No. 83-179 

IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

T983 

IN THE MARRIAGE OF 

WAUNETA E. TURNER, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

and 

VERNON N. TURNER, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROPI: The District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Skedd, Ashley, McCabe & Weingartner; J. Mayo Ashley, 

Helena, 14ontana 

For Respondent : 

John Cobb , Augusta, Montana 

.- 

Submitted on Briefs: August 18, 1983 

Decided: October 17, 1983 

Filed: 

/=- P @ A+,. a$$,& 

clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Vernon N. Turner (husband) appeals from the judgment of 

the District Court, Lewis and Clark County, giving him only 

his personal possessions in a dissolution action brought by 

Wanneta Turner (wife). We affirm. 

The husband and wife married in 1972. They were both in 

their 50's when they married. The wife owned property near 

Lincoln, Montana, in her own name, given to her by her first 

husband. Mr. Turner was a commercial pilot when they 

married, and continued to fly when they moved to Lincoln. 

The Turners lived on the property for approximately 10 years. 

The wife claims the husband made no monetary or 

nonmonetary contribution to the Lincoln property. She claims 

the husband did not give her money for household expenses and 

failed to help maintain the condition of the house and 

outbuildings. The wife alleges she had to sell some of her 

personal property at the husband's insistence. Most of the 

proceeds from the sales were used for the husband's flying 

expenses. 

The husband claims he did make monetary and nonmonetary 

contibutions to the property. He cites various duties he 

performed around the property, such as clearing brush, 

snow-plowing the access road, and cutting thousands of 

dollars of firewood to heat the home. 

After a hearing, the trial court granted the 

dissolution. The court awarded to the wife all property 

owned by her before the marriage. The trial court granted 

the husband his personal belongings. This appeal follows. 

Two issues are raised by this appeal: 

1. Did the trial court properly find that the husband 

made no contribution to the marriage which would justify 

apportionment of the wife's previously owned home? 
2. Did the District Court err in not making a finding 

of the net value of the marital assets, namely the Lincoln 

property? 

Upon consideration of the evidence and testimony, the 

District Court found that the husband's position in the 

marriage was that of a "parasitic freeloader" who victimized 

the wife for the period of their marriage. The court 

therefore ruled that the wife was entitled to outright 

ownership of all the real property at her house near Lincoln. 

Disposition of property in a dissolution proceeding is 

governed by section 40-4-202, MCA, which provides that the 

court shall "equitably apportion" the property "belonging to 

either or both, however and whenever acquired." The statute 

also provides that in disposing of property previously owned 

by one spouse, consideration must be given to "contributions 

of the other spouse" including the nonmonetary contribution 

of a homemaker and the extent to which such contributions 

have "facilitated the maintenance of this property." 

40-4-202, MCA. 

To conclude that the husband was not entitled to any 

claim against the Lincoln real property, it is necessary to 

find that he made - no contribution equitably justifying 

apportionment of that property. The District Court's finding 

that the husband was a parasitic freeloader victimizing the 

wife is just such a finding. We turn now to whether that 

finding was justified. 

This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of 

the trial court and will not alter a judgment unless it finds 

a clear abuse of discretion. Eschenburg v. Eschenburg 

(19761, 171 Mont. 247, 250, 557 P.2d 1014, 1016. After 

considering the record in a light most favorable to the 

respondent, this Court must find substantial facts supporting 

the discretionary judgment of the trial court. 
It is difficult to conceive of a marriage where 

absol-utely no contribution is made by one spouse. The 

equitable meaning of contribution envisioned by section 

40-4-202, MCA, however, is an effort of a spouse which 

substantially aids in the accumulation and/or maintenance of 

the marital estate. The work of a homemaker is just such an 

effort and is specifically enumerated in the statute. The 

marital estate would obviously be substantially depleted if 

these necessary services had to be purchased. But where one 

spouse's contribution is so minimal that it would not even be 

self-supporting, that spouse is merely a burden. In such a 

case, the value of the other spouse's previously owned 

property results inspite - of, rather than because of, the 

first spouse's efforts. 

In this case, the wife was not only the homemaker, but 

also the chief earner. The husband's annual income was 

approximately $5,000, much of which was spent by the husband 

while he was away from the home. The wife paid all of the 

bills, with the exception of the husband's phone bills, 

bought the food and clothing, did the cooking, washing, 

cleaning, and other work to provide for the home. The only 

substantial effort of the husband during the ten year 

marriage was to clear snow from the driveway (with the wife's 

plow), and get wood for the heating of the home (with the 

wife's help). 

The District Court need not further substantiate its 

finding of lack of contribution. The burden is upon the 

husband to demonstrate his contiribution. He failed to do 

SO. 

We hold that under these facts the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that the husband made no 

contribution to the marriage within the meaning of section 

40-4-202, MCA. 
This is not the first case where the non-acquiring 

spouse has been found to have no interest in previously owned 

property. In In re the Marriage of Balsam (1979) , 180 Mont. 

129, 589 P.2d 652, this Court upheld such a distribution 

where a trial court found that none of the value of 

non-appreciated stocks was a product of contribution from the 

marital effort. 

The failure of the District Court to find the net value 

of the Lincoln property now becomes harmless. We take care 

to reemphasize the necessity of such a finding in the 

equitable apportionment of property in the typical marriage 

dissolution. The value of the marital assets is important 

information which should be weighed in the distribution 

determination. However in this case, the value of the 

Lincoln property would make no difference. Whether the 

property is worth $30,000 or $130,000, the husband is 

entitled to exactly none of it. 

The judgment 

concur : 

of the District Court is affirmed. 

aiJ--A J* jllw'.,pJg) Chief Justice