[Cite as Middleburg Hts. v. Elsing, 2016-Ohio-7051.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104116

CITY OF MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

LEEANNA K. ELSING

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

DISMISSED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Berea Municipal Court 

Case No. 15 TRC 02854 

BEFORE: Jones, A.J., Kilbane, J., and Stewart, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 29, 2016 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Patrick M. Farrell 

600 East Granger Road, 2nd Floor 

Brooklyn Heights, Ohio 44131 

John T. Forristal 

P.O. Box 16832 

Rocky River, Ohio 44116

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Peter H. Hull 

City Law Director 

City of Middleburg Heights Law Department 

Middleburg Heights City Hall 

15700 East Bagley Road 

Middleburg Heights, Ohio 44130 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., A.J.: 

{¶1} For the reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final, 

appealable order. 

{¶2} In January 2015, defendant-appellant Leeanna Elsing was charged with 

driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), blood alcohol content over .17 (“BAC”), 

and a continuous lane/weaving violation. Elsing filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and a motion to suppress evidence, and the trial court held a hearing on the 

motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied both motions. Elsing 

pleaded no contest to the DUI charge and the trial court found her guilty; the BAC and 

continuous lane/weaving charges were dismissed. A magistrate sentenced Elsing. She 

now appeals the denial of her motions to dismiss and suppress evidence. 

{¶3} This court ordered Elsing to show cause as to why this appeal should not be 

dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. Specifically, this court noted that, 

although a magistrate has the authority to recommend a sentence to a trial court, the trial 

court must impose the sentence. 

{¶4} Elsing filed a brief in response to this court’s order, in which she contended 

that the “Berea Municipal Court Presiding Judge did, in fact, approve and adapt [sic] the 

Magistrate’s sentence in the underlying case and issued a final appealable order.” In 

support of her contention, Elsing attached an order signed by the trial court judge and 

filed with the clerk of the municipal court prior to Elsing filing this appeal, which 

substantively reads in its entirety as follows: 
As to the cases below wherein action was taken by a Magistrate, as to each 

such case after review, the Court hereby confirms reference of the Case 

under authority of Criminal Rule 19 and Traffic Rule 14, and confirms that 

where required under said rules that the defendant has consented to the 

Magistrate’s presiding over the matter, and in each such case where the 

defendant did not object to the Magistrate’s decision, the Court hereby 

adopts such Magistrate[’]s action as the final and appealable determination 

of this Court in each specific case. 

{¶5} The order lists over 60 cases, one of which is this case. The order is not 

contained in the trial court file for Elsing’s case. 

{¶6} Crim.R. 19 governs the authority of magistrates in criminal cases and 

provides in part that magistrates presiding over misdemeanor cases are authorized to 

“determine guilt or innocence, receive statements in explanation and mitigation of 

sentence, and recommend a penalty to be imposed.” Crim.R. 19(C)(1)(c)(ii).1

 The rule 

further provides that if imprisonment is a possible penalty for the offense charged, the 

matter may be referred to a magistrate “only with the unanimous consent of the parties, in 

writing or on the record in open court.” Id.2 

{¶7} Crim.R. 19 further provides under subsection (D)(4)(a) that a “magistrate’s 

decision is not effective unless adopted by the court,” and under subsection (D)(4)(b) that 

“[n]o sentence recommended by a magistrate shall be enforced until the court has entered 

 1

See also Traf.R. 14, which governs the role of magistrates in traffic cases and provides for the 

appointment of magistrates “for the purpose of receiving pleas, determining guilt or innocence, 

receiving statements in explanation and in mitigation of sentence, and recommending penalty to be 

imposed.” 

2

Elsing was convicted of a first-degree misdemeanor, which was subject to 180 days of 

imprisonment. See R.C. 2929.24. There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that she 

consented to the referral of the case to a magistrate for sentencing. 
judgment.” And under Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(b)(i), a party may file written objections to a 

magistrate’s decision within 14 days of the filing of the magistrate’s decision. Thus, the 

“actual imposition of a recommended penalty is reserved to the court, as part of the 

judgment the court imposes pursuant to Crim.R. 19(D)(4), adopting, modifying, or 

rejecting the magistrate’s decision, after ruling on any objections filed by a party pursuant 

to Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(b).” State v. Gilreath, 174 Ohio App.3d 327, 2007-Ohio-6899, 882 

N.E.2d 22, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). 

{¶8} The Ohio Constitution limits an appellate court’s jurisdiction to the review of 

final judgments or orders of lower courts. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio 

Constitution. A final, appealable order in a criminal case normally consists of the 

verdict and a sentencing order. Youngstown v. Waselich, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 

MA 164, 2005-Ohio-6449, ¶ 5. Under Crim.R. 32(C), a “judgment of conviction shall 

set forth the fact of conviction and the sentence,” and a “judgment is effective only when 

entered on the journal by the clerk.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, to 

constitute a final judgment of conviction, the trial court’s judgment must contain the 

following: “(1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which 

the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on 

the journal by the clerk of court.” State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 

893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 18. 

{¶9} The Second Appellate District considered whether an order similar to the one 

issued by the trial court here constituted a final, appealable order, and held that it did not. 
State v. Pennington, 187 Ohio App.3d 526, 2010-Ohio-2139, 932 N.E.2d 941 (2d Dist.). 

 The Second District reasoned that “an administrative order is not the proper vehicle for 

entering a judgment of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 20. The court noted that although the trial 

court’s order was entered “‘in an effort to facilitate the expeditious disposition of cases,’ 

the order was not directed to the administration of the court but, rather, was intended to be 

a judgment entry on the merits of Pennington’s case and the cases of other similarly 

situated defendants * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting the trial court’s order. 

{¶10} The court further found that “[o]n its face, the administrative order also 

reflects that the administrative judge did not review, to any extent, the recommended 

sentences he was adopting.” Id. The court noted that although a trial judge is not 

required to conduct an independent review if no objections have been filed, nonetheless 

Crim.R. 19(D)(4)(c) requires the judge to review the magistrate’s decision for an “error of 

law or defect evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision.” Id., citing Crim.R. 

19(D)(4)(c). 

{¶11} Like the Second Appellate District, we do not find that the trial court’s mass 

order in this case created a final, appealable order. The order, which is not even part of 

the trial court record, did not advise Elsing (or any of the other parties) of her right to 

object to the magistrate’s decision, address any objections, or specify the sentence 

imposed in each individual case. 

{¶12} As the Second District stated, “[n]one of this decision should ‘diminish the 

standing of magistrates.’” Pennington at ¶ 38, quoting Quick v. Kwiatkowski, 2d Dist. 
Montgomery No. 18620, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3437 (Aug. 3, 2001). “‘Magistrate’s 

truly do the heavy lifting on which we all depend.’ Nonetheless, ‘[m]agistrates are 

neither constitutional nor statutory courts * * * and their powers are wholly creatures of 

rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court.’” Id., quoting 

Quick. “‘[T]hey are adjuncts of their appointing courts, which remain responsible to 

critically review and verify the work of the magistrates they appoint.’” Id., quoting Quick, 

citing Normandy Place Assoc. v. Beyer, 2 Ohio St.3d 102, 443 N.E.2d 161 (1982). 

{¶13} Because no sentence was adopted and reduced to judgment with the trial 

judge’s signature, there was no final order of conviction. See Berea v. Collins, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99406, 2013-Ohio-4191, ¶ 5; Parma v. Blatnica, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

84661, 2005-Ohio-194, ¶ 9. We are therefore unable to reach the merits of this appeal. 

{¶14} Appeal dismissed. 

 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Berea 

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR