COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DIANE HARRIS RAGSDALE 

v. Record No. 1792-98-1 

THOMAS H. RAGSDALE OPINION BY 

 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

THOMAS H. RAGSDALE JULY 27, 1999 

v. Record No. 1797-98-1 

DIANE HARRIS RAGSDALE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge 

Carl W. Isbrandtsen for Diane Harris 

Ragsdale. 

Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. 

Martingayle; Stallings & Richardson, on 

briefs), for Thomas H. Ragsdale. 

 Diane Harris Ragsdale (“wife”) and Thomas H. Ragsdale 

(“husband”) have separately appealed various rulings of the 

trial court. Wife contends the court erred by decreeing in its 

amended final decree of divorce that she is not entitled to 

receive: (1) the amount by which her share of the parties’ 

investment accounts appreciated in value between March 31, 1997 

and the date of distribution; and (2) interest on that portion 

of the equitable distribution award reflecting her share of 

husband’s medical practice. Husband contends the court erred 
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by: (1) awarding wife child support in excess of the statutory 

guidelines amount; and (2) awarding wife attorney’s fees and 

costs. We find no error in the trial court’s rulings and affirm 

its decision. 

I. 

VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS 

 Husband and wife were married on June 21, 1980 in Memphis, 

Tennessee. The parties had two children: Anne Lacey Ragsdale, 

born December 3, 1985, and James Andrew Ragsdale, born May 24, 

1987. On August 15, 1995, wife filed a bill of complaint 

seeking a divorce on the ground of adultery. Husband filed his 

answer to the bill of complaint on August 30, 1995. On December 

8, 1995, the court entered a “Decree Pendente Lite” enjoining 

each party “from transferring, encumbering or disposing of any 

marital asset without the prior consent of both parties or leave 

of this Court.” Notwithstanding the entry of the court’s 

pendente lite decree, husband transferred marital funds in 

several investment accounts to his individual retirement account 

where the funds lost earnings because of a decrease in the 

applicable rate of interest. 

 In order to arrive at an accurate valuation of the funds 

which had been transferred from the marital accounts to 

husband’s separate account, the parties entered a consent order 

on April 21, 1997, stating that, “[f]or the purposes of 

equitable distribution, the plaintiff and the defendant are each 
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entitled to fifty-percent of the value of all of the marital 

property.” A second consent order entered on the same day 

provided as follows: 

The starting valuation date in connection 

with all marital investments and retirement 

accounts shall be on the date of separation, 

however, the parties shall submit evidence 

as to the rate of appreciation of all 

accounts, so that ultimately, using 

financial information obtained through 

March, 1997, the Commissioner shall 

determine what value each account would have 

as of March 31, 1997 . . . . 

At a May 1, 1997 hearing before the Commissioner, wife 

introduced an exhibit, prepared with the cooperation of both 

parties’ accountants, showing the value of the parties’ 

investment accounts as of the date of separation,1 the actual 

value of the accounts on March 31, 1997, and the “pro-forma” 

value of the accounts on March 31, which reflected their value 

after factoring in the appreciation in value the accounts would 

have generated had husband not withdrawn any funds after the 

parties’ separation. The pro-forma value of the accounts was 

stated to be $696,265. When wife moved to introduce Exhibit 16, 

counsel for both parties had the following discourse before the 

Commissioner: 

[Husband’s Counsel]: Mr. Commissioner, I 

think we have an agreement in theory. There 

is some mechanism that my client is 

concerned about how it’s going to be done. 

 

 1

 The separation date is listed as August 18, 1995. 

 
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If I understand what [wife’s counsel] is 

presenting, so the Commissioner understands, 

there’s a figure of six hundred and 

ninety-six thousand two hundred and 

sixty-five dollars. It’s my understanding 

that what [wife’s counsel’s] position is, 

that will be divided equally, with a 

transfer going in a QUADRO to [wife], with 

her receiving credit for assets that are 

already in her name. 

[Wife’s Counsel]: That’s exactly correct. 

The last two entries [on the exhibit], which 

are the HR-10 entries, are [husband’s] 

retirement account. We will prepare a 

QUADRO and he will transfer fifty percent of 

the value, fifty percent of the value on 

3-31-97, whatever that math turns out to be, 

fifty percent by way of a QUADRO to [wife]. 

 In his report filed on September 3, 1997, the Commissioner 

recommended that each party be awarded fifty percent of the 

value of the investment accounts as of March 31, 1997, which 

equaled $348,132.50. The Commissioner did not recommend an 

award providing for the equitable distribution of any 

appreciation in the investment accounts accruing after the March 

31 valuation date. 

 Wife filed an exception to the Commissioner’s failure to 

recommend that she be awarded appreciation in the value of her 

half of the accounts accruing between March 31, 1997 and the 

date husband transferred the award. Wife asserted that the 

failure to make such an award violated the parties’ April 21, 

1997 consent order, which provided that each party is entitled 

to fifty percent of the value of all marital property. 
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 In its final decree of divorce entered March 13, 1998, the 

trial court sustained wife’s exception to the Commissioner’s 

report and agreed that wife was entitled to any appreciation in 

the accounts accruing between March 31, 1997 and the date of the 

transfer. Both parties sought reconsideration of the court’s 

ruling, after which the court modified the final decree by 

letter. Citing Code § 20-107.3(A) and Fahey v. Fahey, 24 Va. 

App. 254, 481 S.E.2d 496 (1997) (en banc), the court reversed 

itself on the issue of appreciation, according the investment 

accounts the value which was established at the Commissioner’s 

hearing and ruling that any appreciation enjoyed by the accounts 

after the valuation date would be awarded to husband as the 

holder of the accounts.2

 

 2 The court’s amended final decree of divorce, subsequently 

entered on July 8, 1998, reads in pertinent part: 

 The value of [the] investment accounts 

as of March 31, 1997, $696,265.00, was 

agreed upon. Each party is entitled to 50% 

of the value of the investment accounts, or 

$348,132.50 . . . . 

 The parties have agreed, pursuant to 

the Consent Order of this Court dated April 

21, 1997, paragraph 7, that the plaintiff 

and the defendant are each entitled to 50% 

of the value of all marital property, and 

said investment accounts are marital 

property. 

 The plaintiff is not entitled to 

appreciation on said investment accounts 

from March 31, 1997 until the date of 

transfer or payment of the equitable 

distribution award. Any appreciation or 

depreciation of the investment accounts 
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We find no error in the decision of the court to exclude 

from wife’s award any appreciation of the investment accounts. 

Wife’s reliance on Wagner v. Wagner, 16 Va. App. 529, 431 S.E.2d 

77 (1993) (en banc), and Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 113, 

355 S.E.2d 18 (1987), is misplaced.3 In neither of these cases 

had the parties agreed to the date upon which the assets in 

question were to be valued. Indeed, as we noted in Mitchell, 

the trial court’s authority to select a valuation date arises in 

the absence of an agreement between the parties. See id. at 

118, 355 S.E.2d at 21. Here, by consent order, both husband and 

wife agreed to the date to be used for valuating the investment 

funds, stating that evidence of their value as of March 31, 1997 

was to be presented for the Commissioner’s consideration. 

Moreover, both parties represented before the Commissioner that 

they had agreed to equally divide the investment accounts by 

their pro-forma value as of March 31, 1997. The parties are 

 

shall inure to the benefit (or detriment) of 

the party holding that asset, for the 

reasons stated in the Court’s letter opinion 

dated May 18, 1998 . . . . 

 3 In Mitchell, we held that, in the absence of an agreement 

between the parties as to the valuation date of marital 

property, the trial court must value the property in a manner 

that will provide the most current and accurate information 

available and that avoids inequitable results. See Mitchell, 4 

Va. App. at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21. In Wagner, we affirmed the 

trial court’s decision to re-value marital property upon remand 

of the case because such re-valuation enabled the court to 

obtain the most accurate valuation and equitable distribution. 

See Wagner, 16 Va. App. at 531-32, 431 S.E.2d at 78-79. 
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bound by that agreement. See Lockhart v. Baxter, 12 Va. App. 

600, 605, 405 S.E.2d 434, 437-38 (1991) (finding no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to wife 

when evidence demonstrated that husband voluntarily signed a 

consent order and property settlement agreement providing for 

the payment of such fees). 

Although the trial court erroneously relied on Fahey in 

denying wife’s motion for an award reflecting appreciation in 

the investment accounts, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

decision because it reached the correct result.4 See Dziarnowski 

v. Dziarnowski, 14 Va. App. 758, 762, 418 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1992) 

(“When a trial court reaches the correct result for the wrong 

reason, its judgment will be upheld on appeal.”). 

II. 

INTEREST ON THE AWARD OF HUSBAND’S MEDICAL PRACTICE 

 In the final decree of divorce entered March 13, 1998, the 

trial court valued husband’s medical practice at $70,000 and, 

pursuant to the parties’ agreement to divide all marital 

property equally, ordered husband to pay wife $35,000. Upon 

 

 4 Fahey is inapposite. In that case, we found that a 

modification of a qualified domestic relations order was 

precluded solely by the dictates of Code § 20-107.3(K)(4), the 

statutory provision which limits a court’s authority to modify 

any order affecting any pension plan or retirement benefits. 

See Fahey, 24 Va. App. at 256-57, 481 S.E.2d at 497. The sole 

issue addressed in Fahey is not presented here. 
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wife’s motion for reconsideration of the final decree, the court 

set aside the final decree on April 3, 1998, “in order to give 

the parties and the [c]ourt time to resolve certain issues.” 

 At a hearing on May 15, 1998, the court heard argument as 

to whether wife was entitled to receive the appreciation in 

value of her share of the accounts. On July 8, 1998, the court 

entered the amended final decree of divorce, modifying its 

position as to the distribution of the parties’ investment 

accounts but leaving unchanged the court’s original award of 

$35,000 to wife as her share of husband’s medical practice. 

 On appeal, wife does not dispute the court’s valuation of 

the practice. Rather, wife asks that she be awarded pre-decree 

and post-decree interest on her share of the medical practice 

from March 31, 1997, the date of valuation, until the date that 

husband actually paid her share of the award after the entrance 

of the amended final decree of divorce, some sixteen months 

later. 

 Code § 8.01-382 provides in relevant part as follows: 

In any action at law or suit in equity, the 

verdict of the jury, or if no jury the 

judgment or decree of the court, may provide 

for interest on any principal sum awarded, 

or any part thereof, and fix the period at 

which the interest shall commence. The 

judgment or decree entered shall provide for 

such interest until such principal sum be 

paid. If a judgment or decree be rendered 

which does not provide for interest, the 

judgment or decree awarded shall bear 

interest from its date of entry, at the rate 
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as provided in § 6.1-330.54, and judgment or 

decree entered accordingly . . . . 

As established by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Dairyland 

Ins. Co. v. Douthat, Code § 8.01-382 “draws an important 

distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment interest.” 248 

Va. 627, 631, 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1994). 

 The award of prejudgment interest is discretionary, a 

matter committed to the trier of fact, “who ‘may provide for’ 

such interest and fix the time of its commencement.” Id. See

Marks v. Sanzo, 231 Va. 350, 356, 345 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1986) 

(stating that “whether interest should have been awarded and, if 

so, from what date interest should run, were matters within the 

sound discretion of the chancellor”). “‘[P]rejudgment interest 

is normally designed to make the plaintiff whole and is part of 

the actual damages sought to be recovered.’” Dairyland, 248 Va. 

at 631, 449 S.E.2d at 801 (quoting Monessen Southwestern Ry. v. 

Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988)). 

The award of prejudgment interest is to 

compensate Plaintiff for the loss sustained 

by not receiving the amount to which he was 

entitled at the time he was entitled to 

receive it, and such award is considered 

necessary to place the [plaintiff] in the 

position he would have occupied if the party 

in default had fulfilled his obligated duty. 

Marks, 231 Va. at 356, 345 S.E.2d at 267 (quoting 

Employer-Teamsters, Etc. v. Weatherall Concrete, 468 F. Supp. 

1167, 1171 (1979)). 
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 In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s failure to award interest to wife on her share of 

husband’s medical practice before the entry of the court’s 

amended final decree of divorce. Husband had no obligation to 

pay wife her share of the practice until the court made its 

equitable distribution award and ordered him to make payment in 

accordance with it. See Decker v. Decker, 22 Va. App. 486, 493, 

471 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1996) (stating that a court may speak only 

through its written orders). Although the court originally 

awarded wife $35,000 for the practice by its final decree of 

March 13, 1998, the court set aside that decree. Thus, wife was 

not entitled to her share of husband’s practice until the court 

reinstated wife’s award by the amended final decree of divorce 

of July 8, 1998. See Marks, 231 Va. at 356, 345 S.E.2d at 267 

(stating that prejudgment interest is intended to compensate a 

plaintiff for losses “‘sustained by not receiving the amount to 

which he was entitled at the time he was entitled to receive it 

. . . .’” (quoting Employer-Teamsters, 468 F. Supp. at 1171)). 

 In contrast to the discretionary nature of prejudgment 

interest, wife is entitled to post-decree interest on her 

equitable distribution award as a matter of law. See Dairyland, 

248 Va. at 631, 449 S.E.2d at 801. By statute, a judgment or 

decree that does not provide for interest “shall bear interest 

from its date of entry” at the rate established by Code 

§ 6.1-330.54. See Code § 8.01-382. “[P]ostjudgment interest is 
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not an element of damages, but is a statutory award for the 

delay in the payment of money actually due.” Dairyland, 248 Va. 

at 632, 449 S.E.2d at 801. 

 However, we find that wife is not entitled to receive 

post-decree interest on her share of husband’s practice. The 

amended decree instructed husband to pay wife her share within 

thirty days of its entry. Wife does not allege, nor does the 

record reflect, that husband failed to transfer her share within 

the time allotted by the court. Thus, there has been no “delay 

in the payment of money actually due” that might justify the 

award of postjudgment interest in this case. See id.

III. 

CHILD SUPPORT 

Husband argues that the trial court erred by deviating from 

the child support guidelines in consideration of the expenses 

being incurred for the payment of his children’s tuition at a 

private school. Husband does not dispute his ability to pay for 

his children’s private education but contends the court’s 

decision was erroneously based on wife’s claim that the parties 

had agreed to provide private schooling for their children. 

Husband argues, in the alternative, that he never agreed to 

continue paying for the children’s private education after 

divorce and that, even had the parties reached such an agreement 

during the marriage, it could not bind either of them once the 
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marriage dissolved. We find husband’s arguments unpersuasive as 

he mischaracterizes the basis for the court’s award. 

In his September 3, 1997 report, the Commissioner reported: 

[b]ased on the financial circumstances of 

the parties, $1,500 per month would be an 

appropriate amount of child support, 

however, so long as the children are in 

Norfolk Academy, a circumstance agreed upon 

by both parties, the amount of child support 

should be $2,000 per month. 

 The trial court agreed that husband should pay child 

support in excess of the guidelines set forth in Code § 20-108.2 

and required him to pay $2,315.02 per month. The court’s 

decision to deviate from the guidelines amount was properly 

based on numerous considerations, of which the parties’ 

agreement was only one. The court incorporated the following 

remarks at a hearing on February 6, 1998 into the amended final 

decree of divorce: 

[I] find[] . . . that the parties had agreed 

the children should go [to Norfolk Academy], 

that they have been there from the beginning 

of their education. It would be disruptive 

to change that procedure. The standard of 

living which was created during the marriage 

allowed them to go to this particular 

private school and it was established that 

this would be the case during the marriage. 

Also, that’s included up under the thirteen 

contributions, monetary, nonmonetary, of 

each party to the well-being of the family, 

and also other factors because, as I have 

mentioned previously, the children’s routine 

would be disrupted and the reason the 

parties are divorcing is because of the 

father’s adultery. 
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“The determination of child support is a matter of 

discretion for the trial court, ‘and such awards will not be 

reversed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the 

evidence.’” Vissicchio v. Vissicchio, 27 Va. App. 240, 253, 498 

S.E.2d 425, 432 (1998) (quoting Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 

81, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986)). Although the amount of child 

support called for by the guidelines set forth in Code 

§ 20-108.2 is presumptively correct, this presumption may be 

rebutted by evidence pertaining to, inter alia, the ability of 

each party to provide child support, the best interests of the 

child, the standard of living enjoyed by the family during the 

marriage, and other factors “necessary to consider the equities 

for the parents and children.” Code § 20-108.1(B). See Niemiec 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 27 

Va. App. 446, 450-51, 499 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1998). Moreover, in 

Solomond v. Ball, we stated that a parent may be required to pay 

for private educational expenses, even though such expenses 

exceed the guidelines, when there is a demonstrated need for the 

child to attend private school and the parent has the ability to 

pay. See 22 Va. App. 385, 391, 470 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1996). 

Among the factors that are relevant to determining whether there 

is a need for private education, the court may consider the 

child’s “attendance at private school prior to the separation 

and divorce” and the family’s tradition. See id.
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We find that the court considered the relevant factors in 

making its award of child support and that a deviation from the 

guidelines amount was warranted. The evidence establishes the 

children’s need to continue their private education at Norfolk 

Academy. During the marriage, the parties sent their children 

to private school. Both children attended Norfolk Academy 

before the parties’ separation and continued to do so after the 

separation. Based on the children’s prior and continuing 

attendance at Norfolk Academy, and the disruption to the 

children’s education that would necessarily accompany a transfer 

to public school, we find that the evidence demonstrates the 

children’s need to continue their education at Norfolk Academy. 

Moreover, given the success enjoyed by the children at Norfolk 

Academy, the evidence supports the conclusion that their 

continued attendance at the Academy is in their best interest 

and avoids the inequitable result of penalizing them as a 

consequence of their parents’ separation and divorce. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deviate 

from the child support guidelines in making its child support 

award. 

IV. 

AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 

 Husband also contends the trial court erred in awarding 

attorney’s fees and various costs to wife. In his report, the 
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Commissioner addressed the issue of attorney’s fees and costs as 

follows: 

[W]ife has submitted a statement for 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $28,427.50 

and costs of $4,426.58 . . . . Having 

observed the conduct of the parties and 

counsel and considering the evidence, 

including . . . wife’s statement for 

attorney’s fees, this Commissioner is of the 

opinion that much of the time spent prior to 

the hearing was generated by ill feeling 

between the parties resulting in extensive 

efforts and procedures that would otherwise 

not have been necessary. Evidence in the 

record does not explain or justify the 

amount of the award sought by . . . wife. 

The key to a proper award of counsel fees is 

reasonableness under all the circumstances. 

Cooke v. Cooke, 23 Va. App. 60, 65, 66 

(1996). Accordingly, your Commissioner 

recommends that . . . wife be reimbursed in 

the amount of $15,000 for attorney’s fees 

and $3,000 for costs. In addition, . . . 

wife has submitted a statement in the amount 

of $11,450 . . . in accounting fees. Of 

that amount, she should be reimbursed 

$4,200. 

After overruling both parties’ exceptions to the Commissioner’s 

report, the trial court adopted the Commissioner’s 

recommendations and awarded wife $15,000 for attorney’s fees, 

$3,000 for costs, and $4,200 for accounting fees. 

 Husband argues wife “over-litigated” her case as a trial 

tactic, driving up her attorney’s fees and costs unnecessarily. 

Without citing any examples from the record, husband alleges 

that wife caused an “absurd number” of court appearances, an 

“excessive amount” of discovery, and “endless fighting over the 

most infinitesimal details.” With respect to the trial court’s 
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award of costs, husband contends “[t]he record is devoid of any 

support for [the] bill from [wife’s] accountant, and there is no 

reason why [he] should be responsible for paying . . . copying 

and other litigation expenses . . . .” We find no merit in 

husband’s contentions and affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

 The award of attorney’s fees is committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal only 

for an abuse of discretion. See Theismann v. Theismann, 22 Va. 

App. 557, 574, 471 S.E.2d 809, 817, aff’d upon reh’g en banc, 23 

Va. App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996); Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 

Va. App. 676, 681, 406 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1991). “Where the 

husband is in a clearly superior financial position and his 

infidelity precipitated dissolution of the marriage, the trial 

court may properly award attorney’s fees to the wife.” 

Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 574, 471 S.E.2d at 817. The key to a 

proper award of fees is “reasonableness under all of the 

circumstances revealed by the record.” Westbrook v. Westbrook, 

5 Va. App. 446, 458, 364 S.E.2d 523, 530 (1988). 

 Here, husband’s infidelity precipitated the dissolution of 

the parties’ marriage, and husband was in a clearly superior 

financial position. Husband’s gross income as a physician was 

determined to be $14,500 per month. In comparison, wife did not 

work outside the home during much of the marriage and had only 

re-entered the work force as a teacher several months prior to 
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the parties’ separation. Furthermore, the record fails to 

support husband’s allegation that wife unnecessarily prolonged 

the litigation as a trial tactic to drive up costs, and wife 

presented detailed billing statements in support of her petition 

for attorney’s fees. 

 In short, the trial judge had sufficient evidence to 

determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested by 

wife and to make its award. Accordingly, we do not find any 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision on this issue. 

See Poliquin, 12 Va. App. at 681, 406 S.E.2d at 405. 

 We further find that the court properly awarded $7,200 in 

accountant fees and litigation costs and that its award was 

based on the evidence presented. 

 The decision of the trial court is affirmed.5

 Affirmed.

 

 5

 Wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs 

incurred on these appeals is denied.