COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Bray 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TIMOTHY JAMES SILVESTER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0515-96-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 DECEMBER 31, 1996 

SUSAN LEE SILVESTER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 

William W. Sweeney, Judge 

 Edward D. Barnes (Charles E. Powers; Joseph 

E. Mayer; Edward D. Barnes & Associates, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 John K. Taggart, III (Patricia D. McGraw; 

Tremblay & Smith, on brief), for appellee. 

 Timothy James Silvester appeals the judgment of the circuit 

court deciding matters of spousal support, custody, and equitable 

distribution. Appellant contends the circuit court erred in: (1) 

evaluating appellant's medical practice; (2) awarding forty 

percent of appellant's medical practice and office building to 

appellee; (3) awarding spousal support prior to issuing its 

ruling on equitable distribution; (4) awarding spousal support in 

an amount of $3,500 per month; (5) awarding spousal support based 

on a financial situation created by the recipient's spending 

habits; (6) refusing to impute income to appellee for purposes of 

determining spousal support; (7) refusing to impute income to 

appellee for purposes of calculating child support; (8) 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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calculating child support without including in the gross income 

of the party requesting child support the spousal support which 

was awarded her; and (9) awarding $8,000 in attorney's fees. We 

affirm the judgment. 

 The parties were married on December 27, 1969. Four 

children were born to the marriage, the first in 1972 and the 

last and only minor in 1980. They separated on June 20, 1993. A 

divorce decree was granted to appellant on October 13, 1994, on 

the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for 

more than one year. 

 When they married, appellant was in graduate school. Six 

months later he completed graduate school and entered medical 

school. He was in medical school for four years and subsequently 

pursued five additional years of residency and practice before 

moving to Lynchburg, Virginia. During the nine years in which he 

was receiving his medical education, he borrowed money, worked as 

a resident, and for the summer held part-time jobs. During this 

time, appellee worked for two periods earning between $250 and 

$300 a week in each position. 

 Once they relocated to Lynchburg, appellant borrowed $60,000 

to $70,000 to begin his practice as a plastic surgeon. The 

practice grew steadily and he added two partners. In the 1980's 

one of the partners became sick and business problems developed. 

 The practice incurred substantial debt during the 1990's. 

Appellee did not contribute to the practice or participate in 

appellant's activities to establish himself in the medical 
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community. 

 During the course of the marriage appellee managed the home 

and tended to the day-to-day duties of raising the children. 

Appellant's annual income eventually reached approximately 

$175,000. Appellee was not employed during this period. Marital 

troubles developed regarding family finances. Appellee concealed 

from appellant some of her debts. She spent more than $75,000 on 

clothing and accessories. She also borrowed without appellant's 

knowledge. 

 In 1988, appellee inherited approximately $390,000 from her 

mother. At separation her account balance was $269,000. At the 

final hearing her account balance was $10,000. 

 In the trial court's February 14, 1996 final decree, (1) 

custody of Chris, the only minor child, was awarded to appellee; 

(2) child support was based on the statutory guidelines without 

deviation; (3) spousal support was set at $3,500 with no income 

imputed to appellee; (4) appellant's share in his medical 

practice was valued at $70,000 and sixty percent was awarded to 

appellant and forty percent to appellee; (5) appellant's share in 

his office building was valued at $41,456 and sixty percent was 

awarded to appellant and forty percent to appellee; and (6) 

appellee was awarded $8,000 in attorney's fees and an additional 

sum not to exceed $1,000 in costs. 

Valuation of Medical Practice

 Appellant's expert valued appellant's interest in his 

medical practice at $65,275, and appellee's expert valued the 
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practice at $79,333. However, appellant's expert admitted that 

had he been aware of certain other assets, he would have valued 

appellant's interest at $75,941. 

 Where experts offer conflicting testimony it is within the 

purview of the trial court to determine credibility. Reid v. 

Reid, 7 Va. App. 553, 563, 375 S.E.2d 533, 539 (1989). Here, the 

court heard evidence by both parties' experts who offered their 

opinions on the value of the appellant's interest, valuations 

which included both experts' recognition of the buy-sell 

agreement controlling the stock. Contrary to appellant's 

argument on brief, in Bosserman v. Bosserman, we did not uphold 

the trial court's use of a buy-sell agreement to value closely 

held stock. 9 Va. App. 1, 7, 384 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1989). We 

held that such an agreement is a factor to be considered in 

valuing an asset, but it is not conclusive as to the value. Id.

 The trial court was not plainly wrong in deciding the value 

of $70,000, and was not bound to select the specific value 

offered by either party's expert, regardless of their relative 

qualifications as experts. See Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 

394, 382 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1989). We find there is sufficient 

evidence in the record to support the trial court's valuation. 

Award of Forty Percent of Practice and

Office Building to Appellee

 The trial court's award is not to be disturbed on appeal 

unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

Bosserman, 9 Va. App. at 5, 384 S.E.2d at 107. The trial court, 
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after noting its consideration of all the factors prescribed by 

Code § 20-107.3, awarded appellee forty percent of appellant's 

interest in his medical practice and in the office building. 

"The purpose of Code § 20-107.3 is to fairly divide the value of 

the marital assets acquired by the parties during marriage with 

due regard for both their monetary and nonmonetary contributions 

to the acquisition and maintenance of the property and to the 

marriage." Bosserman, 9 Va. App. at 5, 384 S.E.2d at 107 (citing 

Robinette v. Robinette, 4 Va. App. 123, 130, 354 S.E.2d 808, 811 

(1987)). 

 Here, the trial court determined that appellant's interest 

in his medical practice and the office building was marital 

property. Appellant argues that the trial court erred because 

the court's award is not reconcilable with several of the factors 

prescribed in Code § 20-107.3. Specifically, appellant argues 

that his contributions both to the overall marital estate, and to 

the practice and office building, vastly exceeded appellee's 

contributions to the same assets. 

 While it is evident that appellant was almost entirely 

responsible for the development and success of his practice, the 

record also contains considerable evidence of appellee's 

nonmonetary and monetary contributions to the marital estate. 

Appellee and appellant were married for a period of twenty-five 

years and during that time appellee was almost solely responsible 

for the upkeep of the marital residence and the raising of the 

children. In addition, appellee's parents contributed to the 
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parties' marital estate, purchasing automobiles for them and, 

until the death of appellee's mother, paying all of the private 

educational expenses of the children. Appellee's inheritance, 

while used in part for appellee's extensive purchasing of clothes 

and accessories, was also contributed to the marital estate. 

Appellee's separate funds were used to pay for various trips for 

the family, for the purchase of household items, and for the 

support of the children. Appellee used $139,000 to pay the 

children's educational expenses; $5,000 was used in the purchase 

of the office building. 

 Appellee's maintenance of the family home, support of the 

parties' children, and use of a significant portion of her 

separate assets for these causes allowed appellant to devote his 

time and energies to the development of his practice. The trial 

court was not plainly wrong in finding that the wife's 

nonmonetary and monetary contributions to the marriage were 

substantial. Thus, we find there is evidence in the record of 

the trial court's consideration of the factors prescribed by Code 

§ 20-107.3(E) and that the evidence was sufficient to support the 

findings of the trial court. 

Spousal Support

 Code § 20-107.1 delineates the specific factors to be 

considered by the trial court in determining spousal support. In 

making a spousal support award, the trial court has broad 

discretion, and on appeal the award will not be reversed unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Gibson v. 
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Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 434, 364 S.E.2d 518, 523 (1988). Here, 

the trial court's consideration of the statutory factors is 

evidenced by the court's statement that "[p]ursuant to § 20-107.1 

. . . spousal support is set at $3,500 per month." 

 Appellant properly notes that mere recitation that the 

factors have been considered is insufficient. Id. at 435, 364 

S.E.2d at 523. "[W]e must examine the record to determine if the 

award is supported by evidence relevant to those factors." Id. 

Provided the record indicates the court's consideration of the 

factors prescribed by Code § 20-107.1, the trial court need not 

disclose the totality of its considerations nor must the trial 

court address each factor point by point in its opinion. Here, 

the record contains evidence relating to the statutory factors 

with which to make an award. Accordingly, we hold that the 

record does not show that the trial court failed to consider the 

appropriate factors or to accord them proper weight within the 

bounds of his discretion. 

 Imputation of Income

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not imputing 

income for purposes of determining spousal and child support 

because the record indicates that appellee is voluntarily 

underemployed. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred 

by not considering income appellee receives from her personal 

assets and income that will be generated by appellee's portion of 

the equitable distribution award. 

 A party seeking spousal support is obligated to earn as much 
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as they reasonably can in order to reduce the amount of support 

needed. Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 734, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 679 (1990). In keeping with this principle a court 

may, under appropriate circumstances, impute income to a party 

who seeks spousal support. Id. However, we have also previously 

held that "the court, in setting support awards, must look to 

current circumstances and what the circumstances will be `within 

the immediate or reasonably foreseeable future,' not to what may 

happen in the future. Id. at 734-35, 396 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting 

Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81-82, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986)). 

 Here, appellee was forty-four years of age, possessed a 

two-year degree and had no appreciable work experience as she was 

a full-time mother and homemaker during the parties' twenty-five 

years of marriage. Appellee is considerably less well suited for 

 reentering the job market than was the wife in Srinivasan, where 

we concluded that despite the fact that the wife possessed a 

Ph.D. and had taught at George Mason University, the court 

improperly imputed income to her. Id. at 735, 396 S.E.2d at 

679-80. We found that "Mrs. Srinivasan, at the time of divorce, 

was leading the life style she was accustomed to during the 

marriage . . . [and] the evidence did not support a finding that 

she had unreasonably refused to accept employment as of the date 

of divorce and she was thus entitled to a reasonable time to 

secure employment." Id. at 735, 396 S.E.2d at 679. Such a 

finding is also appropriate here. If, after a reasonable time, 

appellee unreasonably refuses to seek or accept employment, the 
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imputation of income may be justified. Further, no evidence was 

presented as to the availability of a position for which appellee 

was qualified, or what the amount of income would be for such 

position. 

 Appellant's arguments regarding the court's failure to 

consider the income wife could have earned or will earn from her 

separate assets and the assets obtained via the equitable 

distribution award are also unpersuasive. Although appellee did 

receive substantial inheritance from her mother, evidence was 

presented that those funds have since been all but exhausted. As 

noted, in making a support award and determining whether to 

impute income, the trial court must look at the present 

circumstances of the parties. Id. The record indicates that the 

trial court considered the assets to be awarded wife and those 

separate assets remaining to her in making its support award and 

refusing to impute income. The wife had considerable debt 

including attorney's fees which she would be required to pay with 

her current assets. Imputation of income is within the trial 

court's discretion. Here, credible evidence supported the trial 

court's decision that imputation of income was not appropriate, 

and thus no abuse of discretion is proved. 

Child Support

 Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in calculating 

child support without including appellee's spousal support in her 

gross income. We need not reach this issue as the question is 

moot because the dependent child for whom support was ordered now 
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lives with appellant. Even assuming an error in the calculation 

of the amount of the child support, appellant is not entitled to 

restitution. See Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 415, 429 S.E.2d 208, 

211 (1993). 

Attorney's Fees

 The award of attorney's fees is a matter vested in the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal only 

for an abuse of discretion. Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 

425 S.E.2d 572 (1992). The trial court awarded appellee $8,000 

in attorney's fees and a sum not to exceed $1,000 for costs. At 

trial appellee testified that she had incurred fees in excess of 

$30,000 and expenses in excess of $1,000. The lengthy nature of 

the proceedings and the complexity of the deliberations are also 

apparent from the record. We find that the trial court's award 

of attorney's fees was not excessive. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's award. 

 Affirmed.