## Changing the Way Airline Reservations are made.

Timothy O'Neil

- Dunne of T2Impact Management Consulting http://www.t2impact.com/index.php and VaultPAD Accelerator for Travel Entrepreneurs http://www.vaultpad.com / the purpose of my comments to that I hope you will allow me to explain how the airlines are going to change the way reservations are made through improving the sophistication of the supply of airline products to intermediaries, content partners and ultimately the passenger her/himself. I am providing the comments to the application. I have an interest to seeing the advancement of the capability for airline product distribution.
There is a l ot of confusion and commotion concerning the IATA initiative on new distribution capability

– for mally known as NDC and its formal structure Resolution 787. Rather than try to explain it all

– let me cut to the chase on the important parts of the debate. I regret that this is necessarily rather long. First I will discuss the facts of NDC. What it does and how it was derived. Later I will look at the protagonists and why there is a fight at all and the likely outcome. Then I hope to conclude with what the DoT should do in my opinion with regard to this application. Let's be clear what it is about and why its important to the world of Airline products from all stakeholders. NDC addresses a long held problem that the messaging protocols are out of date with the forms of electronic commerce that power our lives today. Almost everything we do has an electronic component in it. Most of which we never see because it occurs in the supply chain systems in the Business infrastructure. How we get our food fresh in the supermarket, how our iPhones are delivered, how our express packages arrive

– all of this is managed electronically. Ecommerce has been the change in our world that most consumers never see. Should they care? No

– we just want fresh food, an iPhone fro m the Apple store and Fedex to show up on time.

### In the 1950s and 1960s the world was a much simpler place. There was no

e - commerce. It just did not exist. The standard form of business to business data transmissions occurred with Telex (also known as Tel etype). Telex content (purely human readable text) was as simple as the character set on an old typewriter. No, pictures, no funky characters such as @ signs, no complex data messages for example! This was a somewhat secure one way messaging system. It ens ured that a message went from A to B. That's it. Everything we did then was driven by paper. The airlines needed to communicate internally and externally with one another and other stakeholders in the chain such as Airports, Over time the same messaging s ystems were expanded so that messages could pass to external partners, Caterers, Ground handling companies etc. The messages became more complex as the information needs grew. Structures of the passenger information necessarily also grew. In the 1970s and 1980s the need to connect travel agents independently of the airlines meant that the closed world of the airlines opened up to third parties. At the time I worked for PARS and its successor company Worldspan. I was instrumental in breaking open the closed worlds and enabling interactions first by pure communications protocols

– and then with data. I designed the system that enabled large scale interaction between business trading partners such as Tour Operators and Airlines via the GDSs. This led to the des ign of the way that Expedia first worked. I designed based on the then CLEARLY obsolete systems then extant. These networks and data systems expanded enormously with the advent of the PC. Along came the internet in the 1990s and the opportunities for expan ded business relationships grew and grew. However the messaging protocols did not expand. They evolved into the systems that exist today which are still largely unchanged from the 1950s. IATA publishes a book every year called the AIRIMP manual. http://www.iata.org/publications/Pages/AIRIMP.aspx This book lays out the standards. The procedures and rules for making a reservation are contained in another book from IATA, called the Reservations Services Manual. http://www.iata.org/publications/Pages/rsm.aspx Both will put you to sleep. Essentially what these books do is to describe the ways in which the airlines can communicate wit h one another and with third parties in the making and processing of a passenger reservation. Sadly the structure of these message sets and processes/procedures has

### resulted in a rigid set of methodologies. Airlines through separate pathways

send fares u sually via ATPCO to one place for filing, schedules via OAG and Innovata is another. Then the actual state of whether the seat is there (called Availability) is sent to the GDS amongst other places. Any airline has therefore the somewhat ludicrous problem that they have certified MULTIPLE companies to determine a guaranteed price. Except they use different mechanisms. Thus the price on the web, the price of online and offline agencies and the price from the call centre can be different 100% of the time. YET GUARNATEED AS ACCURATE AND THE LOWEST PRICE. Mix in the problems of latency and differing capabilities and voila you have clearly different prices for what seems to be a standard product. Is the consumer confused and full of mistrust. Yup you bet. So it i s a complete myth that there is fair and easy shopping and price comparison. I defy ANYONE in the industry or outside to state that the system isn’t completely fair and open. It is not comprehensive (only some airlines participate in some systems. NO AIRLI NES PARTICIPATE IN ALL SYSTEMS EQUALLY. Clearly in today's world many things have changed from the way business was conducted in the 1960s. Electronic commerce is vastly different. The written page is no longer the medium for communication of information

. Personalization and choice drives an enhanced consumer experience as it should do. The airlines on their own websites have managed to build new systems that enable advanced capability and a far greater degree of choice than you can get from an online tra vel site. Amazon and other pioneers of consumer product ecommerce have created new ways to do business. Walmart et al, UPS and FEDEX have revolutionized the supply chain of physical things. Complex logistics today are a marvel

– getting an iPhone 5 from a factory run by Foxcomm in China to your door engraved with your name in just a few days after logging into the Apple.com website is amazing. We take all of that for granted. The concept of the electronic shopping cart has changed how we buy our "things" o nline. Mobile shopping is even more wondrous. The frustration of the supply side of the airline product (yes that means the airlines) means they have had enough. They need to better communicate their differentiated products and services to a far more sop histicated and personalized world. Consumers believe that the airline product is simple. Its

### a seat, it comes with a price. SURELY SOMEONE KNOWS THE LOWEST PRICE

I CAN BUY THE TICKET FOR THAT SEAT? Actually its not that simple. And the airlines don't want it to be simple. It is complex in ways that cannot be imagined. We must never forget that the mission of an airline is to get the maximum value for that seat before the perishable inventory disappears. Filling the airplane and getting the highest amount o f money for the seats on it

– is obviously very complex. Not only this but the nature of the relationship between the brand of the airline and the consumer enables the interaction of the two for all sorts of commercial and non

- commercial dialogue. For exam ple selling more products not just from the airline but from business partners and doing things like building loyalty to that brand. Necessarily there is a lot of complexity in that. That the airlines want to obfuscate the true price you pay is NOT A CRIME . Presenting the information in a misleading fashion should be and IS against the law. No where in there does it say that the regulator (the DoT) has any business ensuring that comparison shopping is a requirement. Today's current systems as defined by t he AIRIMP manual are inadequate for selling unbundled, rebounded and ancillary airline and non

- airline products. The PNR (Passenger Name Record) is entirely an inadequate way to express the value of a customer to the airline. NDC is designed to change t hat. The first part of the change is the IATA resolution 787 which seeks to change the infrastructure of the communications protocols from the old Telex/Teletype way to the more standard (not just airlines) and sophisticated data communication structures o f XML. And yes

– its not difficult to read the resolution and you can find it here http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/stb/Documents/resolution

787.pdf . This is a relatively short at 11 pages. It is of course contained in the docket as well. NDC is happening now. Around the world there are many teams working on pilot programs to launch NDC to the consumer. The standard for NDC was an open competition and eventually a data schema

– deve loped originally for the Open Axis Group http://www.openaxisgroup.org / by Farelogix http://www.farelogix.com / was adopted by the airlines. The competition pitted The Op en Travel Alliance new schema (OTA

### 2.0) http://www.opentravel.org / against the successful team. Both are

relevant. In my view they will co

- exist and find a way for harmonization. **Who does this affect?** Every developer needs to know this is going on. They should keep abreast of the evolving nature of the standards are they move forward. I would also suggest contacting your airline business partner and seeing how you can get involved in some of the pilot p rojects that are going in in different parts of the world. Two of our VaultPAD companies are actively involved in this. LUTE Technologies http://www.lute

- tec.com / Providing Direct Connect solutions for airlines and large scale intermediaries ; and Air Black Box Company connecting Full Service and Low Cost Carriers for airports and other communities worldwide. http://www.airblackbox.com / Every commercial organization in Trav el needs to keep an eye on this because even if you are not involved in the selling of airline products

– if you are in travel

– airlines drive behavior. Whether you are a supplier such as an airline

– Full Service or Low Cost

– you should be involved. Int ermediaries need to get on board because this is going to change your world. Now let me turn to the reasons for conflict and why everyone seems to get into a tizzy about the issues. Worldwide today there are 4 VERY LARGE companies called GDSs Global Dis tribution Systems : they are

– Amadeus http://www.amadeus.com/amadeus/amadeus.html (the largest) Travelsky (China only) http://www.travelsky.com / , Sabre http://www.sabre.com / (in Partnership with Abacus http://www.abacus.com.sg / for Asia) and Travelport http://www.travelport.com / (Ow ner of 3 GDSs, Apollo, Galileo and Worldspan)

- global revenues for these 4 companies are estimated by T2Impact at US$16

- 18 billion. Now they offer different businesses

- the Intermediary travel business

– ie the systems that connect Travel Agencies with t he Supply Chain Systems is what I am referring to here. Approx. 50% of the world's airline reservations pass through the GDS parts of their business. But this is declining as a category as the market place as distribution of the products fragment. Note tha t LCCs who generally do

### not participate at all or only participate at a lower level are commanding

greater and greater market share. Full Service Carriers are expanding their reach into more channels increasingly with differentiated product. In doing so ar e moving away from their traditional dependence on the GDS channel Their ability to sell more variants of their product set is possible through their own and the new so called "Direct Connect" intermediary channels. As a share globally the GDS companies ar e seeing erosion to the newer channels. As you can imagine they clearly don't want to see share fall away. But the GDS companies

– for whatever reason

– did not adopt and embrace the full extent of the Internet revolution. It does not matter if the airlin es or GDSs were at fault for not keeping pace with the changes in commerce. The fact is that they didn't. Evolution is no longer an option

– transformation and revolution are an absolute necessity

– to support the needs of a sophisticated consumer who want s choice and transparency. IATA commissioned a study to review the future market for airline product distribution. I highly recommend this learned piece from Henry Harteveldt (alo ng with a little help from this author). http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/stb/ndc/Pages/index.aspx I suggest watching the video and then downloading the actual report. It lays out the coming scenarios over the next 5 years for the distribution of airline product s. That the airlines and GDSs have different business goals is self evident. In some cases they can reach an accommodation. In Asia

– this does occur with Abacus and Travelsky. In other parts of the world

– let's just call it contentious. Airlines want

– greater flexibility to differentiate their products and they want a far lower cost of distribution. Travel Agents

– whose revenues from airlines have disappeared need some form of compensation. There is an unnatural act in distribution that airlines pay GD Ss

– GDSs take a significant chunk of that revenue and pass it onto the travel agents in the form of incentive fees. Airlines hate that. Travel Agents need it. GDSs love the model because it puts them squarely in the centre of the world. But it is not sust ainable. The GDSs have fought like crazy to ensure that not only is there a technology restraint to protect their business model

– but also commercial constraints through highly restrictive contracts both upstream (PCA or participating Carrier Agreements) with Full

### Content restrictions, and downstream with Travel Agent Subscriber

Agreements. Individually they are highly restrictive. Taken together

– they are a guaranteed form of protectionism. I have had the ability to look at both sets of contracts and I c an tell you that the interaction of the two results in a restrained marketplace with heavy restrictions placed on Airlines and Travel Agencies who of course should be free as trading partners to engage in whatever relationship they like. The battle for domination of airline product distribution has come to a head. Sabre and Travelport (individually) fought battles with American Airlines and while the cases were both settled out of court

– there is a clear winner. AA will receive multiple p ayments from both Sabre and Travelport. While the out of court settlement terms are officially under lock and key

– a mysterious payment of $280 million appeared in AA's revenues in Q4 2012 and announcements of payments have been made by both GDSs to AA. M ore importantly the most restrictive parts of the contracts between the airlines and the GDSs have now been broken. The fact that the GDS (as market places

– defined in the AA vs Sabre lawsuit) has restrained the ability of the trading partners within the marketplace through first ancient technology and then through highly restrictive use agreements is

– quite simply and unnatural act. The fact that the legality of it was challenged in court and an out of court settlement was reached should demonstrate that something was wrong. I urge the learned people reading this to review my appendix which is the Judge (in the trial of AA vs Sabre) instructions before the start of the hearing. It leads to some very clear conclusions. In my view this has resulted in a ne w era of openness is now coming upon us. And not a moment too soon. Just this week (April 2013) Travelport announced their new merchandising platform. http://travelport.mediaroom.com /index.php?s=43&item=934 At the recent CAPA forum Airlines in Transition in Dublin http://centreforaviation.com/events/airlines

- in

- transition

- 2013 / Travelport went to great pai ns to explain to the audience of airline CEOs and senior industry leaders

– that Airlines could now distribute any content via the platform to Agents (who in turn need to have the new Universal Desktop or Universal API and not the traditional green screen) their way.

### Already

– in various forms American Airlines and Air Canada have

announced their intention to use the platform. easyJet is already using a modified version without the traditional ATPCo fares to distribute some of its product via Travelport. Th e dam holding back the waters of change is clearly crumbling. Other airlines are lining up for this. Today Farelogix and technology service providers such as VaultPAD's LUTE http://www.lute

tec.com / is providing and printing a gazillion tickets of airlines who want this form of distribution. But don't think the war is over. That IATA has filed in this docket to get NDC approved has unleashed an opportunity for the traditionalists to direct their ire and a lot of mis communication into the conversation . This might seem odd for a communications protocol to have to go through regulatory approval. Frankly there is a significant amount of confusion abounding here. The issue of consumer choice has crept into the debate and become a critical part of the debate. BUT IT IS NOT RELEVANT. Let me deal with the battle clear and head on. **Airlines** want to obfuscate the price of the ticket. They need to do this in order to generate profits enough. The battle cry of the airlines thes e days is ROCI

– or Return on Capital Investment. They also want differentiation and the ability to speak directly to the consumer. Just as other consumer products and services. Just a few years back the cry from the airlines was anything but a loss! The **T ravel Agents**  wa nt a simplistic product to sell and for them to get a revenue model that compensates them for their services. The **consumer** wants a trustworthy place that allows online or offline to be able to search and shop and COMPARE easily and FAST. The **GDSs** want to preserve that nice revenue flow. Clearly there is no solution here that meets everybody's needs. In looking at the way out from here

– Regulators are wrestling with the problem of do they i ntervene of not. In my view the regulators have no place getting involved. This is a changing business model situation. There will be winners and losers. No one has the right to be in business unless they have a product that consumers want and are prepared to pay for at a rate that the two parties can agree on. Regulators are there to ensure a

### fairness in the market, these days that means a hands off approach. The

regulators have no need to protect the consumer as in my view more than adequate existing protection schemes already exist. If the regul ators believe that the current protections are not enough

– then they have to look into the mirror because there has been a great deal of attention paid to ensure that the consumer is protected. I absolutely support that the regulators must ensure consumer protection. That does not mean that shopping and price comparison is a god given right. The argument of restriction on freedom of choice is spurious at best. Marketplaces (with very few exceptions) do not have to support cross company product shopping c omparison. Is there a regulation on the comparison of products in Amazon? Does a supermarket have to show the different prices in a shopping display for all prices of say washing powder? Absolutely the supplier and the retailer must publish legal, and full pricing. That any seller

– direct or indirect

– has the right to offer their good or services their way is a basic right of capitalism. Can someone emerge who can figure out the market price of an airline ticket and provide that as a service to the consum er and make money from it? Sure. There are a whole number of them. From the large scale meta search companies like Skyscanner and Kayak http://www.kayak.com / to the personalized trip management system of Pintrips http://pintrips.com / (another VaultPAD company please use a Chrome Browser) In Asia this includes Wego, http://www.wego.com.sg / Skyscanner http://www.skyscanner.com.sg / and Adioso http://adioso.com / there are good places to go. However consumer trust in the current batch of systems is low and will continue to be so

– not least of the reasons is the complexit y of the product. For a bit of fun read my article in Tnooz on the subject http://www.tnooz.com/2011/11 /15/news/why

- air

- results

- are - as predictable

- as - european - finance

- ministers

- or - marriage

- vows - of

- kim

kardashian / Let me be absolutely clear

– defining a solution that would force airlines to participate in a commercial marketplace would set a precedent tha t would reverberate throughout the entire American way of life. Can we imagine a supermarket having to display a list of ALL the products available for sale (whether they sold it or not) and whether it was AVAILABLE TODAY in that

