NO. 4-05-0923 Filed: 6/2/06 

 IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FOURTH DISTRICT 

JEFF ALBEE, SHAWN ALBERT, DAVID GOODMAN,) Appeal from 

JOHN HAMARA, DAVID HOOVER, CRAIG KURTH, ) Circuit Court of 

JOEL LIVENGOOD, and RONNIE SHRIVER, ) McLean County 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) No. 04MR73 

v. ) 

THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, a Municipal ) Honorable 

Corporation, ) Charles G. Reynard, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court: 

Plaintiffs, Jeff Albee, Shawn Albert, David Goodman, 

John Hamara, David Hoover, Craig Kurth, Joel Livengood, and 

Ronnie Shriver, were denied benefits under the Public Employee 

Disability Act (Disability Act) (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2002)) by 

defendant, the City of Bloomington (City). Plaintiffs and 

defendant interpreted differently the period of time that the 

officers were entitled to benefits under the Disability Act. 

Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, seeking to obtain judicial construction of the 

Disability Act. The trial judge construed the statute in plaintiffs' favor. Defendant appeals. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs are law-enforcement officers for the City 

who have been injured in the line of duty. Each plaintiff 

returned to work prior to the one-year anniversary of their dutyrelated injuries. Because of those duty-related injuries, each 

plaintiff subsequently missed work following the one-year anni-
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versary of their duty-related injuries. 

Before the one-year anniversary of their duty-related 

injuries, plaintiffs received full salary payments for the days 

of work that they missed according to the Disability Act (5 ILCS 

345/1 (West 2002)). After the one-year anniversary of their 

duty-related injuries, plaintiffs were denied full salary payments under the Disability Act even though they continued to miss 

work due to the same duty-related injuries and even though none 

of the plaintiffs received an entire year's worth of full salary 

payments. Defendant determined that the Disability Act benefits 

only apply during the calendar year following the duty-related 

injury. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to one year's 

worth of the Disability Act benefits while they are unable to 

perform their duties because of injuries they suffered in the 

line of duty. Defendant claims that the City is obligated to pay 

the officers' salaries under the Disability Act for only one 

consecutive calendar year with the obligation ending on the oneyear anniversary of plaintiffs' injuries regardless of whether 

the officer returned to work during that year. 

As the issue is one of statutory construction, the 

standard of review is de novo. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015 (1996). In 

interpreting the statute, we must "ascertain and give effect to 

the true intent and meaning of the legislature." Kraft, Inc. v. 
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Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990). The 

best evidence of the legislature's intent is the language of the 

statute and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, this 

court is bound by the plain meaning. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at 

189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. When the language of the statute is open 

to two possible interpretations, the interpretation that is 

reasonable and that will not produce "absurd, unjust, unreasonable[,] or inconvenient results" should prevail. Collins v. 

Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 

Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). In determining 

the statute's meaning, we must look at the statute as a whole, 

considering all relevant parts. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at 189, 

561 N.E.2d at 661. 

The applicable section of the Disability Act 

states: 

"Whenever an eligible employee suffers 

any injury in the line of duty which causes 

him to be unable to perform his duties, he 

shall continue to be paid by the employing 

public entity on the same basis as he was 

paid before the injury, with no deduction 

from his sick[-]leave credits, compensatory 

time for overtime accumulations or vacation, 

or service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable to 

perform his duties due to the result of the 
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injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same injury." (Emphasis added.) 

5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2002). 

The trial court determined that the Disability Act's one-year 

limit defined a maximum benefit rather than a statute of limitations. 

There are arguments that favor a one-calendar-year 

limitation. If the one-year limit is not the statute of limitations, what is the statute of limitations? Could an officer work 

for 20 years after his injury and then claim that he had finally 

reached the stage where he was "unable to perform his duties" due 

to the injury? "A limitations period encourages claimants to 

investigate and pursue causes of action and thereby discourages 

delay in the bringing of claims." Golla v. General Motors Corp., 

167 Ill. 2d 353, 370, 657 N.E.2d 894, 902 (1995). Under plaintiffs' interpretation, once an officer is injured he may claim 

that all absences from work, two- to three-day periods over a 

number of years, are due to that injury. A determination that 

there is no limitations period may create uncertainty and doubt, 

where the legislature intended to promote predictability and 

finality. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 370, 657 N.E.2d at 902. 

Nevertheless, the statutory language addresses the 

period of incapacity. Under section 1(b), the employee is 

entitled to continued pay "during the time he is unable to 

perform his duties." 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2002). That time, 

however, is limited to a period of one year. The limitation is 
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on the time he is unable to perform. The limitation is not on 

the calendar period following the injury. Perhaps the legislature did not contemplate the situation where the period of 

incapacity would not be continuous, where the employee would 

return to work for a period and then be unable to work for 

another period. The language of section 1(b), however, does seem 

to refer to the period of incapacity. It is certainly possible 

that a person could be incapacitated for a period of time, return 

to work, and then be incapacitated for a subsequent period. 

This interpretation is supported by other language in 

section 1, which refers to "the period for which continuing 

compensation is required" and "[d]uring this period of disability." 5 ILCS 345/1(c), (d) (West 2002). The Disability Act 

never phrases the time period for which benefits are to be paid 

as one year from the date of the injury. 

The Disability Act was enacted to "provide for a 

continuation of full pay for law[-]enforcement officers *** who 

suffer disabling injuries in the line of duty." Gibbs v. Madison 

County Sheriff's Department, 326 Ill. App. 3d 473, 477, 760 

N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (2001). It would be contrary to the purposes 

of the Disability Act if an officer, injured in the line of duty, 

were penalized for making a good-faith attempt to return to work. 

 An officer who was able to return to work for several months 

should not have his year of full compensation shortened for that 

reason. Similarly, an officer who is able to return to work 

should not be given an incentive not to return, with the "use-it- 
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or-lose-it" argument that the year of continuing compensation 

begins to run immediately. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 

Affirmed. 

TURNER, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.