Present: All the Justices 

RALPH L. PATTON, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Nos. 040616 & 040617 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

March 3, 2005 

CITY OF GALAX 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRAYSON COUNTY 

J. Colin Campbell, Judge 

These appeals arise from companion equity and law cases 

filed in the Circuit Court of Grayson County (the trial court) 

in which the City of Galax maintained that Ralph L. and Frieda 

Patton, husband and wife, are prohibited by its local zoning 

ordinance from utilizing the first floor of the structure on 

their property for residential apartments. In the equity case, 

the chancellor determined that the proposed use of the first 

floor was not subject to the so-called “grandfathering” 

provision in Galax City Code § 160-157 and issued an injunction 

prohibiting the Pattons from making renovations to their 

property for that proposed use. In the law case, the trial 

court reviewed and affirmed the decision of the local Board of 

Zoning Appeals denying the Pattons’ application for a 

conditional use permit for the proposed residential use of the 

first floor. We awarded appeals to the Pattons to review both 

actions of the trial court. 

BACKGROUND 
2

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the City of Galax, 

the prevailing party in the trial court. Matthews v. Board of 

Zoning Appeals, 218 Va. 270, 282, 237 S.E.2d 128, 135 (1977). 

Here, the evidence is provided by an appropriate statement of 

facts certified by the trial court in lieu of a transcript, Rule 

5:11(c), and various trial exhibits. 

The property in question is located at 201 South Main 

Street in the City of Galax. Mr. Patton acquired the property 

in 1967 and thereafter transferred the title to himself and his 

wife jointly. Subsequent to the Pattons’ acquisition of the 

property, the City adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, 

placing the property in a Business General (B-2) District (the 

B-2 District). “This district, containing the major downtown 

retailing center and major outlying commercial areas, provides a 

framework for a strong nucleus of the commercial community, in 

which each business can enhance other business and where all the 

amenities of downtown can be provided.” Galax City Code § 160-

91. 

“Apartment use” of structures in the B-2 District requires 

a conditional use permit. Galax City Code § 160-93(E). 

Apartment use is not permitted on the first floor of any 
3

structure in the B-2 District “fronting on designated streets.” 

Id.

At the time the Pattons acquired the property, the first 

floor of the structure was used principally for a drugstore. 

The record does not reflect when this use was discontinued, 

although the parties do not dispute that such is the case. The 

record also does not reflect the dimensions of the first floor 

or any significant details concerning its interior layout. 

However, it is not disputed that, both before and after the 

adoption of the City’s zoning ordinance, portions of the first 

floor have been used for a woodworking shop, a beauty shop, and 

at times for residential rental rooms. It is also undisputed 

that the second floor of the structure has been in continual use 

for residential apartments.*

In 1997, the Pattons began renovations on the first floor 

of their property. The Pattons obtained a building permit to 

construct a bathroom on this floor. Subsequent renovations, 

including painting and the installation of fire retardant 

sheetrock over existing walls, were conducted without obtaining 

 

*

 The parties refer to apartments and rental rooms 

interchangeably. The record establishes that individual rooms 

are rented for residential occupancy, with common bathrooms and 

a kitchen available for use by the occupants. 
4

building permits. The Pattons intended to use the first floor 

of their property for residential apartments. 

On February 15, 2001, the Pattons were informed by Keith 

Barker, a building official for the City of Galax, that they 

were not permitted to use the first floor of their property for 

residential purposes without a conditional use permit and that 

no further building permits would issue for the ongoing 

renovation work until a conditional use permit was obtained. On 

December 10, 2001, the City filed a bill of complaint in the 

trial court seeking an injunction prohibiting the Pattons from 

continuing to renovate the first floor of the property for 

residential use. 

In their answer to the bill of complaint, the Pattons 

asserted that the property “has been in residential use 

continuously and at all times since the adoption of a zoning 

ordinance by the City of Galax, and that the residential use of 

the premises is grandfathered such that continuing residential 

use of the premises is not in violation of the zoning ordinance 

of the City of Galax.” On January 4, 2002, the chancellor 

issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the Pattons from 

conducting further renovation work on the property. Following a 

hearing on the City’s bill of complaint, the parties agreed to a 

continuance of the proceedings in order to permit the Pattons to 
5

apply for a conditional use permit for residential apartments on 

the first floor street level of the property. 

On March 7, 2002, the Pattons applied to the City of Galax 

for a conditional use permit to allow apartments on the first 

floor street level of the property. Following a public hearing 

on April 25, 2002, the City of Galax Planning Commission denied 

the Pattons’ application. The Commission found that the 

proposed apartments would front on Main Street, which the 

Commission determined to be a “designated street[]” within the 

meaning of Galax City Code § 160-93(E). After the Commission’s 

action was confirmed by the Galax City Council, the Pattons 

filed an appeal with the City of Galax Board of Zoning Appeals. 

On June 25, 2002, the Board denied the Pattons’ appeal, 

concurring in the determination of the Commission that the 

structure on the Pattons’ property fronted on a designated 

street. 

On July 17, 2002, the Pattons filed a notice of appeal in 

the trial court. After issuing a writ of certiorari to the 

Board of Zoning Appeals, the trial court consolidated the appeal 

of the Board’s decision with its consideration of the City’s 

bill of complaint. The trial court ruled that no additional 

evidence was needed in either case and directed the parties to 
6

present their final arguments in written briefs. Those briefs 

reflected the arguments the parties now make on appeal. 

In an opinion letter dated August 8, 2003, the trial court 

ruled in the law case that the Board of Zoning Appeals properly 

construed the term “designated streets” to include all public 

streets within the B-2 District. Referring to the City’s zoning 

map, filed as an exhibit, the trial court noted that Main Street 

is color coded as being within the B-2 District. Thus, the 

trial court concluded that the Board properly followed the 

ordinance in affirming the decision of the Planning Commission, 

as confirmed by the City Council, to deny the conditional use 

permit on the basis that the proposed apartments on the first 

floor of the structure on the Pattons’ property would front on a 

designated street in violation of Galax City Code § 160-93(E). 

The trial court further noted that the use of “the subject 

property . . . for first floor residential apartments was not in 

existence at the time that the zoning ordinance came into 

effect” and, thus, was not grandfathered for that use. 

In a separate opinion letter in the equity case, also dated 

August 8, 2003 and referencing the letter opinion filed in the 

law case, the chancellor opined that the requested injunction 

should issue. A final order and a final decree memorializing 

the rulings of the trial court as reflected in the opinion 
7

letters were entered in the respective cases on December 19, 

2003. 

DISCUSSION 

It is self-evident that if the Pattons are entitled to use 

the first floor of the structure on their property for 

residential apartments as a prior nonconforming use 

grandfathered under the zoning ordinance, a conditional use 

permit for that same purpose would be unnecessary. Accordingly, 

we first consider the trial court’s determination in the equity 

case that because the first floor of the structure was not being 

used for residential apartments at the time the zoning ordinance 

was adopted, only the second floor apartments are grandfathered. 

Because the chancellor heard the evidence ore tenus, his 

decree is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. The 

Dunbar Group, LLC v. Tignor, 267 Va. 361, 366-67, 593 S.E.2d 

216, 219 (2004); Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va. 256, 

264, 576 S.E.2d 497, 501 (2003). Thus, we will not reverse the 

determinations made by the chancellor unless they are plainly 

wrong or without support in the evidence. The Dunbar Group, 267 

Va. at 367, 593 S.E.2d at 219 (2004); Shooting Point, L.L.C., 

265 Va. at 264, 576 S.E.2d at 501. 

It is the settled law of this Commonwealth that for a prior 

use of land that violates a newly enacted zoning restriction to 
8

be considered a lawful nonconforming use, the use must have been 

“ ‘a lawful use existing on the effective date of the zoning 

restriction.’ ” C. & C. Inc. v. Semple, 207 Va. 438, 439 n.1, 

150 S.E.2d 536, 537 n.1 (1966) (quoting 2 E. C. Yokley, Zoning 

Law and Practice § 16-2, at 212 (3rd ed. 1965)), see also

Knowlton v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Virginia, Inc., 220 

Va. 571, 572 n.1, 260 S.E.2d 232, 234 n.1 (1979). “In a civil 

action in which a use is challenged as illegal, the challenging 

party has the initial burden of producing evidence to show the 

uses permitted in the zoning district in which the land is 

located and that the use of the land is not a permitted use. 

Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the landowner to show 

that his use is a lawful nonconforming use.” Masterson v. Board 

of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 47, 353 S.E.2d 727, 734 (1987); 

see also Knowlton, 220 Va. at 574, 260 S.E.2d at 235. 

With respect to nonconforming uses in existence at the time 

the zoning ordinance applicable here was adopted, Galax City 

Code § 160-157 provides, in relevant part, that: 

A. Intent. Within the districts established by this 

chapter or amendments that may later be adopted, 

there may exist structures and uses of land and 

buildings which would be prohibited, regulated or 

restricted under the terms of this chapter or future 

amendments. It is the intent of this chapter to 

permit these nonconforming uses and structures to 

continue until they are removed but not to encourage 

their survival. It is further the intent of this 
9

chapter that these nonconforming structures and uses 

shall not be enlarged upon, expanded or extended. 

. . . . 

D. Nonconforming uses of structures or of structures 

and premises in combination. If a lawful use 

involving individual structures with a replacement 

cost of one thousand dollars ($1,000.) or more or if 

a structure and premises in combination exists at 

the effective date of adoption or amendment of this 

chapter that would not be allowed in the district 

under the terms of this chapter, the lawful use may 

be continued so long as it remains otherwise lawful, 

subject to the following provisions: 

. . . . 

(2) Any nonconforming use may be extended throughout 

any parts of a building which were manifestly 

arranged or designed for such use at the time of 

adoption or amendment of this chapter, but no such 

use shall be extended to occupy any land outside 

such building. 

. . . . 

E. Repairs and maintenance. Nothing in this chapter 

shall prevent the making of ordinary repairs on a 

nonconforming structure or a structure containing a 

nonconforming use, provided that the structure is 

not enlarged in size. 

Prior to the City’s adoption of its zoning ordinance, it is 

unquestioned that the entire structure on the Pattons’ property 

could have been lawfully used for residential apartments without 

distinction as to whether that use was maintained throughout the 

structure, or only in part of it. It is also unquestioned that, 

upon adoption of the zoning ordinance, use of any structure in 

the B-2 District for residential apartments is not a permitted 
10

use under Galax City Code § 160-92 and that such residential 

apartments may qualify as a lawful conditional use upon 

compliance with the specifications and requirements of Galax 

City Code § 160-93. The City established that the Pattons did 

not have a conditional use permit for apartments on the first 

floor of their property. Accordingly, the City met its initial 

burden of proof by showing that the proposed use of the first 

floor of the structure on the Pattons’ property for apartments 

is not a permitted use under the zoning ordinance. Thus, the 

burden shifted to the Pattons in the equity case to show that 

the use of the first floor of their property for apartments is a 

grandfathered prior nonconforming use. Masterson, 233 Va. at 

47, 353 S.E.2d at 734. 

The Pattons contend, as they did before the chancellor, 

that pursuant to Galax City Code § 160-157(D), use of the 

structure on their property for residential apartments is a 

permitted nonconforming use because the second floor has been 

continually used for residential apartments since before the 

ordinance was adopted. We agree that the Pattons established by 

clear evidence that the use of the second floor of their 

property for residential apartments is a permitted nonconforming 

use grandfathered under the zoning ordinance. The Pattons 

further contend that under subsection (D)(2) they are permitted 
11

to extend this residential use to the first floor because its 

occasional prior use for residential apartments demonstrates 

that it was “manifestly arranged or designed for such use at the 

time of adoption” of the zoning ordinance. Continuing, the 

Pattons maintain that the intended renovation of the first floor 

would not enlarge or alter the arrangement or the design of the 

structure and, thus, would be consistent with the provisions of 

subsection (E). We disagree. 

We have not previously had the opportunity to address a 

claim that a use established in one part but not all of a 

building prior to enactment of a zoning ordinance constitutes a 

grandfathered right to extend the nonconforming use throughout 

the building. However, other jurisdictions that have considered 

this issue have held that the right to continue the 

nonconforming use does not extend to other areas of the building 

unless, at the time the ordinance was enacted, the design of the 

building clearly indicated that such use was intended 

throughout. See, e.g., Condor, Inc. v. City of North 

Charleston, 380 S.E.2d 628, 629 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Keller v. 

City of Bellingham, 600 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wash. 1979). Moreover, 

in enacting the zoning ordinance, the government may expressly 

restrict the manner in which a nonconforming use can be extended 

throughout an entire building, see, e.g., Price v. Ackmann, 102 
12

N.E.2d 194, 195 (Ill. Ct. App. 1951), or expressly prohibit 

extension of the use. See, e.g., Phillips v. Zoning 

Commissioner of Howard County, 169 A.2d 410, 413-14 (Md. 1961). 

Thus, rather than treating a prior nonconforming use in one 

part of a building as permitting extension of the use to the 

whole building as a matter of right, it is generally held that 

the government may establish the manner in which extension of 

the use will be permitted, if at all. This principle is in 

accord with “the spirit underlying zoning regulations[, which] 

is to restrict rather than increase nonconforming uses.” Id. at 

414. The clear intent of Galax City Code § 160-157(D)(2) is to 

limit the expansion of a prior nonconforming use of part of a 

building, and the burden was on the Pattons to show that their 

extension comported with the requirements of that ordinance. 

In order to extend the use of the second floor for 

residential apartments to the first floor, it was not sufficient 

for the Pattons to show that the intended renovations of the 

first floor will not alter the manner in which the first floor 

is arranged or designed. Rather, they were required to prove 

that the first floor was “arranged or designed for such use at 

the time of adoption or amendment of” the zoning ordinance. 

Because the record does not contain an adequate description of 

the interior layout of the first floor, we cannot state with any 
13

certainty what its arrangement and design might be. However, 

because it is undisputed that the first floor has been used 

principally for commercial retail purposes, the chancellor’s 

determination that the first floor was not subject to 

grandfathering for use as residential apartments is not plainly 

wrong or without support in the evidence. Accordingly, we hold 

that the chancellor did not err in awarding the injunction 

against the Pattons to prohibit them from using the first floor 

of the structure on their property for residential apartments 

without a conditional use permit. 

We now turn to the question from the law case whether the 

trial court erred in affirming the decision of the Board of 

Zoning Appeals to deny the Pattons a conditional use permit for 

residential apartments on the first floor of the structure on 

their property on the ground that the structure fronted on a 

“designated street[]” as contemplated by Galax City Code § 160-

93(E). “[T]he decision of a board of zoning appeals ‘is 

presumed to be correct and can be reversed or modified only if 

the trial court determines that the BZA applied erroneous 

principles of law or was plainly wrong and in violation of the 

purposes and intent of the zoning ordinance’ and ‘the party 

challenging the BZA’s decision has the burden of proof on these 

issues.’ ” Higgs v. Kirkbride, 258 Va. 567, 573, 522 S.E.2d 
14

861, 864 (1999) (quoting Foster v. Geller, 248 Va. 563, 566, 449 

S.E.2d 802, 804-05 (1994)); see also Board of Zoning Appeals v. 

Bond, 225 Va. 177, 179-80, 300 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1983). 

Similarly, a trial court decision affirming a board of zoning 

appeals determination is also accorded this presumption of 

correctness on appeal to this Court. Masterson, 233 Va. at 44, 

353 S.E.2d at 732-33; Natrella v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 

Va. 451, 456, 345 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1986). 

The parties agree that, pursuant to Galax City Code § 160-

93(E), first floor apartments that do not front on designated 

streets are a permitted conditional use in the B-2 District. 

They disagree over the meaning of the term “designated streets.” 

The Pattons contend that the term means those streets 

specifically designated by the Galax City Council for exclusion 

of first floor apartments rather than all streets shown on the 

City’s zoning map lying within the B-2 District. Because the 

City has not designated any individual streets either in the 

zoning ordinance or on the zoning map for the purpose of 

excluding first floor apartments, they contend that denial of 

the conditional use permit by the Board of Zoning Appeals was in 

error and that the trial court erred in affirming that decision. 

The City responds that “designated streets” are the public 

streets within the B-2 District shown on the City’s zoning map. 
15

Thus, the City contends that the conditional use permit at issue 

here was properly denied based on the determination that the 

Pattons’ proposed apartments on the first floor of their 

property would front on Main Street, a public street shown on 

the zoning map to be within the B-2 District. 

Admittedly, Galax City Code § 160-93(E) is not a model of 

clarity. However, “[z]oning laws should be given a fair and 

reasonable construction in the light of the manifest intent of 

the legislative body enacting them, the object sought to be 

attained, the natural import of the words used in common and 

accepted usage, the setting in which such words are employed, 

and the general structure of the ordinance as a whole.” 

Mooreland v. Young, 197 Va. 771, 775, 91 S.E.2d 438, 441 

(1956)); see also Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Board of 

Zoning Appeals, 229 Va. 568, 571, 331 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1985); 

Citizens Association v. Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 40, 109 S.E.2d 

139, 141 (1959). Applying this standard, we hold that the term 

“designated streets” in Galax City Code § 160-93(E) denotes 

those public streets shown on the City’s zoning map as being 

within the B-2 District. 

Clearly, the object of the creation of the B-2 District is 

to establish a “nucleus” or center for commercial and retail 

trade in the downtown and major outlying commercial areas of the 
16

City. Galax City Code § 160-91. The legislative intent of the 

City in creating this district manifestly was to promote the 

mutual enhancement of businesses within the district by their 

proximity to one another. In this context, residential 

apartments on the first floors of structures fronting on the 

streets in this district do not comport with that intent. 

Moreover, the City’s zoning map clearly indicates that the 

streets within the B-2 District are part of the district. 

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 

affirming the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals denying 

the Pattons a conditional use permit to use the first floor of 

the structure on their property for residential apartments on 

the ground that the proposed apartments would front on a 

designated street in violation of Galax City Code § 160-93. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court in both cases. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE LEMONS join, 

concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I agree with the majority opinion affirming the trial 

court’s judgment in the equity case that the Pattons’ proposed 

use of the first floor for residential apartments was not a 
17

prior nonconforming use grandfathered under the applicable 

zoning ordinance. However, I write separately because I 

respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in the law case 

construing the term “designated streets” under Galax City Code 

§ 160-93 so as to affirm the Board of Zoning Appeals’ denial of 

the Pattons’ application for a conditional use permit. 

The majority holds that the term “designated streets” in 

the zoning ordinance denotes “those public streets shown on the 

City’s zoning map as being within the [business] district.” 

Based on the plain language of the ordinance and established 

principles of statutory construction, I cannot agree and 

therefore respectfully dissent. 

The record reflects that the sole reason the Pattons’ 

conditional use permit was denied by the Board of Zoning Appeals 

was that “the apartments did front on a designated street.” The 

trial court reiterated this basis in its letter opinion. 

However, the agreed statement of facts confirms “there was no 

list of streets” and “no ‘designated streets’ shown upon the 

zoning map for the City of Galax.” The record is devoid of any 

evidence that the City of Galax has ever designated any street 

as a “designated street” under Galax City Code § 160-93 or any 

other provision of the City Code. 
18

The majority bases its reading of the term “designated 

streets” on the City’s perceived intent in creating the B-2 

business district. However, “[t]he purpose and intent of the 

ordinance should be considered but the ordinance should not be 

extended by interpretation or construction beyond its intended 

purpose." Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Va. 271, 274, 

467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996) (citation omitted). Rather, “the 

interpretation of a zoning ordinance is controlled by the 

principle that words in common use must be given their plain and 

natural meaning in the absence of any showing that such words 

were used in any other than their usual and ordinary sense.” 

McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 

516 (1959) (citations omitted). 

“Street” as a term, refers to a large class of roadways, 

not specific, named thoroughfares. A street is a road or way 

over land set apart for public use and travel in a city or town. 

Norfolk City v. Chamberlaine, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 534, 537-38 

(1877). The word "street" is all-inclusive and embraces both 

that portion of the highway set apart for vehicular traffic and 

that part set aside for pedestrians, including the sidewalk. 

Messick v. Barham, 194 Va. 382, 387-88, 73 S.E.2d 530, 533 

(1952). City ordinances have also used the singular word 

“street” when referring to all “public thoroughfare[s].” See
19

City of Staunton v. Cash, 220 Va. 742, 745, 263 S.E.2d 45, 47 

(1980). 

In the ordinance at issue here, the general term, “street,” 

is qualified by the specific, modifying term, “designated.” 

“[W]hen general words and specific words are grouped together, 

the general words are limited and qualified by the specific 

words and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in 

nature to those objects identified by the specific words.” 

Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 Va. 374, 389, 248 

S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978) (citations omitted). 

The term “designate” means “[t]o indicate, select, appoint, 

nominate, or set apart for a purpose or duty” or “[t]o mark out 

and make known; to point out; to name; indicate.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 447 (6th ed. 1990). In the Code of Virginia and the 

decisions of this Court, the adjective, “designated,” is often 

applied to the general term, “streets,” to specify particular 

thoroughfares. See Code § 15.2-942 (empowering localities to 

restrict traffic on designated streets during historical 

reenactment events) (emphasis added); Code § 46.2-1304 

(empowering localities to prohibit the use of trucks on certain 

designated streets) (emphasis added). See also Carolina Coach 

Co. v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 322, 326, 117 S.E.2d 131, 135 
20

(1960) (applying Code § 46.1-181, predecessor statute to Code 

§ 46.2-1304). 

The term “designated streets” has been used in this 

specific sense in ordinances of other Virginia localities. 

White v. Hunt, 209 Va. 11, 14, 161 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1968), 

examined a provision of the Norfolk City Code that outlined the 

“[d]uty of a driver crossing or entering designated streets.” A 

subsequent provision named those designated streets. Id. A 

Falls Church city ordinance provided that historical 

preservation regulations apply to “designated structures.” Cook 

v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 244 Va. 107, 109, 418 S.E.2d 879, 

880 (1992). A subpart of the ordinance required that such 

structures be listed in a city register. Id.

“Designated streets” is not a defined term in the Code of 

the City of Galax. We must, therefore, adopt the meaning 

evident by the plain language of the ordinance. See Chappell v. 

Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 420, 587 S.E.2d 584, 588 (2003). With 

regard to the City Code’s provision permitting apartment use on 

“the first floor not fronting on designated streets,” as a 

conditional use, the plain meaning of the phrase “designated 

streets” must be those streets pointed out, named or indicated 

by the City. As noted above, the record is devoid of any 
21

evidence the City has done so as to South Main Street, or any 

other street. 

The effect of the majority’s decision is to effectively 

rewrite Galax City Code § 160-93(E) from its current provision1

to read “[a]partment use, both on the second floor and the first 

floor not fronting on streets in the Business General district.” 

Had the Galax City Council wished to adopt such an ordinance it 

could have done so, but did not. While City Council may elect 

to amend its zoning ordinances, that power is not within the 

province of the judiciary. Courts cannot add language to an 

ordinance that the drafters have not seen fit to include. See

Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 

564-65 (2003). “[N]or are they permitted to accomplish the same 

result by judicial interpretation.” Burlile v. Commonwealth, 

261 Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The only stated basis for the decision of the Board of 

Zoning Appeals denying the conditional use permit is that the 

Pattons’ building was on a designated street. While I recognize 

 

1

 Galax City Code § 160-93 reads as follows: Conditional 

uses in the Business General (B-2) District shall be permitted 

following a public hearing and approval . . . Conditional uses 

shall be one (1) or more of the following uses: . . . E. 

Apartment use, both on the second floor and the first floor not 

fronting on designated streets. 
22

that the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is presumed to 

be correct, Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 

44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1987), nevertheless, “if the 

administrative interpretation of a portion of an ordinance is so 

at odds with the plain language . . . , such interpretation is 

plainly wrong, and must be reversed.” Cook v. Board of Zoning 

Appeals, 244 Va. 107, 111, 418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992). The 

plain language of the ordinance requires the City to name, in 

some way, the particular streets within the zoning district 

where the first floor apartments fronting on that street do not 

qualify for a conditional use permit. Nothing in the record 

supports a finding that this ever occurred. 

The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals was thus 

plainly wrong and so is the judgment of the trial court 

affirming it. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the 

trial court in the law case.