NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS URENDA-BUSTOS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BRIAN WILLIAMS, SR.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

HOLISWORTH; et al., 

Defendants.

No. 19-15765 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cv-02165-JCM-NJK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 3, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 5 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Luis Urenda-Bustos appeals both the adverse summary judgment ruling on 

his retaliation claim against the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), 

NDOC caseworker Ira Hollingsworth, and Correctional Officer Bryan Wilson and

the dismissal of his excessive force claim against Senior Correctional Officer David 

Foley. Urenda-Bustos maintains that Hollingsworth and Wilson brought retaliatory 

disciplinary charges against him because he filed an excessive force grievance 

against Foley. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Nothing in the record indicates Hollingsworth’s involvement in filing the 

disciplinary charge. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(requiring “[a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate” to prove First Amendment retaliation). The evidence instead suggests Foley

alone filed it. Nor can Hollingsworth’s failure to report Foley’s abusive behavior as 

required by NDOC regulations—an omission that preceded both Urenda-Bustos’s 

grievance and Foley’s disciplinary charge—reasonably be said to implicate 

Hollingsworth. 

Qualified immunity bars Urenda-Bustos’s retaliation claim against Wilson. 

Wilson did not violate a “clearly established” legal right merely by serving as the 

disciplinary hearing officer. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“The 

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is 

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 
3 

the situation he confronted.”). And we find no authority for Urenda-Bustos’s 

suggestion that a disciplinary hearing officer must be licensed in the practice of law

before invoking qualified immunity. 

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Foley for 

lack of personal service. See In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Urenda-Bustos had ninety days from the filing of his complaint to serve Foley. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The court alerted Urenda-Bustos to this deadline and explained 

that he could serve Foley from prison by filing a motion requesting service, after 

which the court would direct the United States Marshals Service to serve Foley at 

his last known address, which had already been filed under seal with the court. But 

he never did. The court did not err, then, in rejecting his pro se status, incarceration, 

or inability to personally learn Foley’s address as good cause to extend the service 

deadline. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although we 

construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of 

procedure.”).

AFFIRMED.