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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re H. TITUS, Minor. April 23, 2015

No. 323439
Calhoun Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 2013-000599-NA

Before: O’C ONNELL , P.J., and F ORT H OOD and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right an August 20, 2014 order terminating her parental rights to the child, HT, pur suant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j). We affirm.

Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that a statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence. W e disagree. “To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincin g evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “We review for clear error a trial court’s fi nding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id .; see also MCR 3.977(K). “A finding of fact is cl early erroneous if the revie wing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Laster , 303 Mich App 485, 491; 845 NW2d 540 (2013) (citation omitted).

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ), (g), and (j) permit termination under the following
circumstances:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a chi ld if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence , 1 or more of the following:

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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under t his chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial disp ositional order, and the court, by clear and convi ncing evidence, finds . . . .-2- ( i ) The conditions that led to the a djudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

( ii ) Other conditions exist that caus e the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction, the parent has re ceived recommendations to rectif y those conditions,
the conditions have not been rectif ied by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has be en given a reasonable opportunit y to rectify the conditions, and there is no reas onable likelihood that the cond itions will be
rectified within a reasonable ti me considering the child’s age.

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(g) The parent, without regard t o intent, fails to provide prop er care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the paren t will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time consid ering the child’s

age.

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(j) There is a reasonable like lihood, based on the conduct or c apacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is r eturned to the home of the parent.

HT was born on February 20, 2013. He was born with illegal su bstances his system, and was removed from respondent’s c are. Throughout the proceedings , respondent’s drug use was a continuing concern. Respondent was ordered to submit to substa nce screenings and individual and group substance abuse therapy, but she missed numerous scre enings, continuously tested positive for prescription medication, and did not complete subs tance abuse therapy until the end of July 2014. Even after completing services, there continued to be concerns about respondent’s use of prescription medication and she continued to use prescri ption medication at the time of termination. Respondent’s counse lor did not believe respondent had fully addressed her
substance abuse issues and her psychological evaluation indicat ed a poor prognosis in regard to
her substance abuse. At the ter mination hearing, respondent fa iled to acknowledge her 33 missed drug screens or take responsibility.

In addition, respondent continued to reside with HT’s legal fa ther, despite his drug use and domestic violence. During the proceeding, HT’s father eith er tested positive for substances or failed to report for drug screenings a total of 42 times. W hen he did submit to screenings, he tested positive for marijuana and cocaine, and on one occasion he overdosed on heroin. There
were also concerns that domestic violence was occurring in the home that respondent shared with HT’s father. The month before termination, it was reported tha t HT’s father was attending domestic violence therapy but had “a long way to go” before rea ching his goals. Despite the concerns regarding domestic vio lence, respondent continued to b e in a relationship with HT’s father until the weeks leading up to termination. Respondent’s domestic violence counselor did not believe that she had made progress. Further, at the time o f termination, respondent lacked stable, appropriate housing and did not have the financial mean s to care for HT because she only-3- possessed a part-time job where she earned $160 each week. Res pondent admitted that she was unable to care for HT until she was admitted into a program tha t would help her locate housing and employment.

The trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’ s parental rights. The proceedings lasted 18 months, and at the time of termination, t here continued to be serious concerns regarding respondent and she was unable to independent ly provide for HT. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the condition that le d to adjudication, drug abuse, along with other conditions, including domestic violence, lack of reg ular income, and lack of stable housing, continued to exist and would not be rectified within a reasonable time. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (c)( ii ). In addition, the evidence showed that respondent was unable to provide proper care and custody for HT, and the trial court did not err in its conclusion that, given respondent’s failure to make progress over the course of the proceedings, respondent would be unable to provide prope r care and custody within a rea sonable time considering HT’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Finally, the trial court did not cle arly err in finding that there was a
reasonable likelihood of harm to H T if he were returned to resp ondent. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The harm to the child contemplated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) inc ludes emotional harm as well as physical harm. In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Based on respondent’s failure to rectify problems with substance abuse, including belated treatment efforts and missed screenings, her lack of proper housing and income, a nd failure to benefit from domestic violence counseling, along with her continued relation ship with HT’s father, the trial court’s holding that there was a reasonable likelihood of harm to HT was not clearly erroneous.

Respondent asserts on appeal that she was able to properly par ent HT because EE, her older child, remained in her care during the proceeding. Howev er, the record shows that EE was removed from her care and placed with his legal father in April 2014. In addition, we reject respondent’s assertion that reasonable efforts were not made to rectify the barriers to reunification. “When a child is removed from a parent’s custod y, the agency charged with the care of the child is [usually] required to report to the trial court the efforts made to rectify the
conditions that led to the removal of the child.” In re Plump , 294 Mich App 270, 272; 817 NW2d 119 (2011). A trial court is not required to terminate parental rights if the State “ has not provided the child’s family

. . . with the services the state considers necessary for the child ’s safe return to his or her home, if r easonable efforts are required.” MCL 712A.19a(6)(c); See In re
Rood , 483 Mich 73, 104 n 46; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “The adequacy of the petitioner’s efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evi dence to terminate a parent’s rights.” In re Rood , 483 Mich at 89. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to provide her assistance with locating housing and employment and with acquir ing financial assistance from the State. However, the record shows that respondent was provi ded with assistance in obtaining employment. In regard to housing assistance, the record reveal s that two days before the termination hearing, respondent applied to the Inasmuchas housi ng program. Respondent claims that the agency should have provided her with assistance with g aining access to the Inasmuchas program; however, ther e is no indication th at mother requested such assistance or that the agency could have hastened the process. Moreover, the record supports that it was because respondent waited until two days before the termination hearing to contact someone from the Inasmuchas program that she was still waiting to gain entry into the progr am. Thus, the record does not support that respondent lacked suitable housing at the time of termination because of the-4- agency’s failure to make reasonable efforts; rather, it was bec ause of respondent’s poor decisionmaking skills and belated efforts.

Respondent next argues that termination of her parental rights was not in HT’s best interests. Once a statutory ground for termination is establis hed, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights if it finds by a preponderance o f the evidence that termination is in
the child’s best intere sts. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss , 301 Mich App at 90. The trial court’s
best-interest decision is also reviewed for clear error. MCR 3 .977(K); In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “In deciding whether termin ation is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the paren t, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the a dvantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

Although the record supports tha t respondent and HT were bonde d, it does not support that it was a typical parent-child bond. See id. HT had been out of respondent’s care for virtually all of his life because respondent consumed prescript ion medication and marijuana during her pregnancy. HT was placed with relatives after he wa s released from the hospital after his birth, and he had been placed with them for almost 18 month s at the time of termination. HT was bonded to his caregivers, and he only saw respondent twice each week for most of the proceeding. At times during parenting time, respondent was ver y tired, not “hands on,” and
failed to interact with HT. Alth ough respondent argues that HT was more bonded with the relative caregivers because he was removed from her care and sh e was only provided with limited parenting time, the record establishes that this was th e result of respondent’s conduct and failure to make progress during the proceeding.

Respondent also claims that she had appropriate parenting abil ities, as evidenced by the fact that she provided care to EE during the proceeding. As al ready stated, EE was removed from respondent’s care in April 201 4 and placed with his legal father. There is no evidence that EE returned to respond ent’s care, and there is no indication th at respondent would be able to properly parent HT within a reason able time in the future given her failure to make progress during the proceeding and her inability to care for HT’s basic needs at the time of termination. HT required permanency and stability. He was thriving in the c are of the relative caretakers and was on track developmentally at the time of termination. The r elatives were interested in adopting HT, and he was bonded to them. See In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (holding that termi nation was in the child’s be st interests where the foster care home could provide stability and permanency). The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in HT’s best in terests. In re Trejo , 462 Mich at

356-357.

Affirmed.

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael F. Gadola