# Official Journal C 447/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 447 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5713 December 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 447

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5713 December 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 447/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7414 — ReAssure/HSBC Life UK) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 447/02 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7437 — Blackstone/TPG/Kensington) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 447/03 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7425 — Robert Bosch/BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2014/C 447/04 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7307 — Electricity Supply Board/Vodafone Ireland/JV) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2014/C 447/05 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7381 — Airbus/Singapore Airlines/AATC) (
  1
  ) | 3 |
| 2014/C 447/06 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7231 — Vodafone/ONO) (
  1
  ) | 3 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 447/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7414 — ReAssure/HSBC Life UK) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 447/02

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7437 — Blackstone/TPG/Kensington) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 447/03

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7425 — Robert Bosch/BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte) (
  1
  )

1

2

2014/C 447/04

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7307 — Electricity Supply Board/Vodafone Ireland/JV) (
  1
  )

1

2

2014/C 447/05

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7381 — Airbus/Singapore Airlines/AATC) (
  1
  )

1

3

2014/C 447/06

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7231 — Vodafone/ONO) (
  1
  )

1

3

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 447/07 | Euro exchange rates | 4 |
| 2014/C 447/08 | Adoption of Commission Decision on the transitional national plan communicated by the Portuguese Republic in accordance with Article 32(5) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council | 5 |
| 2014/C 447/09 | Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third country pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing | 6 |
| 2014/C 447/10 | Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing | 16 |
| 2014/C 447/11 | Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 on notifying a third country of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing | 23 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2014/C 447/12 | Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries | 30 |
| 2014/C 447/13 | Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries | 30 |
| 2014/C 447/14 | Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries | 31 |
| 2014/C 447/15 | Update of reference amounts for the crossing of the external borders, as referred to in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) | 32 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 447/07

Euro exchange rates

4

2014/C 447/08

Adoption of Commission Decision on the transitional national plan communicated by the Portuguese Republic in accordance with Article 32(5) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

5

2014/C 447/09

Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third country pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

6

2014/C 447/10

Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

16

2014/C 447/11

Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 on notifying a third country of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

23

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2014/C 447/12

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

30

2014/C 447/13

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

30

2014/C 447/14

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

31

2014/C 447/15

Update of reference amounts for the crossing of the external borders, as referred to in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)

32

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7414 — ReAssure/HSBC Life UK)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/01)

On 5 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7414. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7414. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7437 — Blackstone/TPG/Kensington)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/02)

On 5 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in the English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7437. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7437. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/2

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7425 — Robert Bosch/BSH Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/03)

On 3 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in German language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7425. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7425. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/2

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7307 — Electricity Supply Board/Vodafone Ireland/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/04)

On 24 October 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7307. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7307. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7381 — Airbus/Singapore Airlines/AATC)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/05)

On 8 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7381. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7381. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/3

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7231 — Vodafone/ONO)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 447/06)

On 2 July 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7231. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7231. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/4

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Euro exchange rates (1)

12 December 2014

(2014/C 447/07)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,2450 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 147,41 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4370 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,79250 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,3700 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2010 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,1190 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,590 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 308,93 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,45280 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1735 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4673 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,8523 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,5056 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4417 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 9,6517 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5946 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6307 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 372,22 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 14,4769 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,7049 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,6740 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 579,32 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,3502 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 55,410 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 71,4175 |
| THB | Thai baht | 40,824 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,3071 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,5119 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 77,7677 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,2450

JPY

Japanese yen

147,41

DKK

Danish krone

7,4370

GBP

Pound sterling

0,79250

SEK

Swedish krona

9,3700

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2010

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,1190

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,590

HUF

Hungarian forint

308,93

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,45280

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1735

RON

Romanian leu

4,4673

TRY

Turkish lira

2,8523

AUD

Australian dollar

1,5056

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4417

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

9,6517

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5946

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6307

KRW

South Korean won

1 372,22

ZAR

South African rand

14,4769

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,7049

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,6740

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 579,32

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,3502

PHP

Philippine peso

55,410

RUB

Russian rouble

71,4175

THB

Thai baht

40,824

BRL

Brazilian real

3,3071

MXN

Mexican peso

18,5119

INR

Indian rupee

77,7677

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/5

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Adoption of Commission Decision on the transitional national plan communicated by the Portuguese Republic in accordance with Article 32(5) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

(2014/C 447/08)

On 11 December 2014, the Commission adopted Decision C(2014) 9360 on the transitional national plan communicated by the Portuguese Republic in accordance with Article 32(5) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) on industrial emissions (1).

This document is available on the following internet site: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/36205e98-8e7a-47d7-808d-931bc5baf6ee

---

(1)  OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17.

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/6

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COMMISSION DECISION

of 12 December 2014

notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third country pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

(2014/C 447/09)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (1), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

| (2) | Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (5) | The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation.

| (6) | In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries.

| (7) | Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries.

| (8) | Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation.

2.   PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

| (9) | The notification of Solomon Islands as flag State was accepted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 of the IUU Regulation as of 1 January 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The notification of Solomon Islands as flag State was accepted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 of the IUU Regulation as of 1 January 2010.

| (10) | From 11 to 14 February 2014, the Commission, with the support of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), visited the Solomon Islands in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

From 11 to 14 February 2014, the Commission, with the support of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), visited the Solomon Islands in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation.

| (11) | The visit sought to verify information concerning the Solomon Islands’ arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels, the measures taken by the Solomon Islands to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing and to fulfil its requirements and points pertaining to the implementation of the Union’s catch certification scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The visit sought to verify information concerning the Solomon Islands’ arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels, the measures taken by the Solomon Islands to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing and to fulfil its requirements and points pertaining to the implementation of the Union’s catch certification scheme.

| (12) | The final report of the visit was sent to the Solomon Islands on 28 February 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The final report of the visit was sent to the Solomon Islands on 28 February 2014.

| (13) | The preliminary comments of Solomon Islands on that final report were received on 6 May 2014 and 20 May 2014. A formal reply to the observations on the legal and administrative framework was submitted on 1 October 2014 and 6 October 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The preliminary comments of Solomon Islands on that final report were received on 6 May 2014 and 20 May 2014. A formal reply to the observations on the legal and administrative framework was submitted on 1 October 2014 and 6 October 2014.

| (14) | Further information on the application of the Union’s catch certification scheme, following request from the Commission on 19 March 2014, was submitted by the Solomon Islands on 28 March 2014 and 7 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Further information on the application of the Union’s catch certification scheme, following request from the Commission on 19 March 2014, was submitted by the Solomon Islands on 28 March 2014 and 7 June 2014.

| (15) | A meeting took place between the Solomon Islands and the Commission on 20 May 2014. |
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(15)

A meeting took place between the Solomon Islands and the Commission on 20 May 2014.

| (16) | The Solomon Islands are a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). The Solomon Islands ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). It is party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (2) (FFA Convention) and to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest (3). |
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(16)

The Solomon Islands are a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). The Solomon Islands ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). It is party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (2) (FFA Convention) and to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest (3).

| (17) | In order to evaluate the Solomon Islands’ compliance with their international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital 16 and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) referred to in recital 16, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for that purpose. |
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(17)

In order to evaluate the Solomon Islands’ compliance with their international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital 16 and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) referred to in recital 16, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for that purpose.

| (18) | The Commission also used information derived from available data published by WCPFC as well as publicly available information. |
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(18)

The Commission also used information derived from available data published by WCPFC as well as publicly available information.

3.   POSSIBILITY OF THE SOLOMON ISLANDS BEING IDENTIFIED AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (19) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of the Solomon Islands as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(19)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of the Solomon Islands as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

3.1.   Recurrence of IUU Vessels and IUU trade flows (Article 31(4) of the IUU Regulation)

| (20) | With respect to Solomon Islands-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Solomon Islands-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Solomon Islands with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(20)

With respect to Solomon Islands-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Solomon Islands-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Solomon Islands with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation.

| (21) | Pursuant to Article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission also examined the measures taken by the Solomon Islands in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market. |
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(21)

Pursuant to Article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission also examined the measures taken by the Solomon Islands in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

| (22) | The Commission considers on the basis of an assessment of all the information at its disposal that Solomon Islands cannot ensure that fishery products entering the Solomon Islands or Solomon Islands-based processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing. That is due to systemic problems undermining the possibility of Solomon Islands authorities to trace catches because of the lack of available official information about fish landed, imported and/or processed. The main elements on which the Commission based its assessment are summarised in recitals 23 to 39. |
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(22)

The Commission considers on the basis of an assessment of all the information at its disposal that Solomon Islands cannot ensure that fishery products entering the Solomon Islands or Solomon Islands-based processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing. That is due to systemic problems undermining the possibility of Solomon Islands authorities to trace catches because of the lack of available official information about fish landed, imported and/or processed. The main elements on which the Commission based its assessment are summarised in recitals 23 to 39.

| (23) | The main fishing activities in waters under the Solomon Islands jurisdiction are not conducted by Solomon Islands-flagged vessels, but by vessels under foreign flags, which use in some cases local ports. In the report to the ninth session of the WCPFC’s 2013 Scientific Committee (4), the Solomon Islands state that a total of 434 vessels were active in the Solomon Islands waters in 2012, namely 214 purse-seine, 200 longline and 20 pole and line vessels. Only 6 purse-seine, 2 longline and 2 pole and line vessels were Solomon Islands-flagged. During the Commission’s visit in February 2014, the Solomon Islands’ authorities confirmed that 401 industrial fishing vessels were licensed to fish in Solomon Islands waters. The decrease of licensed vessels from 2012 is due to the reduction of licenses allocations for the vessels operating under charter agreement. Nevertheless, there are still 143 longline and 2 purse-seine vessels chartered by five locally-based companies. The size of the involved fleet underpins the necessity for measures ensuring non-access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to Solomon Islands market. |
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(23)

The main fishing activities in waters under the Solomon Islands jurisdiction are not conducted by Solomon Islands-flagged vessels, but by vessels under foreign flags, which use in some cases local ports. In the report to the ninth session of the WCPFC’s 2013 Scientific Committee (4), the Solomon Islands state that a total of 434 vessels were active in the Solomon Islands waters in 2012, namely 214 purse-seine, 200 longline and 20 pole and line vessels. Only 6 purse-seine, 2 longline and 2 pole and line vessels were Solomon Islands-flagged. During the Commission’s visit in February 2014, the Solomon Islands’ authorities confirmed that 401 industrial fishing vessels were licensed to fish in Solomon Islands waters. The decrease of licensed vessels from 2012 is due to the reduction of licenses allocations for the vessels operating under charter agreement. Nevertheless, there are still 143 longline and 2 purse-seine vessels chartered by five locally-based companies. The size of the involved fleet underpins the necessity for measures ensuring non-access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to Solomon Islands market.

| (24) | According to the Tuna Management and Development plan draft submitted in November 2013 by the Solomon Islands, total catches in Solomon Islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) amounted to 93 000 tonnes in 2012. That represents around half of the catches of previous years (185 000 tonnes in 2010 and 177 000 tonnes in 2011). |
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(24)

According to the Tuna Management and Development plan draft submitted in November 2013 by the Solomon Islands, total catches in Solomon Islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) amounted to 93 000 tonnes in 2012. That represents around half of the catches of previous years (185 000 tonnes in 2010 and 177 000 tonnes in 2011).

| (25) | The tuna processing industry in Solomon Islands is expanding. Indeed, there are several projects by foreign investors to set up new plants in joint venture with the Solomon Islands. Therefore, the Commission analysed the situation pertaining to the activities of that industry and any impact that those operations may have in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to the Solomon Islands market. |
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(25)

The tuna processing industry in Solomon Islands is expanding. Indeed, there are several projects by foreign investors to set up new plants in joint venture with the Solomon Islands. Therefore, the Commission analysed the situation pertaining to the activities of that industry and any impact that those operations may have in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to the Solomon Islands market.

| (26) | The International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (5) (IPOA IUU) provides guidance on internationally agreed market-related measures which support the reduction or elimination of trade in fish and fish products derived from IUU fishing. The IPOA IUU also suggests in point 71 that States should take steps to improve the transparency of their markets in order to allow the traceability of fish or fish products. Equally, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct) outlines, in particular in its Article 11, good practices for post-harvest and responsible international trade. Article 11(1)(11) of that Code of Conduct (6) requests States to ensure that fish and fishery products are traded internationally and domestically in accordance with sound conservation and management practices through improving the identification of the origin of fish and fishery products. |
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(26)

The International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (5) (IPOA IUU) provides guidance on internationally agreed market-related measures which support the reduction or elimination of trade in fish and fish products derived from IUU fishing. The IPOA IUU also suggests in point 71 that States should take steps to improve the transparency of their markets in order to allow the traceability of fish or fish products. Equally, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct) outlines, in particular in its Article 11, good practices for post-harvest and responsible international trade. Article 11(1)(11) of that Code of Conduct (6) requests States to ensure that fish and fishery products are traded internationally and domestically in accordance with sound conservation and management practices through improving the identification of the origin of fish and fishery products.

| (27) | During its visit to Solomon Islands in February 2014, the Commission met with an operator of a tuna processing plant whose products are exported to the Union. |
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(27)

During its visit to Solomon Islands in February 2014, the Commission met with an operator of a tuna processing plant whose products are exported to the Union.

| (28) | According to that economic operator, its processing plant is exclusively supplied by the purse-seine vessels flagged in the Solomon Islands with regard to the production of cooked tuna loins or flakes for the Union market. The rest stems from longline vessels and is exported mainly to the US or the regional market (Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New-Guinea). The processing plant would be supplied only with domestic products without importation of raw material. However, in that context, it has to be highlighted that according to the understanding of competent authorities all catches obtained in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ are considered as originating in the Solomon Islands irrespective of the fishing vessel’s flag, contrary to the basic rules of origin rules existing in EU law (7). It was also evident that the Solomon Islands authorities had not introduced any specific measure to control the provenance of the fish raw materials and no specific measures were detected to monitor the access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to the Solomon Islands. In that respect, there is a risk that raw material caught by fishing vessels flagged in a country other than the Solomon Islands, including countries which are not allowed to export to the Union under the IUU Regulation, enters the processing industry without adequate control on the products’ traceability. |
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(28)

According to that economic operator, its processing plant is exclusively supplied by the purse-seine vessels flagged in the Solomon Islands with regard to the production of cooked tuna loins or flakes for the Union market. The rest stems from longline vessels and is exported mainly to the US or the regional market (Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New-Guinea). The processing plant would be supplied only with domestic products without importation of raw material. However, in that context, it has to be highlighted that according to the understanding of competent authorities all catches obtained in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ are considered as originating in the Solomon Islands irrespective of the fishing vessel’s flag, contrary to the basic rules of origin rules existing in EU law (7). It was also evident that the Solomon Islands authorities had not introduced any specific measure to control the provenance of the fish raw materials and no specific measures were detected to monitor the access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to the Solomon Islands. In that respect, there is a risk that raw material caught by fishing vessels flagged in a country other than the Solomon Islands, including countries which are not allowed to export to the Union under the IUU Regulation, enters the processing industry without adequate control on the products’ traceability.

| (29) | During its visit, the Commission also met with other operators. The Commission endeavoured to verify the basic principles and policies applied by operators with respect to traceability of trade flows of fishing products from net to plate. The operators could not answer clearly to the questions on the traceability chain and the establishment of the quantities sold and processed. As for the raw material sold to the processing plants in the Solomon Islands and other third countries, the processing plants rely purely on estimations of the weight and on the invoices they receive from their customers without making further verifications on the products. At no stage there is a real control or verification. Likewise, the processing plant operator attributes to each lot of raw material a code upon reception, but afterwards the products are not systematically followed through the processing chain, and no reliable link can be ensured between the final product and the actual underlying catch. |
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(29)

During its visit, the Commission also met with other operators. The Commission endeavoured to verify the basic principles and policies applied by operators with respect to traceability of trade flows of fishing products from net to plate. The operators could not answer clearly to the questions on the traceability chain and the establishment of the quantities sold and processed. As for the raw material sold to the processing plants in the Solomon Islands and other third countries, the processing plants rely purely on estimations of the weight and on the invoices they receive from their customers without making further verifications on the products. At no stage there is a real control or verification. Likewise, the processing plant operator attributes to each lot of raw material a code upon reception, but afterwards the products are not systematically followed through the processing chain, and no reliable link can be ensured between the final product and the actual underlying catch.

| (30) | In addition, the level of knowledge of customs officials in the Solomon Islands was found to be very basic. Customs officials rely on the declarations made by the operators on the export declaration without further verification of the quantities and no traceability system to link the consignment with the customs declarations. In doing so the authorities have no system of control on the raw material used for processing fisheries products and they cannot link the raw materials existing in Solomon Islands market with the exported fisheries products. |
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(30)

In addition, the level of knowledge of customs officials in the Solomon Islands was found to be very basic. Customs officials rely on the declarations made by the operators on the export declaration without further verification of the quantities and no traceability system to link the consignment with the customs declarations. In doing so the authorities have no system of control on the raw material used for processing fisheries products and they cannot link the raw materials existing in Solomon Islands market with the exported fisheries products.

| (31) | As regards the systems put in place to ensure traceability, the Commission concluded that the Solomon Islands were unable to ensure systematic control of the landings. Even though local authorities stated that 100 % of landings in the two authorised ports were covered, they could not prove how inspectors were deployed to ensure this coverage. The Commission found that only one inspector was posted in the port where most of landings take place while the rest of inspectors would move to the other port (which is not on the main island were authorities have their main administrative base and resources) after every landing. The Solomon Islands recognised the need to strengthen their control and monitoring system, such as the traceability system for fishery products, introduction of landing declarations and systematic controls and enhancement cooperation with customs authorities. |
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(31)

As regards the systems put in place to ensure traceability, the Commission concluded that the Solomon Islands were unable to ensure systematic control of the landings. Even though local authorities stated that 100 % of landings in the two authorised ports were covered, they could not prove how inspectors were deployed to ensure this coverage. The Commission found that only one inspector was posted in the port where most of landings take place while the rest of inspectors would move to the other port (which is not on the main island were authorities have their main administrative base and resources) after every landing. The Solomon Islands recognised the need to strengthen their control and monitoring system, such as the traceability system for fishery products, introduction of landing declarations and systematic controls and enhancement cooperation with customs authorities.

| (32) | A thorough analysis of catch certificates validated from the Solomon Islands authorities for exports to the Union revealed a series of weaknesses in the validation process. The Commission’s visit in February 2014 confirmed that analysis. In particular, it was concluded that there was a lack of a systematic control of the information provided in the catch certificates. There was no traceability system in place and the quantities stated in the catch certificate were established by the operator. The competent authorities have to completely rely on that. The catch certificates for the direct importations of processed products are systematically validated after the consignment has already left the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands are not in a position to ensure any control or traceability over those products which they physically never inspect. |
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(32)

A thorough analysis of catch certificates validated from the Solomon Islands authorities for exports to the Union revealed a series of weaknesses in the validation process. The Commission’s visit in February 2014 confirmed that analysis. In particular, it was concluded that there was a lack of a systematic control of the information provided in the catch certificates. There was no traceability system in place and the quantities stated in the catch certificate were established by the operator. The competent authorities have to completely rely on that. The catch certificates for the direct importations of processed products are systematically validated after the consignment has already left the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands are not in a position to ensure any control or traceability over those products which they physically never inspect.

| (33) | Further, the only validating officer does not have direct access to control data such as Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), licence information or logsheets. If any verification or cross-check takes place before the validation this has to be done via telephone calls to the headquarters of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources where the pertinent information is centralised. There was no documentation available on any such verification. |
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(33)

Further, the only validating officer does not have direct access to control data such as Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), licence information or logsheets. If any verification or cross-check takes place before the validation this has to be done via telephone calls to the headquarters of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources where the pertinent information is centralised. There was no documentation available on any such verification.

| (34) | The fact that the validation systematically is done the same day as the exporter declaration (with very few exceptions) indicates that prior verification and data cross-checks are limited if not inexistent. In any case, no documentation of the cross-checks was provided. |
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(34)

The fact that the validation systematically is done the same day as the exporter declaration (with very few exceptions) indicates that prior verification and data cross-checks are limited if not inexistent. In any case, no documentation of the cross-checks was provided.

| (35) | In addition, a number of deficiencies were detected in the catch certificates concerning incoherencies in the numbering system, insufficient information on the applicable conservation and management measures, the catch area as well as serious inconsistencies in the dates such as that the validation date indicated precedes the exporter declaration or the landing declaration precedes the catch date. Such basic errors put on stake the credibility of the entire validation procedure. |
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(35)

In addition, a number of deficiencies were detected in the catch certificates concerning incoherencies in the numbering system, insufficient information on the applicable conservation and management measures, the catch area as well as serious inconsistencies in the dates such as that the validation date indicated precedes the exporter declaration or the landing declaration precedes the catch date. Such basic errors put on stake the credibility of the entire validation procedure.

| (36) | The Commission also detected practices where no information on landings of fish existed (no landing declarations) and the Solomon Islands used alternatively information from transhipment authorisations at port to state quantities in catch certificates. Likewise, it was noted that operators use templates of catch certificates with prefilled information on the vessels, the species, the product codes, etc. There were samples found where the catch certificate was validated with spare lines for bigeye or yellowfin without the quantities. That opens the risk of manipulation of the catch certificate after validation. |
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(36)

The Commission also detected practices where no information on landings of fish existed (no landing declarations) and the Solomon Islands used alternatively information from transhipment authorisations at port to state quantities in catch certificates. Likewise, it was noted that operators use templates of catch certificates with prefilled information on the vessels, the species, the product codes, etc. There were samples found where the catch certificate was validated with spare lines for bigeye or yellowfin without the quantities. That opens the risk of manipulation of the catch certificate after validation.

| (37) | Furthermore, several examples of catch certificates were found where different versions with different quantities were presented upon importation of the products to the Union. The Solomon Islands explained that at the operator’s request they issue additional catch certificates for the same consignment, without questioning the reason for the demand or obtaining the initial original back to avoid fraudulent misuse. That practice together with the other shortcomings detected results in a considerable risk of laundering of IUU fishing or at least non-qualifying fish for export to the Union. In particular the countries in the region that are not qualified to export fish products to the Union could take advantage of the weaknesses of the validation system of the Solomon Islands to cover their fish for indirect importation to the Union. Again, the Solomon Islands showed a lack of understanding and awareness of the risk generated by with the over-coverage of quantities by duplication or triplication of catch certificates. |
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(37)

Furthermore, several examples of catch certificates were found where different versions with different quantities were presented upon importation of the products to the Union. The Solomon Islands explained that at the operator’s request they issue additional catch certificates for the same consignment, without questioning the reason for the demand or obtaining the initial original back to avoid fraudulent misuse. That practice together with the other shortcomings detected results in a considerable risk of laundering of IUU fishing or at least non-qualifying fish for export to the Union. In particular the countries in the region that are not qualified to export fish products to the Union could take advantage of the weaknesses of the validation system of the Solomon Islands to cover their fish for indirect importation to the Union. Again, the Solomon Islands showed a lack of understanding and awareness of the risk generated by with the over-coverage of quantities by duplication or triplication of catch certificates.

| (38) | The Solomon Islands accepted all the shortcomings of the catch certification scheme presented in recitals 32 to 37 and explained the mistakes by the incompetence of the officials in charge. They explained that they were working on improving the catch certification process. In that respect, a series of Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) have been drafted and the staff is being trained to facilitate their implementation. Nevertheless, all the information provided referred to future plans without any concrete tangible results. In addition, the Commission endeavoured to verify if the validation process of catch certificates improved following the Commission’s visit in February 2014 and the introduction of safeguard measures by the Solomon Islands. However, based on the information at its disposal, the Commission has not noted any improvement. |
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(38)

The Solomon Islands accepted all the shortcomings of the catch certification scheme presented in recitals 32 to 37 and explained the mistakes by the incompetence of the officials in charge. They explained that they were working on improving the catch certification process. In that respect, a series of Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) have been drafted and the staff is being trained to facilitate their implementation. Nevertheless, all the information provided referred to future plans without any concrete tangible results. In addition, the Commission endeavoured to verify if the validation process of catch certificates improved following the Commission’s visit in February 2014 and the introduction of safeguard measures by the Solomon Islands. However, based on the information at its disposal, the Commission has not noted any improvement.

| (39) | Given the established lack of traceability and lack of information available to the Solomon Islands about the fish landed, the Solomon Islands cannot ensure that fishery products entering the Solomon Islands or Solomon Islands-based processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing, as presented in recitals 28 to 37. The possibility to control access of IUU products and their subsequent export is also compromised by the ambiguous application of rules of origin as established in recital 28 — as well as by the absence of clear conservation and management measures, described in recitals 63 to 68. |
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(39)

Given the established lack of traceability and lack of information available to the Solomon Islands about the fish landed, the Solomon Islands cannot ensure that fishery products entering the Solomon Islands or Solomon Islands-based processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing, as presented in recitals 28 to 37. The possibility to control access of IUU products and their subsequent export is also compromised by the ambiguous application of rules of origin as established in recital 28 — as well as by the absence of clear conservation and management measures, described in recitals 63 to 68.

| (40) | Therefore, and given all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law as a coastal and market State to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to their market. |
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(40)

Therefore, and given all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law as a coastal and market State to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to their market.

3.2.   Failure to cooperate and to enforce (Article 31(5) of the IUU Regulation)

| (41) | The Commission analysed whether the Solomon Islands effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities. |
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(41)

The Commission analysed whether the Solomon Islands effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities.

| (42) | While the Solomon Islands involved in the implementation of the catch certification scheme of the IUU Regulation generally respond cooperatively and provide feedback to requests for information or verification, the reliability and correctness of their replies are compromised and undermined by the lack of transparency and the little or no possibilities to ensure traceability of fishery products as established in Section 3.1. |
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(42)

While the Solomon Islands involved in the implementation of the catch certification scheme of the IUU Regulation generally respond cooperatively and provide feedback to requests for information or verification, the reliability and correctness of their replies are compromised and undermined by the lack of transparency and the little or no possibilities to ensure traceability of fishery products as established in Section 3.1.

| (43) | In the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of the Solomon Islands’ duties to discharge its obligations as flag, port and coastal State, the Commission also analysed whether the Solomon Islands cooperate with other flag States in the fight against IUU fishing. |
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(43)

In the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of the Solomon Islands’ duties to discharge its obligations as flag, port and coastal State, the Commission also analysed whether the Solomon Islands cooperate with other flag States in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (44) | To that purpose, it was established during the Commission’s visit in February 2014 that there was a lack of willingness on the part of the Solomon Islands to cooperate with flag States of vessels operating in waters under their jurisdiction under different fisheries agreements, as the Solomon Islands were not providing flag States systematically with information pertaining to vessels’ data. That is a clear indication that the Solomon Islands do not fulfil their obligations under international law (in particular Article 7(1)(a) of the UNFSA) to ensure effective conservation and management of straddling fish stocks occurring in its waters and to ensure effective and efficient prevention of IUU fishing. That lack of cooperation also contradicts point 40 of FAO Voluntary guidelines on flag State performance (8), according to which flag and coastal States should only enter into fisheries agreements when both are satisfied that such activities will not undermine the sustainability of living marine resources within the jurisdiction of the coastal State. |
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(44)

To that purpose, it was established during the Commission’s visit in February 2014 that there was a lack of willingness on the part of the Solomon Islands to cooperate with flag States of vessels operating in waters under their jurisdiction under different fisheries agreements, as the Solomon Islands were not providing flag States systematically with information pertaining to vessels’ data. That is a clear indication that the Solomon Islands do not fulfil their obligations under international law (in particular Article 7(1)(a) of the UNFSA) to ensure effective conservation and management of straddling fish stocks occurring in its waters and to ensure effective and efficient prevention of IUU fishing. That lack of cooperation also contradicts point 40 of FAO Voluntary guidelines on flag State performance (8), according to which flag and coastal States should only enter into fisheries agreements when both are satisfied that such activities will not undermine the sustainability of living marine resources within the jurisdiction of the coastal State.

| (45) | Despite the important number of transhipments of foreign-flagged vessels taking place in the Solomon Islands, the country has not established a collaboration with the flag States of these vessels. Therefore, the Solomon Islands would not be in position to comply with their duties as port State under points 52 to 64 of IPOA IUU. In particular, the Solomon Islands do not comply with their obligations as port State vis-à-vis the foreign-flagged vessels using their ports as they are not cooperating with flag States on basic issues such as exchanging information on landings, transhipments and denials to use a port. Whereas, in their submission of 6 May 2014, the Solomon Islands authorities’ stated that they would write to concerned flag States to strengthen collaboration in completing the transhipment data required on catch certificates for exports to the Union, no concrete arrangements with third countries have been concluded up to now as regards exchange of information and data on transhipments. |
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(45)

Despite the important number of transhipments of foreign-flagged vessels taking place in the Solomon Islands, the country has not established a collaboration with the flag States of these vessels. Therefore, the Solomon Islands would not be in position to comply with their duties as port State under points 52 to 64 of IPOA IUU. In particular, the Solomon Islands do not comply with their obligations as port State vis-à-vis the foreign-flagged vessels using their ports as they are not cooperating with flag States on basic issues such as exchanging information on landings, transhipments and denials to use a port. Whereas, in their submission of 6 May 2014, the Solomon Islands authorities’ stated that they would write to concerned flag States to strengthen collaboration in completing the transhipment data required on catch certificates for exports to the Union, no concrete arrangements with third countries have been concluded up to now as regards exchange of information and data on transhipments.

| (46) | With regards to the collaboration with Union Member States on the control of the catch certificates validated by the Solomon Islands, the country received verification requests from three Union Member States. The requests were dealt with by the competent authorities and timely answered. However, the replies usually just confirmed the authenticity of the catch certificate without any further explanation. On the spot there was no documentation available on such verification requests. |
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(46)

With regards to the collaboration with Union Member States on the control of the catch certificates validated by the Solomon Islands, the country received verification requests from three Union Member States. The requests were dealt with by the competent authorities and timely answered. However, the replies usually just confirmed the authenticity of the catch certificate without any further explanation. On the spot there was no documentation available on such verification requests.

| (47) | The Commission analysed whether the Solomon Islands had taken effective enforcement measures in respect of operators responsible for IUU fishing and whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive the offenders of the benefits accruing from IUU fishing had been applied. |
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(47)

The Commission analysed whether the Solomon Islands had taken effective enforcement measures in respect of operators responsible for IUU fishing and whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive the offenders of the benefits accruing from IUU fishing had been applied.

| (48) | With respect to compliance and enforcement, the Commission’s visit revealed that Solomon Islands do not have specific legislation to address IUU fishing activities. Such an omission indicates that the Solomon Islands do not ensure flag State control over the fishing vessels as required under Article 94 of UNCLOS. In addition, the Solomon Islands performance with respect to compliance and enforcement is not in accordance with point 21 of the IPOA IUU which advises States to ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels under its jurisdiction are of sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. |
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(48)

With respect to compliance and enforcement, the Commission’s visit revealed that Solomon Islands do not have specific legislation to address IUU fishing activities. Such an omission indicates that the Solomon Islands do not ensure flag State control over the fishing vessels as required under Article 94 of UNCLOS. In addition, the Solomon Islands performance with respect to compliance and enforcement is not in accordance with point 21 of the IPOA IUU which advises States to ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels under its jurisdiction are of sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities.

| (49) | Indeed, in an audit report published in 2012, the Solomon Islands’ Auditor General (9) noted that the Fisheries Bill in force was outdated and did not cater for the country’s obligations under international, regional, and sub-regional agreements. That finding was agreed by the authorities with whom the Commission met during its visit in February 2014. A new draft of a Fisheries Bill was submitted prior to the visit. However, the sanctions contained in that draft are not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as requested in Article 25(7) of the WCPFC Convention (10). In particular, the sanction scheme relies on a penalty units system whose legal basis has still not been established. The Solomon Islands acknowledged the obsolescence of the system which has not been applied and explained that they were in the process of reviewing it. An updated draft of the Fisheries Bill was submitted on 6 October 2014. However, the situation remain still problematic because of the unclear definitions of serious infringements, penalty points, repeated infringements and level of penalties and because of their unclear legal consequences. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Indeed, in an audit report published in 2012, the Solomon Islands’ Auditor General (9) noted that the Fisheries Bill in force was outdated and did not cater for the country’s obligations under international, regional, and sub-regional agreements. That finding was agreed by the authorities with whom the Commission met during its visit in February 2014. A new draft of a Fisheries Bill was submitted prior to the visit. However, the sanctions contained in that draft are not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as requested in Article 25(7) of the WCPFC Convention (10). In particular, the sanction scheme relies on a penalty units system whose legal basis has still not been established. The Solomon Islands acknowledged the obsolescence of the system which has not been applied and explained that they were in the process of reviewing it. An updated draft of the Fisheries Bill was submitted on 6 October 2014. However, the situation remain still problematic because of the unclear definitions of serious infringements, penalty points, repeated infringements and level of penalties and because of their unclear legal consequences.

| (50) | With respect to the Solomon Islands’ existing capacity, it should be noted that, according to the United Nations Human Development Index (11), the Solomon Islands is considered as a low human development country (143rd in 186 countries in 2013). That is also confirmed by Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12) where Solomon Islands are listed in the category of least developed countries. The list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as at 1 January 2013 for reporting on 2012 (13) considers the Solomon Islands as a least developed country. In that respect, the financial and administrative capacity constraints of the competent authorities may be considered as a factor that undermines the ability of the Solomon Islands to fulfil their cooperation and enforcement duties. Nevertheless, it is recalled that shortcomings in cooperation and enforcement are linked to the lack of an adequate legal framework to enables the appropriate follow up actions rather than to the Solomon Islands’ existing capacity to comply with their international obligations. In that vein, the Commission notes that, on the basis of information obtained during the Commission visit in February 2014, it cannot be considered that the Solomon Islands lack financial resources but rather that they lack the necessary legal and administrative environment to ensure the efficient and effective performance of their duties as flag, coastal, port and market State. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

With respect to the Solomon Islands’ existing capacity, it should be noted that, according to the United Nations Human Development Index (11), the Solomon Islands is considered as a low human development country (143rd in 186 countries in 2013). That is also confirmed by Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12) where Solomon Islands are listed in the category of least developed countries. The list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as at 1 January 2013 for reporting on 2012 (13) considers the Solomon Islands as a least developed country. In that respect, the financial and administrative capacity constraints of the competent authorities may be considered as a factor that undermines the ability of the Solomon Islands to fulfil their cooperation and enforcement duties. Nevertheless, it is recalled that shortcomings in cooperation and enforcement are linked to the lack of an adequate legal framework to enables the appropriate follow up actions rather than to the Solomon Islands’ existing capacity to comply with their international obligations. In that vein, the Commission notes that, on the basis of information obtained during the Commission visit in February 2014, it cannot be considered that the Solomon Islands lack financial resources but rather that they lack the necessary legal and administrative environment to ensure the efficient and effective performance of their duties as flag, coastal, port and market State.

| (51) | Furthermore, it should be highlighted that, in accordance with the recommendations in points 85 and 86 of the IPOA IUU concerning special requirements of developing countries, the Union assisted the Solomon Islands in the application of the IUU Regulation through a specific technical assistance programme financed by the Commission (14). |
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(51)

Furthermore, it should be highlighted that, in accordance with the recommendations in points 85 and 86 of the IPOA IUU concerning special requirements of developing countries, the Union assisted the Solomon Islands in the application of the IUU Regulation through a specific technical assistance programme financed by the Commission (14).

| (52) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that the Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law as coastal and market State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that the Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law as coastal and market State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts.

3.3.   Failure to implement international rules (Article 31(6) of the IUU Regulation)

| (53) | The Solomon Islands have ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. The Solomon Islands are a contracting party to WCPFC. The Solomon Islands are party to the FFA Convention and to the PNA concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest. |
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(53)

The Solomon Islands have ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. The Solomon Islands are a contracting party to WCPFC. The Solomon Islands are party to the FFA Convention and to the PNA concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest.

| (54) | The Commission analysed all the information deemed relevant with respect to the status of the Solomon Islands as a contracting party of the WCPFC. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The Commission analysed all the information deemed relevant with respect to the status of the Solomon Islands as a contracting party of the WCPFC.

| (55) | The Commission also analysed any information deemed relevant with respect to the Solomon Islands’ agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by the WCPFC. |
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(55)

The Commission also analysed any information deemed relevant with respect to the Solomon Islands’ agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by the WCPFC.

| (56) | On the basis of information provided by the Solomon Islands on the situation of tuna fishing activities in their waters, catches in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ tuna stocks accounted in 2012 to 3,5 % of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean catch (15). That represents a decrease of 50 % from the years 2010 and 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

On the basis of information provided by the Solomon Islands on the situation of tuna fishing activities in their waters, catches in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ tuna stocks accounted in 2012 to 3,5 % of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean catch (15). That represents a decrease of 50 % from the years 2010 and 2011.

| (57) | On the basis of the figures presented in recital 56 it appears that the Solomon Islands manage important global tuna resources and thus have the responsibility, as coastal State, to ensure responsible and long-term sustainable management of this resource. Articles 61 to 64 of UNCLOS and Articles 7 and 8 of the UNFSA regulate the utilisation of living resources by the coastal State, which should promote the objective of optimum utilisation of the living resources in its EEZ, and ensure compliance of nationals of other States fishing in its EEZ with conservation and management measures, as well as cooperate with the relevant States and regional organisations involved in that fishery. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

On the basis of the figures presented in recital 56 it appears that the Solomon Islands manage important global tuna resources and thus have the responsibility, as coastal State, to ensure responsible and long-term sustainable management of this resource. Articles 61 to 64 of UNCLOS and Articles 7 and 8 of the UNFSA regulate the utilisation of living resources by the coastal State, which should promote the objective of optimum utilisation of the living resources in its EEZ, and ensure compliance of nationals of other States fishing in its EEZ with conservation and management measures, as well as cooperate with the relevant States and regional organisations involved in that fishery.

| (58) | In that respect, it is noted that in breach of those obligations and recommendations, the Solomon Islands’ legal framework does not ensure efficient and effective management of vessels operating in waters under their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the legal framework does not contain clear and transparent provisions setting out applicable conservation and management measures for all types of waters under the Solomon Islands’ jurisdiction or where these can be found there are no clear and transparent procedures setting how their implementation should be ensured. Those aspects are further analysed in recitals 59 to 75. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In that respect, it is noted that in breach of those obligations and recommendations, the Solomon Islands’ legal framework does not ensure efficient and effective management of vessels operating in waters under their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the legal framework does not contain clear and transparent provisions setting out applicable conservation and management measures for all types of waters under the Solomon Islands’ jurisdiction or where these can be found there are no clear and transparent procedures setting how their implementation should be ensured. Those aspects are further analysed in recitals 59 to 75.

| (59) | Clear evidence of the inadequacy of the Solomon Islands’ legal framework can be found in the way the Islands manage tuna resources. The Solomon Islands explained that the existing ‘Solomon Islands National Tuna Management and Development Plan’ has been only been partially implemented and is consequently due to be replaced by a new plan. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Clear evidence of the inadequacy of the Solomon Islands’ legal framework can be found in the way the Islands manage tuna resources. The Solomon Islands explained that the existing ‘Solomon Islands National Tuna Management and Development Plan’ has been only been partially implemented and is consequently due to be replaced by a new plan.

| (60) | The new Tuna Management Plan draft submitted to the Commission in November 2013 provides the legal framework for management of tuna resources and applies to all Solomon Islands waters from 3 nautical miles including archipelagic ones. However, this is merely a general principles document. During the Commission’s visit in February 2014, the Solomon Islands agreed to review the draft to reflect the reality of their fishing operations, activities and industry. The Solomon Islands stated that the new Plan would include sub-regional conservation and management measures, license regimes and conditions, TAC limits, zonal management for archipelagic waters and EEZs, reference points and harvest control rules. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The new Tuna Management Plan draft submitted to the Commission in November 2013 provides the legal framework for management of tuna resources and applies to all Solomon Islands waters from 3 nautical miles including archipelagic ones. However, this is merely a general principles document. During the Commission’s visit in February 2014, the Solomon Islands agreed to review the draft to reflect the reality of their fishing operations, activities and industry. The Solomon Islands stated that the new Plan would include sub-regional conservation and management measures, license regimes and conditions, TAC limits, zonal management for archipelagic waters and EEZs, reference points and harvest control rules.

| (61) | In any case, the fact is that the existing Plan is obsolete and hence in breach of the obligations set out in Articles 61(2) to (5), 62(1) and Article 64 of the UNCLOS concerning optimum utilisation of resources through proper conservation and management measures. |
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(61)

In any case, the fact is that the existing Plan is obsolete and hence in breach of the obligations set out in Articles 61(2) to (5), 62(1) and Article 64 of the UNCLOS concerning optimum utilisation of resources through proper conservation and management measures.

| (62) | Another aspect of the regulatory deficiency is the absence of clear conservation and management measures adopted by the Solomon Islands, on the basis of the best scientific advice and in accordance with their obligations under UNCLOS, UNFSA and WCPFC, in relation to all the waters under their national jurisdiction, including the archipelagic waters. Indeed, it was established in February 2014 that conservation and management rules lack transparency and clarity (as developed in recitals 63 to 68) and appear neither compatible nor based on best scientific advice (as developed in recitals 69 to 75). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Another aspect of the regulatory deficiency is the absence of clear conservation and management measures adopted by the Solomon Islands, on the basis of the best scientific advice and in accordance with their obligations under UNCLOS, UNFSA and WCPFC, in relation to all the waters under their national jurisdiction, including the archipelagic waters. Indeed, it was established in February 2014 that conservation and management rules lack transparency and clarity (as developed in recitals 63 to 68) and appear neither compatible nor based on best scientific advice (as developed in recitals 69 to 75).

| (63) | Waters under the Solomon Islands’ jurisdiction are referred to as territorial sea, archipelagic waters and EEZ. According to Article 3 of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC area of competence comprises in principle all waters of the Pacific Ocean, including waters under jurisdiction of the Solomon Islands. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Waters under the Solomon Islands’ jurisdiction are referred to as territorial sea, archipelagic waters and EEZ. According to Article 3 of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC area of competence comprises in principle all waters of the Pacific Ocean, including waters under jurisdiction of the Solomon Islands.

| (64) | The Solomon Islands however informed the Commission that it considers that waters under their national jurisdiction (territorial sea, archipelagic waters, EEZ) are not covered by the WCPFC Convention, even though the WCPFC delegated implementation of its conservation and management measures to its contracting parties. Also, while the PNA limit fishing effort with allocation of vessel days (Vessel Day Scheme (VDS)) applies in all EEZs of the parties to the agreement, this limitation does not apply to the Solomon Islands territorial and archipelagic waters. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Solomon Islands however informed the Commission that it considers that waters under their national jurisdiction (territorial sea, archipelagic waters, EEZ) are not covered by the WCPFC Convention, even though the WCPFC delegated implementation of its conservation and management measures to its contracting parties. Also, while the PNA limit fishing effort with allocation of vessel days (Vessel Day Scheme (VDS)) applies in all EEZs of the parties to the agreement, this limitation does not apply to the Solomon Islands territorial and archipelagic waters.

| (65) | Pursuant to Articles 61 to 64 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 of the UNFSA and the overall objective and relevant rules in the WCPFC Convention (in particular Articles 2, 5, 7, 8) it is a clear obligation of a coastal State to adopt measures compatible to those applicable in the region and in the high seas to ensure the long term sustainability of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(1), 7(2), 7(3) and 8(1), also recommends good practices to achieve those obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Pursuant to Articles 61 to 64 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 of the UNFSA and the overall objective and relevant rules in the WCPFC Convention (in particular Articles 2, 5, 7, 8) it is a clear obligation of a coastal State to adopt measures compatible to those applicable in the region and in the high seas to ensure the long term sustainability of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(1), 7(2), 7(3) and 8(1), also recommends good practices to achieve those obligations.

| (66) | Specific conditions for fishing vessels operating in the Solomon Islands waters are settled in the fishing licence, namely the fishing period, species of fish to take, areas to fish and other conditions. The Solomon Islands’ flagged vessels have access to archipelagic waters whereas the chartered flagged fleet and the bilateral/multilateral agreements fleet has access to purse seiner effort in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ as regulated and limited at regional level under VDS. For longliners or vessels operating in archipelagic waters conservation and management measures would be set on the fishing licence. For Pole and Line vessels conservation and management measures would be set on the fishing licence. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Specific conditions for fishing vessels operating in the Solomon Islands waters are settled in the fishing licence, namely the fishing period, species of fish to take, areas to fish and other conditions. The Solomon Islands’ flagged vessels have access to archipelagic waters whereas the chartered flagged fleet and the bilateral/multilateral agreements fleet has access to purse seiner effort in the Solomon Islands’ EEZ as regulated and limited at regional level under VDS. For longliners or vessels operating in archipelagic waters conservation and management measures would be set on the fishing licence. For Pole and Line vessels conservation and management measures would be set on the fishing licence.

| (67) | The lack of clarity and transparency of the applicable conservation and management rules and the actual use of fishing effort under VDS, in addition to the numerous existing arrangements with respect to access for fishing described in recital 66, compromises and undermines the possibility for effective implementation of efficient conservation and management of the fisheries resources of Solomon Islands. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The lack of clarity and transparency of the applicable conservation and management rules and the actual use of fishing effort under VDS, in addition to the numerous existing arrangements with respect to access for fishing described in recital 66, compromises and undermines the possibility for effective implementation of efficient conservation and management of the fisheries resources of Solomon Islands.

| (68) | In conclusion, no clear, transparent and compatible conservation and management rules exist for the Solomon Islands archipelagic waters, in breach of the obligations referred to in recital 65. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

In conclusion, no clear, transparent and compatible conservation and management rules exist for the Solomon Islands archipelagic waters, in breach of the obligations referred to in recital 65.

| (69) | Pursuant to Article 61 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5 and 6 of the UNFSA, and Articles 5 and 6 of the WCPFC Convention, coastal States must determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ, based on the best scientific evidence available to it and on the basis of a precautionary approach; coastal States also have to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that living resources and stocks in the EEZ and other waters under their jurisdiction are not endangered by over-exploitation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(3), 7(4) and 7(5), recommends good practices to comply with those obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Pursuant to Article 61 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5 and 6 of the UNFSA, and Articles 5 and 6 of the WCPFC Convention, coastal States must determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ, based on the best scientific evidence available to it and on the basis of a precautionary approach; coastal States also have to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that living resources and stocks in the EEZ and other waters under their jurisdiction are not endangered by over-exploitation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(3), 7(4) and 7(5), recommends good practices to comply with those obligations.

| (70) | As the Solomon Islands consider that WCPFC rules do not apply to waters under their jurisdiction, it is not entirely clear what data is collected and reported to WCPFC; this may not cover assessments of all Solomon Islands fisheries waters. Reports of the WCPFC Scientific Committee regularly raise the issue of data gaps. For example, in the report of its seventh session in 2011, the WCPFC Scientific Committee noted under point 89 some inconsistencies among fleets in the reporting of skipjack and yellowfin, bigeye tuna on purse-seine logsheets and considering the importance, for scientific purposes, of accurate purse-seine catch composition data, recommended that this problem be referred to the Technical and Compliance Committee (16). Under point 37, it emphasised the uncertainty in purse seine species composition, and urged contracting parties to continue improving estimates of purse seine composition data. In its eighth session, the WCPFC Scientific Committee again raised issues of data gaps and inconsistencies (17), in relation to catch and catch composition, commented on reporting obligations under chartering arrangements and issued management recommendations for improvement (18). It also addressed the lack of data submissions or weak data of some contracting parties, some of which are operating in waters under national jurisdiction of Solomon Islands. |
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(70)

As the Solomon Islands consider that WCPFC rules do not apply to waters under their jurisdiction, it is not entirely clear what data is collected and reported to WCPFC; this may not cover assessments of all Solomon Islands fisheries waters. Reports of the WCPFC Scientific Committee regularly raise the issue of data gaps. For example, in the report of its seventh session in 2011, the WCPFC Scientific Committee noted under point 89 some inconsistencies among fleets in the reporting of skipjack and yellowfin, bigeye tuna on purse-seine logsheets and considering the importance, for scientific purposes, of accurate purse-seine catch composition data, recommended that this problem be referred to the Technical and Compliance Committee (16). Under point 37, it emphasised the uncertainty in purse seine species composition, and urged contracting parties to continue improving estimates of purse seine composition data. In its eighth session, the WCPFC Scientific Committee again raised issues of data gaps and inconsistencies (17), in relation to catch and catch composition, commented on reporting obligations under chartering arrangements and issued management recommendations for improvement (18). It also addressed the lack of data submissions or weak data of some contracting parties, some of which are operating in waters under national jurisdiction of Solomon Islands.

| (71) | The reports also state that observer coverage of 100 % as required by WCPFC is not yet achieved, and the Solomon Islands are not yet compliant with it, according to the annual report submitted to the Scientific Committee in 2012 (19). |
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(71)

The reports also state that observer coverage of 100 % as required by WCPFC is not yet achieved, and the Solomon Islands are not yet compliant with it, according to the annual report submitted to the Scientific Committee in 2012 (19).

| (72) | The WCPFC Scientific Committee advised in its seventh meeting, that, if recent fishing practices for skipjack tuna continue, catch rate levels are likely to decline and catch should decrease as stock levels are fished down to Maximum Sustainable Yield level. Therefore, increases of fishing effort should be monitored (20). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The WCPFC Scientific Committee advised in its seventh meeting, that, if recent fishing practices for skipjack tuna continue, catch rate levels are likely to decline and catch should decrease as stock levels are fished down to Maximum Sustainable Yield level. Therefore, increases of fishing effort should be monitored (20).

| (73) | The Solomon Islands do not apply any WCPFC conservation and management measures in their archipelagic waters and have only limited compatible measures in place. Taking into consideration the highly migratory and straddling nature of tuna resources and the importance of tuna stocks and fishing activities in Solomon Islands archipelagic waters, which are an important geographical spawning area for tuna species, this situation puts at stake any conservation effort on the tuna stock as a whole in the Pacific region. Therefore, the Solomon Islands do not ensure application of conservation and management measures in all waters under their jurisdiction in a manner compatible with requirements of WCPFC, and in accordance with the obligation to ensure that species under the jurisdiction of the coastal State are not endangered by over-exploitation. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Solomon Islands do not apply any WCPFC conservation and management measures in their archipelagic waters and have only limited compatible measures in place. Taking into consideration the highly migratory and straddling nature of tuna resources and the importance of tuna stocks and fishing activities in Solomon Islands archipelagic waters, which are an important geographical spawning area for tuna species, this situation puts at stake any conservation effort on the tuna stock as a whole in the Pacific region. Therefore, the Solomon Islands do not ensure application of conservation and management measures in all waters under their jurisdiction in a manner compatible with requirements of WCPFC, and in accordance with the obligation to ensure that species under the jurisdiction of the coastal State are not endangered by over-exploitation.

| (74) | The Commission also assessed any act or omission by Solomon Islands that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Commission also assessed any act or omission by Solomon Islands that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures.

| (75) | In that respect, neither the Tuna Management Plan in force nor the ‘Solomon Islands Tuna Management and Development Plan’ draft establish clear objectives to limit the number of licences and the total allowable catch. The Commission considers therefore that the lack of conservation and management measures undermines compliance by the Solomon Islands with their international obligations. As tuna is a straddling and highly migratory stock, conservation and management measures have to be consistent and compatible in the entire area of migration to be effective and sustainable, this being also the overall objective of the WCPFC Convention. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In that respect, neither the Tuna Management Plan in force nor the ‘Solomon Islands Tuna Management and Development Plan’ draft establish clear objectives to limit the number of licences and the total allowable catch. The Commission considers therefore that the lack of conservation and management measures undermines compliance by the Solomon Islands with their international obligations. As tuna is a straddling and highly migratory stock, conservation and management measures have to be consistent and compatible in the entire area of migration to be effective and sustainable, this being also the overall objective of the WCPFC Convention.

| (76) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures. |
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(76)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Solomon Islands have failed to discharge their duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

3.4.   Specific constraints of developing countries

| (77) | Taking into account the ranking of the Solomon Islands as a low human development country as a least developed countries (as noted in recital 50), the Commission analysed if the information gathered could be linked with its specific constraints as a developing country. |
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(77)

Taking into account the ranking of the Solomon Islands as a low human development country as a least developed countries (as noted in recital 50), the Commission analysed if the information gathered could be linked with its specific constraints as a developing country.

| (78) | It should be noted that the notification of Solomon Islands as flag State was accepted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 of the IUU Regulation as of 1 January 2010. The Solomon Islands confirmed, as Article 20(1) of IUU Regulation states, that they have national arrangements in place for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by their fishing vessels. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

It should be noted that the notification of Solomon Islands as flag State was accepted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 of the IUU Regulation as of 1 January 2010. The Solomon Islands confirmed, as Article 20(1) of IUU Regulation states, that they have national arrangements in place for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by their fishing vessels.

| (79) | Although specific capacity constraints may exist in general with respect to control and monitoring, the specific constraints of the Solomon Islands derived from their level of development cannot justify an absence of specific provisions in the national legal framework referring to international instruments to combat, deter and eliminate IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, those constraints cannot justify the Solomon Islands’ failure to establish a sanctions system for infringements of international management and conservation measures. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Although specific capacity constraints may exist in general with respect to control and monitoring, the specific constraints of the Solomon Islands derived from their level of development cannot justify an absence of specific provisions in the national legal framework referring to international instruments to combat, deter and eliminate IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, those constraints cannot justify the Solomon Islands’ failure to establish a sanctions system for infringements of international management and conservation measures.

| (80) | It is also noted that the Union has already funded a specific technical assistance action in the Solomon Islands with respect to the fight against IUU fishing (21) and it is currently continuing providing technical assistance to the country through specific capacity building programme. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is also noted that the Union has already funded a specific technical assistance action in the Solomon Islands with respect to the fight against IUU fishing (21) and it is currently continuing providing technical assistance to the country through specific capacity building programme.

| (81) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status of Solomon Islands fisheries governance may be impaired by their level of development. However, account taken of the nature of the established shortcomings of the Solomon Islands, assistance provided by the Union and actions taken to rectify the situation, the development level of that country cannot fully excuse or otherwise justify its overall performance as flag or coastal State with respect to fisheries and the insufficiency of its action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the Solomon Islands, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status of Solomon Islands fisheries governance may be impaired by their level of development. However, account taken of the nature of the established shortcomings of the Solomon Islands, assistance provided by the Union and actions taken to rectify the situation, the development level of that country cannot fully excuse or otherwise justify its overall performance as flag or coastal State with respect to fisheries and the insufficiency of its action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

4.   CONCLUSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFICATION AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (82) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of the Solomon Islands to discharge their duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third countries in fighting IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of the Solomon Islands to discharge their duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third countries in fighting IUU fishing.

| (83) | In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify the Solomon Islands of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the Solomon Islands. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify the Solomon Islands of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the Solomon Islands. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation.

| (84) | Furthermore, the notification to the Solomon Islands of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries, |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Furthermore, the notification to the Solomon Islands of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

The Solomon Islands shall be notified of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2014.

For the Commission

Karmenu VELLA

Member of the Commission

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(1)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

1

(2)  http://www.ffa.int/

2

(3)  Nauru Agreement (http://www.ffa.int/node/93#attachments).

3

(4)  WCPFC Scientific Committee Ninth Regular Session, 6-14 August 2013, Pohnpei, Federates States of Micronesia, Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries Research and Statistics, Solomon Islands, WCPFC-SC9-AR/CCM-21 (http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/AR-CCM-21-Solomon-Islands-AR-Part-1.pdf).

4

(5)  International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001.

5

(6)  Code of Conduct for responsible fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1995.

6

(7)  Articles 22-27 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1) and Article 67(1)(a) and Articles 72 and 75 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 307, 23.11.2010, p. 1).

7

(8)  Voluntary guidelines on flag state performance, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2014.

8

(9)  http://www.pmc.gov.sb/content/fisheries-act-outdated

9

(10)  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, done at Honolulu, 5 September 2000 (http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-conservation-and-management-highly-migratory-fish-stocks-western-and-central-pacific).

10

(11)  Information retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

11

(12)  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

12

(13)  http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm

13

(14)  Accompanying developing countries in complying with the Implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, EuropeAid/129609/C/SER/Multi.

14

(15)  WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session, WCPFC SC8-AR/CCM-21.

15

(16)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, Seventh Regular Session, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia 9–17 August 2011 (http://www.wcpfc.int/node/2896).

16

(17)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session 7-15 August 2012 (http://www.wcpfc.int/node/4587), section 3.1.

17

(18)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session, points 69-71.

18

(19)  WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session, WCPFC-SC8-AR/CCM-21.

19

(20)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, Seventh Regular Session, points 35 and 36.

20

(21)  See footnote 14.

21

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/16

---

COMMISSION DECISION

of 12 December 2014

notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

(2014/C 447/10)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (1), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

| (2) | Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (5) | The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation.

| (6) | In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries.

| (7) | Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries.

| (8) | Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation.

2.   PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

| (9) | From 21 to 23 May 2014, the Commission visited Saint Kitts and Nevis in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

From 21 to 23 May 2014, the Commission visited Saint Kitts and Nevis in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation.

| (10) | The visit sought to verify information concerning Saint Kitts and Nevis’ arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Saint Kitts and Nevis to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. An additional visit took place on 23 and 24 July 2014 at the premises of Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry in London, United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The visit sought to verify information concerning Saint Kitts and Nevis’ arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Saint Kitts and Nevis to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. An additional visit took place on 23 and 24 July 2014 at the premises of Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry in London, United Kingdom.

| (11) | The final report of the visit was sent to Saint Kitts and Nevis on 20 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The final report of the visit was sent to Saint Kitts and Nevis on 20 June 2014.

| (12) | The comments of Saint Kitts and Nevis on that final report were received on 14 July 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The comments of Saint Kitts and Nevis on that final report were received on 14 July 2014.

| (13) | Saint Kitts and Nevis is a cooperating non-contracting party to North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and, until 2013, to Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and accepted the 1993 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Saint Kitts and Nevis is a cooperating non-contracting party to North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and, until 2013, to Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and accepted the 1993 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement).

| (14) | In order to evaluate the compliance of Saint Kitts and Nevis with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital (13) and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), in this case NEAFC and WCPFC, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In order to evaluate the compliance of Saint Kitts and Nevis with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital (13) and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), in this case NEAFC and WCPFC, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise.

| (15) | In that regard, the Commission used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case the Commission for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and WCPFC as well as publicly available information. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In that regard, the Commission used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case the Commission for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and WCPFC as well as publicly available information.

3.   POSSIBILITY OF SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS BEING IDENTIFIED AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (16) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Saint Kitts and Nevis as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Saint Kitts and Nevis as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

3.1   Recurrence of IUU Vessels and IUU trade flows (Article 31(4) of the IUU Regulation)

| (17) | From information provided by economic operators and by relevant coastal States, the Commission has evidence of the recent registration under Saint Kitts and Nevis Registry of a supporting fishing vessel previously involved in illegal transhipments under the flag of Panama. The illegal transhipments took place in violation of coastal States laws along the West African coast during five years up to 2012. The supporting vessel was operating in that period under the flag of Panama without a valid licence issued by Panama for transport, transhipment and support to fishing activities. The vessel conducted non-authorised transhipment in the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) waters of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and received fish caught by vessels in waters for which the Republic of Liberia had imposed specific conservation and management measures in contravention of those measures. The IUU activities of the supporting vessel were investigated by the flag State concerned (Panama) and by one of the coastal States (Liberia). In response to the IUU activities, the flag State (Panama) and the costal State (Liberia) imposed fines on that supporting vessel in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Consequently, the supporting vessel was deregistered from Panama flag and it changed its name. Subsequently it registered with Saint Kitts and Nevis flag in 2014. The past recurrent IUU operations of that vessel should have been taken into account by Saint Kitts and Nevis in exercising its responsibility to ensure that vessels do not engage in IUU fishing and flagging to its flag would not result in IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

From information provided by economic operators and by relevant coastal States, the Commission has evidence of the recent registration under Saint Kitts and Nevis Registry of a supporting fishing vessel previously involved in illegal transhipments under the flag of Panama. The illegal transhipments took place in violation of coastal States laws along the West African coast during five years up to 2012. The supporting vessel was operating in that period under the flag of Panama without a valid licence issued by Panama for transport, transhipment and support to fishing activities. The vessel conducted non-authorised transhipment in the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) waters of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and received fish caught by vessels in waters for which the Republic of Liberia had imposed specific conservation and management measures in contravention of those measures. The IUU activities of the supporting vessel were investigated by the flag State concerned (Panama) and by one of the coastal States (Liberia). In response to the IUU activities, the flag State (Panama) and the costal State (Liberia) imposed fines on that supporting vessel in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Consequently, the supporting vessel was deregistered from Panama flag and it changed its name. Subsequently it registered with Saint Kitts and Nevis flag in 2014. The past recurrent IUU operations of that vessel should have been taken into account by Saint Kitts and Nevis in exercising its responsibility to ensure that vessels do not engage in IUU fishing and flagging to its flag would not result in IUU fishing.

| (18) | By authorising the registration of a supporting fishing vessel previously involved in IUU fishing activities that undermined the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures without a previous check on the past IUU practices of this vessel, Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under Article 94 of Unclos; Article III (1)(a) and (5)(a) of the FAO Compliance Agreement; points 36 and 38 of the FAO International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA IUU) and point 18 of the FAO Voluntary guidelines on flag State performance. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

By authorising the registration of a supporting fishing vessel previously involved in IUU fishing activities that undermined the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures without a previous check on the past IUU practices of this vessel, Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under Article 94 of Unclos; Article III (1)(a) and (5)(a) of the FAO Compliance Agreement; points 36 and 38 of the FAO International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA IUU) and point 18 of the FAO Voluntary guidelines on flag State performance.

| (19) | In view of the situation explained in recitals (17) and (18) and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Saint Kitts and Nevis, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4) (a) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of IUU fishing carried out or supported by vessels currently flying its flag and previously being involved in IUU activities. That failure was observed in particular by insufficient actions to carry out checks on the documented and recurring past IUU activities of the supporting vessel. This action has particular gravity account taken of the fact that the reflagging refers to a notorious IUU offender. Pursuant to Article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission also examined the measures taken by Saint Kitts and Nevis in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In view of the situation explained in recitals (17) and (18) and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Saint Kitts and Nevis, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4) (a) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of IUU fishing carried out or supported by vessels currently flying its flag and previously being involved in IUU activities. That failure was observed in particular by insufficient actions to carry out checks on the documented and recurring past IUU activities of the supporting vessel. This action has particular gravity account taken of the fact that the reflagging refers to a notorious IUU offender. Pursuant to Article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission also examined the measures taken by Saint Kitts and Nevis in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

| (20) | The IPOA IUU provides guidance on internationally agreed market-related measures which supports reduction or elimination of trade in fish and fish products derived from IUU fishing. It also suggests at point 71 that States should take steps to improve the transparency of their markets in order to allow the traceability of fish or fish products. Equally, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct) outlines, in particular in Article 11, good practices for post-harvest and responsible international trade. Article 11(1)(11) of that Code of Conduct requests States to ensure that fish and fishery products are traded internationally and domestically in accordance with sound conservation and management practices through improving the identification of the origin of fish and fishery products. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The IPOA IUU provides guidance on internationally agreed market-related measures which supports reduction or elimination of trade in fish and fish products derived from IUU fishing. It also suggests at point 71 that States should take steps to improve the transparency of their markets in order to allow the traceability of fish or fish products. Equally, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO Code of Conduct) outlines, in particular in Article 11, good practices for post-harvest and responsible international trade. Article 11(1)(11) of that Code of Conduct requests States to ensure that fish and fishery products are traded internationally and domestically in accordance with sound conservation and management practices through improving the identification of the origin of fish and fishery products.

| (21) | In that respect it is noted that the traceability of products is hindered by a lack of transparency in Saint Kitts and Nevis’ national laws, registration and licensing systems. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In that respect it is noted that the traceability of products is hindered by a lack of transparency in Saint Kitts and Nevis’ national laws, registration and licensing systems.

| (22) | The FAO Code of Conduct recommends transparency in fisheries laws and their preparation as well as for respective policy- and decision-making and management processes (Articles 6(13) and 7(1)(9) respectively). It provides principles and standards applicable to the conservation, management and development of all fisheries and covers also, amongst others, capture, processing and trade of fish and fishery products, fishing operations and fisheries research. The FAO Code of Conduct, in Articles 11(2) and 11(3), specifies further that international trade in fish and fishery products should not compromise sustainable development of fisheries, should be based on transparent measures as well as on transparent, simple and comprehensive laws, regulations and administrative procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The FAO Code of Conduct recommends transparency in fisheries laws and their preparation as well as for respective policy- and decision-making and management processes (Articles 6(13) and 7(1)(9) respectively). It provides principles and standards applicable to the conservation, management and development of all fisheries and covers also, amongst others, capture, processing and trade of fish and fishery products, fishing operations and fisheries research. The FAO Code of Conduct, in Articles 11(2) and 11(3), specifies further that international trade in fish and fishery products should not compromise sustainable development of fisheries, should be based on transparent measures as well as on transparent, simple and comprehensive laws, regulations and administrative procedures.

| (23) | The Commission established during its visit that Saint Kitts and Nevis is not in a position to provide information on what species were caught by Saint Kitts and Nevis high seas fishing fleet and what were the trade flows of the products caught. The Commission considered on the basis of the information retrieved from its visit that Saint Kitts and Nevis was not in a position to guarantee the transparency of its markets to allow the traceability of fish or fish products as established in point 71 of the IPOA IUU. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Commission established during its visit that Saint Kitts and Nevis is not in a position to provide information on what species were caught by Saint Kitts and Nevis high seas fishing fleet and what were the trade flows of the products caught. The Commission considered on the basis of the information retrieved from its visit that Saint Kitts and Nevis was not in a position to guarantee the transparency of its markets to allow the traceability of fish or fish products as established in point 71 of the IPOA IUU.

| (24) | In addition, the requirements to grant a fishing authorisation settled in the 2002 St Christopher and Nevis Fisheries Act (applicable only in Saint Kitts and Nevis jurisdictional waters, the ‘2002 Fisheries Act’) and the 2002 Saint Christopher and Nevis Merchant Shipping Act (applicable only for Saint Kitts and Nevis high seas fleet, the ‘2002 Shipping Act’) do not include reporting obligations as provided in point 47(2) of the IPOA IUU and point 29(c)(iv) and Annex I of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. The authorities submitted that they had also introduced specific legal provisions concerning Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry in order to regulate operations of vessels (Maritime Circular No. MC/58/13 December 2013). Nevertheless, that Circular does not contain wording empowering the Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry to adopt binding acts with respect to reporting obligations of vessels. That lack of data by Saint Kitts and Nevis does not allow it to properly follow the traceability of fish products and undermines its capability to prevent IUU fishing products being traded. Given the established lack of traceability and lack of information available to Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities about the fish landed or transhipped by its flagged vessels, Saint Kitts and Nevis cannot ensure that trade of fishery products conducted in this country do not stem from IUU fishing. In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to take into consideration the recommendations in point 24 of the IPOA IUU which advises flag States to ensure comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing, through the point of landing to final destination. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In addition, the requirements to grant a fishing authorisation settled in the 2002 St Christopher and Nevis Fisheries Act (applicable only in Saint Kitts and Nevis jurisdictional waters, the ‘2002 Fisheries Act’) and the 2002 Saint Christopher and Nevis Merchant Shipping Act (applicable only for Saint Kitts and Nevis high seas fleet, the ‘2002 Shipping Act’) do not include reporting obligations as provided in point 47(2) of the IPOA IUU and point 29(c)(iv) and Annex I of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. The authorities submitted that they had also introduced specific legal provisions concerning Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry in order to regulate operations of vessels (Maritime Circular No. MC/58/13 December 2013). Nevertheless, that Circular does not contain wording empowering the Saint Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry to adopt binding acts with respect to reporting obligations of vessels. That lack of data by Saint Kitts and Nevis does not allow it to properly follow the traceability of fish products and undermines its capability to prevent IUU fishing products being traded. Given the established lack of traceability and lack of information available to Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities about the fish landed or transhipped by its flagged vessels, Saint Kitts and Nevis cannot ensure that trade of fishery products conducted in this country do not stem from IUU fishing. In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to take into consideration the recommendations in point 24 of the IPOA IUU which advises flag States to ensure comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing, through the point of landing to final destination.

| (25) | In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Saint Kitts and Nevis, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(a) and (b) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis has failed to discharge its duties under international law as a flag and market State to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Saint Kitts and Nevis, it could be established that, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(a) and (b) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis has failed to discharge its duties under international law as a flag and market State to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

3.2   Failure to cooperate and to enforce (Article 31(5) of the IUU Regulation)

| (26) | The Commission analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The Commission analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities.

| (27) | While Saint Kitts and Nevis fisheries authorities were generally cooperative to respond and provide feedback to requests for information, the reliability and correctness of their replies were compromised and undermined by the lack of legal framework and transparency of its fisheries management system as established in Section 3(1). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

While Saint Kitts and Nevis fisheries authorities were generally cooperative to respond and provide feedback to requests for information, the reliability and correctness of their replies were compromised and undermined by the lack of legal framework and transparency of its fisheries management system as established in Section 3(1).

| (28) | In addition, in the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Saint Kitts and Nevis’s duties to discharge its obligations as flag State, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis cooperates with other States in the fight against IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition, in the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Saint Kitts and Nevis’s duties to discharge its obligations as flag State, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis cooperates with other States in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (29) | From the information retrieved during the visits and from third coastal countries authorities, the Commission established that Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged vessels are operating in West African waters. Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities acknowledged that their government did not formally cooperate with the third countries where Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged vessels operated. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

From the information retrieved during the visits and from third coastal countries authorities, the Commission established that Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged vessels are operating in West African waters. Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities acknowledged that their government did not formally cooperate with the third countries where Saint Kitts and Nevis flagged vessels operated.

| (30) | The situation described in recital (29) indicates that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to cooperate and coordinate activities with coastal States in West Africa waters in preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing as set out in point 28 of the IPOA IUU. In particular, as established in point 31 of the IPOA IUU, Saint Kitts and Nevis as flag State should enter into agreements or arrangements with other States and otherwise cooperate for the enforcement of applicable laws and conservation and management measures or provisions adopted at a national, regional or global level. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The situation described in recital (29) indicates that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to cooperate and coordinate activities with coastal States in West Africa waters in preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing as set out in point 28 of the IPOA IUU. In particular, as established in point 31 of the IPOA IUU, Saint Kitts and Nevis as flag State should enter into agreements or arrangements with other States and otherwise cooperate for the enforcement of applicable laws and conservation and management measures or provisions adopted at a national, regional or global level.

| (31) | Moreover, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis had taken effective enforcement measures in respect of operators responsible for IUU fishing and whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive the offenders of the benefits accruing from IUU fishing had been applied. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Moreover, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Kitts and Nevis had taken effective enforcement measures in respect of operators responsible for IUU fishing and whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive the offenders of the benefits accruing from IUU fishing had been applied.

| (32) | Available evidence confirms that Saint Kitts and Nevis has not fulfilled its obligations under international law with respect to effective enforcement measures. In that respect, the legal framework is based on 2002 Fishing Act (as regards fisheries inside Saint Kitts and Nevis’ jurisdictional waters) and on 2002 Shipping Act (as regards Saint Kitts and Nevis’ flagged vessels targeting high seas fisheries). It is relevant to highlight that in a letter submitted to the FAO in June 2013, Saint Kitts and Nevis acknowledged that its current fishing legal system was ‘not totally compatible’ with international law. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Available evidence confirms that Saint Kitts and Nevis has not fulfilled its obligations under international law with respect to effective enforcement measures. In that respect, the legal framework is based on 2002 Fishing Act (as regards fisheries inside Saint Kitts and Nevis’ jurisdictional waters) and on 2002 Shipping Act (as regards Saint Kitts and Nevis’ flagged vessels targeting high seas fisheries). It is relevant to highlight that in a letter submitted to the FAO in June 2013, Saint Kitts and Nevis acknowledged that its current fishing legal system was ‘not totally compatible’ with international law.

| (33) | The legal framework for Saint Kitts and Nevis’ jurisdictional waters does not comply with the basic requirements in Articles 61, 62 and 117 to 119 of Unclos. There is no national strategy on monitoring, control and surveillance of the fishing fleet and no inspections nor observer scheme. Moreover, Saint Kitts and Nevis’ legal framework does not address IUU fishing activities. In that respect, the current legal framework lacks a definition of serious infringements and a comprehensive list of serious offences addressed with proportionate severe sanctions. Hence, the sanction system in its current form is not comprehensive and severe enough to achieve its deterrent function. Indeed, the treatment of infringements and serious infringements is not adequate to secure compliance, to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by point 21 of the FAO IPOA and 38 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The legal framework for Saint Kitts and Nevis’ jurisdictional waters does not comply with the basic requirements in Articles 61, 62 and 117 to 119 of Unclos. There is no national strategy on monitoring, control and surveillance of the fishing fleet and no inspections nor observer scheme. Moreover, Saint Kitts and Nevis’ legal framework does not address IUU fishing activities. In that respect, the current legal framework lacks a definition of serious infringements and a comprehensive list of serious offences addressed with proportionate severe sanctions. Hence, the sanction system in its current form is not comprehensive and severe enough to achieve its deterrent function. Indeed, the treatment of infringements and serious infringements is not adequate to secure compliance, to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by point 21 of the FAO IPOA and 38 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance.

| (34) | It is noted that as flag State, Saint Kitts and Nevis does not have any management, conservation and monitoring, control and surveillance legal framework to rule fishing activities in high seas or third country waters. Only the fishing fleet in NEAFC area operates under those RFMOs rules and fulfils the requirements in the area despite the fact that there is no Saint Kitts and Nevis specific legal framework in force. Saint Kitts and Nevis has acknowledged that this absence of a legal framework contravenes the Unclos and the IPOA IUU as regards the flag State responsibilities and the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

It is noted that as flag State, Saint Kitts and Nevis does not have any management, conservation and monitoring, control and surveillance legal framework to rule fishing activities in high seas or third country waters. Only the fishing fleet in NEAFC area operates under those RFMOs rules and fulfils the requirements in the area despite the fact that there is no Saint Kitts and Nevis specific legal framework in force. Saint Kitts and Nevis has acknowledged that this absence of a legal framework contravenes the Unclos and the IPOA IUU as regards the flag State responsibilities and the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance.

| (35) | Furthermore, with respect to compliance to and enforcement of existing rules for fishing activities conducted in high seas and third country waters, as described in recital (33), Saint Kitts and Nevis does not have any specific legislation to address IUU fishing activities. There is no explicit definition of IUU activities and the accompanying administrative measures are not provided for. The only measure taken is de-registration of fishing vessels. Nevertheless, such action does not entail the conduct of investigations of illegal fishing activities carried out by vessels or the imposition of sanctions for established infringements. Indeed de-registration of a fishing vessel does not ensure that offenders of infringement are sanctioned for their actions and deprived from the benefits of their actions. This is even more important for the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis which, as explained in recital (45), keeps an International Ship Registry responsible for vessel registration which is located outside Saint Kitts and Nevis and which does not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis have a genuine link with the country as required by Article 91 of the Unclos. The Commission established during its visits that the various Saint Kitts and Nevis agencies do not coordinate themselves during the process of registration of vessels while at the same time they do not cooperate with prior flag States on the status of the vessels to register in order to avoid ‘flag hopping’ as recommended in point 16(e) of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. The simple administrative decision to remove a fishing vessel from the register without ensuring the possibility to impose other penalties is an act that does not ensure deterrent effects. Such an action also does not ensure flag State control over the fishing vessels as required under Article 94 of the Unclos. In addition, Saint Kitts and Nevis’ performance with respect to compliance and enforcement is not in accordance with point 18 of the IPOA IUU which stipulates that in the light of the Unclos provisions each State should take measures or cooperate to ensure that nationals subject to their jurisdiction do not support or engage in IUU fishing. Saint Kitts and Nevis’ performance in that respect is also not in accordance with the recommendations in point 21 of the IPOA IUU which advises States to ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, nationals under their jurisdiction are of sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Furthermore, that administrative practice, that could attract IUU operators for registration of IUU vessels, does not comply with Article 94 of the Unclos. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Furthermore, with respect to compliance to and enforcement of existing rules for fishing activities conducted in high seas and third country waters, as described in recital (33), Saint Kitts and Nevis does not have any specific legislation to address IUU fishing activities. There is no explicit definition of IUU activities and the accompanying administrative measures are not provided for. The only measure taken is de-registration of fishing vessels. Nevertheless, such action does not entail the conduct of investigations of illegal fishing activities carried out by vessels or the imposition of sanctions for established infringements. Indeed de-registration of a fishing vessel does not ensure that offenders of infringement are sanctioned for their actions and deprived from the benefits of their actions. This is even more important for the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis which, as explained in recital (45), keeps an International Ship Registry responsible for vessel registration which is located outside Saint Kitts and Nevis and which does not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis have a genuine link with the country as required by Article 91 of the Unclos. The Commission established during its visits that the various Saint Kitts and Nevis agencies do not coordinate themselves during the process of registration of vessels while at the same time they do not cooperate with prior flag States on the status of the vessels to register in order to avoid ‘flag hopping’ as recommended in point 16(e) of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance. The simple administrative decision to remove a fishing vessel from the register without ensuring the possibility to impose other penalties is an act that does not ensure deterrent effects. Such an action also does not ensure flag State control over the fishing vessels as required under Article 94 of the Unclos. In addition, Saint Kitts and Nevis’ performance with respect to compliance and enforcement is not in accordance with point 18 of the IPOA IUU which stipulates that in the light of the Unclos provisions each State should take measures or cooperate to ensure that nationals subject to their jurisdiction do not support or engage in IUU fishing. Saint Kitts and Nevis’ performance in that respect is also not in accordance with the recommendations in point 21 of the IPOA IUU which advises States to ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, nationals under their jurisdiction are of sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Furthermore, that administrative practice, that could attract IUU operators for registration of IUU vessels, does not comply with Article 94 of the Unclos.

| (36) | With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing those aspects is equally compromised by the described absence of legal framework and the lack of clarity and transparency. As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the impossibility of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing those aspects is equally compromised by the described absence of legal framework and the lack of clarity and transparency. As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the impossibility of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour.

| (37) | With respect to the existing capacity of Saint Kitts and Nevis, it should be noted that, according to the United Nations Human Development Index (2), Saint Kitts and Nevis is considered as a high human development country (72nd in 187 countries). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) Saint Kitts and Nevis is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories, in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipients of 1 January 2013 (4). Account taken of its position it is not considered necessary to analyse Saint Kitts and Nevis’ existing financial and administrative capacity. That is because the level of development of Saint Kitts and Nevis, as demonstrated in this recital, cannot be considered as a factor undermining its capacity to cooperate with other countries and to pursue enforcement actions. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

With respect to the existing capacity of Saint Kitts and Nevis, it should be noted that, according to the United Nations Human Development Index (2), Saint Kitts and Nevis is considered as a high human development country (72nd in 187 countries). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) Saint Kitts and Nevis is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories, in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipients of 1 January 2013 (4). Account taken of its position it is not considered necessary to analyse Saint Kitts and Nevis’ existing financial and administrative capacity. That is because the level of development of Saint Kitts and Nevis, as demonstrated in this recital, cannot be considered as a factor undermining its capacity to cooperate with other countries and to pursue enforcement actions.

| (38) | Despite the analysis under recital (37), it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission’s visits in May and July 2014, it cannot be considered that Saint Kitts and Nevis lacks financial resources. Rather it lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment and empowerments to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its duties. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Despite the analysis under recital (37), it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission’s visits in May and July 2014, it cannot be considered that Saint Kitts and Nevis lacks financial resources. Rather it lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment and empowerments to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its duties.

| (39) | In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(5) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis has failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(5) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis has failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts.

3.3   Failure to implement international rules (Article 31(6) of the IUU Regulation)

| (40) | Saint Kitts and Nevis has ratified the Unclos and the FAO Compliance Agreement. Saint Kitts and Nevis is a cooperating non-contracting party to NEAFC and, until 2013, to WCPFC. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Saint Kitts and Nevis has ratified the Unclos and the FAO Compliance Agreement. Saint Kitts and Nevis is a cooperating non-contracting party to NEAFC and, until 2013, to WCPFC.

| (41) | The Commission analysed all information deemed relevant with respect to the status of Saint Kitts and Nevis as cooperating non-contracting party to NEAFC. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Commission analysed all information deemed relevant with respect to the status of Saint Kitts and Nevis as cooperating non-contracting party to NEAFC.

| (42) | As a cooperating non-contracting Party to NEAFC, Saint Kitts and Nevis should comply with the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries (the NEAFC Convention). The NEAFC Convention and the 2013 Declaration on the Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries expresses the recognition, amongst other international texts, of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) (5). In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis should comply with the UNFSA. However, the facts described in recitals (17)(18)(23)(24), (29) to (36) and (43)-(44) show that Saint Kitts and Nevis has not fulfilled its obligations as flag State regarding this agreement. The Commission considers that these considerations constitute supporting evidence to proceed with the current Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As a cooperating non-contracting Party to NEAFC, Saint Kitts and Nevis should comply with the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries (the NEAFC Convention). The NEAFC Convention and the 2013 Declaration on the Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries expresses the recognition, amongst other international texts, of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) (5). In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis should comply with the UNFSA. However, the facts described in recitals (17)(18)(23)(24), (29) to (36) and (43)-(44) show that Saint Kitts and Nevis has not fulfilled its obligations as flag State regarding this agreement. The Commission considers that these considerations constitute supporting evidence to proceed with the current Decision.

| (43) | The Commission also established on the basis of the information retrieved during the visits in 2014 and from coastal States involved that Saint Kitts and Nevis’ fleet is targeting tuna and tuna-alike species in Western Africa coastal States’ jurisdictional waters. In doing so, the flag State, Saint Kitts and Nevis should cooperate with the RFMO competent in that area and for that species, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). However, Saint Kitts and Nevis is neither a contracting party nor a cooperating non-contracting party to ICCAT. As flag State Saint Kitts and Nevis is not fulfilling its obligations as required by Article 64 of the Unclos for other States whose nationals fish in areas under the jurisdiction of coastal States. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Commission also established on the basis of the information retrieved during the visits in 2014 and from coastal States involved that Saint Kitts and Nevis’ fleet is targeting tuna and tuna-alike species in Western Africa coastal States’ jurisdictional waters. In doing so, the flag State, Saint Kitts and Nevis should cooperate with the RFMO competent in that area and for that species, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). However, Saint Kitts and Nevis is neither a contracting party nor a cooperating non-contracting party to ICCAT. As flag State Saint Kitts and Nevis is not fulfilling its obligations as required by Article 64 of the Unclos for other States whose nationals fish in areas under the jurisdiction of coastal States.

| (44) | Saint Kitts and Nevis is neither a contracting party nor a cooperating non-contracting party of CCAMLR. In the ‘Implementation of Conservation Measure 10-05’ (6), CCAMLR Secretariat highlighted that, as of 24 September 2013, Saint Kitts and Nevis had been identified over the last five years as possibly involved in the harvest and/or trade of Dissostichus spp. while not cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the Catch Documentation Scheme. In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis’s failure to cooperate with CCAMLR contravenes its flag State obligations as set out in Article 119(2) of the Unclos. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Saint Kitts and Nevis is neither a contracting party nor a cooperating non-contracting party of CCAMLR. In the ‘Implementation of Conservation Measure 10-05’ (6), CCAMLR Secretariat highlighted that, as of 24 September 2013, Saint Kitts and Nevis had been identified over the last five years as possibly involved in the harvest and/or trade of Dissostichus spp. while not cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the Catch Documentation Scheme. In that regard, Saint Kitts and Nevis’s failure to cooperate with CCAMLR contravenes its flag State obligations as set out in Article 119(2) of the Unclos.

| (45) | Furthermore, as it was revealed during the visit conducted by the Commission in Saint Kitts and Nevis, this country keeps an International Ship Registry responsible for vessel registration which is located outside Saint Kitts and Nevis. The low level of control by the Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities to the registration process and the lack of relevant requirements such as those established in point 14 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance do not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis have a genuine link with the country. The lack of such genuine link between the State and the vessels that are registered in its registry is in breach of the conditions set out for the nationality of ships under Article 91 of the Unclos. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Furthermore, as it was revealed during the visit conducted by the Commission in Saint Kitts and Nevis, this country keeps an International Ship Registry responsible for vessel registration which is located outside Saint Kitts and Nevis. The low level of control by the Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities to the registration process and the lack of relevant requirements such as those established in point 14 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance do not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis have a genuine link with the country. The lack of such genuine link between the State and the vessels that are registered in its registry is in breach of the conditions set out for the nationality of ships under Article 91 of the Unclos.

| (46) | Finally, contrary to the recommendations in points 25, 26 and 27 of the IPOA IUU, Saint Kitts and Nevis has not developed a national plan of action against IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Finally, contrary to the recommendations in points 25, 26 and 27 of the IPOA IUU, Saint Kitts and Nevis has not developed a national plan of action against IUU fishing.

| (47) | In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Kitts and Nevis failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

3.4.   Specific constraints of developing countries

| (48) | It is recalled that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (7), Saint Kitts and Nevis is considered as a high human development country. (72nd in 187 countries). It is also recalled that, according to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, Saint Kitts and Nevis is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

It is recalled that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (7), Saint Kitts and Nevis is considered as a high human development country. (72nd in 187 countries). It is also recalled that, according to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, Saint Kitts and Nevis is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories.

| (49) | Account taken of that ranking Saint Kitts and Nevis cannot be considered as a country having specific constraints directly derived from its level of development. No corroborating evidence could be established to suggest that the failure of Saint Kitts and Nevis to discharge its duties under international law is the result of lacking development. In the same manner, no concrete evidence exists to correlate the revealed shortcomings in respect of the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities with the lack of capacities and infrastructure. In this respect it is noted that the Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities have not revoked any argument on development constraints and argued that their administration has a good overall efficiency level. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Account taken of that ranking Saint Kitts and Nevis cannot be considered as a country having specific constraints directly derived from its level of development. No corroborating evidence could be established to suggest that the failure of Saint Kitts and Nevis to discharge its duties under international law is the result of lacking development. In the same manner, no concrete evidence exists to correlate the revealed shortcomings in respect of the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities with the lack of capacities and infrastructure. In this respect it is noted that the Saint Kitts and Nevis authorities have not revoked any argument on development constraints and argued that their administration has a good overall efficiency level.

| (50) | In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Saint Kitts and Nevis with respect to fisheries are not impaired by its level of development. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

In view of the situation explained in this section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Saint Kitts and Nevis with respect to fisheries are not impaired by its level of development.

4.   CONCLUSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFICATION AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (51) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of Saint Kitts and Nevis to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of Saint Kitts and Nevis to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing.

| (52) | In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Saint Kitts and Nevis of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Saint Kitts and Nevis. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Saint Kitts and Nevis of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Saint Kitts and Nevis. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation.

| (53) | Furthermore, the notification to Saint Kitts and Nevis of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries, |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Furthermore, the notification to Saint Kitts and Nevis of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

Saint Kitts and Nevis shall be notified of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2014.

For the Commission

Karmenu VELLA

Member of the Commission

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(1)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

1

(2)  Information retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

2

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

3

(4)  DAC List of ODA Recipients (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm).

4

(5)  See Preamble of the Declaration on the Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries as retrieved from http://www.dgrm.min-agricultura.pt/xeo/attachfileu.jsp?look_parentBoui=248939&att_display=n&att_download=y

5

(6)  CCAMLR-XXXII/BG/08.24 September 2013.

6

(7)  See footnote 2.

7

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/23

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COMMISSION DECISION

of 12 December 2014

on notifying a third country of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

(2014/C 447/11)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (1), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

| (2) | Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (5) | The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation.

| (6) | In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries.

| (7) | Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries.

| (8) | Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation.

2.   PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO TUVALU

| (9) | From 18 to 20 February 2014, the Commission, with the support of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), visited Tuvalu in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

From 18 to 20 February 2014, the Commission, with the support of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), visited Tuvalu in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation.

| (10) | The visit sought to verify information concerning Tuvalu’s arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Tuvalu to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The visit sought to verify information concerning Tuvalu’s arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Tuvalu to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (11) | The final report of the visit was sent to Tuvalu on 18 March 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The final report of the visit was sent to Tuvalu on 18 March 2014.

| (12) | Tuvalu replied to the final report of the visit on 16 October 2014. |
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(12)

Tuvalu replied to the final report of the visit on 16 October 2014.

| (13) | Tuvalu is a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Tuvalu ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). It is a party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (2) (FFA Convention) and to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest (3). |
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(13)

Tuvalu is a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Tuvalu ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). It is a party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (2) (FFA Convention) and to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest (3).

| (14) | In order to evaluate Tuvalu’s compliance with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital 13 and established by the relevant RFMOs referred to in that recital, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise. |
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(14)

In order to evaluate Tuvalu’s compliance with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital 13 and established by the relevant RFMOs referred to in that recital, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise.

| (15) | The Commission also used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case the WCPFC, as well as publicly available information. |
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(15)

The Commission also used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case the WCPFC, as well as publicly available information.

3.   POSSIBILITY OF TUVALU OF BEING IDENTIFIED AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (16) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Tuvalu as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(16)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Tuvalu as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

3.1.   Recurrence of IUU Vessels and IUU trade flows (Article 31(4) of the IUU Regulation)

| (17) | With respect to Tuvalu-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Tuvalu-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Tuvalu with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(17)

With respect to Tuvalu-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Tuvalu-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Tuvalu with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation.

| (18) | In the absence of information and evidence as explained in recital 17 it is concluded, pursuant to Article 31(3) and Article 31(4)(a), that it is not necessary to evaluate the compliance of Tuvalu’s action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, with its duties under international law as a flag State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals. |
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(18)

In the absence of information and evidence as explained in recital 17 it is concluded, pursuant to Article 31(3) and Article 31(4)(a), that it is not necessary to evaluate the compliance of Tuvalu’s action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, with its duties under international law as a flag State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals.

3.2.   Failure to cooperate and to enforce (Article 31(5) of the IUU Regulation)

| (19) | The Commission analysed whether Tuvalu effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities. |
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(19)

The Commission analysed whether Tuvalu effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities.

| (20) | In that respect, Tuvalu is reluctant to cooperate with the Commission in addressing the deficiencies in its fisheries management system identified during the Commission’s visit. In the reply to the final report submitted on 16 October 2014, Tuvalu does not present contractual commitments to address the deficiencies identified by the Commission. In particular, Tuvalu recognized the issues and challenges, considers that it would need technical assistance and time to work on improvements but does not offer any commitment or concrete plan of action to solve the established shortcomings. |
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(20)

In that respect, Tuvalu is reluctant to cooperate with the Commission in addressing the deficiencies in its fisheries management system identified during the Commission’s visit. In the reply to the final report submitted on 16 October 2014, Tuvalu does not present contractual commitments to address the deficiencies identified by the Commission. In particular, Tuvalu recognized the issues and challenges, considers that it would need technical assistance and time to work on improvements but does not offer any commitment or concrete plan of action to solve the established shortcomings.

| (21) | In the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Tuvalu’s duties to discharge its obligations as flag, port and coastal State, the Commission also analysed whether Tuvalu cooperates with other flag States in the fight against IUU fishing. |
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(21)

In the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Tuvalu’s duties to discharge its obligations as flag, port and coastal State, the Commission also analysed whether Tuvalu cooperates with other flag States in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (22) | According to Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, coastal and flag States are to cooperate with regard to straddling and highly-migratory fish species. Articles 7 and 20 of the UNFSA further develop the obligation to cooperate, respectively in setting compatible conservation and management measures and in ensuring compliance and enforcement with such measures. In addition, Article 7(1)(3) of the FAO Code of Conduct (4) recommends that States concerned by the exploitation of straddling and trans-boundary fish stocks establish bilateral agreements to guarantee effective cooperation in order to ensure effective conservation and management of resources. This is further specified in points 28 and 51 of the International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU) (5), setting out detailed practices for direct cooperation between States, including the exchange of data or information available to coastal States. |
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(22)

According to Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, coastal and flag States are to cooperate with regard to straddling and highly-migratory fish species. Articles 7 and 20 of the UNFSA further develop the obligation to cooperate, respectively in setting compatible conservation and management measures and in ensuring compliance and enforcement with such measures. In addition, Article 7(1)(3) of the FAO Code of Conduct (4) recommends that States concerned by the exploitation of straddling and trans-boundary fish stocks establish bilateral agreements to guarantee effective cooperation in order to ensure effective conservation and management of resources. This is further specified in points 28 and 51 of the International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU) (5), setting out detailed practices for direct cooperation between States, including the exchange of data or information available to coastal States.

| (23) | In that respect, Article 25(10) of the WCPFC Convention (6) stipulates that each member where it has reasonable grounds for believing that a fishing vessel flying the flag of another State has engaged in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures adopted for the Convention area, shall draw this to the attention of the flag State concerned. |
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(23)

In that respect, Article 25(10) of the WCPFC Convention (6) stipulates that each member where it has reasonable grounds for believing that a fishing vessel flying the flag of another State has engaged in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures adopted for the Convention area, shall draw this to the attention of the flag State concerned.

| (24) | The importance of efficient cooperation mechanisms has to be appraised in the context of the predominant presence of foreign-flagged vessels in waters under jurisdiction of Tuvalu. According to the information provided by Tuvaluan authorities during the Commission’s visit in February 2014, a total of 18 bilateral private licensing contracts from ten countries are currently in force. In that respect, the fleet authorised to operate in Tuvalu waters is composed by 213 purse seine, 17 pole-and-line and 7 longline vessels, from which only one purse seine and two longline vessels are flagged in Tuvalu. Nevertheless, Tuvalu acknowledged that no cooperation channels with the concerned flag States had been setup to ensure that Tuvalu complies with its obligations to cooperate with flag States as described in recitals 22 and 23. |
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(24)

The importance of efficient cooperation mechanisms has to be appraised in the context of the predominant presence of foreign-flagged vessels in waters under jurisdiction of Tuvalu. According to the information provided by Tuvaluan authorities during the Commission’s visit in February 2014, a total of 18 bilateral private licensing contracts from ten countries are currently in force. In that respect, the fleet authorised to operate in Tuvalu waters is composed by 213 purse seine, 17 pole-and-line and 7 longline vessels, from which only one purse seine and two longline vessels are flagged in Tuvalu. Nevertheless, Tuvalu acknowledged that no cooperation channels with the concerned flag States had been setup to ensure that Tuvalu complies with its obligations to cooperate with flag States as described in recitals 22 and 23.

| (25) | With respect to effective enforcement measures, Article 19(2) of the UNFSA establishes that sanctions applicable in respect of violations are to be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and are to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. As examined in recitals 26 to 29, Tuvalu does not have the legal framework or the control over its fleet and waters necessary to adequately sanction offenders. |
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(25)

With respect to effective enforcement measures, Article 19(2) of the UNFSA establishes that sanctions applicable in respect of violations are to be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and are to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. As examined in recitals 26 to 29, Tuvalu does not have the legal framework or the control over its fleet and waters necessary to adequately sanction offenders.

| (26) | The sanction system is setup in Tuvalu’s Marine Resources Act 2006. Although that Act was amended in 2012, it does not take into account the latest developments in international law as regards the fight against IUU fishing. In that respect, the current legal framework lacks an explicit definition of IUU fishing activities and serious infringements and a comprehensive list of serious offences addressed with severe sanctions. |
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(26)

The sanction system is setup in Tuvalu’s Marine Resources Act 2006. Although that Act was amended in 2012, it does not take into account the latest developments in international law as regards the fight against IUU fishing. In that respect, the current legal framework lacks an explicit definition of IUU fishing activities and serious infringements and a comprehensive list of serious offences addressed with severe sanctions.

| (27) | In addition, Tuvalu’s legislation does not contain administrative accompanying measures in a systematic manner. This kind of complementary measures is limited to the suspension and revocation of licences and only applicable in cases of ‘serious offences’ whereas this concept of ‘serious offences’ is not defined within Tuvaluan law. |
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(27)

In addition, Tuvalu’s legislation does not contain administrative accompanying measures in a systematic manner. This kind of complementary measures is limited to the suspension and revocation of licences and only applicable in cases of ‘serious offences’ whereas this concept of ‘serious offences’ is not defined within Tuvaluan law.

| (28) | The notion of ‘serious offences or infringements’ has not been streamlined in Tuvalu’ law. The current legal framework does not provide for detrimental sanctions to deprive the offenders from the benefits obtained from an illegal activity. |
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(28)

The notion of ‘serious offences or infringements’ has not been streamlined in Tuvalu’ law. The current legal framework does not provide for detrimental sanctions to deprive the offenders from the benefits obtained from an illegal activity.

| (29) | Hence, the sanction system in its current form is not comprehensive and severe enough to achieve its deterrent function. Indeed, the treatment of serious infringements is not adequate to secure compliance, to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by Article 19(2) of the UNFSA and Article 25(7) of the WCPFC Convention. |
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(29)

Hence, the sanction system in its current form is not comprehensive and severe enough to achieve its deterrent function. Indeed, the treatment of serious infringements is not adequate to secure compliance, to discourage violations wherever they occur and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by Article 19(2) of the UNFSA and Article 25(7) of the WCPFC Convention.

| (30) | With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing these aspects is equally compromised by the lack of clarity and transparency described in recitals 39 to (48). As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the lack of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour. |
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(30)

With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing these aspects is equally compromised by the lack of clarity and transparency described in recitals 39 to (48). As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the lack of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour.

| (31) | With respect to Tuvalu’s existing financial and administrative capacity, it should be noted that Tuvalu is not ranked within the United Nations Human Development Index (7). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) Tuvalu is listed in the category of least developed countries, in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients of 1 January 2013 (9). In that respect, Tuvalu’s financial and administrative capacity constraints may be considered as a factor that undermines Tuvalu’s ability of to fulfil its cooperation and enforcement duties. |
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(31)

With respect to Tuvalu’s existing financial and administrative capacity, it should be noted that Tuvalu is not ranked within the United Nations Human Development Index (7). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) Tuvalu is listed in the category of least developed countries, in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients of 1 January 2013 (9). In that respect, Tuvalu’s financial and administrative capacity constraints may be considered as a factor that undermines Tuvalu’s ability of to fulfil its cooperation and enforcement duties.

| (32) | Despite the analysis in recital 31 it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission’s visit in February 2014, it cannot be considered that Tuvalu authorities’ lack financial resources. Rather, Tuvalu lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its duties as flag, coastal, port and market State. |
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(32)

Despite the analysis in recital 31 it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission’s visit in February 2014, it cannot be considered that Tuvalu authorities’ lack financial resources. Rather, Tuvalu lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its duties as flag, coastal, port and market State.

| (33) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that Tuvalu has failed to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts. |
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(33)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that Tuvalu has failed to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts.

3.3.   Failure to implement international rules (Article 31(6) of the IUU Regulation)

| (34) | Tuvalu has ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Tuvalu is a member to WCPFC. Tuvalu is a party to the FFA Convention and to the PNA concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest. |
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(34)

Tuvalu has ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Tuvalu is a member to WCPFC. Tuvalu is a party to the FFA Convention and to the PNA concerning cooperation in the management of fisheries of common interest.

| (35) | The Commission analysed all the information deemed relevant with respect to Tuvalu’s status as a member of WCPFC. |
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(35)

The Commission analysed all the information deemed relevant with respect to Tuvalu’s status as a member of WCPFC.

| (36) | The Commission also analysed any information deemed relevant with respect to Tuvalu’s agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by WCPFC. |
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(36)

The Commission also analysed any information deemed relevant with respect to Tuvalu’s agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by WCPFC.

| (37) | According to the comprehensive information provided by Tuvalu on the situation of tuna fishing activities in its waters (10), catches in Tuvalu economic exclusive zone (EEZ) tuna stocks accounted in 2011 to 51 800 metric tonnes (mt). While that represents a decrease from previous years (63 427 mt in 2009 and 60 618 mt in 2010), stocks in Tuvalu’s EEZ still constitute a significant part of the total tuna stocks in the Central and Western Pacific. |
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(37)

According to the comprehensive information provided by Tuvalu on the situation of tuna fishing activities in its waters (10), catches in Tuvalu economic exclusive zone (EEZ) tuna stocks accounted in 2011 to 51 800 metric tonnes (mt). While that represents a decrease from previous years (63 427 mt in 2009 and 60 618 mt in 2010), stocks in Tuvalu’s EEZ still constitute a significant part of the total tuna stocks in the Central and Western Pacific.

| (38) | On the basis of the figures presented in recital 37 it appears that Tuvalu manages important global tuna resources and thus has the responsibility, as coastal State, to ensure responsible and long-term sustainable management of those resources. Articles 61 to 64 of UNCLOS and Articles 7 and 8 of the UNFSA regulate the utilisation of living resources by the coastal State, which should adopt measures compatible to those applying in the region and in the high seas to ensure the long term sustainability of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation of the living resources in its EEZ. Coastal States must also ensure compliance of nationals of other States fishing in their EEZ with conservation and management measures, as well as cooperate with the relevant States and regional organisations involved in that fishery. |
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(38)

On the basis of the figures presented in recital 37 it appears that Tuvalu manages important global tuna resources and thus has the responsibility, as coastal State, to ensure responsible and long-term sustainable management of those resources. Articles 61 to 64 of UNCLOS and Articles 7 and 8 of the UNFSA regulate the utilisation of living resources by the coastal State, which should adopt measures compatible to those applying in the region and in the high seas to ensure the long term sustainability of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation of the living resources in its EEZ. Coastal States must also ensure compliance of nationals of other States fishing in their EEZ with conservation and management measures, as well as cooperate with the relevant States and regional organisations involved in that fishery.

| (39) | Tuvalu’s legal framework fails to provide with clear and transparent conservation and management measures ensuring the efficient and effective management of vessels operating in waters under its jurisdiction. In particular, there are no conservation and management measures for inshore fisheries. Tuvalu also acknowledged that the existing Tuna Management Plan is outdated and in need of revision. Likewise, a shark management plan has not yet been adopted in line with the requirement of WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) 2010-07 (11). |
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(39)

Tuvalu’s legal framework fails to provide with clear and transparent conservation and management measures ensuring the efficient and effective management of vessels operating in waters under its jurisdiction. In particular, there are no conservation and management measures for inshore fisheries. Tuvalu also acknowledged that the existing Tuna Management Plan is outdated and in need of revision. Likewise, a shark management plan has not yet been adopted in line with the requirement of WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) 2010-07 (11).

| (40) | The conservation and management measures in relation to the waters under national jurisdiction, including the archipelagic waters, are incomplete and not based in scientific advice as requested by UNCLOS, UNFSA and WCPFC. Whereas Tuvalu’s 2006 Fisheries Act sets up the main principles for a sustainable management of fisheries and empowers the Ministry of Natural Resources to adopt conservation and management measures accordingly, the Commission’s visit revealed that the development of this type of provisions is very weak. The main effort in that respect has focused on the transposition of the measures contained in PNA Third Arrangement (12) to Tuvalu’s legislative framework in 2009. |
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(40)

The conservation and management measures in relation to the waters under national jurisdiction, including the archipelagic waters, are incomplete and not based in scientific advice as requested by UNCLOS, UNFSA and WCPFC. Whereas Tuvalu’s 2006 Fisheries Act sets up the main principles for a sustainable management of fisheries and empowers the Ministry of Natural Resources to adopt conservation and management measures accordingly, the Commission’s visit revealed that the development of this type of provisions is very weak. The main effort in that respect has focused on the transposition of the measures contained in PNA Third Arrangement (12) to Tuvalu’s legislative framework in 2009.

| (41) | Waters under Tuvalu’s jurisdiction are referred to as territorial sea, archipelagic waters and EEZ. According to Article 3 of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC area of competence comprises in principle all waters of the Pacific Ocean, including waters under Tuvalu’s jurisdiction. Having said that, Tuvalu excludes its territorial and archipelagic waters from the application of the Vessels Day Scheme (VDS), a system that limits fishing effort of the purse seine fleet through the allocation of fishing days. Therefore, the main legal instrument for the conservation of fisheries resources in Tuvalu’s waters does not apply to a considerable portion of the waters under its jurisdiction. With regards to longline and pole-and-line vessels, the conservation and management measures are set in the individual licences. However, there is no public available information on the actual management of catch and effort for both fisheries apart from the general policy of limiting the number of fishing licences. |
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(41)

Waters under Tuvalu’s jurisdiction are referred to as territorial sea, archipelagic waters and EEZ. According to Article 3 of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC area of competence comprises in principle all waters of the Pacific Ocean, including waters under Tuvalu’s jurisdiction. Having said that, Tuvalu excludes its territorial and archipelagic waters from the application of the Vessels Day Scheme (VDS), a system that limits fishing effort of the purse seine fleet through the allocation of fishing days. Therefore, the main legal instrument for the conservation of fisheries resources in Tuvalu’s waters does not apply to a considerable portion of the waters under its jurisdiction. With regards to longline and pole-and-line vessels, the conservation and management measures are set in the individual licences. However, there is no public available information on the actual management of catch and effort for both fisheries apart from the general policy of limiting the number of fishing licences.

| (42) | In addition, Tuvalu confirmed during the Commission’s visit that some WCPFC CMMs are not currently being applied. Those concern CMM 2007-1 on regional observer program establishing 5 % observer coverage on longline vessels and CMM 2010-07 setting that weight of fins landed cannot be more than 5 % of the weight of sharks. The lack of technical capacity and resources was claimed to hinder progress in complying with relevant WCPFC CMMs. |
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(42)

In addition, Tuvalu confirmed during the Commission’s visit that some WCPFC CMMs are not currently being applied. Those concern CMM 2007-1 on regional observer program establishing 5 % observer coverage on longline vessels and CMM 2010-07 setting that weight of fins landed cannot be more than 5 % of the weight of sharks. The lack of technical capacity and resources was claimed to hinder progress in complying with relevant WCPFC CMMs.

| (43) | The clear shortcomings as regards clarity and transparency of the applicable conservation and management rules described in recitals 39 to 42, including the control over fishing effort under VDS, combined with the existence of 18 different private licencing contracts as described in recital 24, undermines the effective implementation of conservation and management measures, in breach of the obligations set out in Article 61(2) to (5), Article 62(1) and Article 64 of the UNCLOS concerning optimum utilisation of resources through proper conservation and management measures. |
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(43)

The clear shortcomings as regards clarity and transparency of the applicable conservation and management rules described in recitals 39 to 42, including the control over fishing effort under VDS, combined with the existence of 18 different private licencing contracts as described in recital 24, undermines the effective implementation of conservation and management measures, in breach of the obligations set out in Article 61(2) to (5), Article 62(1) and Article 64 of the UNCLOS concerning optimum utilisation of resources through proper conservation and management measures.

| (44) | Pursuant to Article 61 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5 and 6 of the UNFSA, and Articles 5 and 6 of the WCPFC Convention, coastal States must determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ, based on the best scientific evidence available and on the basis of a precautionary approach; coastal States also have to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that living resources and stocks in the EEZ and other waters under their jurisdiction are not endangered by over-exploitation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(3), 7(4) and 7(5), recommends good practices to comply with those obligations. |
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(44)

Pursuant to Article 61 of the UNCLOS, Articles 5 and 6 of the UNFSA, and Articles 5 and 6 of the WCPFC Convention, coastal States must determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ, based on the best scientific evidence available and on the basis of a precautionary approach; coastal States also have to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that living resources and stocks in the EEZ and other waters under their jurisdiction are not endangered by over-exploitation. The FAO Code of Conduct, in particular paragraphs 7(3), 7(4) and 7(5), recommends good practices to comply with those obligations.

| (45) | In the report to the WCPFC Ninth Scientific Committee, Tuvalu acknowledged the existence of remaining challenges as regards data collection, reporting and compliance (13). Those issues are attributed to capacity difficulties within the Department of fisheries with respect to monitoring of reporting and data management. |
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(45)

In the report to the WCPFC Ninth Scientific Committee, Tuvalu acknowledged the existence of remaining challenges as regards data collection, reporting and compliance (13). Those issues are attributed to capacity difficulties within the Department of fisheries with respect to monitoring of reporting and data management.

| (46) | In that vein, reports of the WCPFC Scientific Committee regularly raise the issue of data gaps. For example, in the report of its 7th session in 2011, the WCPFC Scientific Committee noted under point 89 some inconsistencies in the reporting of skipjack and yellowfin, bigeye tuna on purse-seine logsheets. Considering the importance, for scientific purposes, of accurate purse-seine catch composition data, the Committee recommended this problem to be referred to the Technical and Compliance Committee (14). Under point 37, it emphasised the uncertainty in purse seine species composition, and urged contracting parties to continue improving estimates of purse seine composition data. In its 8th session, the WCPFC Scientific Committee again raised issues of data gaps and inconsistencies (15), in relation to catch and catch composition, commented on reporting obligations under chartering arrangements and issued management recommendations for improvement (16). It also addressed the lack of data submissions or weak data of some contracting parties, some of which are operating in waters under national jurisdiction of Tuvalu. |
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(46)

In that vein, reports of the WCPFC Scientific Committee regularly raise the issue of data gaps. For example, in the report of its 7th session in 2011, the WCPFC Scientific Committee noted under point 89 some inconsistencies in the reporting of skipjack and yellowfin, bigeye tuna on purse-seine logsheets. Considering the importance, for scientific purposes, of accurate purse-seine catch composition data, the Committee recommended this problem to be referred to the Technical and Compliance Committee (14). Under point 37, it emphasised the uncertainty in purse seine species composition, and urged contracting parties to continue improving estimates of purse seine composition data. In its 8th session, the WCPFC Scientific Committee again raised issues of data gaps and inconsistencies (15), in relation to catch and catch composition, commented on reporting obligations under chartering arrangements and issued management recommendations for improvement (16). It also addressed the lack of data submissions or weak data of some contracting parties, some of which are operating in waters under national jurisdiction of Tuvalu.

| (47) | The WCPFC Scientific Committee advised in its 7th meeting, that, if recent fishing practices for skipjack tuna continue, catch rate levels were likely to decline and catch should decrease as stock levels are fished down to Maximum Sustainable Yield level. Therefore, increases of fishing effort should be monitored (17). However, the Commission’s visit revealed the absence of a real fleet and fishing access policy as demonstrated by the obsolescence and incompleteness of the Tuna Management Plan. |
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(47)

The WCPFC Scientific Committee advised in its 7th meeting, that, if recent fishing practices for skipjack tuna continue, catch rate levels were likely to decline and catch should decrease as stock levels are fished down to Maximum Sustainable Yield level. Therefore, increases of fishing effort should be monitored (17). However, the Commission’s visit revealed the absence of a real fleet and fishing access policy as demonstrated by the obsolescence and incompleteness of the Tuna Management Plan.

| (48) | Tuvalu does not apply any WCPFC conservation and management measures in its archipelagic waters and has only limited compatible measures in place. Taking into consideration the highly migratory and straddling nature of tuna resources and the importance of tuna stocks and fishing activities in Tuvalu archipelagic waters, which are an important geographical spawning area for tuna species, that situation puts at stake any conservation effort on tuna stocks as a whole in the Pacific region. Therefore, Tuvalu does not ensure application of conservation and management measures in all waters under its jurisdiction in a manner compatible with WCPFC’s requirements, and in accordance with the obligation to ensure that species under the jurisdiction of the coastal State are not endangered by over-exploitation. |
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(48)

Tuvalu does not apply any WCPFC conservation and management measures in its archipelagic waters and has only limited compatible measures in place. Taking into consideration the highly migratory and straddling nature of tuna resources and the importance of tuna stocks and fishing activities in Tuvalu archipelagic waters, which are an important geographical spawning area for tuna species, that situation puts at stake any conservation effort on tuna stocks as a whole in the Pacific region. Therefore, Tuvalu does not ensure application of conservation and management measures in all waters under its jurisdiction in a manner compatible with WCPFC’s requirements, and in accordance with the obligation to ensure that species under the jurisdiction of the coastal State are not endangered by over-exploitation.

| (49) | The Commission also assessed any act or omission by Tuvalu that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures. |
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(49)

The Commission also assessed any act or omission by Tuvalu that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures.

| (50) | In that respect, as acknowledged by Tuvalu, the outdated Tuna Management Plan fails to establish clear objectives to limit the number of fishing licences and the total allowable catch. The Commission considers therefore that the lack of conservation and management measures undermines compliance of Tuvalu with its international obligations. As tuna is a straddling and highly migratory stock, conservation and management measures have to be consistent and compatible in the entire area of migration to be effective and sustainable, this being also the overall objective of the WCPFC Convention. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

In that respect, as acknowledged by Tuvalu, the outdated Tuna Management Plan fails to establish clear objectives to limit the number of fishing licences and the total allowable catch. The Commission considers therefore that the lack of conservation and management measures undermines compliance of Tuvalu with its international obligations. As tuna is a straddling and highly migratory stock, conservation and management measures have to be consistent and compatible in the entire area of migration to be effective and sustainable, this being also the overall objective of the WCPFC Convention.

| (51) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Tuvalu failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Tuvalu failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

3.4.   Specific constraints of developing countries

| (52) | Taking into account the ranking of Tuvalu as a least developed country (as noted in recital 31), the Commission analysed if the information gathered could be linked with its specific constraints as a developing country. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Taking into account the ranking of Tuvalu as a least developed country (as noted in recital 31), the Commission analysed if the information gathered could be linked with its specific constraints as a developing country.

| (53) | Although specific capacity constraints may exist in general with respect to control and monitoring, the specific constraints of Tuvalu derived from its level of development cannot justify an absence of specific provisions in the national legal framework referring to international instruments to combat, deter and eliminate IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, those constraints cannot justify Tuvalu’s failure to establish a sanctions system for infringements of international management and conservation measures. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Although specific capacity constraints may exist in general with respect to control and monitoring, the specific constraints of Tuvalu derived from its level of development cannot justify an absence of specific provisions in the national legal framework referring to international instruments to combat, deter and eliminate IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, those constraints cannot justify Tuvalu’s failure to establish a sanctions system for infringements of international management and conservation measures.

| (54) | In addition, it appears that the deficiencies of monitoring, control and surveillance system result from the imbalance between the weak capabilities of the Tuvalu to control fishing activities in its EEZ and the attribution of access to its waters to a large foreign fleet. In addition, despite the important contribution of fisheries to Tuvalu’s general income, it seems that the budget allocated to fisheries management is significantly lower. Consequently, although Tuvalu may have development constraints, the policies followed by that country for the management of fishery resources are not coherent with the allocated resources and country priorities with respect to fisheries management. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

In addition, it appears that the deficiencies of monitoring, control and surveillance system result from the imbalance between the weak capabilities of the Tuvalu to control fishing activities in its EEZ and the attribution of access to its waters to a large foreign fleet. In addition, despite the important contribution of fisheries to Tuvalu’s general income, it seems that the budget allocated to fisheries management is significantly lower. Consequently, although Tuvalu may have development constraints, the policies followed by that country for the management of fishery resources are not coherent with the allocated resources and country priorities with respect to fisheries management.

| (55) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status of Tuvalu fisheries governance may be impaired by its level of development. However, account taken of the nature of the established shortcomings of Tuvalu and actions taken to rectify the situation, Tuvalu’s development level cannot fully excuse or otherwise justify its overall performance as flag or coastal State with respect to fisheries and the insufficiency of its action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by Tuvalu, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status of Tuvalu fisheries governance may be impaired by its level of development. However, account taken of the nature of the established shortcomings of Tuvalu and actions taken to rectify the situation, Tuvalu’s development level cannot fully excuse or otherwise justify its overall performance as flag or coastal State with respect to fisheries and the insufficiency of its action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

4.   CONCLUSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFICATION AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (56) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to Tuvalu’s failure of to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to Tuvalu’s failure of to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing.

| (57) | In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Tuvalu of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Tuvalu. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Tuvalu of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Tuvalu. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation.

| (58) | Furthermore, the notification to Tuvalu of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries, |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Furthermore, the notification to Tuvalu of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

Tuvalu shall be notified of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2014.

For the Commission

Karmenu VELLA

Member of the Commission

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(1)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

1

(2)  http://www.ffa.int/

2

(3)  Nauru Agreement (http://www.ffa.int/node/93#attachments).

3

(4)  Code of Conduct for responsible fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1995.

4

(5)  International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001.

5

(6)  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, done at Honolulu, 5 September 2000 (http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-conservation-and-management-highly-migratory-fish-stocks-western-and-central-pacific).

6

(7)  Information retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

7

(8)  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

8

(9)  DAC List of ODA Recipients (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm).

9

(10)  WCPFC Scientific Committee Ninth Regular Session, WCPFC SC9-AR/CCM-25.

10

(11)  http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/CMM%202010-07%20%5BSharks%5D.pdf

11

(12)  Parties to Nauru Agreement (PNA) Third Arragement, 2008.

12

(13)  WCPFC Scientific Committee Ninth Regular Session, WCPFC SC9-AR/CCM-25.

13

(14)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, Seventh Regular Session, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia 9–17 August 2011 (http://www.wcpfc.int/node/2896).

14

(15)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session 7-15 August 2012 (http://www.wcpfc.int/node/4587), section 3.1.

15

(16)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee Eighth Regular Session, points 69-71.

16

(17)  Summary report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee, Seventh Regular Session, points 35 and 36.

17

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NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/30

---

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

(2014/C 447/12)

In accordance with Article 35(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), a decision has been taken to close the fishery as set down in the following table:

| Date and time of closure | 8.12.2014 |
| --- | --- |
| Duration | 8.12.2014-31.12.2014 |
| Member State | Sweden |
| Stock or group of stocks | COD/03AS. |
| Species | Cod (Gadus Morhua) |
| Zone | Kattegat |
| Type(s) of fishing vessels | — |
| Reference number | 79/TQ43 |

Date and time of closure

8.12.2014

Duration

8.12.2014-31.12.2014

Member State

Sweden

Stock or group of stocks

COD/03AS.

Species

Cod (Gadus Morhua)

Zone

Kattegat

Type(s) of fishing vessels

—

Reference number

79/TQ43

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/30

---

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

(2014/C 447/13)

In accordance with Article 35(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), a decision has been taken to close the fishery as set down in the following table:

| Date and time of closure | 21.11.2014 |
| --- | --- |
| Duration | 21.11.2014-31.12.2014 |
| Member State | Portugal |
| Stock or Group of stocks | GHL/N3LMNO |
| Species | Greenland Halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) |
| Zone | NAFO 3 LMNO |
| Type(s) of fishing vessels | — |
| Reference number | 77/TQ43 |

Date and time of closure

21.11.2014

Duration

21.11.2014-31.12.2014

Member State

Portugal

Stock or Group of stocks

GHL/N3LMNO

Species

Greenland Halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides)

Zone

NAFO 3 LMNO

Type(s) of fishing vessels

—

Reference number

77/TQ43

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/31

---

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

(2014/C 447/14)

In accordance with Article 35(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), a decision has been taken to close the fishery as set down in the following table:

| Date and time of closure | 3.12.2014 |
| --- | --- |
| Duration | 3.12.2014-31.12.2014 |
| Member State | Sweden |
| Stock or group of stocks | COD/03AN. |
| Species | Cod (Gadus Morhua) |
| Zone | Skagerrak |
| Type(s) of fishing vessels | — |
| Reference number | 78/TQ43 |

Date and time of closure

3.12.2014

Duration

3.12.2014-31.12.2014

Member State

Sweden

Stock or group of stocks

COD/03AN.

Species

Cod (Gadus Morhua)

Zone

Skagerrak

Type(s) of fishing vessels

—

Reference number

78/TQ43

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(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

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| 13.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/32

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Update of reference amounts for the crossing of the external borders, as referred to in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (1)

(2014/C 447/15)

The publication of reference amounts for the crossing of the external borders, as referred to in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), is based on the information communicated by the Member States to the Commission in accordance with Article 34 of the Schengen Borders Code.

In addition to the publication in the Official Journal, a monthly update is available on the website of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs.

BELGIUM

Replacement of the information published in OJ C 247 of 13.10.2006

It is stipulated in Belgian law that the availability of adequate means of subsistence should be demonstrated.

The administrative practice is as follows:

| (a) | Aliens staying with a private individual
  Proof of means of subsistence may be furnished by means of a letter of guarantee signed by the person accommodating the alien in Belgium and authenticated by the municipal administration of his place of residence.
  The declaration of liability covers the costs of the alien’s stay, health care, accommodation and repatriation in the event that the alien is unable to pay, so as to ensure that the public authorities do not have to bear them. The declaration must be signed by a person who is solvent and, if this person is an alien, is in possession of a residence permit or establishment permit.
  If necessary, the alien may also be required to furnish proof of personal resources.
  If he is without any financial credit at all, he must have access to approximately EUR 45 for each day of the planned stay. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Aliens staying with a private individual

Proof of means of subsistence may be furnished by means of a letter of guarantee signed by the person accommodating the alien in Belgium and authenticated by the municipal administration of his place of residence.

The declaration of liability covers the costs of the alien’s stay, health care, accommodation and repatriation in the event that the alien is unable to pay, so as to ensure that the public authorities do not have to bear them. The declaration must be signed by a person who is solvent and, if this person is an alien, is in possession of a residence permit or establishment permit.

If necessary, the alien may also be required to furnish proof of personal resources.

If he is without any financial credit at all, he must have access to approximately EUR 45 for each day of the planned stay.

| (b) | Aliens staying at a hotel
  If the alien is unable to furnish proof of any credit at all, he must have access to approximately EUR 95 for each day of the planned stay.
  In most cases, the person concerned must in addition produce a travel ticket (airline ticket) enabling him to return to his country of origin or residence. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Aliens staying at a hotel

If the alien is unable to furnish proof of any credit at all, he must have access to approximately EUR 95 for each day of the planned stay.

In most cases, the person concerned must in addition produce a travel ticket (airline ticket) enabling him to return to his country of origin or residence.

List of previous publications

| | OJ C 247, 13.10.2006, p. 19. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 247, 13.10.2006, p. 19.

| | OJ C 153, 6.7.2007, p. 22. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 153, 6.7.2007, p. 22.

| | OJ C 182, 4.8.2007, p. 18. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 182, 4.8.2007, p. 18.

| | OJ C 57, 1.3.2008, p. 38. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 57, 1.3.2008, p. 38.

| | OJ C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 19. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 19.

| | OJ C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 8. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 8.

| | OJ C 35, 12.2.2010, p. 7. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 35, 12.2.2010, p. 7.

| | OJ C 304, 10.11.2010, p. 5. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 304, 10.11.2010, p. 5.

| | OJ C 24, 26.1.2011, p. 6. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 24, 26.1.2011, p. 6.

| | OJ C 157, 27.5.2011, p. 8. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 157, 27.5.2011, p. 8.

| | OJ C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 16. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 16.

| | OJ C 11, 13.1.2012, p. 13. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 11, 13.1.2012, p. 13.

| | OJ C 72, 10.3.2012, p. 44. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 72, 10.3.2012, p. 44.

| | OJ C 199, 7.7.2012, p. 8. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 199, 7.7.2012, p. 8.

| | OJ C 298, 4.10.2012, p. 3. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 298, 4.10.2012, p. 3.

| | OJ C 56, 26.2.2013, p. 13. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 56, 26.2.2013, p. 13.

| | OJ C 98, 5.4.2013, p. 3. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 98, 5.4.2013, p. 3.

| | OJ C 269, 18.9.2013, p. 2. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 269, 18.9.2013, p. 2.

| | OJ C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 1. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 1.

| | OJ C 152, 20.5.2014, p. 25. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 152, 20.5.2014, p. 25.

| | OJ C 224, 15.7.2014, p. 31. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 224, 15.7.2014, p. 31.

| | OJ C 434, 4.12.2014, p. 3. |
| --- | --- |

OJ C 434, 4.12.2014, p. 3.

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(1)  See the list of previous publications at the end of this update.

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