Filed 9/30/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Miguel C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MIGUEL C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 D078013

 (Super. Ct. No. J242744)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Objector and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 

Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott 

C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner and Respondent.
2

Before committing a minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), 

the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders, 

the law requires the juvenile court to find both that the placement would 

probably benefit the minor, and that less restrictive options would be either 

ineffective or inappropriate. In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1

(Carlos J.) reversed a DJJ placement for a minor with no significant criminal 

record because the only evidence offered by the People, a probation 

department study that lacked even cursory information about DJJ programs, 

was not enough to sustain the commitment decision. In this case, we address 

an issue anticipated, but not decided, in Carlos J.—namely, what constitutes 

substantial evidence to support a DJJ commitment when the minor has 

submitted reliable evidence that such a placement would undermine the 

minor’s specific rehabilitative needs, and where the minor’s own history does 

not demonstrate that less restrictive options would not work?

We conclude that where a minor presents evidence suggesting that a 

DJJ placement would be harmful for reasons specific to the minor, the People 

must provide some contrary evidence that would enable the juvenile court to 

make a comparative analysis of the placement options before it concludes the 

minor will probably benefit from DJJ, and that less restrictive options would 

be ineffective or inappropriate. Here, expert testimony indicated that placing 

this minor in DJJ would be counterproductive because it would likely assure 

his entrenchment in gang culture and, due to the ready availability of drugs 

in DJJ facilities, undermine efforts to treat and improve a significant 

substance abuse disorder that led to a single episode of violent criminal 

behavior over the course of a few hours. Beyond identifying that substance 

abuse treatment was available at DJJ, the People introduced no responsive 

evidence. So, as in Carlos J., we reverse and remand in an opinion that 
3

focuses not on the substantive correctness of the juvenile court’s conclusion, 

but on the procedural requirement that there be evidence in the record to 

support whatever conclusion the court reaches. On remand, given 

intervening changes to the juvenile court law, the trial court must first make 

a threshold finding as to whether juvenile justice realignment now precludes 

commitment to DJJ. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 736.5.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the fall of 2019, a large group of teenagers including 16-year-old 

Miguel C. gathered at Grove Park in Escondido and severely beat M.R., who 

later died from blunt force trauma. One witness told police officers she saw 

about 20 young people “jump” M.R., using skateboards and knives in the 

attack. A hammer recovered near the scene was likely also used as a 

weapon. Officers who responded detained several suspects, including one 

minor who had recorded part of the beating on her cellphone. The video

showed about 30 seconds of the incident and captured over 70 blows aimed at 

the victim from multiple youths involved in the assault. 

While officers were responding to the initial assault, another attack

was reported just a few blocks away. After leaving Grove Park, Miguel 

accosted a man as he was parking his car to unload groceries, punching him 

in the head repeatedly. When the man attempted to run away—abandoning 

his car in the process—Miguel pursued him and punched him in the head 

again. Miguel was then arrested, and quickly connected to the earlier Grove 

Park assault. 

The video, a witness account, and some details provided by the

teenagers involved confirmed that Miguel was a primary actor in the assault 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
4

on M.R.—though it appeared he did not use any weapons. Miguel 

consistently maintained that he did not remember the park incident or 

attacking the second man because he blacked out from excessive alcohol 

consumption, in addition to ingesting cocaine. 

Investigators eventually determined that the fatal assault at Grove 

Park was gang related. M.R. was apparently a known associate of the 

Diablos gang, which has recently been feuding with a tagging crew known as

“B.A.D-K.” or “B.D.K.” Miguel denied any B.D.K association, but admitted 

his friends were members and said that if the group had encountered a 

Diablos associate, they would probably “jump” that person. There were 

conflicting stories about how the fight started. At least two accounts from the 

teenagers indicated M.R. attacked Miguel first, putting him in a chokehold.

But an uninvolved witness watched the group surround M.R. before 

attacking him, apparently unprovoked. 

A juvenile wardship petition filed by the San Diego District Attorney 

alleged that Miguel had committed murder for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and assault likely to 

produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The petition was later 

amended to include a manslaughter charge for the benefit of a gang (Pen. 

Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), to which Miguel pleaded guilty 

in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. 

While the violence committed in the span of a few minutes by the group 

of minors–and particularly by Miguel—is both tragic and stunning, Miguel’s 

previously unblemished record only makes his participation more perplexing. 

He had never been arrested, and was not even documented as a potential 

gang associate. As his defense attorney explained to the court, she would 

usually have contested the gang enhancement for a case like this, but 
5

counseled her client to accept it as part of his plea deal because the 

prosecutor’s overall offer was reasonable. 

The defense retained Dr. Gimel Rogers, a clinical psychologist, to 

evaluate Miguel. She chronicled his difficult family history, which included 

neglect and abandonment by his parents—both of whom have addictions that 

inhibited their ability to care for Miguel and his siblings. Miguel was 

exposed to substance abuse in early childhood, and although his home life 

improved significantly since he went to live with his aunt at the age of 12, 

that was also about the age he began using marijuana heavily. Miguel 

disclosed that by the time he was 16, he was using alcohol, marijuana, and 

methamphetamine on a regular basis. 

Dr. Rogers diagnosed Miguel with severe substance use disorders for 

alcohol and cannabis, and a moderate use disorder for methamphetamine. 

She indicated that he also dealt with anxiety and depression, as well as

behavioral issues such as running away from home and fighting. Despite 

these challenges, she found Miguel demonstrated resilient characteristics and 

could overcome adversity, but would need intensive therapy to help with his 

substance abuse and to address his family history. Dr. Rogers did not 

consider Miguel to be gang entrenched, and believed that he did not 

remember the assault given the evidence corroborating Miguel’s account of 

his state of mind,2 and the mixture of substances he had consumed. 

Dr. Rogers assessed Miguel to have a low to moderate risk of

committing future serious violence, noting that most of his risk factors were 

2 Among other things, Dr. Rogers took note of the transcript of an audio 

recording of Miguel and another involved youth talking in the back of a police 

car after the incident, while they were alone and unaware that they were 

being recorded. Miguel consistently stated that he did remember anything 

and asked the other minor a lot of questions about what occurred. 
6

historical, such as early caregiver disruption, and that his protective factors 

going forward were promising, such as strong social support and positive 

attitudes toward intervention and authority. Ultimately, Dr. Rogers 

recommended Miguel be placed in a lower level security structured 

environment, such as the youthful offender rehabilitation program offered at

Youthful Offender Units (YOU), and warned that a commitment to a higher 

level security environment such as the DJJ might put his rehabilitative 

chances at risk by exposing him to more drugs, higher instances of violence, 

and a social structure revolving around gang affiliation.3

In contrast, the probation department prepared a social study that 

judged Miguel’s recidivism risk to be high and recommended a commitment 

to DJJ. The report put particular emphasis on the seriousness of Miguel’s 

crimes, and four documented fights he was involved in at Juvenile Hall. 

Although the report acknowledged that Miguel was performing well in other 

ways, having improved significantly in his schoolwork while in custody, it 

nonetheless concluded that this was evidence that Miguel “responds well” 

when “placed in a structured environment” before recommending a more 

secure setting. The report acknowledged that Dr. Rogers’s primary diagnosis 

concerned Miguel’s substance abuse, but said nothing about her conclusion 

that a DJJ placement would undermine Miguel’s rehabilitation. It also listed 

3 Megan Baldwin, senior program manager of the Second Chance 

Youthful Offender Rehabilitation Program had not evaluated Miguel but 

testified generally about programs offered through YOU specifically for gang 

at-risk youth. Core curricula help youth offenders examine the behaviors 

that brought them to juvenile hall, overcome gang mentalities, and address 

their substance abuse. Upon release, minors continue to work with regional 

counselors throughout the probationary term who can refer them to 

appropriate programs and services. 
7

programs available at DJJ that it thought Miguel would benefit from, one of 

which was a substance abuse program. 

At Miguel’s contested disposition hearing, the defense asked for Miguel 

to be given an opportunity in the less restrictive YOU program. Dr. Rogers 

testified and reiterated her conclusion that YOU would be a more appropriate 

placement than DJJ. A senior program manager for YOU also testified and 

detailed the support programs available for youth at risk of gang involvement 

and those with substance abuse issues. She specified that minors can

typically stay at YOU for 6 to 12 months, with counseling support that 

usually lasts 12 to 18 months and ends when a youth’s probation period is 

over. 

The People presented no witnesses and relied solely on the probation 

report. In her closing argument, the prosecutor asked for a DJJ commitment 

because she thought the 12 month residential program that YOU could offer 

would not be long enough to rehabilitate Miguel. The court ultimately 

agreed, committing Miguel to DJJ for the maximum term of 16 years (6 years 

for the manslaughter plus 10 for the gang enhancement) based on its concern 

that Miguel needed to be in a structured environment for as long as possible 

to have the best chance at rehabilitation. 

DISCUSSION

Miguel raises only one issue on appeal, citing the Court of Appeal 

opinion in Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 1 and arguing there was 

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision to commit him to 

the DJJ instead of employing a less restrictive option. We agree that the 

present record fails to adequately address and respond to evidence indicating 

that a DJJ commitment would be counterproductive. Accordingly, and 
8

without expressing any view on the ultimate outcome, we reverse and 

remand for a new dispositional hearing.

A. Background: The Shifting Landscape of Juvenile Justice

In In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557 (Aline D.), our Supreme Court 

explained that “ ‘[t]he statutory scheme . . . as now embodied in sections 730 

et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code, contemplates a progressively 

restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders . . . namely, home 

placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local 

treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement.’ ”4 

(Aline D., at p. 564.) A graduated approach to disposition orders became “a 

major component of Juvenile Court Law” whose application was not limited 

to less violent offenders. (In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327, 334

(Michael R.).)

The analysis changed slightly in 1984, when statutory amendments to 

section 202 expanded the focus of the court’s placement decision to

“recognize[ ] punishment as a rehabilitative tool and emphasize[ ] the 

protection and safety of the public.” (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 

49, 57; § 202.) Before the 1984 amendment, a minor’s rehabilitation was the 

only permissible concern in determining a proper placement. (Lorenza M., at 

p. 57; In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.) Although the postamendment scheme continued to contemplate “a progressively more 

restrictive and punitive series of dispositions” with DJJ “normally a 

placement of last resort” (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250), it 

placed no absolute bar on commitment to DJJ in the first instance so long as 

evidence showed a probable benefit to the minor and the ineffectiveness or 

4 The DJJ was previously known as the California Youth Authority 

(CYA). (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 306.)
9

inappropriateness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 

Cal.App.4th 423, 433(Carl N.); In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 

576−577 (Teofilio A.); In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379 (George 

M.); In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 488; § 734.) 

More recently, the pendulum has shifted back toward primarily 

rehabilitative aims, with the Legislature in 2020 overhauling the juvenile 

court law through “juvenile justice realignment.” (See Stats. 2020, ch. 337 

(Sen. Bill No. 823).) By closing DJJ and transferring jurisdiction over youth 

offenders to counties, the stated purpose of juvenile justice realignment is

“[t]o ensure that justice-involved youth are closer to their families and 

communities and receive age-appropriate treatment.” (Id., § 1(b).) The 

expansive legislation draws from evidence that “justice system-involved 

youth are more successful when they remain connected to their families and 

communities,” have lower recidivism rates, and are better prepared to 

transition back into their communities. (Id., § 1(a).) To implement 

realignment, counties are to be given funding to implement public health and 

community based programs that support positive youth development and 

reduce crime. (Id., § 1(c).) A new Office of Youth and Community 

Restoration, housed under the Health and Human Services Agency rather 

than the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is tasked with 

helping counties make the transition, including by promoting “trauma 

responsive, culturally informed services for youth involved in the juvenile 

justice system.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 823 (2019−2020 Reg. 

Sess.); § 2200.)

The realignment bill substantively rewrote major portions of the 

juvenile court law. Effective July 1, 2021, newly enacted section 736.5 shifts 

responsibility for convicted youth offenders from DJJ to the county level. 
10

(§ 736.5, subd. (a).) All wards committed to DJJ prior to July 1, 2021 will 

remain in DJJ custody. (Id., subd. (d).) But pending final closure of DJJ in 

June 2023, a court may only make a DJJ commitment if the minor “is 

otherwise eligible to be committed under existing law and in whose case a 

motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal 

jurisdiction was filed.” (Id., subds. (b), (c), (e); see also § 733.1, subds. 

(a)−(b).) As an alternative to DJJ commitment, courts “shall consider . . . 

placement in local programs,” including county level programs created to 

implement realignment. (§ 736.5, subd. (c).) Although realignment does not 

change section 202, which recognizes punishment as a potential 

rehabilitative tool, the new scheme implicitly places less weight on 

punishment by prioritizing treatment and restricting commitment avenues.

California’s shifting landscape on juvenile justice is in keeping with 

broader trends. Landmark juvenile criminal cases in recent decades have 

increasingly recognized that all juvenile offenders are presumptively capable 

of rehabilitation—even those who have committed terrible crimes. As the 

United States Supreme Court observed in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 

551, 570, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an 

adult[,]” and consequently, “[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more 

transitory, less fixed.” Although this reality is perhaps self-evident to anyone 

who remembers their own adolescence or has guided a child through that 

tumultuous time (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 272), 

scientific research increasingly supports the notion that juveniles are still 

changing: “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 

fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, 

parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through 

late adolescence. [Citation.] Juveniles are more capable of change than are 
11

adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably 

depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.” (Graham v. Florida

(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68; accord Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471‒

480.)

Given these developments and the significant rehabilitative focus of our 

state’s juvenile court law even pre-realignment, the prospect that a particular 

sentencing decision might place a minor in a setting that is likely to entrench 

nascent criminal tendencies rather than encourage reform is particularly 

concerning. As such, cases like this one where a child with no prior record is 

committed to the DJJ after a first offense—albeit a serious one—merit 

particular scrutiny. Miguel was committed to DJJ in August 2020, before 

juvenile justice realignment took effect. Even so, his commitment to DJJ in 

the first instance may be upheld only upon a showing of probable benefit to 

Miguel and ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of less restrictive 

alternatives. (Carl N., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 433; Teofilio A., supra, 

210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)

B. Substantial Evidence Review

We review a juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion. 

(Carl N., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431−432.) “ ‘ “[A] trial court abuses 

its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support 

in the evidence.” ’ ” (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) 

Accordingly, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s commitment order consistent with the purpose of the juvenile court 

law. (Ibid.; Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 579.) Substantial 

evidence, in turn, “must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; 

it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires 

in a particular case.” (Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644.)
12

Miguel questions whether this threshold was met in his case, and we 

find considerable guidance for evaluating his argument in the relatively

recent Carlos J. opinion from the First Appellate District. (Carlos J., supra, 

22 Cal.App.5th 1.) Carlos J. involved a minor in much the same position as 

Miguel—lacking a serious criminal record but sent to DJJ after committing a 

violent crime. Carlos, who was 15 at the time, confronted a rival gang 

associate who had apparently tried to “jump” Carlos the previous year. (Id. 

at pp. 4, 7.) After exchanging words, Carlos and an older member of his gang 

who was with him “drew firearms and shot five or six times in the direction of 

the victim” who then fled, fortuitously escaping without injury. (Id. at p. 4.) 

Prior to this incident, Carlos had no “substantial” record, though he had 

previously been arrested and failed to complete a diversionary program. 

(Id. at p. 7, fn. 4.) He also struggled at school and had been cited for defiant 

behavior and fighting there. (Id. at p. 7.)

A psychologist who evaluated Carlos explained that he had a “ ‘history 

of trauma and active PTSD,’ ” but noted he was amenable to treatment, and 

identified “ ‘individual psycho-therapy’ ” as his primary need. (Carlos J., 

supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) She did not favor a DJJ placement for Carlos, 

noting that given his youth and the nature of his trauma he would benefit 

from “ ‘high structure and therapy’ ” in a less restrictive setting. (Ibid.) The 

probation department made a contrary recommendation for a DJJ 

commitment. It acknowledged the psychologist’s report but also asserted

that Carlos posed a public safety risk and concluded, “ ‘he must be contained 

in a state facility where his educational, therapeutic, and emotional issues 

can be addressed in a secured facility.’ ” (Id. at pp. 8‒9.) This was the only 

evidence submitted to support the People’s placement recommendation. The 
13

juvenile court ultimately committed Carlos to DJJ, citing the seriousness of 

his crime, his gang activity, and the danger to public safety. (Id. at pp. 9‒10.)

In reversing, the appellate court explained that there was “no evidence 

before the juvenile court regarding any ‘intensive treatment’ appellant might 

receive at [DJJ],” information that would have been necessary for the court to 

conclude that a DJJ commitment would probably benefit Carlos by meeting 

his most pressing needs. (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 10.) It also 

identified the “need to weaken [Carlos’s] affiliation with the Sureños gang” as 

a “critical issue for the juvenile court to consider in determining probable 

benefit.” (Id. at p. 11.) The court explained that the probation officer’s 

recommendation amounted to an “unexplained and unsupported assertion of 

possible benefit . . . not evidence of ‘reasonable, credible and of solid value’

from which the juvenile court could make an informed assessment of the 

likelihood a [DJJ] placement would be of benefit to appellant, in light of his 

specific needs.” (Id. at p. 10.) Because “the law required the juvenile court, 

not the probation department, to make the finding of probable benefit,” and 

there was no “evidence in the record of the programs at the [DJJ] expected to 

be of benefit to appellant,” the commitment could not stand. (Ibid.)

In coming to this conclusion, the Carlos J. court explained that there 

are two evidentiary thresholds the People must meet to support a DJJ 

commitment. As an initial, preliminary showing, the probation department

is required to (1) identify programs at DJJ that would likely benefit the 

particular minor, and (2) “include brief descriptions of the relevant 

programs.” (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) The failure of 

evidence at this initial step prompted the reversal in Carlos J.

But the opinion went on to discuss what was required once the People 

clear the first evidentiary hurdle. Of particular relevance here, the appellate 
14

court commented that after the People make a minimal showing to support a 

DJJ commitment for a particular minor, the minor might then “dispute the 

availability or efficacy of particular programs, or . . . suggest that other 

conditions at the [DJJ] undermine the programs [by presenting] sufficient 

evidence to reasonably bring into question the benefit he or she will receive

. . . . ” (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.) In the event of credible 

opposing evidence, the People would then be obligated “to present more 

indepth information about the [DJJ] in order to show probable benefit.” (Id. 

at p. 14.)

Our case appears to pick up where Carlos J. left off, at this second step. 

The probation study in this case provided a list of DJJ programs, with brief 

descriptions, that it thought Miguel could benefit from—one of which 

addressed substance abuse, identified by Dr. Rogers as Miguel’s primary 

treatment need. The inclusion of this information in the study appears to 

meet the initial minimal showing described in Carlos J. (22 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 12.) But Miguel then countered with evidence that a DJJ commitment 

would actually be adverse to his rehabilitation given his particular needs, 

identifying “other conditions at the DJJ,” namely the ready availability of 

drugs and the entrenched gang atmosphere, that would probably undermine 

the efficacy of DJJ’s programming for him. (See id. at p. 13.) Because this

evidence came from Dr. Rogers’s clinical assessment of how Miguel would 

respond to the DJJ environment, it was “of ‘reasonable, credible and . . . solid 

value’ ” and called into question the probation study’s conclusion that a DJJ 

commitment would benefit Miguel. (Id. at pp. 10, 13.)

Consistent with the sequential process outlined in Carlos J., we 

conclude that in response to Dr. Rogers’s report and opinions the People were 

obligated to provide the court with some additional information that would
15

enable it to make a comparative analysis of the benefit to Miguel of the 

different placement options prior to deciding whether Miguel would likely 

benefit from DJJ, and whether other options would be ineffective or 

inappropriate. By way of example, Carlos J. explained that the People might

counter evidence that the gang environment in DJJ would be detrimental to 

the minor’s particular needs “with testimony showing improvements in the 

gang intervention programs or showing flaws in the analysis in the minor’s 

evidence. Such information would enable the juvenile court to balance the 

benefits of the gang intervention services against the risk that confinement 

at the [DJJ] would harden the minor’s gang affiliation and criminality.” 

(Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Only after hearing such evidence 

could the juvenile court fulfill its obligation to “consider ‘the broadest range of 

information’ in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him 

adequate care.” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.)

Here, the People relied solely on the probation study, which failed to 

address the substance of Dr. Rogers’s analysis or provide a contrary expert 

opinion.5 Moreover, given Miguel’s lack of history in the juvenile system, the 

court had less evidence than it often does to assess whether less restrictive 

placement options would fail. (Compare In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 

1076, 1081 [upholding a DJJ commitment where “Minor had a long history 

with the juvenile system and the juvenile court had already tried various less 

restrictive placements”] with Michael R., supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 338–

339 [“We cannot assume without some evidence on the record that minor will 

not respond” to the rehabilitative programs available at less restrictive 

5 The probation study essentially dismissed Dr. Rogers’s findings by 

summarizing them, and then moving on to its DJJ recommendation without 

offering further information or discussion.
16

placements]; see also In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522, 532 [reversing 

a DJJ commitment where there was no “valid reason, supported by 

admissible evidence” that the less restrictive placement option “would be 

ineffective or inappropriate”].) In such circumstances, we cannot say the 

commitment to DJJ was based on credible evidence supporting the legally 

required findings.

In reaching this conclusion, we are sensitive to the traditional 

deference shown to the juvenile court in these matters. We reverse only for 

an abuse of discretion. (George M., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.) But an 

abuse of discretion occurs when there is not enough evidence to support the 

findings that are necessary before committing a minor to DJJ. (Teofilio A., 

supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 579.) “The bottom line is that, where a minor has 

concerns about a particular aspect of the [DJJ] and presents evidence 

supporting those concerns, it may be necessary for the People to provide 

additional information to the juvenile court in order for the court to make a 

properly supported finding of probable benefit.” (Carlos J., supra, 22 

Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) This is such a case.

C. Proceedings on Remand

Ordinarily, proceedings on remand would follow a predictable course. 

The People would have the opportunity at a new disposition hearing to 

provide additional information supporting their view that commitment 

carries a probable benefit to Miguel notwithstanding his articulated concerns.

Nothing in our opinion would be construed to undermine the juvenile court’s

consideration of permissible factors in its placement decision. Public safety, 

which appears to have animated the court’s decision both here and in 

Carlos J., remains a consideration explicitly permitted by the law (§ 202), and 

the trial court would be entrusted with determining the level of security and 
17

length of time necessary for the minor’s commitment on a more developed 

record.

Before making such an inquiry, however, the sweeping juvenile justice 

realignment reforms effected by Senate Bill No. 823 require the juvenile 

court to consider as a threshold matter whether commitment to DJJ remains 

permissible. (See, e.g., Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 460 

[“when a case is remanded for resentencing after an appeal, the defendant is 

entitled to ‘all the normal rights and procedures available at his original 

sentencing’ [citations], including consideration of any pertinent 

circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed”].) 

We leave it to the trial court whether to invite briefing from the parties on 

the scope and effect of realignment, including newly enacted section 736.5, in 

making this decision. Only if commitment to DJJ remains an option need the 

court consider whether, on a more fully developed record, it would confer a 

probable benefit to Miguel consistent with the juvenile court law’s intended 

purpose. (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 14; Teofilio A., supra, 210 

Cal.App.3d at p. 579.) And if the court finds section 736.5 precludes 

commitment, it must reach an alternative placement decision.
18

DISPOSITION

The order committing Miguel to DJJ is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded to the juvenile court for a new disposition hearing consistent with 

this opinion.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

AARON, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.