COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DAVID CHARLES AUMAN 

v. Record No. 2523-94-4 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

MARSHA JOAN AUMAN NOVEMBER 28, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 

 Timothy T. Szabo (Szabo, Quinto, Zelnick & 

Erickson, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 David G. Brickley (Brickley & Borsky, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 David Charles Auman contends that in determining child 

support, the trial court abused its discretion in deviating from 

the presumptive guideline amounts specified in Code § 20-108.2. 

 He argues that no evidence supports a deviation based either (1) 

on an imputation of income to him pursuant to Code 

§ 20-108.1(B)(3) or (2) on the parties' standard of living during 

the marriage pursuant to Code § 20-108.1(B)(10). We find no 

error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 On September 1, 1992, the parties separated. Mr. Auman 

voluntarily began paying $100 per child per week for the support 

of his two children. The elder child had become emancipated when 

the parties' final decree of divorce was entered on November 18, 

1994. The decree required Mr. Auman to pay $100 per week support 

for the younger child. 

 On December 2, 1994, Mr. Auman moved the trial court to 
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reconsider and clarify the amount and frequency of his child 

support payments. After a hearing, the trial court modified the 

November 18, 1994 decree to require Mr. Auman to pay $400 a month 

child support. 

 "Code § 20-107.2(2) vests discretion in the trial court in 

awarding child support and such awards will not be reversed on 

appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence." 

Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986). A 

rebuttable presumption exists that the amount derived from the 

guidelines, Code § 20-108.2, is correct. Code § 20-108.1(B). 

"Once the presumptive amount is determined, the trial court may 

deviate . . . if such deviation is justified by factors 

recognized in Code §§ 20-108.1 and 20-107.2." Alexander v. 

Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 695, 406 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1991). 

"Whenever a child support award varies from the guidelines, Code 

§ 20-108.2(A) requires the trial court to make written findings 

of fact . . . explaining why one or more of these [Code 

§§ 20-108.1 and 20-107.2] factors would make it 'unjust and 

inappropriate' to apply the guidelines to the case." Richardson 

v. Richardson, 12 Va. App. 18, 21-22, 401 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1991). 

 During the marriage, Mr. Auman worked as a clothing salesman 

at Raleigh's. He was laid off shortly before the parties' 

separation. After six weeks of unemployment, he began work at 

Woodward and Lothrop, where he remained for six months. In 

March, 1993, he began work at Saks Fifth Avenue Clearinghouse, 
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where he earned $13.50 per hour. In December, 1993, he 

voluntarily left Saks for a job at Syms, where he earned $9.50 

per hour. In August, 1994, he left Syms for a job as a 

commissioned salesman at Boardroom Clothier Ltd., where he is 

currently employed. Mr. Auman earned gross income of $29,238 in 

1992 and $25,765 in 1993. At the time of trial, his projected 

gross earned income for 1994 was $17,800. 

 Using Mr. Auman's projected 1994 income, the trial court 

determined the presumptive amount of his child support obligation 

to be $237 per month. See Code § 20-108.2. It found this amount 

to be "unjust and inappropriate." In fixing Mr. Auman's support 

obligation at $400 per month, the trial court based its deviation 

from the guideline amount on two factors. 

 First, finding that Mr. Auman had voluntarily left a 

salaried position for a job paying a lower salary and then for a 

job providing compensation only on commission, the trial court 

held that Mr. Auman was voluntarily underemployed. Pursuant to 

Code § 20-108.1(B)(3), it imputed to him an annual earning 

capacity of $28,080, or $2,340 per month, based upon his 1993 

salary. 

 Second, considering the children's standard of living during 

the marriage and Mr. Auman's $100 weekly post-separation 

payments, the trial court found that "the whole thrust of 

[Auman's] testimony has been that he's very interested in his 

children and trying to pay them, not what he's required to pay 
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them, but what they need to live the kind of life that they had 

lived before the separation . . . ." 

 Citing Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 

(1991), Ms. Auman argues that although Mr. Auman's job changes 

may have been based on bona fide business or personal reasons, he 

cannot be permitted thereby to gamble with his child's ability to 

receive needed financial support. Id. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 

119-20. 

 In Antonelli, the father undertook an unsuccessful career 

change in the face of a support order. The Supreme Court held: 

 [W]hen the father who was under court order to pay a 

certain sum for child support, which he was able to pay 

given his employment, chose to pursue other employment, 

albeit a bona fide and reasonable business undertaking, 

the risk of his success at his new job was upon the 

father, and not upon the children. 

Id. Antonelli is not altogether on point. At the time he 

changed jobs, Mr. Auman was not under an order requiring him to 

pay a court-determined amount of child support. However, we find 

the situation presented in this case analogous to that presented 

in Antonelli. 

 When a family is together, it functions as a unit. Family 

decisions, including career decisions, presumably are made by 

consensus. Although the views of minor children may not be 

solicited, those children are nonetheless part of the family 

unit. Their needs and their welfare are factors embraced within 

family decisions. When the family breaks up, a different 

situation comes into existence. No longer are decisions made by 
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consensus. Rather, the parties must chart their courses in a 

context that is adversarial, at least in structure. Thus, each 

party must make his personal decisions having in mind his 

obligations, both actual and potential. In these circumstances, 

a party is not free to make career decisions that disregard the 

needs of his dependents and his potential obligation to them, and 

"the risk of his success at his new job [is] upon [him], and not 

upon [his child]." Id. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 120. 

 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

holding Mr. Auman responsible for considering his support 

obligations when making career changes or in laying upon his 

shoulders the risk of those changes. Thus, the trial court did 

not err in imputing to Mr. Auman income that his 1993 employment 

showed him capable of earning or in requiring him to perpetuate 

for his child the lifestyle that his 1993 income supported. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.