IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-2047

Filed January 13, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RODERICK JOVAN WALLS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl Traum, 

District Associate Judge. 

Roderick Walls appeals his convictions for failure to comply with the sex 

offender registry. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND 

REMANDED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli Huser Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Roderick Walls appeals his convictions for two counts of failure to comply 

with the sex offender registry, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective and the 

district court erred in sentencing. We find Wall’s has failed to prove his trial 

counsel was ineffective. However, we vacate Wall’s sentence and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings.

On August 15, 2014, Walls was charged with one count of failure to 

comply with the sex offender registry by failing to properly register, in violation of 

Iowa Code sections 692A.104 and 692A.111 (2013). Walls pleaded not guilty, 

demanded a speedy trial, and waived his right to a jury trial. On October 20, the 

State filed a motion to amend the trial information and added an additional count 

of failure to comply with the sex offender registry, which occurred on the same 

date as count one, by allegedly providing false information. The district court 

approved the amendment. 

A bench trial was held on October 24. The court found Walls guilty of both 

counts of failure to comply with the sex offender registry. On November 21, the 

court sentenced Walls to concurrent suspended two-year terms, probation, and 

$1250 in fines. Walls now appeals from his conviction and sentence. 

On appeal, Walls claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the State’s amendment to the trial information, and the district court 

erred by referencing a nonexistent plea agreement as one of the reasons for its

sentence. 
3

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. 

Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1999). “Although claims of ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel are generally preserved for postconviction-relief 

proceedings, we will consider such claims on direct appeal where the record is 

adequate.” Id. Upon our review of the record, we find it adequate to address 

Walls’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See State v. Straw, 709 

N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

requires a demonstration of both ineffective assistance and prejudice. Ledezma

v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The ineffective-assistance prong requires proof the 

attorney performed below the standard demonstrated by a reasonably competent 

attorney as compared against prevailing professional norms. Id. The prejudice 

prong requires proof that, but for the ineffective assistance, “the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

The applicant must “show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not 

altered the outcome in the case.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Walls

must prove both the “essential duty” and “prejudice” elements by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 

2012).

The State admits the amendment to the trial information was improper, 

pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8),

1

but claims Walls is unable 

 

1 Rule 2.4(8) provides: 

The court may, on motion of the state, either before or during the trial, 

order the indictment amended so as to correct errors or omissions in 
4

to show his trial attorney breached an essential duty or caused prejudice as the 

result of the proceeding would not have been different. We agree. If Walls’s

counsel had objected to the amendment and the amendment had been 

disallowed by the court, the State had ample time to file a new trial information 

adding count two. Walls cannot show “a reasonable likelihood the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We find 

Walls’s trial counsel was not ineffective. 

Walls also claims he should be re-sentenced because the district court 

listed “[t]he plea agreement of the parties” (which does not exist in the record) as 

a reason for Walls’s sentence and did not adequately list other reasons for the 

sentence imposed.

We review a sentence imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors 

at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). When the court 

imposes a sentence, it is required to “state on the record its reason for selecting 

the particular sentence.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 2.23. In State v. Thacker, our supreme 

court evaluated how a court may properly “state on the record its reasons for 

selecting the particular sentence.” 862 N.W.2d 402, 407–08 (Iowa 2015). 

While the rule requires a statement of reasons on the record, 

a “terse and succinct” statement may be sufficient, “so long as the 

brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review of the 

exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State v. 

Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). A terse and succinct 

statement is sufficient, however, only when the reasons for the 

exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the 

record before the court. See, e.g., State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 

 

matters of form or substance. Amendment is not allowed if substantial 

rights of the defendant are prejudiced by the amendment, or if a wholly 

new and different offense is charged.
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205 (Iowa 1981) (noting it was “clear from the trial court’s statement 

exactly what motivated and prompted the sentence” (emphasis 

added)). When the reasons for a particular sentence have not 

been stated on the record, however, we have vacated the sentence 

and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. See, 

e.g., State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 388–90 (Iowa 1979); 

State v. Thompson, 275 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1979).

We have rejected a boilerplate-language approach that does 

not show why a particular sentence was imposed in a particular 

case. In [State v.] Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d [302,] 304 [(Iowa 2001)], 

we considered boilerplate language in a written order that provided, 

“The court has determined that this sentence will provide 

reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied because it 

is unwarranted.” We concluded such language, standing alone, did 

not satisfy the requirement that the district court make an on-therecord statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id.

at 304–05.

Id. at 408.

Here, the district court listed the following reasons for Walls’s sentence: 

“The Plea Agreement of the parties;” “The nature and circumstances of the 

crime;” “Protection of the public from further offenses;” “Defendant’s criminal 

history, or lack thereof.” Upon our review, we are unable to determine whether 

the court exercised its discretion by listing a nonexistent plea agreement as a 

reason for its sentence and also the court’s reliance on “boilerplate-language.” 

We vacate Walls’s sentence and remand for resentencing so the district can 

satisfy the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) by 

“stat[ing] on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.” 

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED.