NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

GLORIA SANCHEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50168 

D.C. No. 3:16-cr-02077-BEN 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Gloria Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 

87-month sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for importation of 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 18 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50168 

Sanchez contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to 

consider all of the factors relevant to the minor role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2, focusing solely on Sanchez’s knowledge of the scope and structure of the 

criminal activity. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de 

novo and its application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion. See 

United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 

Although the district court did not discuss all of the factors listed in the 

commentary to the minor role Guideline, the record shows that the court was aware 

of and considered those factors. See United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911, 916 (9th 

Cir. 2018). Moreover, in light of the totality of the circumstances, including that 

Sanchez had smuggled drugs across the border on two prior occasions and was also 

involved in transporting vehicles for the organization, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).

Sanchez next argues the district court erred by departing downward in 

offense level, rather than in criminal history category, after it concluded that 

Sanchez’s criminal history category overrepresented her criminal history. Any 

error was harmless. See United States v. Ellis, 641 F.3d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 2011). 

As Sanchez concedes, the reduction in offense level resulted in the same 

Guidelines range that would have applied had the district court instead reduced her 

criminal history category. Sanchez’s contention, raised for the first time on appeal, 
3 17-50168 

that the court’s decision not reduce her criminal history category could prejudice 

her in a future supervised release revocation proceeding is entirely speculative; if 

Sanchez faces revocation in the future, she may argue for a lower criminal history 

category at that time. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.2.

Finally, Sanchez contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32 and due process by considering the facts of another 

defendant’s case. This claim fails. The district court described the relevant facts 

of the other case and gave counsel an opportunity to comment. See United States 

v. Warr, 530 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing Rule 32’s requirements).

In addition, Sanchez has not established that the information regarding the other 

case “demonstrably made the basis for [her] sentence.” United States v. 

Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.