2024 IL App (4th) 230366 

NO. 4-23-0366 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

FLOYD SCHULTZ, STANLEY BLUNIER, and BRAD 

RISKEDAL, Individually and as Class Representatives on 

Behalf of All of the Minority Unitholders of Illinois River 

Energy Holding, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, 

v. 

SINAV LIMITED; GTL RESOURCES USA, INC.; GTL 

RESOURCES LIMITED; GTL RESOURCES PLC; GTL 

CAMBRIDGE LLC; RICHARD H. RUEBE; JEFFREY 

W. LEMAJEUR; VINCENT J. KWASNIEWSKI; NEAL 

T. JAKEL; SIEM KAPITAL, AS; HARWOOD CAPITAL 

LLP, f/k/a North Atlantic Value LLP; and SIEM 

INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

(Sinav Limited; GTL Resources USA, Inc.; GTL 

Resources Limited; GTL Resources PLC; GTL Cambridge 

LLC; Richard H. Ruebe; Jeffrey W. Lemajeur; Vincent J. 

Kwasniewski; and Neal T. Jakel, Defendants-Appellees

and Cross-Appellants). 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of 

Ogle County. 

No. 14L15 

Honorable 

John C. Redington, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justices Knecht and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 This class action, pending now for nearly a decade, has a complex factual and 

procedural history that is better understood in the context of the issues presented rather than 

FILED

April 5, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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through an extensive chronology. We first provide a broad overview of the case and then begin 

our analysis of the issues, supplying additional background information as needed. 

¶ 2 I. OVERVIEW

¶ 3 In 2007, Illinois River Energy Holdings, LLC (IREH), was formed for the purpose 

of operating an ethanol plant in Rochelle, Illinois. IREH’s membership consisted of the plaintiff 

class of approximately 100 minority shareholders, who owned approximately 13% of IREH’s 

shares (also called units), and defendant GTL Resources USA (GTL USA), which owned the 

remaining shares. IREH was formed under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (Act)

(Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-101 (West 2013)), and its activities were governed by a written 

operating agreement (LLC Agreement). The LLC Agreement provided that IREH would be 

managed by a seven-person board of managers with broad authority over the company’s affairs. 

At all times, IREH’s members and managers were required to comply with any contractual duties 

imposed on them by the LLC Agreement and any duties imposed on them by the laws of Delaware, 

the state where IREH was formed and whose laws the parties agreed would govern the contract. 

The contract also included a waiver of the parties’ right to a jury trial. 

¶ 4 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the 87%-13% split in ownership, the LLC Agreement 

granted GTL USA the power to appoint four of the seven managers in its sole discretion, with the 

remaining three managers elected by the shareholders at large. The LLC Agreement also provided 

that majority shareholder approval was necessary for any merger and that the minority 

shareholders waived their dissenters’ rights, including any right to prevent such a merger. On 

January 30, 2012, the board, with GTL USA’s approval, voted 4-3 to undergo a complex 

restructuring called a “cash-out merger” or “squeeze-out” that enabled GTL USA to take complete 

control of IREH by buying out the class members’ shares at $1.10 per share. The three-vote 
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minority consisted of plaintiffs Floyd Schultz, Stanley Blunier, and Brad Riskedal, all of whom 

had served on the IREH board since its founding in 2007. 

¶ 5 The four-vote majority consisted of GTL USA’s appointed managers at that time, 

defendants Richard H. Ruebe, Jeffrey W. Lemajeur, Vincent J. Kwasniewski, and Neal T. Jakel 

(Individual Defendants). All of the Individual Defendants had management roles at IREH; Reube, 

Lemajeur, and Kwasniewski also had management roles at GTL USA. Reube served on the IREH 

board since its founding in 2007, Lemajeur was appointed to the board by GTL USA in 2010, and 

Kwasniewski and Jakel were each appointed to the board by GTL USA on January 17, 2012, less 

than two weeks before the merger vote. 

¶ 6 The merger was finalized with the Delaware Secretary of State on February 22, 

2012. The company at the top of the new corporate structure was defendant Sinav Limited (Sinav), 

with complete ownership of IREH. Later in 2012, the Individual Defendants were offered “sweet 

equity” in Sinav at the market price; Reube purchased 6% of Sinav, Lemajeur purchased 2%, and 

Kwasniewski and Jakel each purchased 1%. Sweet equity is a kind of incentive compensation for 

a business’s employees that serves as both carrot and stick; the employees will eventually receive 

a profit for selling their shares if they help to increase the value of the business, but if the value of 

the business declines, they will lose money on their investment. 

¶ 7 In April 2014, CHS Inc. (CHS), a third-party Illinois company, announced that it 

would purchase Sinav. In May 2014, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the class of minority 

shareholders, filed a six-count complaint against defendants based on their roles in the cash-out 

merger. Plaintiffs did not join CHS as a defendant and did not seek to undo the cash-out merger or 

prevent CHS’s impending purchase of Sinav, which went through in June 2014 at a price 

equivalent to $4.94 per share of IREH, after adjusting for estimated debt.
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¶ 8 Plaintiffs sued GTL USA and the Individual Defendants (collectively, the IREH

Defendants), alleging that all IREH Defendants breached the LLC Agreement (count I), the 

Individual Defendants breached common-law fiduciary duties as managers (count II), and GTL 

USA breached common-law fiduciary duties as the controlling shareholder (count III). 

¶ 9 In deciding these counts, the trial court faced four main questions. First, the court 

had to determine duty; did the IREH Defendants in fact owe the class these alleged duties? Second, 

the court had to determine liability; did the IREH Defendants violate their duties by approving the 

cash-out merger? Third, the court had to determine the remedy; if the IREH Defendants were 

liable, what could the court do to rectify the problem? Fourth and finally, the court had to determine 

valuation; if the remedy involved the payment of money from the IREH Defendantsto the class, 

what amount of money was appropriate? 

¶ 10 After pretrial motion practice and bench trials in 2020 and 2022, the trial court 

found that (1) the IREH Defendants in fact owed the class the alleged duties; (2) the IREH 

Defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties when buying out the class; (3) the 

remedy would be compensatory damages, determined by subtracting $1.10 from a fair share price

as of February 22, 2012, the date the merger was finalized; and (4) the fair share price was $2.78. 

The court calculated prejudgment interest on a compound basis and determined that the IREH

Defendants were jointly and severally liable to the class for $11,966,903.15 on counts I through 

III. Plaintiffs appealed, and the IREH Defendants cross-appealed. 

¶ 11 Plaintiffs also sued the other companies involved in the cash-out merger, alleging 

that they breached common-law fiduciary duties (count IV), aided and abetted the IREH 

Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties (count V), and tortiously interfered with the 

contractual relationship between the class and the IREH Defendants by wrongfully inducing the 
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IREH Defendants to breach the LLC Agreement (count VI). We refer to these remaining 

defendants as the Tort Defendants. They fall into two categories.

¶ 12 First are the “Investor Defendants,” who provided GTL USA with the funds for the 

cash-out merger: Siem Industries, Inc. (Siem Industries), a company based in Luxembourg; Siem 

Kapital, AS (Siem AS), a Norwegian company and indirect subsidiary of Siem Industries; and 

North Atlantic Value LLP (NAV), now known as Harwood Capital LLP, a company based in the 

United Kingdom. 

¶ 13 Second are the “Merger Defendants,” each of which had a direct corporate 

relationship with GTL USA. GTL Resources PLC (GTL PLC) was a publicly traded English 

company that owned GTL USA as its sole subsidiary. Sinav was an investment vehicle formed by 

the Investor Defendants in October 2011 to take GTL PLC private; Sinav is a portmanteau of Siem 

and NAV. GTL Resources Limited (GTL Limited) was the private company formed when Sinav 

purchased all of GTL PLC’s publicly traded stock on January 17, 2012. GTL Cambridge LLC

(GTL Cambridge) was a subsidiary of GTL USA established to merge into IREH as part of the 

cash-out merger. 

¶ 14 Simplified greatly, Sinav had an 87% stake in IREH before the cash-out merger; 

after the cash-out merger, Sinav had a 100% stake. Sinav was thus a more valuable investment for 

the Investor Defendants if the cash-out merger went through, and the approval of the IREH 

Defendants was necessary for that to happen. The Merger Defendants all ultimately answered to 

the Investor Defendants, so they would suffer the consequences of the Investor Defendants’ 

response to the IREH Defendants’ decision, for better or worse. If the Investor Defendants or the 

Merger Defendantsengaged in wrongful conduct to ensure the cash-out merger went through, then 

they could potentially be liable to the class based on that conduct. 
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¶ 15 In March 2015, the trial court dismissed count IV at the first step of the analysis

described above, finding that none of the Tort Defendants owed any fiduciary duties to the class

under Delaware law. In April 2018, the court struck plaintiffs’ jury demand based on the jury-trial 

waiver in the LLC Agreement. After the 2022 bench trial, the court entered judgment against 

plaintiffs on counts V and VI. On count V, the court found that the Tort Defendants were not liable 

for aiding and abetting the IREH Defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duties. On count VI, the 

court concluded that the Tort Defendants were not liable for tortious interference with contractual 

relations based on the IREH Defendants’ breach of the LLC Agreement. Plaintiffs appealed, and 

the Merger Defendants cross-appealed, despite having prevailed on all counts against them.

¶ 16 In all six counts of their complaint, plaintiffs demanded “damages, including 

rescissory damages, to the class members in an amount to be proved up at trial to grant the plaintiffs 

the fair value to which they are entitled for their investment in and commitment to the Rochelle 

plant.” We examine the concept of rescissory damages further in our discussion of remedies, but 

plaintiffs were essentially seeking the monetary benefits of CHS’s purchase of IREH as though 

plaintiffs had still been shareholders in IREH at the time of the purchase. In count VI, plaintiffs 

further demanded “punitive damages for malicious and willful interference with the LLC 

Agreement.” On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s November 2019 order denying them 

leave to amend their complaint to add a demand for disgorgement of defendants’ profitsto counts 

I through VI and a seventh count demanding a declaratory judgment voiding the cash-out merger. 

¶ 17 As explained further below, we hold as follows. On count I against GTL USA for 

breach of contract, we reverse and enter judgment in favor of GTL USA. On count I against the 

Individual Defendantsfor breach of contract, we reverse and remand for a new trial on (1) liability

for monetary damages under the LLC Agreement’s exculpatory provision and (2) the amount of 
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damages for any of the Individual Defendants who are found liable. On count II against the 

Individual Defendants for breach of common-law fiduciary duties, we vacate the trial court’s 

judgment as duplicative because the common-law fiduciary duties alleged in count II were

supplanted by the contractual duties alleged in count I. On count III against GTL USA, we reverse 

and remand for a new trial on the amount of damages. On counts IV and V against the Tort 

Defendants, we affirm. On count VI against the Tort Defendants, we reverse and remand for a jury 

trial. We affirm the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, and we 

dismiss the Merger Defendants’ cross-appeal for lack of appellate standing. Finally, we direct the 

court on remand to revisit the extensive sealing of court documents in these proceedings. 

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 We note at the outset that although the Merger Defendants joined in GTL USA’s 

notice of cross-appeal, they were prevailing parties below, having won dismissal of count IV and 

judgment in their favor on counts V and VI. Accordingly, we dismiss their cross-appeal for lack 

of appellate standing. See Mayster v. Santacruz, 2020 IL App (2d) 190840, ¶ 27 (“[O]ne who has 

obtained by the trial court’s judgment all that has been asked for cannot appeal from that 

judgment.” (citing Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382, 386 (1983), 

and Chicago Tribune v. College of Du Page, 2017 IL App (2d) 160274, ¶ 28)). However, we still 

consider their arguments as potential grounds for upholding the trial court’s judgment. See id.

(explaining that appellees may argue in support of the judgment). 

¶ 20 Furthermore, plaintiffs have not alleged any error by the trial court with respect to 

counts IV and V, thus forfeiting any challenge to the court’s judgment on those counts. See Lewis, 

Yockey & Brown, Inc. v. Fetzer, 2022 IL App (4th) 210599, ¶ 13 (stating failure to challenge the 
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trial court’s judgment on a given count results in forfeiture). Accordingly, we affirm as to counts 

IV and V.

¶ 21 On the remaining counts, we first address the issues relating to counts I through III 

against the IREH Defendants, including plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to their complaint, and 

then we address count VI against the Tort Defendants. 

¶ 22 A. The IREH Defendants (Counts I Through III)

¶ 23 The parties do not dispute that Delaware law governs the substantive issues and 

available remedies on counts I through III because of the express choice of law provision in the 

LLC Agreement. See Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 

351 (2002) (honoring express choice of law provision); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 

§ 187 (1971). When interpreting and applying Delaware law, we are generally bound by the 

decisions of Delaware courts. Bridgeview Health Care Center, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 

Co., 2014 IL 116389, ¶ 21 (holding that Illinois courts apply Delaware law as determined by the 

Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Chancery Court). Even when we apply Delaware law 

to the substantive issues in a given case, however, Illinois law governs “matters of pleading and 

how the litigation shall be conducted.” Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 

2d 560, 565 (2000) (citing Nelson v. Hix, 122 Ill. 2d 343, 346-47 (1988), Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws §§ 122, 127 (1971), and 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws §§ 153, 163 (1998)); 

see Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 351 (explaining that Illinois law governs procedural matters).

Illinois law also determines the applicable standard of review on appeal, along with additional

issues we address below. See Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d at 568; cf. Target Corp. v. Prestige Maintenance 

USA, Ltd., 2013 COA 12, ¶ 19 (applying forum law to standard of appellate review and 

preservation of issues for appeal). 
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¶ 24 We now proceed to the four questions facing the trial court: duty, liability, remedy, 

and valuation. 

¶ 25 1. Duty

¶ 26 The inherent problem with a cash-out merger is that it creates a divergence of 

interests between the minority shareholders, who will either want to prevent the cash-out merger

or receive the highest possible price for their shares, and the majority shareholder, who will want 

to pay the lowest possible price for the minority’s shares. In the present case, it is undisputed that 

the class members waived any right to prevent a properly authorized cash-out merger, so their only 

remaining interest was in receiving as much as possible for their shares. 

¶ 27 By default, an LLC is “member-managed,” meaning that the majority shareholder 

is also the controlling shareholder, with actual control over the cash-out merger process and price.

However, an LLC can adopt an operating agreement to become “manager-managed,” giving 

control over the cash-out merger process and price to a putatively independent board of managers, 

akin to a corporation’s board of directors. In the present case, the LLC Agreement created a sevenmember board of managers and gave GTL USA the power to appoint four of the managers in its 

sole discretion. Notably, GTL USA’s appointment power did not depend on whether it was the 

majority shareholder.

¶ 28 The question of duty requires us to interpret the LLC Agreement and Delaware law 

to determine who had actual control over the cash-out merger and what obligations those decisionmakers owed to the class when making the decision. We review de novo what duties arise from a 

contract (Village of Palatine v. Palatine Associates, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 102707, ¶ 44) and 

whether a legal duty exists (AYH Holdings, Inc. v. Avreco, Inc., 357 Ill. App. 3d 17, 32 (2005)). 

With respect to control, our review is also de novo because we are applying our legal conclusions
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to undisputed facts. City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234, 241 (2005) (“Where, as here, 

the question on appeal is limited to application of the law to undisputed facts, the standard of 

review is de novo.”).

¶ 29 We separately address the questions of control, contractual duties, and commonlaw duties for GTL USA and the Individual Defendants. 

¶ 30 a. GTL USA

¶ 31 i. Control

¶ 32 GTL USA asserts that it lacked “actual control” over the cash-out merger, citing 

section 6.1(d) of the LLC Agreement, which states: 

“Other than the right to elect Managers to the Board of Managers, no 

Member, other than a Member acting in his or her capacity as an officer of the 

Company [(IREH)], has any right or power to take part in the management or 

control of the Company or its business and affairs.”

Under section 5.3(b)(i), “[t]he Company’s Member [GTL USA] shall have the power to identify 

one or more Managers as a ‘GTL Appointee’ in the sole discretion of [GTL USA].” Four of the 

seven managers were designated as GTL appointees. 

¶ 33 GTL USA’s contention is that its control over the cash-out merger was merely

indirect and extended no further than its power to appoint the majority of the board’s managers, 

so the Individual Defendantswere the only ones who wielded control todecide whether the merger

would go through. We disagree.

¶ 34 When interpreting a contract under Delaware law (or Illinois law, for that matter), 

we do not read provisions in isolation but as parts of a whole, viewing each provision in light of 

the others. Samuel J. Heyman 1981 Continuing Trust for Lazarus S. Heyman v. Ashland LLC, 284 
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A.3d 714, 721 (Del. 2022); accord Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., 2023 

IL 128612, ¶ 63. Our purpose is to effectuate the contract’s overall purpose and intent, starting 

with the contract’s plain terms. Ashland, 284 A.3d at 721. 

¶ 35 Immediately after section 6.1(d) of the LLC Agreement comes section 6.1(e), 

which states: “No Member shall have any voting right except with respect to those matters 

requiring a Member vote or approval as specifically provided for in this Agreement or in the Act.” 

(Emphasis added.) If we read section 6.1(d) as eliminating this “voting right” because it is a right 

“[o]ther than the right to elect Managers,” then section 6.1(e) becomes superfluous because the 

right is already eliminated. See id. (stating that courts must give effect to all provisions of a contract 

when possible). The more natural reading, which gives effect to both provisions, is that the “voting 

right *** with respect to those matters requiring a Member vote or approval as specifically 

provided for in this Agreement” is not “a[ ] right *** to take part in the management or control of 

the Company or its business and affairs,” but merely the right to approve (or disapprove) of certain 

specific management decisions by the board of managers. 

¶ 36 Another problem with GTL USA’s interpretation is that it fails to identify any 

provision of the LLC Agreement that expressly grants the board of managers the right or power 

to enter into a merger once elected. Instead, section 5.1(c) of the LLC Agreement states that “the 

Board of Managers shall not have the authority to approve, authorize, or take the following actions 

with respect to the Company without the approval or consent of a Majority in Interest of the 

Members,” including “merg[ing] or consolidat[ing] the Company with another Person.” 

(Emphases added.) When describing this provision in its brief, GTL USA says, “the LLC 

Agreement expressly authorized the Board to ‘merge or consolidate the Company with another 

Person’ if it obtained the consent of the Majority of its Members.” (Emphasis added.) In other 
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words, GTL USA is arguing that a merger could go through if a majority of the board, meaning 

four managers, approved of the merger. 

¶ 37 To reject this argument, we need not go further than the definitions section of the 

contract, which provides specific meanings for “[c]apitalized words and phrases used in th[e] 

Agreement.” “Majority in Interest” is defined as “Members holding more than fifty percent (50%) 

of the Units then held by all Members.” 

“ ‘Member’ means any Person (i) whose name is set forth as such on [the exhibit 

listing the founding Members] initially attached hereto or who has become a 

Member pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, and (ii) who is the owner of one 

or more Units. ‘Members’ means all such Persons.” 

GTL USA was indisputably a “Member” that owned and held more than 50% of “the Units,” so it 

was the “Majority in Interest of the Members.” 

¶ 38 Therefore, contrary to GTL USA’s argument, the LLC Agreement unambiguously 

required the approval of GTL USA itself, not just its appointees to the board, before the cash-out 

merger could go through. See In re Coinmint, LLC, 261 A.3d 867, 901 (Del. Ch. 2021) 

(interpreting similar language as requiring the “two steps” of majority member consent and formal 

board approval); see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 

1994) (holding that fiduciary duties can arise from either majority interest or exercise of de facto

control over the business’s affairs). Under Delaware law, this “ultimate decision-making power 

with respect to *** the [challenged merger] in particular” constituted control over the merger, even 

if that decision-making power did not extend to “the day-to-day, operational management of [the] 

business.” Lewis v. AimCo Properties, L.P., No. 9934-VCP, 2015 WL 557995, at *7 (Del. Ch. 

Feb. 10, 2015).
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¶ 39 It is uncontroverted that GTL USA approved the cash-out merger in a January 30, 

2012, document entitled “Action by the Majority Member of Illinois River Energy Holdings, LLC”

and signed by Reube in his role as chief executive officer of GTL USA. Any claim by GTL USA 

that this approval was a needless formality rather than an exercise of decision-making power is 

plainly in error.

¶ 40 In short, we find that GTL USA had control over the cash-out merger. 

¶ 41 ii. Contractual Duties

¶ 42 Although GTL USA’s approval was necessary for the merger to go through, that 

fact did not, in and of itself, impose a duty under section 5.4(a) of the LLC Agreement, which 

applies to “Managers,” specifically defined as 

“any Person who (i) has been appointed or elected to the Board of Managers and is 

referred to as such in Section 5 of this Agreement or has become a Manager 

pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, and (ii) has not ceased to be a Manager 

pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.” 

It is undisputed that GTL USA itself was not a manager under this definition; the seven-member 

board of managers consisted only of plaintiffs and the Individual Defendants. 

¶ 43 Plaintiffs have not pointed to any other provision of the contract that imposes a duty 

on GTL USA with respect to the cash-out merger, nor did the trial court identify what contractual 

duty GTL USA purportedly breached. In their reply brief, plaintiffs cite GTL USA’s argument 

regarding control and assert that “[b]y acting where it claims it had no right or duty to act, GTL 

USA breached [section 6.1(d) of] the LLC Agreement.” However, a plaintiff alleging a breach of 

contract must identify a “pertinent obligation under the agreement.” (Emphasis added.)In re P3 

Health Group Holdings, LLC, No. 2021-0518-JTL, 2022 WL 16548567, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 
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2022). While GTL USA had no right to act under section 6.1(d), it also had no obligation to refrain 

from acting. Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to advance a theory of vicarious liability, which 

Delaware generally does not recognize for breach of contract claims. See Wenske v. Blue Bell 

Creameries, Inc., No. 2017-0699-JRS, 2018 WL 3337531, at *16 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018). 

¶ 44 Because plaintiffs failed to allege that GTL USA had any contractual duty with 

respect to the cash-out merger under the LLC Agreement, we conclude that the trial court erred by 

finding that GTL USA breached any such duty. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment 

on count I against GTL USA and enter judgment in favor of GTL USA. See Gardner v. 

International Shoe Co., 386 Ill. 418, 433 (1944) (holding that a reviewing court may reverse 

without remanding where no ground of recovery has been shown). 

¶ 45 iii. Common-Law Duties

¶ 46 With respect to common-law fiduciary duties, the LLC Agreement’s silence works 

against GTL USA; when neither the LLC Agreement nor the Act addresses the controlling 

shareholder’s fiduciary duties, “the rules of law and equity *** relating to fiduciary duties *** 

shall govern.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013); Coinmint, 261 A.3d at 900-01. Under 

Delaware law, the controlling shareholder in a cash-out merger owes the minority shareholders the 

default fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care. Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, 

at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010). When the minority shareholders sue the controlling shareholder 

for breach of fiduciary duty in this situation, courts apply an exacting standard of judicial review 

called “entire fairness,” which we explain further in our discussion of liability. Kahn, 638 A.2d at

1116. 

¶ 47 We recognize that the pre-2013 version of the Act, effective when the LLC 

Agreement was executed in 2007, did not expressly mention fiduciary duties, and later dictum
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from the Delaware Supreme Court cast some doubt on whether the pre-2013 Act imposed them. 

Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1219 (Del. 2012) (per curiam) 

(Gatz II). However, the existence of default fiduciary duties under the pre-2013 Act had long been

established as binding precedent in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Id.; Feeley v. NHAOCG, 

LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 660 (Del. Ch. 2012); see Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty 

Debate in Delaware, 39 J. Corp. L. 35, 37 (2013). The Delaware Chancery Court’s interpretation 

of the pre-2013 Act is binding on this court (Bridgeview, 2014 IL 116389, ¶ 21), so we conclude 

that GTL USA owed the class the default fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care under Delaware 

law irrespective of which version of the Act governs. 

¶ 48 At oral argument, counsel for GTL USA conceded that it had the right as majority 

shareholder to veto any cash-out merger proposed by the board but argued that it nevertheless

owed no duties to the class because under the LLC Agreement, the terms of any merger were to

be decided solely by the board. Assuming this allocation of powers reflects the proper 

interpretation of the LLC Agreement, it still does not change our conclusion. Under Delaware law, 

a fiduciary who has only the power to say no to a proposed transaction still has a corresponding 

duty to say no when the proposed transaction is not entirely fair. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1119-20. 

Accordingly, GTL USA’s approval of the cash-out merger had to be consistent with its fiduciary 

duties of loyalty and care, irrespective of whether the Individual Defendants acted consistently 

with any duties of their own. 

¶ 49 b. The Individual Defendants 

¶ 50 i. Control
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¶ 51 The parties do not dispute that the Individual Defendants wielded control over the 

cash-out merger in that the LLC Agreement required all four of their votes for the merger to go 

through. See Coinmint, 261 A.3d at 901-02. We agree.

¶ 52 ii. Contractual Duties

¶ 53 As opposed to GTL USA’s duties as controlling shareholder, the LLC Agreement 

speaks specifically to the Individual Defendants’ duties as managers. Section 5.4(a) governs the 

managers’ duties and reads as follows, with each sentence placed in a separately numbered 

paragraph for ease of analysis:

“[(1)] The Board of Managers shall cause the Company [(IREH)] to 

conduct its business and operations separate and apart from that of any Member, 

Manager or any of its Affiliates.

[(2)] The Board of Managers shall take all actions which may be necessary 

or appropriate (i) for the continuation of the Company’s valid existence as a limited 

liability company under the Laws of the State of Delaware and each other 

jurisdiction in which such existence is necessary to protect the limited liability of 

Members or to enable the Company to conduct the business in which it is engaged, 

and (ii) for the accomplishment of the Company’s purposes, including the 

acquisition, development, maintenance, preservation, and operation of Company 

property in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and applicable laws 

and regulations. 

[(3)] Each Manager shall have the duty to discharge the foregoing duties in 

good faith, in a manner the Manager believes to be in the best interests of the 
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Company, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 

exercise under similar circumstances.

[(4)] No Manager shall act or fail to act in a manner that constitutes any of 

the following: (i) a willful failure to deal fairly with the Company or its Members 

in connection with a matter in which the Manager has a material conflict of interest; 

(ii) a violation of criminal law, unless the Manager had reasonable cause to believe 

that the Manager’s conduct was lawful or no reasonable cause to believe that the 

conduct was unlawful; (iii) a transaction from which the Manager derived an 

improper personal profit; or (iv) willful misconduct.

[(5)] No Manager shall be under any other duty to the Company or the 

Members to conduct the affairs of the Company in a particular manner.” (Paragraph 

structure and numbering added.) 

Our objective is to give effect to all five sentences. Ashland, 284 A.3d at 721. 

¶ 54 In arguing against the existence of fiduciary duties, the Individual Defendants rely 

on sentence five, claiming that their sole duty to the class was to avoid the conduct specifically 

prohibited by sentence four, which we note does not use the word “duty.” We disagree with this 

interpretation because it eliminates the duties listed in sentence three, as well as “the foregoing 

duties” in sentences one and two. Moreover, sentence four’s prohibition on “willful misconduct” 

cannot be given effect without some indication of what conduct was expected of the managers in 

the first place; the most straightforward conclusion is that the standard for the managers’ conduct 

is set forth in the preceding sentences. Accordingly, we reject the Individual Defendants’ 

interpretation and conclude that sentence five eliminates any duties, including common-law 
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fiduciary duties, except for those obligations established in sentences one through four. This 

conclusion does not end our analysis. 

¶ 55 The Individual Defendants are correct that the Act permits an LLC to eliminate its 

managers’ fiduciary duties altogether, but the Act also allows an LLC to supplant those fiduciary 

duties by contract, which is what happened here. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West 

2013) (providing that a manager’s duties “may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by 

provisions in the limited liability company agreement”); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood 

Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 176 (Del. 2002) (Gotham II) (finding that a partnership 

agreement “supplanted common law fiduciary duty principles” but did not eliminate the duties). 

Although sentence five does eliminate the managers’ common-law fiduciary duties, sentence three

unambiguously provides for the “triad” of default fiduciary duties: good faith, loyalty, and due 

care. MHS Capital LLC v. Goggin, No. 2017-0449-SG, 2018 WL 2149718, at *3, *8 (Del. Ch. 

May 10, 2018) (finding that nearly identical contract language “spelled out” these fiduciary 

duties); see Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) 

(explaining that the duty of good faith is actually a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty). As 

such, this provision contractually imposed the fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care on the 

Individual Defendants, and along with those duties, “the contractual equivalent of the entire 

fairness equitable standard of conduct and judicial review.” Gatz II, 59 A.3d at 1213; see 

Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 175 (applying a “contractually created fiduciary duty to meet the entire 

fairness standard”).

¶ 56 The exculpatory provision in section 5.6(a) of the LLC Agreement, which 

eliminated the managers’ personal liability “for monetary damages for a breach of fiduciary duty” 

except in the four circumstances identified in sentence four of section 5.4(a), reinforces our 
- 19 - 

conclusion that the Individual Defendants had fiduciary duties because this exculpatory provision 

restricts only the available remedies for a breach without eliminating the underlying duties, which 

it acknowledges exist and can be breached. Feeley, 62 A.3d at 664; Metro Storage International 

LLC v. Harron, 275 A.3d 810, 847 (Del. Ch. 2022). In other words, if sentence five of section 

5.4(a) had eliminated the managers’ contractual fiduciary duties, then all possible liability for a 

breach of fiduciary duty would have been eliminated along with them, making the exculpation of 

liability for monetary damages in section 5.6(a) superfluous. Here again, we adopt the reading that 

gives effect to both provisions. See Ashland, 284 A.3d at 721. 

¶ 57 We recognize that our interpretation produces an unusual result in that the LLC 

Agreement effectively takes away fiduciary duties with one hand and gives them back with the 

other. See D. Gordon Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary Duty, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1783, 

1791 (explaining that “the notion of ‘contractually adopted fiduciary duties’ ” is “conceptually 

puzzling”). As mentioned above, however, it was not established beyond doubt that the pre-2013 

Act imposed common-law fiduciary duties on the managers of an LLC when the LLC Agreement 

was executed in 2007; as late as 2012, the Delaware Supreme Court viewed this as an issue “about 

which reasonable minds could differ.” Gatz II, 59 A.3d at 1219. Sentence three of section 5.4(a) 

avoids the uncertainty that existed at time of IREH’s formation by making the managers’ fiduciary 

duties explicit as a matter of contract. Even if doing so had merely created uncertainty about 

whether sentence five eliminated the managers’ common-law fiduciary duties, we would resolve 

that uncertainty in favor of preserving fiduciary duties. See Bay Center Apartments Owner, LLC 

v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) 

(interpreting LLC agreement as preserving fiduciary duties when “the existence of fiduciary duties 

under [one provision] c[ould] be reconciled with [another provision’s] apparent elimination of 
- 20 - 

them”); see also Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 168 (“[E]fforts by a fiduciary to escape a fiduciary duty 

*** should be scrutinized searchingly.”). 

¶ 58 We are not persuaded otherwise by the cases the Individual Defendants cite. In one, 

the LLC agreement provided, “Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement or required by law, 

none of the Directors, nor any other Indemnitee shall have any duties or liabilities, including 

fiduciary duties, to the Company or any Member.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Atlas 

Energy Resources, LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010). Even 

if the LLC Agreement here contained the same language—which it does not—that would not 

change the fact that the LLC Agreement itself “expressly set forth” default fiduciary duties as a 

matter of contract. The fact that the LLC Agreement expressly articulates fiduciary obligations 

also distinguishes this case from two others the Individual Defendants cite. See Fisk Ventures, 

LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (noting that the 

LLC agreement did not create fiduciary duties); Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P., No.

3148-VCN, 2012 WL 1564805, at *27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (same). In another case, the court 

found that language in a partnership agreement substituted the entire fairness standard for general 

partners’ actions in specific situations where they had “sole and complete discretion.” Gelfman v. 

Weeden Investors, L.P., 792 A.2d 977, 987 (Del. Ch. 2001). Here, the Individual Defendants’ 

discretion when carrying out their management duties in sentences one and two of section 5.4(a) 

was always cabined by their express fiduciary duties in sentence three. 

¶ 59 Because the Individual Defendants had contractual fiduciary duties and were 

exculpated from monetary liability in certain circumstances, the proper analysis is to consider first 

whether the Individual Defendants are potentially liable for a breach of fiduciary duty under the 

entire fairness standard and then whether their potential personal liability for monetary damages
- 21 - 

is eliminated by the exculpatory provision. See Gatz II, 59 A.3d at 1216 (conducting this analysis 

for contractual fiduciary duties under an LLC agreement).

¶ 60 iii. Common-Law Duties

¶ 61 Under Delaware law, contractually adopted fiduciary duties supplant common-law 

fiduciary duties. Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 176; see Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1129 (Del. 

2010) (“It is a well-settled principle that where a dispute arises from obligations that are expressly 

addressed by contract, that dispute will be treated as a breach of contract claim.”). As such, a claim

for a breach of contractual fiduciary duties is treated as a breach of contract claim because the 

relief being sought is enforcement of the contract. Gatz II, 59 A.3d at 1216 (reviewing a breach of 

fiduciary duties claim “solely on contractual grounds”). Even so, the legal analyses for breach of 

contractual fiduciary duties and breach of common-law fiduciary duties appear to be identical

when the entire fairness standard applies. Id.; Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 175. But see Zimmerman v. 

Crothall, 62 A.3d 676, 704 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that entire fairness standard applied to breach 

of fiduciary duties set forth in an LLC agreement but suggesting that the plaintiff, rather than the 

defendants, may have borne the burden of proving a breach).

¶ 62 We nevertheless take our cue from the Delaware Supreme Court and review the 

trial court’s judgment “solely on contractual grounds” while applying the entire fairness standard. 

Gatz II, 59 A.3d at 1216. Having adopted this approach, we find that plaintiffs’ breach of contract 

claim against the Individual Defendants in count I supplants its claim for breach of common-law

fiduciary duties in count II, so we vacate the trial court’s judgment on count II as duplicative. See 

MHS Capital, 2018 WL 2149718, at *8 (dismissing common-law fiduciary duty claim as 

duplicative of contractual fiduciary duty claim); Martin v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 237 Ill. App. 

3d 910, 920 (1991) (vacating trial court’s judgment on duplicative claim).
- 22 - 

¶ 63 2. Liability

¶ 64 The question of liability requires us to consider whether the IREH Defendants 

breached the duties outlined above. We first address the relevant legal standard, then the parties’ 

cross-motions for summary judgment in 2017, and finally the trial court’s findings after the 2022 

trial.

¶ 65 a. Legal Standard

¶ 66 “When determining whether a circuit court applied the incorrect legal standard, we 

must first ascertain the correct legal standard, which is a question of law subject to de novo

review.” In re Marriage of Trapkus, 2022 IL App (3d) 190631, ¶ 22.

¶ 67 The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “the exclusive standard of judicial 

review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or 

dominating shareholder is entire fairness.” Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117. The court addressed the “entire 

fairness” standard in the definitive case on cash-out mergers as follows: 

“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. 

The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 

initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals 

of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness 

relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, 

including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and 

any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. 

[Citations.] However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair 

dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the 
- 23 - 

question is one of entire fairness.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 

(Del. 1983). 

¶ 68 Entire fairness review applies to the controlling shareholder as well as to members 

of the board appointed by the controlling shareholder. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (applying entire 

fairness to controlling shareholder); Gesoff v. IIC Industries Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Del. Ch. 

2006) (explaining that the entire fairness standard applies to controlling shareholder’s appointees 

to the board because “the process is entirely suffused with the [controlling shareholder’s] coercive 

power”). Stated more colorfully, the Delaware Supreme Court required entire fairness review in 

these circumstances because it “saw the controlling stockholder as the 800-pound gorilla whose 

urgent hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to frighten less powerful primates like putatively 

independent directors who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla.” In re Pure 

Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002). “Not even an honest 

belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to establish entire fairness. Rather, the 

transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.” Gesoff, 902 A.2d at

1145; see Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Fiduciaries 

need not consciously pursue self-interest.”).

¶ 69 Determining which party has the burden of proof is an integral part of the entire 

fairness standard that has been frequently addressed in the context of cash-out mergers: 

“The initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who stands 

on both sides of the transaction. [Citation.] However, an approval of the transaction 

by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority 

shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling 
- 24 - 

or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.” Kahn, 638 

A.2d at 1117. 

See Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1145 (“[T]he standards for shifting the burden of entire fairness, and those 

factors establishing fair dealing, are highly intertwined.”). 

¶ 70 In the present case, there is no dispute that the cash-out merger was never approved 

by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of the class. Thus, under 

Delaware law, the IREH Defendants bore the burden of proving entire fairness. Gatz II, 59 A.3d 

at 1216; see Zimmerman, 62 A.3d at 704 (noting that the burden of proof does not rest with the 

plaintiff “in the case of a default fiduciary duty in the LLC context”). Illinois law is in accord. See 

Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 282-83 (1960) (allocating burden of 

proving fairness to fiduciary directors rather than shareholders). As such, “[t]o demonstrate entire 

fairness, the [defendant] must present evidence of the cumulative manner by which it discharged 

all of its fiduciary duties.” (Emphasis in original.) Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 

(Del. 2001). 

¶ 71 Furthermore, the Individual Defendants bore the burden of proving that their 

liability for monetary damages was exculpated under the LLC Agreement. Auriga Capital Corp. 

v. Gatz Properties, LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 858 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Gatz I), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 

2012); compare Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1164 (describing exculpation as an affirmative defense), with 

Home Healthcare of Illinois, Inc. v. Jesk, 2017 IL App (1st) 162482, ¶ 52 (noting that an 

exculpatory clause may be viewed as an affirmative defense).

¶ 72 Applying the entire fairness standard to the facts of this case, GTL USA could avoid 

liability by proving both of the following: (1) the cash-out merger process was fair, and (2) the 

price of $1.10 per share was fair. A failure to prove either would result in liability. The Individual 
- 25 - 

Defendants could likewise avoid liability by proving both of the foregoing propositions, but a

failure to prove either would not necessarily result in liability for the Individual Defendants; 

instead,the inquiry would establish the acts or omissions that constituted a breach of their fiduciary 

duties. Each of the Individual Defendants could then avoid liability for monetary damages by 

operation of the exculpatory provision in section 5.6(a) of the LLC Agreement by proving all of 

the following with respect to his own breaching acts or omissions: (1) his conduct did not 

constitute a willful failure to deal fairly with IREH or its shareholders in connection with a matter 

in which he had a material conflict of interest; (2) his conduct did not constitute a violation of 

criminal law, unless he had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was lawful or no 

reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful; (3) he did not derive an improper 

personal profit from the transaction; and (4) his conduct did not constitute willful misconduct. A 

manager’s failure to prove just one of these exceptions to exculpation would result in personal 

liability forthat manager. See, e.g., Metro Storage, 275 A.3d at 868 (“Although each exception to 

exculpation could apply, the analysis can start and end with the exception for willful 

misconduct.”). 

¶ 73 b. Summary Judgment 

¶ 74 The trial court addressed the Individual Defendants’ liability on cross-motions for

summary judgment. Illinois law governs the procedures regarding summary judgment. See, e.g., 

Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 547 (1977)

(applying Illinois law governing summary judgment to the fairness of an agreement under 

Delaware law); see also Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d at 565 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 

Laws §§ 122, 127 (1971) and explaining that the law of the forum governs “matters of pleading 

and how the litigation shall be conducted”). Our standard of review is well established: 
- 26 - 

“ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 

a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.] We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment 

de novo. [Citation.] Further, we may affirm a lower court’s ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment on any basis appearing in the record. [Citation.]” Enbridge 

Energy, Ltd. Partnership v. Village of Romeoville, 2020 IL App (3d) 180060, ¶ 69. 

¶ 75 Where, as here, the court proceeded to trial on other issues after granting summary 

judgment, “ ‘the appellant may only refer to the record as it existed at the time the trial court ruled, 

outline the arguments made at that time, and explain why the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment.’ ” Id. ¶ 70 (citing Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 226 

Ill. App. 3d 507, 509-10 (1992)). In other words, the availability of de novo review on appeal does 

not excuse an appellant’s failure to put its best foot forward at the relevant time in the trial court. 

Accordingly, we disregard the Individual Defendants’ arguments to the extent they rely on their 

later testimony at trial.

¶ 76 As explained above, the Individual Defendants would have had the burden of 

proving at trial that the cash-out merger was entirely fair by “present[ing] evidence of the 

cumulative manner by which [they] discharged all of [their] fiduciary duties.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 97. The Individual Defendants could therefore establish entire 

fairness at the summary judgment stage only by showing that there was no genuine dispute of 

material fact as to fair dealing and fair price and that they provided the class with both. See Willett 

v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 360, 372 (2006) (requiring defendant to satisfy summary 

judgment standard when defendant would have borne the burden of proof at trial). Critically, the 
- 27 - 

Individual Defendants could not secure summary judgment against plaintiffs by challenging the 

sufficiency of plaintiffs’ evidence regarding fair dealing and fair price; plaintiffs needed only to

supply enough evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact.

¶ 77 Plaintiffs, for their part, could secure summary judgment against the Individual 

Defendants on the issue of entire fairness either by showing that (1) there was no genuine dispute 

of material fact as to either fair dealing or fair price and plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law or (2) the Individual Defendants’ evidence was insufficient to avoid judgment in 

plaintiffs’ favor as a matter of law, that is, they failed to make a prima facie case of entire fairness. 

Jiotis v. Burr Ridge Park District, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 25. Plaintiffs argued both with 

respect to fair dealing; with respect to fair price, plaintiffs argued that there was a genuine issue of 

material fact and that the trial court should proceed to a trial on damages. Our focus is on the

court’s decision to grant plaintiffs’ motion. 

¶ 78 When asked to make their prima facie case of fair dealing, the Individual 

Defendants argued first that plaintiffs improperly sought a bifurcated inquiry into fair dealing and 

fair price in violation of Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711, which requires consideration of all aspects 

of entire fairness. Although there is some merit to this contention given the importance of a unitary 

inquiry, Delaware courts have nevertheless found a lack of fair dealing sufficient on its own to 

establish liability. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 432 (Del. 1997) (“[T]he process 

[wa]s so intertwined with price that under Weinberger’s unitary standard[,] a finding that the price 

*** might have been fair [would] not save the result.”); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 

757, 766 (Del. Ch. 1986) (failure to prove fair dealing alone established liability); see also In re 

Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 298 A.3d 667, 718 (Del. 2023) (explaining that under 

the entire fairness analysis, fiduciaries cannot “hide behind the price”).
- 28 - 

¶ 79 However, when an exculpatory provision is involved, the court cannot simply 

declare that the transaction was the product of unfair dealing and hold the managers liable; it must 

“articulate the basis upon which it decides the ultimate question of entire fairness” so that it can 

then determine whether the managers’ conduct was exculpated. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 98. 

That is, the court must decide what exactly the Individual Defendants did wrong before it can 

decide whether that wrongdoing subjected them to liability for monetary damages. See In re 

Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litigation, 115 A.3d 1173, 1186 (Del. 2015) (noting 

that exculpation “was best determined after a trial, because the substantive fairness inquiry would 

shed light on why the directors acted as they did”). In the context of personal liability in the 

corporate context, Delaware courts “have emphasized that each director has a right to be 

considered individually when the directors face claims for damages in a suit challenging board 

action.” Id. at 1182. 

¶ 80 Furthermore, the inquiries into fair dealing and exculpation are slightly different. 

Under the entire fairness standard, courts are unconcerned with a board member’s subjective 

mental state because “the transaction *** must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s 

beliefs.” Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1145. In contrast, when determining whether the Individual 

Defendants are exculpated under this LLC Agreement, the trial court must consider questions like 

whether each defendant’s conduct was willful and whether his conflicts of interest, if any, were 

material to his decisions. See Dawson, 2012 WL 1564805, at *32 (“[W]hen intentional misconduct 

or bad faith is the standard at issue, *** some showing of the requisite mental state is necessary 

for the defendant to be liable; mere participation in a self-dealing, unfair transaction is not enough, 

without a showing of the requisite mental state.”); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 

1156, 1167 (Del. 1995) (holding that trial courts must apply an “actual person” test rather than a 
- 29 - 

“reasonable director” test when considering materiality). The manager’s credibility is often central 

to this analysis. See Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 107 (Del. 2013) 

(“[O]bjective factors may inform an analysis of a defendant’s subjective belief to the extent they 

bear on the defendant’s credibility when asserting that belief.”). Questions of intent and motive 

are not well suited to summary determination (Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 149), 

and the court may not evaluate credibility at the summary judgment stage (Coole v. Central Area 

Recycling, 384 Ill. App. 3d 390, 396 (2008); see Allen, 72 A.3d at 107 (holding that ultimate 

inquiry into subjective good faith under partnership agreement “must focus on the subjective belief 

of the specific directors accused of wrongful conduct”)). 

¶ 81 Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and the Individual Defendants’ response 

do not address the correct legal framework regarding the Individual Defendants’ liability, and the 

trial court’s approach was also off the mark. On appeal, we can nevertheless attempt to salvage the 

trial court’s decision if it “is correct on the merits, *** particularly if a retrial would result in the 

same disposition.” Goff v. Teachers’ Retirement System of Illinois, 305 Ill. App. 3d 190, 196 

(1999). With respect to entire fairness overall, any error in granting summary judgment was 

harmless because the Individual Defendants subsequently had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the fairness of the price at the 2020 trial and failed to establish that a price of $1.10 was fair. Thus, 

no amount of fair dealing could have rendered the transaction entirely fair. See In re Emerging 

Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *28 (Del. 

Ch. May 3, 2004); see also Tesla Motors, 298 A.3d at 734 (finding no reversible error when lower 

court’s entire fairness analysis was not “pitch perfect”).

¶ 82 However, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to conduct an analysis of 

each Individual Defendant’s mental state was harmless. Although the Individual Defendants did 
- 30 - 

not address their subjective mental states in their response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

judgment, any attempt to do so would have been premature because exculpation may be addressed 

only after a transaction is determined not to be entirely fair. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 94, 98-

99. The trial court should therefore have allowed the Individual Defendants an opportunity to 

pursue this affirmative defense before finding them liable. See Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC 

v. Catchins, 2023 IL App (1st) 221197, ¶ 28 (finding error when the trial court “deprived the 

defendants of a fair opportunity to properly frame their defense” by simultaneously holding them 

liable at summary judgment and striking their defense). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s 

finding of liability at the summary judgment stage and remand for a trial on the question of 

exculpation. 

¶ 83 To guide the trial court on remand, we briefly address the parties’ arguments 

regarding the first exception to exculpation for “a willful failure to deal fairly with the Company 

or its Members in connection with a matter in which the Manager has a material conflict of 

interest.” We initially agree with the Individual Defendants that materiality must be determined by 

examining each manager’s subjective decision-making process. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1167. 

¶ 84 On the other hand, the Individual Defendants set the bar for a conflict of interest 

far too high, asserting that they had no conflict of interest because they were not certain to be 

offered sweet equity in Sinav until after the merger vote. The Delaware Supreme Court defined 

conflicts of interest in a similar context as follows:

“A director is considered interested where he or she will receive a personal 

financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders. 

[Citations.] Directorial interest also exists where a corporate decision will have a 

materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation and the 
- 31 - 

stockholders. In such circumstances, a director cannot be expected to exercise his 

or her independent business judgment without being influenced by the adverse 

personal consequences resulting from the decision.” Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 

927, 936 (Del. 1993). 

At oral argument, counsel for the Individual Defendants pointed out that the Individual 

Defendants’ alleged certainty in receiving sweet equity in Sinav formed the basis of the trial court’s

decision to find them liable at the summary judgment stage. We have rejected the court’s 

suggestion that only benefits certain to be received can create a conflict of interest; on remand, the 

trial court may still consider the loss of a possible financial opportunity as part of its conflict 

analysis.

¶ 85 c. The 2022 Trial

¶ 86 The trial court determined GTL USA’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty at a 

bench trial in 2022. 

“When a trial court sits without a jury, appellate courts will not disturb its 

findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

[Citation.] A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the 

opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or when the findings are unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re Marriage of Hundley, 2019 IL App 

(4th) 180380, ¶ 48. 

¶ 87 GTL USA’s sole challenge to the trial court’s finding of liability on count III is to 

argue that GTL USA lacked actual control over the decision and thus had no common-law 

fiduciary duties with respect to the cash-out merger, an argument we have just rejected. GTL 

USA’s assertion that it took no action in breach of its duties is contradicted by the exhibits 
- 32 - 

introduced at trial, which feature numerous references to GTL USA’s approval of the cash-out 

merger.

¶ 88 Our review of the trial record shows there is ample evidence to support a finding 

that GTL USA failed to adequately “present evidence of the cumulative manner by which it 

discharged all of its fiduciary duties” to ensure the class members received a fair process and a fair 

price in the cash-out merger. (Emphasis in original.) Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 97. Although 

the trial court erroneously allocated the burden of proof to plaintiffs, the error was harmless 

because plaintiffs were still able to establish their case by a preponderance of the evidence. See 

People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 300 (1978) (“[A]llocation of the burden of proof becomes 

significant in a given case only when the evidence is so nicely balanced that neither [side’s case] 

is established by a preponderance of the evidence.”). In the absence of any additional argument, 

we conclude that the court’s finding that GTL USA was liable for breach of fiduciary duty is not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 89 3. Remedy

¶ 90 The question of remedy requires us to examine how the trial court could remedy 

the IREH Defendants’ breach of their duties. We separately address (1) damages and rescissory 

damages, which plaintiffs sought in their complaint; (2) disgorgement and a declaratory judgment

that the cash-out merger was void, which plaintiffs attempted to seek in their proposed amended 

complaint; and (3) compound interest, which the court awarded on plaintiffs’ claims against the 

IREH Defendants. 

¶ 91 a. Damages and Rescissory Damages

¶ 92 Because plaintiffs’ claim for breach of common-law fiduciary duties against GTL 

USA is an equitable claim, the trial court had broad discretion to craft “any form of equitable and 
- 33 - 

monetary relief as may be appropriate.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Furthermore, the LLC 

Agreement did not limit the available remedies for breach of contract, other than the exculpatory 

provision discussed above, so the court had the same broad discretion to craft a remedy for 

plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against the Individual Defendants who were not exculpated. 

See Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 175. 

¶ 93 The ordinary remedy for a breach of fiduciary duties in the context of a cash-out 

merger involves a “quasi-appraisal,” where the trial court determines the fair value of the business 

at the time of the merger and awards the plaintiffs their proportionate share, subtracting the amount 

they already received in the unfair transaction. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. This remedy, 

which plaintiffs received in the present case, is effectively an award of compensatory damages

because the “fair value” is roughly equivalent to the “fair price” that would have been paid in an 

entirely fair transaction. See Tesla Motors, 298 A.3d at 717 (noting that the economic inquiries for 

fair price and fair value are intended to be equivalent). 

¶ 94 However, “ ‘[t]he fair price aspect of the entire fairness test *** is not in itself a 

remedial calculation.’ ” Id. (quoting ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-

VCL, 2017 WL 3421142, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017), aff’d mem., 184 A.3d 1291 (Del. 2018)).

The trial court may award “rescissory damages” when compensatory damages are inadequate to 

remedy the defendants’ wrongdoing, “particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, 

deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.” 

Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Rescissory damages are intended to be the economic equivalent of 

rescission, a remedy usually employed to unwind a transaction that should never have gone 

through. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 372 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 

956 (Del. 1994). Rescissory damages are especially appropriate if “it is apparent that [a] long 
- 34 - 

completed transaction is too involved to undo.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. When awarding 

rescissory damages, the court determines the value of the business at some point after the merger, 

based on the assumption that if the merger had not gone through, the minority shareholders would 

have sold their shares at the most profitable time; the court then awards the plaintiffs their 

proportionate share of that value, subtracting the amount they already received in the unfair 

transaction. 

¶ 95 Therefore, a decision not to award rescissory damages is essentially a conclusion 

that the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law in the form of compensatory damages. See CC 

Disposal, Inc. v. Veolia ES Valley View Landfill, Inc., 406 Ill. App. 3d 783, 788 (2010) (“If a 

party’s injury can be adequately compensated through money damages, it has an adequate remedy 

at law.”). We would ordinarily review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Id.; see People v. 

Chambers, 2016 IL 117911, ¶ 75 (noting that an exercise of a trial court’s equitable powers is 

subject to review for abuse of discretion). However, the trial court here prevented plaintiffs from 

litigating the possibility of rescissory damages by granting the IREH Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the issue. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2022) (providing that findings in 

an order granting summary determination of an issue “shall be deemed established” at trial). As 

such, our standard of review is de novo. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 49. The summary 

judgment record must be construed liberally in favor of plaintiffs and strictly against the IREH 

Defendants, and the IREH Defendants’ right to judgment on the issue of rescissory damages must 

be clear and free from doubt. Id. We consider the IREH Defendants’ motion anew and perform the 

same analysis a trial court would. Davis v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional 

Transportation Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 31. 
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¶ 96 The IREH Defendants’ first argument is that there is no evidence of egregious 

misconduct. This argument fails at the outset because egregious misconduct is not a condition 

precedent to an award of rescissory damages; they are available whenever “the board puts its 

conflicting personal interests ahead of the interests of the shareholders.” Strassburger v. Earley, 

752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000). The IREH Defendants go on to say that the undisputed 

evidence showed that the Individual Defendants “kept Plaintiffs informed throughout the process” 

and “w[ere] not conflicted.” According to the undisputed evidence, however, plaintiffs were not 

informed of the full terms of the buyout until 10 days before the IREH board meeting on January 

30, 2012, and they were prevented from tabling the merger vote at that meeting to permit them to 

discuss the terms with other class members before the board approved the merger. Reading the 

summary judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as we must in this posture (see

Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 49), the record supports an inference that the Individual Defendants 

were aware they would be offered sweet equity in Sinav before the merger vote and were offered 

sweet equity in Sinav on February 17, 2012, five days before the merger was finalized. Even if 

egregious misconduct were required to obtain rescissory damages, reasonable minds could differ 

as to whether this conduct qualified, making the issue ill-suited for resolution at the summary 

judgment stage. Davis, 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 24 (“If a reasonable person could draw 

competing inferences from the facts, summary judgment should be denied.”). 

¶ 97 With respect to the excessiveness of the delay, the IREH Defendants argue that the 

plaintiffs intentionally sat back and waited to see if the market improved. As the Individual 

Defendants have pointed out elsewhere, however, matters of intent are generally not suitable for 

determination at the summary judgment stage. Beaman, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 149. Moreover, the 

inquiry into excessive delay is not one-sided; if the IREH Defendants are found responsible, then 
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they should not benefit from the delay at plaintiffs’ expense. See In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc.

Stockholder Litigation, 88 A.3d 1, 41 (Del. Ch. 2014). 

¶ 98 Because genuine issues of material fact existed, the trial court erred by precluding 

rescissory damages at the summary judgment stage and must exercise its discretion on remand to 

determine whether they are appropriate, considering the relevant evidence admitted at a new trial. 

Without limiting the court’s discretion, we do note two concerns with the court’s prior analysis. 

¶ 99 First, the inquiry into delay is not identical for rescission and rescissory damages 

“because the passage of time may be what renders rescission impractical and requires the 

deployment of rescissory damages as the functional equivalent.” See id. In precluding rescissory 

damages, the trial court based its reasoning on a case in which only rescission was sought. See

Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 795 A.2d 1, 36 (Del. Ch. 2001)

(Gotham I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. 

Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 855 A.2d 1059, 1072 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Gotham III) (noting that 

rescissory damages had not been sought in Gotham I), aff’d mem., 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003). 

¶ 100 Second, the trial court should consider the extent to which plaintiffs’ delay was 

truly excessive. Plaintiffs filed suit promptly after CHS announced it was purchasing Sinav and 

before the terms of that transaction were finalized. Even true rescission might not have been out 

of the question at that point, had plaintiffs sought it, and the terms of the sale to CHS are easily 

susceptible of proof. To the extent that plaintiffs’ delay resulted in some unfairness to the IREH 

Defendants, that finding must be weighed against any finding that the IREH Defendants failed to 

act fairly toward plaintiffs in the first place. See Reis, 28 A.3d at 466 (noting that the scope of 

recovery for a breach of fiduciary duties should not be determined narrowly). 
- 37 - 

¶ 101 Nevertheless, we emphasize that the trial court’s ultimate choice of remedy will not 

be disturbed as long as it is reasonable.

¶ 102 b. Disgorgement and Declaratory Judgment 

¶ 103 Plaintiffs did not seek disgorgement or a declaratory judgment in their initial 

complaint in May 2014; instead, they moved for leave to seek these remedies in a proposed 

amended complaint filed in June 2018. The trial court denied the motion in November 2019. When 

a trial court denies a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, we review its decision for an 

abuse of discretion, considering the four Loyola factors: “ ‘(1) whether the proposed amendment 

would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by 

virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and

(4) whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified.’ ” Devyn Corp. v. 

City of Bloomington, 2015 IL App (4th) 140819, ¶ 89 (quoting Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof 

Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992)). We will not reverse unless the plaintiff shows that 

the trial court incorrectly weighed all four factors. Id. ¶ 100 (citing I.C.S. Illinois, Inc. v. Waste 

Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 211, 220 (2010)). 

¶ 104 Plaintiffs spend very little time on this argument in their opening brief and 

recognize in their reply brief that they “focused upon the two material and applicable Loyola

factors—lack of prejudice and timeliness.” Even so, with respect to the declaratory judgment, we 

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiffs sought purely monetary relief in their 

2014 complaint, even though the full panoply of equitable remedies might have been available. 

Moreover, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to void the cash-out merger in 2017; they 

provide no reason why a motion for leave to amend could not have been filed at the same time. 

Allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint after four years could also have caused serious 
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prejudice to CHS, which purchased Sinav after plaintiffs filed their complaint. The trial court 

properly considered whether this result would serve the ends of justice. See Kolacki v. Verink, 384 

Ill. App. 3d 674, 680 (2008); 735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2022) (“[A]mendments may be allowed on 

just and reasonable terms.”).

¶ 105 With respect to disgorgement, our conclusion that the trial court must consider 

rescissory damages on remand renders any alleged error harmless. See Orchard Enterprises, 88 

A.3d at 38-39 (explaining that a court may consider disgorgement of profits when measuring 

rescissory damages).

¶ 106 c. Prejudgment Interest

¶ 107 Because the trial court chose a monetary remedy, it also had the equitable discretion 

to award prejudgment interest on a compound basis. See Gotham II, 817 A.2d at 173. We review 

the trial court’s decision to award equitable interest for an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of 

Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 87 (1989). 

¶ 108 GTL USA does not argue that the trial court lacked the discretion to award 

compound interest, but it argues that remand is required for the court to explicitly state the grounds 

for its award of compound interest. See David J. Stone Co. v. Silverstein, No. 298, 1998, ¶ 20 (Del. 

Apr. 1, 1999) (order). Under our standard of review for discretionary determinations, however, the 

trial court does not need to make a formal statement of reasons as long as it supplies “a record 

adequate to allow meaningful review of its exercise of discretion.” People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 

354, 360 (2004); see, e.g., Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 240 Ill. App. 3d 536, 545 (1992) 

(affirming award of equitable compound interest based on a review of the record), aff’d in part, 

rev’d in part on other grounds, 163 Ill. 2d 33 (1994). To simplify matters, we nevertheless urge 
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the trial court on remand to explain its reasoning if it determines that compound interest is

appropriate. 

¶ 109 4. Valuation

¶ 110 Finally, we turn to the question of valuation. In light of our conclusion that the trial 

court improperly eliminated the possibility of rescissory damages at the summary judgment stage, 

we must vacate its award of compensatory damages. If the court on remand concludes that 

compensatory damages remain the appropriate remedy, it should nevertheless consider the

evidence pertinent to rescissory damages when determining the fair value of IREH. See 

Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (holding that a fair value determination may incorporate elements of 

rescissory damages that are susceptible of proof). We briefly address some of the parties’

arguments that may recur on remand. 

¶ 111 We will not set aside a trial court’s fair value determination unless it is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Brynwood Co. v. Schweisberger, 393 Ill. App. 3d 339, 354 (2009)

(citing Weigel Broadcasting Co. v. Smith, 289 Ill. App. 3d 602, 607 (1996)). “A decision is said to 

be against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or 

where the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Id.

¶ 112 The Individual Defendants argue that the trial court erred by ignoring the £1 per 

share that Sinav paid for the public shares of GTL PLC on January 17, 2012. However, the court 

did not ignore this information but emphasized that the amount (approximately $1.61 per share)

may not have represented IREH’s true value because “[i]nformation and insight not communicated 

to the market may not be reflected in stock prices.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cede & 

Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996). The Individual Defendants argue that 

market prices are superior to the discounted cash flow model the court used, but the cases they cite
- 40 - 

involved appraisal proceedings under a dissenters’ rights statute. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield 

Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017); Union Illinois 1995 Investment Ltd. Partnership 

v. Union Financial Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. 2003). The quasi-appraisal remedy

envisioned by Weinberger for a breach of fiduciary duty is not identical to a statutory appraisal. 

See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187-88 (Del. 1988) (noting “this clear 

distinction in terms of the relief available”). Even in a statutory appraisal, however, courts cannot 

rely exclusively on market value. Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992).

¶ 113 Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in conducting its discounted cash flow 

analysis by choosing different data points from each expert and using an unsupported weighted 

average cost of capital rate. Although these concerns are now moot, we emphasize that 

mathematical certainty is not required when a trial court assesses damages; the court need only 

arrive at a responsible estimate of damages based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence. See Reis, 

28 A.3d at 466. Indeed, there is no perfect formula to produce the fair value of a business, which 

“is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign one 

particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all of the relevant 

evidence and based on considerations of fairness.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ.A. 

7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 884 A.2d 

26 (Del. 2005). 

¶ 114 Finally, GTL USA argues that the trial court should have appointed a neutral expert 

to resolve the disparity between the experts’ testimony, citing cases from Delaware. However,

evidentiary matters in Illinois courts are governed by Illinois law. Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 138 (1971); Ford v. Newman, 77 Ill. 2d 335, 338 (1979); cf. Tumlinson v. 

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 106 A.3d 983, 989 (Del. 2013) (applying Delaware’s procedural 
- 41 - 

law regarding expert opinion testimony to case governed by Texas’s substantive law). GTL USA 

cites no case in which an Illinois court has appointed a neutral valuation expert, and even the 

Delaware case GTL USA cites in support of its argument recognized that “no Delaware Court 

ha[d] ever appointed a neutral expert witness upon its own initiative” at that time. In re Shell Oil 

Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992). In encouraging the practice, the Delaware Supreme Court 

adopted procedures similar to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 706) on 

the unusual basis that “the spirit and purpose of the federal rules have always been within the 

inherent power of our courts.” Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1222. The Delaware Supreme Court 

supplanted this inherent power with an explicit rule in 1999. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 

758 A.2d 485, 497 (Del. 2000). Although we offer no opinion as to whether Illinois courts have a 

similar inherent power, we note that adversarial testing is the norm. See Stevenson v. Windmoeller 

& Hoelscher Corp., 39 F.4th 466, 471 (7th Cir. 2022) (recognizing this encroachment on the 

adversary system); see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 

665 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that federal courts rarely appoint neutral expert witnesses).

¶ 115 5. Remand

¶ 116 Having found reversible error in the trial court’s entry of summary judgment 

against (1) the Individual Defendants for breach of contractual fiduciary duties and (2) plaintiffs

on the issue of rescissory damages, wemust remand for a new trial on count I against the Individual 

Defendants and count III against GTL USA. We must also determine the scope of the new trial on 

remand.

¶ 117 With respect to the Individual Defendants, the trial court must conduct the

exculpation analysis laid out above, with the burden of proof on each of the Individual Defendants 

to show that none of the exceptions to exculpation applies to his conduct in breach of his fiduciary 
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duties. With respect to GTL USA and any nonexculpated Individual Defendants, the court must

exercise its discretion to determine whether compensatory or rescissory damages are appropriate 

based on the evidence. If the court finds that compensatory damages remain appropriate, it should 

nevertheless consider the evidence pertinent to rescissory damages as part of its overall fair value 

analysis. If the court decidesthat prejudgment interest should be determined on a compound basis, 

it should explain its reasons for reaching that decision. Because the court’s prior decisions on these 

issues have been reversed, they do not constitute the law of the case. Underwood v. City of 

Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 182180, ¶ 38 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to 

unreversed decisions). Rather, the trial court must proceed in conformity with this court’s mandate, 

including the specific directions and views set forth in this opinion. Clemons v. Mechanical 

Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (2002). 

¶ 118 B. Plaintiffs’ Jury Demand (Count VI) 

¶ 119 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by striking their jury demand on the tortious 

interference with contract claim (count VI) based on the jury trial waiver in the LLC Agreement. 

Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision to strike their jury demand pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019), but this court declined to allow the appeal. 

Schultz v. Sinav Ltd., No. 2-21-0479 (2021) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 23(c)).

¶ 120 We review the trial court’s decision to strike plaintiffs’ jury demand de novo

because it involves three subsidiary questions, each calling for de novo review: (1) whether the 

trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied Illinois’s choice of law principles as 

embodied in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

227 Ill. 2d 147, 154 (2007)), (2) whether plaintiffs have the right to a jury trial on this claim
- 43 - 

(Catania v. Local 4250/5050 of the Communications Workers of America, 359 Ill. App. 3d 718, 

722 (2005)), and (3) whether the trial court properly interpreted the contractual jury waiver (Carr 

v. Gateway, Inc., 241 Ill. 2d 15, 20 (2011)). 

¶ 121 1. The Second Restatement

¶ 122 Plaintiffs assert that Illinois law governs their right to a jury trial because the 

substantive claim sounds in tort, whereas the Tort Defendants assert that Delaware law governs 

because the substantive claim is dependent on the contract and thus falls under the LLC 

Agreement’s Delaware choice of law provision. 

¶ 123 The purpose of a choice of law analysis is for the forum court to determine which

state’s substantive law, also called its “local law,” governs a particular issue in a case with some 

connection to another state. If the states’ local laws are in “actual conflict,” meaning that the forum 

state’s local law and the other state’s local law call for conflicting results, the court must determine 

which state’s local law to apply to the issue. See Bridgeview, 2014 IL 116389, ¶ 24. The supreme 

court has “stress[ed] that a choice-of-law analysis begins by isolating the issue and defining the 

conflict.” Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 155. Here the issue is twofold: did plaintiffs have the right to a 

jury trial on their claim of tortious interference with contract and, if so, did they waive that right 

through the contractual jury waiver in the LLC Agreement? The parties assert generally that a 

conflict exists on this issue. 

¶ 124 Despite making extensive arguments, the parties have overlooked what is an 

uncharacteristically straightforward choice of law principle: “The local law of the forum 

determines whether an issue shall be tried by the court or by a jury.” Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 129 (1971). “As used in the [Second Restatement], the ‘local law’ of a state is 

the body of standards, principles and rules, exclusive of its rules of Conflict of Laws, which the 
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courts of that state apply in the decision of controversies brought before them.” (Emphasis added.) 

Id. § 4(1). Thus, while the Second Restatement generally requires a complex balancing of various 

states’ interests (see id. §§ 6, 186-188), this is one of “the relatively few areas for which it provides 

clear rules,” and the rule calls for the application of Illinois’s local law. Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 

158; see Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 62 (2007) (emphasizing the value of 

the black letter statements in the Second Restatement); see also Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949, 

960 (Kan. 1992) (recognizing that section 129 of the Second Restatement (Restatement (Second) 

of Conflict of Laws § 129 (1971)) reflects black letter law).

¶ 125 Accordingly, we must determine as a matter of Illinois’s local law whether 

plaintiffs’ claim invokes the right to a jury trial under the Illinois Constitution and whether 

plaintiffs remain entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the contractual jury waiver in the LLC 

Agreement. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 129, cmt. a (1971) (“The local law of the 

forum determines whether a party is entitled to a jury trial on any aspect of his case.”). We must 

examine how Illinois courts interpret contractual jury waivers in any case, not just when those 

waivers appear in contracts stipulating to the application of Delaware law. See id. § 122, cmt. a 

(“The forum is more concerned with how its judicial machinery functions and how its court 

processes are administered than is any other state.”).

¶ 126 2. The Right to a Jury Trial

¶ 127 The parties dispute whether plaintiffs in fact had the right to a jury trial on this 

claim; if not, the jury demand was ineffective and the trial court could not have erred by striking 

it. Civil litigants in Illinois courts have the constitutional right to a jury trial, as that right was 

enjoyed before the adoption of the Illinois Constitution in 1970. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 13; People 
- 45 - 

ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 215 (1988); see Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 132 (1943) 

(pointing out that the right to a trial by jury applies to litigants).

¶ 128 We conclude that litigants in Illinois courts ordinarily have the right to a jury trial 

on claims of tortious interference with contract, given that litigants enjoyed jury trials on these 

claims long before 1970. See, e.g., Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 612-13, 617 (1898) 

(Doremus II); Morehouse v. Terrill, 111 Ill. App. 460, 462 (1903). This conclusion is consistent 

with the broader principle that tort victims had the right to a trial by jury at common law; “ ‘an 

action in personam to recover damages for tort [wa]s one of the most familiar of the common-law 

remedies.’ ” Bowman v. American River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 97 (2005) (quoting 

Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 561 (1926)). 

¶ 129 Although a breach of contract is necessarily involved in the tort, the cause of action

arises not from the contract itself but from the defendant’s common-law duty not to wrongfully 

interfere with another person’s right to enter into lawful contracts. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. 

Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union of Chicago No. 753, 371 Ill. 377, 382 (1939), aff’d, 312 U.S. 287 

(1941). The defendant can breach this duty even in the absence of an enforceable contract by 

preventing the plaintiff from entering into a contract in the first place, a principle that was 

established well before 1970. Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 472-73 

(1969) (collecting cases and citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 766 (1939)). 

¶ 130 Although equitable remedies are available in an appropriate case (see Meadowmoor 

Dairies, 371 Ill. at 391), tortious interference with contract is nevertheless “a tort cause of action 

for damages.” Loewenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 Ill. 285, 299 (1932); Doremus 

v. Hennessy, 62 Ill. App. 391, 400 (1895) (Doremus I) (describing wrongful interference with 

contract as an “action[ ] in tort,” where “the question of the extent of damages is almost exclusively 
- 46 - 

for the jury”), aff’d, 176 Ill. 608 (1898). In this respect, tortious interference with contract differs 

from a breach of fiduciary duty, an equitable action to which the right to a jury trial has never

attached. Compare Koehler v. The Packer Group, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 142767, ¶¶ 62-65 

(applying principles of tort law to tortious interference with contract claim), with Capitol 

Indemnity Corp. v. Stewart Smith Intermediaries, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 119, 124 (1992) (“[B]reach 

of fiduciary duty is not a tort; rather, it is controlled by the substantive laws of agency, contract 

and equity.”). 

¶ 131 Our conclusion does not turn on whether plaintiffs’ claim is governed by the local

law of Delaware or Illinois. First and foremost, Illinois litigants historically enjoyed the right to a 

trial by jury as a matter of “remedy,” even when their substantive rights were determined by the 

laws of another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Gehr, 66 Ill. App. 173, 194 

(1896) (noting that “[Illinois] law has provided that the jury shall decide the question” of 

compensation for a tort claim under Mexican law); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Tuite, 44 

Ill. App. 535, 541 (1892) (Gary, J., specially concurring, joined by Shepard, J.) (“The functions of 

court and jury, and the rules of pleading and evidence, when a case is tried in a court of this State, 

are regulated by the law of this State.”); see also Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Rouse, 

178 Ill. 132, 137 (1899) (explaining that “all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled 

by the law of the State where the action is brought” in both tort and contract cases (emphasis 

omitted)). 

¶ 132 Moreover, the Tort Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that 

Delaware law regarding tortious interference with contract actually conflicts with Illinois law, and 

in the absence of an actual conflict, Illinois courts will apply Illinois law. Bridgeview, 2014 IL 

116389, ¶¶ 24-26 (explaining that the party seeking application of another state’s local law has the 
- 47 - 

burden of demonstrating an actual rather than potential conflict). In fact, the Tort Defendants 

conceded before the trial court that Illinois law and Delaware law call for identical analyses, which 

the case law bears out. Compare HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 

Ill. 2d 145, 154-55 (1989) (setting out the elements of the tort under Illinois law), with Bhole, Inc.

v. Shore Investments, Inc., 67 A.3d 444, 453 (Del. 2013) (setting out the elements of the tort under 

Delaware law). This suggests that a distinction between plaintiffs with claims under Illinois law 

and plaintiffs with identical claims under Delaware law would be arbitrary, although we need not 

resolve such unraised issues here. See Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co. v. Pastel, 301 Ill. 253, 

255 (1921) (“[E]very citizen has an equal right with every other to resort to the courts of justice 

for the settlement and enforcement of his rights, and *** discrimination between different classes 

of litigants which is merely arbitrary in its nature is a denial of that right and of the equal protection 

of the law.”); cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951) (finding that Wisconsin violated the 

full faith and credit clause (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1) by refusing to entertain wrongful death actions 

under Illinois law when its courts would entertain wrongful death actions under Wisconsin law). 

¶ 133 3. The Contractual Jury Waiver

¶ 134 Accordingly, the inquiry now turns to whether plaintiffs contractually waived their 

right to a jury trial through the LLC Agreement. We again emphasize that Illinois contract law and

public policy govern this question despite the Delaware choice of law provision in the contract. 

When deciding questions of Illinois contract law, we are not bound by the decisions of federal 

courts, but “we may look to federal decisions for guidance and adopt their reasoning if we find it 

persuasive.” Findlay v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210889, ¶ 63. 

¶ 135 a. The Applicable Standard
- 48 - 

¶ 136 Although the right to a jury trial is fundamental, it can be forfeited or waived, 

including by a party’s conduct. Installco, Inc. v. Whiting Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 776, 786 (2002). 

However, when a party avoids forfeiture by asserting its right to a jury trial in accordance with the

necessary procedures, as plaintiffs did here, the party “cannot be deprived of that right by any act 

of the adverse party or the trial court without an actual waiver.” Themas v. Green’s Tap, Inc., 2014 

IL App (2d) 140023, ¶ 8. “A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Puglisi v. 

Hansford, 193 Ill. App. 3d 803, 807 (1990). 

¶ 137 The Illinois Supreme Court has not opined on contractual jury waivers in general, 

but the court has explained that “it is axiomatic that a party may waive the right to a trial by jury 

in a civil case by entering into a contract to arbitrate.” Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 237 Ill. 

2d 30, 49 (2010) (Carter I); see Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 135, 150 (2006) 

(referring to “the usual maxim of contract law that a party to an agreement is charged with 

knowledge of and assent to the agreement signed”). Waiver of the right to a jury trial is an inherent 

part of an arbitration agreement, but such an agreement involves much more, such as a waiver of 

the right to appeal. Consequently, where an agreement to arbitrate would be valid, surely one of 

its components—an agreement to waive a jury trial—would be as well.

¶ 138 When faced with a similar situation involving jury trial waivers governed by Illinois 

contract law and the constitutional right to a jury trial in federal cases (U.S. Const., amend. VII), 

the Seventh Circuit and the Northern District of Illinois concluded that the contractual jury waivers 

should be examined under ordinary principles of Illinois contract law rather than through a 

heightened examination of the contracting party’s subjective mental state. IFC Credit Corp. v. 

United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2008); JF 

Enterprises, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, 824 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824-25 (N.D. Ill. 2011). These courts 
- 49 - 

recognized that “[a]n agreement to a bench trial cannot logically be treated less favorably than an 

agreement to arbitrate—an agreement that surrenders more rights.” JF Enterprises, 824 F. Supp. 

2d at 824 (citing IFC Credit, 512 F.3d at 994). 

¶ 139 We find the reasoning in these decisions persuasive and conclude that the same 

analysis is appropriate when the right to a jury trial originates from the Illinois Constitution as 

opposed to the United States Constitution. As the court in JF Enterprises noted, the Illinois 

Supreme Court rejected a more demanding subjective standard for jury trial waivers in the form 

of arbitration agreements. Id. (citing Melena, 219 Ill. 2d 135). The supreme court in Carter I, 237 

Ill. 2d at 49-50, adhered to the view that ordinary principles of contract law apply to arbitration 

agreements, albeit with the purpose of placing those contracts on equal footing with “all contracts 

generally,” as required by the Federal Arbitration Act(9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000)). The court noted 

that its decision still “preserve[d] general contract defenses such as lack of mutuality, lack of 

consideration, fraud, duress, unconscionability, and the like, that can truly apply to any contract.” 

Carter I, 237 Ill. 2d at 50. We conclude that these same principles of contract law, including the 

availability of general contract defenses to challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of the 

waiver, are adequate to protect the contracting parties’ constitutional right to a jury trial even when 

the contractual jury waiver does not take the form of an arbitration agreement. 

¶ 140 b. Enforcing the Contractual Jury Waiver 

¶ 141 Returning to basic principles, a contractual jury waiver is essentially a promise by 

the contracting party not to pursue a jury trial, assuming, of course, that a jury trial is an available 

option in the forum. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919) 

(explaining that states may do away with juries altogether). The parties here have assumed that 

such a promise can be enforced through a motion to strike the jury demand from plaintiffs’
- 50 - 

complaint, and we agree. See Stephens, 383 Ill. at 135 (reviewing a trial court’s decision to strike 

a jury demand based on waiver); JF Enterprises, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (granting a motion to 

strike a jury demand based on a contractual jury waiver). Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Tort 

Defendants lacked the right to seek enforcement of the contractual jury waiver. 

¶ 142 It is worth stepping back for a moment to think about what the Tort Defendants did

here. They were alleged to have wrongfully induced the IREH Defendants to breach their contract 

with plaintiffs and the class, but they nevertheless sought to enforce plaintiffs’ promise to the IREH 

Defendants, in that very same contract, not to pursue a jury trial. Suppose the shoe were on the 

other foot and plaintiffs sought to strike a proper jury demand by the Tort Defendants pursuant to 

the contractual jury waiver. The Tort Defendants could fairly assert that they were not parties to 

the LLC Agreement and thus made no promise to waive their right to a jury trial under the Illinois 

Constitution. See Themas, 2014 IL App (2d) 140023, ¶ 8 (holding that the unilateral act of an 

adverse party cannot waive a party’s right to a jury trial); cf. Selzer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No.

09-5484, 2014 WL 1340549 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2014) (declining to enforce contractual jury waiver 

against nonsignatories) Therefore, under the Tort Defendants’ view of the situation, plaintiffs 

surrendered to them, the alleged tortfeasors, the unilateral right to choose whether plaintiffs

themselves would receive a jury trial or a bench trial. Worse still, plaintiffs could not escape this 

result by approaching the Tort Defendants to seek a mutual revocation of the contractual jury 

waiver because the Tort Defendants were not parties to the LLC Agreement; plaintiffs’ right to a 

jury trial would thus be at the mercy of the IREH Defendants as well, on a claim to which those 

defendants were not even parties.

¶ 143 The supreme court found a similar proposition untenable in Bowman, espousing 

the following view: 
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“ ‘It is nothing short of astonishing to suggest that—in a forum in which jury trials 

are generally available at the request of either party—one party would have a 

unilateral right to choose between a jury and a bench trial. Such a unilateral right 

would be unprecedented in law *** and contrary to basic notions of even-handed 

procedural fairness.’ ” Bowman, 217 Ill. 2d at 98 (quoting David W. Robertson & 

Michael F. Sturley, Understanding Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: The Supreme 

Court’s Interpretation of the Seaman’s Elections Under the Jones Act, 14 U.S.F. 

Mar. L.J. 229, 268 (2001-02)).

We decline to endorse the similarly astonishing suggestion that a trial court could deny a litigant 

its constitutional right to a jury trial at the request of a complete stranger to a contractual jury 

waiver. We hold that a party moving to strike an otherwise proper jury demand on the basis of a 

contractual jury waiver must first show that it has standing to enforce the waiver as a party or 

direct beneficiary. An alternative approach would encourage a litigant favoring bench trials to seek 

out any contractual jury waiver signed by another litigant and argue it has some connection to the 

case, however tenuous. 

¶ 144 We further disagree with the Tort Defendants that the problem of enforcement is 

overcome by the sweeping language of the contractual jury waiver, which provides, “Each of the 

Members irrevocably waives to the extent permitted by law, all rights to trial by jury and all rights 

to immunity by sovereignty or otherwise in any action, proceeding or counterclaim arising out of 

or relating to this Agreement.” However, “[t]here is a strong presumption against conferring 

benefits to noncontracting third parties.” Barry v. St. Mary’s Hospital Decatur, 2016 IL App (4th) 

150961, ¶ 82. “ ‘In order to overcome that presumption, the implication that the contract applies 

to third parties must be so strong as to be practically an express declaration.’ ” (Internal quotation 
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marks omitted.) Id. (quoting F.H. Paschen/S.N. Nielsen, Inc. v. Burnham Station, L.L.C., 372 Ill. 

App. 3d 89, 96 (2007)). Here, the LLC Agreement lacks the extremely clear language necessary 

to overcome that presumption; on the contrary, the LLC Agreement states that its provisions “shall 

be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Members and their respective successors, 

transferees, and assigns.” Construing the sweeping language of the contractual jury waiver as 

including tortious interference with contract claims would only benefit nonmembers because a 

party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract. Koehler, 2016 IL App (1st) 142767, ¶ 43. 

We cannot conclude that IREH’s members intended to grant third-party tortfeasors the unilateral 

right to deny them a jury trial. 

¶ 145 Likewise unavailing is the Tort Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs are equitably 

estopped from denying that the contractual jury waiver applies to their claim. Under this theory, 

plaintiffs would have to accept the burden of a bench trial because they have accepted the benefits 

of the LLC Agreement. See Grot v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 292 Ill. App. 3d 88, 93 (1997) (“A 

party that accepts the benefits of an agreement is estopped from *** performing obligations under 

the agreement.”). The Tort Defendants analogize their theory to the concept of arbitration by 

estoppel, under which “non-signatory plaintiffs may be estopped from refusing to arbitrate if their 

claims ‘depend[ ] upon, or [are] inextricably intertwined with’ the contractual obligations of the 

contract containing the arbitration clause.” Peterson v. Devita, 2023 IL App (1st) 230356, ¶ 45 

(quoting Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California, 18 Cal. App. 5th 295, 306 (2017)).

¶ 146 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has squarely rejected the theory of arbitration 

by estoppel, stating that “under basic principles of contract law, only parties to the arbitration 

contract may compel arbitration or be compelled to arbitrate.” Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 

2012 IL 113204, ¶ 55 (Carter II). The court emphasized that these principles of Illinois common 
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law govern all contracts, not just arbitration agreements, because an order compelling arbitration 

is an enforcement of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate. Id. ¶ 60. Here, the trial court’s order striking 

plaintiffs’ jury demand was proper only if it constituted the enforcement of some bargained-for 

obligation. See Grot, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 93 (noting that equitable estoppel applies to contractual 

obligations). There was no bargain between plaintiffs and the Tort Defendants, so the trial court 

erred by striking plaintiffs’ jury demand. 

¶ 147 4. Remand

¶ 148 Because the trial court erroneously denied plaintiffs their right to a jury trial on 

count VI, we must reverse and remand for a jury trial on this count. Bowman, 217 Ill. 2d at 98. 

When trying the remaining issues on counts I through III on remand, the trial court must preserve 

plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial on count VI. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 232 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) (governing trial 

of legal and equitable matters). In light of this disposition, plaintiffs’ challenges to the trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings are moot and may be raised at the new trial, if necessary. See Bowman, 217 Ill. 

2d at 98. 

¶ 149 C. Sealing of Records 

¶ 150 As a final matter, we note that extensive portions of the record in this case are

impounded—meaning sealed from public view—even though the public has a presumptive right 

of access to these records. In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1074-75 (1992) (“The 

file of a court case is a public record to which the people and the press have a right of access. *** 

Once documents are subject to the right of access, only a compelling reason, accompanied by 

specific factual findings, can justify keeping them from public view.”). The record on appeal does 

not disclose why the records were sealed, so we presume the trial court acted within its discretion 

in sealing them. See Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 231 (2000) (noting that the 
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decision to seal court records is discretionary); Bicek v. Quitter, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030 (1976) 

(“It is well settled that there is no presumption of abuse of discretion by a trial court ***.”).

¶ 151 Nevertheless, the trial court on remand must revisit whether the party or parties 

seeking to seal these documents have met the heavy burden necessary to warrant the continued 

restriction on public access; absent such a showing, the documents must be unsealed. See Skolnick, 

191 Ill. 2d 214 (explaining what the party opposing public access must show); see also Marriage 

of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1075 (“The parties’ desire and agreement that the court records 

were to be sealed falls far short of outweighing the public’s right of access to the files.”). The 

parties’ agreement on sealing cannot be the end of the trial court’s scrutiny because the strong 

presumption in favor of open access cannot be so easily overcome. The court must satisfy itself 

that it has a proper basis for sealing and that the extent of the sealing goes no further than is 

necessary to serve the interest which justifies it, regardless of what the parties may agree to. 

¶ 152 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 153 For the reasons stated, the cross-appeal by defendants Sinav, GTL PLC, GTL 

Limited, and GTL Cambridge is dismissed, and the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs leave to 

amend their complaint is affirmed. On count I against GTL USA, we reverse and enter judgment 

in favor of GTL USA. On count I against defendants Reube, Lemajeur, Kwasniewski, and Jakel, 

we reverse and remand for a new trial on (1) liability for monetary damages under the LLC 

Agreement’s exculpatory provision and (2) the amount of damages for any of these defendants 

who are found liable. On count II against defendants Reube, Lemajeur, Kwasniewski, and Jakel, 

we vacate the trial court’s judgment as duplicative of its judgment on count I. On count III against 

defendant GTL USA, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the amount of damages. On counts 

IV and V against defendants Sinav, GTL PLC, GTL Limited, GTL Cambridge, Siem Industries, 
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Siem AS, and NAV, we affirm. On count VI against defendants Sinav, GTL PLC, GTL Limited, 

GTL Cambridge, Siem Industries, Siem AS, and NAV, we reverse and remand for a jury trial. 

Further proceedings shall be consistent with this opinion. 

¶ 154 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and vacated in part; cause 

remanded with directions. 
- 56 - 

Schultz v. Sinav Ltd., 2024 IL App (4th) 230366

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ogle County, No. 2014-L-15; the 

Hon. John C. Redington, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

Terrence P. Canade, Keith D. Parr, and Hugh S. Balsam, of Locke 

Lord LLP, of Chicago, for appellants.

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Paul E. Chadwick, of Fearer Nye & Chadwick, of Rochelle, and 

Charles K. Maier (pro hac vice), Brian A. Dillon (pro hac vice), 

Richard C. Landon (pro hac vice), and Brooke F. Robbins (pro hac 

vice), of Lathrop GPM LLP, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 

appellees Sinav Limited, GTL Resources USA, Inc., GTL 

Resources Limited, GTL Resources PLC, and GTL Cambridge 

LLC.

Thomas K. Cauley Jr., of Cauley Law Group LLC, of Hinsdale, 

and Joseph R. Dosch and Stephen Spector, of Sidley Austin LLP, 

of Chicago, for appellees Richard H. Ruebe and Jeffrey W. 

Lemajeur.

Marcos Reilly, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for 

appellees Vincent J. Kwasniewski and Neal T. Jakel.

Monte L. Mann, Joshua E. Liebman, and Ian P. Flanagan, of 

Armstrong Teasdale LLP, of Chicago, for other appellees.