DESTINATIONSeptember7,2016ByElectronicSubmissionU.S.DepartmentofTransportationDocketManagementSystem1200NewJerseyAvenue,SEWashington,DC20590Re:PetitionofNationalAirCargoGroup,Inc.foranExemptionfrom14C.F.R.§§91.9(a),91.1025(a),121.135(a)(4),121.135(b)(21),and121.141(DocketFAA-2014-0980)DearSirorMadam:NationalAirCargoGroup,Inc.("NationalAirlines")herebypetitionsforaoneyearextensionofthepresentexemptionfrom14C.F.R.§§91.9(a),91.1025(a),121.135(a)(4),121.135(b)(21),and121.141toallowNationalAirlinestooperateB-747freighteraircraftwhiletransportingtallrigidcargo(freightthatistallerthan98inchesandwillnotbreakapartduringanemergencylanding)restrainedtowithstanda3.0g("3G")forwardload.DuetoUSDepartmentofDefenseneeds,NationalAirlineswouldliketopetitiontheexemptionof9Gtiedownforfreightcategorizedastallrigidcargo.Thetallrigidcargo9GrequirementhascausedamajorimpactintheabilitytomoveUSDepartmentofDefenseassetsbacktotheUnitedStatesfromvariouslocationsaroundtheworld.ThisnotonlyhasresultedininabilitytomoveassetsbuthasalsocausedmajoreconomicimpactsonNationalAirlinesanditsindustrycounterparts.www.GoNational.comDtS.OI'CC'11=:99•--.......,..._,..r.....--·-..__...-·-NationalAirlinesCitadelIIBuilding5955T.G.LeeBoulevard,Ste.500Orlando,FL32822T8004513174F4073132255www.NationaiAirlines.comDESTINATIONPetitionforExemptionPage2NationalAirlinessubmitthatthisnarrowly-tailoredexemptionwouldhavenoadverseimpactonsafety,wouldprovideanequivalentlevelofsafetytothe9.0g("9G")forwardrestraintrequirementsetforthin14C.F.R.§25.561(b)(3)(whichisoutdatedandunsubstantiatedbyfreighteraircraft-specificdata),andwouldbeinthepublicinterest.ItwouldenableNationalAirlinestocarrytallrigidcargosafely,efficiently,andcost-effectively.Itwouldbenefitthepublicinterestbymakingavailabletoshippersmorecommerciallyviableshippingoptionsinmoremarketsglobally.And,therequestedexemptionwouldalsoallowNationalAirlinestorealizethefullcapabilitiesoftheirinvestmentsintheB-747aircraftandstemthelossofmillionsofdollarsoftallrigidcargobusinesstoforeignoperatorswhoregularlytransporttallrigidcargowithoutmeetingthe9Gforwardrestraintrequirement.NationalAirlinesrespectfullyrequestexpeditedactiononthisrequest.Thedemandfortransportationoftallrigidcargoisontherise,andfrangiblecargonecessarytotriggera3Gforwardrestraintstandardisbecomingmuchlessavailable.ThisisanurgentsituationforNationalAirlinesandforthepublicinterest,particularlytheshippingpublic.NationalAirlinessubmitsthefollowinginfurthersupportofthisrequest:I.BackgroundAndExemptionRequestNationalAirlines:NationalAirlinesisaPart121certificatedU.S.aircarrierwhichoperatesacargofleetcomprisedexclusivelyofB-747freighteraircraft.NationalAirlinesprovidescharterairserviceworldwideutilizingafleetof2B-747freighters.ItscustomerbaseincludestheU.S.DepartmentofDefense,othergovernmentagencies,andmultiplecommercialentitiesneedingtomoveuniquecargotochallenginglocationsaroundtheworld,helpingtokeeptheU.S.economyonthemove.NationalAirlineshasoperated70+flightutilizingthepresentexemption(ExemptionNo.11125)withoutanyincidentsoraccidentssinceDecember15,2014.NationalAirlinesanditsexperiencedteamofaviationprofessionalsdeliverhighqualityservicestoglobalcustomers,meetingandexceedingtheiraircargoneeds.NationalDESTINATIONEXCELLENCE"'PetitionforExemptionPage3Airlinesalsooperatesafleetof28-757passengeraircraftandisPart121certificatedtoflydomesticandflagpassengersoperations.TallRigidCargo:Thereissubstantialdemandfortransportingtallrigidcargobyair.Therearetwoprincipalcategoriesoftallrigidcargo:1.Industry-standard20-footcontainers(ISO1CC)whichare102inchestall.•Thesecontainersarewidelyusedaroundtheworldthroughouttheglobalsupplychainbecausetheyhaveintermodalcompatibility,whichisimportantasshipmentsareoftentransportedfromdoor-to-doorbymultimodaltransportation.•Commodities(suchasoilandgasrelatedmaterials),projectcargo,reliefgoods,andhi-techequipment(suchassatelliteandcommunicationsmaterials)areoftenshippedin20-footseacontainerstoremotelocationswherethecontainerisalsousedasafieldofficeorsecurestoragearea.Garmentsandperishablesareoftenshippedinsuchcontainers.•Emergingmarkets,suchastheAfricanmarket(whereU.S.carriersarelosingsubstantialbusinesstoforeign8-747operatorsduetothe9Grestriction),areparticularlyreliantontheuseof20-footcontainersforprojectandoil/gascargo.Tallrigidcargoshipmentsareoftencarriedonpartcharterflightstoofflinedestinations.2.Othertallitems,suchasaircraftengines,generators,andlargevehicles,whicharetallerthan98inches.•Forexample,8-747freightersareneededtocarryaircraftenginestosupportmanyoftheworld'swidebodypassengerfleets,whichuseenginesthatareclassifiedastallrigidcargo.The8-74 7freighterisparticularlywell-suitedtotransporttallrigidcargoefficientlyandcost-effectively,andhascarriedsuchcargosafelyfordecades.However,withtheseveredeclinein"frangible"cargoandeverincreasingdemandfortallrigidcargotransportation(bothDESTINATIONEXCELLENCE"'PetitionforExemptionPage4discussedinSectionIIbelow),NationalAirlinesunabletoefficientlyandeffectivelycarrytallrigidcargobecauseoftheoutdated9GforwardrestraintrequirementwhichNationalAirlinesisnotawarehasbeensubstantiatedbydataapplicabletoanyfreighteraircraft,muchless the8-747.Asaresult,NationalAirlineshaslostmillionsofdollarsofbusinessasshippershavebeenturningtoNationalAirlines'foreignB-747competitorstotransporttallrigidshipments.The9GforwardrestraintrequirementimpairsNationalAirlinesabilitytorealizethefulleconomicandefficiencybenefitsoftheirsubstantialinvestmentintheB-747aircraftandreducesNationalAirlines'globalcompetitiveeffectiveness.Italsoresultsintheavailabilityoffewerserviceandpricingoptionsfortallrigidcargoshippers.The9GRequirement:The9GforwardrestraintrequirementstemsfromthefollowingFARprovisions:14C.F.R.§25.561and§25.787establishaircraftdesignrequirementsandrequirethatcargostowagerestraintshandleforwardinertiaforcesof9Gfortallrigidcargo:14C.F.R.§25.561:"(a)Theairplane,althoughitmaybedamagedinemergencylandingconditionsonlandorwater,mustbedesignedasprescribedinthissectiontoprotecteachoccupantunderthoseconditions.(b)Thestructuremustbedesignedtogiveeachoccupanteveryreasonablechanceofescapingseriousinjuryinaminorcrash landingwhen-(3)Theoccupantexperiencesthefollowingultimateinertiaforcesactingseparatelyrelativetothesurroundingstructure:(ii)Forward,9.0g(c)Forequipment,cargointhepassengercompartmentsandanyotherlargemasses,thefollowingapply:(1)Exceptasprovidedinparagraph(c)(2)ofthissection,theseitemsmustbepositionedsothatiftheybreakloosetheywillbeunlikelyto:(i)Causedirectinjurytooccupants;(ii)Penetratefueltanksorlinesorcausefireorexplosionhazardbydamagetoadjacentsystems;or(iii)Nullifyanyoftheescapefacilities providedforuseafteranemergencylanding.DESTINATIONPetitionforExemptionPage5(2)Whensuchpositioningisnotpractical(e.g.fuselagemountedenginesorauxiliarypowerunits)eachsuchitemofmassshallberestrainedunderallloadsuptothosespecifiedinparagraph(b)(3)ofthissection....(d)Seatsanditemsofmass(andtheirsupportingstructure)mustnotdeformunderanyloadsuptothosespecifiedinparagraph(b)(3)ofthissectioninanymannerthatwouldimpedesubsequentrapidevacuationofoccupants."(Emphasisadded)14C.F.R.§25.787(a):"Eachcompartmentforthestowageofcargo,baggage,carry-onarticles,andequipment(suchasliferafts),andanyotherstowagecompartmentmustbedesignedforitsplacardedmaximumweightofcontentsandforthecriticalloaddistributionattheappropriatemaximumloadfactorscorrespondingtothespecifiedflightandgroundloadconditions,andtotheemergencylandingconditionsof§25.561(b),exceptthattheforcesspecifiedintheemergencylandingconditionsneednotbeappliedtocompartmentslocatedbelow,orforward,ofalloccupantsintheairplane...."(Emphasisadded)AlthoughPart25establishesdesignrequirements,otherprovisionsincorporatethedesignrequirementsintoaircarrieroperatingrequirements.Thus,14C.F.R.§21.5requiresBoeingtoincorporatethedesignrequirementsintothemanufacturer'sAircraftFlightManual("AFM"),and14C.F.R.§§91.9,91.1025(a),121.135(a)(4),121.135(b)(21),and121.141requireU.S.aircarrierstocomplywiththeAFM.Boeing'sandNationalAirlines'weight&balancecontrolandloadingmanualsfortheB-747freighterincorporatethe9Grequirementor,alternatively,permittheuseof"frangible"cargo3topreventthetallrigidcargofromshiftingforward.Asdiscussedbelow,thosecomplianceoptionsarenotpracticaloreconomicallyfeasible.The9Grequirementwasestablishedinthe1950sbasedonpassengercompartmentseatingdesignanalyses.NationalAirlinesisnotawareofthe9Gpassenger-compartmentrequirementhavingeverbeensubstantiatedbyanyspecificcargotransportationanalyses.Rather,the9Gpassengercompartmentrequirementbecameananachronisticregulatory"comealong"toapplytocargotransportation.Moreover,studiesconductedbytheU.S.AirForcehaveshownthata3Gforwardrestraintrequirementwouldbeappropriateandprovideanequivalentlevelofsafety.Indeed,theU.S.AirForcehasadoptedapermanentreductiontoa3GforwardrestraintforitsoperationsasDESTINATIONPetitionforExemptionPage6aresultofitsstudies.Inaddition,areviewof8-747freighteraircraftaccidentsrevealedthatnoresultinginjuryorfatalityinsuchaccidentswasattributabletocargoshiftingforward.ThisPetitionseeksanexemptionfrom14C.F.R.§§91.9,91.1025(a),121.135(a)(4),121.135(b)(21),and121.141toallowPart121operatorsof8-747freighteraircrafttooperate8-747freighteraircraftwhiletransportingtallrigidcargorestrainedtowithstanda3.0g("3G")forwardload.Therequestedexemptionwouldbeusedinaircargooperationswithin,to/from,andwhollyoutsidetheUnitedStates.14C.F.R.§11.83.TallrigidcargoshipmentsforvariousshippersofteninvolveitinerarieswhollyoutsidetheUnitedStates,e.g.,fromAsiatoAfrica;AfricatoEurope;EuropetoAsia;OceaniatoAfrica,etc.,andthusanylimitationontherequestedexemptionastoitsgeographicscopewouldeliminatetheexemption'sreal-worldutility.Therequestedexemptionwouldmaintainanequivalentlevelofsafetyandwouldnotadverselyaffectthesafetyofupperdeckoccupantson8-747freightersduringemergencylandingconditions.Itwouldbenefitthepublicinterestbyallowingformoreeffectiveutilizationofthe8-747freighteraircraftandmoreefficient,competitivetransportationoftallrigidaircargotomeettheneedsofgovernmental,civilian,NGO,humanitarian,andmilitaryshippers.II.TheIssueThebottomoftheupperdeckfloorbeamsonthe8-747freighterisataheightof98.1inches.Inthehighlyunlikelyeventofaforwardcargoshift,cargothatis98inchestallorlowerwillnotstriketheupperdeckstructureandoccupantareasonthe8-747freighter,andthereforethe9Gforcestandardsetforthin14C.F.R.§25.561(b)(3)isnotimplicated:thestowagecompartmentmustbedesignedto"theemergencylandingconditionsof§25.561(b),exceptthattheforcesspecifiedintheemergencylandingconditionsneednotbeappliedtocompartmentslocatedbelow,orforward,ofalloccupantsintheairplane...."14C.F.R.§25.787(a).Tallrigidcargo,however,isnotcoveredbytheexceptioncontainedinthelastclausebecausetallrigidcargoislocatedaftoftheoccupantsontheupperdeck.DESTINATIONEXCELLENCE'"PetitionforExemptionPage7Boeing'sandNationalAirlines'currentweight&balancecontrolandloadingmanualsfortheB-747freighterincorporatetherestraintstandardsof14C.F.R.§25.561(b)(3),andprovidethattallrigidcargomustberestrainedeitherto(1)a9Gforwardloadbyusingacumbersomeandcomplexarrangementofsupplementarystrapsconnectedtoaircrafttie-downpoints,or(2)a1.SG(B-74 7-400)forwardloadcombinedwithaspecificvolumeoffrangiblecargoplacedinfrontofthetallrigidcargo,ineithercaseinordertopreventthetallrigidcargofromshiftingforwardandimpactingtheupperdeckandoccupantareas.ThesetwocurrentmethodsfortransportingtallrigidcargoontheB-747freighteraresimplynoteconomicallyfeasibleorpractical.First,restrainingtallrigidcargotoa9Gforwardloadstandardrequiresacumbersomeandcomplexarrangementofstrapsconnectedtoaircrafttie-downpoints.Therearealimitednumberoftie-downpositionsontheB-747freighter,whichmakesitvirtuallyimpossibletorestraintallrigidcargoto9Gandcarryothercargo.Thereareoftenaninadequatenumberoftie-downsonaB-747torestrainheavytallrigidcargotoa9Gforwardloadrequirement;andevenwhenitispossibletorestrainasingleitemoftallrigidcargo,thereareusuallyaninsufficientnumberoftie-downstorestrainadditionalitemsoftallrigidorothercargo.Asaresult,theflightisnotefficientorcost-competitivefortheshipper.Second,itisextremelydifficult,impractical,anduneconomictousefrangiblecargoasabuffer.Thechangingnatureofaircargo,customerdemands,andaircraftroutingstodayissuchthatthereisrarelyasufficientvolumeoffrangiblecargoavailabletoplaceinfrontofthetallrigidcargo.Non-commercialfrangible"filler"cargoisalsoimpracticalforlogistical,cost,customs,anddisposalreasons.Militarypallets(typically88incheswide,notthestandard96inches)donotmeetthewidthrequirementsforfrangiblecargowhentallrigidcargoiscenterline-loadedontheB-747freighter.Asaresult,tallrigidcargo,oftencriticaltomeeturgentmilitary,commercial,andhumanitarianrequirements,cannotbetransportedinatimelyandcost-effectivemanner.INATIONALPetitionforExemptionPage8DESTINATIONTheinabilityofNationalAirlinestocarrytallrigidcargoefficientlyandcompetitivelyisanurgentissue,astheglobaldemandforairtransportationtocarrytallrigidcargohasincreasedsignificantly.Forexample,industry-standard20-footseacontainersarewidelyusedaroundtheworldthroughouttheglobalsupplychaintoshipoilandgasrelatedmaterials,projectcargo,reliefgoods,hi-techequipment,garments,andperishablesbecausetheyhaveintermodalcompatibility,offerabuilt-insecurestorageplace,andcanbeusedasan"office"inremotelocations.Largepowergenerators,largevehicles,andwidebodyaircraftenginesregularlyrequirelong-haulairtransportationaswell.Butthe20-footseacontainersare102inchestall,andthelargeaircraftengines,powergenerators,andlargevehiclesarealsotallerthan98inches.Ill.GrantingTheRequestedExemptionWouldProvideAnEquivalentLevelOfSafetyAndIsInThePublicInterest.Asexplainedbelow,NationalAirlinesnotawareofdatasubstantiatingtheapplicationofthe9Grequirementtofreighteraircraft.However,morerecentstudiesthatwerenotavailablewhenthe9Gforwardrestraintrequirementwasdevelopedinthe1950sdemonstratethata3Gforwardrestraintstandardwouldhavenoadverseimpactonsafety,wouldprovideanequivalentlevelofsafety,andwouldbeinthepublicinterest.A.ReportsandDataShowthata3GForwardRestraintRequirementWouldHaveNoAdverseImpactonSafetyandWouldProvideanEquivalentLevelofSafety.Thedeficiencieswiththe9Gforwardrestraintrequirementarenumerous.First,the9Gstandardwasestablishedinthe1950s,wellbeforetheB-747aircraftwascertificated.Second,itconsideredanalysesofpassengerseats,passengerseatattachments,andthegeometricrelationshipofthepassengerseattotheinteriorofthepassengercompartment.Thisseat-basedrequirementappearstohavebecomearegulatory"comealong"toapplytoDESTINATIONEXCELLENCE'"PetitionforExemptionPage9cargotransport,withoutanyanalysisofthevalidityorefficacyofapplyingsuchaseat-basedrequirementtothecargocompartment.Third,sincethe9Gforwardrestraintstandardpredatedthe8-747bymorethanadecade,itdidnotaccountformanyofthe8-747'sexceptionalcharacteristics.Itdoesnotproperlyreflecttheactualloadsandbehaviorofcargorestrainedbythecargorestraintsystem,straps,andnetsona8-747.Nordoesittakeintoaccountthespatialseparationof8-74 7upperdeckoccupantsandthetallrigidcargo,thecapabilityofthecrownbarriernettorestraintallrigidcargo,orthecrashworthinessandenergyabsorbingcapabilityofthe8-747upperdeckstructure.Fourth,the9Gstandardclearlydidnotaccountfortheinfinitesimalprobabilitythatalloftheeventsnecessaryforanoccupantontheupperdeckofa8-747freightertobeharmedbytallrigidcargoinanemergencylandingwouldoccur.U.S.AirForcestudiesconcludedthatacrasheventathigherthan3Gwithcargoandpassengersis"extremelyrare",withaprobabilityofoneoccurrenceper4millionhoursofoperation.CargoAircraftandSpacecraftForwardRestraintCriteria,TechnicalReportASD-TR-76-30,at21(December1977)("1977USAFTechnicalReport").Putanotherway,combiningmajorandminoraccidentsfortheperiod1962toJuly1976,theprobabilityofacrashatthe"3GtoN/SLevelwithCargoandPassenger"was"extremelyrare"at0.00000025perhours/operation.1977USAFTechnicalReport,at38,50.And,inNovember1981,"CSAF/LETapprovedpermanentreductionto3Gforwardrestraint[c]iting7yearsofoperations(6.73Mflighthours)withnocargorelatedaccidents."Presentation:CargoRestraintforFixedWingAircraft,21May02,AeronauticalSystemsCenter,USAF.AccordingtothesameUSAFpresentation,"Inconcertwith2Gupand1.5Gaft&laterally,3Gforwardrestrainthasprovenadequateandcosteffectivefor30yearsofUSAFcargooperationsinvolvingover29Mflighthours."DESTINATIONEXCELLENCENPetitionforExemptionPage10Fifth,incommercialoperations,morethan420B-747freightershaveflownmorethan20millionflighthoursand4millionflightcycles.TherehasbeennoreportofcargoshiftingforwardandharminganoccupantonaB-747freighterduringemergencylandingconditions(seeNTSBAccidentAviationDatabaseand17hull-lossoccurrencesonB-747freightersdocumentedbytheAviationSafetyNetwork,www.aviation-safety.net;seealsoFAAAccident/IncidentDataSystem).BasedonareviewoftheB-747modelfreighteraccidents,itcanbeconcludedthatanyresultinginjuryorfatalityrelatedtotheaccidentswasnotattributabletocargoshiftingforward.Infact,ifacargoshiftwasinvolvedinanyreportedaccident,itonlyinvolvedcargoshiftingaft,withnoreportedaccidentsinvolvingaforwardshiftatall.Sincethemajorityofcargoisbelowthetall-rigidthreshold,itcanbeconcludedthattyingdowntoflightloadsa1.5G(loading)hasbeenshowntobesufficientinactualincidentsandaccidentstosecurecargoagainstforward-shifting,andthisPetitionfora3Gtiedownthereforeismorethansufficient.Thisconclusionissupportedbytheresultsofthe2008accidentofaKalittaaircraftinBrussels.ThataccidentinvolvedaB-747freighterwhichsufferedseveredamage,breakingintothreesectionsafteranabortedtakeoffduetoabirdstrike.Althoughthemaindeckfloorbeamsintheforwardcargosectionwereshatteredintheaccident,cargointheothersectionswhichwasrestrainedto1.5Gwasstillsecuredtotheaircraft,andthecrewescapeduninjured.SeeFinalReport,Ref.AAIU-2008-13(issuedJuly2009),BelgiumFederalPublicServiceMobilityandTransport,AirAccidentandInvestigationUnit.Sixth,atforwardloadforcesbetween3G(thestandardrequestedinthisPetitionandthestandardadoptedbytheUSAF)and9G(thecurrentstandard),itishighlylikelythattheB-747wouldnotstayintact.AtsuchhighG-forceloads,whetherthetallrigidcargowasshiftingforwardwouldbetheleastoftheoccupants'andcrew'sworriesbecausetheaircraftwouldlikelynotremainintact.Asa1977USAFTechnicalReportpointedout:"ThemaximumlandingloadsthattheC-130,C-141,andC-5cangenerateare0.94,1.05,and1.20G,respectively.Thisisassumingfullreversethrust,fullbraking,andaloosedirtrunway.Foranyloadabovethese,theDESTINATIONEXCELLENCE'"PetitionforExemptionPage11aircraftisinacrashconditionasdefinedbythisreport."1977USAFTechnicalReport,at21.And,accordingtoBoeing,duringhardbrakingtheforwardflightloadfactorsare1.5Gforthe8-747-400and1.2GfortheB-747-8.Indeed,loadsinthe9Grangewouldnotinvolvean"emergencylandingcondition",butratheracrash.Theaircraftandtheattachmentpointswouldfailwellbefore9G.Seventh,theU.S.DepartmentofDefense,whichtheFAAconsiderstobeacompetentauthority,implementedthereduced3Gforwardrestraintrequirement,andtherehasbeennoreportofanaccidentwhereoccupantshavebeenharmedbycargoshiftingforwardduringemergencylandingconditions.The1977USAFTechnicalReport,whichwasissuedafterthedevelopmentofthepassenger-based9Gforwardrestraintstandard,concludedthatreducingtherequirementto3Gforcargooperationswouldmaintainsafetyandresultinsignificantcostsavingsandsimplification.Inpertinentpart,theReportsummarized:"Thecivilianfleetcanalsousethedataindeterminingwhatdesigncriteriatoutilize.Forexample,eithera3Gpositivelockingrailsystemora3Gnetinconjunctionwithcurrent1Y2Grailsystemwouldprovideanadequatesystemratherthanthe9Gsysteminusetoday."1977USAFTechnicalReport,at50-51."Accordingly,NationalAirlinessubmitsthata3Gforwardrestraintrequirementwouldprovideanequivalentlevelofsafetytotheoutdated9Gstandard.B.TheExemptionWouldBeinthePublicInterest.GrantingthisexemptionwouldbeinthepublicinterestbecauseitwouldenableU.S.operatorsof8-747freighteraircrafttosafelyandefficientlycarrytallrigidcargo,includingmultiple20-footseacontainers,aircraftengines,largeoil/gasequipment,andlargevehicles,forhumanitarian,commercial,andU.S.militaryshippersaroundtheworld.Itwouldalsoenable8-DESTINATIONEXCELLENCENPetitionforExemptionPage12747operatorstomoreefficientlyutilizeandtorealizethefullcapabilitiesoftheirB-747aircraft.Shippersneedaccesstoreasonable,safe,andtimelyairtransportationfortheirshipmentsoftallrigidcargo.Absentthisexemption,shipperswillhavefewerchoicesofcarriersandfewer8-747aircrafttohandlecriticalmissions,because,asexplainedabove,the9GforwardrestraintrequirementeffectivelyprecludesU.S.B-747freighteroperatorsfromcompetingfortallrigidcargoshipments,withoutanyimprovementinsafety.This,inturn,leadstodelaysforthedeliveryofcriticalcargoand/orsubstantiallyincreasescostsforshipperstogettheircargodelivered.Forexample,U.S.exportersandimportersaredetrimentallyaffectedastheircostsarebeingdrivenup,andthereforetheircompetitivenessisreduced.TheU.S.militaryandNGOswithurgenthumanitarianmissionsinvolvingtallrigidcargoalsoencounterdelaysandsubstantiallyincreasedcostsinhavingtheirvitalshipmentsdelivered.Evenincaseswhereasingleitemoftallrigidcargocouldbecarried,othertallrigiditemscouldnotbetransportedbecausetherequisitetie-downattachmentsneededtorestrainto9Gwouldnotbeavailableforadditionalitems.NationalAirlinesestimatesthattheneedtoprovidefrangiblefreightorrestraintallrigidcargotothe9Gstandardreducesthecargo-carryingcapabilitybyaminimumof30%and,insomecases,upto50%oftheallowablevolumeandweightallowedbytheBoeing747weightandbalanceloadingandcontrolmanual.Thepublicinterestwouldbemuchbetterservedwitha3Grestraintrequirementbecauseitwouldallowmorepiecesoftallrigidcargotobecarriedonasingleflightwithoutanyreductioninsafety.Adherencetothe9Gstandardresultsinmoreflightsrequiredtotransportthesameamountoftallrigidcargo,makingU.S.operatorsuncompetitiveinthemarketplace.NationalAirlinesislosingsubstantialbusinessduetotheirinabilitytooffercompetitivebidstocarrytallrigidloadsasaresultofthe9Gforwardloadrequirement.Manyforeigncompetitorsroutinelycarry20-footcontainersandothertallrigidcargowithoutrestrainingthemtowithstandaforward9Gforce.DESTINATION EXCELLENCE

