Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Heredia v. O’Brien, 2015 IL App (1st) 141952

Appellate Court 

Caption

GABRIELLE HEREDIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VIRGINIA 

CARROLL O’BRIEN, M.D., HANDE TUNCER, M.D., and RUSH 

UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division

Docket No. 1-14-1952

Filed May 21, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13-L-04302; the 

Hon. John H. Ehrlich, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Whitney B. Mayster, of Dennis T. Schoen, P.C., of Chicago, for 

appellant.

Susan M. Hannigan and Albert C. Lee, both of Anderson, Rasor & 

Partners, LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the 

judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 This is an appeal from the circuit court’s order dismissing a medical malpractice action 

filed by the plaintiff, Gabriella Heredia, against the defendants, two hematologists, Dr. 

Virginia Carroll O’Brien (hereinafter Dr. O’Brien) and Dr. Hande Tuncer (hereinafter Dr. 

Tuncer), and their employer, Rush University Medical Center (hereinafter Rush), arising 

from the plaintiff’s hospitalization and treatment at Rush in the spring of 2009. The cause of 

action was dismissed on the basis that it was not commenced within the two-year statutory 

limitations period set forth in section 13-212(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2010)). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial 

court erred in dismissing her action as untimely because her complaint was filed within two 

years of the date on which she first learned or should have learned through the exercise of 

reasonable diligence that her injuries were sustained as a result of the negligence of the 

hematologists involved in her treatment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment 

of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff, 

who was in her thirties and suffered from antiphospholipid antibody syndrome (APS)1

 and 

lupus, was admitted to Rush on April 24, 2009, for a stroke and was treated there until July 

21, 2009. Prior to her hospitalization, the plaintiff had been prescribed and was using several 

anticoagulant medications as a result of a stroke she had suffered at age 20. During her 

hospitalization at Rush, on May 6, 2009, the plaintiff, underwent a transjugular renal (or 

kidney) biopsy, after which she was readministered blood-thinning therapy, including the 

medication Lovenox. 

¶ 4 Several days after her surgery, the plaintiff suffered a large hemorrhage from the area of 

the biopsied kidney, which had become infected. As a result, the plaintiff further developed 

renal and respiratory failure, multiple abscesses, aspiration pneumonia, and other serious 

injuries and complications for which she continued to require inpatient treatment years after 

her release from Rush. 

¶ 5 As a result, on December 30, 2010, the plaintiff filed her first complaint (hereinafter the 

first action), naming as the defendants the two radiologist surgeons involved in her 

transjugular renal biopsy on May 6, 2009, Dr. Vivek Mishra (hereinafter Dr. Mishra) and Dr. 

Sudheer Paruchuri (hereinafter Dr. Paruchuri), and their employers, Affiliated Radiologists, 

S.C., and Rush. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants, were negligent, inter alia, in: (1) 

performing the transjugular kidney biopsy, (2) carelessly causing damage to the plaintiff’s 

bowel and right kidney during the performance of that biopsy, (3) carelessly failing to 

provide proper and timely monitoring for hemorrhage and infection to the plaintiff following 

that biopsy, (4) carelessly failing to provide proper and timely treatment for injuries sustained 

as a result of that biopsy, and (5) otherwise being “careless and negligent in treating” the 

plaintiff. The plaintiff asserted that as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned 

 

1An autoimmune, hypercoagulable disorder caused by antiphospholipid antibodies, which attack 

and damage tissues and cells and cause blood clots to form in the body’s arteries and veins. 
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actions she suffered serious and permanent injuries of a personal and pecuniary nature, and 

she requested damages in excess of $50,000 against each of the defendants. 

¶ 6 In support of her complaint, pursuant to section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 

(West 2010)), the plaintiff attached an attorney’s affidavit and report from a reviewing expert 

radiologist. That report stated that the expert had reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records 

from Rush and that it was his opinion based on those records that the plaintiff had a 

reasonable and meritorious cause of action in that the defendants breached the applicable 

standard of care in the manner asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 7 On March 28, 2011, and June 2, 2011, the defendants in the first action filed their 

answers to the plaintiff’s complaint denying the allegations therein. The parties subsequently 

proceeded with discovery. 

¶ 8 During discovery, and more than two years after filing of her first action against Rush, on 

April 26, 2013, the plaintiff filed her instant action. This time, in addition to Rush, as the 

defendants, the plaintiff named Dr. O’Brien and Dr. Tuncer, the two hematologists who 

treated her after the transjugular kidney biopsy was performed at Rush on May 6, 2009. In 

her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants-hematologists and Rush (as their 

employer) were negligent, inter alia, in: (1) prescribing, ordering and administering certain 

blood thinners and combinations of blood thinners following her transjugular renal biopsy; 

(2) failing to properly monitor the plaintiff while administering those blood thinners; (3) 

failing to reverse the effects of the blood thinners in a timely manner; and (4) carelessly 

causing the peritoneal hemorrhage and damaging the plaintiff’s right kidney. The plaintiff 

asserted that as a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned acts or omissions by the 

defendants, she suffered “a large perinephric hematoma, renal failure, right kidney necrosis, 

respiratory failure, peritoneal abscess, aspiration pneumonia, multiple fistulas and other 

injuries.”

¶ 9 In support of her complaint, pursuant to section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 

(West 2010)), the plaintiff again attached an attorney’s affidavit and report from a reviewing 

expert physician attesting that the expert had been consulted in reviewing her claim and that 

it was his opinion, based upon a review of the plaintiff’s medical records documenting her 

treatment at Rush, that the plaintiff had a reasonable and meritorious cause of action and that 

the defendants breached the applicable standard of care in the manner asserted in the 

plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 10 On June 24, 2013, the plaintiff moved to consolidate her 2010 and 2013 causes of action, 

contending that they involved the same inpatient hospitalization witnesses and evidence. On 

July 2, 2013, the circuit court granted that motion and consolidated the cases. 

¶ 11 On July 26, 2013, the defendants in the instant action (the hematologists and Rush), filed 

a section 2-619 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)) arguing that the cause of 

action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13-212(a) of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2010)). In their motion, the defendants argued that the 

two-year limitations period on the plaintiff’s claims commenced on June 21, 2009, when she 

was discharged from Rush, or at the very latest, at the time she filed her first medical 

malpractice action on December 30, 2010. The defendants contended that since the plaintiff 

alleged the same injuries in her 2010 and her 2013 causes of action, she must have been on 

notice of all potential claims, including those she raised against the treating hematologists, no 
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later than December 30, 2010. Accordingly, they asserted that the plaintiff’s April 26, 2013, 

complaint was time-barred. 

¶ 12 The plaintiff filed her response to the motion to dismiss on August 30, 2013. Therein, she 

argued that she was unaware of the hematologists’ negligence until January 11, 2012, when 

one of the biopsy surgeons and a defendant in the initial cause of action, Dr. Paruchuri, gave 

his deposition. The plaintiff pointed out that during that deposition, Dr. Paruchuri testified 

that the blood thinner Lovenox, in combination with other anticoagulants (namely, heparin 

and Coumadin), was responsible for the large hemorrhage coming from the plaintiff’s right 

kidney. Dr. Paruchuri also testified that he discovered the connection between Lovenox and 

the hemorrhage when he reviewed the plaintiff’s medical chart, including her radiological 

scans, in preparation for his deposition. In support, the plaintiff attached portions of Dr. 

Paruchuri’s deposition stating that “the bleed corresponded with the onset of the 

administration of Lovenox.”

¶ 13 In addition, in her response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff pointed to several other 

reasons for why, even with the exercise of due diligence, she could not have been aware of 

the hematologists’ contribution to her injuries prior to Dr. Paruchuri’s deposition. 

Specifically, the plaintiff alleged: (1) that her medical records are 17,000 pages long (mostly 

due to her continued inpatient treatment necessitated by the complications of her transjugular 

renal biopsy); and (2) that during her 88-day stay at Rush (between April 24, 2009 and July 

21, 2009) she was administered hundreds of medications, including the blood thinner 

Lovenox. Under this record, the plaintiff contended that her instant action filed on April 26, 

2013, was well within two years of the date when she reasonably could have known that her 

injuries were caused by the actions of the hematologists. 

¶ 14 On November 20, 2013, after having reviewed the briefs and heard the argument of both 

parties, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 2013 action. In doing 

so, the court noted that “it [was] fairly obvious that the facts [were] undisputed in this case,” 

namely, that the plaintiff was aware of her injuries and that they were wrongfully caused 

when she filed her first complaint on December 30, 2010. The court noted that there was no 

issue of fact, since the expert physician upon whom the plaintiff relied to attest to the 

legitimacy of her initial 2010 complaint averred that he reviewed the plaintiff’s medical 

records, which, albeit 17,000 pages long, would have contained the fact that the patient was 

administered Lovenox with the other coagulants after the May 6, 2009, renal biopsy. The 

court, however, invited the plaintiff to provide additional evidence, if she could, in a motion 

to reconsider, showing that the expert who attested to the legitimacy of her initial complaint 

did not have all of the facts necessary to be placed on notice of the contribution of 

improperly administered blood thinners in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

¶ 15 On December 19, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. In that motion, she 

alleged for the first time that the court should find that there remains a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether she could have reasonably known that the blood-thinning therapy 

caused or contributed to her injuries prior to Dr. Paruchuri’s deposition. In support, the 

plaintiff initially reiterated that the 9,414-page hospital chart that documented her 88-day 

hospitalization at Rush, was part of her overall 17,000-page medical record and was 

examined by the plaintiff’s reviewing experts in filing her initial 2010 complaint. The 

plaintiff then attempted to point out several “omissions and inaccuracies” in those hospital 

records compared to Dr. Paruchuri’s subsequent deposition testimony, which created a 
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genuine issue of material fact as to whether her expert could have determined that the 

hematologists’ administration of Lovenox contributed to her injuries. First, she noted that 

while the operative report from her kidney biopsy stated that there were “no complications” 

during the procedure, Dr. Paruchuri testified in his deposition that the plaintiff’s kidney 

capsule was “probably traumatized” and was perforated by him with a cutting needle during 

that biopsy. Second, the plaintiff asserted that, while her medical records stated that her right 

kidney hematoma started three to four days after her biopsy, and that she was not given 

Lovenox until five days after the procedure, Dr. Paruchuri testified that the kidney hematoma 

did not start until seven days after the biopsy, on a date which followed the start of Lovenox. 

Third, the plaintiff pointed out that while her chart revealed entries made by numerous 

medical professionals at Rush stating that her right kidney hematoma was caused by or was a 

complication of her kidney biopsy, Dr. Paruchuri testified in his deposition that Lovenox, in 

combination with other medications, was responsible. 

¶ 16 In support of her allegations, the plaintiff attached: (1) numerous, but unorganized and 

unmarked, pages of her medical records from Rush; (2) portions of Dr. Paruchuri’s 

deposition testimony (mostly taken out of context) to the effect alleged in her motion to 

reconsider; and (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared by the same expert physician 

who signed the plaintiff’s section 2-622 (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 2010)) report in 2010 and 

2012. According to the expert’s newest affidavit, after the expert had an opportunity to 

review Dr. Paruchuri’s deposition testimony, he then went through the patient’s medical 

chart again and found the aforementioned omissions alleged in the plaintiff’s motion to 

dismiss. Specifically, the expert’s affidavit alleged, inter alia, that the first record of the 

plaintiff’s kidney capsule being perforated by a cutting needle during the kidney biopsy was 

made in Dr. Paruchuri’s deposition and that prior to that there were “no entries” in the 

plaintiff’s medical chart documenting such a perforation.

¶ 17 On May 28, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider.

During that hearing, the defendants asserted that the motion should be denied because, 

contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion that she did not know of the injury to her kidney prior to 

Dr. Paruchuri’s deposition, the record undisputedly established that the plaintiff’s 

radiological scans, which were available either at the time or immediately after her biopsy 

and were certainly part of her medical records from Rush, would have shown that the biopsy 

ruptured the kidney capsule and caused the intra-abdominal hematoma. The defendants 

argued that the plaintiff never provided a clear answer as to whether she requested those 

radiological scans or whether those were reviewed by her expert prior to filing her initial 

complaint. 

¶ 18 After hearing arguments by the parties, the circuit court denied the plaintiff’s motion to 

reconsider. In doing so, the court reiterated that the plaintiff had failed to provide additional 

newly discovered evidence that established that at the time she filed her initial complaint she 

was without information necessary to place her on notice that the negligent administration of 

blood thinners (including Lovenox) after the allegedly negligently performed kidney biopsy 

contributed to her injuries. The court explained that although Lovenox, which has 

blood-thinning properties, could have worsened the plaintiff’s hematoma, there was nothing 

in the record to show that the intra-abdominal hematoma itself could have been caused solely 

by the administration of Lovenox. The court further noted that the plaintiff’s attempt to 

distinguish between the rupture of the renal capsule (as admitted by Dr. Paruchuri’s 
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deposition) and the rupture of the renal vein (which was visible on the radiological scans 

available after the plaintiff’s biopsy) was unpersuasive because in either event the rupture 

caused the hematoma so that the fact that any subsequent administration of Lovenox 

contributed to the worsening of that hematoma should have been discoverable by the experts 

in filing the plaintiff’s initial 2010 complaint. As the court explained: 

“It’s the plaintiff’s burden to establish their case, and it’s their burden to 

investigate sufficiently to determine if they have a cause of action at all, and that’s 

what was not done. The plaintiff’s argument that the medical records in this case were 

over 15,000 pages is beside the point. That’s why you hire experts. Whether it’s one 

interventional radiologist or a team of them. It’s the plaintiff’s duty to review the 

records. They were available. *** [E]ven if I assume either way that they either 

weren’t ordered or they were ordered and were not looked at, that doesn’t do anything 

to overcome the standard that the plaintiff knew or should have known the cause of 

the intra-abdominal hematoma. 

So based on that the motion to reconsider will still be denied.”

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 20 The plaintiff now appeals the dismissal of her cause of action as untimely pursuant to 

section 2-619(a) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2010). A motion to dismiss 

pursuant to section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)) admits the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint (i.e., all facts well pleaded), but asserts certain defects, defenses or other 

affirmative matters that appear on the face of the complaint or are established by external 

submissions that act to defeat the claim. Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 20; DeLuna v. 

Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). Subsection (a)(5) of section 2-619, pursuant to which 

defendants’ motion was brought, specifically allows dismissal when “the action was not 

commenced within the time limited by law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2010). In ruling 

on a section 2-619 motion, all pleadings and supporting documents must be construed in a 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the motion should be granted only where no 

material facts are in dispute and the defendant is entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. 

Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55. The relevant inquiry on appeal is “ ‘whether the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent 

such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law.’ ” Sandholm, 2012 IL 

111443, ¶ 55 (quoting Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 

116-17 (1993)). Our review of the circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

section 2-619 is de novo. Relf, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 21. 

¶ 21 In the present case, the parties agree that the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims 

against the defendants are governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 

13-212(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2010)). See Durham v. Michael Reese 

Hospital Foundation, 254 Ill. App. 3d 492, 495 (1993) (“all actions for injury *** predicated 

upon the alleged negligence of a physician [or hospital] are governed by section 13-212(a)”).

¶ 22 Pursuant to section 13-212(a), any claim of malpractice asserted against a physician or 

hospital must be filed within two years of “the date on which the claimant knew, or through 

the use of reasonable diligence should have known, *** of the existence of the injury or 

death for which damages are sought ***, but in no event shall such action be brought more 

than [four] years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged 
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in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.” 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 

2010). Our cases have interpreted this language to mean that the two-year malpractice 

limitations period begins to run when the party knows or reasonably should have known both 

that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused. See Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 

146, 156 (1981); see also Nair v. Bloom, 383 Ill. App. 3d 867, 870 (2008) (citing Knox 

College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981)); Saunders v. Klungboonkrong, 150 Ill. 

App. 3d 56, 59 (1986). “Wrongfully caused” does not mean knowledge of a specific 

defendant’s negligent conduct or knowledge that an actionable wrong was committed. 

Steinmetz v. Wolgamot, 2013 IL App (1st) 121375, ¶ 30 (quoting Castello v. Kalis, 352 Ill. 

App. 3d 736, 744-45 (2004)); see also Young v. McKiegue, 303 Ill. App. 3d 380, 388 (1999). 

Rather, a plaintiff knows or should know his injury was “wrongfully caused” when he 

“becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a 

reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Steinmetz, 2013 IL App (1st) 121375, ¶ 30; see also Saunders, 150 

Ill. App. 3d at 60 (quoting Knox College, 88 Ill. 2d at 416); see also Hanks v. Cotler, 2011 IL 

App (1st) 101088, ¶ 19 (“the commencement of the limitations period” is tolled “until the 

potential plaintiff possesses sufficient information concerning his or her injury and its cause 

to put a reasonable person on notice to make further inquiries”).

¶ 23 The law is well settled that once a party knows or reasonably should have known both of 

the injury and that it was wrongfully caused, “ ‘the burden is upon the injured person to 

inquire further as to the existence of a cause of action.’ ” Castello, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 745 

(quoting Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156); Mitsias v. I-Flow Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, 

¶ 23 (“as soon as [the plaintiff] has sufficient information about her injury and its cause to 

spark inquiry in a reasonable person as to whether the conduct of the party who caused her 

injury might be legally actionable,” the plaintiff has burden to “investigate whether she has a 

viable cause of action”). The purpose of this rule is to encourage diligent investigation on the 

part of potential plaintiffs without foreclosing any claims of which the plaintiffs could not 

have been aware. Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 21. As our supreme court has 

explained: “In that way, an injured person is not held to a standard of knowing the inherently 

unknowable [citation], yet once it reasonably appears that an injury was wrongfully caused, 

the party may not slumber on his rights.” Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 

171 (1981). 

¶ 24 In most instances, the time at which a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known 

both of the injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a question of fact. Nair, 383 Ill. 

App. 3d at 870 (citing Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156); see also Castello, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 744. 

However, “[w]here it is apparent from the undisputed facts *** that only one conclusion can 

be drawn, the question becomes one for the court” (Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156), and can be 

resolved as a matter of law, making a section 2-619 involuntary dismissal on statute of 

limitations grounds appropriate. See Castello, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 744 (citing Witherell, 85 Ill. 

2d at 156); see also Nair, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 870; Saunders, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 61 (“If only 

one conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed facts, the question of the timeliness of the 

plaintiff’s complaint is for the court to decide.”).

¶ 25 In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it determined that 

her 2013 cause of action was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 

5/13-212(a) (West 2010)). She asserts that she was faced with two medically distinct causes 
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of injury and could not have discovered the second cause (i.e., the administration of 

Lovenox) even with due diligence within the two-year limitations period. The plaintiff argues 

that she became aware of that second cause only after one of the surgeons in her initial 

complaint (Dr. Paruchuri) was deposed and testified that the blood thinner Lovenox in 

combination with other medications administered to the plaintiff by the hematologists some 

time after the biopsy caused the hemorrhage in the plaintiff’s right kidney and her remaining 

resulting injuries. We disagree. 

¶ 26 The record in this case establishes that at the very latest at the time the plaintiff filed her 

initial complaint on December 30, 2010, she knew or reasonably should have known that the 

negligent performance of the transjugular renal biopsy on May 6, 2009, including the 

continued administration of the drug Lovenox, was responsible for the massive hemorrhage 

in her kidney. It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s hospital records from Rush note that the 

plaintiff’s right kidney and renal artery were damaged during the biopsy procedure and that 

she was subsequently treated with different blood thinners, including Lovenox. Numerous 

hospital records from Rush document “complications” from the “renal hematoma,” as well as 

the administration of anticoagulants Lovenox and Coumadin as part of the plaintiff’s 

hematology care. 

¶ 27 What is more, the plaintiff alleged as much in her 2010 complaint when she asserted that 

her injuries resulted from the negligent performance of the renal biopsy and the treatment and 

care she received afterwards at Rush. Specifically, the plaintiff’s 2010 complaint alleged that 

the surgeons responsible for the biopsy, including Dr. Paruchuri, “damaged her right kidney 

and bowel during the renal biopsy.” In addition, that complaint alleged that the surgeons 

negligently and carelessly failed to provide proper and timely: (1) monitoring for hemorrhage 

and infection following her kidney biopsy; and (2) treatment to her for the injuries sustained 

as a result of that procedure. 

¶ 28 Under this record, we find disingenuous the plaintiff’s contention that her reliance on Dr. 

Paruchuri’s biopsy report, which stated there were “no complications” during the biopsy 

procedure, precluded her from discovering the hematologists’ negligence prior to the 

surgeon’s deposition. The plaintiff clearly did not believe Dr. Paruchuri’s biopsy report, 

since in her 2010 complaint she accused him of negligence in the performance of that biopsy 

and the follow-up treatment at Rush. Accordingly, under this record, we conclude that the 

plaintiff certainly was on inquiry notice of both her injury and the cause of that injury at the 

time she filed her initial complaint in December 2010, so as to trigger the running of the 

two-year statute of limitations and bar her from filing the 2013 complaint. See 735 ILCS 

5/13-212(a) (West 2010). 

¶ 29 In reaching this decision, we have found the holdings in McCormick v. Uppuluri, 250 Ill. 

App. 3d 386 (1993), and Wells v. Travis, 284 Ill. App. 3d 282 (1996), instructive. In 

McCormick, the court held that a patient’s cause of action for medical malpractice against the 

physician who treated his kidney obstruction in 1984 accrued at the time the patient filed his 

initial 1985 malpractice action against two other doctors and the hospital where he was 

treated. McCormick, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 391. The court therefore concluded that the patient’s 

subsequent 1988 cause of action against the physician was time-barred by the two-year 

statute of limitations, notwithstanding the patient’s contention that he did not know of the 

physician’s negligence until 1987. McCormick, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 391. The court held that 

the patient must have had sufficient information when he filed his initial 1985 action because 
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the physician’s identity was disclosed in the medical records, which the patient possessed 

prior to filing his 1985 action, so that any reasonable discovery would have included 

ascertaining the physician’s involvement. McCormick, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 391. As the 

McCormick court explained, “the running of the limitations clock is not postponed until the 

[patient] first obtains knowledge of [the physician’s] negligent conduct” but, rather, 

commences when he has “sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a 

reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved. 

[Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCormick, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 391. 

¶ 30 The court reached a similar result in Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d 282. In that case, the plaintiff 

filed a malpractice action against one of two physicians involved in the treatment of the 

deceased. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 284. Over two years later, the plaintiff amended her 

complaint to add the second physician to her action, asserting that she did not file suit against 

him earlier because her section 2-622 expert’s report had opined that only the first physician 

had been negligent. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The plaintiff explained that she did not 

know and could not have reasonably known of the second physician’s negligence until the 

first physician was deposed and his expert implicated the second physician. Wells, 284 Ill. 

App. 3d at 286. Since the plaintiff filed her amended complaint within two years of that 

deposition, she asserted that her amended complaint was timely filed. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d 

at 286. 

¶ 31 The appellate court disagreed and dismissed the amended complaint as time-barred by the 

two-year statute of limitations articulated in section 13-212 of the Code. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 

3d at 287-92 (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-212 (West 1994)). The court stated that the two-year 

limitations period commenced on the date that the plaintiff received her section 2-622 expert 

report implicating the first physician. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 287. Rejecting the plaintiff’s 

assertion that knowledge that an injury was wrongfully caused requires knowledge of a 

specific defendant’s negligent conduct, the court reiterated that “the statute of limitations 

begins to run when ‘the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information 

concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine 

whether actionable conduct is involved.’ [Citation.]” Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 287. The court 

then held that the plaintiff was put on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct was 

involved, upon receipt of her expert’s section 2-622 report, regardless of whom the expert 

identified as the responsible party. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 287. 

¶ 32 Applying the rationale of McCormick and Wells to the present case, it is apparent that the 

plaintiff cannot be heard to argue that she did not posses sufficient knowledge on December 

30, 2010, concerning her injuries and their cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to 

determine whether actionable conduct was involved. As already articulated above, it is 

undisputed that the plaintiff here was in possession of a report of her own expert concluding 

that the conduct of the surgeons responsible for her kidney biopsy and subsequent treatment 

at Rush departed from acceptable medical standards. The plaintiff’s initial cause of action 

asserted negligence in the biopsy procedure followed by bleeding complications, which 

necessarily implicated her subsequent hematology care. The plaintiff had two years from the 

date of her expert’s report in the initial cause of action to conduct her inquiry to determine 

whether, and against whom, a lawsuit could be filed. Her failure to do so adequately cannot 

excuse the running of the statute of limitations. 
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¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion we have considered the decisions in Mitsias, 2011 IL App 

(1st) 101126, and Neade v. Engel, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1004 (1996), cited to by the plaintiff and 

find them inapposite. 

¶ 34 In Mitsias, the plaintiff, a patient who was diagnosed with the destruction of cartilage in 

her shoulder joint after having orthopedic surgery, initially brought malpractice claims 

against the physicians who performed her surgery. Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 2. 

Over two years later, she added a products liability claim against the manufactures of pain 

pumps installed in her shoulder during that surgery. Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 3. 

The manufacturers filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of timeliness. Mitsias, 2011 IL App 

(1st) 101126, ¶ 4. After the circuit court granted that motion, the plaintiff appealed. Mitsias, 

2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 4. 

¶ 35 Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, in reversing the circuit court’s order in Mitsias, the 

appellate court explicitly limited the issue on review to whether the statute of limitations 

should be tolled where a plaintiff is aware of one potential wrongful cause of her injury but 

she does not yet know, “nor could she reasonably discover” a second potential wrongful 

cause, because “the causal link was as yet unknown to science.” (Emphases added.) Mitsias, 

2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶¶ 19, 28. Unlike in Mitsias, in the present case, the plaintiff’s 

injury (i.e., any potential complications of blood-thinning therapy after her kidney biopsy) 

was not something yet unknown to science; nor does the plaintiff attempt to argue that it was. 

In fact, as already articulated above, the plaintiff’s initial 2010 complaint establishes that she 

knew of her bleeding injury, as well as that she was receiving blood-thinning therapy, when 

she filed her initial cause of action. Accordingly, her injury, unlike that of the plaintiff in 

Mitsias, was not “inherently unknowable” so as to toll the statute of limitations. (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 29. 

¶ 36 We similarly find Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1004, distinguishable. In that case, the court 

tolled the statute of limitations because the defendant’s overt fraud caused the plaintiff to fail 

to discover that that defendant had wrongfully caused the decedent’s injury. Neade, 277 Ill. 

App. 3d 1004. In Neade, the plaintiff filed a malpractice action against the decedent’s 

primary physician less than two years after the decedent’s death but waited over two years to 

file a lawsuit against the defendant-physician, who had interpreted the decedent’s EKG and 

upon which her primary physician had relied in advising treatment. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d 

1004. 

¶ 37 On appeal from the dismissal of that amended complaint, the plaintiff argued that she 

could not have reasonably known of the defendant-physician’s contribution to her injuries 

until she learned the results of an expert’s discovery deposition. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d 

1004. During that expert’s discovery deposition, the expert reviewed the EKG test interpreted 

by the defendant-physician and discovered that he had openly lied about the EKG, stating 

that it was “normal” when it was obviously not. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. In reversing 

the dismissal of the amended complaint, the appellate court observed that the 

defendant-physician himself had obstructed the plaintiff’s attempts to ascertain whether she 

had a cause of action against him. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. The court found relevant 

that the defendant had been subpoenaed for a deposition scheduled less than two years after 

the decedent’s death but had refused to appear until after the two years expired. Neade, 277 

Ill. App. 3d at 1006. In addition, the defendant had purposely lied at his own deposition and 

provided inaccurate information in order to prevent the plaintiff from discovering a claim 
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against him. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. Accordingly, under that record, the court in 

Neade found that with the utmost diligence, the plaintiff could not have learned of the 

defendant-physician’s negligent contribution to the decedent’s injuries until after his 

sustained attempts at concealment were exposed, thereby justifying the tolling of the 

limitations period. Neade, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. 

¶ 38 Unlike in Neade, nothing in the record before us indicates that the defendantshematologists did anything to prevent the plaintiff from discovering what purported negligent 

acts performed by them led to her injuries. The record contains no documentation, nor does 

the plaintiff point to any, authored by the defendants-hematologists that could have misled 

the plaintiff or were otherwise inaccurate. In fact, as already discussed above, all the 

information the plaintiff required to identify any cause of action against the 

defendants-hematologists was readily available to her (and part of her medical records from 

Rush) by the time she filed her initial 2010 cause of action. Similarly, we find misplaced any 

attempt by the plaintiff to argue that the inaccuracy of Dr. Paruchuri’s documentation of his 

biopsy procedure is analogous to the actions of the defendant in Neade. As already noted 

above, the plaintiff herself gave no credence to that biopsy report, when in 2010 she filed her 

negligence claim against Dr. Paruchuri alleging that he carelessly ruptured, inter alia, her 

right kidney. 

¶ 39 Accordingly, under the record before us, we find that, at the very latest, when she filed 

her 2010 complaint, the plaintiff had sufficient information to be placed on notice of any 

injuries and that those injuries were wrongfully caused so as to trigger the running of the 

statute of limitations. As such, the limitations period expired on December 30, 2012, and her 

cause of action against the defendants-hematologists filed on April 26, 2013, is time-barred. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 41 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.