United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-50168

Sebastian Domingo Bacilio-Sabastian; Raul Us Castro; 

Wilder Xitumul-Garcia; Manuel Santiago-Laines, 

Petitioners—Appellants,

versus

William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United 

States; Rose Thompson, Warden of the Karnes County 

Residential Center; Budd Ratliff, Acting Assistant 

Field Office Director for the San Antonio District of 

ICE; Daniel Bible, Field Office Director for the San

Antonio District Office of ICE; Ronald D. Vitiello, 

Deputy Director and Acting Director of ICE; Chad F. 

Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security; The GEO Group, Incorporated,

Respondents—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:18-CV-793

Before Higginbotham, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Haynes, Circuit Judge:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 13, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Petitioners Sebastian Domingo Bacilio-Sabastian, Raul Us Castro,

Wilder Xitumul-Garcia, and Manuel Santiago-Laines appeal the dismissal of 

their petitions for habeas corpus. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. Background

Petitioners, each with his minor son, fled persecution in their home 

country of Guatemala. When they arrived in the United States, each 

Petitioner was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 

(“ICE”) and separated from his son during detention. While detained and 

separated from their sons, each received written notice that they would be 

paroled into the United States. Petitioners were neither released from 

detention nor given notice that parole had been revoked. Instead, they were 

transferred to various locations before being detained at the Karnes County 

Residential Center in Karnes City, Texas. Two had their parole notices 

confiscated.

In August 2018, Petitioners filed their habeas petition in federal 

district court seeking habeas corpus relief, a writ of mandamus, and a 

declaratory judgment. More specifically, Petitioners claimed that their due 

process rights had been violated by failure to honor the parole notice, that 

federal statutes and regulations created a right to parole based on the parole 

notices they had received, that the parole notices should be honored under 

customary international law, and that a legitimate expectation of parole had 

been created.

Within two weeks after the petition was filed, ICE released Petitioners 

from custody but not on parole. The government then moved for dismissal, 

arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was 

moot. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioners argued that the 

case was not moot since, having not been released on parole and thus being 

unable to accept employment, they continued to suffer adverse 

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consequences. They also asserted that the district court had jurisdiction to 

address whether the revocation of parole had been in accordance with the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

Among other things, the district court determined that Petitioners’ 

release from detention rendered the habeas petition moot. The district court 

ordered that the government provide Petitioners or their attorneys with 

written notice that their parole had been terminated. Upon receipt of 

compliance, it would grant the motion to dismiss. In compliance with the 

order, the Assistant United States Attorney on this case sent a letter to 

Petitioners’ attorneys, which purported to serve as notice of termination of 

parole. The district court then dismissed the habeas petition. Petitioners 

now appeal. 

II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s determination that a case is moot. 

Bayou Liberty Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 

2000).

Mootness doctrine requires that, to show a case or controversy under 

Article III of the Constitution, “through all stages of federal judicial 

proceedings, trial and appellate[,] . . . parties must continue to have a 

personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 

494 U.S. 472, 477–48 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To maintain a habeas case after release from incarceration, petitioners must 

show that they continue to suffer “collateral consequences.” See Carafas v. 

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968). In the criminal context, collateral 

consequences exist when, “[b]ecause of . . . disabilities or burdens which may 

flow from [a] petitioner’s conviction, he has a substantial stake in the 

judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence 

imposed on him.” Id. (cleaned up).

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Petitioners argue that their inability to seek work authorization—

which they could do if released on parole—is a collateral consequence that 

should allow them to maintain their petition. We disagree for two reasons: 

First, we are not convinced that aliens who are released from ICE custody

can maintain a habeas petition by showing collateral consequences. Second, 

even if they could demonstrate collateral consequences, they have not done 

so here because any work authorization is subject to U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (“USCIS”) discretion. Since we hold that Petitioners’ 

habeas petition has become moot, we affirm.1

 

We do not think that the collateral consequences analysis used in the 

criminal context necessarily applies with the same force in the immigration 

context. When an alien is released from ICE custody pending further 

immigration proceedings, no conviction exists to disable or burden that 

petitioner. See Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237 (defining collateral consequences as 

“disabilities or burdens which may flow from [a] petitioner’s conviction” 

(cleaned up) (emphasis added)). To be sure, an alien awaiting immigration 

proceedings has fewer rights then a citizen or lawful resident: for example, 

like Petitioners here, the alien might not be able to seek work. But the 

limitation on employment is based on their undocumented status, not, like a 

criminal case, on an underlying conviction that might be attacked in a habeas

petition. Since neither actual confinement nor an underlying conviction are 

the basis for Petitioners’ employment obstacles, it appears that maintaining 

a habeas petition is not a viable means to obtain the relief that Petitioners 

seek. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently taken a narrow view of habeas 

1 During argument, counsel for Petitioners argued that, even if their habeas claim 

cannot proceed, they had raised viable APA and mandamus claims on appeal. Petitioners’ 

briefing focused solely on the habeas claim. Because any other claims were inadequately 

briefed, they are waived. See Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 653 

(5th Cir. 2004).

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relief in the immigration context, which supports our reluctance to extend 

habeas relief to aliens who are released from detention. See Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2020) (describing 

habeas in the immigration context as “a means to secure release from 

unlawful detention”). 

Even if habeas relief were available for collateral consequences on 

employment in an immigration context, it does not apply here. In the 

criminal context, limitations on employment have been held to be collateral 

consequences when a person’s underlying criminal conviction bars him from 

certain employment. See Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237. Not all possible impacts 

on employment prospects count, though: “nonstatutory consequences”—

like those “dependent upon the discretionary decisions made by an employer

or a sentencing judge”—are generally not actionable collateral 

consequences. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 13 (1998) (cleaned up). Here,

aliens on parole may apply for employment authorization, but approval of 

such authorization is subject to USCIS discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c). 

Therefore, after a parolee gains the ability to seek work authorization, 

obtaining authorization remains dependent upon a USCIS determination. 

Any collateral consequence, then, is too attenuated for habeas relief.

For these reasons, therefore, we conclude that Petitioners’ habeas 

claim is moot. Since their habeas claim is moot, and because Petitioners did

not properly raise any other claim on appeal, we AFFIRM the judgment of 

the district court.

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Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

As a result of the government’s revocation of their parole, Petitioners 

are prevented from applying for employment authorization.1 This renders 

them unable to seek employment. Because this adverse consequence is 

specific, concrete, and flows directly as a matter of law from the challenged 

government action,2 I would hold that Petitioners’ case is not moot. I would 

further hold that the district court is not prevented from reviewing the 

government’s revocation of parole under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e) and 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) because its purported failure to comply with mandatory 

regulations was not a discretionary act.

I must disagree with the majority’s view of the reach of habeas corpus. 

The Supreme Court did not speak to the scope of immigration habeas relief 

in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, focusing only on the 

Suspension Clause.3 The habeas statute itself “does not limit the relief that 

may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody. Its 

mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.”4

The majority holds that Petitioners’ inability to seek employment is a 

consequence of their undocumented status, not “an underlying conviction 

that might be attacked in a habeas petition.” But this misunderstands the 

cause of Petitioners’ inability to seek employment. It is not Petitioners’ 

undocumented status itself but rather the underlying reason Petitioners 

remain undocumented—the government’s revocation of their parole. 

1 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c).

2 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 9 (1998) (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 

237 (1968)).

3 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).

4 Carafas, 391 U.S. at 239.

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Because this revocation can be challenged in a habeas petition, I conclude 

that Petitioners’ habeas action is a viable means for the relief they seek and 

find no reason to limit the collateral consequences doctrine within the 

immigration context.

The majority concludes that because Petitioners’ work authorization 

is subject to USCIS discretion, its consequence is “too attenuated for habeas 

relief.” Yet, its impact on Petitioners’ employment prospects differs little 

from cases where the Supreme Court has found an adverse effect on 

employment to be a collateral consequence. In Carafas v. LaVallee, the Court 

found that the petitioner’s inability to engage in certain businesses was a 

collateral consequence flowing from his conviction.5 One of those businesses 

was trafficking in alcoholic beverages.6 Reversing the petitioner’s conviction 

only removed the prohibition, permitting the petitioner to apply for a liquor 

license, but he still needed the license to be approved before being able to 

engage in that business. Despite this attenuation, the Court found a collateral 

consequence. Likewise, in Ginsberg, the Court found it sufficient for 

collateral consequence purposes that the petitioner’s conviction “might 

result in the revocation of [his] license” required to run his luncheonette

business because a town ordinance provided that the Commissioner of 

Buildings “may suspend or revoke any license issued, in his discretion, for [] 

conviction of any crime.”7 In both cases, the Court found a collateral 

consequence although the petitioner’s enjoyment of employment depended 

5 Id. at 237-38; see also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946) (finding 

that a non-citizen petitioner faced collateral consequences because his conviction may 

impede his ability to become a citizen “if [he] seeks naturalization” and, if naturalized, his 

conviction might result in the loss of certain civil rights).

6 Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237 n.4 (citing New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, 

McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 3—B, § 126). 

7 Ginsberg v. State of NY, 390 U.S. 629, 633 n.2 (1968) (emphasis added). 

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on the discretion of a third party. It follows that Petitioners’ inability to seek 

work authorization from USCIS is a collateral consequence resulting from 

the revocation of parole status, and their petition is not moot.

There is no other jurisdictional obstacle to reaching the merits of 

Petitioners’ case. The district court found that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e) and 

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) foreclose jurisdiction to review the government’s actions.8

This was error. Challenges to “the extent of the Attorney General’s 

authority” are outside the scope of these jurisdiction stripping provisions.

9

While the government has discretion to revoke Petitioners’ status, it must 

abide the regulations controlling its exercise.10 The government’s “extent of 

that authority is not a matter of discretion.”11 Therefore, Petitioners do not 

challenge discretionary government action, and the district court can 

properly reach the merits of their case.

I respectfully dissent.

8 Section § 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary 

judgment regarding the [apprehension and detention of aliens] shall not be subject to 

review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Section § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have 

jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the 

Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the 

discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

9 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 

S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).

10 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 

U.S. 260, 267 (1954), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as recognized in 

Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (“[A]s long as the regulations remain operative, the 

Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep” those regulations.).

11 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688.

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