UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CELTNIEKS, BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Staff Sergeant STEPHEN M. WILLIAMS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20160006 

Headquarters, Fort Carson 

Lanny J. Acosta, Jr., Military Judge 

Colonel Gregg A. Engler, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Melissa R. Covolesky, JA; Major Christopher D. 

Coleman, JA (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier, JA; Captain 

Bryan A. Osterhage, JA; Captain Joshua B. Fix, JA (on reply brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, JA; Captain John Gardella, JA (on brief). 

31 August 2017 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his plea, of one specification of absence from his unit for over thirty 

days terminated by apprehension in violation of Article 86, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge 

also convicted appellant, contrary to his plea, of one specification of larceny of 

property of a value greater than $500.00, in violation of Article 121, UCMJ. The 

military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 

eighteen months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 

approved the sentence as adjudged. The convening authority also credited appellant 

with nineteen days confinement credit against the sentence to confinement. 
WILLIAMS—ARMY 20160006 

2 

 This case is before us for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant raises 

two assignments of error, one of which merits discussion and relief, and one which 

is rendered moot by our decision in this case. In particular, appellant argues that the 

military judge committed error when he allowed the trial counsel to amend the 

larceny specification upon which appellant was convicted, such amendment 

constituting a major change to the specification in violation of Rule for Court 

Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 603. We agree and provide relief in our decretal 

paragraph. Appellant’s personal submissions pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 

12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), other than the issue discussed below, do not warrant 

relief. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was originally charged, inter alia, with the following violation of 

the UCMJ: 

CHARGE II: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 121. 

. . . . 

Specification 3: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or 

near Fort Carson, Colorado and at or near Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, between on or about 20 January 2013 and 

on or about 16 February 2013, steal U.S. Currency, of a 

value greater than $500, the property of Military Star 

Exchange Credit Program. 

At trial, the military judge amended the above specification, over defense objection, 

to read: 

CHARGE II: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 121. 

Specification 3: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or 

near Fort Carson, Colorado and at or near Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, between on or about 20 January 2013 and 

on or about 16 February 2013, steal cards, of a value 

greater than $500, the property of Military Star Exchange 

Credit Program. 

The military judge found appellant guilty of the above specification. We 

agree with appellant that the change in the specification from larceny of “currency” 

to larceny of “cards” was a major change. It is true, as the government argues, that 

appellant was on notice of the conduct he was accused of committing from the 

discovery materials and bill of particulars provided by the government—stealing gift 
WILLIAMS—ARMY 20160006 

3 

cards purchased with a Military Star Card. It is also true that appellant was given a 

continuance by the military judge to investigate the amended specification, so he 

was not surprised on the day of trial regarding the conduct he was defending against. 

However, the application of R.C.M. 603 against the backdrop of recent case law 

from our superior court leads us to the conclusion that the change to Specification 3 

of Charge II constituted a major change. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

In pertinent parts, R.C.M. 603 reads: 

Rule 603. Changes to charges and specifications 

(a) Minor changes defined. Minor changes in charges and 

specifications are any except those which add a party, 

offenses, or substantial matter not fairly included in those 

previously preferred, or which are likely to mislead the 

accused as to the offenses charged. 

. . . . 

(d) Major changes. Changes or amendments to charges or 

specifications other than minor changes may not be made 

over the objection of the accused unless the charge or 

specification affected is preferred anew. 

R.C.M. 603(a), (d). 

In United States v. Reese, our superior court applied ordinary rules of 

statutory construction in interpreting R.C.M. 603 and stated, “To the extent our 

precedent has required a separate showing of prejudice under these circumstances [a 

major change over defense objection], it is overruled: absent ‘preferral anew’ and a 

second referral there is no charge to which jurisdiction can attach, and Article 59(a), 

UCMJ, is not, in fact, implicated.” 76 M.J. 297, 302 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (internal 

citation omitted). 

In this case, appellant’s conduct consisted of stealing gift cards by using a 

Military Star Card account he set up in the name of one of his subordinates, a 

Specialist Williams, and designating himself as an authorized user of the card. 

There is no doubt that appellant did not steal U.S. currency as charged in the 

original specification. It is also clear that there is a difference between U.S. 

currency and gift cards. On its face the amended specification adds a substantial 

matter not fairly included in the original charge, namely what was stolen. While 

they could be used for the same purposes, gift cards are not U.S. currency. This 
WILLIAMS—ARMY 20160006 

4 

change is not of the type to amend “trivial mistakes.” United States v. Longmire, 39 

M.J. 536, 538 (A.C.M.R. 1994). This change to the specification was a major 

change. 

It is not dispositive that appellant actually knew the basis for Specification 3 

of Charge II was the larceny of “cards” and not “U.S. currency” because a prejudice 

analysis under these circumstances is no longer appropriate after Reese. What is 

dispositive is that the change to Specification 3, made over defense objection, added 

a substantial matter not fairly included in the original charge, thus rendering it a 

major change under R.C.M. 603(a). “The practical effect is that if a change is major 

and the defense objects, the charge has no legal basis and the court-martial may not 

consider it unless and until it is ‘preferred anew,’ and subsequently referred.” 

Reese, 76 M.J. at 301 (quoting R.C.M. 603(d)). 

Appellant also alleges his defense counsel were ineffective by alerting the 

government to a factual impossibility in the government’s case (i.e., that appellant 

did not steal “U.S. currency”) before jeopardy attached. This assignment of error is 

directly related to the same Specification 3 of Charge II discussed above and is moot 

in light of our decision. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty of Specification 3 of Charge II are set aside. The 

remaining findings of guilty are affirmed. The sentence is set aside. The case is 

returned to the same or a different convening authority. A rehearing is directed on 

Specification 3 of Charge II and the sentence. If the convening authority determines 

that a rehearing on that specification is impracticable, the convening authority may 

dismiss that specification and charge, and order a rehearing on the sentence only. If 

the convening authority determines that a rehearing on the sentence is likewise 

impracticable, the convening authority may take any other lawful action. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: