NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

PATRICIA WATKINS,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent

______________________

2019-2195

______________________

Petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice 

Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 2014-002.

______________________

Decided: April 10, 2020

______________________

PATRICIA WATKINS, Jackson, MS, pro se. 

 LAUREN MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H.

HUNT, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MAYER and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 WATKINS v. DOJ

PER CURIAM.

Patricia Watkins (“Watkins”) appeals the final determination of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (“BJA”) denying her claim seeking a death benefit 

pursuant to the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 

(“PSOBA”), Pub. L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (codified as 

amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10281–88). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2013, Leo Watkins (“Officer Watkins”) was 

employed both by the Hinds Community College Police Department and the City of Raymond, Mississippi Police Department (“Raymond Police Department”). A. 2. On 

August 2, 2013, he “fell unconscious while on a lunch break 

from performing traffic and crowd control at graduation 

ceremonies for Hinds Community College.” A. 1. Although 

Officer Watkins was rushed to the hospital, he never regained consciousness and died on August 19, 2013. A. 3. 

His death certificate lists his cause of death as “cardiopulmonary failure due to brain hemorrhage due to hypertension.” A. 7.

Watkins, who is Officer Watkins’ sister, subsequently 

filed a claim seeking a death benefit pursuant to the 

PSOBA.* After the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Office 

denied her claim, A. 22–24, Watkins requested a hearing 

officer determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 32.17. Watkins was permitted to submit evidence in support of her 

claim when she appeared before the hearing officer. A. 25. 

The hearing officer determined that although Officer Watkins “was a long-term, dedicated police officer,” there was 

insufficient evidence to establish that his death was the 

* The BJA determined that Officer Watkins was not 

married and had no children at the time of his death. A. 

4–5.

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WATKINS v. DOJ 3

direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the 

line of duty. A. 34.

Watkins then appealed to the BJA. She presented evidence that Officer Watkins had responded to a domestic 

disturbance call when he was on duty with the Raymond 

Police Department on March 6, 2013. A. 7. As Officer Watkins was attempting to make an arrest, the suspect pushed 

him “against a wall . . . causing his head to hit the wall with 

sufficient force to break the drywall.” A. 7 (footnote omitted). Watkins supplied photographs showing that Officer 

Watkins sustained bruises on his head as a result of this 

incident and testified that he had complained of headaches 

for several months after the incident occurred. A. 7.

On April 11, 2019, the BJA denied Watkins’ claim. A. 

1–17. It explained that a claimant seeking a PSOBA death 

benefit “must demonstrate that it is more likely than not 

that the decedent was a public safety officer, who died as 

the direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in 

the line of duty.” A. 4 (footnotes, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the BJA agreed with the 

hearing officer that Officer Watkins was a public safety officer, A. 5, it concluded that there was no “competent medical evidence” showing that Officer Watkins’ fatal stroke 

was the direct and proximate result of the head injury he 

sustained in March 2013. A. 8. The BJA determined, 

moreover, that Watkins was not entitled to rely on 34 

U.S.C. § 10281(k), which creates a rebuttable presumption 

that a stroke suffered by a public safety officer while engaged in “nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical law 

enforcement . . . activity” qualifies as a personal injury 

“sustained in the line of duty” for PSOBA purposes. See A.

9–11. The BJA concluded that Officer Watkins’ duties in 

the period immediately prior to his stroke did not involve 

nonroutine or strenuous physical law enforcement activity. 

A. 11–12. According to the BJA, “in the 24-hour period preceding the onset of his fatal stroke, Officer Watkins conducted routine patrol activities and did not engage in any 

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4 WATKINS v. DOJ

activity that would constitute nonroutine stressful or 

strenuous physical law enforcement activity within the 

meaning of the [PSOBA] and its implementing regulations.” A. 11.

Watkins then filed a timely appeal with this court. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 10287.

II. DISCUSSION

This court’s authority to review a decision by the BJA 

to deny a claim for a PSOBA death benefit is limited. “We 

review the BJA’s application of its own regulations to determine ‘(1) whether there has been substantial compliance 

with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary 

or capricious action on the part of the government officials 

involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports 

the decision denying the claim.’” Li v. Dep’t of Justice, 947 

F.3d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Amber-Messick v. 

United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

The PSOBA provides a one-time cash payment to the 

survivors of public safety officers who are killed as the result of injuries sustained in the line of duty. 34 U.S.C. 

§ 10281(a); see Amber-Messick, 483 F.3d at 1318. For a survivor to qualify for this benefit, at least three requirements 

must be satisfied. First, the public safety officer must have 

suffered a “personal injury” within the meaning of the 

PSOBA. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a). Second, the personal injury 

must have been suffered “in the line of duty,” and, finally,

the officer’s death must have been the “direct and proximate result” of that injury. Id.; see Cassella v. United 

States, 469 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

On appeal, Watkins argues that her brother died as a 

result of the blow to the head he sustained in March 2013 

while making an arrest. See Pet. Corrected Informal Br. 

1–2; see also Pet. Mem. in Lieu of Reply Br. 1–5. Substantial evidence, however, supports the BJA’s determination 

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WATKINS v. DOJ 5

that Officer Watkins’ August 2013 death was not the “direct and proximate result,” 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a), of the 

head trauma he suffered in March 2013. See, e.g., Consolo 

v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966) (“[S]ubstantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge 

Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Substantial evidence review asks whether a reasonable fact finder could 

have arrived at the agency’s decision and requires examination of the record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and detracts from an agency’s 

decision.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In concluding that the head injury Officer Watkins sustained in March 2013 was not the direct and proximate 

cause of his death, the BJA relied on the opinion of Stephen 

J. Cina, M.D., an independent forensic pathologist, who 

concluded that “[t]he injuries received [by Officer Watkins] 

in March 2013 did not contribute to [his] death.” A. 7. Cina 

stated that there was “no evidence that [Officer Watkins] 

injured his brain or bled into the membranes around his 

brain when he received blunt force injuries to his head in 

March of 2013” and that it was “[m]ore likely than not

[that] the superficial blunt force injuries received in March 

2013 [were] completely unrelated to his stroke in August 

2013.” A. 7–8; see also A. 38–39. Cina explained that Officer Watkins suffered from “longstanding, poorly controlled hypertension,” and concluded that his stroke “was 

part of a natural disease process, namely high blood pressure.” A. 39.

Significantly, moreover, the medical records associated 

with Officer Watkins’ hospitalization in the period prior to 

his death contain no indication that his death was caused 

by his March 2013 head injury. A. 8. As the BJA correctly 

noted, “[h]ospital treatment records from . . . Officer Watkins’ attending physician . . . make no mention of a head 

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6 WATKINS v. DOJ

injury” and the causes of death listed on his treatment discharge summary do not include traumatic head injury. A. 

8 (footnote omitted). Under such circumstances, the BJA 

had ample support for its conclusion that Watkins failed to 

establish that it was more likely than not that her brother’s 

August 2013 death was directly and proximately caused by 

the head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8–9; see 28 

C.F.R. § 32.5(a) (“Except as otherwise may be expressly 

provided in the [PSOBA] or this part, a claimant has the 

burden of persuasion as to all material issues of fact, and 

by the standard of proof of ‘more likely than not.’”).

On appeal, Watkins argues that the BJA “failed to consider the facts about [Officer Watkins’] blunt force trauma 

head injury . . . that was sustained while answering a domestic disturbance call on March 6, 2013.” Pet. Mem. in 

Lieu of Reply Br. 4. We disagree. The BJA carefully considered the record evidence showing that Officer Watkins 

had suffered a blow to the head while making an arrest in 

March 2013 and concluded that this head injury was “sustained in the line of duty.” A. 7. As the BJA correctly determined, however, Watkins did not present “competent 

medical evidence” showing that her brother’s August 2013 

fatal stroke was “directly and proximately caused” by the 

head injury he sustained in March 2013. A. 8.

Watkins also points to an autopsy report prepared by 

Matthias Okoye, M.D., and asserts that it establishes that 

the cause of Officer Watkins’ death was the head injury he 

sustained in March 2013. Pet. Corrected Inf. Br. 2. Because Okoye’s autopsy report was not presented to the 

BJA, however, it is “not part of the record on appeal and 

[is] not properly before us.” Turman–Kent v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 657 F.3d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see, e.g., 

Oshiver v. OPM, 896 F.2d 540, 542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“We 

will not consider the new evidence contained in the supplemental papers because that evidence was not presented to 

the Board.”). We note, moreover, that Okoye conducted his 

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WATKINS v. DOJ 7

autopsy in October 2019, more than six years after Officer 

Watkins’ death.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Watkins’ remaining arguments 

but do not find them persuasive. Accordingly, the final determination of the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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