I ha ve ur ged a do pt i ng a pr ot ocol i n w hi ch eac h cas e woul d be com pare d t o f act ual l y s i mi l ar ca s es i n w hi ch 1 eit h er a l i fe s ent enc e or ca pi t al puni s hment was im p ose d t o det er mi ne whe t her t he cas e i s mo r e c ons i s t ent wi t h “ l i fe” (c o n tinu e d ...) 

# IN THE S UP REME COURT OFTENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE June3, 200 4 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v . C HRIS TO P HE RA . D A V IS Autom aticApp e al fr omth eCo ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 96-B-866 J. Randall Wyatt, Judge

No.M2001- 01866-SC-DDT-D D - F iled Augu st 25, 2004

A DOL PH O 

## A. B I RCH 

## , J R 

## ., J

. , co n cu rr i n g an dd i s s en t i n g. I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Davis’s convictions should be af firmed. As to the sentenc es of de at h , h owever, I continue to adhere to my views expressed in a longline of dissents beg inning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 920-25 (Tenn. 2000) (B irch, J., concur ring and dissenting ), and most rec ently elabor ated on in State v. Davidson, 121 S .W.3d 600, 629-36 (Te nn. Oct. 20, 2003) ( Birc h, J ., dissen t ing) , that the compar ative proportionalityrevie w protocol currently embra ced by the m ajority is inadequate t o shield defe ndants from the a rbitrary and disproportionate imposit ion of the death penalty

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 206(c) (1)( D)(1995 Sup p. ). I haverepe ate dly

e xpre sse d my

dis ple a su rewi th the c ur

re nt p ro toc ol s inc ethetim eof its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W .2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). See State v. Holton, 126 S.W .3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 2004) (B i rc h , J ., concur ring and dissenting ); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) (B irch, J., dis senting ); State v. Carter , 114 S.W .3d 895, 910-11 (Te nn. 2003) (B irch, J ., dissenting) ; S t at e v . R eid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 288-89 (Tenn. 2002) ( Birc h, J ., concur ring and dissenting) ; State v. Austin, 87 S .W.3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) ( Bi rc h , J

. , dissenting) ; State v. S t e v e n s , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d8 1 7 , 8 5 2 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ) ( B i r c h , J

. , c o n c u rri n g an dd i s s e n t i n g ) ; S t at ev . M c Ki n n e y, 74 S.W .3d 291, 320-22 (Tenn. 2002) (B irch, J., concurringand dissenting ); State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 431-32 (Te nn. 2001) (B irch, J ., concur ring and dissenting ); State v. Stout, 46 S .W.3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (B irch, J., concurringand dissenting ); Ter ry v. State, 46 S.W .3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (B irch, J., dis senting ); State v. Sims, 45 S .W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn. 2001 ) (B i rc h , J ., concur ring and dissenting) ; State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 19 6 , 2 3 3 -3 4 (Tenn. 2000) (B irch, J., dis senting ). As pre vio us ly

dis c us se d, I

be lie vethat th ethre eba sic pr ob le ms w iththec ur re nt p ro po rtion a lity

analy sis arethat: ( 1) thepr op ortio nality te st i s o verb ro a d, (2 ) thepo ol of case s us ed for c omp ari so n is 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1
cases o r “ d eat h” cases. See S t at e v. M cK i nney, 74 S.W

. 3 d a t 3 2 1 (B i rch, J

. , c o ncurri ng a nd dis sent i ng). T he current p rotoco l al l o ws a f

i nd i ng pro p o rt i o nal i t y i f t he case i s si m i l ar t o exi st i ng deat h pen al t y c a se s. In o the r wo rd s, a c a se is di s propo r t i onat e onl y i f t he cas e u nder r evi ew “ i s pl ai nl y l ack i ng i n c i r cums t anc es cons i s t ent wi t h t hos e i n s i mi l ar ca s es i n w hi ch t he d e a th p e n a lty has b een i m p o sed.” B l and , 95 8 S.W

. 2 d at 66 5 (emp hasi s ad d ed ).

In m y vie w , ex c lud ing fro m c o m p a riso n tha t gr o u p o f ca se s in w h ic h the S ta te d id no t se e k the d e a th p e n a lty, 2
o r i n w hich no ca p i t al senten cing he aring wa s held , f rustrates an y m ea ningful co m p ariso n for p ro p o rti o na l i t y pu rp o ses. S e e B la n d , 9 5 8 S .W .2 d a t 6 7 9 (B irc h , J., d isse n ting ).

As I s t at ed i n my c on cu r r i n g / di s s en t i n g opi n i on i n St at e v . G ods ey , “ [ t ] h e s cope of t h e an al y s i s e mpl oy ed by 3 t he major i t y appear s t o be r at her amorphous an d undef i ned–expan di ng , cont r act i ng , an d s hi f t i ng as t he ana l y s i s mo ves f rom case t o case. ” 60 S.W

. 3 d 75 9 , 79 7 (T enn. 20 0 1 )( B i rch, J. , co ncurri ng and dis sent i ng).

I a lso no te tha t i n a re c e n t stu d y o n the c o sts a n d the c o n se q u e n c e s o f the d e a th p e n a lty c o n d u c te d b y the S ta te 4 C o m p tro ller , o n e o f t h e c o n c lus io n s w a s tha t p ro se c u to rs a c ro ss th e s ta te a re inc o n siste n t i n the ir p u rs u it o f t h e d e a th p enal t y , a fact t hat al so co nt ri b ut es t o arbi t rari ness i n t he i m p o si t i o n o f th e de at h pe nal t y . See Jo hn G

. M o rgan, C o m p tro ller o f t h e T re a su ry, T e n n e sse e ’s D e a th P e n a lty: C o s ts a n d C o n se q u e n c e s 1 3 (J u ly 2 0 0 4 ), avai l abl e at w w w .c o m p tro ller.s ta te .tn .u s/o re a /rep o rts
. 

## -2- inadequate, and (3) revie w is too subje ctive. I have previously discussed, in depth, my

perc eption 2 3 

## that these flaws undermine thereliability of the c urrent proportionality protocol. See State v. Go d s e y , 6 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 9 3

- 8 0 0 ( B i r c h , J. , c o n c u rri n g an d d i s s e n t i n g )

. I c o n t i n u e t o a d h e r eto m y view that the current compar ative proportionality protocol is w oefully inadequate to p ro t ect defe ndants from the arbitra ry or disproportionate imposit ion of the death penalty

. Acc ording ly , I 4 

## re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt f ro m th at po rtion of the ma jority op ini ona ff

irmin g theimp os iti onof

thede ath penalty in this case.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B IRCH , JR.