First Division June 4, 2007 No. 1-06-0098 SANTO S ALVARE Z and MA RIE PER EZ ALVARE Z; PH ILLIP DO UGLA S; AND RE W D RAT T an d S OP HIE DRATT; F AYE H. NA

ZON; POL

ISH WO MEN’S ALLIANCE OF AMERI CA; EVANSTON PLAZA L.L .C.; and DAVID L

AWLESS, Individually

and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff s-Appell ants,

v. MARIA PAPPAS, Treasurer and ex-officio Collector of Cook County

, Illi nois, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal f

rom the Circu it Court of Cook Cou

nty

05 CH 2822

Honorable Julia M. Nowicki, Judge Presiding PRESID ING

JUSTICE

McBRI DE delive

red the o pinion of t

he court : Plaintiff s appeal from an order of

the circ uit court o f Cook Coun

ty d ismissing their first amended complain t pursuan t to section 2-619(a

)(5) of the Code o f Civil Proc edure ( 735 I LCS 5/2-619( a)(5) (

West 2004) ). The c ircuit co urt held that plainti ffs’ cla ims for a r

eturn of duplicat e real estate tax pay

ments were barred by

the five-ye ar statute of limitations in section 20-175 of the Prope rty Tax Code (t

he Code)(35 ILCS 200

/20-175 ( West 2004) ). Plaintif

fs appea l, contending that section 20-175 does not apply to their claims and that the circuit court therefore erred i n dismissing

their co mplaint. F or the re asons tha t follow, w e affir

m. Prior to setting forth the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, we find it helpful to review the following background information regarding real estate tax billing procedure s in Cook County. Defenda

nt, the Cook County treasurer, is veste d with the duty to bill, collect and disburse to the appropriate

tax distric ts the ge

neral r eal esta te taxes le vied upon real es tate in1-06-0098

2

Cook County. 35 I

LCS 200/20-85 (West 2004). By January 31 of eac

h year, e stimated tax bills setting out the first installment of property taxes for the pr eceding y ear, pay able in that yea

r, are prepared and mailed to the taxpay er by def endant. See 35 IL CS 200/21-30 (West 2004). The first insta llment of t

axes on the

estimate d tax bills is c omputed a t 50% of th e total of

each ta x bill for the preceding y

ear. 35 ILCS 200/21-30 (West 2004). By June 30 of each y ear, actual tax bills are prepared and mailed. These bills set out the total taxes due and the amount of estimated taxes billed in the first installment, and state the balance of taxes due for that y ear as computed by s ubtract ing the a mount of th e first in stallment from the t

otal taxes d

ue that y ear. 35 I LCS 200/21-30 (West 2004). On September 13, 2005, plaintiffs filed a six-count amended complaint against defe ndant alleging that they

had made duplicate real estate tax installment pay ments and seeking a return of those payments. The a

mended complaint sought relief under the following the ories: (1) conversion; (2) a violation of plaintiffs’ equal protection and due proc ess guarantees; (3) unlawful taking without just compensation; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) the I llinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Ac t (the Unclaimed Property Act) (765 IL CS 1025/0.05 et seq . (West 200 4)); and

(6) the I llinois Stat

e Employ ees Pensi on Sy stem. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs alleg ed that defendant was the only treasurer in the State who refused to refund a duplicate rea l estate tax payment when the r efund was requested more than five years after the duplicate pay ment was made. Plaintiffs asserted that defendant had no author ity t o collec t, deposit , or disburse to tax dist ricts any duplicat e pay ments of r

eal esta te taxes, and that, for in excess of the past 15 ye ars, defendant has engag ed in policies and practices1-06-0098

3

concerning those duplicate pay ments that were unauthorized by statute. Specifically, plaintiffs complained that defendant accepted and disburse d duplicate payme nts with knowledge that the relevant tax bill had already been satisfied, posted the duplicate pay ment on the official Collector’s Warrant Books as an additional pay ment and failed to credit duplicate pay ments of first insta llment bills

to the sec ond instal lment bill f or that y ear’s ta xes, refu nded dupl icate payments only

when an application was submitted within five y ears of the date on which the duplicate payme

nt was made, failed to give the recipient of a refunded duplicate pay

ment any of the ear nings ma de on such funds wh

ile in def endant’ s possessi on, faile d to provid e adequate notice to taxpayers of their r ight to obtain a refund of duplicate pay ments, and failed to turn over any unclaimed duplica

te payments to the State Tre asurer. Plaintiffs also alleged that, as of August 1 , 2005, de fendant began to mail to ta

xpay ers writ

ten notic e of the e

xistence o f duplica

te payments on their re al estate tax bills and the manner in which such pay ments could be refunded. As set out in the amended complaint, plaintiffs Santos Alvarez and Maria Perez Alvarez were billed for the first installment of their 1989 real estate taxes. The Alvar ezes held a tax

escrow accoun t with Citiba

nk, which disburse d funds fr

om that ac count to pa

y th e first installme nt on February

10, 1990. T

he Alvar ezes also issued a c

heck to de fendant

for the f irst installment on March 4, 1990. In July , 1990, defendant issued the second installment on the Alvarezes’ 1989 real estate taxes. The Alvarezes paid this bill on August 6, 1990, and Citibank paid that same bill on August 11, 1990. Plaintiff Phillip Douglas was a McDonald’s franchisee who wa s required to maintain a real estate tax escrow account with McDonald’s Corpora tion for payment of r

eal estate taxes.1-06-0098

4

Douglas paid the second installment of his 1998 real estate taxes on October 22, 1999, a nd McDonald’s Corporation also issued a check to defenda nt for the second installment on November 1, 1999. Plaintiff s Andrew and Sophie

Dratt he ld a mortg age on their co ndominium w

ith Homeside Lending, whic h required the Dratts to maintain an escrow acc ount held by Homeside for payme

nt of real estate taxes. The Dratts received the se cond installment of their 1998 real
estate ta xes in Septe

mber 1999 . On Nove

mber 1, 19 99, Homes ide tende red pay ment to defendant for that bill, and on November 4, 1999, the Dratts also issued a c heck to defendant for the second installment. Plaintiff Faye

Nazon failed to pay the 1994 r eal estate taxes on property that she owned, and those taxes were sold to a buyer in April 1996. Defendant issued the second installment on Nazon’s 1995 real estate taxes in August 1996, and Nazon paid that installment on October 9, 1996. On October 18, 1996, the buy er of Nazon’s 1994 real estate taxes also paid the second installme nt on Nazon ’s 1994 re al estate taxes. When

Nazon subs equently

redeemed her pr

operty from the 1994 tax sale on August 13, 1998, she was required to pay all of the real estate taxes levied upon her property

that were paid by

the tax buyer. This redemption included the buy er’s pay ment of the

second in stallment

of Nazon’ s 1995 rea

l estate t axes, res ulting in a duplica te pay ment of tha

t installme

nt. Count I of the am ended c omplaint a lleged that the d uplicate pay ments wer

e plaintif fs’ private property , that defendant permanently converted that property

for her own benefit five years a fter the date the duplicate pay ments were made, and that such conversion damag ed1-06-0098

5

plaintiff s in the amo

unt of ea ch duplic ate pay

ment. Count II a

lleged that defendant’s retention of the duplica te payments constituted a taking of plaintiffs’ private property without just compensation and a violation of plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process rights. Count III similarly allege d that defendant’s retention of plaintiffs’ private property constituted a taking without just compensation and a violation section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000). Count IV alleged that de fendant was unjustly enr iched by per

manently retaining plaintiffs’ duplicate pay

ments five yea

rs after they

were made. Count V alleged that the duplicate payme

nts were abandoned property under the Unclaimed Property Act. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant, as a gover nment entity, was require d under the Unclaimed Property Act to turn ove

r that pro perty to the State

Treasur er for th e benef it of plain tiffs and state pe nsioners

. Count VI alleged that plaintiff D avid Lawless was entitled to pension benef its from the Illinois State Employe es Pension System, and that the pension sy stem was funded, in part, by income the Illinois State Treasurer e arned on money turned over to her as custodian of unclaimed property. Plaintiffs claimed tha t “the infusion of unclaimed duplicate pay ments now in the custody or under the

control of the defendant” would improve the financial stability of Lawless’s state pension fund, and that defendant’s failure to turn over those funds to the State Treasurer deprived Lawless of the f inancial security

to which he is entitled. The comp laint req

uested th e followi

ng reli ef: (1) c ertific ation of the matter as a cla ss action; (2) a declaration that the duplicate pay ments were plaintiffs’ private property , and that defenda nt’s rete ntion of th at prope

rty constitute d an unconstitutiona l taking without jus t1-06-0098

6

compensation and a violation of plaintiffs’ due process and equal pr otection rights; (3) entry

of a temporary, pr

eliminary or per

manent injunction or writ of mandamus , providin g for a ppropria te equitable and injunctive relief to ensure the return of pla intiffs’ property a

nd for an accounting of all duplicate payme

nts, enjoining defendant from engag ing in the policies and practices complained of, and requiring defenda nt to deposit all duplicate payments with the State Tre asurer as requi red unde r the Unc laimed Pro

perty Act; and (

4) judgment in the

amount of

the duplic ate payments and all income e arned thereon. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant argue d that plaintiffs’ claims arose under section 20-175 of the Code and were barred by

that section’s five-y

ear statute of limitations. See 35 IL CS 200/20-175 (West 2004)). The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiff s now appe al that dis missal. Whether a cause of action was properly dismissed under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code based on the statute of limitations presents a question of law that we review de novo. Ferguson v. Ci ty of Chi cago , 213 I ll. 2d 94, 99(2004). M oreover , our res olution of this appe al raise s a question o f statutor

y in terpretation, na

mely , whethe

r plaintif fs’ clai ms for a r eturn of duplicat e tax payments are g overned by se ction 20-175 of the Code and thereby subject to that section’s five-ye ar statute of limitations. An issue of statutory interpre tation presents a question of law and is also reviewed de novo

. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the I llinois Municipal Retirement Fund , 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erre d in dismissing their complaint1-06-0098

7

based on the statut e of limita

tions. Spec ifically

, plaintif fs asser t that the d

uplicate pay ments tendere d to defe

ndant we re not ta x pay ments, tha

t their re quests for return

of those p ay

ments did not implica

te section 20-175 o f the Code , which a pplies to r

efunds of tax pay ments due

to erroneous assessments, and that the court erred in whe n it applied that section’s five-year limitations

period to dismiss the ir compla

int. Our analysis is g

uided by well-esta

blished principles of statutory interpr etation. The primary rule of

statutory interpreta

tion is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriag e of Rogers , 213 Ill. 2d 129, 136 (2004). The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. In re Donald A.G. , 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). I n determining the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory

terms, we must consider the statute in its entirety , keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature’s appa rent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis , 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). I n interpreting a statute, we also must presume that when the leg islature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results. Progressive Universal Insurance

Co. v. Liberty

Mutual Fire Insuranc e Co. , 215 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2005). Section 20-175 of the Code, entitled “Refund for erroneous asse ssments or overpay ments,” provides, in relev ant part :

“If any property is twice a ssessed for the same y ear, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the errone ously assessed taxes have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or ha ve been overpaid by the sa

me claimant or by diff

erent claimants, the1-06-0098

8 County Collector *** shall r

efund the taxes to the

proper c laimant. *** A cla im for re fund shal l not be al lowed unl ess a pet ition is filed within 5 years f

rom the date the right to a refund arose .” 35 IL CS 200/20-175 (West 2004)). As an initi al matter , plaintif fs asser t that the d

uplicate pay ments wer

e not “ta x pay ments” but, rather, represented mistaken pay ments of real estate tax assessments that had already been

sa ti sf ie d. As su ch , p la in ti ff

s m ai nt ai n t ha t t he mi st ak en pa yme nt s c on st it ut ed “t an gi bl e p ro pe rt y” that was s ubject to the Uncla

imed Prope

rty Act (765 IL CS 1025/8.1 ( West 2004) ). Plaintif

fs also assert that, because the duplicate pay ments were not tax payments, their re quests for a return of those pay ments wer

e not cla ims for a “

refund. ” We reje ct plainti ffs’ co ntention f or two re asons. First, plaintiffs provide no authority f or the proposition that the duplicate pay ments were not “tax payments” but, rather, r epresented unclaimed tangible proper ty. A point raised on appeal t hat is not su

pported by c itation to r

elevant authority is waived

under Supreme Cour

t Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) ). McCarthy v. Denkovski , 301 Ill. App. 3d 69, 74 (1998). Accordingly , plaintiffs’ contention is waived. Second, w e find pla

intiffs’ distinction betwee n “tax pay

ments” a nd “mistak

en pay ments” to be without consequence. Plaintiffs received installment bills for their real esta te taxes and thereafter sent pay

ment to defendant in satisfaction of those bills. Clearly , these payments we re “tax payments,” and we

decline to interpret them otherwise. Contrary to plaintif

fs’ asse rtion, the charac ter of the se pay

ments is not

chang ed mere ly because the tax bills had already been satisfied when the pay ments at issue were made. Rather,1-06-0098

9

the duplicate pay

ments, even if made by

mistake, amounted to “overpay ments” of plaintiffs’ real estate taxes. Although the Code does not define “overpaid,” to ove rpay is g enerally de fined as “to pay more tha

n (an amount due)” or “to pay (a person) in excess.” Webster’s Unabridge d Dictionary Second E dition 1383 (1998); see also Detrana v. Such , 368 Ill. App. 3d 861, 868 (2006) (noting that the dictionary can be used to ascertain the ordinary and popular meaning of a word). The Supreme Court interpreted the term “over payment” in a similar manne r in United States v. D alm , 494 U.S. 596, 108 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). In Dalm , the Court considered the meaning of the term “ove rpayment” a s it was used in a federal limitations period applicable to a “[c]laim for credit or refund of an over payment of any

tax imposed by [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954].” 26 U.S.C. §6511(a) (1982). In rejec ting a distinction between refund a ctions an d suits for funds wr ongfull y r etained , the Cour

t noted tha

t “[t]he com

monsense interpre tation is th at a tax is overpaid when a taxpayer pays more than is owed, for whatever

reason or n o reason a t all .” (Emphasis added.) Dalm , 494 U.S. at 609 n.6, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 562 n.6, 110 S. Ct. at 1368-69 n.6. Here, too, by se

nding duplicate pay

ments to defendant, plaintiffs paid more than what was owed on their real estate taxes. That these duplicate pa yments were

made by mistake is of no consequence. We therefore find that the duplica te payments wer

e tax “overpayme

nts,” and reject plaintiffs’ argument that those pay ments were tangible personal proper ty. According

ly, the Un cl ai me d P ro pe rt y Ac t, wh ic h “ pr ov id es a p ro ce du re wh er eb y ce rt ai n p er so na l p ro pe rt y, presumed abandoned, is placed in the custody of the State for its eventual return to its rightful owner” ( Canel v. Topinka , 342 Ill. App. 3d 65, 69 (2003)), does not apply in this case.1-06-0098

10

We also re

ject plai ntiffs’ c ontention

that their request s for a r

eturn of those dupl icate pay ments wer

e not cla ims for a “

refund. ” A refu

nd, as use d in the ta

x context, “is

the amoun

t a taxpayer or re

porting entity would re ceive from the government due to an ove rpayment of ta

xes.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1281 (6th e d. 1990); see also Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary Second Edition 1622 (1998) (defining refund as “to g ive back or restore (esp. money )).” In this case, plaintiff s reques ted a return of ov erpaid t axes. We fin

d that the se reque sts are properly characterized as claims for a refund of those o verpay

ments. Having characterized plaintiffs’ duplica te payments as re al estate tax “overpay ments,” and their requests for a return of those pay ments as claims for a “refund,” we must now determine whether those refund claims are within the scope of section 20-175 and thereby subject to its five -y ear sta

tute of lim

itations. Plaintiff s assert t hat sect ion 20-175 does not g overn the ir claims because it applies only when property

is erroneously a ssessed, through a double or a premature assessment, and that erroneous assessment is then either paid or overpaid. Plaintiffs claim that, in this case, “ there was no erroneous assessment and there was no ove rpayment ca

used by an er

roneous

assessme nt,” and t herefore sect

ion 20-175 does not a

pply . Defen

dant res ponds that

the statut e applies to refund claims for overpaid taxes and to refund claims for ta xes paid due to erroneous

assessme nts. The title of section 20-175, “Refund for erroneous asse ssments or overpayme nts,” suggests that the statute applies to both refunds for er roneous assessments and to refunds for overpai d taxes. Mor

eover, a fter re viewing the text of s ection 20 -175, we believe that the st

atute1-06-0098

11

is most reasonably interpre ted as providing for refunds in two distinct situations: when taxes have been erroneously

assessed, due to a property being either twice assessed in the same y ear or assessed before it becomes taxable; and when taxes have bee n overpaid by the sa

me claimant or by differe nt claimants. See 35 IL CS 200/20-175 (West 2004). Additionally, a review of section 20-175’s legislative history supports defendant’s argument that the legislature intended the sta tute to provide a mechanism by which taxpayers could obtain a refund for overpaid taxes such as those at issue in this case. Sec tion 286 of the Revenue Act of 19 39 is the pr

edeces sor statut

ory provision

to section

20-175. A s enacte d in 1939, section 286 provided:

“If any real or personal property shall be twice assessed for the same yea

r, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the taxes so erroneously a ssessed shall have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or have been twice paid by differe

nt claiman ts , the county court *** shall direc t the county collector to r efund such taxes ***.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 120, par. 767. The General Assembly

amended the text of section 286 in 1975. Public Act 79-184 deleted the phrase “ twice pa id by differe nt claima nts,” and in its plac e substitut

ed “ove rpaid by the same claimant or by diffe

rent claimants, the County Collector, upon being satisfied of the facts in the case shall refund such taxes to the proper claimant ***.” See Pub. Act 79-184, §1, eff. Oct.1, 1975. As a

result, su bsequen t to the 197 5 amendme

nt, section 286 provided, in r elevant part:1-06-0098

12 “If any real or personal property shall be twice assessed for the same yea

r, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the taxes so erroneously a ssessed shall have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or have been overpaid by the same claimant or by different claimants , the County Collector *** shall refund such taxes to the proper claimant ***.” (Emphasis added.) I ll. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 767. During the floor debate on the legislation in the Senat e, Senator Moore s tated tha t “House Bill 184 provides for refunds by t he county collector in case s where an i nstallmen t of real es tate taxes has been paid twice in error . *** This does gi ve the c ounty col

lector the authority to refund suc

h paymen ts . It is

of ... the re’s not hing on the books now that all ows them to do it. (Emphasi s added. ) 79th I ll. Gen. A ssem., Senate Proc eeding s, May 15, 1975, a

t 227 (sta tements of Senator Moore). During the floor deba tes on the legislation in the House, Speaker Schlickman stated that, “House Bill 184, as it was originally introduced, created a new para graph in the Revenue Act providing for a refund by the county

collector in case an

y installm ent of rea l estate taxes is paid twice in error . It was the opinion of the Cook County Collector that instead *** an existing p aragr

aph should

be amend

ed.” (E mphasis a dded.) 7 9th Il l. Gen. As sem., Hou se Proceedings, March 19, 1975, at 12-13 (statements of Spea ker Schlickman). Speaker Schlickma

n later a dded that , “House

Bill 184 c oncerns

itself wit h the prob lem that c onfronts real estate pr operty ta xpayers who either, inadvertently , have paid an installment twice . *** Presently, there is no statutory authority in the Revenue Act by which the c ounty collectors ca n1-06-0098

13

make a refund of over-pay ment by taxpay

ers. This Bill as amended *** fills that void ***.” (Emphasi s added. ) 79th I ll. Gen. A ssem., Ho use Proce edings, March 20 , 1975, at 48 (state ments of Speaker Schlickman). These statements conclusively demonstrate that the 1975 amendment broadened the scope of section 20-175, and that the leg islature intended that section to thereafter provide for refunds when a real e state tax installment bill has been twice paid in error. Of equal importance, when the langua ge of a statute admits to more than one construction, the interpretation that is reasonable should prevail and we should a void an interpretation that would produce absurd, unjust, unreasonable, or inconve nient results. In re Application of County Collector of Du Pag e County for Judgment for Ta xes for Year 1993 , 187 Ill. 2d 326, 332 (1999). Plaintiffs’ interpretation of sec tion 20-175 would produce an absurd and unjust result. To adopt plaintiffs’ interpretation would leave taxpay ers without a statutory mechanism by which to obtain a r efund for duplicate tax pay ments made in error. This is not the result that the legislature intended, and to interpret the statute in such a manner would work a hardship on taxpayers. In conclusion, considering the language of the statute a s well as its legislative history, we agree with defendant that sec tion 20-175 of the Code applies to refund claims for duplicate tax payments such as those ma de by plaintiffs in this case. Adopting this interpretation gives effect to the legislature ’s intent a nd avoids t

he absur d and unju st results

that would

follow we

re we to adopt pla intiffs’ interpre

tation of t he statute . Accor

dingly , we find that plain

tiffs’ r efund cl aims for duplicate real estate tax pay ments are governed by

section 20-175 of the Code. In light of that conclusion, the question of whe ther or not plaintiffs voluntarily made the1-06-0098

14

duplicate payme

nts is moot. See Scoa I

ndustrie s, Inc. v. Howlett , 33 Ill. App. 3d 90, 96 (1975) (“The q uestion of whether or not a pa

yme nt is volunta

ry is moot if a

nd when th e legis lature h as, as a matter of grace, pr

ovided a statutory re

medy for re fund”). Where, as here, the leg islature has
enacte d a statuto

ry remedy for a re fund, a ta

xpay er who ha s voluntar

ily o r involunt arily paid his taxes can recover them only by virtue of that statute. Weil-McLain Co. v. Collins , 395 Ill. 503, 507 (1946 ); Scoa Industries, I nc. , 33 Ill. App. 3d at 96. Therefore , plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for recovering their duplicate ta x payments lies in section 20-175, and the equitable re lief plaintiffs request is unavailable. See Bass v. South Cook County Mosquito Abatement District , 236 Ill. App. 3d 466, 467-68 (1992) (“[E]quity will not assume jurisdiction to grant relief where an adeq uate re medy at law exis ts”); Wood River Township v. Wood River Township Hospital , 331 Ill. App. 3d 599, 605-06 (2002) (“[E]quitable jurisdiction is barred for tax relief w hen there is an adequate remedy

at law”). Having so conclu

ded, we m

ust now de

termine w

hether p laintiff

s’ claims were pr operly dismissed as being untimely under the five-ye ar statute of limitations in section 20-175. Section 20-175 of the Code specifically provides that the five-y

ear statute of limitations begins to run on “the dat e the rig ht to a re fund aro se.” 35 I LCS 200 /20-175 ( West 2004) ). In

this case , becau se plaintiffs’ tax bills had already bee n paid when they te

ndered the duplicate pay

ments, plaintiffs had a right to a refund of those pay ments on the date that they we re made. Therefore, we conclude that the five-y

ear statute of limitations commenced on the date that plaintiffs made the duplicat e pay ments. This conclusion is consistent with federal tax cases addressing the issue of ac crual. For1-06-0098

15

example, in Dalm , the Supreme Court held that a federal limitations period, applicable to refund claims for overpaid taxes, began to run when a ta xpayer tendere d payment of a ta x to the government, not when the taxpay er discovered that the pay ment was erroneous. Dalm , 494 U.S. at 609 n.7, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 562 n.7, 110 S. Ct. at 1369 n.7. I n so holding, the Court noted: “The ve ry purpose o f statute s of limitat ions in the

tax context is

to bar the assertion of a refund claim afte r a certain period of time has passed, without regard to whether the cla im would otherwise be meritorious. That a taxpayer does not learn until after the limitations period has run that a tax was paid in error , and that he or she has a ground upon which to claim a ref und, does not op erate to lift the statutory bar .” (Emphasis added.) Dalm , 494 U.S. at 609 n.7, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 562 n.7, 110 S. Ct. at 1369 n.7. See also Sund ance Ho mes, Inc . v. C ount y of DuPage , 195 Ill. 2d 257, 269 (2001) (“[An] action [for a refund] accrues when the tax is paid”). Given our determination that the statute of limitations began to run on the date that the duplicat e pay ments wer

e made, p laintiff

s do not disp

ute that their clai

ms for a r efund of those overpayme

nts were untimely. All of plaintiffs’ duplica te payments wer

e made between March 4, 1990, and November 4, 1999. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint was filed on September 13, 2005, more

than five ye ars afte

r the dupl icate pa

yme nts were made. Ac cordingly, plaintiff s’ claims were untimely, a

nd their first amended complaint was properly dismissed. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the c ircuit court of Cook County dismissing1-06-0098

16

plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is affirmed. Affirmed. GARCIA and R. GORDON, JJ., concur.