COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Petty, Athey and Senior Judge Frank Argued by videoconference

ALAN H. NIELSEN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0037

- 21

- 4 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY JULY 27, 2021 JACQUELINE M. NIELSEN

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY

Stephen E. Sincavage , Judge
John H

. Kitzmann ( Hope F

. Rosen ; Davidson & Kitzmann, PLC; ShounBach , on brief

s ) , for appellant.
Lawrence D. Diehl ( (Barnes & Diehl, P.C. , on brief) , for appellee

.
Alan H. Nielsen ( h usband) appeals the trial court’s calculation of spousal support awarded

to Jacqueline M. Nielsen ( w ife). 1 For the reason s below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND Because the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite below only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposi tion of this appeal. “When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Shah v. Shah , 70 Va. App. 588, 591 (2019) (quoting C ongdon v. Congdon , 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003)).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1

- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1 In a companion case decid ed this day, Jacqueline M. Niels e n v. Alan H. Niels e n , No. 0010

- 2 1

- 4 ( Va. Ct. App. July 27 , 2021 ) , this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred. UNPUBLISHED- 2

- ANALYSIS “Upon petition of either party, a court may

. . . [modify] .

. . spousal support .

. . as the circumstances may make proper.” Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 195 (1997) (alterations in original ) (quoting Code § 20

- 109 )

. “The moving party in a petition for modification of support is required to prove both a material change in circumstances and that this change warrants a modification of support.” Id. (quoting Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter , 8 Va. App. 601, 605 (1989) )

. “The ‘ circumstances ’ which make ‘proper’ an increase, reduction or cessation of spousal support under Code § 20

- 109 are financial and economic ones.” Hollowell v.
Hollowell , 6 Va. App. 417, 419 (1 988). “When a court awards spousal support based upon due
consideration of the factors enumerated in Code § 20

- 107.1, as shown by the evidence, its
determination ‘will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion.’” Chaney v.
Karabaic

- Chaney , 71 Va. App. 431, 435 (2020) (quoting Dodge v. Dodge , 2 Va. App. 238, 246 (1986) )

. When considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion the Supreme Court has
observed that [t]he exercise of discretion . . . presupposes “that, for some

decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts

— yet still remain entirely reasonable.” Thomas v. Commonwealth , 62 Va. App. 104, 111 (2013) (citation omitted). “This bell

- shaped curve of reasonability governing o ur appellate review rests on the venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie.” Sauder v. Ferguson , 289 Va. 449, 459 (2015) (citation omitted).
Du v. Commonwealth , 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016)

. In determining whether evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision , “ the appellate court does not retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of the credibility of the
witnesses.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks , 12 Va. App. 890, 894 (1991).- 3

-

Here, the trial court determi ned that a material change of circumstance s had occurred and
considered whether the spousal support award should be modified. The trial court expressly noted that it considered all the factors listed in Code § 20

- 107.1. One of those factors is the “standard of living established during the marriage.” Code § 20

- 107.1(E)(2). The trial court
made factual fin dings on the parties’ incomes and expenses. H usband argues on appeal only that in determining the modified spousal support amount, the trial court should not have allowed as
an expense the m oney w ife gives to her mother each month

. The trial court took into account the “financial decisions made during the marriage to maintain [the parties’] way of life” and what would be required for w ife “to maintain [ w ife’s] way of life as when [she was] married.” The trial court found the “evidence [showed] that during the marriage [the money given to the mother ] was something that was done during the marriage ” and “the money [ w ife] pays to help her mother out” was part of the lifestyle established during the marriage

. The trial court distinguished between that expense and the portion of w ife’s claimed cell phone expense that was used for her adult children. The court noted it was “a nice thing to do” to include them on her cell phone plan , but “it’s not something that is required for support.” Thus, the trial court expressly considered which of w ife’s claimed
expenses w ere for her own support and which were for the support of others. The trial court found the money given by w ife to her m other was for w ife’s lifestyle support. 2

2 We note that Code § 20

- 88 makes support of parents a legal obligation. That c ode section states, in part,

It shall be the joint and several duty of all persons eighteen years of age or over, of sufficient earning capacity or income, after reasonably providing for his or her own immedi ate family, to assist in providing for the support and maintenance of his or her mother or father, he or she being then and there in necessitous circumstances. Code § 20

- 88

.- 4

-

H usband argues that Robbins v

. Robbins , 48 Va. App. 466 (2006) , and de C amp v. deCamp , 64 Va. App. 137 (2014) , support his position. Both cases dealt with the overlap of spousal support and child support, which is not at issue here. In neither case was there a factual finding by the trial court that the expense challenged was for maintenance of the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. See Code § 20

- 107.1(E)(2)

. In Robbins , this Court held that
the trial court abused its discretion when it calculated spousal support by subtracting child support payments to negate overlapping child and spousal support items listed on the mother’s expense sheet. Robbins , 48 Va. App. at 485. Here , there is no child support issue, so Robbins does not apply.
In deCamp , this Court noted,
While Code § 20

- 107.1(E)(1) requires the consideration of the “needs” of the “parties,” the statute does not (as the child support statute does) create a mathematical formula primarily reliant on the input of financial data. Instead, § 20

- 107.1(E) requires only the factfinder to “consider” the estimated needs of the parties. By doing so, the statute thus authorizes a flexible, commo nsense approach to this aspect of the factfinding exercise. deCamp , 64 Va. App. at 145 (quoting Robbins , 48 Va. App. at 484 n.10). Here, t he trial court
found , based on the testimony presented , that the money given to w ife’s mother was a financial
need of w ife for the maintenance of the lifestyle established during the marriage rather than a financial need of a third party

. The trial court, as the factfinder , “was then free to consider and weigh the evidence of [ w ife’s] estimated needs and award spousal support within its discretion.”
Id. at 146. These needs include w ife’s lifestyle of charitable contributions to her mother. We acknowledge that “ conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts” as presented here. Du , 292 Va. at 564. The trial court’s decision to treat the money given by w ife to her mother as a component of lifestyle was , however, within the “bell

- shaped- 5

-

curve of reasonability .” Id. ; see also id

. ( recognizing “ that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie” ). Moreover, the trial court noted that h usband did not provide evidence to challenge the amount of money w ife claimed as an expense related to her mother. The trial court foun d that
the support for the mother had been a longstanding part of the marriage finances and had continued when the original spousal support determination was made. H usband provided no
evidence that the amount of support given by w ife to her mother now was different from the

amount , or value, given d uring the marriage.
The “record here reflects that the circuit court properly considered the estimated needs of

w ife ” and acted within its discretion in awarding w ife a n appropriate spousal support amount. deCamp , 64 Va. App. at 147

. H usband seeks an award of attorney ’ s fees and costs in this appeal. “ Because w ife prevailed in this appeal, we deny husband ’ s request f or attorney ’ s fees and costs. ” Harrison v.
Harrison , 58 Va. App. 90, 106 (2011)

. CONCLUSION
For the se reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court

. Affirmed.