### CASE NO.:12-15-00068-CR & 12-15-00069-CR

____________________________________________________________ IN THE TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from Cause No. F1421007 & F1521497

420 th 

### Judicial District Court Nacogdoches County, Texas

____________________________________________________________

ANDREW PJ WHITAKER,

Appellant VS. THE STATE OF TEXAS

____________________________________________________________ BRIEF OF APPELLANT

____________________________________________________________ Respectfully submitted, Winfred A. Simmons, II Attorney for Appellant Pursuant to Rule 75 of the Texas Rules 115 West Shepherd Avenue of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Lufkin, Texas 75904 does requests oral argument. (936) 632-3242- Telephone (936) 632-4325- Facsimile Texas Bar No. 00794636 lawyersimmons@consolidated.net ACCEPTED 12-15-00068-CR TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS 7/20/2015 12:00:00 AM

CATHY LUSK CLERKI DENTI TY OF PA RTI ES A ND COUNS EL Pursuant to Tex. R. A

pp. P. 55. 2 (a), the following is a l ist of parties to the trial court’s judg m ent and the nam es and addresses of trial and appellate c o unsel. 1. A n drew PJ Whitak er, A

ppellant 2. John Boundy Counsel for A

ppellant at trial 2428 Doug las Road Nacog doches, Texas 75961 (936) 371-9484 3. Winfred A

. S im

m ons, I I Counsel for A

ppellant on A

ppeal 115 W est S hepherd A v enue L u fk in, Texas 75904 (936) 632-3242 4. Cristian L a ne Counsel for The S t ate of Texas at Trial A s sist. District A t torney for Nacog doches County 101 W

. Main S treet Nacog doches, Texas 75961 (936) 560–7766 5. A n drew Jones Counsel for The S t ate of Texas on A ppeal A s sist. District A t torney for Nacog doches County 101 W

. Main S treet Nacog doches, Texas 75961 (936) 560–7766 6. The Honorable Edwin A

. Klien Trial Judg e, 420 t h Judicial District Court Nacog doches C ounty 101 W

. Main S treet Nacog doches, Texas 75961 (936) 560–7848

i.TA BL E OF CONTES TS PA GE

I dentify of A ll Parties.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. Table of Contents.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii. I ndex of A

uthorities.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii. S tatem ent of the C ase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . I ssues Presented.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . S tatem ent of Facts.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . S um m ary of A

rg um ent.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i. A rg um ent.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Prayer.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Certificate o f S erv ice.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.

iiI NDEX OF A

UTHORI TI ES

C A SE S: PA GE
A l m a n z a v . S t a t e , 686 S

. W. 2d 157 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1985)

. 2, 3, 4 B a n k s v . S t a t e , 530 S

. W. 2d 940 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1975)

. 9 B ur k h o l d e r v . S t a t e , 660 S

. W. 2d 540 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1983)

. 6 B ur k s v . U

n i t e d S t a t e s, 437 U

. S

. 1, 57 L. Ed

. 2d 1, 98 S

. C t. 2141 ( 1978)

. 6 C o pe l a n d v . S t a t e , 747 S

. W. 2d 14 ( T e x. A pp. – Ho ust o n [ 1 s t

. Di st

. ] 1988, n o pe t

. ) 6 Ga r d n e r v . S t a t e , 780 S

. W

. 2d 259 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1989)

. 2, 6 Gr e e n v . M a sse y , 437 U

. S

. 19, 57 L. Ed

. 2d 15, 98 S

. C t

. 2151 ( 1998)

. 7 Ja c k so n v . V i r g i n i a , 443 U

. S

. 307, 99 S

. C t

. 2781, 61 L. Ed

. 2d 560 ( 1979)

. 6 Ki n g v . S t a te , 953 S

. W. 2d 266 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1997)

. 9 M a l i k v . S t a t e , 953 S

. W

. 2d 234 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1997)

. 3 M c Que e n v . S t a t e , 781 S

. W

. 2d 600 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1989)

. 2, 5 Ly n c h v . S t a t e , 643 S

. W

. 2d 737 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1983)

. 2, 4, 5, 8 P o se y v . S t a t e , 966 S

. W. 2d 57 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1998)

. 2, 3, 4 R a n k i n v . S t a te , 995 S

. W. 2d 210 ( T e x. A pp. – Ho ust o n [ 14 th Di st

. ] 1999, pe t

. r e f ’ d )

. 9 R y l a n d v . S t a te , 101 S

. W. 3d 107 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 2003)

. 7 S a un d e r s v . S ta t e , 913 S

. W. 2d 564, 571 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. 1995) 3 S t r i c k l a n d v . Wa sh i n g t o n , 466 U

. S

. 688, 104 S

. C t. 2052, 80 L. Ed

. 2d 674 91984)

. 7 S k i l l e r n v . S t a t e , 890 S

. W. 2d 849 ( T e x. A pp. – A ust i n 1994, pe t

. r e f

’ d )

. 9 S o l i z v . S t a te , 97 S

. W. 3d 137 ( T e x C r i m . A pp. 2003)

. 9 S t a te v . B l a n

k e n sh i p, 170 S

. W

. 3d 676 ( T e x. C r i m , A pp. 2005)

. 9 V a n Gul d e r v . S t a t e , 709 S

. W. 2d 178 ( T e x. C r i m . A pp. ) c e rt

. de ni e d, 467 U

. S

. 1169, 106 S

. C t

. 2891, 90 L. Ed

. 2d 978 ( 1986) 6
RUL ES A

ND S TA T UTES

T e xa s P e n a l C o d e A

n n . 1. 07 ( 35) 4 T e xa s P e n a l C o d e A

n n . 31. 07 2 T e xa s R ul e s A

ppe l l a n t P r o c e d ur e 44. 2 9, 10

i i i

.

### C A S E N O. : 1 2

- 1 5

- 0 0 0 6 8

- C R & 1 2

- 1 5

- 0 0 0 6 9

- C R

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I N THE T EXAS C OUR T O F AP P EAL S TWEL F TH S UP R EM E J UDI C I A L DI S TR I C T

TYL ER , TEXAS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ On Ap p e a l f

ro m C a u s e No

. F 1 4 2 1 0 0 7 & F 1 5 2 1 4 9 7 4 2 0 t h 

### J u d i c i a l Di s t ri c t C o u rt Na c o g d o c h e s Co u n t y , Te x a s

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ANDR EW PJ WHI TAKER ,

Ap p e l l a n t VS

. THE S TATE OF TEXAS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ B R I EF OF AP P EL L ANT

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TO THE HONORA BL E COURT OF A PPEA L S : S TA TEMENT OF THE CA S E I n the January t erm of 2015, A ppellant was indicted on one count o f Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and one count of E v ading A r rest. A t the close of ev idence, on February 25, 2015, A

ppellant requested a m otion for directed v erdict based on the S tate’s failure of prov e v enue. The T rial Court denied A ppellant’s m otion. On February 25, 2015, A ppellant was found g u ilty of one count of Unauthorized Use o f a ev ading arrest iv

.and one count of Ev ading A rrest. A ppellant w as sentenced to thirteen (13) years confinem ent in t he Texas Departm ent of Crim inal Justice– I nstitutional Div ision on the

ev ading c o unt and two (2) years state jail on the u nauthorized use count. I t is from these

v erdicts which A

ppellant appeals. For Purposes o f clarity, t he A ppellant will be refer to the Clerk ’s Record as “ CR” and the Reporter’s R ecord as “ R R” and cite the v olum e and pag e n um ber in order to not confuse the two records when citing such docum ents. When referencing Defense Exhibits, the abbrev iation “ DE” will b e used. I S S UES P RES ENTED 1. Whether the appellant was depriv ed of a fair trial when defense of m istak e of fact was raised by ev i dence but charg e was subm itted without objection or request? 2. Whether the ev idence of unauthorized use of a m otor v ehicle presented at trial was sufficient to w ithstand challeng e on a p peal? 3. Whether the failure t o request an instruction on the defense o f m istak e o f fact constitutes i neffectiv e a ssistance of counsel? 4. Whether appellant was s ufficiently harm ed by the failure of proof of v e nue to rev erse a nd rem and for a n ew trial?

S TA TEMENT OF THE FA CTS During the January t erm 2015, A p pellant was indicted on one count o f Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and one count of Ev ading A rrest. The S tate alleg ed, i n its i ndictm ent, A ppellant com

m itted Unauthorized U se by “ intentionally and k nowing ly” operate a m otor-propelled v ehicle without the effectiv e consent o f Jesus

v .Barrios-Quezada

. [CR. Vol. 1, Pg

. 2]. A p pellant does not dispute he was is possession of the v ehicle, but denied he k nowing ly possessed t he v ehicle without consent o f the actual

owner. The S tate called sev eral witness, including the a l leg e d v ictim , Jesus BarriosQuezada, who testified he did not g iv e appellant or a nyone else perm ission to possess his

v ehicle. [ RR. Vol. 3, Pg

. 18, ln. 1 7–19]. The rem aining witnesses were v ictim ’s s ister Guadalupe B arrios who testified she n oticed the v ehicle was m issing

. The rem aining witnesses, A

ustin McDonald, Frank R udisill and A lbert Patterson, all o fficers from Nacog doches l aw enforcem ent w ho testified that A p pellant fled from law enforcem ent. On February 25, 2015, A p pellant was found g

uilty by jury and the sam e jury sentenced A

ppellant to serv e thirteen (13) years confinem ent in the Texas Departm ent of Crim inal Justice– I nstitutional D iv ision for ev ading a nd two (2) y ears confinem e nt in the S tate Jail f

or unauthorized use. I t is from these v erdicts which A p pellant a ppeals. S UMMA R

Y OF THE A RGUMENT The T rial C ourt erred failing to charg e the jury o n the defense of m istak e of fact. Further, the ev idence is i nsufficient to justify a v erdict of g u ilt beyond a reasonable doubt

as to unauthorized use based upon the total lack of sufficient proof of an essential elem ent of the offense, nam ely k nowledg e. The S tate failed to prov e proper v enue as to either charg e which harm ed appellant requiring rem a nd.

v i.ARG UMENT

W h eth er th e ap p ellan t w as d ep r ived o f a f a ir trial w h en d ef

en s e o f m istak e o f f act w as raised b y evid en ce b u t ch arge w as su b m itted w i th o u t o b jectio n o r r eq u est?
The a ppellant was indicted for unauthorized u se of a m otor v ehicle. [ CR. Vol 1. , Pg

. 77]. A person com

m its t he o ffense of unauthorized use of a m otor v ehicle if he intentionally or k

n owing ly driv es or operates a m otor v ehicle without t he effectiv e
consent of the owner. Tex. Penal Code 31. 07. A ppellant adm itted to d

riv ing another’s

v ehicle. H owev e r, the d efendant testified t hat he had receiv ed t he k eys and believ ed he had perm ission to driv e f

rom an indiv idual in possession of the v ehicle and to which appellant believ ed he had effectiv e consent of the indiv idual he [appellant] believ ed to be the “ owner”. [RR. Vol. 3. Pg

. 77]. A defendant’s k nowledg e of the lack of c o nsent is one of the elem ents which m

ust be p rov en. P osey v. S tate, 9 66 S

. W

. 2d 5 7 ( Tex. Crim

. A

p p. 1998), McQueen v. State, 781 S

. W. 2d 600 ( Tex. Cr. A pp. 1989); Gardner v. State, 780 S

. W. 2 d 259 ( Tex. Cr. A pp. 1989). The Court has held that such

ev idence raises the defense of m i stak e of fact. The court’s charg e should instruct the jury

on the law of m istak e of fact. Lynch v. S tate, 643 S

. W

. 2d 737 (Tex. Cr. A pp. 1983). A ppellant’s defense was obv ious, he believ ed he had consent of the owner to possess the

v ehicle. A t this point, a

ppellant m

u st concede t hat the P osey Court has also held that

om ission of a defensiv e charg e on m istak e of fact does not deny appellant a fair trial. P osey at 71. Howev er, t his ruling stands in stark contrast to a long line of c a se law and

- 1-precedent

. I n Williams , t he defendant was conv icted of a g g rav ated k i dnaping

. The issue

arose as to the defensiv e issue of “ release in a safe place”. The Court concluded there was sufficient ev idence adduced at trial, without d efendant’s request, t o raise the issue as a leg al defense. Therefore, the i ssue should hav e b een subm i tted to the jury and the trial court’s failure to do so was error. Hav ing found “ error i n t he c harg e” due to the om ission of the defensiv e issue, t he next step was to apply harm analysis under Almanza. P osey at 76 (quoting Williams v
. S tate, 851 S

. W

. 2d 282, 286-89 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1983)). Almanza specifically refers to o missions of defensive theories in the charg e absent a request or objection. Almanza v. S tate, 686 S

. W. 2d 157, 171 (Tex. C r. A pp. 1985). A determ i nation of e g reg ious error a nalysis d oes not com e into play unless defendant failed
to object to the c harg e. P osey v
. State, 966 S

. W. 2d 57, 76 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1998). Despite such p recedent, the m ajority in P osey ruled that defensiv e issues do not becom e applicable to t he c ase unless the defendant either request an instruction o r objects to the

om ission the instruction. Further, the Court of Crim inal A ppeals hav e nev er a rticulated such a principle. Id at 71. I n the case at i ssue, appellant testified uncontradicted that h e

was unaware that he [appellant] did hot hav e the consent of the actual owner of t he

v ehicle. A

ppellant specifically t estified an indiv idual to whom he b eliev e d to be the

owner o f the v ehicle g av e him the k eys and p erm ission to possess and operate the subject

v ehicle. I n P osey the appellant failed to testify and t hus P osey should be c onsidered disting u ishable and not controlling

. A n issue does not becom e ‘applicable to the case’ by

v irtue of a party requesting an instruction but rather becom es a p plicable to the case

- 2-throug h-out the course of trial, when raised by the ev idence. Id at 71. The responsibility

for d eciding what l aw is applicable to the case falls squarely on the shoulders of the trial judg e. Further, in ev aluating prosecution cases, appellate courts do not look t o t he actual charg e but instead m a k e a determ ination based on a “ hypothetically correct” charg e. Malik v. State, 953 S

. W. 2d 234 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1997). A

n a p pellant court can determ i ne the theory of prosecution, and according ly, the law a pplicable to the case, based on the ev idence presented [at trial], s o as to fashion a ‘hypothetically c orrect charg e”. Yet for defensiv e theories, law only becom e s “ applicable to the case” by v irtue of defense request that it be included in the charg e. S ee e
. g. , S anders v
. State, 817 S

. W. 2d 688 (Tex. Crim

. A

p p. 1991). S uch differentiation between prosecution and defensiv e issues leads to inequitable treatm ent and om inous results. I t i s ‘ error’ in t he jury charg e due to the om ission of a defense raised by the ev i dence. Williams v
. State, 851 S

. W. 2d 282 (Tex. Crim

. A

pp. 1993). I t was error to om it a m istak e of fact i nstruction to the jury in this case. The o m ission of any defensiv e issue in the jury charg e is error that i s subject
to Almanza analysis. HARM ANALYSIS I n Almanza the Court of Crim inal A ppeals, the Court set out the basic fram ework for a nalysis on appeal f

or preserv ed and unpreserved “ e r rors’ in the jury charg e. This fram ework is based on the Court’s interpretation o f A rticle 36. 19. The Court interpreted that there are two standards of rev iew. One standard for “ error appearing on the record

- 3-that was calculated to i njure the defendant” applies to errors in ov erruling objections to

the charg e which were presented to the t rial court. A s econd, an independent basis, for

rev ersal exist if the error arises ev en thoug h not t im ely objected to, which is s o eg reg ious that it creates such harm that denies the defendant a fair and im partial trial. P osey, at 67. (Wom ack , J. , concurring ). I n the instant case, the lik elihood the j ury’s decision was adv ersely affected by the

error is g reat. I n an u nauthorized use of a m otor v ehicle case, m istak e of fact is raised if the defendant receiv ed the k eys f r om som eone who was apparently a u thorized t o g iv e them

. I n s uch a case, a m istak e of fact instruction is required in order to prev ent the crim e of unauthorized use from b eing a strict liability crim e. See L ynch v. State, 643 S

. W. 2 d 737, 738 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1983). Here, appellant’s uncontradicted testim ony

was that he [appellant] receiv ed to k e ys to the v e hicle from an i ndiv idual k nown as

“ Rum m y”. [RR. Vol. 3. P g . 77]. “Ow n er” means a person w

ho has title to the property, possession o

f the property, w

hether law

ful or n ot,

. . . . ”. Tex. Penal C ode A nn. 1. 07 (35).

“ Rum m y” m et the d efinition of an “ owner” — “ Rum m y had p ossession of the property, whether lawful or not.

. . . ”

. A defendant is entitled to affirm ativ e subm ission of a defense raised by the ev idence. Lynch at 738. This ev i dence r aised t he defense of m istak e of fact. The ev idence reflects t hat the only defense t hat was p resented was appellant believ ed he had effectiv e consent from t he “ owner” of the v e hicle. H owev e r, t he d efense counsel did
not object or request a jury i nstruction on m istak e o f fact. [RR. Vol. 3. P g . 92, ln. 5–9]. The jury was not instructed on appellant’s sole d efense. A g ain, a m istak e of fact

- 4-instruction i s required i n o rder t o prev ent the c rim e o f unauthorized use from being a

strict liability c rim e. T he jury was not instructed it could find that “ Rum m y” was an

“ owner” within the m eaning o f the statute. The S tate m u st p rov e, a t a m inium , that the defendant knew he lack ed consent of the owner or owners of the v ehicle. McQueen, 781 S

. W. 2 d at 604 n. 5

. Considering the absence o f a m i stak e of fact i nstruction, the jury had
to conv i ct ev en if the j ury believ ed appellant receiv ed the k eys and perm i ssion t o driv e the v ehicle from “ Rum

m y”. A trial in which o nly one possible result is possible, ev en i f the jury believ ed the appellant, cannot be fair and im partial. I n the instant case, a ppellant suffered eg reg ious h arm as a result the failure to properly instruct the jury. The A ppellant prays this Honorable A ppeals Court sustain this point of error,

rev erse a nd render a judg m ent o f acquittal. W h eth er th e evid e n c e o f u n au th o riz ed u se o f a m o to r veh icle p r esen ted at trial w as su f f icien t to w ith stan d ch a llen ge o n ap p eal? I n rev iewing sufficiency of the ev idence, the e v idence is analyzed in the lig ht m ost fav orable to the v e rdict t o determ ine if a rational t rier of fact could hav e found the essential elem e nts of the crim e beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. V i rginia, 443 U. S

. 307, 318–19, 99 S

. Ct. 2 7 81, 2787–88, 61 L

. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Here, the ev i dence shows that the appellant was unaware that h e d id not hav e
consent of the actual owner of the v ehicle and could not be g uilty of unauthorized use of

a m otor v ehicle. A

p pellant testified he receiv ed the k eys to the v ehicle from a n indiv idual k nown t o appellant as “ Rum m y”. [RR. Vol. 3. Pg

. 77]. There is no ev i dence appellant

- 5-k

new the v ehicle w as stolen. No i ndication on or inside the v ehicle that a theft h ad occurred. A

ppellant operated the v ehicle by using t he ig nition k eys. T he S tate’s proof showed no ev idence that appellant k new he did not hav e the o wner’s c onsent. Texas law requires such ev idence. Gardner v
. State, 7 80 S

. W

. 2d 259 ( Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1989). Where an appellant puts on uncontradicted ev idence establishing a defense, no rational trier of f act could find appellant g uilty beyond a reasonable doubt, appellate courts m ust

rev erse. V an Guilder v. S

tate, 709 S

. W. 2d 178, 183 ( Tex. Crim

. A pp. ), cert. denied, 476 U. S

. 1169, 106 S

. Ct. 2891, 90 L

. E d. 2d 978 (1986); Copeland v. State, 747 S

. W. 2d 14, 16–17 ( Tex. A

pp. – Houston[1st Dist. ] 1988, no pet. ). Where the ev idence is insufficient
to sustain a conv iction on appeal, the court m ust rev erse the conv iction and order a judg m ent of acquittal. B u rkholder v. State, 660 S

. W. 2 d 5 40, 542 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1983). Once A ppellant has dem onstrated that the v erdict is found insufficient on all issues, the v erdict should not and cannot be allowed to stand. I n Burks v. United States , 437 U. S

. 1, 57 L

. Ed. 2 d. 1, 98 S

. Ct. 2141 (1978) and Greene v. Massey , 437 U. S

. 19, 57 L

. Ed. 2d 15, 98 S

. Ct. 2151 (1978), the S uprem e Court held that retrial is barred after an appellate determ ination o f insufficient ev idence. Therefore, the A p pellant prays this Honorable A

ppeals Court sustain this point of error a nd rev erse the trial court’s ruling and prays the case ag ainst A ppellant b e dism i ssed or, in the alternativ e, t hat it be

rem anded with instruction that A p pellant’s be acquitted.

- 6-INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF C OUNSEL

W h eth er th e f

ailu re to r eq u est an in stru ctio n o n t h e d ef en s e o f m istak e o f f

act co n stitu tes in ef

f ective assistan ce o f c o u n sel?
To show, o n appeal, ineffectiv e assistance of counsel, A ppellant m

ust dem onstrate that trial counsel’s p e rform ance was deficient because it fell below an objectiv e standard of reasonableness, and, b ut for counsel’s errors, the result of the p roceeding would hav e been different See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S

. 668, 688, 692, 104 S

. Ct. 2 052, 80 L

. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Ryland v. State, 101 S

. W. 3d 107, 109–10 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 2003). A

rev iewing court m

ust presum e t hat counsel’s perform ance was reasonably effectiv e. Id, at 694, 104 S

. Ct. A

t 2068. I n the present case, the only defense presented was the appellant b eliev e d he had
consent of the owner to p ossess the v ehicle. Despite this obv ious fact, trial c o unsel failed
to request a jury instruction as to appellant’s m istak en belief. A ppellant’s sole d efense

was that he was under the reasonable but m istak en belief that he [appellant] h ad
perm ission of the “ owner’ of t he v ehicle to possession and driv e the v ehicle. A reasonably e ffectiv e trial c ounsel should hav e soug ht a m istak e of fact instruction. A

m istak e of fact instruction is required in order to prev ent the crim e of unauthorized use from being a s trict liability crim e. The Court of C rim inal A ppeals has held t hat such

ev idence raises the defense of m i stak e of fact, and the trial court’s charg e should instruct the jury on the law of that defense. See Lynch v. State, 643 S

. W. 2d 737, 7 38 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1983). I n t his case, a properly subm itted jury i nstruction, the jury could, if believ ed,

- 7-find appellant not g uilty because a proper instruction would allow the jury to neg ate the

required culpable m ental s tate for unauthorized use of a m otor v ehicle. Giv en t rial counsel’s failure, conv iction becam e a foreg o ne conclusion because a ppellant’s o nly defense was, not that he had e ffectiv e consent of the actual owner, but that he had
consent of “ Rum

m y”. S ince t he charg e as subm i tted, required the jury to conv ict, ev en if they believ ed appellant receiv ed the v ehicle k eys and perm ission t o driv e from “ Rum m y ”. The failure by trial counsel to request a m istak e of fact instruction, allowed the jury to

conv ict ev en if they [ the jury] believ ed appellant’s uncontradicted t estim o ny. The charg e allowed by trial counsel to be subm itted to the jury did not i nstruct the jury that the jury could find “ Rum

m y” was an “ owner” within the definition o f an “ owner” for the unauthorized use of a m otor v ehicle s tatue. A reasonably effectiv e trial counsel would hav e s oug ht a m istak e o f fact jury instruction. The failure to seek such a n instruction, p articularly under these f acts, so eg reg iously harm ed and prejudiced A ppellant’s defense, rendered counsel ineffectiv e. The lik ely result would h av e b een different “ b ut for” trial counsel’s failure to seek a proper m istak e of fact i nstruction. Therefore, the A

ppellant prays this Honorable A ppeals Court s ustain t his point of

error and rev erse the trial court’s ruling and p rays t he case ag a i nst A ppellant be dism issed
or, in the alternativ e, that it be rem anded with instruction that A ppellant’s be g ranted a

new trial.

- 8-W h eth er ap p ellan t w as su f f icien tly h arm ed b y th e f ailu re o f p ro o f o f ven u e to reverse an d rem a n d f

o r a n ew trial?
Venue m eans the place where the case m ay be tried. Soliz v
. State, 97 S

. W. 3d 137, 141 (Tex. Crim

. A

p p. 2003). Venue is not constituent elem e n t o f the offense c harg ed. Skillern v. State, 890 S

. W. 2d 849, 860(Tex. A pp.

– A ustin, 1994, pet. ref’d). V enue need only be prov ed b y preponderance of the e v idence. See Tex. Code Crim Pro A nn. A rt. 13. 17 (West 2005); Banks v. S tate, 530 S

. W. 2 d 9 40, 943 (Tex. Crim

. A pp. 1975). I t is
presum ed that v enue was prov ed at trial unless disputed at trial or the record affirm ativ e l y shows t he contrary. See Tex. R

. A pp. 44. 2 (c)(1). A defendant’s m otion for directed

v erdict w hich specifically challeng es v enue raises the issue of v enue on appeal. Failure to
prov e v enue as charg ed [in the indictm ent] is rev ersible error. Black v. State, 645 S

. W. 2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim

. A

pp. 1 983). Failure to p rov e v enue when the issue is r aised at trial is now subject to a harm analysis rather than autom atic r ev e rsal of the conv iction. State v. Blankenship, 170 S

. W

. 3d 676, 683 ( T ex. Crim

. A p p. 2005). A determ ination of the harm is whether it affected [appellant’s] substantial r ig hts. S ee T ex. R

. A

pp. P. 4 4. 2(b). A substantial r ig h t is affected w hen the e rror had a s ubstantial and injurious effect or influence in determ i ning the jury’s v e rdict. See King v. S tate, 953 S

. W. 2 d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim , A pp. 1997); R ankin v. S

tate, 995 S

. W. 2 d 2 10, 215 (Tex. A pp. –Houston [14 t h Dist. ] 1999, pet. ref’d). Here, appellant r aised t he issue of v enue v ia tim ely m otion for directed v e rdict. The S tate is not entitled to the presum ption on a

p peal that v enue w as properly p rov en.

- 9-See Tex. R. A pp. 44. 2 (c). A

ppellant arg ues t he S tate f ailed to prov e v enue within Nacog doches C ounty, S tate of Texas. [RR. Vol. 3. Pg

. 92, ln. 1 2-21]. A ppellant placed

v enue at issue v ia his m otion f or directed v erdict. Venue m ust be p rov en. The S tate nev e r requested the court tak e j udicial notice of any v enue in this cause. N o proof o f v enue to rises to t he lev el o f a preponderance o f ev idence that v enue is proper in Nacog doches County, S tate of T exas. There is no e v idence whatsoev er connecting either offense charg ed [UUMV or Ev ading ] to Nacog doches County, Texas. I n a country as larg e as t he United S tates, it is beyond the realm of r e a sonability that there could o nly be on

“ Nacog d oches County” in a country of this size. Your appellant is further and m ore eg r eg i ously harm ed b y t he S tate not hav ing to
carry its burden of p roof as alleg e d in the c harg i ng i nstrum ent. Prosecutors would no long er be require to prov e that the alleg ed crim e was com m itted within the actual confines of a particular county or ev en state. A l lowing with approv al such a “ close
enoug h” standard as to proper v enue, enables the S tate t o f orum shop within T exas. Following this “ close enoug h” standard, defendants could n ev er be assured of defending
ag ainst a lleg ation within the g eog raphical c onfines of any one particular c ounty. Prosecutors would m erely determ ine which counties were best suited to g ain conv ictions according to which counties were m ost l ik e ly to c onv ict of a particular crim e and prosecute the crim e in that v enue. Now a d efendant i s subject to be tired anywhere in the S tate without any recourse.

- 10-PRA YER

WHEREFORE, PREMI S E CONS I D ERED, the Honorable A ppeals Court rev erse the judg m ent of the Trial Court and rem and this cause w ith instructions that A ppellant’s be acquitted. Respectfully subm itted,

________________________________ Winfred A

. S i m

m ons, I I A ttorney for A

ppellant 115 West S hepherd A v enue L ufk in, Texas 75904 (936) 632-3242

- Telephone (936) 632-4325-Facsim ile TBN: 00794636 Em ail: lawyersim

m ons@ consolidated. net CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I DO HEREBY CERTI FY that on July 19, 2 015, a t rue and correct copy of this A ppellant’s Brief was s erv ed on all attorney o f record or parties.
A n d r e w Jo n e s C o un se l f o r T h e S t a t e o f T e xa s o n A ppe a l A ssi st

. Di st r i c t A

t t o r n e y f o r Na c o g d o c h e s C o un t y 101 W. M a i n S tr e e t Na c o g d o c h e s, T e xa s 75961 ( 936) 560–7766

_______________________________ Winfred A

. S i m

m ons, I I A ttorney for A

ppellant CERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE I certify that the num

ber of words in this docum ent is 4090.

_____________________________ Winfred A

. S i m

m ons, I I

- 11-