COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Frank and Petty 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANGELINA LYNN HEIDERSCHEIDT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1298-08-4 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY 

 JUNE 9, 2009 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge Designate 

 Kevin J. Gerrity, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General; William C. Mims, Attorney 

General, on briefs), for appellee. 

 On appeal, Angelina Lynn Heiderscheidt argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

determine that she had violated the conditions of her probation because the period of her probation 

had expired at the time the violations occurred. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the 

conviction. 

I. 

On June 22, 1995, the Circuit Court of Fauquier County entered a standing order providing 

that “all persons granted and placed on probation” in Fauquier County from that time forward 

would be “probationed . . . under the terms and conditions ordered by the Court set out as conditions 

eleven (11) through sixteen (16) below, which shall automatically become a part of every probation 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
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order[.]”1 The order was recorded in the court’s Miscellaneous Order Book 5, page 1769. 

Paragraph fourteen of the order requires that all persons on probation: 

Shall pay the fine, if any, and costs of this prosecution together 

with interest to the Clerk of this Court within six (6) months. (If 

said fine and costs are not paid prior to the termination of 

probation, probation shall automatically be extended until a 

hearing shall be conducted.) 

 Five years later, in June 2000, Heiderscheidt pleaded guilty to one count of prescription 

fraud in violation of Code § 18.2-258.1. The trial court sentenced Heiderscheidt to serve three 

years’ incarceration to run consecutive to any other sentence she had to serve, and assessed costs in 

the total amount of $666 against Heiderscheidt. The trial court then suspended all but twelve 

months of the sentence and placed Heiderscheidt on probation for a period of three years to 

commence upon her release from custody. Heiderscheidt was to “comply with all of the terms and 

conditions of probation as set forth in the order of this Court entered on June 22, 1995 in 

Miscellaneous Order Book 5, page 1769.” 

 Heiderscheidt began her term of probation upon her release from incarceration on 

November 3, 2003.2

 At the time of her release, Heiderscheidt’s probation officer reviewed the 

terms and conditions of her probation with her and advised her that “her minimum date of release 

from supervision was November of 2006, but she would remain under supervision until she 

received a final release.” 

 On May 8, 2007—six months after her specific three-year term of probation expired on 

November 4, 2006—Heiderscheidt’s probation officer sent a letter to the trial court requesting 

that Heiderscheidt’s probation be extended two more years because Heiderscheidt never had paid 

1

 Paragraphs one through ten of the 1995 order enumerated “the terms and conditions 

prescribed by the Virginia Department of Corrections . . . .” 

2

 Heiderscheidt’s active sentence on the charge that underlies this appeal was served 

consecutive to sentences on other, unrelated charges. 
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her court costs. On May 18, 2007, the trial court entered an order that extended her supervised 

probation for an additional two years, until November 4, 2008. Although Heiderscheidt 

endorsed the order, the record does not reflect whether there was a hearing prior to the extension 

of Heiderscheidt’s probation. 

On January 16, 2008, Heiderscheidt’s probation officer sent a letter to the trial court, 

alleging that Heiderscheidt had violated her supervised probation. The probation officer reported 

that Heiderscheidt (1) failed to abide by all federal, state, and local laws as demonstrated by a 

September 13, 2007 misdemeanor conviction of driving on a suspended driver’s license as well 

as a misdemeanor embezzlement conviction in another jurisdiction on January 1, 2008; 

(2) changed her residence several times since 2007 without notifying her probation officer; and 

(3) failed to pay her court costs in full. 

 In response, the trial court issued a capias for Heiderscheidt to show cause why her 

probation should not be revoked. Heiderscheidt filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Heiderscheidt argued that the 

behavior alleged in the probation violation letter all took place after her original term of 

probation ended on November 4, 2006. She also argued that the May 18, 2007 order that 

purported to extend the period of her supervised probation until November 4, 2008 was not 

legitimate under Code § 19.2-304 because she was denied her right to a hearing before her 

probation was extended. 

 Following the hearing, the trial court denied Heiderscheidt’s motion to dismiss, 

explaining that she had adequate notice of the conditions of her probation and that the probation 

was for a set duration: 

It wasn’t indefinite probation. There was a term of probation. But 

that term was predicated on her fulfilling certain conditions. One 

is paying fines and costs. She didn’t do that. 
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* * * * * * * 

I don’t think there’s any question that she was on probation. So 

the motion to dismiss is going to be denied at this time and we’ll 

proceed on the revocation. 

The trial court then took evidence regarding the probation violations and revoked one 

year of Heiderscheidt’s previously suspended sentence. This appeal followed. 

II. 

 On appeal, Heiderscheidt asks this Court to determine whether the trial court erred “in 

denying appellant’s motion to dismiss, finding it still maintained jurisdiction over the appellant, 

and that her term of supervised probation had been validly extended beyond its original 

expiration date.” Because the trial court’s refusal to grant the motion to dismiss involves a 

purely legal determination, we review it de novo on appeal. See Young v. Commonwealth, 273 

Va. 528, 533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007). 

 According to Code § 19.2-303, “[a]fter conviction, whether with or without jury, the 

court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part and in 

addition may place the defendant on probation under such conditions as the court shall determine 

. . . .” This “statute places wide discretion in the trial court to determine what conditions are to 

be imposed in each particular case.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 418, 423, 512 

S.E.2d 838, 841 (1999). A trial court may modify both the conditions of probation and the 

period of probation “but only upon a hearing after reasonable notice to both the defendant and 

the attorney for the Commonwealth.” Code § 19.2-304. Our Supreme Court has “noted the 

wide latitude the legislature has afforded trial courts in fashioning rehabilitative programs for 

defendants.” Nuckoles v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1083, 1085, 407 S.E.2d 355, 356 (1991) 

(citing Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 685, 292 S.E.2d 348, 351 (1982)). Accordingly, 

the “probation statutes . . . should be liberally construed to provide trial courts a valuable tool for 
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rehabilitation of criminals.” Grant, 223 Va. at 685, 292 S.E.2d at 350 (citing Dyke v. 

Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478, 484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952)). 

Heiderscheidt reasons that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke her probation 

in January 2008 because the three-year term of probation set forth in her original sentencing 

order expired in November of 2006. Thus, she argues, the May 2007 order extending her 

probation was invalid and she was no longer subject to the terms of her probation when her 

probation was revoked in January 2008. At the same time, though, Heiderscheidt does not 

dispute that she failed to pay her court costs during the original term of probation, nor does she 

dispute that the 1995 standing order was incorporated into her sentencing order and constituted 

the terms and conditions of her probation.3 

We do not agree with Heiderscheidt’s premise. While Heiderscheidt’s sentencing order 

set a three-year probation period, the 1995 order further provided that—in the event court costs 

were not paid during the probation period—probation would be extended until the court held a 

hearing. Thus, by operation of the 1995 order, Heiderscheidt remained under the trial court’s 

jurisdiction after the specific three-year term expired and she was still under the trial court’s 

jurisdiction when it entered the May 2007 order extending her probation another two years for 

failure to pay her court costs.4

 Because of that extension, Heiderscheidt was still bound by the 

 3

 We note that the trial court entered another standing order in 2002 that modified the 

terms of the 1995 order and applied “henceforth [to] all persons granted and placed on probation 

. . . .” However, the record does not indicate whether this modification complied with the notice 

and hearing provisions of Code § 19.2-304, which states in pertinent part that a trial court “may 

subsequently . . . modify any condition of probation, but only upon a hearing after reasonable 

notice to both the defendant and the attorney for the Commonwealth.” Accordingly, we do not 

consider the terms of the 2002 order. 

4

 Because the end of the period of probation in this case was predicated on the occurrence 

of two definite events—the expiration of three years and, if not already paid during that three 

years, the payment of court costs—we note that this case does not involve an indefinite term of 

probation. Cf. Hartless v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 172, 510 S.E.2d 738 (1999). 
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terms and conditions of her probation that she was found to have violated at the time of the 

revocation hearing below. 

 Heiderscheidt, however, claims that the May 2007 order was void because she was not 

afforded a hearing as required by Code § 19.2-304. We disagree. Even assuming arguendo that 

the May 2007 order was entered without a hearing, the order would merely be voidable.5

 

If the [trial] court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 

controversy, and the parties are before it, . . . a mistaken exercise 

of that jurisdiction does not render its judgment void. The court 

has jurisdiction to err, as well as to correctly adjudicate the 

questions before it for decision, and the remedy to correct the 

errors of the court is solely by appeal. 

Erickson-Dickson v. Erickson-Dickson, 12 Va. App. 381, 388-89, 404 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1991) 

(citations omitted). Therefore, the May 2007 order was binding because it was neither vacated 

by the court that issued it within the twenty-one-day time period of Rule 1:1, nor overturned by 

an appellate court. Wright v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 690, 704, 667 S.E.2d 787, 794 

(2008) (citations omitted). 

III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the trial did not err when it denied Heiderscheidt’s motion to 

dismiss. At the time of the revocation hearing at issue in this case, the trial court had jurisdiction 

over Heiderscheidt. We therefore affirm. 

 Affirmed.

 5

 Heiderscheidt endorsed the order extending her probation, and she does not contest that 

she had notice of the extension.