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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/1083NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________ No. 02-2917

____________ GILDA GLADYS PARKE R, Appellant
v. PORT AUT HORI TY OF AL LEGHENY C OUNTY,

____________________ ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT FO R T HE WE STE RN DIST RIC T O F PE NN SY LV AN IA

(Dist. Court No. 00-cv- 00671) District Court Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Am brose
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 23, 2003 Before: ALITO, FUENTES, and BE CK ER , Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: J anuary21, 2004)

______________________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

______________________1 Thi s Cou rt ’s ana ly si s r egard in g Pa rk er ’s ADA cl ai m is di spo si ti ve o f he r PHRA

claim
. Taylor v . Pho enixv ille Sch . Dist. , 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (“anal ysi s of an A DA claim app lies equally to a PHR A claim ”). -2- PER CU RIA M : This is an appeal fr om the District Court ’s grant of summary j udgment in favor of the Port A uthority of Alleghe ny Coun ty (“the Port Autho rity”) on Gilda Glad ys Parker’s clai ms that t

he Port Authority

terminated her e mployment in viol ation of

the Americans with Disabi lities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“the A DA ”) and the P enns ylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat . § 951 et seq. (“the PH RA ”). 1 We af fi rm. I. Parker w as diagno sed w ith diabetes in 199 3. She be gan w orking fo r the Port Autho rity as a bus operator trainee o n M arch 15, 19 99. Af ter initial trai ning and before entering a 90 -probationary period , Parker receive d a cop y of the Port A uthority’s Perform ance C ode fo r Probationa ry Employees. Th e Perform ance C ode sets ou t the Port Autho rity’ s attendance policy and outlines eac h action co nsidered su fficient cause f or a final writt en warning, s uspension, or immediate discharge. Additionall y, the Performance Co de no tes that “ [w ]ithin the first thirty (30) s ched uled w orkin g days, all incide nt/occ urrences may be vi ewed for possi ble dis cipli nary acti on up to and inc luding dischar ge.” Parke r began her 90- day pr obationary period on May 16, 1999. On M ay 18, 1999, the Port Authori ty learne d that Par ker had been i nvolved in an incide nt du ring w hich s he did not fo llow prop er rou ting, be cam e lost, an d then failed to-3-

follow the proper pro cedure o f reporting he r location to the T raffic D ivision of the P ort Authority and obt aining re-routing directi ons. I nstead, Parker i mproperly obtaine d directions from the bus passengers. On M ay 20, 1999, the Port Authori ty ’s Employ ee Relati ons Represent ative , the Director of Service Delivery

for the Port Authori ty ’s Harmar Divi sion, and an inst ructor met w ith Park er rega rding the M ay 18th in ciden t and iss ued a Fina l Writte n W arning in accordance wit

h the Performance Code. On June 1, 1999, two complaint s were lodged against Parker. One complaint al leged that Parker ’s bus mis sed a st op. The other
co m pl ain t al leg ed th at P ar ke r’s bu s w as 25 m in ut es lat e a t a d iff er en t st op . T he ne xt da y, Par ker me t wi th R obi n R och ez, h er P ort A uth ority su per viso r, to d iscu ss th e co mp laint s. Rochez retrained Parker on a variety of procedures. On June 3, 1999, Par

ker cal led the Port Authori ty to report that she would not be at work. Parker

spoke with Teeny a McLellan (an i nstruc tor) and Tom Collins ( a Harmar Supervisor), nei ther of whom was her supervisor. Parker st ated that she was not feeli ng
we ll beca use o f her d iabete s. W hen R oche z learn ed of this, she agree d that P arker s hou ld not report to work because, among other reas ons, Rochez di d not beli eve that it was sa fe for Parker

to ret urn unti l she had bee n clear ed by t he Port Authority ’s medical department . Parker

asked Colli ns about t

he possibi lit

y of a l ight- duty position with t he Port Authori ty . Coll ins fol lowed up with Donna Lucas, t he Employee Rel ations Repre sentative. On the same day, Lucas info rmed P arker that light-duty positions w ere-4-

not avai lable for probationaryemploye es because t hose employ ees needed t o work in the positions for

which theywere hired i n order t o be evaluated. Also on Ju ne 3, th e Po rt Au thority info rmed Park er that sh e nee ded to obtain information from her doc tor r egarding he r medicalstat us in orde r to r eturn to work. The Port Authori ty request ed information to eva luate whether Parker ’s medicalconditi on disqu alified h er fro m o peratin g a bu s. Ap prox imate ly one w eek la ter, Park er fax ed a n ote fr om he r d oc to r in di ca tin g t ha t sh e h ad an ap po in tm en t o n J un e 1 5, 1 99 9. S ev er al d ays after the fax was rec eived, Parker st illhad not provi ded any medi cal documentation for her absence s. Accordi ngly , the Port Authori ty gave her an aut horizat ion for t he rele ase of her medical records. After Parker fail ed to provide any information regardi ng her status, supervi sors at

the Port Authority sc heduled a meeting with her to revi ew her performance since her probati onary period commenced. The meeting occur red on June 23, 1999. Due to Parker ’s overa ll uns atis factory work per formance and excess ive, unexcused abse nteeism , the Po rt Au thority term inated her em ployme nt. On October 8, 1999, Parker fi led a char ge of discrimination with t he Equal Employment Opport

unity Commission (“EEOC”) all eging dis abili ty discrimination under the ADA and the PHRA . After receivi ng the EEOC’s notice of dismis sal and right to sue, Parker fi led thi s acti on. The District Court granted summary j udgment in favor of the Port A utho rity, and the C ourt d enied as m oot P arker’ s mo tion to s trike as in adm issible hearsay vari ous assertions in t he Port Authority’ s Statement of Material Facts.-5- II. We exercise pl enaryreview over aDistri ct Court’ s grant of summary j udgment and ther efo re ap ply the sam e leg al sta nda rds a ppl ied b y the D istrict Co urt. Courson v. Bert BellNFL R etirement Plan , 214 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 200 0). In evaluating the Port Authority’ s motion for summary judgment, we m ust view the evidence in the light most favorabl e to Parker

and must deci de whether the Port Authority was entitled to j udgment
as a ma tter o f law
. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 ; Celo tex C orp. v . Catre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (19 86)
. III. The AD A p rohib its “discr imina tion ag ainst a q ualified individ ual w ith a disa bility because of the disabi lit

y of s uch indivi dual. ” 42 U.S.C. § 12112( a). To est ablis h that s he has a dis abili ty , Parker

must show that : (i ) she has a physi cal or ment al impai rment that substant iall y l imit s one or more of her major li fe acti viti es; ( ii) she has a r ecord of such impairme nt; or (iii) she was “reg arded as” having su ch an im pairmen t by the Port Au tho rity. See Marinell i v. Ci ty of Erie, Pa. , 216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000) (appl yi ng 42 U .S.C. § 121 02(2)). Parker’ s clai ms are based on di abetes, a condition with which s he was diagnosed in 19 93. P arker c once des th at her d iabete s wa s con trolled a nd th at it did n ot sub stantially limi t a major

life acti vity . Therefore, her c laims are dependent on her abili ty to prove that the Port Authority regarded her as having an impairment that subst antiall y li mits a2 The plaintiffs i n Sutton had visi on impairment s which were corr ectabl e by

prescripti ve glass es. The pl ainti ffs’ vi sion probl ems caused the m to be denied pos iti ons as commercialairl ine pil ots. The plaintiffs s ued under the ADA ’s “re garded as” pr ong, and the S upr em e C our t den ied th eir cl aim , inter alia , because“if j obs uti lizi ng an indivi dual’s skil l (but

not his or her uni que tal ents) are avai lable , one i s not pre cluded from a sub stantial c lass of jobs. S imilarly, if a h ost of diffe rent job s are av ailable, o ne is not precluded from a broad r ange of jobs. ” Sutton , 527 U.S. at 492.

3 The EE OC regu lations a lso allow for an individ ual to e stablish that s/he is “rega rded as” d isabled if s/he “ [h]as a physica l or me ntal im pairm ent tha t substa ntially limi ts major

life acti viti es onlyas a res ult of t he attitudes of others toward such impairment .” 29 C.F. R. § 1630.2(l )(2). “These misper cepti ons often ‘ resul [t] fr om ster eoty pic ass umptions not trul y i ndicative of . . . i ndividualabili ty .’” See Sutton , 527 U.S. at 490 (citing 42 U .S.C. § 121 01(7)). -6- m ajo r lif e a cti vi ty. To be “disabl ed” under the “regar ded as” portion of the ADA 's de finit ion of disab ility, Parker m ust de mo nstrate e ither tha t: (i) althou gh sh e had no im pairm ent at a ll, the P ort A utho rity erroneo usly believ ed tha t she h ad an impa irmen t that sub stantially limited major life ac tivities; or (ii ) she had a non-limiting im pairmen t that the Port Au tho rity mis take nly be lieve d lim ited a major lif e ac tivity. See Sutto n v. U nited A ir Lines, Inc. , 527 U .S. 471, 489 (1999); 2 Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth. , 247 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2001). I n eithe r case, the defi niti on of “subst antia lly limi ts” r emains thesame as it does in other

parts of the st atute . 3 To e stablish that the Port A utho rity believed her to be limi ted in t

he lif e acti vity of “working,” “working” must enc ompass “eit her a cl ass of jobs or a broad range of j obs in various cl asses as compared to t he average per son having comparable t

raini ng, ski lls and abil iti es.” Sutton , 527 U.S. at 491 (ci tati on and inte rnal quo tations o mitted ); accord Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 527 U.S. 516, 5234 We do not find the EE OC Policy Statemen t on wh ich Parker relies (A ppellant’s

Br. at 24) to be appos ite. There, t he employ ee was regarded a s incapabl e performi ng any job requi ring t

he abil ity

to work well wit

h the publi c. Here, Lucas’s st atement maynot -7- (1999). Thus, “t o be regarde d as subst antia lly limi ted in t

he major l ife activit

y of working, one must

be regarde d as precl uded from more than a parti cular j ob.” Murphy , 527 U.S . at 523 ; accord Sutton , 527 U.S. at 492. In this c ase, the record , even wh en vie we d in the light m ost fav orab le to Pa rker, is insuffi cient

to show that

the Port Authority r egarded her “as precluded from more than a parti cular j ob.” Murphy , 527 U.S. at 523. Par ker rel ies heavi ly on Donna Lucas’s all eged stat ement that

Parker “coul dn’t handl e the st ress t hat goes al ong with the j ob.” Parker suggests that Lucas ’s st atement s hows that Lucas regarded her as unable to perform “a
var i ety of

j ob s [ t ha t ] i nv ol ve st

r es s, dri vi ng an d the pu bl i c. ” A pp el l an t ’ s B r . at 19
. We rejec t thi s argument. While we give Parker the benefi t of anyreasonabl e infer ences from the rec ord, t

his ar gument draws infe rences t hat are not reas onable. Lucas’s st atement cannot re asonablybe inte rpret ed to mean that she felt that Par ker was incapable of performing a ll j obs that involved any degr ee of stress, any type or amount of dri ving, a nd any type or

degree of i nterac tion wit h the publi c. Rather , al l that Lucas’s st atement may reasonabl y be i nterpreted t o mean is that she di d not thi nk that Par ker could handle the parti cular mi x of str ess, drivi ng, and publ ic interaction invol ved in the parti cular j ob of drivi ng a bus. Consi dering Lucas ’s al leged st atement and a ll of t he other e vidence on whi ch P arker

re li es , we do n otfi nd s uff ic ie ntevi den ce to su ppo rt a r egard ed- as cl ai m. 4reasonabl y be r ead as expre ssing any simil ar view about

Parker’ s abil iti es. I nstead, Lucas allegedlyreferred just to the job of driving a bus. -8- Parker arg ues that her reg arded-as claim is supported b y the Port Autho rity’ s insi stence t

hat she pr ovide medicalinformation before returning to work. Requiring an employe e to “submit

a medical release and be cleared by [her ] phy sici an” is not evidence that a n em plo yer reg ard s the em plo yee as disa bled
. See Som ers v. C ity of M innea polis , 245 F.3d 782, 788 ( 8th Cir. 2001). As we noted i n Tice , 247 F.3d at 515, “an appropriately- tail ored examination only establ ishes that t he employer harbors dou bts (not cer taint ies) with res pect t o an employ ee's abili ty to perform a parti cular job”) (emp hasis in origina l). “Do ubts a lone d o no t dem onstra te that the emp loyee w as he ld in any partic ular reg ard, an d, as w e hav e exp lained , inability to pe rform a partic ular job is not a dis abili ty within t

he meaning of the Act.” Id. (citation omitted). The refore, the Po rt Authority’ s request

for a medicalexcuse for Par ker’s absences does not indi cate that the Port Au th or it

y re ga rd ed he r a s d is ab le d, in vi ol atio n of th e ADA. IV. W e ha ve c ons ider ed a ll of P ark er’s a rgu me nts, b ut w e fin d no bas is fo r rev ersa l. Acco rdingly, the District Court’s gran t of sum mary judgm ent in favo r of the Po rt Authority i s affirmed.