J-S61032-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : CHAD W. LEONHART, :

: Appellant : No. 159 WDA 2016 Appeal from the PCRA Order January 7, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-20-CR-0001000-2012 BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016 Chad W. Leonhart (“Leonhart”) appeals from the Ord er dismissing his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Pos t Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. On January 10, 2013, Leonhart was charged with 300 counts of sexually violent offenses against his step-son, who was under the age of thirteen. Prior to trial, Leonhart was given a ple a offer to plead guilty to one count, count forty-six, of involuntary deviate sexu al intercourse. 1 In exchange for Leonhart’s guilty plea, he would recei ve a 10 to 20 year prison term, 10 years of probation, and no determination o f Leonhart being a sexually violent predator. Leonhart indicated that he would accept the plea offer if he could plead no contest. However, the C ommonwealth stated that

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b).J-S61032-16

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it would only accept a guilty plea. Leonhart subse quently rejected the plea offer, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth withdrew counts 1 through 33, 70 through 90, 116 through 136, 149 through 169, 182 t hrough 202, and 215 through 235. At the close of trial, the trial cour t granted Leonhart’s Motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to counts 63 through 69 and counts 208 through 214. On November 8, 2013, the jury fou nd Leonhart guilty of 81 counts of sexually violent offenses against a ch ild. On that same date, the trial court sentenced Leonhart to an aggregate term of 64 to 140 years in prison. This Court affirmed the judgment of sen tence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Leonhart’s Petiti on for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Leonhart , 104 A.3d 39 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 104 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2014). On June 9, 2015, Leonhart filed the instant PCRA Pe tition. The PCRA court appointed Leonhart counsel, who filed an Amen ded PCRA Petition. The

PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice. There after, on January 7, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Leonhart’s PCRA Peti tion. Leonhart filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A. P. 1925(b) Concise

Statement. On appeal, Leonhart raises the following question for our review:

“Should Leonhart be entitled to relief under the Po st Conviction Relief Act,J-S61032-16

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. , when he was forced to go to trial while ‘butting heads’ with trial counsel?” Brief for Appellant at 4.

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition for post [-] conviction relief is well set tled: [W]e must examine whether the record supports the PCRA court’ s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s determi nation is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings wil l not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findin gs in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Franklin , 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-convi ction petition is not absolute. It is within the PCRA co urt’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s cl aim is patently frivolous and has no support either in the record o r other evidence. It is the responsibility of the reviewin g court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA pet ition in light of the record certified before it in order to deter mine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in denyi ng relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Wah , 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and brackets omitted). Leonhart argues that his trial counsel, Bruce Barr ett, Esquire (“Attorney Barrett”), was ineffective because Leonh art was not able to discuss the Commonwealth’s plea offer without “butt ing heads” with Attorney Barrett, which ultimately caused Leonhart to reject the plea offer.

See Brief for Appellant at 7. Leonhart claims that if he had alternate counsel, he would have been better able to understa nd the plea offer, and the ramifications of rejecting the plea offer. Id. at 8. Thus, LeonhartJ-S61032-16

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asserts that he was entitled to an evidentiary hear ing to determine whether he had sufficient representation at time he was con sidering the plea. Id.

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA p etition pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that the re was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if no t for counsel’s error. The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs. Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of dem onstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Franklin , 990 A.2d at 797 (citations omitted). “[C]ounsel has a duty to communicate plea bargains to his client, as well as to explain the advantages and disadvantages of the offer.”

Commonwealth v. Marinez , 777 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2001). “Failure to do so many be considered ineffectivenes s of counsel if the defendant is sentenced to a longer prison term than the term he would have accepted under the plea bargain.” Id. However, the decision to accept or reject a plea deal is ultimately left to the accuse d. Commonwealth v. Copeland , 554 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. Super. 1988). Here, the trial court conducted a colloquy with Leo nhart regarding the plea deal. See N.T., 5/20/13, at 5-21. Leonhart stated that he ha d a full and complete opportunity to discuss the decision to reject the Commonwealth’s plea offer with Attorney Barrett, an d that he understood the charges against him. Id. at 17-19. Leonhart admitted that he wasJ-S61032-16

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aware of the permissible range of sentences availab le if he went to trial. Id. at 18-19. Leonhart also stated that he fully under stood the plea agreement, and that he was rejecting it. Id. at 21. Leonhart’s statements during his on-the-record coll oquy demonstrate he knowingly rejected the plea offer. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad , 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that t he appellant is bound by statements made during a colloquy); see also Copeland , 554 A.2d at 60. Thus, Leonhart’s ineffectiveness claim is without a rguable merit and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See Wah , 42 A.3d at 338. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Leonhart’s

PCRA Petition.

Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/16/2016