PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______

Nos. 11-4074 and 11-4180

______

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

doing business as LIBERTY MUTUAL PROPERTY

AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

Appellant, No. 11-4180

v.

JAMES E. SWEENEY,

Appellant, No. 11-4074

______

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-06-cv-02227)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

______

Argued June 26, 2012

Before: FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges,

and OLIVER, District Judge.

*

 

*

The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief Judge of

the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Ohio, sitting by designation.
2

(Filed: August 2, 2012)

James A. Godin

Palmer & Barr

607 Easton Road

Suite E3, Grove Summit Office Park

Willow Grove, PA 19090

Daniel J. Maher, Jr

Jenkins, Robinson, Wolf & Rubinate

6th and Chestnut Streets

500 Public Ledger Building

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Richard J. Mennies (Argued)

Mayers, Mennies & Sherr

3031 Walton Road

Building A, Suite 330

P.O. Box 1547

Blue Bell, PA 19422

Counsel for Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. d/b/a

Liberty Mutual Property & Casualty Ins. Co.

Stephen David

Edward H. Rubenstone (Argued)

Lamm Rubenstone

3600 Horizon Boulevard, Suite 150

Trevose, PA 19053

Counsel for James E. Sweeney

______
3

OPINION OF THE COURT

______

OLIVER, District Judge.

I.

In this insurance dispute, Defendant-Appellant James 

Sweeney (“Mr. Sweeney”) appeals from the Order of the 

District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Liberty Mutual Insurance 

Company (“Liberty Mutual”). Liberty Mutual cross-appeals 

from the portion of the District Court‟s Order rejecting two 

alternative and independent bases for denying Mr. Sweeney 

coverage under his insurance policy. For the following 

reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court, 

and remand with instructions for the District Court to enter 

judgment in favor of Mr. Sweeney. Liberty Mutual‟s crossappeal is dismissed.

II.

At all relevant times, Mr. Sweeney owned and 

operated a transmission repair shop in Chalfont, 

Pennsylvania. During the course of managing his repair shop, 

Mr. Sweeney developed an informal business relationship 

with George Tradewell (“Mr. Tradewell”), who owned a car 

rental business in nearby Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania. As 

part of this business relationship, Mr. Sweeney would refer 

his customers to Mr. Tradewell if they needed to rent a 

vehicle while their own vehicles were in Mr. Sweeney‟s shop 

for repair. In his deposition, Mr. Tradewell estimated that he 

would rent vehicles to one or two of Mr. Sweeney‟s 

customers per month.
4

The manner in which the rental cars would be 

delivered to Mr. Sweeney‟s customers varied. On some 

occasions, Mr. Sweeney would simply refer his customers to 

Mr. Tradewell‟s shop or drive them to Mr. Tradewell‟s 

business. If any of Mr. Tradewell‟s employees were 

available, Mr. Tradewell would have them drop off a rental 

car at Mr. Sweeney‟s shop. As another option, Mr. Sweeney 

would pick up a rental car from Mr. Tradewell‟s business and 

deliver it to the customer either that day or the following 

morning. On those instances where Mr. Sweeney came into 

possession of a rental car for the purpose of delivering it to 

one of his customers, Mr. Sweeney would occasionally use 

the car to run personal errands. This was encouraged by Mr. 

Tradewell, who asked Mr. Sweeney to use those occasions as 

opportunities to make sure the cars were running properly.

On February 4, 2004, at 8:17 p.m., Mr. Sweeney was 

injured in a car accident while driving a 2000 Ford Taurus 

owned by Mr. Tradewell‟s business. Mr. Tradewell had no 

firsthand knowledge of how and when Mr. Sweeney came 

into possession of the car, and was out of the state on the day 

of the accident. At his deposition, Mr. Sweeney also could 

not recall when he came into possession of the vehicle, but 

testified that he intended to deliver it to a customer the 

following morning. That evening, Mr. Sweeney‟s wife asked 

him to go to a local grocery store to pick up taco shells for 

their dinner. Mr. Sweeney opted to use Mr. Tradewell‟s 2000 

Ford Taurus to run this errand because it was the outermost 

car in his driveway. He was involved in the accident on his 

way back from the grocery store. Following the accident, Mr. 

Sweeney filed an application for underinsured motorist 
5

(“UIM”) benefits1pursuant to his insurance policy with 

Liberty Mutual, which claim Liberty Mutual denied, relying 

upon three policy provisions:

1. The “auto business” exclusion: “We will 

not pay for bodily injury sustained while 

using a non-owned motor vehicle in any 

kind of auto business. Examples of auto 

business are: selling, repairing, servicing, 

storing or parking motor vehicles.” 

(App. 64a.)

2. The “intended use” provision: “You and 

a resident relative are insured while 

using a non-owned car. The owner must 

give permission to use it. It must be used 

in a way intended by the owner.” (App. 

53a.)

3. The “regular use” provision: “We will 

not pay for bodily injury sustained while 

using or occupying a motor vehicle or 

trailer not insured under this Part, that is 

furnished or made available for regular 

use by you or a household resident.” 

(App. 63a.)

 

1 As this Court has explained, “UIM insurance is designed to 

protect an insured from a negligent driver of another vehicle 

who causes injury to the insured, but through no fault of the 

insured, lacks adequate insurance coverage to compensate the 

insured for his or her injuries.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2001).
6

On May 25, 2006, Liberty Mutual filed an action for 

declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Liberty Mutual sought a 

declaration providing that Mr. Sweeney was not entitled to 

coverage on the basis of the three provisions cited above. 

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. 

Sweeney on the basis that the second exclusion did not bar 

coverage, and denied Liberty Mutual‟s cross-motion for 

summary judgment. Liberty Mutual appealed, and on March 

23, 2009, this Court summarily remanded the case to the 

District Court as a result of the District Court‟s failure to 

address all three policy exclusions relied upon by Liberty 

Mutual. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 317 F. App‟x 185 

(3d Cir. 2009). This Court explained that the District Court‟s 

ruling was improper because “Liberty Mutual need only 

prove that one of its asserted policy exclusions applies.” Id.

On remand, the District Court granted Liberty 

Mutual‟s motion for summary judgment and denied Mr. 

Sweeney‟s motion for summary judgment, finding that while 

the “intended use” and “regular use” provisions did not bar 

coverage, Liberty Mutual could nevertheless deny coverage 

on the basis of the “auto business” provision. Mr. Sweeney 

timely appealed the Order of the District Court. Liberty 

Mutual filed a cross-appeal challenging the District Court‟s 

determinations concerning the “intended use” and “regular 

use” provisions.

III.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment de 

novo and apply the same standard the District Court applied. 

Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 
7

2011). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all inferences in the nonmoving 

party‟s favor. See Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 

1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). We will affirm if our review 

shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

IV.

On appeal, Mr. Sweeney argues that the District Court 

erred in holding that Liberty Mutual could deny coverage on 

the basis of the policy‟s “auto business” exception. Mr. 

Sweeney argues that this provision does not bar coverage 

because, at the time of the accident, he was running a 

personal errand and was not engaged in any type of “auto 

business” as defined by the policy. As an initial matter, Mr. 

Sweeney notes that the District Court considered the wrong 

policy language in interpreting the “auto business” exception. 

The language considered by the District Court provided, in 

pertinent part, that Liberty Mutual “will not pay for bodily 

injury caused by anyone using a non-owned motor vehicle in 

any kind of auto business.” (App. 54a.) However, prior to 

Mr. Sweeney‟s 2004 accident, certain provisions in his 

insurance policy had been amended, including the “auto 

business” provision. The amended provision provided that 

Liberty Mutual “will not pay for bodily injury sustained while 

using a non-owned motor vehicle in any kind of auto 

business. Examples of auto business are: selling, repairing, 

servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles.” (App. 64a 

(emphasis added).)

Interpreting the original policy language, the District 

Court held that “the relevant issue is not one of timing as 
8

Defendant contends, but whether the language „in any kind of 

auto business‟ pertains to Defendant‟s use of the „non-owned‟ 

vehicle.” (App. 11a.) The District Court further emphasized 

that “but for Defendant‟s desire to provide his customers with 

an alternative means of transportation while he serviced the 

customers‟ transmissions, Defendant would never have come 

into possession of the „non owned‟ vehicle. The specific 

reason for Defendant‟s use at the time of the accident is not 

enough to change the general purpose for which he possessed 

the vehicle.” (App. 12a.) Liberty Mutual concedes that the 

District Court did not consider the correct language, but 

argues that the result would nevertheless be the same under 

the amended policy language.2 We disagree.

In this case, it is undisputed that, at the time of the 

accident, Mr. Sweeney was engaged in a personal errand, i.e.,

he was returning home from a trip to the grocery store, and 

that he used a non-owned vehicle which was to be delivered 

to a customer the following morning. The dispositive 

 

2

The record reveals that Sweeney did not file a motion for 

reconsideration, which would have been appropriate in light 

of the District Court‟s failure to evaluate the correct 

provision. This Court has explained that the “purpose of a 

motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law 

or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco 

Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). 

Nevertheless, we possess the authority to issue the relief 

requested by Sweeney. On an appeal from a grant of 

summary judgment, “we are free to enter an order directing 

the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the 

appellant,” where, as here, the appeal raises only issues of 

law. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 1995).
9

question before the court is whether his injuries were 

“sustained while using a non-owned motor vehicle in any 

kind of auto business,” notwithstanding the fact that at the 

time of the accident he was using Mr. Tradewell‟s vehicle for 

a personal endeavor.

Under Pennsylvania law, the interpretation of a 

contract of insurance is a matter of law for determination by 

the court. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. 

Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983). The court‟s “primary 

goal in interpreting a policy . . . is to ascertain the parties‟ 

intentions as manifested by the policy‟s terms.” Kvaerner 

Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 

Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). The court construes 

“[w]ords of common usage . . . according to their natural, 

plain, and ordinary sense.” Id. To this end, the court “may 

consult the dictionary definition of a word to determine its 

ordinary usage.” Id. Contractual terms are ambiguous “if 

they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation 

when applied to a particular set of facts.” Madison Const. 

Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 

1999). If the court finds that a particular term is ambiguous, 

“the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured 

and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.” 

Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566 (citation 

omitted). If “however, the language of the contract is clear 

and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 

language.” Id. We find that the “auto business” exclusion at 

issue in this case is unambiguous, and does not operate to bar 

coverage in this case.

While the District Court held that “the relevant issue is 

not one of timing,” (App. 16a), this is incorrect when one 

considers the actual policy language. The relevant “auto 
10

business” exception bars coverage for injuries “sustained 

while using a non-owned motor vehicle in any kind of auto 

business.” The operative clause is “sustained while using,” 

which unambiguously imposes a temporal restriction. The 

word “while” is defined as “the time during which an action 

takes place or a condition exists.” Webster‟s Third New 

International Dictionary, Unabridged (Merriam-Webster 

2002), http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (last accessed 

May 30, 2012). The exclusion is triggered in “the time during 

which” the insured is “using a non-owned motor vehicle in 

any kind of auto business.” At the time of the accident, Mr. 

Sweeney was using Mr. Tradewell‟s car for the purpose of 

running a personal errand, and not using it “in any kind of 

auto business.” The fact that the car was a rental vehicle 

which was to be eventually delivered to a customer is not 

dispositive; pursuant to the plain language of the policy, we 

look to the conduct Mr. Sweeney was engaged in at the time 

of the accident.

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to 

analyze a similar policy provision, various panels of the 

Superior Court have interpreted policies containing various 

“auto business” exceptions and have similarly examined the 

timing and circumstances of the accident. See, e.g., McKuhn 

v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 664 A.2d 175, 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1995) (holding exclusion applied where, “at time of the

accident,” driver “was engaged in the business of parking 

vehicles” and accident “occurred during McKuhn‟s working 

day during his employment as a parking attendant”); Pecorara 

v. Erie Ins. Exch., 596 A.2d 237, 239-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

1991) (holding exclusionary clause did not apply where “at 

the time of the accident” truck was being used “to haul shale 

to improve a parking lot” which was “not the normal use of 
11

an automobile . . . while engaged in the automobile [repair] 

business”); Zizza v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 761, 762 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. 1980) (holding exclusion applied where at the time of the 

accident, employee of auto repair business was driving 

customer‟s car to his shop for repairs, “in furtherance of the 

interests of [employer]”).3

This line of cases teaches us that “we are to examine 

the conduct at issue to see if it is contemplated by the 

exclusion.” McKuhn, 664 A.2d at 177. That is because such 

“automobile business” exclusions are typically intended to 

“encompass a specific risk,” Percorara, 596 A.2d at 239, 

namely the risks associated with the operation of the 

automobile businesses. See also McKuhn, 664 A.2d at 177 

(“We must ask whether the exclusion was meant to protect 

against the risk occasioned by the conduct.”). At argument, 

counsel for Liberty Mutual questioned whether a focus on the 

timing and circumstances of the accident provides an 

appropriate limiting principle. However, we need not define 

the outer limits of the auto business exception at issue here 

because the facts of this case are not at the margins. Mr. 

Sweeney‟s accident did not take place as he was making a 

brief rest stop on his way to deliver the car to a customer; Mr. 

Sweeney was returning from a trip to the grocery store in a 

car that he intended to deliver to a customer the next day. 

Because Mr. Sweeney‟s injuries were sustained while he was 

using the non-owned vehicle to run a personal errand after 

 

3

In the absence of guidance from Pennsylvania‟s Supreme 

Court, we may look to intermediate appellate court decisions 

tending to show how the Supreme Court would decide the 

issue. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 

86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008).
12

work hours, and not while he was engaged “in any kind of 

auto business,” we reverse the decision of the District Court 

finding that coverage was precluded by the “auto business”

exception.

V.

On cross-appeal, Liberty Mutual challenges the 

District Court‟s determination regarding the “intended use” 

provision of the insurance policy.4 The District Court 

originally addressed the “intended use” provision in its 

January 4, 2008 Order granting judgment in favor of Mr. 

Sweeney, which this Court summarily reversed so that the 

District Court could address all three policy provisions. The 

District Court incorporated this analysis into its October 7, 

2011 Order granting Liberty Mutual‟s summary judgment 

motion. (App. 9a, n. 1.) The District Court held that “Mr. 

Tradewell‟s understanding and consent to the occasional use 

of his cars to run personal errands” was clear from the record, 

(App. 16a, n.1), and thus Liberty Mutual had not 

demonstrated a breach of the “intended use” provision, which 

provides that “[Mr. Sweeney] and a resident relative are 

insured while using a non-owned car. The owner must give 

permission to use it. It must be used in a way intended by the 

owner.” Before this Court, Liberty Mutual argues that “[t]he 

 

4 We note that in this case, a cross-appeal was not necessary 

to preserve Liberty Mutual‟s arguments concerning the 

remaining two policy provisions, even though the District 

Court rejected Liberty Mutual‟s two alternative grounds for 

denying Sweeney UIM benefits. In raising these points on 

appeal, Liberty Mutual has “asserted no more than a defense 

of the judgment in its favor.” Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 

72, 78 n.8 (3d Cir. 1984).
13

policy language is clear: the non-owned vehicle must be used 

in a way that the owner both permitted and intended. 

Otherwise, the policy language would be redundant.” 

(Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 24.) Liberty Mutual 

argues that this provision was breached, citing to the 

following deposition testimony of Mr. Tradewell:

Q. Now, can we agree that in your statement 

you‟ve indicated that you were aware that Mr. 

Sweeney would use your vehicles for personal 

errands?

A. It was not intended, although not forbidden.

(App. 252a.) On the basis of Mr. Tradewell‟s conclusory 

statement that such use “was not intended,” Liberty Mutual 

argues that “Mr. Tradewell‟s permission to use the vehicle on 

a personal errand . . . is not enough to escape this policy 

exclusion when Mr. Tradewell‟s own testimony is that Mr. 

Sweeney‟s personal errand „was not intended.‟” 

(Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 24.)

Liberty Mutual, however, selectively quotes Mr. 

Tradewell‟s deposition testimony, omitting testimony which 

unequivocally shows that the vehicle was being used in a 

manner contemplated by the owner:

Q. How did you first become aware that Mr. 

Sweeney would run personal errands in your 

vehicles?

A. I asked him to.

. . .
14

Q. When you say personal errands, you mean 

personal on behalf of you, or personal on behalf 

— I guess I looked at it differently. You mean 

personal on behalf of you, or do you mean 

personal on behalf of him?

A. Him.

. . .

A. Rather than use his personal car for running 

an errand, I would prefer him use mine to get 

the road experience and give me an opinion.

. . .

Q. I‟m not asking you whether it was allowed in 

retrospect. I‟m asking you whether or not 

before this accident you knew that he was 

taking your vehicles and going to the super 

market with them?

A. Yes.

(App. 253a-256a.)

The operative term in this provision is unambiguous. 

The word “intended” is defined as “to have in mind.” 

Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 

(Merriam-Webster 2002), http://unabridged.merriamwebster.com (accessed May 30, 2012). The deposition 

testimony in this case reflects that Mr. Tradewell clearly had 

in mind that Mr. Sweeney might be using his vehicles to run 

personal errands on those occasions where he came into 

possession of them. In fact, he encouraged Mr. Sweeney to 
15

do so as a means of getting Mr. Sweeney‟s opinion regarding 

the condition of his cars. Liberty Mutual has put forth no 

evidence showing that Mr. Tradewell did not have in mind 

that Mr. Sweeney would be using his vehicles to run personal 

errands, and thus the District Court properly rejected Liberty 

Mutual‟s contention that this provision was breached.

VI.

Finally, we address Liberty Mutual‟s argument 

concerning the policy‟s “regular use” exclusion, which 

provides that “[Liberty Mutual] will not pay for bodily injury 

sustained while using or occupying a motor vehicle or trailer 

not insured under this Part, that is furnished or made available 

for regular use by you or a household resident.” After noting 

that “[g]enerally, courts have found the term „regular use‟ 

unambiguous in exclusion of automobile liability coverage,” 

(App. 13a), the District Court held that “it is obvious that 

[Mr. Sweeney‟s] use of the „non-owned‟ vehicle was not 

habitual but merely incidental to a service offered as a 

convenience to his customers.” (App. 14a.) On cross-appeal, 

Liberty Mutual argues that “the test for „regular [use]‟ does 

not consider how often the fleet of vehicles is actually used, 

but rather whether the group of vehicles was regularly 

available for use.” (Appellee/Cross-Appellant‟s br. at 30.) 

Liberty Mutual further argues that “[g]iven the nature of the 

relationship between their two businesses, [Mr. Tradewell] 

made vehicles available for Mr. Sweeney‟s regular use in 

connection with his transmission repair business.” (Id. at 31.) 

We disagree, and hold that the “regular use” exclusion does 

not operate to bar coverage for Mr. Sweeney‟s injuries.

As both Mr. Sweeney and Liberty Mutual note, courts 

have routinely found “regular use” exclusions to be 
16

unambiguous. See, e.g., Brink v. Erie Ins. Grp., 940 A.2d 

528, 533 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (holding exclusion is not 

ambiguous). Viewed in isolation, “„[r]egular use‟ means 

„habitual use‟ as opposed to occasional or incidental use.” 

Crum & Forster Pers. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Corp., 631 A.2d 

671, 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citation omitted). However, 

the “vehicle must be „furnished or available‟ for regular use[;] 

. . . [t]his implies an understanding with the owner of the 

vehicle that the family member of the named insured could 

use the automobile of the other person at such times as he or 

she desired, if available.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Significantly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has described 

the purpose of such provisions as preventing “the situation in 

which [the insured] may have two vehicles which they can 

use interchangeably while insuring only one of them.” Id.; 

see also Johnson v. Braunsberg, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 659, 661 

(Pa. Com. Pl. 1970) (“Regular use” exclusion “represents an 

attempt on the part of the insurance company to strike a 

balance between the desire of the insured to be covered, even 

though not always using his own car, and its own right to 

receive payment of premiums based upon the risk presented 

by the number of automobiles operated.”). While the 

question whether a vehicle is excluded from coverage under a 

“regular use” provision is usually a question for the jury, the 

court can decide the issue of coverage as a matter of law 

where the relevant facts are not in dispute. Crum & Forster 

Pers. Ins. Co., 631 A.2d at 673.

In this case, the record does not reveal any indicia of 

habitual use or any understanding between Mr. Sweeney and 

Mr.Tradewell that Mr. Sweeney had general access to Mr. 

Tradewell‟s fleet of vehicles. As the District Court noted, 

Mr. Tradewell‟s vehicles were available to Mr. Sweeney in 
17

limited circumstances only, i.e., when one of Mr. Sweeney‟s 

customers needed a replacement vehicle while his or her 

vehicle was being repaired in Mr. Sweeney‟s shop. And even 

when one of Mr. Sweeney‟s customers needed a rental 

vehicle, Mr. Sweeney did not as a matter of course pick up a 

vehicle from Mr. Tradewell‟s business and deliver it to the 

customer. That was only one of several ways in which a 

customer could come into possession of one of Mr. 

Tradewell‟s rental vehicles. Under these circumstances, Mr. 

Sweeney was not allowed “unfettered access” to Mr. 

Tradewell‟s cars, as the District Court put it. To the contrary, 

it was limited, conditional, and infrequent, such that an 

expectation of an additional premium for Mr. Tradewell‟s 

vehicles would be unreasonable. See Burstein v. Prudential 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 208-09 (Pa. 2002) 

(discussing policy concerns and “practical realities of 

insurance” animating “regular use” exclusions). None of the 

cases cited by Liberty Mutual support its position; rather, they 

support our conclusion. See, e.g., Prudential Prop. & Cas. 

Ins. Co. v. Hinson, 277 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 

(holding “regular use” provision applied where driver “used 

either one of the two Oley Township police vehicles for 

twenty to forty hours a month, in the performance of his 

duties, over the course of approximately six years” and such 

vehicles “were readily obtainable by him whenever his fulltime schedule permitted”); Crum & Forster Pers. Ins., 631 

A.2d at 674 (holding vehicle was furnished and available for 

“regular use” to family member of the insured where he 

admitted to using subject vehicle “on an average of five times 

per week for and during the entire four years preceding the 

accident”); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shoemaker, 

965 F. Supp. 700, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd,149 F.3d 1165 

(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that important indicia of regular use 
18

include “(1) blanket permission to use the car rather than 

having to request permission each time and (2) an available 

set of keys”). Because Liberty Mutual has not put forth any 

evidence suggesting that Mr. Tradewell‟s rental cars were 

“furnished or made available for regular use” by Mr. 

Sweeney, we will affirm the District Court.

VII.

For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the 

judgment of the District Court, dismiss Liberty Mutual‟s 

cross-appeal, and remand this case to the District Court with 

instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Sweeney.