J-S02029-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER GOODWIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3609 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 24, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0012214-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2018

Appellant Christopher Goodwin appeals pro se from the order denying 

his timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition without a hearing. 

Appellant raises a multitude of ineffective assistance of counsel claims2in 

connection with his conviction for first-degree murder3 and related offenses.4 

Appellant also asserts that the PCRA court erred by failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing, refusing to allow him to amend his PCRA petition, and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 We have reordered Appellant’s claims and arguments for the purpose of 

review. 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106, 6108.
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accepting PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel pursuant to 

Turner/Finley.

5

 We affirm.

A review of the record reveals the following facts and procedural history 

relevant to this appeal. Shortly after midnight on June 25, 2011, Dwayne 

Isaacs (Decedent) was shot and killed in the Wilson Park project in 

Philadelphia (Wilson Park). The shooting occurred in a small circular park near 

27th and Jackson Streets. Investigators obtained information that three 

individuals, Andre Cunningham, Aaron Respes, and Raheem Zachary, 

witnessed the shooting. 

Philadelphia Police Detective John Verrecchio was assigned the case, 

and Detective Thomas Gaul assisted Detective Verrecchio. Police also received 

anonymous tips regarding the incident, but those tips were not documented 

in writing.

On July 21, 2011, Cunningham gave a written statement to Detectives 

Verrecchio and Gaul.6 According to Cunningham’s statement, he was in the 

park, and Aaron Respes and Raheem Zachary were sitting on a bench inside 

the park. Appellant climbed over a fence to enter the park, went to Respes 

____________________________________________

5 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 

6Cunningham was brought to the police station approximately eighteen hours 

before giving his written statement to Detectives Verrecchio and Gaul. 
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and Zachary, and asked them if they had any “Xannies.”7 Decedent walked 

down the pathway of the park. Appellant approached Decedent and shot 

Decedent in the head. After Decedent fell to the ground, Appellant continued 

shooting as he walked away from Decedent. 

Cunningham identified Appellant as the shooter by Appellant’s 

nickname, “Gunna,” by his first name, “Chris,” and by his photograph. 

Cunningham signed his written statement to the police and Appellant’s 

photograph. 

The following day, July 22, 2011, Respes gave a written statement to 

Detectives Verrecchio and Gaul.8 According to Respes, he was walking past 

the park and saw Appellant shoot Decedent. Respes identified Appellant by 

his nickname, and by a photograph. Respes signed his statement and 

Appellant’s photograph. Respes did not indicate that there were other people 

in the area or that Appellant asked for “Xannies.”

Zachary was also interviewed by police. However, Zachary refused to 

give a written statement.9

____________________________________________

7 No evidence was introduced to establish that the term “Xannies” referred to 

a narcotic. However, “Xannies” apparently referred to Xanax. See N.T., 

5/22/14, at 219.

8 Respes was brought to the police station approximate twelve hours before 

giving his written statement to Detectives Verrecchio and Gaul.

9 A police activity log associated with Zachary’s oral statement indicated, in 

part, that Zachary told detective that he was in the park at the time of the 

shooting but did not see the shooter. 
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Investigators also received information that Decedent was involved in a 

confrontation with Leroy Brown (Kamac)10 shortly before the shooting. The

information suggested that the confrontation involved a prior home invasion 

during which Rahsul Issacs, Decedent’s nephew, shot Lekkir Brown, Kamac’s 

son. 

On August 2, 2011, Appellant was charged with the murder of Decedent 

and was taken into custody that same day. The trial court initially scheduled 

a preliminary hearing for August 24, 2011, but continued the hearing when 

Cunningham and Respes failed to appear. 

On October 25, 2011, Detectives Verrecchio and Gaul brought Respes 

to court for the preliminary hearing. At the hearing, Respes testified that 

Appellant shot Decedent.11 

Immediately after the preliminary hearing, Respes met with Tobi 

Downing, a relocation coordinator in the District Attorney’s Office. Respes 

signed a form declining relocation assistance. 

Two days after his first meeting with Tobi Downing, Aaron Respes called 

the relocation office. The next day, on October 28, 2011, Respes again met 

with Downing, this time with his mother. At some point after that meeting, 

Respes and his mother moved out of Wilson Park. 

____________________________________________

10 Appellant uses the spelling “Camac” throughout his brief. We use the 

spelling “Kamac” based on the spelling used in the trial transcript. 

11 Cunningham did not appear at the October 25, 2011 preliminary hearing. 
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On June 3, 2012, Cunningham contacted a defense investigator and 

recanted his statement to the police. Cunningham informed the defense 

investigator that a detective, allegedly Detective John Pitts, choked him before 

he gave his statement to Detectives Verrecchio and Gaul.

In May 2013, immediately before trial, Cunningham met the assigned 

prosecutor at her office. Detective Verrecchio was also present during 

portions of the meeting. At some point during this meeting, the 

Commonwealth printed photographs from Facebook purporting to show 

Appellant and Lekkir Brown together, as well as Respes. 

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial, and the Commonwealth began its 

case on May 20, 2013. The Commonwealth asserted that Appellant shot and 

killed Decedent in retaliation for the shooting of Kamac’s son by Decedent’s 

nephew during a home invasion. In support, the Commonwealth called 

Decedent’s sister, Lisa Hall, who testified that Decedent told her about a

confrontation with Kamac. According to Hall, Decedent told her that he was 

worried about going out in the neighborhood because of his confrontation with 

Kamac.

During the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Cunningham, 

Cunningham recanted his statement to police and testified that he did not see 

the shooting. According to Cunningham, he was intoxicated at the time of the 

interview. The prosecutor also questioned Cunningham about their meeting 

shortly before trial and the process by which the prosecutor obtained 

photographs from Facebook. The prosecutor also questioned Cunningham 
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about statements he purportedly made during that meeting, including 

statements involving threats against Respes. The Commonwealth admitted 

the Facebook photographs of Appellant and Lekkir Brown and of Respes into 

evidence.

On cross-examination, trial counsel elicited Cunningham’s testimony 

that he was on Taney Terrace where he saw Appellant with two females. 

Cunningham also testified that a black detective with a lump on his neck

choked and threatened him before he gave his statement to Detectives 

Verrecchio and Gaul. Cunningham did not know the name of the detective 

who threatened him. 

During the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Respes, Respes also 

recanted his statement to the police.

12

 The Commonwealth admitted 

Cunningham’s and Respes’ prior written and signed statements to police as 

substantive evidence. Respes denied receiving any threats or seeking 

relocation for himself. Respes explained that he agreed to relocation to assist 

his mother. 

The defense, in turn, emphasized that Cunningham’s and Respes’

statements to police should not be credited. The defense challenged the 

adequacy of the investigation into Decedent’s murder and asserted that there 

____________________________________________

12 Cunningham completely recanted his statement to police and testified that 

he did not see the shooting. Respes also denied identifying Appellant during 

his statement to the police. Respes testified at trial that he was at the scene 

of the shooting, heard a gunshot, and saw Decedent and “someone who 

looked like [Appellant]” holding a gun. N.T., 5/21/13, at 86-91. 
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was a rush to judgment to implicate Appellant. The defense emphasized that 

there were more likely suspects in the shooting, including Kamac, with whom 

Decedent was in a confrontation over the prior home invasion. Additionally, 

Anara Brown—Kamac’s niece and the cousin of Lekkir Brown, who was shot in 

the home invasion—testified for the defense. Anara Brown stated she was 

with Appellant on the 2600 block of Jackson Street at the time of the shooting. 

Appellant elected not to testify at trial.

On May 28, 2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder 

and related offenses. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

life imprisonment.

This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on July 14, 2014.13 

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 2009 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. July 14, 2014) 

(unpublished memorandum). On January 21, 2015, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 108 A.3d 34 (Pa. 2015).

On June 15, 2015, Appellant filed the timely pro se PCRA petition that 

gives rise to this appeal. The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent 

Appellant, and PCRA counsel entered his appearance on April 11, 2016. On 

July 8, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se motion for appointment of new PCRA 

counsel. On August 10, 2016, PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no-merit”

____________________________________________

13 In his direct appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence. See Goodwin, 2009 EDA 2013, at *2.
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letter. On September 6, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se “Response and 

Objection to Counsel’s ‘Finley No-Merit Letter.’” On September 22, 2016, the 

PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

That same day, the court denied Appellant’s July 8, 2016 request for new 

counsel.

Appellant filed a pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. 

On October 24, 2016, the PCRA court denied Appellant PCRA relief and granted 

PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal pro se. The PCRA court did not 

order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant, in his pro se brief, sets forth thirteen issues with related 

arguments. For the purposes of this appeal, we reproduce the headings of 

Appellant’s arguments in the following order:

14

1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to adequately prepare 

a pretrial investigation[?]

2. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor eliciting hearsay evidence of [Decedent’s] then 

existing state of mind[?]

3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor eliciting hearsay evidence of threats, arguing with 

____________________________________________

14 Appellant presents fifteen questions involved in this appeal, but combines 

several questions in the headings in his brief. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. We 

elect to address Appellant’s issues as stated in the headings for each issue in 

his brief, but have reordered the issues. 
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[a] witness, improper bolstering, the trial court giving a faulty 

instruction and allowing threat evidence[?]

4. Was trial counsel ineffective for opening the door to numerous 

[instances of] prejudicial testimony[?]

5. Was direct appeal counsel ineffective for failing to challenge 

hearsay evidence[?

15].

6. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object and request 

a mistrial due to [a] pretrial discovery violation[?]

7. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to elicit testimony that 

[K]amac was a possible shooter, by impeaching the witness 

with exculpatory evidence within his possession[?]

8. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s numerous fraud[s] upon the court[?]

9. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

numerous [instances of] prosecutorial misconduct in closing 

argument[?]

10. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor improperly focusing the jury[’s] attention on the 

element of fear in order to inflame the passions of the jury[?] 

11. W[ere] Appellant’s due process rights violated due to the 

cumulative effect of the errors complained of herein[?]

12. Did the PCRA court err[] by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition 

without a[n] evidentiary hearing, failing to grant leave to 

amend, and accepting PCRA counsel Finley letter[?]

13. Was PCRA counsel ineffective due to the following 

performance summarized below[?] 

____________________________________________

15 The heading in page 27 of Appellant’s brief stated: “Was trial counsel 

ineffective for opening the door to numerous prejudicial testimony and was 

direct appeal counsel ineffective for failing to challenge hearsay evidence.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 27 (some capitalization omitted). We have separated 

these two arguments for the purposes of this disposition. 
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See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12, 19, 21, 27, 31, 35, 38, 40, 44, 48, 51, 52

(some capitalization omitted). 

Appellant, in his first ten issues, contends that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Our review is governed 

by the following principles: 

We must examine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s 

determination, and whether the PCRA court’s determination is free 

of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.

* * *

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided 

effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and 

proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any 

objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s 

error.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). We may affirm the PCRA court’s ruling on any basis apparent in the 

record. Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2009).

1. Trial counsel’s failure to prepare a pretrial investigation 

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his claims that trial counsel failed to prepare for trial. In support, 

he argues that trial counsel failed to investigate or call two witness—Tiara 

Young and Raheem Zachary. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. Appellant also 

suggests that trial counsel appeared to be unaware of information in the 

anonymous tips given to police and Respes’ relocation paperwork. Further, 
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Appellant argues that trial counsel should have discovered and presented 

evidence that Detective Pitts had a history of threatening and assaulting 

suspects. Id. at 15-17. We address these arguments separately.

(A) Tiara Young

The background to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel should have 

investigated Tiara Young is as follows. Yvette Morris gave a statement to 

police that Young called her after the shooting and said that there was a rumor 

that Kamac shot the victim. Appellant’s Brief at 13. From this, Appellant 

suggests that a proper investigation of Young would have revealed the identity 

of the individual who stated that Kamac was the actual shooter.

When raising a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to call a potential 

witness, a petitioner must establish that 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, 

the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify 

for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the 

witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair 

trial.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810-11 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted).

Instantly, Appellant failed to establish that either Tiara Young or the 

individual who allegedly told Young about the crime existed or were available 

and willing to testify for the defense. Thus, Appellant’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to investigate or call Young fails. See Matias, 63 

A.3d at 810-11.
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(B) Raheem Zachary

As to Zachary, Appellant assserts Zachary would have testified that he 

saw the shooter, who did not match Appellant’s description, and could have 

provided further testimony to support Appellant’s alibi defense by testifying 

that he saw Appellant with two females on the 2600 block of Jackson Street.16 

Appellant specifically argues the PCRA court erred in concluding that Appellant 

failed to establish prejudice. Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.

Our review reveals that Zachary’s proposed testimony that he saw an 

individual running from the scene is too speculative to warrant relief, as 

Zachary testified he was one block away from the shooting and did not see 

the shooting. Thus, Zachary’s mere assertion that the individual he saw was 

the shooter, does not establish merit or prejudice based on trial counsel’s 

alleged failure to discover this information. See Matias, 63 A.3d at 810-11. 

Moreover, Zachary’s proposed testimony that he saw Appellant with two 

women on the 2600 block of Jackson Street was cumulative of testimony 

already presented at trial. Anara Brown testified at trial that she was with 

____________________________________________

16 We note that Appellant, in his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice 

provided a certification that Raheem Zachary would testify that he had a clear 

view of the shooter and that Appellant was not the shooter. Appellant’s 

certification also indicated that Zachary refused to sign a statement the 

detective’s prepared implicating Appellant during the investigation. Appellant 

has also attached to his brief an affidavit in which Zachary states he saw 

Appellant and two females outside 2620 Jackson Street, and then heard shots. 

Zachary saw a person fleeing the scene of the shooting who did not match 

Appellant’s description. We will consider Zachary’s affidavit for the purpose 

of this appeal. 
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Appellant in front of 2620 Jackson Street at the time of the shooting and that 

Appellant did not shoot Decedent.17 N.T., 5/22/13, at 248-49, 252-53. 

Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant did not establish 

prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged failure to interview or call Zachary. See 

id. 

(C) Anonymous tips and Aaron Respes’ relocation paperwork

Appellant also argues the PCRA court improperly rejected his claim that 

trial counsel’s failed to investigate the anonymous tips received by police and 

Respes’ relocation paperwork. In sum, Appellant claims that if trial counsel 

had been prepared, counsel could have utilized information to better effect or 

refrained from referring to other information. These arguments, however, are 

duplicative of more specific claims discussed below. At this juncture, we note 

that the record belies Appellant’s arguments that trial counsel failed to 

discover the information that (1) the anonymous tips received by the police 

implicated Appellant, as well as other individuals, in the shooting, and (2) 

Respes declined relocation services. 

(D) Evidence regarding Detective Pitts

Appellant further argues the PCRA court should have granted relief on 

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the 

detective who allegedly brutalized Cunningham before Cunningham gave his 

____________________________________________

17 Additionally, after recanting his statement to police, Cunningham testified 

that he observed Appellant with the two women at the time of the murder. 

See N.T. Trial, 5/20/13, at 247.
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written statement. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant specifically asserts that 

the PCRA court erred in concluding that evidence of Detective Pitts’ behavior 

in other cases was not admissible in the instant case. Id. at 18-19. Appellant 

argues that the evidence of Detective Pitts’ record in other cases would be 

admissible as rebuttal evidence of Detective Gaul’s testimony regarding the 

character of Detective Pitts. Id. 

The PCRA court, when dismissing this claim, opined: 

[Appellant] alleges that trial counsel failed to introduce 

corroborating evidence tending to prove that Detective James 

Pitts threatened and choked Cunningham in order to elicit a 

statement. Cunningham testified that Pitts choked him in both 

direct and cross-examination. [Appellant] claims that two 

homicide cases . . . were dismissed because witnesses were 

choked by Detective Pitts. [Appellant] argues that trial counsel 

was unaware of these cases, and had he brought them up, 

[Appellant] would have been acquitted. 

[Appellant] fails to demonstrate that such evidence is relevant and 

admissible. Detective Pitts did not interview Cunningham, he did 

not record Cunningham’s statement, nor did he testify at trial, 

precluding introduction on an impeachment basis. If such

evidence were offered to show that Pitts did in fact choke [other 

defendants], it would be precluded as inadmissible hearsay.

Moreover, the Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. Trial 

counsel effectively and reasonably raised the issue. Not only did

Cunningham testify that Detective Pitts choked him, but trial 

counsel elicited further evidence of Pitts’ abuse while crossexamining Cunningham, Detective Gaul, and Detective 

Verrecchio. Trial counsel’s examination permitted the jury to infer 

that Detective Pitts may have coerced Cunningham, but they 

found the Petitioner guilty regardless.

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/24/16, at 22 (footnotes and record citations omitted). 

Following our review, we agree with the PCRA court’s cogent analysis. 

Of note, the PCRA judge in this case also presided over trial and was able to 
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make factual findings and credibility determinations based on the existing 

record that Cunningham did not encounter Detective Pitts. See Franklin, 

990 A.2d at 797. Thus, we discern no basis upon which to disturb its ruling.18

2. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor eliciting hearsay 

evidence of Decedent’s then existing state of mind

Appellant’s next issue focuses on trial counsel’s failure to object to 

testimony regarding statements Decedent made before he was killed. 

According to Appellant, trial counsel’s omission permitted the Commonwealth 

to introduce hearsay evidence that resulted in prejudice. 

The background to this claim is as follows. Lisa Hall testified for the 

Commonwealth that she spoke with Decedent on the telephone approximately 

two hours before Decedent was shot. Hall and Decedent discussed the prior 

home invasion during which Decedent’s nephew, Rahsul Isaacs, was rumored 

to have shot Lekkir Brown. See N.T., 5/21/13, at 263. Hall further testified 

that Decedent told her he “was kind of leery about going out to the project 

because of what [Kamac] had said to him and the young guys that was out 

there.” Id. 

____________________________________________

18 Appellant has also filed an application to vacate and remand based on afterdiscovered evidence related to this claim. Specifically, he references 

additional evidence regarding Detective Pitts, namely, that a court has 

reviewed Detective Pitts’ internal affairs file and that another PCRA petitioner 

obtained a new trial in a case in which the detective was involved. However, 

given the PCRA court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility based 

on the existing record, this additional evidence does not warrant relief. 
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Appellant, in his pro se PCRA petition, alleged that trial counsel should 

have objected to Hall’s testimony that Decedent was afraid as hearsay. PCRA 

Pet., 6/15/15, at 36. PCRA counsel, when seeking leave to withdraw from 

representation, asserted that Appellant’s claim was meritless because Hall’s 

testimony fell within the state of mind exception to the general rule against 

hearsay. Finley Ltr., 6/11/16, at 5 (unpaginated). 

The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s claim on an alternative basis. The 

court reasoned that Decedent’s statements were admissible because the 

“evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to establish 

[Appellant’s] motive[.]” PCRA Ct. Op., at 9-10. Thus, the court concluded 

that trial counsel had no basis to object.19

Appellant presently argues that the PCRA court’s rationale is 

unsustainable. In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Moore, 

937 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 2007). Appellant’s Brief at 21.

It is well settled that “[h]earsay is an out-of-court statement offered to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted” and is generally inadmissible. See

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). 

When an extrajudicial statement is offered for a purpose other 

than proving the truth of its contents, it is not hearsay and is not 

excludable under the hearsay rule. Thus, statements are 

____________________________________________

19 The PCRA court specifically rejected PCRA counsel’s assertion that the 

testimony regarding Decedent’s statements were admissible under the “state 

of mind” exception to the rule against hearsay. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 10 n. 2.
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admissible to establish ill-will or motive where they are not being 

offered for the truth of the matter contained therein.

Id.

In Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 2007), however, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a victim’s statement that was 

admitted as “circumstantial evidence to establish the victim’s fear,” and 

establish the defendant’s motive was inadmissible. Id. at 1072. In Moore, 

the Court concluded was statements of the victim that the defendant bullied 

him was “plainly relevant to [the defendant]’s motive only to the degree that 

the hearsay statements were true.” Id.

In light of the foregoing, we agree with the PCRA court that Decedent’s 

statement regarding the prior shooting of Lekkir Brown and the rumor that 

Decedent’s nephew was responsible for the shooting of Lekkir Brown was not 

hearsay. The truth of those matters were not at issue and, therefore, did not 

constitute hearsay. See Puksar, 740 A.2d at 225.

Decedent’s statements that he was in a confrontation with Kamac and 

was fearful of going out into the neighborhood, however, fall closer to Moore

than Puksar. The motive or ill-will asserted by the Commonwealth in this 

case depended on the truth of Decedent’s statement that the confrontation 

occurred. See Moore, 937 A.2d at 1072. 

Nevertheless, unlike Moore, Decedent’s statements regarding the 

confrontation with Kamac, Lekkir Brown’s son, did not directly implicate 

Appellant in any prior bad acts or wrongdoing. Moreover, the fact that Kamac 
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confronted Decedent about the prior shooting of Lekkir Brown was undisputed

and was essential to the defense’s theory that Kamac had a greater motive to 

kill Decedent that Appellant. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude 

that the error in admitting Decedent’s statement resulted in a reasonable 

probability that the outcome at trial would have been different. Thus, this 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not warrant relief. See Franklin, 

990 A.2d at 797; Wiley, 966 A.2d at 1157.

3. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor eliciting hearsay 

evidence of threats, arguing with a witness, improper bolstering, 

the trial court giving a faulty instruction and allowing threat 

evidence

In his next issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in rejecting 

his ineffectiveness claims as to: (A) the prosecutor’s references to threats 

during the examination of Cunningham and Respes, the two witnesses who 

provided statements to the police, (B) the trial court’s cautionary instructions, 

(C) hearsay evidence regarding threats against Respes that were introduced 

through the relocation coordinator Tobi Downing, and (D) the prosecutor’s 

“arguing” with Cunningham.20 See Appellant’s Brief 19-27. 

(A) Threats

____________________________________________

20 We have reordered the presentation of Appellant’s arguments in support of 

this issue. 
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As to the prosecutor’s references to threats against Cunningham and 

Respes, Appellant cites to the following portions of the Commonwealth’s direct 

examination of Cunningham: 

[Prosecutor] Okay. Didn’t you tell me in my office on Friday 

that [Appellant’s] brother, Gunna Ish, that goes by that nickname, 

Gunna Ish, threatened Aaron [Respes]?

[Cunningham] No.

Q You didn’t tell me in my office that [Appellant’s] brother told 

Aaron, if he does time, then Aaron’s dead?

A No.

N.T., 5/20/13, at 227.

Appellant also refers to the following portions of the Commonwealth’s 

direct examination of Respes regarding the events after Respes testified at 

the preliminary hearing:

[Prosecutor] Okay. How about when you were leaving the 

courthouse with the detectives.

Did you see people from Wilson [Park] outside the room?

[Respes] No.

Q How about outside the courthouse?

A No.

Q Nothing?

A No. You can’t see out of those curtains.

Q I’m talking about when you were walking out with detectives 

over to my office.

Do you remember that?

A No.
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Q You don’t remember?

A Yeah, I remember walking over, but I didn’t see anybody from 

Wilson.

Q You don’t remember anyone yelling “snitch” when you were 

walking with the detectives?

A No.

Q Do you remember why you went to my office after?

A No.

Q Do you remember that you got interviewed for possible 

relocation?

* * *

[Prosecutor] Do you know the [Appellant’s] brother, Ishmael 

Goodwin?

[Respes] Yes.

Q Does he have a nickname?

A Ish.

Q Okay. Do they call him Gunna Ish or just Ish?

A Ish. I call him Ish.

Q Okay. He never threatened you?

A No.

Q Never said that if his brother does time, you’re going to get 

killed?

A No.

Q Do you see Ish in the courtroom?

A Yes, he's right there.

Q What color shirt is he wearing?

A Blue.

Q The second row of people in that light blue shirt right there?
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A Yes.

Q That’s [Appellant’s] brother?

A Yes. 

Q Okay. Do you see other people in the neighborhood from 

Wilson?

A Yes.

N.T., 5/21/13, at 138, 146-47.

Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred in concluding that the 

prosecutor’s references to threats were introduced to explain Cunningham’s 

and Respes’ recantation at trial. Appellant insists that this evidence was 

introduced to allege that he and his brother intimidated witnesses and to 

establish consciousness of guilt. He further contends that the testimony

regarding threats was unreliable because both Cunningham and Respes

testified at trial that they were not threatened. Appellant’s Brief at 22-23.

We have reviewed the record and discern no merit to Appellant’s claim. 

Although a variety of threat evidence was presented at trial and referred to 

by the Commonwealth, the evidence was admitted to explain Cunningham’s 

and Respes’ recantations of their statements to the police. See 

Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811, 824 (Pa. 1994) (indicating that 

where the purpose of introducing threat evidence is not to establish guilt, but 

to explain a prior inconsistent statement, it is a permissible use). Indeed, the 

trial court issued a cautionary instruction to this effect and clearly stated that 

the only purpose of the evidence of threats against Cunningham and Respes 
J-S02029-18

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was for assessing the credibility of their trial testimony.21 N.T. Trial, 5/28/13, 

at 113; see Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 673 (Pa. 2015) 

(reiterating that “[j]uries are presumed to follow such instructions”). Thus, 

we discern no basis to disturb the PCRA court’s ruling that the threats evidence 

was admissible and that trial counsel had no basis to object. 

(B) Cautionary instructions

Appellant also complains that the trial court’s cautionary instructions 

implicated him in the threats against and that trial counsel should have 

objected. As noted above, the Commonwealth referred to threats during its 

direct examination of Cunningham and Respes. However, both Cunningham 

and Respes denied the allegations that threats were made. Additionally, 

Respes specifically denied hearing any threats after his preliminary hearing or 

seeing any individuals from the Wilson Park neighborhood at the preliminary 

hearing. 

The Commonwealth, however, subsequently called Detective Gaul. 

Detective Gaul testified, in part, that Aaron Respes appeared fearful when 

entering and leaving the courtroom. Detective Gaul further testified that after 

Respes testified at the preliminary hearing, the detective and Respes were 

____________________________________________

21 The entire cautionary instruction issued by the trial court is reproduced 

below in connection with Appellant’s separate challenge to the instruction 

itself. Moreover, we note that the court did not issue a consciousness of guilt 

instruction.
J-S02029-18

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walking through the hallway of the courthouse to go to the District Attorney’s 

office. N.T., 5/22/13, at 48. Detective Gaul continued: 

Basically, after we passed through, like, you know, it was a large 

crowd. But as you’re walking through the crowd, you can’t see 

who’s yelling stuff, but they’re yelling at [Respes], you know, 

snitch, things of that nature. And we’re just trying to get him 

through the crowd and get him over the District Attorney’s Office, 

but he was visibly shaken by what was going on.

Id. 

In its charge to the jury, the trial court issued the following cautionary 

instruction:

You also heard evidence throughout the course of this trial about 

alleged intimidation and/or threats. I want to point out to you 

that the only specific evidence that you had in this case was that 

someone shouted out after the preliminary hearing a Mr. Respes 

was walking down the hall, called him a name, and I believe it was 

a snitch.

Now, first of all, there’s no evidence that that was done on 

the defendant’s behalf or clearly it was not done by the 

defendant. But this evidence is before you for, once again, a 

limited purpose, and that is that the evidence of the calling out of 

the name and any other evidence concerning possible intimidation 

or about any of the witnesses in this case, this evidence is before 

you for a limited purpose, and that is for the purpose of helping 

you in assessing the credibility of Mr. Cunningham and Mr. 

Respes. It must not be considered by you in any way other than 

the purpose for which I stated. It’s one factor that you use when

you determine the credibility and weight of each of the witnesses.

N.T., 5/28/13 at 112-13 (emphasis added). 

Appellant complains that by referencing the evidence that someone 

yelled “snitch,” the trial court improperly suggested that Detective Gaul’s 

version of the events at the preliminary hearing were credible. Appellant’s 
J-S02029-18

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Brief at 25. Appellant further suggests that the instruction insinuated that 

Appellant was connected to the threats. Id. He asserts that the trial court 

should have stated that there was no evidence linking Appellant to the threats 

and then stopped. Id. Thus, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the instruction, and that the PCRA court erred 

in dismissing this claim as meritless. 

Following our review, we agree with the PCRA court that this claim relies 

on a strained reading of the cautionary instruction, which was proper in all 

respects. The trial court accurately indicated that there was evidence that an 

unknown individual called Respes a snitch. The trial court further made clear 

that Appellant was not linked to the name calling or any threats. Thus, the 

PCRA court properly concluded that Appellant’s assertion that the instruction 

was improper lacked arguable merit.

(C) Testimony of Tobi Downing

Appellant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the testimony of the relocation coordinator Tobi Downing, who 

discussed her two meetings with Respes after Respes testified at the 

preliminary hearing. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth elicited 

hearsay statement from Respes and improperly bolstered Respes’ prior 

statement to the police. Appellant contends the admission of those 

statements violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 

Appellant further contends that Ms. Downing’s testimony improperly bolstered 
J-S02029-18

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the “fear factor” emphasized by the Commonwealth throughout trial. 

Appellant’s Brief at 24. 

However, the record indicates that the Commonwealth did not elicit Tobi 

Downing’s testimony regarding statements made by Aaron Respes. Rather,

Downing testified to the facts regarding their meetings after Respes testified 

at the preliminary hearing. Moreover, Respes was available for crossexamination by Appellant. In any event, Appellant appears to suggest that 

Downing’s testimony was unreliable because Respes, at trial, testified he 

denied relocation services at the first meeting with Downing and only 

appeared to accept relocation services at the second meeting to assist his 

mother. Such evidence was admissible for the purposes of impeachment to 

explain Respes’ recantation. Therefore, Appellant fails to establish any 

arguable merit to his claim that trial counsel should have objected to

Downing’s testimony.

(D) Arguing with a Witness

Appellant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the prosecutor’s examination of Cunningham regarding the meeting 

between the prosecutor and Cunningham shortly before trial. 

By way of background, Detective Verrecchio described the meeting as 

follows. Cunningham was with the prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office and 

was “cooperative and forthcoming.” N.T., 5/22/13, at 154. According to the 

detective, at some point during the meeting, Cunningham accessed Facebook 

on the prosecutor’s computer and identified individuals from pictures on 
J-S02029-18

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Facebook. Id. at 155. Copies of those pictures were printed at that time. At 

trial, they were marked as exhibits, and published to the jury. 

Appellant’s claim arises out of the following portion of the 

Commonwealth’s direct examination of Cunningham:

[Prosecutor] And when you were in my office, do you 

remember talking with me in front of Detective Verrecchio?

[Cunningham] Yeah. He was asking me why I didn’t come to 

court and stuff.

Q And we also went over what happened the night of the 

murder; right?

A Yes.

Q And you told me everything that you saw, and what you told 

me was consistent with this statement; right?

A No. I told you that I was on Taney Terrace.

Q Are you telling me that in my office with Detective 

Verrecchio you didn’t tell me how this defendant committed this 

murder?

A I told you I was on Taney Terrace.

Q You’re not answering my question.

A You never said nothing about that. You said, What 

happened? And I told you I was on Taney Terrace. And then you 

started going into the statement and stuff, and that was about it.

Q Actually, I never showed you your statement when you were 

there. You didn’t show me the statement. You started talking 

about it.

Q I asked you what happened, and you told me that [Appellant], 

Gunna, committed the shooting and you saw it; right?

A I did not say that.

Q You didn’t say that?

A No.
J-S02029-18

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Q Well, you sat down, in fact, at my computer and started 

printing out Facebook pictures of everyone, didn’t you? 

A No. You went on my Facebook.

THE COURT: She went on your Facebook?

[Cunningham]: Yes. She asked me to log in. And I logged 

in for her, and she went on my Facebook.

THE COURT: Was there a detective there?

THE WITNESS: He was in and out. He was in and out. 

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

***

Q All right. Well, let me ask you this: You have a Facebook 

page?

A Yes.

Q Is there a password for your Facebook page?

A Yes.

Q And on last Thursday, after you repeated the whole murder 

that you witnessed, you said, I’ll even show you some pictures of 

everyone on Facebook, and you showed them to me, didn't you?

A No. I gave you my password. You went through it, and I 

was sitting in the chair. And that’s when you offered to buy me 

soup.

Q To buy you soup?

A Yes.

Q Are you saying that you only gave me Facebook pictures 

because I bought you soup?

A No.

Q You didn’t eat all night overnight, did you?

A I didn’t eat since I was locked up.
J-S02029-18

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Q You told that your stomach hurt and you didn’t want to eat; 

right?

A I told you I was cool. You kept offering to buy me soup. 

You said you was going to go get it.

Q All right. Am I supposed to let you starve in my office?

A No. 

N.T., 5/20/13, at 206-08. 

According to Appellant,

The prosecutor sought to bolster the witness[’] out-of-court police 

statement by arguing with Mr. Cunningham about things the 

witness allegedly said to her out of court. The prosecutor claimed 

that Mr. Cunningham told her exactly what [i]s in his police 

statement when they were at her office. The witness claimed that 

he told her exactly what [i]s in his affidavit taken by the defense 

investigator. The prosecutor continued to argue with the witness 

and insinuated the witness is lying. The prosecutor presented no 

evidence, not even in the form of a written statement or recording 

of that interv[ie]w. The prosecutor then argued with the witness 

about [F]acebook pictures. The witness claimed that the 

prosecutor went through his [F]acebook page and the prosecutor 

claim[ed] that the witness gave her the pictures. Through the 

course of them arguing about who printed the pictures, the 

prosecutor is calling the witness a liar and claiming that he 

identified peo[pl]e to her personally. Also, the [t]rial [c]ourt had 

to stop the prosecutor from bullying the witness. 

Trial counsel[’s] failure to object was not the result of any 

strategy. [T]rial counsel allowed the prosecutor to inject facts 

outside the record to allege [A]ppellant’s guilt. Moreover[,] the 

prosecutor undermined Mr. Cunningham’s credibility. The 

prosecutor offered no evidence of proof and this misconduct was 

seen by the jury as the prosecutor[’s] own personal[] opinion of 

the witness.

Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. 
J-S02029-18

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Even if trial counsel could have objected to the manner of the 

prosecutor’s questioning of Cunningham, the exchange did not affect a fair 

consideration of Respes’ prior statements identifying Appellant as the shooter. 

Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Appellant has 

failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable possibility that the jury 

would have found Appellant not guilty had trial counsel objected to this 

exchange. See Franklin, 990 A.2d at 797; Wiley, 966 A.2d at 1157. 

4. Trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for opening the door to numerous 

instances of prejudicial testimony

Appellant, in his next issue, asserts that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his claims that trial counsel “opened the door” to irrelevant and 

prejudicial testimony. Appellant specifically argues that trial counsel was 

ineffective for eliciting (A) references to anonymous tips identifying Appellant 

as the killer; (B) references to Raheem Zachary’s oral statement to police; (C) 

statements referring to Appellant’s prior possession of a firearm; and (D) 

Appellant’s statement to Detective Verrecchio that he used “Xannies.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 27-31, 32-35.

(A) Anonymous Tips

As to Appellant’s argument as to anonymous tips received by police, the 

record reveals the following. During cross-examination of Detective Gaul, trial 

counsel inquired: “What did you do to find out the who, what, when, and 

why[]” of the shooting. N.T., 5/22/13, at 50. Trial counsel then asked where 

the detective obtained information that Appellant was an associate of Lekkir 
J-S02029-18

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Brown and the alleged motive for the shooting of Decedent. Id. at 52. The 

detective responded that “it was through, like, anonymous tips and 

investigation, you know, as far as motive and what was done throughout the 

investigation and what the investigation led to.” Id. 

Additionally, trial counsel posed the following question to Detective 

Gaul: “You told the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that immediately there 

were anonymous tips coming into the police department about who did it and 

what happened; right?” Id. at 68. The detective responded: 

Just anonymous tips coming into the Homicide Unit. Our general 

number is (215) 686-3334 or 3335, also 3336. I’m sorry. And 

people would call and say, Look, I know who did that shooting out 

there. They wouldn’t say how they know who did it, but they 

would supply a name or nickname. And all the consistent tips 

were Gunna. That’s what we had at first.

N.T., 5/22/13, at 69. 

The record also reveals that the trial court later cautioned the jury on 

the use of the reference to the anonymous tips during the presentation of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence: 

Members of the jury . . . I’m telling you, this morning you heard 

a lot of testimony about information from anonymous sources and 

what things normally happen.

I ruled about in response to rumors and alleged retaliation and 

intimidation of witnesses. I’m going to give you specific charges 

or instruction in reference to that before you begin your 

deliberations, but I just want to remind you that this is not really 

being offered for the truth of the matter in certain instances, but 

it’s being offered to challenge the credibility of certain witnesses.

And I just want to let you know that you will get more specific 

instructions on that later because, generally speaking, what other 
J-S02029-18

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people said isn’t before you for the truth of the matter. That’s 

why we have the witnesses come to court and testify. But right 

now, for instance, with the detectives, part of what's going on is 

there’s a question about what they did or why they did something 

and not other things. So some of that comes in for that purpose 

only and not for the truth of the matters.

So about the rumors, we have trials. We don’t convict people on 

rumors. That’s why we have trials and we have live witnesses. 

By live witnesses, I mean people that come in and testify in front 

of you.

N.T., 5/22/13, at 173-74. As noted above, the trial court repeated a similar 

instruction in its final charge to the jury.22 See N.T., 5/28/13, at 111-12. 

Appellant presently asserts that the references to the anonymous tips 

identifying him as the shooter constituted hearsay evidence and violated his 

confrontation rights. Id. 

As noted above, “an extrajudicial statement is offered for a purpose 

other than proving the truth of its contents, it is not hearsay and is not 

excludable under the hearsay rule.” Puksar, 740 A.2d at 225 (citation 

omitted). Moreover, even if inadmissible hearsay is admitted at trial, a 

cautionary instruction can dispel the prejudice as it is presumed that the jury 

followed the trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Bedford, 50 A.3d 

707, 713 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc). 

Instantly, the information contained in the anonymous tips were not 

admitted for the truth of the matter contained in the tips. See Puksar, 740 

____________________________________________

22 The cautionary instruction in the trial court’s final charge is reproduced 

above in conjunction with Issue 3(B). 
J-S02029-18

- 32 -

A.2d at 225. Additionally, the trial court’s careful instructions belie Appellant’s 

assertions that he suffered prejudice as a result from the remarks that the 

tips identified him as the shooter. See Bedford, 50 A.3d at 713. Therefore, 

no relief is due based on this claim. 

(B) Raheem Zachary’s statement

Appellant next argues that the trial counsel was ineffective for opening 

the door to references to Raheem Zachary’s oral statement to the police. 

Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant’s argument arises out of trial counsel’s 

cross-examination of Detectives Gaul and Verrecchio regarding their efforts to 

corroborate Cunningham’s statement to police. For example, during the 

cross-examination of Detective Gaul, trial counsel engaged in the following 

exchange:

[Trial counsel] In Mr. Cunningham’s statement, he said he 

went to a lady’s house by the name of Theresa; remember that?

[Detective Gaul] Yes, sir.

Q Anybody try to find Theresa?

A I believe that --

Q Try and corroborate that that’s where he was and that’s 

what he did?

A That may have been attempted. I know we did -- the main 

person that I know that we contacted to try to corroborate was 

Raheem Zachary.

Now, our contact with him was documented within an 

activity sheet that I believe was dated -- I believe it was filled out 

on July 30, and he was brought into the Homicide Unit on July 27. 

He refused to go on paper, but he also supplied information. I 

mean, if you’re asking for documentation, I believe that activity 

sheet’s within the file.
J-S02029-18

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Q I’ve seen that.

A Okay.

Q But I’m talking about Mr. Cunningham’s statement because 

Mr. Zachary didn’t give you a statement; right?

A Well, Mr. Zachary is mentioned in Mr. Cunningham’s 

statement, I believe, as far as being out there.

Q I understand.

A There were attempts made. As far as, like, Theresa that was 

mentioned, I might not have been the detective that went out and 

spoke with Theresa or maybe tried to locate Theresa, but it might 

have been done. Again, as far as my knowledge, you know, it 

could have been done; it couldn’t have been done. I wouldn’t be

able to tell you.

N.T., 5/22/13, at 72-73.

Moreover, during trial counsel’s cross-examination of Detective 

Verrecchio, the following exchange occurred:

[Trial counsel] Well, to corroborate what Mr. Cunningham said. 

He said that at least when he was giving his narrative, according 

to this interview about what happened, he said he was in the 

speakeasy. He was in the speakeasy with my client. He didn’t 

know my client had left the speakeasy, and identified him as a

shooter, at least in this interview.

[Detective Verrecchio] Well, there’s a lot of other corroboration 

in the interview. We don’t go out and corroborate every little 

detail that somebody would tell us. What we do is we corroborate 

what they’re saying, and he gave a lot of corroborative 

information during the course of the interview that definitely had 

the ring of truth.

Q Definitely had the ring of truth?

A Yes, sir.

Q Like Aaron Respes was sitting on a bench at the circle?

A Yes, with Zachary, Raheem Zachary.
J-S02029-18

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Q Yeah.

A He was sitting on the bench with him.

Q So he would have been -- both Aaron and Zachary would 

have been in the circle at the time that [Decedent] was shot?

A That’s correct.

Q And that had the ring of truth to you?

A Yes, it did. Raheem Zachary told us he was in the 

circle with him.

Q Did you write that down anywhere?

A I believe it’s in an activity sheet.

Q Did you do a formal interview with Mr. Zachary when he told 

you that?

A No. He refused to provide a written interview.

Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).

Appellant disputes the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant could not 

establish prejudice because the contents of Zachary’s statement were not 

revealed at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant asserts that trial counsel 

elicited hearsay statements by Zachary that bolstered the Commonwealth’s 

case and undermined the in-court testimony of other witnesses. Id. at 33. 

Appellant further suggests that trial counsel’s reference was prejudicial 

because it permitted the jury “to infer that . . . Zachary had harmful 

information[.]” Id. at 32.

We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to establish a basis 

for relief, albeit on different grounds. See Wiley, 966 A.2d at 1157. With 

respect to Detective Gaul’s testimony, the record establishes that Detective 
J-S02029-18

- 35 -

Gaul did not testify as to the contents of Raheem Zachary’s oral statement to 

police. Therefore, Appellant’s assertion that trial counsel permitted Detective 

Gaul to present hearsay evidence lacks arguable merit. 

Detective Verrecchio, however, testified to a portion of Raheem 

Zachary’s statement. Even assuming that trial counsel should have stricken 

or otherwise challenged the detective’s testimony, the passing reference to 

Zachary’s statement was not so inflammatory that the jury could not fairly 

decide Appellant’s guilt or innocence in this case. Appellant’s boilerplate 

contention that the jury could have concluded that Zachary implicated 

Appellant is too speculative to warrant relief.23 Furthermore, as noted above, 

although Detective Verrecchio’s unsolicited testimony could be read to 

corroborate Cunningham’s testimony, the jury also had Respes’ prior 

statement identifying Appellant as the shooter. Therefore, we decline to 

disturb the PCRA court’s ruling on this argument. 

(C) Testimony referring to a firearm that admitted Appellant’s guilt

Appellant argues that trial counsel posed a question that conceded 

Appellant’s guilt regarding possession of the murder weapon or a prior bad 

act. Appellant’s Brief at 33-34. During the Commonwealth’s direct 

examination of Detective Verrecchio, the Commonwealth presented evidence 

that a search warrant was not obtained for Appellant’s residence. The 

____________________________________________

23 Raheem Zachary did not place Appellant at the scene of the murder, but 

asserted he did not see the shooter. 
J-S02029-18

- 36 -

Commonwealth elicited the detective’s testimony to explain the decision not 

to seek a search warrant for the murder weapon at the time of Appellant’s 

arrest. Specifically, the Commonwealth adduced testimony that it would be 

unlikely that Appellant would still have the murder weapon at the time of his 

arrest approximately one month after the shooting. 

The challenged testimony arose during the following exchange between 

trial counsel and Detective Verrecchio regarding the failure of investigators to 

seek a search warrant for Appellant’s residence: 

[Trial counsel] But let me ask you this. You wouldn’t know 

whether there was a gun present or not unless you looked; right?

In this case, this case, you wouldn’t know whether 

[Appellant] is dumb enough to leave a gun someplace 

unless you look; right?

[Detective Verrecchio] There was information that came to light 

about a weapon.

N.T. 5/22/13, at 231 (emphasis added).

The PCRA rejected Appellant’s argument, opining that “trial counsel 

clearly sought to raise an inference of reasonable doubt by challenging the 

thoroughness of the Commonwealth’s investigation into the murder weapon.” 

PCRA Ct. Op. at 16. The court further concluded that Detective Verrecchio 

appropriately indicated and later explained at a sidebar conference that his 

reference to “information . . . about a weapon” could have introduced evidence 

of a prior, unrelated charge for possession of a firearm. Id. at 15. 
J-S02029-18

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Instantly, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s narrow focus 

on trial counsel’s question to assert that counsel conceded his guilt did not 

warrant relief. Trial counsel question to the detective—“you wouldn’t know 

whether the defendant is dumb enough to leave a gun someplace unless you 

look”—was not a concession of guilt but a challenge to the adequacy of the 

investigation, in particular, the decision not to seek a warrant for Appellant’s 

home. 

With respect to Appellant’s challenge to Detective Verrecchio’s 

testimony that he received information about “a weapon,” the record 

establishes that Detective Verrecchio mistakenly believed that Appellant had 

been charged with possessing a firearm between the murder of Decedent and 

the time of his arrest. However, Appellant was charged with possession of a 

firearm well before the murder.24 Even assuming that trial counsel should 

have moved to strike Detective Verrecchio’s testimony, Appellant cannot 

establish prejudice as trial counsel subsequently elicited the detective’s 

concession that a murder weapon in this case was not found. N.T., 5/22/13, 

at 235. Thus, we discern no basis upon which to conclude that this passing 

reference resulted in prejudice. 

(D) Appellant’s statement that he used “Xannies”

____________________________________________

24 Appellant also challenges Detective Verrecchio’s reference to receiving 

information about a weapon in his claim that the prosecution knowingly 

introduced false information. As discussed below, we find no merit to this 

claim. 
J-S02029-18

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Appellant, in support of his claim that trial counsel improperly opened 

the door to Appellant’s drug use, refers to the following excerpt of trial 

counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Verrecchio regarding the quality of 

the investigation and whether there was corroboration of Cunningham’s 

statement to police: 

[Trial counsel] Okay. Now, you said there was a lot of 

corroboration in Mr. Cunningham’s statement. Are you telling the 

ladies and gentlemen of the jury that the fact that he said he went 

to the speakeasy wasn’t that important to check whether or not 

that occurred?

[Detective Verrecchio] I’m not telling the ladies and gentlemen of 

the jury that it’s not important. What I’m saying to you is that 

there is a lot of corroboration in the interview. If you give me one 

second, I’ll point all the corroboration out for you. 

Q Okay.

A He says Gunna was the person who did it, and he knew his 

first name was Chris. That was corroborated.

Q What did that corroborate?

A Gunna’s nickname and his real name is Christopher. So 

that’s corroborated.

Q That his name was Gunna?

A No, that he knew him as Gunna but his real name is Chris. 

That’s true.

Q Everybody in the neighborhood knows that; right?

A You’re asking me what's corroborated. It’s a true 

statement.

Q Okay. Right.

A I’m telling you what –

Q Go ahead. I’m sorry. Go ahead. 
J-S02029-18

- 39 -

A I was walking. I saw [Decedent] and he was ahead of me 

and he was walking through the circle. [Decedent] was walking 

through the circle because that’s where he was killed.

Q Well, okay. Go ahead.

A Gunna hopped the fence by an alleyway. There is a fence 

there in the alleyway.

Q Okay. 

A He didn’t realize he left the speakeasy. Gunna stopped first 

and was talking to two boys who were sitting on the bench. We’ve 

identified them as Raheem and Aaron. He was asking them if they 

had any Xannies. We know he uses Xannies.

Q Who do you know uses Xannies?

A Gunna, your client.

Q Oh, did he tell you that?

A Yes.

Q When did he tell you that?

A When he was arrested.

N.T., 5/22/13, at 183 (emphasis added). Trial counsel continued to question 

the detective regarding Appellant’s alleged use of “Xannies” to emphasize that 

the detective did not document Appellant’s statement in any reports. Id. at 

183-84. 

The trial court called a recess and convened a sidebar conference. At 

the conference, trial counsel indicated that he had spoken with Appellant many 

times and that he was “almost positive” that Appellant “didn’t say that” to the 

detective. N.T., 5/22/13, at 188-89. The court called Detective Verrecchio to 

clarify the circumstances under which Appellant allegedly made the statement 

to the detective. According to the detective, after Appellant’s arrest, 
J-S02029-18

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it was explained to him what he was there for, and he was just, 

like, I just do my Xannies. It was kind of, like, just blowing 

everything off. 

***

It was more like, I didn’t kill nobody. I just do my Xannies. I ain’t 

sweating this. 

Id. at 193. 

Further discussions at the conference ensued about whether the 

testimony violated Appellant’s right to post-arrest silence. Trial counsel then 

requested that the detective’s testimony regarding be stricken. The trial court 

granted the motion, and when the jury returned from lunch, the court issued 

the following instruction:

[M]embers of the jury, before lunch, you may have heard a 

comment about [Appellant] allegedly made that he, in fact, uses 

Xannies.

That comment is stricken from the record, so if anyone wrote it 

down, you have to strike it because you treat it as if it was never 

said.

Id. at 198. 

The PCRA court concluded Appellant’s argument was meritless. 

According to the court, trial counsel did not reveal that Appellant had a drug 

problem and reasonably used the testimony to challenge the thoroughness of 

the investigation. PCRA Ct. Op. at 14.

Appellant now contends that his claim has arguable merit because trial 

counsel examination led to Detective Verrechio confirming that Appellant used 

“Xannies.” Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s decision to ask who used 
J-S02029-18

- 41 -

Xannies was unreasonable because trial counsel did not know the answer. 

Lastly, Appellant states that trial counsel’s more extended examination 

regarding Detective Verrecchio’s testimony was prejudicial because it 

corroborated Cunningham’s statement to police that Appellant asked for 

“Xannies” before the murder and it implicated him in prior bad acts. 

Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, trial counsel did not “open the door” 

to the references to “Xannies.” Rather, the implications of drug use were 

raised in Cunningham’s statement to the police and then in Detective 

Verrecchio’s narrative testimony regarding points of corroboration. Thus, 

Appellant’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for “opening the door” 

to the issue of drug use lacks arguable merit. 

Appellant further argues that he was entitled to relief because trial 

counsel failed to move for a mistrial. However, in light of the trial court’s 

striking the offending testimony and issuing a limiting instruction, we discern 

no basis to conclude that the trial court would have granted such a motion. 

Therefore, Appellant has not established arguable merit to his argument that 

he was entitled to a mistrial. 

In any event, having reviewed the entirety of the trial record, we 

conclude that Appellant cannot establish prejudice based on the Detective 

Verrecchio’s testimony referring to Appellant’s statement at the time of arrest. 

As noted previously, even if the reference to Appellant’s use of “Xannies” 

improperly bolstered Cunningham’s statement identifying Appellant as the 
J-S02029-18

- 42 -

shooter, the jury was still entitled to credit Respes’ prior statement. 

Therefore, no relief is due. 

5. Direct appeal counsel’s failure to challenge hearsay evidence

Appellant, in his next issue, claims that the PCRA court erred in 

concluding that there was no merit to the claim that his direct appeal counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of hearsay evidence 

based on the references to anonymous tips. Appellant’s Brief at 31. This 

claim is related of Appellant’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for 

opening the door to such evidence, which was discussed in issue 4(A). In any 

event, our review reveals that trial counsel did not object to the testimony 

regarding anonymous tips or otherwise preserve this issue for review on direct 

appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 

739, 777 (Pa. 2014). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that direct appeal counsel 

was ineffective for raising this claim lacks merit.

6. Trial counsel’s failure to object to or request a mistrial for 

discovery violations

Appellant’s next issue focuses on the PCRA court’s dismissal of his claims 

that trial counsel should have objected to and requested a mistrial due to 

alleged discovery violations. In support, he refers to (1) the relocation 

paperwork completed by Aaron Respes, (2) the anonymous tips, (3) threats 

against witnesses; (4) Decedent’s statements to Hall; and (5) Appellant’s 

statement to Detective Verrecchio that Appellant used “Xannies.” 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 provides, in relevant part, 

that “the Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney . . . any 

written confession or inculpatory statement, or the substance of any oral 

confession or inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to whom 

the confession or inculpatory statement was made that is in the possession or 

control of the attorney for the Commonwealth.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(b). 

This Court has held that an inculpatory statement made to a police 

investigator, but not in the possession or control of the attorney for the 

Commonwealth is not subject to disclosure under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(b). 

See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 804 (Pa. Super. 2003). But 

see Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. 2001) (discussing 

exculpatory information known to police but not within the possession of the 

Commonwealth). 

Moreover, the remedy for an alleged violation of the rules of disclosure 

are discretionary with the trial court. Burke, 781 A.2d at 1143. It is further 

well established that: 

[a] motion for mistrial is a matter addressed to the 

discretion of the court. A trial court need only grant a 

mistrial where the alleged prejudicial event may reasonably 

be said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.

A mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are 

adequate to overcome any possible prejudice.

The law presumes that jurors will follow the trial court’s 

instructions.
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Commonwealth v. Gillen, 798 A.2d 225, 231 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

With respect to Appellant’s first four arguments, Appellant fails to 

establish that the Commonwealth did not disclose the information or material.

Therefore, Appellant claims of ineffectiveness fail for lack of arguable merit. 

As to Appellant’s fifth argument, regarding Detective Verrecchio’s 

testimony that Appellant told the detective that Appellant used “Xannies,”

Appellant fails to demonstrate that this information resulted in prejudice. As 

noted above, the testimony was stricken and the trial court issued an

instruction for the jury to disregard the reference. See Gillen, 798 A.2d at 

231. 

7. Trial counsel’s failure to elicit testimony that Kamac was a 

possible shooter by impeaching witnesses

Appellant, in his next issue, claims that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his assertion that trial counsel failed to cross-examine Detective 

Gaul with alleged exculpatory evidence that Kamac shot Decedent. 

Appellant’s Brief at 38-39. According to Appellant, the PCRA court 

misconstrued his claim. Specifically, he argues that that the PCRA court 

focused on trial counsel’s impeachment of Detective Gaul using evidence that 

Kamac threatened Decedent before the shooting. He contends his present 

claim is based on trial counsel’s failure to confront the detective with evidence 

that others named Kamac as the shooter. 
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However, as noted above, Appellant does not establish the existence of 

any admissible exculpatory evidence that Kamac shot Decedent.25 

Additionally, Appellant fails to establish any prejudice resulting from trial 

counsel’s failure to confront Detective Gaul with evidence that there were 

rumors that Kamac shot Decedent, where trial counsel cross-examined the 

detective about Kamac’s stronger motive to kill Decedent. 

8. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s numerous 

frauds upon the court 

 Appellant’s next issue relates to his allegations that the Commonwealth 

admitted false evidence, namely: (1) threats against Respes and (2) Detective 

Verrecchio’s reference to receiving information regarding the murder weapon. 

Appellant’s Brief at 40-44. 

Our review is governed by the following principles:

The prosecution may not knowingly and deliberately misrepresent 

the evidence in order to gain a conviction. Nevertheless, a claim 

of purposeful prosecutorial misrepresentation will not stand if 

examination of the record fails to reveal any indication of 

deceptive tactics on the part of the prosecution. Minor 

discrepancies in the Commonwealth’s case will not be considered 

false evidence.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 294 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

With respect to Respes, Appellant notes that Respes testified that he 

was not threatened and that he only sought relocation to enable his mother 

____________________________________________

25 As noted above, Appellant’s sole reference to exculpatory evidence was that 

Yvette Morris indicated that Tiara Young heard rumors that Kamac shot 

Decedent.
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to move to a better neighborhood. From this Appellant complains that all 

evidence that Respes was threatened was false and the Commonwealth 

knowingly admitted false evidence of threats. Such a boilerplate allegation 

false to establish “fraud” or prosecutorial misconduct. See id. 

With respect to Detective Verrecchio’s testimony that he obtained 

information regarding a weapon, we have previously noted that Detective 

Verrechio’s reference was premised on a mistake. Appellant, however, asserts 

that the Commonwealth must have “intended to sneak this false evidence in 

through Dt. Verrecchio’s testimony.” Appellant’s Brief at 44. 

Appellant’s assertions fail to establish any arguable merit to his 

argument that the Commonwealth knowingly attempted to introduce false 

evidence. Indeed, as discussed above, the detective testified to this matter 

on cross-examination by trial counsel, and there is no indication that the 

Commonwealth intended to admit the evidence. Thus, no relief is due. 

9. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the numerous instances of 

prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument

In his next issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in rejecting 

his argument that trial counsel failed to object to the Commonwealth’s closing 

argument. Appellant asserts that the prosecutor expressed her personal 

opinions by calling a defense witness a liar, shifted the burden of proof by 

noting Appellant did not call additional alibi witnesses, and established 

Appellant’s guilt when the prosecutor referred to him as a stone cold killer. 

Appellant’s Brief at 44-47. 
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As our Supreme Court has noted, 

[i]t is settled that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a 

personal belief as to the credibility of the defendant or other 

witnesses. However, the prosecutor may comment on the 

credibility of witnesses. Further, a prosecutor is allowed to 

respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor.

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 544 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted

and emphasis added). 

Here, the instances that Appellant characterizes as the prosecutor 

expressing her personal opinion were simply her argument regarding the 

credibility of certain witnesses and the credibility of Appellant’s alibi defense. 

See N.T. Trial, 5/28/13, at 79-81. Moreover, trial counsel had made 

Detectives Gaul and Verrecchio out to be liars. See id. at 23, 25-26, 32-33, 

41, 44-45. Thus, the Commonwealth’s argument concerning credibility is a 

logical and vigorous response. 

Moreover, we agree with the PCRA court that “[t]he prosecutor’s 

comment that [Appellant’s] associates Natika Hawkins, Dooler, and Black 

were not at trial is a logical attack on alibi witness [Anara] Brown’s credibility, 

not an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 18. As 

to the use of the phrase “stone cold killer,” this is nothing more than oratorical 

flair. [CITE]. Thus, we discern no basis to disturb the PCRA court’s ruling that 

Appellant failed to establish arguable merit to his claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object during closing argument.

10. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor improperly 

focusing the jury’s attention on the element of fear in order to 

inflame the passions of the jury
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Appellant’s next issue focuses on the PCRA court’s rejection of his claim 

that trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct based on the 

Commonwealth’s references to and admission of evidence of threats. 

Appellant’s Brief at 48-51. Appellant contends the Commonwealth 

intentionally inflamed the passions of the jury such that it could not have 

rendered a fair verdict. 

However, as discussed above, the threat evidence was admitted for the 

narrow purpose of evaluating the credibility of Cunningham and Respes and 

specifically weighing their prior statements to the police versus their trial 

testimony recanting their statements. As we have also stated above, 

Appellant cannot establish prejudice in light of the trial court’s cautionary 

instructions. Moreover, we note that trial counsel did object shortly after the 

above-recited passage when the Commonwealth’s argument began to

implicate the specific facts of this case. Thus, Appellant failed to establish 

arguable merit to this re-casted claim of ineffectiveness. 

To summarize our review of Appellant’s first ten issues claiming 

ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude Appellant failed to establish 

arguable merit in Issues 1, 3(A)-(C), 4(A) 5, 6 (A)-(D), 7, 8, 9, and 10. We 

further conclude that Appellant failed to establish prejudice in Issues 3(D), 

4(B)-(D), and 6(E). For these reasons, we decline to disturb the PCRA court’s 

rulings on Appellant’s individual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

11. Cumulative effect of the errors
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Appellant’s next issue raises a claim of cumulative error. According to 

Appellant, 

[c]ounsel opened the door to a wide range of hearsay evidence 

and prior bad acts. All of which went directly towards [A]ppellant’s 

guilt. [T]rial counsel not only elicited prejudicial information but 

allowed the prosecutor to undermine[ A]ppellant’s trial. The 

prosecutor [used] the victim hearsay statements as substantive 

evidence of guilt, labeled [A]ppellant’s alibi defense as fraudulent, 

used the element of fear to inflame the jury, and [failed] to turn 

over pretrial discovery material, which created a trial by ambush. 

Also[,] the prosecutor introduce[d] false evidence into the guilt of 

[A]ppellant. Moreover, trial counsel had witnesses who were 

willing to come to court and testify to [A]ppellant’s innocence and 

counsel failed to used exculpatory evidence within his possession.

Appellant’s Brief at 51. Appellant concludes that “these errors destroyed the 

confidence of [A]ppellant’s trial.” Id. at 52. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated: 

We have often held that “no number of failed [ ] claims may 

collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.” 

However, we have clarified that this principle applies to claims that 

fail because of lack of merit or arguable merit. When the failure 

of individual claims is grounded in lack of prejudice, then the 

cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may properly be 

assessed.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). 

As noted above, Appellant did not establish prejudice with respect to the 

following individual issues: (1) Issue 2, which relates to hearsay evidence 

about the confrontation between Kamac and Decedent; (2) Issue 3(D), which 

relates to the prosecutor’s question of Cunningham regarding their meeting 

before trial, (3) Issue 4(B), which relates to Detective Verrecchio’s references 
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to Raheem Zachary; (4) Issue 4(C) which relates to Detective Verrecchio’s 

information about a weapon; and (5) Issues 4(D) and 6(E), which relate to 

Detective Verrecchio’s reference to Appellant’s statement regarding

“Xannies.” Following our review, we conclude that the combined effect of 

these issues did not undermine the reliability of the jury’s verdict. As noted 

above, Respes unequivocally identified Appellant as the shooter in his prior 

statement to the police and at the preliminary hearing. Although Respes 

recanted his identification of Appellant at trial, he continued to suggest that 

the shooter “looked like” Appellant. Thus, Appellant’s claim of cumulative 

error fails. 

12. PCRA court’s error by denying Appellant’s PCRA petition 

without an evidentiary hearing, failing to grant leave to amend, 

and accepting PCRA counsel’s Finley letter & 13. PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness

Appellant’s final two issues, which we address together, allege error in 

the PCRA court’s decisions to (A) deny relief without a hearing, (B) deny his 

request to file an amended petition, and (C) permit PCRA counsel to withdraw 

despite Appellant’s allegations of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant’s 

Brief at 11-12.

(A) Evidentiary hearing 

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in declining to hold an 

evidentiary hearing. He contends that he was entitled to a hearing to consider

claims that the PCRA court dismissed based on findings that trial counsel acted 

with a reasonable strategic basis. He further contends that the credibility of 
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Raheem Zachary’s recent statements indicating Appellant did not shoot 

Decedent were at issue.

It is well-settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary 

hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the 

record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not 

necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

However, because we have concluded above that Appellant failed to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his ineffectiveness claims, 

we discern no error in the PCRA court’s decision to deny Appellant’s petition 

without a hearing. See id. 

(B) Denial of request to amend petition

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by failing to grant him leave 

to amend his PCRA petition and instead accepting PCRA counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. However, this contention amounts to little more than a bald claim 

in Appellant’s brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 11 (noting that the PCRA court 

found his claims to be largely incomprehensible and this alone “should have 

given the PCRA court reason to grant leave to amend these defects”). 

The decision whether to permit amendment is within the PCRA court’s 

discretion. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1191 (Pa. 

Super. 1999). Amendment shall be freely allowed to achieve substantial 

justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). While Rule 905 provides for liberal
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amendment, when such amendment is frivolous or meritless, such 

amendment is unnecessary. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

Instantly, the PCRA court conducted an independent review of the 

record and determined that no relief was due. Thus, permitting amendment 

of Appellant’s PCRA petition was unnecessary. While the PCRA court found 

portions of Appellant’s brief to be incomprehensible, the court addressed each 

potential issue it perceived from Appellant’s petition and his Rule 907 

response. Additionally, Appellant has adduced no further materials or claims 

in this appeal worthy of further relief. Therefore, we discern no error on the 

part of the PCRA court in denying Appellant’s request to amend his PCRA 

petition.

(C) PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter and ineffectiveness

Finally, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel failed to follow the 

standards of Turner/Finley when seeking leave to withdraw. Appellant’s 

Brief at 55. Appellant further raises claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective 

for the following reasons:

1. Failure to investigate Tiara Young;

2. Failure to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to 

interview and call Raheem Zachary; 

3. Failure to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to 

investigate Mr. Cunningham’s claim of police brutality;

4. Improvidently filing a Turner/Finley letter and failing to follow 

the standard of Turner/Finley; and
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5. Failing to discover newly discovered evidence of a Brady v. 

Maryland[26] violation, namely Appellant’s belief that Aaron 

Respes received a deal in exchange for his testimony.

Appellant’s Brief at 52.

In order to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley, 

[i]ndependent review of the record by competent counsel is 

required before withdrawal is permitted. Such independent 

review requires proof of:

1. A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature 

and extent of his review;

2. The “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue 

the petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3. The PCRA counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no-merit” 

letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4. The PCRA court conducting its own independent review 

of the record; and

5. The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition 

was meritless.

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009) (citation and 

brackets omitted). Additionally, 

PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must contemporaneously 

serve a copy on the petitioner of counsel’s application to withdraw 

as counsel, and must supply to the petitioner both a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter and a statement advising the petitioner that, in 

the event that the court grants the application of counsel to 

withdraw, he or she has the right to proceed pro se or with the 

assistance of privately retained counsel.

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

and emphasis omitted).

____________________________________________

26 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Instantly, PCRA counsel complied with the procedural requirements for 

withdrawing from representation. Therefore, Appellant’s assertion that 

counsel failed to follow the Turner/Finley standard to withdraw warrants no 

relief. 

As to the PCRA counsel’s alleged failure to investigate Tiara Young and 

Raheem Zachary as witnesses,

27 we have previously concluded that those 

arguments lacked merit. Thus, there can be no ineffective assistance of PCRA 

counsel in relation to these claims. 

 As to the failure to investigate Cunningham’s claim of police brutality, 

we have already concluded that the PCRA court properly determined that 

further evidence regarding Detective Pitts was not relevant or admissible at 

trial. Thus, Appellant’s claim that PCRA counsel should have conducted further 

research into this matter lacks arguable merit. 

Finally, as to Appellant’s assertion of a Brady violation, Appellant 

contends that there was a cooperation agreement between Respes and the 

Commonwealth. Specifically, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth 

withdrew attempted murder charges against Respes shortly after Appellant 

was sentenced. 

However, Appellant was well aware of the open charges against Respes

at trial. During direct examination, the Commonwealth questioned Respes 

____________________________________________

27 We note that PCRA counsel averred that he attempted to contact Tiara 

Young, but that she could not be found. Additionally, Appellant raised his 

claim regarding Zachary in response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. 
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regarding Respes’ open case for attempted murder. N.T., 5/21/13, at 153. 

The Commonwealth further elicited Respes’ testimony that there was no deal 

with the police or the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony. Id. at 

154. To the extent Appellant now speculates that a cooperation agreement 

was in place, we note that Respes recanted his identification of Appellant at 

trial and was not a cooperative witness for the Commonwealth. Thus, 

Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth violated Brady does not warrant 

relief. 

Order affirmed. Application to vacate and remand denied. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/18