2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/366PRECE DENTI AL

UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-2956

BARRY PRIE STER,

Appellant

v.
DONALD T. VAUGHN; THE DI STRI CT ATT ORNEY OF THE COUNT Y OF PHI LADELP HIA; THE ATT ORNEY GENE RAL OF T HE STA TE O F PE NN SY LV AN IA

On Appeal from the United St ates Distri ct Court f

or the Eastern District

of Pen nsylvan ia (D.C. Civi l No. 02-cv- 00075) Distric t Judg e: Ho n. Stew art D alzell

Argued May 4, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, FUE NTES and BE CK ER , Circu it Judges
(Fil ed: August 19, 2004)

Johanna E. Markind (Argued) Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorneyfor Appella nt Thomas W. Dolgenos (Argued) Chief, Feder al Litigati on Ron ald Eisenb erg Deputy Dis tri ct Attorney Law Division Arnold H. Gordon First Assist ant Dist

rict Attorney Lynne Abraham Distri ct Attorney Philadelphia, PA 19102-1582 Attorney s for Appell ees
OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SL OV ITE R, Circu it Judge

. Thi s appeal arises f

rom appell ant Barry Prieste r’s 199 1 sta te conviction of first de gr ee mur de r, two cou nts of aggravat ed assau lt , cr im in al c on sp ira cy, and possess ion of

an inst rument of

crime. Priester appeals t

he decisi on of

the United States Distri ct Court f or the Eas tern Di s tri ct of P enns ylvania d enying h is petit ion for a w rit of habeas corpus . The Distri ct Cour t h ad s ubj ectma tte r juri sdiction over Pri ester ’s hab ea s corpus petit ion pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254 and
we have juri sdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 2253. I. FACTS AN D PROCEDURAL

HIS TORY On May 19, 1990, Pr iest er and NathanielButler met

Trac ey Poste ll at the
cornerof 8th and L oud en S treets in Philadelphia. Prieste r told P oste ll that he
was meeting a gr oup of

people t o confront the indivi duals who had “rol led” Dari us Barnes – a m utual f riend. P ostell ag reed to2

accompany Pries ter and B utler to lo cate th ese indivi duals. Priester drove one c ar wh ile Ba rne s dro ve a not her

. Two or three othercars cont aining a dditi onal gang
mem bers joined t

he caravan. Ac cord ing to Postell’s tri al te sti mony, at one point al ong the way Pri ester

pul l ed alongside Barnes’
car and said, “[w]hen we get up there, no questi ons asked, start busti ng.” Tri al Tr. at 190 (Se pt. 13, 1991 ). The cars ar rived a t th e B elfield Recreati onal Cen ter in No rth Ph iladelp hia and Barnes beg an searc hing th e play ground for their

target s. Once Barnes id entif ied the indi viduals who “rolled ” hi m, Pries ter r emo ved a gun from his jacket and han ded it to B utler

. Butler f ired severalshots in t o the crow d. Shots w ere also fired from the o th er vehic les. Soon after the shoo ti ng, Priester and th e others drove away from th e s ce ne . A s a resul t of the shooti ng, Terre nce Luc a n died, and Ro nald H olli man and Walter Jef ferson sustained signifi cant injures. On June 7 , 1990 , Philad elphia Homicide D e tective Frank M cGo uirk questi oned Postel l about t he sh oot in g. At that ti m e, Post ell, who subsequentl y pl ed guilty in a negotiate d plea, detai led the factualscenari o sur rounding t he shooti ng as well as Priester’s an d Bu tler’s invo lvem ent. Butler was t hen arres ted and questi oned. He stated that Prie ster w as in the car w ith h im a nd P oste ll, and that Butler shot tw ice into the cro wd with a .38 calibe r pistol. After further

investigati on, Priester and Barnes were indi cted on fi rst d egree mu rder, tw o cou nts of ag grav ated a ssault, crimina l conspir acy a nd possessi on of an inst rument of crime. They were t ried togethe r in the Philadelphia Court of Common Ple as b efo re a ju ry. D uring te s timonyat trial, Pos tell attem pted to
rec ant the st ory he told t he polic e an d stated that he had lie d to the pol ic e and
was asleep i n the c ar whe n the inc ident occurred. Having been forewarned by defense cou nsel about this change, t

he prosecution sought the t rial court’s app r oval to admit

Butler’ s previ ous statem ent, which the trialcou rt gr anted subject to re dac tion . Th erea fter , a redact ed versi on of the pri or statement made by Bu tle r, descr ibing th e incid ent,
w as intr oduced at t

rial . This redacted statement replac ed Priester’s nam e, and all othernames, with ph rase s such as “t he otherguy. ” Ap p. at 91-97. At the conclusi on of the trial, th e jur y convi cted Priester as well as Butler onall co unt s. At the sentenci ng phase, t he juryreturned a sentence of li fe i mprisonment for each defendanto n t he murder convi ctions and t he court i mposed sentence s on t h e remaini ng c o unts, to run concur rentl y for both defendants. Af te r th e trial cou rt denie d po stverdict m otions , Pri ester appealed t o the Pen nsylvan ia Superior

Court, c ontending that th e Comm o nw ealth b reach ed its agreementnot to i ntrod uce Butler’ s prior statement and chall enging the suffici ency of the reda ction, the adm ission of Po stell’s earli er statement as subs tanti ve evidence, and the su fficien cy of the evide nce to convict hi m o f firs t degree murder. The3

court rejec ted the se clai ms. The Pennsyl vani a Supreme Court deni ed alloc atur

. Commonw ealth v. Priester , 634 A.2d 220 (Pa. 1993). Priester then file d a petit ion for c olla teralreview under t he Pen nsylvan ia Post-Convic tion Relief Ac t, 42 Pa. Cons. St at. § 9541 et s eq . (2003) (“PCR A”), which was denied byboth the trial cou rt and th e Su perior Co urt. Priester n ext petit

ioned for a llocatur in the Pennsy lvani a Supreme Court of thr ee issues. He arg ued that B utler’s statement wa s insuf fic ie ntly redac ted in vi olati on of Bruton v. United State s , 39 1 U.S. 123 (196 8); th at the tri al court erred beca use it admitt ed Postell’s p rio r inconsi stent

statements as subst a ntive evidence; and that

the juryinst

ructi ons regardi ng acco mp lice lia bility wer e defic ient. The Pe nn sy lv ani a Su pr eme Court denie d alloc atur

. Therea fter, Priester fi l ed a pro se petit ion for a writ

of habeas corpus in the Distri ct Court, whic h was amended after th e a ppointment

of new counsel. The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who issued an opinion recommending that Priester’s cla ims be denied. The Distri ct Cour t a ppro ved a nd ad opted th e M agistrate J ud ge’s re commendation, but certi fied for appealtwo of the many cl ai ms ra ised by Pri ester : the c laim that the admiss i on of Butler ’s reda cted st atement violated the C o nfrontat ion Clause of

the Sixth Amendment, and the cl aim that tri al counsel was ineffective beca use o f his failure to o bject

to the j ury inst

ructi on on accomplice lia bi lity. 1 We now consider

these is sues o n app eal.

II. DIS CUSS ION A. Standard of

Review At th e o ut se t, we s et fort h our standard of revie w. Under the An tiTerrorism and Effecti ve Death Penalty Act (“AE DP A”): An applic ation f or a w rit o f habeas corpus on behal f of a person in cust ody pur suant to the jud gm ent o f a State court shallnot b e grante d with respec t to any cla im that was adjudicated on the meri ts in Stat e cou r t proceedi ng s u nless th e adjud ic ationof t

he c la im –

1 Co unse l for P riester atte mp ts to add a n inef fectiv enes s of c oun sel claim based on a fai lure to object to the adm issio n of the r eda cted state me nt. See Appellant ’s Br. at 20-24. However, the Dis tric t C our

t c erti fi ed onl y th e t wo issues set forth above for appeal, App. at 7, and we denie d Prie ster’s req uest to certi fy ot her is sues on Septe mber 23, 2003. Therefore, we decline to discuss this issue herein . In any ev ent, in h is reply brief Prieste r states th at the issu e is properl y pr esented a s a Confrontat ion Clau se claim . Ap pellan t’s Re ply Br. at 2 n.1. We decl ine to di scuss t he due proc ess cla ims re lated to the arg um ents made on appeal for

the same re ason.4

(1) resul ted in a

decisi on that was contrary t o, or involvedan un reaso nable applic at ion of, clearl y establ ished Federal l aw, as determi ned by the S upr eme Cou rt of the Un ite d States

.

. . . 28 U .S.C. § 225 4(d) (emp hasis adde d). Priester argues that becaus e the Pen nsylvan ia S uper ior C ourt cite d on ly Pen nsylvan ia law with no r efer ence to fe deral law, w e need n ot apply AE DP A’s deferential st an da rd of

re vi ew. In granting
a certi ficat e of appealabi lit y, the Dist

rict Cou rt stated it belie ved that t he deferential standar d w as appli cable, but cited in a foo tnote this court’ s opini on in Ever et t v. Beard , 290 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 200 2), which held otherwis e. We need not d we ll on th is issue 2 because subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States have

made clear

that as long as the reasoni ng of the state court doe s not cont radict relevant Supreme Co u rt precedent, A ED PA ’s general rule of

def eren ce a ppl ies. Earlyv. Packer , 537 U.S . 3 (20 02); Woodford v. Visc iotti , 537 U.S. 19 (2002)

. In Early , the Sup reme Co urt held that qu alificat ion for AED PA deference “do es not require citation of our cases – indeed, it does not
ev en require awareness of our cases, so long as neithe r the reasoning nor the res ult of the state cour t decis ion contra dicts them .” Early , 537 U. S. at 8 (emp hasis in origi na l). Similarly , in Wo odford , the Su pr eme Co urt held that the Calif ornia Supreme Co urt’s “sh orthan d refe rence ” to the ineffective ass ist ance o f c ounsel standar d, w hile i mprecise, did not render the decisi on unworthy of d eference. Wo odford , 537 U.S. at 24; see also Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (apply ing the deferen tial AED PA standard of review whe re the state court had r elied o nly on its

2 We note that i n Eve rett , the accomplice liabi lit

y i nstruc tion was patently erroneous as a matt er of la w, as the trial c ourt peppered its inst ructi ons with lega l admonitions such a s, “[a] kill ing is willfuland deli berate if the defe ndan t and/or hi s accompli ce
. . . con scio usly d ecid ed to kill th e vic tim . . . .” Eve rett , 290 F .3d at 5 04 (e mp hasis in origi nal). Inste ad of objecting, t rial counsel ac tuall y “compl imented t he judge on the fairne ss of the se inst ructi ons after the jur y l eft the courtroom.” Id. at 505. The Commonwealth argued that accomplice liabi lit

y for firs t-degree murder was not cl early

establ ished at

the time of Evere tt’ s tri al, but we held that

Everett ’s trial c ounsel was i neffecti ve for fail ing to obj ect t o an inst ructi on that allowed a j uror t o ascri be an accomplice ’s intent to t he defendant and that a Penn sylvania Superior C ourt decisi on file d well befor e Everett ’s trial shou ld hav e give n cou nsel a b asis to object . The Eve rett opinion noted that the Penn sylvania Suprem e Cou rt therea fter s pecifi call y hel d that f or an accomplice to be found guilty, s/he must hav e inte nde d th at the victi m b e kill ed. Id. at 512-14.5

own precedent

to rej ec t the petitioner’s ineff ectiv e assistance of counse l allegation); Rom pilla v. Horn , 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 200 4) ( a pply ing AEDPA d eference to Pe nnsylva nia co urt’ s determi nationof

petitioner’s alle gation of ineffective assis tan c e of c oun sel des pite the court’ s fail ure to expressly cite to the Stri ckland standard). A cc or di ng ly, we hold that the deferential standar d of AED PA applies even if the state co urt do es no t cite to any federallaw as long as the state court de ci si on i s c ons is te ntwit h f ed er al la w. B. Bruton Issue In order to protec t a defend ant’s Sixth Am endm ent rights to conf ro nta tion and cross- exam ination , trial c ou rts t hat admitt ed statements of non -te sti fyi ng codefe ndan ts wo uld ro utinely instruct jurors that the statements were not to be considered evidence against the defendant at tri al. In Bruton , the Suprem e Cou rt recogniz ed the ina dequacy of such instructi ons, stating th at “th e re ar e s ome conte xts in which the ri sk that the jury will not, or can not, fo llow in struc tions is so great

. . . that t

he practical and human limi tati ons of the jury system c anno t b e ignored. ” Bruton , 391 U.S. at 135. The Court held that “because of the substant ial risk t

hat the j ury , desp ite inst ructi ons to the c ontrary, looked to t he i nc riminat

ing extraju dicial sta teme nts in determ in ing petit

ioner’ s guil t, a dmissi on of [the co-defendant’s] confessi on in this joint trialviolated peti tioner’s rig ht of
cross- exam inatio n secu red b y th e Con frontation Claus e of th e Six th Am end me nt.” Id. at 126. Th e Cou rt noted that som e cou rts had redac te d t he statement to avoid t

he S i xth Amendment issues. S ee id. at 134 n.10 ( “So me c ourts have required deletion of re feren ces to code fend ants whe re pra ctic a ble. ”)

. Therea fter, th e c ou rts ge ne ra lly f ol lowed the practi ce of redacting co -defendants’ statem ents in ord er to elim inate all exp licit
re fer ences to other

defendants on tri al before those statem ents w ere ad mitted into evidence. Prie ster argues that the admissi on o f Butler’s redact ed sta teme nt viola ted his Sixt h Amendment right t o confrontation. The issue a rose in the ins tant case because Poste ll gave test

imony at trial t

hat dif fered from the state men ts that he gave to pol ice. The state m oved to adm it But ler’s stat ement as evidenc e of B utle r’ s involvement

in the s ho oting. The statem ent
was redac ted t o rep lace all re feren ces to Priester and other parti ci pa nts i n the shooti ngs with words such as “the other guy,” “s omeone,” “someone el se,” “t he guy,” and “ anoth er gu y.” App . at 91- 97. In relevant part , the redact ed statement read at tri al was: A: Well li ke 15 gu y s c ame an d we were all si tti ng on the cor ner of 8th and Louden Sts. It w as li ke 4 something in the a fternoon. Several guy s c ame up to the
corner some were walking and others wer e in cars. They started f ig ht ing and shooti ng at anybody who6

wa s out there

. . . . So meb ody gave one of the guy s a .38 calib er g un . . .
. Then another guy

shot twice. Af te r the first guy shotth ey pul led off and after the othe r two s ho ts I pulled of f.

. . . . Q: In wh at car w as th e guy wh o sho t first? A: He wa s the p assen ger in the fr ont se at of th e b ro wn To yo ta. That was the first
car. Q: How m any were i n t h e car with hi m? A: Tw o other guys. Q: Ho w ma ny were i n the second car? A: I was the driveran d t wo others. Q: How m any shots did y ou see fire d from the second car? A: Two.

. . . . Q: Who did the guy in y our car sh oot at? A: He just put

out the window and sh ottwi ce . H e wasn’t l ooking. App. at 91-93. The tri al court inst ructed jurors: A s tat em en t m ad e b y a

defendantbefore tri al may be considered as evide nce but only agains t t h e defendantwho made the sta te men t. You may not
cons id e r one de fendan t’s st atement as eviden c e against the other d efen dant[ ] . . . . Trial Tr. at 416 (S ept. 17, 1991 ). Prie ster argues that the admissi on o f this red ac ted state men t violated the S ixth Amendment because re placi ng Pr iester’s
name with vary ing phras es and pronouns did not adequa tel y shi eld his identi ty , as othertria l tes timonymade clear who was in the second c ar. Duri ng Pos tel l’s tes tim on y, he identified the occupants o f his car as being “B arry [Pries ter] and Na te [B utler ].” App. at 108 (quoting Tria l Tr. at 182 (Sept. 13, 1991)). Furthermore, in his opening statement, t

he prose cutor cla imed, in the first

of those cars was an indivi dual bythe name of Darius Ba rnes. In another
c a r , the defen dants , NathanielButler and Barry Priester, were ridi ng along with an indivi dual nam e d Trac ey Poste ll. App. at 106 (quo ting T rial Tr. at 2 0 (Se pt. 12, 1991 )). From Poste l l’s testi mony and the prosecuto r’s open ing state me nt, wh ich is not evidence, the jur

y coul d have infer

red7

thatthe “other guy ” in Butl er’s s tate ment
wa s Prie ster. Bu t this infe rence is not a fo regone conclusion. There were at least fift een perpetrators in va rious cars involvedin the s hoo tin g. The redacted statement by Bu tler is unclear as to t he peop le in the first car, in the second c ar, who was shooting when and fr om which
car. This is beca use th e trial cou rt removed not jus t refe rences to Pri ester , but removed refe rences t o everyname in the statem ent, mak ing the statem ent dif ficult to fo ll ow. Subsequentto Bruton , t

he S upr eme Cour t held th at the in trodu ction o f th e redact e d statement of a nonte sti fyi ng codefendantwas not unc ons titutional. It rejecte d the co ntextu al imp licatio n argumentPrie ster m ake s he re. It s tate d that wh ere asc ertainin g th e identi ty of a co-defendant

in a reda cted st atement requires an in f erence dr awn from linki ng othe r evidence to the statement, the risk that the jury ca nno t follo w l imiting inst ructi ons is not sufficiently s ubst a ntial to violat e the S ixth Amendment

. Richardson v. Marsh , 48 1 U.S. 200, 208 ( 1987) (“Where the necessity of su c h link age is i nvolved, it i s a les s va li d general ization that the jury will no t likely obey the ins truction to di s regard t he evid ence .”). “In short , while it maynot alw ays be simple f

or the members of

a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incri minati ng infere nce, there does not existthe over wh elmin g pro bability of th eir inabil ity to do so .

. . . ” Id. Priester argu es that t he Supreme Cou rt’s decisi on in Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S. 185 (1998), and this court’ s decis ion in United States v. Richards , 241 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 200 1), clari fy the rule set for th in Richardson in a manner t ha t supp orts his argu men t. We find th is unpersua sive. In the first plac e, both decision s were announced after Priester’s merits appeal
was h eard in t

he Pennsy lvania

Superior Cou rt and it d id no t act u nreaso nably in fail ing to predi ct the Supreme C ourt ’s decisi on in Gray . Moreover, the deci sion in Gray , even i f appli cable, does not support Priester’s contention. T he Co urt explai ned in Gray that it “gr anted certiorari in order to con sider Bruton ’s app lication to
a redaction that

replac es a name with an obvious bla nk s pace or symb ol or wo rd such as ‘del eted. ’” Gray , 523 U.S. at 188. It then held tha t such redac tions were
co nstitution ally imp er mi ssib le. I n Richardson , the i ssue was “whe ther Bruton requires the same res ult when the codefe ndant’s conf ession is reda cted to
om it any r eference to the defen dant, but the de fenda nt is nonethel ess li nked to the confessi on by evi dence proper ly admitt ed against him attrial.” Richardson , 481 U. S. at 202

. The Court held t hat the admissi on of the reda cted co nfessi on was not
unco nstitution al. The Co urt in Gray explai ned that the key di ffer e nce between Gray and Richardson was the exte nt to which t he state ment’s alte rati ons dire ctly connected the statement to t

he defendant, as “nicknames and s pecif ic desc ripti ons fall insi de, no t o utsid e, Bruton ’s pr otec tion .” Gray , 523 U.S. at 195. The reas ons given in G ray for holdi ng such redact ions8

impe rmissib le – such as “an obvious bl ank wi ll not likelyfool any one,” “t he obvious deletion may well call the juror s’ attenti on spec ia ll y to the removed name,” and that “a blank or so me ot her si milarl y obvi ous altera t ion” are “di rectl y acc usatory, ” Gray , 523 U.S. at 193- 94 – do not ap ply to the inst ant case. There a re no such “nic kna me s,” descriptions or p hr ases that directly implic ate Pr iester in t he inst ant
case. Fi na lly, in this court ’s Richards opinion, on w hich P rie sterrelies, there
were only three pe ople invol ved in the
cas e, one of whom was the confessor an d
one of whom w as the co -defendant Richards, and the w o rd “fri end” was substi tutedfor Ri cha rds’ nam e. Richards , 241 F.3 d at 3 41. As the prosecut or call ed the co-defe ndant’s m other t o testifythat the confessor

and co-defendant

Richards
were “frie nds,” the w ord “fr iend ”
un eq uivo cally pointed to R ichards. In contra st, in thi s case the re were at least fift een pe rp etrators invol ved in the shooti ng, an d t he ph ra se s “ th e o th er gu y”
or “an other guy ” are ber eft of any innuendo that t

ies t hem unavoidabl y to Priester. In Richards , the replac ement was tantamount to an expl icit referenc e to the co-defendant ; the s ame cannot be said for the reda ction i n the ins tant c ase. Because the tri al court redacted t he statement care fully , and becaus e it ga ve appr opriate limiti ng inst ructions befor e the admissi on of the statement an d during jury instruc tio ns, the District Cou rt did not err in holding tha t the admission of Bu tler’s redact ed statement did not r un afoul of the Sixth Am endm ent.

C. Jury Ins truct ion Iss ue Priester argues that the D ist rict Cou rt erred i n concludi ng that hi s tri al at torne y’s failure to object to the jury inst ructi ons did not cons tit ute ine ffecti ve assis tance of c oun se l. The p ar ame te rs of the Sixth Amendment r ight of a crimina l defendantto rece ive e ffec ti ve assi stance of
co un sel were set forth in Stri ckland v. Washington , 466 U.S . 668 , 686 (19 84) . A defendantclai ming a violation of t his ri ght must make a two-part showing: First, the defendant must show that c oun sel’ s performance wa s def icient. This requires showing that counsel made errors s o seri ous that c ounsel was not functi oning as the “cou nsel” guarante ed the defendantby th e Sixth Amendment

. Second, the defendant must show th at the defi cient performance prejudi ced the defense. This requ ir es a show in g that coun sel’ s errors were so s erious as to deprive the defe nd ant of a fair trial, a trial w hose result is re liabl e. Id. at 687. “Jud ic ia l scrutiny of couns el’s performa nce mu st be h ighly def erentia l” to
ensure “the wide latitude counsel must have in making t acti cal deci sion s. ” Id. at 689. “[ A] court must indulge a

strong9

presumpti on that c ouns el ’s con duct f alls with in the wide range of reaso nabl e professi onal ass ist ance . . . .” Id. The porti on of

the trial judge’s jury inst ructi on which Priester c lai ms was misleading was: [M]urder of th e firs t degree is a cri mi nal homici de
comm i ttedwith a spe cific intent to kil l. An intentiona l kill ing is a kill ing by means of poison or by lying in w ait
or by anyother ki nd of willfu l, de li berate an d prem editated act. Therefore, i n o rder t o find th e defendants guilt

y of
m urd er in the f

irst degree, you mu st find that the k i lli ng was a willful , delibe rate and premedit ated act.

. . . . Member s of the j ury , y ou ma y find a defe ndan t guilt y o f a crime wit

hout findi ng that he personal ly engaged in th e c onduct required for commission of that

crime or
even that he was p e rsona lly present when the cr ime was committed. A defendant i s guil ty of a
cr ime if he i s an accomplice of another pe rson w ho commits that cri me. A de fendant does not bec ome an acco mp lic e mere ly by bei ng present at the scene or mer e ly by knowing of the cr im e. He is
a n accomplice if, wit

h the intent of promotion or facil itat ing commission of t he crime, he soli cits or commands or encourages or requ ests anoth er pers on to
com mit it or i f

he aids or ag rees to aid o r attem pts to aid the o ther pe rson in plann ing o r com mitting it.
You may fin d th e defe ndan ts guilt

y of a crime on the theo ry that they were
an accomplice as long a s you are sa t isfi ed beyond a
reaso nable doubt that the
cr ime was committed and the de fendants were an accomplice of the per sons wh o com mitted it. Trial Tr. at

564-65, 577- 78 (Sept. 19, 1991). Priester argues that al though he was charged with three different degre es of homicide, inc lu ding fir st degr ee murder which require s a spe cific inte nt to kill, Sm ith v. Horn , 120 F.3d 400, 422 (3d Cir. 1997), “the im port o f the in str ucti on regardi ng t h e requ ireme nt of s pecif ic intent to kil l was dil uted bythe court ’s instr uctions regardi ng acco mp lic e liabi lity.” Appellant ’s Br. at 25. As the Distri ct Court s tate d:10 Pr i ester clai ms that th e i nstruction to the jury enab led the jury to find him guilty as an acco mp lice to firs t-de gr ee mu rder ev en if he did n ot hav e the in tent to kill. This instru c tion , Priest e r continue s, vi olate d Pen nsylvan ia law – which
m akes spec ific inten t to kil l
an essential e lement for accomplice liabil ityto first deg ree murder – an d burdened his fundament al right under the Due Process Clause to be conv icted o nly up on proofbeyond a rea so nable doubt o f every element of t

he offense. App. at 20 (f ootn otes o mit te d). O n state colla t eral rev iew , t he Pennsy lvani a Superior Court held t

hat the inst

ruc tio ns were correct

as a matt er of st ate l aw. App. at 71. Federal courts reviewing habeas cl ai ms can not

“r eex ami ne state court d etermi nations on s tate- law que stion s.” Estelle v. Mc Guire , 50 2 U .S. 62, 67-68 (1991). This is parti cularl y t rue in t he inst ant case b ecau se the is sue o f approp riate jury instr uctions o n accomplice liability in firs t-degree murder trials has been squar elyaddresse d by the P e nnsyl vani a Suprem e Cou r t

. Co mm onw ealth v. Thompson , 674 A.2d 217, 222-23 (Pa. 1996) (uphol ding accomplice liabi lit

y i nstruc tions near l y identi cal to thos e quoted ab ov e) ; Co mm onw ealth v. Cheste r , 58 7 A.2d 1367, 13 84 (Pa. 19 91) (sam e). Bound b y the state court’s determi nationthat t

he i n struc tion at

issue comported with st ate l aw, it is evi dent that Priester cannot sat

isfythe firs t component of a viabl e ineffect

ive ass ist ance of
coun s el claim – that c oun sel’ s perfo rman ce w as de ficien t. Thus Priester cannotove rc ome the “stron g presumpti on” that his co unse l’ s con duct fel l outs ide the “wide range of rea sonable pr ofessi onal assis tance. ” Stri ckland , 466 U.S. at 689.

III. CONCLU SI ON Applyi ng AED PA’s deferential standard in revi ewing Pries ter’ s habeas petit ion, we hold that

the Dist rict Co urt did not err i n concludi ng that t he admissi on of the redac ted state men t com ported with the requ ireme nts of the Sixth Amendment and that trial counsel’ s fail ure to obj ect t o the accomplice liability in st ructi on did not
cons titute ineffective ass i stance o f
coun sel.
Fo r t he re as ons gi ve n a bov e, we wil l a ffirm the District Court ’s order denyi ng the petiti on for a writ of habeas corpus.