In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐3846

CLAUDIA MANLEY and

NOEL MANLEY,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

BRUCE LAW and

HINSDALE TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 86,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15‐CV‐7499 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2017 — DECIDED MAY 10, 2018

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit

Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. American politics is not for the

thin‐skinned. In this case, a dispute between an elected school

board member and a student outside a high school play esca‐

lated quickly. The school board launched an investigation into

the board member’s alleged bullying of the student. The
2 No. 16‐3846

board member and her husband filed this lawsuit, originally

to try to stop the investigation. After that did not work, the

plaintiffs asserted that the school board and superintendent

violated their federal constitutional rights by conducting the

investigation and publicly criticizing the board member for

her handling of the dispute with the student. The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs tell us, pro‐

tects their emotional well‐being and entitles them to feel that

the government treated them fairly. We affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing the case.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Because the plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judg‐

ment against them, we view the facts in the light reasonably

most favorable to them, giving them the benefit of all infer‐

ences drawn from the evidence in the record. Brunson v. Mur‐

ray, 843 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2016). This does not mean, how‐

ever, that we vouch for the objective truth of all the facts pre‐

sented. Id.

Plaintiff Claudia Manley was a member of the school

board for Hinsdale Township High School District 86 in Du‐

Page County, Illinois. In the winter of 2015, the district was

preparing for a contested election in April for three school

board seats. Manley was not up for reelection, but her allies

on the board were. On the evening of March 12, 2015, Manley

got into a verbal altercation with a student who was leaf‐

letting for Manley’s political opponents outside a high school

play. Manley insisted that the leafletting violated school board

policy.

The altercation between Manley and the student sparked

a wider controversy. The student accused Manley of bullying,
No. 16‐3846 3

and a wave of support for the student crashed against Manley.

The night of the incident, the student’s parents called Manley

and left her several voicemails. When those messages were

not returned, the student and her parents pursued a public

campaign to embarrass Manley that included online petitions,

newspaper articles, and comments at public meetings, all

aimed at removing Manley from her position on the board.

As the pressure increased, the school district’s superinten‐

dent, defendant Bruce Law, began an investigation into Man‐

ley’s behavior outside the play. After Law announced the in‐

vestigation, Manley and her husband Noel filed suit in state

court to enjoin the investigation.

No injunction was issued, and the investigation ended

with no change in Manley’s legalrights orlegal status. Manley

has alleged bias and unfairness on the part of the board, the

superintendent, and his investigator, but the investigation

ended with nothing more than a public report finding that

Manley violated a board policy calling for “mutual respect,

civility and orderly conduct” at school events. The board

adopted the investigative report’s findings and formally ad‐

monished Manley for violating the board’s policy and for

overstepping her authority in attempting to enforce unilater‐

ally the district’s leafletting policy. Manley is no longer on the

school board, but not because of district action against her.

She decided not to seek reelection in 2017.

As these events unfolded, the Manleys’ lawsuit evolved in

state court from an action to enjoin the investigation to a suit

seeking a declaratory judgment that numerous alleged proce‐

dural irregularities violated state and local law. The amended
4 No. 16‐3846

complaint, however, also sought damages that “might, for ex‐

ample, be awarded pursuant to the remedies provided by

42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Based on this reference to relief under a federal statute for

alleged federal constitutional violations, the defendants re‐

moved the suit to federal court. The plaintiffs fought to sup‐

port their federal claims. Both sides moved for summary

judgment, and the district court granted the defendants’ mo‐

tion. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to offer evi‐

dence of a required element of a due process claim: the depri‐

vation of a constitutionally recognized liberty or property in‐

terest. The district court also found that Noel Manley lacked

standing to assert his federal claims. With no remaining ques‐

tions of federal law and no diversity of citizenship between

the parties, the district court declined to exercise supple‐

mental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims

through 28 U.S.C. § 1367, remanding the remaining claims to

state court. Plaintiffs have appealed. We review de novo the

district court’s grant of summary judgment. Brunson, 843 F.3d

at 704.

II. Analysis

Bitter disagreements and harsh words are not new to

American politics. Nearly two centuries ago, Tocqueville

wrote that in American politics, “electioneering intrigues, the

meanness of candidates, and the calumnies of their opponents

... are occasions of enmity which occur the oftener, the more

frequent elections become.” Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democ‐

racy in America 125 (Henry Reeve trans., 1862). The legal sys‐

tem leaves most of these matters to the political process, not

the courts.
No. 16‐3846 5

The Constitution does not guarantee good feelings or reg‐

ulate manners in political disputes. Toward the ends of liberty

and self‐rule, the Constitution’s embrace of free speech and

popular elections ensures robust and sometimes even rude

public discourse. These side effects of liberty and representa‐

tive government are well‐known. If the transient evils of “an

election accidentally severs two friends, the electoral system

brings a multitude of citizens permanently together .... Free‐

dom produces private animosities, but despotism gives birth

to general indifference.” Id. at 125.  

These insights form the foundation of New York Times Co.

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Supreme Court de‐

scribed “a profound national commitment to the principle

that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,

and wide‐open, and that it may well include vehement, caus‐

tic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government

and public officials.” Id. at 270. More recently, Justice Scalia

observed that public accountability for political acts “fosters

civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.” Doe v.

Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg‐

ment). That courage is needed because of the sometimes

harsh and unfair attacks on public officials and candidates. As

we said, American politics is not for the thin‐skinned, even, or

perhaps especially, at the local level.

Neither does the Constitution forbid official investigations

carried out by public officials, even when undertaken for po‐

litical reasons. Framer and Justice James Wilson found in our

tradition the power of legislators to act as “grand inquisitors

of the realm.” James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and

Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, in

3 The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, L.L.D. 199, at
6 No. 16‐3846

219 (1804). Writing of the British House of Commons, he ob‐

served: “The proudest ministers of the proudest monarchs

have trembled at their censures; and have appeared at the bar

of the house, to give an account of their conduct, and ask par‐

don for their faults.” Id.

Congress has assumed that investigative power over pub‐

lic officials since the Nation’s birth. See David P. Currie, The

Constitution in Congress at 20–21, 163 (1997); Kilbourn v. Thomp‐

son, 103 U.S. 168, 189–90 (1881) (“[T]he Constitution expressly

empowers each House to punish its own members for disor‐

derly behavior.”). In the First Congress, the House of Repre‐

sentatives decided it had authority to investigate the Superin‐

tendent of Finance of the United States under the Articles of

Confederation. James Madison supported the investigation,

saying that the legislature “should possess itself of the fullest

information in order to doing justice to the country and to

public officers,” 2 Annals of Cong. 1515 (1790), and Madison’s

view prevailed. In its early years, Congress exercised this

power in other circumstances, often investigating and criticiz‐

ing Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s administration of the

Treasury Department. See 3 Annals of Cong. 899–906 (1793);

4 Annals of Cong. 465–466 (1794). If Congress may investigate

and censure public officials for political purposes, a local

school board’s admonishment of a member is not likely to be

the stuff of constitutional violation. Against this backdrop, we

proceed to the specific legal questions at hand.

A. Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clause imposes basic procedural obliga‐

tions on the government—in most cases, prior notice and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard—before it deprives a per‐

son of life, liberty, or property. Cleveland Board of Education v.
No. 16‐3846 7

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). When a state or local gov‐

ernment violates these obligations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may au‐

thorize an award of damages against the government and/or

its officers. These damages may include compensation for in‐

tangible emotional harm and even nominal damages where

no actual injury occurs. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64,

266 (1978). This does not mean, however, that every person

who suffers harm traceable to procedurally questionable gov‐

ernment actions can recover damages from the government.

Before a plaintiff can recover any damages at all, he or she

must first establish that a due process violation occurred. See

Carey, 435 U.S. at 266; Babchuk v. Indiana University Health, Inc.,

809 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 2016). To establish a violation, the

plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a liberty or

property interest at issue in the case. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.

693, 711 (1976); Babchuk, 809 F.3d at 969.

Procedural due process does not protect every conceivable

legal interest. The doctrine requires that the interest meet

three requirements relevant to this case. First, the affected in‐

terest must have a foundation in state or federal positive law.

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 710–11 & n.5. Second, the interest

must be a freestanding entitlement and not contingent on

post‐injury administrative or judicial processes for recogni‐

tion. Id. at 712. Third, the interest must itself be substantive

rather than procedural in nature. Cromwell v. City of Momence,

713 F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 2013); Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424,

1426 (7th Cir. 1989).  

The Manleys argue here that the investigation and repri‐

mand impaired three interests that should be protected under

the Due Process Clause: a feeling of fair‐dealing on the part of

the government; their mental and emotional well‐being; and
8 No. 16‐3846

entitlement to processes mandated by the state and the dis‐

trict itself. Each of these interests fails at least one of the re‐

quirements for a viable due process claim.

1. Fair Dealing by the Government

The plaintiffs claim a liberty interest in “a feeling that the

government has dealt with [them] fairly.” To the extent the

plaintiffs identify a positive law basis for this purported inter‐

est, they claim it resides in the procedural component of the

Due Process Clause. They do not base any claim on any sub‐

stantive aspect of due process. As Paul v. Davis makes clear,

however, the procedural component of the Due Process

Clause does not provide substantive rights itself. 424 U.S. at

701 (procedural due process does not “ex proprio vigore extend

to [plaintiffs] a right to be free of injury wherever the state

may be characterized as the tortfeasor”). The plaintiffs’ argu‐

ment that they have a liberty interest in a feeling of fair‐deal‐

ing through the clause itself fails.  

The plaintiffs have not directed us to cases recognizing a

protected liberty or property interest in a feeling that the gov‐

ernment is dealing fairly with anyone. They rely on the Su‐

preme Court’s statement in Carey v. Piphus that “a purpose of

procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling

that the government has dealt with him fairly.” 435 U.S. at 262.

From this statement, the Manleys argue that if a law has a cer‐

tain purpose, “it follows logically that the result is an ‘interest’

protected by the law.” That conclusion does not follow from

the premises. An “interest” in procedural due process doc‐

trine is not an amorphous “interest” in the general meaning

of that word. As far as we know, no court has gone so far as

to say, as the plaintiffs argue, that the United States Constitu‐
No. 16‐3846 9

tion requires state and local government officials to avoid up‐

setting other public officials and candidates affected by their

actions or words. This unprecedented theory’s threat to robust

public debate is obvious. The district court properly rejected

it.

2. Emotional Well‐Being

The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants deprived

them of a protected liberty interest in their emotional well‐

being. Emotional well‐being, unlike the more elusive subjec‐

tive feeling of fairness, is recognized in state law, at least in

some situations. States protect limited personal interests in

emotional well‐being through the torts of intentional and neg‐

ligent infliction of emotional distress and through compensa‐

tory damages for emotional distress tied to other tort liability.

See, e.g., Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 77 N.E.3d 50 (Ill.

2016). This limited interest has not been recognized as an in‐

dependent liberty interest protected by due process.

Procedural due process protects only interests that are

freestanding entitlements protected against injury or depriva‐

tion, independent of procedural protections granted by law.

The Supreme Court made this clear in Paul v. Davis when it

held that procedural due process does not protect reputa‐

tional interests because Kentucky did not create a freestand‐

ing “legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation” al‐

tered by the state’s branding that individual an active shop‐

lifter. 424 U.S. at 711. Instead, the Court explained, an individ‐

ual’s “interest in reputation is simply one of a number which

the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law,

providing a forum for vindication of those interests by means

of damages actions.” Id. at 712.
10 No. 16‐3846

The same is true here. Illinois does not create a freestand‐

ing legal guarantee of present enjoyment of emotional well‐

being. Instead, it protects people from certain negligent and

intentional actions that injure them. E.g., Schweihs, 77 N.E.3d

50. Any legal protection of emotional well‐being is contingent

on tort doctrines. When a tortious injury causes physical

harm, compensatory damages are available for harm to emo‐

tional well‐being, but when a tortious act causes no physical

harm, emotional damages are available only if the act was ex‐

treme or outrageous and undertaken with the knowledge and

intent that the action would likely result in severe emotional

harm. Id. at 59, 63. Since plaintiffs must prove these injuries

and damages in court, the substantive restrictions of tort law

and the procedural requirements of the state judicial process

shape whatever liberty interest might be derived from the

plaintiffs’ claim.  

The nature of this process itself determines what process

might be due to the plaintiffs here: access to the courts to pur‐

sue a tort claim against the defendants. The Manleys have not

argued that any defendant or the state itself has deprived

them of the ability to pursue these claims. If the plaintiffs be‐

lieve they have viable claims under state law, they may be able

to pursue them in state court.

To support their claims to a federally protected liberty in‐

terest in emotional well‐being, the plaintiffs again rely on

Carey v. Piphus. In that case, the Supreme Court determined

that students who received lengthy school suspensions with‐

out an opportunity to respond to the charges against them

could recover damages for this due process violation even if

in the end the suspensions were justified. 435 U.S. at 249–50,
No. 16‐3846 11

262–63. To recover damages exceeding a nominal sum, how‐

ever, the students had to show that they suffered compensa‐

ble harm traceable only to the denial of a hearing—that is, to

the due process violation itself—and not traceable to justified

suspensions. Id. at 263.  

The plaintiffs misread the case in two ways. First, Carey

did not decide whether a due process violation occurred, let

alone whether people have a right to a hearing before the gov‐

ernment takes action that upsets them. The case decided only

the availability of certain damages once a due process viola‐

tion has been established. Id. at 262–64. The defense in Carey

simply did not contest the district court’s holding that a

school’s suspension of students without procedural protec‐

tions violated due process. Id. at 251 n.5. This points to plain‐

tiffs’ second error. The underlying liberty interest in Carey was

not emotional well‐being, as the plaintiffs argue, but a state

entitlement to public education that the Court recognized as

a protected liberty interest in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

No similar entitlement is involved in this case.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Alston v. King, 231 F.3d 383 (7th Cir.

2000), is also misplaced. The plaintiff in Alston was a city offi‐

cial whose employment contract entitled him to a hearing be‐

fore he could be fired. He was fired summarily, without the

promised hearing, and he ultimately showed both a breach of

contract and a due process violation. We held that the district

court had erred in limiting the due process damages to nom‐

inal damages, at least as a matter of law, because the plaintiff

had offered at least some evidence that the denial of a hearing

was itself humiliating. Id. at 389. The underlying due process

violation in Alston was not contested or decided on appeal,

however. See Alston v. King, 157 F.3d 1113, 1116–17 & n.5 (7th
12 No. 16‐3846

Cir. 1998) (opinion from earlier appeal). Alston did not hold

that emotional distress alone is sufficient to prove a denial of

due process, which is plaintiffs’ theory in this case.

3. Procedural Interests

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the school

district did not follow board policy or state procedural law in

the investigation. To the extent that the plaintiffs maintain the

school district denied them a constitutional right to these le‐

gally prescribed processes, their claim fails. Even when re‐

quired by statute or ordinance, purely procedural rules of

state and local law give rise to constitutionally protected in‐

terests only when the mandated procedure contains within it

a substantive liberty or property interest. Cromwell, 713 F.3d at

364. In other words, the federal Constitution does not enforce

compliance with state procedural rules. E.g., Swarthout v.

Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 221–22 (2011) (per curiam) (due process

does not require federal courts to review “the application of

all state‐prescribed procedures in cases involving liberty or

property interests”).

For example, a government promise that an employee can

be fired only for good cause creates a substantive property

right in secure employment, whether or not the government

provides procedures to enforce that right. Id. By contrast, a

rule that “merely provides procedures to be followed does not

include a substantive right” if the procedures protect nothing

more than employment that can be terminated at will. Miyler

v. Village of East Galesburg, 512 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2008); ac‐

cord, e.g., Cain, 879 F.2d at 1426 (“It is by now well‐established

that in order to demonstrate a property interest worthy of

protection under the fourteenth amendment’s due process
No. 16‐3846 13

clause, a party may not simply rely upon the procedural guar‐

antees of state law or local ordinance.”). The plaintiffs have

identified no substantive liberty or property interest attached

to the procedural rules they claim the district violated.  

B. Remaining Matters

The plaintiffs also argue that the federal Declaratory Judg‐

ment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, provides authority to adjudicate

their due process claim. That Act offers no independent basis

for the plaintiffs’federal claims. The lack of a protected liberty

or property interest defeats those claims on the merits, re‐

gardless of the nature of the relief sought. To the extent the

plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment of their rights under

state law, the federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides no

basis for doing so. The Act provides no independent source

of federal subject‐matter jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). The district court

wisely chose to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state‐law claims, and the plaintiffs have

not challenged that decision on appeal.

Finally, the district court gave lack of standing as an alter‐

native reason for dismissing Noel Manley’s claims. It is clear

that Claudia Manley has standing and that Noel’s claims all

derive from hers. Deciding whether Noel’s federal claims fail

on the merits or for lack of standing would make no differ‐

ence. No relief is available to Noel under federal law. We need

not decide more here. The district court’s judgment is  

AFFIRMED.