In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822 

NANO GAS TECHNOLOGIES, INCORPORATED, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, 

v.

CLIFTON ROE, 

Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 17-cv-02241 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2021 — DECIDED APRIL 25, 2022 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. These cross-appeals are the latest 

battleground in a long-standing dispute between an inventor 

and the company that owns his invention. Clifton Roe assigned his invention to Nano Gas Technologies, Incorporated 

(“Nano Gas”) in return for equity, a board seat, and a potential salary. After the business relationship soured, Roe picked 

up his invention and left. Pursuant to the assignment 
2 Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822

agreement, arbitration followed. The arbitrator recognized 

that, while Roe harmed Nano Gas, Nano Gas benefited from 

Roe’s invention. The arbitrator fashioned a unique remedy, 

awarding damages to both parties that, once offset, required 

Roe to compensate Nano Gas for a lesser amount. All agree 

that the arbitrator’s award is not a picture of clarity. The district court attempted to interpret the award. Both parties appeal and ask us to take a second look.

I. Background

Roe invented a nozzle that transforms gases into liquids. 

Roe assigned the nozzle to Nano Gas, hoping to commercialize this technology. The terms of the assignment agreement 

granted Roe 20% equity in Nano Gas and a board seat. It also 

tied Roe’s salary to Nano Gas successfully raising capital or 

Roe successfully developing the technology into a working 

machine, whichever came first. Nano Gas and Roe failed to 

satisfy either condition before frustrations boiled over. Roe 

left Nano Gas, taking with him a prototype machine and a box 

of Nano Gas’s intellectual property produced by Jeff Hardin, 

another employee. Roe continued to develop the technology 

on his own. After an unsuccessful scuffle before a federal 

court in the Eastern District of Michigan, the parties entered 

arbitration.

The arbitrator generally found for Nano Gas, determining 

that Roe should compensate Nano Gas for the financial harms 

Roe caused when he continued to use the technology and 

made off with the Hardin work papers. Concurrently, the arbitrator balanced the equities and found that Roe deserved 

some compensation for his work. The arbitrator explained 

that it considered other ways of compensating Roe but 
Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822 3 

determined that an offset of two financial awards was appropriate. The award stated the following:

Roe will have contributed a great deal to whatever success the Nano Gas machine ultimately achieves. The 

Arbitrator has decided that equity requires that some 

form of award be made to Roe for all that he has contributed. That award, however, should be in the form 

of an offset against the Arbitrator’s award to Nano Gas.

The Arbitrator considered awarding Roe some sort of 

royalty on future profits that might flow from the Nano 

Gas machine or other related intellectual property, but 

decided against this. It should be noted in this regard 

that Roe remains a major shareholder in Nano Gas, and 

that, as such, he could benefit financially from this in 

the future should Nano Gas experience profitability 

and an increase in value.

The arbitrator then made the following money awards, addressing both the Hardin work papers and the offset:

Roe is ordered to conduct a further search for the box 

of Hardin work-papers and to return same to Nano 

Gas or, in the event that Roe is unable to do that, to pay 

to Nano Gas the sum of $150,000. 

Roe is ordered to pay damages to Nano Gas in the 

amount of $1,500,000, with such payment to be made 

by (1) first, subtracting from the amount to be paid to 

Roe by Nano Gas under this decision ($1,500,000) the 

amount to be paid to Nano Gas by Roe under this decision ($1,000,000) and (2) thereafter, the remainder 

($500,000) in such manner as Roe chooses. 
4 Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822

Nano Gas is ordered to pay Roe the amount of 

$1,000,000, to be paid by Nano Gas by subtracting this

amount from the amount Roe is ordered to pay Nano 

Gas.

In effect, Nano Gas satisfied its obligation to Roe without further action. Roe received $1,000,000 back instantly on the 

money he owed Nano Gas. But Roe’s obligation to Nano Gas, 

a significant sum of $500,000 (or $650,000 if Roe did not return 

the Hardin work papers), remained outstanding. 

Nano Gas filed a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois to enforce the award and enter judgment for $650,000. 

The district court did both. Then, Nano Gas filed a turnover 

motion seeking Roe’s Nano Gas stock, valued at approximately $117,000. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 (instructing courts to 

apply state law in post-judgment proceedings); 735 ILCS 5/2-

1402 (providing Illinois procedure for enforcing a judgment). 

Roe resisted. He argued that the award explicitly stated he 

could pay the remaining amount “in such manner as Roe 

chooses,” and provided he remain a Nano Gas shareholder. 

Nano Gas filed a supplemental turnover motion, wherein it 

argued that Roe had no intention of paying the award. At a 

hearing on the motion, Nano Gas informed the district court 

that Roe first voiced his interpretation of the award during a 

deposition related to Nano Gas’s citation to discover assets. In 

his deposition, Roe stated he intended to pay off the award 

with dividends from the stock and claimed the award gave 

him the power to wait until he died and satisfy the debt 

through his estate. Roe’s interpretation seems to have blindsided Nano Gas. 

The district court denied Nano Gas’s turnover motion. It 

found that Roe had the power to pay both the $500,000 award 
Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822 5 

and the $150,000 award for the Hardin work papers, “in such 

manner as Roe chooses.” It also reasoned that the award 

stated Roe would continue to benefit as a shareholder. 

Nano Gas filed a motion to reconsider. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e). It argued that Roe’s power to choose did not apply to 

the $150,000 award for the Hardin work papers. The district 

court granted the motion and amended its order. It maintained its interpretation that Roe could choose how to pay the 

$500,000 award, but ordered Roe to turn over the Nano Gas 

stock or identify other assets to satisfy the $150,000 award. 

Roe then filed his own motion to reconsider. He argued that 

the district court’s amendment conflicted with its prior ruling 

that Roe remain a shareholder. The district court denied the 

motion. It determined that Roe’s award was the offset, not indefinite shareholder status. 

II. Discussion

Roe appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider. Nano Gas cross-appeals the district court’s findings 

regarding Roe’s discretion to satisfy the $500,000 award. Reviewing the district court’s turnover orders resolves both appeals. 

A turnover order is a final judgment. We review de novo 

the district court’s ruling on Nano Gas’s motion. Maher v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 506 F.3d 560, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Est. of McMurray, 274 F.3d 1133, 1134 (7th 

Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Sayyed, 862 F.3d 615, 617 

(7th Cir. 2017). Simultaneously, “[j]udicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited.” Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. 

v. FCE Benefit Adm’rs, Inc., 967 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 
6 Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822

706 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and 

the Supreme Court, indicate that “arbitration awards are 

largely immune from ... scrutiny in court.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. 

Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 10 F.4th 814, 816 (7th 

Cir. 2021); see 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11. 

Though neither party seeks to modify the award under 

FAA § 11, the wrong interpretation may inadvertently alter 

the award. See United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. PPG Indus., Inc., 

751 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that a party effectively 

asked the Court “to write in the margins of the arbitrator’s 

decision and add [favorable] language”). We may not alter the 

arbitrator’s award. Instead, we must enforce the award as 

written and “if possible, resolve apparent ambiguities by examining the arbitrator’s opinion and the record.” Id. at 585 (citations omitted); see Tri-State Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 221 F.3d 1015, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). 

First, we consider Roe’s contention that the award entitles 

him to remain a shareholder. We agree with the district court 

that the award is devoid of any language indicating Roe shall 

remain a shareholder indefinitely. The award can only be read 

as informing the parties that the arbitrator considered awarding Roe a right to future profits but declined to do so. The reference to Roe’s shareholder status at most serves as an equitable consideration for why the arbitrator determined the offset was the appropriate award. It is merely explanatory, separate from the arbitrator’s ultimate ruling. The award only 

grants Roe the $1,000,000 offset—his Nano Gas shares are fair

game.

Second, we consider Roe’s claim that the award prevents 

Nano Gas, or the courts, from determining how Roe pays his 
Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822 7 

$500,000 obligation to Nano Gas. Though Roe invites ambiguity through an alternative reading of “in such manner as Roe 

chooses,” his reading is unreasonable. The award lacks any 

indication that the arbitrator granted Roe complete discretion 

to decide if, when, and how Roe pays the award during his 

lifetime. The “manner” Roe chooses does not mean the “time” 

Roe chooses. Rather, we can only conclude that the arbitrator 

intended for Roe to satisfy his obligations to Nano Gas in the 

usual post-arbitration proceedings. If Roe had multiple assets 

which could satisfy the judgment, he could choose which assets to deliver. If Roe failed to pay Nano Gas on his own accord, Nano Gas could turn to the courts to recover what Roe 

owed. But Roe cannot refuse to turn over his only identifiable 

asset, choose hypothetical forms of payment that may never 

come to fruition, or require Nano Gas to wait until he dies. 

Both the language of the arbitrator’s opinion and common

sense easily resolve this issue. 

Courts may remand to the arbitrator to clarify an award. 

See United Steel, 751 F.3d at 585 (citing Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs

& Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 500 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 

2007)). Yet it is unnecessary and impractical to do so here. The

arbitrator entered its award over five years ago and, at oral 

argument, Roe’s counsel could not confirm the arbitrator’s 

whereabouts. When an award’s language compels only one

conclusion, the parties need not track down the arbitrator to 

confirm the obvious. Resolving this matter today allows Nano 

Gas to return to the district court and resume enforcing the 
8 Nos. 21-1809 & 21-1822

judgment without needless delay. Nano Gas has waited long 

enough.* 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

findings regarding Roe’s discretion to satisfy the $500,000 

award and affirm the district court’s amended judgment as to 

the $150,000 award for the Hardin work papers. We remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* At oral argument, Roe’s counsel indicated that Roe has moved on to 

another company with a new, better invention. Given Roe’s apparent recent business success, he may have new assets to satisfy the award without 

forfeiting his stock. We leave these issues in the capable hands of the district court.