FI LED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEV ENT H CI RCUI T Oct obe r 1 3, 20 11 J OHN LEY CLERK [PUBLIS H]

IN THE U

NITED STATE S COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

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__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 0- 13 49 0

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__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 1 :0 8- cv -2 18 04 -DLG
JESUS DELGAD O,
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pet it io ne r - App el la nt ,

vers us FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Res po nd en t - Ap pe ll ee.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t forth e So ut he rn Dis tri ctof F lo rid a

__

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Oct ob er 1 3, 2 01 1)
Befo re BARKETT, W ILSON an d M ARTIN, Cir cu itJu dg es

. W ILSON, Cir cu itJu dg e: In 19 94 , Jes us Delg ad o was co nv ic te d o f two co un ts of f irs t-d eg ree m

ur de r,

on e co un t o f arm edbu rg la ry , andon e co un t o f po ss es si on of a fir earm by a

co nv ic te d fe lo n, b ut th os e co nv ic ti on s wer e se t as id e o n app eal by the Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t. In 20 04 , Delg ad o was retrie d a nd ag ai n c on vi ct edof t wo co un ts of fir st -d eg ree m

ur de r. He cla im s t ha t t hi s s eco nd tri al vi ol at edth e Fi fthAm en dm en t’s p ro hi bi ti on on do ub le jeop ardy . On d ire ctap pe al , th e Fl or id a

Supr em e Co ur t d en ie d h im rel ie f, as di d t he fed eral di st ric t co urt o n h is
ap pl ic at io n fo r a wri t o f habe as co rp us . Havi ng care fu ll y rev ie wedth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t’s d eci si on in li gh t o f Uni te d S ta te s Su pr em e Co ur t p rece de nt , we

co nc lu de th atDelg ad o i s n ot en ti tl edto habe as rel ie f be cau se he was n ot“ twi ce
pu t i n jeo pa rd y ” as th atph ras e is de fin edin fed eral co ns ti tu ti on al law.
I.
In ord er t o p ro pe rly fram e th e p art ie s’ arg um en ts , we off er t he fol lo win g ba ck gr ou nd

. A.
On d ire ctap pe al fro m

Delg ad o’s fi rs t t ria l, t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t

su m m ari zedth e u nd erl y in g c rime as fo ll ows : Mar le ne McF ie l d w a s a ne ig hb or of Tom as an d Vio le tt a Ro dr ig ue z, th e vi ct im s in th is cas e. In th e earl y ev en in g ho ur s of Aug us t 30 , 19 90 , Ms

. Mc F i el d wit ne ss ed th e Ro dr ig ue zes arri ve ho m e. Late r, at aro u n d 1 0 p.m ., Ms

. McF ie ld rem em

b e r e d he ari ng do gs in th e ho m e di rect ly be hi nd th e Ro dr ig ue zes ’ ho m e wail in g in an un us ua l fas hi on

. The fo ll owi ng m orn i n g , Ms

. McF ie ld wen t to th e Ro dr ig ue zes ’ ho m e an d no ti ced th at th e ga te le ad in g to th e Ro dr ig ue zes ’ fro nt po rch was ajar; th e ke y was st il l in th e l o c k o n th e in si de po rti on of th e ga te

. Ms

. McF ie ld rem ov ed th e ke y fro m th e ga te an d en te red th e fro nt po rch a r e a. Sh e th en ran g th e do orbe ll , bu t no on e an swe red

. K n o w i n g t h a t t h e R o d r i g u e z e s w e r e e x t r e me l y se cu rit y -c onsc iou s pe opl e, Ms

. Mc Fi el d becam e su sp ic io us an d s umm on edth e p ol ic e. Whe n th e po li ce arri ve d, th ey di sc o v e r e d th at th e fro nt do or was un lo ck ed

. The fir st of fic er on th e sc en e di d no t

2no ti ce an y si gn of a fo rced en try. In si de , po li ce se cu red th e be dr oo m s an d li vi ng ro om area fir st

. Not hi ng in th os e area s in di cat e d a nyth in g un us ua l. As th e po li ce m ov ed to ward th e ki tc he n, th ey

no ti ced a bl oo ds ta in ed kn ife an d a p is to l l y in g o n t he flo or

. The ki tc he n, ut il it y ro om , an d ga rag e d id ex hi bi t si gn s of a po ss ib le st ru gg le

. The ut il it y ro om co nn ect s th e ki tc he n an d th e ga rag e. A w oo de n do or le ad in g fro m th e ut il it y ro om in to th e ga rag e wa s crac ke d in th e cen te r an d it s hi ng es were br ok en

. Mr. Ro dr ig ue z’s bo dy was di sc ov ered ne xt to th is do or , jus t in si de th e ga rag e. His bo dy ha d bu ll e t a nd st ab wou nd s. Ms

. Ro dr ig ue z’s bo dy was al so di sc ov ered in th e ga rag e; it was wed ge d be twee n a car an d th e ga rag e wall

. Her bo dy ha d bl un t fo rce tra um a an d st ab wou nd s. In th e k it ch en , two cab in et dr awers were op en

. The kni fe whi ch po li ce fo un d was si m il ar to a se t fo un d in on e of th e op en ki tc he n dr awers

. A si ng le se t of bl oo dy sh oe -p rin t im pr es si on s le d fro m th e ga rag e in to th e ki tc he n an d up to t h es e dr awers

. Mr. Ro dr ig ue z was fo un d wit ho ut sh o e s an d th e so le s of Ms

. Ro dr ig ue z’s sl ip pe rs di d no t m at ch th e bl oo dy im

pr es si on s. The pi st ol fo un d ne xt to t h e kn ife , a .22 cal ib er Ru ge r se m ia ut om at ic , was eq ui pp ed wit h a si le nc er. Po li ce co ul d no t tra ce th e pi st ol be cau se it s se ria l n u m be r ha d be en r em ov ed

. Po li ce di d reco ve r si x .22 cal ib er sh el l cas in gs th at were la te r de te rm in ed to ha ve be en fir ed fro m th e Ru ge r. No ot he r .22 cal ib er am m un it io n was fou nd at th e ho m e. Po li ce al so fo un d a .38 cal ib er rev ol ve r, whi ch be lo ng ed to Mr. Ro dr i g u e z , in a zi pp ered po uc h in si de a cl os ed cab in et in th e mas te r be dr oo m

. Test in g on th e r e vo lv er rev eal ed it ha d no t be en fir ed

. The St at e p r es en te d an ex pe rt who te st ifi ed th at te st s pe rfo rm e d o n t h e vi ct im s’ ha nd s in di cat ed th at ne it he r ha d tri gg ered a fir earm

.

3A si ng le dr op of on ly ap pe ll an t’s bl oo d[ ] was fo un d in th e 1 ga rag e. A m ix tu re of ap pe ll an t’s an d th e v i c t i ms’ bl oo d was fo un d in th e ga rag e, on th e ha nd gu n, at th e ba se of th e ki tc he n ph on e th at hu ng fro m a wall , a n d on th e ki tc he n ph on e it se lf. App el la nt 's pa lm pr in t was di sc ov ered on th e ki tc he n ph on e. The po li ce de te rm in ed th at th e la st cal l on th is ph on e was m ad e to Barb ara Lam el la s’ ho m e, whe re ap pe ll an t re si de d a t t he ti m e. In ad di ti on to th e ph y s i c al ev id en ce ga th ered fro m th e sc en e, po li ce le arn ed th at ap pe l l a n t an d th e Ro dr ig ue zes kn ew each ot he r an d ha d recen tl y ex pe rie nc ed di ffi cu lt ie s as a re s u l t of a bu si ne ss tra ns act io n be twee n th e R o d r i gu ezes an d Hor at io Lam el la s. In Ju ne of 19 90 , t h e Ro dr ig ue zes so ld th ei r dry cl ean in g bu si ne ss to Hor at io La m el la s. Afte r th e pu rch as e, Barb ara Lam el la s, Hor at io Lam el la s’ da ug h te r, an d ap pe ll an t, Ms

. Lam el la s’ bo y fri en d, ra n t he bu si ne ss

. Mar ia Hern an de z worke d at th e d r y cl ean in g bu si ne ss be fo re and aft er the sa le to Mr. Lam el la s. Ms

. Hern an de z te st ifi ed th at aft er th e sa l e s h e ob se rv ed ap pe ll an t co m pl ai ni ng th at th e m ach in es were no t worki ng pr op erl y an d ab ou t di ss at is fie d cu st om ers

. Acc o r d in g to Ms

. Hern an de z, ap p e l l a nt st at ed th at th e Ro dr ig ue zes ha d

“ tri ck ed hi m wit h th e m ach in es , an d th e bu si ne ss th ey ha d so ld th em .” Ms

. Hern an de z st at e d t h at whi le th e Ro dr ig ue zes were in ch arg e, bu si ne ss was st ead y an d th e m ach in es work edwell

. Bas ed on th is in fo rm at io n reg ard in g th e dry cl ean in g bu si ne ss an d th e ev id en ce fo un d at th e ho m e, ap pe ll an t be cam e a su sp e ct

. App el la nt was no t lo cat ed an d ap pr eh en de d by po li ce un ti l Decem be r 23 , 19 92 , m or e th an two y ears aft er t he m

ur de rs

. Delg ad o v . Sta te , 77 6 S o. 2 d 2 33 , 23 4– 35 (Fl a. 20 00 ) (p er cu ria m ) (“ Delg ad o I” ),

su pe rs ed edby stat ut e, Fl a. St at . § 8 10 .01 5.

As clar ified in Delg ado’s se cond dire ct appe al, Delg ado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681, 683 1 (F la. 2006) (pe r cur iam) (“ Delg ado I I ”), the blood was dete rmined to match De lga do’s blood ty pe—a ty pe shar ed by

only one per cent of

the population.
4B.

A gra nd jury in di ct edDelg ad o fo r two co un ts of f irs t-d eg ree m

ur de r, on e

co un t o f arm edbu rg la ry , and on e co un t o f po ss es si on of afir earm by a con vi ct ed
fel on . Delg ad o v . Sta te , 94 8 S o. 2 d 6 81 , 68 4 (F la . 20 06 ) (p er cu ria m ) (“ Delg ad o II”) . The i nd ic tm en t ch arg edfir st -d eg ree m ur de r on th e al te rn at iv e th eo rie s o f
pr em ed it at io n a nd fel on y m ur de r. Id. Th e p red ic at e o ffen se supp or ti ng Delg ad o’s
fel on y -m ur de r ch arg e was bu rg la ry

. Delg ad o I, 7 76 So . 2dat 2 36

. 2
In Flo rid a, bu rg la ry

en ta il s “ en te rin g o r rem ai ni ng in a dwe ll in g, a s tru ctur e,

ora co nv ey an ce wi th th e in te nt to co m m it an off en se th erei n, u nl es s t he pre m is es

are a t t he ti m e o pe n t o t he pu bl ic or t he de fen da nt is li cen se d o r in vi te d t o e nt er o r

rem ai n.” Fla . Sta t. § 81 0.0 2( 1) (a). Un li ke it s co m m on law co un te rp art , Flo rid a’s

st atut ory de fin it io n o f bu rg la ry

do es no t re qu ire an il le ga l b reak in g a nd en te rin g o f
a p ro te ct edpre m is es with t he in te nt to co m m it a fel on y . See Del ga do I, 77 6 S o. 2d at 2 36 . Ins te ad , itis su ffi ci en t t ha t a b ur gl ar s im pl y “ rem ai n i n” a st ru ctur e

Count One, which re lated to the killing of Tomas Rodriguez, rea d: 2
The Gra

nd J urors of the State of Florida , duly called, impaneled and sworn to inquire and true prese ntment make in and for the body of the County of Dade , upon their oaths, prese nt that on or betwee n the 29th day of August , 1 9 9 0 and the 31st day of August, 1990, within the County of Dade , State of Florida , J ESUS DEL GADO, did unlawfully and feloniously

kill a human being , to wit: TOMAS RODRI GUEZ , from a preme ditated desi gn to eff ect the death of TOMAS RODRI GUEZ , or while eng ag ed in the perpe tration of, o r in an attempt to perpe trat e burg lary , by shooting TOMAS RODRI GUEZ with a firea

rm, in violation of Section 782.04(1), Florida Statutes, to the evil example of

all others in like case s offe nding and ag ainst the peac e and dignity

of the State of F lorida. Count Two, which re lated to the killing of Violetta Rodriguez, was identica l, excepting the substituti on of Violetta Rodriguez’s name f or that of he r husband.

5wit h “ th e in te nt to co m m itan off en se th erei n.” Fla . Sta t. § 81 0.0 2( 1) . The cri m e,

ne ve rth el es s, re ta in s i ts tre sp as so ry fou nd at io ns , m ean in g t ha t co ns en t t o e nt er an d

rem ai n i n t he rel ev an t s tru ctur e is a co m pl et e d efen se . See St at e v . Hick s, 4 21 So

. 2d 51 0, 5 10 –1 1 (F la . 19 82 ); R ay v. St at e, 52 2 S o. 2 d 9 63 , 96 4 n .3 (F la . 3dDis t.
Ct . App . 19 88 ), ov erru le d o n o th er g ro un ds by D el ga do I, 77 6 S o. 2 d a t 2 40 –4 1,

su pe rs ed edby stat ut e, Fl a. St at . § 8 10 .01 5 (r ei ns ta ti ng Ray).
Befo re Del ga do ’s firs t d ire ctap pe al , Flo rid a co ur ts in te rp ret edth e b ur gl ary
st atut e’s “ rem ai ni ng in ” la ng ua ge bro ad ly. See, e.g ., Ray , 52 2 S o. 2 d a t 9 65 –6 7.
Bec au se “ a p ers on wou ldno t o rd in ari ly tol erat e an ot he r pe rs on rem ai ni ng in th e
pr em is es an d c omm it ti ng a cri m e, an d t ha t wh en a vi ct im be co m es aware o f th e

co m m is si on of acri m e, th e v ic ti m im pl ic it ly w it hd raws co ns en t t o t he
pe rp et rat or ’s rem ai ni ng in th e p rem is es ,” id . at 9 66 , cou rts read il y all owe d
ci rcu m st an ti al ev id en ce t o d em on st rat e th ata de fen da nt ’s li cen se to rem ai n i n t he
vi ct im ’s pre m is es ha d b een withd rawn at t he ti m e th e d efen da nt be ga n c omm it ti ng th e p red ic at e cri m in al off en se . See, e.g ., id . at 9 66 (“ [W] e wil l n ot requi re t ha t [th e v ic ti m ] ha ve y el le d t o t he de fen da nt , ‘ Get o ut !’ befo re we ca n c on cl ud e th at th e d efen da nt ’s li cen se to rem ai n o n t he pre m is es was wi th dr awn .”). As n ot edby
th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t i n Del ga do I, th is li be ral in te rp ret at io n o f th e

“ rem ai ni ng in ” cl au se effe ct iv el y co nv ert eda ho st of c riminal off en se s i nt o bu rg la rie s, s im

pl y be cau se th ey

were co m

m it te d i nd oo rs : [I]f we m ak e t h e a s s u m pt io n th at “ a pe rs on wou ld no t or d in ari ly to le rat e an ot he r pe rs on rem ai ni ng in th e pr em is es an d co m

m it ti ng a cri m e,” an d as su m in g th at th is wit hd rawn co ns en t can be es tabl is he d at tri al , a nu m be r of

6cri m es th at wou ld no rm al ly no t qu al ify as fel on ie s wou ld su dd e n l y b e el ev at ed to bu rg la ry

. In ot he r wor ds , an y cri m e, in cl ud in g m is de m ean or s , co m m it te d on an ot he r pe rs on ’s pr em is es wou ld be co m e a bu rg la ry if th e own er of th e pr em is es be co m es aware th at th e su sp ect is co m m it ti ng t he cri m e. Obv io us ly, th is le ad s to an ab su rd res ul t

. F o r ex am pl e, if a pe rs on ho s t s a pa rty an d cat ch es an in vi te e sm ok in g m ari

juan a on th e pr em is es , th e in vi te e is no t on ly gu il ty of a m i s d e m ean or m ari juan a ch arg e bu t al so of bu rg la ry , a se co nd -d eg ree fel on y
. The sa m e can be sa id of th e in vi te e who writ es a ba d che ck fo r pi zza in fro nt of an aware ho st

. The ot he r ex tre m e is al so tru e. An in vi te e who co m m it s se co nd -d eg ree m

ur d er on an ot he r pe rs on 's pr em i s e s a n d in th e pr es en ce of an aware ho st co ul d be ch arg ed wit h fir st -d eg ree fel on y m ur de r, wit h th e un de rlyin g fel on y be in g bu rg la ry

. The po ss ib il it y e xi st s th at m an y ho m ic id es co ul d be el ev at ed to fir st -d eg ree m ur de r, m erel y be cau se th e ki ll in g was co m m it te d in do or s. Delg ad o I, 7 76 So .2dat 2 39

. Delg ad o’s b ur gl ary an d fe lo ny m ur de r ch arg es were b ro ug ht on jus t s uc h a
th eo ry . See i d. at 23 6. “ The Sta te pro se cu te d t hi s ca se on th e p rem is e th at
ap pe ll an t’s en try int o t he vi ct im s’ ho m e was co ns en su al (i.e ., app el la nt was i nv it ed

to en te r th e v ic ti m s’ ho m e) b ut th atat s om e p oi nt , th is co ns en t was wit hd rawn .”
Id . Relyin g o n Del ga do ’s sp eci fic in te nt to ki ll th e v ic ti m s, t he in di ct m en t de si gn at ed“ m

ur de r” as th e p red ic at e o ffen se supp or ti ng bu rg la ry : The Gran d Ju ro rs of th e S t a t e of Fl or id a, du ly cal le d, im pa ne le d an d swo rn to in qu ire an d tru e pr es en tm en t m ak e in an d fo r th e bo dy of th e Co un ty of Dad e, up o n th ei r o a t h s , p res en t th at on or be twee n th e 29 th da y of Aug us t , 19 90 an d th e 31 st da y of Aug us t, 19 90 , wit hi n th e Co un ty of Dad e, St at e of Fl or id a, JESUS DELGADO , di d en te r or r em ai n in a dwe ll in g, th e pr op ert y of TOMA S RODRIGUEZ an d/ or VIOLETTA RODRIGUEZ, wit ho ut th e co ns en t of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ an d/ or VIOLETTA RODRIGUEZ, a s own ers or cu st od ia ns , l oc a t e d a t 11 20 0 So ut hwe st 15 7t h St reet , Mi am i, Dad e Co un ty, Fl or id a, th e

7sa m e be in g oc cupi ed by TOMAS RODRIGUEZ an d/ or VIOLETTA RODRIGUEZ. JES U S DELGADO ha vi ng an in te nt to co m

m it an of fen se th erei n, to wit : Mu rd er, an d in th e co ur se of co m

m it ti ng sa id bu rg la ry JESUS DELGADO was arm ed wit h o r di d arm hi m se lf wit h a fir earm , in vi ol at io n of 81 0.0 2 Fl or id a St atut es , to th e ev il ex am pl e of al l ot he rs in li ke cas es of

fen di ng an d ag ai ns t th e pe ace an d di gn it y of t he Sta te of F lo rid a. (em ph as is ad de d)

. The up sh otof t hi s l eg al ba ck dr op was t ha t, b y si m pl y cau si ng th e v ic ti m s’
de at h i nd oo rs wit h t he sp eci fic in te nt to do so , Delg ad o c omm it te d b ot h
pr em ed it at edm

ur de r an d fe lo ny m

ur de r in th e co m

m is si on of a bu rg la ry . Bot h
th eo rie s re li edon pro of

of t he same facts . And , as re fle ct edby the jury
in st ru ct io ns , bo th cri m es req ui redth e jury to fi ndall th e el em en ts of p rem ed it at ed

m ur de r. C.
At t he en d o f tr ia l, the co ur t ch arg edth e jury in t he fol lo win g m an ne r: 1. Pre m ed it at edMu rd er

Now, th ere are two way s in whi ch a pe rs on m ay be [s ic ] co nv ic te d of f

i r s t de gr ee m

ur de r. One is kn own as pr em ed it at ed m

ur de r, an d th e ot he r on e is kn own as fel on y m ur de r. Befo re y ou can fin d th e de fen da nt g u i l t y of fir st de gr ee m ur de r pr em ed it at ed m

ur de r [s ic ], t h e S ta te m

us t p r ov e th e fo ll owi ng th ree el em en ts be y on d a reas on a b l e do ub t ; th at Vio le tt a Ro dr ig ue z an d Tom as Ro dr ig ue z are de ad

. Th a t t h e de at h was cau se d by th e cri m in al act or ag en cy of Je su s Delg ad o, an d th at th ere was a pr em ed it at ed ki ll in g o f Vio le tt a Ro dr ig ue z an d To m as Ro dr ig ue z. Now, ki ll in g wit h pr em ed it at io n i s k il li ng aft er c o n s c io us ly de ci di ng to do so

. The de ci si on m us t be

8pr es en t in th e m in d at th e ti m e of th e ki ll in g. The la w do es no t fix th e ex act pe rio d of ti m e th at m us t pa ss be twee n th e fo rm at io n of th e pr em ed it at ed in te nt to ki ll , an d th e ki ll in g. The pe rio d of ti m e m

us t be lo ng en ou g h t o al lo wed [s ic ] refl ect io n by th e de fen da nt

. The pr em ed it at ed in te nt to ki ll m us t b e fo rm edbe fo re t he ki ll in g. 2. Fe lo ny Murd er Now, be fo re y ou can fin d th e de fen da nt gu il ty of

f i r st de gr ee fel on y m

ur de r th e St at e m

us t pr ov e t h e fo ll owi ng th ree e le m en ts be y on d a reas on ab le do ub t. Vio le tt a Ro dr ig ue z an d Tom as Ro dr ig ue z are de ad

. And th e de at h oc cu rred as a co ns eq ue nc e o f an d whi le Je su s Delg a do was in [s ic ] en ga ge d in th e co m m is si on of a bu rg la ry

. The d e a t h oc cu rred as a co ns eq ue nc e of an d whi le Je su s Delg ad o was at te m pt in g t o c o m

m it th e bu rg la ry , a nd Je su s Delg ad o was t h e pe rs on who act ua ll y ki ll ed Vio le tt a Ro dr iq ue z [s ic ] an d/ or Tom as Ro dr iq ue z [s ic ].
In or de r to co nv ic t of fir st de gr ee fel on y m ur de r it is no t ne ces sa ry fo r th e St at e to pr ov e th at th e de fen da nt ha d a p rem ed it at e d es ig n o r in te ntto ki ll .[ ] 3
3. Bu rg la ry Now, be fo re y ou can fin d th e de fen da nt gu il ty of

arm ed bu rg la ry co un t 3, th e St at e m us t pr ov e th e fo ll owi ng th ree el em en ts be y on d a reas on ab le do ub t. Tha t Mr. Delg a d o e n t ered or rem ai ne d in a st ru ctur e own ed by or was in th e po ss es si o n of a Vio le tt a Ro dr iq ue z [s ic ] an d Tom as Ro dr iq ue z [s ic ]. Th a t Mr. Delg ad o di d no t ha ve pe rm is si on or co ns en t of Vio le tt a an d/ or Tom as Ro dr igu ez, or an y on e au th or iz e [s ic ] to act fo r th em, to en te r in th ei r th e [s ic ] st ru ctur e atth atti m e.

Thoug h this admoniti on is true in a tra ditional felony -murder context, si nce the 3 predic ate of

fense in this case, burg lary , itself require d specific intent to kill the victims, see supra note 4, this instruction was incorre ct.
9At th e ti m e of en te rin g or rem ai ni ng in th e st ru ctur e th e de fen da nt ha d a fu ll y -fo rm [ s ic ], an d co ns ci ou s in te nt to co m m itth e o ffen se of m

ur de r in th atst ru ctur e.[ ] 4
A pe rs on m ay be gu il ty of th is of fen se if he or ig in al ly en te red th e p rem is es wit h t he co ns en t [s ic ], bu t r e main [s ic ] th erea fte r. He kn ew th e co ns en t ha d b e e n wit hd rawn , an d co ns en t m ay be [s ic ] wit hd rawn by wor ds oract io ns

. The in te nt in whi ch [s ic ] th e act is do ne is n’t [s ic ] is an op erat io n of th e m in d, an d th eref or e, i s n o t al way s cap ab le of d ire ctan d p os it iv e p ro of

. It m ay be es tabl is he d by ci rcu m st an ti al ev id en ce li ke a n y o t h e r fact in th e cas e. Eve n th ou gh an un la wfu l en te ri n g or rem ai ni ng in a st ru ctur e pr ov ed [s ic ] if th e ev id en ce do es no t es tabl is h it was do ne wit h th e in te nt to co m m itm ur de r. The d efen da nt m

us t b e fo un d n ot gu il ty. Tria l Tran sc rip t at 15 04 –1 3 (a ll em ph as es ad de d)

. Afte r be in g s o c ha rg ed , th e jury fou nd Delg ad o g ui lt y on all co un ts , in cl ud in g t he two co un ts of f irs t-d eg ree m

ur de r. Beca us e th e v erd ic t was ge ne ral , th e jury didno t s pe ci fy

th e th eo ry

of f irs t-d eg ree m

ur de r up on whi ch itrel ie d. At 5
th e p en al ty pha se of t ria l, the co ur t fo ll owe d t he jury’ s re co m m en da ti on an d

se nt en cedDelg ad o t o d eat h.
D.

This instruction, like the subsequently emphasized one, c ontradicts the standa rd fe lony 4 murder state-of- mind inst ruction hig hlighted a bove: “In order

to convict of fir st deg ree felony murder it is not nece ssary for the State to pr ove that the de fenda nt had a pr emeditate de sign or intent to kill .” See note 3, infra.
The c ourt did not enter judg ment on the fire arm c ount, as it merg ed with the ar med 5 burg lary

. 10On d ire ctap pe al , Delg ad o c ha ll en ge d, am on g o th er thi ng s, t he leg al an d

fact ua l s uf

fic ie nc y of t he Sta te ’s fel on y -m

ur de r ch arg e. The F lo rid a Supr em e Co ur t re -ex am in edth e m ean in g o f th e b ur gl ary st atut e an d c on cl ud edth ata

“ rem ai ni ng in ” h adto be “ su rrep ti ti ou s” in ord er t o s at is fy th e el em en ts of
bu rg la ry . See Del ga do I, 77 6 S o. 2 d a t 2 40 . It b eg an by exam in in g t he co m m on la w ori gi ns of t he cri m e, tr aci ng bu rg la ry ’s evo lu ti on fro m it s n arro w comm on law
fo un da ti on s t hr ou gh it s s ta tu to ry ex pa ns io n i n m od ern ti m es . Id. at23 6– 37 . It
lo ok edto th e Mo de l Pe na l Co de , leg al sch ol ars hi p, an d New Yo rkcas el aw in te rp ret in g a si m il arl y

word edst atut e to in fo rm it s i nt erp ret at io n o f th at

ex pa ns io n’s p ro pe r sc op e. Id . at 2 36 –3 8. Th e co ur t h y po th es iz edab ou t t he
ab su rdres ul ts th atwou ldflo w fro m ex te nd in g R ay

to it s l og ic al co nc lu si on . Id. at
23 9. An d fi na ll y , itco nc lu de d t ha t p rin ci pl es of s ta tu to ry co ns tru ct io n re qu ire d a
rei nt erp ret at io n o f th e “ rem ai ni ng in ” cl au se , bec au se —ab se nt th e ad di ti on of a

“ su rrep ti ti ou sn es s” req ui rem en t t o t he st atut ory lan gu ag e—c urren t ca se law

“ effe ct iv el y

wip edou t t he cla us e ‘un le ss

. . . th e d efen da nt is li cen se d o r in vi te d t o

en te r’” from

th e st atut ory

tex t. Id . at 2 40

. Add it io na ll y , th e co ur t d et erm in edth e st atut e was am bi gu ou s, an d t he
pr in ci pl e o f le ni ty requ ire d i t t o re so lv e th atam bi gu it y in fav orof t he accu se d: App lying th is pr in ci pl e to th e pr es en t cas e, th e m os t fav or ab le in te rp ret at io n of Fl or id a ’s b u rg la ry st atut e is to ho ld th at th e “ rem ai ni ng in ” la ng ua ge ap pl ie s on ly in si tu at io ns whe re th e rem ai ni ng in w as do ne su rrep ti ti ou sl y
. Thi s in te rp ret at io n is co ns is te nt wit h th e or ig in al in te nt io n of th e bu rg la ry st atut e. In th e co nt ex t of an oc cupi ed dwe ll in g, bu rg la ry was no t in te nd ed to co ve r th e si tu at io n whe re an in vi te d g u e st tu rn s cri m in al or vi ol en t. Rat he r,

11bu rg la ry was in te nd ed to cri m in a l i z e th e co nd uc t of a su sp ect who te rro riz es , sh oc ks , or su rp ris es th e un kn owi ng oc cupa nt . Man y

ot he r st at es th at ha ve th e “ rem ai ni ng in ” la ng ua ge in th ei r bu rg la ry st atut es ha ve in cl ud ed th e wor d su rrep ti ti ou sl y

or s im il ar l an gu ag e in th e st atut e. As sta te d e arl ie r, co ns en su al en try is an affi rm at iv e de fen se to th e ch arg e of bu rg la ry , an d th eref or e th e bu rd en is on th e de fen da nt to es tabl is h th at t h e re was co ns en t to en te r.

. . . In th e pr es en t cas e, th er e e xi st s su ffi ci en t ev id en ce in th e reco rd th at ap p e l l an t m et hi s bu rd en of es tabl is hi ng co ns en su al en try. W e are co gn iz an t th at aft er ap pe l l a n t en te red th e vi ct im s’ ho m e, he is accu se d of co m m i t t i ng two he in ou s m

ur de rs

. Reg ard le ss of whe th er th es e accu sa ti on s are tru e, ap pe ll an t’s act io ns are no t th e type of co nd uc t whic h th e cri m e of bu rg la ry was in te nd ed to pu ni sh

. Our de ci si on in no way pr ev en ts th e St at e fro m pr os ec ut in g ap pe ll an t fo r wha te ve r cri m es he m ay ha ve co m m it te d on ce in si de th e vi ct im s’ ho m e. Bu t co ns id eri ng bo th th e reco rd in th is cas e an d th e St at e’s th eo ry of th e cri m e, ap pe ll an t’s co nd uc t d oe s n ot am ou nt to bu rg la ry

. Id . at 2 40 –4 1 (f

oo tn ot es om it te d) (ci ta ti on s o m it te d)

. At t he en d o f it s o pi ni on , th e co ur t fr am edit s d eci si on to rem an d t he cas e fo r ret ria l b y

refe ren ci ng Yate s v . Uni te d S ta te s, 3 54 U.S. 29 8, 7 7 S . Ct. 1 06 4 (1 95 7) (rem an di ng a cas e fo r ret ria l af te r ho ld in g t ha t a g en eral jury ve rd ic t ca nn ot be up he ldwhen th e jury was in st ru ct edon alt ern at iv e th eo rie s o f gu il t an d o ne of
th os e th eo rie s was leg al ly ins uf fic ie nt ), ov erru le d i n p artby Burk s v . Uni te d
St at es , 43 7 U.S. 1 , 16 , 98 S. Ct. 2 14 1 (1 97 8) . In ad di ti on , itex pl ic it ly
di st in gu is he d Del ga do ’s cas e fro m th e p aral le l s cen ari o wh ere, u nd er Gri ffi n v

. Uni te d S ta te s, 5 02 U.S. 46 , 11 2 S . Ct. 4 66 (19 91 ), a g en eral ve rd ic t m ay be up he ld
whe re a ju ry

was i ns tru ct edon alt ern at iv e th eo rie s o f gu il t an d o ne of t ho se th eo rie s i s fa ctua ll y

in su ffi ci en t:

12Thi s is no t a cas e whe re th ere was m erel y in su ffi c i e n t ev id en ce to su pp or t th e bu rg la r y ch arg e. The jury in th is cas e was in st ru ct ed th at a de fen da nt can be fo un d gu il ty of bu rg la ry , ev en if th e in it ia l en t r y w a s co ns en su al , if th e vi ct im s la te r wit hd rew t h ei r co ns en t. Thi s th eo ry of bu rg la ry was al so rel ie d on by the St at e as th e u nd erl y in g fel on y to su p p o r t th e fel on y m ur de r ch arg e. Pu rs ua nt to ou r an al y si s in to da y ’s o pi ni on , s uc h a t h e ory of bu rg la ry (an d fe lo ny m

ur de r) i s l eg al ly ina de qu at e. Delg ad o I, 7 76 So . 2dat 2 42

. E.
Befo re h is sec on d t ria l, Del ga do un su cces sf ul ly chal le ng edhi s s ub se qu en t
pr os ecu ti on as a vi ol at io n o f do ub le jeop ard y . After h e was ag ai n c on vi ct edof
pr em ed it at edm

ur de r an d s en te nc edto de at h, Del ga do ap pe al ed , arg ui ng th e do ub le jeop ard y

is su e. The F lo rid a Supr em e Co ur t re jecte d h is cla im

as f ol lo ws: I. Do ubl e J eo pa rdy Delg ad o cl ai m s th at hi s ret ria l on two co un ts of fir st -d eg ree pr em ed it at ed m ur de r was ba rr e d by do ub le jeop ardy be cau se he was , in effe ct , jud ic ia ll y acq ui tt ed of fir st

- d e gr ee m

ur de r by th is Co ur t in Delg ad o I. Delg ad o reas on s th at be cau se th is Co ur t he ld th at th e St at e’s th eo ry of bu rg la ry was b o t h fact ua ll y an d le ga ll y in su ffi ci en t, li ke wis e th e St at e’s th eo ry of fir st -d e g r ee fel on y m ur de r was bo th fact ua ll y an d le g a ll y in su ffi ci en t. He fu rth er reas on s th at he ha s effe ctua ll y be en acq ui tt e d o f fir st -d eg ree m

ur de r in i t s en ti ret y du e to th e fact ua l in su ffi ci en cy of th e un de rlyin g th e ory of fel on y m ur de r an d, th eref

or e, can no t be ret ri ed on th e th eo ry of pr em ed it at edm

ur de r. Delg ad o’s c l a i m is wit ho ut m eri t. Whi le we reco gn iz e th at an acq ui tt al is req ui red whe n a co nv ic ti on is no t su pp orte d by fact ua ll y su ffi ci en t ev id en ce, se e, e.g ., Bal la rd v. St at e, 92 3 So

. 2d 47 5, 48 6 (Fl a. 20 06 ) (rev ers in g co nv ic ti on s, va ca t i ng se nt en ces , an d rem an di ng wit h di rect io ns to en te r a jud gm en t of acq ui tt al whe re ev id en ce

13was in su ffi ci en t to su pp or t co nv ic ti on s) , an d th at su ch an acq ui tt al gi ve s ris e to do u b le jeop ard y pr ot ect io ns , Sat ta zah n v. Pen ns y lv an ia , 53 7 U.S. 10 1, 12 3 S. C t

. 73 2, 15 4 L.Ed.2 d 58 8 (2 00 3) , th is Co ur t di d no t effe ctua ll y acq ui t Delg ad o of fir st -d eg ree m ur de r in Del g a do I. In Delg ad o I, we d is cu ss edat l en gt h t he di st in ct io n b etween le ga l an d fact ua l in su f

f ic ie nc y an d ex pr es sl y st at ed th at

“ [t]hi s is no t a cas e whe r e t h ere was m erel y in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce to s up p o r t th e bu rg la ry ch arg e.” Id

. at 24 2 (em ph as is ad de d)

. Rat he r, we st at ed th at “ [p ]urs ua nt to ou r an al y si s in to da y ’s op in io n, [th e St at e’s] th eo ry of bu rg la ry (an d felo ny m

ur de r) is l eg al ly in ad eq ua te .” Id

. (em ph as is ad de d) . W e d idno t fi nd th ateit he r of th e St at e’s th eo rie s of fir st -d eg ree mu rd er was fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t an d ex pr es sl y st at ed th at “ [o ]ur de ci si on in no way pr ev en ts th e St at e fro m p ro se cu ti ng ap pe ll an t fo r wha te ve r cri m es he m ay ha ve co m

m it te d o n ce in si de th e vi ct im ’s ho m e.” Id

. at 24 1. In fact , th e on ly factua l in su ffi ci en cy w e reco gn iz ed was co ns eq ue nt to ou r ho ld in g th at th e St at e was req ui red to sh ow th at Delg ad o rem ai ne d i n th e Ro dr ig ue zes ’ dwe ll in g su rrep ti ti ou sl y in or de r to pr ov e Delg ad o c omm it te d b ur gl ary. Id. at 24 2.
Mo reo ve r, ev en if th e St at e’s th eo ry of fel on y m ur de r was ren de red fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t by ou r ho ld in g in Delg ad o I, we ex pr es sl y reco gn iz ed th at a de fen da nt m ay be ret rie d o n t he same cou nt wher e o ne of two alt ern at iv e th eo rie s is factua ll y in su ffi ci en t bu t th e o t h e r i s no t. Id

. (ci ti ng Grif

fin v. Uni te d St at es , 5 0 2 U.S. 46 , 11 2 S. Ct

. 4 6 6 , 11 6 L. Ed. 2d 37 1 (1 99 1) ; San Mar ti n v. St at e, 71 7 So .2d 46 2, 47 0 (Fl a.1 99 8) ). Thu s, be cau se th e St a t e’s al te rn at iv e t he ory of fir st -d eg ree m ur de r ba se d on pr eme d i t a ti on was no t he ld to be fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t in Delg ad o I, Delg ad o was no t effe ctua l l y acq ui tt ed of fir st -d eg ree m

ur de r. In th e al te rn at iv e, Delg ad o as se rts th at he was acq ui tt ed of pr em ed it at ed m ur de r un de r Delg ad o I be cau se th e St at e ’s t he ory of bu rg la ry at hi s fir st tri al in cl ud ed al l th e el em e n t s of pr em ed it at ed m ur de r; an d, th eref

or e, hi s acq ui tt al on th e bu rg la ry co un t am ou nt s to an acq ui tt al on th e pr em ed it at ed m

ur de r co un t un de r th e “ sa m e el em en ts ” te st of Bl oc kb ur ge r v. Uni te d St at es , 28 4 U.S. 29 9, 30 4, 52 S. Ct

. 18 0, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1 93 2)

. Howev er, bu rg la ry an d 7

14fir st -d eg ree pr em ed it at ed m ur de r do no t s ha re al l of th e sa m e st atut ory el em en ts ; in pa rti cu la r, th ey do no t sh are th e sa m e el em en t of in te nt

. Co nc ed in g th is fact , Delg ad o 8 in vi te s us to ex pa nd th e “s a me el em en ts ” te st be y on d a co m pa ris on of th e st atut ory el em en ts to co ns id er th e reco rd an d th e St at e’s actua l th eo ry

. Gab e r v
. S t at e, 68 4 So

. 2d 18 9, 19 0 (Fl a .19 96 ) (s ta ti ng th at in ou r do ub le jeop ard y an al y si s, “we c an no t ex am in e fact s fro m th e reco rd ” bu t

“ m us t lo ok on ly to th e s t a t ut ory el em en ts ”). W e de cl in e th e in vi ta ti on

. W e fin d n o c om pe ll in g reas on to de pa rt f r o m es tabl is he d pr eced en t an d ex pa nd th e “ sa m e el em en ts ” te stin Flo rid a. 7. “ Thi s te st in qu ire s whe th er each of fen se co nt ai ns an el em en t no t co nt ai ne d in th e ot he r; if no t, th ey are th e s a me of

fen se an d do ub le jeop ard y ba rs su bs eq ue nt pu ni sh m en t or pr os ecu ti on .” Bo le r v. St at e, 67 8 So

. 2d 31 9, 32 1 (Fl a. 19 96 ) (ci ti ng Bl oc kb ur ge r, 28 4 U.S. at 30 4, 5 2 S . Ct. 1 80 ).
8. The in te nt r e q u i r ed fo r bu rg la ry is th at th e ac c u s e d in te nd ed to co m m it an of

fen se

. § 81 0.0 2( 1) (a), Fl a. St at

. (2 00 6)

. The in te nt req ui red fo r pr em ed it at edm

ur de r is th at th e accu se d fo rm ed th e sp e c i f

i c in te nt to ki ll a hu m an be in g. § 7 82 .04 (1 )(a) (1 ), Fla . Sta t. (2 00 6)

. Our ho ld in g in Delg ad o I di d no t ba r th e St at e fro m ret ry in g Del ga do for fir st -d eg ree m ur de r un de r th e th eo ry th at it was pr em ed it at ed

. The refo re, we de ny th is cl ai m fo r rel ie f. Delg ad o v . Sta te , 94 8 S o. 2 d 6 81 , 68 6– 87 (Fl a. 20 06 ) (p er cu ria m ) (“ Delg ad o II ”). Delg ad o wai ve d s ta te po st -co nv ic ti on pro ceed in gs an d app li edforhabe as rel ie f in fed eral di st ric t co ur t o n h is Fif th Am en dm en t cl ai m . The d is tri ctco ur t de ni edhi s ap pl ic at io n, an d Del ga do ap pe al s t ha t d eci si on he re. II.

15W e n ot e atth e o ut se t t ha t t hi s co ns ti tu ti on al cla im co m es to us fol lo win g a
pr io r m eri ts ad

jud ic at io n i n s ta te co urt, an d Del ga do do es no t ch al le ng e th e fac tu al

un de rp in ni ng s o f th atpri orst at e co ur t d eci si on . Con se qu en tl y , Delg ad o i s n ot

en ti tl edto rel ie f in fed eral co ur t u nl es s t he st at e co ur t ad jud ic at io n “ res ul te d i n a de ci si on th atwas c on tra ry to , or i nv ol ve d a n u nr eas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f, cl earl y

es tabl is he d F ed eral law, as de te rm in edby the Supr em e Co urt o f th e Uni te d
St at es .” 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4( d) (1 ).
* * *
In hi s fe de ral pe ti ti on , as h e d idin hi s s ta te co ur t ap pe al , Delg ad o a rg ue s th athi s re tri al forpre m ed it at edm ur de r vi ol at edhi s ri gh ts un de r th e Fi fth
Am en dm en t’s Do ub le Jeo pa rdy Cla us e, be cau se he ha d a lre ad y be enpu t o nc e in jeop ard y forth e “ sa m e o ffen se .” The s ub st an ce o f hi s ar gu m en t i s b es t u nd ers to od

as co ns is ti ng of t hr ee an al yti cal st ep s. Fi rs t, i n Del ga do I, th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t fo un d t he pro se cu ti on ’s tri al

ev id en ce was in su ffi ci en t t o s us ta in it s ch arg e o f fel on y m ur de r on th e b as is of
bu rg la ry an d, co ns eq ue nt ly, jud ic ia ll y acq ui tt edDelg ad o o f fel on y m ur de r an d
bu rg la ry . See Un it edSta te s v . Mart in Lin en Supp ly Co., 43 0 U.S. 5 64 , 57 1, 9 7 S

. Ct . 13 49 (19 77 ) (d efi ni ng a jud ic ia l “ acq ui tt al ” as a ru li ng by the co ur t i n fa vo r of
th e d efen da nt th at , “ wha te ve r it s l ab el , actua ll y rep res en ts a res ol ut io n, co rrec t o r

no t, o f so m e o r al l o f th e fac tu al ele m en ts of t he off en se ch arg ed ”). Ju st li ke a fav or ab le jury ve rd ic t, s uc h a n a cq ui tt al tri gg ers th e fu ll pro te ct io ns of t he Dou bl e

16Je op ardy

Cla us e an d b ars an y

su bs eq ue nt jeop ardy

forth e “ sa m e o ffen se .” See
Bu rk s, 4 37 U.S. at 1 5.
Seco nd , un de r Fl or id a’s pe cu li ar b ur gl ary la w, Delg ad o’s p rem ed it at ed

m ur de r ch arg e was a le ss er-i nc lu de d o ffen se of h is fel on y -m ur de r ch arg e. Bec au se th e fel on y

m ur de r was pre di cat edup on bu rg la ry , and th atbu rg la ry was it se lf p red ic at edup on th e cri m e o f pr em ed it at edm ur de r—r equi rin g, i n t he word s of th e co ur t i n i ts jury in st ru ct io ns , th atDelg ad o “ ha d a ful ly-form [si c], and

co ns ci ou s i nt en t t o c omm itth e o ffen se of m ur de r in th atst ru ctur e,” Tri al
Tran sc rip t at 15 13 —t he ch arg e o f pr em ed it at edm ur de r in hi s s eco nd tri al di d n ot

“ req ui re[] pro of

of afactwhi ch th e [fe lo ny m ur de r di d] no t.” Se e Bl oc kb ur ge r v. Uni te d S ta te s, 2 84 U.S. 29 9, 3 04 , 52 S. Ct. 1 80 (19 32 ) (“ The ap pl ic ab le rul e is
th at , wher e th e sa m e act or t ran sa ct io n c on st it ut es a vi ol at io n o f two di st in ct
st atut ory pro vi si on s, t he tes t t o b e ap pl ie d t o d et erm in e whe th er t he re ar e two of fen se s o r on ly one , is whet he r eac h p ro vi si on requi res pro of of a factwhi ch th e
ot he r do es no t.”) ; Br own v. Oh io , 43 2 U.S. 1 61 , 16 6, 9 7 S . Ct. 2 22 1 (1 97 7) ; Ex
pa rte Niel se n, 1 31 U.S. 17 6, 1 88 –8 9, 9 S. Ct. 6 72 (18 89 ) (“ [I]t se em s t o u s v ery cl ear t ha t wh ere, as in th is cas e, a p ers on ha s b een tri edan d c on vi ct edfor a cri m e whi ch ha s v ari ou s i nc id en ts in cl ud edin it , he c an no t b e a s eco nd ti m e tr ie d fo r on e of th os e in ci de nt s wi th ou t b ei ng twi ce p ut in jeop ard y forth e sa m e o ffen se .”).
And , th ird , bec au se th e Co ns ti tu ti on ’s baron su cces si ve pro se cu ti on s fo r th e

“ sa m e o ffen se ” n eces sa ril y ba rs pro se cu ti on s fo r le ss er- (a nd gre at er-) in cl ud ed
of fen se s, s ee Br own , 43 2 U.S. at 16 8 (d efi ni ng a le ss er-i nc lu de d o ffen se as a n

17of

fen se “ req ui r[i ng ] no pro of be y on d t ha t wh ic h i s re qu ire d fo r co nv ic ti on of t he
gr eat er”) , th e St at e was pro hi bi te d fr om retry in g h im

forpre m ed it at edm

ur de r in a

se co nd tri al

. 6 Delg ad o fu rth er ar gu es th atth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t’s d eci si on “ was

co nt rary to, o r in vo lv edanun reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f, cl earl y est ab li sh edFed eral
la w” be cau se th e co ur t re fu se d t o l oo k b ey on d t he st atut ory ele m en ts of f

el on y

m ur de r an d p rem ed it at edm ur de r to th e d es cri pt io n o f th os e el em en ts pre se nt edto th e jury at tr ia l. He g ro un ds th is arg um en t i n Ex pa rte Niel se n, 1 31 U.S. at
18 8– 89 , and it s p ro ge ny, whi ch he in te rp ret s as req ui rin g m or e th an an ab st ract
st atut ory co m pa ris on of e le m en ts in a su cces si ve pro se cu ti on cas e li ke hi s. He
al so cit es ou r own de ci si on in Mars v. Mo un ts , 89 5 F .2d13 48 (11 th Cir . 19 90 ), as
well as v ari ou s o pi ni on s fr om ou r si st er ci rcu it s, as supp or ti ng th is vi ew. Afte r car efu l co ns id erat io n, we co nc lu de th atDelg ad o’s d ou bl e-jeo pa rd y cl ai m is witho utm eri t. Eve n i f we as su m e, fo r th e p ur po se s o f th is cas e, th atth e St at e’s pr em ed it at edm

ur de r ch arg e in Delg ad o’s s eco ndtri al was fo r th e “ sa m e of fen se ” as th e fel on y -m

ur de r ch arg e in hi s i ni ti al pro se cu ti on , Delg ad o’s Fi fth
Am en dm en t ri gh ts were n ot vi ol at edbe cau se th ere was no sec on d “ jeop ard y ,” as
th atco nc ep t i s d efi ne d u nd er fe de ral co ns ti tu ti on al law. Co ns eque nt ly, th e st at e

Delg ado foc uses a grea

t deal of e nergy

on trying to disting uish his case fr om some 6 others bec ause F lorida’s fir st-deg ree murder statute criminalizes premeditate d murder a nd felony murder in the sa

me statutory

provision, as opposed to two sepa rate ones. We have previously reje cted that this statute’s org anization has any constitutional significa

nce f or the purpose s of succe ssive-prose cution double-jeopa rdy analy sis. See Delap v. D ug g er, 890 F .2d 285, 313 n.36 (11th Cir. 1989); see a lso St ate v. Wrig ht, 203 P.3d 1027, 1032 n.6 (W ash. 2009) ( en banc ). Howeve r, De lga do’s fa ilure to establish the constitutional significa nce of this dist inction does not compromise the substanc e of his ar gument.
18co ur t’s p rio r de ni al of p os t-c on vi ct io n re li ef was no t o nl y no t “ co nt rary to” or “ an

un reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f” Supr em e Co ur t p rece de nt , § 2 25 4( d) (1 ), itwas

19en ti rel y

co rrec t. W e th eref

or e aff irm th e jud gm en t o f th e d is tri ct 7

Our c onclusion here is lim ited to the Florida Supreme Court’s primar

y rulingthat 7 Delg ado wa s not acquitted, not its alternative de termination that Delg ado wa s not tried twice f or the same of

fense . L atchingon to this alternative ruling , the State urg es us to deny Delg ado’s petition on “same off

ense” g rounds, ar guing that, under B lockburg er, w e may not look bey ond the abstra ct statutory

elements of two r eleva

nt offense s—even to indictment—to eva luate their “same ness” a

nd acc using D elg ado of try ing to r esurr ect Gr ady

v. Corbin’s “same conduct” test. 495 U.S. 508, 510, 110 S. C t. 2084 (1990), over ruled by United States v. Dix on, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 113 S. Ct . 2849 (1993). The State’s stanc e on what constitutes the “same of fense ” for double-jeopa

rdy purposes drastica lly

oversimplifies what is an e x cee dingly complex area

of constitutional law, see Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 700, 100 S. Ct . 1432 (1980) ( Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (cha rac terizing “ the words ‘ same off ense’ ” as “ dece ptively

simple in appear ance but virtually kaleidoscopic in application”) , and it calls to mind our introductory rema rks in a similar forme r case : This c ase involving the arc ane principles of double jeopar dy

and collater al estoppel is not susceptible of brig ht-letter law or black- letter law; the are as are most ofte n g ray , and dimly to be seen. Nee dless to say , one ente ringthis field must do so wit h trepidation. As a result, the battles i n t h es e are as are pockmar ked by assaults, retre ats, and advanc es. In both fields we look for terra in that has been foug ht over, and cast our eyes about for tactica l maneuve rs in order to discov er s o m e grand design which really and in fac t can fit the particula

r case befor e us for judgme nt and dispositi on. But we find no classic to co mp ar e t o the Clausewitz of milit ary fame

. We too are thus hesitant to enter the field, but we shal l do so brave ly

. And, at analy sis’ end, we are confide nt th at contempora ry jurisprudenc e justifies our conc lusion. United States v. L arkin, 605 F .2d 1360, 1361–62 (5th Cir. 1979), par tially withdrawn a

nd modified on other grounds by 611 F.2d 585 ( 1980). As explained below, we need not wa de into the murky water s of what c onstitut es the same off ense in orde r to resolve this case—a fac t that is fortunate for

the State. Its rigid a

nd cate g orica l approa ch to “sa meness” simply

cannot be square d with the holdings of E x parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 187 (holdingthat a convic tion of a Mormon on a c harg e of c ohabiting w ith his two wives over a

2 1/2-year

period ba rre d a subseque nt prosecution for adultery with one of them on the day

followingthe end of

that period); Ha

rris v. Oklahoma , 433 U.S. 682, 682–83, 97 S. Ct . 2912 (1977) ( per c uriam) ( holding that de fenda nt’s conviction for f

elony murder ba sed on a killing in the c ourse of

an ar med robbe ry

barr ed a subse quent prosec ution ag ainst the same defe ndant for the robber

y ); I llinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419–20, 100 S. Ct. 2260 (1980) (holdingthat double jeopar dy may prec lude involuntary

manslaug hter prose cution of automobile driver who had pre viously been c onvicted for

failingto reduc e spee d to avoid the collision); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693–94 (1980) ( holding r ape a nd felony murder a re the same off

ense unde r Bloc kburg er where felony murder c onviction could not be had without proof of the ra pe); a nd even Justice Scalia’s opinion in Dix on itself, see 509 U .S. at 700 (dec iding, a long w ith J ustice Kenne dy , that a prior c onviction for cr iminal contempt prec ludes subsequent prose cution for the crime of assault)—a ll of which re quire somethingmore than a copy of a state ’s cr iminal code in order to determine whether

one cha rg ed off ense is ac tually

included in another . See also United States v. Kaiser , 893 F.2d 1300, 1305–06 ( 11th Cir. 1990) (deter mining, under

Bloc kburg er, that the def endant’ s char g e “of

filing a false r eturn is a lesse r included of fense of tax evasion by
20co ur t.
III.

The Fif th Am en dm en t g ua ran te es th atno pe rs on sh al l “ be su bjec t fo r th e

sa m e o ffen se to be twi ce p ut in jeop ard y of l ife or l im

b . . . .” U.S. Con st . am en d.
V. Bas edon it s p la in tex t, t he Am en dm en t re qu ire s t ha t cr im in al de fen da nt s 8
de m on st rat e two th in gs in ord er t o i nv ok e it s p ro te ct io n: (1) th atth ey ha ve be en

“ twi ce p ut in jeop ard y ”; an d (2 ) th atth ey ha ve be en so pu t fo r th e “ sa m e o ffen se .”

means of f

iling the same fa lse retur

n,” notwithstandingthe fa ct that, “in the a bstract,” eac h offe nse has a

n element not re quired for the other, a

nd stating “ we do not dec ide the issue at ha nd in the abstrac t”). I ts true that, in Dix on, a hig hly fra cture d Court overrule d Gra dyv. Corbin and its “sameconduct” extension of the Ex parte Nielsen line of c ases. I d. at 704 (majority opinion). But in overr uling Gr ady ’s g loss and decla ringBloc kburg er to be the sole test of what constitutes the same off ense, the Court did not overrule the c ases listed above . In fac t, the opinion of J ustice Scalia—re prese nting the c ontrolling interpr etation of B lockburg er a nd the ca ses listed above, g iven that there wer e four dissenting votes in Dixon to retain Gra dy ’s full-blown “sa me conduc t” test—applied B lockburg er in a way that incorporated the holding s of these c ases within the Bloc kburg er r

ubric. See id. at 697–702. The Gove rnment’s a rgument in this case does not ref lect the view

of the Supreme Court, as illustrated by Dix on. Instead it repr esents the dissenting view

of Chief Just ice Rehnquist from that c ase. E.g ., id. at 714 (Rehnquist, J ., concur ringin part, dissentingin part) ( “I n my view, B lockburg er’ s same-e lements test require s us to focus, not on the ter

ms of the par

ticular c ourt order s involved, but on the elements of c ontempt of cour t in the ordinary

sense. . . . B eca

use the g ener ic cr ime of conte mpt of court has diff ere nt elements than the substantive criminal cha rg es in this case, I

believe that they

are separ ate offe nses under

Bloc kburg er.” ); id. at 716–17 (“O ur double jeopa rdy case s applying B lockburg er have f ocused on the statutory

elements of the offe nses cha rg ed, not on the fa cts that must be proved unde r the pa

rticular indictment at issue.”). B ut even the Chief J ustice’s dissentingvoice allowed that Ha

rris imports some measure of flexibili ty into Blockburg er in c ases “ wher e the crimes in question ar e ana logous to greater a nd lesser inc luded offe nses.” I d. at 714; acc ord Whalen, 445 U.S. at 708–09 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (“[T]he Blockbur g er te st, although use ful in identifying statutes that define greater a nd lesser inc luded offe nses in the traditional sense , is less satisfac tory , and per

haps eve n misdirected, whe n applied to statutes def ining “ compound” and “pr edicate” of

fense s. Strictly

speaking , two crimes do not stand in the re lationship of gr eate r and lesser included off

enses unless pr oof of the greater ne cessa rily entails proof of

the lesser .”). See also United States v. L iller, 999 F.2d 61, 62–63 ( 2d Cir. 1993).

The Double J eopar dy

Clause of the F ifth Amendment applies to the State through the 8 Due Proc ess Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. Be nton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct

. 2056 (1969).
21Bec au se Delg ad o c an no t s ho w th athe was “ twi ce p utin jeop ard y ,” as th e Supr em e

Co ur t’s co ns ti tu ti on al juri sp ru de nc e d efi ne s t ha t co nc ep t, the Sta te was n ot
pr ecl ud edfro m

ret ry in g h im

forpre m ed it at edm

ur de r. A.
In th e co nt ex t o f su cces si ve pro se cu ti on s, t he Fif th Am en dm en t’s d ou bl ejeop ard y pro hi bi ti on “ was de si gn edto pro te ctan in di vi du al fro m be in g s ub

jecte d

to th e h azar ds of t ria l an d p os si bl e co nv ic ti on m or e th an on ce fo r an all eg ed
of fen se .” Green v. Un it edSta te s, 3 55 U.S. 18 4, 1 87 , 78 S. Ct. 2 21 (19 57 ).

The un de rlyin g id ea, on e th at is de ep ly in gr ai ne d in at le as t th e Ang lo -Am eri can syste m of juri sp ru de nc e, is th at th e St at e wit h al l it s res ou rces an d po wer s h ou ld no t be al lo wed to m ak e rep eat ed at te m pt s to co nv ic t an in di vi du al fo r an al le g e d o f

fen se , th ereb y su bjec ti ng hi m to em ba rras sm en t, ex pe ns e an d or de al an d co m pe ll in g hi m to li ve in a co nt in ui ng st at e of an xi et y an d in se cu rit y , as well as en ha nc in g th e po ss ib il it y th at ev en th ou gh in no cen t h e m ay be fou nd gu il ty. Id . at 1 87 –8 8.

“ The Dou bl e Je op ard y

Cla us e,” h owe ve r, “ is no t an ab so lu te ba r to

su cces si ve tri al s.” J us ti ces of B os to n M un . Cou rt v . Ly do n, 4 66 U.S. 29 4, 3 08 , 10 4 S . Ct. 1 80 5 (1 98 4) . For o ve r a h un dr edy ears , th e Supr em e Co ur t h as

reco gn iz edth atth e Fi fth Am en dm en t d oe s n ot ge ne ral ly pro hi bi t re tryin g de fen da nt s wh o s uc ceed in ha vi ng th ei r co nv ic ti on s s etasi de on ap pe al . See Ba ll
v. Un it edSta te s, 1 63 U.S. 66 2, 6 71 –7 2, 1 6 S . Ct. 1 19 2 (1 89 6) (es tabl is hi ng th e

“ Bal l ru le ”); Lock ha rt v . Nels on , 48 8 U.S. 3 3, 3 8, 1 09 S. Ct. 2 85 (19 88 ) (“ It h as lo ng be en set tl ed

. . . th atth e Dou bl e Je op ard y Cla us e’s ge ne ral pro hi bi ti on

22ag ai ns t s uc ces si ve pro se cu ti on s d oe s n ot pre ve nt th e g ov ern m en t fr om ret ry in g a de fen da ntwho su ccee ds in ge tt in g h is fir st co nv ic ti on set asi de , th ro ug h d ire ct
ap pe al or c ol la te ral att ack , bec au se of s om e err orin th e p ro ceed in gs lea di ng to

co nv ic ti on .” (ci ti ng Bal l, 1 63 U.S. at 6 71 –7 2) ). Ju st ic e Harl an , writ in g fo r th e Co ur t i n Un it edSta te s v . Tateo , exp la in edth e Bal l ru le ’s rat io na le in th e fo ll owi ng
te rm s: Co rres po nd in g to th e rig ht of an accu se d to be gi ve n a fai r

tri al is th e so ci et al in te res t in pu ni sh in g on e who se gu il t is cl ear aft er he ha s ob ta in ed su ch a tri al

. It wou ld be a hi gh pr ic e in de ed fo r so ci et y to pa y were ev ery accu se d gr an te d im m uni ty fr om pu ni sh m en t be cau se of an y de fect su ffi ci ent to co ns ti tu te rev ers ib le erro r in th e pr oc eed in gs le ad in g to co nv ic ti on

. 37 7 U.S. 4 63 , 46 6, 8 4 S . Ct. 1 58 7 (1 96 4) ; s ee al so Uni te d S ta te s v . Sco tt , 43 7 U.S.
82 , 91 , 98 S. Ct. 2 18 7 (1 97 8) (“ [R]equ ir[ in g] a cri m in al de fen da nt to st an d t ria l
ag ai n a fte r he ha s s uc ces sf ul ly inv ok eda st atut ory

rig htof app eal to up se t h is fir st

co nv ic ti on is no t an actof g ov ern m en ta l o pp res si on of t he so rt a ga in st whi ch th e Dou bl e Je op ard y

Cla us e was in te nd edto pro te ct .”).
Doc tri na ll y , th e Supr em e Co ur t h as reco nc il edth e te ns io n b et ween th e Fi fth
Am en dm en t’s t ex t an d t he Bal l ru le th ro ug h t he co nc ep t o f “ co nt in ui ng jeop ard y .” See Lydon , 46 6 U.S. at 30 8 (“ [I]m pl ic it in th e Bal l ru le pe rm it ti ng ret ria l af te r

rev ers al of aco nv ic ti on is th e co nc ep t o f ‘con ti nu in g jeo pa rd y .’ ” (ci ti ng Pri ce v

. Geo rg ia , 39 8 U.S. 3 23 , 32 9, 9 0 S . Ct. 1 75 7 (1 97 0) )). Je op ard y is sai d t o “ at ta ch ”
whe n ade fen da nt is “pu t t o t ria l.” Serfa ss v. Un it edSta te s, 4 20 U.S. 37 7, 3 88 , 95 9

“This state of je opardy

attache s when a

jury is empanele d and sworn, or , in a benc h 9 trial, when the judge beg ins to rece ive evidenc e.” Ma rtin L inen Supply

Co., 430 U.S. at 569.
23S. Ct . 10 55 (19 75 ). Bu t “ th e p ro te ct io n o f th e Doubl e Je op ard y Cla us e b y

it s
te rm s ap pl ie s o nl y

if t he re h as be en so m e ev en t, s uc h a s an acq ui tt al , whi ch

te rm in at es th e o rig in al jeop ard y .” Ric ha rd so n v . Uni te d S ta te s, 4 68 U.S. 31 7, 3 25 , 10 4 S . Ct. 3 08 1 (1 98 4) . Drawin g fr om Ju st ic e Hol m es ’s di ss en ti ng vi ews in Kep ne r v. Un it edSta te s, 1 95 U.S. 10 0, 1 34 –3 6, 2 4 S . Ct. 7 97 (19 04 ), an d re lying

on co ns id erat io ns of “ fai rn es s t o s oc ie ty, la ckof f in al it y , andli m it edwaiv er,” s ee Ly do n, 4 66 U.S. at 3 08 ; Pr ic e, 39 8 U.S. at 32 9, t he Supr em e Co ur t h as de te rm in edth atm os t ap pe ll at e rev ers al s o f co nv ic ti on s d o n ot qu al ify as s uc h

te rm in at in g e ve nt s b ecau se th e “ ‘crim in al pro ceed in gs ag ai ns t [t he ] accu se d h av e

no t ru n t he ir f

ul l co ur se .’ ” See Lydon , 46 6 U.S. at 30 8 (q uo ti ng Pri ce, 3 98 U.S. at
32 6) . In o th er wo rd s— an d p art ic ul arl y in li gh t o f th e fac t t ha t t he de fen da nt was th eret of or e u nd er a v erd ic t o f gu il t— in a ve ry real sen se , th e d efen da ntwas n ev er

ou t o f jeop ardy . Sin ce i t s ta nd s t o re as on th ata de fen da nt can no t b e p ut in jeop ard y a se co nd ti m e whe n h is ori gi na l jeo pa rd y ha s yet to en d, t he Bal l ru le
do es no t o ffen d t he Dou bl e Je op ard y Cla us e. B.
Des pi te it s b read th , th e Bal l ru le an d i ts im pl ic it co nc ep t o f co nt in ui ng jeop ard y pe rm it s a c rit ic al ex cep ti on . In Bu rk s v . Uni te d S ta te s, t he Supr em e Co ur t h el d t ha t i f a co nv ic ti on is set asi de forin su ffi ci en cy of t he ev id en ce, “ [t]he
Dou bl e Je op ard y

Cla us e fo rb id s a s eco ndtri al forth e p ur po se of a ffo rd in g t he
pr os ecu ti on an ot he r op po rtu ni ty to s up pl y ev id en ce wh ic h i t fa il edto m us te r in th e fir st pro ceed in g.” 43 7 U.S. 1 , 11 , 98 S. Ct. 2 14 1 (1 97 8) . Establ is hi ng a ke y Fif th

24Am en dm en t d ic ho to m y be twee n app el la te rev ers al s fo r tr ia l erro r ve rs us fact ua l
in su ffi ci en cy , Chi ef J us ti ce Be rg er ex pl ai ne d fo r a u na ni m ou s C ou rt:

[R]eve rs al fo r tri al erro r, as di st in gu is he d fro m ev id en ti ary in su ffi ci en cy , do es no t co ns ti tu te a de ci si on to th e e f fect th atth e g ov ern m en t has fai le d to pro ve it s ca se . As su ch , it im pl ie s no th in g wit h res pe ct to th e gu il t or in no cen ce of th e de fen da nt

. R at he r, it is a de te rm in at io n th at a de fen da nt ha s be en co nv i ct ed th ro ug h a jud ic ia l pr oc es s whi ch is de fect iv e in so m e fu nd am en t a l r es pe ct , e.g ., in co rrec t rece ip t or reject io n of ev id en ce, in c o r rect in st ru ct io ns , or pr os ecu to ria l m is co nd uc t. Whe n th is oc cu rs , th e accu se d ha s a st ro ng in te res t in ob ta in in g a fai r read jud ic at io n of hi s gu il t free fro m erro r, ju st as so ci et y m ai nt ai ns a va li d co nc ern fo r in su rin g th at t h e g u i lt y are pu ni sh ed

. . . . Si nc e we ne ces sa ril y affo rd ab so lu te fin al it y to a jury’ s v e r d i ct of acq ui tt al —n o m at te r ho w erro ne ou s it s de ci si on—i t is di ffi cu lt to co nc ei ve ho w so ci et y ha s an y gr eat er in te res t in ret ry in g a de fen da nt whe n, on rev ie w, it is de ci de d as a m at te r of la w th at th e ju ry co ul d no t pr op erl y ha ve returne d a ve rd ic t o f gu il ty. Id . at 1 5– 16

. Bu rk s t he refo re s av es co nv ic ti on s s etasi de be cau se of e vi de nt ia ry in su ffi ci en cy

fro m th e Bal l ru le ’s swee p, t erm in at in g a de fen da nt ’s jeop ard y as t o th atoff en se an d t rig ge rin g t he ful l p ro te ct io n o f th e Dou bl e Je op ard y Cla us e. See
Nels on , 48 8 U.S. at39 . Butwher e Bu rk s d oe s n otap pl y , and a co nv ic ti on is

rev ers edon th e b as is of l eg al erro r, th e d efen da nt ’s jeop ard y co nt in ue s an d a

se co nd tri al is pe rm it te d u nd er Ba ll . See No rth Caro li na v. Pe arce , 39 5 U.S. 7 11 , 72 0, 8 9 S . Ct. 2 07 2 (1 96 9) (de cl ari ng , pre -Bu rk s, t ha t t he do ub le jeop ard y
gu aran te e “ im

po se s n o l im it at io ns what ev er upo n t he po wer t o re try a defe nd an t who ha s s uc ceed edin ge tt in g h is fir st co nv ic ti on set asi de .”)(e m ph as is ad de d)

. IV.

25A.

Delg ad o was co nv ic te d i n h is fir st tri al an d s uc ceed edin ha vi ng th at

co nv ic ti on set asi de on ap pe al . As a res ul t, h is Fif th Am en dm en t cl ai m

ris es (an d,
in th is cas e, fal ls ) wit h h is ab il it y to sh ow t ha t t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t d eci si on in Delg ad o I “ acq ui tt ed ” h im of f el on y m ur de r an d b ur gl ary. An “ acq ui tt al ” is a de ci si on by a cou rt o r a jury in f av orof t he de fen da nt th at“ ‘actu al ly repre se nt s a r es ol ut io n, co rrec t o r no t, o f so m e o r al l o f th e fac tu al
el em en ts of t he off

en se ch arg ed .’ ” Sm it h v . Mas sa ch us et ts , 54 3 U.S. 4 62 , 46 8,
12 5 S . Ct. 1 12 9 (2 00 5) (qu ot in g M art in Lin en Supp ly Co., 43 0 U.S. at 57 1) . In Delg ad o I, t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t ad dr es se d Del ga do ’s bu rg la ry ch arg e an d
fo un d t ha t i t was “ le ga ll y in ad eq ua te .” Delg ad o I, 7 76 So . 2dat 2 42 (em ph as is
ad de d) . Stat in g e xp li ci tl y th at“ [t]hi s [wa s] no t a c as e whe re t he re was m erel y in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce t o s up po rt t he bu rg la ry ch arg e,” i d., t he co urt d et erm in edth at it s “ ho ld in g o n t he bu rg la ry is su e co m

pe l[l edit ] to rem an d t hi s ca se fora ne w tri al ,” id . at 2 41 . It an al og iz edDelg ad o’s ca se to Yate s, a c as e in whi ch th e Supr em e Co ur t fo un d c on st it ut io na l erro r, bu t p erm it te d re tri al , wher e a jury
returne d a ge ne ral ve rd ic t af te r ha vi ng be enin st ru ct edon alt ern at e th eo rie s o f
gu il t, o nl y

on e o f whi ch was l eg al ly adeq ua te . Anditsp eci fic al ly dis ti ng ui sh edit
fro m Griff in , wher e th e Supr em e Co ur t d eci de d t ha t, wh ere ajury is ch arg edon al te rn at e th eo rie s o f gu il t— on ly one of wh ic h i s fa ctua ll y ad eq ua te —a g en eral
gu il ty verd ic t wi ll st an d.

26Mo reo ve r, whe n a dd res si ng Delg ad o’s d ou bl e-jeo pa rd y arg um en ts in Delg ad o II , th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t co nf irmed th atitdi d n ot setasi de Delg ad o’s i ni ti al co nv ic ti on on th e b as is of e vi de nt ia ry in su ffi ci en cy : Whi l e w e r eco gn iz e th at an acq ui tt al is req ui red whe n a co n vi ct io n is no t su pp or te d by fact ua ll y su ffi ci en t ev id en ce, se e, e.g ., Bal la rd v. St at e, 9 2 3 S o. 2d 47 5, 48 6 (Fl a. 20 06 ) (rev ers in g co nv ic ti on s, va cat in g se nt en ces , an d rem an di ng wit h di rect io ns to en te r a jud gm en t of acq ui tt al whe re ev id en ce was in su ffi ci en t to su p p or t co nv ic ti on s) , an d th at su ch an acq ui tt al gi ve s ris e to d ou bl e jeop ard y pr ot ect io ns , Sat ta zah n v. Pen ns y lv an ia , 53 7 U.S. 10 1, 12 3 S. Ct

. 73 2, 15 4 L. Ed.2 d 58 8 (2 00 3) , th is Co ur t di d no t effe ctua ll y acq ui t Delg ad o of fir st -d eg ree m ur de r in Delg ad o I. In D e l g a d o I, we di sc us se d at le ng th th e di st in ct io n be twee n le ga l an d fact ua l in su ffi ci en cy an d ex pr es sl y st at ed th at “ [t]hi s is no t a cas e whe re th ere was mer e ly in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce to su pp or t th e bu rg la ry ch arg e.” Id

. at 24 2 (em

ph as is ad de d)

. Rat he r, we st at ed th at “ [p ]ur s ua nt to ou r an al y si s in to da y ’s op in io n, [th e St at e’s] th eo ry of bu rg la ry (an d fel on y m ur de r) is l e g al ly in ad eq ua te .” Id

. ( e mp h a si s ad de d)

. W e di d no t fin d th at ei th er of th e St at e’s th eo rie s of fir st -d eg ree m ur de r was fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t an d ex pr es sl y st at ed th at “ [o ]ur de ci si on in no w a y pr ev en ts th e St at e fro m pr os ecu ti ng ap pe ll an t fo r wha te ve r cri m es he m ay ha ve co m m it te d on ce i n s i d e t h e vi ct im ’s ho m e.” Id

. at 24 1. In fact , th e on ly fact ua l in su ffi ci en cy we reco gn iz ed was co ns eq ue nt to ou r ho ld in g th at th e St a t e w a s req ui red to sh ow th at Delg ad o rem ai ne d in th e Ro dr ig ue z e s ’ dwe ll in g su rrep ti ti ou sl y in or de r to pro ve Delg ad o c omm it te d b ur gl ary. Id. at 24 2.
Mo reo ve r, ev en if th e St at e’s th eo ry of fel on y m ur de r was ren de red fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t by ou r ho ld in g in Delg ad o I, we ex pr es sl y reco gn iz ed th at a de fen da nt m ay be ret rie d o n t he same co un t whe re o ne of t wo al te rn at iv e th eo rie s is factua ll y in su ffi ci en t bu t th e ot he r i s n o t

. Id

. (ci ti ng G r i f

f in v. Uni te d St at es , 50 2 U.S. 46 , 11 2 S. Ct

. 46 6, 11 6 L.Ed.2 d 37 1 (1 99 1) ; San Mar ti n v. St at e , 71 7 So .2d 46 2, 47 0 (Fl a.1 99 8) ). Thu s, be cau s e th e St at e’s al te rn at iv e th eo ry of fir st -d eg ree m ur de r ba se d on pr em ed it at io n w a s n o t he ld to be fact ua ll y in su ffi ci en t in

27D e lg ad o I, Delg ad o was no t effe ctua ll y acqui tt ed o f fir st -d eg ree m

ur de r. Delg ad o II , 94 8 S o. 2 d a t 6 86 –8 7.
W e co nc lu de th atth e su bs ta nc e o f th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t’s an al y se s i n bo th Delg ad o I a nd Delg ad o II de m on st rat es th atDelg ad o’s o rig in al co nv ic ti on

was setasi de on th e b as is of a leg al “ erro r in th e p ro ceed in gs ,” no t fa ctua l
in su ffi ci en cy

. See Tat eo , 37 7 U.S. at 46 5. Co ns eque nt ly, th e g en eral rul e o f

1 0
Bal l, n ot th e ex cep ti on of B ur ks , app li es to th is cas e, an d t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t re as on ab ly reli edon th e Yat es do ct rin e. Of co ur se itis tru e th at , in a se ns e, by fin di ng th e St at e’s bu rg la ry th eo ry le ga ll y de fic ie nt , th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t was als o fi nd in g t ha t t he Sta te ’s
pr es en ta ti on was fa ctua ll y in ad eq ua te . But th atfactua l i na de qu acy aros e o nl y as a

res ul t o f th e rev ie win g c ou rt’s re in te rp ret at io n o f th e g ov ern in g l aw. See Pa rk er v

. Loc kh art , 79 7 F . Sup p. 7 18 , 72 1 (E.D. Ark . 19 92 ) (“ The pro of ‘ fai le d’ on ly

Ordinar ily , a cour

t’s char acte rization of its own ruling is not disposit ive of whe ther its 1 0 rulingwas, in fa ct, an a cquittal, for double je opardy purposes, see Smit h v. Massac husetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468–69, 125 S. C t. 1129 (2005); but in Parker v. L ockhar t, 797 F. Supp. 718, 722 (E.D. Ark. 1992), the district court interpr eted the f ollowing state ment from Tibbs v. Florida as indicatingthat that rule is inapplicable in a ca se like De lga do’s: “[the state supreme ] court’s construction of its prior opinion binds this C ourt.” See 457 U.S. 31, 47 n. 24, 102 S. C t. 2211 (1982) ( citing G ree ne v. Masse y , 437 U.S. 19, 25–26 & nn.8–10, 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978)). I t is unclear whether

the rule e stablished in Gree ne re quires simply that we de fer

to a state court’s inter

pretation of its own ambiguous prior decision with respe ct to what that dec ision said as a matter of historica l fac t, or, as Parke r assumed, whether that later inter

pretation also eliminates our re sponsibili ty under Smith to evaluate the eff ect of the prior r

uling a s a matter of double-jeopa

rdy law. We suspect it was the former , see River a v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty ., 162 F.3d 486, 489 ( 7th Cir. 1998) (“Interpre tation [ under the Gre ene r ule] of an ambiguous statement by a judg e does not pre sent any question of constitutional law. The que stion is what the speake r soug ht to convey , not what a r ule of law compels the state to do; it is a question of fa ct for the same re ason that ‘the state of a man' s mind is as much a fac t as the state of his dige stion.’”), but we take no position on t he matter beca use the opinion of De lga do Iwas not ambiguous and, either w ay , the Gre ene r

ule does not impact our de cision.

28be cau se th e Ark an sa s Su pr em e Co ur t co ns tru edth e cap it al fel on y m ur de r la w no t
to ap pl y to th e fac ts all ag reed were p ro ve d a t Pa rk er’s fi rs t t ria l.”)

. Thi s was 1 1
si m pl y no t a c as e whe re t he pro se cu ti on so ug ht “ an ot he r op po rtu ni ty to s up pl y

ev id en ce wh ic h i t fa il edto m us te r in th e fi rs t p ro ceed in g.” Bur ks , 43 7 U.S. at11

. Giv enth atfact , we bel ie ve th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t p ro pe rly det erm in edth at th e Bu rk s ex cep ti on di d n ot ap pl y . See Par ke r, 79 7 F . Sup p. at 72 5; Sta te v. Wrig ht , 20 3 P .3d10 27 , 10 31 & n .5 (Wash . 20 09 ) (en ba nc ) (ch arac te riz in g a n

an al og ou s ap pe ll at e rev ers al of a fel on y -m ur de r co nv ic ti on as “ res ul t[i ng ] fro m tri al erro r, no t i ns uf

fic ie nt ev id en ce,” a nd de cl ari ng “ [t]he pro bl em of c on vi ct io n fo r a n on -ex is te nt cri m e is no t a f ai lu re o f pr oo f” (i nt ern al qu ot at io n m ark s

om it te d) ); Un it edSta te s v . Lanz ot ti , 90 F.3d 12 17 , 12 21 –2 2 (7 th Cir . 19 96 ).

In Parker , the district court a ddresse d a double- jeopar dy question near ly

identical to 1 1 that prese nted in this case. Par ker ha d been tr ied and c onvicted of two c apital fe lony murders f

or two killings in the course of burg lary . See Parke r v. State, 731 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Ark. 1987). The burg lary , howeve r, wa s predicated solely upon Parker ’s bre akingand ente ringthe victims’ home in order

to commit the murder. I d. On direc t appea l, the Arka nsas Supreme Court reve rsed Par

ker’ s conviction bec ause it dete rmined that the burg lary statute could not be construed to e ncompass the f acts e stablished at Parke r’s trial. I d. at 425–26. Parke r wa s then retrie d and convic ted of c apital murder for “ causingthe dea

th of two or more persons in the course of the same criminal episode.” Parker , 797 F. Supp. at 719. He appea led on Double J eopar dy g rounds, but the Arka

nsas Supreme Court re

jected his c laim, decidingthat his “orig inal conviction was not re verse d beca use the e vidence was insuffic ient, but beca use the state ha d committed ‘trial er

ror’ in ‘cha

rg ing a nd trying Par

ker unde r the wr ongcapital murde r provision.’” I d. On habe as re view, the district cour t ag ree d, deciding : The [Arkans as S upreme Court] in [P arke r’s first direc t appea l] examined the applicability of the law, not the adequa cy of the proof. I f the evidenc e wa s i n any sense “insuffic ient” to convict under the felony murder statute, it was only beca use the court narr owly construed the statute to make it inapplicable to t h e p ro of offe red at trial. The conviction was reve rsed, there fore , based the court’s view of the law , not its vi ew of the evidenc e. I d. at 722–33.
29W e fi nd supp or t fo r th is co nc lu si on in sev eral cas es wher e th e Supr em e

Co ur t h as ad dr es se d a na lo go us si tu at io ns

. In Lock ha rt v . Nels on , forex am pl e, th e Supr em e Co ur t ad dr es se d a cas e in
whi ch “ a rev ie win g c ou rt s etasi de a de fen da nt ’s con vi ct io n o f en ha nc edsen te nc e be cau se cert ai n e vi de nc e was erro ne ou sl y ad m it te d a ga in st hi m , and fur th er h el d
th atth e Doubl e Je op ard y Claus e fo rb ad e th e St at e to ret ry hi m as ahabi tu al
of fen de r be cau se th e rem ai ni ng ev id en ce ad du cedat t ria l was leg al ly ins uf fic ie nt
to supp or t a c on vi ct io n.” 48 8 U.S. at 34

. App lying “ th e lo gi c o f Bu rk s,” t he 1 2
Co ur t d et erm in edth atth e Dou bl e Je op ard y Claus e d idno t b ar t he de fen da nt ’s

ret ria l wh ere t he ev id en ce was su ffi ci en t fr om th e v an ta ge of t he tri al co ur t, an d

on ly late r de te rm in edto be in su ffi ci en t b ecau se of a n u nk no wn l eg al erro r. Id. a t 1 3
40 . Had t he erro r co m e to li gh t, t he Co ur t o bs erv ed , th e p ro se cu ti on “ wou ld
pr es um ab ly [hav e h ad ] an op po rtu ni ty to o ffer[ot he r] evi de nc e” t o b rid ge th e

ev id en ti ary gap. Id . at 4 2. “ Perm it ti ng ret ria l i n t hi s i ns ta nc e is no t t he so rt o f
go ve rn m en ta l o pp res si on at wh ic h t he Dou bl e Je op ard y Cla us e is aim ed .” Id

.

Followinga guilty

plea f or burg lary , the prosec ution in Nelson sought to enha nce 1 2 Nelson’s sente nce unde r Arka nsas’s habitual- offe nder statute. 488 U .S. at 34

– 35. Per the statute, the prose cution introduced c opies of the minimum-require d number of prior felony convictions. I d. at 36. “Unbe knownst to the prosec utor, one of those convictions had be en pardone d by

the Gover

nor seve ral year s after

its entry .” I d. at 36. Nelson soug ht a writ of ha beas corpus in fe dera l district court and succ eede d in havinghis sentence invalidated. I d at 37. Afte r the prosec ution announced its intention to pursue the same enhanc ement at r esente ncingon the basis of anothe r convic tion, “the District Court decide d that the Double Jeopardy Clause preve nted the State fr om attempting to re sentenc e [Nelson] as a habitual offe nder.” I d.
The Ne lson Court emphasized that there wa s no evidenc e of pr osecutoria l misconduct 1 3
or over rea ching , see 488 U .S. at 34, imply ing—c orre ctly , we think—that had ther e bee n evidenc e of either , the Double Jeopardy analy sis might be ver

y differ ent. L ikewise, in De lga do’s ca se, there is no alleg ation that the prosec utors acte d in bad fa ith by pursuingthis burgla

ry charg e. The leg al theory

was sound in light of

then-g overninglaw.

30As i n Nel so n, t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t’s re ve rs al he re “ ‘im pl ie [d ] no th in g wit h re sp ectto th e g ui ltor i nn oc en ce o f th e d efen da nt ,’ bu t . . . si m pl y ‘

. . . de te rm in [ed ] th athe ha [d ] be en co nv ic te d t hr ou gh a jud ic ia l p ro ces s wh ic h [wa s]
de fect iv e in so m e fu nd am en ta l re sp ect .’ ” Id . at 4 0 (q uo ti ng Bu rk s, 4 37 U.S. at 1 5)

. Andsi m il ar t o Nel so n, t he ev id en ce h ere was su ffi ci en t at th e ti m e o f tr ia l. See id

. at40 . Sin ce t he ba si s fo r th e Bu rk s ex cep ti on is th at“ th e g ov ern m en t’s ca se
ag ai ns t t he de fen da ntwas s o l ack in g t ha t t he tri al co ur t s ho ul d h av e en te reda jud gm en t o f acq ui tt al , rat he r th an subm it ti ng th e cas e to th e jury,” see Nel so n, 4 88
U.S. at 3 9 (c it in g B ur ks , 43 7 U.S. at 16 –1 7) , a rev ie win g c ou rt’s app li cat io n o f
th atex cep ti on sh ou ldco ns id er t he su ffi ci en cy of t he ev id en ce at th e ti m e o f tr ia l.
See i d. at 41 –4 2. Itis th e “ qu an tu m of e vi de nc e” at th atpo in t t ha t co un ts . Id. at
42 ; ac co rdPark er, 7 97 F. Sup p. at 72 3. 1 4
Add it io na ll y , th e Supr em e Co ur t h as de cl in edto ba r ret ria l fo ll owi ng aft er a

rev ers edco nv ic ti on wher e th e p ro se cu ti on ha d s im pl y rel ie d o n t he wron g s ta tu te in it s ch arg in g d oc um en t. See Mo nt an a v . Hall , 48 1 U.S. 4 00 , 40 4, 1 07 S. Ct.

The Parke r cour

t rea soned: 1 4
To l o o k at it another way , had the Arka nsas Supreme Court deter mined that the law was indeed what the jury in Parker ’s case had b een instructed, that is, that burg lary could be the predic ate felony when the object of the burg lary was the murder, it is undisputed that the evidenc e offere d at trial was sufficie nt to convict Parker

. The problem, there fore , was the applicability of the law to the evidenc e (leg al inapplicability), not the applicability of the evidenc e to the law (fa ctual inapplicability). The inadequa cy was in the statute (or, more acc urate ly , in the prosec utor’s and trial judge ’s understanding of the statute), not the proof

. 797 F. Supp. at 723.
3118 25 (19 87 ) (p er cu ria m ) (“ It i s cl ear t ha t t he Co ns ti tu ti on pe rm it s re tri al aft er a

co nv ic ti on is rev ers edbe cau se of a de fect in th e ch arg in g i ns tru m en t.” ( ci ti ng Bal l,
16 3 U .S. at67 2) ).
W e are m in df

ul th atth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t’s d eci si on for cedDelg ad o
to “ ru n t he ga un tl et ” o f tr ia l fo r a s eco ndti m e th ro ug h n o faul t o f hi s o wn— a fac t im pl ic at in g v ari ou s i nt eres ts pro te ct edby the Dou bl e Je op ard y Cla us e. See Ab ne y v. Un it edSta te s, 4 31 U.S. 65 1, 9 7 S . Ct. 2 03 4 (1 97 7) ; Gre en , 35 5 U.S. at 18 7– 88 ; Nels on , 48 8 U.S. at44 (Mar sh al l, J ., di ss en ti ng ) (ch arac te riz in g t he Sta te ’s

“ ‘hon in g [o f] its tri al st rat eg ie s an d p erfe ct in g [o f] its ev id en ce t hr ou gh su cces si ve
at te m pt s at co nv ic ti on ’” as “ th e cl as si c Dou bl e Je op ard y ev il ” (q uo ti ng Tib bs v. Fl or id a, 45 7 U.S. 3 1, 4 1, 1 02 S. Ct. 2 21 1 (1 98 2) )); Ill in oi s v . Som erv il le , 41 0 U.S.
45 8, 4 71 , 93 S. Ct. 1 06 6 (1 97 3) (st at in g t ha t t he de fen da nt ha s a “ weig ht y ” in te res t

“ in ha vi ng hi s fa te de te rm in edby the jury fir st im pa ne le d” ). Bu t, as di sc us se d
ab ov e, th os e in te res ts m

us t b e b al an cedag ai ns t t he co un te rv ai li ng in te res ts of

so ci et y . See Tat eo , 37 7 U.S. at 46 6.
The Flo rid a Supr em e Co ur t d et erm in edth atth e err orin Delg ad o’s o rig in al
pr os ecu ti on was l eg al , no t fa ctua l. Tha t co nc lu si on was e nt ire ly corre ctin li gh t o f
go ve rn in g l aw, an d i t was en ti rel y fat al to Delg ad o’s d oubl e jeop ard y cla im

. Bec au se th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt d idno t ac qu it Delg ad o i n h is fir st di rect
ap pe al , hi s Fi fth Am en dm en t ri gh ts were n ot vi ol at ed

. B.

32Fu rth erm or e, ev en if we wer e to co nc lu de th atth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t

di d a cq ui t Del ga do of f

el on y m ur de r an d b ur gl ary in Delg ad o I, s ev eri ng hi s

or ig in al jeop ard y

as t o t ho se ch arg es , itwou ldli ke ly not ch an ge th e res ul t. The erro r, le ga l o r fac tu al , add res se d b y th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t i n Delg ad o I wa s co nf

in edto is su es un rel at edto th e p rem ed it at edm ur de r ch arg e (i .e.,

co ns en t t o e nt er an d re m ai n i n t he pre m is es ). Ther e is no arg um en t t o b e m ad e, th eref or e, th atth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t re so lv ed“ so m e o r al l o f th e fac tu al
el em en ts of t he off

en se ” o f pr em ed it at edm

ur de r in Delg ad o’s fa vo r in Delg ad o I.
See M art in Lin en Supp ly Co., 43 0 U.S. at 57 1. Co ns eq ue nt ly, th ere i s l it tl e di st in gu is hi ng Delg ad o’s ca se fro m th e m or e tr ad it io na l s cen ari o wh ere a de fen da nt , tri edfortwo off en se s t ha t ar e wel l u nd ers to od to be gre at er- a ndles se rin cl ud edcri m es , is acq ui tt edof t he gre at er o ffen se an d c on vi ct edof t he les se r,

on ly to h av e th atco nv ic ti on set asi de on ap pe al . In t ha t ca se , itis be y on d d ou bt
th atif t he co nv ic ti on were re ve rs edforan y reas on ot he r th an ev id en ti ary in su ffi ci en cy , th e p ro se cu ti on wou ldbe en ti tl edto ret ry th e d efen da nt forth e le ss er-i nc lu de d c ha rg e. See Un it edSta te s v . Larki n, 6 05 F.2d13 60 , 13 67 –6 8 (5 th
Ci r. 19 79 ), m od ifi edby 611 F.2d58 5 (1 98 0) (res ol vi ng an an al yti cal ly ide nt ic al
si tu at io n wh ere t he de fen da nt m ad e a s ub st an ti al ly stro ng er s ho win g t ha t h e h ad

act ua ll y be en acq ui tt edof a gre at er-i nc lu de d o ffen se ). 1 5

In Bonne r v. City

of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e 1 5 adopted a s binding pre cede nt all decisions of the for mer F ifth Circuit handed down pr ior to the close of busine ss on September 30, 1981.
33Delg ad o’s jeo pa rdy on th e p rem ed it at edm

ur de r ch arg e at ta ch edwhen hi s

or ig in al jury was swo rn an d c on ti nu edth ro ug h h is sec on d p ro se cu ti on . There fo re, he was n ot “ twi ce p ut in jeop ard y ” fo r th atoff en se . See i d.; acco rdUni te d S ta te s

1 6
v. Ho we, 53 8 F .3d82 0, 8 26 –2 7 (8 th Cir . 20 08 ), ab ro ga te d o n o th er g ro un ds by Yeag er v . Uni te d S ta te s, _ _ U.S. _ _, 1 29 S. Ct. 2 36 0, 2 36 7– 68 (20 09 ); Un it ed
St at es v. J os e, 42 5 F .3d12 37 , 12 41 (9t h C ir. 2 00 5) (rea ch in g t he same con cl us io n

The L arkin c ourt explained: 1 6 Even if we assume that [he was acquitted o f t h e g reater-inc luded offe nse in his first tr i al] , L arkin’s double jeopar dy rig ht will not be violated by

the re trial of the [lesser- included off ense].
In Br own, J eff

ers, and Har

ris, the defen d ants had been subjected to two independe nt proce eding s. In eac h case , trial on either the g rea

ter or the lesser char g e was followed by a prosec ution of the other offe nse in a separ ate proce eding

. In contra st, L arkin was subjected to only one trial in which the conspira cy and vicar ious liability counts wer e tried simult aneously

. Thus, even assuming the validity of L arkin’s arg

ument that the conspirac y char ge i s a lesser included offe nse of the Pinkerton [v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct

. 1180 (1946)] vicar ious liability counts, L arkin’s position is indisti nguishable from a defe ndant who was tried on a murder char g e and a manslaug hter count in the alternative. Such simult aneous jeopar d y for greater and lesser included offe nses is clea rly proper

. See J eff ers, supra, 432 U.S. at 152 & n. 20, 97 S. Ct. at 2217 & n. 20 (“a defe ndant is normally entitled to ha ve char g es on a g rea

ter and a lesser of fense resolved in one proce eding ”) (plurality opinion).
Fur thermore , the fact that the j ury in L arkin’s trial acquitted him of the Pinkerton counts and hung on the conspirac y ch ar ge, t h er eby causing a mistrial as to the latter count and allowing t h e Gover nment to retry the conspirac y char g e, does not dictate a differ ent result. I t is of course axiom atic t h at L arkin may not be retrie d on the char g es of which he was acquitted. S ee P ri ce v. Ge o rg ia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 26 L

. Ed.2d 300 (1970 ); Gre en v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S. Ct . 221, 2 L

. Ed.2d 199 (1957). Howeve r, i t i s eq ually well s ettled t hat a defe ndant m ay be retrie d on a lesser offe nse, of which he was convi cted at an initial trial, afte r that conviction was reve rsed on appea l; and that that result obtains even though the first trial also resulted in a verdic t of acquittal on a greater offe nse. See Price, supra, 398 U.S. at 326–27, 90 S. Ct. 1757.
L arkin, 605 F .2d at 1367–68 (footnotes omitted).
34in th e in ve rs e sc en ari o—whe re jeo pa rd y ter m in at edon th e le ss er-i nc lu de d o ffen se

an d c on ti nu edas t o t he gre at er— st at in g: “ Whi le th e Dou bl e Je op ardy Cla us e d oe s

no t b ar re tri al aft er re ve rs al of a co nv ic ti on , itdo es ba r a s uc ces si ve tri al on an of fen se no t ch arg edin th e o rig in al in di ct m en t o nc e jeop ardy ha s al read y
te rm in at edon , what is fordo ub le jeop ard y pu rp os es , th e ‘sam e o ffen se .’ ” (em ph as is om it te d) ). W ere we a dd res si ng a sc en ari o wh ere Del ga do was n ot als o ch arg edfor

th e le ss er-i nc lu de d c rime in t he fir stpro ceed in g (a ss um in g h e was
acq ui tt edon th e g reat er-i nc lu de d c ha rg e), t he Sta te wou ldbe ba rredfro m bri ng in g th atne w cha rg e in a se pa rat e p ro ceed in g. Se e Harri s, 4 33 U.S. at 6 82 –8 3. Bu t th atis no t t hi s ca se

. 1 7

Finally , we briefly

addre ss the parties’ arguments relate d to collatera l estoppel and 1 7 exhaustion. S ee A she v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970) (holding that the Double J eopar dy Clause incorpor ates the doc trine of c ollatera l estoppel in criminal proc eeding s). “Collatera l estoppel, or, in modern usa g e, issue pre clusion, ‘means simply that when a

n issue of ultimate fac t has once been de termined by a valid and f

inal judgme nt, that issue cannot ag ain be litigated betwe en the same par ties in any

future la wsuit.’” Schiro v. F arle y , 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S. Ct . 783 (1994) ( quoting Ashe , 397 U.S. at 443). To be r eleva nt to a double jeopar dy argument such as that r aised by Delg ado, collate ral e stoppel require s that the defe ndant have a ctually

had “a n issue of ultimate fac t” re solved in his favor in a pr ior proce eding . See id. Ba sed on the a

naly sis of Section IV above , it is clear that De lga do did not have any fac tual issues resolved in his fa

vor, and, he nce, c ollatera l estoppel has no plac e in this case’ s double-jeopa rdy analy sis. Neve rtheless, the district c ourt deter mined that Delg ado’s f

eder al petition raised a separ ate F ifth Amendment cla im for re lief on the ba sis of collatera l estoppel and c oncluded that this separate claim wa s proce durally barr ed for

failure to exhaust st ate c ourt reme dies. On appea l, Delg ado argues this was er ror be cause he did not raise a separ ate c ollatera l estoppel claim, but simply

invoked the conc ept of c ollatera l estoppel in support of his Bur ks-driven double jeopar dy

argument:

. . . DEL GADO was never making a separ ate collater al es t oppel claim. He made it clea r in his Memorandum of L aw t h at the collater al estoppel a

rgument was be ing linked to the Burks ca se. In other words, the ultimate fac t was DEL GADO’ s judicial acquittal of burg lary , wh ich included preme ditation as a lesser- included of the felony -murder pursuant to the instructions of the Court, DEL GADO never pled collater al estoppel as to any fac t prese nted to the jury

. . . . DEL GADO is claiming , and has alway s maintained that this retria l is
35V.

In li gh t o f th e fo reg oi ng di sc us si on , Delg ad o h as no t d em on st rat edth atth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co ur t’s d en ia l o f rel ie f was “ co nt rary to, o r in vo lv edan

un reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f, cl earl y est ab li sh edFed eral law.” § 22 54 (d ). W e th eref or e aff irm th e d is tri ctco urt’s d en ia l o f hi s ap pl ic at io n fo r habe as rel ie f.
AFFIRMED.

barr ed by the judicial acquittal of the Florida Supreme Court beca use of B urks.
I f De lga do had ra ised a sepa rate and distinct claim for r elief on a collater al estoppel theory , the district court c erta inly would have be en cor

rec t in deemingit procedur ally defa ulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). Howeve r, in light of the re cord, it see ms more likely to us that, per his appe llate explanation, Delg ado’s invocation of collater al estoppel wa s merely a misguided attempt to bolster the double jeopa rdy claim addre ssed above . Moreove r, our c ateg orization of Delg ado’s c ollatera l estoppel argument is utterly irrele vant to its im pact on this ca se. Ex haustion is about substance, not for m. And we be lieve that the r ecor d in this case demonstrates the followingthings c lear ly : the substance of Delg ado’s sole f

eder al constitutional claim was that his retrial for preme ditated murder

violated the F ifth Amendment’s Double J eopar dy Clause bec ause he was judicially acquitted of

the same of

fense in Delg ado I ; he prese nted that ar gument, fully and fa irly , to the Florida

Supreme Court; and, ba sed upon its rulingthat completely

and prope rly

reje cted De lga do’s constitutional gr ievanc e, that cour t plainly understood it. This is not t he stuff of proce dural de fault. See O ’Sullivan v. Boer ckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct . 1728 (1999) ( “[T] he exhaustion doctrine is desig ned to g ive the state c ourts a full and f

air opportunity

to resolve f

eder al constitutional claims before those claims ar e prese nted to the fe dera l courts.”) ; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509 (1971) (“[O]nce the fe dera l claim has bee n fairly prese nted to the state c ourts, the exhaustion require ment is satisfied.”). Consequently , we de cide to avoid a profitless and diff

icult analy sis of what truly constitutes a sepa

rate claim or a

rgument for e x haustion purposes and simply conclude that Delg ado’s pe tition was due to be denie d, in full, on its m erits.
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