COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

GENE ALLEN DODD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0777-95-3 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 APRIL 30, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATH COUNTY 

Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 

 Ronald W. Vaught (Parks & Vaught, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Monica S. McElyea, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Gene Allen Dodd (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial 

of driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender in 

violation of Code § 46.2-357. On appeal, he argues that the 

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement 

made to the game warden when no reasonable suspicion supported 

the stop of his vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm the trial 

court. 

 On October 25, 1994 at 5:00 p.m., State Game Warden Jerry 

Jones (Jones) was patrolling on Sandy Springs Road in Bath 

County. It was hunting season for squirrels and bow hunting 

season for deer. Sandy Springs Road is a relatively isolated 

dirt road in the woods and is frequented by hunters. Jones 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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encountered an old Ford van driven by appellant travelling slowly 

in the opposite direction. As the two vehicles approached one 

another, appellant, who was wearing a camouflage jacket, pulled 

the van over to the side of the road and stopped. Jones asked 

him "if he was having any luck," and appellant replied, "No." 

 While the van was stopped, Jones noticed that the sliding 

door on the passenger side was open facing the woods and that 

someone was in the back of the van as well as in the passenger 

seat. Appellant started to drive away when Jones said, "Wait a 

minute, I would like to talk to you." Appellant stopped the van 

again, and as Jones got out of his truck, he heard a commotion in 

the back of the van. Jones walked around to the passenger side 

of the van to talk to the passengers and found a loaded rifle and 

a loaded revolver. Jones then asked to see appellant's driver's 

license. Appellant told Jones that his driver's license was 

revoked because he was an habitual offender. Jones charged 

appellant with driving after having been adjudicated an habitual 

offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357. 

 Appellant moved to suppress his inculpatory statement to 

Jones, arguing that the stop of the van was not supported by a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. At 

the suppression hearing on February 28, 1995, Jones testified 

that he stopped the vehicle because he "had a reasonable 

suspicion that they were road hunting." The trial court denied 

appellant's motion. 
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 In considering a trial court's ruling on a suppression 

motion, we view the evidence in the "light most favorable to 

. . . the prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this 

instance, and the decision of the trial court will be disturbed 

only if plainly wrong. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 

1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). 

 "A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an 

automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has 'a 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, 

that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" Freeman 

v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 

(1995) (quoting Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 

405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)). "'[W]hen a court reviews whether an 

officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, 

it must view the totality of the circumstances . . . objectively 

through the eyes of a reasonable police officer with the 

knowledge, training, and experience of the investigating 

officer.'" Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 170, 455 

S.E.2d 744, 748 (1995) (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. 

App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989)). "If the officer's 

suspicion amounts to merely an 'inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch . . . [rather] than a fair inference in light 

of his experience, [it] is simply too slender a reed to support 

the seizure' under the fourth and fourteenth amendments." Logan 

v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 442, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) 
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(en banc) (quoting Murphy, 9 Va. App. at 144, 384 S.E.2d at 128). 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence established that, at the time of the 

stop, Jones knew that: (1) it was hunting season for squirrels 

and bow hunting season for deer; (2) Sandy Springs Road was 

frequented by hunters; (3) appellant was wearing a camouflage 

jacket; (4) appellant was a hunter because he answered, "No," to 

Jones' question about "having any luck"; (5) there were at least 

two passengers in the van; and (6) the sliding door on the 

passenger side of the van facing the woods was open. These 

enumerated circumstances and Jones' experience as a game warden 

provided a reasonable suspicion that appellant and his companions 

were "road hunting" and adequately supported this investigatory 

stop. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.