Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC2021-0651

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CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

vs.

FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

November 30, 2023

COURIEL, J.

This case arises from two unrelated but contemporaneous 

episodes in which a Tallahassee police officer, asserting selfdefense, used lethal force in detaining a suspect. Each officer

invoked the protections of article I, section 16(b)-(e) of the Florida 

Constitution, an amendment adopted by Florida voters that is 

colloquially known as Marsy’s Law. The amendment enumerates 

certain rights of crime victims “to achieve justice, ensure a 

meaningful role throughout the criminal and juvenile justice 

systems for crime victims, and ensure that crime victims’ rights and 

interests are respected and protected by law in a manner no less 
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vigorous than protections afforded to criminal defendants and 

juvenile delinquents.” Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const.

The City of Tallahassee (City) proposed to release the two 

officers’ names to the public. The Florida Police Benevolent 

Association (FPBA) sought an emergency injunction to prevent that 

from happening. The trial court decided not to issue that 

injunction; the FPBA appealed, and the trial court’s order requiring 

disclosure of the officers’ names was stayed pending appeal. The 

dispute ultimately made its way here.1

To determine whether the officers’ names can be released, we 

have been asked three questions: First, can police officers acting in 

an official capacity be Marsy’s Law “victims”? Second, does Marsy’s 

Law require the commencement of a criminal proceeding to take 

effect? And third, does Marsy’s Law contain a right for victims to 

remain anonymous?

1. We have jurisdiction because the First District Court of 

Appeal’s decision below in Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. 

City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), expressly 

construes article I, section 16(b) and (e), provisions of the Florida 

Constitution. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
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We need only answer the third question to resolve this case:

Marsy’s Law guarantees to no victim—police officer or otherwise—

the categorical right to withhold his or her name from disclosure.

No such right is enumerated in the text of article I, section 16(b) of 

the Florida Constitution. Nor, as a matter of structure, would such 

a right readily fit with two other guarantees contained in article I: 

the right expressed in section 16(a) of the criminally accused “to 

confront at trial adverse witnesses,” and the right found in section 

24(a) of every person to inspect or copy public records.

We decide only what Marsy’s Law says and does not say; we 

do not pass upon the validity of any statutory right of certain 

persons, in certain situations, to withhold their identities from 

disclosure.

I

A

Florida’s constitution requires that every twenty years, a 

Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) convene to “examine the 

constitution of the state, hold public hearings, and, not later than 

one hundred eighty days prior to the next general election, file with 

the custodian of state records its proposal, if any, of a revision of 
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[the] constitution or any part of it.” Art. XI, § 2, Fla. Const. Brief 

summaries of these amendments are then included on the ballot for 

voters to approve or reject.

In 2018, the CRC proposed several amendments, one of 

which—Amendment 6—included Marsy’s Law. The proposed ballot 

title and summary for Amendment 6 read in relevant part:

RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS . . . . Creates constitutional 

rights for victims of crime; requires courts to facilitate 

victims’ rights; authorizes victims to enforce their rights 

throughout criminal and juvenile justice processes.

Dep’t of State v. Hollander, 256 So. 3d 1300, 1306 (Fla. 2018). 

Three individual plaintiffs and the League of Women Voters filed 

complaints in the circuit court arguing that the ballot title and 

summary were misleading. In Hollander, we rejected these 

consolidated claims, holding that the ballot title and summary 

reasonably informed voters of the chief purpose and effect of 

Amendment 6. Id. at 1311. And in the subsequent general election 

of 2018, Florida voters approved the proposed amendment.

The provision states that “every victim is entitled to [various]

rights, beginning at the time of his or her victimization,” art. I, 

§ 16(b), Fla. Const., including “[t]he right to prevent the disclosure 
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of information or records that could be used to locate or harass the 

victim or the victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or 

privileged information of the victim,” art. I, § 16(b)(5), Fla. Const. 

And a “victim,” according to Marsy’s Law, “is a person who suffers 

direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a 

result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or 

delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is 

committed.” Art. I, § 16(e), Fla. Const.

B

On May 19, 2020, a man rushed at a Tallahassee police officer

with a hunting knife. The officer defended himself by fatally 

shooting the assailant. Eight days later, on May 27, a different 

Tallahassee police officer responded to a crime in progress. The 

perpetrator, who had just stabbed a man to death, aimed a gun at 

the officer. The officer defended himself by shooting the man, 

killing him. A grand jury investigated each shooting and 
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determined in each case that the shooting was lawful and a 

justifiable use of force.2

Reporters sought disclosure of the officers’ names from the 

City. The officers, however, asserted that they qualified for Marsy’s 

Law protections because they were victims of the assaults from 

which they had defended themselves. And as Marsy’s Law victims, 

the officers argued, they were entitled to prevent the release of their 

personal identifying information, including their names. The City 

was not swayed.

The FPBA sued the City on June 12, 2020,3 seeking a

declaratory judgment, mandamus relief, and injunctive relief. The 

2. Regarding the May 19 incident, the grand jury concluded 

that the assailant’s decision to possess a knife, to conceal himself 

and his weapon, and to charge towards the officer with the knife 

created a situation in which the officer was reasonably put in fear of 

imminent bodily harm or death. See Respondents’ Answer Brief on 

the Merits at 6 nn.9-10. The grand jury found similarly regarding

the May 27 incident, concluding that the assailant’s actions of 

pointing a gun at the officer while advancing towards the officer 

created a situation in which the officer was reasonably put in fear of 

imminent bodily harm or death. See id. at 14 nn.21-22.

3. By this point, the News Media Coalition had intervened, 

consisting of (1) the First Amendment Foundation; (2) the Florida 

Press Association; (3) Gannett Company, Inc. (whose Florida 

properties include the Tallahassee Democrat); (4) The McClatchy 
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circuit court denied the petition and ordered that the names of the 

officers be released. The First District Court of Appeal reversed. 

See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 

3d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). According to the First District, (1) 

“[n]othing in article I, section 16 excludes law enforcement 

officers—or other government employees—from the protections 

granted crime victims,” id. at 801-02; (2) “a criminal prosecution 

need not begin before a victim may assert his rights under article I, 

section 16(e),” id. at 803-04; and (3) article I, section 16(b)(5) 

“includes records that could reveal the victim’s . . . identity,” in this 

case the officers’ names, id. at 804.

The City and the News Media Coalition (Coalition) then 

petitioned this Court to reverse the First District’s decision. The 

trial court’s order, requiring the release of documents identifying 

the police officers’ names, was stayed pending appeal.4

Company, LLC (doing business as Miami Herald); and (5) The New 

York Times Company.

4. The City asks us to hold “(1) that police officers acting in an 

official capacity are not ‘victims’ under Marsy’s Law; (2) that Marsy’s 

Law requires the commencement of a criminal proceeding; and (3) 

that Marsy’s Law contains no right for victims to remain 
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II

Interpreting the Florida Constitution is a matter of law that we 

undertake de novo. See W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 

3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012) (“Statutory and constitutional construction are 

questions of law subject to a de novo review.”). In so doing, we 

begin, and for good reason often end, with its words. Advisory Op. 

to the Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting 

Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (“First and 

foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used in the 

Constitution.”). And we give the words of the constitution their 

plain, usual, ordinary, and commonly accepted meanings at the 

time they were written. See Brinkmann v. Francois, 184 So. 3d 504, 

510 (Fla. 2016) (“[W]ords used in the constitution should be given 

their usual and ordinary meaning because such is the meaning 

anonymous.” Petitioner’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 42. 

Similarly, the Coalition urges us to “hold that law enforcement 

officers cannot seek ‘victim’ status refuge under Marsy’s Law to hide 

their identities as it relates to deadly conduct taken in the name of 

government” and “that the mere identity (i.e., the name) of a Marsy’s 

Law crime ‘victim’ is never protected.” Petitioner News Media 

Coalition’s Initial Merits Brief at 4-5. The FPBA, on the other hand, 

simply asks us to “adopt[] and approve[]” the First District’s 

decision. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits at 47.
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most likely intended by the people who adopted the constitution.” 

(quoting Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 990 So. 2d 503, 512

(Fla. 2008))). “To discern that ordinary meaning . . . words must be 

read and interpreted in their context, not in isolation.” Sw. Airlines 

Co. v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1788 (2022) (cleaned up).

Applying these interpretive principles to this case, we conclude 

that Marsy’s Law does not guarantee to a victim the categorical 

right to withhold his or her name from disclosure. In their ordinary 

and plain usage, the relevant words of our Constitution,

“information or records that could be used to locate or harass the 

victim or the victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or 

privileged information of the victim,” art. I, § 16(b)(5), Fla. Const., 

do not encompass the victim’s identity.

A

We first consider whether a victim’s name qualifies as 

“information or records that could be used to locate or harass the 

victim or the victim’s family.” Art. I, § 16(b)(5), Fla. Const. Yes, 

says the FPBA, as a victim’s name can be used, (crucially) along 

with other information, to do what the Constitution forbids. What’s 

more, it contends, unless a situation arises in which having a 
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victim’s name could not assist in locating the victim or the victim’s 

family, Marsy’s Law requires concealment of the victim’s name upon 

his or her request.

Fairly read, the text does no such thing. For it is one thing to 

identify a person and another altogether to locate or harass5 him or 

her. “Widely circulated dictionaries are helpful for identifying the 

plain meaning of constitutional language.” Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. 

Progressive Select Ins. Co., 260 So. 3d 1038, 1043 (Fla. 2018). To 

“identify” a person is to “fix the identity of” him or her. Identify,

Webster’s New World College Dictionary 722 (5th ed. 2018). But to 

“locate” a person is to “establish [that he or she is] in a certain 

place.” Locate, Webster’s New World College Dictionary 855 (5th ed. 

2018).6 To “identify” someone, then, is to distinguish him or her 

5. The City and the Coalition focus primarily on the 

connection between identifying and locating a victim, perhaps upon 

the assumption that locating an individual is a predicate to his or 

her harassment. But see infra note 8.

6. Likewise, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 

Language defines the verb “identify” as “[t]o establish or recognize 

the identity of” or to “ascertain as a certain person . . . .” Identify,

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 872 (5th 

ed. 2011). And it defines the verb “locate” as “[t]o place at a certain 
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from other persons; to “locate” that person is to determine his or 

her physical whereabouts. The “information or records” from 

section 16(b)(5) that could be used to accomplish the former are not 

necessarily the same as those that could be used to accomplish the 

latter. Marsy’s Law speaks only to the right of victims to “prevent 

the disclosure of information or records that could be used to locate 

or harass” them or their families. Art. I, § 16(b)(5), Fla. Const.

One’s name, standing alone, is not that kind of information or 

record; it communicates nothing about where the individual can be 

found and bothered.

In other provisions, our Constitution expressly addresses the 

disclosure of a person’s identity. See art. X, § 25(b), Fla. Const. (“In 

providing such access [to certain medical records], the identity of 

patients involved in the incidents shall not be disclosed . . . .”) 

(emphasis added); art. X, § 29(d)(4), Fla. Const. (“All records 

containing the identity of qualifying patients shall be confidential 

and kept from public disclosure . . . .”) (emphasis added). We are 

location . . . .” Locate, The American Heritage Dictionary of the 

English Language 1029 (5th ed. 2011).
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not persuaded that Florida voters ratified an implicit guarantee 

that, elsewhere in the same constitution, is expressly stated. See 

Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 524 

(Fla. 2018) (“A proposed amendment ‘must stand on its own merits 

and not be disguised as something else.’ ” (quoting Askew v. 

Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982))).

Similarly, when our statutes reflect a legislative bargain to 

conceal the identities of persons, they do so expressly. We see this 

in section 119.071, Florida Statutes (2018),7 the very legislation

that discusses, among other things, confidentiality, public records, 

and crime victims. See, e.g., § 119.071(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (“Any 

information revealing the identity of a confidential informant or a 

confidential source is exempt” from public records requirements.) 

(emphasis added); § 119.071(2)(h), Fla. Stat. (exempting from 

disclosure any criminal intelligence or criminal investigative 

information “that reveals the identity” of the victim of certain 

offenses including child abuse, sexual battery, and other sexual 

7. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Florida Statutes 

will be to those that were on the books in 2018, the year Marsy’s 

Law was ratified.
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offenses); § 119.071(2)(j)1., Fla. Stat. (exempting from disclosure 

“[a]ny document that reveals the identity, home or employment 

telephone number, home or employment address, or personal 

assets of the victim of a crime and identifies that person as the 

victim of a crime”).

This stands to reason, for in enacting the Crime Victims 

Protection Act, the Florida Legislature expressly found “that it is a 

public necessity that disclosure to the public of victims’ identities be 

limited as provided for in this act.” Ch. 95-207 § 2(5), Laws of Fla. 

(emphasis added). Likewise, laws that provide for the concealment 

of the identities of other classes of persons also do so with express 

reference to their identities. See, e.g., § 430.504, Fla. Stat. 

(providing that certain “information may not be disclosed publicly in 

such a manner as to identify a person who receives [certain] 

services”) (emphasis added); § 430.608(1), Fla. Stat. (“Identifying

information about elderly persons who receive [certain] services . . .

is confidential and exempt” from public records requirements.); 

§ 458.3193(3), Fla. Stat. (“The agreement must restrict the release 

of information that would identify individuals . . . .”).
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Section 119.071, Florida Statutes, provides another clue that

“locate” and “identify” have different meanings relevant to our case.

The two words—or derivations or synonyms of them—frequently 

appear in conjunction with each other; they would not if just one 

would suffice to communicate both ideas. See § 119.071(2)(h)2.b., 

Fla. Stat. (allowing for the disclosure of certain information if its 

“release would assist in locating or identifying a person that such 

agency believes to be missing or endangered”) (emphasis added); 

§ 119.071(4)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (preventing from public disclosure—in 

twenty-two instances—the names and locations of agency personnel 

and their family members); § 119.071(5)(c)2., Fla. Stat. 

(“Information that would identify or locate a child who participates 

in a government-sponsored recreation program is exempt from” 

certain public disclosure requirements.); § 119.071(5)(c)3., Fla. Stat. 

(same, but for the parents or guardians of those children). This 

usage is repeated elsewhere in our statutes. See, e.g.,

§ 914.27(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (exempting from public records 

requirements “information” that “discloses: [t]he identity or location

of a victim or witness who has been identified or certified for 

protective or relocation services”); § 943.0583(11)(b)2., Fla. Stat. 
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(“The information provided should be limited to that needed to 

identify or locate the victim.”). We break no new ground by giving 

different effect to these different words. See Parrish v. State Farm 

Fla. Ins. Co., 356 So. 3d 771, 777 (Fla. 2023) (“Our Legislature, too, 

has been choosy about [the words disinterested and independent], 

using them together where the use of one would have sufficed if 

they meant the same thing.”). These statutory distinctions between 

the verbs to “locate” and to “identify” are relevant to our 

understanding of Marsy’s Law: they are evidence that, in our laws 

as in the minds of the ordinary people they govern, those words 

mean different things, and are used on purpose when they are 

chosen—together or separately.

Protecting crime victims from being located—as opposed to 

identified—is a meaningful distinction, for exposure of a crime 

victim’s location creates a threat of physical danger that exposure of 

his or her name alone does not generally pose.8 And even though 

8. Of course, a victim may be illegally defamed or threatened 

even if his or her physical location is unknown. See, e.g.,

§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (“‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of 

conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial 

emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate 
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any number of facts can be used to identify a crime victim, such as 

physical characteristics, sex, age, nationality, or occupation, the 

Florida Constitution says nothing about protecting the disclosure of 

those facts. That is because the constitutional text does not 

guarantee the concealment of absolutely any fact that might be 

used to identify a victim—to pick him or her out from among 

others—but on “prevent[ing] the disclosure of information or 

records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the 

victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or privileged 

information of the victim.” Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const.

B

That the plain language of section 16(b)(5) does not explicitly 

protect a victim’s name from disclosure stands to reason. For if it 

did, it would raise serious doubt about how to square a victim’s 

purpose.”). Our decision today does not lessen a victim’s protection 

from such harassment, even if it is accomplished without reference 

to his or her physical location. We conclude only that the plain 

language of Marsy’s Law, correctly understood in its constitutional 

context, does not guarantee in every case a victim’s right to avoid 

such harassment by remaining anonymous. 
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rights under Marsy’s Law and a defendant’s right to “confront at 

trial adverse witnesses.” Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.9

The right to confront adverse witnesses at trial has been “a 

cornerstone of Western society for a number of centuries,” Harrell v. 

State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Fla. 1998), and it has long been 

9. Neither shooting at issue here resulted in a trial because,

in each case, the assailant perished and the grand jury concluded 

the police officer’s conduct was lawful. While we therefore have no 

occasion to rule upon any specific confrontation-related objection or 

argument to a victim’s invocation of Marsy’s Law made at a trial, we 

nonetheless consider the confrontation clause because determining 

the original public meaning of Marsy’s Law requires us to consult 

its constitutional context. See Advisory Op. to Governor—1996 

Amend. 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997) 

(“Amendment 5 does not exist in isolation; it was incorporated into 

an existing section . . . . Where the constitution contains multiple 

provisions on the same subject, they must be read in pari materia 

to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each 

provision.”).
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secured by both the United States10 and Florida Constitutions.11 In 

almost all cases, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to physically confront accusers,” id. at 1368, 

and to “cross-examine the witnesses against him,” Brown v. State, 

10. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” 

Amend. VI, U.S. Const. In an earlier case, after “[n]oting the 

similarities between the confrontation clauses of the federal and 

Florida constitutions, we perceive[d] no reason to interpret article I, 

section 16, of the Florida Constitution any differently than its 

federal counterpart” on the issue then before us. Perez v. State, 536 

So. 2d 206, 209 n.4 (Fla. 1988). No party has suggested a reason to 

think that the original public meanings of the clauses differ with 

respect to witness anonymity as that issue is presented in this case.

But in interpreting the words of our state Constitution, we remain 

“bound under federalist principles to give primacy to our state 

Constitution and to give independent legal import to every phrase 

and clause contained therein.” Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 

962 (Fla. 1992).

11. A confrontation right was guaranteed in Florida’s first 

constitution, which provided “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 

against him.” Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (1838). The language 

remained the same in Florida’s next two constitutions, see art. I, 

§ 10, Fla. Const. (1861); art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (1865), but the 

clause was omitted from the 1868 Constitution. In 1885, it was 

reinserted, and provided that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him 

face to face.” Declaration of Rights, § 11, Fla. Const. (1885). The 

clause took its present form in 1968. See art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.
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471 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1985).12 “Through confrontation and crossexamination, defendants have the means of testing the accuracy of 

witnesses’ testimony.” Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 955 (Fla. 

1999); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[The 

federal Confrontation Clause] is a procedural rather than a 

substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, 

but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 

12. The “principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 

directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 

particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 

accused.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004); see also

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary 

object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent 

depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted 

in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal 

examination and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”); California 

v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“From 

the scant information available it may tentatively be concluded that 

the Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier 

against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and 

absentee witnesses.”) (emphasis added). In light of this history and 

the constitutional text, the United States Supreme Court has 

concluded that the clause “forbids the introduction of out-of-court 

‘testimonial’ statements unless the witness is unavailable and the 

defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness 

previously.” Samia v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 2004, 2012 (2023)

(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54). Examples of testimonial 

statements include “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the 

course of interrogations” and “ex parte testimony at a preliminary 

hearing.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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the crucible of cross-examination.”). And a defendant’s knowledge 

of the identity of an adverse witness is often critical to the force and 

integrity of a cross-examination, as a witness’s identity may be

germane to the determination of bias or credibility.

A criminal defendant’s right to know his accuser’s identity is 

not absolute, though. See, e.g., State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1, 

2, 5 (Fla. 1977) (“The prosecution’s limited privilege to withhold the 

identity of a confidential informer is well established under Florida 

law. . . . We approve of the ‘personal safety’ exception to the 

otherwise ordinary duty of the State to allow the defendant full 

access to its witnesses on cross-examination . . . .”); United States v. 

Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 500 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We have 

recognized that [the federal confrontation] right is not absolute, 

however, and that ‘a trial court may limit cross-examination if the 

information sought could endanger the witness.’ ” (quoting Chavis 

v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 226 (4th Cir. 1980))); United States 

v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here there is a 

threat to the life of the witness, the right of the defendant to have 

the witness’ true name, address and place of employment is not 

absolute.”). But these exceptions prove the rule: absent special 
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circumstances, criminal defendants in Florida have a right to expect 

that they will meet their accusers in court, whether or not those 

accusers allege that they are victims of the defendant’s actions. See

Hassberger, 350 So. 2d at 4 (“Almost never . . . is the State 

privileged to withhold the witness’ real identity.”).13

For these reasons, even assuming section 16(b)(5) could 

plausibly be read in isolation to secure a victim’s right to 

anonymity, “the cardinal rule to construe provisions in context,” 

United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 673 (1998), counsels against 

reading it that way. A constitutional amendment “must be 

construed in para [sic] materia with all of those portions of the 

Constitution which have a bearing on the same subject.” State v. 

13. Our decision in Hollander squares with our conclusion 

today. Although that case required only that we address alleged 

deficiencies in the ballot title and summary of the proposed 

constitutional amendment that would become Marsy’s Law, we 

concluded that “[t]he title and summary are not misleading because 

the actual text of the proposed amendment does not restrict any 

existing defendants’ . . . rights or subordinate any existing 

defendants’ . . . rights to the newly created victims’ rights.” 

Hollander, 256 So. 3d at 1308. We identified possible close calls 

such as a “victims’ right to a speedy trial” and “the time constraints 

and reporting requirements for appeals and collateral attacks”—

each now codified under section 16(b)(10)—but did not discuss any 

possible right of crime victims to prevent the disclosure of their 

names. Id. at 1308, 1309.
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Div. of Bond Fin. of Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 278 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. 

1973); see Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 316 (Fla. 1930) (“[I]n 

construing and applying provisions of the Constitution, such 

provisions should be considered, not separately, but in coordination with all other provisions.”).

And it is our job, when possible, to read different 

constitutional provisions in concert, not conflict. See Burnsed v. 

Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1974) (“Where 

a constitutional provision will bear two constructions, one of which 

is consistent and the other which is inconsistent with another 

section of the constitution, the former must be adopted so that both 

provisions may stand and have effect.”). This is especially true 

when we are charged with interpreting an amendment, for “it is 

settled that implied repeal of one constitutional provision by 

another is not favored, and every reasonable effort will be made to 

give effect to both provisions.” Jackson v. Consol. Gov’t of City of 

Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497, 500 (Fla. 1969).

By reading section 16(b)(5) to shield, as a general matter, only 

information that can be used to locate or harass, rather than 

identify, a victim, we give effect to Marsy’s Law while also protecting 
- 23 -

a defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses at trial. That right 

would be drawn into doubt if we found that section 16(b)(5)

categorically secured a victim’s right to anonymity in all criminal 

cases. In all, what the text suggests, the context confirms: section 

16(b)(5) does not secure a victim’s right to anonymity.14

C

Finally, a word about the “[a]ccess to public records and 

meetings” provision of the Florida Constitution—it says:

Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public 

record made or received in connection with the official 

business of any public body, officer, or employee of the 

state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with 

respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or 

specifically made confidential by this Constitution.

Art. I, § 24(a), Fla. Const. It is relevant to this case insofar as our 

statutes say that “[p]olice reports are public records except as 

otherwise made exempt or confidential.” See § 119.105, Fla Stat. 

14. Because the confrontation right is also enshrined in the 

federal constitution, Amend. VI, U.S. Const., and applicable in state 

prosecutions, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), we are

mindful of the “elementary rule . . . that every reasonable 

construction must be resorted to in order to save a [provision] from 

unconstitutionality,” Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895). 

That rule’s application here supports our holding.
- 24 -

And indeed, the Coalition filed a “public records request” with the 

Tallahassee Police Department for “any incident records” related to 

the second of the two shootings,15 and it “specifically request[ed] 

such records that include the identity of the officer . . . .” The FPBA

argued that section 24 does not require disclosure of the officers’ 

names, notwithstanding their inclusion in reports that constitute 

public records, because that provision is expressly subordinated 

“with respect to records . . . specifically made confidential by this 

Constitution”—to wit, by section 16(b)(5). Art. I, § 24(a), Fla. Const. 

But for the reasons we have articulated, there is no textual basis in 

Marsy’s Law for the idea that victims’ names are categorically 

immune from disclosure.

What is missing from this account is section 24(c), which sets 

out another way to shield certain public records.

The legislature . . . may provide by general law passed by 

a two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of 

records from the requirements of subsection (a) . . . 

provided that such law shall state with specificity the 

public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no 

broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose 

of the law.

15. It is unclear from the record whether the Coalition filed a 

similar request regarding the first shooting.
- 25 -

Art. I, § 24(c), Fla. Const. And sure enough, some Florida statutes 

do just this16 for certain public records. According to section 

119.071(2)(j)1., Florida Statutes, “[a]ny document that reveals the 

identity . . . of the victim of a crime and identifies that person as the 

victim of a crime, which document is received by any agency that 

regularly receives information from or concerning the victims of 

crime, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State 

Constitution.”

Today’s decision neither weakens these various exemptions of 

certain information from public disclosure, nor prevents the 

Legislature—in performing the constitutional function reserved to it 

and not to us—from expanding them. Our decision instead is 

limited to the determination that Marsy’s Law does not guarantee to 

crime victims a generalized right of anonymity.

16. Notably, section 119.071(4)(d)2.a., Florida Statutes, 

makes exempt from public records requirements “[t]he home 

addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of 

active or former sworn law enforcement personnel . . . .” 

Conspicuously missing, however, are their names (despite the 

names of their “spouses and children” being so protected in the very 

same provision). Id.
- 26 -

III

Marsy’s Law does not preclude the City from releasing the 

names of the two police officers whose conduct is at issue in this 

case. We quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with our decision.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ., 

concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal

Constitutional Construction/Class of Constitutional Officers

First District - Case No. 1D20-2193

(Leon County)

Philip J. Padovano and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock Berman &

Seider, Tampa, Florida; and Cassandra K. Jackson, City Attorney’s 

Office, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner City of Tallahassee, Florida

Carol Jean LoCicero and Mark R. Caramanica of Thomas & 

LoCicero PL, Tampa, Florida, and Daniela B. Abratt of Thomas & 

LoCicero PL, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Petitioner News Media Coalition
- 27 -

Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondents

Shannon K. Lockheart and Paul G. Rozelle, General Counsel, 

Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, Largo, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Pinellas County Sheriff, Bob Gualtieri

Edward G. Guedes and John J. Quick of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole 

& Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel

Peter A.D. McGlashan, General Counsel, Volusia County Sheriff’s 

Office, DeLand, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Volusia County Sheriff, Michael J. Chitwood

Edward L. Birk of Marks Gray, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida,

for Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 

Press, Radio Television Digital News Association, Poynter 

Institute, Society of Professional Journalists Florida Pro 

Chapter, Florida Center for Government Accountability, and 

Asian American Journalists Association Florida Chapter

Benjamin James Stevenson of ACLU Foundation of Florida, 

Pensacola, Florida, and Daniel B. Tilley of ACLU Foundation of 

Florida, Miami, Florida; and David T. Goldberg of Donahue 

Goldberg & Littleton, Brooklyn, New York,

for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, 

Inc.

Carri S. Leininger and Jayme S. Sellards of Williams, Leininger & 

Cosby, P.A., North Palm Beach, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office