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*********************************************** 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHARLES B. SPADONI

(AC 44826)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the trial court’s judgment denying

his application for reinstatement to the bar. The defendant had been

suspended from the practice of law, upon presentment by the plaintiff,

Disciplinary Counsel, following his conviction in federal court of

obstruction of justice in connection with a public corruption scheme.

The defendant also was convicted of other felony offenses, including

racketeering, bribery and wire fraud, but those convictions were

reversed on appeal. The defendant subsequently filed an application for

reinstatement to the bar, and the trial court referred the application to

the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar

for New Haven County pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-

53). The committee held an evidentiary hearing on the application, during

which the defendant refused to answer direct questions regarding his

conduct during and surrounding the events that resulted in the convictions that were reversed. The defendant also testified that he was innocent of any wrongdoing and that he had not committed the crime of

obstruction of justice, focusing his testimony on multiple exhibits that

he argued demonstrated his innocence. Following the hearing, the committee issued a report in which it recommended that the defendant’s

application for reinstatement be denied on the ground that he lacked

the requisite good moral character to practice law. In reaching its decision, the committee found, inter alia, that the defendant’s refusal to

answer questions regarding the reversed convictions demonstrated a

lack of honesty and candor, that his reinstatement could be detrimental

to the integrity and standing of the bar and the administration of justice

because he refused to accept responsibility for the obstruction of justice

conviction, which strikes at the heart of the public trust in the legal

profession, and that his failure to accept responsibility for his wrongdoing made rehabilitation impossible. A three judge panel of the Superior

Court thereafter accepted the committee’s recommendation and rendered judgment denying the defendant’s application for reinstatement,

concluding that the committee, in making its recommendation, did not

abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without a fair

investigation of the facts. Held:

1. The trial court correctly determined that the committee had the authority

to question the defendant about his presuspension misconduct; pursuant

to Practice Book § 2-53, the committee had the authority and duty to

investigate conduct that could inform its assessment of the defendant’s

moral fitness, including not only the underlying facts of the defendant’s

obstruction of justice conviction but also all of the facts that the committee believed could be relevant to the determination of the defendant’s

present fitness to practice law and moral character, and the defendant’s

argument that the committee had the authority to investigate only conduct of which he was convicted conflated the attorney reinstatement

process with the attorney grievance process.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the committee improperly found that he failed to accept his obstruction of justice conviction

with sincerity and honesty because he plausibly reconciled his claim of

innocence with that conviction before the committee; contrary to the

defendant’s contention, his claim of innocence did not render the other

criteria set forth in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim (311

Conn. 430), for evaluating an application for reinstatement inapplicable

but, rather, was simply another piece of evidence for the committee to

consider in conjunction with all of the other factors utilized in determining whether the defendant met his burden to show rehabilitation, good

moral character and a present fitness to be reinstated to the legal profession.

Argued March 9—officially released September 20, 2022
Procedural History

Presentment by the plaintiff for disciplinary proceedings following the defendant’s felony conviction,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Hartford, where the court, Bryant, J., issued an order

suspending the defendant from the practice of law on

an interim basis; thereafter, the court, Sheridan, J.,

rendered judgment suspending the defendant from the

practice of law; subsequently, the defendant filed an

application for reinstatement to the bar; thereafter, the

defendant’s application for reinstatement was referred

to the Standing Committee on Recommendations for

Admission to the Bar for New Haven County, which

filed a report recommending denial of the application

for reinstatement; subsequently, a three judge panel,

Sheridan, Budzik and Lynch, Js., accepted the standing

committee’s report and rendered judgment denying the

defendant’s application for reinstatement to the bar,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Charles B. Spadoni, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Paul C. Jensen, Jr., assistant bar counsel, with whom,

on the brief, were Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary

counsel, and Elizabeth M. Rowe, assistant bar counsel,

for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

NORCOTT, J. The defendant, Charles B. Spadoni, an

attorney suspended from the practice of law, appeals

from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his

application for reinstatement to the bar of this state.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the three judge

panel of the Superior Court considering the defendant’s

application for reinstatement to the bar improperly

accepted the report and recommendation of the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to

the Bar for New Haven County (committee) because (1)

the committee exceeded the scope of its investigative

authority by inquiring as to the defendant’s presuspension misconduct, and (2) the committee improperly

found that the defendant failed to accept his federal

conviction for obstruction of justice with sincerity and

honesty. We disagree with the defendant and, therefore,

affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history, as set

forth in the court’s memorandum of decision, are relevant to this appeal.1

‘‘The [defendant] was admitted to

the Connecticut bar on May 3, 1977. . . . In 1997, the

[defendant] was hired as the general counsel for a Boston based private equity firm, Triumph Capital Group

[Inc.] (Triumph). United States v. Triumph Capital

Group, Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2008). Triumph

managed some of the investments of the state pension

funds. Id., 152–53. Certain investments made by the

state pension funds with Triumph, contributions made

by Triumph to the state Republican party and contracts

Triumph had with Republican candidate Paul Silvester’s

campaign staffers came under federal scrutiny. Id., 153.

In connection with that scrutiny, on January 9, 2001,

the [defendant] was indicted by a federal grand jury for

committing various crimes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), [18 U.S.C.

§ 1961 et seq.]. Id., 156.

‘‘On July 16, 2003, a jury found the [defendant] guilty

of [racketeering, racketeering conspiracy] obstructing

justice, bribery and [wire] fraud. Id., 156. The [defendant] was sentenced principally to concurrent [thirtysix] month terms of imprisonment on all counts and a

$50,000 fine. Id., 158. Thereafter, the [defendant]

appealed. On appeal, the [United States Court of

Appeals for the] Second Circuit found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, which found

the [defendant] guilty of [racketeering, racketeering

conspiracy] bribery, wire fraud and obstruction of justice. Id., 160, 169. The Second Circuit ordered a new

trial on the racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery and wire fraud charges on the ground that the government unconstitutionally suppressed material exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Id., 165. The Second

Circuit did not order a new trial on the obstruction of

justice charges, stating that, [e]ven if the suppressed
notes had an impeaching effect so strong as to call

into question Silvester’s testimony on other matters,

the government’s evidence of [the defendant’s] obstruction of justice was overwhelming. In light of the forensic

examiner’s detailed testimony regarding the suspicious

timing of the deletion of relevant files from [the defendant’s] laptop using Destroy-It! software, and its corroboration with [Robert] Trevisani’s testimony about [the

defendant’s] mention of Destroy-It! as software to be

used in order to hide something . . . we do not think

that the suppression of [Special] Agent [Charles E.]

Urso’s notes raises a reasonable probability that the

verdict on the obstruction of justice count would have

been different. . . . Id., 165 n.13.

‘‘On November 10, 2008, the [defendant] and the government both filed motions for rehearing, and, on

November 21, 2008, the Second Circuit denied both

motions. The mandate issued on January 12, 2009. On

November 16, 2009, the [defendant] served a copy of a

motion to recall the mandate on the government, which

was summarily denied by the Second Circuit on December 18, 2009. On September 15, 2011, the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut resentenced the [defendant] to two years of incarceration, a

$50,000 fine and three years of supervised release. On

July 9, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment

of conviction for obstruction of justice. United States

v. Spadoni, 479 Fed. Appx. 392, 393 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 568 U.S. 1019, 133 S. Ct. 625, 184 L. Ed. 2d

411 (2012). The [defendant’s] license to practice law

in Connecticut was suspended from January 31, 2007,

through September 9, 2016.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)

On April 19, 2017, the defendant filed in the Superior

Court an application for reinstatement to the bar pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53. On May 9, 2017, pursuant

to Practice Book § 2-53 (f), the defendant’s application

was referred to the committee. On February 20, 2019,

the committee held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s application, at which the defendant was present

and permitted to testify. At the reinstatement hearing,

the defendant refused to answer direct questions

regarding his conduct during or surrounding the events

that resulted in his racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud convictions, which were

reversed on appeal. Specifically, the defendant ‘‘took

the position that any conduct which did not result in

his conviction of a crime was off limits for [the committee] in assessing his character and fitness to practice

law.’’2 Further, when asked by committee member Howard K. Levine whether ‘‘the inquiry into [the defendant’s]

present moral fitness [allowed] . . . the committee to

look into matters that are not the subject of grievances

or criminal convictions,’’ the defendant responded: ‘‘On

a going forward basis, you have full rein, plenary power

to do—whatever my moral fitness is. But . . . in terms
of moral fitness, it’s really limited to the presuspension.

It’s the conviction and it’s not—you cannot then use a

conviction and then go back and try to resurrect or

investigate . . . conduct that . . . didn’t result in a

conviction.’’ The committee asked if the defendant

would reconsider his refusal to answer its questions,

but the defendant refused and stood on his objection.3

Before the committee, the defendant also stated

affirmatively that he believed that he was innocent of

any wrongdoing and that he had not committed the

crime of obstruction of justice, even though his conviction on that charge had been affirmed on appeal. In

support of his belief, the defendant testified that the

Second Circuit ‘‘articulated no factual predicate that

exists in the trial evidence for its holding that the jury

had sufficient evidence to find [the defendant] guilty

of obstructing justice.’’ The defendant focused his direct

testimony on multiple exhibits, including contracts,

transcripts from the criminal trial, and affidavits that

he argued demonstrated his innocence. Additionally,

on cross-examination, the defendant stated that there

was ‘‘insufficient evidence to find [him] guilty because

. . . the finding of sufficiency was based on . . . [nonexistent] evidence, and the allegation that . . . [he]

failed to turn over a disk that had been called for . . .

by a subpoena is not based on fact.’’

Ultimately, on February 5, 2021, the committee issued

its written report in which it recommended that the

defendant’s application for reinstatement be denied

because the defendant failed to meet the standards for

good moral character to practice law as set forth in

Practice Book § 2-5A. Specifically, the committee recommended that the defendant should not be reinstated

because he ‘‘blatantly refused to accept his wrongdoing.’’ The committee noted that, although the Second

Circuit reversed the defendant’s convictions of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bribery, and wire

fraud, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on those charges. Consequently, the committee

concluded that inquiry regarding the defendant’s conduct surrounding these charges was relevant because

‘‘these offenses [are] antithetical to the qualities necessary for an attorney to maintain the trust of the public.

Engaging in such conduct evinces a lack of moral character, honesty and respect for the public, law enforcement and the judiciary which should be inherent to all

members of the bar.’’ The committee was not persuaded

that the Second Circuit’s reversal of the defendant’s

convictions on these charges ‘‘negates the nature and

seriousness of the original jury findings to the point

where the committee should not consider and place

considerable weight on them.’’ The committee, therefore, concluded that the defendant’s failure to answer

questions about those charges demonstrated that he

lacked ‘‘honesty and candor’’ and ‘‘deprived the commit-
tee [of] the opportunity even to assess whether whatever conduct he may have engaged in leading up to his

suspension did or did not uphold the requirement that

the [defendant] be of good moral character. . . . [I]t

is the [defendant’s] lack of candor and honesty in refusing to answer that leads the committee to find that the

[defendant] has not met his burden of proving he is of

good moral character.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)

Additionally, the committee found that ‘‘[t]he [defendant’s] conviction for obstruction of justice strikes at

the heart of public trust in the legal profession. Recognizing that the [defendant] continues to profess his innocence, the conviction stands and details his participation in a public corruption scheme. Obstruction of

justice implicates all of the traits that the public expects

members of the bar to possess, including honesty,

respect for law enforcement and the judiciary. That the

[defendant] continues to deny any responsibility for or

even acknowledgment of the crime of which he was

convicted serves only to amplify the committee’s concerns that public confidence in the profession would

be undermined by his [reinstatement].’’ The committee

further noted that the defendant’s refusal to accept

responsibility for his obstruction of justice ‘‘makes rehabilitation an impossibility. There has been no acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing and, therefore, [the defendant] cannot possibly be rehabilitated.’’

For these reasons, the committee recommended that

the defendant’s application for reinstatement be denied.

On June 1, 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held

before a three judge panel of the Superior Court to

determine whether to accept or reject the committee’s

recommendation that the defendant’s application for

reinstatement be denied. The Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, the Statewide Grievance Committee,

and the defendant all appeared and participated in the

hearing. In its memorandum of decision, the court

stated that, before both it and the committee, ‘‘the

[defendant] offered only his own testimony with regard

to his acceptance of responsibility and his recognition

of the harm his violation of federal criminal law has

caused to the legal profession and the public.’’

On June 30, 2021, the court, by way of a memorandum

of decision, unanimously accepted the committee’s recommendation and denied the defendant’s application

for reinstatement. In doing so, the court reiterated the

committee’s concerns regarding the defendant’s return

to practice and evaluated the record along with the

defendant’s candor and demeanor as he responded to

questions from the court. Having done so, the court

reasoned that it could not ‘‘conclude that the committee

acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts in

recommending that the [defendant] not be readmitted

to the practice of law in Connecticut.’’ This appeal fol-
lowed.

Because both of the defendant’s claims pertain to the

attorney reinstatement process, we first discuss that

procedure and the applicable standards of review. ‘‘Fixing the qualifications for, as well as admitting [or readmitting] persons to, the practice of law in this state has

ever been an exercise of judicial power. . . . This

power has been exercised with the assistance of committees of the bar appointed and acting under rules of

court. . . . Although these committees have a broad

power of discretion, they act under the court’s supervision. . . . Accordingly, [i]t is the court, and not the

bar, or a committee, which takes the final and decisive action.

‘‘In deciding whether to accept or reject a standing

committee recommendation on reinstatement to the

bar, the trial court does not take evidence or hear the

matter de novo. . . . Rather, it reviews the standing

committee’s decision on [the] record to determine

whether [the standing committee] has conducted a fair

and impartial investigation, and whether it acted fairly

and reasonably or from prejudice and ill will in its

consideration of the application. . . . Ultimately, the

court must decide whether the standing committee, by

approving or withholding its approval of an application,

acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts. . . .

In either admission or readmission proceedings, the

burden is on an applicant to prove his or her present

fitness to practice law. . . .

‘‘As to any subordinate facts found by a standing

committee, the trial court reviews them only for clear

error. A factual determination is clearly erroneous only

in cases in which the record contains no evidence to

support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but

the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . The

standing committee, as fact finder, determines with

finality the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be accorded their testimony. . . . At the same time,

[t]he ultimate facts [found by a standing committee]

are reviewable by the court to determine whether they

are reasonable and proper in view of the subordinate

facts found and the applicable principles of law.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v.

Ganim, 311 Conn. 430, 450–52, 87 A.3d 1078 (2014).

Ultimately, ‘‘[b]ecause the trial court exercises no

discretion, but rather is confined to a review of the

record before the [standing committee], we are not

limited to the deferential standard of manifest abuse

or injustice when reviewing [the trial court’s] legal conclusions about the adequacy of the evidence before the

[standing committee] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 452. Instead, our ‘‘review of the trial
court’s decision, to either accept or reject the standing

committee’s recommendation, is plenary.’’ Id.

We now turn to the language of Practice Book § 2-53,

which governs the application process for a suspended

attorney to be reinstated to the bar. Particularly, § 2-

53 (a)4 provides that an attorney who has been suspended is permitted to file an application for reinstatement. ‘‘The application shall be referred by the clerk

of the Superior Court where it is filed to the chief justice

or designee, who shall refer the matter to a standing

committee on recommendations for admission to the

bar . . . .’’ Practice Book § 2-53 (f). Then, the committee to which an application for reinstatement has been

referred, ‘‘shall investigate the application, hold hearings pertaining thereto and render a report with its

recommendations to the court.’’ Practice Book § 2-53

(i).

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

accepted the report by the committee because the committee exceeded the scope of its investigative authority

by inquiring as to the defendant’s presuspension misconduct. Specifically, the defendant argues that the

committee’s inquiry into his actions that served as the

basis for his racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, wire

fraud, and bribery convictions, and the conclusions it

drew from his refusal to answer questions about those

actions, were improper because those convictions were

reversed by the Second Circuit and the scope of the

committee’s investigation does not include alleged but

unajudicated misconduct.5 We disagree.

We begin with the general principles and standards

of review that govern our resolution of the defendant’s

first claim. We interpret the defendant’s claim to be

challenging the scope of the committee’s investigation

pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53, not the court’s acceptance of the committee’s recommendation. Consequently, to the extent that we are interpreting the relevant sections of the rules of practice, our review is

plenary. See, e.g., Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn.

94, 99, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).

We next outline the duties and limits of a committee’s

investigation and adjudication of an application for reinstatement. Throughout the reinstatement process, Practice Book § 2-53 (j) instructs that ‘‘[i]t is the applicant’s

burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he or she possesses good moral character

and fitness to practice law as defined by Section 2-

5A.’’ Practice Book § 2-5A provides: ‘‘(a) Good moral

character shall be construed to include, but not be limited to, the following: (1) The qualities of honesty, fairness, candor and trustworthiness; (2) Observance of

fiduciary responsibility; (3) Respect for and obedience

to the law; and (4) Respect for the legal rights of others
and the judicial process, as evidenced by conduct other

than merely initiating or pursuing litigation. (b) Fitness

to practice law shall be construed to include the following: (1) The cognitive capacity to undertake fundamental lawyering skills such as problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation,

organization and management of legal work, making

appropriate reasoned legal judgments, and recognizing

and solving ethical dilemmas; (2) The ability to communicate legal judgments and legal information to clients,

other attorneys, judicial and regulatory authorities, with

or without the use of aids or devices; and (3) The capability to perform legal tasks in a timely manner.’’

As stated by our Supreme Court, ‘‘[o]ur rules of practice do not enumerate specific criteria to be used in

evaluating an application for reinstatement to the bar.

Connecticut courts and those of other jurisdictions,

however, have relied on several considerations, however, among them the following: (1) the [applicant’s]

present moral fitness; (2) the [applicant’s] acceptance

of wrongdoing with sincerity and honesty; (3) the extent

of the [applicant’s] rehabilitation; (4) the nature and

seriousness of the original misconduct; (5) the [applicant’s] conduct following the discipline; (6) the time

elapsed since the original discipline; (7) the [applicant’s] character, maturity, and experience at the time

of discipline and at present; (8) the [applicant’s] current

competency and qualifications to practice law; (9) [the

applicant’s payment of] restitution; and (10) the proof

that the [applicant’s] return to the practice of law will

not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the

bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of

the public interest.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311

Conn. 454–55.

‘‘[W]hen courts consider the evidence introduced in

reinstatement proceedings of an applicant’s current fitness, they must evaluate it against the backdrop of the

applicant’s prior misconduct, and [inquire] whether the

former is of sufficient weight to overcome the latter.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 456. As such,

‘‘[a]n attorney’s commission of misconduct that results

in criminal convictions, particularly for crimes that

involve elements of dishonesty, casts a dark shadow

over his or her fitness to practice law, and typically

results in a lengthy period of suspension or disbarment.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 457.

In the reinstatement process, ‘‘[t]he court’s fundamental inquiry in addressing a petition for reinstatement

to the practice of law is whether the attorney has rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character

since the suspension was imposed. . . . The applicant

must show that he is presently fit to again exercise the

privileges and functions of an attorney as an officer of

the court and confidential manager of the affairs and
business of others entrusted to his care . . . keeping

. . . in view . . . his previous misconduct, his discipline therefor, and any reformation of character

wrought thereby or otherwise as shown by his more

recent life and conduct.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 453. Specifically, ‘‘[t]he

appropriate inquiry when deciding whether to grant

admission to the bar is whether the applicant has present fitness to practice law. . . . Fitness to practice law

does not remain fixed in time.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original.) Scott v. State Bar Examining

Committee, 220 Conn. 812, 829, 601 A.2d 1021 (1992).6

Accordingly, it is clear that a committee’s consideration of an applicant’s present good moral character is

an expansive inquiry. The committee may consider the

applicant’s conduct prior to or after his or her suspension, regardless of whether that conduct served as the

basis for his or her suspension. The committee may

also consider all conduct in determining the applicant’s

present fitness. For example, in Scott v. State Bar

Examining Committee, supra, 220 Conn. 815, the applicant for admission sat for the state bar examination

in July, 1987, which he passed. Nevertheless, the Bar

Examining Committee voted unanimously to deny him

admission to the bar on the basis of both its and the local

standing committee’s investigation into the applicant’s

past criminal record. Id. The standing committee conducted a hearing in which it questioned the applicant

about both his criminal record, as well as his prior drug

use. Id. The standing committee, and later the executive

committee of the Bar Examining Committee, conducted

hearings that involved the applicant’s history dating

back to marijuana use between 1977 and 1985. Id., 814.

More specifically, the hearings investigated the following events: ‘‘In 1981, the [applicant] was arrested and

charged with possession of controlled drugs and possession of [marijuana]. The possession of controlled

drugs charge was nolled and the [applicant] paid an

$85 fine for possession of [marijuana]. He was convicted

of possession of [marijuana] for a second time in 1983

and paid a $385 fine. The [applicant’s] last drug related

conviction occurred in 1984, when he was arrested and

charged with interfering with a police officer and possession of a controlled substance. The interference

charge was nolled, and he paid a $250 fine for possession of a controlled substance. The [applicant] has also

been cited for failing to register a change of address with

the [Department of Motor Vehicles], failure to carry his

registration, illegal dumping, failure to carry an insurance card, making an improper left turn and failure to

have insurance. Furthermore, at the age of seventeen,

he was adjudicated as a youthful offender on a charge

of criminal attempt to commit burglary.’’ Id., 814 n.2.

All of this conduct, regardless of the timing or final

adjudication was investigated in relation to the applicant’s admission to the bar. Id., 815. On the basis of
the information learned during its investigation, the Bar

Examining Committee members denied the applicant

admission to the bar because he had three convictions

involving illegal substances, his explanation of his criminal prosecutions was not credible, and he ‘‘displayed

a lack of candor and did not appreciate the importance

of his testimony at the hearing.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 816. The applicant appealed to the

Superior Court, which reversed the decision of the Bar

Examining Committee and ordered the applicant admitted to the bar. Id., 813–14. The Bar Examining Committee appealed to this court, and the appeal was transferred to our Supreme Court, which reversed the

judgment of the Superior Court. Id., 814. Specifically,

our Supreme Court noted that the rules of practice

delegated to the Bar Examining Committee, ‘‘the duty,

power and authority to . . . determine whether such

candidates are qualified . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 825–26. Therefore, the court held that the Bar Examining Committee

was within its authority to question the applicant about

all prior arrests, even those that were nolled or did not

result in a conviction, in order to consider the applicant’s candor and credibility when assessing his moral

fitness. Id., 825. It further concluded that ‘‘[i]t was

improper for the trial court . . . to substitute its own

assessment of the [applicant’s] credibility and candor

for that of the [Bar Examining Committee].’’ Id.

In the present case, the defendant challenges the

committee’s authority to delve into and adjudicate

‘‘alleged but unadjudicated, presuspension misconduct

. . . .’’ Particularly, the defendant challenges the committee’s attempted questioning regarding conduct

related to his convictions that were reversed on appeal.

As in Scott, the committee had the authority to investigate conduct that could play a role in its assessment

of the defendant’s moral fitness. See Scott v. State Bar

Examining Committee, supra, 220 Conn. 825–26. In

the present case, this included not only the underlying

facts of the defendant’s obstruction of justice conviction, but also all of the facts that the committee believed

could be relevant to the determination of the defendant’s present fitness to practice law, as well as his

good moral character. Not only did the committee have

the authority to do so, but the rules of practice charge

it with investigating such conduct. See Practice Book

§ 2-53 (i). Ultimately, the committee had a duty to undertake a fair investigation of the facts by exploring the

defendant’s moral character. See Statewide Grievance

Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311 Conn. 463–64.

Although the defendant argues7

that the committee

only had the authority to investigate conduct of which

he was convicted, specifically his obstruction of justice

conviction, this argument appears to conflate the reinstatement process pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53

with the grievance process pursuant to Practice Book
§ 2-32. As discussed previously, the committee’s inquiry

to determine whether to reinstate a suspended applicant is unbound in time. See Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 220 Conn. 829. Conversely, Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) permits the dismissal of a

grievance complaint that is founded on allegations that

occurred more than six years prior to the filing of such a

complaint. This court previously has held that ‘‘attorney

grievance proceedings and bar admission proceedings

are quite different; we therefore do not accept the petitioner’s invitation to draw an analogy between the two.

. . . The burden in grievance proceedings is on the

statewide grievance committee to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convincing

proof. . . . The ultimate burden of proving good moral

character required for admission to the bar, however, is

on the applicant.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Friedman v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 77 Conn. App. 526, 541, 824 A.2d 866

(2003), appeal dismissed, 270 Conn. 457, 853 A.2d 496

(2004). Therefore, with the foregoing principles in mind,

we conclude that the court correctly determined that

the committee had the authority to question the defendant about his presuspension misconduct.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the committee

improperly found that he failed to accept his obstruction of justice conviction with sincerity and honesty.

The defendant argues that he was not required to do

so because he proved to the committee that he plausibly

reconciled his claim of innocence and, additionally, that

the remaining criteria set forth in Ganim for the court

to utilize in the evaluation of an application for reinstatement are not applicable. We disagree.

We begin with the general principles and standards

of review that govern our resolution of the defendant’s

second claim. ‘‘[W]hen reviewing the legal conclusions

of the trial court concerning the adequacy of evidence

before the [committee], we need only determine

whether the [committee’s] finding, that the [applicant]

lacked good moral character, is supported in the record

of the application proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 529. ‘‘Ultimately, the court must

decide whether the . . . committee, by approving or

withholding its approval of an application, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or in abuse of its discretion

or without a fair investigation of the facts.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311 Conn. 451.

Along with the considerations for reinstatement set

forth by our Supreme Court in Ganim, we reiterate

that, ‘‘[i]n either admission or readmission proceedings,

the burden is on an applicant to prove his or her present

fitness to practice law.’’ Id. In Ganim, our Supreme

Court stated that ‘‘the defendant’s failure to either
explain, or acknowledge any responsibility for, his

extensive criminal wrongdoing, or to express remorse

for that wrongdoing, was a highly relevant consideration . . . .’’ Id., 463. The court noted that, although

this type of acknowledgement in the reinstatement process is not required, it is one of the many factors that

must be examined. See id., 464 n.32.

The defendant contends that Ganim stands for the

proposition that, in a reinstatement proceeding in which

the applicant maintains his innocence, even after his

conviction is upheld on appeal, the applicant is not

required to accept his established conviction if his claim

of innocence plausibly can be reconciled with his conviction. The defendant argues that he appropriately reconciled his claim of innocence with his obstruction of

justice conviction before the committee, and, therefore,

the committee improperly relied on his failure to accept

responsibility for that conviction and to admit his

wrongdoing in recommending that he not be reinstated

to the bar.

In support of this claim, the only law to which the

defendant cites are two footnotes from Ganim. See id.,

464 n.32; id., 466 n.33. The first footnote provides: ‘‘The

defendant contends that the trial court improperly held,

as a matter of law, that he necessarily had to be found

remorseful, or acknowledge his criminal wrongdoing,

before he could be found presently fit to practice law.

