[Cite as State v. Staley, 2019-Ohio-4173.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 18AP-125 

 (C.P.C. No. 16JU-12031)

v. : (C.P.C. No. 17CR-5107)

[J.L.S., III], : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 10, 2019 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellee. Argued: Steven L. Taylor.

On brief: Stephen E. Palmer, and William J. Fornia, for 

appellant. Argued: Stephen E. Palmer.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, J.L.S., III, appeals from judgments of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch ("juvenile 

court") and the General Division ("trial court") binding him over from the juvenile court to 

the trial court and sentencing him to a four-year term of incarceration following a plea of 

no contest. For the following reasons, we reverse. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On October 7, 2016, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, filed a complaint in the 

juvenile court alleging appellant was delinquent and committed the offense of conspiracy 

to commit murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and 2923.01, a felony of the first degree. In 

the complaint, the state alleged appellant committed the following substantial overt acts in 
No. 18AP-125 2 

furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) "provided a map of the plan to commit murder to John 

Doe #1," (2) "solicited John Doe #1 to participate in conspiracy to commit murder," 

(3) "solicited John Doe #2 to participate in the conspiracy to commit murder," and 

(4) "showed and explained map of the plan to commit murder to John Doe #2." (Compl. 

at 1.) 

{¶ 3} On April 17, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing at which appellant entered 

a stipulation to a finding of probable cause. In the recitation of facts at the hearing, the 

assistant prosecutor asserted that beginning in spring 2016, appellant began soliciting 

others to assist him in conducting a mass shooting at Hilliard Davidson High School. 

Appellant engaged in discussions with classmates over a messaging application, with at 

least one classmate feigning agreement with the plan during the school year. 

{¶ 4} In the following school year, beginning after summer 2016, appellant's efforts 

intensified. Appellant drew at least three diagrams, which included plans of attack on the 

school. In recruiting others, appellant displayed the diagrams and explained how the 

shooting would proceed. Appellant regularly discussed his plans with a group of students, 

including a second student who also feigned agreement with appellant's plans. Although 

the agreement of the two students was only feigned, appellant believed they had committed 

in earnest and continued his preparations. 

{¶ 5} One of the recovered diagrams, which was admitted as an exhibit at the 

hearing, displayed the positioning of his co-conspirators during the attack. The diagram 

also contained a list of ammunition and firearms required for the attack. There were 

references to school shootings on the diagram, including specific reference to "the 

Columbine shooters, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris." (Apr. 17, 2017 Tr. at 9.) At the bottom 

of the diagram, there was a reference to the "last week of school assembly." (Apr. 17, 2017 

Tr. at 9.) 

{¶ 6} On September 22, 2016, some students saw appellant showing the diagram 

to others and reported the incident to the school resource officer from the City of Hilliard 

Division of Police. Following investigation by law enforcement agencies, a search warrant 

was issued, resulting in the seizure of a computer, school-issued iPad, and phone from 

appellant. According to the assistant prosecutor, search history from September 2016 

recovered from the devices revealed the following: 
No. 18AP-125 3 

Timothy McVeigh, the Irish Republican Army, Bin Laden and 

Bin Laden death time, which we believe to be [appellant] 

searching for a significant date to commit the attack. 

[Appellant] also searched 500 Smith & Wesson firearms for 

sale, street sweeper shotgun, which the State believes to be a 

reference to assault style weapons. He searched for Vance's 

and LAPD shooting ranges. Many searches for firearms, 

firearm -- how to purchase firearm parts. He searched the quo 

-- to quote, one of his search terms was "fully automatic 

weapons for sale". He -- his [web bookmarks] included easy 

ways to make thermite. He also bookmarked a number of 

firearms websites. 

In addition to those, the officers found photos and other data 

that was extremely disturbing including horrific racist images, 

dozens of pictures of Nazi and Naz -- Neo-Nazi imagery, photos 

of firearms, photos of firearms that were taken from stores and 

online ads, a video of the defendant reloading a firearm, images 

glorifying school shootings and Columbine, images making 

light of the Holocaust. 

(Apr. 17, 2017 Tr. at 10.) 

{¶ 7} Additionally, investigators recovered from appellant's phone messages with 

two to three other students. In those messages, there was "constant discussion about Hitler, 

the Nazi's, discussion about Mein Kampf, [and] discussion about school shooting." 

(Apr. 17, 2017 Tr. at 11.) The messages also "contained horrifically racist language, 

particularly aimed at African American and Jewish people," which, according to the 

assistant prosecutor, was related to appellant's motivation for the shooting. (Apr. 17, 2017 

Tr. at 11.) 

{¶ 8} After his arrest, appellant sent a text in which he asked another person to 

destroy the diagram. Following the execution of a search warrant on appellant's home, the 

following items were seized by investigators: four gas masks, a tactical vest, shooting targets 

that had been shot, and firearm advertisements which had been cut from newspapers and 

magazines. The assistant prosecutor concluded the summary by stating appellant was 

preparing to "carry out the object of this conspiracy that he believed others had already 

agreed to, which was to shoot and kill as many people at Hilliard Davidson High School as 

possible." (Apr. 17, 2017 Tr. at 11-12.) 
No. 18AP-125 4 

{¶ 9} On the same day as the hearing, the juvenile court filed a judgment entry 

reflecting a finding of probable cause based on the stipulation of the parties. On April 26, 

2017, the juvenile court filed a judgment entry amending its April 17, 2017 judgment entry. 

{¶ 10} On August 30, 2017, the juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing. At 

the hearing, Dr. Daniel L. Davis, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, testified as an expert 

witness in forensic psychology and in the area of juvenile justice. Dr. Davis performed a 

bindover evaluation on appellant, in which he considered treatment needs, risks, and 

psychological factors that contribute to amenability. In the course of his evaluation, Dr. 

Davis reviewed police interviews, police reports, text message correspondence, web search 

history, school records, medical records from Nationwide Children's Hospital, and mental 

health records. Dr. Davis consulted with appellant's therapist, Edward Scott Dagenfield, 

MA, LICDC, and interviewed appellant's family, including his mother, father, and 

stepfather. Finally, Dr. Davis performed psychological testing on appellant. 

{¶ 11} As a result of his evaluation, Dr. Davis found appellant had mental health 

needs requiring treatment from a person skilled in treating adolescents. Dr. Davis stated 

that "given the gravity of the accusations against [appellant], that treatment should be 

carefully monitored and progress or lack of progress should be always made aware to the 

Court." (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr. at 24.) Dr. Davis rendered the opinion that appellant had a 

"moderate to high probability of amenability and in all of the factors that I looked at, the 

arguments from a psychological perspective outweighed those factors that were negative in 

suggesting that the person be transferred." (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr. at 39.) 

{¶ 12} Nicole Bass-Stith, an intensive probation officer with the Franklin County 

Juvenile Probation Department, testified she began supervising appellant on April 17, 2018. 

Appellant was on GPS electronic monitoring and was confined to his home unless he had a 

doctor's appointment, counseling session, or meeting with his attorney. Appellant was 

enrolled in school at the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow. Bass-Stith testified she was 

not aware of any threatening behavior from appellant since she began supervising him. 

Bass-Stith stated appellant was following her rules. 

{¶ 13} When the juvenile judge made reference to "[t]here was something about 

being described as creepy," Bass-Stith responded "[n]o. What I said was, that I had 

concerns. I never said -- I don't know if I said those words. I'm pretty sure I didn't say those 
No. 18AP-125 5 

words." (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr. at 101-02.) Bass-Stith elaborated that she had "concerns" 

because appellant was "over accommodating," although she stated that "now that I've 

gotten to know the family, I'm assuming * * * that's just how they are." (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr. 

at 102.) Bass-Stith also had initial concerns because of a question appellant asked about 

how "he couldn't go places and what if the house caught on fire or what if they ran out of 

gas or what if something happened." (Aug. 30, 2017 Tr. at 102.) 

{¶ 14} Lois Thorpe, an employee of the Franklin County Juvenile Probation 

Department in the Electronic Monitoring Unit, testified she was responsible for monitoring 

appellant's ankle monitor and visited him once a week at his home. Appellant had no 

violations on his ankle monitor. Based on her interactions with appellant, Thorpe found 

him to have a high maturity level. Thorpe testified she never felt threatened at appellant's 

home, neither appellant nor his family had done anything that would cause her alarm, and 

she never received any reported concerns from the community about appellant. 

{¶ 15} Following testimony, the juvenile court admitted: (1) Dr. Davis's report, (2) a 

NetCare Forensic Report authored by Jayne Speicher-Bocija, Ph.D., a psychologist with 

NetCare Forensic Center, (3) records from the Juvenile Detention Center, (4) the bindover 

investigation packet, and (5) the state's exhibits. In the NetCare report, Dr. Speicher-Bocija 

found with a reasonable degree of professional certainty that appellant was amenable to 

care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 

{¶ 16} On September 6, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing at which it found 

appellant was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. On the same day, the 

juvenile court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law ("decision"), reflecting its 

amenability determination. On September 11, 2017, the juvenile court filed a judgment 

entry binding appellant over to the trial court. 

{¶ 17} On September 28, 2017, a Franklin County Grand Jury filed an indictment 

charging appellant with the aforementioned offense of conspiracy to commit murder. On 

January 9, 2018, the trial court held a hearing at which appellant entered a plea of no 

contest. On the same day, the trial court filed an entry reflecting appellant's plea. 

{¶ 18} On February 8, 2018, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. On 

February 9, 2018, the trial court filed a judgment entry finding appellant guilty of the 

charged offense, sentencing him to a term of incarceration of four years, and imposing a 
No. 18AP-125 6 

mandatory five-year period of postrelease control. On March 9, 2018, the trial court filed 

an amended judgment entry. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 19} Appellant appeals and assigns the following sole assignment of error for our 

review: 

THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DISREGARDING UNREFUTTED EVIDENCE, ENGAGING 

IN AN ARBITRARY ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS AND LAW, 

AND GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO TRANSFER 

APPELLANT'S CASE TO ADULT COURT, IN VIOLATION OF 

R.C. 2152.12(B) AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 20} In his assignment of error, appellant asserts the juvenile court erred in 

granting the state's motion to transfer appellant's case to the trial court to be tried as an 

adult. 

A. Standard of Review 

{¶ 21} Because "an amenability hearing is a broad assessment of individual 

circumstances and is inherently individualized and fact-based," we apply an abuse of 

discretion standard when reviewing a juvenile court's determination regarding amenability 

to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 

¶ 14. An abuse of discretion connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

B. Applicable Law 

{¶ 22} R.C. 2152.12 governs the transfer of a juvenile from the juvenile court to the 

trial court to be tried as an adult. State v. Easley, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-9, 2016-Ohio-7271, 

¶ 7, citing State v. Morgan, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-620, 2014-Ohio-5661, ¶ 30. Pursuant to 

R.C. 2152.12(B), a juvenile court may transfer the case if it finds that: (1) the child was 14 

years of age or older at the time of the offense, (2) there is probable cause to believe the 

child committed the offense, and (3) the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation 

within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require the child be subject 

to adult sanctions. Because appellant was 16 years old at the time of the offenses, the 
No. 18AP-125 7 

juvenile court was required to determine whether there was probable cause to believe the 

child committed the act alleged. R.C. 2152.12(B)(2); Easley at ¶ 7. Appellant stipulated as 

to the existence of probable cause in the juvenile court and does not dispute the existence 

of probable cause on appeal. 

{¶ 23} As the age and probable cause requirements were met, the juvenile court was 

required, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), to determine whether appellant was amenable to 

care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system, considering the factors listed under R.C. 

2152.12(D) and (E). "In making this determination, the court is required to consider 

whether the factors indicating that the case should be transferred outweigh the factors 

indicating that the case should not be transferred." Easley at ¶ 8, citing State v. Erwin, 

10th Dist. No. 09AP-918, 2012-Ohio-776, ¶ 8. Because the statutes are silent regarding the 

weight accorded to individual factors, the juvenile court "has the discretion to determine 

how much weight should be accorded to any given factor." Id. at ¶ 8, citing State v. 

Marshall, 1st Dist. No. C-150383, 2016-Ohio-3184, ¶ 15, citing Morgan at ¶ 37. R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3) provides that the "record shall indicate the specific factors that were 

applicable and that the court weighed." See also Juv.R. 30(G) ("The order of transfer shall 

state the reasons for transfer."). 

{¶ 24} R.C. 2152.12(D) provides that a juvenile court shall consider the following 

factors, in addition to any other relevant factors, in favor of transferring a juvenile: 

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or 

psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of 

the alleged act. 

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim 

due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of 

the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the 

victim. 

(3) The child's relationship with the victim facilitated the act 

charged. 

(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as 

a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity. 

(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child's person or 

under the child's control at the time of the act charged, the act 

charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised 

Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, 
No. 18AP-125 8 

allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the 

firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm. 

(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting 

adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a 

community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior 

delinquent child adjudication or conviction. 

(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs 

indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the 

juvenile system. 

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically 

mature enough for the transfer. 

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within 

the juvenile system. 

{¶ 25} R.C. 2152.12(E) provides that a juvenile court shall consider the following 

factors, in addition to any other relevant factors, against transferring a juvenile: 

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged. 

(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing 

the act charged. 

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, 

at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative 

influence or coercion of another person. 

(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or 

property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that 

nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged. 

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent 

child. 

(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically 

mature enough for the transfer. 

(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability. 

(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the 

juvenile system and the level of security available in the 

juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public 

safety. 

C. Analysis 

{¶ 26} Before addressing appellant's arguments, we note the seriousness of this 

matter as outlined in the factual history. Regardless of the allegations in this case, however 

terrifying, it is the duty of this court to ensure that " '[j]ustice is even-handed and equally 

administered to all, irrespective of any and all considerations.' " State ex rel. Clay v. 
No. 18AP-125 9 

Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner's Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, ¶ 39, quoting 

Koppelman v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 202 F.2d 955, 956 (3d Cir.1953) (Kalodner, J., 

dissenting). Constrained by the standard of review and mindful of the requirement under 

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) that the trial court indicate the applicable factors that it weighed in 

reaching its amenability determination, we proceed with our review. 

{¶ 27} In his assignment of error, appellant asserts the juvenile court's amenability 

decision is unreasonable and arbitrary. Appellant contends the juvenile court's findings 

with regard to the factors favoring transfer under R.C. 2152.12(D) and the factors 

disfavoring transfer under R.C. 2152.12(E) were legally and factually erroneous. For 

purposes of analysis, we consider the juvenile court's findings regarding each of the factors 

along with arguments specific to those factors raised on appeal. 

1. Factors in Favor of Transfer 

a. R.C. 2152.12(D)(1)

{¶ 28} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(1), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious 

economic harm, as a result of the alleged act." Under this factor, the juvenile court found: 

The Court disagrees with the psychologists and probations [sic] 

finding that there are no victims in this case. This case came to 

the attention of law enforcement and the schools because 

[appellant] attempted to recruit and was successful in 

recruiting some co-conspirators in this act. The victims in this 

case may not have suffered physical harm but they indeed 

suffered psychological harm. They were placed in fear of harm 

and imminent danger in a terrorism [sic] attack. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 2.) 

{¶ 29} Appellant argues the juvenile court erred in its analysis of this factor because 

there were no victims of the alleged act. In support of this argument, appellant contends 

the juvenile court failed to constrain its analysis to the "alleged act" as required by R.C. 

2152.12(D)(1), but instead expanded the analysis to include "its own interpretation of what 

the act would have been in the event of an actual 'terrorism attack.' " (Emphasis sic.) 

(Appellant's Brief at 30.). Additionally, appellant argues evidence did not reflect that the 

attack was "imminent." (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant's Brief at 30.) 

{¶ 30} First, we note the term "victim" is not defined by R.C. 2152.12. Second, absent 

a statutory definition, we do not construe the term "victim" as narrowly as appellant does. 
No. 18AP-125 10 

Although it is true appellant was stopped before he was able to carry out his plan, the record 

reflects that psychological harm was inflicted as a result of appellant's conspiracy. In a 

police report attached to the bindover packet, one of the children who reported appellant's 

conduct to police was "scared and concerned" as a result of overhearing appellant's 

discussion of his plan to conduct a school shooting. (Bindover Investigation Exhibit.) The 

student also reported being "disturbed" by witnessing appellant's school shooting diagram. 

Given the context of this case, we find this sufficient to support a finding of psychological 

harm. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946), quoting United States v. 

Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) ("For two or more to confederate and combine together 

to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the 

gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere 

commission of the contemplated crime."); State v. Heath, 170 Ohio App.3d 366, 2007-

Ohio-536, ¶ 52 (8th Dist.) (finding in the context of a case in which the defendant hired a 

"hit man" to kill her husband that a " 'murder for hire' scheme, by its very nature, assumes 

harm or death will come to the victim"). 

{¶ 31} Next, although not a listed factor under R.C. 2152.12(D)(1), the record 

provides some support for the juvenile court's conclusion that the victims were in 

"imminent" danger. Here, appellant believed he had secured the cooperation of two coconspirators. The assistant prosecutor stated appellant was preparing to "carry out the 

object of this conspiracy that he believed others had already agreed to, which was to shoot 

and kill as many people at Hilliard Davidson High School as possible." (Apr. 17, 2017 Tr. at 

11-12.) Therefore, we cannot find the juvenile court abused its discretion in referring to 

"imminent" danger. 

b. R.C. 2152.12(D)(2) 

{¶ 32} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(2), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of 

the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age 

of the victim." Under this factor, the juvenile court found: 

The intended victims were high school students that would 

have been unable to protect themselves from an active shooter 

in the school. The students and teachers would have been 

vulnerable as [appellant] planned out a path through the 

school, the targets he would take and the escape route he would 
No. 18AP-125 11 

use to exit the school. The Court finds that this exacerbated the 

psychological harm to the victims. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 2.) 

{¶ 33} Appellant argues this factor did not apply because there were no identifiable 

victims. Appellant also argues the juvenile court erred in its analysis by failing to constrain 

its analysis to the act charged. As discussed in our analysis of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(1) factor, 

the record supported the juvenile court's analysis of the harm to the intended victims as a 

result of the alleged act. As a result, we find appellant's contentions regarding the R.C. 

2152.12(D)(2) factor to be without merit. 

c. R.C. 2152.12(D)(3) 

{¶ 34} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child's relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged." Under this 

factor, the juvenile court found: 

There's indication that [appellant] was bullied in school. This 

was his opportunity to get those who had bullied or taunted 

him for being different. He admittedly developed an ominous 

or threatening image and described himself as a "badass" 

during the investigative interview. He began to wear black 

clothes and leather duster with a skunk's scent in an effort to 

keep others at bay. He reported that [h]e wore clothes that 

made him look like a "school shooter." Therefore, the Court 

finds that his relationship with the victims facilitated the act 

charged. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 2.) 

{¶ 35} Appellant contends there was no rational basis for the juvenile court to find 

this factor favored transfer because: (1) there were no victims, (2) the victims, if there were 

any, were the same individuals who bullied appellant, and (3) there was no evidence to 

support the conclusion that revenge for bullying was appellant's motive. 

{¶ 36} Here, the record supports an inference that appellant's commission of the act 

charged was in response to bullying from his peers at school. Dr. Davis noted in his report 

that, according to appellant's parents, appellant "was picked on socially and developed a 

'persona.' " (Davis Report at 8.) Additionally, children "would taunt [appellant] and say 

that he 'looked like a school shooter.' " (Davis Report at 8.) Dr. Dagenfield reported to 

Dr. Davis that appellant's identity was as a result of "apparently [being] bullied in the 7th 
No. 18AP-125 12 

grade" and that "this was his strategy for keeping malcontents and other kids from 

antagonizing him." (Davis Report at 10.) 

{¶ 37} In the bindover investigation, it was noted that "[t]here are varying but 

consistent reports of [appellant] being bullied at school." (Bindover Investigation at 7.) 

Appellant "purposefully isolated himself by wearing dark clothes or presenting an ominous, 

or threatening image, a persona [appellant] himself described as being 'a badass' * * * 

during the bindover interview." (Bindover Investigation at 7.) The bindover investigation 

linked appellant's "reclusive school behavior" with bullying, noting appellant "seemed 

reluctant to admit anything that would make him appear as weak, and being subject to 

bullying would be detrimental to the image of being 'a badass' that he seems desperate to 

portray, particularly in social settings such as school and amongst peers where he feels 

socially inferior." (Bindover Investigation at 7-8.) 

{¶ 38} Appellant drew a map containing a "gymnasium, cafeteria, library or another 

large room" and told witnesses it was a representation of the school auditorium. (Bindover 

Investigation at 2.) The plans included specific mention of the "[l]ast week of school 

assembly" and references to school shootings. (Bindover Investigation at 2.) Based on the 

foregoing, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that appellant's relationship with 

the victims facilitated the act charged. 

{¶ 39} Appellant also asserts the juvenile court's reasoning was arbitrary because it 

relied on bullying to support the transfer under R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), but refused to rely on 

it in its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(E)(1) and (2) to support a finding of amenability. 

{¶ 40} In its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(E)(1), the court found that "[t]he victims had 

bullied [appellant] at some point. There's no indication of the time period but the bullying 

was not considered serious." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) However, the court did not 

ultimately conclude whether the factor in R.C. 2152.12(E)(1) was applicable or not, as 

required by R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). In its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(E)(2), the court found that 

"[t]here's no indication that [appellant] acted under provocation. This plan was developed 

between 2015 and 2016. He had multiple drafts of the plan, recruited accomplices, he had 

the physical evidence of the intent to carry out the threat." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

Additionally, in its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(E)(8), the court appears to conclude the 

opposite of its finding under R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), stating that "[t]here's no indication that 
No. 18AP-125 13 

bullying attributed to this act as he had already developed the persona of a school shooter." 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5.)1 

{¶ 41} The state suggests the court's reasoning can be explained by considering that 

"while bullying and antagonism could be found to 'provoke' some reaction, the juvenile 

court could conclude that it was not serious enough to actually provoke or induce 

conspiring to commit mass murder." (Appellee's Brief at 41.) Although the court was free 

to draw such a conclusion, we cannot infer the same based solely on the inconsistent 

findings in the judgment entry relating to R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), (E)(1), (E)(2), and (E)(8). 

"[A] court speaks only through its journal entries." Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam 

Properties II, Ltd., 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-Ohio-1101, ¶ 29, citing State ex rel. Worcester 

v. Donnellon, 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 118 (1990). See State v. Lytle, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-866, 

2015-Ohio-1133, ¶ 3, citing State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705 (stating 

that "a trial court speaks through its journal and that any defects in the entry are 

paramount"). "Neither the parties nor a reviewing court should have to review the trial 

court record to determine the court's intentions," but instead "the entry must reflect the 

trial court's action in clear and succinct terms." Infinite Sec. Solutions at ¶ 29. 

Furthermore, as previously stated, R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) requires the juvenile court to indicate 

in the record which specific factors were applicable and weighed. Given the inconsistent 

statements regarding bullying and the fact that the juvenile court did not indicate whether 

R.C. 2152.12(E)(1) applied, we cannot meaningfully review whether or not the court's 

resolution of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(3) factor was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. 

See Talley v. Talley, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-812, 2016-Ohio-3533, ¶ 27, citing Kaechele v. 

Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Canada, 10th 

Dist. No. 16AP-7, 2016-Ohio-5948, ¶ 18-20 (finding trial court committed prejudicial error 

by failing to include in decision and entry a sufficient explanation for its basis for 

discounting the credibility of sworn affidavits in support of the appellant's postconviction 

relief petition).

 

1 We also note that in its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), the court stated that "[t]here is no indication that Peer 

Rejection contributed to his escalation of his plan to commit the school shootings." (Sept 6, 2017 Decision at 

4.) 
No. 18AP-125 14 

d. R.C. 2152.12(D)(4) 

{¶ 42} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(4), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a gang or 

other organized criminal activity." Under this factor, the juvenile court found "[i]t was 

unclear from the record whether or not [appellant] was an active member of a White 

Supremacist [gang] or had any other gang affiliation. The psychologists opined that he is a 

low to moderate risk for aggressive behavior." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 2.) 

{¶ 43} Appellant argues the juvenile court was ambiguous about this factor, and we 

agree it is unclear whether the court found the factor favored transfer. Nevertheless, 

appellant does not assert the juvenile court erred with regard to this factor. Accordingly, 

we find the juvenile court did not err in its analysis of the factor under R.C. 2152.12(D)(4). 

e. R.C. 2152.12(D)(5) 

{¶ 44} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(5), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child had a firearm on or about the child's person or under the child's control 

at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the 

Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or 

displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a 

firearm." Under this factor, the juvenile court found: 

There is no indication that [appellant] had carried a firearm 

into the school but the record is clear that he did have access to 

firearms in the home. The record is also clear that [appellant] 

has knowledge of weapons and admitted in his PSI report that 

he took his mother to the range to teach her to shoot. He has an 

affinity for weapons. Given the nature of the seriousness of his 

charges, he still wants to pursue a career as a gun smith. The 

Court finds that this factor is not applicable as [appellant] did 

not use, display, brandish or indicate that he possessed a 

firearm. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 3.) 

{¶ 45} Appellant asserts the record does not support he had access to firearms in the 

home. Appellant does not contend, however, the juvenile court erred in finding the factor 

under R.C. 2152.12(D)(5) was not applicable because he did not use, display, brandish, or 

indicate that he possessed a firearm. Accordingly, we find any error in the juvenile court's 

statement of facts to be harmless. 
No. 18AP-125 15 

f. R.C. 2152.12(D)(6) 

{¶ 46} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(6), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether "[a]t the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition 

as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior 

delinquent child adjudication or conviction." The juvenile court found this factor was not 

applicable and appellant raises no challenge to this finding. Accordingly, we find the 

juvenile court did not err with regard to its analysis of the factor under R.C. 2152.12(D)(6). 

g. R.C. 2152.12(D)(7) 

{¶ 47} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(7), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that 

rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system." Under this factor, the 

juvenile court found: 

The Court released [appellant] on GPS EMD monitoring 

during the pendency of the case after he had been detained in 

the Juvenile Detention Center for 173 days. He had no outages 

or overt violations of the Court's orders. The probation officer 

and EMD monitor were in contact with him on a weekly basis. 

In their testimony or report to the writing officer, at least one 

of the witnesses felt that [appellant] was "creepy." He hovered 

over them when they were checking his computer to be sure 

that he had not been on any websites related to terrorism. 

There was some trepidation of the witnesses in monitoring 

[appellant]. However, the only treatment [appellant] has 

received has been with individual and family counseling since 

this case began. The Court has no history reported by 

[appellant] or his family of previous juvenile sanctions or 

programs. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 3.) 

{¶ 48} Appellant asserts this factor does not apply because he had not been subject 

to any previous juvenile sanctions or programs. Appellant also asserts that insofar as the 

juvenile court considered appellant's responses to supervision in the current case, it should 

have favored amenability as there was no evidence to support the court's findings. 

{¶ 49} Here, it is unclear whether the juvenile court ultimately found this factor to 

be applicable. Because the juvenile court failed in compliance with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) to 

indicate whether this factor was applicable, we cannot meaningfully review whether or not 

the court's resolution of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(7) factor was a proper exercise of the court's 
No. 18AP-125 16 

discretion. See Talley at ¶ 27, citing Kaechele at paragraph two of the syllabus; Canada at 

¶ 18-20. 

h. R.C. 2152.12(D)(8) 

{¶ 50} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the 

transfer." Under this factor, the juvenile court found: 

[Appellant] is emotionally mature enough for the transfer. His 

mother indicated that he stopped sharing his emotional 

feelings with her around the age of 12. There's indication that 

his father teased him for crying and he developed a more 

"macho" personality. [Appellant] has never been diagnosed 

with any behavioral or emotional health disorders. He denied 

feeling suicidal or homicidal. However, in the JDC, [appellant] 

was on suicide protocol which was one of the factors the Court 

considered when he was ordered released on house arrest. This 

indicates a level of psychological maturity in that he denied 

during his interview being suicidal but used being suicidal to 

have counseling from his personal counselor while detained 

and ultimately used suicide as one of the factors the Court used 

in making a determination to issue an order for his release from 

the JDC. He scored a high rating in Peer Rejection and Dr. 

Davis testified that [appellant] is psychologically mature. There 

is no indication that Peer Rejection contributed to his 

escalation of his plan to commit the school shootings. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 3-4.) 

{¶ 51} Appellant disputes several of the juvenile court's findings under this factor as 

unsupported by the record. First, appellant argues Dr. Davis did not testify that appellant 

was mature enough for transfer. However, in his report, Dr. Davis stated the following: 

On the Sophistication Maturity Scale, [appellant's] raw score of 

19 resulted in a T score of 69 that was in the 96th percentile and 

in the high range. Overall, he is a youth, who has developed age 

appropriate cognitive capacities (that is he knows right from 

wrong for example), is generally autonomous and who has a 

still emerging self-concept. He has adequate interpersonal 

skills for his age and can identify non-delinquent, non-violent 

problem solving alternatives. 

(Davis Report at 21.) As a result, we find the record sufficiently supports the juvenile court's 

finding regarding appellant's psychological maturity as determined by Dr. Davis. 
No. 18AP-125 17 

{¶ 52} Second, appellant argues the juvenile court incorrectly found he had not been 

diagnosed with any behavioral or emotional health disorders. The state does not dispute 

appellant's contention, but instead responds that appellant's diagnoses were not serious 

and warranted little, if any, weight in assessing amenability. The state also argues the 

juvenile court considered appellant's mental health diagnoses elsewhere in its findings. 

{¶ 53} In his report, Dr. Davis stated that four mental health diagnoses were 

"suggested," including: (1) "Unspecified Depressive Disorder," (2) "Social Anxiety 

Disorder," (3) "Disruptive Behavior Disorder Not Otherwise Specified," and (4) "Rule Out 

Autism Spectrum Disorder." (Davis Report at 15.) Additionally, Dr. Davis stated that, at 

Nationwide Children's Hospital Crisis Unit following appellant's arrest, appellant was 

diagnosed with "Disruptive Behavior Disorder NOS with a recommendation that an autism 

spectrum disorder be ruled out." (Davis Report at 10.) However, Dr. Davis found appellant 

"does not appear to have active symptoms [of] serious mental illness." (Davis Report at 

22.) Dr. Davis noted that "there is not a consensus in the research as to the applicability 

and validity of diagnostic classification systems * * * to children and adolescents in 

particular." (Davis Report at 15.) 

{¶ 54} Dr. Speicher-Bocija found that appellant "qualified for diagnoses of 

Depression, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Features, 

Unspecified Depressive Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder, Disruptive Behavior Disorder 

Not Otherwise Specified and a rule out of Autism Spectrum Disorder." (Speicher-Bocija 

Report at 9.) Dr. Speicher-Bocija also stated that appellant was "not currently suffering 

from acute psychopathology associated with serious mental illness. He did not exhibit any 

clinical signs, symptoms, or behaviors that would be consistent with those usually seen in 

a serious mental illness such as Schizophrenia or Other Psychotic Disorder, Major 

Depression, Bipolar Disorder, or Dissociative Disorder." (Speicher-Bocija Report at 7.) 

Finally, Speicher-Bocija stated that appellant "does not currently exhibit or endorse any 

symptom of a serious mental illness. However he has qualified for mental health diagnoses 

that could be a focus of treatment. Further, additional assessment for autism spectrum 

disorder was recommended." (Speicher-Bocija Report at 11.) 

{¶ 55} Consistent with its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), the juvenile court in its 

analysis of R.C. 2152.12(D)(9) found that "[appellant] has no known mental health 
No. 18AP-125 18 

diagnosis." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) Similarly, in its analysis of R.C. 2152.12(E)(7), the 

juvenile court found "[appellant] has no mental illness or intellectual disability based upon 

the psychological reports prepared for this hearing." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5.) 

However, as noted by the state, the juvenile court referred to Dr. Davis's findings with 

regard to appellant's mental health diagnoses in its consideration of the factor under R.C. 

2152.12(E)(8). Specifically, the court stated that "Dr. Davis also offered diagnostic 

impressions of an Unspecified Depressive Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder, Disruptive 

Behavior Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and Rule Out Autism Spectrum Disorder." 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5.) Thus, the juvenile court's findings under the R.C. 

2152.12(D)(8) factor regarding whether appellant qualified for mental health diagnoses are 

inconsistent with its other findings, particularly those findings under the R.C. 

2152.12(E)(8) factor, and unsupported by the record. 

{¶ 56} Third, appellant argues the record does not support the juvenile court's 

finding that appellant was on suicide protocol. The state points to nothing in the record to 

support the juvenile court's findings on this point, and our independent review failed to 

reveal any evidence of the same.2 

{¶ 57} Because of the juvenile court's inconsistent and unsupported findings, we are 

unable to determine whether the court's resolution of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(8) factor was a 

proper exercise of the court's discretion. As a result, on remand, the court must determine 

based on the facts in the record whether appellant is emotionally, physically, or 

psychologically mature enough for the transfer. 

i. R.C. 2152.12(D)(9) 

{¶ 58} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)(9), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether "[t]here is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system." 

Under this factor, the juvenile court found: 

[Appellant] had been developing his plan for more than one 

year. He has no known mental health diagnosis and there is no 

programming that will be of assistance in rehabilitating him in 

the juvenile system. There is no reported abuse history, drug or 

alcohol addiction, no educational difficulties or IEP is noted in 

 

2 We note the state's argument that "[g]iven the state of this record, the defense must have made off-the-record 

representations that the juvenile court has concluded were misleading on this point." (Appellee's Brief at 53-

54.) As the state itself notes, there is nothing in the record to support such a conclusion. Therefore, we decline 

to consider the state's argument. 
No. 18AP-125 19 

his educational file that would be ordered for rehabilitation in 

the juvenile system. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 59} Appellant admits the juvenile court had discretion to disagree with the 

experts' conclusion that there was sufficient time to rehabilitate him within the juvenile 

system. However, appellant argues the juvenile court's finding was not supported by an 

accurate assessment of the facts and a rational review of the options. Specifically, appellant 

argues the juvenile court erred in basing its finding on the lack of appellant's mental health 

diagnoses and programming that would be of assistance in the juvenile system. 

{¶ 60} As we previously noted in our review of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(8) factor, the 

record reflects that appellant qualified for several mental health diagnoses. Therefore, the 

court's statement that appellant has "no known mental health diagnosis" is not supported 

by the record and is inconsistent with the court's finding under the R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) 

factor. (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 61} Furthermore, with regard to the availability of treatment options in the 

juvenile system, Dr. Davis noted that appellant "has at least a moderate to high probability, 

from a psychological standpoint, of positively responding to treatment within the juvenile 

justice system" and that "not all treatment options available within the juvenile justice 

system have been exhausted." (Emphasis sic.) (Davis Report at 24.) Dr. Speicher-Bocija 

found that appellant's diagnoses could be a focus of treatment and that "[t]here appears to 

be sufficient time to rehabilitate [appellant] within the juvenile system." (Speicher-Bocija 

Report at 11.) The juvenile court does not appear to have considered this evidence as there 

is no explanation for why it rejected the evidence and ultimately concluded "there is no 

programming that will be of assistance in rehabilitating him in the juvenile system." 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) Based on the juvenile court's inconsistent and unsupported 

findings, we are unable to determine whether the court's resolution of the R.C. 

2152.12(D)(9) factor was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. On remand, the court 

must determine based on the facts in the record whether there is not sufficient time to 

rehabilitate appellant within the juvenile system. 
No. 18AP-125 20 

2. Factors Against Transfer 

a. R.C. 2152.12(E)(1)

{¶ 62} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(1), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "victim induced or facilitated the act charged." Under this factor, the juvenile 

court found "[t]he victims had bullied [appellant] at some point. There's no indication of 

the time period but the bullying was not considered serious." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 63} Appellant argues the juvenile court's findings under this factor are 

inconsistent with its findings under the R.C. 2152.12(D)(3) factor and that such 

inconsistency renders the juvenile court's findings without a rational or logical basis. As 

discussed in our review of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(3) factor, we found the court's statements 

regarding bullying to be inconsistent. Here, it is unclear whether the juvenile court found 

this factor was applicable or how much weight it accorded such factor. As a result, we 

cannot meaningfully review the juvenile court's resolution of the R.C. 2152.12(E)(1) factor. 

b. R.C. 2152.12(E)(2) 

{¶ 64} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(2), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged." 

Under this factor, the juvenile court found "[t]here's no indication that [appellant] acted 

under provocation. This plan was developed between 2015 and 2016. He had multiple 

drafts of the plan, recruited accomplices, he had the physical evidence of the intent to carry 

out the threat." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 65} Appellant argues the juvenile court's reasoning does not apply to this factor. 

Additionally, appellant again argues the juvenile court erred by failing to examine bullying 

in its consideration of this factor. Here, the record supports the juvenile court's finding that 

the plan was developed over a significant period of time. However, as previously discussed 

in our analysis of R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), the court's findings under R.C. 2152.12(E)(2) appear 

to be inconsistent with its other findings under R.C. 2152.12(D)(3), (E)(1), and (E)(8). As a 

result, without further explanation from the court,3 we cannot determine whether the 

court's resolution of this factor was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. 

 

3 We note that on remand the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that any provocation was not serious 

enough to provoke the act charged, if such conclusion is supported by the evidence in the record. 
No. 18AP-125 21 

c. R.C. 2152.12(E)(3) 

{¶ 66} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(3), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act 

charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person." Under 

this factor, the juvenile court found "[appellant] is the principal actor in the act charged." 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 67} Appellant argues there is no evidence to support the juvenile court's 

conclusion that he was the principal actor. Contrary to appellant's argument, the record 

provides ample support for the juvenile court's finding that appellant was the principal 

actor in the charged act. The bindover investigation report submitted to the juvenile court 

reflects that appellant drew a map of the school, planned for supplies, provided the map of 

the plan to John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, and solicited John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 to 

participate in the plan to commit murder in furtherance of the conspiracy. These 

statements were also supported by a police report attached to the bindover investigation 

report. As a result, we cannot find the juvenile court erred in its consideration of the R.C. 

2152.12(E)(3) factor. 

d. R.C. 2152.12(E)(4) 

{¶ 68} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(4), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have 

reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in allegedly committing 

the act charged." Under this factor, the juvenile court found "[a]lthough [appellant] did not 

cause physical harm to anyone, the Court has more than reasonable cause to believe that 

physical harm and even death would have occurred if he had been able to carry out his 

plan." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) 

{¶ 69} Appellant argues the juvenile court erred for three reasons. First, appellant 

argues there was no evidence that anyone suffered harm. However, the juvenile court found 

that appellant did not cause physical harm. As a result, we find no error in the juvenile 

court's reasoning. 

{¶ 70} Second, appellant asserts the juvenile court erred in assessing this factor 

based on what would have happened if appellant had completed his plan, rather than the 
No. 18AP-125 22 

act charged. We cannot agree with appellant that this factor is inapplicable to him merely 

because he was stopped prior to the completion of his plan. 

{¶ 71} Third, appellant argues the juvenile court incorrectly based its finding on 

what the court had reasonable cause to believe, as opposed to what appellant had 

reasonable cause to believe. It is true the juvenile court did not track the statutory language 

and instead focused on what the court had reasonable cause to believe rather than what 

appellant had reasonable cause to believe. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is 

the duty of a court to apply the statute as written. State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 

2015-Ohio-236, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of 

Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545 (1996) (" 'If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and 

definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.' "). 

Furthermore, while parts of the record could be construed to support a conclusion that 

appellant had reasonable cause to believe physical harm would occur in committing the 

charged act, another part of the record from the same expert report could be construed 

otherwise. 

{¶ 72} In his report, Dr. Davis noted that appellant stated "he has significant 

remorse for his actions and disclaims violent intent." (Davis Report at 18.) Additionally, 

Dr. Davis found appellant "is a youth, who has developed age appropriate cognitive 

capacities (that is he knows right from wrong for example), is generally autonomous and 

who has a still emerging self-concept. He has adequate interpersonal skills for his age and 

can identify non-delinquent, non-violent problem solving alternatives." (Davis Report at 

21.) However, Dr. Davis also stated "[i]t is highly likely in my opinion that his very poor 

social skills and social anxiety (and/or Autism) significantly contributed to the behaviors 

that resulted [in] his involvement in the alleged instant offenses and caused him to not fully 

appreciate the seriousness of the act or how others would view it as very serious and 

threatening, if the court accepts his response to the charges." (Emphasis added.) (Davis 

Report at 23.) It is the responsibility of the juvenile court in the first instance to resolve 

conflicts in the evidence. See generally Dannaher v. Newbold, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-155, 

2004-Ohio-1003, ¶ 137; State v. Adams, 9th Dist. No. 05CA008685, 2005-Ohio-4360, ¶ 15; 

State v. S.M., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-701, 2015-Ohio-1916, ¶ 31. Accordingly, we find the 

juvenile court erred in its consideration of the R.C. 2152.12(E)(4) factor. The trial court 
No. 18AP-125 23 

must apply the correct standard and in so doing must consider the applicable evidence and 

explain its resolution of the same. 

e. R.C. 2152.12(E)(5) 

{¶ 73} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(5), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child." Under this 

factor, the juvenile court found "[appellant] has not previously been adjudicated a 

delinquent child." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) Appellant does not dispute this finding. 

f. R.C. 2152.12(E)(6) 

{¶ 74} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(6), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the 

transfer." Under this factor the juvenile court found "[appellant] is emotionally, physically 

and psychologically mature enough for the transfer." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 4.) As 

discussed in our review of R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), the juvenile court made inconsistent and 

unsupported findings regarding appellant's mental health diagnoses and his status on 

suicide patrol in determining whether appellant is emotionally, physically, or 

psychologically mature enough for the transfer. Consistent with our review of the trial 

court's findings under the R.C. 2152.12(D)(8) factor, and given the lack of additional 

findings in this section, the juvenile court must on remand determine whether appellant is 

not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer under R.C. 

2152.12(E)(6). 

g. R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) 

{¶ 75} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(7), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether the "child has a mental illness or intellectual disability." Under this factor, the 

juvenile court found "[appellant] has no mental illness or intellectual disability based upon 

the psychological reports prepared for this hearing." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5.) 

Appellant asserts this finding is not supported by the record. As previously noted in our 

discussion of R.C. 2152.12(D)(8), the record reflects appellant qualified for several mental 

health diagnoses and the court's finding is inconsistent with its finding under the R.C. 

2152.12(E)(8) factor. Accordingly, the juvenile court's finding under the R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) 

factor is inconsistent with its other findings and not supported by the record. 
No. 18AP-125 24 

h. R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) 

{¶ 76} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(8), the juvenile court was required to consider 

whether "[t]here is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system and 

the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of 

public safety." Under this factor, the juvenile court made the following findings: 

Both Dr. Davis and Dr. [Speicher]-Bocija concluded that 

[appellant] is amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice 

system. However, the Court reviewed State v. Marshall, 2016-

Ohio-3184, where the trial court had made the decision to 

sustain the motion to relinquish when the psychologist had 

opined that the juvenile was amenable to treatment and the 

Court found that he was not. The trial court's ruling was 

affirmed in that case. A juvenile court in making an amenability 

determination is entitled to disagree with the opinion of a 

medical expert and may take into account the severity of the 

offenses when considering whether a juvenile is mature enough 

for transfer and whether enough time exists to rehabilitate in 

the juvenile-justice system. See State v. Johnson, 2015-Ohio96, 27 N.E.3d 9 ¶ 40 (8th Dist.); Morgan, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 13AP-620, 2014-Ohio-5661, at ¶ 37 (holding that a juvenile 

court is not bound by an expert opinion). 

The Court finds that there is not sufficient time to rehabilitate 

[appellant] and provide a reasonable assurance of public safety. 

[Appellant] is currently on GPS EMD monitor on house arrest. 

It is not conceivable that he can be maintained in that state. It's 

important to note that he concocted this plan while in his 

parents' home, on his home computer, made maps or plans 

th[r]ough electronic communication with peers, has a fixation 

on violence, violent acts, violent people, such as Timothy 

McVey [sic] and Charles Manson, homegrown terrorists, 

violent groups such as Nazis and the KKK, and numerous priorschool shooters. He had acquired a bullet proof vest and a gas 

mask for his attack. He had dwelled on his plan for the span of 

a year although the drawings/plans were considered recently 

done. 

Dr. Davis opined that there was no evidence or indication of an 

increasing imperative to commit the act. There's no indication 

that bullying attributed to this act as he had already developed 

the persona of a school shooter. There's no psychological break 

from reality. Dr. Davis also cautioned that the threat 

assessment model did accurately predict the allegations, even 

though the assessment is a measure of immediacy and different 

from a longer term predictive assessment. 
No. 18AP-125 25 

Dr. Davis also offered diagnostic impressions of an Unspecified 

Depressive Disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder, Disruptive 

Behavior Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and Rule Out 

Autism Spectrum Disorder. The Court finds that none of these 

disorders rise to a level of incompetence to understand the 

actions that he has committed, to assist with his own defense 

or understand the nature of these proceedings. 

Dr. [Speicher]-Bocija conducted the same assessments as Dr. 

Davis and opined that [appellant] had a high score on the 

Sophistication-Maturity scale of the RSTI. She opined that 

[appellant] displayed a tendency to direct his high level of 

Sophistication-Maturity to a criminologic end in sustaining the 

delinquency charge. Also she noted that [appellant] called the 

diagram he created and its implicit threat a joke. Further she 

opined, based upon the Virginia Model for Student Threat 

Assessment, [appellant] should be considered as a "high 

threat" level. She recommended that the Court consider 

imposing a serious youthful offender designation because he is 

highly motivated to avoid adult sanctions. Franklin County 

Prosecutor's Office did not file for a Serious Youthful Offender 

specification, therefore, the Court cannot consider this option. 

(Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5-6.) 

{¶ 77} Appellant argues the juvenile court erred in its consideration of this factor 

because it did not make a specific finding about the seriousness of the offense, unlike the 

cases to which it cited. Furthermore, appellant argues the juvenile court did not offer 

specific facts or reasoning about why the experts were incorrect. Finally, appellant argues 

the juvenile court failed to analyze the availability of any programs and appellant's response 

while under supervision. 

{¶ 78} Appellant is correct that the juvenile court in its consideration of the R.C. 

2152.12(E)(8) factor did not explicitly make a finding specifically regarding the severity of 

the offense in this case.4 Nevertheless, a reading of the entirety of the juvenile court's 

findings under R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) reveals the trial court did consider the severity of the 

offense. Specifically, the court found that appellant "concocted this plan while in his 

 

4 In Marshall, the court stated that "a juvenile court in making an amenability determination is entitled to 

disagree with the opinion of a medical expert and may take into account the severity of the offenses when 

considering whether a juvenile is mature enough for transfer and whether enough time exists to rehabilitate 

in the juvenile-justice system." Id. at ¶ 21. We note that a juvenile court's determination to reject a medical 

expert's opinion is different from erroneously finding that no mental health diagnosis was made when the 

record reflects otherwise. 
No. 18AP-125 26 

parents' home, on his home computer, made maps or plans th[r]ough electronic 

communication with peers, has a fixation on violence, violent acts, violent people, such as 

Timothy McVey [sic] and Charles Manson, homegrown terrorists, violent groups such as 

Nazis and the KKK, and numerous prior-school shooters. He had acquired a bullet proof 

vest and a gas mask for his attack. He had dwelled on his plan for the span of a year 

although the drawings/plans were considered recently done." (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 

5.). Therefore, considering the entirety of the juvenile court's findings, we cannot find the 

juvenile court committed prejudicial error by failing to explicitly make a finding regarding 

the severity of the offense in its resolution of the R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) factor.5 

{¶ 79} However, as discussed in our analysis of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(3) factor, the 

juvenile court's determination in this section that "[t]here's no indication that bullying 

attributed to this act as he had already developed the persona of a school shooter" is 

inconsistent with its other findings related to bullying. (Sept. 6, 2017 Decision at 5.) 

Additionally, as previously discussed in our analysis of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(8) factor, the 

juvenile court's determination in this section related to appellant's mental health diagnoses 

is inconsistent with its other findings. Based on the lack of clarity resulting from the court's 

inconsistent findings, we are unable to determine whether the juvenile court properly 

exercised its discretion in analyzing the R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) factor. 

D. Conclusion 

{¶ 80} In making its amenability determination, the juvenile court was required to 

"indicate the specific factors that were applicable and that the court weighed." R.C. 

2152.12(B)(3). Here, in multiple instances as outlined above, it is unclear from the juvenile 

court's decision which factors it found to be applicable in favor of or against transfer. 

Additionally, in multiple instances, the juvenile court's findings are either inconsistent with 

its own findings elsewhere in the decision or not supported by the record. Finally, as to one 

factor, the court applied the incorrect standard. Because the juvenile court's decision fails 

to comply with R.C. 21512.12(B)(3) and lacks sufficient clarity to enable meaningful 

appellate review, we cannot determine whether any errors in its determination were 

prejudicial. As a result, we must remand this matter for the juvenile court to apply the 

 

5 Furthermore, we note the plain language of R.C. 2152.12(E)(8) does not specifically require a court to make 

a finding regarding the severity of the offense, although such a finding may be informative. 
No. 18AP-125 27 

proper standard, consider the evidence and weigh the same, resolve inconsistencies in its 

findings, and properly journalize its findings. However, in so remanding, we recognize the 

seriousness of conduct in question and specifically make no determination as to whether 

appellant is amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Accordingly, appellant's 

assignment of error is sustained. 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 81} Having sustained appellant's sole assignment of error, we reverse the 

judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, 

Juvenile Branch, and the General Division and remand this matter to the Juvenile Branch 

for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision. 

Judgments reversed; 

cause remanded. 

BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.