T.C. Memo. 2005-94

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JAMES VERNON WILLIAMS, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 13821-03L. Filed May 2, 2005.

P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to

sec. 6330, I.R.C., in response to a determination by R

that levy action was appropriate.

Held: Because P has advanced groundless

complaints in dispute of the notice of intent to levy,

R’s determination to proceed with collection action is

sustained.

Held, further, a penalty under sec. 6673, I.R.C.,

is due from P and is awarded to the United States in

the amount of $5,000.

James Vernon Williams, pro se.

Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent.
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1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHERRY, Judge: This case arises from a petition for

judicial review filed in response to a Notice of Determination

Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330.1 The issues for

decision are: (1) Whether respondent may proceed with collection

action as so determined, and (2) whether the Court, sua sponte,

should impose a penalty under section 6673.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. 

The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are

incorporated herein by this reference.

Petitioner filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax

Return, for the 1999 and 2000 taxable years on or about April 17,

2000, and April 10, 2001, respectively. On each of these

returns, petitioner reported $0 on substantially all pertinent

lines, including $0 of total income and $0 of total tax. The

1999 return also incorporated petitioner’s request for a refund

of $2,600, derived from 1999 estimated tax payments and the

amount applied from his 1998 return. Petitioner attached to each

return a statement contending, inter alia, that no law
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2 The notice of intent to levy incorporated, in addition to

the income tax liabilities dealt with in the notice of

determination and at issue in this proceeding, civil penalties

under sec. 6702 for the filing of frivolous returns. This Court

lacks jurisdiction to review any issues related to those

penalties. Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324, 328-329 (2000).

established his liability for income taxes or required him to

file a return.

Respondent issued to petitioner a statutory notice of

deficiency for 1999 on January 18, 2002, and for 2000 on February

1, 2002. The deficiencies determined for 1999 and 2000 were

$13,896 and $19,833, respectively. Respondent also determined

accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) in the

respective amounts of $2,259 and $3,967. Petitioner at no time

petitioned this Court for redetermination of the deficiency and

penalty reflected in either notice. Respondent assessed tax,

penalty, and interest amounts due for 1999 and 2000 on

September 30, 2002, and sent notice(s) of balance due on that

date.

On February 11, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner a

Final Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your Right To a

Hearing with respect to his unpaid liabilities for 1999 and

2000.2 Petitioner executed on February 24, 2003, and timely

submitted to respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection

Due Process Hearing, with multiple attachments setting forth his

disagreement with the proposed levy. He challenged the validity
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of, and requested that the Appeals officer have at the hearing

copies of documents pertaining to, among other things, the

underlying tax liability, the assessment, the notice and demand

for payment, and the verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of any applicable law or procedure had been met.

Appeals Officer Julieanne M. Petersen (Ms. Petersen), of the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of Appeals in Las Vegas,

Nevada, sent petitioner a letter dated May 5, 2003, scheduling a

hearing for June 4, 2003. The letter briefly outlined the

hearing process, advised that audio or stenographic recording of

hearings was not allowed, and explained the opportunity to

present and discuss “non-frivolous” material. The letter also

warned petitioner as follows: “The Courts have deemed the

arguments that are contained in your previous correspondence with

the Internal Revenue Service frivolous. They will not hear them

and neither will they be addressed at your Collection Due Process

hearing.”

Petitioner responded on May 16, 2003, with a 17-page letter

asserting his right to record the hearing, as well as reiterating

and expanding upon arguments advanced in his previous

communications. Ms. Petersen sent a follow-up letter dated May

30, 2003, in which she specifically addressed petitioner’s

arguments; cited numerous cases contrary to the positions being

taken by petitioner; alerted petitioner that his present
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noncompliance with filing requirements would render collection

alternatives unavailable; and pointed petitioner to Pierson v

Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000), and other cases

establishing imposition of sanctions in analogous circumstances. 

Ms. Petersen enclosed with the letter certified transcripts of

account and copies or summaries of the various cited cases.

Petitioner again responded with a lengthy letter dated June 2,

2003, in the same vein as his earlier submissions. As regards

the hearing, he stated: “I’ll be there @ 1:00pm with recorder

running and plan to bring a witness or two.”

Petitioner appeared for the scheduled hearing on June 4,

2003, but the hearing did not proceed when Ms. Petersen refused

to permit petitioner to record the meeting. On July 18, 2003,

respondent issued to petitioner the aforementioned Notice of

Determination Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330,

sustaining the proposed levy action. An attachment to the notice

addressed the verification of legal and procedural requirements,

the issues raised by the taxpayer, and the balancing of efficient

collection and intrusiveness. According to the attachment,

petitioner “did not raise any non-frivolous arguments.”

Petitioner’s petition disputing the notice of determination

was filed with the Court on August 18, 2003, and reflected an

address in Pahrump, Nevada. Therein petitioner (1) claimed that

he was denied a hearing on account of the inability to record,
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(2) referenced the section 7401 authorization requirement for

civil actions, and (3) demanded “his hearing and sanctions

against agent(s).”

On August 10, 2004, respondent filed a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Rule 121. Petitioner was directed to file

any response to respondent’s motion on or before September 10,

2004. The Court permitted the filing on October 12, 2004, of an

untimely response wherein petitioner propounded frivolous

rhetoric, including assertions of “fraud” on the part of

respondent. The Court on November 16, 2004, issued an order

denying the motion for summary judgment, ruling as follows:

As respondent correctly notes in the motion for

summary judgment, issues raised by petitioner during

the administrative process and before us have been

repeatedly rejected by this and other courts or are

refuted by the documentary record. Moreover, the Court

observes that maintenance of similar arguments has

served as grounds for imposition of penalties under

section 6673. However, the case in its current posture

presents a procedural shortcoming.

On July 8, 2003, this Court issued Keene v.

Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003), in which it was

held that taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section

7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330 hearings. The

taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when

denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the

case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id. In

contrast, we have distinguished, and declined to

remand, cases where the taxpayer had participated in an

Appeals Office hearing, albeit unrecorded, and where

all issues raised by the taxpayer could be properly

decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19, 20;

Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.
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The circumstances of the instant case are

analogous to those in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, and

diverge from those where it was determined that remand

was not necessary and would not be productive. 

Critically, the notice of determination was issued on

July 18, 2003. Although this date is subsequent to the

opinion in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, petitioner was

not afforded an opportunity for a recorded conference. 

Further, because the requested face-to-face hearing was

not held, there still exists a possibility that

petitioner might have raised one or more nonfrivolous

issues if the meeting had proceeded.

In this situation, the Court declines to

characterize the failure to allow recording as harmless

error. Hence, the Court will deny respondent’s motion

for summary judgment at this time. As in Keene v.

Commissioner, supra at 19, however, we admonish

petitioner that if he persists in making frivolous and

groundless tax protester arguments in any further

proceedings with respect to this case, rather than

raising relevant issues, as specified in section

6330(c)(2), the Court may consider granting a future

motion for summary judgment. In such an instance, the

Court would also be in a position to impose a penalty

under section 6673(a)(1).

On November 24, 2004, the Court also issued an order

explaining the returning unfiled of various other procedurally

improper documents received from petitioner during October and

November. We noted that the documents were “replete with

frivolous contentions and tax protester rhetoric” and, in light

of petitioner’s “continued recalcitrance”, reiterated our earlier

warning regarding penalties under section 6673.

This case was called from the calendar of the trial session

of the Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 6, 2004, and a

trial was held on that date. At the outset, the Court reminded

petitioner that respondent’s motion for summary judgment had been
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denied because recording was not permitted, and we explained as

follows:

Now, the point that I want to make sure that you

understand here is that this hearing is being recorded,

and it will be recorded verbatim. So that any issues

that you wish to raise, you need to raise them here,

because you won’t get another chance to raise them

somewhere else unless I conclude at the end of this

trial that there are issues which must be ruled upon by

an appeals officer, and which are legitimate issues, so

that I can determine if that appeals officer abused

their discretion.

If there are no legitimate issues, then there is

nothing for me to determine that the appeals officer

has abused--that is, that there is no issue that the

appeals officer could have abused their discretion on,

and so there is no need to remand the case.

Petitioner proceeded to make a lengthy argument focusing

primarily on his contention that, in denying a recorded hearing

and in refusing to clarify the statutes and regulations used to

determine any taxable income, respondent violated the letter and

intent of the law. Petitioner asked that the determination be

vacated and that an award be issued under section 7433. However,

petitioner declined to be sworn in or to offer any other

testimony or evidence.

Following the proceedings, each party filed a posttrial

brief. Petitioner recapitulated his arguments made at trial and

prayed for a series of remedies, most of which are not within the

jurisdiction of this Court.
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OPINION

I. Collection Actions

A. General Rules

Section 6331(a) authorizes the Commissioner to levy upon all

property and rights to property of a taxpayer where there exists

a failure to pay any tax liability within 10 days after notice

and demand for payment. Sections 6331(d) and 6330 then set forth

procedures generally applicable to afford protections for

taxpayers in such levy situations. Section 6331(d) establishes

the requirement that a person be provided with at least 30 days’

prior written notice of the Commissioner’s intent to levy before

collection may proceed. Section 6331(d) also indicates that this

notification should include a statement of available

administrative appeals. Section 6330(a) expands in several

respects upon the premise of section 6331(d), forbidding

collection by levy until the taxpayer has received notice of the

opportunity for administrative review of the matter in the form

of a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals. Section 6330(b)

grants a taxpayer who so requests the right to a fair hearing

before an impartial Appeals officer.

Section 6330(c) addresses the matters to be considered at

the hearing:

SEC. 6330(c). Matters Considered at Hearing.--In

the case of any hearing conducted under this section--
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(1) Requirement of investigation.--The

appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain

verification from the Secretary that the

requirements of any applicable law or

administrative procedure have been met.

(2) Issues at hearing.--

(A) In general.--The person may raise at

the hearing any relevant issue relating to

the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,

including--

(i) appropriate spousal defenses;

(ii) challenges to the

appropriateness of collection actions;

and

(iii) offers of collection

alternatives, which may include the

posting of a bond, the substitution of

other assets, an installment agreement,

or an offer-in-compromise.

(B) Underlying liability.--The person

may also raise at the hearing challenges to

the existence or amount of the underlying tax

liability for any tax period if the person

did not receive any statutory notice of

deficiency for such tax liability or did not

otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such

tax liability.

Once the Appeals officer has issued a determination

regarding the disputed collection action, section 6330(d) allows

the taxpayer to seek judicial review in the Tax Court or a U.S.

District Court, depending upon the type of tax. In considering

whether taxpayers are entitled to any relief from the

Commissioner’s determination, this Court has established the

following standard of review:
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where the validity of the underlying tax liability is

properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on

a de novo basis. However, where the validity of the

underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the

Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative

determination for abuse of discretion. [Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).]

B. Analysis

1. Appeals Hearing

Hearings conducted under section 6330 are informal

proceedings, not formal adjudications. Katz v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 329, 337 (2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41

(2000). There exists no right to subpoena witnesses or documents

in connection with section 6330 hearings. Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 372 (2002), affd. 329 F.3d 1224 (11th

Cir. 2003); Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167 (2002);

Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 41-42. Taxpayers are entitled to

be offered a face-to-face hearing at the Appeals Office nearest

their residence. Where the taxpayer declines to participate in a

proffered face-to-face hearing, hearings may also be conducted by

telephone or correspondence. Katz v. Commissioner, supra at 337-

338; Dorra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-16; sec. 301.6330-

1(d)(2), Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Furthermore, once

a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing

but has failed to avail himself or herself of that opportunity,

we have approved the making of a determination to proceed with

collection based on the Appeals officer’s review of the case
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file. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25;

Leineweber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-17; Armstrong v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-224; Gougler v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-185; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48. Thus,

a face-to-face meeting is not invariably required.

Regulations promulgated under section 6330 likewise

incorporate many of the foregoing concepts, as follows:

Q-D6. How are CDP hearings conducted?

A-D6. * * * CDP hearings * * * are informal in

nature and do not require the Appeals officer or

employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s

representative, to hold a face-to-face meeting. A CDP

hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a faceto-face meeting, one or more written or oral

communications between an Appeals officer or employee

and the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, or

some combination thereof. * * *

Q-D7. If a taxpayer wants a face-to-face CDP

hearing, where will it be held?

A-D7. The taxpayer must be offered an opportunity

for a hearing at the Appeals office closest to

taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business

taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business. 

If that is not satisfactory to the taxpayer, the

taxpayer will be given an opportunity for a hearing by

correspondence or by telephone. If that is not

satisfactory to the taxpayer, the Appeals officer or

employee will review the taxpayer’s request for a CDP

hearing, the case file, any other written

communications from the taxpayer (including written

communications, if any, submitted in connection with

the CDP hearing), and any notes of any oral

communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s

representative. Under such circumstances, review of

those documents will constitute the CDP hearing for the

purposes of section 6330(b). [Sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2),

Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.]
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This Court has cited the above regulatory provisions, and

corresponding promulgations under section 6320, with approval. 

See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, supra; Leineweber v.

Commissioner, supra; Dorra v. Commissioner, supra; Gougler v.

Commissioner, supra.

With respect to the instant matter, the record reflects that

petitioner was provided with an opportunity for a face-to-face

hearing on June 4, 2003. The hearing did not proceed when

petitioner was not permitted to record the meeting. As explained

in our previous order in this case, in Keene v. Commissioner, 121

T.C. 8, 19 (2003), this Court held that taxpayers are entitled,

pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330

hearings. The taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when

denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the case to

allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id.

In contrast, again as noted in our November 16, 2004, order,

we have distinguished, and declined to remand, cases where the

taxpayer had participated in an Appeals Office hearing, albeit

unrecorded, and where all issues raised by the taxpayer could be

properly decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19-20;

Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195. 

Stated otherwise, cases will not be remanded to Appeals, nor
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determinations otherwise invalidated, merely on account of the

lack of a recording when to do so is not necessary and would not

be productive. See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner, supra;

Durrenberger v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner,

supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra; see also Lunsford v.

Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001). A principal scenario

falling short of the necessary or productive standard exists

where the taxpayers rely on frivolous or groundless arguments

consistently rejected by this and other courts. See, e.g., Frey

v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner, supra; Kemper

v. Commissioner, supra. 

Because no hearing had been conducted at all in petitioner’s

case, we declined to grant respondent’s motion for summary

judgment. The record as it then existed did not foreclose the

possibility that petitioner might have raised valid arguments had

a hearing been held. Accordingly, we provided petitioner an

opportunity before the Court at the trial session in Las Vegas to

identify any legitimate issues he wished to raise that could

warrant further consideration of the merits of his case by the

Appeals Office or this Court. Petitioner, however, merely

continued to focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and

offered no substantive issues of merit.

Hence, despite repeated warnings and opportunities, the only

contentions other than the recorded hearing advanced by
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petitioner are, as will be further discussed below, of a nature

previously rejected by this and other courts. The record

therefore does not indicate that any purpose would be served by

remand or additional proceedings. The Court concludes that all

pertinent issues relating to the propriety of the collection

determination can be decided through review of the materials

before it.

2. Review of Underlying Liabilities

Statutory notices of deficiency for 1999 and 2000 were

issued to petitioner, and he has at no time alleged that he did

not receive these notices. He did not timely petition this Court

for redetermination when he had the opportunity to do so. 

Accordingly, petitioner is precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B)

from disputing his underlying 1999 and 2000 liabilities in this

proceeding. His remaining contentions generally challenging the

“existence” of any statute imposing or requiring him to pay

income tax warrant no further comment. See Crain v.

Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We perceive

no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and

copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these

arguments have some colorable merit.”)
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3. Review for Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner has also made various arguments relating to

aspects of the assessment and collection procedures that we

review for abuse of discretion. Action constitutes an abuse of

discretion under this standard where arbitrary, capricious, or

without sound basis in fact or law. Woodral v. Commissioner, 112

T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of

assessment in accordance with section 6203. The Commissioner is

not required to use Form 23C in making an assessment. Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 369-371. Furthermore, section

6330(c)(1) mandates neither that the Appeals officer rely on a

particular document in satisfying the verification requirement

nor that the Appeals officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of

the verification upon which he or she relied. Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002); Nestor v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. at 166.

A Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments and Other

Specified Matters, for instance, constitutes presumptive evidence

that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section 6203. 

Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 40 (and cases cited thereat). 

Consequently, absent a showing by the taxpayer of some

irregularity in the assessment procedure that would raise a

question about the validity of the assessments, a Form 4340
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reflecting that tax liabilities were assessed and remain unpaid

is sufficient to support collection action under section 6330. 

Id. at 40-41. We have specifically held that it is not an abuse

of discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on Form 4340, Nestor

v. Commissioner, supra at 166; Davis v. Commissioner, supra at

41, or a computer transcript of account, Schroeder v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-48, to comply with section 6330(c)(1).

Here, the record contains Forms 4340 for 1999 and 2000,

indicating that assessments were made for each of these years and

that taxes remain unpaid. Petitioner has cited no irregularities

that would cast doubt on the information recorded thereon.

 In addition to the specific dictates of section 6330, the

Secretary, upon request, is directed to furnish to the taxpayer a

copy of pertinent parts of the record of assessment setting forth

the taxpayer’s name, the date of assessment, the character of the

liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the

amounts assessed. Sec. 6203; sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.

Regs. A taxpayer receiving a copy of Form 4340 has been provided

with all the documentation to which he or she is entitled under

section 6203 and section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs. 

Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 370 n.7. This Court likewise

has upheld collection action where taxpayers were provided with

literal transcripts of account (so-called MFTRAX). See, e.g.,
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Frank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-88; Swann v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-70. The May 30, 2003, letter to petitioner from

Ms. Petersen enclosed copies of certified transcripts of account. 

The Court concludes that petitioner’s complaints regarding the

assessments and verification are meritless.

Petitioner has denied receiving the notice and demand for

payment that section 6303(a) establishes should be given within

60 days of the making of an assessment. However, a notice of

balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within

the meaning of section 6303(a). Craig v. Commissioner, supra at

262-263. The Forms 4340 indicate that petitioner was sent

notices of balance due for each of the tax years involved.

Petitioner has also attempted to raise section 7401 as a

defense. Section 7401 directs that no civil action for, inter

alia, collection or recovery of taxes shall be commenced unless

authorized or sanctioned by the Secretary. This section has no

bearing on the instant proceeding in that the levying upon

property under section 6331 is an administrative action that does

not necessitate the institution of a civil suit.

Lastly, in his petition, petitioner requested “sanctions

against agent(s).” He also cited sections 7214 and 7433 at trial

and on brief. The record in this case reflects nothing that

would warrant any form of “sanctions” against IRS personnel. 

Furthermore, statutes such as sections 7214 and 7433, imposing
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criminal and civil penalties, respectively, against IRS personnel

in enumerated circumstances, are not within the jurisdiction of

this Court.

Thus, with respect to those issues enumerated in section

6330(c)(2)(A) and subject to review in collection proceedings for

abuse of discretion, petitioner has not raised any spousal

defenses, valid challenges to the appropriateness of the

collection action, or collection alternatives. As this Court has

noted in earlier cases, Rule 331(b)(4) states that a petition for

review of a collection action shall contain clear and concise

assignments of each and every error alleged to have been

committed in the notice of determination and that any issue not

raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed conceded. See 

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185-186; Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000). For completeness, we

have addressed various points advanced by petitioner during the

administrative process and this litigation, but the items listed

in section 6330(c)(2)(A) were not pursued in any proceedings. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that respondent’s determination

to proceed with collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities was

not an abuse of discretion.

II. Section 6673 Penalty

Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require the

taxpayer to pay a penalty not in excess of $25,000 when it
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appears to the Court that, inter alia, proceedings have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or

that the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or

groundless. In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 581, we

warned that taxpayers abusing the protections afforded by

sections 6320 and 6330 through the bringing of dilatory or

frivolous lien or levy actions will face sanctions under section

6673. We have since repeatedly disposed of cases premised on

arguments akin to those raised herein summarily and with

imposition of the section 6673 penalty. See, e.g., Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 264-265 (and cases cited thereat).

With respect to the instant matter, we are convinced that

petitioner instituted this proceeding primarily for delay. 

Throughout the administrative and pretrial process, petitioner

advanced contentions and demands previously and consistently

rejected by this and other courts. He submitted lengthy

communications quoting, citing, using out of context, and

otherwise misapplying portions of the Internal Revenue Code,

regulations, Supreme Court decisions, and other authorities. 

While his procedural stance concerning recording was correct, he

ignored the Court’s explicit warning that any further proceedings

would be justified only in the face of relevant and nonfrivolous

issues.
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Moreover, petitioner was, on multiple occasions, expressly

alerted to the potential use of sanctions in his case. Yet he

appeared at the trial session in Las Vegas without any legitimate

evidence or argument in support of his position. He instead

continued to espouse those positions that had been explicitly

addressed and rejected in this Court’s order of November 16,

2004, or in other cases previously decided by the Court. The

Court sua sponte concludes that a penalty of $5,000 should be

awarded to the United States in this case. To reflect the

foregoing,

An appropriate decision

will be entered.