### store clearly to every con sumer? That would be patently ludicrous.

**Conclusion** We are moving to a far more dynamic and personalized choice in the search, sale and delivery of airline products. This is a good thing. Getting there is painful and there will be casualties as we trans form from a predetermined fixed price market restrained by legacy technologies and inhibited by anachronistic contracts to a truly dynamic personalized offering of a wide variety of choice. Let's be clear and open. The commercial practices and structures d esigned in the 1950s and 1960s have no place in today's world. As consumers we demand choice. As sellers, we have a responsibility to meet the needs and demands of our customers

- FAIRLY . If we fail

– whether intermediary or direct

– to provide what the ma rket needs, then we will be punished ultimately and forced from the market unless and until we do. Removing the unnatural barriers to a free market whether they are technological, regulatory, commercial or historic is good for everyone. That is the basis o f a free society. NDC and Resolution 787 are a natural progression. I respectfully submit that the DoT should either dismiss the application as non

- relevant. The DoT has a responsibility to ensure the health of the airline industry, ensure fair competiti on takes place and that the needs of the country are accounted for. If there must be a decision by the DoT then it should be to not interfere with the processes of the market change. I believe that the DoT would be ill advised to consider anything that w ould inhibit the changing nature of the distribution of airline products. There are good processes already in place to ensure that the consumer is not abused. Sincerely and Respectfully

Timothy O’Neil

- Dunne, Managing Partner T2Impact LLC.IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. § § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11-CV-244-Y § TRAVELPORT LIMITED, et al. §
SEALED ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS Before the Court is the Partial Motion to Dismiss (doc. 163) filed by defendants Sabre Inc., Sabre Holdings Corporation, and Sabre Travel International Limited (collectively, “Sabre”), along with Sabre’s Supplement to Its Motion to Dismiss (doc. 283). Also before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 169) and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (doc. 287) filed by defendants Travelport Limited and Travelport, LP (collectively, “Travelport”), and the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 165) filed by defendant Orbitz Worldwide, LLC (“Orbitz”). After review, the Court will deny the motions.

I. Background This is an antitrust case that plaintiff American Airlines, Inc. (“American”), filed against Travelport, Orbitz, and Sabre. American is a large domestic and international airline. Orbitz operates an online travel agency. And Travelport and Sabre each Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 1 of 23 PageID 10626operate global distribution systems (“GDSes”). 1 In its first amended complaint (doc. 70), American asserted claims against the defendants under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act as well as under state law. In that complaint, American alleged in essence that Sabre and Travelport had each unlawfully wielded monopoly power in the market for the distribution of airline fare, flight, and availability information and the provision of booking services to travel agents (“the Market”), as well as in the submarkets consisting of Sabre and Travelport customers, respectively. In addition, American alleged that Sabre and Travelport, along with Orbitz and other unnamed industry participants, had engaged in an industry-wide conspiracy to preserve the GDSes’ monopoly power. All defendants responded by moving for dismissal of the first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After reviewing the motions, the Court determined that American had stated claims against Sabre for monopolization of the Market and the Sabre submarket and a claim against Travelport for monopolization of the Travelport submarket. The Court, however, dismissed all other claims--some with prejudice--and granted American leave to file a second amended complaint. Pursuant to

1 GDSes distribute airline fare, flight, and availability information to travel agents, enabling those travel agents to make reservations and issue tickets to travelers. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. 2, ¶ 2.) Airlines provide their information to GDSes and pay each GDS a booking fee for every reservation that is made through the GDS. ( Id. at 3, ¶¶ 6-7.) 2 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 2 of 23 PageID 10627that order, American filed its second amended complaint (doc. 159). American also filed a motion for reconsideration challenging certain aspects of the Court’s dismissal order. The Court rejected the majority of the arguments made in that motion, but granted reconsideration on American’s argument that it should be permitted to assert section 1 claims based on its own contracts with Sabre and Travelport. Rather than grant American leave to file an entirely new complaint, however, the Court granted American leave to file a supplement to its second amended complaint. American thereafter filed its supplement (doc. 265), and Sabre and Travelport filed supplemental motions to dismiss.In the second amended complaint and supplement, American reurges its position that Sabre, Travelport, and Orbitz have engaged in an industry-wide conspiracy to preserve the GDSes’ market power. According to American, the defendants have conspired to preserve the GDS model 2 and to exclude American’s “AA Direct Connect” from the Market and submarkets. AA Direct Connect is a method of providing airline information and booking services directly to travel agents without having to go through GDSes. Based on these allegations, American asserts the following claims in its second amended complaint: (1) monopolization by Sabre of the Market and the Sabre submarket in violation of section 2 of

2 The GDS model is explained in detail in the Court’s November 21, 2011 Order Regarding Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Leave (doc. 244). 3 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 3 of 23 PageID 10628the Sherman Act; (2) monopolization by Travelport of the Travelport submarket in violation of section 2; (3) conspiracy by Sabre, Travelport, Orbitz, and “other unnamed co-conspirators” to monopolize the Market and submarkets in violation of section 2; (4) agreement between Sabre and Travelport to unreasonably restrain interstate commerce in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act; (5) group boycott by Sabre, Travelport, and “numerous travel agencies” in violation of section 1; (6) agreement between Travelport and Orbitz to allocate customers in violation of section 1; and (7) unreasonable restraint of competition by Sabre and Travelport via their contracts with American in violation of section 1. The defendants now collectively seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of counts 3-7.

II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) auth orizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (holding that Rule 8(a)’s simplified

4 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 4 of 23 PageID 10629pleading standard applies to most civil actions). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. , 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace , 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and his “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 547, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). The Court need not credit bare conclusory allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper attachments. A court is permitted, however, to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

5 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 5 of 23 PageID 10630judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc. , 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A written document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the complaint and may be considered in a 12(b)(6) dismissal proceeding.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp. , 484 F.3d 776, (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). In addition, a “court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss that ‘are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.’” Sullivan v. Leor Energy,
LLC , 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ. , 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)).

III. Analysis A. Count Three: Conspiracy to Monopolize in Violation of Section 2 “Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides a cause of action against ‘single firms that monopolize or attempt to monopolize, as well as conspiracies and combinations to monopolize.’” Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc. , 200 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan , 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993)). 3 To

3 Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads, in relevant part, as follows: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . . 6 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 6 of 23 PageID 10631state a claim for conspiracy to monopolize, a plaintiff must plead facts showing “(1) the existence of specific intent to monopolize; (2) the existence of a combination or conspiracy to achieve that end; (3) overt acts in furtherance of the combination or conspiracy; and (4) an effect upon a substantial amount of interstate commerce.” Id. at 316 (quoting N. Miss. Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jones , 792 F.2d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). After reviewing the second amended complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of American, the Court concludesthat American has stated a plausible section 2 conspiracy-tomonopolize claim. 4 First, American identifies the specific intent to monopolize allegedly shared by Sabre, Travelport, and Orbitz. American alleges that Sabre, Travelport, Orbitz, and certain unnamed industry participants conspired “to punish and retaliate against American for its direct connect initiative, with the specific intent of preserving Sabre’s and Travelport’s monopolies in the [Market] and su bmarkets.” (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. 52, ¶ 177.) American contends that AA Direct Connect poses a threat to the GDS model and that, consequently, the defendants and certain

15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2012).

4 It would take a treatise to respond to all of the arguments raised by the parties in their motion-to-dismiss briefing. Therefore, the Court will explicitly address only those arguments (a) that are germane to the disposition of the instant motions and (b) that are not indirectly addressed by the Court’s analysis. 7 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 7 of 23 PageID 10632other industry participants share an interest in excluding AA Direct Connect from the Market and submarkets. Ac cording to American, the GDSes benefit directly from the GDS model because it allows them to enjoy monopoly power, while travel agencies such as Orbitz benefit indirectly from the model because they share in the booking fees that the GDSes charge to airlines. These allegations, taken as true, support a reasonable inference that GDSes and travel agencies alike share an interest in preserving the status quo of the GDS model and defeating efforts such as AA Direct Connect that challenge the long-term viability of the GDS model. The allegations further support an inference that Sabre, Travelport, and Orbitz have specifically intended to act in accordance with that shared interest. Second, American has adequately pleaded the existence of a conspiracy. More precisely, American has alleged facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Sabre, Travelport, Orbitz, and other industry participants engaged in a combination or conspiracy to preserve the GDS model and exclude AA Direct Connect from the Market and submarkets. American alleges that the defendants, joined by various travel agencies, “agreed with one another not to implement American’s direct connect technology, agreed to bias their displays to disfavor American’s flights, agreed to boycott American flights for their own corporate sales, and agreed to encourage their corporate customers to ‘book away’ from American and shift sales to other airlines.” (Second Am. 8 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 8 of 23 PageID 10633Compl. 6, ¶ 14.) American alleges further that this conspiracy was “orchestrated by Sabre and Travelport, with assistance from large travel agencies such as Orbitz and Expedia, and trade associations such as the Business Travel Coalition and the American Society of Travel Agents.” ( Id. 7, ¶ 15.) Third, American has alleged facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that overt acts were taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. For example, the defendants, American alleges, “coordinated their actions through telephone and email communications, and face-to-face meetings among their senior executives, board members, and employees.” ( Id. ) American also alleges that in November 2010 “a senior executive at Sabre reported to colleagues on a conversation he had with a Travelport representative” and mentioned “a roadmap for AA plan.” ( Id. at 36, ¶ 115.). In addition, American alleges that “an Orbitz employee sent an email to employees at Sabre, Expedia, BTC, and ASTA asking them to ‘stand together’ with Orbitz against American.” ( Id. ¶ 116.) Further, as a final example, American alleges that “[i]n mid-2010, the GDSs were meeting with travel agencies to ‘discuss AA’ or to ‘share views and action plan’ on AA Direct Connect.” ( Id. at 39, ¶ 126.) These allegations are sufficient to support an inference that the defendants took actions in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Fourth, American has alleged facts showing that the alleged conspiracy has had a substantial effect on commerce. The second 9 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 9 of 23 PageID 10634amended complaint alleges that Sabre controls the largest GDS in the Market, accounting for more than 60% of all airline ticket sales made by U.S.-based travel agencies, and that Travelport controls three GDSes--Galileo, Apollo, and Worldspan--which collectively account for over 30% of all airline ticket sales made by U.S.-based travel agencies. ( Id. at 2, ¶ 3; 11, ¶ 26.) Furthermore, American alleges that the majority of airlines’ passenger revenues are generated by ticket sales through travel agencies. ( Id. at 12, ¶ 33.) According to American, approximately 51% of American’s passenger revenue is generated by sales through brick-and-mortar travel agencies, and approximately 10-15% is generated by sales through online agencies. ( Id. ) Given these allegations, it is reasonable to infer that a substantial amount of commerce is affected by the alleged conspiracy. In their motions to dism iss, the defendants collectively contend that American’s conspiracy allegations are merely conclusory and are insufficiently pleaded. Admittedly, American’s conspiracy allegations are rather sweeping. But anchoring American’s broad conspiracy allegations are facts that, taken as true and construed in American’s favor, support a reasonable inference of an industry-wide conspiracy between Sabre, Travelport, Orbitz, and other travel agencies and trade associations. Moreover, whereas American’s first amended complaint lacked any allegations linking Sabre’s and Travelport’s activities, the second amended complaint contains several such allegations of horizontal 10 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 10 of 23 PageID 10635agreement. Thus, American, rather than alleging several discrete vertical conspiracies (as it did in its first amended complaint), has alleged facts that plausibly support a reasonable inference that a broad, industry-wide conspiracy to exclude American from the Market and submarkets exists. To illustrate, consider American’s allegation that “Sabre and Travelport have a policy and practice of using contractual and technical methods to prevent non-GDS distribution providers from interoperating with their platforms” while “they permit interoperation with each other.” ( Id. at 30, ¶ 93.) This allegation corroborates American’s position that Sabre and Travelport have been working together to exclude non-GDS technologies from the Market and the submarkets. Travelport argues that it is illogical to infer that Travelport and Sabre are engaged in a common conspiracy in the Market, particularly one that preserves Sabre’s market position, because they are competi tors. But in the economic landscape painted by American’s complaint, Travelport has a concrete monopoly in the Travelport submarket and a tight grip on 30% of the Market, each of which is jeopardized if the GDS model crumbles. In view of this, it is not illogical to infer that Travelport is willing to work to maintain the GDS model simply because it benefits Sabre. Consider also American’s allegation that Sabre, Orbitz, and Amadeus, the fifth GDS in the Market, engaged in “regular communication with each other about the threat that American’s 11 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 11 of 23 PageID 10636activities posed to the GDS model, how each of the GDSs would approach negotiations with American (and other airlines)[,] and how they would neutralize the threat that AA Direct Connect posed to the GDS model and its monopoly profits.” ( Id. at 32, ¶ 99.) Describing an example of such collaboration, American alleges that “in September 2010, a senior executive at Sabre and a member of Travelport’s board of directors discussed their strategies for negotiating with American, including the Travelport director’s belief that American’s direct connect initiative would not get any traction.” ( Id. ) These allegations help solidify American’s assertion that Sabre and Travelport have aligned themselves in their respective negotiations with American. Moreover, American alleges that the conspiracy to monopolize “between, Sabre, Travelport, and numerous travel agencies was conducted at the highest levels by some of the most senior executives at these firms and they recognized that their communications crossed the line of legitimate competition on the merits.” ( Id. at 34, ¶ 107.) To illustrate, American alleges that “one senior executive at a leading travel agency wrote to one of Sabre’s most senior executives, ‘the circle needs to be very small and very tight.’” ( Id. ) Furthermore, alleges American, “another travel agency expressed concerns about discussing American’s direct connect initiative in writing, and suggested using a code name” while Sabre “ordered its employees not to use words such as ‘bias’ in their e-mails and to communicate verbally, rather than in 12 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 12 of 23 PageID 10637writing, with senior executives when possible.” ( Id. ) While none of these allegations is, on its own, enough to support an inference of a conspiracy, when considered together and in context, and construed in favor of American, they are sufficient to support a conspiracy-to-monopolize claim under section 2. B. Count Four: Unreasonable Restraint on Interstate Commerce by Sabre and Travelport in Violation of Section 1 “To establish a § 1 violation, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendants engaged in a conspiracy, (2) that restrained trade, (3) in the relevant market.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. , 547 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc. , 300 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2002)). 5 In addition, “antitrust plaintiffs must prove they have suffered an injury stemming from the complained-of anti-competitive behavior.” Stewart , 200 F.3d at 312 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “Once a plaintiff establishes that a conspiracy occurred, whether it violates § 1 is determined by the application of either the per se rule or the rule of reason.” Golden Bridge , 547 F.3d at 271 (citing Spectators’ Commc’n Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club , 253 F.3d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2001)). Should “the court determine[] that the defendant’s conduct ‘would always or almost

5 Section 1 states, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1. 13 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 13 of 23 PageID 10638always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,’ the restraint is per se illegal and no further inquiry occurs.” Id. (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc. , 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)). But “if the conduct is not deemed per se unreasonable, the plaintiff will also have to prove that the conduct unreasonably restrains trade in light of actual market forces under the rule of reason.” Id. (citing Leegin , 551 U.S. at 886). Most cases will require analysis under the rule of reason. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C. , 528 F.3d 346, 360 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court “has analyzed most restraints under the so-called rule of reason” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). American alleges that “Sabre and Travelport have conspired and agreed with one another not to compete with one another on certain terms on which they provide airline booking services to American.” (Second Am. Compl. 53, ¶ 180.) In particular, alleges American, Sabre and Travelport have agreed that “they would not implement AA Direct Connect” and that they would “coordinate their negotiations with American.” ( Id. ) As discussed above, American has alleged facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Sabre and Travelport have been working together to exclude AA Direct Connect from the Market and submarkets. More to the point here, American has alleged facts from which it may be inferred that Sabre and Travelport have agreed not to compete for American’s business, but instead to align 14 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 14 of 23 PageID 10639themselves together in their negotiations with American. For example, American alleges that a Sabre employee stated: “We don’t want to take advantage of it with Travelport agencies. We want AA to LOSE the book/passenger. We need to support Tport in their tough actions.” ( Id. at 39, ¶ 125.) The defendants may dispute that this was ever said or that the speaker intended the comment to mean what American contends it means. But at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must treat American’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in American’s favor--even if those inferences are not the **most** reasonable. 6 See Kaiser Aluminum , 677 F.2d at 1050. Because a horizontal agreement between competitors not to compete “would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,” Sabre and Travelport’s alleged agreement amounts to a restraint that is per-se unlawful. Leegin , 551 U.S. at 886; see also Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Bus. Mach. Corp. , 777 F.2d 306, 317 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Horizontal agreements affect inter

6 Throughout its briefing, Travelport highlights purported discrepancies between American’s allegations and the actual documents from which the allegations are derived. While the Court is permitted to consider certain documents described in American’s second amended complaint, and even though the Court is not bound to treat as true any allegations that contradict such documents, the Court declines to engage in significant document review at the pleading stage. In other words, the Court will not undertake to check the accuracy of the allegations in American’s fifty-five-page second amended complaint and four-page supplement by comparing each of those allegations to the document from which it is derived. Such an evidence-based process is more appropriately conducted at the summary-judgment stage. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court will treat American’s allegations as true and will only refuse to give them effect if they are directly contradicted by a document obviously central to American’s second amended complaint. See Kaiser Aluminum , 677 F.2d at 1050; Sullivan , 600 F.3d at 546. 15 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 15 of 23 PageID 10640brand competition, and because interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust law, they are generally illegal per se.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Transource Int’l , 725 F.2d at 280 (“[A]greements not to compete among potential competitors are also illegal per se.” (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States , 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973))). But even if analyzed under the rule of reason, the alleged agreement between Travelport and Sabre to align themselves in their negotiations with American would, given the economic landscape alleged in the second amended complaint, unreasonably restrain trade in, and foreclose a substantial share of, the Market and submarkets in violation of section 1. Golden Bridge , 547 F.3d at 271. C. Count Five: Group Boycott in Violation of Section 1 American contends that “Sabre, Travelport, and numerous travel agencies have combined and conspired with one another to retaliate against American for its efforts to implement direct connect.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 183.) American alleges that Sabre and Travelport carried out the boycott by “obtain[ing] agreements from these travel agencies to bias their displays to disfavor American flights” and by “soliciting travel agents and major corporate customers’ agreement[s] to reduce their sales of tickets on American flights.” ( Id. ) Technically, the allegations contained in the second amended complaint under the headings “Sabre and Travelport Orchestrate a 16 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 16 of 23 PageID 10641Group Boycott” and “Fifth Claim for Relief: Group Boycott in the Relevant Markets in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act” do not establish the existence of a group boycott involving both Sabre and Travelport. Instead, the allegations under these headings show the existence of two boycotts--one orchestrated by Sabre and the other by Travelport. But reading the allegations in the context of the entire second amended complaint, and considering that elsewhere in the complaint allegations of collusion between Sabre and Travelport can be found, the Court is satisfied that American has alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Sabre and Travelport orchestrated a group boycott of American. Further, because American has alleged that Sabre and Travelport (1) possess dominant positions in the Market and their respective submarkets, (2) “control access to an element necessary to enable [American] to compete,” and (3) have no pro-competitive justifications for their alleged boycott, the alleged horizontal boycott is per se unlawful. Tunica Web Adver. v. Tunica Casino Operators , 496 F.3d 403, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co. , 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (“This Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned as per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co. , 739 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Horizontal agreements are ordinarily considered 17 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 17 of 23 PageID 10642illegal per se ‘because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue.’” (quoting Transource Int’l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc. , 725 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1984))). D. Count Six: Customer-Allocation Agreement in Violation of Section 1 A customer-allocation agreement is per-se unlawful under section 1. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp ., 370 U.S. 690, 708 (1962). American alleges that “[b]eginning in November 2010, Travelport and Orbitz entered into secret customer allocation agreements with numerous other travel agencies.” (Second Am. Compl. 54, ¶ 187.) According to American, “[p]ursuant to these agreements, these agencies agreed not to compete for the business of [the] corporate customers” of Orbitz for Business (“OFB”), Orbitz’s corporate travel agency. ( Id. )What American is alleging here is not a horizontal customerallocation agreement. A “classic” customer-allocation agreement is “one[] in which ‘competitors at the same level agree to divide up the market for a given product.’” Ca. ex ral. Harris v. Safeway,
Inc. , 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp. , 82 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1996)). Instead, what American is alleging is an agreement between Orbitz and other travel agencies, monitored and enforced by Travelport, not to compete for OFB customers. Such an agreement constitutes a per-se violation under section 1. See Transource , 725 F.2d at 280 (“[A]greements not to compete among potential competitors are also 18 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 18 of 23 PageID 10643illegal per se.”). Thus, while the Court disagrees with American’scharacterization of this claim as one challenging a customerallocation agreement, the Court nevertheless concludes that American has pleaded a section 1 claim based on Orbitz and other travel agents’ alleged agreement not to compete for OFB customers. 7 E. Count Seven: Section 1 Violation Based on Sabre’s and Travelport’s Contracts with American Lastly, American alleges that “Sabre and Travelport have included terms in their subscriber agreements with American that have the purpose and effect of excluding [from] competition . . . direct connect, as well as restricting competition among GDSs.” (Pl.’s Supp. to Second Am. Compl. 1, ¶ 2.) More specifically, alleges American, “both Sabre and Travelport require that American provide them with full content and content parity, and restrict American’s ability to provide incentives to travel agents to shift

7 This alleged agreement not to compete is horizontal be cause it is primarily between Orbitz and other travel agencies. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. , 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (“Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizon tal restraints.”). That Travelport has joined in the agreement and policed it does not render the agreement a vertical restraint, even though Travelport has a vertical relationship with Orbitz. See Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. , 637 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Conspiracies between a manufacturer and its distributors are . . . treated as horizontal when the source of the conspiracy is a combination of the distributors.”). Moreover, American’s failure to identify the other travel-agency participants is not fatal to American’s section 1 claim (as it was to many of American’s claims in the first amended complaint) because American has alleged the identity of at least two members of the conspiracy--Travelport and Orbitz-- and because American has alleged sufficient facts to apprise Travelport and Orbitz of the particular agreement that it is challenging. In any event, American explains that it knows the identities of the other travel-agency participants but that Orbitz refused to consent to American’s filing of a proposed second amended complaint that included those names. If this is true, then Orbitz should not be permitted to now challenge the sufficiency of American’s complaint on that basis. 19 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 19 of 23 PageID 10644bookings among GDSs.” ( Id. ) In addition, American alleges that Sabre “has prohibited American from publicly marketing a Direct Connect program.” ( Id. ) According to American, “[t]hese provisions effectively prevent American from promoting competition and supporting new entrants in the relevant markets, including competition from its own AA Direct Connect.” ( Id. ) “To prove conspiracy or ‘concerted action’ [for purposes of section 1], the plaintiff must prove that the conspirators had a ‘conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’” Spectators’ Commc’n Network , 253 F.3d at 220 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. , 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). That said, “[a]ntitrust law has never required identical motives among conspirators, and even reluctant participants have been held liable for conspiracy.” ( Id. ) Indeed, section 1 itself states that “ **[e]very contract**  , combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (emphasis added). Based on this language, if a contract unreasonably restrains trade, then it offends section 1--even if one of the parties to the contract assented to its terms merely because of financial necessity. 8 See

8 Travelport posits that “[a] plaintiff that voluntarily enters into and enjoys the ben efits of a contract cannot later complain that the contract violates the antitrust laws.” (Travelport Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 6.) According to Travelport, American “will need to show that [it] had anticompetitive terms imposed upon it” and that it “unwillingly complied.” ( Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) Travelport’s position is difficult to reconcile with the 20 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 20 of 23 PageID 10645id. Sabre and Travelport contend that their subscriber agreements wi th American cannot support a section 1 claim because the agreements are not exclusionary and do not foreclose a substantial share of the Market or submarkets. Concerning the latter, Sabre
argues that American must allege facts indicating its percentage share of the airline-services market. But in the Court’s view, this argument would more likely be correct if the aggrieved party

were a passenger or a travel agent seeking to obtain flights. Instead, because American is the aggrieved party, the relevant

United States Supreme Court’s comments in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corporation , 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation , 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). There, the Supreme Court, in holding that in pari delicto is not a defense to an antitrust action, stated that a “plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.” Id. at 139. The Court noted further that “permitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall gain does not encourage continued violations by those in his position since they remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct.” Id. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that American must allege facts showing that it was completely innocent in its involvement in the scheme embodied by the subscriber agreements. But at the same time, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to answer the question of whether “truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. at 140. That is,

“ Perma Life Mufflers did not foreclose a defense to an antitrust claim based on a plaintiff's ‘truly complete involvement.’” Rogers v. McDorman , 521 F.3d 381, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Perma Life Mufflers , 392 U.S. at 140). In any event, American’s allegations do not suggest that it had “truly complete involvement” in the drafting and selection of provisions in the subscriber agreements. To the contrary, American has alleged facts indicating that the economic realities were such that American had little choice but to accept the terms in the subscriber agreements. Thus, American should not be barred from asserting section 1 claims based on its subscriber agreements with Sabre and Travelport simply because American was a party to those agreements. See Perma Life Mufflers , 392 U.S. at 140 (“[E]ven if petitioners actually favored and supported some of the other restrictions, they cannot be blamed for seeking to minimize the disadvantages of the agreement once they had been forced to accept its more onerous terms as a condition of doing business.”). 21 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 21 of 23 PageID 10646market for purposes of American’s section 1 claim is the Market (i.e., the distribution of airline fare, flight, and availability information and the provision of booking services to travel agents), along with the Sabre and Travelport submarkets (i.e., the provision of airline booking services to Sabre and Travelport subscribers, respectively). American has alleged facts showing that its subscriber agreements with Sabre and Travelport (or Travelport’s predecessors) bear on its ability to access Sabre and Travelport’s combined ninety-plus percentage sha r e of the Market and their respective 100% shares of their submarkets. These allegations are sufficient to establish substantial foreclosure. Regarding Sabre and Travelport’s contentions that the subscriber agreements are not exclusionary, the Court maintains the position it took in its November 21, 2011 Order Regarding Motions
to Dismiss and Motion for Leave (doc. 244): that while the factfinder may eventually find that the full-content and related provisions are not anticompetitive, at this stage of the litigation the Court is simply not able to say that the aforementioned allegations are, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a section 1 claim.

IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that American’s second amended complaint and supplement contain sufficient

22 Case 4:11-cv-00244-Y Document 380 Filed 08/07/12 Page 22 of 23 PageID 10647allegations to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED. SIGNED August 7, 2012.

____________________________ TERRY R. MEANS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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