1The HONORABLE JOHN F. NANGLE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2The HONORABLE CHARLES R. WOLLE, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-3443

_____________

Clinton Morse Watson, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

Robert Ray et al., * District of Iowa

*

Appellees. *

____________

Submitted: March 10, 1999

 Filed: September 29, 1999 

____________

Before McMILLIAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and

NANGLE,1 Senior District Judge.

____________

NANGLE, Senior District Judge.

Clinton Morse Watson appeals the district court’s2 termination of a consent

decree issued in 1981 which addressed prison conditions at Iowa State Penitentiary

(ISP) in Fort Madison, Iowa. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

This case began as a class action filed in 1978 by inmates at ISP. The action

was brought on behalf of all present and future general population inmates at ISP

challenging the conditions of confinement at the institution as violative of the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments. After two years of discovery, a three-week trial was held

in 1980. Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143, 145 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Appellant’s Br. at 2.

The court appointed experts on its own motion to examine the conditions of

confinement. Watson, 90 F.R.D. at 145. After the experts filed their reports, the

parties entered into extensive settlement negotiations and tentatively agreed upon a

proposed consent order. Id. As a result of objections raised by the named plaintiffs

and members of the plaintiff inmate class, the court held a final settlement conference

at the penitentiary wherein it informally gave its view of the issues it would be called

upon to decide if settlement were not consummated. Id. Nevertheless, the named

plaintiffs and a majority of the known class members ultimately rejected the settlement

offer. Id. 

In considering the merits of the action, the district court first addressed the

totality of the conditions of confinement and found that the conditions violated the

inmates’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. In order to craft an appropriate

remedy, the court reviewed the proposed settlement documents, the experts’ reports,

the evidentiary record, and the parties’ comments. Ultimately, the court found that

implementation of the proposed consent order would rectify the unconstitutional

conditions of confinement and would be in the best interests of the plaintiff class. Id.

Because the consent decree would “offer benefits to the inmates that could not be

constitutionally imposed” and would “at the same time [adequately remedy] all serious

constitutional issues” in the case, the court found that all parties would benefit from the

adoption and approval of the settlement over the objections of the named plaintiffs. Id.

at 147-48. Accordingly, the court accepted the proposed consent order in 1981. Id.

at 151. The decree required, inter alia, annual monitoring of the ISP, and included a

statement that the relief embodied therein might in some instances be more than what

the Constitution requires. Id. at 155-56.

On May 10, 1996, the defendant prison officials moved for termination of the

decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2).

Order Terminating Decree and Dismissing Pending Proceedings, J.A. at 11a. This

portion of the PLRA provides for immediate termination of prospective relief regarding
3

prison conditions unless the court has made specific findings set forth in the statute.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). If the court finds a current and ongoing violation of a federal

right and the prospective relief is necessary and narrowly drawn, then the prospective

relief will not be terminated. Id. § 3626(b)(3). The inmates asserted that the immediate

termination provision of the PLRA was unconstitutional, and the United States

intervened to defend the statute. Intervener-Appellee’s Br. at 3. 

On February 10, 1997, Judge Wolle held that the PLRA violated the inmates’

constitutional rights, following a similar order entered by District Judge Harold D.

Vietor. See Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV70062, 1996 WL 622556, at *4 (S.D. Iowa

Sept. 18, 1996) (holding that the immediate termination provision of the PLRA violates

the principle of separation of powers by requiring federal courts to reopen final

judgments). The parties appealed, but this Court reversed Judge Vietor’s opinion in

Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997), and remanded this case for

reconsideration in light of that decision. 

On remand, the inmates argued that the decree should not be terminated, that the

PLRA’s immediate termination provision is unconstitutional, and alternatively that they

should receive an opportunity to investigate and allege current and ongoing federal

violations in order to satisfy the statute. J.A. at 12a; Appellant’s Br. at 4. On August

10, 1998, the district court granted the motion to terminate the decree, refused to allow

any discovery, and concluded that the PLRA was not unconstitutional. J.A. at 12a-15a.

The United States did not participate in the proceedings on remand. IntervenerAppellee’s Br. at 4.

The plaintiff inmates appeal the termination of the consent decree claiming that

the district court erred in holding that the decree did not contain the findings required

under 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and that the district court erred in concluding that the

immediate termination provision of the PLRA is constitutional. Alternatively, the

inmates assert that the district court erred in terminating the decree without allowing

the inmates an opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the existence of current and

ongoing violations of federal rights.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court reviews de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute. United

States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1999); Department of Social Servs. v.
4

Bowen, 804 F.2d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 1986). When determining the meaning of a

statute, our starting point must be the plain language of the statute. Vig, 167 F.3d at

447; United States v. Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1994). “Our objective in

interpreting a federal statute is to give effect to the intent of Congress.” Vig, 167 F.3d

at 447; Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 1987). When no specific

definition for a term is given in the statute itself, we look to the ordinary common sense

meaning of the words. Vig, 167 F.3d at 447; United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947,

956 (8th Cir. 1995). “Absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the

language is regarded as conclusive.” Vig, 167 F.3d at 447; Minnesota v. Heckler, 718

F.2d 852, 860 (8th Cir. 1983). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides limitations on prospective

relief in prison condition litigation. The immediate termination provision, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(b)(2), provides as follows:

(2) Immediate termination of prospective relief.—In any civil action

with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall

be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief

if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding

by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further

than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is

the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right.

This provision is limited by § 3626(b)(3) which states that the prospective relief will

not be terminated if the court finds that it remains necessary to correct a current or

ongoing violation of the federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation, is narrowly drawn, and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation.

“Prospective relief” is defined to include all relief other than compensatory damages,

and it expressly includes consent decrees. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7), (9). “Consent

decree” is defined to include any relief entered by the court based in whole or in part

upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private

settlements. Id. § 3626(g)(1). The statute expressly applies to prospective relief

granted before the enactment of the PLRA. Id. § 3626 note.

 
5

A. Statutory Interpretation

The inmates claim that the district court erred in finding that the 1981 decree did

not conform to the requirements of the PLRA. Specifically, they claim that the decree

should be deemed to comply with the PLRA because it was a “litigated judgment”

premised on a finding of unconstitutional conditions to which the prison officials failed

to object on appeal. Appellant’s Br. at 7-10. That is, because the decree was a

judgment in which the finding of unconstitutional conditions was made by the district

court and not by the consent of the parties, it automatically complies with the PLRA.

This automatic compliance is a result of the fact that the then-existing requirements for

a district court to grant injunctive relief over the objection of the party enjoined are

identical to those required by the PLRA itself. See Smith v. Arkansas Dep’t of

Corrections, 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating in dicta that the PLRA did not

change the standards for determining whether to grant an injunction). Accordingly,

because the prison officials did not object when the decree was adopted that it was not

narrowly tailored, they waived the right to assert that argument upon their motion for

termination of the decree. Appellant’s Br. at 7-15.

The inmates’ argument, however, fails to recognize the unique manner in which

the decree was adopted by the district court. A finding of constitutional violations was

made by the court in an effort to spur ongoing settlement negotiations. Watson, 90

F.R.D. at 145. When the proposed consent decree was rejected by the named plaintiffs

and other members of the inmate class, the court, acting pursuant to its powers under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), reviewed the proposal and obtained input from

the plaintiff class for the purpose of determining whether the decree was in the best

interests of the class. Id. at 146. After an exhaustive and thorough review, the district

court determined that the named class representatives were not acting in the best

interests of the class when they rejected the settlement. Id. at 146-48. Consequently,

the court accepted the proposed settlement on behalf of the plaintiff class and approved

the consent order pursuant to its obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(e). Id. at 151. 

Because the decree was based in part on the acquiescence of the parties (the

prison officials and the court on behalf of the plaintiff class), the decree is not a

“litigated judgment” in the manner in which appellant uses that term. Rather, it is a

consent decree as that term is defined in the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(1).

Accordingly, even if appellant’s novel argument is valid for decrees that truly were not
3We do not address the validity of this argument today as the question is not properly before

us.

4

J.A. at 13a (district court’s finding that the 1981 relief was not narrowly tailored).

5Watson, 90 F.R.D. at 147-48 (“The terms of the proposed consent decree offer benefits to

the inmates that could not be constitutionally imposed, and at the same time all serious constitutional

issues are adequately remedied in the decree.”); id. at 155 (“This Order may include specific

requirements and procedures beyond what is required by the Constitution of the United States of

America and Constitution of the State of Iowa, or any other statutory or common law requirement.”).

6Appellant also asserts that because the decree should be deemed to have the proper findings

under the PLRA, § 3626(b)(1) applies rather than section (b)(2). Appellant’s Br. at 10-13. Because

we hold that the decree does not contain the proper findings, we find that appellant’s argument on

this point has no merit.

6

consent decrees,3 it would not aid the inmates in this case. This decree did not contain

the findings required by the PLRA,4 and, because it was a consent decree that

admittedly provided more relief than the Constitution required,5 it should not be

deemed to comply with the PLRA. Therefore, it is subject to the immediate termination

provision of § 3626(b)(2). Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d at 1084.6

The district court found and the inmates admit that the decree was entered in

1981 without the findings required by the PLRA. J.A. at 13a (“The relief Judge Stuart

awarded was not narrowly drawn but quite general.”); Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5 (“The

relief ordered by Judge Stuart is clearly a combination of measures that cleave to the

constitutional floor and those that exceed it.”); Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6 (“[The court

and the parties] put together the remedies that seemed to best resolve the violations, but

without any magic words not then required by law or even recommended by

prudence.”). Accordingly, the decree is subject to immediate termination pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) unless the district court finds current and ongoing violations

pursuant to § 3626(b)(3). The district court found that the inmates had failed to prove

the existence of such current and ongoing violations. J.A. at 13a-14a. Consequently,

the district court did not err in terminating the 1981 decree.

B. Constitutional Claims

The inmates next assert that § 3626(b)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to this

case because it deprives the federal courts of the power to issue effective remedies for

constitutional violations, and it burdens the inmates’ fundamental right to access to the

courts. Appellant’s Br. at 16-20. The crux of the inmates’ argument again rests on
7

their contention that the decree is a “litigated judgment” which was impliedly narrowly

tailored, necessary, and the least intrusive means to correct the constitutional violation.

 Termination of this decree would therefore prevent the district court from completely

remedying the constitutional violations found in 1981 and would deprive the inmates

of a fundamental right in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

However, as we found supra, this decree is not a “litigated judgment.” Rather,

the decree is unique in that it is a consent decree accepted on behalf of the class by the

court after a finding that the named representatives were not acting in the best interests

of the class. Thus, the decree contains relief that is greater than could constitutionally

be imposed if the decree were solely imposed by the court. Watson, 90 F.R.D. at 147-

48 (“The terms of the proposed consent decree offer benefits to the inmates that could

not be constitutionally imposed, and at the same time all serious constitutional issues

are adequately remedied in the decree.”). Accordingly, this case is identical to Gavin

v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997) and Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594 (8th

Cir. 1998), which also involved consent decrees requiring greater relief than could

constitutionally be imposed by the court alone. In Gavin, this Court rejected the

contention that application of the PLRA to such a consent decree deprived the inmates

of their fundamental right of access to the courts, 122 F.3d at 1089-90. Similarly, in

Tyler, this Court rejected the contention that application of the PLRA to such a consent

decree deprives federal courts of their power to remedy constitutional violations, 135

F.3d at 597. Accordingly, bound by this direct precedent, we find that the district court

did not err in finding the PLRA constitutional as applied to this case.

C. Discovery

The inmates’ most meritorious argument is that the district court erred in denying

them adequate discovery to prove the existence of current and ongoing violations

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). We review a district court’s discovery decisions

for abuse of discretion. National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Dow Chemical

Co., 165 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 1999); Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir.

1987). The United States, as intervener, agrees that in some instances, discovery

should be allowed in order for inmates to determine if a current and ongoing violation

exists. Appellee-Intervener’s Br. at 16. 

Even if the United States is correct in its interpretation of the PLRA, an issue

which we decline to decide today, discovery would not be necessary in this case. The
8

district court found in its termination order that appellants failed to show present

violations of constitutional rights, that most of the problems giving rise to the decree

had been solved, and that recent reports suggested that the only areas of current

noncompliance with the decree were not of a constitutional magnitude. J.A. at 13a14a. The district court based this finding on evidence produced in a lengthy 1996

modification hearing and in recent reports from the Iowa State Commissioner of Health,

the Iowa State Fire Marshal, and the Regional Director of the Federal Bureau of

Prisons. J.A. at 13a-14a, 16a-31a, 34a-36a. Additionally, when asked at oral argument

if there was any indication of current violations, appellant could only point to “the

looming threat of potential overcrowding” but did not produce any evidence to support

a finding that this threat constitutes a “current and ongoing violation” under the PLRA.

Given the wealth of evidence available in the record to support the district court’s

finding of no current and ongoing violations, we find that the denial of discovery in this

case was not an abuse of discretion. 

III. CONCLUSION

Finding that the district court properly terminated the consent decree in this case

pursuant to the PLRA, that the immediate termination provision of the PLRA as applied

to this case is constitutional and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the inmates discovery, we hereby affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.