### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20

‐ 2803

M ICHELLE J AUQUET

, individually

and as legal guardian of “Student A,”

her minor child,

Plainti ff‐ Appellant

,

v.

G REEN B AY A REA C ATHOLIC E DUCATION

, I NC

., Defendant

‐ Appellee

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 1:20

‐ cv

‐ 00647

— William C. Griesbach

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED F EBRUARY 12, 2021

— D ECIDED M AY 7, 2021

____________________

Before R IPPLE

, H AMILTON

, and S T

. E VE

, Circuit Judges

.

S T

. E VE

, Circuit Judge

. Before the arrival of the COVID

‐ 19

pandemic in the spring of 2020, Plainti ff Michelle Jauquet’s

daughter, “Student A,” was already experiencing an exceed

‐ ingly di ffi cult eighth grade year at Notre Dame of De Pere

Catholic Middle School in Wisconsin. One of her classmates,

“Student B,” repeatedly and inappropriately targeted Student2 No. 20

‐ 2803

A with sexually suggestive harassment beginning in the fall

of 2019 and continuing into the spring of 2020. As a result of

this bullying, Jauquet brought this suit on behalf of herself

and her daughter, alleging Title IX violations by the operator

of the students’ school, Defendant Green Bay Area Catholic

Education, Inc. (“GRACE”), as well as breach of contract and

negligence claims under Wisconsin state law. The district

court dismissed Plainti ff s’ Title IX claim with prejudice for

failing to state a claim and declined to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. This ap

‐ peal followe d.

For the reasons explained below, we a ffi rm the district

court’s dismissal order.

I. Background

Over the course of several months between 2019 and 2020,

Student B subjected Student A to vile and o ff ensive bullying,

both in school and online. As described in the complaint, Stu

‐

dent B began harassing Student A on a we ekend school trip

in September 2019. During that trip, Student B repeatedly

called Student A a “slut” and a “skinny bitch” and encour

‐ aged other classmates to do the same. On other occasions, Stu

‐

dent B ridiculed Student A for her weight and appearance, in

‐ cluding by telling other classmates in a group chat on Snap

‐

chat (an app known for its ability to send disappearing mes

‐

sages 1 ) that Student A “would be hot” if she “weren’t 50

pounds.”

1 See United States v. Kushmaul

, 984 F.3d 1359, 1361 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021)

(“Snapchat is a camera application for smartphones that allows users to,

among other things, send disappearing images to other Snapchat users.”)No. 20

‐ 2803 3

Student A and her mother did not initially report this har

‐

assment to school o ffi cials, as Student A feared retaliation

from Student B and his friends. Jauquet, however, requested

a meeting with the school principal, Molly Mares, when Jau

‐

quet discovered sexually suggestive and vulgar posts on Stu

‐

dent B’s Instagram account, another social networking ser

‐

vice. 2 Though these particular posts were not targeted at her

daughter, Jauquet was concerned by the graphic nature of the

posts. Jauquet also learned that Student B had texted a picture

exposing his naked genitalia to a female student at another

school; the photo made its way back to students at Notre

Dame, who then widely shared the picture. When Jauquet

met with Mares in December 2019, Mares agreed that the

posts and shared images were unacceptable.

After Jauquet’s meeting with Mares, Student B escalated

his cruel and vicious campaign against Student A. Days be

‐

fore their winter vacation, Student B told his classmat es that

they should “buy [Student A] a rope and teach her to use it,”

insinuating that the girl should hang herself. These comments

caused Student A to experience “serious emotional distress”

and she emailed her mother in the middle of the school day

for help. Mares met with Jauquet and Student B’s parents that

same day. The complaint alleges that Mares “coached” Stu

‐

dent B in to giving a “rote” apology to Student A. Mares also

suspended Student B for three days, which fell on the fi nal

three days before winter vacation.

(citing Create a Snap, Snapchat, h tt ps://support.snapchat.com/en

‐ US/a/capture

‐ a

‐ snap).

2 Dancel v. Groupon, Inc.

, 949 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 2019).4 No. 20

‐ 2803

Unsatis fi ed with the lack of “any protective or restorative

measures or other victim services” for Student A, Jauquet met

with the President of GRACE, Kim Desotell, and the school’s

police liaison the next day. When the police liaison denied

that she had jurisdiction over the ma tt er, Jauquet fi led a com

‐ plaint with the Brown County Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce, and the Sher

‐

i ff ’s O ffi ce issued a juve nile citation to Student B.

Frustrated by what Student A’s family saw as an inade

‐

quate response from Notre Dame and GRACE, Student A’s

grandfather sent multiple emails to school and diocese lead

‐ ership about the situation. Jauquet also threatened to pull Stu

‐

dent A and her sister from the school. Desotell responded by

forwarding the necessary transfer paperwork to Jauquet.

Ultimately, Student A and her sister remained at Notre

Dame, and their mother continued to press Desotell to take

stronger measures to protect her daughter from bullying at

the school. In response, Desotell sent an email to all eighth

‐ grade boys explaining that the school would not tolerate bul

‐ lying. Desotell further o ff ered to move Student A’s seat away

from Student B’s. Desotell maintained that GRACE had not

o ff ered victim services to Student A, because Student A did

not appear to need them—she had said that she was doing

“okay for now” during a meeting. So at Jauquet’s urging, Des

‐

otell met with Student A again, which the complaint acknowl

‐ edges was “helpful” to some degree. The complaint also al

‐ leges, however, that Desotell used the meeting to criticize the

Jauquet family and Ms. Jauquet in particular for “coach[ing]

her daughter to be more emotional.”

Beyond the allegations about the interactions between Stu

‐

dent A and Student B, the complaint also explains that this

bullying was part of a pa tt ern of behavior for Student B. TwoNo. 20

‐ 2803 5

years prior, Student B had bullied another male student using

anti

‐ LGBTQ slurs. In another example, Student B referred to

a student su ff ering from cancer as “the hunchback of Notre

Dame.”

The complaint also describes school policies and practices

that Plainti ff s believe foster a “boys will be boys” atmosphere

at the school. The complaint accuses GRACE of “cultural tol

‐

erance of improper and in some cases illegal male sexual be

‐

havior under the traditional mantra ‘boys will be boys.’ ” The

complaint suggests the school imposes a more restrictive

dress code on girls than boys as evidence of the school accom

‐ modating “rape culture” whereby “male students are not ex

‐ pected to bear responsibility for controlling sexual arousal or

keeping their sexual behaviors within accepted moral or legal

boundaries.” In addition, the complaint alleges that the school

tolerates both poor academic performance and “obscene, dis

‐ respectful, and disruptive behaviors” from boys that it does

not tolerate from girls. This situation “emboldens students

like [Student B] to escalate harassing behaviors, including

sexual ones.”

The district court dismissed Plainti ff s’ Title IX claim fi nd

‐ ing that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege the school was delib

‐ erately indi ff erent to the alleged harassment” and that the “al

‐ legations [were] too vague and inde fi nite to state a claim for

sexual discrimination or harassment on the part of the

school.” On appeal, Plainti ff s challenge the district court’s dis

‐

missal of their complaint for two reasons. First, they argue

that the district court impr operly narrowed their claim of di

‐

rect discrimination by Notre Dame. Second, they argue that

the district court’s ruling on Plainti ff s’ indirect discrimination

claim was contrary to the facts pled in the complaint.6 No. 20

‐ 2803

II. Discussion

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint de

novo, and the decision to dismiss a claim with prejudice for

an abuse of discretion. Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising,

LLC

, 887 F.3d 329, 333, 335 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court may af

‐

fi rm on any ground supported by the record. Id. ; see also Sand

‐

ers v. Venture Stores, Inc.

, 56 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 1995).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court “construe[s] all allegations

and any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the plainti ff .” Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC

, 978 F.3d 507, 512

(7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “[W]hile a complaint does not

need ‘detailed factual allegations’ to survive a 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, it must allege su ffi cient facts ‘to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 512–13 (quoting

League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago

, 757 F.3d

722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). At the motion to dismiss stage, plainti ff s must set

forth “adequate factual detail to lift [their] claims from mere

speculativ e possibility to plausibility.” Schillinger v. Kiley

, 954

F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal

, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)).

A. Whether the district court correctly dismissed Plainti ff s’

Title IX claims

Title IX provides that: “No person in the United States

shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be

denied the bene fi ts of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any education program or activity receiving Federal fi nancial

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “The Supreme Court has in

‐ terpreted Title IX to provide individual plainti ff s with anNo. 20

‐ 2803 7

implied private right of action to pursue claims of gender dis

‐

crimination in federal court and has recognized a number of

claims that constitute discrimination

. ” Doe v. Columbia Coll.

Chicago

, 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Cannon v.

Univ. of Chicago

, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979)).

A plainti ff may allege a “direct” or “institutional” Title IX

violation by pleading facts to show that the school itself dis

‐

criminated against a person on the basis of their sex. See id. A

plainti ff may also pursue a theory of “indirect” discrimination

by way of student

‐ on

‐ student harassment that is so sev ere

that the harassment functionally excludes a student from

school activities on the basis of sex. See Davis Next Friend La

‐

Shonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed.

, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The

district court reviewed Plainti ff s’ complaint for both of these

theories of Title IX discrimination and found that Pl ainti ff s

had not alleged facts to support either theory.

1. Indirect Sex Discrimination

In Davis

, the Supreme Court held that victims of stu

‐

dent

‐ on

‐ student harassment could sue their school for dam

‐

ages if the school had been deliberately indi ff erent to sev ere

and pervasive harassment of which the school had actual

knowledge. 526 U.S. at 648. “[R]ecipients [of federal funding]

may be liable for their deliberate indi ff erence to known acts

of peer sexual harassment.” Id. But, “[k]eeping in mind how

thoughtless and even cruel children can be to one another, the

Supreme Cour t has interpreted both Title VI and Title IX to

impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school

o ffi cials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of

another.” Doe v. Galster

, 768 F.3d 611, 613–14 (7th Cir. 2014);

see also Columbia Coll. Chicago

, 933 F.3d at 857 (noting that de

‐

liberate ind i ff erence is a “high bar”). First, the school or school8 No. 20

‐ 2803

o ffi cials must have had actual knowledge of sex

‐ based harass

‐

ment. Galster

, 768 F.3d at 613–14. Second, the harassment

must have been “so severe, pervasive, and objectively o ff en

‐

sive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the

educational opportunities or bene fi ts provided by the

school.” Id

. (quoting Davis

, 526 U.S. at 650). Third, the school

must have been deliberately indi ff erent to the harassment.

Davis

, 526 U.S. at 648. “To ensure that school administrators

continue to enjoy the fl exibility they require in making disci

‐ plinary decisions, the school will not be held liable unless its

response to harassment is clearly unreasonable in light of the

known circumstances.” Johnson v. Ne. School Corp.

, 972 F.3d

905, 911–12 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omi tt ed) (cit

‐ ing Davis

, 526 U.S. at 648); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest

‐ Chicago

Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163

, 315 F.3d 817, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2003)

(school’s response to sexualized bullying of victim student

was not clearly unreasonable “in light of each of the immedi

‐

ate disciplinary and preventative steps the school district

[took] in response to [the bully’s] conduct[.]”).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that the cause of action

for indirect Title IX claims is limited. Allowing these kinds of

suits “does not mean that recipients [of federal funds] can

avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable peer

harassment or that administrators must engage in particular

disciplinary action.” Davis

, 526 U.S. at 648. Moreover, victims

of harassment do not have a “Title IX right to make particular

remedial demands.

... In fact, as we have previously noted,

courts should refrain from second

‐ guessing the disciplinary

decisions made by school administrators.” Id. (citing New Jer

‐

sey v. T.L.O.

, 469 U.S. 325, 342–43 n.9 (1985)); Gabrielle M.

, 315

F.3d at 825 (same).No. 20

‐ 2803 9

Here, the parties agree that deliberate indi ff erence is the

only issue in dispute. GRACE has conceded that it is subject

to Title IX, and GRACE does not contest that it had actual

knowledge of the harassment. In its motion to dismiss,

GRACE argued that the harassment of Student A did not rise

to the leve l of “depriv[ing her] of access to the educational

opportunities [and] bene fi ts provided by the school.” Galster

,

768 F.3d at 614. GRACE, however, has correctly abandoned

that line of argument on appeal; we agree with Plainti ff s that

the cruel bullying was severe and pervasive. See id. at 613–14.

GRACE now agrees that “‘[d]eliberate indi ff erence’ is the

[only] element at issue in this appeal.”

Although we condemn Student B’s behavior, we agree

with the district court that GRACE was not deliberately indif

‐

ferent to Student A’s harassment. The school responded

promptly to Plainti ff s’ bullying complaints, and the complaint

does not contain any allegations that the bullying persisted

beyond early January 2020, even though plainti ff s did not fi le

their complaint until April. See Gabrielle M.

, 315 F.3d at 825

(school district did not act with deliberate indi ff erence as a

ma tt er of law where the district promptly dis ciplined a school

bully). “This is not a situation where the school ‘learned of a

problem and did nothing.’” Johnson

, 972 F.3d at 912 (quoting

Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE–2 Sch. Dist.

, 511 F.3d

1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008)). In this case, school o ffi cials sus

‐ pended the primary perpetrator, Student B, for several days

in December 2019. In addition, Plainti ff s met with school o ffi‐

cials several times, including once for the express purpose of

allowing Student A to voice her concerns as a victim of bully

‐ ing. School o ffi cials o ff ered to change her seat in class and fa

‐

cilitated an apology from Student B. These acts all demon

‐

strate that the school was not deliberately indi ff erent to10 No. 20

‐ 2803

Student A’s harassment; the school’s response to the harass

‐

ment was not “clearly unreasonable in light of the known the

circumstances.” Johnson

, 972 F.3d at 911–12; Gabrielle M.

, 315

F.3d at 825.

Plainti ff s do not believe that the school took su ffi cient ac

‐

tion. But even if the s chool’s response to the harassment was

not as fulsome as a parent would want for her child, “[a] neg

‐ ligent response is not unreasonable, and therefore will not

subject a school to liability [under Title IX].” Johnson

, 972 F.3d

at 911–12. Here, Plainti ff s seem particularly upset that Stu

‐

dent B was not outright expelled and that Principal Mares

“coached” him into issuing an apology to Student A. But, Da

‐

vis makes clear that Title IX liability does not give victims li

‐

cense to demand particular remedial actions from the school.

See Davis

, 526 U.S. at 648.

In Davis

, the Supreme Court speci fi cally war ned courts not

to intrude upon the educational decisions made by school of

‐

fi cials. 526 U.S. at 648. And this Court has recently empha

‐

sized this point:

[W]e will not second guess a school’s disciplinary de

‐

cisions—even a school’s decision not to impose any

disciplinary measures—so long as those decisions are

not clearly unreasonable. Indeed, judges “make poor

vice principals.” And in appropriate cases, courts can

“identify a response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a

ma tt er of law.”

Johnson

, 972 F.3d at 912 (citing Davis

, 526 U.S. at 648–49; Stiles

ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cty., Te nn.

, 819 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir.

2016); Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist.

, 743 F.3d 982,No. 20

‐ 2803 11

996 (5th Cir. 2014)); see also Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.

,

956 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020).

Here, the district court followed this guidance in dismiss

‐ ing Plainti ff s’ Title IX claim for student

‐ on

‐ student harass

‐

ment. Although we recognize that Student B’s inappropriate

and unacceptable comments made the challenging ye ars of

junior high even more stressful for Student A, the school

quickly disciplined Student B and his bullying stopped. While

it is understandable that Jauquet would have preferred the

school to take even more decisive action in punishing Student

B for his behavior, Title IX does not require a school to sat isfy

a victim’s parent’s remedial requests.

2. Direct Sex Discrimination

The district court also analyzed whether Plainti ff s had al

‐ leged a claim for Title IX discrimination perpetrated directly

by GRACE but found that Plainti ff s’ “allegations are too

vague and inde fi nite to state a claim for sexual discrimination

or harassment on the part of the school.” Cf. Columbia Coll.

Chicago

, 933 F.3d at 856 (plainti ff failed to allege “facts that

could lead to a reasonable inference that [the defendant

school] denied him an educational bene fi t because of his

sex.”).

Pl ainti ff s contend that the school culture at Notre Dame

fosters an environment that discriminates against female stu

‐

dents on the basis of their sex. According to the complaint,

GRACE generally permits “gender discriminatory policies

and practices that, in addition to their direct impacts on Plain

‐

ti ff ’s daughter, also support sexual bullying and allow it to

fl ourish.” To support these allegations of direct sex discrimi

‐

nation, Plainti ff s point to Notre Dame’s dress code, which12 No. 20

‐ 2803

Plainti ff s maintain is more restrictive of girls’ clothing; to the

higher academic standards that are girls are held to compared

to boys at GRACE; and to GRACE’s tolerance of a high level

“obscene, disrespectful, and disruptive behavior[]” from boys

that it would not tolerate from girls. At oral argument, Pl ain

‐

ti ff s also pointed to Student A’s experience at Notre Dame as

further support for their allegations of discriminatory policies

and practices.

“A [direct] Title IX discrimination claim requires a plain

‐

ti ff allege (1) the educational institution received federal fund

‐ ing, (2) plainti ff was excluded from participation in or deni ed

the bene fi ts of an educational program, and (3) the educa

‐

tional institution in question discriminated against plainti ff

based on gender.” Columbia Coll. Chicago

, 933 F.3d at 854 (cit

‐ ing Doe v. Purdue Univ.

, 928 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2019)).

Here, the parties do not dispute that GRAC E receives fed

‐

eral funding and is subject to Title IX’s requirements. With re

‐ gard to the second element of exclusion from participation in

or denial of the bene fi ts of an educational program, the com

‐ plaint does not specify what program or bene fi t Student A

was not able to access because of the dress code or the di ff er

‐

ences in the school’s expectations for students. In fact, the

complaint repeatedly emphasizes that Student A is an honor

roll student and does not suggest her academic status

changed as a result of the practices and policies alleged. While

it is possible as a general ma tt er that a school’s dress code

, cul

‐

ture, and response to bullying could exclude a student from

educational bene fi ts on the basis of her sex, Plainti ff s have not

pled facts in this case to support an inference that GRACE ex

‐

cluded Student A beca use of her sex. The facts alleged in the

complaint do not support a reasonable inference that thisNo. 20

‐ 2803 13

particular plainti ff was excluded from the bene fi ts of an edu

‐

cational program. See Schillinger

, 954 F.3d at 994.

Even if Plainti ff s were able to satisfy the second element of

a direct Title IX claim, the complaint also fails to allege facts

to support the contention that GRAC E discriminated against

Student A on the basis of her sex. At the motion to dismiss

stage, plainti ff s must set forth “adequate factual detail to lift

[her] claims from mere speculative possibility to plausibility.”

Id. (citing Iqbal

, 556 U.S. at 678).

In Columbia College

, the district court dismissed a male

plainti ff ’s Title IX claims for failing to state a claim, where he

alleged that his college deprived him of access to his educa

‐

tion through its handling of a female student’s accusation of

sexual assault against him and we a ffi rmed. 933 F.3d at 854–

55. There, the plainti ff accused the school of discriminating

against him through its process for handli ng sexual assault

allegations after the school suspended the plainti ff for one

year following a formal disciplinary hearing, during which

the plainti ff was given an opportunity to present exculpatory

evidence. Id. at 853. In addition, the plainti ff charged that the

school fostered an “anti

‐ male” campus culture through the

school’s approv al of various campus events that showed its

commitment to preventing and remedying sexual violence.

Id. at 855. But we found that “there [was] no way to plausibly

infer that Columbia’s investigation or adjudication was

tainted by an anti

‐ male bias. [The plainti ff ] fail[ed] to allege

particularized facts that could lead to a reasonable inference

that [the school] denie d him an educational bene fi t because of

his sex.” Id. at 856.

Here too, Plainti ff s’ allegations of GRACE’s direct sex dis

‐

crimination are too vague and conclusory to state a claim for14 No. 20

‐ 2803

relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because

there are insu ffi cient facts to “draw [a] reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable” for Title IX sex discrimination.

Schillinger

, 954 F.3d at 994. Although Student B bullied Stu

‐

dent A based on her sex, the complaint contains no facts to

support a reasonable inference that the school’s response was

impacted by Student A’s sex, or, more to the point, that

GRACE denied her an educational bene fi t through its han

‐ dling of Student B’s bullying based on Student A’s sex. See

Columbia Coll. Chicago

, 933 F.3d at 856. “A plainti ff cannot rely

on [] generalized allegations alone,

... but must combine them

with facts particular to [her] case to survive a motion to dis

‐

miss.” Id. at 855.

Plainti ff s’ complaint contains several other allegations of

direct discrimination that are not supported by any facts. For

example, the complaint alleges that the school discriminates

against female stude nts by imposing a more restrictive dress

code on girls than on boys. But the complaint does not even

say what the dress code is. We have previously recognized

that a dress code can form the basis of a Title IX violation, but

the mere existence of a dress code, by itself, is not evidence of

discrimination. See Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch.

Corp.

, 743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2014). In Hayden

, we reversed the

district court’s dismissal of a plainti ff ’s Title IX claim that wa s

based on a haircut policy requiring male basketball players to

wear short hair. Id. at 572. There, we found that the school did

intentionally discriminate against boys by virtue of the short

hair policy. Id. at 583. Hayden

, however, does not stand for the

proposition that di ff erences in dress codes necessarily violate

Title IX. See id. at 584 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dis

‐ senting in part). “[D]i ff ering grooming standards are not dis

‐

crimination if they are comparable.” Id. (collecting cases).No. 20

‐ 2803 15

Here, the complaint did not specify what aspects of the dress

code are more restrictive for girls than for boys, either in the

policy or its enforcement. There are thus no facts from which

we can draw a reasonable inference that the dress code dis

‐

criminates against female studen ts. See Schillinger

, 954 F.3d at

994.

The complaint is similarly devoid of factual support for its

allegations that GRACE holds female students to higher

standards of academic performance and behavior than male

students. And the complaint does not contain facts to permit

a reasonable inference that Student A was denied access to

educational bene fi ts because she was allegedly held to a

higher standard of academic performance. Without any fac

‐

tual support to show that female students are treated di ff er

‐ ently than male students on account of their sex, the com

‐ plaint’s conclusory allegations are insu ffi cient to survive a

motion to dismiss. “Title IX requires a systemic, substantial

disparity that amounts to a denial of equal opportunity before

fi nding a violation of the statute.” Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty.

Sch. Corp.

, 667 F.3d 910, 922 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Davis

, 526

U.S. at 650). Plainti ff s have not pled such a case here.

B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in dis

‐ missing Plainti ff s’ Title IX claims with prejudice and

state law claims without prejudice

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

Plainti ff s’ Title IX claims with prejudice. “We will not reverse

a district court’s decision [to dismiss a complaint with preju

‐ dice], when the court provides a reasonable explanation for

why it denied the proposed amendment.” Gonzalez

‐ Koeneke v.

West

, 791 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2015).16 No. 20

‐ 2803

Here, Plainti ff s made no e ff ort to amend their complaint

or to add any speci fi cs to the complaint, which the district

court described as “vague and inde fi nite.” Plainti ff s also did

not seek reconsideration by the district court, seek leave to fi le

an amended complaint, or otherw ise request an opportunity

to cure the de fi ciencies of their complaint. On appeal and at

the district court, they have not shown or argued that the

complaint could be cured with additional facts that could

support a Title IX claim. Indeed, even at oral argument, Plain

‐

ti ff s’ counsel asserted that the complaint as drafted was su ffi‐

cient. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of dis

‐

cretion to dismiss the Title IX claim with prejudice. Although

leave to amend is ordinarily “freely given,” we have “recog

‐

nized, on many occasions, that a district court does not abuse

its discretion by denying a motion for leave to amend when

the plainti ff fails to establish that the proposed amendment

would cure the de fi ciencies identi fi ed in the earlier com

‐ plaint.” Id. at 807. In this case, Plainti ff s never even requested

leave to amend their complaint or for reconsideration before

appealing th e district court’s order. As a result, they have not

demonstrated how they could cure the complaint’s de fi cien

‐

cies, so dismissal with prejudice was not unreasonable. “A

district court does not ‘abuse its discretion by failing to order,

sua sponte

, an amendment to [the complaint] that [the plain

‐

ti ff ] neve r requested.’” Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co.

, 937 F.3d 998,

1008 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wagner v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.

,

840 F.3d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Without a federal claim in the case, the district court ap

‐ propriately dismissed Plainti ff s’ state law claims without prej

‐

udice, thereby relinquishing subject ma tt er jurisdiction over

the remaining claims. See O’Brien v. Vill. of Lincolnshire

, 955

F.3d 616, 628 (7th Cir. 2020) (no abuse of discretion inNo. 20

‐ 2803 17

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims); Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity

, 479 F.3d 904 (7th

Cir. 2007) (describing the “sensible presumption” that federal

courts may dismiss state law claims when all federal claims

have dropped out of a case prior to trial).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the district

court is

A FFIRMED

.