J-S33017-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

HILDA CID 

Appellant

v.

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 484 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 2019-24877

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2021

Appellant Hilda Cid appeals from the order denying her motion to strike 

or set aside the arbitration award in favor of Appellee Erie Insurance 

Exchange. Appellant raises numerous claims of trial court error. Because we 

agree with the trial court that Appellant waived her claims, we affirm.

We state the facts and procedural history as presented by the trial court:

[Appellant] commenced the instant action on October 18, 2019, 

by filing a “petition to appoint a third/neutral arbitrator and to 

order arbitration to begin within sixty (60) days of this order.” The 

action relates to a dispute between [Appellant] and [Appellee] 

over underinsured motorist benefits (UIM). [Appellant], an 

insured of [Appellee] at all times relevant, seeks UIM benefits in 

connection with a motor vehicle accident in 2005.

The Honorable Thomas P. Rogers appointed a neutral arbitrator 

and the UIM dispute proceeded to arbitration before a threearbitrator panel. The arbitrators issued an award on July 9, 2020, 

in which they concluded:
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1. [Appellant] recovered $50,000 from the motorist 

responsible for the accident of 5/10/2005 in compensation 

for her bodily injuries sustained in that accident.

2. The damages for bodily injury [Appellant] is legally 

entitled to recover from the motorist responsible for the 

accident of 5/10/2005 do not exceed the sum of $50,000.

3. Accordingly, the arbitrators award the sum of zero dollars 

($0) in underinsured motorist benefits.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/3/21, at 1-2 (formatting altered). We add that the insurance 

policy’s arbitration clause states that “any arbitration will follow the arbitration 

provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1927.” Ex. A to Brief in Support of the 

Response in Opp’n of Appellee to Appellant’s Petition to Appoint a Neutral 

Arbitrator, 11/12/19.

On Monday, August 10, 2020, Appellant timely filed a motion to strike 

and/or set aside arbitration award, appoint a new arbitrator, and order a new 

arbitration hearing. Appellant’s Mot. to Strike and/or Set Aside Arbitration 

Award, 8/10/20, at 25. Appellant’s motion to strike attached thirty-two 

exhibits and raised numerous issues that, according to the trial court, were 

“difficult to discern.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (stating that “it is difficult to 

discern the material facts substantiating [Appellant’s] request for relief”). 

Appellant’s motion, however, did not request any modification or correction 

of the arbitration award. See Appellant’s Mot. to Strike and/or Set Aside 

Arbitration Award at 25. On February 9, 2021, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion. Order, 2/9/21.
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On March 5, 2021, Appellant timely appealed.1 The trial court did not 

order Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).2 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue: “Whether the trial court 

erred in refusing to dismiss and/or strike/vacate the result of [Appellant’s] 

arbitration award?” Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

In support of her sole issue, Appellant raises numerous arguments, 

including a claim that judicial estoppel applies to bind Appellee into 

recognizing her injuries, and Appellee cannot contend otherwise. Id. at 9-10. 

Appellant similarly contends that judicial estoppel also prevents Appellee from 

opposing Appellant’s request for delay damages, and regardless, she is 

entitled to delay damages. Id. at 11-12. Appellant asserts that her husband’s 

testimony at the arbitration hearing was sufficient to support her claim for loss 

of consortium/emotional distress. Id. at 12-14. Appellant claims the 

arbitration panel erred by not holding Appellee in contempt for alleged 

discovery violations, and, therefore, Appellant was entitled to a default 

judgment in her favor. Id. at 14-16. 

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1 Appellant purported to appeal on behalf of both herself and her husband, 

Leonardo Cid. Notice of Appeal, 3/5/21. The record reflects, however, that

Appellant’s husband is not a party to this action. Compare Appellant’s Pet. 

to Appoint a Third/Neutral Arbitrator, 10/18/19, at ¶ 1 (identifying only 

Appellant as the plaintiff), with Appellant’s Brief at 9 (referring to both 

Appellant and her husband as appellants). 

2 The record transmitted to this Court did not include the record from the 

arbitration hearing or the hearing transcript before the arbitration panel.
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Appellant also alleges that Appellee’s counsel had a conflict of interest 

and should have been barred from representing Appellee. Id. at 16-18. 

Relatedly, Appellant asserts that because she subpoenaed two of Appellee’s 

counsel to testify, they should have been disqualified from representing 

Appellee. Id. at 19-20. 

Appellant additionally claims that arbitration should not be permitted in 

Pennsylvania, and these claims are intertwined with allegations that the 

arbitrators were biased against her. Id. at 20-23. Finally, Appellant maintains 

that she is entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the insurance policy as her 

claims are not arbitrable.3 Id. at 23-27.

We are guided by the following summary of the law in Racicot v. Erie 

Ins. Exchange, 837 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. 2003), which also addressed an 

arbitration under the Arbitration Act of 1927:

the trial court’s standard of review in a proceeding to modify or 

correct the arbitration award is that set forth at [42 Pa.C.S. § 

7302(d)(2)]:

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3 Appellant’s appellate brief copied, nearly word-for-word, her argument 

section in support of her motion to strike and her final arbitration 

memorandum, which was attached as an exhibit to her motion to strike. 

Compare Appellant’s Brief at 9-27, with Ex. 14 to Appellant’s Mot. to Strike 

and/or Set Aside Arbitration Award; see also Appellee’s Brief at 15 n.7 

(stating, “[a]s evident via review of the original record forwarded from the 

trial court, [Appellant’s] brief herein is a carbon copy of the brief reviewed by 

the trial court”); Appellee’s Resp. in Opp’n to Appellant’s Mot. to Strike and/or 

Set Aside Arbitration Award, 9/4/20 (claiming that Appellant copied and 

pasted pleadings filed in other counties). For example, in her appellate brief, 

Appellant requests that Appellee “be precluded from presenting any evidence 

at the trial of this matter.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (emphasis added).
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Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an 

arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall, 

notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 

modify or correct the award where the award is contrary to 

law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court 

would have entered a different judgment or a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2). 

[Section 7302(d)(2)] grants a trial court the power to “modify or 

correct the award where the award is contrary to law,” but this 

provision does not grant a trial court the power to vacate an 

award of arbitrators.

In cases such as this, where arbitration is governed by statute and 

not common law, a trial court may vacate an award of a board of 

arbitrators only in a very limited set of circumstances.

Racicot, 837 A.2d at 499-500 (last emphasis in original, formatting altered, 

and footnote and some citations omitted); accord Pantelis v. Erie Ins. 

Exch., 890 A.2d 1063, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that this “Court may 

reverse a trial court’s decision to affirm, modify or correct an arbitration award 

arising from an insurance contract only if the trial court abused its discretion 

or committed an error of law” (citations and footnote omitted)).

4

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In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heintz, 804 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2002), 

the Court similarly observed as follows regarding the standard of review for 

an arbitration under the Arbitration Act of 1927:

Section 7302(d)(2) provides that a court shall modify or correct 

an arbitration award where it is contrary to law. In applying this 

standard, a panel of this Court observed that under the Act of 

1927, the power to enter the equivalent of judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict is provided as part of the power to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Section 7314 sets forth the “very limited set of circumstances”

applicable to vacating an award in a statutory arbitration, including:

(1) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award 

where:

(i) . . . 

(ii) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a 

neutral or corruption or misconduct in any of the arbitrators 

prejudicing the rights of any party;

(iii) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(iv) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon good 

cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence 

material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the 

hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 7307 (relating to 

hearing before arbitrators), as to prejudice substantially the 

rights of a party . . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1)(ii)-(iv).5

In Pantelis, the Court initially examined whether the appellant had 

properly preserved issues for appellate review because “[i]ssues not raised in 

an earlier proceeding cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pantelis, 

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modify or correct an award. When exercising this power to grant 

relief as a result of legal error, courts should be careful to clarify 

that they are modifying or correcting the award, rather than 

vacating it. Similarly, petitioners who seek relief from a legally 

erroneous arbitration award should be careful to caption their 

petitions as petitions to modify or correct the award, because § 

7302(d)(2) authorizes only modification or correction.

Heintz, 804 A.2d at 1214-15 (citations and footnote omitted and formatting 

altered).

5 Subsections (i) and (v) have no bearing on this case. 
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890 A.2d at 1066 (citation omitted). In that case, the Pantelis Court 

reviewed the arbitration transcript, which revealed that the appellant had 

properly preserved the issues for appellate review. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal”). In contrast, in Del Ciotto v. Pa. Hosp. of the 

Univ. of Penn Health Sys., 177 A.3d 335 (Pa. Super. 2017), an appeal from 

an arbitration award, the plaintiff failed to indicate in the record where he 

raised or preserved a particular issue. Del Ciotto, 177 A.3d at 358 n.19. The 

Del Ciotto Court therefore held that the plaintiff waived the issue. Id. at 

358.

Finally, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, 

when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a 

Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Branch Banking & Trust v.

Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942-43 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “We 

shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record 

to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will deem [the] issue to 

be waived.” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

Instantly, like the plaintiff in Del Ciotto, Appellant did not identify where 

in the record she raised or preserved her numerous arguments before the 

arbitration panel. See Del Ciotto, 177 A.3d at 358 n.19. Indeed, as noted 

herein, the arbitration record was not made part of the record, unlike in 
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Pantelis, in which the arbitration transcript was part of the record and the 

Court held the appellant had preserved the issues. See Pantelis, 890 A.2d 

at 1066. Therefore, identical to the Del Ciotto Court, we similarly hold that 

Appellant has waived her arguments for appellate review. See Del Ciotto, 

177 A.3d at 358; accord Pa.R.A.P. 302.

Even if Appellant did not waive her arguments on that basis, we agree 

with the trial court that Appellant failed to properly develop the arguments in 

her appellate brief, primarily because it duplicated her prior trial court 

pleadings. See Gesiorski, 904 A.2d at 942-43; accord Appellee’s Brief at 

15 n.7 (noting Appellant’s “brief herein is a carbon copy of the brief reviewed 

by the trial court”). Because Appellant’s brief was originally written for the

trial court, it did not explain how the trial court abused its discretion or erred 

as a matter of law by denying her motion to strike or set aside the arbitration 

award. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 15. Further, like the Milby Court, we 

similarly decline to act as Appellant’s counsel, develop these claims on her 

behalf, and argue how the trial court abused its discretion. See Milby, 189 

A.3d at 1079.

Finally, we note that Appellant requested that the trial court vacate the 

arbitration award and order a new arbitration hearing. See Appellant’s Mot. 

to Strike and/or Set Aside Arbitration Award, at 25. Although Section 

7302(d)(2) authorizes modification or correction of the arbitration award, it 

“does not grant a trial court the power to vacate an award of arbitrators,”
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except under limited circumstances. See Racicot, 837 A.2d at 499 (last 

emphasis in original and citation and footnote omitted); Heintz, 804 A.2d at 

1214-15. Although arbitrator misconduct is one such limited circumstance, 

see 42 Pa.C.S. § 7314(a)(1)(ii), as set forth herein, Appellant failed to 

properly raise and preserve such a claim. See Del Ciotto, 177 A.3d at 358 

n.19; Gesiorski, 904 A.2d at 942-43. For all these reasons, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by denying Appellant’s 

motion. See Pantelis, 890 A.2d at 1065; Racicot, 837 A.2d at 499-500.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2021