United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1444 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

JOSUE SOTO-SOTO, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. 

 Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Vivianne M. 

Marrero, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals 

Section, Eleonora C. Marranzini, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, and Franco L. Perez-Redondo, Research and Writing 

Specialist, on brief for appellant. 

 Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Mariana 

E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, 

Appellate Division, and Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United 

States Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

May 1, 2017 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Josue SotoSoto appeals from a two-year sentence imposed following the 

revocation of a term of supervised release. He complains that the 

district court erred both in stating that it had granted him "two 

previous opportunities" to reform his ways and in fashioning a 

substantively unreasonable sentence. Finding his plaints 

unpersuasive, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are largely uncontested. On October 

18, 2013, the appellant entered a guilty plea to a charge of being 

a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to eighteen months' 

imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

The appellant served the incarcerative portion of the sentence and 

began serving his term of supervised release on November 3, 2014. 

The appellant's new status got off to a rocky start: at 

an intake interview, he disobeyed instructions to wait in the 

reception area and fled from the probation office. Several months 

later, the appellant was apprehended; and, on May 19, 2015, the 

district court held a hearing to consider revocation of his 

supervised release. In the end, the court did not revoke 

supervised release but, rather, attached an additional condition 

requiring cognitive behavioral treatment. Nevertheless, the court 
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took pains to warn the appellant "that any future non-compliance 

[would] result in the revocation of his [supervised release]." 

On July 7, 2015, the probation officer, by motion, 

informed the district court that the appellant had again violated 

the conditions of his supervised release. The motion noted that, 

on July 4, the appellant had been charged with aggravated domestic 

abuse, domestic abuse by means of threats, and unlawful carrying 

and use of bladed weapons in derogation of Puerto Rico law. See 

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, §§ 632(d), 633; id. tit. 25, § 458d. Even 

though a local magistrate found probable cause to believe that 

these charges were well-founded, the parties agreed to dispose of 

the motion by adding anger management and domestic violence 

counseling to the existing conditions of the appellant's 

supervised release. 

The matter came before the district court on January 15, 

2016. Although the court made no express findings as to whether 

the conditions of supervised release had been violated, it declared 

that the appellant had "demonstrated a disregard and lack of 

commitment towards the Court and the supervision conditions." Even 

so, the court accepted the parties' agreement, allowed the existing 

supervised release term to continue, and added anger management 

and domestic violence counseling as additional conditions. The 

court took the occasion, though, to issue "a stern warning," 

telling the appellant bluntly that this was his "last opportunity" 
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and admonishing him that if he again failed to comply with his 

supervised release conditions, the court would "not hesitate in 

revoking [his] term of supervision." (Emphasis in original). 

The third time was not the charm. Less than a month 

after the January 15 hearing, the probation officer learned that 

a participant in the appellant's transitional housing program 

claimed that the appellant had supplied him with synthetic 

marijuana. Moreover — after being asked to consent to a search — 

the appellant had left the program without authorization. Though 

the probation officer made arrangements for the appellant to reenter the program, the appellant absconded. 

Once the appellant was back in custody, the probation 

officer moved for revocation of his supervised release. On April 

6, 2016, the district court convened a hearing. The appellant 

admitted the allegations contained in the probation officer's 

motion and asked the court to sentence him either to time served 

or — if the court was unwilling to do so — to no more than five 

months' imprisonment (the low end of the guideline sentencing 

range), without any further term of supervised release. The 

government demurred, pointing out that the appellant had 

repeatedly flouted both the probation officer's instructions and 

the supervised release conditions. With this tarnished record in 

mind, the government proposed that the court choose between two 

alternative dispositions. In the first instance, it recommended 
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imposition of the statutory maximum term of immurement — two years, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) — with no further period of supervised 

release. Should that proposal not suit the court, the government 

recommended, as an alternative, a sentence at the high end of the 

guideline sentencing range (eleven months), to be followed by a 

fresh term of supervised release. The probation officer agreed 

with the suggestion for a two-year term of immurement, counselling 

against a new term of supervised release because the appellant had 

demonstrated that he "would not follow instructions." 

The district court determined that the appellant had 

violated the conditions of his supervised release. Relatedly, the 

appellant had "demonstrated that he is unable to comply with the 

conditions of his supervision." The court added that even though 

the appellant had been "granted two previous opportunities and was 

allowed to continue on supervision in an effort to assist him in 

his reintegration to the community, he did not abide by the 

supervision conditions." Consequently, the court revoked the 

existing term of supervised release. 

The court then turned to sentencing. Based on the 

appellant's criminal history category (III) and the fact that the 

original offense of conviction (felon in possession) was a grade 

C violation, see USSG §7B1.1(a)(3), the court set the guideline 

sentencing range at five to eleven months, see id. §7B1.4(a). The 

court abjured the guideline range, however, and sentenced the 
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appellant to two years' imprisonment (the statutory maximum), with 

no new term of supervised release. This timely appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The appellant makes both a procedural and a substantive 

challenge to his sentence. We discuss them in order. 

A.

The appellant's claim of procedural error assails the 

district court's characterization of the second revocation 

proceeding as a second chance for the appellant to get his act 

together. This misperception, he says, adversely affected the 

court's sentencing calculus. Preserved claims of sentencing error 

are typically reviewed for reasonableness, under an abuse of 

discretion rubric. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007); United States v. Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 37 (1st 

Cir. 2016). Here, however, the appellant did not preserve the 

claim of procedural error that he now advances.1 Our review, 

 1 To be sure, the appellant's counsel stated, at the end of 

the disposition hearing, that the appellant objected to the 

sentence as "procedurally . . . unreasonable." No objection was 

raised, however, to the court's "two previous opportunities" 

comments. A general objection to the procedural reasonableness of 

a sentence is not sufficient to preserve a specific challenge to 

any of the sentencing court's particularized findings. To preserve 

a claim of error for appellate review, an objection must be 

sufficiently specific to call the district court's attention to 

the asserted error. See United States v. Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d 

456, 462 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 

168 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 249 

(1st Cir. 1990). 
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therefore, is for plain error. See United States v. Duarte, 246 

F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the plain error standard, the 

appellant must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear 

or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's 

substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. 

Plain error is plainly absent here. 

The short of it is that the record supports the district 

court's characterization. The appellant's first opportunity to 

avoid a new prison sentence came during the May 19, 2015 revocation 

hearing, when the district court decided not to revoke supervised 

release despite the appellant's admission that he had violated 

some of the pertinent conditions. Instead of ordering revocation, 

the court allowed the appellant to remain free on supervised 

release. The appellant does not dispute that this outcome 

constituted an "opportunity," afforded to him by the court, to 

remain out of prison. 

The crux of the matter, though, is the January 15, 2016 

revocation hearing, which the district court characterized as the 

appellant's second blown opportunity to remain at liberty. The 

appellant contends that this characterization was incorrect 

because there was no finding that a factual or legal basis existed 

to revoke his supervision and send him back to prison at that time. 

The appellant's premise is sound: the court made no actual finding. 
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But the conclusion that the appellant draws from that premise does 

not follow. 

To begin, the district court's characterization was not 

a post hoc afterthought: the minutes of the January 15 hearing 

reflect that the court expressly stated that it was granting the 

appellant "a last opportunity."2 The court's contemporaneous 

characterization of its own order is entitled to some weight. Cf. 

Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining 

that "uncertainty as to the meaning and intendment of a district 

court order can sometimes best be dispelled by deference to the 

views of the writing judge"). 

In all events, the appellant cabins the word 

"opportunity" in a way that defies both common usage and common 

sense. It is apodictic that appellate courts should "'allow a 

good deal of leeway' in reviewing the adequacy of a district 

court's explanation" of a sentencing determination. United States 

v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United 

States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2007)). Viewing the 

outcome of the January 15 hearing as affording the appellant an 

opportunity to redeem himself comports with common linguistic 

usage. See, e.g., Opportunity, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (defining "opportunity" broadly as "a 

 2 The appellant did not object to this portion of the minutes 

(even though he objected to a different portion of the minutes). 
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favorable juncture of circumstances"). It likewise comports with 

common sense. After all, the court exercised its discretion to 

accept a recommended outcome that permitted the appellant to remain 

free on supervised release without having to defend himself against 

the probation officer's charges. Had the court pressed ahead with 

those charges, the appellant would have been at risk of revocation 

(and, thus, of being returned to prison). 

A district court, particularly when ruling from the 

bench, cannot be expected to use language that is "precise to the 

point of pedantry." Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 

1088 (1st Cir. 1993). As long as the court's words reflect a 

correct understanding of the law, the facts, and the state of 

proceedings, no more is exigible. See United States v. Pelletier, 

469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding no error, even though 

district court's word choice was "an awkward locution," since court 

clearly understood the law); cf. Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 

1244 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that trial courts need not 

be "letter-perfect in their syntax"). The court below satisfied 

this standard. When all is said and done, we find no error, plain 

or otherwise, in the court's characterization of the outcome of 

the January 15 hearing as an "opportunity" afforded to the 

appellant.3

 3 For the sake of completeness, we note that the appellant 

actually received a third opportunity when — less than a month 
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B.

This leaves the appellant's claim that his two-year 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. Inasmuch as this claim 

was raised below, our review is for abuse of discretion. See 

United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir.), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 258 (2015). 

The touchstone of abuse of discretion review in federal 

sentencing is reasonableness. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. In this 

context, "reasonableness is a protean concept, not an absolute." 

United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008). An 

inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence must 

"take into account the totality of the circumstances, including 

the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. The test is whether the sentence reflects "a plausible 

sentencing rationale and a defensible result." Martin, 520 F.3d 

at 96. 

Here, our analysis starts with the relevant statutory 

framework. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to guide a 

sentencing court in the exercise of its discretion when imposing, 

inter alia, a sentence following the revocation of a term of 

 

after the January 15 revocation hearing — he flouted his supervised 

release conditions and left his transitional housing program 

without authorization. Rather than notifying the court of this 

lapse, the probation officer simply arranged for the appellant to 

re-enter the program. 
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supervised release. "The maximum sentence for a person who 

violates the conditions of his supervised release varies based on 

the severity of 'the offense that resulted in the term of 

supervised release.'" United States v. Fontanez, 845 F.3d 439, 

445 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). For this 

purpose, offenses are grouped in various categories. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). The parties agree that the underlying offense in 

this case (felon in possession) is a class C violation, which bears 

a maximum two-year sentence upon revocation of supervised release. 

See id. 

Section 3583 incorporates by reference some, but not 

all, of the sentencing factors limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 

United States v. Vargas-Dávila, 649 F.3d 129, 131 (1st Cir. 2011). 

These incorporated factors include the nature of the offense, 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); the offender's history and characteristics, 

id.; the need for deterrence, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B); and the need to 

protect the public, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Although the court must 

mull all of the incorporated factors, "it need not do so 

mechanically." Vargas-Dávila, 649 F.3d at 131. 

In the case at hand, the appellant asseverates that his 

sentence is substantively unreasonable because his supervised 

release was never before revoked and the sentencing record shows 

no "plausible explanation" for the sentence. The force of this 

asseveration is undercut to a significant extent by the appellant's 
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course of conduct. Actions have consequences, and the appellant's 

actions gave the district court ample reason to believe that only 

a substantial sentence would deter him from his wayward practices. 

By the same token, the appellant's actions showed that he was a 

particularly poor candidate for a further term of supervised 

release. As the court observed, from the very beginning, the 

appellant "demonstrated that he [was] unable to comply with the 

conditions of his supervision." This assessment was borne out by 

the probation officer, who recommended that the appellant not be 

given any term of supervised release because "he [did] not 

cooperate or commit[] to the terms at all." 

Even without any consideration of the incidents that 

prompted the second revocation hearing,4 the record makes manifest 

that the appellant was a serial violator of the conditions of 

supervised release. He repeatedly left his transitional housing 

program without authorization and failed, on several occasions, to 

follow his probation officer's instructions. What is more, the 

appellant was explicitly warned, during both the first and second 

hearings, that any further violations would result in the 

 4 The district court's sentencing rationale did not address 

whether or not the appellant actually committed the infractions 

alleged in the motion that sparked the January 15 revocation 

hearing. Instead, the court relied mainly on facts such as that 

the appellant showed "poor judgment" and "repeated[ly] failed to 

cooperate with the probation officer, the supervision strategies 

and the work plan set out for him." Those discerned facts find 

firm footing in the record. 
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revocation of his supervised release (and, thus, in additional 

prison time). These warnings went unheeded, and the court acted 

well within its discretion in giving heavy weight to this checkered 

history. 

The court's rationale plainly justified a substantial 

sentence. We recognize that the court proceeded to impose a 

statutory maximum two-year sentence, notwithstanding that the 

guideline sentencing range topped out at eleven months of 

incarceration. See USSG §7B1.4(a). But the guideline ranges with 

respect to sentences for revocation of supervised release are 

merely advisory, see United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 492 (1st 

Cir. 2005) (citing USSG §§7B1.1-7B1.5), and the court had the 

authority to vary upward from the applicable range so long as the 

circumstances justified such a variance. We think that they did: 

a high-end guideline sentence would in all likelihood have carried 

with it a new supervised release term, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), 

and the appellant had given the court reason to believe that a new 

term of supervised release would be fruitless. In view of the 

appellant's demonstrated unwillingness to comply with conditions 

of supervised release, the court's decision to eschew a new term 

of supervision and instead impose a lengthier sentence seems 

altogether appropriate. 

The upshot, then, is that the court articulated a 

plausible sentencing rationale and reached a defensible result. 
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It considered the proper mix of sentencing factors (including the 

appellant's history and characteristics, the seriousness of the 

offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, 

and furthering deterrence) and concluded that the "statutory 

maximum term in this case [was] warranted." On this record, the 

two-year sentence — though severe — did not "fall[] outside the 

'expansive boundaries' of the entire range of reasonable 

sentences." Vargas-Dávila, 649 F.3d at 130 (quoting Martin, 520 

F.3d at 92). 

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the sentence is 

Affirmed.