COURT OF APPEALS 

DECISION 

DATED AND FILED

July 2, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Court of Appeals 

 

NOTICE 

 This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1591-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF3225

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS 

DISTRICT I 

STATE OF WISCONSIN, 

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

 V. 

ASMAR M. YOUNG, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Before Kessler, Brennan and Kloppenburg, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

2 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Asmar M. Young entered pleas to four crimes 

committed over five days. Young filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his 

pleas, arguing that: (1) his pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered 

because the circuit court failed to establish a factual basis for one of the 

convictions; (2) his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

entered because (a) he was not advised of and did not understand the elements of 

the crimes and the maximum penalties, and (b) his original trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by advising Young to enter the pleas, and by not adequately 

explaining the elements of the crimes and the maximum penalties; and (3) his 

replacement counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these issues 

in his presentencing plea withdrawal motion. The court denied Young’s 

postconviction motion without a hearing. Young makes the same arguments on 

appeal. As we explain, we reject Young’s arguments and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The criminal complaint described the following five crimes: 

• On the afternoon of July 8, 2015, two men, Z.D. and D.S., were 

sitting in the front seat of a car when a male entered the car, pointed 

a pistol at them, and took the keys to the car, cash, and a cell phone 

belonging to one of the men. A second male took a wristwatch from 

one of the men. A third male accompanied the other two. The three 

males left in a red four-door car with tinted windows and a 

temporary license plate. 

• At about midnight on July 9, 2015, Z.D. and D.S., who had been 

robbed on July 8, saw the same red four-door car with a temporary 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

3 

license plate, followed the car, and were shot at by the same males 

who had robbed them. 

• At about 4:00 a.m. on July 9, 2015, L.A. (misidentified in the 

criminal complaint as L.J.) died of a single gunshot wound sustained 

as he drove away from two gunmen who had emerged from a red 

four-door car with tinted windows and who had fired at him at close 

range. 

• On July 11, 2015, a male armed with a handgun robbed D.K. of his 

car keys and stole his car from an apartment complex parking lot. A 

red car with a temporary license plate was seen in the complex at the 

time of the theft and was located near the stolen car when the stolen 

car was later recovered. 

• On July 13, 2015, a video recording showed an altercation between 

Young and J.T. as Young left a gas station, and the video showed 

Young then shooting with a handgun at a car into which J.T. had 

withdrawn. Young was wearing a T-shirt with the logo “LRG” on 

the front and was accompanied by two minor females. 

¶3 According to the criminal complaint, the two men robbed in their car 

on July 8 identified Young as one of the males who robbed them at gunpoint. 

Also according to the criminal complaint, D.K. told police that Young is his 

cousin and that, on the day D.K.’s car was stolen, Young came to his apartment, 

told D.K. that D.K’s car window had been smashed, and stayed in the apartment 

while D.K. went to check on his car. At that point D.K.’s car was stolen at 

gunpoint as described above, and Young left when D.K. returned to the apartment. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

4 

¶4 According to the criminal complaint, on July 16, 2015, law 

enforcement officers located Young inside a residence; he was wearing a T-shirt 

with the logo “LRG” on the front; two minor females were present; and a 9 

millimeter semi-automatic pistol was located in a couch. Forensic testing showed 

that the casing from that pistol matched the casings recovered from the scene of 

the shooting shortly after midnight on July 9, the scene of the shooting of L.A. at 

4:00 a.m. on July 9, and the scene of the shooting of J.T. on July 13. 

¶5 The State initially charged Young with two counts of armed robbery 

as a party to a crime for the July 8 robbery, one count of armed robbery as a party 

to a crime for the July 11 stealing of the car, and first-degree recklessly 

endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm by 

a felon for the July 13 shooting. The State subsequently filed several amended 

informations, ultimately adding one count of first-degree reckless homicide as a 

party to a crime with use of a dangerous weapon for the July 9 shooting death of 

L.A. and three additional counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. 

¶6 On the day the case was scheduled for trial, the parties told the 

circuit court that Young would enter pleas, and the court scheduled a plea hearing 

for two days later. At the plea hearing, Young pleaded no contest to one count of 

first-degree reckless homicide and guilty to one count of armed robbery, one count 

of first-degree recklessly endangering safety, and one count of possession of a 

firearm by a felon. 

¶7 Subsequently, Young told the circuit court he wanted to withdraw

his pleas because his trial counsel pressured him into entering the pleas. The court 

granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and Young’s replacement counsel filed a 

motion to withdraw Young’s pleas. The court held a hearing at which Young and 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

5 

trial counsel testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Young’s 

plea withdrawal motion. 

¶8 After a competency examination determined that Young was 

competent to proceed and was malingering, the case proceeded to sentencing. 

¶9 Postconviction, Young’s competence was again evaluated and he 

was found competent to proceed. Young then filed a motion to withdraw his 

pleas, and the circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Young appeals. 

¶10 We will relate additional facts, including details of the plea hearing 

and the hearing on Young’s presentencing plea withdrawal motion, in the

discussion that follows. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 Young argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea to the homicide 

count as not knowingly and intelligently entered because the circuit court failed to 

establish a factual basis for his plea to that count. Young also argues that he is 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his argument that his pleas were not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because: (1) he was not advised 

of and did not understand the elements of the crimes and the maximum penalties; 

(2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising Young to enter the 

pleas and by not adequately explaining the elements of the crimes and the 

maximum penalties; and (3) replacement counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to raise these issues in his presentencing plea withdrawal motion. We 

address and reject each argument in turn. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

6 

I. Failure to Establish Factual Basis for Homicide Plea1

¶12 When a defendant moves to withdraw his or her plea after 

sentencing, “the defendant carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that the [circuit court] should permit the defendant to 

withdraw the plea to correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, 

¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[I]f a circuit court fails to establish a factual basis” for a plea, as 

required by WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(b) (2017-18),2 “manifest injustice has 

occurred.” Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶17. The establishment of a factual basis is 

necessary for a plea to be knowing and intelligent. See State v. Lackershire, 2007 

WI 74, ¶¶34-35, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (stating that “establishing a 

factual basis under § 971.08(1)(b) is necessary for a valid plea” and “helps ensure 

that the defendant’s plea is knowing and intelligent” (citation omitted)). Pertinent 

here, establishing the factual basis for a plea means establishing “that a crime has 

been committed and it is probable that the defendant committed it.” State v. 

Payette, 2008 WI App 106, ¶7, 313 Wis. 2d 39, 756 N.W.2d 423. 

 

1

 This challenge implicates the circuit court’s duty in the plea colloquy to establish a 

factual basis for a plea. Challenges that a court has not fulfilled its plea colloquy duties are 

typically addressed under the analysis set forth in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 

12 (1986). However, our supreme court has acknowledged that “applying the Bangert procedure 

for failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement is an awkward fit.” State v. Lackershire, 2007 

WI 74, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23. Accordingly, we address Young’s factual-basis 

challenge in this section separately from the Bangert analysis that we apply to his other plea 

colloquy defect challenges in the section that follows. 

2

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.08(1)(b) provides that before a court accepts a plea of guilty or 

no contest, it shall “[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the 

crime charged.” All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless 

otherwise noted. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

7 

¶13 Here, the circuit court relied on the criminal complaint to establish 

the factual basis for the plea. “Whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to 

establish probable cause that [the defendant] committed the crimes charged is a 

question of law which we review de novo.” Id., ¶14.3 

¶14 Young does not argue that the criminal complaint contains 

insufficient facts to establish that the crime of first-degree reckless homicide 

occurred. Rather, Young argues that there is no factual basis for the homicide plea 

because the criminal complaint does not contain facts connecting Young to the 

homicide described in the criminal complaint. That is, Young argues that the 

 

3

 As the parties note, in State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 

836, the supreme court, in reviewing a factual-basis claim, stated, “A court’s decision to allow 

withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter of discretion, subject to the erroneous exercise of 

discretion standard on review.” Id., ¶13. However, the court in that case appeared to resolve the

factual-basis claim as a matter of law based on its own independent review of the record: 

We conclude ... that Thomas has not demonstrated the 

“manifest injustice” required to withdraw his guilty plea. A

factual basis supporting the plea was established, because when 

the record is viewed under the totality of the circumstances, it is 

evident that Thomas assented to the facts as his counsel 

stipulated to them. Since a proper factual basis was established, 

the guilty plea does not result in manifest injustice. 

Id., ¶27. Independent review is consistent with the supreme court’s more recent statement in 

State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659, that: 

When examining a defendant’s postconviction motion 

for plea withdrawal, we employ the following standard of 

review. “[W]hether a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty

plea ‘on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant 

to relief’ and whether the record conclusively demonstrates that 

the defendant is entitled to no relief” are questions of law that we

review de novo. 

(citation omitted) (italics added). Accordingly, we proceed with de novo review here. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

8 

criminal complaint does not establish that “it is probable that the defendant 

committed” the homicide. See id., ¶7. The record refutes Young’s argument. 

¶15 The criminal complaint here states the following. On the afternoon 

of July 8, 2015, Young used a gun to rob Z.D. and D.S. and then left in a red fourdoor car with tinted windows and a temporary license plate. Later, around 

midnight, Young fired gunshots at Z.D. and D.S. from the same red four-door car 

with a temporary license plate. Still later, at 4:00 a.m. on July 9, 2015, two men 

emerged from a red four-door car with tinted windows and fatally shot L.A. Then, 

on July 13, 2015, Young fired a gun at J.T. and injured him. The same gun was

used in each of the three shootings, and that gun was found on July 16, 2015, in 

the residence where Young was located. 

¶16 These facts suffice to establish that it was probably Young who used 

the same gun to shoot at Z.D. and D.S. around midnight on July 9, to fatally shoot 

L.A. around 4:00 a.m. on July 9, and to shoot J.T. on July 13. See id. (a sufficient 

factual basis requires a showing that the defendant probably committed the crime, 

not that the defendant’s guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt). 

¶17 On appeal, Young argues that the criminal complaint could not 

provide a factual basis for the plea because he was not charged with the homicide 

in the criminal complaint, but was rather charged in the amended information. 

However, Young cites no legal authority in support of his argument, and we need 

not consider it further. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, 

Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 (“Arguments 

unsupported by legal authority will not be considered, and we will not abandon 

our neutrality to develop arguments.” (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, the 

question is not whether the defendant was charged with the crime in the criminal 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

9 

complaint, but whether the facts in the complaint constitute the crime with which 

the defendant was ultimately charged and to which the defendant pleaded. See

Lackershire, 301 Wis. 2d 418, ¶48 (“[f]actual basis cases typically involve the 

question of whether undisputed facts actually constitute the crime charged” at the 

plea hearing). 

¶18 In sum, Young fails to show the absence of a factual basis for his nocontest plea to first-degree reckless homicide. 

II. Defective Plea Colloquy and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

¶19 As stated, “When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after 

sentencing, he [or she] must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 

refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would result in ‘manifest injustice.’” State 

v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (quoted source 

omitted). “One way for a defendant to meet this burden is to show that he [or she] 

did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

¶20 A defendant may show that the plea was not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered under one of two lines of cases: (1) the 

Bangert line of cases, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), 

when the plea colloquy is defective; or (2) the Nelson/Bentley line of cases, 

Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), and State v. Bentley, 

201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), when “some factor extrinsic to the plea 

colloquy, like ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion, renders a plea infirm.” 

State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶¶2, 74, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

10 

¶21 Young argues that the circuit court erred in failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his pleas based on 

(1) the circuit court’s failure to inform him of the elements of and maximum 

penalties for the crimes, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. To warrant an 

evidentiary hearing, Young must satisfy the requirements of Bangert or 

Nelson/Bentley. See id., ¶24. We analyze Young’s first challenge to the validity 

of his pleas under Bangert, and his second challenge under Nelson/Bentley. 

A. Young’s First Challenge—The Circuit Court Failed to Explain the Elements 

and the Maximum Penalties of the Crimes 

¶22 “A defendant may invoke Bangert only by alleging that the circuit 

court failed to fulfill its plea colloquy duties.” Id., ¶27. The court’s duties include 

establishing that the defendant understands the elements and the maximum 

penalties of the crimes. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 

¶35; WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a).4 A Bangert motion warrants an evidentiary 

hearing if the defendant (1) shows specific defects in the plea colloquy and 

(2) “alleges that in fact the defendant did not know or understand the information 

that should have been provided at the plea colloquy.” Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 

¶27; see also State v. Pegeese, 2019 WI 60, ¶26, __ Wis. 2d __, 928 N.W.2d 590. 

Whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Bangert motion is a 

question of law that we review independently. Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶¶30-31; 

Pegeese, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶17 (whether defendant has shown that the plea colloquy

was deficient such that a plea hearing requirement was violated is a question of 

law that this court reviews independently). 

 

4

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) provides that before a court accepts a plea of guilty or 

no contest, it shall determine that the plea is made “with understanding of the nature of the charge 

and the potential punishment if convicted.” 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

11 

¶23 Young alleges that the circuit court failed to explain, and that he did 

not understand, the elements and the maximum penalties of the crimes. We 

resolve this appeal by addressing only the first Bangert prong, whether the court 

failed to meet its plea colloquy duties with respect to explaining and ascertaining 

Young’s understanding of the elements and maximum penalties of the crimes. See 

Pegeese, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶28 n.6 (addressing only whether the circuit court met its 

obligations in conducting the colloquy where the defendant alleged that he did not 

understand what he alleged the court did not adequately explain). 

¶24 Young first alleges that the circuit court failed to explain and 

ascertain that he understood the elements of the crimes, but the record shows to 

the contrary. Specifically, the plea colloquy transcript shows that the court read 

each element of each crime to Young and asked Young if he understood, and that 

each time, Young answered that he understood. Young also signed a plea 

questionnaire that stated that his attorney had explained to him the elements that 

the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if he went to trial. 

¶25 Young acknowledges that the circuit court explained the legal 

elements of the four crimes to which Young agreed to plead but argues that the 

court’s explanation was too cursory to satisfy legal requirements. Young 

acknowledges that he indicated that he understood the elements of each crime but 

argues that his mere answering each question “yeah” does not suffice to 

demonstrate that he understood the elements. 

¶26 However, Young cites no legal support for the proposition that the 

circuit court must do more than what the court did here, namely, read each element 

of each crime and obtain Young’s affirmation that he understood. Accordingly, 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

12 

we do not further consider his argument as to the elements of the crime. See 

Industrial Risk Insurers, 318 Wis. 2d 148, ¶25. 

¶27 Second, Young alleges that the circuit court failed to explain and 

ascertain that he understood the maximum penalties for each crime, but the record 

refutes this argument as well. At the plea hearing, the court correctly told Young 

the maximum penalty for each crime, including any penalty enhancers, and Young 

told the court that he understood. In addition, the plea questionnaire that Young 

signed and that the court referenced at the plea hearing also identified the correct 

maximum penalties. Young fails to cite any legal authority supporting the 

proposition that the court was required to do more, and, therefore, we do not 

further consider his argument as to the maximum penalties. See id.

¶28 In sum, the record establishes that the circuit court fully and 

correctly explained the elements and maximum penalties of the crimes, and Young 

fails to present any legal authority supporting the proposition that the court was 

required to do more. Accordingly, Young is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

on his Bangert challenge. 

B. Young’s Second Challenge—Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶29 A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 

Nelson/Bentley if the defendant’s motion fails to allege sufficient facts that, if 

true, would entitle the defendant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, 

or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 

relief. Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶75. This court reviews independently whether a 

defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea “‘on its face alleges facts which would 

entitle the defendant to relief,’ and whether the record conclusively demonstrates 

that the defendant is entitled to no relief.” Id., ¶78 (citation and footnote omitted). 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

13 

¶30 A Nelson/Bentley claim based on ineffective assistance requires a 

defendant to prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Bentley, 201 

Wis. 2d at 311-12. If we determine that the defendant fails to make a sufficient 

showing on one of those two prongs, we need not examine the other. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). We resolve this appeal based on the 

deficient performance prong. 

¶31 To prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that, under 

all of the circumstances, counsel’s specific acts or omissions fell “outside the wide 

range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. We review counsel’s 

strategic decisions with great deference, because a strong presumption exists that 

counsel was reasonable in his or her performance. Id. at 689. “A fair assessment 

of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 

time.” Id. A defendant’s burden is to show that counsel “made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. 

¶32 “Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a 

mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶25, 374 Wis. 2d 

164, 892 N.W.2d 611. The circuit court’s findings of fact will be upheld unless 

they are clearly erroneous. Id. “‘[T]he circumstances of the case and ... counsel’s 

conduct and strategy’ are considered findings of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). However, whether those facts constitute deficient performance 

and whether such deficient performance was prejudicial are questions of law that 

we review independently. State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI App 138, ¶27, 246 

Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

14 

¶33 Young argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by advising Young to enter the pleas and by not adequately explaining the 

elements of the crimes and the maximum penalties. We address and reject 

Young’s arguments in turn. 

1. Improperly advising Young to enter the pleas 

¶34 In Young’s postconviction motion, Young alleges that he told his 

trial counsel before the plea hearing that he wanted new representation, and that 

counsel told him that he could seek new representation only after entering a plea. 

Young alleges that he then entered his pleas with the understanding that he could 

withdraw them after receiving a new attorney, but that the circuit court denied the 

plea withdrawal motion filed by replacement counsel. Thus, Young alleges, trial 

counsel improperly advised him to enter the pleas. 

¶35 Young testified as to these allegations in his presentencing plea 

withdrawal motion, and after an evidentiary hearing on that motion the circuit 

court rejected Young’s testimony as not credible. Trial counsel testified that: 

counsel did not coerce Young into entering a plea; counsel told Young that no one 

could force him to enter a plea and he did not have to if he did not want to; Young 

“wanted to delay” entering a plea and they discussed Young’s concerns and “he 

ultimately decided to go ahead and enter the plea”; if Young had not wanted to 

proceed with the plea hearing they would not have proceeded; and Young 

“certainly knew what was happening” with respect to the plea hearing. The court 

found counsel’s testimony credible. Given the court’s findings of credibility and 

fact at the presentencing plea withdrawal motion hearing, Young fails to show that 

trial counsel was deficient in advising him to enter the pleas and not withdrawing 

before the plea hearing. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

15 

2. Failure to adequately explain elements and maximum penalties

¶36 Young also alleges in his postconviction motion that his trial counsel 

failed to “adequately” explain the elements and maximum penalties of the crimes 

and that he did not have enough time to ask trial counsel his questions about the 

elements and maximum penalties. However, Young does not identify what 

unanswered questions he had or what more trial counsel should have told him 

about the elements and maximum penalties. Thus, his motion fails to allege 

sufficient facts to “allow the reviewing court to meaningfully assess [his] claim.” 

See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314. 

¶37 Moreover, the record refutes Young’s allegations. At the 

presentencing plea withdrawal motion hearing, Young testified generally that he 

did not understand what was going on in court but did not testify as to what

specifically he did not understand, or that trial counsel failed to explain the 

elements and maximum penalties of the crimes to him. Young also testified that 

he never read or signed the plea questionnaire that contained his signature. Trial 

counsel testified that Young did not tell him that Young did not understand any 

aspect of the plea proceedings, and that they met the day of the plea hearing for at 

least an hour discussing Young’s concerns. The circuit court found that trial 

counsel’s testimony was more credible than Young’s, that Young had met with 

trial counsel at least five or six times before the plea hearing, that Young signed 

the plea questionnaire as did counsel, and that Young understood the proceedings. 

The court also noted that Young had told the court at the plea hearing that his plea 

was voluntary and knowing after discussing it with trial counsel. The circuit court 

found that “nothing interfered with [Young] entering the plea.” 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

16 

¶38 In sum, Young fails to show that he is entitled to a hearing on his 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Replacement Counsel 

¶39 Finally, Young argues that replacement counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to raise all of the claims addressed above in the presentencing 

plea withdrawal motion, when the claims would have been reviewed under a more 

lenient standard. This allegation fails for two reasons. First, replacement counsel 

did raise Young’s challenge to the plea colloquy as to the elements of the crimes, 

as well as Young’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as to improperly 

coercing him to enter his pleas. Second, we have explained above why Young’s 

remaining claims—his claim of the lack of a factual basis for the plea, his 

challenge to the plea colloquy as to the maximum penalties, and his claim of 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel as to counsel’s explanation of the elements and 

maximum penalties—lack merit. Counsel is not deficient for failing to present 

claims that we have determined to lack merit. See State v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 

153, ¶14, 256 Wis. 2d 270, 647 N.W.2d 441 (“Failure to raise an issue of law is 

not deficient performance if the legal issue is later determined to be without 

merit.”). 

¶40 Accordingly, Young fails to show that he is entitled to a hearing on 

his claim of ineffective assistance of replacement counsel. 

CONCLUSION

¶41 For the reasons stated, we affirm. 

 By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed. 
No. 2018AP1591-CR 

17 

 This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.