alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The Hon. W illiam W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California,

*

sitting by designation.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 07a0322n.06

Filed: May 8, 2007

06-2066

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DARNELL ZANDERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: DAUGHTREY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District *

Judge.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Darnell Zanders, appeals from the district court’s grant

of summary judgment to the defendant, John Potter, the Postmaster General of the United

States Postal Service, in this suit brought pursuant to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17. Zanders, an African-American male,

alleged that he was the victim of racial discrimination because his supervisor, John Talick,

placed a letter of warning in Zanders’s file as a result of acts and omissions that the plaintiff

asserts were also committed by a white male who did not receive similar discipline from

his superiors.
06-2066

Zanders v. Potter

- 2 -

The district court concluded that because the letter of warning did not result in a loss

of position, salary, benefits, or prestige, it could not be considered an adverse employment

action of the type necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In fact, the

record in this case indicates that Zanders has continued to receive salary increases, “spot”

awards, and excellent evaluations even after the issuance of the letter of warning.

Alternatively, the district court determined that “even if Plaintiff were able to

demonstrate an adverse employment action, Defendant would still be entitled to summary

judgment because Plaintiff has not shown that he ‘was treated differently than similarly

situated individuals outside of his protected class.’” In reaching that conclusion, the district

judge noted that, although Zanders and the white male filled the same supervisory position,

the white male did so only on an interim basis while the plaintiff was on another assignment

and that “the expectations for an employee in a non-supervisory role who temporarily

assumes a supervisory role would be lower, or at least different, than the expectations for

a permanent manager.” 

The district court in this case has ably summarized the relevant evidence and has

correctly identified the applicable law. Given that treatment of the plaintiff’s claims, the

issuance of a full, written opinion by this court would be duplicative and would serve no

precedential purpose. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the

reasoning set forth in that court’s opinion and order filed on July 21, 2006.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-88,948-01

IN RE RODERICK MARQUIS JOHNSON, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 983364 IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant

to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that in 2009, he filed an application for

a writ of habeas corpus in the 179th District Court of Harris County and that his application has not

been forwarded to this Court.

Respondent, the Judge of the 179th District Court of Harris County, shall file a response with

this Court by having the District Clerk submit the record on such habeas corpus application. In the

alternative, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in its order designating issues, if timely

entered, and then have the District Clerk submit the record on such application. In either case,

Respondent’s answer shall be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application for
2

leave to file a writ of mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted his

response.

Filed: September 26, 2018

Do not publish
ex10-1.htm


EXHIBIT 10.1


 





 


PROMISSORY NOTE


 



	$2,000,000 	Austin, Texas





                                                                                                           


October 24, 2011







Valence Technology, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Maker”), hereby promises to pay to the order of Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC (“Lender”), or its successors and assigns, in lawful money of the United States of America, Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), together with accrued and unpaid interest thereon, on January 15, 2012 (the “Maturity Date”).







The unpaid principal amount of this Promissory Note shall bear interest at a rate per annum equal to three and one half percent (3.5%) calculated on the basis of a 365-day year and the actual number of days elapsed.







This Promissory Note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any time, without premium or penalty.







Maker hereby waives presentment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest, notice of protest and all other demands, protests and notices in connection with the execution, delivery, performance, collection and enforcement of this Promissory Note.  Maker shall pay all costs of collection when incurred, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.







This Promissory Note is being delivered in, is intended to be performed in, shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with, and be governed by the internal laws of, the State of Texas, without regard to principles of conflict of laws.







This Promissory Note may only be amended, modified or terminated or any provision hereof waived by an agreement in writing signed by the party to be charged.  This Promissory Note shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of Maker and inure to the benefit of Lender and its successors, endorsees and assigns. 


 




	 	 	VALENCE TECHNOLOGY, INC.	 
	 	
 

	 	 
	 	 	By: /s/ Donald E. Gottschalk	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Name: Donald E. Gottschalk	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Title: Acting CFO	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	Under Authority Of BOD Resolution	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	October 26, 2010
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18

OF THE UNITED STATES CODE,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Geotec Thermal Generators, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bradley T. Ray, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/Bradley T. Ray

--------------------------------

BRADLEY T. RAY

Chief Executive Officer

Geotec Thermal Generators, Inc.



December 28, 2006
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly Report of Saratoga Resources, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                    |  |                                
|------------------- |  | -------------------------------
|Date: July 23, 2007 |  | /s/ Thomas Cooke               
|                    |  | Name:  Thomas Cooke            
|                    |  | Title:  Chief Executive Officer



|                    |  |                                
|------------------- |  | -------------------------------
|Date: July 23, 2007 |  | /s/ Thomas Cooke               
|                    |  | Name:  Thomas Cooke            
|                    |  | Title:  Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  quarterly  Report of  Saratoga  Resources,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended  September 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"),  each of the undersigned,
in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         1.    the Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.    the information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of  operation of the
Company.


Dated:  July 8, 2005                           /s/ Thomas Cooke
                                               ______________________________
                                               Name: Thomas Cooke
                                               Title: Chief Executive Officer

Dated:  July 8, 2005                           /s/ Thomas Cooke
                                               ______________________________
                                               Name: Thomas Cooke
                                               Title: Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 99.6

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to
18 United States Code s. 1350

As adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 40-F of Manulife Financial Corporation (the Company) for the
year ended December 31, 2016, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned officer of the Company certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |                                      
|---------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: February 9, 2017
|                      
|/s/ Donald A. Guloien 
|Name:                  |  | Donald A. Guloien                    
|Title:                 |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>


                                  Exhibit 99.1

                      Statement of Chief Executive Officer
         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code


         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the
undersigned, Brian D. Haveson, the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Nutri/System, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that:


   1)    The Company's Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for the period ended June 30,
         2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
         13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Date: August 6, 2002                              /S/ BRIAN D. HAVESON
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


                                       20
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3010 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3010

    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on phosphoric acid, 
                 lanthanum salt, cerium terbium-doped.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 8, 2012

 Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To extend the temporary suspension of duty on phosphoric acid, 
                 lanthanum salt, cerium terbium-doped.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PHOSPHORIC ACID, LANTHANUM SALT, CERIUM TERBIUM-DOPED.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.10.77 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to phosphoric acid, lanthanum 
salt, cerium terbium-doped) is amended by striking the date in the 
effective period column and inserting ``12/31/2015''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                          3,307,159
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   4,034,981
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                10,487,663
<PP&E>                          3,273,922
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  43,023,901
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           10,882,042
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        370
<OTHER-SE>                      28,125,679
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    43,023,901
<SALES>                         1,978,209
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                1,978,209
<CGS>                           1,304,730
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   1,304,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                16,098,965
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (15,540,328)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (15,540,328)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (15,540,328)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.44)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.44)



</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Rowland’s

request for oral argument is denied.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARLENE D. ROWLAND,

 Petitioner,

 v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR; et al.,

 Respondents.

No. 10-70428

LABR No. 08-108

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Department of Labor

Submitted February 21, 2012** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

Arlene D. Rowland petitions pro se for review of the Department of Labor’s

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) order dismissing her whistle-blower

complaint under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 

FILED

MAR 05 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-70428

We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) and 49 U.S.C.

§ 42121(b)(4). We review the ARB’s decision pursuant to the Administrative

Procedure Act and will reverse only if the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Coppinger-Martin

v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). We deny the petition.

The ARB did not err by dismissing Rowland’s complaint because Rowland

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Prudential Equity

Group, LLC’s filing of a lawsuit to confirm an arbitration award constituted an

adverse action under the SOX. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (SOX whistle-blower

provision); Van Asdale v. Int’l Games Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2009)

(elements of prima facie case under SOX whistle-blower provision).

Rowland’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Rowland’s request for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary because

respondents have included the necessary parts of the administrative record in the

excerpts of record. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         567,765
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,068
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,776
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         677,367
<DEPRECIATION>                                 675,732
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 578,897
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     572,058
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   578,897
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               216,872
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                67,273
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                588,948
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            588,948
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   588,978
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    17.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    17.40
        

</TABLE>
Jeffery L. GORDON, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Ocean Partners Associates, Ltd., Appellees.

Case No. 5D17-1259

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed April 13, 2018

Jeffery L. Gordon, Cocoa, pro se.

Katie Sabo, Tallahassee, for Appellee, Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission.

No Appearance for Appellee, Ocean Partners Associates, Ltd.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See**Mid-Fla. Freezer Warehouses, Ltd. v. Unemplmt. App. Comm'n* , 41 So.3d 1014, 1017-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("On appeal, this Court cannot make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the referee, and instead, must uphold the referee's decision where there is competent, substantial evidence to support the decision." (citation omitted) ).

PALMER, TORPY and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
## NO. 12

- 14

- 00289

- CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ALLSTATE TEXAS LLOYD S,

APPELLANT

V.

SUSIE SMITH,

APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL FROM THE 145T H

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM O PINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. In its motion, Appellant states that

the parties have resolved their dispute, and therefore the appeal is no longer necessary. Because

Appellant has complied with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1),

we grant Appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.2 (a).

Opinion delivered January 21, 2015.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J. and Hoyle, J.

( PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JANUARY 2 1 , 2015

NO. 12

- 14

- 00289

- CV

ALLSTATE TEXAS LLOYD S,

Appellant

V.

SUSIE SMITH,

Appellee

Appeal from the 145th District Court

of Nacogdoches County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. C1329498)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the motion of the Appellant to dismiss

the appeal herein, and the same being considered, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and

DECREED by this Court that the motion to dismiss be granted and the appeal b e dismissed, and

that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J. and Hoyle , J

.
Ricky Lebron RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1286

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed December 15, 2017.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1328

RALPH L. HAYES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LYNCHBURG CITY SCHOOL BOARD, as constituted by Mary Ann H. 

Barker, Dr. Regina T. Dolan-Sewell, Charlie White, Jenny 

Poore, J. Marie Walker, Thomas H. Webb, Albert Billingsly, 

Katie Snydor, and Treney Tweedy, Members of the School 

Board,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior 

District Judge. (6:13-cv-00008-NKM-RSB)

Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ralph L. Hayes, Appellant Pro Se. Phillip Verne Anderson, John 

Chadwick Johnson, FRITH, ANDERSON & PEAKE, PC, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

In this Title VII action alleging racial 

discrimination, Ralph L. Hayes appeals the district court’s 

order granting Lynchburg City School Board’s motion for summary 

judgment. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we deny Hayes’ motion for the appointment 

of counsel and affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Hayes v. Lynchburg City Sch. Bd., No. 6:13-cv-00008-NKMRSB (W.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2014). We deny as moot the School Board’s 

motion to quash. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED