DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

SHARONIT AMAR SELIGSOHN,

Appellant,

v.

JACOB SELIGSOHN,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-2411

[November 28, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Arthur M. Birken, Senior Judge; L.T. Case No. 

062015DR006386AXXXCE.

Craig A. Boudreau, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Sandor F. Genet of Sandor F. Genet & Associates, P.A., North Miami 

Beach, for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

The Former Wife raises ten issues in her appeal of the circuit court’s 

final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We agree with four arguments

raised by the Former Wife and reverse those portions of the final judgment. 

We affirm the remaining issues without comment.

First, we reverse the portion of the court’s judgment that required 

payment of guardian ad litem fees out of homestead-protected property. 

Second, we reverse the portion of the court’s order granting the Former 

Husband a blanket award of ultimate decision-making authority over all 

issues. Third, we reverse the court’s calculation of step-down child 

support, an issue the Former Husband concedes on appeal. Finally, we 

reverse the portion of the court’s order requiring the Former Wife to attend 

parent effectiveness training classes. 
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Analysis

i. The Court Erred in Ordering Payment of the Guardian Ad Litem 

Fees Out of Homestead Property

First, the Former Wife argues that the court erred when it ordered the 

forced sale of the parties’ marital home—the Former Wife’s homestead—to 

satisfy the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”) fees. The GAL fees are a third-party 

liability unrelated to the property.

The Florida Constitution grants strong homestead protection to real 

property. Art. X, § 4(a), Fla. Const. The Florida Supreme Court has held 

that based on the plain language of the constitution, “a homestead is only

subject to forced sale for (1) the payment of taxes and assessments 

thereon; (2) obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair 

thereof; or (3) obligations contracted for house, field or other labor 

performed on the realty.” Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 

1992).

This provision is liberally construed; “the Florida constitutional 

exemption of homesteads protects the homestead against every type of 

claim and judgment except those specifically mentioned in the 

constitutional provision itself[.]” Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 

1018, 1021 n.5 (Fla. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Unsecured 

creditors are not included as an exception to the homestead exemption. 

Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 852 (Fla. 2007) (citing Sherbill v. Miller 

Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 1956); Carter’s Adm’rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 

558, 570–71 (Fla. 1884)).

Former Wife argues the court erred when it required her to sell

homestead property to pay the fees of the GAL—an unsecured creditor. 

We agree.

Hua v. Tsung, 222 So. 3d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), is instructive. 

There, the dissolution of marriage judgment ordered that proceeds from 

the sale of a rental property be used to satisfy a debt to the husband’s 

father, and the remainder was to be divided equally between husband and 

wife. Id. at 590–91. The father’s loan to his son enabled the son to pay 

the mortgage on the rental property. Id. at 586.

We reversed, holding that “[i]n [a] dissolution action, the trial court does 

not have jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights of nonparties.” Id. at 

591 (alteration in original) (quoting Noormohamed v. Noormohamed, 179 

So. 3d 379, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). We explained that “by awarding 
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part of the proceeds of the sale of the rental property to the father, the 

court essentially placed an equitable lien on the property to allow the 

father to secure repayment of the loan. The court thus converted him from 

an unsecured creditor into a secured one.” Id.

Although the Former Wife’s property was homestead property, not 

rental property, the holding is instructive. Here, the court’s order of 

payment from proceeds functioned as an equitable lien on the couple’s 

homestead property to secure repayment of the unsecured debt. The 

Florida Constitution does not allow the court to pierce the homestead 

protection in such a manner.

Thus, we reverse the court’s order requiring payment of the GAL’s fee 

from the proceeds of the forced sale of the Former Wife’s homestead 

property. In reaching this conclusion, we do not decide whether the court 

could order payment of the GAL’s fees from other sources attributable to 

the Former Wife. That is an issue the circuit court can determine in the 

first instance on remand.

ii. The Court Erred in Awarding the Former Husband a Blanket 

Award of Ultimate Decision-Making Authority

Second, the Former Wife argues that, because any ultimate decisionmaking authority must be limited to specific issues, the court improperly 

awarded the Former Husband “ultimate decision-making authority as to 

all issues” as part of the parenting plan. We agree.

As part of the parties’ parenting plan, the court ordered Former Wife 

and Former Husband to exercise shared parental responsibility. But if the 

parties disagreed about an issue, the Former Husband was granted 

“ultimate decision-making authority as to all issues.”

As we noted in McClure v. Beck, 212 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017),

“[w]e have previously held that giving the primary residential parent 

unlimited decision making authority over all matters regarding the 

children is incompatible with shared parental responsibility.” Id. at 398 

(citing Schneider v. Schneider, 864 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). 

Instead, a court may award “one parent ultimate authority over specific

matters in situations where the parties are unable to come to an 

agreement.” Id. (citing Schneider, 864 So. 2d at 1195).

The Former Husband argues the blanket award of ultimate authority is 

supported by the record. He argues the “court did this to address [Former 

Wife’s] outrageous and obstructive conduct regarding all aspects of the 
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children’s welfare and maintenance.” We need not determine whether the 

statement is accurate. Even if the record supported a finding that the 

Former Wife’s conduct was “outrageous and obstructive,” the court lacked 

the authority to give one parent the ultimate decision-making authority 

over a child when the parents share responsibility.

On remand, any award of ultimate decision-making authority must be 

limited to specific decisions and those decisions must be expressly listed

in the final judgment. See McClure, 212 So. 3d at 399.

iii.The Court Erred in Deciding the Amount of Step-Down Child 

Support

Third, the Former Wife argues the court erred in its calculation of 

alimony after the oldest child reaches the age of eighteen. The Former 

Husband concedes that the court erred in its child support calculation for

the parties’ youngest child.

As the Former Wife argues and the Former Husband concedes, the 

award of child support continues for four years past the termination of 

alimony, for which the trial court failed to account. On remand, the court 

must recalculate child support for the period after the termination of 

alimony.

iv. The Court Erred in Ordering Former Wife to Attend Parent 

Effectiveness Training Classes

Finally, before entering the final judgment, the court ordered both 

parents to attend parent effectiveness training (“PET”) classes “to endeavor 

to get them to co-parent.” The Former Husband attended classes, but the 

Former Wife did not. In the final judgment, the court ordered that the 

Former Wife “attend weekly [PET classes] until further Court order. She 

shall demonstrate to the Court and in her parenting and verbally what has 

been taught to her, and that she understands what she has been taught 

and that she can put into practice what she has been taught.”

The Former Wife argues the trial court erred in ordering her to attend 

PET classes because the court lacks the authority to order a parent into 

therapy.

She relies on Ford v. Ford, 153 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), to 

support her argument. In Ford, as a remedy for violating the parenting 

plan, the court “ordered the former wife to obtain psychological counseling 

and continue with it ‘until she is able to convince [the two minor children] 
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that it is her desire that they see their father and love their father and to 

create a loving, caring feeling toward their father in their minds.’” Id. at 

318 (alteration in original). On appeal, the former wife did “not challenge 

the authority of the trial court to order counseling.” Id. at 319. Rather, 

she contended that “the counseling provision condition[ed] the duration of 

therapy on ‘vague, ambiguous and potentially insurmountable goals.’” Id.

We agreed with the former wife’s contention and held that the order was 

“vague and [] much too broad to be enforced.” Id. (citing Lanza v. Lanza, 

804 So. 2d 408, 409–10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).

Like Ford, the order here is vague and ambiguous about the scope and 

termination date of the ordered treatment. The court ordered the Former 

Wife to attend the classes “weekly until further Court order. It also 

required that Former Wife show the court, through parenting and verbally, 

that she “understands” and “can put into practice what she has been 

taught.” Because the court neither provided a duration for the compelled 

weekly classes nor identified a standard to judge the Former Wife’s 

compliance, the order is vague and unenforceable.1 Thus, we reverse that 

portion of the court’s order.

Conclusion

The court’s judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

TAYLOR and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

 

1 As a result of our conclusion, we need not address whether a court could ever 

order a party to a dissolution action to attend PET classes. That issue is left for 

a case where its resolution is dispositive.