In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1709

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL L. ALDEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 04 CR 40043—G. Patrick Murphy, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2008—DECIDED MAY 30, 2008

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

WOOD, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Michael

Alden was convicted of conspiring to manufacture, to

possess with the intent to distribute, and to distribute in

excess of 500 grams of methamphetamine in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Alden appeals various

rulings made by the district court, as well as his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
2 No. 07-1709

I. Background

From 1998 until 2004, Alden, along with approximately

thirty other individuals, manufactured and sold methamphetamine throughout several counties in southern

Illinois. A grand jury returned a suppressed indictment

on July 7, 2004, charging conspiracy to manufacture, to

possess with the intent to distribute, and to distribute

in excess of 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Alden was represented

by the Federal Public Defenders Office for his arraignment on July 9, 2004; that same day, the district court

individually appointed Alden an attorney (“Attorney #1”).

After three superceding indictments and a lapse of

two years, the case went to trial. During the two years

between indictment and trial, three different attorneys

were appointed to represent Alden, none to his liking.

On October 4, 2004, Alden filed a pro se motion for

appointment of new counsel, claiming that Attorney #1

refused to file a laundry list of motions. Attorney #1

advised the district court that Alden called his office,

cursed at him, and threatened to “go after” him if he

did not do the things Alden wanted. Attorney #1 explained that he was willing to file all motions that

were consistent with his ethical obligations to the court,

and that he had been trying to work with Alden to get

the information needed to file certain motions, but Alden

had refused to communicate with him. Alden persisted

in his demand for new counsel, and the district court

advised Alden: “I’m going to bend over backwards to

satisfy you, and I’m going to let [Attorney #1] withdraw

if he wants to, and I’ll get another attorney. I’ll tell you

this. I don’t know who it will be. I’ll appoint another

attorney, and if that doesn’t work out, you’re on your

own.”
No. 07-1709 3

On November 4, 2004, Alden was appointed his second counsel (“Attorney #2”). A few months after that

appointment, however, Attorney #2 filed a motion to be

appointed standby counsel and to allow Alden to proceed

pro se, since Alden insisted on continuing to file pro se

motions despite Attorney #2’s representation. Shortly

thereafter, Alden filed another pro se motion of ineffective assistance of counsel in which he complained that

Attorney #2 was not filing motions that he felt should

have been filed.

On September 8, 2005, the district court conducted a

hearing on Attorney #2’s motion and Alden’s pro se motions. Attorney #2 explained that he filed the motions

which he believed were consistent with his ethical obligations and that he had explained to Alden the dangers

associated with filing pro se motions (e.g., that they become part of the court record and the prosecution gets

copies of them) and representing himself. The district

court told Alden that Attorney #1 and Attorney #2

were very good lawyers, and that Alden would have to

make up his mind as to whether he would accept Attorney #2’s services or represent himself. The district court

told Alden:

I think you would not be well served if you didn’t

take [Attorney #2’s] services. I think it would be the

wrong thing for you to do, but you’ve got to fish or

cut bait today. You’re going to have to say yes or no

one way or the other. . . . I’m going to hear from

you what you want to do. You want to represent

yourself or do you want [Attorney #2] to do it? If

you represent yourself I’ll have him to serve as standby counsel. . . . He’s rendering good service to you,

and that’s all anybody could do. . . . You have adequate
4 No. 07-1709

counsel, and I’m going on record with that, you have

adequate counsel. . . . I can’t give you anybody else

that’s more competent than he is to represent you.

Alden refused to answer the district court’s question and

said, “I don’t want him to represent me, and I don’t

want to represent myself.” The district court advised

Alden that he could hire private counsel at his own expense, but Alden maintained that he could not afford

private counsel. The district court then ruled: “You made

a decision that based on what you say and the tenor of

this whole [hearing], you don’t want [Attorney #2] to

represent you. You want to represent yourself.”

For the next thirteen months, Alden represented himself (with Attorney #2 as standby counsel), filing numerous motions with the district court. On August 2,

2006, Attorney #2 filed a motion to withdraw as standby

counsel. Another hearing was held, and Attorney #2

explained to the court that Alden had “hit on” and threatened his secretaries, and had threatened him with physical

harm. On August 30, 2006, the district court granted

Attorney #2’s motion to withdraw, and appointed Attorney

#3 to serve as standby counsel to Alden. Less than a

month later, Alden filed a pro se filing entitled “Lawyer

Issues,” in which he complained that Attorney #3 would

not file any motions challenging the validity of the suppressed indictment filed by the government.

On October 10, 2006, the district court held a hearing

and appointed Attorney #3 to be Alden’s full counsel.

However, Alden maintained that he was not adequately

represented because Attorney #3 would not argue that

the suppressed indictment was invalid and would not

commit to calling every witness that he wanted called.

When the district court explicitly asked Alden if he
No. 07-1709 5

wanted Attorney #3 to represent him, Alden responded

affirmatively. Trial was then scheduled to commence on

November 14, 2006.

On November 7, 2006, Attorney #3 advised the court

that he had recently received over one thousand pages

of recent discovery documents, and that he would not

be ready to effectively represent Alden on the trial date

of November 14, 2006. Attorney #3 requested a continuance, but Alden refused to agree to a continuance and

said he would waive the automatic thirty-day continuance to which he was entitled under the Speedy Trial

Act. Alden said that he would rather represent himself

on November 14, 2006 than have any delay to allow

Attorney #3 to properly prepare for trial. The district

court advised Alden that the mandatory statutory

penalty he faced if convicted was twenty years to life,

that federal criminal conspiracy cases were complicated

and subject to broad and complex rules of evidence, that

he would be disadvantaged by his lack of legal training

and experience in criminal defense cases, that representing himself would be unwise, and that pro se litigants

are held to the same evidentiary and procedural rules as

licensed attorneys. Alden stated that he understood all

of these things. The district court asked Alden about his

educational background, his experience with the criminal justice system and criminal trials, and again opined

that Alden was ill-suited to proceed pro se. Despite these

admonitions, Alden told the court that he wanted to

represent himself, and the court appointed Attorney #3

standby counsel.

The trial began as scheduled on November 14, 2006.

On the second day of trial, Alden filed more motions,

including a motion to withdraw his waiver of the thirty-
6 No. 07-1709

day continuance. That motion was denied, and after a

three-day trial, a jury found Alden guilty of the drug

trafficking conspiracy as charged.

On March 26, 2007, a sentencing hearing was held, at

which Alden represented himself with Attorney #3 as

standby counsel. The district court agreed with the government’s position that Alden was responsible for 5.1

kilograms of methamphetamine, and that Alden “knew

that he was having his wife testify to something that was

false,” warranting a two-level upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Based upon

its findings, the district court determined that Alden’s

sentencing range was 324-405 months with a statutory

range of imprisonment of twenty years to life. The district court sentenced Alden to 324 months’ imprisonment. Alden timely appealed, and this Court appointed

appellate counsel for Alden.

On October 11 and October 22, 2007, Alden filed pro se

motions with this Court, in which he alleged ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel because his attorney refused to raise concerns about the validity of the suppressed indictment and other issues that Alden wanted

raised, and asked this Court to disregard appellate counsel’s brief. Those motions, along with a pro se motion to

reconsider those motions, were denied.

II. Discussion

Alden brings an array of arguments on appeal, including

several in a supplemental brief filed by Alden himself.

We address the arguments warranting discussion in turn.
No. 07-1709 7

1 Rule 6(e)(4) states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he magistrate

judge to whom an indictment is returned may direct that the

indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or

has been released pending trial.”

A. The Indictment

Alden has persistently argued that the indictment for the

drug conspiracy is invalid because it was “suppressed.”

We address this not because it has merit, but because we

wish to put Alden’s argument at rest once and for all.

Undoubtedly, several attorneys and judges have already

explained to Alden that the initial indictment was in no

way defective because it was “suppressed.” A suppressed indictment is simply an indictment filed under -

seal until the defendant is in custody, as allowed by

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4).1

 See also 22

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim. 3d § 830 (2008).

The indictment was unsealed on July 9, 2004, the day

Alden was arraigned on the charges. Furthermore, three

superceding indictments followed, all of which were

valid and included the same drug conspiracy charge.

Alden went to trial on the third superceding indictment,

and he makes no argument that that indictment was

invalid, and for good reason; the indictment in this case

was valid.

B. Competency

Alden contends that the district court erred in failing

to order a competency hearing sua sponte in light of his

irrational behavior throughout the proceedings, namely
8 No. 07-1709

his obsession with irrelevant issues and his paranoia

and distrust of the criminal justice system.

A court may, on its own motion, order a hearing on the

competency of a defendant “if there is reasonable cause

to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering

from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally

incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand

the nature and consequences of the proceedings against

him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. §

4241(a); United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 758 (7th

Cir. 2007); see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)

(holding that a judge must provide a competency hearing on his own motion if the evidence raises a bona

fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand

trial). The district court is in the best position to determine the need for a competency hearing. Savage, 505

F.3d at 760. We review the district court’s decision not to

order a competency hearing for abuse of discretion and its

findings regarding a defendant’s competence only for

clear error. United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 622 (7th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Downs, 123 F.3d 637, 641 (7th

Cir. 1997).

There is no question that Alden understood the charges

against him and was capable of assisting in his own

defense. Alden was very active and vocal throughout

every step of the judicial process. Despite his reluctance

to listen to his attorneys and the court, Alden displayed a

clear understanding of the proceedings and was able to

assist in his defense.

In a nearly identical case, this Court found similar

behavior by a criminal defendant to be “common, sometimes because of suspiciousness and sometimes just

because the accused is trying to throw a monkey
No. 07-1709 9

wrench into the proceedings.” United States v. Timberlake,

409 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir. 2005). We continued:

Many defendants express dissatisfaction with counsel,

assert that their rights have been denied at every turn

(because they have an unreasonable view of what

rights they possess), demonstrate that they do not

understand how the legal system handles witnesses

and investigators (that’s why they need lawyers,

after all), and forget or choose to ignore what judges

said earlier. Many defendants even dismiss their

lawyers because they suppose without justification

that more should be done to assist them.

Id. (internal citations omitted). We have also noted that

“persons of unquestioned competence have espoused

ludicrous legal positions,” but the articulation of unusual

legal beliefs is a far cry from incompetence. United States

v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2003).

Although Alden has demonstrated that he can be rude,

unreasonable, and myopic in his approach to this case, that

is not the same as incompetence and is not the type of

conduct that implies the kind of mental shortcomings

required to oblige a district court to sua sponte order a

competency examination. The district court did not err by

not ordering a competency examination. Alden was

competent to stand trial. Simply being a monumental

pain in the neck is not a symptom of incompetency; it is

usually a symptom of stupidity.

C. Self-Representation

Next, Alden contends that the district court erred by

allowing him to proceed pro se with standby counsel.
10 No. 07-1709

Although Alden (through his appellate counsel) acknowledges his uncooperative nature with the various appointed counsel, he argues that his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel was violated when the district court twice

found—once on September 8, 2005, and again on November 7, 2006—that Alden had waived his right to counsel

and elected to proceed pro se.

We first address whether Alden waived his right to

counsel. Although Alden has a right to the assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment, he does not have the

right to counsel of his choice. United States v. Oreye,

263 F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 2001). A district court is not

required to appoint a new lawyer each time the defendant requests one. See id. (holding that the district court

judge was fully within his rights to refuse to appoint a

defendant a third attorney when he has no legitimate

basis for being dissatisfied with his second appointed

counsel). “[A] defendant can waive his right to counsel

through conduct as well as words.” Id. at 670 (citing

United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 827-28 (7th Cir. 2000)).

A defendant waiving his right to counsel must do so

knowingly and intelligently. United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d

525, 530 (7th Cir. 2005). “[S]o long as the district court has

given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the

assistance of appointed counsel, defendant’s actions

which have the effect of depriving himself of appointed

counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.”

Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 (quoting United States v. Fazzini,

871 F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989)). What is said to the

defendant in warning him of the dangers of waiving

counsel is unimportant, so long as it is established that

the defendant made a knowing and informed waiver

of counsel. Todd, 424 F.3d at 531.
No. 07-1709 11

Four factors are considered in determining whether a

waiver was knowing and intelligent: (1) whether and to

what extent the district court conducted a formal

hearing into the defendant’s decision to represent himself;

(2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the

defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of

self-representation; (3) the defendant’s background

and experience; and (4) the context of the defendant’s

decision to waive his right to counsel. Todd, 424 F.3d at 530.

Because competent individuals have a constitutional right

to self-representation, a district court can not force a

defendant to proceed with unwanted counsel. Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975).

On September 8, 2005, after Alden expressed his dissatisfaction and inability to work with Attorney #2, the

district court held a hearing and gave Alden an ultimatum:

accept Attorney #2’s services, hire private counsel, or

proceed pro se. Alden claims that this ultimatum effectively

coerced Alden into representing himself. We disagree.

This is the same ultimatum the district court gave the

defendant in Oreye. See Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670; see also

Irorere, 228 F.3d at 827-28 (explaining that after refusing

to work with four appointed attorneys, defendant’s

conduct constituted a decision to represent himself).

Alden refused to make that decision for himself, and the

district court could not force Alden to continue with

Attorney #2. Alden stated that he could not afford to

hire private counsel, so he left the district court with only

one option: to have Alden proceed pro se.

The district court also adequately warned Alden of

the risks involved in proceeding pro se and advised him

against doing so. The record also shows that both Attorney #1 and Attorney #2 advised Alden of the dangers
12 No. 07-1709

associated with proceeding pro se, such that Alden was

well-aware of the dangers and disadvantages involved

in self-representation. Alden’s conduct required the district court to make the determination that he had effectively waived his right to counsel and wished to proceed

pro se, and the district court in no way erred in doing so.

Alden also claims his waiver of his right to counsel on

November 7, 2006 was not knowing and intelligent,

thus the district court erred by accepting it. Again, we

disagree. Attorney #3 was appointed full counsel on

October 10, 2006. Shortly thereafter, Attorney #3 requested a continuance in order to prepare for trial, and

Alden filed a pro se motion to proceed pro se. The district

court held a formal hearing on Alden’s motion and Attorney #3’s motion for a continuance. At that hearing,

Alden made it very clear that he wanted to proceed pro se

rather than allow a thirty-day continuance to delay his

trial so that his attorney could adequately prepare. The

district court explained to Alden the complex nature of

the conspiracy charges against him and that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and evidentiary

standards as licensed attorneys. The district court asked

Alden about his educational background and experience

with the criminal justice system, and said that he felt

Alden was ill-prepared to represent himself. Nevertheless, Alden said he understood all of these things

and wished to represent himself. Nothing suggests that

Alden’s decision was anything but knowing and intelligent

(insofar as any decision to represent oneself in a criminal case can be deemed “intelligent”). In light of Alden’s

clear desire to represent himself and his constitutional

right to do so, the district court’s decision to accept

Alden’s waiver of counsel was proper.
No. 07-1709 13

2 In his opening brief, Alden asserted that the district court

made a basic mathematical error in adding up the various

drug quantities. However, at oral argument, Alden’s counsel

conceded that there was no error on the district court’s part,

and that the drug quantities were properly calculated. We

therefore need not address Alden’s arguments pertaining to

this alleged procedural error or that the alleged error resulted

in an incorrect Guidelines range calculation.

D. Sentencing

Alden also contends that the district court made various

errors in sentencing him.2

 First, Alden argues that the

district court failed to properly consider the factors under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining his sentence.

We use a non-deferential standard of review when

determining whether the district court followed proper

post-Booker sentencing procedures. United States v. Price,

516 F.3d 597, 606 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. RodriguezAlvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005). Section 3553(a)

provides that the following factors should be considered

in imposing a sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed training and treatment; (3) the

kinds of sentences available; (4) the appropriate sentencing range under the applicable Guidelines issued by

the Sentencing Commission; (5) any pertinent policy

statement; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants;

and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of

the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court
14 No. 07-1709

judge need not apply all § 3553(a) factors in a systematic

or “checklist fashion.” Price, 516 F.3d at 606; United States v.

Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005). The district

court may comport with its obligations by simply giving

an adequate statement of reasons, consistent with

§ 3553(a), for believing the sentence it selects is appropriate. United States v. Harris, 490 F.3d 589, 597 (7th Cir.

2007). If the district court does so, and the sentence rendered is within the applicable Guidelines range, the

sentence it selects will be presumed reasonable by this

Court. United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 748-49 (7th

Cir. 2007).

The district court judge adequately considered the

§ 3553(a) factors and explained why Alden’s sentence

was appropriate. The judge referred to Alden’s history

as “tawdry, and it goes back for years and years and

years.” The judge also discussed: (1) law enforcement’s

inability to deal with Alden’s criminal activities, and but

for the success of this government investigation and

prosecution, that Alden would certainly have continued

his life of crime; (2) Alden’s prior convictions and his

many incarcerations, all of which failed to deter him

from future crimes; and (3) Alden’s drug addiction,

stating that professionals would be available in prison to

help treat and protect Alden. The district court judge then

turned to the Sentencing Guidelines, and decided to

sentence Alden “at the very lowest end of the guideline.”

The district court gave an adequate statement of reasons consistent with the factors.

Next, Alden argues that the district court erred when

it ended his allocution even though he stated that he

was not yet finished speaking. Alden raises this argument for the first time on appeal, and we therefore re-
No. 07-1709 15

view it for plain error only. See United States v. Leupke,

495 F.3d 443, 446-48 (7th Cir. 2007) (deciding as a matter

of first impression that the right to allocution is subject

to forfeiture, thus plain error is the appropriate standard

of review where no contemporaneous objection is made).

Under plain error review, an error must be “clear or

obvious” and “affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights.”

United States v. Schalk, 515 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2008). If

there is plain error, this Court will reverse if it determines, in its discretion, that the error “seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Luepke, 495 F.3d at 448 (quoting United

States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides that,

“[b]efore imposing sentence, the court must . . . address the

defendant personally in order to permit the defendant

to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence. . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).

This right is not unlimited, however. See United States v.

Eibler, 991 F.2d 1350, 1356 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that

defendant was entitled to right to allocute, but not to

allocute in camera); United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920,

926 (6th Cir. 2004) (statements contesting matters previously raised and decided against the defendant are not

proper during allocution); United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d

1018, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993) (allocution is not the time to reargue facts or law); United States v. Kellogg, 955 F.2d

1244, 1250 (9th Cir. 1992) (right to allocution is limited to

statements designed to mitigate sentence).

Alden elected to use his allocution time to try read a

motion he had previously filed. The district court told

Alden that reading it into the record was unnecessary as

it was already on the record, and invited Alden to speak
16 No. 07-1709

about himself, his wife, or his family. Alden disregarded

the district court’s invitation and began to summarize

his motion and make legal arguments about the statutory

sentencing enhancements filed in this case. The district

court did not interrupt Alden despite its instruction not

to focus on the motion or legal arguments. After Alden

was finished, the district court again asked him if he

had anything to say before being sentenced, and reminded him to focus on addressing the court, the public,

or his wife, and to save legal arguments for another

time. Alden again paid no attention to the district court’s

instruction and began to argue that his co-defendants

received lighter sentences despite statutory enhancements, and that a sentence of twenty years (the statutory

minimum for Alden’s conviction) would be “bogus.” After

a brief apology to his family for the effects his drug addiction has had on his relationships with them, Alden

criticized the legal system’s prosecution of drug addicts

and again veered back to legal arguments addressing

the merits of his conviction. Perceiving Alden’s statements to mean that he has nothing to say in mitigation of

his sentence and was not going to confine his comments

to the boundaries of an allocution, the district court

properly interrupted Alden and continued with the

sentencing. Alden’s right to allocution was not violated;

the district court simply limited it, in an entirely appropriate manner, to the purpose of Rule 32.

Alden also contends that the district court erred by

enhancing his sentence based on his prior felony drug

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 851 and for obstruction

of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Alden bases this argument on the fact that the grounds for the enhancements were not submitted to the jury. This argument is

without merit since neither enhancement required a jury
No. 07-1709 17

determination. See United States v. Williams, 410 F.3d 397

(7th Cir. 2005) (prior convictions); Price, 516 F.3d at 607

(obstruction of justice enhancements).

Alden also argues that the § 851 enhancement for the

prior drug conviction is improper because it is based on

the same charged conspiracy of which he was convicted here. Alden is again mistaken; the § 851 enhancement was filed in relation to Alden’s November 13, 2001

conviction for Unlawful Possession of Cannabis with

Intent to Deliver, which in turn relates to his February 11,

1999 arrest during which he also possessed meth precursors. Besides, even if the enhancement had been based on

the same drug conspiracy charged here, the enhancement was still proper. See United States v. Garcia, 32 F.3d

1017, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that where a defendant continues his involvement in a conspiracy after a

factually related conviction becomes final, that conviction is properly used as a “prior conviction” under § 851).

Thus, the district court did not err in applying the sentence enhancements.

In his supplemental brief, Alden makes countless other

arguments as to why his conviction should be reversed.

None of these arguments are adequately developed or

even cite any substantive legal authority for support.

Because it is not the obligation of this Court to research and

construct the legal arguments available to parties, United

States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006), these

arguments are waived and warrant no discussion. See

Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and

undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where

those arguments raise constitutional issues).”).
18 No. 07-1709

III. Conclusion

In closing, we acknowledge Alden’s contempt for the

criminal justice system and his false belief that the world

is out to get him, but we warn him to be cautious of the

slanderous remarks he readily made against his attorneys and the district court judge throughout the proceedings of this case. Alden has filed complaints with the

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission

against all of his appointed counsel (including appellate

counsel), despite their generous and competent service to

him. Alden also referred to the district court judge as

“vindictive” in his supplemental brief. Rest assured,

Alden has had his day in court. Instead of accepting

the consequences of his criminal conduct, Alden seeks to

abuse the system by continuing to make unfounded

accusation against third parties. This conduct will not be

tolerated, nor will it be entertained by this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Alden’s conviction and sentence.

USCA-02-C-0072—5-30-08