BELL MANAGEMENT, INC., )

) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) vs. ) ) No. SD35680 THERESA M. BARBERO, ) ) Filed: January 8, 2019 Defendant-Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POLK COUNTY

Honorable Elizabeth V. Rohrs

APPEAL DISMISSED Bell Management, Inc. ("Bell") filed a petition for unlawful detainer against Theresa M. Barbero ("Barbero") in August 2017. Bel l voluntarily dismissed its petition without prejudice in September 2017. Barbero attem pts to appeal. 1 Rule 67.02(a) permits a plaintiff to dismiss a civi l action without order of the court when that dismissal is filed prior to the int roduction of evidence at trial in a courttried case or prior to the swearing of the jury pan el for voir dire in a jury-tried case.

1 This Court is left to guess as to what trial court ruling or action Barbero challenges and what relie f she seeks because her brief includes no jurisdictional statement, points relied on, or conclusion. See Rule 84.04(a). We recognize that Barbero appears pro se before this Court, just as she did before the tria l court. But pro se parties "are bound by the same rules of procedure as parties represented by lawyers, and are not entitled to indulgences they would not have received if represented by counsel." Belisle v. City of Senath , 974 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998). Howeve r, as there is no final judgment from which Barbero may appeal, we dismiss on that b asis. All rule references are to Missouri Court Ru les (2018).2

Under Rule 67.02(a), a plaintiff's voluntary dismis sal of a civil action without an order of the court: is effective on the date the dismissal is filed wit h the court. Moreover, once a case has been dismissed under Rule 67.02, it is as if the suit were never brought. Consequently, a trial court loses j urisdiction to enter any subsequent orders regarding the dismissed action. No appeal can be taken from the dismissal. The circuit court may take no further steps as to the dismissed action, and any step attempted is viewed a nullity. Matter of Gurgel , 543 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (interna l citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). Applying these principles to the instant case, onc e Bell's voluntary dismissal was filed, it was immediately effective without any act ion by the trial court. From that point forward, it was "as though the suit had never been brought." Richman v. Coughlin , 75 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (internal c itation omitted). No further steps could be taken, and any steps attempted in the dism issed suit were a nullity. Id. ; Brown v. MO Delta Med. Ctr. , 293 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). Accordingly, after Bell voluntarily dismissed the a ction, there remained nothing to appeal. State ex rel. Frets v. Moore , 291 S.W.3d 805, 812 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). 2 Because there is no final judgment from which Barbe ro may appeal, the appeal is dismissed. 3 MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – OPINION AUTHOR JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. – CONCURS

2 After Bell voluntarily dismissed its petition, Bar bero continued to file multiple motions before the trial court. Those motions had no legal effect and any t rial court action attempted in the dismissed case w as a nullity. 3 "The right to appeal is purely statutory and, wher e a statute does not give a right to appeal, no rig ht exists. Other than statutorily recognized exceptio ns not applicable to the present case, section 512. 020 requires that there be a 'final judgment' as a prer equisite to appellate review." Buemi v. Kerckhoff , 359 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal citations o mitted).