J-S48022-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

J. JESUS LANDEROS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1034 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 21, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-SA-0000341-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

J. Jesus Landeros (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction of driving while operating privilege is 

suspended or revoked – DUI related.

1

 We affirm.

On August 7, 2017, Officer Brandon Schippers (Officer Schippers) of the 

Forks Township Police Department was on patrol near George Street in Forks 

Township, Northampton County, Pennsylvania. Officer Schippers initiated a 

traffic stop when he observed Appellant driving southbound on George Street 

in a white Chevrolet van that was missing a rearview mirror and had a cracked 

windshield. During the stop, Appellant provided Officer Schippers with a Texas 

driver’s license. While running a check on Appellant’s Texas license on his 

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1

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).
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patrol car’s computer, Officer Schippers discovered that Appellant’s

Pennsylvania driving privileges were suspended.

Officer Schippers cited Appellant for driving while operating privilege is 

suspended or revoked – DUI related, a summary offense. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1543(b)(1). On November 13, 2017, the magisterial district judge found 

Appellant guilty of that offense and Appellant filed a timely summary appeal. 

On March 21, 2018, the trial court held a summary appeal hearing. At the 

hearing, Appellant’s certified driving record was entered into evidence without 

objection. Appellant’s driving record indicated that he had a prior conviction 

of DUI for which his license was suspended. Importantly, Appellant’s driving 

record revealed that Appellant participated in an accelerated rehabilitative 

disposition (ARD) program that he had entered following his DUI conviction. 

Appellant did not dispute that he was required to turn in his license at the 

beginning of the ARD program. Appellant’s driving record further revealed 

that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) mailed an

official notice of suspension to Appellant at his address of record at the time 

of the suspension. Appellant’s driving record indicated that as of the date of 

the traffic stop at issue in this case, Appellant’s Pennsylvania driver’s license 

remained suspended.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that 

Appellant had actual notice of his license suspension and sustained the 

magisterial district judge’s decision finding him guilty of violating Section 
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1543(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code. The same day, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to 60 days of incarceration in the Northampton County Prison and 

assessed a fine of $500.00. On March 28, 2018, Appellant timely appealed to 

this Court.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:

DID THE COMMONWEALTH PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT HAD 

ACTUAL NOTICE OF A DUI RELATED SUSPENSION?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellant 

had actual knowledge of his license suspension based on his entry into the 

ARD program and his presentation of a Texas driver’s license during the traffic 

stop. Appellant asserts that the trial court’s conclusion that he had actual 

knowledge of the license suspension was based on “pure speculation” because 

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2 On April 12, 2018, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. On April 17, 2018, Appellant 

timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. On April 25, 2018, the trial court filed 

a statement indicating that in lieu of filing a memorandum opinion, the court 

would “rely on the record and that no further statement was necessary.” Rule 

1925(a) Statement, 4/25/18. We remind the trial court that under Rule 

1925(a)(1), the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal 

“shall forthwith file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the 

order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in 

writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a). Here, the trial court’s 1925(a) statement neither provides its 

reasons for the order nor indicates the place in the record where such reasons 

may be found. Because we can discern the reasoning underlying the trial 

court’s decision in this case from the transcript of the summary appeal 

hearing, we decline to remand for a filing of a proper Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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nothing in the record imputes actual knowledge of the suspension onto 

Appellant.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence 

establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with 

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the 

evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a 

defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “[I]n a license suspension case, 

our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, whether any error of law was 

committed and whether the decision is a manifest abuse of discretion.” 
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Commonwealth v. Rose, 820 A.2d 164, 169 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quotations 

and citations omitted).

Appellant challenges his conviction of driving while operating privilege 

is suspended or revoked under Section 1543(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code, which 

states:

A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway of 

this Commonwealth at a time when the person’s operating 

privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of 

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 

3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) . . . shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary 

offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to 

undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor 

more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).

Regarding convictions under Section 1543(b)(1), we have explained:

In Commonwealth v. Kane, [] 333 A.2d 925, 927 ([Pa.] 

1975), our Supreme Court held that it is necessary for the 

Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had actual notice of a 

suspension in order to sustain a conviction of driving while under 

suspension. As this Court described the requirement in 

Commonwealth v. Crockford, [] 660 A.2d 1326, 1329 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1995), actual notice is “a judicially created element, 

designed to protect a defendant’s due process rights.”

. . . In Kane, the Court determined that the evidence offered 

to prove actual notice was insufficient where the only evidence of 

actual notice was a notice of suspension that was mailed to the 

defendant. Kane, 333 A.2d at 927. “Mailed letters do go astray 

for a variety of reasons. Criminal conviction requires proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt and that standard is not satisfied when one of 

the elements which must be proven is actual notice, and the only 

evidence presented is that a notice was mailed.” Id. As this Court 

has held, however, “[w]hen notice is mailed to the appellant and 

additional evidence exists indicating that appellant received notice 

of suspension, then the evidence can be sufficient to prove actual 
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notice.” Commonwealth v. Gray, [] 514 A.2d 621, 622 ([Pa. 

Super.] 1986)[.]

Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107, 112-13 (Pa. Super. 2014). “The 

Commonwealth is required to establish actual notice which may take the form 

of a collection of facts and circumstances that allow the fact finder to infer that 

a defendant has knowledge of suspension.” Id. at 114.

In Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 653 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1995), our 

Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors courts may consider 

in determining whether an individual accused of violating subsection 

1543(b)(1) had actual notice of a license suspension:

Factors that a finder of fact may consider in determining 

circumstantially or directly whether a defendant had actual notice 

of his or her suspension include, but are not limited to, evidence 

that the defendant was verbally or in writing apprised of the 

license suspension during the trial or a plea, statements by the 

accused indicating knowledge that he or she was driving during 

the period in which his or her license had been suspended, 

evidence that PennDOT sent by mail the notice of the suspension 

to appellant’s current address, evidence that PennDOT’s notice of 

suspension was not returned as undeliverable, attempts by the 

accused to avoid detection or a citation, and any other conduct 

demonstrating circumstantially or directly appellant’s knowledge 

of the suspension or awareness of guilt.

Zimmick, 653 A.2d at 1221.

In this case, the trial court determined that Appellant had actual 

knowledge of the license suspension based on his application to and 

involvement in the ARD Program and his presentation of a Texas driver’s 

license during the traffic stop. The transcript of Appellant’s summary appeal 

reflects the following:
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THE COURT: . . . The testimony is that [Appellant] proffered a 

Texas driver’s license here.

[Defense Counsel]: Right.

THE COURT: Ostensibly, that gives an indication that he may have 

dual citizenship and may be permitted to have a Texas driver’s 

license. But it also creates the inference that [Appellant]

displayed the Texas license because he had the knowledge, based

upon his experience with the Pennsylvania system, ARD et cetera,

that his driver’s privileges were suspended.

* * *

THE COURT: Well, I mean, if you want to offer evidence that the 

records of the Commonwealth do not contain notice that

[Appellant] knew about the, you know, the suspension, of course

there is this hurdle called the ARD Application. He went through

the ARD process, which imputes to him a specific knowledge about 

being notified, being charged, making an application for the ARD 

Program, participating in the program. There’s a whole body of 

knowledge which can’t be ignored within the context of notice.

* * *

THE COURT: . . . . I’m going to deny your motion. And in so 

doing, I’m going to just go a little bit further in our discussion

again. Because evidence takes the form of not only written 

documents, but evidence comes in through the testimony of the 

parties that are before the Court. You know that. It’s axiomatic. 

This case, the testimony in this case, which hoists your client on 

his own guitar [sic], if you know what I mean by that expression, 

is his participation in the ARD Program. And his knowledge, 

therefore, that he was charged, that he made an attempt to avoid 

the charges; that is, to resolve the charges, by making an 

application to the ARD Program, and participating in the Program. 

Independent of that fact, I would be more focused on the notice 

issue. And I’m denying your motion because of that reason. 

Because the evidence in this case is such that I believe your client

– make a finding that your client had notice of a previous

suspension of his license.

N.T., 3/21/18, at 13, 15, 18-19.
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Upon review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding that Appellant had actual notice of his license 

suspension. Appellant’s certified driving record indicates that his license was 

suspended at the time of the traffic stop underlying this case. N.T., 3/28/18, 

at 8-10, Exhibit 1. Additionally, Appellant’s driving record reveals that 

PennDOT received from Appellant an affidavit acknowledging his license 

suspension. Id. at 10, Exhibit 1. Appellant’s driving record also reflects that 

as a result of the DUI conviction that led to the license suspension, he enrolled 

and participated in an ARD program. Id. As the trial court pointed out, 

Appellant’s involvement in the ARD program created the inference that 

Appellant was aware of his prior DUI conviction and the consequences of that

conviction, including the license suspension. Appellant’s driving record further 

indicates that PennDOT mailed notice of the license suspension to him. Id. at 

Exhibit 1. There is no evidence that this notice was returned to PennDOT as 

undeliverable. Moreover, the record reveals that despite residing in 

Pennsylvania, Appellant presented Officer Schippers with a Texas driver’s 

license, leading to the reasonable implication that Appellant knew that his 

Pennsylvania license was suspended. Id. at 6.

These facts and circumstances, taken together, support the trial court’s 

finding that Appellant had knowledge of his license suspension at the time of 

his traffic stop. See Harden, 103 A.3d at 114. Accordingly, we find no merit 

to Appellant’s sufficiency claim.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/18