J-S75020-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GRETCHEN GEIBEL

v.

HARRY SMITH AND DESIREE 

HASSELL

APPEAL OF: DESIREE HASSELL

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 506 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-1498

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 06, 2018

Desiree Hassell appeals, pro se, from the judgment of possession

entered March 30, 2017, in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, 

regarding Gretchen Geibel’s property located at 309 Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, 

Pennsylvania. Hassell raises three issues on appeal, challenging (1) whether 

the parties’ contract provided for a recovery of funds, (2) whether she received 

due process; and (3) whether the trial court was biased. For the reasons 

below, we affirm.

The facts underlying this appeal are summarized by the trial court as 

follows:

[] Desiree Hassel[l], along with her live-in boyfriend, Harry 

Smith, had entered into an Article of Agreement on July 25, 2013 

to purchase a house from [] Gretchen Geibel, and the property at 

309 Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, Mercer County, Pennsylvania.

[Hassell] agreed to purchase the property for $50,000.00 by 
J-S75020-17

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making monthly payments of $600.00 per month commencing 

August 15, 2013 and on the first day of each succeeding month 

thereafter for 18 months at which time the princip[al] balance 

would be due. [Hassell] was also obligated to pay all utilities, real 

estate taxes, insurance, and maintenance of the premises.

[Hassell] took occupancy of the property upon executing the 

Article of Agreement and remained thereafter and still remains in 

this home.

It is uncontested that [Hassell] stopped making payments 

on March 1, 2015 when $325.00 was paid to [Geibel]. [Geibel]

then continued to pursue the monthly payments and eventually 

gave a 30 day notice to vacate the premises.

[Hassell] failed to cure the default and/or vacate the 

premises and [Geibel] filed a Complaint in Ejectment on June 10, 

2016 at which time [Hassell] was behind by almost $13,000.00.

[Geibel] sought a monetary judgment as well as a judgment for 

possession of the premises.

This matter was assigned to the undersigned judge as the 

case manager and the Court met with the parties for an initial 

status conference on August 16, 2016 at which time [Geibel]

appeared with her attorney and [Hassell] appeared pro se. The 

parties entered into settlement discussions at this off the record 

conference and the Court entered a Case Management Order. The 

case was then scheduled for the January 2017 trial list for a nonjury trial and a pre-trial conference on December 28, 2016. The 

Court also established a discovery deadline of October 17, 2016

and directed [Geibel’s] attorney to provide [Hassell] a 

spreadsheet itemizing all of the monetary damages alleged as well 

as an amortization schedule. [Hassell] was ordered also to file an 

answer to the complaint by September 15, 2016.

The parties did not engage in discovery and [Geibel] filed a 

Motion for a Summary Judgment that was scheduled for argument 

on February 6, 2017 and the trial was continued generally pending 

resolution of the motion. On February 6, 2017, the Court granted 

the summary judgment motion as to Harry Smith and he was 

ordered to vacate the premises by March 12, 2017. Notably, 

Harry Smith who was also pro se in this matter did not file an 

appeal from the February 6, 2017 Order but is believed to still be 

residing in the subject house. In addition, on February 6, 2017 

[Hassell] appeared again pro se and the parties reached an 

agreement embodied in an Order dated February 6, 2017 wherein 
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[Hassell] agreed to an Order granting possession of the property 

to [Geibel] and [Hassell] agreed to vacate the premises by 

midnight of March 12, 2017, unless she paid the sum of $3,650.00 

to [Geibel] by February 16, 2017 and commenced paying $650.00 

on the 15th day of the months of March, April and May. The Court 

scheduled a review conference for May 30, 2017. The February 

6, 2017 Order also directed that a stay would be granted 

automatically for possession in [Geibel] if [Hassell] paid the funds 

as set forth above.

[Geibel] filed a Motion for Judgment for Possession on March 

17, 2017 on the basis that [Hassell] had not complied with the 

February 6, 2017 agreed upon Order by paying $3,650.00 by 

February 16, 2017. [Geibel’s] motion also averred that [Hassell]

was granted an extension to April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises 

so long as she paid the sum of $1,300.00 to [Geisel] and allowed 

[Geisel] to inspect the premises. [Hassell] paid the $1,300.00 but 

inspection of the home did not occur.

[Hassell] appeared again before the Court with [Geisel] and 

her attorney on March 24, 2017 for a hearing on the Motion for 

Judgment for Possession and after a hearing the Court granted 

the Motion for Judgment for Possession and gave possession of 

309 Lunn Boulevard to [] Geibel, and gave [Hassell] until midnight 

of April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises. [Hassell] did not object 

to this Order. Harry Smith was likewise evicted. The Prothonotary 

entered judgment for possession on March 30, 2017.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2017, at 1-3. This timely appeal followed.1

As noted supra, Hassell purports to raise three issues on appeal. First, 

she argues there was “no affirmation of a contact, or agreement for monies 

payable past the expiration” of the parties’ agreement. Hassell’s Brief at 7. 

She maintains her final payment was made on March 1, 2015, and the contract 

did not include a “carryover clause.” Id. at 8. Therefore, Hassell insists 

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1 On April 3, 2017, the trial court ordered Hassell to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Hassell 

complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on April 25, 

2017. 
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Geibel’s lawsuit “requesting possession, along with damages for amounts not 

covered under contract or agreed to, should have been disallowed.” Id.

Second, Hassell insists she was denied due process because she did not 

receive proper notice of Geibel’s request for repossession of the property. See 

id. at 9. She contends that whether the contract is viewed as a 

landlord/tenant agreement or an installment land contract, “specific notice, 

due process, is required to be given prior by the seller/landowner requesting 

court assistance in reclaiming property.” Id.

Lastly, Hassell contends the trial court judge was biased against her 

because (1) the judge and Geibel discussed the fact they had used the same 

home builder, and (2) the judge presided over a criminal prosecution against 

Harry Smith. See id. at 11-12.

Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 

statutory and case law, we conclude the trial court thoroughly addressed and 

properly disposed of Hassell’s claims in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 

7/24/2017, at 4-8 (finding (1) recusal was not necessary under the facts of 

this case, and, in any event, Hassell waived the claim by failing to move for 

recusal in the trial court;2 (2) Hassell waived her claim that eviction was not 

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2 See Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2017, at 4-5. See also Reilly by Reilly v. 

Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (Pa. 1985) (“Once 

the trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party is deemed to have 

waived his right to have a judge disqualified, and if he has waived that issue, 

he cannot be heard to complain following an unfavorable result.”).
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a proper remedy once the lease/agreement expired by failing to file 

preliminary objections or move for summary judgment;3 (3) the Landlord 

Tenant Act was not applicable to the present action, and therefore, Geibel was 

not required to provide notice to vacate under the Act;4 and (4) in any event, 

the March 24, 2017, order was “based upon an agreement reached between” 

the parties).5 Accordingly, we rest upon its well-reasoned basis.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/6/2018

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3 See id. at 5-6.

4 See id. at 6.

5 Id. at 6. It merits emphasis that during the March 24, 2017, hearing, Hassell

conceded that because she did not pay the $3,650.00 due under the parties’ 

extended agreement, Geibel was “entitled to possession.” N.T., 3/24/2017, 

at 9.
Circulated 02/08/2018 12:44 PM

r !LED IH HERCER 

COUNTY 

2811 JUL 24 AH IQ: cs 

RUTH A. 8\CE 

PROTHOHOTARY 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MERCER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL ACTION - LAW 

· GRETCHEN GEIBEL, 

Plaintiff 

Received 9/6/2017 1 :39:02 PM ffiourt Western m l,dct 

Filed 9/6/2017 1 :39:00 PM 

�ourt 

Western 01 trict 

506 WDA 017 

v. 

HARRY SMITH and 

DESIREE HASSEL, 

Defendants 

No. 2016 - 1498 

RULE 1925 OPINION1 

Appellant, Desiree Hassel, along with her live-in boyfriend, Harry Smith, had 

entered into an Article of Agreement on July 25, 2013 to purchase a house from 

appellee, Gretchen Geibel, and the property at 309 Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, Mercer 

County, Pennsylvania. Appellant agreed to purchase the property for $50,000.00 

by making monthly payments of $600.00 per month commencing August 15, 2013 

and on the first day of each succeeding month thereafter for 18 months at which 

time the principle balance would be due. Appellant was also obligated to pay all 

utilities, real estate taxes, insurance, and maintenance of the premises. Appellant 

took occupancy of the property upon executing the Article of Agreement and 

remained thereafter and still remains in this home. 

I This Opinion is untimely for several reasons. First, the parties informally advised the Court of 

settlement talks which eventually fell through. Second, appellant had requested transcripts, was 

advised of the modest cost, but never followed through with payment. Hence, the Court ordered 

transcripts on its own (that were recently completed) for the March 24, 2017 and February 6, 2017 

hearings. 
It is uncontested that appellant stopped making payments on March 1, 2015 

when $325.00 was paid to the appellee. Appellee then continued to pursue the 

monthly payments and eventually gave a 30 day notice to vacate the premises. 

Appellants failed to cure the default and/or vacate the premises and appellee 

filed a Complaint in Ejectment on June 10, 2016 at which time appellant was behind 

by almost $13,000.00. Appellee sought a monetary judgment as well as a 

judgment for possession of the premises. 

This matter was assigned to the undersigned judge as the case manager and 

the Court met with the parties for an initial status conference on August 16, 2016 at 

which time appellee appeared with her. attorney and appellant appeared pro se. 

The parties entered into settlement discussions at this off the record conference and 

the Court entered a Case Management Order. The case was then scheduled for 

the January 2017 trial list for a non-jury trial and a pre-trial conference on December 

28, 2016. The Court also established a discovery deadline of October 17, 2016 

and directed appellee's attorney to provide appellant a spreadsheet itemizing all of 

the monetary damages alleged as well as an amortization schedule. Appellant 

was ordered also to file an answer to the complaint by September 15, 2016. 

The parties did not engage in discovery and appellee filed a Motion for a 

Summary Judgment that was scheduled for argument on February 6, 2017 and the 

trial was continued generally pending resolution of the motion. On February 6, 

2017, the Court granted the summary judgment motion as to Harry Smith and he 

was ordered to vacate the premises by March 12, 2017. Notably, Harry Smith who 

was also prose in this matter did not file an appeal from the February 6, 2017 Order 

but is believed to still be residing in the subject house. In addition, on February 6, 

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2017 appellant appeared again pro se and the parties reached an agreement 

embodied in an Order dated February 6, 2017 wherein appellant agreed to an Order 

granting possession of the property to appellee and appellant agreed to vacate the 

premises by midnight of March 12, 2017, unless she paid the sum of $3,650.00 to 

appellee by February 16, 2017 and commenced paying $650.00 on the 15th day of 

the months of March, April and May. The Court scheduled a review conference for 

May 30, 2017. The February 6, 2017 Order also directed that a stay would be 

granted automatically for possession in the appellee if appellant paid the funds as 

set forth above. 

Appellee filed a Motion for Judgment for Possession on March 17, 2017 on 

the basis that appellant had not complied with the February 6, 2017 agreed upon 

Order by paying $3,650.00 by February 16, 2017. Appellee's motion also averred 

that appellant was granted an extension to April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises so 

long as she paid the sum of $1,300.00 to the appellee and allowed appellee to 

inspect the premises. Appellant paid the $1,300.00 but inspection of the home did 

not occur. 

Appellant appeared again before the Court with appellee and her attorney on 

March 24, 2017 for a hearing on the Motion for Judgment for Possession and after a 

hearing the Court granted the Motion for Judgment for Possession and gave 

possession of 309 Lunn Boulevard to appellee, Gretchen Geibel, and gave 

appellant until midnight of April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises. Appellant did not 

object to this Order. Harry Smith was likewise evicted. The Prothonotary entered 

judgment for possession on March 30, 2017. 

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Appellant, Desiree Hassel, then filed an appeal to the Superior Court on 

March 31, 2017 which included a statement of the background of the case wherein 

. appellant admitted her last payment was March 1, 2015 and submitted a statement 

of questions involved as well as her argument. An appeal conference was 

scheduled for April 25, 2017 and appellant was directed to submit a Statement of 

Errors Complained Of which was filed by appellant on April 25, 2017. 

In her Statement of Errors Complained Of, appellant lists three primary 

issues. One of those issues is whether or not this Court should have recused itself 

from any proceedings in this matter for two reasons. First, that the Court had a 

"casual acquaintances with the plaintiff." Appellee, Gretchen Geibel, was generally 

known to the Court (although the Court had never met her) until the initial status 

conference held August 16, 2016. The only connection between the Court and 

appellee was that they had a general contractor in common who built both of their 

homes several miles apart and the Court's general contractor had made reference 

to her from time to time. This information was disclosed to all parties at the status 

conference and none of the parties at any time indicated or requested that the Court 

recuse. Furthermore, the Court felt no need initially or at any time thereafter to 

recuse based upon that limited information about Ms. Geibel. 

Appellant also argues that recusal should have occurred because this Court 

also presided over her co-defendant/boyfriend's criminal case that was unrelated to 

this civil lawsuit. In that criminal case, Harry Smith pied guilty to theft related 

charges and the Court obtained information in a pre-sentence investigation report 

prior to sentencing Mr. Smith on March 27, 2017. That information pertained to 

appellant's dismissal from her employment with a "healthy severance package" and 

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a reference in the PSI that she had earned $88,000.00 the prior year. See 

Transcript dated March 24, 2017, pages 4-5. 

On March 24, 2017 when appellant and appellee and her attorney were in 

Court regarding the Motion for Judgment of Possession, this Court did address to 

the appellant that information contained in the PSI which painted a more glowing 

view of appellant's income and assets than she had been representing throughout 

the civil lawsuit as the parties discussed settlements and reasons for non-payment 

since 2015. Appellant took issue with the information and advised the Court that 

the information was incorrect. 

Once again the parties reached an agreement for the March 24, 2017 Order, 

and appellant never requested that the Court recuse, nor did the Court feel 

conflicted in any way based upon the PSI information and its limited prior 

information about appellee. Furthermore, appellant has waived this issue by failing 

to raise it at any time in this litigation. 

Appellant next argues that the Court should not have allowed the suit to 

proceed against her in ejectment with a request for damages of rental monies 

claimed after the agreement expired. Unfortunately, appellant's legal education is 

limited as is her knowledge of the varying nuances between articles of agreement 

(land contracts) and the process of ejecting a person under that type of agreement 

and suing for damages. She conflates the remedies in a lease with the remedies in 

ejectment. 

While there were times during the various conferences and arguments on 

motions during this litigation that appellant mentioned issues of eviction pursuant to 

leases that may have expired and/or land contracts that may have expired and the 

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proper remedies that may have been available, at no point did she file preliminary 

objections raising these issues or a motion for summary judgment after the 

completion of discovery challenging appellee's claims under appellant's arguments. 

Hence, appellant has waived once again her right to raise this issue for the first time 

on appeal. 

Finally, appellant argues that the Court should not have allowed this lawsuit 

to proceed without requiring evidence of the service of a notice to vacate under the 

Landlord Tenant Act She argues that this would have been a due process 

violation and that the Court should therefore not have permitted the entry of 

judgment for possession. She also argues that the acceptance of money by the 

appellee from her in March and April of 2017 would make judgment for possession 

premature. 

Once again, appellant is confusing the legal status of her relationship with the 

appellee under the land contract. The Landlord Tenant Act is simply not applicable 

to this situation and that action in ejectment was the appropriate procedure and 

cause of action to pursue for appellee to regain possession of this house and 

property. Thus, notice was not required to vacate under the Landlord Tenant Act. 

Even if appellant is correct on any issue, her appeal on any of these issues 

should nonetheless be denied because the March 24, 2017 Order is based upon an 

agreement reached between appellant and appellee. Appellant represented to the 

Court (as she had on previous occasions in this case) that she would make her 

monthly payments, and on this particular occasion she had agreed at the February 

6, 2017 argument on the summary judgment motion, to pay a lump sum of 

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$3,650.00 by February 16, 2017 and begin paying $650.00 per month." She also 

agreed on February 6, 2017, as the Order of that date indicates, that possession of 

the property was granted to Gretchen Geibel but that the possession provision was 

stayed so long as appellant made her lump sum and monthly payments. The Court 

properly scheduled a review conference for May 30, 2017 to monitor her compliance 

with the February 6, 2017 agreed upon Order. Appellee at all times in the case 

bent over backwards. to avoid the necessity of removing the appellant from the 

home by giving her every opportunity to cure the default by demonstrating a 

successful pattern of paying her monthly obligation. Appellee even went further 

than the February 6, 2017 Order and made an additional agreement with appellant 

thereafter giving her an extension. 

Despite all of those efforts by the appellee, appellant continued to renege on 

her agreements, resulting in the final agreement embodied in the March 24, 2017 

Order granting a judgment of possession for the appellee but giving the appellant 

the time she had requested (April 2, 2017) to vacate the property. Accordingly, 

appellant's payment of the monthly payments for March and April of 2017 were 

insufficient pursuant to the agreement reached between the parties rendering the 

judgment for possession premature. 

Simply stated, appellant and appellee continued throughout this case to 

reach agreements to bring appellant in compliance with the Article of Agreement so 

that she would not have to leave the property. Appellant continuously came up 

with excuse after excuse, then entered into agreements that were embodied in the 

2 See Transcript of February 6, 2017 hearing, page 5, where appellant was asked if the Order 

dictated in her presence was acceptable, to which she responded "it is." 

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... 
February 6 and March 24, 2017 Orders that were settlement agreements. Thus, 

/ 

the Court properly entered a judgment for possession in favor of appellee that was 

agreed upon if appellant did not fulfill her end of the agreements. This was done 

not pursuant to any Court determination on a motion, but" as a consequence for 

appellant's continual breach of various agreements reached to settle this matter. 

Hence, the trial court respectfully requests that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

enter an Order affirming the entry of judgment for possession of the property at 309 

Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, Mercer County, Pennsylvania to appellee, Gretchen 

Geibel. 

BY THE COURT: 

Date: July 24, 2017 

rmb 

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J.