Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 08-1154

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

RICHARD VILLAR,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges,

and Saris, District Judge. *

Mark L. Stevens, Esq., for appellant.

Aixa Maldonado-Quiñones, Assistant United States Attorney,

with whom Michael J. Gunnison, Acting United States Attorney, was

on the brief for appellee.

November 10, 2009
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SARIS, District Judge. After a jury trial, Defendantappellant Richard Villar, a Hispanic man, was convicted of bank

robbery. Hours following his conviction, defense counsel received

an e-mail message from one of the jurors disclosing that during

deliberations another juror said, “I guess we’re profiling but they

cause all the trouble.” When defense counsel filed a motion for a

court inquiry into the validity of the verdict, the court held a

hearing in which the juror was asked only to authenticate the email. Concluding that an allegation of ethnically biased

statements within the jury room was not, as Villar argued, an

external matter open to post-verdict inquiry, the district court

held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precluded the court from

engaging in any further examination beyond the mere authentication

of the e-mail.

Appellant now challenges the conviction on the grounds that

the district court erred when it ruled that Rule 606(b) prohibited

it from taking juror testimony about ethnically biased comments

during the course of deliberations, and that the appellant was

denied the right to due process and the right to an impartial jury

in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.

While we agree with the trial court that Rule 606(b) precludes

inquiry into juror prejudice, we hold that the court has the

discretion to conduct such an inquiry under the Sixth Amendment and

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
 Joshua Gagnon and Dedra Scott, the Appellant’s co- 1

conspirators, pleaded guilty to the charges prior to Appellant’s

trial.

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Accordingly, the Court reverses the district court’s order denying

appellant’s motion to make an inquiry into the validity of the

verdict, and remands to the trial court. Appellant also argues

that the District Court incorrectly applied the four-level

enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual §

2B3.1(b)(2)(D), an argument that we find has no merit.

BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2006, Richard Villar was indicted on charges of

conspiring with Joshua Gagnon and Dedra Scott to commit bank

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(a), and

committing a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).

Trial commenced on August 21, 2007. During jury selection, neither

party requested the court to ask the potential jurors voir dire

questions regarding bias based upon race or ethnicity.

1. Evidence Introduced at Trial

At trial, the government introduced testimony from fifteen

witnesses, including Dedra Scott, Villar’s girlfriend and coconspirator, and Shauna Harrington, Gagnon’s girlfriend. Neither 1

of the bank tellers who testified could positively identify the

Appellant as one of the men who robbed the bank. Based on this

evidence, particularly the testimony of Dedra Scott and Shauna

Harrington, the jury could reasonably find the following facts. 
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On April 18, 2006, a teller at St. Mary’s bank in Hudson, New

Hampshire, was returning from her lunch break when a man wearing a

hooded sweatshirt and a ski mask jumped over the nearby chain link

fence, stuck something against her side, and told her to get inside

the bank. The man had a “Hispanic accent.” He told the teller to

remain quiet and no one would get hurt. Eventually, the teller saw

that the man was holding a gun. Once inside the bank, the teller

saw that her assailant was not alone. Another man, who was white,

was asking tellers to place money inside a bag. The Hispanic

robber holding the gun pointed it at another teller who was hiding

underneath her desk and told her to stand in the middle of the bank

lobby. Later, he told the two tellers to get down on their knees

before both men fled the bank. The two men stole a total of

$17,429. 

According to Shauna Harrington’s testimony, planning for the

robbery began a few days prior to April 18, 2006. While they were

getting high on drugs, Villar suggested to Scott, Gagnon, and

Harrington that they all rob a bank. The four shared an apartment

at the time in Nashua, New Hampshire. According to Harrington,

Scott and Gagnon seemed interested in the idea. In addition, two

or three days before the robbery, Villar showed Harrington two BB

guns: one black and the other silver and black. Responding to

Villar’s inquiry, Harrington told him that the black one looked

more realistic.
- 5 -

On the morning of the robbery, one of Dedra Scott’s friends

asked her to go to Patrick Kagwa’s home because he was suffering

from a prolonged diabetic seizure. When she found Kagwa

unconscious and comatose, she called 911. Scott then followed the

ambulance in Kagwa’s light blue minivan. After learning that Kagwa

had suffered permanent brain damage and would not wake up, Scott

left the hospital and returned to the apartment she shared with

Villar, Gagnon, and Harrington. At that time, Villar asked Scott

to use Kagwa’s minivan to drive him to Villar’s brother’s house.

When they drove by St. Mary’s Bank, Villar asked Scott to turn

around and pick Gagnon up from the apartment. After they had done

so, the three returned to the bank, where Villar told Scott to

drive around the building to verify whether it had a second exit.

Villar instructed Scott where to turn, and then he and Gagnon

exited the vehicle.

Scott eventually picked Gagnon and Villar up near a stop sign

a few blocks away from the bank. As they drove away, Scott saw a

police cruiser with its lights on driving in the opposite

direction. When they stopped at a gas station, Gagnon threw a bag

of money on the front seat. Villar opened the bag and showed Scott

all of the money. Scott became upset because the police knew that

she had Kagwa’s minivan. She told Gagnon and Villar that she would

drop them off in Lowell, Massachusetts, but Villar burned her with

a cigarette, telling her that she was “not going anywhere.” Once
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they arrived at Villar’s brother’s home, they all counted the

stolen money. Villar told Scott that she would receive $3,000.

When they returned to their shared apartment, Scott told

Harrington, “We just robbed an F-ing bank.” Villar then threw

Harrington a backpack containing thousands of dollars. Gagnon gave

her $1,000, which Harrington claimed she immediately returned to

him. Later, Villar told Harrington that during the robbery, he had

done all of the talking and that he had carried a gun. That night,

a few hours after the robbery was committed, Villar, Scott, Gagnon,

and Harrington went to a hotel in Manchester, New Hampshire. While

there, they counted the money again, and Gagnon and Villar each

took $7,000. They spent the evening at the hotel getting high.

Police recovered the ski mask and the weapon used during the

robbery in a wooded area near St. Mary’s Bank. Eyewitnesses Rino

Giordano and Melissa Nichols separately observed two men acting

suspiciously around the time of the robbery in the vicinity of St.

Mary’s Bank. They both described one of the subjects as Hispanic

and as being shorter than his companion. A third eyewitness,

Michael Febonio, saw two men acting suspiciously and described one

as having darker skin than the other. Nichols also described the

getaway vehicle as a light blue minivan.

The defense attacked the credibility of two of the

government’s key witnesses, Shauna Harrington and Dedra Scott,

based on their drug use, criminal histories, prior lies and
Some of the details provided by these witnesses were 2

corroborated by lay witnesses who saw the robbers and the getaway

vehicle.

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inconsistent statements. In addition, Dedra Scott was impeached 2

as a cooperating witness. Appellant pointed out the government’s

lack of physical evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA, implicating

him in the robbery. Finally, defense counsel argued that the

testimony of one bank teller, along with a surveillance photograph

taken during the robbery, indicated that the Hispanic robber was

taller than Mr. Gagnon. Appellant noted that Villar is, in fact,

shorter than Gagnon. Appellant also introduced alibi witnesses.

2. Postverdict Juror Inquiry

Appellant was convicted on both counts on August 24, 2007

after a jury trial. Hours after the verdict was delivered, defense

counsel returned to his office and received an e-mail entitled

“Juror No. 66.” In the e-mail, the juror stated:

I felt compelled to send this to you. I don’t know if I

should even be doing this but I don’t care. I know it’s

late but I want you to know that there were at least 3

people on that jury who actually listened to the

testimony with an open mind. We tried to make the rest

pay attention. We made them go through every piece of

evidence and every witness. Between us we pointed out

every discr[e]p[a]ncy. They made up some story to

explain it away. I want you to know that I will go to

jail before I ever serve on another jury. It was awful.

I’m sorry we couldn’t do anything. We finally decided to

not prolong that young man’s hope any longer. We could

have stayed there for another week. Their minds were

made up from the first day. Here’s one example, A man

said “I guess we’re profiling but they cause all the

trouble.” Well I won’t keep you longer. Again I am

sorry we couldn’t do more. You know if I thought he
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would have gotten a different kind of jury the next time

I think [I] would have kept them there. These people are

the salt of the earth and there is no gray in their

lives. I really hope they never get into the scales of

blind justice because she isn’t. God bless you and Mary

keep you safe.

(Appellee’s Br. App. at 1 (emphasis added).) On August 27, 2007,

defense counsel moved to set aside the jury’s verdict, arguing that

there was the possibility of bias and prejudice on the part of at

least one juror based upon Villar’s Hispanic ethnicity. The court

subsequently summoned the juror who contacted defense counsel to

appear at a special hearing on August 28, 2007 to inquire about the

e-mail.

With respect to the motion to set aside the verdict, the trial

court stated: 

I don’t believe that [United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d

16 (1st Cir. 2003)] or [Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.

107 (1987)] give me the authority if I choose to because

I, for example, attach – I personally believe that ethnic

bias is so reprehensible in the deliberative process and

so damaging and dangerous, that if it were up to me, if

I had a hint of juror bias based on a statement from one

juror that another juror made a comment which could

reflect racial bias, if I were balancing the

constitutional interests versus the interests that

underlie the rule, I might balance that interest

differently. But it’s not up to me. If you think it is,

let me know. I don’t believe I’m free to inquire simply

because I attach relatively greater weight to the Sixth

Amendment interest in a fair trial free from ethnic bias

than does the Supreme Court or the drafters of the rule.

He concluded that based on the evidence he had available, Rule

606(b) did not give him “discretion to act.” He also noted that

his “instinct as a trial judge” was to develop the record
 On appeal he has recast the constitutional right as arising 3

under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well.

- 9 -

immediately “rather than waiting 18 months to do it.” Defense

counsel argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, racial bias 3

constitutes an exception to Rule 606(b). However, there was no

separate discussion about the constitutional issues. Concluding

that he did not have the authority or power under the Rule to

inquire into the matter further than verifying that the juror had,

in fact, sent the e-mail to defense counsel, the trial judge held:

I ultimately have to apply the Rules of Evidence and the

Supreme Court and First Circuit case law applying those

rules to the facts of this case, and doing that I

conclude that I am constrained from breaching the

confidentiality of the deliberative process in

questioning the juror on the basis of the e-mail, which

is all we have at this time to call into question the

integrity of the jury’s deliberative process.

A limited voir dire of the juror followed to authenticate the email. 

On August 31, 2007, Villar filed a motion to set aside the

jury’s verdict, to which the government objected. On October 2,

2007, the court issued an endorsed order denying Villar’s motion.

On November 27, 2007, the Court sentenced defendant, and this

timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Rule 606(b)

Contending that the juror’s e-mail created a possibility that

the jury was racially or ethnically biased against him, appellant
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asserts that the district court erred in its legal conclusion that

Rule 606(b) barred any inquiry into the possibility of bias within

the jury room.

A threshold issue is the appropriate standard of review. The

parties argue that the abuse of discretion standard governs the

trial judge’s application of Rule 606(b). The district court’s

response to an allegation of juror misconduct is generally reviewed

only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Connolly, 341

F.3d 16, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. OrtizArrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993); Mahoney v.

Vondergritt, 938 F.2d 1490, 1492 (1st Cir. 1991)). Here, however,

the trial court judge seemed to be making a ruling of law, because

he found he lacked “discretion to act” or make any inquiry under

Rule 606(b) based only on the juror e-mail. Therefore, the

appropriate standard of review of that legal ruling is de novo.

Janeiro v. Urological Surgery Prof’l Ass’n, 457 F.3d 130, 139 (1st

Cir. 2006). 

Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 606(b) states:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or

statement occurring during the course of the jury's

deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or

any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the

juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or

indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in

connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1)

whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly

brought to the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside

influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror,

or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the
- 11 -

verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or

evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a

matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Rule 606(b) codifies the “‘firmly established

common-law rule’ that prohibits admission of juror testimony to

impeach a jury verdict.” United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16,

34 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,

117 (1987)). There are important policy considerations underlying

the Rule, including “finality, maintaining the integrity of the jury

system, encouraging frank and honest deliberations, and the

protection of jurors from subsequent harassment by a losing party,”

and ensuring public confidence in the justice system. Id. 

Rule 606(b) contains three exceptions, two of which –

“extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influence” – are

relevant to our analysis. We have warned that courts generally

“‘should be hesitant to haul jurors in after they have reached a

verdict to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct, or

extraneous influences.’” Id. (quoting Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d

1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1988)) (alterations omitted). A “court should

only conduct such an inquiry when ‘reasonable grounds for

investigation exist,’ i.e., ‘there is clear, strong, substantial and

incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative

impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of

a defendant.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210,

1234 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
- 12 -

The key case in this area is Tanner v. United States, which

involved allegations, brought to light after conviction, that

several jurors had consumed alcohol and drugs during lunch breaks,

causing them to sleep through the afternoon sessions of a trial and

possibly affecting their reasoning ability. 483 U.S. at 117. The

Court there recognized the common law exception to the bar against

post-verdict juror testimony in cases involving an “extraneous

influence.” Id. at 117 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.

140, 149 (1892)). The “external/internal distinction” employed by

the Tanner Court is not a “locational distinction” but rather is

“based on the nature of the allegation.” Id. at 117-18. Juror

testimony about a matter characterized as “external” to the jury is

admissible under Rule 606(b), while testimony about “internal”

matters is barred by the Rule. See id. Explaining that juror

intoxication does not fit within the exception to Rule 606(b) for

“outside influence[s],” but rather was more properly labeled an

internal issue, the Tanner Court held that the district court did

not err when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 125,

127.

Using this framework, most courts have concluded that juror

testimony about race-related statements made by deliberating jurors

does not fall within either the “extraneous prejudicial information”

or the “outside influence” exceptions of Rule 606(b), but does fall

squarely within Rule 606(b)’s prohibition of post-verdict juror
- 13 -

testimony. See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236-38

(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the

district court to admit evidence of racial comments in the jury room

under Rule 606(b)’s exceptions); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155,

1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Rule 606(b) was intended to

preclude evidence of racial slurs during jury deliberations, because

“[w]e cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions

of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies”)

(internal citations omitted); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d

369, 373 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (stating that “juror testimony

regarding the possible subjective prejudices or improper motives of

individual jurors” is inadmissible under the Rule). But see United

States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Even

without characterizing racial bias as ‘extraneous,’ a powerful case

can be made that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable to racial bias

because . . . ‘[a] juror may testify concerning any mental bias in

matters unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called

upon to decide.’”) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n.5

(1983) (per curiam) and adding emphasis)). 

We are persuaded by the courts that have held that Rule 606(b),

by its express terms, precludes any inquiry into the validity of the

verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments

made “during the course of deliberations.” As such, the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law when he held
 The Appellant asserts violations of both his due process 4

rights and his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury.

Courts that have dealt with the issue of possible racial and ethnic

bias during jury deliberations have framed their discussions

primarily in the context of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g.,

Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (“Petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests in

an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are protected by several

aspects of the trial process.”); Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 (“We

must remember that the Sixth Amendment embodies a right to a fair

trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.”).

Other courts have considered a challenge to bias in juror

deliberations as encompassing both due process and Sixth Amendment

rights. See, e.g., Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159. The parties do

not distinguish between the two rights for purposes of the

analysis.

- 14 -

that Rule 606(b) precluded further juror inquiry. 

2. Due Process and Sixth Amendment Rights

Appellant’s more powerful argument is that the application of

Rule 606(b) to prevent juror testimony about racial or ethnic

statements made in jury deliberations is unconstitutional, violating

a defendant’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and

to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. U.S. Const. amends V, VI. Constitutional issues are 4

reviewed de novo. United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d 54, 70

(1st Cir. 2000).

The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to

a “fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors. The

failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the

minimal standards of due process.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722

(1961) (internal citations omitted). One touchstone of a fair trial

is an impartial trier of fact – “‘a jury capable and willing to
- 15 -

decide the case solely on the evidence before it.’” McDonough Power

Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (quoting Smith

v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (habeas case involving claims

of denial of due process due to juror bias)). When questions of

juror bias are raised, the Supreme Court has long recognized that

“it would not be safe to lay down any inflexible rule because there

might be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not

be excluded without ‘violating the plainest principles of justice.’

This might occur in the gravest and most important cases . . . .”

McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915); see also United

States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating

the rule “that possible internal abnormalities in a jury will not

be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and most important cases’”)

(quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269) (emphasis added). “The obvious

difficulty with prejudice in a judicial context is that it prevents

the impartial decision-making that both the Sixth Amendment and

fundamental fair play require.” United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d

1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing jury verdict based on a voir

dire of deliberating jurors where the “religious prejudice displayed

by the jurors . . . is so shocking to the conscience and potentially

so damaging to public confidence in the equity of our system of

justice, that we must act decisively to correct any possible harmful

effects on this appellant”); see also United States v. McClinton,

135 F.3d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
- 16 -

protect a criminal defendant from a jury’s lynch mob mentality

through the guarantees of due process of law and trial by an

impartial jury.”).

Tanner did not address the issue of racial bias but instead

involved issues of juror competence. The Supreme Court recognized

that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to an unimpaired jury,

but concluded that, because there were “several aspects of the trial

process” that could protect this right, the district court’s

invocation of a rule of evidence to bar juror testimony did not

amount to a constitutional violation. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27.

The Court listed voir dire, observations of the jury by counsel and

the court during trial, opportunities for jurors to report

inappropriate juror behavior prior to rendering a verdict, and the

admissibility of non-juror testimony as to wrongdoing as examples

of “other sources of protection” for a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

rights. Id. at 127.

After Tanner, courts have struggled with its application to

cases involving the possibility of Sixth Amendment violations during

jury deliberations. In two habeas challenges involving state court

convictions, two circuits have suggested that the use of juror

testimony may be appropriate in the rare case where due process and

Sixth Amendment concerns are implicated. In Shillcutt, the Seventh

Circuit held that the intent of Rule 606(b) was to preclude postverdict juror testimony, but nonetheless proceeded to address the
- 17 -

constitutional question:

The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such

an unfair manner as to deny due process. Thus, further

review may be necessary in the occasional case in order

to discover the extremely rare abuse that could exist

even after the court has applied the rule and determined

the evidence incompetent. In short, although our scope

of review is narrow at this stage, we must consider

whether prejudice pervaded the jury room, whether there

is a substantial probability that the alleged racial slur

made a difference in the outcome of the trial.

827 F.2d at 1159 (involving the following comment made by a juror

during the last twenty minutes of six hour deliberations: “Let’s be

logical; he’s a black, and he sees a seventeen year old white girl

– I know the type.”). See also Anderson v. Miller, 346 F.3d 315,

327-29 (2d Cir. 2003) (raising constitutional concerns regarding

scope of Rule 606(b)’s preclusion of juror testimony if there were

credible allegations that a juror’s safety was threatened by fellow

jurors); but see Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 225-35 (3d Cir.

2003) (Alito, J.) (applying the narrow habeas standard in a case

involving allegations that one juror called another a “nigger

lover,” the court stated that Tanner “implies that the Constitution

does not require the admission of evidence that falls within Rule

606(b)’s prohibition,” and as such, “the state courts did not

violate ‘clearly established Federal law’ in refusing to consider

those statements.”).

Many courts have recognized that Rule 606(b) should not be

applied dogmatically where there is a possibility of juror bias

during deliberations that would violate a defendant’s Sixth
- 18 -

Amendment rights. See, e.g., Heller, 785 F.2d at 1527 (involving

a voir dire of jurors who made anti-Semitic comments); Wright v.

United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Certainly,

if a criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially

prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without trampling the

[S]ixth [A]mendment’s guarantee to a fair trial and an impartial

jury.”); Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (W.D.N.Y. 1979)

(requiring an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner presented a

juror affidavit describing two racially charged statements allegedly

made during deliberations, including the remark “[y]ou can’t tell

one black from another. They all look alike.”); Smith v. Brewer,

444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (“Where . . . an offer of

proof showed that there was a substantial likelihood that a criminal

defendant was prejudiced by the influence of racial bias in the jury

room, to ignore the evidence might very well offend fundamental

fairness”); Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97, 571 N.E.2d

371, 376 (1991) (concluding that, although juror bias could not be

considered admissible as an extraneous matter under the state’s nonimpeachment rule (which is similar to Fed. R. of Evid. 606(b)), a

hearing on the question of ethnic slurs against Hispanics was

nevertheless required to determine whether the ethnically-biased

statements were made because the “possibility raised by the

affidavit that the defendant did not receive a trial by an impartial

jury, which was his fundamental right, cannot be ignored”). See
- 19 -

generally Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 Harv.

L. Rev. 1595, 1597 (1988) (“Although few courts have admitted juror

testimony of racist jury misconduct, most courts at least

acknowledge that [R]ule 606(b) could not be applied to exclude such

evidence if, taken at face value, the evidence established a

constitutional violation.”).

Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that Tanner precluded inquiry

into claims that racist statements were made in the jury room during

the trial of a Native American defendant for assaulting an officer

with a dangerous weapon. Several days after the defendant was

convicted, a juror reported to defense counsel that, during

deliberations, the foreman insisted that “‘[w]hen Indians get

alcohol, they all get drunk’ and that when they get drunk, they get

violent.” Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231. Several jurors apparently

discussed the need to “send a message back to the reservation.” Id.

at 1232. After considering juror affidavits, the trial court held

that two jurors lied during voir dire about their experiences with

Native Americans and that a new trial was warranted. Id. The Tenth

Circuit reversed, asserting that it is “not necessarily in the

interest of overall justice” to attempt to cure “defects” such as

possible racial prejudice in the jury process: 

As the Court said in Tanner, “There is little doubt that

postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in

some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts

reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior.

It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system

could survive such efforts to perfect it.”
- 20 -

Id. at 1240 (quoting Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120). The Tenth Circuit

turned to the four protections the Tanner Court characterized as

protective of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights: the voir dire

process, the ability of the court and counsel to observe jurors

during the trial, the ability of jurors to make pre-verdict reports

of misconduct, and the availability of post-verdict impeachment

through non-juror evidence of misconduct. Id. (“[I]n most if not

all cases [these protections] serve to protect the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right without breaching the ban on post-verdict juror

testimony.”). Acknowledging that at least two of Tanner’s listed

protections might not be effective at identifying racist (as opposed

to drunken) jurors, the Benally court concluded that, because “jury

perfection is an untenable goal,” the safeguards noted in Tanner

were sufficiently protective. Id. (noting, however, that a judge

may not be able to easily identify racist jurors through observation

and that “voir dire might be a feeble protection if a juror is

determined to lie.”). The court rejected the defendant’s attempt

to distinguish Tanner on the grounds that racial bias is a more

serious danger to the justice system than intoxicated jurors.

Acknowledging, though, that the constitutional argument was the

“most powerful” one, the court nonetheless was skeptical of the

Shillcutt approach, concluding on an appellate record that this was

not a “case . . . where the verdict itself was shown to be based on

the defendant’s race rather than on the evidence and the law.” Id.
 See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring) 5

(“Because the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror

himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in

concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware

of it,’ . . . it necessarily must be inferred from surrounding

facts and circumstances.” (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at

221-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring))). As the trial judge in this

case pointed out based on his many years of dealing with jury

trials, many defense attorneys have sound tactical reasons for not

proposing specific voir dire questions regarding racial or ethnic

bias because it might be viewed as insulting to jurors or as

raising an issue defense counsel does not want to highlight. As

the government pointed out, voir dire using questions about race or

ethnicity may not work to a defendant’s benefit where one of the

robbers was described as Hispanic.

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at 1239, 1241. 

While the issue is difficult and close, we believe that the

rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as

to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims

of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a

defendant’s right to due process and an impartial jury. In our

view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not

provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and

ethnically biased comments made during deliberations. While

individual pre-trial voir dire of the jurors can help to disclose

prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluctant

to admit racial bias. In addition, visual observations of the jury 5

by counsel and the court during trial are unlikely to identify

jurors harboring racial or ethnic bias. Likewise, non-jurors are

more likely to report inappropriate conduct – such as alcohol or

drug use – among jurors than racial statements uttered during
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deliberations to which they are not privy. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court here did have

the discretion to inquire into the validity of the verdict by

hearing juror testimony to determine whether ethnically biased

statements were made during jury deliberations and, if so, whether

there is a substantial probability that any such comments made a

difference in the outcome of the trial. The experienced trial judge

in this case suggested that he might have conducted such an inquiry

if he had possessed the discretion to do so. 

Although we conclude that the district court erred when it

concluded that it had no discretion to hold an inquiry into possible

bias in jury deliberations, we emphasize that not every stray or

isolated off-base statement made during deliberations requires a

hearing at which jury testimony is taken. As courts and

commentators have highlighted, the need to protect a frank and

candid jury deliberation process is a strong policy consideration.

Still, at the other extreme, there are certain rare and exceptional

cases involving racial or ethnic prejudice that require hearing jury

testimony to determine whether a defendant received a fair trial

under the Sixth Amendment. The determination of whether an inquiry

is necessary to vindicate a criminally accused’s constitutional due

process and Sixth Amendment rights is best made by the trial judge,

who is most familiar with the strength of the evidence and best able

to determine the probability of prejudice from an inappropriate
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racial or ethnic comment. There is nothing about the evidence in

this case that allows us to make this determination on appeal. 

We need not decide here what procedures the trial judge should

follow if he decides to make such an inquiry on remand. See United

States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A] district

court maintains significant discretion in determining the type of

investigation required by a juror misconduct claim.”); OrtizArrigoitia, 996 F.2d at 443 (noting that a trial judge is “not . .

. shackled to a rigid and unyielding set [of] [sic] rules and

procedures” but rather is “vested with the discretion to fashion an

appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether

misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial”);

Mahoney v. Vondergritt, 938 F.2d at 1492 (upholding trial judge’s

decision not to go beyond a preliminary inquiry, held without

counsel present, into post-verdict allegations that jurors did not

confine their deliberations to evidence presented at trial). 

Despite our view that there is a constitutional outer limit,

we stress that the policies embodied in Rule 606(b) and underscored

in Tanner are extremely important; the rule itself is rooted in a

longstanding concern about intruding into jury deliberations and the

problems that would be caused if jury verdicts could be easily

undermined by post-judgment comments volunteered by (or in some

cases) coaxed from jurors with second thoughts. In this case, we

do not say that we would necessarily have pressed for further
- 24 -

inquiry based on the somewhat terse and perhaps ambiguous report of

a single juror if the district judge had not indicated his interest

in doing so but for the bar of Rule 606(b), which he deemed

absolute. But, as we have said, the district judge is in the best

position to make the initial judgment. If in this case he thinks

further inquiry appropriate, he is free to proceed; if he thinks the

passage of time alters that initial disposition, that too is within

his province.

3. Sentencing

In the event the trial court concludes that the jury verdict

is valid, we address Appellant’s second argument. Villar contends

that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence by four levels

for “otherwise us[ing]” a pellet gun. In his view, his conduct of

sticking the gun into the bank teller’s side amounted to no more

than a “brandish[ing]” of a dangerous weapon and warrants only a

three-level adjustment. He argues that he should have only received

a three-level enhancement for “brandish[ing]” a weapon. We review

de novo the district court’s interpretation of the language used in

the Sentencing Guidelines. Its findings of fact are reviewable for

clear error. See United States v. LaFortune, 192 F.3d 157, 160 (1st

Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Nuñez-Rodriguez, 92 F.3d 14, 19

(1st Cir. 1996)).

After a sentencing hearing on January 22, 2008, the district

court sentenced the Appellant to 188 months imprisonment. The total
 “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or 6

explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the

Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a

plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United

States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).

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offense level was 32, including a four-level enhancement for

“otherwise use” of a gun. In addition, with respect to the

Appellant’s criminal history categorization, the trial court

departed downward one level from Level VI to Level V, resulting in

a guideline range of 188 to 232 months. 

Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides

that a four-level adjustment is appropriate “if a dangerous weapon

was otherwise used” during a robbery. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) (2008) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). Under the

version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the

sentencing hearing, a dangerous weapon is “otherwise used” if the

“conduct did not amount to a discharge but was more than

brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous

weapon.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(I). A weapon is “brandished” if 6

all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence

of the weapon was otherwise made known to another person,

in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether

the weapon was directly visible to that person.

Accordingly, although the dangerous weapon does not have

to be directly visible, the weapon must be present. 

Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C).

The Sentencing Guidelines were amended to reflect the

applicable definition of “brandished” on November 1, 2000. Under
 Prior to November 1, 2000, the Guidelines provided that 7

“brandished” meant that the weapon was “pointed or waved about, or

displayed in a threatening manner.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C)

(1999) (amended Nov. 1, 2000). Under that definition, some courts

drew a distinction between explicit and implicit threats

accompanying the display of a weapon in order to distinguish

between “brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing].” See, e.g., United

States v. Moerman, 233 F.3d 379, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding

that “pointing the firearm in a threatening manner” without the use

of verbal threats was “brandish[ing]” of a weapon). The majority

of circuits that have analyzed this issue under the amended

definition have noted that the explicit/implicit distinction is no

longer useful. Since the amended definition, courts have instead

focused on the “specific” as opposed to “general” use of the weapon

in determining which enhancement is appropriate. See generally

United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2009)

(holding that “otherwise use[]” requires that “[t]he threat to the

victim must be specific rather than general”); United States v.

Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that

defendant “otherwise used” a weapon when he “employed the gun to

convey a threat directed at [a] specific teller which was intended

to intimidate her into complying with his demands”); United States

v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Neither the guidelines

nor the caselaw requires . . . a verbalized threat to harm the

victim in order to constitute ‘otherwise used’”).

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the earlier version, this Court drew the following line between 7

“brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing]” a weapon during a robbery:

As we view it, a person may “brandish” a weapon to

“advise” those concerned that he possesses the general

ability to do violence and that violence is imminently

and immediately available. A general, or even pompous,

showing of weapons, involving what one would consider an

arrogant demonstration of their presence, constitutes the

generalized warning that these weapons may be, in the

future, used and not merely brandished. Altering this

general display of weaponry by specifically leveling a

cocked firearm at the head or body of a bank teller or

customer, ordering them to move or be quiet according to

one's direction, is a cessation of “brandishing” and the

commencement of “otherwise used.”

LaFortune, 192 F.3d at 161-62 (finding that a defendant “otherwise

used” a weapon by pointing a gun at bank tellers and customers,
- 27 -

telling them to “get down”). See also United States v. Cover, 199

F.3d 1270, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, under the pre2000 Guidelines, “the use of a firearm to make an explicit or

implicit threat against a specific person constitutes the ‘otherwise

use’ of the firearm”); United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676

(11th Cir. 1999) (holding a semi-automatic handgun one-half inch

from victim’s forehead in the course of a robbery constitutes

“otherwise use” of the weapon); United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d

531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating the majority view that the “key

consideration [about ‘otherwise use’] is whether a gun . . . was

pointed at a specific person in an effort to create fear so as to

facilitate compliance with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate

the commission of the crime”). 

Although LaFortune was decided under an earlier version of the

guidelines, the parties do not argue that the November 1, 2000

amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines, which changed the definition

of “brandished,” undermines this Court’s holding in LaFortune. The

LaFortune court focused on the “specific[] leveling” of a weapon at

another person as opposed to a “general display of weaponry” as the

demarcation between “brandish[ing]” and “otherwise us[ing].” 192

F.3d at 161. As such, the reasoning in LaFortune is fully

consistent with the amended definition of “brandished.” Compare

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C) (1999) (describing a brandished weapon

as one that was “pointed or waved about”) with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt.
- 28 -

n.1(C) (2008) (defining “brandish[ing]” as the “display” of the

weapon, or whether “the presence of the weapon was otherwise made

known to another person”).

Appellant argues that the trial court should have applied the

three-level enhancement for “brandish[ing]” because the robbers made

no reference to the gun or explicit threats to shoot it. He adds

that the teller did not know it was a gun when she felt something

in her side. According to the bank teller’s testimony at trial,

while at first she only felt a hard object at her side, once inside

the bank, she saw that it was a gun. The robber also pointed the

gun at another teller, ordering her to get up from her desk and move

to the center of the bank. The tellers were later told to “get on

the floor” before the robbers exited the bank. The trial judge

found the tellers’ versions of the event to be credible. 

This “specific” use of the weapon to make an unmistakably clear

and specific threat falls within the definition of “otherwise used”

under LaFortune and the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the

district court properly concluded that Appellant “otherwise used”

a weapon for the purposes of enhancing the sentence. 

For the foregoing reasons, we remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.