This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

79312 

Vol. 75, No. 243 

Monday, December 20, 2010 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73 

[NRC–2008–0619] 

RIN 3150–AI25 

Requirements for Fingerprint-Based 

Criminal History Records Checks for 

Individuals Seeking Unescorted 

Access to Research or Test Reactors 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; reopening of 

comment period. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is reopening the 

public comment period for the proposed 

rule that was published on July 10, 

2010. The proposed rule would amend 

the NRC’s regulations by requiring 

research and test reactor licensees to 

obtain a fingerprint-based criminal 

history records check before granting 

any individual unescorted access to 

their facilities. The comment period for 

this proposed rule, which closed on 

October 4, 2010, is reopened and will 

remain open until January 31, 2011. 

DATES: The comment period for the 

proposed rule published July 10, 2010 

(75 FR 42000), has been reopened and 

now closes on January 31, 2011. 

Comments received after this date will 

be considered if it is practical to do so, 

but the NRC is able to assure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID 

NRC–2008–0619 in the subject line of 

your comments. For instructions on 

submitting comments see the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. You may submit 

comments by any one of the following 

methods. 

Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2008–0619. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, 

telephone: 301–492–3668; e-mail: 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive a reply e-mail confirming 

that we have received your comments, 

contact us directly at 301–415–1966. 

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852 between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

during Federal workdays (telephone: 

301–415–1966). 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. 

Jason Lising, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001; telephone: 301–415–3841; e-mail 

Jason.Lising@nrc.gov; or Timothy A. 

Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001; telephone: 301–415–1462; e-mail 

Timothy.Reed@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Submitting Comments and Accessing 

Information 

Comments submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be posted on the 

NRC Web site and on the Federal 

rulemaking Web site, http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. The NRC requests that any 

party soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this document 

using the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and have 

copied for a fee publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1– 

F21, One White Flint North, 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852. 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

301–415–4737, or by e-mail to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. 

Federal rulemaking Web site: Public 

comments and supporting materials 

related to this proposed rule can be 

found at http://www.regulations.gov by 

searching on Docket ID NRC–2008– 

0619. 

Extension Request 

On October 3, 2010, Stephen Miller 

representing The National Organization 

of Test, Research, and Training 

Reactors, requested an extension of the 

public comment period until January 

31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML102790180). The Commission has 

granted your request. Therefore, the 

NRC is reopening the public comment 

period until January 31, 2011. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day 

of December 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–31852 Filed 12–17–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 29 

[Docket No. SW022; Special Conditions No. 

29–022A–SC] 

Special Conditions: Eurocopter France 

(ECF) Model EC225LP Helicopter, 

Installation of a Search and Rescue 

(SAR) Automatic Flight Control System 

(AFCS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 


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SUMMARY: This document proposes 

amended special conditions for the ECF 

model EC225LP helicopter. This 

helicopter, as modified by ECF, will 

have novel or unusual design features 

associated with installing an optional 

SAR AFCS. Special conditions No. 29– 

022–SC, published in the Federal 

Register on November 6, 2008 (73 FR 

65968), addressed these issues. The 

proposed amendment revises the 

original final special conditions to 

address comments and to clarify the 

intent of some requirements. The 

applicable airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for these design 

features. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

the Administrator considers necessary 

to show a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

by January 19, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies 

of your comments to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Attn: Special Conditions Docket (ASW– 

111), Docket No. SW022, 2601 Meacham 

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You 

may deliver two copies to the Rotorcraft 

Directorate at the above address. You 

must mark your comments: Docket No. 

SW022. You can inspect comments in 

the Docket on weekdays, except Federal 

holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

FAA, Aircraft Certification Service, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and 

Policy Group (ASW–111), Attn: Stephen 

Barbini, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 

222–5196; facsimile (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will file in the special conditions 

docket all comments we receive, as well 

as a report summarizing each 

substantive public contact with FAA 

personnel concerning these special 

conditions. You can inspect the docket 

before and after the comment closing 

date. If you wish to review the docket 

in person, go to the address in the 

ADDRESSES section of this document 

between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your mailed comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On March 27, 2006, ECF applied for 

a change to Type Certificate (TC) No. 

H4EU to install an optional SAR AFCS 

in the model EC225LP helicopter. The 

model EC225LP is a transport category 

helicopter certified to Category A 

requirements when configured for more 

than nine passengers and Category A or 

B requirements when configured for 

nine or less passengers. This helicopter 

is also certified for instrument flight 

under the requirements of Appendix B 

of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29–47. 

The use of dedicated AFCS upper 

modes, in which a fully coupled 

autopilot provides operational SAR 

profiles, is needed for SAR operations 

conducted over water in offshore areas 

clear of obstructions. The SAR modes 

enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully 

coupled maneuvers, to include 

predefined search patterns during cruise 

flight, and to transition from cruise 

flight to a stabilized hover and 

departure (transition from hover to 

cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also 

includes an auxiliary crew control that 

allows another crewmember (such as a 

hoist operator) to have limited authority 

to control the helicopter’s longitudinal 

and lateral position during hover 

operations. 

Flight operations conducted over 

water at night may have an extremely 

limited visual horizon with little visual 

reference to the surface even when 

conducted under Visual Meteorological 

Conditions (VMC). Consequently, the 

certification requirements for SAR 

modes must meet Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29. While Appendix B to 14 CFR 

part 29 prescribes airworthiness criteria 

for instrument flight, it does not 

consider operations below instrument 

flight minimum speed (VMINI), whereas 

the SAR modes allow for coupled 

operations at low speed, all-azimuth 

flight to zero airspeed (hover). 

Since SAR operations have 

traditionally been a public use mission, 

the use of SAR modes in civil 

operations requires special 

airworthiness standards (special 

conditions) to ensure that a level of 

safety consistent with Category A and 

Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) 

certification is maintained. In this 

regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks adequate 

airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR 

mode certification to include flight 

characteristics, performance, and 

installed equipment and systems. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, ECF must show 

the EC225LP, as changed, continues to 

meet the applicable provisions of the 

rules incorporated by reference in TC 

No. H4EU or the applicable regulations 

in effect on the date of application for 

the change. The regulations 

incorporated by reference in the TC are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in H4EU are 

as follows: 

a. 14 CFR 21.29. 

b. 14 CFR part 29 Amendments 29–1 

to 29–25; plus § 29.785 through 

Amendment 29–28; plus §§ 29.963, 

29.967, 29.973, 29.975 through 

Amendment 29–34; plus §§ 29.25, 

29.865 through Amendment 29–42; plus 

§§ 29.1, 29.2, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 

29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.64, 29.65, 

29.67, 29.73, 29.75, 29.77, 29.79, 29.81, 

29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.307, 29.337, 

29.351, 29.361, 29.391, 29.395, 29.397, 

29.401, 29.403, 29.413, 29.427, 29.501, 

29.519, 29.547, 29.549, 29.561(c), 

29.561(d), 29.563, 29.602, 29.610, 

29.613, 29.621, 29.625, 29.629, 29.631, 

29.663, 29.674, 29.727, 29.755, 29.775, 

29.783, 29.787, 29.803, 29.805, 29.807, 

29.809, 29.811, 29.855, 29.861, 29.901, 

29.903, 29.908, 29.917, 29.923, 29.927, 

29.954, 29.961, 29.965, 29.969, 29.971, 

29.991, 29.997, 29.999, 29.1001, 

29.1011, 29.1019, 29.1027, 29.1041, 

29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1093, 

29.1125, 29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1163, 

29.1181, 29.1189, 29.1193, 29.1305, 

29.1309, 29.1323, 29.1329, 29.1337, 

29.1351, 29.1359, 29.1415, 29.1521, 

29.1549, 29.1557, 29.1587, A29, B29, 

C29, D29 through Amendment 29–47; 

plus 29.1317 through Amendment 29– 

49. 

c. 14 CFR part 36 Amendment 21 

(ICAO Annex 16, Volume 1, Chapter 8). 

d. Equivalent Safety Findings: 

(1) TC2899RD–R–F–01; § 29.1303(j), 

Vne aural warning. 

(2) TC2899RD–R–F–02; 

§ 29.1545(b)(4), Airspeed indicators 

markings. 

(3) TC2899RD–R–F–03; § 29.1549(b), 

Powerplant instruments markings. 

(4) TC2899RD–R–F–05; §§ 29.173, 

29,175, Static Longitudinal Stability. 

(5) TC2899RD–R–F–06; 14 CFR part 

29, Appendix B, paragraph IV; IFR 


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Static Longitudinal Stability–Airspeed 

stability. 

(6) TC2899RD–R–A–01; 

§ 29.807(d)(2), Ditching emergency exits 

for passengers. 

(7) TC2899RD–R–P–01; § 29.923(a)(2), 

Rotor drive system and control 

mechanism tests. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness standards and special 

conditions, the ECF model EC225LP 

must comply with the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness standards (that 

is, 14 CFR part 29) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the ECF model EC225LP helicopter 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under § 21.16. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the TC for that model 

be amended later to include any other 

model that incorporates the same novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same TC be modified to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The ECF model EC225LP helicopter 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: 

The SAR system is composed of a 

navigation computer with SAR modes, 

an AFCS that provides coupled SAR 

functions, hoist operator control, a 

hover speed reference system, and two 

radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled 

SAR functions include: 

(a) Hover hold at selected height 

above the surface. 

(b) Ground speed hold. 

(c) Transition down and hover to a 

waypoint under guidance from the 

navigation computer. 

(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and 

hover near a target over which the 

helicopter has flown. 

(e) Transition up, climb, and capture 

a cruise height. 

(f) Capture and track SAR search 

patterns generated by the navigation 

computer. 

(g) Monitor the preselected hover 

height with automatic increase in 

collective if the aircraft height drops 

below the safe minimum height. 

These SAR modes are intended to be 

used over large bodies of water in areas 

clear of obstructions. Further, use of the 

modes that transition down from cruise 

to hover will include operation at 

airspeeds below VMINI. 

The SAR system only entails 

navigation, flight control, and coupled 

AFCS operation of the helicopter. The 

system does not include the extra 

equipment that may be required for over 

water flight or external loads to meet 

other operational requirements. 

Discussion of Comments 

Final special conditions; request for 

comments, No. 29–022–SC for ECF 

model EC225LP helicopters was 

published in the Federal Register on 

November 6, 2008 (73 FR 65968), with 

the comment period closing December 

22, 2008. One commenter, 

AgustaWestland (AW), responded to our 

request for comments and submitted 

various comments and 

recommendations. 

Referring to subparagraph (a)(3), 

which deals with a Go Around mode, 

AW states that they do not agree with 

a requirement for a function that 

possibly performs an automatic ascent 

in case of a detected failure. They state 

that this could be even an unsafe 

maneuver during hover while operating 

the winch. They point out that EASA 

states in CRI B–03 ‘‘The automatic 

collective control should provide a high 

integrity function that flies up whenever 

a SAR mode is coupled and the aircraft 

is below the minimum safety height, if 

needed to satisfy the failure 

demonstrations in § G, 2. The minimum 

safety height must not rely on crew 

setting only.’’ They state there are more 

generic requirements that address the 

safety aspects induced by SAR 

operation at low height. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

interpretation of the requirement. The 

intent of the requirement is for the goaround mode to be manually activated 

by the pilot in order to avoid a 

hazardous situation. This action would 

interrupt any coupled SAR mode and 

automatically command the helicopter 

to ascend and accelerate to the 

instrument flight rules (IFR) envelope. 

The intent is that the go-around mode 

be provided in any low-speed 

environment, such as during hover 

operations or while transitioning to a 

hover. The requirement of subparagraph 

(a)(3) differs from the requirement of 

automatic transition of the helicopter to 

the instrument flight envelope in 

subparagraph (a)(2). Subparagraph (a)(2) 

requires an automatic transition to the 

IFR flight envelope when a departure 

from hover mode is activated as part of 

the normal SAR mode sequencing. 

Subparagraph (a)(3) requires a means for 

the pilot to interrupt the normal SAR 

modes sequencing, commanding the 

AFCS to automatically transition the 

helicopter to the IFR flight envelope. 

Subparagraph (a)(3) is not intended to 

require automatic initiation of a goaround following a single failure of the 

AFCS. Failure modes are addressed in 

subparagraph (a)(9). While we disagree 

with AW’s interpretation of the 

requirement, we recognize the wording 

may be unclear. We have therefore made 

a change to subparagraph (a)(3) to reflect 

that the required go-around mode is 

pilot-selectable and the purpose is to 

interrupt any other coupled mode. We 

have also clarified in subparagraph 

(a)(2) that this requirement pertains to 

normal SAR mode sequencing. 

With respect to subparagraphs (b)(3) 

and (b)(4) of the SAR Mode System 

Architecture, the commenter asks if 

both the sensor variables and the AFCS 

mode references should be presented to 

the crew. 

We concur with these 

recommendations, which is consistent 

with the requirement of subparagraph 

(b)(2). Therefore, subparagraphs (b)(3) 

and (b)(4) are revised to additionally 

require the actual groundspeed and 

actual heading to be displayed to the 

pilot. 

For subparagraph (b)(5) of the special 

conditions, AW asks why the wind 

indication should be available only 

when the automatic modes are engaged, 

or transitioning from one mode to 

another. They state that the wind 

information should be made available, 

independently from any AFCS engaged 

mode, at the beginning of the transition 

from cruise to hover. 

We disagree. Subparagraph (b)(5) 

requires wind speed and wind direction 

only when SAR automatic piloting 

modes are engaged or transitioning from 

one SAR mode to another. This 

requirement is intended to be a 

minimum requirement to ensure wind 

speed and direction is available for 

operations near the surface when 

coupled to the SAR modes. Thus, the 

requirement is unchanged. 

In reference to subparagraph (c)(3), 

the commenter states that AC 29– 

1329.d.(5) explains how the deviations 

caused by a malfunction should be 

evaluated during an instrument landing 

system (ILS) approach. The commenter 

believes that malfunction testing for 

SAR modes should be evaluated in the 

same manner since the SAR-mandatory 

15-foot buffer above the surface is 

equivalent to the buffer provided in ILS 

approaches. Likewise, penetration of 

this 15-foot buffer does not guarantee a 

catastrophic event, but should be treated 

as a hazardous event as long as impact 


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with the surface is avoided. Therefore, 

the commenter requests subparagraph 

(c)(3) be modified to require failures not 

shown to be extremely remote (a safety 

objective for hazardous failures) must 

not result in a loss of height that is 

greater than half of the MUH with a 

minimum of 15 feet above the surface. 

We disagree with the commenter. The 

intent of the requirement to have a 15- 

foot minimum height above the surface, 

following an AFCS failure, was to 

provide an acceptable safety margin. 

The requirement for such a margin 

stems from the likelihood of 

encountering hazards such as 

inconsistent wave heights, floating 

debris, and other unforeseen obstacles 

that would create a catastrophic 

condition if the helicopter penetrated 

the 15-foot buffer. Therefore, we 

consider SAR AFCS failure conditions 

that result in recovery closer than 15 

feet above the surface to be catastrophic. 

We have made non-substantive changes 

to improve the intent of the 

requirement. 

Additional wording was added to 

subparagraph (f)(1)(i)(C) that provides 

linkage to the MUH determination made 

in subparagraph (c)(3). This change was 

made for clarification purposes only and 

is not intended to increase or alleviate 

the current requirements. We have also 

defined MUH in subparagraph (c)(3). 

We do not intend for the SAR AFCS to 

decouple automatically if the helicopter 

descends below MUH. 

The commenter states that in 

subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5), the inflight demonstration of failures should 

be required only for failures that cannot 

be shown to be extremely remote. AW 

states that this requirement would 

provide some alleviation for the 

malfunction flight validation. They state 

that this should be allowed because 

SAR missions are normally conducted 

by trained pilots and they should be 

able to complete the mission even after 

some malfunction has occurred in flight. 

Because of the considerable crew 

workload involved in a SAR mission, 

the commenter believes that it is 

important to permit coupling of the 

Flight Director modes even after a 

malfunction affecting the AFCS. The 

commenter believes that the reduction 

in pilot workload provided by a coupled 

Flight Director ‘‘would considerably 

reduce the risk of inadvertent pilot 

operation, a benefit that should be 

considered in comparison to the 

probability of ‘‘an extremely remote’’ 

failure.’’ 

We do not agree with commenter. The 

existing requirement does not require 

flight testing for failure modes not 

shown to be extremely improbable; 

rather, subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5) 

permit ground or flight testing to 

demonstrate compliance for failure 

modes not shown to be extremely 

improbable. This is consistent with the 

methodology prescribed in the advisory 

circular guidance for AFCS failure 

modes testing. 

We made some other minor changes 

to improve and clarify wording, with no 

substantive increase or decrease to the 

current requirements. 

In subparagraph (a)(1) we added 

‘‘(within the maximum demonstrated 

wind envelope)’’ to highlight that safe 

and controlled flight is required 

throughout the wind envelope. Adding 

this phrase does not change our intent 

of SAR envelope definition. 

We added, ‘‘Pilot-commanded descent 

below the safe minimum height is 

acceptable provided the alerting 

requirements in (b)(7)(i) are sufficient to 

alert the pilot of this encroachment’’ to 

subparagraph (a)(4). This clarifies that 

the SAR AFCS is permitted to descend 

below the stored or pilot-selected safe 

minimum height only when 

commanded by the pilot, provided the 

alerting requirements are sufficient to 

alert the pilot of the descent. 

We modified subparagraph (b)(6) to 

indicate that the AFCS system must 

monitor for all deviations and failures, 

not just those that create a hazard, 

which was our original intent. The 

alerting requirement does not change; a 

pilot alert is still required for all 

deviations and all failures that require 

pilot-corrective action. 

Clarifications were made to 

subparagraph (b)(7) by adding 

subparagraph (iii) for normal 

transitions. We have also denoted the 

remainder of the subparagraph as a note. 

This makes the requirement more 

specific. 

We clarified in subparagraph (b)(8) 

that the hoist operator control has 

limited authority. 

Subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) of the current 

special condition contains two 

requirements. We have separated them, 

so subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) only contains 

the hoist operator control 

noninterference requirement and 

subparagraph (b)(8)(iv) contains the 

pilot override criteria for the hoist 

control. 

We modified subparagraph (d)(2) by 

deleting ‘‘danger of’’ from the first 

sentence. This change does not alter the 

intent of this requirement. 

Subparagraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) was 

modified to incorporate more general 

terms to clarify the requirement. 

We have changed subparagraph 

(b)(10) to state a functional hazard 

assessment must address all failure 

conditions, not just those that represent 

catastrophic failure conditions. This 

change makes this SAR special 

condition requirement consistent with 

the requirements of § 29.1309. 

We have changed the second 

paragraph in subparagraph (e)(1)(ii) to a 

note. This ‘‘note’’ provides information 

only and is better characterized as a 

‘‘note.’’ The original wording was always 

intended to stand as a note, but it was 

not previously marked as one. 

We removed the parenthetical from 

subparagraph (g)(4) as it is not needed. 

The intent of this requirement has not 

changed. 

Finally, we clarified subparagraphs 

(g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(ii), by changing 

‘‘transition,’’ ‘‘hover,’’ and ‘‘cruise’’ to 

‘‘transition modes,’’ ‘‘hover modes,’’ and 

‘‘cruise modes,’’ respectively. This 

general wording allows an applicant 

more flexibility in the use of SAR mode 

terminology. 

Applicability 

These special conditions apply to the 

ECF model EC225LP helicopters. 

Should ECF apply at a later date for a 

change to the TC to include another 

model incorporating the same novel or 

unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well under the provisions of § 21.101(d). 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of helicopter. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) proposes 

replacing Special Conditions No. 29– 

022–SC, Docket No. SW022 (73 FR 

65968, November 6, 2008) with the 

following special conditions as part of 

the type certification basis for 

Eurocopter France model EC225LP 

helicopters when the optional Search 

and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight 

Control System (AFCS) is installed: 

In addition to the part 29 certification 

requirements for Category A and 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B), the following additional 

requirements must be met for 

certification of the SAR AFCS: 

(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled 

SAR flight modes must provide: 


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(1) Safe and controlled flight in three 

axes (lateral and longitudinal position/ 

speed and height/vertical speed) at all 

airspeeds from instrument flight 

minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover 

(within the maximum demonstrated 

wind envelope). 

(2) Automatic transition to the 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B) envelope as part of the normal SAR 

mode sequencing. 

(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around 

mode that safely interrupts any other 

coupled mode and automatically 

transitions to the helicopter instrument 

flight (Appendix B) envelope. 

(4) A means to prevent unintended 

flight below a safe minimum height. 

Pilot-commanded descent below the 

safe minimum height is acceptable 

provided the alerting requirements in 

(b)(7)(i) are sufficient to alert the pilot 

of this descent below safe minimum 

height. 

(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. 

To support the integrity of the SAR 

modes, the following system 

architecture is required: 

(1) A system for limiting the engine 

power demanded by the AFCS when 

any of the automatic piloting modes are 

engaged, so FADEC power limitations, 

such as torque and temperature, are not 

exceeded. 

(2) A system providing the aircraft 

height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the 

instrument panel in a position 

acceptable to the FAA that will make it 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(3) A system providing the aircraft 

heading and the pilot-selected heading 

at a location on the instrument panel in 

a position acceptable to the FAA that 

will make it plainly visible to and 

usable by any pilot at their station. 

(4) A system providing the aircraft 

longitudinal and lateral ground speeds 

and the pilot-selected longitudinal and 

lateral ground speeds when used by the 

AFCS in the flight envelope where 

airspeed indications become unreliable. 

This information must be presented at a 

location on the instrument panel in a 

position acceptable to the FAA that is 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at their station. 

(5) A system providing wind speed 

and wind direction when automatic 

piloting modes are engaged or 

transitioning from one mode to another. 

(6) A system that monitors for flight 

guidance deviations and failures with 

an appropriate alerting function that 

enables the flight crew to take 

appropriate corrective action. 

(7) An alerting system must provide 

visual or aural alerts, or both, to the 

flight crew under any of the following 

conditions: 

(i) When the stored or pilot-selected 

safe minimum height is reached. 

(ii) When a SAR mode system 

malfunction occurs. 

(iii) When the AFCS changes modes 

automatically from one SAR mode to 

another. 

Note: For normal transitions from one SAR 

mode to another, a single visual or aural alert 

may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or 

a mode having a time-critical component, the 

flight crew alerting system must activate 

early enough to allow the flight crew to take 

timely and appropriate action. The alerting 

system means must be designed to alert the 

flight crew in order to minimize crew errors 

that could create an additional hazard. 

(8) The SAR system hoist operator 

control is considered a flight control 

with limited authority and must comply 

with the following: 

(i) The hoist operator control must be 

designed and located to provide for 

convenient operation and to prevent 

confusion and inadvertent operation. 

(ii) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable by the hoist operator 

control throughout the range of that 

control. 

(iii) The hoist operator control may 

not interfere with the safe operation of 

the helicopter. 

(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls 

must be able to smoothly override the 

control authority of the hoist operator 

control, without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength, and without 

the danger of exceeding any other 

limitation because of the override. 

(9) The reliability of the AFCS must 

be related to the effects of its failure. 

The occurrence of any failure condition 

that would prevent continued safe flight 

and landing must be extremely 

improbable. For any failure condition of 

the AFCS which is not shown to be 

extremely improbable: 

(i) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable and capable of continued 

safe flight without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength. Additional 

unrelated probable failures affecting the 

control system must be evaluated. 

(ii) The AFCS must be designed so 

that it cannot create a hazardous 

deviation in the flight path or produce 

hazardous loads on the helicopter 

during normal operation or in the event 

of a malfunction or failure, assuming 

corrective action begins within an 

appropriate period of time. Where 

multiple systems are installed, 

subsequent malfunction conditions 

must be evaluated in sequence unless 

their occurrence is shown to be 

improbable. 

(10) A functional hazard assessment 

(FHA) and a system safety assessment 

must be provided to address the failure 

conditions associated with SAR 

operations. For SAR catastrophic failure 

conditions, changes may be required to 

the following: 

(i) System architecture. 

(ii) Software and complex electronic 

hardware design assurance levels. 

(iii) HIRF test levels. 

(iv) Instructions for continued 

airworthiness. 

The assessments must consider all the 

systems required for SAR operations to 

include the AFCS, all associated AFCS 

sensors (for example, radio altimeter), 

and primary flight displays. Electrical 

and electronic systems with SAR 

catastrophic failure conditions (for 

example, AFCS) must comply with the 

§ 29.1317(a)(4) High Intensity Radiated 

Field (HIRF) requirements. 

(c) SAR Mode Performance 

Requirements. 

(1) The SAR modes must be 

demonstrated in the requested flight 

envelope for the following minimum 

sea-state and wind conditions: 

(i) Sea-State: Wave height of 2.5 

meters (8.2 feet), considering both short 

and long swells. 

(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 

knots for all other azimuths. 

(2) The selected hover height and 

hover velocity must be captured (to 

include the transition from one captured 

mode to another captured mode) 

accurately and smoothly and not exhibit 

any significant overshoot or oscillation. 

(3) For any single failure or any 

combination of failures of the AFCS that 

is not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the recovery must not result 

in a loss of height greater than half of 

the minimum use height (MUH) with a 

minimum margin of 15 feet above the 

surface. MUH is the minimum height at 

which any SAR AFCS mode can be 

engaged. 

(4) The SAR mode system must be 

usable up to the maximum certified 

gross weight of the aircraft or to the 

lower of the following weights: 

(i) Maximum emergency flotation 

weight. 

(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground 

Effect (OGE) weight. 

(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight. 

(d) Flight Characteristics. 

(1) The basic aircraft must meet all the 

part 29 airworthiness criteria for 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B). 

(2) For SAR mode coupled flight 

below VMINI, at the maximum 

demonstrated winds, the helicopter 

must be able to maintain any required 

flight condition and make a smooth 

transition from any flight condition to 

any other flight condition without 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules 79317 

requiring exceptional piloting skill, 

alertness, or strength, and without 

exceeding the limit load factor. This 

requirement also includes aircraft 

control through the hoist operator’s 

control. 

(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below 

VMINI, the following requirements of 

Appendix B to part 29 must be met and 

will be used as an extension to the IFR 

certification envelope of the basic 

aircraft: 

(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph IV of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: 

The requirements of paragraph V of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(iii) Dynamic Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph VI of 

Appendix B are replaced with the 

following two paragraphs: 

(A) Any oscillation must be damped 

and any aperiodic response must not 

double in amplitude in less than 10 

seconds. This requirement must also be 

met with degraded upper mode(s) of the 

AFCS. An ‘‘upper mode’’ is a mode that 

utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to 

provide an operational SAR profile. 

(B) After any upset, the AFCS must 

return the aircraft to the last 

commanded position within 10 seconds 

or less. 

(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of 

the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be 

able to manually recover the aircraft and 

transition to the normal (Appendix B) 

IFR flight profile envelope without 

exceptional skill, alertness, or strength. 

(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) 

Performance Information. 

(1) The following performance 

information must be provided in the 

Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement 

(RFMS): 

(i) OEI performance information and 

emergency procedures, providing the 

maximum weight that will provide a 

minimum clearance of 15 feet above the 

surface, following failure of the critical 

engine in a hover. The maximum weight 

must be presented as a function of the 

hover height for the temperature and 

pressure altitude range requested for 

certification. The effects of wind must 

be reflected in the hover performance 

information. 

(ii) Hover OGE performance with the 

critical engine inoperative for OEI 

continuous and time-limited power 

ratings for those weights, altitudes, and 

temperatures for which certification is 

requested. 

Note: These OEI performance requirements 

do not replace performance requirements that 

may be needed to comply with the 

airworthiness or operational standards 

(§ 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external 

loads or human external cargo. 

(f) RFMS. 

(1) The RFMS must contain, at a 

minimum: 

(i) Limitations necessary for safe 

operation of the SAR system to include: 

(A) Minimum crew requirements. 

(B) Maximum SAR weight. 

(C) Engagement criteria for each of the 

SAR modes to include MUH (as 

determined in subparagraph (c)(3)). 

(ii) Normal and emergency procedures 

for operation of the SAR system (to 

include operation of the hoist operator 

control), with AFCS failure modes, 

AFCS degraded modes, and engine 

failures. 

(iii) Performance information: 

(A) OEI performance and height-loss. 

(B) Hover OGE performance 

information, utilizing OEI continuous 

and time-limited power ratings. 

(C) The maximum wind envelope 

demonstrated in flight test. 

(g) Flight Demonstration. 

(1) Before approval of the SAR 

system, an acceptable flight 

demonstration of all the coupled SAR 

modes is required. 

(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe 

operations during coupled maneuvers. 

The demonstration of fail-safe 

operations must include a pilot 

workload assessment associated with 

manually flying the aircraft to an 

altitude greater than 200 feet above the 

surface and an airspeed of at least the 

best rate of climb airspeed (Vy). 

(3) For any failure condition of the 

SAR system not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the pilot must be able to 

make a smooth transition from one 

flight mode to another without 

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(4) Failure conditions that are not 

shown to be extremely improbable must 

be demonstrated by analysis, ground 

testing, or flight testing. For failures 

demonstrated in flight, the following 

normal pilot recovery times are 

acceptable: 

(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/ 

Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes: 

Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second. 

(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot 

recognition plus 3 seconds. 

(5) All AFCS malfunctions must 

include evaluation at the low-speed and 

high-power flight conditions typical of 

SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS 

hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory 

malfunctions, particularly in yaw, 

require evaluation. AFCS malfunction 

testing must include a single or a 

combination of failures (for example, 

erroneous data from and loss of the 

radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and 

altitude sensors) which are not shown to 

be extremely improbable. 

(6) The flight demonstration must 

include the following environmental 

conditions: 

(i) Swell into wind. 

(ii) Swell and wind from different 

directions. 

(iii) Cross swell. 

(iv) Swell of different lengths (short 

and long swell). 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 

14, 2010. 

Bruce E. Cain, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–31867 Filed 12–17–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1199; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–225–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to supersede an 

existing airworthiness directive (AD) 

that applies to the products listed above. 

The existing AD currently requires 

replacement of the power control relays 

in the P91 and P92 power distribution 

panels for the fuel boost and override 

pumps with new, improved relays 

having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) 

feature, or installation and maintenance 

of universal fault interrupters (UFIs) 

using a certain supplemental type 

certificate. Since we issued that AD, we 

have determined that we need to clarify 

which relays may be replaced by 

installation of UFIs. This proposed AD 

would continue to require the actions of 

the existing AD and also specify which 

relays may be replaced by GFIs or UFIs. 

We are proposing this AD to prevent 

pump housing burn-through due to 

electrical arcing, which could create a 

potential ignition source inside a fuel 

tank. This condition, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in a fuel tank explosion and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by February 3, 2011. 


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