NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in 

the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 200235-U 

Order filed June 28, 2021

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2021 

J. CRAIG ARBOGAST and MISCHELE )

ARBOGAST, as Trustees of the Craig and ) 

Mischele Arbogast Family Trust, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DOUGLAS J. SCHAUB, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

(The Marilee Porter Revocable Trust, ) 

Defendant). )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

Peoria County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-20-0235 

Circuit No. 19-MR-56 

Honorable 

Mark E. Gilles, 

Judge, Presiding.

___________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Daugherity and Wright concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s (1) finding of adverse possession was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, (2) finding of trespass was not erroneous as a matter of law,

and (3) award of $1000 in nominal damages for the trespass was not excessive.

¶ 2 The plaintiffs, J. Craig Arbogast and Mischele Arbogast, as Trustees of the Craig and 

Mischele Arbogast Family Trust, brought a complaint for adverse possession, prescriptive 
2 

easement, and trespass against the defendant, Douglas J. Schaub. The circuit court found in favor 

of the Arbogasts on their adverse possession and trespass claims. Schaub appeals.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

1

¶ 4 In August 1985, the Arbogasts purchased real estate in rural Brimfield, Illinois (hereinafter 

the Arbogast Property). At that time, the Arbogast Property was bordered on the west and south 

by land owned by Robert and Marilee Porter, whose property consisted of 25 acres of farmland to 

1 This image is provided by the Peoria County Property Tax website. The website provides a 

disclaimer that it is a tool for county employees and the general public use and data provided therein is as 

is without warranty of accuracy, timeliness, or completeness. The website is intended to be used as 

informational only. We use this information only to better illustrate the location of the property in this case. 

Schaub’s property at issue is bolded and outlined in red (identified with Parcel Identification Number (PIN) 

1101400021). This image was obtained by entering Schaub’s PIN into the search tool. See Peoria County 

Property Tax, https://gis.peoriacounty.org/peoriagis/ (last visited June 23, 2021). We clarify that the map 

appears to show the Arbogasts’ detached garage as having a separate driveway than the half-oval gravel 

driveway to the west of the Arbogasts’ home. However, evidence of record shows that it is one continuous 

gravel driveway stretching across the strip, thereby connecting the detached garage to the home.

Additionally, the gravel driveway’s two points of access are directly connected to Windish Road.

North 

~ LJ Arbogust I lomc 

D Arbogast Garage 

Schaub Property 
3 

the south of the Arbogast Property and a 468’ x 30’ strip that ran along the entire western boundary 

of the Arbogast Property. To the west of the strip lies a road owned by Michael Windish (referred 

to as Windish Road). Windish Road was created in 1977 when Roy Windish purchased the land 

upon which it lies from the Porters. The deed from the Porters to Roy Windish included a perpetual 

easement allowing the use of Windish Road for ingress and egress in favor of owners of lots in the 

area. When the Arbogasts purchased their property, a gravel driveway resembling the shape of a 

half oval existed on the strip, which provided them access to Windish Road then to Route 8. 

¶ 5 In September 1995, the Arbogasts and Marilee Porter, as widow and successor to Robert 

Porter, signed a two-part agreement. The first part provided the Arbogasts with an easement to use 

a “portion” of the strip for the purpose of maintaining, repairing, or replacing the existing well and 

waterline running from the strip to the Arbogasts’ home. The second part of the agreement 

provided Marilee Porter with a relocated easement as her existing easement on the northern part 

of the Arbogast Property was set to be extinguished by the widening of Route 8. 

¶ 6 In March 2003, Marilee Porter deeded a remainder interest in her property to her son, 

Dennis Porter, and reserved herself a life estate. In June 2016, Dennis Porter conveyed his 

remainder interest to Schaub. Beginning in September 2018, Schaub plowed the strip and dumped 

piles of dirt on the gravel driveway the Arbogasts use to access Windish Road. 

¶ 7 In January 2019, the Arbogasts filed a complaint against Schaub.2 Count I set forth a claim 

for adverse possession, alleging that they continuously, exclusively, and openly and apparently

possessed the strip adversely to the title holder of record (Marilee Porter) since August of 1985. 

Count II set forth a claim for a prescriptive easement in that they continuously, exclusively, and 

2 The Arbogasts also brought this action against the Marilee Porter Revocable Trust, but later 

voluntarily dismissed the trust when Marilee Porter conveyed her life estate to Schaub in May 2019.
4 

openly and apparently used the entire length of the strip as a means of ingress and egress to their 

property by regularly driving their vehicles across it at various points since August 1985, which 

was without permission and adverse to Marilee Porter. Count III alleged trespass, describing the 

incidents when Schaub accessed the strip and took action to prevent them from using it. 

¶ 8 In February 2019, the Arbogasts filed a petition for a preliminary injunction. In addition to 

the facts set forth in their complaint, they added that Schaub had repeatedly made complaints to 

local law enforcement agencies alleging trespass, which resulted in the filing of criminal 

complaints against them. In March 2019, the court granted the preliminary injunction to enjoin 

Schaub from any further interference with the Arbogasts use and possession of the strip. 

¶ 9 In December 2019, the court held a bench trial. The following testimony was adduced.

Michael Windish testified that his brother leased Windish Road in 1977 and he often helped his 

brother farm the area. In the 1990s, he did not frequent Windish Road as often, but once he owned 

it in 1998, he used it regularly except in the wintertime. After the Arbogasts purchased their home, 

he observed them mow and park on the strip. Windish also testified that he farmed land for Marilee 

Porter since 1999, never mowed the strip for her, and never saw her use any portion of the strip 

for any purpose. He noted that he had observed Schaub mow the strip.

¶ 10 Mischele Arbogast testified that she has lived on the Arbogast Property continuously since 

Labor Day weekend in 1985. Since the Arbogasts moved in, they have mowed the grass on the 

strip, fertilized it, weeded it, edged it, and trimmed it. She understood that Marilee Porter owned 

the strip, never maintained it, and never used it for any purpose during the entire time the Arbogasts 

lived there. In addition to maintenance, the Arbogasts used the strip to store and park a truck and 

trailer, guest parking, and for children to play. While the Arbogasts’ children were growing up, 

they used the strip as the home’s front yard as the home faced west. She stated that these activities 
5 

took place for anyone in the neighborhood to see and that they were never told by Marilee Porter 

or anyone acting on her behalf to stop using the strip. She described that these activities on strip 

extended across the entire area of the strip. Mischele also stated that she had a detached garage 

built in 2008, which opens to the west toward Windish Lane and cannot be used effectively without 

the ability to use the strip. The gravel driveway on the strip is used to access the garage.

¶ 11 Mischele testified that, before Schaub purchased the strip, he would snowplow the gravel 

driveway on the strip out to Windish Lane as a favor, but he did not snowplow the gravel driveway 

after he owned the strip. She stated that, after Schaub purchased the strip in 2016, he would mow 

over the top of her husband Craig’s mowing and Craig would also mow over the top of Schaub’s 

mowing. Schaub did not object to their use of the strip until 2018 when he plowed up the strip, 

dropped a dirt pile on the gravel driveway that led to the garage, and called the police several

times. She recalled that the sheriff came out about six or seven times in response to Schaub’s calls.

Mischele paid $75 to have the dirt pile removed, $135 for added rock on the driveway to avoid 

getting stuck in the mud, and $80 to have the rock spread. It took the Arbogasts a day of work to 

repair the area themselves. They also spent $6618.25 in attorney fees to defend the criminal 

trespass charges. Mischele described that, since the injunction was granted, Schaub would take 

pictures of the area and stop his vehicle in front of the house and sit. This made Mischele feel 

intimidated and uncomfortable, which caused her to lock all the doors to the house.

¶ 12 Schaub testified that he purchased the strip in 2016. He maintained it by mowing grass, 

plowing snow, and supplying gravel. He knew that the Arbogasts were using the gravel driveway 

on the strip and did not have any objections at that time. Schaub stated that the Arbogasts offered 

to buy the strip, and they only mowed the strip because they promised Marilee Porter that they 

would. Schaub stated that he observed the Arbogasts mowing the property but that he mowed it 
6 

too. In 2018, he believed that the Arbogasts were not respecting the property and there were “three 

DUI’s and some other criminal stuff” so he had the land surveyed. Schaub provided that if adverse 

possession was granted, he would be landlocked and no longer have legal access to Windish Road.

¶ 13 Craig Arbogast testified as a rebuttal witness and stated that he never (1) told Schaub that 

he promised Marliee Porter that he would cut the grass on the strip, (2) spoke to Marilee Porter 

about the strip, and (3) offered to buy the strip from Schaub. He stated that he knew the strip was 

owned by Marliee Porter and Schaub subsequently purchased it.

¶ 14 The court found in favor of the Arbogasts as to their adverse possession and trespass claims

and awarded them $1000 in nominal damages for the trespass. Schaub filed a motion to reconsider, 

and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. Among other things, he argued that the court failed 

to set the dates of adverse possession, the Arbogasts failed to prove that their possession was 

exclusive and adverse (i.e., the cross-easement agreement), the award of damages was not 

supported by the evidence, and the court failed to address Schaub’s now landlocked property. The 

court denied the motion, stating (1) adverse possession was established by September 3, 2005; (2)

the evidence was uncontroverted that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip was without permission; (3)

it considered all the evidence before it; (4) nominal damages were appropriate as actual damages 

were not proved; and (5) Schaub’s property was not left landlocked. Schaub appeals.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, Schaub argues (1) the circuit court’s finding of adverse possession was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that 

he trespassed on the strip for which he simultaneously possessed color of title at the time of the 

alleged trespass, and (3) the award of $1000 for nominal damages was excessive. 

¶ 17 A. Adverse Possession
7 

¶ 18 To succeed on a claim for adverse possession, the claimant must establish possession of 

the property for the entire 20-year statutory period that was: (1) continuous; (2) hostile or adverse; 

(3) actual; (4) open, notorious, and exclusive; and (5) under a claim of title inconsistent with that 

of the true owner. Township of Jubilee v. State, 405 Ill. App. 3d 489, 498 (2010). All presumptions 

are in favor of the title owner and the claimant must prove each element by clear and unequivocal 

evidence. Knauf v. Ryan, 338 Ill. App. 3d 265, 269 (2003); Dotson v. Former Shareholders of 

Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattle Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d 846, 855 (2002) (the “clear and unequivocal 

evidence” standard has not been explained by the supreme court; thus, courts apply the clear and 

convincing standard in adverse possession cases).

¶ 19 A circuit court’s finding of adverse possession will not be reversed unless it is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Cobb v. Nagele, 242 Ill. App. 3d 975, 978 (1993). A finding is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent 

or when the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Best v. Best, 

223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). We give deference to the circuit court as the finder of fact because it 

is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. Id.

Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court regarding the credibility 

of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or inferences to be drawn. Id. at 350-51. 

Schaub argues that the court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the

Arbogasts failed to establish the elements required to satisfy a claim for adverse possession.

3

 

¶ 20 1. Continuous Possession

3 Schaub’s post-trial motion only challenged the elements pertaining to exclusivity and 

hostility/adversity. Supra ¶ 14. We address his arguments that extend beyond the scope of his post-trial 

motion because, in cases appealed following a civil bench trial, “[n]either the filing of nor the failure to file 

a post judgment motion limits the scope of review.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(3)(ii) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Therefore, 

Schaub’s failure to include these issues in his post-judgment motion does not preclude him from raising the 

issues on appeal. Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 12.
8 

¶ 21 Schaub argues that the activities of mowing, fertilizing, weeding, parking, and playing on 

the strip are not, by definition, continuous. Notably, Schaub’s argument fails to address the 

Arbogasts’ regular use of the strip for ingress and egress to access their home and their long-term 

storage of a truck and trailer on the strip. We find that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip was 

continuous. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the Arbogasts moved into their 

property Labor Day weekend in 1985 and used the strip continuously when the adverse possession 

period ended on September 3, 2005. There was no evidence presented that the Arbogasts’ use or 

possession of the strip was interrupted during the 20-year period. No one other than the Arbogasts 

used or maintained the strip at issue and the Porters never attempted to exclude the Arbogasts, 

their children, or their guestsfrom the portions of the strip that extended beyond the well easement.

See Brandhorst v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 40. Thus, the court’s finding that the 

Arbogasts’ possession was continuous was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 22 2. Hostile or Adverse Possession

¶ 23 The hostile or adverse element is satisfied when an assertion of ownership is incompatible 

with any other claim of right. In re Estate of Cargola, 2017 IL App (1st) 151823, ¶ 19. Therefore, 

it must be clearly shown that the use of the land was adverse and not merely permissive. Id. Schaub 

first argues that the Arbogasts’ use of the strip could not be hostile because it was permissive per 

the 1995 cross easement agreement entered into between the Arbogasts and Marilee Porter. 

However, the cross-easement agreement only permitted the Arbogasts to access a “portion” of the 

strip as it related to maintaining the well. The easement did not provide the Arbogasts with 

unfettered access to the entire strip for other purposes, such as parking, storing a trailer, egress and 

ingress, or a place for children to play. The Arbogasts use of the strip was hostile as they exceeded 

the scope of the easement with respect to boundaries and use. We note that although Schaub
9 

testified that the Arbogasts promised Marilee Porter that they would mow the strip, this testimony 

was directly refuted, and the court was in the best position to resolve the conflicting evidence.

¶ 24 However, Schaub argues that the court’s holding in Mann v. LaSalle National Bank, 205 

Ill. App. 3d 304, 309 (1990), demonstrates that the Arbogasts’ possession of the strip was not 

hostile. We find Mann inapposite. In that case, the court held that the land in question was 

“essentially an unenclosed vacant lot” and the claimant’s use was “presumptively permissive and 

not adverse.” Id. Although it has been held that possession of vacant and unenclosed land is 

presumed to be permissive and not adverse (Morris v. Humphrey, 146 Ill. App. 3d 612, 615 

(1986)), the strip in the case at bar was not vacant as it abutted the Porters’ property and contained 

a well and gravel driveway. See also Light v. Steward, 128 Ill. App. 3d 587, 596 (1984) (“the land 

was not vacant as evidenced by the fact that the [right-of-way] ran by the [owners’] residence”).

¶ 25 Schaub also argues that the Arbogasts use of the strip was not hostile because there was no 

evidence of an ascertained boundary for the Arbogasts purported use of the property. See Knauf, 

338 Ill. App. 3d at 269. Here, the strip has a clear and ascertainable boundary as it is the same 

length as the Arbogast Property and extends along the entire west side of the Arbogast Property. 

Further, the testimony demonstrated that the Arbogasts possessed the entire strip, albeit different 

portions for different uses, such as parking, ingress, egress, children playing, storing vehicles, and 

maintaining the landscape and driveway. See Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶¶ 62-64. 

Thus, the court’s finding of hostility was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26 3. Actual Possession

¶ 27 Schaub argues that mowing, trimming, and occasionally occupying vacant land is not 

sufficient to constitute actual possession. “The making of improvements or acts of dominion over 

land, indicating to persons residing in the immediate neighborhood who has exclusive management 
10 

and control of the land, are sufficient to constitute possession.” Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Ill. App. 

3d 348, 351 (1976). Here, the Arbogasts possessed the strip as if they were the true owners. They 

mowed the grass on the strip, fertilized it, weeded it, edged it, trimmed it, parked vehicles and 

trailers on it, used it for egress and ingress, and their children played on it. Similarly, in Brandhorst, 

the court found that mowing the lawn, weeding, raking leaves, shoveling snow, and the claimant’s

children playing on the land demonstrated actual possession. Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th) 

130923, ¶ 54; see Township of Jubilee, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 498 (the mere mowing of grass alone is 

generally insufficient to support a finding of adverse possession). Further, adverse claimants need 

not erect a fence or other structures on the land in question to prove actual possession. Brandhorst, 

2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 54. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Arbogasts 

exercised management, maintenance, and control over the strip during the 20-year period, and the 

court’s finding of actual possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 28 4. Open, Notorious, & Exclusive Use

¶ 29 The adverse claimant’s use of the land must be of open and visible character to apprise the 

world that the land has been appropriated and is occupied. Estate of Welliver v. Alberts, 278 Ill. 

App. 3d 1028, 1038 (1996). Regarding exclusivity, the adverse claimant must possess the property 

independent of a like right in others and the rightful owner must be deprived of possession.

Brandhorst, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, ¶ 57 (the adverse claimant only needs to demonstrate that 

the alleged rightful owner never possessed the land during the adverse possession period).

¶ 30 Schaub argues that there was no evidence regarding how the community could have been 

apprised of the Arbogasts’ purported possession and exclusive use and enjoyment of the entire 

strip. We disagree. The evidence demonstrated that the Arbogasts controlled and maintained the 

strip during the statutory period as if they were the true owners. Further, the unrebutted evidence 
11 

demonstrated that, during the 20-year period, the Porters never maintained or possessed the strip.

Windish even testified that he observed the Arbogasts maintain and occupy the strip during the 

relevant period. Thus, the Arbogasts’ maintenance of the strip indicated to the community that 

they were in possession of and claiming ownership. See Joiner v. Janssen, 85 Ill. 2d 74, 82 (1981). 

¶ 31 Nonetheless, Schaub also argues that he possessed and maintained the strip since his 

purchase in 2016 by mowing the grass, plowing the snow, and maintaining the gravel portions. 

The Arbogasts argue that this fact is irrelevant because they satisfied the prescriptive period for 

adverse possession on September 3, 2005. The Arbogasts rely on law pertaining to prescriptive 

easements providing that “[p]rescriptive easements are not created by judicial edict; a legal 

judgment merely establishes that a prescriptive easement exists or not.” (Emphasis in original.) 

Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. JS II, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 063420, ¶ 81. We find that the same

procedure applies here.

¶ 32 When adverse possession is established, the adverse claimant is accorded title to the land 

and the previous titleholder is divested of title. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of 

Chicago v. Wilson, 103 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361 (1982). The adverse possessor obtains title that can 

only be divested by the conveyance of the land to another or by a subsequent disseisin for the 

statutory period. Knauf, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 271. No deed is required to support ownership acquired 

by adverse possession. Tapley v. Peterson, 141 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404 (1986). The adverse 

possessor’s mere possession bars the owner of recovery, and no deed is required to continue the 

bar. Augustus v. Lydig, 353 Ill. 215, 222 (1933). Stated another way, the running of the statute of 

limitations, along with the presence of the requisite elements, not only bars the owner but also 

vests title created by operation of law in the adverse possessor. Therefore, the Arbogasts obtained 

ownership of the strip by adverse possession by operation of law before Schaub purchased it. The 
12 

case at bar is a formality in the form of a legal judgment establishing whether the elements required 

for adverse possession were satisfied.

¶ 33 Thus, the court’s finding that the Arbogasts’ possession was open, notorious, and exclusive 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 34 5. Claim of Title Inconsistent With That of the True Owner

¶ 35 Last, Schaub argues that the Arbogasts made no permanent changes, never believed they 

owned the strip, and used the strip with permission. As already mentioned, the Arbogasts were not 

required to make permanent changes to the strip and did not use the strip with permission. Also, 

there is no requirement that the Arbogasts needed to believe that they actually owned the strip. The 

evidence shows that the Arbogasts used and controlled the strip as if it were their own. “Using and 

controlling property as owner is the ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title inconsistent with 

that of the true owner.” Peters v. Greenmount Cemetery Association, 259 Ill. App. 3d 566, 570 

(1994). Thus, the court’s finding that the Arbogasts possessed the strip under a claim of title 

inconsistent with that of the true owner was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the court’s findings that the Arbogasts obtained fee simple 

ownership of the strip by adverse possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.4

¶ 37 B. Trespass

¶ 38 “A trespass is an invasion in the exclusive possession and physical condition of land.” 

Millers Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois v. Graham Oil Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 129, 139 

(1996). In Illinois, a person may be liable in trespass for negligently or intentionally causing a 

4 In Schaub’s opening brief, he argued that the court failed to address whether the finding of adverse 

possession left his remaining property landlocked. Upon the filing of supplemental transcripts, the record 

demonstrates that, during the hearing on his post-trial motion, the court found that Schaub’s remaining 

property was not landlocked. Schaub has since formally withdrawn this argument in his reply brief.
13 

thing or a third person to enter the land of another. Id.

¶ 39 Schaub argues that the court erred when it found him liable for trespassing the strip 

because, at the time of the purported intrusion, he had color of title. Thus, he did not “enter the 

land of another.” Id. Schaub notes that he obtained title to the strip in 2016 by warranty deed, the 

purported trespass occurred in 2017 to 2018, and the Arbogasts’ title by adverse possession was 

not adjudicated until 2020. We first note that Schaub only had a remainder interest subject to 

Marilee’s life estate at the time of the trespass in this case. He did not acquire a present possessory 

interest until the life estate was transferred to him during this litigation. Also, we have already 

decided that the finding of adverse possession period running from September 3, 1985, to

September 3, 2005, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Arbogasts were not 

required to own the strip in deed to bar Schaub in trespass. See Augustus, 353 Ill. at 222. Thus, an 

action brought by an adverse claimant for trespass against a record titleholder is a viable cause of 

action. See Applebey v. Lenschow, 144 Ill. App. 3d 208, 215-16 (1986) (likewise a record 

titleholder cannot recover from a party found to have adversely possessed the disputed land).

¶ 40 Despite this, Schaub contends that an immediate transfer of title upon the expiration of the 

statutory period for adverse possession defies logic and reasoning as no notice would be required 

to the record titleholder and it allows the property to be transferred with no real estate taxes ever 

being paid by the claimant. Schaub’s position ignores the purpose of the adverse possession

elements. The law of adverse possession requires the adverse claimant to possess the land in a way 

that provides notice. For instance, the statutory period is lengthy at 20 years and requires the 

claimant to possess the land in a specific manner: continuously, adversely, actually, openly, 

notoriously, exclusively, and with an assertion of title over the true owner. These onerous elements 

were construed to provide the notice that Schaub complains does not exist. The record titleholder’s 
14 

continued payment of property taxes has no bearing on this analysis, and Schaub fails to cite 

authority providing otherwise. As stated aptly by Oliver Wendell Holmes, “if a man neglects to 

enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.”

¶ 41 C. Nominal Damages

¶ 42 “[N]ominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established 

a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages.” In re Estate 

of Hoellen, 367 Ill. App. 3d 240, 252 n.3 (2006). Schaub argues that the award of $1000 in nominal 

damages was excessive. He provides that nominal damages in such cases is typically only $100, 

citing only Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Terra Foundation for 

American Art, 2014 IL App (1st) 130307, ¶ 85. However, we fail to see how this case supports his 

argument. In that case, the court held that $100 in nominal damages for trespass was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. It included no discussion on how or why it decided this 

amount was sufficient. Schaub otherwise fails to develop or further support his argument. 

Where an issue is merely included in a vague allegation of error, it is not argued, and it will not 

satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court rule requiring argument and citation to relevant 

authority. Lake County Grading Co., LLC v. Village of Antioch, 2014 IL 115805, ¶ 36; Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Therefore, Schaub has forfeited this argument. Even if we excuse 

his forfeiture, we fail to see how the $1000 award in nominal damages was excessive based on the 

facts and circumstances before us.

¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.