[Cite as Maxim Ents., Inc. v. Haley, 2011-Ohio-6734.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

MAXIM ENTERPRISES, INC. 

 Appellee 

 v. 

STEPHEN T. HALEY 

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee 

 and 

BAC FIELD SERVICES CORP. 

 Defendant/Cross-Apellant 

C.A. No. 25459 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CV 2008-07-5093 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 28, 2011 

 

 DICKINSON, Judge. 

INTRODUCTION 

{¶1} Stephen Haley has attempted to appeal an order of the trial court granting Bank of 

America’s motion to vacate judgment. According to Mr. Haley, Countrywide Field Services 

Corporation hired Maxim Enterprises to inspect and preserve its real properties. Maxim, in turn, 

hired subcontractors to perform the work. When Countrywide did not pay Maxim, Maxim did 

not pay the subcontractors. After some of the subcontractors assigned their rights to Mr. Haley, 

Maxim sued Mr. Haley and those subcontractors, alleging that the assignments were invalid. Mr. 

Haley subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Countrywide. Because Countrywide 

had been purchased by Bank of America, he named “Bank of America fka Countrywide Field 
2 

 

Services Corporation” in his complaint. When Bank of America did not answer, Mr. Haley 

obtained a default judgment against it. Bank of America subsequently moved to vacate the 

judgment under Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Mr. Haley did not 

name the correct entity. The trial court granted Bank of America’s motion. Mr. Haley has 

attempted to appeal, assigning as error that the trial court incorrectly granted Bank of America’s 

motion to vacate. We dismiss the attempted appeal because the trial court’s order is not 

appealable under Rule 54(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. 

JURISDICTION 

{¶2} Under the Ohio Constitution, Ohio’s courts of appeals “have such jurisdiction as 

may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the 

courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district . . . .” Ohio Const. Art. IV § 

3(B)(2). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that Article IV Section 3(B)(2) “empower[s] the 

General Assembly to alter the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.” State v. Collins, 

24 Ohio St. 2d 107, 108 (1970). The Ohio General Assembly, in Section 2501.02 of the Ohio 

Revised Code, has provided that the courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction . . . to review, 

affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the 

court of appeals within the district . . . .” See also R.C. 2505.03(A) (providing that “[e]very final 

order, judgment, or decree of a [lower] court . . . may be reviewed on appeal[.]”). “It is a basic 

principle of our system of appellate procedure that only judgments and final orders are subject to 

review.” Humphrys v. Putnam, 172 Ohio St. 456, 457 (1961). 

{¶3} Even if a trial court’s journal entry is a judgment or final order, it is not 

appealable if it does not comply with the rules prescribed by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding 

the timing of appeals. Under Article IV Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio 
3 

 

Supreme Court has authority to “prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of 

the state . . . .” Exercising that authority, the Supreme Court has prescribed the Ohio Rules of 

Civil and Appellate Procedure, which contain requirements regarding the timing of appeals. See 

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 159-60 (1977) (“Questions involving 

the joinder and separation of claims and the timing of appeals are matters of practice and 

procedure within the rule-making authority of this court . . . .”). For instance, under Rule 54(B) 

of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, “[if] more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or 

more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is 

no just reason for delay.” 

{¶4} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, if Rule 54(B) is applicable, a judgment 

must comply with it to be appealable. Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St. 

2d 184, 186 (1972). Accordingly, to determine whether a trial court’s journal entry is appealable 

in a multiple party or multiple claim case, we engage in a two-step analysis examining (1) 

whether it is a judgment or final order under Sections 2501.02 and 2505.03 of the Ohio Revised 

Code and (2) whether it complies with Rule 54(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. See 

Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St. 3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, at ¶10 (“The general rules 

regarding final appealable orders in multiparty and/or multiclaim cases involve the tandem of 

R.C. 2505.02(B) for substance and Civ.R. 54(B) for procedure.”). 

{¶5} We will focus on the second step of the analysis because, under Section 

2505.02(B)(3), “[a]n order that vacates or sets aside a judgment” is a “final order.” As noted 

previously, under Civil Rule 54(B), “[if] more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . 

. . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more 
4 

 

but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just 

reason for delay.” “In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any 

order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 

or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of 

the claims or parties . . . .” Id. 

{¶6} This case has involved numerous claims by numerous parties. Some of those 

claims have been resolved, but others have not. It is not necessary to list all of the parties and 

their claims in this opinion. We have reviewed the trial court’s order granting Bank of 

America’s motion to vacate judgment and note that it does not resolve all of the outstanding 

claims or determine that “there is no just reason for delay.” Accordingly, the order is not 

appealable under Civil Rule 54(B). Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Inc. v. Kutina, 9th Dist. 

24275, 2011-Ohio-2241, at ¶9; Milton Banking Co. v. Dulaney, 182 Ohio App. 3d 634, 2009-

Ohio-1939, at ¶8 (concluding that order granting relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(B) for 

one defendant was not appealable because it did not satisfy Civil Rule 54(B) requirements). The 

attempted appeal is dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶7} The trial court’s order does not resolve all of the outstanding claims or contain a 

determination that there is no just cause for delay. Mr. Haley’s attempted appeal is dismissed. 

Appeal dismissed. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 
5 

 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

 

 CLAIR E. DICKINSON 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P.J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY

MOORE, J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY

APPEARANCES:

JEFFREY C. MILLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

JAMES S. WERTHEIM and MONICA LEVINE LACKS, Attorneys at Law, for 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.