[Cite as State v. Lang, 2024-Ohio-3157.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

WYANDOT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 16-23-10

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

AMBER L. LANG, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. 22-CR-0125

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: August 19, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Alicia A. Lentz-Conley for Appellee
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MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Amber L. Lang (“Lang”), appeals the December 

21, 2023 judgment issued by the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas 

following her guilty plea. This appeal concerns whether the trial court properly 

computed the amount of restitution arising from Lang’s theft conviction. Lang 

claims that at least some of the restitution awarded includes amounts for offenses 

she did not commit and includes amounts for which the victim was separately 

reimbursed by a third party. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Indictment, Plea, and Sentence

{¶2} On November 9, 2022, Lang was indicted for theft, in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1). The Indictment charged that, on or about June and July of 2022, 

Lang deprived Ridi’s Convenience Stores (“Ridi’s”) of lottery tickets with a value 

in an amount greater than $7,500 but less than $150,000, without Ridi’s consent. 

Given the alleged value, the charged offense was a fourth-degree felony. 

{¶3} Lang subsequently pleaded guilty to the offense. The trial court 

sentenced Lang to serve three years of community control, serve 45 days in jail, and 

pay restitution to Ridi’s in an amount to be determined after a hearing. The 

restitution hearing took place on August 18 and November 28, 2023.
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B. Evidence Presented at the Restitution Hearing

{¶4} Lang worked for Ridi’s, which owns several convenience stores. She 

was the district manager in charge of the store at the Carey, Ohio location—which 

is where the theft occurred. Among her other duties, Lang was responsible for 

“handling the lottery,” i.e., overseeing the lottery reconciliation at the store. 

(Hearing Tr. at 139-144).

{¶5} Importantly, the lottery tickets at issue in this case were scratch-off 

tickets. Witnesses explained that, in the usual course of business, the Ohio Lottery 

Commission (“Commission”) sends a pack of lottery tickets to a store; the store 

makes the lottery tickets available for purchase to customers; a purchased ticket is 

rung up and activated, and the store collects the ticket’s purchase price—which is 

printed on the ticket’s face; and, the store is charged by the Commission for the pack 

of lottery tickets once the last ticket in the pack is sold. Thus, at the time the last 

ticket in a pack is sold, the number of tickets a store purchased should correspond 

with the number of tickets the store sold. 

{¶6} The Commission has a point-of-sale (POS) system that tracks all ticket 

sales and activated tickets electronically, thereby relieving the store of having to 

inform the Commission of its sales. Using its POS system, the Commission 

generates and sends out weekly invoices showing a store’s sales and pay-outs (for 

winnings). Thus, the weekly invoices showed Ridi’s what its sales were at the store 
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on a weekly basis and how much money the Commission would take out of Ridi’s 

bank account for payment.

{¶7} Bonnie Ignat (“Ignat”) was the controller and accountant for Ridi’s. 

She had a bachelor’s degree in accounting and 25 years of experience working at a 

certified public accountant firm. Ignat explained that she recorded all lottery sales 

and winnings based on what was entered in the store’s own POS system, which was 

separate from the Commission’s POS system.

{¶8} Ignat realized something was wrong when she discovered that Ridi’s 

bank account had a negative balance because the Commission had pulled out more 

money than the account contained, i.e., it overdrew the account. Upon reviewing 

the store’s records, the recorded lottery ticket sales were insufficient to justify the 

amount of money the Commission had withdrawn from the account. The store’s 

owner testified that, upon questioning Lang about the discrepancy between the two 

POS systems, Lang admitted to stealing lottery tickets. 

{¶9} The police got involved, with Charles Seeley of the Upper Sandusky 

Police Department (“Detective Seeley”) leading the investigation. During Detective 

Seeley’s interview of Lang, she did not deny stealing lottery tickets. According to 

Detective Seeley, he confronted her about playing 53 lottery tickets a day during the 

height of her theft, asked if that would surprise her, and she said “no.” Lang told 

him “that she had been going through a lot of life issues and that she had started . . 

. taking lottery tickets and scratching them as a way of relieving her stress and 
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anxiety.” (Hearing Tr. at 9). Lang said that things in her life had recently gotten 

worse, and she started taking more and more lottery tickets in the past couple of 

months.

{¶10} In her interview with Detective Seeley, Lang denied there was anyone 

else involved in the theft. Although Lang said two other people were present when 

she scratched off some of the tickets, she did not know if they would have 

understood whether the tickets had been paid for or stolen. Based on Detective 

Seeley’s investigation, there was nothing to indicate anyone else was involved in 

the theft.

{¶11} At the request of Ridi’s owner, Ignat conducted a formal accounting 

of profits and losses for the store’s lottery sales. Using accounting software, she 

compared the sales numbers from the store’s POS system to the Commission’s 

invoices for the bank withdrawals—which indicated what the Commission 

maintained the store had sold. Ignat also created a spreadsheet that showed a sideby-side comparison of the store’s numbers with the Commission’s numbers. The 

spreadsheet covered the time period from the beginning of January 2022 through 

the end of July 2022. Although what the store collected and sold should have 

matched what the Commission said the store collected and sold, Ignat said that was 

not the case. The discrepancies between the two significantly increased in June and 

July of 2022. Ignat subtracted the difference between the Commission’s numbers 

and the store’s numbers to come up with a figure for the store’s loss. Based on her 
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analysis and accounting, the amount Ignat deemed attributable to the theft of lottery 

tickets was approximately $117,000.1 

{¶12} Ignat testified that Ridi’s had paid that entire amount to the 

Commission. Doing so required Ridi’s to move money into its deficient bank 

account from other sources. Ridi’s and Detective Seeley also contacted the 

Commission for information regarding the amount of winnings paid out. Ticket 

sales are distinguishable from winnings distributed for a winning ticket. Stores are 

reimbursed by the Commission for winnings that a store provides to a customer with 

a winning ticket, but not for the purchase price of a ticket. Ignat explained that the 

Commission had “compensated [the store] for any winnings, winning ticket that was 

turned in,” but the store was “not compensated for the cost of the original ticket that 

was not purchased because it was stolen.” (Hearing Tr. at 57). Ignat clarified that 

the $117,000 figure was the cost to Ridi’s of the stolen tickets; that figure did not 

include any winnings reimbursed by the Commission to Ridi’s.

{¶13} The following exchange took place during Ignat’s testimony regarding 

the spreadsheet she made:

Q: ... How much of this spreadsheet can you attribute to 

Amber Lang based on your accounting?

A: Based on my accounting, all I can attribute is that we 

lost 117,000. As to who took that money, I cannot 

1 Among other exhibits admitted during the hearing were the profit-and-loss statement, the spreadsheet, and 

a statement of weekly invoices from the Commission from January 2022 through July 2022.
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account for that. . . . All I know is that is what we are 

missing.

Q: And do you -- is it your testimony that that missing 

amount is due to theft?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And how do you know that?

A: Because if it wasn’t theft, I would have the cash in the 

bank account.

Q: And I just want to be clear on this. You were 

compensated for winnings?

A: Yes.

Q: Not the cost of tickets?

A: Correct.

(Id. at 74). Ignat further explained: “[I]f the tickets were actually sold, [Ridi’s] 

would have collected the money and [Ridi’s] would have had the money in hand to 

pay the lottery” and its “bank account would not have come up negative week after 

week.” (Id. at 60).

{¶14} Ignat also explained how Lang could have committed the theft: the 

Commission will not “pay out a winning ticket if [it] can’t say that this winning 

ticket was purchased,” so after she scratched off the ticket, Lang “had to have 

scanned the [winning] lottery tickets saying that they were sold with the lottery,” 

but “[s]he just did not put the cash in [the store’s] register and if [it was] a losing 

ticket, she threw it away.” (Id. at 77). On cross-examination, Ignat admitted it was 

possible some of the discrepancy between the store’s and the Commission’s sales 
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numbers could be from an accounting error or from an employee forgetting to scan 

a ticket.

{¶15} Lang testified in her defense. She said she never took any money from 

Ridi’s except for winnings from the tickets she played. She also did not believe any 

of the money “missing in this case” was “winnings from when [she] played” the 

lottery at the store. (Hearing Tr. at 149). According to Lang, her coworkers knew 

what she was doing, all of them played the lottery while working at the store, and 

they played the same way that she played. However, Lang did not identify the time 

frame in which her coworkers played the lottery, and she admitted she did not know 

whether they ever cashed out at the end of their shift because she was not there the 

entire time they played. Lang also admitted on cross-examination that she did not 

know how many lottery tickets she played on a daily basis, and she was unsure 

whether or not she played more than 50 tickets a day at the height of the theft.

{¶16} Lang called one of her former co-workers, Brandy Rochester 

(“Rochester”), to testify. Rochester acknowledged that she and all other employees 

played the lottery while working at the store. However, like Lang, she did not 

identify the time frame in which they played the lottery. In fact, she admitted that 

she did not know when she and Lang started playing the lottery together at work,

and she volunteered that she is “not good with time frames.” (Id. at 172). Notably, 

the following exchange occurred during Rochester’s testimony:
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Q: ... [Y]ou always paid for your tickets?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. So there was never any money missing --

A: No.

Q: -- from your playing lottery?

A: No.

Q: And same for Amber as well?

A: As far as I know. What I seen was it was always taken 

care of.

Q: Okay. All right. But you knew that there was some 

money missing as far as the lottery system was 

concerned?

A: When it came to the computer and things being off in 

the computer, it was just numbers. I didn’t realize – I 

don’t know, I’m kind of dumb like that, but I didn’t 

realize that it was actually money.

. . . 

Q: [Y]ou said that everyone played [the lottery while 

working at the store]. Was, uh -- Did management 

know about this? Did the owners know about this?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: But it wasn’t hidden from management, was it?

A: No.

Q: No. And, um, you said at the time you didn’t really 

know it was wrong? 

A: I didn’t know it was illegal to do that.
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Q: Okay.

A: I mean cause what I seen, it was paid for.

(Id. at 170-171, 177).

{¶17} Detective Seeley testified in rebuttal that he had explored whether or 

not there were any other suspects. Ridi’s did not provide him with any other 

suspects, and Lang had denied anyone else was knowingly involved.

C. Restitution Order

{¶18} In its judgment entry following the restitution hearing, the trial court 

made the following findings and conclusions concerning restitution:

The Court has considered the testimony and review of the Exhibits 

and has heard the arguments of Counsel as to the issue of restitution. 

. . . 

After reviewing all of the evidence, the Court finds a couple pieces of 

evidence compelling. One was the testimony of one of the owners of 

the store indicating the great amount of losses were rather late during 

the period. This is confirmed by the lottery analysis of the Carey store 

that has a review of everything for 2022 beginning the week of 

January 8, 2022. Looking at the pattern during that time, figures were 

fairly consistent all along. . . . 

Before the week ending May 21, 2022, there was an average loss of 

about $317.00 a week, which is somewhat consistent with what one 

of the owners advised that they would not always balance out, and that 

there would be some sort of differences from week to week. 

. . . Starting [the week ending May 21, 2022], the losses bec[a]me 

much larger and consistent. There were no surpluses after that. It 

greatly increased to more than $10,000.00 a week, beginning in July.

All things considered, that is where the clear theft occurred. The 

Court is going to base the restitution on the figures from May 21, 2022 

through the end of July 2022. When those losses are added up for 
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those weeks, that totals $106,013.00. [In comparison,] [t]he total 

losses for [all of] 2022 [were] $112,029.00. . . . 

From the $106,013.00, the Court deducted the average loss from 

preceding weeks of $317.00 per week, which results in a total 

reduction in the amount of $3,483.00.

As a result, the Court finds that restitution is owed in the amount of 

$102,530.00 . . . 

(Dec. 21, 2023 Judgment Entry at 6-7). This appeal followed.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Lang raises a single assignment of error for our review:

Assignment of Error

The trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in 

failing [sic], as for order of restitution that it was not supported by 

substantial and credible evidence, and did not indicate the actual 

economic loss that was directly and proximately related to the criminal 

activity of the Defendant/Appellant.

III. DISCUSSION

{¶19} In the assignment of error, Lang argues the trial court did not properly 

compute the amount of restitution arising out of her conviction for theft. She 

specifically argues that “the court ordered restitution for offenses she did not 

commit or alternatively made her responsible for the losses that apparently can be 

attributable to everyone else in the store who is playing the lottery.” (Appellant’s 

Brief at 12). She asserts that doing so did not comport with legal standards for 

imposing restitution and violated her due process rights. She asks that we reverse 

the order for restitution and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to 
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impose restitution in the amount of $7,500, i.e., the minimum in the range for fourthdegree felony theft.

A. Standard of Review

{¶20} “We review a trial court’s order of restitution for an abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Dingledine, 2023-Ohio-4256, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). A trial court 

abuses its discretion when its conduct is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

State v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9. A decision is arbitrary if it is made without 

consideration of, or regard for, facts or circumstances. Id. A decision may also be 

arbitrary if it is without an adequate determining principle. Id. 

B. Applicable Law

{¶21} “Restitution in Ohio is limited to economic losses suffered by the 

victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.” State v. 

Yerkey, 2022-Ohio-4298, ¶ 1. Specifically, the statute governing financial sanctions 

provides, in relevant part:

(A) . . . [T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony 

. . . shall sentence the offender to make restitution pursuant to this 

section and [R.C. 2929.281]. . . . Financial sanctions . . . include, but 

are not limited to, the following:

(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s

criminal offense or the victim’s estate, in an amount based on the 

victim’s economic loss. . . . At sentencing, the court shall 

determine the amount of restitution to be made by the offender. 

The victim, victim’s representative, victim’s attorney, if 

applicable, the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s designee, and the 

offender may provide information relevant to the determination of 

the amount of restitution. The amount the court orders as 
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restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss 

suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense. . . . The court shall hold a hearing on 

restitution if the offender, victim, victim’s representative, or 

victim’s estate disputes the amount. . . . 

R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); see also R.C. 2929.281 (amount of restitution). “Economic 

loss” is defined as “any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and 

proximate result of the commission of an offense.” R.C. 2929.01(L); see also R.C. 

2929.281(A) (non-exhaustive list of items that qualify as “economic loss”). In line 

with this law, restitution may be ordered only for those acts constituting the crime(s) 

for which the defendant was convicted. State v. Miller, 2009-Ohio-6157, ¶ 3 (3d 

Dist.); see also State v. Rohrbaugh, 2010-Ohio-6375, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.) (“[m]any Ohio

courts, including this court, have recognized that restitution must be limited to the 

offenses for which a defendant is charged and convicted”).

{¶22} “The court shall determine the amount of full restitution by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). “A preponderance of the 

evidence is defined as that measure of proof that convinces the judge or jury that the 

existence of the fact sought to be proved is more likely than its nonexistence.” State 

ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 54. The type of evidence upon which the 

sentencing court may rely in determining the amount of restitution is broad. E.g., 

Miller at ¶ 5; State v. Halcomb, 2013-Ohio-1301, ¶ 31 (3d Dist.) (affirming 

restitution amount where the prosecution presented competent, credible evidence, 

by way of testimony and exhibits, of the actual amount of loss suffered by the victim 
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as a result of defendant committing aggravated burglary). “The weight to be given 

the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact.” 

State v. Alexander, 1999 WL 446432, *3 (3d Dist. June 30, 1999) (affirming amount 

of restitution ordered by trial court following restitution hearing).

C. Analysis

{¶23} Based on evidence presented during the hearing, and recited above, 

there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the 

restitution amount awarded was a direct and proximate result of Lang’s theft. The 

trial court’s methodology was reasonable, not arbitrary, and consistent with the 

evidence and time frame charged in the Indictment (to which Lang pleaded guilty). 

See State v. Perkins, 2019-Ohio-3993, ¶ 8, 11-12, 32 (11th Dist.) (affirming 

restitution amount stemming from theft of lottery tickets, where “the amount of 

restitution requested by the state is supported by competent, credible evidence in the 

form of [the] testimony” from the victim’s part-owner and manager).

{¶24} Lang argues that “any incorporation of winnings on the tickets is not 

properly restitution.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). However, the evidence did not 

indicate winnings paid out by Ridi’s and reimbursed by the Commission were 

included in the restitution awarded. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that the 

reimbursements made by the Commission were specifically not included in the 

accounting made by Ignat that the trial court relied on in its decision. Moreover, if 

Lang had not stolen those winning scratch-off tickets, then they would have been 
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sold to paying customers; Ridi’s would have paid out the winnings to those 

customers, and the Commission would have reimbursed Ridi’s for those payments. 

In short, the amount of reimbursement from the Commission is different from the 

amount awarded in restitution for Ridi’s losses caused by Lang’s theft (i.e., the cost 

of the tickets).

{¶25} Finally, we do not agree with Lang that the trial court abused its 

discretion in ordering her “to pay restitution for damage arising from a crime of 

which [s]he was not convicted.” State v. Williams, 2004-Ohio-2801, ¶ 23-24 (3d 

Dist.) (reversing restitution order where the trial court ordered defendant to pay the 

amount of two counterfeit checks, because he was only convicted of forgery for one 

of the checks). As an initial matter, the trial court was in the best position to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses, including Lang and Rochester, and was entitled to 

believe some, all, or none of their testimony. State v. Borger, 2023-Ohio-1124, ¶ 

20-21 (1st Dist.) (affirming restitution amount that involved the trial court making 

a credibility determination). If anything, Rochester’s testimony showed she and the 

other employees did not commit theft. Rochester said she always paid for her lottery 

tickets and, from what she saw, store employees paid for the tickets they played. 

Further, neither Lang nor Rochester indicated when Rochester and the other 

employees were playing the lottery, including whether it was during the relevant 

time period identified in the indictment and by the trial court for purposes of 

calculating the amount of restitution. See Perkins, 2019-Ohio-3993, at ¶ 8 (11th 
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Dist.) (affirming restitution amount despite victim being uncertain “who had access 

to the lottery machines during every instance when tickets were taken” and victim 

testifying some of the economic loss could be attributed to the malfunction of the 

lottery machine).

{¶26} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding a 

preponderance of the evidence established that Ridi’s suffered an economic loss of 

$102,530.00 as a direct and proximate result of Lang’s theft.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶27} For the foregoing reasons, Lang’s assignment of error is overruled. 

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and 

argued, we affirm the judgment of the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment Affirmed.

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/jlm