In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1383 

WILLIAM JONES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

JAY VAN LANEN and ANDREW WICKMAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 2:18-cv-01866 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2021 — DECIDED MARCH 7, 2022 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Wisconsin inmate William Jones 

sued two prison officials contending they violated his constitutional rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances

and denying him access to courts. The district court determined that Jones had not identified facts that would allow 

judgment in his favor on either claim. While we agree with 

the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, we conclude that Jones 
2 No. 20-1383 

identified enough facts—when viewed, as they must be at this 

stage of litigation, in his favor—to get part of his remaining 

retaliation claim to trial. So we affirm in part and reverse in 

part. 

I 

A 

On the morning of April 4, 2018, Captain Jay Van Lanen

of the Green Bay Correctional Institution sought to escort inmate Raynard Jackson to a scheduled high school equivalency 

exam. Jackson reacted strangely and refused to leave his cell, 

even though he had previously expressed substantial interest 

in taking the exam. In witnessing this reaction, Captain Van 

Lanen also saw what appeared to be contraband in Jackson’s 

cell and ordered a search. Officer Joshua Gomm performed 

the search and found several prohibited items, including bottles of unknown liquids, a damaged hair pick, and (most notably for our purposes) a large stack of documents containing 

the names and health information of other inmates. Because 

prisoners are generally prohibited from possessing other inmates’ medical information, Captain Van Lanen instructed 

Officer Gomm to confiscate the records. 

Some of the seized documents belonged to fellow inmate 

William Jones. Jackson had the records as part of his work as 

a jailhouse lawyer: he was helping Jones prepare a lawsuit 

against Captain Van Lanen and others at the facility. Jones intended to bring claims alleging that the prison officials violated his rights under the Eighth, Fourteenth, and First 

Amendments, respectively, by subjecting him to inhumane 

prison conditions, assigning him to a restrictive housing unit 
No. 20-1383 3

without due process, and denying him access to the Qur’an 

and Islamic worship services. 

Upon learning that guards removed his paperwork from 

Jackson’s cell, Jones sought to get it back, claiming the documents amounted to privileged and confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones also approached Captain Van Lanen and asked why Jackson was not 

allowed to have the documents. By Jones’s account, Captain 

Van Lanen did not take well to the question and indeed reacted by saying he would not return the records: “Everything 

is against the law and legal work to you guys, and I went 

through your stuff and it is contraband now and you won’t 

get to use it to sue me with!” According to Jones, Captain Van 

Lanen then added that he planned to speak to Captain Andrew Wickman, the officer who would preside over Jackson’s 

disciplinary hearing, to “make sure he knows it’s contraband.” 

At Jackson’s disciplinary hearing, Captain Van Lanen 

stood by his prior account, testifying that the documents removed from Jackson’s cell were contraband and not legal materials. Jones, too, testified but offered a contrary account, explaining that he provided medical records to Jackson as part 

of requesting legal assistance. For his part, Jackson declined 

to support Jones’s version of events, perhaps wanting to 

avoid being pulled into the dispute. In the end, Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted 

not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records. With the records therefore constituting contraband under prison policy, Captain Wickman ordered the lion’s share 

of them destroyed. 
4 No. 20-1383 

In May 2018, following the conclusion of the administrative proceedings within the Green Bay prison, Jones invoked 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed suit in federal court against Captain 

Van Lanen and Captain Wickman. His complaint alleged that 

both defendants violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents from Jackson’s cell as part 

of an effort to get even with Jones for filing so many administrative grievances and otherwise taking steps to sue Captain 

Van Lanen. Jones further alleged that the document destruction violated his constitutional rights in another way—by depriving him of his right to access the courts. 

Jones’s claim survived initial screening under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a), and the case proceeded to discovery. In time both 

sides moved for summary judgment. 

B 

The district court granted the defendants’ motion and entered judgment against Jones. As the district court saw it, 

Jones’s retaliation claim fell short because he could not point 

to facts permitting a finding that either Captain Van Lanen or 

Captain Wickman took any action in response to the threat of 

litigation. To the contrary, the district court viewed the evidence in the summary judgment record as only supporting a 

finding that both defendants had a legitimate and a non-retaliatory reason—enforcing the prison’s contraband policy—for 

confiscating the documents found in Jackson’s cell. 

