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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 20-FM-0028

IN RE RASHAWN GASKINS, APPELLANT,

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(MHE1538-19)

(Hon. Peter A. Krauthamer, Motion Judge)

(Argued June 30, 2021 Decided December 30, 2021)

Christine Pembroke for appellant.

Holly M. Johnson., Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. 

Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor 

General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. 

Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee. 

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, THOMPSON,

* Associate Judge, 

and FISHER, Senior Judge.

 * Judge Thompson was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of 

argument. Although her term expired on September 4, 2021, she will continue to 

serve as an Associate Judge until her successor is confirmed. See D.C. Code § 11-

1502 (2012 Repl.). She was qualified and appointed on October 4, 2021, to perform 

judicial duties as a Senior Judge and will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a 

date to be determined after her successor is appointed and qualifies.
2

BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: This appeal comes to us from D.C. 

Superior Court’s Family Court, Mental Health and Habilitation Branch. Appellant

Rashawn Gaskins appeals the trial court’s order of outpatient commitment, claiming

evidentiary insufficiency. He argues that the evidence presented at trial did not, by 

clear and convincing means, demonstrate a likelihood that he would injure himself 

or others due to his mental illness. We disagree and affirm the outpatient 

commitment order. 

I.

In the summer of 2019, appellant was involuntarily committed to the 

Department of Behavioral Health’s Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program 

(“CPEP”) on emergency applications on two occasions. On June 11, 2019, appellant 

made statements to White House Secret Service Officers about killing persons in 

order to defend himself. Then, on August 18, 2019, appellant made statements to a 

United States Capitol Police Officer about returning to the Capitol armed while 

Congress was in session.

One day after the second incident, the District of Columbia Office of Attorney 

General (the “District”) filed in the Superior Court an emergency petition to continue 
3

the involuntary detention of appellant under the Ervin Act. D.C. Code § 21-541, et 

seq. (2012 Repl.). The trial court ordered that appellant remain detained. Shortly 

after, an evidentiary hearing was held on August 22, 2019, where the trial court 

determined there was probable cause to remand appellant to the Department of 

Behavioral Health for emergency observation and diagnosis.

On August 25, 2019, the District filed a petition for commitment, asserting 

that while detained at the Department of Behavioral Health, appellant was examined 

by a psychiatrist, who provided the certified opinion that appellant was “mentally 

ill, and because of the illness, is likely to injure [him]self or others if not committed.” 

The District of Columbia Commission on Mental Health (the “Mental Health 

Commission”) held a hearing regarding the petition on September 12, 2019, and 

recommended outpatient commitment for one year, which, with the assistance of

counsel, appellant initially accepted.1

A hearing before an associate judge of the Superior Court was then scheduled 

for September 25, 2019, to consider the Mental Health Commission’s 

 1 The Mental Health Commission recommended one year of outpatient 

treatment, which included that appellant would meet with a core service agency three 

to five times per week, would reside with a relative, and continue to take his 

medication.
4

recommendation. At the hearing, appellant through his counsel withdrew his 

acceptance of the recommendation, and the matter was set for a bench trial on 

December 17 and 18, 2019. At the bench trial the following evidence was presented

by the parties. 

On June 11, 2019, appellant quickly approached a White House vehicle 

entrance located on the corner of 15th Street and E Street, NW, where United States 

Secret Service Officers (“SSO”) Zackry Everett and Timothy McCarthy were 

posted. Appellant testified, explaining that he approached the SSOs because he was 

assaulted by United States Marshals at the Superior Court earlier that day and wanted 

to complain or file charges against the Marshals with a federal agency.2

When appellant reached the White House perimeter, he began asking SSO 

McCarthy questions, initially asking whether the President actually lived at the 

 2 Appellant recounted that at the Superior Court, he entered a courtroom to 

observe proceedings while wearing a hat. Upon entering, appellant was asked by 

the presiding judge to remove his hat. Appellant did not do so until a Marshal

approached him and directed him to remove the hat. Appellant then observed 

another individual in the courtroom with something on their head and put his hat 

back on. The Marshal returned to appellant and “snatched” appellant’s hat from his 

head and walked away. Appellant followed the Marshal, then the Marshal threw the

hat to the ground, pulled out his taser, and began to push appellant. More 

individuals, a mix of Marshals and court security, became involved to remove 

appellant from the courthouse.
5

White House, then whether the area was secure. SSO McCarthy pressed appellant

as to why he asked about security, and appellant responded he wanted to start killing 

people. Appellant testified, admitting that while speaking to the SSO at the White 

House he said, “if people are willing to threaten my life, then I have to defend my 

life.” Both SSOs, McCarthy and Everett, testified that appellant was then detained 

and handcuffed without resistance. After being detained, appellant informed the 

SSOs that he was assaulted by United States Marshals and government officials and 

that he was being followed. Appellant was transported to the D.C. Department of 

Behavioral Health’s CPEP without issue, and later released.

Two months later on August 18, 2019, appellant went to the United States 

Capitol and had an interaction with two United States Capitol Police Officers 

(“CPOs”). CPO Wayne Trautman was posted outside of the United States Capitol 

when appellant, approaching at a quickened pace, asked from approximately thirty 

feet away if there was a shift- or post-change.

3 CPO Trautman testified that 

appellant approached and proceeded to talk for approximately fifteen to twenty 

minutes, expressing his unhappiness with the state of the world. CPO Trautman 

asked appellant how he would go about fixing the world, and appellant responded in 

 3 Appellant had been to the U.S. Capitol earlier that day and spoke to a 

different CPO, CPO Gimble.
6

a verbal and non-verbal manner. Appellant made a nonverbal shrugging motion, 

lifted his hands and said, “I don’t know, maybe I return armed, . . . when Congress 

is in session,” while motioning as if drawing a concealed handgun from his right 

hip.4

 Taking the statement about returning armed as a threat to Congress, CPO 

Trautman placed appellant in handcuffs without any issue.

5

 CPO Frederick Hopkins 

arrived to observe, noting appellant was agitated, did not want to be handcuffed, and

asked not to be detained and for the CPO not to “FD12” him.6 Appellant was then

transported and temporarily held for psychiatric examination by CPEP.

7

Prior to trial, CPO Trautman also testified at appellant’s August 22, 2019,

probable cause hearing, in which the trial court determined there was cause to 

 4 At trial, appellant disputed CPO Trautman’s testimony that he stated he 

would return to the Capitol armed, stating he merely talked about how old traditions 

are the problem and that younger children should be influenced by a different 

philosophy. 

5 After the detention, appellant expressed concerns that his phone was being 

“tapped.”

6 “FD12” refers to Form FD-12, an “Application for Emergency 

Hospitalization by a Physician or Psychologist of the Person, Officer or Agent of 

D.C. Department of Behavioral Health or an Officer Authorized to Make Arrests.”

7 At trial, appellant for the most part confirmed the event and statements made 

at the White House in June of 2019 and the United States Capitol in August of 2019, 

except as explicitly distinguished.
7

remand appellant to the Department of Behavioral Health for emergency observation 

and diagnosis. At trial, CPO Trautman testified that as appellant exited the 

courtroom following the probable cause hearing, he looked at CPO Trautman and 

said something to the effect of “I don’t know how much money you make . . . but I 

am coming for you.” CPO Trautman did not know if appellant was making a 

physical threat or a threat to take legal action. When asked about his statement to 

CPO Trautman, appellant stated he intended to seek civil remedies because CPO 

Trautman committed perjury and violated his “oath.” Then, in October of 2019, CPO 

Trautman received a call from former co-workers that appellant had returned to the 

United States Capitol.8

In addition to the testimony of the SSOs and CPOs, the trial court heard 

testimony from Dr. Constantine Shustikoff, an attending psychiatrist with the 

Psychiatric Institute of Washington (PIW), who observed and diagnosed appellant. 

Dr. Shustikoff met with appellant approximately five times per week over the course 

of six weeks (while appellant testified that Dr. Shustikoff only met with him once). 

