# FILED July 24, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRI MINAL APPEA LS OF TENNESSEE ATJA CKSON JULY SES SION, 1997 JOE HOBSON, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9609-CC-00309 ) Ap pella nt, ) ) ) MADISON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. FRA NKLI N MURCHI SON STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appell ee. ) (Post- Convict ion)

ON AP PEA L FROM THE J UDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COU NTY
FOR THE APP ELLA NT : FOR THE APPELLEE : GEORGE MORTON GO OGE JOHN KNOX W ALKUP Dist ri ct Publ ic Def ender Attor ney General and Reporter 227 W . Bal ti more Street Jackson, TN 38301 CLINTON J . MORGAN Assist ant Attor ney General 450 James Robertson Par kway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493 JERRY W OOD ALL Dist ri ct Attor ney General AL EARLS Assist ant Di str ictAtto rney Gener al P.O. Box 2825 Jackson, TN 38302

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFI RMED DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE1 Th e rec ord is unc lear re gard ing the offe nse s of w hich the P etitione r wa s ac tually con victed
. In hi s peti ti on for p ost-co nvi cti on rel ief , he st ates t hat he i s chall enging convi cti ons for p ossession of dil audid and possessi on of cocai ne. On anot her document submitt ed by the Pet it ioner to t he cler k of the t ri al court, he refe rs t o convi cti ons for p ossession of cocai ne wit h int ent t o sell , possessi on of dil audid wit h int ent t o sell , and posse ssion ofdrug paraphernal ia. Unfort unatel y, the record does not contain copies of the judgm ents for the challenged co nvictions. The Petitioner does m ake it clear, however, thatthe conv ict ions cha ll enged through thi s peti ti on for p ost-co nvi cti on rel iefare t he drug offenses to which h e plea ded gui lty on Ja nuary25, 1989 and Apri l 16, 1990.

2 See Tenn . Code A nn. §§ 40-30-2 02, -206(b) (Supp . 1996). -2- 

# OPINION

The Peti ti oner, Joe Hobson, appeal s as of ri ght pursuant t o Rule 3 ofthe Tennessee Rules of Appellat e Procedure from the tr ial co urt ’s deni al o f his peti ti on for po st-co nviction relief. The Peti ti oner f il ed a pro se petition for po stconvi cti on rel iefon March 28, 1996, chal lengi ng vari ous convi cti ons for drug off enses recei ved i n 1989 and 1990. 1 On April 9, 1996, t he tr ial courtdismis sed the peti ti on wit hout conducti ng an evi denti ary hear ing, fi nding t hat i t was bar red by the stat ute of l imitat ions. 2 W e affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.

The procedural hi story ofthe ca se a t b ar i s somewhat convol uted. The Peti ti onerenter ed guil ty p leas to v ari ous drug offenses on January25, 1989 and Ap ril 16, 19 90. H e filed a petition for po st-co nviction relief, which is t he subject ofthe case sub judice , on Ma rch 28 , 19 96 . In th e p etitio n, h e a rgu ed tha t his guilty pleas h ad been entered inv olu nta rily be ca us e th e tria l cou rt ha d n ot fu lly advi sed him about his r ightagainstself -i ncri minati on and hisri ght of confrontat ion. He also cl aimed thatthe convict ions bas ed on his guil ty p leas
were lat er used to enhance a f ederal sentence. The State responded to the peti ti on on April 4, 1996, by moving to di smiss it on the ground thatitwas barr ed by the st atut e of l imit ati ons. On Apri l 9, 1996, t he t ri al court ent ered an order3 See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-30-10 2 (repealed 199 5). -3- su m m arily dism is sing the p etition a s ha ving b een barre d by th e thre e-ye ar sta tute of li mitati ons. 3

I t appears that on t he same da y that the order ofdismissal was e nter ed , Ap ril 9, 1996, t he Peti ti oner r eceiv ed a copy ofthe St ate’ s answer t o his pe ti ti on. At thatti me, he was i ncarcerated in a f ede ral peni tenti ary i n Mem phis, T ennessee. In response to the St ate’ s answer, which argued thatthe p etitio n was ti me-barred, the P etitione r sen t add itional d ocu m ents to t he cler k of t he tr ial court in which he had fi led his pet iti on. The docu men t s ma de ref erence t o the convi cti ons which he was chall enging and a gain setforth hi s reas ons thatthey sh ou ld be set asi de. The Peti ti oneralso responded to the St ate’ s content ion t hat his peti ti on was ti me-barred byargui ng thatthe Post -Convi cti on Proce dure Act of1995 had ext ended the f il ing deadli ne to May 10, 1996. Because he had fi led his peti ti on on March 28, 1996, he as sert ed thatitwas not bar red bythe s tatute ofli mitat ions. The tr ial courtcler k recei ved and f il ed thes e ad ditiona l doc um ents on Apri l 11, 1996.

On thatsame day, Apr il 11, 1996, a copy ofthe order of di smissal was mailed to t he Peti ti oner. The en velo pe in w hic h it w as sen t, ho we ver, did not li st the Pe tition er’s name or pri soner numberor any o ther iden tifying feature. Ra ther, it wa s ad dre sse d o nly to the “Fe de ral C orre ctio na l Inst it ute” in “ Mem phis, Te nne sse e.” As a resul t, ther e was a lo ng delaybetween t he ti me the order was mailed and the t ime the Pet it ioner actual lyrecei ved i t. Itappears t hat he recei ved the order on May 10, 1996.4Tennessee Rule ofCivi l Procedure 60. 02 all ows a tr ial courtto provi de rel ieffrom fi nal judgments, orders or proceedi ngs for anumber of reasons, incl uding “mistake, inadv erte nce, sur pri se or ex cus able neg lect.” -4- After recei vi ng the copy o f the State’s a nsw er to his pe tition but before recei vi ng the copyof t he orderof di smissal , t he Pe tition er d ec ide d to write dire ctly to the t ri al court i n response to the St ate’ s content ion thatthe pet it ion was t imebarr ed. On April 24, 1996, he wrot e a letterto th e tria l cou rt exp lain ing tha t his peti ti on was not f il ed aft er t he stat ute ofli mitat ions had expi red because t he 1995 Post-Conv ict ion Procedure Act had ext ended the f il ing deadl ine t o May 10, 1996. He also en closed a copy ofthe relev ant porti on ofthe 1995 Act . The l ett erwas recei ved and f il ed by t he tr ial courtcler k on Apri l 26, 1996.

On April 29, 1996, apparent lyin response to thi s letter, th e trial court enter ed an order

appoint ing t he district publi c defender as counsel forthe Petitioner. A heari ng o n the matt er was setforJune 24, 1996. I t i s uncl ear whetherthe t ri al court r eali zed thatthe pet it ion had al ready be en dismi ssed as ofApril 9, 1996. At t hat ti me, counsel for t he Petiti oner was u nawar e thatthe peti ti on had already been di smissed. Thus, couns el began to i nvest igat e the
ca se. During the i nvest igat ion, counsel disco vered t hat t he peti ti on h ad bee n dismis sed by an o rder enter ed on Apri l 9, 1996. As a result , counsel fi led a motion to setaside t he ord er of d ism issa l pu rsu an t to T en ne sse e R ule of C ivil Proc edu re 60.02. 4 In suppo rt ofthe Rul e 60.02 moti on, counsel argued t hat t he Peti ti onerhad no t rec eive d p rop er n otic e o f the ord er o f dism issa l, seemingl y by mistake or i nadvert ence, unt il aft er t he ti me period f or f il ing not ice ofappeal had exp ired. See Ten n. R. A pp. P. 4 (a).-5- During the ti me that couns el was di scover ing t hat t he peti ti on had already been dismis sed, the Pet it ioner fi nall y rec eiv ed the copyof t he orderof d ism issa l. In response to t hat order, he fi led a pro se noti ce of appeal on May 20, 1996 . As
a resul t, the record was sen t to th e cle rk o f this Court. No rul ing was ev er made
on the R ule 60.0 2 m otion, nor w as the e videntiary heari ng schedul ed for June 24, 1996, ev er conduct ed.

On ap pe al, the Pet it ioner , wi th t he assi stance of cou ns el, a rgu es prim arily thatthis C ou rt sh ou ld a void reachi ng the meri ts ofthe t ri al court’ s dismi ssal o f the post- conv ict ion p eti ti on. I nstead, he request s thatwe remand thi s case t o the tri al courtforconsi derat ion ofthe Rule 60. 02 motion and , ifthatmotion i s deemed well -ta ken, an evi denti ary hear ing on t he post- convi cti on peti ti on as wa s or igin ally schedule d forJune 24, 1996 . Th e P etitio ne r co nte nd s th at h e h as a co lora ble cla im forthe extensi on of t he post- convi cti on stat ute ofli mitat i ons to Ma y 10, 199 6, tha t sho uld b e co nsid ered by the trial cou rt.

Initia llywe note t hat, alt hough there has been procedural conf usion in th is
case and a R ule 6 0.02 mo ti on wa s fil ed, i t i s from the tr ial court ’s order of dismis sal that t he Petiti oner now appeals. The present case is before this Cou rt pursuantto the Pe titioner’s noti ce of app eal filed on M ay 20, 1 996 . Obviou sly, the noti ce of appeal was fi led afterthe expi rat ion ofthe t hirty- day t ime peri od from the entry o f the trial c ourt’s orde r of dism issa l. Ten n. R. A pp. P. 4 (a). The State, how ever, concedes t hat t he Peti ti onerwas not properl y served wi th a copyof t he orderof di smissal . Giv en thatcircumstance and t hat t he noti ce of appeal is not juris dic tion al, the S tate h as a gree d to wa ive tim ely filing of the notice
. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) . We see no purpose i n remanding this c as e fo r the trial c ou rt’s-6-

considerati on of the Ru le 60 .02 m otion and , s houl d thatmotion be found t o be well -ta ken, consi derat ion ofthe Pet it ioner ’s cl aim thatthe 1995 Post -Convi cti on Proc edu re A ct ext ended the f il ing deadl ine f or hi s peti ti on for post- convi cti on relief. W e bel iev e th at we have suffi cientinf ormati on to address the merit s of t he Pe tition er’s appeal f rom the t ri al court ’s order ofApril 9, 1996, dismis sing t he peti ti on.

Alt hough the Pet it ioner ’s pr imary argum ent on appe al is that this Co urt sh ou ld rem and to the trial court for c on sid era tion of th e R ule 60 .02 m otio n, it is clear from the peti ti on, other documents i n the record, and the appel lat e bri ef t hat he also argues thathis pet it ion was notbarre d by t he stat ut e of l imit ati ons because of t he one-ye ar gra ce peri od p rovi de d by t he 1995 Post- Convict ion Pro ced ure A ct. See Compiler ’s Not es to T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-30- 201 (Supp. 1996) (ref erri ng to Acts 1995, ch. 207, § 3). Accordi ngly, he co nte nds thatthe tri al courterred in f indi ng thathis pet it ion f or post -convi cti on rel iefwas barr ed by the statu te of lim itations
. At t he tim e th e P etitio ne r’s c on victio ns be ca m e fin al, the sta tute o f li mitat ions appl icabl e to post -convi cti on proceedi ngs was three years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102 ( repea led 1 995 ). The expirati on of t he thr ee-year

stat ute ofli mitat ions i n the Pe tition er’s cas e o ccu rred in 19 92 for h is guilty ple as en tere d o n Ja nu ary 2 5, 1 98 9, a nd in 1993 for the guil ty p leas ent ered
on Ap ril 16, 19 90. A s we state d ab ove , t he presen t pe tition wa s no t filed un til March 28, 1996.

Ofcourse, the new Post -Convi cti on Procedur e Act gov erns t his pet iti on and all petition s filed a fter M ay 10 , 199 5. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30 -201 et
s eq. (Supp . 19 96 ). W e a gre e w ith th e P etitio ne r tha t this Ac t pro vide s, in-7-

pert inentpart, th at “no twiths tand ing a ny oth er provi si on of t his part t o the contrary, any pe rson h aving gro und fo r relie f rec og niz ed un de r this pa rt sh all have at l ea st on e (1) ye ar from Ma y 10, 1 995 , to file a pe tition or a mo tion to reopen a pe tition un der th is pa rt.” Compiler ’s Not es to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30 - 201 (Su pp. 1996 ) ( ref err in g t o Ac ts 1995 , ch. 207, § 3) . The Peti ti oner ar gues thatthese t erms of t he new Post- Convict ion Pr ocedure Actall owed him one year fro m May 10, 1995 , t o f il e hi s peti ti on and, t hus, hi s March 1996 pet it ion was ti mely f il ed.

We recogni ze thatanother panel ofthis Cou rt has hel d, wi th one member dissent ing, that the ne w Po st-C o nvi cti on Procedur e Act provi des “a one- year wind ow” during which eac h an d eve ry de fend ant m ay file a p etition. See Arn old Carter v. State , C.C. A. No. 03 C01 - 95 09 - CC- 00 27 0, Mo nroe Cou nty ( Ten n. Cr i m. Ap p., Knoxvi ll e, Jul y 11, 199 6), perm. t o appeal granted (Tenn. 1996) . The Carter courtheld t hat t he one-ye arwindowis av aila ble eve n if th e p etitio n w ou ld have been long ago barr ed bythe t hree-y ear st atut e provi ded under t he previ ous act.

Otherpanels of t his Court hav e fol lowed th e re as on ing of th e d isse nt in Carterand h eld that the 1995 Act did n ot provide previous ly-barred p etitioners with a new one-y earperi od from May 10, 1995 dur ing whi ch theycould p eti ti on forpos t-con viction re lief. See Doyle Cart erv. State , C .C. A. No. 01C0 1- 951 1- CC00398, Da vidso n C oun ty (Te nn. C rim. A pp., N ash ville, Feb . 12, 1 997 ); Eri c C. Pendlet on v. State , C. C.A. No. 01C01-9604- CR-00158, Davi dson County (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p., N as hville , F eb. 1 2, 19 97); W alla ce Bu tler v. R icky Be ll, W ard en , C.C. A. No. 02 C01 - 95 10 - CC- 00 29 7, Fa ye t t e Co un t y ( Ten n. Cr i m. App., Jackson,-8-

No v. 19, 1 996 ); Joh nny L. Bu tler v. Sta te , C.C .A. N o. 0 2 C01-9509-CR-00289, Shelby Coun ty (Te nn. C rim. A pp., J ack son , De c. 2, 19 96); Stephen Koprowski
v. State , C.C. A. No. 03C01-9 511-CC-00 365 , An de r so n Co un t y ( Ten n. Cr i m. Ap p., Kn oxville, Ja n. 28 , 199 7); Ste ve K opro wsk i v. State , C.C .A. No. 03C01- 951 1-CR -0037 8, Kno x Cou nty (Te nn. C rim. Ap p., Kno xville, Jan. 28, 199 7).

We choose t o fol low t he reasoni ng set fort h in t he Carterdisse nt . I n our vi ew, the one-year window provi ded by the language of t he new Act is ap plica ble
on ly to t hose peti ti oners who were not a lread y bar red b y the p reviou s sta tute of lim it atio ns at t he ti me the new Act t ook eff ect. Thus, i f t he previ ous three-year statu te ofli mitat ions had not ex pir ed on a peti ti onerat t he ti me the new Act t ook effec t, he or she woul d have one y ear f rom the effect iv e date ofthe st atut e, May 10, 19 95 , to file for p os t-co nvic tion relie f. Th is ap pro ac h is in accordance wit h the gen eral teno r of the en tire Act as w ell as its legislative history.

In th e case sub judice , t he record indi cates t hat t he Peti ti oner was convi cted on guil ty p leas i n Januaryof 1989 and April of 1990. The previ ous thr ee-year

stat ute ofli mitat ions ex pir ed for the Pe tition er in 1992 and 1 993. As
a resul t, the Pet it ioner was already barre d by t he previ ous stat ute ofli mitat ions on th e da te the new Act to ok e ffect, M ay 10 , 199 5. Furth ermore, the Pet it ioner has not demonstrated that h e fits with in an exce ption to the statu te of l imitat ions. See Tenn. Code An n. § 4 0-30-202 (b), (c) (Supp. 1996). Accordi ngly , t he tr ial court properl y found thatthe peti tion was barr ed by the stat ute of l imitat ions.-9- Forthe reasons setforth i n the di scussi on above, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court did noterr in di smissi ng the p etition fo r pos t-con viction re lief. W e therefore affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.

____________________________________ DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOE B. JONE S, PRES I DI NG JU DGE

___________________________________ JOE G. RI LEY , JUD GE