UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4829

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEFON DONTA ROBINSON, a/k/a Twin,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (7:11-cr-00007-FL-1)

Submitted: April 19, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013

Before KING, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lynne Louise Reid, L.L. REID LAW, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Stefon Donta Robinson appeals the ninety-month 

sentence imposed by the district court following this court’s 

remand for resentencing in light of Dorsey v. United States, 132 

S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012). On appeal, Robinson contends that the 

district court violated Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 

(2011), by considering his need for drug treatment in imposing 

his sentence and that the court’s error violated his substantial 

rights. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

In reviewing a sentence, we must ensure that the 

district court did not commit any “significant procedural 

error,” such as failing to consider the sentencing factors of 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). “[A] court’s consideration of an improper § 3553(a) 

factor is likewise erroneous.” United States v. Bennett, 698 

F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 

(2013). 

“[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of 

promoting . . . rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006); 

see Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388-91. The district court “may not 

impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to 

complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote 

rehabilitation.” Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2393. However, “[a] 

court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for 
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rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific 

treatment or training programs.” Id. at 2392. 

We review for plain error Robinson’s contention that 

the district court improperly based his sentence on an 

impermissible factor. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 

577 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review). To 

demonstrate plain error, Robinson must show that: (1) there was 

an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected 

his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

732 (1993). In the sentencing context, an error affects 

substantial rights if the defendant demonstrates “that he would 

have received a lower sentence had the error not occurred.” 

United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010); see

United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2001) (en 

banc) (stating that plain error affects substantial rights if 

defendant was subjected to sentence “longer than that to which 

he would otherwise [have been] subject”). 

Upon review, we conclude that, while the district 

court erred in noting Robinson’s need for drug treatment in 

imposing the upward variance, Robinson failed to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a 

lesser sentence had it not considered that factor. See United 

States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2011) (requiring 
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defendant to demonstrate “reasonable probability” that error 

affected outcome of proceeding). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s amended 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED