[Cite as In re C.W. , 2020-Ohio-6869.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

In re C.W., H.W., F.W. Court of Appeals Nos. L-20-1125 L-20-1129 Trial Court No. JC 19272468

DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: December 23, 2020 * * * * * Laurel A. Kendall, for appellants. Rebecca L. West-Estell, for appellee.

* * * * * MAYLE, J.

I. Introduction {¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, the appellants, T.W. (“mother”) an d J.W. (“father”), appeal the July 15, 2020 judgment of the Lucas Coun ty Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating their parental rights and granting permanent custody of their children, C.W., H.W., and F.W., to Lucas County Childr en Services (“LCCS”), the appellee herein. For the following reasons, we affirm.2. II. Background A. The family’s involvement with LCCS. {¶ 2} LCCS first became involved with this family in November of 2017 when mother and her three children were living with mother’s then-hu sband, T.P. (hereinafter “stepfather”) and his son, B.P. (hereinafter “stepbrother”). The referral involved reports that stepfather “chokes and hits [stepson]” (i.e., his own son) “on the back of the head.” In response, “LCCS worked with the family through an alternativ e response unit.” (Complaint at ¶ 5(a)). {¶ 3} On November 13, 2018, LCCS received a second referral, again wi th respect to stepbrother, who was alleged to be “hoarding food” at school because he “wasn’t eating at home or getting anything to drink” and also because h e was “having to care for his younger [step-siblings].” Stepbrother reported that mother (i.e., his stepmother) had called the police on him for “stealing food.” An assessments c aseworker for LCCS made a visit to the home and met with mom, stepfather, and stepbroth er. While investigating the allegations surrounding stepbrother—who is not the subject of this case—the

caseworker identified serious concerns about mother’s children. At the time, C.W. was six years old. H.W. was four, and F.W. was two. {¶ 4} On January 2, 2019, another referral was made about a claim of physical abuse sustained by stepbrother. This was considered a “one-ho ur crisis,” causing the assessment caseworker to interview stepbrother and C.W. at scho ol, outside the presence of mother and stepfather. Stepbrother reported that “he hadn’t had breakfast or lunch so3. he was hungry. So [he] and his [step-siblings] stole some Chee tos, [and] dad whooped him [with] eight hits. And then * * * [mother] came home [and said] ‘I didn’t see him get whooped.’ * * * [so] [stepbrother] was pushed to the floor [and] hit between 12 to 21 times with a belt.” The caseworker observed that stepbrother h ad “a lot of scratches all over his face,” a “goose egg on the side of his head [that was] smeared with a little bit of blood,” and a “red area on his back and on his butt cheek.” C. W. affirmed that stepbrother had been hit with a belt. The assessments casework er went to the home, and stepfather “admitted to whooping all the children” and that he had gone “overboard.” Mother reported that she “was gone” at the time. But, a six-y ear-old niece, who was visiting, confirmed that, when mother came home, she said, “whi p him again because I didn’t see it.” The caseworker “checked” H.W. and F.W., and sh e observed that H.W. “had some bruising to her butt area.” Mother denied any knowle dge of the bruises. {¶ 5} The caseworker observed that there was “plenty of food in the k itchen” but that there were “a lot of padlocks on the kitchen door.” The p arents’ room and the bathroom were also padlocked. The caseworker testified that mo m’s “punishment seemed extremely excessive,” like punishing H.W., who was four, by requiring her “to sit in a room or bed * * * for four days.” Another “example” cited by the caseworker was that when the caseworker “tried to talk to [mom]” about how lon g stepbrother had been “on his punishment” and “without snacks” and deprived of “his t oys,” mom responded, “how the hell do you expect me to know?”4. {¶ 6} The children reported that their home had mice in it, and that mother used a BB gun to shoot the mice. Mother also “point[ed] [the gun] at the children and their [stepfather].” {¶ 7} Based upon the above, the caseworker told mother that she “woul d like” mother to “go ahead” and have a mental health assessment, but m om was “adamant” that an assessment was not necessary because she was already treatin g with a “psychiatrist,” who had prescribed Percocet—for back pain—which, according to m other, he would not do unless she was “mentally stable.” {¶ 8} On January 3, 2019, the children were examined at the agency, b efore they were placed with foster parents. Melinda Aschliman, R.N. condu cted those exams. She described H.W. as having “dirty clothes, dirty underwear, dirty hair,” a “fine rash all over her body * * * possibly [from] bug bites, * * * a dark bruise o n her center, upper chest * * * bruises on her legs [and] deep layers of a bruise” on her right buttock. H.W. “didn’t talk,” but stepbrother told the nurse that “she had been spanke d.” An LCCS supervisor, Amy Cox, assisted with the assessments. She described the girl s as “very, very skinny,” and that they “smell[ed] [of] urine.” Based upon “the yellow h ue” of their underwear, “it appeared that there were wearing those underwear for an extende d period of time.” B. LCCS files a complaint, and a case plan is developed. {¶ 9} On January 4, 2019, LCCS filed a complaint in dependency, negle ct and abuse as to all three children and a motion to place the childr en into shelter care. In addition to the allegations raised above, the complaint also al leged that the children’s5. father was J.W. (“father”), that mother and father had a histor y of domestic violence between them, that father lived in Kentucky, and that efforts b y LCCS to contact him were unsuccessful. After a hearing that same day before a magi strate, LCCS was granted interim, temporary custody of C.W., H.W., and F.W. {¶ 10} An adjudicatory hearing was held on March 12, 2019. The purpos e of an adjudicatory hearing is “to determine whether a child is * * * abused, neglected, or dependent or is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the court. ” Juv.R. 2(B). Mother and father attended the hearing and consented to a finding of abuse , neglect and dependency. At the conclusion of the hearing, LCCS was granted temporary cu stody. {¶ 11} A case plan was developed that ordered mother to attend parenti ng classes and to complete a dual assessment. Months later, in October of 2019, the case plan was amended to include trauma and domestic violence therapy, follow ing an incident of domestic violence between mother and stepfather. The case plan also provided for supervised, Level 1 visitation (the most restrictive) at LCCS f or both parents. Finally, the case plan ordered trauma counseling for C.W. and developmental assessments for H.W. and F.W. Separately, a dual assessment and parenting classes w ere ordered as to father. C. LCCS moves for permanent custody, and a trial is held. {¶ 12} On March 11, 2020, LCCS filed a motion for permanent custody. A threeday trial was held, beginning on June 22, 2020. In all, 12 wit nesses testified: an LCCS assessment caseworker (Barb Cummins), C.W.’s therapist (Sandra Pessefall), H.W. and F.W.’s therapist (Dena Shafer, LISW), a child abuse expert (Ran dall Schlievert, M.D.),6. an LCCS supervisor (Amy Cox), the foster-father (Ju.P.), the fo ster-mother (Je.P.), an LCCS nurse (Melinda Aschliman, R.N.), the LCCS caseworker (Cher ese Mitchell-El), mother, and the GAL (Sharon Fitzgerald). {¶ 13} LCCS assessment caseworker Barb Cummins testified that, althoug h this case began with allegations of physical abuse, the agency suspe cted that the children had also been abused sexually, based upon reports by the children t hat surfaced in April of 2020. At that time, “C.W. [began] talking about having to slee p naked with his mother in bed, that his mother was touching his penis, that he had to tak e cold showers with her.

That he would urinate on the bathroom wall and she would lick i f off. Information about seeing [mother] and [stepfather] having sex, doing what dogs do . Imitating the noises they make in their sexual encounter.” Cummins did not have to “pry anything out of C.W.”; rather, he “spit out” what had “happened” and was “adama nt” that it had occurred. C.W. disclosed much of the abuse by writing letters, which he asked Cummins to give to “the judge.” H.W. also disclosed that mother and st epfather “had touched her vagina.” Cummins concluded that the children had “been exposed to something sexual * * * because the [two older children], especially [C.W.] were descriptive [as to] * * * what was going in where.” She believes that “they [were] expos ed to a lot of sexual abuse,” and she added that each was “very afraid of going home. ” {¶ 14} As a result of the sex abuse claims, LCCS referred the children to Dr. Schlievert who interviewed and assessed the children for “possi ble sexual abuse.” While Dr. Schlievert had “concerns,” he concluded that there was not enough “information that7. was conveyed to [him] directly by the children” to make a findi ng that sexual abuse had

occurred in this case. The children’s therapists {¶ 15} Sandra Pessefall is C.W.’s therapist, who met with C.W. at leas t 70 times by the time of trial. Pessefall diagnosed C.W. with post-traum atic stress disorder as a result of witnessing domestic violence between stepfather and m other and from being physically and sexually abused by them. According to her, C.W. “consistently” reported that he did not want to “have anything to do with his biologica l mother,” due to his “deep seeded fear” of her. In March of 2020, Pessefall wrote the cas eworker to recommend that visitation, even by video, be stopped because each visit with m other was a “set back” for

C.W. and “re-traumatized him.” She added that the video visits were, in some ways, worse than the in-person visits because they “brought [mother] into his safe place. He feels safe in the foster home. * * * [H]aving her there made it so that he didn’t feel that safe anymore.” Pessefall testified that C.W. “really started o pening up more once the visitations stopped” in the spring of 2020. Pessefall opined t hat although the trauma therapy is helping C.W., he will likely need “to work” on his m ental health for “the rest

of his life.” {¶ 16} Next, Dena Shafer testified. Ms. Shafer conducted “play therap y” with H.W. and F.W., beginning in July of 2019. As a result of that therapy, she diagnosed “unspecified trauma related disorder” as to both girls and a sp eech delay, as to H.W. In sessions, H.W. displayed “aggressive behavior.” Shafer opined that H.W. lacks an8. emotional bond with mother, and she “ignore[d]” questions about father or responded that she “didn’t want to talk” about him. Although younger, F. W. was “more verbal” than H.W. She told Shafer that mother “bite my vagina” [sic], and when asked if she wanted to visit with mother, F.W. responded, “No, her hurt me.” [Sic]. Like her siblings, F.W. did not appear to have a bond with either parent. {¶ 17} Shafer also recommended that visits between the girls and mothe r cease because “their anxiety would increase before and after visits” causing “bedwetting, diarrhea [and] aggressive behaviors.” Those behaviors decrease d, though not entirely,

once the visits were halted. The foster parents {¶ 18} The children were placed in the foster home on the evening of J anuary 3, 2019, and remained there, 18 months later, when the hearing occ urred. {¶ 19} According to the foster parents, C.W. “didn’t really talk a lot ” when he arrived and they described him as “zombie-like for quite a whil e.” In consultation with C.W.’s physician, he was “taken off” a medication used to treat ADHD, and became a “totally different kid. Spunky, perky, happy, just wanted to p lay with everybody. He loves to be outside. Just night and day difference.” Over tim e, C.W. has also “open[ed] up” and become “more talkative.” When the visits with mother w ere in person, “a pattern developed” whereby C.W. would misbehave in school and g o into “panic mode” as they drove from their home to the location of the visits. A fter the visits, C.W. would wet the bed, have temper tantrums and “zone out.” C.W. was giv en a notebook to write9. down “his thoughts and feelings,” and he wrote frequent notes t o the caseworker, the court, his foster parents and the GAL, stating that he did not want to go on any more visits. In those notes, he also described the abuse he sustain ed. Foster father testified that C.W. wrote of “not being fed, being kept in a room, locked in a room. Having to bang on walls to be heard.” He also disclosed that mother “tou ched his penis and his butt,” that he was “handcuffed” to stepbrother and forced to wa tch his sisters eat McDonalds while the boys were denied food, that he was “whooped with a belt,” that stepfather “punched him in the face” and threw a television at mother. In April of 2020, C.W. divulged “sexual-type things” to foster mother, including that mother had “put her finger in [C.W.’s] butt.” Foster mother reported the abuse to C.W.’s therapist. {¶ 20} Foster father testified that C.W. is “very into sports now,” es pecially soccer. Foster father taught him how to play baseball, and the ir time together is either “sports related” or “just talking [about how to] be a good, sol id man.” {¶ 21} When H.W arrived, she was “very timid” and her speech was “bare ly understand[able].” She used inappropriate language, calling fo ster mother a “yucky bitch.” F.W., who was two years old, “called everybody in [the ] house a bitch constantly.” Both used to “scream” at bath time because they a ssumed that the bath would be filled with cold water. And, “both of the girls from the beginning were adamant that someone had touched their vagina without using exa ct terms” according to foster mother. H.W. also reported physical abuse that was simi lar to the claims alleged by C.W.10. {¶ 22} When H.W., who was four years old, arrived she “didn’t speak,” and it was thought that she had “selective mutism.” “[T]o this day,” [whe n] confronted with anything at all, [like forgetting to flush the toilet], she fre ezes and won’t speak.” Within a couple of days of her placement, however, H.W. “really loosen ed up” and began to “laugh and smile.” Foster father said it has been “incredible” to witness her improvement. He described her as “real friendly [and] fun lovi ng” girl who loves pageants and cheerleading. She was “very proud” to have earned “first place” in their town’s Christmas pageant. {¶ 23} The foster parents described F.W. as a “spitfire” who “wants to do everything that her big sister does.” They allowed her to play T-ball but are “making her wait a little bit [to participate in cheerleading] until [she g ets] better with listening.” F.W. told her foster parents that she is “scared” of mother. Althou gh she does not have a lot of “memory of the physical abuse,” she “seems to recall * * * the belt” and “being whooped.” And “she walked around the longest time saying [moth er] bite my vagina.” {¶ 24} Foster mother described similar acting out by the girls around the time of visits, including fits of “screaming and crying” and “bedwettin g” and “diarrhea” and “nightmares.” She testified that the children “never wanted to visit” mother, and she could only recall the children visiting with father “two, maybe three” times. {¶ 25} Although the foster parents have had other foster children in t heir home, this was their “first kind of permanent placement” and they “wo uld” be interested in adopting them. Their “biggest concern is * * * that [the child ren are] safe.”11. The LCCS caseworker {¶ 26} The caseworker testified that, as part of its investigation, LC CS learned that mother sustained “a lot of trauma during her [own] childhood,” including claims that “there was no food in the [mother’s childhood] home [and] cupbo ards were locked.” {¶ 27} With regard to the case plan, the caseworker testified that mot her completed the dual assessment and later, trauma counseling with her own provider, who, while not a “psychiatrist,” was qualified to provide trauma cou nseling. The caseworker described mother’s participation in parenting classes as “consi stent” and that she “completed the class successfully.” As to domestic violence th erapy, mother initially resisted it on the basis that she was no longer living with eit her abuser, i.e., father or stepfather. Ultimately, however, mother began the classes, the n took a six-month hiatus, before re-engaging and “substantially completing” the course. Despite her near-total completion of the coursework identified in her case plan, LCCS was not satisfied with mother’s progress because she “never did take any * * * respons ibility” for the harm done to the children. Instead, as to each and every claim, mot her either denied any knowledge of it, said her kids were lying or “being coached,” o r blamed stepfather for her

“situation.” {¶ 28} As for father, the caseworker offered to arrange a home-study i n Kentucky after father expressed his intention “to get the kids to take t hem back [there].” Kentucky denied the request for an “interstate compact placement” due to father’s lack of adequate12. housing and employment and because “he hadn’t completed a dual diagnostic assessment and parenting classes as requested of him by the state of Ohio. ” {¶ 29} In all, father visited with the children two or three times, th e last of which occurred in October of 2019. In December of 2019, the casework er learned—from his mother—that father was “homeless” and that his “phone was off,” and she encouraged him to call her so she could “help him.” Father called the cas eworker in March of 2020. At that time, father reported that he was living in Perrysburg, Ohio, with a friend, who was reportedly a convicted sex offender. Father told the casew orker that he left Kentucky after his girlfriend (and mother to his new baby) repo rted him for domestic violence. When told that LCCS was seeking permanent custody, f ather told the caseworker that he had always “suspected sexual abuse,” but had not reported it to anyone. Father did not ask to see the children. {¶ 30} As a result of his dual assessment, father was diagnosed with a nxiety and depression. Although he attended some counseling sessions, he failed to re-engage after the pandemic began, despite being provided with a tablet from t he provider so that sessions could continue. Father told the caseworker that “he j ust hadn’t set it up yet.” Father never enrolled in parenting classes. {¶ 31} The caseworker testified that it would be in the children’s bes t interest if the agency was awarded permanent custody because the children, even a year-and-onehalf later, remain “traumatized [by] the abuse.” In the casewo rker’s experience, “kids * * * want to go back home to their parents, even if the abuse was bad.” But, she added,13. “I never had a case like this where children have sustained so much abuse and then they say they don’t want to go home. This is actually my first.”

Mother {¶ 32} Mother’s refusal to accept responsibility was on full display a t the hearing. For example, when asked if she “realized that waiting that six months [to re-engage in domestic violence services] prolonged [her] reunification with her children,” mother responded, “that’s not my fault.” When asked if her “thinking” had changed with regard to padlocks—in light of her parenting classes—mother answered, “Yes. I have alarms on

all the doors now. No more locks. Just alarms.” Mother denie d that the children ever witnessed her shooting mice because they were “asleep in bed wh en [she] shot the mice.” Besides, she said, “[i]t was a little BB gun. It was not going to hurt them at all.” She volunteered that she taught her “6 year old * * * how to work t he gun [safely] * * * which is not against the law.” Mother described her children a s “gullible,” and said she was not surprised that they no longer wanted to visit with her after “living in this rich girl’s home who tells them things.” Finally, as to all the evi dence of abuse in this case, mother would only acknowledge a single incident and that was to stepbrother, at the hands of stepfather. Mother said that her “whole screw up in a ll of this is that I was trying to take care of a kid that wasn’t mine.” {¶ 33} Mother was willing to admit that her own experience in foster c are was bad, and because of it, she “hate[s]” her own mother “for what she [did]” like “beating14. the shit out of [her] all the time [and] selling [her] out [and ] not taking care of her.” But, she added that she does not “let that stuff bother her now [bec ause] [l]ife is too short.” The guardian ad litem {¶ 34} The children’s guardian ad litem and attorney was appointed by the court on January 9, 2019. She conducted an independent investigation in this case and authored a report dated June 22, 2020. Throughout the course o f the case, the GAL observed five or six visits, met the children about twelve time s, and spoke with the caseworkers, therapists, mother, father, foster parents, visita tion “guards” and two parenting instructors. {¶ 35} The GAL recommended that it was in the best interests of the ch ildren that LCCS be awarded permanent custody. She explained that, althoug h the parents had been “offered all kinds of services,” neither “learned to look at th eir [own] trauma” or recognize that the cycle of abuse was continuing in the lives o f their children. {¶ 36} The GAL found the children’s reports of sexual abuse (against m other) and physical abuse (against mother and stepfather) credible because the “kinds of things” the children discussed were “so far beyond their developmental imag ination [that] they must have experienced at least some of it.” The GAL criticized moth er’s refusal to take responsibility for “what happened in the home,” noting that “[a ]t the very least,” she knew stepfather was violent because she experienced it firsthan d when he put her in the hospital with a “dislocated foot.” And, she questioned mother’ s denial that mother did15. not observe bruising on her children, “given the number of time s the kids talked about not having any clothes on in the house.” {¶ 37} As for dad, it was the GAL’s “impression that he * * * left his children behind a long time ago.” In the beginning, when dad lived in K entucky, the GAL thought that he was “committed,” and she “did her darnedest” to “get the funding for him” to obtain services there and to help him travel back and f orth. But then he just “stopped” communicating with her over the course of nine months . The GAL learned later that dad “was up here with his ex-wife (i.e., mother) for a couple of weeks” but failed to let anyone know so that visits could be “set up * * * with the kids.” By the GAL’s “calculations, he only visited for two hours with his chi ldren since the case was opened.” She observed one of those visits and described his be havior as appropriate and

that he “seemed comfortable” with them. The GAL described dad as “living * * * parallel,” to this case and noted that he was “not even asking to have the children.” {¶ 38} Finally, the GAL opined that it would be “devastating” for the children if they were returned to mother’s care, based upon their “demonstr ated anxiety, terror, sadness, fear and physical manifestation of all those things.” She added that, “seeing how much they don’t want to go [to mother’s] home, a ruling for them to go home I think would be catastrophic, especially for [C.W.].” In her 35 years of doing guardian ad litem work, the GAL testified that this case ranked “among the worst just from the intensity of

the children’s disclosures.”16. D. The court grants LCCS’s motion. {¶ 39} On July 15, 2020, the trial court granted LCCS’s motion, termin ating mother and father’s parental rights and awarding permanent cust ody of C.W., H.W. and F.W. to LCCS. The parents appealed and assigned the following errors for our review: I. The evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the minor

children here could not be returned to their mother was not cle ar and convincing when she had substantially completed her case plan s ervices, and had visited regularly with the children, and when time rema ined in the

case. II. The evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the minor

children here could not be returned to their father was not cle ar and convincing with [sic] he had engaged in case plan services; whe n his interactions with the children were considered appropriate; and when time

remained on the case. III. Law and Analysis {¶ 40} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth “specific findings a juvenile court mu st make before granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody of a c hild.” In re A.M., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18, citing In re C.F. , 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 22. As relevant here, the court must f ind by clear and convincing evidence “(1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)17. through (e) applies and (2) that a grant of permanent custody i s in the child’s best interest. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).” Id. {¶ 41} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) requires a finding that the child has no t been abandoned or orphaned , has not been in the custody of a public children services agenc y or a private child placing agency for at least 12 months of a c onsecutive 22-month period, and cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable tim e or should not be placed with either parent; subsection (b) requires a finding that the child is abandoned; subsection (c) requires a finding that the child is orphaned an d there are no relatives who are able to take permanent custody; subsection (d) requires a f inding that the child has been in the temporary custody of a public children services age ncy or a private child placing agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; and subsection (e) requires a finding that the child or another child the pare nt had custody of has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent on three separate o ccasions. {¶ 42} Here, the juvenile court determined that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies to the facts of this case. Therefore, the court was required to c onsider whether granting permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest and whether any of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present that would i ndicate that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. In re B.K. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1053, 2010-Ohio-3329, ¶ 42-43. On appeal, mother and father challenge the juvenile court’s findin gs with respect to Section (E), i.e., that the children should not, and could not within a reasonable time, be placed18. with either parent. They do not challenge the trial court’s fi nding that a grant of permanent custody to the department was in the children’s best interest. Therefore, we confine this decision to the juvenile court’s determination tha t, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the children should not, and could not withi n a reasonable time, be placed with either parent. Accord In re A.M . at ¶ 18. {¶ 43} We review a trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In re P.W. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1060, 2012-Ohio-3556, ¶ 20. In doing so, we must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and dete rmine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). But, while we review th e evidence and consider the witnesses’ credibility, we must be mindful that the juvenil e court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh evidence and evaluate testimon y. In re. P.W. at ¶ 20. Its discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child “should be accorded the utmost respect, given the natur e of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” (Internal citations omitted.) In re C.P. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-1128, 2009-Ohio2760, ¶ 10. {¶ 44} In its decision, because the court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)( 1)(a) applies, it examined the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. A court nee d only find one (E) factor19. present to support a finding that the child cannot be placed wi th either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. In re C.F. at ¶ 50, citing In re

William S. , 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 661 N.E.2d 738 (1996), syllabus. {¶ 45} The court found that Sections (E)(1), (2) and (4) applied to bo th mother and father. It found that Section (E)(10) also applied as to fathe r. Those sections provide, (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) o f this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151. 353 of the Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either paren t within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the pare nts, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151. 353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should no t be placed with either parent: (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s ho me and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent effor ts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initia lly caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed cont inuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the c hild to be20. placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the pa rents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consid er parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other s ocial and

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made a vailable to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to all ow them to resume and maintain parental duties. (2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellec tual disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequat e permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, wit hin one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of t his section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code;

* * * (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate wi th the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingnes s to provide an adequate permanent home for the child;

* * * (10) The parent has abandoned the child.21. {¶ 46} All of the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414 must be by clea r and convincing evidence. “Clear and convincing evidence” is eviden ce sufficient for the trier

of fact to form a firm conviction or belief that the essential statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been established. Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; In re Tashayla S. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1253, 2004-Ohio-896, ¶ 14. A. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the ch ildren could not be returned to the mother’s care within a reasonable time or shoul d not be returned. {¶ 47} As to Section (E)(1), the court found that “despite substantial ly completing case plan services, Mother lacks the ability or has failed to m ake significant progress in the services to return the children to her and to keep the chil dren safe and heathy.” Based upon her testimony at trial, the court concluded that mother “l acks insight in the circumstances she and her children were living in” including he r use of locks in the home, “shooting mice with a BB gun in the presence of children” and claiming there were “no bruises on the children despite being presented with e vidence to the contrary.” {¶ 48} In appellants’ first assignment of error, mother does not chall enge any particular Section (E) finding by the court. Instead, she clai ms that, because parents are allowed “up to [24 months] to complete case plan services, * * * this court should find that approximately six months remained available” to her—as of the time of trial—to complete her case plan. And, she claims that “arguably * * * a dditional time would be22. helpful to her.” We interpret mother’s claim as a challenge to the trial court’s finding under Section (E)(1). And, we find it not well-taken. {¶ 49} Mother’s testimony at trial firmly established that, despite mo re than 18 months of services, she remained steadfast in her unwillingness or inability to accept any responsibility for the conditions that led to the children’s re moval. If anything, mother doubled down, insisting that the agency’s concerns were unfound ed. When asked whether her “thinking” on the use of padlocks had changed in li ght of parenting classes, mother answered, “Yes. I have alarms on all the doors now. No more locks. Just alarms.” Mother rationalized the use of shooting “a little BB gun” in the house while the children were “sleeping,” only then to announce that she had “l egally” taught her “6 year old” to operate a “gun.” {¶ 50} Mother also appears to challenge the trial court’s finding—that the children

could not and should not be returned to her mother’s care withi n a reasonable time—by pointing to “evidence” that she “wasn’t questioned” about sexua l abuse and was “unaware” of stepbrother’s beating. First, evidence was presen ted from multiple sources that mother witnessed and even encouraged stepbrother’s beating . But, what speaks volumes to this court is the total absence that mother ever, in the 18 months after the children were removed, acknowledged the harm that was done to t he children, if only physically and emotionally, irrespective of the cause. At the time of their removal, the children were described as dirty, very skinny, bruised, traumat ized, mute, aggressive, zombie-like, and profane. As expressed by the GAL, mother simp ly lacks, then and now,23. any understanding of “what kind of shape the kids [were] in,” a nd “if [mother] doesn’t understand it, she can’t do anything about it.” A parent “is a fforded a reasonable, not an indefinite, period of time to remedy the conditions causing the children’s removal.” In re

A.L.A. and A.S.A. , 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2011-L-020 and 2011-L-021, 2011-Ohio-312 4, ¶ 108. (Finding that mother was not entitled to more than the 18 months that had elapsed since the case plan in that case was filed.) We see no evidenc e to support mother’s claim that an additional six months of services would make any differ ence in her ability to provide a safe and loving home to these children. In sum, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding under Section (E)(1) that, despite mother’s substantial completion of her case plan, she failed co ntinuously and substantially to remedy the conditions that caused the children ’s removal. {¶ 51} As to Section (E)(2), the court found that mother has been in m ental health counseling for a “substantial period of time yet has made very little progress.” The court noted that “many of the actions [mother] took towards the child ren [that were considered inappropriate] were taken towards her by her own mother yet she fails to acknowledge the gravity of these actions.” The court concluded that, “Moth er lacks insight into how her past trauma has affected the way she parents toward the chi ldren.” {¶ 52} Mother does not address the trial court’s finding under Section (E)(2), nor does she address the trial court’s specific conclusion that “he r past trauma” affects the way she parents. Based upon our review of the record, mother s ustained terrible abuse herself as a young person, and perhaps understandably, “hates” her mother for it. But,24. the record contains no evidence to suggest that mother’s treatm ent for trauma has had any measurable impact on her psychological well-being. Merely comp leting the coursework and professing that she does not “let that stuff bother her” do es not cast doubt on the trial court’s finding that mother remains severely impacted by unreso lved trauma. {¶ 53} Finally, as to Section (E)(4), the court found that mother “fai led to demonstrate an ability to maintain control of the children duri ng visits. Mother’s testimony regarding visits was contrary to others who have obse rved the visits.” {¶ 54} The evidence at trial established that mother attended “99%” of the visits. On appeal, mother asserts that her attendance and her “diligenc e” in following recommendations, “particularly [in] regards [to] bringing food for the visits” demonstrate her ability to care for the children. {¶ 55} Actually, the record indicates that mother was asked to discontinue bringing food to the visits because it was so disruptive. The GAL testified extensively about the visits between mother and the children. In short, th ey were “so bad” that the GAL requested that they be suspended. Many factors influenced the GAL, including the fact that before, during and after the visits, the “kids bodies rebel[led].” She elaborated that there was “just so much peeing and pooping going on and th rowing up, * * * in reaction” to visiting with mother. Also, before entering the v isitation room, the kids would “cling[] to all sorts of personnel, whether it was securi ty guards or foster mom or foster dad or visitation people.” Once inside the visitation r oom, the girls “lost control” by climbing onto furniture, making a mess with food, and repeat edly running into the25. hallway and eluding the security guards who ran after them. Wh ile C.W. would “behave himself and cooperate,” mom “basically ignored” him, while the girls “rais[ed] havoc”

and “evolved into this wildness.” The GAL described mom as “ve ry rigid” who “would lecture” the girls, but “nothing seemed to work.” Of particula r relevance to the trial court’s finding under Section (E)(4), the GAL testified that th e girls would typically use the bathroom “three or four times” per visit, and initially, mo ther was allowed to take them. However, after a report that she had “hurt their vagina” while in the LCCS bathroom, the agency prohibited mother from taking them anymore . After another visit and report, “the kids were no longer allowed to sit on mom’s la p.” {¶ 56} In sum, we find that competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2) and (4) as to mother. T herefore, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that the children could not be placed with mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her. Accordingly, the first assignment of

error is found not well-taken. B. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the ch ildren could not be returned to the father’s care within a reasonable time or shoul d not be returned. {¶ 57} Here, the juvenile court found that father “has abandoned the c hildren in that he has not visited with the children in over [18] months n or has he asked to visit with them” under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). {¶ 58} Under R.C. 2151.011(C), “a child shall be presumed abandoned wh en the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact w ith the child for more than26. ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact w ith the child after that period of ninety days.” Here, father admits that he only atten ded two or three visits at LCCS, the last of which occurred in October of 2019. Thus, he had no contact with the children for at least seven months prior to the permanent custo dy hearing in this case. During some of that time, at least, he was back in Ohio but fai led to communicate with the caseworker or GAL. Most notably, when he did finally conta ct the caseworker, he

did not ask to visit with the children. We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that father abandon ed the children under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). Accord In re. M.G ., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-20-1114, L-20-1115, 2020- Ohio-5288, ¶ 41. {¶ 59} The trial court also found that the children could not or shoul d not be placed with father under Sections (E)(1), (2), and (4), and fat her does not challenge the court’s findings under those sections. To the contrary, he spe cifically admits that “he did not engage in a parenting program” and lacks “stable housing,” which supports the trial court’s finding, under Section (E)(1), i.e., that father “has f ailed to complete case plan services and has stated to more than one person that he is not in a position to take custody of the children.” Also, and as discussed above, he agrees that he “only visited with the

children three times and has not visited with them since Octobe r of 2019” which supports the trial court finding under Section (E)(4). And finally, whi le he maintains that he “engaged” in mental health treatment at Harbor, he does not cha llenge the trial court’s27. finding under Section (E)(2) that, “[a]lthough father has engag ed in mental health counseling, he has been sporadic in his compliance.” {¶ 60} The only argument raised by father is that—like mother—he is en titled to an additional six months to “re-establish visits” and complete a parenting class. Father’s aspirational claim falls flat, in light of the record evidence establishing that he never asked to see his children, lost contact with the agency, did no t testify at the hearing, and admitted that he was not in a position to care for the children . For these reasons, we find the second assignment of error not well-taken. {¶ 61} We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenil e court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that C.W., H.W., and F.W. could not be

returned to mother or father within a reasonable time or should not be returned to mother or father. Therefore, we find that the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to LCCS in this case was not against the manifest weight of the ev idence. Accordingly, the appellants’ assignments of error are not well-taken.

IV. Conclusion {¶ 62} For the reasons expressed above, we find that the trial court’s decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that the appellants’ assignments of erro r are without merit. Therefore, the July 15, 2020 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,28. Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs o f this appeal are assessed to mother and father, to be shared equally. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ________________________

_______ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.