IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyrone Hall, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, : No. 709 C.D. 2015

Respondent : Submitted: February 19, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: March 9, 2016

Tyrone Hall (Claimant) petitions pro se for review of an order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) finding him ineligible for 

unemployment compensation benefits under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment 

Compensation Law (Law)1because his termination was due to willful misconduct. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

 

1 Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. 

(1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§751–914. Section 402(e) provides, in pertinent part:

An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week—

* * *

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

I.

The following facts are not in dispute. Claimant was employed as a 

Junior Asset Management Specialist for IntellecTechs (Employer) from April 21, 

2014, through June 6, 2014. In August 2014, he filed a claim stating that he was 

forced to quit his job for medical reasons as his physician ordered him to refrain 

from working due to a medical problem he suffered while at military reserves 

training. In a follow-up call placed by the Unemployment Compensation Service 

Center (Service Center), Claimant explained, “[I] am under doctors’ [sic] orders to 

not work at all[.]” (Certified Record [C.R.], Record of Oral Interview (8/15/14)).

The Service Center determined that Claimant satisfied his burden of 

proving that he voluntarily quit his job for health reasons and that he informed 

Employer of his health limitations, thereby demonstrating that he was not 

ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.2 However, because 

 

(continued...)

(e) In which his unemployment is due to his discharge or 

temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected 

with his work, irrespective of whether or not such work is 

“employment” as defined in this act

43 P.S. §802(e).

2

Section 402(b) renders an employee ineligible for compensation for any week:

In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work 

without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, irrespective 

of whether or not such work is in “employment” as defined in this 

act: Provided, That a voluntary leaving work because of a 

disability if the employer is able to provide other suitable work 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

Claimant’s work restrictions were so great that he was unable to accept any type of 

work offered by Employer, the Service Center found him ineligible for benefits 

pursuant to Section 401(d)(1) of the Law.3

Employer appealed the Service Center’s determination under Section 

402(b) of the Law to the Board, asserting that Claimant did not voluntarily quit his 

job for health reasons, but rather, was terminated on June 7, 2014, for falsifying 

timesheets resulting in the theft of company funds. In support of its appeal, 

Employer stated that Claimant did not work May 2730, 2014, but nonetheless 

reported his paid time off as hours worked in Employer’s time-management system 

in violation of Employer’s “Timesheets, Payroll, and Pay Deductions” Policy and 

further failed to report the overpayment.

 

(continued...)

shall be deemed not a cause of a necessitous and compelling 

nature....

43 P.S. §802(b).

3

To be eligible to receive compensation benefits, an employee must:

[be] able to work and available for suitable work: Provided, That 

no otherwise eligible claimant shall be denied benefits for any 

week because he is in training with the approval of the secretary 

nor shall such individual be denied benefits with respect to any 

week in which he is in training with the approval of the secretary 

by reason of the application of the provisions of this subsection 

relating to availability for work or the provisions of section 402(a) 

of this act relating to failure to apply for or a refusal to accept 

suitable work.

Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. §801(d)(1).
4

At a telephonic hearing in September 2014, the Referee noted that she 

attempted to call Claimant twice but the call went directly to voicemail, and it 

appeared that Claimant turned his telephone off, despite the fact the hearing notice 

indicated that Claimant was to call the office. Employer’s Chief Executive 

Officer, Jeri Prophet, testified that she terminated Claimant on June 7, 2014, via 

telephone call and by letter dated August 1, 2014, because “[h]e falsified time 

sheets resulting in overpayment and upon investigation it was done intentionally 

and he did not report the payroll error resulting in being paid company funds that 

[were] not due to him.” (C.R., 9/19/14 Transcript of Testimony, at 3.)

CEO Prophet explained that Employer was a government contractor 

for which Claimant worked at an off-site location—a United States Marine Corp 

Base at Camp Lejeune. She stated that on June 11, 2014, the Camp Lejeune site 

manager notified her that Claimant had not reported to work since Monday, June 9, 

2014, and advised that the government was terminating the contract position. 

After this exchange, CEO Prophet immediately contacted Claimant via text 

message to inquire about his whereabouts. She testified that Claimant did not 

respond until June 13, 2014, when he advised that he was away for military drill 

due to the fact that he is a reservist for the United States Military. CEO Prophet 

explained that Employer maintained a policy and procedure for requesting time off 

but that Claimant failed to follow it. According to CEO Prophet, Claimant advised 

via text message that he had informed the site manager of his whereabouts.

Regardless, when the government terminated the position on June 11,

2014, it requested Employer to submit a time audit pursuant to which Employer 
5

provided a log of all of Claimant’s time. While reviewing the logs, CEO Prophet 

testified that it came to her attention that Claimant had requested time off for May 

27–30, 2014, but still represented that he worked those days on his timesheet. 

Employer also presented a screenshot of the “Timesheet Payroll” Form Claimant 

submitted, indicating that from May 16 to May 31, 2014, Claimant worked 80 

hours with no paid time off.

CEO Prophet explained that in follow up, Claimant stated that he did, 

in fact, take off May 27–30, 2014, for a funeral. According to CEO Prophet, 

Claimant then admitted knowing that he claimed this time on his timesheet and 

understood that he had been overpaid. She summarized their conversation as 

follows:

I asked him why he failed to report the overpayment and 

he indicated at that point that he didn’t know. And I 

asked him, you know, do you understand the policies and 

procedures in the employee handbook that you are 

responsible for accurately recording your time, you 

signed the policy. He indicated to me that he did 

understand and that he did understand that he was not 

tracking his time according to our or the government’s 

time keeping system. It was very clear to me upon 

discovery that there was another entire week of time that 

he had put into the time keeping system that he did not 

show up for work not one day that week and so upon 

those two discoveries without reporting the payroll error 

that he was terminated immediately for theft of company 

funds.

(Id. at 7.) In other words, CEO Prophet explained that upon investigation, she 

detected several instances where Claimant did not show up for work at Camp 
6

Lejeune but indicated that he had worked on his timesheet, thereby hiding his 

absence from CEO Prophet who otherwise would not have known since she works 

in Virginia.

The Referee issued a decision crediting Employer’s evidence and 

finding Claimant ineligible for benefits under Sections 402(b) and 401(d)(1) of the 

Law. Specifically, with regard to Section 402(b), the Referee determined that 

Employer’s undisputed testimony satisfied its burden of showing that Claimant 

was terminated for willful misconduct because he admitted claiming time for 

which he had not worked, despite being aware of Employer’s policies. Further, 

with respect to Section 401(d)(1), the Referee explained that although a claimant is 

presumed to be able and available for work when he files a claim, here, Claimant 

rebutted this presumption by informing the Service Center that he was not able and 

available for work.

Claimant appealed to the Board, explaining that he was unable to 

attend the hearing before the Referee and requested that it be rescheduled in 

advance. He further advised that the hearing was, in fact, rescheduled pursuant to

a notice he received in the mail. The Board remanded the matter to the Referee for 

a hearing to determine whether Claimant had proper cause for his non-appearance 

at the prior hearing.
7

On remand,4the Referee conducted another hearing by telephone at 

which Claimant testified regarding his non-appearance at the first hearing.5 

Regarding the merits of the case, Claimant testified that in May 2014, he notified 

Employer as well as the governmental entity with which Employer had a contract 

that he required time off due to a family member’s death. He stated that 

subsequently, Romeo Speeno, one of CEO Prophet’s associates, contacted him 

about his timesheet. According to Claimant, he realized that he made a mistake 

inputting his time and disclosed the same to Mr. Speeno, who agreed to correct the 

error. Additionally, he stated that he informed CEO Prophet of the mistake. He 

stated that he received notice of his termination on June 7, 2014, at which time he 

was serving reserved military duty and that he interpreted that letter to terminate 

him because of his absence on that date. He testified that he discussed the issue 

with Employer, which planned to investigate but asked him to return his equipment 

in the meantime. Subsequently, he received a letter indicating that he was 

terminated due to his May timesheet. He stated that after receiving the letter, he 

contacted Employer and advised that the timesheet issue had already been resolved 

as per prior conversations.

 

4

The Referee conducted another hearing by telephone and, again, Claimant neither called 

in nor answered his telephone. However, realizing that the hearing notice was not sent to the 

Philadelphia address to which Claimant recently moved, the Referee rescheduled the hearing. 

Likewise, Employer was apparently unaware of the hearing.

5 Because the Board determined that Claimant’s non-appearance at the initial hearing was 

excusable, and because that finding has not been challenged on appeal, we will not set forth at 

length Claimant’s testimony regarding this issue.
8

On cross-examination, Claimant admitted that CEO Prophet provided 

his initial employee orientation but denied that she taught him how to input time, 

stating that Mr. Speeno assisted him in doing so in May 2014. He did 

acknowledge that during the orientation, CEO Prophet reviewed the timekeeping 

system with him, but explained that “I didn’t have any of the equipment in front of 

me to you know understand it.” (C.R., 11/24/14 Transcript of Testimony, at 18.) 

He agreed that he received the Employee Handbook and reviewed it but denied 

recalling its policy regarding incorrect entries of time.

Claimant stated that he knew he had claimed time for the days he took 

off for bereavement in May 2014 and, therefore, called Mr. Speeno in May to 

address the issue since he was unable to reach CEO Prophet. Thereafter, he 

assumed the issue was resolved. However, when questioned who handles payroll 

issues for Employer, Claimant stated that Human Resources does and admitted that 

Mr. Speeno is not part of Human Resources but stated that he is Claimant’s first 

contact manager and a recruiter. Claimant explained that when he subsequently 

viewed his timesheet and realized the error had not been corrected, he left a 

voicemail for CEO Prophet on May 27 or 28, 2014, and thought he sent an email 

to her as well.

Regarding his termination, Claimant explained that initially, he was 

not given a reason as to why he was fired. Because he had been away from work 

on reserve duty orders, he presumed his absence to be the reason but provided 

those orders a month in advance and later learned his termination was due to his 
9

May timesheet, which he thought was resolved. With respect to why it was proper 

for Claimant to contact Mr. Speeno about his timesheet error, he stated:

He was doing that work. He was anything at the 

first—he said he was like my manager. He said anything 

[sic] call him up and he’ll help me. He’ll straighten out 

that. I said okay fine. So that was like my first line of 

defense for me right there to call him up and if anything 

go [sic] on that’s the person I talk to but I couldn’t get 

contact with Ms. Prophet that was my first line of 

defense. Him, he was like my manager. He told me if I 

had any problems give him a call.

(Id. at 23.) He recalled that his termination was provided via email and that he 

never spoke to CEO Prophet personally.

In rebuttal, CEO Prophet stated that Claimant was provided an 

Employee Handbook for which he signed, along with numerous emails indicating 

that CEO Prophet handles all payroll issues. She explained that Claimant was 

provided her cellphone number and yet, Claimant apparently reached out to Mr. 

Speeno, who is a recruiter and is no longer involved in the employment process 

once an employee is hired. She recalled that she spoke to Claimant numerous 

times about other issues and at no point did he mention his timesheet error. 

Further, according to her, Claimant never advised her that he had discussed this 

issue with Mr. Speeno. Regarding his absence while at drill, CEO Prophet stated 

that she requested he provide her with his orders numerous times and that he 

repeatedly failed to do so.
10

Claimant disputed that he failed to provide his orders, indicating that 

he emailed scanned copies of his orders to CEO Prophet and Mr. Speeno and 

verbally advised both of them as well. Claimant also submitted a note from 

William Chapman, M.D. dated September 9, 2014, indicating that Claimant was 

able to return to work with no restrictions as of the following day, September 10, 

2014.

Following the hearing, the Board determined that Employer satisfied 

its burden of proving that Claimant was discharged for willful misconduct because

based on Employer’s policy, Claimant was or should have been aware of 

Employer’s timekeeping and payroll practices and should have known that any 

problems with respect to these issues needed to be directed to CEO Prophet. 

Further, the Board credited CEO Prophet’s testimony that Claimant both requested 

time off and requested payment for hours he did not work on May 2730, 2014, 

and admitted to being aware of the overpayment despite the fact he did not report 

it. The Board rejected Claimant’s testimony that he reported the issue to Mr. 

Speeno. As such, the Board concluded that “the [C]laimant’s action of knowingly 

submitting inaccurate timesheets and failing to notify the [E]mployer of an 

overpayment falls below the standard that an employer has the right to expect from 

an employee and benefits must be denied under Section 402(e) of the Law.” 

(3/11/15 Board Decision, at 3.) Claimant filed a motion for reconsideration, which 

the Board denied, and this appeal followed.
11

II.

On appeal,6 Claimant first contends that the Board erred in 

determining that he lacked a necessitous and compelling reason for quitting his job 

pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law. However, the Board did not find Claimant 

ineligible for benefits because he quit under Section 402(b); rather, it found him 

ineligible under Section 402(e) on the basis that he was terminated for willful 

misconduct. Claimant acknowledges this fact in his brief, noting that he “was 

discharge[d] from his employment.” (Brief of Petitioner, at 10.) Nonetheless, he 

suggests that we apply the law applicable to Section 402(b). Because Claimant has 

conflated these issues and because the Board made no finding of ineligibility 

pursuant to Section 402(b), we reject Claimant’s argument.

Further, Claimant asserts that the Board’s decision must be reversed 

because insofar as it relied on Section 402 of the Law, that provision does not 

exist. In support of this claim, he cites 43 P.S. §402 and notes that this provision 

was repealed by the Act of May 22, 1933. In this regard, Claimant has 

 

6 Our review is limited to determining whether the Board’s findings of fact are supported 

by substantial evidence in the record, whether errors of law were committed, whether agency 

procedure was violated, or whether constitutional rights were violated. Gillins v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 633 A.2d 1150, 1153 (Pa. 1993). We have defined “substantial 

evidence” as such “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support 

a conclusion.” Palladino v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 81 A.3d 1096, 1100 

n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

After the instant appeal was initiated, the Board filed an application to dismiss, arguing 

that Claimant waived the only issue capable of review by failing to address it in his brief. We 

declined to dismiss the appeal at that time, but ordered that the application be considered with 

the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the application but affirm 

the Board’s ruling.
12

misconstrued the Board’s decision. Although the Board relied on Section 402 of 

the Law, that provision is codified at 43 P.S. §802, not 43 P.S. §402, and the 

former section remains in full force and effect. Therefore, we likewise find this 

argument without merit.7

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision finding Claimant 

ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of 

the Law, 43 P.S. §802(e).

 

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

 

7 Notably, Claimant has made no argument with respect to and has not challenged on 

appeal the Board’s findings pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Law.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyrone Hall, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation Board :

of Review, :

Respondent : No. 709 C.D. 2015

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of March, 2016, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated March 11, 2015, at No. B576035, is affirmed.

 

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge