THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

October 3, 1989 

Hr. Hilary B. Doran, Jr. 

Chairman 

Texas Racing commission 

P. 0. Box 12080 

Austin, Texas 78711-2080 

Opinion NO. JM-1104 

Re: Authority of Texas Racing commission to redefine 

by rule the term "breeder" 

(RQ-1795) 

Dear Mr. Doran: 

You ask the following question about the Texas Racing 

Act, article 179e, V.T.C.S.: 

Does the Section 6.08 of the Texas Racing 

Act require the Texas Racing Commission to 

pay breeders* awards, under the Texas Bred 

Incentive Program for thoroughbred 

the owner of the mare at the 

conception of the accredited 

horse? 

horses, to 

time of 

Texas-bred 

The Racing Act provides for a certain percentage of the * _. breakage1 to be paid to breeders of Texas-mea nor&es. 

V.T.C.S. art. 179e, f 6.08(c)(Z). Your question involves 

the definition of nbreederll for purposes of section 

6.08(C)(Z). Section 6.08(d)(Z) defines nbreederG' as Ita 

person who is owner of record, 8t the ~&ima of conceotiou, of 

the mare that foaled the accredited Texas-bred horse." YOU 

explain that although the preceding definition is the 

uniform definition of 'breederW for quarter horses, it is 

not the uniform definition of mbreederlW for thoroughbreds. 

You state that throughout the United States the *'breeder" of 

a thoroughbred is the owner at the time of foaling. You 

1. The "breakage" is "the odd cents by which the 

amount payable on each dollar wagered exceeds a multiple of 

10 cents, except in the event a minus pool occurs, in which 

case the breakage shall be in multiples of five cents." 

V.T.C.S. art. 179e, 9 l-03(20). 

p. 5790 
Mr. William A. Meincke - Page 2 (JM-1104) 

also state that the Racing Commission urged the legislature 

to bring Texas law into line with standard practice by 

amending article 1790 to define "breeder" as the person who 

is the breeder according to rules of the appropriate state 

horse breed registry. The legislature, however, did not 

enact either of the bills that would have done so. w S.B. 

448, 71st Leg. (1989); H.B. 1232, 71st Leg. (1989). 

Your question is whether the Racing Commission must 

apply the definition of wbreederw set out in section 

6.08(d)(2) when it distributes the breakage to breeders of 

thoroughbreds. You suggest that the definition of O'breederOq 

set out in section 6.08 should not be applied to thoroughbreds because it is inconsistent with the purposes of the 

statute, one of which is to encourage the horse-breeding 

industry. You also state that w[t]o require the payment of 

breeders' awards to persons who, traditionally and according 

to other states breeders* programs, are not considered the 

'breeder' of the horse appears to be an absurd result." 

Unless a statute is ambiguous, a court must follow the 

clear language of a statute. B Dallas N.A . 

m. Inccr 691 S.W.Zd 605, 607 (Tex. 1985). In S immons 

Y., 220 S.W. 66 (1920), the Supreme Court wrote: 

Courts must take statutes as they find them. 

More than that, they should.be willing to 

take them as they find them. They should 

search out carefully the intendment of a 

statute, giving full effect to all of its 

terms. But they must find its intent in its 

language, and not elsewhere. They are not 

the law-making body. They are not responsible for ommissions in legislation. They 

are responsible for a true and fair interpretation of the written law. 

LSi. at 70. However problematic the current statutory 

definition of l'breederVa may be when applied to 

thoroughbreds, it is not ambiguous. Conception and foaling 

are clearly distinct events. Consequently, neither this 

office nor the Racing Commission has authority to define 

"breeder of a thoroughbred I1 for purposes of section 6.08 as 

the owner at the time of foaling rather than the time of 

conception. 

p. 5791 
Mr. William A. Meincke - Page 3 (JM-1104) 

SUMMARY 

The Racing Commission has no authority 

to disregard the statutory definition of 

wbreederm in regard to thoroughbreds for 

purposes of section 6.08 of the Texas Racing 

Act, article 179e. V.T.C.S. 

JIM NATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

MARYKELLER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

Lou MccRKARY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STBAKLBY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Sarah Woelk 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 5792