According to the defendant, the court considered

remorse and acknowledgment of wrongdoing to be a

bright line requirement for readmission, and such a

requirement is not prescribed by statute or court rule

. . . . We recognize that the trial court did devote a

significant portion of its analysis to the issue of the

defendant’s lack of remorse, and it ended that section

of its memorandum of decision by concluding that the

standing committee improperly found that [the defendant] was remorseful or acknowledged that he engaged

in the criminal misconduct, which are necessary components of rehabilitation and a finding of present fitness. . . . At the same time, however . . . it is clear

that lack of remorse was not the sole basis for the

court’s ultimate determination that the defendant had

not met his burden of proving present fitness.

‘‘To the extent the trial court’s decision can be read

as stating a hard and fast rule requiring remorse, in all

cases, as an absolute condition for reinstatement, we

disavow it as legally incorrect. Nevertheless . . . the

defendant’s lack of remorse, particularly as it was not

accompanied by an explicit profession of innocence

and plausible explanation for his sixteen criminal convictions, certainly was a proper consideration in this

case, even if it was not a dispositive one. Additionally,

even putting aside the issue of the defendant’s remorse,

or lack thereof, we still would conclude that the other

probative and credited evidence in the record was not
sufficient to support the standing committee’s finding

of present fitness. Accordingly, any error by the trial

court in this regard was of no consequence.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 464

n.32.

Additionally, the second footnote on which the defendant relies provides: ‘‘In a reinstatement proceeding,

an applicant’s previous criminal convictions, upheld on

appeal, are treated as conclusive evidence that the

applicant in fact engaged in conduct that was seriously

wrong. . . . Unless this premise somehow is shown to

be faulty, an applicant’s subjective belief that he did

not in fact engage in wrongful conduct suggests two

other possibilities. The first possibility is that the [applicant] is, for whatever reason, in such a state of denial

as to be unable to appreciate the difference between

reality and imagination with respect to what he did and

did not do. If this is the case, a necessary premise for

rehabilitation (and for the ability to practice law)—the

ability to appreciate the reality of what one is doing

and has done—is missing from the [applicant].

‘‘The second possibility is that the [applicant’s] ability

to form reasonably acceptable moral and legal conclusions about his conduct—and his ability to appreciate

and apply the commonly-agreed upon meaning of the

law and the ethical requirements of the legal profession—are so far from adequate that he similarly has no

business practicing law. . . . These were possibilities

that the standing committee should have explored in

the present case.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 466 n.33.

These two footnotes simply do not stand for the proposition that an individual need not exhibit good moral

character under the criteria set forth in Ganim, even

if an individual plausibly reconciles his or her claim of

innocence with the evidence that formed the basis of

his or her conviction. Instead, as the court in Ganim

stated, an applicant’s ‘‘denial of responsibility, like the

convictions themselves, is simply another piece of evidence to consider, and to be given such weight as it

deserves in light of the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 465.

‘‘The law requires a reformation of character as demonstrated by an applicant’s more recent life and conduct. The more egregious the misconduct resulting in

disbarment, the greater the proof of moral character

and trustworthiness required for reinstatement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance

Committee v. Rapoport, 119 Conn. App. 269, 282, 987

A.2d 1075, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 907, 995 A.2d 639

(2010). ‘‘Thus, when courts consider the evidence introduced in reinstatement proceedings of an applicant’s

current fitness, they must evaluate it against the backdrop of the applicant’s prior misconduct, and [inquire]

whether the former is of sufficient weight to overcome
the latter.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311

Conn. 456.

In the present case, the defendant argues that he

did not need to accept his established conviction with

sincerity and honesty because he proved his claim of

innocence to the committee. This argument only further

exhibits the defendant’s confusion with the reinstatement process, particularly, his belief that his claim of

innocence presupposes that all other criteria from

Ganim are met, which is simply not what the committee

found. The committee was not investigating or recommending guilt or innocence; instead, the committee was

charged with determining whether the defendant had

been rehabilitated, as well as whether he possessed

good moral character and the requisite fitness to practice law, which must all be ‘‘viewed against the backdrop of the defendant’s misconduct and the disrepute

it brought’’ to both the defendant and the legal profession. Id., 462.

Although this failure to acknowledge or express

remorse for misconduct is not the sole factor determinative of the defendant’s application for reinstatement, it

was appropriate for the committee to consider, particularly in light of its concerns about the defendant’s candor and demeanor before the committee. See id., 464–

65. Additionally, it plays a role in whether the defendant

has exhibited to the committee that he has been rehabilitated since his conviction. Particularly, the committee

expressed significant concerns that more than ten years

had passed since the defendant’s suspension, but he

continues to insist that he did not commit any wrongdoing. This led the committee to state that rehabilitation

would be impossible so long as the defendant fails to

acknowledge that he committed a crime. Thus, although

failing to acknowledge or exhibit remorse for his misconduct does not alone bar the defendant’s application

for reinstatement, it may be considered in conjunction

with all of the other factors utilized to determine if the

defendant has met his burden to show rehabilitation,

good moral character, and a present fitness to be reinstated to the legal profession.8 See id., 467.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err

in finding that the committee did not act arbitrarily or

unreasonably, or in abuse of its discretion when issuing

its recommendation that the defendant’s application for

reinstatement to the bar be denied.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge any of the facts found by

the committee and adopted by the court.

2 At the reinstatement hearing, during the assistant bar counsel’s crossexamination of the defendant, when asked about a certain conversation

with Silvester, the defendant stated: ‘‘Well, what is—I’m now going to object

because we’re really going into areas beyond the scope of my—my direct

and—and I was charged with campaign bribery, which I was acquitted of.
So all these questions now are irrelevant, and I object to continuing this

line of inquiry.’’

The following colloquy then took place between committee member Howard K. Levine and the defendant:

‘‘Q. I have just one question, and I appreciate you engaging in this with

me. One of the [Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, 311 Conn.

430, 87 A.3d 1078 (2014)] factors is the applicant’s character, maturity and

experience at the time of discipline and at present. Again, is it your position

that that limits the inquiry solely to those matters that comprised of your

conviction and does not allow either counsel or the committee to inquire

into matters upon which you were acquitted or matters which were not the

subject of a grievance?

‘‘A. Yes, unless the—I don’t prevail in demonstrating that I was innocent,

then that fact would rise. But if I’m demonstrating that I’m innocent then

it doesn’t get—you don’t get to go back and start, make the entry.’’

3 The following colloquy took place at the reinstatement hearing between

Levine and the defendant:

‘‘Q. Okay. Mr. Spadoni, if we gave you the opportunity, fully understanding

your legal position, if we gave you [the] opportunity now for [the assistant

bar counsel] to ask you those questions again, would you still stand on your

legal position or would you answer the questions?

‘‘A. I would stand on my legal position because it’s—and I don’t think

you have the authority—this is not the forum. That—that train left. You

know, when I was—when I was—they could have filed a grievance which

can be independent.’’

4 Practice Book § 2-53 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An attorney who has

been suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of one

year or more or has remained under suspension pursuant to an order of

interim suspension for a period of one year or more shall be required to

apply for reinstatement in accordance with this section, unless the court that

imposed the discipline expressly provided in its order that such application

is not required. . . .’’

5 The defendant, without any direct citation to legal authority, frames his

first claim as challenging the committee’s ‘‘subject matter jurisdiction’’ to

investigate certain allegations against him. We disagree with the defendant’s

characterization. ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a

court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before

it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has

competence to entertain the action before it.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group, 335 Conn. 448, 463, 239 A.3d 272

(2020). Here, there is no dispute that the committee had the authority to

adjudicate the defendant’s application for reinstatement; rather, the defendant’s claim challenges whether the committee’s inquiry into his presuspension misconduct was proper.

6 Although Scott involved admission to the bar and not reinstatement

following suspension, cases involving a committee’s investigation of an

individual’s application for admission are applicable here because, as stated

by our Supreme Court, ‘‘[i]n either admission or readmission proceedings,

the burden is on an applicant to prove his or her present fitness to practice

law.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311 Conn. 451.

7 The defendant also argues that, because the committee did not have

authority to adjudicate or investigate the facts underlying the racketeering,

racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud, and bribery allegations, the committee’s

findings of fact that are based on his refusal to answer questions concerning

those allegations are void as a matter of law. In support of this argument,

the defendant fails to cite any legal authority, and, therefore, we decline to

review it because it is inadequately briefed. See Marvin v. Board of Education, 191 Conn. App. 169, 178 n.8, 213 A.3d 1155 (2019) (‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a

bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they . . .

consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority

and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)).

8

It must be restated that ‘‘[a]ttorney discipline exists for the purpose of

preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons

unfit to practise in them. . . . An attorney as an officer of the court in the

administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for the manner in

which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him. His admission

is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right

conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise
it, so that when he, by misconduct in any capacity, discloses that he has

become or is an unfit or unsafe person to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of an attorney, his right to continue in the enjoyment

of his professional privilege may and ought to be declared forfeited. . . .

Therefore, [i]f a court disciplines an attorney, it does so not to mete out

punishment to an offender, but [so] that the administration of justice may

be safeguarded and the courts and the public protected from the misconduct

or unfitness of those who are licensed to perform the important functions

of the legal profession.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide

Grievance Committee v. Ganim, supra, 311 Conn. 452–53.