[Cite as State v. Moiduddin, 2019-Ohio-3544.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

UNION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 14-18-15 

 v. 

MOHAMMED MOIDUDDIN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2017 CR 0238 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: September 3, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Terry L. Hord for Appellant 

 Gary D. Andorka for Appellee 
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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the July 18, 2018 

judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to 

suppress evidence of defendant-appellee, Mohammed Moiduddin (“Moiduddin”), 

and dismissing the indictment against him. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

{¶2} This case stems from a stop of an automobile on US 33 in Union 

County, Ohio. (Doc. No. 36). In the early morning hours of September 3, 2017, 

Trooper Dorian Byers (“Trooper Byers”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed 

a vehicle traveling eastbound on US 33 at a low rate of speed. (Id.); (Apr. 5, 2018 

Tr. at 32). After pacing the vehicle at a slow speed for a period of time, Trooper 

Byers activated his overhead lights and effected a stop of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 

36). On approaching the passenger side of the vehicle, Trooper Byers noticed that 

the driver, Moiduddin, displayed indicators of intoxication. (Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 30-

31). Trooper Byers then asked Moiduddin to exit the vehicle and proceeded to 

subject him to field sobriety testing. (Id. at 31-33). Although a portable breath test 

failed to detect the presence of alcohol in Moiduddin’s system, Moiduddin’s 

performance on a number of the field sobriety tests administered by Trooper Byers 

was unsatisfactory, which prompted Trooper Byers to arrest him on suspicion of 

operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs. (Id. at 36-37); (Defendant’s Ex. 

B). Thereafter, while inventorying the contents of Moiduddin’s vehicle, Trooper 
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Byers discovered a small plastic bag filled with a white, powdery substance and a 

separate black bag with a label that read “Analytical Sample.” (Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 

39-40); (Defendant’s Ex. B). Chemical analyses later revealed that the bags 

contained substances that are substantially structurally similar to 4-

methoxymethamphetamine and phencyclidine. (State’s Ex. 1). 

{¶3} On October 30, 2017, the Union County Grand Jury indicted 

Moiduddin on three counts: Count One of operating a vehicle under the influence 

of a drug of abuse in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), (G)(1)(a), a first-degree 

misdemeanor, and Counts Two and Three of aggravated possession of drugs in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), fifth-degree felonies. (Doc. No. 1). On 

November 29, 2017, Moiduddin appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to 

the counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 7). 

{¶4} On January 31, 2018, Moiduddin filed a motion to suppress evidence. 

(Doc. No. 18). In support of his motion, Moiduddin argued that his rights under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of 

the Ohio Constitution were violated when Trooper Byers stopped his vehicle. (Id.). 

In particular, Moiduddin contended that Trooper Byers did not have probable cause 

or reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for a violation of R.C. 4511.22, Ohio’s 

slow-speed statute. (Id.). 
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{¶5} A hearing on Moiduddin’s motion to suppress was held on April 5, 

2018. (See Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 1). On April 12, 2018, Moiduddin filed his postsuppression-hearing brief. (Doc. No. 31). On April 20, 2018, the State filed its 

response to Moiduddin’s post-suppression-hearing brief. (Doc. No. 34). That same 

day, the State filed an amended response to Moiduddin’s post-suppression-hearing 

brief. (Doc. No. 35). 

{¶6} On July 18, 2018, the trial court granted Moiduddin’s motion to 

suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 36). Specifically, the trial court concluded that 

Trooper Byers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop 

Moiduddin for a violation of R.C. 4511.22. (Id.). The trial court also concluded 

that the stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was not permissible under the community 

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. (Id.). 

Finally, after granting Moiduddin’s suppression motion, the trial court also 

dismissed the indictment. (Id.). 

{¶7} On August 17, 2018, the State filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 37). 

It raises one assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court failed to apply the law of communitycaretaking/emergency-aid function to the facts that exist in the 

hearing on the motion to suppress evidence and then based on the 

suppression of the evidence the trial court sua sponte dismissed 

the case in its entirety. 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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{¶8} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by 

granting Moiduddin’s motion to suppress evidence. It further argues that the trial 

court erred by sua sponte dismissing the indictment against Moiduddin. With 

respect to the trial court’s grant of Moiduddin’s motion to suppress evidence, the 

State notes that Trooper Byers was reasonably concerned for Moiduddin’s wellbeing because of the unusually slow speed at which Moiduddin was operating his 

vehicle. Specifically, the State asserts that Trooper Byers was concerned that 

Moiduddin’s vehicle may have been mechanically impaired or that Moiduddin was 

suffering from a “medical episode.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). Furthermore, the 

State notes that Trooper Byers was also concerned that Moiduddin and other 

motorists on the highway were imperiled by the presence of Moiduddin’s slowmoving vehicle in fast-moving traffic. (Id. at 11-14). The State argues that, given 

these concerns, Trooper Byers’s stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was constitutionally 

valid because Trooper Byers was exercising a “community caretaking” function 

when he stopped Moiduddin’s vehicle. (Id. at 10-15). Regarding its contention that 

the trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing the indictment, the State argues that 

because the dismissal was apparently based on the trial court’s supposedly 

erroneous decision to grant Moiduddin’s motion to suppress, its decision to dismiss 

the indictment was also erroneous. (Id. at 5-6). We turn first to the State’s argument 

that the trial court erred by granting Moiduddin’s motion to suppress, followed by 
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the State’s argument that the trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing the 

indictment. 

{¶9} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of 

law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a 

suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is 

in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See 

State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a 

motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact 

if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State 

v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of 

law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently 

determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. 

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). 

{¶10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied 

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 

provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

Furthermore, Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 

and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 

be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 

be searched, and the person and things to be seized. 

“Historically, the protections afforded by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 

Constitution have been construed as coextensive with the protections of the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution,” with limited exceptions. State v. 

Box, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-371, 2017-Ohio-1138, ¶ 17, citing State v. 

Geraldo, 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 125-126 (1981), State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 

239 (1997), and State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 434 (2000). See, e.g., State v. 

Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, ¶ 23 (“Article I, Section 14 of the 

Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment against 

searches and seizures conducted by members of law enforcement who lack authority 

to make an arrest.”). “‘The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose 

a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement 

officers in order to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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arbitrary [governmental] invasions.”’” State v. Kerr, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-01, 

2017-Ohio-8516, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 592 (9th 

Dist.1995), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979). “‘The 

Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it 

merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.’” Id., quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 

500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991), citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990). “Thus, ‘[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

reasonableness.’” Id., quoting Jimeno at 250. 

{¶11} In this case, Trooper Byers’s stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle potentially 

implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by 

the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 

‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning” of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), citing Prouse at 

653, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074 (1976), 

and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975). 

Accordingly, “[a]n automobile stop is * * * subject to the constitutional imperative 

that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Id. at 810. While probable 

cause to believe that a motorist has committed a crime is a “complete justification 

for a traffic stop,” a traffic stop need not be supported by probable cause to satisfy 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 23. Rather, a traffic stop is reasonable, and thus 

constitutionally permissible, if a law enforcement officer has “a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to 

commit a crime,” including a traffic violation. Id. at ¶ 7, citing Prouse at 663 and 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), quoting BrignoniPonce at 881; State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-592, 2014-Ohio-712, ¶ 

10. 

{¶12} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable 

suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s 

freedom of movement].’” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-17-05, 2017-Ohio5845, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988), quoting Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). “‘Reasonable suspicion entails some 

minimal level of objective justification for making a stop—that is, something more 

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but less than the level 

of suspicion required for probable cause.’” Kerr at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Ramos, 

155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-Ohio-6535, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 70 

Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27. “‘The “reasonable 

and articulable suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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individual factors themselves.’” (Emphasis sic.) Smith, 2017-Ohio-5845, at ¶ 9, 

quoting Mays at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio2204, ¶ 19. “‘[T]hese circumstances are to be viewed through the eyes of the 

reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they 

unfold.’” Kerr at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991), 

citing United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976) and State v. Freeman, 

64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295 (1980). 

{¶13} With respect to the circumstances surrounding Trooper Byers’s stop 

of Moiduddin’s vehicle, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 

At 4:09 a.m. on the morning of September 3, 2017, Trooper Byers was 

on stationary patrol on US 33 near milepost 18 facing eastbound 

traffic when he observed [Moiduddin’s] vehicle travelling at a speed 

which he estimated to be 45 mph. Trooper Byers asked Trooper 

Austin to clock the vehicle and Trooper Austin clocked the vehicle by 

laser at 35 mph. The speed limit in that area was 70 mph. There was 

no posted slow speed limit. Trooper Byers pulled out and fell in 

behind the vehicle for a pace clock of the vehicle. He testified that he 

did not recall the vehicle’s speed as a result of the pace clock. The 

vehicle was traveling in the right hand (slow) lane and the vehicle 

never strayed from its marked lane * * *. The vehicle’s slow speed 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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caused Trooper Byers to activate his lights. Trooper Byers testified 

that when he activated his lights, the vehicle pulled over immediately. 

The trooper observed the traffic in the area to be light. There was no 

testimony that [Moiduddin’s] vehicle was blocking or impeding the 

flow of any traffic. 

(Doc. No. 36). In addition, the trial court found that “there was no showing that 

[Moiduddin] committed any other traffic infraction * * *.” (Id.). Competent, 

credible evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings concerning Trooper 

Byers’s stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle. See State v. Craw, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-

17-09, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 36, citing State v. Thompson, 7th Dist. Jefferson Nos. 98 

JE 28 and 98 JE 29, 2001 WL 69197, *5-6 (Jan. 24, 2001). 

{¶14} At the April 5, 2018 suppression hearing, Trooper Byers testified that 

he was on patrol on September 3, 2017 at approximately 4:09 a.m. when a vehicle 

caught his attention because it “was traveling at an unusual[,] * * * low rate of 

speed.” (Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 26-28). He stated that he visually estimated that the 

vehicle was traveling “close to about 45 miles per hour.” (Id. at 27). Trooper Byers 

testified that because his view of the vehicle was obstructed, he asked a fellow 

trooper to use a laser speed gun to determine the speed of the vehicle. (Id.). Trooper 

Byers testified that the laser reading showed that the vehicle was actually moving 

at a speed of 35 miles per hour. (Id. at 27-28). 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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{¶15} Trooper Byers indicated that he was concerned about the vehicle 

because at “[t]hat time of day and at the 70 mile per hour zone, you hardly will ever 

see a vehicle traveling at that low rate of speed. And if they are, it could be a 

possible medical episode or somebody is having vehicle issues.” (Id. at 28). He 

reiterated that he was “[a]bsolutely” concerned that the driver of the vehicle could 

have been suffering from a medical problem or that they were otherwise impaired. 

(Id. at 29). He also testified that the vehicle’s slow speed caused him concern for 

the safety of other motorists and that he deemed the driving to be unsafe. (Id. at 29, 

36). 

{¶16} Trooper Byers testified that he pulled out of the “cross over” to catch 

up to the vehicle and “just paced him right there at about the same speed.” (Id. at 

28). Although he could not recall the speed at which the vehicle was traveling while 

he paced it, he did testify that the vehicle was moving “very slow.” (Id. at 29). 

Trooper Byers testified that he eventually activated his blue emergency lights and 

effected a stop of the vehicle. (Id.). He identified Moiduddin as the driver of the 

slow-moving vehicle. (Id. at 31). 

{¶17} On cross-examination, Trooper Byers initially testified that he 

believed that it was raining when he stopped Moiduddin’s vehicle, but upon being 

presented with a copy of the traffic ticket he issued to Moiduddin, he acknowledged 

that the ticket stated that there were no adverse weather conditions at the time of the 
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stop. (Id. at 42, 44); (Defendant’s Ex. A). He further testified that traffic was light 

on the morning of the stop, that the stop was executed in a rural area, that the 

highway featured two eastbound lanes, and that there was no posted minimum speed 

limit. (Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 44-45). Trooper Byers stated that there were no cars 

between Moiduddin’s vehicle and his cruiser while he paced Moiduddin’s vehicle 

and that, “[o]ther than a few cars that passed [him]” while he was pacing Moiduddin, 

there was no other traffic on US 33. (Id. at 45). According to Trooper Byers, 

Moiduddin was operating his vehicle in the right-hand lane, and he was neither 

impeding nor blocking traffic. (Id. at 45-46). 

{¶18} Trooper Byers stated that as he paced Moiduddin’s vehicle, he did not 

observe Moiduddin weave in his lane, commit any marked lane violations, or 

commit any traffic violation other than what Trooper Byers believed to be a slowspeed violation. (Id. at 45-46). He testified that the reason he stopped Moiduddin’s 

vehicle was for a slow-speed infraction in violation of R.C. 4511.22. (Id. at 44). 

When questioned about his earlier statement that he was concerned that the driver 

of the vehicle could have been in the midst of a “medical episode,” Trooper Byers 

conceded that his statement of facts summarizing the events of September 3, 2017 

did not mention “any concern about [Moiduddin] possibly having a medical 

episode.” (Id. at 52); (Defendant’s Ex. B). 
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{¶19} Finally, on redirect-examination, Trooper Byers agreed with the 

State’s proposition that “[i]f a car had come up fast behind this other vehicle driven 

by Mr. Moiduddin, and a car was going the registered speed of 70 miles per hour, 

and Mr. Moiduddin was going 35 miles per hour,” there would “have been an 

unreasonable situation that [Trooper Byers] could have prevented.” (Apr. 5, 2018 

Tr. at 55). 

{¶20} On these findings, the trial court first concluded that Trooper Byers 

did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Moiduddin’s vehicle for 

a violation of R.C. 4511.22(A): 

Given the facts presented by the testimony of Trooper Byers, the fact 

that there was no evidence presented that any traffic was impeded or 

obstructed, and that there was no showing that [Moiduddin] 

committed any other traffic infraction, the State has failed to make a 

prima facie showing that [Moiduddin’s] conduct violated the elements 

of O.R.C. 4511.22(A) on its face.1

 Because Trooper Byers failed to 

establish a prima facie violation of the statute, his suspicion of 

 

1

 R.C. 4511.22(A) provides: “No person shall * * * operate a vehicle * * * at such an unreasonably slow 

speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when stopping or reduced 

speed is necessary for safe operation or to comply with law.” Courts have generally interpreted the statute 

to require evidence of actual impediment or obstruction of traffic. State v. Bahen, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

16AP-65, 2016-Ohio-7012, ¶ 25-26; State v. Dean, 5th Dist. Licking No. 12-CA-60, 2013-Ohio-313, ¶ 14. 
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criminal activity was unreasonable. Accordingly, there was no basis 

for the investigative traffic stop. 

(Doc. No. 36). 

{¶21} The State concedes that Trooper Byers had neither probable cause nor 

reasonable suspicion to stop Moiduddin’s vehicle for a violation of R.C. 4511.22.2

 

(See Appellant’s Brief at 10-11). Given that it is undisputed that Moiduddin was 

not operating his vehicle on a part of the highway with a posted minimum speed 

limit3

 and that Moiduddin’s vehicle did not impede or obstruct traffic, we do not 

second-guess the State’s concession. Instead, the State argues that the judgment of 

the trial court granting Moiduddin’s suppression motion should be reversed because 

the trial court erred by concluding that the stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was not valid 

under the community caretaking exception. 

{¶22} After concluding that the stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was not 

supported either by probable cause or by reasonable suspicion of a violation of R.C. 

4511.22, the trial court proceeded to determine whether the “caretaker exception to 

the warrant requirement” supported Trooper Byers’s stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle. 

 

2

 The State also conceded this point at the trial-court level. (See Doc. Nos. 34, 36). 3

 A driver may also violate R.C. 4511.22 by operating their vehicle at a speed which is less than a posted 

minimum speed limit: “Whenever the director of transportation or local authorities determine on the basis 

of an engineering and traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a controlled-access highway, 

expressway, or freeway consistently impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the director or 

such local authority may declare a minimum speed limit below which no person shall operate a motor vehicle, 

trackless trolley, or street car except when necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.” R.C. 

4511.22(B). 
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(Doc. No. 36). In its analysis, the trial court relied on State v. Dunn, a case in which 

the Supreme Court of Ohio held: 

The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement allows a law-enforcement officer 

with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an 

immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent 

serious injury to effect a community-caretaking/emergency-aid stop. 

131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 26. In concluding that the community 

caretaking exception did not supply a valid basis for Trooper Byers’s stop of 

Moiduddin’s vehicle, the trial court found that the “totality of the circumstances * 

* * d[id] not suggest that there was an immediate need for assistance to protect life 

or prevent serious injury.” (Doc. No. 36). The trial court concluded that although 

Moiduddin “was driving at a very slow speed,” “he did not violate O.R.C. 4511.22 

and slow speed alone does not create a reasonable belief that there was an 

immediate need for assistance to prevent death or serious injury.” (Id.). 

{¶23} The State argues that the stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was permissible 

under the community caretaking exception because Trooper Byers was reasonably 

concerned that Moiduddin’s vehicle was mechanically impaired or that Moiduddin 

was suffering from a “medical episode.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11-12). It further 

contends that the stop was a valid exercise of Trooper Byers’s function as 
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community caretaker because “operating a vehicle at such slow speed presented 

concern for other motorists’ safety on US 33” even though Moiduddin’s driving did 

not amount to a violation of R.C. 4511.22. (Id. at 11-12). In response, Moiduddin, 

relying almost entirely on Dunn, argues that the trial court correctly determined that 

the community caretaking exception is not applicable to the facts of this case 

because “Trooper Byers did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe that 

there was an immediate need for his assistance to protect life or prevent serious 

injury to justify the stop.” (Appellee’s Brief at 5). Moiduddin asserts that this case 

“involve[s] the stop of a vehicle by show of authority and is different from coming 

upon a vehicle that is already stopped to inquire whether there is a need of 

assistance.” (Id.). Finally, Moiduddin submits that “[Trooper Byers’s] conduct of 

pacing the vehicle for a significant amount of time is contrary to any belief of 

immediate need for assistance.” (Id. at 6). 

{¶24} Before evaluating the merits of the parties’ arguments, we feel it 

necessary to review the origins of the community caretaking exception and the 

development of the doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States first 

acknowledged the community caretaking exception in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 

U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523 (1973). In that case, Dombrowski was involved in a singlevehicle accident in rural Wisconsin. Id. at 435-436. At the scene of the accident, 

Dombrowski informed local police officers that he was a Chicago police officer. Id. 
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at 436. Believing that Chicago police officers were required by regulation to carry 

their service revolvers with them at all times, local police officers looked for 

Dombrowski’s service weapon on his person. Id. Failing to find a weapon on 

Dombrowski’s person, one of the local police officers looked into the front seat and 

glove compartment of Dombrowski’s vehicle; however, the officer did not find a 

revolver. Id. Thereafter, local police officers had the disabled vehicle towed to a 

privately owned garage where it was left outside without a police guard. Id. After 

Dombrowski was formally arrested for drunken driving and taken to the hospital, 

one of the local police officers drove to the private garage to search for 

Dombrowski’s revolver in the wrecked automobile. Id. at 436-437. During the 

search for Dombrowski’s weapon, which was conducted without a warrant, the local 

police officer unlocked the trunk of the vehicle, where he discovered evidence 

linking Dombrowski to a murder—a crime for which he was eventually convicted. 

Id. at 437, 439. 

{¶25} In upholding the constitutionality of the search of Dombrowski’s 

vehicle, the court observed: 

Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and 

also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become 

disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of 

police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such 

contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has 

violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. 

Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate 

vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and 

engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as 

community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 

criminal statute. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 441. The court concluded that the justification for the 

search of Dombrowski’s vehicle, “concern for the safety of the general public who 

might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the 

vehicle,” was “constitutionally reasonable.” Id. at 447. Acknowledging its previous 

“recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places,” the 

court held that “the type of caretaking ‘search’ conducted * * * of a vehicle that was 

neither in the custody nor on the premises of its owner, and that had been placed 

where it was by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely because 

a warrant had not been obtained.” Id. at 447-448. 

{¶26} Since Dombrowski, “an overwhelming majority of lower federal 

courts and state courts have consistently described and applied the [community 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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caretaking] doctrine as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement.” State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 682 (Tenn.2016), fn. 9 

(collecting cases). See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 644 Pa. 27, 58-60 (2017) 

(collecting cases). While many courts have limited application of the exception to 

its original context—searches (and occasionally seizures) of automobiles—some 

courts have extended the doctrine to permit warrantless entries into and searches of 

the home.4

 Compare, e.g., Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir.2010) 

(“We * * * interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in [Dombrowski] as being 

expressly based on the distinction between automobiles and homes for Fourth 

Amendment purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify 

warrantless searches of a home.”) with, e.g., State v. Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, 363 

(2010) (“[U]nder certain circumstances a reasonably exercised community 

caretaker function may permit a warrantless entry into a home * * *.”). As the 

doctrine has developed, “the community caretaking rubric has become ‘a catchall 

for the wide range of responsibilities that police officers must discharge aside from 

their criminal enforcement activities.’” MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 

8, 12 (1st Cir.2014), quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 

(1st Cir.1991). Consequently, it is unsurprising that courts have struggled to 

 

4

 Because this appeal involves the stop of an automobile on a public highway, we do not concern ourselves 

with the question of whether the community caretaking doctrine should extend beyond the context of 

automobiles to residences. 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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consistently frame the scope of the exception and differentiate it from other Fourth 

Amendment exceptions. 

{¶27} As explained by the First Circuit Court of Appeals: 

[C]ourts do not always draw fine lines between the community 

caretaking exception and other exceptions to the warrant requirement. 

The juxtaposition between the community caretaking exception and 

the emergency aid exception furnishes an apt illustration of this 

overlap. Some courts have treated emergency aid as a freestanding 

exception to the warrant requirement. Others have classified 

emergency aid as “a subcategory of the community caretaking 

exception.” People v. Ray, 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 

928, 933 (1999). Indeed, some courts have held that giving the 

community caretaking exception a life in the home independent and 

apart from the emergency aid exception “would render the 

emergency-aid doctrine obsolete.” [State v.] Vargas, [213 N.J. 301,] 

63 A.3d [175,] at 189 [(2013)]. The other side of the coin is that some 

courts continue to insist on a sharp line of demarcation between the 

emergency aid exception and the community caretaking exception. 

The same sort of disarray is evident in the manner in which courts 

have attempted to define the interface between the exigent 
Case No. 14-18-15 

-22- 

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and the 

community caretaking exception. For example, some courts “apply 

what appears to be a modified exigent circumstances test, with 

perhaps a lower threshold for exigency if the officer is acting in a 

community caretaking role.” Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d at 176. Other 

courts steadfastly maintain that the exceptions are not congruent and 

must be analyzed and applied distinctly. 

Given the profusion of cases pointing in different directions, it is 

apparent that the scope and boundaries of the community caretaking 

exception are nebulous. 

(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Id. at 13-14. The First Circuit’s observations are 

addressed specifically to the extent to which those courts that extend the community 

caretaking exception to warrantless searches of the home blend the community 

caretaking exception with the emergency aid and exigent circumstances exceptions 

in that context. However, the community caretaking exception has also been 

correlated with the emergency aid and exigent circumstances exceptions in the 

context of automobile stops. See, e.g., United States v. Toussaint, 838 F.3d 503, 

507 (5th Cir.2016). 

{¶28} Amidst this doctrinal uncertainty, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided 

State v. Dunn, the case the trial court used to conclude that the stop of Moiduddin’s 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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vehicle was not valid under the community caretaking exception. In Dunn, a law 

enforcement officer received a dispatch that a suicidal man driving a tow truck was 

in possession of a weapon and intended to kill himself when he arrived at a specified 

address. 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, at ¶ 2. En route to the given address, 

the law enforcement officer spotted the tow truck. Id. at ¶ 3. He then executed a 

traffic stop of the tow truck, later finding a loaded firearm in the glovebox of the 

tow truck. Id. at ¶ 4-5. Dunn was subsequently indicted on one count of improper 

handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and he moved to suppress evidence on 

grounds that the traffic stop violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 

¶ 7. The trial court overruled Dunn’s motion to suppress but the trial court’s ruling 

was subsequently reversed on appeal. Id. at ¶ 8-9. 

{¶29} In reversing the appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio 

stated: “There are a number of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement, including the one applicable to this case, the community-caretaking 

exception, which courts sometimes refer to as the ‘emergency-aid exception’ or 

‘exigent-circumstance exception.’” Id. at ¶ 15. The court noted that the Supreme 

Court of the United States had referred to the community caretaking exception as 

the “emergency-aid exception” and that its own precedents discussed the exception 

under the term “exigent circumstances” rather than “community caretaking.” Id. at 

¶ 18-20, citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546 (2009), Brigham City 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006), Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 

S.Ct. 2408 (1978), and State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348 (1994). According to 

the court, the “community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement is necessary to allow police to respond to 

emergency situations where life or limb is in jeopardy.” Id. at ¶ 21. 

{¶30} On its face, Dunn appears to stand for the proposition that “community 

caretaking” is synonymous with “emergency aid” or assistance rendered under 

“exigent circumstances.” See id. at ¶ 15. However, examining the cases of the 

Supreme Court of the United States cited in Dunn and the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 

own precedents, there is good reason to believe that, whatever overlap might exist 

between the community caretaking, emergency aid, and exigent circumstances 

exceptions, the concepts are not entirely interchangeable. 

{¶31} First, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relied 

on by the court in Dunn do not limit application of the community caretaking 

exception to instances where law enforcement officers possess an objectively 

reasonable belief that they must intervene immediately in order to protect life or 

prevent injury. Importantly, Dombrowski, the source of the community caretaking 

doctrine, did not itself involve an “emergency” or “exigency” of the type present in 

Dunn. In Dombrowski, the justification for the warrantless search of Dombrowski’s 

vehicle was “concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) 

413 U.S. at 447. Thus, it was law enforcement’s interest in neutralizing the 

possibility of harm, rather than its need to respond to the probability of imminent 

injury or death, that justified the warrantless search. Furthermore, in subsequent 

applications of Dombrowski, the court held that, pursuant to the community 

caretaking function, law enforcement officers may impound vehicles and conduct 

standardized inventory searches of those vehicles. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 

367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 

(1976). Neither of these cases was decided on the basis that impounding and 

inventorying the vehicles were reasonable because law enforcement officers were 

presented with an urgent need to intervene to prevent injury or death. Instead, 

impounding and inventorying the contents of the vehicles were justified by a 

generalized interest in “guard[ing] the police from danger” posed by potential 

hazards in the vehicles as well as interests in “protect[ing] [the] owner’s property 

while it [was] in the custody of the police * * * [and] insur[ing] against claims of 

lost, stolen, or vandalized property.” Bertine at 372. Hence, the most direct 

guidance from the Supreme Court of the United States suggests that, as community 

caretakers, law enforcement officers may conduct certain searches and seizures in 

circumstances bereft of emergency or exigency. 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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{¶32} Moreover, in Dunn, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied heavily on the 

Supreme Court of the United States’s opinions in Mincey, Brigham City, and Fisher 

to support its equation of the community caretaking exception with the emergency 

aid and exigent circumstances exceptions. However, Mincey, Brigham City, and 

Fisher do not couch their holdings in terms of “community caretaking,” and the 

phrase does not appear in the opinions. In fact, the only mention in either Mincey, 

Brigham City, or Fisher to Dombrowski or any of its direct progeny is a single 

reference in Mincey to Justice Powell’s concurrence in Opperman. See Mincey, 437 

U.S. at 390, citing Opperman at 381 (Powell, J., concurring). 

{¶33} Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s pre-Dunn and post-Dunn 

jurisprudence suggests that the court itself does not limit the community caretaking 

exception to instances where law enforcement officers possess an objectively 

reasonable belief that they must intervene immediately in order to protect life or 

prevent injury. In numerous cases predating Dunn, the court, frequently relying on 

Dombrowski, Bertine, or Opperman, recognized that law enforcement officers may 

impound vehicles and conduct inventory searches in their roles as community 

caretakers. E.g., Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, ¶ 11. 

Likewise, after Dunn, the court acknowledged that “[i]nventory searches performed 

pursuant to standard police procedure on vehicles taken into police custody as part 

of a community-caretaking function are reasonable.” State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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165, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 21, citing Opperman at 373.5

 Finally, there are further 

indications from the post-Dunn court that the community caretaking function 

encompasses more than the administration of emergency aid. See State v. BanksHarvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 

judgment only) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized the caretaking 

function of law enforcement in relation to motor vehicles and in rendering 

emergency aid.”) (Emphasis added.), citing Dombrowski at 441, Mincey at 392, and 

Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47. 

{¶34} Therefore, although Dunn can be read to suggest that the community 

caretaking, emergency aid, and exigent circumstances exceptions are fungible, we 

believe that Dunn is better understood as representing the view that the emergency 

aid and exigent circumstances exceptions fall under the broader umbrella of 

“community caretaking.” By implication, then, there may be some actions taken by 

law enforcement officers that do not fit under the emergency aid or exigent 

circumstances exceptions but that are nevertheless justifiable because they were 

carried out in order to discharge a duty under another facet of the community 

caretaking function. 

{¶35} Returning to the parties’ arguments, Moiduddin argues that the trial 

court was correct in applying Dunn to conclude that the stop of his vehicle was 

 

5 Leak was a plurality opinion. 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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unconstitutional because “the totality of the circumstances * * * d[id] not suggest 

that there was an immediate need for assistance to protect life or prevent serious 

injury.” (Appellee’s Brief at 5-6); (Doc. No. 36). However, in light of the preceding 

discussion, we conclude that the trial court erred by relying exclusively on Dunn to 

hold that the stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was not justified under the community 

caretaking exception. Even assuming that the trial court correctly concluded that 

Moiduddin’s “slow speed alone d[id] not create a reasonable belief that there was 

an immediate need for assistance to prevent death or serious injury,” we still find 

that Trooper Byers was executing a community caretaking function when he 

stopped Moiduddin’s vehicle. Thus, we conclude that the stop of Moiduddin’s 

vehicle was permissible under the community caretaking exception. 

{¶36} As this court has previously held, “[w]hile Terry and much of its 

progeny stand for the proposition that a police officer generally needs a reasonable 

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an occupant of a vehicle is or 

has been engaged in criminal activity, nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires 

that the ‘specific and articulable facts’ relate to suspected criminal activity.” 

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 53 (3d Dist.1999). We 

concluded that to insist that every vehicle stop be supported by a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity would be to “overlook[] the police officer’s 

legitimate role as a public servant designed to assist those in distress and to maintain 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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and foster public safety.” Id. Thus, “under appropriate circumstances[,] a law 

enforcement officer may be justified in approaching a vehicle * * * without needing 

any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity * * * to carry out ‘community 

caretaking functions’ to enhance public safety.” Id. at 54. As with all searches and 

seizures, the “key to * * * permissible police action” when conducting community 

caretaking functions is reasonableness. Id. Provided that a law enforcement officer 

is “able to point to reasonable, articulable facts upon which to base her safety 

concerns,” the brief seizure of an automobile and its occupants will be deemed 

reasonable. Id. 

{¶37} While we have had difficulty locating an Ohio case endorsing the 

principle that a law enforcement officer is justified in effecting a community 

caretaking stop of a vehicle doing little more than driving at an unusually slow, 

albeit noncriminal, speed, decisions of the courts of our sister states support that 

such stops are constitutionally reasonable. See Trejo v. State, 76 So.3d 684, 689-

690 (Miss.2011) (holding that a law enforcement officer may perform a community 

caretaking stop of a motorist whose slow driving suggests that they are falling 

asleep, but concluding that driving between 58-60 miles per hour in a zone with a 

speed limit of 70 miles per hour, without more, does not support a reasonable 

inference that the driver is at risk of falling asleep); State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 

1175-1176 (2006) (“Absent reasonable suspicion, and under very limited and 
Case No. 14-18-15 

-30- 

narrow circumstances, an inquiry stop of a slow driver may also be permissible 

pursuant to the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment.”); State 

v. Rinehart, 617 N.W.2d 842, 843-844 (S.D.2000); Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 

361, 363-364 (Tex.App.1998); State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.Super 75, 77-78 (1992) 

(abnormally slow speed suggests number of objectively reasonable concerns 

including: “something might be wrong with the car * * * [and] a traffic safety 

hazard is presented to drivers approaching from the rear when an abnormally slow 

moving vehicle is operated at night on a roadway without flashers”); contra State v. 

Bacher, 170 Ohio App.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-727, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.) (community 

caretaking exception inapplicable where only apparent indication that driver might 

have been in distress was the fact that the vehicle was moving at 42-43 miles per 

hour in a zone with a speed limit of 65 miles per hour). We join these courts and 

conclude that in some circumstances, a law enforcement officer may be justified in 

effecting a community caretaking stop of an abnormally slow-moving vehicle to, at 

the very least, determine whether the vehicle is suffering from a mechanical 

malfunction and to temporarily remove the hazard of an excessively slow-moving 

vehicle from fast-moving traffic. 

{¶38} Here, Trooper Byers testified that because of the abnormally slow 

speed at which Moiduddin’s vehicle was traveling, he was concerned that 

Moiduddin’s vehicle was experiencing mechanical problems or that Moiduddin was 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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suffering from a “medical episode.” (Apr. 5, 2018 Tr. at 28-29). Trooper Byers 

also indicated that he was concerned for Moiduddin’s safety and for the safety of 

other motorists on the highway due to the risk that a much faster moving vehicle 

could collide with Moiduddin’s slow-moving vehicle. (See id. at 29, 36, 55). Thus, 

rather than basing his stop on a generalized “hunch” that the driver of the vehicle 

was in distress or that public safety was endangered, Trooper Byers articulated 

specific facts upon which his concerns were based. Although the circumstances do 

not necessarily suggest that immediate assistance was needed to prevent serious 

injury or death, the circumstances do support that Trooper Byers’s safety concerns 

were legitimate and reasonable and that he was justified in stopping Moiduddin’s 

vehicle to dispel these concerns. 

{¶39} Nevertheless, Moiduddin argues that the stop of his vehicle was not 

constitutionally valid because “[t]here is no mention of a medical episode in Trooper 

Byers’s Statement of Facts and his conduct of pacing the vehicle for a significant 

amount of time is contrary to any belief of immediate need for assistance.” 

(Appellee’s Brief at 6). Moiduddin’s argument is without merit. As the Supreme 

Court of the United States has stressed repeatedly, “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under 

the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long 

as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis sic.) 

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404, quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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98 S.Ct. 1717 (1978). Here, the circumstances, when viewed objectively, support 

that a community caretaking stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was justified to determine 

whether Moiduddin’s car was functioning properly and to briefly remove his vehicle 

from the flow of traffic, thereby fostering and enhancing public safety. Thus, the 

stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle was reasonable regardless of Trooper Byers’s 

subjective beliefs or of the fact that he hesitated in stopping Moiduddin’s vehicle. 

{¶40} Similarly, the fact that Trooper Byers testified that he stopped 

Moiduddin’s vehicle for a potential violation of R.C. 4511.22 does not defeat 

application of the community caretaking exception. Although Dombrowski speaks 

of community caretaking functions as those “totally divorced” from the detection 

and investigation of violations of criminal statutes, “[a]s an officer goes about his 

or her duties, an officer cannot always ascertain which hat the officer will wear—

his law enforcement hat or her community caretaker hat.” State v. Kramer, 315 

Wis.2d 414, 433 (2009). Consequently, law enforcement officers may encounter 

situations where both their law enforcement and their community caretaking 

functions are implicated. As noted above, an officer’s subjective motivations have 

no bearing on the question of whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment. Brigham City at 404-405. Therefore, 

so long as a police officer is able to point to specific, objective, and 

articulable facts which, standing alone, reasonably would suggest that 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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his assistance is necessary, a coinciding subjective law enforcement 

concern by the officer will not negate the validity of [a search or 

seizure] under * * * the community caretaking doctrine. 

Livingstone, 644 Pa. at 74. See McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 686-687; Kramer at 

432-435; State v. Smathers, 232 N.C.App. 120, 127-128 (2014). Under the 

circumstances, it would have been objectively reasonable for any law enforcement 

officer to perform a community caretaking stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle. 

Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether Trooper Byers’s stop of Moiduddin’s vehicle 

was partially motivated by an interest in enforcing the traffic laws. 

{¶41} In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred by holding that the stop 

of Moiduddin’s vehicle was not justified under the community caretaking exception. 

As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Moiduddin’s motion 

to suppress. 

{¶42} Having concluded that the trial court erred by granting Moiduddin’s 

motion to suppress, we now consider whether the trial court also erred by dismissing 

the indictment against Moiduddin. In this case, it appears that the trial court’s 

decision to dismiss the indictment was predicated on its assessment that, having 

granted Moiduddin’s motion to suppress, the State was left with insufficient 

evidence to prosecute Moiduddin for the crimes with which he was charged. (See 

Doc. No. 36). Given that we have determined that the trial court’s decision to grant 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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Moiduddin’s motion to suppress was in error, we have little difficulty reversing the 

trial court’s dismissal of the indictment as the ostensible basis for the dismissal has 

been fatally undermined. However, even if the trial court had been correct in 

granting Moiduddin’s suppression motion, we would still conclude that the trial 

court erred by dismissing the indictment. 

{¶43} “If a trial court finds a Fourth Amendment violation, the remedy is 

suppression of the wrongfully obtained evidence, not dismissal.” State v. Lassiter, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92278, 2009-Ohio-3893, ¶ 5. See State v. Sanders, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 12 CO 35, 2013-Ohio-5220, ¶ 13; State v. Marcum, 12th Dist. 

Butler Nos. CA2005-10-431 and CA2005-20-446, 2006-Ohio-2514, ¶ 9. Neither 

appellate courts nor trial courts “possess adequate or complete prosecutorial 

information and are [thus] unable to make an informed judgment whether sufficient 

evidence remains to prosecute.” State v. Malone, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-03-060, 2004-

Ohio-3794, ¶ 20, citing State v. Bertram, 80 Ohio St.3d 281, 284 (1997). As a result, 

“[d]ismissal of a case by the trial court after granting a motion to suppress is error 

because it deprives the state of its opportunity to determine the sufficiency of its 

own case.” Marcum at ¶ 10, citing State v. Hamilton, 97 Ohio App.3d 648, 651 (3d 

Dist.1994). After a trial court grants a motion to suppress, “[t]he state is permitted 

to determine whether it will seek a stay of proceedings to pursue a Crim.R. 12 appeal 

or alternatively proceed to a final judgment.” Id., citing Malone at ¶ 19, citing State 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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v. Fraternal Order of Eagles Aerie 0337 Buckeye, 58 Ohio St.3d 166, 169 (1991). 

“‘While the state may have a tougher row to hoe without the availability of 

suppressed evidence, it does not necessarily follow that, as a matter of law, the 

defendant is entitled to dismissal of the charge.’” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Couch, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17520, 1999 WL 961264, *5 (June 25, 1999). 

{¶44} Therefore, regardless of whether the trial court correctly or incorrectly 

granted Moiduddin’s motion to suppress evidence, the trial court erred when it 

dismissed the charges pending against Moiduddin. See Malone at ¶ 21. 

{¶45} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶46} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Judgment Reversed and 

Cause Remanded 

SHAW, J., concurs. 

/jlr 

WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶47} I concur with the majority that the trial court should not have dismissed 

the case upon granting the motion to suppress. The decision whether to proceed 

with the case without the suppressed evidence is one for the prosecutor to make. 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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However, I dissent from the majority opinion in its decision to reverse the judgment 

granting the motion to suppress. If this is a question of law being misunderstood by 

the trial court, as would permit this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court, 

then the matter should be remanded to the trial court for it to reconsider its decision 

using the correct legal standard. I fully agree with the majority that in an appropriate 

situation an officer can stop a driver for driving at a speed substantially under the 

posted limit as part of the caretaking function. However, in this case the officer’s 

testimony regarding the reasons for the stop could either support a finding that the 

stop was for the purpose of his caretaking functions or the trial court could determine 

that based upon the other facts, this claim lacked credibility. If the trial court used 

the correct standard of law, but found the officer’s claim of using the caretaking 

function was not credible, then that is a question of fact that we should not overturn 

and the judgment should be affirmed. 

{¶48} A review of the trial court’s judgment shows that the trial court 

specifically considered the possibility of the caretaking function as a basis for a stop. 

It noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio has held as follows: 

The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a lawenforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to 

believe that there is an immediate need for his or her assistance to 

protect life or prevent serious injury to effect a communitycaretaking/emergency-aid stop.
Case No. 14-18-15 

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State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 26, 964 N.E.2d 1037. The 

trial court then determined in fact that there was no evidence that suggested an 

immediate need for assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury in this case. 

{¶49} On appeal, the determination of the facts is left to the discretion of the 

trial court. State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 12, 47 N.E.3d 821. 

An appellate court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported 

by competent, credible evidence.” Id. quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 

152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, 797 N.E.2d 71. As noted above, the community 

caretaker function can be claimed as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement if the officer credibly can cite to specific facts which would lead an 

objective, reasonable person to believe that there is an immediate need for assistance 

to protect life or prevent serious injury. Slow speed alone is not sufficient for 

determining that emergency aid is required. State v. Bacher, 170 Ohio App.3d 457, 

2007-Ohio-727, ¶ 14, 867 N.E.2d 864 (holding that traveling at a speed of 22-23 

miles per hour below the posted speed limit on the interstate without other evidence 

of an emergency was insufficient to support a stop on the basis of the community 

caretaking function. 

{¶50} In this case, the trial court specifically found no such facts were 

present. The only evidence presented was a slow speed from which the officer 

testified that he thought there could be a medical issue. Tr. 28-29. However, he 
Case No. 14-18-15 

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also conceded that he did not mention that belief in his report. Tr. 52. The officer 

admitted that he pulled Moiduddin over for a slow speed violation. Tr. 44. The trial 

court determined that the officer had not presented evidence from which an 

objective, reasonable person could conclude there was an immediate need for aid. 

Although the officer stated that he was concerned about a medical issue, the trial 

court could have chosen to disbelieve this testimony as that is the province of the 

trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). The 

trial court found this case to be more like the situation in Bacher. Having found no 

factual support for “an immediate need for assistance to protect life or prevent 

serious injury”, the trial court determined that the caretaking exception to the Fourth 

Amendment did not apply in this case. Doc. No. 36. As the factual findings of the 

trial court are supported by some competent, credible evidence, this Court should 

accept the findings of fact. Leak, supra. Applying the law to those facts, I would 

affirm the judgment of the trial court as to suppression. For this reason, I 

respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.