IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

JENNIFER AUGUST, )

)

 Appellant, )

) 

v. ) C.A. No. S21A-08-003 MHC

)

PEOPLE’S PLACE II, INC. )

and )

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )

APPEAL BOARD, ) 

)

 Appellees. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Submitted: December 2, 2021

Decided: February 23, 2022

Upon Consideration of Appellant’s Appeal from a Decision of 

the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board,

AFFIRMED.

Jennifer August, Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. Pro Se.

Jennifer C. Jauffret, Esquire, Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, 

Delaware. Attorney for People’s Place II, Inc.

Victoria E. Groff, Esquire, Daniel C. Mulveny, Esquire, Delaware Department of 

Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Unemployment Insurance Appeal 

Board.

Victoria W. Counihan, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, 

Delaware. Attorney for Delaware Division of Unemployment Insurance.

CONNER, J.
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Jennifer August (“August”) appeals pro se from a decision of the

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”) that found her ineligible for 

unemployment insurance benefits because she was not unemployed as defined by 19 

Del. C. § 3302(17). The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record 

below and relevant law. For the reasons set forth, the Court finds that the decision 

was free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the 

Board’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2019, August was hired by People’s Place II, Inc. (“People’s 

Place”) as a full-time domestic violence therapist.1In addition to her employment

with People’s Place, August owned and operated The Art Therapy Way.2In March 

2020, The Art Therapy Way was temporarily closed as a non-essential business in 

accordance with Governor Carney’s COVID-19 response.3 August remained 

employed full-time with People’s Place.4

1 Record at 120 [hereinafter “R. at ---”].

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 9–10, 148.
3

On March 29, 2020, August filed for unemployment insurance benefits with 

the Delaware Department of Labor Division of Unemployment Insurance (the 

“Division”).

5 On October 1, 2020, a Claims Deputy determined that August was not 

eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because she was not unemployed 

under 19 Del. C. § 3302(17).6

On October 11, 2020, August appealed the determination to an Appeals 

Referee.7 At the June 2, 2021, hearing before the Appeals Referee, a representative 

of People’s Place and August both confirmed that August was employed full-time 

and experienced no wage reduction with respect to her job at People’s Place during 

the time she requested unemployment insurance benefits.8 August’s hearing

testimony included the following statements:

August: [C]an I stipulate that I was employed full time by People’s Place? . 

. . And I represented that at all times? Can we stipulate that?;

9

August: But I would like to stipulate that I was working full time when I 

applied for unemployment;

10

August: And again, I would like to stipulate I represented and I was 

employed full time at People’s Place. It’s on my application. It’s in 

every email;

11

August: I did not have a loss of income from People’s Place, right? Not from 

that part of my regular job.12

5

Id. at 120.

6

Id. at 130.

7

Id. at 161.

8

See Id. at 9, 120–21

9

Id. at 36.

10 Id. at 43.

11 Id. at 89. 

12 Id. at 90.
4

August also testified that she had four other claims pending within the 

Division.

13 The Appeals Referee determined that the matter on appeal was limited 

to the Claims Deputy’s decision to deny the March 29, 2020, unemployment 

insurance benefit claim, and therefore, August’s other claims were outside the 

subject matter of the appeal.

14

 

The Appeals Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy’s determination that August 

was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because she was not 

unemployed.15 The decision stated in part, “[a]lthough [August’s] personal business 

suffered lost wages as a result of the pandemic, [August’s] full-time employment 

with [People’s Place] remained the same and was unaffected by the pandemic. . . .

As such, she is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.”16

On June 18, 2021, August appealed to the Board.17 After reviewing the record, 

the Board affirmed the decision.18 The Board’s decision stated that “[August] may 

have other pending appeals or claims for unemployment benefits, but the Board can 

only consider the record before it.”19 Accordingly, the Board determined that the 

only issue to be considered was whether August was unemployed.20 The decision 

13 Id. at 37–38.

14 Id. at 121.

15 Id. at 121–22.

16 Id. at 121.

17 Id. at 10.

18 Id. 

19 Id.

20 Id.
5

noted that August was possibly eligible for pandemic unemployment assistance 

(“PUA”) but the claim before the Board was not a PUA claim.21

On August 19, 2021, August appealed to this Court.22 August filed an opening 

brief on October 6, 2021.23 On October 26, 2021, People’s Place informed the Court 

that it will not be participating in briefing24 and both the Board and the Division 

submitted letters in lieu of answering briefs.25

PARTY CONTENTIONS

August advances no less than fourteen arguments for why, in her view, the 

Board erred. Her filings have been carefully reviewed and her claims can be 

categorized into three groups: 1) that August was denied due process; 2) that the 

Board’s decision was incorrect; and 3) several additional arguments. Her salient 

contentions are addressed below. 

21 Id. at 10; see generally id. at 204.

22 Id. at 8.

23 See Pl.’s Opening Br. 

24 Letter from Jennifer C. Jauffret to Judge Mark H. Conner (Oct. 26, 2021). Pursuant to Super. 

Ct. Civ. R. 107(f), the Court decides this case on the papers currently before it. See Cavallaro v. 

Securitas Sec., 2006 WL 2848106, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 2006).

25 Letter from Daniel C. Mulveny to Judge Mark H. Conner (Oct. 26, 2021); Letter from Victoria 

W. Counihan to Judge Mark H. Conner (Oct. 26, 2021). The Board has no interest in whether the 

Superior Court sustains its ruling. McIntyre v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 962 A.2d 917 

(Del. 2008) (TABLE) (citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Barron, 470 A.2d 257, 261 (Del.1983)).
6

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3323(a), a party to a Board decision may appeal to 

the Superior Court.26 On appeal this Court reviews such decisions to determine 

whether they are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.27

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.”28

The Superior Court’s review of a Board decision is limited to the record 

below.

29 The Court will not “weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, 

[or] make its own factual findings.”30 The record is considered in the “light most 

favorable” to the party prevailing below.31 “Absent abuse of discretion,” a Board 

decision will be upheld.32

26 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) reads in relevant part, “[w]ithin 10 days after the decision of the 

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board has become final, any party aggrieved thereby may 

secure judicial review thereof by commencing an action in the Superior Court . . . .”; see also 29 

Del. C. § 10142(a).

27 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Del. 1981); Flowers-Nichols

v. Tri-State Waste Solutions, 2011 WL 2176515, at *3 (Del. Super. May 31, 2011).

28 Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981) (citing Consolo v. Federal Maritime 

Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966)).

29 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72(g); see also Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 

763 (Del. 1976).

30 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).

31 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2011); see also Pochvatilla 

v. U.S. Postal Service, 1997 WL 524062, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9, 1997).

32 Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
7

DISCUSSION

A. This Court’s Review is Limited to the Certified Record

i. Hearing transcript

When a Board decision is appealed to this Court pursuant to § 3323(a), the 

Board is statutorily required to “certify and file with the Court all documents and 

papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together . . . .”33“From

time to time, minor omissions do occur . . . . A transcript or an adequate substitute

for a transcript is required only to the extent that it is essential for the presentation

of a particular issue on appeal.”34

August takes issue with seventeen separate portions of the Appeals Referee 

hearing transcript and has proposed corrections. Even if it is assumed for the sake of 

the argument that August’s proposed corrections to the transcript are correct, the 

alleged minor transcription deficiencies were immaterial to the Board’s decision and 

are irrelevant to this appeal. Further, there is no reason to believe that portions of the 

record were intentionally altered or that the Board relied on evidence outside of the 

record. Thus, the decision is reviewed based on the certified record.

33 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).

34 Bass v. State, 720 A.2d 540, 541 (Del. 1984) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 

S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963)).
8

ii. Evidence to be considered

August’s filings include several exhibits and alleged facts that are not in the 

record. The Court will not hear new evidence in this matter.35 Additionally, August’s 

arguments related to other pending Division claims and the payment of benefits will 

not be considered not only because they are outside of the record but because this 

Court will not review any matter regarding unemployment insurance benefit claims

prior to the exhaustion of the administrative remedies below.36

B. August was not Denied Due Process and the Board did not Err Procedurally

“In the [instant] context, due process has been described as ‘simply an 

opportunity to be heard in one's own defense. The formality and procedural 

requisites can vary according to the nature of a case.’”37 Nineteen Del. C. § 

3320(a) provides the Board with significant discretion over the review and appeal 

of unemployment claims.38 The Board is authorized to enact regulations pertaining 

35 See Hurtt v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2019 WL 1558585, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 10, 

2019); see also Thompson v. UIAB, 2011 WL 1225587, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2011).

36 19 Del. C. § 3322(a) states in pertinent part, “judicial review . . . shall be permitted only after 

any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted all administrative remedies as provided 

by this chapter.” See Gullion v. Advance Xing Pain, 2006 WL 1067280, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 

24, 2006); see also Bradfield v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2012 WL 5462844, at *3 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2012), aff'd, 53 A.3d 301 (Del. 2012).

37 Kids & Teens Pediatrics of Dover v. O'Brien, 2020 WL 95849, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 8, 

2020), aff'd, 241 A.3d 218 (Del. 2020) (quoting Morris v. S. Metals Processing Co., 530 A.2d 

673, 1987 WL 37999, at *1 (Del. 1987)).

38 See Funk, 591 A.2d at 225; see also Cornell v. Candle Light Bridal, 2015 WL 2395841, at *3 

(Del. Super. Apr. 17, 2015).
9

to hearing procedures.39 Nineteen Del. Admin. C. § 1201–6.3 states in relevant part 

that the Board may “affirm, modify or set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal 

on the basis of evidence previously submitted, without further hearing . . . .” 

Moreover, this Court has previously held that the Board is not under a duty to 

notify claimants of the review date of an appeal.40

Despite August’s displeasure with the manner in which her claim was 

reviewed, the Board’s procedures were free from legal error, no abuse of discretion

occurred and August was not denied due process. The Board did not err in affirming 

the decision of the Appeals Referee without further hearing and it was not required 

to notify August of the date that her appeal was reviewed. The Board did not err by 

limiting its review to the March 29, 2020, claim because the only matter appealed to 

the Board was the October 1, 2020, determination by the Claims Deputy regarding 

her March 29, 2020, claim. The Board did not err by including People’s Place in the 

proceedings below,

41 the Board had jurisdiction over her when she applied for 

unemployment insurance benefits and disputed her claim42 and the Board did not 

induce her to give up her appeal by informing her of PUA policies.

39 19 Del. C. § 3321(a).

40 Molinaro v. Div. of Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2005 WL 1952989, at *1 (Del. Super.

June 24, 2005).

41 19 Del. C. § 3317(b) necessarily involves employers in the unemployment insurance benefit 

claim process. 

42 See 19 Del. C. §§ 3126, 3320.
10

C. The Board’s Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free From 

Legal Error 

To be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, an individual must be 

unemployed.43 Unemployment is defined by 19 Del. C. § 3302(17).

44

Here, the Board applied § 3302(17) to determine whether August was 

unemployed and in turn potentially eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.

Notwithstanding August’s frequent invocation of federal pandemic assistance law, 

this was not a PUA claim and the Board applied the correct legal standard. While 

August may believe the facts support a finding that she was unemployed, this Court 

will not reweigh the evidence.

45 Substantial evidence supported the determination 

that August was not unemployed within the meaning of § 3302(17) and there was 

no evidentiary error.46 As previously stated, People’s Place and August both 

43 19 Del. C. § 3315; see also Corbin v. Am. Flag Inc., 2007 WL 3105856, at *2 (Del. Super. 

Oct. 15, 2007).

44 19 Del. C. § 3302(17) reads:

Unemployment exists and an individual is “unemployed” in any week during 

which the individual performs no services and with respect to which no wages are 

payable to the individual, or in any week of less than full-time work if the wages 

payable to the individual with respect to such week are less than the individual's 

weekly benefit amount plus whichever is the greater of $10 or 50% of the 

individual's weekly benefit amount. The Department shall prescribe regulations 

applicable to unemployed individuals making such distinctions in the procedures 

as to total unemployment, part-total unemployment, partial unemployment of 

individuals attached to their regular jobs and other forms of short-time work as 

the Department deems necessary.

45 Supra note 26.

46 See Geegan v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, Del. Supr., 76 A.2d 116, 117 (1950); 

see also Phillips v. P & N Distribution, 1998 WL 437148, at *5 (Del. Super. June 23, 1998); 
11

confirmed on the record that August was employed full-time and experienced no 

wage reduction with respect to her job at People’s Place during the time she 

requested unemployment insurance benefits. In consideration of this evidence, it was

reasonable for the Board to determine that August was not unemployed. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Board’s decision was free from legal error and supported 

by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance 

Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

_/s/ Mark H. Conner___________

Mark H. Conner, Judge

cc: Prothonotary