In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2022

UNITED STATES of AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DWIGHT WARREN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 CR 397-1--William T. Hart, Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2001--DECIDED February 8, 2002

 

 Before BAUER, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit

Judges.

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In January 2001,

Dwight "Scoop" Warren entered a guilty

plea to one count of armed bank robbery,

see 18 U.S.C. sec. 2113(a) & (d), and was

sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment,

three years of supervised release, he

received a $100 special assessment, and

was ordered to pay $66,684 in

restitution. On appeal, Mr. Warren

challenges the imposition of a four-point

upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. sec.

2B3.1(b)(2)(D) because he "otherwise

used" a dangerous weapon. For the reasons

set forth in the following opinion, we

affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I

BACKGROUND

 Early one morning in November 1998, Mr.

Warren and an accomplice drove to a

branch of St. Paul Federal Bank in

Chicago. When they arrived at the bank,

Mr. Warren exited their van and entered

an enclosed ATM booth. As he waited there

for bank employees to arrive for work,

Mr. Warren placed a mask over his face

and donned a pair of gloves.

 A bank teller soon arrived, and Mr.
Warren produced what appeared to be a

silver handgun and ordered her to enter

the bank. (Mr. Warren later stated that

he used a silver cigarette lighter shaped

like a gun rather than an actual firearm,

although no lighter was ever recovered.)

Once inside, Mr. Warren instructed the

teller to turn off the entry alarm. The

teller recalled that Mr. Warren then

grabbed her by the arm, placed the weapon

in her back, ordered her into the vault

room, and said that he didn’t want to

hurt her. After the teller opened the

cash drawer, Mr. Warren restrained her by

taping her wrists and ankles with duct

tape. He then emptied the cash drawer of

over $66,000 and placed the money in a

gym bag. Mr. Warren left the bank through

a rear exit and took off with his

accomplice in the waiting getaway van.

 For almost two years this crime remained

unsolved, but a jailhouse informant’s tip

led investigators to Mr. Warren.

Eventually, he pleaded guilty to one

count of armed bank robbery, see 18

U.S.C. sec. 2113(a) & (d).

 At sentencing, the district court

calculated Mr. Warren’s base offense

level to be 20, see U.S.S.G. sec.

2B3.1(a), with an additional two points

for taking the property of a financial

institution, see sec. 2B3.1(b)(1),

another two points for physical restraint

of the teller, see sec. 2B3.1(b)(4), and

yet another two points because the loss

was between $50,000 and $250,000, see

sec. 2B3.1(b)(7)(C). The district court

also assessed two points for obstruction

of justice, see U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1, but

reduced the adjusted offense level by

three for acceptance of responsibility

under U.S.S.G. sec. 3E1.1. Finally, the

district court added four points under

sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) because Mr. Warren

"otherwise used" a dangerous weapon. Mr.

Warren’s total offense level was

therefore 29, which, combined with his

Category III criminal history, yielded a

guideline range of 108-135 months. The

district court sentenced Mr. Warren to a

term of 120 months of imprisonment.

II

DISCUSSION

 Mr. Warren submits that he should not

have received a four-point upward
adjustment under sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) for

otherwise using a dangerous weapon. He

contends that, at most, his conduct

constituted mere "brandishing" of a

dangerous weapon. Specifically, Mr.

Warren highlights that the parties

dispute whether his weapon actually made

contact with the teller’s back; he

describes his conduct as "holding the gun

in the vicinity of the teller’s back."

Appellant’s Br. at 9. We review the

application of sec. 2B3.1(b)(2) for clear

error. See United States v. Seavoy, 995

F.2d 1414, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1993).

 Whether Mr. Warren touched the teller’s

back with the gun or whether he simply

came close to touching her is not an

important distinction for purposes of

determining the applicability of the

enhancement. Although something more than

a general display of a weapon is

necessary to constitute use under

subsection (b)(2)(D), see Seavoy, 995

F.2d at 1422, physical contact between

the weapon and the victim is not a

prerequisite to finding that the

defendant "otherwise used" a dangerous

weapon, see, e.g., United States v.

Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676-77 (11th Cir.

1999) (weapon was "otherwise used" when

held one-half inch from victim’s head);

United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 238,

240-41 (3d Cir. 1991) (weapon was

"otherwise used" when held "at close

range").

 Moreover, Mr. Warren admitted during his

plea colloquy that he intimidated his

victim with the weapon and also admitted

that he threatened her by warning that he

"didn’t want to hurt her." Tr.I at 14-15,

26. We have affirmed "otherwise used"

adjustments when pointing a weapon at a

specific victim created a personalized

threat of harm. See United States v.

Taylor, 135 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir.

1998); United States v. Hernandez, 106

F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1997). The

district court reasonably could have

found that Mr. Warren’s behavior did

constitute such a personalized threat.

Mr. Warren’s argument in his brief that

the factual situation here does "not

constitute an increased level of threat

beyond the level necessary to instill

fear in a reasonable person," Appellant’s

Br. at 9, is conclusory and does not

demonstrate why the district court was

clearly erroneous in assessing the facts
as it did.

 In the alternative, Mr. Warren submits

that the district court erred in relying

on the presentence investigation report

("PSR"), which recounts that he "poked"

the teller with his gun. Mr. Warren

maintains that the PSR version of the

crime should be deemed unreliable because

the Government did not produce at

sentencing either the teller or the

investigating FBI agent. Both had given

statements that constitute a large

portion of the PSR. At sentencing, Mr.

Warren made clear that this reliability

argument centered on only one disputed

fact: whether or not he actually touched

the teller with the weapon. His counsel

stated: "Mr. Warren certainly

acknowledges that he intimidated her with

it, but he denies that he touched her

with it." Tr.I at 26. However, it is

irrelevant whether the district court

credited the teller’s story that there

was actual physical contact between the

gun and her back. The district court

could have imposed the "otherwise used"

points solely by relying on Mr. Warren’s

own admission, through counsel, that he

had intimidated the victim with a weapon,

id., in a situation in which such

intimidation clearly constituted a

personalized threat.

Conclusion

 The district court did not commit clear

error in determining that the sentence

should include an enhancement because a

dangerous weapon was "otherwise used."

Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED