United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 21, 2020

Decided January 27, 2020 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

Nos. 18-3686 & 19-2114 

In the Matter of: ROSEE TORRES and 

NOEL TORRES, 

Debtors-Appellants. 

 

 

 Appeals from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 18-cv-05279 

Edmond E. Chang, 

Judge. 

No. 19-1657 

ROSEE TORRES and NOEL TORRES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 19-cv-00112 

 We have agreed to decide these appeals without oral argument because the 

briefs and records adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument 

would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
Nos. 18-3686, 19-2114, & 19-1657 Page 2 

JUDICIAL SALES CORPORATION, et 

al. 

 Defendants-Appellees.

Andrea R. Wood, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Rosee and Noel Torres sought to void the foreclosure of the mortgage backed by 

their Chicago home by filing a bankruptcy action. They also filed an original civil suit in 

the district court, seeking money damages and the reversal of the state court’s 

foreclosure judgment. In each case, the couple advanced over a dozen theories of relief 

under state and federal law stemming from their allegation that Wells Fargo and others 

used fraudulent and discriminatory practices to foreclose on their residence. The 

Torreses did not prevail in either case. We previously consolidated their two appeals 

arising from the bankruptcy proceeding, and we now consolidate those with a third, 

arising out of the civil suit, for the benefit of judicial economy. Because the foreclosure 

and sale have already occurred, the appeals in the bankruptcy case are moot and must 

be dismissed. And because the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to upset the 

judgment of the Illinois court, we affirm the dismissal of the civil suit. 

Wells Fargo, N.A. sued the Torreses for foreclosure after they allegedly defaulted 

on the loan that was secured by a mortgage on their house. After the Circuit Court of 

Cook County entered a foreclosure judgment, the couple filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 

proceeding, triggering an automatic stay of the foreclosure action. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 

Wells Fargo moved to lift the stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), and the bankruptcy court 

granted the motion, finding no equity in the property for the bankruptcy estate. In 

response to the Torreses’ arguments that the foreclosure was a sham—because, they 

alleged, they never borrowed money from Wells Fargo and the mortgage on their home 

was “paid in full”—the bankruptcy court explained that the Torreses should raise those 

defenses in state court. 

The Torreses filed an interlocutory appeal in the district court of the bankruptcy 

court’s decision to lift the automatic stay, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); Colin v. Option One 

Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d 912, 916 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003) (bankruptcy court’s order lifting 

automatic stay is appealable). They also requested a preliminary injunction to postpone 

the auction of their home pending the appeal. The district court denied the motion for a 

preliminary injunction—an order the Torreses appealed to this court—and later, on 

Wells Fargo’s motion, dismissed the appeal outright after the state court approved the 

sale and entered a final judgment. The court explained that, although it had jurisdiction 
Nos. 18-3686, 19-2114, & 19-1657 Page 3 

to review the bankruptcy court’s order, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the appeal was 

“frivolous” because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it “from considering any of the 

Torreses’ objections to the state court foreclosure judgment.” See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

In addition to the bankruptcy matter, the Torreses filed a separate federal lawsuit 

alleging, among other things, that the foreclosure was premised on fraud and 

discrimination. In short, they alleged that Wells Fargo targeted the Torreses because of 

their race and age, and then conspired with the other defendants to trick the state court 

into validating a fabricated mortgage and approving a staged foreclosure sale (to a third 

party that was essentially a straw man for Wells Fargo). The Torreses sought money 

damages, relief from the state court’s judgment, and reversal of the foreclosure sale. 

Because the state court had already approved the judicial sale of the property and title 

had passed to a third party, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice at 

screening for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This is the subject 

of the Torreses’ third appeal. 

To begin, we address the two appeals arising from the bankruptcy proceeding. 

The Torreses first challenge the order denying a preliminary injunction against the sale 

of their property, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), but the district court mooted the 

interlocutory appeal in number 18-3686 when it dismissed the case in its entirety. 

See Auto Driveway Franchise Sys. v. Auto Driveway Richmond, 928 F.3d 670, 674–75 

(7th Cir. 2019). 

The Torreses also appeal the district court’s dismissal of the entire bankruptcy 

appeal, but that appeal is also moot because after it was filed, the foreclosure action 

ended in a final judgment. “[A] suit becomes moot when the issues presented are no 

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This occurs] 

only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the 

prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The only relief the Torreses sought in the interlocutory 

bankruptcy appeal, other than reinstatement of the automatic stay, was to enjoin the 

sale of their home. But, while the appeal was pending in the district court, the state 

court approved the sale of the property, and title transferred to the third party. Under 

Illinois law, a foreclosure action is finally decided once the court “enters an order 

approving the sale and directing the distribution.” Matter of Anderson, 917 F.3d 566, 572 

(7th Cir. 2019) (citing EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Kemp, 982 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. 2012)). That 

rendered appeal number 19-2114 moot, although the district court gave other reasons 
Nos. 18-3686, 19-2114, & 19-1657 Page 4 

for dismissing it. Without a live controversy, we must vacate the judgment of the 

district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See United States 

v. Munsingwear, Inc. 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). 

On to the appeal from the original civil action, which the second district court 

dismissed based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine provides that “the 

Supreme Court of the Unites States is the sole federal tribunal authorized to review the 

judgments of state courts in civil litigation.” Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 

2015). It applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. 

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 

669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017). We ask whether the federal plaintiff is alleging an injury caused 

by the state-court judgment or an injury independent of the judgment that the state 

court failed to remedy; in the latter case, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. Mains, 852 F.3d 

at 675 (There must be “no way for the injury complained of by a plaintiff to be 

separated from a state court judgment.” (internal citations omitted)). 

The Torreses primarily argue on appeal, as they did in the district court, that 

Wells Fargo obtained the foreclosure through a scheme to defraud them and 

discriminate against them. Those claims—which encapsulate their theories of commonlaw fraud and alleged violations of consumer protection and anti-discrimination 

statutes—are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Like the plaintiff in Mains, the 

Torreses assert that the state-court judgment was in error because it rested on fraud and 

discrimination by the defendants. 852 F.3d at 676. Had the Torreses argued that an 

underlying fraud or discriminatory act caused an injury independent from the 

foreclosure judgment and the loss of their home, those claims could have survived. 

See Iqbal, 780 F.3d at 729–730. As it is, however, the Torreses’s complaint made clear that 

the foreclosure judgment caused their injuries, and they expressly asked the district 

court for “relief from judgment and sale.” Rooker-Feldman prohibits that outcome. See id. 

On appeal, the Torreses mostly restate the allegations in their complaint and 

mention the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only to argue that an exception applies because 

they had no “reasonable opportunity to raise the issues in state court proceedings.” 

Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2017). They argue that the defendants’ 

conspiracy robbed them of a fair shot in state court. But the Torreses misapprehend that 

exception, which accounts for procedural bars to bringing their claims in state court. 

See Taylor v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (reasonable 
Nos. 18-3686, 19-2114, & 19-1657 Page 5 

opportunity exists when no “state laws, state court procedures or other impediments ... 

stand in the way of her bringing her claims in state court”). Here, the Torreses had the 

opportunity to raise, and did raise, their claims in the foreclosure action and multiple 

appeals. 

For these reasons, we VACATE and REMAND appeals number 18-3686 and 

number 19-2114 with instructions to dismiss the bankruptcy appeal as moot. In appeal 

number 19-1657, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction.