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17-2281 

Richardson v. Manhattan N.Y.C. Transit Auth., Headquarters

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 29th day of March, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge,

PIERRE N. LEVAL, 

 Circuit Judge, 

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR.,*

 District Judge. 

__________________________________________ 

HALANA RICHARDSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 17-2281 

MANHATTAN NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT 

AUTHORITY, HEADQUARTERS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________________________ 

 

* Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York, sitting by designation.
 

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Halana Richardson, pro se, New York, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: No appearance. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (McMahon, C.J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, 

and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

Plaintiff-appellant Halana Richardson, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment 

dismissing her action against the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”), in which she 

alleged sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court (McMahon, C.J.) dismissed sua sponte Richardson’s 

amended complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and denied 

leave to amend. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history 

of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

“We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).” 

Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). To avoid dismissal, a 

complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We afford a pro 
 

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se litigant “special solicitude” by interpreting a complaint filed pro se “to raise the strongest claims 

that it suggests.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). 

The district court concluded that Richardson did not plead “that any alleged adverse 

employment actions resulted from her engagement in activity protected under Title VII.” App. at 

7. We agree. “To state a claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must plead facts 

that would tend to show that: (1) she participated in a protected activity known to the defendant; 

(2) the defendant took an employment action disadvantaging her; and (3) there exists a causal 

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 

115 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). While Richardson alleges that she lodged several complaints with 

NYCTA’s management, none of them supports a retaliation claim, either because they do not 

represent activity protected by Title VII or because Richardson makes no allegation that NYCTA 

took any adverse employment action against her as a result of such activity. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment to the extent it dismissed Richardson’s retaliation claim. 

The district court also decided that Richardson failed to allege facts showing that the 

alleged harassment was “motivated [by] her race, color, sex, or any other impermissible factor.” 

App. at 7; see Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that 

mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile environment or through such 

concrete deprivations as being fired or being denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII 

only when it occurs because of an employee’s sex, or other protected characteristic.”). However, 

we conclude that the amended complaint, interpreted “to raise the strongest claims that it 
 

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suggests,” Hill, 657 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), does permit an 

inference that certain alleged actions were motivated by Richardson’s sex. 

Richardson alleged that she “was yelled at [and] called a ‘bitch’ . . . in front of other 

coworkers . . . because [she] would not entertain their advances, nor go out with them let alone 

have sex with these men.” Am. Compl. at 18, Richardson v. Manhattan Transit Auth. N.Y.C. 

Headquarters, No. 16-cv-1304-CM (S.D.N.Y. Feb 22, 2017), ECF No. 5 (“Am. Compl.”). One 

male coworker, who Richardson alleged was “infatuated with [her]” (and whom she had reported 

for unrelated misconduct), allegedly posted notices calling her a “SNITCH BITCH” and took other 

actions to intimidate her, such as urinating in a booth while she was inside and bumping her hard 

enough to knock her down. Id.; see Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 622 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[P]rior 

derogatory comments by a co-worker may permit an inference that further abusive treatment by 

the same person was motivated by the same sex-bias manifested in the earlier comments.”). 

Richardson alleged that a supervisor “left the notices up for viewing,” and that her “coworkers[,] 

especially the male coworkers[,] mocked [her] with the very words that were on the [notices].” 

Am. Compl. at 18. Richardson also alleged that she “would not entertain” another male coworker’s 

“verbal advances asking [her] about [her] clothing and hair,” which angered him, and that he 

physically pushed past her in an intimidating manner. Id. at 15, 17. She further alleged that a 

supervisor told her to give that coworker “the benefit of the doubt” during a meeting attended by 

many male coworkers, which she understood as the supervisor giving permission for further 

harassment. Id. at 15; cf. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining 

that a supervisor’s derogatory comment about a plaintiff in front of her male coworkers heightened 

its discriminatory impact). 
 

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Given those allegations, we respectfully conclude that Richardson’s Title VII claim for 

discrimination should not have been dismissed on the basis that she failed to allege facts permitting 

an inference that the alleged mistreatment occurred because of her sex, and we vacate the judgment 

to the extent that it dismissed that claim.1

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED to the extent it dismissed 

Richardson’s Title VII claim for retaliation and VACATED to the extent it dismissed

Richardson’s Title VII claim for discrimination because of sex. We REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

 

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 In dismissing the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court noted that 

Richardson failed to show that she had exhausted her administrative remedies. However, in 

another case decided by this Court after the district court’s ruling here, we held that the failure to 

plead exhaustion of administrative remedies does not justify dismissing a complaint sua sponte 

because “the burden of pleading and proving Title VII exhaustion lies with defendants and 

operates as an affirmative defense.” Hardaway, 879 F.3d at 491.