Opinion filed July 25, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

Nos. 11-22-00271-CR & 11-22-00272-CR

__________

MICHAEL SHAIDEN HUMPHRIES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court

Brown County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. CR28439 & CR28440

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Michael Shaiden Humphries, was charged with one count of 

burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and one count 

of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. § 30.02(a)(1), (3), (d) (West 2019), § 37.09(a)(1), (c) (West Supp. 2023). 

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge for burglary of a habitation with intent to 

commit aggravated assault. Instead, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the 
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lesser-included-offense of burglary of a habitation. See PENAL § 30.02(c)(2), (d). 

Appellant also entered an open plea of guilty to the charge of tampering with or 

fabricating physical evidence. 

The State declined to waive going forward the charged offense of burglary of 

a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. The trial court conditionally 

accepted Appellant’s open pleas of guilty pending the presentation of evidence. The 

cases proceeded to a bench trial in a unified proceeding, and the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault 

and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice for a term of twenty years for the conviction for burglary of a 

habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and a term of ten years for the 

conviction for tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The trial court 

ordered that the sentences run concurrently. 

In Appellant’s first issue, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting evidence that the State did not timely disclose evidence during discovery

under Brady and Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.1 See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h) (West Supp. 2024); Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963). In his second issue in each case, Appellant challenges the 

voluntariness of his pleas, asserting that they were entered without his knowledge of 

the complained-of evidence.

2

 Specifically, Appellant alleges that he did not have 

notice of impeachment evidence as addressed in his first issue, and that the absence 

1

Appellant submitted two briefs to address each conviction independently. Appellant’s first issue 

is identical as to both cause numbers. 

2

Appellant’s second issue in each brief challenges the voluntariness of his plea to each charge, 

respectively. In Cause Number 11-22-00272-CR, Appellant challenges his pleas of not guilty to the charged 

offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and guilty to the lesser included 

offense of burglary of a habitation. Similarly, in Cause Number 11-22-00272-CR, Appellant challenges 

his plea of guilty to the charge of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.
3

of this notice would have affected his strategy with respect to the pleas that he 

entered. We affirm.

Background Facts

On July 7, 2021, Appellant was sitting in a car outside of his ex-girlfriend’s

apartment complex when he saw her and John Murray leave in separate vehicles.

Appellant testified that he followed them to a nearby gas station and that his exgirlfriend refused to speak with him. Appellant said he left the gas station at the

same time as his ex-girlfriend and proceeded down the same highway following her 

until he had to make a turn to go home. Appellant testified that, a short time later, 

he went looking for his ex-girlfriend’s car by driving down the highway they had 

just traveled. Appellant testified that, after spotting both cars at the Murray house, 

he stabbed one of the tires on John’s Mustang. 

Appellant said that on the evening of July 9, after days of heavy drinking, he 

“decided” to return to the Murray home. Appellant testified that he brought a loaded 

.22 caliber rifle with “the intention to hurt” John. Appellant parked on a nearby road 

and taped a note to the car window that read “out of gas” to avoid suspicion. 

Appellant then used the same tape to secure a flashlight to the rifle and to cover his 

wrists and ankles to avoid leaving “DNA evidence.”

Appellant testified that he went to the Murray home and spray painted

“DON’T CHEAT ON A DEALERS $$$ —C” on the garage door to point toward a 

different motive for the incident. Appellant said he then canvased the home with the 

rifle to find a discrete point of entry. The Murray’s surveillance cameras captured 

footage of Appellant outside the home. Appellant testified that he found a window 

on the side of the home with no motion sensor lights. He cut the window’s screen 

with a knife that he routinely carried, and he entered the home. The window led into 

the bathroom that is attached to John’s bedroom. Appellant said that he left his rifle
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on the ground outside and forgot to retrieve it before entering through the window. 

Appellant testified that, once inside the bedroom, he unplugged the television to 

darken the room. Appellant said that he still intended to harm John, but he 

abandoned his plan when he saw his ex-girlfriend in the bed. He then exited the 

home without incident. 

Appellant testified that he realized he had left his rifle behind, and he made 

his way back toward the Murray home to retrieve it. Appellant admits that he saw 

law enforcement vehicles present once he arrived back at the Murray home, but he 

was able to retrieve the rifle without being noticed. He testified that he later hid the 

rifle in a stock tank nearby. Appellant was able to avoid capture by law enforcement 

following the incident, but he turned himself in later that evening.

John also testified about the incident and his recollections of the events. 

Contrary to Appellant’s testimony, John stated that he was awakened to Appellant

tripping over a dog cage in the room, and he heard a “click.” His familiarity with 

firearms led him to believe it was the sound of a “gun jamming.” John testified that 

he never saw a firearm while Appellant was in the home, but his experience made 

him think that Appellant “had a gun in the room.” John testified that he got up and

went toward Appellant, who ran to the bathroom and exited through the window. 

Deputy Chris Angel with the Brown County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched 

to the Murray home. Deputy Angel testified that he initially saw Appellant’s rifle

in the yard “approximately 15 to 20 feet from the window.” The rifle was visibly 

jammed, and he stated that his experience led him to believe it was the result of a 

double feed of ammunition into the chamber.3

 After photographing the rifle, Deputy

Angel went to his vehicle to get gloves, but the rifle was missing when he returned. 

3

Officer Angel explained that “a double feed is when you’re trying to load . . . ammunition into the 

chamber [and] when you pull the slide back . . . it sends two up.”
5

Deputy Angel testified that he spoke to John Murray, his parents (who lived 

in the home), and Appellant’s ex-girlfriend. Deputy Angel said that they had told

him “about seeing the subject with the gun.” Appellant’s attorney objected to the 

statement on hearsay grounds and told the trial court that he was unaware of anything 

that would support Deputy Angel’s testimony that the rifle was brought into the 

home. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the line of questioning 

to continue as to the demeanor of the victims. 

Wylie Murray, John’s father, testified that John woke him up and told him, 

“[t]here’s somebody in the house with a gun.” Appellant’s trial attorney did not 

object to Wylie’s testimony. Telise Murray, John’s mother, also testified that John 

frantically ran into the bedroom and said an intruder had come into his room with a 

gun. Telise said that she instinctively grabbed her firearm before searching for the 

intruder. Appellant’s trial attorney did not object to Telise’s testimony.

Investigator Charles Woods with the Brown County Sheriff’s Office arrived 

at the Murray home after the firearm disappeared. Appellant called Investigator 

Woods to testify in order to question him about the inconsistencies between the 

complaint and supplemental narrative he filed and the Murrays’ testimony. 

Appellant’s trial attorney asked Investigator Woods why the documents did not 

include the statements from Wylie and Telise about John hearing a firearm jamming 

or communicating to each other that there was an intruder with a gun. At one point, 

Appellant’s trial attorney suggested that Appellant was unaware of this information 

and questioned Investigator Woods about whether he believed Appellant’s 

knowledge of it might have changed the outcome of the case. Investigator Woods 

responded that it was a possibility.

After Investigator Woods’s testimony, the trial court inquired about any 

potential Article 39.14 issues since Appellant’s trial attorney suggested that he was 
6

not informed that John told Wylie and Telise that there was a person with a gun in 

the house. Appellant’s trial attorney said that the information in the Murrays’

testimony about a gun being in the home was not provided to Appellant. The State 

responded that the information from John was disclosed to Appellant before his open 

plea, but the information from Wylie and Telise was not known by the State prior to 

their testimony. Appellant’s trial attorney maintained that he did not know about 

any evidence of a “click,” as described by John. After a discussion about the

admissibility of the contested evidence, the trial court determined that the State had 

violated its discovery obligation as to the testimony of John and that his statement 

would be “excluded and [not] considered by the [c]ourt.” The trial court stated that 

it would not exclude Wylie’s and Telise’s testimony because it had no evidence that 

the State was aware of the additional information prior to their testimony. 

After closing arguments, the trial court announced its basis for finding 

Appellant guilty. As to the charged offense of burglary, the trial court stated:

“It doesn’t matter if the gun went in or not. You spent all of this 

time dancing around that issue, but you clearly went in with the intent 

to commit aggravated assault. You told us that. You said when you 

loaded the gun, you went in with the plan of hurting him, John Murray, 

and you did so when you were loading that gun. Clearly that was your 

intent. When you entered into the residence, you admitted that your 

intent was still to do that. And when you got into the room, you 

admitted your intent was to still do that. As you said, you didn’t have 

the gun and you didn’t have the knife, but you were still going to do it.

So, there is no doubt that you had the intent to commit the felony 

offense of aggravated assault.” 

The trial court subsequently found Appellant guilty of both offenses as charged in 

the indictments.

Analysis

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting and considering evidence that the State failed to timely disclose during 
7

discovery. See CRIM PROC. art. 39.14(h), (k); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Specifically, 

Appellant contends that, while the trial court correctly excluded John’s testimony 

that he saw a man with a gun in the home, the trial court erroneously allowed Wylie 

and Telise to testify that John told them he saw a man with a gun in the home. 

Appellant analogizes the testimony of Wylie and Telise Murray with the “fruit of 

the poisonous tree” doctrine that applies to evidence obtained illegally. However, 

Appellant provides no case law to support the proposition that the doctrine is 

applicable to an Article 39.14 disclosure objection.

The State contends that John’s statement that there was a gun in the house is 

not exculpatory, mitigating, or impeachment evidence that requires disclosure under 

Article 39.14. Rather, the State asserts that (1) the substance of the testimony is 

inculpatory; and (2) the testimony at trial was not inconsistent with the witness’ prior 

statements. Further, the State maintains that it told Appellant’s trial attorney about 

John’s statement that a gun was in the home before Appellant’s pleas were entered, 

and that it had no knowledge that John told his parents about seeing a man with a 

gun in the home prior to their testimony at trial. Assuming, without deciding, that 

Appellant has preserved his point of error for our review, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion.

4

4

We note that Appellant did not request a continuance at any point. When previously withheld 

evidence is disclosed at trial, the defendant has an opportunity to request a continuance. Williams v. State, 

995 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). A defendant’s failure to request a 

continuance waives any Brady violation. Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, 

pet. ref’d); Gutierrez v. State, 85 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d); Williams, 995 

S.W.2d at 762. Likewise, a defendant’s failure to request a continuance also waives any violation under 

Article 39.14(h). See O’Kane v. State, No. 04–16–00526–CR, 2017 WL 3159462, at *3 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio July 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“By failing to file a written, 

sworn motion for continuance, [the defendant] failed to preserve error” based on the State’s failure to 

comply with Article 39.14(h)); see also Prince v. State, 499 S.W.3d 116, 120–21 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2016, no pet.) (same); Cadena v. State, No. 11-22-00225-CR, 2023 WL 8459093, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—

Eastland Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 
8

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We will 

uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 

We will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling on appeal if it is correct on any 

theory of law that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 

125–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2015, no pet.).

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that “the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87; see 

also Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Thus, Brady

is violated when three requirements are satisfied: (1) the State suppressed evidence; 

(2) the suppressed evidence is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the suppressed 

evidence is material. Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d at 724. 

Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure imposes broader 

discovery protections for criminal defendants, “making disclosure the rule and nondisclosure the exception.” See Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2021); see also CRIM PROC. art. 39.14. As the Court of Criminal Appeals 

explained in Watkins, Article 39.14(h) creates “an independent and continuing duty 

for prosecutors to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the defense even if 

that evidence is not ‘material.’” Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 277. Subsection (k) of 

Article 39.14 also places a duty upon the prosecution to promptly disclose any 
9

additional material, favorable evidence discovered “at any time before, during, or 

after trial.” CRIM PROC. art. 39.14(k).5

 

Upon review of the Article 39.14 hearing, the trial court determined that there 

was no evidence that the State was aware of the additional information revealed in

Wylie’s and Telise’s testimony before the trial began. As a result, the State did not 

violate Article 39.14 or the principles of Brady by failing to disclose information 

that Wylie and Telise had never provided to the State or law enforcement in the first 

place. See CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(h) (“[T]he State shall disclose to the defendant 

any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating . . . information in the possession, 

custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would 

tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged.”) (emphasis added); Pena v. 

State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Brady and its progeny do not 

require prosecuting authorities to disclose exculpatory information to defendants 

that the State does not have in its possession and that is not known to exist.”) (quoting 

Hafdahl v. State, 805 S.W. 2d 396, 399 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)); see also

Wells v. State, 675 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet. h.) (“Brady

does not require the State to disclose exculpatory information that it does not know 

exists. Nor does the State have any duty to seek out such information independently 

on the defendant’s behalf.”) (citations omitted). “Where there is no showing that the 

matters sought to be discovered are material, or that the items sought are in the 

possession of the prosecution, the defendant is not entitled to relief on appeal.” 

Turpin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (quoting Brem v. State, 

571 S.W.2d 314, 321–22 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978)). Accordingly, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Wylie and Telise

5

We note that in State v. Heath, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that the 

disclosure requirements of Article 39.14 extend to items in the possession of law enforcement. No. PD0156-22, 2024 WL 2952387 (Tex. Crim. App. June 12, 2024).
10

when it found that there was no evidence to support a discovery violation by the 

State. 

While we find no error in the trial court’s admission of the testimony of Wylie 

and Telise, the standard of review for discovery violations under Article 39.14

requires that we analyze harm separately. Fortuna v. State, 665 S.W.3d 861, 867 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); see Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 290. 

A violation of the discovery rules in Article 39.14 is a state statutory error, and we 

analyze harm accordingly and not as constitutional error. Non-constitutional 

errors that do not affect an appellant’s substantial rights must be disregarded. 

TEX. R. EVID. 103(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Error affects substantial rights in a jury trial only if the error had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Gonzalez v. State, 

544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). However, to determine whether an 

error affected a substantial right in a non-jury case, we consider whether the error 

denied the complaining party some right to which he was legally entitled. See 

Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In determining harm, 

we consider the entire record. See id. at 349. If it appears that a non-constitutional 

error did not influence the result or had only a slight effect, we should not overturn 

a criminal conviction. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). 

The weight of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is a relevant factor in 

conducting a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). Id.; See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). 

The character of the alleged error and how it may be considered in connection with 

other evidence in the case are also relevant. Id. at 359.
11

Upon finding that the State failed to disclose the new information from John’s 

testimony as required by Article 39.14, the trial court exercised its discretion by 

excluding the evidence, thereby providing Appellant with an immediate remedy. 

See CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(h), (k). When a prosecutor willfully withholds evidence 

in violation of a discovery order, exclusion of the evidence is the proper 

remedy. Oprean v. State, 201 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The 

excluded evidence cannot support an assertion that Appellant’s substantial rights 

were affected because any error was cured with its exclusion from admission and

consideration by the trial court. Further, we have already concluded that the 

inclusion of the statements from Wylie’s and Telise’s testimony were not offensive 

to the State’s responsibilities under Article 39.14 and therefore cannot stand as 

error that denied Appellant any right to which he was legally entitled. See Motilla, 

78 S.W.3d at 360; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). 

Though not dispositive, the weight of other evidence of guilt is a relevant 

factor, and the trial court provided an explanation that reflected its reliance on the 

substantial evidence beyond the testimony of Wylie and Teslise. The trial court 

specifically determined that John’s statement to his parents about seeing a gun in the 

house was not necessary to prove Appellant’s intent to commit aggravated assault. 

Accordingly, there was no harm that resulted from any error with respect to Wylie’s 

and Telise’s testimony. We overrule Appellant’s first issue in both cause numbers. 

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the voluntariness of his pleas. 

Appellant alleges that his pleas of not guilty to the charged offense of burglary with 

intent to commit aggravated assault and guilty to a lesser-included offense were 

involuntary because they were entered without knowledge that John saw a man with 

a gun in the Murray home. Appellant challenges the voluntariness of his plea of 

guilty to the charged offense of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence for 
12

the same reason. He contends that this evidence was impeachment evidence that 

might have affected his pleas had it not been withheld.

A guilty plea involves, among other things, a waiver of a defendant’s rights 

to be tried by a jury, to confront his accusers, to have a speedy and public trial, and 

to invoke his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2016) (orig. proceeding). To be effective, a waiver of those rights must be 

made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 

322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). To be knowing and voluntary, a guilty plea must be 

made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970). When the record 

shows that a defendant was properly admonished, it presents a prima facie showing 

that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 

S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2023). The burden 

then shifts to the defendant to prove that “he did not fully understand the 

consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.” Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197

(citing Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d at 871). If the defendant “attests during the 

initial plea hearing that his plea is voluntary,” the defendant has a “heavy burden” 

on appeal to prove that his plea was involuntary. Houston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 212, 

217 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting Coronado v. State, 25 

S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d)).

A defendant’s voluntary guilty plea is not contingent upon his awareness of 

the full dimension of the State’s case. Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d at 809. “While any 

defendant who is deciding whether or not to plead guilty would certainly prefer to 

be apprised of his exact odds of an acquittal at trial, the reality is that every defendant 
13

who enters a guilty plea does so with a proverbial roll of the dice.” Id. The more 

information a defendant has beforehand about the State’s case, the better the 

opportunity for him to make a “wise” plea. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 

(2002). “But even if the defendant is less well-informed, as long as he has a 

sufficient awareness of his circumstances—including an awareness that some facts 

simply remain unknown to him or are undetermined as of the time of the plea—his 

potentially unwise plea is still a voluntary one.” Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d at 809.

Appellant contends that his pleas were not voluntary because he was unaware 

of the new information in the Murrays’ testimony about an intruder with a gun.

Appellant’s assertion rests upon his allegation that the State failed to properly 

disclose the evidence as required by Article 39.14. See CRIM PROC. art. 39.14(h),

(k). The trial court found that the State had not fulfilled its obligation to Appellant 

as to John’s testimony and excluded the new evidence. However, the trial court also 

determined that there was no evidence to suggest that the State was aware of the

additional information revealed in the testimony of Wylie and Telise prior to its 

introduction at trial. As previously noted, the State does not have an obligation to 

disclose information that it was never provided. See CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(h) 

(“[T]he State shall disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or 

mitigating . . . information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that 

tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for 

the offense charged.”) (emphasis added). 

When Appellant entered his pleas after being admonished by the trial court, 

he did so with the awareness at that time that there may be undetermined facts of the 

case. See Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d at 809. The introduction at trial of those previously 

undetermined facts, absent a violation of the State’s discovery obligations, cannot 

support the assertion that his plea was involuntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 
14

U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (“A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely 

because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus 

misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties attached to 

alternative courses of action.”). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue 

in each case. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

July 25, 2024

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.