Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1712-CR-2976 | July 16, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Derick W. Steele

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremy Fletchall,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A02-1712-CR-2976

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. 

Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

34D01-1308-FB-643 

34D01-1501-F6-11

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jeremy Fletchall (Fletchall), appeals the trial court’s 

revocation of his probation and imposition of his previously suspended 

sentences.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Fletchall presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether Fletchall 

was properly advised of the terms of his probation before he was found to have 

violated his probation for the second time.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On August 23, 2013, the State charged Fletchall with three Counts of Class B 

felony dealing in a narcotic drug and two Counts of Class B felony dealing in a 

schedule II controlled substance in Cause No. 34D01-1308-FB-643 (FB-643). 

One Count of Class B felony dealing in a schedule II controlled substance was 

later dismissed. On January 7, 2015, while Fletchall was out on bond on FB643, the State filed another Information, charging him with two Counts of 

Level 6 felony theft in Cause No. 34D01-1501-F6-11 (F6-11). 

[5] On April 22, 2015, Fletchall entered into a plea agreement in both Causes, 

pleading guilty to three Counts of Class B felony dealing in a narcotic drug in 

FB-643 and to both Counts of Level 6 felony theft in F6-11. That same day, the 

trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years, with 10 years 
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executed and 5 years suspended for each of his offenses in FB-643. In F6-11, 

Fletchall was sentenced to concurrent terms of 913 days for each of his offenses. 

The trial court ordered the sentences in both Causes to run consecutively to 

each other, and verbally advised Fletchall:

As a specific condition of his probation he shall follow any and 

all recommendations made by the [p]robation [d]epartment 

concerning education or treatment, further that as a specific 

condition of his probation he shall attend, complete and pay for 

the Drug and Alcohol Program. . . . . As a further specific 

condition of his probation he shall make restitution to the 

Kokomo Police Department in the sum of $480.

(Suppl. Transcript Vol. II, p. 12). As part of its sentencing order, the trial court 

enumerated the following specific conditions of Fletchall’s probation:

Successfully attend, complete and pay for the Howard County 

Drug and Alcohol Program and/or such other program as may 

be from time to time designated by the Howard County Drug 

and Alcohol Program. As further specific conditions of 

probation, [Fletchall] is ordered to follow any and all 

recommendations made by the [p]robation [d]epartment 

including, but not limited to, treatment and education. As 

further specific conditions of probation, [Fletchall] is ordered to 

pay restitution to the Kokomo Police Department . . . It is 

recommended that [Fletchall] be placed in a Therapeutic 

Community Program while incarcerated in the Indiana 

Department of [C]orrection. Upon successful completion of said 

program, the [c]ourt will consider modifying his sentence, so as 

to reduce the total time of incarceration. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II. p. 11).
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[6] On May 9, 2016, Fletchall’s sentence in both Causes was modified to allow him 

to serve the balance of his suspended sentence on electronic monitoring and day 

reporting and/or re-entry court supervision through Community Corrections. 

On May 27, 2016, Fletchall entered into a re-entry court program participation 

agreement. This agreement, signed by Fletchall, provided him with all the 

terms and conditions of the re-entry program and noted, in relevant part:

8. If Participant is terminated from the [re-entry] [p]rogram 

while on the Community Transition Program they will be 

returned to the Department of Correction[]. If Participant is on 

probation they will be referred to the sentencing court for final 

disposition and if they are on parole they will be referred to the 

parole board for final disposition.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 5-6). 

[7] On November 9, 2016, the State filed a petition to revoke Fletchall’s suspended 

sentence in both Causes when he was found to have violated the rules of the reentry court program after testing positive for morphine and by leaving the 

program. As a result, Fletchall was terminated from the program. The trial 

court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition on March 21, 2017, and after 

Fletchall admitted to the allegations, the trial court revoked his probation. The 

trial court ordered Fletchall to serve 548 days of his previously-suspended 

sentence in FB-643 and in F6-11, the trial court ordered him to return to 

probation “with all the previous terms and conditions to remain in full force 

and effect,” after completing his sentence in FB-643. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, 

p. 32). 
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[8] On July 11, 2016, Fletchall signed specific conditions of home detention, which 

specified, in pertinent part:

6. I agree to limit my movement away from my house to involve 

only traveling to and from work. All other deviations must be 

pre-approved by the Community Corrections staff. If I am found 

to be away from my residence without prior permission from a 

Staff Member, I may be accused of escape. In case of a medical 

emergency, I agree to contact the Home Detention Staff as 

quickly as possible and show proof that it was in fact a medical 

emergency. Further, I understand that any attempt on my behalf 

to falsify information which will result in or has in fact resulted in 

a deviation from my schedule, will result in a violation being 

filed with the Prosecutor’s office. 

* * * *

27. I understand all of the above conditions and agree to comply 

with each provision. I understand that if I am found to be in 

violation of any of the aforementioned conditions, I may be 

subject to sanctions which may include loss of errand time, 

forfeiture of good time credit or possibl[y] jail. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 23, 26). 

[9] On July 18, 2017, Fletchall entered into a second re-entry court program 

participation agreement, which cautioned Fletchall that if he was terminated 

from the re-entry program, he would be returned to the Department of 

Correction or, if on probation, to the trial court for final disposition. In 

addition to the agreement, Fletchall was handed the re-entry handbook which 

contained all the conditions and sanctions of the programs. However, barely a 
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month later, on August 23, 2017, a second notice of termination from the reentry program was filed in both Causes because Fletchall was not in a place 

where he had permission to be. After being terminated from the re-entry 

program, the State filed a petition to revoke Fletchall’s suspended sentence in 

both Causes on October 12, 2017. During the fact-finding hearing on the 

State’s petition on November 21, 2017, Fletchall acknowledged that he had to 

follow certain rules with the re-entry program and admitted that he was out 

more than three hours running errands in violation of the program

requirements. The trial court concluded that Fletchall had violated the terms of 

his probation and revoked his probation. Fletchall was ordered to serve the 

entire balance of his previously-suspended sentence in both Causes.

[10] Fletchall now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[11] Fletchall contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in 

violation of his probation because the trial court had failed to advise him of the 

terms of his probation. Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court 

discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 

878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of 

probation and may revoke probation if conditions are violated. Id. Once a trial 

court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, 

the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed. Id. If 

this discretion were not afforded to the trial court and sentences were 

scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial courts might be less inclined to order 
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probation to future defendants. Id. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing 

decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion 

standard. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[12] Whenever the trial court places a person on probation, the court must specify 

on the record the conditions of the probation and give the person a written 

statement specifying his conditions of probation. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2-1; -2.3. 

“Thus, the law generally requires that if a person is placed on probation, the 

trial court must provide the defendant a written statement containing the terms 

and conditions of probation at the sentencing hearing.” Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 

1231, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). However, we have previously held that the 

trial court’s failure to provide written probation terms may be harmless error if 

the defendant has been orally advised of the conditions and acknowledges that 

he understands them. Id. 

[13] Nevertheless, during the trial court’s hearing on the State’s petition to revoke 

Fletchall’s probation, Fletchall never presented the argument that he had not 

been advised of the conditions of probation. It is well settled that a party may 

not present an argument or issue to an appellate court unless the party raised 

the same argument or issue before the trial court. See Craig v. State, 883 N.E.2d 

218, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Fletchall waived his claim.

[14] Furthermore, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) mandates that the argument 

section of an appellate brief should contain the contentions of the appellant 
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supported by cogent reasoning and with reference to the appropriate authorities 

and record. Not counting the standard of review, Fletchall’s entire argument is 

two sentences long, with another two sentences repeating what has already 

been stated. The argument is coached in general terms—"the failure to have 

written, signed rules of probation is fatal”—and fails to assert which proceeding 

Fletchall is referring to, which probation terms he was not advised about, or 

which were unclear. (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). Accordingly, Fletchall waived his 

claim.

[15] Notwithstanding these waivers, a review of the record discloses that Fletchall 

was apprised of his terms of probation, signed specific conditions of home 

detention, signed two re-entry court program participation agreements, and 

acknowledged during the hearing that he had violated the conditions of his 

probation. Therefore, as Fletchall was repeatedly advised of his probation 

conditions, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of his probation. 

CONCLUSION

[16] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in revoking Fletchall’s probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his 

previously suspended sentence.

Affirmed.

May, J. and Mathias, J. concur