# Official Journal C 41/2012

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2012.041.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 41 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5514 February 2012 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2012.041.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 41

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5514 February 2012

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Systemic Risk Board |
| 2012/C 041/01 | Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Systemic Risk Board

2012/C 041/01

Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3)

1

| | II   Information |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2012/C 041/02 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| 2012/C 041/03 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  2
  ) | 9 |

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2012/C 041/02

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

5

2012/C 041/03

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  2
  )

2

9

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2012/C 041/04 | Euro exchange rates | 11 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2012/C 041/04

Euro exchange rates

11

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Commission |
| 2012/C 041/05 | Specific call for proposals — EAC/S02/12 — Erasmus University Charter 2013 | 12 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2012/C 041/06 | Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China | 14 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

2012/C 041/05

Specific call for proposals — EAC/S02/12 — Erasmus University Charter 2013

12

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

2012/C 041/06

Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China

14

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |
| | (2)   Text with EEA relevance, except for products falling under Annex I to the Treaty |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

(2)   Text with EEA relevance, except for products falling under Annex I to the Treaty

2

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Systemic Risk Board

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/1

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RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD

of 22 December 2011

on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities

(ESRB/2011/3)

2012/C 41/01

THE GENERAL BOARD OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 2(2) and 4(2)(a) and Protocol (No 25) on the exercise of shared competence thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (1), and in particular Article 3(2)(b), (d) and (f) and Articles 16 to 18 thereof,

Having regard to Decision ESRB/2011/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 20 January 2011 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board (2), and in particular Article 15(3)(e) and Articles 18 to 20 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | A well-defined policy framework is a necessary condition for effective macro-prudential policy. With the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) within the European System of Financial Supervision, a policy framework was put in place for macro-prudential policy at the European Union level, to be exercised through warnings and recommendations, which need to be implemented. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

A well-defined policy framework is a necessary condition for effective macro-prudential policy. With the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) within the European System of Financial Supervision, a policy framework was put in place for macro-prudential policy at the European Union level, to be exercised through warnings and recommendations, which need to be implemented.

| (2) | The effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in the Union also depends on the national macro-prudential policy frameworks of the Member States, since the responsibility for the adoption of the measures necessary to maintain financial stability lies first within national frameworks. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in the Union also depends on the national macro-prudential policy frameworks of the Member States, since the responsibility for the adoption of the measures necessary to maintain financial stability lies first within national frameworks.

| (3) | Legislative initiatives are currently being discussed in some Member States regarding macro-prudential frameworks. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Legislative initiatives are currently being discussed in some Member States regarding macro-prudential frameworks.

| (4) | It is necessary to provide guiding principles on core elements of national macro-prudential mandates, balancing the need for consistency among national approaches with the flexibility to accommodate national specificities. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

It is necessary to provide guiding principles on core elements of national macro-prudential mandates, balancing the need for consistency among national approaches with the flexibility to accommodate national specificities.

| (5) | Setting out explicitly a clear objective would help the national macro-prudential authorities to overcome the bias towards inaction. Macro-prudential policies can be pursued at national level upon the initiative of the national macro-prudential authorities, or as a follow-up to recommendations or warnings from the ESRB. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Setting out explicitly a clear objective would help the national macro-prudential authorities to overcome the bias towards inaction. Macro-prudential policies can be pursued at national level upon the initiative of the national macro-prudential authorities, or as a follow-up to recommendations or warnings from the ESRB.

| (6) | Generally, macro-prudential policy can be pursued by either a single institution or a board composed of several institutions, depending on the national institutional frameworks. In any case, the entrusted authority should be identified in a clear and transparent way. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Generally, macro-prudential policy can be pursued by either a single institution or a board composed of several institutions, depending on the national institutional frameworks. In any case, the entrusted authority should be identified in a clear and transparent way.

| (7) | Recital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 provides that: ‘the national central banks should have a leading role in macro-prudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability.’ This conclusion is further strengthened when central banks are also in charge of micro-prudential supervision. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Recital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 provides that: ‘the national central banks should have a leading role in macro-prudential oversight because of their expertise and their existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability.’ This conclusion is further strengthened when central banks are also in charge of micro-prudential supervision.

| (8) | Depending on the national institutional framework, co-operation among authorities with competences influencing financial stability may take different forms, ranging from coordination to exchange of data and information. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Depending on the national institutional framework, co-operation among authorities with competences influencing financial stability may take different forms, ranging from coordination to exchange of data and information.

| (9) | The ESRB will discuss potential cross-border policy spill-overs of macro-prudential measures planned by the competent national authorities so as to ensure a minimum degree of coordination and limit possible negative spill-over effects. To this end, the ESRB Secretariat should be informed in advance of significant macro-prudential actions proposed by national authorities, for discussion by the Steering Committee of the ESRB. If deemed appropriate by the Steering Committee, the proposed macro-prudential actions may be drawn to the attention of the General Board. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The ESRB will discuss potential cross-border policy spill-overs of macro-prudential measures planned by the competent national authorities so as to ensure a minimum degree of coordination and limit possible negative spill-over effects. To this end, the ESRB Secretariat should be informed in advance of significant macro-prudential actions proposed by national authorities, for discussion by the Steering Committee of the ESRB. If deemed appropriate by the Steering Committee, the proposed macro-prudential actions may be drawn to the attention of the General Board.

| (10) | The tasks and powers of the macro-prudential authority should be clearly defined. Taking into account the impact that the ongoing EU reform of the capital requirements framework for credit institutions (3) might have, the procedures to assign instruments to the macro-prudential authority should allow — within the principles of the relevant legislative framework — for timely adjustments of the policy toolkit in response to innovation and change within the financial system and to the changing nature of risks to financial stability. The macro-prudential authority should justify ex-ante why it needs certain instruments, and have the right of initiative to request the assignment of those instruments. Instruments should include both those that can affect cyclical risks, such as unsustainable levels of leverage, maturity mismatch and credit growth, and those that can affect market structures. An institutional separation between non-binding and binding instruments could be provided for. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The tasks and powers of the macro-prudential authority should be clearly defined. Taking into account the impact that the ongoing EU reform of the capital requirements framework for credit institutions (3) might have, the procedures to assign instruments to the macro-prudential authority should allow — within the principles of the relevant legislative framework — for timely adjustments of the policy toolkit in response to innovation and change within the financial system and to the changing nature of risks to financial stability. The macro-prudential authority should justify ex-ante why it needs certain instruments, and have the right of initiative to request the assignment of those instruments. Instruments should include both those that can affect cyclical risks, such as unsustainable levels of leverage, maturity mismatch and credit growth, and those that can affect market structures. An institutional separation between non-binding and binding instruments could be provided for.

| (11) | Transparency improves the understanding of macro-prudential policies by the financial sector and the public at large, and is a necessary requirement for accountability vis-à-vis the legislature, as the representative of the wider population. Given that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is difficult to quantify, accountability may be phrased in terms of achieving intermediate objectives, or explaining publicly the rationale of the use of macro-prudential instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Transparency improves the understanding of macro-prudential policies by the financial sector and the public at large, and is a necessary requirement for accountability vis-à-vis the legislature, as the representative of the wider population. Given that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is difficult to quantify, accountability may be phrased in terms of achieving intermediate objectives, or explaining publicly the rationale of the use of macro-prudential instruments.

| (12) | Pressures can be put on macro-prudential policy makers not to tighten policies in a boom or to loosen them in a bust. In order to safeguard policy credibility, macro-prudential authorities should be shielded against outside pressures through independence. Central banks entrusted with macro-prudential mandates should be independent in the sense of Article 130 of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Pressures can be put on macro-prudential policy makers not to tighten policies in a boom or to loosen them in a bust. In order to safeguard policy credibility, macro-prudential authorities should be shielded against outside pressures through independence. Central banks entrusted with macro-prudential mandates should be independent in the sense of Article 130 of the Treaty.

| (13) | This Recommendation is without prejudice to the monetary policy mandates of the central banks in the Union, and to the tasks entrusted to the ESRB. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

This Recommendation is without prejudice to the monetary policy mandates of the central banks in the Union, and to the tasks entrusted to the ESRB.

| (14) | ESRB recommendations are published after informing the Council of the European Union of the General Board’s intention to do so and providing the Council with an opportunity to react, |
| --- | --- |

(14)

ESRB recommendations are published after informing the Council of the European Union of the General Board’s intention to do so and providing the Council with an opportunity to react,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

SECTION 1

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation A —   Objective

Member States are recommended to:

| 1. | specify that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth; |
| --- | --- |

1.

specify that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth;

| 2. | ensure that macro-prudential policies can be pursued at national level upon the initiative of the national macro-prudential authority, or as a follow-up to recommendations or warnings from the ESRB. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ensure that macro-prudential policies can be pursued at national level upon the initiative of the national macro-prudential authority, or as a follow-up to recommendations or warnings from the ESRB.

Recommendation B —   Institutional arrangements

Member States are recommended to:

| 1. | designate in the national legislation an authority entrusted with the conduct of macro-prudential policy, generally either as a single institution or as a board composed of the authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability. The national legislation should specify the decision-making process of the governing body of the macro-prudential authority; |
| --- | --- |

1.

designate in the national legislation an authority entrusted with the conduct of macro-prudential policy, generally either as a single institution or as a board composed of the authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability. The national legislation should specify the decision-making process of the governing body of the macro-prudential authority;

| 2. | where a single institution is designated as the macro-prudential authority, establish mechanisms for cooperation among all authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability, without prejudice to their respective mandates; |
| --- | --- |

2.

where a single institution is designated as the macro-prudential authority, establish mechanisms for cooperation among all authorities whose actions have a material impact on financial stability, without prejudice to their respective mandates;

| 3. | ensure that the central bank plays a leading role in the macro-prudential policy and that macro-prudential policy does not undermine its independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty; |
| --- | --- |

3.

ensure that the central bank plays a leading role in the macro-prudential policy and that macro-prudential policy does not undermine its independence in accordance with Article 130 of the Treaty;

| 4. | mandate the macro-prudential authority to cooperate and to exchange information also cross-border, in particular by informing the ESRB of the actions taken to address systemic risks at national level. |
| --- | --- |

4.

mandate the macro-prudential authority to cooperate and to exchange information also cross-border, in particular by informing the ESRB of the actions taken to address systemic risks at national level.

Recommendation C —   Tasks, powers, instruments

Member States are recommended to:

| 1. | entrust the macro-prudential authority as a minimum with the tasks of identifying, monitoring and assessing risks to financial stability and of implementing policies to achieve its objective by preventing and mitigating those risks; |
| --- | --- |

1.

entrust the macro-prudential authority as a minimum with the tasks of identifying, monitoring and assessing risks to financial stability and of implementing policies to achieve its objective by preventing and mitigating those risks;

| 2. | ensure that the macro-prudential authority has the power to require and obtain in a timely fashion all national data and information relevant for the exercise of its tasks, including information from micro-prudential and securities market supervisors and information from outside the regulatory perimeter, as well as institution-specific information upon reasoned request and with adequate arrangements to ensure confidentiality. Under the same principles the macro-prudential authority should share with micro-prudential supervisory authorities the data and information relevant for the exercise of the tasks of those authorities; |
| --- | --- |

2.

ensure that the macro-prudential authority has the power to require and obtain in a timely fashion all national data and information relevant for the exercise of its tasks, including information from micro-prudential and securities market supervisors and information from outside the regulatory perimeter, as well as institution-specific information upon reasoned request and with adequate arrangements to ensure confidentiality. Under the same principles the macro-prudential authority should share with micro-prudential supervisory authorities the data and information relevant for the exercise of the tasks of those authorities;

| 3. | entrust the macro-prudential authority with the power to designate and/or develop the surveillance approaches for identifying, in coordination or together with the micro-prudential and securities market supervisors, the financial institutions and structures that are systemically relevant for the respective Member State, and to determine or recommend on the perimeter of national regulation; |
| --- | --- |

3.

entrust the macro-prudential authority with the power to designate and/or develop the surveillance approaches for identifying, in coordination or together with the micro-prudential and securities market supervisors, the financial institutions and structures that are systemically relevant for the respective Member State, and to determine or recommend on the perimeter of national regulation;

| 4. | ensure that the macro-prudential authority has control over appropriate instruments for achieving its objectives. Where necessary, clear and expeditious procedures should be established for assigning instruments to the macro-prudential authority. |
| --- | --- |

4.

ensure that the macro-prudential authority has control over appropriate instruments for achieving its objectives. Where necessary, clear and expeditious procedures should be established for assigning instruments to the macro-prudential authority.

Recommendation D —   Transparency and accountability

Member States are recommended to:

| 1. | ensure that macro-prudential policy decisions and their motivations are made public in a timely manner, unless there are risks to financial stability in doing so, and that the macro-prudential policy strategies are set out and published by the macro-prudential authority; |
| --- | --- |

1.

ensure that macro-prudential policy decisions and their motivations are made public in a timely manner, unless there are risks to financial stability in doing so, and that the macro-prudential policy strategies are set out and published by the macro-prudential authority;

| 2. | entrust the macro-prudential authority with the power to make public and private statements on systemic risk; |
| --- | --- |

2.

entrust the macro-prudential authority with the power to make public and private statements on systemic risk;

| 3. | make the macro-prudential authority ultimately accountable to the national parliament; |
| --- | --- |

3.

make the macro-prudential authority ultimately accountable to the national parliament;

| 4. | ensure legal protection for the macro-prudential authority and its staff when they act in good faith. |
| --- | --- |

4.

ensure legal protection for the macro-prudential authority and its staff when they act in good faith.

Recommendation E —   Independence

Member States are recommended to ensure that:

| 1. | in the pursuit of its objective, the macro-prudential authority is as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies and from the financial industry; |
| --- | --- |

1.

in the pursuit of its objective, the macro-prudential authority is as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies and from the financial industry;

| 2. | organisational and financial arrangements do not jeopardise the conduct of macro-prudential policy. |
| --- | --- |

2.

organisational and financial arrangements do not jeopardise the conduct of macro-prudential policy.

SECTION 2

IMPLEMENTATION

1.   Interpretation

Terms used in this Recommendation have the following meanings:

| | ‘financial institutions’ means financial institutions as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010; |
| --- | --- |

‘financial institutions’ means financial institutions as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010;

| | ‘financial system’ means financial system as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010. |
| --- | --- |

‘financial system’ means financial system as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010.

2.   Criteria for implementation

| 1. | The following criteria apply to the implementation of this Recommendation:






  (a) | the recommended measures should be enacted in the national legislation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

The following criteria apply to the implementation of this Recommendation:

(a)

the recommended measures should be enacted in the national legislation;

| (b) | regulatory arbitrage should be avoided; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

regulatory arbitrage should be avoided;

| (c) | due regard should be paid to the principle of proportionality in the implementation, with reference to the different systemic significance of the financial institutions, to the different institutional systems, and taking into account the objective and the content of each recommendation; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

due regard should be paid to the principle of proportionality in the implementation, with reference to the different systemic significance of the financial institutions, to the different institutional systems, and taking into account the objective and the content of each recommendation;

| (d) | For the purpose of recommendation A:






  (i) | intermediate policy objectives may be identified as operational specifications of the ultimate objective; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(d)

For the purpose of recommendation A:

(i)

intermediate policy objectives may be identified as operational specifications of the ultimate objective;

| (ii) | macro-prudential policy should allow action also on measures that have macro-prudential relevance. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

macro-prudential policy should allow action also on measures that have macro-prudential relevance.

| 2. | Addressees are requested to communicate to the ESRB and to the Council the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction. The reports should as a minimum contain:






  (a) | information on the substance and timeline of the actions taken; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Addressees are requested to communicate to the ESRB and to the Council the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction. The reports should as a minimum contain:

(a)

information on the substance and timeline of the actions taken;

| (b) | an assessment of the functioning of the actions taken, from the perspective of the objectives of this Recommendation; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

an assessment of the functioning of the actions taken, from the perspective of the objectives of this Recommendation;

| (c) | detailed justification of any inaction or departure from this Recommendation, including any delays. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

detailed justification of any inaction or departure from this Recommendation, including any delays.

3.   Timeline for the follow-up

| 1. | Addressees are requested to communicate to the ESRB and the Council the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction, as specified in the following paragraphs. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Addressees are requested to communicate to the ESRB and the Council the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction, as specified in the following paragraphs.

| 2. | By 30 June 2012, addressees communicate to the ESRB an interim report covering at the minimum the following aspects: (a) a statement concerning whether a macro-prudential mandate has been implemented or is planned to be implemented; (b) an examination of the legal basis for the implementation of this Recommendation; (c) the foreseen institutional shaping of the macro-prudential authority and the devised institutional changes; (d) an assessment for each recommendation hereby provided of whether it is or will be covered by the national measures on the macro-prudential mandate and, if not, adequate explanations. The ESRB may inform the addressees of its views on the interim report. |
| --- | --- |

2.

By 30 June 2012, addressees communicate to the ESRB an interim report covering at the minimum the following aspects: (a) a statement concerning whether a macro-prudential mandate has been implemented or is planned to be implemented; (b) an examination of the legal basis for the implementation of this Recommendation; (c) the foreseen institutional shaping of the macro-prudential authority and the devised institutional changes; (d) an assessment for each recommendation hereby provided of whether it is or will be covered by the national measures on the macro-prudential mandate and, if not, adequate explanations. The ESRB may inform the addressees of its views on the interim report.

| 3. | By 30 June 2013, addressees communicate the final report to the ESRB and the Council. Recommended measures should be in force not later than the 1 July 2013. |
| --- | --- |

3.

By 30 June 2013, addressees communicate the final report to the ESRB and the Council. Recommended measures should be in force not later than the 1 July 2013.

| 4. | The General Board may extend the deadlines in paragraphs 2 and 3 where legislative initiatives are necessary to comply with one or more recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The General Board may extend the deadlines in paragraphs 2 and 3 where legislative initiatives are necessary to comply with one or more recommendations.

4.   Monitoring and assessment

| 1. | The ESRB Secretariat:






  (a) | assists the addressees, including by facilitating coordinated reporting, providing relevant templates and detailing where necessary the modalities and the timeline for the follow-up; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

The ESRB Secretariat:

(a)

assists the addressees, including by facilitating coordinated reporting, providing relevant templates and detailing where necessary the modalities and the timeline for the follow-up;

| (b) | verifies the follow-up by the addressees, including by assisting them upon their request, and reports on the follow-up to the General Board via the Steering Committee within two months from the expiry of the deadlines for the follow-up. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

verifies the follow-up by the addressees, including by assisting them upon their request, and reports on the follow-up to the General Board via the Steering Committee within two months from the expiry of the deadlines for the follow-up.

| 2. | The General Board assesses the actions and the justifications reported by the addressees and, where appropriate, decides whether this Recommendation has not been followed and the addressees have failed to adequately justify their inaction. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The General Board assesses the actions and the justifications reported by the addressees and, where appropriate, decides whether this Recommendation has not been followed and the addressees have failed to adequately justify their inaction.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 December 2011.

The Chair of the ESRB

Mario DRAGHI

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(1)  OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ C 58, 24.2.2011, p. 4.

2

(3)  Commission proposals for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (COM(2011) 453 final) and for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (COM(2011) 452 final).

3

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/5

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(Text with EEA relevance)

2012/C 41/02

| Date of adoption of the decision | 15.12.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 606/09 |
| Member State | Netherlands |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Nationale regeling voor de instandhouding en het herstel van beschermde historische monumenten |
| Legal basis | Monumentwet 1988 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Heritage conservation |
| Form of aid | Direct grant, Guarantee, Soft loan |
| Budget | | Annual budget: EUR 400 million |

Date of adoption of the decision

15.12.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 606/09

Member State

Netherlands

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Nationale regeling voor de instandhouding en het herstel van beschermde historische monumenten

Legal basis

Monumentwet 1988

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Heritage conservation

Form of aid

Direct grant, Guarantee, Soft loan

Budget

Annual budget: EUR 400 million

| | Overall budget: EUR 2 000 million |
| --- | --- |

Overall budget: EUR 2 000 million

Intensity

100 %

Duration (period)

1.1.2010-31.12.2014

Economic sectors

Real Estate, Hotels and restaurants (tourism)

Name and address of the granting authority

Nederlandse rijksoverheid

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 30.9.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33095 (11/N) |
| Member State | Spain |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Recapitalisation of UNNIM Banc |
| Legal basis | Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito |
| Type of measure | Individual aid |
| Objective | Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy |
| Form of aid | Recapitalisation |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 948 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | Financial intermediation |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Royal Kingdom of Spain |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

30.9.2011

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33095 (11/N)

Member State

Spain

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Recapitalisation of UNNIM Banc

Legal basis

Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito

Type of measure

Individual aid

Objective

Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy

Form of aid

Recapitalisation

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 948 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

Financial intermediation

Name and address of the granting authority

Royal Kingdom of Spain

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 30.9.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33096 (11/N) |
| Member State | Spain |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Recapitalisation of NCG Banco |
| Legal basis | Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito |
| Type of measure | Individual aid |
| Objective | Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy |
| Form of aid | Recapitalisation |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 2 465 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | Financial intermediation |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Kingdom of Spain |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

30.9.2011

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33096 (11/N)

Member State

Spain

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Recapitalisation of NCG Banco

Legal basis

Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito

Type of measure

Individual aid

Objective

Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy

Form of aid

Recapitalisation

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 2 465 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

Financial intermediation

Name and address of the granting authority

Kingdom of Spain

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 30.9.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33103 (11/N) |
| Member State | Spain |
| Region | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Recapitalisation of Catalunya Banc |
| Legal basis | Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito |
| Type of measure | Individual aid |
| Objective | Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy |
| Form of aid | Recapitalisation |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 1 718 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | Financial intermediation |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Kingdom of Spain |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

30.9.2011

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33103 (11/N)

Member State

Spain

Region

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Recapitalisation of Catalunya Banc

Legal basis

Article 9 Real Decree Law 9/2009, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito

Type of measure

Individual aid

Objective

Aid to remedy serious disturbances in the economy

Form of aid

Recapitalisation

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 1 718 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

Financial intermediation

Name and address of the granting authority

Kingdom of Spain

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 16.1.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33603 (11/N) |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | Veneto |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Modifiche al regime di aiuti diretto a fronteggiare i danni conseguenti gli eccezionali eventi alluvionali che hanno colpito il territorio della Regione Veneto nei giorni dal 31 ottobre al 2 novembre 2010 (SA.32683) |
| Legal basis | OPCM 3906 del 13 novembre 2010; Ordinanza del Commissario n. 9 del 17 dicembre 2010; Progetto di Ordinanza del Commissario recante disposizioni per la concessione alle imprese di aiuti destinati a ovviare ai danni arrecati dagli eccezionali eventi alluvionali che hanno colpito il territorio regionale nei giorni dal 31 ottobre al 2 novembre 2010; Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri n. 3943 del 25 maggio 2011 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Compensation for damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 60 million |
| Intensity | 100 % |
| Duration (period) | Until 31.12.2013 |
| Economic sectors | All sectors |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Commissario delegato ex OPCM 3906 per il tramite dei Comuni |
| Via Paolucci 34 |
| 30147 Marghera VE |
| ITALIA |

Date of adoption of the decision

16.1.2012

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33603 (11/N)

Member State

Italy

Region

Veneto

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Modifiche al regime di aiuti diretto a fronteggiare i danni conseguenti gli eccezionali eventi alluvionali che hanno colpito il territorio della Regione Veneto nei giorni dal 31 ottobre al 2 novembre 2010 (SA.32683)

Legal basis

OPCM 3906 del 13 novembre 2010; Ordinanza del Commissario n. 9 del 17 dicembre 2010; Progetto di Ordinanza del Commissario recante disposizioni per la concessione alle imprese di aiuti destinati a ovviare ai danni arrecati dagli eccezionali eventi alluvionali che hanno colpito il territorio regionale nei giorni dal 31 ottobre al 2 novembre 2010; Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri n. 3943 del 25 maggio 2011

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Compensation for damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 60 million

Intensity

100 %

Duration (period)

Until 31.12.2013

Economic sectors

All sectors

Name and address of the granting authority

Commissario delegato ex OPCM 3906 per il tramite dei Comuni

Via Paolucci 34

30147 Marghera VE

ITALIA

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

---

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/9

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(Text with EEA relevance, except for products falling under Annex I to the Treaty)

2012/C 41/03

| Date of adoption of the decision | 6.1.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33112 (11/N) |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | Calabria | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Regime di Aiuto Misure Forestali Programma di Sviluppo Rurale 2007-2013 della Regione Calabria [Dec. n. C(2010) 1164 del 26 febbraio 2010]: Misura 221 — Primo imboschimento di terreni agricoli; Misura 223 — Primo imboschimento di superfici non agricole. |
| Legal basis | PSR Calabria, Allegato X — Schede di misura 221, 223 [Art. 36, b, i-iii; Artt. 43 e 45 regolamento (CE) n. 1698/2005] |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Forestry, Rural development (AGRI) |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 19 million |
| Intensity | 80 % |
| Duration (period) | Until 31.12.2013 |
| Economic sectors | Forestry and logging |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Regione Calabria |
| Dipartimento Agricoltura |
| Via Molè |
| 88100 Catanzaro CZ |
| ITALIA |

Date of adoption of the decision

6.1.2012

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33112 (11/N)

Member State

Italy

Region

Calabria

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Regime di Aiuto Misure Forestali Programma di Sviluppo Rurale 2007-2013 della Regione Calabria [Dec. n. C(2010) 1164 del 26 febbraio 2010]: Misura 221 — Primo imboschimento di terreni agricoli; Misura 223 — Primo imboschimento di superfici non agricole.

Legal basis

PSR Calabria, Allegato X — Schede di misura 221, 223 [Art. 36, b, i-iii; Artt. 43 e 45 regolamento (CE) n. 1698/2005]

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Forestry, Rural development (AGRI)

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 19 million

Intensity

80 %

Duration (period)

Until 31.12.2013

Economic sectors

Forestry and logging

Name and address of the granting authority

Regione Calabria

Dipartimento Agricoltura

Via Molè

88100 Catanzaro CZ

ITALIA

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

| Date of adoption of the decision | 6.1.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | SA.33810 (11/N) |
| Member State | Denmark |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Large Growth Guarantee Scheme/extension of the calculation methodology for the aid element in guarantees (SA.33022) |
| Legal basis | The Finance Act 2011
  Act No 549 of 1 July 2002 (as amended) on Vækstfonden
  Executive order No 1013 of 17 August 2007 (as amended) on the activitities on Vækstfonden |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | SMEs |
| Form of aid | Guarantee |
| Budget | Overall budget: DKK 75 million |
| Intensity | 7,26 % |
| Duration (period) | Until 31.12.2015 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Vækstfonden |
| Strandvejen 104 A |
| 2900 Hellerup |
| DANMARK |

Date of adoption of the decision

6.1.2012

Reference number of State Aid

SA.33810 (11/N)

Member State

Denmark

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Large Growth Guarantee Scheme/extension of the calculation methodology for the aid element in guarantees (SA.33022)

Legal basis

The Finance Act 2011

Act No 549 of 1 July 2002 (as amended) on Vækstfonden

Executive order No 1013 of 17 August 2007 (as amended) on the activitities on Vækstfonden

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

SMEs

Form of aid

Guarantee

Budget

Overall budget: DKK 75 million

Intensity

7,26 %

Duration (period)

Until 31.12.2015

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Vækstfonden

Strandvejen 104 A

2900 Hellerup

DANMARK

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_en.htm

---

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/11

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

13 February 2012

2012/C 41/04

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3254 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 102,86 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4329 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,83885 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,8098 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2090 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 7,5710 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,045 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 290,45 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,6988 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1942 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,3458 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,3312 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,2326 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,3222 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,2782 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5867 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6622 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 485,49 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 10,1629 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,3386 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5870 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 11 926,83 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,0116 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 56,280 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 39,5760 |
| THB | Thai baht | 40,836 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,2757 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 16,8404 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 65,1430 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3254

JPY

Japanese yen

102,86

DKK

Danish krone

7,4329

GBP

Pound sterling

0,83885

SEK

Swedish krona

8,8098

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2090

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

7,5710

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,045

HUF

Hungarian forint

290,45

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,6988

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1942

RON

Romanian leu

4,3458

TRY

Turkish lira

2,3312

AUD

Australian dollar

1,2326

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,3222

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,2782

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5867

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6622

KRW

South Korean won

1 485,49

ZAR

South African rand

10,1629

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,3386

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5870

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

11 926,83

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,0116

PHP

Philippine peso

56,280

RUB

Russian rouble

39,5760

THB

Thai baht

40,836

BRL

Brazilian real

2,2757

MXN

Mexican peso

16,8404

INR

Indian rupee

65,1430

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/12

---

SPECIFIC CALL FOR PROPOSALS — EAC/S02/12

Erasmus University Charter 2013

2012/C 41/05

1.   Objectives and description

The Erasmus University Charter provides the general framework for the European cooperation activities a higher education institution (HEI) may carry out within the Erasmus programme as part of the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP). The Erasmus University Charter must be awarded as a prerequisite for HEI to organise student mobility and teaching and other staff mobility, to carry out Erasmus intensive language courses and intensive programmes, and to apply for multilateral projects, networks, accompanying measures and to organise preparatory visits (1). The Erasmus University Charter is based on the LLP Decision (2) which covers the 2007 to 2013 period. The specific objectives of the LLP are listed in Article 1.3 of the Decision.

2.   Eligible applicants

The Erasmus University Charter applies to all higher education institutions defined in Article 2.10 of the Decision.

Applicants must be established in one of the following countries:

| — | the 27 Member States of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

the 27 Member States of the European Union,

| — | the EEA/EFTA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, |
| --- | --- |

—

the EEA/EFTA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,

| — | the candidate countries: Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, |
| --- | --- |

—

the candidate countries: Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,

| — | Switzerland. |
| --- | --- |

—

Switzerland.

3.   Deadline for the submission of applications

The deadline for submitting applications for the Erasmus University Charter is 29 March 2012.

4.   Full details

The information about the Erasmus programme and the Erasmus University Charter can be found at the following internet address:

http://ec.europa.eu/llp

Applications must be submitted according to the guidelines provided by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency and available at the address:

http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/index_en.htm

---

(1)  The Erasmus University Charter is not required for HEI from countries that are eligible only for participation in Erasmus multilateral projects, networks and accompanying measures (programme actions listed in point A.2 of the Annex to Decision No 1720/2006/EC).

(2)  Decision No 1720/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an action programme in the field of lifelong learning. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0045:0068:EN:PDF

---

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

| 14.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 41/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 41/14

---

Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China

2012/C 41/06

The European Commission (‘the Commission’) has decided on its own initiative to initiate an interim review investigation of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People’s Republic of China pursuant to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (‘the basic Regulation’). The review is limited in scope to the examination of dumping.

1.   Product

The product subject to this review investigation is hand pallet trucks and their essential parts, i.e. chassis and hydraulics, originating in the People's Republic of China, currently falling within CN codes ex 8427 90 00 and ex 8431 20 00. Hand pallet trucks are defined as trucks with wheels supporting lifting fork arms for handling pallets, designed to be manually pushed, pulled and steered, on smooth, level, hard surfaces, by a pedestrian operator using an articulated tiller. The hand pallet trucks are only designed to raise a load, by pumping the tiller, to a height sufficient for transporting and do not have any other additional functions or uses such as for example (i) to move and to lift the loads in order to place them higher or assist in storage of loads (highlifters); (ii) to stack one pallet above the other (stackers); (iii) to lift the load to a working level (scissorlifts); or (iv) to lift and to weigh the loads (weighing trucks) (‘the product under review’).

2.   Existing measures

By Council Regulation (EC) No 1174/2005 (2) the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts originating in the People's Republic of China.

By Council Regulation (EC) No 684/2008 (3) the Council clarified the original product scope.

Following an anti-circumvention investigation in accordance with Article 13 of the basic Regulation, this duty was extended by Council Regulation (EC) No 499/2009 (4) to imports of the same product consigned from Thailand, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not.

Following an expiry review investigation pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Council, by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2011 (5) decided that the above mentioned measures should be maintained.

3.   Grounds for the review

The Commission has at its disposal sufficient prima facie evidence that, as far as dumping is concerned, the circumstances on the basis of which the existing measures were imposed have changed and that these changes are of a lasting nature.

Based on a comparison of Chinese export prices to the EU with a normal value established on the basis of prices paid or payable in the EU, it is seen that dumping has increased. Chinese imports of hand pallet trucks and their essential parts continue to enter the EU market at dumped prices. More specifically, there are indications that Chinese exporting producers can afford to export the product concerned at low prices because of price distortions in the steel market in the People's Republic of China due to State interference. This development, amongst others, calls into question the validity of the MET granted to one Chinese exporting producer.

In addition, the information at the disposal of the Commission indicates that the capacity of the Chinese exporting producers of hand pallet trucks and of their essential parts is much bigger than China's domestic demand and that the EU market continues to be a very attractive destination for their exports. Indeed, on the basis of Eurostat statistics, it appears that imports from China have replaced almost entirely imports from other third countries in recent years.

Based on the above, it is considered that the circumstances with regard to the dumping as determined in the original investigation have significantly changed and that these changes are of a lasting nature. Consequently, the continued imposition of measures at the existing level appears to be no longer appropriate to offset the effects of injurious dumping.

4.   Procedure

The Commission hereby initiates a review investigation in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an interim review investigation.

The review investigation will assess whether the continued imposition of the measure is no longer necessary to offset dumping or whether the existing measure is not, or is no longer, sufficient to counteract the dumping which is causing injury.

The investigation will assess whether there is a need for the continuation, removal or amendment of the existing measures.

Procedure regarding dumping

Exporting producers (6) of the product under review from the country concerned, including those that did not cooperate in the investigations which led to the amendment and maintaining of the measures in force, are invited to participate in the Commission review investigation.

4.1.   
  Investigating exporting producers

4.1.1.   Procedure for selecting exporting producers to be investigated in the country concerned

(a)   Sampling

In view of the potentially large number of exporting producers in the country concerned involved in this proceeding and in order to complete the review investigation within the statutory time-limits, the Commission may limit the exporting producers to be investigated to a reasonable number by selecting a sample (this process is also referred to as ‘sampling’). The sampling will be carried out in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary, and if so, to select a sample, all exporting producers, or representatives acting on their behalf, are hereby requested to make themselves known to the Commission. These parties have to do so within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified, by providing the Commission with the following information on their company or companies:

| — | name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers, and contact person, |
| --- | --- |

—

name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers, and contact person,

| — | the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces of the product under review sold for export to the Union during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011 for each of the 27 Member States (7) separately and in total, |
| --- | --- |

—

the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces of the product under review sold for export to the Union during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011 for each of the 27 Member States (7) separately and in total,

| — | the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces of the product under review sold on the domestic market during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011, |
| --- | --- |

—

the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces of the product under review sold on the domestic market during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011,

| — | the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces for the product under review sold to other third countries during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011, |
| --- | --- |

—

the turnover in local currency and the volume in pieces for the product under review sold to other third countries during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011,

| — | the precise activities of the company worldwide with regard to the product under review, |
| --- | --- |

—

the precise activities of the company worldwide with regard to the product under review,

| — | the names and the precise activities of all related companies (8) involved in the production and/or sales (export and/or domestic) of the product under review, |
| --- | --- |

—

the names and the precise activities of all related companies (8) involved in the production and/or sales (export and/or domestic) of the product under review,

| — | any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample.

The exporting producers should also indicate whether, in the event that they are not selected to be in the sample, they would like to receive a questionnaire and other claim forms in order to fill it/these in and thus claim an individual dumping margin in accordance with section (b) below.

By providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is selected to be part of the sample, this will imply completing a questionnaire and accepting a visit at its premises in order to verify its response (‘on-spot verification’). If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed not to have cooperated in the review investigation. The Commission's findings for non-cooperating exporting producers are based on facts available and the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for the selection of the sample of exporting producers, the Commission will also contact the authorities of the country concerned and may contact any known associations of exporting producers.

All interested parties wishing to submit any other relevant information regarding the selection of the sample, excluding the information requested above, must do so within 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified.

If a sample is necessary, the exporting producers may be selected based on the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which can reasonably be investigated within the time available. All known exporting producers, the authorities of the country concerned and associations of exporting producers will be notified by the Commission, via the authorities of the country concerned if appropriate, of the companies selected to be in the sample.

All exporting producers selected to be in the sample will have to submit a completed questionnaire within 37 days from the date of notification of the sample selection, unless otherwise specified.

The completed questionnaire will contain information on, inter alia, the structure of the exporting producer's company(ies), the activities of the company(ies) in relation to the product under review, the cost of production, the sales of the product under review on the domestic market of the country concerned and the sales of the product under review to the Union.

Companies that had agreed to their possible inclusion in the sample but were not selected to be in the sample shall be considered to be cooperating (‘non-sampled cooperating exporting producers’). Without prejudice to section (b) below, the anti-dumping duty that may be applied to imports from the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers will not exceed the weighted average margin of dumping established for the exporting producers in the sample (9).

(b)   Individual dumping margin for companies not included in the sample

Non-sampled cooperating exporting producers may request, pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation that the Commission establish their individual dumping margins (‘individual dumping margin’). The exporting producers wishing to claim an individual dumping margin must request a questionnaire and other claim forms in accordance with section (a) above and return them duly completed within the deadlines specified in the following sentence and in section 4.2.2 below. The completed questionnaire reply must be submitted within 37 days of the date of the notification of the sample selection, unless otherwise specified. It must be underlined that, in order for the Commission to be able to establish individual dumping margins for those exporting producers in the non-market economy country, it must be proven that they fulfil the criteria for being granted market economy treatment (‘MET’) or at least individual treatment (‘IT’) as specified in section 4.2.2. below.

However, exporting producers claiming an individual dumping margin should be aware that the Commission may nonetheless decide not to determine their individual dumping margin if, for instance, the number of exporting producers is so large that such determination would be unduly burdensome and would prevent the timely completion of the review investigation.

4.2.   
  Additional procedure with regard to exporting producers in the non-market economy country concerned

4.2.1.   Selection of a Market Economy Third Country

Subject to the provisions of section 4.2.2 below, in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, in the case of imports from the country concerned normal value shall be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country. For this purpose the Commission shall select an appropriate market economy third country. The Commission intends to contact producers in other market economy third countries such as Brazil for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the People's Republic of China. Should cooperation not be forthcoming, the Commission envisages using the prices actually paid or payable in the Union again for this purpose. Interested parties are hereby invited to comment on the appropriateness of this choice within 10 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

4.2.2.   Treatment of exporting producers in the non-market economy country concerned

In accordance with Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation, individual exporting producers in the country concerned, which consider that market economy conditions prevail for them in respect of the manufacture and sale of the product under review, may submit a properly substantiated claim to this effect (‘MET claim’). Market economy treatment (‘MET’) will be granted if the assessment of the MET claim shows that the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation (10) are fulfilled. The dumping margin of the exporting producers granted MET will be calculated, to the extent possible and without prejudice to the use of facts available pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation, by using their own normal value and export prices in accordance with Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation.

Individual exporting producers in the country concerned may also, or as an alternative, claim individual treatment (‘IT’). To be granted IT these exporting producers must provide evidence that they fulfil the criteria set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation (11). The dumping margin of the exporting producers granted IT will be calculated on the basis of their own export prices. The normal value for exporting producers granted IT will be based on the values established for the market economy third country selected as outlined above.

Attention is also drawn to section 9 of this notice.

(a)   Market economy treatment (MET)

The Commission will send MET claim forms to all the exporting producers in the country concerned selected to be in the sample and to non-sampled cooperating exporting producers that wish to apply for an individual dumping margin, to any known association of exporting producers, as well as to the authorities of the country concerned.

All exporting producers claiming MET should submit a completed MET claim form within 21 days of the date of the notification of the sample selection or of the decision not to select a sample, unless otherwise specified.

(b)   Individual treatment (IT)

To apply for IT, exporting producers in the country concerned selected to be in the sample and non-sampled cooperating exporting producers that wish to apply for an individual dumping margin should submit the MET claim form with the sections relevant for IT duly completed within 21 days of the date of the notification of sample selection, unless otherwise specified.

4.3.   
  Investigating unrelated importers

   (12)
   (13)

Unrelated importers of the product under review from the country concerned to the Union, including those that did not cooperate in the investigations which led to the amendment and maintaining of the measures in force, are invited to participate in the Commission review investigation.

In view of the potentially large number of unrelated importers involved in this proceeding and in order to complete the review investigation within the statutory time-limits, the Commission may limit to a reasonable number the unrelated importers that will be investigated by selecting a sample (this process is also referred to as ‘sampling’). The sampling will be carried out in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all unrelated importers, or representatives acting on their behalf, are hereby requested to make themselves known to the Commission. These parties should do so within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified, by providing the Commission with the following information on their company or companies:

| — | name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person, |
| --- | --- |

—

name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person,

| — | the precise activities of the company with regard to the product under review, |
| --- | --- |

—

the precise activities of the company with regard to the product under review,

| — | total turnover during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011, |
| --- | --- |

—

total turnover during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011,

| — | the volume in pieces and value in EUR of imports into and resales made on the Union market during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011 of the imported product under review originating in the country concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the volume in pieces and value in EUR of imports into and resales made on the Union market during the period 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2011 of the imported product under review originating in the country concerned,

| — | the names and the precise activities of all related companies (14) involved in the production and/or sales of the product under review, |
| --- | --- |

—

the names and the precise activities of all related companies (14) involved in the production and/or sales of the product under review,

| — | any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample.

By providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is selected to be part of the sample, this will imply completing a questionnaire and accepting a visit at its premises in order to verify its response (‘on-spot verification’). If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed not to have cooperated in the review investigation. The Commission's findings for non-cooperating importers are based on the facts available and the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for the selection of the sample of unrelated importers, the Commission may also contact any known associations of importers.

All interested parties wishing to submit any other relevant information regarding the selection of the sample, excluding the information requested above, must do so within 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified.

If a sample is necessary, the importers may be selected based on the largest representative volume of sales of the product under review in the Union which can reasonably be investigated within the time available. All known unrelated importers and associations of importers will be notified by the Commission of the companies selected to be in the sample.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the sampled unrelated importers and to any known association of importers. These parties must submit a completed questionnaire within 37 days from the date of the notification of the sample selection, unless otherwise specified. The completed questionnaire will contain information on, inter alia, the structure of their company(ies), the activities of the company(ies) in relation to the product under review and on the sales of the product under review.

4.4.   
  Other written submissions

Subject to the provisions of this notice, all interested parties are hereby invited to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence. Unless otherwise specified, this information and supporting evidence should reach the Commission within 37 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

4.5.   
  Possibility to be heard by the Commission investigation services

All interested parties may request to be heard by the Commission investigation services. Any request to be heard should be made in writing and should specify the reasons for the request. For hearings on issues pertaining to the initial stage of the review investigation the request must be submitted within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. Thereafter, a request to be heard should be submitted within the specific deadlines set by the Commission in its communication with the parties.

4.6.   
  Instructions for making written submissions and sending completed questionnaires and correspondence

All written submissions, including the information requested in this notice, completed questionnaires and correspondence provided by interested parties for which confidential treatment is requested shall be labelled ‘Limited (15)’.

Interested parties providing ‘Limited’ information are required to furnish non-confidential summaries of it pursuant to Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation, which will be labelled ‘For inspection by interested parties’. These summaries should be sufficiently detailed to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. If an interested party providing confidential information does not furnish a non-confidential summary of it in the requested format and quality, such confidential information may be disregarded.

Interested parties are required to make all submissions and requests in electronic format (the non-confidential submissions via e-mail, the confidential ones on CD-R/DVD), and must indicate the name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers of the interested party. However, any Powers of Attorney, signed certifications, and any updates thereof, accompanying market economy treatment and/or individual treatment claim forms or questionnaire replies shall be submitted on paper, i.e. by post or by hand, at the address below. Pursuant to Article 18(2) of the basic Regulation if an interested party cannot provide its submissions and requests in electronic format, it must immediately inform the Commission. For further information concerning correspondence with the Commission, interested parties may consult the relevant web page on the website of Directorate-General for Trade: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-defence

Commission address for correspondence:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Trade |
| Directorate H |
| Office: N105 04/092 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22979618 |
| E-mail: TRADE-11.3-HAND-PALLET-TRUCKS@ec.europa.eu |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Trade

Directorate H

Office: N105 04/092

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22979618

E-mail: TRADE-11.3-HAND-PALLET-TRUCKS@ec.europa.eu

5.   Non-cooperation

In cases where any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time-limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, provisional or final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information may be disregarded and use may be made of facts available.

If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially and findings are therefore based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

6.   Hearing Officer

Interested parties may request the intervention of the Hearing Officer of Directorate-General for Trade. The Hearing Officer acts as an interface between the interested parties and the Commission investigation services. The Hearing Officer reviews requests for access to the file, disputes on the confidentiality of documents, requests for extension of time-limits and requests by third parties to be heard. The Hearing Officer may organise a hearing with an individual interested party and mediate to ensure that the interested parties' rights of defence are being fully exercised.

A request for a hearing with the Hearing Officer should be made in writing and should specify the reasons for the request. For hearings on issues pertaining to the initial stage of the review investigation the request must be submitted within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. Thereafter, a request to be heard must be submitted within specific deadlines set by the Commission in its communication with the parties.

The Hearing Officer will also provide opportunities for a hearing involving parties to take place which would allow different views to be presented and rebuttal arguments offered on issues pertaining, among others, to dumping, injury, causal link and Union interest.

For further information and contact details interested parties may consult the Hearing Officer's web pages on DG Trade's website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/hearing-officer/index_en.htm

7.   Schedule of the review investigation

The review investigation will be concluded, according to Article 11(5) of the basic Regulation within 15 months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

8.   Processing of personal data

Any personal data collected in this review investigation will be treated in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (16).

9.   Important information for exporting producers in non-market economy countries: implications of the WTO Appellate Body Report EC-Antidumping measures on fasteners (WT/DS397) on the way in which the Commission will conduct this investigation

The Commission encourages all exporting producers from the People's Republic of China which is considered to be a non-market economy country in view of the provisions of Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation, to make themselves known within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, if they are interested in cooperating and obtaining an individual anti-dumping duty, even if they consider that they do not comply with the criteria for obtaining IT. The Commission draws their attention to the following (17).

In EC-Certain Iron or Steel fasteners from China (WT/DS397), the WTO Appellate Body found, inter alia, that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation is inconsistent with certain provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.

Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on the measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters (18) (‘the enabling Regulation’) provides that the Council of the European Union may, inter alia, amend Union measures taken pursuant to the basic Regulation in order to take into account the legal interpretations made in a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body with regard to a non-disputed measure, if it considers this appropriate.

Therefore, should the review investigation which is initiated by the present Notice of initiation result in the amendment of the anti-dumping measures in force, in the Commission's view the aforementioned Article 2 would constitute a legal basis for complying with the legal interpretations developed by the WTO Appellate Body in the above mentioned dispute. This would imply, in more practical terms, that if an exporting producer came forward within the deadline set out above and fully co-operated by furnishing all relevant information but did not apply for IT, or applied but was found not to fulfil the criteria, the aforementioned Article 2 of the enabling Regulation could serve, in duly justified cases, as a legal basis for awarding that exporting producer an individual duty. In examining this question, the Commission will take account of the reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body in the above-mentioned dispute, and in particular of the elements discussed in paragraphs 371-384 of its report.

Operators obtaining an individual duty on the basis of this part of this Notice of initiation should be aware that the findings may result in an increase in the duty compared to the one that would apply if no individual duty had been granted.

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(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

(2)  OJ L 189, 21.7.2005, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 192, 19.7.2008, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 151, 16.6.2009, p. 1.

(5)  OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 1.

(6)  An exporting producer is any company in the country concerned which produces and exports the product under review to the Union market, either directly or via third party, including any of its related companies involved in the production, domestic sales or exports of the product concerned.

(7)  The 27 Member States of the European Union are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

(8)  In accordance with Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 concerning the implementation of the Community Customs Code, persons shall be deemed to be related only if: (a) they are officers or directors of one another's businesses; (b) they are legally recognised partners in business; (c) they are employer and employee; (d) any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 % or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them; (e) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; (f) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; (g) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or (h) they are members of the same family. Persons shall be deemed to be members of the same family only if they stand in any of the following relationships to one another: (i) husband and wife, (ii) parent and child, (iii) brother and sister (whether by whole or half blood), (iv) grandparent and grandchild, (v) uncle or aunt and nephew or niece, (vi) parent-in-law and son-in-law or daughter-in-law, (vii) brother-in-law and sister-in-law. (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1). In this context ‘person’ means any natural or legal person.

(9)  Pursuant to Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation, any zero and de minimis margins, and margins established in accordance with the circumstances described in Article 18 of the basic Regulation shall be disregarded.

(10)  The exporting producers have to demonstrate in particular that: (i) business decisions and costs are made in response to market conditions and without significant State interference; (ii) firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes; (iii) there are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system; (iv) bankruptcy and property laws guarantee legal certainty and stability and (v) exchange rate conversions are carried out at market rates.

(11)  The exporting producers have to demonstrate in particular that: (i) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are free to repatriate capital and profits; (ii) export prices and quantities and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined; (iii) the majority of the shares belong to private persons. State officials appearing on the Board of Directors or holding key management positions shall either be in a minority or it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from State interference; (iv) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate and (v) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual exporters are given different rates of duty.

(12)  Only importers not related to exporting producers can be sampled. Importers that are related to exporting producers have to fill in Annex 1 to the questionnaire for these exporting producers. For the definition of a related party see footnote 8.

(13)  The data provided by unrelated importers may also be used in relation to aspects of this investigation other than the determination of dumping.

(14)  For the definition of a related party see footnote 8.

(15)  A ‘Limited’ document is a document which is considered confidential pursuant to Article 19 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51) and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement). It is also a document protected pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).

(16)  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

(17)  Should sampling for exporting producers be deemed necessary, an individual anti-dumping duty will only be determined for those exporting producers either (i) selected to be in the sample or (ii) for which an individual dumping margin has been determined pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation.

(18)  OJ L 201, 26.7.2001, p. 10.

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ANNEX A

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ANNEX B

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