Filed 12/12/22 P. v. Tulanda CA2/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FRANCIS TULANDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B315420

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA073477-01)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.

Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Defendant and appellant Francis Tulanda appeals a 

judgment of conviction for felony murder and robbery. He 

contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a 

judgment of acquittal. 

Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion 

by overruling his objections to certain evidence. He first contends 

the court erroneously admitted a recording of a Perkins1

operation because substantial parts of it were inaudible. 

Alternatively, defendant argues the trial court should have at a 

minimum excluded hearsay statements made by his accomplice 

to the Perkins agent. Finally, defendant contends the trial court 

erroneously permitted a police officer to opine about portions of 

the recording. 

We reject defendant’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. The Homicide of Vincent Roper and the Taking of 

Money from His House

Many of the facts in this case were established by 

uncontradicted evidence. The victim was Vincent Roper (Roper),

the father of defendant’s ex-wife Reeneaka Roper. 

On or about August 23, 2017, defendant, his friend 

Christopher Brandon, and Brandon’s girlfriend Acorri Patton 

went to Roper’s house in Palmdale to take money Roper kept in a 

safe. Defendant asked Roper to give him the money. When 

Roper refused, defendant and his accomplices engaged in a 

physical altercation with him. 

1

See Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292. 
3

The injuries Roper sustained during this altercation led to 

his death. Roper’s death was a homicide caused by “hemorrhage 

due to sharp-force injuries of the head.” 

While Roper was lying on the kitchen floor in a pool of 

blood, defendant went upstairs and retrieved a safe from one of 

Roper’s bedrooms. Defendant and his accomplices left with the 

safe. As defendant expected, the safe contained substantial sums 

of cash. Roper died approximately 15 minutes after sustaining 

his injuries.

The main factual dispute between the parties concerns

defendant’s mens rea. Defendant claims he went to Roper’s 

house to retrieve his own money that Roper stole from him. He 

also claims that he attempted to stop fighting Roper, but Roper 

kept attacking him. The People contend that defendant and his 

accomplices went to Roper’s home to steel the victim’s money, 

and that they intentionally killed Roper by stabbing him to 

death.

B. The Police Investigation

On August 25, 2017, Marquisha Kirklin went to Roper’s 

house to check on him. Kirklin often assisted Roper who was 64

years old and could not read or write. After finding Roper’s front 

door open and furniture at the front of the house displaced, 

Kirklin called the police. 

When Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies 

arrived at the scene, they found obvious signs of an altercation

downstairs. Roper was lying dead in the kitchen. Furniture and 

other items were strewed everywhere. Dried blood was 

splattered in numerous locations in several rooms. In a bedroom 

upstairs, the police found padding and plywood pulled back in the 

closet. 
4

Police criminologists analyzed the DNA in samples of the 

blood they took from Roper’s home. Defendant’s DNA was found 

in several locations, including the dresser drawer and carpet in 

the bedroom and the wall next to the landing on the stairs. 

Brandon’s and Patton’s blood was also found at the scene. 

Detective John Duncan subpoenaed records for Brandon’s 

and defendant’s telephones. The records indicated that from 

August 21 to 23, 2017, there were numerous communications 

between Brandon’s phone and Roper’s phone, and between 

defendant’s phone and Brandon’s phone. The records also 

indicated that these phones were near Roper’s home when many 

of the calls were made. 

On March 22, 2018, Detectives Duncan and Joseph

Valencia interviewed defendant and Brandon. The detectives 

also sent an undercover agent to speak with them in jail. The 

interviews and the Perkins operation were recorded.

In their interviews, defendant and Branson falsely stated 

they did not know each other. They both also falsely denied 

having anything to do with Roper’s homicide.

In the Perkins operation, the police recorded defendant and 

Brandon making numerous incriminating statements to the 

agent and each other. Most significantly, defendant discussed 

with the agent the circumstances he believed might have led to 

his arrest for murder. 

Defendant claimed the victim owed him money for “weed.” 

He further stated that he went to the victim’s house and asked 

for his money. When the victim refused his request, defendant 

“[w]hooped his ass.” Defendant denied intending to kill the 

victim. Rather, defendant stated, “I just wanted to get my shit” 

and “[t]each him a lesson.”
5

Defendant told the agent that after he knocked the victim 

unconscious, he looked for money but could not find any. 

Defendant also mentioned the victim could not read or write. 

In a separate conversation with the agent, Brandon 

described the victim as an “old man,” defendant’s “father-in-law,”

and defendant’s “ex-wife’s daddy.” Brandon also told the agent 

about a violent altercation between the victim on one side and 

defendant, Brandon, and a woman on the other. 

C. The Charges Against Defendant

In an information, the People charged defendant with two 

counts: (1) murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))

2

committed while 

engaged in the commission of a robbery and/or a burglary (§§ 211, 

460) within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17); and 

(2) first degree residential robbery (§ 211) committed while 

personally using a deadly and dangerous weapon, namely a knife

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Charges against Brandon and Patton were 

tried separately. 

D. The People’s Case-in-Chief

In July and August 2021, the superior court held a jury 

trial on the charges against defendant Tulanda. The following 

witnesses testified for the People: Reeneaka Roper, the victim’s 

daughter; Kirklin, Roper’s assistant; Deputy Luis Alvarez, the 

officer who first arrived at the scene; Detective Duncan, the lead 

detective on the case; criminologists Luis Olmos, Christopher 

Lee, and Gregory Wong, who collected and analyzed DNA from

blood found in Roper’s house; and Dr. Matthew Miller, the 

2 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.
6

pathologist who testified about Roper’s autopsy. Outside the 

presence of the jury, the People called Brandon as a witness, but 

he invoked his right against self-incrimination and did not 

testify. 

The People also played for the jury the recordings of 

Detective Duncan’s interviews of defendant and Brandon and the 

recording of the Perkins operation. Additionally, the parties 

stipulated that, if sworn, Danielle Hefte, a cellphone analysis 

expert witness, would testify to certain facts about defendant’s 

and Brandon’s cellphones. Finally, the People moved into 

evidence various documents, including photographs of the crime 

scene. 

After the People rested, defendant orally moved for entry of 

a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 on the ground 

there was no evidence that “anything was taken” from Roper. 

The trial court denied the motion, finding the jury could infer 

defendant took money.

E. Defendant’s testimony at trial

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He told a story that 

was completely different than what he said to the police in his 

interview. Defendant’s testimony also varied in important ways

from what he told the Perkins agent. We summarize his 

testimony below. 

In 2013, Roper was struggling financially. Defendant 

assisted him by purchasing groceries and paying for his rent and

utilities for about a year. Defendant’s relationship with Roper 

soured, however, when he learned from Reeneaka Roper’s halfbrother, Anton, that Roper went to defendant’s house and took 

his safe. Defendant had $60,000 in the safe that he had earned 

as a licensed marijuana distributor. 
7

In June of 2016, defendant went to Roper’s house and 

asked for his safe. Roper responded by pointing a gun at 

defendant. Roper told defendant, “Forget the money. The money 

is mine now.” When defendant protested, Roper said, “Get the 

fuck off my property before I blow your brain out.” 

Defendant claims he “didn’t really care about the money”; 

he was upset about the deterioration of his relationship with 

Roper. But when Roper boasted about his theft to third parties 

and called defendant a “pussy” for not doing anything about it, 

defendant decided to take action. 

On or about August 21, 2017, defendant, Brandon, and 

Patton went to Roper’s home. Patton knocked on Roper’s front 

door and claimed that her son’s drone had fallen in his backyard. 

Through this deception, Patton gained entry to Roper’s house. 

Defendant and Brandon waited in a car around the corner. 

Defendant and his accomplices believed that Roper would engage 

with Patton and try to have sex with her.

The plan was for Patton to put Visine eye drops in Roper’s 

drink, causing him to fall asleep. While he was sleeping, 

defendant and Brandon would go into the house and take 

defendant’s safe. But the plan failed after multiple attempts over 

the next few days. Defendant and Brandon then decided to

confront Roper in his home. 

Defendant politely asked, “Roper, can you please give me 

my money back?” Roper responded by punching Brandon in the 

face. This began a protracted physical fight in Roper’s living 

room and kitchen. At one point Patton accidently sprayed Mace 

(pepper spray) into Brandon’s mouth, incapacitating him. 

Defendant and Roper continued to fight. During the melee, 
8

defendant told Roper he could keep the money if he let them go, 

but Roper kept attacking. 

While defendant was fighting Roper, Patton hit Roper over 

the head with various pots and a broom handle. When Patton hit

Roper’s head with a “deep-fry pot” with four pointy edges, Roper 

was cut and started to bleed a little. The fight finally ended 

when Patton hit Roper five times with an iron pot in the kitchen, 

knocking him to the floor in an incapacitated state. 

Defendant then went upstarts and searched both bedrooms 

for his safe. He found and took the safe out of a compartment in 

the floor of the guest bedroom’s closet. He later found about 

$20,000 in the safe. 

In cross-examination, defendant admitted that he did not 

have any documentation showing he had a marijuana 

distribution license. He also acknowledged that he did not report 

Roper’s theft of $60,000 to the police or Roper’s threat to “blow 

[his] brain out.” Defendant further conceded that there were no 

pictures of a frying pan with four pointy edges in evidence. 

Finally, defendant admitted that although he had a video 

surveillance and alarm system in his home, he did not have a 

video of Roper stealing his safe. 

F. The People’s Rebuttal

In the People’s rebuttal, Reeneaka Roper testified. She 

stated defendant did not tell her he was assisting her father 

financially and there was no reason to believe that he did so. She 

also testified defendant never told her that Roper stole his money 

and there was no reason to believe any such theft occurred. 

Defendant’s safe, moreover, only had about $4,000 in it. Finally, 

she stated that while she had a license to distribute marijuana, 

defendant did not.
9

Detective Duncan testified that he did not see any pots

with four pointy edges at Roper’s house. 

G. Defendant’s Conviction

The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. The trial 

court then sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole. Defendant timely appealed the judgment. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Defendant’s 

Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his 

section 1118.1 motion for a judgment of acquittal. He contends: 

“Brandon’s statements were the only evidence presented as to the 

taking element of a robbery, but because he was an accomplice as 

a matter of law and his statements were not corroborated, the 

evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to allow a reasonable 

trier of fact to find that [defendant] committed robbery.” 

A. Applicable law

1. Claim-of-right defense

An essential element of robbery is that the defendant 

intended to take “another’s property.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 

Cal.4th 249, 254.) Likewise, an element of burglary is that the 

defendant entered a dwelling or other statutorily defined space 

with the intent to take the “personal property of another.” 

(§§ 459, 484.)

The taking element is not satisfied when “the taker 

entertains a good-faith belief that he has a right to the property 

taken, even if the belief is mistaken.” (People v. Johnson (1991) 

233 Cal.App.3d 425, 457 (Johnson); accord People v. Hendricks
10

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 (Hendricks).) But when “the purported 

right is based in an illegal endeavor,” the “felonious intent is not 

negated.” (Johnson, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 457.) In other 

words, “[t]he claim-of-right defense is inapplicable to claims 

based on notoriously illegal activities.”

3

(Hendricks, supra, 44 

Cal.3d at p. 642.) 

The claim-of-right defense also cannot be asserted against a 

robbery charge by a defendant who seeks to “satisfy, settle or 

otherwise collect on a debt.” (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 

935, 956 (Tufunga).) But if the defendant believes in good faith 

that he is recovering his specific property, he can assert the 

defense. (Ibid.) 

2. Section 1118.1 motion

“When a trial court rules on a motion for a judgment of 

acquittal under section 1118.1, the standard the trial court must 

apply is the same as what the appellate court applies when 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction.” 

(People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 301.) “A court resolves a 

section 1118.1 motion by determining whether the prosecution 

presented sufficient evidence, measured from the moment the 

section 1118.1 motion is made, to permit the jury to resolve the 

issue. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s determination de 

novo.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 

entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

3 A claim-of-right is not a true affirmative defense 

because it is merely an argument to defeat one of the elements 

the People must prove. (See People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

989, 996–998.)
11

determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it 

appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) 

We cannot reweigh the facts or the credibility of the 

witnesses. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 67.) The jury is 

free to “believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony”

(CALCRIM No. 226), even if it is uncontradicted, so long as it 

does not act arbitrarily. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 

3 Cal.3d 875, 890; see also People v. McCoy (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th

778, 785.) 

3. Accomplice testimony

“A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an 

accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as 

shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the 

offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows 

the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.” 

(§ 1111.) 

“‘The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial or 

slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone, 

and it must tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act 

that is an element of the crime. The corroborating evidence need 

not by itself establish every element of the crime, but it must, 

without aid from the accomplice’s testimony, tend to connect the 

defendant with the crime. [Citation.]’” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 472, 505, italics added.) 
12

B. Legal Analysis 

Defendant makes two related but distinct arguments. He 

contends that when the People rested, there was no substantial 

evidence showing (1) he took any money from Roper’s residence;

and (2) if he did take money, it belonged to another. Without this 

evidence, defendant argues, the jury could not have convicted 

defendant of robbery and felony murder committed during a 

robbery.4

1. Defendant’s taking of money

Although defendant conceded in his own testimony that he 

took about $20,000 from Roper, he argues that when the People 

rested, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 

that he took any money. But as defendant acknowledges, his 

accomplice Brandon stated to the Perkins agent that defendant 

took money from Roper. The People presented the Perkins

operation audio recording to the jury before resting.

Defendant argues that the People could not rely solely on 

Brandon’s statements to the Perkins agent to prove the element 

of taking. Defendant is incorrect . 

The People did not need to provide corroborating evidence 

regarding each element of defendant’s crimes. All that was 

required was corroborating evidence, circumstantial or direct, 

tending to connect defendant to the crime. There was an 

abundance of such evidence here. For example, there was 

corroborating evidence that defendant engaged in the violent 

4 Felony murder does not require that the robbery be 

successful; an attempted robbery will suffice. (§ 190.2, subd. 

(a)(17); CALCRIM No. 540A.)
13

confrontation in Roper’s home that led to Roper’s death. 

Defendant’s blood and DNA were splattered all over the crime 

scene, and defendant admitted to “whooping” the victim.

In any case, besides Brandon’s statements, there was 

circumstantial evidence that defendant took money from Roper. 

Defendant admitted that he went to Roper’s home to collect 

money he alleges he was owed. Further, the rug and padding in 

one of the closets in Roper’s home were lifted, indicating 

something was taken by the intruder. From these facts, the jury 

could have concluded that defendant in fact took money from 

Roper despite his contrary statement to the Perkins agent. 

2. Defendant’s claim-of-right defense

There was ample evidence supporting the jury’s finding 

that the specific money defendant stole did not belong to him. 

Defendant admitted to the Perkins agent that he went to Roper’s 

home to obtain money he was “owed” for “weed,” and that when 

Roper did not give him what he wanted, he “[w]hooped his ass.” 

Even if the jury credited defendant’s claim that he was “owed”

money by Roper (as opposed to just harboring a desire to steal a 

large sum of cash out of greed), a claim-of-right defense cannot 

excuse theft of funds to settle a perceived debt. (Tufunga, supra, 

21 Cal.4th at pp. 954–956.) 

Moreover, defendant stated to the Perkins agent that he 

earned the money by selling marijuana. When defendant moved 

for a judgment of acquittal, he had not yet presented evidence of 

his alleged marijuana distribution license. The jury could have 

properly inferred the alleged $60,000 defendant claimed he was 

owed consisted of illicit profits from marijuana sales. Such a

finding would have also defeated defendant’s claim-of-right

defense. (Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 642.)
14

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 

When It Admitted the Perkins Operation Audio 

Recording

Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the Perkins

operation audio recording on the ground there were many 

portions of the recording that were inaudible. Defendant argues 

on appeal the trial court’s denial of that motion was error.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence “‘for 

abuse of discretion, and [the ruling] will not be disturbed unless 

there is a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of 

justice.’” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 951.) “When 

evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a conviction 

unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 

the defendant would have occurred absent the error.” (Ibid.)

An audio recording “may be admissible even if substantial 

portions of it are unintelligible.” (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 

Cal.3d 548, 574.) “‘To be admissible, tape recordings need not be 

completely intelligible for the entire conversation as long as 

enough is intelligible to be relevant without creating an inference 

of speculation or unfairness.’” (People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 

Cal.App.4th 175, 225; accord People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 

611.)

Most of the recording at issue here consists of intelligible 

relevant statements made by defendant, Brandon, the agent, and 

police officers. The jury could have assessed that information 

without speculating. While substantial parts of the recording are

inaudible, defendant was free to attack its probative value on 

that basis. There was nothing unfair about letting the jury 

decide for itself the probative value, if any, of the recording. The 
15

trial court’s decision to admit the recording therefore was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by 

Admitting Statements Brandon Made to the Perkins

Agent 

Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude as hearsay 

Brandon’s statements to the Perkins agent while defendant was 

not present. The People argued that the statements were 

admissible under Evidence Code section 1230 (section 1230) 

because they were against Brandon’s penal interest. The trial 

court denied the motion. Defendant argues that the trial court

abused its discretion. We disagree. 

The People do not dispute that Brandon’s statements to the 

Perkins agent were hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) The issue is 

whether the statements fall within the exception to the hearsay 

rule set forth in section 1230. 

Section 1230 provides in relevant part that a statement is 

not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 

“unavailable,” and the statement “subjected him to the risk of . . . 

criminal liability.” “[T]he rationale underlying the exception is 

that ‘a person’s interest against being criminally implicated gives 

reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made 

against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers usually 

associated with the admission of out-of-court statements.” 

(People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).) 

In determining whether to apply this exception, the trial 

court should focus on the trustworthiness of the statement. 

(People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1055.) This entails 

analyzing “‘“not just the words but the circumstances under 

which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, 
16

and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.” [Citation.]’” 

(Id. at pp. 1055–1056; accord Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711.) 

Brandon was unavailable at trial because he invoked his 

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. His 

statements to the Perkins agent were against his penal interest

because they tied him to Roper’s murder. Brandon discussed in 

detail the violent confrontation he and his accomplices had with 

Roper. He also noted he was unlikely to have left any hair at the 

scene because he was “braided up.” This shows a consciousness 

of guilt.

Brandon’s statements to the agent were also reasonably 

trustworthy. He was good friends with defendant at the time. 

Indeed, outside the agent’s presence, he and defendant confirmed 

their “love” for each other. Brandon had no discernable reason to 

falsely implicate himself and his friend in any crime. Under 

these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying defendant’s motion to exclude the statements. 

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error by 

Overruling Objections to Detective Duncan’s 

Testimony

Over defendant’s objections, Detective Duncan testified 

about Brandon’s and defendant’s statements made during the 
17

Perkins operation. Detective Duncan’s testimony fell into two 

categories.5 

A. Testimony assisting the jury to understand the actions 

of the police

“A lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is rationally 

based on the witness’s perception and if it is helpful to a clear 

understanding of his testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.)” (People v. 

Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 153.) A law enforcement officer

may provide opinion testimony that helps explain police conduct

and the scope of a police investigation. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 1210, 1253–1254.) 

Some of Detective Duncan’s testimony regarding the 

Perkins operation falls into this category. For example, Brandon 

stated to the agent there were no additional witnesses. Detective 

Duncan testified that this statement was “very helpful with the 

investigation.” Another example is Detective Duncan’s testimony 

regarding Brandon’s statements about a woman meeting Roper 

on the day of his homicide. According to Detective Duncan, this 

was the “first time we start to realize there was a plan regarding 

the murder of Mr. Roper.” 

Detective Duncan’s testimony about how certain 

statements made during the Perkins operation affected the police 

5 Detective Duncan also explained what some slang 

terms meant. Defendant concedes this testimony was admissible.
18

investigation was admissible. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in permitting such testimony.

B. Testimony interpreting the probative significance of 

Brandon’s and defendant’s statements 

Detective Duncan also provided testimony about the 

Perkins operation that did not relate to the police investigation. 

Defendant objected to this testimony based on the “best evidence” 

rule, also known as the secondary evidence rule. Under this rule, 

the “content of a writing may be proved” with secondary evidence 

only if certain conditions are satisfied. (Evid. Code, § 1521, subd. 

(a).) The trial court correctly overruled this objection because 

Detective Duncan’s testimony was not offered to prove the 

“content” of the recording; its content was undisputed.

Defendant also objected to Detective Duncan’s testimony on 

the ground that it invaded “the province of the jury.” “Witnesses 

must ordinarily testify to facts, leaving the drawing of inferences 

or conclusions to the jury or court.” (Froomer v. Drollinger (1962) 

201 Cal.App.2d 90, 98.) A police officer, however, may give a lay 

opinion about inferences he or she drew from observed facts. 

(People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 497 [officer could offer 

lay opinion that button appeared to be ripped from jeans].) 

Detective Duncan provided testimony that went beyond 

drawing reasonable inferences from facts he observed and crossed 

the line into improperly interpreting facts for the jury. For 

example, in the Perkins operation, Brandon told the agent, “she 

[Patton] kind of fucked up, but she was supposed to spray 

[Roper], but she sprayed me, bro.” Referring to this statement, 

Detective Duncan testified: “Mr. Brandon talks about how the 

plan was for the female to come in and spray Mr. Tulanda [sic]. 

That would be, obviously, to disorient him.” (Italics added.) 
19

While Brandon’s statement indicates that Patton 

mistakenly sprayed Brandon instead of Roper, it does not 

necessarily indicate that the three accomplices “planned” to spray 

Roper before they entered his house. Detective Duncan’s 

testimony interpreting Brandon’s statement was improper.

Another example is Detective Duncan’s interpretation of 

the following conversation: 

Defendant: “You think they have something on you?”

Brandon: “Huh.”

Defendant: “You think they have something? 

(INAUDIBLE) talking about blood in the house.”

Brandon: “(INAUDIBLE) same shit. (INAUDIBLE) lying. 

(INAUDIBLE) That’s what I was thinking like, I hope uh, like 

you just don’t crack when they tell you that bullshit. 

(INAUDIBLE) they don’t have no blood. He said your blood all 

over the house. Damn, Frank, I love you, bro.”

[¶] . . .[¶]

Brandon: “I love you too, man. I was thinking about you 

that whole time.” 

Regarding the above exchange, Detective Duncan testified:

“It shows that they’re worried about each other snitching on each 

other. You know, they’re worried about some DNA. They’re 

worried about blood coming back to them, the blood evidence; 

then they’re just expressing their love and respect for each other, 

basically reassuring each other.” 

Although some of defendant’s objections to Detective

Duncan’s testimony should have been sustained, defendant has 

not shown prejudice. The People presented overwhelming 

evidence supporting most of the facts they needed to prove to 

obtain felony murder and robbery convictions. Defendant even 
20

admitted he went to Roper’s house to retrieve money and that he 

was involved in the violent confrontation that led to Roper’s 

death. The only major factual dispute was whether defendant 

believed that the money he took belonged to Roper. On that issue 

Detective Duncan’s testimony about the Perkins operation audio 

recording was marginal at most.

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury: “Witnesses 

who were not testifying as experts gave their opinions during the 

trial. You may but are not required to accept those opinions as 

true or correct. You may give the opinions whatever weight you 

think appropriate. . . . You may disregard all or any part of an 

opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported 

by the evidence.” The trial court further instructed the jury: 

“You must decide what the facts are. It is up to you all of you, 

and you alone, to decide what happened based only on the 

evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.” 

We have no reason to believe the jury failed to make its 

own assessment of the Perkins operation audio recording; we 

assume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. 

Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 431.) Therefore, any error by the 

trial court in overruling defendant’s objections to Duncan’s 

testimony did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (See People v. 

Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1027 [“Nothing in the record 

undermines our confidence that the jury followed those 

instructions and decided the issues based on its own assessment 

of the evidence”]; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 300–301 

[“we see nothing in the record that would lead us to conclude that 

the jury was likely to disregard the instructions it received 

concerning its duty to decide the issues of credibility and guilt 
21

based upon its own assessment of the evidence, not the opinions 

of any witness”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

TAMZARIAN, J. *

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

BAKER, J.

*

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.