United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-2749

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Kelvin Key, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

Raymond Marvin Mickelson, Jr.; *

Gary Case; on their own behalf and *

on behalf of others similarly situated, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

James McKinney; John Ault; *

Russell Behrends, C/O; Mayo, Captain, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

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Submitted: April 22, 1999

Filed: May 13, 1999

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Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

While he was incarcerated in Anamosa State Penitentiary Kelvin Key was

restrained in handcuffs and leg shackles for twenty-four hours for throwing water on

a corrections officer. Key filed this action against Iowa prison officials under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the restraint procedure violated his Eighth and
1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa, with the consent of the parties.

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Fourteenth Amendment rights. After trial on a stipulated record the district court1 ruled

in favor of the defendants, and Key appeals from the judgment. We affirm.

After disturbances in Anamosa prison caused by inmates throwing food trays,

feces, and other objects at corrections officers, Warden John Ault instituted a new

restraint policy. Under the new policy inmates caught spitting, throwing objects, or

starting a fire were to be placed in restraints for twenty-four hours. Notice of the new

policy was given to inmates in those areas of the prison where the disorderly conduct

had occurred.

The policy provided that corrections officers who observed inappropriate

behavior were to contact the shift supervisor. The supervisor then decided whether or

not to place an inmate in restraints. When the policy was first implemented, inmates

were restrained by placing them in handcuffs which were then attached to a belly chain.

The belly chain severely limited an inmate’s movement, and a different mechanism was

adopted after a restrained inmate had defecated on himself. The revised procedure

connected an inmate’s handcuffs by means of a loose chain to leg shackles. Although

inmates did not have a full range of motion while connected to the leg shackles, they

were generally able to take care of their basic bodily functions. Before being placed

in restraints an inmate showered and was strip-searched. According to the policy a

restrained inmate was checked by a nurse every eight hours and by a corrections officer

every thirty minutes. During the period of restraint the inmate was given three meals

of institutional food loaf, a concoction prepared by blending and cooking together all

of the components of a meal.

Key was restrained for twenty-four hours after he threw water on a correction

officer’s leg while on a work detail outside of the prison. Key testified that he had not
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received prior notice of the new policy and that he had no hearing before he was

restrained. He claims he accidentally spilled water on the officer because he tripped,

but the prison disciplinary committee, which met after Key had already been placed in

restraints, found that he had only pretended to trip and that he intentionally threw the

water.

Key testified that while restrained he had difficulty sleeping and taking care of

his bodily functions and that the restraints were painful. He claimed that he was unable

to cover himself with his blanket and that his requests to have his handcuffs loosened

to relieve the pain were denied. He admitted he was “able to take care of bodily

functions such as urinating,” but said “it’s hard,” and indicated that he had urinated on

himself and had not had a bowel movement because of the circumstances. He also

complained that he was not able to have a shower for a day after being released.

Key, together with inmates Raymond Marvin Mickelson, Jr. and Gary Case, who

had also been restrained under the new policy, filed this action seeking damages and

injunctive relief. They claimed that the policy violated the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment

requirement of due process. In addition to Warden Ault the inmates sued James

McKinney, former Deputy Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections; Russell

Behrends, Security Director of Anamosa; and Curt Mayo, a Correctional Supervisor

at Anamosa. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and

eventually ruled for the defendants. It found that the restraint procedure was

humiliating, degrading, and uncomfortable, but not painful, and that the policy was

intended to manage behavior rather than to punish. It concluded that the restraint

procedure did not violate the inmates’ right to humane conditions of confinement and

was not malicious and sadistic; it thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment. It also

concluded that the inmates’ due process claims failed because the restraint policy did

not create liberty interests requiring any particular process.
2Key has meanwhile been transferred from Anamosa to the Iowa State

Penitentiary, possibly making his claim for injunctive relief from the Anamosa policy

moot. See, e.g., Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). Key’s claim

for monetary damages is not moot, however. See id.

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Mickelson and Cash chose not to appeal, but Key did.2 He claims that the

district court erred in concluding that Anamosa’s twenty-four hour restraint policy did

not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or the

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. The state prison officials urge

affirmance on the grounds relied on by the district court and also raise qualified

immunity as a defense. We review the district court’s factual findings after trial for

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir.

1996).

To make out an Eighth Amendment violation a plaintiff must show a serious

deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and “offending

conduct [that is] wanton.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302 (1991) (quotations

omitted). A successful challenge to conditions of confinement requires a showing that

prison officials have been deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s health or safety.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A challenge to the way in which prison

officials respond to a disturbance must show that they acted “maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

320–21 (1986) (quotations omitted).

Key claims that the restraint procedure deprives inmates of the minimal civilized

level of living. Restrictive prison measures more severe than this procedure have been

found not to violate the Constitution, however. See O’Leary v. Iowa State Men’s

Reformatory, 79 F.3d 82, 83 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“inmate . . . deprived of

underwear, blankets and mattress, exercise, and visits”); Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d

961, 963 (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate placed in “strip cell for two days without clothing,
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bedding, or running water, with a concrete floor, a concrete slab for a bed, and cold air

blowing on him”); Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1995) (no clothes,

running water, hygiene supplies, blanket, or mattress). In this case Key was in

handcuffs and leg shackles for twenty-four hours after being accused of throwing liquid

on a guard while on a work detail outside the prison. He was not deprived of bedding,

food, or bathroom facilities, and he was checked on by a nurse and guard at regular

intervals. While the shackles made it more difficult to sleep and relieve himself, he has

not shown that he suffered a serious deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities.”

The parties agree that the Farmer standard of culpability may be appropriately

applied to this case, and the record shows that the prison officials were not deliberately

indifferent to the health and safety of restrained inmates. In response to inmate

difficulty in taking care of bodily functions, prison officials changed the method of

restraint to allow inmates a greater range of movement. The condition of the restrained

inmates was regularly checked, and the record contains examples of handcuffs being

loosened and medical conditions being considered. This does not show deliberate

indifference or wanton conduct. In light of this conclusion we need not consider the

applicability of the Whitley standard which gives prison officials even more leeway

when they are acting in response to disturbances within an institution. 475 U.S. at

320–21. Since Key has not shown a serious deprivation of “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities” and “offending conduct [that is] wanton,” his Eighth

Amendment claim fails.

Key also argues that he has a liberty interest in not being shackled as punishment

and that he was therefore entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard

before being restrained for twenty-four hours. A prison inmate only has a liberty

interest in a condition of confinement if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range
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of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court

of law.” Id. at 485. In Sandin the Supreme Court held that thirty days of solitary

confinement — as compared to administrative segregation, protective custody, and

normal “lockdown time” for inmates in the general population — “did not work a

major disruption in [the inmate’s] environment.” Id. at 486. Similarly, twenty-four

hours in restraints — as compared to time prisoners can expect to be handcuffed and

in leg shackles while serving their sentences — did not work a major disruption in

Key’s prison life. Consequently, Key had no liberty interest in not being restrained and

therefore no right to due process before the restraints were imposed. Accordingly, he

has not made out a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.