### Technical Support Docum ent (TSD)

for the Transport Rule

Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0491



## Electric Generation Ownership, Market Concentration

and Auction Size

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Air and Radiation

July 2010

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### Electric Generation Ownership and Market Concentration

In this T echnical Support Do cument (TSD), we explain inmore detail the issues and analyses completed for the alte rnative remedy of State Budgets/I ntrastate Trading described in the proposed Transport Rule preamble in sectio n V.D.5. In summary, this option would set state-specific caps for SO 2 

### , NO X 

### annual, and NO X 

### ozone season emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) and create separate allowance trading progr ams within each state in the respective regions starting in2012. Under this option, EPA would allocate allowances to the

covered sources within each state and the cove red sources would only be allowed to use for compliance allowances allocated within their stat e. To address the concentrated nature of numerous state power markets th rough allocations, under this option some allowances would be

withheld from certain sources in each state thatcontrol a large share of fossil-fueled power generation, and made available fo r companies with a small shar e of generation in the state through auctions. The first part of this TSD describes the st eps EPA took to determine whether the potential for market power may exist if only intrastate tr ading is allowed. It pr ovides a state by state analysis of electricity gene ration ownership and why EPA be lieves electricity markets are sufficiently concentrated to be a concern. Sec ond, this TSD looks at th e threshold for auction participation that was chosen. The objective was to have both enough potentially disadvantaged participants to make the auctions competitive, and to have sufficient sources supplying the allowances to each state pool for auctioning. Fina lly, we discuss the share of allowances that would be available for purchase and why it woul d be adequate to address the market power problem and meet the needs of owne rs with a small market share.

Market Concentration For the State Budgets/ Intrastate Trading op tion described in the proposal, EPA analyzed power generation ownership by state to determin e whether market power would be a potential threat in states within the Transport Rule regions. The analysis was conducted by taking the following steps:

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### 1) EPA ran the Integrated P lanning Model (IPM) for the State Budgets/Intrastate Trading option in which allowance trading was limited to intrastate (IPM run “TR_SB_Intrastate_Trading”). We looked at the detailed output parsed files from that IPM model run for 2014 with particular interest in electricity generation (MWh) at the unit level. Specific details abou t the EGU modeling for this proposal are

available in the RIA and the IPM v3.02EISA Documentation.

2) Following the overall IPM modeling, two primary data sets were used for this analysis of market concentration: the 2014 IPM parsed file containing operating projections at the EGU level and holding company information from the Velocity Suite Ventyx database. 1 

### Units were primarily matche d to the parent or holding company using CAMD_ID or ORIS code. Some units were matched by hand due to differences in representing units in each database or multiple ownership of units. In the case of multiple owners, the generation was prorated using percentage of ownership information.

3) Once EGUs were matched with their ow ners, we summed the total amount of generation owned by each company in each state. The results were sorted by state using pivot tables in Excel and compared to total generation for each state. This allowed EPA to analyze how much gene ration each holding company or parent

owned in each state and calcula te each company’s share as a percentage of total state generation. Many companies appear multiple times with their share of generation ownership in each state in which they have operations. Any owners with zero generation were excluded. Units that could not be matched have also been omitted.

In three states, Florida, Mi ssouri and Nebraska, the gene ration from unmatched EGUs was over 10 percent of the st ate’s total generation. Ho wever, excluding these units from the analysis does not change whether th e states are considered concentrated or not. In Florida, these additional units w ould potentially make an already not highly

concentrated state even less so. In th e case of Missouri and Nebraska where two

1 http://www.ventyx.com/index.asp



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### companies own about 70 percent of the total generation in each state, including these units would not change the fact that they are considered highly concentrated markets. The excluded EGUs in the remaining stat es are generally a small percentage—5 percent or less—of a state’s generation and are not believed to have a significant impact on the results that would materially affect EPA’s overall analysis of state electricity markets.

Overall, results for amount of electricity generation, number of parent or holding companies, size of parent companies, and market share distribution varied widely from state to state. In all states (except Tennessee and the District of Colu mbia, which have only one owner and therefore no market share issues), there wa s at least one company with only a small share— less than 10 percent—of total generation. Additio nally, in most states, there was at least one large company with 25 to 50 percent of generatio n ownership. In extreme cases, one or two entities owned 90 percent or more of the power generation in a stat e. Another way to look at the results is that 38, or around 5 percent, of the largest generation owners region-wide control more than 40 percent of the generation in this anal ysis. Of the total 699 companies identified, 615 companies own less than 10 percent of the generation in a state in which they operate (46 entities own between 10 – 25%). These results indicate that there may be disparities among covered sources in the allowance markets and that the cap ability to exert market power is likely. The results are displayed below in Table 1. In this table, small owners are those that are projected to own 10 percent or less of the state’s generation in 2014, medium owners own 10 – 25 percent, and large owners own more than 25 percent.

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### TAB LE 1: PERCENT AND NUMBER OF CO MPANIES IN EACH MARKET SHARE CATEGORY BY STATE Pct of Generation Owned (MWh) Number of Companies

State Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Total Alabama 15% 20% 65% 9 1 1 11 Arkansas 38% 34% 28% 14 2 1 17 Connecticut 18% 82% 0% 7 4 - 11 Delaware 4% 0% 96% 4 - 2 6 District of Columbia 0% 0% 100% - - 1 1

Florida 41% 31% 27% 28 2 1 31 Georgia 16% 12% 72% 18 1 1 20 Illinois 15% 23% 62% 15 1 2 18 Indiana 28% 44% 28% 23 3 1 27 Iowa 19% 0% 81% 56 - 2 58 Kansas 15% 19% 67% 4 1 1 6 Kentucky 27% 12% 60% 10 1 2 13 Louisiana 29% 43% 28% 21 2 1 24 Maryland 5% 0% 95% 8 - 2 10 Massachusetts 19% 16% 65% 23 1 2 26 Michigan 15% 24% 61% 27 1 1 29 Minnesota 19% 23% 59% 26 1 1 28 Mississippi 16% 14% 70% 11 1 1 13 Missouri 10% 33% 57% 11 2 1 14 Nebraska 10% 0% 90% 10 - 2 12 New Jersey 31% 14% 55% 23 1 1 25 New York 52% 48% 0% 50 4 - 54 North Carolina 6% 0% 94% 8 - 2 10 Ohio 16% 51% 32% 24 3 1 28 Oklahoma 34% 26% 39% 20 2 1 23 Pennsylvania 41% 59% 0% 44 4 - 48 South Carolina 11% 11% 78% 6 1 2 9 Tennessee 0% 0% 100% - - 1 1 Texas 65% 35% 0% 78 2 - 80 Virginia 31% 15% 54% 14 1 1 16 West Virginia 1% 12% 87% 4 1 2 7 Wisconsin 8% 50% 42% 19 3 1 23 TOTAL 615 46 38 699



### To further examine the market power concen tration, we used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the power sector in each state as a way to measure the size of the firms in relation to the industry and as an indicator of the amount of competition. HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration that has been used by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and state attorney generals to measure market concentration for purposes of antitrust enforcement. The HHI of a market is calculated by summing the squares of

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### the percentage m arket shares he ld by the respective firms. A score of 1,800 or more indicates that the industry is highly concentrated and th at the potential for market power may exist. According to our analysis, six states (AR, FL , IN, NY, PA and TX) had HHI scores below 1,800. The remaining HHI scores ranged from 1,817 in L ouisiana all the way up to 10,000 in Tennessee

and the District of Columbia. These collectivel y high HHI scores indicate that the electricity markets by state are exceedingly concentrated an d that steps may be needed to ensure that markets operate as intended. Tabl e 2 shows the HHI scores for each state in the Transport Rule region. Scores in some states are slightly inflateddue to the exclusion of units that could not be

matched to owners and were therefor e omitted from the HHI calculation.

TABLE 2: HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX SCORES State HHI Score Alabama 4,715 Arkansas 1,676 Connecticut 1,869 Delaware 4,652 District of Columbia 10,000 Florida 1,471 Georgia 5,429 Illinois 2,557 Indiana 1,555 Iowa 3,634 Kansas 4,898 Kentucky 2,176 Louisiana 1,817 Maryland 4,522 Massachusetts 2,464 Michigan 4,356 Minnesota 4,022 Mississippi 5,129 Missouri 3,844 Nebraska 4,121 New Jersey 3,361 New York 758 North Carolina 4,709 Ohio 2,040 Oklahoma 2,090 Pennsylvania 1,096 South Carolina 4,068 Tennessee 10,000 Texas 956 Virginia 3,254 West Virginia 4,059 Wisconsin 2,644



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### The preliminary analysis of the generation ow nership in each state which showed that a small number of entities own a large share of generation combined with the HHI scores support EPA’s concern that market power problems may ar ise in states where dominant entities with a large share of allowances would be able to control the availability and prices of allowances in the market. The detailed spreadsheet results for the market concentration analysis described in this TSD, "Detailed Analysis of EGU Ownership by State,” are available in the docket for this proposal.

Criteria for Auction Participation Once EPA determined that the potential for excessive market power in numerous state allowance markets was likely, we decided that making a portion of allowances available to potentially disadvantaged entities through auctions would reduce that risk. As explained in the proposal, only entities projected to own 10 percen t or less of the generati on in a state would be eligible to participate in th e state auction. EPA looked at a range of generation ownership percentages and determined that 10 percent would ensure suffici ent participation and provide assistance for entities at a potential disadvantage in the allowance market. EPA believes that entities with greater than 10 percent owners hip generally own multiple units, receive a considerable share of allowances, and woul d not need access to auctioned allowances. The data show that using a 10 percent thres hold would allow more than 85 percent of all entities to participate, excluding the very largest owners-- those with the po tential to control the markets. Looking at the states in dividually, we project that at l east 60 percent of the owners in every state in the program (except Tennessee and the District of Columbia which have only one EGU owner each) would be eligible and, in some states, up to 90 percent. At the 10 percent threshold, there is at least one large owner that w ould be required to contribute allowances to the auction. In addition, there are re latively few entities between 10 a nd 20 percent ownership share, indicating that the majority of entities are either large or small with only a small group in

between. In some of the less concentrated mark ets, a threshold greater than 15 or 20 percent could possibly make all (or nearly all) entities e ligible and leave no entities to supply allowances. Similarly, if a threshold much below 10 percen t is applied, then fewer entities will be eligible to participate in auctions, and they may actually have to contribute allowances and they may still face an unfair market. The 10 percent limit helps those potentially disadvantaged

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### entities and prevents the advantaged ones from c ontrolling the allowance market. The number of entities between 5 - 10 percent of ownership region-wide is not larg e, but ensuring owners in that range access to allowances through the auctions keeps them from becoming potentially disadvantaged. A lower market share requirement would reduce the number of participants and auction competitiveness, whereas a greater number helps to ensure that auctions remain viable and that prices reflect their market values. In general, looking at the dataavailable to EPA, the 10 percent threshold for auction participation st rikes the right balance between those who need

access to allowances and those who have access and makes the field more level for all regulated

entities.

Percentage of Allowances in the Auctions

EPA believes that the allowance distribu tion methodology including auctions described in the preamble would provide entities that own a small share of power generation with access to

the allowances needed to cove r their projected emissions. Ho wever, as described in the preamble, there is some amount of inherent variabili ty in electricity generation from year to year that is not fully addressed through allocations. EPA analyzed the variability on a state by state basis for small entities to identify an appropriate size range for the state allowance auctions. The variability analysis for entities with a small market share is similar to the approach used for the variability analysis that was conducted for th e State Budgets/Limited Trading remedy described in the proposal. This analys is supports EPA’s recommendation fo r somewhere in the range of 2 to 5 percent of the total availabl e allowances in each trading program in each state be auctioned

to entities with a small share of electric generation in a state.

1) Two primary data sets were used for this analysis: heat input data for 2002-2008 and unit level descriptions from the CAMD da tabase and holding company information from the Ventyx database. Units were primarily matched using CAMD_ID or ORIS code. Some units were matched by hand due to differences in representing units in each database, or multiple ownership of un its. In the case of multiple owners, the owner of the largest percentage was used. In a handful of cases, since multiple units were co-owned by the same parties, the sec ond largest owner may have been listed as

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### Som e units were excluded because the two da ta sets could not be matched. It is not expected that these exclusions would impact the analysis, and may in fact make the analysis more conservative (meaning find a greater variability) in its outcome. Only 80 of the roughly 3,750 units included in the variability analysis were excluded because they could not be matched to a holding company.

2) Emission rates used to create the state budgets were matched to each unit. Then, the heat input for each unit was multiplied by th e emissions rate to get emissions for

annual SO 2 

### and NO x 

### , and ozone season NO x 

### . This provided emission totals that reflected only heat input variability and accounted for any controls known to be installed by the end of 2009.

3) The next step involved rolling up data to the holding company level by state. We determined each holding company’s ownership by state using a pivot table. Companies with share of generation equal to 10 percent or less were considered small

and identified as such. We then calculated combined annual emissions of small holding companies for each state using a pivot table.

4) Finally, we calculated variability for the companies included for consideration

because of their small market share. A lin e was fit to the emission trends for each state and pollutant. We found expected valu es for annual emissions for each state and pollutant using the fitted line. Then EPA calculated the differences between the expected and actual (calculated) emissi ons. We found standard deviation of differences; for 95 percent confidence in terval, we multiplied by 1.65 (note this is one-tailed, since only positive deviations are problematic). After that, we divided the variability by the total state budget for each pollutant to determine percent of state budget represented by variability of small holding companies. Setting a 4 percent threshold, we looked at those cases more cl osely for outlier data and explanations for

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### TAB LE 3: VARIABILITY OF ENTITIES WITH SMALL MARKET SHARE IN TRANSPORT REGION

Standard Deviation/State Budget (95% confidence interval) SO 2 NOx OS NOx Alabama 0.27% 0.32% 0.58% Arkansas 0.15% Connecticut 3.20% 2.82% 3.36% Delaware 0.91% 1.01% 1.50% District of Columbia NA NA NA

Florida 3.22% 2.22% 1.74% Georgia 0.34% 0.72% 2.16% Illinois 1.92% 1.06% 1.53% Indiana 1.31% 1.20% 2.11% Iowa 1.67% 1.19% NA Kansas 2.10% 1.85% 2.80% Kentucky 3.87% 0.65% 3.43% Louisiana 0.01% 2.51% 2.71% Maryland 3.64% 1.80% 2.41% Massachusetts 3.72% 6.42% NA Michigan 0.47% 1.01% 2.25% Minnesota 4.00% 3.09% Mississippi NA NA 3.40% Missouri 1.74% 0.60% NA Nebraska 0.80% 0.55% NA New Jersey 37.72% 6.64% 7.30% New York 11.90% 5.70% 7.02% North Carolina 0.34% 2.27% 3.72% Ohio 2.78% 1.83% 3.79% Oklahoma NA NA 1.45% Pennsylvania 4.36% 1.17% 1.58% South Carolina 5.73% 3.83% 4.00% Tennessee NA NA NA Texas NA NA 1.80% Virginia 3.10% 3.73% 6.07% West Virginia 1.00% 0.97% 1.52% Wisconsin 2.39% 1.34% NA NOTE: In NJ, large variability can be explained by la rge changes in heat input patterns at two plants.



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### 11 For most states and pollutant s, variability for holding comp any considered to have a small market share is less than 4 percent. For st ates that had variability greater than 4 percent, explanations for the high vari ability were found, incl uding variability fr om one or two high emission units (often being used less over time in preference for lower emission units, reducing future impact of these units). Note that al l entities will receive allowances through budget allocations regardless of their relative size. Ho wever, with variability, covered entities may need

access to additional allowances at times. This an alysis shows that the variability tends to be within about 4 percent for the smaller owners in most states and that a modest amount of additional allowances would help to ensure th at they are able to meet their compliance obligations even when their budget allocations are insufficient. In a handful of states, an a llowance pool for auctioning to small owners is less necessary, because the markets are not highly concentrat ed. However, for this option, EPA would implement a uniform allowance allocation method a nd auction format for all included states in each program. The detailed spreadsheet results fo r the variability analysis of small owners of power generation described in this TSD, "Detaile d Analysis of Variability of Entities with Small Market Share," is available inthe docket for this proposal.