1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48930

In the Interest of: J ohn Doe I and J ane Doe II, Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. ) ) ) STATE OF IDAHO , DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner

- Respondent,

v.

J OHN DOE (2021

- 2 5 ) , Respondent

- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: November 1, 2021
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. Brent Ferguson , Magistrate

. Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed

. Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., Elmore County Public Defender; Matthew F. Keen , Mountain Home, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John R. Shackelford , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ HUSKEY, Chief Judge John Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating his par ental rights. John Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that it was not impossible for John Doe to comply with the case plan. John Doe also argues the magistrate court erred by presiding over the case. The magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights is affirm ed

.2 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John Doe is the father of J.G. and I.G

. John Doe’s spouse , 1 Jane Doe, is the mother of K.G., J.G., and I.G

. In September 2018, K.G., J.G., and I.G. were removed from the Does’ home

a nd pl aced in foster care. The magistrate court granted the Department of Health and Welfare (Department) temporary custody of the children and subsequently held an adjudicatory hearing
where the Does stipulated to having an unstab le home environment. Approximately one month later, t he magistrate court approved case plans for John Doe and Jane Doe and authorized an extended home vis it for K.G., J.G., and I.G. The children remained in the Does’ home for approximately eleven months , but were again removed from the home and returned to the care of
the Department in October 2019

. In August 2020, the State petitioned to terminate John Doe ’s and Jane Doe’s parental rights. I n spring 2021 , the magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that John Doe neglected his children and that termination of John Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of
the children. The magistrate court entered a judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights to
J.G. and I.G. John Doe timely appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion

. Doe v. Doe , 148 Idaho 243,
245

- 46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064

- 65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. In re Doe , 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe ,

1 John Doe and Jane Doe have been in a relationship since December 2009 and hold themselves out as husband and wife but are not legally ma rried.3

143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further , the magi strate court ’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe , 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III. ANALYSIS On appeal, John Doe does not dispute the magistrate court’s conclusion that he failed to comply with his case plan , that he neglected his children by failing to provide proper parental care and control, or that termination is in the best interests of the children. Instead, John Doe argues there is not substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findin g that John Doe’s failure to complete the tasks was due to John Doe’s choices and not because of impossibility.
John Doe also asserts the magistrate court erred by presiding ov er the case. In response, the State
argues this Court should affirm the judgme nt terminating John Doe’s parental rights because John Doe failed to challenge the magistrate court’s finding that he neglected his children by failing to provide proper parental care and control

. The State further argues John Doe waived any argument
rega rding impossibility by failing to raise the issue in the magistrate court. Finally, the State argues
John Doe waived any argument th at the magistrate court erred by presiding ov er the case by failing to establish an adequate record for review

. A. S ubs tantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Magistrate Court’s Finding of Neglect A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000 ) ; Doe v. State , 137 Idaho 75 8, 76 0, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U nited S tates Constitution. State v. Doe , 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that , wherever possible , family
life shoul d be strengthened and preserved

. I.C. § 16

- 2001 (2)

. Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when terminating the parent

- child relationship. State v. Doe , 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P .3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminatin g a parent

child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id

. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined tha t a court may terminate a parent

- child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16

- 2009 ; In re D oe , 146 Idaho 759,
761

- 62 , 203 P.3d 689, 691

- 92 (2009); Doe , 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652

.4

Idaho Code Section 16

- 2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent

- child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abando nment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well

- being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time

. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe , 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117

. The magistrate court termina ted John Doe’s parental rights on the basis that h e neglected his children pursuant to I daho C ode § 16

- 2002(3)(a) and I.C. § 16

- 2002(3)(b). Idaho Code § 16

- 2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16

- 1602(31). Section 16

- 1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well

- being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parent s, guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a C hild P rotection A ct case and the Department has had temporary or legal cu stody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty

- two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal cus tody of the Department. I.C. § 16

- 2002(3)(b). Failure to provide children with stable and safe housing may be considered in a neglect determination. See Matter of Doe Children , 162 Idaho 69, 77

- 78, 394 P.3d 112, 120

- 21 (Ct. App. 2017). The magistrate court found that John Doe neglected his children because he failed to comply with his court

- ordered case plan and because he failed to provide proper parental care and
control for his children. Regarding John Doe’s affirmative defense of impossibility, the magistrate
court found that John Doe had the ab ility to complete his case plan but chose not to. John Doe does not dispute the magistrate court’s conclusion that h e faile d to complete his case plan or that
he failed to provide proper parental care and control for his children. I nstead , John Doe asserts that his compliance with the incomplete tasks of the case plan was rendered impossible b y the
COVID

- 19 pandemic and the Department ’s statement that the Does were required to secure a three

- bedro o m residence. The State asserts that John Doe waived his right to assert an
im possibility defense because he did not timely raise the issue below and , alternatively, that the magistrate court correctly found that it was not impossible for John Doe to complete his case plan.5

If the court grants a judgment o n more than one independent basis and the appellant does not challenge each basis for termination, th en we must affirm the judgment. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017

- 36), 163 Idaho 274, 278, 411 P.3d 1175, 1179 (2018) (notin g court need
not ad dress parent’ s arg ument because “magistrate court’ s order contains additional, unchallenged findings of neglect that must be affirmed”) ; Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016

- 09), 163 Idaho 707, 711, 418 P.3d 1216, 1220 (2016) (“When a judgment is g ranted on alternative grounds and one of them is not addressed on appeal, we must af firm the judgment.”)

. Because John Doe does not challenge the magistrate court’s finding that he neglected the children by failing to provide proper parental care and cont rol, we affirm the magistrate court’s judgment finding that
John Doe neglected his children on th ose ground s

. Additionally, and notwithstanding the State’s argument that John Doe waived consideration of the issue, the magistrate court’s finding that John Doe failed to comply with his case plan by choice, not impossibility, is supported by substantial and competent evidence. The incomplete tasks in John Doe’s case plan required him to demonstrate his ability to provide for his children by verify ing his income and maintain ing a safe and stable home free of hazards ; attend to his children ’s physical, dental, developmental
, and m ental health needs; and participate in family preservation services (FPS) and gain demonstrable skills

. In September 2018, John Doe moved out of the home he previously resided in with Jane
Doe due to a no

- contact order with Jane Doe’s now adult son

. 2 At some point, it appears John Doe
was able to return to the residence. In November 2018, the Department approved an extended
home visit to allow K .G., J .G., and I.G. to return to the home. In October 2019, John Doe and
Jane Doe lost the residence and John Doe , without notifying the Department, took the children to
live with a former foster parent for K.G. The Department infor med the Doe s that they needed to
secure a three

- bedroom residence for the children , but within a week of that notification , the Department notified the Does that a two

- bedroom apartment would be acceptable

. 3 John Doe

2 Jane Doe’s older son and daughter were originally taken into foster care , but they reached age eighteen during the pendency of the case and are no longer in the care of the Department. T hus, they are not the subject of this case.

3 At trial, a Department employee testified that within the week after the Department informed John Doe that he need ed to secure a three

- bedroom apartment, it corrected itself and informed John Doe that he needed to secure only a two

- bedroom apartment. The Department also acknowledged that a two

- bedroom home would have b een sufficient. Notwithstanding this6

located a three

- bedroom apartment in October 2019 , but he felt it was “just too small.” After rejecting this housing option, John Doe took no significant steps to secure any suitable housing. From October 2019 to March 2021, John Doe lived with friends or in a local motel. Three weeks prio r to trial and more than two years after the children were taken into the care of the Department , the Does obtained suit able housing. On appeal, John Doe relies, in part, on the Department’s statement that he needed to secure
a three

- bedroom apartment a s a basis for his impossibility defense. The magistrate court concluded

t hat although the Department made John Doe’s search for a residence more difficult by telling the Does they needed a three

- bedroom residence, it was not impossible for John Doe to sec ur e suitable housing , as evidenced by the fact that John Doe located , but rejected, a thr ee

- bedroom apartment
in October 2019

. The magistrate court found that although John Doe eventually complied with

t he housing requirement , it was too late to successfully reunite w ith the children.
As to the COVID

- 19 pandemic as a basis for his impossibility claim , a side from his testimony that the COVID

- 19 pandemic led to an increase in the cost of housing , John Doe
p rovided no evidence in support of his argu ment that the pandemic rendered his search for housing impossible. John Doe’s ability to secure housing shortly before trial demonstrate s that compliance
with this task was not impossible. As a result, substantial and competent evidence supports the magi strate court’s finding that John Doe was dir ectly responsible for his failure to obtain suitable housing in timely manner. In addition to failing to secure suitable housing, John Doe did not demonstrate the ability to meet his children’s needs. John Doe did not provide any medical care for his children. John
Doe claimed he w as unable to attend appointments because restrictions related to the COVID

- 19 pandemic allowed only one p erson in addition to the patient to attend the appointments

. In contrast, the children’s foster mother testified that she had difficulty getting John Doe to attend any doctor or therapy appointments or to care for the children in any significant way. For example, John Doe did not attend any appointments between October 2019 and Ma rch 2020, before pandemic

- related restrictions were imposed. When asked to take the children to appointments, John Doe refused because attending the appointments would have precluded him from getting sufficient sleep due to his work schedule. John Doe te stified that he did not consider altering his

testimony, the magistrate court found that the requirement for a three

- bedroom apartment was in pl ace between October 2019 and March 2021.7

work schedule to allow him to attend his children’s appointments. In total, John Doe attended no more than two of I.G.’s appointments and he did not attend any appointment s for J.G. As the magistrate court st ated, this was “simply a matter of priority” ; John Doe was aware of the requirements outlined in his case plan and chose not to attend appointments. As a further example of John Doe’s lack of engagement with his children’s medical needs, prior to the pand emic and

s hortly after being placed in foster care, I.G. needed medical care before the Department had formally approved the foster placement . T he foster parent was unable to reach John Doe to get
the necessary approval for the care. Consequently, the foster parent could not obtain medical care for I.G. until the Department intervened and approved the foster parent as a placement for I.G

. With respect to the FPS task, John Doe did participate in FPS from January 2019 to July
2019

. T he FPS specialist initially assigned to the Does’ case worked with John Doe to identify safety concerns in their home, including moldy food, lice, bed bugs, and rodent infestations. The FPS specialist reported that John Doe would not engage in visits or p ut forth meaningful effort towards improving his parenting skills

. In July 2019, many of th e safety concerns identified when
John Doe initially engaged with FPS remained in the hom e. When FPS informed John Doe that a frequent visitor to the ir home was a registered sex

- offender , John Doe continued to allow the
individual to visit his home and to interact with the children

. On one occasion , the individual was present with the children while both John Doe and Jane Doe were absent from the home

. John Doe asserts that had he been able to secure a residence, he would have been able to
demonstrate the skills h e learned through participa ting in FPS. This argument is unpersuasive. Six months after John Doe began working with FPS, many of the safety concerns i nitially
identified were still present in the home , with the addition of allowing a known registered sex

offender to interact with the children. In fact, after participating with FPS, when John Doe voluntarily relinquished the children to the former foste r parent in October 2019, the clothing he
left with the children was unserviceable and the food he left was expired. Throughout this case, John Doe had many opportunities to demonstrate the skills he allegedly learned through FPS but
did not do so.
The magistrate court’s conclusion that it was not impossible for John Doe to comply with his case plan and that John Doe was responsible fo r his failure to comply with his case plan is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Additionally, John Doe do es not challenge the8

magistrate court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the children. As a result, we affirm the magistrate court’s order terminating John Doe’s parental rights.
B. The Magistrate Court Did Not Err by Presiding Over the Case John Doe asserts the magistrate court erred by presiding over this case because, at the time of trial, the magistrate judges of Elmore County were represented by the Attorney General’s Office
in a c ivil lawsuit. John Doe asserts that because the Department is also represented by the Attorney General’s Office , it was error for the magistrate court to preside over this case. Issues not raised below are typically not considere d for the first time on appeal. Matt er of
Doe II , 169 Idaho 82, 86, 491 P.3d 644, 648 (Ct. App. 2021)

. The minutes from an adjudicatory hearing in March 2021 indicate that the issue of a conflict for the magistrate court was raise d

. However, the minutes do not provide any detail as to what the alleged conflict was or who raised
the issue. N o objection or motion for disqualificatio n was filed at any time during the pendency
of the case

. In the absence of a motion for disqualification, this Court will not review that issue on appeal. Idaho Dep’ t of Health & Welfare v. Doe , 150 Idaho 563, 568, 249 P.3d 362, 367 (2011)

. However, even if John Doe had properly raised the issue below, his argument fails on appeal. Denial of a motion for disqualification of a judge is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Idaho Dep’ t of Health & Welfare v. Doe , 161 Idaho 660, 664, 389 P.3d 946, 950 (2016). A judge may be disqualified for cause where it is shown t hat the judge is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in the action. Id

. However, a judge may not be disqualified for prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the party and is of such nature
and characte r as would render it improbable that the party would receive a fair and impartial trial.
Id. Beyond his conclusory statement that the “appearance of a possibility of impartiality should give one pause , ” John Doe provides no argument or authority in support of this claim. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argu ment and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2018

- 24) , 164 Idaho 143, 14 7, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). Furthermore, t here is no indication in the record that the magistrate judg e was biased or prejudiced against John Doe. Thus, John Doe has failed to show the magistrate court erred by presiding over the case

.9 IV. CONCLUSION The magistrate court’s finding that John Doe neglected his children is supported by
subst antial and com petent evidence and John Doe does not challenge the magistrate court’s conclusion that terminating his parental rights is in the best interests of the children. John Doe has failed to show the magistrate court erred by presiding over this case. Accordingly, the magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR

.