AFFIRMED in part; REVERSE and RE NDER in part and Opinion Filed May 2, 2023 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00362-CV DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S. A. DE C.V. AND DYNARESOURCE INC., Appellants V. GOLDGROUP RESOURCE S INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887 OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove 1 Opinion by Justice Goldstein Dynaresource de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (DynaMexico) and Dynaresource Inc.appeal the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss, motion for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment, and special appearance filed by Goldgroup Resources, Inc. The trial court’s j udgment also denied Dynaresource’s 2 motion for

1 The Honorable Justice Lana Myers was originally a member of this panel. The Honorable Justice Breedlove succeeded Justice Myers on this panel when her term expired on Decem ber 31, 2022. Justice Breedlove has reviewed the briefs and the record.
2 Except where necessary to distinguish separate Dynaresource entities, appellants are referred to collectively as “Dynaresource.”–2– recognition of a foreign judgment. In five issues, Dynaresource argues the trial court erred in (1) granting Goldgroup’s special a ppearance, (2) reaching the merits of the recognition action after granting the sp ecial appearance, (3) preventing an evidentiary hearing from being held on the merits of the recognition action by ruling simultaneously on the special appearan ce and on the merits, (4) granting Goldgroup’s motion for non-recognition of a foreign judgment, and (5) granting Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss. In this cas e of first impression, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting Goldgroup’s special appearance; in all other respects, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Dynaresource’s motion for r ecognition of a foreign judgment and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition.
BACKGROUND On September 1, 2006, DynaMexico, a Mexican corporation, Dynaresource, a Delaware corporation, a nd Goldgroup, a British Columb ia corporation, entered into an Earn In/Option Agreement wher eby DynaMexico granted Goldgroup an option to earn up to a fifty-percent equity interest in DynaMexi co, which owned gold mining operations and assets comprising the San Jose de Gracia property located in Mexico. Under the heading “Governing La w/Jurisdiction,” the agreement provided that, “[s]ubject to the applicability of Me xican law in respect to the shares of DynaMexico and the acquisition thereof, th e venue and jurisdiction for any dispute–3– related to this Agreement sh all be in Denver, Colorado.” The agreement specifically provided for dispute resolution: 8.16 Dispute Resolution. All questions or matters in disp ute under this Agreement shall be submitted first to mediation and then if no resolution to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms hereof. (a) Any dispute shall first be submitted to a mediator, selected by the Parties, by agreement at a neutral loca tion, agreed to by all parties. All costs of the mediation shall be bor ne equally by the parties to the dispute. (a) It shall be a condition precedent to the right of any party to submit any matter to arbitration pursuant to the provisions hereof, that any party intending to refer a ny matter to arbitration shall have given not less than 10 days’ prior notice of its intention to do so to the other party, together with particulars of the matte r in dispute. On the expiration of such 10 days, the party who gave su ch notice may proceed to refer the dispute to arbitration as provided in paragraph (b). (b) The party desiring arbitration sh all refer the dispute to binding arbitration in Denver, Colorado under the Rules of American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) by a single arbitrator selected by the parties. If the parties cannot agree, an arbitrator from the Denver area shall be selected by the AAA office in Denver. The arbitrator’s decision shall be final, binding and non-appeal able and may be enforced in any court. The parties shall each pay a pr o rata share of th e arbitrator’s and AAA’s charges for the arbitration. The ar bitrator may, in his or her sole discretion, award attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses to that party which the arbitrator, in its sole disc retion, determines is the prevailing party. Finally, the agreement constituted “the entire agreement and understanding of the Parties in respect of the subject ma tter hereof and supersedes all prior understandings, agreements or representations.”–4– As set out in the pleadings and court orders in the record, the history of disputes between Goldgroup and Dynaresource dates back to December 2012, when Dynaresource sued Goldgroup in Texas. Goldgroup defended by arguing, among other things, that Dynaresour ce’s claims were subject to arbitration. Dynaresource dismissed the lawsuit in Ma rch 2014 and refiled it in Mexi co (the Mexico lawsuit). 3 Also in March 2014, Goldgroup made a demand against Dynaresource in Denver, Colorado before the Interna tional Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and an arb itrator was appointed. On May 30, 2014, Dynaresource filed a lawsuit seeking d eclaratory and injunctive relief against Goldgroup in Federal District Court in Colorado. Dynaresource also raised arguments that the Colorado arbitration s hould be stayed pending a determination of arbitrability by courts in Mexico. In September 2014, the arbitrator de termined that he had authority to determine jurisdiction under AA A rules because the rules we re incorporated into the arbitration agreement, and the arbitrat or deferred ruling on all objections to arbitrability until the merits . Between Dece mber 2014 and September 2015, the Colorado arbitration, the Colo rado Federal lawsuit, and th e Mexico lawsuit were all pending. In September 2015, the judge issu ed an order in DynaResource’s Colorado Federal lawsuit, finding that the parties’ arbitration agreement remained operative,

3 As part of the Mexico lawsuit, Dynaresource also sought declaratory relief as to the invalidity of the agreement’s arbitration provision.–5– at least some of Goldgroup’s claims were subject to arbitration, and nearly all Dynaresource’s arguments against arbitrability were to be addressed by the arbitrator. In October 2015, the Mexico City Court issued an order declaring the arbitration agreement “ineffective and impo ssible [of] enforcement,” providing that Dynaresource recover from Goldgroup $28, 280,808.34 in damages for Goldgroup’s “breach of its obligation to refrain from doing something, when boasting as the owner of the San Jose de Gr acia project” and as “damages and lost profits resulting from the breach of its corporate obligation to refrain from doing something, with respect to the San Jose de Gracia mining pr oject, as a result of lawful profits that [Dynaresource] should have received . . . from the sale of gold that should have occurred.” In November 2015, the arbitrator, afte r being advised of the Mexican order, issued a procedural order denying D ynaresource’s application to suspend proceedings based on the Mexico City Cour t order and re-affirmed that a hearing on the merits was set for Nove mber 16, 2015. Dynaresource contended that the order from the court in Mexico City litigati on was “way more mandatory than your resolutions and even the Denver judge [sic] resolution” and ceased to participate in any further arbitration proceedings. In April 2016, Dynaresource dismisse d the Colorado Federal lawsuit. In August 2016, the arbitrator issued a Fina l Award in favor of Goldgroup, awarding–6– damages and attorney’s fees. Among other things, the arb itrator found insufficient cause to excuse Dynaresour ce’s failure to participate in the arbitration, and Dynaresource had no right to pursue arbitr ability challenges in the Mexico City lawsuit. Goldgroup sought confirmation of the arbitration award in Colorado federal court. In May 2019, the Colorado federal court gran ted Goldgroup’s motion to confirm the arbitration award, denied Dynaresource’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, and directed the clerk to close the case. Th e order began by noting that “a reader may pause a nd wonder why this case [was ] before the District of Colorado when none of the parties are c itizens of the state of Colorado and the underlying events which gave rise to the pa rties’ dispute did not occur here.” The order explained that the parties’ agreem ent expressly provided that “the party desiring arbitration shall refer the dis pute to binding arbitration in Denver, Colorado,” including that venue and juri sdiction for any dis pute related to the agreement was to be in Denve r. In April 2021, the Unite d States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitration award. In the interim, commencing in Novemb er 2015, Goldgroup began a series of challenges to the Mexican court order in Mexico, culminating in the Mexican Supreme Court’s dismissal of Goldgroup’s appeal in July 2019. In December 2019, the Mexican Federal Appeal Court issued a “Final Ruling” affirming the Mexican court order. In February 2020, the Mexican trial court issued a final judgment–7– foreclosing on all solely-held Goldgroup shar es of DynaMexico in partial execution of the Mexican monetary award. In August 2020, Dynaresource again file d suit in Dallas County, this time seeking to domesticate, through recognitio n, the Mexican court’s judgment. Goldgroup filed a motion to vacate asse rting seven grounds including a special appearance averring it is a Canadian corpor ation with its principal place of business in Vancouver, British Columbia, with no Texas contacts and improper service. The Dallas County district court, following a hearing, issued an order of dismissal for want of jurisdiction on November 30, 2020. In its or der, the trial court made the following findings:
1. DynaResource filed this action, pursuant to Chapter 36A of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 2. There has been no service of pro cess, pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure upon Goldgroup by DynaResource. 3. Goldgroup has not waived service of process in this action. 4. Goldgroup has not made a genera l appearance in this action. 5. Goldgroup has specifically objected to the Court’s jurisdiction based upon DynaResource’s total failure to serve Goldgroup pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 4, 2020, Dynaresour ce filed an Original Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgme nt in Dallas County distri ct court. The petition alleged personal jurisdiction was “not required in this recognition lawsuit” pursuant to section 36A.005 of the Uniform Fore ign Currency Money J udgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). See T EX
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. C ODE A NN . § 36A.005. Specifically,–8– Dynaresource argued Goldgroup was properly personally serv ed with process in the Mexico lawsuit, was domiciled in Mexico, had a business office in Mexico and the cause of action arose out of business do ne by Goldgroup through that office and a foreign-country judgment may not be re fused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if these criteria are met. See id. § 36A.005(a). On December 31, 2020, Goldgroup filed a special appearance asserting it was a nonresident of Texas, had no assets in Texas, and had no purposeful contacts with Texas. On January 4, 2021, Goldgroup file d a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the parties’ express agreement designated De nver as the forum for any dispute. The motion asserted that “the dispute that gave rise to the Mexico Judgment was directly related to Goldgroup’s ownership interest and obligations in Dynaresource and the San Jose de Gracia project, both of whic h the Agreement governed.” Goldgroup argued the trial court was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment if “the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question wa s to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in the foreign court.” See id. § 36A.004(c)(5). Because the case was governed by a forum-selection clause that designated Denver as the forum for any dispute, Goldgroup argued, Texas’ venue statutes did not apply. On January 7, 2021, Goldgroup filed a motion for non-recognition. As it had in the previous Texas suit, Goldgroup argu ed that the Mexico Judgment violated the parties’ express agreement that venue an d jurisdiction for any dispute between the–9– parties would be in Denver; the Mexico Judgment conflicted with a final and conclusive judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado; and the UFCMJRA did not apply to the Mexico Judgment because (1) the Mexico Judgment was not “final, conclusi ve, and enforceable” and (2) the Mexico City court neither had pers onal jurisdiction over Goldgro up nor jurisdiction over the subject matter. On February 8, 2021, the trial c ourt conducted a hearing on Goldgroup’s special appearance and motion to dismiss. On May 12, 2021, the trial court entered a final judgment granting Goldgroup’s speci al appearance, motion to dismiss, and motion for non-recognition and denying Dyna resource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment. This appeal followed. To provide the appropriate context to the legal issues before us, we start with an abbreviated primer of the UFCMJRA
. THE UFCMJRA FRAMEWORK 4 Section 36A.006 of the UFCMJRA provide s that, if recognition of a foreigncountry judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition may be raised by filing an action seeking recogni tion of the foreign-country judgment. Id.

4 The UFCMJRA is a limited recognition statute fund amentally distinct from the recognition given to a sister court judgment under the Uniform Enfo rcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). See generally National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) comment 1 accompanying section 36A.006.–10– § 36A.006. 5 The issue of recognition always must be raised in a court proceeding. Id. cmt. 1. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought must comply with all stat e procedural rules with regard to that type of action. Id. cmt. 4. Thus, by filing an action under section 36A.006, a party is required to comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See T EX
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. P. 2 (“These rules shall govern th e procedure in the justice, county, and district courts of the State of Texas in all ac tions of a civil nature.”). The UFCMJRA provides the standards for recognition of foreign-country judgments: (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a court of this state shall recognize a forei gn-country judgment to which this chapter applies. (b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if: (1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign court did not ha ve personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. (c) A court of this state is not re quired to recognize a foreign-country judgment if:

5 Until the foreign judgment is recognized, there is no domesticated judgment for purposes of all applicable challenges to a judgment afforded full faith and credit. Unlike a party in possession of a registered judgment from a sister state, Dynaresour ce, as a judgment creditor has no right of enforcement until the judgment is recognized. See T EX

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. C ODE §§ 35.008 and 36A.006, cmt. 1.–11– (1) the defendant in the proceedi ng in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend; (2) the judgment was obtained by fra ud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunit y to present the party’s case; (3) the judgment or the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or the United States; (4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; (5) the proceeding in the forei gn court was contrary to an agreement between the partie s under which the dispute in question was to be determined ot herwise than by proceedings in the foreign court; (6) jurisdiction was based only on personal service and the foreign court was a seriously inc onvenient forum for the trial of the action; (7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; (8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible w ith the requirements of due process of law; or (9) it is established that the foreign country in which the judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered in this state that, but for the fact that they are rendered in this state, would constitute foreign-c ountry judgments to which this chapter would apply under Section 36A.003. (d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in Subsection (b) or (c) exists. T EX
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. C ODE A NN . § 36A.004. According to the NCCUSL comments accompanying section 36A.004:–12– Recognition of a judgment means th at the forum court accepts the determination of legal rights and obligations made by the rendering court in the foreign country. See, e.g. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, Ch. 5, Topic 3, Introductory Note (recognition of foreign judgment occurs to the extent the forum court gives the judgment “the same effect with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issues involved that it has in the state where it was rendered.”). Recognition of a fo reign-country judgment must be distinguished from enforcement of th at judgment. Enforcement of the foreign-country judgment involve s the application of the legal procedures of the state to ensure that the judgment debtor obeys the foreign-country judgment. Recogn ition of a forei gn-country money judgment often is associated with en forcement of the judgment, as the judgment creditor usually seeks recognition of the foreign-country judgment primarily for the purpose of invoking the enforcement procedures of the forum state to assist the judgment creditor’s collection of the judgment from th e judgment debtor. Because the forum court cannot enforce the foreign-country judgment until it has determined that the judgment will be given effect, recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign-country judgment. Recognition, however, also has signi ficance outside the enforcement context because a foreign-country judgment also must be recognized before it can be given preclusive e ffect under res judicata and collateral estoppel principles. The issue of whether a foreign-country judgment will be recognized is distinct fro m both the issue of whether the judgment will be enforced, and the issu e of the extent to which it will be given preclusive effect. Id. cmt. 2. The interplay between sec tions 36A.004 and 36A.005 is clarified by NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36A.004: Under § 36A.004(b)(2), the forum c ourt must deny recognition to the foreign-country judgment if the fo reign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Sec tion 36A.005(a) lists six bases for personal jurisdiction that are adequate as a matter of law to establish that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction. Section 36A.005(b) makes clear that other grounds for personal jurisdiction may be found sufficient. Id. cmt. 6.–13– The purpose of recognition is two-fold—to domesticate a judgment for purposes of enforcement and attain precl usive effect of that judgment. The UFCMJRA does not address seeking recognition in a forum court when the purported judgment debtor has no ties, no presence, and no assets in the forum state. This appeal directly implicates this issue.
ANALYSIS As a threshold matter, it is antithetical to our system of justice to be able to file a suit for recognition of a judgment when the purported judgment debtor has no ties to the state in which recognition is sought , either through assets to attach or seize by enforcement or personal jurisdic tion over the judgment debtor. 6 Dynaresource does not dispute the lack of nexus to Texa s, rather it contends the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction “because secti on 36A.006(a) of the Uniform Act specifies that recognition of a foreign Judgment may be accomplished via an original action in this Court.” Other than the venue provision, 7 Dynaresource provides no facts in support of filing for r ecognition in Texas. The NCCUSL comment to Sec tion 36A.006 is clear that: While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment may be raised, it is not intended to create any new procedure not currently exis ting in the state or to otherwise

6 The Due Process Clause “does not co ntemplate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7 We note without additional comment or analysis that Dynaresource relies on section 15.002(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to asser t venue is proper in Dallas County as both its nonparty parent company DynaUSA as well as DynaMe xico have principal places of business here.–14– effect existing state procedural requi rements. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign- country judgment is sought under §36A.006 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that type of action. Nor does this Act address the question of what constitutes a sufficient basis for juri sdiction to adjudicate with regard to an action under §36A.006. Id. cmt. 4. Further, the NCCUSL notes the courts are split on the issue of whether the presence of debtor assets is a suffici ent basis for jurisdiction and that the Act takes no position on that issue. Id

. 8 We take the position and e xpressly conclude that th e Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a UFCMJRA recogn ition suit, including Rule 120a, with attendant application of Texa s jurisprudence to those rule s. As set forth below, consistent with constituti onal due process considera tions, the Texas rules and jurisprudence require some articulated semb lance of a Texas tie to the debtor; thus, Dynaresource’s venue pleadings alone are insufficient to maintain the recognition suit in Dallas, Texas. Special Appearance In its first issue, Dynaresource argue s the trial court erred in granting Goldgroup’s special appearance . Whether a trial court ha s personal jurisdiction over

8 In so noting, the NCCUSL references Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has been determined by a court of compet ent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have juri sdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.”). We find the Shaffer opinion, its historical analysis of International Shoe , and its progeny instructive in concluding that a nexus to Texas, eith er in rem or in personam, is required to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant/judgement debtor. Id. at 213 (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluate d according to the sta ndards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny”) (footnote omitted).–15– a nonresident defendant is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. See Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara , 633 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2021, no pet.) (en banc) (citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell , 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018)). When a trial c ourt does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appear ance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Id. When the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate appellate court. Id. at 125–26 (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). When the relevant facts in a case are undisputed, an appellate court need not cons ider any implied findings of fact and considers only the legal question of whether the undisputed facts establish Te xas jurisdiction. See id. at 126 (citing Old Republic , 549 S.W.3d at 558). Courts have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” jurisdiction and “specific” jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. , 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). For an indi vidual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the indi vidual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corpor ation is fairly regarded as at home. See id. A court with general jurisdiction may h ear any claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the cl aim occurred in a different State. See id. But–16– “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to” general jurisdiction in that State. See id. Specific jurisdiction exists when (1 ) the defendant has “made minimum contacts with Texas by purposefully availi ng itself of the privilege of conducting activities [in the state],” and (2) the defe ndant’s potential liability arose from or is related to those contacts. In re Christianson Air C onditioning & Plumbing, LLC , 639 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007)). To show purposeful availment, a plaintiff must prove that a nonresident defendant seeks a benefit, advantage, or profit from the forum market. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). Only the defendant’s contacts are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or third person. See id. And those contacts “must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co. , 278 S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex. 2009)). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pl eading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisi ons of the Texas long-arm statute. Saidara , 633 S.W.3d at 126 (citing Old Republic , 549 S.W.3d at 559); Moncrief Oil , 414 S.W.3d at 149. In order to meet its burden, a plaintiff must show the act on which jurisdiction is predicated, not a prim a facie demonstration of the existence of–17– a cause of action. Bruno’s Inc. v. Arty Imports, Inc. , 119 S.W.3d 893, 896–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Clark v. Noyes , 871 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1994, no pet.). Th is minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in Texas. Saidara , 633 S.W.3d at 126. If the plaintiff does not meet this burden, the defendant need only prove th at it does not reside in Texas to negate jurisdiction. See Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc. , 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982). Here, Dynaresource argues the trial c ourt erred in granting Goldgroup’s special appearance “where the UFCMJRA clearly and unequivocally provides that a Court may not deny Recognition of a Fo reign Judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Judgment Debtor.” In making this argument, Dynaresource relies on two Texas cases: Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd ., 260 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.—Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) and Beluga Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A., 294 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). These cases sta nd for the proposition that, under the version of the UFCMJRA in effect at the time, a challenge to a Te xas court’s personal jurisdiction was not available under the UFCMJRA. Beluga , 294 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Haaksman , 260 S.W.3d at 480–81). These ca ses hold that the language of the UFCMJRA did not require personal juri sdiction over a judgment debtor in Texas as a prerequisite for enforcing a fo reign country judgment in Texas. Id . (citing–18– Haaksman , 260 S.W.3d at 479–80). 9 The court in Beluga determined that, based on Haaksman , the trial court properly denied th e special appearance of Beluga, the debtor on a Uruguayan judgment. Id . at 305. However, these cases relied on a chapter of the civil practice and remedies c ode that was entirely repealed in 2017.
See Acts 2017, 85th Leg, ch. 390 (S.B. 944), § 2, effective June l, 2017 (repealing sections 36.001 to 36.008). In conjunction with the cited ca ses, Dynaresource relies on section 36A.005(a)(1) of the current UFCMJRA, wh ich provides that a foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the defendant was served w ith process personally in the foreign country. See T EX
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. C ODE A NN .§ 36A.005(a)(1). 10 Dynaresource conflates the former repealed and current versions of secti on 36A.005(a)(1) and pre-2017 authorities to support its contention that a judgment de btor is not entitled to make a special appearance in Texas court challenging pe rsonal jurisdiction in an action brought under the UFCMJRA. We decline to fo llow Dynaresource’s line of reasoning. The rationale in Beluga and Haaksman , on which Dynasource relies in arguing that a special appearance is not available in a proceeding under the

9 By our analysis we are strictly separating proceed ings seeking recognition of a foreign judgment under the UFCMJRA from proceedings to enforce a fore ign judgment once recognized, which the UFCMJRA does not address.
10 The current version of section 36A.005 provides a non-exclusive list of bases upon which a foreign judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction, all dependent upon the defendant’s relationship to the foreign country.–19– UFCMJRA, premised as it is upon a repeal ed version of the UFCMJRA, is not determinative here. See Beluga , 294 S.W.3d at 305; Haaksman , 260 S.W.3d at 480– 81. NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36 A.004 makes clear that, contrary to Dynaresource’s contention, the reference to “lack of personal jurisdiction” in section 36A.005(a)(1) refers to the lack of person al jurisdiction in a foreign court, which may preclude a court of this state fro m recognizing a foreign-country judgment under section 36A.004(b)(2). See id

. The procedural mechanism of a special appearance is solely “for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that su ch party or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.” T EX
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. P. 120a. While the UFCMJRA specifically addresses service of process as it relates to the underlying foreign court, it provides no guidance as to the formalities of recogn ition proceedings, requisites of filing, or specified notice of the proceeding to the j udgment debtor. We therefore look to the laws and rules of procedure of this state for guidance. T EX
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. P. 1, 2. Basic state and federal constitutiona l constructs of due process require notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Roper v. Jolliffe , 493 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“Due process at a minimum requires noti ce and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a m eaningful manner.”)).–20– Texas rules provide for a special appearan ce in response to an original court proceeding to telegraph to the court the la ck of personal jurisdiction or nexus to
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. P. 120a. Goldgroup, as the pa rty resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment, has the statutor y burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition exists, 11 while simultaneously avoiding the adverse consequence of subjecting itself to this state’s jurisdiction for all purposes. The trial court clearly granted Goldgroup’s special appearance while simultaneously ruling on motions to dismiss, for recognition a nd for non-recognition. Because Dynaresource does not cha llenge the granting of Goldgroup’s special appearance on any other grounds th an those raised and rejected above, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Goldgroup’s special appearance. See Siskind , 642 S.W.2d at 438. We overrule Dynaresource’s first issue. Once it granted Goldgroup’s special appearance, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed further with the underlying recognition proceeding. See T EX
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U.S. at 319. We therefore conclude the trial cour t erred in proceeding to rule on the

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. P. 120a. Accordingly, we need not further address Dynaresource’s remaining issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgm ent granting Goldgroup’s special appearance; in all other respects, we re verse the trial court’ s judgment and render judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdic tion Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment and Goldgroup’ s motion to dismiss and motion for nonrecognition.

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE C.V. AND DYNARESOURCES INC., Appellants
No. 05-21-00362-CV V. GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887. Opinion delivered by Justice Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and Breedlove participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court granting Goldgroup Resources In c.’s special appearance is AFFIRMED . In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is REVERSED , and judgment is RENDERED that Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. It is ORDERED that appellee GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC. recover its costs of this appeal from appellant s DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE C.V. AND DYNARE SOURCES INC..
Judgment entered May 2, 2023.