* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has deter mined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-21091

Summary Calendar

_____________________

EVERETT E. EDENS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESSE BROWN, Sec. Dept. Vet. Affairs, ET AL.,

Defendants,

ROBERT L. BERNARD,

Movant-Appellant.

________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-93-1615)

________________________________________________

August 2, 1996

Before DAVIS, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Robert L. Bernard appeals the sanction im posed by the trial

court, for violation of its order. We AFFIRM.

I.

Everett E. Edens, pro se , filed an employment discrimination

action against Jesse E. Brown, Secretary, Department of Veterans2

Affairs (the VA). The court granted Edens’ application to proceed

in forma pauperis and later appointed counsel for him.

During the jury trial, when the VA's attorney, Bernard, began

to question Edens about his attorney's fee, the court asked Bernard

“[w]hat possible purpose could be served by revealing to the jury

that this attorney was appointed" and that Edens had no obligation

to pay for such services. The court stated that, pursuant to the

statute under which Ede ns’ attorney was appointed, recovery of

attorney's fees is allowed and stated: “No, you may not question

Mr. Edens about that. No, you may not make any mention of that to

the jury whatsoever."

Nevertheless, at the end of his closing argu ment, Bernard

stated to the jury that “taxpayers are paying for you to be here,

for me to be here, for the court and all the people to be here, to

listen to Mr. Edens. And even pay for his lawyer.” The court

found that Bernard violated its order “not to make any reference

whatsoever to who must pay for Edens' counsel, to the fact that

Edens' counsel is court-appointed, or that Edens is not obligated

to pay his counsel". The court declared a mistrial and assessed

sanctions against the VA and Bernar d in the amount of $3,000, to

cover Edens’ reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, for

violation of an order of the court.

II.3

The imposition of attorney’s fees as a sanction i s reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. O ’Neill v. AGWI Lines

, 74 F.3d 93, 96

(5th Cir. 1996). We are advised that the VA has paid the sanction.

But, because of other obvious adverse effects on Bernard, we do not

consider the issue moot.

A.

Bernard asserts first that the district c ourt erred by

imposing a sanction under F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 37(b), based on an alleged

violation of the court's order not related to discovery. We need

not address thi s issue, because, obviously, the court had the

inherent power to impose the sanction. “Courts of justice are

universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with

power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence,

and submission to their lawful mandates." C hambers v. NASCO, Inc.

,

501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (interna tional quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Anderson v. Dunn , 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)). Along that

line, “the district court possesse[s] the inherent power to assess

attorney's fees as sanctions for bad-faith conduct in litigation".

Citizens Bank

& Trust Co. v. Case , 937 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir.

1991). Among other things, “[a] court may assess attorney's fees

as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court order."

Chambers , 501 U.S. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B.4

Bernard's assertion that the court's instruction was unclear

and ambiguous is without merit. And, as hereinafter discussed, his

claims that the court failed to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law before imposing the sanctions, that he did not

violate the order intentionally or in bad faith, and that the court

erred by not imposing a less severe sanction are also without

merit. The court found that Bernard's closing argument statement

“directly violated the Court Order and could only have been made

with the intent to prejudice and inflame the jury". It concluded

that, “in the light of

... Bernard's actions during the entire

trial, Mr. Bernard's statement regarding Edens' attorney fees was

made in bad faith and constituted willful misconduct on the part of

Bernard, justifying severe remedies". It concluded further “that

such statement so prejudiced the jury that a mistrial was warranted

and was declared after two days of trial

... [and] that good cause

has been shown for the imposition of sanctions against both

Defendant and Defendant's counsel". As stated, we find no abuse of

discretion.

C.

Finally, Bernard asserts that t he court committed a clear

error o f law by ruling that, in a 1991 Civil Rights Act lawsuit,

attorneys' fe es are to be determined by the jury, and that the

sanctioning process violated due process of law. Needless to say,

any error in ruling that the jury would determine attorneys' fees

does not excuse the blatant violation of the court’s order.5

Likewise, the court presented Bernard an opportunity to be heard;

and its sanctioning process was in conformity with due process

requirements.

III.

For the foregoing reasons the sanction is

AFFIRMED.