UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ASO RASOOL,

Plaintiff,

v. 

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his official 

capacity as United States Secretary of 

Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-02367 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff Aso Rasool sues Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Andrew Davidson—chief of the Asylum Division 

of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—for “unreasonable delay” in 

adjudicating his asylum application. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendants move to transfer this 

case to the Eastern District of Virginia or, in the alternative, to dismiss. See Mot. to Transfer and 

Dismiss (Mot. to Transfer), ECF No. 9. Mindful that they bear the burden to show that transfer 

is warranted, the Court will grant their motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

1

 See SEC v. Savoy 

1

 Defendants urge the Court to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) rather than § 1404(a). 

See Mot. to Transfer at 9 n.2. Transfer under § 1406 is proper when the Court determines that 

venue is lacking. See § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying 

venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer 

such case[.]”) (emphasis added). Section 1404(a) is proper when the Court determines that it 

would be more convenient for a case to be heard elsewhere. See § 1404(a) (“For the 

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 

civil action[.]”) (emphasis added). The Court need not decide whether venue is proper here 

because it determines that it is more convenient for the case to be heard in the Eastern District. 

Thus, the Court will evaluate this case for transfer under § 1404(a). 
2

Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that the movant “bear[s] the burden 

of persuasion on the transfer issue”). 

First, the Court examines whether Rasool could have brought his claim in the Eastern 

District. Ctr. for Env’t Sci., Accuracy & Reliability v. Nat’l Park Serv., 75 F. Supp. 3d 353, 356 

(D.D.C. 2014) (“The first step in resolving a motion for transfer of venue under § 1404(a) is to 

determine whether the proposed transferee district is one where the action might have been 

brought.”) (cleaned up). Where the defendant is “an agency of the United States” or “an officer 

or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(e) governs venue. See Montgomery v. Barr, 502 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174 (D.D.C. 2020). 

Section 1391(e)(1) provides that a plaintiff may bring a civil action “in any judicial district in 

which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in 

the action.” 

Rasool resides in the Eastern District. See Compl. at 1 (listing Rasool’s home address in 

Vienna, Virginia).

2 And he seeks to compel action in the Eastern District. See Compl. ¶ 20 

(stating that “Defendants allow local offices to adjudicate . . . cases”); Mot. to Transfer at 6 

(stating the relevant local office is in Arlington, Virginia). Thus, Rasool could have brought the 

case in the Eastern District. 

Second, the Court considers the private interest factors. See Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 305 (D.D.C. 2017). “The private-interest factors include: 

(1) the plaintiffs’ choice of forum . . .; (2) the defendants’ choice of forum; (3) whether the claim 

arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses of the 

2

 All page numbers refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 
3

plaintiff and defendant . . . and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.” Greater Yellowstone 

Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 2001). 

The first factor, plaintiff’s choice of forum, counts for less when, as here, the plaintiff 

does not reside in that forum. See Montgomery, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (explaining plaintiff’s 

choice of venue is entitled to less deference when “plaintiff is not a resident of the forum, the 

plaintiff resides in the transferee district, and the relevant events occurred there.”). The second 

and third factors both support transfer because Defendants prefer the Eastern District and the 

claim arose there. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. E.P.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179 

(D.D.C. 2009) (“In cases brought under the [Administrative Procedure Act], courts generally 

focus on where the decision-making process occurred to determine where the claims arose.”). 

Rasool counters that his Complaint seeks an overhaul of the entire asylum system and 

that because he brings a challenge to national immigration policy, his claims arose in the District

of Columbia, home to DHS and USCIS. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 19 (“This case involves national 

policy issues that may require the testimony of policymakers here in the District.”), ¶ 39(b) 

(asking the Court to “[o]rder defendants to address the large backlog problem”), ¶ 39(c) (asking 

the Court to “[o]rder defendants to stop the current arbitrary and capricious system now in 

effect”). 

Rasool’s arguments fail for three reasons. First, he cannot claim venue in the District 

“[b]y naming high government officials as defendants” because that could allow “a plaintiff [to] 

bring a suit here that properly should be pursued elsewhere.” Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 

253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Montgomery, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 175–77 (finding that local 

issues predominated over national policies and thus transfer to plaintiff’s home district was 
4

preferable). “[T]he actions of local USCIS offices are frequently, and appropriately, transferred 

to the venue encompassing those local offices[.]” Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 305. 

Second, Rasool mistakenly believes that USCIS is headquartered in the District. In fact, 

it moved to Maryland in December 2020. See Melnattur v. U.S. Citizen. & Immigr. Servs., No. 

CV 20-3013 (JDB), 2021 WL 3722732, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2021). And it is USCIS, not the 

Secretary or DHS, that possesses the authority for processing and adjudicating immigration 

applications. See 8 C.F.R. § 100.1 et seq. (explaining that USCIS has “been delegated authority 

under the Immigration and Nationality Act to administer and enforce certain provisions of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act and all other laws relating to immigration”); see also id. 

§ 103.2 et seq. (explaining the submission and adjudication of immigration applications by 

USCIS). So even if Rasool were correct that his challenge to the entire asylum system means his 

case belongs where policymakers reside, they are not here. 

Finally, Rasool’s argument fails because although he vaguely alleges that he is 

challenging DHS’s “policy of arbitrary interview scheduling,” he does not identify a specific

DHS policy or national guidance that would tie his Complaint to the District.3

 Opp’n to Mot. to 

Transfer (Pl.’s Opp’n) at 11, ECF No. 10. This matters because courts in this district have 

transferred cases even when plaintiffs have identified particular “policy memos disseminated 

3

 Even if Rasool does identify a policy or national guidance, he misunderstands it. He claims 

that local USCIS offices can “randomly interview applicants, in any order the local office 

wants.” Compl. ¶ 20. But USCIS follows a last-in, first-out process. See USCIS, Affirmative 

Asylum Interview Scheduling (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-andasylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-interview-scheduling (“Starting January 29, 2018, the 

Asylum Division will give priority to the most recently filed affirmative asylum applications 

when scheduling asylum interviews.”); see also Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Health & Hum. Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Courts in this jurisdiction have 

frequently taken judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government 

agencies.”). Rasool cannot obtain jurisdiction based on a non-existent policy. 
5

from USCIS headquarters” that the plaintiffs claimed influenced the local office’s adjudication 

of their applications. Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 306; see also id. (“Plaintiff does not explain 

how any of these alleged errors were dictated by, or even in line with, any nationwide policy or 

anything else emanating from the District of Columbia. Venue is clearly more appropriate in 

[the transferee district] for these claims, which make up the majority and gravamen of Plaintiff's 

complaint.”). Thus, Rasool’s challenges to immigration policy fail require venue in the District. 

See also Montgomery, 502 F. Supp. at 177 (transferring case in which the plaintiff’s claims did 

not “challenge any policy’s broad effects, but rather the implementation (or lack thereof) of those 

policies as to her.”).

The remaining private interest factors involve ease for the parties and witnesses and the 

location of evidence. Ease for the parties points to transfer or, at the very least, is neutral. 

Rasool cannot argue a transfer inconveniences him because a plaintiff “cannot reasonably claim 

to be inconvenienced by litigating in its home forum.” Tower Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Lush Cosms. Ltd., 

285 F. Supp. 3d 321, 326 (D.D.C. 2018). 

Rasool responds that he would “have to seek out and engage a new lawyer” if the Court 

transfers the case. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. But “[t]he location of counsel is not a consideration under 

this factor.” Wolfram Alpha LLC, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 333. The Eastern District is convenient for 

Defendants because that is where the relevant USCIS office and staff are located. Mot. to 

Transfer at 6, 14; accord Pasem v. U.S. Citizen. & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-CV-344 (CRC), 2020 

WL 2514749, at *4 (D.D.C. May 15, 2020) (“The USCIS personnel who best know the 

individual causes of any delays in processing times will also be available at [the local office]; 

thus, the convenience to witnesses also tips the scales in favor of transfer.”). The private interest 

factors therefore favor transfer to the Eastern District. 
6

Third, the Court examines the public interest factors. Bourdon, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 305. 

“These factors include (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws and the pendency 

of related actions in the transferee’s forum; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the 

potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies 

at home.” Id. at 308. 

The first factor is neutral because this case involves questions arising under federal law, 

and therefore there is “no advantage to having a federal court familiar and experienced with the 

state law of [the District of Columbia] adjudicate this action.” Greater Yellowstone Coal., 180 F. 

Supp. 2d at 129. The second factor is also neutral. Defendants highlight statistics showing that 

the courts here and in the Eastern District face about equal caseloads and disposition times based 

on several metrics. See Mot. to Transfer at 16. To the extent either district is more favorable 

based on a particular metric, “[s]tatistics provide, at best, only a rough measure of the relative 

congestion of the dockets in the two districts.” United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 

2d 74, 84 (D.D.C. 2011). 

The most important public interest factor is the interest in deciding local controversies at 

home. Accord Wolfram Alpha LLC, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 338 (stating that “the local interest in 

deciding local controversies at home” is “perhaps the most important amongst the public 

factors”). Rasool’s Complaint seeks to force the local USCIS office to “adjudicate his asylum 

application and his withholding application forthwith.” Compl. ¶ 39(a). Because “any potential 

impacts are to be felt locally,” transfer to the Eastern District is warranted. Pres. Soc. of 

Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 893 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 (D.D.C. 2012). This is true 

even though Rasool challenges an administrative decision. See McAfee, LLC v. U.S. Citizen. & 

Immigr. Servs., No. 19-CV-2981 (DLF), 2019 WL 6051559, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2019)
7

(“[C]ourts have a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, including even 

controversies requiring judicial review of an administrative decision.”) (cleaned up). The public 

interest factors therefore favor transfer. 

The Court finds that Defendants have met their “burden of persuasion on the transfer 

issue.” Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d at 1154. Because the Court will transfer the case to the Eastern 

District, it need not reach the substance of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and will deny it 

without prejudice. See Abusadeh, 2007 WL 2111036, at *1 (“In light of the transfer of venue, 

the Court shall not address the substance of Defendants’ motion to dismiss but shall deny that 

motion without prejudice so that Defendants may refile it, if appropriate, upon transfer[.]”).

For all these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Transfer and Dismiss is GRANTED as to the 

motion to transfer and DENIED WITHOUT PREJDUICE as to the motion to dismiss; and it is 

further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transfer this case to the Eastern District of 

Virginia, Alexandria Division. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2021 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.