COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

REBECCA BRADDOCK 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2293-96-4 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 

FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

 OF FAMILY SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Leslie M. Alden, Judge 

 (Herman M. Sawyer, Jr., on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Dennis R. 

Bates, Senior Assistant County Attorney; 

Louise M. DiMatteo, Assistant County 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 (Marlene M. Hahn; Sandra L. Havrilak; Hicks & 

Havrilack, on brief), Guardian ad litem of 

the subject child, an infant. 

 Rebecca Braddock appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her youngest child. 

Braddock contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that 

the Fairfax County Department of Family Services (Department) 

presented clear and convincing evidence meeting the statutory 

requirement for terminating her parental rights; and (2) denying 

Braddock's request for a continuance. Upon reviewing the record 

and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "[T]he termination of residual parental rights is a grave, 

drastic and irreversible action." Helen W. v. Fairfax County 

Dep't of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 

(1991). "When addressing matters concerning a child, including 

the termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the 

paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best 

interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. 

App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests," and the 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Id. (citations omitted). On review, "[a] trial court is presumed 

to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the 

statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the 

child's best interests." Id. We view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Department as the party prevailing below 

and its evidence is afforded all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. 

I.

 The Department became involved with Braddock and her family 

in 1985 when the Department found that Braddock provided 

inadequate supervision of the two older children. Subsequently, 

the Department addressed issues of the home's physical condition 
 3 

and the children's care and supervision. In April 1993, the 

Department removed the youngest child, then three years old, from 

the home because the home was dirty to the point of being unsafe 

and because the Department continued to be concerned with 

Braddock's supervision of the children. The child was returned 

to Braddock's physical custody two months later, but removed 

again in March 1994. In September 1994, the parties stipulated 

that the child was neglected. 

 In June 1995, the Department filed its petition seeking to 

terminate Braddock's parental rights to her youngest child. In 

June 1996, the juvenile and domestic relations district court 

denied the petition, and ordered that the child be returned to 

Braddock upon completion of certain specified steps. However, 

the district court suspended its order upon evidence that the 

child's teenaged brother was charged with criminal sexual abuse 

of the child. The brother subsequently entered an Alford plea to 

the criminal charges of aggravated sexual battery and assault. 

The Department noticed its appeal of the district court's denial 

of its petition to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County on July 3, 

1996. 

 The Department sought to terminate Braddock's parental 

rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (2). The statute 

required that the Department prove, by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination was in the child's best interests and 

that 

 (1) The neglect or abuse suffered by such 
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child presented a serious and substantial 

threat to his life, health or development; 

and 

 (2) It is not reasonably likely that the 

conditions which resulted in such neglect or 

abuse can be substantially corrected or 

eliminated so as to allow the child's safe 

return to his parent . . . within a 

reasonable period of time. 

Id. The circuit court found that the Department established by 

clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests 

of the child to terminate Braddock's parental rights. 

 The evidence presented by the Department established that 

the child was originally removed from the home due to unhealthy 

living conditions and inadequate supervision. Braddock took 

steps to improve the physical conditions in the home and the 

Department noted that Braddock had substantially satisfied that 

requirement. 

 However, during the course of the Department's involvement 

with the family, it became clear that Braddock's teenaged son had 

sexually abused the child. The son's psychological profile, 

based on testing done in 1994, noted that he was "at risk for 

sexually inappropriate behavior, particularly with younger 

children." Questions concerning possible sexual abuse of the 

child were raised at least as early as 1994, when the child 

refused to draw her brother as part of the family, then drew him 

on a separate sheet of paper, without clothes, and remarked that 

she had seen him without clothes. Subsequently, the child 

reported numerous instances of this abuse, which were 
 5 

corroborated by a physical examination. Braddock was present 

during the June 1996 juvenile court hearing when the police 

detective investigating the child abuse allegations testified 

that the son admitted inserting his fingers into the child's 

vagina on several occasions. 

 Braddock testified before the circuit court that she 

believed the foster mother prompted the child to allege sexual 

abuse to keep from losing the child. As recently as two weeks 

before the trial, Braddock opined that the outstanding issue was 

a messy house. Dr. M. Kathryne Jacobs, a clinical psychologist 

specializing in young children and families, observed Braddock's 

interaction with the child at that time. Dr. Jacobs testified 

that Braddock's reaction to the child's disclosure illustrated 

that Braddock had a character disorder that left her unable to 

handle the information concerning her son's abuse of her 

daughter. Because Braddock was emotionally unable to process 

such stressful information, she was unable to take the steps 

necessary to adequately protect the child. Dr. Jacobs noted that 

Braddock demonstrated little emotion in connection with her own 

childhood sexual abuse by a family member. 

 Contrary to Braddock's argument on appeal, her son's abusive 

behavior was not imputed to her. Rather, it was Braddock's 

demonstrated inability or reluctance to accept her own role in 

improving the family's condition and in protecting her youngest 

child from future abuse which caused the trial court to terminate 
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her parental rights. Dr. Jacobs opined that Braddock could not 

cope with the difficulties of the situation. Despite being 

cautioned by the Department regarding the possibility of sexual 

abuse by her son, Braddock did not prevent him from babysitting 

young children in her neighborhood. 

 Braddock either refused or was unable to address the 

significant issues of her inadequate supervision and the 

psychological and emotional needs of her family resulting from 

the sexual abuse of her youngest child. Despite counseling and 

substantial services provided by the Department with the goal of 

addressing these specific issues, these underlying circumstances 

were not substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the 

child's safe return. 

 Dr. Marie Majarov, the child's counselor, testified that the 

child was dealing with issues related to the sexual abuse. The 

child expressed anger, a lack of self-esteem, and a sense of 

being damaged. Dr. Majarov indicated that the child did not feel 

trusted and safe with Braddock because Braddock failed to believe 

the child's report of abuse. Continued contact with Braddock 

caused the child emotional stress as the child dealt with issues 

of loyalty. The child repeatedly indicated that she felt safe in 

her current foster home and expressed the desire to stay there 

until she grew up. 

 The trial court found that the Department proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that the child's best interests would be 
 7 

served by terminating Braddock's parental rights. This finding 

was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 
 8 

II.

 "The decision whether to grant a continuance is a matter 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Abuse of 

discretion and prejudice to the complaining party are essential 

to reversal." Venable v. Venable, 2 Va. App. 178, 181, 342 

S.E.2d 646, 648 (1986). The Department appealed the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court order returning the child to 

Braddock on July 3, 1996. Braddock sought to continue the trial 

"until the criminal proceedings against [her son] are concluded." 

 Her son was found guilty of aggravated sexual abuse and assault 

on August 23, 1996. On August 30, 1996, the trial court denied 

Braddock's motion on the ground that "§ 16.1-296 of the Virginia 

Code requires a merits hearing on the termination petition must 

be heard within 90 days of perfecting the appeal." 

 While Braddock contended that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying her motion to continue the trial, she 

failed to allege how the continuance prejudiced her. On these 

facts, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Braddock's 

motion to continue. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.