UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT
PAUL ARTHUR LOPEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. JERRY ROARK; JOE BOOKER; JAMES FRAWNER; MICHAEL GONZALES, Defendants - Appellees. No. 14-2001 (D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00743-JCH-CG) (D.N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before LUCERO , TYMKOVICH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

In June 2009, Paul Lop ez arrived at the Lea County Correctional Facility (Lea County) near Hobbs, New Mexico, where he began serving a 24-year sentence for aggravated burglary, possession of burglary tools, and larceny. While at Lea County, Lopez was placed in protective custody a nd housed with othe r protective-custody inmates. A few years later, Lopez was transferred to the Otero County Pr ison Facility (Otero County) near Chaparral, New Mexico. After arriving, he wa s placed in the general prison * After examining the briefs and appella te record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. Accordingly, the case is ordered submitte d without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, claim prec lusion, and issue preclusion. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive valu e consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 19, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - population. But Lopez wanted to be in prot ective custody, so he sent a letter to Joe Booker, the Deputy Secretary of Operati ons within the New Mexico Corrections Department, asking for placement in protectiv e custody. The letter said that Lopez had nine enemies in Otero County’s general population, so his placement in the general population jeopardized his safety. Lopez al so asked Michael Gonzales, a correctional officer at Otero County, for pl acement in protective custody. Lopez eventually succeeded in his endeavor , but his success was short-lived. After a brief stint in protective custody, he was put back in the gene ral population. And, according to Lopez, on ce the other inmates caught wind of his attempts to be put in protective custody, they labeled him a “snitch, ” a “protective custody bitch,” and targeted him for abuse. About two weeks after going back into the general p opulation, another inmate physically assaulted Lopez, resulting in inju ries to Lopez’s head and face. Lopez then sent a letter to Jerry Roark, the Director of the Adult Prisons Di vision within the New Mexico Corrections Departme nt, requesting placement in protective custody—but to no avail. He also filed a grievance against Go nzales and James Frawner, Otero County’s Warden, seeking placement in protec tive custody—also to no avail. Lopez then turned to the federal judiciary for redress, filing a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Distri ct of New Mexico. The complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ro ark, Booker, Frawner, and Gonzales. The principal claim was that Defendants knew Lopez faced a substantial risk of serious harm- 3 - but refused to take reasonable measures to ab ate that risk in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Numerous motions followed on the heels of Lopez’s complaint, including a motion to amend the complaint, a motion to compel service of proc ess on Roark and Booker, and a motion for a preliminary injunc tion ordering Defendants to transfer Lopez back to Lea County. The district court dealt with many of th ese motions in a single order. Among other things, the district court denied Lopez’s mo tion to amend his complaint and his motion to compel service of process, dismissed Lop ez’s claims against Ro ark and Booker, and denied Lopez’s mo tion for a preliminary injunction. Unsatisfied with those rulings, Lope z filed this interlocutory appeal. Before us, Lopez raises four arguments. Firs t, he argues that the district court should have granted him leave to amend his complaint. Second, he argues that the district court should have granted his motion for service of process. Third, he argues that the district court should not have dismissed his claims against Roark and Book er. And fourth, he argues that the district court should have gr anted his motion for a preliminary injunction. As a threshold matter, we d on’t have appellate jurisdicti on to entertain Lopez’s first three arguments. Generally, we may review only the final decisions of a district court. Miller v. Basic Research, LLC , No. 13-4048, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. May 6, 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). A final decision is “one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Hatten-Gonzales v. Hyde , 579 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court’s denial of leave to amend,- 4 - denial of service of process, and dismissal of the claims against Roark and Booker are not final decisions, so we don’t have appellate ju risdiction to review those decisions at this interlocutory stage. But we do have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying Lopez’s motion for a preliminar y injunction. That’s because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, we generally may review an interl ocutory order of a district c ourt denying an injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). (Because appellate jurisd iction exists over this issue, we deny Frawner and Gonzales’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.) Turning then to the prelimin ary-injunction issue, we start with our standard of review. When a district court denies a motion for a preliminary injunc tion, we review that order for abuse of discretion only. Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion when its conclusion rests on an erroneous legal premise or on a clearly erroneous factual finding. Id. A district court also abuses its discretion when its conclusion is arbitrar y or manifestly unreasonable. Id. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate four elements: (1) a likelihood of success on the mer its; (2) a likelihood that the party will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction; (3) that the balance of equities tip in the party’s favor; and (4) that the inj unction serves the public interest. Id. at 1251. And where, as here, the party seeks a preliminary injunction ordering some affirmative act that upsets the status quo, the party must make a “heightened showing” of these elements. Id. Applying these principles here, we can’t sa y the district court ab used its discretion in denying Lopez’s preliminary-injunction motion. In support of his motion, Lopez didn’t- 5 - even mention the third and fourth prelimin ary-injunction factors, much less make a “heightened showing” of those factors. See R. at 70–72. In short, Lopez failed to carry his burden of proof, so the district court acte d within its discretion in denying Lopez’s motion. We affirm the district court’s orde r denying Lopez’s motion for a preliminary injunction. And while we gran t Lopez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis , we remind him of his obligation to pay the full filing fee.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge