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Re: Petition of National Air Cargo Group, Inc. for an Exemption from 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9(a), 

91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 (Docket FAA-2014-0980) 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

National Air Cargo Group, Inc. ("National Airlines") hereby petitions for a one year 

extension of the present exemption from 14 C.F.R. §§91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 

121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 to allow National Airlines to operate B-747 freighter aircraft while 

transporting tall rigid cargo (freight that is taller than 98 inches and will not break apart during an 

emergency landing) restrained to withstand a 3.0g ("3G") forward load. 

Due to US Department of Defense needs, National Airlines would like to petition the 

exemption of 9G tiedown for freight categorized as tall rigid cargo. The tall rigid cargo 9G 

requirement has caused a major impact in the ability to move US Department of Defense assets 

back to the United States from various locations around the world. This not only has resulted in 

inability to move assets but has also caused major economic impacts on National Airlines and 

its industry counterparts. 

www.GoNational.com DtS.O I'CC'1 1=: 99 •--. ..... ., ... _ ,.. r ... .. --· -.. __ ... - ·-

National Airlines 

Citadel II Building 

5955 T. G. Lee Boulevard, Ste. 500 

Orlando, FL 32822 

T 800 451 3174 F 407 313 2255 

www.NationaiAirlines.com 
markets globally. And, the requested exemption would also allow National Airlines to realize the 

full capabilities of their investments in the B-747 aircraft and stem the loss of millions of dollars 

of tall rigid cargo business to foreign operators who regularly transport tall rigid cargo without 

meeting the 9G forward restraint requirement. 

National Airlines respectfully request expedited action on this request. The demand for 

transportation of tall rigid cargo is on the rise, and frangible cargo necessary to trigger a 3G 

forward restraint standard is becoming much less available. This is an urgent situation for 

National Airlines and for the public interest, particularly the shipping public. 

National Airlines submits the following in further support of this request: 

I. Background And Exemption Request 

National Airlines: National Airlines is a Part 121 certificated U.S. air carrier which 

operates a cargo fleet comprised exclusively of B-747 freighter aircraft. National Airlines 

provides charter air service worldwide utilizing a fleet of 2 B-7 4 7 freighters. Its customer base 

includes the U.S. Department of Defense, other government agencies, and multiple commercial 

entities needing to move unique cargo to challenging locations around the world, helping to 

keep the U.S. economy on the move. National Airlines has operated 70+ flight utilizing the 

present exemption (Exemption No. 11125) without any incidents or accidents since December 

15, 2014. National Airlines and its experienced team of aviation professionals deliver high 

quality services to global customers, meeting and exceeding their air cargo needs. National 
chain because they have intermodal compatibility, which is important as shipments 

are often transported from door-to-door by multimodal transportation. 

• Commodities (such as oil and gas related materials), project cargo, relief goods, and 

hi-tech equipment (such as satellite and communications materials) are often 

shipped in 20-foot sea containers to remote locations where the container is also 

used as a field office or secure storage area. Garments and perishables are often 

shipped in such containers. 

• Emerging markets, such as the African market (where U.S. carriers are losing 

substantial business to foreign 8-747 operators due to the 9G restriction), are 

particularly reliant on the use of 20-foot containers for project and oil/gas cargo. Tall 

rigid cargo shipments are often carried on part charter flights to offline destinations. 

2. Other tall items, such as aircraft engines, generators, and large vehicles, which are taller 

than 98 inches. 

• For example, 8-747 freighters are needed to carry aircraft engines to support many 

of the world's wide body passenger fleets, which use engines that are classified as 

tall rigid cargo. 

The 8-7 4 7 freighter is particularly well-suited to transport tall rigid cargo efficiently and 

cost-effectively, and has carried such cargo safely for decades. However, with the severe 

decline in "frangible" cargo and ever increasing demand for tall rigid cargo transportation (both 
efficiency benefits of their substantial investment in the B-747 aircraft and reduces National 

Airlines' global competitive effectiveness. It also results in the availability of fewer service and 

pricing options for tall rigid cargo shippers. 

The 9G Requirement: The 9G forward restraint requirement stems from the following 

FAR provisions: 

14 C.F.R. § 25.561 and§ 25.787 establish aircraft design requirements and require that 

cargo stowage restraints handle forward inertia forces of 9G for tall rigid cargo: 

14 C.F.R. § 25.561: 

"(a) The airplane, although it may be damaged in emergency landing conditions on land 

or water, must be designed as prescribed in this section to protect each occupant 

under those conditions. 

(b) The structure must be designed to give each occupant every reasonable chance of 

escaping serious injury in a minor crash landing when-

(3) The occupant experiences the following ultimate inertia forces acting 

separately relative to the surrounding structure: 

(ii) Forward, 9.0g 

(c) For equipment, cargo in the passenger compartments and any other large masses, 

the following apply: 

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, these items must be 

positioned so that if they break loose they will be unlikely to: 

(i) Cause direct injury to occupants; (ii) Penetrate fuel tanks or lines or cause fire or explosion hazard by damage to 

adjacent systems; or 

(iii) Nullify any of the escape facilities provided for use after an emergency 

landing. 
placarded maximum weight of contents and for the critical load distribution at the 

appropriate maximum load factors corresponding to the specified flight and ground load 

conditions, and to the emergency landing conditions of§ 25.561(b), except that the 

forces specified in the emergency landing conditions need not be applied to 

compartments located below, or forward, of all occupants in the airplane . ... " (Emphasis 

added) 

Although Part 25 establishes design requirements, other provisions incorporate the 

design requirements into air carrier operating requirements. Thus, 14 C.F.R. § 21.5 requires 

Boeing to incorporate the design requirements into the manufacturer's Aircraft Flight Manual 

("AFM"), and 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9, 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 

require U.S. air carriers to comply with the AFM. Boeing's and National Airlines' weight & 

balance control and loading manuals for the B-747 freighter incorporate the 9G requirement or, 

alternatively, permit the use of "frangible" cargo3 to prevent the tall rigid cargo from shifting 

forward. As discussed below, those compliance options are not practical or economically 

feasible. 

The 9G requirement was established in the 1950s based on passenger compartment 

seating design analyses. National Airlines is not aware of the 9G passenger-compartment 

requirement having ever been substantiated by any specific cargo transportation analyses. 

Rather, the 9G passenger compartment requirement became an anachronistic regulatory "come 

along" to apply to cargo transportation. 

Moreover, studies conducted by the U.S. Air Force have shown that a 3G forward 

restraint requirement would be appropriate and provide an equivalent level of safety. Indeed, the 

U.S. Air Force has adopted a permanent reduction to a 3G forward restraint for its operations as 
and wholly outside the United States. 14 C.F.R. §11 .83. Tall rigid cargo shipments for various 

shippers often involve itineraries wholly outside the United States, e.g., from Asia to Africa; 

Africa to Europe; Europe to Asia; Oceania to Africa, etc., and thus any limitation on the 

requested exemption as to its geographic scope would eliminate the exemption's real-world 

utility. 

The requested exemption would maintain an equivalent level of safety and would not 

adversely affect the safety of upper deck occupants on 8-747 freighters during emergency 

landing conditions. It would benefit the public interest by allowing for more effective utilization of 

the 8-747 freighter aircraft and more efficient, competitive transportation of tall rigid air cargo to 

meet the needs of governmental, civilian, NGO, humanitarian, and military shippers. 

II. The Issue 

The bottom of the upper deck floor beams on the 8-747 freighter is at a height of 98.1 

inches. In the highly unlikely event of a forward cargo shift, cargo that is 98 inches tall or lower 

will not strike the upper deck structure and occupant areas on the 8-747 freighter, and therefore 

the 9G force standard set forth in 14 C.F.R. §25.561 (b)(3) is not implicated: the stowage 

compartment must be designed to "the emergency landing conditions of §25.561 (b), except that 

the forces specified in the emergency landing conditions need not be applied to compartments 

located below, or forward , of all occupants in the airplane .... " 14 C.F.R. §25.787(a). Tall rigid 

cargo, however, is not covered by the exception contained in the last clause because tall rigid 

cargo is located aft of the occupants on the upper deck. 
forward and impacting the upper deck and occupant areas. 

These two current methods for transporting tall rigid cargo on the B-747 freighter are 

simply not economically feasible or practical. 

First, restraining tall rigid cargo to a 9G forward load standard requires a cumbersome 

and complex arrangement of straps connected to aircraft tie-down points. There are a limited 

number of tie-down positions on the B-747 freighter, which makes it virtually impossible to 

restrain tall rigid cargo to 9G and carry other cargo. There are often an inadequate number of 

tie-downs on a B-747 to restrain heavy tall rigid cargo to a 9G forward load requirement; and 

even when it is possible to restrain a single item of tall rigid cargo, there are usually an 

insufficient number of tie-downs to restrain additional items of tall rigid or other cargo. As a 

result, the flight is not efficient or cost-competitive for the shipper. 

Second, it is extremely difficult, impractical, and uneconomic to use frangible cargo as a 

buffer. The changing nature of air cargo, customer demands, and aircraft routings today is such 

that there is rarely a sufficient volume of frangible cargo available to place in front of the tall rigid 

cargo. Non-commercial frangible "filler" cargo is also impractical for logistical, cost, customs, 

and disposal reasons. Military pallets (typically 88 inches wide, not the standard 96 inches) do 

not meet the width requirements for frangible cargo when tall rigid cargo is centerline-loaded on 

the B-747 freighter. As a result, tall rigid cargo, often critical to meet urgent military, commercial, 

and humanitarian requirements, cannot be transported in a timely and cost-effective manner. 
locations. Large power generators, large vehicles, and widebody aircraft engines regularly 

require long-haul air transportation as well. But the 20-foot sea containers are 102 inches tall, 

and the large aircraft engines, power generators, and large vehicles are also taller than 98 

inches. 

Ill. Granting The Requested Exemption Would Provide An Equivalent Level Of Safety 

And Is In The Public Interest. 

As explained below, National Airlines not aware of data substantiating the application of 

the 9G requirement to freighter aircraft. However, more recent studies that were not available 

when the 9G forward restraint requirement was developed in the 1950s demonstrate that a 3G 

forward restraint standard would have no adverse impact on safety, would provide an equivalent 

level of safety, and would be in the public interest. 

A. Reports and Data Show that a 3G Forward Restraint Requirement Would Have 

No Adverse Impact on Safety and Would Provide an Equivalent Level of Safety. 

The deficiencies with the 9G forward restraint requirement are numerous. 

First, the 9G standard was established in the 1950s, well before the B-747 aircraft was 

certificated. 

Second, it considered analyses of passenger seats, passenger seat attachments, and 

the geometric relationship of the passenger seat to the interior of the passenger compartment. 

This seat-based requirement appears to have become a regulatory "come along" to apply to 
straps, and nets on a 8-7 4 7. Nor does it take into account the spatial separation of 8-7 4 7 upper 

deck occupants and the tall rigid cargo, the capability of the crown barrier net to restrain tall rigid 

cargo, or the crashworthiness and energy absorbing capability of the 8-747 upper deck 

structure. 

Fourth, the 9G standard clearly did not account for the infinitesimal probability that all of 

the events necessary for an occupant on the upper deck of a 8-747 freighter to be harmed by 

tall rigid cargo in an emergency landing would occur. U.S. Air Force studies concluded that a 

crash event at higher than 3G with cargo and passengers is "extremely rare", with a probability 

of one occurrence per 4 million hours of operation. Cargo Aircraft and Spacecraft Forward 

Restraint Criteria, Technical Report ASD-TR-76-30, at 21 (December 1977) ("1977 USAF 

Technical Report"). Put another way, combining major and minor accidents for the period 1962 

to July 1976, the probability of a crash at the "3G to N/S Level with Cargo and Passenger" was 

"extremely rare" at 0.00000025 per hours/operation. 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 38, 50. 

And, in November 1981, "CSAF/LET approved permanent reduction to 3G forward restraint 

[c]iting 7 years of operations (6.73M flight hours) with no cargo related accidents." Presentation: 

Cargo Restraint for Fixed Wing Aircraft, 21 May 02, Aeronautical Systems Center, USAF. 

According to the same USAF presentation, "In concert with 2G up and 1.5G aft & laterally, 3G 

forward restraint has proven adequate and cost effective for 30 years of USAF cargo operations 

involving over 29M flight hours." 
any resulting injury or fatality related to the accidents was not attributable to cargo shifting 

forward. In fact, if a cargo shift was involved in any reported accident, it only involved cargo 

shifting aft, with no reported accidents involving a forward shift at all. Since the majority of cargo 

is below the tall-rigid threshold, it can be concluded that tying down to flight loads a 1.5G 

(loading) has been shown to be sufficient in actual incidents and accidents to secure cargo 

against forward-shifting , and this Petition for a 3G tie down therefore is more than sufficient. 

This conclusion is supported by the results of the 2008 accident of a Kalitta aircraft in 

Brussels. That accident involved a B-747 freighter which suffered severe damage, breaking into 

three sections after an aborted takeoff due to a bird strike. Although the main deck floor beams 

in the forward cargo section were shattered in the accident, cargo in the other sections which 

was restrained to 1.5G was still secured to the aircraft, and the crew escaped uninjured. See 

Final Report, Ref. AAIU-2008-13 (issued July 2009), Belgium Federal Public Service Mobility 

and Transport, Air Accident and Investigation Unit. 

Sixth, at forward load forces between 3G (the standard requested in this Petition and the 

standard adopted by the USAF) and 9G (the current standard), it is highly likely that the B-747 

would not stay intact. At such high G-force loads, whether the tall rigid cargo was shifting 

forward would be the least of the occupants' and crew's worries because the aircraft would likely 

not remain intact. As a 1977 USAF Technical Report pointed out: "The maximum landing loads 

that the C-130, C-141, and C-5 can generate are 0.94, 1.05, and 1.20G, respectively. This is 

assuming full reverse thrust, full braking , and a loose dirt runway. For any load above these, the 
authority, implemented the reduced 3G forward restraint requirement, and there has been no 

report of an accident where occupants have been harmed by cargo shifting forward during 

emergency landing conditions. The 1977 USAF Technical Report, which was issued after the 

development of the passenger-based 9G forward restraint standard, concluded that reducing 

the requirement to 3G for cargo operations would maintain safety and result in significant cost 

savings and simplification. In pertinent part, the Report summarized: 

"The civilian fleet can also use the data in determining what design criteria to 

utilize. For example, either a 3G positive locking rail system or a 3G net in 

conjunction with current 1 Y2G rail system would provide an adequate system 

rather than the 9G system in use today." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 50-51 ." 

Accordingly, National Airlines submits that a 3G forward restraint requirement would 

provide an equivalent level of safety to the outdated 9G standard. 

B. The Exemption Would Be in the Public Interest. 

Granting this exemption would be in the public interest because it would enable U.S. 

operators of 8-7 4 7 freighter aircraft to safely and efficiently carry tall rigid cargo, including 

multiple 20-foot sea containers, aircraft engines, large oil/gas equipment, and large vehicles, for 

humanitarian, commercial, and U.S. military shippers around the world. It would also enable 8-
delivery of critical cargo and/or substantially increases costs for shippers to get their cargo 

delivered. For example, U.S. exporters and importers are detrimentally affected as their costs 

are being driven up, and therefore their competitiveness is reduced. The U.S. military and 

NGOs with urgent humanitarian missions involving tall rigid cargo also encounter delays and 

substantially increased costs in having their vital shipments delivered. 

Even in cases where a single item of tall rigid cargo could be carried, other tall rigid 

items could not be transported because the requisite tie-down attachments needed to restrain to 

9G would not be available for additional items. National Airlines estimates that the need to 

provide frangible freight or restrain tall rigid cargo to the 9G standard reduces the cargo-carrying 

capability by a minimum of 30% and, in some cases, up to 50% of the allowable volume and 

weight allowed by the Boeing 747 weight and balance loading and control manual. The public 

interest would be much better served with a 3G restraint requirement because it would allow 

more pieces of tall rigid cargo to be carried on a single flight without any reduction in safety. 

Adherence to the 9G standard results in more flights required to transport the same amount of 

tall rigid cargo, making U.S. operators uncompetitive in the marketplace. 

National Airlines is losing substantial business due to their inability to offer competitive 

bids to carry tall rigid loads as a result of the 9G forward load requirement. Many foreign 

competitors routinely carry 20-foot containers and other tall rigid cargo without restraining them 

to withstand a forward 9G force. 
for the charter. As such, National Airlines has noted a significant reduction in business and the 

loss of millions of dollars in revenue due to the 9G requirement. National Airlines additionally 

notes that on flights where nonrevenue frangible freight can be used, it has done so at the 

airline's (not the shipper's) expense, resulting in additional cost to the airline for the buildup and 

disposal of this cargo. This has also caused substantial losses due to these additional 

unrecouped costs. 

In the context of economic regulation , Congress directed the Secretary to strengthen the 

competitive position of U.S. air carriers to at least ensure equality with foreign air carriers, 

including the attainment of the opportunity for U.S. air carriers to maintain and increase their 

profitability in foreign air transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§401 01 (a)(15) and (e)(1 ). We believe that 

the FAA can act in the public interest and level the playing field without any diminution of safety 

by granting this exemption to provide for a 3G forward restraint requirement. 

IV. Petitioner Requests Expedited Consideration And Approval. 

National Airlines urges the FAA to expeditiously review and approve this Petition. U.S. 

8-747 operators are being adversely impacted by the application of the 9G requirement, as are 

shippers. Application of a 3G requirement would not adversely affect safety and would provide 

an equivalent level of safety as supported by cargo-compartment based studies. If the FAA 

determines that notice and comment is required, National Airlines requests a shortened 

publication and comment period and a waiver from the requirement that petitions be submitted 

120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. Delay would continue to 
million hours, and National Airlines is not aware of any report showing that tall rigid cargo has 

moved forward and either caused frangible freight to compress or caused injury or death to any 

crew member on board the aircraft. Given this substantial safety track record, the extremely low 

probability of an accident in the 3G to N/S range, the impracticality and economic infeasibility of 

securing tall rigid cargo to a 9G forward restraint, and the USAF's conclusion that a 3G forward 

restraint requirement would provide an equivalent level of safety and would not adversely affect 

safety, National Airlines requests that the FAA grant the exemption requested herein 

expeditiously. 

VI. National Airlines' Responses to the Questions Posed in Ms. Suzanne Masterson's 

Letter on August 6, 2014 on Similar Docket FAA-2014-0184. 

• National Airlines anticipates operating two flights per day (approximately 60 flights per 

month) for the duration of the US Department of Defense drawdown from Afghanistan 

(exact timeframe unknown). 

• National Airlines requests exemption allowing for restraint of cargo for 3.0g ("3G") and 

no requirement for the use of frangible cargo. 

• Granting of this petition would allow National Airlines and its industry counterparts to 

carry cargo under contract of the US Department of Defense to remove cargo from 

Afghanistan to support US National interests. 

• This mission would require the transport of mostly tall rigid cargo. 

Contact Information 

National Air Cargo Group, Inc. dba National Airlines 

5955 T.G. Lee Blvd., Suite 500 

Orlando, FL 32822 

Phone: 407-283-6272 

Fax: 407-313-2255 
Section of the FAR Affected: 

14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), 121.141 

Description of Relief Sought: Petitioner seek to be added to the exemption from the 

requirements of 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 

121.141 to allow the operation of 8-747 freighter aircraft while transporting tall rigid 

cargo restrained to withstand a 3.0g forward load. 
In the matter of the petition of 

National Air Cargo Group, Inc. 

for an exemption from§§ 91.9(a), 

91.1 025(a), 121.135(a)( 4), 

121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 ofTitle 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations 

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014-0980 

PARTIAL GRANT OF EXEMPTION 

By a submission to the Department of Transportation's Federal Docket Management System 

(FDMS) dated November 19, 2014, Mr. Joseph R. Batten ofNational Air Cargo Group, Inc. 

(National Airlines)- Director of Operations, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) for an exemption from the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 related to the requirements for 

transporting cargo. 

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulations: 

§ 91.9(a) Civil aircraft flight manual, markings, and placard requirements, which states that 

no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in 

the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or otherwise 

prescribed by the certificating authority of the country. 

§ 91.1025(a) Program operating contents, which requires the program operating manual include 

procedures for ensuring compliance with aircraft weight and balance limitations. 

§ 121.135(a)(4) Manual contents, which requires that each manual required by§ 121.133 must 

not be contrary to any Federal regulations or the certificate holder's operations specifications or 

operating certificate. 
petitioner

s letter dated November 19, 2014. The complete petition may be found in the docket. 

Reasons Why the Exemption Would Not Adversely Affect Public Safety 

As explained below, National Airlines is not aware of data substantiating the application of 

the 9G requirement to freighter aircraft. However, more recent studies that were not 

available when the 9G forward restraint requirement was developed in the 1950s 

demonstrate that a 3G forward restraint standard would have no adverse impact on safety, 

would provide an equivalent level of safety, and would be in the public interest. 

A. Reports and Data Show that a 3G Forward Restraint Requirement Would Have 

No Adverse Impact on Safety and Would Provide an Equivalent Level of Safety. 

The deficiencies with the 9G forward restraint requirement are numerous. 

First, the 9G standard was established in the 1950s, well before the B-74 7 aircraft was 

certificated. 

Second, it considered analyses of passenger seats, passenger seat attachments, and the 

geometric relationship ofthe passenger seat to the interior of the passenger compartment. 

This seat-based requirement appears to have become a regulatory "come along" to apply to 

cargo transport, without any analysis of the validity or efficacy of applying such a seatbased requirement to the cargo compartment. 

Third, since the 9G forward restraint standard predated the B-747 by more than a decade, it 

did not account for many of the B-7 47's exceptional characteristics. It does not properly 

reflect the actual loads and behavior of cargo restrained by the cargo restraint system, 

straps, and nets on a B-747. Nor does it take into account the spatial separation ofB-747 

upper deck occupants and the tall rigid cargo, the capability of the crown barrier net to 

restrain tall rigid cargo, or the crashworthiness and energy absorbing capability of the 

B-7 4 7 upper deck structure. 

Fourth, the 9G standard clearly did not account for the infinitesimal probability that all of 

the events necessary for an occupant on the upper deck of a B-7 4 7 freighter to be harmed 

by tall rigid cargo in an emergency landing would occur. U.S. Air Force studies concluded 

2 
proven adequate and cost effective for 30 years of USAF cargo operations involving over 

29M flight hours." 

Fifth, in commercial operations, more than 420 B-74 7 freighters have flown more than 20 

million flight hours and 4 million flight cycles. There has been no report of cargo shifting 

forward and harming an occupant on a B-747 freighter during emergency landing 

conditions (see NTSB Accident Aviation Database and 17 hull-loss occurrences on B-747 

freighters documented by the Aviation Safety Network, www.aviation-safety.net; see also 

FAA Accident/Incident Data System). Based on a review of the B-747 model freighter 

accidents, it can be concluded that any resulting injury or fatality related to the accidents 

was not attributable to cargo shifting forward. In fact, if a cargo shift was involved in any 

reported accident, it only involved cargo shifting aft, with no reported accidents involving a 

forward shift at all. Since the majority of cargo is below the tall-rigid threshold, it can be 

concluded that tying down to flight loads at 1.5G (loading) has been shown to be sufficient 

in actual incidents and accidents to secure cargo against forward-shifting, and this Petition 

for a 3G tie down therefore is more than sufficient. 

This conclusion is supported by the results of the 2008 accident of a Kalitta aircraft in 

Brussels. That accident involved a B-747 freighter which suffered severe damage, breaking 

into three sections after an aborted takeoff due to a bird strike. Although the main deck 

floor beams in the forward cargo section were shattered in the accident, cargo in the other 

sections which was restrained to 1.5G was still secured to the aircraft, and the crew escaped 

uninjured. See Final Report, Ref. AAIU-2008-13 (issued July 2009), Belgium Federal 

Public Service Mobility and Transport, Air Accident and Investigation Unit. 

Sixth, at forward load forces between 3G (the standard requested in this Petition and the 

standard adopted by the USAF) and 9G (the current standard), it is highly likely that the B747 would not stay intact. At such high G-force loads, whether the tall rigid cargo was 

shifting forward would be the least of the occupants' and crew's worries because the aircraft 

would likely not remain intact. As a 1977 USAF Technical Report pointed out: "The 

maximum landing loads that the C-130, C-141, and C-5 can generate are 0.94, 1.05, and 

1.20G, respectively. This is assuming full reverse thrust, full braking, and a loose dirt 

runway. For any load above these, the aircraft is in a crash condition as defined by this 

report." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 21. And, according to Boeing, during hard 

braking the forward flight load factors are 1.5G for the B-747-400 and 1.2G for the 

3 
summarized: 

"The civilian fleet can also use the data in determining what design criteria to 

utilize. For example, either a 3G positive locking rail system or a 3G net in 

conjunction with current 1 Y2G rail system would provide an adequate system rather 

than the 9G system in use today." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 50-51. 

Accordingly, National Airlines submits that a 3G forward restraint requirement would 

provide an equivalent level of safety to the outdated 9G standard. 

Reason the Exemption Would Benefit the Public Interest 

Granting this exemption would be in the public interest because it would enable U.S. 

operators of B-74 7 freighter aircraft to safely and efficiently carry tall rigid cargo, 

including multiple 20-foot sea containers, aircraft engines, large oil/gas equipment, and 

large vehicles, for humanitarian, commercial, and U.S. military shippers around the world. 

It would also enable B-7 4 7 operators to more efficiently utilize and to realize the full 

capabilities oftheir B-747 aircraft. Shippers need access to reasonable, safe, and timely air 

transportation for their shipments of tall rigid cargo. Absent this exemption, shippers will 

have fewer choices of carriers and fewer B-7 4 7 aircraft to handle critical missions, because, 

as explained above, the 9G forward restraint requirement effectively precludes U.S. B-747 

freighter operators from competing for tall rigid cargo shipments, without any 

improvement in safety. This, in turn, leads to delays for the delivery of critical cargo 

and/or substantially increases costs for shippers to get their cargo delivered. For example, 

U.S. exporters and importers are detrimentally affected as their costs are being driven up, 

and therefore their competitiveness is reduced. The U.S. military and NGOs with urgent 

humanitarian missions involving tall rigid cargo also encounter delays and substantially 

increased costs in having their vital shipments delivered. 

Even in cases where a single item of tall rigid cargo could be carried, other tall rigid items 

could not be transported because the requisite tie-down attachments needed to restrain to 

9G would not be available for additional items. National Airlines estimates that the need to 

provide frangible freight or restrain tall rigid cargo to the 9G standard reduces the cargocarrying capability by a minimum of 30% and, in some cases, up to 50% of the allowable 

volume and weight allowed by the Boeing 747 weight and balance loading and control 

4 
National Airlines estimates that it is losing millions of dollars of air cargo business because 

it is unable to effectively compete for tall rigid cargo shipments in light of the 9G forward 

restraint requirement. National Airlines operates many of its flights as unscheduled "ad 

hoc" charters, and therefore frangible freight is most often not available. As the absence of 

the frangible cargo requires the use of 9G tie downs, National Airlines often loses charters 

to foreign competitors as the tie-down requirements result in the inability to carry all of the 

cargo required for the charter. As such, National Airlines has noted a significant reduction 

in business and the loss of millions of dollars in revenue due to the 9G requirement. 

National Airlines additionally notes that on flights where nonrevenue frangible freight can 

be used, it has done so at the airline's (not the shipper's) expense, resulting in additional 

cost to the airline for the buildup and disposal of this cargo. This has also caused 

substantial losses due to these additional unrecouped costs. 

In the context of economic regulation, Congress directed the Secretary to strengthen the 

competitive position of U.S. air carriers to at least ensure equality with foreign air carriers, 

including the attainment of the opportunity for U.S. air carriers to maintain and increase 

their profitability in foreign air transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(l5) and (e)(l). We 

believe that the FAA can act in the public interest and level the playing field without any 

diminution of safety by granting this exemption to provide for a 3G forward restraint 

requirement. 

Federal Register publication 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for Federal Register 

publication for public comment. This request is identical to a previously granted request, and it will not 

set a precedent in the long term. National Airlines requested an expedited processing of this exemption 

as it is identical to a previously granted request, and any delay would adversely affect National Airlines 

and its ability to fulfill the tall rigid cargo restraint requirements of its humanitarian, commercial, and 

military customers. 

The FAA's analysis 

The Boeing 747 Cargo airplane can carry cargo in the fuselage aft of the flight deck that is taller 

than the height of the flight deck floor structure above the main deck. When this tall cargo is rigid, 

such as an Intermodal Container, it is identified in the current Boeing 747 Weight & Balance 

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As an alternative to restraining the tall rigid cargo (and all cargo aft ofthe tall rigid cargo) for 90 

loads, the Boeing 747 W&B Manual permits the use of frangible cargo in the forward fuselage 

(note: this approach is used for other cargo airplanes). Boeing's definition for frangible cargo is 

that which would compress and conform to the fuselage in the event of an accident with forward 

loads exceeding 1.50. Using this method, the tall rigid cargo is restrained for only 1.50 forward 

loads, which then allows for the accommodation of more cargo. Frangible cargo precludes the tall 

rigid cargo from impacting the flight deck floor during a survivable crash event when the forward 

loads exceed 1.50 (tall rigid cargo that becomes loose during a crash cannot impact the flight deck 

floor). This alternative method of preventing the cargo from impacting the flight deck floor has 

been shown to meet the forward emergency landing load requirements. The petitioner has 

expressed concerns about the availability and associated costs of frangible cargo at many airports, 

resulting in severe limitations in the amount of tall rigid cargo that can be carried. Under the 

current Boeing 747 W&B Manual, the carriage oftall rigid cargo, including Intermodal 

Containers, is not economically viable without sufficient frangible cargo. 

The following is the FAA's analysis of each of the petitioner's numbered arguments regarding the 

alleged "deficiencies" of the existing 90 standard. 

1. Since the codification of part 25, the emergency landing condition requirements in § 25.561 

have been updated three times2. The 90 forward load requirement was based on research 

and in-service data available when the rule was originally promulgated. The FAA 

reviewed this standard each time§ 25.561 was updated, and concluded each time that the 

research and data available at each amendment level indicated that the standard was still necessary and appropriate for the transport airplane fleet (which included the Boeing 747 

airplane). The Boeing 747 does not contain any unique features or attributes that affect the 

applicability and appropriateness of the 90 forward emergency landing load requirement. 

2. As discussed in the United States Air Force (USAF) Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) 

report referenced by the petitioner [Cargo Aircraft and Spacecraft Forward Restraint 

Criteria, Technical Report ASD-TR-76-30 (December 1977) (" 1977 USAF Technical 

Report")], it was found during FAA crash tests that instrumentation on pallet loads and 

seats recorded different 0-force levels at the same lateral location in the aircraft. It was 

1Boeing W&B Manual: The Boeing W&B Manual is referenced in the operating limitations section ofthe airplane flight manual. It is, 

therefore, legally mandatory under§ 91.9. 

2 14 CFR § 25.561 was revised at amendment 25-23, 5/8/1970; amendment 25-64, 6/16/1988; amendment 25-91, 7/29/1997 

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tall rigid cargo. While these methods have been shown to satisfy the requirements of 

§§ 25.561 and 25.787, these may not be the only acceptable methods. The FAA will 

consider proposals for changes to the Boeing747 W&B manual for other methods, provided 

sufficient substantiating data is included with each proposal. While the petitioner has 

indicated that there may be features unique to the Boeing 747 cargo airplane that may 

mitigate the safety risk to occupants during a crash event, the petitioner has provided no 

data to show that the occupants would be afforded the same level of safety (intended by the 

regulations) during a crash landing if the proposed lower emergency landing loads were 

employed. 

4. Crash landings in any kind of transport airplane are rare. Nevertheless, the FAA has 

imposed standards to ensure occupants are protected when survivable crash landings do 

occur. The requirements in§ 25.561 are intended to protect occupants in the event of a rare 

crash landing, up to what is considered a survivable event in a transport category airplane. 

The requirements have evolved over many years, supported by extensive research and inservice data. To grant an exemption, we must find that it's in the public interest, the 

primary consideration of which is safety. The petitioner has offered nothing to indicate 

that, in the event of a rare crash landing, the occupants would be protected. 

5. The emergency landing condition requirements in§ 25.561 apply to all transport category 

airplanes. The 9G forward load factor in§ 25.561 is considered adequate and appropriate 

for crash events that are considered survivable. While there may not have been a specific 

crash event involving a Boeing 747 where the airplane has been subjected to a condition 

equivalent to the most severe event addressed by the regulatory standards (e.g., maximum 

forward emergency landing load), the standards were developed with consideration of the 

available data deemed applicable to all transport category airplanes. The longitudinal loads 

experienced during a survivable crash landing, and the physiological effects on occupants, 

are similar regardless of airplane type. As noted above, the FAA finds that the Boeing 7 4 7 

does not contain any unique features or attributes that would warrant a forward emergency 

landing load factor different than that provided in § 25.561. 

The fact that, to date, there has not been a Boeing 747 crash landing with the maximum 

forward emergency landing load is irrelevant to whether the standard is appropriate for 

protecting occupants in the event of a crash landing in which that load is experienced. 

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throughout the impact sequence. The FAA findings were discussed in the FAA Notice of 

Proposed Rule Making for Amendment 25-64 of§ 25.561, Docket No. 25040. The 

petitioner has provided no data demonstrating these findings are inapplicable to the Boeing 

7 4 7 or that compliance with the current standards would not protect occupants in an 

otherwise survivable crash landing. 

7. In the summary of the USAF report, it is stated that the probability of occurrence of a crash 

landing that would produce a longitudinal force between the range of 3G and 9G on cargo 

was low, and this probability is not accounted for in the FAA rule. Consideration of this 

low probability, coupled with the unique mission ofthe USAF, supported the use of a 

lower longitudinal load factor than that used by the FAA for the civilian fleet. However, 

later USAF aircraft, including the KC-10 and the Boeing 767-2C tanker, were required by 

the USAF to meet a 9G forward emergency landing load requirement. 

The probability of crash landings of different levels of severity was not considered in the 

development of the emergency landing factors in§ 25.561. These factors are intended to 

protect occupants in precisely those circumstances in which the aircraft itself may be 

destroyed, but the crash loads and their effects on occupants are survivable. 

The FAA 9G emergency landing load standard can be traced back to promulgation of the 

emergency landing conditions requirement in Civil Air Regulations 4b.260, Amendment 4b-6, 

effective March 5, 1952. The origin ofthe 9G forward load requirement in the § 4b.260 was 

investigated and documented by ASD in the aforementioned USAF report. In the USAF study, the 

ASD traced the roots of this requirement back to crash investigations and crash tests of various 

aircraft types conducted between the 1920s and 1950s. Later investigations included the 

consideration of the differences in dynamic responses of crew/passenger seats, cargo/cargo 

restraint systems, and aircraft structure. The regulations have since been updated to improve crew 

and passenger safety for emergency landing and crash conditions. 

The current regulatory standards have established a level of safety for the overall airplane through 

the FAA's rulemaking process. Based on review of available data, including this USAF study, the 

FAA cannot justify what would amount to a significant reduction in the airworthiness safety 

standards. The FAA concludes that granting this exemption for all Boeing 74 7 cargo operations is 

not in the public interest, and is not a benefit to the public as a whole as the alternative standard 

(reduction in the emergency landing load factors of§ 25.561(b)(3)(ii) to 3G forward) proposed by 

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cargo on the Boeing 747 may not be economically advantageous, the FAA recognizes that methods 

can be developed that are both practical and economically viable. New methods may include the addition of barrier nets, fixed airplane anchor points, and other methods that have previously been 

employed in other mission specific airplanes. 

FAA has coordinated with United States (US) Department ofDefense (DoD) representatives 

regarding retrograde activity in Afghanistan: the current US Administration has indicated that by 

the end of 2014, the US troops in Afghanistan will transition from a combat to a support role, 

resulting in withdrawal ofthe majority of US troops from Afghanistan. This action will require the 

transport of a large quantity of cargo by contract air carriers. A significant amount of this cargo is 

considered "tall rigid cargo" as described above. This is a unique, time-limited mission, linked to 

US national security. As noted by the petitioner, granting of this exemption would allow National 

Airlines to carry cargo under contract of the US DoD to remove cargo from Afghanistan to support 

US National interests. 

The FAA's Decision 

The FAA has concluded that it is in the public interest to grant a time-limited exemption from 

§§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141, to not apply the forward 

emergency landing load factor of9G specified in§ 25.561(b)(3)(ii) for restraint of cargo on the 

main deck of Boeing 747 series airplanes. This partial grant is identical to previously granted 

Exemption No. 11096 (copy enclosed). This exemption applies only to all-cargo flights 

originating in Afghanistan for the transport of cargo for the DoD, including all flight segments to 

reach the intended final destination, provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not altered 

or changed prior to reaching the final destination. 

Section 25.561 provides requirements for emergency landing conditions on land or water where 

the airplane may be damaged or destroyed. The scope of this exemption is limited to the forward 

loads ofthe emergency landing conditions of section 25.561(b)(3)(ii). This exemption provides no 

relief from flight loads. Part 25 subpart C - Structure, under the subheadings Flight Loads and 

Flight Maneuver and Gust Conditions, provides requirements for in-flight conditions for all 

transport category airplanes. All cargo must be secured to the loads prescribed for these in-flight 

conditions. 

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shipping containers. In discussions with the DoD, DoD representatives have indicated that one 

mode of transit employed by the DoD to remove this cargo from Afghanistan is by the use of air 

cargo carriers. Existing limitations in air carrier cargo operator manuals limit the amount of cargo 

that can be carried on Boeing 747 cargo airplanes, which is one ofthe primary airplane models 

used for this mission. Representatives of the DoD have indicated that these limitations may inhibit 

the ability of the DoD to meet their planned mission requirement to remove military equipment 

from Afghanistan by the end of2014. By easing the current limitations in the air carrier cargo 

operator manuals, this exemption would allow the petitioner to better support the DoD mission. 

Documentation ofthis communication may be found in docket FAA-2014-0184. 

The FAA is aware of concerns raised by the petitioner regarding the perception of a lack of parity 

within the air cargo transport industry as it relates to the usage of Boeing 747 cargo airplanes and 

compliance with the subject regulations. The FAA is investigating this issue to determine whether 

regulatory action is necessary and appropriate. 

The Grant of Exemption 

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a partial grant of exemption is in the public interest 

and provides a benefit to the public as a whole. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 

49 U.S.C. §§ 106(±), 40113 and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, National Air Cargo 

Group, Inc. (National Airlines), is hereby granted a time-limited exemption from§§ 91.9(a), 

91.1 025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141, to not apply the forward emergency 

landing load factor of 9G specified in § 25.561 (b )(3 )(ii), for restraint of cargo on the main deck of 

Boeing 747 series airplanes, subject to the conditions and limitations below. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. This exemption applies only to all-cargo flights originating in Afghanistan for the transport 

of cargo for the United States Department of Defense, including all flight segments to reach 

the intended final destination, provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not 

altered or changed prior to reaching the final destination. 

2. All cargo must be secured for all flight loads as required by 14 CFR part 25, subpart C. 

This exemption provides no relief from 14 CFR part 25, subpart C, flight loads. 

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Director, Flight Standards Service 

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