Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-AD-371 | October 31, 2018 Page 1 of 12

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Darlene R. Seymour

Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Meredith L. McIntyre

McIntyre & Smith

Bedford, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF 

L.G.K.

J.K.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

G.C.,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-AD-371

Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Andrea K. 

McCord, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

47C01-1702-AD-5

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case 

[1] G.C. (“Putative Father”) filed a motion to set aside the adoption of the minor 

child L.G.K. (“Child”) by J.K., her maternal grandfather (“Maternal 
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Grandfather”). Maternal Grandfather appeals, raising one issue for our review, 

which we restate as whether the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s 

motion for relief from judgment. We conclude that because Maternal 

Grandfather presented an adoption petition to the trial court in which E.K. 

(“Mother”) fraudulently claimed that she did not know the identity of Child’s 

father, the trial court did not err in granting Putative Father’s motion for relief 

from judgment and setting set aside the adoption.

[2] We affirm. 

Issue

Whether the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s 

motion for relief from judgment.

Facts

[3] The facts in the light most favorable to Putative Father are that Mother and 

Putative Father dated and had an intimate relationship from December 2013 

through October 2014. In December 2014, Mother told Putative Father that 

she was pregnant. Putative Father saw Mother one time during the pregnancy 

and did not provide support. Putative Father’s parents (“Paternal 

Grandparents”), however, maintained contact with Mother throughout the 

pregnancy.

[4] Child was born on August 20, 2015. Putative Father was not present at the 

birth, but Paternal Grandparents visited Mother at the hospital shortly after 

Child was born, and Putative Father’s mother informed him that Child had 
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been born. Putative Father’s name was not listed on Child’s birth certificate, 

and Putative Father did not establish paternity or register with the Putative 

Father Registry. Putative Father testified that he and Mother took a DNA test 

using a product obtained from a drugstore, and that the test showed that he was 

Child’s biological father. Mother disputes this.

[5] After Child was born, Mother and Putative Father lived together for 

approximately six months and acted as parents to Child. Both Putative Father

and Paternal Grandparents established a relationship with Child. Child calls 

Putative Father “dad” and calls Paternal Grandparents “granny” and “poppy.” 

Mother and Putative Father eventually separated, but Putative Father

continued to visit regularly with Child. Mother and Putative Father jointly 

hosted a birthday party for Child when Child turned one year old. Maternal 

Grandfather attended the party.

[6] Mother led Putative Father to believe that he was the biological father of Child. 

At some point, Mother told Putative Father that she was going to the 

prosecutor’s office to establish child support but did not do so. She requested 

child support from Putative Father of $400.00 per month, which Putative 

Father paid at times and Mother accepted. Mother threatened to take Putative 

Father to court and deny him visitation unless he paid her child support. 

Mother and Putative Father discussed going to the Indiana Department of 

Health to have Putative Father listed on Child’s birth certificate; however, this 

was not done. At one point, Mother agreed to have Putative Father’s name 

placed on Child’s birth certificate, but she did not do so.
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[7] On February 17, 2017, B.P., Mother’s then fiancé, filed a petition to adopt 

Child. Putative Father was not provided with notice of the petition. On May 

10, 2017, Maternal Grandfather filed a petition for adoption (“Second 

Adoption Petition”), and B.P. agreed to it. Putative Father was not provided 

with notice of the Second Adoption Petition. The Second Adoption Petition 

stated that the biological father was unknown and had not been disclosed by 

Mother to Maternal Grandfather or Maternal Grandfather’s attorney. The 

Second Adoption Petition was granted, and the decree of adoption was issued 

on May 22, 2017.

[8] On June 19, 2017, under a separate cause number, Putative Father filed a 

petition to establish paternity and for orders relating to custody, visitation, and 

support. Putative Father continued to have contact with Child after the 

adoption decree was issued, though Putative Father did not learn of Child’s 

adoption until Mother moved to dismiss his paternity action. Putative Father

registered with the Putative Father Registry in August 2017.

[9] On August 4, 2017, Putative Father filed a motion to set aside the adoption, 

alleging that Mother and Maternal Grandfather defrauded him by “allowing 

him to have a regular visitation schedule with this child, by taking his regular 

child support payments, and allowing him to be this child’s father, while behind 

the scenes, [Mother] was planning to have this child adopted by first her 

fianc[é], and then by her father.” (App. Vol. 2 at 9). Maternal Grandfather 
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filed a motion to dismiss Putative Father’s motion. Putative Father responded 

and, additionally, moved for relief from judgment.1

[10] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on November 28, 2017. On January 

25, 2018, the trial court granted Putative Father’s motion to set aside the 

adoption.2 The court issued a written order, determining (among other things) 

that:

[Mother] held [Putative Father] out to be the [Child’s] Father to 

[Putative Father], his family, her family and to the child up to 

and including the summer of 2017. The photos and text 

messages entered into evidence establish that [Putative Father] 

and his family have a loving relationship with [Child].

Based on the Court’s observation of [Mother] and the evidence 

presented, the Court does not find her to be credible.

(App. Vol. 2 at 10). The trial court concluded (in relevant part) that:

The child’s rights as well as [Putative Father’s] rights are not well 

served by denying notice and a hearing to a father whose identity 

and location were known by the Petitioner. Further, by not 

setting aside this order, the child’s right to an involved and loving 

parent is compromised. . . . [Putative Father] has demonstrated 

that he established a substantial relationship with the child and 

was not given the right to contest the adoption or proceed with 

his Paternity matter, and/or the Petitioner procured a fraud upon 

 

1

Father’s motion for relief from judgment was not provided in the record on appeal.

2 The trial court also denied Mother’s motion to dismiss the paternity action, although it is unclear when the 

trial court consolidated the paternity action with the adoption matter.
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the Court by stating in his Petition that “‘The biological father is 

unknown and has not been disclosed to the petitioner or 

petitioner’s attorney by the Mother’” when it was clear to the 

Court that the Petitioner knew that [Putative Father] had been 

acting as and was believed to be the child’s Father, therefore 

invoking the Court to set the Adoption aside under Indiana Trial 

Rule 12(b)(6) [sic]. Further, that [Putative Father] was 

fraudulently induced, through material misrepresentations by 

[Mother], to not exercise his obligations or rights to take legal 

action to establish his rights legally. The Court further finds that 

[Putative Father] had standing to join in the Adoption because of 

the fraudulent actions of the Petitioner and to protect his due 

process rights allowing him to be equally protected as a parent 

and/or to proceed with his right [to] establish legally whether or 

not he is the Father. Further, he is furthering the rights of the 

child to determine whether she will be able to continue with their 

relationship and a relationship with her possible half-sister. 

[Putative Father] should have been notified of the filing of any 

Petition for Adoption of the minor child, [L.G.K.].

(App. Vol. 2 at 18-19). 

Discussion

[11] The issue before us is whether the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s 

motion for relief from judgment. Maternal Grandfather argues that the trial 

court erred in granting the motion for relief from judgment, and that the trial 

court should have upheld the adoption decree and dismissed Putative Father’s 

paternity action. According to Putative Father, the trial court reached the 

correct result because Mother and Maternal Grandfather perpetrated fraud on 

the court by misrepresenting their knowledge of the existence of Putative Father 

as Child’s biological father. In his reply brief, Maternal Grandfather maintains 
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that “[Putative] Father cannot cry “‘fraud’”, as Mother is not to blame for

[Putative Father’s] own inaction in failing to register” with the Putative Father 

Registry. (Maternal Grandfather’s Reply Br. 9).3

[12] The trial court’s decision whether to set aside a judgment is given substantial 

deference on appeal, and we will reverse only if the trial court abused its 

discretion. In re Adoption of L.C.E., 940 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for 

relief. Id. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

[13] Trial Rule 60 motions address the equitable grounds justifying relief from the 

legal finality of the final judgment. Blichert v. Brososky, 436 N.E.2d 1165, 1167 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(3) provides that a court may 

relieve a party from a final judgment based on fraud, misrepresentation, or 

other misconduct of an adverse party. The decision of whether to grant or deny 

such a motion is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court. Stonger v. 

Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002); Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 

(Ind. 1994). We will not reverse a grant or denial of a motion for relief from 

judgment in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 358; 

 

3 The parties also raise arguments of constitutional due process, relating to a putative father registering (or 

failing to register) with the Putative Father Registry, and interpretation of the adoption statutes. Finding the 

issue of fraud dispositive, we decline to address those arguments. 
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see also Beike v. Beike, 805 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The burden 

is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just. Levin, 

645 N.E.2d at 604.

[14] When, as in this case, the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: “we must first determine 

whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings 

support the judgment.” In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006); see also Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (providing that where the trial court 

has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, “the court on appeal shall not 

set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 

be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.”). Factual findings “are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any 

evidence or reasonable inferences to support them [and] . . . [a] judgment is 

clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and the 

conclusions relying on those findings.” T.W., 859 N.E.2d at 1217.

[15] To assert a claim of fraud on the court, the party must establish that an 

unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court’s 

decision and that such acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly 

presenting its case or defense. Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 357. The party also must 

show that he has a “meritorious claim or defense.” Outback Steakhouse of 

Florida, Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 2006). This meritorious claim 

or defense requirement merely requires a prima-facie showing, that is, “‘a 

showing that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other 
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evidence.’” Id. This requires a showing that “‘vacating the judgment will not 

be an empty exercise.’” Id.

[16] Fraud on the court has been narrowly applied and is limited to the most 

egregious of circumstances involving the courts. Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 

357. To prove fraud on the court, it is not enough to show a possibility that the 

trial court was misled. Id. at 358. Instead, there must be a showing that the 

trial court’s decision was actually influenced. Id.

[17] Here, Putative Father alleges that Mother “misrepresented to [Putative Father]

the facts regarding his relationship with [Child], and [Maternal Grandfather]

and Mother misrepresented their knowledge about the existence of [Putative 

Father] as [Child’s] biological father[, and that] [a]s a result of these 

misrepresentations, [Putative Father] failed to file with the putative father 

registry[,] and the trial court . . . granted [Maternal Grandfather’s] adoption 

petition.” (Putative Father’s Br. 11). This allegation thus alleges an 

unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court’s 

decision and that such acts prevented Putative Father from fairly presenting his 

case. See Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 357. We agree.

[18] Putative Father grasped the opportunity to undertake his parental 

responsibilities toward Child by exercising regular visitation with Child, paying 

child support to Mother, and attending Child’s doctor’s appointments. At the 

same time, Mother was holding Putative Father out as Child’s father, accepting 

child support payments, and permitting Putative Father to exercise visitation. 
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This continued even after Maternal Grandfather filed the adoption petition. 

Mother allowed Putative Father to keep Child over a weekend in June 2017, 

after the adoption petition was granted and before Putative Father was made 

aware of the adoption. Mother knew that Child called Putative Father “dad,” 

and Mother, Putative Father, and Child had all lived together for a period of 

time. In addition, Putative Father was led to believe, and indeed believed, he 

was Child’s father. Nevertheless, Maternal Grandfather fraudulently presented 

an adoption petition to the trial court claiming that Mother did not know the 

identity of Child’s father.

[19] Based on the language of the trial court’s written order granting (among other 

things) relief from judgment, it appears that the court was strongly of the view 

that its granting of the adoption petition was significantly influenced by 

Maternal Grandfather’s claim that Mother did not know the identity of the 

Child’s father. The trial court specifically found that “[b]ased on the Court’s 

observation of [Mother] and the evidence presented [at the evidentiary hearing], 

the Court does not find her to be credible.” (App. Vol. 2 at 10). We will not 

second-guess the trial court’s finding.

[20] We are aware and acknowledge that INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-18 governs the 

waiver of notice rights of unregistered putative fathers, providing that, “A

putative father who fails to register within the period specified by section 12 of 

this chapter waives notice of an adoption proceeding. The putative father’s 

waiver under this section constitutes an irrevocably implied consent to the 

child’s adoption.” I.C. § 31-19-5-18. INDIANA CODE § 31-19-5-12(a) sets forth 
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the time period in which a putative father must register, that is, for our 

purposes, within thirty days of the child’s birth or by the date on which the 

petition to adopt the child is filed, whichever is later. We also acknowledge 

that statutes and established caselaw provide that “a putative father whose 

consent has been implied may not challenge the adoption or establish 

paternity.” See, e.g., In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000); In re Adoption of J.D.C., 751 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); 

In re Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d 292, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); In re Adoption 

and Paternity of K.A.W., 99 N.E.3d 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); I.C. §§ 31-19-9-13, 

–14. 

[21] Here, a verified petition for adoption was filed by Maternal Grandfather that 

stated that Mother did not disclose the name of Child’s putative father. See I.C. 

§ 31-19-5-1.4 However, evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that 

both Maternal Grandfather and Mother knew that Putative Father was Child’s 

father, and that Mother chose not to disclose this. Regardless of Putative 

Father’s statutory waiver of notice of the adoption proceeding for failure to 

register with the Putative Father Registry, the fraud perpetrated by Mother and 

Maternal Grandfather precluded the trial court from having an opportunity to 

 

4 The statutory authority governing the Putative Father Registry

applies to a putative father whenever (1) an adoption under IC 31-19-2 has been or may be filed 

regarding a child who may have been conceived by the putative father; and (2) on or before the 

date the child’s mother executes a consent to the child’s adoption, the child’s mother has not 

disclosed the name or address, or both, of the putative father to the attorney or agency that is 

arranging the child’s adoption.

I.C. § 31-19-5-1(a).
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consider Putative Father’s relationship, as well as his family’s relationship, with 

Child which compromises the best-interests aspect of the adoption decisionmaking process. See I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(1).5 Under this set of facts, and in 

support of the trial court’s belief that Mother lacked credibility at the 

evidentiary hearing, we conclude that Putative Father was entitled to equitable 

relief, notwithstanding Putative Father’s failure to register with the Putative 

Father Registry.

[22] Based on the foregoing, we find that Mother and Maternal Grandfather 

engaged in an unconscionable plan or scheme to improperly influence the 

court’s decision regarding the adoption, that such acts ultimately prevented 

Putative Father from fairly challenging the adoption of Child, and that Putative 

Father established a prima-facie showing of a meritorious defense. Therefore, 

we conclude that the trial court properly granted Putative Father’s motion for 

relief from judgment and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

[23] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

5

INDIANA CODE § 31-19-11-1(a)(1) reads as follows: “(a) Whenever the court has heard the evidence and 

finds that: (1) the adoption requested is in the best interest of the child; . . . the court shall grant the petition 

for adoption and enter an adoption decree.