## In the Court of Appeals Second App ellate District of Texas

at Fo rt Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 20

- 00115

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018

- 009345

- 1

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ. Memorand um Opinion by Justi ce Walker 

### W ILBERT 

### C LEWIS 

### , Appellant

V



### . V ALENCIA 

### A PARTMENTS D 

### / B 

### / A 

### M EDERA 

### R ESIDENTIAL 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OP INION
P ro se a ppellant Wilbert C lewis lost his justice court case aga inst a ppellee
Valen cia Apartments d/b/a Medera Residential and appealed de novo to the c ounty

c ourt at l aw, which dismiss e d his claims for want of jurisdiction. We affirm. Subject

- matter jurisdiction is essential to a court ’ s authority to decide a case

. Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd. , 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018)

. S tand ing is a component of subject

- matter jurisdiction

. Id. It may b e rais ed for the first time on appeal , and a court may

— and if in doubt , m ust

— raise standing on its own at any
time. Id

. Standing canno t be waived, and it requ ires a plaintiff to plea d facts
demonstratin g that he

— and not a third party

— h as su ffered a con cr ete in jury , that
there is a causal connection between the injury and the defendant ’ s con duct, and that

t here is a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court

. Id. at
484

– 85. Standing is a constitutional prer equ is i te to maint ain ing su it

. Tex. De p ’ t of Transp. v . Sunset Val

ley , 146 S.W.3d 6 37, 6 46 (Tex. 2004). W ithout standing, a case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction

. Se e , e.g. , Ellis v. Wildcat Creek Wind Farm
LLC , No. 02

- 20

- 0005 0

- CV, 2021 WL 1134416, a t *1 , *3, *8 ( Tex. A pp.

— Fort Worth Mar. 25, 2021 , no pet.) (

mem. op.) (vacating trial court ’ s judgment when appellants failed to demonstrate standing and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction without reaching arguments on the merits ).
The record b e fore us here r efle ct s that i n June 2015, J ohn Coleman , Lena Wiggins, and Har old Wiggins (collectively, the R esidents) signed a lease for apartment3

n umber 1322 in a complex owned by Medera

. The R esidents paid a securit y deposit of $429.50, and the lea se t h ey sign ed stated, “ Security

- deposit refund check and any
dedu ction i temi zations will be by . . . one check jointly payable to all [R] esidents and mailed to any one [R] esident [ Medera] choose [s] ” and that the R e sidents would be
mailed the secur ity

- de po sit r efund , less lawful deductions and an itemized accounting of any deductions, no later than 30 days after surrender or abandonment of the
apartment unless otherwise provided by law.
On July 29, 2016 , Med era sent Coleman a lette r stating that it s r ec ords
i n dicated that he had vacated the apartment on July 9, 2 01 6 , and that Medera was
refu nding $95.29 of his $42 9.50 security deposit. Medera ’ s letter reflected the following items had been deducted fr om that deposit: $41 .14 for rent , $20

. 42 fo r water, $28.16 for waste wa ter, $1.50 for trash, and $242.99 for d ama ges. 1

1 Unde r the Pro perty Code, i f the landlord retains all or part of a security deposit, the landlord shall g ive to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any,

“ tog ether with a wri tt en descrip tion and i temized list of all deductions. ” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.104 ( c). However, the landlord is not required to g ive the tenant a description and itemized list of de ducti ons if the tenant ow es rent when he surre nder s pos session of the p re mises and there is n o controversy concerning the amount of rent owed. Id.4

Clewis , who is not an attorney, 2 sued Medera twice in the justice court , 3 both
times seeking recovery of funds w ithheld from the R esident s ’ security deposit

. 4 Nothing in the record before us sh ows that Clewis had standing to bring a claim fo r the return of a security d eposit belong ing to third parties. Cf. Meyers , 548 S.W.3 d

at 484

– 85

. The trial court d ismissed Clewis ’ s claim s against Meder a for la ck of jurisdiction. Although the order pu rp orts to grant Medera ’ s plea to the jurisdiction, in which Medera argued that Clewis ’ s appeal from the justice court to the county court at law was untimely, the record reflects that Medera ’ s plea to the jurisdiction should not have

2 See , e .g. , Clewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. , No. 2

- 08

- 184

- CV, 2009 WL 2414377, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2009, no pet.) (m em. op. on reh ’ g ) ( “ Because Wilber t [Cl ewis] is not an at torney, he may not represent [his wife] Ro se Mary on appeal. ” ).

3 Clewis did not appeal from the first justice court judgment , which was signed on September 25, 2017.

4 According to other documents c ontained in the record, the Residents a re Clewis ’ s sibl in gs. But w hile a no n

- attorney pro se party may represent h i mself, he gener ally may not represent another p a rty
. See Tex. R. Civ . P . 7 ( stating that “ [a] ny part y to a suit may appear and prose cut e or defend his rights therein, either in p erson or by an a tt orney of the court ” (emphasis a dded) ) ; Tex. R. Civ . P. 500. 4(a) (stating t hat an individual in j ustice c ou r t may represent himself, may be represented by an authorized agent in an evi ction cas e, or may be represent ed by an attorney); Kuns toplast of Am., In c. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA , 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Te x. 1996) (stat ing that an individ ua l must appear in person or by an attorney ) ; Paselk v. Rabun , 293 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.

—

Texarkana 2009, pet. denied) ( “ Although a layperson h as th e right to re present [him] sel [f] , a layperson does not have the right to r epresent others. ” )

.5

be en granted because C le wis timely filed his appeal de novo

. 5 However, the record
also shows that the trial court did not err by dismissing Clewis ’ s c laim s for lack of jurisdiction because Clewis lacked standing to bring them

. 6
Ac cordingly, the trial court did no t err by dis m i s sing Clewis ’ s c laims

. Without reaching the merits of the parties ’ arguments , we delete the in ac curate portions of the
trial court ’ s ju dgment referring to Medera ’ s plea to the jurisdiction a nd affirm the
dismissal j udgment as modified

. See Tex. R. App. P . 43.2(b ).

5 In its pl ea to the jurisdicti on , M edera bas ed its argument on the da y Clewis ’ s notice of app eal was file

- marked by the justice court , not on the day it wa s mai led

. Cf. T ex . R. Civ. P. 500 .5(b) ( justice

- court mailbox rul e). C lewis pointed this out in hi s response to the plea and attached the certified mail re cei pt showing that he had placed his notice of ap pe al in the mail by the due date

. See id. A fte r a hea ring on Med er a ’ s plea to th e jurisdiction , a t which M edera ’ s counsel acknowled ged that Clewis “ ha[d] proper ly perfected the appeal , ” the case proceeded , and Medera moved fo r summary judgment

.

6 After Medera prevailed in the justice court, Clewis file d an appeal de n ov o in the county court at law an d t hen attempted to amend his pleadings t o include a claim for breach of lease and breach of a “ Conciliation Agreement. ” But p ar ties on appeal from the justice court may amend their pleadings in the county court at law on l y if the amended pleadings do not set u p a new cause of action or exceed the justice court ’ s jurisdictional l im i ts , the amount of which C l e wis did not address in his amended pleading

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3 ; Crumpton v. Stevens , 93 6 S.W .2d 4 73, 476 (T e x. App.

— Fort Worth 1996, no writ) ; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. , 2 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Tex. A pp.

—

Wac o 1927, no writ)

. T o the extent Clewis could amend his pleadings to include these new claims , the record reflects th at he was no t a party to the Residents ’ lease , an d his a mended petition contained no factual allegations to support his standing as to the c onciliation agreement or that Medera was a party to that agreement and breached it

. To the contrary, in his motion fo r new tri a l in the just ice court, Clewis co mplains that the conc iliation agreement that he claims the justice court jud ge a dmi tted into evidence

— but which is not contained in the record before us

— “ w as not even signed b y [Me dera ’ s] authorized [r]e presentative. ”6 /s/ Br ian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Delivered: August 19, 2021