1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEBORAH A. TRUDEL, et al. , Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 15-1966 (JEB) SUNTRUST BANK, et al. , Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Reading like the plot of one of John le Carré’s Cold War novels , the Complaint in this case opens with the assassinati ons of Yevgenyi Scherban, a Ukra inian politician and businessman, and Nadejda Nikit ina, his wife. In 1996, both wer e gunned down on the tarmac of an airport in Donetsk, Ukraine , by contract killers dressed as police officers and a flight technician. Although those gunmen w ere prosecuted, Scherban’s three sons were left to hunt globally for their father’s oversea s cash reserves. Some asset s had been stashed in the United States with Defendant SunTrust Bank, but to the sons’ chagrin, those accounts are now closed, emptied, or still unidentified. T he children and the estates’ personal representativ e hope that this lawsuit against SunTrust and ot hers, brought almost two decades later, will help them reclaim some of those long-lost fortunes. SunTrust now moves to dismiss the counts against it, positing t hat too much time has passed for such a suit and that the claims as pled are implausi ble. As the Second Amended Complaint is, in large part, a his torical tale, the Court will grant the lion’s shar e of Defendant’s Motion.2 I. Background In narrating this decad es-old Scherban family saga, the Court p rimarily draws from the facts in the Second Amended Compl aint (which the Court will, fo r brevity, refer to as the Complaint) and supplements with other submissions that Plaintif fs provide. See ECF No. 43. The events recounted there can at times seem fantastical. The Court, however, suspends any disbelief, reminding itself of Mar k Twain’s adage: “Fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; Truth isn’t.”
A. Scherban Family History Scherban, the family patriarch, w as born in Ukraine following t he end of the Second World War. Id., ¶ 16. In apparent filial symmetry, he had thr ee wives and also three sons. From his first marriage, he gaine d his eldest son, Evgenyi Scherban (Evgenyi). Id., ¶ 2. One marriage later, a second son was born, Rusla n Scherban (Ruslan). Id., ¶ 3. Finally, Scherban’s third marriage, to Nikitina, completed the trifecta when it produced Yevgen Scherban (Yevgen). Id., ¶ 4. Those three half-brothers — Evgenyi, Ruslan, and Yevgen — were the original Plaintiffs in this action. Scherban amassed more than poten tial heirs. In the early 1990s , he made his bed in Ukraine’s emerging free-mark et economy. Id., ¶¶ 15-16. Harnes sing his capitalist instinct, he started up several notable busine ss enterprises and eventually came to control a network of gas stations throughout the new ly independent country. Id., ¶ 16. As the Complaint tells it, “[T]he assets under Scherban’s control surpassed $100 million,” making him one of the richest businessmen in the former Soviet republic. Id., ¶ 18. Scherban gained fame not only for his financial success but als o for his political rise. When Ukraine hosted its first leg islative elections as an indep endent country in March 1994,3 voters elected him to be a legislator to the Rada, Ukraine’s na tional parliament. Id., ¶ 17. These feats did not go unnoticed. As a prominent public figure and b usinessman, he often found himself the target of criminal enterprises who eyed his busines ses and his wealth. Id., ¶ 19. Eventually, in 1996, a criminal ga ng was contracted to assassin ate Scherban as a way to eliminate competition in Ukraine’s natural-gas industry. Id., ¶¶ 24, 26. It was promised roughly three million dollars to carry out the plot. Id., ¶ 24. The murderous scheme came to fruition on November 3, 1996. Id. , ¶ 20. That day, Scherban, Nikitina, and Rusla n (the second son) flew in by priv ate plane to an airport in Donetsk, Ukraine. Id., ¶ 22. Thr ee men met them on the tarmac — two posing as police officers with firearms and a third dre ssed as a flight technician. Id. Once the Scherban family disembarked, the conspirators s prayed them with bullets, killin g Scherban and Nikitina, as well as two others in their entour age. Id., ¶¶ 22-23. Ruslan, then only nineteen years old, survived the incident. Id., ¶¶ 3, 22-23.
B. Matters of Inheritance For a family of serious politic al and business stature, Scherba n and Nikitina surprisingly left no written will or otherwise catalogued their assets. Id. , ¶ 27. Their estates, surely complex, were instead broken up in accordance with Ukrainian intestacy l aws. Id., ¶¶ 27-30. To exacerbate inheritance matters , Scherban also deposited sign ificant sums of money in the United States, fearing that Ukrainian banks were unreliable . Id., ¶ 32. More specifically, he opened at least three accounts w ith Defendant SunTrust Bank at its Boca Raton, Florida, branch and others with Merrill Lynch, which is a defendant in a separa te lawsuit brought on behalf of his estate. Id., ¶¶ 35-76; Opp. at 10; see Estate of Yevgenyi A. S cherban v. Merrill Lynch, No. 14- 6312 (S.D.N.Y.).4 For the most part, Scherban managed these American accounts wit h the help of his assistant, Alexei Alexeenko. One account was set up under the names of Nikitina and Alexeenko jointly. See SAC, ¶ 35. Although t he latter was named on the account, he, in reality, acted only to facilitate Scherban’s financ ial transactions in the United S tates. Id., ¶ 36. A second account was set up, likely in the names of Scherban and Alexeenko, and held unknown sums of money. Id., ¶¶ 66-67. The third SunTrust account is th e primary focus here. Scherban opened up this savings account (with terminal digits 5216) around 1994, id., ¶ 38, butit is somewhat unclear who owned Account 5216, both before an d after the assassinations. According to Plaintiffs, “Scherban set up, among other acco unts, [this] savings account at SunTrust, designating two direct beneficiaries and the na mes on the account, namely Nikit ina and Ruslan.” Id. This could mean either that Scherban hel d the account (which would pass to the beneficiaries, Nikitina and Ruslan, if he died) or that Niki tina and Ruslan held it. See E CF No. 46-5, Exh. A (June 1997 Statement for Account 5216) (listing Nikitina and Ruslan as add ressees); see also SAC, ¶ 3. To whom the funds would pass should N ikitina die is also unclear — either half to Nikitina’s estate and half to Ruslan or entirely t o Ruslan — as the individuals’ ownership rights in the accounts are not specified. These details matter not in the end, and so the Court will not fuss over them now. It will assume, to Plaintiffs’ benefit , that both estates and Ruslan he ld some legal share of the third account. Prior to Scherban and Nikitina’s deaths, that account contained over one million dollars. See SAC, ¶ 41. Regardle ss of Ruslan’s ownership status, he alleges that he “was unaware of the existence of A ccount x5216” and “has no recollec tion that anyone told him about that account” when it was ope ned. Id., ¶¶ 38-39. He lacked th is knowledge because — in a5 fateful pattern for all of Sch erban’s holdings — Alexeenko was tasked with keeping tabs on the family’s American financial interests. Id., ¶¶ 37, 68-69, 82-8 6; see ECF No. 46-13 (Affidavit of Mikhail Serdiouk), ¶¶ 5-9 (allegi ng Alexeenko lived at address where Account 5216’s statements were sent).
C. Emptying the Coffers This shaky financial arrangement w as stress-tested when Scherba n and Nikitina died in November 1996 — a test it flunked. On December 17, 1996, SunTrust receiv ed a fax signed “N. Nikiti na” requesting that the bank transfer via wire $282,000 f rom Account 5216 to a Czech Re public bank account held by a corporation, Defendant Gwynfe Holding Limited. See SAC, ¶¶ 45- 46. Among other suspicious circumstances ( e.g. , Nikitina was deceased), the fax misspelled the name of the Cz ech bank and did not use SunTrust’s wire-tr ansfer form. Id., ¶¶ 52-53. YetSunTrust employees approved the transfer anyway. Id., ¶¶ 48-51, 55- 56. The family discovered in 2014 or 2015 that Gwynfe was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands until its dissolutio n sometime after 1999. Id., ¶¶ 57-58. (It has not yet been served in this suit.) The remainder of the account — which amounted to $771,129.03 as of June 1997 — was kept intact. Id., ¶¶ 62-65. That account was closed following inactivity on January 22, 2003, however, and SunTrust allegedly t hen held onto the extant sums. Id., ¶¶ 62-65, 97 (stating that SunTrust never transferred the m oney to State of Florida after five years, as required by statute). In other words, in one way or a nother, all of Account 5216’s fu nds are gone. Separately, within two days of the murders, Alexeenko and an as sociate of his opened a SunTrust checking account in the name of a company that they jo intly owned. Id., ¶¶ 70-71.6 Without the family’s authoriza tion, Alexeenko then transferred into that SunTrust account over two million dollars from one of Sch erban’s other corporate acco unts. Id., ¶¶ 72-73.
D. Later Discoveries While the Complaint now recounts these misdeeds, Plaintiffs wer e not aware of them for some time. After Scherban and Nikitina’s assassinations, the s ons feared that they would also be targeted — indeed, on one occasion, an assailant shot at Evgeny i as he was traveling in a car, resulting in another pa ssenger’s death. Id., ¶ 80. Scherban’s former associates a lso undermined the family. Alexe enko stole from Scherban’s businesses a nd, between 1996 and 1997, withheld from the sons letters sent by an American attorney. Id., ¶¶ 72-73, 81 . These missives would ha ve allowed two of them to seek refuge in the United States and i nvestigate their father’s fina ncial matters. Id., ¶ 81. Because they could not emigrate, Evgenyi a nd Ruslan lived an itinerant life for many years in other parts of Europe. Id., ¶¶ 39, 44, 81. Scherban’s estate was nevertheless still able to manage a few o f its affairs abroad. In 1999, for instance, it opened a probate matter in Florida to di spose of a family home located in Boca Raton. Id., ¶ 77. When the pr operty was eventually sold, the estate deposited the proceeds in a trust account at SunTru st, which was open from March 2001 to April 2003. Id. In May 2003, the sons were finally able to reconnect with Alexe enko. Id., ¶ 82. They arranged for a family acquainta nce to meet with him in Florida, where the erstwhile advisor turned over some financial docum ents and several expired, unuse d SunTrust debit cards under Nikitina’s and Ruslan’s names. Id., ¶¶ 81-83. Plaintiffs cont inue to be unaware of which bank accounts the cards belong t o. Id., ¶¶ 68, 82-83. In those mee tings, Alexeenko also executed a7 notarized affidavit where he for swore any stake in Scherban’s b usiness fortunes and affirmed that he was but a secretary who managed limited financial matte rs. Id., ¶ 82. Alexeenko glaringly omitted a few things. Not only did he not reveal that he had pocketed some two million dollars, but he and other assistants also withheld complete financial information from the sons. I d., ¶¶ 84-85. Ruslan, on this poi nt, suggests that Alexeenko or other assistants failed to forward ma il addressed to him from SunTrus t. Id., ¶ 42. Some of those SunTrust accounts had listed as the relevant address Scherban’s Boca Raton property, not a Ukrainian address. Id., ¶ 34. For instance, through affidavit s attached to their Opposition, Plaintiffs inform the Court that SunTrust sent statements for A ccount 5216 to the Boca Raton home. See June 1997 Statement. Alexeenko would have possessed (and thus should have disclosed) those statements, as he allegedly res ided at that ad dress. See Serdiouk Affidavit, ¶ 9. For the most part, Plaintiffs did not begin uncovering Alexeenk o’s and others’ various wrongdoings until 2014, during discovery in their related New Y ork action filed tha t August. Id., ¶¶ 37, 40, 45, 47, 117. In May 2016, they finally recovered Su nTrust’s June 1997 monthly statement for Account 5216, whic h indicated that a balance of $ 771,129.03 remained in that account after Gwynfe’s unaut horized transfer of $282,000. Id., ¶ 62.
E. The Present Action On November 6, 2015, the sons and Scherban’s and Nikitina’s est ates filed the present lawsuit against Defendants SunT rust, Alexeenko, Gwynfe, and Doe s 1 through 10 (ten unnamed individuals, including Gwynfe employees, who had facilitated th e aforementioned frauds). See ECF No. 1. Since then, this law suit has involved plenty of cle an-up work regarding which Plaintiffs or Defendants are proper.8 One month into the lawsuit, Plain tiffs apparently feared that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Alexeenko, and s o they stipulated to dismissi ng him without prejudice. See ECF No. 11 (Notice of Voluntary D ismissal). Then, following Su nTrust’s first motion to dismiss, the Court issued an Opi nion instructi ng Plaintiffs als o to remove the estates as parties, as estates cannot bring a dire ct suit, and to designate instead the proper personal representative. See Estate of Scherban v. SunTrust Bank, No. 15-1966, 2016 WL 7 77913, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2016). An Amended Complaint fared littl e better, as only the sons were named as Plaintiffs, and a personal representative for t he estates was again missing fro m the caption. See ECF No. 27. Following full briefing on anothe r motion to dismiss by SunTrus t, the sons informed the Court that both estates had finally obtai ned a representative, Deborah Trudel, through the Probate Division of the Superior Court. S ee ECF No. 34-6; see In re Ye vgenyi A. Scherban, No. 16- ADM-729 (D.C. Super. Ct. Prob. Div.); In re Nadejda Nikitina, N o. 16-ADM-736 (D.C. Super. Ct. Prob. Div.). In a brief Order, the Court accordingly denie d Defendant’s motion without prejudice and specifically direct ed that “Plaintiffs shall file a Second Amended Complaint naming as Plaintiffs only Trudel as personal representative and Ruslan Scherban in his own individual capacity,” as the latter was plausibly named as a jo int holder of Account 5216. See
ECF No. 41. The instant Second Amended Compl aint nonetheless names Trudel, Evgenyi, Ruslan, and Yevgen as Plaintiffs. In tow, the y bring twelve counts againstSunTrust, asserting that the bank assisted the unauthorized w ire transfer of $282,000 from Accoun t 5216, kept hold of the remaining $771,129.03 from that account , and later failed to di sclose key financial information.9 While all counts list SunTrust as Defendant, only some name Gwy nfe or Does 1 through 10. True to practice, SunTrust has on ce again moved to dismiss. Th at Motion is now ripe.
II. Legal Standard A party may invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon whi ch relief can be granted.” In evaluating that motion to dismiss, the Court “must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as tr ue and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts al leged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schu ler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation omitted); see Jerome Steve ns Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court need not accept as true , however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegati on” or an infer ence unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading standard is “not meant to impose a gre at burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (200 5), as a complaint should survive so long as there is a “‘reasonably founded hope that the [disco very] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support the claim.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 5 50 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. a t 347). Although “detailed fac tual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a dism issal motion, id. at 555, a compla int still “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief t hat is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. a t 570). That is, a plaintiff must put forth “factual content that a llows the court to draw the re asonable inference that the defendant is liable for the mi sconduct alleged.” Id. A compla int may survive even if “‘recovery10 is very remote and unlikely’” or the veracity of the claims are “doubtful in fact” if the factual matter alleged in the complaint is “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S . 232, 236 (1974)).
III. Analysis At the heart of Plaintiffs’ laws uit is a basic desire to reclai m assets once belonging to Scherban and Nikitina. Yet the Complaint presents a twelve-course tasting menu of counts; it is not quickly digestible. Briefly, the causes of action a gainst SunTrust are as follows: conversion or confiscation (Count I); breach of contract (C ount II); negligence (Count III ); breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV); fraud (Count V); unjust enri chment (Count VI); money had a nd received (Count VII); accounting (Count VIII); declaratory relief (Count IX); fraudul ent concealment (Count X); civil conspiracy (Count XI); and constr uctive trust (Count XII). Pla intiffs support these claims with factual allegations that SunTru st is responsible for approving the $282,000 unauthorized wire transfer, retaining $771,129.03 that belongs to the estates or Ruslan, and more recently failing to disclose financial information relevant to Scherban’s many acco unts. Defendant moves to have each count dismissed. Dismissal is easier said tha n done. To borrow from Tolstoy: Al l happy counts are alike; each unhappy count is unhappy in its own way. The Court addres ses in turn the following issues: (1) a preliminary question regar ding the proper Plaintiffs here , (2) another threshold issue concerning what law to apply, eit her the District of Columbia’s or Florida’s, ( 3) whether a number of the claims (Counts I-V II, XII) are timely under sever al applicable statutes of limitations and repose, (4) wheth er a private right of action e xists for certain federal statutes such11 that Plaintiffs could seek decl aratory relief (Count IX), and ( 5) the merits of the accounting, fraudulent-concealment, and civil-conspiracy claims (Counts VII I, X-XI). To presage the conclusion, the Court ultimately finds that: (1) only Trudel and Ruslan may bring suit, (2) Florida law applies, (3) Counts I through V II and XII are time barred, (4) declaratory relief is unavailabl e here, and (5) Plaintiffs have only properly pled their accounting and fraudulent-concealment counts.
A. Proper Plaintiffs The Court first addresses a poi nt now thrice litigated: who are the proper Plaintiffs here? In its last Order, following the filing of the Amended Complain t, the Court directed that “Plaintiffs shall file a Second Amended Complaint naming as Pla intiffs only Trudel as personal representative and Ruslan Scher ban in his own individual capaci ty.” ECF No. 41. Yet Evgenyi and Yevgen are still on the roste r. SunTrust thus justifiably maintains that the Complaint should be dismissed as to those two Plaintiffs. See Mot. at 9-10. Th e Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ only retort is that Evgenyi and Yevgen individuallyhold fraudulentconcealment claims (Count X), a cause of action that was not ad ded until the most recent Complaint. See Opp. at 4-8. Th at count, they believe, cannot be brought by Trudel because SunTrust’s particular fraudulent acts occurred only in 2015 or 2016, many years after Scherban and Nikitina passed away. If Trude l can represent the estates with respect to that count, however, Plaintiffs consent to the remova l of Evgenyi and Yevgen as part ies. See ECF No. 46-1 (Conditional Motion). The Court grants that request, a lthough it first notes that Pla intiffs’ reasoning is fundamentally flawed. Whether or not Trudel can bring such a c laim does not affect Evgenyi’s and Yevgen’s ability to do so. P laintiffs cannot point out how those two sons have ever12 interacted with or held interes ts in the accounts involved in t his action. In any event, Trudel is a proper Plaintiff here, as she ha s been empowered by the Probate Division of the Superior Court to pursue claims that Scherban or Nikitina would have possessed had they been alive. See Dennis v. Edwards, 831 A.2d 1006, 1008, 1013-15 (D.C. 2003) (al lowing, in case where defendants removed funds after decedent’s death, “personal repr esentative [to] sue[] in his representative capac ity, as a court appoint ed fiduciary, standi ng in the shoes of the decedent”) (citing D.C. Code § 20-701 et seq. ). Surely Scherban and Nikitina , if alive, could have asserted a claim that SunTrust fraudulently hid from them information abou t their accounts. The only Plaintiffs needed in this action are thus Trudel (as personal r epresentative to the estates) and Ruslan (who jointly held Account 5216); the other sons are dism issed.
B. Choice of Law Another speed bump obstructs the road here. Before the Court c an plow forward with the substance of Plaintiffs’ claims, it must determine what law app lies. Defendant briefs its Motion primarily under D.C. law, but Tr udel and Ruslan argue that Flor ida law applies, as the accounts were set up and managed from th e bank’s Boca Raton branch. See Opp. at 10-11. SunTrust, in its Reply, holds fast to its i nitial position, but concedes tha t the Court’s application of Florida law would not change the outcome of t he merits or timeliness issues . See Reply at 3-5. Even if this concession is not a f ull-throated waiver, there ap pears to be litt le reason why D.C. law would be relevant in analyzing Plaintiffs’ counts. Th is Court, sitting in diversity, follows the choice-of-law rule s of the forum jurisdiction — i.e. , the District of Columbia. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (194 1). In determining which law to apply, those rules re quire the Court to cons ider both the “gove rnmental interests” of the states at issue and which jurisdiction has the “most significant relation ship” to the dispute. Hercules &13 Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 40 (D.C. 1989). Th at analysis is not hard here. With all of the relevant even ts and interactions occurring out of a SunTrust branch in Florida, that state appears to be the jurisdiction both with the greates t interest in preventing local-bank misfeasance and with the most c ontacts to this dispute. See He rcules, 566 A.2d at 41-42 (examining which jurisdiction’s policies would be advanced and factors for weighing the relationship to the dispute); see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Truc k Ins. Exch., 960 A.2d 617, 620 (D.C. 2008) (similar). Given also D efendant’s suggestion that application of F lorida law would not prejudice it, the Court will a pply the law of the Sunshine State in the subsequent sections.
C. Timeliness (Counts I-VII, XII) With the preliminaries out of the way, the Court now moves on t o the Complaint’s actual counts. As expected with a cas e where a large chunk of the rel evant events took place over a decade before the action was co mmenced (in November 2015), Defe ndant contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are brought t oo late under Florida’s statute s of limitations and repose. As a preface, the Court notes tha t a few counts are certainly timely. Plaintiffs’ fraudulent-concealment and civil-conspiracy claims cite SunTrus t actions taking place in late 2015 or 2016. See SAC, ¶¶ 168, 178. The four-year limitations period for an action for accounting also does not begin until a plaintiff has actual kno wledge that his money has been taken, which Plaintiffs clai m occurred only in 2014. See Nayee v. Nayee, 705 So. 2d 961, 963- 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (permitting claims where defendan t “fails to conclusively demonstrate actual knowledge”). F or now, the Court sets aside those three counts, as well as the one for federal declaratory relief. This leaves a healthy bundle, c onsisting of: conv ersion or conf iscation, breach of contract, negligence, breach of f iduciary duty, fraud, unjust e nrichment, money had and received,14 and constructive trust — Counts I through VII and XII, respecti vely. These causes of action, moreover, do not cover only one incident. Each count, instead, addresses both events regarding the $282,000 wire transfer from Account 5216 and facts pertaini ng to the $771,129.03 remaining in the account after the tran sfer. See, e.g., SAC, ¶¶ 113, 117 -18, 125-26, 135, 141, 145-46, 150- 51, 183. In other words, each count in effect contains two the ories for how SunTrust breached various contractual or common-law duties. This distinction structures the following discussion. Because the legal analysis of claims based on the wire transfer runs somewhat differently from that of claims based on SunTrust’s possession of the account’s remai nder, the Court bifurcates its explanation for why Plaintiffs’ counts are tardy. Wire Transfer Given the current state of tec hnology, the idea that an individ ual would use a fax machine to initiate a large-scale bank transaction may now seem foreign . Yet that is how Gwynfe allegedly managed to pocket $282,000 of the Scherban family fortune — by someone’s sending a fax, signed in Nikitina’s name after the couple’s death, to aCzech bank. Although Plaintiffs treat these w ire-transfer claims as arising under Florida common law, that framing is not correct. Flo rida has adopted aspects of th e Uniform Commercial Code, and common-law claims remain availabl e “[u]nless displaced by the p articular provisions of th[at] code.” Fla. Stat. § 671.103. With regard to wire transfers be tween banks, Florida has codified Article 4A of the Code, which covers fund transfers. UCC claim s brought under Article 4A are thus “intended to be the exclusi ve means of determining the rig hts, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any situati on covered by particular provisi ons of the Article.” Id. § 670.102 cmt. Only if a situation is not specifically provided for in A rticle 4A may common-law claims15 remain viable. See Regions Bank v. Provident Bank, Inc., 345 F .3d 1267, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 119 F. Supp. 3d 13 28, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2015); see also Fla. Stat. § 670.102 cmt. (“Conse quently, resort to princi ples of law or equity outside of Article 4A is not appropriate to c reate rights, duties and liab ilities inconsistent with those stated in this Article.”). Why does this distinction between t he UCC and common law matter ? Florida’s statutes of limitations applying to the la tter are considerably more gen erous than the statute of repose for the former. Compare Fla. Stat. § 95.11, with id. § 670.505. T he Court thus first confirms whether the claims a re truly displaced by — i.e. , specifically provided for by — the UCC before examining the Code’s statute of repose.

a. UCC Displacement Determining whether the UCC cove rs a particular genus of claim is inherently a somewhat fact-intensive inqui ry. See, e.g., Corfan Banco Asunc ion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank, 715 So. 2d 967, 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding neglige nce claims in case displaced but declining to reach whether to adopt blanket rule displacing all negligence claims); In re Bancredit Cayman Ltd., 419 B .R. 898, 914-15 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2 009) (finding contract claims displaced where they regarded onl y the fund transfer). Some fu rther detail into the Complaint’s allegations are thus necessary. Trudel and Ruslan complain of the unauthorized wire transfer, b ut these objections take many forms. They assert that th e faxed request had various “re d flags”: the instruction misspelled the name of the Czec h bank; Gwynfe did not list a co rporate address; and the sender did not use SunTrust’s proper wire -transfer form. See SAC, ¶¶ 52-53, 56. In this situation, Plaintiffs contend that SunTrust employees should have attempte d to contact Nikitina or16 investigated the faxed instr uctions with the Czech bank, but th ey approved the fund transfer without a second thought. Id., ¶¶ 49-51, 53-55. Closer inspection of the UCC rev eals that Article 4A covers the se circumstances in full. With regard to the Czech-bank misspelling, Article 4A addresses the “rights and obligations” of SunTrust and Plaintiffs in cases where the sender of the wire-t ransfer instructions misidentifies the bank. See Fla. Stat. § 670.208(2)(b). As to the absence o f Gwynfe’s corporate address, other provisions then specify what in formation of the recipient of th e fund transfer must be listed. Id. § 670.207; see Corfan, 715 So. 2d at 969-71 (holding this provi sion to be exclusive). Finally, in relation to the proper wiring form and duties to c ontact Nikiti na or the Czech bank, the UCC again comprehensively regulates security procedures for “[d]ete cting error in the transmission or the content of the payment orde r or communication” and the cons equences of erroneous payments under those procedures. See Fla. Stat. § 670.201(2); see also id. §§ 670.202, 670.205. All told, the wire-transfer cl aims here fit comfortably within the scope of UCC Article 4A, leaving no room for common-law th eories to create additional ri ghts or remedies. See Corfan, 715 So. 2d at 971 n.5 (“The uniformity and certainty sought by the statute for these transactions could not possibly exist if parties could opt to sue by way of pre-Code remedies where the statute has specifically defined the dutie s, rights and l iabilities of the parties.”); see also Bancredit Cayman, 419 B.R. at 914 (finding displacement where “the loss s uffered by the Plaintiff occurred only when, and solely because of the Funds Transfer”). This means that the Complaintshould have instead brought UCC c hallenges to the Gwynfe bank transfer. Offering P laintiffs a liberal constructi on, however, the Court will treat their common-law claims regardi ng the transfer as if they were properly pled under Article 4A.17 b. Statute of Repose Because claims regarding the unaut horized wire transfer must be brought under the Code, Article 4A’s statute of repose applies. As a brief primer, whi le statutes of limitations prescribe the period in which to file a lawsuit after a cause of action h as accrued, statutes of repose “do so regardless of the time of the accrual of the cause of action.” Bauld v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978). A repose period instead commences from the date a specified act has occurred and places a stri ct “outer limit beyond which . . . suits may not be instituted.” Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 421 (Fla. 1992). The relevant act in this case, of course, was the wire transfer, and Article 4A provides one year for the customer to notify her bank after any unauthorized fund transfer from her account. See Fla. Stat. § 670.505; see also Lake Wales Publ’g Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335, 335-36 (Fl a. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“[T]he U.C.C. limitation period generall y prevails over that contained in a general statute of limitations.”). Almost twenty have passed here. Plaintiffs respond that this part icular statute of repose is no t as draconian as it first appears. See Opp. at 16-20. They are partially correct, as th e statute’s language indeed provides an out. The otherwise-short one-year period begins only once a nother condition is met — specifically, when “the customer received notific ation reasonab ly identifying the [payment] order.” Fla. Stat. § 670.505. As Plaintiffs argue, Scherban a nd Nikitina were dead, and Ruslan was in hiding, making such notif ication to the accountholders atricky proposition. That may be so, but the repose st atute does not require that th e customer have actual knowledge of the transfer. Arti cle 4A’s definitional section e laborates that a bank “gives” notice to another “by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other person in ordinary course, whether or not t he other person actually comes to know of it.” Id.,18 § 671.201(26); accord id., § 671.209(4). Hence, a person “‘rec eives’ a notice or notification when . . . [i]t is duly delivered in a form reasonable under th e circumstances . . . at [a] location held out by that person as the place for receipt of such commun ications.” Id., § 671.201(26)(b); accord id., § 671.209(5)(b). This standard thus focuses on whe ther the bank acted in accorda nce with the information it knew, not on whether the custo mer actually received account materials. See 3 James J. White, Robert S. Summers & Robert A. Hi llman, Uniform Commercial Code § 24:8 (6th ed. 2016) (“Note that the bank need not show actual knowledge; it is enou gh to show ‘notification.’”). Courts have thus found that the on e-year repose period can begi n if the bank and customer “agreed and intended for [another person] to receive their acco unt statements, statements containing the contested debits ,” and the bank delivered them. Anderson, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1351; see B.B.C.F.D., S.A. v. B ank Julius Baer & Co., 77 A.D.3d 463, 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (commenting, in analyzing UCC, tha t a plaintiff may not charge bank for losses arising “from misplaced confidence in [her] agent”). This is what happened here. In th e Complaint, Plaintiffs plead that the family designated Alexeenko to be a “facilitator” w ho received financial informat ion and managed the family’s American interests. See SAC , ¶¶ 35-37, 82-86; see also ECF No. 46-4 (Affidavit of Ruslan Scherban), ¶ 10 (“Alexeenko was authorized to receive correspon dence, open and fax relevant documentation that would have come to my name, because I was ph ysically not in the USA, and someone had to attend to the incom ing mails.”). SunTrust accou nt information addressed to Plaintiffs was sent not directl y to Ukraine, but instead to the family’s Boca Raton address, where Alexeenko allegedly resided. Id., ¶ 34; see June 1997 Statemen t; Serdiouk Affidavit, ¶ 9. Confirming this arrangement, R uslan alleges that he never antic ipated receiving direct mail from19 SunTrust regarding Account 5216, as he asked that mail sent to him be “routed to Ukraine” — presumably, via Alexeenko — instead. See SAC, ¶ 42; see also R uslan Affidavit, ¶ 10 (alleging Alexeenko was tasked with forwarding his mail). Indeed, the bu lk of the Complaint is premised on the idea that Alexeenko receiv ed Scherban-family financial i nformation but then acted as an unfaithful agent in conceali ng it. Id., ¶¶ 35-37, 82-86. As Plaintiffs have themselves explained to the Court, SunTrust thus did deliver account information to a “location held out by th[e] [customer] as the place for receipt of such communications.” Fla. Stat. § 671.201(26)(b). The fact that f amily members did not actually gain access to that information — because Scherban’s assistants did not route that mail to them in Ukraine — does not change the legal conclusion that SunTrust provided reasonable notice in compliance with the information it knew. Plaintiffs’ claims re garding the wire transfer are thus barred by the UCC’s one-year statute of repose.
Account Remainder While it may be too late for Plaintiffs to sue SunTrust over th e wire transfer, they also bring claims related to the leftover $771,129.03 in Account 521 6. Plaintiffs’ theory is this: SunTrust closed that account in January 2003, apparently follow ing years of inactivity. See SAC, ¶ 97. Instead of giving that unclaimed property to the St ate of Florida, where perhaps the sons could lawfully reclaim it, S unTrust then kept the money fo r itself. Id., ¶ 64. Plaintiffs thus apply their eight aforementioned common-law counts (Counts I-VI I, XII) to these acts: conversion or confiscation, breach of contract, negligence, bre ach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and constructive trust. The Court begins with the statute of limitations for those coun ts, moves next to the delayed-discovery doctrine, and ends with a dis cussion of tolli ng.20 a. Statute of Limitations Perhaps anticipating a situati on like this one where a plaintif f brings a smattering of claims, the Florida code assemble s many of its statutes of limi tations in the same place. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11. For Plaintiffs’ count s, the time bar for commen cing actions is largely uniform — four years, except that contrac t suits may be brought within fi ve years. See id. § 95.11(2)(a) (five years for contract), (3)(a ) (four years for negligence), (3)(h) (four years for conversion or confiscation — i.e. , “taking, detaining, or injuring pe rsonal property”), (3)(j) ( four years for fraud); Chau Kieu Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 709 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying § 95.11(3)(p)’s residu ary four-year period to money h ad and received, accounting, and constructive trust); Xavier v. L eviev Boymelgreen Marquis Devel opers, LLC, 117 So. 3d 773, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (applying § 95.11(3)(p)’s residu ary four-year period to unjust enrichment); Anthony v. Perez-Abre u & Martin-Lavielle, P.A., 51 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (applying § 95.11(3)(p)’s residuary four-year period to civil conspiracy); Berg v. Wagner, 935 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (applyin g § 95.11(3)(o)’s four-year period for intentional torts to breach of fiduciary duty). All of these periods arrest Pl aintiffs’ progress. The four- or five-year clock to file a lawsuit begins ticking when each cause of action accrues. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031. Except for the fraud count, accrual happens “when the last element constitutin g the cause of action occurs.” Id., § 95.031(1). Given that Plaintiffs ’ claims all concern SunTrus t’s unlawful seizure of their money in January 2003, over twelve years before the suit was filed, a ll of these limitations periods have long since expired. As to the accrual exception for f raud claims, the Court discuss es it in next addressing more broadly the delayed- discovery doctrine.21 b. Delayed Discovery Although most limitations periods may have passed, Plaintiffs c ontend that they did not discover the specific facts surrounding Account 5216 until 2014 or later. This, they believe, should stop the running of the clock for each of their counts. Before moving to the other counts, the Court begins with fraud, as the rules of the game for this count are s lightly different and allow for such a disc overy exception. Florida’s legislature, in fact, has explic itly provided for a delayed-dis covery rule for fraud. The limitations period to file a fraud action runs “from the time the facts giv ing rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been disc overed with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a). Even with this momentary advantag e, the fraud count suffers fro m a fatal flaw. The discovery exception in such a case is limited by another statut e of repose. “[A]n action for fraud . . . must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commi ssion of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the f raud was or should have been discov ered.” Id. (emphasis added). Trudel and Ruslan allege that S unTrust closed the account in Ja nuary 2003, yet the sons did not initiate this lawsuit until November 2015, ten months past the twelve-year repose period. See SAC, ¶ 97; ECF No. 1. Given that so much time has passed, the delayed-discovery doctrine is of no help. Next, Plaintiffs also wish to ha ve this statutory delayed-disco very doctrine extend to their other claims regarding Account 5216. On this point, Florida la w is not so liberal. That legislature has provi ded statutory delayed- discovery rules only for claims of fraud, products liability, professional malprac tice, medical malpractice, and i ntentional torts based on abuse. See Fla. Stat. §§ 95.031(2), 95.11(4)(a ), (4)(b), (7). The state h as no catch-all discovery statute.22 Nor is this Court empowered to cr eate an extra-statutory extens ion to the doctrine here. In two recent cases, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whethe r such a general exception existed as a matter of judicial , as opposed to statutory, const ruction. First, in Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000), it considered the viability of crafting one for a tort based on childhood sexual abuse when the abuse-based statutory except ion had only been passed after the plaintiff filed her lawsu it. Hearndon did allow for a judg e-made discovery rule in that case, reasoning that such a carve-out w as consistent with the later-p assed statute, the child-sexualabuse exception was now widely ac cepted in American jurispruden ce, and the law should acknowledge the uniquely pernicio us effects of childhood molest ation on victims’ memory. Id.
