In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00215-CR 

 

MICHAEL DAVID SPARKS, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 47th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 081638-A-CR, Honorable Dee Johnson, Presiding 

April 12, 2024 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Michael David Sparks appeals from his conviction for the state jail felony offense 

of possessing methamphetamine in an amount less than one gram and the 

accompanying sentence of eight years in prison. His punishment was enhanced by two 

prior felony convictions. He challenges his conviction through two issues, arguing 1) the 

State failed to provide sufficient proof linking the final felony convictions it used to enhance 

his punishment, and 2) the trial court erred in not conducting an on-the-record inquiry into 

his ability to pay court costs. We affirm.
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Background

An officer stopped appellant after he saw him riding a motorized scooter without 

registration. Once stopped, the officer noted appellant was compliant but “consistently 

kept putting his hand by his pockets.” This led the officer to believe he might be hiding 

weapons or contraband, so he requested consent to search appellant’s pockets. 

Appellant consented, and the officer found a clear baggy that was tied in a knot. The bag 

was small and “contained crystals that [the officer] knew to be the form or typically the 

form of methamphetamine.” He placed appellant under arrest. The substance was later 

tested and found to contain .11 gram of methamphetamine.

At trial, appellant was found guilty as charged in the indictment. During the 

punishment phase and over appellant’s objection, the State introduced into evidence a 

document certified by the Department of Corrections, Commonwealth of Kentucky. That 

document ostensibly showed appellant had been finally convicted of felony offenses in 

Kentucky. Two of the offenses were utilized by the State to enhance the punishment 

range of appellant’s offense from a state jail felony to that of a second-degree felony. At 

the close of evidence, the jury assessed punishment against appellant at eight years of 

confinement in prison. The court also assessed against appellant $420.00 in costs to be 

paid upon release on parole or completion of his sentence. 

Issue One—Sufficiency of Proof Linking Appellant to Prior Convictions

Via his first issue, appellant claims the State failed to provide sufficient proof to link 

him to the final felony convictions in Kentucky, and thus, the punishment range was 

improperly enhanced. We overrule the issue. 
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To show appellant had been convicted of the prior offenses, the State had to prove 

1) that the prior convictions exist, and 2) that appellant is linked to them. Flowers v. State, 

220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “No specific document or mode of proof is 

required to prove these two elements.” Id. While evidence of a certified copy of a final

judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove 

both elements in a number of different ways; those ways include “documentary proof 

(such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence

of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted.” Id. at 921-22.

“Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle pieces the State offers to prove the 

existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, the factfinder determines if the 

pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the puzzle.” Harper v. State, Nos. 01-22-

00249-CR, 01-22-00250-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9535, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trier of fact 

must consider the evidence as a whole, as each piece of evidence may provide little 

meaning if considered in isolation. Id. The factfinder looks at the totality of evidence 

admitted concerning the prior conviction to determine whether the two elements can be 

found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If so found, then “the various pieces used to 

complete the puzzle are necessarily legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Id.

On appeal, appellant argues the Kentucky document is not sufficient to show he

was finally convicted of the felonies. Further, he claims that while the document shows a 

name, date of birth, age, social security number, and other information such as cause 

number, conviction date, offense, and sentence length, it does not state that appellant 

was the person convicted or that the convictions were final convictions as required by 
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Penal Code section 12.425(b). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.425(b). Further, 

appellant asserts, the Kentucky document does not contain a photograph or thumbprint 

from which the convictions could be linked to him. 

First, the record at bar shows an officer testified that the name of the person he 

stopped was Michael Sparks. He also obtained his birthdate and other identifying 

information during the stop, which identifying information originated from Kentucky. The 

name and birthdate obtained matched the ones on the Kentucky record or document 

containing the Kentucky convictions. 

Second, the Kentucky record was certified. It also 1) contained identifying 

information, 2) specified the offenses for which the subject was convicted, and 3) 

specified the sentences, time actually served, conviction dates, and jail credit. This 

constituted prima facie evidence of the Kentucky convictions. Furthermore, “[o]nce the 

State makes prima facie proof of an enhancement conviction, finality of the conviction is 

presumed if the record is silent regarding finality.” Davy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 745, 752 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. ref’d). Absent from the record is evidence suggesting the 

Kentucky convictions were not final. Thus, sufficient evidence supported the conclusion 

that the documents were final convictions from a Kentucky court.

Third, the Kentucky documents introduced by the State included appellant’s name, 

middle initial, birthdate, age, race (white), and pertinent conviction dates for each 

conviction.

1 This information matched the name, middle initial, birthdate, age, and race 

of appellant. To paraphrase Richard v. State, No. 06-13-00068-CR, 2013 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 15119 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 17, 2013, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.). “[w]hile it is 

1 Incidentally, each conviction comported with the enhancement allegations in the indictment. 
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conceivable that another [Michael David Sparks] born on [August 14, 1962], committed 

this offense[s] in [Spark’s] home State of [Kentucky], such an instance is unlikely.” Id. at 

*16. We find this evidence more than legally sufficient to prove the existence of two prior 

convictions in Kentucky and appellant being the subject of them. 

Issue Two—Failure to Conduct an On-The-Record Inquiry of Ability to Pay

Through his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to 

conduct, on the record, an inquiry into his ability to pay court costs. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 42.15(a-1) (providing that “during or immediately after imposing a 

sentence . . . a court shall inquire on the record whether the defendant has sufficient 

resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs”). Appellant 

requests that we remand this matter for that inquiry. We overrule the issue. 

The judgment here ordered appellant to pay $420.00 in costs but ordered that he 

pay it upon his release on parole or completion of his sentence. No hearing or inquiry 

into appellant’s ability to pay appears in the record, nor does it appear appellant waived 

the requirement for such an inquiry as permitted by article 42.15(a-2). See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15(a-2). Nevertheless, the trial court found him unable to pay 

same and delayed the payment until “release on parole or completion of his/her 

sentence.” 

We recently addressed like circumstances in Stanberry v. State, No. 07-23-00194-

CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) and Mayo v. State, No. 07-23-00243-CR, 2024 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 2396 (Tex. App.—Amarillo April 4, 2024, no pet. h.) (op. on reh’g). In neither did 

the trial court conduct the requisite hearing “on the record.” Nevertheless, in both, the 
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trial court ordered that payment of the costs occur upon the defendant’s release via parole 

or on completion of sentence. These circumstances lead us to conclude that 1) the trial 

court had found appellant unable to pay and 2) remanding the matter to the trial court to 

undertake a “gratuitous inquiry” into appellant’s financial status was an unnecessary 

exercise wasting judicial resources. Stanberry, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066, at *6. 

Should it be discovered that his financial resources upon release were insufficient, 

appellant was also free to seek relief then. Id. at *6-7. The same is no less true here. 

Thus, on the authority of Stanberry and Mayo, we reject issue two.

Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.