UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

VICTORIA NWAOBASI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1648

FIRST SECURITY FEDERAL SAVINGS

BANK, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(CA-95-3516-CCB)

Submitted: December 31, 1996

Decided: January 13, 1997

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Erroll D. Brown, Kirk A. Wilder, LAW OFFICES OF ERROLL D.

BROWN, Landover, Maryland, for Appellant. Lawrence S. Greenwald, Bradford W. Warbasse, GORDON, FEINBLATT, ROTHMAN,

HOFFBERGER & HOLLANDER, L.L.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Victoria Nwaobasi, an African woman, filed an EEOC complaint

against her employer, First Security Mortgage ("mortgage division"),

and Jane McQuilkin, a senior vice-president of First Security Federal

Savings Bank ("First Security"), alleging race and sex discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation in her employment in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1961, as amended , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

(1994). The EEOC issued a right to sue letter in September 1994, and

Nwaobasi filed a timely complaint in the district court in October

1994.

The mortgage division filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

it lacked the capacity to be sued because it was an unincorporated

subsidiary of First Security. The district court granted the mortgage

division's motion and dismissed Nwaobasi's complaint without prejudice, at the same time granting Nwaobasi's motion to substitute First

Security as a party. The district court gave Nwaobasi fifteen days to

serve process on First Security, but Nwaobasi failed to comply until

four months after the district court's order. First Security filed a second motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of service of process.

The district court granted the motion in September 1995 and dismissed Nwaobasi's complaint without prejudice. Nwaobasi did not

appeal that order.

Nwaobasi filed a second complaint, identical to the first, in

November 1995. First Security again filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the complaint was time-barred because it was filed more

than ninety days after receipt of the right to sue letter. Nwaobasi did

not file an opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the district court

dismissed the second complaint in March 1996. The court also denied

Nwaobasi's motion for reconsideration, and she timely appealed both

orders. We affirm.

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This court reviews the district court's decision to dismiss Nwaobasi's claim de novo. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir.

1991). We find persuasive the policy followed in several other circuits that dismissal of a Title VII claim without prejudice does not toll

the ninety-day limitations period. See Minnette v. Time Warner, 997

F.2d 1023, 1027 (2d Cir. 1993); Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975

F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist.

No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Grumman Ohio

Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 27-28 (6th Cir. 1987). Since Nwaobasi filed her

second complaint more than one year after receiving her right to sue

letter, that complaint was time-barred.

Nwaobasi's other arguments were not raised before the district

court, and they cannot now be raised on appeal. Singleton v. Wulff,

428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Muth v. United States , 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th

Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. First Security's

unopposed motion to take judicial notice is granted. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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