### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 25, 200 6 S es sio n


### STAT E O F T EN NE SSEE v. CA ROL ET TE STE PH EN S

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 75690 Mar y Beth Leibow itz, Judge

No. E2005-01925-CC A-R9- CD - F iled October 13, 2006

The a ppellant, Carolette Stephe ns, was indi cted on one count of sec ond deg ree murder. D uring the jury trial in May

of 2005, the trial c ourt sua sponte de clar ed a mistrial over objecti o n o f b o th the Sta te a nd th e app e lla nt. Th e c a se wa s im me diate ly re sc he du le d f

or tr ia l. T he app e lla nt s ou g ht a dismiss al of the indictment, a rg uing tha t the retria l placed the appellant in double jeopar dy . The trial court de nied the motion to dism iss the indictment, but permitted the ap p el lant to seek a n int e rl oc uto ry

app e a l. Th is Cou rt g ra nte d the int e rl oc uto ry app e a l. On app e a l, the app e lla nt p re se nts the following issues: (1) whe th er t h e S t ate pr ovoked the tria l court into g ranting a mistrial by eliciting te stimonyreg arding an unconstitutional sear ch war rant that had been suppr essed by the trial court; (2) wh et h er the trial court erre d in gr anting a mistrial based on ma nifest nec essity ; and (3) whether the appe llant’s rig hts to protec tion a g ainst double jeopar dy will be violated by

a re trial for
se c on d d e g re e mur de r. Becaus e th e tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

de c lare d a

mis tr ia l w ith ou t a

ma nif e st
ne c e ssi ty fo r d oin g so , th e do ub le je op ard y pr ov isi on s of the fe de ra l a ndstate c on sti tut ion s p ro hib it
a re trial of the a

ppellant on the cha

rg e that is the su b

j ec t of this appea l. The judg ment of the trial court de ny ing the appellant’ s motion t o dismiss is there fore reve rsed and the indictment dismiss ed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Reve rsed and Dismissed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J. joined and J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT

. J R ., J ., filed a se parate conc urring opinion.

Rob e rt L . Joll e y , Jr. , K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Caro le tte Ste ph e ns

.
Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. Tu rn e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ra nd a ll E . N ic ho ls, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndKe vin Al le n, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t At torne y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n October

of 2002, t he appellant was indicted by a Knox Count y

Gra nd J ury

with one count of second deg ree murder. Subsequently , the appellant filed a motion to suppress all items seized as
a re sult of a sea

rch w arr ant issued for the appellant’ s apartment. The trial court gr anted the motion to suppress, “e x cluding from evide nce in this ca se all items found inside the def endant’ s residenc e and seized during the s ear ch conducted by police pursuant to the warrant issued on J uly 12, 2002.”

The trial of

the matter be g an on M ay2, 2005. At trial, L arry Boling , a sec urity

office r for Fort Sande rs Medica l Center in downtown Knoxvill e, testified that a t approxim ately 4:00 p.m. on J uly 12, 2002, he noticed a

disturbance at the ambulance doors. Mr. B oling witnesse d a man be ing b r o u g h ti n f

r o mo u t s i d e

. T h e m a n w a s s l u m p e d o v e r i n a w h e e l c h a i r

a n d w a s b e i n g a s s i s t e d b y a nurse a nd the unidentified drive r o f a vehicle pa rked outside. The driver of the vehicle was late r identified as the a

p p el l an t

. Mr. B oling a ssisted in ge tting the patient to the treatment a rea , then returne d to the lobby to g et m ore information from the driver of the vehicle. Upon hi s return, Mr

. B oli ng dis c ov e re d th a t th e dr ive r a ndthe ve hi cle we re g on e . M r. B oli ng c on ta c te d th e se c ur ity dispatcher t o s ec u re the videotape of the c losed circ uit television in t he eme rg ency drop-of f ar ea. The police revie wed the vide otape upon their arrival.

Dr. Micha el Deboe r wa s one of the phy sician’s o n d u t y i n the emer g ency room at F ort Sa nd e rs Me dic a l Ce nte r o n July 12 , 20 02

. Dr

. De bo e r tr e a te d the vic tim , O rl a nd o D ur ray B e nn e tt, who was pr onounced de ad af ter unsucc essful attempts at re suscitation.

Fr eda V inson, the victim’s aunt, testified t hat t he appellant and the victim wer e dating at the time of th e v i ct i m ’s dea th. Ms. Vinson stated that there w ere problems in the re lationship that surfa ced a fter the appellant a ccuse d the victim of che ating on her w ith another woma n. The
app e lla nt t oldMs. Vi ns on du ri ng a te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio n th a t sh e wa s g oin g to kill the vic tim

.
Br oderic k Roge rs was a friend of both the a ppellant and the vic tim. Mr. Roger s testified that on J uly 12, 2002, he w as i n the L onsdale Home s are a of K nox ville on Texas Avenue, whe re the appellant lived. Mr. Rog ers wa lked by the appe l l ant’s apartment and notice d someone’s f oot hang ing out the d o o r. M r. R og ers r an to the door to see what wa s g oing on. When Mr. Rog ers op e ne d th e do or , th e vic tim fe ll ont o him. Mr . Rog e rs state d tha t the vic tim ha d s e ve ra l ho le s in his shirt and that his chest ar ea w as bloody

. Mr. Rog ers sa w the appe llant inside the apartment, kne eling in the floor, cle aning up blood. The appellant did not ex plain what had ha ppened inside the apartment. Mr. Roge rs helped c arry the victim to a car

so that he could be taken to the hosp i t al

. Mr. Rog ers testified tha t he did not see any one else inside the apa rtment.-3-

Qwande ll Vinson, the victim’s cousi n , testified that he r ece ived a tele phone ca ll from the appellant on July12, 2002. Acc ording to Mr. Vinson, the appe llant asked him to “co m e g et” the victim “befor e [she] ki ll[ ed] him.” Mr. Vinson told the appel l ant not to do any thing. During the
conver sation, Mr. Vinson could hear the victim in the backg round asking Mr. Vinson to come g et him. W hen Mr. Vinson a rrived at the apartment, it was surrounded by police ca rs.

L arry Viney ard, a

former investigator for the Knoxvi lle Police Depa rtment, testified that he
was a ssigne d to investiga te the murde r of the victim. I nvestig ator Vine y ard w ent to the emer g ency ro om a ft e r be ing a dv ise d th a t th e vic tim wa s tr a ns po rt e d to the ho sp ita l by a n u nid e nti fi e d f

e ma le driver. A fter r eviewing the secu rity came ra ta

pe and be ing a dvised that the victim had died, I nv e sti g a tor

Vi ne y ardwe nt to the apa

rt me nt on Te xas Av e nu e wh e re the vic tim ha d be e n livi ng wi th the appe llant. When I nvestig ator Viney ard arrive d on the s cene , he was informed by another office r that there was what appea red to be blood on the fr ont porch. Upon f urther inspe ction, I nvestig ator Viney ard a lso discovere d what appe are d t o b e b lood on the back por ch. During Investig ator Viney ard’ s testimony , the following exchang e occ urre d:

COUNSEL

FOR THE S T ATE: Okay . When y ou arrived there - - wa s [s ic] there other pe rsonnel beside s I nvestig ator B ell there ?

I NVESTI GATOR VINEYARD: The re w as a police office r. I don’t reme mber what his name wa s. But ther e wa s [si c] c ivilians standing around the location bec ause the police we re the re.
COUNSEL

FOR THESTATE: How many people?

I NV EST I GA TOR VINE YA RD : O h, the re wa s [si c ] pr ob ably te n o r f if te e n p e op le p r o b ab ly s ta n d in g inth e g e n e r a l a

r e a o f th e f r o n t o f th e ap ar tm e n t c o mp le x.
COUNSEL

FOR THESTATE: Okay . Had the c rime sce ne been sec ured or
unsecur ed?

I NVESTI GATOR VINEYARD: It was sec ured. The are a in front of the a partment ha d been
se c ur e d a ndthe ba c k o f tha t apa rt me nt.

CO U N SE L

F O R T H E ST A T E : O k a y

. A n d w h a t d idy o u f in d ? Di d y o u n o ti c e a ny thing unusual? You said there was blood on the fr ont porch. Did y ou notice anything usua l [ sic] about the fr ont porch?

I NVESTI GATOR VINEYARD: Uh, nothing unusual that I - - that I can think of.

CO UN SEL

F ORTH E ST AT E: Wha t di d y ou a ndI nv e sti g a tor Jone s d o n e xt?-4-

I NVESTI GATOR VINEYARD: We, uh, chec ked the area . We, uh, went - - ha d - - it was a situation where we a sked for a sea rch w arr ant to possiblyg o inside the location.
At that point, counsel for the appellant a sked to approa ch the bench and, outside the hearing of the jury , o bje c te d to I nv e sti g a tor Vi ne y ard ’s me nti on of the su pp re sse d s e arc h w arr a nt, bu t sp e c if ic a lly stated that he did not want a mistrial. The trial court e x cused the jury for a jury -out hea

ring on the matter. During the hearing , the appellant moved for a dismiss al of the indictment be cause “jeopa rdy ha s a tta c he d” a ndthe dis c us sion of th e se arc h w arr a nt w a s rule d “ tot a lly ina dmi ssi ble in the se pr oc e e din g s. ” Cou ns e l f

or the app e lla nt s ou g ht a

“ fl a t ou t di smi ssa l” rathe r tha n a mis tr ia l.

Counsel for the State a sked the trial court to g ive a curative instruc tion, arg uing that it was
an:
[H] onest mistake. I t was an ope n-ende d question by me in ref ere nce. A nd of cour se, y ou Honor, a n d every

body in this courtroom knows I was g oing to the dumpster

. That’s whe re I

wanted to g et. And he leape d over the dumpster and went to the - - and wha t he said Judge, a s that - - that he asked fo r a s ea rch w arr ant for the p o s s ib il it y o f g e tt in g in th e h o u s e

. T h e r e ’ s n o p r e ju d ic e

. T h e o n ly p r ejudice tha t
c ou ld b e ha d f

ro m th a t st a te me nt i s thi s ju ry mig ht thin k n ow that I

fo un d n oth ing in the house. Tha t a sea

rch w arr ant was e x ecute d and nothing was found so - - whic h cuts ag ainst me, not for me.

Af te r h e ari ng the arg ume nts of c ou ns e l, the tria l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th e fo llo wi ng :

I n th is c a se wh a t’ s b e e n s a id i s, “ We a pp lie d f or a se arc h w arr a nt. ” No w, a t th is point I have no w ay

of telling the jury , “Well, now y ou want to disreg ard e verything that y ou mig ht thin k a

bout a se arc h w arr a nt. ” Ob vio us ly , th a t le a ds the jury to believe that something ha

ppened in that house or t hat t herewas something that didn’t
com e o u t o r that nothing wa s found, i.e., that somebody hid it, as [ counsel for

the appellant] sugg ests.
[I ] don’t want to g rant a dismiss al i n this case. I don’t want to g rant a

judgme nt of
a c qu itt a l. I

do n’ t th ink

e ith e r i s th e app ro pr ia te re me dy . I th in k th a t th e re me dy

is
a mis tr ia l. But I wi ll saythat on e of the re a so ns wh y

I thi nk thi s is a dif fi c ult situation is t hat this is not a strong State’ s case at this point.

I ’v e he ardno mor e , b ut a s I un de rs ta ndthe pr oo f, thi s - - the case wi th re g ardto second de g ree murder is we ak. I don’t know what would happen if we kept on g oing and we g ot a [ m] otion for judgment of acquittal. But I don’t think we ca n even g et there

. [I ] don’t want the j ury to sit around. And t hey ’ll do it too. They ’ll speculate about
w h a t th a t me a n t ab o u t th a t s e ar c h

. T h e y ’ r e p r o b ab ly a lr e a d y d o in g th a t. So I ’m-5-

g oing to g rant a

motion for mistrial, and I ’m g oing to le t y ou all arg ue at the Court of Criminal Appea ls what that means to the f uture of this ca se.

A m i s t ri a l [ s u a ] s p o n t e i s wh at I ’m gra n t i n g. [ I ] t ’s n o ta m o t i o n

. I ’m gra n t i n g a mis tr ia l.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fu rthe r c lari fi e d it s f

ind ing s a s f

oll ow s:
Th e c omm e nt a

bo ut the se arc h w arr a nt w ill - - wi ll - - I c a n’ t e ve n th ink of a

way to unring that bell with the jury , to expl ain to the jury t o d isreg ard the conce pt of a
sear ch wa rra nt, whether

or not there was a sear ch or not to specula te about a sea rch
w arr a n t i n s u c h a

w a y th a t w o u ldn o t b e p r e

ju d ic ia l t o [t h e a

p p e ll a n t]

.
I thi nk , th e re fo re , th a t c re a te s a ma nif e st n e c e ssi ty

[to] d e c lare a

mis tr ia l.
Subsequently , the appellant filed a motion to dismiss the i ndictment and pre vent re trial based on double jeopar dy

. On J uly 15, 2005, the trial court he ld a hea ring on the motion to dis miss. The trial court ultimately

denied the motion to dismiss , and ente red a n o rder g ranting the appe llant’s motion to seek a n interlocutory appea l. This Court gra nted the application for interlocutory appea l
on Se pte mb er 16 , 20 05. O n a pp e a l, the app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t th e Sta te pr ov ok e d th e tr ia l c ou rt to g rant a mistrial by

eliciting imprope r testimony from a w itness, that the trial court imprope rly g rante d
a m i s t r i a l , a n d t h a ta

r e t r i a l o f t h e ap p e l l a n ti s b arr e d b y d o u b l e j e o p ar d y.

An a ly sis
On appe al, the appe llant arg ues that the trial court err ed in de ny ing her motion to dismis s the indictment based on double jeopardy

. Specifica lly , the appellant arg ues that the State provoke d the trial court to g rant a

mistrial sua sponte afte r eliciting improper testimony about a suppre ssed sea rch
war rant fr om a State witness and that r etrial of the appellant on the c harg e of se cond deg ree murder is barre d by

double jeopar dy . I n other words, the appellant a rg ues that the State provoke d the trial
c ou rt to g ra nt a

mis tr ia l. T he Sta te c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y ru le d t hat th e re wa s a manifest nec essity

for a mistrial.
The double je opardy

clause of the F ifth Amen d m en t t o the United States Constitut ion provides that no per son shall “be subject for the same of

fense to be twice put in jeopa rdy of life or limb . . . .” A rticle 1, sec tion 10 of the Tenne ssee Constitution contains a simil ar pr ovision. As our supreme c ourt has noted many times, the three fundame ntal principles underly ing double jeopar dy provide prote ctions ag ainst: (1) a se cond pro s e c u tion after a n acquittal; (2) a second pr osecution af

ter conviction; and (3) multipl e punishments for the sa me offe nse. State v. De nton, 938 S.W .2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996) ; see a lso North Carolina v. Pear ce, 395 U .S. 711 (19 6 9 ), over ruled in part by Alabama v. Smit h, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).-6-

Whe r e th e tria l is te r mi n a te d o v e r th e o b je c ti o n o f th e d e f

e n d a n t, a s is th e c a s e h e r ein, the te st fo r li f

t i n g t h e d o u b l e j e o p ar d y

b ar t o a s e c o n d t r i a l i s t h e “ m a n i f e s tn e c e s s i t y ” s t a n d ar d f

i r st enunciated by

J ustice Story ’s opinion f or the Court in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824),
a nda do pte d in Te nn e sse e in Maha la v. Sta te , 18 Te nn . 532 , 536 (1 83 7)

. Al tho ug h Per e z de a lt w ith the most common form of “ma nifest nec essity ,” the de clar ation of a mistrial following a jury ’s i n ab i l i t y t o r e a c h a

v e r d i c t , t h e p r i n c i p l e s t a t e dt h e r e i n ap p l i e s g e n e r a l l y.
[T] he law ha s invested Courts of justice with the authority to disc harg e a jury from g ivi ng a ny

ve rd ic t, w he ne ve r, in the ir op ini on , ta

kin g a ll the c ir c ums ta nc e s in to consideration, there is a manif est nec essity for the act, or the ends of public justice
wo uld oth e rw ise be de fe a te d. Th e y are to e xer c ise a

so un d d isc re tio n o n th e su bje c t;
a ndit i s impo ssi ble to d e fi ne a ll the c ir c ums ta nc e s, wh ic h wo uld re nd e r it p ro pe r t o interfe re. To be sure, the pow er oug ht to be used with the greater c aution, under urg ent circ um s tance s, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in ca pital case s espec ial l y , Courts should be ext reme ly car eful how the y

interfe re w ith any

of the chanc es of life , in favor of the prisoner . But, a fter a ll, they have the rig ht to order the discharg e; and the se curity which the public ha ve fo r t he fa ithful, sound, and conscie ntious ex erc ise of this discretion, re sts, in thi s, as in other c ases, upon the responsibilityof the Judges, unde r their oa ths of office

. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580. The doctrine of “manife st ne cessity ” saf eg uards the a ccuse d’s rig ht to have his tr ia l c omp le te d b y

a pa rt ic ula r t ri bu na l, wh ile a t th e sa me tim e pr e se rv ing “ the pu bli c ’s int e re st in fair tria ls de signe d to e nd in just j udg ments.” Wade v. Hunte r, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); Etter v. State, 205 S.W .2d 1, 3 (1947).

Th e pu rp os e of

a mis tr ia l is to c or

re c t th e dama g e do ne to the j ud ici a l pr oc e ss w he n s ome event ha s occur

red w hich would pre clude a n impartial verdic t. See Arnold v. State, 563 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) . The de cision whether to gr ant a mistrial i s within the trial court’s disc r e ti o n a n d w il l n o t b e d is tu r b e d ab s e n t a n ab u s e o f th a t d is c r e ti o n

. St a te v

. M il lb r o oks, 819 S.W. 2d44 1, 44 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 91 ). F or thi s r e a so n, a n a

pp e ll ate court ’s re vie w s ho uld provide c onsiderable defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s ruling in de termining whether an occ urre nce or e ve nt at tr ia l ha s so pr e

jud ic e d th e de fe nd a nt o r the Sta te a s to pr e c lud e a fa ir a ndimp art ia l ve rd ic t. State v. Wil liams, 929 S.W .2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Howeve r, as noted, if the trial
court d o e s g r a n t a mi s tria l o v e r th e o b je c ti o n o f th e d e f

e n d a n t w ith o u t a “ ma n if

e s t n e c e s s it y ” for do ing so , d ou ble je op ard y c on c e rn s w ill pr oh ibi t a

re tr ia l of the de fe nd a nt.

I n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r the re is a “ ma nif e st ne c e ssi ty ” fo r a mis tr ia l, “ ‘n o abs tr a c t f or mul a should be mecha nically ap p l i ed and all cir cumstance s should be taken into ac count.’” State v. Mo un c e , 8 59 S .W .2 d 31 9, 32 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) (c itatio n o mit te d) . O nly wh e n th e re is “ no fe a sib le alternative to halting the pr ocee dings” can a manife st nece ssitybe shown. State v. Knig ht, 616 S.W .2d 593, 596 (Tenn. 1981)

.T h es e f ac t or s ar e n on

- ex cl u s i v e a n d m ay not be per t i n en t i n ev er y ca s e. W i l l i am D ot s on , 1999 W L 357327, 1

at * 4; s ee St at e v

. M ou n ce , 859 S. W

. 2d 319, 322 ( T en n

. 1993) ( h ol di n g t h at de t er mi n at i on of pr opr i et y of

mi s t r i al i s n ot subject t o m echanis t i c d et erm i nat i o n and s ho ul d be m ad e o n t he f act s o f each i nd i vi d ual case).

-7- Ag ain, the issue of w hether a retria l sha ll be allowed must be decide d on the circ umstances of each case and is within the discre tion of the trial judg e. The trial judg e must weig h the rig hts of the pu bli c to a

fa ir a ndc omp le te a dju dic a tio n a g a ins t th e c on sti tut ion a l rig ht o f the a c c us e d n ot t o be har assed, oppr essed by succe ssive trials, or otherw ise denied the protec tion of his constitut ional rig hts. The exercise of this discr etion by the trial judge is r eviewe d by resolving any doubts in favor of the li bert y of th e c iti zen . St a te v. Ev a Jea n B ro wn , N o. 11 67 , 1 98 8 WL 13 66 00 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , a t K no xvill e , D e c . 2 0, 19 88 ), pe rm . a pp

. de nie d (T e nn

. 19 89 ). F urthe r, the pr os e c uti on mus t d em o n s t ra t e t h e m an i fe s tn ec es s i t y fo r a n d l ac k

o f f ea s i b l e a l t er n at i v es t o t h e m i s t ri al , ev en t h o u gh it was g rante d sua sponte, if the de fenda nt is to be ag ain tried. I d.

I n the ca se her ein, the trial court decla red a mistrial sua

sponte afte r I nvestig ator Vine y ard interjec ted improper testimony about the suppressed sear ch war rant. Although T ennesse e courts do not apply any exacting s t an d ar d fo r dete rmining w hen a mistrial is nec essary afte r a w itness has injected imprope r testimony , this Court has considered: ( 1) whe ther the improper testimony resulted from questioning by

the State, ra ther t h an having been a g ratuitous decla

ration; (2) the rela tive streng th or wea

kness of the State’s proof; and (3) whe ther the tria l court promptly g ave a curative instruction. See State v. Demetr ius Holmes, No. E2000-02263-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1538517, 1 at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, Nov. 30, 2001); State v. Willi am Dotson, No. 03C01-9803- CC-00105, 1999 WL 357327, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J une 4, 1999). This a naly tical fra mework is helpf

ul in the case at bar

.
L oo kin g to the abo ve no n- e xclu siv e fa c tor s a nd app ly ing the m to the c a se he re in, we ini tia lly note that there is nothing in the re cord tha t indicates that the prose cu t o r i n t enti onally elicited I nvestig ato r Viney ard’ s statement that the police soug ht a sea rch w arr ant for the appellant’ s apartment. I n fac t, it appear s from the rec o rd that the prosec utor did not ex pect Investig ator Viney ard to re fer to the sear ch war rant. I ndeed, the prosec utor mere ly asked Investig ator Vine y ard the next st ep in his investiga tion, making no hints whatsoeve r at the searc h war rant or the fruits of the sea rch. Mor eover , the statement made by I nvestig ator Vine y ard w as an isolated mention of the
sear ch wa rra nt and was immediate ly halted.

Se c on d, we dis a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c omm e nts a s to the we a kn e ss o f the Sta te ’s c a se a t th e po int the tr ia l wa s sto pp e d. To the c on tr ary , we de te rm ine that the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d u p to the point of the mistrial of the appe llant’s g uilt was more than a dequate to withstand a motion for judgme nt of ac quittal. Accor ding to the vic tim’s aunt, the victim and the appe llant were having problems in thei r p er s o nal re lationship. Ms. Vinson t estified that the a ppellant told her she w as g oing to kill the victim. Brode rickRoge rs found the vic tim at the appellant’s a partment he saw a foot hang ing out of

the d o o r. W h en M r. R og ers ope ned the door , the victim fell out onto Mr. Roge rs. At the time, the victim had seve ral holes in his shi rt , and his che st area was bloody . Mr.-8-

Roge rs saw the appellant in the a partment c leaning up blood. T h e ap p ellant said nothing to Mr. Rog e rs . M r. Rog e rs he lpe d to pla c e the vic tim in a ca r. At so me po int

on the da y

of the inc ide nt, Qwande ll Vi n son testified that he re ceive d a telephone call fr om the appellant during w hich the appellant state d that she wa s g oing to kill the victim. When Mr

. Vinson arrived at the appe llant’s apartment, it was surrounde d by police car s. The appellant was seen and identified as the driver of the vehicle who broug ht t h e v i ct i m t o the hospital and immediately left the sce ne. While the
so un dn e ss o f the Sta te ’s c a se re ste d o n th e c re dib ili ty of the S tat e’s witne sse s, the re wa s a mpl e evidenc e pre sented a t the point to of the mistrial to sus tain a convic tion. Moreove r, the trial court de c lare d a

mis tr ia l prior

to the c on c lus ion of

the Sta te ’s pr oo f. L a stl y , the tr ial c ou rt c ho se no t to g ive a c urative instruc tion, instead dete rmining tha t a manife st nece ssityexis ted for a mistrial beca use a c urative instruction could not be cra fted that would provide the nec essary relief to the appellant.

L oo kin g a t th e fa c tor s as ap pli c able to thi s ca se , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly determined that manifest nec essity require d a mistrial. The opportunity for a n impartial verdic t was not lost w h e n th e in v e s ti g a to r ma d e a n is o late d r e f e r e n c e to th e s u p p r e s s e d s e ar c h w arr a nt. See Wil liams, 929 S.W .2d at 388. The prosec utor did not intentionallyelicit the improper te stimonyand the trial court could have quic kly issued a cur ative instruction to the jury to disreg ard me ntion of the
sear ch wa rra nt. Furthe r, the investig ator did not speak of the fruits of the s ear ch, but rathe r that he “as k ed” for a se arc h war

rant for the appe llant’s residenc e. As the a ssistant dist rict attorne y noted
a t tria l w ith no me nti on of a ny e vid e nc e that th e re fe renc e d w arr a nt r e ve a le d, in o ur op ini on , it

is lik e ly the jury wo uldha ve c on c lud e d th a t no e vid e nc e wa s fo un d. Mo re ov e r, the app e lla nt e xplic itl y op po se d th e g ra nt of a mis tr ia l. I n li g ht o f the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, it w ou ld v iol a te the fe de ra l a ndstate const i t u t ional provisions prohibiting double jeopa rdy for the a

ppellant to be tried a g ain. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt a nddis mis s th e ind ic tme nt.

Conclusion

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt de ny ing the mot ion to dis mis s o n d ou ble jeopar dy g rounds is reve rsed a nd the indictment for se cond deg ree murder is dismissed.

______________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE