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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37351

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIELLE RENAI POE,

Defendant-Respondent.

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2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 362

Filed: February 15, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 

Order of the district court granting motion to dismiss, reversed.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for appellant. 

William J. Douglas, Post Falls, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge

The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s order granting Danielle Renai Poe’s 

motion to dismiss her felony methamphetamine conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. 

We reverse.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Poe was convicted, upon jury verdict, of possession of a controlled substance, 

methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)(b). The district court granted a withheld judgment 

(withheld for five years) and placed Poe on supervised probation for three years. Subsequently, 

Poe admitted to six violations of her probation, namely, consuming alcohol, entering a bar, using 

methamphetamine, traveling out of state without permission, breaking curfew, and associating 

with a convicted felon. The district court revoked Poe’s withheld judgment and imposed a 

sentence of four years with two years determinate, suspended the sentence, extended Poe’s 

supervised probation for an additional eighteen months, and released her to a drug treatment 
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program. After completion of the program, the district court converted her probation to 

unsupervised probation until June 23, 2011. 

On November 23, 2009, Poe filed a motion to dismiss her conviction pursuant to 

I.C. § 19-2604. The State objected. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and 

granted the motion. The State appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

The State contends that the district court lacked authority to dismiss Poe’s felony 

conviction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, because she had not, at all times, complied with the terms 

and conditions of probation. This Court exercises free review over the application and 

construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). 

Idaho Code § 19-2604 provides in relevant part:

(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been 

withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that 

the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which 

he was placed on probation, or has successfully completed and graduated from an 

authorized drug court program or mental health court program and has at all times 

complied with the terms and conditions of probation during any period of 

probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court may, if 

convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing the 

period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the 

sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally 

dismiss the case and discharge the defendant. . . .

(Emphasis added.) The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and requires the 

defendant’s compliance with the terms and conditions of probation “at all times” in order to be 

eligible for dismissal of the conviction. It has been clearly held that I.C. § 19-2604, means what 

it says. “A defendant who has at any time failed to do what he or she was required to do while 

on probation in a particular case has not at all times complied with the terms and conditions of 

his or her probation in that case.” State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 

(2003) (discussing the “at all times” language in I.C. § 19-2604(2)). See also State v. Thompson, 

140 Idaho 796, 798-799, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117-1118 (2004); State v. Griffith, 140 Idaho 616, 617, 

97 P.3d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 487, 959 P.2d 465, 468

(Ct. App. 1998).
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There is no question here that Poe violated the terms of her probation. There is also no 

question that after the withheld judgment was revoked and she was again placed on probation 

she performed admirably. As noted by the district court, the conviction impedes her ability to 

serve overseas in her military career and, as with all felony convictions, negatively impacts the 

defendant socially and economically. However, while these facts may support a determination 

that, should she be eligible under the statute, dismissal would be compatible with the public 

interest, they do not change the language of the statute.

The district court went to considerable lengths to bypass the statute. First, the district 

court noted that, while Schwartz is a relatively recent decision, only one of the Justices sitting on 

that case remains with the Idaho Supreme Court. The district court also extensively referenced a 

document supported by the current Supreme Court entitled “Legislative Priorities of the Courts,” 

which suggests that the legislature amend I.C. § 19-2604, to allow dismissal upon substantial 

compliance with probationary terms, rather than compliance “at all times.” The district court, 

thereupon, set forth a host of policy reasons why the “substantial compliance” language should 

be employed. Contrary to supporting the district court’s notion that Schwartz may be 

distinguishable or subject to revision by the Court, the fact that the document is the “Legislative 

Priorities of the Courts,” demonstrates that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to change the 

statute should it so desire. The Idaho appellate courts have consistently and properly applied the 

clear language of the statute, even if policy reasons exist supporting a legislative modification.1

 

The district court next suggested that Schwartz may be distinguishable because the statute 

does not apply in this situation. The district court then outlined an alternative interpretation of 

the statute described as “just as plausible as the interpretation found in Schwartz.” The district 

court construed the statute to allow dismissal since Poe had been compliant with the terms of her 

probation during the time her sentence was suspended, even though she had not been compliant 

while her sentence was withheld. This construction of the statute is simply untenable. The term 

“or” as used in the statute clearly references the sentencing status under which the defendant is 

on probation, not differing time periods of service of probation. 

The district court next held that the rule of stare decisis dictates following precedent 

unless it is manifestly wrong. The court found that application of Schwartz and the statute 

 

1 The district court also stated that it was somewhat likely that the legislature would amend 

the statute in the 2010 Legislative Session, but it did not.
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involved here may lead to a manifestly wrong result. The district court attempted to limit refusal 

to apply the statute to “the facts of this case,” which it described as: “a drug possession crime in 

which there has not only been substantial compliance by Poe on probation where not only is the 

defendant in recovery, but where the [sic] Poe’s performance is so highly thought of that the 

highest ranking member of the Idaho National Guard travelled from Lewiston, Idaho, to provide 

his testimony to this Court.” Again, while Poe is to be applauded and the facts of this case may 

support a call for amendment of the statute, the district court was not free to disregard the 

language of the statute to order dismissal. Unless and until the legislature actually amends the 

statute, the courts of this state must apply the statute as written, and interpreted by the Supreme 

Court. The district court erred in granting Poe’s motion to dismiss.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court was without authority to grant Poe’s motion to dismiss her felony 

conviction under I.C. § 19-2604(1), because Poe had not, at all times, complied with the terms 

and conditions upon which she was placed on probation. The district court’s order granting 

Poe’s motion and dismissing Poe’s felony conviction is reversed.

Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.