SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1677-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

QUENTON C. JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued May 2, 2018 – Decided July 10, 2018

Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 

14-03-0622.

Clifford P. Yannone argued the cause for 

appellant (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally, 

Cunningham & Turnbach, attorneys; Clifford P. 

Yannone, on the brief).

Shiraz Imran Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for respondent (Joseph D. 

Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, 

of counsel; Shiraz Imran Deen, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1677-16T3

Defendant Quenton C. Jackson appeals from a January 3, 2017 

order denying his motion for a new trial. Defendant, convicted 

of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-7(b), was sentenced on November 16, 2016, to a five-year 

term of imprisonment subject to five years of parole ineligibility. 

The court granted defendant's request that he be permitted 

to represent himself on April 19, 2016, after a comprehensive 

Faretta1 hearing. The judge did, however, direct defendant to 

apply to the Office of Public Defender for standby counsel. The 

application was granted, and defendant had standby counsel 

available throughout the proceedings. 

Jury selection was completed on July 26, 2016. The following 

day, defendant failed to appear. Since defendant had been admitted 

to Monmouth Medical Center,

2 the judge adjourned the trial until 

August 2, 2016.

On August 1, 2016, defendant failed to contact the court, as 

he had been instructed, or to produce the documentation to 

corroborate his hospitalizations, and a bench warrant issued for 

 

1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 

2 In the transcripts of the proceedings, Monmouth Medical Center 

is referred to by its former name, the Paul Kimball Hospital.
3 A-1677-16T3

his arrest. He was located on August 2, at Ocean Medical Center,3

just after he had been discharged. Trial resumed, and the jury 

convicted defendant.

The facts leading to the charge can be described briefly. 

Ocean County Prosecutor's Office Special Operations Group 

detectives executed a warrant at defendant's residence related to 

an ongoing drug distribution investigation. Officers recovered a 

loaded black 9mm semi-automatic pistol from a sock hidden in a 

recess near defendant's kitchen cabinets. Several practice range 

shooting targets hung on a wall. 

The detectives conducted a taped interview after defendant 

signed a Miranda4 waiver. He admitted that he lived alone in the 

home, but denied any knowledge regarding the handgun. When asked 

about the target practice sheets hanging on the wall, defendant 

responded that he had brought them home from a shooting range 

where he uses 40mm rounds.

At the August 2 proceeding, the judge and defendant engaged 

in the following exchange:

THE COURT: [Defendant], you are present.

We have had to have the Sheriff's Department 

bring you in. It is 11:30. I believe they 

had you here at around 11. Good morning. We 

 

3 In the transcripts, Ocean Medical Center is referred to as Brick 

Hospital.

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 A-1677-16T3

provided you with some water. Anything you 

would like to say at this point in time? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, Your Honor. I'm not 

feeling well. 

THE COURT: Uh-huh. 

[DEFENDANT]: The Sheriffs came and got 

me out of the hospital. That's where I was 

at. The day that you called me for documents, 

I couldn't get that to you because I was in 

the hospital at the time, too. 

THE COURT: All right. Well, do you have 

any proof that you were in the hospital or 

anything? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Well, you can provide that to 

the [c]ourt. And I understand from my 

officers that you were released from the 

hospital, you were not admitted. 

[DEFENDANT]: Released today. That was 

today. 

THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm talking. 

That they in fact found you at Brick

Hospital after they had been to your house 

last night; after they had been to your house 

that you had given us your address this 

morning. That you were not at either place. 

That you were not at Paul Kimball Hospital 

this morning where your parents thought you 

were. And that they finally tracked you down 

at Brick Hospital. 

I'm informed by them that you were not 

admitted to the hospital and that you have

been discharged from the hospital. And I have 

no proof that you are not capable of 

continuing with this trial. 

For the record, you did not in any way 

comply with my instructions, both to you by 
5 A-1677-16T3

leaving a message on your phone as well as 

speaking with your girlfriend on a number of 

occasions, to provide the [c]ourt with proof 

that you in fact were admitted to a hospital 

and that you in fact had some diagnosis that 

would not allow you to continue with the 

trial. 

You are here this morning and we are 

ready to proceed.

Defendant contended he could not proceed:

THE COURT: Do you understand that, 

[defendant]?

[DEFENDANT]: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: You don't. All right. What 

part don't you understand?

[DEFENDANT]: I don't understand none of 

this. I'm ill right now and I don't know why 

I'm here. I just got out of the hospital. 

THE COURT: You're here because you 

started the trial and you've been discharged 

from the hospital. 

[DEFENDANT]: I've been back to the 

hospital.

THE COURT: And you haven't communicated 

with the [c]ourt in any way, shape or form 

since last Wednesday. 

[DEFENDANT]: Well, I was in the hospital 

last night, I was in the hospital today.

THE COURT: You've been discharged from 

the hospital, sir. 

[DEFENDANT]: I was in the hospital last 

night. 
6 A-1677-16T3

THE COURT: You've been discharged from 

the hospital this morning, sir. 

[DEFENDANT]: And I was in the hospital 

in Bricktown today. 

THE COURT: You've been discharged this 

morning. 

[DEFENDANT]: Where I got picked up. 

That's where I got picked up. 

THE COURT: So you're not going to 

stipulate that that document shows that you 

had a prior conviction in 2003 which can be 

demonstrated to the jury to indicate that you 

are a prior felon under the statute? Am I 

correct in assuming that? 

[DEFENDANT]: I can't tell you anything 

right now, sir. I'm not in my right state of

mind, so. 

THE COURT: All right. For the record, 

the [c]ourt is looking at the defendant and 

he appears to be sitting sort of properly in 

his chair. He is dressed as he was dressed 

the first day in what appears to be jeans and 

sneakers and a shirt at this time.

During the Miranda hearing, defendant again claimed he was 

unable to proceed:

THE COURT: [Defendant], any objection to 

the [p]rosecutor playing a redacted version? 

A version that doesn't have many things that 

are in this past statement, I assume. . . .

You shook your head no, does that mean no, 

[defendant]? 

[DEFENDANT]: I can't even -- I can't 

concentrate. I can't say. I plead the Fifth, 

Your Honor. 
7 A-1677-16T3

THE COURT: Okay. You can plead the 

Fifth. The [c]ourt, for the record, indicates 

that [defendant], when the portion came up 

about the gun I was observing [defendant], his 

eyes became completely wide open, he became 

interested in what was being said on the 

video.

When asked to comment about the proposed redactions, defendant and 

the judge had the following exchange: 

THE COURT: [Defendant], any comment on 

any of that? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I can't 

represent myself right now at this point. 

THE COURT: And why is that, sir? 

[DEFENDANT]: Because I can't think 

clearly. My blood pressure is probably 

through the roof right now and anxiety, so. 

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that. I'm 

observing you all this time. You do not appear 

to be in any distress whatsoever. 

[DEFENDANT]: That's your opinion, Your 

Honor. 

THE COURT: Yes, it is. 

[DEFENDANT]: That's your opinion. 

THE COURT: And I'm just placing on the 

record that I'm observing you and that is 

absolutely my opinion.

When asked if he wanted to continue to represent himself, or 

was willing to allow standby counsel to "step in," defendant

responded that he would prefer to retain his own attorney. The 
8 A-1677-16T3

court observed that defendant's similar request had been denied 

the prior week, and that the issue had arisen back in January. 

When the January request was made, defendant had contacted an 

attorney, but had not actually retained her. Because the lawyer 

had not yet been retained, the judge refused her request for an 

adjournment since the jury was "on its way over to begin [the] 

trial."

Defendant reiterated he could not proceed because of his 

health, and the judge denied his request for postponement. 

Defendant insisted that he could not stand when he addressed the 

judge because he might faint "[f]rom the pressure, the high blood 

pressure, the anxiety." The judge observed that defendant was 

physically able to fully participate and had repeatedly expressed 

his concerns on the record in a manner that corroborated the 

judge's perspective that he was fit to proceed. The judge added: 

"I am again placing on the record that I continue to observe you 

and I feel [you are] competent to continue at this time."

The medical and hospital documentation defendant provided in 

support of his application for a new trial stated that he suffered 

from anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and high blood pressure. 

Although defendant had gone for treatment to two different 

hospitals, both discharged him after an overnight stay. The 

medical documents included summaries finding defendant to be
9 A-1677-16T3

generally in normal health, not in need of further 

hospitalizations.

In ruling on the motion for a new trial after review of the 

documents, the judge held defendant was not prejudiced by being 

compelled to try the matter despite his alleged health problems. 

The judge said:

[T]he totality of the circumstances and the 

events that occurred, including what 

transpired before the trial, what transpired 

with the [c]ourt's impression that there was 

a delay tactic going on by the defendant in 

firing a very competent attorney who had 

obtained, in the [c]ourt's opinion, a plea 

bargain that was beneficial, noting all of the 

evidence that was presented against 

[defendant], and he denied or decided to not 

take the deal. That he then went into a delay 

mode after that and did everything he could 

after that to try to delay this trial. 

So I find that, while the motion is 

appropriate, it is out of time. But I will 

still, for the record, indicate that I am 

denying it both for that reason as well as for 

the reasons given as far as that I do not find 

that there was any prejudice to [defendant].

That I do not find that there has been any 

medical evidence submitted that would show 

that [defendant] in fact was not able to 

participate from a competency standpoint, from 

an ability to understand what was going on, 

from an ability to represent himself in this 

case. To understand that he had the right and 

the ability to question the standby attorney 

that the [c]ourt had appointed, to use the 

services of that attorney if he had any 

questions. 
10 A-1677-16T3

And I also find that, clearly, based on 

my observations and personal observations of 

the defendant during the trial, that he was 

more than capable and appropriate in preparing 

his defense and presenting his defense and in 

executing both his opening and closing 

statements, his objections to evidence and all 

things that an attorney would have done on his 

behalf. 

Could he have been represented better 

with respect to certain things if he had an 

attorney? I think that's probably true. But 

the [c]ourt does not feel that he has the right 

now to come back and say that certain things 

were not done properly because he was not 

familiar with court rules and things like that 

and that he was too sick to continue. I think 

his own reactions, his own demeanor proved 

that he was capable of proceeding to trial at 

that time. So I deny all of the requests that 

were made on behalf of the defendant at this 

time. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 

APPLICATION TO POSTPONE THE TRIAL BECAUSE HE 

HAD EXPERIENCED MEDICAL ISSUES THAT DEEMED HIM 

UNFIT TO PROCEED AS AN INEXPERIENCED PRO SE 

LITIGANT THUS DENYING APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL 

IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO R. 3:20-1 

BECAUSE HE WAS REQUIRED TO PROCEED AS AN 

INEXPERIENCED PRO SE LITIGANT SUFFERING WITH

MEDICAL ISSUES THAT PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND 

DEPRIVED HIM A FAIR TRIAL THUS CAUSING A 

MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW. 
11 A-1677-16T3

I.

Whether to grant an adjournment of trial due to a defendant's

health difficulties is a matter within the discretion of the trial 

court. State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259 (App. Div. 

1989); State v. Kaiser, 74 N.J. Super. 257, 271 (App. Div. 1962). 

The trial court's decision "will not be deemed reversible error 

absent a showing of an abuse of discretion which caused defendant 

a 'manifest wrong or injury.'" McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super at 259 

(quoting State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 

1985)). 

According to the Kaiser court, 

Among those factors deserving consideration by 

the court in the exercise of its discretion 

are medical reports, personal observation of 

the accused, the effect of a continuance upon 

the State's ability to produce evidence at a 

subsequent date, and whether or not the 

accused will be better able to stand trial at 

a later time. 

[74 N.J. Super. at 271.] 

We also consider "the clarity of the accused's testimony at trial 

and the conduct of the trial court in granting defendant periods 

of rest whenever . . . requested." Ibid. (citing State v. Pierce, 

27 P.2d 1087, 1088 (Wash. 1933)).

Furthermore, a trial court's decision on a motion for new 

trial "shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there 
12 A-1677-16T3

was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-1. We defer 

to the trial court with respect to "intangibles" not transmitted 

by the record, including credibility and demeanor, but otherwise 

make our own independent determination of whether a miscarriage 

of justice occurred. Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 360 (1979); 

Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977); Dolson 

v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-8 (1969); Kimmel v. Dayrit, 301 N.J. 

Super. 334, 355 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Caputa v. Antiles, 296 

N.J. Super. 123, 138-39 (App. Div. 1996)).

II.

Although framed as two separate points of error, defendant 

makes essentially the same argument as to both: that defendant's 

health mandated an adjournment. To the contrary, our review of 

the medical records supports the judge's conclusion that 

defendant's health did not warrant a postponement. No due process 

violation occurred because his application was denied. 

Defendant's health issues were not disabling, and although he 

attempted to be admitted into a second facility when discharged 

from the first, he was quickly discharged from that hospital as 

well. The trial judge repeatedly observed that defendant was

responding throughout the trial as capably as could be expected 

from a self-represented litigant. 
13 A-1677-16T3

When we review the Kaiser factors, that analysis supports the 

trial judge's decision denying the motion for a new trial. The 

medical records documented that defendant's medical problems were 

not so serious as to impact his self-representation. The judge 

repeatedly observed that defendant's demeanor, attentiveness, and

questions to witnesses established beyond question his ability to 

proceed. Although the State would suffer minimal prejudice in 

light of the nature of the charge, defendant's diagnosed conditions 

are chronic. An adjournment would not have made a significant 

change to defendant's anxiety, depression, and elevated blood 

pressure. Independently weighing the Kaiser factors, we conclude

the judge did not err in denying defendant's motion for a 

postponement upon his return to court after the execution of the 

arrest warrant.

III.

Defendant's motion for a new trial was made out of time. 

However, the judge nonetheless ruled on the merits. As we have 

said, the judge found that defendant's conduct during the trial 

was entirely appropriate. He denied the motion as untimely and 

on the merits, and both decisions are supported by the record and 

relevant precedent. The denial of the motion for a new trial was 

not a miscarriage of justice.

Affirmed.