IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 18, 2003 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HAROLD GARLAND MABRY, JR.

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2000-D-2024 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge

No. M2002-01867-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 13, 2004

The appellant, Harold Garland Mabry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to

possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a firearm during a felony. Pursuant to

the plea agreement, the appellant received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in

the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a

certified question of law concerning the validity of the search warrant underlying the search of his

residence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J, and

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., joined.

David Vincent (at trial) and C. Edward Fowlkes (at trial and on appeal), Nashville, Tennessee, for

the appellant, Harold Garland Mabry, Jr.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth T. Ryan, Senior Counsel; Victor S.

Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and John Zimmerman, Assistant District Attorney General,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On March 12, 2000, police, acting pursuant to a search warrant, conducted a search of the

appellant’s residence. Based upon the results of the search, the appellant was indicted on charges

of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possession of a firearm during

a felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine

with the intent to sell. Subsequently, the appellant filed numerous motions to suppress, alleging that

the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not contain sufficient probable cause for the issuance
1

 We note that Rule 32(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a] judgment of

conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. . . . The judgment shall be

signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.” The July 3, 2002, document did not set forth the appellant’s plea, the

verdict or findings, or the adjudication and sentence. Therefore, the July 3, 2002, document does not comply with the

requirements for a judgment of conviction. 

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of a search warrant. Upon the trial court’s denial of the motions to suppress, the appellant pled guilty

to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of a firearm

during a felony. The plea agreement specifically provided that the appellant was “[r]eserving

certified issue of law on search issue as set forth in motion to suppress [and] further set forth in

separate order to be submitted and incorporated into judgments by reference. This issue is

dispositive of the case.” The plea agreement was filed on May 13, 2002.

On July 3, 2002, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and decided that it needed more

time in which to consider the appropriate sentence for the appellant. Accordingly, the trial court

advised the parties to return on July 9, 2002, at which time sentence would be imposed. During the

July 3 hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

Defense Counsel: If I may, Your Honor. I have here the judgment of

conviction. The rules on the certified question of law requires that it

be issued on the judgment. So I’d ask that be Page 2 to the Judgment.

Page 1 would be, of course, the –.

Trial Court: Okay. That’s fine. Let’s hear the officer first. I’ve heard

this a little bit more than average, but I – but I need to hear everything

I need to hear. And I’ll be glad to do it. 

At the conclusion of the July 3 hearing, the trial court signed a document entitled “Judgment

of Conviction.” The document stated that the appellant had pled guilty while reserving a certified

question of law concerning whether the affidavit underlying the search warrant sufficiently

established probable cause. Specifically, the appellant alleged that the affidavit failed to meet the

Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining the validity of an informant’s tip. He also alleged that the

affidavit contained fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations of material fact. The July 3

document provided that “[c]ounsel for the Defense, the State and the Court consent to the

Reservation of this certified question of law and that the question is dispositive of the case.”

Additionally, each party signed the July 3 document. Finally, the July 3 document did not state the

offenses of which the appellant was convicted and did not reference the plea agreement.1

Subsequently, on July 9, 2002, the trial court sentenced the appellant and signed two standard

judgments of conviction. These judgments of conviction did not set forth the reservation of a

certified question of law, nor did the judgments specifically incorporate by reference the plea

agreement filed on May 13, 2002, or the “Judgment of Conviction” which was filed on July 3, 2002.
2

 The appellant’s notice of appeal specifically stated that his appeal stemmed from the July 3, 2002, document.

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On appeal, the appellant challenges the validity of the search warrant.2 The State argues that

the appellant failed to properly certify the question of law. Before reviewing the appellant’s

complaint regarding the search warrant, we must first determine whether he properly reserved his

certified question of law. 

II. Analysis

A. Certified Question

Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an appellant

may appeal from any judgment of conviction occurring as a result of a guilty plea if the following

requirements are met:

(A) The judgment of conviction, or other document to which such

judgment refers that is filed before the notice of appeal, must contain

a statement of the certified question of law reserved by defendant for

appellate review;

(B) The question of law must be stated in the judgment or document

so as to identify clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue

reserved; 

(C) The judgment or document must reflect that the certified

question was expressly reserved with the consent of the state and the

trial judge; and 

(D) The judgment or document must reflect that the defendant, the

state, and the trial judge are of the opinion that the certified question

is dispositive of the case.

Additionally, in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988), our supreme court explicitly

provided prerequisites to appellate consideration of a certified question of law under Rule

37(b)(2)(i). The court stated:

Regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy

in open court or otherwise, the final order or judgment from which

the time begins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appeal must contain a

statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by

defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated

so as to clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue

reserved.
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Id. This court has repeatedly cautioned that “[b]ecause the prerequisites enunciated in Preston are

mandatory, failure to properly reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Preston will result in

the dismissal of the appeal.” State v. Andrea McCraw, No. 03C01-9903-CR-00106, 2000 WL

250146, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Mar. 7, 2000) (citing State v. Pendergrass, 937

S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1996)).

In State v. Danny Harold Ogle, No. E2000-00421-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 38755, at *4

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 17, 2001), this court expressed concern regarding the inflexible

requirements of Preston and its prodigy. Specifically, we stated:

In many of these cases the state, defendant and trial court have

all agreed (as evidenced by the guilty plea transcript) that the question

is properly certified, only to have the state correctly argue on appeal

that the certification was not in compliance with Preston, requiring

dismissal of the appeal. . . . Thus, in spite of everyone’s earlier

agreement as evidenced by the transcript of the hearing, the parties

are left in a quandary and, at the very least, face even more delay.

Based upon the documented appellate history of guilty pleas

with certified questions of law, we observe that it has become more

of a trap than serving its intended purpose. In spite of repeated

appellate cautions, the dictates of Preston are simply not being met

and, according to its history, will not be met. . . . Unfortunately, it

appears there is undue prejudice to the state, crime victims,

defendants and all involved in these cases because that which has

clearly been agreed upon has not been written on the appropriate

document at the appropriate time. 

Id. At the conclusion of our opinion in Ogle, we urged our supreme court to reexamine the

requirements for properly certifying a question of law. Id.

Subsequently, in State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), our supreme court

again considered the Preston/Rule 37 requirements and concluded that substantial compliance with

the dictates of Preston was not sufficient to properly certify a question of law. However, Armstrong

provided that a trial court could take corrective action prior to the judgment becoming final in order

to comply with Preston. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 912. 

The instant case comes before us in a slightly different posture than Armstrong. As we noted

earlier, on July 3, the trial court, needing more time to deliberate sentencing issues, continued the

appellant’s sentencing hearing until July 9. Regardless, the trial court entered a “Judgment of

Conviction,” detailing the terms of the appellant’s certified question of law. The transcript of the

July 3 hearing reflects that the appellant’s counsel specifically requested that the “Judgment of

Conviction” be made “Page 2 to the Judgment.” On July 9, subsequent to sentencing the appellant,
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the trial court signed standardized judgment of conviction forms which failed tomention the certified

question of law. Additionally, the “Judgment of Conviction” document signed on July 3 was not

attached to the July 9 documents. 

This court has previously cautioned that “we must look to the substance of a trial court’s

‘curative’ order, rather than to its label, in determining whether it satisfies the Preston requirements.”

State v. Paul Anthony Wright, No. W2001-02574-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1860526, at *6 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Jackson, Apr. 7, 2003). The transcript of the July 3 hearing clearly reflects that

counsel was aware of the strict requirements of Preston and specifically requested that the July 3

document be “Page 2 to the Judgment.” As in Wright, there is no question that “[t]he better practice

. . . would have been for the judgment form[s] to reference the trial court’s order certifying the

question of law.” Id. However, we conclude that the July 3 and July 9 documents, which were filed

roughly contemporaneously and contain the agreed decision of the parties, serve to properly certify

the appellant’s question of law.

B. Search

The appellant’s certified question stems from the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress. In reviewing a trial court’s determinations regarding a suppression hearing, “[q]uestions

of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in

the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d

18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, “a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld

unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id. Nevertheless, appellate courts will review the trial

court’s application of law to the facts purely de novo. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn.

2001). Furthermore, the State, as the prevailing party, is “entitled to the strongest legitimate view

of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences

that may be drawn from that evidence.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.

1. Informant’s Tip

The appellant’s residence was searched pursuant to a search warrant and contraband was

seized. On appeal, the appellant specifically questions whether there was probable cause to support

the issuance of the search warrant. Our supreme court has explained that

[t]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires

that search warrants issue only “upon probable cause, supported by

Oath or affirmation.” Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee

Constitution precludes the issuance of warrants except upon

“evidence of the fact committed.” Therefore, under both the federal

and state constitutions, no warrant is to be issued except upon

probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as a reasonable

ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances indicative of an

illegal act.
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State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tenn. 1998) (footnote and citations omitted). In this state,

“a finding of probable cause supporting issuance of a search warrant must be based upon evidence

included in a written and sworn affidavit.” Id. Specifically, “[i]n order to establish probable cause,

an affidavit must set forth facts from which a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that the

contraband will be found in the place to be searched pursuant to the warrant.” State v. Norris, 47

S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). We note that “‘affidavits must be looked at and read in

a commonsense and practical manner’, and . . . the finding of probable cause by the issuing

magistrate is entitled to great deference.” State v. Bryan, 769 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1989)

(quoting State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 357 (Tenn. 1982)). 

In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989), our supreme court espoused the twopronged Aguilar-Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if

the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.”

See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,

84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964). Specifically,“hearsay information supplied by a confidential informant can

not support a finding of probable cause unless it also contains factual information concerning the

informant’s basis of knowledge and credibility.” Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 294-95 (citing Jacumin,

778 S.W.2d at 432, 436). However, “independent police corroboration of the information provided

by the informant may make up deficiencies in either prong.” State v. Powell, 53 S.W.3d 258, 263

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The Jacumin court cautioned against applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test

in a hypertechnical fashion. See Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436.

This court has explained that “[u]nder the . . . ‘basis of knowledge’ prong, facts must be

revealed which permit the magistrate to determine whether the informant had a basis for his

information or claim regarding criminal conduct.” State v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996); see also State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Specifically,

“[t]he informant must describe the manner in which he gathered the information, or the informant

must describe the criminal activity with great particularity.” State v. Steven Woodard, No. 01C01-

9503-CR-00066, 1996 WL 76022, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 23, 1996).

The second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, sometimes referred to as the reliability,

veracity, or credibility prong, deals with the truthfulness of the informant. Under this prong, “facts

must be revealed which permit the magistrate to determine either the inherent credibility of the

informant or the reliability of his information on the particular occasion.” Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 338.

Before applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test, we must first examine the contents of the affidavit

written in support of the search warrant. The affidavit, which was prepared by Officer John Donegan

on March 12, 2000, provided:

1. On or about the middle part of February your affiant and other

officers began a drug investigation involving Bobby Mangrum. At

that time information was supplied by a confidential informant who
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stated that he/she could buy cocaine and marijuana from Mr.

Mangrum.

2. On or about February 18th, 2000, your affiant met with said

individual who then made contact with Mr. Mangrum in regards to

making a purchase of cocaine and marijuana. Your affiant supplied

said informant with marked vice funds along with being fitted with

a recording device and a transmitting device. The C.I. was then

searched for any contraband prior to the deal, he/she had none on

his/her person. The informant was directed by Mr. Mangrum to come

to 2750 Penn Meade Dr. to take delivery of said drugs. Your affiant

and other officers assisted in the surveillance of said residence and

did follow[] the C.I. to that location and once inside did monitor a

conversation between Mr. Mangrum and the C.I. dealing with the

cocaine and marijuana. Once the C.I. left that location he was

followed a short distance away and was checked for any contraband.

Your affiant recovered the drugs that had been discussed by Mr.

Mangrum and the C.I. Your affiant turned these drugs into the metro

police property room where they were sent to the T.B.I. lab for

analysis.

3. On 3-11-00 your affiant again met with the same said C.I. in

regards to making a purchase of marijuana from Mr. Mangrum. Mr.

Mangrum directed the C.I. to go to 298 Hickory Hollow Terr[ace] and

pick one pound of marijuana up from the occupant of the apartment.

The C.I. was again fitted with a transmitter and a recording device

and searched before going to that address for contraband. Your

affiant and other officers maintained constant visual contact with the

C.I. until he/she went inside of 298 Hickory Hollow Terrace. During

the C.I.’s time inside said location your affiant an[d] other officers

monitored the transmitter and heard the transaction of the drugs take

place. The C.I. was then followed to a pre determined location where

Officer Burchwell recovered approx. one pound of marijuana from

him/her.

4. Your affiant and other officers observed three male subjects exit

298 Hickory Hollow Terrace a short time later. These subjects were

stopped a short distance away for investigation. It was learned during

this stop that one of the passengers was the person who lived at 298

Hickory Hollow Terrace a Mr. Keomuangtai. Officers asked for

consent to [search] that location but were refused. Your affiant and

other officers then went to that location to secure it until a search

warrant could be obtained. 
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5. Your affiant obtained a search warrant for 298 Hickory Hollow

Terrace and recovered approx. 26 pounds of marijuana from that

location. While there the cell phone of Mr. Keomuangtai rang several

times. Your affiant identified the caller as being Bobby Mangrum

due to the caller I.D. showing the same number that the C.I. had

contacted him by. The caller I.D. also registered the call as being

“Bobby’s cell phone.” Officer Burchwell and other officers took Mr.

Keomuangtai’s cell phone and went to the area of 2750 Penn Meade

Dr. and waited for Bobby to call once more. Mr. Mangrum called a

short time later and was told that Mr. Keomuangtai had been arrested

and that the police were on their way to his house. A short time later

a car arrived at 2750 Penn Meade and a male white, later identified

as Shane Hurd, went inside the house and returned to the car a short

time later. This person was stopped by officers and was found to be

in possession of three small packets of cocaine. This subject cooperated with police and stated that Mr. Mangrum had directed him

to go to his house and retrieve the cocaine. Officers were told by

same said person that Mr. Mangrum was at the Waff[le] House at

McGavock Pike and Pennington Bend. Officers then went to the

Waff[le] House and place Mr. Mangrum under arrest. After being

advised of his rights he was asked for consent to [search] 2750 Penn

Meade Dr. but refused.

6. Mr. Hurd further co-operated with officers in telling them that Mr.

Mangrum kept his marijuana at 298 Hickory Hollow Terrace. Mr.

Hurd further stated that Mr. Mangrum kept his money at his uncle’s

house for safe keeping. Mr. Hurd stated that his uncle owned a bar

near Harding Place named Slick Willies. Officer Jesse Burchwell

went to that location and was able to identify Mr. Mangrum’s uncle

with the assistance of Mr. Hurd. Officer Burchwell learned that

Harold Mabry aka “Bubba” was Bobby’s uncle and introduced

himself and explained why he was there. Mr. Mabry stated that he

would be glad to go with the officers to [h]is home and give consent

if they could wait until 3 o’clock when he closed his bar. Officer

Burchwell agreed to Mr. Mabry’s offer. Prior to this agreement

Officer Burchwell had sent officers to maintain surveillance on 808

Reischa Ct. in the event someone attempted to remove anything.

Officer Burchwell advised me that at least two people left from the

bar and were attempting to gain entry into 808 Reischa Ct. in an

apparent attempt to remove contraband or money. At that point

officers took those subjects into custody and secured that house. 
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The search of the appellant’s residence was based largely upon the statement by the

informant, Hurd, “that Mr. Mangrum kept his money at his uncle’s house for safe keeping.” There

is no mention in the affidavit of Hurd having been a police informant on a prior occasion. Thus, that

basis for establishing his credibility is lacking. “Absent a showing of informant credibility, the

affidavit must show that the information given by the informant is otherwise reliable.” Moon, 841

S.W.2d at 339. 

The State argues that Hurd should be deemed credible because he made a statement against

penal interest. This court has previously recognized that “admissions of crime may carry their own

indicia of credibility.” Id. at 340 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,

584, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971). Regardless, this court cautioned that “such a conclusion

necessarily requires the statement against penal interest be the one which provides the reason for the

search.” Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 340. As we noted, the significant statement underlying the need to

search the appellant’s residence was “that Mr. Mangrum kept his money at his uncle’s house for safe

keeping.” We question whether the statement was against Hurd’s penal interest. Regardless, we

conclude that we need not decide this issue because the information given by Hurd was sufficiently

corroborated by police.

In the instant case, Hurd not only told police that Mangrum kept his money at the appellant’s

house, he also told police that Mangrum was at a specific Waffle House restaurant at the time that

Hurd was detained, Mangrum kept his marijuana at 298 Hickory Hollow Terrace, the appellant was

Mangrum’s uncle, and the appellant worked at a bar named Slick Willie’s. The police proceeded

to the named Waffle House restaurant and therein discovered and arrested Mangrum. Additionally,

the police had just discovered a large quantity of marijuana at 298 Hickory Hollow Terrace. Further,

the police proceeded to Slick Willie’s where they encountered the appellant and learned that he was

Mangrum’s uncle. Thus, the information given by Hurd on this occasion was sufficiently verified

by police so that the remainder of his information could be deemed reliable. See State v. Nathan

Alex Weaver, No. M2001-00873-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1877107, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Nashville, Apr. 15, 2003). Next, we turn to whether the affidavit contained a basis of Hurd’s

knowledge.

We acknowledge that the affidavit does not specifically identify the source of the information

contained in Hurd’s statement to police. However, in Spinelli, the Supreme Court explained that 

[i]n the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the

information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip

describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the

magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial

than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation

based merely on an individual’s general reputation.

393 U.S. at 416, 89 S. Ct. at 589; see also Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432. We conclude that the

aforementioned details, which were verified by police and contributed to the appellant’s credibility,
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were specifically and intimately related to the underlying criminal conduct and indicated Hurd’s

personal involvement in the criminal enterprise. See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th

Cir. 1999) (stating “the degree of detail contained in a tip may be used to infer whether the informant

had a reliable basis for making his statements”). Moreover, the affidavit reflects that police

apprehended Hurd in the act of obtaining cocaine on Mangrum’s behalf. Therefore, after examining

the informant’s tip and the affidavit as a whole, we conclude that the issuing magistrate did not abuse

its discretion in issuing the search warrant for the appellant’s residence, nor did the trial court err in

overruling the appellant’s motion to suppress. 

2. False Statements

Finally, the appellant maintains that “[t]he search warrant is invalid because the underlying

affidavit contains recklessly made false statements essential to the establishment of probable cause.”

Specifically, the appellant contends that the misleading statement in the affidavit is the allegation

that “at least two people left from the bar and were attempting to gain entry into 808 Reischa Court

in an apparent attempt to remove contraband or money. At that point officers took those subjects

into custody and secured the house.” The appellant complains that one of the foregoing individuals

in fact entered the residence and then left, while another individual waited in the vehicle.

Additionally, the appellant argues that when the subjects were apprehended, “no contraband or

money was found in their possession. . . . This is a fact that should have been included in the

affidavit for the issuing magistrate to consider.” The appellant further argues that police recklessly

left out of the affidavit that one of the subjects informed police that he was at the residence to check

on the appellant’s son. The appellant reasons that “[w]ithout this premise the State has no basis to

support the knowledge prong which is otherwise non-existent.” 

In State v. Little, 560 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tenn. 1978), our supreme court held that “there are

two circumstances that authorize the impeachment of an affidavit sufficient on its face, (1) a false

statement made with intent to deceive the Court, whether material or immaterial to the issue of

probable cause, and (2) a false statement, essential to the establishment of probable cause, recklessly

made.” This court has observed that the same rationale of the Little test extends to material

omissions in an affidavit. See State v. Yeomans, 10 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

“However, an affidavit omitting potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a

question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information.”

Id. The appellant bears the burden of establishing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard by

a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

At the suppression hearing in the instant case, John Edwards and Victor Darryl Greenfield

testified that they went to the appellant’s house at 12:15 or 12:30 a.m. to “drop money off” for “[t]he

kids” to purchase pizza. Edwards went into the house while Greenfield waited in the vehicle.

Edwards denied removing anything from the residence. 

Detective Burchwell testified that three people left Slick Willie’s after police spoke with the

appellant. The individuals were Edwards, Greenfield, and Christy Brown. Detective Burchwell
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explained that Edwards and Brown attempted to enter the appellant’s residence. After the subjects

were detained, it was discovered that Brown possessed the keys to the appellant’s safe where the

contraband was ultimately discovered. Detective Burchwell also related that the babysitter who was

staying at the appellant’s residence told him that she heard someone come in the house. That person

made a telephone call and stated to the person on the other end of the line that he possessed the

wrong set of keys, explaining that the key ring did not have a Harley-Davidson emblem. Detective

Burchwell noted that Brown’s key ring had a Harley-Davidson emblem. 

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the

appellant’s motion to suppress. Therein, the trial court implicitly accredited the testimony of

Detective Burchwell. The trial court noted that “[w]hen maintaining surveillance on the 808 Reischa

Court residence, police observed at least two (2) people leaving a bar and attempting to gain entry

into the 808 Reischa Court residence in an apparent attempt to remove evidence from the house.”

Thus, it appears that the trial court determined that the contested statement was not false and did not

misrepresent the facts. We agree. See State v. Leon Hurd, No. E1999-01341-CCA-R3-CD, 2001

WL 348871, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Apr. 10, 2001). Moreover, we conclude that the

omission of Edwards’ alleged reason for being at the residence did not call into question the accuracy

of the affidavit. Accordingly, the appellant has failed to impeach the validity of the search warrant.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

___________________________________ 

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE