COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Clements 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

LEVON ANDREW DICKERSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3003-99-4 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 DECEMBER 28, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Alfred D. Swersky, Judge 

 John B. Jacob, Jr., for appellant. 

 Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Levon A. Dickerson (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

on an indictment charging two counts of malicious wounding, 

attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery, violations of 

Code §§ 18.2-51, -26 and –22, respectively. On appeal, defendant 

complains the trial court erroneously denied a motion to suppress 

a confession obtained by police in violation of the Constitutions 

of the United States and this Commonwealth. Finding no error, we 

affirm the convictions. 

The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
On review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

"[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to . . . the 

prevailing party below, and we grant all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible from that evidence." Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 

12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). In our 

analysis, "we are bound by the trial court's findings of 

historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to 

support them." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 

S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 

517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 

(1996)). 

I. 

 Defendant first maintains that he confessed involvement in 

the subject offenses without the safeguards prescribed by Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

However, 

[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear that 

[Miranda] . . . warnings must be given 

before statements are taken from suspects 

only where there is custodial interrogation 

as thus defined in Miranda: "By custodial 

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated 

by law enforcement officers after a person 

has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way." 

Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 46, 307 S.E.2d 864, 872 

(1983) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 

(footnote omitted)). 

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Whether a suspect is "in custody" under 

Miranda is determined by the circumstances 

of each case, and "the ultimate inquiry is 

simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or 

restraint on freedom of movement' of the 

degree associated with formal arrest." The 

determination "depends on the objective 

circumstances of the interrogation, not on 

the subjective views harbored by either the 

interrogating officers or the person being 

questioned." 

Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 262 

(1998) (internal citations omitted). 

 Here, while at defendant's residence, Alexandria Police 

Detectives Ellman and Purcell "asked [defendant] if he would be 

willing to come down to the police station" and "talk about" "some 

things that had happened over the last few weeks or days." Ellman 

advised defendant that "he wasn't under arrest and . . . would be 

free to go at any time, . . . that we would . . . bring him back." 

Defendant agreed and "got dressed" in the "bedroom area," while 

the detectives waited elsewhere in the home. As the three 

departed the residence for the stationhouse, defendant's father 

was encountered on the "front stoop." Detective Purcell "knew" 

the father, explained the circumstances to him, and the father 

advised "that was okay." 

 En route to the station, defendant "was calm" and 

"conversational," discussing a "variety of things" with the 

detectives, including his "understanding of the criminal justice 

system based upon" prior experience. On arrival, defendant was 

offered food, drink, and the opportunity to use the bathroom. The 

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door to the "interview room," although closed, was unlocked, and 

defendant, once seated, was again assured that he was "free to go 

at any time. All you have to do is tell us and we will drive you 

back home." 

 During the ensuing exchange, Ellman broached the subject 

offenses and advised defendant that "some evidence led [him] to 

believe that [he] might be involved." When defendant professed 

innocence, Ellman suggested defendant provide fingerprints for 

comparison to those previously connected to the crimes, "so we 

could positively eliminate [him]." Defendant agreed and, upon 

return to the interview room, "indicated that he . . . had been 

. . . involved in the case." Before further questioning, however, 

Ellman reminded defendant that he was "not under arrest," "free to 

go at any time," and "came down here voluntarily." Defendant then 

confessed to the crimes, and the detectives returned him to his 

residence. 

 Such evidence, considered with the entire record, establishes 

that a reasonable person, similarly situated, would not have 

considered himself under arrest or otherwise restrained by police. 

Defendant, therefore, was not in custody, as contemplated by 

Miranda, when he confessed to police. 

II. 

 "However, defendant reminds us that any confession, 'even if 

obtained in full compliance with Miranda, may be inadmissible if 

. . . not voluntary.'" Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 

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386, 457 S.E.2d 402, 408 (1995) (quoting Kauffmann v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 405, 382 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1989)). 

 Review on appeal of the voluntariness 

of a statement requires an "independent 

examination" of "'the totality of all the 

surrounding circumstances'" to ascertain if 

it was "the 'product of an essentially free 

and unconstrained choice by its maker,' or 

whether the maker's will 'has been overborne 

and his capacity for self-determination 

critically impaired.'" Wilson v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 551, 413 

S.E.2d 655, 656 (1992); Gray v. 

Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 

157, 163 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 

36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 873, 108 S. Ct. 207, 98 L. Ed. 2d 158 

(1987). 

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 858, 434 S.E.2d 319, 324 

(1993). Our consideration must include "not only the details of 

the interrogation, but also the characteristics of the accused." 

Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 253, 349 S.E.2d 161, 

163-64 (1986). "While the question whether a statement is 

voluntary is ultimately a legal rather than a factual one, 

subsidiary factual determinations made by the trial court are 

entitled to a presumption of correctness." Bailey v. 

Commonwealth, 2000 WL 432386, *14 (Va. 2000). 

 The instant record discloses that defendant, age fourteen at 

the time of the offenses and confession, then attended Alexandria 

public schools in an "Individualized Education Program," a 

placement resulting from an "inability to control his . . . 

aggressive behavior," a "Disability" characterized on school 

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records as an "Emotional Disturbance." Although defendant's 

teacher opined that he "functions around the first or second 

grade," defendant was classified at an eighth grade level and his 

curriculum included math, language arts, science and social 

studies. 

 From the inception of contact with police, defendant 

willingly cooperated in the investigation and was repeatedly 

assured that he was not under arrest, free to leave and would be 

delivered home upon request. Defendant conversed with Detective 

Ellman on an array of topics, both prior to and during the 

interview, including defendant's experience with the criminal 

justice system, without suggestion of confusion, threat or 

coercion. Such circumstances, together with other evidence before 

the court, provide abundant support to the trial court's finding 

that defendant voluntarily spoke with police. 

 Defendant's contentions that police erroneously neglected to 

"encourage" his father to "come to the station" and "tricked" him 

into confessing through a ruse regarding fingerprint evidence are 

also without merit. While the presence of parents and police 

tactics are considerations relevant in determining the 

voluntariness of a juvenile's statement, such factors are clearly 

not persuasive on the instant record. See Grogg v. Commonwealth, 

6 Va. App. 598, 613, 371 S.E.2d 549, 557 (1998) (juvenile's waiver 

valid despite absence of parent); Novak, 20 Va. App. at 387-88, 

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457 S.E.2d at 409 (deception by police in questioning juvenile 

defendant did not taint confession). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

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