AFFIRMED, and Opinion Filed May 29, 1997

In The (Hffiirt nfAppeals ¥iftl| Btstrtrt at Qkxas at lallas

No. 05-95-01613-CR No. 05-95-01614-CR No. 05-95-01615-CR

SHANE HOWARD BALDWIN, Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F92-29378-RM, F92-29810-RM, and F92-29817-PM

OPINION Before Justices Lagarde, Hankinson, and Bridges Opinion By Justice Bridges Shane Howard Baldwin appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and two 

### offenses oftheft. After the trial court overruled appellant's motions to suppress, appellant 

### entered aplea of nolo contendere before the court, and the trial court found appellant 

### guilty. In three points oferror, appellant complains generally ofthe trial court's denial ofhis motions to suppress. We affirm the judgments ofthe trial court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Early on the morning of June 22, 1992, Grand Prairie police officers Ballard and 

### Wills responded to aresidential burglar alarm at 209 Gramley Drive. At the house, the officers saw the front doorwas open and heard the alarm going off. They entered the house 

### and quickly searched through the house for burglars. In the course of this search, the officers found no burglars but discovered two new air conditioning units with their wires cut and two bedrooms full of electronic equipment. Based on their observations, the officers 

### supposedthatthe resident ofthe house mightworkonelectronic equipment. GrandPrairie 

### policedepartmentpolicyrequires officersrespondingto a residentialalarmatanunoccupied residence to identify and contactthe owner ofthe residence before leaving. OfficerBallard 

### saw a portable cellularphone onthe floor ofonebedroom, andthe plasticflap ofthe phone
case showed aman's name and phone number in plain view. Officer Ballard thought the phone number would enable him to identify the owner ofthe house. Officer Ballard relayed the phone number on the cellular phone to the police 

### dispatcher. The dispatcher called the number and determined that the phone had been stolen in aburglary and the owner ofthe phone was not the owner ofthe house. Officer 

### Ballardthen calledfor a detective unitto cometo the house, andDetective Isbellresponded 

### to the call. Officers Ballard andWills showedDetective Isbellthe electronic equipment and the air conditioning units. Detective Isbell identified the owner of the house throughcomputer records, obtained asearch warrant, and executed the warrant immediately. After listing the property found in the house, Detective Isbell executed the return ofthe warrant. Based on the property found after the search warrant was executed, an arrest warrant was issued for Bryan Little, the occupant of the house at 209 Gramley Drive. Appellant was subsequently arrested along with Little. 

### Appellant signed avoluntary statement detailing his involvement in multiple thefts. 

### Appellant gave his address as "2314 Ave C." In his separate statement, Little gave the address "209 Gramley." In his statement, Little referred to 209 Gramley as his house and 

### did not say that appellant lived there. Further, appellant consistently referred to 209 Gramley as "Bryan's house." 

### Appellant filed his motions to suppress the physical evidence and his voluntary statement. At the hearing on the motions, Little testified that the house at 209 Gramley 

### belongedto his parents, andhe, appellant, and anothermanwere rentingthe house. Little also testified that appellantwasjustmoving in and had onlybeen atthe house about a week when the alarm went off. The trial court denied the motions to suppress, and appellant entered aplea of nolo contendere to the charges against him. 

### On appeal, appellant argues (1) the-trial court erred in overruling his motions to 

### suppress evidence andhis confessionbecausethe stolenproperty atissuewas discoveredby 

## policeinthe course ofan illegal search; (2) the trial courterredin overrulinghis motionto suppress his confessionbecause the police unlawfully obtainedthe information reliedupon

-3-to supply probable cause for their arrests; and (3) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's denial of the suppression motions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW Appellant's points of error all challenge the trial court's ruling on his motions to suppress. At ahearing on amotion to suppress, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight given to their testimony. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The trial judge may accept or reject any or all of the witnesses' testimony. Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993), affd, 912 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We do not engage in our own factual review. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We only consider whether the trial court improperly applied the law to the facts. See Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543; Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We apply an abuse ofdiscretion standard to the court's ruling and will reverse only if
a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Dawson v. State, 868 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. 

### App.-Dallas 1993, pet. refd). Ifthe evidence supports the trial court's ruling, we do not disturb that ruling. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. We will uphold the trial court's ruling on 

### any valid theory, regardless ofwhether the State argued it in the trial court or on appeal. See Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at

713. 

### All three of appellant's points of error hinge on his assertion that the police

-4-conducted an illegal search of the residence at 209 Gramley.1 However, before appellant
can complain of the trial court's ruling on the motions to suppress, he must have standing to challenge the search.
STANDING Aparty does not have automatic standing to challenge the police officers' search under the Fourth Amendment. Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Rather, aparty may challenge police conduct only ifit infringes on his own Fourth Amendment rights. See Lewis v. State, 598 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Black v. State, 776 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet. refd). In order 

### for a partyto challenge the police officers' search, he bears the burden to prove thathe had 

### alegitimate expectation ofprivacy upon which the police improperly intruded. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978); Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g); Black, 116 S.W.2d at 701. In order to determine ifaparty has standing to challenge the search and seizure, the court should consider whether he (1) had aproperty or possessory interest in the item 

### seized or the place searched, (2) had complete dominion and the right to exclude others, (3) took precautions usually taken by those seeking privacy, (4) put the property to some 

### private use, (5) made aclaim of privacy consistent with historical notions, and (6) was

'Appellant'sfirstpointoferroralsocontainsofthetrialcourt'sfailure tosuppresshisconfession, buthis argumentdoes not address this issue. We therefore consider this argument waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 74(f).

-5-legitimately on the premises. Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Black, 776 S.W.2d at 701. The record shows that only Little gave 209 Gramley as his own address when he made his voluntary statement. Appellant gave his address as "2314 Ave C." In his voluntary statement, appellant did not claim any property or possessory interest in the residence at 209 Gramley, and he consistently referred to the residence as "Bryan's house." At the 

### hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, only Little testified that he, appellant, and another man lived at 209 Gramley together. The trial judge was free to reject Little's 

### testimony. SeeJohnson, 864 S.W.2d at713. Similarly, the trialjudgewas free to accept that 

### appellant had his residence at the address given in his voluntary statement. See id. Accordingly, the trialjudge was free to conclude that appellant did not meet his burden of 

### provingthathe had a legitimate expectation ofprivacyin the residence at 209 Gramley and that appellant lacked standing to challenge the search. 

### Even if appellant had standing to challenge the search, he could not prevail on 

### appeal. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the record contains evidence that the police officers entered the residence at 209 Gramley 

### legally inresponse to a burglar alarm. Inside-the house, the officers found a phone number and aname in plain view. Thinking the name and number mightbelong to the homeowner, 

### the police had the dispatcher call the number. Onlythen did the police officers realize the cellular telephone was stolen. Without disturbing any ofthe property inside the residence,

-6-the police officers called in adetective who obtained and executed asearchwarrant. Based
on this evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motions to suppress the evidence of stolen property and his subsequent confession. In addition, it would be improper for this Court to weigh the factual sufficiency of the evidence elicited at the suppression hearing. At asuppression hearing, the trialjudge is the sole and exclusive trier offact andjudge ofthe credibility ofthe witnesses, as well as 

### the weight to be given their testimony. DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. Crim. 

### App. 1996). The trialjudge is also the initial arbiter ofthe legal significance ofthose facts. Id.; see Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 104(a). 

### On appeal, we are to limit our review ofthe trial court's rulings, both as to the facts 

### andthe legal significance ofthosefacts, to a determinationofwhetherthetrial court abused its discretion. DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496. We are specifically instructed to give deference 

### to the trial court's ruling with regard to amotion to suppress. See State v. Carter, 915 

### S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Even ifwe would have reached adifferentresult, 

### as long as the trial court's rulings are atleastwithin the "zone ofreasonable disagreement,"
we should not intercede. Id. at 496-97. We do not engage in our own factual review of a 

### trial court's decision on amotion to suppress. Johnson, 864 S.W.2d at 713. Thus, the 

### standard ofreview applied to the trial court's ruling on amotion to suppress precludes a 

### factual sufficiency review. See id. Carter, 915 S.W.2d at 504 ;DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496- 97. Becausewe conclude appellanthadno standingto challenge the searchof209 Gramley,we overrule appellant's points oferror one, two, and three.
We affirm the trial court's judgments.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 90 951613F.U05 DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE

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