Docket No . 110194.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

__________________

THE PEOP LE OF TH E ST ATE OF I LLI NOIS, Appe llant, v.

CLAU DIA MA DRIGAL, A

ppelle e.
Opinion filed March 24, 2011.

JUSTICE TH OM

A S d el i v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Ju st ice Kilbr ide an d J us t ice s F r ee man, Garm an , Ka rmeier, Bur ke, and T heis co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Defe ndan t, Claudia Madrigal , was i ndi cted i n the ci rcui t court of Kane Co un t y o n o ne co un t o f ide nt it y t he ft invi ol ati on of se cti on 16G –15 (a )( 7) of t he Identity Theft Law (720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a)(7) (West 200 8)) . Se cti

on 1 6G –15 (a) (7) prov

i de s th at “ [a] pers on com m i ts the of fe nse of ide ntity theft when

he or she kn

owingl y ***
uses any personal i de nti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on or pers ona l i denti f i ca ti on do cument of another for the purpo se of gain in g access to any

record of the actions taken, com

mun ic ations m

ade or received, or o ther activ ities o rt r an sa ct io ns of that p erson, withou t t he prior express permi ssion of that perso n.” 720 ILCS 5/1 6G–15(a) (7) (West 2008)

. The in dictmen t alleged that defendant “knowin gly use d personal i de nti f i ca ti on i nf orma tion of G abri ela Vas quez , b eing Ga br iela-2- Vazque z’s name, dat e o f birth, and addr es s, to gai n acce ss to a re cord of actions taken, acti

vi ties or transactions of

Gab riela Vazquez, withoutthe prior express perm i ss i on of Ga br i el a V as quez.”

A pers on convi cted of violatin g section 16G–15(a)(7) f

or th e f i rs t ti me is g ui l ty of a Class 3 fel

ony, pun is hab le by up to fi ve y ears i n pri son. 720 ILCS 5/16G–15(d)(2) (West 2008); 730 I LCS 5/5–4. 5–40(a) (West 2008)

. Defend ant fi

le d a m ot ion to dismi

ss the i ndict m en t, s eek ing dis mi ssal on three separat e due pr oc ess g ro unds . Fir st , d efenda nt
ma in taine dthat section 16G–15(a)(7) is un co nst itutional

ly vague because its p ro hibitions a re not sufficient ly defini te, when me asured by co mmon und er st anding an d pr ac ti ce s, to gi

ve a p ers on of ordi na ry in tell ige nce fa i r warni

ng as to what conduct is prohi bi ted. Seco nd, defend ant ar gue d t hat t he chargi ng i nstrume nt is im permissi bl y v ague. And finall y, de fend ant ar gu ed

th at s ecti on

16 G– 15 (a)(7 ) f

ai l s to
r eq uir e a cu lpa ble menta l sta t e and th eref oreca n b e read to a

pp l y to con du ct th at is w h oll y i n n oce n t. Af ter a h ea ri n g on th e m oti on to dism iss t he ind ict men t , t he cir cu it courtden i ed

th e f irst t wo gr ou nds fo r d ismi ssal. But it g ra nt ed t he
moti on t o d ismiss o n t he t hird g ro und , find i ng th at the statutory su bs ec ti on at issue lac ks a culpa ble menta l sta t e and cap t ur es inno cent con du ct, t hus vio lating due pr ocess. The trial court la ter entered an order und er Il li nois Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 1 8 ( Ill. S. Ct . R . 1 8 ( eff. Sept. 1, 2 006 ) ) , ind ica t ing t ha t se ct io n 1 6G –1 5( a) ( 7) is unconsti tut iona l on its f ace as vio la tive of substantiv e due pro cess under the fourteenth am

endm ent of the Un

ited State s C ons

ti tution (U.S. Co nst ., amend. XI V) and a rt icle I, sec t ion 2, of t he I llino is Consti tution (Ill . Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Th e court further f ound that t he statut e could n

ot be reasonably

construed in a manne r that preserves its consti tut iona li ty an d that t he jud gme nt o f dis miss al c o uld not re st on a ny

a lternati ve grounds. The State properly a ppeal ed dir ec t ly t o t his co ur t as a matt er of r ight . See I ll. S . C t . R . 6 03 (e ff. Oc t. 1, 20 10 )

. We no w c o nsid er t he co nst it ut io na lit y of s e cti on 16G–15(a)(7) o f the i

dentity theft statute.

AN AL YSIS We beg in by no t ing t hat t he q ue st io n o f whet he ra s t at ut e is unconsti tut iona l is a qu est ion o f law, w hich this cour t reviews de-3- novo
. People v. Johnson , 22 5 I ll. 2d 57 3, 58 4 ( 20 07 )

. All statutes a re presum ed const itu t iona l , an d th e p ar ty ch all engi

n g th e con sti tuti on al i ty of a st at ut e has t he burden of cl early establ is hi ng that it vi ola tes the constituti on. People v. Carpenter

, 228 Ill . 2d250, 267 (2008 ); Johnson , 22 5 I l l . 2d at 5 84 . U

n der the b an

n er of i ts pol ic e power, t he leg isla t ur e h as wid e d isc r et io n t o fas hio n p en alt i esf or crim in al o ffen se s, bu t t his d is cr etion i s lim ited by the constitutional guarantee of

su b sta n ti v e d ue proce ss , w

h i ch prov i de s th

at a per son ma y not be depriv

ed of l ib erty wi thout due proc es s of

l aw. People v. Wright , 194

Ill . 2d 1, 2 4 (2 000 ). W

he n th e c ha l l en ge d s tatute

doe s n ot aff ect a fun dam ental consti tutiona l righ t, th e a ppr opri atetes t f or det er mini ng i ts c on sti tuti on al i ty is the hi ghl y de feren tial r at io na l ba sis test. Carpenter, 22 8 Ill. 2d at 267 ; Joh nson , 225 Ill . 2d at 584-85. Under that test, a

statute wi

l l be sustai ne d i f i t “ ‘ be ars a

re a so na ble
r ela t io nsh ip to a pu blic inter est t o be ser ved, and t he me ans adopted
ar e a reas onable method o f accompli shin g t he desired o bjective.’ ” Wright , 194 Ill. 2d at 24 ( quo t ing People v. Adams , 144 Ill . 2d 381, 390 (1 991)). Ac co r di ng ly, we mus t firs t de t er min e the s t at ut e’ s p ur po se in order t o a sses s whe t her t he pr ohi b i ti ons con tai ne d i n s ec ti on 16G– 15(a)( 7) r eas ona bly i mplement t hat pur po se. The langua ge o f the sta tute itsel f is the best indicat or of t he legislat ive intent and statutory purpose. Carpenter, 228 Ill . 2dat 268. We will ther efo re loo k t o t he sp ec ific lang ua ge o f t he I de nt it y The ft Law to determi

ne i ts purpose. The le gis la

tive declara ti on

i n se cti on 16 G– 5( a) of

th e I den ti ty Th eft Law states that it is the “pub li

c po lic y of t his St at e t hat t he substantial

bur den place d upon

the e conom

y *** a s a re su lt o f t he rising incidenc e o f ident ity t heft and t he neg at iveeffe ct o f t his cr ime
on the Peo ple of thi s Stat e and its vi ctims is a matter of g

rave concern *** and theref

ore i den ti ty th ef t sh al l b e i den ti f i ed an d dea l t wi th
sw ift ly an d ap propriatel

y .” 720ILCS 5/16G

–5(a) (We st 2008 ). Sec ti on 1 6G–5 (b) contin

ues by decl arin g that t he “

wide spread
av ai l ab i l i ty an d un au thor ize d a cc es s to p ers ona l i denti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on have led and wi

ll lead to a substant ial

in crease i n i den ti ty t heft related cri

me s.” 720 ILCS 5/16G–5(b) (Wes t 2008)

. Fro m the foregoin g, it is clea r, and bo t h par t ies ag re e, t hat t he pu rp os e o f the i den ti ty t heft sta tute i s to p rotect the

ec onom y an d pe ople of

I llino is f rom th e i l l -e f f ects o f i den ti ty th ef t.-4- Cruci al t o d efend ant’s ar gu men t t ha t se ct io n 1 6G –1 5( a) ( 7) is unconsti tut iona l is the char ge t hat it do es no t co nt ain a c ulp ab le
me ntal state and therefore re su lt s in p o t en t ially p un ishin g w ho lly innoce nt co nd uc t

. T his court hasrepeatedly hel d that a stat ute viol

ates t he du e p roc es s c l au se s of b oth the Ill in ois an d Uni ted St ates Co nst itu t ions if i

t po t ent ially

subjec t s who lly

inno cent con

duct to crim in al pen al ty wi th ou t re quir ing a cu lpable ment al st at e beyo nd
mereknowl edge . See, e.g. , Carpenter, 228 Ill . 2d at 269 (st ruck down
a st at ut e t ha t “p o t en t ially

cri m i n al ize s i n n oce n t con duct, as i t v i si ts t he status o f a

f el on upon an y one wh o own s or

operate s a

ve hi cl e h e or she know s to contai

n a f al se or s ecret com

pa rtment , d efined as one in tended an d d es ig ned to co n ce al th e c om pa rtm en t or i ts c on ten ts f rom la w enf orcem en t off i cers ”); Wright , 194 Ill . 2d at 25, 28 ( struck downrec ord-ke epi

ng statute because i

t “potentially

subj ects *** innoce nt co nduct to *** a sever e pena lty”); In re K .C. , 186 Ill . 2d 542, 549, 553 ( 19 99 ) ( inva lida t ed cr iminal t r es pa ss t o a v eh icle sta tute t hat proh i bi ted en teri ng a veh i cl e w he ne ve r i t wa s done

“ kn ow in gly and wit ho ut au t ho r it y” be ca us e it “p o t en t ially p un is h[ ed ] wh o lly innoce nt co nduc t wit hou t re quir ing proo f of a cul pabl e m ental state”); People v. Zaremba , 158 Ill . 2d 36, 42-43 (1 99 4) (th ef t sta tute di d n ot b ear a r ea so na ble r ela t io nsh ip t o it s p ur po se be ca us e “ it po t en t ially subj ect[ed] who lly

innoce nt co nd

uc t to pu n i sh men t” a n d f ai l ed to requi re a cul pa bl e ment al st at e o t her t han t hat t he de fendant do t he prohib ited

act ions “kno wingly

”); People v. Wick

, 107 Ill . 2d 62, 66 (1985) (“Because ag gra

va ted ars on asde f i ne d by the sta tute d oesnot requi re an unlawfu l pur po se in set t ing a fire, how ever , t he statut e as pr es en t ly con sti tute d swe ep s to o broadly by puni shi ng i nnocen t as wel l as c ul pab l e con duct i n s ettin g f i res.” ). Simp ly put, t hi s court has he ld t ha t in su ch ca se s, a s t at ut e fa ils t he
r at io na l ba sis t es t be ca us e it do es no t r ep r es en t a r ea so na ble meth od of preventi ng the targeted conduct. S ee Carpenter, 228 Ill . 2d at 269; Wright , 194 I ll. 2d a t 25. In Carpenter, we considered the fac ia l
con sti tuti on al i ty o f a statut e that bann

ed fal se or secret com

pa rtm en ts in automobil

es. Bec a us e t he st at ut e in t ha t ca se lac ke d a cu lpa ble
me ntal state beyond b ot h knowl edge of the c om

pa rtm en t’s ca paci ty to conceal

an d a n i n ten t to co n ce al, w e h

el d th at th e statu te “ d[i d] n ot co nt ain a r ea so na ble mea

n s of pr ev en ti n g th e ta rg ete d c on duct, an d it therefore vi

olate[d] due process.” Carpenter, 228 Ill . 2d at 269.-5- In Wright , we considered t he co nst it ut io na lit y o f an au t o mo bile
re co rd -k eep ing

sta tute de si gn ed to pre ve nt th e tra ns f er or sa l e of stolen motor vehi cles (s ee 62 5 ILC S 5/5– 401.2( a) (West 199 6)). In dec laring the statut e unconsti tut iona l on i ts face, we hel

d that it co uld not “wi thstand scrutin

y un der t he rational

basis test.” Wright , 19 4 I ll. 2d at 25. W e f ound th at “[i ]n an al ogou s c as es , th

i s c our t an d c our ts in ot her jurisd ictio ns ha ve he ld t ha t cr iminal s t at ut es t ha t po t en t ially punis h in nocent conductviolate due process prin ci ple s because

they are not reasonabl

y de signed

to achi ev e the i r purpos es.” Wright , 194 Ill . 2d at 25. In the pre sent c as e, s ec ti on

16 G– 15 (a) of

th e I den ti ty Thef t Law atte m pts to i m pl em en t i ts s tatu tory pu rp ose of pr ev en ti n g i den ti ty theft as foll

ows: “(a) A pe rs on com m i ts th e of f ense of ide ntity theft when he o rsh e k no win gl y: ( 1) us esan

y pers ona l i denti f y i ng i nf orm ati on or personal ide nt ifica t io ndocum

en t of an oth er pers on to fr au du len t ly

obta i n c red i t, m one y , goo ds, servi ce s, or othe r prope rty, or (2) uses any

pers ona l i denti f y i ng i nf orm ati on or personal i de nti f i ca ti on docum en t of an oth er wi th i n ten t to co mmit any felony t heft or ot her felony vi ol ati on of Sta te la wn ot s et f

orth in paragraph

(1) of thi s s ub se cti on ( a), or (3) obtains, r ecord s, possesses, sells, transfers, purchases, or m

an uf ac ture s a ny pers ona l i denti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on o r p ersonal

ide ntif ic ation docum

ent of another wi th i n ten t to co mmit o rt o aid o rab et an o t he rin
co mmi t t ing a ny f el ony the f t or oth er f

el ony vi ol ati on of State l aw , or (4) uses, obtains, rec ords , po ssesses, sell s, tr ansf ers, purchases, or m

an uf ac ture s a ny pers ona l i denti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on o rpe r so na l ide nt if

ic ation docum

ent of another kno wing t hat suc h per so nal ident if ic a ti on i nf orm ati on or personal i nf orm ati on docum en ts were stolen or produced wi thou t l aw f ul au thor i ty , or (5) use s, tran sfers , o r p os sess es d oc ument -mak ing i m pl em en ts to pro duce fal se iden tifi cation or false1 Subparagraph (a)(6) of th e stat ute a lso do e s n

ot app e ar to

re qu ire cri m in alin te nt , c rim in al kn ow ledge o r a crim in al purpo se . See

720 ILCS
-6- docum en ts with kn owledge t hat t hey will be used by the pe rs on or anot her to commi

t any fel ony the ft or ot her f el ony vi ol ati on of State l aw , or (6) uses any

pers ona l i denti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on or per s onal ide ntif ic ation docum

ent of another to po rtray hims elf or h er self as t hat per so n, o r o t her wise, for t he purpo se of

gai ni ng ac ce ss to an y pers ona l i denti f i ca ti on i nf orm ati on or personal i

dentif ic ation docum

ent of that per so n, without the prior express pe rm is si on of that pe rs on, or (7) uses any personal ident ifi cation information or personal identification document of anot her for the p ur pose of gaining access to any record of the actions taken, communications made or re ceived, or other activities or transactions of that person, without the prior expr es s permission of that person. ” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 720 IL CS 5/1 6G–1 5(a) (W est 200 8). All se ve n o f t he su bp ar ag r ap hs in section 16G–15(a) require at least
a me ntal s tate o f m ere knowle dge, as i

ntroduct ory pa

ra graph (a)
ma kes cl ea r: “ A pe rs on c om

m i ts th e of f ense of ide nt it y t heft when he
orshe know

ingly ” do es a nything p ro scr ibed by t he differe nt off

enses in subparagraphs (a)(1) thro ugh (a)(7 ). (E mph

asis added.) 720 ILCS 5/16G–15(a) ( We st 20 08 )

. T he firs t five o ffen se s lis te d in subparagraphs (a )( 1) t hro ugh ( a) (5 ), how ever , a lso r equ ire t he ad d itional elem ent of crim

in al i ntent o r knowledge. In o ther wo rds, th ey re qui rea cri m i n al pu rp ose i n addi ti on to the general

knowle dge that one is co mmi

t t ing t he act ions

specifi ed. Subparagraphs (a)(1) thr ou gh ( a) ( 5) ar e n o t at iss ue in t his c as e a nd cle ar ly do no t fall wit hin the pa ram eters of the li ne of cases that deal

with s tatut es that po t en t ially

pu n i sh i n n oce n t con duct. Unlike t he o ffen se s d es cr ibe d in subp ar agr aphs (a)(1) t hrough (a)(5), howev er, subparagraph (a)(7) cle ar ly do es no t r eq uir e c r iminal in t en t , cr iminal k no wle dge , or a cr imi nal pur pos e in or der t o s ubject one t o a felony co nvictio n and pu n i sh men t. 15/16G–15(a)(6 ) (West 200 8). Tha t su bsect ion, however, is not at iss ue her e, and we make no ruling with r espect to its constit utiona lity.
-7- Section 16G–15(a)(7) r eq uir es o nly that a p erson knowingly

use any “ personal ide nt ifi cation information or pe rs ona l i denti f i ca ti on do cument of another

for the pur pose of g ai

ni ng a cce ss to an

y record of the actions taken, com

mun ic ations m

ade or received, or o ther activ ities or tra

ns ac ti ons of tha t pe rs on , without t he prior express pe rm i ss i on of that person.” (Emphas is adde d.) 72 0 ILCS 5/16G–15(a)(7) (West 2 00 8)

. “P er so na l ide nt ifying in fo rmat io n” is defi ned for purposes of t he st at ut e so as t o includ e eve ryt hingfr o m a perso n’s n am

e, addr es s, da

te of b i rth , or te leph on e n

um b er to o bvio us ly mo re co nfide nt ial ide nt ifying info r ma tion such as soci al
se cu ri ty number s, ba nk ac co unt num bers or credit card num

bers. See 720 ILCS 5/16G–10(b) (West 2008). Because any one of the pieces of in form ation l is ted qualifi es as “ personal ident ify ing informat ion” f

or pur pos esof com m i ttin g the off en se l i sted i n s ection 16G

–15(a )(7), a pe rs on wh o simp ly

uses so meone ’s name fo r t he pu rp os e o f gaining
access to an

y rec ord of the ac ti ons taken , com

m un i ca ti ons made or recei ved, orot her activ

ities or tr ansactions of that person, withoutt he pr io rex pr es s p er miss io n o f t ha t pe r so n, is g ui lt y o f aCla ss 3 f elo ny. The net resul

t is that section 16G– 15(a ) ( 7) wo uld po t en t ially punis h as a fe lo ny a w id e array of wh ol l y i nn ocent c ond

uc t. F or exam ple , doi ng a com puter s earch throug h Google or some other search engi ne or through a social

netwo rki ng si te suc h as F ac eb ook
o r MyS pa ce , by en t er ing so meo ne ’s na me, co uld uncover num erous records of actions

taken, comm

unications m

ade or re ce i

ve d, or ot her activ ities or tr an sa ct io ns o f t ha t pe r so n. T hu s, t he st at ut e a s it
cu rr en t ly r ea ds wo uld crim

in aliz e such i

nnocuous conduct as so meone using the in

ternet t o look up how t hei r nei ghbor did in

the Chi cago Mar at hon. Moreover, a husban d who calls

a repai r shop for his wi fe, withouth er

“pri or e x pr es s p er m i ss i on ,”to see if h

er car is ready, wh

at was wr o ng , an d h o w mu ch t he r ep air bill is, wo uld be se ek in g i nf orm ati on i n v i ol ati on of the sta tute. A pers on who calls an em ploy er of a f rien d to s ee i f th e f rien d is worki

n g or on v ac ati o n, a nd who recei vesan ans wer t o his inqu iry wo uld be a po t ent ial felon und er t he statut e. The person m

igh t be told that t he friend res i gned (re cord of act ions taken), that he call ed in sick (r eco rd of c ommunicat ions ma de-8- orrece i ve d), o rt ha t he is on vaca tion sai l i ng i n the Ca rri be an (record of acti vi tie s of the p erson

). A p ers on who calls

a hotel to see if

her husba nd h as re giste re d, c h ecke d i n yet, or made a reserv

ation, wi thout get t inghis e xp r es s p er miss io n fir st , is subj ect to f el on y i m pri son men t. The stat ute co uld also li

kely quell the wor k of biogr aphers, j our n al i sts oran yone atte m pti ng to do a fa mily gene alog y, which a ll m ight requi re us i n g p er son

al i den ti f y i n g i n f orm ati on to ga i n ac ce ss to re co rd s o f co mmunicatio ns, a ct ivities o r a ct ions o f a per so n. The Identity

Thef t Law do es co nt ain some n arrow exemptions that do not app ear t o a ffect t he exam ple s noted above. See 720 I LCS 5/16G –40 (W est 200 8). Among ot her thi ngs, section 16G–40 states that th e I den

ti ty Th ef t La w doesnot prohi

bi t the ca pture or tran sm i ss i on of personal

ident ify ing informat ion in “t he o rd inary and la wful course of busi

ness ”; n or does

i t ap pl y to peac e of

f i cers who are in law ful p er fo rman ce o f t he ir duti es , or to “acti vi ties authorized under
an y other s tatute.” See

720 IL CS 5/1 6G–4 0 (West 200 8). The pro blem wi

th section 16G–15 (a)(7 ), t hen, i s th at it lacks a
cu lpa ble men

tal state, as i t does n ot requi re a cri m i na l pur pos e f ora pe rs on to be convicted o f a f

elony . Be cau se t he st at ut e p o t en t ially puni shes a significant amou nt of whol ly in nocent conduct not related to t he st at ut e’ s p ur po se , we simp ly do no t be lieve t ha t t his is a rational
wa y of addr es si n g th e p rob l em of i den ti ty th ef t. The State argued b ef

ore t he cir cu it co ur t t ha t ide nt it y t he ft it se lf is les s lik ely t o o cc ur if t he so r t o f in fo r mat io n b an ne d by se cti on 16G–15(a)(7) can be pr event ed fr om being g at her ed in t he fi rst pla ce. Th is ma y b e true. But what i s wrongful is not t he gatheri

ng o f s uc h i nf orm ati on by u sing a p er so n’s na me oradd re ss, but ra t her gat her ing
orusing s uch info rmat ion fo r t he pu rp ose of com m i tti n g i den ti ty th ef t. We note that in addi

tion to o ur establis

hed case la w n o ted above,

“ cou rtsof o t her jurisd ictio ns have si mi larl y struck dow n laws” falli

ng under the sam e catego r y

asthe one be f ore u s “ asbe i

ng vi ol ati ve of
su bst ant ivedu e p r o ce ss , if t he pr o hibit io n is ‘ t o o sw ee pin g in
enco mpassing activ

ity whi ch i s wholly

in nocent.’ ” D.P. v. State , 705 So. 2d 59 3, 6 00 (F l a. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Green, J., diss entin g); see also Wyche

v. State , 619 So. 2d 231, 235-37 (Fla. 1993) (struck down ordi na nc e p rohi bi ti ng a “ kn own prosti tute” f rom enga ging in c er t ain
ro ut ineact ivi

ties) ; State v. Saiez , 489 So. 2d 1125, 1127-29 (Fla. 1986) (inv

ali dated st atut e crim

in ali zin g mere posse ss io n o f a c r ed it-9- card em b oss i n g m ach i n e wi th out reg ard to th

e i n ten t o f t h e posse ssor); Peo

ple v

. Munoz , 172 N.E.2d 535 (N. Y. 1961) (str uck dow n l aw tha t proh i bi ted the pos se ss i on

of “a kn i f e or sh arp pointed
oredge d instr ument” by a perso n under the age o f 21); Peo p le v. Bunis , 172 N.E.2d 273 (N.Y. 1961) (held in val id a la w that pro hi

bi ted t he kno wing sa le of a mag azine orother pu bl i cation wi thout a cover); S tate v. Birdse ll , 1 04 S o. 2d 1 48 ( La. 195 8) (invalidat ed law t hat prohib ited

po ss es sio n o f a h ypo de rmi c needle, regar dless of the use f orwhi ch the n eedl e was posse sse d); b

ut, c. f. , Villageof H

off man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U .S. 489, 4 97 n .9 (1982) (noted o rdin

ance b ann in g drug pa raphe rnal i a w asnot irrati onal
means of d isco ur aging drug use even thought her e might be innoc ent uses f or th e b an n ed i tem s; b ut c our

t di d no t for eclo se a subs t ant ive du e p roc es s ch al

l en ge to a s tatu te t hat bans or punishe s a significant
am ount of i nn ocen t conduct i

n othe r contex ts). Bunisis particularly

in structive. The

re, New York’ s h

i ghe st court in val ida ted a st at e law t hat pr ohibit ed t he sale of m agazi nes an d ot her publicat ions wi

thout cove

rs, re ga r dle ss o f the circu msta nces . T he courtnoted that “[w]hatwas wrongful [was] not t he sale of coverless magazi nes, but rather their sal

e by a ven dor who t ake s par t in a
sc he me to defraud a m

agazi ne pub li sher.” Bunis , 172 N.E.2d at 274. The cour t co ntinued by

corr ectly reasoni

ng as fol lows: “A dmi tt edl y, b y deno minating as cr imi nal all sales, [t he sta tute ] nec es sa

ri l y ten dsto prevent corrupt sales. But, even
were we to suppo se that it had power to pro hi bi t such corrupt sales, it is u nr ea so na ble an d b ey ond the l eg i ti mateexerc i se

of t he pol i ce pow er f or th e L eg i sl atu reto i n te rd i ct a ll

sales, pe rmiss ible and i

ll ic it al ike , i n ord er to prev en t those wh i ch are i l l i ci t. The Legi slature may

not vali dly ma ke i t a crim e to do
so mething which is inno ce nt in it se lf mer ely be ca us e it is someti me s done i

mproperl y, som etim es attended

by im proper motiv es or do ne as pa

rt o f an il le gal schem e.” Bunis , 172 N.E.2d at 274. S imila r ly, we fi

nd that a statute, s

uch as s ection 16G

–15(a )(7), whi ch crim in aliz es the use o f mer e n ame s, o ro t he rco mmo nly an d p ub licly
av aila ble informat ion su ch as add re sses and p hone number s, fo r t he purpo se of g aining acc ess t o inn ocen t info rmat io n a bo ut pe o ple withoutan

y cri m i na l i nte nt, pur pos e or k no wle dg e is an inva lid-10- e xercise of th e p oli ce

pow er an d is n ot re as on ab l

y re l ate d to the purpos e of

the statute. To av o id t he co nst it ut io na l pr o ble m, t he St at e s ug ge st s t ha t t his courtread a cul

pabl e m en tal stat e i nto t he statute so t hat a crim in al purpo se is r eq uir ed fo ra v io lat io n. T his c o ur t r eje ct ed t he sa me ar gument in Wright

and Carpenter

under sim

il ar circumstances, wi

th b oth court s ho ld in

g that where a statut e al

ready c ontains

a m ental sta te of mere knowledge, this court cannot read a crimi nal -purpo se re quir ement i

n to the s tatute. Carpenter, 22 8 Ill. 2d at 270 ; Wright , 194 Il l . 2d at 29 -30. Wright specifi cally dis tingui shed People v. Tolliver , 147 Ill . 2d 397 (1992), which was “able t o imply the me ntal sta te of k now ledge plus c riminal purp os e as an element of [ t he sta tute at i ssue the

re] b eca use that prov

i sion con tai ne d no m en tal state.” Wright , 194 Ill . 2d at 29. Carpenter

re lied upo n Wr ight to fi nd that if a statut e al

ready
co nt ain s o ne o rmo r e me nt al s t at es an d n o ne o f t he m pr o vid e cu lp ab ilit y, a court may

n ot a dd a c

ul pab l e m en tal state. Carpenter, 228 I ll. 2d at 27 0. Carpenter then di stin

guis hed People v. Bailey , 167 I ll. 2d 210 (1995 ). In Bailey , th

i s c our t i n ter pr ete d th e stal ki n g s tatu te to r eq uir e the p rohib ited conduct be perf ormed “wi

thout la wful
author i ty,” even though those words were not in the statut e. Se e Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d a t 2 71- 72; Bailey , 1 67 I ll. 2d a t 224 . T he st alking st at ut e at issue in Bailey pr ovide d that a person comm itted t he offense “when he or she tra n sm i ts to an oth er pers on a th re at wi th t he in tent t o place that per so n in reas ona ble app re hensio n of d eat h, bo dily har m, sexu al assa ult , c onf ine men t o rr es t r ain t , an d in f urthe ran ce of t he t hre at kno wingly do es a ny one o r mo re of t he follow ingac t s o n a t lea st 2 s ep ar at e o cc as io ns .” 720 I LCS 5/12–7.3(a) (We st 1992 ). The second part of the statut e then requi red that t he defend ant follow “the per so n, ot her than wi thin the resi dence of the def endan t,” or p la ce “the per so n unde r su rve ill ance by
re maining pr ese nt ou t side” any one of a number of lo cat ions specifi ed in the s tatut e. 720 IL CS 5/1 2–7.3( a)(1), (a )(2) (W est 199 2). Carpent er n ot ed t hat t he ho lding in Bailey was li mi ted t o its facts. Carpenter, 228 Il

l . 2d at 27 2. Moreover, Carpenter obs erved that inter pr et ing

th e statu te in Bailey to in

cl ude the phrase “

without lawf

ul
au t ho r it y” was probabl

y n ot necess ary b ecause the statute d id no t pun ish any innoce nt co nduc t as w rit t en, as it alrea dy co nt ained “a-11- re quir ement o f ‘k no win g’ co nd uc t in fu r t he r an ce o f a c lea r ly cu lpa ble obje ctive , i.e. , t he int en t t o pla ce an o t he rpe r so n in ‘ r ea so na ble appre he ns i on of death, bodily

harm , se xu al as sa ul t, con f i ne men t or restrai nt.’ ” Carpenter, 228 Il

l . 2d at 27 2 (quoti

ng 7 20 IL CS 5/1 2–7.3 (West 199 2) ). Unlike t he st at ut e in Bailey , section 16G– 15(a

)(7 ) at is sue i n th i s c as e doesnot

pr ohibi t co nduct t hat is malum in se

. Ac cord ing ly, we likew ise find tha t t he st at ut e in Baileyca n n ot b e compared wi

th section 16G–15(a)(7), whi ch cri mi nal iz es t he wh o lly innoce nt con

duc t of us i ng a m ere na me or a ddr es s of a p er so n t o ga in informat ion abo ut t he ac t ions t ake n by that per so n. S imila r ly, the

State ’s rel i an ceupon People v. Williams , 235 Ill . 2d 178 (2009), is m

is pla ced. There, we uphel

d the u ni denti f i ed us e of
so und r ec ordings s

tatut e, containe d in

section 16–8 of

the Crim in al Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/16–8 (West 20 04 )), ag ai n st a subs t ant ive due pr oce ss

ch al l en ge . In doi n g s o, w e d

i sti n guis hed Carpenter, Wright , K.C. , Zaremba and Wick on t he basis that unlike

the statut es in t hos e ca ses, t he unide nt ifi ed r eco rd ing s stat ut e “ca pt ur e[ d] t he preciseacti

v i ti es th at i t wa s m ea n t to puni sh.” Williams , 235 Ill . 2dat 209. We re

ject ed t he no t ion t hat sec t ion 1 6–8 po t ent ially punishe d any innoce nt con

du ct ( Williams , 23 5 I ll. 2d at 212) and f urther noted t hat if any add i t io na l int en t ele men t s w er e s up plie d t o se ct io n 1 6– 8, it
wo uld defea t t he legislat ivepur po se in enac t ing t he statut e ( Williams , 235 Ill. 2d at 210-1 1). I n contrast t o t he st at ut e in Williams , se cti on 16 G– 15 ( a) ( 7) po t en t ially

pun i sh es a w i dearray

of in nocent conduct beyond what the le g islatu re co uld have re aso nably meant t o p unish. We therefore concl

ude that t he pr ese nt cas e falls squ ar ely under t he Carpenter-Wick

li ne of cases. Fin ally, t he Stat e argues thatwe should aban don the CarpenterWick l ine of p re ced ent and it s re quir ement t hat st at ut es c ont ain a
cu lpa ble menta l sta t e t o a void punishing who lly innoce nt co nduc t . T he Sta te claims tha t we s hou ld aband on o ur pr ece dent be cau se i t is at odds wi th th e U ni ted State s S upr

em e C ourt’ s i

nte rpreta ti on of subs t ant ivedue pr oce ss under t he federal const itut ion. The St ate ’s cl ai m that there i s a di

vergenc e i

n ourjurisprudence

fro m that of t he Un i ted Sta tes Su pr em e C our t i n th i s a re a is n ot co rre ct. In supp ort of i

ts argumen

t, t he State relies upo n United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 (1987) , for the followi ng pri nci ple : “A f ac i al ch al l en geto a le gis lative Ac t is, o f co ur se, t he-12- mostdiffi

cult challenge t o mo unt suc ces sfully, since t he chal le nger must establish th at n

o se t of ci rc um sta n ce s ex i sts under whi ch the Act would b e val

id. The fact that t he [statute] migh t o pe r at e u nc o nst it ut io na lly un de rso me concei

vab le set of ci rcum stan ces i s i ns uf f i cien t to render it w ho lly inva lid ***.” Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745. The St at e also re lies upo n t he prop osi ti on t ha t a “ ‘la w n ee d n o t be in
ev ery re sp ect l ogi

ca l l y con siste n t wi th i ts a i m s to be co nstit ut ional[;] [i ]t isen ou gh t hat t her e is an evil at hand fo r c or re ct ion, and t hat i t mightbe thought that t he particul ar legi slative me asure was a

rational way to correct it.’ ” U

n ited States v. Comstock

, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1949 , 1966 ( 2010)(Ke nn edy , J., con curri ng)( qu oting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. , 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955 )). The case l

awre lied upo n by the Stat e i nf orms our constitutional anal ysi s, bu t ult imat ely is not c ontr ol l i ng of the outc ome of

t he pr ese nt case because

none of the State’s case s i nvol ved a pen al statut e that la cked a c ulp ab le me nt al s t at e a nd t he r eb y cr iminaliz ed a significant
amou nt of inno cent co nduc t . R at her , t he pr inciples no t ed he re by the Sta te were used as general aids t o as se ss i ng the consti tutiona l i ty of statut es t hat wer e r egu lato ry o r c ivil in natu re and tha

t did n ot involve any crim in al prohib itions. The State’s argumen t “ign ores t he particular care [ the Un i ted State s S upr

em e C ourt] ha [s ] tak

en to avoi d
co nst ru inga statu

te to dispe nse w ith mens reawh er e d o ing so wo uld ‘cri mi nal iz e a broad rangeof a

ppare ntl y i nn ocen t conduct.’ ” Staples
v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quot in g Liparota v. United States , 47 1 U .S. 4 19, 426 (19 85) ); se e al so City of Houston, Texas v . Hill , 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987) (“Cri mi nal statut es must be scrutin iz ed with pa rticular care [citation]; those that make unl awful a substantial

amo un t o f co nst it ut io na lly pr o t ec t ed co nd uc t may be he ld fac ially invalid eve n if the y also ha ve legit imate a pplicat ion. ”) . T he Uni ted Sta tes Cou rt of A pp ea l s, Si xth Ci rcuit, has al

so observed

that “w here a c r imina l st at ut e p r o hib it s a nd pu nis he s s ee ming ly i nno cent orinno cu o us co nd uc t t ha t do es no t in itsel f f urni sh groundsto al

l ow t he pr es ump t io n t ha t de fen da nt kn ew his a ct io ns mu st be wr o ng ful,
con vi cti on wi thou t som e other, ex

tran eou s p roof

of blameworthiness
orculpabl

e men tal stat e is f

orbidden by

the Due Pr ocess Cl ause. ” Stanleyv. Turner , 6 F .3d 39 9, 4 04(6 th

Ci r. 1993). Mo reover, as-13- pr ev io us ly

no t ed , in a dd it i on to o ur ow n Carpenter

- Wick l i ne of pr ec eden t, co ur t s in many ot her jurisd ictio ns have avo ide d
cr imi nalizing i n n oce n t con duct b y proce ed i n g to strike down

crim in al statut es as fac ially

unc ons t itu t ional whe re t hos e st at ut es ha d t he pot entia l to punish i nn ocen t conduct. See, e.g. , Wyche , 619 So. 2d at 235-37; Saiez , 489 So. 2d at 1127-29; Munoz , 172 N.E.2d at 539-40; Bu nis , 172 N.E .2d at 275 ; Birdsel l , 10 4 S o

. 2d at 15 3- 54 ; s ee als o People v. Lardie , 551 N.W.2d 656, 669 n.53 (Mi ch. 1996) (a crim in al sta tute t hat lacks a cr imi

nal intent element may beup he ld o nly if it does no t pu nish co nd uc t “inno ce nt o rinno cu o us in itsel f” an d the la w is d es ign ed fo rt he pr o t ec t io n o f t he pu blic healt h and saf ety an d has
no co mmon law bac kgr ou nd that i nc l uded a parti cul ar cri m i na l i nten t).

CONCLUSION For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e find no sol i d re as on to d

ep art f rom our pr ece dent in Carpenter, Wright , K.C. , Zaremb a , and Wick

. Applying that precedent to this

case, we concl

ude that defen

dant me t her bu r de n o f sh o win g t ha t se ct io n 1 6G –1 5( a) ( 7) is fa cia lly
un co nst it ut io na l. We empha size t hat ou r r ulingdoes not a f f ec t an y of t he o t he rpr o visio ns o f t he I de nt it y Th eft La w, inc lud in g th os e contain ed i n s ec ti ons 16G –15 (a) (1) thr

ough (a) (6) . Be ca

us e s ec ti on 16G–15(a)(7) ai

ms at t he la udabl e goal of c omba

ting i dentity theft, we encourage the le gis la

ture t o consider

cur ingthe constitutional

defec t in the p ro vision. We ther efore a ffi

rm t he judg ment o f the circu it co ur t of Kane Co un t y, wh

i ch f oun d s ecti on 16 G– 15 (a)(7 ) to be unconsti tut iona l under bot h the stat e and federal constitut ions.

Af fi rmed.