COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

YOLANDA TURNER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 Record No. 1559-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

ALBERT SPINNER, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

F. Bruce Bach, Judge 

 Lloyd F. Sammons for appellant. 

 J. Chapman Petersen (Murphy, McGettigan, 

Richards & West, P.C., on brief), for 

appellees. 

 By order entered March 7, 1996, the circuit court placed the 

person of T. T. (child) under the guardianship of appellees, 

Albert and Karen Spinner (Spinners). Appellant, Yolanda Turner 

(mother), the child's biological mother, appeals that order, 

contending that the court had no jurisdiction to enter it. We 

conclude that the jurisdictional question has been rendered moot 

and dismiss mother's appeal. 

 I. 

 The child was born in Washington, D.C. in July 1993. In 

October 1993, Adrienne Hall took physical custody of the child 

and relocated her to Virginia. The child remained with Hall in 

Virginia pursuant to a temporary custody decree of the Superior 

Court of the District of Columbia (D.C. court). In January 1995 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the D.C. court granted permanent custody of the child to Hall, 

reserving reasonable visitation rights for mother. 

 The child remained in Hall's custody, in Virginia, until 

November 1995 when Hall left the child in the Spinners' care, in 

Virginia, and underwent surgery. Hall died unexpectedly 

following surgery, and the Spinners kept physical custody of the 

child, knowing no one else to care for her. When mother was 

notified of Hall's death, she stated her intention to take 

custody of the child. 

 In January 1996, the Spinners filed a petition in Fairfax 

County Circuit court (Virginia court), pursuant to Code § 31-4, 

requesting the court to appoint them guardians over the person of 

the child. On February 9, 1996, mother filed a motion to dismiss 

the Spinners' petition by special appearance. Mother construed 

the Spinners' motion as a "de facto" request for custody and 

argued that the D.C. court retained jurisdiction over the custody 

of the child. On February 22, 1996, mother filed a custody 

petition in the D.C. court. 

 On March 7, 1996, the Virginia court conducted a hearing on 

the guardianship over the person issue. At that time, mother had 

taken physical possession of the child during a period of 

"visitation" and had refused to return her. Mother failed to 

appear at the guardianship hearing, but her attorney made a 

special appearance to request the court to stay its proceeding, 

pending the D.C. court's determination of whether it would 
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exercise jurisdiction over the custody issue. Mother's counsel 

again maintained that a determination of the issue of 

guardianship over the person was tantamount to a custody 

determination and, therefore, that the Virginia court had to 

defer to the D.C. court. The Virginia court, however, decided to 

proceed with the guardianship hearing. In so doing, the Virginia 

court stated: 

 I'm not saying D.C. can't or really shouldn't 

go ahead with the custody and their decision 

may be that this court ought to resolve the 

custody. I don't know. 

* * * * * * * 

 If I [grant guardianship -- and place 

physical custody with the Spinners], I would 

do it knowing that a subsequent custody 

determination by a court of competent 

jurisdiction would give a superior right, I 

think, to any sort of guardianship that I 

would give it. 

 Following the hearing, the Virginia court awarded 

guardianship of the child to the Spinners. The Virginia court 

found that no one had custody over the child, and "[that was] 

what guardianship is intended for under Virginia law." The 

Virginia court reiterated that the custody issue would proceed in 

the District of Columbia, but it ordered the child to be returned 

to the Spinners during the pendency of those proceedings. The 

Virginia court entered its final order March 7, 1996. 

 From that order, mother appeals. Mother argues that a 

determination of guardianship over the person is tantamount to a 

determination of custody and, therefore, the provisions of the 
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UCCJA and the PKPA must be followed before a court has 

jurisdiction to award guardianship over the person. 

Specifically, she argues that because the issue of custody in 

this case was properly before the D.C. court, the Virginia court 

was bound not to proceed until the D.C. court determined whether 

it would exercise jurisdiction over the case. We find mother's 

argument to be moot and dismiss the appeal. 

 II. 

 "The duty of this court . . . is to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which 

cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." 

Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644, 29 S.E.2d 

831, 832 (1944). Moot questions are not justiciable and, to 

avoid issuing advisory opinions, courts do not rule on such 

questions. In re Times-World Corporation, 7 Va. App. 317, 323, 

373 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1988). A case is moot "when the issues 

presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome." Richmond, Fredericksburg & 

Potomac R.R. v. Transportation Communications International 

Union, 776 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Va. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 

973 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United Stated Parole Comm'n 

v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479 

(1980)). A case is no longer live if, for example, a challenged 
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order has no "continued impact on the parties," or if no issues 

in the order remain unresolved. Id. (quoting Firefighters Local 

Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 569, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 81 

L. Ed. 2d 483 (1984)). As long as the parties have a concrete 

interest in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot. 

State Water Control Bd. v. Appalachian Power Co., 12 Va. App. 

73, 75, 402 S.E.2d 703, 705 (1991) (en banc). 

 There are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. First, 

cases capable of repetition, yet evading review remain 

justiciable. Id. at 75, 402 S.E.2d at 705; In re Times-World 

Corp., 7 Va. App. at 323, 373 S.E.2d at 477. Second, cases 

involving voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activity are 

not moot. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 858 F. 

Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994). 

 Subsequent to the Virginia court's guardianship 

determination in the present case, the D.C. court deferred 

jurisdiction over the issue of custody to Virginia.1 We find the 

D.C. court's deferral of jurisdiction to render mother's 

appellate contention moot. We find neither exception to the 

mootness doctrine to apply. See City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 

858 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994); Jones v. Poindexter, 903 F.2d 

1006 (4th Cir. 1990). 

 

 1We granted the Spinners' motion to supplement the record 

with the transcript of the D.C. court's proceeding. See Rountree 

v. Rountree, 200 Va. 57, 63, 104 S.E.2d 42, 47 (1958); Ward v. 

Charlton, 177 Va. 101, 107-08, 12 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1941). 
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 Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 

Dismissed.