Richard K. Simon, Esq. 1700 Decker SchooILane 

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### AUG 282014 PART 16 DOCKETS
Office ofthe ChiefCounsel Attention: FAA Part 16Airport Proceedings Docket AGC-610 FederalAviationAdministration 800 IndependenceAve. S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 Re: Part 16 Complaint August 28,2014



### NationalBusinessAviationAssociation,KruegerAviation,Inc., Harrison Ford,justiceAviation,Kim DavidsonAviation,Inc.,AeroFilm, YouriBujko, ]amesRoss, ParamountCitrusLLCandAircraftOwnersandPilots Associationv. City of SantaMonica, California DocketNos. 16-14-04/FAA-2014-05921

Answer ofthe Complainants to Respondent's Motionto Dismiss

The Complainants, as set forth above, submit this answer to the August 14, 2014 · Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") filed by the City of Santa Monica ("Santa Monica," "City," or "Respondent"), sponsor and operator of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport ("SMO" or "Airport"). For the reasons set forth below, Complainants request that the Motion be denied, that the FAA require the Respondent to file an Answer to the Complaint, that the FAA subsequently address the substance of the Complaint, and, in so doing, confirm that the GrantAssurances remain in effect for SMO and the City through 2023. INTRODUCTION As an initial matter, it is important to understand what this Part 16 proceeding is actuallyabout- and notwhatthe Respondenthas attemptedto reframe itas being about:

• It is not abouttheterms ofAirportleases.

1A copy of the Complaint also has been posted at the regulations.gov website under dockets nos. 16-14- 05/FAA-2014-0538. To the extentapplicable, this reply also pertainstothose dockets.

1• Itis not aboutredressingfuture violations ofGrantAssurances.

• It is not about the City's ability to evaluate options or to consider what actions it mighttake as a proprietor ofSMO.

• And it clearly does notseekan "advisory" opinion. These argumentsby Santa Monica are all red herrings. This Part 16 action is solely about a determination that the City already has made, repeatedly affirmed in writing (including in both federal court and the presentproceedings), and disseminated widely: namely, that its Grant Assurance obligations ended on june 29, 2014- two months ago -and that since then the City no longer has been a federal grantee airportsponsor obligated to complywith those GrantAssurances. The Complainants

- and all Airport tenants and users - have been, are, and will continue to be impacted by the purported loss of the protections afforded by Grant Assurances at SMO, and commenced this action to challenge the City's determination. The FAA indisputably has jurisdiction under Part 16 to address that request; both the FAA's broad mandate under Part 16 and its own precedents permit present scrutiny ofthe City's decision. Even though the City contends that none ofthe GrantAssurances are still applicable at the Airport, it maintains in its Motion that Part 16 cannot be invoked by the Complainants because the Complaint has not alleged a violation of any particular Grant Assurance. That is incorrect. While Part 16 complaints typically do allege a violation of one or more Grant Assurances, Part 16 does not require that any specific Assurance be at issue; indeed, the FAA has never considered itself to be limited to reviewing an airport's compliance with the Assurances cited in a complaint

- and, as discussed infra, there is ample authorityto supportthe applicabilityofPart 16in thepresentcircumstances. Additionally, the City argues that its rejection of its federal obligations has not yet had a "direct and substantial" effect on Complainants, who must, in its view, wait until the City takes additional steps to further implement its determination before the necessary harm canbe said to existto maintain a Part 16 complaint. Thatis also incorrect. Unlike the City's consideration of potential future Airport scenarios

- such as those in its ongoing "Visioning Process"

- the impacts of the City's already definitive rejection of its Grant Assurance obligations are immediate and reaL and implicate the present interests of Airport tenants and users, including Complainants. For the reasons set forth below, these impacts clearlymeettherequirements ofPart 16. The remainder of the City's objections to the Complaint are, individually and collectively, equallygroundless. Theyalso are addressed infra. Finally, itis apparentfrom the Motion thatthe City believes thatits 1984 Settlement Agreementwith the FAA- which imposes certain obligations on the Cityuntiljuly 1, 2015- allows it to shield and obfuscate the ultimate impacts ofthe decision it has already made regarding the GrantAssurances. The City repeatedlyasserts in its Motionthatithas notyet
2concluded precisely how it will use its declared "freedom" from federal obligations. But that is ultimately irrelevant. The City is the respondent in this proceeding because it has adopted and implemented a legal position (which no other grantee sponsor has ever presumed to assert): that it has the power unilaterally to decide when its federal obligations end. Thatthe 1984 SettlementAgreement separately applies to the Airport for anotherten months does notvalidate what the City has done, orrenderthe need for an FAA rulingonthe Complaintanyless urgent. 

### ARGUMENT This Answer generally will respond to the Motion in the same order that the issues werepresentedbythe City, with a few exceptions for purposes ofsimplicityand clarity. I. 

### Factual Background The FAA already is familiar with the history of SMO and the City's decades-long efforts to restrict operations at the Airport, or to close it altogether, and it need not be restated here. But it should be noted that the account ofthe history ofSMO which appears in the Motion is greatly oversimplified and, in certain respects, inaccurate. Among other things, the City does not fully address the Airport's operation and improvement by the federal government during World War II and the subsequent conditional transfer of the improved Airportpropertyto the City. While immaterialto the presentPart 16proceeding, the absence ofa complete and accurate accountofbackgroundfacts should be noted. More significantly, the City reiterates its position that the 2003 amendment to its grant agreement with the FAA (no. DTFA08-94-C-20857) did not extend its obligations beyondjune 29, 2014, referring to certain exhibits attached to its Motion. This issue, and the same exhibits, already were reviewed by the FAA in In re City ofSanta Monica, California, docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807, Director's Determination (May 27, 2008), which reacheda different conclusion: In 2003 the City requested, and the FAA approved a grant amendment for $240,000, increasing its [Airport Improvement Program ("AlP")] grant total to $10.2 million. This was the last AlP-funded project at SMO to date. As a result, SMO is obligated underits AlP grantassurances until atleast 2023. !d. at 12-13 (footnote and citation omitted and emphasis added). Although this conclusion was not incorporated into the agency's final decision in that proceeding, and is not put at issue by the Motion, the City has offered no basis upon which a different result could be reached, and Complainants respectfully suggestthat no suchbasis exists. 

### II. Failureto State a Claim The City argues that the Complaint mustbe dismissed because it does not identify a specific GrantAssurancethatthe City is allegedto beviolating. The Motion also argues that the Complainants are seeking an "advisory" opinion and thatthere is "no concrete dispute" to be adjudicated because, allegedly, the City is currently in compliance, and any harms to

3the Complainants are speculative. As discussed infra, these arguments are flawed, and fail to establish that the Complaint does not state a claim that may be addressed bythe FAA in this forum. Additionally, the City's argument in section IV(C) of the Motion (at 15-16)- which asserts that the FAA lacks jurisdiction to address the issues presented by Complainants

- essentiallyrestates those samepoints and also will be addressed here. 1. 

### Jurisdiction At its core, the City's argument is that the FAA's unquestioned jurisdiction to hear Grant Assurance-related disputes under Part 16 terminates when confronted with an airport sponsor's refusal to acknowledge that it has any GrantAssurance obligations at all. See Motion, at 12. The short answerto this contentionis that in Part 16 proceedings the FAA routinely considers, implicitly and explicitly, whether federal Grant Assurances or other cognizable authorities (such as Instruments of Transfer) are applicable to the airport sponsor. Such consideration is an important component of every reported Director's Determination and Final Agency Decision. Indeed, § 2.3 of the Airport Compliance Manual (FAA Order 5190.6B) reiterates that a standard element ofFAA review is "Determining if an Airport is Federally Obligated." Although in most instances this consideration is proforma (because most sponsors do notjoin the City in disputing their federal obligations), it can, in fact, be the crux of a Part 16 proceeding. For example, Dart v. City ofCorona, California, docket no. 16-99-20, Director's Determination Qune 26, 2000), devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to the very issue ofthe sponsor's federal obligations. As described therein: The City takes the position thatit is not a federally obligated airport sponsor and that the Airportis nota federally obligated airportbecause the land area on which the Airport is located was not conveyed by or paid for by the Federal government. In support of its assertion, the City submits that the Airport is not identified as such by inclusion in FAA Order 5190.2R, List of PublicAirportsAffected byAgreements with the Federal Government, and that the City consequently is not obligated to make the airport available to FAR Part 103 Ultralightvehicle operations. !d. at 11. After analyzing all ofthe facts and circumstances, the Director's Determination concluded that the sponsor was subject to the prohibition against the grant of exclusive rights

- although not pursuant to the Grant Assurances or an Instrument ofTransfer, but instead anotherpillar ofthe FAA's authority: Against this background, and based on the evidence of record in this proceeding, we conclude that the City is not a federally obligated airport sponsor subject to Federal obligations set forth in agreements or property deeds overwhich FAA has congressionally mandatedjurisdiction. However, our inquiry does not end here. FAA policy regarding the applicability ofthe exclusive rights prohibition specifically provides that the expenditure ofF AA

4F&E funds for the installation of navigation aids on an airport makes the airportsubjectto the exclusive rights prohibition. Id. at 15. The FAA has always had the power under Part 16 to resolve the "big picture" question of whether and to what extent an airport sponsor is federally obligated, and the agency should be surprised to learn that the City believes that it does not. The City would no doubt argue that here, unlike in Dart, the nature and scope of the City's federal obligations is the only question raised, but that is a distinction without a difference. The issue is the scope ofthe FAA's authority,which includes the question nowatissue. Further, the FAA's authority is broadly defined throughout Part 16. As an initial matter, 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(a) provides that: "The provisions of this part govern all

... proceedings involving Federally-assisted airports," including proceedings filed pursuantto "[t]he assurances and other Federal obligations contained in grant-in-aid agreements issued under the Airport and Airway improvement Act of 1982

...." Section 16.3 defines "noncompliance"- a predicate for a complaint as used elsewhere in Part 16- as "anything done or omitted to be done by anyperson in contravention ofanyprovision ofanyAct, as defined in this section, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrator" (emphasis added). And Section 16.101 provides that in addition to reviewing third-party complaints: "The FAA may initiate its own investigation of any matter within the applicability ofthis part" (emphasis added). Grant Assurance duration is well within the ambit ofthese provisions. The City also charges

- although without elaboration orthebenefit ofanycitation to authority- that the FAA lacks jurisdiction in this case because the Complaint "involves the interpretation and determination of the expiration date of a contract." Motion, at 15. Indeed it does, but notjust of any type of contract - a contractwhich provided a grant to the City in return for its compliance with the assurances included therein. Essentially every Part 16 proceeding involves the interpretation and determination of obligations set forth in such a contract, or the similar obligations of a property transfer, as specifically authorized and intended by Part 16. Moreover, if this contention is intended to reflect language in the Final Agency Decision (July 8, 2009) in In re City of SantaMonica, California, docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807

- to the effect that the agency could not consider claims involving the 1984 Settlement Agreement in a Part 16 proceeding

- the City's reliance upon that language is entirely misplaced.2 No decision of the FAA even implies that because a Grant Assurance agreement itself is contractual in nature, the specific requirements of such an agreement

- including its duration

- may not be considered in a Part 16proceeding. In sum, the City's argument thatthe FAA lacks jurisdiction to hear the Complaint is createdofwhole cloth, withoutanybasis in authority, and shouldbe disregarded.

2 In particular: "The City's obligations under the 1984 Settlement Agreement are not a proper subject in a proceeding under 14 C.F.R. Part 16 because that Agreement was not incorporated in the Grant Assurances." Id. at4 (emphasis added].

52. "Advisory" Opinion The City's Motion sets forth a raft ofstrawmen - which have nothingto do with the actual allegations ofthe Complaint- and then asserts thatthe Complainants are seeking an "advisory" opinion concerningthem. The Complaintin fact seeks no such opinion. The City's current and past pronouncements and actions leave no doubt that it will continue its efforts to restrict operations at SMO or to close the Airport altogether in light ofits claim to be free from Grant Assurance constraints. But Complainants do not seek a decision inthis proceeding, as the City erroneously claims, that a particularleaseterm is or is not consistent with the Assurances.3 Complainants do not seek an order "forcing the CITY to lease its propertyto them for eight (8) more years" (Motion, at 3), or an opinion "as to the legality of 'possible' future conduct" (Motion, at 15)4 The relief sought by the Complaintis clear andlimited: Complainants request that the FAA exercise its plenary authority under Part 16 to determine that the City's Grant Assurance obligations remain binding and effective, and that the City must continue to comply with those obligations, until no soonerthanAugust 2023. Complaint, 

### ,-r 30. This is not a request for "an improper 'advisory' opmwn based on speculation about the CITY's plans," Motion, at 13, but rather a request for a determination -wellwithin the FAA's authorityto issue- based on an actual and presentcontroversy. Part 16 decisions have recognized that "[t]he FAA Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. Part 16, applythe procedural structure of49 U.S.C. section 46101(a) to complaints filed with the

3 However, the City does cite FAA precedent which confirms that an airport usually must make long-term leases available to tenants, to the extent it has entered into an agreement which requires the continued operation ofthe airport. See Motion, at 14 (citing Santa Monica AirportAssodation v. City of Santa Monica, California, docket no. 16-99-21, Director's Determination, at 22 (November 22, 2000)). That decision predatedthe City's 2003 GrantAmendment, so to the extent it also suggested thatthe outer boundary ofthe City's obligations was set by the 1984 Settlement Agreement, that language is now obsolete. See also Skydance Helicopters. Inc. v. Sedona Oak-Creek Airport Authority, docket nos. 16-02-02/FAA-2002-13068, Director's Determination, at 32 (Marcb 7, 2003) ("the Authority proyjdes no explanation as to why it could nothave offered the Complainanta lease term that runs commensurate withthe remaining length ofits lease withthe County").

4 The Complaint did cite the short-term 3-year leases then proposed to the Santa MoniCa City Council as illustrative ofthe types ofCity action thatGrant obligations would foreclose. See Complaint, 1[ 30, n.2. In fact, both this reference and the City's reliance on the staffproposal to extend the leases ofAirport tenants for three years, see Motion, at 3 and 10, have proven optimistic. Two days before its Motion was filed, the City Council declined to adopt the proposal and directed the Santa Monica Airport Commission to consider shorter-duration alternatives, including month-to-month lease renewals. The minutes ofthe Council meeting are not yet available but a video of the Council's August 12, 2014 meeting is available at http://santamonica.granicus.com/mediaplayer.php?view id-2&clip_j_d""l3.1J1 In any case, because of their short term nature, the adoption ofeither a three-year maximum or month-to-month terms by the City at a future date wouldbe a violation checkedbythe continuedapplicability ofthe GrantAssurances.

6FAA against federally assisted airports." jimsairAviationServices, Inc. v. San Diego Regional Airport Authority, docket nos. 16-06-08/FAA-2006-25225, Final Agency Decision and Order, at 15 (August 9, 2007). That procedural structure includes jurisdiction to "issue a declaratmy ruling to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." Department of Transportation, Hawaii Inspection Fee Proceeding, Order 2012-1-18, at 7 (January 24, 2012); see also CompassAirlines, LLCv. Montana Dep'tof Labor & Industry, No. 12-CV-105- H-CCL, 2013 WL 4401045, *14 (D. Mont., Aug. 12, 2013), (recognizing that 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a) empowers DOT agencies to "provide equitable remedies such as injunctive relief and declaratory relief'). Thus, the pending request clearly is notfor an "advisory" opinion butfor a declaratoryremedywell within the agency's authority. 5 3. DirectandSubstantial Effect As discussed above, Complainants vigorously dispute the City's assertion that its blanket rejection ofall Grant Assurance obligations is not itselfa cognizable matter for the purposes of Part 16. Complainants also maintain that the City's actions have a current etfect upon them, and thus that they are "directly and substantially" affected by the City's non-compliance andhave standingto the extentrequiredbyPart 16. The City generally is correct that "the standing requirement ensures that the FAA's resources are not expended on matters in which the Complainant's interest is insufficient to justify the burden of processing a Complaint under Part 16" (Motion, at 15). But the Complainants' interestin maintainingthe protections ofGrantAssurances for the duration ofthe City's contractual commitmentcould notbemore substantial. As a preliminarymatter, the Complaintalleges noncompliance under not one, butall of the Grant Assurances as a result of the City's conceded rejection of any compliance obligation after june 29, 2014. It also alleges that all but one of the Complainants, apart from the representative organizations, areAirporttenants. 6 That alone should be sufficient to establish theirinterest. "The fact thatthe Complainant is currentlypayingfees orrentals to the Respondent demonstrates that he is directly and substantially affected by any alleged noncompliance." RoyalAir, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, Louisiana, docket nos. 16-02- 06/FAA-2002-13063, Director's Determination, at 15 (January 9, 2004). The FAA has recognized that "current" compliance means notjustthat an airport is not presently violating any Grant Assurances, but also that tenants and users are able to plan for the future. See, e.g., AtlanticHelicopters, Inc. v. Monroe County, Florida, docket nos. 16-07-12/FAA-2008-0250, Director's Determination, at 31 (September 11, 2008) ("[s]ponsors must provide aeronautical businesses that meetminimum standards withthe

sMoreover, the City's citation of constitutional ripeness standards (Motion, at 13) is misplaced, as administrative agencies are not subject to the same requirements as an Article III court. See, e.g., NAACP v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir.1995). 'Theexception is anAirportuser (Complaint, 

### 1f 9), which as such pays landingfees for its operations.

7opportunity for occupancy with certainty of associated rights to conduct business for appropriatelengths oftime, depending on investmentrequirements and associated costs"). That the City, now purportedly free from Grant Assurance obligations, has delayed taking further specific actions at SMO does not change the fact that its current position

- that it has the right "to use the Airport Property as it chooses in its sovereign discretion, including for non-aviation purposes," City ofSanta Monica v. U.S., eta/., no. 13-CV-8046 (C.D. Cal.), Complaint at§ 2 - preventsAirporttenants and users from planning for a future in all but the shortest term. This situation may effectively force many ofthem to relocate from SMO, which would depopulate the facility and perpetuate a cycle of decline- exactly the outcome that the City wants and which the FAA must prevent. As the FAA recently observed, "an airport sponsor's federal obligations are not altered or suspended based on its intent and desire to close the airport." De Vries v. City of St. Clair, Missouri, docket nos. 16-12-07 /FAA-2012-0744, Director's Determination, at 26 (May 20, 2014). ltis also nottrue thatthe FAA has no powerunder Part 16 to considerfuture events and consequences. While most Part 16 proceedings have emphasized current compliance issues, and the FAA commonly has declined to consider matters that are entirely speculative, the FAA also has made clear that it may address current practices that are likely to result in future violations

- of which the City's position regarding its lack of obligations is a prime example. See, e.g., ]etAwayAviation LLC v. Board ofCommissioners, Montrose County, Colorado, docket nos. 16-06-01/FAA_2006-25185, Director's Determination, at 34 (November 6, 2006) (warning respondent that UNICOM frequency mustbe reclaimed bythe airportfrom the existing FBO to which ithadbeen assigned when a second FBO contract was awarded). Likewise, in Town ofFairview, Texas v. City of McKinney, Texas, docket no. 16-99-04, Director's Determination, at 17 Quly 26, 2000), the FAA specified that it could hear a complaint which alleged that an airport's current noncompliance with wildlife mitigation requirements would lead to future hazards, so long as the complainant "demonstrate[ d] a realistic danger ofsustainingdirectinjury."7 The danger arising from Santa Monica's erroneous conclusion that it is no longer boundbyany ofthe GrantAssurances is no less realistic. The history ofthe City's efforts to close SM0 and to restrict its operations, as well as recent developments such as the fact thatbythe City's admission even thebestcase scenario under contemplation for the future ofSMO leases is non-compliantthree-year maximum terms- demonstrate thatthe Citywill use any absolution from Grant Assurance constraints to disadvantage Airport tenants and users. Thus, Complainants should not be further obliged to demonstrate how any of the various proposals previously or currently under consideration by the City might affect

7 This standard is ata minimum consistentwithfederal court decisions, which hold thatfuture injuries can be cognizable. See. e.g., Susan B. AnthonyListv. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) ("[a]n allegation offuture injury may suffice ifthe threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial riskthatthe harm will occur") (quotation marks omitted); Amador County, California v. Kempthorne, 592 F.Supp.2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2009). In any case, as for ripeness, the standing requirements that apply to administrative agencies are Jess strict than those that apply to Article III courts; the City is wrong (see Motion, at 13) to suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194F.3d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir. 1999).

8them individually when implemented. The City has already rejected all of its compliance obligations and made clearthatgoingforward its intentis to "starve" SMO, even ifit has not yetselectedthe specific tools by which itwill do so. Finally, the FAA also has made clear that even if an airport nominally is in current compliance with the Grant Assurances, if a compliance matter may arise in the future but easily evade review, it maybe addressed bythe FAA preemptivelyin a Part 16 proceeding. 

### See, e.g., Royal Air, Inc. v. City 

### ofShreveport, Louisiana, docket nos. 16-02-06/FAA-2002- 13063, Director's Determination, at 17 ("[t]he focus is on current compliance, but a necessary part of current compliance is a sponsor's actions in carrying out its federal obligations. The Respondent's former actions, as well as current actions, shape its airport compliance efforts regardless of subsequent developments in tenancy at the airport. The typical standard for a claim of mootness is whether a matter is capable of repetition, but evading review. Under this premise, the Director cannotfind that the complaint is moot"). To the extentthat the City's actions may have the effect ofdriving awaytenants and users, the same concerns applyhere. III. Good Faith Effortto Resolve Complainants have fulfilled the pre-complaintresolution requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 16.21. Part 16 "does not require any particular informal resolution method. Additionally, Part 16

... does not statethat efforts to resolve an issue mustbegin or conclude atany given point." 

### Consolidated Services Engineers & 

### Constructors, Inc. v. City 

### of Palm Springs, California, docket nos. 16-03-05/FAA-2003-15433, Director's Determination, at 23 Qune 10, 2004). Complainants' efforts began long before the present filings with efforts to dissuade the City from its erroneous interpretation ofits obligations, includingthe National Business Aviation Association's March 24, 2014letterto the City's Mayor and Council which warned that the restrictions then under consideration would violate the City's continuing Grant Assurance obligations. 

### See Exhibit 14to the Complaint. This letterwas ignored at the time

- andwas ignored again bythe Motion. Complainants' ensuing pre-complaint efforts with the City, 

### see Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 to the Complaint, commencedwith an offerto discuss unconditionallya range ofoptions for resolution: I want to afford the City the opportunityto discuss anypossible resolution of the GrantAssurance duration issue. My clients and I are willing to meetwith City representatives or to engage in any form of dialogue that might be usefuL If the City believes the involvement of a third party, such as a mediatororthe FAA itself, would behelpful, Iwould certainlyconsiderit. Exhibit 11, at 2. This was met with what can only be described as a non-response, 

### see Exhibit 12, reciting the various measures then under evaluationbythe City but evincing no serious willingness to address the specific issue on the table

- the duration of Grant Assurances.

9The City now complains thatthe final letter from Complainants' counsel was not in good faith because it urged the City to accept its Grant Assurance obligations, but this misses the point: Complainants did not and do nothave the authorityto alter the duration of those obligations, a power residing only with the FAA. Nor could Complainants make commitments binding the many other Airport tenants and users. Complainants' only options for resolution were to convince the City that it was wrong or to convince it to engage with the FAA, both ofwhich provedunavailing. As noted in the Complaint, Part 16 Complainants are not required to engage in continued one-sided efforts to resolve a dispute with officials who have "for all practical purposes" made clear that theywill not complywith the GrantAssurances. SeeBombardier Aerospace Corp. and Dussault Falconjet Corp. v. City of Santa Monica, California, docket no. 16-03-11, Director's Determination, at 23 (January 3, 2004). The City has been intransigent on the subject of Grant Assurance duration since it first surfaced, and itis outlandish to argue thatthe Complainants did not showgood faith in undertaking an additional effort, albeit futile from the inception, to atleast have the subject discussed beforethe City's response made clear thatithad no interestin doing so. Afinal pointis worth noting here. In its discussion of"good faith," the City states: Even if the CITY were to [renounce the 2014 date] it would not allow Complainants "to understand and plan for the future", their alleged concern in their june 11, 2014 letter to the CITY

... given that such a renunciation would not guarantee that the Complainants would be offered tenancies at SMO until2023, orevenbeyond 2015. Motion, at 15. Whether willful or unknowing, this passage perfectly encapsulates what is defective with the City's entire Motion: itis based on the assumption that Complainants are pursuing an entirely different claim, and not one focused solely on the wrong the City has already perpetrated in rejecting its Grant Assurance obligations. The Complainants are indeed entitled to "understand and plan for the future" based on a 2023 expiration date for those GrantAssurances, andhave initiated this proceedingto allowthem to do that. CONCLUSION At page 15 ofits Motion, the City again attempts to reframe this case by offering an inapt analogy involving a hypothetical arrest for possession of marijuana. In that vein, Complainants would suggest an alternative scenario a bit more on point: the City is in a bankbrandishing a gun, and announcing thatthere is nothing that can stop it from holding up the place. It now argues thatit cannotbe arrestedbecause it has notyet decided which teller it will assault and which banknotes it will take. That would not work as a matter of criminal law, andbyanalogyitdoes notworkunder Part 16. To summarize:

101. The City has unilaterally determined, and does not now deny, its position that itis no longer obligated byfederal GrantAssurances. 2. The FAA has the jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility under 14 C.F.R Part 16to address a dispute as to when GrantAssurance obligations end. 3. The FAA likewise has thejurisdiction, authority, and responsibility under 14 C.F.R. Part 16to find that the City's rejection ofall GrantAssurances is itselfa violation ofthose obligations and the grantagreements thatitsigned. 4. The Complainants, as tenants and users ofthe Airport, have standing to seek redress in this proceeding. The City's rejection of all Grant Assurances already has had, and will continue to have, direct and substantial effects on them. These facts, and this Complaint, meet the requirements for Part 16 review and relief. The Respondent's Motion shouldbe denied pursuantto 14 C.F.R. § 16.26(c)(4). The FAA should require the Respondent to answer the Complaint and proceed to promptly consider and rule upon the substance ofthe complaint, given the import and urgencyofthe issue for the Complainants and the othertenants and users oftheAirport.



## Richardl<:si111011:ES4> 1700 DeckerSchool Lane Malibu, CA 90265 310-503-7286

11Certificate ofService Iherebycertifythat Ihave this daycaused the foregoing answerto be served onthe following personsbyfirst-class mail with a courtesycopyby electronic mail: Rod Gould City Manager City ofSanta Monica 1685 Main Street, Room 209 SantaMonica, CA 90401 rod.gould@smgov.net Marsha Moutrie, City Attorney joseph Lawrence,Assistant CityAttorney Lance Gams, Deputy CityAttorney Ivan Campbell, Deputy City Attorney City ofSantaMonica 1685 Main Street, Room 310 SantaMonica, CA 90401 marsha.moutrie@smgov.net joseph.lawrence@smgov.net lance.gams@smgov.net ivan.campbell@smgov.net Stelios Makrides AirportManager City ofSantaMonica AirportAdministration Building 3223 Donald Douglas Loop South Santa Monica, CA 90405 stelios.makrides@smgov.net Dated this 28thday ofAugust, 2014.

1700 DeckerSchool Lane Malibu, CA 90265 310-503-7286

12