' "

Petition

for Exemption Page

13 National
Airlines estimates

that

it

is losing millions

of dollars

of air cargo business because

it

is unable

to effectively

compete

for

tall rigid cargo shipments

in light

of the

9G forward restraint requirement.

National
Airlines operates

many

of

its flights

as unscheduled

"ad hoc" charters,

and therefore frangible

freight

is most often

not available

. As the absence

of the frangible

cargo requires

the use

of 9G

tie downs, National
Airlines

often loses charters

to foreign competitors

as the tie-down requirements

result

in the inability

to carry

all

of the cargo required for the charter.

As such, National
Airlines

has noted

a significant
reduction

in business

and

the loss

of millions

of dollars

in revenue

due

to the

9G requirement.

National
Airlines additionally notes

that

on flights where nonrevenue

frangible

freight

can

be used

, it has done

so

at the airline's

(not

the shipper's)
expense,

resulting

in additional

cost

to the airline

for the buildup

and disposal

of this cargo.

This

has also caused substantial

losses

due

to these additional unrecouped

costs

. In the context

of economic regulation

, Congress

directed

the Secretary

to strengthen

the competitive

position

of

U

. S

. air carriers

to

at least ensure equality

with foreign

air carriers

, including

the attainment

of the opportunity

for

U

. S

. air carriers

to maintain

and increase

their profitability

in foreign

air transportation.

49

U

. S

. C

. §§401

01 (a)(15)

and (e)(1

). We believe

that the FAA

can

act

in the public interest

and level

the playing

field without

any diminution

of safety by granting

this exemption

to provide

for

a 3G forward restraint requirement. IV. Petitioner Requests Expedited Consideration

And Approval. National
Airlines

urges

the FAA

to expeditiously

review

and approve

this Petition.

U

. S. 8-747 operators

are being adversely
impacted

by the application

of the

9G requirement,

as are shippers. Application

of

a 3G requirement

would

not adversely

affect safety

and would provide an equivalent

level

of safety

as supported

by cargo-compartment

based studies.

If the FAA determines

that notice

and comment

is required

, National
Airlines requests

a shortened publication

and comment

period

and

a waiver

from

the requirement

that petitions

be submitted 120 days before

the proposed
effective

date

of the exemption.

Delay would continue

to**INA110NAL**

**~** DESTINATION
**EXCELLENCE**

**~**

Petition

for Exemption Page

14 adversely

affect National
Airlines

and

its ability

to fulfill

the

tall rigid cargo requirements

of

its humanitarian

, commercial,

and military customers.

At the same

time,

the delay would adversely affect

the public interest

in that shippers

would continue

to

be denied

safe, timely,

and costcompetitive

service

from

U.S

. all-cargo

B-747 operators

for flying

their

tall rigid cargo. V. Conclusion. The B-747 freighter

aircraft

has now flown

for several

million cycles

and more

than

20 million
hours,

and National
Airlines

is not aware

of any report showing

that

tall rigid cargo

has moved forward

and either caused frangible

freight

to compress

or caused

injury

or death

to any crew member

on board

the aircraft.

Given

this substantial

safety

track record,

the extremely

low probability

of
an accident

in the

3G

to N/S range

, the impracticality

and economic infeasibility

of securing

tall rigid cargo

to

a 9G forward

restra

i nt

, and

the USAF's conclusion

that

a 3G forward restraint requirement

would provide

an equivalent

level

of safety

and would

not adversely

affect safety, National
Airlines requests

that

the FAA grant

the exemption requested

herein expeditiously

. VI. National Airlines' Responses

to the Questions

Posed

in Ms. Suzanne Masterson's Letter

on August

6, 2014

on Similar Docket FAA-2014-0184. • National
Airlines anticipates

operating

two flights

per day (approximately

60 flights

per month)

for the duration

of the

US Department

of Defense drawdown

from Afghanistan (exact timeframe unknown). • National
Airlines requests exemption

allowing

for restraint

of cargo

for

3

. 0g ("3G")

and no requirement

for the
use

of frangible

cargo. • Granting

of this petition

would

allow National
Airlines

and

its industry counterparts

to carry cargo under contract

of the

US Department

of Defense

to remove

cargo

from Afghanistan

to support

US National interests

. • This mission

would require

the transport

of mostly

tall rigid cargo

.DESTINATIONEXCELLENCENPetitionforExemptionPage15•Additionally,thisexemptionwouldallowformorecargotobecarriedonfewerflights,providingforuseoffewerresources.DESTINATION EXCELLENCE

N

Petition

for Exemption Page

16 We appreciate

your consideration

in this matter

. If you require additional information

, please

do not hesitate

to contact

me. Contact Information National

Air Cargo Group,

Inc. dba National
Airlines 5955

T.G.

Lee Blvd

., Suite

500 Orlando,

FL 32822 Phone: 407-283-6272 Fax: 407-313-2255**INA110NAI.** DESTINATION
**EXCELLENCE**

FEDERAL REGISTER SUMMARY

Petition

for Exemption ATTACHMENT

1 In accordance

with

§11

. 81 (f),

a summary

of this Request

for Addition

to Petition

for Exemption

for publication

in the Federal Register

is as follows

: Docket

No.: FM-2014-

__ Petitioner:

National

Air Cargo Group,

Inc

. Section

of the FAR Affected: 14 C.F.R.

§§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21),

121.141 Descrip

t ion

of Relief Sough

t: Petitioner

seek

to
be added

to the exemption

from

the requirements

of
14 C.F

. R.
§§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21),

and 121.141

to allow

the operation

of 8-747 freighter

aircraft

while transporting

tall rigid cargo restrained

to withstand

a 3.0g forward

load.

# Exemption

No. 11125 UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION RENTON, WASHINGTON

98057-3356 In the matter

of the petition

of National

Air Cargo Group,

Inc. for

an exemption

from§§
91.9(a), 91.1 025(a), 121.135(a)(

4), 121.135(b)(21),

and 121.141 ofTitle

14, Code

of Federal Regulations

Regulatory

Docket

No. FAA-2014-0980 PARTIAL

GRANT

OF EXEMPTION By

a submission

to the Department

of Transportation's

Federal Docket Management

System (FDMS)

dated November

19, 2014,

Mr. Joseph

R. Batten ofNational

Air Cargo Group,

Inc

. (National Airlines)-

Director

of Operations,

petitioned

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

for

an exemption

from

the requirements

of Title

14, Code

of Federal Regulations

(14 CFR) 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21),

and 121.141

related

to the requirements

for transporting

cargo. The petitioner

requests

relief
from

the following regulations: 

# § 91.9(a)

Civil aircraft

flight manual, markings,

and placard requirements,

which

states

that no person

may operate

a civil aircraft without complying

with

the operating limitations

specified

in the approved Airplane

or Rotorcraft

Flight Manual, markings,

and placards,

or otherwise prescribed

by the certificating

authority

of the country. 

# § 91.1025(a)

Program operating
contents,

which requires

the program operating

manual include procedures

for ensuring compliance

with aircraft
weight

and balance limitations. 

# § 121.135(a)(4)

Manual contents,

which requires

that each manual required

by§ 121.133

must not

be contrary

to any Federal regulations

or the certificate

holder's operations specifications

or operating certificate.§121.135(b)(21)Manualcontents,whichrequiresthateachmanualrequiredby§121.133containmethodsandproceduresformaintainingtheaircraftweightandcenterofgravitywithinapprovedlimits.§121.141Airplaneflightmanual,whichrequiresthateachcertificateholdershallkeepacurrentapprovedairplaneflightmanualforeachtypeofairplanethatitoperatesexceptfornon-transportcategoryairplanes;andthatineachairplanerequiredtocarryanairplaneflightmanual,thecertificateholdershallcarryeitherthemanualrequiredby§121.133oranapprovedAirplaneManual.Thepetitionersupportsitsrequestwiththefollowing.Thisinformationisquotedfromthepetitioner'sletterdatedNovember19,2014.Thecompletepetitionmaybefoundinthedocket.ReasonsWhytheExemptionWouldNotAdverselyAffectPublicSafetyAsexplainedbelow,NationalAirlinesisnotawareofdatasubstantiatingtheapplicationofthe9Grequirementtofreighteraircraft.However,morerecentstudiesthatwerenotavailablewhenthe9Gforwardrestraintrequirementwasdevelopedinthe1950sdemonstratethata3Gforwardrestraintstandardwouldhavenoadverseimpactonsafety,wouldprovideanequivalentlevelofsafety,andwouldbeinthepublicinterest.A.ReportsandDataShowthata3GForwardRestraintRequirementWouldHaveNoAdverseImpactonSafetyandWouldProvideanEquivalentLevelofSafety.Thedeficiencieswiththe9Gforwardrestraintrequirementarenumerous.First,the9Gstandardwasestablishedinthe1950s,wellbeforetheB-747aircraftwascertificated.Second,itconsideredanalysesofpassengerseats,passengerseatattachments,andthegeometricrelationshipofthepassengerseattotheinteriorofthepassengercompartment.Thisseat-basedrequirementappearstohavebecomearegulatory"comealong"toapplytocargotransport,withoutanyanalysisofthevalidityorefficacyofapplyingsuchaseatbasedrequirementtothecargocompartment.Third,sincethe9GforwardrestraintstandardpredatedtheB-747bymorethanadecade,itdidnotaccountformanyoftheB-747'sexceptionalcharacteristics.Itdoesnotproperlyreflecttheactualloadsandbehaviorofcargorestrainedbythecargorestraintsystem,straps,andnetsonaB-747.NordoesittakeintoaccountthespatialseparationofB-747upperdeckoccupantsandthetallrigidcargo,thecapabilityofthecrownbarriernettorestraintallrigidcargo,orthecrashworthinessandenergyabsorbingcapabilityoftheB-74 7upperdeckstructure.Fourth,the9GstandardclearlydidnotaccountfortheinfinitesimalprobabilitythatalloftheeventsnecessaryforanoccupantontheupperdeckofaB-74 7freightertobeharmedbytallrigidcargoinanemergencylandingwouldoccur.U.S.AirForcestudiesconcluded2

# that

a crash event

at higher

than

3G with cargo

and passengers

is "extremely

rare",

with

a probability

of one occurrence

per

4 million

hours

of operation.

Cargo Aircraft

and Spacecraft

Forward Restraint
Criteria, Technical

Report ASD-TR-76-30

(December

1977) ("1977
USAF Technical
Report").

Put another

way, combining

major

and minor accidents for
the period

1962

to July 1976,

the probability

of

a crash

at the "3G

to N/S Level

with Cargo

and Passenger"

was "extremely

rare"

at 0.00000025

per hours/operation.

1977 USAF Technical

Report,

at 38,

50. And,

in November

1981, "CSAF/LET

approved permanent
reduction

to 3G forward restraint,

citing

7 years

of operations

(6.73M

flight hours)

with

no cargo related accidents." Presentation:

Cargo Restraint

for Fixed
Wing Aircraft,

21 May

02, Aeronautical

Systems

Center,
USAF. According

to the same USAF presentation,

"In concert

with

2G

up and 1.5G

aft

& 

# laterally,

3G forward restraint

has proven adequate

and cost effective

for

30 years

of USAF

cargo operations
involving

over 29M flight hours." Fifth,

in commercial operations,

more

than

420 B-74

7 freighters

have flown

more

than

20 million

flight hours

and

4 million

flight cycles.

There

has been

no report

of cargo shifting forward

and harming

an occupant

on

a B-747 freighter

during emergency

landing conditions

(see NTSB Accident Aviation Database

and

17 hull-loss occurrences

on B-747 freighters documented

by the Aviation

Safety Network, www.aviation-safety.net;

see also FAA Accident/Incident

Data System).

Based

on

a review

of the B-747 model freighter accidents,

it can

be concluded

that

any resulting

injury

or fatality related

to the accidents was

not attributable

to cargo shifting forward.

In fact,

if

a cargo

shift

was involved

in any reported accident,

it only involved

cargo shifting

aft, with

no reported accidents involving

a forward

shift

at all. Since

the majority

of cargo

is below

the tall-rigid threshold,

it can

be concluded

that tying down

to flight
loads

at 1.5G (loading)

has been shown

to be sufficient in actual incidents

and accidents

to secure

cargo against forward-shifting,

and

this Petition for

a 3G

tie down therefore

is more

than sufficient. This conclusion

is supported

by the results

of the 2008 accident

of

a Kalitta aircraft

in Brussels.

That accident involved

a B-747 freighter

which suffered

severe damage, breaking into three sections

after

an aborted takeoff

due

to

a bird strike. Although

the main

deck floor beams

in the forward

cargo section

were shattered

in the accident,

cargo

in the other sections

which

was restrained

to 1.5G

was

still secured

to the aircraft,

and

the crew escaped uninjured.

See Final Report,

Ref. AAIU-2008-13

(issued

July 2009), Belgium

Federal Public Service Mobility

and Transport,

Air Accident

and Investigation

Unit. Sixth,

at forward

load forces between

3G (the standard requested

in this Petition

and

the standard
adopted

by the USAF)

and

9G (the current standard),

it

is highly

likely

that

the

B747 would

not stay intact.

At such
high G-force

loads, whether

the
tall rigid cargo

was shifting forward

would

be the least

of the occupants'

and crew's worries because

the aircraft would

likely

not remain

intact.

As

a 1977 USAF Technical

Report pointed

out: "The maximum

landing

loads

that

the C-130, C-141,

and

C-5

can generate

are 0.94,

1.05,

and 1.20G, respectively.

This

is assuming

full reverse

thrust,

full braking,

and

a loose

dirt runway.

For
any load above
these,

the aircraft

is

in

a crash condition

as defined

by this report."

1977 USAF Technical

Report,

at 21. And, according

to Boeing,

during

hard braking

the forward

flight

load factors

are 1.5G

for
the B-747-400

and 1.2G

for
the 

# 3

# B-747-8.

Indeed,

loads

in the

9G range would

not involve

an "emergency

landing condition",

but rather

a crash.

The aircraft

and

the attachment

points would

fail well before 9G. Seventh,

the U.S. Department

of Defense

(DoD),

which

the FAA considers

to be

a competent
authority, implemented

the reduced

3G forward restraint requirement,

and there has been

no report

of
an accident

where occupants

have been harmed

by cargo shifting forward

during emergency

landing conditions. The

1977 USAF Technical

Report,

which was issued

after

the development

of the passenger-based

9G forward restraint standard, concluded

that reducing

the requirement

to 3G

for cargo operations

would maintain

safety and result

in significant

cost savings

and simplification.

In pertinent

part,

the Report summarized:

"The civilian

fleet

can also

use

the data

in determining

what design criteria

to utilize.

For example,

either

a 3G positive
locking

rail system

or

a 3G

net

in conjunction

with current

1 Y2G

rail system

would provide

an adequate

system

rather than

the

9G system

in use today."

1977 USAF Technical

Report,

at 50-51. Accordingly,

National
Airlines submits

that

a 3G forward restraint requirement

would provide

an equivalent

level

of safety

to the outdated

9G standard. Reason

the Exemption

Would Benefit

the Public Interest 

# Granting

this exemption

would

be

in the public interest because

it would enable

U.S. operators

of B-74

7 freighter

aircraft

to safely

and efficiently

carry

tall rigid cargo, including

multiple

20-foot

sea containers,

aircraft engines,

large oil/gas equipment,

and large vehicles,

for humanitarian,
commercial,

and U.S. military shippers

around

the world. It 

# would

also enable

B-7

4 7 operators

to more efficiently

utilize

and

to realize

the
full capabilities

oftheir

B-747 aircraft. Shippers

need access

to reasonable,

safe,

and timely

air transportation

for their shipments

of tall rigid cargo. Absent

this exemption,

shippers

will have fewer choices

of carriers

and fewer

B-7

4 7 aircraft

to handle critical missions,
because, as explained

above,

the

9G forward restraint requirement
effectively
precludes

U.S. B-747 freighter operators

from competing

for tall rigid cargo shipments,

without

any improvement

in safety.

This,

in turn, leads

to delays

for the delivery

of critical

cargo and/or substantially

increases

costs

for shippers

to get their cargo delivered.

For example, U.S. exporters

and importers

are detrimentally

affected

as their costs

are being driven

up, and therefore

their competitiveness

is reduced.

The U.S. military

and NGOs

with urgent humanitarian

missions involving

tall rigid cargo

also encounter

delays

and substantially increased

costs

in having

their

vital shipments delivered. Even

in cases where

a single

item

of tall rigid cargo could

be carried,

other

tall rigid items could

not

be transported

because

the requisite tie-down attachments

needed

to restrain

to 9G would

not

be available

for additional

items. National
Airlines estimates

that

the need

to provide frangible

freight

or restrain

tall rigid cargo

to the

9G standard
reduces

thecargocarrying capability

by

a minimum

of 30%

and,

in some cases,

up

to 50%

of the allowable volume

and weight allowed

by the Boeing

747 weight

and balance loading

and control 

# 4

# manual.

The public interest

would

be much better served

with

a 3G restraint requirement because

it would

allow

more pieces

of tall rigid cargo

to
be carried

on

a single
flight without

any reduction

in safety. Adherence

to the

9G standard

results

in more flights required

to transport

the same amount

of tall rigid cargo, making

U.S. operators uncompetitive

in the marketplace. National
Airlines

is losing substantial

business

due

to their inability

to offer competitive bids

to carry

tall rigid loads

as

a result

of the

9G forward

load requirement.

Many foreign competitors

routinely

carry 20-foot containers

and other

tall rigid cargo without restraining them

to withstand

a forward

9G force. National
Airlines estimates

that

it

is losing millions

of dollars

of air cargo business
because it

is unable

to effectively

compete

for tall rigid cargo shipments

in light

of the

9G forward restraint requirement.

National
Airlines operates

many

of

its flights

as unscheduled

"ad hoc" charters,

and therefore frangible

freight

is most often

not available.

As the absence

of the frangible

cargo requires

the
use

of 9G

tie downs, National
Airlines

often
loses charters to foreign competitors

as the tie-down requirements

result

in the inability

to carry

all

of the cargo required

for the charter.

As such, National
Airlines

has noted

a significant
reduction in business

and

the loss

of millions

of dollars

in revenue

due

to the

9G requirement. National
Airlines additionally

notes

that

on flights
where nonrevenue

frangible

freight

can be used,

it has done

so

at the airline's

(not

the shipper's)
expense, resulting

in additional cost

to the airline

for
the buildup

and disposal

of this cargo.

This

has also caused substantial

losses

due

to these additional unrecouped

costs. In the context

of economic regulation,

Congress

directed

the Secretary

to strengthen

the competitive

position

of U.S.

air carriers

to

at least ensure equality

with foreign

air carriers, including

the attainment

of the opportunity

for U.S.

air carriers

to maintain

and increase their profitability

in foreign

air transportation.

49 U.S.C.

§§ 40101(a)(l5)

and (e)(l).

We believe

that

the FAA

can

act

in the public interest

and level

the playing

field without

any diminution

of safety

by granting

this exemption

to provide

for

a 3G forward restraint requirement. 

# Federal Register publication The FAA

has determined that

good cause exists

for waiving

the requirement

for Federal Register 

# publication

for public comment.

This request

is identical

to

a previously

granted request,

and

it will

not set

a precedent

in the long term. National
Airlines requested

an expedited processing

of this exemption as

it

is identical

to

a previously granted request,

and any

delay would adversely

affect National
Airlines and

its ability

to fulfill

the

tall rigid cargo restraint requirements

of

its humanitarian,
commercial,

and military customers. 

# The 

# FAA's analysis The Boeing

747 Cargo airplane

can carry cargo

in the fuselage

aft

of the flight

deck

that

is taller than

the height

of the flight

deck floor structure

above

the main deck. When

this

tall cargo

is rigid, such

as
an Intermodal Container,

it

is identified

in the current Boeing

747 Weight

& 

# Balance 5(W&B)Manual1as"tallrigidcargo."Becausetheupperportionsofthetallrigidcargocanencroachontheflightdeckfloorduringhigh"0"forwardemergencylandingloadconditions,thistallrigidcargo,andallcargoaftofthatlocation,needstoberestrainedto90forwardemergencylandingloads[Title14,CodeofFederalRegulations(14CFR)25.561]toprotecttheflightcrewandotheroccupants.Standardheightcargo(96inchesorless)isonlyrestrainedfor1.50forwardflightloadssinceitfitsbelowtheflightdeck(§25.787).ThepetitionerhasindicatedthatunderthecurrentBoeing7 4 7 W&BManual,thecarriageoftallrigidcargo(includingIntermodalContainers)isnoteconomicallyviableduetonumberofstrapsrequiredtosecurethecargoforthe90forwardloadandthecorrespondingairplanespace/volumerequiredforthestrapattachmentstotheairplane.Asanalternativetorestrainingthetallrigidcargo(andallcargoaftofthetallrigidcargo)for90loads,theBoeing747W&BManualpermitstheuseoffrangiblecargointheforwardfuselage(note:thisapproachisusedforothercargoairplanes).Boeing'sdefinitionforfrangiblecargoisthatwhichwouldcompressandconformtothefuselageintheeventofanaccidentwithforwardloadsexceeding1.50.Usingthismethod,thetallrigidcargoisrestrainedforonly1.50forwardloads,whichthenallowsfortheaccommodationofmorecargo.Frangiblecargoprecludesthetallrigidcargofromimpactingtheflightdeckfloorduringasurvivablecrasheventwhentheforwardloadsexceed1.50(tallrigidcargothatbecomeslooseduringacrashcannotimpacttheflightdeckfloor).Thisalternativemethodofpreventingthecargofromimpactingtheflightdeckfloorhasbeenshowntomeettheforwardemergencylandingloadrequirements.Thepetitionerhasexpressedconcernsabouttheavailabilityandassociatedcostsoffrangiblecargoatmanyairports,resultinginseverelimitationsintheamountoftallrigidcargothatcanbecarried.UnderthecurrentBoeing747W&BManual,thecarriageoftallrigidcargo,includingIntermodalContainers,isnoteconomicallyviablewithoutsufficientfrangiblecargo.ThefollowingistheFAA'sanalysisofeachofthepetitioner'snumberedargumentsregardingthealleged"deficiencies"oftheexisting90standard.1.Sincethecodificationofpart25,theemergencylandingconditionrequirementsin§25.561havebeenupdatedthreetimes2.The90forwardloadrequirementwasbasedonresearchandin-servicedataavailablewhentherulewasoriginallypromulgated.TheFAAreviewedthisstandardeachtime§25.561wasupdated,andconcludedeachtimethattheresearchanddataavailableateachamendmentlevelindicatedthatthestandardwasstillnecessaryandappropriateforthetransportairplanefleet(whichincludedtheBoeing747airplane).TheBoeing747doesnotcontainanyuniquefeaturesorattributesthataffecttheapplicabilityandappropriatenessofthe90forwardemergencylandingloadrequirement.2.AsdiscussedintheUnitedStatesAirForce(USAF)AeronauticalSystemsDivision(ASD)reportreferencedbythepetitioner[CargoAircraftandSpacecraftForwardRestraintCriteria,TechnicalReportASD-TR-76-30(December1977)("1977USAFTechnicalReport")],itwasfoundduringFAAcrashteststhatinstrumentationonpalletloadsandseatsrecordeddifferent0-forcelevelsatthesamelaterallocationintheaircraft.Itwas1BoeingW&BManual:TheBoeingW&BManualisreferencedintheoperatinglimitationssectionoftheairplaneflightmanual.Itis,therefore,legallymandatoryunder§91.9.214CFR§25.561wasrevisedatamendment25-23,5/8/1970;amendment25-64,6/16/1988;amendment25-91,7/29/19976

# determined that

the difference

in the resultant

G-load

was attributable

to the differences

in the structural

stiffness

and corresponding

dynamic responses

of seat installations

as compared

to cargo/cargo

restraint systems. Therefore,

while

the seat requirement

has increased

to

a 16G forward dynamic

load,

the corresponding

forward

load

for cargo

has remained

at 9G; both requirements

protect occupants

for the same airplane

level event. Therefore,

contrary

to petitioner's

assertion,

the

9G standard

has been shown

to
be inadequate

for seats,

but appropriate

for cargo. 3.

As discussed

above,

two methods

for restraining

tall rigid cargo

for the forward emergency landing

loads

on

a Boeing

747

are presented

in the Boeing

W&B Manual.

One

is

to secure the cargo

for the

9G forward

load,

and

the other

is to carry frangible

cargo

in front

of the tall rigid cargo.

While

these methods

have been shown

to satisfy

the requirements

of §§ 25.561

and 25.787, these

may

not

be the only acceptable

methods.

The FAA

will consider proposals

for changes

to the Boeing747

W&B manual

for other methods, provided sufficient substantiating

data

is included

with each proposal.

While

the petitioner

has indicated

that there

may

be features

unique

to the Boeing

747 cargo airplane

that may mitigate

the safety

risk

to occupants

during

a crash event,

the petitioner

has provided

no data

to show

that

the occupants

would

be afforded

the same

level

of safety (intended

by the regulations)

during

a crash landing

if the proposed

lower emergency

landing

loads

were employed. 4. Crash landings

in any kind

of transport

airplane

are rare. Nevertheless,

the FAA

has imposed standards

to ensure occupants

are protected

when survivable

crash landings

do occur.

The requirements

in§ 25.561

are intended

to protect occupants

in the event

of a rare crash landing,

up

to what

is considered

a survivable

event

in

a transport category airplane. The requirements

have evolved

over many years, supported

by extensive

research

and

inservice

data.

To grant

an exemption,

we must

find

that

it's

in the public interest,

the primary consideration

of which

is safety.

The petitioner

has offered nothing

to indicate that,

in the event

of a rare
crash landing,

the occupants

would

be protected. 5. The emergency

landing condition requirements

in§ 25.561

apply

to all transport category airplanes.

The

9G forward

load factor

in§ 25.561

is considered

adequate

and appropriate for crash events

that

are considered survivable.

While

there

may

not have been

a specific crash event involving

a Boeing

747 where

the airplane

has been subjected

to

a condition equivalent

to the most severe

event addressed

by the regulatory
standards

(e.g., maximum forward emergency

landing

load),

the standards

were developed

with consideration

of the available

data deemed applicable

to

all transport category airplanes.

The longitudinal

loads experienced

during

a survivable

crash landing,

and

the physiological

effects

on occupants, are similar regardless

of airplane

type.

As noted above,

the FAA
finds

that

the Boeing

7 4 7 does

not contain

any unique features

or attributes

that would warrant

a forward emergency landing

load factor different

than

that provided

in

§ 25.561. The

fact that,

to date, there

has

not been

a Boeing

747 crash landing

with

the maximum forward emergency

landing

load

is irrelevant

to whether

the standard

is appropriate

for protecting occupants

in the event

of

a crash landing

in which

that load

is experienced. 7

# 6. The petitioner

is correct

that

the standards

in§ 25.561

are not intended

to protect occupants only during emergency

landings.

They

are intended

to protect occupants

in precisely

those circumstances

in which

the aircraft

itself

may

be destroyed,

but

the crash
loads

and their effects

on occupants

are survivable.

During

the promulgation

of Amendment

25-64 (effective

June

16, 1988)

of§ 25.561,

the FAA increased

certain

load factors

in § 25.561(b)(3)(iii)

to ensure

that compartments

and items

of mass would

not

fail during

a crash event

that would otherwise

be survivable.

The

9G forward

load factor

was considered

adequate

and appropriate

for crash events

that were considered survivable.

For the survivable

crash events considered

in the FAA's investigation

(which included

FAA and NASA research

and

a review

of existing accident

data),

it was shown

that

the airplane structure
remains substantially

intact

and provides

a livable volume

for the occupants throughout

the impact sequence.

The FAA findings

were discussed

in the FAA Notice

of Proposed

Rule Making

for Amendment

25-64

of§ 25.561, Docket

No. 25040.

The petitioner

has provided

no data demonstrating

these findings

are inapplicable

to the Boeing 7 4 7

or that compliance

with

the current standards

would

not protect occupants

in
an otherwise survivable

crash landing. 7.

In the summary

of the USAF report,

it

is stated

that

the probability

of occurrence

of

a crash landing

that would produce

a longitudinal

force between

the range

of 3G and

9G

on cargo was low,

and this probability

is not accounted

for

in the FAA

rule. Consideration

of this low probability,

coupled

with

the unique mission

ofthe USAF, supported

the
use

of

a lower longitudinal

load factor

than

that used

by the FAA

for
the civilian

fleet. However, later USAF aircraft, including

the KC-10

and

the Boeing 767-2C
tanker,

were required

by the USAF

to meet

a 9G forward emergency

landing

load requirement. The probability

of crash landings

of different

levels

of severity

was

not considered

in the development

of the emergency

landing

factors

in§ 25.561.

These factors

are intended

to protect occupants

in precisely

those circumstances

in which

the aircraft

itself

may

be destroyed,

but

the crash loads

and their effects

on occupants

are survivable

. The FAA

9G emergency

landing

load standard

can

be traced

back

to promulgation

of the emergency

landing conditions requirement

in Civil

Air Regulations

4b.260, Amendment

4b-6, effective

March

5, 1952

. The origin ofthe

9G forward

load requirement

in the

§ 4b.260

was investigated

and documented

by ASD

in the aforementioned

USAF report.

In the USAF

study,

the ASD traced

the roots

of this requirement

back

to crash investigations

and crash

tests

of various aircraft

types conducted

between

the 1920s

and 1950s.

Later investigations

included

the consideration

of the differences

in dynamic responses

of crew/passenger

seats, cargo/cargo restraint systems,

and aircraft structure.

The regulations

have since
been updated

to improve

crew and passenger

safety

for emergency

landing

and crash conditions. The current regulatory
standards

have established

a level

of safety

for
the overall airplane through the FAA's rulemaking

process

. Based

on review

of available

data, including

this USAF

study,

the FAA cannot justify

what would amount

to

a significant
reduction

in the airworthiness

safety standards.

The FAA concludes

that granting

this exemption

for

all Boeing

74

7 cargo operations

is not

in the public interest

, and

is not

a benefit

to the public

as

a whole

as the alternative

standard (reduction

in the emergency

landing

load factors

of§ 25.561(b)(3)(ii)

to 3G forward) proposed

by 8thepetitionerwouldbeareductioninthelevelofsafetycomparedtothatprovidedbytheexistingruleandwouldnotprovideadequateprotectionforoccupantsintheeventofasurvivablecrashlanding.Thepetitioner'spublicinterestjustificationisbasedprimarilyontheassertionthatcompliancewith§25.561resultsinacompetitivedisadvantagerelativetocertainforeignoperatorsthatarenotrequiredtocomplywiththisstandard.Thisjustificationcouldbeappliedtoanyairworthinessstandardwithwhichaforeignoperatorisnotrequiredtocomply,andisnot,initself,groundsforfindingthatitisinthepublicinteresttoallowareducedlevelofsafety.AlthoughcurrentlyapprovedmethodsforcargoretentionthatapplytothecarriageoftallrigidcargoontheBoeing747maynotbeeconomicallyadvantageous,theFAArecognizesthatmethodscanbedevelopedthatarebothpracticalandeconomicallyviable.Newmethodsmayincludetheadditionofbarriernets,fixedairplaneanchorpoints,andothermethodsthathavepreviouslybeenemployedinothermissionspecificairplanes.FAAhascoordinatedwithUnitedStates(US)DepartmentofDefense(DoD)representativesregardingretrogradeactivityinAfghanistan:thecurrentUSAdministrationhasindicatedthatbytheendof2014,theUStroopsinAfghanistanwilltransitionfromacombattoasupportrole,resultinginwithdrawalofthemajorityofUStroopsfromAfghanistan.Thisactionwillrequirethetransportofalargequantityofcargobycontractaircarriers.Asignificantamountofthiscargoisconsidered"tallrigidcargo"asdescribedabove.Thisisaunique,time-limitedmission,linkedtoUSnationalsecurity.Asnotedbythepetitioner,grantingofthisexemptionwouldallowNationalAirlinestocarrycargoundercontractoftheUSDoDtoremovecargofromAfghanistantosupportUSNationalinterests.TheFAA'sDecisionTheFAAhasconcludedthatitisinthepublicinteresttograntatime-limitedexemptionfrom§§91.9(a),91.1025(a),121.135(a)(4),121.135(b)(21),and121.141,tonotapplytheforwardemergencylandingloadfactorof9Gspecifiedin§25.561(b)(3)(ii)forrestraintofcargoonthemaindeckofBoeing747seriesairplanes.ThispartialgrantisidenticaltopreviouslygrantedExemptionNo.11096(copyenclosed).Thisexemptionappliesonlytoall-cargoflightsoriginatinginAfghanistanforthetransportofcargofortheDoD,includingallflightsegmentstoreachtheintendedfinaldestination,providedthecargoormethodtosecurethecargoisnotalteredorchangedpriortoreachingthefinaldestination.Section25.561providesrequirementsforemergencylandingconditionsonlandorwaterwheretheairplanemaybedamagedordestroyed.Thescopeofthisexemptionislimitedtotheforwardloadsoftheemergencylandingconditionsofsection25.561(b)(3)(ii).Thisexemptionprovidesnorelieffromflightloads.Part25subpartC -Structure,underthesubheadingsFlightLoadsandFlightManeuverandGustConditions,providesrequirementsforin-flightconditionsforalltransportcategoryairplanes.Allcargomustbesecuredtotheloadsprescribedforthesein-flightconditions.9

# This determination

is based

on the limited

risk exposure

of this specific mission coupled

with

the importance

ofthe mission

as

it relates

to US National security.

This determination

is also consistent

with

the USAF recommendation

in the aforementioned

report:

"9G

was

a reasonable level

of restraint

for protection

of passengers,

yet

it was recognized

that

it could

not

be achieved under

all circumstances,

particularly

not

in combat conditions." Additional Information The FAA

has held discussions

with

the DoD regarding

air carrier

all cargo operational

support

for the DoD mission

to remove military equipment

out

of Afghanistan

by the end of2014.

This DoD effort began

in 2013, involving

the movement

of approximately

24,000 vehicles

and 20,000 shipping containers.

In discussions

with

the DoD,

DoD representatives

have indicated

that

one mode

of transit employed

by the DoD

to remove

this cargo

from Afghanistan

is by the use

of air cargo carriers. Existing limitations

in air carrier

cargo operator manuals

limit

the amount

of cargo that

can

be carried

on Boeing

747 cargo airplanes,

which

is one ofthe primary airplane
models used

for this mission

. Representatives

of the DoD
have indicated

that these limitations

may inhibit the ability

of the DoD

to meet
their planned mission requirement

to remove military equipment from Afghanistan

by the end of2014.

By easing

the current limitations

in the

air carrier

cargo operator manuals,

this exemption

would

allow

the petitioner

to better support

the DoD mission. Documentation

ofthis communication

may

be found

in docket FAA-2014-0184. The FAA

is aware

of concerns

raised

by the petitioner regarding

the perception

of

a lack

of parity within

the

air cargo transport
industry

as

it relates

to the usage

of Boeing

747 cargo airplanes

and compliance

with

the subject regulations.

The FAA

is investigating

this issue

to determine

whether regulatory

action

is necessary

and appropriate. The Grant

of Exemption In consideration

of the foregoing,

I find

that

a partial

grant

of exemption

is

in the public interest and provides

a benefit

to the public

as

a whole. Therefore,

pursuant

to the authority contained

in 49 U.S.C.

§§ 106(±),
40113

and 44701, delegated

to me

by the Administrator,

National

Air Cargo Group,

Inc. (National Airlines),

is hereby granted

a time-limited

exemption

from§§ 91.9(a), 91.1 025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21),

and 121.141,

to not apply

the forward emergency landing

load factor

of 9G specified

in

§ 25.561

(b )(3 )(ii),

for restraint

of cargo

on the main

deck

of Boeing

747 series airplanes,

subject

to the conditions

and limitations

below. Conditions

and Limitations 1. This exemption

applies

only

to all-cargo

flights originating

in Afghanistan

for the transport of cargo

for
the United

States Department

of Defense, including

all flight segments

to reach the intended

final destination,

provided

the cargo

or method

to secure

the cargo

is not altered

or changed

prior

to reaching

the final destination. 2.

All cargo

must

be secured

for

all flight
loads

as required

by

14 CFR

part

25, subpart

C. This exemption

provides

no relief

from

14 CFR

part

25, subpart

C, flight loads. 103.Theflightcrewmustcarryacopyofthisexemptiononallflightsoperatedunderthisexemption.Thisexemptionexpiresoneyearfromthedateofissuanceofthisexemption,unlesssoonersupersededorrescinded.IssuedinWashington,D.C.onDecember15,2014./Is//JohnS.DuncanDirector,FlightStandardsService11