Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

SC-2022-0860

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Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Yvonne Mason 

v. 

Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert) 

(Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-20-900093)

STEWART, Justice.
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Midsouth Paving, Inc. ("Midsouth"), and Christopher Nivert have 

petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa 

Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment in their 

favor in an action commenced against them by Yvonne Mason. For the 

reasons explained below, Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert 

are barred by § 25-5-11, § 25-5-52, and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, of the 

Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. 

Code 1975. Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the trial court 

to enter a summary judgment in favor of Midsouth and Nivert. 

Facts and Procedural History

PeopleReady, Inc., is a temporary-employment agency that

recruits, hires, and supplies temporary employees for Midsouth, a roadpaving contractor, through a contractual agreement ("the labor-supply

agreement").1 In June 2020, Mason applied with PeopleReady to work as 

a flagger. On July 2, 2020, Mason attended training provided by 

Midsouth, and, shortly thereafter, she began accepting assignments as a 

flagger at Midsouth job sites. During her employment with PeopleReady, 

1The labor-supply agreement was entered into between Midsouth's 

parent company, CRH Americas, Inc., f/k/a Oldcastle, Inc., and 

PeopleReady's parent company, TrueBlue, Inc.
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Mason worked as a flagger only at Midsouth job sites. Mason would 

receive a daily text message from PeopleReady with a list of available 

flagging jobs, and Mason had the option to accept or reject the jobs. If 

Mason accepted a job, she would go to the PeopleReady office where she 

would receive a "ticket" to take to the Midsouth job site. PeopleReady 

initially provided Mason with a hard hat, sunblock, water, and a vest 

with "Midsouth" printed on it, and Mason kept those items in her 

automobile. At the job site, Midsouth employees directed and supervised 

Mason's job duties. Mason's flagging duties generally included holding a 

sign that said either "Stop" or "Slow" to help with redirecting traffic led 

by a pilot vehicle during road-paving jobs. At the end of each shift, a 

Midsouth supervisor would verify the hours Mason worked on her ticket, 

and Mason would return the ticket to the PeopleReady office. 

On August 13, 2020, Mason was working at a Midsouth job site 

when Nivert unintentionally drove his pilot vehicle into Mason while he 

was making a three-point turn. Mason's leg was severely injured, and she 

received multiple surgeries and remained in a hospital and then a

rehabilitation facility for over a month. PeopleReady began paying 

workers' compensation benefits to Mason after the accident and also paid
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for her continued medical care. Pursuant to the labor-supply agreement, 

Midsouth was an insured alternate employer under PeopleReady's 

workers' compensation insurance policy. 

On November 2, 2020, Mason commenced an action against 

Midsouth and Nivert in the trial court, asserting claims of negligence;

wantonness; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligence 

per se. Midsouth answered the complaint and raised numerous 

affirmative defenses, including immunity under § 25-5-52 and § 25-5-53

of the Act ("the exclusive-remedy provisions"). Nivert filed a separate 

answer and raised, among other defenses, the exclusive-remedy 

provisions and asserted that Mason's claims did not meet the 

requirements of § 25-5-11 of the Act, which, generally, requires willful 

conduct to support a civil claim against a co-employee. 

Midsouth and Nivert jointly moved for a summary judgment, 

asserting that Mason had been a "special employee" of Midsouth's, that 

Mason had not alleged willful conduct on the part of Nivert, and that, 

therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions and § 25-5-11 barred her 

claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Midsouth and Nivert supported 

their motion with, among other evidence, deposition testimony from 
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various employees of Midsouth and PeopleReady and other documents 

relating to Mason's employment relationship with Midsouth and 

PeopleReady, including a document that Mason had signed entitled 

"Employment Terms and Acknowledgements" ("the employment 

agreement"), which contained the following relevant provision:

"16. I understand that my employer provides temporary 

associates for its customers to work at the customer's job site. 

While working at the customer's job site, I agree and consent 

that the customer is my special employer ('Special Employer') 

and that the customer directs, controls and supervises my 

work. Workers' Compensation shall be my sole remedy for on 

the job injuries. If I am ever injured in the course of my work 

I agree that I will elect, and solely rely upon [PeopleReady's]

Workers' Compensation coverage for any recovery for such 

injuries, and waive any recovery whether civil or through 

workers' compensation, from any Special Employer. ..."

Midsouth also submitted evidence indicating that Mason's job duties 

while on Midsouth assignments were directed, controlled, and supervised 

exclusively by Midsouth employees. PeopleReady paid Mason for the 

hours she worked at Midsouth assignments based on the hours verified 

on the ticket filled out by a Midsouth supervisor. However, PeopleReady 

submitted an invoice to Midsouth, and Midsouth paid PeopleReady 

Mason's hourly rate of $14.35 plus a 51% additional charge. That 
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additional charge was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other 

expenses, workers' compensation insurance.

Mason filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment 

motion in which she argued that genuine issues of material fact existed,

thus precluding the entry of a summary judgment. Mason specifically 

asserted that she was an independent contractor, not a "special 

employee," of Midsouth. Mason supported her response with, among 

other evidence, the labor-supply agreement, which states, in relevant 

part:

"7. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

"Supplier [i.e., PeopleReady] enters into this Agreement as an 

independent company. Supplier shall not in any way 

represent that it is an agent, employer, employee, partner, or 

legal representative of Customer [i.e., Midsouth] or any 

Customer Affiliate. As an independent contractor, Supplier is 

not authorized to make any contract, agreement, warranty, or 

representation on behalf of Customer or any of its Affiliates 

without Customer's express written prior approval. Supplier 

is solely responsible for the recruiting, screening, 

interviewing, selecting, testing, and hiring of all TAs

[temporary associates]. TA [i.e., Mason] shall be considered 

solely an employee of Supplier and not employees or agents of 

Customer or any Customer Affiliate. Customer and its 

Affiliates will not treat TAs as Customer employees or 

Affiliate employees for purposes of worker's compensation 

insurance, federal or state income tax withholding, FICA 

withholding, or any other taxation purpose. ..."
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Mason also submitted testimony indicating that she believed that 

she had been an employee of PeopleReady, that she had not intended to 

be a special employee of Midsouth, and that she believed that she had 

worked as an independent contractor for Midsouth. Mason also presented 

testimony indicating that she had intended to work for only PeopleReady 

because she had preferred having the ability to accept only the 

assignments she wanted and had not wanted to be constrained by 

another employer.

On August 10, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying 

Midsouth and Nivert's summary-judgment motion. Midsouth and Nivert 

petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. 

Standard of Review

"'The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary 

writ, to be "issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in 

the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon 

the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 

3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly 

invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte United Serv. 

Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see also Ex 

parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134 (Ala. 1995).' Ex parte Carter,

... 807 So. 2d 534[,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)]."

Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala. 2001). The "denial of a 

summary-judgment motion based on a claim of immunity under the 
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exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ... is 

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Tenax Corp., 

228 So. 3d 387, 391 (Ala. 2017)(citing Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So. 3d 

1224, 1228 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)). In conducting our de novo review of 

whether a summary judgment is due to be granted on the basis of the 

applicability of the immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy 

provisions of the Act, this Court considers whether the defendant 

established a prima facie showing as to each element of the defense 

raising the exclusive-remedy provisions and, if so, whether the plaintiff 

presented substantial evidence to overcome the defendant's prima face 

showing. Gaut v. Medrano, 630 So. 2d 362, 364 (Ala. 1993).

Discussion

Midsouth and Nivert argue that they are entitled to a summary 

judgment because, they assert, Mason was a special employee of 

Midsouth's and, as a result, was barred from asserting claims against 

Midsouth and Nivert under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. 

They further assert that Mason did not allege willful conduct sufficient 

to bring a claim against Nivert under § 25-5-11 of the Act. Section 25-5-

52 provides, in part: 
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"Except as provided in [the Act], no employee of any 

employer subject to [the Act] ... shall have a right to any other 

method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an 

injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational 

disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the 

actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and 

from a cause originating in such employment or 

determination thereof." 

Section 25-5-53 provides, in part: 

"The rights and remedies granted in [the Act] to an 

employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the 

employee, his or her personal representative, parent, 

dependent, or next of kin, at common law, by statute, or 

otherwise on account of injury, loss of services, or death. 

Except as provided in [the Act], no employer shall be held 

civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer's 

employee, for purposes of [the Act], whose injury or death is 

due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged 

in the service or business of the employer, the cause of which 

accident or occupational disease originates in the 

employment. In addition, immunity from civil liability for all 

causes of action except those based upon willful conduct shall 

also extend ... to an officer, director, agent, or employee of the 

same employer ...."

In addition, § 25-5-11 allows an injured employee to bring a cause 

of action against, among other third parties, a co-employee whose conduct

was willful and contributed to the employee's injury, but it does not affect 

the immunity afforded the designated persons in § 25-5-53. See Padgett 

v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 585 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1991)).
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The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act also provide immunity 

to any employer characterized as a "special employer" of an injured 

employee that satisfies the following three-pronged test adopted in Terry 

v. Read Steel Products, 430 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1983):

" '"When a general employer lends an employee to a 

special employer, the special employer becomes liable for 

workmen's compensation [and thus immune from liability for 

tort actions brought by the employee] only if

" '"( a) the employee has made a contract of 

hire, express or implied, with the special employer;

" '"(b) the work being done is essentially that 

of the special employer; and

" '"(c) the special employer has the right to 

control the details of the work.

" '"When all three of the above conditions are satisfied 

in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for 

workmen's compensation." '"

Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 430 So. 2d at 865, quoting in turn

1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 48 (1980)).

There is no dispute regarding the second and third prongs

identified in Terry; Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and 

Midsouth controlled the details of her work. The issue is whether Mason 

expressly or impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth.
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Mason argues, as she did in her response to Midsouth and Nivert's 

summary-judgment motion, that she did not expressly or impliedly 

consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth. Midsouth argues that Mason 

expressly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth by signing the 

employment agreement with PeopleReady that specifically stated that 

Mason would be a special employee of PeopleReady's customers. The

employment agreement between PeopleReady and Mason does not evince 

an express contract of hire between Midsouth and Mason; however, as 

discussed below, that agreement supports the contention that Mason 

impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth. 

In determining whether a worker impliedly consented to a contract 

of hire with a special employer, this Court has considered several factors, 

including: 1) "whether the general employer is, in reality, acting as a 

'labor broker' or a temporary employment agency for the special 

employer," G.UB.MK Constructors v. Garner, 44 So. 3d 479, 488 (Ala. 

2010); 2) "whether the special employer provided the workers' 

compensation insurance," id., and 3) " '"whether the employment with the 

borrowing employer was of such duration that the employee could be 

reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the risks of his 
SC-2022-0860

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employment," '" id. (quoting Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367, quoting in turn 

Vanterpool v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 766 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1985)). 

Midsouth asserts that it presented evidence affirmatively 

supporting the foregoing factors and, therefore, demonstrated that 

Mason had impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth. In 

particular, Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that 

PeopleReady is a temporary-employment agency that provides 

temporary employees to Midsouth; that Midsouth paid PeopleReady an 

amount in excess of Mason's hourly rate to cover, among other expenses,

premiums for workers' compensation insurance; and that Mason worked 

exclusively at Midsouth job sites, used Midsouth's equipment, and 

submitted to Midsouth's control. 

PeopleReady is indisputably a temporary-employment agency, and

it supplies temporary employees to Midsouth. In cases in which a 

temporary-employment agency places an employee with a special 

employer, " '"the employee applies to the general employer for the specific 

purpose of temporary placement with special employers and thus 

necessarily agrees to a contract of hire with the special employer." '" Ex 

parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488, 
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quoting in turn Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 366). See also Hicks v. Alabama Power 

Co., 623 So. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (Ala. 1993)(discussing various cases 

involving employment agencies2 and recognizing that the employees in 

those cases did not contact the employment agencies "for the purpose of 

entering into employment with those companies to do the work of those 

companies; rather, the plaintiffs intended for the general employers to 

'market' them to secure employment with another, special employer" and 

that, "[o]nce those plaintiffs were presented by the employment services 

to the special employers, those plaintiffs then entered into a contract of 

hire with those special employers"). 

Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady 

served as a temporary-employment agency that supplied temporary 

workers to various customers, including flaggers for Midsouth, and that 

Mason applied for employment with PeopleReady for the purpose of 

working as a flagger. Accordingly, Midsouth demonstrated that 

PeopleReady acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth. See

2Terry v. Read Steel Prods., 430 So. 2d 862, 865 (Ala. 1983), Marlow 

v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988), Bechtel v. Crown Cent. 

Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986), and Pettaway v. Mobile 

Point Mfg. Co., 467 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1985).
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Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at 

488).

The second consideration -- whether the special employer pays 

workers' compensation benefits, also weighs in favor of finding an implied 

contract of hire. Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that

PeopleReady physically paid Mason's wages but that, in return,

Midsouth paid PeopleReady Mason's hourly wages, plus a 51% additional 

charge that was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other expenses, 

workers' compensation insurance. Moreover, the labor-supply agreement 

required Midsouth to be an insured alternate employer under 

PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. As we have 

previously explained, whether a special employer participates in funding 

workers' compensation coverage is a "particularly significant" 

consideration, because permitting a civil action against an entity 

providing benefits under the Act would contravene the very purpose of 

the Act. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 489. See also Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 

3d at 394 (placing import on evidence indicating that the alleged special 

employer paid a portion of the employee's workers' compensation 

insurance premiums). Therefore, Midsouth presented evidence showing 
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that it funded, at least in part, workers' compensation insurance that was 

used to cover Mason.

In addressing the third consideration -- whether the employee's 

employment with the alleged special employer "'was of such duration 

that the employee could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and 

acquiesced in the risks of his employment,'" this Court has considered 

the frequency and exclusivity of the employee's work with the alleged 

special employer and the employee's understanding of the scope of the 

special employer's authority. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (noting that the 

employee had reported to the alleged special employer's workplace each 

workday, that he was aware that it was his ordinary workplace, and that 

he was aware that he was required to follow instructions of the special 

employer's supervisors). This Court distinguished cases in which an 

employee is briefly or randomly "lent to another employer," noting that, 

in those cases, the employee would have "little or no reason to actually 

consent to a contract of hire with the borrowing employer." Gaut, 630 So. 

2d at 367. This Court in Gaut also discussed Pettaway v. Mobile Paint 

Manufacturing Co., 467 So. 2d 228, 230 (Ala. 1985), and highlighted the 

decision of the employee in that case to accept the employment agency's 
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offer of a work assignment as indicative of an implied contract of hire. 

630 So. 2d at 366. Likewise, here, Midsouth presented evidence 

indicating that Mason had applied to PeopleReady to work as a flagger, 

that Mason had accepted only Midsouth job assignments during her 

employment with PeopleReady, and that Midsouth supervisors 

exclusively directed her job duties and verified her work hours. Moreover, 

as mentioned above, Mason signed an employment agreement with 

PeopleReady that specifically designated her as a "special employee" of 

the customer, i.e., Midsouth, and required her to acknowledge her 

understanding that Midsouth would direct, control, and supervise her 

work. Accordingly, Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that 

Mason's employment with Midsouth "'was of such duration that [she] 

could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the 

risks of [her] employment.'" Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (quoting Vanterpool, 

766 F. 2d at 122).

Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady 

acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth, that Midsouth 

paid at least a portion of the premiums for workers' compensation 

insurance for PeopleReady's employees working for Midsouth, and that 
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Mason "'could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced 

in the risks of [her] employment'" from the duration of her employment 

with Midsouth. Id. As a result, Midsouth demonstrated that Mason 

impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth, and, as 

mentioned above, there is no dispute regarding the other two factors 

relevant to the determination of whether Midsouth was Mason's special 

employer -- Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and Midsouth 

had the right to control the details of her work. See Terry, 430 So. 2d at 

865. Accordingly, Midsouth made a prima facie showing of Mason's status 

as a special employee of Midsouth and, thus, the applicability of the 

immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. As a 

result, the burden shifted to Mason to present substantial evidence 

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

her employment status with Midsouth. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364.

Mason asserts that a factual dispute exists as to whether there 

existed a mutual contract of hire with Midsouth and, ultimately, whether 

she was a special employee of Midsouth's. First, Mason asserts that 

Midsouth was precluded from entering into a contract of hire with her 

because of the provision in the labor-supply agreement that states that 
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temporary associates placed with Midsouth "shall be considered solely an 

employee of [PeopleReady] and not employees or agents of [Midsouth]." 

Mason argues that that "agreement constitutes strong and compelling 

evidence" that Midsouth was not Mason's employer in any capacity and 

that it foreclosed the possibility of Midsouth's offering a contract of hire 

to Mason. Mason relies on Hicks v. Alabama Power Co., in which this 

Court considered a similar provision in a contract between a general 

employer and an alleged special employer prohibiting an employee of the 

general employer from being considered an employee of the special 

employer. 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (Ala. 1993). Hicks is distinguishable from 

the present case because, in Hicks, the general employer was not an 

employment agency; the employee was placed by a union for employment 

with the general employer, who provided contracting services to another 

company. Additionally, as mentioned above, the Court in Hicks noted the 

distinction between the factual scenario in that case and previous cases

involving temporary-employment agencies. Moreover, this Court more 

recently considered an argument regarding a similar provision in a 

contract between a maintenance contractor (the general employer) and a 

utility company (the special employer) in Garner. The employee in that 
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case argued that he was not a special employee, and he relied on a 

provision in a contract between the companies stating that the 

maintenance contractor's employees that provided services to the utility 

company would continue to be considered the maintenance contractor's

employees. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 490. This Court noted that the employee 

"was not a party to the contract and there was no evidence indicating that 

he ever saw it or was aware of th[at] provision." Id. This Court explained 

that, although " '"employers certainly may contract as between 

themselves to define their business relationships and accomplish their 

business objectives, an agreement between the employers may not be 

determinative of the issue of special employment." '" Garner, 44 So. 3d at 

490 (quoting Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 142 N.M. 72, 82, 162 P.3d 909, 

919 (Ct. App. 2007), quoting in turn Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace 

Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 559-60, 585 N.E.2d 355, 358-59, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106, 

109 (1991)). The situation in Garner is much more analogous to the 

present case than is the situation in Hicks. 

Mason also argues that Midsouth did not provide workers' 

compensation benefits, which, she asserts, presents a factual dispute as 

to the existence of an implied contract of hire. Mason relies on the 
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remainder of the provision in the labor-supply agreement considering 

temporary associates to be solely employees of PeopleReady that states 

that Midsouth would not treat the temporary associates as its own 

"employees for purposes of worker's compensation insurance, federal or 

state income tax withholding, FICA withholding, or any other taxation 

purpose." Regardless of the terms of the labor-supply agreement, the 

evidence presented indicated that Midsouth paid an amount in excess of 

the temporary associates' hourly wages for the purpose of covering 

additional expenses, including workers' compensation insurance, and 

Midsouth was required to be an insured alternate employer under 

PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. Accordingly, the 

labor-supply agreement between PeopleReady and Midsouth is not 

substantial evidence demonstrating that Mason did not impliedly 

consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth. 

Mason also points to evidence that she presented indicating that, 

despite signing the employment agreement with PeopleReady addressing 

her status as a special employee with PeopleReady's customers, she was 

not aware that she would be considered a special employee, she did not 

know what a special employer was and no one explained that term to her, 
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and she did not realize that she was waiving her right to assert civil 

claims for injuries against PeopleReady's customers. However, this Court 

has explained that "when a competent adult, having the ability to read 

and understand an instrument, signs a contract, he will be held to be on 

notice of all the provisions contained in that contract and will be bound 

thereby." Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1296 

(Ala. 1991) (citing Massey v. Ingram, 567 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1990), and 

Norman v. Amoco Oil Co., 558 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1990)). Therefore, Mason's 

ignorance of the terms of her employment agreement with PeopleReady 

does not serve as substantial evidence that she did not have an implied 

contract of hire with Midsouth or that she was not a special employee of 

Midsouth's.

Mason further points to her testimony that she intended to be an 

employee of only PeopleReady and that she never intended to be 

employed by Midsouth. Mason contends that she sought employment 

with PeopleReady because she wanted the flexibility of accepting or 

rejecting jobs based on her preferred schedule. It is undisputed, however, 

that Mason applied to PeopleReady for the purpose of working as a 

flagger. PeopleReady does not have employees who perform flagging 
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duties for it; instead, PeopleReady supplies employees to perform 

flagging duties for other companies, particularly Midsouth. See, e.g., 

Hicks, 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (recognizing that the employees in Terry;

Marlow v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988); Bechtel v. 

Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986); and 

Pettaway did not seek employment with the temporary-employment 

agencies to perform the work of those agencies but, instead, for the 

purpose of performing the special employers' work). Evidence of Mason's 

intent with respect to her employment is an important consideration. See 

Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488 (stating that "the focus is on what the employee 

intended in providing services for the alleged special employer"). 

However, the evidence Mason presented regarding her intent is not 

substantial evidence sufficient to overcome the evidence demonstrating 

that she was a special employee of Midsouth's.

Perhaps the most instructive case is Pettaway, the facts of which 

are largely indistinguishable from Mason's factual scenario. In that case, 

Pettaway was employed by Manpower, a temporary-employment agency. 

After three months' employment with Manpower, during which he had 

accepted temporary job assignments with various Manpower customers, 
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Pettaway accepted an assignment with Mobile Paint Manufacturing 

Company. Pettaway stopped by Manpower's office before and after his 

shifts at Mobile Paint's job site to obtain and return a timesheet. While 

working for Mobile Paint, Pettaway was supervised and directed by 

Mobile Paint employees. Pettaway received paychecks from Manpower, 

but Mobile Paint paid to Manpower Pettaway's wages and an additional 

charge that covered, among other expenses, premiums for workers' 

compensation insurance. After working for Mobile Paint for

approximately three weeks, Pettaway was injured, and he commenced an 

action against Mobile Paint. The trial court in that case entered a 

summary judgment in favor of Mobile Paint, finding that it was 

Pettaway's special employer and, thus, that his claims were barred by 

the Act. Pettaway appealed, and this Court affirmed the summary 

judgment, determining that, under the facts, Mobile Paint was 

Pettaway's special employer. 467 So. 2d at 228-30. Likewise, here, Mason 

accepted job assignments with Midsouth, retrieved a timesheet from 

PeopleReady before each job, had it filled out by a Midsouth supervisor, 

and returned it to PeopleReady at the end of each shift; Mason's pay and 

workers' compensation insurance from PeopleReady was subsidized by 
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Midsouth; and Mason's specific job duties were assigned and controlled 

by Midsouth. 

Applying this Court's precedent to the evidence presented, 

Midsouth demonstrated that Mason was a special employee of 

Midsouth's, and Mason failed to present substantial evidence to refute 

that she was a special employee of Midsouth's. In addition, Mason did not 

present any evidence or argument indicating that Nivert acted willfully 

in causing her injuries so as to permit a claim against him under § 25-5-

11. Therefore, the immunity afforded in the exclusive-remedy provisions 

of the Act bars Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Accordingly, 

Midsouth and Nivert have demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary 

judgment in their favor. 

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Mitchell, and 

Cook, JJ., concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result.