J-S18037-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant

v.

JALIL COOPER

 No. 566 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered January 15, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014102-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, SOLANO and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2017

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”), which granted Appellee Jalil 

Cooper’s motion to dismiss his misdemeanor charges of recklessly 

endangering another person (“REAP”) and felony charge of fleeing or 

attempting to elude an officer pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. The 

Commonwealth argues it is not required to bring all summary, 

misdemeanor, and felony charges in a single court proceeding. Pursuant to 

this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___, 

2017 PA Super 281, 2017 WL _____ (Aug. 30, 2017) (en banc), we reverse 

the CCP’s order and remand for further proceedings. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The CCP summarizes the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On November 28, 2011, Philadelphia police observed 

[Appellee] failing to stop and signal before a right turn. 

[Appellee] also drove his car through red lights, failed to 

stop at stop signs and acted recklessly toward an unknown 

male passenger. Police arrested [Appellee] and charged

him [via criminal complaint] with a felony count of Fleeing 

or Attempting to Elude Police and two misdemeanor counts 

of [REAP]. Police also issued three summary traffic

citations: reckless driving, driving with a suspended 

license, and disregarding a steady red signal. 

On December 22, 2011, the Commonwealth filed bills of 

information charging [Appellee] with a felony count of 

Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police and two 

misdemeanor counts of [REAP] that arose out of the same 

conduct on November 28, 2011. The Commonwealth 

never filed a joinder motion to join the three summary 

offenses pending in Philadelphia Traffic Court with the one 

felony and two misdemeanor charges pending in the 

[CCP].

On February 23, 2012, [Appellee] was found guilty in 

Philadelphia Traffic Court of the summary offense of 

disregarding a steady red signal and not guilty of driving 

with a suspended license; the reckless driving charge was 

dismissed.

Following the February 23, 2012 proceeding in 

Philadelphia Traffic Court, [Appellee] filed a motion to 

dismiss the one felony and two misdemeanor charges 

pursuant to Section 110. The [CCP] granted [Appellee’s]

motion and dismissed those charges with prejudice.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/20/16, at 1-2. The Commonwealth timely appealed and filed 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue: “Did the 

[CCP] err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it dismissed 
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felony and misdemeanor charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the 

prior adjudication of summary traffic offenses?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 

Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute states, in relevant part:

§ 110. When prosecution barred by former 

prosecution for different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different 

provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is 

based on different facts, it is barred by such former 

prosecution under the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in 

a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating 

to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the 

same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

* * *

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or 

arising from the same criminal episode, if such 

offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting 

officer at the time of the commencement of the first 

trial and occurred within the same judicial 

district as the former prosecution unless the 

court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such 

offense[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) (emphasis added). 

In Perfetto, this Court determined that 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which 

governs the jurisdiction of traffic courts, creates an exception to the 

compulsory joinder rule. Perfetto at *13. The Perfetto Court reasoned 

that under Section 1302 traffic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 

summary traffic violations. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b) (“[t]he 

jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be exclusive of the 
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courts of common pleas . . . .”) We concluded, “[W]here a defendant is 

charged with a summary traffic violation, a misdemeanor, and a felony, in 

judicial districts with a traffic court, the Title 75 summary offense may be 

disposed of in a prior proceeding in the traffic court, which has exclusive 

jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder rule.” 

Perfetto at *14. 

Here, an earlier prosecution in the former Philadelphia Traffic Court1

resulted in a conviction of the summary traffic violation of disregarding a 

steady red signal, the fleeing/eluding and REAP offenses arose from the 

same criminal episode as the summary offense, and the prosecutor during 

the traffic court proceeding would have known of the offenses, as they were 

charged at the same time as the summary offenses. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 

110(1)(ii). Furthermore, all of Appellee’s offenses occurred within the single 

judicial district of Philadelphia. See id. Nevertheless, Philadelphia has a 

designated traffic court that had exclusive jurisdiction to hear Appellee’s 

summary traffic violations. See Perfetto at *13-14; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 

1302(b). Accordingly, Perfetto applies in this case and dictates that a 

subsequent prosecution for fleeing/eluding and REAP in the CCP is 

permissible under the compulsory joinder rule. See Perfetto at *13-14. 

 

1 At the time of Appellee’s offenses, Philadelphia had a separate traffic court 

that adjudicated his summary traffic violation. However, as of June 19, 

2013, Philadelphia restructured the Municipal Court into two sections, the 

General Division and the Traffic Division, which absorbed the former Traffic 

Court. 
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Therefore, we conclude that the CCP erred in granting Appellee’s petition to 

dismiss the fleeing/eluding and REAP charges under Section 110, and we 

reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. 

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2017