### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 26

, 200 8

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . WI LLI AM KEI TH PAULSO N, ALIAS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Knox County No. 78033 Richard R. Baumgartner , Judge

No. E2007-02621-CC A-R3- CD - Filed Septem ber 24, 2009

Th e de fe nd ant, Willi a m K e ithPa uls on , w a s c on vi cte d by a Kn ox County

jur y of re c kle ss endang erme nt, a Class E felony ; two co u n t s of fe lony evadingarr est, Class D felonies; eva ding

arr est, a Class A misdemeanor; driving without a license, a Class C mi sdemea

nor; and violation of the state reg istration law, a Class C misdemeanor. Subsequently
, he was sentenc ed to an ef fec tive eig hteen- y ear

sentenc e, as a

car eer offe nder, in the D epar

tment of Correc tion. On a ppeal, he raises the sing le issue of whe ther double je opardy principles re quire the me rg er of his convictions for

rec kless endang erme nt, felony evading arr est, and evading arr est into a si ng le conviction for felony evadingarr est. Following revie w of the rec ord, we conclude that the two counts for felony evading

arr est should have be en mer g ed into a sing le count as the y wer e simply alternative char g es for the

same c onduct. Fur

ther, we deter

mine that t h e m isdemeanor evadingarr est should have a lso been
merg ed with t he felony evading arr est as i t repr esente d a sing le cour se of c onduct. Howe ver, me rg er of the single rema ining felony evading arr est and the rec kless endang erme nt c onvictions is not require d. As such, the case is remande d for e ntry of cor rec ted judg ments of conviction in ac corda nce with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt s o f t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ma nde d

J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER

a ndJ. C. M C L IN , JJ., joined.

J. Liddell Kirk (on appe al), an d P atrick Loope r and A nastac ia Shelton (at trial), K noxville, Te nn e sse e , f

or the app e lla nt, W ill ia m K e ith Pa uls on , A lia s.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; De sh e a Du la ny , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; Ra n d a l l E u g e n e N i c h o l s , D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ; a n d P h i l i p H

. M o r t o n a n d T a K ish a M. Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorneys Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION-2- Fa c tu al B ac kgr ound

The de fenda

nt’s convictions in this case a rose f rom his actions of l ea d i n g p o l i ce on an

a pp ro xi mat e fi ft een- mi le c has e on Kno x vi ll e roa dwa y s. On t he ev eni ng of M arch 5, 20 03 , Kn ox vil le
po lic e of fi c e r Joh n K ie ly

and his pa rt ne r e nc ounte re d the de fe nd ant, wh o wa s stand ingou tsi de his vehicle w hich was stopped in a lane of traff ic. They approa ched the defe ndant and inquired if he was havin g tr ou

ble wi th h is ve hic le

. Th e de fe nd ant i nf or me d th e of

fi c e rs tha t he wa s h a vin g pr ob le ms with his car but that he w as g oing to g et the vehic le to a s af e p l ac e and the n return home . After chec king the defe ndant’s information and running his criminal hi story , the officers left the defe ndant wi th h is v e hic le , is su ingno c itatio ns

. Ac c or din g to Of fi c e r Ki e ly
, bo th he and his pa rt ne r w e re po lit e and cour teous to the defe ndant, and the de fenda nt cause d them no problems.

Around 1:30 a.m. on the following morning
, Offic er J eff Day was on routine patrol, spotted the def endant’ s vehicle, a

nd noticed that the de fenda nt’s license plate was not il l u m i n ated, which is a vio la tio n o f a

loc a l or din anc e . O ff

ic e r Da y ini tiate d a

tr a ff ic sto p, and

the de fe nd ant p ull e d h is

car to the side of the ro ad

. Of fi cer Day approa ched the defe ndant’s ca r, explaining why

he had
sto pp e d h im, and

a sk e d to se e the de fe nd ant’ s d ri ve r’ s li c e ns e . T he de fe nd ant t he n in fo rm e d h im th a t h e h a d b e e n s t o p p e d e ar l i e r b y K n o xv i l l e p o l i c e o f

f i c e r s an d t h a t t h e y h a d f

a i l e d t o r e tu r

nhis license to him. At this point, Officer Day had the defenda

nt move hi s car

into a K-mar

t parking lot for sa fety rea sons. Office r Da

y contac ted Off

icer Kiely by radio, and Kiely ag ree d to come to the

scene . Whil e wa iting, Officer Day returne d to his patrol car, and the def endant r emained in his own vehicle.

Whe n Of fi c e r Ki e ly and his pa

rt ne r, Of fi c e r Cok e r, arr ive d a t the K- mart pa rk inglot , K ie ly
approa ched O ffice r Da

y , and Coker a

pproac hed the de fenda

nt’s car . Whil e O ff

i ce r Ki ely

was informing Offic er D ay

that they did not have the defe ndant’s driver’s license , he hea rd Off icer Coker
say , “He y g uy s. L ook at this .

. . what’s this g uy doing?” W hen Of

fer Kiely turned, he observe d the defe ndant start his ca

r, make an U- turn, and pull out of the par king lot. Offic er Coker shouted for the def endant to stop.

Offic ers Kiely and Coker returne d to the ir patrol car , activate d the blue lights and sire ns, and followed the de fendan t n o rt h b o u n d on Br oadwa y . Offic er D ay

also followed the de fenda nt. The defe ndant was not spee ding, tr avelingonly approximately forty miles per hour, but he did run two

re d li g hts . O ff

ic e r K e ily , c on c e rn e d a

bo ut t he ra in- sli c k r oa d c on dit ion s, re ma ine d a pp ro xima te ly

on e hund re d a nd fi ft y y ard s b e hin d th e de fe nd ant. No ne the le ss, he and Of fi c e r Day con ti nu e d to
purs ue the de fe nd ant wi th bo th the ir blu e lig hts and the ir sir e ns a c tiv a te d. Th e re wa s o the r t ra ff ic on the roa dway , althoug h it was not heavily cong ested.

Ba sed upon information rece ived via ra dio commun i ca tion, a Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol of fi c e r h a d p ark e d h is p a tr ol u nit a c ro ss t he ro a dw ay , with his blu e lig hts fl a sh ing , in or de r t o a ssi st in stopping the de fenda

nt. The def

endant pr ocee ded to drive t o war d the ca r, nea rly hit the car
, swerve d abruptly

to th e lef t, and continued towa

rd Clinton Highwa

y . The Te nnessee Hig hway Patrol-3-

office r then stated ove r the ra dio, “He almost hit me head-on. I ’m g oing to take over the pursuit.” He a lso requeste d back up f rom a sec ond highw ay

patrol off

icer

.

Also in the are a at the time we re K nox County

Sheriff’ s deputies, including Serg eant Donny Weaver
, who initially advised his of fice rs to sta

y out of the pursuit. Weaver
, along w i t h Of fice rs Ke ily and Da y , o bs e rv e d th e se c on d h ig hw ay patr ol o ff

ic e r a pp ro a c h th e sc e ne , lo se c on tr ol o f h is vehicle, a nd hit a telephone pole. All thr ee office rs stopped to a ssist the highw ay patrol off icer . The defe ndant was observe d pulling int o a shoppi ng cente r parking lot and coming to a stop i n front of the first hig hway

patrol off

icer who continued to pursue him. As the officer beg an to exit his car, the def endant pr ocee ded to pull out “at a hig h rate o f speed coming back towa rd the interse ction wher e the tra ffic a ccide nt was,” tra veling ag ainst the flow of tra ffic. T he hig hway patrol off

icer
ag ain re sumed his chase , and the defenda nt pulled into a Goody ’s parking lot, driving direc tly toward a white pickup tr

uck. Althoug h the t ruck did not stop, it appear ed that the de fenda nt’s vehicle ma de
contac t with the “pickup truc k’s re ar bumpe r.” A t this point, Ser g eant Weaver , who had a ctivated his blue lights and joined in the pursuit, sa w the defe ndant proce ed acr oss the parking lot and stop

near an emba nkment. The hig hway

patrol off

icer ag ain pul l ed d i re ct ly

behind the def

endant a nd exit ed his vehicle

. T h e defe ndant then sped f orwa rd ac ross the “e mbankment and a ditch, [and

came ] across the top of it
, back out into t he northbound lane of traf fic,” but traveling southbound. Serg eant Weave r pursue d the defe ndant and decide d to e nd the pursuit quickly by nece ssary

means as the de fenda

nt was enda

ng eringboth citiz ens and the other officer s. Serg eant Weave r struck the de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le in t

he ri g ht r e ar in o rd e r t o atte mpt to f or c e him of f t he ro a d. Th e de fe nd ant s til l ref used to stop.

At this p o int, Serg eant Weave r ra dioed Deputy Ricker, who w as in the ar ea, to e nter the pursuit. T he two office rs attempted to “ box -in” the de fenda nt, and Deputy

Ricker then bumpe d the side of the de fenda

nt’s vehicle. The defe ndant acc eler ated, which ca used his vehicle to r oll onto the

m ed i an an d

l an d u p s i d e d o wn

. De p u t y

R i c k e r ’ s c a r a l s o cr as h ed
, ca u s i n g i n j u ri es i n cl u d i n g a

ru ptu re d s ple e n. Af

te r t he c ra sh , th e de fe nd ant pr oc e e de d to c lim b o ut o f t he wi nd owof

his ve hic le and fle e on foot. Serg eant Weave r and a highw ay p at ro l office r pursue d and appr ehende d the defe ndant.

Ba sed upon the above conduct, the defe ndant was indicted by a Knox Country g rand jury

for

rec kless endang erme nt, two counts of felony evading arr est, misdemeanor evading arr est, violation of the drive r’s lice nse law, violation of the state re g istration law, and f ailure to provide evidenc e of financ ial responsibility

. A j u ry trial was late r commenc ed. The defe ndant testified in his own defe nse at trial a

nd acknow ledg ed that he ha d, in fac t, fled fr om the office rs w h i le beingpursued. He disputed none of the factual circumstance s of the ac tual pursuit. Howeve r, he te stified that the initial encounter w ith Office rs Keily and Coker was somewhat hostile. He f urther stated that when Of fi c e r C ok e r ar

ri ve d at th e K- mart

pa rk inglot duri ngthe se c on d s top , h e or de re d th e de fe nd a nt t o g et out of the c ar. The defe ndant testified that he r efuse d beca use he “ didn’t think it was rig ht the
way he wa s talking to me.” He we nt o n to testify that he had pr ior bad e x perie nces w ith law enfor ceme nt office rs and “ chose that time” to leave.-4-

After hear ing the evidenc e presented, the jury convicted the defe ndant as c harg ed, with the exception of the char g e for failure to pr ovide proof of financ ial responsibility . After a subseque nt sentenc ing he aring , the def endant wa s sentenc ed, as a care er offende r, as follows: si x y ear s for the

rec kless endang erme nt, twelve y ear s for e ach c ount o f fe l o n y evading a rre st, eleven months and
twen t y -nine da

y s for the misdemea

nor eva ding a

rre st, and thirty

day s for both the violation of the dr ive r’ s li c e ns e law a

nd the vio la tio n of the state re g istra tio n law. Th e c ourt or de re d a ll c ounts to be ser ved conc urre ntly , with the exception of the re ckless enda ng erme nt conviction, resulting in an eff ective se ntence of eig hteen y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction.

The defenda

nt subsequently

filed a pr o s e “motion f

or a delay ed appea l,” which the trial cour t treated as a

timely filed m otion for new t rial. Following the appointment of ne w counse l, amended motions we re filed, and a hear ing was held. The tria l court, by written orde r, denie d the motion for new tria l. The def

endant timely

appea led that denial.

Ana lys is

On appe al, t he defenda

nt raises the single issue of whether double jeopardy principles we re vio la te d b y

the tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to m e rg e his c on vic tio ns fo r re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt, tw o c ounts of fe lony evading arr est, and misdemeanor arr est. Acc ording to the petitioner, these f our convic tions should have be en mer g ed “into a sing le fe lony co n v i cti on for e vading arr est in a vehic le.” As a n ini tia l matte r, the State arg ues that th e de fe nd ant h a s w a ive d th e iss ue ba se d u po n h is f a ilure to include the issue in his motion for new trial. The defe ndant acknow ledg es that he failed to objec t at trial or r aise the issue in his motion for new tr ial.

The State is cor

rec t that, ge nera lly , the f

ailure to pre sent an issue in a motion for ne w trial

re su lts in wa ive r. Rul e 3( e ) o f t he Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A

pp e llate Pr oc e dure pr ov ide s th a t, f or a pp e a ls “in a ll c a s e s tr ie d b y a ju r y , n o is s u e p r e s e n te d f

o r r e v ie w s h a ll b e p r e d ic a te d u p o n e r r o r

. . . c omm itt e d o r oc c ur

ri ng duri ng the tr ia l of the c a se , or oth e r g ro un d upo n whi c h a new tr ia l is so ug ht, unless the same w as spec ifically stated in a motion for a

new tria l; otherwise such issues w i l l be
tr e a te d a s w aiv ed. ” Ten n. R. A pp . P. 3( e ); se e als o S

tat e v . M ar tin , 940 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding t hat a de fenda nt relinquishes the rig ht to arg ue on appe al any issues that should have been pr esente d in a motion for new trial). W hile acknow ledg ing his fa ilure to previously raise the issue, the def

endant c ontends that waive r is not a ppropriate as the provisions of Rule 3(e) “do not apply if the issue that a de fenda nt failed to rai s e i n a m o t ion for new trial would result in the dismiss al of the prosec ution ag ainst the ac cused if f ound meritorious.” Rely ing upon State v. Kee l
, 88 2 S. W.3 d 410 , 416 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 4) , he a sse rt s th a t w a ive r i s in a pp lic a ble he re be c a

us e he is not asking for a

new tria l b u t fo r dismiss al of c onvictions which violate double jeopa rdy principles. Howe ver, the defe ndant’s ar g ument is mispl ace d. E v e n if me ritorious, his arg ument does not result in dismiss al of the pr osecution as he acknow ledg es that one c onviction will st ill remain. Thus, the prosec ution is not dismiss ed.

Howeve r, this court may

revie w possible err or, whether properly assig ned or not, unde r the doctrine of

plain err or upon the re cord unde r Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal-5-

Procedur e. Sta te v . O

gle , 6 66 S.W. 2d

58 (T e nn

. 19 84 ). Before an e rr or may be so re c og nize d, it

mus t be “ pla in” and

mus t a ff

e c t a “ su bs tanti a l r ig ht” of

the a ccus ed. Th e wor d “ pla in” is
sy nony mous w ith “clea

r” or equivalently

“obvious.” United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct . 1770 (1993). Plain er ror is not mere ly err or that is c onspicuous, but is espec ially eg reg ious

err or that strikes at the f airne s s, integ rity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s. State v. W ooden
, 658 S.W .2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) . I n State v. Adk isson
, 899 S.W .2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), t h i s court de fined “ substantial rig ht” as a rig ht of “funda

mental
p ro p o rt i o n s in the indictment process, a rig ht to the proof of e very element of

the offe nse and . . . constitutional in nature .” I n that case , this court established five factors to be applied in determining wh e the r a n e rr or is p la in:

(a ) T he re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli shwh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; (b) a clea r and une quivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) considera

tion of the err or must be “ne cessa ry to do substantial just ice.”

Id. at 641-42. Our

supreme c ourt cha

rac terized the Adkisson te s t a s a “ c le ar an d meaning ful standard” and emphasiz ed that eac h of t he five fac tors must be pre sent befor e an e rror qualifies as plain err or. Sta te v . S

mi th , 24 S.W .3d 2 7 4
, 2 8 2 -8 3 (T enn. 2000). B ased upon our revie w, we

c on c lud e tha

t th e fi ve fa c tor s have be e n e sta bli sh e d and that r e vie w i s n e c e ssa ry purs ua nt t o p la in

err or.

B o t h o u r

f e d e r a l an d

s t a t e c o n s t i tu t i o n s p r o h i b i t p e r s o n s f r o m b e i n g “ t w i c e p u t i nj e o p a r dy” fo r the same of

fe ns e . U.S. CO NST . ame nd . V ; T e nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 10 . “ Th is p ro hib iti on a g a ins t do ub le je op ard

y pr ov ide s pr ote c tio n fr om thr e e e vil s: (1 ) a se c on d pr os e c uti on a ft e r an acq ui tta l; (2) a second pr osecution af

ter a conviction; an d (3 ) m ultiple punishm ents for the same off ense.” Sta te v . F ra nk lin
, 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d

7 8 9
, 7 9 7 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Le wis , 958 S.W .2d 736 at 738). Proof that the of

fense s have the same exact statutory elements is not require d to establish that offe nses ar e the “ same” for double jeopardy purposes. State v. De nton , 938 S.W .2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996). The issue be fore us relate s to the l ast of the thre e categ ories as the defe ndant contends that the four c onvictions resulted fr om the same c ontinuous act, i.e. , th e c on tin uo us po lic e purs uit

.

I n State v. De nton , our supreme court recog nized that “[t] he key issue in multi ple punishment

c a s e s is le g is lati v e in te n t.” Id

. at 3 79. I n other wor ds, the court must deter mine whether

the leg islature intended that eac h violation resulting f rom a si ng le ac t be a se parate offe nse. Presumptively , “the leg islature do es n o t ordinarily intend to punish the same offe nse under two differ ent statutes.” Id . I n Denton, the cour t set out a four -par

t balancinginquiry

which is to be uti lize d in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

de fe nd ant h a s r e c e ive d mu lti ple punis hme nts fo r the same a c t in violation of the principles of double jeopar dy

. Id . at 37 9- 81 ; se e als o Stat e v . G oo dwi n , 143 S.W .3d 771, 781 (Tenn. 2004) . First, t h e re viewing court must deter mine whether

eac h offe nse re quires proof of an ele ment th at t he other does not, in acc ordanc e with Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. C t. 180 (1932). Denton , 938 S.W .2d at 379. Second, the c ou rt m u s t look to the-6-

specific evidenc e offere d in the ca se to deter mine whether

differ ent evidenc e wa s used to prove e ach
separ ate of

fense

. Id . at 380. Next, the court is to consider whe ther ther e we re multiple victims or multipl e episode s. Id

. at 381. Finally
, the court must e x amine the purposes of the respe ctive statutes prohibiting the de fenda

nt’s conduct a

nd deter mine whether the s tatutes serve differ ent purposes. Id

. a t 38 1. No on e fa c tor

in t his te st i s d e te rm inativ e ; r a the r, the c ourt mus t ba lanc e all fa c tor s in relation to each other

. Id . Moreove r, our supre me cour t further noted that, while appe llate re view must be g uided by the test announce d in Blockburge r , that test is not conclusive of leg islative intent and the r eviewingcourt must also examine: (1) whether there were multipl e victim s involved; (2) wh e the r s e ve ra l di sc re te a c ts w e re inv olv e d; a nd (3 ) w he the r t

he e vil a t w hich e ach offe ns e is direc ted is the same or

differ ent. Id . at 378-79.

I. Two C ount s o f F e lon y Ev adi ng A r r e st

Cla ss D fe lony

arr e st i s d e fi ne d b y

our c ri min a l c od e a s f

oll ow s:

I t is unlawful for a

ny person, while ope rating a m o t o r v ehicle on a ny street, r oad, al l ey o r h i ghway

in this st ate, to intentionall y flee or attem

pt to elude any

law enfor ceme nt of

fice r, afte r having rec eived any signa l f rom such office r to bring the vehicle to a

stop.

T.C.A. § 39-16-603( b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added)

. The statute further provides that, in orde r to be classified as Class D felony arr est, it must cre ate a risk of death or injury to innocent by standers or other third p arties. Id . at (b)( 3). Counts two and three of the indictment re turned a g ainst the defe ndant cha

rg ed fe lony

evadingarr est, count two by “intentionally

fleei n g” and count three by “attempting to elude.” T hus, we a g ree with the defe ndant that t hese were alternative char g es for the same off ense. The State, at trial, eve n noted t o the t rial cour t that these counts re flec ted alter native
way s of cha

rg ing the same off

ense. It is well settled that merg er is appr opriate in orde r to protec t

a g a ins t do ub le jeopa rdy whe n a jury c on vic ts a

de fe nd ant u

nd e r a lte rn a te the or ie s o f t he same offe nse. State v. Hurley , 876 S.W. 2d 57 , 70 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State v. Addison , 973 S.W .2d 260, 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . The re cord e stablishes only one fe l o n y ev ad i n g arr est in this case. As such, the two c onvictions for fe lony evadingarr est should be merg ed into a sing le conviction.

II. F e lon y Ev adi ng A r r e st/M isde m e ano r Eva ding Ar r e st

Next, the defenda

nt contends th a

t h is conviction for misdemea nor eva ding a

rre st should have also bee n merg ed with the fe lony evadingarr est as it was pa rt of the same c ontinuing cr iminal episode, a sserting that there “wa s one sing le pursuit from the time off icer s beg an pursuing [t he] defe ndant . . . until [ the] defenda nt was i n custody .” The S tate counte rs, althoug h acknow ledg ing that the convictions both a rise from a single course of conduct, that the fa cts of the c ase suppor t dual punishmen t fo r t wo separ ate c riminal offe nses. The State c ontends that the def endant c ommitt ed
tw o d ist inc t of

fe ns e s b y fi rs t f le e ingfr om o ff

ic e rs in a mot or ve hic le on

the str e e ts, c re a tin g a

ri sk of death or serious injury

to innocent by standers, a nd then flee ing f

rom the off

icer s on foot.-7-

As noted, we must beg in with a Blockburge r ana ly sis of the e le me nt of the tw o off e ns e s. Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 16 -6 03 (a )( 1) pr ov ide s tha t “it is unla wf ul f or any pe rs on to intentionally

flee by any means of loc omotion from any one the pe rson k n o ws t o be a la w enfor ceme nt office r if the pe rson: (A) know s the offic er is attempting to a rre st the person; or (B ) has been a rre sted.” Violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. T .C.A. § 39-13-603(a )(3)

. As p r e v i o u s l y n o t ed
, s u

b s ec t i o n(b ) s t at es t h at “[ i ] ti s u n l aw fu l fo r a n y p er s o n , wh i l e o p er at i n g a mot or ve hic le on

any str e e t, r oa d, a lle y

or hig hw ay in t his state, to in ten tio na lly

fl e e or a tte mpt to elude a ny law enf orce ment office r, af

ter having r ece ived any

signa l from such off

icer to bring the vehicle to a

stop . . . [ and] the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to innocent by sta nd e rs or oth e r thi rd pa

rt ie s.

. . .” T. C.A

. § 39 -1 6- 60 3( b) (1 ), (3 ). Withthe inc lus ion of the ri sk of death or injury

to by standers, violation of subsec tion (b) is a Class D fe lony

.

Com pa ri so n o f t he tw o o ff

e ns e s r e ve a ls t

hat the y pa ss Blockburge r

scrutiny . Subsection (a) require s t h at t h e acc used know that the police office r is attempting to a rre st the person, but subsection (b) r equire s only a sig nal to stop and not an ar rest or attempted arr est. I n addition, subsection (b) a ddresse s a spec ific m ethod of evading arr est, that is by use of a mot or vehicle and that the flig ht or attempt to elude c reates a risk of de ath or i n j u ry to innocent par

ties. See State v

. Gregory M

ullins , No. E2004-02314- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Aug. 25, 2005) ; S ta tev. PrenticeC. Call oway , No

. M 2 0 0 4 -0 1 1 1 8 -C C A- R 3 -C D ( T en n

. C ri m

. App. at Na shville, J une 2, 2005). Thus, diffe rent statutory elements a

re pr esent.

Ne xt, we no te that both of the c ha rg e d off e ns e s we re e sta

bli sh e d, to som e e xten t, b y the same

course of conduc t, that is the defenda nt’s flig ht f

ro m p o l i ce office rs. Howe ver, pr oof that the defe ndant fled in a

motor vehicle after having rec eived a signa l to stop and that innocent by standers

we re a t ri sk of de a th or inj ur y wa s re qu ir e d to e sta

bli sh fe lony e va din g arr e st. To est ablish misdemeanor eva d i n g ar re st, proof wa s only require d that the def

endant f led, by any means of locomotion, knowing that of fice rs wer e attempting to arr est him. The State introduced e vidence of

eac h of these e lements. Thus, we c onclude that e ach of fense did require differ ent proof.

Th ir d, we must a

na ly ze w he the r t

he tw o o ff

e ns e s in vo lve mul tip le vic tim s o r m ult ipl e episodes. As pointed out by the State, misdemeanor evadingarr est does not contemplate victims per se, while Class D fe lony

arr est does require that innocent by standers or third parties be place d at risk. The State fur

ther a sserts two distinct acts of flig ht during the i ncident, that being the c hase in the c ar

and th e de fe nd ant’ s su

bs e qu e nt f

lig ht o n f oo t a ft e r h is c ar w a s w re c ke d. Whil e makin g thi s argument, the State ac knowledg es that pane ls of this court have pr eviously rea ched dif

fer ent conclusions but urg es us to conclude that this case is factua lly distinguishable. See G regory M ullins
, No. E2004-02314- CCA-R3-CD; State v. Prentice C . Callow ay , No. M2004-01118-CCA-R3-CD. H o w e v e r , w e f

in d n o s u c h f

a c tu a l d is ti n c ti o n p r e s e n t in th is c a s e an d c o n c lu d e tha t the proof
pre s e n te d a t t r ia l w it h r e g ar d to b o th o f f e n s e s e s ta b li s h e d o n e c o n ti n u o u s c r im in a l e p is o d e r a ther than two discre te ac ts supporting multiple convictions.

L ikewise, we disag ree with the State’s asser tion that the respective leg islative purposes of the two cr imes addre ss differ ent conc erns. As note d in Prentice C. Calloway
,-8-

[th e ] e v il a t w h ic h th e s tatute is d ir e c te d is th e s a me w h e th e r

o n e f le e s o nf o o t or motor vehicle, that is, to discoura g e flig ht f rom a police office r perf

orming his or her officia l duties. The fa ct that the punishment is enhanc ed if the su s p ec t fl ees in a
motor vehi c le r a th e r

th anb y s o me o th e r

me an s o f

lo c o mo ti o nd o e s n o t a lt e r the
g ener al evil the statute see ks to prevent.

State v. PrenticeC. Call oway , No. M2004-01118-CCA-R3-CD.

Ba sed upon the a

bove ana ly sis and the fa cts prese nted, we c onclude that the defe ndant’s convictions for misdemea nor eva ding a

rre st and Class D felony evading a rr es t v iolate the

c on sti tut ion a l pr oh ibi tio ns a g a ins t do ub le je op a rd y . A c c or din g ly , mer g e r of the mis de me ano r i nto the fe lony is nece ssary

.

III . F e lon y Ev adi ng A r r e st/R e c kle ss E ndang e r m e nt

F ina lly , th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s tha t th e se tw o c on vic tio ns a lso vio la te pr inc ipl e s o f d ou ble jeopar dy and should be mer g ed beca use they “ar e basica lly the same thing.” He contends that the Sta t e relied upon the same pr oof, name ly his operation of his ca

r, to establish the dea dly

wea pon elem e n t o f r e c k le s s e n d an g e r me n t an d to in c r e a s e th e e v a d in g ar r e s t to a f e lo n y , th a t the class of potential people at risk was the “ prac tically the same” and that the r isk or dang er c reated by the de fe nd ant wa s est a

bli sh e d by the same c on du c t. H e a sse rt s th a t th e re is “ no t li ke ly to b e a Cla ss D felony evadingthat [i s not] also rec kless and [does not] place another person at serious risk with a motor vehicle.”

We ag ree with the State, and the de fenda nt acknowle dg es, that ea ch off ense r equire s proof

o f e l em en t s t h at t h e o t h er d o es n o t

. C l as s E fe l o n y re ck l es s en d an ger m en t i s “r ec k l es s en gag[ i n g] in c on du c t w hic h p la c e s o r m ay pla c e ano the r p e rs on

in i mmi ne nt d ang e r o f d e a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily inj ur y

. . . c omm itt e d w ith a de a dly we a po n. ” T. C.A

. § 39 -1 3- 10 3( a ), (b ) (2 00 6)

. Ag a in, Cla ss D felony evadingarr est is committed while “o p er at i n g a motor vehic le on any street, r oad, alley

or highw ay in this S tate, . . . [and] int entionally flee [i ng ] or attempt[ ing] to elude any law enf orce ment office r, af ter having r ece ived any

signa l from such off

icer to bring the vehicle to a stop . . . [and] the flig ht or attempt to elude c reates a risk of de ath or inj ury to innocent by standers or other third
pa rt ie s. ” T. C.A . § 39 -1 6- 60 3(b )(1 ), (3 ). Thus , r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt r e qu ir e s u se of any de a dly

wea pon, while felony evading arr est requir es oper ation of a motor ve hicle. Se e Sta te v . J oh nn yC. Menifee , No. M2005-00708-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App. at Na s h v i l le, J uly 31, 2006). Moreove r, eva ding a

rre st require s a flig ht or an attempt to elude a law e nforc ement off icer following a sig nal to stop. Id . T hu s, we a g re e that th e of fe ns e s p a ss Blockburge r

scrutiny as there is not an identity of ele ments.

Next, we must ex amine the spe cifi c ev i d en ce offer ed by the State to deter

mine whether differ ent proof w as used to esta blish each offense

. Wit h reg ard to felony evading arr est, the proof

e sta bli sh e d th a t th e de fe nd ant fl e d f ro m mu lti ple po lic e of

fi c e rs , le a din g the m on

a lon g c ha se in h is

car on rain slick roa ds, running multipl e tra ffic lig hts and driving into onc oming lanes of traff ic at-9-

a hig h rate of spee d. Proof was pr esente d that the def endant’ s acts cause d risk to othe r driver s on the roa dway

and, spec ifically , to the driver of a white pickup tr

uck. W i t h re gar d to the felony

rec kless end an ger m en t, proof wa s prese nted that the def endant, while ope rating his vehicle on a roadw ay in Tennesse e, drove that vehicle stra ight towa rd a hig hway

patrol off

icer parke d in the

ro a dw ay in a n atte mpt to sto p the de fe nd ant. Th e pr oo f f ur the r e sta bli sh e d th a t th e de fe nd ant n e a rl y hit the office r’s car head- on. Thus, separ ate proof was prese nted that, within the s i n gl e c o u rs e of conduct, the de fenda

nt committed separate and distinct ac ts which established both offenses, whic h

wer e sepa

rate d by time, location, and actus reas

. See State v. Johnny C. Menifee , No. M2005- 00 70 8- CCA -R 3- CD . A g a in, we do no t di sp ute that th e de fe nd ant’ s a c ts w e re a ll c omm itt e d w ith in a sing le cr iminal episode; howeve r, this is not t he dete rm inative test for double jeopar dy

. Se e id

. Moreove r, base d upon the fore g oing, it is also clea r that there wer e multiple victims and disti nct

e pis od e s o f c on du c t c on sti tut ingse pa ra te of fenses . T wo sp e c if

ic vic tim s w e re sp e c if

ic a lly established.

Finally , with reg ard to the pur pose of the two statutes, this court has previously conclude d that they are not the same. Id

. Evading arr est leg islatively addre sses the threatened ha rm “to . . . the public interest of obstructing a law enfor ceme nt office r i n the di schar g e of any leg al dut y ,” and the
ag gra v at ed form of this offe nse “a ddresse s the public harm whe n the ac t of eva ding a rre st creates a risk of death or i njury to innocent by standers or other thi rd parties.” Id

. (citations omitted). On the oth e r ha

nd
, the c ri me of re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt “ a dd re sse s th re a te ne d h arm

‘t o th e ind ivi du a l’ by prohibiting conduct which may place another person in dang er of death or serious bodily

injury with a dea dly

wea pon.” Id . (citations omitted). Thus, the re spective harms underly ing the two crimes a re disting uishable in purpose.

Ba sed u p o no u r a b o v e c o n s id e r a ti o n , w e c o n c lu d e th a t d o u b le je o p ar d

y d o e s n o t b ar

d u al convictions for Class D f elony evadingarr est and Class E fe lony rec kless endang erme nt upon the fac ts of this case. Thus, mer g er is not re quired.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed u p o nth e f o r e g o in g , th e c a s e is r e ma n d e d to th e tr ia l c o u rt f

o r e n tr y o f c o r rec ted judgme nts in accor dance with this opi nion.

__________________________________ JOHN EVE RETT WILL IAMS, JUDGE