United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TRIM-LOK, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1096

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana in No. 3:13-cv-00819-RLMMGG, Senior Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: September 7, 2017

______________________ 

 MICHAEL DAVID MARSTON, Botkin & Hall, LLP, 

South Bend, IN, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by GARRICK THEODORE LANKFORD. 

 DANIEL M. CISLO, Cislo & Thomas LLP, Los Angeles, 

CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by

CHONG WOOK PAK, MARK D. NIELSEN. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
2 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

Lifetime Industries, Inc. (“Lifetime”) appeals from the 

district court’s final judgment granting Trim-Lok, Inc.’s

(“Trim-Lok”) motion to dismiss Lifetime’s patent infringement complaint for failing to adequately allege that 

Trim-Lok either directly or indirectly infringed claims 1–6 

of U.S. Patent 6,966,590 (“the ’590 patent”). See Lifetime 

Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-819, 2016 WL 

5724451, at *3–5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016) (“Opinion”). 

For the following reasons, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Lifetime owns the ’590 patent, which generally describes a two-part seal for use in a mobile living quarters

(also referred to as a “recreational vehicle” or “RV”) with a 

slide-out room. See ’590 patent, col. 2 ll. 37–39. As the 

name implies, a slide-out room is formed by extending a 

portion of the side wall of the RV outward to create extra 

interior space. See, e.g., id. col. 2 ll. 37–51. Figure 1 of 

the ’590 patent shows an RV with the slide-out room 

extended: 

Id. fig. 1. A seal is “commonly placed along the interface 

between the slide-out room and the opening in the side-
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 3

wall of the mobile living quarters to prevent water, debris, 

and excessive air drafts from entering the interior of the 

mobile living quarters from the outside.” Id. col. 1 ll. 18–

23.

According to the patent, prior art seals had to be 

separately mounted to both the slide-out room and the 

wall of the RV, could not be easily adapted to different RV 

models, or were difficult to replace. Id. col. 1 ll. 36–38, 

51–58. The inventor explained that the claimed two-part 

seal could be “easily adapted for installation on different 

slide-out room configurations” and could be “easily assembled and installed.” Id. col. 2 ll. 12–18. Claim 1 is 

exemplary: 

1. A resilient seal used in combination with a 

mobile living quarters having a slide-out room 

defining an interior space, said mobile living 

quarters comprising a first sidewall having an 

exterior side, said first sidewall defining an 

opening through which said slide-out room is 

shifted between open and closed positions relative the first sidewall, said slide-out room including a second sidewall spaced from said 

first sidewall and an end wall defining said interior space, said end wall including a peripheral flange overlapping said first sidewall 

when said slide-out room is in its said closed 

position, said seal comprising a mounting portion attached to said first sidewall along said 

opening and a separate bulb portion, said bulb 

portion slidably connected to said mounting 

portion for comp[r]essible contact with said 

flange of said exterior wall when said slide-out 

room is in its said closed position.

Id. col. 4 ll. 7–22. Dependent claims 2–5 further limit “the 

seal and mobile living quarters of claim 1,” and independent claim 6 is directed to a “method of attaching a seal to 
4 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

a mobile living quarters having a slide-out room.” Id. col. 

4 ll. 23–64. 

On August 12, 2013, Lifetime sued Trim-Lok, alleging 

that Trim-Lok both directly and indirectly infringed the 

’590 patent. See Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1–4. Trim-Lok 

moved to dismiss the original complaint on the basis that 

Lifetime did not adequately identify the product or products that allegedly infringed. J.A. 22–33. Lifetime thus 

filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) in an attempt to 

identify the accused products. J.A. 37–43. Trim-Lok 

moved to dismiss the FAC on that same basis. J.A. 65–

84. The district court granted the motion, and also granted Lifetime leave to file a second amended complaint 

(“SAC”). J.A. 180–87. Accordingly, Lifetime filed an SAC. 

See J.A. 188–199. 

In the SAC, Lifetime alleged that in the months before it filed the original complaint, two of its engineers 

with knowledge of the ’590 patent and the Lifetime products that it covered left Lifetime and began working for 

Trim-Lok. Lifetime alleged that Andrew Busch (“Busch”), 

who participated in the design of Lifetime’s seals, left 

Lifetime on or around March 1, 2013. J.A. 190–91 ¶ 17. 

Lifetime also alleged that Daryl Torrey (“Torrey”), who 

participated in the design of manufacturing equipment 

and tooling for Lifetime’s products, left Lifetime on or 

around May 3, 2013. J.A. 191 ¶ 18. Lifetime alleged that 

within one month of Busch and Torrey leaving Lifetime, 

they began working at Trim-Lok. J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18.

Lifetime further alleged that it learned that Trim-Lok, 

for the first time, was offering for sale a two-part seal for 

an RV with a slide-out room in June 2013, soon after 

Busch and Torrey began working for Trim-Lok. J.A. 190 

¶ 16. Specifically, Lifetime alleged that Ed Ksiezopolski

(“Ksiezopolski”), a Lifetime representative, discovered a 

two-part Trim-Lok seal installed on an RV with a slideout room at a plant run by Forest River, an RV manufac-
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 5

turer, in Elkhart County, Indiana (“the Forest River 

plant”). J.A. 190 ¶ 16. 

Thus, Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok either directly or 

indirectly infringed the ’590 patent by causing the twopart seal to be installed on the RV at the Forest River

plant. Supporting its claim of direct infringement, Lifetime alleged that “[a]t least one representative, agent, or 

employee of” Trim-Lok visited the Forest River plant 

while “acting on behalf of” Trim-Lok, and “directly installed” Trim-Lok’s two-part seal onto “an RV having a 

slide-out room.” J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Lifetime alleged that the 

Trim-Lok agent installed the seal “for the purpose of test 

fitting [the seal] on a Forest River RV . . . and to solicit 

sales” of the seal to Forest River. Id. 

As for induced infringement, Lifetime alleged that 

Forest River’s “making, using, offering for sale and selling 

of an RV having the Accused Product [i.e., the two-part 

seal] constitutes infringement,” J.A. 195 ¶ 40, that TrimLok “influenced Forest River” to include the two-part seal 

in their RVs, “knowing that such combination would fulfill 

all elements of at least one claim of the ’590 patent,” J.A. 

195–96 ¶ 42, and that “employees or representatives or 

agents of [Trim-Lok] assisted in the installation, [or] 

directed the installation” of the seals, J.A. ¶ 43. Thus, 

Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok induced Forest River to 

infringe. Id. 

Concerning contributory infringement, Lifetime alleged that the two-part seal sold by Trim-Lok had only 

one purpose—for use on RVs with slide-out rooms, J.A. 

197 ¶ 55, that Trim-Lok assisted in or directed the installation of the seal on an RV, J.A. 197 ¶ 51, and that the 

seals were not staple articles of commerce suitable for 

noninfringing use, J.A. 197–98 ¶ 57. 

Trim-Lok again moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Lifetime had not adequately identified the accused product and that Lifetime had not adequately 
6 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

pleaded direct or indirect infringement. Although the 

district court determined that Lifetime had adequately 

identified the accused product, it concluded that Lifetime 

had not adequately pleaded its case. See Opinion, 2016 

WL 5724451, at *3–5. The court concluded that Lifetime 

had not adequately pleaded direct infringement because 

the claims require both a two-part seal and an RV, and 

Trim-Lok only manufactures seals. Id. at *4. The court 

rejected Lifetime’s argument that Trim-Lok had “assisted 

with the installation, directed the installation, or directly 

installed” the Trim-Lok seal as confusing liability for 

direct infringement with liability for contributory infringement, which the court characterized as imposing 

liability “based on an offer to sell a component, material, 

or apparatus.” Id. Thus, the court dismissed Lifetime’s 

direct infringement allegations.

Regarding indirect infringement, the district court 

concluded that Lifetime had not alleged “any facts from 

which intent [to infringe] could be inferred in this case.” 

Id. at *5. Instead, the court determined, Lifetime had 

only made conclusory allegations that Trim-Lok had acted 

knowingly and intentionally. Id. Accordingly, the court 

dismissed Lifetime’s allegations of indirect infringement 

as well.

The district court entered judgment against Lifetime, 

and Lifetime timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

“We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to 

state a claim under the law of the regional circuit.” 

BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility 

LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re 

Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent 

Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). In the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a 

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal 
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 7

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) is reviewed de novo. Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of 

Chi., 844 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2016). In so doing, the 

Seventh Circuit “assume[s] all well-pleaded allegations 

are true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.

In arguing that the district court erred, Lifetime contests direct and indirect infringement separately. We 

take each argument in turn, beginning with direct infringement. 

I. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT

Before reaching the merits of Lifetime’s allegations of 

direct infringement, we must first address a dispute 

relating to the pleading standard. To survive a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint must “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff meets 

this requirement if it “pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Meeting 

this requirement requires a plaintiff to do more than 

plead facts that are “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

In the past, Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms to the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Form 18”) was titled 

“Complaint for Patent Infringement” and provided a 

sample allegation of direct infringement. See Lyda v. 

CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We had

also held that compliance with Form 18 “effectively immunize[d] a claimant from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.” K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time 

Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(internal citation omitted). 
8 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

However, Form 18 was abrogated by the Supreme 

Court effective December 1, 2015. See Supreme Court of 

the United States, Order Regarding Amendments to the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29, 2015), 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(u

pdate)_1823.pdf. That order also states that it will govern 

“insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings” pending 

on that date. Id. Thus, until December 1, 2015, complaints that complied with Form 18 were “effectively 

immunized,” K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1283, from challenges to 

the adequacy of their pleading. 

Lifetime filed its SAC on October 13, 2014, J.A. 188–

99, but the district court did not issue its order dismissing 

the SAC until September 30, 2016, Opinion, 2016 WL 

5724451, at *5. Thus, the SAC was filed while Form 18 

was still in effect, but the court did not issue the order 

dismissing it until after Form 18 was abrogated. In its 

order, the court did not reference Form 18, but did repeatedly reference the Iqbal / Twombly standard. See 

Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *1–4. 

Lifetime argues that the district court erred in dismissing its direct infringement count because the court 

should have applied the requirements of Form 18, rather 

than Iqbal / Twombly. As the SAC meets the requirements of Form 18, Lifetime contends, the court erred even 

if the SAC does not meet the Iqbal / Twombly standard. 

Although Lifetime recognizes Form 18’s abrogation, it 

argues that it would not be “just and practicable” to apply 

what it views as the more rigorous Iqbal / Twombly

standard to its SAC, given the time period between when 

the SAC was filed and Form 18’s abrogation. In the 

alternative, Lifetime argues that the SAC meets the Iqbal

/ Twombly standard.

Trim-Lok responds that the Supreme Court order specifically indicates that it should be applied to pending 
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 9

cases, and that the SAC does not meet either the requirements of Form 18 or the Iqbal / Twombly standard. 

The parties assume that there is a difference between 

the requirements of Form 18 and Iqbal / Twombly; however, we have never recognized such a distinction. See KTech, 714 F.3d at 1284 (“That Form 18 would control in 

the event of a conflict between the form and Twombly and 

Iqbal does not suggest, however, that we should seek to 

create a conflict where none exists.”). In any event, we 

need not resolve the question whether there is a difference between the two standards here because, as we 

explain, the SAC met the Iqbal / Twombly standard for

pleading direct infringement. 

We now turn to the merits of the district court’s decision. Lifetime argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing its direct infringement count because the court

stated that Lifetime had to establish that “Trim-Lok knew 

about the ’590 patent in June 2013, and knew that it was 

infringing . . . that patent” to plead direct infringement, 

Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *3, but that patent infringement is a strict-liability offense. Trim-Lok responds

that the court’s dismissal of the direct infringement count 

was not predicated on Lifetime’s failure to plead 

knowledge of the patent, and thus the section of the 

court’s opinion quoted by Lifetime was taken out of context.

Although we agree with Lifetime that direct infringement is a strict-liability offense that does not require 

knowledge of the patent or intent to infringe, see Commil 

USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015), 

we also agree with Trim-Lok that the district court’s 

statement did not affect its analysis or lead to its dismissal of Lifetime’s allegations of direct infringement, see 

Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *3–4. “We sit to review 

judgments, not opinions.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip 

Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Doe v. 
10 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

Howe Military Sch., 227 F.3d 981, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(refusing to reverse discovery rulings where they “did not 

make a difference in the disposition of the plaintiffs’ 

claims.”). The court’s judgment was not predicated on the 

alleged error of law, and therefore that error does not 

require reversal. 

The court’s decision relating to direct infringement 

turned on the fact that the claims of the ’590 patent 

require both a seal and an RV, but Trim-Lok only manufactures seals. See Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *4. 

Lifetime argues that it properly pleaded direct infringement because it alleged that a Trim-Lok employee or 

representative “directly installed” Trim-Lok’s two-part 

seal on “an RV having a slide-out room.” J.A. 194 ¶ 33.

Trim-Lok responds that the district court correctly 

dismissed the SAC because Trim-Lok only makes seals, 

not the seal and RV combination required to infringe the 

claims. Trim-Lok contends that Lifetime’s allegation that 

a Trim-Lok agent installed the seal on a Forest River RV 

is speculative and implausible because it does not identify 

a person controlled by Trim-Lok who took an action that 

would directly infringe. 

We agree with Lifetime that the SAC adequately 

alleged that Trim-Lok directly infringed. “One who 

‘makes’ a patented invention without authorization infringes the patent.” Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. 

Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 

1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Commercial manufacture is not 

the only way that a combination can infringe. Limited 

internal manufacture and use can also infringe. See id. 

(remanding for determination of reasonable royalty 

damages where infringing product was made, but not 

sold). For example, we affirmed a finding of infringement 

of claims to a combination of a primary fireplace burner 

and a secondary burner because “each time [a secondary 

burner] was attached to a primary burner by either [the 
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 11

alleged infringer] or an end-user, the combination was 

infringing.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson 

Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We have also 

reversed a grant of summary judgment of noninfringement relating to orthopedic surgical implants where there 

was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether surgeons infringe by making the claimed apparatus” by 

having the implant contact a patient’s bone, as required 

by the patent, during surgery. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. 

Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). 

The district court dismissed Lifetime’s direct infringement count on the basis that Trim-Lok only made 

one of the two components that comprised the patented 

invention. Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *4. Although 

Lifetime did not allege that Trim-Lok made the RV onto

which it installed the seal, Lifetime did allege that TrimLok installed the seal onto the RV; that is, Lifetime 

alleged that Trim-Lok made an infringing seal-RV combination. J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Because Lifetime alleged that an 

agent of Trim-Lok installed the seal onto the RV, and that 

the resulting seal-RV combination infringed the ’590 

patent, it alleged that Trim-Lok directly infringed in a 

manner consistent with our precedents holding that 

assembling the components of an invention is an infringing act of making the invention. 

 Trim-Lok’s complaints concerning lack of detail ask 

for too much. There is no requirement for Lifetime to 

“prove its case at the pleading stage.” Bill of Lading, 681 

F.3d at 1339 (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529 

(2011)). Our precedent requires that a complaint place 

the alleged infringer “on notice of what activity . . . is 

being accused of infringement.” K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1284. 

The SAC meets that requirement. Lifetime identified

where the alleged infringement occurred (the Forest River

plant); when it occurred (in or around June 2013); who 

performed the allegedly infringing act (an agent or em-
12 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

ployee of Trim-Lok); and why (to test fit the seal onto the 

RV and to solicit sales). J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Lifetime pleaded 

other facts supporting its allegations as well: that Ksiezopolski discovered the seal installed “adjacent to the opening for the slide-out room on the Forest River RV” and 

learned that Trim-Lok was offering its seal for sale, J.A. 

190 ¶ 16; that Trim-Lok admitted that it had offered its 

seals for sale, J.A. 191 ¶ 20; and that former Lifetime 

employees with knowledge of the seal design and manufacturing process had joined Trim-Lok shortly before June 

2013, J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18. Drawing reasonable inferences in Lifetime’s favor, these facts make it plausible 

that a Trim-Lok agent installed the seal onto the Forest 

River RV. “[W]e do not say that these inferences are, in 

fact, correct or that they are the only fair inferences to be 

drawn from the facts alleged.” Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 

1340 n.12. Taken together, however, they render Lifetime’s pleadings sufficiently plausible to survive a motion 

to dismiss.

It is important to note that the limited scope of the 

district court’s decision similarly limits our own review. 

Its decision to dismiss Lifetime’s direct infringement 

count was based solely on the conclusion that Trim-Lok 

only made one component of the patented invention. As 

explained above, Lifetime adequately alleged that TrimLok created an infringing combination by installing its 

seal onto an RV at the Forest River plant. We need not, 

and do not, express any other opinion relating to the level 

of detail contained in Lifetime’s SAC. 

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Lifetime’s direct infringement 

allegations for failing to state a claim.

II. INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT

As Form 18 does not apply to allegations of indirect 

infringement, the Iqbal / Twombly standard unquestionably applies to Lifetime’s allegations of induced and con-
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 13

tributory infringement. See Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor 

Glob. Enters., Ltd., 700 F.3d 1287, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

For an allegation of induced infringement to survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead facts plausibly 

showing that the accused infringer “specifically intended 

[another party] to infringe [the patent] and knew that the 

[other party]’s acts constituted infringement.” Bill of 

Lading, 681 F.3d at 1339. 

The district court dismissed Lifetime’s indirect infringement counts on the basis that they failed to plead 

“any facts from which intent could be inferred,” and 

instead had only supplied conclusory allegations. Opinion, 2016 WL 5724451, at *5. The court also noted that 

Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the 

patent and the alleged infringement in July 2013, when 

Trim-Lok received a cease-and-desist letter, but that the 

allegedly infringing acts occurred “well before.” Id. 

Lifetime argues that it pleaded sufficient facts to support a plausible claim of induced infringement because it 

alleged that Busch and Torrey had knowledge of the ’590 

patent and its scope. Specifically, Lifetime contends that 

because it alleged that the employees hired by Trim-Lok 

had knowledge of seal design and manufacturing relating 

to products covered by the ’590 patent, that knowledge

could be imputed to the Trim-Lok employees that assisted 

or directed the allegedly infringing installation. Taken 

together, Lifetime contends, these facts plausibly establish that Trim-Lok knew that its acts constituted infringement. 

Trim-Lok responds that Lifetime’s allegations, at best, 

only alleged that it knew of the ’590 patent, not that it 

had the intent to infringe. For example, Trim-Lok contends that Lifetime’s former employees could have used 

their knowledge of Lifetime’s seal to design around the 

’590 patent’s claims. Thus, Trim-Lok continues, Lifetime 

has only pleaded that Trim-Lok intended the consequenc-
14 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

es of its actions, but has not adequately pleaded that 

Trim-Lok intended to infringe. 

We agree with Lifetime that it has plausibly alleged 

that Trim-Lok induced infringement of the ’590 patent. 

“[T]he plausibility requirement is not akin to a ‘probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for 

enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that 

discovery will reveal’ that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1341

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

At the outset, we agree with Lifetime that it adequately pleaded that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the 

patent before the allegedly infringing act. Lifetime specifically alleged that Busch and Torrey had knowledge of the 

patent and its scope when they joined Trim-Lok in the 

months before June 2013. J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18. Drawing reasonable inferences in Lifetime’s favor, these facts 

make it plausible that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the 

’590 patent before June 2013. 

We also agree that Lifetime plausibly pleaded that 

Trim-Lok had the intent to infringe. Trim-Lok’s responses again ask too much. Lifetime pleaded that Trim-Lok 

had knowledge of the ’590 patent, its scope, and the 

products covered thereby. After Trim-Lok gained that 

knowledge, Lifetime alleged that it then assisted in or 

directed the installation of exactly the same type of seal 

as the one described in the patent onto an RV at the 

Forest River plant. Lifetime alleged, moreover, that 

Trim-Lok never made or sold these particular seals prior 

to gaining that knowledge, and that the seals have no 

noninfringing use. Our precedent does not require Lifetime to do more.

Bill of Lading is instructive. 681 F.3d at 1339. In 

that case it was unclear whether the claimed method had 

been performed at all, but we determined that the patent 

owner had adequately pleaded intent where it alleged 
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 15

knowledge of the patent and had plausibly pleaded that 

the defendants’ customers performed the claimed method. 

Id. at 1341–42. Lifetime pleaded facts that are at least as 

strong, because Lifetime could rely on direct evidence (i.e., 

the two-part seal found installed on an RV at the Forest 

River plant) that tended to show infringement. This 

evidence, taken together with Trim-Lok’s prior knowledge 

of the patent and viewed in Lifetime’s favor, “gives rise to 

a reasonable inference that [Trim-Lok] intend[ed] to 

induce” Forest River to infringe. Id. at 1341. Thus, we 

reverse the district court’s dismissal of the induced infringement count.

Finally, Lifetime argues that the district court erred 

in dismissing its contributory infringement count because 

contributory infringement only requires knowledge of the 

patent and of infringement, not the intent to infringe, and 

that it adequately pleaded the elements of contributory 

infringement. Trim-Lok responds that contributory 

infringement does require the intent to infringe, and that 

Lifetime inaccurately equates knowledge of the patent 

with knowledge of infringement.

We agree with Lifetime that it plausibly pleaded contributory infringement. Contributory infringement occurs, inter alia, when a party sells “a component of a 

patented . . . combination . . . constituting a material part 

of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made 

or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 

patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 

suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. § 

271(c). We have held that contributory infringement 

requires “only proof of a defendant’s knowledge, not 

intent, that his activity cause infringement.” HewlettPackard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 

(Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1927 

(“[C]ontributory infringement requires knowledge of the 

patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” 

(citation omitted)). Thus, the district court erred to the 
16 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 

extent that it dismissed the contributory infringement 

count for failing to plausibly allege that Trim-Lok intended to infringe. 

Lifetime also plausibly pleaded that Trim-Lok knew of 

the patent and knew of infringement. As explained 

previously, Lifetime adequately pleaded that Trim-Lok 

gained knowledge of the patent before June 2013 from

Busch and Torrey. Lifetime also pleaded that a two-part 

seal was found installed on a Forest River RV, and that 

Trim-Lok employees assisted with or directed that installation. It is reasonable to infer, based on those facts and 

at this stage of litigation, that Trim-Lok also knew of 

infringement. 

 Trim-Lok also generally contends that Lifetime has 

not plausibly pleaded that the seal was installed by others

with the assistance or under the direction of Trim-Lok 

employees because Lifetime’s direct infringement count 

alleges that Trim-Lok employees installed the seal themselves. But “[t]he Federal Rules permit a party to plead 

in the alternative.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life 

Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). Moreover, the seal discovered by Ksiezopolski was 

installed on the Forest River RV by someone, and the two 

plausible installers are either Trim-Lok employees or 

Forest River employees. If it was Trim-Lok employees, 

then Trim-Lok may be liable for direct infringement; if it 

was Forest River employees, then Trim-Lok may be liable 

for indirect infringement. Thus, a more developed record 

will clarify what role, if any, Trim-Lok employees had in 

the installation of the seal at the Forest River plant. At 

present, Lifetime has adequately pleaded both direct and 

indirect infringement. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the indirect infringement counts.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 
LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRIM-LOK, INC. 17

decision of the district court is reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED