[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 20CA3935

v. :

SASHIA JOHNSON, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellant. :

_________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Roger Soroka and Joshua Bedtelyon, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant. 

Shane Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED:4-28-22

ABELE, J.

{¶1} Sashia Johnson, defendant below and appellant herein, 

appeals the trial court’s granting of the state’s motion to 

disqualify her attorney. Appellant assigns two errors for review: 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT HER 

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL BECAUSE THE 

COURT DID NOT HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO 

INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 

BETWEEN CODEFENDANTS JORDAN AND JOHNSON.”
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SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT HER 

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL BECAUSE THERE 

WAS NO ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN 

CODEFENDANTS JORDAN AND JOHNSON.” 

{¶2} On June 29, 2020, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment that charged appellant with (1) trafficking in cocaine 

in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and possession of cocaine in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), both first-degree felonies with major 

drug offender and forfeiture specifications, and (2) possessing 

criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree 

felony. On the same date, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an 

indictment that charged Co-defendant Adrienne Jordan (see State v. 

Jordan, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3936, 2022-Ohio-XXXX) with 

identical offenses. The same attorney represented appellant and 

Co-defendant Jordan1. 

{¶3} After the state raised the issue of conflicting 

representation, at the September 3, 2020 hearing appellant’s 

counsel argued that (1) a criminal defendant has a fundamental 

right to be represented by an attorney of their choice, (2) counsel 

advised his clients of potential conflicts, and (3) counsel 

obtained conflict waivers from each client. Also, both appellant 

1 The same attorney represents appellant and Jordan on 

appeal. 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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and Jordan told the trial court on the record that they wished to 

have the same attorney represent them both, and provided written 

disclosures of potential conflict. 

{¶4} At a second hearing, the trial court inquired about the 

particular facts involved in the traffic stop that resulted in the 

indictments, including who drove the vehicle, who owned the vehicle 

and the precise location within the vehicle where officers found 

the drugs. Concerning the cocaine, the state replied, “in the 

center console, accessible to both Defendants.” When asked about 

the marijuana, the state replied, “[t]here was residue in the 

driver’s side door panel, and there were baggies of marijuana 

retrieved from Defendant Jordan’s purse.” The state also indicated 

that the co-defendants’ cell phones were “being downloaded by the 

O.S.P. lab.” The court then asked defense counsel, “why wouldn’t 

Ms. Johnson at trial want to argue that this is Ms. Jordan’s 

narcotics?” Counsel answered “they understand that” and indicated 

that he had filed a suppression motion2, “so we don’t necessarily 

get to that trial until we have that suppression hearing. * * * 

They would not have to make that decision, but at this point they 

are aware that that would potentially be a defense available to 

them, and neither of them are interested in that defense.” At that 

2

 Appellant and Co-defendant Jordan filed a motion to suppress 

evidence on October 2, 2020. 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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point, appellee interjected that “any offers that would be 

considered being made by the State would occur before that 

[suppression] hearing. Once that hearing is underway it will be a 

plead as charged situation or go to trial.” Defense counsel then 

responded, “which was relayed at the last hearing, Your Honor, and 

then relayed to our clients as well, and they still wish to proceed 

in this manner.” 

{¶5} On November 9, 2020, the trial court removed Soroka & 

Associates LLC as counsel and ordered appellant to obtain new 

counsel. The court wrote in part:

In this matter the State has alleged that Johnson was the 

driver of a vehicle owned by either Jordan, or her family 

member, and Jordan was the passenger when they were 

stopped by the Troopers of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. 

The State further alleges that a large quantity of 

cocaine was found in the center console. Defendants, 

through counsel do not dispute these facts but allege 

that the suppression of evidence will decide the issue 

and the parties will not proceed to trial.

The trial court cannot foresee what evidence the State 

will present at trial, or what each of the co-defendants 

may wish to explore prior to trial. In reviewing this 

matter this Court finds there is serious potential that 

one defendant will change her position and claim the 

other committed the charged offenses alone. The evidence 

at trial may more strongly incriminate one defendant over 

the other. It is also possible that the evidence could 

more strongly exculpate one defendant over the other. 

Counsel representing both defendants would be precluded 

from arguing those facts to the jury that tend to 

incriminate one defendant but not the other or tend to 

exculpate one defendant but not the other. Additionally, 

one defendant may desire to explore potential plea 

bargains with the State rather than go to trial. This 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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Court finds that there is a serious potential for a 

conflict of interest in dual representation of both 

defendants. 

The hearing in this matter also included defendant 

Jordan’s probation violation in 17-CR-733. Since that 

matter is separate and distinct from the issues raised in 

the case in which they are codefendants, this Court finds 

there is no actual or serious potential for conflict in 

defense counsel’s continued representation in that 

matter. 

Therefore, this Court refuses the waiver of conflicts 

offered in this matter and finds a serious potential for 

conflict of interest in the matter in which Johnson and

Jordan are co-defendants, being case number 20-CR388(A)/(B).

Wherefore, in case number 20-CR-388(A)/(B) defense 

counsel and the firm Soroka & Associates LLC are hereby 

removed as counsel of record and relieved of further 

responsibilities in this matter. Defendants are ORDERED 

to obtain new counsel within fourteen (14) days of the 

date of this entry. Defense counsel shall continue as 

counsel in the matter of State of Ohio v. Adrienne 

Jordan, 17-CR-733 [the probation violation case]. 

This appeal followed.

I.

{¶6} Because appellant’s assignments of error are 

interrelated, we consider them together. In her first assignment 

of error, appellant asserts that the trial court did not have an 

affirmative duty to inquire into possible conflicts of interest 

between Co-defendants Jordan and Johnson and, thus, the court’s 

order denied appellant her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In her 

second assignment of error, appellant contends the court’s order 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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denied appellant her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because no 

actual conflict of interest exists between Co-defendants Jordan and 

Johnson. 

{¶7} “‘[T]he standard of review for determining whether the 

court erred in its pretrial disqualification of defense counsel is 

whether it abused its broad discretion.’” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio 

St.3d 133, 137, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Keenan 

v. Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 180, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994). The 

term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that a court’s attitude is 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio 

St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). When reviewing a trial 

court’s decision concerning counsel disqualification, an appellate 

court must be cognizant of the context within which the ruling is 

made and aware that “‘the likelihood and dimensions of nascent 

conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict.’” Wheat v. 

U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988).

{¶8} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defense.” “[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s 

preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the 

essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective 

advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he [or 

she] prefers.” Wheat, 466 U.S. at 159, citing Morris v. Slappy, 

461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) and Jones 

v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 

Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s counsel “is 

circumscribed in several important respects,” Wheat, supra, at 

159, including the right to be free from conflicts of interest. 

State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 312, 595 N.E.2d 878 (1992); 

accord State v. Pickett, 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA13, 2016-Ohio4593, ¶ 49. 

{¶9} In general, dual representation does not per se violate 

due process, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 

1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), and may even benefit clients in cases 

when a common defense may be mounted against charges. Id. at 483. 

However, “multiple representation of criminal defendants engenders 

special dangers of which a court must be aware.” Wheat, supra, 486 

U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140. Therefore, both 

defense counsel and the trial court are under an affirmative duty 

to ensure that a defendant's representation is conflict-free. 

State v. Dillon, 74 Ohio St.3d 166, 167-168, 657 N.E.2d 273 (1995).

{¶10} “[A] court confronted with and alerted to possible 

conflicts of interest must take adequate steps to ascertain whether 

the conflicts warrant separate counsel.” Wheat, supra, at 159-160. 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a trial court does not have

a duty to inquire regarding potential conflicts with dual 

representation unless the court knows or reasonably should know 

that a possible conflict of interest exists, or when the defendant 

objects to the multiple representation. State v. Manross, 40 Ohio 

St.3d 180, 181, 532 N.E.2d 735, (1988); see also State v. Williams,

__ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-3152, __ N.E.3d __. 

{¶11} Thus, the right to counsel of choice is not unqualified, 

but is “only a presumptive right to employ * * * chosen counsel.” 

Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 137, 689 N.E.2d 929. “‘[T]hat 

presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual 

conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict.’” 

Id., quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. While an essential element of 

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to have counsel of one’s 

choice, and the “erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of 

choice, ‘with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and 

indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error,’” 

(internal citations omitted), a defendant may not “demand that a 

court honor his waiver of conflict-free counsel.” United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 U.S. 140, 147, 150-152, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 

L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). 

{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[a] lawyer 

represents conflicting interests when on behalf of one client, it 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client 

requires him to oppose.” Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d at 182, citing 

Columbus Bar Ass’n. v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St.2d 208, 237 N.E.2d 298 

(1968). “Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect 

because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. * * * 

[A] conflict may * * * prevent an attorney from challenging the 

admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps 

favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the 

relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to 

minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another.” 

Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489-490, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426.

{¶13} The Fifth District has considered this issue in State v. 

Kish, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-22, 2017-Ohio-7551 and State v. 

Cook, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-23, 2017-Ohio-7552. In Kish 

and Cook, after a weekend visitation, authorities charged the codefendants, presumably boyfriend and girlfriend, with domestic 

violence, endangering children and assault. When the same attorney 

represented both co-defendants, the state moved to disqualify and 

explained that a plea offer had been extended to Kish for testimony 

against Cook. Both co-defendants, however, expressed satisfaction 

with joint representation and provided written disclosures of any 

potential conflict. After the trial court disqualified defense 

counsel from representing both defendants, the Fifth District 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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concluded “there is clearly a potential conflict of interest 

inherent in counsel’s simultaneous representation of [Cook and 

Kish] in litigation stemming from the same set of facts.” Cook at 

¶ 30, Kish at ¶ 32. The court wrote:

Neither the trial court, nor this court can foresee what 

evidence the state will present at trial, or what each of 

the co-defendants may wish to explore prior to trial. 

For instance, it is possible that Kish will change his 

position and claim Appellant committed the charged 

offenses alone. The evidence at trial may more strongly 

incriminate one defendant over the other. It is also 

possible that the evidence could more strongly exculpate 

one defendant over the other. Counsel representing both 

defendants would be precluded from arguing those facts to 

the jury that tend to incriminate one defendant but not 

the other or tend to exculpate one defendant but not the 

other. Additionally, while Kish rejected a plea bargain, 

Appellant may desire to explore potential plea bargains 

with the state rather than go to trial.

Id. 

The Fifth District further noted that, although appellants 

explicitly waived any potential conflict, the trial court could 

properly refuse to accept their waiver. Cook at ¶ 31, Kish at ¶ 

33. “As in Keenan, nothing in the record suggests that the trial 

court’s decision to refuse the waiver and remove retained counsel 

was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Instead, it is 

clear the court based its decision on the potential for conflict 

and the court’s decision to protect both of the Appellants’

constitutional rights.” Id.
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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{¶14} In another joint representation case, State v. Rivera, 

2017-Ohio-8514,3 multiple co-defendants indicated they wanted the 

same attorney to represent them, but the trial court expressed 

concern “about the codefendants’ interests diverging once further 

discovery, plea discussions, and trial preparation began.” Id. 

The Ninth District observed that “neither the trial court nor the 

appellate court can foresee what evidence will be presented at 

trial or what plea deals may be offered by the State and accepted 

by one or more of these individuals.” Id. at ¶ 12. Joint 

representation could: (1) preclude counsel from exploring plea 

negotiations and agreements to testify favorable to one and 

prejudicial to another, (2) prevent counsel from challenging the 

admission of evidence prejudicial to one, but perhaps favorable to 

another, and (3) cause counsel to refrain from arguing at 

sentencing the relative involvement and culpability of one by 

minimizing the involvement of another. Rivera at ¶ 12. 

{¶15} In U.S. v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir.2007), after the

government asked about the appropriateness of joint representation, 

the co-defendants sought to waive any conflict. The district court 

disqualified counsel because the situation was “rife with potential 

3 The complete citation for Rivera is State v. Rivera, 9th Dist. 

Lorain No. 16CA011057, 16CA011059, 16CA011060, 16CA011061, 

16CA011063, 16CA0011073 and 16CA011075, 2017-Ohio-8514.
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

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conflicts of interest.” Brock at 766. Although the Sixth Circuit 

noted that the co-defendants’ waivers did not adequately 

acknowledge potential conflicts, the court agreed with the district 

court’s observation that it may be in one client’s best interest to 

plead guilty and testify against the other. Also, if both

defendants are found guilty, counsel may be in a position to 

contend that one or the other should receive a lesser sentence. 

Id. See, also, Serra v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 4 F.3d 

1348, 1354 (6th Cir.1994), (defenses of each defendant 

“intrinsically antagonistic.” Id. at 1350-1351). United States v. 

Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 887 (2d Cir. 1982)(conflict implications 

include whether to present a defense that helps one defendant more 

than the other; whether to have one defendant testify while other 

remains silent; whether neither defendant testify because one poor 

or vulnerable witness; whether emphasize in summation that certain 

evidence admitted only against (or less compelling against) one 

defendant rather than other); U.S. v. Garner, E.D.Kentucky No. 12-

CR-65-JMH, 2013 WL 99396 (Jan.7, 2013), fn. 2 (difficulties 

inherent in dual representation because attorney’s ability to give 

best representation to both clients compromised when one defendant 

acts in own best interest and may hurt the other defendant’s

interests - also, the defendants desire for solidarity can be 

achieved with separate counsel, and court’s conclusion does not 
SCIOTO, 20CA3935

13

foreclose co-defendants opportunity to present a “unified” or 

“united” defense).

{¶16} Additionally, the Fifth District in Cook described 

conflicts in this manner:

Potential conflicts that can arise where the same 

attorney represents codefendants can include where both 

of the defendants wish to testify but they have differing 

explanations as to how the relevant events transpired. 

Where one of the defendants wishes to testify while the 

other does not and the silence of one might suggest to 

the jury that he alone is guilty of the crime. 

Additionally, the evidence against one of the defendants 

may be stronger than the evidence against the other and 

comparison of the respective strengths of the evidence 

against the two during plea bargaining or examination of 

witnesses or closing argument would be helpful to the 

defendant faced with the weaker evidence but would be 

harmful to the defendant faced with the stronger 

evidence. 

State v. Cook, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-23, 2017-Ohio-7552, ¶ 

24. 

{¶17} The United States Supreme Court also spoke at length to 

the minefield that trial courts must navigate to predict possible 

conflicts:

Unfortunately for all concerned, a * * * court must pass 

on the issue whether or not to allow a waiver of a 

conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the

wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but 

in the murkier pre-trial context when relationships 

between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. * * * 

It is the rare attorney who will be fortunate enough to 

learn the entire truth from his own client, much less be 

fully apprised before trial of what each of the 

Government’s witnesses will say on the stand. A few bits 
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

of unforseen testimony or a single previously unknown or 

unnoticed document may significantly alter the 

relationship between multiple defendants. These 

imponderables are difficult enough for a lawyer to 

assess, and even more difficult to convey by way of 

explanation to a criminal defendant untutored in the 

niceties of legal ethics. * * *

For these reasons we think the district courts must be 

allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of 

conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where 

an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but 

in the more common cases where a potential for conflict 

exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual 

conflict as the trial progresses. 

Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 162-163, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140.

{¶18} “The United States Supreme Court has definitely 

recognized the authority of a federal district court to disqualify 

chosen defense counsel, over objection and despite waivers of 

conflict of interest, because of actual conflicts of interest or 

serious potential conflicts of interest.” United States v. Lamar, 

E.D. Kentucky No. 09-82-DLB, 2013 WL 12221618, (Sept. 20, 2013) 

*10. “Such discretion is warranted, moreover, because of the 

‘whipsaw’ nature of waiver of conflict-free representation: ‘If a 

trial court disqualifies counsel, defendant will argue * * * a 

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. 

If a trial court refuses to disqualify an attorney, a defendant may 

later attempt to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

based on conflict of interest, asserting that his waiver was not 

knowingly or voluntarily made.’” U.S. v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

840 (2008), quoting Serra at 1353-1354, citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 

161-162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. U.S. v. Mays, 69 F.3d 116, 121 (6th 

Cir.1995)(district courts given wide latitude to make such 

determinations and decision upheld unless ‘arbitrary’ or ‘without 

adequate reasons’). But see U.S. v. Gebbie, 185 F.R.D. 516 (S.D. 

Ohio 1999) (disqualification not warranted because (1) codefendants voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived Sixth 

Amendment right to conflict-free representation, (2) attorney 

steadfastly maintained no conflict exists, (3) attorney invested 

significant time and effort in lengthy and complex case and has a 

high level of knowledge that uniquely qualifies him, and (4) united 

defense is best for co-conspirators.) 

{¶19} In the case sub judice, appellant asserts that because 

both co-defendants have been apprised of potential conflicts and 

have formally waived any conflict, the trial court should have 

denied appellee’s request for disqualification. However, as we 

point out above, Wheat “rejected the claim that waivers by all 

affected defendants cure any problems created by the multiple 

representation, noting that courts have an independent interest to 

ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 

standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair 

to all who observe them and that various rules of ethics and 

professional conduct impose limitations on multiple representation 
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

of clients.” State v. Keenan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89554, 2008-

Ohio-807, ¶ 27. Thus, courts must look beyond a waiver to 

determine if dual representation is appropriate. Here, we agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that potential conflicts of 

interest exist with the dual representation of appellant and her 

co-defendant. A trial court must be allowed “substantial latitude 

in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only * * * where 

an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the 

more common cases [such as the case at bar] where a potential for 

conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual 

conflict * * *.” Wheat, 486 U.S at 163, 108 S.Ct.1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 

140. Here, the trial court observed that, although the codefendants argue that the eventual suppression of evidence would 

result in this matter not proceeding to trial, this outcome is not 

a certainty. Furthermore, unforeseen events, including 

unanticipated testimony or other evidence, could unexpectedly and 

quickly shift the relationship between the co-defendants. The 

trial court is also properly concerned about the possibility that 

one defendant may contend that her co-defendant alone committed the 

charged offenses. As the trial court pointed out: (1) the evidence 

adduced at trial could more strongly exculpate or inculpate one or 

the other co-defendant, and could place counsel in the position of 

arguing one client may have greater culpability than the other 
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

client, and (2) the plea agreement process, including the reduction 

of the seriousness of an offense in exchange for testimony, could 

invite a potential conflict of interest in the dual representation 

of both defendants.4 As the Wheat court pointed out, trial courts 

should have substantial latitude to refuse waivers of conflicts of 

interest, not only in cases when an actual conflict can be 

demonstrated prior to trial, but also in situations when the 

potential for conflict exists that may result in an actual conflict 

once a trial begins. Here, in light of the nature of the traffic 

stop and discovery of controlled substances, we believe that it is 

certainly foreseeable that conflicts between the co-defendants may 

arise throughout this proceeding. 

{¶20} Accordingly, in the case at bar we do not believe that 

the trial court’s disqualification of counsel constitutes an abuse 

of discretion. Therefore, we hereby overrule appellant’s 

assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

4 Additionally, a comment to the Ohio Rules of Professional 

Conduct is particularly salient in the case sub judice: “The 

potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple 

defendants in a criminal matter is so grave that ordinarily a 

lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant.” 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, Comment 15. 
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall

recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479.]

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court 

directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this 

judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate 

pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

 For the Court

BY:_____________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 

commences from the date of filing with the clerk.