[Cite as State v. Vargas, 2012-Ohio-2768.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97377

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

VERKO VARGAS

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-552581 

BEFORE: Jones, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Keough, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 21, 2012 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Christopher R. Fortunato 

13363 Madison Avenue 

Lakewood, Ohio 44107

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Justin S. Gould 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Verko Vargas, appeals his conviction for obstructing 

official business. We affirm. 

{¶2} In 2011, Vargas was charged with one count each of theft of a motor vehicle 

and obstructing official business. The matter proceeded to a trial by jury at which the 

following pertinent evidence was presented. 

{¶3} Aria Mondla-Dontarvon testified that she allowed her daughter, Edenike, to 

drive her car to work the evening of July 16, 2011. Vargas, who was dating Edenike at 

the time, rode with her to work. Edenike went inside to work her shift and left the keys 

with Vargas, who often waited for her while she worked. 

{¶4} When her shift ended the next morning, Edenike went outside to discover that 

her mother’s car and Vargas were missing. Aria and Edenike each testified that Vargas 

did not have permission to use the car. 

{¶5} Kimberly Wilson testified that she was driving on Pearl Road at about 3:45 

a.m. on July 17, 2011, when a blue car passed her at a high rate of speed. She called 

911. Minutes later she saw the car again, crashed into a telephone pole. She saw the 

driver, later identified as Vargas, standing outside the car. Wilson testified that she 

drove up to Vargas to see if he was injured, but he ran away. The police arrived and 

Wilson told them that Vargas had run behind the bank. 

{¶6} Strongsville police officer Michael Mendise testified that he responded to the 

scene where Wilson informed him that Vargas had run behind the bank, which is perched 
on a steep ravine. According to Patrolman Mendise, he could smell an odor of alcohol 

as he approached a set of steps behind the bank; he then saw Vargas hiding under the 

stairs. Patrolman Mendise ordered Vargas to put his hands up and Vargas complied. 

Vargas then began to “scoot” toward the edge of the ravine. Patrolman Mendise ordered 

Vargas to move toward him and away from the cliff, warning him “don’t go forward or 

you’re going to get hurt.” 

{¶7} Vargas went over the edge of the cliff and the officers lost sight of him. The 

officers heard noises that sounded like Vargas falling down the side of the cliff and then 

heard him splash into the river at the bottom of the ravine. The officers immediately 

proceeded down the cliff because they were concerned about Vargas’s safety. 

Patrolman Mendise testified that he “fell, slid, and tripped” down the steep ravine, 

describing the descent as “disastrous.” 

{¶8} Vargas began to wade and swim in the river. The police finally 

apprehended him and pulled him to safety. A rescuer with the Southwest Emergency 

Response Team (“SERT”) repelled down the side of the ravine to assess Vargas’s 

condition. Eventually, the rescuing officers and Vargas had to be pulled up the side of 

the cliff by ropes. The entire incident lasted three hours and included multiple members 

of the Strongsville Police and Fire Departments, SERT, and Cleveland Metroparks 

rangers. 

{¶9} The jury convicted Vargas of obstructing official business but acquitted him 

of theft. The trial court sentenced him to ten months in prison. It is from this 
conviction that Vargas now appeals, raising three assignments of error for our review; the 

assigned errors will be discussed together. 

I. The appellant’s conviction should be reversed when there was 

insufficient evidence to convict the appellant of obstructing official 

business. 

II. The trial court’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

III. The trial court erred when it should have granted a judgment of 

acquittal under Crim.R. 29. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶10} Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of acquittal where 

the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense. Crim.R. 29(A) 

and sufficiency of evidence review require the same analysis. State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. 

No. 95095, 2011-Ohio-1241, ¶ 18, citing State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 

2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386. But the legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence 

and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the 

syllabus. 

{¶11} The role of an appellate court presented with a sufficiency of the evidence 

argument is delineated as follows: 

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence 

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would 

convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. 

{¶12} On the other hand, the weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the 

greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one side of the issue rather than 

the other. State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. No. 96493, 2011-Ohio-6077, ¶ 14, citing, State v. 

Brindley, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-926, 2002-Ohio-2425, ¶ 16. When presented with a 

challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court, after 

reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered. 

Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist. 1983). An appellate court should reserve reversal of a conviction as being against 

the manifest weight of the evidence for only the most “exceptional case in which the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at id.

{¶13} Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, 

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding 

that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes 

a finding of sufficiency. Cleveland v. Kirkpatrick, 8th Dist. No. 94950, 

2011-Ohio-2257, ¶ 26, citing State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-725, 

2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15. “[T]hus, a determination that a conviction is supported by the 
weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” Kirkpatrick at

id. 

R.C. 2921.31 prohibits obstructing official business and provides: 

(A) No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, 

obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act 

within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or 

impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful 

duties. 

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of obstructing official business. 

Except as otherwise provided in this division, obstructing official business 

is a misdemeanor of the second degree. If a violation of this section 

creates a risk of physical harm to any person, obstructing official business is 

a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶14} Vargas claims that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence to convict 

him of obstructing official business, and the trial court should have granted his Crim.R. 

29 motion for acquittal, because running away from the police did not obstruct official 

business nor did he cause a risk of physical harm to anyone. He further claims that the 

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was “no 

evidence of an illegal act.” We disagree. 

{¶15} This court has found that obstructing official business is established where 

there is both an illegal act that quickens the duty of the police officer to enforce the law, 

and interference with intent to impede that enforcement. Garfield Hts. v. Simpson, 82 

Ohio App.3d 286, 291, 611 N.E.2d 892 (8th Dist.1992), citing Warrensville Hts. v. 

Watson, 50 Ohio App.2d 21, 361 N.E.2d 546 (8th Dist.1976). Fleeing from pursuing 

police may be sufficient to sustain a conviction for obstructing official business. In 
State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. No. 96627, 2011-Ohio-6886, police officers responded to a 

beauty salon based on a report of a man with a gun. When the police arrived at the salon 

they saw the defendant walking away. A chase ensued and the police were able to 

apprehend the defendant after he fell into a creek. This court found that the defendant’s 

decision to ignore police orders and flee was sufficient to show that he obstructed official 

business. 

{¶16} In State v. Williams, 8th Dist. No. 89574, 2004-Ohio-4476, this court 

affirmed a conviction for obstructing official business when the defendant ignored police 

orders to stop and the police chased the defendant for several minutes before 

apprehending him. This court found that the fact that cars had to swerve around the 

defendant to avoid hitting him and the defendant swallowed evidence was sufficient to 

constitute obstructing official business. Id. at ¶ 38. In Williams, this court noted that 

the risk of physical harm the defendant caused was to himself. 

{¶17} In this case, the police were investigating a single car accident in the middle 

of the night. Contrary to Vargas’s assertion that he should have been free to walk away, 

Patrolman Mendise testified that he had a duty to investigate because Vargas had left the 

scene of an accident and the officer had to make sure he was not injured. Moreover, the 

officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the area where he located 

Vargas. Vargas ignored the police order to stay away from the edge of the ravine. 

Once Vargas went over the side of the cliff and into the river, Patrolman Mendise 

testified that he heard Vargas struggling in the water “like [he] was choking.” The 
officers, who knew the terrain was dangerous, decided to follow Vargas over the cliff and 

into the river in order to rescue him. 

{¶18} Sergeant John Hall testified that all but one officer on duty that night 

responded to the scene to assist in the pursuit and rescue. He further testified that it is an 

officer’s duty at the scene of a car accident to investigate the accident and determine if 

there are any injuries, alcohol involved, take a report, etc. 

{¶19} Based on these facts, the state presented sufficient evidence that the police 

were unable to complete their duties at the scene of the car accident because they had to 

chase, and then rescue Vargas. 

{¶20} The state also presented sufficient evidence that Vargas’s actions caused a 

risk of physical harm. The entire incident lasted approximately three hours and involved 

multiple facets of the city’s safety forces. Patrolman Mendise and three other officers 

involved testified that Vargas put himself and the police, fire, and SERT at risk of harm. 

Liuetenant Harry Drennan of the Strongsville Fire Department and SERT testified that 

descending the side of the ravine without safety equipment, as the officers in this case did 

to pursue Vargas, presented a risk of injury to the officers. Liuetenant Drennan testified 

that while he was treating Vargas for any possible injuries, Vargas “slapped” or “hit” him 

hard enough to knock him off balance and into a patch of poison ivy. Moreover, 

Vargas, who had just been in a car accident, presented a risk of injury to himself as he 

traversed dangerous terrain in the middle of night trying to evade capture. After 

reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and considering the credibility of the 
witnesses, we are not persuaded that the jury lost its way and created such a miscarriage 

of justice that Vargas’s conviction must be reversed. 

{¶21} Therefore, we find that the Vargas’s conviction for obstructing official 

business was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Accordingly, the assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶22} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR