J-S19001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

B.L.

v.

L.S.

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 273 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 

2021-FC-001377-03

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

Appellant, L.S. (“Mother”), appeals from the trial court’s February 7, 

2023 order entered following a three-day custody trial, wherein the trial court, 

inter alia, affirmed its determination that B.L. (“Father”) have sole legal 

custody and primary physical custody of H.L. and L.L. (“Children”).

1

 After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court provided the following background on this matter:

The parties were previously married and subsequently divorced 

while living in South Carolina. The parties have two young 

children. After the divorce, Mother relocated from South Carolina 

to Pennsylvania with ... [C]hildren. Father is in the Marine Corps 

and was subsequently stationed in Mississippi. Father filed a 

complaint for custody, seeking expanded rights of physical 

____________________________________________

1 H.L. was born in 2015, and L.L. was born in 2016. 
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custody.[2] Mother opposed.[3] The [c]ourt filed temporary 

custody orders after the first two days of the custody trial on 

March 8, 2022[,] and on August 11, 2022. In the order following 

the second day of trial, August 11, 2022, the [c]ourt temporarily 

gave [F]ather sole legal custody and primary physical custody of 

[C]hildren. On December 28, 2022, the third and final day of trial, 

the [c]ourt entered an order, which was filed on January 3, 2023, 

affirming sole legal custody and primary physical custody with 

Father.[4, 5] On January 27, 2023, Mother filed a notice of appeal 

and a concise statement of errors [complained of on appeal] in 

relation to the order filed on January 3, 2023.[6] On January 13, 

2023, [Father] petitioned for reconsideration.[7] A hearing on 

reconsideration was held on January 31, 2023. The petition for 

reconsideration was really a petition for clarification. The order of 

____________________________________________

2 Prior to Father’s complaint, Mother had primary physical custody of Children. 

Mother and Father shared legal custody, except that Mother had ultimate 

decision-making authority if they disagreed. 

3

In addition, W.L. and N.L. (“Paternal Grandparents”), who live about twenty 

minutes away from Mother in Maryland, subsequently filed a petition to 

intervene, which the trial court granted. See N.T., 3/4/22, at 196 (Mother’s 

stating that Paternal Grandparents live about twenty minutes away from her). 

Paternal Grandparents claimed that Mother was not allowing them to see 

Children. They requested, among other things, physical custody of Children 

when Father is unable to exercise his physical custody periods. 

4 The January 3, 2023 final custody order, inter alia, gave Mother partial 

physical custody of Children on two weekends per month, and for two, twoweek periods (for a total of four weeks) during the summer. 

5 Paternal Grandparents indicated at trial that “they do not need time in 

addition to Father’s primary physical custody[,]” and therefore, the trial court 

awarded them no time. N.T., 12/28/22, at 119. 

6 This appeal was docketed at 160 MDA 2023. 

7 Father sought reconsideration and clarification on whether Mother may 

exercise her weekend custody of Children in Mississippi or Pennsylvania, as 

well as how the parties should split travel expenses and share custody of 

Children on holidays. On January 19, 2023, the trial court entered an order 

expressly granting reconsideration and scheduling a hearing on the petition 

for reconsideration. 
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clarification was entered on January 31, 2023[,] and filed on 

February 7, 2023. [Therein , among other things, the trial court 

reaffirmed that Father have sole legal custody and primary 

physical custody of Children. Mother then filed another, timely

notice of appeal and a concise statement.

8, 9 The trial court 

thereafter issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.]

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 2/27/23, at 1-2. 

On appeal, Mother raises four issues for our review:

[1]. The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by excluding testimony and documentary evidence 

intended to impeach and to rebut testimony from both Father and 

the Guardian Ad Litem [(“GAL”)] regarding the military 

investigation of Father and past abuse of [H.L]. 

[2]. The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by finding Mother has committed Parental Alienation 

Syndrome without expert testimony and evidence to support such 

a conclusion[,] and then using this finding to support [its] 

conclusion on a majority of the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 

5328(a).

[3]. The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by failing to consider and to analyze the factors set 

forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h). 

[4.] The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by transferring primary physical custody of [C]hildren 

to [Father] before all testimony and evidence was presented and 

prior to the conclusion of trial.

____________________________________________

8 This is the appeal presently before us, docketed at 273 MDA 2023. 

9 This Court subsequently quashed Mother’s appeal at 160 MDA 2023. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1703(b)(3)(ii) (“After an appeal is taken..., the trial court ... may ... 

[g]rant reconsideration of the order which is the subject of the appeal ... if an 

order expressly granting reconsideration of such prior order is filed in the trial 

court ... within the time prescribed by these rules for the filing of a notice of 

appeal ... with respect to such order, or within any shorter time provided or 

prescribed by law for the granting of reconsideration. A timely order granting 

reconsideration under this paragraph shall render inoperative any such notice 

of appeal ... theretofore or thereafter filed or docketed with respect to the prior 

order.”). 
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Mother’s Brief at 6.10, 11 

In addressing Mother’s issues, we remain cognizant of the following:

The appellate court is not bound by the deductions or 

inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, 

nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no 

competent evidence to support it.... However, this broad 

scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the duty 

or the privilege of making its own independent 

determination.... Thus, an appellate court is empowered to 

determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible factual 

findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not 

interfere with those conclusions unless they are 

unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings; and 

thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.

Moreover, 

[o]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

defer to the findings of the trial court who has had the 

opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of 

the witnesses.

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial 

court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern 

of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate 

interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration 

of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, 

and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

The test is whether the evidence of record supports the trial 

court’s conclusions.

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014) (cleaned up). 

I. 

____________________________________________

10 We have re-ordered Mother’s issues for ease of disposition. 

11 Father has filed an appellee’s brief, which Paternal Grandparents have 

joined. 
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In Mother’s first issue, she contends that the trial court “abused its 

discretion and committed an error of law by excluding testimony and 

documentary evidence intended to impeach and to rebut testimony from both 

Father and the [GAL] regarding the military investigation of Father and past 

abuse of [H.L].” Mother’s Brief at 36 (emphasis omitted).

12

 Mother’s

argument on this issue is not the model of clarity. First, with respect to the 

military investigation of Father, Mother does not clearly explain what evidence 

from the military investigation the trial court purportedly excluded and why 

the trial court abused its discretion in allegedly excluding it.13 Instead of 

discussing the exclusion of such evidence, she seems to challenge the weight

____________________________________________

12 In reviewing this issue, we are mindful that “[t]he decision whether to admit 

or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Egelkamp v. Egelkamp, 524 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa. Super. 1987)

(citation omitted). 

13 Mother provides no background on the military investigation in her brief, in 

contravention of Rule of Appellate Procedure 2117. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) 

(providing that the statement of the case shall contain “[a] closely condensed 

chronological statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which are necessary 

to be known in order to determine the points in controversy, with an 

appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the record where the 

evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be found”). However, after 

reading the transcripts from the custody trial, we note that the military 

investigated Father shortly after the parties separated, in early 2019, for 

allegedly abusing Mother. See N.T., 3/4/22, at 24-25, 69-72; N.T., 8/11/22, 

at 106-08. There were conflicting accounts at trial about the results of the 

military investigation. Mother testified that “the basis for conduct unbecoming 

of an officer and a gentleman due to [Father’s] abusing [her] was met,” but 

claimed that she was restrained at a pre-trial conference from reaching out to 

the military to obtain supporting evidence. N.T., 8/11/22, at 107. Father, on 

the other hand, represented that the abuse allegations made to the military 

were false and that he was vindicated of any wrongdoing. N.T., 3/4/22, at 

69-72. 
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the trial court placed on it. To illustrate, she complains that “[t]he abuse of 

Mother by Father as reported to the military by a third party, while admitted 

into evidence to some extent, was given no consideration by the [t]rial 

[c]ourt.” Id. at 38 (citation omitted); see also id. at 36 (“Father’s abusive 

conduct toward Mother was also set forth in her testimony. However, the 

weight given to that testimony, Mother acknowledges, is in the discretion of 

the [t]rial [c]ourt.”). Thus, because the crux of Mother’s argument pertaining 

to the military investigation involves the weight the trial court placed on such 

evidence, we deem her claim that the trial court wrongly excluded such 

evidence from trial to be waived. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 

766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When briefing the various issues that have been 

preserved, it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently 

developed for our review. ... The brief must support the claims with pertinent 

discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities. 

... [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate 

review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be 

waived.”) (citations omitted).

14

 

Second, with respect to Father’s purported past abuse of H.L., Mother 

claims that the trial court “summarily dismissed and excluded” evidence of 

____________________________________________

14 Moreover, to the extent Mother challenges the weight the trial court placed

on the evidence of the military investigation, we deem that claim waived due 

to Mother’s failure to raise it in her statement of questions involved. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the 

statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”). 
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Father’s abuse of H.L. Mother’s Brief at 36.15 Specifically, she cites to the 

following portion of the transcript where the trial court excluded a report of a 

forensic interview taken of H.L. in South Carolina years prior:

[Mother’s counsel:] You said what H.L.’s been through previously, 

and one of the factors the [c]ourt has to consider is abuse. Has 

[Father] physically abused H.L. in the past? 

[Mother]: Yes. 

[Mother’s counsel:] What did he do? What did [Father] do? 

[Mother]: He threw H.L. across the room. H.L. landed on his neck. 

And then [Father] proceeded to tear H.L.’s bunk bed into shreds 

in front of him, beat it to pieces, and then made H.L. sleep on the 

floor because H.L. was supposed to be sleeping but he made a 

mess in the bathroom. He’s also spanked H.L. so hard [that] he 

got blisters on his rear end. 

[Mother’s counsel:] When were these events? 

[Mother]: Prior to leaving my marriage. 

THE COURT: Can you give me some year? 

[Mother:] So H.L. was three, so he’s seven, four or five years ago. 

[Mother’s counsel:] Did you witness this?

[Mother]: I did.

[Mother’s counsel:] Was H.L. interviewed? 

[Mother:] H.L. was forensically interviewed. 

[Mother’s counsel:] If you turn to D-13, is this a report of H.L.’s 

forensic interview in South Carolina?

[Paternal Grandparents’ counsel:] I’m going to object because it 

can’t be authenticated and it was litigated previously, and I 

believe Your Honor had already requested that we limit the scope 

____________________________________________

15 Again, Mother provides no factual background in her brief on this alleged 

abuse. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4), supra. 
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of the testimony to the events that occurred from the last order 

moving forward.

[Mother’s counsel:] Your Honor, that is what you ordered in 

December. However, I’m sure the [c]ourt recalls[,] in March[,] 

there was significant testimony regarding events prior to January 

of 2021. 

THE COURT: Well--

[Mother’s counsel:] I’m also offering ... this under Rule of Evidence 

607[,] where the credibility of any witness or any party can be 

attacked or challenged by any evidence that’s relevant to the 

issue. And abuse is a factor the [c]ourt has to consider. 

THE COURT: I get all that, but without an expert telling me that a 

four-year-old is old enough to be competent, he was four when 

this interview took place, that’s not competent testimony. It’s 

excluded.

N.T., 8/11/22, at 58-60 (original brackets omitted). 

Mother does not proffer a legal argument or explanation as to why the 

trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence.16 Instead, she 

argues that, if this evidence had been admitted, it would have offered an

explanation, aside from Mother’s behavior, for why H.L. has anxiety. Thus, 

because Mother does not set forth a legal analysis pertaining to why the trial 

court abused its discretion in excluding the forensic report, we also conclude

this claim is waived. See Hardy, supra. Thus, no relief is due on Mother’s 

first issue. 

II.

____________________________________________

16 We also note that Mother admitted at trial that every single report, made 

to the South Carolina authorities implicating Father in some kind of physical 

or sexual abuse of Children, was investigated by the South Carolina authorities 

and determined to be unfounded. N.T., 8/11/22, at 106. 
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In Mother’s second issue, she avers that the trial court “abused its 

discretion and committed an error of law by finding Mother has committed 

Parental Alienation Syndrome without expert testimony and evidence to 

support such a conclusion[,] and then using this finding to support [t]he 

[c]ourt’s conclusions on a majority of the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 

5328(a).” Mother’s Brief at 39 (emphasis omitted).17 We disagree.

Section 5328(a) provides:

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide adequate physical 

safeguards and supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating 

to consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child.

____________________________________________

17 Mother does not provide a definition for Parental Alienation Syndrome in 

her brief. However, our research shows that Parental Alienation Syndrome 

refers to “a child’s unwarranted rejection of one parent in response to the 

attitudes and actions of the other parent.” Amy J.L. Baker, Parental Alienation 

Syndrome–The Parent/Child Disconnect, SOCIAL WORK TODAY Vol. 8. No. 6 

(Nov/Dec 2008), available at

https://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/102708p26.shtml.
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(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the 

child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child 

adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special 

needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by 

another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). 
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Here, the trial court set forth the following reasons for why, pursuant to 

the Section 5328(a) factors, it awarded Father primary physical custody and 

sole legal custody of Children:

Going through the factors now, the first factor is which party is 

more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing 

contact between the child and the other party. This factor is a 

great place for the [c]ourt to put on the record that the [c]ourt 

has concluded that [M]other has engaged in Parental Alienation 

Syndrome and has done so consistently and to a point where it 

has adversely affected [C]hildren. As a result of that, [M]other 

has discouraged [C]hildren from having [a normal] relationship 

with their [F]ather. While the [c]ourt observed testimony and 

evidence of [M]other’s Parent[al] Alienation Syndrome during the 

various hearings, the [c]ourt cannot help b[ut] also point out that 

the [GAL] indicated the same, and, in fact, recommended that 

[C]hildren go to [F]ather because of [M]other’s false allegations 

and her trying to literally steer ... [C]hildren [a]way from a normal 

relationship with [F]ather and [F]ather’s parents.[18] So this factor 

is a very high factor in favor of [F]ather. 

Factor two, present or past abuse committed by a party, and 

whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child. The [c]ourt 

has concluded that [M]other’s Parent[al] Alienation Syndrome is 

emotional abuse to [C]hildren. The [Parental G]randparents 

requested [M]other’s periods be supervised because of that. The 

[c]ourt is not taking that drastic action. But if [M]other does not 

change her ways, at some future hearing, because a modification 

has been requested or whatever, the [c]ourt might do that, 

because the [c]ourt is concerned about a risk of harm to these 

[C]hildren by [M]other’s emotional abuse. In any event, coupled

with factor number one, it is a factor high in favor of [F]ather.

Factor 2.1, is involvement by protective services, and is not a 

factor.

____________________________________________

18 At trial, the GAL testified that she recommends that Father be the primary 

custodian of Children because “[M]other is alienating [C]hildren from [F]ather. 

And my concern is primarily over the older child, H.L. I believe that not only 

is there alienation, but there is also significant loyalty issues that H.L. has with 

[M]other.” N.T., 3/4/22, at 157 (original brackets omitted). 
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Factor three, the parental duties performed by each party on 

behalf of the children. Both parents have performed those 

parental duties at various time to various degrees. Therefore, it’s 

a neutral factor. 

Factor number four, the need for stability and continuity in the 

children’s education, family life, and community life. 

