In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2945

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

REGINALD PALMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:99-30228-01-GPM--G. Patrick Murphy, Chief Judge.

Argued March 7, 2001--Decided March 27, 2001/*

 Before DIANE P. WOOD, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.

 Per Curiam. Reginald Palmer was convicted on

three counts of distributing crack within 1,000

feet of a playground. He appeals, challenging

only the very lengthy prison sentence--475

months--he received.

 In May and June 1998, Palmer sold small amounts

(.9 grams, and 1.9 grams twice) of crack to

Keenan Deal who was--much to Palmer’s later

surprise--cooperating with authorities. The sales

occurred within 1,000 feet of Virginia Park, an

East St. Louis, Illinois, playground. A

superseding indictment charged Palmer with three

counts of distributing crack, 21 U.S.C. sec.

841(a)(1), and three parallel counts of doing the

deals within 1,000 feet of a playground, id. sec.

860(a). Palmer entered guilty pleas to all six

counts without a plea agreement, but because the

distribution counts were lesser-included offenses

of the more serious "playground" counts, see

Williams v. United States, 150 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.

1998), the district court entered judgment only

on the latter.

 In preparing the presentence investigation

report (PSR), the probation officer calculated

Palmer’s relevant conduct using information from

Deal and from federal agents who interviewed

several sources, including Palmer’s former

neighbor, Robert Branscomb, and Warren Griffin,
a "governor" of the Gangster Disciples gang. The

probation officer concluded that Palmer’s

relevant conduct totaled 353 grams/1 of crack:

98 grams from Deal, 14 grams from Branscomb, and

241 grams from Griffin. Palmer objected but, for

the most part, provided only conclusory responses

denying certain transactions or objecting to

particular witness statements. He did, however,

specifically object to any drugs involving

Griffin, arguing that those activities were

unreliable and too remote in time to be included

in his relevant conduct under the sentencing

guidelines.

 At the sentencing hearing, Deal described five

previous occasions when he bought 1.7 grams of

crack from Palmer. He also testified about

several more ounces of crack he saw Palmer

carrying during those transactions. Branscomb

testified that Palmer sold crack outside

Branscomb’s home "about every day during the year

of 1998 and 1999." Finally, the government called

a deputy U.S. marshal who had previously

interviewed Griffin about his contacts with

Palmer during 1996. Griffin, according to the

marshal, had "taught [Palmer] the drug trade."

Griffin allegedly told the marshal he received

two ounces of crack from Palmer and had seen him

in possession of seven or eight ounces of crack

that Palmer and a friend had cooked from powder.

 Palmer offered no direct evidence to support

his objections to the PSR. He did, however, argue

that a substantial portion of the relevant

conduct amount, particularly the quantity

attributable to him by reason of Griffin’s

statements, was based on hearsay and should not

be included in the final calculation. Palmer

suggested that the total amount of crack was only

135 grams, not 353.2, although it is unclear how

he arrived at this calculation. The district

judge determined:

There is a substantial, rational basis for

attributing more than 150 grams to the defendant.

Now, the Government has an exact 353.2 grams. I

am not prepared to say that they are exactly

correct, but I am prepared to say that there is

substantially more than 150 grams that must be

attributed to the defendant under the evidence

that is before me.

 We review for clear error the district court’s

calculation of the drug quantity attributed to

Palmer as relevant conduct. United States v.

Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 875 (7th Cir. 2001). In

doing so, we refrain from second-guessing the

district judge, United States v. McEntire, 153

F.3d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1998), and must affirm

unless we are left with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed,"

Huerta, 239 F.3d at 875 (internal quotations and

citation omitted).

 Palmer first argues that the district court

failed to make a specific finding of drug

quantity; the judge’s determination of "more than

150 grams" is legally insufficient, Palmer

suggests. The government argues that Palmer

forfeited this argument, and others, by failing

to properly object at sentencing, and accordingly

our review should only be for plain error. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Krankel,

164 F.3d 1046, 1055 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998). We

reject this argument and find the defendant’s

objections adequate to trigger clear error,

rather than plain error, review.

 Recognizing the importance of drug quantity in

sentencing, we require that a sentencing court

make an explicit drug-quantity finding and

explain how it arrived at the sentence. McEntire,

153 F.3d at 435. The district court here

specified only "more than 150 grams," but a more

exact sum was not necessary given that anything

between 150 and 500 grams would have resulted in

the same sentencing range. But is the "more than

150 grams" finding supportable?

 This case presents a situation we have been

encountering with increased regularity. A

defendant pleads guilty to dealing in small

amounts of crack--here, Palmer sold only a total

of 4.7 grams to Deal in the three transactions

specifically charged in the indictment--but then

the presentence report lists huge amounts of

crack as "relevant conduct," which dramatically

ratchet up the resting point on the sentencing

guideline grid. We conclude here that the 98

grams attributed to Palmer through Deal and the

14 grams attributed to him through Branscomb,

though dwarfing the amounts involved in the

actual sales, are supportable based on our review

of this record. But we have serious misgivings

about the huge amount, 241 grams, piled on Palmer

through a U.S. marshal’s recitation of a

statement given to him by Griffin, who did not

personally testify (he took the Fifth) at the

sentencing hearing. Our doubts about Griffin’s

evidence, inaccurately presented to us by the

government as Griffin’s "testimony," gives us

great pause even if only a portion of it is

needed to move Palmer over 150 grams. First, the

matters related by Griffin are remote in time--

over 2 years old--to the sales to Deal that form

the basis for the counts of conviction. Second,

the district court did not make any specific

findings as to Griffin’s reliability, which

probably is understandable given the fact that

the way his "evidence" was presented affords no
basis for determining that what he told the

marshal was true or accurate.

 Accordingly, given our serious concerns about

the Griffin evidence, we determine that a finding

of "more than 150 grams" on the basis of this

record is clearly erroneous. The record, however,

does support, for relevant conduct purposes, a

sentence within the range of 50 to 150 grams of

crack. Accordingly, the sentence is VACATED and the

case REMANDED to the district court for

resentencing. At resentencing, no further

proceedings will be necessary, other than an

adjustment of the sentence, if the district court

elects to sentence Palmer on the basis of 50 to

150 grams. To go beyond that level, more

proceedings regarding Griffin and a better record

on the reliability of the information he offered

will be required.

/* This appeal was originally resolved in an

unpublished order of March 27, 2001.

Subsequently, we granted a request to convert the

order to a published opinion.

/1 We have rounded the amounts off.