UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CAMPANELLA, and CELTNIEKS 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist TERRE W. MARTIN 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20120898 

Headquarters, Seventh U.S. Army Joint Multinational Training Command 

Joshua S. Shuey, Military Judge 

Major John L. Kiel, Jr., Acting Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry, Jr., 

JA; Major Amy E. Nieman, JA; Captain James S. Trieschmann, Jr., JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; 

Captain Sean P. Fitzgibbon, JA; Captain Timothy C. Erickson, JA (on brief). 

16 September 2014 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per curiam: 

 A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of larceny of military property of a value of $500 or less on 

divers occasions, in violation of Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 

U.S.C. § 921 (2006). The military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct 

discharge, confinement for nine months, a $10,000 fine, and reduction to the grade 

of E-1. The convening authority waived automatic forfeitures for a period of six 

months and only approved so much of the sentence as extends to a bad-conduct 

discharge, confinement for nine months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant’s 

sole assignment of error warrants discussion but no relief. Appellant correctly notes 

that one government sentencing witness, Mr. DS, was never placed under oath. For 

the reasons explained below, this error did not materially prejudice the substantial 
MARTIN—ARMY 20120898 

2

rights of appellant, and, accordingly, we affirm the findings and the sentence. See 

UCMJ art. 59(a). 

 Appellant entered provident pleas of guilty to stealing funds from the dining 

facility (DFAC), where he worked. Appellant repeatedly stole cash from the DFAC 

and repeatedly attempted to hide his larceny by adjusting the headcount numbers 

downward in a DFAC database, the Armed Forces Management Information Service 

(AFMIS). A DFAC with a lower headcount generally would have corresponding 

lower amounts of revenue. Appellant thus evaded detection until the government 

discovered abnormally large numbers of lowered headcounts. Appellant estimated 

that he stole approximately $3,000, but also acknowledged that he did not know how 

much he stole. 

 In its pre-sentencing case, the government attempted to establish a more 

precise amount stolen by appellant. The government called several witnesses and 

the military judge admitted hundreds of pages of documentary evidence. The 

sentencing case culminated with the expert testimony of Ms. MH, an auditor and 

accountant assigned to the Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office, U.S. Army 

Europe. Ms. MH, after reviewing much of the government’s case, testified that the 

DFAC in question had $47,173.65 in headcount reductions, and appellant was 

responsible for 77% of those reductions. The military judge admitted a spreadsheet 

(Pros. Ex. 17) reflecting Ms. MH’s calculations. 

 Ms. MH relied, inter alia, on four prosecution exhibits (Pros. Ex. 10-13), 

which were printouts of logs of DFAC meal adjustments occurring while appellant 

worked there. Those logs identified the person who made the headcount reductions. 

Included in each of those exhibits were attestation certificates signed by Mr. DS, a 

technician with AFMIS. The government also called Mr. DS as a telephonic witness, 

but did not administer an oath to him. Appellant did not object at trial to this failure 

to swear Mr. DS. Mr. DS only testified about the nature of the exhibits at issue. 

The military judge ultimately admitted Pros. Exs. 10-13. 

 The government’s failure to administer an oath to Mr. DS is error that is plain 

and obvious. See United States v. Washington, 63 M.J. 418, 424 (C.A.A.F. 2006); 

Rule for Courts-Martial 807(b)(1)(B); Military Rule of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. 

Evid.] 603. However, Mr. DS’s testimony was not necessary for the admission of 

Pros. Exs. 10-13. Those records are records of regularly conducted activities. Mil. 

R. Evid. 803(6). Mr. DS’s attestation certificates sufficiently authenticated those 

exhibits for purposes of admissibility. Mil. R. Evid. 902(11). While appellant at 

trial presented an email from Mr. DS indicating that he “resorted and reformatted” 

the data to be clearer, we find that these circumstances of production do not indicate 

a lack of trustworthiness for those exhibits. Mil. R. Evid. 803(6). Nothing in the 

record indicates that Mr. DS altered or otherwise manipulated the data except to 
MARTIN—ARMY 20120898 

3

make it clearer. For example, Mr. DS sorted the meal data by date of the meals, 

instead of when the data was entered into the system. 

 Even if Pros. Exs. 10-13 were inadmissible, we are not convinced that these 

exhibits substantially influenced the adjudged sentence. See United States v. Reyes, 

63 M.J. 265, 267-68 (C.A.A.F. 2006). As described above, Pros. Exs. 10-13 were 

subsumed within Pros. Ex. 17 and the testimony of Ms. MH. Ms. MH could rely on 

Pros. Exs. 10-13 (among other information) in forming her expert testimony and her 

properly-admitted spreadsheet. See Mil. R. Evid. 703. Thus, whether or not Pros. 

Exs. 10-13 were admissible, the contents of those exhibits were cumulative with the 

evidence properly admitted at trial. 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings and the sentence as 

approved by the convening authority are AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: