## NO. 12-08-00060-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

MANDELL RHODES

, JR., § APPEAL F ROM THE 349TH APPELLANT V. JAMES POLAND, CHARLES

SHIPMA N, § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF PAM ELA FREEM

AN , L YNN RU ZI CKA, ELV IS HIGHTOWE

R, GERA LD GARRETT, THOMAS F ORDYC

E, PAUL KIE

L, R. GARC IA, CH ARLES SPEIR , AND HO WARD TH

RASHE R, APP ELL EES § AN DE RSO N C OU NTY, TE XAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Mandell Rhodes, Jr., an inmate in the Texas De p ar t m ent of Criminal J ustice-Institut ional Di vis ion (“ TD CJ”) , p ro c e e din g pr o s e , filed an in f or ma pa up e ris suit ag ainst Parole Commissi oners Jame s Po land , Cha

rl e s Shi pma

n, Pame la F re e man, L y

nn Ruzi c ka , E lvi s H ig hto we r, Ge ra ld G arr e tt, Th oma s F or dyc e , Pa

ul K ie l, R . G arc ia , Ch a rl e s Sp e ir , a

nd Ho wa rd Th ra sh e r ( c oll ect ive ly “Appe llees”)

. I n two issues, Rhodes argues that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion by dismiss ing his su it. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND Rhodes is an inmate. Whil e incar cer ated, Rhodes f iled an in f or ma pa up e ris c ivi l su it a g a ins t Ap pe lle e s se e kin g a

de c larator

y jud g me nt t

hat T e xas Govern men t Co de , s e c tio n 5 08 .0 44 1 is
un c on sti tut ion a l and

that App e lle e s are , the re fo re , d ive ste d o f t he ir a uth or ity to d e te rm ine his pa

ro leSee Act s 1983, 68t h Le g . , p. 6681, S. J. R. N o. 13. 1

In his p e tit io n fo r d e c la ra to ry j u d g m e n t, R h o d e s sta te s tha t he ha s sta n d ing to b rin g this su it b e c a u se his 2 p aro l e w as re vo ke d o n J uly 2 1 , 2 0 0 6 b y certain p aro l e c o m m i ssi o ne rs. R hodes f ur t her al l ege s t hat he was su b se q u e n tly d e n ie d a “n e w p a ro le ” b y o the r p a ro le c o m m issio n e rs . 2 e lig ibi lity or re vo ke h is parol e . In h is p e tit ion , Rh od e s a lle g e d th a t se c tio n 5 08 .0 44 1 is unconstitutional because it c onflicts with the 1983 amendment to a rticle I V, sec tion 11 of the Texas 1 Con sti tut ion , w hic h, a c c or din g to R ho de s, “ [ve sts ] t

he po we r to de te rm ine pa ro le s ‘ e xclu siv e ly ’ t o ‘B oard me mbers[.] ’” Thus , Rh o d e s contends that sec tion 508.0441 conflicts with article IV, sec tion 2 11 beca use sec tion 508.0441 vests “parole commissioners” with “the c lemency power to determine pa ro le s[.]” I n c on

jun c tio n w ithhis or ig ina l pe tit ion , Rh od e s f ile d a de c laratio n o f p re vio us laws uit s, in which he de signated three previously filed ac tions. On Janu ary 25 , 2 00 8, wi tho ut c on du c tin g a he ari ng , the tr ia l cou rt fo un d that Rhod e s’ s su it was fr ivolo u s or malicious and dismissed it. I n its order, the tria l court found that f rom Rhodes’s aff idavit of previous filing s, “the c laim is subst antially simil ar to pre vi o u s claims” broug ht by Rhodes and that the “ rea listi c cha nce of ultimate succe ss is sli g ht.” This appea l followed.

C O N STITU TIO N A LITY O F T EX A S G OV ERN M ENT C ODE , S E CT I ON 508.0441 I n h i s f i r s t an d s e c o n d i s s u e s , Rh o d e s ar g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rt e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g his lawsuit pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedie s Code, section 14.003. W e re view the tria l court’s dismissal of an in f or ma pa up e ris suit under an a buse of discret i o n s t an dard. Hickson v. Moya , 9 26 S.W. 2d

39 7, 39 8 ( Te x. Ap p. –Wa c o 1 99 6, no wr it) . Atr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if it acts arbitra

rily , capr iciously , and without ref ere nce to a

ny g uiding r ules or princ iples. Le ntwo rth v. Trahan , 981 S.W .2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 1998, no pet.). The trial courts are g iven broa d discretion to deter mine whether

a ca se should be dismiss ed beca use (1) prisoners have a strongincentive to litigate; (2) the g overnme nt bear s the cost of a n i n f o rm a p au pe ris suit; (3) sanctions ar e not eff

ective; and (4) the dismiss al of unmeritorious claims acc rues to the be nefit of state off icials, cou rt s , an d meritorious claimants. See Montan a v. Patterson , 894 S.W .2d 812, 814–15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1994, no wr it). I n th e ins tant c a se , the tr ia l c ourt ma de a fi nd ing in its or de r of dis mis sa l that “ the c la im i sW e h av e interp reted t he all eg ati o ns in R ho d es’s p eti t i o n for d ec l ara t o ry jud gm en t l i b era l l y i n the int ere st 3 of j us t i ce. 3 su bs tanti a lly

sim ila r t o p re vio us c la ims ” br ou g ht b y Rho de s and that th e “ re a lis tic c ha

nc e of ult imate
succe ss is slight.” Howeve r, we will aff irm a dismissal if it was proper under a ny leg al theory

. See Johns on v

. Lynaugh , 7 96 S.W. 2d

70 5, 70 6– 07 (T e x. 19 90 ); Birdo v . Ame nt , 814 S.W .2d 808, 810 (Tex. App.–Waco 1991, writ denie d). Rho de s so ug ht a

de c larator

y jud g me nt t

hat T e xas G ov e rnme nt C od e , s e c tio n 5 08 .0 44 1 is unconstitutional in l ight of the 1983 amendment to a rticle I V, section 11 of the Texas Consti tution. Compare T EX
. C O N ST . art. IV, § 11 with T EX
. G OVT
. C ODE ANN
. § 50 8. 04 41 (V e rn on 20 04 ). Ar tic le I V, se c tio n 1 1 s tate s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

(b) In al l cri m i nal cases, excep t t reason and i m p eachm ent , t he G o vernor shal l have p o wer, af t er convict i o n, on t he wri t t en si gned recom m end at i o n and ad vi ce o f th e B o a rd o f P ardo ns and P aroles , or a m ajo ri t y t hereo f , t o grant rep ri eves and c o m m ut at i o ns o f punis hm ent and pa rdo ns; and un der s uch r ul es as t he Legi s l at ur e may pre s cr i be, an d upon t he wr i t t en r ecomm endat i on an d advi ce o f a m ajo ri t y of t he B o ard o f P ardo ns and P aroles , he s hal l have t he p o wer t o remit fi nes and f or f ei t u r es . T h e G ov er n or s h al l h av e t h e powe r t o g r an t on e r epr i ev e i n an y ca pi t al ca s e f or a pe r i od not t o exc eed t hi r t y ( 30 ) day s ; an d he s hal l ha ve po wer t o re voke condi t i onal par do ns . W i t h t he advi ce a n d c o n se n t o f t h e L e g islatu re , he m a y gr a n t r e p rie v e s, c o m m u ta tio n s o f p u n ish m e n t an d p a rd o n s in cases o f t reason.
T EX
. C O N ST
. art I V, § 11. Section 508.0441 provides, in per tinent part, that “[b]oard members a nd parol e c o mm is s io n e r s ” s h a ll d e te r mi n e w h ic h inmate s ar e to b e r e le a s e d o np ar o le o r

mandatory supe r v is io n a s w e ll a s d e te r

mi n a ti o n s r e g ar d in g th e c o n ti nu a ti o n , mo d if ic a ti o n , an d r e v o c ation of parole or mandatory

supervision. See T EX
. G OVT
. C ODE ANN . § 508.0041(a) (1), ( 4) (Ve rnon 2004). I n h is p e tit ion

fo r d e c larato ry

jud g me nt, Rho de s a

rgue s th a t si nc e se c tio n 5 08 .0 04 1 g ra nts
cer tain authority to “par ole commi ssioners,” it conflicts with article I V, sec tion 11, which provides that the g overnor

acts upon the advice of

the “B oard of

Pardons and Par oles, or a ma jority there of,” to gr ant repr ieves and commutations of punishment a nd pardons. Howeve r, “pa role” means “ the 3 dis c re tio na

ry and c on dit ion a l r e le a se of

an e lig ibl e inm a te se nte nc e d to the ins tit uti on a l di vis ion

so that the inmat e may

serve the re mainder of

the inmate’s se ntence under the supervision of the pardons a nd parole s division.” T EX
. G OVT
. C ODE A NN
. § 508.001(6) (Ve rnon 2004). A “r eprie ve” is a “[t] empora

ry relief from or postponeme nt of execution o f cr i m inal punishment or sentenc e.”4

B LACK ’ S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 1302 (6th ed. 1990). It does no more than sta y the execution of a sentenc e for

a time, and it is ordinarily an act of clemency extended to a prisoner to affor d him an opportunity

to procure some amelioration of the s en tence imposed. Id. I t di ff e rs fr om a commutation, which is a re duction of a se ntence , and fr om a par don, which is a pe rmane nt
canc ellation of a se ntence

. I d. ; see also B LACK ’ S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 280 (6th ed. 1990) ( defining “commutation”) . Neither parole nor mandat o ry s upervision is a commutation of sente nce or any other for m of cleme ncy . T EX
. G OVT
. C ODE ANN
. § 5 0 8.002 (Ve rnon 2004). As suc h, Rhodes’s argument is without m erit bec ause article I V, s ection 11 makes no provision perta ining to the gr ant
or re vocatio n of par ole. Consequently , section 508.0441 is not in conflict with article IV, sec tion 11 . T he re fo re , w e ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in dis mis sin g Rho de s’ s su it. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN . § 14 .0 03 (a )( 2) , ( b) (V e rn on 20 02 ); Johns on , 796 S.W .2d at 706–07. Rhodes’s first a nd second issues a

re ove rruled.

D I S P OS I T I ON Havingoverr

uled Rhodes’s first a n d s ec ond issues, we af fi rm the trial cour

t’s order of dis mis sa l.



### S AM GRI FF I T H J ustice

Opinion delivere d October 8, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)