Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 30, 2023

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00614-CV

FIDELIS JOHNSON BADAIKI, Appellant

V.

PINE FOREST PARK PLACE, AND AMERICAN EAGLE AUTO 

STORAGE, Appellees 

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1092824

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Fidelis Johnson Badaiki, pro se, sued Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing 

LLC,1 Pine Forest Park Place, and American Eagle Auto Storage for violations of 

the Texas Towing and Booting Act. See Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2308.001, 2308.404. 

After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Badaiki and 

1 Prior to trial Badaiki non-suited his claims against Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing 

LLC.
2

awarded him damages under the Act. Badaiki appeals the trial court’s judgment

asserting that the trial court erred in failing to award (1) statutory damages under 

section 2308.404(c) of the Occupations Code, (2) damages for injury to his 

vehicle’s suspension system alleged to have occurred when his vehicle was towed, 

(3) prejudgment interest, and (4) post-judgment interest. See Tex. Occ. Code §

2308.404(c). No appellee’s brief has been filed. 

GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A judgment shall conform to the pleadings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; see also

Mullen v. Roberts, 423 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1968) (“It is a rule that . . . a default 

judgment . . . must accord with the pleadings.”). “[A]s a general rule plaintiffs are 

required to plead for prejudgment intertest sought at common law as an element of 

damages, whereas statutory or contractual interest may be predicated on a prayer 

for general relief.” Benavidez v. Isles Const. Co., 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987). 

Exemplary damages must be specifically pleaded. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 56; see also

First Nat’l Bank of Irving v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi-Edinburg 1983, no writ) (“Since plaintiff’s petition did not allege that the

alleged misconduct by the bank was committed knowingly, the trial court could not 

and our Court cannot deem such an allegation as proved or confessed.”). “It is 

impermissible in a default judgment to render judgment for damages in excess of 

the damages specifically pleaded.” Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., Inc., 

722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986).

In a no-answer default judgment, a judgment may be entered on the

pleadings alone, and all facts properly pled are deemed admitted. Whitaker v. 

Rose, 218 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “For 

liquidated damages, a trial court can render default judgment if it can verify the 

damages by referring to the allegations in the petition and the written instruments.”
3

Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 241). For unliquidated damages the trial court must hear 

evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 243; see also Whitaker, 218 S.W.3d at 220. “[A] 

defaulting defendant does not admit that the event sued upon caused any of 

plaintiff’s alleged injuries.” Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 

732 (Tex. 1984). “The causal nexus between the event sued upon and the 

plaintiff’s injuries must be shown by competent evidence.” Id.

Under section 2308.404 of the Texas Towing and Booting Act: 

(a) A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner 

who violates this chapter is liable to the owner or operator of the 

vehicle that is the subject of the violation for:

1) Damages arising from the removal, storage, or booting of 

the vehicle; and 

2) Towing, storage, or booting fees assessed in connection with 

the vehicle’s removal, storage, or booting. 

. . .

(c) A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner

who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violates this chapter is 

liable to the owner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of 

the violation for $1,000 plus three times the amount of fees 

assessed in the vehicle’s removal, towing, storage, or booting.

Tex. Occ. Code § 2308.404. 

BACKGROUND

Badaiki filed suit in the justice court and appealed to the county civil court at 

law, de novo. In his original petition in the justice court, which became part of the 

record in the county civil court at law, Badaiki requested $294.16 for the costs of 

the tow and the storage fees assessed, as well as $20.00 for the costs of the 

photographs. Badaiki attached the receipt for payment of the towing and storage 

fees. Badaiki did not allege or plead that appellees Pine Forest Park Place and 

American Eagle Auto Storage “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly” violated
4

the Towing and Booting Act. There is also no general prayer for relief contained 

in the petition. 

Just before trial, Badaiki non-suited Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing 

LLC. The trial court conducted a bench trial and rendered judgment in favor of 

Badaiki against Pine Forest Park Place and American Eagle Auto Storage for 

$314.16 in “Towing and Storage Charges.” Badaiki filed a motion to modify the 

judgment requesting that the trial court modify the final judgment to include 

prejudgment and post-judgment interest, damages to the vehicle’s suspension 

system, and statutory damages under section 2308.404(c). The trial court denied 

Badaiki’s motion.

BADAIKI’S PLEADINGS

Badaiki did not allege or plead any facts that would establish that Pine 

Forest and American Eagle “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly” violated the 

Towing and Booting Act. See Shockley, 663 S.W.2d at 691; see also Whitaker, 

218 S.W.3d at 220. Badaiki also failed to plead any damages to his vehicle alleged 

to have occurred when his vehicle was towed. Thus, neither the trial court nor this 

court can deem such allegations as proven or confessed.

2

 See Shockley, 663 

S.W.2d at 691. Badaiki similarly failed to plead for prejudgment or post-judgment 

interest in his petition. See Benavidez, 726 S.W.2d at 25. As a result, the petition 

did not state a cause of action for these additional damages against appellees and 

the trial court did not err in failing to award such damages.

3 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 

2 Even if the pleading was sufficient to give fair notice of such a claim, Badaiki has failed 

to point to evidence in the record demonstrating, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of 

the issue or that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241–42 (Tex. 2001). 

3 Even if the petition could be construed to request prejudgment interest, the decision of 

whether to award prejudgment interest under equitable principles is within the trial court’s 

discretion. Henry v. Masson, 453 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). 
5

301; see also Shockley, 663 S.W.2d at 691 (“[T]he plaintiff’s petition did not 

allege that any of the alleged misconduct . . . was committed knowingly. The 

petition did not state a cause of action for these ‘additional damages’ . . . the 

default judgment for these ‘additional damages’ cannot stand.”). 

CONCLUSION

We overrule Badaiki’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.

Badaiki has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding him

prejudgment interest. See id. at 49–50 (where serious and genuine dispute regarding ultimate 

liability existed, decision not to award prejudgment interest under equitable principles was not 

abuse of discretion); Pickens v. Alsup, 568 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.—Austin 1978, writ ref’d 

n.r.e.) (same). Other than arguing his entitlement to prejudgment interest, Badaiki has not shown

how the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him prejudgment interest. On the

record here we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was so arbitrary or unreasonable as 

to amount to a clear error of law. See Henry, 453 S.W.3d at 50.