Richard K. Simon, Esq. 

1 7 0 0 Decker Schoo I Lane --='"""';::-;:tc:;;rri ~ ~ \[\\ 

Malibu, CA 90265 \0) ~ ~ \_!;; U \\!) 

(310) 503-7286 \1\l 

rsimon3@verizon.net AUG 2 8 2014 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Attention: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket 

AGC-610 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave. S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Re: Part 16 Complaint 

August 28,2014 

National Business Aviation Association, Krueger Aviation, Inc., Harrison 

Ford, justice Aviation, Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc., Aero Film, Youri Bujko, 

]ames Ross, Paramount Citrus LLC and Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association v. City of Santa Monica, California 

Docket Nos. 16-14-04/FAA-2014-05921 

Answer ofthe Complainants to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

The Complainants, as set forth above, submit this answer to the August 14, 2014 · 

Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") filed by the City of Santa Monica ("Santa Monica," "City," or 

"Respondent"), sponsor and operator of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport ("SMO" or 

"Airport"). For the reasons set forth below, Complainants request that the Motion be 

denied, that the FAA require the Respondent to file an Answer to the Complaint, that the 

FAA subsequently address the substance of the Complaint, and, in so doing, confirm that 

the Grant Assurances remain in effect for SMO and the City through 2023. 

INTRODUCTION 

As an initial matter, it is important to understand what this Part 16 proceeding is 

actually about- and not what the Respondent has attempted to reframe it as being about: 

• It is not about the terms of Airport leases. 

1 A copy of the Complaint also has been posted at the regulations.gov website under dockets nos. 16-14-

05/FAA-2014-0538. To the extent applicable, this reply also pertains to those dockets. 

1 
• It is not about redressing future violations of Grant Assurances. 

• It is not about the City's ability to evaluate options or to consider what actions it 

might take as a proprietor of SMO. 

• And it clearly does not seek an "advisory" opinion. 

These arguments by Santa Monica are all red herrings. This Part 16 action is solely about a 

determination that the City already has made, repeatedly affirmed in writing (including in 

both federal court and the present proceedings), and disseminated widely: namely, that its 

Grant Assurance obligations ended on june 29, 2014- two months ago -and that since 

then the City no longer has been a federal grantee airport sponsor obligated to comply with 

those Grant Assurances. 

The Complainants - and all Airport tenants and users - have been, are, and will 

continue to be impacted by the purported loss of the protections afforded by Grant 

Assurances at SMO, and commenced this action to challenge the City's determination. The 

FAA indisputably has jurisdiction under Part 16 to address that request; both the FAA's 

broad mandate under Part 16 and its own precedents permit present scrutiny of the City's 

decision. 

Even though the City contends that none of the Grant Assurances are still applicable 

at the Airport, it maintains in its Motion that Part 16 cannot be invoked by the 

Complainants because the Complaint has not alleged a violation of any particular Grant 

Assurance. That is incorrect. While Part 16 complaints typically do allege a violation of 

one or more Grant Assurances, Part 16 does not require that any specific Assurance be at 

issue; indeed, the FAA has never considered itself to be limited to reviewing an airport's 

compliance with the Assurances cited in a complaint - and, as discussed infra, there is 

ample authority to support the applicability of Part 16 in the present circumstances. 

Additionally, the City argues that its rejection of its federal obligations has not yet 

had a "direct and substantial" effect on Complainants, who must, in its view, wait until the 

City takes additional steps to further implement its determination before the necessary 

harm can be said to exist to maintain a Part 16 complaint. That is also incorrect. Unlike the 

City's consideration of potential future Airport scenarios - such as those in its ongoing 

"Visioning Process" - the impacts of the City's already definitive rejection of its Grant 

Assurance obligations are immediate and reaL and implicate the present interests of 

Airport tenants and users, including Complainants. For the reasons set forth below, these 

impacts clearly meet the requirements of Part 16. 

The remainder of the City's objections to the Complaint are, individually and 

collectively, equally groundless. They also are addressed infra. 

Finally, it is apparent from the Motion that the City believes that its 1984 Settlement 

Agreement with the FAA- which imposes certain obligations on the City until july 1, 2015-

allows it to shield and obfuscate the ultimate impacts of the decision it has already made 

regarding the Grant Assurances. The City repeatedly asserts in its Motion that it has not yet 

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concluded precisely how it will use its declared "freedom" from federal obligations. But 

that is ultimately irrelevant. The City is the respondent in this proceeding because it has 

adopted and implemented a legal position (which no other grantee sponsor has ever 

presumed to assert): that it has the power unilaterally to decide when its federal 

obligations end. That the 1984 Settlement Agreement separately applies to the Airport for 

another ten months does not validate what the City has done, or render the need for an FAA 

ruling on the Complaint any less urgent. 

ARGUMENT 

This Answer generally will respond to the Motion in the same order that the issues 

were presented by the City, with a few exceptions for purposes of simplicity and clarity. 

I. Factual Background 

The FAA already is familiar with the history of SMO and the City's decades-long 

efforts to restrict operations at the Airport, or to close it altogether, and it need not be 

restated here. But it should be noted that the account of the history of SMO which appears 

in the Motion is greatly oversimplified and, in certain respects, inaccurate. Among other 

things, the City does not fully address the Airport's operation and improvement by the 

federal government during World War II and the subsequent conditional transfer of the 

improved Airport property to the City. While immaterial to the present Part 16 proceeding, 

the absence of a complete and accurate account of background facts should be noted. 

More significantly, the City reiterates its position that the 2003 amendment to its 

grant agreement with the FAA (no. DTFA08-94-C-20857) did not extend its obligations 

beyond june 29, 2014, referring to certain exhibits attached to its Motion. This issue, and 

the same exhibits, already were reviewed by the FAA in In re City of Santa Monica, 

California, docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807, Director's Determination (May 27, 

2008), which reached a different conclusion: 

In 2003 the City requested, and the FAA approved a grant amendment for 

$240,000, increasing its [Airport Improvement Program ("AlP")] grant total 

to $10.2 million. This was the last AlP-funded project at SMO to date. As a 

result, SMO is obligated under its AlP grant assurances until at least 2023. 

!d. at 12-13 (footnote and citation omitted and emphasis added). Although this conclusion 

was not incorporated into the agency's final decision in that proceeding, and is not put at 

issue by the Motion, the City has offered no basis upon which a different result could be 

reached, and Complainants respectfully suggest that no such basis exists. 

II. Failure to State a Claim 

The City argues that the Complaint must be dismissed because it does not identify a 

specific Grant Assurance that the City is alleged to be violating. The Motion also argues that 

the Complainants are seeking an "advisory" opinion and that there is "no concrete dispute" 

to be adjudicated because, allegedly, the City is currently in compliance, and any harms to 

3 
the Complainants are speculative. As discussed infra, these arguments are flawed, and fail 

to establish that the Complaint does not state a claim that may be addressed by the FAA in 

this forum. Additionally, the City's argument in section IV(C) of the Motion (at 15-16)-

which asserts that the FAA lacks jurisdiction to address the issues presented by 

Complainants - essentially restates those same points and also will be addressed here. 

1. Jurisdiction 

At its core, the City's argument is that the FAA's unquestioned jurisdiction to hear 

Grant Assurance-related disputes under Part 16 terminates when confronted with an 

airport sponsor's refusal to acknowledge that it has any Grant Assurance obligations at all. 

See Motion, at 12. 

The short answer to this contention is that in Part 16 proceedings the FAA routinely 

considers, implicitly and explicitly, whether federal Grant Assurances or other cognizable 

authorities (such as Instruments of Transfer) are applicable to the airport sponsor. Such 

consideration is an important component of every reported Director's Determination and 

Final Agency Decision. Indeed, § 2.3 of the Airport Compliance Manual (FAA Order 

5190.6B) reiterates that a standard element of FAA review is "Determining if an Airport is 

Federally Obligated." 

Although in most instances this consideration is pro forma (because most sponsors 

do not join the City in disputing their federal obligations), it can, in fact, be the crux of a 

Part 16 proceeding. For example, Dart v. City of Corona, California, docket no. 16-99-20, 

Director's Determination Qune 26, 2000), devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to 

the very issue of the sponsor's federal obligations. As described therein: 

The City takes the position that it is not a federally obligated airport sponsor 

and that the Airport is not a federally obligated airport because the land area 

on which the Airport is located was not conveyed by or paid for by the 

Federal government. In support of its assertion, the City submits that the 

Airport is not identified as such by inclusion in FAA Order 5190.2R, List of 

Public Airports Affected by Agreements with the Federal Government, and that 

the City consequently is not obligated to make the airport available to FAR 

Part 103 Ultralight vehicle operations. 

!d. at 11. After analyzing all of the facts and circumstances, the Director's Determination 

concluded that the sponsor was subject to the prohibition against the grant of exclusive 

rights - although not pursuant to the Grant Assurances or an Instrument of Transfer, but 

instead another pillar of the FAA's authority: 

Against this background, and based on the evidence of record in this 

proceeding, we conclude that the City is not a federally obligated airport 

sponsor subject to Federal obligations set forth in agreements or property 

deeds over which FAA has congressionally mandated jurisdiction. However, 

our inquiry does not end here. FAA policy regarding the applicability of the 

exclusive rights prohibition specifically provides that the expenditure ofF AA 

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F&E funds for the installation of navigation aids on an airport makes the 

airport subject to the exclusive rights prohibition. 

Id. at 15. The FAA has always had the power under Part 16 to resolve the "big picture" 

question of whether and to what extent an airport sponsor is federally obligated, and the 

agency should be surprised to learn that the City believes that it does not. The City would 

no doubt argue that here, unlike in Dart, the nature and scope of the City's federal 

obligations is the only question raised, but that is a distinction without a difference. The 

issue is the scope of the FAA's authority, which includes the question now at issue. 

Further, the FAA's authority is broadly defined throughout Part 16. As an initial 

matter, 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(a) provides that: "The provisions of this part govern all ... 

proceedings involving Federally-assisted airports," including proceedings filed pursuant to 

"[t]he assurances and other Federal obligations contained in grant-in-aid agreements 

issued under the Airport and Airway improvement Act of 1982 .... " Section 16.3 defines 

"noncompliance"- a predicate for a complaint as used elsewhere in Part 16- as "anything 

done or omitted to be done by any person in contravention of any provision of any Act, as 

defined in this section, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrator" 

(emphasis added). And Section 16.101 provides that in addition to reviewing third-party 

complaints: "The FAA may initiate its own investigation of any matter within the 

applicability of this part" (emphasis added). Grant Assurance duration is well within the 

ambit of these provisions. 

The City also charges - although without elaboration or the benefit of any citation to 

authority- that the FAA lacks jurisdiction in this case because the Complaint "involves the 

interpretation and determination of the expiration date of a contract." Motion, at 15. 

Indeed it does, but not just of any type of contract - a contract which provided a grant to 

the City in return for its compliance with the assurances included therein. Essentially 

every Part 16 proceeding involves the interpretation and determination of obligations set 

forth in such a contract, or the similar obligations of a property transfer, as specifically 

authorized and intended by Part 16. Moreover, if this contention is intended to reflect 

language in the Final Agency Decision (July 8, 2009) in In re City of Santa Monica, California, 

docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807 - to the effect that the agency could not consider 

claims involving the 1984 Settlement Agreement in a Part 16 proceeding - the City's 

reliance upon that language is entirely misplaced.2 No decision of the FAA even implies 

that because a Grant Assurance agreement itself is contractual in nature, the specific 

requirements of such an agreement - including its duration - may not be considered in a 

Part 16 proceeding. 

In sum, the City's argument that the FAA lacks jurisdiction to hear the Complaint is 

created of whole cloth, without any basis in authority, and should be disregarded. 

2 In particular: "The City's obligations under the 1984 Settlement Agreement are not a proper subject in a 

proceeding under 14 C.F.R. Part 16 because that Agreement was not incorporated in the Grant Assurances." 

Id. at 4 (emphasis added]. 

5 
2. "Advisory" Opinion 

The City's Motion sets forth a raft of straw men - which have nothing to do with the 

actual allegations of the Complaint- and then asserts that the Complainants are seeking an 

"advisory" opinion concerning them. The Complaint in fact seeks no such opinion. 

The City's current and past pronouncements and actions leave no doubt that it will 

continue its efforts to restrict operations at SMO or to close the Airport altogether in light 

of its claim to be free from Grant Assurance constraints. But Complainants do not seek a 

decision in this proceeding, as the City erroneously claims, that a particular lease term is or 

is not consistent with the Assurances.3 Complainants do not seek an order "forcing the 

CITY to lease its property to them for eight (8) more years" (Motion, at 3), or an opinion "as 

to the legality of 'possible' future conduct" (Motion, at 15) 4 The relief sought by the 

Complaint is clear and limited: 

Complainants request that the FAA exercise its plenary authority under Part 

16 to determine that the City's Grant Assurance obligations remain binding 

and effective, and that the City must continue to comply with those 

obligations, until no sooner than August 2023. 

Complaint, ,-r 30. This is not a request for "an improper 'advisory' opmwn based on 

speculation about the CITY's plans," Motion, at 13, but rather a request for a determination 

-well within the FAA's authority to issue- based on an actual and present controversy. 

Part 16 decisions have recognized that "[t]he FAA Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. Part 

16, apply the procedural structure of 49 U.S.C. section 46101(a) to complaints filed with the 

3 However, the City does cite FAA precedent which confirms that an airport usually must make long-term 

leases available to tenants, to the extent it has entered into an agreement which requires the continued 

operation of the airport. See Motion, at 14 (citing Santa Monica Airport Assodation v. City of Santa Monica, 

California, docket no. 16-99-21, Director's Determination, at 22 (November 22, 2000)). That decision 

predated the City's 2003 Grant Amendment, so to the extent it also suggested that the outer boundary of the 

City's obligations was set by the 1984 Settlement Agreement, that language is now obsolete. See also 

Skydance Helicopters. Inc. v. Sedona Oak-Creek Airport Authority, docket nos. 16-02-02/FAA-2002-13068, 

Director's Determination, at 32 (Marcb 7, 2003) ("the Authority proyjdes no explanation as to why it could 

not have offered the Complainant a lease term that runs commensurate with the remaining length of its lease 

with the County"). 

4 The Complaint did cite the short-term 3-year leases then proposed to the Santa MoniCa City Council as 

illustrative of the types of City action that Grant obligations would foreclose. See Complaint, 1[ 30, n.2. In fact, 

both this reference and the City's reliance on the staff proposal to extend the leases of Airport tenants for 

three years, see Motion, at 3 and 10, have proven optimistic. Two days before its Motion was filed, the City 

Council declined to adopt the proposal and directed the Santa Monica Airport Commission to consider 

shorter-duration alternatives, including month-to-month lease renewals. The minutes of the Council meeting 

are not yet available but a video of the Council's August 12, 2014 meeting is available at 

http://santamonica.granicus.com/mediaplayer.php?view id-2&clip_j_d""l3.1J1 In any case, because of their 

short term nature, the adoption of either a three-year maximum or month-to-month terms by the City at a 

future date would be a violation checked by the continued applicability of the Grant Assurances. 

6 
FAA against federally assisted airports." jimsair Aviation Services, Inc. v. San Diego Regional 

Airport Authority, docket nos. 16-06-08/FAA-2006-25225, Final Agency Decision and 

Order, at 15 (August 9, 2007). That procedural structure includes jurisdiction to "issue a 

declaratmy ruling to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." Department of 

Transportation, Hawaii Inspection Fee Proceeding, Order 2012-1-18, at 7 (January 24, 

2012); see also Compass Airlines, LLC v. Montana Dep't of Labor & Industry, No. 12-CV-105-

H-CCL, 2013 WL 4401045, *14 (D. Mont., Aug. 12, 2013), (recognizing that 49 U.S.C. § 

46101(a) empowers DOT agencies to "provide equitable remedies such as injunctive relief 

and declaratory relief'). Thus, the pending request clearly is not for an "advisory" opinion 

but for a declaratory remedy well within the agency's authority.5 

3. Direct and Substantial Effect 

As discussed above, Complainants vigorously dispute the City's assertion that its 

blanket rejection of all Grant Assurance obligations is not itself a cognizable matter for the 

purposes of Part 16. Complainants also maintain that the City's actions have a current 

etfect upon them, and thus that they are "directly and substantially" affected by the City's 

non-compliance and have standing to the extent required by Part 16. 

The City generally is correct that "the standing requirement ensures that the FAA's 

resources are not expended on matters in which the Complainant's interest is insufficient 

to justify the burden of processing a Complaint under Part 16" (Motion, at 15). But the 

Complainants' interest in maintaining the protections of Grant Assurances for the duration 

of the City's contractual commitment could not be more substantial. 

As a preliminary matter, the Complaint alleges noncompliance under not one, but all 

of the Grant Assurances as a result of the City's conceded rejection of any compliance 

obligation after june 29, 2014. It also alleges that all but one of the Complainants, apart 

from the representative organizations, are Airport tenants.6 That alone should be sufficient 

to establish their interest. "The fact that the Complainant is currently paying fees or rentals 

to the Respondent demonstrates that he is directly and substantially affected by any 

alleged noncompliance." Royal Air, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, Louisiana, docket nos. 16-02-

06/FAA-2002-13063, Director's Determination, at 15 (January 9, 2004). 

The FAA has recognized that "current" compliance means not just that an airport is 

not presently violating any Grant Assurances, but also that tenants and users are able to 

plan for the future. See, e.g., Atlantic Helicopters, Inc. v. Monroe County, Florida, docket nos. 

16-07-12/FAA-2008-0250, Director's Determination, at 31 (September 11, 2008) 

("[s]ponsors must provide aeronautical businesses that meet minimum standards with the 

s Moreover, the City's citation of constitutional ripeness standards (Motion, at 13) is misplaced, as 

administrative agencies are not subject to the same requirements as an Article III court. See, e.g., NAACP v. 

FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir.1995). 

'The exception is an Airport user (Complaint, 1f 9), which as such pays landing fees for its operations. 

7 
opportunity for occupancy with certainty of associated rights to conduct business for 

appropriate lengths of time, depending on investment requirements and associated costs"). 

That the City, now purportedly free from Grant Assurance obligations, has delayed 

taking further specific actions at SMO does not change the fact that its current position -

that it has the right "to use the Airport Property as it chooses in its sovereign discretion, 

including for non-aviation purposes," City of Santa Monica v. U.S., eta/., no. 13-CV-8046 

(C.D. Cal.), Complaint at§ 2 - prevents Airport tenants and users from planning for a future 

in all but the shortest term. This situation may effectively force many of them to relocate 

from SMO, which would depopulate the facility and perpetuate a cycle of decline- exactly 

the outcome that the City wants and which the FAA must prevent. As the FAA recently 

observed, "an airport sponsor's federal obligations are not altered or suspended based on 

its intent and desire to close the airport." De Vries v. City of St. Clair, Missouri, docket nos. 

16-12-07 /FAA-2012-0744, Director's Determination, at 26 (May 20, 2014). 

lt is also not true that the FAA has no power under Part 16 to consider future events 

and consequences. While most Part 16 proceedings have emphasized current compliance 

issues, and the FAA commonly has declined to consider matters that are entirely 

speculative, the FAA also has made clear that it may address current practices that are 

likely to result in future violations - of which the City's position regarding its lack of 

obligations is a prime example. See, e.g., ]etA way Aviation LLC v. Board of Commissioners, 

Montrose County, Colorado, docket nos. 16-06-01/FAA_2006-25185, Director's 

Determination, at 34 (November 6, 2006) (warning respondent that UNICOM frequency 

must be reclaimed by the airport from the existing FBO to which it had been assigned when 

a second FBO contract was awarded). Likewise, in Town of Fairview, Texas v. City of 

McKinney, Texas, docket no. 16-99-04, Director's Determination, at 17 Quly 26, 2000), the 

FAA specified that it could hear a complaint which alleged that an airport's current 

noncompliance with wildlife mitigation requirements would lead to future hazards, so long 

as the complainant "demonstrate[ d] a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury."7 

The danger arising from Santa Monica's erroneous conclusion that it is no longer 

bound by any of the Grant Assurances is no less realistic. The history of the City's efforts to 

close SM 0 and to restrict its operations, as well as recent developments such as the fact 

that by the City's admission even the best case scenario under contemplation for the future 

of SMO leases is non-compliant three-year maximum terms- demonstrate that the City will 

use any absolution from Grant Assurance constraints to disadvantage Airport tenants and 

users. Thus, Complainants should not be further obliged to demonstrate how any of the 

various proposals previously or currently under consideration by the City might affect 

7 This standard is at a minimum consistent with federal court decisions, which hold that future injuries can be 

cognizable. See. e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) ("[a]n allegation of future 

injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm 

will occur") (quotation marks omitted); Amador County, California v. Kempthorne, 592 F.Supp.2d 101, 105 

(D.D.C. 2009). In any case, as for ripeness, the standing requirements that apply to administrative agencies 

are Jess strict than those that apply to Article III courts; the City is wrong (see Motion, at 13) to suggest 

otherwise. See, e.g., Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir. 1999). 

8 
them individually when implemented. The City has already rejected all of its compliance 

obligations and made clear that going forward its intent is to "starve" SMO, even if it has not 

yet selected the specific tools by which it will do so. 

Finally, the FAA also has made clear that even if an airport nominally is in current 

compliance with the Grant Assurances, if a compliance matter may arise in the future but 

easily evade review, it may be addressed by the FAA preemptively in a Part 16 proceeding. 

See, e.g., Royal Air, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, Louisiana, docket nos. 16-02-06/FAA-2002-

13063, Director's Determination, at 17 ("[t]he focus is on current compliance, but a 

necessary part of current compliance is a sponsor's actions in carrying out its federal 

obligations. The Respondent's former actions, as well as current actions, shape its airport 

compliance efforts regardless of subsequent developments in tenancy at the airport. The 

typical standard for a claim of mootness is whether a matter is capable of repetition, but 

evading review. Under this premise, the Director cannot find that the complaint is moot"). 

To the extent that the City's actions may have the effect of driving away tenants and users, 

the same concerns apply here. 

III. Good Faith Effort to Resolve 

Complainants have fulfilled the pre-complaint resolution requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 

16.21. Part 16 "does not require any particular informal resolution method. Additionally, 

Part 16 ... does not state that efforts to resolve an issue must begin or conclude at any given 

point." Consolidated Services Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. City of Palm Springs, 

California, docket nos. 16-03-05/FAA-2003-15433, Director's Determination, at 23 Qune 

10, 2004). 

Complainants' efforts began long before the present filings with efforts to dissuade 

the City from its erroneous interpretation ofits obligations, including the National Business 

Aviation Association's March 24, 2014letter to the City's Mayor and Council which warned 

that the restrictions then under consideration would violate the City's continuing Grant 

Assurance obligations. See Exhibit 14 to the Complaint. This letter was ignored at the time 

- and was ignored again by the Motion. 

Complainants' ensuing pre-complaint efforts with the City, see Exhibits 11, 12 and 

13 to the Complaint, commenced with an offer to discuss unconditionally a range of options 

for resolution: 

I want to afford the City the opportunity to discuss any possible resolution of 

the Grant Assurance duration issue. My clients and I are willing to meet with 

City representatives or to engage in any form of dialogue that might be 

usefuL If the City believes the involvement of a third party, such as a 

mediator or the FAA itself, would be helpful, I would certainly consider it. 

Exhibit 11, at 2. This was met with what can only be described as a non-response, see 

Exhibit 12, reciting the various measures then under evaluation by the City but evincing no 

serious willingness to address the specific issue on the table - the duration of Grant 

Assurances. 

9 
The City now complains that the final letter from Complainants' counsel was not in 

good faith because it urged the City to accept its Grant Assurance obligations, but this 

misses the point: Complainants did not and do not have the authority to alter the duration 

of those obligations, a power residing only with the FAA. Nor could Complainants make 

commitments binding the many other Airport tenants and users. Complainants' only 

options for resolution were to convince the City that it was wrong or to convince it to 

engage with the FAA, both of which proved unavailing. 

As noted in the Complaint, Part 16 Complainants are not required to engage in 

continued one-sided efforts to resolve a dispute with officials who have "for all practical 

purposes" made clear that they will not comply with the Grant Assurances. See Bombardier 

Aerospace Corp. and Dussault Falcon jet Corp. v. City of Santa Monica, California, docket no. 

16-03-11, Director's Determination, at 23 (January 3, 2004). 

The City has been intransigent on the subject of Grant Assurance duration since it 

first surfaced, and it is outlandish to argue that the Complainants did not show good faith in 

undertaking an additional effort, albeit futile from the inception, to at least have the subject 

discussed before the City's response made clear that it had no interest in doing so. 

A final point is worth noting here. In its discussion of "good faith," the City states: 

Even if the CITY were to [renounce the 2014 date] it would not allow 

Complainants "to understand and plan for the future", their alleged concern 

in their june 11, 2014 letter to the CITY ... given that such a renunciation 

would not guarantee that the Complainants would be offered tenancies at 

SMO until2023, or even beyond 2015. 

Motion, at 15. Whether willful or unknowing, this passage perfectly encapsulates what is 

defective with the City's entire Motion: it is based on the assumption that Complainants are 

pursuing an entirely different claim, and not one focused solely on the wrong the City has 

already perpetrated in rejecting its Grant Assurance obligations. The Complainants are 

indeed entitled to "understand and plan for the future" based on a 2023 expiration date for 

those Grant Assurances, and have initiated this proceeding to allow them to do that. 

CONCLUSION 

At page 15 of its Motion, the City again attempts to reframe this case by offering an 

inapt analogy involving a hypothetical arrest for possession of marijuana. In that vein, 

Complainants would suggest an alternative scenario a bit more on point: the City is in a 

bank brandishing a gun, and announcing that there is nothing that can stop it from holding 

up the place. It now argues that it cannot be arrested because it has not yet decided which 

teller it will assault and which banknotes it will take. That would not work as a matter of 

criminal law, and by analogy it does not work under Part 16. 

To summarize: 

10 
1. The City has unilaterally determined, and does not now deny, its position 

that it is no longer obligated by federal Grant Assurances. 

2. The FAA has the jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility under 14 C.F.R 

Part 16 to address a dispute as to when Grant Assurance obligations end. 

3. The FAA likewise has the jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility under 14 

C.F.R. Part 16 to find that the City's rejection of all Grant Assurances is itself a 

violation of those obligations and the grant agreements that it signed. 

4. The Complainants, as tenants and users of the Airport, have standing to seek 

redress in this proceeding. The City's rejection of all Grant Assurances 

already has had, and will continue to have, direct and substantial effects on 

them. 

These facts, and this Complaint, meet the requirements for Part 16 review and relief. The 

Respondent's Motion should be denied pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 16.26(c)(4). The FAA should 

require the Respondent to answer the Complaint and proceed to promptly consider and 

rule upon the substance of the complaint, given the import and urgency of the issue for the 

Complainants and the other tenants and users of the Airport. 

Richardl<:si111011:ES4> 

1700 Decker School Lane 

Malibu, CA 90265 

310-503-7286 

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Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that I have this day caused the foregoing answer to be served on the 

following persons by first-class mail with a courtesy copy by electronic mail: 

Rod Gould 

City Manager 

City of Santa Monica 

1685 Main Street, Room 209 

Santa Monica, CA 90401 

rod.gould@smgov.net 

Marsha Moutrie, City Attorney 

joseph Lawrence, Assistant City Attorney 

Lance Gams, Deputy City Attorney 

Ivan Campbell, Deputy City Attorney 

City of Santa Monica 

1685 Main Street, Room 310 

Santa Monica, CA 90401 

marsha.moutrie@smgov.net 

joseph.lawrence@smgov.net 

lance.gams@smgov.net 

ivan.campbell@smgov.net 

Stelios Makrides 

Airport Manager 

City of Santa Monica 

Airport Administration Building 

3223 Donald Douglas Loop South 

Santa Monica, CA 90405 

stelios.makrides@smgov.net 

Dated this 28th day of August, 2014. 

1700 Decker School Lane 

Malibu, CA 90265 

310-503-7286 

12