J-S41003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHNATHAN REDDICK,

Appellant No. 1284 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006774-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 22, 2016

Appellant, Johnathan Reddick, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ 

probation, imposed after he was convicted of receiving stolen property 

(RSP), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a), and unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3928(a). On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and 

weight of the evidence, as well as the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

After careful review, we are compelled to affirm.

Appellant was charged with the above-stated offenses after he was 

stopped by police on March 16, 2009, driving a stolen vehicle. Appellant 

proceeded to a non-jury trial on December 10, 2012. At the conclusion of 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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that proceeding, the court found Appellant guilty of RSP and UUV. On 

December 17, 2014,1 he was sentenced to a term of 2 to 4 years’ 

incarceration, and 3 years’ probation, for his RSP conviction. Appellant also 

received a concurrent term of 2 years’ probation for UUV. Appellant filed a 

timely post-sentence motion, which was denied by operation of law on April 

23, 2015. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, and also timely complied 

with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on September 18, 2015. Herein, Appellant presents three claims for our 

review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict Appellant of 

[RSP], 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925, and [UUV], 18 Pa.C.S. § 3928?

II. Whether the weight of the evidence is against Appellant’s 

convictions for [RSP], 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925, and [UUV], 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3928?

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Appellant to 2-4 years[’] incarceration followed by 3 

years[’] reporting probation[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions. 

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

____________________________________________

1 We note that the lengthy delay between Appellant’s conviction and 

sentencing was due to Appellant’s absconding following the court’s verdict. 

See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 12/17/14, at 4-5.
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most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Appellant was convicted of RSP and UUV. Those crimes are defined, 

respectively, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property 

of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 

has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, 

retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of 

the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane, 

motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of 

another without consent of the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a). 

In regard to a conviction for these two offenses, premised on the 

defendant’s possession of a stolen vehicle, this Court has explained: 

In order to convict [a defendant] of [RSP], it [is] necessary 

for the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the vehicle was stolen, that [the defendant] was in possession of 

it and that he had guilty knowledge; that is, he knew or had 

reason to know that it was stolen. 

In addition, a conviction for [UUV] must be predicated on 

proof that the defendant operated the vehicle without the 

owner's consent and that the defendant knew or had reason to 

know that he lacked the owner's permission to operate the 

vehicle. 
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...

[T]he intent requirement, i.e., the requisite knowledge that 

the car was stolen can be shown entirely through circumstantial 

evidence. While it is clear that mere possession without more is 

insufficient to show that the defendant knew or should have 

known that the property was stolen, other facts can make the 

inference of guilty knowledge reasonable, even compelling. Such 

circumstances include but are not limited to the unexplained 

possession of recently stolen property, flight from the police or 

other evidence indicating an attempt to avoid capture and the 

condition of the property indicating a theft.4

4 This court has noted that relevant considerations which 

may support an inference of guilty knowledge include an 

accused's conduct at arrest and conduct while in 

possession; the time elapsed between the accused's 

possession and the theft; the type of property; the situs of 

the theft and the situs of the possession; the value of the 

property and the price paid for the property; and the 

quantity of the property.

Commonwealth v. Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa. Super. 1991) 

(internal citations, quotation marks, and one footnote omitted).

The totality of the evidence presented at Appellant’s non-jury trial was 

as follows. Philadelphia Police Officer James Dorsey testified that on March 

16, 2009, at approximately 6:00 p.m., he stopped a 2009 Chevrolet Tahoe 

that was being driven by Appellant. N.T. Trial, 12/10/12, at 8-9, 13. Officer 

Dorsey asked Appellant if he owned the vehicle, and Appellant replied that 

he did. Id. at 12. However, Appellant then changed his statement and 

claimed that the vehicle “belonged to a relative.” Id. 

After Officer Dorsey’s testimony, Appellant and the Commonwealth 

stipulated that if called to the stand, Thomas Ercolani would testify that he 

owned a car dealership located in Media, Pennsylvania, and that his 
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dealership owned the 2009 Tahoe that Appellant was driving when he was 

stopped by Officer Dorsey. Id. at 15. Ercolani would have further stated 

that he last saw that vehicle on March 14, 2009, at approximately 5 p.m., 

and that neither Appellant, nor anyone else, had permission to be driving the 

vehicle on March 16, 2009. Id. at 15. Ercolani would have also testified 

that he employed, at the dealership, a man by the name of Dennis Arnold.2 

Id. 

Appellant then took the stand in his own defense, testifying that he 

had borrowed the Tahoe from his brother, Darren Arnold, who was a “sales 

rep” at Ercolani’s car dealership.3 Id. at 17, 20. Appellant explained that he 

had asked Arnold if he could “test drive one of the vehicles” from the 

dealership, and Arnold agreed to let him borrow the 2009 Tahoe “for the 

weekend.” Id. at 17, 18. Appellant claimed that Arnold brought the Tahoe 

to Appellant’s house, and that Appellant had no idea that the vehicle was 

stolen from the dealership until he was stopped by Officer Ercolani. Id. at 

17, 18. Appellant denied telling Officer Dorsey that the vehicle belonged to 

him; instead, he testified that he told the officer that he “got the car from ... 

the dealer, from the sale rep.” Id. at 19. On cross-examination, the 

____________________________________________

2 The record indicates that this employee’s name was actually Darren Arnold, 

rather than Dennis Arnold. See id. at 17.

3 Arnold did not testify at trial. See id. at 20 (Appellant’s confirming that 

Arnold was not present to testify). 
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Commonwealth asked Appellant: “You didn’t have any ownership papers or 

anything for the car, right?” Appellant replied, “No.” Id. at 19. Later, the 

court questioned Appellant, and he responded, as follows:

THE COURT: And you didn’t have any owner’s card or insurance 

information, you had nothing in the car?

[Appellant]: I mean other than the information that was given 

through -- once he dropped the car off. I mean, as far as like, 

hey, you have the -- it’s a little chart that you basically fill out 

that says, hey, you have the car for the day.

THE COURT: For the day?

[Appellant]: Not for the -- well, for the duration is what I mean, 

not for the day, just for the weekend is what I have the car for.

Id. at 21. After this exchange, Appellant’s testimony concluded, and the 

parties stipulated that Appellant had been convicted of a misdemeanor theft 

offense in 2008.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as we must, we are compelled to deem the circumstantial 

evidence sufficient to prove that Appellant knew, or should have known, that 

the vehicle he was driving was stolen. Most notably, when stopped by 

Officer Dorsey while driving the Tahoe, Appellant provided false statements 

to the officer regarding who owned the vehicle. These false statements 

made it reasonable for the court to infer that Appellant had a guilty 

conscious, and/or was attempting to mislead the officer, because he knew 

he was driving a car that had been illegally taken from the car dealership. 

See Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 653 A.2d 35, 37 (Pa. Super. 1995) 
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(“Fabrication of false and contradictory statements by the accused is 

evidence from which a jury may infer that they were made with the intent to 

mislead police and are indicative of guilt.”) (citation omitted). In addition, 

Appellant admitted that the Tahoe he was driving did not contain any 

ownership papers, insurance information, or any other documentation. 

Appellant should have suspected, from this lack of documentation, that the 

car had not been legally removed from its owner, the dealership. Thus, it 

supports Appellant’s guilty knowledge. Finally, Appellant’s prior crimen falsi 

offense called into question his overall credibility, and reasonably cast doubt 

on the veracity of his testimony that he believed he validly possessed the 

stolen vehicle. Considering the totality of these facts, and all reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from them, we are compelled to conclude that 

the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of RSP. Likewise, for these 

same reasons, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant knew, or 

should have known, that he was operating the vehicle without the consent of 

the owner, i.e., Ercolani’s dealership. Accordingly, his conviction for UUV is 

also supported by sufficient evidence.

Next, we address Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. 

Essentially, Appellant reiterates his argument that the evidence was “so 

tenuous” regarding his knowledge that the vehicle was stolen that it 

amounted to “virtually no proof whatsoever.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. In 

reviewing Appellant’s argument, we keep in mind that:
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A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-1136 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, in rejecting Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim, the trial 

court reasoned:

In this case, the [c]ourt found the evidence and testimony 

presented by the prosecution credible and did not find [] 

Appellant’s testimony credible. When confronted by the police 

with the question of the Tahoe’s ownership, it was telling that [] 

Appellant changed his original statement of ownership and didn’t 

possess any documents from the dealership showing that he had 

permission to drive the Tahoe. From these facts this [c]ourt 

determined that Appellant failed to obtain permission from the 

owner to drive the vehicle and knew he did not have permission, 

notwithstanding Appellant’s trial testimony, at odds with Officer 

Dorsey’s, as he claims he never said the vehicle was his. 

Therefore, this [c]ourt properly exercised its rights as finder of 

fact to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and, in this case, 

determined that [] Appellant lacked credibility, warranting his 

conviction.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/16/15, at 4-5.

Appellant’s argument, which is essentially a reiteration of his challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence, does not convince us that the trial court 
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abused its discretion by denying his weight-of-the-evidence claim. The court 

believed Officer Dorsey and did not believe Appellant; this Court may not reassess the credibility of a witness’ testimony. See Commonwealth v. 

Hankerson, 118 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2015). Based on our discussion 

of Appellant’s sufficiency claim, supra, the court’s verdict does not shock 

one’s sense of justice, so as to warrant this Court’s reversing that verdict. 

See id. (“An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so 

contrary to the evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice.”). 

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence.

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to 

pursue such a claim is not absolute. When challenging the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, an appellant 

must present a substantial question as to the inappropriateness 

of the sentence. Two requirements must be met before we will 

review this challenge on its merits. First, an appellant must set 

forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon 

for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence. Second, the appellant must show that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. That is, [that] the 

sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing 

scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. We 

examine an appellant’s [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(f) statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry 

must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in 

contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary 

only to decide the appeal on the merits. 

Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations, quotation marks and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
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Here, Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief 

which states, in its entirety: “Appellant presented multiple mitigating factors 

including his rehabilitative potential, yet his sentence was beyond the 

aggravated range, which was an abuse of discretion by the court.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant’s single sentence does not identify how the 

court’s sentence violated a specific provision of the Sentencing Code, or a 

particular, fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. 

Accordingly, Appellant has not convinced us that a substantial question 

exists for our review. 

In any event, we would deem Appellant’s sentencing challenge 

meritless. As this Court has stated: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted).

Appellant essentially contends that the court “weighed excessively 

[Appellant’s] risk to reoffend[,]” and did not consider mitigating factors, 

such as Appellant’s “remorse and determination to change his ways.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 19, 20. After reviewing the record, we disagree. 

Certainly, the court considered Appellant’s extensive criminal history, which 
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was outlined in his presentence report. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 3-4. 

The court also took into account the presentence investigator’s conclusion 

that Appellant poses “a significant risk for incurring future offenses....” Id. 

at 4. While Appellant claims that the court only considered these facts, and 

did not take into account his remorse and desire to change, the record does 

not support this argument. The court listened to Appellant’s statements at 

the sentencing hearing, id. at 8-10, but concluded that his conduct belied 

his expressions of remorse and desire to change. Specifically, the court 

stressed that Appellant absconded for a lengthy period of time following the 

verdict, and he was disrespectful during the presentence investigation by 

refusing to answer questions and by providing misleading/incorrect 

information to the investigator. See id. at 3-4; TCO at 10-11. The court 

also found that Appellant made “misleading” statements during the 

sentencing hearing by blaming his conduct during the presentence 

investigation on a concussion he suffered years earlier. See TCO at 11 

(citing N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 15). Therefore, it is apparent that the 

court considered Appellant’s claims of remorse and desire to change, but 

found those assertions unconvincing in light of his conduct and lengthy 

criminal history. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument herein would not 

convince us that the court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2016