United States Court of Appeals

 for the eighth circuit

 ___________

 

 No. 96-2277

 ___________

 

 Justus Graf Von Kerssenbrock- *

 Praschma, a citizen of Germany, *

 *

 Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United

States

 v. * District Court for the

 * Western District of

Missouri.

 John Saunders, Director of the *

 Missouri Department of *

 Agriculture; Jeremiah W. Nixon, *

 Attorney General of the State of*

 Missouri, *

 *

 Appellees. *

 ___________

 

 Submitted: April 14, 1997

 Filed: August 1, 1997

 ___________

 

 Before FAGG, MAGILL, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

 ___________

 

 MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

 

 Justus Graf Von Kerssenbrock-Praschma appeals both the 

 district court's(1) dismissal of his Just Compensation Clause

claim 

 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district

court's 

 grant of summary judgment against Praschma on his Equal

 
 (1) The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District

Judge 

 for the Western District of Missouri.

 

 

 

 

 
 

 Protection Clause claim. He sought to enjoin Missouri

enforcement 

 of an anti-alien farmland transfer statute relating to the

transfer 

 of farmland to his two sons who live in Germany. On appeal, 

 Praschma argues that: (1) the enforcement of sections 442.560 

 through 442.592 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (the Missouri 

 statute), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 442.560-442.592 (1987 & Supp.

1989), 

 would violate the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 

 between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany

(FCN 

 Treaty), 7 U.S.T. 1839 (1956); (2) the enforcement of the

Missouri 

 statute would violate equal protection; and (3) the district

court 

 has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Praschma's takings

claim 

 even though Praschma has not yet attempted to obtain just 

 compensation through state procedures. We affirm.

 

 I.

 

 In a prior appeal, this Court summarized the background of 

 this case as follows:

 

 Praschma is a sixty-six-year-old German citizen. In 

 the spring and summer of 1978, he obtained fee simple 

 absolute title in two tracts of Missouri farmland 

 totalling approximately 1100 acres. Praschma has 

 indicated that he wishes to "devise, deed, transfer or 

 otherwise dispose of" the two tracts of farmland to Georg 

 and Justus, his two sons, who are also aliens. Neither 

 son is a plaintiff in this action. Praschma has executed 

 a will that leaves the farmland to his son Georg, and he 

 has indicated that he wishes to transfer one farm to each 

 of his sons by deed. 

 

 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.571(1) (1986) prevents 

 acquisition of agricultural land by aliens. The statute 

 applies to any transfer by Praschma to his sons, but does 

 not apply to Praschma's holding of the land because the 

 statute became effective after Praschma acquired his land 

 and contains a grandfather clause exempting lands held by 

 aliens before the effective date of the statute. Mo. 

 Rev. Stat. §§ 442.576(1) (1986), 442.586 (1986 & Supp. 

 1994). Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.576 provides the means for 

 enforcing the scheme. Upon learning of a violation, the 

 attorney general is instructed to obtain a court order 

 requiring the alien owner to

 
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 divest himself of the land. If the alien does not comply 

 with the order within two years, the land is sold at 

 public sale. 

 

 Praschma brought an action for injunctive relief, 

 arguing that Missouri's statutory scheme is 

 unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it 

 violates (among other things) the Takings Clause of the 

 Fifth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Due 

 Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 

 Amendment. The district court dismissed the action 

 because it found that Praschma lacked standing, and 

 Praschma timely appealed.

 

 Von Kerssenbrock-Praschma v. Saunders, 48 F.3d 323, 324-25 (8th 

 Cir. 1995). This Court reversed the district court's dismissal

and 

 remanded, holding that Praschma had suffered injury in fact

and, 

 thus, had standing. Id. at 325-26.

 

 Upon remand, the district court granted a motion to

dismiss 

 Praschma's due process, just compensation, and state law

claims. 

 In dismissing the takings claim, the district court held that

it 

 lacked jurisdiction over the claim because Praschma "has made

no 

 attempt to avail himself of the many adequate remedies that

might 

 be afforded him in the state courts of Missouri . . . ." Order 

 (Feb. 16, 1996) at 11, reprinted in J.A. at 59. 

 

 The district court then called for motions for summary 

 judgment on Praschma's remaining equal protection and ex post

facto 

 claims. On April 17, 1996, the district court granted summary 

 judgment in favor of the state officials. In granting summary 

 judgment on the equal protection claim, the court held that the 

 Missouri statute was rationally related to a legitimate state 

 interest and that Praschma had failed to provide evidence of 

 invidious discrimination. Praschma appeals.

 
 -3-

 

 

 

 
 

 II.

 

 Praschma first argues that enforc ement of the Missouri 

 statute would violate the FCN Treaty. We decline to consider

this 

 argument for the first time on appeal. 

 

 The general rule is that "[n]ormally, a party may not

raise an 

 issue for the first time on appeal as a basis for reversal." 

 Seniority Research Group v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 976 F.2d

1185, 

 1187 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing cases); see also Singleton v.

Wulff, 

 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("It is the general rule, of course,

that 

 a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed 

 upon below."); Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dep't, 111 F.3d

585, 

 587 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We have examined the record carefully and

we 

 find no evidence that this issue was ever raised in the

district 

 court . . . . We therefore decline to consider the issue . . .

."); 

 Kosulandich v. Survival Tech., Inc., 997 F.2d 431, 433 (8th

Cir. 

 1993) ("Notwithstanding the dubious validity of these claims,

we 

 will not address them head-on for the first time on appeal.").

 

 As this Court has stated:

 

 The rationale for the rule is twofold. First, the record 

 on appeal generally would not contain the findings 

 necessary to an evaluation of the validity of an 

 appellant's arguments. Second, there is an inherent 

 injustice in allowing an appellant to raise an issue for 

 the first time on appeal. A litigant should not be 

 surprised on appeal by a final decision there of issues 

 upon which they had no opportunity to introduce evidence. 

 A contrary rule could encourage a party to "sandbag" at 

 the district court level, only then to play his "ace in 

 the hole" before the appellate court. 

 

 Stafford v. Ford Motor Co., 790 F.2d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 1986) 

 (citations omitted); see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120.

 
 -4-

 

 

 

 
 

 In this case, our consideration of the FCN Treaty issue

would 

 implicate both of these rationale. First, we are not satisfied 

 that the record on appeal contains all of the findings

necessary 

 for a full evaluation of Praschma's argument. See Stafford,

790 

 F.2d at 706. Specifically, were Praschma to prevail in arguing 

 that the Missouri statute conflicts with the FCN Treaty,

unresolved 

 factual issues would remain regarding whether the FCN Treaty

even 

 applies to the anticipated transfer of Praschma's Missouri 

 agricultural land to his sons. For example, the state

officials 

 argue that the evidence may establish that the transfer is not 

 related to the conduct of Praschma's commercial enterprise and 

 therefore not within the scope of the FCN Treaty's provisions. 

 Although we acknowledge our ability to consider the purely

legal 

 question of whether the Missouri statute is in conflict with

the 

 FCN Treaty, we decline to make such a pronouncement in a

factual 

 vacuum. 

 

 Second, we are particularly mindful of the "inherent 

 injustice" in allowing Praschma to raise the FCN Treaty issue

for 

 the first time on appeal. See id. The state officials should

not 

 be surprised by a decision based on the FCN Treaty when they

had no 

 opportunity to introduce evidence on that issue. See id. Our 

 consideration of the FCN Treaty issue would ratify Praschma's 

 decision to "'sandbag'" before the district court, and to "play

his 

 'ace in the hole'" before this Court. See id.

 

 However, the general rule against consideration of an

issue 

 not passed upon below is not absolute. As the Supreme Court

has 

 stated: 

 

 The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved 

 for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the 

 discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on 

 the facts of individual cases. We announce no general 

 rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a 

 federal appellate court is justified in resolving an 
 issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution 

 is beyond any doubt or where injustice might otherwise 

 result.

 

 -5-

 

 

 

 
 

 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (quotations and citations omitted);

see 

 also Seniority Research Group, 976 F.2d at 1187 ("There are 

 exceptions, as where the obvious result of following the rule

would 

 be a plain miscarriage of justice or would be inconsistent with 

 substantial justice.").

 

 This is not a case where either "the proper resolution is 

 beyond any doubt" or "where injustice might otherwise result." 

 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (quotation omitted). Although we 

 believe treaty interpretation is of great importance, we cannot

say 

 that injustice will result if we fail to accept Praschma's 

 invitation to interpret the FCN Treaty in this context. But

cf. 

 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) 

 (considering for the first time on appeal defendant's position

that 

 treaty provides, not a defense, but rather "essential

background").

 

 Therefore, because Praschma did not argue to the district 

 court that the enforcement of the Missouri statute would

violate 

 the FCN Treaty, we will not consider that issue on appeal.(2)

 

 (2) The state officials further argue that Praschma cannot

raise 

 the FCN Treaty issue on appeal because one of Praschma's 

 interrogatory answers expressly disavowed his reliance on any 

 treaty. The relevant question and answer are as follows:

 

 INTERROGATORY NO. 14: If you contend that any 

 treaty or agreement between the United States of America 

 and the government of any other nation are superior to or 

 pre-empt or invalidate _ _ 442.591 through 445.591, RSMo, 

 state the name of each other nation and of each treaty or 

 agreement.

 

 ANSWER: Objection. Work Product. I am personally

 aware of no such treaty at this time.

 

 Answers To Def.'s First Set Of Interrogs. To Pl. at 7,

reprinted in 

 J.A. at 392.

 

 Although Praschma presented no argument to the district
court 

 that the Missouri 

 

 -6-

 

 

 

 
 

 III.

 

 Praschma next argues that the Missouri statute denies him 

 "equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

In 

 evaluating whether a statute violates equal protection, the

Supreme 

 Court has set forth various standards, including both a strict 

 scrutiny and a rational basis test. See Graham v. Richardson,

403 

 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny test which

requires 

 that the statute be "necessary to promote a compelling

governmental 

 interest"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 

 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (applying rational basis test which

requires 

 that the statute be "rationally related to a legitimate 

 governmental purpose"). Praschma asserts both that: (1) the 

 constitutionality of the Missouri statute must be subjected to

the 

 strict scrutiny test and (2) the Missouri statute fails both

the 

 strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test. We decline

to 

 address Praschma's first assertion and disagree with his

second.

 

 In granting the state official's motion for summary

judgment, 

 the district court held that "[t]he goals and concerns

articulated 

 by the legislation's proponents provide

 

 statute violates any treaty, we do not believe 

 that his interrogatory answer waived such an argument. See Eli 

 Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 1978)

("Although 

 [defendant's] Answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory 10 denied

that 31

 U.S.C. §§ 53 and 67 were the basis for his 'claim of right to

have 

 access to and examine' plaintiff's books and records, the

answer 

 did not constitute an abandonment of reliance on those

provisions 

 . . . .); Guilfoyle v. Accounting Management Service, Inc., No.

84 

 C 10913, 1986 WL 5640, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1986) ("The 

 plaintiff submitted an interrogatory to the defendant seeking
the 

 identity of any clients the defendant would assert were

produced by 

 Accounting Management Service for the plaintiff, and the

defendant 

 responded that he lacked knowledge as to what Accounting

Management 

 Service did. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, this

interrogatory 

 answer does not constitute a waiver of any right to claim a 

 deduction for income, but the answer did convey to the

plaintiff 

 that the defendant had no information on the amount of

plaintiff's 

 income.").

 -7-

 

 

 

 
 

 a rational basis for this statute." Order (Apr. 17, 1996) at

6, 

 reprinted in J.A. at 479. Before reaching this conclusion, the 

 district court first determined that the rational basis test

was 

 the proper test to apply in analyzing the constitutionality of

the 

 Missouri statute. In making this determination, the district

court 

 noted that Praschma did "not dispute [the state official]'s 

 contention that the rational basis test should be applied in

this 

 instance." Id. at 3, reprinted in J.A. at 476 (citing Pl.'s

Opp'n 

 at 5).

 It is on appeal to this Court that Praschma for the first

time 

 argues that the Missouri statute is subject to the strict

scrutiny 

 analysis. Compare Appellant's Br. at 28 ("Because the Missouri 

 statute creates a classification based on alienage, its 

 constitutionality must be reviewed under strict scrutiny." 

 (quotations, alteration, and footnote omitted)), and id. at 29 

 ("Strict scrutiny also is mandated in this case because the 

 Missouri statute interferes with a fundamental right."), with 

 Compl. at 5, reprinted in J.A. at 27 ("The Statutes have taken

a 

 fundamental right to transfer the farms without any rational 

 basis." (emphasis added)), and Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1, 

 reprinted in J.A. at 74 ("Plaintiff [Praschma] has been treated 

 unequally without any rational basis." (emphasis added)), and

Pl.'s 

 Opp'n at 3 ("The record in support of Mr. [Praschma's] Summary 

 Judgment shows there can be absolutely no rational basis to

treat 

 Mr. [Praschma] so shabbily (and unconstitutionally)." (emphasis 

 added)). 

 Because the district court did not pass upon this issue,

we 

 will not consider it on appeal. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at

120; 

 Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 

 1993) ("While complaints are to be liberally construed, an

attempt 

 to amend one's pleadings in an appellate brief comes too late." 

 (quotation omitted)); cf. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d

1119, 

 1138 n.14 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[The defendant] never argued that

strict 

 scrutiny was appropriate under the equal protection analysis

either 
 in his answer and counterclaim, his motions before the district 

 court, his briefs to this court, or during oral argument. 

Thus, 

 neither the government nor the district court had the

opportunity 

 to consider either whether strict scrutiny would be applicable

to 

 [defendant]'s claim, or whether the Act would pass

constitutional 

 muster under this

 

 -8-

 

 

 

 
 

 more exacting standard of review. Accordingly, we decline to 

 address this issue in this appeal.").

 

 Furthermore, we believe that the Missouri statute is 

 rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The

state 

 officials argue that the statute serves Missouri's interests

by: 

 (1) protecting the state's food supply; (2) preserving the

family 

 farm system; (3) slowing the rising cost of agricultural land;

and 

 (4) mirroring restrictions on American's ability to acquire 

 European and Japanese land. Because there is a rational 

 relationship between the disparate treatment of nonresident

aliens 

 and these legitimate governmental purposes, the Missouri

statute 

 does not violate Praschma's right to equal protection.(3) Cf.

MSM 

 Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 332-34 (8th Cir. 1991)

(holding 

 that state constitutional provision prohibiting nonfamily farm 

 corporations from owning and operating Nebraska farm and ranch

land 

 does not violate equal protection because retaining and

promoting 

 family farm operations in Nebraska were legitimate state

interests 

 and voters reasonably could have believed that

 

 (3) Praschma also argues that because two Missouri counties

are 

 excluded from the statute's restrictions, the statute fails the 
 rational basis test. We disagree. 

 

 Equal protection does not apply to legislative

distinctions 

 between political subdivisions. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366

U.S. 

 420, 427 (1961) ("[W]e have held that the Equal Protection

Clause 

 relates to equality between persons as such, rather than

between 

 areas and that territorial uniformity is not a constitutional 

 prerequisite. . . . [W]e have noted that the prescription of 

 different substantive offenses in different counties is

generally 

 a matter for legislative discretion."); Reeder v. Kansas City

Bd. 

 of Police Comm'rs, 796 F.2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he 

 Supreme Court has long held that when the state chooses to

regulate 

 differentially, with the laws falling unequally on different 

 geographic areas of the state, the Equal Protection Clause is

not 

 violated so long as there is no underlying discrimination

against 

 particular persons or groups. The Equal Protection Clause

protects 

 people, not places. So long as all persons within the 

 jurisdictional reach of the statute are equally affected by the 

 law, it matters not that those outside the territorial reach of

the 

 law are free to behave differently." (citations omitted)).

 

 -9-

 
 

 

 
 

 enacting the initiative would promote family farm operations); 

 Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren, 246 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Wis.

1976) 

 (holding that a Wisconsin statute making it unlawful for a 

 nonresident alien to acquire or own more than 640 acres of land

in 

 Wisconsin does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 

 United States Constitution because "[l]imiting the benefits of

land 

 ownership to those who share in the responsibilities and

interests 

 of residency is not an unreasonable exercise of legislative 

 choice"). 

 

 IV.

 

 Praschma also argues that the district court erred in 

 dismissing his takings claim for lack of subject matter 

 jurisdiction.(4) We disagree.

 

 (4) The state officials argue that this Court lacks

jurisdiction 

 over Praschma's just compensation claim because the order 

 dismissing that claim is not referred to in the notice of

appeal. 

 We disagree. 

 

 This Court has stated the governing rules as follows:

 

 The requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

 3(c) that a notice of appeal "designate the judgment, 

 order, or part thereof appealed from" is a jurisdictional 

 prerequisite of the appellate court. . . . The Eighth 

 Circuit traditionally construes notices of appeal 

 liberally, but the intent to appeal the judgment in 

 question must be apparent and there must be no prejudice 

 to the adverse party. 

 

 Burgess v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 71 F.3d 304, 306-07 (8th

Cir. 

 1995). 

 

 Here, Praschma's intent to appeal is apparent from the 

 interrelationship between the two district court orders and the 

 fact that Praschma's Appeal Information Form indicates he will 

 argue "constitutional reasons, primarily equal protection of

laws." 

 Appellant's Form A (Appeal Information Form), reprinted in 
 Appellees' Br. Addendum at 6. Moreover, the state officials

fully 

 argue the takings issue in their brief and do not allege they

have 

 been prejudiced in any way. Consequently, we will address 

 

 -10-

 

 

 

 
 

 The general rule is that a plaintiff must seek

compensation 

 through state procedures before filing a federal takings claim 

 against a state.(5) See Williamson County Reg'l Planning

Comm'n v. 

 Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) ("[I]f a State provides

an 

 adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property 

 owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause 

 until it has used the procedure and been denied just 

 compensation.").(6) The rationale underlying the Williamson 

 requirement is that "a property owner has not suffered a

violation 

 of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has

unsuccessfully 

 attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures 

 provided by the State . . . ." Id. Under this

 
 Praschma's takings claim.

 (5) Missouri law allows for a property owner to seek

compensation 

 through an inverse condemnation proceeding. See generally Mo.

Rev. 

 Stat. Const. Art. I, § 26 (1986 & Supp. 1989) ("That private 

 property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without

just 

 compensation."); Tierney v. Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of 

 Kansas City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Mo. 1987) (holding that

inverse 

 condemnation action "may be maintained in spite of sovereign 

 immunity to fulfill the [Missouri state] constitutional command 

 that property not be taken without just compensation"); Zumalt

v. 

 Boone County, 921 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("To state

a 

 claim for inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must allege his 

 property was taken or damaged by the state for public use

without 

 just compensation. The landowner does not have to show an

actual 

 physical taking of property, but must plead and prove an

invasion 

 or an appropriation of some valuable property right which the 

 landowner has to the legal and proper use of his property which 

 invasion or appropriation directly and specially affects the 

 landowner to his injury." (quotations and alternations

omitted)).

 (6) Similarly, a plaintiff bringing suit against the United 

 States, rather than an individual state, must seek compensation 

 through federal procedures before filing a federal takings

claim. 

 See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 ("[W]e have held that taking

claims 

 against the Federal Government are premature until the property 

 owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker

Act, 

 28 U.S.C. § 1491."). The procedure for seeking compensation

from 

 the United States is to file a claim in the United States Court

of 

 Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).

 
 -11-

 

 

 

 
 

 standard, the Missouri statute has not violated Praschma's

right to 

 just compensation because Praschma has not sought compensation

from 

 the state.

 

 Praschma counters that this requirement only applies to 

 federal suits seeking damages, not to suits, such as his,

seeking 

 only injunctive relief. Praschma finds support for this 

 proposition by drawing an inference from Hodel v. Irving, 481

U.S. 

 704 (1987), aff'g sub nom. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260 (8th

Cir. 

 1985). In Irving, the plaintiffs argued that a federal statute 

 seized property without just compensation and sought both 

 injunctive and declaratory relief. Irving, 758 F.2d at 1262. 

The 

 district court found the statute constitutional. Id. at 1261. 

 This Court reversed, holding that "the statute is in violation

of 

 the fifth amendment." Id. at 1269. In Hodel, the Supreme

Court 

 upheld this Court's reversal of the district court. Hodel, 481 

 U.S. at 718. The Supreme Court held that the statute effected

a 

 taking without just compensation. Id. at 712-18. However,

neither 

 this Court's nor the Supreme Court's opinions addressed whether 

 jurisdiction was lacking because the plaintiffs failed to avail 

 themselves of the process for compensation provided by the

Tucker 

 Act. Because neither court sua sponte found jurisdiction

lacking, 

 Praschma asserts that the courts tacitly acknowledged that the 

 Williamson requirement did not apply because the plaintiffs

were 

 not seeking money damages. We disagree.

 

 First, as neither court directly addressed the question,

we do 

 not believe the negative inference Praschma draws for the Hodel 

 opinions establishes the proposition that the Williamson 

 requirement only applies to federal suits seeking damages. 

Second, 

 we note that the plaintiffs in Hodel were challenging a

federal, 

 rather than a state statute. 

 Praschma also relies on Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d

852 

 (9th Cir. 1995). However, Dodd merely stands for the

proposition 
 that a federal takings claim against a state can be brought in

the 

 district court and need not first be presented in state court. 

Id. 

 at 860-61. Dodd says nothing about whether state law remedies

must 

 first be pursued prior to asserting a federal claim for

equitable 

 relief in federal court.

 

 -12-

 

 

 

 
 

 Thus, Dodd is distinguishable in that Praschma does not lack 

 jurisdiction because he has failed to pursue a federal takings 

 claim in state court, but rather because he has failed to

pursue 

 the State of Missouri's procedures for compensation.

 

 Finally, Praschma cites Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v.

Brady, 

 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), in which the district 

 court found that, where the plaintiff was seeking a declaratory 

 judgment rather than damages, the court had jurisdiction to

decide 

 the takings claim, even though the plaintiff had not sought

relief 

 pursuant to the Tucker Act.

 

 We do not find Praschma's use of authority persuasive, and 

 therefore we hold that the Williamson requirement applies

equally 

 to takings claims for damages and equitable relief brought

against 

 the states.

 

 In reaching this conclusion, we find particularly

persuasive 

 a similar holding of the Eleventh Circuit:

 

 [T]he only federal constitutional ground supporting the 

 district court's injunction is [plaintiff]'s Fifth 

 Amendment takings claim. That claim, however, is not 

 ripe. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 

 Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3116, 

 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). A Takings Clause claim does not 

 become ripe unless the state provides no remedy to 

 compensate the landowner for the taking. A property 

 owner cannot claim a violation of the Clause unless the 

 state provides the landowner no procedure (such as an 

 action for inverse condemnation) for obtaining just 

 compensation. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195, 105 S.Ct. at 

 3121.

 

 Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co., Inc. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d

1481, 

 1490-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).

 
 -13-

 

 

 

 
 

 We also find support for our conclusion from the D.C. 

 Circuit's opinion in Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of 

 Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In

Transohio, 

 the court addressed the question of whether the Williamson 

 requirement blocked district court jurisdiction over a takings 

 claim for injunctive relief against the Federal Government. In 

 dicta, the Transohio court concluded that there was a limit

upon 

 the district court's jurisdiction and that "the district court 

 should accept jurisdiction over takings claims for injunctive 

 relief in the few cases where a Claims Court remedy is so 

 inadequate that the plaintiff would not be justly compensated." 

 Id. at 613 (quotations omitted). In the context of a claim for 

 injunctive relief against a state, we hold that the district 

 court's jurisdiction is similarly limited. We expressly leave 

 undecided the question, not argued in this appeal, of whether

the 

 district court would have jurisdiction over a takings claim for 

 injunctive relief where the state remedy is "so inadequate that

the 

 plaintiff would not be justly compensated." See id.

(quotations 

 omitted). 

 

 Thus, the district court properly found that it did not

have 

 jurisdiction over Praschma's takings claim.

 

 V.

 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

 

 A true copy.

 

 Attest:

 

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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