[Cite as Cirotto v. Am. Self Storage of Pickerington, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4335.]

COURT OF APPEALS

FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER CIROTTO

Plaintiff-Appellant

-vsAMERICAN SELF STORAGE of

PICKERINGTON, LLC, et al.

Defendants-Appellees

JUDGES:

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Hon. Andrew J. King, J. 

Case No. 23 CA 14

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 22 CV 86

JUDGMENT: Dismissed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 1, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee

CHRISTOPHER CIROTTO PRO SE THOMAS M. MCCASH

750 West Rich Street 55 South High Street

#410 #210

Columbus, Ohio 43222 Dublin, Ohio 43017
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} Appellant Christopher Cirotto appeals the February 22, 2023, decision of 

the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas denying his Motion for Sanctions

{¶2} Appellees are American Self Storage of Pickerington, LLC, et al.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶3} This action arises from a storage agreement between Appellant Christopher 

Cirotto and Appellees American Self Storage of Pickerington, LLC, et al.

{¶4} For purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts and procedural history are 

as follows:

{¶5} On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Cirotto initiated this case 

by filing a Complaint for injunctive relief and a motion for an emergency temporary 

protection order. Appellant alleged that Defendant-Appellee, American Self Storage of 

Pickerington, LLC, a self-storage company, was about to sell the property that he had 

stored on Appellee's premises. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the 

following day, restraining Appellee from selling, auctioning, destroying, or otherwise 

disposing of any property belonging to Appellant.

{¶6} On March 14, 2022, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss or for change of 

venue, arguing that Appellant was a resident of Franklin County, Appellee's facility was 

located in Franklin County, and that there was no connection in this case to Fairfield 

County. The trial court agreed and on March 15, 2022, issued an order finding that it

lacked jurisdiction over the matter and ordered the matter transferred to Franklin County.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 3

{¶7} On May 5, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to add Robert Leveck as a 

defendant in this action and for Appellee to be held in contempt of court when it became 

apparent that Appellee had proceeded with the sale of Appellant’s property.

{¶8} Even though the venue of the original complaint was improper, the trial court 

found that it still had the authority to enforce its orders and proceeded with a contempt 

hearing on June 7, 2022. The court found that Appellee had acted in contempt of the 

court's March 3, 2022, Order, and issued a financial sanction of $250 (with the appropriate 

opportunity for Defendant to purge the contempt). 

{¶9} On September 7, 2022, Appellant filed a "Motion for Sanctions Against 

Defendant's Attorney Blair Lewis and for Leave of Court to Submit this Motion, For Good 

Cause." 

{¶10} The trial court, finding that “motions for sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 

and Civ.R. 11 are collateral to and independent of the primary action" (Martell v. Martell, 

5th Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00017, 2018-0hio-4927, ¶ 27) and “therefore, even though the 

primary action in this case had concluded, the issue of sanctions remains extant, and ripe 

for this Court's review.” Barbato v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 5th Dist. No. 2005 CA 00044, 2005-

0hio-5219, ¶ 30.

{¶11} By Judgment Entry filed December 7, 2022, the trial court found that

sanctions pursuant to Civ.R. 11 and/or R.C. §2323.51 were not appropriate in this case

and overruled Appellant’s motion.

{¶12} On February 22, 2023, the trial court re-issued its Opinion and Entry as a 

Nunc Pro Tunc to include “This is a final appealable order” language.

{¶13} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following errors for review:
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 4

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

WRONGFULLY DISMISSING AND OVERRULING MY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS 

SEPTEMBER 7, 2022 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTAPPELLEE'S ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS, IN THE COURTS DECEMBER 7, 2022 

OPINION, ENTRY, AND ORDER, AND FURTHER "BASICALLY" STATING THAT HIS 

ILLICIT CONDUCT WAS OK.

IN ADDITION, THIS SAME DECEMBER 7TH ORDER WAS ALSO 

WRONGFULLY CONTRARY TO ALL OF THE RELEVANT MATERIAL FACTS AND 

MATERIAL EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN A COURT REQUESTED, (NOVEMBER 3, 

2022- AND AFTERWARDS, NON-ORAL HEARING), THAT ASKED FOR ANY 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND WRITTEN ARGUMENT(S); WHEREBY I 

SUBMITTED ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS'S UNETHICAL 

AND PROHIBITED BEHAVIOR, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL COMPELLING 

ARGUMENTS. I DID SUBMIT THIS TO THE COURT ON NOVEMBER 3, 2022, TO 

ALSO BE CONSIDERED. AND IT SEEMED TO BE SIMPLY IGNORED BY THE 

COURT, BECAUSE NOTHING IN IT SEEMED TO BE MENTIONED OR ADDRESSED 

OR EVEN CONSIDERED.

{¶15} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, BY NOT 

SETTING ASIDE ITS DECEMBER 7, 2022 OPINION, ENTRY, AND ORDER, AND 

COMING TO TERMS WITH ITS ERRORS AND WRONGFUL CONCLUSIONS 

REGARDING THAT OPINION, ENTRY, AND ORDER. INSTEAD, THE TRIAL COURT 

CONTINUED TO WRONGFULLY ERROR BY NOT ADDRESSING ANYTHING OF 
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 5

SUBSTANCE CONTAINED IN MY DECEMBER 21, 2022 MOTION TO SET ASIDE ITS 

PREVIOUS OPINION. ENTRV, [SIC] AND ORDER ... AND THE COURT JUST 

BASICALLY RE-ISSUED ITS ORIGINAL ERRONEOUS AND WRONGFUL OPINIONS, 

CONCLUSIONS, AND DECISIONS. NONE-THE-LESS, THE TRIAL COURT'S 

FEBRUARY 22, 2023 ORDER, IS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER, WHICH I THEN 

USED TO FILE MY NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THIS FIFTH DISTRICT COURT ON 

MARCH 22, 2023, WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE TIME THAT IS ALLOWED.

{¶16} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

WRONGFULLY ALLOWING AND ACCEPTING ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS'S 

RESPONSE TO MY MOTION ON OCTOBER 24, 2022. ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS'S 

RESPONSE TO MY MOTION FOR SANCTIONS WAS DUE ON OR BEFORE 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2022. YET WITH NO EXCUSE OF ANY KIND, AND WITH NO GOOD 

FAITH MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO DO SO ... BLAIR LEWIS WAS ALLOWED 

TO SUBMIT A 30-DAY LATE RESPONSE, AND THEN HAVE IT ERRONEOUSLY AND 

WRONGFULLY CONSIDERED, AS IF IT WERE TRUE. IT CONTAINED NO SWORN 

AFFIDAVIT AS TO ITS TRUTHFULNESS, NOR DID IT CONTAIN ANY CREDIBLE 

EVIDENCE TO REFUTE MY TRUTHFUL AND RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS OF 

UNETHICAL AND ILLICIT BEHAVIOR ON HIS PART. NEITHER AS AN OHIO 

ATTORNEY, NOR AS A SWORN OFFICER OF THE COURT.

{¶17} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

STATING ITS FAULTY OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS, BASED UPON THE TRIAL 

COURT BLINDLY ACCEPTING BLAIR LEWIS'S REPEATED AND 

UNSUBSTANTIATED LIES AND MISREPRESENTATION, AND FOR SOME 
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 6

UNKNOWN REASON, THE TRIAL COURT SEEMINGLY GIVING A LICENSED 

ATTORNEY, (ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS), SOME EXTRA FORMS OF 

"PROFESSIONAL COURTESY", THAT SEEMS TO INCLUDE ATTORNEY BLAIR 

LEWIS RECEIVING EVERY CONCEIVABLE BENEFIT, OF EVERY DOUBT, AS IF 

WHATEVER HE AUTHORS, AND STATES, AND SUBMITS TO THE TRIAL COURT IS 

ACCURATE AND TRUE. ALL THE WHILE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 

ABUSING ITS DISCRETION, BY IGNORING AND REFUSING TO CONSIDER, 

RELEVANT AND SUBSTANTIABLE [SIC] REFUTING MATERIAL FACTS AND 

MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT I HAVE PROVIDED TO IT). [SIC]

{¶18} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 

ALLOWING AND CONDUCTING A "MOTION FOR SANCTIONS HEARING'', FOR 

ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS TO ADDRESS AND ANSWER EACH AND EVERY 

INDIVIDUAL SANCTIONABLE ALLEGATIONS, (AS BROUGHT FORTH IN BOTH MY 

MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS, AS WELL AS MY WRITTEN ARQUMENT(S) [SIC] TO 

SUPPORT, ... CONCERNING EACH OF HIS UNETHICAL AND PROHIBITED ACTIONS 

AND BEHAVIORS, THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND WRONGFULLY 

WAS NOT WILLING TO TAKE THEIR DUE DILIGENCE TIME TO PROPERLY 

ADDRESS OR CONSIDER. 

BLAIR LEWIS'S GUILT OF HIS UNETHICAL AND PROHIBITED ACTIONS AND 

BEHAVIOR IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. NONE-THE, LESS, IF THE COURT HAD A 

PROBLEM IN BELIEVING THAT A LICENSED ATTORNEY WOULD INTENTIONALLY 

AND REPEATEDLY SUBMIT FALSE INFORMATION, AND WITHHOLD MATERIAL 

FACTS, IT SEEMS AS THOUGH THE TRIAL COURT WOULD BE DUTY BOUND TO 
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 7

CONDUCT A "SANCTIONS HEARING" AND GIVE ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS THE 

OPPORTUNITY_ [SIC] TO ANSWER EACH AND EVERY ALLEGATION AND 

EXAMPLE WITH CREDIBLE ANSWERS AND CREDIBLE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. 

(JUST LIKE THE COURT CONDUCTED FOR THE DEFENDANTS' IN THE JUNE 7, 

2022 "CONTEMPT OF COURT HEARING".

NONE-THE-LESS ... MY TRUTHFUL AND ACCURATE ACCUSATIONS ARE 

EASILY FOUND TO BE "MORE LIKELY THAN NOT" TRUE AND ACCURATE. THEN 

THIS APPEAL WOULD NOT HAVE EVEN BEEN NECESSARY. WHICH FOR CIVIL 

ISSUES AND IS ALL THAT IS NECESSARY ... RIGHT? AND IF ... MY ALLEGATIONS 

AND EXAMPLES COULD BE CONVINCINGLY REFUTED BY ATTORNEY BLAIR 

LEWIS IN A HEARING ... THEN SO BE IT. BUT THEY CAN'T.

HOWEVER; MANY OF THESE TRUTHFUL AND ACCURATE ACCUSATIONS 

AGAINST ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS, ARE ACTUALLY VERY EASY TO BE FOUND 

CORRECT AND ACTIONABLE, BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT. HOW? 

BECAUSE THERE ARE NO CREDIBLE EXCUSES, OR CREDIBLE ANSWERS, THAT 

BLAIR LEWIS CAN GIVE ... THAT MAKE ANY CREDIBLE OR LOGICAL SENSE.

THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION BY NOT 

TAKING THE TIME TO PERFORM ITS REQUIRED DUE DILIGENCE TO HAVE 

ATTORNEY BLAIR LEWIS COME INTO COURT, UNDER OATH, AND ANSWER 

EACH LEGITIMATE ACCUSATION REGARDING HIS UNETHICAL AND PROHIBITED 

BEHAVIOR. BLAIR LEWIS'S AUTHORED STATEMENT IN HIS UNTIMELY 

RESPONSE, WHERE HE BASICALLY STATES, "THAT HE DID NOTHING WRONG" 
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 8

... WHILE NOT REALLY ADDRESSING OR DEFENDING ANYTHING ... JUST DOES 

NOT SEEM TO "CUT THE JUDICIAL MUSTER.”

I. – V.

{¶19} Before turning to the merits of this case, we must first address whether the 

trial court had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s Motion for Sanctions. 

Venue

{¶20} Venue is a procedural matter. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 88, 

290 N.E.2d 841 (1972). Civ.R. 3(C) sets out counties in which “[p]roper venue lies,” but it 

also states, “Any action may be venued, commenced, and decided in any court in any 

county.” (Emphasis added.) The 1970 Staff Note to Civ.R. 3 recognizes that “any action 

may be commenced and decided in any court that has jurisdiction of the subject matter.” 

{¶21} Improper venue does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear an action. 

Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1107, 2007-Ohio-4410, 2007 

WL 2421814, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, 2005-Ohio3804, 831 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 23. “Rather, the question of venue is one of convenience and 

asks in which court, among all of those with jurisdiction, to best bring a claim.” Id., citing 

State v. Kremer, 3d Dist. No. 15-05-05, 2006-Ohio-736, 2006 WL 389617, ¶ 6.

{¶22} In conjunction with Civ.R. 12(B), Civ.R. 3(D)(1) creates a mechanism for a 

defendant to raise the defense of improper venue and to have the action transferred to a 

county that is described as proper under Civ.R. 3(C). Civ.R. 3 makes clear that its 

provisions “are not jurisdictional” and that a judgment is not subject to collateral attack

“solely on the ground that there was improper venue.” Civ.R. 3(H), See Speigel v. Ianni, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220467, 2023-Ohio-3809, ¶ 35.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 9

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

{¶23} Subject matter jurisdiction is distinct from venue. See Morrison v. Steiner, 

32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. Subject-matter 

jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits, while 

venue connotes the locality where the suit should be heard.” Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio 

St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972); State ex rel. Dunbar v. Ham, 45 Ohio St.2d 112, 

115, 341 N.E.2d 594 (1976), quoting The New York, Chicago, and St. Louis RR. Co. v. 

Matzinger, 136 Ohio St. 271, 276, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940).

{¶24} Ohio's common pleas courts have “original jurisdiction over all justiciable 

matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies 

as may be provided by law.” Article IV, Section 4(B), Ohio Constitution. A common pleas 

court's subject-matter jurisdiction “extends to ‘all matters at law and in equity that are not 

denied to it.’ ” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 

1040, ¶ 20, quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554, 558-59, 29 N.E. 179 (1891). 

{¶25} “When a court has the constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a 

particular class or type of case, that court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Ostanek v. 

Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, 181 N.E.3d 1162, ¶ 2, citing Corder v. Ohio 

Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 369, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14.

{¶26} The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is open to challenge at any time 

because subject-matter jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court's ability to hear a 

case. Id. If a court acts without subject-matter jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that 

court is void. Cheap Escape Co. v. Tri-State Constr., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-335, 

173 Ohio App.3d 683, 2007-Ohio-6185, 880 N.E.2d 122, ¶ 18.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 10

Analysis

{¶27} Here, we find that while venue was not proper in Fairfield County, the 

Fairfield County Common Pleas Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

matters before it in this case.

{¶28} However, we find that once the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court 

issued its March 15, 2022, order finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter (more 

correctly venue) and ordering the matter transferred to Franklin County, it no longer had 

jurisdiction to accept and consider Appellant’s motion for sanctions as all matters 

pertaining to the underlying cause are now properly before the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas. 

{¶29} The lower court reasoned that it still maintained jurisdiction to consider the 

motion for sanctions because “even though the primary action in this case has concluded, 

the issue of sanctions remains extant, and ripe for this Court's review” citing Barbato v. 

Mercy Med. Ctr., 5th Dist. No. 2005 CA 00044, 2005-0hio-5219, ¶ 30. However, the 

primary action in this case had not concluded, but rather was still pending, albeit in 

another court in another county.

{¶30} Two courts cannot simultaneously exercise jurisdiction over the same 

subject matter. To allow otherwise would frustrate the original order transferring venue to 

another court, would create a risk of inconsistent judgments, and waste judicial resources.

Atwood Resources, Inc. v. Lehigh, 98 Ohio App.3d 293, 298, 648 N.E.2d 548, 551 (5th 

Dist.1994).
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 11

{¶31} Accordingly, the appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

Fairfield County, Ohio, is dismissed. 

By: Wise, J.

Gwin, P. J., concurs.

King, J., dissents.

JWW/kw 1113
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 12

King, J., dissents,

{¶ 32} I agree with the majority that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction 

but venue was improper. I do not agree that the transfer of the case to the proper venue 

deprived it of jurisdiction to enforce its orders over parties that violated its orders while 

the case was before the transferring court. Because I conclude that court should not 

dismiss the appeal; I would affirm the trial court. 

{¶ 33} As the majority observed, the transfer of venue occurred under the civil 

rules. That procedural transfer does not itself divest the common pleas court of subject 

matter jurisdiction under either Article IV, Section (4)(B) or R.C. 2503.01. In the absence 

of either a constitutional or statutory rule, the majority cites to a judicially created rule 

against concurrent proceedings occurring in multiple courts. 

{¶ 34} The judicial policy behind this certainly makes sense, i.e. waste of judicial 

resources and the risk of inconsistent judgments. But the purpose behind this rule 

suggests a more modest scope than the one defined by the majority to deprive courts of 

jurisdiction to enforce its orders. 

{¶ 35} Here, there is neither the risk of inconsistent judgment nor waste of 

resources. The Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas was in the superior position to 

regulate the parties subject to its orders and sanction those parties for noncompliance. 

One can imagine ample prudential reasons, such as difference in local rules or standing 

orders, why the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas would decline to sanction parties 

for conduct occurring before a different tribunal. In the unlikely event a movant sought 

sanctions in both courts simultaneously and both courts intended to proceed, the non-
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 13

moving party could likely avail itself of a writ of prohibition from this court. Thus, I would 

find that rule inapplicable here. 

{¶ 36} Moreover, I question whether the receiving court would have jurisdiction 

over that particular matter arising before the transferring court. The subject matter giving 

rise to court’s sanction was the contravention of its decree. As this court recognized 

decades ago, sanctions are collateral to the underlying suit. Barbato v. Mercy Med. Ctr, 

5th Dist. Stark App. No. 2005 CA 00044, 2005-Ohio-5219, ¶ 30. That collateral action 

arose here arose in the transferring court before the transfer. In my view, the receiving 

court is thus unlikely to have authority to impose sanctions for misconduct occurring prior 

to assuming jurisdiction over the noncompliant party. 

{¶ 37} In opposition to this, the transferring court enjoyed the inherent power of 

contempt to aid in the exercise of its judicial powers. Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cnty.

Comm'rs, 36 Ohio St. 3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362, 1364 (1988). For a trial court to wield 

this inherent and important power under the majority’s holding, it would either have to wait 

until all collateral matters are resolved prior to the transfer or transfer a case and forego 

the power to sanction misbehavior. Neither outcome appears desirable. Instead, we 

should follow Barbato in this situation and allow the transferring court whose order was 

flaunted to decide what sanctions, if any, to impose. 

{¶ 38} I would also add the majority’s conclusion implies that if attorney’s fees were 

awarded under Civ. R. 3(D)(2), then the trial court there too would have to conduct all 

hearings, allow for sufficient motion practice, and impose its order prior to the transfer—

otherwise it would lack the subject matter jurisdiction to do so after the transfer. This 
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 14 14

likewise would cause either unnecessary delays or operate as a windfall for a wrongdoer. 

In my view, the trial court instead retains limited jurisdiction to deal with this matter too. 

{¶ 39} Further, because we found that subject-matter jurisdiction existed when the 

violation of the court’s order occurred, I conclude we should not sua sponte raise the issue 

of jurisdiction to then dismiss the appeal. See Driggins v. Bowen, 2023-Ohio-205, ¶ 36, 

aff'd sub nom. Driggins v. Bracy, 2023-Ohio-4018, ¶ 36, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 27. This rule is consistent with the idea a court can 

determine its own jurisdiction, and that decision can be reviewed on appeal. Goldstein v.

Christiansen, 1994-Ohio-229, 70 Ohio St. 3d 232, 235. In the absence of an assignment 

of error by the adverse party, I do not believe we should inquire into this particular 

jurisdictional matter. 

{¶ 40} In turning to the merits now, the trial court determined a sanction for 

contempt was appropriate, but it declined to impose additional sanctions for the same 

conduct. The appellant did not appeal the decision regarding the contempt. The main 

thrust of his appeal was he wanted a sanction hearing to cross-examine certain witnesses 

because he believed an attorney appearing in the matter was being untruthful. As the 

complained about conduct is subject to an abuse of discretion review, I would find the trial 

court did not err and affirm its judgment. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I 

dissent.