COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

ANGELA MAY JENKINS 

v. Record No. 0616-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

WRANGLER, INC./VF CORPORATION JULY 17, 1995 

 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (George Warren Shanks, on briefs), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on briefs. 

 (J. David Griffin; Fowler, Griffin, Coyne & Coyne, on 

brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief. 

 Angela May Jenkins (claimant) appeals from a decision of the 

Workers' Compensation Commission finding that she was not 

entitled to compensation after November 6, 1992 for disability 

due to her compensable occupational disease, bilateral carpal 

tunnel syndrome.1 The commission relied upon a November 6, 1992 

release by Dr. Dennis W. Wise, the treating orthopedist, to find 

that the claimant was able to return to her pre-injury work, 

without restrictions, as of that date. The claimant contends 

that the commission erred in relying upon this release. We 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1The deputy commissioner ruled that the claimant met her 

burden under Code § 65.2-400 and proved that her bilateral carpal 

tunnel syndrome constituted an occupational disease causally 

related to her employment. Employer did not seek review of these 

findings by the full commission. Therefore, they became the law 

of the case. The full commission ruled that Dr. Wise 

communicated to the claimant on January 20, 1992 that she 

suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome causally related to her 

work. This finding was not appealed by employer to this Court. 
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agree. We reverse the commission's decision and remand this case 

for entry of an award consistent with this opinion. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "[I]f 

no credible evidence exists in support of a factual finding, the 

issue of the sufficiency of the evidence is one of law for this 

Court to decide." Spruill v. C.W. Wright Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 

330, 333, 381 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1989). 

 The commission failed to recognize that, in his November 6, 

1992 release, Dr. Wise referred only to the claimant's ability to 

return to regular work, without restrictions, based on the 

cervical strain diagnosis. Dr. Wise did not state on the release 

form that the claimant had recovered sufficiently from her carpal 

tunnel syndrome that she could, without restrictions, return to 

her pre-injury work. There were no corresponding office notes or 

any explanation from Dr. Wise for this narrowly-worded release. 

Moreover, through July 1992, Dr. Wise consistently noted that the 

claimant suffered from arm and hand pain, and that carpal tunnel 

release surgery was the only possible solution to her problem. 

The claimant testified that she wanted to have the surgery, but 

she did not have the resources to pay for it. 

 Dr. Galen Craun, who examined the claimant on July 23, 1992 

at employer's request, did not comment on her ability to work. 

Dr. Frank C. McCue, III, an orthopedic surgeon who examined the 
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claimant on June 7, 1993, suggested that she be considered for 

light-duty work only and that surgery would be indicated if her 

condition remained symptomatic. Dr. McCue opined that an attempt 

to return to heavy activity in patients who have carpal tunnel 

syndrome generally causes recurrences. 

 The claimant testified about the pain and disability she 

continued to experience after November 6, 1992 due to her carpal 

tunnel syndrome. She also described her reasonable job search 

efforts from the time her compensation ended on September 14, 

1992 through February 1993. She stated that, after February 

1993, she asked friends about possible job prospects, but was 

unable to find suitable work. 

 S. Paul McFarland, a vocational evaluator for the Department 

of Rehabilitative Services, evaluated the claimant on December 4, 

1992. Based upon this evaluation and his experience, McFarland 

opined that the claimant could not be placed in a job until she 

underwent the carpal tunnel release surgery recommended by her 

physicians. 

 This evidence proved, as a matter of law, that the claimant 

remained partially disabled after November 6, 1992, and that she 

made reasonable efforts to market her residual capacity. There 

is no evidence to support a finding that the claimant had 

recovered sufficiently from her carpal tunnel syndrome that she 

could return to her pre-injury work, without restrictions. 

Accordingly, the commission erred as a matter of law in finding 
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that the claimant did not prove that she was disabled after 

November 6, 1992, and in failing to award her temporary total 

disability benefits after November 6, 1992. 

 For the stated reasons, we reverse the commission's decision 

and remand this case for entry of an award consistent with this 

opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.