### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 14 , 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH AD MIC HAE L KN IGHT
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 40100367 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2005- 00779-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 31, 2006

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Cha d Mic ha e l Kn ig ht, app e a ls the se nte nc ing de c isi on of the Mo ntg ome ry

Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt . F oll ow ing a

jury tr ia l, Knig ht w a s c on vic te d o f r e c kle ss e nd a ng e rm ent , a Cla ss A misdemeanor, and ag g ravated child abuse , a Class A fe lony , and sente nced to an eff ective te rm of twenty y ear s, eleve n months, and twenty -nine da y s in confinement. On a ppeal, Knig ht arg ues that the trial court err ed in: (1) f ailing to a

pply various sente ncing considerations which would have
serve d to mitigate his sente nce, a s authorized by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-113(13) (2 00 3) ; a nd(2 ) r e fu sin g to s e nte nc e him as an e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o ff

e nd e r i n a c c or da nc e wi th Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-109 (2003 ). Af t er review of

the re cord, w e af

firm the judgme nt of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opi n i o n o f t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.
Roge r E. Ne ll, District Publ ic Def ender ; and Russell Church, Assistant Publi c De fende r, Clarksville, Te nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla nt, Cha d M ic ha e l K nig ht.

Paul G

. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Blind Akra wi, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; John W. Ca rn e y , Jr. , Dis tr ic t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d Da nie l Br oll ie r, As sis ta nt Dis tr ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
At approximately

6:07 p.m. on May 17, 2001, Offic er Jimm y Dill of the Clarksville Police De pa rt me nt w a s d isp a tc he d to the Ap pe lla nt’ s h ome a t 1845 Park way Pla c e , A pa

rt me nt D , in Clarksville, in response to a call that the Appe llant’s eleve n-we ek-old son, Dy lan Knig ht, was not br e a thi ng . A t th a t ti me , the App ell ant wa s se rv ing a s a c he mic a l op e ratio ns sp e c ia lis t in the U. S. Army a ndwa s a ssi g ne d to th e mil ita ry po st at F t. C a mpb e ll. He , h is w if e , a ndc hil d r e sid e d in-2-

Clarksville. On this particula r day , the Appellant left t he base, returne d home, and drove his wife , Br o o k e , to h e r jo b a t Ry a n ’ s St e ak H o u s e , w ith th e ir s le e p in g s o n s e c u r e d in a c ar seat. Af ter
arriving home, the Appellant fe d the baby and laid him in his crib. He state d that ten minutes later he discove red that the victim was not breathing a nd started CPR imm ediately and ca lled 911.

Offic er D ill found the victim on the couch, could not find a puls e, and be g an to administer CPR. Th e EM S arrive d s ho rt ly the re a ft e r andini tiate d a dv a nc e d li fe su pp ort pr oc e du res prior to transporting the victim to Bla nchfie ld A rmy Communi ty Hospital at Ft. Campb el l

. T h e victim ’s mother met the Appe llant at Bla nchfie ld before the victim was “life flig hted” to Va nderbilt Hospital in Nashville.

At Vande rbilt, the victim e x hibited injurie s consistent with “Shaken B aby Sy ndrome.” He suffe red f rom a subdura l hematoma on the surf ace of t he brain, as well as ble eding on the rig ht side of the br a in, re tin a l hem or rh a g e s, br uis ing on the he a d a ndba c k, a nde le ve n rib f ra c tur e s. Th e vic tim underw ent surg ery

during which a se ction of his brain wa s removed and a dra in was inserte d. Subsequently , test results indicated that the victim was brain dead, and l ife support was withdrawn. An a uto ps y

la te r c on fi rme d th a t th e vic tim ha d s uf fe re d a c omb inatio n o f b othne w a ndoldri b fr ac t u re s , i n addit ion to new and old blee ding in the br ain. The injuries w ere indicative of “ blunt trauma” to the head and “for cef ul squeezing of

the che st.”
When que stioned, the Appellant f irst denied any

involvement in the death of his infant son. Ho we ve r, du ri ng la te r q ue sti on ing by De te c tiv e Al a n Cha rv is of the Cla

rk sv ill e Pol ic e De pa

rt me nt, the Appellant a dmitted that on the evening of May 17, 2001, he became very upset bec ause his son
was c ry ing and shook the eleve n-we ek-old ba by ten to fiftee n t i m es

. T h e Appellant also made a written stat em en t i n which he a dmitted that after he fed the victim, the baby started to cry . The Appellant bec ame upset and tried to c omfort his son, but nothing worke d. His statement includes the fo llo wi ng :

I started shaking him and sa id “Dy lan, please be quiet.” I said this twice while I was shaking him. I

stopped and he stopped crying and i t looked like he wa s passed out
or we nt to sleep. I

immediately

knew someth i n g wa s wr o n g and what I did was wrong

. . . .
Sa tur da y be fo re mothe r’ s d a y , M a y 12 , 2 001, Broo ke wa s a t w or k. I wa s a t ho me wi th D y la n. He sta

rt e d c rying a ndI

wa s w a lki ng the fl oo r w ith him try ing to c a lm him do wn a ndsto p c rying . I

wa s in the be dr oo m a ndstarted sh aki ng him to t ry to make him quit crying. I t h en rea liz ed that he w as just a baby and I was squee zing him to [ sic] hard so I

quit.

On J uly 3, 2001, the Appellant was indi cted for two counts of a g g ravated child abuse and one
c ou nt o f f ir st d e g re e mur de r. F oll ow ing the c on c lus ion of pr oo f, the jury fo un d the Ap pe lla nt g uil ty of the Class A misdemeanor of rec kless endang erme nt, a lesser of fense of ag g ravated child abuse , one count of t he C lass A felony of agg ravated child abuse as indicted, and one count of a g g ravatedAt t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e Ap pe l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t hi s dr u g

- a bu s i n g mo t h e r w a s i n c a pa bl e of r a i s i n g h i m. 1
H e l i v ed an i mpov er i s h ed l i fe an d w as r ai s ed by h i s g r an dmot h er a n d ph y s i ca l l y abu s ed by h i s g r an dmot h er ’ s h u s ban d. H e met hi s f at her wh en he was four t een y ear s o l d and m oved i n wi t h hi m whe n he dropp ed out o f sch oo l , b ut he l at er
o b ta ine d a G E D

. -3- child abuse, a lesser of

fense of first deg ree murder. Asentenc ing he aring was he ld on Febr uary 7, 2005, at which the trial court dismissed the sec ond count of a g g ravated child abuse and sente nced the Appellant to ele ven months and twenty -nine da y s for re ckless endang erment, to be serve d
consec utively

to a t we n ty -y ear

sentenc e, as a

violent offende r, for

ag g ravated child abuse . The Appellant subseque ntly

filed a motion for ne w trial and a n amende d motion f o r new tria l, which
we re he ardby

the tr ia l c ou rt

on Ma rc h 1 1, 20 05 . T he mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l w a s deni e d, a ndthi s appea l followed.

Ana lys is
The Appe lla n t co n t ends that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to apply various mitigating considerations to hi s sentence as authorized by Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-113(13) (2003). Specifically , he contends that consideration of hi s adver se childhood history , his sorrow and
re mor se fo r h is c on du c t, h is a c c e ptanc e of re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is a c tio ns , h is m ili tary se rv ic e , a ndhis lack of prior criminal hist ory

sh o u l d have se rved to mitigate his sentence . Additionally , the Appellant ar g ues the c ourt er re d i n failing to sentence him as an espe cially mitigated of

fende r be c a us e the c ou rt fo un d no e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s a nde rr e d in no t app ly ing mit ig a tin g fa c tor (1 3) to his sentence

. See T.C.A. § 40-35-109 ( 2003).

Whe n a n a c c us e d c ha lle ng e s the le ng th, rang e , or ma nn e r of the se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , th is court ha s a duty

to conduct a de novo revie w of t h e sentence w ith a presumption that the de te rm inatio ns ma de by

the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re ct. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) (2 00 3) ; State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The court must consider the evidenc e rece ived at the trial and sentenc ing hearing, the prese ntence report, the principles of se ntencing , arg uments of counse l, the nature and cha

rac teristics of the of

fense , mitigating and enhancing fac tors, statements made by the offe nder, and the pot ential for reha bilitation. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2da t 16 8; see also T.C.A. § 40-35- 2 1 0 ( 2 0 0 3 )

. T h e b u r d e n o f s h o w i n g t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e i s i m p r o p e r i s u p o n t h e ap p e a l i n g p a r t y. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d), Sentenc ing Commission Com ments.

Th e Ap pe lla nt w a s c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d c hil d a bu se, a Cl ass A f

e lon y , w hic h c arrie s a sentenc ing r ang e of f

ifteen to twenty -five y ear s. T.C.A. § 40-35-112( 1) (2003) . The pre sumptive sentenc e for

a Class A fe lony

is the midpoint within the rang e unless ther e ar e enhanceme nt or mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. T. C.A

. § 40 -3 5- 21 0( c ). Th e pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e is i nc re a se d f or app lic able enhanc ing f

actor s and dec rea sed for

applicable mitigating fac tors. Id . at (e ).

After a thoroug h revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-113( 13) is inappropriate to mitigate the Appellant’s se ntence in this case

. Wit h reg ard to the Appellant’s arg ument that his “psy cholog ical and childhood history ” should provide mitigation of 1-4-

his s e n te n c e , th e tria l c o u r t f o u n d th a t th e A p p e ll a n t “ c e r tain ly d idn o t h a v e th e b e n e f

it o f loving pare nts; however, in this sense a nd this particular c ase I find that that has no we ight whatsoever.” W e agr ee an d l i k ew i s e f

i n d , fo l l o wi n g de novo revie w, that the Appe llant’s arg ument of an a bused and displace d childhood, based upon the fac ts presente d, is inapplicable to mit igate the Appe llant’s
se nte nc e un de r m iti g a tin g fa c tor (1 3)

. Mo re ov e r, we are a wa re of no a uth ority

wh ic h w ou ld p e rm it mitigation of a

non-ca pital sentence based upon the assertion of an abuse d or improvised childhood under the catc h-all mitigating f actor

.
At the se nte nc ing he ari ng , the Ap pe lla nt ma de no re qu e st f or the tr ia l c ou rt

to c on sid e r h is
remorse and ac cepta nce of resp o n s i b i l i t y

for his conduc t; however , he now c ontends that the trial court should have considere d th es e fa ctors. A de fenda nt’s bareassertion of remorse or hollow apolog ies at the sente ncing h ea ri n g do not automatically g rant e ntitlement to mi tigation in the
se nte nc ing pr oc e ss. B e fo re it c a n app ly re mor se a s a

mit ig a tin g fa c tor , a

tr ia l c ou rt

mus t e va luate whether a def endant’ s claims of re morse ar e cr edible. State v. Patricia Marie J enson , No. M2 00 3- 02 84 8- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , June 21 , 2 00 5) . T he tr ia l c ou rt is i n the best position to determin e the cr edibilityof the Appe llant, based upon the de meanor and ap p ea ra n ce o f t h e Ap p el l an t wh en t es t i fy i n g. T h i s co u rt gi v es d ef er en ce t o t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs in th at regar d. Re vie w o f the re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e on ly pr oo f o f the Ap pe lla nt’ s r e mor se is h is self-se r v in g s tate me n ts ma d e a t th e s e n te n c in g h e ar in g

. T h e A p p e ll a n t’ s r e p e a te d d e n ia l o f a ny involvement in hi s infant son’s death, the indiffer ence expressed during his son’s brief ho sp itali z ati on prio r t o d e a th, a ndthe no n- e xpre ssi on of re mor se ou tsi de the c ou rt ro om m ili ta te ag ainst application of mitigating f actor (13).

This co u rt has pre viouslyheld that a de fenda nt’s prior honora ble military

service may

be considere d as a mitig ating fac tor. State v. Vince nt Gerrard Ove rton , No. 02C019510-CC00303 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, June 2, 1997), perm. to appeal de nied , (Tenn. Ma r. 16, 1998). Howeve r, this court has a lso held that a t rial court’s ref usal to miti g ate a

defe ndant’s sente nce ba sed on past milit ary

service was not er

ror. Sta te v . Ca lv in L ou is H ill , N o. M2 00 4- 00 59 7- CCA -R 3- CD (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. at Na s h v i l l e, M ar

. 8 , 2 0 0 5 ). W h i l e w e w o u l d agr ee t h at an h o n o ra b l e d i s ch ar ge from military

service is commendable , that did not occur in this case

. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate a gai n st the trial court’s r efusa l to mit igate the Appe llant’s sentenc e base d on the Appellant’ s mili tary service

. We ag ree with the Appellant’s a ssertion that his presente nce report indicates that he has no prior criminal recor d. A t ri al co u rt may consider the absenc e of a prior criminal hist ory

under Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tion 40 -35- 11 3( 13 ); ho we ve r, a g a in, thi s c ou rt is n ot r e qu ir e d to consider it as a mitiga ting f actor

. State v. W

illiams , 920 S.W .2d 247, 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) , perm. to appeal de nied, ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 )

. G o o d c i t i z e n s h i p i s e x p e c t e d o f e v e r y c i t i z e n o f t h i s c o u n tr y, a nd , a c c or din g ly , it

is n ot e rr or

fo r a se nte nc ing c ou rt

to r e je c t ap pl ica ti on of

thi s c ir c ums ta nc e to reduc e a de fenda nt’s sentenc e. Thus, the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion in thi s reg ard.

We are constraine d to note that the trial court did not apply as an e nhancing fac tor Tenne ssee Cod e a nn otate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 6) (2 00 3) , th a t th e Ap pe lla nt a bu se d a po sit ion of

private trus t,Bl ake ly v. Was hi ngt on , 5 4 2 U .S . 2 9 6 , 1 2 4 S . C t. 2 5 3 1 (2 0 0 4 ). 2

St at e v

. G om ez , 1 6 3 S .W .3 d 6 3 2 , 6 6 1 (T e n n . 2 0 0 5 ). 3

-5- beca use the sente ncing hearing oc curr ed during the period of unce rtainty betwee n the United States Supreme Court’s de cision in Bl ake ly in J une of 2004, a nd the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s dec ision 2 in Gomez in A pril o f 2 00 5. Th e tr ia l c ou rt vo ic e d c on c e rn s in the app lic ati on of mo st a ll 3 enhanc ement fa ctors and, a s a matter of caution, chose to apply no enhanc ement factors other than those permissible under Bl ake ly . Our de novo revie w makes it cle ar tha t enhanc ement fa ctor (16) , that th e Ap pe lla nt a

bu se d a po sit ion of

private trus t, s ho uldapp ly . T he Ap pe lla nt wa s a pa re nt i n
a po sit ion of

c us tod ia l care ov e r his e le ve n- we e k- oldso n. Al tho ug h u nc e rt a int ie s e xiste d a t th e tim e of sentenc ing, it is clea

r t hat t his enhanc ement factor is fac tually applicable to this case. Se e Sta te v. Kissinger, 92 2 S. W.2 d 4 82 , 48 8 (Ten n. 19 96 ); Sta te v . D e br a E lai ne Kir

k , No. E2004-0 1 2 6 3-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Sept. 30, 2005); Sta te v . P atr ic ia M ar ie Jenson , No. M 2003-02848-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 21, 2005). Ba sed upon our finding s and re view of the rec ord, we conclude that the pre sumptive mini m u m sentence of twenty y ear s is clear ly

justified in this case

.
T h e A p p e ll a n t a ls o ar g u e s th a t h e s h o u ld h a v e b e e n s e n te n c e d a s a n e s p e c ia lly mitigated offe nder. A trial judg e may find a defe ndant to be an espec ially mitigated of fende r if the de fenda nt has no prior f

elony convictions and if the c ourt finds mitigating but no enhanc ement factors. T.C.A. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 9

. T h is p r o v is io n is n o t man d a to r y b u t, r a th e r , is d is c retionar y

. State v. Braden , 867 S.W .2d 750, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) ; T.C.A. § 40-35-109, S entenc ing Commission Com me nts . Wh e the r a

de fe nd a nt i s to be se nte nc e d a s a n e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o ff

e nd e r i s a determination that rests within the sound discretion of t he trial c ourt. State v. Hick s , 868 S.W .2d 72 9, 73 9- 31 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ). I t ha s b e e n n ote d that fi nd ing a de fe nd a nt to be a n e sp e c ia lly mitigated of

fende r is rese rved f

or “instanc es whe re the trial judg e ma ydesire to de part fr om even the minimum s entenc e for a Rang e I

offe nder a nd impose lesser p en al t ies.” T.C.A. § 40-35- 109, Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments. I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c ourt found that no mi t igating fac tors wer e applicable. Our a naly sis, su pr a , is c onsistent with this finding

. As such, the Appe llant is not eligible for

sentenc ing a s an espe cially mitigated of

fende r.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g , w e a ff ir m th e se nte ncing d e c isi on of the Mo ntg ome ry

Cou nty Circuit Court.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE