[Cite as State v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-3322.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100447

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

ISIAH B. HALE

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-09-529253-A 

BEFORE: Keough, J., Jones, P.J., and McCormack, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 31, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Michael J. Cheselka 

75 Public Square, Suite 920 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2084 
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court’s decision 

allowing defendant-appellee, Isiah Hale, to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} In 2009, Hale was charged with murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and 

having a weapon while under disability. Hale’s codefendant, was charged with 

conspiracy and having a weapon while under disability. In 2010, Hale pleaded guilty to 

an amended count of involuntary manslaughter with a three-year firearm specification. 

He was sentenced to a total prison term of eight years. 

{¶3} On January 5, 2011, Hale filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the 

basis that the state disclosed at the trial of Hale’s codefendant that gunshot primer residue 

was found on the victim’s hand, which was information requested by Hale during pretrial 

discovery, but was not disclosed to him. The state opposed the motion, and in May 2011 

the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. 

{¶4} In August 2013, the trial court granted Hale’s motion to withdraw his plea by 

written decision. 

The Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, entered into on April 

22, 2010, to correct a manifest injustice pursuant to rule 32.1 of the Ohio 

Rules of Criminal Procedure is granted. 

The Defendant, Isiah B. Hale, along with a Co-Defendant, was charged 

with Murder, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 2903.02(A) and (B) 

with Firearm Specifications. There were two additional felony offenses 

referencing Mr. Hale. Throughout the pre-trial discovery process, the 

Defendant maintained that he acted in self-defense. On March 5, 2010, the 

results of a gunshot residue test conducted by the Cuyahoga County 
Coroner’s Office were received. The test results reflected that the murder 

victim, Montrell Stonewall, did indeed have gunshot primer residue on his 

right hand. 

The defense requested, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, any evidence material to the defense including the results of any 

gunshot residue tests performed on the victim. The State produced the 

requested discovery information in its possession. That information 

included information from the Coroner’s Office — absent any results of the 

gunshot residue test. Defense counsel relied on the fact that no gunshot 

residue test had been performed and advised Mr. Hale to forgo his 

affirmative defense of self-defense. Subsequently Mr. Hale entered a 

change of plea to Involuntary Manslaughter. 

On January 4, 2011, the State disclosed, during the trial of the 

Co-Defendant that a gunshot residue test had indeed been performed on the 

victim. The results proved positive for the presence of gunshot primer 

residue on the right hand of the victim. The Co-Defendant was acquitted. 

The Defense also alleges a Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83. The elements necessary to trigger a Brady violation are: 

(i) The evidence must be favorable to the accused; 

(ii) The evidence must have been either willfully or 

inadvertently suppressed by the government; 

(iii) Prejudice must have ensued. 

It is the opinion of the Court that the Defendant’s burden of proof is met 

under a Brady analysis as well. It must be said that no one believes that the 

State intentionally or willfully withheld the gunshot residue test results. 

This delayed disclosure was material to the issues of guilt as it substantiated 

the Defendant’s self-defense defense and was tantamount to a manifest 

injustice mandating the granting of the Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his 

Guilty Plea. 

{¶5} The state appeals this decision, raising as its sole assignment of error that the 

trial court erred in granting Hale’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
{¶6} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only 

before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may 

set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her 

plea.” Crim.R. 32.1. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “manifest injustice” as a 

clear or openly unjust act. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 

699 N.E.2d 83 (1998). This standard permits a defendant to withdraw his plea only in 

extraordinary cases. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977). 

The defendant moving for a postsentence withdrawal of a guilty plea, has the burden of 

establishing the existence of a manifest injustice. Id. at paragraph one of syllabus. 

{¶7} The decision to grant or deny a Crim.R. 32.1 motion is committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. We will not 

reverse a trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id., citing State v. Xie, 62 

Ohio St.3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). A trial court abuses its discretion when its 

judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶8} In this case, the state contends that the disclosure of the gunshot residue test 

does not constitute a manifest injustice that necessitates the vacation of conviction and 

withdrawal of Hale’s guilty plea. Specifically, the states directs this court to the fact that 

Hale acknowledged shooting the victim while the victim was pointing a gun at him, but 

that Hale never stated that he was being shot at by the victim. The state seems to allude 
that only after learning about the presence of the gunshot primer residue, did Hale’s story 

change. These arguments were made and rejected in the trial court. 

{¶9} The evidence and testimony that was adduced at the hearing on Hale’s motion 

shows that in 2010, a trace evidence report was generated by the coroner’s office 

following the examination of the victim. Contained in that report was a finding 

indicating that gunshot primer residue was detected on the victim’s right hand. Despite 

discovery being requested by Hale, the defense did not receive this report. In fact, the 

record reveals that this report was not released to either the state or the defense until 

January 2011, the day prior to the start of the trial against Hale’s codefendant. It is clear 

that the withholding of the report was inadvertent by the coroner’s office, and not willful 

by the state. 

{¶10} However, it cannot be said that when a defendant is maintaining a defense 

of self-defense and the trace evidence report indicates that the victim had gunshot primer 

residue on his hand, that this evidence would not be considered potentially exculpatory. 

Without knowledge of this potentially exculpatory evidence, it cannot be said that Hale 

entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court’s decision 

finding that a manifest injustice was demonstrated by Hale was neither arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unconscionable. The court heard all the testimony and reviewed all the 

evidence in making its decision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 

Hale’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the state’s assignment of error 

is overruled. 
{¶11} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and 

TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR