(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TREVINO v. THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS 

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 11–10189. Argued February 25, 2013—Decided May 28, 2013 

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, ___, this Court held that “a procedural

default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial

claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the [State’s] initial-review

collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez regarded a prisoner from Arizona,

where state procedural law required the prisoner to raise the claim 

during his first state collateral review proceeding. Ibid. This case 

regards a prisoner from Texas, where state procedural law does not 

require a defendant to raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim on collateral review. Rather, Texas law appears to permit a 

prisoner to raise such a claim on direct review, but the structure and 

design of the Texas system make it virtually impossible for a prisoner 

to do so. The question presented in this case is whether, despite this

difference, the rule set out in Martinez applies in Texas.

Petitioner Trevino was convicted of capital murder in Texas state

court and sentenced to death after the jury found insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a life sentence. Neither new counsel 

appointed for his direct appeal nor new counsel appointed for state 

collateral review raised the claim that Trevino’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances. When 

that claim was finally raised in Trevino’s federal habeas petition, the

District Court stayed the proceedings so Trevino could raise it in 

state court. The state court found the claim procedurally defaulted

because of Trevino’s failure to raise it in his initial state postconviction proceedings, and the federal court then concluded that this fail-
 

 

 

 

2 TREVINO v. THALER 

Syllabus 

ure was an independent and adequate state ground barring the federal courts from considering the claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 

Its decision predated Martinez, but that court has since concluded 

that Martinez does not apply in Texas because Martinez’s good-cause

exception applies only where state law says that a defendant must initially raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in initial

state collateral review proceedings, while Texas law appears to permit a defendant to raise that claim on direct appeal. 

Held: Where, as here, a State’s procedural framework, by reason of its 

design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a

defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal, the exception recognized in Martinez applies. Pp. 5–15.

(a) A finding that a defendant’s state law “procedural default” rests 

on “an independent and adequate state ground” ordinarily prevents a 

federal habeas court from considering the defendant’s federal constitutional claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722,729–730. However, a “prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by

showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of the 

federal law.” Martinez, supra, at ___. In Martinez, the Court recognized a “narrow exception” to Coleman’s statement “that an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does 

not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default.” 566 U. S., at 

___. That exception allows a federal habeas court to find “cause” to

excuse such default where (1) the ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of

there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state

collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law requires that the

claim “be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.” Id., at 

___. Pp. 5–8.

(b) The difference between the Texas law—which in theory grants 

permission to bring an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on

direct appeal but in practice denies a meaningful opportunity to do 

so—and the Arizona law at issue in Martinez—which required the

claim to be raised in an initial collateral review proceeding—does not

matter in respect to the application of Martinez. Pp. 8–14.

(1) This conclusion is supported by two characteristics of Texas’

procedures. First, Texas procedures make it nearly impossible for an

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim to be presented on direct 

review. The nature of an ineffective-assistance claim means that the 

trial record is likely to be insufficient to support the claim. And a 

motion for a new trial to develop the record is usually inadequate be-
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Syllabus 

cause of Texas rules regarding time limits on the filing, and the disposal, of such motions and the availability of trial transcripts. Thus, 

a writ of habeas corpus is normally needed to gather the facts necessary for evaluating these claims in Texas. Second, were Martinez not 

to apply, the Texas procedural system would create significant unfairness because Texas courts in effect have directed defendants to 

raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims on collateral, rather than on direct, review. Texas can point to only a few cases in

which a defendant has used the motion-for-a-new-trial mechanism to 

expand the record on appeal. Texas suggests that there are other 

mechanisms by which a prisoner can expand the record on appeal,

but these mechanisms seem special and limited in their application,

and cannot overcome the Texas courts’ own well-supported determination that collateral review normally is the preferred procedural 

route for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Respondent also argues that there is no equitable problem here, where

appellate counsel’s failure to bring a substantial ineffectiveassistance claim on direct appeal may constitute cause to excuse the 

procedural default, but respondent points to no case in which such a 

failure by appellate counsel has been deemed constitutionally ineffective. Pp. 8–13.

(2) The very factors that led this Court to create a narrow exception to Coleman in Martinez similarly argue for applying that exception here. The right involved—adequate assistance of trial counsel—

is similarly and critically important. In both instances practical considerations—the need for a new lawyer, the need to expand the trial

court record, and the need for sufficient time to develop the claim—

argue strongly for initial consideration of the claim during collateral,

not on direct, review. See Martinez, 566 U. S., at ___. In both instances failure to consider a lawyer’s “ineffectiveness” during an initial-review collateral proceeding as a potential “cause” for excusing a 

procedural default will deprive the defendant of any opportunity for 

review of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. See id., at 

___. Thus, for present purposes, a distinction between (1) a State

that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2) a 

State that grants permission but denies a fair, meaningful opportunity to develop the claim is a distinction without a difference. Pp. 13– 

14. 

449 Fed. Appx. 415, vacated and remanded. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for the Court, in which KENNEDY, 

GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a 

dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–10189 

CARLOS TREVINO, PETITIONER v. RICK THALER,
 

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

DIVISION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 28, 2013] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), we considered 

the right of a state prisoner to raise, in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. In that case an Arizona procedural rule required 

a defendant convicted at trial to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel during his first state collateral

review proceeding—or lose the claim. The defendant in 

Martinez did not comply with the state procedural rule. 

But he argued that the federal habeas court should excuse 

his state procedural failing, on the ground that he had 

good “cause” for not raising the claim at the right time,

namely that, not only had he lacked effective counsel

during trial, but also he lacked effective counsel during his 

first state collateral review proceeding. 

We held that lack of counsel on collateral review might

excuse defendant’s state law procedural default. We 

wrote: 

“[A] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas 
 

2 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective

assistance at trial if, in the [State’s] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in

that proceeding was ineffective.” Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 15). 

At the same time we qualified our holding. We said 

that the holding applied where state procedural law said

that “claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must 

be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.” Ibid. 

(emphasis added).

In this case Texas state law does not say “must.” It does 

not on its face require a defendant initially to raise an 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding. Rather, that law appears at

first glance to permit (but not require) the defendant 

initially to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel on direct appeal. The structure and design of the 

Texas system in actual operation, however, make it “virtually impossible” for an ineffective assistance claim to be

presented on direct review. See Robinson v. State, 16 

S. W. 3d 808, 810–811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We must 

now decide whether the Martinez exception applies in this 

procedural regime. We conclude that it does. 

I 

A Texas state court jury convicted petitioner, Carlos 

Trevino, of capital murder. After a subsequent penaltyphase hearing, the jury found that Trevino “would commit 

criminal acts of violence in the future which would constitute a continuing threat to society,” that he “actually

caused the death of Linda Salinas or, if he did not actually 

cause her death, he intended to kill her or another, or he 

anticipated a human life would be taken,” and that “there

were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a 

sentence of life imprisonment” rather than death. 449 

Fed. Appx. 415, 418 (CA5 2011). The judge consequently 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

imposed a sentence of death. 

Eight days later the judge appointed new counsel to 

handle Trevino’s direct appeal. App. 1, 3. Seven months 

after sentencing, when the trial transcript first became 

available, that counsel filed an appeal. The Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals then considered and rejected Trevino’s

appellate claims. Trevino’s appellate counsel did not 

claim that Trevino’s trial counsel had been constitutionally 

ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial court proceedings. Id., at 12–24. 

About six months after sentencing, the trial judge appointed Trevino a different new counsel to seek state 

collateral relief. As Texas’ procedural rules provide, that

third counsel initiated collateral proceedings while Trevino’s appeal still was in progress. This new counsel first 

sought postconviction relief (through collateral review) in

the trial court itself. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief; and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed that denial. Id., at 25–26, 321–349. Trevino’s 

postconviction claims included a claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty

phase of Trevino’s trial, but it did not include a claim that 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness consisted in part of a failure 

adequately to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase of Trevino’s trial. Id., at 

321–349; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 523 (2003) 

(counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating

circumstances deprived defendant of effective assistance of

counsel).

Trevino then filed a petition in federal court seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus. The Federal District Court appointed another new counsel to represent him. And that 

counsel claimed for the first time that Trevino had not 

received constitutionally effective counsel during the 

penalty phase of his trial in part because of trial counsel’s

failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating 
 

4 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

circumstances during the penalty phase. App. 438, 456–

478. Federal habeas counsel pointed out that Trevino’s 

trial counsel had presented only one witness at the sentencing phase, namely Trevino’s aunt. The aunt had 

testified that Trevino had had a difficult upbringing, that 

his mother had an alcohol problem, that his family was on

welfare, and that he had dropped out of high school. She 

had added that Trevino had a child, that he was good with

children, and that he was not violent. Id., at 285–291. 

Federal habeas counsel then told the federal court that 

Trevino’s trial counsel should have found and presented at 

the penalty phase other mitigating matters that his own

investigation had brought to light. These included, among

other things, that Trevino’s mother abused alcohol while 

she was pregnant with Trevino, that Trevino weighed only 

four pounds at birth, that throughout his life Trevino

suffered the deleterious effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,

that as a child Trevino had suffered numerous head injuries without receiving adequate medical attention, that

Trevino’s mother had abused him physically and emotionally, that from an early age Trevino was exposed to, and 

abused, alcohol and drugs, that Trevino had attended

school irregularly and performed poorly, and that Trevino’s cognitive abilities were impaired. Id., at 66–67. 

The federal court stayed proceedings to permit Trevino

to raise this claim in state court. The state court held that 

because Trevino had not raised this claim during his 

initial postconviction proceedings, he had procedurally

defaulted the claim, id., at 27–28; and the Federal District 

Court then denied Trevino’s ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim, id., at 78–79. The District Court concluded 

in relevant part that, despite the fact that “even the most

minimal investigation . . . would have revealed a wealth

of additional mitigating evidence,” an independent and 

adequate state ground (namely Trevino’s failure to raise

the issue during his state postconviction proceeding) 
 

 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

barred the federal habeas court from considering the 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id., at 131– 

132. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729–730 

(1991).

Trevino appealed. The Fifth Circuit, without considering the merits of Trevino’s ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim, agreed with the District Court that an

independent, adequate state ground, namely Trevino’s

procedural default, barred its consideration. 449 Fed. 

Appx., at 426. Although the Circuit decided Trevino’s case 

before this Court decided Martinez, the Fifth Circuit’s 

reasoning in a later case, Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F. 3d 222 

(2012), makes clear that the Fifth Circuit would have 

found that Martinez would have made no difference. 

That is because in Ibarra the Circuit recognized that 

Martinez had said that its good-cause exception applies

where state law says that a criminal defendant must 

initially raise his claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel in initial state collateral review proceedings. 687 

F. 3d, at 225–226. Texas law, the Circuit pointed out, does

not say explicitly that the defendant must initially raise

the claim in state collateral review proceedings. Rather 

Texas law on its face appears to permit a criminal defendant to raise such a claim on direct appeal. Id., at 227. 

And the Circuit held that that fact means that Martinez 

does not apply in Texas. 687 F. 3d, at 227. Since the 

Circuit’s holding in Ibarra (that Martinez does not apply 

in Texas) would similarly govern this case, we granted 

certiorari here to determine whether Martinez applies in

Texas. 

II
 

A 

We begin with Martinez. We there recognized the historic importance of federal habeas corpus proceedings as 

a method for preventing individuals from being held in 
 

 

 

6 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

custody in violation of federal law. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 6–7). See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U. S. 475, 484–485 (1973). In general, if a convicted 

state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court 

that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal 

Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus 

that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release.

We similarly recognized the importance of federal habeas corpus principles designed to prevent federal courts

from interfering with a State’s application of its own firmly

established, consistently followed, constitutionally proper

procedural rules. Martinez, supra, at ___ (slip op., at

6–7). Those principles have long made clear that a 

conviction that rests upon a defendant’s state law “procedural default” (for example, the defendant’s failure to raise 

a claim of error at the time or in the place that state law 

requires), normally rests upon “an independent and adequate state ground.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 729–730. 

And where a conviction rests upon such a ground, a federal habeas court normally cannot consider the defendant’s

federal constitutional claim. Ibid.; see Martinez, 566 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6–7).

At the same time, we pointed out that “[t]he doctrine

barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is

not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal

review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 6–7). And we turned to the issue directly 

before the Court: whether Martinez had shown “cause” to 

excuse his state procedural failing. Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 15).

Martinez argued that his lawyer should have raised, but 

did not raise, his claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel during state collateral review proceedings. Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 4). He added that this failure, itself 

amounting to ineffective assistance, was the “cause” of, 
 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

and ought to excuse, his procedural default. Id., at ___ 

(slip op., at 4). But this Court had previously held that

“[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction 

attorney does not qualify as ‘cause,’” primarily because a

“principal” such as the prisoner, “bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent,” the attorney. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 12) 

(quoting Coleman, supra, at 753–754; emphasis added).

Martinez, in effect, argued for an exception to Coleman’s 

broad statement of the law. 

We ultimately held that a “narrow exception” should

“modify the unqualified statement in Coleman that an 

attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction

proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We 

did so for three reasons. First, the “right to the effective

assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our 

justice system. . . . Indeed, the right to counsel is the

foundation for our adversary system.” Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 9).

Second, ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appellate review could amount to “cause,” excusing a defendant’s failure to raise (and thus procedurally defaulting) a 

constitutional claim. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). But States 

often have good reasons for initially reviewing claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel during state collateral proceedings rather than on direct appellate review. 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9–10). That is because review of 

such a claim normally requires a different attorney, because it often “depend[s] on evidence outside the trial

record,” and because efforts to expand the record on direct

appeal may run afoul of “[a]bbreviated deadlines,” depriving the new attorney of “adequate time . . . to investigate

the ineffective-assistance claim.” Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 10).

Third, where the State consequently channels initial 
 

8 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

review of this constitutional claim to collateral proceedings, a lawyer’s failure to raise an ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim during initial-review collateral 

proceedings, could (were Coleman read broadly) deprive a

defendant of any review of that claim at all. Martinez, 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7).

We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a federal habeas court to find “cause,” 

thereby excusing a defendant’s procedural default, where

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was 

a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there 

being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the

state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral 

review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in 

respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an 

initial-review collateral proceeding.” Martinez, supra, at 

___ (slip op., at 11, 15). 

B 

Here state law differs from that in Martinez in respect

to the fourth requirement. Unlike Arizona, Texas does not 

expressly require the defendant to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an initial collateral 

review proceeding. Rather Texas law on its face appears 

to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim 

on direct appeal. Does this difference matter? 

1 

Two characteristics of the relevant Texas procedures

lead us to conclude that it should not make a difference in 

respect to the application of Martinez. First, Texas procedure makes it “virtually impossible for appellate counsel

to adequately present an ineffective assistance [of trial

counsel] claim” on direct review. Robinson, 16 S. W. 3d, at 
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

810–811. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself 

has pointed out, “the inherent nature of most ineffective

assistance” of trial counsel “claims” means that the trial 

court record will often fail to “contai[n] the information

necessary to substantiate” the claim. Ex parte Torres, 943 

S. W. 2d 469, 475 (1997) (en banc).

As the Court of Criminal Appeals has also noted, a 

convicted defendant may make a motion in the trial court

for a new trial in order to develop the record on appeal. 

See Reyes v. State, 849 S. W. 2d 812, 816 (1993). And, in 

principle, the trial court could, in connection with that

motion, allow the defendant some additional time to develop a further record. Ibid. But that motion-for-new-trial 

“vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints

and because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this point.” Torres, supra, at 475. See Tex. Rule 

App. Proc. 21.4 (2013) (motion for a new trial must be

made within 30 days of sentencing); Rules 21.8(a), (c) (trial

court must dispose of motion within 75 days of sentencing); Rules 35.2(b), 35.3(c) (transcript must be prepared 

within 120 days of sentencing where a motion for a new 

trial is filed and this deadline may be extended). Thus, as 

the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded, in Texas “a

writ of habeas corpus” issued in state collateral proceedings ordinarily “is essential to gathering the facts necessary to . . . evaluate . . . [ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel] claims.” Torres, supra, at 475. See Robinson, 

supra, at 810–811 (noting that there is “not generally a

realistic opportunity to adequately develop the record for 

appeal in post-trial motions” and that “[t]he time requirements for filing and presenting a motion for new trial 

would have made it virtually impossible for appellate

counsel to adequately present an ineffective assistance 

claim to the trial court”). 

 See also Thompson v. State, 9 S. W. 3d 808, 813–814, 

and n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[I]n the vast majority of 
 

 

10 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

cases, the undeveloped record on direct appeal will be 

insufficient for an appellant to satisfy the dual prongs of 

Strickland”; only “[r]arely will a reviewing court be provided the opportunity to make its determination on direct

appeal with a record capable of providing a fair evaluation 

of the merits of the claim . . .”); Goodspeed v. State, 187 

S. W. 3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (similar); Andrews v. State, 159 S. W. 3d 98, 102–103 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005) (similar); Ex parte Brown, 158 S. W. 3d 449, 453 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam) (similar); Jackson v. 

State, 973 S. W. 2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per 

curiam) (similar). See also 42 G. Dix & J. Schmolesky, 

Texas Practice Series §29:76, pp. 844–845 (3d ed. 2011) 

(hereinafter Texas Practice) (explaining that “[o]ften” the 

requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel be supported by a record containing direct evidence of why counsel acted as he did “will require that the

claim . . . be raised in postconviction habeas proceedings

where a full record on the matter can be raised”).

This opinion considers whether, as a systematic matter,

Texas affords meaningful review of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. The present capital case illustrates why it does not. The trial court appointed new

counsel for Trevino eight days after sentencing. Counsel 

thus had 22 days to decide whether, and on what grounds,

to make a motion for a new trial. She then may have had 

an additional 45 days to provide support for the motion

but without the help of a transcript (which did not become 

available until much later—seven months after the trial).

It would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, within

that time frame to investigate Trevino’s background, determine whether trial counsel had adequately done so,

and then develop evidence about additional mitigating 

background circumstances. See Reyes, supra, at 816 

(“[M]otions for new trial [must] be supported by affidavit 

. . . specifically showing the truth of the grounds of 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

attack”).

 Second, were Martinez not to apply, the Texas procedural system would create significant unfairness. That 

is because Texas courts in effect have directed defendants 

to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

on collateral, rather than on direct, review. As noted, they

have explained why direct review proceedings are likely 

inadequate. See supra, at 8–10. They have held that 

failure to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the 

defendant from raising the claim in collateral proceedings. 

See, e.g., Robinson, 16 S. W. 3d, at 813; Ex parte Duffy, 

607 S. W. 2d 507, 512–513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (overruled on other grounds by Hernandez v. State, 988 S. W. 

2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). They have held that the

defendant’s decision to raise the claim on direct review 

does not bar the defendant from also raising the claim in 

collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 343 S. W. 

3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Torres, supra, at 475. 

They have suggested that appellate counsel’s failure to 

raise the claim on direct review does not constitute “ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Sprouse v. State, No. 

AP–74933, 2007 WL 283152, *7 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 31, 

2007) (unpublished). And Texas’ highest criminal court

has explicitly stated that “[a]s a general rule” the defendant “should not raise an issue of ineffective assistance 

of counsel on direct appeal,” but rather in collateral review proceedings. Mata v. State, 226 S. W. 3d 425, 430, 

n. 14 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Robinson, supra, at 810 (“[A] post-conviction writ proceeding,

rather than a motion for new trial, is the preferred method

for gathering the facts necessary to substantiate” an 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim).

The criminal bar, not surprisingly, has taken this strong

judicial advice seriously. See Guidelines and Standards 

for Texas Capital Counsel, 69 Tex. B. J. 966, 977, Guideline 12.2(B)(1)(d) (2006) (“[S]tate habeas corpus is the first 
 

 

12 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

opportunity for a capital client to raise challenges to the 

effectiveness of trial or direct appeal counsel”). Texas now 

can point to only a comparatively small number of cases in

which a defendant has used the motion-for-a-new-trial 

mechanism to expand the record on appeal and then received a hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim on direct appeal. Brief for Respondent

35–36, and n. 6 (citing, inter alia, State v. Morales, 253 S. W. 

3d 686, 689–691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Robertson v. 

State, 187 S. W. 3d 475, 480–481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). 

And, of those, precisely one case involves trial counsel’s 

investigative failures of the kind at issue here. See Armstrong v. State, No. AP–75706, 2010 WL 359020 (Tex.

Crim. App., Jan. 27, 2010) (unpublished). How could 

federal law deny defendants the benefit of Martinez solely

because of the existence of a theoretically available procedural alternative, namely direct appellate review, that

Texas procedures render so difficult, and in the typical

case all but impossible, to use successfully, and which

Texas courts so strongly discourage defendants from

using?

Respondent argues that Texas courts enforce the relevant time limits more flexibly than we have suggested. 

Sometimes, for example, an appellate court can abate an

appeal and remand the case for further record development in the trial court. See Cooks v. State, 240 S. W. 3d 

906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But the procedural possibilities to which Texas now points seem special, limited in 

their application, and, as far as we can tell, rarely used.

See 43A Texas Practice §50:15, at 636–639; 43B id., 

§56:235, at 607–609. Cooks, for example, the case upon 

which respondent principally relies, involved a remand for

further record development, but in circumstances where 

the lower court wrongly failed to give a defendant new 

counsel in time to make an ordinary new trial motion. 240 

S. W. 3d, at 911. We do not believe that this, or other, 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

special, rarely used procedural possibilities can overcome 

the Texas courts’ own well-supported determination that

collateral review normally constitutes the preferred—and

indeed as a practical matter, the only—method for raising

an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

Respondent further argues that there is no equitable 

problem to be solved in Texas because if counsel fails to

bring a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel on direct appeal, the ineffectiveness of appellate

counsel may constitute cause to excuse the procedural 

default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986). But 

respondent points to no case in which such a failure by

appellate counsel has been deemed constitutionally ineffective. And that lack of authority is not surprising given

the fact that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has 

directed defendants to bring such claims on collateral 

review. 

2 

For the reasons just stated, we believe that the Texas 

procedural system—as a matter of its structure, design,

and operation—does not offer most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel on direct appeal. What the Arizona law 

prohibited by explicit terms, Texas law precludes as a

matter of course. And, that being so, we can find no significant difference between this case and Martinez. The very 

factors that led this Court to create a narrow exception to 

Coleman in Martinez similarly argue for the application of 

that exception here.

The right involved—adequate assistance of counsel at 

trial—is similarly and critically important. In both instances practical considerations, such as the need for a 

new lawyer, the need to expand the trial court record, and

the need for sufficient time to develop the claim, argue

strongly for initial consideration of the claim during col-
 

14 TREVINO v. THALER 

Opinion of the Court 

lateral, rather than on direct, review. See Martinez, 566 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10); see also Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U. S. 500, 505 (2003). In both instances failure 

to consider a lawyer’s “ineffectiveness” during an initialreview collateral proceeding as a potential “cause” for 

excusing a procedural default will deprive the defendant 

of any opportunity at all for review of an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim. See Martinez, supra, at 

___ (slip op., at 7). 

Thus, for present purposes, a distinction between (1) a 

State that denies permission to raise the claim on direct 

appeal and (2) a State that in theory grants permission

but, as a matter of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction without a difference. In saying this, we do not (any 

more than we did in Martinez) seek to encourage States 

to tailor direct appeals so that they provide a fuller opportunity to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claims. That is a matter for the States to decide. And, as 

we have said, there are often good reasons for hearing the

claim initially during collateral proceedings. 

III 

For these reasons, we conclude that where, as here, 

state procedural framework, by reason of its design and 

operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that 

a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct 

appeal, our holding in Martinez applies: 

“[A] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas

court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that

proceeding was ineffective.” 566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 15). 
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

Given this holding, Texas submits that its courts should

be permitted, in the first instance, to decide the merits

of Trevino’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 

Brief for Respondent 58–60. We leave that matter to be 

determined on remand. Likewise, we do not decide here 

whether Trevino’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel is substantial or whether Trevino’s initial state 

habeas attorney was ineffective.

For these reasons we vacate the Fifth Circuit’s judgment

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–10189 

CARLOS TREVINO, PETITIONER v. RICK THALER,
 

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

DIVISION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 28, 2013] 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO 

joins, dissenting. 

In our federal system, the “state courts are the principal

forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state 

convictions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. __, __ (2011) 

(slip op., at 13). “Federal courts sitting in habeas,” we 

have said, “are not an alternative forum for trying . . . 

issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue 

in state proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 

437 (2000). This basic principle reflects the fact that

federal habeas review “‘intrudes on state sovereignty to

a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.’” Richter, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., 

dissenting)).

In order to prevent circumvention of the state courts

and the unjustified intrusion on state sovereignty that

results, we have held that “a state prisoner [who] fails to 

exhaust state remedies . . . [or] has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal 

claims” will not be entitled to federal habeas relief unless 

he can show “cause” to excuse his default. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 732, 750 (1991). There is an 
 

 

2 TREVINO v. THALER 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

exception to that rule where “failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” ibid.; 

that exception is not at issue here.

Cause comes in different forms, but the one relevant 

here is attorney error. We recognized in Coleman that 

“[w]here a [habeas] petitioner defaults a claim as a result 

of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, 

the State, which is responsible for the denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default.” 

Id., at 754. But we simultaneously recognized that “[a] 

different allocation of costs is appropriate in those circumstances where the State has no responsibility to ensure 

that the petitioner was represented by competent counsel.” 

Ibid. In that situation, we held, “it is the petitioner who 

must bear the burden of a failure to follow state procedural rules.” Ibid. Because the error in Coleman occurred 

during state postconviction proceedings, a point at which

the habeas petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel, the petitioner had to bear the cost of his default. Id., 

at 757. 

Last Term, in Martinez v. Ryan, we announced a “narrow exception” to Coleman’s “unqualified statement . . .

that an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a 

procedural default.” 566 U. S. 1, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6). 

In Martinez, Arizona law did not allow defendants to raise 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal;

they could only raise such claims in state collateral proceedings. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). We held that while 

Arizona was free to structure its state court procedures in 

this way, its “decision is not without consequences for the 

State’s ability to assert a procedural default in later proceedings.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10). “By deliberately

choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the 

direct-appeal process, where counsel is constitutionally 

guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes prisoners’ 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

ability to file such claims.” Ibid. Thus, “within the context of this state procedural framework,” attorney error 

would qualify as cause to excuse procedural default if it 

occurred in the first proceeding at which the prisoner was 

“allow[ed]” to raise his trial ineffectiveness claim. Id., at 

___, ___ (slip op., at 10, 13). 

We were unusually explicit about the narrowness of our 

decision: “The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings,” and “does not 

extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the

first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of

ineffective assistance at trial.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at

13–14). “Our holding here addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where the State

barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct

appeal.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). In “all but the limited 

circumstances recognized here,” we said, “[t]he rule of 

Coleman governs.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). 

This aggressively limiting language was not simply a 

customary nod to the truism that “we decide only the case 

before us.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 396 

(1981). It was instead an important part of our explanation for why “[t]his limited qualification to Coleman does 

not implicate the usual concerns with upsetting reliance 

interests protected by stare decisis principles.” Martinez, 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 12). The fact that the exception

was clearly delineated ensured that the Coleman rule 

would remain administrable. And because States could 

readily anticipate how such a sharply defined exception 

would apply to various procedural frameworks, the exception could be reconciled with our concerns for comity and

equitable balancing that led to Coleman’s baseline rule in 

the first place. See Coleman, supra, at 750–751. The 

States had a clear choice, which they could make with full 

knowledge of the consequences: If a State “deliberately

cho[se] to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the 
 

 

 

4 TREVINO v. THALER 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

direct-appeal process” through a “decision to bar defendants

from raising” them there, then—and only then—would 

“counsel’s ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding qualif[y] as cause for a procedural default.” 

Martinez, 566 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 10, 14). 

Today, with hardly a mention of these concerns, the

majority throws over the crisp limit we made so explicit

just last Term. We announced in Martinez that the exception applies “where the State barred the defendant from

raising the claims on direct appeal.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at

14). But today, the Court takes all the starch out of its

rule with an assortment of adjectives, adverbs, and modifying clauses: Martinez’s “narrow exception” now applies

whenever the “state procedural framework, by reason of 

its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a 

typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful

opportunity” to raise his claim on direct appeal. Ante, at 

14. 

The questions raised by this equitable equation are as

endless as will be the state-by-state litigation it takes to

work them out. We are not told, for example, how meaningful is meaningful enough, how meaningful-ness is to be 

measured, how unlikely highly unlikely is, how often a 

procedural framework’s “operation” must be reassessed, or

what case qualifies as the “typical” case. Take just this

last example: The case before us involved a jury trial

(hardly typical), a capital conviction (even less typical),

and—as the majority emphasizes—a particular species of 

ineffectiveness claim that depends on time-consuming

investigation of personal background and other mitigating

circumstances. Ante, at 10. Yet the majority holds it up,

apparently, as a case that is typical in the relevant sense, 

saying that “[t]he present capital case illustrates” the 

“systematic” working of Texas’s procedural framework. 

Ibid. 

Given that the standard is so opaque and malleable, the 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

majority cannot describe the exception applied here as 

narrow, and does not do so. Gone are the repeated words

of limitation that characterized the Martinez opinion.

Gone too is the clear choice that Martinez gave the States

about how to structure their criminal justice systems. 

Now, the majority offers them a gamble: If a State allows

defendants to bring ineffectiveness claims both on direct 

appeal and in postconviction proceedings, then a prisoner 

might have to comply with state procedural requirements

in order to preserve the availability of federal habeas

review, if a federal judge decides that the state system

gave the defendant (or enough other “typical” defendants) 

a sufficiently meaningful opportunity to press his claim.

This invitation to litigation will, in precisely the manner

that Coleman foreclosed, “‘frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith

attempts to honor constitutional rights.’” Coleman, 501 

U. S., at 748 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 

(1982)). In what I suspect (though cannot know) will be a

broad swath of cases, the Court’s approach will excuse 

procedural defaults that, under Coleman, should preclude

federal review. But even in cases where federal courts 

ultimately decide that the habeas petitioner cannot establish cause under the new standard, the years of procedural

wrangling it takes to reach that decision will themselves 

undermine the finality of sentences necessary to effective 

criminal justice. Because that approach is inconsistent

with Coleman, Martinez itself, and the principles of equitable discretion and comity at the heart of both, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–10189 

CARLOS TREVINO, PETITIONER v. RICK THALER,
 

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

DIVISION
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 28, 2013] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting. 

I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012). That opinion sought to

minimize the impact of its novel holding as follows: 

“Our holding here addresses only the constitutional 

claims presented in this case, where the State barred 

the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal.’’ Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). 

I wrote in my dissent: 

“That line lacks any principled basis, and will not last.’’ 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2, n. 1). 

The Court says today: 

“Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim on direct appeal. Does this difference matter?’’ “[W]e can find no 

significant difference between this case and Martinez.’’ Ante, at 8, 13 (emphasis removed).