FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-10810 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-00179-PJH

AZIM CHOUDHRY,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 28, 2006—San Francisco, California

Filed August 25, 2006

Before: Gilbert S. Merritt,* Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

*The Honorable Gilbert S. Merritt, Senior Judge, United States Court

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

10217
COUNSEL

Mark Rosenbush, San Francisco, California, for the

defendant-appellant.

Derek D. Owens, Special Assistant United States Attorney,

and Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant United States Attorney,

United States Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, California,

for the plaintiff-appellee.

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10219
OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge: 

Azim Choudhry (“Choudhry”) appeals the district court’s

denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Upon

observing a vehicle parked illegally, two San Francisco police

officers performed an investigatory traffic stop of the vehicle,

in which Choudhry was a passenger. During a subsequent

search of the vehicle, the officers discovered a gun under the

front passenger seat. Choudhry was indicted for possession of

a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Alleging that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, Choudhry filed a motion to suppress the gun. 

In challenging the lawfulness of the stop, Choudhry argued

that a civil parking offense that is enforced through an administrative process could not, standing alone, justify an investigatory stop. Choudhry also argued that the other

circumstances surrounding the stop were insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion and that the stop therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Other than noting the

parking violation as one fact in its analysis of the events leading up to the stop, the district court did not address the merits

of Choudhry’s argument regarding the parking violation.

Although we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress, we

do so on a narrower ground than the one advanced by the district court. Because parking infractions constitute traffic violations under California’s Vehicle Code and local laws enacted

pursuant to the Vehicle Code, and because the officers had the

authority to enforce the particular violation at issue, we hold

that a civil parking violation under California’s Vehicle Code

falls within the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Accordingly,

we conclude that the parking violation provided the officers

with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of

the vehicle. In light of our disposition, we need not address

10220 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
the other factors that the district court relied upon to deny the

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Just after midnight on February 7, 2005, San Francisco

Police Officers Silver and Chan were patrolling Bernal

Heights Boulevard. The officers observed a vehicle parked

illegally near the entrance of Bernal Heights Park, an area

designated as a no-stopping/tow-away zone between the hours

of 10 PM and 6 AM every day.1 Because the officers were

unable to determine whether the car was occupied, Officer

Silver used the police car’s spotlight to illuminate the vehicle

from behind. In response to the sudden spotlight, the vehicle’s

occupants, Sonja Alvarado (“Alvarado”) and Choudhry, made

“hurried movements.” According to Officer Silver, these

movements led the officers to believe that either a sexual

encounter or “some other possibly illegal act” was taking

place. In a declaration filed in opposition to the motion, Officer Silver explained that the officers decided to investigate

further and turned on their emergency lights “in order to conduct an investigatory stop.” Alvarado, the driver of the vehicle, turned on the vehicle’s engine and began to pull away.

After both police officers exited their patrol car and commanded her to stop, she did. 

While Officer Chan questioned Alvarado, Officer Silver

spoke with Choudhry through the passenger side window.

Having determined that Alvarado’s license had been sus1The car was parked in violation of The City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code, Traffic Code (“San Francisco Traffic Code” or

“S.F. Traffic Code”) § 32. That section requires the Board of Supervisors

to pass resolutions designating restricted parking or stopping areas and to

erect signs giving notice of those areas. It further states: “Any person violating any of the class of resolutions now or hereinafter in effect, which

are referred to in the following subsections of this Section, shall be guilty

of an infraction.” Subsection (b) refers to “[r]esolution[s] prohibiting parking on any street or alley.” S.F. Traffic Code § 32(b). 

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10221
pended and that there were two active warrants outstanding

for her arrest, Officer Chan placed Alvarado under arrest.

Because Officer Silver recognized the “faint odor of burnt

marijuana,” he suspected that Choudhry possessed marijuana

and ordered Choudhry out of the car. As Officer Silver performed a pat-down search, Choudhry admitted that he had

marijuana in the pocket of his pants. Officer Silver found

marijuana in Choudhry’s front pants pocket and placed

Choudhry in the police car. Choudhry then informed Officer

Silver that he had found a gun, which he had placed inside

Alvarado’s car. Officer Silver discovered the gun under the

passenger seat where Choudhry had been sitting. 

The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Choudhry for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of a firearm by a

felon. Claiming that the detention and search violated the

Fourth Amendment, Choudhry filed a motion to suppress the

evidence that the officers seized as a result of the stop. As he

does in this appeal, Choudhry advanced two central arguments in support of his motion: first, Choudhry argued that

because California has decriminalized parking offenses, the

police could not perform an investigatory stop on the basis of

the parking violation alone; and second, Choudhry asserted

that the other circumstances surrounding the stop were insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. 

The district court denied Choudhry’s motion. In its oral

decision, the court declined to determine whether the parking

violation was enough, standing alone, to justify the stop.

Instead, the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop were sufficient for the officers to

have formed an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Alvarado and Choudhry were engaged in criminal activity. The

district court relied on the following circumstances: (1) the

parking violation, (2) Alvarado’s brief attempted “flight,” (3)

the couple’s hurried movements after the officers turned on

the spotlight, and (4) Officer Silver’s belief that Bernal

Heights was a high-crime area.

10222 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
After the district court denied his suppression motion,

Choudhry entered a conditional plea of guilty to the indictment, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.

The district court sentenced Choudhry to 57 months and he

timely appealed. On appeal, Choudhry re-asserts that the

parking violation was insufficient alone to justify an investigatory stop and the totality of the circumstances did not constitute reasonable suspicion. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo whether the police had reasonable suspicion

to make an investigatory stop, a mixed question of law and

fact. See United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 452 F.3d 1028, 1033

(9th Cir. 2006). We may affirm the denial of the motion to

suppress on any basis supported by the record. See United

States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 649 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000).

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.

See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION

A.

[1] The officers’ investigatory stop of Alvarado’s vehicle

implicates the Fourth Amendment “because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure . . .

even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,

653 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Investigatory

traffic stops are akin to the on-the-street encounters addressed

in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969); accordingly, the same

objective standard applies: a police officer may conduct an

investigatory traffic stop if the officer has “reasonable suspicion” that a particular person “has committed, is committing,

or is about to commit a crime.” Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104.

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10223
Officers have reasonable suspicion when “specific, articulable facts . . . together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person

detained is engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 1105 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion analysis

takes into account the totality of the circumstances. United

States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). “This process allows officers to draw on

their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information

available to them.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002). 

[2] A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714-17 (9th Cir. 2005). In Whren, the Court

held that, in general, “the decision to stop an automobile is

reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe

that a traffic violation has occurred.” 517 U.S. at 810; Willis,

431 F.3d at 715 (“Whren stands for the proposition that if the

officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation

occurred, the officers may conduct a traffic stop.”).2 The

Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the standard

should be different where “civil traffic regulations” are concerned. See 517 U.S. at 810-11.

B.

[3] Whether Whren applies to parking violations under California’s civil-administrative enforcement scheme is a matter

of first impression in this court. We conclude that it does and

that, here, the parking violation justified the investigatory stop

of Alvarado’s vehicle. In so holding, we note that our conclusion is consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits that

2

In Lopez-Soto, we considered and rejected the argument that Whren

altered the standard for traffic stops from “reasonable suspicion” to “probable cause.” See 205 F.3d at 1104. 

10224 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
have considered Whren’s application to parking violations.

See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402-03 (5th Cir.

2004); United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 594 (6th Cir.

2003); United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248 (7th Cir.

1999). 

[4] In 1992, the California Legislature significantly

amended the California Vehicle Code (“Vehicle Code”) to

establish a separate civil administrative scheme for enforcing

parking violations. Section 40200(a) mandates that “any”

non-misdemeanor parking violation “is subject to a civil penalty” to be enforced through “the civil administrative procedures set forth in this article.” Cal. Veh. Code § 40200(a). The

new enforcement scheme provides for civil penalties for parking violations and delinquent payments, but no criminal sanctions. See, e.g., id. § 40220 (“Collection of unpaid parking

penalty . . .”).3 Legislative intent, California court decisions,

and the interpretation of the California Attorney General all

confirm that parking violations are “[n]o longer . . . treated as

infractions within the criminal justice system; instead, they

are treated as civil offenses subject to civil penalties and

administrative enforcement.” Tyler v. County of Alameda, 40

Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 645 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Cal. Stats.

1992, c. 1244 § 1(b), 1992 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1244 (Deering) (“Criminal penalties are not appropriate sanctions for

standing and parking violations; and criminal procedures are

not necessary for the fair enforcement of those violations.”);

82 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 47 (1999) (adopting the interpretation

in Tyler). The Vehicle Code authorizes municipalities to

3Following the 1992 amendments, parking violations are subject to

fines. In instances of delinquent or non-payment, municipalities may

assess late payment penalty fines, see id. § 40203.5, or, when unpaid penalties exceed $400, may enforce collection through entering a civil judgment, see id. §§ 40220, 40221. At no point, however, may a municipality

impose penal sanctions. In fact, the 1992 amendment to section 40220

deleted subsection (c)), which allowed the processing agency to “[f]ile a

criminal complaint with the court” if fees remained unpaid. See id.

§ 40220, Notes 1992 Amend. (West 2005). 

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10225
establish parking enforcement agencies and to contract with

public and private agencies to process parking citations. See,

e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 40200.5, 40200.6. As discussed in

detail below, however, California law also allows police officers to enforce parking violations. See id. § 40202(a) (outlining how the “peace officer or person authorized to enforce

parking laws” must proceed when an unoccupied vehicle is

parked illegally); People v. Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 766

(Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a police officer was authorized

to enforce a parking violation where the illegally parked vehicle was occupied). 

[5] In Whren, the Court held that when police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the

decision to stop an automobile is reasonable. 517 U.S. at 810.

The defendants in Whren argued that, in the context of “civil

traffic regulations,” the Fourth Amendment standard should

be different—namely, that the standard should consider

whether a reasonable officer would have made a stop based

on the particular violation, not whether the officer observed

any violation. Id. The Court rejected this argument. Instead,

it held that a traffic violation was sufficient to justify an

investigatory stop, regardless of whether (i) the violation was

merely pretextual, id. at 811-12, (ii) the stop departed from

the regular practice of a particular precinct, id. at 814-15, or

(iii) the violation was common and insignificant, id. at 818-

19. Thus, under Whren, so long as Officers Silver and Chan

had reasonable suspicion to believe that Alvarado “violated

the traffic code,” the stop was “reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment [and] the evidence thereby discovered admissible.” Id. at 819. 

Choudhry seeks to distinguish Whren on two related

grounds. First, he argues that Whren does not apply because

the reasonable suspicion inquiry centers on criminal activity

—that is, he asserts that Whren is limited to conduct for which

the individual may be arrested. Second, he argues that in California, parking laws are distinct from other traffic laws

10226 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
because of California’s separate civil-administrative scheme

for enforcing parking penalties. We find neither argument

persuasive. 

1.

[6] In separating civil parking violations and criminal activity, Choudhry reads Whren more narrowly than that decision

and our circuit law permit. Although the reasonable suspicion

inquiry does center on suspected criminal activity, Whren

carves out an exception in the context of traffic stops, i.e., a

stop is “reasonable” where an officer suspects an individual

has committed a traffic violation. 517 U.S. at 810. Whren is

not limited to “criminal” traffic code violations. In fact, the

case specifically contemplated the opposite: at the outset of its

opinion, the Court noted that it was addressing the petitioners’

appeal in the scope of “civil traffic violation[s].” Id. at 808.4

The Court explicitly declined to distinguish among different

types of traffic code violations, be they standing or moving

violations. See id. at 818-19. Indeed, we have interpreted

Whren as applying generally to traffic code violations. See

Willis, 431 F.3d at 715 (describing Whren as sanctioning all

stops where the officers have cause to “believe that the petitioner violated the traffic code”);5

cf. Miranda v. City of Cor4Choudhry argues that the Court’s use of the term “civil” is dicta

because the Court did not address whether the specific provisions at issue

were criminal or civil. We are not persuaded. At the very least, the inclusion of “civil” at multiple points in Whren indicates that the Court viewed

the traffic violations as civil offenses and that the Court’s reasoning therefore applies to traffic regulations enforced through civil-administrative

procedures. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808, 810. Moreover, “[w]e do not treat

considered dicta of the Supreme Court lightly.” Montero-Camargo, 208

F.3d at 1132 n.17. 

5The dissent in Willis did not dispute the majority’s interpretation of

Whren, but disagreed with the court’s conclusion that the standard had

been met in that case. See 431 F.3d at 723 (Fletcher, W., J., dissenting)

(noting that in light of Whren, “police may make an ordinary ‘traffic stop’

whenever they have sufficient reason to believe that a traffic law has been

violated”). 

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10227
nelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that

although a “non-criminal” traffic violation did not justify

impoundment, it was “sufficient justification for police officers to seize a vehicle for a traffic stop”). Thus, Whren does

not distinguish between traffic violations enforced through a

civil-administrative process and traffic violations subject to

criminal enforcement. 

2.

Choudhry’s argument must turn not on the distinction

between civil and criminal traffic violations, but on whether

a parking violation, which is enforced through a civiladministrative scheme, should be considered a traffic violation within the scope of Whren. In light of the administrative

process used to enforce parking penalties in California, there

is some force to Choudhry’s argument that parking violations

are distinct from criminal traffic infractions. On balance, however, his argument fails. The structure of the California Vehicle Code, the authority of law enforcement officers to enforce

the Vehicle Code, and the specific authority granted to San

Francisco City and County police officers to enforce the violation at issue lead us to conclude that Whren controls Choudhry’s case.6

[7] Although California has enacted a civil administrative

process to enforce parking penalties, it has not removed parking regulation from the division of the Vehicle Code that covers moving traffic violations. See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22500-

26. This organizational structure demonstrates that while the

legislature intended to decriminalize parking penalties, it still

6Our analysis here mirrors the analytical framework employed by the

Sixth Circuit in Copeland. In Copeland, the Sixth Circuit held that Whren

applied to a traffic stop based on a parking violation because the regulation was “set forth under the general traffic laws of the Michigan Vehicle

Code” and “officers may enforce any of the regulations subsumed in [the

relevant] section by virtue of a stop.” 321 F.3d at 594. 

10228 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
considered parking regulation as part of the general “traffic

laws.” A structural analysis of the Code is informative. The

general rules governing parking regulation, as well as the provisions granting local authorities the power to establish parking restrictions pursuant to the Vehicle Code, are contained in

Division 11, Rules of the Road. See Cal. Veh. Code

§§ 22500-26. Among other rules, Division 11 covers moving

violations, which include laws governing such matters as

turns, stop signs, and vehicle speed. Notably, the Vehicle

Code has separate divisions entitled Equipment of Vehicles

(Div. 12, §§ 24000-28150), Safety Regulations (Div. 14.8,

§§ 34500-20.5), and Drivers’ Licenses (Div. 6, §§ 12500-

15325). Had the legislature intended to treat parking regulation as entirely distinct from other traffic offenses, it could

have separated them in a similar way. Instead, the legislature

determined that a separate civil-administrative scheme was

the preferred method for processing and enforcing civil penalties for parking violations. To distinguish parking violations

from other traffic violations, as Choudhry urges we do, would

necessarily require us to rely on logic the Supreme Court considered, but rejected, in Whren: that different “types” of traffic violations could be distinguished in justifying a traffic

stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19.

[8] Nor does California case law suggest a distinction in the

authority to enforce parking and traffic violations under the

Vehicle Code; rather, decisions by the California Court of

Appeal recognize the general authority of police officers to

“detain and cite a person for violating the Vehicle Code.”

Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766 (emphasis added); see also People v. Brown, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (“A

police officer may legally stop a motorist he suspects of violating the Vehicle Code for the purpose of issuing a citation.”

(emphasis added)). In Hart, the court considered the validity

of a detention that occurred during the citation of a driver for

a parking violation when the driver was present in the car.

The court noted that although the Vehicle Code outlines the

procedures for citing an unattended illegally parked vehicle,

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10229
see Cal. Veh. Code § 40202, it does not contain a provision

governing the procedures for “giving notice” when an illegally parked vehicle is occupied, Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

766. Citing the general authority of police officers to “detain

and cite” individuals for Vehicle Code violations, the court

held that a detention in such a situation was appropriate. Id.

7

[9] Here, the officers had the express authority to enforce

this specific parking violation. Alvarado had parked the vehicle in an area designated by signs as a no parking/tow-away

zone between the hours of 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM. California

Vehicle Code section 22651 allows “[a]ny peace officer . . .

engaged in directing traffic or enforcing parking laws and regulations” to remove a vehicle “[w]henever any vehicle is

parked or left standing where local authorities, by resolution

or ordinance, have prohibited parking and have authorized

7

In Choudhry’s attempt to distinguish Hart, he misreads the Vehicle

Code. First, Choudhry argues that, in Hart, the defendant violated a provision found in the “criminal infractions” section of the Vehicle Code (Cal.

Veh. Code § 22500(f)), while Alvarado’s parking violation fell under section 40200. Alvarado did not violate section 40200 or a similar provision,

as Choudhry’s analysis would suggest. She violated section 32 of the San

Francisco Traffic Code. San Francisco derives its authority to restrict

“stopping, standing, or parking” on its roads in part from a different provision in the same Vehicle Code chapter at issue in Hart. See Cal. Veh.

Code § 22507(a). The parking enforcement scheme covers “any” nonmisdemeanor parking violation. See id. § 40200. Section 22500(f) is not

a misdemeanor. Accordingly, both the violations at issue here and in Hart

are enforced under section 40200.7 

Second, during oral argument, Choudhry argued that Hart is distinguishable because Alvarado violated the San Francisco Traffic Code, not

the California Vehicle Code. The distinction Choudhry draws, however,

is not supported by the structure of the Vehicle Code. As noted above, the

San Francisco Traffic Code provision at issue was adopted pursuant to the

Vehicle Code. Section 40000.1 of the Vehicle Code treats violations of the

code and violations of laws adopted pursuant to the code similarly: “it . . .

constitutes an infraction for any person to violate, or fail to comply with,

any provision of this code, or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this

code.” Section 40200 places parking violations under the civil enforcement scheme, but otherwise does not alter section 40000.1. 

10230 UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY
removal of vehicles.” Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(n). Section 130

of the San Francisco Traffic Code is such an ordinance: it

grants police officers the authority to remove or cause to have

removed “any vehicle that is parked or left standing unattended in violation of California Vehicle Code or the San

Francisco Traffic Code and where signs are posted giving

notice of removal for such a violation.” S.F. Traffic Code

§ 130. Vehicle Code section 22651(n), in combination with

the local code provision, confirms that the officers were

within their authority to enforce Alvarado’s parking violation.

Thus, while California utilizes distinct civil procedures to

enforce penalties for parking violations, parking regulation

nonetheless falls within the scope of Whren’s holding. 

IV. CONCLUSION

[10] Because the parking violation alone provided the officers with a sufficient basis to conduct an investigatory stop of

Alvarado’s vehicle, we need not address the totality of the circumstances analysis on which the district court relied to deny

Choudhry’s motion. For the above reasons, we agree with the

district court that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the denial of Choudhry’s motion to

suppress and his conviction. 

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. CHOUDHRY 10231