at 1185-86. In the wake of Hearndon, Florida D istrict Courts of Appeal divi ded on the reach of the delayed-discovery rule. The stat e’s Supreme Court, in Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2002), resolved that split. That case concerned an elderly dem entia patient’s suit against family members who had misappropriated her assets without her knowledg e. Id. at 708-09 (involving counts of, inter alia , breach of fiduciary duty, civ il conspiracy, conversion, and u njust enrichment). As Davis describe d the split, where one district had “call[ed] the delayed discovery doctrine a common law remedy” a pplicable generally, another dis trict had “found that it was clear the Legislature did not i ntend for the doctrine to apply to all causes of action.” Id. at 710- 11. Davis came out in favor of the latter approach and conclud ed, in no uncertain terms, that acknowledging a general common-law delayed-discovery doctrine “ would result in this Court rewriting the statute, and, in f act, obliterating t he statute.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added). To the extent that a judicial ex ception exists under Florida law, it must then be exceedingly narrow. Although it may effectively be an exceptio n of one ( i.e. , only Hearndon),23 Davis suggested bare minima a case would need to meet if a court were to extend the doctrine: a “statutory endorsement” of a particular cause of action, a “mod ern trend” among other courts, and a situation where the lack of discovery was “caused” by the defendant’s actions. Id. at 712. Perhaps realizing that Davis ’s holding practically sounded the death knell for extra-statutory carve-outs, courts have consisten tly interpreted the case to “l imit[] Hearndon so it applies only to cases of childhood sexual abuse” an d uniformly declined to exte nd the doctrine. Raie v. Cheminova, Inc., 336 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003) (wrongful death); see, e.g., Wachovia Bank N.A. v. Tien, No. 15-11158, 2016 WL 4010165, at *3 (11th C ir. July 27, 2016) (conversion); W.D. v. Archdi ocese of Miami, Inc., 197 So. 3d 58 4, 587-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (respondeat superior); Acc ess Ins. Planners, Inc. v. Gee, 175 So. 3d 921, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (contract); Cisko v. Diocese of Steubenville, 12 3 So. 3d 83, 84-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (negligence); Brooks T ropicals, Inc. v. Acosta, 959 So. 2d 288, 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (fiduciary duty and contr act); Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (fiduciary du ty); Med. Jet, S.A. v. Signature Flight Support-Palm Beach, Inc., 941 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (contract) ; Young v. Ball, 835 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ( civil conspiracy). This case presents no special rea son to stray from the pack. I ndeed, Davis addressed an even starker case where family m embers (not simply close associ ates) took adva ntage of the plaintiff’s dementia, a mental condition (beyond simple lack of knowledge). And, unlike the situation in Hearndon, no Florida s tatute specifically suggests that Plaintiffs’ other common-law claims are legislative prioriti es and should receive favored tr eatment. Quite the opposite could be argued. The fact that a statut ory rule for fraud was already available in this case (had Plaintiffs been more punctual) s uggests even less of a need for judicial freelancing as to other24 counts. See Brooks Tropicals , 959 So. 2d at 296 (noting it was “especially true” that fraud exception did not extend beyond fraud and fraud-in-the-induceme nt claims to reach fiduciaryduty claim). As to the direct “cause” of the delay, although Plaintiffs may have lacked knowledge of their specific claims prior t o filing the suit in November 2015 , they acknowledge that this ignorance was principally attribut able to the malfeasance of Sc herban’s associates (including Alexeenko) and not because SunTrust affirmatively hid informati on from the family in the entire period between 1996 and 2015. See SA C, ¶¶ 81-90 (alleging, how ever, that “SunTrust was obligated to undertake the necessary diligence” in dealing with the family). The Court can thus find no basis in Florida law to pull the delayed-discovery swor d out of its stone to save Plaintiffs’ tardy claims.

c. Tolling Plaintiffs take one last stab at the timeliness issue. They co ntend that equitable tolling can drag the limitations period out farther. While the delayed -discovery doctrine postpones the accrual of claims and thus “pertains to the existence of a caus e of action which then triggers the running of a statute of limitati ons, tolling focuses directly o n limitation periods and interrupting the running thereof.” Hearndon, 767 So. 2d at 1185 (emphasis a dded). The Court thus focuses on whether events after the claims accrued (January 2003) shoul d suspend the limitations period. Plaintiffs’ only tolling argumen t is an equitable one, as none of the statutory bases for tolling are asserted here. S ee Fla. Stat. § 95.051. “The doctrine of equitable tolling was developed to permit under certain circumstances the filing of a lawsuit that otherwise would be barred by a limitations period.” Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 1988). The doctrine does not req uire “misconduct on the part o f the defendant” but rather25 focuses “on the plaintiff’s bl ameless ignorance and the lack of prejudice to the defendant.” Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 n.11 (F la. 2001); see Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987). “Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inact ion, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting hi s rights, or has timely asserte d his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1134. There is no such “extraordinary circumstance” here. Williams v . Albertson’s Inc., 879 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). As a preliminary m atter, the Court notes that tolling would not apply to the fraud count, which is the nearest miss o f Plaintiffs’ claims. See Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 696 (Fla. 2015) (“Ther e is no tolling provision for the fraud statute of repose.”); see also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 1 34 S. Ct. 2175, 2187-88 (2014) (discussing general understanding that tolling is not available for statutes of repose). As for the other common-law claims, counting four or five years from SunTr ust’s wrongful keeping of the account’s money in January 2003, the time to file suit would ha ve ended in January 2007 or 2008. In other words, Plaintiffs believe that special circumst ances after the cause of action accrued should allow the Court to stop the running of the limit ations clock for almost eight years until November 2015, when the action commenced. Whatever deceit Alexeenko and other Scherban associates engaged in here does not justify a nearly eight-year delay. The sons were able to reach Alexeenko by May 2003. See SAC, ¶ 82. When he met the sons’ family friend, he turned over financial documents and a few SunTrust debit cards with Nikitin a’s and Ruslan’s names on them . Id., ¶¶ 81-83. At that point, the sons knew that SunTrust had or continued to have the family ’s funds. Even so, Plaintiffs recount no effort by Ruslan or the estates to inquire with SunT rust for over a decade following26 that encounter. The Court thus assumes Alexeenko’s concealment can at most justify a few months’ worth of equitable tolling — from January 2003 (when th e causes of action accrued) to May 2003 (when he handed over information regarding SunTrust) — in which case May 2007 or 2008 would have been the proper filing deadline. That still leaves Plaintiffs with a sizeable request: another s even-and-a-half years of tolling. Even more assumptions are necessary here if Plaintiff s are to have a glimmer of hope. Hypothetically, it might have taken some time for Plaintiffs to get their bearings after the May 2003 meeting. This, however, could not have taken long. The e states had ably i nitiated another Florida probate action for the Boca Raton house in 1999 (a mere three years after the deaths) and opened a local SunTrust account f or those real-estate proceeds in 2001. Id., ¶ 77. In apparent pleadings discord, the Court notes some tension between Plainti ffs’ assertions that the estates were able to open a Florida SunTrust account in 2001 (and close it in 2003) but t hat they were not able to seek information on othe r SunTrust accounts in the years following 2003. In any event, the lone assumption that the estates needed a bit of time to process Alexeenko’s disclosures cannot br idge this temporal gulf. The Court could not reasonably conclude that, after May 2003, it took the estates (or Ruslan) another seven-plus years to organize their affairs and reac h out to SunTrust. Plaintiffs’ only explanation for why such estate consolidation was difficult come s in a repeated refrain that, u ntil December 2015, Ruslan “had no opportunity to come to the U.S., approach [ sic ] in person any managers at SunTrust.” Id., ¶ 44. Fatally, they never explain why a face-to-face meeting w as required. Nor do they assert that they attempted to contact S unTrust by phone or mail or tha t they asked any other individuals or attorneys to visit or cont act a bank branch. Considering th at the size of Scherban’s fortune27 apparently exceeded $100 million, this protracted delay after M ay 2003 in seeking account information from SunTrust will not do. Plaintiffs’ period of i naction is simply too long. The prejudice to Defendant of t olling would also be great. Acc ount 5216 has long been closed, and Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that SunTrust’ s bank records were subject to a seven-year retention policy, meani ng that all of the relevant d ocuments could well have been discarded in 2010. Id., ¶ 97. Applying equitable tolling woul d thus contravene the fundamental purpose of statutes of limitati ons, which is “to relieve defend ants and the courts from litigation of stale claims because evidence may have been lost or witnesses’ memories faded.” Mosher v. Anderson, 817 So. 2d 812, 818 (Fla. 2002) (quoting In re Estate of Musgrove, 696 P.2d 720, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)). Under thes e circumstances, the Court c annot provide th e tolling that Plaintiffs seek.
* * * In sum, Counts I through VII and XII — conversion or confiscati on, breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciar y duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and constructive trust — have bee n brought too late. The unauthori zed-wire-transfer UCC claims are barred by a one-year repose peri od, and the other common-law cl aims are barred by various statutes of limitations or, i n the case of the fraud count, by a statute of repose. As a final adjudicatory note, even if part s of the UCC claims arise under Florida common law instead, the remaining-funds limitations ana lysis would also apply to bar th em. The Court now moves on to address the four remaining counts, proceeding somewhat out of numerical order.
D. Private Right of Action (Count IX) The Court begins with Plaintiffs’ declaratory-relief claim that SunTrust violated the Banking Secrecy Act and anti-m oney-laundering provisions of the Patriot Act. In general, “the28 operation of the Declaratory Judgm ent Act is procedural only,” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), and enl arges the range of re medies but not federal courts’ jurisdiction. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). The availability of a declaration a s relief “presupposes the existe nce of a judicially remediable right” that falls within federal juris diction. Schilling v. Rogers, 3 63 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). The problem here is that Plain tiffs point to no such private ri ght of action available to them under either Act. In fact, as other courts have found, th ere is none. See Spitzer Mgmt., Inc. v. Interactive Brokers, LLC, No. 13-2184, 2013 WL 6827945, at * 2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2013) (“The Patriot Act and the Banking Secrecy Act obligate financia l institutions to monitor their accounts for suspicious activity i ndicative of money laundering and other criminal or terrorist activities. . . . Neither of these statutes creates a private cause of action . . . .”); see also AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (similar for Banking Secrecy Act); Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (M.D . Fla. 2015) (“To the extent federal banking statutes such a s the Bank Secrecy Act impose du ties on banks, those duties extend to the United States, not a bank’s customers.”). Seeing as Plaintiffs have not shown that these statutes are privately e nforceable — indeed, they have po inted to no specific sections at all they would seek to enforce — their declaratory-relief count mus t be dismissed.
E. Merits (Counts VIII, X-XI) Much like a typica l season finale of Survivor , only three remain. Those counts are: accounting (Count VIII), fraudulent concealment (Count X), and civil conspiracy (Count XI). These causes of action differ some what from their counterparts. They focus not on lost funds, but are properly thought of as ac tions against SunTrust for inf ormation that the bank has failed to29 disclose. Defendant responds, oftenin cursory fashion, that t he Complaint has not plausibly stated any of these theories. The Court now looks at each. Accounting In an action for an accounting, a plaintiff broadly seeks from another “a general investigation of all of the trans actions between the parties.” 1 Florida Jurisprudence 2d: Accounts & Accounting § 32 (2016). “Under Florida law, a party that seeks an equitable accounting must show that: 1) the p arties share a fiduciary rel ationship or that the questioned transactions are complex, and 2) aremedy at law is inadequate. ” Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1071 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs her e essentially contend that Scherban opened numerous bank accounts at SunTrust (some unknown and wit h unknown sums) and ask, as relief, that the bank reveal w hat (if anything) is left of t hose accounts and who has drawn money from them. See SAC, ¶¶ 154-58; see also id. at 38 (reque sting the Court “[t]o order SunTrust to release to Plaintiffs herein all documentation asso ciated with the above identified accounts, as well as any other accounts or assets held for the deceased or Plaintiffs in their own names or for their benefit, without limitation”). SunTrust gives little reason to doubt the viability of this count. In its Motion, Defendant raises only one merits argument: “The relief requested (essenti ally a discovery request) is not cognizable as a cause of action under the law.” Mot. at 28. T his is legally mistaken, however, as Florida law recognizes a separate cause of action for an accoun ting. See Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp., 128 So. 3d 976, 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 201 4) (“[A]n action for an accounting is a separate and distinct cause of action that may be available where a fiduciary duty exists.”).30 SunTrust waits until its Repl y to put forth a second defense, a lbeit halfheartedly. That brief lists the elements of a n accounting action, then states s nappily: “Therefore, Count VIII should be dismissed with prejudice. ” Reply at 22. As a prelim inary matter, the Court does not consider whether there is anot her legal remedy that would entit le Plaintiffs to their bank records, as Defendant fails to point out w hat other claim would subsume the accounting count. Compare Chen v. Cayman Arts, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301-02 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (permitting claim where, “though [the plaintiff] ha s alleged breach of contract, he may be unable to ascertain the amount of any potential damages without an accounting”), with K ee v. Nat’l Reserve Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (“When a judgment for breach of contract is obtainable, the remedy at law is considered adequate, precludin g the need for the imposition of an equitable remedy.”). The Court can only divine from Su nTrust’s single explanatory parenthetical an argument that Plaintiffs have not pled the “existence of a fiduciary rel ationship or complex transaction.” Reply at 22. This is not so. Tr udel and Ruslan did allege tha t SunTrust owed fiduciary duties from Plaintiffs’ various dealings with the bank, including thro ugh dealings related to the family’s probate proceedings. See SAC, ¶¶ 77-79, 133-37. In Florida, abank may, moreover, owe a fiduciary duty to its customers under the right set of facts. See Bldg. Educ. Corp. v. Ocean Bank, 982 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Capital Bank v. M VB, Inc., 644 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). It may, of course, turn out to be the case that SunTrust owes n o duty, another legal remedy is adequate, or fulfilli ng the accounting obligation for the Scherban family’s bank balances is quite easy. For now, SunTrust’s minimalist briefin g offers no specific ground to dismiss the accounting claim, a nd the Court declines to pull De fendant’s sled for it.31 Fraudulent Concealment Beyond suing to force SunTrust to reveal details about the Sche rban family accounts, Plaintiffs claim that that the bank has already improperly conc ealed certain information. A bit more background may be helpful here. According to the Complaint, in November 2015, Plaintiffs sought information about the various Scherban holdings from SunTrust. See SAC, ¶ 91. Time and again, SunTrust responded that it had “reviewed the records at SunTrust Bank to determine if there were any accounts” and concluded that “SunTrust Bank no longer has any records in its system.” ECF No. 38-1 (Affidavit of John A. Barry), ¶¶ 3, 8 (emphases added); see SAC , ¶¶ 92-93 (quoting Barry Affidavit). Apparently, these representations omitted the cruc ial fact that SunTrust never held on to information for closed account s in the first place. Id., ¶ 94. Old account information would thus not be “at” the bank or in “its system.” SunTrust instead outsourced its archiving services first to Iron Mountain Information Management LLC and, beginnin g in February 2002, to Viewpointe Archives Services LLC . Id., ¶¶ 95-96. Plaintiffs a llege that SunTrust continually neglected to mention that it could not possibly have the docume nts and that they should instead contact Iron Mountain or Viewpointe to search for their account information. Id., ¶¶ 97-99. This omission hence crippled Plaintiff s’ protracted search for their assets. Id., ¶¶ 166-74. As an initial matter, it is unclear whether SunTrust meant the words “at” the bank and in “its system” literally or whether it