### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 16, 200 3

AD RIA N R . A RN ETT v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 73265 Richard R. Baum gartner , Judge

No
. E 2 0 0 3 -0 0 9 5 4 -C CA -R 3 -PC F ebruary 10, 2004

Pe tit ion e r, Ad

ri a n R. Ar

ne tt, tim ely fi led a p e tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, a tta c kin g his convictions for two counts of ag g ravated ra pe, one c ount of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping , one c ount o f a g g ra

vate d ro bb e ry , o ne c ount o f a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , a nd on e c ou nt o f s e tti ngfi re to pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y
. F oll ow ing a n e vid e nti a ry he a ri ng , the pe tit ion wa s d ism iss e d b y the tr ia l c ourt

. On appea l, he ra ises one issue: his trial counsel re ndere d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel by failing to properly

reque st funding f

or and obtaining the service s of an independe nt expert in forensic DNA analy sis in order to cha lleng e DNA evidenc e int roduce d by the S tate. After a review of the rec ord,
we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of t h e cour t, in which J OE G. R I L EY and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

J

. L iddell Kirk, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee ( on appea l); and Ge rald L . Gulley , J r., Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee (at tr ia l) fo r t

he a pp e lla nt, Ad ri a n R. Ar

ne tt.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rr y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Randall Eug ene N ichols, District Attorney Gene ral; and Philip Morton, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

At the pos t-conviction hearing , only the P etitioner and his trial counsel testified. Petit ioner
asser ted other f

actua l gr ounds in support of his alleg ation that trial co unsel rende red ine ffe ctive assistance , but has not prese nted those issues in this appeal.
Prior to his conviction in state court, Petitioner was convicted in f eder al cour

t on car jacking char g es which w ere the re sult of the same incide nt leading to his convictio ns in state court. He testified at the post-conviction hear ing that his tria l counsel informe d him that DNA evidenc e had come ba ck “positive,” i n d i cating that it identified him as the perpe trator of the ag g ravated ra

pe

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c ha rg e s a nd the oth e r re la te d cr imi na l ac ts. Th e vic tim of the a g g ra vate d ra pe c ha rg e s w a s una

ble to make a positi ve identification of Petiti oner at the trial, but her boy friend w as able to identify Pe tit ion e r. Pe tit ion e r sti ll ma int a ine d that he wa s no t the pe rs on wh o h a d c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e s, t h o u gh a juvenile co-def endant testified at his state trial and positively identified Petitioner. Neve rtheless, Petitioner testified at the post-convic tion hearingthat he had told his attorney to “g et
a no the r D NAwh e re I c a n pro ve my inn oc e nc e be c a us e that will ve ri fy that I

did no t do tha

t [c omm it the offe nses].” Petiti oner ack n o wl ed g ed that his attorney informed him that there was no more specimen a

vailable to run a

nother DN A t est afte r t he F BI had run its test. During cross-e x amination of Petitioner at the post-c onviction hear ing, the following testimony was e licited: Q An d te ll u s h owy ou kn owthat ano the r D NAte st w ou ld b e dif fe re nt.
A Be cause - - I d o n ’t k n o w. I just wanted anothe r one to ve rify that - - and show these pe ople - - showthe state it wasn’ t me that rape d that woman.

* * * Q And he [defense counsel] told y ou he had done all he could do , t h at they did n’ t ha ve a ny mor e to t e st, ri g ht?

A Wel l , I m e a n - - s h o o t , I m e a n , t h a t ’ s w h y I w a s t r y i n g to g e t th e sta te to verify - - Iwanted to try

to ge t some where Ican showthe state a nd y our Honor that I

did not rape that woman - - Q But if ther e wa sn’t any thing to test - -

A - - a nd

the y did n’ t ha ve e no ug h e vid e nc e fo r i t. Q I ’m sorry . I f there wasn’t a ny thing to test, what did y ou want him to do?

A Ime a n - - sho ot, I me a n, wh a t am I su pp os e d to do ? I ’m

no t ju st g oin g to j us t g ive m y life up. You know what I ’m saying. I ’m g oing to f ight f or my life. Yo u kno w wh a t I ’m say ing

. Es pe c ia lly Idid n’ t do it, I ’m

no t g oin g to j us t si t down her e and ta

ke it.

Pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d that he c ou ld no t ob ta in a n in de pe nd e nt D NAte st b e c a us e the re wa s n ot a

ny sampl e re ma ini nga ft e r t he F B Idid it s a na ly sis . H e ha d b e e n g ive n th is information by

the federa l public defe nder w ho had re prese nted Petitioner in fede ral c ourt and ha d fac ed the same problem a nd been una

ble to have inde pendent DN A testing

. Tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t w hat he a nd the fe de ra l pu

bli c de fender

ha d tr ie d to do in t

he ir respe ctive ca ses was to attack the State’ s m et h o d o logy of the DN A proof. T rial counse l

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acknow ledg ed that he was not a scientist, a nd that he did not know how much of a sample would be
ne c e ssa ry fo r m a kin g a n in de pe nd e nt t e st, a nd he did no t tr y to f ind ou t.

Pe tit ion e r d id n ot o ff

e r a ny pr oo f at the he a ri ng c on c e rn ing ho w muc h D NAsampl e wo uld be nec essar

y for testi n g, and he did not submit any proof at the post-conviction hea ring that any sample in this particular case might have been rema ining either at the time of trial or at the time of the pos t-conviction hearing

. The trial c ourt implicitl y acc redited the testimony

of trial counse l on this iss ue. In its findings from the be nch, incor porate d in the order

denying post-c onviction relief, the trial cour

t found:

Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt co mpl a ins that the re wa s no ind e pe nd e nt te st o f t he DN A r e su lts that wer e introduce d at trial. [Trial counsel] te stifies [si c] that he explored that issue
a nd wa s - - w a s a ssu

re d by c ouns e l fo r [pe tit ion e r] a t the fe de ra l tr ia l that - - w ho a lso
a tte mpt e d to ob ta in a

n in de pe nd e nt t e st, that the re we re no - - the re wa s n o s a mpl e le ft that c ou ld b e te ste d. Th e re fo re , if the re ’s no thi ngle ft

to b e te ste d, y ou

c e rt a inl y can’ t be ineff

ective f or not having the test conduc ted.

Th e tr ia l judg e ' s fin din g s of fa c t on post -c on vic tio n he a ri ng s ar e c on c lus ive on a pp e a l un le ss the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . The trial court’s f indings of fac t a

re a ffor ded the we ight of

a jury verdic t, and this court is bound by the trial court’s findings unless the evidence in the record preponder ates ag ainst those finding s. Henley v. Sta te , 960 S.W. 2d 57 2, 57 8 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; Al le yv . S tat e , 958 S.W .2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 97 ). Th is c ourt ma

y no t r e we ig h o r r e e va luate the e vid e nc e , n or su bs tit ute its inf e re nc e s f or tho se draw n by the trial judg e. Sta te v . H on e y c utt , 54 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001) . Questions
conce rning the credibility of wit nesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are resolved by the t rial court, not this court. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 461. The burden of establishing that the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise is on petitioner. Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 579. Howeve r, the t r i a l c o u rt ’ s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w a r e r e v i e w e d u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption of cor rec tness. Fi e lds v . S

tat e , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

. This court reviews a claim of inef fec tive assistance of counse l under the standa rds of Baxter
v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) , and Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. C t. 2052, 80 L

. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The petitioner has the bur den to prove that (1) the attorney ’s per formanc e wa s defi c ie nt, a nd

(2 ) t he de fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e re su lte d in

pr e jud ic e to t

he de fe nd a nt s o a s to deprive him of a fa ir trial. Strickland , 46 6 U. S. a t 68 7, 10 4 S. Ct. at 2 06 4; Go ad v . S tat e , 938 S.W. 2d 36 3, 36 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Bu tle r v . S tat e , 78 9 S.W. 2d 89 8, 89 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) . T he fa ilure to pr ov e e ith e r d e fi c ie nc y

or pr e jud ice ju st ifie s d e nia l of

re lie f; the re fo re , th e c ourt ne e d n ot a dd

re ss the components in any

particula r orde r or e ven addr ess both if one is insufficie nt. Goad , 938 S.W .2d
a t 370. I n o rd e r t o e sta

bli shpr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r m

us t e sta bli sha “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counsel’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en diffe rent. A
rea sonabl e p ro b ab ility

is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068.

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The test in Tenne ssee to dete rmine whe ther counsel provided effe ctive assist ance is whether his or he r p e rf

or manc e wa s w ith in t

he ra ng e of c omp e te nc e de mand e d o f atto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s. Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 936. The pe titioner must overcome the presumption that counsel’s c onduct falls within the wide ra

ng e of a cce ptable prof

essional assistance

. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2 06 5; Ho ne

y c utt , 54 S.W .3d at 769. Ther efor e, in orde r to prove a defic iency , a petitioner must show “that counsel’s a cts or omissions were so se rious as to fall below an obje ctive standa rd of re asonable ness under preva iling prof

essional norms.” Goad , 938 S.W .2d at 369 (c iting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct . at 2065).
The trial c ourt specif

ically found that there was no evidenc e available for independe nt DNA testing, a nd Petitioner offe red no pr oof to show otherw ise. Petitioner argues in his brie f that he “ met the pre judice re quirement in a showingof ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel by proving by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that trial c ounsel did not retain or seek to r etain the servic es of a DNA e x pert to assist him in understanding the State’s most important phy sical evide nce.”

As su min g the a c c ur a c y of thi s ar g ume nt, we mus t als o note that Peti tio ne r fa ile d to su bmi t any proof at the post-conviction hear ing that would show trial counsel’s failure t o o ff er t hat particula r evide nce w ould have a ffe cted the r esults of the trial. The ref ore, e ven if the tria l court wa s in err or i n finding counsel was not ineffe ctive, which we do not conclude, Petitioner fa iled to show
a ny pr e jud ic e . A c c or din g ly , Pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is a pp e a l.

CO NC LU SION

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE