NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

KRISTA MARIE CLINE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0230 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. V1300CR201880022

The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Kevin M. Morrow

Counsel for Appellee

Krista Marie Cline, Goodyear

Appellant

FILED 6-29-2023
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which 

Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined. 

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Krista Marie Cline appeals from her convictions and 

sentences for theft and fraudulent schemes and artifices. We find no 

reversible error and affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Cline managed the assets of several trusts, all signed and 

executed in Yavapai County. Between 2014 and 2017, Cline served as the 

trustee of the Nelson Trust.2 During this time, Cline failed to provide an 

annual accounting or distribute proceeds to the beneficiaries. Cline entered 

a 30-year “owner-carry” contract for the trust’s residential property with 

“extremely unfavorable terms” and never distributed the proceeds to 

beneficiaries. Cline sold assets belonging to the trust’s commercial property

without depositing the proceeds in the trust account, informing 

beneficiaries, or making distributions. When Cline began her tenure with 

the Nelson Trust, the trust account had around $60,000 in assets. In the end, 

the trust account had less than $500 remaining.

¶3 In 2017, the probate court ordered Cline to provide an 

accounting for the Nelson Trust. When Cline eventually disclosed the 

accounting, it lacked a detailed itemization of expenses, fees, and service 

dates. Trust account records showed over $50,000 in transfers and 

withdrawals were made without documentation. Cline’s banking records 

revealed that she transferred $35,065 from the trust to her fiduciary account, 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts. State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1 (App. 2019).

2 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the trusts and 

beneficiaries.
STATE v. CLINE

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3

$22,950 to her checking account, $6,250 to another business account, and 

$600 to pay her credit card bill.

¶4 Between 2014 and 2018, Cline served as the trustee of the 

Porter Trust. Although the trust’s executor had personally “taken care of 

most of his affairs,” Cline removed $32,758 of the trust’s $45,000 cash assets 

throughout her time as a trustee. Her banking records showed that she 

transferred $11,592 from the trust account to her fiduciary account, $14,700 

to her checking account, $2,550 to another business account, and $3,916 to 

pay her credit card bill. Cline also sold vehicles belonging to the trust for

about $6,600 without depositing the proceeds into the trust account.

¶5 For nine months in 2017, Cline served as the trustee of the 

Kennedy Special Needs Trust. When first executed, the trust had over

$15,000 to help Kennedy live independently. Cline’s banking records 

showed she transferred $5,103 from the trust account to her fiduciary 

account, $560 to her checking account, and $1,412 to pay her credit card

accounts. At the end of her tenure as trustee, only around $3,000 remained.

¶6 With an investigation into Cline’s trust management looming, 

she provided additional invoices to authorities. For the Nelson and Porter

Trusts, the invoices did not list specific dates for services rendered, and the

time spent on routine services appeared heavily inflated, consistently

rounded up to “large even hours.” Some invoices showed Cline billed for 

services she had not completed. For the Kennedy Trust, the formatting of 

the invoices differed from those of the other trusts, with dates specified next 

to the services rendered. The invoices, however, contained inflated hours 

for routine services, discrepancies in expenses, and creation dates after 

Cline stopped acting as trustee. When Cline eventually spoke with the lead

detective, she could not recall making any “improper transfers” and denied

transferring money to anything but her fiduciary account.

¶7 The State charged Cline with three counts of fraudulent 

schemes and artifices, Class 2 felonies (Counts 1, 3, and 5), two counts of 

theft, Class 2 felonies (Counts 2 and 4), and one count of theft, a Class 6 

felony (Count 6). Counts 1 and 2 applied to offenses committed against the 

Nelson Trust, Counts 3 and 4 applied to crimes against the Porter Trust, and

Counts 5 and 6 applied to crimes against the Kennedy Trust.

¶8 In an unrelated criminal case, Cline was tried and convicted 

for mismanaging another trust between January 2016 and March 2017. See 

State v. Cline (the 2017 case), 1 CA-CR 20-0257, 2021 WL 871756, at *1–2, 

¶¶ 2–3, 9 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (mem. decision). In the 2017 case, the
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

4

superior court sentenced Cline to multiple concurrent terms of 

imprisonment. Id. at *2, ¶ 9. We affirmed Cline’s convictions but corrected

an error in the sentencing minute entry. Id. at *6, ¶¶ 35–36.

¶9 As the trial approached in this case, Cline waived her right to

counsel and elected to represent herself. In this capacity, Cline filed several

pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. She argued that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction because

trusts fall within the domain of the probate court. The superior court 

granted some of Cline’s motions but denied the motion to dismiss.

¶10 In the six-day jury trial, the State presented testimony from 

(1) the lead detective about the relevant trusts; (2) beneficiaries, counsel for 

the successor trustee, and other interested parties associated with the 

Nelson Trust; (3) family members associated with the Porter Trust; (4) the 

successor trustee for the Kennedy Trust; (5) a fiduciary expert; and (6) a 

forensic accountant.

¶11 At the close of the State’s case, Cline moved for a judgment of 

acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 20(a)(1), 

arguing the evidence showed she acted within her lawful authority as 

trustee. The superior court denied the motion. Although Cline chose not to 

testify on her behalf, she called witnesses associated with the Kennedy 

Trust. Cline presented evidence of legitimate, documented purchases she 

made for Kennedy while acting as trustee.

¶12 In its closing argument, the State focused on the sparse,

nonspecific, and hurried nature of the accounting Cline provided 

authorities. The State contended that compared to Cline’s personal and 

business accounts, the jury could reasonably infer that she created the 

invoices “after the fact using bank records as a guide.” In Cline’s closing 

argument, she attacked the investigation, claiming authorities should have 

uncovered more details about her banking records, income, and online 

scheduling. Before its rebuttal argument, the State informed the court that 

it intended to comment on Cline’s failure to provide any additional,

possibly exculpating, documents. Cline did not object, and the court found 

it an appropriate rebuttal argument. The State then argued to the jury that

authorities gave Cline a chance to provide additional documentation, but 

she chose not to do so.

¶13 The jury convicted Cline on Counts 1 through 4 but could not

reach a unanimous verdict on Counts 5 and 6. The court granted the State’s 

motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 6 with prejudice. The jury found one
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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aggravating factor applied to Counts 1 and 3, and two aggravating factors

involved Counts 2 and 4. After the jury rendered its verdict, Cline renewed 

her motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b)(1). She argued

insufficient evidence supported her convictions, and she acted within her

lawful authority in managing the trusts. The court denied the motion, 

finding sufficient evidence that Cline exceeded her role as a fiduciary in 

controlling and depriving the beneficiaries of the trust assets.

¶14 As sentencing approached, Cline submitted a sentencing 

memorandum and letters of support from friends and family. Cline asked

for leniency and requested presentence incarceration credit for her time in 

custody in the 2017 case. She moved to preclude portions of the adult 

probation department’s presentence report, arguing it included false and

inaccurate statements. The court conducted a two-day presentence hearing,

where Cline called the presentence report writer to testify about her 

findings and challenged the nature of the report. Cline’s family and friends

testified, further countering the recommendations made in the report. The

court sustained Cline’s objections to technical errors but declined to 

preclude the “investigative narrative.”

¶15 At the sentencing, the State argued that the offenses in Cline’s 

2017 case constituted two prior felony convictions. The State also argued 

that consecutive sentences would be appropriate because Cline harmed 

multiple victims. Acknowledging the disposition in the 2017 case, Cline 

contended that the offenses, in that case, represented only one prior felony 

conviction and should run concurrently with her sentences in this case.

¶16 Noting that the 2017 case involved one victim, the superior 

court agreed with Cline and found the 2017 case constituted one prior 

felony conviction, or the equivalent of the first felony offense, under A.R.S. 

§ 13-703(A).3 The court balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, 

including the jury’s findings and Cline’s family and community support.

Based on these factors, the court sentenced Cline as a category one 

repetitive offender on Counts 1 and 2, imposing slightly mitigated terms of 

4.5 years’ imprisonment, and as a category two repetitive offender on

Counts 3 and 4, imposing slightly mitigated terms of 7 years’ imprisonment. 

See A.R.S. § 13-703(A), (H)–(I). The court ordered the sentences to be served 

3 We cite versions of the sentencing statutes in effect at the time of the 

offenses. See A.R.S. § 1-246 (“[T]he offender shall be punished under the law 

in force when the offense was committed.”).
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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concurrently to each other but consecutively to her sentences in the 2017 

case. The court awarded two days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶17 After sentencing, Cline moved to modify the sentence,

arguing that the court erred by (1) failing to conduct a trial on her prior 

convictions before imposing sentence enhancements; (2) running her

sentences consecutively to those in the 2017 case; (3) failing to calculate her 

presentence incarceration credit accurately; (4) considering false 

information in the presentence report; and (5) denying her the right to

allocution. The court found the motion entitled Cline to a priors trial with

oral argument.

¶18 After the priors trial, the court found sufficient evidence of

Cline’s prior felony conviction in the 2017 case. In reaching its decision, the 

court reviewed the State’s pretrial allegation of Cline’s prior felony 

conviction and the certified copies of the felony convictions and booking 

information. The court also noted that it presided over the 2017 case. The 

court found consecutive sentences in the current and 2017 cases appropriate 

because they involved separate victims. As a result, Cline was only entitled 

to presentence incarceration credit for two days spent in custody for this 

case. The court found no merit to Cline’s claims about the presentence 

report and right to allocution, noting that she fully litigated all perceived

sentencing issues. Thus, the court denied Cline’s motion to modify the 

sentence.

¶19 Cline timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

¶20 Cline argues the superior court erred by denying her motion 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the indictment 

did not confer jurisdiction on the “criminal court.” She contends

jurisdiction vested solely in the probate court. We review challenges to a

court’s jurisdiction de novo. Lay v. Nelson, 246 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8 (App. 2019).

¶21 “‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction’ refers to a court’s statutory or 

constitutional power to hear and determine a particular type of case.” State 

v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 14 (2010). The Arizona constitution grants 

the superior court jurisdiction over all “[c]riminal cases amounting to 

felony.” Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14(4); see also A.R.S. § 12-123(A). As outlined

in A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1), jurisdiction is established if the “[c]onduct 
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

7

constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs 

within this state.” That a defendant may have a parallel civil case involving 

the same conduct does not divest the court of jurisdiction. See State v. Ott, 

167 Ariz. 420, 428 (App. 1990) (“No federal or state constitutional rule 

prohibits parallel civil and criminal proceedings.”); see also Acolla v. Peralta, 

150 Ariz. 35, 38 (App. 1986) (There are many “instances in which civil 

remedies are permitted for acts which also carry criminal penalties.”).

¶22 Contrary to Cline’s assertion, the indictment invoked the 

subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court. See State v. Buckley, 153

Ariz. 91, 93 (App. 1987) (filing of indictment confers jurisdiction on the 

court). The State filed criminal charges against Cline for fraudulent schemes 

and artifices and theft, both of which are felony offenses. A.R.S. 

§§ 13-2310(A), 13-1802(A), (G). The indictment for those charges triggered 

the court’s jurisdiction to try and sentence Cline. See State v. Rodriguez, 205 

Ariz. 392, 395, ¶ 7, n.1 (App. 2003) (The court generally has “jurisdiction

over any criminal case in which the defendant is charged by indictment or 

information with a felony.”). Cline’s involvement in the parallel probate 

case did not strip the court of jurisdiction in her criminal case. See Ott, 167 

Ariz. at 428. The court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 13-108(A)(1).

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Cline’s Motion for 

Judgment of Acquittal. 

¶23 Cline challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all 

counts, arguing the superior court erred by denying her motion for 

judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(a)(1) and (b)(1). We review the court’s 

ruling on Cline’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. State v. West, 226 

Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011).

¶24 Rule 20 allows a defendant to move for a judgment of 

acquittal before or after the verdict “if there is no substantial evidence to 

support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1), (b)(1). Substantial evidence 

“is such proof that ‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67 (1990) (quoting State v. Jones, 125 

Ariz. 417, 419 (1980)). The critical inquiry is whether “any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This inquiry 

does not permit the reviewing court to reweigh conflicting evidence or 

assess witness credibility. State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 334, ¶ 38 
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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(App. 2013). Cline argues the superior court misapplied the law in making 

its determination and later in instructing the jury. 

¶25 To secure a conviction for fraudulent schemes and artifices, 

the State must prove the defendant “knowingly obtain[ed] any benefit by 

means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or 

material omissions.” A.R.S. § 13-2310(A). The Arizona Supreme Court has 

adopted a broad view of the statute. It concluded that fraudulent schemes 

and artifices can be “accomplished either by active misrepresentations, or 

omitting material facts which defendant knew were being misunderstood, 

or by stating half-truths, or by any combination of these methods.” State v. 

Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 423–24 (1983). The evidence at trial showed that, 

through misrepresentation and omission, Cline misled those associated 

with the Nelson and Porter Trusts to gain a benefit. Cline represented 

herself as a fiduciary, promising to function within that role ethically and 

in the best interest of the trusts. Cline then used her authority as trustee to 

sell trust property and transfer funds from the trust to her accounts. Cline 

made material omissions in her accounting, using vague and inflated 

numbers to conceal her misuse of trust assets. Even if some of the 

accounting contained “half-truths,” the elements of A.R.S. § 13-2310(A)

would still be satisfied. See id. at 423.

¶26 To secure a conviction for theft, the State had to prove that, 

without lawful authority, the defendant knowingly controlled the 

“property of another with the intent to deprive the other person of such 

property.” A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1). Theft of property valued at $25,000 or 

more is a Class 2 felony. A.R.S. § 13-1802(G). The statute applies to any

“unlawful ‘acquisition’ of property belonging to others.” State v. Tramble, 

144 Ariz. 48, 52 (1985). The evidence at trial showed that Cline transferred

most of the funds from the Nelson and Porter Trusts to her accounts, 

intending to deprive beneficiaries of trust assets. Cline’s role as trustee did 

not give her lawful authority, as she contends, to drain the trust accounts of 

assets or sell trust property without distributing the proceeds to the 

beneficiaries. The evidence satisfied the elements of A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1).

¶27 The court reached a legally correct decision by denying the 

motion for judgment of acquittal and provided jury instructions consistent 

with the relevant statutes and Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (“RAJI”). 

See RAJI Stat. Crim. 18.02.01, 23.10 (5th ed. 2019); see also State v. Noriega, 187 

Ariz. 282, 284 (App. 1996) (“The purpose of jury instructions is to inform 

the jury of the applicable law in understandable terms.”). The superior 

court did not err by denying Cline’s motion for judgment of acquittal under 

Rule 20(a)(1) and (b)(1).
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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C. The Superior Court Did Not Commit Misconduct.

¶28 Cline argues the superior court displayed a pattern of

hostility toward her, “systematically” denying her motions, applying the 

law incorrectly, and considering facts outside the scope of the case. She also

contends that the court acted “in the ‘absence of jurisdiction,’” and all 

rulings made after learning of the jurisdictional defect constituted 

misconduct. Because Cline did not raise these issues below, she is not 

entitled to relief absent fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Escalante, 245 

Ariz. 135, 140, 142, ¶¶ 12, 21 (2018).

¶29 The right to a fair trial necessarily includes “the right to have 

the trial presided over by a judge who is completely impartial and free of 

bias or prejudice.” State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. 110, 112 (1967). “Bias and prejudice 

mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will, or undue friendship or favoritism, 

toward one of the litigants.” State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 322 (1993). “Judicial 

rulings alone do not support a finding of bias or partiality without a 

showing of an extrajudicial source of bias or deep-seated favoritism.” State 

v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 342, ¶ 22 (App. 2020). Judges are presumptively 

impartial, and overcoming that presumption requires proof of actual, not 

speculative, bias. Id.

¶30 Cline has failed to overcome the presumption. The court gave

Cline ample time to litigate evidentiary and procedural issues. The court 

allowed her to file untimely pretrial motions and granted some. The court 

correctly ruled on the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, acting within its authority to try and sentence Cline. The court 

heard multiple post-verdict and post-sentencing motions, allowing Cline to

litigate issues, present mitigation, and challenge her sentences’ legality. The 

court did not appear partial, biased, or hostile, giving Cline leeway to 

present her chosen defense and litigate perceived issues. We find no error, 

fundamental or otherwise.

D. The State Did Not Commit Prosecutorial Error.

¶31 Cline contends that the cumulative effect of multiple 

instances of prosecutorial error prevented her from receiving a fair trial. 

Although Cline asserted claims of prosecutorial error in post-verdict 

pleadings, she did not raise the issues before or during the trial. We review 

solely for fundamental error because she failed to object to the alleged 

prosecutorial error. State v. Vargas, 251 Ariz. 157, 163, ¶ 10 (App. 2021) 

(citing Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12). We assess each allegation 

independently and consider whether they cumulatively led to an unfair 
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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trial. State v. Arias, 248 Ariz. 546, 556, ¶ 32 (App. 2020). A defendant will not 

prevail on such a claim without first showing that an error occurred. See id.

at 555, ¶ 31.

1. The State’s Closing Arguments Were Not Improper.

¶32 Cline argues that the State shifted the burden of proof in 

closing arguments by commenting on her failure to present evidence and 

referred to facts not in evidence by discussing how the sparse nature of her 

accounting demonstrated culpability.

¶33 Counsel is given “wide latitude” in closing arguments to the 

jury. State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 426 (1990). Counsel may summarize

properly admitted evidence, ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences, and 

suggest conclusions. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 602 (1993). Although the 

State must not shift the burden of persuasion to the defense, Sandstrom v. 

Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–24 (1979), the State may “comment on the 

defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence,” State ex rel. McDougall 

v. Corcoran, 153 Ariz. 157, 160 (1987). In determining whether the State’s 

closing arguments created an error, we consider “the context in which the 

statements were made as well as ‘the entire record and . . . the totality of the 

circumstances.’” State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180, 189, ¶ 39 (2012) (quoting State 

v. Rutledge, 205 Ariz. 7, 13, ¶ 33 (2003)).

¶34 The State’s comments fell within the latitude afforded to 

counsel in closing arguments. The State’s suggestion that Cline created the

accounting “after the fact” to conceal the offenses aligned with the admitted 

documents, which contained gaps, omissions, and non-specific dates. See 

State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 91 (App. 1997) (Argument of counsel is 

permitted if it is “sufficiently linked to the evidence.”). The jury could have 

drawn reasonable inferences that the accounting demonstrated culpability

and showed Cline’s attempt to make large transfers of funds appear 

legitimate. Nor did the State commit error by pointing out that Cline could 

have provided the authorities with exculpatory documentation. As the 

superior court noted, the argument constituted proper rebuttal. See State v. 

Edmisten, 220 Ariz. 517, 525, ¶ 25 (App. 2009) (The court found the 

prosecutor’s rebuttal argument appropriate when the defendant “opened 

the door to such argument, and the prosecutor was entitled to respond.”). 

The State did not argue facts not in evidence and did not engage in 

burden-shifting.
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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2. The State Did Not Present False Testimony.

¶35 Cline contends that the State introduced perjured testimony 

in the grand jury proceedings and at the trial, claiming the State’s witnesses 

gave false statements about the location of the offenses and conduct related 

to the Kennedy Trust. While the State must not knowingly use false or 

perjured testimony to obtain a conviction, an inconsistency in witness 

testimony does not constitute perjury. State v. Ferrari, 112 Ariz. 324, 334 

(1975). Such testimony is simply fodder for cross-examination or 

impeachment, to be considered by the jury in assessing witness credibility. 

See id. Even so, the prejudicial impact of materially false testimony can be 

cured if corrected through further witness examination. See State v. 

Holsinger, 115 Ariz. 89, 92–93 (1977).

¶36 The State did not present false testimony at any stage of the 

proceedings. The lead detective testified to the grand jury that the offenses 

occurred in Yavapai County. This proved true at trial when the State 

presented evidence that trust property, beneficiaries, and the execution of 

trusts fell within Yavapai County. The detective did not commit perjury. 

See A.R.S. § 13-109(A) (“Criminal prosecutions shall be tried in the county 

in which conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such 

conduct occurred.”).

¶37 At trial, parties associated with the Kennedy Trust gave 

conflicting testimony about Cline’s purported misuse of funds. Cline 

impeached the witnesses with evidence showing she made legitimate 

purchases for Kennedy’s benefit. As Cline concedes, she cured 

inconsistencies in this testimony and later obtained dismissals for all counts 

associated with the Kennedy Trust. Cline has shown no error.

¶38 Having addressed each instance in turn, we find no error. 

Without such a finding, Cline has failed to show the cumulative effect of 

the alleged conduct so infected her trial with unfairness that she was denied 

due process.

E. The Superior Court Did Not Commit Reversible Sentencing Error.

¶39 Cline raises several alleged sentencing errors. We generally

review sentencing claims for an abuse of discretion, State v. Jenkins, 193 

Ariz. 115, 121, ¶ 25 (App. 1998), but we review un-objected sentencing 

orders for fundamental error, see Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12. We review 

the superior court’s application of sentencing statutes and issues of

statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Lambright, 243 Ariz. 244, 249, ¶ 9 

(App. 2017). We will not remand for resentencing if the sentences fall within 
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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the prescribed statutory range. State v. Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 12 

(App. 2006).

1. The Record Establishes Cline’s Prior Felony Conviction.

¶40 Cline argues the superior court erred by finding she had one 

non-historical prior felony conviction, incorrectly sentencing her as a 

repetitive offender under A.R.S. § 13-703(A) and conducting a priors trial 

after sentencing. Cline does not explicitly challenge the accuracy of the 

conviction records presented at the priors trial, nor does she argue the State

would be unable to prove the conviction if remanded for resentencing.

¶41 To enhance a defendant’s sentence with a prior conviction,

the defendant must admit, or the State must prove, the existence of the 

conviction. State v. Morales, 215 Ariz. 59, 61, ¶¶ 6–7 (2007). Without such

evidence, the imposition of an enhanced sentence is fundamental error. See 

id. at 61–62, ¶ 10. The typical remedy for such error would be to remand for 

“a resentencing hearing at which the state will be put to its burden of 

proving the prior conviction.” Id. at 62, ¶ 13. But we need not remand for 

resentencing when the record proves the existence of the prior felony 

conviction. See id. Even without a priors trial, resentencing is not required 

if “there would be no point in remanding for a hearing” to admit the 

conviction records again. Id.

¶42 First, Cline’s prior can be sufficiently gleaned from the 

presentencing report and sentencing record. The superior court presided 

over the trial in the 2017 case, the parties acknowledged the disposition of 

the case several times, and Cline only argued that the offenses in the case 

constituted one non-historical prior felony conviction. Agreeing with Cline, 

the court found the non-historical prior felony conviction represented the 

first offense, Counts 1 and 2 represented the second, category one repetitive 

offense, and Counts 3 and 4 represented the third, category two repetitive 

offense. These sentences comply with the versions of A.R.S. § 13-703 in 

effect during the offenses. See 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 43, § 2; 2015 Ariz. 

Sess. Laws, ch. 74, § 2; 2013 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 55, § 3. We need not 

remand for resentencing when the record establishes the prior conviction. 

See Morales, 215 Ariz. at 62, ¶ 13.

¶43 Second, the superior court’s decision to conduct a 

post-sentencing priors trial does not warrant resentencing. Allowing 

further testimony and correcting potential errors is the remedy afforded a 

motion for new sentencing. Cline does not deny that the jury found her 

guilty in the 2017 case, and she does not claim the State would be unable to 
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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prove the existence of her conviction. See State v. Miller, 215 Ariz. 40, 44, ¶ 13 

(App. 2007) (Remand was unnecessary when the defendant failed to 

“suggest that he was not convicted of the felonies at issue or that the state 

would have been unable to produce the necessary documentary 

evidence.”).

2. Remand Is Not Required Under the Applicable Version of 

A.R.S. § 13-711(A).

¶44 Cline argues the superior court failed to provide an adequate 

reason for running her sentences consecutively to those in the 2017 case, as 

required by A.R.S. § 13-711(A).

¶45 Under the version of A.R.S. § 13-711(A) in effect at the time of 

the offenses, “if multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a 

person at the same time, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall 

run consecutively unless the court expressly directs otherwise, in which 

case the court shall set forth on the record the reason for its sentence.” 2008

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 301, § 27 (emphasis added). The language of this 

statute is triggered only when multiple sentences are imposed “at the same 

time.” Id. Not when, as here, the superior court orders the sentences to be 

served consecutively to sentences imposed in another case. Nothing in 

A.R.S. § 13-711(A) required the court to impose concurrent sentences in 

both cases or to articulate its reasons. Moreover, even if the statute required 

a basis for imposing a sentence consecutively to another case, the court 

stated its reasons: multiple victims. No more explanation was needed.

3. The Superior Court Did Not Err When Awarding 

Presentence Incarceration Credit.

¶46 Cline contends that she is entitled to presentence 

incarceration credit for all time spent in custody before and after sentencing 

in the 2017 case. A defendant sentenced to consecutive sentences has a right 

to credit on just one sentence, “even if the defendant was in custody 

pursuant to all of the underlying charges prior to trial.” State v. McClure, 189 

Ariz. 55, 57 (App. 1997). A defendant is not entitled to “double credit” for 

time served. State v. Cuen, 158 Ariz. 86, 88 (App. 1988). Because the superior 

court ran Cline’s sentences consecutively to those in the 2017 case, she is not 

entitled to “double credit” for time applied to her sentences in that case. We 

find no error in the court’s award of two days’ credit.
STATE v. CLINE

Decision of the Court

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4. Cline Failed to Raise Additional Claims of Sentencing Error 

Adequately.

¶47 Finally, Cline raises several other alleged sentencing issues

without sufficient argument or citation to the record, including claims the

superior court used false information in the presentence report, denied her 

the right to allocution, and incorrectly interpreted sentencing statutes. 

¶48 “Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment 

and waiver of that claim.” State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989); see also

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7)(A) (Arguments must contain “supporting 

reasons for each contention” and “citations of legal authorities and 

appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant 

relies.”). Waiver aside, the record does not suggest any defects at sentencing 

requiring reversal. Cline had the chance to litigate any perceived pre- and 

post-sentencing issues fully. The superior court considered proper factors 

when imposing sentences within the prescribed statutory range and gave 

Cline considerable leeway in pleading for leniency. See Munninger, 213 Ariz. 

at 397, ¶¶ 11–12. None of the alleged errors require remand for 

resentencing.

CONCLUSION

¶49 We affirm.