IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 57931-6-II

CHASE P. HORNADAY,

Appellant,

And

DIANA R. HORNADAY, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Respondent,

CRUSER, C.J. — Chase and Diana Hornaday1 were married for nearly 11 years before they 

separated in August 2021. Diana left Chase after their two children, TH and QH, told her that 

Chase had been hitting them. Upon separating, Diana was granted a domestic violence protection 

order. Chase then petitioned for dissolution of their marriage. The trial court issued a temporary 

parenting plan under which Chase was required to undergo a domestic violence evaluation and 

follow all treatment recommendations before resuming visitation with his children. Chase was 

found in contempt for failing to begin treatment, and he had not yet completed treatment when the 

dissolution action proceeded to a bench trial.

At trial, Diana testified that Chase had explosive and unpredictable rage, threatened her, 

controlled her, posted nude photos of her online without permission, and placed the children in 

 

1 During the dissolution action, Diana changed her name to Diana Young. For clarity and 

consistency, we refer to her as Diana throughout. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 20, 2024
No. 57931-6-II

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dangerous situations. The court also considered a guardian ad litem (GAL) report and a letter from 

the children’s counselor showing that the children disclosed being hit and yelled at by Chase. 

Chase testified and denied the abuse allegations.

The trial court found that there was an overwhelming history of domestic violence that 

warranted limitations on Chase in the parenting plan and that supported Diane’s request for a 

restraining order against Chase. Based on its findings, the trial court issued a final parenting plan 

with limitations on Chase’s contact with the children and granted Diana’s request for a restraining 

order. The trial court also found that Chase was voluntarily underemployed and imputed income 

to him for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation, and ordered Chase to pay spousal 

support to Diana for four years.

Chase appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in issuing both the final parenting plan and 

the restraining order because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of domestic 

violence. Additionally, Chase contends that the trial court erred by imputing income to him 

because the evidence did not establish that he relocated and got a lower paying job in order to 

reduce his child support obligations. Finally, Chase asserts that the trial court erred in awarding 

spousal support to Diana because it erroneously considered the history of domestic violence 

against Diana in its award. We affirm.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Chase and Diana were married in 2009. They share two children, TH and QH, who were 

10 and 6 years of age when the trial court entered its final parenting plan in 2023. Chase also has 
No. 57931-6-II

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two children from previous relationships, including KH, who was almost 18 years of age and lived 

in Utah at the time of the trial. 

Diana was a stay-at-home parent for the majority of the marriage while Chase, a former 

Marine, was employed outside the home in the field of air traffic and ground control after he left 

the military. Chase changed jobs frequently, and they moved states several times to support 

Chase’s employment. During this time, they resided in Washington state twice. 

Chase underwent training in air traffic and ground control and had worked in this field for 

around six years at the time of trial. At the time of Chase and Diana’s separation, Chase was 

working as a ground controller at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SeaTac) and made at least 

$36 to $39 per hour. 

During the marriage, Chase owned at least three firearms. On one occasion, Chase 

accidentally discharged a firearm with QH in the same room and while Diana and TH were home. 

Chase also struggled with anger issues during the marriage. 

Chase and Diana separated in August 2021. Diana moved to Utah with the children soon 

after the separation. 

II. LITIGATION

A. Protection Orders

Immediately upon their separation, Diana filed for a domestic violence protection order. 

Diana was granted a temporary protection order upon filing.

In September 2021, Chase agreed to the entry of a final protection order. The trial court 

found that Chase “respresent[ed] a credible threat to the physical safety of” Diane and the children 

and granted the final protection order for one year. Ex. 107 at 1.
No. 57931-6-II

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In tandem with the protection order, the court also ordered Chase to surrender his firearms 

and other weapons. Chase initially surrendered only two of his three firearms. The trial court had 

to undertake a second hearing and issue a second order before Chase surrendered the remaining 

firearm. 

A year later, the trial court renewed the protection order for another year after finding that 

Chase had “not proven based on a preponderance of the evidence that there ha[d] been a substantial 

change of circumstances to cause [the] court to deny the petition for renewal.” Ex. 108 at 1.

Nothing in the record suggests that Chase agreed to the renewal of the protection order. Chase did 

not move to revise or appeal the protection order or its renewal. 

B. Temporary Parenting Plan

Meanwhile, soon after the trial court granted Diana the initial final protection order, Chase 

petitioned for divorce. 

In November 2021, as part of a temporary parenting plan, the trial court ordered Chase to 

complete a domestic violence evaluation and to follow all treatment recommendations. 

Specifically, the temporary parenting plan required that Chase start and comply with treatment as 

recommended by the domestic violence evaluation and comply with ongoing treatment with the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The trial court also appointed a GAL in December 2021. 

Chase underwent his initial evaluation in December 2021. In this evaluation, Chase 

admitted that he posted Diana’s intimate photos on a website without her acknowledgment, though 

he denied engaging in any abusive behaviors. The evaluation identified verbal, emotional, 

psychological, and physical abuse, specifically yelling at Diana, using her sexually explicit photos 
No. 57931-6-II

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online without her permission despite an active protection order, and physically harming the 

children by slapping them, as behaviors that needed to be addressed in treatment. 

This initial evaluation specifically recommended that Chase should: (1) continue his mental 

health treatment as recommended by his provider at the VA; (2) complete a level 3 domestic 

violence intervention treatment (DVIT) program for a minimum length of 52 weeks; and (3) 

complete a domestic violence victim’s impact panel. 

Because Chase was unhappy with his initial evaluation, he was evaluated again in May 

2022 by a second evaluation center.2 Chase’s second evaluation returned similar results, but it also 

indicated personality anomalies, sociopathic traits, and psychopathic traits in its mental health 

screening. Additionally, it concluded that Chase had homicidal ideation in the preceding 12 months 

and stated that his readiness to change was low due to a low level of accountability and insight 

into his own actions.3

The second evaluation recommended that Chase complete a level 3 DVIT program for a 

minimum of once weekly for 12 months and engage in individual therapy for a minimum of twice 

a month while in DVIT treatment. 

 

2 Chase has expressed that he strongly disagrees with the result of his second evaluation. 

3 The second evaluation also included far more detail and noted inconsistencies regarding Chase’s 

self-reporting. Chase stated that he was no longer taking medication to treat his mental health 

conditions and seemed to state that he was still in therapy even though he had discontinued therapy 

a few months prior. Chase also self-reported high-risk factors, including abuse of children, based 

on Chase’s response to Diana’s petition for a protection order in which Chase wrote that “he has 

slapped the children and threatened to slap them in the mouth.” Ex. 121 at 3. Finally, in Chase’s 

second evaluation, the evaluator stated that Chase failed to disclose his full legal history, including 

his charge for domestic violence and battery in Idaho. 
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Chase was later found in contempt for his delay in commencing treatment as outlined 

above. When trial started in the dissolution action, Chase had completed only 19 weeks of DVIT 

treatment.4

C. Bench Trial

Trial began in January 2023. 

Chase broadly argued that the evidence of abuse was insufficient to support the strong 

limitations in the temporary parenting plan regarding his contact with his children. He requested a 

parenting plan with 50/50 custody, suspension of the domestic violence protection order 

requirements, and an adjustment in his child support obligation to represent his current income. 

Chase also denied any accusations of abuse. In addition, Chase argued that income should not be 

imputed to him because he moved to Utah to reestablish contact with the children once he was 

permitted to do so. 

Diana argued that the permanent parenting plan should restrict Chase’s contact with the 

children to phone calls until he completed domestic violence treatment as a limitation pursuant to 

RCW 26.09.191 because there was a significant history of domestic violence. She emphasized that 

Chase delayed his required treatment and failed to disclose his second domestic violence 

evaluation. Diana expressed that Chase’s “own continued delay” in complying with his treatment 

requirements had kept him from progressing towards the next phase in the parenting plan, thereby 

preventing him from contacting the children. Verbatim Rep. or Proc. (VRP) (Jan. 31, 2023) at 11.

 

4 Chase also completed the domestic violence victim impact panel in August 2022 and was 

complying with other treatment recommendations in the fall of 2022. 
No. 57931-6-II

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Diana also requested a continuing restraining order against Chase due to his domestic 

violence against her and his continued controlling and abusive behaviors since they separated. She 

further requested that Chase be ordered to pay child support and that income be imputed to him on 

the ground that he was voluntarily underemployed. Diana additionally requested spousal support 

given the length of Chase and Diana’s marriage, the disparity in their incomes and resources, and 

her need to obtain further education.

1. Evidence at Trial

a. Chase’s Testimony and Witnesses

Chase testified as the primary witness for his case. Chase broadly denied abusing either 

Diana or their children. 

Chase testified regarding his progress in completing the requirements of the temporary 

parenting plan. He explained that he had completed 19 weeks of DVIT. And he claimed that he 

started DVIT when he did because it took time to find an office in Utah that met Washington 

standards and allowed his domestic violence class credits to transfer to Washington.5

Although Chase admitted to previously being in counseling for anger issues and stated that 

he is not currently in counseling, Chase expressed disagreement with his second domestic violence 

evaluation’s finding that he had sociopathic and psychopathic traits. Regarding his delay in 

beginning DVIT, Chase testified that he delayed because he was not ordered to begin treatment by 

 

5 According to Diana, Chase offered no proof that his DVIT provider in Utah “is equivalent to or 

following the requirements of Level 3 DVIT set out in [WAC] Chapter 388-60B.” Clerk’s Papers 

(CP) at 853-54. Diane further asserted that the classes listed on the website for Chase’s DVIT 

provider “d[id] not appear” to satisfy the requirements for level 3 DVIT. Id. at 854.
No. 57931-6-II

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a particular date and the order did not create a “ticking time” in which to complete the treatment, 

“especially since [he] was seeking a second evaluation.” Id. at 46.

Chase also testified that when he initially posted intimate photographs of Diana online,6he 

did so with Diana’s consent. But he conceded that Diana revoked consent to share her photographs 

prior to their separation. Chase also conceded that after Diana revoked her consent, he reposted 

older photographs that had already been purchased, that were already free online, or that Diana 

previously agreed to posting. 

When asked about his move from Washington to Utah and his subsequent drop in income, 

Chase testified that he moved and accepted a lower paying job because he wanted to be close to 

his children, including KH, who was planning to move in with Chase once KH turned 18. Chase 

stated that it made more sense to him to be closer to his children. Regarding his career change after 

moving to Utah, Chase expressed that he did not get a job in air traffic control because air traffic 

control jobs were “not hiring in [Utah]” when Chase moved there. Id. at 37. When asked if he 

could afford all of the financial obligations requested by Diana, Chase said he would be unable to 

because he only makes $24 per hour at his current job. 

Chase also called a former neighbor and former coworker who both expressed a positive 

view of Chase’s demeanor and interactions with children. 

 

6 During their marriage, Chase and Diana posted intimate photographs of Diana on multiple 

websites used for selling intimate photographs and videos to individuals. Chase and Diana had 

accounts on these sites that allowed them to post those photographs to an account page, manage 

subscribers, and facilitate sales of those photographs. 
No. 57931-6-II

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b. Diana’s Testimony

In contrast to Chase’s testimony, Diana’s testimony communicated a history of abuse. 

Diana testified that the day before she and Chase separated, the children told Diana that Chase had 

been hitting them in the face.7

Diana then testified regarding Chase’s severe anger issues. She stated that Chase had 

explosive rage and that it was impossible to know what would set it off. Diana recalled times where 

Chase would scream at her and be physically intimidating by not allowing her to leave the room 

or cornering her, among other things. Diana also shared that Chase would make threats and that 

there were times when Chase’s explosive temper was aimed at the children. Diana stated that 

Chase’s temper was unrestrained regardless of who was watching or where he was. 

Diana also recounted that Chase discharged a firearm in their home in the same room as 

QH.8 Diana admitted that she was very afraid that Chase was going to become physically violent, 

in part because Chase made threats of physical violence starting when Diana was pregnant with 

QH and Diana said no to a sexual request that Chase had made. Diana shared that Chase would 

randomly say things such as if Diana ever hit him, he would hit her back “ten times harder.” VRP 

(Feb. 1, 2023) at 81. However, Diana stated that Chase had never physically hit her. 

Diana further testified that Chase was coercive, especially sexually. For example, Diana 

stated that if she was not comfortable doing something sexual, Chase would threaten and 

manipulate her by telling her things such as if she refused to do what he wanted, it would be her 

 

7 Diana audio recorded QH telling her that Chase hit her and TH. 

8 QH told Diana that Chase fired the gun in front of her. Chase stated that it was a “ ‘[m]isfire.’ ” 

Ex. 119 at 5. Previously, Chase had described the incident as a “negligent discharge.” CP at 484.
No. 57931-6-II

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fault if he cheated on her. Diana testified that Chase would then badger her and make her life 

miserable until she gave in – often doing less around the house, neglecting any tasks related to the 

children, stonewalling or being mean to her, or making the house messier so that she had more to 

do with less support. 

Diana also asserted that Chase coerced her into posting intimate photos online and that she 

had first revoked consent to post her photos in May 2021. Despite her revocation, Chase continued 

to post intimate photographs of her online and admitted to doing so via text to Diana in August 

2021.9 Diana stated that since their separation in August 2021, Chase had reposted more than a 

thousand photos and videos, asked one of the websites hosting an account not to cancel their 

account, and posted new photos of Diana. 

Diana stated that since the issuance of the September 2021 final protection order, Chase’s 

behavior continued to be threatening. She testified that after she left him, Chase texted her cousin 

“threatening things” and claiming to know that Diana and the children were with her cousin. VRP

(Feb. 1, 2023) at 100-01. Diana shared that Chase also attempted to track her phone in September 

and October 2021. 

Diana stated that as soon as phone calls between Chase and the children began, Chase asked 

the children where they were.10 Additionally, Diana told the court that after the children’s 

 

9 The record contains many pages of text messages between the two regarding the intimate photos. 

Generally, the texts show that Diana told Chase she was very uncomfortable, afraid, and revolted 

by Chase’s requests to take sexual photos and videos of her and that Chase was angry and pushed 

her to continue allowing it. Other text messages include accusations of anger and Chase treating 

Diana poorly. 

10 Chase would apparently ask the children multiple questions about where they were living with 

Diana. Chase also recorded phone calls between himself and the children from October 2021 to 

August 2022, even after the trial court ordered Chase to stop recording the calls. 
No. 57931-6-II

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interviews with the GAL, Chase was “very pushy” on a phone call to find out what the children 

said to the GAL. Id. at 102. According to Diana, QH repeatedly tried to change the subject, but 

Chase would not let her. When QH finally shared that she had told the GAL that Chase had been 

hitting her, Chase said that had “ ‘never happened.’ ” Id. Diana also shared that there have been 

many phone calls where TH simply left the room because he did not want to talk with Chase. Diana 

additionally testified that Chase repeatedly told the children that it was up to Diana whether he 

could see them and that they could see him if she let them. 

Diana also testified about Chase’s relationship with his ex-wife. Diana recalled Chase’s 

calls with his ex-wife being very volatile and verbally violent. Diana shared that Chase had 

previously been charged with battery and domestic violence in Idaho due to his relationship with 

his ex-wife. Diana also stated that Chase had once left the house and then returned and told her 

that he had broken into his ex-wife’s house; stolen some things, including his ex-wife’s passport; 

and ruined his ex-wife’s wedding dress. 

In Diana’s testimony regarding Chase’s income, she referenced a text message in the record 

that Chase sent her in which he said that he was going to start “seriously” looking for jobs outside 

of Washington due to the state employee COVID-19 vaccine mandate and his perception of the 

state as too progressive and expensive. Ex. 140 at 1. In the message, Chase stated that he would 

refuse to get the vaccine and planned on working until he was fired for noncompliance. 

c. Diana’s Other Witnesses

Diana’s sisters, Melanie and Leslie, testified on Diana’s behalf. 

Melanie testified that Diana and Chase’s marriage was volatile to the point it caused Diana 

to live with her during Diana’s pregnancy with TH. Melanie also observed that Chase’s parenting 
No. 57931-6-II

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was more intense and aggressive than Diana’s. Melanie stated that Chase seemed to have a short 

temper with the children and that she saw him grab the children’s arms a couple of times. Melanie 

further testified that when Diana called her when she was separating from Chase, Diana was very 

scared, did not feel safe, and felt like things were escalating. VRP (Feb. 1, 2023) at 162.

Leslie testified that Chase’s communications with Diana felt overbearing and that Chase 

would contact Leslie and Melanie to tell them intimate details about Diana and Chase’s 

relationship. Leslie testified that later in Diana and Chase’s marriage, she heard them yelling at 

each other, and she noticed quick tempers on the part of both Diana and Chase. 

Leslie also stated that Chase frequently yelled at the children. Leslie was especially 

concerned that Chase did not seem to care if the children wore seatbelts in the car. In addition, 

Leslie stated that after Diana and Chase’s separation, QH seemed more nervous around men. 

d. Exhibits

In addition to the testimony, Diana presented several exhibits, including the GAL report, a 

letter from the children’s counselor, and other documents, that were admitted at trial without 

objection. Chase did not present any exhibits. 

i. The GAL Report 

The October 2022 GAL report submitted to the court addressed: (1) issues related to 

making a parenting plan for the children, (2) Chase’s domestic violence, and (3) Chase’s mental 

health. As part of the investigation, the GAL interviewed Chase, Diana, and the children, and she 

reviewed a number of documents. 

The children individually told the GAL that they were afraid of Chase and concerned about 

seeing him. As part of the investigation, the GAL had a telephone call with the children’s 
No. 57931-6-II

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counselor, Johnathan Colbey Strong. In addition to providing the same information he provided in 

a letter to the court, Strong shared with the GAL that reunification between Chase and the children 

was appropriate but that the children would need to be prepared for reunification if the court 

ordered reunification. 

In the GAL’s assessment, she stated that both parents were actively involved in the care of 

the children. The GAL also noted that Chase planned to move closer to the children to spend time 

with them in the future when he was allowed visitation. The GAL discussed Chase’s treatment up 

to that point, noting that his DVIT providers described him as “dedicated, [having] good 

attendance, participation, attitude, and completion of assignments.” Ex. 119 at 11.11

The GAL ultimately recommended that Diana maintain primary custody of the children. 

The GAL also recommended three phases for reunification and parental visitation, starting with 

supervised two-hour visits up to twice a week parallel to reunification counseling for Chase and 

the children. In the second phase, the visitation would transition to day visits after three months of 

reunification counseling. And finally, the visitation would transition to every-other-weekend visits 

after three months of day visits with continued reunification counseling. The GAL additionally 

recommended that the protection order be modified to include third party visitation, that Chase 

continue and complete DVIT, and that Chase and Diana enter co-parenting counseling once the 

protection order was lifted. 

 

11 At the time, Chase was complying with treatment recommendations and was enrolled in 

domestic violence treatment at Assessment, Counseling, and Education Services, Inc. in Utah. 
No. 57931-6-II

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ii. Letter from the Children’s Counselor

The children began receiving mental health treatment with Strong in May 2022. As part of 

the dissolution proceedings, Strong wrote a letter, providing some details shared by the children 

during counseling. The letter noted that during their appointments, both children shared, 

“unprompted” “fear and trauma” regarding what happened with Chase. Ex. 143 at 1. Strong stated 

that what the children expressed would “be classified as emotional and physical abuse” by Chase. 

Id.

Strong wrote that the children told him about experiences of abuse where Chase “hit” or 

“slapped” or “yelled at” and “degraded” them. Id. Strong also noted that the children each 

expressed fear regarding those instances of abuse. Strong stated that the “effects” of abuse on the 

children were perceptible, that they were “still struggling” with those effects, and that those effects 

had caused “difficult interruptions to their daily life.” Id. As an example, QH informed Strong that 

she “felt nervous” around men and that she was “scared and concerned for her life” because she 

feared that another person might behave “like [Chase]” and “shoot a gun at her.” Id.

iii. Other Exhibits

Diana proffered several additional exhibits relevant to Chase’s anger issues. One exhibit 

included an image of a list of symptoms written by Chase prior to attending his first VA 
No. 57931-6-II

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appointment. The list included: “angry all the time – unprovoked,” “marriage issues,” and 

“extreme lack of empathy.” Ex. 125 at 1.

12

Another exhibit included screenshots of texts between Chase and a friend. In one message, 

Chase said that he “used to try and pick fights with people” in an attempt to feel what he felt in 

combat. Ex. 138 at 2. In another message, Chase said he was “always angry. . . always.” Id. at 3.

Finally, Chase later messaged that not killing enemies overseas during combat was made “more 

upsetting” because he “had more enemies back home that it was never legal to kill.” Id. at 5.

Diana also offered exhibits showing Chase’s digital tracking and controlling of her 

electronic accounts. One exhibit included text messages received by Diana indicating that Chase’s 

phone number signed up for a service to track and locate her phone after their separation. Another 

exhibit included screenshots of account recovery of the email address used for one of Chase and 

Diana’s online accounts that showed that the password, account recovery email, and account 

recovery phone number had been changed so that Chase could access the account after their 

separation. 

Regarding their online accounts, Diana provided exhibits that included emails to one of the 

websites from September 2021, requesting that the account be re-registered with a different email 

and that the account not be deleted. Additionally, Diana provided exhibits that included 

 

12 Chase testified that this list was a “handwritten list of an advise list by VA . . . help websites to 

make sure [veterans] are getting the most out of [their] VA disability. It does not necessarily mean 

I have all of them or agree with all of them.” VRP (Jan. 31, 2023) at 44. In contrast, Diana testified 

that the list was a list of Chase’s actual symptoms for his June 2021 counseling appointment at the 

VA. She explained that “[p]rior to [Chase’s] appointment he was told to make a list of his 

symptoms, not hypothetical symptoms. These were not suggestions. [Chase] was told to make a 

complete list of everything that he personally experienced.” VRP (Feb. 1, 2023) at 84. Diana also 

stated that all the symptoms listed were ones that she witnessed. 
No. 57931-6-II

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screenshots from one of Chase and Diana’s online accounts that showed posts from September 

2021, including photographs of Diana’s face and personal, non-intimate images, in addition to 

more sensitive photographs. 

2. Final Parenting Plan

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the trial court found that Chase 

had (1) physically and emotionally abused or threatened to abuse a child, (2) a history of domestic 

violence, (3) “a long-term emotional or physical problem that gets in the way of his ability to 

parent,” and (4) engaged in abusive use of conflict in a manner that could cause serious damage to 

the psychological development of the children. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1063. Accordingly, the trial 

court concluded that RCW 26.09.191 limitations must be imposed. 

In its oral ruling, the trial court specifically found that Chase had subjected Diana to 

“continuous threats of physical assault, sexual assault, and a pattern of emotional abuse.” VRP 

(Feb. 13, 2023) at 214. The trial court stated that the evidence was “overwhelming” on the issue 

of domestic violence. Id.

As a result, the trial court found that a parenting plan that included phased-in time for Chase 

with the children was in their best interests. The trial court ordered a seven-phase parenting plan 

with limitations on Chase. In addition to the seven-phase plan, the trial court subjected Chase to 

additional counseling and treatment requirements. As a result of the limitations, Diana has the sole 

decision-making authority under the parenting plan.
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3. Restraining Order 

The trial court granted Diana’s request for a restraining order, finding that she had a 

“reasonable fear” and that “ongoing protection” was needed. CP at 1098. The restraining order 

stated that it expired on December 31, 2033, over 10 years and 10 months after it was issued. 

4. Child Support

Regarding the child support calculation, the trial court found that (1) Chase was voluntarily 

underemployed because he willingly left his employment in Washington for a lower paying job in

Utah, and (2) he did so to reduce the amount of child support. Based on these findings the trial 

court imputed income to Chase and calculated his child support obligation using the imputed 

income. 

5. Spousal Maintenance

When considering spousal maintenance, the trial court considered the fact that Diana 

moved frequently throughout the marriage in order to accommodate and support Chase’s career. 

The court stated that Diana had “less earning capacity” at the time of trial and that there was “great 

need” for spousal maintenance. VRP (Feb. 13, 2023) at 218-19.

The court further stated that although it was not permitted to consider fault, under In re 

Marriage of Foran, 67 Wn. App. 242, 834 P.2d 1081 (1992), it could consider “a history of 

domestic violence limiting the wife’s ability to work due to a long-term abuse.” Id. at 219. The 

court found that Diana had “a need for support,” and Chase had “the ability to pay.” CP at 1097.

The trial court awarded maintenance to Diana for four years. 
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At the conclusion of trial, the court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law 

and entered a final child support order, parenting plan, restraining order, and dissolution decree.13

Chase appeals the parenting plan, the restraining order, the child support order, and the 

spousal maintenance order.

ANALYSIS

Chase argues that the trial court erred when it (1) imposed limitations on his contact with 

his children under RCW 26.09.191, (2) granted the restraining order based on findings of sexual, 

physical, and emotional abuse that were not supported by the record, (3) imputed income to Chase 

when the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was purposely underemployed to reduce 

his child support income, and (4) considered Chase’s history of domestic violence as a factor in 

ordering Chase to pay spousal support. These arguments fail.

I. LIMITATIONS ON CHASE IN THE FINAL PARENTING PLAN14

Chase argues that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting his parenting time with 

the children in the final parenting plan because substantial evidence did not support its finding of 

 

13 The trial court re-issued the final divorce order two days after trial due to a scrivener’s error. 

14 Chase also raises an additional issue regarding the parenting plan – that “[t]he trial court’s 

parenting plan was not specific as to the number of phone calls per week, thereby improperly 

limiting and effectively eliminating Chase’s contact with the children under phase one,” contrary 

to the language in the order stating that he “ ‘shall’ ” have phone contact with the children. Br. of 

Appellant at 33-34 (boldface omitted). The order provides, “Chase Hornaday shall have telephone 

contact with the children up to three times per week, if the children’s counselors approve the calls. 

Calls should be up to 10-15 minutes per call. The children will initiate the calls to Chase Hornaday. 

The children may terminate the calls earlier if uncomfortable.” CP at 1064.

Because the order states that it is up to the children to initiate up to three the calls per week 

and gives the children the option to end the calls at their discretion, the order, read in its entirety, 

gives the children the discretion to be involved in the calls and, contrary to Chase’s assertions, 

does not mandate telephone contact. Accordingly, this argument fails.
No. 57931-6-II

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domestic violence under RCW 26.09.191(2).15 Specifically, Chase contends that the trial court’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect insufficient consideration of RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) 

and RCW 26.09.191(3)(b), statutory provisions he contends the trial court is required to consider 

before imposing RCW 26.09.191 limitations. Chase also argues that the trial court should not have 

relied on past protection orders and that it should have given more weight to the GAL’s 

recommendations and to Chase’s evidence. These arguments fail.

A. Legal Principles

We review a trial court’s parenting plan for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Black, 

188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds or reasons, or the trial court misapplies the 

law. Id. A trial court’s decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons if the factual findings are 

not supported by the record or if the facts do not meet the requirements of the applicable standard. 

In re Parenting & Support of L.H., 198 Wn. App. 190, 194, 391 P.3d 490 (2016).

We determine whether a trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 

Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. Substantial evidence is that which would persuade a fair minded and

rational person of the truth of a stated premise. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 

850 P.2d 527 (1993). We do not, however, reweigh the evidence to determine if we would reach a

 

15 To the extent Chase may also be attempting to argue that the trial court failed to make findings 

on the seven factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a), this argument fails because the trial 

court was not required to make such findings once it limited Chase’s contact under RCW 

26.09.191. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) (“Where the limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive 

of the child’s residential schedule, the court shall consider [the seven enumerated] factors.” 

(Emphasis added.)).
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different conclusion from the trial court. In re Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 561, 

359 P.3d 811 (2015).

Trial courts have broad discretion in developing parenting plans. In re Marriage of Katare, 

175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). They must, however, wield this discretion in the best 

interest of the children and, in most instances, only after considering the factors identified in RCW 

26.09.187(3). In re Parentage of J.H., 112 Wn. App. 486, 492-93, 49 P.3d 154 (2002). RCW 

26.09.187(3) establishes seven factors that the trial court must generally consider when making 

residential provisions for each child. But trial courts are also restrained by RCW 26.09.191, which 

mandates restrictions in permanent parenting plans in specific cases and permits restrictions under 

other circumstances.

Relevant here, under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(ii) and (iii), a parent’s residential time with the 

children shall be limited when the parent has engaged in the “physical, sexual, or a pattern of 

emotional abuse of a child” or the parent has “a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in 

RCW 7.105.010.” But an exception to this mandatory provision exists under RCW 

26.09.191(2)(n), which provides that the court may waive the mandatory limitations upon making 

certain express findings regarding lack of harm to the child.16

Additionally, RCW 26.09.191(3)(b) gives the trial court the discretion to limit or preclude 

any provision of the parenting plan when a parent has a “long-term emotional or physical 

impairment which interferes with the parent’s performance of parenting functions as defined in 

RCW 26.09.004.”

 

16 We set out this statute in more detail below.
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B. Application

Chase argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s decision to impose 

restrictions against him in the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.191(1) and (2)(a). This is so, Chase 

argues, because (1) the trial court did not make any findings under RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) or RCW 

26.09.191(3)(b); (2) the trial court improperly relied on the past domestic violence orders because 

they were stipulated orders and he was coerced into stipulating and the past domestic violence 

orders were based on “vague allegations” by Diana that were either not credible or did not “rise to 

the level of ‘domestic violence’ under RCW 7.105.010(9)(a) and (b);” and (3) the trial court should 

have given greater weight to the recommendation of the GAL and to his own evidence. Br. of 

Appellant at 30-31. These arguments fail.

1. RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) and (3)(b)

Chase cites no authority for his contention that the trial court must make affirmative 

findings under RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) or (3)(b) as a precondition to imposing restrictions in a 

parenting plan under RCW 26.09.191(1) or (2)(a). Under RCW 26.09.191(2)(n), a trial court, 

having made factual findings that would ordinarily mandate the imposition of restrictions on a 

parent under RCW 26.09.191(1) and (2)(a), may waive those mandatory restrictions under certain 
No. 57931-6-II

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conditions if it makes express findings that demonstrate a lack of risk to the child.17 But there is 

nothing in the text of RCW 26.09.191 that requires affirmative findings by the trial court to the 

effect that a parent in fact poses the dangers listed in (2)(n) before a trial court is permitted to 

impose restrictions on a parent under RCW 26.09.191(2). Nor does Chase cite any cases in support 

of this contention.18

And although pursuant to RCW 26.09.191(3)(b), the trial court may preclude or limit any 

provision of the parenting plan if it finds that the parent has “[a] long-term emotional or physical 

impairment which interferes with the parent’s performance of parenting functions as defined in 

RCW 26.09.004,” there is nothing in the text of RCW 26.09.191 that requires a trial court to make 

a finding under (3)(b) before it is permitted to impose restrictions on a parent under RCW 

26.09.191(1) or (2)(a). Nor, again, does Chase cite any cases in support of this contention. 

 

17 Specifically, RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) provides:

If the court expressly finds based on the evidence that contact between the parent 

and the child will not cause physical, sexual, or emotional abuse or harm to the 

child and that the probability that the parent’s or other person’s harmful or abusive 

conduct will recur is so remote that it would not be in the child’s best interests to 

apply the limitations of (a), (b), and (m)(i) and (iv) of this subsection, or if the court 

expressly finds that the parent’s conduct did not have an impact on the child, then 

the court need not apply the limitations of (a), (b), and (m)(i) and (iv) of this 

subsection. The weight given to the existence of a protection order issued under 

chapter 7.105 RCW or former chapter 26.50 RCW as to domestic violence is within 

the discretion of the court. This subsection shall not apply when (c), (d), (e), (f), 

(g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m)(ii) of this subsection apply.

18 We note that Chase relies on the unpublished case In re Marriage of Gitre, No. 54806-2-II, slip 

op. (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2022) (unpublished), 

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2054806-2-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. 

But, unlike here, in Gitre the trial court assigned a parent who would otherwise be subject to 

limitations under RCW 26.09.191 as the primary custodian for the children, so findings were 

clearly required under RCW 26.09.191(2)(n). Gitre, No. 54806-2-II, slip op. at 20.
No. 57931-6-II

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2. Reliance on Past Protection Orders

With regard to Chase’s argument that the trial court improperly relied on past domestic 

violence orders because he was coerced into agreeing to the entry of these orders, Chase does not 

direct us to any evidence supporting his assertion that he was coerced into agreeing to the entry of 

the initial final protection order. And the record does not show that Chase agreed to the entry of 

the renewed protection order. 

Regarding Chase’s argument that the trial court improperly relied on the past domestic 

violence orders because they were based solely on Diana’s vague allegations that did not rise to 

the level of domestic violence under RCW 7.105.010(9)(a) and (b), Chase stipulated to the entry 

of the September 2021 order and cannot now challenge the factual basis for that order. And with 

regard to the renewed protection order, the court renewed the September 2021 order because Chase 

failed to prove any substantial change in circumstances, not based on any allegations by Diana, so 

Chase’s assertion that the trial court relied on Diana’s allegations has no basis. 

Accordingly, Chase does not demonstrate that the trial court improperly relied on the prior 

protection orders when determining whether to impose the restrictions under RCW 

26.09.191(2)(a).

3. GAL Report and Chase’s Evidence

Finally, regarding Chase’s contention that the trial court should have given more weight to 

the GAL report and to Chase’s evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or make credibility 

determinations. McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 561. These determinations are solely within the 

purview of the trial court. Id.
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Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of domestic violence and its 

imposition of restrictions on Chase pursuant to RCW 26.09.191(2)(a). Diana’s testimony 

illustrated a history of abuse that was corroborated in part by testimony from her sisters, as well 

as the GAL report. Additionally, multiple exhibits, as well as Diana’s and Chase’s testimonies,

demonstrated that Chase continually violated Diana’s protection order by attempting to track her 

location and initially failing to surrender all of his firearms, among other things.19 And none of 

Chase’s arguments establish that the trial court erred. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in limiting Chase’s parenting time in the final parenting plan. 

II. RESTRAINING ORDER

Chase next argues that the trial court erred in granting the restraining order for many of the 

same reasons that the trial court erred in placing restrictions on Chase’s parenting time. He argues 

that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings of sexual, physical, and 

emotional abuse.20 Chase contends that Diana’s testimony and exhibits regarding Chase’s abuse 

are broad assertions about alleged harm, unsupported by substantial factual evidence, and therefore 

do not justify the restraining order. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

In a dissolution decree, the trial court shall make provisions for any necessary continuing 

restraining orders. RCW 26.09.050(1). We review a trial court’s decision to enter a restraining 

 

19 To support his argument, Chase relies on State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 27 P.3d 1246 

(2001). But Ancira is inapposite because it is a criminal case and the “extreme degree of 

interference with fundamental parental rights” referred to a complete bar against the father’s 

contact with his children is not at issue here. 107 Wn. App. at 654.

20 He again cites Ancira, which does not apply for the same reasons discussed previously. 
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order for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Kowalewski, 163 Wn.2d 542, 553, 182 P.3d 

959 (2008).

B. Application

Substantial evidence of a history of domestic violence, including evidence that the 

offending partner fantasized about killing the other, is sufficient to support the imposition of a 

restraining order. E.g., In re Marriage of Mishko, 23 Wn. App. 2d 571, 578, 519 P.3d 240 (2022).

Here, there is substantial evidence to support the imposition of a restraining order. Diana’s 

testimony alone substantially supported a finding of domestic violence. And it was further 

corroborated by the breadth of exhibits and the testimony of others, including Chase. As such, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Diana a 10-year restraining order against Chase. 

III. CHILD SUPPORT ORDER

Chase also argues that the trial court erred by improperly imputing income to him because 

its finding that Chase was intentionally trying to lower his income to reduce his child support 

payments was not supported by substantial evidence. Chase asserts that the evidence showed that 

he left his job and moved to be closer to the children so he could exercise parenting time with them 

once he was allowed contact, not to purposefully lower his income. Chase argues that “[t]he fact 

that [he] has not been able to replace the income he had in Washington should not be held against 

him when his perfectly valid reason for leaving was the support of his children, not to harm them 

by providing less support.” Br. of Appellant at 39. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

We review a trial court’s decision regarding child support for abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Pollard, 99 Wn. App. 48, 52, 991 P.2d 1201 (2000). For the purposes of child support, 
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trial courts “shall impute income to a parent when the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 

voluntarily underemployed.” RCW 26.19.071(6). The court determines whether a parent is 

voluntarily unemployed or underemployed by considering multiple factors. Id. But the court “shall 

not impute income to a parent who is gainfully employed on a full-time basis, unless the court 

finds that the parent is voluntarily underemployed and finds that the parent is purposely 

underemployed to reduce the parent’s child support obligation.” Id. (emphasis added).

Pollard provides a two-step analysis consistent with RCW 26.19.071(6) for trial courts to 

apply when considering whether to impute income to a parent. 99 Wn. App. at 52-53. First, the 

trial court must consider whether the parent is voluntarily underemployed based on the factors 

outlined in RCW 26.19.071(6). Id. Then, if the court determines that the parent is “ ‘gainfully 

employed on a full-time basis’ ” but also underemployed, the court must further determine whether 

the parent is “purposely underemployed to reduce his [ ] support obligation.” Id. at 53 (emphasis 

added) (quoting RCW 26.19.071(6)).

B. Application

Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Chase was purposefully 

underemployed in order to reduce his child support obligation. Chase’s testimony on his 

qualifications was sufficient to show that he could have obtained higher paying employment, 

including at a Utah airport – Chase specifically testified that he was a ground controller at SeaTac, 

an FAA airport, and was qualified to work as an air traffic controller at “thousands of federal 

contract airports, Department of Defense airports, and local communal airports.” VRP (Feb. 1, 

2023) at 193. He also testified that he left his $36 per hour job at SeaTac for a lower paying job in 

a factory in Utah in order to be closer to his children. But there was also evidence that Chase 
No. 57931-6-II

27

intended to fail to comply with the Washington COVID vaccine mandate, get fired, and leave the 

state because he perceived Washington as being too progressive and expensive. 

It was within the trial court’s discretion to infer that Chase’s testimony regarding his reason 

for moving was not credible, particularly because Chase had expressed other reasons for leaving 

Washington and he would not have been able to see the children in the near future and he was not 

taking the court-ordered steps that would allow him to see them sooner. Therefore, we conclude 

that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings underlying its decision to impute his 

income. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to Chase. 

IV. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

Finally, Chase argues that the trial court erred by considering evidence of domestic 

violence when determining whether Diana was entitled to spousal support. He contends that the 

trial court’s reliance on Foran as support for its finding that the alleged abuse in this case warranted 

a spousal support award is misplaced because there is no evidence that any abuse impacted Diana’s 

ability to further her education or work. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

In a dissolution proceeding, trial courts may grant spousal support. RCW 26.09.090(1).

The support amount “shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems 

just, without regard to misconduct,” after the court considers all relevant factors including but not 

limited to the parties’ financial resources and obligations; the time needed to acquire training or 

education sufficient to fine appropriate employment; the standard of living during the marriage; 

the duration of the marriage; and the party seeking support’s age and physical and emotional 

condition. RCW 26.09.090. Although the trial court cannot consider fault, it may consider 
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evidence of the effect of domestic violence with respect to the circumstances surrounding a 

spouse’s need for spousal support. Foran, 67 Wn. App. at 259.

We review a trial court’s ruling concerning a spousal support award for abuse of discretion. 

In re Marriage of Zahm, 138 Wn.2d 213, 226-27, 978 P.2d 498 (1999). “Nothing in RCW 

26.09.090 requires the trial court to make specific factual findings on each of the factors listed in 

RCW 26.09.090(1).” In re Marriage of Mansour, 126 Wn. App. 1, 16, 106 P.3d 768 (2004). But 

it is an abuse of discretion when an award of spousal support does not evidence a fair consideration 

of the statutory factors. In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 349, 28 P.3d 769 (2001).

B. Application

Here, the trial court considered Diana’s history of moving to accommodate and support 

Chase’s career, Diana’s earning capacity, Diana’s need for support, the credibility of Chase’s 

testimony, Chase’s ability to work, and the disparity in Chase’s and Diana’s respective incomes. 

Regarding its consideration of the history of domestic violence, the court specifically stated that it 

was not considering that factor as evidence of fault. Rather, it was considering the effect of the 

abuse on Diane’s ability to work as permitted under Foran. 

The trial court considered multiple factors other than domestic violence in awarding 

spousal support, as required under RCW 26.09.090. Regarding its consideration of domestic 

violence, the trial court made clear that it was considering the history of domestic violence only in 

the context of how domestic violence limited Diana’s ability to work, as permitted under Foran. 

As mentioned by Diana, it is presumed that trial court knows the rules of evidence and that it 

considered only the evidence properly before it and only for proper purposes.
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Chase contends that the trial court could not consider the past abuse because, unlike in 

Foran, in which the wife suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, there was no evidence that 

the “abuse was such that it had prevented or is currently preventing Diana from supporting herself 

as she is currently working and attending school.” Br. of Appellant at 40. But Diana testified that 

during the marriage she had to shield the children from Chase’s explosive anger when he was 

present and that Chase engaged in coercive control that resulted in Diana being responsible for all 

home care. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to determine that this form of abusive 

behavior limited Diana’s ability to pursue additional education or to obtain employment 

experience during the marriage and was therefore relevant to whether she was entitled to support.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the history of 

domestic violence as permitted under Foran and awarding spousal support to Diana.

V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Diana requests attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.1 and RCW 26.09.140. 

We have the authority to award fees if requested under RAP 18.1(a). For the purposes of 

attorney fees in dissolution proceedings, RCW 26.09.140 provides that we may order a party to 

pay a reasonable amount to the other party for the cost of maintaining or defending any proceedings 

under chapter 26.09 RCW after considering the financial resources of both parties. When 

consideration of the financial resources of the parties regarding an award of attorney fees is 

required, each party is required to file a financial affidavit no later than 10 days prior to the date 

the case is set for consideration on the merits. RAP 18.1(c).
No. 57931-6-II

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This case was set for June 17, 2024. Diana filed her financial affidavit on June 10, less than 

10 days prior to the hearing date. Chase did not file a financial affidavit, nor did he move to strike 

Diana’s financial affidavit as untimely.

Because Chase has not objected to Diana’s untimely financial affidavit and we may waive 

time restrictions under RAP 18.8(a) and RAP 1.2(a), we will consider Diana’s request for fees and 

costs despite the late filing of her financial affidavit because the purpose of the rule has been 

satisfied. Diana’s financial affidavit demonstrates financial need. And Chase does not establish 

that he is unable to pay or challenge Diana’s financial affidavit. Accordingly, we grant Diana’s 

request for fees and costs upon her compliance with RAP 18.1(d).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s final parenting plan, restraining order, child support award, and 

spousal support. Additionally, we grant Diana’s request for fees and costs.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

CRUSER, C.J.

We concur:

LEE, J.

PRICE, J.