RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0858-MR

HEATHER PARSLEY, AS GUARDIAN/

CONSERVATOR FOR COLETON PARSLEY,

A MINOR; AND HEATHER PARSLEY AND 

BRIAN PARSLEY, INDIVIDUALLY APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE STEVE A. WILSON, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CI-00047

CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY;

SAYLORS GOLF CARTS, INC.; 

EDGEHILL FARM, INC.; AND

JOHN F. BALLANCE APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, KRAMER, AND MAZE, JUDGES.

MAZE, JUDGE: Appellants (collectively referred to as “Parsley”) appeal the 

entry of separate summary judgments dismissing appellees Saylors Golf Carts, 
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Inc., and Cincinnati Insurance Company from litigation stemming from serious 

injuries sustained by Coleton Parsley while riding on an innertube pulled by a 4-

wheeler all-terrain vehicle (ATV) driven by appellee John Ballance. Parsley 

argues that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary disposition 

concerning the liability of Saylors for Ballance’s actions and as to coverage for 

Ballance under a Cincinnati Insurance Company policy insuring Saylors. We 

affirm.

After a snowfall on January 13, 2018, John Ballance and his wife 

Katie hosted an impromptu sledding party for their family and friends at their farm 

in Oakland, Kentucky. Although the Parsleys allege that the Ballances had invited 

guests to the property, John Ballance stated in deposition testimony that people 

other than family had not been invited but simply started showing up. One of 

those who showed up was appellant Coleton Parsley, a friend of the Ballances’

son. At some point in the evening, Mr. Ballance was using a four-wheeler to tow 

his son and Coleton on an innertube. While Coleton was being towed, the 

innertube on which he was riding struck a utility pole causing catastrophic injuries 

from which Coleton is unlikely to fully recover.

Edgehill Farm, where the accident occurred, is located approximately 

five miles from Saylors Golf Carts, Inc., a golf cart sales, rental, and service 

business owned by the Ballances. The Ballances reside on and individually own a 
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portion of Edgehill Farm. Edgehill Farm also owns the property on which Saylors 

Golf Carts is located in Smiths Grove, Kentucky, although the businesses are 

separate business entities.

The ATV Mr. Ballance was operating at the time of the accident is the 

primary focus of this appeal. Approximately four years prior to the accident, a 

Saylors’ customer, Jim Stirgill, traded the subject ATV and another ATV for a golf 

cart. In deposition testimony, Mr. Ballance stated that within days of that 

transaction, he took the ATVs to the Edgehill Farm property where he and his 

family used them for recreation and as their personal farm implements. He also 

stated that the ATVs Stirgill traded in were kept in a barn where he sometimes 

stored excess golf cart inventory from shortly after the trade-in in December 2013 

until the accident in 2018. 

Mr. Ballance acknowledged that because Saylors so rarely takes 

ATVs in trade for golf carts, he was unaware that, unlike golf cars, ATVs are 

accompanied by certificates of title. Accordingly, Saylors did not require Mr. 

Stirgill to produce an endorsed certificate of title to complete the trade-in 

transaction. Nor did Saylors submit an application for a new title and registration 

to the county clerk. Thus, the ATV in question remained in Stirgill’s name until 

after the accident when the Ballances discovered that title had never been 

transferred. They thereafter contacted Mr. Stirgill who signed the ATV over to 
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Mr. Ballance individually. On March 21, 2018, approximately two months after 

the accident, a new title was issued to Mr. Ballance individually.

In January 2019, Parsley filed a complaint in Warren Circuit Court 

naming John Ballance, Edgehill Farm, and Saylors as defendants. The complaint 

also named Cincinnati Insurance Company as a defendant, seeking recovery on a 

commercial general liability policy it had issued to Saylors. Following exchange 

of written discovery and Mr. Ballance’s deposition, Saylors and Cincinnati 

Insurance separately moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted each

motion holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, concluding that 

both Saylors and Cincinnati Insurance were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 

and dismissing Parley’s claims against each entity. 

With respect to Saylors, the circuit court specifically held that Mr. 

Ballance was not furthering any business or other interest of Saylors by pulling his 

son and Coleton on the innertube in the snow. The court also concluded that 

ownership of the ATV was irrelevant because there was no evidence that Saylors 

negligently allowed Mr. Ballance to operate the ATV. In granting Cincinnati 

Insurance’s motion, the circuit court determined that Mr. Ballance was not acting

as an officer or employee of Saylors at the time of the accident and that his act of 

pulling his son and Coleton on an innertube was in no way connected to Saylors’

business. Although Edgehill Farm is also an insured under Saylors’ commercial 
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policy, the trial court determined that coverage was limited to damages arising out 

of the ownership, maintenance, or use of property designated by the policy. 

Because the location designated by the policy is not the location where the accident 

occurred, the circuit court concluded coverage did not extend to Edgehill. After 

the circuit court subsequently certified each judgment as final and appealable, this 

appeal followed.

In appeals from the grant of summary judgment, this Court must 

conduct a de novo review to determine “whether the trial court correctly found that 

there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 

(Ky. App. 1996). Further, “[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable 

to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be 

resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 

476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Finally, as our Supreme Court emphasized in Isaacs v. 

Smith, 5 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Ky. 1999), “[a]n issue of nonmaterial fact will not 

preclude the granting of a summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment 

should be granted if the court is fully satisfied that there is an absence of genuine 

and material factual issues. Steelvest does not hold to the contrary, but expressly 

reaffirms that longstanding position.” With these principles in mind, we turn to the 

arguments for reversal.
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1. Dismissal of Parsley’s Claims against Saylors

Parsley first argues that genuine issues of material fact as to the 

ownership of the ATV and as to Saylors’ vicarious liability for Mr. Ballance’s use 

of the ATV at the time of the accident preclude summary disposition. As 

previously noted, in dismissing the claims against Saylors, the circuit court 

specifically determined that ownership of the ATV was irrelevant. Rather, the 

circuit court held that the dispositive issues centered upon whether Mr. Ballance’s 

use of the ATV fell within the course and scope of his employment with Saylors 

and whether Saylors negligently entrusted the ATV to Mr. Ballance on the night in 

question. We reiterate the well-established rule set out in Steelvest that “[t]he trial 

judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if 

a real issue exists.” 807 S.W.2d at 480. And, in so doing, “[t]he record must be 

viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary 

judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Id.

Thus, viewing this record in the light most favorable to Parsley, we 

will presume that the ATV in question was listed as an inventory asset of Saylors 

at the time the accident occurred. Nevertheless, we are in complete agreement 

with the decision of the circuit court that Saylors’ liability turns upon whether it is 

vicariously liable for Mr. Ballance’s use of the ATV and whether it negligently 
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entrusted the ATV to him on the night in question, not whether Saylors in fact 

owned the ATV.

As set out in the order granting summary judgment, the record is 

devoid of any evidence suggesting that Mr. Ballance was using the ATV to further 

Saylors’ business interests when the accident occurred. In Papa John’s 

International, Inc. v. McCoy, our Supreme Court reexamined and reiterated the 

rule set out in the American Law Institute’s RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 

7.07 (2006), entitled “Employee Acting Within Scope of Employment:”

This general rule is consistent with the standard advanced 

by Prosser and Keeton—as noted in the Patterson [v. 

Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Ky. 2005)] opinion—in 

their treatise on tort law: “[I]n general, . . . the master is 

held liable for any intentional tort committed by the 

servant where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly 

or in part to further the master’s business.” Thus, if the 

servant “acts from purely personal motives . . . which 

[are] in no way connected with the employer’s interests, 

he is considered in the ordinary case to have departed 

from his employment, and the master is not liable.” This 

approach “conforms to the economic theory of vicarious 

liability . . . because when the employee acts for solely 

personal reasons, the employer’s ability to prevent the 

tort is limited.”

244 S.W.3d 44, 52 (Ky. 2008) (footnotes omitted). Because review of the record 

confirms the circuit court’s finding that there is absolutely no evidence in the 

record that Mr. Ballance was acting in the course and scope of his employment, 

summary judgment in favor of Saylors is appropriate. The accident occurred at the 
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Ballance’s residence during an impromptu event occasioned by a larger snowfall 

than is normal for the area. Parsley failed to offer any evidence to rebut Mr. 

Ballance’s deposition testimony that the impromptu sledding party was a purely 

personal recreational activity at which the golf cart business “didn’t even come to 

mind.”

In addition, we are convinced that this case falls squarely within the 

rationale set out in Mid-States Plastics, Inc. v. Estate of Bryant ex rel. Bryant

concerning the requirement that for vicarious liability to attach, there must be 

evidence that the activity in question can be construed as furthering the work of the 

employer. 245 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. 2008). In Bryant, Daniel Edwards, the president 

of Mid-States Plastics, had a planned business trip to Indianapolis and invited his 

pastor to ride along in a leased plane to allow the minister to visit his family while 

Edwards worked. The trip was free for the minister and involved no business 

purpose on his part for Mid-States. On the return trip, the plane struck a cell phone 

tower and crashed, killing both Edwards and Reverend Bryant. In affirming the 

entry of summary judgment in favor of Mid-States, the Kentucky Supreme Court 

reasoned:

In our case, it is clear that Reverend Bryant was a 

guest of Edwards and his presence “could not be 

construed as being for the purpose of accomplishing the 

work of the corporation,” as required by Wigginton

[Studio v. Reuter’s Adm’r, 254 Ky. 128, 71 S.W.2d 14 

(1934)] before liability attaches to the master. 71 S.W.2d 
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at 16. Also, the fact that Edwards was an officer of MidStates (President, as well as the General Manager and 

Chief Executive) and not just an employee does not 

change the outcome. Wigginton made clear that “in 

order for a company to be held responsible for the 

tort of one of its officers he must be acting within the 

scope of his employment and in the furtherance of the 

corporation’s business.” Id.

Id. at 730 (emphasis added). The connection between Saylors and the impromptu 

sledding party at the Ballances’ residence is even more attenuated than the relation 

between Mid-States and Edward’s invitation to Reverend Bryant to accompany 

him on a scheduled Mid-States’ business trip. In sum, an impromptu sledding 

party at an employee’s residence cannot be construed as serving the interests of 

Saylors without the production of some evidence to the contrary. 

Furthermore, Parsley did not plead nor attempt to offer proof as to 

negligent entrustment. Although Parsley now argues that the Saylors took the 

position below that the ATV is a motor vehicle, that is a distortion of Saylors’

position as it simply noted that the titling requirements of ATVs differ from those

regarding golf carts. In any event, our Supreme Court in Manies v. Croan settled 

the question of whether an ATV can be considered to be a motor vehicle for 

purposes of the limitations provision of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations 

Act:

 ATVs, like the golf carts considered in Kenton 

County Public Parks Corporation v. Modlin, Ky.App., 

901 S.W.2d 876 (1995), are not to be used on the public 
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roadways. With respect to ATVs, our General Assembly 

expressly prohibited such use in KRS 189.515(1):

No person shall operate an all-terrain vehicle 

upon any public highway or roadway or 

upon the right-of-way of any public highway 

or roadway.

It seems clear that a vehicle which by law is 

prohibited from operation on public highways could not 

also satisfy the language of KRS 304.39–020(7), i.e., 

“any vehicle which transports persons or property upon 

the public highways of the Commonwealth.” Moreover, 

there is no credible basis for concluding that the 

registration and insurance requirements of the MVRA 

were intended to apply to ATVs. The exclusion of ATVs 

from the MVRA’s reparations system similarly excludes 

causes of action arising from their use from the MVRA’s 

more generous limitations period. The trial court 

correctly applied the one-year limitations period in KRS 

413.140.

977 S.W.2d 22, 23-24 (Ky. App. 1998). Nothing in Parsley’s argument persuades 

us that ATVs should be treated as motor vehicles for negligent entrustment 

analysis.

Thus, in our view, ATVs are to be construed to be chattel and fall 

within the purview of Section 390 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D. The 

application of that section was explained by this Court in Hercules Powder 

Company v. Hicks:

 It is important to recall that the rule [Section 390 of 

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D] imposes liability upon the 

supplier of a chattel for use by an incompetent person if, 

and only if, the supplier knows or has reason to know of 
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the probable misuse by reason of the incompetence of the 

person to whom the chattel is furnished. The record fails 

to reflect any basis upon which a finding could be made 

that Hercules knew or had reason to know of any 

incompetence of Herbert or Wabassco or any of its 

employees. Section 12 of Restatement of Torts 2d points 

out that the words ‘reason to know’ as used in the 

Restatement of Torts denote the fact that the actor has 

information from which a person of reasonable 

intelligence would infer that the fact in question exists, or 

that such person would govern his conduct upon the 

assumption that such fact exists. Significantly, Section 

12 provides that the words ‘should know’ denote the fact 

that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence 

would ascertain the fact in question in the performance of 

his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the 

assumption that such fact exists.

453 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Ky. 1970). Nothing in the facts alleged in Parsley’s

complaint would support a claim of negligent entrustment and the circuit court did 

not err in so holding.

Accordingly, we hold that the Warren Circuit Court did not err in 

granting summary judgment dismissing Parsley’s claim against Saylors.

2. Dismissal of Parsley’s claim against Cincinnati Insurance

The single issue concerning the dismissal of Parsley’s claims against 

Cincinnati Insurance Company is whether the circuit court properly concluded that 

the policy covering Saylors provides no coverage for Mr. Ballance for the claims 

asserted against him in the complaint. Initially, Parsley asserts that coverage is 

available to Mr. Ballance simply because he was driving an ATV belonging to 
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Saylors at the time of the accident and, because Saylors disputes ownership of the 

ATV, genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment. 

Again, because the record is to be construed most favorably to the party opposing 

summary judgment, for purposes of the arguments concerning Cincinnati 

Insurance, we will presume ownership on the part of Saylors. Nevertheless, 

ownership of the ATV is, in and of itself, insufficient to impose liability under the 

policy issued to Saylors.

The policy in question contains a “golfmobile” endorsement which 

provides:

WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to 

include as an insured any person(s) using or legally 

responsible for the use of golfmobiles loaned or rented to 

others by you or any of your concessionaires but only for 

their liability arising out of the use of the golfmobiles.

The circuit court specifically rejected Parsley’s contention that “golfmobiles” can 

be reasonably interpreted to mean either golf carts or Saylors’ inventory generally, 

holding that the term “golfmobile”:

can only be reasonably interpreted to mean golf carts or 

other types of mobiles used on a golf course because 

“golf” is an integral part of the term. Regardless of 

whether the ATV was owned by Saylors at the time of 

the incident, users of ATVs were not covered under the 

additional endorsement covering golfmobiles.

We agree. 
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To suggest that the term “golfmobiles” encompasses Saylors’

inventory in general fails to accord any significance to the use of that particular 

term in the endorsement. As Cincinnati Insurance correctly posits, to equate the 

term “golfmobile” to general inventory leads to absurd results as general inventory 

might include golf cart parts and office furniture as well. In Stone v. Kentucky 

Farm Bureau Insurance Company, this Court reiterated that, as a general rule, 

interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law for the court. 34 S.W.3d 

809, 810-11 (Ky. App. 2000) (citing Morganfield National Bank v. Damien Elder 

& Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1992)). The Stone Court also noted that while 

ambiguous terms are to be construed against the drafter and in favor of the insured, 

the policy must be accorded a reasonable interpretation, “and there is no 

requirement that every doubt be resolved against the insurer.” Id. at 811 (citing 

Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App. 1996)). And 

finally, Stone holds that policy terms “should be interpreted in light of the usage 

and understanding of the average person.” Id. (citing Fryman v. Pilot Life 

Insurance Company, 704 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1986)). We thus concur in the circuit 

court’s assessment that the term “golfmobile” cannot be reasonably construed as 

encompassing inventory in general – to hold otherwise would undermine the very 

purpose for using a specialized term like “golfmobile” in the policy endorsement.
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Parsley also argues that coverage for Mr. Ballance is provided by an 

additional insured endorsement for owners, lessees, or contractors. The circuit 

court concluded that coverage under that endorsement extends only to damages 

caused in whole or in part by:

1. Your [Saylors’] acts or omissions;

2. The acts or omissions of those acting on your 

[Saylors’] behalf;

in the performance of your [Saylors’] ongoing operations 

for the additional insured(s) at the location(s) designated 

above.

In other words, the circuit court interpreted the word “your” as referring to Saylors. 

This construction comports with the policy’s declaration that if the named insured 

is an organization other than a partnership, joint venture or limited liability 

company, the named insured’s “executive officers” and directors are insureds “but 

only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors.” Similarly, the 

commercial general liability policy provides that employees of the named insured 

are insureds only with regard to acts within the scope of their employment or while 

performing duties related to Saylors Golf Carts’ business interests.

Parsley attempts to conflate Mr. Ballance’s status as an “additional 

insured” with Saylors’ status as the only named insured on the policy. As 

Cincinnati correctly argues, there is a fundamental difference between a named 

insured and someone who qualifies as an additional insured for the provision of 
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coverage under the specific circumstances set out in the endorsement. Because 

Mr. Ballance was not acting as an executive officer or employee of Saylors at the 

time of the accident, nor was any business interest of Saylors being furthered by 

the impromptu sledding party at the Ballances’ residence, the circuit court 

correctly determined that Saylors’ commercial policy does not provide coverage 

for his act of using the ATV for a purely personal and recreational activity. Simply 

stated, Mr. Ballance’s actions fall outside the scope of that policy’s explicitly 

defined coverage.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court 

dismissing Parsley’s claims against Saylor’s Golf Carts and Cincinnati Insurance 

Company.

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:

Matt McGill

Bowling Green, Kentucky

Kyle R. Salyer

Paintsville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SAYLORS 

GOLF CARTS, INC.:

Thomas N. Kerrick

Colton W. Givens

Bowling Green, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE 

CINCINNATI INSURANCE 

COMPANY:

Michael D. Risley

Louisville, Kentucky