2024 UT App 99

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAWN VITTORIA,

Appellant,

v.

PROVO CITY,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20220659-CA

Filed July 18, 2024

Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department

The Honorable Jared Eldridge

No. 220300023

T.C. Taylor and Peter Lattin, Attorneys for Appellant

J. Brian Jones and Gary D. Millward,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY

concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Dawn Vittoria slipped and fell on a sidewalk owned by 

Provo City (the City). She subsequently made a claim against the 

City and later filed suit in district court. The City moved to 

dismiss. The district court concluded that Vittoria’s complaint 

was untimely under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the 

GIAU) and dismissed Vittoria’s complaint with prejudice. 

Vittoria appeals, and we affirm.
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BACKGROUND1

¶2 On July 11, 2019, while walking along a sidewalk owned 

by the City, Vittoria tripped and suffered an injury. The fall 

occurred when Vittoria caught her foot on a “height differential 

of several inches between two” slabs of concrete. This defect had 

existed for at least a year prior to the incident, which led Vittoria 

to assert that the City “knew or should have known” about its 

presence.

¶3 In March 2020, Vittoria filed a notice of claim. The City did 

not process the claim until after receiving a calculation of the 

damages sought, which Vittoria submitted in December 2020. In 

February 2021, in a letter to Vittoria, the City denied liability but 

made a settlement offer of $13,800 “as a courtesy to a Provo citizen 

without any admission of fault.” The assistant city attorney 

signed the letter. Vittoria did not accept the offer.

¶4 A year later, in February 2022, Vittoria filed suit in district 

court. The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss the case, 

see generally Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as untimely under the 

requirements of the GIAU. Following additional briefing and oral 

argument, the district court granted the City’s motion and

dismissed the case with prejudice as time-barred.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Vittoria argues on appeal that the district court erred when 

it dismissed her claim as untimely under the GIAU. “Because a 

1. “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts only 

as they are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual 

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those 

facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Haynes v. 

Department of Public Safety, 2020 UT App 19, n.2, 460 P.3d 565 

(cleaned up).
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trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of 

law, the standard of review is correctness,” with no deference to 

the court’s decision. Moulding Invs., LLC v. Box Elder County, 2024 

UT App 23, ¶ 21, 545 P.3d 781 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶6 Under the GIAU, an individual with a claim against a 

governmental entity must file a notice of claim “within one year 

after the claim arises.” Utah Code § 63G-7-402. Sixty days after a 

notice of claim is filed, an individual is free to “pursue an action 

in the district court against the governmental entity.” Id. § 63G-7-

403(2)(a). However, that action must be “commence[d] . . . within 

two years after the claim arises.” Id. § 63G-7-403(2)(b).2

¶7 Though Vittoria filed a timely notice of claim with the City, 

she did not file an action in the district court until February 2022, 

over two and a half years after her claim arose in July 2019. 

Because Vittoria’s claim was over six months past the GIAU 

deadline when she filed it, her claim is untimely, and the district 

court appropriately dismissed her claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶8 Vittoria, however, argues that the GIAU conflicts with 

Utah Code section 78B-2-303, which states, “Actions on claims 

against a county, city, or incorporated town, which have been 

rejected by the county executive, city commissioners, city council, 

or board of trustees shall be brought within one year after the first 

2. The GIAU includes a savings provision that is inapplicable 

here. See Utah Code § 63G-7-403(3)(b) (allowing a claimant to 

commence an action after the time limit if (1) the action was 

originally commenced on time, (2) the action failed or was 

dismissed for reasons other than the merits, and (3) the new action 

is commenced within one year of the previous action’s failure or 

dismissal).
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rejection.” Vittoria contends that the two statutes “conflict any 

time a city denies a claim one year after the incident giving rise to 

a lawsuit”—which is, as she argues, what happened here. Vittoria 

argues that in granting the City’s motion to dismiss, the district 

court failed to “harmonize” the GIAU and section 78B-2-303. 

Vittoria views this issue as a matter of first impression, but it is 

not.

¶9 The legislature expressly stated that the GIAU is a 

“comprehensive chapter” applying to “all functions of 

government” and governing “all claims against governmental 

entities.” Id. § 63G-7-101(2). Our supreme court has “consistently 

required strict compliance with the requirements of the [GIAU].” 

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ¶ 19, 977 P.2d 1201. In 

Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40, 389 P.3d 423, like here, a tort suit 

under the GIAU was brought against the City. Id. ¶ 1. When 

initially filed, the suit was timely but was dismissed because the 

“plaintiffs failed to submit an ‘undertaking’ or bond as required 

by statute.” Id. When the plaintiffs refiled, they had surpassed the 

one-year filing deadline required by the GIAU. Id. (citing Utah 

Code § 63G-7-402). The plaintiffs argued that their claim was in 

fact timely by invoking Utah Code section 78B-2-111, known as 

the Savings Statute. Id. Our supreme court considered whether 

the time-bar provision of the GIAU, the same one at issue here, 

foreclosed the Savings Statute. Id. ¶ 2. The court determined that 

the GIAU did in fact foreclose the Savings Statute because the 

GIAU “speaks comprehensively on the procedure and requisite 

timing of a claim filed against the government.” Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis 

added). The court explained that the GIAU is “all-encompassing 

on the matters that it regulates in comprehensive detail,” which 

includes “actions for which the government has waived its 

immunity” and the “manner and means by which a plaintiff may 

pierce through such immunity.” Id. ¶ 22. On those matters, the 

court construed the GIAU “as speaking comprehensively in the 

sense of foreclosing the application of other laws regulating 

claims against non-governmental parties.” Id. The court reasoned 
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that, among other things, the GIAU “speaks in careful detail . . . 

on the timing requirements” of both filing a notice of claim with a 

governmental entity and initiating an action in court after such 

claim is denied. Id. ¶ 23. The court concluded that the GIAU’s 

“filing and timing standards are presented in such detail that [it] 

view[s] them as occupying the field.” Id. ¶ 26.

¶10 While Vittoria is correct in her assertion that Craig did not 

address the exact section of the Utah Code at issue here, the 

parallels to her case are undeniable, and Craig compels our 

affirmance here. As in Craig, the issue here is whether or not 

another section of the Utah Code supersedes the timing standards

of the GIAU, which require—beyond filing a notice of claim 

within a year—a claim to be brought in district court within two 

years after the claim arises. See Utah Code § 63G-7-403(2)(b). 

Vittoria argues that her claim was in fact timely, despite the 

GIAU, by invoking section 78B-2-303, which allows claims against 

a city to be “brought within one year after the first rejection.” Id. 

§ 78B-2-303. Just as in Craig, the heart of this argument concerns 

the timing of filing a claim under the GIAU, a matter that our 

supreme court has unquestionably determined the GIAU “speaks 

comprehensively” on. 2016 UT 40, ¶ 18. 

¶11 The court in Craig explained that the GIAU is “allencompassing on the matters that it regulates in comprehensive 

detail,” such as the requisite timing of filing a claim against the 

government. Id. ¶ 22. Our supreme court decisively explained that 

on these matters, the GIAU speaks “comprehensively in the sense 

of foreclosing the application of other laws regulating claims 

against non-governmental parties.” Id. It is true that the Savings 

Statute in Craig didn’t specifically address governmental entities,

while the statute at issue here does. However, it is evident that 

section 78B-2-303 still does not apply, given our supreme court’s 

emphatic declaration that the GIAU “speaks in careful detail . . . 

on the timing requirements” of both filing a notice of claim with a 

governmental entity and initiating an action in court against that
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20220659-CA 6 2024 UT App 99

entity, and that because of that detail, the GIAU preempts other 

statutes addressing timing requirements. Id. ¶ 23. Thus, even that 

difference between Craig and the case before us is not enough to 

overcome our supreme court’s conclusion that the GIAU’s “filing 

and timing standards are presented in such detail that” they 

“occupy[] the field.”3 Id. ¶ 26.

¶12 What is more, without the GIAU, Vittoria would have no 

claim at all against the City because it is only through the GIAU’s 

waivers of governmental immunity that she is able to pursue such 

a suit. See Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ¶¶ 12–16, 322 P.3d 

669 (holding that the maintenance of public sidewalks is a 

governmental function subject to the GIAU). Vittoria cannot 

invoke the GIAU with one hand to pursue her claim while 

disavowing the GIAU with the other hand in order to maintain 

her claim’s timeliness.

¶13 When interpreting a statute, our supreme court has 

instructed that our “primary goal” is to “evince the true intent and 

purpose of the legislature as expressed through the plain 

language” of the statute and to “render all parts thereof relevant 

and meaningful.” Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 

24 P.3d 958 (cleaned up). In doing so, we are to “avoid 

interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous 

or inoperative.” Id. Here, the legislature very clearly expressed its 

3. To further underscore that the GIAU preempts the field, the 

legislature amended the GIAU—just a year after our supreme 

court’s decision in Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40, 389 P.3d 423—

by adding, as mentioned in note 2, a savings provision, see Act of 

Mar. 9, 2017, ch. 300, § 4, 2017 Utah Laws 1463, 1464–65. The 

legislature could have amended the Savings Statute with 

language making clear that it applied despite the GIAU, but the 

legislature instead amended the GIAU—highlighting that the 

GIAU is indeed intended to be “comprehensive.” Utah Code

§ 63G-7-101(2).
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intent that the GIAU is a “comprehensive chapter” that applies to 

“all functions of government” and governs “all claims against 

governmental entities.” Utah Code § 63G-7-101(2). The 

legislature’s mandate that it apply to “all claims against 

governmental entities” must include Vittoria’s claim as her claim 

can only be brought under the GIAU. Id. (emphasis added). 

Vittoria’s assertion that the two statutes must be harmonized is 

well-taken, but her proposed method for harmonizing them—i.e., 

by allowing section 78B-2-303 to trump section 63G-7-101(2) when 

a county, city, or incorporated town first rejects a claim more than 

two years after the claim arises—would render the GIAU’s statute 

of limitations “superfluous or inoperative” in such instances,

while acting in direct violation of the GIAU’s plain language that 

it be applied comprehensively. Hall, 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15.

¶14 Instead of Vittoria’s proposed approach, the two statutes 

can be readily harmonized based on our supreme court’s

determination in American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 

P.2d 757 (Utah 1992), that section 78B-2-3034 does not apply to 

claims seeking damages in law. Id. at 761. There the court 

explained that the GIAU “sets time limits within which a notice 

of claim and an action itself may be filed against a governmental 

entity” but acknowledged that equitable claims are a common law 

exception to this requirement. Id. at 759. Under this framework, 

the court determined that section 78B-2-303 does not apply to 

suits that sound in law but may apply to those sought in equity. 

Id. at 761. Thus, the two statutes do not conflict with one another, 

and neither of them is superfluous; instead, the statutes apply in 

different scenarios and thereby work in harmony. As Vittoria’s 

4. The court in American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 

757 (Utah 1992), was discussing Utah Code section 78-12-30 

(1992), which was later renumbered in 2008 as section 78B-2-303. 

Id. at 761; see Act of Jan. 31, 2008, ch. 3, § 667, 2008 Utah Laws 48, 

394. The two statutes have nearly identical language.
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claim sounds in law, rather than equity, section 78B-2-303 simply 

does not apply here.

¶15 Vittoria further argues that “one of the major points of the 

GIAU is to give a governmental entity an opportunity to attempt 

to resolve a claim before suit is filed.” Vittoria explains that delays 

in her providing information regarding the damages she sought 

and the City’s delay in providing information in return were 

“undoubtedly exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic occurring 

at the same time.” Vittoria argues that an “open-ended deadline 

for a governmental entity without a similar set-off or benefit for 

the claimant is inequitable” and further emphasizes why we 

should “harmonize” the GIAU and section 78B-2-303. Vittoria 

would have us view the two sections of the code as working in 

tandem. She argues that section 78B-2-303 “would and should 

operate as both an enlargement of rights under the GIAU, as well 

as a tool by which the government may shorten their window of 

exposure.” As an example, she explains that in her case her notice 

of claim was timely submitted but she did not receive a denial of 

the claim until ten months later. Thus, if section 78B-2-303 

applied, it would enlarge her rights by providing her with an 

additional year to file the claim from the date of denial, rather 

than the two years from the date of the claim arising under the 

GIAU. But, as Vittoria contends, if the City had denied her notice 

of claim within a week, for example, section 78B-2-303 would 

shorten her rights as it would require her to file a claim a year 

from that denial—a date before the deadline required under the 

GIAU.

¶16 We find this argument unconvincing because of the timing 

in which the GIAU allows a claimant to file a claim with the 

district court. Vittoria was aware that the GIAU was the 

controlling law when she filed her notice of claim, as evidenced 

by her notice itself. Her notice of claim stated that it was “given 

pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Title 63G, Chapter 7, 

including § 63G-7-401.” And the notice continued that the claim 
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was appropriate pursuant to Utah Code section 63G-7-301 

because a city “waives immunity for an injury caused by a 

defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on its sidewalks,” such 

as the “height differential” Vittoria tripped over. Under the 

GIAU, Vittoria was free to file her claim with the district court 

sixty days after she filed the notice of claim with the City in March 

2020—even before receiving the City’s denial of liability or 

settlement offer. See Utah Code § 63G-7-403(2)(a). Vittoria took no 

such action until February 2022, at which point she was more than

six months too late. See id. § 63G-7-403(2)(b). The GIAU does not 

prevent claimants from pursuing their claims, regardless of the 

speed, or lack thereof at times, with which the government 

responds to a notice of claim. Vittoria had leave to file her claim 

well before—in fact, years before—her time expired under the 

GIAU, and she did not do so.

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, section 63G-7-403(2) of the 

GIAU occupies the field, and section 78B-2-303 does not apply to 

Vittoria’s claim. The district court acted correctly when it 

dismissed Vittoria’s claim as time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm.