This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

17115 

Vol. 74, No. 70 

Tuesday, April 14, 2009 

1To view the proposed rule and environmental 

assessment, go to http://www.regulations.gov/ 

fdmspublic/component/ 

main?main=DocketDetail&d=APHIS-2008-0147. 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service 

9 CFR Part 94 

[Docket No. APHIS–2008–0147] 

Change in Disease Status of the 

Republic of Korea With Regard to 

Foot-and-Mouth Disease and 

Rinderpest; Availability of an 

Environmental Assessment 

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, USDA. 

ACTION: Notice of availability of an 

environmental assessment. 

SUMMARY: We are advising the public 

that an environmental assessment has 

been prepared by the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service relative to a 

proposed rule that would add the 

Republic of Korea to the list of regions 

considered free of rinderpest and footand-mouth disease. The environmental 

assessment documents our review and 

analysis of environmental impacts 

associated with adding the Republic of 

Korea to the list of regions considered 

free of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth 

disease. We are making this 

environmental assessment available to 

the public for review and comment. 

DATES: We will consider all comments 

that we receive on or before May 29, 

2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by either of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ 

component/ 

main?main=DocketDetail&d=APHIS2008-0147 to submit or view comments 

and to view supporting and related 

materials available electronically. 

• Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: 

Please send two copies of your comment 

to Docket No. APHIS–2008–0147, 

Regulatory Analysis and Development, 

PPD, APHIS, Station 3A–03.8, 4700 

River Road, Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 

20737–1238. Please state that your 

comment refers to Docket No. APHIS– 

2008–0147. 

Reading Room: You may read any 

comments that we receive on the 

environmental assessment in our 

reading room. The reading room is 

located in room 1141 of the USDA 

South Building, 14th Street and 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC. Normal reading room 

hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except holidays. To be 

sure someone is there to help you, 

please call (202) 690–2817 before 

coming. 

Other Information: Additional 

information about APHIS and its 

programs is available on the Internet at 

http://www.aphis.usda.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. 

Julia Punderson, Senior Staff 

Veterinarian, Regionalization Evaluation 

Services, National Center for Import and 

Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road, 

Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737–1231; 

(301) 734–4356. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

In a proposed rule 1 titled ‘‘Change in 

Disease Status of the Republic of Korea 

With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

and Rinderpest’’ and published in the 

Federal Register on March 30, 2009 (74 

FR 14093–14097, Docket No. APHIS– 

2008–0147), we proposed to amend the 

regulations in 9 CFR part 94 by adding 

the Republic of Korea to the list of 

regions that are considered free of 

rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease. 

APHIS’ review and analysis of the 

potential environmental impacts 

associated with adding the Republic of 

Korea to the list of regions considered 

free of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth 

disease are documented in detail in an 

environmental assessment entitled 

‘‘Proposed Rule for the Status of the 

Republic of Korea Regarding Foot-andMouth Disease and Rinderpest: 

Environmental Assessment’’ (February 

2009). We are making this 

environmental assessment available to 

the public for review and comment. We 

will consider all comments that we 

receive on or before the date listed 

under the heading DATES at the 

beginning of this notice. 

The environmental assessment may 

be viewed on the Regulations.gov Web 

site or in our reading room (see 

ADDRESSES above for a link to 

Regulations.gov and information on the 

location and hours of the reading room). 

You may request paper copies of the 

environmental assessment by calling or 

writing to the person listed under FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Please 

refer to the title of the environmental 

assessment when requesting copies. 

The environmental assessment was 

prepared in accordance with: (1) The 

National Environmental Policy Act of 

1969 (NEPA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 

4321 et seq.), (2) regulations of the 

Council on Environmental Quality for 

implementing the procedural provisions 

of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500–1508), (3) 

USDA regulations implementing NEPA 

(7 CFR part 1b), and (4) APHIS’ NEPA 

Implementing Procedures (7 CFR part 

372). 

Done in Washington, DC, this 8th day of 

April 2009. 

Kevin Shea, 

Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–8494 Filed 4–13–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73 

RIN 3150 AI25 

[NRC–2008–0619] 

Requirements for Fingerprinting for 

Criminal History Record Checks of 

Individuals Granted Unescorted 

Access to Research and Test Reactors 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing this 

Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin the process 

of establishing generic requirements for 

NRC research and test reactor (RTR) 

licensees to obtain fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks on 

individuals having unescorted access to 

their facilities. This action is taken to 

inform all interested parties of the 

17116 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 14, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

options that the NRC is considering for 

implementing the requirements of the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) as 

they pertain to RTRs. 

DATES: Submit comments by June 15, 

2009. Comments received after this date 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the Commission is able to ensure 

consideration only of comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Comments submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be made available 

for public inspection. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. All commenters should 

ensure that sensitive or Safeguards 

Information is not contained in their 

responses or comments to this ANPR. 

Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2008–0619. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 

301–492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

E-mail Comments To: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive a reply e-mail confirming 

that we have received your comments, 

contact us directly at (301) 415–1677. 

Mail Comments To: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

Hand Deliver Comments To: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

during Federal workdays. (Telephone 

(301) 415–1677). 

Fax Comments To: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 

415–1101. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this document 

using the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and have 

copied for a fee publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Public 

File Area, Room O–1F21, One White 

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, Maryland. The PDR 

reproduction contractor will copy 

documents for a fee. 

NRC’s Agencywide Document Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1 800–397–4209, 

or (301) 415–4737, or by e-mail to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Harry Tovmassian, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415– 

3092, e-mail harry.tovmassian@nrc.gov; 

or Linh Tran, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, telephone (301) 415–4103, e-mail 

linh.tran@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background 

Before the terrorist actions of 

September 11, 2001, NRC regulations in 

10 CFR 73.60 and 10 CFR 73.67 

imposed physical protection 

requirements on RTRs that included 

measures for storing and using special 

nuclear material in controlled access 

areas, monitoring the controlled access 

areas for unauthorized activities, and 

ensuring a response to all unauthorized 

activities to protect special nuclear 

material from theft or diversion. 

Additionally, 10 CFR 73.60(f) 

implemented the Commission’s 

authority to impose alternative or 

additional security measures for the 

protection against radiological sabotage 

for RTRs licensed to operate at power 

levels at or above two megawatts 

thermal (MWt). Under this provision, 

several RTRs have implemented such 

additional measures. Subsequent to 

September 11, 2001, the NRC evaluated 

the adequacy of security at RTRs and 

considered whether additional actions 

should be taken to help ensure the 

trustworthiness and reliability of 

individuals with unescorted access to 

RTRs. RTRs were advised to consider 

taking immediate additional 

precautions, including observation of 

activities within their facility. The NRC 

evaluated these additional measures at 

each facility during the remainder of 

2001. 

From 2002 through 2004, RTRs 

voluntarily implemented compensatory 

measures (CM) that included sitespecific background investigations for 

individuals granted unescorted access. 

Depending on local restrictions, such as 

university rules, some of these 

background investigations included 

provisions for Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks, while 

checks at other RTRs included 

provisions for local or State law 

enforcement fingerprint-based criminal 

history record checks. Investigations at 

some RTRs did not include any 

fingerprinting. The NRC has also 

conducted security assessments at 

certain RTRs which helped to identify 

risk-significant areas and materials. 

On August 8, 2005, the President 

signed the EPAct into law. Among other 

features, Section 652 of the EPAct 

amended Section 149 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) and provided 

the NRC with additional authority to 

require fingerprint-based criminal 

history record checks for unescorted 

access to a broader class of its licensees, 

including RTRs. Before the passage of 

the EPAct, Section 149 limited the 

NRC’s authority to require 

fingerprinting of individuals being 

considered for unescorted access to 

nuclear power plants. 

In October 2005, the NRC staff 

informed the Commission of the staff’s 

plan for implementing the NRC’s 

responsibilities under the EPAct and 

requested Commission approval of the 

staff’s funding recommendation for 

fiscal year 2006. The Commission 

approved the staff’s recommendations 

and directed the staff to recommend 

appropriate interim regulatory actions 

that the NRC should implement while it 

developed the generic requirements for 

granting unescorted access, including 

the provisions in Section 652 of the 

EPAct pertaining to fingerprinting. 

In January 2007, the NRC staff 

provided information and 

recommendations to the Commission on 

its EPAct interim implementation plan. 

In March 2007, the Commission 

directed the NRC staff to issue orders to 

RTRs to require fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks for 

individuals with unescorted access to 

these facilities. The orders were to 

require fingerprinting only for 

individuals with unescorted access to 

risk-significant areas or materials within 

the facilities. The Commission also 

directed the NRC staff to proceed with 

a rulemaking to determine if fingerprintbased criminal history record checks 

should be required for additional RTR 

personnel. 

On April 30, 2007, the NRC issued 

NRC Order EA–07–074, ‘‘Order 

Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal 

History Records Check Requirements for 

Unescorted Access to Research and Test 

Reactors,’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML070750140) (72 FR 25337; May 4, 

2007). On August 1, 2007, the NRC 

issued Order EA–07–098, ‘‘Order 

Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal 

History Records Check Requirements for 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 14, 2009 / Proposed Rules 17117 

Unescorted Access to the General 

Atomics’ Research and Test Reactor,’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML072050494) 

(72 FR 44590; August 8, 2007). These 

orders required RTR licensees to 

conduct FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

history record checks for individuals 

granted unescorted access to special 

nuclear materials at their facilities. 

The Commission directed the NRC 

staff to implement the EPAct on an 

interim basis through orders while 

developing a rule because it was 

necessary to implement the 

requirements immediately for common 

defense and security. Unlike the 

requirements of a rule, the orders apply 

only to the licensees named in the 

orders and would not apply 

prospectively to applicants for new 

licenses. Therefore, the NRC would 

have to periodically issue orders as 

needed to cover new and amended 

licenses, and perhaps reissue them 

periodically to existing licensees if 

requirements or administrative practices 

change. Finally, to improve regulatory 

efficiency and stability, it is appropriate 

to place generally applicable 

requirements in the regulations, rather 

than to rely on orders indefinitely to 

impose these requirements. 

This ANPR is being published to 

obtain stakeholder views on the issues 

associated with the proposal to require 

fingerprint-based criminal record checks 

for individuals granted unescorted 

access to RTRs. The rulemaking would 

generically require RTR licensees to 

ensure that individuals granted 

unescorted access to risk-significant 

areas and risk-significant materials at 

RTRs are subject to an FBI fingerprintbased criminal history record check or 

an acceptable alternative. The 

rulemaking process, which will include 

a proposed and final rule as well as this 

ANPR, will provide RTR licensees and 

other interested stakeholders several 

opportunities to comment on the 

proposed requirements to ensure 

transparency in the development of 

requirements designed to provide 

adequate protection of the public health 

and safety and the common defense and 

security. 

Existing Requirements Pertaining to 

Research and Test Reactors 

The security of RTRs is regulated 

through requirements located in part 73 

of the Commission’s regulations. The 

specific security measures that are 

required vary depending on several 

factors, which include the quantity and 

type of special nuclear material 

possessed by the licensee, as well as the 

power level at which the licensee is 

authorized to operate. For RTRs that 

possess special nuclear material of 

moderate or low strategic significance 

(defined by 10 CFR 73.2), 10 CFR 

73.67(b)(c)(d) and 73.67(f), as 

applicable, specify the basic fixed site 

physical security requirements (e.g., 

storage and access controls). Sections 

73.60(a) through (e) specify additional 

requirements for physical protection at 

RTRs with a formula quantity of 

strategic special nuclear material that is 

not readily separable from other 

radioactive material and that has a total 

dose rate of less than 100 rem per hour 

at 3 feet without shielding. For licensees 

subject to these requirements, the 

provisions of 10 CFR 73.60 are intended 

to be implemented in addition to the 

applicable requirements of 10 CFR 

73.67. 

In addition, 10 CFR 73.60(f) specifies 

that ‘‘* * * the Commission may 

require, depending on the individual 

facility and site conditions, any 

alternate or additional measures deemed 

necessary to protect against radiological 

sabotage at non-power reactors licensed 

to operate at or above a power level of 

2 megawatts thermal.’’ As noted 

previously, these additional measures 

have been imposed on several NRC 

licensees who are licensed to operate at 

these levels. 

Sections 73.60 and 73.67 require 

RTRs, at a minimum, to store and to use 

special nuclear material in controlled 

access areas, monitor the controlled 

access areas for unauthorized activities, 

and ensure a response to all 

unauthorized activities. These 

regulations also require that unescorted 

access to the controlled access areas be 

limited to authorized individuals. The 

RTRs implement these requirements on 

a site-specific basis through their 

security plans and procedures. As 

previously mentioned, RTRs also 

implemented site-specific background 

investigations or checks in their 

voluntarily adopted CMs, and obtained 

an FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

history record check for individuals 

granted unescorted access to special 

nuclear material under NRC orders. 

Rulemaking Considerations 

As a result of the EPAct, the NRC is 

directed by Section 149 of the AEA to 

require the licensee to obtain a 

fingerprint-based criminal history 

record check for any individual who is 

permitted unescorted access to (i) a 

utilization facility; or (ii) radioactive 

material or other property subject to 

regulation by the Commission that the 

Commission determines to be of such 

significance to the public health and 

safety or the common defense and 

security as to warrant fingerprinting and 

background checks. Section 149 

requires that the fingerprints that are 

collected by licensees be submitted to 

the FBI through the NRC. The statute is 

clear that all persons who are granted 

unescorted access to these facilities, 

areas, or materials as designated by the 

NRC must be fingerprinted, unless 

relieved by rule. Section 149 permits the 

NRC to relieve certain individuals by 

rule from the fingerprinting 

requirement. Currently, the NRC has not 

issued a regulation that would relieve 

any person granted unescorted access to 

an RTR from the fingerprinting 

requirement. 

As noted previously, the NRC issued 

site-specific orders to satisfy the 

mandate of the EPAct. Each RTR 

licensee was required by those orders to 

obtain an FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

history record check for individuals 

before granting unescorted access to 

special nuclear materials. Those orders 

remain in effect. The orders require each 

licensee to obtain the fingerprints of 

each individual who is seeking or 

permitted unescorted access. 

Specifically, the orders state that, ‘‘an 

individual who is granted ‘unescorted 

access’ could exercise physical control 

over the special nuclear material 

possessed by the licensee, which would 

be of significance to the common 

defense and security or would adversely 

affect the health and safety of the 

public, such that the special nuclear 

material could be used or removed in an 

unauthorized manner without detection, 

assessment, or response by systems or 

persons designated to detect, assess or 

respond to such unauthorized use or 

removal.’’ In implementing the 

requirement of the EPAct on an interim 

basis, the orders were issued requiring 

fingerprinting only for individuals with 

unescorted access to risk-significant 

materials (i.e., fuel), within the research 

and test reactor facilities. 

Although the interim order 

requirements were limited to risksignificant materials of the licensee’s 

facility, the Commission solicits 

comment on whether the scope of the 

unescorted access fingerprinting 

requirement in the order should be 

broadened in the proposed rule to 

include unescorted access to 

appropriate areas of the facility. This 

would ensure that all of the risksignificant materials and equipment in 

the facility are protected, rather than 

just the special nuclear material. Under 

the existing requirements, licensees 

must conduct the FBI fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks for 

individuals who could exercise physical 

control over the special nuclear 

material; existing requirements do not, 

17118 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 14, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

however, specifically address 

unescorted access to the physical areas 

surrounding the special nuclear material 

or the reactor itself. 

All RTRs are licensed as utilization 

facilities as that term is defined by 

Section 11 of the AEA and 10 CFR 50.2. 

However, because RTRs are all uniquely 

configured and not susceptible to a 

generic classification of what portion or 

portions of a larger facility constitute 

the part of the ‘‘utilization facility’’ for 

which unescorted access is an issue, the 

NRC is seeking comment on whether 

defining this term too broadly might 

frustrate the agency’s regulatory 

objectives, interfere with other statutory 

mandates of the AEA, or inefficiently 

implement the intent of the EPAct. For 

example, imposing an FBI fingerprintbased criminal history record check for 

all individuals with unescorted access 

to all areas of a generically-defined 

utilization facility could potentially 

hinder research and education 

activities, create undue administrative 

burdens, and be a costly, but 

unnecessary requirement for licensees. 

It may be better to design the 

requirement in such a way that FBI 

fingerprint-based criminal history 

record checks at an RTR facility are 

limited to individuals with unescorted 

access to the ‘‘areas of significance’’ 

within the facility. The ‘‘areas of 

significance’’ would likely encompass 

the nuclear reactor as well as fuel 

storage areas and the components 

designed specifically for reactor safety 

and protection of the public health and 

safety. To ensure consistency among the 

RTRs in implementing the EPAct, the 

NRC is considering defining ‘‘areas of 

significance’’ as the protective boundary 

requiring FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

record checks for granting of unescorted 

access. Individuals who have 

unescorted access to the ‘‘areas of 

significance,’’ without verification of 

trustworthiness and reliability, could 

directly perform malevolent acts or may 

facilitate others in commission of these 

acts, involving special nuclear material 

or equipment that would directly or 

indirectly endanger the public health 

and safety by exposure to radiation. 

Specific Considerations 

The NRC proposes to specify the 

requirement to have a fingerprint-based 

criminal history record check for 

individuals with unescorted access to 

RTRs through a revision of 10 CFR 

73.60. The NRC proposes to add a new 

paragraph (g) ‘‘Requirements for 

criminal history record checks of 

individuals granted unescorted access,’’ 

to the existing regulation at 10 CFR 

73.60. The NRC is proposing to require 

that each RTR licensee have: (1) A 

program for obtaining fingerprint-based 

criminal record checks for individuals 

granted unescorted access to ‘‘areas of 

significance;’’ (2) a procedure to assure 

that certain prohibited information is 

not used as the basis for the denial of 

unescorted access; (3) specific 

procedures for the conduct of 

fingerprinting; (4) a procedure for 

correction or completion of criminal 

record information; (5) a procedure for 

protection of information; and (6) a 

procedure for official review. 

Before determining the exact nature of 

a proposed rule implementing the 

requirements of the EPAct, the NRC is 

seeking comments on this matter from 

stakeholders. Specific areas on which 

the Commission is requesting comments 

are discussed in the following sections. 

Comments accompanied by supporting 

rationale are particularly requested on 

the following questions or subjects. 

Areas of Significance 

Under the EPAct’s mandate to require 

fingerprinting for unescorted access to 

utilization facilities, the NRC is 

proposing to require fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks only for 

individuals granted unescorted access to 

the ‘‘areas of significance’’ within the 

RTR facility. As noted earlier, the 

unique nature of each RTR makes it 

difficult to develop a genericallyapplicable definition of ‘‘utilization 

facility’’ that would result in an 

effective and implementable regulation. 

This objective would be better achieved 

by limiting this requirement to an area 

within the RTRs identified as the ‘‘area 

of significance.’’ Generally speaking, the 

NRC considers ‘‘areas of significance’’ of 

a particular RTR as physically bounded 

location(s) within the facility where 

special nuclear material and/or 

equipment are contained, such that 

access to, or disruption within the area 

could cause an event endangering the 

general public heath and safety by 

exposure to radiation. In attempting to 

determine what specific areas of an RTR 

might generically constitute ‘‘areas of 

significance,’’ the NRC identified three 

potential options: (1) Controlled access 

areas (CAAs) as defined in 10 CFR 73.2; 

(2) areas of the facility as determined in 

each licensee’s security assessment; or 

(3) prescriptive locations, such as the 

reactor (regardless of type), spent fuel 

storage areas, fresh fuel storage areas, 

fresh fuel processing areas, control 

room, areas containing engineered 

safety feature equipment, if applicable, 

areas of containment/confinement, if 

applicable, and areas containing coolant 

piping, if applicable. 

Regarding option 1, the NRC believes 

that areas at the facility that are 

designated as CAAs are already defined 

in each licensee’s security plans or 

security procedures and access to these 

CAAs is already being controlled. 

Regarding Option 2, licensee’s security 

assessments could be used to identify 

‘‘areas of significance’’ as areas 

designated to be protected against 

malevolent activities such as theft or 

sabotage. 

Areas of Significance Issues 

Keeping these options in mind, the 

NRC is seeking specific comment on the 

following questions and issues: 

1. Which of these definitions of ‘‘areas 

of significance’’ should be adopted by 

the NRC? Are there other preferable 

ways to define ‘‘areas of significance’’? 

If so, what should they be and what are 

their advantages and disadvantages? 

2. What would be the approximate 

number of additional personnel that 

must be fingerprinted for unescorted 

access based on the ‘‘areas of 

significance’’ as described in Question 

1? Are there any specific categories of 

persons whom the NRC should consider 

exempting from fingerprinting? 

3. What is the estimated cost or 

impact of performing security plan or 

procedure revisions, and of providing 

the necessary administrative controls 

and training to implement fingerprint 

requirements for individuals permitted 

unescorted access to ‘‘areas of 

significance’’ such as those described in 

Question 1? 

Unescorted Access 

The NRC is also considering a 

definition of unescorted access that 

would be specific to the RTR facilities. 

The current concept of ‘‘unescorted 

access’’ for power reactors is not readily 

applicable to RTRs because of an RTR’s 

site-specific configuration. For the 

purpose of the orders, an individual 

who is required to be authorized by the 

licensee for ‘‘unescorted access’’ is 

someone who could exercise physical 

control over the special nuclear material 

possessed by the licensee. These 

individuals include those with the 

capability and knowledge to use the 

special nuclear material in the 

utilization facility or to remove the 

special nuclear material from the 

utilization facility without detection, 

assessment, or response by the physical 

protection system. Because the focus of 

this rulemaking effort is related to the 

trustworthiness and reliability of 

individuals being granted unescorted 

access to the facility, and not just access 

to the special nuclear material, the NRC 

plans to define an individual with 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 14, 2009 / Proposed Rules 17119 

unescorted access to the utilization 

facility as any individual who has the 

ability to access licensee-designated 

‘‘areas of significance’’ without 

continuous direct supervision or 

monitoring by an authorized individual. 

The NRC Seeks Stakeholders’ Views on 

the Following Questions 

4. Is the proposed definition of 

individuals with unescorted access 

reasonable and sufficient? If not, why? 

For example, should persons granted 

unescorted access to ‘‘areas of 

significance’’ be permitted access to the 

facility at times when no supervision or 

oversight is present (e.g., evenings or 

weekends)? Should the NRC require 

access controls such as maintaining 

records of the time and duration of 

persons accessing an ‘‘area of 

significance’’ without escorts? 

Implementation of the Orders 

To develop the proposed 

requirements for fingerprint-based 

criminal history record checks, the NRC 

would like feedback from stakeholders 

on their experiences in implementing 

the orders that were issued in April 

2007, such as: 

5. What has worked well, what has 

not, and why? 

6. What requirements were found to 

be the most burdensome? Are there less 

burdensome alternatives that would 

accomplish the same level of 

protection? 

7. Are there requirements in the 

orders that appear to contribute little to 

the security of the facility? Could the 

same resources be used more effectively 

in other ways? 

8. Are there other enhancements that 

could be made? 

9. Has the implementation of the 

orders identified any new issues that 

should be addressed through 

rulemaking? 

Others Items of Interest to the NRC 

Because RTRs all have unique sitespecific configurations, the NRC is 

seeking stakeholders’ views on the most 

effective way to formulate regulations 

that continue to provide adequate safety 

to the public without imposing an 

unnecessary burden on any individual 

licensee. During the development and 

implementation of the orders, the NRC 

identified several issues for which it 

planned to provide clarification in the 

rulemaking process. One issue was 

obtaining the fingerprints of a person for 

whom an FBI fingerprint-based criminal 

history record check is unlikely to yield 

reliable results. The FBI criminal history 

record check does not provide 

information on individuals who are 

under eighteen years of age, and will 

only obtain information on an 

individual’s criminal history record 

within the United States. Thus, for 

foreign nationals who have never lived 

in the United States, students who are 

18 years old or younger, or even U.S. 

citizens who have lived abroad for 

much or all of their adult lives, the 

criminal history record check is 

unlikely to provide any useful 

information regarding a person’s 

trustworthiness and reliability. 

However, as noted earlier, Section 149 

of the AEA requires the obtaining of 

fingerprints for all persons granted 

unescorted access, except if these 

persons are relieved by rule. 

In Light of This, the NRC Seeks 

Stakeholders’ Views on the Following 

Questions 

10. Regarding alternatives to 

fingerprinting foreign nationals and/or 

minors regarding a trustworthiness and 

reliability determination: (a) Do foreign 

nationals and/or minors require 

unescorted access to ‘‘areas of 

significance’’? (b) are there alternative 

methods to obtain information upon 

which a licensee could base a 

trustworthiness and reliability 

determination for these individuals? 

11. Is there any additional 

information that the NRC should 

consider in preparing the proposed 

rule? 

Proposed rule language was not 

included in this ANPR. During the 

public comment period for this ANPR, 

the NRC plans to conduct a public 

workshop to discuss this rulemaking 

with stakeholders. Thus, RTR licensees 

and other interested stakeholders will 

have several opportunities to provide 

their comments for the NRC’s 

consideration. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day 

of April 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

J. Samuel Walker, 

Acting Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E9–8461 Filed 4–13–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Internal Revenue Service 

26 CFR Part 1 

[REG–144689–04] 

RIN 1545–BD71 

Determination of Distributive Share 

When a Partner’s Interest Changes 

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

Treasury. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: This document contains 

proposed regulations regarding the 

determination of partners’ distributive 

shares of partnership items of income, 

gain, loss, deduction and credit when a 

partner’s interests varies during a 

partnership taxable year. Also, the 

proposed regulations modify the 

existing regulations regarding the 

required taxable year of a partnership. 

These proposed regulations affect 

partnerships and their partners. 

DATES: Written or electronic comments 

and requests for a public hearing must 

be received by July 13, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: 

CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–144689–04), Room 

5203, Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 

7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington 

DC 20044. Submissions may be handdelivered Monday through Friday 

between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. 

to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG–144689–04), 

Courier’s Desk, Internal Revenue 

Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, 

NW., Washington, DC; or sent 

electronically via the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal at 

www.regulations.gov (IRS REG–144689– 

04). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Concerning the proposed regulations, 

Laura Fields or Jonathan Cornwell at 

(202) 622–3050, concerning submissions 

of comments and the hearing, Richard 

Hurst at (202) 622–7180 (not toll-free 

numbers) or 

Richard.A.Hurst@irscounsel.treas.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

These proposed regulations contain 

amendments to the Income Tax 

Regulations (26 CFR part 1) under 

section 706 of the Internal Revenue 

Code (Code). These amendments are 

proposed to conform the Income Tax 

Regulations for certain of the provisions 

of section 1246 of the Taxpayer Relief 

Act of 1997, Public Law 105–34 (111 

Stat. 788 (1997)) (the 1997 Act) and 

section 72 of the Deficit Reduction Act