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The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2023

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John B. Holway, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Negro Leagues Baseball Museum, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

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Submitted: February 5, 2008

Filed: February 12, 2008

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Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, John B. Holway appeals the district court’s1

 adverse

judgment holding that his claims against the Negro Leagues Baseball Museum, Inc.

(NLBM) were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Upon careful

consideration, we find Holway’s arguments on appeal to be without merit, and we

affirm.
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First, NLBM did not waive its statute-of-limitations defense by failing to cite

the specific statute in its answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (party shall state defenses

in short and plain terms), (c) (party shall set forth affirmative defenses such as statute

of limitations); Buttice v. G.D. Searle & Co., 938 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E. D. Mo. 1996)

(rejecting argument that defendant was required to include in answer specific statute

of limitations; holding Rule 8(c) was satisfied where answer stated, “Plaintiff’s claims

are barred by the applicable statute of limitations”). 

We further conclude that the district court did not plainly err in submitting to

the jury an instruction--to which Holway did not object--related to NLBM’s statuteof-limitations defense. Contrary to Holway’s arguments, there was ample evidence

at trial supporting the submission of the jury instruction. See Slidell, Inc. v.

Millenium Inorganic Chems., Inc., 460 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006) (while district

court’s jury instructions are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, review is for

plain error if challenging party failed in district court to object to instruction and state

grounds therefor; under plain-error standard, review is confined to exceptional cases

where error has seriously affected fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings). Likewise, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

See id. at1057 (rejecting appellant’s argument that no evidence supported jury finding

of waiver of breach of contract; “We construe this argument as one based on Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Under this rule, the district court’s denial of a new trial

is virtually unassailable, and we will reverse only when there is an absolute absence

of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”)

We also find no merit to Holway’s newly asserted equitable-estoppel argument

challenging NLBM’s statute-of-limitations defense. See McCrary v. Truman Med.

Ctr., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (equitable estoppel requires

defendant to have induced plaintiff to delay bringing suit until after statutory period

expired; doctrine did not apply where defendant made no promises or representations

to plaintiff to persuade her not to file suit). 
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Finally, because the issue of damages is moot, we need not consider Holway’s

challenge to the district court’s exclusion of his damages expert as a trial witness.

The judgment is affirmed. 

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