraud in the second degree for receiving between $250 and $1,500 benefits. Id. at 444. 

 2 Because this claim is waived, we need not address the State’s argument that 

appellants are bound by their plea agreement where they agreed to pay restitution to the victim 

“in full” and the State’s request for specific performance. RAP 2.5(a). A plea agreement is a

contract between the State and the defendant. State v. Wiatt, 11 Wn. App. 2d 107, 111, 455 

P.3d 1176 (2019) (citing State v. MacDonald, 183 Wn.2d 1, 8, 346 P.3d 748 (2015)). “After a 

party breaches the plea agreement, the nonbreaching party may either rescind or specifically 

enforce it.” Wiatt, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 111 (citing State v. Armstrong, 109 Wn. App. 458, 462,

P.3d 397 (2001)). 
No. 84169-6-I/8

8

The jury convicted Taylor of the lesser charge, but the court ordered restitution for 

$9,074, based on alleged facts that supported welfare fraud in the first degree. Id. We 

reversed the restitution order because the jury, the fact-finder, had to have determined 

that Taylor only benefited between $250 and $1,500 in benefits because of the guilty 

finding as to the lesser charge instead of welfare fraud in the first degree. Id. at 446.

The Taylor court acknowledged that “restitution is not necessarily limited by the 

definition of the crime,” but that the issue in Taylor was that “the jury’s verdict” did not 

establish an underlying criminal act that could serve as the basis for a restitution award 

greater than $1,500. Id. at 445. Taylor is inapposite. The courts in the instant cases 

did not exceed their authority in ordering restitution in the amount of $2,250.

Appellants next contend for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated the 

excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

article I, § 14 of the Washington Constitution because the court did not consider their 

lack of ability to pay when ordering the victim penalty assessment and restitution with a 

12 percent annual interest rate.3 

While a party may raise a claimed error for the first time when error affects a 

constitutional right, that error must be manifest. RAP 2.5(a). A “manifest” error is one 

that causes “actual prejudice.” State v. Ramos, 24 Wn. App. 2d 204, 214, 520 P.3d 65, 

72 (2022), review denied, 101512-7, 2023 WL 2400403 (Wash. Mar. 8, 2023). Actual 

prejudice means “the claimed error had practical and identifiable consequences.” State 

v. Shelton, 194 Wn. App. 660, 675, 378 P.3d 230 (2016). Appellants cannot establish a 

manifest error affecting a constitutional right. 

 3 Restitution allows for the “maximum rate” permitted by statute. RCW 10.82.090(1); 

RCW 4.56.110(6); RCW 19.52.020(1).
No. 84169-6-I/9

9

We recently held, once again, that the mandatory VPA is “‘neither 

unconstitutional on its face nor as applied to indigent defendants.”’ State v. Griepsma, 

No. 83720-6-l, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2023) (quoting State v. Curry, 118 

Wn.2d 911, 918, 829 P.2d 166 (1992)),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/837206.pdf; see State v. Tatum, 23 Wn. App. 2d 

123, 130-31, 514 P.3d 763 (rejecting an excessive fines challenge to the VPA, 

explaining that we are bound by Curry), review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1021, 520 P.3d 977 

(2022); Ramos, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 214 (“As this court explained in Tatum, we are bound 

by [Curry’s] holding here.”). We also recently held that restitution is inherently 

proportional to the crime even if the defendant lacks the ability to pay. Ramos, 24 Wn.

App. 2d at 230. Additionally, we held that “[b]ecause the legislature did not intend for 

interest to be a penalty, and because interest accruing on restitution is paid to crime 

victims rather than to the government, interest on restitution awards is not punishment 

and not subject to an excessive fines clause analysis under the Eighth Amendment or 

article I, § 14.” Id. at 228. Because appellants’ claimed errors are not manifest, they 

are waived. 

Appellants further contend for the first time on appeal that the 12 percent interest 

on restitution violates their constitutional rights4 to substantive due process and equal 

protection because the courts did not inquire whether appellants had the ability to pay. 

This constitutional challenge requires further factual development, and the potential risk 

of hardship does not justify review before the relevant facts are fully developed. See

 4 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12; 

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
No. 84169-6-I/10

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Shelton, 194 Wn. App. at 672. Because nothing in the record indicates the State has 

attempted to enforce the imposed restitution or sanction for failure to pay, appellants’ 

constitutional challenges are not ripe for review. RAP 2.5(a)(3). 

We affirm. 

WE CONCUR: