### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 284 -CV

In the Matte r of B. P. S.
F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. J-2 7,75 4 , HO NORAB LE W. JEANNE MEURER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The district c ourt, sitti ng as a juvenile court, adjudicate d B.P.S. delinquent af t er finding t hat he c ommitt ed the of fense of ag g ravated robbe ry . See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.03 (West 2003). The juvenile court assessed punishment at t hree y ear s’ probation. I n a si ng le issue on appea l, B.P.S. challeng es the fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence suppo rt i n g the juvenile cour t’s finding that a dea dly

wea pon was used dur ing the commission of the offe nse. Withi n that issue, B .P. S. a lso c ha lle ng e s th e a dmi ssi bil ity of c e rt a in e vid e nc e . We wi ll a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND The juve n i le cour

t hear d evidenc e that, on the e vening of Nove mber 17, 2006, the victim, Gorg e Alcide s Ramos River a, was approa ched on the stree t by a g roup of f

our boy s, one of whom Rivera identifie d in court as B .P.S. R ivera testified that B.P.S. asked him if he had a c iga rette. Rivera told him that he did not. A cc ording to Rivera, B .P.S. t hen aske d him for a dollar . Rivera g ave B .P.S. a dollar, but B.P.S
. told him, “No, it’s five.” Rivera rec ounted that, at this point, oneI t is undisput ed that Rivera was hit by one of the other boy s, not B.P.S. The State relied 1 on the law of

parties to h o l d B. P
. S
. responsible for the other boy ’s ac tions. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 7.02 (West 2003). Rivera did not speak Eng lish. Both his statement t o the police a nd his trial testimony

wer e 2 translated f

rom Spanish to English. 2 of the other

boy s hit him in the head. When the State as k ed R i v er a wh at he g ot hit with, R ivera 1
answe red, “ The t ru t h i s Idon’t know. I t was so—so fast that I didn’t see.” The State then a sked if what h e w a s h it

w it h w a s h ar d

o r s o f t. Ri v e r a te s ti f ie d , “ V e r y h ar d
. ” T h e St a te a ls o a s ked,

“ Whe n y ou

g ot h it, did it hurt ? ” Riv e ra re sp on de d, “ Of c ours e .” Riv e ra

ide nti fi e d f

or the c ourt a
sc ar o ve r h is l e ft

e y e wh e re he wa s a lle g e dly hit
. Riv e ra e xpla ine d th a t, a ft e r h e wa s h it, he fe ll t o the g ro u n d “fr om the impact.” He then re called the boy s “starting [] to press on [his] pockets.” Rivera testified that “they took ever

y thing. The y t o o k m y

telephone, my

wallet, and e very

thing.” After the boy s left, Rive ra go t u p an d made his wa y back to his apa

rtment. He te stified that he “had a lot of blood,” and he place d a jac ket ar ound his head to c over the wound. When he r eturne d to his apartment, Rivera

and his friends decided to go ba ck out and try to locate the boy s. Rivera a nd his friends found them at a bus stop. Rivera testified that, when they arr ived, police of

fice rs wer e alre ady talking to the boy s. Rivera a pproa ched one of the of fice rs and, through a fr iend who tr ans la te d for

him , told the office r what happene d. The off icer s sear ched B .P.S. and found Rivera’s 2 cell phone in B .P.S.’s pocke t. Rivera testified that the police then c alled an a mbulance, a

nd Rivera
wa s tr ans po rt e d to the e me rg e nc y ro om. At

the ho sp ita l, d oc tor s e xami ned Ri vera ’s wo un ds
. Ri v e r a te s ti f

ie d th a t th e y p u t a p a tc h o n h is e y e an d a ls o “ d id s o me s ti tc h e s ” b e c a u s e h is wound “wa s very big.”3 I n add it ion

to R ive ra ’s te sti mony

a bo ut t he natur e and

se ve ri ty of his inj ur ie s, a lso
a dmi tte d int o e vid e nc e we re po lic e ph oto g ra ph s ta ke n o f R ive ra ’s fa c e on

the nig ht o f t

he inc ide nt, and medica l rec ords from the h o s p i t al wher e Rivera was tre ated. The photogr aphs show what appea rs to be blood ar ound Rivera’ s left ey e and on his forehe ad, while the me dical re cords pr ovide details about Rivera ’s injuries. Specific ally , in a re cord titled, “Eme rg ency Room R ep o rt,” the t re at i n g p h y s i ci an re p o rt edt h e f o l l o wi n g: Patient is a 19-y ear -old L atin-Amer ican male who was in a fig ht this afternoon a

nd was struc k with a roc k on his face . There was no loss of consciousness. He ha s no ne c k o r b a c k p a i n . H e s ay s h e d o e s h a v e s o m e m i l d p a i n i n h i s t h i g h s a nda lit tle ache in his left flank. . . .

. . . . He ha s a 1 c m j a g g e d

l a c e r a t i o nj u s ta

b o v e h i s l e f

te y e b r o w . T h e r e ar e t w o s m a ll ro c k f or e ig n b od ie s in

the wo un d w hic h w e re e a sil y re mov e d. Th e re wa s n o v isi ble or pa lpa ble sk ull fr a c tur e , no ev ide nc e of e ntr a pme nt. He ha s a

sma ll a br a sio n o n h is left malar reg ion of his fac e. Other wise his fac e is nontender and tra umatic. . . .

. . . . A f t e r o b t a i n i n g a d e qu a t e an e s t h e s i a t h e ar e a w a s p r e p p e d an d d r a p e d i na ste ri le manner . . . . The two roc ks were remove d. The wound w as re explored. No o t h er i n jury or for eig n body

was noted. It was then c losed with . . . sutures and Neosporin a

pplied. DI AGNOSES 1. Fa cial lac eration, sutured. 2. Closed-hea d trauma. PL AN I have g iven him he ad injury as well as wound pre cautions, and r equeste d he re turn if he has more pain, fe ver, vomiting , vision chang es, we akness, numbness, r ash, or fe e ls w or se . I

have re qu e ste d h e re tur

n in 48 ho ur s f

or a wo un d c he c k. Ipla c e d h im on Kef lex and Vicodin. He did re ceive Durice f her e.4 The juvenile court also hear d evidenc e from City of Austin p o l i ce o ffice r Carlos Vallejo, who r esponded to the c rime. Va llejo testified that he had be en a police office r for approximately

five-a nd-a- half y ear s. Of

rele vance to this appeal, the State a sked Va llejo the fo llo wi ngqu e sti on : “ I s an o bje c t w iththe de ns ity or ha rd ne ss o f a ro c k, or so me thi ngso lid

lik e that,
a roc k, a piec e of wo o d, a har d piece of plastic, is that able to inflict ser ious bodily injury ; do y ou know? ” Counsel for B .P.S. obj ecte d to this question on num erous g rounds, including that it called for spe culation, was not re levant, wa s more pre judicial than proba

tive, and that the of

fice r had not be e n d e sig nate d o r q

ua lif ie d as an e xpe rt . T he juv e nil e c ourt ov e rr ule d th e ob

je c tio ns . T he State then rephr ased the question: “Do y ou believe that taking a n object like that, with that density , and hittin g so me bo dy , is c a

pa ble of c a us ingse ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y , if no t de a th?” Co un sel fo r B .P. S. objected to the State’ s rephr asing and re -urg ed his ea rlier objec tions. The juvenile court re sponded: The objec tion is overruled. How ever , the Court wil l acc ept this as just the g ener al knowledg e of w hether or not a rock, or som ething like that, striking so me on e ’s he a d, by

the ba sic c omm on

kn ow le dg e of

a ll o f u s c ou ld c a

us e death or serious bodily

injury . Please a

nswer the question. Vallejo answ ere d, “Ye s.”

The juvenile court a lso heard te stimony from B .P.S., who denied the alleg ations ag ainst him. B.P.S. testi fied that h e s aw his friend “ punch” River a. B .P.S. was then asked, “ What does he punch him with? ” B .P.S. answered, “ His fist, for all I seen.” The juvenile c o u

r t f o u n d that B.P.S. committ ed the of fense of ag g ravated robbe ry and adjudicate d him de linquent. Following the dispositi on hear ing, the juvenile cour t placed B .P.S. on probation, to beg in at the Travis County L eade rship Aca demy , for thre e y ear s. This appea l followed.5 AN AL YSI S Evid ence adm issib ility

Al tho ug h B .P. S. d e sig nate s on ly a sin g le iss ue on

a pp e a l—w he the r t

he e vid e nc e is fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the juv e nil e c ourt ’s de a dly we a po n fi nd ing

—h e de vo te s mo st o f h is briefingto the separ ate issue of whether cer tain evidenc e should ha

ve been a dmitted. Although not specific ally

assig ned as e rror , since we are to construe br iefs libera lly and addr ess “e very issue raised
and ne c e ssa ry to f ina l di sp os iti on

of the a pp e a l,” we wi ll s e pa

ra te ly a dd re ss B .P. S.’ s a dmi ssi bil ity arguments. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.9, 47.1.

We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit evidenc e under an abuse of discre tion standard. W

alt e rs v . S tat e , 24 7 S.W. 3d

20 4, 21 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s discretion only

when the de cision lies “outside the zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Id
. B.P.S. contends that the juvenile c ourt should not have admitted (1) Of fice r Va llejo’s testimony about whethe r a r ock or similar objec t was c apable of ca using se rious bodily

injury or death a nd (2) the me dical re cords. We will addre ss eac h contention in turn. Of fic e r V all e jo’ s te sti mony B.P.S. asserts that Of

fice r Va llejo’s testimony

should not have bee n admitted for the fo llo wi ngre a so ns : ( 1) it v iol a ted rul e 70 1, re la tin g to o pin ion te sti mony

by a lay wi tne ss,
see Tex. R. Evi d. 701; (2) it violated rules 702 a nd 703, rela t i n g t o expert testimony , se e id
. 702, 703; (3) it violated rules 401 and 403, in that it was either not r eleva nt or more pr ejudicial than probative, se e id
. 40 1, 40 3; a nd (4 ) V a lle jo’ s n a me wa s n ot i nc lud e d o n th e State ’s wi tne ss l ist
.6 We find these conte ntions to be without m erit. F irst, rules 702 and 703 a re not imp lic a te d in

thi s c a se , a s th e juv e nil e c ourt did no t a llo w O ff

ice r Val lej o to te sti fy

a s an e xpe rt : “[T] he Court will acc ept this as just the ge nera l knowledg e of whether or not a roc k, or something lik e that, s tr iki ngso me on e ’s he a d, by the ba sic c omm on kn ow le dg e of a ll of us c ou ld c a us e de a th
or ser ious bodily

injury .” Second, ther e wa s no abuse of discretion in the juvenile c ourt’s finding that Vallejo’s testimony was a dmissibl e under

rules 401 and 403. Rule 401 de fines “r el evant e vidence ” as “evide nce ha

ving a ny tendency to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the deter mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence .” Tex. R. Evi d. 401. The juvenile c ourt did not abuse its discretion in finding that Vallejo’s testimony about whethe r a r ock or similar objec t was ca pable of causingserious bodily injury or death made a dea dly wea

pon finding more or less probable
. As for rule 403, it provides that rele vant evidenc e may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice,
c on fu sio n o f t

he iss ue s, or

mis le a din g the jur

y , o r by c on sid e ra

tio ns of un du e de lay , o r n e e dle ss prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” Tex
. R. Evid. 403. Be cause this was a one-da y trial befor e the juvenile cour

t (and not a jury

), the juvenile c ourt did not abuse its discretion in finding that such
conce rns wer e not pre sent here
.

Third, there was no abuse of discretion in the j uvenile cour t’s findingthat Vallejo’s testimony was prope r opinion testimony by a lay witness under r

ule 701. Rule 701 provides that lay witness testimony

“is limit ed to those opinions or i nfer ence s which are (a) rationally based on the perc eption of the witness a nd (b) he lpful to a clea

r under standing of the witness’ te stimony or the7

determinati o n o f a f

a c t in is s u e . ” T e x. R. E v id
. 7 0 1
. T h is Co u rt h a s e xp la in e d w h a t is require d under se ction (a) of this rule:

The rule ’s re quirement that the o p i n i o n or infer ence of a la y witness be “rationally

based on the perc eption of the witness” ca n b e s ai d to have two e le me nts . T he fi rs t e le me nt inv olv e s the pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of the wi tne ss as required by Rule 602. The ne cessa ry persona l knowledg e may be g ained by the per ception of fac t by the s enses of the witness. Thus, the per ception underlying a

lay witness’s testimony

may be what was seen, hear d, smelled, ta ste d, tou c he d, or

fe lt. Th e se c on d e le me nt m and a te s th a t th e op ini on mus t be one that a re asonable person c ould draw from the under ly ing f acts. Unde r Rul e 70 1, muc h mu st b e le ft to t he dis c re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. Ha rn e tt v . S

tat e , 38 S.W .3d 650, 6 5 7 -58 (Te x . App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d) (interna l citations omit ted).

Although it is true that Of fice r Va llejo did not have any persona l knowledg e of the spec ific objec t that was used in the c ommissi on of the c rime, he testified that he had be en a police off icer for ap p ro x i m at el y

five-a nd-a- half y ear s. Also, the rec ord re flec ts that Vallejo saw Rivera’ s wounds befor e they wer e tre ated a

nd heard R i v era

descr ibe, throug h a tra

nslator, how Rivera wa s attacke d. Fr om the se under ly ing f acts, Va llejo could drawthe conc lusion that, whatever Rivera wa s hit with, the object was c apable of ca using se rious bodily

injury or death in the manner of its use. Thus, the juvenile c ourt’s admission of Vallejo’ s lay -wit n es s testimony was not “o utside the zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Se e Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 2 0 1 S. W. 3 d

6 9 5 , 7 0 4-05 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); se e als o Ho lli s v . S tat e , 219 S.W .3d 446, 467 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (“ Under

Rule 701, an off

icer may testify about opinions based on his persona l training and first-hand e x perie nces w ithout being qua lified as an e x pert unde r Rule 702.”)
.8 Finally , as for

B.P.S.’s contention that Va llejo’s name wa s not included on the State’s witness list, during trial, counsel for B.P.S. withdrew this objection immediately afte r it was made
and be fo re the juv e nil e c ourt ha d a n o pp or tun ity to c on sid e r i t: [C o u n s e l f

o r B
. P
. S
. ]: Yo ur

Hon or, I ’m
. . . g oin g to o bje c t to thi s wi tne ss. Ido n’ t k now . . . wh o th is w itn e ss i s. Th e State ha s no t pr ov ide d me wi th a wi tne ss l ist ; despite the fa ct that I
. . . filed m y discovery order and also my 404(b) letter quite a while ag o. And fr om t he of fe ns e re po rt

that I sa w, Ido n’ t . . . w a it. This is the APD office r. [Pro se c uto r]: Ye s, sir , it is. [C ounsel for B .P.S.] : Okay . That’s fine
. There fore , any

err or re lating to the State’s alleg ed failure to inc lude Vallejo on its witness li st has not been pr eser

ved for revie w. We conclude that there w as no abuse of discre tion in the juvenile court’s admission of Of fi c e r V a lle

jo’ s te sti mony . H ow e ve r, e ve n wer e we to a ssume that th e juv e nil e c ourt sh ou ld not ha ve admitted his te stimony , any err or would be ha rmless. See Tex. R. App. P
. 44.2(b). As we wi ll e xpla in b e low , th e re wa s o the r e vi den ce in the re c or d s up po rt ingthe juv e nil e c ourt ’s de a dly
we apon finding apar

t from Vallejo’ s testimony
. Se e Le da yv . S tat e , 983 S.W .2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“I t is well established that the improper admission of evi d en ce d oes not constitute reve rsible er

ror if the same fa cts are shown by other e vidence which is not challeng ed.”)
.Id e m s on an s means “ of the same sound.” Ma rti n v . S tat e , 5 4 1 S
. W .2d 605, 606 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The rule of ide m s on an s provides that if two n am es sound alike but are sp e ll e d d if

f e r e n tl y , an y v ar ia

n c e in s p e ll in g is im mate r ia l, “ p r o v id e d th e mi s s p e ll in g d o e s not transfor m the name into a wholly

distinct appellation.” Id . We no te that th e dif fe re nt n a me s in

thi s case appea

rs t o be a que stion invol ving the rule of idem sonans . The victim testified duringtrial that his full na me was “ Gorg e Alcide s Ramos Rivera.” The name of the patient in the medica l rec ords was “ J org e Alce des.” 9 Medical rec ords

I n his brief, B .P.S. asserts that the medica l re co rd s detailing the nature of Rivera ’s injuries should not have bee n admitted beca use: (1) the patient named in the rec ords was a person named “ J org e Alce des,” not Gor g e Rivera ; (2) B .P.S. had “no o p p o rt u n i ty to confront a

nd
c ro ss- e xami ne the do c tor ” wh o tr e a te d Ri ve ra ; and (3 ) o ne pa

rt ic ula r s ta te me nt i n the re c or ds is “hea rsay within hearsa

y .” Howe ver, dur ing tri al , B.P.S. only objected to the a dmission of a particula r statement in the medic al re cords on the ba sis of “hea rsay within hearsa

y ”:
Th e on ly ob

je c tio n that I have is g oin g to be in t his pa ra g ra phwh e re it s ay s, “The patient is a 19-y ear -old L atin male, who wa s in a fig ht this afternoon and wa s struck in the roc k with a—in the fa ce w ith a rock.” Ibelieve that’s hear say within hearsa

y , and would ask that that portion be struck.
There fore , B.P.S. has not p reserved e rror on the issues of (1) the var iance betwee n the name of the victim in the indictment and the name in the medica l rec ords, see Ma rti n v . S tat e , 541 S.W .2d 605, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (“Q uestions involving the rule of idem sonans [ ] m ust be raise d 3 in the first instance at trial. I f the issue is rai s ed fo r the first time on appe al, it will be treate d
a s h a vin g be e n w a ive d a nd wi ll p re se nt not hi ng for re vie w. ” ), and (2 ) B .P. S.’ s in a

bil ity to conf ro n t and cr oss-examine the treating phy sician. Se e Re y na v . S tat e , 168 S.W .3d 173, 179Be fore admitting the medical rec ords, the juvenile court a sked counse l for B .P.S. i f there 4 was a ny other objec tion. Counsel replied, “No, Y our Honor.” 10 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ) ( “ An ob je c tio n o n h e ars ay

do e s n ot p re se rv e e rr or

on Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e g rounds.”) . Thus, we sha ll consider only the “he arsa

y within hearsa

y ” issue. After counsel for

B.P.S. objected on this g round, t he juvenile c ourt initially sustained the objection, dele ting the statement about the patient be ing “struck with a rock” but admitting the
re ma ind e r of the me dic a l r e c or ds
. Howeve r, the juvenile court late r over ruled B .P.S.’s objection 4 afte r the juvenile c ourt deter mined that the documents we re me dical re cords that satisf ied the business rec ords exception to the hear say rule. See Tex. R. Evi d. 803(4), 803( 6). Rule 805 provides, “Hear say included within hear say is not ex cluded unde r the he ars ay ru le if e a c h p art of the c omb ine d state me nts c on fo rm s w ithan e xce pti on to t he he ars a y

ru le provided in these r

ules.” Te x . R. Evid. 805. Thus, in order for the “struc k with a rock” statement to be admissible, both the medical r ecor ds and the spec ific statement within the medica l rec ords neede d to conform to an exception to the hearsay rule. On this re cord, w e ca nnot conclude that the juv e nil e c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

a dmi tti ng

the state me nt. F ir st, the me dic a l r e c or ds in thi s c a se satis fi e d th e bu sin e ss r e c or ds e xce pti on to the hearsay rul e . T o b e p r o p e r ly a d mi tt e d u n d e r Ru le 8 0 3 ( 6 ) , th e p r o p o n e n t m u s t p r o v e th a t t

he d o c u m e n tw a s m a d e a to r n e ar t h e t i m e o f

t h e e v e n t s r e c o r d e d , f

r o m i n f o r m a t i o nt r an s m i t t e d

b y a person with knowledg e of the events, a nd made or

kept in the cour se of a regula rly conducte d business activity . Tex. R. Evi d. 803(6). The predic ate f or admission of a business rec ord may be established by an aff

idavit that c omplies with Rul e 902(10)
. Id
. The predicate witness does not have11

to be the re cord’ s cre ator or have persona l know ledg e of the contents of the r ecor d. Re y es v . S tat e , 48 S.W .3d 917, 921 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2001, no pet.). The witness nee d only have pe rsonal knowledg e of the manner in which the re cords we re pr epar ed. Id . Ru le 90 2( 10)(b ) pro vi de s a sample for

m of an a ffidavit that complies with the rule and st ates that “ an af fidavit which
s u b s t an t i a l l y

c o mp l i e s w i t h th e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s r u l e s h a l l s u f

f i c e . ” T e x . R
. E v i d
. 9 0 2 ( 1 0 ) ( b )
. In this case, the me dical re cords include d an af fidavit by Shari Mitchell, the custodian of rec ords for South Austi n Hospital, who ave rre d that she had pe rsonal knowledg e of th e m an n er in which the
rec ords wer e pre pare d. The affidavit follows t he sample f orm provided in rule 902(10)( b) and thus substantially

complies with the rule. We find no a buse of discr etion in the juvenile cour t’s decision to admit the medical re cords pur suant to the business rec ords exception to the hear say rule. Second, the state ment within the medical recor ds satisfied t he medical diag nosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule. To be proper ly admitted under r

ule 803(4), the proponent must prove that the stateme nt was made for the p u rp o se of medic al diag nosis or treatment a nd descr ibing medic al history , or past or pr esent sy mp t o m s , p ai n, or sensations, or the inception or g e ne ra l c ha

ra c te r o f the c a

us e or e xter

na l so ur c e the re of ins of

ar a s r e a so na

bly pe rt ine nt t o d ia g no sis or treatment. Tex. R . Evid. 803(4). The statement at issue, “ Patient is a 19-y ear -old L atin-Amer ican male who wa s in a fig ht this afternoon a nd was struc k with a roc k on his face ,” wa s in a section of the “Eme rg ency

Room Report” titled, “Hi s t o ry of Prese nt I llness / Review of Sy mptoms.” The doc ument was sig ned by the treating phy sician. Thus, we fi n d n o ab u se of discr etion in t he juv e nil e c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat th e state me nt w a s ma de fo r t he purp os e of me dic a l di a g no sis
or tr e a tme nt.12 We conclude that the juvenile cour t did not abuse its discretion in ad m i tting the statement within the medica l rec ords. Howe ver, e ven assuming t h ere was e rror , it would be harmless. See Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b). The re w ere other stateme nts in the medical re cords from which the juvenile c ourt could infer that Rivera ha d been struc k with a roc k
. Specifica lly , in the

“ Phy sic a l E xami natio n” se c tio n, the ph y sic ian w ro te , “ Th e re are tw o sma ll r oc k f or e ig n b od ie s in the wound which w ere easily remove d.” The n, in a sec tion labeled “Proc edure Note,” the phy sician
wr ote , “ Th e tw o r oc ks we re re mov e d. ” B .P. S. d id n ot o bje c t to e ith e r o f t he se state me nts
. We overrule B.P.S.’s arguments involving the a dmissibi lity of the e vidence
.
F actual suf

fi ciency We n o w tu r

n t o B
. P
. S
. ’ s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s f a c tu a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t to support the juvenile cour t’s deadly wea pon fi n d i n g. I n his brief, B .P.S. concedes that there w as sufficie nt e vidence supporting his a djudication for the offe nse of r obbery . He a sserts, howeve r, that he should not have be en adjudicated for the offe nse of a g g ravated robbery “bec ause the State’s evidenc e wa s fac tually

insufficient to prove bey ond a re asonable doubt the use of a deadly wea pon, namely some unknown blunt object.” Adjudications of delinquenc y in juvenile case s are based on the criminal standar d
o f p r o of. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03( f) ( West S upp. 2007). Ther efor e, we revie w
a dju dic a tio ns of

de lin qu e nc y

in ju ven ile c a se s b y

a pp lyingthe same sta

nd ard s a pp lic a ble to sufficienc y

of the e vidence challeng es in crimi n al ca ses. In re M. C.L. , 110 S.W .3d 591, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.).13 I n a fact ua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l li g ht a

nd a sk whe th er th e trie r o f f

a c t w a s r a tio na lly

jus tif ie d in fi nd ingg uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. See W ats on v . S

tat e , 2 04 S.W. 3d 40 4, 41 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); se e als o W oo le yv . S tat e , ___ S.W .3d ___, 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 762, at *21 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008) (holding that fac tual sufficie ncy , like leg al suffic iency , should be measure d “by the elements of the offe nse as define d by
a hy pothetically corr ect jury char g e”)
. We the n deter mine whether the evidenc e support i n g the
ve rd ic t is so we a k that th e ve rd ic t is c le arl y wr on g and

manif e stl y un jus t or wh e the r t

he ve rd ic t is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and prepondera nce of the conf

licting e vidence
. W

atson , 204 S.W .3d at 415. “The verdic t may be set aside only if it is so contra ry to the overwhelming weig ht of the evide nce as to be clearly wrongand unjust.” Gr ott i v . S tat e , _ _ _ _ S
. W
. 3 d _ _ _ , 2 0 0 8 T e x . C r i m . A p p . LE X IS 7 6 1 , at * 1 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g W atson , 20 4 S.W. 3d a t 41 4- 17 ). I n o the r w or ds , w e wi ll
no t r e ve rs e a

c a se on a fact ua l su ff ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e un le ss w e c an s ay , w ithso me ob je c tiv e ba sis in the rec ord, that the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contra dicts the ver dict. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 417.

A per son commits the offense of ag g ravated robbe ry if he c ommits a rob b er y and he either (1) c auses se rious bodily injury to another or (2 ) u s es or ex hibits a deadly wea pon d u r in g th e c o mm is s io no f th e robbery . See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.03. The pe nal code define s “ser ious bodily

injury ” as “ bodily

injury that cre ates a

su bstantial risk of death or that
c a u s e s d e a th , s e r io u s p e r

ma n e n t d is f igu r e me n t, o r

p r o tr a c te d

lo s s o r im p a ir me n t o f th e function of any bodily member or

org an.” Id . § 1.07(a) (46) ( West S upp. 2007). T h e p enal c ode def ines

“ de a dly we a po n” a s:14 (A) a firear

m or any thing manif

estly desig ned, made , or ada

pted for the pur

pose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury ; or (B ) any

thi ngthat in

the mann e r o f i ts u se or int e nd ed us e is c a p a b l e o f c a u s i n g d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y.
Id . § 1.07(a) (17) ( West Supp. 2007). In its petiti on alleg ing de linquent conduct, the State c harg ed that an “unknow n blunt object” wa s used during the commission of the offe nse. The State conce des that an “unknow n blunt object” is not “manife stly desig ned, made , or ada

pted for the purpose of inflicting de ath or ser ious bodily injury .” The ref

ore, the State was re q u i red to prove, beyond a
re a so na ble do ub t, t

hat an “ un kn ow n b lun t ob je c t” wa s c a

pa ble of c a us ingde a th o r ser io us bo dil y injury “in the manne r of its use or intende d use.” Whether an obje ct qualifies a s a de a d ly w e a p o n d e p e n ds upon the evidenc e pre sented. Se e Tho ma s v . S

tate , 821 S.W .2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). I ndeed, the court of c riminal
a pp e a ls h a s n ote d th a t, d e pe nd ingup on the e vid e nc e sh ow n, “ a lmost anythingc an b e a de a dly
wea pon.” Lan e v . S

tat e , 151 S.W .3d 188, 191 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Severa l fac tors are used in making suc h a dete rmination, including: (1) the phy sical proximi ty betwee n the victim and the object; (2) the threats or words use d by the assailant; (3) the size and shape of the wea pon; (4) the
wea pon’s ability

to inflict death or serious bodi ly injury ; and (5) the m anner in which the de fenda nt used the we apon. In re S.B. , 117 S.W .3d 443, 446 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, no pet.). Another fac tor to consider is the nature of the injuries or wounds inflicte d on the victim, if any
. See Lane , 151 S.W .3d at 191. No one f actor is determinative, a

nd an appe llate cour

t must ex amine ea ch
case on its own facts to dete rmine whe ther the f act f inder c oul d h av e co n cluded f rom the15

surrounding circ umstances that the obje ct used wa s a dea dly wea pon. Br own v . S

tat e , 716 S.W .2d 93 9, 94 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); In re S.B. , 117 S.W .3d at 447.

B.P.S. asserts that the juve nil e court’s dea dly wea pon finding is based on nothing
mo r e th an “ in f

e r e n c e s s ta c k e d u

p o n in f e r ence s.” See Ree dy

v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 567, 585 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref ’d). We disa g ree with B .P.S.’s chara cter ization of the evidence in this case. The evi d en ce i n the re cord w hich supports the juvenile c ourt’s finding that an “u n kn o wn b l u n to b

j ec t ” w as u s edi nt h e c o m m i s s i o no f t h e o ff en s e i n cl u d es t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

• Riv e ra ’s te sti mony a

bo ut the natur e of his inj ur ie s. He te sti fi e d th a t he wa s h it wi th s ome thi ng“ ve ry

ha rd .” I t w a s so ha

rd , in fa c t, that, w he n h e wa s h it, he fe ll to the g round “f

rom the impact. ” He fu rt her te stified that “ther e wa s a lot of blood,” and he drew the court’s attention to a scar above his lef

t ey e whe re he had alleg edly been hit. The injury

was seve re e noug h that po l i ce o fficers ca lled an ambulance to transport Rivera to the em er gency

room for tre atment. Rivera fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t do c tors pu t a patc h o ve r h is e y e and “ did so me sti tc he s” beca use the wound w as “ve ry

big.”

• Po l i ce photogr aphs showing Rivera’ s fac e af ter he was hit. The photog raphs show what a

ppear s to be blood around Rivera ’s left e y e and on his for ehea d.

• Medi ca l records deta iling the nature of River a’s injuries. Statements in the rec ords include: “Patient is a 19-y ear -old L atin-Amer ican male who was in a fig ht this afte rnoon and was struck with a rock on his f ace ”; “He has a 1 cm j agge d l ac er at i o nj u s tab o v e h i s l ef tey eb ro w” ; “T h er e ar e t wo s m al l ro ckfo re i gn bodies in the wound”; “ Fa cial lac eration, sutured”; and “ Closed-hea d trauma.”
Fr om the above e vidence , the juvenile cour t could find, bey ond a re asonable doubt, that the object used in the commissi o n o f the off ense w as “c apable of ca

using se rious bodily

injury or death” “in the manne r of its use or intende d use.”We n ote , h ow e ve r, tha t e ve n a fi st c an b e a

de a dly we a po n, de pe nd ingon

the mann e r i n 5 which it is used. Se e Lan e v . S tat e , 151 S.W .3d 188, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

16 There is evidence in the rec ord contra ry to the juvenile cour

t’s fin d i n g. Rivera te sti fi e d th a t h e di d no t kn owwh a t he wa s h it w ith , a nd the ob je c t w a s n e ve r r e c ov e re d. I n f a c t, B .P. S. t e sti fi e d th a t Riv e ra wa s h it, no t w itha

ro c k, bu t w itha

fi st. F ur

the rm or e , a c c or din g to 5 B.P.S., the rocks r emoved f rom Rivera’ s wound could have been gr avel f rom Rivera’ s jacke t when he plac ed the jac ket ar ound his he ad to c over the wound. Howeve r, despite this contra ry evidenc e,
we cannot say , with some objective basis in the rec ord, that the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e contr adicts the juvenile c ourt’s dea dly wea pon finding . B.P.S. admitted at trial that he
saw one of the other boy s who was with him hit R ivera . Whether Rivera was hit in the fac e with a rock, a fist, or some other unknow n b lunt object, the nature and seve rity of Rivera ’s injuries—as shown from Rivera ’s own testi mony , the police photog raphs, a nd the medica l rec ords admitted into evidence —provides suff icient evidenc e fr om which the juvenile c ourt could find, beyond
a re a so na ble do ub t, t

hat th e un kn ow n b lu nt ob jec t wa s c a

pa ble of c a us ingse ri ou s b od ily injury or death. We overrule B.P.S.’s cha lleng e to the fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence
.17 CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he juv e nil e c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 6, 2008