NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PAMELA MELVIN,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DAVID J. SHULKIN, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1550

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 16-1015, Judge William Greenberg.

______________________ 

Decided: August 17, 2017

______________________ 

 PAMELA MELVIN, Fayetteville, NC, pro se.

 MEEN GEU OH, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON 

KIDD-MILLER; Y. KEN LEE, LARA EILHARDT, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC.
2 MELVIN v. SHULKIN

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Pamela Melvin (“Melvin”) appeals from a decision of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”). The Veterans Court denied Melvin’s 

motion for sanctions against the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) and the Veterans Court. See Melvin v. 

McDonald, No. 16-1015, 2016 U.S. App. Vet. Claims 

LEXIS 792 (Vet. App. 2016). Because we lack jurisdiction 

to review the issues Melvin raises in this appeal, we 

dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

Melvin served on active duty in the United States 

Army from June 9, 1975 to June 8, 1978. In May 2003, 

Melvin received service connection, effective June 27, 

2001, for degenerative joint disease and instability in her 

right and left knees. After becoming dissatisfied with her 

medical treatment and benefits, Melvin filed two separate

petitions for a writ of mandamus on November 12, 2015 

and November 23, 2015. In the petitions, Melvin asked, 

inter alia, that the Veterans Court direct the VA Secretary to provide Melvin with certain medical benefits and 

treatment, remove certain statements from her medical 

records, and provide Melvin with access to certain VA 

records. The Veterans Court consolidated the petitions 

because they sought duplicative relief and denied most of 

the petition because Melvin sought relief that the court 

did not have jurisdiction to grant.

After the Veterans Court’s decision, Melvin filed another petition for a writ of mandamus, along with a check 

for the filing fee, on March 11, 2016. This new petition 

again asked for the Veterans Court to provide Melvin 

with certain medical benefits and treatment. The Veter-
MELVIN v. SHULKIN 3

ans Court did not accept the petition, and Melvin received 

a notice stating, “[t]he Court has instructed that we 

return [the filing] as not contemplated by Court’s Rules

[sic] and not to open a new petition using this material.” 

Suppl. App. 31. Melvin then filed a motion on March 18, 

2016 “for an appealable judge’s order of the Court’s decision to not accept, to not review, and to return her the 

March 11, 2016 petition.” Suppl. App. 26. The Veterans 

Court, apparently unaware that Melvin had submitted a 

filing fee on March 11, 2016, asked Melvin to remit a 

filing fee for the new petition.

In response to receiving the notice requesting a filing 

fee for the new petition, Melvin asserts that she called the 

Clerk’s office at the Veterans Court on March 30, 2016,

and informed the Deputy Clerk that she no longer wished 

to litigate her additional petition. During this conversation, Melvin also requested that the Veterans Court not 

cash the check she had sent as her filing fee and instead 

return the check to her.

Thereafter, the Veterans Court issued an order on 

May 12, 2016, stating that it had received—or found—

Melvin’s filing fee for her March 11, 2016 petition and 

that it had jurisdiction to consider a portion of Melvin’s 

petition regarding certain benefits. The Veterans Court 

ordered the VA to respond to the part of Melvin’s petition 

over which the court had determined it could exercise

jurisdiction.

On May 13, 2016, Melvin filed a motion to dismiss her 

petition. Melvin alleged that the Veterans Court had 

ignored her request to dismiss the petition and return the 

filing fee and instead had used the fee to file the petition 

so that the VA could “make certain statements and allegations for another matter.” Suppl. App. 38. Melvin filed 

a related motion on May 16, 2016, requesting that the 

Veteran’s Court, pursuant to its inherent power, impose 

sanctions on the VA for “willful and bad faith harass-
4 MELVIN v. SHULKIN

ment” and for having the Clerk’s office file her petition 

“by unlawful means,” thereby “forcing her to litigate this 

case against her will.” Suppl. App. 44.

The Veterans Court acknowledged Melvin’s arguments but found that “the alleged facts presented simply 

are not true.” Melvin, 2016 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 

792, at *2. The court explained that it asked the VA to 

file a response in this matter “based on an apparent 

mistaken belief that [Melvin] requested that the filing fee 

she had already paid be used for this petition.” Id. The 

court granted Melvin’s motion to dismiss the petition, 

revoked the order requesting the VA to respond, returned 

Melvin’s filing fee to her, and denied Melvin’s motion for 

sanctions.

Melvin now appeals the Veterans Court’s denial of her 

motion for sanctions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 

U.S.C. § 7292.

II. DISCUSSION

We have limited subject matter jurisdiction to review 

appeals from the Veterans Court. We have jurisdiction to 

“review and decide any challenge to the validity of any 

statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof . . . and 

to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the 

extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(c). Unless an appeal presents a constitutional 

issue, we cannot review “a challenge to a factual determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to 

the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).

Melvin asserts that the Veterans Court had inherent 

authority to issue sanctions and “the responsibility to 

control its litigating proceedings and the conduct of those 

before it.” Appellant’s Informal Br. 8. Melvin argues that 

the court should have granted sanctions “for the filing of 

this case in Melvin’s name without her consent and 

knowledge.” Id. Melvin also alleges that the VA attor-
MELVIN v. SHULKIN 5

neys had access to and control over her computer and 

repeatedly deleted her drafts of her brief in this case. Id.

at 8–9. 

Melvin argues that the filing of this case without her 

consent violated her Fifth Amendment right to liberty and 

right to engage in conduct without intervention of the 

government. Melvin also argues that the filing of her case 

and the deletion of her draft briefs violated her Fifth 

Amendment right to equal protection because it forced her 

to be a party in a court case and provided the court with 

personal jurisdiction over her. According to Melvin, the 

VA attorneys also violated numerous federal laws and 

committed fraud when they allegedly filed this case.

Melvin’s request for sanctions is inherently a factual 

question, which leaves it outside the scope of our jurisdiction to review appeals from the Veterans Court. See 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2); see also Melvin v. McDonald, 634 F. 

App’x 309, 311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Whether sanctions are 

appropriate [in an appeal from the Veterans Court] is a 

factual matter outside the jurisdiction of this court.”); 

Malik v. McDonald, 618 F. App’x 1007, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (explaining that a decision by the Veterans Court 

not to impose sanctions “is factual in nature, and thus 

unreviewable by this Court”). Although Melvin attempts 

to frame her appeal as one involving constitutional issues 

under the Fifth Amendment, Melvin never raised any 

constitutional challenges in her motion for sanctions filed 

with the Veterans Court, see Suppl. App. 44–53, and thus 

has waived her constitutional arguments. See, e.g., 

Charles v. Shinseki, 587 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(finding an argument waived because the party raised it 

for the first time on appeal). Because Melvin’s appeal 

raises factual questions and she has waived any potential 

constitutional arguments, we lack jurisdiction to consider 

this portion of Melvin’s appeal.
6 MELVIN v. SHULKIN

Even if we were to consider Melvin’s constitutional 

arguments on the merits, which would allow us to consider a challenge to a factual question, the Veterans Court’s 

decision is correct. Based on the record before us, the 

Veterans Court accepted Melvin’s March 11, 2016 petition 

and requested a response from the VA because of an 

apparent misunderstanding regarding Melvin’s desire to 

pursue the merits of the petition she filed with the court. 

See Melvin, 2016 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 792, at *1–

2. Upon learning that Melvin wished to have her petition 

voluntarily dismissed and her filing fee returned to her, 

the Veterans Court dismissed the petition and returned 

the filing fee to Melvin. Id. Even if we assume that the 

Fifth Amendment covers the scope of constitutional 

protections alleged by Melvin, there is no evidence to 

support Melvin’s claim that a constitutional violation 

occurred. 

Melvin also filed a Second Supplemental Informal 

Brief in which she seeks to add additional issues to this 

appeal. Melvin asks that we declare that the Veterans 

Court does not have jurisdiction to consider cases involving certain types of medical benefits. Melvin’s request 

does not have any bearing on the writ of mandamus that 

gave rise to this appeal and was voluntarily dismissed at 

the request of Melvin. Indeed, the Veterans Court agreed 

with Melvin’s position—i.e., that it does not have jurisdiction to consider cases involving the types of medical 

benefits raised by Melvin—when addressing the consolidated case involving her two petitions for a writ of mandamus.

Melvin’s requested declaration regarding the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction appears to be based on statements 

allegedly made by the VA in other cases litigated in other 

federal courts. Because Melvin’s requested declaration 

does not have any bearing on this appeal, the issues 

raised in Melvin’s Second Supplemental Informal Brief 

effectively amount to a request for an advisory opinion 
MELVIN v. SHULKIN 7

regarding the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court. It is 

well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 

392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968) (explaining that “no justiciable 

controversy is presented when . . . the parties are asking 

for an advisory opinion” and that the “oldest and most 

consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that 

the federal courts will not give advisory opinions”); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). We therefore do 

not have jurisdiction to entertain Melvin’s arguments in 

the Second Supplemental Informal Brief.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Melvin’s remaining arguments, 

and we find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Melvin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.