Filed 11/16/21 Mansour v. Farmers Insurance Exchange CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ZAKI MANSOUR,

Cross-complainant and 

Appellant,

v.

FARMERS INSURANCE 

EXCHANGE et al.,

Cross-defendants and 

Respondents.

 B298538

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC371493)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.

Avalon Legal Group, Bryan Naddafi and Elena Nutenko; 

Benedon & Serlin, Kelly Riordan Horwitz and Kian Tamaddoni 

for Cross-complainant and Appellant Zaki Mansour.

Arent Fox, Richard D. Buckley, Jr. and George N. Koumbis;

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffrey A. Miller and Barry 
2

Kaiman for Cross-defendants and Respondents Farmers 

Insurance Exchange and Travelers Property Casualty Company 

of America.

_______________________

Zaki Mansour appeals from the denial of his motion to 

compel acknowledgment of full satisfaction of two money 

judgments totaling $213,056 entered against him and his ex-wife 

Luzelba in favor of Marina Strand Colony #1 Homeowners 

Association, Inc. (Marina).

1

 The judgments were entered 

following an arbitration relating to Luzelba’s condominium in 

Marina’s complex. When Luzelba later sold the condominium,

the buyer required Marina to release all liens against the 

property, including two judgment liens arising from the 

arbitration, and Marina tendered an escrow demand for $112,500

as an “agreed upon settlement amount.” After receiving payment

from the escrow, Marina recorded a form acknowledgment of 

satisfaction of judgment that checked the box for “[f]ull 

satisfaction,” but also checked the box stating “[t]he judgment 

creditor has accepted payment or performance other than that 

specified in the judgment in full satisfaction of the judgment,” to 

which was added “[a]s to the real property located at 41560 Via 

Dolce #337” (the condominium address).

On appeal, Zaki contends the escrow demand constituted

Marina’s unambiguous agreement to accept $112,500 in full 

satisfaction of the two money judgments against the Mansours. 

Marina’s insurance carriers, Travelers Property Casualty 

Company of America and Farmers Insurance Exchange 

1 We refer to Zaki and Luzelba Mansour by their first names

to avoid confusion.
3

(collectively, the Carriers)

2 contend the escrow demand and 

acknowledgment of judgment are ambiguous and the trial court 

properly considered extrinsic evidence showing that Marina and 

Luzelba intended the $112,500 as payment for a release of all

liens on the property, but not full satisfaction of the judgments. 

We agree with the Carriers and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Marina’s Judgments Against the Mansours3

Zaki and Luzelba married in 1993 and separated in 2010. 

Prior to their marriage, Zaki purchased a condominium in the 

Marina Strand Colony 1 complex at 4150 Via Dolce in Marina del 

Rey (the property). Before they were married, Luzelba 

refinanced the property and transferred the proceeds from the 

refinance to Zaki, in exchange for which title was placed in 

Luzelba’s name as her separate property. Zaki and Luzelba lived 

in the property with their children until approximately 2003.

Marina is the homeowner’s association for the condominium 

complex.

In 2007 Mary Kusion and her son, Ian Rowe, lived in the 

condominium below the Mansours’ unit. The Kusions filed a 

complaint against the Mansours and Marina alleging the 

Mansours had installed prohibited flooring and plumbing that 

caused noise and water intrusion into the Kusions’ unit, and 

2 On February 11, 2021 we granted the Carriers’ unopposed 

motion to be substituted in place of Marina. 

3 Our summary of the facts is based on the declarations and 

exhibits submitted in connection with Zaki’s motion to compel 

acknowledgment of satisfaction.
4

Marina concealed and refused to remedy these violations and 

other problems in the common areas. Marina and the Mansours 

filed cross-complaints against each other: Marina sought from 

the Mansours indemnification and recovery of unpaid 

assessments, and the Mansours alleged Marina interfered with 

their use of the property and caused them to incur costs. In 

March 2010 Marina and the Mansours entered into a settlement 

agreement resolving their cross-complaints, under which the 

parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration of all disputes 

arising from the settlement. 

In August 2010 the Mansours commenced arbitration 

against Marina, alleging breach of the settlement agreement as 

to repairs Marina was to perform under the agreement. The 

arbitrator ruled in favor of Marina and awarded it attorneys’ fees 

and costs as the prevailing party under the settlement 

agreement. On March 17, 2014 the trial court entered a 

judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award in the amount of 

$170,545 (the 2014 judgment).

In November 2014 the Mansours initiated another 

arbitration against Marina to enforce the terms of the settlement 

agreement. The arbitrator granted Marina’s summary judgment 

motion and awarded it attorneys’ fees and costs, and on August 1, 

2016 the trial court entered a second judgment for Marina 

confirming the award in the amount of $42,511 (the 2016 

judgment). Marina subsequently recorded a judgment lien 

against the property. 

B. The Sale of the Property, Escrow Demand, and 

Acknowledgment of Satisfaction

According to a declaration Luzelba submitted in the 

Mansours’ dissolution proceeding, Zaki was responsible for the 
5

Mansours’ finances prior to their separation, but Luzelba later 

learned that Zaki had stopped making payments on the

condominium, including the promissory note, the home equity 

line of credit, and the homeowners’ association dues on the 

property. As a result, several liens and judgments were recorded 

against the property, exceeding $522,341. In 2016 Luzelba 

discovered the note securing the deed of trust was in default and 

the property was facing foreclosure. Fearing a foreclosure and 

damage to her credit, Luzelba found a buyer for the property, 

Kartomi, Inc., which specialized in acquiring distressed 

properties and was interested in buying the property in a short 

sale.

In order to purchase the property, Kartomi required 

Marina to release all liens and encumbrances against the 

property. To that end, on September 7, 2017 Marina transmitted 

a demand letter to the escrow agent handling the sale (the escrow 

demand). The escrow demand, signed by Tracy Neal, one of 

Marina’s attorneys at Beaumont Gitlin Tashjian (Beaumont), 

was titled “[Marina] Escrow Demand / 4050 Via Dulce, Unit 337, 

Marina Del Rey, CA 90292 Escrow No: 17-5423-JS.” The 

document stated, “In connection with the pending sales 

transaction, this shall serve as [Marina’s] Amended Escrow 

Demand as follows,” then listed six debts relating to the property, 

including the “Abstract of Judgment recorded on September 2, 

2014 for 2012 Arbitration-Attorney’s Fees and Costs” in the 

amount of $170,545 (the 2014 judgment) and the “Judgment 

entered on August 1, 2016 for 2014 Arbitration-Attorney’s Fees 

and Costs” in the amount of $42,511 (the 2016 judgment). The 

other four debts included unpaid assessments, late fees, 

administrative fees, and another judgment, totaling $12,891. 

The escrow demand listed the total amount of the six items as
6

$228,931, below which it indicated the “AGREED UPON 

SETTLEMENT AMOUNT” was $112,500. The escrow demand 

copied only the Marina board of directors; it did not mention the 

Mansours.

On September 7, 2017 Kartomi executed a settlement and 

mutual release agreement with Marina (release). The release 

included a recital that “[Kartomi] tendered a settlement offer for 

$112,500.00 in exchange for releases of [Marina’s] encumbrances 

against [the property]. Said releases shall release [the property] 

only, and shall not release the sellers to the contemplated real 

estate transaction personally.” The release included a Civil Code 

section 1542 waiver provision stating, “[N]othing contained . . . in 

the [release], shall release the seller in the contemplated real 

estate transaction, Luzelba Lozano-Mansour, nor Zaki Mansour 

(whether or not same is a seller in the contemplated real estate

transaction[)], personally[,] or otherwise as to their obligations to 

[Marina] (including judgments) evidenced by [Marina’s] 

encumbrances against the property.” (Boldface and underlining

omitted.) The Mansours were not parties to the release.

Upon the sale of the property, the escrow agent paid 

$112,500 to Marina through her Beaumont attorneys. Beaumont

disbursed $14,501 to Marina “for amounts owed to it directly”

and the remaining $97,999 to the Carriers, who had furnished

Marina’s legal defense in the arbitrations. Neal prepared and 

signed an “acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment” 

(capitalization omitted) on Judicial Council form EJ-100 

(acknowledgment), which was recorded against the property on 

September 25, 2017. Where the form provided, “Satisfaction of 

the judgment is acknowledged as follows,” Neal checked the box 

for “[f]ull satisfaction,” rather than the boxes for “[p]artial 

satisfaction” or “[m]atured installment.” Neal also checked the 
7

box stating, “The judgment creditor has accepted payment or 

performance other than that specified in the judgment in full 

satisfaction of the judgment,” but he added next to this statement 

in typeface, “As to the real property located at 4150 Via Dolce # 

337 Marina del Rey, CA 90292.” 

C. Zaki’s Motion To Compel Acknowledgment of Satisfaction 

On March 13, 2019, in response to the Carriers’ efforts to 

collect on Marina’s judgments against Zaki’s property in Nevada, 

Zaki filed a motion to compel Marina to acknowledge full 

satisfaction of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 724.050.

4

 Zaki argued the escrow demand constituted an 

offer by Marina to accept $112,500 as the “‘[a]greed [u]pon 

[s]ettlement [a]mount’” to satisfy the six listed debts, including 

the 2014 and 2016 judgments, and the Mansours accepted this 

offer when they closed escrow, allowing Marina to receive 

$112,500 from the sale. Zaki asserted the recording of an 

acknowledgment of full satisfaction of judgment (instead of 

partial satisfaction) showed Marina’s intent that the settlement 

fully satisfy the judgments.

4 Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 provides that if a 

judgment has been satisfied, the judgment debtor may demand 

the judgment creditor file an acknowledgment of satisfaction of 

judgment, and if the creditor fails to do so, the debtor may file a 

motion for an order requiring the creditor to comply with the 

demand and to pay the debtor’s attorneys’ fees. All further 

undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
8

Zaki also submitted Luzelba’s September 14, 2017 

declaration filed in the Mansours’ divorce proceeding.

5

 Luzelba 

declared that “the negotiated demands from the liens and 

judgments on the Via Dolce Property” include an “offer of 

settlement” by Marina “with respect to assessments, late fees, 

interest, and related charges; a memorandum of costs; an 

abstract of judgment recorded September 2, 2014; a judgment 

entered August 1, 2016; and an amended judgment entered on 

March 16, 2017, against Zaki Mansour and Luzelba Mansour,”

for $112,500.00. Luzelba stated further, “Certain creditors have 

reduced the total amount of their demands under the assumption 

that the sale would proceed as planned.”

In its opposition, Marina argued the escrow demand did not 

constitute a settlement of its judgments against the Mansours, 

noting the Mansours were not mentioned in the document, were 

not involved in its negotiation, and were not third party 

beneficiaries of the agreement. Rather, the revised escrow 

demand was a “communication sent to [the escrow agent] in order 

to proceed with the contemplated sale,” and the intent of the 

parties was “clearly not that the judgments would be satisfied in 

full.” Further, the release negotiated by Marina and Kartomi 

expressly stated the Mansours would not be released from the 

judgments by the $112,500 payment to Marina. Marina also 

asserted Neal’s inclusion of the property address on the 

acknowledgment showed Marina’s intent was limited to 

satisfaction of Marina’s claims against the property, rather than 

full satisfaction of the judgments against the Mansours. 

5 Luzelba filed the declaration in support of her ex parte 

application to expunge a notice of pendency of action Zaki had 

recorded against the property.
9

Robert Nau, Marina’s treasurer and board member, stated 

in a supporting declaration that he understood $112,500 was

“Kartomi’s settlement amount in order to purchase the [p]roperty 

in exchange for Marina releasing all the liens and encumbrances 

placed on the [p]roperty,” and “at no point were Luzelba Mansour 

or Zaki Mansour . . . parties to the understanding that led to the 

amount required by Marina and Kartomi to release the various 

Marina liens and encumbrances existing against the [p]roperty. I 

personally never had any conversations or email communications

with the Mansours on this subject.” Nau also declared, “At no 

point did Marina intend a full satisfaction of judgment . . . when 

[Beaumont] recorded the [a]cknowledgment of [s]atisfaction of 

[j]udgment. At various times prior to the close of escrow for the 

sale of the [p]roperty, I was a party to several telephone calls on 

this subject with Marina’s counsel . . . , the escrow officer and 

counsel retained by Marina’s insurance carriers. During each of 

these phone conversations, it was expressly agreed and 

understood that Marina would only release its liens and 

encumbrances placed on the [p]roperty . . . . At no time was it 

ever discussed or agreed that the $112,500 payment was

intended as, or would otherwise constitute, a full and complete 

release of the Mansours[.]” 

Neal similarly declared the revised escrow demand was 

“never intended to be an agreement or settlement of any kind of 

what the Mansours owed to Marina on the . . . judgments entered 

in favor of Marina” and “[i]t was never my office’s intent in 

recording the [acknowledgment], which clearly indicated that it 

was a full satisfaction . . . ‘as to the real property located at 4150 

Via Dulce #337, Marina Del Rey, CA 90292’ to record a full

satisfaction as to the two judgments entered in this [c]ourt 

against the Mansours.” (Boldface and underlining omitted.) 
10

Neal testified the release signed by Kartomi “reflect[ed] the 

understanding of Marina and Kartomi.”

Marina also offered excerpts of Luzelba’s testimony from a 

January 2019 deposition in the Carriers’ Nevada collection 

action. Luzelba was asked, “Did you ever enter into . . . a 

settlement agreement to fully discharge the debt that was owed 

to Marina and its carriers?” Luzelba responded, “I don’t believe

. . . that I did. In my mind, the way I understood this whole 

process, was that they were willing to accept whatever they got 

from the sale and that they would come after me for the rest. All 

I wanted was to get that condo sold and not get a foreclosure and 

try to get rid of as much debt as I could. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . It’s not 

that I believed that the sale . . . cleared their debt. 

[¶] . . . [¶] . . . But if I help them and if I corroborate [sic] with 

them, they will go after another asset that’s not directly attached 

to me.”

In his reply memorandum, Zaki argued other portions of 

Luzelba’s deposition testimony showed that Luzelba believed the 

$112,500 payment would fully satisfy the two judgments. In 

response to the question, “Was the idea that selling this property 

ultimately would discharge any and all obligations?,” Luzelba 

replied,“I believed that that would have been the case. And to 

my surprise, it wasn’t. Because I was constantly being reached 

out by [Marina’s attorney] that I am still owing them a balance. 

[¶] . . . [¶] . . . I had numerous phone calls from him, ‘We are 

going to help you, but we can only help you if you help us.’ I’m 

still thinking that I owe this money, but in hindsight I thought 

that by selling the property, then they get paid off. [¶] But when 

I had a meeting with them, they told me we’re not going to budge, 

we will still come after you for the remaining balance.”
11

After a hearing, on April 26, 2019 the trial court denied 

Zaki’s motion. In its seven-page order, the court found there was 

an ambiguity in the acknowledgment created by the language, 

“‘The judgment creditor has accepted payment or performance 

other than that specified in the judgment in full satisfaction of 

the judgment. As to the real property located at 4150 Via Dolce 

#337 Marina del Rey, CA 90292.’” The court therefore considered 

what it described as “extrinsic evidence,” including the 

declarations and deposition testimony submitted by Marina, and 

found “that neither [Luzelba] nor Marina intended the $112,500 

to be a full satisfaction of the judgment. Correspondingly, it 

remains an issue of fact as to whether [Zaki] could rely on the 

[a]cknowledgment to claim the judgment was satisfied.” The 

court concluded Zaki failed to show the judgment had been 

satisfied.

Zaki timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“If a money judgment has been satisfied, the judgment 

debtor . . . may serve . . . on the judgment creditor a demand in 

writing that the judgment creditor do one or both of the following: 

[¶] (1) File an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment with 

the court. [Or] [¶] (2) Execute, acknowledge, and deliver an 

acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment to the person who 

made the demand.” (§ 724.050, subd. (a); see Gray1 CPB, LLC v. 

SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 898.) “If the 

judgment creditor does not comply with the demand within the 

time allowed, the person making the demand may apply to the 

court on noticed motion for an order requiring the judgment 
12

creditor to comply with the demand.” (§ 724.050, subd. (d); see 

Gray1 CPB, at p. 898.) “If the court determines that the 

judgment has been satisfied and that the judgment creditor has 

not complied with the demand, the court shall either (1) order the 

judgment creditor to comply with the demand or (2) order the 

court clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment.” (§ 724.050, 

subd. (d).)

Section 724.050 “has been interpreted to require the trial 

court to first determine whether the judgment has been satisfied 

in fact before ordering entry of satisfaction of judgment.” 

(Schumacher v. Ayerve (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1860, 1863; see 

Pierson v. Honda (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1411, 1414, fn. 4 [“a 

reasonable reading of the section requires the trial court find 

actual satisfaction of the judgment”].) A motion under 

section 724.080, subdivision (d), is a proper mechanism by which

a judgment debtor may force a judgment creditor to agree to 

accept a lesser amount as full satisfaction of a judgment. (Horath 

v. Hess (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 456, 469 [judgment creditor’s

“agreement to accept payment from [debtor] of only $100,000 plus 

costs . . . was properly enforced by [debtor] pursuant to a 

section 724.050 motion”].)

“On appeal, we will uphold the factual findings supporting 

the trial court’s decision on a motion for satisfaction of judgment 

if the findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (Jhaveri v. 

Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 748; accord, George S. 

Nolte Consulting Civil Engineers, Inc. v. Magliocco (1979) 

93 Cal.App.3d 190, 193-194.) “We will presume the existence of 

every fact the finder of fact could reasonably deduce from the 

evidence in support of the judgment or order. [Citation.] . . . [A]ll 

intendments and presumptions must be indulged to support the
13

judgment or order on matters as to which the record is silent, and 

error must be affirmatively shown.” (Jhaveri, at pp. 748-749.)

However, we apply a different standard of review here, 

where Zaki had the burden of proof on his motion to satisfy 

judgment to show the 2014 and 2016 judgments had been 

satisfied, which burden the trial court found Zaki did not meet. 

“‘In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly 

concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry 

the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to 

characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial 

evidence supports the judgment.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, where the 

issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question 

for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a 

finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’” (Juen v. 

Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979; 

accord, Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769; Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. 

County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) “‘Specifically, 

the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was 

(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”” 

(Juen, at p. 979; accord, Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, at p. 838.) 

“[U]nless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of 

the losing [party], we presume the trial court found the [losing 

party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry 

the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to 

judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” 

(Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation

(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.)
14

B. The Trial Court Properly Considered Evidence of the 

Parties’ Intent

Zaki contends the escrow demand, coupled with the 

Mansours’ payment of the demand through escrow, constituted 

an unambiguous written agreement for Marina to accept 

$112,500 in full satisfaction of the money judgments against the 

Mansours, and the trial court therefore erred in considering the 

acknowledgment and other evidence of the parties’ intent with 

respect to the settlement payment. The Carriers counter that 

Zaki was neither a party nor a third party beneficiary of the 

escrow demand, which was negotiated between Marina and 

Kartomi and tendered to the escrow agent, and Marina did not 

authorize Neal to sign an acknowledgment of full satisfaction of 

the judgments. The Carriers contend the trial court correctly 

treated the acknowledgment as a contract and considered 

extrinsic evidence based on an ambiguity in the acknowledgment 

as to whether the parties intended that the settlement payment 

fully satisfy the two judgments. Zaki has the better argument 

that the escrow demand constituted an agreement reflecting the 

parties’ intent to settle their dispute, but contrary to his 

contention, the escrow demand was ambiguous, and therefore the 

trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence (including the 

acknowledgment) in determining the intent of the parties in 

reaching a $112,500 settlement. 

As to the acknowledgment, we are not aware of any legal 

authority treating an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment 

as a mutual agreement between a creditor and debtor that a 

judgment has been satisfied. Rather, an acknowledgment of 

satisfaction of judgment is evidence of the creditor’s intent as to 

whether a judgment has been partially or fully satisfied. (See

McCall v. Four Star Music Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
15

In McCall, relied on by the Carriers, the Court of Appeal

considered whether a judgment against one of several jointly 

liable defendants (Joe E. Johnson) had been satisfied where the 

other defendants had reached a settlement agreement with the 

plaintiffs that fully released the claims against all parties 

“‘except Joe E. Johnson, individually.’” (Id. at p. 1397, italics 

omitted.) The plaintiffs filed an acknowledgment of satisfaction 

of judgment that checked the box stating “‘[t]he judgment 

creditor has accepted payment or performance other than 

specified in the judgment in full satisfaction of the judgment,’” 

but they named only the settling defendants and omitted 

Johnson’s name. (Ibid.) In determining whether the plaintiffs 

intended to release Johnson, the Court of Appeal considered the 

parties’ settlement agreement, explaining “[t]he intent of the 

parties as expressed in the release is controlling.” (Id. at 

p. 1400.) The court treated the acknowledgment as “further 

evidence of [plaintiffs’] intention” not to release Johnson because 

the acknowledgment named the settling defendants and not 

Johnson. (Id. at p. 1401.) Here too, the acknowledgment is 

evidence the trial court properly considered in determining 

Marina’s intent in accepting the $112,500 settlement payment.6 

As to the escrow demand, even if it constituted an 

enforceable agreement between Marina and the Mansours (or 

6 In McCall, the court concluded the filing of an 

acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment that provided for 

“‘full satisfaction of the judgment’” (italics omitted) was “clearly a 

clerical error which does not accurately reflect the intent of the 

parties.” (McCall v. Four Star Music Co., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1397, 1402.) 
16

Luzelba as the owner of the property),7 the agreement is 

ambiguous because it does not state whether the $112,500 

“agreed upon settlement amount” (capitalization omitted) 

constituted a full settlement as to the two judgments (as argued 

by Zaki) or only settlement of the liens recorded against the 

property (as argued by the Carriers). “‘Extrinsic evidence is 

admissible . . . to interpret an agreement when a material term is 

ambiguous.’” (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 

432; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. 

Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37, 39-40 [notwithstanding the plain and 

unambiguous language on the face of a contract, if extrinsic 

evidence is “relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of 

the instrument is reasonably susceptible,” the extrinsic evidence 

may be admitted to determine the contracting parties’ objective 

intent].)

Zaki argues that because the escrow demand listed the two 

judgments and their full money value, Marina unambiguously 

agreed to settle those judgments for $112,500. But in referring to 

the property in the subject line and including in the “[t]otal 

[a]mount” owed Marina’s additional claims against the property, 

including unpaid assessments and fees, a reasonable 

interpretation of the escrow demand is that it was intended only 

to clear the liens on the property so it could be sold to Kartomi. 

7 Although we do not decide whether the Mansours were 

third party beneficiaries of the escrow demand, Luzelba may 

have been—she was the property owner; she understood that 

clearing the claims against the property was a condition for 

closing a sale; and the settlement payment came from the sale 

proceeds. Further, Luzelba’s deposition testimony indicates she 

agreed to a settlement with Marina, albeit reluctantly, when she 

pursued the Kartomi sale.
17

In light of the ambiguity in the agreement, extrinsic evidence was

admissible to show the intent of the parties in agreeing to the 

$112,500 settlement. (Brown v. Goldstein, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th

at p. 432.)

C. Zaki Failed To Present Evidence Compelling a Finding the 

Parties Agreed to Full Satisfaction of the Judgments

Marina presented significant evidence below that she and 

Luzelba did not intend the settlement payment to satisfy fully 

the judgments against the Mansours. Nau averred he was 

involved on behalf of Marina in telephone conversations with the 

Beaumont attorneys, Kartomi, and the Carriers’ attorneys, and 

“[d]uring each of these phone conversations, it was expressly 

agreed and understood that Marina would only release its liens 

and encumbrances placed on the [p]roperty . . . . At no time was 

it ever discussed or agreed that the $112,500 payment was 

intended as, or would otherwise constitute, a full and complete 

release of the Mansours[.]” The release—which Neal testified 

“reflect[ed] the understanding of Marina and Kartomi”—stated 

the $112,500 was “in exchange for releases of [Marina’s] 

encumbrances against [the property]. Said releases shall release 

[the property] only, and shall not release to the sellers to the 

contemplated real estate transaction personally.” Luzelba 

testified in her January 2019 deposition that she understood and 

acquiesced in the agreement reached between Marina and 

Kartomi: “In my mind, the way I understood this whole process, 

was that they were willing to accept whatever they got from the 

sale and that they would come after me for the rest. All I wanted 

was to get that condo sold and not get a foreclosure and try to get 

rid of as much debt as I could. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . It’s not that I 

believed that the sale . . . cleared their debt. [¶] 
18

. . . [¶] . . . They just made it very clear to me that . . . whatever 

they received, that they’re still going to come after me for the 

rest.” Luzelba testified her paramount concern was avoiding 

foreclosure, and she hoped that if she cooperated with Marina, 

“they will go after another asset that’s not directly attached to 

me.”

Zaki argues the recording of the acknowledgment shows 

Marina agreed to full satisfaction of the judgments because had 

Marina intended only a partial satisfaction, it would have 

selected “[p]artial satisfaction” rather than “[f]ull satisfaction” on 

the acknowledgment form. But as the trial court found, the 

acknowledgment is ambiguous because Neal added the limiting 

language that provided, “‘As to the real property located at 4150 

Via Dolce # 337 Marina del Rey, CA 90292’” after the form 

language stating that the judgment creditor had accepted 

payment other than full satisfaction. The language specifying 

that the $112,500 payment fully satisfied Marina’s claims “[a]s to 

the real property” is consistent with Nau’s and Neal’s accounts, 

as well as the language in the release stating that Marina’s 

settlement offer for $112,500 was “in exchange for releases of 

[Marina’s] encumbrances against the [property].”8

8 Zaki also argues that if Marina had intended to release 

only its claims against the property, it could simply have 

recorded a release of its judgment lien under section 697.370 

rather than an acknowledgment. Section 697.370, 

subdivision (a)(1), provides that a judgment creditor may “release 

from the judgment lien all or part of the real property subject to a 

lien.” A release “is sufficient if it is executed by the judgment 

creditor in the same manner as an acknowledgment of 

satisfaction of judgment . . . .” (§ 697.370, subd. (b).) Although

the acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment was carelessly 
19

Zaki points to portions of Luzelba’s 2017 declaration 

contemporaneous with the sale and her 2019 deposition 

testimony as evidence Luzelba believed the settlement would 

fully satisfy the money judgments. But Luzelba’s declaration, 

like the escrow demand, lists “negotiated demands from the liens 

and judgments on [the property],” including the two judgments 

and other debts relating to the property, including “assessments, 

late fees, interest, and related charges.” Nowhere in her 

declaration does Luzelba state she understood Marina’s offer 

fully released her or Zaki from the judgments.

Zaki also points out that when Luzelba was asked at her 

deposition whether selling the property “would discharge any and 

all obligations,” she responded, “I believed that that would have 

been the case. And to my surprise, it wasn’t.” But Luzelba 

acknowledged, “[W]hen I had a meeting with them, they told me 

we’re not going to budge, we will still come after you for the 

remaining balance.” And, as noted, Luzelba testified later in the 

deposition that her understanding of the settlement agreement 

was that “they would come after me for the rest.”

The ambiguous acknowledgment and declaration, combined 

with Luzelba’s inconsistent deposition testimony, does not 

constitute “‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’” evidence that is 

“‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination’” that Marina agreed to accept $112,500 in full 

satisfaction of the money judgments. (Juen, supra, 

32 Cal.App.5th at p. 979; Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. 

prepared, and a release of the judgment liens would have been 

more appropriate, Zaki provides no authority that Marina was 

required to record a release rather than to utilize the 

acknowledgment form.
20

County of Kern, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) We therefore 

affirm the trial court’s contrary finding.

DISPOSITION

The trial court order denying Zaki’s motion to compel 

acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment is affirmed. The 

parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. IBARRA, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.