SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4215-17T4

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND

SOCIETY, FSB, as Trustee for

STANWICH MORTGAGE LOAN 

TRUST A,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER HARTNETT, MR. 

HARTNETT, husband of JENNIFER

HARTNETT, and MRS. PETER 

GALE, his wife,

Defendants,

and

PETER GALE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted September 10, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 19, 2019
2

A-4215-17T4

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. F002057-14.

Peter Gale, appellant pro se.

Hill Wallack LLP, attorneys for respondent (Sean 

Dennis Adams, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this residential foreclosure action, defendant Peter Gale appeals the 

May 8, 2015 order granting summary judgment to plaintiff Wilmington Savings 

Fund Society, FSB.

1

 After a review of defendant's contentions in light of the 

record and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

In 2008, Gale and defendant Jennifer Hartnett2executed a note to First 

Interstate Financial Corp. (First Interstate) for $487,971. The note was secured 

by a mortgage held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), 

as nominee for First Interstate. In September 2011, MERS assigned the 

mortgage to BANA.

3

In July 2016, the mortgage was assigned by BANA to the 

 

1 Summary judgment was entered in favor of Bank of America, N.A. (BANA).

Plaintiff was subsequently substituted in the foreclosure action for BANA.

2 Hartnett did not appeal the final judgment order.

3 Bank of America was a successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing 

LP, formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP.
3

A-4215-17T4

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and, in November 2016, 

HUD assigned the mortgage to plaintiff. In October 2011, Gale defaulted on his

obligations under the note and mortgage. 

In January 2014, BANA filed a complaint for foreclosure. Gale filed a 

contesting answer. Summary judgment was granted to BANA in 2015. In 2017 

plaintiff was substituted in for BANA. Plaintiff's motion for final judgment was 

granted on March 29, 2018.

On appeal, Gale contests plaintiff's right to foreclose and standing, 

specifically whether plaintiff was in possession of the original note, whether the 

assignment was proper and whether plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to 

foreclose (NOI). We are unconvinced by these arguments.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and a trial court's 

ruling is owed no special deference. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l 

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).

It is well-established that in order to have standing in a foreclosure action, 

the "party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying 

debt." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 

2011) (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 327-28 (Ch. 

Div. 2010)). Standing is conferred by "either possession of the note or an 
4

A-4215-17T4

assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint." Deutsche 

Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012) (citing 

Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 

2011)).

Here, we are satisfied plaintiff established a prima facie case for 

foreclosure. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated its standing to foreclose on the 

property because the assignment of the mortgage from MERS to BANA predated 

the January 2014 filing of the foreclosure complaint. Upon that assignment, and 

underlying transfer of possession, BANA became the holder of the instrument.

BANA also provided copies of the original note and NOI to the trial judge as 

exhibits supporting its summary judgment motion. Plaintiff then was substituted 

for BANA under the court's order of March 6, 2017. 

In addressing Gale's argument concerning the validity of the assignment, 

we have stated that "[a] valid assignment must contain evidence of the intent to 

transfer one's rights, and 'the subject matter of the assignment must be described 

sufficiently to make it capable of being readily identified.'" K. Woodmere 

Assocs., L.P. v. Menk Corp., 316 N.J. Super. 306, 314 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting 

3 Williston on Contracts § 404, at 4 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1957)).
5

A-4215-17T4

Here, we are satisfied MERS, as nominee, properly assigned First 

Interstate's mortgage and note to BANA in September 2011. An agent of MERS 

executed the assignment, demonstrating the intent to transfer. See N.J.S.A. 

46:14-4.2. In addition, the subject matter of the assignment is "readily 

identified" because it includes the property's address, the amount loaned to 

defendants, and where the mortgage was recorded. See Menk Corp., 316 N.J. 

Super. at 314. The subsequent assignments to HUD and plaintiff were also 

properly recorded.

Gale's contention pertaining to the NOI lacks merit. The record reflects 

BANA mailed an NOI letter to Gale in June 2013. The certified mail number 

and letter were included with BANA's summary judgment exhibits.

Affirmed.