NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.C. and E.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0213

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS519859

The Honorable Wendy S. Morton, Judge, Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Stephanie I., Scottsdale

Appellant

Mathers Law Offices, LLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Mathers

Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellee Robert C.

FILED 06-27-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.C. and E.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Stephanie I. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

granting Robert C.’s (“Father”) petition to terminate her parental rights. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are divorced and have two children, N.C.

and E.C. Mother has a history of alcohol and substance abuse. In 2019, 

Mother and Father entered a parenting plan whereby Mother’s parenting 

time was conditioned on her sobriety. In 2020, Mother was arrested, and 

later convicted, for driving under the influence (“DUI”). Mother was 

arrested in the presence of E.C. Following that incident, Father filed a 

petition to modify child custody, which resulted in the court ordering 

Mother’s parenting time be supervised and weekly drug testing for Mother. 

¶3 Mother participated in supervised parenting time until 

February 2021 when N.C. found an empty wine bottle in her home, after 

which Father discontinued Mother’s parenting time per the parenting plan. 

Later that year, Mother was arrested and convicted of another DUI. In May 

2021, Father petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533, alleging prolonged substance 

abuse and mental illness. In December 2022, the superior court denied 

Father’s petition. 

¶4 Later that month, Father initiated the current matter by filing 

a new petition. Father once again sought to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights, this time alleging abandonment. The court granted Father’s petition 

and terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding that Father proved 

abandonment and that termination was in the children’s best interests. 

¶5 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal under 

Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.C. and E.C.

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, Mother asserts the court: (1) violated the principle 

of res judicata by allowing Father’s petition to proceed despite a previous 

adverse ruling; and (2) erred in terminating her parental rights.

1

I. Res Judicata Does Not Preclude Father’s Petition.

¶7 Mother argues res judicata, now known as claim preclusion,

bars Father’s petition because the court previously denied a petition to 

terminate her parental rights. 

¶8 We review de novo the applicability of claim preclusion. 

Lawrence T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 260, 262 ¶ 7 (App. 2019). A party 

asserting claim preclusion must establish: (1) the claims of the prior and 

current litigation are identical; (2) the court entered a final judgment on the 

merits in the prior litigation; and (3) the parties in the two suits are identical. 

Id. at 263 ¶ 8. However, the application of claim preclusion is limited in 

proceedings to terminate parental rights because constraining our courts

for the sake of judicial economy must not imperil a child’s best interests. Id. 

at ¶ 9. 

¶9 Mother’s argument fails because Father’s current petition is 

distinct from his prior one. We apply the “same evidence” test in 

determining whether claims are identical, barring subsequent litigation 

when “no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than 

that needed in the first.” Id. at 265 ¶ 17. 

¶10 Here, the court relied substantially on evidence not presented 

in the prior proceeding to determine abandonment. Specifically, the court 

considered evidence of Mother’s failures to support the children financially

for over three years and maintain normal relationships with them for at 

least two years. While it is true the court considered evidence of Mother’s 

alcohol and substance abuse in both proceedings, it did so in the prior 

proceeding as its own ground for termination. By contrast, the court in this 

proceeding discussed such evidence to refute Mother’s claims that Father 

interfered with her relationship with the children; the parenting time 

agreement was conditioned upon her sobriety. Further, the court’s use of 

1 Mother also asserts her due process rights have been violated and a 

previous family court order is invalid. In doing so, she provides no citations 

to the record nor to legal authority as required. See ARCAP 13(a)(7); Melissa 

W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, 117–18 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). As such, 

she has waived these arguments and we do not address them further.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.C. and E.C.

Decision of the Court

4

Mother’s alcohol abuse was to address the children’s best interests and its 

detrimental effects to them. Unlike in the prior litigation, the court in the 

current proceeding did not consider any evidence pertaining to Mother’s 

mental health. Thus, the claims here are not identical to Father’s previous 

petition and claim preclusion does not apply. 

II. The Court Did Not Err in Finding Abandonment.

¶11 Mother argues the court erred in finding abandonment, 

alleging various deficiencies in the evidence as well as asserting Father 

interfered with her attempts to maintain a relationship with the children. 

When reviewing the court’s order terminating parental rights, we review 

the court’s factual findings and accept them if they are supported by 

reasonable evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 

Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023). “[W]e do not reweigh evidence because the court 

is ‘in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.’” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 582 ¶ 23 (2021) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004). 

¶12 As noted above, the court found abandonment based on 

Mother’s failures to pay child support and maintain a normal parental 

relationship with the children. In addressing Mother’s failure to pay child 

support, the court considered Father’s testimony that Mother had not paid 

child support since 2021. The court also noted Mother’s inconsistent 

testimony that she was unaware of her child support obligation, despite her 

prior petition to modify that very duty. 

¶13 In addressing Mother’s failure to maintain a normal parental 

relationship, the court considered three social studies completed by a social 

worker. These studies, contrary to Mother’s assertions, do not emphasize 

Mother’s alcohol and substance abuse struggles, but rather focus on 

Mother’s lack of contact with the children. With regards to N.C., the court 

found Mother had not maintained regular contact with him in 36 months, 

with no contact in 2022. Mother likewise did not contact E.C. in 2022. But,

during the current proceedings, Mother contacted E.C. to arrange a secret, 

unsupervised visit in violation of a previous court order. Mother also tried 

to enlist E.C. in falsifying evidence for the social study, asked E.C. to spy on 

Father and N.C., and disparaged Father and E.C.’s stepmother. The court 

found these contacts insufficient to constitute regular parental contact. 

¶14 The court also addressed Mother’s claim that Father 

interfered with her attempts at maintaining a normal parental relationship 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.C. and E.C.

Decision of the Court

5

with the children. The court explained that Father’s discontinuation of 

Mother’s parenting time was consistent with the parenting plan that 

Mother agreed to. The court also noted that Father did not interfere with 

Mother’s ability to contact the children via phone or text message and only 

limited E.C.’s use of her phone as a consequence for inappropriate behavior, 

not contact with Mother. 

¶15 The court reiterated these findings in discussing the 

children’s best interests. It found termination benefited the children 

because of the stability Father and his wife provided, as well as the 

children’s wish for the latter to adopt them. Conversely, the court found 

that preserving Mother’s parental rights would be detrimental to the 

children because of her struggles with alcohol and substance abuse, her 

manipulative behavior during litigation, and her unsupervised meeting 

with E.C. in violation of the court order. 

¶16 Accordingly, because the court’s findings of abandonment 

and best interests pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B) and (B)(1) are supported 

by reasonable evidence and inferences, we conclude the court did not err. 

See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.