NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS URENDA

- BUSTOS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, S R .; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees,
and HOLISWORTH; et al.,

Defendants. No. 19

- 15765
D.C. No. 2:16

- cv - 02165

- JCM

- NJK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 3 , 2020 * * San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 5 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Luis Urenda

- Bustos appeals both the adverse summary judgment ruling on
his retaliation claim against the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) , NDOC c aseworker Ira Hollingsworth , and Correctional Officer Bryan Wilson and
the dismissal of his excessive force claim against Senior Correctional Officer David Foley. Urenda

- Bustos maintains that Hollingsworth and Wilson brought retaliatory disciplinary charg es against him because he filed a n excessive force grievance against Foley

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
N othing in the record indicat es Hollingsworth’s involvement in filing the disciplinary charge

. See Rhodes v. Robinson , 408 F.3d 559 , 567

– 68 (9th Cir. 2005) ( requiring “[a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an
inmate ” to prove First Amendment retaliation). T he evidence instead suggests Foley
alone filed it

. Nor can Hollingsworth’s fa ilure to report Foley’s abus ive behavior as required by NDOC regulations

— an omission that preceded both Urenda

- Bustos’s grievance and Foley’s disciplinary charge

— reasonably be said to implicate Hollingsworth

. Q ualified immunity bars Urenda

- Bustos’s retaliation claim against Wilson.
Wilson did not violate a “clearly established” legal right merely by serving as the disciplinary hearing officer

. See Saucier v. K atz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“ The relevant, disp ositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is
whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in3

the situation he confronted. ”). And we find no authority for Urenda

- Bustos’s suggestion that a disc iplinary hearing officer must be licensed in the practice of law
before invok ing qualified immunity

. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Foley for lack of personal service. See In re Sheehan , 253 F.3d 507 , 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Urenda

- Bustos had ninety days from the filing of his compla i nt to serv e Foley

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). T he court alerted Urenda

- Bustos to this de adline and explained
that he could serve Foley from prison by filing a motion requesting service , after
which the court would direct the United States Marshal s Service to serve Foley at
his last known address , which had already been filed under seal with t he court

. But
h e never did

. T he court did not err , then, in rejecting his pro se status, incarceration,

or inability to personally learn Foley’s address as good cause to extend the service
deadline

. See G ha zali v. Moran , 46 F.3d 52 , 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (“ Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure. ”).
AFFIRMED.