Filed: July 11, 2012 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2271

1:09-cv-01217-TSE-IDD

TIRE ENGINEERING AND DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tyre 

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited 

Liability Corporation; JORDAN FISHMAN, an individual; 

BEARCAT TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire Systems, d/b/a 

Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited Liability Company; 

BCATCO A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey Channels Islands 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

SHANDONG LINGLONG RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign company; 

SHANDONG LINGLONG TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a Zhaoyuan Leo 

Rubber Products Company, Ltd., a foreign company,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited liability company; AL 

DOBOWI TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign limited liability 

company; AL DOBOWI GROUP, a foreign corporation; TYREX 

INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a foreign limited liability company 

based in Dubai; TYREX INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a 

foreign corporation; QINGDAO TYREX TRADING COMPANY, LTD., a 

foreign corporation; SURENDER S. KANDHARI, an individual,

Defendants.

No. 10-2273

1:09-cv-01217-TSE-IDD

TIRE ENGINEERING AND DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tyre 

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited 

Liability Corporation; JORDAN FISHMAN, an individual; 

BEARCAT TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire Systems, d/b/a 

Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited Liability Company; 
2

BCATCO A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey Channels Islands 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.

AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited liability company; AL 

DOBOWI TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign limited liability 

company; TYREX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a foreign limited 

liability company based in Dubai; TYREX INTERNATIONAL 

RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

SHANDONG LINGLONG RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign company; 

SHANDONG LINGLONG TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a Zhaoyuan Leo 

Rubber Products Company, Ltd., a foreign company; AL DOBOWI 

GROUP, a foreign corporation; QINGDAO TYREX TRADING 

COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation; SURENDER S. KANDHARI, 

an individual, 

Defendants.

No. 10-2321

1:09-cv-01217-TSE-IDD

TIRE ENGINEERING AND DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tyre 

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited 

Liability Corporation; JORDAN FISHMAN, an individual; 

BEARCAT TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire Systems, d/b/a 

Alpha Mining Systems, a Florida Limited Liability Company; 

BCATCO A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey Channels Islands 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited liability company; AL 

DOBOWI TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign limited liability 

company; TYREX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a foreign limited 

liability company based in Dubai; TYREX INTERNATIONAL 

RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation; SHANDONG 
3

LINGLONG TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a Zhaoyuan Leo Rubber 

Products Company, Ltd., a foreign company; SHANDONG 

LINGLONG RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign company,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

AL DOBOWI GROUP, a foreign corporation; QINGDAO TYREX 

TRADING COMPANY, LTD., a foreign corporation; SURENDER S. 

KANDHARI, an individual,

Defendants.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed June 6, 2012, as 

follows:

On page 37, line 1, the sentence beginning “We affirm” 

is changed to read “Finally, we affirm,” and the final sentence 

of the majority opinion on page 37, lines 3 through 6, is 

deleted.

For the Court – By Direction

 /s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TIRE ENGINEERING AND 

DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha

Tyre Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Corporation; JORDAN

FISHMAN, an individual; BEARCAT

TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Company; BCATCO

A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey

Channels Islands Corporation,  No. 10-2271 Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

SHANDONG LINGLONG RUBBER

COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

company; SHANDONG LINGLONG

TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a

Zhaoyuan Leo Rubber Products

Company, Ltd., a foreign

company,

Defendants-Appellants,

and 
AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited 

liability company; AL DOBOWI

TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign

limited liability company; AL

DOBOWI GROUP, a foreign

corporation; TYREX INTERNATIONAL,

LTD., a foreign limited liability

company based in Dubai; TYREX 

INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMPANY,

LTD., a foreign corporation;

QINGDAO TYREX TRADING

COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

corporation; SURENDER S.

KANDHARI, an individual,

Defendants. 

TIRE ENGINEERING AND 

DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha

Tyre Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Corporation; JORDAN

FISHMAN, an individual; BEARCAT

TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire  No. 10-2273

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Company; BCATCO

A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey

Channels Islands Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

2 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
v. 

AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited

liability company; AL DOBOWI

TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign

limited liability company; TYREX

INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a foreign

limited liability company based in

Dubai; TYREX INTERNATIONAL

RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

corporation,

Defendants-Appellants,

and 

SHANDONG LINGLONG RUBBER

COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

company; SHANDONG LINGLONG

TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a

Zhaoyuan Leo Rubber Products

Company, Ltd., a foreign

company; AL DOBOWI GROUP, a

foreign corporation; QINGDAO

TYREX TRADING COMPANY, LTD., a

foreign corporation; SURENDER S.

KANDHARI, an individual,

Defendants. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 3
TIRE ENGINEERING AND 

DISTRIBUTION, LLC, d/b/a Alpha

Tyre Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Corporation; JORDAN

FISHMAN, an individual; BEARCAT

TIRE ARL, LLC, d/b/a Alpha Tire

Systems, d/b/a Alpha Mining

Systems, a Florida Limited

Liability Company; BCATCO

A.R.L., INCORPORATED, a Jersey

Channels Islands Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

AL DOBOWI, LTD., a foreign limited  No. 10-2321

liability company; AL DOBOWI

TYRE COMPANY, LLC, a foreign

limited liability company; TYREX

INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a foreign

limited liability company based in

Dubai; TYREX INTERNATIONAL

RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

corporation; SHANDONG LINGLONG

TIRE COMPANY, LTD., f/k/a

Zhaoyuan Leo Rubber Products

Company, Ltd., a foreign

company; SHANDONG LINGLONG

RUBBER COMPANY, LTD., a foreign

company,

Defendants-Appellees, 

4 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
and 

AL DOBOWI GROUP, a foreign

corporation; QINGDAO TYREX

TRADING COMPANY, LTD., a foreign 

corporation; SURENDER S.

KANDHARI, an individual,

Defendants. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge.

(1:09-cv-01217-TSE-IDD)

Argued: December 7, 2011

Decided: June 6, 2012

Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part by published per curiam opinion. Judge Diaz wrote an opinion dissenting in part.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard Douglas Klingler, SIDLEY AUSTIN

LLP, Washington, D.C.; Howard Marc Radzely, MORGAN

LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Shandong

Linglong Rubber Company, Ltd., Shandong Linglong Tire

Company, Ltd., Al Dobowi, Ltd., Al Dobowi Tyre Company,

LLC, TyreX International, Ltd., and TyreX International Rubber Company, Ltd. William Edgar Copley, WEISBROD

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 5
MATTEIS COPLEY, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Tire

Engineering and Distribution, LLC, Jordan Fishman, Bearcat

Tire ARL, LLC, and Bcatco ARL, Incorporated. ON BRIEF:

Peter D. Keisler, James C. Owens, Jr., Bryson Love Bachman,

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Al Dobowi,

Ltd., Al Dobowi Tyre Company, LLC, TyreX International,

Ltd., and TyreX International Rubber Company, Ltd.; R. Ted

Cruz, William S. W. Chang, Shelly M. Doggett, MORGAN

LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Shandong

Linglong Rubber Company, Ltd., and Shandong Linglong

Tire Company, Ltd. August J. Matteis, Jr., GILBERT LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Tire Engineering and Distribution,

LLC, Jordan Fishman, Bearcat Tire ARL, LLC, and Bcatco

ARL, Incorporated.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Alpha,1 a domestic producer of mining tires, sued Al Dobowi2

and Linglong,3 foreign corporations. Alpha alleged that the

defendants conspired to steal its tire blueprints, produce

infringing tires, and sell them to entities that had formerly

purchased products from Alpha. A jury found in favor of

Alpha on all claims submitted to it, awarding the company

$26 million in damages. The district court upheld the damages

award against the defendants’ post-trial challenges. Al

1By "Alpha," we refer collectively to Tire Engineering & Distribution,

LLC; Bearcat Tire ARL, LLC; Bcatco A.R.L., Inc.; and Jordan Fishman.

2By "Al Dobowi," we refer collectively to Al Dobowi, Ltd.; Al Dobowi

Tyre Co., LLC; TyreX International, LTD.; and TyreX International Rubber Co. Ltd. Al Dobowi is domiciled in the United Arab Emirates. 

3By "Linglong," we refer collectively to Shandong Linglong Rubber

Co., Ltd.; and Shandong Linglong Tire Co., Ltd. Linglong is domiciled in

China. 

6 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
Dobowi and Linglong appeal, contesting the verdict and the

district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.

We initially hold that the district court properly exercised

jurisdiction over Al Dobowi and Linglong. We affirm the district court’s judgment that Al Dobowi and Linglong are liable

to Alpha under the Copyright Act and for conversion under

Virginia law, but we dismiss the remaining theories of liability submitted to the jury. We affirm the jury’s damages award.4

As a final matter, we vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees. 

I.

A.

Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of Alpha, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to that party,

giving it the benefit of all inferences. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc.,

928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991). Any factual findings

made by the district court are subject to clear-error review.

CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551

F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Alpha develops and sells specialized tires for underground

mining vehicles. Prior to 2005 and the events giving rise to

this suit, Alpha flourished in the mining-tire market with its

unique and effective designs. To protect its intellectual property and brand, Alpha obtained copyrights for its designs and

a trademark for its "Mine Mauler" product name. Alpha also

closely guarded its blueprints, as with these in hand any manufacturer could copy the company’s distinctive tires and jeopardize its market position. 

4Alpha noted a cross appeal challenging the dismissal of its Virginia

statutory conspiracy claim only in the event that we vacated the damages

award. In accordance with Alpha’s position, because we affirm the damages award, we do not reach its cross appeal. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 7
In May 2005, John Canning, a former employee of Alpha,

organized a meeting at a hotel in Richmond, Virginia. Canning invited Sam Vance, an employee of Alpha; and Surender

Kandhari, the chairman of defendant Al Dobowi, to attend

and discuss prospects for Al Dobowi’s entry into the miningtire business. Vance offered to supply Al Dobowi with

Alpha’s blueprints, customer list, and cost information. The

three men discussed the possibility of Al Dobowi’s using this

information to produce and sell a line of mining tires that copied Alpha’s designs and challenged its place in the tire market.

Following the meeting, Vance began working from his

home in Tazewell, Virginia on a business plan, which anticipated selling tires in both the United States and abroad. Kandhari received Vance’s business plan, at which point he

formally welcomed Vance to Al Dobowi. Kandhari explained

that he "want[ed] [Vance] on board" and "definitely expect[ed] [him] to be full time committed in developing business." J.A. 1367. Kandhari proposed that Vance take a position with Al Dobowi as the "Business Development Director

for an AL DOBOWI group company based in the USA." Id.

Throughout their correspondence that summer, Vance and

Kandhari referred to Vance’s Virginia home as a satellite

office of Al Dobowi.

With the blueprints in their possession, Vance, Kandhari,

and Canning set out to find a tire manufacturer to produce

mining tires based on Alpha’s designs. They found a willing

partner in Linglong, and by the end of that summer Linglong

had agreed to manufacture a range of mining tires pursuant to

Alpha’s blueprints. From the beginning of the relationship,

Linglong knew that the blueprints had been stolen. In a September email, Vance and a Linglong representative discussed

taking steps to slightly modify their tires to make it less obvious that they had copied Alpha’s designs. Linglong further

recognized that Vance was performing work from his office

8 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
in Virginia. Indeed, in that same email Vance noted that he

had been modifying the designs from his Tazewell office. 

Their relationship having been formalized, Al Dobowi and

Linglong began the manufacturing process. Linglong produced a range of mining tires based on Alpha’s designs. Al

Dobowi began to sell the tires in early 2006 under the name

Infinity. Al Dobowi convinced Sandvik, one of the largest

manufacturers of underground mining equipment, to purchase

tires from it instead of Alpha. By July 2006, Vance had abandoned his Virginia office and moved permanently to China.

During the winter of 2006, Jordan Fishman, founder and

CEO of Alpha, began to suspect that Vance had stolen

Alpha’s blueprints and given them to Al Dobowi. Fishman

saw an Infinity tire catalogue, which featured products almost

identical to Alpha’s. He confirmed his suspicions at a trade

show in the fall of 2006, where he saw the Infinity tires up

close and was struck by their similarity to Alpha’s line of

tires. 

B.

On October 28, 2009, Alpha filed suit against Al Dobowi

and Linglong.5

 Alpha’s amended complaint included nine

counts arising out of Al Dobowi and Linglong’s conversion

of its blueprints and sale of infringing tires.

Al Dobowi and Linglong ("Appellants") first moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district

court denied the motion, stating in open court that "there is a

5Alpha filed separate suits against Al Dobowi and Linglong, respectively, but the district court consolidated the two suits soon after filing.

The consolidated suit and Alpha’s cross appeal were consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Alpha in its complaint named other persons as defendants, but the entities enumerated in footnotes 2 and 3 are the only

defendants that remain in the case on appeal. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 9
prima facie basis for showing personal jurisdiction." J.A. 143.

Appellants then moved for summary judgment on all claims.

The district court granted the motion as to four of the nine

claims raised by Alpha. With regard to the remaining counts,

the court dismissed all claims barred by the applicable statutes

of limitations. Relevant here, the court dismissed all claims

under the Copyright Act that accrued prior to October 28,

2006. It also dismissed in its entirety Alpha’s claim under the

Virginia business-conspiracy statute, Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-

499 to 500, finding it barred by Virginia’s two-year statute of

limitations governing actions for personal injuries. 

The parties proceeded to a jury trial. Alpha presented evidence establishing that Al Dobowi and Linglong had conspired to steal its blueprints and use them to manufacture

infringing tires, which they then sold to Alpha’s former customers. Alpha’s damages expert testified that the company

had suffered $36 million in damages as a result of Appellants’

unlawful acts.

The court submitted five counts to the jury: (1) violation of

the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; (2) violation of the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., as

to registered trademarks; (3) violation of the Lanham Act as

to unregistered trademarks; (4) common-law conversion; and

(5) common-law civil conspiracy. Important to our disposition, the court instructed the jury as follows on the Copyright

Act claim:

[C]opyright laws generally do not apply to infringement that occurs outside of the United States. However, if you find that plaintiffs proved that the

infringing acts outside of the United States were a

consequence or result of predicate infringing acts

that occurred inside the United Stated [sic], then you

may consider those infringing acts that occurred outside the United States.

10 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
J.A. 1107–08. If the jury found in favor of Alpha on the copyright claim, the court instructed it to award damages equal to

Appellants’ total profit attributable to the infringement. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alpha on all counts,

awarding it $26 million in damages. Because the jury found

that Appellants were engaged in a conspiracy, Appellants

were adjudged jointly liable for the total damages award.

Appellants first contested the verdict in a Rule 50(b)

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The district

court upheld the verdict in part and sustained the damages

award. First, the court reiterated that it properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Appellants. Moving to the merits, it

found unavailing Appellants’ challenges to liability under the

conversion, conspiracy, and Copyright Act claims. Appellants’ contentions regarding the validity of the Lanham Act

claims fared better. Holding that Alpha presented insufficient

evidence to support a finding of liability on the majority of its

trademark claims, the court dismissed Alpha’s registeredtrademark claim in its entirety and upheld its unregisteredtrademark claim as to only two of eleven marks. Finally, the

court ruled that the jury’s damages award was reasonable. 

Appellants then filed a Rule 59 motion for a new trial,

arguing principally that the damages award was unsustainable

in view of the court’s dismissal of the majority of Alpha’s

trademark claims, on which the jury may have relied in calculating damages. The district court denied the motion. The

court reasoned that the measure of damages was the same for

all counts, and dismissal of some claims did not disturb the

overall award because the remaining claims supported the

award in full. 

In a later order, the court awarded Alpha $632,377.50 in

attorneys’ fees, concluding that Appellants’ violation of the

Lanham Act provided the sole basis for the award. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 11
This appeal followed.

II.

We first consider Appellants’ challenge to the district

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. We review

de novo whether the district court possessed jurisdiction,

though the court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear

error. CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 292. Characterizing their contacts with the forum state as negligible, Appellants contend

that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects them from being forced to litigate in Virginia. 

Appellants’ argument is unavailing. Evidence presented at

trial and the district court’s factual findings establish specific

jurisdiction over Appellants.6 Both Al Dobowi and Linglong

possessed sufficient contacts with Virginia such that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent

with the demands of due process.

A.

A lawful assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant

requires satisfying the standards of the forum state’s long-arm

statute and respecting the safeguards enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. CFA Inst., 551 F.3d

at 292. If a potential exercise of jurisdiction comports with the

state’s long-arm statute, the Constitution "requires that the

defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum

state." Id. Because Virginia’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the outer bounds of due process, the two6On December 19, 2011, Alpha submitted a motion to supplement the

appellate record with documents purportedly relevant to our jurisdictional

analysis. Because we conclude that the evidence presented at trial supports

the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction, we need not consider

any materials included in the filing. We accordingly deny the motion as

moot. 

12 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
prong test collapses into a single inquiry when Virginia is the

forum state. Id. at 293. A Virginia court thus has jurisdiction

over a nonresident defendant if the exercise of such jurisdiction is consonant with the strictures of due process.

The Due Process Clause contemplates that a court may

assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant through either

of two independent avenues. First, a court may find specific

jurisdiction "based on conduct connected to the suit." ALS

Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707,

711 (4th Cir. 2002). "If the defendant’s contacts with the State

are also the basis for the suit, those contacts may establish

specific jurisdiction." Id. at 712. Second, a court may exercise

personal jurisdiction under the theory of general jurisdiction,

which requires a more demanding showing of "continuous

and systematic" activities in the forum state. Id. Alpha argues

only that the court possessed specific jurisdiction over Appellants, so our analysis is confined to that model.

Fairness is the touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry, and

the " ‘minimum contacts’ test is premised on the concept that

a corporation that enjoys the privilege of conducting business

within a state bears the reciprocal obligation of answering to

legal proceedings there." CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 293. In the

context of specific jurisdiction, "the relevant conduct [must]

have [only] such a connection with the forum state that it is

fair for the defendant to defend itself in that state." Id. at 292

n.15. We do more than formulaically count contacts, instead

taking into account the qualitative nature of each of the defendant’s connections to the forum state. In that vein, "a single

act by a defendant can be sufficient to satisfy the necessary

‘quality and nature’ of such minimal contacts, although

‘casual’ or ‘isolated’ contacts are insufficient to trigger" an

obligation to litigate in the forum. Id. at 293 (quoting Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945)). 

We consider three factors when determining whether a

court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 13
(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum

state; (2) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of those

activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction

is constitutionally reasonable. Id. at 294. 

First, we must conclude that a nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state to authorize the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over the defendant. The purposeful-availment test

is flexible, and our analysis proceeds on a case-by-case basis.

Through our recent decisions we can glean a basic outline of

the doctrine. 

We have found purposeful availment where a defendant

substantially collaborated with a forum resident and that joint

enterprise constituted an integral element of the dispute. In

CFA Institute, we noted that the defendant contacted the

plaintiff, which "sparked ongoing business transactions, by

which [defendant] repeatedly reached into Virginia to transact

business with [plaintiff], invoking the benefits and protections

of Virginia law." Id. at 295. In particular, a representative of

the defendant visited the plaintiff’s office in the forum state,

after which the parties substantially corresponded and collaborated from afar. Id. at 294–95. Where such minimum contacts are present, that the defendant did not initiate the

contacts does not bar a judicial finding of purposeful availment. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209,

216 (4th Cir. 2001). 

In contrast, we have determined that purposeful availment

was lacking in cases in which the locus of the parties’ interaction was overwhelmingly abroad. We dismissed both defendants from the action in Consulting Engineers Corp. v.

Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2009), finding that

neither had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia, the forum state. One defendant

maintained no offices, conducted no ongoing business, and

14 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
made no in-person contact with the plaintiff in the forum

state. Id. at 279–80. Though the defendant discussed entering

an agreement with a Virginia resident, any work contemplated

would have been performed in India and no agreement was

ever executed. Id. at 280. Moreover, the activity giving rise to

the claim occurred in India, not Virginia. Id. "On these facts,"

we wrote, "[defendant’s] contact with Virginia was simply too

attenuated to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Id.

The second defendant similarly lacked sufficient contacts

with the forum state. It, too, maintained no offices in Virginia,

and none of its employees had ever traveled there. Id. at 281.

The activity complained of took place in India, and the

alleged conspiracy was hatched outside of the forum state. Id.

at 282. Although this defendant exchanged four brief emails

and had several phone conversations with the Virginia-based

plaintiff about contractual negotiations, we concluded that

these contacts were qualitatively insufficient to show purposeful availment. Id. at 281–82.

A similarly overpowering foreign nexus to the dispute in

Foster v. Arletty 3 Sarl, 278 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2002), militated against a finding of purposeful availment. As in Consulting Engineers, we found it important that the defendants in

Foster had no offices or employees in the forum state. Id. at

415. Fairness also factored into our decision, and we reasoned

that the dispute’s close connection to France—all of the parties to the contracts at issue were French citizens; the contracts were negotiated, drafted, and executed in France; and

performance was to take place in France—rendered us unable

to conclude that the defendants "should reasonably anticipate

being haled into court in South Carolina." Id. Given France’s

centrality to the case, "some fleeting communication by telephone and fax" between the plaintiff and defendants while the

plaintiff was in South Carolina was "insufficient, standing

alone, to establish jurisdiction." Id.; see also J. McIntyre

Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785, 2790 (2011)

(plurality) (concluding that court lacked personal jurisdiction

over British corporate defendant that "had no office in [the

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 15
forum state]; . . . neither paid taxes nor owned property there;

. . . neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State"

and had never "in any relevant sense targeted the State").

Second, with purposeful availment established, we require

that the plaintiff’s claims arise out of activities directed at the

forum state. The analysis here is generally not complicated.

Where activity in the forum state is "the genesis of [the] dispute," this prong is easily satisfied. See CFA Inst., 551 F.3d

at 295. A plaintiff’s claims similarly arise out of activities

directed at the forum state if substantial correspondence and

collaboration between the parties, one of which is based in the

forum state, forms an important part of the claim. See id. at

295–96. 

Third, exercise of personal jurisdiction must be constitutionally reasonable. This prong of the analysis "ensures that

litigation is not ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ as to

place the defendant at a ‘severe disadvantage in comparison

to his opponent.’ " Id. at 296 (quoting Nolan, 259 F.3d at

217). The burden on the defendant, interests of the forum

state, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief guide our

inquiry. Id. A corporate defendant’s domicile abroad, standing

alone, does not render domestic exercise of jurisdiction

unduly burdensome. Id. In CFA Institute, we acknowledged

that the defendant’s location in India "may present unique

challenges" but nevertheless determined that its ability to

secure counsel in the forum state and its choice to do business

with a forum resident—which also made the prospect of litigation in the state foreseeable—counseled that defending the

suit would not be particularly burdensome. Id. Virginia moreover maintained a "substantial interest" in resolving the grievances of its businesses, particularly when Virginia law

informed some of the claims. Id. at 296–97. Finally, the plaintiff had a substantial interest in protecting its intellectual property after having "carved out a market niche by cultivating"

its distinctive mark and products. Id. at 297.

16 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
B.

Though domiciled abroad, both Al Dobowi and Linglong

have sufficient contacts with Virginia such that the district

court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over them complied

with the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate. We examine each

defendant’s contacts in turn. 

1.

By hatching the conspiracy to unlawfully copy Alpha’s

tires while in Virginia and substantially corresponding with an

employee based in Virginia, Al Dobowi purposefully availed

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum

state. Indeed, Al Dobowi’s contacts with Virginia are similar

to those deemed sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in

CFA Institute. Kandhari, as the chairman of Al Dobowi,7

 met

with Vance in Virginia. The conspiracy to copy Alpha’s blueprints and sell infringing tires was entered into at this same

7Al Dobowi maintains that we must establish an independent basis for

the lawful exercise of personal jurisdiction over each of the Al Dobowi

entities sued in this case. It further suggests that Kandhari’s activities were

on behalf of only TyreX International, Ltd. and cannot be considered contacts between the other entities and Virginia. We reject Al Dobowi’s

attempts to convert, for the purpose of this litigation, its freewheeling corporate structure into a rigidly defined set of semi-autonomous bodies.

Kandhari considers himself the chairman of all ten or twelve companies

within the Al Dobowi Group. The record reflects that there are no hardand-fast divisions between the various entities. For instance, when asked

to describe the structure of Al Dobowi, Kandhari’s son testified as follows: "It’s a family business, so you work for the family and you help out

wherever is necessary, so whenever you’re required to do something, you,

you work for the family, so you are plugging gaps wherever required

whenever required." J.A. 647. He further testified that he is not employed

by any particular entity, but instead by "the family." Id. Importantly, Al

Dobowi pays its employees by drawing a check from whichever entity has

available cash. Id. 660. We are thus not dealing with independent entities

having "discrete status[es] as subsidiaries," Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011), and compartmentalized analysis is inappropriate. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 17
meeting in Virginia. As was the case with the defendant’s visits to the forum state in CFA Institute, which sparked a contractual relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, 551

F.3d at 295, Al Dobowi and Vance’s relationship originated

in Virginia. And like the defendant in CFA Institute, Al

Dobowi "repeatedly reached into Virginia to transact business

. . . , invoking the benefits and protections of Virginia law,"

id. Al Dobowi employed Vance, a resident of Virginia who

maintained an office in Virginia and wielded significant

authority within the company. It substantially corresponded

with Vance while he was in Virginia, developing a business

plan and exchanging thoughts on designs for the Infinity line

of tires.

Al Dobowi’s contacts with the forum state are far more

extensive than those found lacking in Consulting Engineers

and Foster. Whereas the acts giving rise to the disputes in

those cases occurred almost exclusively abroad, a substantial

nexus exists here between Virginia and Alpha’s claims.

Unlike the defendants in Consulting Engineers, Al Dobowi

had an office and employee in the forum state, its representatives traveled to the forum state, and a critical part of the

activity of which the plaintiffs complain—conspiring to

infringe its intellectual property rights—took place in the

forum state. And in contrast to the defendants in Foster, Al

Dobowi had an office and employee in the forum state, forged

an agreement in the forum state, and worked closely with a

U.S. citizen. Upon joining the conspiracy and hiring Vance,

Al Dobowi thus should have "reasonably anticipate[d] being

haled into court in [Virginia]," Foster, 278 F.3d at 415. 

Alpha’s claims moreover arise out of Al Dobowi’s contacts

directed at Virginia. Again, CFA Institute is illustrative. As in

that case, Al Dobowi’s visit to Virginia "was the genesis of

this dispute," CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 295. And correspondence

between Vance, a Virginia resident working in Virginia, and

Al Dobowi forms an important part of Alpha’s claim, another

factor central to our analysis in CFA Institute. 

18 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
Finally, exercise of personal jurisdiction over Al Dobowi is

constitutionally reasonable. Al Dobowi, based out of the

United Arab Emirates, certainly faced a greater disadvantage

litigating in Virginia than do Virginia residents. But this is not

dispositive. See id. at 296. Al Dobowi, like the defendant in

CFA Institute over whom jurisdiction was deemed constitutionally reasonable, was able to secure able counsel and

should have foreseen the possibility of being forced to litigate

in the forum state. Thus Al Dobowi’s defense of a suit in Virginia is not particularly burdensome. See id. Although the

entities that compose Alpha are not Virginia companies, the

state has an interest in ensuring that the nation’s copyright and

trademark laws are not violated within its borders. And, as

was the case in CFA Institute, Virginia has a particular interest in this dispute because some of the claims are based on the

state’s law. Alpha, too, has a substantial interest in obtaining

relief. Indeed, the jury’s award of damages reveals the significant harm visited on Alpha by Al Dobowi’s unlawful activities. Like the plaintiff in CFA Institute, Alpha has "carved out

a market niche by cultivating" a distinctive mark and product

line and was entitled to use Virginia’s judicial system "to protect and vindicate its intellectual property and other legal

rights," id. at 297. 

2.

Although fewer in number, Linglong’s contacts with Virginia are qualitatively significant and demonstrate that it, too,

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. As with Al Dobowi, we find that CFA

Institute controls our jurisdictional inquiry here. To be sure,

Linglong lacks some of the contacts found in CFA Institute—it has neither offices nor employees in Virginia, and no

representative visited Virginia to forge or further the conspiracy. But those contacts were not deemed dispositive in that

case. Rather, the defendant’s "repeatedly reach[ing] into Virginia to transact business with [plaintiff], invoking the beneTIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 19
fits and protections of Virginia law" constituted the core of

our jurisdictional holding. CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 295.

As was the case in CFA Institute, Linglong’s reaching into

the forum state affords a sufficient basis to conclude that the

purposeful-availment prong is satisfied. Linglong engaged in

extensive collaboration with Vance while he was working

from his Virginia office. Vance and a representative from

Linglong exchanged ideas about the tire manufacturing process—and, in particular, how best to alter Alpha’s designs to

make it appear less obvious that they had copied Alpha’s

blueprints. Vance worked on the drawings from his Virginia

office, incorporating Linglong’s ideas and responding to its

concerns, and ultimately submitting them to Linglong from

Virginia. The district court moreover concluded that Linglong

knew through its correspondence with Vance "that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would occur in Virginia," J.A.

1247, and we find no reason to disturb this factual finding on

clear-error review. Given its substantively weighty communications with Vance while he was operating out of his Virginia

office—covering details of the manufacturing process that

forms the gravamen of this dispute—Linglong should have

"reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court in [Virginia],"

Foster, 278 F.3d at 415. 

The qualitative significance of Linglong’s contacts sets this

case apart from Consulting Engineers and Foster. That the

activity giving rise to the suit took place abroad bolstered our

conclusion in Consulting Engineers that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Here, in contrast,

Vance and Linglong’s manipulation of Alpha’s blueprints and

development of a production plan—which forms a critical

part of Alpha’s claims—took place while Vance was working

in Virginia. And unlike Foster, where the defendants had only

"fleeting communication" with a resident of the forum state,

id., Linglong engaged in substantive deliberations with Vance

about the design and manufacturing process. In sum, in contrast to the defendants in Consulting Engineers and Foster,

20 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
Linglong "repeatedly reached into Virginia to transact business with [Vance], invoking the benefits and protections of

Virginia law," CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 295. 

Having established that Linglong purposefully availed itself

of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, we

have no trouble concluding that Alpha’s claims arise out of

Linglong’s activities directed at the state. Linglong’s correspondence with the Virginia-based Vance was substantial and

forms a central part of Alpha’s claims, a factor convincing us

that this prong of the inquiry is satisfied, see id. at 295–96.

Finally, for the same reasons outlined with respect to Al

Dobowi, exercise of jurisdiction over Linglong comports with

notions of constitutional reasonableness.

III.

Turning to the merits, Appellants challenge the validity of

the jury’s verdict on Alpha’s copyright, trademark, conversion, and conspiracy claims. We review de novo the district

court’s rejection of Appellants’ arguments. Sloas v. CSX

Transp., Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 392 (4th Cir. 2010).

We hold that Alpha has presented an actionable claim

under the Copyright Act, and we sustain the jury’s liability

verdict on that count. Likewise, we sustain the jury’s liability

determination on Alpha’s conversion claim. However, we dismiss Alpha’s trademark and conspiracy claims, finding that

each lacks merit.

A.

Appellants first argue that the Copyright Act has no extraterritorial reach. Because the only claims raised by Alpha

involve conduct abroad, Appellants maintain that the Copyright Act affords Alpha no remedy. Alternatively, even if the

Copyright Act sometimes reaches foreign conduct that flows

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 21
from a domestic violation, Appellants urge us to consider that

foreign conduct only where, unlike here, the domestic violation is not barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of

limitations. 

We hold that Alpha has presented a cognizable claim under

the Copyright Act and therefore uphold the jury’s finding of

liability on that count. We adopt the predicate-act doctrine,

which posits that a plaintiff may collect damages from foreign

violations of the Copyright Act so long as the foreign conduct

stems from a domestic infringement. No court applying the

doctrine has ascribed significance to the timeliness of domestic claims, and we decline to endorse Appellants’ proposal

that we limit its application to cases where a domestic violation is not time barred. 

1.

As a general matter, the Copyright Act is considered to

have no extraterritorial reach. E.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v.

Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994). But

courts have recognized a fundamental exception: "when the

type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad," a

plaintiff may collect damages flowing from the foreign conduct. Update Art, Inc. v. Modin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73

(2d Cir. 1988). 

This predicate-act doctrine traces its roots to a famous Second Circuit opinion penned by Learned Hand. See Sheldon v.

Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir.

1939). The Second Circuit in Sheldon was confronted with an

undisputed domestic Copyright Act violation. The defendant

had converted the plaintiff’s motion picture while in the

United States and then exhibited the picture abroad. Id. The

court was required to decide whether the damages award

could include profits made from foreign exhibition of the

film. Id. Answering the question in the affirmative, Judge

Hand articulated the framework of the predicate-act doctrine:

22 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
The Culver Company made the negatives in this

country, or had them made here, and shipped them

abroad, where the positives were produced and

exhibited. The negatives were ‘records’ from which

the work could be ‘reproduced,’ and it was a tort to

make them in this country. The plaintiffs acquired an

equitable interest in them as soon as they were made,

which attached to any profits from their exploitation,

whether in the form of money remitted to the United

States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign

companies held by the defendants. . . . [A]s soon as

any of the profits so realized took the form of property whose situs was in the United States, our law

seized upon them and impressed them with a constructive trust, whatever their form.

Id. Once a plaintiff demonstrates a domestic violation of the

Copyright Act, then, it may collect damages from foreign violations that are directly linked to the U.S. infringement. 

The Second Circuit has reaffirmed the continuing vitality of

the predicate-act doctrine. Update Art, 843 F.2d at 73. In

Update Art, the plaintiff owned the rights to distribute and

publish a certain graphic art design. Id. at 68. Without authorization from the plaintiff, the defendant published the image

in an Israeli newspaper. Id. at 69. The court reasoned that "the

applicability of American copyright laws over the Israeli

newspapers depends on the occurrence of a predicate act in

the United States." Id. at 73. "If the illegal reproduction of the

poster occurred in the United States and then was exported to

Israel," the court continued, "the magistrate properly could

include damages accruing from the Israeli newspapers." Id.

But if the predicate act of reproduction occurred outside of the

United States, the district court could award no damages from

newspaper circulation in Israel. Id.

More recently, the Ninth Circuit embraced the predicate-act

doctrine. L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 23
F.3d 987, 990–92 (9th Cir. 1998). The court endorsed Second

Circuit precedent, which it construed as holding that

"[r]ecovery of damages arising from overseas infringing uses

was allowed because the predicate act of infringement occurring within the United States enabled further reproduction

abroad." Id. at 992. To invoke the predicate-act doctrine,

according to the Ninth Circuit, damages must flow from "extraterritorial exploitation of an infringing act that occurred in

the United States." Id. The court distinguished a previous

decision, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24

F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), as controlling only a narrow class

of cases dealing with the Copyright Act’s "authorization" provision, in which a plaintiff alleges merely a domestic authorization of infringing conduct that otherwise takes place wholly

abroad. L.A. News, 149 F.3d at 991–92. Such a case presents

concerns not relevant to disputes in which a predicate act of

infringement—going beyond mere authorization—occurred in

the United States. Id. at 992. The Ninth Circuit further noted

that the predicate-act doctrine does not abrogate a defendant’s

right to be free from stale claims. Id.

At least two other circuits have recognized the validity of

the predicate-act doctrine, even if they have not had occasion

to squarely apply it to the facts before them. Litecubes, LLC

v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(endorsing principle that "courts have generally held that the

Copyright Act only does not reach activities ‘that take place

entirely abroad’ " (quoting Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1098)); Liberty Toy Co. v. Fred Silber Co., 149 F.3d 1183, 1998 WL

385469, at *3 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision)

("[I]f all the copying or infringement occurred outside the

United States, the Copyright Act would not apply. However,

as long as some act of infringement occurred in the United

States, the Copyright Act applies." (citations omitted)). 

We join our sister circuits that have adopted the predicateact doctrine. The doctrine strikes an appropriate balance

between competing concerns, protecting aggrieved plaintiffs

24 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
from savvy defendants while also safeguarding a defendant’s

freedom from stale claims. Absent the predicate-act doctrine,

a defendant could convert a plaintiff’s intellectual property in

the United States, wait for the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations to expire, and then reproduce the property

abroad with impunity. Such a result would jeopardize intellectual property rights and subvert Congress’s goals as engrafted

on to the Copyright Act. But lest the doctrine lead to a windfall for plaintiffs and force a defendant to face liability for

stale claims, plaintiffs may collect only those damages "suffered during the statutory period for bringing claims, regardless of where they may have been incurred," L.A. News, 149

F.3d at 992.

2.

Applying the predicate-act doctrine to this case, we conclude that Alpha has presented a valid claim under the Copyright Act. Accordingly, we sustain the jury’s finding of

liability on that count. 

Distilling applicable case law, we find that a plaintiff is

required to show a domestic violation of the Copyright Act

and damages flowing from foreign exploitation of that

infringing act to successfully invoke the predicate-act doctrine. Alpha has shown both. Appellants concede on appeal

that Alpha has established a domestic violation of the Copyright Act. While in the United States, Vance and Al Dobowi

unlawfully converted Alpha’s blueprints and reproduced them

absent authorization. These acts constitute infringing conduct

under the Copyright Act. See Update Art, 843 F.2d at 73 (concluding there would be an actionable violation if defendant

illegally reproduced image while in the United States). And

Alpha has demonstrated damages flowing from extraterritorial

exploitation of this infringing conduct. Al Dobowi and

Linglong used the converted blueprints to produce mining

tires almost identical to those of Alpha. They then sold these

tires to former customers of Alpha, causing Alpha substantial

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 25
damage. See Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52 (finding damages flowing from foreign exploitation of infringing act where defendant converted negatives of motion picture in United States

and exhibited the film abroad). 

Effectively granting the validity of the above analysis,

Appellants contend that the predicate-act doctrine may not be

employed when recovery of damages from a domestic violation of the Copyright Act is barred by the three-year statute

of limitations. Because the statute of limitations bars Alpha

from collecting damages for activities within the United

States, Appellants assert that the jury’s Copyright Act verdict

may not stand. 

We are not persuaded by Appellants’ creative interpretation

of applicable case law. It may be true that, in each of the cases

in which a court has invoked the predicate-act doctrine, the

plaintiff would have been eligible to receive a damages award

based solely on a domestic infringement. But courts ascribed

no relevance to this observation, never discussing the statute

of limitations and its effect on the predicate-act doctrine.

Quite the opposite, at least the Ninth Circuit anticipated that

a plaintiff may collect damages from extraterritorial conduct,

even if the statute of limitations bars an award based on

domestic infringement. L.A. News, 149 F.3d at 992

("Defendants’ argument that adoption of the Second Circuit

rule would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the statute of limitation by recovering damages for distribution abroad occurring many years after the infringing act in the United States

is without merit. An action must be ‘commenced within three

years after the claim accrued.’ . . . A plaintiff’s right to damages is limited to those suffered during the statutory period for

bringing claims, regardless of where they may have been

incurred." (emphasis added)). That Alpha may not collect

damages from Appellants’ domestic activities is thus of no

moment to the analysis, as the district court accurately

instructed the jury.

26 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
B.

The Appellants next argue that the district court incorrectly

denied their Rule 50 motion as to Alpha’s Virginia state-law

conversion claim because that claim is preempted by the

Copyright Act. Conversion under Virginia law requires a

showing of "any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over

property in denial of, or inconsistent with, the owner’s rights."

Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 679 (Va. 2001). Relevant

here, the Copyright Act states:

[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to

any of the exclusive rights within the general scope

of copyright as specified by section 106 [of the

Copyright Act] in works of authorship that are fixed

in a tangible medium of expression and come within

the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed exclusively by

this title.

17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a). Section 301’s "broad preemptive

scope," Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655,

658 (4th Cir. 1993), serves "to insure that the enforcement of

these rights remains solely within the federal domain," Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d

Cir. 1992). We use a two-part test to determine if a claim is

preempted by the Copyright Act, looking at (1) whether the

claim "falls within the subject matter of copyright" and (2)

whether the claim "protects rights that are equivalent to any

of the exclusive rights of a federal copyright." Carson v.

Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[B]oth prongs of [this] two-factor test

must be satisfied for preemption to occur." Id.

In applying the "equivalency" prong, we have explained

that "reference must be made to the elements of the state

cause of action." Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc., 1

F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993). A state cause of action is not

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 27
"equivalent" and avoids preemption if the action requires an

"extra element [that] transform[s] the nature of the action,"

Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2006), making it "qualitatively different from a copyright

infringement claim," Altai, 982 F.2d at 716 (internal quotation

marks omitted). See also Rosciszewski, 1 F.3d at 230 (same).

Applying this standard, we have concluded that claims under

the Virginia Computer Crimes Act are preempted, see Rosciszewski, 1 F.3d at 230, while claims for misappropriation of

trade secrets under Maryland law are not, see Trandes, 996

F.2d at 660. Importantly, in Trandes, we explained that the

focus under § 301 is not on the "conduct" or "facts pled," but

on the "elements" of the causes of action. Id. at 659. 

Most relevant to this case, in United States ex. rel Berge v.

Bd. of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453

(4th Cir. 1997), we held that the Copyright Act preempted a

claim for conversion under Alabama law when no tangible

objects embodying the intellectual property were converted.

We explained it was "hornbook law that a state law action for

conversion will not be preempted if the plaintiff can prove the

extra element that the defendant unlawfully retained the physical object embodying plaintiff’s work." Id. at 1463. (internal

quotation marks omitted). "However, § 301(a) will preempt a

conversion claim where the plaintiff alleges only the unlawful

retention of its intellectual property rights and not the unlawful retention of the tangible object embodying its work." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Applying this framework, we conclude that the district

court correctly denied the Appellants’ Rule 50 motion. In

doing so, the district court concluded that Alpha presented

sufficient evidence that the Appellants "unlawfully obtained

copies" of Alpha’s blueprints and retained those copies, thus

denying Alpha the "right to control" them. J.A. 1217. Specifically, Alpha proved that "Vance ‘took’ the blueprints without

authorization." J.A. 1217-18. Accordingly, because Alpha

was able to "prove the extra element that the defendant

28 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
unlawfully retained the physical object embodying plaintiff’s

work," the Copyright Act does not preempt the conversion

claim. Berge, 104 F.3d at 1463; see also Seng-Tiong Ho v.

Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding conversion claim under Illinois law preempted where plaintiff

alleged only "unauthorized publishing, not possession"); Carson, 344 F.3d at 456-57 (finding conversion claim under

Texas law was not preempted where complaint alleged physical retention of tangible forms). 

C.

Appellants further challenge the jury’s finding of liability

under the Lanham Act, arguing that the statute’s sweep does

not extend to the extraterritorial acts alleged by Alpha. We

agree. Because Appellants’ trademark infringement lacks a

sufficient effect on U.S. commerce, we find that the Lanham

Act does not reach the conduct complained of by Alpha.

Although the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially in some

instances, only foreign acts having a significant effect on U.S.

commerce are brought under its compass. Nintendo, 34 F.3d

at 250. Confining the statute’s scope thusly ensures that judicial application of the Act will hew closely to its "core purposes . . . , which are both to protect the ability of American

consumers to avoid confusion and to help assure a trademark’s owner that it will reap the financial and reputational

rewards associated with having a desirable name or product."

McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120–21 (1st Cir. 2005).

With these aims in mind, we have reasoned that the archetypal injury contemplated by the Act is harm to the plaintiff’s

"trade reputation in United States markets." See Nintendo, 34

F.3d at 250.

Other circuits have posited that the Lanham Act’s

significant-effect requirement may be satisfied by extraterritorial conduct even when that conduct will not cause confusion

among U.S. consumers. Under this diversion-of-sales theory,

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 29
courts find a significant effect on U.S. commerce where sales

to foreign consumers would jeopardize the income of an

American company. E.g., McBee, 417 F.3d at 126. The doctrine is narrowly applied, however, because the injury in this

context—harm to a U.S. business’s income absent confusion

among U.S. consumers—"is less tightly tied to the interests

that the Lanham Act intends to protect, since there is no

United States interest in protecting [foreign] consumers." Id.

Thus courts invoking the diversion-of-sales theory have

required the defendants to be U.S. corporations that conducted

operations—including at least some of the infringing activity—within the United States. Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1991); Am. Rice, Inc.

v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 414–15 (5th

Cir. 1983). Only in such instances is there a sufficient nexus

between U.S. commerce and the infringing activity.

Recognizing that it has not alleged confusion among U.S.

consumers, Alpha grants that its Lanham Act claims can prevail only if we adopt, for the first time, the diversion-of-sales

theory. Although we find compelling the reasons underpinning use of the doctrine in other cases, we decline to apply it

to the facts before us. Courts upholding liability under the

Lanham Act based solely on harm to a U.S. company’s

income from foreign infringement have stressed that the

defendants in those cases were U.S. companies that conducted

substantial domestic business activity. Ocean Garden, 953

F.2d at 504; Am. Rice, Inc., 701 F.2d at 414–15. Here, in contrast, Appellants are not U.S. corporations and they lack a pervasive system of domestic operations. Thus we cannot

conclude that the extraterritorial conduct—exclusively foreign

sales of infringing tires—has a significant effect on U.S. commerce as required by the dictates of the Lanham Act, see Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250. We accordingly hold that the Lanham

Act does not afford Alpha relief, and we dismiss its claims

under that statute.8

8We also vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Alpha.

The court premised the award solely on Alpha’s successful Lanham Act

claims. Because we dismiss those claims, we must also vacate the award

of attorneys’ fees. 

30 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
D.

Appellants finally contend that the jury’s verdict on

Alpha’s common-law civil conspiracy claims must be set

aside and those claims dismissed. We find this argument convincing. Alpha’s common-law civil conspiracy claims alleged

that the Defendants conspired to infringe Alpha’s trademarks

and copyrights and to convert Alpha’s property. "A common

law claim of civil conspiracy" under Virginia law "generally

requires proof that the underlying tort was committed." Almy

v. Grisham, 639 S.E.2d 182, 188 (Va. 2007). If the underlying

tort is dismissed for any reason, so, too, must the corresponding conspiracy claim be dismissed. Accordingly, because we

have dismissed the Lanham Act claim—the underlying tort

for the conspiracy to infringe trademarks claim—the corresponding conspiracy claim must be dismissed as well.

We further conclude that Alpha’s claim for conspiracy to

infringe its copyrights is preempted by the Copyright Act. As

discussed previously, a state-law cause of action is not preempted so long as it requires an element additional to the

showing required under the Copyright Act and that element

"‘changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim,’" Rosciszewski, 1

F.3d at 230 (quoting Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 716).

We conclude that the additional elements required to prove

conspiracy to infringe copyrights are not sufficient to escape

the Copyright Act’s ambit of preemption. Under Virginia law,

"‘[t]he gist of the civil action of conspiracy is the damage

caused by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed conspiracy and not the mere combination of two or more persons

to accomplish an unlawful purpose or use an unlawful

means.’" Almy, 639 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting CaterCorp, Inc. v.

Catering Concepts, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 277, 281–82 (Va. 1993)).

Thus the core of the claim for conspiracy to infringe copyrights is identical to that under the Copyright Act, and the

extra element of agreement or combination does not make it

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 31
otherwise. Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (D.

Md. 1998) ("[W]hile the formulation for civil conspiracy adds

the element of agreement to the elements that copyright

infringement requires, the right protected by such a cause of

action in this case would serve merely to vindicate the same

right as under the Copyright Act."). Alpha’s claim for conspiracy to commit copyright infringement must therefore be

dismissed as preempted by the Copyright Act. 

Turning to Alpha’s final conspiracy claim—conspiracy to

convert—we find this claim should not be dismissed. First, in

contrast to the conspiracy to infringe trademarks, we have

upheld the jury’s liability finding on the conversion claim.

Second, in contrast to the conspiracy to infringe copyrights,

the conspiracy to convert claim is not subject to preemption

for the same reasons the underlying conversion claim was not.

Accordingly, although we find that the conspiracy to

infringe trademarks and copyrights claims must be dismissed,

the conspiracy to convert claim remains meritorious. We are

thus faced with the question of whether the jury’s verdict on

the civil conspiracy claim may stand given these conclusions.

We believe it cannot. The district court instructed the jury that

"[y]ou may find defendants liable for conspiracy to commit

one, two, or all three of the underlying torts." (J.A. 1098). The

jury verdict form on this claim required the jury to find in

favor of either Alpha or the Defendants on the "Civil Conspiracy" claim, but did not require the jury to issue a special finding of which underlying torts the Defendants conspired to

commit. In rejecting the Defendants’ Rule 50 motion on this

claim, the district court concluded that the conspiracy verdict

could stand even after it dismissed several of the trademark

infringement claims because "the jury could not have found

a conspiracy to commit trademark infringement without also

finding a conspiracy to commit copyright infringement." (J.A.

1240-41). We have now, however, also dismissed the conspiracy to infringe copyright claims and, under the district court’s

32 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
own rationale, we believe the proper course is to set aside the

jury’s verdict on this count.9

IV.

Finally, we turn to the jury’s damages award.10 We have

concluded that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the Appellants. We also uphold the jury’s determination that the Appellants are liable to Alpha under the

Copyright Act and for conversion under Virginia law, but we

dismiss the remaining claims against the Defendants. The

question that remains is whether, in light of the fact that we

are reversing the jury’s verdict on some claims, a new trial for

damages is required. The Appellants raised this argument

below in a Rule 59 motion for a new trial after the district

court dismissed several of the Lanham Act claims, but the district court rejected it. We review the district court’s refusal to

9This conclusion comports with the Supreme Court’s recognition that

when a jury issues a general verdict on multiple theories of liability and

one of those theories is overturned on appeal, the entire verdict falls. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19,

30 (1962); United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 (1959). This general verdict rule is discussed in greater detail in Part IV. 

10Consistent with Virginia law, the jury’s finding of guilt on the civil

conspiracy claim meant that the Appellants were held jointly and severally

liable for the damages award. Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 198 (Va.

1957), abrogated on other grounds by Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 695

S.E.2d 537, 541 (Va. 2010) (holding that, under Virginia law, "conspirators are jointly and severally liable for all damage resulting from the conspiracy." ); see also Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d

88, 103 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting "the law of conspiracy establishes that

every conspirator is jointly and severally liable for all acts of coconspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy"). Although we vacate

the civil conspiracy verdict because of the dismissal of the underlying tort

of trademark infringement and the preemption of the conspiracy to

infringe copyrights claim, that action does not undercut the jury’s factual

conclusion that the Defendants undertook activities jointly. Accordingly,

we do not disturb the conclusion that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Alpha. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 33
award a new damages trial for abuse of discretion. Robinson

v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 242 (4th Cir.

2009).

The Supreme Court has recognized that when a jury issues

a general verdict on multiple theories of liability and one of

those theories is overturned on appeal, the entire verdict falls.

Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products

Co., 370 U.S. 19, 30 (1962); United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613,

619 (1959). We have followed this rule as well, explaining

"[o]ur rule is that because of the impossibility of knowing but

what the jury’s verdict rested on the legal erroneous theory,

such a general verdict may not stand as a basis for judgment."

Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 591 (4th Cir. 1985).

In this case, however, the jury completed a special verdict

form as to liability, but issued only a general verdict on the

damages award. 

In Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268 (4th Cir. 1994),

we addressed whether the general verdict rule extended to

such situations. There, the plaintiff brought two separate

claims (intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution) that stemmed from two separate incidents.

The verdict form "made it clear that the jury found Whirlpool

liable" for both claims, and that it issued a "global figure" for

damages—$75,000 actual and $125,000 punitive. Id. at 1278.

On appeal, we reversed the district court’s denial of Whirlpool’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the emotional distress claim. We then extended the Flowers rule to

the damages award, concluding that a "new trial is necessary

on the damages issue" because the jury did not "distinguish[ ]

the amount attributable to each claim." Id.

In this case, the district court concluded that a new trial is

unnecessary—even after it dismissed several of the Lanham

Act claims—because the "damages award in this case would

have been the same regardless of whether all eleven or only

34 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
two of the trademark claims were submitted to the jury." (J.A.

1237). The court based this determination on the damages

provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), which

states "[t]he copyright owner is entitled to recover . . . any

profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement." In this case, Alpha’s expert witness testified that the

Appellants realized $36 million in sales of infringing tires,

although there was some dispute regarding whether all of the

sales were within the three-year limitations period under the

Copyright Act. The jury awarded $26 million—which the district court noted was the amount of sales within the three-year

limitations period. The Appellants contend that, under Barber,

with some of Alpha’s theories of liability set aside, the district

court abused its discretion and a new trial on damages is necessary. We disagree.

While remaining cognizant of the general verdict rule,

courts "have engrafted a sort-of harmless error gloss onto the

basic principle." Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 564

(5th Cir. 2006). An error is harmless in this context "‘where

it is reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly

influenced by issues erroneously submitted to it.’" Braun v.

Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting E.I. Du

Pont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247, 1258

n.8 (8th Cir. 1980)), quoted with approval by Henderson v.

Winston, No. 94-2017, 1995 WL 378602 at *5 (4th Cir., June

27, 1995). See also Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 105 (1st

Cir. 2001) (same). 

Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073-74 (10th Cir.

2003), exemplifies this sensible approach. In Quigley, the

Tenth Circuit faced a similar situation to this case, having dismissed one of five claims in a case where the jury issued a

special verdict on liability but awarded a lump-sum of compensatory damages. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that

the damages award could stand because reversal on one of the

counts "has no effect on the damages award," particularly

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 35
because the district court had noted that the damages for each

of the five claims were "the same." Id. at 1074. 

In addition to this caselaw, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also counsel harmless error review of trial errors:

[N]o error in admitting or excluding evidence—or

any other error by the court or a party—is ground for

granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for

vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the

court must disregard all errors and defects that do

not affect any party’s substantial rights.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Rule 61 "directs courts to disregard any

error or defect in the proceeding" unless the error is "‘prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings.’" Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. ReDirect, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 

Applying this harmless error approach, we affirm the district court’s denial of a new trial on damages. Unlike Barber,

but like Quigley, the claims in this case are predicated on the

same conduct, and the maximum recovery for each claim is

the "same." Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1074. To the extent the

recoveries differ, the Copyright Act offers the most generous

relief—the defendants’ profits. In sum, we are "reasonably

certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues

erroneously submitted to it," and that any error was therefore

harmless. Braun, 731 F.2d at 1206. 

V.

We hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Appellants. Turning to the merits, we conclude that

Alpha presented an actionable claim under the Copyright Act

and for conversion under Virginia law, but that its remaining

36 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
claims must be dismissed. Finally, we affirm the jury’s 

damages award in favor of Alpha, but we vacate the district 

court’s award of attorneys’ fees. 

AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART,

AND VACATED IN PART

DIAZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I join Parts I–III of the majority opinion. But because our

precedent squarely forecloses sustaining a general award of

compensatory damages when a theory of liability has been

dismissed postverdict, I dissent from the majority’s ruling in

Part IV. I would instead vacate the jury’s damages award and

remand the case for a limited trial on damages. 

I.

A.

As the majority forthrightly recognizes, long-standing

Supreme Court precedent dictates that a general verdict be

overturned when one theory of liability is dismissed. Sunkist

Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370

U.S. 19, 30 (1962). In such a case, the jury finds the defendant generally liable but does not specify which of the multiple claims submitted to it supports the liability determination.

Because a general verdict "‘prevents us from perceiving upon

which plea [the jury] found’" the defendant liable, we are

required to nullify the verdict if just one of the potential

grounds for liability is overturned. Id. (quoting Maryland v.

Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 493 (1884)); see also Flowers v.

Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 591 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[B]ecause

of the impossibility of knowing but what the jury’s verdict

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 37
rested on the legally erroneous theory, such a general verdict

may not stand as the basis for judgment.").

Even when dismissal of a claim does not jeopardize the

jury’s liability verdict, it might call into question the damages

award. We confronted just this situation in Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268 (4th Cir. 1994). There, two claims

were submitted to the jury, which found the defendant liable

on each count. Id. at 1271, 1278. The jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in actual damages and $125,000 in punitive damages, but it did not apportion the amounts on a per-claim

basis. Id. On appeal, we dismissed one of the successful

claims for insufficient evidence. Id. at 1276. We then vacated

the damages award, accepting the defendant’s argument that

the general award could not stand after dismissal of one of the

two claims. Id. at 1278. 

Turning first to the award of actual damages, we noted that

"the liability verdict need not be disturbed because the verdict

form made it clear that the jury found [the defendant] liable

for both [claims]." Id. Concluding next that the award of

actual damages could not stand, we rejected the plaintiff’s

argument—one strikingly similar to that advanced by Alpha.

The plaintiff maintained that we could sustain the damages

verdict as long as a single upheld finding of liability supported the entire damages award. Id. We cursorily rejected

this position as a blatant contravention of Supreme Court precedent. "[W]e must apply the Flowers rule," we wrote, "and

vacate the damages award." Id.

We next considered whether we could uphold the award of

punitive damages in light of our postverdict dismissal of a

theory of liability. Under South Carolina law, which governed

the dispute, punitive damages were permissibly awarded

where the defendant’s conduct was willful, wanton, or reckless. Id. The jury’s general verdict precluded us from determining on which claim it based its award of punitive

damages. Id. at 1279. Because substantial evidence did not

38 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
support one of the two claims submitted to the jury and the

verdict was ambiguous, we also vacated the punitive-damages

award. Id.

Seizing on the sufficiency-of-the-evidence language from

Barber, we upheld a general award of punitive damages in the

face of postverdict dismissal of a claim in Johnson v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 1284, 1999 WL 314660 (4th Cir.

1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). The jury in

Johnson found for the plaintiff on two of the three claims submitted to it, awarding $19,280 in actual damages and $38,000

in punitive damages, the latter of which were not apportioned

on a per-claim basis. Id. at *2. In a post-trial motion, the district court dismissed one of the two successful claims, reasoning that failure to do so could lead to an impermissible double

recovery for actual damages under state law. Id. at *3–4. On

appeal, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the

punitive-damages award must be set aside, reasoning that "the

district court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor

of [the defendant] on [the plaintiff’s] slander claim created no

ambiguity in the jury’s award of punitive damages." Id. at *4.

While not disturbing Barber’s analysis of general awards of

actual damages, we limited its mandate in the punitivedamages domain to cases in which a claim dismissed postverdict is "infirm due to insufficient evidence." Id. Because

sufficient evidence supported the only dismissed theory of liability in Johnson, we affirmed the punitive-damages award.

Id.

B.

Viewing this case through the prism of Barber, I am unable

to conclude that the general damages award may stand.

Rather, a straightforward application of the rule announced in

that decision compels vacating the award. 

I note first that the principles enunciated in Sunkist do not

require us to overturn the verdict as to liability. Unlike the

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 39
general verdict entered by the jury in Sunkist, the jury here

enumerated a separate finding of liability for each of the five

claims submitted to it. Even taking into account that only two

of the counts submitted to the jury are actionable—those for

violation of the Copyright Act and state-law conversion—we

need not disturb the liability verdict. See Barber, 34 F.3d at

1278.

The damages award, however, does not fare so well under

our precedent. Proper disposition of the case begins and ends

with Barber. In that case, we rejected an argument identical

to that advanced by Alpha. Even if an upheld theory of liability supports the general damages award in full, we reasoned

that we must nevertheless vacate the award when another

claim is dismissed postverdict. Id. In this case, the district

court dismissed Alpha’s registered-trademark claim postverdict for insufficient evidence. It moreover dismissed

Alpha’s unregistered-trademark claim as to nine of eleven

marks, also for lack of evidence. The damages award consequentially may not stand under a faithful reading of Barber.

Nothing in our subsequent decisions calls into question

Barber’s treatment of general damages awards, at least

where—as here—an award of punitive damages is not at

issue. Our decision in Johnson drew on language from Barber

to conclude that a general punitive-damages award may stand

even when a claim is dismissed postverdict, so long as at least

one upheld theory of liability supports the award and the dismissed claim was not defective for insufficient evidence.

Johnson, 1999 WL 314660, at *4. Distinguishing a general

award of compensatory or actual damages from one of punitive damages makes sense, given the comparatively looseygoosey nature of determining the proper amount of punitive

damages. Where actual or compensatory damages must be

tethered to the claims with some mathematical precision, a

jury may—within constitutional limits—award punitive damages on a global basis based on standards that require little

more than a subjective judgment as to what amount is suffi40 TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG
cient to deter or punish the defendant for its conduct. It comes

as no surprise, then, that dismissal of a single claim on

grounds unrelated to the sufficiency of the evidence did not

move the panel in Johnson to question the jury’s award of

punitive damages where another viable claim remained and

the evidence supporting the award was not impugned. The

general damages award in this case, however, is entirely compensatory, so Johnson does not affect our analysis. Instead,

Barber controls and requires that we vacate the award.

II.

To be sure, the majority’s approach to the damages issue

holds a great deal of intuitive appeal. Its model vindicates the

will of the jury while promoting judicial economy and the

conservation of resources. Were we writing on a blank slate,

I would enthusiastically embrace its analysis. Constrained as

we are by our precedent, however, I must respectfully dissent

from Part IV of the majority opinion. 

TIRE ENGINEERING v. SHANDONG LINGLONG 41