UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NATHANIEL SHAREEF MANNING,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,

Senior District Judge. (1:98-cr-00128-JAB-1)

Submitted: May 19, 2015 Decided: June 1, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Eric Lloyd Iverson, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Shareef Manning appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing 

him to 12 months’ imprisonment and 12 months of supervised 

release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. Following our careful 

review of the record, we affirm.

A district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and 

imposing a term of imprisonment is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th 

Cir. 1999). The district court need only find a violation of a 

condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the 

evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v. 

Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Manning violated the conditions of his supervised release, as 

the evidence presented at the hearing supported the district 

court’s finding that Manning committed two new state crimes.

Counsel questions whether the sentence imposed is 

reasonable. “A district court has broad discretion when 

imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” 

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We 
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will affirm a revocation sentence if it falls within the 

prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. Id. 

In making this determination, we first consider whether the 

sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable, 

applying the same general considerations employed in review of 

original criminal sentences. United State v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we find the sentence 

unreasonable will we consider whether it is “plainly so.” Webb, 

738 F.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court considered the Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory 

policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors 

applicable to the supervised release revocation context, see 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e); Webb, 738 F.3d at 641, and provided sufficient 

explanation for the sentence imposed, see United States v. 

Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Our 

review of the record reveals no procedural or substantive error 

by the district court. We thus conclude that Manning’s sentence 

is not plainly unreasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and 

have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Manning, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Manning requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Manning.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the material before this 

court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED