2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/436PRECEDENT IAL

IN THE UN ITED STATES CO URT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

_______________ No. 03-3537

________________ UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v.
AN TH ON Y D ’A NG EL ICO ,

Appellant

_______________________________ On Appeal From the United St ates Dis tri ct Court For the Eastern Distri ct of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 02-cr -00738) Di s t r i ct J ud ge : Ho no r ab l e M i ch ae l M. Bayls on

_______________________________ Submitte d Und er Third Circu it LAR 34.1(a)

June 28, 2004 Before: AMBR O, BECK ER and GR EE NB ER G, Circuit Judges

(Fil ed: Jul y 19, 2004)
PATRI CK L. MEEHAN, ESQ. United States Attorney LAURI E MAGID, ESQ. Deputy United State s Attorne y for Policy an d A ppea ls ROBERT A. ZAUZMER, ESQ. Assist ant Unite d States Attorney Senior Appell ate Counsel FRANCI S C. BARBI ERI , J R. , E SQ. Assist ant Unite d States Attorney Office of United St ates Attorney 615 Chestnut St

reet Philadelphia, PA 19106 Attorney s for Appel lee
MAUREEN KEAR NEY ROWLEY , E SQ. Chief FederalDefender DAVID L . Mc COLGI N, ESQ. Assist ant Federa l Defender Supervisi ng Appellat e Attorney ELAI NE DeMAS SE ES Q. Assist ant Federa l Defender Senior Appell ate Counsel De fend er A ssocia tion of Philad elphia Federal Court

Divisi on Curtis Center, Independence Square W est Suite 540 West Philadelphia, PA 19106 Attorney s for Appel lant

_______________________

OPI NION

_______________________
BE CK ER , Circuit

Judge. This ap pe al b y d efe ndant Anthony D’Angelico calls up on u s onc e aga in to assess w hether a Guidelines sentence must be vacated a nd the matter remanded t o the Distri ctCourt becausethe part ies have not made a clear

record on whethe r the Dis tri ct Cou rt’s denial of the d own ward d eparture soughtby D’A nge lico— und er U .S.S .G. §2

5K2.13, based up on his put ativemental retar dation—was base d on legal o r discretionary grounds. If the refusal was on legal grounds, we have juri sdiction; if it was di sc re tio na ry, we do n ot. See United St ates v. Ge orgia dis , 933 F.2d 12 19, 1222 (3d Cir. 1991). Because the bac kground fact s and proceduralhistory ge nerally do not bear on this is su e, we need not set them forth, except in sof ar as theyare neces saryto our disposi tion

. Notwithst anding our inj unction i n United Statesv. Mum mert , 34 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 1994), that Dis tri ct Judges cl earl y note the basis for th eir refusal to depart downward, the is sue keeps r ecurri ng. What the District Judge said here was: I do not find t

hat the re are g round s for a downward depar ture , as y ou have requested, and I’ m going to deny tha t

. But, I wil l sentence y our cli ent to the lower e nd of the gu ideli ne range and in thehopes that he’s going to ha ve to sp en d a bo ut six ye a rs in prison. May be h e’ llget som e t ime off for good behavior. And, he’ll just underst and that hec an ’t conduct himself the way he was. D’Angelico submits that the st atement is less than pel lucid: Although U .S.S. G. § 5K2.13 [the Guidelineat issue] e xpre ssly sets out a number of

limi tati ons on the co urt’s d ep arture authority, the district court made no explic it fi ndings re garding any of those fac tors. Nor did the court state tha t it had leg al auth o rity to d epar t or state th at its refu sal to depart resul ted from the e x ercis e of its discre tion. Fu rth e rmore, t he statement the court did m ake (“ I do not find th at t here a re ground s for a dow nwa rd d e parture”) is ambiguous regardi ng the basi s for the co urt’ s ruli ng, as it

equall y suppor

ts both a conc lusio n th at the refusal to de part was base d on a belie f that o ne or more of the express l imit ations on the court’s autho rity to dep art did exist in this cas e, anda con clusion th at the refusalresulted fro m the exer cise of di scretion. . . . As such, the reco rd fails to reve al w heth er denialof the departure was based on legalor disc retio nar y grou nds

. This argument i s ve ry s trong. On the otherhand, the government poi nts out that it did not dis pute at

sentenci ng that t

he District C ourt h ad the authority t o depart unde r the circumst ances of t his case. It g oes o n to dem onstra te the p oint: [W]hen the Dist

rict Court asked for the go v ernment t o respond t o the defend ant’s mo ti o n, the government stated that “ to som e extent[,] there’s som e validity to that

position and [the gov ernm ent] wo uld no t objec t to som e minimum departure in li ght of the defe ndan t’s dim inished capa city and the fa ct that h is men ta l c apac ity play ed som e role in the o ffe nse her e.” In Mum mert we stated t hat where the governmentconcedes the plaus i bili ty of the dow nwa rd d epartu re, “it seem s quite lik ely that the dist rict c our t’s re fus al to d epa rt . . .3

was discre tionar

y. ” 34 F.3d at

205. We are chagrined that the dist rict court s, wh ic h could so ea sily make crystal cle a r whether thei r r efusal to depart is because theydo n ot belie ve th at theyhave the autho rity to do so o r, conver sely , whether theyund erstan d their authori ty to depart and exercise their disc retion n ot to, so o ften f ail to take th at opport unity. This is the case he re. Our frustr ation i s not l imit ed to the courts, for the prosecutor and defense counsel also bear res ponsibi lit y. There is no reason that, if a di stri ct court does not clarify the basi s f or no n-de partur e, cou nsel sh ould not remind thecourt to do so. Em ph ati ca lly, this is counsel’s resp on sibili ty for i t is a matter of preserving the record for ap pea l ( or, from the government’s poi nt of v iew , insulati ng the judgm ent from appeal). Counse ls’ fail ures en gend er nee dless a ppea ls an d waste of ti me and funds. We expe c t counsel to heed thi s inj unction. Though this is not

our prefer

red cours e, the state of the rec ord h ere do es allow us to divine, albei t indirectl y, the basi s for the Distri ct Cou rt’s refusalto depart downward. Th e gov ernm ent ac kno wle dged at senten cin g itself that t he defendantwas correct that t he Cou rt had the pow er to depart. Given this, we are s a tis fied that theable Dist rict Judge in this case und erstoo d his authority to depart and ex erc ised hi s discretion not to do so. Under the ci rcumstance s , we have no appe llate juris dicti on. See United Stat es v. Denardi , 892 F.2d 269, 272 ( 3d Cir. 1989) (holdi ng that t

he Court of Appeals lacks ju r isdi ctionund er 18 U.S .C. § 3 742 to entertain an app eal from a district court’s exercise of discretion i n refusi ng to de part dow nwa rd). The appeal wil l theref ore be dismis sed.