Dr. Shustikoff diagnosed appellant with “bipolar one disorder, severe with psychotic 

 8 CPO Hopkins also testified at trial that appellant returned to the United 

States Capitol approximately one month earlier, November 2019. It is unclear 

whether this is the same October 2019 visit, when CPO Trautman was notified, or if 

it is an additional visit. 
8

features,” his most recent episode being “manic.” According to Dr. Shustikoff, 

appellant showed symptoms of “distinct, abnormal, expansive mood that was pretty 

persistent; grandiosity; the rapid speech and being very, very talkative; also the flight 

of ideas.” Dr. Shustikoff indicated that appellant did not talk about hurting anyone 

when they met and specifically denied the allegations against him.

With regard to appellant’s behavior at PIW, Dr. Shustikoff informed the court 

that appellant repeatedly refused to take medication, only voluntarily taking the 

prescribed medication once. She also informed the court that after being discharged 

from PIW, appellant did not follow through with voluntarily taking medication. Dr. 

Shustikoff recalled one incident, in September of 2019, where an emergency code 

was called for appellant because he was frustrated with being at PIW and became

agitated and aggressive.

Dr. Shustikoff testified that two-thirds of bipolar patients will have another 

episode of mania or depression with similar symptoms. Dr. Shustikoff testified if 

appellant’s mental illness were to become unstable, symptoms would include

“abnormal mood, usually expansive or irritable, increase in energy, impulsivity, 

grandiosity,” and he would likely engage in similar behavior — approaching law 

enforcement and making threats. Dr. Shustikoff expressed concern for appellant’s 
9

safety and the safety of others because appellant was not following medical 

recommendations and because of “the severity of the behaviors and threats that 

happened during his last admission.”

The trial court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence that 

appellant suffered from “bipolar [one] disorder and manic episodes”. Appellant’s 

refusal to engage in any treatment for his mental illness, coupled with his “obsessive 

behavior to go to federal law enforcement agencies and personnel and continually 

engage in conversations with them and say very, very odd things,” rose to a level of 

likelihood of injury to himself or others. The court highlighted that appellant talked

about killing people or returning armed when Congress was in session to fix the 

world, commending the federal officers who defused the situation in a professional 

manner, suggesting other officers may not have exhibited such control. The court 

also noted that appellant was locked into the idea of doing harm to others as a means 

to save the world. As the least restrictive alternative to inpatient commitment, the 

trial court ordered one year of outpatient commitment. This appeal followed. 
10

II.

On appeal, appellant does not challenge his diagnosis or that his behavior is 

caused by his mental illness; rather, he argues evidentiary insufficiency to support

the likelihood that he would injure himself or others. “In examining a claim of 

insufficiency, the applicable standard of review is ‘whether there is any substantial 

evidence which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact below.’” In 

re Artis, 615 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Boynton v. Lopez, 473 A.2d 375, 

376 (D.C. 1984)). This court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government and give full weight to the factfinder’s ability to weigh the evidence, 

determine the credibility of witnesses, and draw justifiable inferences.” In re 

Perruso, 896 A.2d 255, 259 (D.C. 2006) (quotation omitted). “When a case is heard 

by a judge sitting without a jury . . . the judgment will not be overturned ‘unless it 

appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” 

Perruso, 896 A.2d at 259 (quoting D.C. Code § 17-305(a) (2012 Repl.)).

Civil commitment is governed by the Ervin Act, and in order to involuntarily 

commit an individual the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 

that “the person is mentally ill and, because of that mental illness, is likely to injure 

himself or others if not committed.” D.C. Code § 21-545(b)(2) (2012 Repl.); 
11

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26, 431-32 (1979) (holding that due to the 

liberty interests at stake, there must be clear and convincing evidence to order an 

involuntary civil commitment, which is a standard higher than the preponderance

standard); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (defining clear and 

convincing as the truth of factual contentionsto be “highly probable” orsubstantially 

more likely to be true than untrue); see In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1238 (D.C. 

1979) (replacing the District of Columbia’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

standard applicable to involuntary civil commitments with the clear and convincing 

standard announced in Addington); see also Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961, 

973-74 (D.C. 2020). “[I]t is necessary for the government to prove that the 

individual suffers from a mental illness and that the danger-productive behavior of 

the individual results from the mental illness.” In re Stokes, 546 A.2d 356, 363 (D.C. 

1988) (citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court’s conclusion — that appellant was mentally ill and 

because of his illness and refusal to be treated, he was likely to injure himself or 

others — was neither plainly wrong nor without substantial evidentiary support. On 

appeal, appellant argues that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence he was 

likely to injure himself or others by acting on his statements because (1) his behavior 

did not result in actual injury to himself or others; and (2) he has no history of 
12

conduct resulting in injury. Appellant’s argument is premised on the likelihood of

physical injury. However, this court has “deliberately declined to over define the 

term ‘injure;’” where “‘injure’ connotes an element of danger, the danger need not 

necessarily be physical nor involve violence.” In re Gahan, 531 A.2d 661, 664 (D.C. 

1987); In re Mendoza, 433 A.2d 1069, 1071-72 (D.C. 1981) (while in hospital the 

patient made various threats and experienced episodes of violence); In re Bumper, 

441 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C. 1982) (holding that “injury” includes unintentional injury 

and injury resulting from nonviolent acts); In re Snowden, 423 A.2d 188, 191-92

(D.C. 1980) (declining to adopt the “recent overt act” test, which would help indicate 

future dangerousness; instead concluding that appellant’s being threatening was 

enough to find a likelihood to injure self or others). All that is required is that the 

subject be found likely, by reason of mental illness, to “inadvertently place himself 

in a position of danger or . . . to suffer harm.” Snowden, 423 A.2d at 191. 

The recommendation for outpatient commitment was supported by substantial 

evidence that appellant would place himself or others in a position of danger as 

demonstrated by his continued refusal to engage in treatment for his mental illness 

and his patterned behavior of approaching law enforcement and making threats. 

While at PIW appellant voluntarily took his prescribed medication on one occasion 

and after discharge did not follow through with medication. Dr. Shustikoff testified 
13

that two-thirds of persons diagnosed with appellant’s mental illness, bipolar 

disorder, would experience a future episode; and there was a high risk appellant 

would engage in similar behavior — approaching law enforcement and making 

threats — during another episode. See Mendoza, 433 A.2d at 1072 (concluding 

involuntary “commitment is partly based on a prediction of future conduct”). Dr. 

Shustikoff also expressed concern for appellant’s safety and the safety of others 

because appellant was not open to or willing to abide by medical recommendations,

and due to “the severity of the behaviors and threats that happened during his last 

admission.”

Appellant’s past behavior strongly validates an inference that he will continue 

to engage with law enforcement and make threatening statements. Within two 

months appellant engaged with two federal law enforcement entities, Secret Service 

and Capitol Police, both resulting in appellant’s detention for making threats to 

physically harm others. Furthermore, even after being detained and committed for 

mental health treatment, appellant returned to the Capitol, at which time, CPOs

notified CPO Trautman that appellant had returned. We can surmise that CPO 

Trautman was notified because appellant threatened to “come after” him at the 

probable cause commitment hearing. We conclude that there was sufficient 

evidence to support the determination that appellant’s mental illness, for which he 
14

failed to abide by prescribed treatment, and the conduct which led to his detentions 

established the clear and convincing evidence that appellant was likely to injure 

himself or others. 

Appellant also asserts that he was able to bring his concerning behavior into 

control without civil commitment in the months before trial; therefore, civil 

commitment is not necessary. However, there is no limitation placed on the medical 

history the trial court may consider in assessing appellant’s mental health and 

potential to injure. Gahan, 531 A.2d at 666 (stating “[w]e are unwilling to establish 

a per se rule limiting the extent of an individual’s medical history which a trial court 

may consider”). This court has also repeatedly rejected the suggestion that there 

must be a recent overt act indicating future dangerousness to order commitment. 

Perruso, 896 A.2d at 260; Gahan, 531 A.2d at 666; Snowden, 423 A.2d at 191-92. 9

 9 On appeal appellant also asserts that his mental illness is so apparent and 

recognizable to law enforcement and ordinary people that special accommodations 

would be made for him to prevent injury. However, this argument is not persuasive,

where the evidence demonstrated that appellant’s illness was not immediately 

apparent to some officers. 
15

III.

We affirm the trial court’s decision to order one year of outpatient 

commitment, as appellant was mentally ill with bipolar disorder and because of his 

mental illness was likely to injure himself or others. 

So ordered.