Filed 5/21/15 Munoz v. Deutsche Bank National TrustCA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RAUL MUNOZ, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. G049133 (Super. Ct . No. 30-2012-00597286)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Derek W. Hunt, Judge. Affirmed. Raul Munoz , in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Chuck Birkett Tsoong, St ephen S. Chuck, Tiffany M. Birkett and Victoria J. Tsoong for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *2 Plaintiff and appellant Raul Munoz 1 lost a triplex in foreclosure. He tried to block the foreclosure by asserting, inter a lia, that the documentation in connection with the securitization, pooling, and assignment of his loan was fraudulent. On appeal, he
maintains that the documentatio n was improper. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, he
asserts that the court erred in sustaining the defendant financial institutions’ demurrers to five of his causes of action and in granting their motion for summary judgment as to his remaining two causes of action. Th e court did not err. We affirm.

I
FACTS A. Appellant’s Allegations and Request for Judicial Notice: The following allegations are take n from appellant’s first amended complaint. The document desc riptions, where indicated, are taken from the documents attached to appellant’s request for judi cial notice, filed in the trial court. On or about June 8, 2007, appellant signed a promissory note and deed of trust in favor of Home Loan Funding, In c., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was designated as bot h the “nominee” and the beneficiary of the deed of trust. A copy of th e deed of trust dated June 7, 2007, securing a promissory note in the amount of $602,400, was attached to appellant’s request for judicial notice. It
identified Home Loan Funding, Inc. as the lender, MERS as both the lender’s nominee and the beneficiary, and Fidelity Nati onal Title Company as the trustee. According to appellant, around the time he got the loan, Home Loan Funding, Inc. “attempted to securitize and se ll his loan to another entity[,]” but “[t]hat entity was not Deutsche Bank . . . .” (Boldface and italics omitted.)

1 The pleadings, judgment, and loan do cumentation at issue in this case refer to appellant as Raul Munoz. However, appe llant filed his notice of appeal and briefing on appeal under the name Raul Munoz Ulloa.3 In July 2008, IndyMa c Bank was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision. Its assets were tran sferred to IndyMac Federal Bank. On February 18, 2009, Roger Stotts , vice-president of MERS signed an assignment of the deed of trust and the underly ing note. Appellant made reference to an assignment of deed of trust atta ched to his request for judicial notice. That assignment of deed of trust was signed by Stotts on be half of MERS as nominee for Home Loan Funding, Inc. It stated th at MERS as nominee for Home Loan Funding, Inc. assigned
both its beneficial interest under the deed of trust, and the underlying note, to IndyMac Federal Bank. The assignment of deed of trust was recorded on March 6, 2009. Appellant disputed both the authenticity and the contents of the assignment. Appellant also made reference to a s ubstitution of trustee, of which he also sought judicial notice. Th at substitution of trustee was dated February 19, 2009, and signed by Christina Allen, vice-president of IndyMac Federal Bank. The substitution of trustee recited that IndyMac Federal Bank was the current beneficiary under the deed of trust, and substituted NDEx West, LLC as trustee under the deed of trust. The
substitution of trustee was recorded on Februa ry 26, 2009. Appellant alleged that Allen was not a vice-president of IndyMac Federal Bank and the document was fraudulent. In February 2009, appellant “initiate d loan modification negotiation efforts with Onewest, [his] subsequent servicer.” In March 2009 , the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sold IndyMac Federa l Bank to OneWest Bank. OneWest Bank acquired the right to service the mortgages “p reviously serviced by IndyMac, including
. . . the loan at i ssue in this matter.”
Erica A. Johnson-Seck executed an assi gnment of deed of trust on behalf of IndyMac Federal Bank. In suppor t of this assertion, appellant made reference to the copy of the assignment of deed of trust attached to his request for judicial notice. That copy showed that, on September 15, 2009, Johnson- Seck, as attorney-in-fact for IndyMac Federal Bank, assigned all beneficial interest under appellant’s deed of trust to Deutsche4 Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of the IndyMac Indx Mortgage Trust 2007- AR19, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates , Series 2007-AR19 u nder the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated July 1, 2007. Appellant allege d that Johnson-Seck was not the attorney-in-fact for IndyMac Federa l Bank, so the assignment was fraudulent. Eventually, appellant and OneWest Bank entered into a custom loan
modification in December 2010. The modifi cation agreement was re corded on January 18, 2011. On August 23, 2011, a notice of de fault was recorded with respect to appellant’s loan. In describi ng appellant’s June 7, 2007 deed of trust securing the loan, the notice recited that NDEx West, LLC was th e original trustee, substituted trustee, or agent for the trustee and that MERS was the bene ficiary. It did not recite any subsequent history concerning the deed of trust. The notice advised appellant to contact OneWest Bank in care of NDEx West, LLC to a rrange for payment to stop foreclosure. After receiving the notice of default, appellant sent a series of letters addressed to NDEx West, LLC, IndyMac, and De utsche Bank. He sent a couple of the
letters to MERS also. A lthough OneWest Bank responded to one of the letters by promising to research appellant’s matter, a ppellant received no s ubsequent information from OneWest Bank. He received no response at all to most of his letters. Appellant’s property was lost thr ough foreclosure on Oc tober 18, 2012.
The trustee’s deed stated th at NDEx West, LLC, as trustee, conveyed the property to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as tr ustee of the IndyMac Indx Mortgage Trust 2007-AR19, Mortgage Pass-through Certific ates, Series 2007-AR19 under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated July 1, 2007.

B. Procedural History: Appellant, in propria persona, file d a first amended complaint against several defendants, including: (1) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee of5 the IndyMac Indx Mortgage Trust 2007-AR19 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-AR19, under the Pooling and Se rvicing Agreement da ted July 1, 2007 (Deutsche Bank); (2) IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest Bank); and (3) MERS, (collectively, respondents). 2 The first amended complaint was based on the purp ortedly wrongful sale, by for eclosure, of his triplex in Santa Ana, California. It asserted causes of action for (1 ) declaratory relief, (2) negligence, (3) quasi-contract, (4) violation of 12 United States Code secti on 2605, (5) 15 United States Code section 1692 et seq., (6) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and (7) accounting. It sought in excess of $5 million in damages. Deutsche Bank, OneWest Bank 3 and MERS filed a demurrer to the entirety of the first amended complaint. The court sustained all demurrers by defendant MERS.
It overruled the other defendants’ demurrers to the third and seventh causes of action. In addition, it sustained without leave to amend the other defendants’ de murrers to the first and second causes of action. Finally, it sustai ned with leave to ame nd their demurrers to the fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action. Appellant did not file a second amended complaint to amend the fourth, fi fth and sixth causes of action. Deutsche Bank, OneWest Bank and ME RS thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted th e motion and entered summary judgment. Appellant filed a notice of app eal from the summary judgment.

2 The lawsuit was dismissed without pr ejudice as against a fourth defendant, NDEx West, LLC, due to lack of service of process.

3 Respondents, including OneWest Ba nk, filed an answer to the first amended complaint in which they stated OneW est Bank had been err oneously sued as its division, IndyMac Mortgage Services.6 II
DISCUSSION A. Scope of Appeal: Respondents claim the ruling on the demurrer is not before us on appeal. They explain that appellant did not file an a ppeal with respect to that ruling and they say it is too late for him to do so now. Conseq uently, they conclude appellant’s appeal is untimely as to that ruling. They are in error. “An or der sustaining a demurrer is interlocutory and not appealable. [Citati on.] The appeal must be taken from a subsequent judgment of dismissal. [Citation.]” ( Conley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1130.) Appellant had no opportunity to challenge the ruling on the demurrer until the judgment of dismis sal was entered and his challenge is not untimely. Respondents also fault a ppellant for his failure to mention the ruling on the demurrer in his notice of appeal. However, Co de of Civil Procedure section 906 provides that “the reviewing court may review the verd ict or decision and any intermediate ruling, proceeding, order or decisi on which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment or order appealed from or which substa ntially affects the rights of a party . . . .” (See also George Ball Pacific, Inc. v. Coldwell Banker & Co. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 248, 253, fn. 4.) That being the case, we will review the ruling on the demurrer in the
matter before us.

B. Demurrer: (1) Standard of review— “We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the complaint alleges f acts sufficient to state a cause of action. [Citation.] We assume the truth of the proper ly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pl eaded, and matters of whic h judicial notice has been7 taken. [Citation.] We construe the plea ding in a reasonable manner and read the allegations in context. [Citation.] We affi rm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regard less of the trial court’s stat ed reasons. [Citation.]” ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) “If we conclude the complaint fails on any grounds stated in the demurrer,
we must then consider whether there is a ‘“reasonable possibility ”’ the complaint’s defect(s) can be cured by an amendment. [Citation.]” ( Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 506.) “The burden of proving the reasonable possibility of such a cu rative amendment falls ‘“‘squarely on the plaintiff.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 507.) (2) Merits— Appellant cites Ramirez v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 391 at page 397, which provides: “A genera l demurrer admits the truth of all material facts alleged in the complaint.” He says that respondents ha ve, therefore, admitted all the alleged facts and the only question is whet her the alleged facts support a claim. He contends that they do. (a) Declaratory relief With respect to his first cause of action, appellant says he seeks “Declaratory Relief as to whether the Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of [his] in favor of Deutsche Bank, MERS, and Onewest, such that either of them can collect [his] mortgage payments, demand pa yment or have Ndex engage in debt collection activities.” Declaratory relief is not available in this context. In his first amended complaint, appella nt alleged that his property was lost through foreclosure. Indeed, he attached a copy of the trustee’s deed upon sale as exhibit H. Appellant has not explained why, consider ing the lien of his deed of trust has been foreclosed, there is any remaining question as to whether the deed of trust provides continuing security.8 Moreover, as respondents noted in th eir demurrer, the court generally does not provide declaratory relief with respect to past acts, where no fu ture conduct between the parties is at issue. ( Cardellini v. Casey (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 389, 397-398.) Appellant now cites an unpublis hed federal court decision in Schafer v. CitiMortgage,

Inc. (C.D. Cal., June 15, 2011, No. 11-03919) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64558. If we consider this unpublished decisi on as persuasive authority ( Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155, fn. 6), we observe th at it had to do with a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure, rule 12(b)(6), and in particular with the application of the federal Declarat ory Judgment Act (28 U. S.C. § 2201(a)). An analysis of whether a federal court should dismiss a declaratory relief cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act is not germane to the analysis of whether it was proper to sustain a demurrer as to a declar atory relief cause of action under California law. Appellant has not shown that his de claratory relief cause of action could be
amended so as to state a viable cause of action under California law. ( Cardellini v. Casey , supra , 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 397-398.) (b) Negligence The negligence cause of action contains allegations that appear to be taken from a stock complaint. It alleges, inter a lia, that respondents “b reached [their] duty by colluding to lure Plaintiffs in to [a] predatory loan that [resp ondents] knew or should have
known Plaintiff would default on[,]” and that he had suffered harm, including having
been “forced to borrow excessive amounts of money, having the equity stripped from their home and, now, facing foreclosure.” Yet appellant premised his action on the allegation that he did not borrow from any of re spondents, inasmuch as they were “thirdparty strangers” to his loan, and that hi s property had already been lost through
foreclosure. In any event, in their demurrer, resp ondents noted that a negligence cause of action must be based on a duty. They cited Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan9 Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089 at page 1096, wherein the court stated that “as a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the
institution’s involvement in the loan tran saction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” Appellant now acknowledges that this is a correct statement of law. However, he emphasizes that a financial instit ution may owe a duty of care to a borrower
when its involvement does exceed the scope of its conventi onal role as a mere lender of money. He cites Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 2011, No. C10-03892) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32350, another unpublished de cision, wherein the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a duty of care where the lender had
offered the borrowers a trial loan modification plan, with a guarantee that if they made the modified payments on time for three mont hs they would receive a permanent loan modification, but the lender re neged on the deal even afte r the borrowers had fulfilled their part of the bargain. The court conclu ded that the defendants had adequately alleged
that the lender’s involvement in the loan transaction had ind eed exceeded “‘the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money. . . .’” ( Id. at p. *21.) We observe that
this case has been criticized in several others. (See, e.g., Casault v. Fannie Mae (C.D. Cal. 2012) 915 F.Supp.2d 1113; Bunce v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (E.D. Cal., July 17, 2013, No. CIV 2:13- 00976) 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1001 11.) Anyway, the case before us is distinguishable. Appellant says his first amended complaint shows he “initiated loan modification negotiation efforts with Onewest” a nd that his applications “for several loan
modifications . . . were all . . . denied without further explanation . . . .” However, this is not what his first amended complaint says. Rather, in his first amended complaint appellant alleged that he sought a loan modification from OneWest Bank in February 2009, and eventually obtained one, in Decem ber 2010. He further alleged that the modification agreement was recorded on Janu ary 18, 2011. A copy of the recorded10 modification agreement was attached as exhibit A to his first amended complaint. So, in his first amended complaint, appellant alle ged that he sought and obtained a loan modification. We see nothing here to show that the lender acted other than in “its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” ( Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan
Assn. , supra , 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1096.) (c) Statutory violations (i) correspondence Next, appellant lumps most of his re maining causes of action together, and says respondents could not properly foreclose because they fabricated an assignment of deed of trust and falsely represented to him a nd the court that they had the right to take his property away. He contends respondents committed a number of statutory violations and he bases his arguments on a series of le tters he sent after receiving OneWest Bank’s August 23, 2011 notice of default. On September 11, 2011, appellant sent a “VALIDATION OF DEBT NOTICE” to NDEx West, LLC , IndyMac Mortgage Services, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. He as ked for: (1) information c oncerning the nature of the debt; (2) an explanation of the manner in wh ich they calculated the money owing; (3) certified copies of documents showing that he agreed to pay the asserted monies owing; (4) a copy of any applicable judgment; (5) the identity of the original creditor and the
name and address of the current owner of the loan; (6) proof that the statute of limitations had not expired; (7) proof that they were lic ensed to collect in th e state; and (8) their license numbers and registered agent. Rema rkably, the letter declar ed: “If you do not answer within a reasonable amount of time, you accept this offer of full satisfaction of said loan concerning th e deed of trust . . . and its note, and an officer will be appointed to record a reconveyan ce on your behalf.” On October 28, 2011, appellant sent a further inquiry entitled “QUALIFIED WRITTEN REQUEST, CO MPLAINT, DISPUTE OF DEBT &11 VALIDATION OF DEBT LETTER, FOIA REQUEST, SIGNATURE REVOCATION, and AFFIDAVIT.” (Unde rscoring omitted.) That letter contained a barrage of requests for information. Among other things, appe llant demanded the receipt of documents identified in 22 different categories, and po sed 20 generic questions on late fees, four general questions on debit and credit info rmation, and three br oad questions about accounting and servicing systems. He asked, for example, for respondents to identify each “accounting and servicing system used by [t hem] and any sub-servicers or previous servicers from the inception of this account to the present date . . .” and to “provide the name and address of the company or part y that designed and sold the system.” In addition, in his “QUALIFIED WRITTEN REQUEST,” appellant purported to unilaterally impose upon respon dents the granting by them of an unlimited power of attorney in him to endorse their na mes “upon any instrument in satisfaction of the obligation(s) of this REQUEST/AGREEM ENT or any agreement arising from this agreement.” Furthermore, it advised respon dents: “If you fail to satisfy the demand within the allotted time after having been duly served with this Qualified Written Request, then by Tacit Procuration [Appellant ] . . . will determine for you and each of you, [that you] concur and are satisfied with the justness of the demand . . . .” Finally, by his “QUALIFIED WRITTEN REQU EST,” appellant purported to “revoke and withdraw any and all power and authority in the matter of [respondents] ” with respect to his loan
and to revoke their status as trustees or beneficiaries. On March 23, 2012, appellant se nt another “VALIDATION OF DEBT NOTICE,” substantially similar to his letter of September 11, 2011. Finally, on June 5, 2012, appellant sent a “DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST ACTIVITIES OF PURPORTED DEBT.” (Underscori ng omitted.) In that demand letter, appellant recited, inter alia, that he had received no response to his prior three letters, that respondents had failed to validate the debt, and that the foreclosure proceedings were unlawful.12 A trustee’s deed upon sale wa s recorded on Oc tober 18, 2012. (ii) 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (RESPA) In his first amended complaint, a ppellant asserted that OneWest Bank failed to comply with 12 Unite d States Code section 2605(e) by timely responding to his correspondence. In a garbled allegation, appe llant asserted: “Onewe st failed to comply because On November 29, 2011 one month af ter Onewest responded to [his] request but informed [him] that Onewest would research the inquiry concerning the mortgage loan.” He continued on: “However, Onewest has not sent any response to plaintiff’s qualified written request and Plaintiffs i nquiries are still unanswered.” In the demurrer, respondents asserted that appellant’s correspondence did not constitute a “qualified written request,” with in the meaning of 12 United States Code section 2605(e)(1)(A), to which th ey were required to respond. They further asserted that even if they were required to respond, appe llant had not stated a viable claim under 12 United States Code section 2605(e) because he had failed to allege actual harm.
Title 12 United States Code secti on 2605(e)(1)(A) provides: “If any servicer of a . . . mortgage lo an receives a qualified written request from the borrower . . . for information relating to the servicing of su ch loan, the servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the correspon dence within 5 days . . . .” Title 12
United States Code section 2605(e)(1)(B) defines “a qualified written request” as “a written correspondence . . . that— . . . (ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the ex tent applicable, that the acco unt is in error or provides
sufficient detail to the servi cer regarding other informat ion sought by the borrower.” Here, appellant did not state that he believed his account was in error. Rather, he demanded that respondents prov e they owned his promissory note. In addition, he sought informa tion about such things as ac counting systems and requested copies of a myriad of documents, includin g those pertaining to the securitization and pooling of his loan, the transfers of his loan , and the servicing of his loan. We question13 whether his seemingly endless and most assu redly burdensome request for information fell within the spirit of 12 Unite d States Code section 2605(e)(1)(A). Nonetheless, while it is a close call, we do not conclude that a ppellant failed to provide “sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other informati on sought by the borrower.” (12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B).) That is not th e end of our inquiry, however.
Title 12 United States Code secti on 2605(f) states, “Whoever fails to comply with any provision of this section sh all be liable to the borrower for each such failure in the following amounts: [¶] . . . [¶] In the case of any action by an individual, an amount equal to the sum of— [¶] (A) any actu al damages to the borrower as a result of
the failure . . . .” “Asserting a defendant’s failure to respond to a [qualified written request] and the suffering of general damages is insu fficient to state a cl aim under RESPA. [Citation.] Instead, federal courts have re ad 12 United States Code section 2605 as requiring a plaintiff to plead specific fact s showing both the defendant’s failure to respond and the plaintiff’s suffering of ‘pecuniary damage s’ in order to avoid the dismissal of his or her RESPA claim. [Citati ons.] In effect, this pleading requirement
has limited RESPA claims to circ umstances in which a plainti ff can allege specific facts to show causation—‘“actual damages to the borro wer as a result of th e failure [to comply with RESPA requirements].”’ [Citation.]” ( Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531-532.) In his first amended complaint, appe llant stated he had “suffered actual damages, including but not limit ed to devastation of their cr edit, monetary damages, and
threatened foreclosure of their home” and that he had “been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.” However, he did not ex plain how the failure to provide a timely response to his request for documents, such as copies of the documents pertaining to loan securitization, pooling, transf er, and servicing, had caused a devastation of his credit, monetary damages or foreclosure (either thr eatened or completed). “Federal district14 courts have found sufficiently pled actual damages include the assertion of concrete harms cause by the RESPA violation itself, not harms generally resulting from a plaintiff’s default and the foreclosure of his or her home.” ( Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) (iii) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Appellant’s fifth cause of action was for violation of 15 United States Code section 1692, et seq. Although appellant di d not cite a particular statute, he quoted snippets of language clearly taken fro m 15 United States Co de section 1692e. That statute provides in pertinent pa rt that, “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading repres entation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The false representation of--[¶] (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken . . . .” (15 U.S.C. § 1692e.) Appellant alleged each of the respondents had committed fraud as prohibited by federal law by misrepresenting that the de bt was due and owing to Deutsche Bank as an innocent purchaser for value when the debt had not been validly assigned to Deutsche Bank. In their demurre r, respondents asserted that the cause of action, which they characterized as one for fraud, failed for lack of specificity. They argued appellant was required to specify “the ‘who, what, when, we re, and how of the fraud.’ [Citation.]” They emphasized that where there are multiple defendants, the plaintiff was required to describe for each defe ndant the nature of his participation in the
fraud. We agree. Appellant’s bare allegations that each of the respondents falsely represented that the debt was owing to Deut sche Bank, as an innocent purchaser for value, that they threatened to engage in legally impermis sible collection activities, and that they tried to collect on th e debt through the false preten se of claiming Deutsche Bank15 was an assignee, “are too conclu sory, vague and confusing to give each ‘defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the gr ounds upon which it rests.’ [Citation.]” ( Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic Registration (10th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 1231, 1240.) Appellant has simply offered “vague alleged acts . . . with zero details or concrete examples. [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) In other words, from the first amended complaint, “we
cannot tell which defendant is alleged to have done what, nor can we tell what the misconduct was. [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) That is to say, we do not know if the respondents were alleged to have made their misrepresent ations via letters, faxes, e-mails, telephonic communication, or some other method. We al so do not know what persons were alleged to have made misrepresentations on behalf of which of the respondents, and when. (iv) Business & Professions Code § 17200 In his sixth cause of action, appellant asserted that respondents had violated
Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq., whic h is commonly known as the “unfair competition law.” ( Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) The unfair competiti on law “‘“‘borrows’ viola tions of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices” that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) Appellant alleged that respondents had violated a number of state and federal statutes and, therefore, had also violated of the unfair competition law. Appellant described the unlawful condu ct as: (1) “executing and recording false and misleading documents; [fn. omitted] ” (2) “executing and recording documents without the legal author ity to do so;” (3) “failing to disclose the principal for which documents were being executed and recorded . . . ;” (4) “demanding and accepting payments for debts that were non-existent;” (5) “violating the Security First Rule;” (6) reporting payments as late to cr edit bureaus without the legal ri ght or authority to do so;” (7) acting as a beneficiary without the legal au thority to do so, and;” (8) “other deceptive business practices . . . .”16 In their demurrer, respondents argued that appellant’s allegations were
insufficient to establish a viable claim under the unfair competition law for several reasons. Notably, they asserted that appellant had failed to allege causation. To bring a claim under the unfair comp etition law, a plaintiff must “‘(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as an injury in fact, i.e., economic injury , and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by , the unfair business practice . . . that is th e gravamen of the cl aim.’ [Citation.]” ( Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) We are concerned here with the second requirement. Where a plaintiff defaults on his or her loan and then loses his or her property through for eclosure, the loss of the property is caused by the plaintiff’s default, not th e defendant’s allegedl y wrongful actions. In that case, the plaintiff “cannot show any of th e alleged violations have a ca usal link to [the] economic injury” and the sustaining of a demurrer to the unfair comp etition law cause of action is proper. ( Id. at p. 523.)

C. Summary Judgment: (1) Standard of review— “‘Under summary judgment law, any part y to an action, whether plaintiff or defendant, “may move” the c ourt “for summary judgment” in his [or her] favor on a cause of action . . . or defense (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a))—a plaintiff “contend[ing] . . . that there is no defense to the action,” a defendant “contend[ing] that the action has no merit” ( ibid. ). The court must “grant[]” th e “motion” “if all the papers
submitted show” that “there is no triabl e issue as to any material fact” ( id. , § 437c, subd. (c))—that is, there is no issue requiring a tria l as to any fact that is necessary under the pleadings and, ultimately, the law [citations ]—and that the “moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)).’ [Citation.]” ( Willemsen v. Mitrosilis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 622, 626.)17 “‘[I]n moving for summary judgment, a “defendant . . . has met” his [or her] “burden of showing that a cause of ac tion has no merit if” he [or she] “has shown
that one or more elements of th e cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plainti ff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. [(p)(2)].)’ [Citation.]” ( Willemsen v. Mitrosilis, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 626, fn. omitted.) “The plaintiff . . . may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of mate rial fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “On review of a summary judgment, we ‘examine the reco rd de novo and independently determine whether [the] decisi on is correct. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Willemsen v. Mitrosilis , supra , 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 626.) (2) Merits— (a) allegations supporting remaining causes of action After the demurrers were sustained, the only causes of action remaining were the causes of action for quasi-contract a nd an accounting. In his cause of action for quasi-contract, appellant asserted: “Deutsch e, MERS, and Onewest knowingly accepted payments and retained them for [their] own use knowing that [they] did not acquire an interest in Plaintiffs Note, su ch that they could accept or k eep Plaintiffs payments. It would be inequitable for Deutsche, MERS, a nd Onewest to retain the payments [they] received from Plaintiff which [they] did not have legal authority to collect.” Similarly, in his cause of action for an accounting, appellant asserted that he had made his mortgage payments to Deutsche Bank, OneWest Bank, and MERS for about two years, but that they were not actually entitled to any of that money because they never had an interest in18 his loan. So, he argued, they were required to return the money to him and they owed him an accounting to show the amou nt of money to be returned. (b) motion for summary judgment In their motion for summary judgment, respondents asserted, inter alia, that through various assignments of a ppellant’s note and deed of tr ust, as well as the right to service the same, they had acquired all the ri ghts to collect the monies owing under the
note and deed of trust and to foreclose. In support of their motion, respondents filed an
index of exhibits. The exhib its consisted of copies of do cuments intended to show the rights of respondents to collect the monies ow ing under appellant’s note and deed of trust and to foreclose. They incl uded copies of eight recorded documents appellant himself already had provided to the court, either as attachments to his request for judicial notice or as exhibits to his first amended complaint: (1) the deed of trust securing appellant’s note; (2) the assignment of deed of trust ex ecuted by Johnson-Seck; (3) the assignment of deed of trust executed by Sto tts; (4) the substitution of trus tee executed by Allen; (5) the modification agreement between appellant and IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of OneWest Bank; (6) the notice of default; (7) the notice of trustee’s sale; and (8) the
trustee’s deed. Respondents also provided copies of a Master Purchase Agreement by and among the FDIC as conservator for IndyMa c Federal Bank, IMB Holdco LLC, and OneWest Bank Group LLC, da ted March 18, 2009, and a Servicing Business Asset Purchase Agreement by and between the FDIC as receiver for IndyMac Federal Bank and OneWest Bank, dated March 19, 2009.
In addition to the fore going, respondents filed the declaration of their attorney, Victoria J. Tsoong. Tsoong identified each of the above-referenced documents, by recording information where applicable, a nd stated true and correct copies were
attached to the index of exhibits. In additi on, she explained that, pursuant to the Master Purchase Agreement and the Servicing Busi ness Asset Purchase Agreement, “OneWest19 acquired substantially all of the assets, includi ng the servicing rights to the loan at issue in this action, from [IndyMac Federal Bank] by and through its receiver the FDIC. OneWest, including through its servicing division IndyMac Mort gage Services . . . is the current servicing agent on beha lf of Deutsche [Bank].” Respondents also filed the declaration of Charles Boyle, a vice-president of OneWest Bank. In his declaration, Boyl e stated OneWest Bank was the mortgage servicer for appellant’s loan and was the attorney-in-fact for Deutsche Bank, the beneficiary under the deed of trust. Boyl e described the business records practices of OneWest Bank’s mortgage servicing busin ess and noted that “IndyMac Mortgage Services [was] the servicing division of OneW est, and [was] not a separate legal entity from OneWest.” Boyle stated he had examin ed the relevant busi ness records, and he
outlined the chain of events as described in the documents attach ed to the index of exhibits, including the variou s assignments and substitutions, appellant’s default, and the
foreclosure. (c) opposition Appellant filed his own declaration in support of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In terestingly, he admitted that he received a July 6, 2007
letter from Home Loan Fundi ng, Inc. notifying him that the mortgage servicing was being transferred to IndyMac Bank. He also acknowledged having received a letter dated October 30, 2012 from OneWest Bank in resp onse to appellant’s Oc tober 11, 2012 letter
to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Appellant himself described the letter as “[giving] a full accounting of how the loan [had] progressed including a history of the loan modification,” the defau lt and the foreclosure. He attached a copy of the letter describing the chronology of events and explaining why, contra ry to appellant’s assertion, IndyMac Mortgage Services had th e right to foreclose on the property and
would not rescind the foreclos ure sale. The letter from OneWest Bank reiterated, inter alia, that Home Loan Funding, Inc. had tran sferred the servicing of his loan to IndyMac20 Bank, and that when IndyMac Bank was closed , the loan servicing rights were sold to IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of OneWest Bank. Appellant questioned how this inform ation made sense in light of the purported assignment of deed of trust from IndyMac Federal Bank to Deutsche Bank, signed by Johnson-Seck as a ttorney-in-fact. He wonder ed how it was possible that
OneWest Bank and Deutsche Ba nk could both own his note and deed of trust and to whom he really should have been making his payments. Furthermore, in the body of his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, appellant objected to the decl arations of Tsoong and Boyle as being
inadmissible. He asserted that their declar ations could not have been based on personal knowledge. Appellant did not raise his objections to the declarations orally at the hearing on the motion. However, he did remi nd the court, in a vague manner, that there were “many irregularities that he mentioned in his opposition . . . .” The court did not rule on the objections contained in the body of his opposition. (d) waiver On appeal, appellant reiterates his objections to the Tsoong and Boyle declarations. However, respondents claim th e objections are waived on appeal, because appellant did not properly present his objections in the trial court. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527, 531.) They are correct. As the Supreme Court in Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th 512 stated, “evidentiary objections made ‘a t the hearing shall [not] be deemed waived’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(5)), even if the trial court fails to rule on them expressly.” ( Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 527, fn. omitted.) It then proceeded to address
“how and when evid entiary objections must be made to be deemed made ‘at the hearing,’ under section 437c, subdivi sion (b)(5) and (d).” ( Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 527.) It concluded, “the Californi a Rules of Court govern. [Citations.]” ( Id. at p.21 531.) It cited “current rule 3.1352 [which] stat es: ‘A party desiring to make objections to evidence in the papers on a motion for summary judgment must eith er: [¶] (1) Submit objections in writing under rule 3.1354; or [¶ ] (2) Make arrangements for a court reporter to be present at the hearing.’” ( Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 531.) It also
noted that “current rule 3.1354 require[s] written objections to be served and filed before the hearing. [Citation.]” ( Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 531.) We observe that California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(a) requires that “all written objections to evidence in support of or in oppos ition to a motion for summary judgment . . . must be served and filed at the same time as the objecting party’s opposition or reply pape rs are served and filed.” Rule 3.1354(b) specifies: “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. . . . Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: [¶] (1) Identify the na me of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; [¶] (2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; [¶] (3) Quote or set fo rth the objectionable statement or material; and [¶] (4) State the grounds fo r each objection to that stat ement or material. . . .” Furthermore, rule 3.1354(c) requires the “p arty submitting written objections to evidence [to] submit with the objections a proposed or der” and specifies the required form of the
order. In this case, appellant failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. He did not file and serve objections separate from his opposition. Moreover, the objections contained within the body of hi s opposition did not satisfy the remaining requirements of the rule. Inasmuch as appe llant’s written objections were not made in
accordance with rule 3. 1354, we conclude they were not “made at the hear ing” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure secti on 437c, subdivisions (b)(5) and (d). Given that, and the fact that the court did not rule upon them, the objections have not been preserved on appeal. ( Reid v. Google, Inc. , supra , 50 Cal.4th at pp. 531-532.)22 (e) analysis
We nonetheless address whether res pondents met their burden to raise a complete defense to appellant’s re maining two causes of action. Respondents’ evidence showed that MERS, as nominee for Home Loan Funding, Inc., assigned the note and beneficial interest in the deed of trust to IndyMac Federal Bank, in February 2009 . It further showed that, in March 2009, the FDIC as receiver for IndyMac Federal Bank transferred substantially all of the assets of IndyMac Federal Bank, incl uding loan servicing right s, to OneWest Bank. Both Tsoong and Boyle declared that appellant’s deed of trust and the right to service his loan were among the specific assets transferred. So, the eviden ce showed that OneW est Bank, through its mortgage servicing division IndyMac Mortgage Services, was the servicer for appellant’s loan, and thus had the right to collect th e monies owing thereunder and to foreclose following appellant’s default. Consequently, respondents raised a complete defense to appellant’s causes of action for qu asi-contract and an accounting. The burden then shifted to appellant to raise a triable issue of material fact. In his opposition to the moti on for summary judgment, a ppellant acknowledged the transfer of assets from IndyMac Federal Bank to OneWest Bank, the se rvicing of his loan by OneWest Bank, and the modification of hi s loan by OneWest Bank. However, he called attention to the assignment of deed of trust signed by Johnson-Seck, as giving rise
to confusion in the chain of title. As we recall, on September 15, 2009, Johnson-Seck, as attorney-in-fact for IndyMac Federal Bank, executed an assignm ent of deed of trust by which IndyMac Federal Bank purportedly assigned the beneficial interest in th e deed of trust to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of the IndyMac Indx Mortgage Trust 2007- AR19, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates , Series 2007-AR19 u nder the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated July 1, 2007. This was after the da te of the Master Purchase23 Agreement by which the FDIC agreed to transfer IndyMac Federal Bank assets to
OneWest Bank. In reviewing the evidence to determin e Johnson-Seck’s authority to execute the assignment of deed of trust, we find a copy of a limited power of attorney attached to Boyle’s declaration. The limited power of a ttorney, given by the FD IC as receiver for IndyMac Federal Bank, authorized the attorney-in-fact to exec ute documents on behalf of the receiver. However, it is unclear that th is particular limited power of attorney
authorized Johnson-Seck to exec ute the assignment in question. And, we do not know if a different power of attorney ga ve her the requisite authority. So, we can see why the assignmen t executed by Johnson-Seck raised
confusion as to the owner of the beneficial inte rest in the deed of tr ust as of the date of foreclosure. There was a question whethe r the assignment was defective, and thus,
whether the beneficial interest in the deed of trust had been properly transferred to Deutsche Bank as trustee of the mortgage trust or whether it re mained with OneWest Bank, which had acquired the assets of IndyMa c Federal Bank. But either way, OneWest Bank, through its mortgage servicing division IndyMac Mortgage Services, remained the servicer entitled to collect appellant’s payments and to foreclose. This being the case, appellant failed to raise a triable issue of materi al fact with respect to his causes of action for quasi-contract and an accounting. As a closing note, appellant has not shown how the question regarding the legal effect of the Johnson-Seck a ssignment could have prejudiced him. 4 He was required to pay the monies owing under the note and deed of trust to the loan servicer in any event. Moreover, since OneWest Bank a nd Deutsche Bank are both parties to the litigation, and each of them claims the money was properly paid to the loan servicer,

4 We also note that, to the extent appe llant has raised additional issues for the first time in his reply brie f, we do not consider them. ( Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 108.)24 neither of them can come forward in the future and claim otherwise. “Absent any prejudice, [appellant has] no standing to comp lain about any alleged lack of authority or defective assignment. [Citations.]” ( Siliga v. Mortgage Electr onic Registration Systems,

Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 85.) The court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment.

III
DISPOSITION The order and judgment are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.