As for the access to courts claim, the district court concluded that Jones could not demonstrate he had suffered any 

harm. He could not show, the district court reasoned, that he 

needed any of the documents to file suit or, similarly, that he 

was unable to proceed with litigation and later request the 
No. 20-1383 5

confiscated medical records in discovery. Without Jones taking either step, the district court concluded that no reasonable 

jury could find that the destruction of the documents confiscated from Jackson’s cell caused Jones any harm and, by extension, prevented any access to court. So on this claim, too, 

the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. 

Jones now appeals. 

II

A 

We begin with Jones’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 

Everyone agrees on what the claim requires—evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude Jones “engaged in 

protected First Amendment activity, suffered a deprivation 

that would likely deter future First Amendment activity, and 

the First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in the 

defendant’s decision to take the retaliatory action.” Walker v. 

Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2017). The parties likewise 

agree that the First Amendment protects acts taken to prepare 

for litigation, such as drafting a complaint. See Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2013). What 

Jones’s claim turns on, then, is whether the evidence in the 

summary judgment record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, allowed a finding that Captain Van Lanen’s 

and Captain Wickman’s actions were motivated by the threatened litigation. 

We begin with the retaliation claim against Captain Van 

Lanen. In places in his briefs and verified complaint, Jones 

suggests that the many grievances he filed put Captain Van 

Lanen on notice of a potential lawsuit against him. This 
6 No. 20-1383 

reality, Jones continues, shows that Captain Van Lanen had a 

motive to retaliate by seizing the documents from inmate 

Jackson and thereby lessening the chance of any complaint 

against him ever hitting a court’s docket. 

Without more, these facts—even when viewed in the light 

most favorable to Jones—are not enough to survive summary 

judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim. See 

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a prisoner’s verified complaint that provided only 

“speculation regarding the officers’ motive” for destroying 

his legal documents could not survive summary judgment on 

a First Amendment retaliation claim). To conclude otherwise 

would risk countenancing the inference that every prison official on the receiving end of a grievance harbors a retaliatory 

motive against a complaining inmate. We know of no authority permitting such a sweeping finding, at least not at the level 

of generality at which Jones presses the point. 

But Jones’s claim against Captain Van Lanen rests on 

more. Buried within the thousand pages of submitted evidence are sworn declarations from two Green Bay inmates 

corroborating Jones’s account of the retaliatory statements 

made by Captain Van Lanen. Inmate Michael Johnson stated 

that during the events in question, he overheard Captain Van 

Lanen say to inmate Raynard Jackson that he planned to 

speak with Captain Wickman to make sure he “knows that 

[the documents confiscated from Jackson’s cell were] contraband.” Johnson added that he heard Captain Van Lanen then 

tell Jones, “You can’t sue me now.” A second inmate, Arnell 

Gilmer, submitted a similar declaration swearing to being 

present and having heard Captain Van Lanen make the same 

statements. 
No. 20-1383 7

This is enough. If a jury credited the testimony of these 

two inmates, Jones would have enough evidence to permit a 

verdict in his favor on the retaliation claim against Captain 

Van Lanen. Rule 56 does not require more to survive a motion 

for summary judgment. See Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & 

Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining

that summary judgment is improper where a fact “affecting 

the outcome of the case” is in dispute). 

Despite the declarations from inmates Johnson and 

Gilmer, Captain Van Lanen urges a different view. He highlights that, contrary to the claims made in his verified complaint, Jones testified during his deposition that he no longer 

remembered exactly what Captain Van Lanen or Captain

Wickman said to him during their interactions. All Jones was 

able to say was that he could not recall “verbatim what he 

said, but [it was] pretty much that I am not getting them back, 

that they’re contraband now and I’m not getting them back.” 

We do not see Jones’s deposition testimony as a barrier to 

getting to trial. No doubt Captain Van Lanen will be able to 

use the testimony to impeach any different account Jones offers at trial. But Jones’s deposition testimony does nothing to 

affect the independent, sworn declarations of inmates Michael Johnson and Arnell Gilmer. Those declarations corroborate Jones’s contention that Captain Van Lanen ordered the 

documents confiscated in retaliation for the threat of litigation. How all of this plays out at trial—what the jury chooses 

to believe and disbelieve—is a separate issue. All we need 

conclude is that Jones has identified enough evidence to create a material dispute for a jury to resolve. 

The analysis of the retaliation claim against Captain Wickman is more difficult. The two inmate declarations that save 
8 No. 20-1383 

Jones’s claim against Captain Van Lanen do not directly substantiate Jones’s allegations against Captain Wickman. All 

that inmates Johnson and Gilmer were able to convey was 

that Captain Van Lanen stated that he planned to let Captain 

Wickman know the seized documents were contraband. 

This falls short. Yes, Jones alleged in his verified complaint 

that, a few days after inmate Raynard Jackson’s disciplinary 

hearing, he approached Captain Wickman to question why he 

ordered the materials destroyed. The discussion did not go 

well, with Captain Wickman allegedly saying, “Captain Van 

Lanen is a good man and I’m not going to let y’all cost him 

his livelihood with frivolous lawsuits.” And, yes, the law allows verified complaints—containing not just allegations but 

sworn statements of fact—to serve as evidence for purposes 

of summary judgment. See Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 246–47 

(7th Cir. 1996); see also 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1339 (4th ed. 2021) 

(“[A] verified pleading may be treated as an affidavit and 

used in the action in any way in which an affidavit would be 

suitable, such as in the context of evaluating a summary judgment motion.”). 

The remainder of the summary judgment record is not so 

clear, though. When it came time for his deposition testimony 

Jones stated that he could not “remember exactly” what Captain Wickman said to him. Jones went no further. Unlike the 

account in his verified complaint, he did not testify that Captain Wickman said anything suggesting the outcome of the 

disciplinary hearing was preordained to shield Captain Van 

Lanen from a lawsuit. 

For his part, Captain Wickman testified that following the 

disciplinary hearing, he went to inmate Jackson’s cell to try to 
No. 20-1383 9

ascertain for certain whether the seized documents constituted legal materials (that Jackson could have as part of offering legal assistance to other inmates) or instead contraband. 

He explained that he asked Jackson for some indication—a 

court filing, a case number, or anything else showing that the 

documents were legal materials—but that Jackson offered 

nothing to clarify the situation. Jackson’s failure to support 

Jones’s account, Captain Wickman added, contributed to his 

ultimate finding in the disciplinary hearing that the confiscated records constituted contraband. 

On this record—with no evidence more closely linking 

Captain Wickman’s decisionmaking in the disciplinary proceeding with facts showing some influence by Captain Van 

Lanen—Jones has not done enough to create a jury question 

on his claim against Captain Wickman. His verified complaint, especially when considered in light of his deposition 

testimony, cannot carry his claim to trial when we see nothing 

else in the record to allow a jury to find that Captain Wickman’s ultimate decision reflected unconstitutional retaliation 

against Jones for his desire to file a lawsuit against Captain 

Van Lanen. To allow otherwise would relieve Jones of his burden at summary judgment. See Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, 

Inc., 945 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial”) (cleaned up). 

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize full well that circumstantial evidence may be enough to survive summary 

judgment if that evidence could allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference in support of the non-moving party. See 
10 No. 20-1383 

Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that “[c]ircumstantial evidence can create an issue of credibility”); LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 2020) (reinforcing that evidence that would “allow a jury to infer that 

[certain] circumstances” exist can be enough for a claim to 

proceed to trial); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 772 

(7th Cir. 2005) (allowing a case to survive summary judgment 

because, despite only presenting circumstantial evidence, the 

plaintiff was not “asking the finder of fact to speculate” but 

was asking only that the fact finder “infer causation, logically, 

from undisputed facts and competent evidence”) (emphasis 

in original). 

In the end, however, Jones invites an inference against 

Captain Wickman that veers too far into speculation to survive summary judgment. He sees an available finding of retaliatory motivation largely from the situational relationships 

of prison officials—from the perspective that one officer (Captain Van Lanen) would be able to do something behind the 

scenes to influence an ultimate decisionmaker (like a warden 

or, here, Captain Wickman) in ways that result in a violation 

of an inmate’s rights. We do not foreclose that such an inference might be possible on a particular evidentiary record. But 

having rolled up our sleeves and combed the summary judgment record, we do not see evidence permitting a finding that 

Captain Wickman’s determination that the confiscated documents were contraband reflected retaliatory bias. 

Accordingly, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for Captain Van Lanen but not for Captain 

Wickman on Jones’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 
No. 20-1383 11

B 

That brings us to Jones’s access to courts claim. He contends that Captain Van Lanen and Captain Wickman denied 

him meaningful access to the courts on his underlying claims 

by destroying his legal materials. We see the evidence in a different way. 

The right to access the court is fundamental and essential 

to prisoners’ ability to vindicate legal rights. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (evaluating the “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts”) (quoting Bounds v. 

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). “Without this right,” we have 

emphasized, “all other rights a prisoner may possess are illusory.” Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1983). 

To prove the claim, Jones must submit evidence identifying “(1) a non-frivolous, underlying claim; (2) the official acts 

frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in 

a suit or settlement.” Harer v. Casey, 962 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 

2020) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). 

The second element poses a hurdle Jones cannot clear. By 

its terms, that element requires Jones to make some showing 

that Captain Van Lanen or Captain Wickman did something 

to adversely affect—to frustrate—his effort to vindicate his 

rights through litigation. See Ortloff v. United States, 335 F.3d 

652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (making this same observation in the 

context of affirming a dismissal of a prisoner’s access to courts 

claim based on allegations that prison officials destroyed documents relating to pending lawsuits), abrogated on other 

grounds by Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008). 

Speculation is insufficient. 
12 No. 20-1383 

On at least one prior occasion, and drawing upon the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), 

we have referred to this second element along the lines of the 

injury component of standing doctrine. See, e.g., Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 553–54 (7th Cir. 2009). Whether viewed as a 

matter of standing or merits—a question of some complexity—we end up at the same point. The district court properly 

dismissed Jones’s claim. 

Jones insists that Captain Van Lanen and Captain Wickman “unconstitutionally frustrated and impeded his nonfrivolous claims” by confiscating and destroying his legal documents. These actions, he urges, hindered his litigation prospects, weakened the settlement potential of his claims by destroying evidence, and interfered with inmate-to-inmate legal 

assistance. 

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to 

Jones, we cannot get there. Jones overstates what findings the 

record reasonably permits. Right to it, we see nothing that 

would allow a jury to conclude the confiscation and destruction of Jones’s documents created any meaningful impediment to the three claims Jones sought to bring to court. Jones 

has personal knowledge that could support each of his underlying claims: 

• Conditions of confinement claim: Having experienced the conditions firsthand, Jones could 

describe them in a pleading, testify about 

them, and use discovery to obtain corroboration from fellow inmates. 

• Unfair process claim: Jones has firsthand 

knowledge about the process he received 
No. 20-1383 13

(and did not receive) before being placed in 

the restrictive housing unit. We do not see 

how any aspect of pleading or litigating this 

claim would be hampered by Jones no 

longer having access to any of the destroyed 

documents. 

• First Amendment Free Exercise claim: Here, 

too, Jones would be able to explain how he 

allegedly repeatedly requested but was denied access to religious services and a copy 

of the Qur’an. And he could use the discovery process to seek copies of the written requests that he contends went ignored by 

prison officials. 

In no way does our analysis establish a filing requirement 

for plaintiffs with an access to courts claim. The Supreme 

Court has rejected such a prerequisite, and we too have underscored the same point. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53 (describing how a plaintiff may establish standing by showing, 

for example, that inadequate prison law library facilities 

made it impossible to file a complaint); Harer, 962 F.3d at 310 

n.2 (“To be clear, we do not hold ‘that a filed suit on the underlying claim is a prerequisite for a backward-looking access 

claim.’”) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 n.14). 

In some cases, the denial of access to courts might make 

filing an underlying claim an impossibility. See, e.g., Jackson v. 

Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310–11 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that a 

prisoner was unable to file his underlying complaint because 

prison mailroom officials intentionally delayed his petition to 

proceed in forma pauperis). But a plaintiff must show more 

than just some minimal degree of impediment in filing claims. 
14 No. 20-1383 

Jones has not established that either defendant took steps imposing any meaningful impediment to his underlying claims.

The district court was right to enter judgment for the defendants on this claim. 

III

Jones has benefited immensely from the very able assistance of appointed counsel on appeal. Counsel diligently 

scoured the record presented to the district court and pinpointed facts showing that Jones did enough at summary 

judgment to get his retaliation claim to trial against Captain 

Van Lanen. 

* * * 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in 

part.