IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18–0563

Filed March 6, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

JARROD DALE MAJORS,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, John D. 

Lloyd, Judge. 

Defendant appeals from a second resentencing order imposing a 

mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder committed as a 

juvenile. AFFIRMED.

Bradley Bender, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Clinton L. Spurrier, County Attorney, for appellee. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice. 

In this appeal, we must decide whether the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing a seventeen and one-half-year mandatory 

minimum prison term before parole eligibility on the defendant’s second 

resentencing for attempted murder during a home invasion and whether 

defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation. The 

defendant was age seventeen at the time of the crime in 2002, and he has 

been resentenced twice as our caselaw on juvenile sentencing evolved. See 

State v. Majors, 897 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 2017) (remanding for 

resentencing in light of State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017)

(plurality opinion), decided the same day). The defendant, now age thirtyfive, appeals his latest resentencing, contending that the district court 

failed to follow our court’s 2017 mandate to apply Roby and that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense expert on the youth 

sentencing factors. We retained the appeal. 

On our review, we determine the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by imposing the mandatory minimum after considering the 

youth sentencing factors under Roby. The sentence is supported by 

testimony from the State’s expert. The defendant personally chose not to 

retain a defense expert, and we conclude his counsel was not 

constitutionally ineffective for relying on cross-examination of the State’s 

expert without retaining a defense expert that his client chose to forgo. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment of sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

On May 30, 2002, Jarrod Dale Majors was a seventeen-year-old high 

school senior fifteen days away from his eighteenth birthday. He lived with 

his parents on a quiet street in Bedford, Iowa. Majors had become 

obsessed with Hollie Peckham, a thirty-year-old woman who lived across 
3

the street with her thirty-two-year-old husband, Jamie Peckham, and their

twenty-two-month-old twins. While the Peckhams were away one evening, 

Majors entered their home, hid inside the closet of the master bedroom, 

and awaited their return. Majors wore a ski mask and gloves to avoid 

identification. He attached a large knife to his waistband, wrapped a roll 

of duct tape around his wrist, and held a .22 caliber rifle with a plastic 

soda bottle taped to the barrel to act as a makeshift silencer. 

When the Peckhams returned home, Hollie went upstairs while 

Jamie remained downstairs with the twins. As Hollie entered her bedroom, 

Majors emerged from the closet and attacked while pointing the gun at 

her. Hollie screamed for her husband, and Majors told her that he was 

not there, which led Hollie to believe Majors had killed him. She ran out 

of the bedroom, down the stairs, and out of the house screaming for help. 

Hollie found a neighbor, who accompanied her back to the Peckham home

while his wife called the police. Meanwhile, Jamie subdued Majors after a 

struggle witnessed by the toddlers. The neighbor helped Jamie restrain

Majors until the police arrived. Jamie later testified that he knew who the 

assailant was before removing his ski mask because he had repeatedly 

seen Majors trespassing and peering in bathroom windows at Hollie over 

the preceding two years. Hollie injured her ankle during the incident, and 

the entire family was emotionally traumatized. Jamie described it at the 

most recent resentencing hearing as “[k]ind of feel[ing] like there’s a 9-11 

that happened where we survived, but it changed everything. It’s a 

watershed moment.”

Majors initially told the police that he was paid $100 to commit the 

crime as a prank. His story later changed to claiming he had been 

hallucinating and could not remember the crime due to using drugs and 

prolonged sleep deprivation. As motive for his crime, he claimed to believe
4

that Jamie was going to attack him and poison his dog. Majors had no 

prior criminal record apart from a single offense for possession of alcohol 

as a minor. 

Majors pled guilty to attempted murder in exchange for the State’s

agreement to dismiss the remaining ten charges upon the expiration of the 

appeal deadline and on the condition that there would be no appeal. 

Majors was sentenced on January 22, 2003, to a prison term of up to 

twenty-five years with a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-half

years before parole eligibility. Majors appealed the sentence in violation of 

the plea agreement, prompting the county attorney to refile the dismissed 

counts. On May 13, Majors entered into a second plea agreement by

pleading guilty to burglary in the second degree. He was sentenced to a 

ten-year term for that charge, which was to be served consecutively to his

sentence for attempted murder. In exchange, the State agreed to amend 

the charge of burglary from first to second degree and to dismiss the 

remaining charges after the appeal deadline as long as Majors did not 

appeal. Majors did not file a direct appeal from his sentence. 

In 2014, we decided State v. Lyle, holding that any automatic 

mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders 

violated the Iowa Constitution’s provision against cruel and unusual 

punishment. 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014). Majors filed for a 

resentencing hearing based on Lyle. On September 16 of that year, when 

Majors was thirty years old, the district court conducted a resentencing 

hearing applying the Lyle factors. 

Majors was resentenced to a term of incarceration of up to twentyfive years for attempted murder with a mandatory minimum of seventeen 

and one-half-years before parole eligibility. His ten-year sentence on the 

burglary conviction remained in place with the sentences to be served 
5

consecutively. Majors appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 

sentence after determining the district court had properly considered the 

Lyle factors. On further review, we determined that the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing a minimum period of incarceration 

without eligibility for parole under Roby, decided the same day. Majors, 

897 N.W.2d at 127. We reversed Majors’ sentence and remanded for a 

second resentencing consistent with the Lyle factors as explained in Roby, 

which stated that “the factors must not normally be used to impose a 

minimum sentence of incarceration without parole unless expert evidence 

supports the use of the factors to reach such a result.” 897 N.W.2d at 

147. 

At the second resentencing hearing on March 5, 2018, when Majors 

was age thirty-three, defense counsel told the court his client chose not to 

retain an expert, and the court conducted a colloquy to confirm this was 

Majors’ own decision:

MR. BOOTH: . . . I’ve had discussions with Mr. Majors 

in regard to whether or not we should have requested or tried 

to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation since we 

knew the State was intending to call a psychiatrist to testify 

and to subject the defendant to a psychiatric evaluation on 

behalf of the State. 

In my discussions with Mr. Majors, it’s my 

understanding that he does not wish to delay these 

proceedings any longer, that he is comfortable proceeding 

without the assistance of an independent psychiatric 

evaluation, Your Honor. . . .

[the Court swore in Majors] 

. . . . 

MR. BOOTH: I’ve also advised you that we could ask the 

court for State funds in order to hire a psychiatrist or conduct 

an independent psychiatric evaluation to support your 

position at sentencing. Are you aware of that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

MR. BOOTH: And was it your decision that we not hire 

an independent or obtain an independent evaluation? 
6

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

MR. BOOTH: Was that because your belief is that we 

should proceed -- your desire is to not have any further delays 

and proceed with resentencing; is that correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct. 

MR. BOOTH: Thank you, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Mr. Majors, without telling me what [you 

and] Mr. Booth discussed, do you feel you’ve had enough time 

to discuss this issue with him, or would you like some more 

time to discuss it with him? 

THE DEFENDANT: I believe I’ve had enough time.

THE COURT: Is it your decision that you not ask for any 

further continuances? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, my decision. 

The court additionally offered to leave the record open to give Majors an 

opportunity to submit additional evidence later, but Majors declined the 

offer. 

The hearing proceeded with live testimony from two witnesses:

Deputy Nate Bucher and Dr. Theresa Clemmons, a psychiatrist at the 

department of corrections serving as the State’s expert. Jamie Peckham 

gave an oral victim-impact statement. 

Dr. Clemmons formed her opinions after reviewing Majors’ records 

and interviewing him by teleconference. Dr. Clemmons noted Majors’ prior 

inconsistent statements regarding his mindset during the crime, but she

stated that “when we discussed what happened he was able to tell me 

specifically” what he did and that Majors admitted he did not do the crime 

on a dare. Dr. Clemmons testified that “[she did not] believe he’s taking 

full responsibility for the entirety of all of his actions the night of the 

offense.” The prosecutor and defense counsel each questioned 

Dr. Clemmons extensively regarding her conclusions under the five 

sentencing factors. Those factors are

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful 

behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
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appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular “family 

and home environment” that surround the youth; (3) the 

circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances 

relating to youth that may have played a role in the 

commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful 

offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5) 

the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change. 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 

477–78, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)); see also Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 135 

(quoting same factors). 

The prosecutor began with the first factor. 

The first one is the youthful offender status or fact, that 

the person was in fact not 18 years old at the time of the 

commission of the crime. 

. . . . 

Q. In looking at that factor, how did you think that 

played into the defendant’s situation in this case? In other 

words, do you feel that his status in the case at the time this 

happened would mitigate his responsibility for what 

happened, substantially or minimally mitigate it? A. I would 

say more so minimally mitigate it. Looking at the overall 

youthful offender, the idea of a youthful offender is the idea of 

brain maturing and whether brains mature enough to make 

good decisions, whether you have good control of your 

emotions, good control [over] impulsivity, have good 

development of your frontal lobe specifically, and the idea of 

that is that over time your brain does develop, it matures. 

But looking at his age, from 17 years and 50 weeks to 

18 years is a very small change. It’s not a switch. It’s not on 

an 18th birthday you flip a switch and the brain is fully 

mature. It actually takes much longer than the 18th birthday 

to reach the full maturity, and some people say your brain is 

ever changing during your lifetime, and we have no mark for 

full brain maturity. 

So looking at kind of those ideas, there would have been 

minimal brain change or brain growth or brain development 

within those two weeks. So it wouldn’t have necessarily 

changed his ability to make decisions, his ability to control 

emotions better or worse, his ability to have impulse control, 

that sort of thing. 

. . . . 

Q. So in terms of mitigating his responsibility for the 

crime, at best [the first factor] would have minimal mitigating 

value; would that be fair? A. Yes. 
8

On cross-examination, Dr. Clemmons stated that she was looking 

at this factor from the perspective of whether Majors was a risk to all 

parties involved and emphasized her focus on whether he displayed any 

empathy. Majors’ counsel asked whether she thought Majors may not 

have contemplated the risks and consequences to the victims, and she 

replied that she did not specifically ask him that so she could not answer.

The prosecutor’s direct examination then elicited the expert’s 

testimony on the second factor, Majors’ supportive family and home

environment. 

A. He described his family as supportive. He described his 

relationship with his mother as a good relationship. He and 

his mother still have frequent visits, and they talk regularly. 

He mentioned that his mother was supportive growing up. He 

denied any abuse. 

He did mention with his father the physical abuse that 

we talked about, but he did mention that through the years 

that he and his father did have a good, supportive relationship 

over the years, also came up for visits as well. 

And then him and his brother also have a good 

relationship, from my understanding. Growing up they had 

some similar friends. And they denied any abuse going back 

and forth. He mentioned they would have had, you know, the 

typical brother relationship where they probably roughhouse 

a bit and that but no abuse back and forth between the boys. 

Q. So the only negative he described to you in relation 

to his family relationship was a period of prior abuse by his 

father; is that correct? A. Yes. 

Q. And that would have ended when he would have 

been roughly in sixth grade; correct? A. Yes, he mentioned 

the physical abuse ended in sixth grade. 

Q. He described to you after that period of time he and 

his father developed a good relationship? A. To my 

understanding, yes. 

Dr. Clemmons testified that Majors’ other familial relationships with his 

brother and mother had been good at the time of the crime and continue 

to be, that there were no substance abuse issues within the family or other 
9

abuse, and that it would be fair to say that Majors basically described a 

positive, supportive family. 

Q. So again in terms of this factor, did you say anything 

about his home environment or relationship would mitigate 

his actions in terms of the crime? A. At the time of the 

offense, there didn’t appear to be anything going on within the 

family that would have mitigated anything. 

Q. The people that you deal with in the prison system, 

is it fairly common that many of them have very troubled home 

lives? A. Absolutely. 

Q. And that’s contributed to them being where they’re 

at; would that be fair to say? A. Absolutely. 

Q. And you didn’t see anything in this case; did you? 

A. Not at the time of offense. 

Q. Would it be fair to say that factor would have 

minimum mitigating value in this case? A. Yes. 

Majors’ counsel cross-examined Dr. Clemmons regarding how 

Majors’ childhood scoliosis, surgery in the sixth grade, and his inability to

participate in sports affected his home environment. In response, she 

noted she was focusing on his home environment at the time of the crime 

many years later.

The prosecutor then turned to the third factor, the circumstances of 

the crime, in which Dr. Clemmons noted the absence of peer pressure. 

Q. The next factor I wanted to look at is the 

circumstances of the crime and I think in terms of the Iowa 

Supreme Court looking at the issue of outside influences 

significantly. Did you look at that issue as well in relation to 

the defendant? A Yes. 

Q. And in terms of involvement of other youthful people 

with him, did you find any evidence of that in this particular 

case? A. No, I did not. 

Q. I believe the supreme court case indicated if they 

were jointly committing crimes with others. In this case is 

there any evidence whatsoever that anyone else participated 

with the defendant in the commission of this crime? A. No. 

Q. Is there any indication that anybody else was 

involved in the planning or preparation for this crime? A. No. 
10

Q. In terms of those factors such as peer pressure, did 

he indicate to you any indication that peer pressure played a 

role in what he did that night? A. No. 

Dr. Clemmons went on to state that she would not classify Majors’ crime 

as an impulsive one, but rather it appeared to be planned given the 

clothing to mask his identity, the rifle with a makeshift silencer, and the 

knife as a backup weapon. 

Q. In terms of what we have here, we have one who had 

a well thought out crime and did so in a way that was going 

to minimize their likelihood of being caught and held 

accountable; would that be correct? A. That is correct. 

Q. Again in terms of the circumstances of the crime, 

would you say that the factors and circumstances would 

provide minimal mitigating value of the defendant’s youthful 

offender in this case? A. Correct. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged Dr. Clemmons about 

impulsivity and her belief that this was a planned crime.

When discussing the fourth factor, the defendant’s competency to 

navigate legal proceedings, Dr. Clemmons testified on direct that she had 

reviewed Majors’ competency evaluation from his forensic psychiatric 

hospitalization close in time to the crime. 

Q. And were you able to determine from that whether 

the defendant was competent to understand what he was 

doing in terms of being able to assist in his defense in the case 

that was pending against him? A. Yes. . . . In the letter from 

Dr. Hartman from August 2, 2002, Dr. Hartman mentions 

that Mr. Majors was competent to participate in judicial 

proceedings. He stated he currently does not have a mental 

condition which prevents him from appreciating his charge, 

understanding the proceedings or assisting in his own 

defense. 

I reviewed his history and available data surrounding 

the activities in question and would indicate that Mr. Majors 

understood the nature and quality of behavior in which he 

was allegedly involved. That statement and information would 

indicate at that time he had sufficient competency to 

distinguish right from wrong. It is equally this writer’s opinion 

that at this time he had capacity to form intent consistent with 

accountability. 
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Dr. Welch, who was also the psychologist who met with 

him, stated he does appear to be well aware of the charges 

against him and can aid in his own defense. 

So both a licensed psychologist and a psychiatrist 

mentioned that they thought he had no -- there was no 

concern for diminished capacity or competency at that time. 

Q. And that was based on an evaluation done in July 

of 2002; correct? A. Yes, that is correct. 

Q. Would you have expected that from May 25, 2002, 

when the evaluation was done, any reasonable likelihood 

there would have been a significant change in his mental 

capacity and competency during that small window of time? 

A. None of the information I have would have indicated that, 

no. 

Q. In this case would you say it’s also significant that 

to an extent the defendant kind of throughout the progress of 

this case kind of went through a checklist of more or less 

minimizing any responsibility? First someone there, to 

offering me money, next thing I’ve got a mental competency 

issue, I don’t understand to the point of asking other prisoners 

how to make it sound more effective, to I’m not responsible 

because of use of drugs and a blackout? A. It seemed that he 

was definitely trying to find ways to reduce his responsibility 

for the actions that he had performed. 

Q. And doing ways recognized by the legal system; 

correct? A. Correct. 

Q. Diminished capacity would provide a potential legal 

defense; correct? A. Correct. 

Q. So would substance abuse intoxication? 

A. Correct. 

Q. Again I would ask you in this case do you feel that, 

based upon your information, that the defendant was fully 

able to understand the legal proceedings and navigate the 

legal system at that time? A. I don’t have any information to 

the contrary. 

Q. So again this would be another minimal mitigating 

value in terms of his being a youthful offender; correct? 

A. Yes. 

Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Clemmons about Majors’ difficulty in 

school. 

In terms of going into the alternative school, it sounds 

like a smaller class size, more attention, and also he 

mentioned to me it was only three hours a day versus the full 

seven to eight hours of schooling, which was his preference. 
12

Lastly, Dr. Clemmons addressed the fifth factor, capacity for 

rehabilitation, recognizing in this case that they had the benefit of sixteen 

years of hindsight since this 2002 crime, Majors’ prison disciplinary 

history, and his long-standing and continuing lack of empathy and

remorse. 

Q. And in terms of his rehabilitative capacity, what 

would your thoughts be in that area? A. I have several 

thoughts in that area. He does have . . . the ability in terms 

of understanding what the treatment program would be like. 

His IQ is good, so he would be able to understand the content. 

He does not have any behavior problems right now. He 

hasn’t had disciplin[e] since 2014, so there wouldn’t be any 

problems with him sitting in class, going through treatment, 

performing those kind of things. 

The main point that I’ve been concerned about -- and I 

think this was also mentioned in the presentence 

investigation from 2002 but really gets him out of his 

evaluation -- was the concern for feelings of remorse, empathy 

for the victims and also feelings of guilt for his actions. 

That really comes down to the core of what the 

rehabilitation is in terms of taking responsibility for the 

action, admitting wrongdoing and then going through that 

treatment with kind of that desire to want to change so that 

way in the future whatever underlying factor led you to that 

offense doesn’t lead you to that offense in the future. 

Q. Or other offenses? A. Right. 

Q. In this case did you feel that the defendant showed 

remorse for what he had done? A. I didn’t get that sense, no. 

Q. We’ve already talked about the victim empathy and 

accepting responsibility issues. And so together with those 

three, in your opinion, do you think those things all will 

reduce the effectiveness of full rehabilitation in relation to the 

defendant? A. That would reduce the rehabilitation, correct. 

Q. If you’re looking at whether the prospect of him 

being a good candidate for parole rehabilitation, that would be 

something that, based upon the information you’ve looked at 

and reviewed, you would say he’s not a good prospect for full 

rehabilitation; would that be fair? A. I would say that’s 

correct. 

Q. Again in evaluating this factor, rehabilitation would 

be something that would be a minimal mitigating value in our 

analysis of assessment of what the appropriate sentence 

would be; would you say that’s fair? A. Yes. 
13

On cross-examination, Dr. Clemmons acknowledged that Majors had 

shown a capacity for change since 2014 and that Majors apologized to the 

Peckhams at his previous sentencing hearings, but she noted his motive 

for secondary gain. Dr. Clemmons admitted to working primarily with 

adults and that Majors’ was her first resentencing hearing on the 

Miller/Lyle/Roby factors.

The district court subsequently issued its resentencing order 

stating, “The court will consider the five factors as applied to this case, in 

light of the explication of those factors contained in Roby.” The court

outlined in considerable detail Roby’s description of each factor and its 

analysis of each factor’s application to Majors’ case.

Regarding the first factor, age and maturity, the district court noted 

that Majors was fifteen days shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of 

the crime, and found

it [was] reasonable to assume that he would have been more 

mature than a 15 or 16 year old defendant and not 

appreciably less mature than if he had committed the crime 

two weeks later, at which point he would have been treated as 

an adult without question. 

Elaborating, the district court cited to the evaluation done at the Iowa 

Medical and Classification Center at Oakdale two months after the crime 

that opined Majors understood the nature and quality of his behavior and 

noted that he had been soliciting help from other inmates regarding how 

to look more psychiatrically ill to aid in his defense. The district court 

acknowledged that the report identified Majors as having “limited insight 

and impaired judgment and being emotionally immature” as well as being 

a loner bullied throughout his childhood. Noting Roby emphasized the 

importance of expert testimony, the district court referenced

Dr. Clemmons’ determination that there was nothing about Majors’ age 
14

that mitigated against a mandatory sentence. “It does not appear to the 

court that the defendant’s age is a mitigating factor in light of the 

contemporaneous assessment and the current psychiatric testimony.” 

Turning to the second factor, the family and home environment, the 

district court noted that “[n]o one point[ed] to any home environment facts 

that influenced the defendant’s behavior.” Indeed, Majors had no juvenile 

criminal history apart from a single offense of possession of alcohol. The 

court referred to the physical abuse by Majors’ father until about the sixth 

grade, noting the father–son relationship subsequently improved and was 

“in good shape” at the time of the crime. Majors himself had denied any 

abuse issues, and his father had contacted the facility where Majors was 

being held numerous times to advocate for greater phone access. The 

district court noted, “Dr. Clemmons also did not identify any family or 

household issues that in her opinion would have mitigated the offense. 

The court concludes that this factor does not mitigate the defendant’s 

conduct.” 

In considering the third factor, the circumstances of the crime and 

attendant youth factors, the district court determined, 

This crime was a solo act by the defendant. There was 

no one involved who encouraged or goaded the defendant into 

acting. There is no indication that he was in any way seeking 

to curry favor with or win approval of any peer group. 

The court relied in part on the Oakdale report and Dr. Clemmons’ 

testimony. 

Dr. Clemmons also found no indications of any outside 

influences on the defendant in the planning and execution of 

this crime. In addition, she noted the deliberate nature of the 

crime -- the use of a ski mask and gloves, shoes with no 

identifiable tread, a rifle with a homemade silencer attached 

and a backup weapon -- was supportive of a finding that the 

defendant was acting for himself and not impulsively or at the 

behest of another. 
15

The district court emphasized the conclusions in the Oakdale report that 

in 2002 Majors “understood the nature and quality of [his] behavior [and] at 

that time he had the capacity to form intent consistent with accountability.” 

The district court concluded that the third factor was not mitigating. 

Regarding the fourth factor, competency to navigate the legal 

system, the district court stated it “fails to see how this factor mitigates in 

the defendant’s favor” and explained why:

While the crime occurred when the defendant was still a 

minor, the only part of the criminal proceeding that occurred 

while he was a minor was his initial appearance and his 

preliminary hearing at which he successfully obtained 

dismissal of two counts that had been filed initially. The entire 

remainder of this criminal proceeding took place after he had 

attained legal adult status. In addition, he was evaluated for 

competency to stand trial as noted above. This evaluation 

occurred in July 2002 and preceded the bulk of the 

proceedings in this case. This evaluation found him 

competent to assist in his own defense and to stand trial. 

As an additional consideration, the defendant 

demonstrated an understanding of the legal system that belies 

any disability due to his age. He claimed to be suicidal in 

order to get out of the Taylor County jail. He sought an 

evaluation of his competency in order to try to aid his case. 

He solicited other inmates at Oakdale for ideas on how he 

could appear more worthy of a determination of psychiatric 

incompetency. He tried out various lies in an effort to frame 

an explanation that would allow him to avoid or ameliorate his 

culpability. None of those actions indicate a defendant 

overwhelmed by the system due to his age or immaturity. 

Dr. Clemmons also found nothing in the 2002 evaluation that 

would indicate that the defendant was overwhelmed by the 

system and pointed in her testimony to these additional 

factors as support for that conclusion. 

Finally, the district court turned to the fifth factor, capacity for 

reform, and noted that if it were only considering the defendant at the time 

of the original sentencing in evaluating this factor, his youth and potential 

to reform might weakly mitigate in Majors’ favor. Focusing on 

Dr. Clemmons’ testimony, the court recognized her concern that Majors 

has never shown empathy for the victims of his crime and his lack of 
16

empathy “was a trait he brought to prison with him.” The court expressed 

uncertainty over how to consider Majors’ prison conduct when evaluating 

this factor, but concluded, “The only factor that came close to favoring 

mitigation, the possibility of reform, is further weakened if not destroyed 

by his prison conduct.” Majors had numerous prison disciplinary 

violations before Lyle was decided in 2014. His behavior improved after 

our decision in Lyle, but he committed another major violation (providing 

a fake urine sample to fool a urinalysis) upon returning from his 2018 

resentencing hearing. The court concluded the fifth factor “would mitigate 

in the defendant’s favor, albeit somewhat weakly in the court’s 

assessment.” 

The district court determined “[a] mandatory minimum sentence, in 

the absence of mitigating factors and the presence of ‘a frightening crime,’ 

seems appropriate” and that

after careful consideration of the Lyle factors . . . the 

mandatory minimum sentence for adults convicted of 

attempted murder applies to this defendant and that he 

should be subject to serve 70% of the sentence before 

becoming eligible for parole. 

The court resentenced Majors on the charge of attempted murder to the 

same sentence as before, twenty-five years imprisonment with eligibility 

for parole after serving a mandatory minimum of seventeen and one-halfyears. The district court concluded that Majors’ sentence for burglary was 

not up for resentencing, and it remained a ten-year sentence that would 

run consecutively to his sentence for attempted murder. 

Majors filed this direct appeal, which we retained. 
17

II. Standard of Review. 

If the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, as it is here, 

we review for an abuse of discretion. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 137. As we 

explained in Roby, 

A discretionary sentencing ruling, similarly, may be [an abuse 

of discretion] if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant 

factor that should have received significant weight, gives 

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or 

considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits 

a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies 

outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the 

case. 

Id. at 138 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 

578 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016), judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part 

by People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Mich. 2018)). “Sentencing 

decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in 

their favor.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018); see also 

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). 

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. 

Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Iowa 2017). Normally such claims are 

preserved for postconviction-relief actions, but ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims can be resolved on direct appeal when the record is 

sufficient to allow a ruling.1 State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 2005).

III. Analysis. 

Majors argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on remand and that his trial 

 1In State v. Macke, we held that the 2019 amendment to Iowa Code section 814.7 

does not apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before the 

statute’s effective date of July 1, 2019. 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019). Although 

under the current version of Iowa Code section 814.7 Majors would not have a right to 

direct appeal on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, he did have such a right at 

the time his judgment and sentence was issued on April 2, 2018. As such, we will 

consider Majors’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in this appeal. 
18

counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony on the Lyle

factors at his 2018 resentencing. The State responds that the district 

court properly applied the Lyle factors and that the mandatory minimum 

was supported by expert testimony, while Majors’ own decision to forgo 

retaining a defense expert precludes relief on his ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim. 

A. No Abuse of Discretion. Our decisions have clarified that the 

sentencing court must consider the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors in an 

individualized sentencing hearing if it is contemplating imposing a 

mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 

at 148. The State must prove the defendant’s “irreparable corruption” for 

a life-without-parole sentence. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 556 (Iowa 

2015). That proof is not required for a shorter mandatory minimum 

sentence. 

We have given some procedural guidance. Our decision in Roby

allows district courts to impose minimum terms of incarceration “after a 

complete and careful consideration of the relevant mitigating factors of 

youth.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 148. Indeed, we stated that “‘[i]f the 

mandatory minimum period of incarceration is warranted,’ we commanded 

[our judges] to impose the sentence.” Id. at 143 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10). If the factors are properly applied, 

“the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is 

satisfied.” Id. at 145. “[T]he factors must not normally be used to impose 

a minimum sentence of incarceration without parole unless expert 

evidence supports the use of the factors to reach such a result.” Id. at 
19

147.2 We now turn to addressing what the district court must find in order 

to impose a mandatory minimum sentence for a crime committed under 

age eighteen. 

Our earlier opinions have been criticized for running the risk of 

“mak[ing] it difficult, if not practically impossible, for a sentencing judge 

to ever impose any minimum term of incarceration.” Id. at 151 (Zager, J.,

dissenting); see also State v. White, 903 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Iowa 2017) 

(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“Our court has extended Miller to all mandatory 

minimums but has yet to say what the substantive standard is. Plainly it 

isn’t ‘irreparable corruption’ . . . . Still, our court hasn’t told district courts 

what that standard is. This isn’t about moving the goal posts. The court 

has yet to erect the goal posts.”). Yet as we indicated in Roby, mandatory 

minimum sentences are permissible. While there is a presumption against 

minimum terms of incarceration for juvenile offenders, we have expressly 

upheld, even commanded, their use if the court concludes that sentence

is warranted after consideration of the factors. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 143

(plurality opinion). Such a conclusion does not need to rise to the level of 

irreparable corruption. 

We reiterate that our role on review is for abuse of discretion. An 

abuse of discretion may exist if the sentencing court fails to consider a 

factor, gives significant weight to an improper factor, or arrives at a 

conclusion that is against the facts. Id. at 138. But if the court follows 

our outlined sentencing procedure by conducting an individualized 

 2The State stops short of asking us to overrule Roby or Lyle. As we recently noted 

in Goodwin v. Iowa District Court, “We do not ordinarily overrule our precedent 

sua sponte.” 936 N.W.2d 634, 645 n.4 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Estate of McFarlin v. State, 

881 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Iowa 2016)); see also State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813, 828 (Wis. 

2019) (overruling precedent at the state’s request to “return to our past practice of 

following decisions of the United States Supreme Court”). Adversarial briefing should 

guide a supreme court’s weighty decision to overturn its precedent. 
20

hearing, applies the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors, and imposes a sentence 

authorized by statute and supported by the evidence, then we affirm the 

sentence. Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 2019); 

see also Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 552–53 (explaining our review for abuse of 

discretion and emphasizing the discretionary nature of judges). As we 

stated in Formaro, 

Judicial discretion imparts the power to act within legal 

parameters according to the dictates of a judge’s own 

conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment of others. It is 

essential to judging because judicial decisions frequently are 

not colored in black and white. Instead, they deal in differing 

shades of gray, and discretion is needed to give the necessary 

latitude to the decision-making process. This inherent 

latitude in the process properly limits our review. Thus, our 

task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by 

the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or 

based on untenable grounds. 

638 N.W.2d at 725 (citations omitted); see also Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 552–

53. We trust the sentencing courts to know, after applying the factors,

when a mandatory minimum term of incarceration for juvenile offenders

is warranted. Such trust is essential to the “respect afforded by the 

appellate process.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. 

We recently affirmed a twenty-year mandatory minimum on a fiftyyear sentence for second-degree murder committed by a sixteen-year-old. 

Goodwin, 936 N.W.2d at 637. The sentencing court conducted an 

individualized sentencing hearing, relied on expert testimony in applying 

the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors, and imposed a sentence within the statutory 

limits. Id. at 645–47. Under circumstances in which two of the factors 

were mitigating, we determined that imposing the twenty-year mandatory 

minimum was neither illegal nor an abuse of discretion. Id. We reach the 
21

same conclusion as to Majors’ seventeen and one-half-year mandatory 

minimum prison term.3 

Under the first factor, the sentencing court must consider “the age 

of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such as ‘immaturity, 

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Lyle, 854 

N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at 

2468).4 The district court appropriately noted that Majors was nearly age 

eighteen when he committed the crime in 2002. Majors argues the court 

erred in emphasizing his age and states the fact that he was nearly 

eighteen at the time of the crime is “immaterial to the crucial question 

whether [he] possessed features of maturity beyond his years.” We reject 

his attempt to alter the first factor. The court must consider “the age of 

the offender and the features of youthful behavior,” which explicitly 

articulates that each is a separate consideration under this factor. Id.

(emphasis added). The district court properly considered the present 

expert testimony of Dr. Clemmons and the 2002 Oakdale psychiatric 

 3The district court, as noted, relied in part on the testimony of the State’s expert 

psychiatrist, Dr. Theresa Clemmons. Majors’ trial counsel did not argue that 

Dr. Clemmons was unqualified to testify as an expert because she was not a child 

psychologist or child psychiatrist. Nor does Majors’ appellate counsel argue that trial 

counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation by failing to challenge the 

admissibility of Dr. Clemmons’ expert testimony on grounds that she was unqualified. 

“Generally, we have been committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of expert 

testimony.” Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa 2010). Indeed, we 

have stated that “an expert does not need to be a specialist in the area of the testimony 

as long as the testimony is within the general area of expertise of the witness.” Id. at 687. 

In Roby, we nowhere specified that the state was limited to using expert testimony of a 

child psychologist or psychiatrist to support a mandatory minimum sentence. Such a 

limitation on expert testimony would make little sense when, as here, the offender was 

age thirty-three at the time of his second resentencing. 

4“Studies that have examined logical reasoning abilities in structured situations 

and basic information-processing skills, for instance, have found no appreciable 

differences between adolescents age 16 and older and adults[.]” Laurence Steinberg et 

al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile 

Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 Am. Psychologist 583, 586 (2009). 
22

assessment of Majors’ decisional capacity contemporaneously with the 

criminal offenses. The record supports the district court’s determination

that Majors’ maturity was comparable to a young adult and is not a 

mitigating factor. 

Under the second factor, the sentencing court must consider “the 

particular ‘family and home environment’ that surround the youth.” Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at 

2468). “This factor seeks to identify any familial dependency and negative 

influences of family circumstances that can be ingrained on children” and 

considers the impact of all home environments, financial situations, and 

social backgrounds. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146. Majors, relying on an 

article that outlined resentencing considerations for a potential sentence 

of life without parole, urges that Dr. Clemmons should have interviewed 

family members, reviewed school reports, and utilized social maturity 

scales.5 Such additional investigation is not required here, especially 

given that Majors was age thirty-three at the time of this second 

resentencing. Dr. Clemmons testified about how Majors had been picked 

on by other kids and noted a report of abuse by his father that ended when 

he was in sixth grade and had since improved. She found no mitigation 

given his childhood or the family environment at the time of the crime, in 

2002, when Majors was living on a quiet street in a loving, two-parent 

household with good relationships with family members. The district court 

considered her expert testimony and noted the absence of “any home 

environment facts that influenced [Majors’] behavior.” Unlike many 

youthful offenders raised in troubled home environments, Majors had no 

 5Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 

88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 696–97 (2016) (proposing considerations for a potential lifewithout-parole sentence). 
23

juvenile criminal record apart from a single offense for possession of 

alcohol and thus had been able to conform his behavior to societal 

expectations before he invaded the Peckham home. The record supports 

the district court’s determination that the second factor is not mitigating 

for Majors. 

Under the third factor, the sentencing court must consider “the 

circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances relating to 

youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime.” Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. Here, our caselaw directs the sentencing judge 

to give attention to “the juvenile offender’s actual role and the role of 

various types of external pressure.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146. As such, 

this factor is more relevant in situations of group participation in a crime. 

Id. For homicide offenses, this also involves consideration of “the way 

familial and peer pressures may have affected” the defendant. State v. 

Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 853 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 

556). “Our sentencing courts can and should consider the heinous nature 

of the crime in evaluating whether to impose a mandatory minimum 

sentence.” Goodwin, 936 N.W.2d at 647. 

Majors argues that the court did not give proper weight to his initial 

assertions that he had been dared to commit the crime, had been acting 

under direction of voices in his head due to drug use, and had blacked 

out. However, Dr. Clemmons testified that Majors himself admitted to her 

that he did not commit the crime on a dare, and his claim of being on a 

drug binge was inconsistent with other evidence. The district court 

appropriately relied on the absence of peer pressure, noting Majors acted 

alone without anyone goading him. The court’s conclusion is supported 

by the expert testimony of Dr. Clemmons, who “found no indications of 

any outside influences . . . in the planning and execution of this crime.” 
24

Nor was the crime impulsive; to the contrary, Majors acted deliberately 

with careful planning. He observed the Peckham family for years, even 

watching Hollie, the object of his obsession, through bathroom windows. 

He learned their nightly routine, snuck into their home, and hid in Hollie’s 

bedroom closet before emerging to attack her. He wore a ski mask and 

gloves to avoid detection. He brought duct tape presumably to bind her. 

He carried a rifle with a makeshift silencer and a knife as a backup weapon

to subdue or kill his victims. As we observed in our prior decision, he 

committed a “frightening crime.” Majors, 897 N.W.2d at 125. And the 

district court properly relied on present expert testimony and the 2002 

contemporaneous Oakdale psychiatric assessment that at the time of the 

crime Majors understood the nature of his conduct and had the decisional 

capacity to be held accountable. The record supports the district court’s 

determination that the third factor is not mitigating for Majors. 

Under the fourth factor, the sentencing court must consider “the 

challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal

process.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. “This factor recognizes that 

juveniles are typically less capable than adults at navigating the legal 

process.” Goodwin, 936 N.W.2d at 647. But Majors was an adult

throughout these criminal proceedings. Dr. Clemmons testified that the 

2002 Oakdale assessment found him competent to assist in his own 

defense, and both a licensed psychologist and psychiatrist in 2002 found 

there was no concern that Majors had diminished capacity or competency. 

The record supports the district court’s determination that Majors 

“demonstrated an understanding of the legal system that belies any 

disability due to his age.” The record supports the district court’s 

determination that the fourth factor is not mitigating for Majors. 
25

Under the fifth factor, the sentencing court must consider “the 

possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

at 404 n.10. This factor typically favors mitigation because juveniles are 

generally more capable of rehabilitation than adults. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 

147. Here, the district court appropriately gave weight to expert testimony 

on Majors’ lack of empathy and remorse from his initial arrest to the 

present. And the district court properly considered Majors’ prison 

disciplinary violations, which as Dr. Clemmons explained were not 

attributable to his youth because he continued to accrue violations as an 

adult. Even at age thirty-three, and on the same day as his 2018 

resentencing, Majors committed another disciplinary violation. The record 

supports the district court’s determination that the fifth factor is, at best,

“weakly” mitigating for Majors. 

The district court was unsure what weight to give Majors’ conduct 

in prison. On resentencing, we encourage district courts to consider the 

defendant’s conduct in prison—a sixteen-year span in this case. When

initially sentencing a juvenile offender shortly after the crime, the district 

court must attempt to predict how the defendant will respond to the future 

opportunities to mature and rehabilitate himself while incarcerated. By 

contrast, we have observed that parole boards have

“the benefit of seeing the individual offender’s actual behavior, 

rather than having to attempt to predict chances at maturity 

and rehabilitation based on speculation.” As a result, the 

parole board may decide to continue confinement of the 

juvenile “[i]f rehabilitation has not yet occurred” until he or 

she “has demonstrated through his or her own actions the 

ability to appreciate the severity of the crime.” “This is 

consistent with the approach of our prior holdings in the area 

of juvenile sentencing, because it allows for a realistic and 

meaningful opportunity for parole upon the juvenile’s 

demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation.” 
26

State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 201 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. 

Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017)). On resentencing, the court, like 

the parole board, can look back and rely on the defendant’s actual 

behavior (good or bad) while incarcerated.6 See Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 

170 (considering the “juvenile offender’s progress towards rehabilitation” 

while incarcerated before imposing a new sentence). This may benefit 

some defendants. For example, in State v. Louisell, we affirmed a 

resentence that granted immediate parole eligibility to a juvenile offender 

who had served twenty-six years in prison, noting “Louisell is a model 

inmate who has achieved rehabilitation; grown from a naïve and impulsive 

youngster to a mature, accomplished, and intelligent woman; and 

accepted full responsibility for the crime she committed as a juvenile in 

1987.” 865 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 2015). Majors has not been a model 

inmate. 

On balance, we determine the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in applying the foregoing factors to impose the seventeen and 

one-half-year mandatory minimum sentence. Importantly, as we 

reiterated in Goodwin, “[o]ur district courts can and should [also] weigh 

public safety (incapacitation), deterrence, and retribution when sentencing

juvenile offenders for violent felonies.” Goodwin, 936 N.W.2d at 647; see 

also Harrison, 914 N.W.2d at 201 (“Despite our emphasis on rehabilitation, 

juvenile sentences may still aim to promote additional penological goals, 

including deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation.”); Zarate, 908 

 6Courts in other jurisdictions have held that prison disciplinary violations can be 

considered on resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Swimm, 340 S.E.2d 65, 70 (N.C. 1986) 

(allowing a defendant’s bad conduct while incarcerated to be considered on resentencing); 

Commonwealth v. Losch, 535 A.2d 115, 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that during 

resentencing the judge “may also allow the prosecution to introduce evidence relating to 

appellant’s bad conduct, if any, since the time that judgment of sentence was last 

imposed”). 
27

N.W.2d at 854–55 (approving consideration of other goals of criminal 

punishment when sentencing juvenile offenders, including incapacitation, 

deterrence, and culpability). 

B. No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Majors argues his trial 

counsel had a duty to present an expert witness to testify regarding the 

five sentencing factors. He asserts that his trial counsel’s failure to present 

such an expert amounts to constitutionally deficient representation, that 

is, ineffective assistance of counsel. The State contends that Majors

cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain 

an expert witness because Majors himself, then age thirty-three, chose not 

to do so. We begin with our framework for ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims. 

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the 

claimant must satisfy the two-prong test by proving that his trial counsel 

failed to perform an essential duty and prejudice resulted. State v. Clay, 

824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa 2012) (describing the two-prong test for 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims set out in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). “A 

defendant’s inability to prove either element is fatal.” State v. Graves, 668 

N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003). 

Under the first prong, our presumption is that counsel performed 

competently unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 495. Counsel’s performance is 

measured objectively against the prevailing professional norms after 

considering all the circumstances. Id. A claimant can rebut the 

presumption by showing that counsel failed to perform an essential duty. 

State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014). More is required than a 
28

showing that counsel’s trial strategy backfired or the case would have been 

tried differently by another attorney. Id. 

To establish the second prong, prejudice, “the claimant must prove 

by a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to perform an 

essential duty, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2016). This proof does not require 

a showing that counsel’s conduct “more likely than not altered the 

outcome in the case,” but rather that “the probability of a different result 

is ‘sufficient to undermine [our] confidence in the outcome’ of the trial.” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 882). 

The record must be adequate to resolve an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim on direct appeal. Id. at 704. We find that this record is 

adequate, and we hold that Majors’ counsel did not breach an essential 

duty by failing to present a defense expert to testify regarding the 

sentencing factors. Our emphasis in Roby on the importance of presenting 

expert testimony on the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors was directed at the 

State—if the State wants to recommend that the sentencing court impose 

a mandatory minimum sentence, Roby held that an expert is “normally” 

necessary to analyze the factors. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 148. Although the 

option of presenting an expert is available to both parties, the defendant 

does not need expert testimony in order to avoid a mandatory minimum

sentence. 

Majors himself made the decision not to present an expert during 

the resentencing hearing. Majors cannot now blame his counsel for 

honoring his own decision. See Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 413 

(Iowa 1985) (“[A]ppellant cannot now assert a claim of ineffectiveness of 

counsel based primarily on appellant’s own decisions . . . .”); State v. 

Lemburg, 257 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Iowa 1977) (rejecting a claim of ineffective 
29

assistance of counsel for the attorney’s alleged failure to litigate certain

defenses because “[i]t was [the appellant’s] own decision to reject the 

possibilities of these defenses”). 

Calling a defense expert would run the risk that the prosecutor’s 

cross-examination would elicit adverse information. Majors’ counsel made 

a strategic decision to rely on his own cross-examination of the State’s 

expert. “We believe that the question of whether or not to call an expert 

witness is a matter of trial strategy.” Heaton v. State, 420 N.W.2d 429, 

432 (Iowa 1988); see also State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Iowa 2003)

(“Generally, the decision not to call a particular witness or the defendant 

to testify implicates a reasonable tactical decision.”). Indeed, Majors’ 

counsel referred to that strategy to support his client’s decision to decline 

to keep the record open for a psychiatric examination and a defense expert.

MR. BOOTH: . . . I’d like to indicate to the court again 

that I’ve again advised Mr. Majors that we could at this point 

ask for the record to remain open in order to get a psychiatric 

examination done. Again on my recommendation it’s my 

understanding that he is declining to have that done at this 

time, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Mr. Booth, without detailing the legal 

reason, can you place [on] record some reasons for your 

recommendation? 

MR. BOOTH: Well, with respect as indicated in my 

cross-examination, Your Honor, I believe that I was able to 

glean the information that I might otherwise be able to obtain 

through the State’s witness, Your Honor, and in my personal

opinion and my professional opinion, I believe that that 

should be sufficient, Your Honor. I’m not sure that an 

independent evaluation would provide the same or similar 

opportunity to present information. 

THE COURT: It seems like a reasonable choice of trial 

strategy, Mr. Booth. 

We agree that this was a reasonable trial strategy rather than a 

breach of duty. See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006);

Polly, 657 N.W.2d at 468 (holding that the defendant’s ineffective-
30

assistance-of-counsel claim failed because “[t]rial counsel’s decision not to 

call [the defendant] to testify clearly was a strategical decision we will not 

second-guess”); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1992);

Heaton, 420 N.W.2d at 432 (holding defense counsel was not ineffective 

for not calling an expert at trial); Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 564 

(Iowa 1980) (“[Defendant] shows no injury from [defense counsel’s] 

decision not to consult the expert witnesses or use them at trial. He has 

failed to carry his burden of proving [defense counsel] was incompetent or 

in any way ineffective on this contention.”). 

We reiterate that these sentencing hearings need not be a battle of 

the experts. A “basic proposition” regarding this process is that “juvenile 

sentencing hearings are not entirely adversarial. The goal is to craft a 

‘punishment that serves the best interests of the child and of society.’ ” 

Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 144 (quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402). Requiring 

the defense to present an expert in every juvenile sentencing case would 

not serve that goal. 

We hold Majors’ defense counsel had no duty to present an expert 

to testify regarding the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors. Given that Majors failed 

to prove the first element required to prevail on an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim, a breach of duty, we end our analysis there. See Graves, 

668 N.W.2d at 869 (“A defendant’s inability to prove either element is 

fatal.”).

IV. Disposition. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s resentencing 

order and judgment of sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield and McDonald, JJ., join this 

opinion. McDonald, J., files a concurring opinion in which Christensen, 
31

C.J., joins. Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Wiggins, J., joins. 

Oxley, J., takes no part. 
32

#18–0563, State v. Majors

McDONALD, Justice (concurring specially).

For the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in Goodwin v. 

Iowa District Court, 936 N.W.2d 634, 649 (Iowa 2019) (McDonald, J., 

concurring specially), I conclude the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing a minimum sentence on the defendant. I concur in 

the majority opinion and the judgment of the court.

Christensen, C.J., joins this special concurrence.
33

#18–0563, State v. Majors

APPEL, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. 

The sentencing hearing in this case does not remotely resemble that 

contemplated by State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), State v. Seats, 

865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015), State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014), 

and State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013). The overarching problem is 

that the district court failed to recognize the principles of developmental 

child psychology that underlie our juvenile sentencing cases and entered 

a sentencing order that failed to apply the proper framework to this case. 

Further, counsel for Jarrod Majors made no effort to present the law or to 

show, through competent expert testimony, how the law related to the 

facts at hand. As a result, the sentence in this case should be vacated and 

the matter remanded for resentencing. 

I. By Failing to Recognize the Developmental Child Psychology 

Underpinning Our Caselaw and the Proper Framework for Considering 

Juvenile Culpability, the District Court Committed Reversible Error. 

A. The Need for Qualified Expert Testimony on Developmental 

Child Psychology in Cases Where Juvenile Offenders Face the 

Possibility of the Imposition of Mandatory Adult Minimum Sentences. 

The basic framework of the United States Supreme Court on juvenile 

justice fundamentally turns on concepts of developmental child 

psychology as articulated in the recent seminal trilogy of cases: Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), Graham v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 

S. Ct. 1183 (2005).7 

 7“Developmental psychology, broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of 

changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle.”

Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A 
34

We applied child developmental psychology under the article I, 

section 17 cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Iowa 

Constitution in Roby, Seats, Lyle, and Null. Under our caselaw, the state 

must show in an individualized hearing that a juvenile criminal defendant 

facing a mandatory adult sentence falls outside the norm of most juveniles, 

where age is presumptively considered a mitigating factor on the critical 

issue of culpability. 

In Roby, we explored the contours of an individualized hearing 

required before the state may apply a mandatory adult minimum sentence 

against a juvenile offender. We noted that the mitigating developmental 

factor of “age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior” is most 

meaningfully applied when based on qualified professional assessments of 

the offender’s decision-making capacity utilizing the expert’s 

“developmental and clinical knowledge.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145 (first 

quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10; then quoting Elizabeth S. Scott et 

al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. 

Rev. 675, 697 (2016) [hereinafter Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform]). 

As authority for its reliance on qualified professional assessments, the 

Roby court cited the work of four leading authorities in the area: Thomas 

Grisso, Marsha Levick, Elizabeth Scott, and Laurence Steinberg.8 These 

 

Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & 

L. 389, 391 (1999) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Adjudication of Youthful Offenders].

8These experts continue to provide valuable research on the issue of juvenile 

development and the criminal justice system. See generally Thomas Grisso et al., 

Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities 

as Trial Defendants, 27 Law & Hum. Behav. 333 (2003) (evaluating data indicating 

impairment of judgment and competence in juveniles, affecting legal competence to stand 

trial); Thomas Grisso & Antoinette Kavanaugh, Prospects for Developmental Evidence in 

Juvenile Sentencing Based on Miller v. Alabama, 22 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 235, 240 

(2016) (exploring evidentiary considerations regarding the Miller developmental factors in 

new sentencing cases); Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to 

Ensure Juveniles a Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court 
35

four leading authorities on child development and the law state that 

“[b]ecause the Miller factors are based upon developmental constructs, 

expert assessments by forensic child clinical psychologist or psychiatrists

are required to inform courts making sentencing decisions.” Scott et al., 

Juvenile Sentencing Reform, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 695 (emphasis added).9 

Scott and her colleagues further emphasize the importance of child

development expertise. According to these leading authorities, “[g]eneral 

forensic mental health professionals who evaluate adults for criminal 

courts are usually not qualified to undertake these assessments.” Id. 

Yet, that is exactly what occurred in this case. The State’s expert 

was a staff psychiatrist with the department of corrections. She was 

named as an expert by the State at the last minute in this matter, on 

 

Process, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 175 (2007) (arguing that juveniles need counsel at all points 

in legal proceedings as they generally do not understand their rights or the proceedings 

well enough to make informed decisions); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, 

Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799 (2003) (addressing how legal practitioners should 

think about immaturity as it relates to competence and moral blameworthiness); 

Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and 

Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 793 (2005) (applying legal trial competence 

requirements to juveniles and examining the relationship between immaturity and 

incompetence); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent 

Decisionmaking, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1607 (1992) (exploring existing literature on adolescent 

decision-making within their capacities as legal actors); Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing 

Reform, 88 Temple L. Rev. 675 (analyzing the Miller framework and how it has been 

applied by lower courts and states); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social 

Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 La. L. Rev. 35 (2010) (analyzing the 

juvenile constitutional framework, underlying developmental science, and the principle 

that “children are different”); Steinberg & Cauffman, Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 

6 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 389 (outlining aspects of adolescent development relevant to legal 

proceedings); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in 

Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 

249 (1996) (canvassing extant scientific literature to create a framework for psychosocial 

evaluation of capacity for judgment in juveniles).

9The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry recommends that 

professionals conducting assessments should have adequate experience, education, and 

training, including knowledge of normal growth and development and child 

psychopathology. Louis J. Kraus et al., Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Practice 

Parameter for Child and Adolescent Forensic Evaluations, 50 J. Am. Acad. Child & 

Adolescence Psychiatry 1299, 1304 (2011). 
36

January 30, 2018, conducting Majors’ psychiatric evaluation two weeks 

later on February 13. The resentencing hearing was initially scheduled for 

February 20 and only later was continued to March 5. She worked

primarily with adults and only came in contact with juveniles in the 

corrections system. There is nothing in the record to establish her 

qualifications with regard to child developmental psychology. Indeed, as 

will be shown below, the State’s expert demonstrated little familiarity with 

child developmental psychology. 

In effect, while the State’s expert was testifying at the March 5 

hearing, it was in fact the prosecutor testifying through repeated use of 

leading questions that suggested the answer. By way of example,

Q. Through your evaluation, as well as a review of the 

record, you found no psychiatric or mental health illness that 

would have impacted his ability to understand what he was 

doing at the time of the crime; correct? A. That’s correct.

. . . .

Q. Is it also a concern in terms of rehabilitation if the 

defendant doesn’t take full responsibility for his actions or 

minimizes his conduct? A. This is kind of where the concern 

for the treatment kind of comes up in terms of 

rehabilitation. . . . That’s kind of where the rehabilitation is 

founded upon.

. . . .

Q. Taking that one step further, if one takes a little 

responsibility but kind of minimizes what he did, it’s going to 

minimize them because they’re going to get out or 

rehabilitation programs; correct? A. Correct.

. . . .

Q. Combined with a lack of empathy for the victims, 

that doesn’t give us a very good forecast for his rehabilitation; 

would that be fair? A. That would be fair.

. . . .
37

Q. So in some respects the judicial declaration at 18 is 

a demarcation point and somewhat of an partial line being 

drawn; would that be fair? A. That would be fair.

Q. If you’re going to draw the line there, then if that’s 

the best way the line gets drawn, then what you’re saying is 

the development that this defendant would have had in the 15 

days from commission of crime until he reached age of 

majority would have been minimal, if any; correct? A. That’s 

correct.

Q. So in terms of mitigating his responsibility for the 

crime, at best it would have minimal mitigating value; would 

that be fair? A. Yes. 

While Majors’ counsel inexplicably did not object to the expert’s 

qualifications or to her testimony, the testimony of the State’s expert is 

entitled to little or no weight by the court. The repeatedly leading nature 

of the questioning undermines any credibility in the testimony. See 

Denniston Partridge Co. v. Romp, 244 Iowa 204, 210, 56 N.W.2d 601, 604 

(1953) (“While the absence of proper objection left the answers in the 

record for what they were worth, we think the weight of such testimony is 

very slight.”). Further, the lack of qualifications in child developmental 

psychology undermines her testimony. State ex rel. Leas in re O’Neal, 303 

N.W.2d 414, 421 (Iowa 1981) (“[I]t is not sufficient that the expert be 

generally qualified in the area of inquiry; ‘sufficient data must appear upon 

which an expert judgment can be made (on the specific question 

propounded,) and if absent, the opinion is incompetent.’ ” (quoting 

Holmquist v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1977))). 

We have emphasized that “[p]erceptions applicable to adult behavior 

cannot normally be used to draw conclusions from juvenile behavior.” 

Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147; see also Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the 

Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 539, 598 (2016) (“I am not 

asserting either that adolescent offenders are categorically incapable of 
38

achieving any particular mens rea or should be rendered blameless by 

their immaturity. Quite the contrary—I am arguing that, like all offenders, 

adolescents should be held accountable for the mens rea they actually

achieved.”); Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining 

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and 

Adolescence, 15 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 285, 293 (2012) (“Emerging 

research in [the field of developmental psychology] indicates that 

developmental immaturity consists of four components distinguishing 

adolescents from adults: independent functioning, decision-making, 

emotion regulation, and general cognitive processing.”). But by using a 

psychiatrist with no demonstrable child development training and whose 

clinical experience was largely with adults, the State’s presentation was 

more akin to a sentencing process that might be appropriate for an adult 

but assuredly was inappropriate for a juvenile. This is evidenced by a 

number of specific errors and omissions in the expert testimony, which 

was erroneously relied upon in the district court’s ruling. 

B. “First and Foremost”: Direction Regarding Consideration of 

the Mitigating Factors of Youth. Lyle states in clear language, “First 

and foremost, the time when a seventeen-year-old could seriously be 

considered to have adult-like culpability has passed.” 854 N.W.2d at 398 

(emphasis added). The first-and-foremost principle is entirely absent from 

the testimony of the expert and from the district court’s opinion. First and 

foremost, lessened culpability for all juveniles under eighteen is the norm, 

not the exception. First and foremost, because “children are 

constitutionally different than adults,” they ordinarily cannot be held to 

the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing. Miller, 

567 U.S. at 470–72, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65. First and foremost, the default 

rule is that children are not subject to mandatory minimums of 
39

incarceration. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 144 (citing Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74). 

First and foremost, “[m]itigation normally is warranted in all crimes.” Id.

at 146. 

As noted by Scott and her colleagues, “[g]iven the background 

principle embraced by the [United States] Supreme Court that most youths 

are immature, the prosecutor carries a substantial burden.” Scott et al., 

Juvenile Sentencing Reform, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 696. According to Scott 

and Steinberg, “a strong presumption that mitigation applies categorically 

to the juvenile offenders avoids innocent errors and more pernicious 

influences that may distort individualized determinations.” Elizabeth S. 

Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice 141 (2008) 

[hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice].

Roby embraces these principles. Under Roby, expert testimony may 

be used to show that the normative mitigation principle does not apply by 

showing that the particular juvenile offender “possessed features of 

maturity beyond his or her years.” 897 N.W.2d at 146. The State has the 

burden of showing the unusual or exceptional maturity, the prerequisite 

showing for departure from child developmental norms. The State must 

show that the juvenile’s maturity is so exceptional and so outside the norm 

that an adult mandatory sentence is appropriate. 

The State’s expert testified that she “found nothing about Majors’ 

age at the time of the offense that mitigated against a mandatory 

sentence.” But that is not the child development framework presented in 

Roby. Under the Roby framework, juveniles under eighteen are less 

culpable than adults unless expert testimony shows maturity beyond his 

or her years. Id. at 146. The record should not be viewed through the lens 

ordinarily applied to adult behavior, but through the lens of child 

developmental psychology principles. Id. at 147. 
40

No such expert testimony was offered in this case. Instead, the 

State’s expert, through highly leading questions, flipped the Roby

framework on its head, put the burden of mitigation based on age on 

Majors, and then declared that she had found nothing to establish 

mitigation. She ignored, or more likely given her lack of qualifications was 

unaware of, the normative developmental principle that teenagers, 

including those that are seventeen years of age, are categorically less 

culpable than adults absent expert testimony that the offender “possessed 

features of maturity beyond his or her years.” Id. She occasionally cited 

facts in the record germane to child development, but these facts were not 

analyzed through the lens of child developmental psychology as required 

by our caselaw. 

Although not explicit, the district court ruling in this case appears 

to have flipped the burden as well. It certainly does not start from the 

general presumption of mitigation for seventeen-year-olds. Indeed, in key 

passages, it reads very much like an ordinary adult sentencing order. If 

the district court had operated from the assumption that “[f]irst and 

foremost, the time when a seventeen-year-old could seriously be 

considered to have adult-like culpability has passed” and the “children are 

different” framework, the numerous and repeated shortcomings in the 

State’s expert testimony would have been viewed as problematic. Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 398; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 470–72, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65. 

A clear example of the district court’s endorsement of legal error arising 

from expert testimony is presented in the erroneous treatment of a 

seventeen-year-old as nearly an adult contrary to established caselaw. 

Even if it is unclear that the district court applied the wrong legal 

standard, reversal and remand is appropriate to clarify the basis of the 

court’s ruling. See State v. Showens, 845 N.W.2d 436, 449–50 (Iowa 2014) 
41

(finding reversal and remand proper where unsure whether the district 

court applied correct legal standard). 

C. Erroneous Treatment of Seventeen-Year-Old as Nearly an 

Adult Contrary to Established Caselaw. 

1. Introduction. The State’s expert and the district court 

erroneously analyzed the impact of Majors’ age. They emphasized that 

Majors’ offense occurred fifteen days before he turned eighteen and then 

suggested that the proper analytical approach was to determine whether 

fifteen days of additional life would have had any impact on Majors’ 

decision-making.

2. Contrary to principles of child developmental psychology. This 

bizarre analytical framework is completely inconsistent with the principles 

of child developmental psychology that underlie Miller, Graham, and Roper

and Roby, Seats, Lyle, and Null. The line for the presumption of lessened 

culpability has been placed at eighteen years of age, many years inside the 

scientific boundaries of the developing child. As noted by the Supreme 

Court, the age of eighteen comes from history and social meaning of age, 

but not from developmental psychology. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct. 

at 1195. This presumption exists in part because the law assumes that a 

person eighteen years of age has the freedom to extricate themselves from 

unfavorable social environments and in part because society generally 

accepts eighteen as a threshold separating children from adults for a wide 

variety of activities. Id. But with respect to persons under the age of 

eighteen, “the presumption of immaturity can be applied confidently to 

most persons in the group.” Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice

at 140. 

It is simply wrong and completely inconsistent with developmental 

psychology, however, to conclude that a seventeen-year-old is almost 
42

eighteen and therefore not entitled to the presumption of immaturity. It is 

well established that a lot of relevant social and emotional development 

related to culpability occurs in juveniles after the age of eighteen and 

through the mid-twenties.10 According to two leading scholars in 

adolescent development and the law, Scott and Steinberg, “[t]he research 

clarifies that substantial psychological maturation takes place in the 

middle of late adolescence and even into early adulthood.” Id. at 60. Thus, 

Scott and Steinberg emphasize that “adolescents, even at age sixteen and 

seventeen, are immature in their psychosocial and emotional development, 

and this likely affects their decisions about involvement in crime in ways 

that distinguish them from adults.” Id. at 131. Recently, Steinberg and 

his colleagues stated,

Over the past decade, developmental psychologists and 

neuroscientists have found that biological and psychological 

development continues into the early twenties, well beyond 

 10The leading exploration of developmental psychology for “emerging adults” is 

Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens 

Through the Twenties, 55 Am. Psychologist 496 (2000). The article broadly examines the 

subjective and objective differences of individuals between eighteen and twenty-five, as 

compared to adolescents and youth adults. See also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence 

Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less 

Culpable than Adults, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 741, 758 (2000) (“The present study indicates 

that . . . psychosocial characteristics continue to develop during late adolescence, and 

that these changes result in significant declines in antisocial decision-making . . . [which] 

are appreciable enough to warrant drawing a legal distinction.”). The last twenty years of 

research have supported Arnett’s view that the brains of teens continue to evolve until 

the mid-twenties. See, e.g., Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult?: 

Assessing Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 Psychol. Sci. 549, 

559–60 (2016) (suggesting young adults have lower cognitive capacity in emotional 

situations when compared to adults); Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young 

Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 669 (2018) (canvassing both 

the scientific literature about young adult development and examining it in light of 

sentencing and mass incarceration); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a 

Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. 

Rev. 641 (2016) (examining the neuroscientific, psychological, and sociological research 

on young adulthood as applied in a criminal justice context); Kelsey B. Shust, Comment, 

Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving Young Adults, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 

667, 684–89 (2014) (exploring broadly the legal relationship between youthfulness and 

culpability). 
43

the age of majority. Recently, researchers have found that 

eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old adults are more like younger 

adolescents than older adults in their impulsivity under 

conditions of emotional arousal.

Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adult as a Transitional Legal Category: 

Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 642 

(2016) [hereinafter Scott et al., Transitional Legal Category].

3. Contrary to caselaw. The caselaw does not support the justshort-of-eighteen analysis of the State’s expert that was erroneously 

adopted by the district court. In Roper, the Supreme Court made no 

mention of the just-short-of-eighteen argument even though Roper was 

just a few months shy of his eighteenth birthday when he committed a 

brutal murder. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 619, 125 S. Ct. at 1223. Nothing 

in United States Supreme Court caselaw suggests that a just-short-ofeighteen analysis is appropriate in considering the culpability of youth in 

the application of cruel and unusual punishment concepts.

Our Iowa caselaw is clear on this point. In Null, for instance, we 

cited Steinberg and others for the proposition that “identity development, 

which is often accompanied by experimentation with risky, illegal, or 

dangerous activities, occurs in late adolescence and early adulthood.” 836 

N.W.2d at 55 (citing Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice at 50–

52). We further noted that “[t]he research clarifies that substantial 

psychological maturation takes place in middle and late adolescence and 

even into early adulthood.” Id. (quoting Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking 

Juvenile Justice at 60). 

Then in Lyle, the district court sentenced a seventeen-year-old to an 

adult mandatory minimum for the crime of second-degree robbery. 854 

N.W.2d at 380. We vacated the sentence and remanded the case for an 

individualized hearing on whether the adult mandatory sentence could be 
44

imposed on Lyle. Id. at 404. In Lyle, we cited Graham for the proposition 

that persons under eighteen had “categorically diminished culpability.” Id.

at 398 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–75, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30).

We again returned to the subject in Seats, where we considered a 

sentencing proceeding involving a seventeen-year-old offender convicted of 

first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. 865 N.W.2d at 549. In 

sentencing Seats to life in prison without parole, the district court 

emphasized that Seats was a seventeen-year-old, thereby raising the 

“almost eighteen” argument. Id. at 556–57. 

In response, we stated that we recognized that “in Roper, the line 

between being a juvenile and an adult was drawn for cruel and unusual 

punishment purposes at eighteen years of age.” Id. at 556–57 (citing 

Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, 125 S. Ct. at 1197–98). Yet, we cited Null for the 

proposition that current science demonstrated that the brain continued to 

develop into the early twenties. Id. at 557 (citing Null, 836 N.W.2d at 55). 

We repeated the findings of Scott and Steinberg that “adolescents, even at 

the age sixteen and seventeen, are immature in their psychosocial and 

emotional development, and this likely affects their decisions about 

involvement in crime that distinguishes them from adults.” Id. at 557 

(quoting Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice at 131). Then we 

declared, “In light of the science, the fact that a defendant is nearing the age 

of eighteen does not undermine the teachings of Miller and Null.” Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Finally, in Roby, the defendant was sixteen and seventeen years old 

when he committed the crimes of sexual abuse in the second and third 

degrees. We again cited the work of developmental psychologists for the 

proposition that “developmental changes . . . continue into the midtwenties.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting Scott et al., Transitional Legal 
45

Category, 85 Fordham L. Rev. at 647). We declared that “age is not a 

sliding scale that necessarily weighs against mitigation the closer the 

offender is to turning eighteen years old at the time of the crime.” Id. But 

that, of course, is exactly what the State’s expert did, and the approach 

the district court uncritically adopted. 

In a footnote, the majority cites Steinberg for the proposition that 

cognitive development of sixteen-year-olds is often fully developed. See

Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? 

Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA 

“Flip-Flop,” 64 Am. Psychologist 583, 586–87 (2009) (“Studies that have 

examined logical reasoning abilities in structured situations and basic 

information processing skills, for instance, find no appreciable differences 

between adolescents age 16 and older and adults[.]”). But the majority is 

apparently unaware that Steinberg, consistent with the consensus social 

science, emphasizes that psychosocial and emotional development

continues into the mid-twenties and that this delay in development 

impacts criminal culpability. See Scott & Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile 

Justice at 60; see also Scott et al., Transitional Legal Category, 85 Fordham 

L. Rev. at 647 (“[B]ecause development of brain systems that regulate 

impulse control is more protracted, continuing into the early twenties, a 

period of vulnerability to risky behavior results . . . [and may be likened to 

an] ‘accelerator’ [being] pressed to the floor, [while] a good ‘braking system’ 

is not yet in place.” (Footnote omitted.)). Further, the majority fails to 

recognize that our caselaw, and that of the United State Supreme Court, 

embraces the work of Steinberg and his colleagues for precisely the 

opposite proposition advanced by the majority and supported by the 

footnote. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1196; Seats, 865 

N.W.2d at 557. Finally, the majority fails to tell the reader that Roby, 
46

Seats, Lyle, and Null stand for the proposition that even those approaching 

eighteen years of age as a general rule have diminished culpability. 

In the end, the district court was misled by an unqualified expert. 

“Forensic professionals conducting assessments for a sentencing hearing 

must be sure to keep up with relevant post-Miller legislation and case law 

in the jurisdiction where the hearing is taking place.” Kimberly Larson et 

al., Miller v. Alabama: Implications for the Forensic Mental Health 

Assessment at the Intersection for Social Science and the Law, 39 New Eng. 

J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 319, 330 n.60 (2013) [hereinafter Larson 

et al., Mental Health Assessments]. As a nonlawyer medical professional 

with very limited professional interaction with juveniles who was 

designated at the last minute to testify as an expert for the first time in a 

sentencing hearing involving a juvenile offender, the State’s expert, 

perhaps, can be forgiven for her lack of knowledge about child and young 

adult developmental psychology and the applicable caselaw. She simply 

was clueless when the prosecutor asked her leading questions that led the 

expert to testify in a manner contrary to applicable Iowa Supreme Court 

precedent and in total disregard of the findings of child developmental 

psychology. 

The district court expressly embraced the “almost eighteen” 

reasoning of the State’s expert in considering age, which it characterized 

as “the most important factor” under our decisions. Through the use of 

the “almost eighteen” framework, the district court, like the State’s expert, 

eviscerated the importance of age by essentially treating Majors as an 

adult. When a district court unlawfully considers a factor in making a 

decision, an abuse of discretion is present. State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 

831, 856 (Iowa 2018) (“ ‘[I]f a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant 

factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight 
47

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors 

but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment’ a discretionary 

sentencing ruling may be an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Roby, 897 

N.W.2d at 138)); State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 2005) (“[T]he use 

of an impermissible sentencing factor is an abuse of discretion and 

requires resentencing.”). 

D. Failure to Conduct Meaningful Evaluation. In order to 

overcome the presumption of diminished culpability for youth, the State 

must ordinarily present a meaningful professional evaluation of the 

defendant. Consistent with principles of child developmental psychology, 

we have taken a broad approach to environmental factors, including such 

things as parental neglect, drug or alcohol use, prior exposure to violence, 

and age-related susceptibility to psychological or emotional damage. 

Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556. In conducting a forensic evaluation of a juvenile 

offender, Scott and her colleagues declare that the child development 

expert evaluating the culpability of juvenile defendants must engage in 

“skilled interviewing of the youth, and of family members, teachers, and 

peers who have observed the youth’s functioning.” Scott et al., Juvenile 

Sentencing Reform, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 697. This should be done in light 

of “a comprehensive review of records of the youth’s past behavior in 

various social situations (e.g. school, rehabilitation settings).” Id.

Instead, the State’s expert selectively gathered documents available 

at the department of corrections and in the court file. She assiduously 

gathered documents regarding each and every discipline violation. But 

contrary to the child developmental psychology authorities, she did not 

thoroughly interview the parents. Contrary to the child development 

authorities, she did not thoroughly interview teachers. Contrary to the 

child development authorities, she did not thoroughly interview Majors’ 
48

peers. She appears to have thoroughly gathered information that might 

reflect adversely on Majors but did not engage in the kind of thorough 

exploration that is required for meaningful evaluation according to Scott 

and her colleagues. 

I suppose one might argue that the thorough investigation 

demanded by Scott and her colleagues would be inefficient and yield very 

little. The State has limited resources, so the argument goes, and cannot 

be expected to reach out beyond the department of corrections and the 

court system in the gathering of materials for the evaluation of a juvenile 

offender facing an adult mandatory minimum sentence. But that just is 

not the way things are done, right? Can’t we simply follow our gut 

instincts, with a limited factual review?

No! Put simply, the law requires more. The State has the burden of 

showing that a juvenile offender is an exceptional person that falls outside 

ordinary norms that mitigate culpability. This burden is very difficult to 

meet without a thorough investigation of the family and social background 

of a juvenile offender, as demanded by Scott and her colleagues.

Since circumstances vary from individual to individual, it is difficult 

to draw a line in the sand to say that a particular review is sufficient or 

not. At some point the investigation supporting an evaluation must come 

to an end, and at some juncture there are diminishing returns. There is, 

for instance, no requirement that an expert interview all family members, 

every teacher, and every peer. But what is required is that a reasonable 

review be conducted. That did not occur in this case. 

The record shows that Majors was abused by his father up until 

sixth grade. Certainly this is a fact that any child developmental 

psychologist would want to explore and develop. See, e.g., Samantha 

Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders with a 
49

Developmental Approach to Sentencing, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 801, 850 (2013) 

(noting the limitations of developmental science and generalizations 

because of varying experiences in individuals due to their sociological 

backgrounds, including exposure to abuse, trauma, or neglect); David 

Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, 

and Law, 101 Marq. L. Rev. 601, 626 (2018) (“As children’s brains react to 

traumatic stressors, processes are trigged that affect different systems in 

the body . . . rang[ing] from behavioral self-regulation problems and mental 

illness . . . [to] risk of alcohol or substance abuse . . . .” (Footnotes 

omitted.)). See generally Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Early Physical Abuse 

and Later Violent Delinquency: A Prospective Longitudinal Study, 12 Child 

Maltreatment 233 (2007) (citing the link between early physical abuse and 

later aggression and delinquency and other social and psychological 

problems, including depression and anxiety). The State’s expert in Majors’ 

case made no such effort. 

The record also shows that Majors transferred out of the Bedford 

Public Schools and enrolled in an alternative school at age fifteen. 

Something substantial is going on here. Any child developmental mental 

health professional would thoroughly review the attendant circumstances 

to figure out what was going on. See, e.g., Substance Abuse & Mental 

Health Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Screening and 

Assessment of Adolescents in Juvenile Justice Setting, in Screening and 

Assessing Adolescents for Substance Use Disorders, Treatment 

Improvement Protocol (TIP) Series 45 (2012) (noting that screening and 

assessing adolescents in a juvenile justice setting is a complex task and 

the evaluator must be alert to the comorbidities a juvenile experiencing 

substance abuse may encounter, such as poor school performance). Yet, 
50

the State’s expert made no serious effort to understand what was going on 

here. 

And this isn’t the only issue of concern that the expert did not 

properly consider. Majors suffered from scoliosis, or curvature of the 

spine. It was apparently serious enough to require surgical intervention 

and the placement of rods in his back at the age of twelve. Later, he had 

to wear a brace of some kind. Although Majors was inclined to athletics, 

he could no longer engage in contact sports in small town Iowa middle and 

high schools. What was the impact of this development? Did it contribute 

to feelings of anger and loneliness? See Ryszard Tomaszewski & 

Magdalena Janowska, Psychological Aspects of Scoliosis Treatment in 

Children, in Recent Advances in Scoliosis 301, 301–03 (Theodoros Grivas 

ed., 2012) (noting the effects of scoliosis compound on existing challenges 

of adolescence, creating altered perceptions of body image, anger, 

embarrassment, and impairment of social functioning); Despina 

Sapountzi-Krepia et al., The Experience of Brace Treatment in 

Children/Adolescents with Scoliosis, 1 Scoliosis art. 8 (2006) (noting that 

scoliosis can be a risk factor for psychological impairment in children and 

adolescents, particularly in those undergoing brace treatment). How did 

this affect Majors? The expert gives us no insight.

The record further indicates that as a child, Majors was mocked by 

his peers because his family raised chickens in the country. According to 

his discharge summary from Oakdale in 2003, Majors “seem[ed] to be an 

angry individual who tend[ed] to ruminate on being ridiculed by other 

children in the past and tend[ed] to lose his temper when things [did] not 

go his way.” A nurse additionally noted that Majors “appear[ed] to have 

many years of anger bottled up from teasing and abuse from peers.” He 

was “tearful” when describing past experience of abuse and teasing, and 
51

his file notes Majors was “very immature (emotionally) and doesn’t cope 

well with stress or problems.” The file suggests that Majors “might benefit 

from therapy targeting interpersonal relationships, difficulties, and anger.” 

These are the kinds of things that would interest a child developmental 

psychologist or psychiatrist. See Anat Brunstein-Klomek et al., Bullying, 

Depression, and Suicidality in Adolescents, 46 J. Am. Acad. Child & 

Adolescent Psychiatry 40, 40–41 (2007) (noting that studies examining the 

relationship between bullying, and depression and suicidality, found 

victims were more likely to manifest more depressive symptoms, 

psychological distress, and both suicidal ideations and suicide attempts 

than nonvictims); Nicholas Carlisle & Eric Rofes, School Bullying: Do Adult 

Survivors Perceive Long-Term Effects?, 13 Traumatology 16, 17–18, 23 

(2007) (noting studies that determined the common emotional and 

behavioral responses to bullying are vengefulness, anger, self-pity, 

anxiety, low self-regard, and school absenteeism and discussing how some 

symptoms remain even after bullying as stopped, and how anger and 

vengeful ideation are a long-term effect of survivors of bullying); Calli 

Tzani-Pepelasi, Childhood Bullying Can Cause Lifelong Psychological 

Damage—Here’s How to Spot the Signs and Move On, The Conversation, 

(last updated August 8, 2018), http://theconversation.com/childhoodbullying-can-cause-lifelong-psychological-damage-heres-how-to-spot-thesigns-and-move-on-100288 [https://perma.cc/JY5C-9976] (discussing 

studies that outline effects of bullying including self-esteem issues and 

anger due to repeated victimization). The State’s expert drives by these 

very important developmental clues and finds nothing, individually or 

cumulatively, in Majors’ background to support lessened culpability? 

In addition, the State’s expert failed to recognize obvious features of 

the record that show immaturity, such as compromised capacity to 
52

consider future consequences. When Majors was at Oakdale receiving 

psychiatric treatment, he was preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the notion 

that he threw his life away. Obviously, Majors came to the view that his 

risk-taking calculus was unbalanced. One of the trademark features of 

youth is undervaluing the long-term costs of their behavior to themselves 

and others. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by 

Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished 

Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 

1012 (2003). Majors stewing over his predicament suggests he came to 

recognize his “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 

consequences” that Miller finds lessen culpability in juveniles. 567 U.S. at 

472, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.

One of the elements of youthful immaturity is the influence of mass 

media. See generally Jeffery Jensen Arnett, Adolescents’ Use of Media for 

Self-Socialization, 24 J. Youth & Adolescents 519, 520 (1995) (finding 

media to be a significant part of adolescents’ lives, and the potential of 

media in socialization of youth “especially strong”); Jonathan Seiden, 

Comment, Scream-ing for a Solution: Regulating Hollywood Violence; An 

Analysis of Legal and Legislative Remedies, 3 J. Const. L. 1010, 1010 

(2001) (analyzing violence in film and the effects of viewing violent films on 

juveniles). As noted by prestigious authority, the “visible and volatile” 

influence of media is an important part of the socio-ecology of children and 

youth. Nat’l Res. Council & Inst. of Med., Studying Media Effects on 

Children and Youth 1 (2006).

Majors is a poster child of the influence of the media. He got the 

idea of putting a plastic bottle on the end of his rifle to muffle the sound 

from a Steven Segal movie. Sounds like a pretty immature reaction to me. 

Copycat behaviors among juveniles who commit violent crime is not 
53

unusual. See Ray Surette, Self-Reported Copycat Crime Among a 

Population of Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, 48 Crime & 

Delinquency 46, 62 (2002). 

And then there is the issue of adolescent drug use. Generally, 

adolescent drug usage has been found to be a mitigating factor to be 

considered in sentencing juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Seats, 865 N.W.2d 

at 556 (“One of the circumstances the sentencing judge needs to consider 

is whether substance abuse played a role in the juvenile’s commission of 

the crime.”). It certainly should have been considered here. 

At the time of resentencing, the State’s expert diagnosed Majors as 

having alcohol-use disorder, cannabis-use disorder, and stimulant 

disorder, specifically methamphetamine, all moderate and in sustained 

remission. These disorders must have predated his imprisonment and 

been developed as a juvenile. The record supports such a conclusion of 

adolescent polysubstance abuse by Majors. Any reasonable exploration of 

juvenile substance abuse would have yielded important information 

relevant to Majors’ sentence. 

The starting point is the accepted definition of substance-use 

disorder.11 According to the DSM-5, substance-use disorder is 

characterized by a “cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological 

symptoms indicating that the individual continues using the substance 

despite significant substance related problems.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 483 (5th ed. 2013) 

[hereinafter DSM-5]. 

Adolescent substance use is associated with negative health and 

behavioral outcomes, including alterations in neurodevelopment. See 

 11Under the DSM-IV framework, which Majors was diagnosed under, the various 

alcohol- and substance-abuse disorders have been consolidated under the umbrella of 

substance-use disorder in the DSM-5.
54

generally Reagan Wetherill & Susan F. Tapert, Adolescent Brain 

Development, Substance Use, and Psychotherapeutic Change, 27 Psych. 

Addictive Behav. 393, 393 (2013) (“Adolescent substance use is associated 

with negative health, social, and behavioral outcomes, including 

alterations in neurodevelopment.”). Since the brain changes through 

adolescence, exposure to neurotoxins, such as alcohol and illicit drugs, 

may interrupt neurodevelopment and associated cognitive and behavioral 

functioning. Id. at 394–96 (explaining the complex neurological pathways 

that are impacted through behaviors such as drinking and illicit drug use). 

An important characteristic of substance-use disorder is the “underlying 

change in brain circuits that may persist beyond detoxification,” especially 

in individuals with severe disorders. DSM-5 at 483.

Adolescent substance use has been linked to issues in interpersonal 

relationships. Studies report that temperamental and personality traits 

reflecting “behavioral undercontrol and poor self-regulation are associated 

with adolescent substance use problems.” Laurie Chassin et al., 

Adolescent Substance Use, in Handbook of Adolescent Psychology 676 

(Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2004). The 

personality characteristics most consistently associated with adolescent 

substance use include “unconventionality, low ego control, sensation 

seeking, aggression, impulsivity, and an inability to delay gratification.” 

Id. 

Additionally, adolescents with substance use problems are 

characterized by 

lower levels of executive functioning—that is, higher order 

cognitive processes that allows for future goal-oriented 

behavior. These processes include planning, organizational 

skills, selective attention, hypothesis generations, cognitive 

flexibility, maintenance of cognitive-set decision making, 

judgment, inhibitory control, and self regulation. 
55

Id. at 677. Compared to adults, the health and social consequences of 

substance abuse for adolescents are more serious due to a variety of 

biological reasons. Garrett O’Connor, The Psychology of Adolescent 

Addiction, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 701, 701 (1997). 

While experimentation with substances occurs for many 

adolescents, some progress to regular use where the adolescent uses in an 

attempt to achieve a high or intoxication or they use as a coping 

mechanism. Id. at 707. This may lead to a change in behavior from 

decreased school or job performance, social isolation, and deceitful 

patterns of behavior with family and friends to prevent them from learning 

about the drug use. Id. Other behaviors include lying, stealing, and 

blaming others. Id. at 707–08. In the event the adolescent continues using 

and their use becomes more frequent, more serious problems develop, 

including progression in severity of delinquent behaviors, an increase in 

depression, and reduced impulse control. Id. 

Where other substances, such as alcohol, may require repeated uses 

and exposure to cause damage to the brain, methamphetamine can induce 

significant brain death within hours of a single high dose. Mary Holley, 

How Reversible Is Methamphetamine-Related Brain Damage?, 82 N.D. L. 

Rev. 1135, 1138 (2006). When someone is early in their addiction, the 

crash from methamphetamine may appear like a “mild depression.” Id. 

Continued and habitual use equates to a worse crash that lasts longer, 

between seven to fourteen days. Id. at 1139. Following habitual use, the 

person may sleep for days, present as irritable, and have physical 

symptoms, such as headaches, to accompany the psychological. Id. 

Additionally, “[n]early ninety percent of meth addicts experience at least 

occasional hallucinations while intoxicated.” Id. at 1141. 
56

Following continued use, someone who is addicted to 

methamphetamine may “fly into a rage and act aggressively or violently” 

and may demonstrate “increase[ed] irritability, impatience, and 

impulsiveness,” thereby impairing the user’s relationships with those 

around them. Id. at 1140. It may also produce “profound insomnia” in 

the user, though they are “not distressed by it, [as] he does not feel a need 

for sleep. He feels highly productive, important, and intelligent. He 

commonly does not realize he’s impatient. Instead, he places the blame 

on others . . . .” Id. at 1139–40.

Not surprisingly, “[methamphetamine] use during adolescence is 

associated with . . . behavioral problems such as increased anti-social 

behaviors.” Jordan M. Buck & Jessica A. Siegel, The Effects of Adolescent 

Methamphetamine Exposure, 9 Frontiers in Neuroscience 1, 2 (2015). 

Additionally, in adolescent users, methamphetamine-induced 

psychological and behavioral alterations appear to remain even after 

secession of the drug. Id.

The State’s expert sailed by these substance-abuse issues. 

Although polysubstance abuse was noted, it was simply not explored. In 

light of the history of parental abuse, the school transfer issue, the 

scoliosis, the mockery from childhood peers, the influence of the mass 

media, the polysubstance abuse, and the pent-up anger in Majors, there 

was a lot of material for a well-qualified child developmental psychologist 

or psychiatrist to consider. But the State’s expert left these boulders 

unturned. In light of the gaps, the district court must determine whether 

the State successfully rebutted the notion that, “first and foremost,” a 

juvenile offender has less culpability than an adult. The professional 

opinion was not a meaningful evaluation utilizing child developmental 

psychology. There is no indication that the district court evaluated the 
57

very weak nature of the expert testimony against the “first and foremost” 

and “children are different” framework. Where it is uncertain whether the 

correct legal standard has been applied, we may reverse and remand for 

application of the correct legal standard. Showens, 845 N.W.2d at 449. 

E. Flawed Analysis of Ability to Navigate Legal System. The 

expert’s review of Majors’ medical records from 2003, finding that Majors 

was competent to stand trial and that he was not insane, led the expert to 

conclude that the Miller factor related to the ability of youth to interact 

with the legal system was not in play. But that reasoning is demonstrably 

incorrect. If Majors was incompetent or insane, there would be no trial, 

no conviction, and no sentence. See State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 

395 (Iowa 1993) (“Constitutionally, defendants may not be tried or 

convicted while they are incompetent to stand trial or to assist in their 

defense.”); State v. McMullin, 421 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa 1988) (“Insanity 

is an affirmative defense which, if proved, will preclude conviction of a 

crime.”). In other words, if he was insane or incompetent, there would be 

no need to consider Miller factors at all. If you use incompetence to stand 

trial and insanity as screening tools, you totally eliminate the criterion of 

difficulties juveniles face in navigating the court system as spelled out by 

the Supreme Court in Graham, and in our caselaw. The analysis offered 

by the expert is certainly, unquestionably, incorrect as a matter of law. 

Indeed, the State’s expert did not address the concerns of Graham. 

In Graham, the Court noted that youth have a limited understanding of 

the criminal legal system, “are less likely than adults to work effectively 

with their lawyers to aid in their defense” due to a lack of trust and more 

“limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the 

institutional actors within it.” 560 U.S. at 78, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. When 

the question is appropriately framed, there is ample reason to believe that 
58

Majors did, in fact, have trouble navigating the legal system, precisely as 

Graham forewarned. 

The State’s expert clearly did not review the record in this case. If 

she had, she would have learned that there was ample reason to believe 

that Majors had trouble dealing appropriately with the legal system. Over 

the course of the proceedings stemming from these charges, from 2002 to 

the present, Majors had at least eleven attorneys of record, many of which 

fairly quickly withdrew. Focusing on the relevant period of 2002–2003, 

Majors was represented by at least four attorneys. On May 31, 2002, a 

lawyer was appointed as counsel for Majors. That lawyer withdrew, 

however, on June 4, at which point a second lawyer appeared. On 

February 25, 2003, a third lawyer perfected the defendant’s appeal, which 

was handled by the state appellate defender’s office. On remand, a fourth 

lawyer undertook his representation, but withdrew on April 15. The 

musical chairs with all the lawyers, at the very least, suggests Majors had 

difficulty getting along with his legal representatives. 

Ultimately, Majors agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted 

murder with the proviso that no appeal would be taken.12 He then turned 

around and filed a notice of appeal, pulling down his plea bargain. He 

claimed that he did so because his parents and his attorney pressured him 

to accept the original plea bargain and that his attorney later urged him 

to appeal. After the appeal was filed, the original plea bargain failed and 

Majors was back to square one. Eventually, he plead guilty not only to 

 12The condition of the plea bargain that no appeal be taken was very important to 

the State. There was little in the trial information to suggest that Majors attempted to 

murder anyone. No shots were fired. He hid in a closet, with duct tape, suggesting 

perhaps a planned kidnapping or sexual assault but something other than attempted 

murder. Although his rifle was loaded and he had clear shots at the victims, he did not 

discharge the weapon. In the plea colloquy, Majors generally admitted the facts in the 

trial information, but examination of the minutes do not clearly establish the basis for 

attempted murder.
59

attempted murder, which was the sole crime for which he was convicted 

in the first plea bargain, but the additional crime of burglary. Because of 

his on-off-on approach to the plea bargain, Majors ended up with an 

additional ten years added onto his prison sentence. Inability to navigate 

the legal system abounds in this example. 

The State’s expert noted that Majors tried to manipulate the system 

by feigning psychiatric illness pending disposition of criminal charges. To 

the extent this is true, such a manipulative maneuver is part of the normal 

adolescent effort to avoid responsibility but also shows a fundamental 

misunderstanding of how our legal system works. 

Further, as correctly narrated by the State’s expert, Majors came up 

with numerous oddball and inconsistent stories attempting to explain his 

behavior. No doubt he attempted to manipulate the legal system to lessen 

his culpability, and those attempts failed. It seems likely that his 

immaturity led him to make these inconsistent stories and failed efforts to 

manipulate the legal system. As every parent knows, nonacceptance of 

blame and inconsistent reporting is a trademark feature of youth called to 

account for their actions. 

Finally, as with the age criterion, the expert shifted the burden of 

proof on the question of the ability of juvenile defendants to navigate the 

court system. When asked whether Majors was able to understand the 

legal proceedings, the expert noted that they “don’t have any evidence to 

the contrary.” But evidence to the contrary is exactly what is required to 

eliminate difficulties in navigating the court system as a mitigating factor 

when considering imposition of an adult mandatory sentence on a juvenile 

offender. 

The district court did not focus on the potential difficulties Majors 

had in navigating the legal system. The district court did emphasize that 
60

Majors backed out of a plea agreement, ultimately resulting in an 

additional ten-year sentence. If this case were to be remanded, the district 

court would have an opportunity to give the question more careful 

consideration. 

F. Flawed Approach to Impulsivity. The State’s expert suggested 

that because Majors engaged in planning for his crime, Majors lacked the 

impulsivity associated with youth. There is no exact and unique definition 

of impulsivity, and there is no agreement over its major components. 

Nour-Mohammad Bakhshani, Impulsivity: A Predisposition Toward Risky 

Behaviors, 3 Int’l J. High Risk Behavs. & Addiction 1, 3 (2014). Impulsivity 

has sometimes been defined as swift action without forethought or 

conscious judgment, but also as “behavior without adequate thought” and 

“the tendency to act with less forethought than do most individuals of 

equal ability and knowledge.” F. Gerard Moeller et al., Psychiatric Aspects 

of Impulsivity, 158 Am. J. of Psychiatry 1783, 1783 (2001). 

But under the caselaw, it is clear that the latter two definitions of 

impulsivity apply when considering the mitigating features of youth. For 

example, in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993), the 

Supreme Court considered a case where the nineteen-year-old defendant 

surveyed the layout of the store prior to a robbery, determined the number 

of workers present, determined to kill any witnesses to the crime, retrieved 

a handgun, engaged in robbery, and killed an employee. Id. at 353, 113 

S. Ct. at 2661. The Court noted that the jury was entitled to consider the 

mitigating qualities of youth which “often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.” Id. at 367, 113 S. Ct. at 2669. 

Similarly, in Roper, a seventeen-year-old defendant planned to commit a 

burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and 

throwing her from a bridge into the water. 543 U.S. at 556–57, 125 S. Ct. 
61

at 1187–88. Counsel challenging his sentence called clinical psychologists 

and other witnesses indicating that the defendant was “very immature,” 

and “very impulsive.” Id. at 559, 125 S. Ct. at 1189. In granting relief, the 

Roper Court cited Johnson for the proposition that juveniles engage in 

“impetuous and ill-considered actions.” Id. at 569, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 

(quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367, 113 S Ct. at 2669). Likewise, in 

Graham, the juvenile defendant engaged in a crime spree which showed 

planning, yet the Court again in granting relief cited Johnson, noting that 

the qualities of youth included a tendency to make “impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.” 560 U.S. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 

(quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367, 113 S. Ct. at 2669). 

Clearly, under Johnson, Roper, and Graham, the fact that the 

underlying crime involved planning does not negate the notion that the 

signature qualities of youth, including the tendency to make “impetuous 

and ill-considered decisions,” may be considered as a mitigating factor in 

the sentencing of a juvenile offender. And, as noted by Roby, “[t]he 

aggravating circumstances of a crime that suggest that an adult offender 

is depraved may only reveal a juvenile offender to be wildly immature and 

impetuous.” 897 N.W.2d at 146. The fact that juveniles have the ability 

to plan a crime does not negate the proposition that “children are different” 

or the application of Roper-Graham-Miller principles. To the extent the 

district court relied on “planning of the crime” as preventing application of 

the mitigating features of youth, it applied the wrong legal standard. 

G. Treatment of Rehabilitation. Developmental psychology tells 

us two things about the prospects for the rehabilitation of juveniles and 

our ability to predict which offenders will commit violence in the future. 

First, rehabilitation is the norm for juvenile offenders, even when they 

commit heinous crimes. The origins of the juvenile justice system are 
62

rooted in the idea of more rehabilitation for youthful offenders than their 

adult counterparts. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 390–92 (summarizing the 

social science and caselaw underlying the rehabilitative purposes inherent 

in juvenile justice); Comm. on Assessing Juvenile Justice Reform, Nat’l 

Acad. of Scis., Reforming Juvenile Justice 1–4, 31–49 (2013) [hereinafter 

Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Reforming Juvenile Justice] (outlining the penological 

differences in dealing with juvenile and adult offenders); Martin Gardner, 

Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right to Rehabilitation: 

Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 455, 471–74 

(2016) (expounding on the rehabilitative origins of the juvenile justice 

framework); Kathryn Monahan et al., Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice: 

A Developmental Perspective, 44 Crime & Just. 577, 577 (2015) 

[hereinafter Monahan et al., A Developmental Perspective] (“The early 

juvenile court viewed and treated juveniles as distinct from adults, with a 

greater focus on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment for youthful 

criminal behavior.”). 

In fact, a developmental approach recognizes that the illegal 

behavior occurred during a period of development when youth are more 

likely to exercise poor judgment and engage in risky behavior in pursuit of 

thrills and excitement. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Reforming Juvenile Justice at 

20 (“A developmental approach to juvenile justice recognizes that illegal 

acts committed by adolescents occur in the context of a distinct period of 

human development, a time of life when individuals are more likely to 

exercise poor judgment, take risks, and pursue thrills and excitement.”). 

Research reinforces that juveniles are different from adults in their 

cognitive processing and development, making them categorically 

different. Id. at 32 (“[A] growing body of research [over the last decade] on 

adolescent development, particularly brain development . . . reinforces the 
63

conventional wisdom that adolescents are different from adults in ways 

that affect their criminal conduct, and it has probably contributed to the 

reemergence of less punitive attitudes toward juvenile offenders.”). While 

the pendulum has swung between orientations of punishment versus 

rehabilitation, it has shifted back through the use of developmental 

sciences. Monahan et al., A Developmental Perspective, 44 Crime & Just. 

at 578 (noting that declining crime rates, increasing support for 

rehabilitative penological approaches, and advancing scientific 

understanding of developmental science contribute to this shift). This was 

best captured in Roper, where the Court recognized the “diminished 

culpability of juveniles” and their greater capacity for rehabilitation due to 

their “transient immaturity.” 543 U.S. at 571, 573, 125 S. Ct. at 1196–

97. This principle was applied in subsequent cases regarding juvenile 

culpability in both the United States Supreme Court and this court. See 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 

S. Ct. at 2026; Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 392.

Second, while some offenders may well reoffend in the future, it is 

extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make predictions of future 

dangerousness. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of 

Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 

60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 353, 362–63 (2003) (suggesting that clinical 

predictions about future dangerousness are too unreliable for use in 

court); Adam Lamparello, Using Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future 

Dangerousness, 42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 481, 488 (2011) (“[T]he 

courts––and commentators––have consistently recognized that predictive 

adjudications, whether it be for future dangerousness or lack of control, 

are often unreliable or . . . simply inaccurate.”). In fact, the likelihood of a 

juvenile offender become a chronic adult criminal is small. Alex R. 
64

Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory, Research, and 

Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 New Eng. J. 

on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 347, 353 (2013) [hereinafter Piquero, Youth 

Matters] (“Only a very small number of persons continue to offend into and 

throughout adulthood . . . .”). 

Rates of all kinds of crimes committed by juveniles decrease 

precipitously with age, a phenomenon referred to as the “age-crime curve.” 

Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court 

Decisions About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 Nature Reviews 

Neuroscience 513, 515 & fig. 1 (2013) (illustrating “a consistent 

relationship between age and crime” across offenses and despite changes 

in the overall crime rate); see also Alex R. Piquero et al., Violence in 

Criminal Careers: A Review of the Literature from a Developmental LifeCourse Perspective, 17 Aggression & Violent Behav. 171, 172 (2012) 

(examining theoretical frameworks for longitudinal offending patterns). 

Further, across many studies, it appears that even for violent offenders, 

“the likelihood of repeating [violence] is very rare.” Piquero, Youth Matters, 

39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement at 356. These difficulties are 

even more present when juvenile offenders are involved. See Roper, 543 

U.S. at 573, 125 S. Ct. at 1197 (“It is difficult even for expert psychologists

to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 

unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose 

crime reflects irreparable corruption.”); Larson et al., Mental Health 

Assessments, 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement at 335–36 

(“[T]here is currently no basis in current behavioral science nor wellinformed professional knowledge that can support any reliable forensic 

expert opinion on the relative likelihood of a specific adolescent’s prospects 

for rehabilitation at a date that may be years to decades in the future.”); 
65

Piquero, Youth Matters, 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement at 

355 (“[I]t is very difficult to predict early in the life-course which individual 

juvenile offender will go on to become a recidivistic adult offender.”); Scott 

et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 684 (“[P]rediction of 

future violence from adolescent criminal behavior, even serious criminal 

behavior, is unreliable and prone to error.”). 

In Roby, we stated that rehabilitation was a factor that supports 

mitigation for most juvenile offenders because “delinquency is normally 

transient.” 897 N.W.2d at 147. We emphasized that “judges cannot 

necessarily use the seriousness of a criminal act, such as murder, to 

conclude the juvenile falls within the minority of juveniles who will be 

future offenders or are not amenable to reform.” Id. After all, “the 

signature qualities of youth are transient.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 394 

(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1196). We have further 

concluded, however, that in the resentencing of juveniles, current evidence 

regarding rehabilitation is admissible. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 

121–22 (Iowa 2013) (finding that individualized sentencing considerations, 

including demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, must necessarily be 

meaningfully considered in juvenile sentencing). 

While rehabilitation is thus the norm, it is extremely difficult to 

predict future dangerousness of adults and even harder with respect to 

juveniles. The inability to identify irreparably corrupt juveniles led the 

United States Supreme Court to categorical rules in Graham and Roper. 

Here, Majors has been incarcerated for most of his prison stay in a 

maximum security prison. Because of the shortage of available 

programing and the length of his sentence, he has been waitlisted for 

victim-impact programming. Juveniles serving lengthy sentences are 

often disadvantaged in prison by lack of services to meet their 
66

developmental needs. Some prisons can be “complicit in the lack of 

development” because “it is the policy in some prisons to withhold 

counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are 

ineligible for parole consideration.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 79, 130 S. Ct. at 

2032–33. Majors is no exception.

Majors had a lengthy disciplinary record while in prison related to 

drug offenses and other nonviolent offenses. In 2014, six of Majors’ eight 

offenses were drug or alcohol related; in 2013 all four of his offenses were 

drug or alcohol related. In 2012, four out of ten were drug or alcohol 

related; in 2010 he had one offense for not wearing his identification; and 

a few years he had some verbal or possession related offenses. Research 

suggests that there are many causes of prison disciplinary problems. See 

generally David DeMatteo et al., The Use of Measures of Psychopathy in 

Violence Risk Assessment, in Handbook of Violence Risk Assessment 19–

40 (Randy S. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010). Additionally, studies 

show age, education, and social supports can contribute to misconduct. 

Alan J. Drury & Matt DeLisi, The Past Is Prologue: Prior Adjustment to 

Prison and Institutional Misconduct, 90 Prison J. 331, 333 (2010) (noting 

studies that indicate “inmates who are younger, male, less educated, lack 

a social support network . . . and/or have a history of violent behavior 

engage in significantly higher levels of misconduct in prison than inmates 

not possessing these characteristics”). 

A lengthy prison sentence gives little hope and little incentive to 

reform; but once it became possible that he might be able to challenge the 

mandatory minimum sentence, Majors’ behavior, consistent with renewed 

hope, turned around. Majors now has not had any discipline in the four 

years prior to the hearing in this case. Even the expert stated that the last 

four years evinced Majors had “the capacity for change.” 
67

In 2013, Judge Ann Power-Forde, sitting as a member of the Grand 

Chamber of the European Courts of Human Rights, summed up the 

importance of the prospect of release for someone incarcerated, stating 

that

hope is an important and constitutive aspect of the human 

person. Those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious 

of acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others, 

nevertheless retain their fundamental humanity and carry 

within themselves the capacity to change. Long and deserved 

though their prison sentences may be, they retain the right to 

hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs 

which they have committed. They ought not to be deprived 

entirely of such hope. To deny them the experience of hope 

would be to deny a fundamental aspect of their humanity and, 

to do that, would be degrading.

Vinter & Others v. United Kingdom, [2013] Eur. Ct. H.R. 645 (July 9, 2013), 

http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2013/645.html. In Graham, the 

emphasis on rehabilitation was renewed. See Chad Flanders, The 

Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 383, 413 (2015) 

[hereinafter Flanders, Rehabilitative Ideal] (“Indeed, the fact that life in 

prison without parole foreclosed ‘the rehabilitative ideal’ (as the Court put 

it) is central to its holding. . . . [and] is perhaps the theme of the opinion 

. . . .” (Footnote omitted.)). With rehabilitation comes hope. Justice 

Kennedy stated the proposition succinctly when he wrote that “[l]ife in 

prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment 

outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, [and] no 

hope.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 79, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 

Tailoring rehabilitation to the individual can be “both backwardlooking and retributive or forward-looking and rehabilitative.” Flanders, 

Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 Ga. L. Rev. at 394. The difference, simply defined, 

is that 
68

[i]f the judge is looking at details about the offender . . . to find 

out what he deserves as his punishment, then the judge’s 

individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit the 

offender to the right amount of deserved retributive 

punishment. . . . 

But if the judge is using those same details to determine 

how much rehabilitation the offender needs––as well as his 

fitness for rehabilitation––the judge’s individualizing is 

forward-looking. 

Id.

Further, there appears to be a life cycle of prison disciplinary events 

for juvenile offenders. During early years of incarceration, juvenile 

offenders often engage in a higher base rate of misconduct with a reduction 

as they mature. Larson et al., Mental Health Assessments, 39 New Eng. 

J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement at 341 (“We know that even chronic and 

violent juvenile offenders are more likely to desist from such behaviors 

than continue them into adulthood.”). And, it is hardly surprising that 

Majors, who has a history of untreated polysubstance abuse, has several 

disciplinary violations related to drug and alcohol abuse in light of the 

inability of the department of corrections to provide him with substanceabuse programming. 

Among other things, the literature establishes that youthful 

offenders are more likely to be victims of both physical nonsexual and 

sexual crime and property crime. Id. at 337 nn.75–76 (providing statistics 

on crimes against incarcerated juveniles). Majors was a victim of sexual 

assault while incarcerated. Such victimization increases the likelihood of 

disciplinary history. 

In any event, on the question of future rehabilitation, predictions are 

often quite difficult. We should be extremely cautious of unstructured 

clinical evaluations by a psychologist unfamiliar with the principles of 

child developmental psychology. 
69

Further, there is the issue of consistency. Judges necessarily make 

an ad hoc judgment, case by case, but the parole board is in a better 

position to ensure consistency. While the district court’s characterization 

of the rehabilitation as minimally favorable is, if anything, an 

understatement, it is unclear whether the district court regarded 

rehabilitation as the norm under a “first and foremost” and “children are 

different” framework. As a result, reversal and remand is appropriate. 

Showens, 845 N.W.2d at 449–50. 

H. Lack of Remorse as a Juvenile Trait. One of the signature 

features of youth is thoughtlessness toward others. “Adolescents, often 

thoughtless and impulsive, will perpetrate a crime . . . without considering 

its impact on others.” David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children’s 

Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective 

Decision-Making, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 13, 21 (2003). Compared to 

adults, the characteristics underlying remorselessness, such as 

egocentrism and lack of empathy, do not have the same predictive 

importance for future behaviors because the traits are so common in 

adolescent development. Adam Saper, Juvenile Remorselessness: An 

Unconstitutional Sentencing Consideration, 38 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 

Change 99, 137 (2014) [hereinafter Saper, Juvenile Remorselessness] 

(“Sociological pressures limit a youth’s expression of remorse . . . [and] 

these expressions are hindered by developmental limitations ranging from 

an inability to fully appreciate the sensation of remorse, to inadvertent 

pain avoidance techniques that result in the suppression of otherwise 

existing emotions.”). 

And, as noted in Graham, “[t]he juvenile should not be deprived of 

the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of 

human worth and potential. . . . Maturity can lead to that considered 
70

reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and 

rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 79, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (emphasis added). And 

in the words of Roper, youth have an “underdeveloped sense of 

responsibility.” 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. In other words, seen 

through the lens of child development as applied in Graham and Roper, a 

juvenile’s lack of remorse is not the equivalent of a lack of remorse in fully 

developed adults. It is part of youthful immaturity, and therefore a 

mitigating factor, not an aggravating factor, in sentencing. 

Further, even to the extent relevant, remorselessness cannot be 

assessed in a clinical interview. Indeed, as a youth, the record reveals that 

Majors had trouble communicating in group, tended to keep to himself, 

and not volunteer. According to the DSM-5, psychologists should only 

conclude that an individual lacks remorse by looking at 

multiple information sources. . . . In addition to the 

individual’s self-report, it is necessary to consider reports by 

others who have known the individual for extended periods of 

time [and across relationships and settings] (e.g., parents, 

teachers, co-workers, extended family members, peers).

DSM-5 at 470. No evidence in this case was offered to comply with the 

DSM-5 requirement. 

At the most recent hearing, Majors, now in his mid-thirties, 

apologized to the victims. He asked the court for permission to address 

them, but that was denied. Majors proceeded to take full responsibility for 

his actions and apologized, saying “I would just like to apologize. I couldn’t 

imagine anybody running into my house and pointing a gun at my mom, 

couldn’t imagine what the Peckhams went through. I’m sorry for it.”

In short, lack of remorse is a transient juvenile trait that is often 

ameliorated as the juvenile matures. Those in charge of sentencing must 

not apply adult standards of remorse to juveniles; if they do, they fail to 
71

recognize that children are different from adults in terms of their emotional 

and social development. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, 

Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 

94 (2004) (“Seemingly remorseless acts by children or adolescents can 

affect whether they are tried as juveniles or as adults.”); Kristin Henning, 

Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role 

of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 383, 440–41 

(2013) (noting that factors such as language skills, limited life experiences, 

diminished capacity, peer pressure, teenage bravado, and implementation 

of coping mechanisms—humor, denial, or indifference—make remorse “a 

particularly unreliable measure of a youth’s amenability to treatment and 

need for punishment”); Lauren M. Kelly, Admit the Crime or Do the Time: 

Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Transfer Conundrum, 73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 563, 579 

(2012) (noting that paradoxically “[b]y requiring the juvenile to take

responsibility for his action and show remorse,” that “the juvenile is 

implicitly required to admit guilt”). See generally Martha Grace Duncan, 

“So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of 

the Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1469 (2002) (exploring the inability of courts 

to correctly adjudge remorse in juveniles, and questioning the validity of 

remorsefulness in predicting recidivism and rehabilitation); Saper, 

Juvenile Remorselessness, 38 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 99 (framing 

consideration of remorselessness in the sentencing of juveniles as 

unconstitutional due to key developmental differences in youth and adults 

regarding remorse, and the propensity of courts to mistake hallmarks of 

juvenile developmental immaturity as dispositive of remorselessness). The 

district court does not appear to have utilized a “first and foremost” and 

“children are different” framework in evaluating the lack of remorse. 

Again, “[p]erceptions applicable to adult behavior cannot normally be used 
72

to draw conclusions from juvenile behavior.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147. 

On the remorse issue, Majors erroneously was treated like an adult by the 

district court. 

I. A Note on Discretion. We have indicated that the review of a 

district court sentence applying Miller factors is for abuse of discretion.13 

But this does not mean the discretion is freestanding and without bounds. 

Indeed, while an element of discretion may be involved, that discretion 

may only be exercised when the state makes a compelling case that the 

Miller factors defeat the ordinary presumption against imposition of the 

mandatory minimums for juvenile offenders. The discretion must be 

exercised in a fashion that recognizes that the ability of judges to predict 

which offenders will return to crime is quite limited14 and that subjective 

decisions are not very useful and can lead to serious fairness concerns. 

Unbridled district court discretion would have several unacceptable 

consequences. First, it would allow for a variable enforcement of 

constitutional rights. Second, it would further open the door to implicit 

bias that is already rampant in our criminal justice system. See Jeffrey 

Fagan, The Contradictions of Juvenile Crime & Punishment, Daedalus, 

Summer 2010, at 43, 51–52 (noting that “[r]acial disparities in juvenile 

detention and incarceration closely resemble racial disparities in the 

imprisonment and jailing of adults,” as well as providing statistics and 

analysis to that effect); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming 

 13Although I joined the Roby decision in its entirety, upon reflection, I doubt that 

the abuse of discretion standard is the correct standard when constitutional claims are 

at stake. Constitutional claims must apply equally across all cases and should not be 

subject to variabilities in the exercise of judicial discretion. 

14For instance, in an amicus brief filed in Miller, juvenile court judges explained 

that “the criminal justice system cannot predict what kind of person a fifteen-year-old 

juvenile offender will be when he is 35 or 55 or 75.” Brief of Former Juvenile Ct. Judges 

as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 

2455 (Nos. 10–9646, 10–9647) 2012 WL 135044, at *1.
73

Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 Law & 

Hum. Behav. 483, 499 (2004) (analyzing the results of two studies on 

racial disparities in the juvenile justice system, finding generalized racial 

bias, and noting that “[e]ven decision makers with good intentions are 

susceptible”). 

J. Summary. Writing a few years ago, Scott et al., declared that 

“adhering to the Court’s developmental framework and limiting the impact 

of punitive impulses toward juvenile offenders generally poses an ongoing 

challenge.” Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 

714. They are certainly correct. 

Unfortunately, this case represents unprincipled backsliding. 

Stripped of the window dressing, the hearing in this case was the kind 

utilized, day in and day out, in the sentencing of adults. For the reasons 

stated above, the sentence in the case must be vacated and the case 

remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

A. Introduction. On appeal, Majors claims that his counsel was 

ineffective at his resentencing hearing. For reasons that completely escape 

me, criminal defense lawyers all too often regard sentencing hearings as 

requiring them only to review a presentence investigative (PSI) report for 

errors or mistakes and to present a smattering of argument to the judge 

prior to sentencing. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275–76 (Iowa 2016) 

(Appel, J., concurring specially) (noting the critical nature of sentencing 

within criminal proceedings and exploring the professional responsibilities 

of attorneys related to sentencing). In our current system, where plea 

bargaining is the norm, the sentencing proceeding is the most important 

part of a criminal proceeding. 
74

There has been recognition in the literature that sentencing is given 

short shrift by the participants. As noted by one authority, “[s]entencing 

is too often considered an afterthought rather than seen as a critical stage 

in a criminal case.” Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s 

in Control as Problem Solving and Client Centered Sentencing Takes Center 

Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. & Soc. Change 11, 12 (2004). As discussed 

below, the problem becomes more acute when dealing with a juvenile 

offender. 

B. Applicable Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

The American Bar Association’s Center for Criminal Justice states that 

counsel in a criminal case “has a duty independently to investigate the 

client’s circumstances, including such factors as previous history, family 

relations, economic condition, and any other information relevant to 

disposition.” Juvenile Justice Standards: Standards Relating to Counsel 

for Private Parties, standard 9.2(b)(ii), at 175 (Inst. Judicial Admin. & Am. 

Bar Ass’n 1980). Further, a defense lawyer “should present all arguments 

or evidence which will assist the court or its agents in reaching a 

sentencing disposition favorable to the accused” and should verify, 

supplement, or challenge information in any presentence report made 

available to the defense “rather than relying on the court’s presentence 

report.” Standards for Criminal Justice, standard 4-8.3(c), (e) (Am. Bar 

Ass’n 4th ed. 2015).

A go-along-to-get-along philosophy does not comport with effective 

assistance for a criminal defendant. As stated in the ABA Standards for 

Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4-1.2(e), at 

120–21 (3d ed.1993),

Advocacy is not for the timid, the meek, or the retiring. Our 

system of justice is inherently contentious, albeit bounded by 

the rules of professional ethics and decorum, and it demands 
75

that the lawyer be inclined toward vigorous advocacy. Nor can 

a lawyer be half-hearted in the application of his or her 

energies to a case. Once a case has been undertaken, a lawyer 

is obliged not to omit any essential lawful and ethical step in 

the defense, without regard to compensation or the nature of 

the appointment. . . .

Because the law is a learned profession, lawyers must take 

pains to guarantee that their training is adequate and their 

knowledge up-to-date in order to fulfill their duty as 

advocates.

Id. cmt., at 122–23 (footnote omitted); see also State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 

488, 495–96 (Iowa 2012).

It is not enough for counsel at sentencing to simply look over the PSI 

report, make a few corrections, and plead for mercy. Counsel must engage 

in thorough preparation, develop a sensible plan, and mount a vigorous 

mitigation defense. See generally Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A Case 

for Making Mitigation the Heart of Noncapital Sentencing, 41 Am. J. Crim. 

L. 41 (2013) (noting the success of well-prepared investigation and 

presentation of mitigating life history in legal proceedings). The need for 

zealous counsel is critical in cases involving juvenile sentencing. There 

can be a temptation, contrary to the teachings of Roper, Miller, Null, and 

Roby, to sentence juveniles harsher than adults on the ground that early 

onset of violent criminal activity shows a particularly depraved person. 

But a sentencing judge must be given the proper understanding of child 

developmental psychology before sentencing a juvenile offender to an adult 

sentence. 

Not surprisingly, Juvenile Justice Standards provide that “[t]he 

lawyer should seek to secure the assistance of psychiatric, psychological, 

medical or other expert personnel needed for purposes of evaluation, 

consultation or testimony with respect to formation of a disposition plan.” 

Juvenile Justice Standards: Standards Relating to Counsel for Private 

Parties, standard 9.2(c), at 177; see Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the 
76

Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency 

Representations, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 771, 796 (2010) (noting the 

systematic failure of juvenile delinquency attorneys to gather necessary 

records or hire experts). See generally Beth Caldwell, Appealing to 

Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence for Juveniles 

in Adult Court, 64 Me. L. Rev. 391 (2012) [hereinafter Caldwell, Appealing 

to Empathy] (discussing broadly the professional obligations of attorneys 

to present mitigating evidence and the impact such mitigation may have 

on case outcomes). 

Attorneys have a range of responsibilities unique to juvenile 

representation. By way of example,

the National Juvenile Defender Center interprets the duties of 

competence and diligence to require that juvenile defense 

attorneys are “well-versed in the areas of child and adolescent 

development” and have a “working knowledge,” and contact 

with experts, in “collateral consequences” of conviction, 

special education, abuse and neglect, cultural competence, 

and mental health. In addition, these standards indicate that 

competent juvenile defense counsel should consult “with 

mitigation specialists, social workers, and mental health, 

special education, and other experts to develop a plan 

consistent with the client’s expressed interests” at the 

disposition hearing. Counsel should also “prepare[] and 

present[] the court with a creative, comprehensive, strengthsbased, individualized disposition alternative consistent with 

the client’s expressed interests.” Although these standards 

relate to the representation of juveniles in delinquency court, 

they are germane to representing juvenile offenders in adult 

court.

Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy, 64 Me. L. Rev. at 410–11 (quoting Robin 

Walker Sterling, Nat’l Juvenile Defs. Ctr., Role of Juvenile Defense Counsel 

in Delinquency Court 14, 18 (2009)).

These standards are designed to apply in juvenile adjudications, but 

it is inconceivable to me that a lesser standard would apply in a criminal 
77

sentencing proceeding involving a juvenile or in a resentencing hearing of 

a juvenile offender. 

C. Application of Standards. In light of these standards, a strong 

case can be made that Majors’ counsel was ineffective. In considering a 

resentencing of a juvenile offender, the fact finder must be introduced to 

the science of adolescent brain development in some fashion. Such 

evidence may be received through an expert who testifies about what is 

known of adolescent brain development and its corresponding thought 

processes. Jenny E. Carroll, The Problem with Inference and Juvenile 

Defendants, 45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 49 (2017) (noting that “[s]uch 

testimony could occur in two forms: an expert could evaluate a particular 

defendant and testify as to her cognitive processes, or an expert could 

speak more broadly to what is generally known of adolescent brain 

development and its corresponding thought processes” (footnote omitted)). 

But Majors’ counsel took no steps to present the court with this kind 

of critical information. He did not challenge the qualifications of the 

State’s expert and allowed the prosecutor to ask a long series of leading 

questions to his expert. His involvement with the generalized state expert 

was limited to cursory cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. 

For example, counsel for Majors did not meaningfully challenge the 

just-short-of-eighteen theory. He did not confront the expert with the 

many authorities in child psychology to the contrary. And, counsel did 

not present the caselaw to the contrary to the district court. Indeed, 

counsel did not provide a brief on sentencing. None of the applicable 

caselaw was presented to the district court. Similarly, counsel did not 

explore the “first and foremost” dictates of Roby, either through crossexamination of the expert or in his nonexistent briefing before the court. 
78

Counsel offered no evidence at the hearing other than a brief 

statement from the client. There is certainly nothing in the record to 

suggest that counsel did any independent investigation of the long list of 

potentially mitigating leads which would have been revealed from a 

cursory review of the trial record. 

On appeal, the State asserts correctly that the record shows that 

Majors did not wish to have an independent medical examination and that 

he explicitly directed his lawyer not to pursue it. There are three problems 

here. First, an independent medical examination is not what he really 

needed. No one claimed he had a current medical condition that required 

diagnosis. Indeed, the State explicitly declined to claim, for instance, that 

Majors had any diagnosable disorder such as an antipersonality conduct 

disorder. What Majors’ counsel desperately needed, as is abundantly clear 

in this case, was a child development expert to explain to counsel the 

fundamentals of child developmental psychology, assist in the 

development of the case, and offer testimony to support Majors’ position. 

Without such assistance, the counterintuitive principles of child 

development psychology were wholly unpresented and unexplored in this 

case. 

Second, the decision whether to call an expert witness is not 

generally a client decision but rests with effective counsel. See State v. 

Sammons, 749 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (finding the decision 

to call an expert witness “a matter of trial strategy” for counsel); Davis v. 

State, 723 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ga. 2012) (stating that the decision to call 

experts is “within the broad range of professional conduct afforded trial 

attorneys”). Further, Majors’ expressed preference made no sense. First, 

there was plenty of time prior to the hearing for his counsel to hire a 

qualified child development psychologist. Second, if the record was later 
79

supplemented, there was no significant possibility that this decision would 

have delayed his release. He had not yet taken substance abuse and 

victim impact programming. There was little possibility that any delay 

caused by the hiring of a qualified expert witness would have significantly 

delayed his release from prison. Acquiescing in the client’s desire not to 

hire an expert was the easiest course, but it did not reflect zealous 

advocacy. 

It is also suggested that counsel made a strategic decision not to call 

an expert because he elicited the testimony he needed from the State’s 

expert. But in light of the completely inadequate testimony obtained from 

the State’s expert, this conclusion simply cannot be sustained. Counsel 

for Majors seems to have been unaware of the child developmental science 

and the applicable Iowa caselaw. It is difficult to understand the strategic 

reasoning behind not hiring a qualified expert to prevent the risk of a 

runaway train based upon unqualified expert opinion. 

In addition to the question of duty, there is the question of prejudice. 

In order to find prejudice, our confidence in the outcome must be 

undermined. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 

2052, 2068 (1984) (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different . . . [which is] sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.”); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 

2001) (applying the Strickland ineffective-assistance standard in Iowa 

caselaw). Based on the above, my confidence in the sentencing outcome 

is definitely undermined. The district court simply did not have the benefit 

of an appropriate presentation that explained the principles of child 

psychology and applied them to the current case. 
80

And there was a lot to work with in this case. With a juvenile 

offender facing an adult mandatory minimum sentence, there almost 

always is. Indeed, after examining the aspects of the record explored

above––including abuse by his father, polysubstance abuse, teasing about 

his family’s raising of chickens, the nonobvious social and psychological 

effects of scoliosis, transfer from public school to an alternative school, 

tearful reminiscence regarding the childhood abuse and teasing inflicted 

on him, the influence of media as evidence of immaturity, the issues 

surrounding the psychology of juvenile remorse, the unchallenged use of 

the just-short-of-eighteen theory by the State, etc.––can anyone doubt that 

Majors would have benefitted had local counsel hired a consulting or 

testifying expert in child developmental psychology? And had that 

happened, isn’t there, at the very least, a fair chance a different result 

would have occurred? 

I do not need to decide the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue, 

because I would reverse the sentence in this case as a result of the 

manifest errors in the analysis and remand the case for a new hearing 

consistent with the substance of this opinion. But I wish to make it very 

clear that we judges should expect, and our system of justice should 

demand, zealous and tenacious advocacy from counsel at a resentencing 

hearing. Zealous advocacy demands that a lawyer representing a juvenile 

defendant (1) be familiar with the underlying case; (2) have a good working 

knowledge of the relevant law and child development concepts applicable 

to imposition of mandatory adult sentences on juvenile offenders; 

(3) conduct a thorough, independent investigation of background facts 

that might support mitigation; and (4) present expert testimony in child 

developmental psychology to put the mitigation evidence in its proper 

context. What is plainly not acceptable is a brief review of the file and any 
81

PSI report, a passive approach to extensive leading questions of an 

unqualified expert, a seat-of-the-pants cross-examination, a failure to call 

an expert in child psychological development, and the failure to even file a 

brief with the district court. 

The majority rules, as a matter of law, that counsel was not 

ineffective. I disagree. But at a minimum, it is hard to understand why 

the matter should not be preserved for postconviction relief to see what 

counsel did and did not do and what explanations, if any, might be 

available for the very limited defense offered in the resentencing hearing. 

The majority instead closes the door, preferring to leave the very 

substantial questions regarding the use of the State’s expert and the lack 

of appropriate expert response unexplored. 

III. Conclusion.

I do not suggest, of course, that Majors should not be held 

responsible for his crime. The question is whether the crime “is not as 

morally reprehensible as that of an adult,” because “children are different.” 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Thompson v. 

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699 (1988) (plurality 

opinion)); Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. And, of course, the 

impact of our decision is not whether Majors will be released, but whether 

he is eligible to be considered for release by the parole board.

For the reasons explained above, I would reverse the sentence in this 

case and remand the case for a real sentencing hearing in which the 

propositions that “[f]irst and foremost, the time when a seventeen-year-old 

could seriously be considered to have adult-like culpability has passed” 

and the “children are different” framework can be applied as required by 

our caselaw. 

Wiggins, J., joins this dissent.