Filed 11/6/13 P. v. Ruiz CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

RANDAL A. RUIZ, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B243545 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. GA078254) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, 

Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed. 

 David McNeil Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

INTRODUCTION 

 A jury found defendant and appellant Randal Ruiz (defendant) guilty of first 

degree burglary and second degree burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to 

concurrent 35 years-to-life sentences on each count. On appeal, his appointed counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) requesting that 

this court independently review the entire record to determine if there are any issues, 

which if resolved in defendant’s favor, would require reversal or modification of the 

judgment. Accordingly, we notified defendant that he could brief any grounds of appeal, 

contentions, or arguments he wanted us to consider. As discussed below, 

notwithstanding two extensions of time within which to file a brief, defendant failed to 

timely submit a brief prior to the cause being submitted for decision. 

Based on our independent review of the entire record, we conclude that there are 

no arguable issues on appeal and, for that reason, affirm the judgment of conviction. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On October 23, 2009, Stephen Biskup was staying temporarily in a guesthouse 

located behind the main house at 1453 Bellford Street, Pasadena. There was a storage 

shed behind the guesthouse. That morning, between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m., Biskup “looked 

out on the porch to the backyard” and noticed that the gate to the yard, which had been 

closed the night before, was “slightly open.” Biskup approached the gate, looked through 

it, and noticed a man with a backpack on a bicycle about to leave. Biskup did not know 

the man, who said “Hi” and then “took off on the bike.” A Sheriff’s deputy arrived later 

that morning and interviewed Biskup. 

In October 2009, Mary Ann Shemdin owned a residential property located at 1453 

and 1455 Bellford Street in Pasadena. There were two homes on the lot, a two car garage 

with a carport, and a storage shed at the back of the deep lot. Shemdin lived in one of the 

homes and a male lived in the second one. 
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 On the morning of October 23, 2009, the man who lived in the second house 

contacted Shemdin about something that had occurred in the storage shed at the back of 

the lot. Following her discussion with the man, Shemdin went to inspect the storage 

shed. She noticed that the door to the shed, which was always locked, was open, as was a 

window. When she entered the shed, she observed that it had been “ransacked.” The 

shed had been “very full” with furniture, Christmas decorations, files, and boxes 

containing her daughter’s possessions. Her daughter, Marie St. Claire, had moved out of 

state and left some of her possessions behind in the shed. Shemdin could see that “things 

[in the shed] had been gone through,” but she did not have a written inventory of her 

daughter’s possessions. Several items in the shed had been moved or altered. 

 After inspecting the shed, Shemdin called the Sheriff’s Department, and a 

Sheriff’s deputy responded to take a police report. As the deputy completed his report, a 

City of Pasadena police officer arrived and asked Shemdin if she knew a Marie St. Claire. 

When Shemdin told the officer that St. Claire was her daughter, he asked her if she 

recognized a computer. 

A few days later, Shemdin went to the Pasadena Police Department and was 

shown certain items, including a computer and jewelry, among others. Of the items she 

was shown, Shemdin recognized the computer as her daughter’s. Shemdin had last seen 

her daughter’s computer, which was not operating properly, in the storage shed with her 

daughter’s other possessions. 

On October 23, 2009, Angele Ajamian resided at 1447 Bellford Avenue, 

Pasadena. Her neighbor, Mary Ann Shemdin, lived next door. That morning between 

7:00 and 8:00 a.m., Ajamian was in her family room watching the news. From her 

window, she saw a man with a backpack going toward the back of the property where a 

rental unit was located. The man left a bicycle and stood behind a big tree. Ajamian 

opened the door and asked, “‘Can I help you?’” The man replied, “‘I’m looking for 

Hector.’” Ajamian said, “‘There is no Hector here,’” and the man “took his bike and 

left.” A few days later, police officers showed Ajamian a photo lineup and she identified 
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defendant’s photograph as the man she saw in her backyard. Ajamian also identified 

defendant in court as the man she saw that morning. 

On the morning of October 23, 2009, Frank Greer was home alone working in his 

office at his residence located at 2305 Woodlyn Road, Pasadena. His office was adjacent 

to the laundry room in his garage and connected to the laundry room by a door. The 

laundry room could also be accessed through the garage by another door. 

 At approximately 9:30 a.m., Greer heard a noise in the laundry room and looked 

up, but did not see anything. When he heard another noise from the laundry room, he 

looked up again and saw the silhouette of a man through the sheer white curtain on the 

door to the laundry room. Greer, who was expecting his wife, not a man, saw the male 

silhouette touch the door knob and heard the knob “kind of turn a little bit.” Greer then 

said, “‘Hello,’” which caused the man to “sort of [freeze]” and then leave. 

 Greer was “taken aback” and decided to investigate “what was going on.” He 

went through the laundry room into the garage and outside to the driveway through the 

open front garage door. There he observed defendant, wearing a bandana and a 

backpack, trying to free a bicycle that was entangled in some mesh netting in a tomato 

garden. After defendant freed the bicycle and moved it into the driveway, he said, “‘I 

was just looking for Hector.’” Defendant then mounted his bicycle and rode away. 

 Greer called 911 and provided a description of defendant. He informed the 911 

operator that he was scheduled to leave for the airport and was told that “they would send 

someone right over.” When a police officer responded, he told Greer that the police had 

found someone who matched the description Greer had provided to the 911 operator. 

The officer asked Greer to accompany him to a location where they were detaining the 

man matching the description. The officer transported Greer to the location where Greer 

was able to observe the man being detained wearing a bandana and identify him as the 

man he had seen at his house. Greer also identified defendant in court as the man with 

the bicycle that he saw in his driveway. 

 On October 23, 2009, City of Pasadena Police Officer Roxanne Bevel was 

working patrol with her partner Office Burchett. Shortly after 9:30 a.m., she received a 
5

radio broadcast regarding a burglary. While the officers were en route to the scene of the 

burglary, they observed a male on a bicycle “who had a light gray covering over his head, 

[that] later was identified as a long-sleeved shirt.” The man generally fit the description 

of the burglary suspect that the officers were provided in the dispatch broadcast. Officer 

Bevel identified defendant in court as the man they observed that morning. 

 As the officers approached defendant, Officer Bevel noticed that he had a 

backpack on his back and was carrying a green bag. The officers detained defendant and 

recovered a “Radio Shack golf scope” and screwdriver from his rear pockets and black 

and purple gloves from his front pants pocket. Inside defendant’s backpack, Officer 

Burchett noticed “various tools, [a] screwdriver, allen wrenches, . . . a couple of watches, 

a recorder, . . . and . . . miscellaneous other items.” Inside the green bag, Officer Burchett 

recovered a blue and silver laptop and other items. Red bolt cutters were also recovered 

from the backpack. In addition, the officers recovered jewelry from defendant’s person, 

including six rings, hoop earrings, three bracelets, a pendant, and a chain, as well as a 

bicycle repair kit. The officers arrested and booked defendant. 

 On October 23, 2009, City of Pasadena Police Officer Christopher Burchett was 

working patrol with his partner, Officer Bevel. The officers contacted defendant that 

morning and eventually arrested him. Officer Burchett assisted Officer Bevel in 

searching defendant and inventorying all the items that the officers recovered from him. 

One of those items was a laptop computer. Officer Burchett powered on the computer 

and searched through it looking for a name. He found a resume with a name, Marie St. 

Claire, and an address, 1455 Bellford Avenue, Pasadena. Based on that information, 

Officer Burchett sent Officer Lopez to the address in an effort to locate the owner. 

 City of Pasadena Detective Richard Pippin investigated the burglary of the shed at 

1453 Bellford Avenue, Pasadena. As part of the investigation, he spoke to Shemdin and 

showed her items that were booked into evidence as a result of defendant’s arrest. 

Shemdin identified the computer as belonging to her daughter, but none of the other 

items. Detective Pippin also showed Ajamian a six-pack photo lineup. Ajamian 

identified the photograph of defendant in that lineup. 
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B. Defense Case 

 Defendant called Mitchell Eisen as an expert to testify about various issues with 

the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In a second amended information, the District Attorney charged defendant in 

count 1 with first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 4591 and in count 2 

with second degree burglary in violation of section 459. The District Attorney alleged 

that defendant had suffered seven prior violent or serious felony convictions within the 

meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) 

through (i). The District Attorney also alleged that defendant suffered two convictions 

for which a prison term was served within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). 

The District Attorney further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior serious felony 

convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). 

 Following trial, the jury found defendant guilty on both counts. In a subsequent 

court trial on the prior conviction allegations, the trial court found all of the prior 

conviction allegations true. 

 The trial court sentenced defendant on count 1 to a term of 25 years to life 

pursuant to the true findings on the prior strike convictions, plus a consecutive ten-year 

term pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for an aggregate term on count 1 of 35 

years to life. The trial court sentenced defendant on count 2 to the same 35 years-to-life 

sentence as imposed on count 1 to run concurrent to the sentence on count 1. The trial 

court also imposed, but stayed, additional two-year terms on each count pursuant to 

section 667.5, subdivision (b). 

 

1

 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
7

DISCUSSION

 In response to the brief submitted by defendant’s counsel under Wende, supra, 25 

Cal.3d 436, we independently examined the entire record to determine if there were any 

arguable issues on appeal. Based on that independent review, we have determined there 

are no arguable issues on appeal. We are therefore satisfied that defendant’s appointed 

counsel has fully satisfied his responsibilities under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. 

 As noted above, on May 6, 2013, we granted defendant permission to file within 

30 days, a letter brief raising any issues, arguments, or contentions that he wished to raise 

in support of his appeal. At defendant’s request, we granted him two extensions of time, 

totaling an additional 45 days, within which to file a letter brief. Notwithstanding that 

defendant’s last extension of time expired on July 15, 2013, defendant did not submit a 

brief before that date. Instead, well after the cause was submitted for decision on August 

5, 2013, he attempted to file without permission on September 3 and 23, 2013, letter 

briefs comprised of over 100 handwritten pages. 

 Because defendant’s letter briefs were submitted six to nine weeks late without 

permission and well after the cause was submitted, we are justified in not considering 

them. Even if we had considered the multitude of contentions raised by those letter 

briefs, we would not reverse defendant’s judgment of conviction. 

As to the many claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted throughout 

those briefs, such claims are generally not cognizable on a direct appeal, but rather are 

more appropriately raised on habeas corpus. “‘To establish a violation of the 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his 

counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against the standard of a reasonably 

competent attorney and that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to 

defendant in the sense that it “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”’ (People v. 

Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169], quoting Strickland 

v. Washington [(1984)] 466 U.S. [668,] 686.) Preliminarily, we note that rarely will an 
8

appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Mendoza Tello

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267-268 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].)” (People v. 

Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.) “We have repeatedly stressed ‘that “[if] the record 

on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] 

. . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there 

simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ 

(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212] quoting 

People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 

1].) A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a 

habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Wilson, supra, at p. 936; People v. Pope, supra, at 

p. 426.)” (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267.) 

As for the various other contentions involving pretrial suppression motions, 

discovery issues, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and various other claimed legal 

errors, to the extent those contentions were not forfeited, defendant did not and cannot 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by such claims of error. The evidence of defendant’s 

guilt was consistent and came from a variety of credible sources, including two 

eyewitness identifications by Greer and Ajamian, and the incriminating items recovered 

from defendant’s person, including St. Claire’s computer which had last been seen in the 

storage shed, the jewelry, and the burglary tools such as gloves, bolt cutters, 

screwdrivers, and wrenches. Given the strength of the evidence of defendant’s guilt, the 

claimed errors could not have been prejudicial. “[E]ven if the court’s ruling were 

deemed erroneous, it would not be prejudicial. Considering the consistent evidence of 

defendant’s guilt from a variety of sources, the outcome of the trial was not affected by 

the court’s ruling, either as a matter of reasonable probability under state law (People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), or under the ‘harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ standard for federal constitutional error (Chapman v. California (1967) 

386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].).” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 

472, 497-498.) Based on our independent review of the record, even assuming one or 
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more of the claimed errors occurred, under any applicable standard, defendant was not 

prejudiced. 

As to the various sentencing errors that defendant raises, including his claims of 

evidentiary error in the court trial on the prior conviction allegations, we have, as noted 

above, independently reviewed the record, including the record as it relates to the court 

trial on the prior convictions and defendant’s sentence, and have determined that there 

were no errors concerning the trial court’s admission of the documentary evidence in 

support of the prior conviction allegations2 and no sentencing errors.3

 Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of conviction from which defendant appeals. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MOSK, J. 

We concur: 

 TURNER, P. J. 

 KRIEGLER, J. 

 

2 See, e.g., Penal Code section 969b; People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082. 

3

 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 [trial court’s 

discretion to dismiss strike limited].