Unfortunately, [M]other’s false allegations and other actions 

[have] led this [c]ourt to conclude that she’s engaged in Parent[al] 

Alienation Syndrome which has resulted in instability with 

[C]hildren. The [GAL] made a good bit in her report about [H.L.’s] 

anxiety, and there seems to be a link between [H.L.’s] anxiety and 

[M]other[’s] calling the State Police to come get the iPad, so this 

is a factor also in favor of [F]ather.[19] 

Factor number five, the ability [sic] of extended family. Both 

parties have extended family, so that is a neutral factor. 

Factor six, the children’s sibling relationships[,] is not a factor.

Factor seven, the well-reasoned preference of the child. The 

[c]ourt did not interview [L.L]. The [c]ourt did interview [H.L]. 

[H.L.] did express at the time that he wanted to stay with 

[M]other. However, just as the [GAL] concluded in her report, 

this [c]ourt concluded that that was coached and was not a wellreasoned preference, so that preference has been ignored by the 

[c]ourt.[20] 

____________________________________________

19 For context, in January of 2022, Father bought an iPad for Children so that 

he could more easily contact them when they are with Mother. N.T., 3/4/22, 

at 25, 61-62. Mother did not want the iPad in her house because she believed 

it was “being used in an attempt to get her information.” Id. at 23-24; see 

also id. at 28, 30. She therefore contacted the Pennsylvania State Police. 

Id. at 23-24. The police seized the iPad and were investigating it at the time 

of trial. Id. at 25-26, 28. 

In the GAL’s report, the GAL noted that — when interviewing H.L. —

he discussed having “worry attacks” and “mentioned that the ‘cops came 

and took his Father’s iPad’ from his Mother’s house and now he worries they 

will come and arrest his Mother.” Report of GAL, 2/11/22, at 9. 

20 With respect to H.L.’s being coached, the GAL testified:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Factor eight, the attempts of a parent to turn a child against the 

other parent. This is exactly what Parent[al] Alienation Syndrome 

is, so this factor is subsumed in factors one and two. 

Factor nine, which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent, and nurturing relationship with the children adequate 

for their emotional needs. Again, [M]other has had a lot of drama 

in ... [C]hildren’s lives as part of her campaign to drive them away 

from [F]ather. Therefore, just like factor number four, this is a 

factor in favor of [F]ather. 

Factor number ten, which party is more likely to attend to the 

daily, physical, emotional, developmental, educational, and 

special needs of the children. Coupled with [M]other’s Parent[al] 

Alienation Syndrome, the [c]ourt finds that [M]other tends to be 

what the [c]ourt will refer to in the vernacular as a helicopter 

mom. The [c]ourt was puzzled why [M]other feels it necessary to 

help a six-year-old and a seven, almost eight-year-old child have 

showers.[21] This [j]udge took showers by himself when he was 

____________________________________________

In interviewing H.L., it was obvious to me that he was being 

coached by [M]other as to what to say. Again, the level of 

coaching and alienation in this case is more than I had ever seen 

before.

[H.L.] said, I can’t remember what I’m supposed to tell you. And 

also[,] H.L. would tell me stories about activities that he would do 

with his [F]ather or grandparents[,] and then it became obvious 

that something clicked that he should not be enjoying those 

experiences. And then he would say, however, I don’t want to 

see my [F]ather or I don’t want to see my grandparents.

N.T., 3/4/22, at 159 (original brackets omitted). See also Report of GAL at 

9-10 (“[H.L. said multiple times during the interview, ‘I have something to tell 

you[,]’ but then said ‘I forget’ when I asked him what it was. I have observed 

similar behaviors from children, especially young ones when they are being 

coached on what to say or discuss.”). 

21 To elaborate, Mother testified that, when in Father’s care, 

[H.L.] gets himself in the shower by himself. He does not use 

soap, because he said he’s afraid it’s going to burn his eyes and 

burn his skin. I did send them hypoallergenic[,] tear-free[,] sting-

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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five. That ... was only one of many times where [M]other seemed 

to be over involved with [C]hildren. Therefore, even factor 

number ten is in favor of [F]ather. 

Factor 11, the proximity of the residences of the parties. 

Obviously[,] ... [M]other [lives] in Pennsylvania[,] and [F]ather in 

Mississippi. I’m not sure if the [c]ourt heard testimony, but the 

[c]ourt knows that that is at least a thousand miles, probably 

more, and typically is going to have to ... have [C]hildren go back 

and forth by airfare. This [c]ourt has not gone through the 

relocation factors, because the [c]ourt did not think it necessary; 

but the [c]ourt has very much taken into account the fact that the 

parties are so far apart. The [c]ourt has tried to craft an order 

providing [M]other with as much time with ... [C]hildren as the 

[c]ourt believes is in [C]hildren’s best interest. 

Factor 12, each party’s availability to care for the children or make 

appropriate child care arrangements. That is not a factor.

Factor 13, the level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with each other. 

Unfortunately, this is tied in with factor one and factor eight in 

that there is a lot of conflict. Mother continually accuses [F]ather 

of things he hasn’t done. Even today[, M]other accused [F]ather 

of not telling her who [H.L.’s] counselor was, but the [c]ourt saw 

in ... OurFamilyWizard[22] where [F]ather did specifically tell 

____________________________________________

free soap. He said he’s still afraid to use the soap, because he 

doesn’t have any help; and if it gets in his eyes, it’s going to burn. 

The same thing with [L.L]. After [H.L.] is done, [L.L.] gets herself 

in the shower by herself. She says she has a hard time adjusting 

the temperature. I know this because when they are with me, I 

help them shower. I help them adjust the temperature, help them 

get the soap out of their eyes when they are saying, “Mommy, 

daddy doesn’t do this with us. We have to do all of this by 

ourselves. He doesn’t help us with anything.” So those are some 

of the difficulties. 

N.T., 12/28/22, at 31-32. 

22 OurFamilyWizard is a custody and co-parenting website and app. See B.G. 

v. S.G., 2021 WL 1402261, at *4 n.8 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 14, 2021); see 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[M]other who [H.L.’s] therapist was and [the] name of the practice 

and everything, so this is all tied in with [M]other’s Parent[al] 

Alienation Syndrome. Factor 13 is in favor of [F]ather. 

Factor 14, history of drug and alcohol abuse. The [c]ourt heard 

some testimony about [M]other’s alleged alcohol abuse. That may 

be part of the reason why [M]other engages in Parent[al] 

Alienation Syndrome, but [M]other’s motivations for that are not 

something that this [c]ourt can speculate on, and, therefore, this 

is not a factor. 

Factor 15, mental and physical condition of a party or a member 

of a party’s household. Just like in [factor] 14, [M]other maybe 

could be helped by some therapy, either parenting or individual 

therapy, but the [c]ourt is not going to speculate on that. 

Therefore, factor 15 is not a factor.

Factor 16, any other relevant factor. This [c]ourt has already 

talked about a rather strong recommendation by the [GAL] for 

[F]ather to have majority custody. This [c]ourt has taken a good 

bit of credence in th[e GAL’s] report, particularly since the [c]ourt 

is aware that that [GAL] has a great deal of family law experience 

as well as experience as a hearing officer. In addition, the 

[c]ourt’s hearing the evidence and seeing the exhibits have 

caused the [c]ourt to conclude exactly what the [GAL] put in her 

report, and, therefore, that is another factor in favor of [F]ather. 

N.T., 12/28/22, at 124-29. 

Mother attacks the trial court’s Section 5328(a) analysis on appeal, 

complaining that the trial court “could have and should have appointed an 

expert to conduct an evaluation and offer an opinion to the [c]ourt as to 

whether or not Parental Alienation Syndrome was present in the case.” 

Mother’s Brief at 39. She says that “the behaviors leading to and resulting in 

Parental Alienation Syndrome in a child is beyond the knowledge of a 

____________________________________________

also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that an unpublished, non-precedential 

memorandum decision filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive 

value). 
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layperson and, therefore, expert testimony is required to understand, as well 

as to properly diagnose, Parental Alienation Syndrome, which did not occur 

here.” Id. at 42 (citation omitted). Instead of appointing an expert, Mother 

claims that the trial court relied exclusively on the report of the GAL, and 

impermissibly delegated its judicial, decision-making authority to the GAL. Id. 

at 40, 41. 

We reject Mother’s argument. First, with respect to her claim that an 

expert was needed, Mother has waived this issue. When the trial court went 

through the Section 5328(a) custody factors at the conclusion of trial, making

repeated references to Parental Alienation Syndrome, our review of the record 

shows that Mother lodged no objection that the trial court was improperly 

making a diagnosis and should have appointed an expert to conduct an 

evaluation.

23, 24

 Accordingly, she has waived this claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

____________________________________________

23 She also does not point us to where she raised such an objection below. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable law an issue is not 

reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the argument must 

set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote thereto, either a 

specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement of the case 

which set forth the information relating thereto as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

2117(c), or substantially the same information.”). 

24 We additionally point out that Mother seemingly suggests that she was

aware that Parental Alienation Syndrome was involved in the case at the end 

of the second day of trial, but still did not raise below that an expert was 

needed. See Mother’s Brief at 46 (“Mother believes that it was clear to the 

[t]rial [c]ourt [that Parental Alienation Syndrome was involved in the case] at 

the conclusion of the second day of trial on August 11, 2022. The opportunity 

and time to gain that expert opinion over these issues was present between 

August 11, 2022[,] and December 28, 2022[, i.e., the third day of trial]. At 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.”). 

Notwithstanding, even if not waived, we would be unconvinced that the 

trial court erred or abused its discretion by failing to appoint an expert to 

determine if Parental Alienation Syndrome existed in this case. The trial court 

reasonably explained why it did not appoint an expert, as follows:

[Section] 5328(a)(1) requires a court to determine “which party 

is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing 

contact between the child and another party.” Also, [Section] 

5328(a)(8) requires a court to evaluate "[t]he attempts of a 

parent to turn the child against the other parent....” In using the 

phrase “[P]arental [A]lienation [S]yndrome,[”] the court was not 

attempting to make a medical or psychological diagnosis. The 

court was describing a pattern of behavior by Mother designed to 

separate [C]hildren from Father. The court heard credible 

testimony regarding Mother’s attempts to alienate [C]hildren from 

Father ... through interference with Father’s communication with 

[C]hildren. In addition, the court heard testimony regarding 

Mother[’s] calling the Pennsylvania State Police to come and seize 

an iPad [that] Father gave [C]hildren and testimony regarding 

other false allegations. Based on the testimony and evidence 

presented, the [c]ourt found that Mother had prevented [C]hildren 

from pursuing a normal relationship with Father. The court did 

not need the testimony of an expert witness to determine that 

Mother had engaged in behavior designed to turn [C]hildren 

against Father....

TCO at 9-10. 

While the trial court used the phrase ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome,’ it 

is evident that it did so to refer to the reoccurring ways in which Mother has 

____________________________________________

that time, Mother had no real hope of an outcome in her favor and her only 

alternative was to complete the trial and file a notice of appeal. Mother 

contends that an [i]nterlocutory [a]ppeal after August 11, 2022, was not a 

realistic option either due to the short period of time between August 2022 

and the conclusion of trial.”) (citation omitted). 
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tried to alienate Children from Father.

25

 Expert testimony is not needed to 

establish that Mother engaged in behavior designed to alienate Children from 

Father. See Burlington Coat Factory of Pennsylvania, LLC v. Grace 

Construction Management Company, LLC, 126 A.3d 1010, 1021 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (en banc) (“Expert testimony is necessary when a case presents 

questions beyond the ken of the average layperson.”) (citation omitted). In 

addition, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that Mother has 

tried to alienate Children from Father. See A.V., supra (“The test is whether 

the evidence of record supports the trial court’s conclusions.”). Thus, if 

preserved, we would disagree with Mother that the trial court erred and 

abused its discretion by finding that Mother committed parental alienation 

without expert testimony and evidence to support such a conclusion. 

Second, regarding Mother’s claim that the trial court impermissibly 

relied on the GAL, we likewise deem this claim waived due to Mother’s failure 

to raise it in her concise statement and statement of questions involved. See

O.G. v. A.B., 234 A.3d 766, 781 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2020) (determining that the 

mother waived an issue where, among other things, she failed to raise it in 

____________________________________________

25 As Father aptly notes, “if the trial court would have eliminated the word 

‘syndrome’ in its recitation and discussion of the factors, [M]other would have 

no argument to this [C]ourt[,]” and that its “[d]escribing it as a ‘syndrome’ 

was a matter of semantics, not substance.” Father’s Brief at 17, 18.
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her statement of questions involved and concise statement) (citations 

omitted).

26

 

However, even if not waived, we would discern no such impropriety by 

the trial court. Though the trial court credited the GAL’s report and testimony, 

and noted the GAL’s experience, we would conclude that it did not improperly 

delegate its judicial authority to her. Cf. C.W. v. K.A.W., 774 A.2d 745, 749-

50 (Pa. Super. 2001) (determining that the trial court delegated its judicial 

power to the GAL where the court repeatedly asked for the GAL’s opinion on 

evidentiary rulings, stated that the GAL taught the court its job, closely 

followed the GAL’s recommendations, and issued its custody order on the 

same day the GAL delivered its recommendations to the trial court). The fact 

that the trial court agreed with many of the GAL’s observations upon hearing 

the evidence, and therefore placed weight on the GAL’s testimony and report,

was in its prerogative as the fact-finder. See A.V., supra (“[O]n issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial 

court who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor 

of the witnesses. The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial 

court places on evidence.”); Father’s Brief at 19 (“[S]imply because the court 

agreed with the [GAL’s] recommendation[] does not translate into the 

____________________________________________

26 Because Mother did not specifically raise this issue in her concise statement,

the trial court did not address whether its reliance on the GAL was 

inappropriate in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
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court[’s] ‘delegating’ its decision-making power to the [GAL].”). As such, no 

relief is due on Mother’s second issue. 

III.

In Mother’s third issue, she argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion and committed an error of law by failing to consider and analyze 

the factors for relocation set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h). Mother’s Brief at 

33. Although Father already resided in Mississippi when the trial started, 

Mother says that the trial court should have considered the Section 5337(h) 

factors because the modification of custody involved Children’s moving to a 

distant location. Id. She also emphasizes that she has been the primary 

source and provider for Children’s needs since their birth, and claims that the 

trial court gave little to no consideration to the impact on Children of having 

to attend a new school, make new friends, etc. Id. at 35. According to 

Mother, the trial court’s “failure to consider the impact[] of this move to 

Mississippi on [C]hildren[,] and their continuing developmental and 

educational needs[,] was an abuse of discretion and error of law.” Id. at 35-

36. 

We agree with Mother that the trial court should have considered the 

factors set forth in Section 5337(h). See D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 476 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (“In a custody case where neither parent is relocating, but 

the children stand to move a significant distance, trial courts should still 
J-S19001-23

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consider the relevant factors of [S]ection 5337(h) in their [S]ection 5328(a) 

best interests analysis.”). Section 5337(h) provides:

(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a 

proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors, 

giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the 

safety of the child:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration 

of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to 

relocate and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other 

significant persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and 

the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s 

physical, educational and emotional development, taking 

into consideration any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial 

circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age 

and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of 

either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the 

child and the other party.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not 

limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational 

opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or 

emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.
J-S19001-23

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(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h).

The trial court did not go through the Section 5337(h) factors at the end 

of the trial, in conjunction with its Section 5328(a) best-interests analysis. 

The trial court, however, points out that Mother did not object at the time. 

See TCO at 4 (“[A]fter analyzing the custody factors on the record, the [c]ourt 

specifically asked counsel if there was anything else that needed to be 

addressed, and neither counsel requested additional analysis. If either 

counsel wanted the [c]ourt to go through the relocation factors on the 

record[,] counsel could have stated this.”). Our review of the record confirms 

the trial court’s account. Accordingly, Mother has arguably waived this issue. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra. 

Even if waiver is not appropriate, we would conclude that Mother’s third 

issue lacks merit. Though the trial court did not review the Section 5337(h) 

relocation factors on the record at the conclusion of trial, it subsequently

reviewed them in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. There, it went through the factors 

as follows:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the 

child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and with 

the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons in 

the child’s life.

This factor was slightly in favor of not granting the relocation 

because [C]hildren had a closer and longer relationship with 

Mother than with Father.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the likely 

impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational 
J-S19001-23

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and emotional development, taking into consideration any special 

needs on the child.

The [c]ourt determined that this factor was in favor of relocation 

because Mother had not provided for [C]hildren well in terms of 

emotional development, as well as other matters. Mother’s false 

accusations against Father regarding various things involving 

[C]hildren[,] and Mother’s attempt to alienate [C]hildren from 

Father[,] has been detrimental to [C]hildren’s emotional 

development, as well as perhaps other types of development. 

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial 

circumstances of the parties. 

The court fashioned an order in which [C]hildren will see Mother 

quite a lot to accommodate this factor. It is noteworthy that, 

subsequent to this order, the court had to hold a hearing on 

reconsideration/clarification to try to help the parties fine-tune 

Mother’s times with [C]hildren and the transportation thereof and 

whether they need to be in Pennsylvania or Mississippi, which 

underscores the fact that the court’s order obviously provided for 

a great deal of time for Mother to spend with [C]hildren, and, in 

fact, Mother has been spending that time with [C]hildren, and 

therefore the court’s order took into account this factor very 

much. 

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and 

maturity of the child.

As the [c]ourt indicated in analyzing this issue under the custody 

factors, the [c]ourt only interviewed the older child, H.L.[,] who 

was seven years old[,] and believed the child had been coached 

and did not have a well-reasoned preference. The [c]ourt also 

notes that H.L.’s [GAL] noted in her report that she interviewed 

H.L. twice and indicated that he exhibited behaviors she had 

observed in children who had been coached. Therefore, H.L.’s 

preference was not regarded. 

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either 

party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the 

other party.

This factor was analyzed thoroughly while assessing the custody 

factors. Father has always tried to promote a relationship 
J-S19001-23

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between [C]hildren and their [M]other. However, Mother has 

steadfastly, and over a substantial period [of] time, tried to thwart 

the relationship between [C]hildren and ... [F]ather. Therefore, 

the [c]ourt determined that relocation was necessary.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, 

financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

In this case, the parties were not relocating, but only [C]hildren 

were relocated from Mother in Pennsylvania[,] to Father in 

Mississippi. As mentioned, after the parties’ divorce in South 

Carolina, Mother relocated to Pennsylvania and Father 

subsequently moved to Mississippi. Neither party is seeking to 

relocate. Therefore, this factor was not applicable. 

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional 

benefit or educational opportunity. 

This factor favored relocation because relocation will enable 

[C]hildren to thrive under Father’s primary ... parenting role. 

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation.

Father’s motivations for moving [C]hildren to Mississippi were 

noble. Father wanted to enable [C]hildren to have a more normal 

relationship with both parents. On the other hand, Mother’s 

opposition to the relocation was not motivated by noble reasons. 

It seemed to the [c]ourt that Mother simply wanted dictatorial 

control over [C]hildren’s lives. Thus, this factor favored 

relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member 

of the party’s household and whether there is a continued risk of 

harm to the child or an abused party.

This factor favored relocation because Mother’s dictatorial control 

over [C]hildren[,] and attempts to alienate [C]hildren from their 

[F]ather[,] rises to the level of emotional abuse. Therefore, this 

was a factor highly in favor of relocation.

For example, the [c]ourt heard testimony that Father was having 

difficulty for years in communicating with ... [C]hildren in having 

to call Mother’s phone, being hung up on, or being concerned 

about being accused of stalking. Father testified that he discussed 
J-S19001-23

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with Mother his purchase of an iPad for [C]hildren to use in 

communicating with him. In this way, Father would not have to 

call Mother’s phone to exercise his court-ordered times of 

communication with [C]hildren. After [C]hildren brought the iPad 

to her home, Mother called the Pennsylvania State Police and had 

the iPad seized. The police officer who visited the home and 

seized the iPad indicated that Mother was concerned that Father 

was seeking to get ... information about her. Apparently, H.L. 

either witnessed the officer or his car[,] or learned about the 

seizure in some way, causing or contributing to anxiety attacks. 

In her report, the [GAL] noted that, “I discussed with [H.L.] what 

he called his ‘worry attacks’ but he could not articulate when they 

started o[r] why he was having them. He mentioned that the 

‘cops came and took ... Father’s iPad’ from his Mother’s house and 

now he worries they will come and arrest his Mother.” There 

seems to be a link between H.L.’s anxiety and Mother’s action in 

having the police come to the home to seize the iPad. At any rate, 

the court sees this behavior as supportive of Father’s assertion 

regarding Mother[’s] attempting to alienate him from [C]hildren. 

This factor weighed in favor of relocation. The [c]ourt also notes 

that [C]hildren’s [GAL] testified that, “I believe that it is in 

[C]hildren’s best interest to immediately go and live primarily with 

[F]ather.”

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

This factor was not applicable.

TCO at 5-8 (internal citations omitted; some brackets added). 

Contrary to Mother’s argument, the trial court acknowledged that 

Children have a closer and longer relationship with Mother. However, it also

found — and placed great weight on the fact — that Mother’s behavior has 

been detrimental to Children in terms of their emotional development. It 

noted Mother’s history of false accusations against Father and her efforts to 

thwart Children’s relationship with him, characterizing her attempts at 

alienation as emotional abuse and citing H.L.’s worry over the iPad incident. 

Despite Mother’s behavior, the trial court’s final custody order permits Mother 
J-S19001-23

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to see Children relatively often, considering the distance between the parties. 

In addition, it promotes Children’s having a more normal relationship with 

both of their parents. 

In reviewing the trial court’s Section 5337(h) analysis, we would 

conclude that the record supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions. 

See A.V., supra. We also remind Mother that “[t]he parties cannot dictate 

the amount of weight the trial court places on evidence.” Id. Accordingly, 

even if preserved, Mother’s third issue would fail. 

IV. 

In Mother’s fourth and final issue, she argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion and committed an error of law by transferring primary physical 

custody to Father before all testimony and evidence was presented. Mother’s 

Brief at 13. As mentioned supra, at the conclusion of the second day of trial 

on August 11, 2022, the court entered a temporary custody order, in which it 

granted Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Children. 

While Mother acknowledges that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.13 

authorizes the trial court to enter temporary orders in cases where a party 

has requested special relief, she points out that Father never made such a 

request. Id. at 17. In addition, Mother insists that the trial court had to 

analyze and consider, at a minimum, the factors set forth in Section 5328(a) 

before transferring custody in the middle of trial, which she says it did not do. 

Id. at 18. As a result of the trial court’s allegedly inappropriate temporary 
J-S19001-23

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order, Mother asks us to vacate the trial court’s final custody order and 

remand for further proceedings. Id. at 32.

Again, no relief is due. Initially, in Mother’s concise statement and 

statement of the questions involved, she only contends that the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion by transferring custody to Father, prior to the 

conclusion of trial, before all testimony and evidence was presented.

27

 In her 

concise statement and statement of questions involved, she did not 

specifically challenge the trial court’s temporary custody order on the basis

that Father had not requested such special relief and/or that the trial court 

had not analyzed the Section 5328(a) factors before transferring custody.28 

Thus, those aspects of Mother’s argument are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 

supra; O.G., supra.

29

 

Turning to Mother’s preserved claim that the trial court should not have 

entered a temporary custody order prior to the conclusion of evidence,

assuming arguendo that this issue is not moot, we point out that Rule 1915.13 

____________________________________________

27 At trial, Mother also only objected to the trial court’s temporary custody 

order on the basis that it was entered prior to the conclusion of the evidence. 

N.T., 8/11/22, at 116 (“Your Honor, for the record, I’m going to place an 

objection to the entry of this order prior to the conclusion of the evidence and 

the record in this case.”). 

28 The trial court also did not address these specific issues in its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion. 

29 Further, even if not waived, we would decline to disturb the trial court’s final 

custody order — which we have determined the trial court properly entered —

due to any such purported errors made in the trial court’s prior, temporary 

custody order.
J-S19001-23

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states that “[a]t any time after commencement of the action, the court 

may on application or its own motion grant appropriate interim relief. The 

relief may include, but is not limited to, the award of temporary legal or 

physical custody....” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.13 (emphasis added). Here, the trial 

court temporarily awarded Father primary physical custody and sole legal 

custody of Children pending the final day of trial, and Mother does not 

persuade us that the trial court was not authorized to do so under Rule 

1915.13 because trial had not yet concluded.

30 Thus, Mother’s final issue also 

fails. 

Order affirmed. 

McLaughlin, J., concurs in the result.

Sullivan, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

____________________________________________

30 As Father observes, by the end of the second day of trial, the trial court had 

heard substantial evidence of Mother’s emotional abuse of Children. Father’s 

Brief at 5-7; see also N.T., 8/11/22, at 117 (the trial court’s observing at the 

end of the second day of trial that it will likely make a finding that Mother has 

alienated Children from Father, and noting that Mother’s behavior may 

amount to emotional abuse). In addition, Father points out that, at that time,

the beginning of the school year was approaching. Father’s Brief at 6. 
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