[Cite as State v. Hauptstueck, 2011-Ohio-3502.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO : 

: Appellate Case No. 24013 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 

: Trial Court Case No. 10-CR-90 

v. : 

: 

KEITH HAUPTSTUECK : (Criminal Appeal from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 15th day of July, 2011. 

. . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LAURA M. WOODRUFF, Atty. Reg. #0084161, Montgomery 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. 

Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

GEORGE A. KATCHMER, Atty. Reg. #0005031, 108 Dayton Street, Yellow Springs, Ohio 

45387 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} Keith Hauptstueck appeals from his conviction and sentence following a jury 

trial on four counts of raping a child under age thirteen, one count of forcible rape, two counts 
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of gross sexual imposition involving a child under age thirteen, one count of gross sexual 

imposition by force, and one count of sexual battery. 

{¶ 2} Hauptstueck advances eight assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends 

the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing arguments by appealing to jurors’ 

emotions. Second, he claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce 

inadmissible expert testimony. Third, he asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 

arguing facts not in evidence. Fourth, he alleges that count nine of his indictment, which 

charged sexual battery, was fatally defective. Fifth, he argues that he received constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Sixth, he contends his convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Seventh, he claims the trial court erred in failing to suppress 

a tape recording of telephone conversations he had with the victim’s mother. Eighth, he 

asserts that cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 

{¶ 3} The charges against Hauptstueck stemmed from allegations that he had sexually 

abused his grandson, M.S., on numerous occasions over several years. The victim’s mother, 

T.I., testified at trial that she confronted her son after a friend expressed concerns about an 

inappropriate relationship between Hauptstueck and the child. Without mentioning 

Hauptstueck, T.I. and her husband asked M.S. whether “anything inappropriate” was going on 

and whether he knew what they were talking about. M.S. replied that he did know, and he 

accused Hauptstueck of sexually abusing him. According to T.I., M.S. told her that 

Hauptstueck had “been doing it * * * for years.” 

{¶ 4} After confronting her son, T.I. contacted the police, who began an investigation. 

While the investigation was proceeding, Hauptstueck periodically called T.I.’s house. T.I. 
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initially avoided the calls. She then reported the calls to police. Detective Michael Rotterman 

discussed the issue with T.I. and informed her that she could tape-record her conversations 

with Hauptstueck. The following day, T.I. gave police a recording of two telephone 

conversations between herself and Hauptstueck during which he made incriminating 

admissions about fondling M.S. and engaging in oral sex with the child. After reviewing the 

tapes, detective Rotterman and another detective interviewed Hauptstueck at the police 

station. During those interviews, Hauptstueck again admitted sexually molesting M.S on 

multiple occasions. M.S. also testified at trial and recalled Hauptstueck sexually abusing him 

at three locations over a period of years. M.S. additionally testified about Hauptstueck 

possessing a gun and threatening to kill anyone who found out about the abuse. 

{¶ 5} After the jury convicted Hauptstueck of the charges set forth above, the trial 

court imposed an aggregate sentence of sixty-six and one-half years in prison. This appeal 

followed. 

{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Hauptstueck contends the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct during closing arguments by appealing to jurors’ emotions. In particular, he takes 

issue with remarks the prosecutor made while playing part of a tape recording. The remarks 

were as follows: 

{¶ 7} “I just want to play a couple more clips for you. And these are [T.I.’s] words, 

and they are quite haunting. 

{¶ 8} “(CD played from 11:21 a.m. to 11:22 a.m.)1

 1

 The clips from the CD were not transcribed but they were recorded on the audio/video transcript which we have reviewed. 

The clips are from the telephone recording between the victim’s mother and the defendant which had previously been played to the jury. 

The portion replayed during the argument is the victim’s mother saying the boy feels he is not worth anything, he cuts himself because of 
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{¶ 9} “[T.I.’s] words that her son will be changed forever, that she’s left with a broken 

child. She thought she took her kids to a safe place, to their grandparents. Her words are 

haunting, but the Defendant’s words convicted him of seven of the nine counts. And the final 

two counts, common sense convicts the Defendant.” (Trial transcript, at 236-237). 

{¶ 10} Hauptstueck contends the prosecutor’s remarks were objectionable because 

they were intended to inflame jurors’ emotions. We note, however, that defense counsel did 

not object. Therefore, Hauptstueck has waived all but plain error, which does not exist unless, 

but for the error, the outcome would have been different and reversal is necessary to prevent a 

manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Davis, 127 Ohio St. 3d 268, 2010-Ohio-5706. We see 

no plain error here. 

{¶ 11} “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor’s acts were 

improper in their nature and character and, if they were, whether the substantial rights of the 

defendant to a fair trial were prejudiced thereby.” State v. McGonegal (Nov. 2, 2001), 

Montgomery App. No. 18639, citing State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14. “While a 

prosecutor may not make excessively emotional arguments tending to inflame the jury’s 

sensibilities, the prosecutor is entitled to some latitude in making a closing argument to the 

jury.” State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St. 3d 146, 168. In the context of argument about the 

force element of the two final charges, where the force was not physical but rather subtle or 

psychological, the child’s emotional state could have had some relevance. We are not able to 

say that the argument was improper. 

{¶ 12} Even if defense counsel had objected, the prosecutor’s remarks here would not 

 

what the defendant has done and she is left with a broken child who she thought she had taken to a safe place, the grandparents’ home. 
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have warranted reversal. In our view, the remarks did not make an excessively emotional 

appeal to the jurors’ emotions. While characterizing T.I.’s words as “haunting,” the prosecutor 

focused on Hauptstueck’s own words, which the prosecutor pointed out were enough to 

convict him on most of the charges. We see no prosecutorial misconduct and certainly no 

plain error. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 13} In his second assignment of error, Hauptstueck claims the trial court erred in 

allowing the State to introduce inadmissible expert testimony. This argument concerns 

testimony from pediatric psychologist Sarah Greenwell, who explained that adolescent males 

often delay reporting abuse involving a family member. 

{¶ 14} Hauptstueck contends Greenwell’s testimony was inadmissible under Evid.R. 

703, which provides: “The facts or data in the particular case upon which the expert bases an 

opinion or inference may be those perceived by the expert or admitted into evidence at the 

hearing.” Hauptstueck also challenges the admissibility of Greenwell’s testimony under 

Evid.R. 705, which states: “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give 

the expert’s reasons therefor after disclosure of the underlying facts or data. The disclosure 

may be in response to a hypothetical question or otherwise.” 

{¶ 15} On appeal, Hauptstueck contends Greenwell was not asked any hypothetical 

questions. He also notes that she demonstrated no familiarity with the facts of his case, did not 

refer to any such facts, and did not claim to have reviewed the record. Therefore, he argues 

that her testimony failed to comply with Evid.R. 703 and Evid.R. 705. 

{¶ 16} We are unpersuaded by Hauptstueck’s argument. Once again, we are limited to 

plain-error review as no objection was made below. As set forth above, Greenwell testified 
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generally about delayed disclosures of sexual abuse, a relevant issue in this case. Although she 

did not specifically address M.S.’s situation, she identified the types of children who tend to 

delay reporting and the situations often involved. Greenwell indicated that her testimony was 

based on her own experience and her review of the “literature.” Greenwell adequately 

identified the basis for her opinions, and she satisfied Evid.R. 703 and Evid.R. 705. See, e.g., 

Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St. 3d 237, 241, 2005-Ohio-4787, ¶26. (“Because 

experts are permitted to base their opinions on their education, including their review of 

professional literature, training, and experience, it follows that experts are also permitted to 

testify regarding that information.”). The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 17} In his third assignment of error, Hauptstueck asserts that the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence. In particular, he challenges the 

prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments about the absence of DNA or other physical 

evidence. Hauptstueck contends no testimony was presented at trial upon which the 

prosecutor could base an argument regarding such evidence. 

{¶ 18} We disagree. Plain-error analysis applies here, too, because defense counsel did 

not object to the prosecutor’s remarks. In any event, the record fails to support Hauptstueck’s 

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. On cross examination, defense counsel asked two 

detectives whether they had found any DNA or other physical evidence corroborating M.S.’s 

allegations. They responded that they had not. On re-direct examination, one of the detectives 

explained that he did not expect to find physical evidence such as DNA because the 

allegations involved touching and oral sex performed long before the investigation began. 

Moreover, defense counsel commented on the lack of DNA evidence in his closing argument. 
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 In light of the testimony and the defense argument, the prosecutor properly addressed the 

non-existence of DNA or other physical evidence during closing arguments. The third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 19} In his fourth assignment of error, Hauptstueck alleges that count nine of his 

indictment, which charged sexual battery, was fatally defective. 

{¶ 20} Count nine alleged that Hauptstueck “did engage in sexual conduct with 

another, not his spouse, said offender being the other person’s natural or adoptive parent, or a 

stepparent or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other person[.]” 

Hauptstueck claims this charge was flawed because it failed to set forth the facts upon which 

his “in loco parentis” status was predicated. His argument emanates from State v. Noggle

(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 31. There, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[i]ndictments based 

upon an alleged offender’s status as a person in loco parentis should at least state the very 

basic facts upon which that alleged status is based.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 21} Upon review, we find Hauptstueck’s argument to be unpersuasive. As with his 

other arguments, he failed to raise this one below. Therefore, he has waived all but plain error.

State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, paragraph three of the syllabus. We 

find no plain error here. 

{¶ 22} The purpose of including a factual basis to support an allegation of in loco 

parentis status in an indictment is to give a defendant sufficient notice of the charge against 

him. 2

 See State v. Funk, Franklin App. No. 05AP-230, 2006-Ohio-2068, ¶49. When an 

 2

The State suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court implicitly has overruled Noggle because more recent cases only have required an 

indictment to track the language of a statute to be sufficient. The conclusion in Noggle that the words “in loco parentis” were not sufficient 

has not been directly overruled, modified, or criticized by any more recent Ohio Supreme Court cases. Given our disposition of this 
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indictment charging sexual battery lacks such a factual basis, a bill of particulars can serve the 

same purpose. Noggle, at 34. Here Hauptstueck never requested a bill of particulars. This fact, 

combined with his failure to object to the language of his indictment and his ability to present 

a defense at trial, suggests that he was not misled and that he understood the nature of the 

sexual battery charge against him. Indeed, it is readily apparent to this Court that the factual 

basis for an in loco parentis finding here was Hauptstueck’s status as a grandparent with 

whom M.S. visited and spent the night. A grandparent is significantly different from the 

teacher/coach relationship in Noogle or the family-friend/houseguest in Funk. Because 

Hauptstueck was a grandparent, and because the evidence supports a finding of in loco 

parentis status, we find no plain error in his indictment’s omission of specific basic facts to 

support that status. Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 23} In his fifth assignment of error, Hauptstueck argues that he received 

constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In particular, he criticizes his attorney 

for failing to object to count nine of his indictment, to pediatric psychologist Greenwell’s 

expert testimony, or to the prosecutor’s closing argument. 

{¶ 24} To prevail on his claim, Hauptstueck must show deficient performance and 

resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674. To establish deficiency, he must show that counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To show prejudice, he must demonstrate that 

counsel’s deficiency impacted the judgment against him. State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 

St.3d 136. Reversal is warranted if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

 

assignment of error on other grounds, we decline to determine whether Noggle has been implicitly overruled. 
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deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. 

{¶ 25} Upon review, we conclude that Hauptstueck cannot prevail on his 

ineffective-assistance claim. In our analysis above, we concluded that he was not prejudiced 

by his indictment’s omission of basic facts supporting an in loco parentis allegation in count 

nine. Moreover, with regard to Greenwell’s testimony, we held that it was not objectionable 

under Evid.R. 703 or Evid.R. 705. We also found nothing objectionable about the challenged 

portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument. In light of these determinations above, 

Hauptstueck has failed to establish any deficient performance by his trial counsel that 

prejudiced him. His fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 26} In his sixth assignment of error, Hauptstueck contends his convictions are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support, he notes that M.S. failed to report any 

abuse for years and ultimately did so only after being questioned by his mother. Hauptstueck 

also stresses M.S.’s inability to recall specific dates or the number of times sexual abuse took 

place. He additionally points to evidence that T.I. once caught M.S. viewing “gay 

pornography” on the internet. Hauptstueck attributes M.S.’s allegations of abuse to the child 

having viewed this pornography. 

{¶ 27} When a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. 

Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (citations omitted). A judgment should be reversed 
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as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional case in which the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 

175. 

{¶ 28} Having reviewed the record, we do not find that Hauptstueck’s convictions are 

against the weight of the evidence. M.S. testified about incidents of abuse occurring at three 

locations over a period of years. The jury heard recorded telephone conversations between 

Hauptstueck and T.I. during which he admitted sexually abusing M.S. The jury also watched a 

recording of Hauptstueck’s interview at the police station during which he again admitted 

molesting M.S. on multiple occasions. 

{¶ 29} With regard to M.S.’s delay in reporting the abuse, the State presented 

testimony from pediatric psychologist Greenwell, who explained why adolescent males often 

delay reporting abuse involving a family member. As for M.S.’s inability to recall certain 

specifics, his lack of recall is not surprising given the length of time involved. Finally, the jury 

was free to reject Hauptstueck’s theory that M.S. may have fabricated the sexual-abuse 

allegations after viewing internet pornography. In light of M.S.’s testimony, and 

Hauptstueck’s recorded confessions, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest 

miscarriage of justice when it found him guilty. The evidence does not weigh heavily against 

Hauptstueck’s convictions. The sixth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 30} In his seventh assignment of error, Hauptstueck claims the trial court erred in 

failing to suppress the tape recording of his telephone conversations with T.I. In support, he 

contends detective Rotterman induced T.I. to record the conversations. Therefore, he reasons 

that T.I. was acting as a government agent and that a warrant was required before she could 
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tape the conversations. 

{¶ 31} Hauptstueck’s argument lacks merit for at least two reasons. First, the record 

does not establish that T.I. was acting as a State agent when she recorded the calls. Detective 

Rotterman did not instruct her to record any conversations, did not provide her with a 

recording device, did not arrange the conversations, and was not present when they occurred. 

The detective simply told her that she could talk to Hauptstueck on the telephone and 

suggested that she might want to record the conversation. We are unpersuaded that this advice 

transformed T.I. into an agent of the State for Fourth Amendment purposes. 

{¶ 32} Second, Hauptstueck’s argument is unpersuasive even assuming, purely 

arguendo, that T.I. did qualify as a State agent. We are aware of no authority that precludes a 

law-enforcement officer or other government agent from speaking to a suspect on the 

telephone and recording the conversation without a warrant. Although Hauptstueck generally 

cites R.C. 2933.51, et. seq., Ohio’s electronic surveillance law, nothing therein precluded T.I. 

from recording her telephone conversations with him. The statute generally prohibits the 

warrantless interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. It does not apply, 

however, to a law-enforcement officer who “intercepts a wire, oral, or electronic 

communication, if the officer is a party to the communication[.]” R.C. 2933.52(B)(3). Nor 

does the statute apply to “[a] person who is not a law enforcement officer and who intercepts 

a wire, oral, or electronic communication, if the person is a party to the communication[.]” 

R.C. 2933.52(B)(4). The upshot of these exceptions is that T.I. was not prohibited from 

recording her conversations without a warrant because she was a party to the conversations. 

For this additional reason, the seventh assignment of error is overruled. 
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{¶ 33} In his eighth assignment of error, Hauptstueck raises a claim of cumulative 

error. He contends the effect of the errors alleged in his first seven assignments of error, even 

if individually harmless, cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. 

{¶ 34} It is true that separately harmless errors may violate a defendant’s right to a fair 

trial when the errors are aggregated. State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 397. To find 

cumulative error, we first must find multiple errors committed at trial. Id. at 398. We then 

must find a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have been different but for 

the combination of separately harmless errors. State v. Thomas (Sept. 21, 2001), Clark App. 

No.2000-CA-43. In our review of Hauptstueck’s other arguments, however, we found no 

multiple errors. Therefore, we find no cumulative error. The eighth assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶ 35} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FAIN, J., concurs. 

FROELICH, J., concurring: 

{¶ 36} I concur, but I would find the separate playing of and commenting on the 

“haunting” excerpt to be inappropriate and possibly error. Its effect was to emphasize a 

mother’s emotional explanation of the harm and pain suffered by her and her child rather than 

whether the State had proved the Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 37} However, I agree with the majority that such actions were not plain error and 

that the failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance; the lack of objection may 
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well have been a decision by counsel not to draw attention to the statements. Further, even if 

an objection had been made, the playing of the recording and the prosecutor’s brief remark did 

not deprive the Appellant of a fair trial. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

Copies mailed to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Laura M. Woodruff 

George A. Katchmer 

Hon. Barbara P. Gorman