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302 Nebraska Report

CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

Chase County, a political subdivision of 

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. City o

Imperial, a political subdivision

the State of Nebraska, appellan

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 8, 2019. No. S-17-813.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary 

judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

party against whom the judgment was granted and gives such party the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

2. Declaratory Judgments: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from a 

declaratory judgment, an appellate court, regarding questions of law, has 

an obligation to reach its conclusion independently of the conclusion 

reached by the court below.

3. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The interpretation 

of statutes and regulations presents questions of law, in connection with 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.

4. Declaratory Judgments: Justiciable Issues. Declaratory judgments 

are available when a present actual controversy exists, all interested 

persons are parties to the proceedings, and a justiciable issue exists for 

resolution.

5. Justiciable Issues. A justiciable issue requires a present, substantial 

controversy between parties having adverse legal interests susceptible to 

immediate resolution and capable of present judicial enforcement.

6. Declaratory Judgments: Justiciable Issues. At the time that the declaration is sought, there must be an actual justiciable issue from which the 

court can declare law as it applies to a given set of facts.

7. Declaratory Judgments. A declaratory judgment action can afford no 

relief to one who has failed to pursue a full, adequate, and exclusive 

statutory remedy.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/22/2019 01:05 AM CDT
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302 Nebraska Report

CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, 

Pirtle, Riedmann, and Bishop, Judges, on appeal thereto 

the District Court for Chase County, David W. Urbom, Judge

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed with directions.

Joshua J. Wendell, of McQuillan & Wendell, P.C., L.L.O., 

for appellant.

Arlan G. Wine, Chase County Attorney, for appellee.

Andre R. Barry and Nathan D. Clark, of Cline, Williams, 

Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for amicus curiae League 

of Nebraska Municipalities.

Katharine L. Gatewood, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for 

amicus curiae Sarpy County.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, 

Freudenberg, J

Funke, 

The issue presented is which governmental agency, under 

Nebraska’s statutory scheme, is financially responsible for 

medical services received by a person who is arrested, detained, 

taken into custody, or incarcerated. The district court found that 

the City of Imperial, Nebraska (Imperial), was responsible for 

the payment of $436 in medical costs incurred by an arrestee. 

The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 

decision and determined Chase County, Nebraska (Chase), to 

be the responsible party. Upon further review, we determine 

that declaratory judgment is not available, because the record 

does not show the existence of a justiciable controversy. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with directions to 

reverse and vacate the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 24, 2016, an 

Imperial police officer arrested an individual for disturbing 
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

the peace and transported him to the Chase County jail for 

booking. Because the arrestee was heavily intoxicated and 

belligerent and was unable to answer questions during the 

booking process, the jail personnel requested that the arrestee 

be medically cleared before he was admitted into the jail facility. The arresting officer transported the arrestee to the Chase 

County hospital for a physical examination, which indicated 

that the arrestee had no medical conditions that would endanger another person or himself if placed in the jail. Shortly after 

midnight, the arresting officer returned the arrestee to the jail 

with a medical authorization form, the arrestee cooperated with 

the booking process, the agencies completed a custody authorization form, and the admission process was finalized.

Following these events, the hospital submitted a medical bill 

in the amount of $436 to Chase, and later to Imperial. Each 

party declined payment and contended that the other party was 

responsible for the payment.

District Cou

Chase filed an action for declaratory judgment in district 

court and moved for summary judgment, seeking a determination that Imperial was solely responsible for the medical 

charges. The district court granted the motion based on its 

interpretation of Nebraska’s statutory scheme governing the 

payment of medical services for persons who are arrested, 

detained, taken into custody, or incarcerated.1 The court 

also based its decision on the “Standards for Jail Facilities” 

regulations.2

The court’s order laid out the relevant statutory provisions, 

beginning with § 47-701(1), which provides: “Notwithstanding 

any other provision of law, sections 47-701 to 47-705 shall 

govern responsibility for payment of the costs of medical services for any person ill, wounded, injured, or otherwise in need 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 47-701 to 47-705 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2016).

2 See 81 Neb. Admin. Code, chs. 1 (2014) and 4 (2012).
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

of such services at the time such person is arrested, detained, 

taken into custody, or incarcerated.” Section 47-702 sets forth 

that the recipient of the medical services, or the individual’s 

insurer or another available source, is primarily responsible 

for the payment of medical services. Upon a showing that 

the recipient or its insurer cannot pay the medical provider 

in whole or in part, § 47-703(1) provides that “the costs of 

medical services shall be paid by the appropriate governmental 

agency.” The district court proceeded to determine whether 

Chase or Imperial was “the appropriate governmental agency” 

to be held responsible for the medical costs.

The first sentence of § 47-703(2) provides that medical 

services necessitated by injuries or wounds suffered during the 

course of apprehension or arrest shall be paid by “the apprehending or arresting agency and not the agency responsible for 

operation of the institution or facility in which the recipient of 

the services is lodged.” The second sentence of § 47-703(2) 

provides that “[i]n all other cases, the appropriate governmental agency shall be the agency responsible for operation of the 

institution or facility in which the recipient of the services is 

lodged . . . .”

The court determined that the medical charges were not for 

injuries suffered during the arrest and were not for medical 

services required for an individual confined in jail. The court 

articulated that “[t]he determining factor to transfer the obligation from the arresting agency to the facility receiving the 

prisoner rests on the term ‘lodged.’”

The court relied on a dictionary to define the word “‘lodged’ 

as (a) to provide temporary quarters for; [or] (b) to establish 

or settle in place.” The court also considered 81 Neb. Admin. 

Code, ch. 1, § 002.26, which defines “inmate” as “[a]ny individual confined or residing in any jail facility,” as well as 81 

Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, § 002.01B, which provides:

Persons who are unconscious, seriously injured or those 

persons who appear to present a substantial risk of serious harm to another person or a substantial risk of serious 
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

harm to themselves within the near future as defined by 

the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act shall not be 

admitted to the jail facility unless examined and approved 

for admission by a medical authority or a licensed mental 

health authority.

The court found that “a person is not ‘lodged’ in jail until 

such person has been accepted by the facility after the person 

and the arresting officer have complied with all requirements 

for acceptance, including any medical examination of the 

arrested person.” The court therefore concluded that Imperial 

was responsible for paying the $436 medical bill to the hospital. Imperial appealed.

Court of Appeal

On appeal, Imperial assigned that the district court erred, 

restated and reordered, in (1) determining that the arresting 

agency is responsible for the arrestee’s medical costs when 

the jailing agency required that the arrestee receive the care 

prior to lodging the arrestee in the jail and (2) considering the 

Nebraska jail standards regulations.

The Court of Appeals determined that the language of 

§ 47-703(2) was clear and unambiguous and that therefore, it 

was precluded from looking beyond the words of the statute 

to construe its meaning.3 As a result, the court determined that 

consideration of and reference to the Nebraska jail standards 

regulations was unnecessary and prohibited.4

The court interpreted the language of § 47-703(2) and 

found the first sentence of that section inapplicable, because 

the arrestee did not require medical services as a result of 

an injury or wound suffered during the course of the arrest. 

The court then construed the second sentence of § 47-703(2) 

and found that sentence applied in this case. The court did so 

3 See Chase County v. City of Imperial, 26 Neb. App. 219, 918 N.W.2d 631 

(2018).

4 Id.
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

by emphasizing the phrase “[i]n all other cases.” The court 

reasoned that based upon the clear language of § 47-703(2), 

“the costs of medical services are chargeable to the agency 

responsible for operation of the correctional facility where the 

recipient is lodged in all cases where medical services were not 

necessitated by injuries or wounds suffered during the course 

of apprehension or arrest.”5

The Court of Appeals rejected Chase’s contention that 

Imperial was responsible for the medical costs due to the 

fact that the services were rendered before the arrestee was 

admitted into the jail. The court stated that the application of 

§§ 47-701 and 47-702 “is not limited to only those arrestees 

who are ultimately lodged into a correctional facility.”6 Under 

its interpretation, the court did “not read § 47-703(2) to require 

lodging the arrestee into the facility as a condition precedent 

to holding [Chase] responsible for medical costs.”7 Rather, 

the court viewed “the phrase ‘facility in which the recipient 

of the services is lodged’ to describe the governmental agency 

that operates the facility rather than to limit its responsibility 

for payment.”8 The court supported its statutory interpretation 

by reasoning that Chase’s position would allow a county “to 

circumvent payment for medical services for any person who 

is arrested, detained, or taken into custody by requiring medical services for that individual prior to completing the booking process.”9

Petition for Further R

In its petition for further review, Chase assigns, restated, 

that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) concluding that a jailing 

agency’s obligation to pay the incurred medical costs begins 

5 Id. at 224, 918 N.W.2d at 635.

6 Id. at 225, 918 N.W.2d at 636.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 226, 918 N.W.2d at 636.

9 Id.
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

“‘at the time such person is arrested, detained, taken into custody, or incarcerated’” and (2) concluding that the phrase “‘in 

all other cases’” means that medical services are chargeable 

to the jailing agency even when an arrestee receives medical 

services prior to being lodged in the jail facility.

Imperial contends that the Court of Appeals was correct 

in determining that § 47-703(2) is clear and unambiguous. 

Imperial agrees with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the 

statute creates two discrete categories of circumstances regarding the payment of medical services for an arrestee: (1) when 

an arrestee requires medical care as the result of an injury 

sustained during the course of apprehension or arrest, in which 

event the arresting agency must provide payment, or (2) “all 

other cases,” in which event the lodging agency must provide 

payment. Imperial argues that preexisting intoxication falls 

into the category of “all other cases.” Imperial further argues 

that Chase is financially responsible, because Chase made the 

request for the medical services.

We granted Chase’s petition for further review. Sarpy County 

filed a brief as amicus curiae in which it stated that it currently 

is in receipt of a hospital payment demand under circumstances 

factually similar to this case. Sarpy County argues that the 

Court of Appeals’ interpretation failed to recognize that there 

is “an evident statutory gap in § 47-703(2) for situations where 

1) an arrestee is not lodged in a facility and 2) the cause of 

[the] wound or injury did not occur as the result of the arrest 

or apprehension.”10 Sarpy County argues that § 47-703(2) is 

silent regarding an agency’s financial responsibility for medical 

services in those two situations and that the Court of Appeals 

erred by filling the gap rather than leaving the matter for 

the Legislature.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Chase assigns on petition for further review, restated, that 

the Court of Appeals erred in (1) concluding that Chase’s 

10 Brief for amicus curiae Sarpy County at 7.
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Cite as 302 Neb. 395

obligation to pay the incurred medical costs began “‘at the 

time such person is arrested, detained, taken into custody, or 

incarcerated’” and (2) concluding that the phrase “‘in all other 

cases’” means that medical services are chargeable to the jailing agency even when the recipient of the medical services was 

not then lodged in the jail.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-3] In reviewing a summary judgment, the court views the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 

the judgment was granted and gives such party the benefit of 

all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.11 In an 

appeal from a declaratory judgment, an appellate court, regarding questions of law, has an obligation to reach its conclusion 

independently of the conclusion reached by the court below.12

The interpretation of statutes and regulations presents questions of law, in connection with which an appellate court has 

an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective 

of the decision made by the court below.13

ANALYSIS

[4-6] Declaratory judgments are available when a present 

actual controversy exists, all interested persons are parties to 

the proceedings, and a justiciable issue exists for resolution.14

A justiciable issue requires a present, substantial controversy 

between parties having adverse legal interests susceptible to 

immediate resolution and capable of present judicial enforcement.15 A declaratory judgment action cannot be used to determine the legal effects of a set of facts which are future, 

11 Ray Anderson, Inc. v. Buck’s, Inc., 300 Neb. 434, 915 N.W.2d 36 (2018).

12 See id.

13 Woodmen of the World v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 299 Neb. 43, 907 

N.W.2d 1 (2018).

14 Board of Trustees v. City of Omaha, 289 Neb. 993, 858 N.W.2d 186 

(2015).

15 Id.
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contingent, or uncertain.16 At the time that the declaration is 

sought, there must be an actual justiciable issue from which 

the court can declare law as it applies to a given set of facts.17

Declaratory relief cannot be used to obtain a judgment which 

is merely advisory.18

[7] This court has consistently recognized that a declaratory judgment action should not be entertained where another 

equally serviceable remedy is available.19 A declaratory judgment action can afford no relief to one who has failed to pursue 

a full, adequate, and exclusive statutory remedy.20

In this matter, Chase sought a declaration as to which 

of the parties under this set of facts is the “appropriate 

governmental agency” responsible for the costs of medical 

services under § 47-703(2). However, as explained above, 

the statutory scheme the parties ask this court to interpret 

places primary responsibility on the recipient or the recipient’s insurer.21 Neither the parties, the district court, nor the 

Court of Appeals considered whether, under § 47-702, the 

arrestee or his insurer, if any, could pay the medical provider 

in whole or in part.

Section 47-703(1) provides that “[u]pon a showing that 

reimbursement from the sources enumerated in section 47-702 

is not available, in whole or in part, the costs of medical services shall be paid by the appropriate governmental agency.” 

The parties made no showing that the recipient or his insurer 

could not pay for the medical costs, and as a result, the 

analysis cannot proceed to declare the parties’ rights under 

§ 47-703(2).

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Nesbitt v. Frakes, 300 Neb. 1, 911 N.W.2d 598 (2018).

19 See, Mansuetta v. Mansuetta, 295 Neb. 667, 890 N.W.2d 485 (2017); 

Bentley v. School Dist. No. 025, 255 Neb. 404, 586 N.W.2d 306 (1998).

20 Boettcher v. Balka, 252 Neb. 547, 567 N.W.2d 95 (1997).

21 See §§ 47-702 and 47-703(1).
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

The required showing under § 47-703(1) is not onerous. 

Section 47-703(1) indicates that the provider of services shall 

submit an affidavit to the agency stating:

(a) in the case of an insurer, health maintenance organization, preferred provider organization, or other similar 

source, a written denial of payment has been issued or 

(b) in all other cases, efforts have been made to identify 

sources and to collect from those sources and more than 

one hundred eighty days have passed or the normal collection efforts are exhausted since the medical services 

were rendered but full payment has not been received.

Section 47-703(1) indicates there is a low threshold regarding 

the adequacy of the affidavit by stating that “[i]n no event shall 

the provider of medical services be required to file a suit in a 

court of law or retain the services of a collection agency to 

satisfy the requirement of showing that reimbursement is not 

available pursuant to this section.”

No allegations within Chase’s complaint or any of the evidence adduced on the motion for summary judgment make 

the necessary showing under § 47-703(1). At argument before 

this court, Chase admitted that it did not make a showing 

to the district court that the recipient lacked the ability to 

pay and Imperial admitted that it knew Chase did not fulfill this requirement and did not raise an argument based on 

§ 47-703(1) as a defense in district court. Because the requirements of § 47-703(1) were not satisfied, there was no showing 

that the “appropriate governmental agency” is liable for medical costs under § 47-703(2).

Though we appreciate the importance of this case to the 

parties and the far-reaching effects it may have on other 

governmental agencies, no justiciable controversy presently exists regarding the parties’ rights under § 47-703(2). 

A determination of responsibility under § 47-703(2), absent 

the necessary showing under § 47-703(1), would be purely 

advisory. In addition, based on the record, we must conclude that there remains for the parties an adequate statutory 
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CHASE COUNTY v. CITY OF IMPERIAL

Cite as 302 Neb. 395

remedy under §§ 47-702 and 47-703(1). Declaratory judgment 

is not available.

We are aware that this may be a case of last impression 

regarding the parties’ competing positions under § 47-703(2). 

There are two different bills to amend § 47-703 currently 

before the Legislature22; one of which identifies the very factual scenario now before us.

CONCLUSION

 We conclude that declaratory judgment is unavailable due 

to the lack of a justiciable controversy between the parties. In 

addition, declaratory judgment cannot provide the parties a 

remedy, because a statutory remedy is available. We reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals with directions to reverse 

and vacate the judgment of the district court.

Reversed with directi

Papik, J., not participating

22 See 2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 216, § 1, and L.B. 455, § 2.