implied, more broadly, tha t it had searched all locations that it controlled, including its contra ctors’ files. Further, if (as Plaintiffs allege) SunTrust only needed to keep documents for seven year s in the first place, id., ¶ 97 , it is uncertain whether SunTrust’s representations would constitute meaningful misstatements. Set ting aside these factual uncertainties, the Court infers from the Complaint an allegatio n that SunTrust or its contractors32 could retain account informati on beyond seven years and only se arched the bank’s databases and not its vendors’ systems. SunTrust contends that Plaintif fs have nevertheless not success fully pled the elements of a fraudulent-concealment claim . In Florida, a plaintiff must a llege that the defendant concealed or failed to disclose a materi al fact, it knew or should have k nown that fact should have been disclosed, it knew that its concealment or nondisclosure would induce the plaintiff to act, it had a duty to disclose the fact, and the plaintiff detrimentally reli ed on the misinformation. See Hess, 175 So. 3d at 691 (quoting Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess, 95 So. 3d 254, 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So. 3d 106 0, 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Defendant specifically argues that Trudel and Ruslan ha ve failed to allege “affirmative acts by SunTrust intended to conc eal information” or that they “made any request for records and w[ere] subsequently denied the request by SunTrust.” Mot. at 3 0. In its Reply, SunTrust adds that Rule 9’s pleading standar d for fraud applies and again sta tes cursorily: “None of the elements constituting fraudulent concealment are sufficiently p led in the Second Amended Complaint.” Reply at 23. None of these contentions holds w ater. The Court tackles SunT rust’s more general observations first. Rule 9(b) req uires that a plaintiff “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fra ud.” This standard demands that she must describe the time, place, content, and originator of the mi srepresentations, what fact wa s misrepresented, and the consequences of the fraud. U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Bak er Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Trudel and Ruslan have met this high pl eading hurdle. They specify that SunTrust misrepresented on six o ccasions relating to these court proceedings since 2015 — including one specifi c instance on August 4, 2016 — that it had reviewed its system’s records at33 the bank and found no information when in fact the bank never w ould have had any records. Plaintiffs thus allege that SunTrust omitted the material fact that it used Iron Mountain’s and Viewpointe’s archiving services . Although Plaintiffs are sligh tly vaguer as to the injury, they allege that they have been on a years-long quest to untangle th e estates’ affairs and that SunTrust has, in effect, impeded that effort. See SAC, ¶¶ 80-99, 171, 1 73. It may be the case that these undisclosed facts about outside vendors are not ultimately mate rial or harmful (especially given that those companies may have discarded the relevant files), bu t Plaintiffs have at least made enough headway in their pleadings to pass the motion-to-dismiss stage. As to SunTrust’s more specific objections that Plaintiffs have not pled affirmative acts or ever requested information, neither is persuasive. As to the l atter, Plaintiffs allege that they “propos[ed] . . . [that SunTrust] di sclose to Plaintiffs the re cords.” Id., ¶ 167. Florida law, moreover, does not require any affirmative misrepresentations; it is enough that a plaintiff alleges the nondisclosure of material facts. See M/I Schottenstein Hom es, Inc. v. Azam, 813 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 2002) (noting Florida has extended case law around “ affirmative misrepresentations to the arena of nondisclosure of ma terial facts”). The fraudulent -concealment claim, too, may thus march forward until further dis covery demonstrates otherwise. Civil Conspiracy And then there was one. In their final, civil-conspiracy claimagainst all Defendants, Plaintiffs contend that SunTrust, Alexeenko, Gwynfe, and Does 1 through 10 (unnamed persons, including owners of Gwynfe) participated in a scheme to steal S cherban’s assets and hide those facts from the sons and estates. See SAC, ¶¶ 175-81. SunTrustretorts that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the bank formed an agreement with those other individuals. Plaintiffs’34 Complaint does not end on a high no te here, as the Court sides with Defendant in finding that it cannot reasonably infer such agreement. At minimum, a civil-conspiracy c laim requires an agreement betw een two or more parties to carry out some unlawful act. Anthony, 51 So. 3d at 526 n.1. In alleging such an agreement, Rule 12(b)(6)’s threshold gene rally would not be satisfied by amere contention that Alexeenko, Gwynfe, or the others simply used S unTrust as an instrumentalit y of their plot. See Freyre v. Hillsborough Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 13-2873, 2014 WL 211204 3, at *7 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2014) (“A decision reached by [an individual] based on the info rmation presented to her by other individuals does not plausibly c onstitute a conspiracy.”). “Wi thout more, parallel conduct [also] does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agr eement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.” Twombly, 5 50 U.S. at 556-57 (in context of Sherman Act); accord Alhassid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (for Florida civil-conspiracy c laim). Instead, “[a] cause of a ction for civil conspiracy should allege the scope of the conspir acy, its participants, and when the agreement was entered into.” In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. A lien Tort Statute & Shareholder Derivative Litig., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Plaintiffs nowhere even allege that SunTrust reached some agree ment with the other parties. See Alhassid, 60 F. S upp. 3d at 1319 (“Because [plain tiff] never alleged that there was an agreement, it has failed to allege sufficient facts with res pect to the conspiracy count.”) (quoting Russo v. Fink, 87 So. 3d 815, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)). Trudel and Ruslan recount that Alexeenko concealed a ccount information from them and then SunTrust separately hid information, but Plaintiffs s tate no facts as to how those events were coordi nated or why they would be related. See SAC, ¶¶ 176, 178-79. And although Gwynf e and Alexeenko may have35 used SunTrust’s services as a means to pocket Scherban’s assets , Plaintiffs do not suggest that the bank was in on the scheme. Id., ¶ 177; see Serdiouk Affida vit, ¶ 11 (alleging that Alexeenko asked another associate to confir m a wire transfer with SunTrus t telephonically). The closest Trudel and Ruslan ge t to alleging conspiracy is tha t SunTrust “failed to cooperate in arrangements for a deposition of Alexeenko, as tho ugh such evidence would be undesirable for SunTrust.” SAC, ¶ 179. Yet a simple litigatio n position that benefits another does not a conspiracy make. See Regions Bank v. KEL Title Ins. Grp., Inc., No. 12-118, 2012 WL 5381510, at *2, 4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2012) (finding provisio n of legal services would not create plausible inference of c onspiracy). Nor do Plaintiffs s uggest why SunTrust’s cooperation would be necessary to subpoena Alexeenko for a deposition or th at the bank somehow directed him not to appear at any scheduled deposition. As Plaintiffs have not raised a reasonable inference that SunTr ust entered into any agreement with the other purporte d conspirators, the Court will dismiss SunTrust from this

count. * * * All told, after the edges of t he Complaint are smoothed out, Pl aintiffs have plausibly supported legal theories for accounting (Count VIII) and fraudu lent concealment (Count X). These counts essentially raise t he issue that SunTrust has not yet revealed the full extent of relevant account information (or that a factual question exists as to whether the bank has done so), an issue that is wholly a nd uniquely within the bank’s pow er to head off. As to all other counts, the Court will dismiss SunTrust as a Defendant.36 IV. Conclusion For these reasons, the Court wi ll grant in part and deny in par t Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge Date: December 12, 2016