[Cite as Gentile v. Ackerman, 2017-Ohio-798.]

STATE OF OHIO, MONROE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

ANTHONY M. GENTILE, et al. 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 

VS. 

GEORGE ACKERMAN, et al. 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 

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CASE NO. 14 MO 0004 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio 

Case No. 2012-110 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellees Attorney Craig Sweeney 

122 North Main Street 

Woodsfield, Ohio 43793 

For Defendants-Appellants Attorney Gregory Brunton 

65 East State Street, 4th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-4227 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: March 6, 2017 
[Cite as Gentile v. Ackerman, 2017-Ohio-798.]

DeGENARO, J. 

{¶1} Defendants-Appellants, George Ackerman, et al., appeal the trial 

court's decision applying the 1989 version of R.C. 5301.56, Ohio's Dormant Mineral 

Act, and granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellees, Anthony Gentile, et al. 

{¶2} It was error for the trial court to resolve this action by applying the 1989 

version of R.C. 5301.56 as the Ohio Supreme Court recently held the 2006 version 

controls. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case 

remanded for the trial court to apply the 2006 version of R.C. 5301.56, pursuant to 

the Ohio Supreme Court's recent rulings regarding the DMA. 

{¶3} Appellees are the surface owners of certain real property in Monroe 

County. In 2012, Appellees filed an original and amended complaint pursuant to the 

Ohio Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47-5301.55 and the 1989 version of R.C. 

5301.56, asserting that the DMA operated to have the severed oil and gas interests 

of Appellees deemed abandoned. Central to the parties' dispute was whether the 

1989 or 2006 version of R.C. 5301.56 controlled resolution of the case. 

{¶4} After a procedurally complex path, on February 27, 2014, the trial court 

granted judgment in favor of Appellees; in doing so the trial court applied the 1989 

version of R.C. 5301.56 only, further finding that all "remaining arguments and 

positions [raised by the parties] to be moot." This appeal was stayed pending the 

Ohio Supreme Court's decision in multiple cases regarding, inter alia, whether the 

1989 or the 2006 version of R.C. 5301.56 controls. 

{¶5} In Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2016-

Ohio-5796 (Sept. 15, 2016), ¶ 2, the Court held "the 2006 version of the Dormant 

Mineral Act, which is codified at R.C. 5301.56, applies to all claims asserted after 

June 30, 2006[.]" On November 2, 2016, this case was returned to the active docket. 

{¶6} In their sole assignment of error, Appellants assert: 

The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary 

judgment and denying appellants' motion for summary judgment. 

{¶7} In Corban the Ohio Supreme Court held the 2006 version of R.C. 
- 2 - 

5301.56 controlled, reasoning in pertinent part: 

In accord with this analysis, we conclude that the 1989 law was 

not self-executing and did not automatically transfer ownership of 

dormant mineral rights by operation of law. Rather, a surface holder 

seeking to merge those rights with the surface estate under the 1989 

law was required to commence a quiet title action seeking a decree that 

the dormant mineral interest was deemed abandoned. 

* * * 

Dormant mineral interests did not automatically pass by 

operation of law to the surface owner pursuant to the 1989 law. Thus, 

as of June 30, 2006, any surface holder seeking to claim dormant 

mineral rights and merge them with the surface estate is required to 

follow the statutory notice and recording procedures enacted in 2006 by 

H.B. 288. These procedures govern the manner by which mineral rights 

are deemed abandoned and vested in the surface holder and apply 

equally to claims that the mineral interests were abandoned prior to 

June 30, 2006. 

Id. at ¶ 28, 31. 

{¶8} This case was filed with the trial court well after June 30, 2006. 

Granting judgment in favor of Appellees, the trial court only discussed and relied 

upon facts within the 20 years prior to the effective date of the 1989 version, or within 

the three-year statutory grace period ending March 22, 1992, and applied its 

interpretation of the 1989 version of R.C. 5301.56 to those facts. There was no 

discussion of the law or the facts relative to the 2006 version. 

{¶9} Pursuant to Corban, the trial court erred by applying the 1989 version 

and granting judgment in favor of Appellees on that basis. 

{¶10} The fact that Appellees brought their complaint under the 1989 version 

of the statute does not change the outcome. In Albanese v. Batman, Slip Opinion No. 
- 3 - 

2016-Ohio-5814, ¶ 16-22 (Sept. 15, 2016), the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that 

the 2006 version of R.C. 5301.56 applied, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs' 

claims were originally framed under the 1989 version. 

{¶11} Accordingly, Appellants' sole assignment of error is meritorious. The 

judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for the trial court to 

apply the 2006 version of R.C. 5301.56 pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's recent 

rulings regarding the DMA, including, inter alia, Corban. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Robb, P. J., concurs.