AFFIRMED in part; REVERSE and RENDER in part and Opinion Filed 

May 2, 2023 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00362-CV 

DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE C.V. AND DYNARESOURCE 

INC., Appellants 

V. 

GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887 

OPINION 

Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove1

Opinion by Justice Goldstein 

Dynaresource de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (DynaMexico) and Dynaresource Inc. 

appeal the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss, motion for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment, and special appearance filed by Goldgroup 

Resources, Inc. The trial court’s judgment also denied Dynaresource’s2

 motion for 

1

 The Honorable Justice Lana Myers was originally a member of this panel. The Honorable Justice 

Breedlove succeeded Justice Myers on this panel when her term expired on December 31, 2022. Justice 

Breedlove has reviewed the briefs and the record. 

2

 Except where necessary to distinguish separate Dynaresource entities, appellants are referred to 

collectively as “Dynaresource.” 
 –2– 

recognition of a foreign judgment. In five issues, Dynaresource argues the trial court 

erred in (1) granting Goldgroup’s special appearance, (2) reaching the merits of the 

recognition action after granting the special appearance, (3) preventing an 

evidentiary hearing from being held on the merits of the recognition action by ruling 

simultaneously on the special appearance and on the merits, (4) granting 

Goldgroup’s motion for non-recognition of a foreign judgment, and (5) granting 

Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss. In this case of first impression, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment granting Goldgroup’s special appearance; in all other respects, we 

reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment dismissing for lack of 

jurisdiction Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment and 

Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition. 

BACKGROUND 

On September 1, 2006, DynaMexico, a Mexican corporation, Dynaresource, 

a Delaware corporation, and Goldgroup, a British Columbia corporation, entered 

into an Earn In/Option Agreement whereby DynaMexico granted Goldgroup an 

option to earn up to a fifty-percent equity interest in DynaMexico, which owned gold 

mining operations and assets comprising the San Jose de Gracia property located in 

Mexico. Under the heading “Governing Law/Jurisdiction,” the agreement provided 

that, “[s]ubject to the applicability of Mexican law in respect to the shares of 

DynaMexico and the acquisition thereof, the venue and jurisdiction for any dispute 
 –3– 

related to this Agreement shall be in Denver, Colorado.” The agreement specifically 

provided for dispute resolution: 

8.16 Dispute Resolution. 

All questions or matters in dispute under this Agreement shall be 

submitted first to mediation and then if no resolution to binding 

arbitration pursuant to the terms hereof. 

(a) Any dispute shall first be submitted to a mediator, selected by the 

Parties, by agreement at a neutral location, agreed to by all parties. All 

costs of the mediation shall be borne equally by the parties to the 

dispute. 

(a) It shall be a condition precedent to the right of any party to submit 

any matter to arbitration pursuant to the provisions hereof, that any 

party intending to refer any matter to arbitration shall have given not 

less than 10 days’ prior notice of its intention to do so to the other party, 

together with particulars of the matter in dispute. On the expiration of 

such 10 days, the party who gave such notice may proceed to refer the 

dispute to arbitration as provided in paragraph (b). 

(b) The party desiring arbitration shall refer the dispute to binding 

arbitration in Denver, Colorado under the Rules of American 

Arbitration Association (“AAA”) by a single arbitrator selected by the 

parties. If the parties cannot agree, an arbitrator from the Denver area 

shall be selected by the AAA office in Denver. The arbitrator’s decision 

shall be final, binding and non-appealable and may be enforced in any 

court. The parties shall each pay a pro rata share of the arbitrator’s and 

AAA’s charges for the arbitration. The arbitrator may, in his or her sole 

discretion, award attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses to that party 

which the arbitrator, in its sole discretion, determines is the prevailing 

party. 

Finally, the agreement constituted “the entire agreement and understanding of the 

Parties in respect of the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior 

understandings, agreements or representations.” 
 –4– 

 As set out in the pleadings and court orders in the record, the history of 

disputes between Goldgroup and Dynaresource dates back to December 2012, when 

Dynaresource sued Goldgroup in Texas. Goldgroup defended by arguing, among 

other things, that Dynaresource’s claims were subject to arbitration. Dynaresource 

dismissed the lawsuit in March 2014 and refiled it in Mexico (the Mexico lawsuit).3

 

Also in March 2014, Goldgroup made a demand against Dynaresource in Denver, 

Colorado before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American 

Arbitration Association (AAA), and an arbitrator was appointed. On May 30, 2014, 

Dynaresource filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 

Goldgroup in Federal District Court in Colorado. Dynaresource also raised 

arguments that the Colorado arbitration should be stayed pending a determination of 

arbitrability by courts in Mexico. 

 In September 2014, the arbitrator determined that he had authority to 

determine jurisdiction under AAA rules because the rules were incorporated into the 

arbitration agreement, and the arbitrator deferred ruling on all objections to 

arbitrability until the merits. Between December 2014 and September 2015, the 

Colorado arbitration, the Colorado Federal lawsuit, and the Mexico lawsuit were all 

pending. In September 2015, the judge issued an order in DynaResource’s Colorado 

Federal lawsuit, finding that the parties’ arbitration agreement remained operative, 

3

As part of the Mexico lawsuit, Dynaresource also sought declaratory relief as to the invalidity of the 

agreement’s arbitration provision. 
 –5– 

at least some of Goldgroup’s claims were subject to arbitration, and nearly all 

Dynaresource’s arguments against arbitrability were to be addressed by the 

arbitrator. 

 In October 2015, the Mexico City Court issued an order declaring the 

arbitration agreement “ineffective and impossible [of] enforcement,” providing that 

Dynaresource recover from Goldgroup $28,280,808.34 in damages for Goldgroup’s 

“breach of its obligation to refrain from doing something, when boasting as the 

owner of the San Jose de Gracia project” and as “damages and lost profits resulting 

from the breach of its corporate obligation to refrain from doing something, with 

respect to the San Jose de Gracia mining project, as a result of lawful profits that 

[Dynaresource] should have received . . . from the sale of gold that should have 

occurred.” 

In November 2015, the arbitrator, after being advised of the Mexican order, 

issued a procedural order denying Dynaresource’s application to suspend 

proceedings based on the Mexico City Court order and re-affirmed that a hearing on 

the merits was set for November 16, 2015. Dynaresource contended that the order 

from the court in Mexico City litigation was “way more mandatory than your 

resolutions and even the Denver judge [sic] resolution” and ceased to participate in 

any further arbitration proceedings. 

 In April 2016, Dynaresource dismissed the Colorado Federal lawsuit. In 

August 2016, the arbitrator issued a Final Award in favor of Goldgroup, awarding 
 –6– 

damages and attorney’s fees. Among other things, the arbitrator found insufficient 

cause to excuse Dynaresource’s failure to participate in the arbitration, and 

Dynaresource had no right to pursue arbitrability challenges in the Mexico City 

lawsuit. 

 Goldgroup sought confirmation of the arbitration award in Colorado federal 

court. In May 2019, the Colorado federal court granted Goldgroup’s motion to 

confirm the arbitration award, denied Dynaresource’s motion to vacate the 

arbitration award, and directed the clerk to close the case. The order began by noting 

that “a reader may pause and wonder why this case [was] before the District of 

Colorado when none of the parties are citizens of the state of Colorado and the 

underlying events which gave rise to the parties’ dispute did not occur here.” The 

order explained that the parties’ agreement expressly provided that “the party 

desiring arbitration shall refer the dispute to binding arbitration in Denver, 

Colorado,” including that venue and jurisdiction for any dispute related to the 

agreement was to be in Denver. In April 2021, the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitration award. 

 In the interim, commencing in November 2015, Goldgroup began a series of 

challenges to the Mexican court order in Mexico, culminating in the Mexican 

Supreme Court’s dismissal of Goldgroup’s appeal in July 2019. In December 2019, 

the Mexican Federal Appeal Court issued a “Final Ruling” affirming the Mexican 

court order. In February 2020, the Mexican trial court issued a final judgment 
 –7– 

foreclosing on all solely-held Goldgroup shares of DynaMexico in partial execution 

of the Mexican monetary award. 

In August 2020, Dynaresource again filed suit in Dallas County, this time 

seeking to domesticate, through recognition, the Mexican court’s judgment. 

Goldgroup filed a motion to vacate asserting seven grounds including a special 

appearance averring it is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business 

in Vancouver, British Columbia, with no Texas contacts and improper service. 

 The Dallas County district court, following a hearing, issued an order of 

dismissal for want of jurisdiction on November 30, 2020. In its order, the trial court 

made the following findings: 

1. DynaResource filed this action, pursuant to Chapter 36A of the 

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 

2. There has been no service of process, pursuant to Texas Rules of 

Civil Procedure upon Goldgroup by DynaResource. 

3. Goldgroup has not waived service of process in this action. 

4. Goldgroup has not made a general appearance in this action. 

5. Goldgroup has specifically objected to the Court’s jurisdiction based 

upon DynaResource’s total failure to serve Goldgroup pursuant to 

the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 

On December 4, 2020, Dynaresource filed an Original Petition for 

Recognition of Foreign Judgment in Dallas County district court. The petition 

alleged personal jurisdiction was “not required in this recognition lawsuit” pursuant 

to section 36A.005 of the Uniform Foreign Currency Money Judgments Recognition 

Act (UFCMJRA). See TEX.CIV. PRAC.& REM.CODE ANN. § 36A.005. Specifically, 
 –8– 

Dynaresource argued Goldgroup was properly personally served with process in the 

Mexico lawsuit, was domiciled in Mexico, had a business office in Mexico and the 

cause of action arose out of business done by Goldgroup through that office and a 

foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal 

jurisdiction if these criteria are met. See id. § 36A.005(a). 

On December 31, 2020, Goldgroup filed a special appearance asserting it was 

a nonresident of Texas, had no assets in Texas, and had no purposeful contacts with 

Texas. On January 4, 2021, Goldgroup filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 

the parties’ express agreement designated Denver as the forum for any dispute. The 

motion asserted that “the dispute that gave rise to the Mexico Judgment was directly 

related to Goldgroup’s ownership interest and obligations in Dynaresource and the 

San Jose de Gracia project, both of which the Agreement governed.” Goldgroup 

argued the trial court was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment if 

“the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the 

parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by 

proceedings in the foreign court.” See id. § 36A.004(c)(5). Because the case was 

governed by a forum-selection clause that designated Denver as the forum for any 

dispute, Goldgroup argued, Texas’ venue statutes did not apply. 

On January 7, 2021, Goldgroup filed a motion for non-recognition. As it had 

in the previous Texas suit, Goldgroup argued that the Mexico Judgment violated the 

parties’ express agreement that venue and jurisdiction for any dispute between the 
 –9– 

parties would be in Denver; the Mexico Judgment conflicted with a final and 

conclusive judgment from the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado; and the UFCMJRA did not apply to the Mexico Judgment because (1) the 

Mexico Judgment was not “final, conclusive, and enforceable” and (2) the Mexico 

City court neither had personal jurisdiction over Goldgroup nor jurisdiction over the 

subject matter. 

On February 8, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on Goldgroup’s 

special appearance and motion to dismiss. On May 12, 2021, the trial court entered 

a final judgment granting Goldgroup’s special appearance, motion to dismiss, and 

motion for non-recognition and denying Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a 

foreign judgment. This appeal followed. 

To provide the appropriate context to the legal issues before us, we start with 

an abbreviated primer of the UFCMJRA. 

THE UFCMJRA FRAMEWORK4

Section 36A.006 of the UFCMJRA provides that, if recognition of a foreigncountry judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition may be 

raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment. Id.

4

 The UFCMJRA is a limited recognition statute fundamentally distinct from the recognition given to 

a sister court judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). See generally

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) comment 1 accompanying 

section 36A.006. 
 –10– 

§ 36A.006.5

 The issue of recognition always must be raised in a court proceeding. 

Id. cmt. 1. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country 

judgment is sought must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that 

type of action. Id. cmt. 4. Thus, by filing an action under section 36A.006, a party 

is required to comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 

2 (“These rules shall govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts 

of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature.”). 

The UFCMJRA provides the standards for recognition of foreign-country 

judgments: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a court of 

this state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this 

chapter applies. 

(b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment 

if: 

(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does 

not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 

requirements of due process of law; 

(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant; or 

(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject 

matter. 

(c) A court of this state is not required to recognize a foreign-country 

judgment if: 

5

 Until the foreign judgment is recognized, there is no domesticated judgment for purposes of all 

applicable challenges to a judgment afforded full faith and credit. Unlike a party in possession of a 

registered judgment from a sister state, Dynaresource, as a judgment creditor has no right of enforcement 

until the judgment is recognized. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 35.008 and 36A.006, cmt. 1. 
 –11– 

(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not 

receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the 

defendant to defend; 

(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing 

party of an adequate opportunity to present the party’s case; 

(3) the judgment or the cause of action on which the judgment is 

based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or the United 

States; 

(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive 

judgment; 

(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an 

agreement between the parties under which the dispute in 

question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in 

the foreign court; 

(6) jurisdiction was based only on personal service and the 

foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of 

the action; 

(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise 

substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with 

respect to the judgment; 

(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the 

judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due 

process of law; or 

(9) it is established that the foreign country in which the 

judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered 

in this state that, but for the fact that they are rendered in this 

state, would constitute foreign-country judgments to which this 

chapter would apply under Section 36A.003. 

(d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the 

burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in 

Subsection (b) or (c) exists. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36A.004. According to the NCCUSL 

comments accompanying section 36A.004: 
 –12– 

Recognition of a judgment means that the forum court accepts the 

determination of legal rights and obligations made by the rendering 

court in the foreign country. See, e.g. Restatement (Second) of 

Conflicts of Laws, Ch. 5, Topic 3, Introductory Note (recognition of 

foreign judgment occurs to the extent the forum court gives the 

judgment “the same effect with respect to the parties, the subject matter 

of the action and the issues involved that it has in the state where it was 

rendered.”). Recognition of a foreign-country judgment must be 

distinguished from enforcement of that judgment. Enforcement of the 

foreign-country judgment involves the application of the legal 

procedures of the state to ensure that the judgment debtor obeys the 

foreign-country judgment. Recognition of a foreign-country money 

judgment often is associated with enforcement of the judgment, as the 

judgment creditor usually seeks recognition of the foreign-country 

judgment primarily for the purpose of invoking the enforcement 

procedures of the forum state to assist the judgment creditor’s 

collection of the judgment from the judgment debtor. Because the 

forum court cannot enforce the foreign-country judgment until it has 

determined that the judgment will be given effect, recognition is a 

prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign-country judgment. 

Recognition, however, also has significance outside the enforcement 

context because a foreign-country judgment also must be recognized 

before it can be given preclusive effect under res judicata and collateral 

estoppel principles. The issue of whether a foreign-country judgment 

will be recognized is distinct from both the issue of whether the 

judgment will be enforced, and the issue of the extent to which it will 

be given preclusive effect. 

Id. cmt. 2. The interplay between sections 36A.004 and 36A.005 is clarified by 

NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36A.004: 

Under § 36A.004(b)(2), the forum court must deny recognition to the 

foreign-country judgment if the foreign court did not have personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. Section 36A.005(a) lists six bases for 

personal jurisdiction that are adequate as a matter of law to establish 

that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction. Section 36A.005(b) 

makes clear that other grounds for personal jurisdiction may be found 

sufficient. 

Id. cmt. 6. 
 –13– 

The purpose of recognition is two-fold—to domesticate a judgment for 

purposes of enforcement and attain preclusive effect of that judgment. The 

UFCMJRA does not address seeking recognition in a forum court when the 

purported judgment debtor has no ties, no presence, and no assets in the forum state. 

This appeal directly implicates this issue. 

ANALYSIS 

As a threshold matter, it is antithetical to our system of justice to be able to 

file a suit for recognition of a judgment when the purported judgment debtor has no 

ties to the state in which recognition is sought, either through assets to attach or seize 

by enforcement or personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor.6

 Dynaresource 

does not dispute the lack of nexus to Texas, rather it contends the trial court had 

subject matter jurisdiction “because section 36A.006(a) of the Uniform Act specifies 

that recognition of a foreign Judgment may be accomplished via an original action 

in this Court.” Other than the venue provision,7

 Dynaresource provides no facts in 

support of filing for recognition in Texas. 

The NCCUSL comment to Section 36A.006 is clear that: 

While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition 

of a foreign-country judgment may be raised, it is not intended to create 

any new procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise 

6

 The Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against 

an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” International 

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 

7

 We note without additional comment or analysis that Dynaresource relies on section 15.002(a)(4) of 

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to assert venue is proper in Dallas County as both its nonparty parent company DynaUSA as well as DynaMexico have principal places of business here. 
 –14– 

effect existing state procedural requirements. The parties to an action 

in which recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought under 

§36A.006 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to 

that type of action. Nor does this Act address the question of what 

constitutes a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to adjudicate with regard 

to an action under §36A.006. 

Id. cmt. 4. Further, the NCCUSL notes the courts are split on the issue of whether 

the presence of debtor assets is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction and that the Act 

takes no position on that issue. Id.

8

 

We take the position and expressly conclude that the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure apply to a UFCMJRA recognition suit, including Rule 120a, with 

attendant application of Texas jurisprudence to those rules. As set forth below, 

consistent with constitutional due process considerations, the Texas rules and 

jurisprudence require some articulated semblance of a Texas tie to the debtor; thus, 

Dynaresource’s venue pleadings alone are insufficient to maintain the recognition 

suit in Dallas, Texas. 

Special Appearance 

In its first issue, Dynaresource argues the trial court erred in granting 

Goldgroup’s special appearance. Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over 

8

 In so noting, the NCCUSL references Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has 

been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there 

would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant 

has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an 

original matter.”). We find the Shaffer opinion, its historical analysis of International Shoe, and its progeny 

instructive in concluding that a nexus to Texas, either in rem or in personam, is required to exercise 

jurisdiction over a defendant/judgement debtor. Id. at 213 (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of 

state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 

progeny”) (footnote omitted). 
 –15– 

a nonresident defendant is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. 

See Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2021, no pet.) (en banc) (citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 

S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018)). When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and 

conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support 

the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Id. When the appellate 

record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not 

conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate 

appellate court. Id. at 125–26 (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 

S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). When the relevant facts in a case are undisputed, an 

appellate court need not consider any implied findings of fact and considers only the 

legal question of whether the undisputed facts establish Texas jurisdiction. See id.

at 126 (citing Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558). 

Courts have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” 

jurisdiction and “specific” jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 

Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is 

an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home. See 

id. A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even 

if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State. See id. But 
 –16– 

“only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to” 

general jurisdiction in that State. See id. 

Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has “made minimum 

contacts with Texas by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities [in the state],” and (2) the defendant’s potential liability arose from or is 

related to those contacts. In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 

639 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Moki Mac River 

Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007)). To show purposeful 

availment, a plaintiff must prove that a nonresident defendant seeks a benefit, 

advantage, or profit from the forum market. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. 

Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). Only the defendant’s contacts are 

relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or third person. See id. And 

those contacts “must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” 

Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013) (quoting 

Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex. 

2009)). 

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring 

a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. 

Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 126 (citing Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559); Moncrief Oil, 

414 S.W.3d at 149. In order to meet its burden, a plaintiff must show the act on 

which jurisdiction is predicated, not a prima facie demonstration of the existence of 
 –17– 

a cause of action. Bruno’s Inc. v. Arty Imports, Inc., 119 S.W.3d 893, 896–97 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Clark v. Noyes, 871 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1994, no pet.). This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an 

allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed 

tortious acts in Texas. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 126. If the plaintiff does not meet 

this burden, the defendant need only prove that it does not reside in Texas to negate 

jurisdiction. See Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 

1982). 

Here, Dynaresource argues the trial court erred in granting Goldgroup’s 

special appearance “where the UFCMJRA clearly and unequivocally provides that 

a Court may not deny Recognition of a Foreign Judgment for lack of personal 

jurisdiction over the Judgment Debtor.” In making this argument, Dynaresource 

relies on two Texas cases: Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., 260 

S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) and Beluga 

Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A., 294 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2009, no pet.). These cases stand for the proposition that, under the version 

of the UFCMJRA in effect at the time, a challenge to a Texas court’s personal 

jurisdiction was not available under the UFCMJRA. Beluga, 294 S.W.3d at 305 

(citing Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480–81). These cases hold that the language of 

the UFCMJRA did not require personal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor in Texas 

as a prerequisite for enforcing a foreign country judgment in Texas. Id. (citing 
 –18– 

Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 479–80).9

 The court in Beluga determined that, based on 

Haaksman, the trial court properly denied the special appearance of Beluga, the 

debtor on a Uruguayan judgment. Id. at 305. However, these cases relied on a 

chapter of the civil practice and remedies code that was entirely repealed in 2017. 

See Acts 2017, 85th Leg, ch. 390 (S.B. 944), § 2, effective June l, 2017 (repealing 

sections 36.001 to 36.008). 

In conjunction with the cited cases, Dynaresource relies on section 

36A.005(a)(1) of the current UFCMJRA, which provides that a foreign-country 

judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the 

defendant was served with process personally in the foreign country. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 36A.005(a)(1).10 Dynaresource conflates the former 

repealed and current versions of section 36A.005(a)(1) and pre-2017 authorities to 

support its contention that a judgment debtor is not entitled to make a special 

appearance in Texas court challenging personal jurisdiction in an action brought 

under the UFCMJRA. We decline to follow Dynaresource’s line of reasoning. 

 The rationale in Beluga and Haaksman, on which Dynasource relies in 

arguing that a special appearance is not available in a proceeding under the 

9

 By our analysis we are strictly separating proceedings seeking recognition of a foreign judgment under 

the UFCMJRA from proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment once recognized, which the UFCMJRA 

does not address. 

10 The current version of section 36A.005 provides a non-exclusive list of bases upon which a foreign 

judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction, all dependent upon the 

defendant’s relationship to the foreign country. 
 –19– 

UFCMJRA, premised as it is upon a repealed version of the UFCMJRA, is not 

determinative here. See Beluga, 294 S.W.3d at 305; Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480–

81. NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36A.004 makes clear that, contrary to 

Dynaresource’s contention, the reference to “lack of personal jurisdiction” in section 

36A.005(a)(1) refers to the lack of personal jurisdiction in a foreign court, which 

may preclude a court of this state from recognizing a foreign-country judgment 

under section 36A.004(b)(2). See id. 

The procedural mechanism of a special appearance is solely “for the purpose 

of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the 

defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process issued 

by the courts of this State.” TEX.R.CIV. P. 120a. While the UFCMJRA specifically 

addresses service of process as it relates to the underlying foreign court, it provides 

no guidance as to the formalities of recognition proceedings, requisites of filing, or 

specified notice of the proceeding to the judgment debtor. We therefore look to the 

laws and rules of procedure of this state for guidance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1, 2. Basic 

state and federal constitutional constructs of due process require notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. See Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 

(“Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”)). 
 –20– 

Texas rules provide for a special appearance in response to an original court 

proceeding to telegraph to the court the lack of personal jurisdiction or nexus to 

Texas. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. Goldgroup, as the party resisting recognition of a 

foreign-country judgment, has the statutory burden of establishing that a ground for 

nonrecognition exists,11 while simultaneously avoiding the adverse consequence of 

subjecting itself to this state’s jurisdiction for all purposes. The trial court clearly 

granted Goldgroup’s special appearance while simultaneously ruling on motions to 

dismiss, for recognition and for non-recognition. 

 Because Dynaresource does not challenge the granting of Goldgroup’s 

special appearance on any other grounds than those raised and rejected above, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in granting Goldgroup’s special appearance. See 

Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 438. We overrule Dynaresource’s first issue. 

Once it granted Goldgroup’s special appearance, the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to proceed further with the underlying recognition proceeding. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 120a (special appearance made for purpose of objecting to jurisdiction of 

the court); see generally Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216–17 (assertion of jurisdiction 

inconsistent with constitutional limitation on state power.); see also Int’l Shoe, 326 

U.S. at 319. We therefore conclude the trial court erred in proceeding to rule on the 

11 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36A.004 (d). 
 –21– 

merits of Dynaresource’s claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. Accordingly, we need 

not further address Dynaresource’s remaining issues. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting Goldgroup’s special 

appearance; in all other respects, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render 

judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Dynaresource’s motion for recognition 

of a foreign judgment and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for nonrecognition. 

210362F.P05 

 

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN 

JUSTICE 
 –22– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO 

S.A. DE C.V. AND 

DYNARESOURCES INC., 

Appellants 

No. 05-21-00362-CV V. 

GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC., 

Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 134th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and 

Breedlove participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court granting Goldgroup Resources Inc.’s special appearance is AFFIRMED. In 

all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is REVERSED, and judgment is 

RENDERED that Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment 

and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition are 

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC. recover 

its costs of this appeal from appellants DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE 

C.V. AND DYNARESOURCES INC.. 

Judgment entered May 2, 2023.