Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 30 , 2023

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00614

- CV

FIDELIS JOHNSON BADAIKI , Appellant

V. PINE FOREST PARK PLACE, AND AMERICAN EAGLE AUTO STORAGE , Appell ees

On Appeal from the Co unty Civi l C our t at Law No . 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1092824

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Fidelis Johnson Badai ki , pro se, sued Bryan Miller d /b/a Classic Towing LLC, 1 Pine Forest Park Place, and American Eagle Auto S t orage fo r violation s of
the Texas Tow ing and Booting Act. See Tex. Occ. Cod e § § 230 8 .001 , 2308.404

. After a bench trial , the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Badaiki an d

1 Prior to trial Badai ki non- suited his claims against Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing LLC.2 awarded him damages under the Act. Badaiki appeals th e t rial court ’ s judg m ent asserti ng that the trial co urt e rred in failing to awar d (1 ) statutory damages unde r section 2 308. 404 (c) of the Occupatio n s Code , (2) damages for injury to his
vehicle ’ s suspension system alleged to have occurred when h is vehicle was towed , (3) prejudgment inter e st, and (4) post

- judgme nt interest

. See Tex. Occ. Code §
2308.404 (c)

. No ap pell ee ’ s brie f has been filed.

G ENERAL L EGAL P RINCIPLES A judgment shall conform to the pleadings . Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; see also
Mullen v. Roberts , 423 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1 9 68) ( “It is a rule tha t

. . . a de fault judgment

. . . must accord with the pleadings. ” )

. “ [A]s a general rule plaintiffs are

re quired to plead for prejudgment intertest sought at common law as an element of damage s, w here as statutory or contractual inte r est may be predicated on a pra yer for ge neral relief. ” Benavidez v. Isles Const. Co. , 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987)

. Exemplary damages must be s pecifically ple aded. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 56 ; see also
First Nat ’ l Bank of Irving v. Shockley , 663 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. App.

— Corpus
Christi

- Edin burg 1 983, no writ) ( “ Since plaintiff ’ s petition di d not allege tha t the alleged misconduct by t he bank was committed knowingly , the trial court could not and our Court cannot deem such an allegation as prov ed o r con fesse d

. ” )

. “ It is imperm is sibl e in a de fault judgment to render judgment for damages in excess of the damages specifically pleaded. ” C apitol Brick , Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., Inc. , 722 S.W. 2d 399 , 401 (Tex. 1986)

. In a no

- answer default judgment , a judgment m a y b e entered on the

p leadings alon e, and all facts properly pled are deemed admitt ed. Whi taker v.
Rose , 218 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

. “ For liq uidated damages, a trial court can render default judgment if it can veri f y t he damages by refe rr ing to the alleg ations in the petition and the written instruments. ”3 Id

. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 24 1). F or unliquidated damages the trial court must hear
evidence

. Tex. R. Civ. P. 243; see also Whitaker , 218 S.W.3d at 220

. “ [A]
d e fau lting defendant do es not admit that the event sued upon caused any of plaintiff ’ s alleged in juries

. ” Mor gan v. Compugraphic Corp. , 675 S.W. 2d 729, 732 (Tex. 1984)

. “ The causal nex us between the event sued upon and the plaintiff ’ s injuries mus t be sho w n b y co m petent eviden ce. ” Id

. Und er s ection 2308.404 of the T e xas Towing and Booting Act : (a) A t owing company, booting company, or park ing facility owner who violat e s t his ch apter is liabl e to the owner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of th e vi olation for: 1) D amag es arising fr om the removal, storage, or booting of the vehicle; and 2) T owing, sto rage, or bo oting fees assessed in conn ection w ith the vehi cle ’ s re mov al, storage , or boo ting.

. . . (c) A t owing company, booting company, or park ing facil i ty owner who intentio nal ly, knowin gly, or rec klessly violates this chapter is liable to the o wner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of the violation fo r $1 ,000 pl us three times the amount of fees assessed in the vehicle ’s removal, towing, sto r age , or boo ting.

Tex. Occ. Code § 2 308.404

.
B ACKGROUND

Badaiki filed suit in the justice court and appe al ed to the county civil court at
law , de novo. In his original petition in the justice court, wh ich became part of the record in the county civil co u rt at law, Badaiki re quested $294. 16 for t he costs of the tow and the storage fees assessed, as well as $ 20.00 for the costs of the photographs. Badaiki attached the receipt for payment of the towing and s to rage fees. Badaiki d id not allege or plead tha t ap pellees Pine Fores t Park Place and
American Eagle Auto Storage “ knowingly, intentionall y, or recklessly ” violated4 the Towing and Booting Act. There is also no general prayer for relief contained
in the petition.

Just before trial, Badaiki non
- suit ed Bry an Miller d/b/a Cl assic Towing
LLC

. T h e trial court conducted a bench trial and rend ered judgment in favor of
Badaik i against Pine Forest Park Place and American Eagle Auto Storage for $314.16 in “ Towin g and Storage C h arges

. ” Bad aiki filed a motion t o mo dify the judgment request ing th at the trial court modify the final judgm ent t o include

pre ju dgment and post

- judgment interest , damages to the vehicle ’ s suspen sion system, and statutory damages under section 2308.404 (c)

. The trial court denied
Bad aiki ’ s mo tion

.
B ADAIKI ’ S P LEADIN GS

Bad a iki di d not allege or plead any facts that w ould establish that Pine
Forest and American Eagle “ knowingly, intentionall y, or recklessly ” violated the Towing and Booting Act

. S ee Shockley , 663 S.W.2d at 691 ; see also Whi t a ker , 218 S.W.3d at 22 0

. Bad aiki a lso failed to plead any damages to his veh icle alleged

to have occurred when his vehicle was towed. T h us, neither the trial court nor this
court can deem such allegations as proven or confessed

. 2 See Shockley , 663
S.W .2 d at 691. Badaiki sim ilarly failed to plead for prejudgment or post

- judgment interest in his petition. See Benavidez , 726 S.W.2d at 25

. A s a result, the p etition did not state a cause of action for these additional damage s against ap p ellees and
the tria l co urt did no t err in failing to a ward such damages

. 3 See Tex. R. Civ. P.

2 Even if the pleading was sufficient to give fair notice of s uch a c laim, Badaiki has failed to poi nt to evidence in the record demonstrating, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of t he issue or t hat the adverse finding i s against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Fran c is , 46 S.W.3d 237, 24 1

– 42 (Tex. 20 01 )

. 3 Even if the petition could be construed to request prejudgment interest, t he decision of whether to award prejudgment interest under equitable principles is within the trial court ’ s discretion. Henry v. Masson , 4 53 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex . App.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)

.5 301; see also Shockley , 663 S.W.2d at 691 ( “ [T] he plain tiff ’ s petition di d not allege tha t any of the alleg ed misconduct . . . was committed knowingly . The petition di d not sta te a cau se of action for t he se ‘ additio nal damages ’ . . . the
defaul t judgment for thes e ‘ additional damages ’ cannot stand. ” ).

C ONCLUSION

We overrule Badaiki ’ s sole issue on appeal and affirm t he judgment of th e trial court.

/s/ Ken Wise Justi ce

Panel consists of Justices Wise , Jewell , and Poissant

.

Badaiki has failed to show that the tria l court abused its discretion in not awarding him prejudgment interest. See id. at 49

– 50 (where serious and genuine dispute regarding ultimate liabil i ty e xisted, decision not to award pr ejudgment interest under equitable principles was n ot abu se of discretion ); P ickens v. Alsup , 568 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1978, writ ref ’d

n.r .e.) (same). Other than arguing his entitlement to prejudgment int e res t, Badaiki has not shown how th e trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him prejudgment interest

. On the record here w e cannot conclude that the trial court ’ s decision was so arbitr ary o r unreasonable as to amount to a clear error of la w

. See Henry , 453 S.W .3d at 50

.