IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

MIAMI DIVISION 

Case No. 

IN RE: Chapter 11 

IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., et al., Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 19-10289-LSS 

 

Debtors. (Jointly Administered) 

 / 

BLANCA MOURE-CABRERA, Adversary Case No. 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO., et al., 

 Defendants. 

 / 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL 

Pursuant to Rule 9027 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1334 and 1452, Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. 

(collectively, “J&J”) hereby remove the claims against J&J in the above-captioned matter (the 

“State Court Talc Claims”) from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for 

Miami-Dade County, Florida, Case No. 19-000727 (the “State Court”) to this Court. The 

grounds for removal are set forth below: 

BACKGROUND 

1. On February 13, 2019, Imerys Talc America, Inc., and two affiliates, Imerys Talc 

Vermont, Inc., and Imerys Talc Canada, Inc. (collectively, the “Debtors”), filed a voluntary 

chapter 11 petition, commencing a reorganization case styled: In re: Imerys Talc America, Inc., 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 1 of 11
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et al., Case No. 19-10289-LSS, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 

Delaware (the “Chapter 11 Case”). 

2. Since the Chapter 11 Case was commenced, the Debtors have remained as debtors 

in possession under 11 U.S.C. § 1101 and have the rights, powers, and duties set out in 11 

U.S.C. §§ 1107 and 1108. 

3. At the time the Debtors commenced the Chapter 11 Case, the State Court Talc 

Claims were pending in the State Court. The State Court Talc Claims are not proceeding before 

the United States Tax Court and are not brought by a governmental unit to enforce its police or 

regulatory powers. 

4. Among others, J&J and the Debtors are named as co-defendants in the abovecaptioned matter. The State Court Talc Claims are those brought against J&J. 

5. The State Court Talc Claims against J&J center on allegations that exposure to the 

Debtors’ talc caused the Plaintiff’s injuries—specifically, mesothelioma. J&J disputes these 

allegations. 

6. The Complaint (attached as Exhibit A hereto) generally alleges that exposure to 

asbestos, contained in the Debtors’ talc, through the habitual use of J&J cosmetic talcum powder 

products, caused the Plaintiff’s personal injury and/or wrongful death. J&J’s responsive 

pleading is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 

7. On April 18, 2019, J&J filed in the United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware (the “District of Delaware”) a Motion to Fix Venue for Claims Related to Imerys’s 

Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5) and 1334(b) (the “Motion”). The Motion and 

supporting papers are attached hereto as Exhibit C. The State Court Talc Claims are among 

those that J&J seeks to consolidate in the District of Delaware. 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 2 of 11
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8. Thousands of plaintiffs across the country allege similar personal injury and 

wrongful death claims against J&J (the “Talc Claims”). As noted in the declaration supporting 

the Debtors’ bankruptcy petition, the Debtors have historically been the exclusive supplier of 

cosmetic talc to J&J. See Declaration of Alexandra Picard, Chief Financial Officer of the Debtors 

in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings (the “First Day Declaration”) ¶ 18 

(attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of John J. Nolan in Support of the Motion, found in 

Exhibit C). Because the Debtors have historically been J&J’s sole supplier of cosmetic talc, the 

Debtors are routinely named as a co-defendant in the actions in which the Talc Claims arise. 

Even where the Debtors are not so named as co-defendants, however, the Talc Claims are related 

to the Debtors’ bankruptcy. 

9. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) provides as follows: 

The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful 

death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the 

bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in 

which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which 

the bankruptcy case is pending. 

10. The purpose of this section is to centralize the adjudication of claims, and the 

express language of the statute confers authority on the District of Delaware to determine the 

proper venue for trial of this civil action. See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 

1011 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming centralization of thousands of state and federal personal injury 

cases against debtors and non-debtor co-defendants in the district court where a bankruptcy was 

pending, finding “Section 157(b)(5) . . . expressly confers on the district court sitting in 

bankruptcy and having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy proceedings the power to fix the venue of 

any tort case against the debtor pending in other districts.”); Whittingham v. CLC of Laurel, LLC, 

No. 2:06cv11-KS-MTP 2006 WL 2423104, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 22, 2006) (“[T]he ultimate 

venue of the trial in the personal injury case should be determined by the District Court where 

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the bankruptcy case is pending.”); see also 1-3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.06 (16th ed. 2019) 

(“Section 157(b)(5) provides that the venue of the [personal injury tort and wrongful death] trial 

is to be determined by the district court in which the title 11 case is pending. This unusual, 

perhaps unique, provision empowers a court other than that in which the litigation is pending to 

decide where the trial is to take place. The court in which the title 11 case is pending has the 

options of trying the case itself or directing that the trial occur in the district court for the district 

in which the claim arose.”). 

11. Given the pendency of the Motion, J&J believes that this Court cannot and, in any 

event, should not take any further action in this civil action until the District of Delaware has 

ruled on the Motion. Because the District of Delaware has the ultimate power to determine venue 

of the personal injury and wrongful death claims, the District of Delaware necessarily has 

authority to consider any procedural motions filed in this civil action if the resolution of such 

motions might have some bearing on the trial of the claims. See Calumet Nat’l Bank v. Levine, 

179 B.R. 117, 120 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (“Under section 157(b)(5), the district court for the 

bankruptcy district has sole authority for ultimately fixing venue for [personal injury 

tort/wrongful death] actions against bankruptcy debtors.”). Accordingly, the appropriate course 

of action is to defer ruling on any motions, including any motions seeking abstention or remand, 

because the District of Delaware must first determine the venue in which this civil action should 

proceed. 

12. J&J filed the Motion in pursuit of equitable and uniform outcomes on threshold 

issues for the Debtors’ creditors, the thousands of plaintiffs prosecuting similar claims and 

actions across the country, the Debtors’ themselves, and J&J, and in the interest of efficiency and 

preservation of judicial resources. 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 4 of 11
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13. In deciding the Motion, J&J expects that the District of Delaware will address—

on a global scale, for all of the Talc Claims—the following issues: (i) federal subject matter 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), (ii) abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), (iii) equitable 

considerations, if any, favoring remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), and (iv) the propriety of the 

removal of the State Court Talc Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). 

14. Further, as noted in the Memorandum of Law in Support of Johnson & Johnson’s 

and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.’s Motion to Fix Venue for Claims Related to Imerys’s 

Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5) and 1334(b) (the “Memorandum of Law”) the District 

of Delaware may exercise its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) to fix venue for the State Court 

Talc Claims even if this Court remands the State Court Talc Claims back to the State Court. See

Ex. C, Memorandum of Law § IV. 

15. Therefore, in the interests of comity, efficiency, and achieving uniform outcomes 

by coordinated judicial proceedings, J&J respectfully requests that this Court await the District 

of Delaware’s forthcoming decision on the Motion before issuing a ruling on any future motion 

to remand filed by the Plaintiff in this matter. See Calumet, 179 B.R. at 121 (“[A] purpose 

behind section 157(b)(5) is making it possible for a single forum to oversee the many claims and 

proceedings that might arise in or affect a bankruptcy case.”). In cases involving transfer and 

remand motions, courts have held that the “transferee” court under section 157(b)(5) is the 

proper forum to decide the remand motion. See Whittingham, 2006 WL 2423104, at *1 

(“Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Remand and Request for this Court to abstain. This issue needs 

to be considered as a part of the big picture. The District Court in Georgia [with jurisdiction over 

the bankruptcy] should consider this issue.”); see also Calumet, 179 B.R. at 123 (court stayed all 

proceedings while debtor-defendant pursued section 157(b)(5) motion and deferred ruling on 

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pending motions because “whichever court ultimately takes the case should be the one that rules 

on the remaining argument”); cf. Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 01-

2113 DA, 2001 WL 34048067, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. April 3, 2001) (holding that transferee court in 

multidistrict litigation is “a proper authority to decide the remand motion” and “[t]he general rule 

is for federal courts to defer ruling on pending motions to remand in [multidistrict litigation]” 

until after the case is transferred). 

GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL 

16. A party “may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action . . . to the 

district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has 

jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1452(a). 

17. District courts have original jurisdiction to hear all civil proceedings that are, 

among other things, “related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 

18. Because J&J has filed the Motion in the District of Delaware, J&J primarily looks 

to the Third Circuit’s interpretation of related-to jurisdiction. A related-to case represents “the 

broadest of the potential paths to bankruptcy jurisdiction.” In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 

163 (3d Cir. 2004). Although such a case does not invoke a substantive right under the 

Bankruptcy Code, it is one that “could conceivably have an effect on the estate being 

administered in bankruptcy.” Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984), overruled 

on other grounds by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995). “A key 

word in this test is ‘conceivable.’ Certainty, or even likelihood, is not a requirement.” In re 

Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 1991). As clarified by later Third

Circuit decisions, Pacor’s “conceivable effect” test asks “whether the allegedly related lawsuit 

would affect the bankruptcy proceeding without the intervention of yet another lawsuit.” In re 

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W.R. Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 

F.3d 190, 227 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended (Feb. 23, 2005)). 

19. In any event, every other U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted or closely 

followed the standard for related-to jurisdiction as articulated by the Third Circuit in Pacor. See

In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 

F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir.1991); In re 

Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir.1990); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 

and n. 19 (11th Cir.1990); In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir.1988); In re Wood, 825 F.2d 

90, 93 (5th Cir.1987); In re Dogpatch, U.S.A., Inc., 810 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir.1987); A.H. 

Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002 n.11 (4th Cir. 1986); cf. Matter of FedPak Sys., Inc., 

80 F.3d 207, 213–14 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our precedents hold that [a] case is ‘related’ to a 

bankruptcy when the dispute ‘affects the amount of property for distribution [i.e., the debtor’s 

estate] or the allocation of property among creditors.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

20. As more fully described in the Memorandum of Law, there are three bases for 

exercising related-to jurisdiction over the State Court Talc Claims. First, through a series of 

supply agreements, certain contractual rights and obligations between the Debtors and J&J arose 

upon the filing of the Complaint asserting the State Court Talc Claims. See Ex. C, Memorandum 

of Law § II.A. Second, the Debtors have demanded coverage under certain insurance policies 

available to J&J. The Debtors’ First Day Declaration also claims “[o]ne or more of the Debtors 

also have rights to the proceeds of insurance policies issued to J&J and its subsidiaries.” Ex. C, 

Nolan Declaration, Ex. 1, First Day Declaration ¶ 28. Additionally, the Debtors were 

contractually obligated to obtain and maintain insurance naming J&J as an additional insured. 

See Ex. C, Memorandum of Law § II.B. Finally, each bottle of J&J cosmetic talcum powder 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 7 of 11
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purchased by the Plaintiff contained the Debtors’ talc. There exists an identity of interest 

between the Debtors and J&J such that the State Court Talc Claims are, in essence, claims 

against the Debtors. See Ex. C, Memorandum of Law § II.C. 

21. Accordingly, removal of the State Court Talc Claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1452(a). 

THE REMOVAL PREREQUISITES HAVE BEEN SATISFIED 

22. Removal of the State Court Talc Claims is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

1452. Removal is being accomplished in accordance with Rule 9027 of the Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) and the local rules of this Court (the “Local 

Rules”). 

23. The State Court is located in the division and district of this Court. Venue is 

proper under Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(1). 

24. Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(1) requires that this Notice of Removal “contain a 

statement that upon removal of the claim or cause of action, the party filing the notice does or 

does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy court.” J&J states that it 

does not consent to the entry of final orders or judgments by the Bankruptcy Court if it is 

determined that the Bankruptcy Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final orders or 

judgments consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution. Rather, through the 

Motion, J&J requests that the District of Delaware fix venue for the State Court Talc Claims in 

the District of Delaware. 

25. Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(1) further requires that this Notice of Removal “be 

accompanied by a copy of all process and pleadings.” Copies of “all process and pleadings” are 

attached hereto as Exhibit D. 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 8 of 11
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26. This Notice of Removal is being filed within ninety (90) days of the order for 

relief in the Chapter 11 Case. No order has been entered in the Chapter 11 Case with respect to 

the Civil Action terminating the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. This Notice of Removal 

is timely under Rule 9027(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 

27. In accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 9027(b), J&J will promptly serve written 

notice of this removal to the above-captioned Plaintiff’s counsel of record. 

28. All parties to the State Court Talc Claims pending in the State Court are 

HEREBY NOTIFIED that removal of the State Court Talc Claims will be effected upon the 

filing of a copy of this Notice of Removal with the Clerk of the State Court pursuant to 

Bankruptcy Rule 9027(c). And “[t]he parties shall proceed no further in that court unless and 

until the claim or cause of action is remanded.” Bankruptcy Rule 9027(c). 

29. No admission of law, fact, or liability is intended by this Notice of Removal. Nor 

does this Notice of Removal waive any defenses available to J&J. 

30. If any question is raised as to the propriety of the removal of the State Court Talc 

Claims, J&J requests the opportunity to present a brief and oral argument in support of removal, 

but would prefer that this Court await the District of Delaware’s decision on the Motion. 

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Dated: April 18, 2019 Respectfully submitted, 

CARLTON FIELDS, P.A. 

By: /s/ Alexandra D. Blye 

Alexandra D. Blye (Fla. Bar No. 71499) 

(ablye@carltonfields.com) 

Stephen J. Krigbaum (Fla. Bar No. 978019) 

(skrigbaum@carltonfields.com) 

Ryan S. Cobbs (Fla. Bar No. 912611) 

(rcobbs@carltonfields.com) 

CityPlace Tower – Suite 1200 

525 Okeechobee Boulevard 

West Palm Beach, FL 33401 

Tel: (561) 659-7070 

Fax: (561) 659-7368 

Counsel for Johnson & Johnson and 

Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 18, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document 

is being served this day by e-mail on all counsel of record identified on the below Service List, 

and by U.S. Mail on any pro se party. 

 /s/ Alexandra D. Blye 

 Alexandra D. Blye 

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 10 of 11
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SERVICE LIST 

Blanca Moure-Cabrera v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., et al. 

Case No. 

United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Florida 

Marc P. Kunen 

The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A. 

600 Brickell Ave., Suite 3800 

Miami, FL 33131 

mpk@ferrarolaw.com

mxt@ferrarolaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Andrea Cox 

Christopher Collings 

Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP 

200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3600 

Miami, FL 33131 

Andie.cox@saul.com

Christopher.collings@saul.com

Jessica.barrero@saul.com

Bonnie.mcleod@saul.com

Mia-ctdocs@saul.com

Attorneys for Publix Super Markets, Inc.

Stuart A. Weinstein

Shapiro Blasi Wasserman & Herman, P.A. 

7777 Glades Rd., Suite 400 

Boca Raton, FL 33434 

saweinstein@sbwlawfirm.com 

Attorneys for Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 

And Imerys Talc America, Inc.,

Case 19-01106-RAM Doc 1 Filed 04/18/19 Page 11 of 11