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ANTHONY A. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 37168)

Alvord, Sheldon and Norcott, Js.

Argued April 20—officially released August 11, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Sferrazza, J.)

Anthony A., self-represented, the appellant (petitioner).

Edward Wilson, Jr., assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Terrence M. O’Neill, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. Following a grant of certification to

appeal by the habeas court, the petitioner, Anthony A.,

appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal,

the petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that he failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. The petitioner’s habeas

claim was that the respondent, the Commissioner of

Correction, deprived him of a protected liberty interest

under the fourteenth amendment to the United States

constitution1 by ‘‘falsely’’ classifying him as a sex

offender without due process of law. We agree that the

court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the

habeas petition and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. On July 5, 2012, the petitioner was

sentenced to an effective term of three years and six

months incarceration after pleading guilty to unlawful

restraint in the first degree, failure to appear and violation of probation.2 The state entered a nolle prosequi

as to an additional charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship.3

Shortly after being sentenced, the petitioner learned

that the Department of Correction (department) had

classified him as a sex offender and had assigned him

a sex offender treatment need score. The department

provided the petitioner with an Offender Accountability

Plan (plan) that listed ‘‘sex treatment referral’’ as a

‘‘specific program recommendation.’’ The plan

expressly provided that ‘‘[f]ailure to comply with [the

plan’s] recommendations, or conduct which results in

discipline or increases in risk level, shall negatively

impact your earning of Risk Reduction Earned Credit4

. . . and/or chances of [the department’s] supervised

community release and/or parole.’’

The petitioner refused to sign the plan and requested

a hearing to prove he had not sexually assaulted his

wife. He claimed that the sex offender designation and

treatmentrecommendation should be removed from his

plan.5 The departmentresponded: ‘‘You had a hearing on

7/7/2012,6 and it was found to be verified in the police

report that there was non-consensual sexual contact.

Therefore, your [sex offender treatment need] score

. . . is accurate and will not be changed.’’ The petitioner’s repeated efforts to modify his plan to delete the

sex offender designation were all unsuccessful.

On February 20, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, the selfrepresented petitioner claimed: (1) he was informed

by the assessment counselor that the department had
classified him as a sex offender; (2) the classification

was made on the basis of an inaccurate police report;

(3) he was told that he risked forfeiting ‘‘good time,

parole [and] early release’’ if he did not participate in a

sex offender treatment program; (4) he was wrongfully

classified as a sex offender; (5) his wife, the alleged

victim, wrote a letter to the Superior Court stating that

she never was sexually assaulted by the petitioner and

that the police report was inaccurate; (6) he never has

been convicted of a sexual offense; and (7) he was

deprived of a liberty interest without due process of

law. The respondent’s return alleged, inter alia, that the

petitioner had not stated a claim for which relief could

be granted.

A hearing was scheduled before the habeas court on

July 31, 2014. At the beginning of the proceeding, the

court stated that it had reviewed the material submitted

by the parties and that there was a preliminary issue

as to whether the petitioner’s claim could be afforded

habeas relief. The court asked the respondent if the

court could consider the allegations in the petition and

the attached affidavits as factual information for an

offer of proof as to the petitioner’s claim, to which

the respondent had no objection. The self-represented

petitioner and the respondent then presented their arguments addressed to the issue of whether the claim as

stated alleged the violation of a protected liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment7 and whether a

habeas court could provide relief for such a claim.

At the conclusion of the arguments, the court stated:

‘‘I [am] prepared to rule on this matter and in my ruling,

I [am] going to assume for purposes of this ruling that

the factual allegations by [the petitioner] are correct,

in that he has been classified as a sex offender when

he was notreally a sex offender.’’8 The court determined

that habeas corpus relief was not an available remedy

for the petitioner’s ‘‘misclassification’’ and that ‘‘parole

eligibility under [General Statutes] § 54-125 does not

constitute a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to

invoke habeas corpus jurisdiction.’’9 Accordingly, the

court rendered judgment as follows: ‘‘[F]or the reasons

that I [have] indicated, I must find that the claim here,

even assuming that the factual allegations are true, cannot provide a basis for habeas corpus relief and the

petition is dismissed.’’ This appeal followed.

After the appeal was filed, the petitioner finished

serving his sentence of incarceration. On April 1, 2015,

he contacted the appellate clerk’s office and advised

this court that he had been released from prison and

that he planned to appear for oral argument. On April

10, 2015, he again contacted the appellate clerk’s office

and stated that he had been arrested on April 6, 2015,

for violation of a protective order and for disorderly

conduct. He further stated that he had not posted bond

in connection with the new charges and was being
detained at New Haven Correctional Center.

Because the petitioner was released from prison prior

to oral argument before this court, we must decide

whether his claim in this appeal is moot under Patterson

v. Commissioner of Correction, 112 Conn. App. 826,

964 A.2d 1234 (2009). ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter

because it implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

829. ‘‘[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at

the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the

pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude

an appellate court from granting any practical relief

through its disposition of the merits, a case has become

moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 830.

‘‘This court cannot provide any practical relief after the

petitioner has served his sentence in its entirety. . . .

Unless the petitioner’s claim falls under an exception

to the mootness doctrine, we must dismiss his appeal

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 830–31.

Here, as in Patterson, the petitioner cannot satisfy

the ‘‘limited duration’’ requirement of the capable of

repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. Id., 836. Inmates who are classified as

being in need of sexual offender treatment by the

department may face a wide range of sentences. The

department’s classification of the petitioner is not of

such a limited duration that the substantial majority of

cases raising a question about such a classification will

become moot before they can be fully litigated.

We conclude, however, that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, as set

forth in State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74

(2002), is applicable under the circumstances of this

case. In McElveen, our Supreme Court stated: ‘‘[F]or a

litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is

a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. Accordingly, the litigant must

establish these consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need not demonstrate that these consequences are more probable than not. This standard

provides the necessary limitations on justiciability

underlying the mootness doctrine itself. Where there is

no direct practical relief available from the reversal of

the judgment, as in this case, the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the

litigant some practicalrelief in the future. The reviewing

court therefore determines, based upon the particular

situation, whether the prejudicial collateral consequences are reasonably possible.’’ Id., 208.

With the petitioner’s new arrest, we are persuaded
that there is a reasonable possibility that, should he

return to prison, he will again be classified as being in

need of sex offender treatment because the department

assigned him a sex offender treatment need score with

a recommended sex offender treatment referral during

his previous incarceration. Accordingly, the petitioner’s

appeal is not moot.

We now address the merits of the petitioner’s claim

that the habeas court improperly determined that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he failed to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction for adjudicating habeas petitions is conferred on the Superior Court by General

Statutes § 52-466, which gives it the authority to hear

those petitions that allege illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty. . . . We have long held that because

[a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.

. . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court

may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . Subject matter jurisdiction

involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the

type of controversy presented by the action before it.

. . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits

of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .

The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be

waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party,

or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez v. Commissioner

of Correction, 139 Conn. App. 173, 177–78, 55 A.3d

588 (2012).

‘‘The principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus

is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate

fundamental fairness. . . . The writ has been

described as a unique and extraordinary legal remedy.

. . . Our Supreme Court has recognized that the writ

of habeas corpus, as it is employed in the twentieth

century . . . does not focus solely upon a direct attack

on the underlying judgment or upon release from confinement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Joyce v. Commissioner of Correction, 129

Conn. App. 37, 39–40, 19 A.3d 204 (2011). ‘‘Nonetheless,

despite this expansion of the writ beyond its initial

objective of securing immediate release from illegal

detention, in order to invoke successfully the jurisdiction of the habeas court, a petitioner must allege an

interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief. . . . In

order to invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas action, a petitioner must allege that he

is illegally confined or has been deprived of his liberty.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 40–41.

‘‘In order to state a claim for a denial of procedural

due process . . . a prisoner must allege that he pos-
sessed a protected liberty interest, and was not afforded

the requisite process before being deprived of that liberty interest. . . . A petitioner had no right to due process . . . unless a liberty interest has been deprived

. . . . To constitute a deprivation of liberty, a restraint

must have imposed an atypical and significant hardship

. . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 42–43.

In the present case, the habeas court in its oral ruling,

citing Fuller v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn.

App. 375, 71 A.3d 689,10 cert. denied, 310 Conn. 946,

80 A.3d 907 (2013), and Coleman v. Commissioner of

Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138, 958 A.2d 790 (2008),11

cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905, 962 A.2d 793 (2009), concluded that the petitioner had failed to allege the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. The habeas court

determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claim of ‘‘misclassification’’ because prison classification, parole eligibility and eligibility for rehabilitative

programs were not cognizable liberty interests sufficient to invoke habeas corpus jurisdiction under our

case law.12

The dispositive substantive issue in this appeal is

whether the petitioner has alleged a cognizable liberty

interest that affords jurisdiction to the habeas court

over his claim. Specifically, is the petitioner, who

alleges that he has never been convicted of a sexual

offense and has no history of problematic sexual behavior, entitled to procedural due process before being

classified as a sexual offender and referred for sex

offender treatment by the department? If the habeas

court correctly determined that the petitioner’s claim

was not an alleged violation of a cognizable liberty

interest, then it properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction overthe claim and could not considerthe merits

of that claim. If the petitioner did allege the violation

of a cognizable liberty interest, the habeas court

improperly dismissed the petitioner’s petition and the

matter must be remanded to that court for a hearing

on the merits of the petitioner’s claim. We conclude,

for the reasons discussed herein, that the allegations

of the habeas petition were sufficient to allege the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, and, thus, we

remand the case to the habeas court for further proceedings.

‘‘Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable

many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a

retraction justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system. . . . But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional

environment, a prisoneris not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime.

There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution

and the prisons of this country.’’(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555–56, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974).

‘‘Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under

certain circumstances create liberty interests which are

protected by the Due Process Clause. . . . But these

interests will be generally limited to freedom from

restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in

such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection

by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.’’ (Citations omitted.) Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472, 483–84, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).13

Although there is no appellate case law in this state

adopting a ‘‘stigma plus’’ test for claims alleging the

deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of

law,14 we find that test to be particularly appropriate

underthe facts of the present case. Although not labeled

as the ‘‘stigma plus’’ test, it was utilized by the United

States Supreme Court in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,

100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980). In Vitek, the issue

was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment entitled a prisoner to certain procedural

protections, including notice and a hearing, before he

could be transferred involuntarily from the prison to a

state mental hospital for treatment of a mental disease

or defect. Id., 482–83. The Court concluded: ‘‘[H]ere,

the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental

hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled

with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires

procedural protections.’’ Id., 494.

At issue under the factual circumstances of this case

is the characterization of the petitioner as a sex offender

and the consequences that flow from that characterization. The petitioner alleges that he has no history of

sexual offenses and that the incident relied on by the

respondent as set forth in the police report was

expressly discredited by the alleged victim. He claims

that the stigma of being labeled a sex offender subjects

him to atypical and significant hardship in the penal

system, as does the plan’s recommendation for sex

offender treatment. Because the petitioner claims that

he is not a sex offender and can prove that he is not a

sex offender, he refused to sign the plan acknowledging

that status and his need for sex offender treatment. By

refusing to participate in the recommended treatment

program, the petitioner alleges that he forfeited ‘‘good

time, parole and early release.’’

To satisfy the ‘‘stigma’’ element of the test, the petitioner must set forth allegations which, if true, demonstrate that the department has characterized him in a

way that is sufficiently derogatory so as to injure his

reputation, that this characterization is capable of being

proved false, and that the characterization is false. To
satisfy the ‘‘plus’’ element of the test, the petitioner

must allege that this mischaracterization has caused

him to experience a governmentally imposed burden

that significantly altered his status as a matter of state

law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–711, 96 S. Ct.

1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976).

We agree with the petitioner that his allegations satisfy the stigma plus test. ‘‘We can hardly conceive of a

state’s action bearing more stigmatizing consequences

than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.

. . . One need only look to the increasingly popular

Megan’s laws, whereby states require sex offenders to

register with law enforcement officials who are then

authorized to release information about the sex

offender to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing

consequences of being labeled a sex offender. The classification of an inmate as a sex offender is precisely

the type of atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life that the Supreme Court held created a protected

liberty interest. Sandin [v. Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 483–

84].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997).15

Having labeled the petitioner as a sex offender, the

department provided him with a plan recommending

sex offender treatment. The plan specifically provides

that failure to comply with the plan’s recommendations

will negatively impact his earning ofrisk reduction credits, and his eligibility for parole and participation in

supervised community release programs. The statute

pertaining to earned risk reduction credits; General

Statutes § 18-98e; likewise provides that an inmate may

earn such credits by adhering to his offender accountability plan. Coerced participation in sex offender treatment, when the petitioner alleges he is not a sex

offender, that he has never been convicted of a sex

offense, that he has no history of problematic sexual

behavior, and that he can prove that he is not an

offender, is sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘plus’’ element of

the test.

In summary, we conclude that the petitioner’s habeas

petition has sufficiently alleged the violation of a protected liberty interest underthe fourteenth amendment.

By alleging that he was deprived of this cognizable

liberty interest without procedural due process, he is

entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim in the

habeas court. At the hearing, the petitioner will, of

course, have to prove the allegations in his petition to

prevail. The habeas court will need to determine what

procedural due process was provided to the petitioner

prior to his classification as a sex offender16 and

whether that process was adequate under the circumstances.17

For these reasons, we conclude that the habeas court

incorrectly dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

to the habeas court for further proceedings according

to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution

provides in relevant part: ‘‘No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .’’

2 The petitioner received a sentence of five years incarceration, execution

suspended after forty-two months, and three years of probation on the

unlawful restraint charge. He received an unconditional discharge on the

failure to appear charge. The petitioner also was found to have violated his

probation in connection with a previous conviction, and his probation was

revoked in that case.

3 The charges of unlawful restraint in the first degree and sexual assault

in a spousal relationship both arose in connection with an incident that

occurred on July 19, 2011. The police responded to a report of a domestic

dispute at the petitioner’s residence. The petitioner and his wife were intoxicated and had been smoking crack cocaine.

4 General Statutes § 18-98e provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Notwithstanding

any provision of the general statutes, any person sentenced to a term of

imprisonmentfor a crime committed on or after October 1, 1994, and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction on or after said date

. . . may be eligible to earn risk reduction credit toward a reduction of

such person’s sentence, in an amount not to exceed five days per month,

at the discretion of the Commissioner of Correction for conduct as provided

in subsection (b) of this section occurring on or after April 1, 2006.

‘‘(b)An inmate may earn risk reduction creditfor adherence to the inmate’s

offender accountability plan, for participation in eligible programs and activities, and for good conduct and obedience to institutional rules as designated

by the commissioner, provided (1) good conduct and obedience to institutional rules alone shall not entitle an inmate to such credit, and (2) the

commissioner or the commissioner’s designee may, in his or her discretion,

cause the loss of all or any portion of such earned risk reduction credit

for any act of misconduct or insubordination or refusal to conform to

recommended programs or activities or institutional rules occurring at any

time during the service of the sentence or for other good cause. . . .’’

5

In addition to the undisputed fact that the charge of sexual assault in a

spousal relationship had been nolled, the petitioner relied on his wife’s letter

to the Superior Court, in which his wife stated that she did not wish to

pursue the charges against the petitioner, that the ‘‘police report [was]

inaccurate,’’ and that the petitioner ‘‘never sexually assaulted me.’’

6 The petitioner was sentenced on July 5, 2012. According to the department’s response, he had a hearing two days later on July 7, 2012.

7 During his argument at the habeas proceeding, the self-represented petitioner argued that the duration of his sentence was affected by his sex

offender classification, that his sex offender treatment need score was determined without him being present or having the ‘‘opportunity to defend’’

himself or to ‘‘face [his] accusers,’’ that he had never committed a sexual

offense and did not have a history of sexual offenses, that his noncompliance

with recommended sex offender treatment in the plan had deprived him of

risk reduction earned credit and other rehabilitation programs, and that the

sex offender classification had stigmatized him and made him fearful for

his safety in the prison environment.

8 The court made its ruling immediately following the parties’ arguments

as to whether a habeas court could afford relief on the petitioner’s claim.

There was no evidence presented during the habeas proceeding as to

whether the petitioner was notified and participated in a department hearing

prior to the sex offender classification, how the petitioner had been stigmatized by that determination, or the specific details regarding the impact of

his failure to participate in a sex offender treatment program on the length

of his confinement. The habeas court, having determined that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction, did not reach the merits of the petitioner’s

claims.

9 The petitioner’s Classification Review Sheet indicates that his release

date was March 29, 2015, and that his parole eligibility date was September

18, 2014.
10 In Fuller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144 Conn. App. 380,

this court concluded that the petitioner’s claim that the respondent failed

to make available to her the programs she needed to complete her offender

accountability plan did not constitute a cognizable liberty interest sufficient

to invoke habeas jurisdiction.

11 In Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 111 Conn. App. 142,

this court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to due process

prior to being classified as a security risk group member and that his transfer

from Cheshire Correctional Institution to Northern Correctional Institution

did not implicate a liberty interest.

12 We note that after the habeas court in this action rendered its judgment,

our Supreme Court decided Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315

Conn. 231, 106 A.3d 266 (2014). In Vandever, the petitioner claimed that his

due process rights were violated because the evidence presented at the

department hearing that he was afforded to contest his placement in administrative segregation did not support the respondent’s placement decision.

Id., 233. On appeal to this court, we determined that ‘‘[a] prisoner has

no constitutionally protected interest in or to a particular classification.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 735, 742, 42 A.3d 494 (2012), rev’d, 315 Conn. 231,

106 A.3d 266 (2014). On the granting of certification, our Supreme Court

determined that this court was ‘‘incorrect insofar as it indicated that under

no circumstances can Connecticut prisoners establish a liberty interest in

avoiding administrative segregation.’’ Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 315 Conn. 233–34. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded

that the petitioner had received all of the process that he was due under

the factual circumstances of that case. Id., 234.

13 We realize that Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, and Sandin v.

Connor, supra, 515 U.S. 472, involve due process claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Nevertheless,the claims in those cases concern conditions of confinement, and we find the language addressing § 1983 challenges to conditions

of confinement to be instructive in evaluating the petitioner’s due process

claim in this habeas action.

14 This court, in State v. Pierce, 69 Conn. App. 516, 530–33, 794 A.2d 1123

(2002), rev’d, 269 Conn. 442, 849 A.2d 375 (2004), concluded that due process

requires a hearing to enable a trial court to make a finding as to whether

a felony was committed for a ‘‘ ‘sexual purpose’ ’’ in accordance with General

Statutes § 54-254 (a). We reasoned that the sexual offender registration

system satisfied the ‘‘ ‘stigma plus’ ’’ test, thereby giving rise to a cognizable

liberty interest. Our Supreme Court reversed that decision, however, on the

ground that this court improperly had invoked the plain error doctrine in

reaching that conclusion, because we raised the due process issue sua

sponte and the trial court’s actions were in conformity with a presumptively

valid statute. State v. Pierce, 269 Conn. 442, 452–54, 849 A.2d 375 (2004).

Our Supreme Court did not express an opinion as to whether a liberty

interest was implicated.

15 Applying Vitek v. Jones, supra, 445 U.S. 480, the Third, Fifth, Ninth and

Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that prisoners who have not

been convicted of a sex offense have a liberty interest and are entitled to

due process before being classified as sex offenders. See Renchenski v.

Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding sex offender conditions

may be imposed on inmate only afterinmate afforded due process); Coleman

v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding petitioner had liberty

interest in freedom from stigma and compelled treatment and state required

to provide procedural due process before imposing such conditions); Kirby

v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding state’s classification of prisoner as sex offender and requirement that he complete sex

offender treatment as precondition to parole eligibility implicated liberty

interest under due process clause); Neal v. Shimoda, supra, 131 F.3d 829

(holding state required to provide hearing before classifying prisoner as sex

offender and requiring him to complete treatment program as condition to

parole eligibility).

16 The department’s procedures for classifying an inmate in need of sex

treatment, as contained in the department’s objective classification manual,

may or may not have been followed in the petitioner’s case. See footnote

8 of this opinion. This, too, may be a factor to be considered in determining

whether he was afforded the procedural process that he was due. ‘‘[A] liberty

interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from

state policies or regulations . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 242, 106 A.3d
266 (2014).

17 ‘‘The requirements imposed by the [due process] [c]lause are, of course,

flexible and variable [depending on] the particular situation being examined.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vandever v. Commissioner of

Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 244, 106 A.3d 266 (2014).