SLIP OP . 07-122 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________ : PARKDAL E I

NTERNATI ONAL , L TD., : RI VERVI EW S TEEL

CO., L TD., and : SAMUEL , SON & CO., L TD., : : Pla int if fs , :

: Be fo re : J an e A
. R es t an i , C h i ef J u d ge an d : : Court No. 06-00289 RUSS ELMETAL S EXPORT, : : Plaintiff-Interve nor, :

: v . : : UN I TE D ST AT ES, : : Def endant. : ____________________________________:
OPI NI ON [P laintiffs’ motion for judg ment on the ag ency rec ord denie d, judgme nt for def endant.] Dated: August 8, 2007 Hunto n & Willi ams, L L P ( Ric ha rd P. F e rr in a

nd Willi am Sil ve rm an) fo r t he pla int if

fs
. Sharre tts, P aley , Carter

& B lauvelt, PC (Be atrice A. B ricke ll and Peter J. Baskin) for the plaintiff-interve nor. Pe te r D . K e isl e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Je ann e E. Da

vid so n, Di re c tor ; Patr ic ia M. McCarthy , Assistant Director , Commercial L itigation B ranc h, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Jus tice (D avid S. Sil verbr and and Mic hael D. Panzer a); Mar k B. L ehnar dt, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerc e, of c ounsel, for the de fe nd ant.Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 2

Prior to 1984, Comm erc e automatica lly conducte d administrative re views on 1 antidumping duty

order s ever

y y ear . See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1) ( 1982); 19 C.F.R. § 353.53(a) (1983). Subseque ntly , Congr ess passed the Trade and Ta riff A ct of 1984, Pub. L . No. 98-573, § 611, 98 Stat. 2948, 3031 (“1984 Ac t”), whic h made year ly administrative re views conting ent upon a re quest from a

n interested pa

rty , or at the initiative of the Sec reta ry of Commerce
. Restani, Chief J udg e: Plaintiffs Parkdale I nternational, L td., Riverview Steel Co., L t d
. , an d S amu e l , S o n& C o . , L t d
. , an d p l a i n t i f f

- i n t e r v e n o r R u s s e l M e t a l s E x p o rt( c o l l e c t i v e l y, “Plaintiffs”) a

re importer s and exporter-r eseller s of ce rtain cor rosion-re sistant carbon stee l flat products fr om Canada. Since 1993, Plaintiffs’ merc handise ha s been subjec t to an antidumping duty or de r. Se e Ce rt a in C or

ro sio n- Re sis tant C arb on

Ste e l F lat Pr od s. & Ce rt a in C ut- to- L e ng th Carbon Steel Plate fr om Canada, 58 F ed. Reg . 44,162, 44,162 (De p’t Commerce Aug . 19, 1993) (antidumping duty

order). Plaintiffs challeng e the va lidity of the United States De partment of Commerce’ s (“Commerc e”) interpre tation of its regulations gove rningthe assessment of antidumping duties on mer chandise enter ed into the United States by rese llers who ar e unaff iliated with a fore ign pr oducer . For the re asons stated be low, the cour t finds that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute, but that Com merc e’s inter pretation is valid. Bac kgr ound Un de r t he Un ite d St ate s’ re tr os pe c tiv e sy ste m of a sse ssi nganti dumpi ngdutie s, Commerce instruc ts Cust oms and Bor der Protec tion (“Customs”) to collect c ash deposits of estimated antidumping duties from importers at the time the subject merc handise is enter ed, ins te a d o f i mme diate ly

a sse ssi ngdutie s o n e ntr ie s o f s ub je c t me rc ha

nd ise . Se e 19 C.F .R. §§ 351.211(b), 351.212( a) ( 2007). Assessment of a ntidumping duties occ urs af ter the op po rt un ity fo r a n a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w o f t he anti dumpi ngduty

or de r. Se e 19 C.F .R.

1 § 3 51 .2 13 . U nd e r 1 9 U .S. C. § 16 75 (a ) ( 20 00 ), Comme rc e pu bli sh e s a no tic e of op po rt un ity toCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 3

reque st an administrative re view in the “a nniversar y month” in which the re levant antidumping duty order was published. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1); 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b) . I f a r equest for revie w is rec eived, Commerc e is requir ed to deter mine “the nor

mal value a

nd export price . . . of
e a c h e ntr y of the su bje c t me rc ha

nd ise ” and

“ the dumpi ngmarg in f

or e a c h s uc h e ntr

y .” 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 5( a )( 2) (A ). Af

te r t he dumpi ngmarg ins are e sta bli sh e d, Comme rc e is r e qu ir e d to “ pu bli sh in the Fe dera l Reg ister the re sults of such revie w, tog ether with notice of a

ny duty to be assesse d [or] estimated duty

to be deposited.” I d. § 1675(a) (1). F ollowing publication, the final results of an administrative r eview be come “ the basis for the assessment of c ounterva iling or a ntidumping duties on entries of me rcha ndise cove red by

the deter mination and for de posits of estimated duties.” I d. § 1675(a) (2)( C).

Be cause administrative re views under § 1675(a) are g rante d only on reque st, not
a ll e ntr ie s o f s ub

je c t me rc ha

nd ise are ne c e ssa

ri ly su bje c t to the re qu e ste d r e vie w. Con g re ss fore saw this possibili ty , but electe d not to legislate a par ticular method for

assessingduties on entries not cove red by

an administrative r eview. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-1156, at 181 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), a s repr inted in 1984 U.S.C.C .A.N. 5220, 5298 (de leg atingto Comm erc e the responsibility

to promulgate re g ulations gove rningautomatic asse ssment of duties on entries f or which no re quest for r eview w as re ceive d). To fill this ga p in statutory

authority , Commerce pu bli sh e d r e g ulatio ns , c ur

re ntl y c od if ie d at 19 C.F .R. § 3 51 .2 12 (c ), that g ov e rn the a uto matic assessment of duties on e ntries for which no re view wa s reque sted. See Mittal Can., Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (CI T 2006). Unde r those re g ulations, if no one reque sts an administrative re view of a ny entity subject to an a

ntidumping duty

order , Commerce will inst ruct Customs to assess antidumping duties at “ rate s equal to the c ash deposit of, or bondCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 4

for, e stimated antidumping duties . . . re quired on that mer chandise at the time of e ntry .” 19 C.F .R. § 3 51 .2 12 (c )( 1) (i ). I f C omm e rc e re c e ive s a tim e ly re qu e st f or a re vie w o f a

n o rd e r, it w ill instruct Customs “to assess a ntidumping duties . . . and to continue to c ollect ca sh deposits, on the merc handise not cove red by the re quest in acc ordanc e with par ag raph ( c)( 1) of this section.” I d. § 351.212(c) (2).

Commerce ha s a stated policy that “compa

ny -spec ific asse ssment rates must be based on the sales information of the first company in the commerc ial chain that kne w, at the time the merc handise wa s sold, that the mercha ndise was de stined for the United States.” Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Procee dings: Asse ssment of Antidumping Duties, 63 F ed. Reg . 55,361, 55,362 (De p’t Commerce Oct. 15, 1998) ( notice and r equest for comment on policy
conce rningassessment of a ntidumping duties) (“ Reseller N otice”) . By identifying the party

that ha d k no wl e dg e of

the de sti natio n o f t

he su bje c t me rc ha

nd ise , Co mme rc e de te rm ine s w hic h e nti ty was the “ price discriminator” that eng ag ed in the dumping , and henc e which c ompany ’s dumping
marg in s ho uld

a pp ly to a g ive n e ntr

y . Se e Antid

ump ing& Counte rv a ili ngDuty Pr oc e e din g s: Assessment of Antidumping Duties, 68 Fe d. Reg . 23,954, 23,960 (De p’t Commerce May 6, 2003) (notice of policy

conce rningassessment of a ntidumping duties) (“ Reseller Policy”)

. When conductingan antidumpinginvestigation, Com merc e examines the re cords of responding produce rs, but rar ely

examines the sales of r eseller s such as Plaintiffs. Reseller Notice, 63 F ed. Reg . at 55,362. Instead of de termining whether a produc er ha d knowledg e of the destination of its sales to identified rese llers, Commerce assumes that a pr oducer knew the de stination of all of its sa le s to e ve ry

re se lle r i t id e nti fi e s d

ur ingthe ini tia l inve sti g atio n. I d. B e c a us e the pr od

uc e r i s assumed to be the f

irst company

in the commerc ial chain that kne w of the pr oduct’s destination,Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 5

cash de posits for antidumping duties on a ll mercha ndise sold to identified rese llers is initi ally set at the produc er’ s cash de posit rate. I d.

T h i s a s s u mp t i o nr e m a i n s i ne f f e c tun t i l th e t i m e f

o r ana dm i n i s tr at i v e r e v i e w . If no interested pa

rty reque sts a revie w of a

rese ller or its produce r duringthe anniver sary month of the anti dumpi ngduty

or de r p ur su ant t o 1 9 U .S. C. § 16 75 (a ), Comme rc e wi ll c on tin ue to a ssume that the produc er w as aw are of the ultimate destination of the g oods that it sold t o the re seller a nd assess duties on the re seller’ s entries at the cash de posit rate plac ed on the pr oducer under the automatic asse ssment regulation, 19 C.F.R. §351.212(c)( 1). Reseller Notice, 63 F ed. Reg . at 55,363. I f a r eview is re quested for a re seller, Commerc e will cea se to assume that the pr oducer
was a war e of the rese ller’s e ntries, and se t a rate spec ific to the re seller if Commerc e dete rmines it was unaff

iliated with a produc er. I d. I f someone r equests a r eview of a produc er, Commerc e wi ll d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he pr od uc e r i n q ue sti on wa s a wa re of the ult imate de sti natio n o f s a le s to a g iven re seller. I d. I f Commerce discovers that the produce r wa s awa re of the destination of a sale to a r eseller , Commerce w ill find that the producer set the price of sale into the United States and asse ss antidumping duties ac cording ly . I d. I f, howe ver, Commerc e finds that a pr oducer
was una war e of the ultimate destination of the sales to a r eseller , it can no long er r ely on its prior assumption to apply

the produc er’ s assessment rate ca lculated dur ing the administrative revie w. I d. In such a c ase, Commerc e has at least two options to determine what assessment rate should apply

to the unaff

iliated rese ller that is not cover ed by the re sults of the
a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w. F ir st, Comme rc e c ou ld r e ta in t he status qu o, a

pp lyingthe pr od

uc e r’ s c a sh deposit rate use d at the time the mer chandise was e ntere d. Followingthis approac h, CommerceCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 6

Th e a ll o the rs rate is the sim ple ave ra g e of

the c omp any -s pe c if

ic marg ins c a lc ulate d in 2 the orig inal antidumping investig ation. See Reseller Notice, 63 F ed. Reg . at 55,362.
Se e a lso Ce rt a in C or

ro sio n- Re sis tant C arb on

Ste e l F lat Pr od s. & Ce rt a in C ut- to- L e ng th 3 Carbon Steel Plate fr om Canada, 63 F ed. Reg . 12,725, 12,744 (De p’t Commerce Mar. 16, 1998) (final r esults of antidumping duty administrative re views) ( “[I ]f the exporter is not a firm cove red in this review, a pr ior revie w, or the or igina l less than fair va lue (L TFV ) investig ation, but the manufa cture r is, the ca sh deposit rate w ill be the rate established for the most rece nt period for the manufa cture r of the me rcha ndise.”); Cer

tain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel F lat Prods. & Certain Cut-to-L eng th Carbon Steel Plate from Cana da, 66 F ed. Reg . 11,553, 11,555 (De p’t Comme rc e F e b. 26 , 2 00 1) (a me nd e d f ina l r e su lts of

anti dumpi ngduty

a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie ws ) (“[ I ] f t he ex po rt er i s n ota fi rmcov eredin th is revi ew, a pre vi ou s re vi ew, or t he o ri ginal L TFV investigation, but the manufac turer is, the c ash deposit rate will be the rate established f or the (continued...) would reta in its i nitial assumption t hat, at the time of the investigation (or last revie w), the produce r wa s awa

re of the destination of the r eseller ’s merc handise, e ven thoug h that assumption pr ov e d f a lse duri ngthe c ur

re nt a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w. Al te rn ativ e ly , Co mme rc e c ou ld r e je c t it s initial assumpti on that the produc er w as aw are of the ultimate destination of the me rcha ndise that it sold t o the re seller. Abse nt that assumption, the reseller would fall into the categ ory of unaff iliated exporters who did not participate in the investigation. The assessment rate for unrevie wed pa

rties is the so-ca lled “all other s” rate. 2 For most of the time that the antidumping duty order at issue in this case ha s been in e ffe ct, Commerce chose the first option, instructing Customs that “if the exporter is not a firm c overe d in this review, or the orig inal investigation, but the manufac turer is, the [cash] deposit rate w ill be the rate established for the most rece nt period for the manufa cture r of the
me rc ha nd ise .” Ce rt a in C or

ro sio n- Re sis tant C arb on

Ste e l F lat Pr od s. & Ce rt a in C ut- to- L e ng th Carbon Steel Plate fr om Canada, 62 F ed. Reg . 18,448, 18,468 (De p’t Commerce Apr. 15, 1997) (final r esults of antidumping duty administrative re views). As exporter-r eseller s, Plainti ffs 3Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 7

(...continued) 3 most rece nt period for

the manufa cture r of the me rcha ndise.”). purcha se the subjec t mercha ndise from Cana dian produc ers a nd arr ang e the e ventual sale of the g oo ds in U .S. c omm e rc e . It is un c on te ste d th at Pla int if f r e se lle rs are no t a ff

ili ate d w iththe ir produce rs; the produc ers in question did not have know ledg e of the ultimate destination of the
merc handise they

sold to P laintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs’ entries ha ve historically

been liquidated at the ca sh deposit rate the y paid when the merc handise e ntere d. In 1998, howeve r, Commerce published a notice a

nd reque st for comment c oncer ning the automatic asse ssment of antidumping duties a imed at “c larify [i ng ]” this practice. Rese ller Notice , 63 Fe d. Reg . at 55,361. Under

Commerce’ s proposal, “a utomatic liquidation at the cash de posit rate re quired at the time of entry

[would] only

apply to a re seller if no a dminist rative r eview ha s been r equeste d, either of the re seller or

of any produce r of the me rcha

ndise the re seller e x ported to the United State s, and

the re se lle r d oe s n ot h ave its own c a shde po sit ra te .” I d. at 55 ,3 62 ; se e a lso Mitta l, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 n.10 (“ [T] he Reseller Policy example presents a

n exceeding ly

rar e, perha ps anomalous, ca se whe re the importer does not re quest a re view but Commerce lear ns of information prior to liquidation that sheds light on the r ate that wa s in effe ct at the time of the
rese ller’s e ntries.”) . I f a r eview of the re seller’ s produce r wa s reque sted, and the pr oducer was not awar e of the final destination of the me rcha ndise it sold to t hat re seller, the r eseller ’s entrie s would be liquidated at the a ll others rate , unless there was a rate specific to it. R eseller Notice, 63 Fe d. Reg . at 55,362. The ne w interpre tation was adopte d in 2003. See Reseller Policy , 68 Fe d. Reg . at 23,954.

In 2006 and 2007, Commerce completed a dminist rative r eviews of theCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 8

Plaintiffs’ entries made betwee n August 1, 2003, and J uly 31, 2004, wer e liquidated 4 prior to commenc ement of this litigation. The court de nied a motion for a preliminary

injunction p re v en t i n g l i qu i d at i o no f t h e e n tri es m ad e b et we en Au gu s t1 , 2 0 0 4 , an d J u l y 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 , th o u gh liquidation is curr ently

enjoined by

a sepa rate order of this Court in another ca se addr essing separ ate issues. See Parkdale Int’l, L td. v. United States, Court No. 07-166 (CI T May 18, 2007) (tempora ry restra ining or der)
. antidumping duty

order on car bon steel flat pr oducts. See Cer tain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Prods. fr om Canada, 71 F ed. Reg . 13,582, 13,583 (De p’t Commerce Mar. 16, 2006) (final r esults of antidumping duty administrative re view); Cer tain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Prods. fr om Canada, 72 F ed. Reg . 12,758, 12,758 (De p’t Commerce Mar. 19, 2007) (final r esults of antidumping duty administrative re view) ( collectively , “F inal Results”). Reviews we re r equeste d for Plaintiffs’ pr oducer s, but no request wa s made to re view Plaintiff
re se lle rs . In th e F ina l Re su lts , Co mme rc e state d th at it wo uld “ ins tr uc t [Cus tom s] to liq

uid ate
unre vie we d e ntr ie s at th e a ll- oth e rs ra te if the re is n o r ate fo r t

he int e rm e diate c omp any (i e s) inv o lv e d in th e tr an s a c ti o n . ” 7 1 F e d
. Re g . at 1 3 , 5 8 4 ; s e e a ls o 7 2 F e d
. Re g . at 1 2 , 7 5 9 ( “ [W] e wi ll i ns tr uc t [Cus tom s] to liq

uid ate unre vie we d e ntr ie s at th e “ Al l O the rs ” ra te if the re is n o r ate for the inter

mediate c ompany (ies) involved in the tra nsaction.”) . Be cause Plaintiffs are unaff iliated rese llers, and their produce rs wer e subjec t to the final results of the a dminist rative revie w, but Plaintiffs were not, and Plaintiffs’ entrie s were conseque ntly order ed to be liquidated at the all other s rate. (See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. J . on the Ag ency R. 2–3.) 4 Plaintiffs challeng e the va lidity of the Rese ller Policy , claimingthat the

“ c lari fi c atio n” is i rr e c on c ila bly inc on sis te nt w ith§ 3 51 .2 12 (c ), that it is a rb itr ary , c a

pr ic iou s, and not supported by

g overninglaw, and that Comm erc e fa iled to comply with the proce dural require ments of the Administrative Proce dure A ct (“ APA”), 5 U .S.C. § 551 et seq., in issui ngCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 9

the Reseller

Policy . (See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. J . on the Ag ency R. 15–27.) J ur is di c t io n a nd St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w The c ourt addre ssed the question of its jurisdiction to hear this ca se in a prior opinion denying Plaintiffs’ motions for pr eliminary injunctions. S ee Par

kdale Int’l, L td. v. Un ite d St ate s, __

F . Su pp . 2 d _ _, Slip Op . 0 7- 72 (C I T M ay 11 , 2 00 7) . T he c ourt

a dh e re s to its conclusion, as f

urther e x plained below, that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U .S.C. § 1581(i)(4),
as an a ction related to the administration and enf orce ment of antidumping duty order s. The Court of International Trade was c reated by the Customs C ourts Act of 1980, Pub. L . No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727, which g rante d the cour t exclusi ve jurisdiction over
c e rt a in m atte rs to p ro vid e a “ c omp re he ns ive sy ste m [th at] wi ll e ns ur e g re ate r e ff ic ie nc y in judicial resour ces a

nd uniformity

in the judicial decision makingproce ss” in the ar ea of international tra de. H.R. Rep. No. 96- 1235, at 20 (1980), a s repr inted in 1980 U.S.C.C .A.N. 3729, 3731. In that Act, Cong ress set out a numbe r of diff ere nt are as of jurisdiction, two of which ar e re levant her e. F irst, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) vests the c ourt with authority to review“any civil action commenc ed under section 516A of the Tarif f Ac t of 1930 [19 U.S.C . § 1516a].” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). To br ing suit under § 1581(c) , a par

ty must contest a “f

actua l finding[] or le g a l c on c lus ion []” ma de in a de te rm inatio n li ste d in

19 U. S.C. § 1 51 6a (a )( 2) (B ). 19 U. S.C. § 1516a(a )(2) (A). A mong the se ar e fa ctual finding s or leg al conc lusions made in a final deter mination of an administrative re view of a n exis ting a

ntidumping duty

order conducte d pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675. I d. § 1516a(a )(2) (B )(iii).

Second, Cong ress provide d this Court wit h broad r esidual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) to hear “ any civil action commenc ed ag ainst the United States . . . that ar isesCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 10

out of any law of the United States providingfor . . . tar iffs [or] dut ies . . . on the importation of
merc handise for

rea sons other than the r aising of re venue,” as we ll as case s challeng ing Commerce’ s “administration and e nforc ement with re spect to the matter s ref err ed to” in the
rema inder of § 1581. 28 U .S.C. § 1581(i)(2), (4) . Congr ess has e mphasized, however , that “the Court of International Trade [shoul d] notpermit subsection (i) . . . to be utiliz ed to circ umvent the e xclu siv e me tho d o f j ud ic ia l r e vie w o f t ho se anti dumpi ngand

c ounte rv a ili ngduty deter minations li sted in [19 U.S .C. § 1516a].” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1235, at 48. Thus, it has bee n held that § 1581(i) “ ‘may not be invoked whe n jurisdiction under anothe r subsec tion of § 1581 is o r c ou ld h ave be e n ava ila ble , unle ss t

he re me dy

pr ov ide d und e r t

hat ot he r s ub se c tio n w ou ld be manife stly

inadequate.’” Norc al/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F .2d 356, 359 (F ed. Cir. 1992) (quotingMiller & Co. v. United States, 824 F .2d 961, 963 (F ed. Cir. 1987)) (empha sis removed).

Def endant c ontends that Plaintiffs had the opportunity to file a c ase br ief challeng ing the Reseller Policy in the Final Results, and thus should have f iled suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). (D ef.’ s Combined Mot. t o Dismiss & Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for J . Upon the Ag ency R. 11–16.) Plaintiffs counter that a pplication of the Rese ller Policy was a fore g one conclusion, and that Comm erc e’s mer e invocation of the Reseller Policy is not a fac tual finding or a le g al conc lusion supporting Commerce ’s deter mination in the Final Results. (Pls.’ Br. on J urisdiction 2–5.)

In decidingbetwee n the appr opriate ba ses for jur isdiction, the “‘mer e re citation of a ba sis for jurisdiction, by either a party or a c ourt, ca

nnot be controlling [; ]’” instead, the court “ ‘look[s] to the true nature of the action . . . in deter mining jurisdiction.’” N orsk HydroCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 11

A f a c ia l c ha lle ng e is a

br oa d- ba se d atta c k o n a

statut e or re g ulatio n’ s c on sis te nc y

wi th 5 exis ting law . A fa cially

invalid regulation or law ther efor e ca nnot be justified under a

ny potential application, and is void. When makinga fa cial cha lleng e to a r egulatory policy such as that at issue her e, “the challeng er must establish that no set of c ircumstance s exi sts under which the [regulation] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). F urther, when r uling on suc h a cha lleng e, “the ag ency ’s construc tion of the statute is entitled to gr eat weig ht.” Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 732 F .2d 924, 928 (F ed. Cir. 1984). Def endant a rgues that Plaintiffs’ cla ims reg ardingthe 2004 to 2005 administrative re view are not ripe for

adjudication bec ause, at the time Plainti ffs filed suit, the fina l results of the r e v i e wh a d

n o tb e e ni s s u e d
. ( D e f

. ’ s C o mb i n e d

M o t . t o D i s m i s s & R e s p . t o P l s . ’ M o t . f o r J. Upon the Ag ency

R. 16.) To deter

mine whether

an ac tion is ripe for judicial re view, the c ourt must determine: “( 1) the fitness of the issues for judicia l decision and (2) the har dship to the parties of withholding cour

t consideration.” Nat’l Park H ospitality Ass’n v. De p’t of Interior, 53 8 U .S. 80 3, 80 8 ( 20 03 ). Un de r t he fi rs t pr on g , th e c ourt

mus t de te rm ine “ wh e the r t he iss ue ‘i s purely leg al [or] . . . would benef it from a more concr ete se tting, and whether the ag ency ’s ac tion is sufficiently

final.’” Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 ( D.C. Cir. 1998) (quotingNatura l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F .3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). As th e D
. C
. C i rc u i tre ce n t l y re af fi rm ed , a “ ‘p ure l y

l ega l cl ai mi nth e c o n t ex to f afa ci al ch al l en ge

. . . is pr e sumpt ive ly

re vie wa ble .’ ” Nat’ l A ss’ n o f H ome B uil de rs v. U. S. A rmy Cor ps of En g ’r s, 440 F.3d 459, 464 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home B uilders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng ’rs, 417 F .3d 1272, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (inter nal quotations omitt ed); see also Rothe De v. Cor p. v. De p’ t of

De f. , 4 13 F .3 d 1 32 7, 13 35 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 5) (“ ‘Ac a se is g e ne ra lly ri pe if any rema ining que stions are pure ly leg al ones . . . .’” ) (quotingMonk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2003)). The issues in this case ar e pure ly leg al, and do not conc ern a ny fac tual d et erm i n at i o nm ad e i nth e F i n al R es u l t s . Int erm s o f h ar d s h i p , th e c o urtfi n d s th atal th o u gh postponing the a ction with respec t to the 2004 to 2005 entries would work only a minimal ha rd sh ip, if any , o n th e pa

rt ie s, it w ou ld n ot b e ne fi t th e c ourt in a ny wa y , a s th e ne c e ssa

ry fa c ts t o resolve this ca se ar e alr eady definite. Conseque ntly , the cour t finds that this action is ripe for revie w. Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F .3d 1347, 1355 (F ed. Cir. 2006) (quotingWil liams v. Sec’y of Na vy , 7 87 F .2 d 5 52 , 5 57 (F e d. Cir . 1 98 6) ). In th is c a se , Pl a int if fs c ha lle ng e , o n f

a c ia l g ro un ds , a g ener ally

applicable policy

reg ardingthe assessment of duties on entries whic h wer e not
cover ed by

the re sults of an administrative re view under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a). Plaintiffs do not 5
se e k to c ha lle ng e the fa c tua l c on c lus ion that th e y a re un a ff ili ate d r e se lle rs , n or

do the y se e k to challeng e the leg al conc lusion that, as unaffiliated r eseller s, the terms of the Re seller Policy apply to them. I ndeed, Plaintiffs’ e ntries wer e excluded fr om the Final Results. Thus, theCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 12

Followingthe cour

t’s reque st at oral ar g ument, Def endant c ited case s sugg esting that 6 Pla int if fs ’ c la ims c ou ld b e tim e -b arr e d und e r t he tw o- y e ar s tatut e of

lim itatio ns fo r § 15 81 (i ) actions provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). (See Def .’s Resp. to Ct.’s Request for Citation.) As noted above , various APA cla ims, for example, a fa ilure to provide notice and comment, a ccr ue at th e tim e a

ru le is p ut i nto e ff

e c t, a nd might h ave be e n ti me -b arr e d in thi s c a se . F a ilure to f

ile suit withi n the statute of limitations period is an aff irmative def

ense, which must be claimed in a defe ndant’s first re sponsive pleading . USCI T R. 8(d) (“ [A] party shall set forth af

firmatively

. . . [a] statute of limitations . . . and any other matter

constituting an . . . a ffirmative defe nse.”)
. Al tho ug h a

n e xce pti on

is m a de fo r s tatut e s o f l imi tatio ns that are jur isd ic tio na l in natur e , c ourt s have no t tr e ate d th e fa ilure to c omp ly wi th t he tw o- y e ar s tatut e of

lim itatio ns un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 2636(i) as a

jurisdictional issue under § 1581(i) . See Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973 (F ed. Cir. 1994). In Mitsubis hi, the plaintiff filed a suit under § 1581(a ) and § 1 58 1( i) , c ha lle ng inga

uto matic liq

uid atio n o f c e rt a in e ntr ie s at a 94 pe rc e nt a d v a lor e m r ate re qu ir e d und e r a

pr e lim ina

ry anti dumpi ngde te rm inatio n, rathe r t ha n th e 13 .4 3 p e rc e nt r ate established in the fina l results. I d. at 975. Althoug h jurisdiction was not available under § 1 58 1( a ), the c ourt

fo un d th at th e a

uto matic a sse ssm e nt o f a

nti dumpi ngdutie s “ pe rt a in[e d] to the ‘a dminist ration and e nforc ement’ of laws ‘pr oviding f

or . . . duties’” under § 1581( i). I d. at 977 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)). Thus, the cour t concluded that “the trial c ourt appa rently had jurisdiction over this case under se ction 1581(i)(2) , (4).” I d. Havingconclude d that this Court had jurisdiction, howeve r, the F eder al Circuit then found that the pla intiff’s claim wa s barr ed (continued...) nature of Plaintiffs’ complaint is, by definition, divorced f

rom any final dete rmination reg arding entries that we re w ithin the scope of the F inal Results. Com merc e’s r efe renc e to the mer e exis tence of the Rese ller Policy does not rende r the F inal Results a final leg al deter mination with respec t to all entries of c arbon stee l flat products fr om Canada.

Treating the r efe renc e to the Reseller Policy in the Final Results as a § 1516a de te rm inatio n w ou ld c re ate pr oc e dura l in c e nti ve s in c on sis te nt w iththe purp os e of the Cus tom s Courts Act and the A PA. Plainti ffs’ c laims arise fr om the APA, and cha lleng e the statutory basis for, a

nd proce dural fla

ws in the adoption of, the Rese ller Policy . Be cause a cla im under the APAa c c ru e s at th e tim e of “ fi na l a g e nc y

a c tio n, ” 5 U .S. C. § 70 4, fa c ia l c ha lle ng e s to
re g ulatio ns and

c la ims ari sin gfr om a

fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th A PA p ro c e dure s a c c ru e at th e tim e the ru le wa s p ub lis he d, no t w he n th e ru le is a pp lie d to a

pla int if f. Se e Dunn -M c Campb e ll 6Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 13

(...continued) 6 under the two-y ear

statute of limitations i n § 2636(i). I d. at 978. This conclusion implies that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) ma y be had de spite a par

ty ’s fa ilure to meet the f

iling dea dline under § 2 63 6( i) . A s th e Sup re me Court ha s r e c e ntl y

state d, “ ‘[i ]f the L e g isl atur e c le arl y state s th at a thr e sh old lim itatio n o n a

statut e ’s sc op e sh a ll c ount a s juri sd ic tio na l, t he c ourt s a

nd lit ig ants wi ll be duly instructed and w ill not be left to wrestle with the issue.’” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S.Ct . 1397, 1405–06 (2007) ( quoting Ar baug h v. Y& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2 00 6) ); but c .f

. B ow le s v . Ru sse ll, 12 7 S. Ct. 23 60 , 2 36 5 ( 20 07 ) ( in t he c on te xt of

ha be a s c or pu s, distinguishing Arbaugh). The statute of limitations i n question provides that “[a] civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction under se ction 1581 of this titl e, other than an a c tio n s pe c if

ie d in su bs e c tio ns (a )– (h ) o f t

his se c tio n, is b arr e d unle ss c omm e nc e d in acc ordanc e with the rule s of the cour t within two y ear s after

the ca use of a ction first ac crue s.” 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). The statute’s r efe renc e to ac tions of which the cour t “has jurisdiction” be ing barr ed does not c lear ly

state a Cong ressional intent to treat this st atute of limitations as jurisdictional. Defe ndant’s cited c ase pe rtains to the statute of limitations for the Court of F e de ra l Cla ims , a

nd do e s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly me nti on the jur isd ic tio n o f t

his Court un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 1581(i), or the statute of limitations provided for such a ctions in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). See J ohn R. Sa nd & Gr ave l Co . v . U nit e d St ate s, 45 7 F .3 d 1 34 5, 13 54 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 6) (d isc us sin gstatut e of lim itatio ns fo r t

he Court of F e de ra l Cla ims un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 25 01 ). De fe nd ant f a ile d to timely raise the statute of limitations defense, a nd there fore the cour

t finds that affir

mative defe nse wa s waived. Roya lty Inte re st, Inc . v . N at’ l Park Se rv ., 11 2 F .3 d 1 28 3, 12 87 (5 th C ir . 1 99 7) (h old ingthat a fac ial challeng e to re g ulation acc rues whe n the ag ency publishes its rule in the Fede ral Reg ister); Wind Ri ver MiningCorp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 715 ( 9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[i] f a pe rson wishes to cha lleng e a me re pr ocedur al violation in the adoption of a regulation or other a g ency action, the c halleng e must be brought within si x y ear s of the de c isi on ” and

that “ [s]imi larl y , if

the pe rs on

wi sh e s to br inga

po lic y -b a se d f

a c ia l c ha lle ng e to the g ov e rnme nt’ s d e c isi on , th at to o mu st b e br ou g ht w ith in s ix y e ars of the de c isi on ” ). A c la im raisingproce dural objec tions accr ues at the time that the r

ule g oes into eff

ect be cause the rele vant har

m has alre ady

been inf licted: an intere sted party has lost the opportunity

to alter the ag ency ’s dec ision through f ull participation in the regulatory proce ss. See, e.g ., Wind R iver, 94 6 F .2 d at 71 5 ( ho ldi ngthat g ro un ds fo r a c a us e of a c tio n f or fa c ia l or pr oc e dura l c ha lle ng e s toCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 14

a re g ulation “will usually be appa rent to any

interested c itiz en within a six -y ear period following pr omu lg atio n o f t

he de c isi on ” and

be c a us e “ [t]he g ov e rnme nt’ s inte re st i n f ina lity outw e ig hs a late-c omer’s de sire to protest the a g ency ’s ac tion as a matter of policy or proc edure ”); Thr ift Depositors of Am., Inc. v. Of fice of Thrift Super

vision, 862 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D.D.C. 1994) (statingthat a “c halleng e to an a g ency ’s promulg ation of an inter im final rule without notice and comment is a ca se or c ontroversy”) ( citing T enn. Ga s Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Ene rg y Regulatory Comm’n, 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). F urthermor e, enc ourag ing pa rties to file suit as soon
a s a ru le is p ub lis he d p re se rv e s th e c ourt ’s a bil ity to r e mand

in t ime fo r t

he a g e nc y to c or re c t it s
e r r o r s b e f o r e th e n e wp o li c y

h a s b e e ng iv e nw id e s p r e a d r e li an c e . I f

th e c o urt w e r e to r e c o g n iz e that th is c la im c ou ld, and the re fo re mus t, h ave be e n r a ise d und e r § 15 81 (c ), a pa rt y might w a it y ear s befor e it opts not to participate in an a dminist rative r eview. O nly then would it obtain an opportunity

to file a c ase br ief in an a dminist rative r eview to c halleng e the a utomatic application of the Rese ller Policy

to its admit tedly

unrevie wed e ntries, and ther eby eventua lly

obtain revie w of the pr oc e dura l f

laws in t he a do pti on

of the Re se lle r P oli c y . A lth ou g h th e re may be so me
case s where a fa cial or pr ocedur al cha lleng e to a r egulation should be raised in a n administrative revie w, the natur e of Plaintiffs’ obje ctions to the Reseller Policy sug g est that this case doe s not involve a dete rmination within the meaningof 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. Given the pur pose of the Cus tom s Co ur

ts A c t, t o p ro vid e a

“ c omp re he ns ive sy ste m [th at] wi ll e ns ur e g re ate r e ff ic ie nc y in judicial resour ces a

nd uniformity

in the judicial decision makingproce ss,” H.R. Rep. No. 96 -1 23 5, at 20 , th e c ourt

fi nd s th at a

mand ate re qu ir ingPla int if fs to r a ise thi s a

rgume nt i n administrative re view would fa vor proc edura l formality

over the swift resolution of ca ses ripe for a djudication.Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 15 The F eder al Circuit’s holding in Miller is not contra ry to this out come. In that
case , the Fe dera l Circuit considered whether a par ty could bringa cha lleng e to a f inal deter mination in an administrative revie w that was issued outside the statutory time limi t. 824 F .2 d at 96 2. Th e pla int if

f b ro ug ht s uit

un de r § 15 81 (i ), arguin gthat Co mme rc e ’s de c isi on to issue an untimely

final dete rmination was a pr ocedur al matter c oncer ning the administration and enfor ceme nt of the administrative re view, not the substance of the re view itself. I d. at 963–64. Th e c ourt dis a g re e d, ho ldi ngthat “ the pr oc e dura l c or re c tne ss o f a

c ounte rv a ili ngduty deter mination, as well as the mer its, are subjec t to judicial review,” and could be revie wed
un de r § 15 81 (c ). I d. at 96 4. Mil le r i nv olv e d a c ha lle ng e to C omm e rc e ’s fa ilure to c omp ly wi th pr oc e dura l r

ule s in a sp e c if ic a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w, and the c on se qu e nt i nv a lid ity of the re su lts issued pursuant to that re view. In this case, Plaintiffs do not argue that Commerce was incor rec t in a pp lyingthe Re se lle r P oli c y , n or do the y argue that th e F ina l Re su lts are inc on sis te nt w ith Commerce’ s established asse ssment policy , as stated in the Rese ller Policy . Unlike Miller, Pla int if fs make no argume nt c on c e rn ingComme rc e ’s c on du c t du ri ngthe re vie w o r a

uth or ity to iss ue the F ina l Re su lts
.

Nor is this outcome contra ry to this C ourt’s dec ision in American Sig nature , Inc. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (CI T 2007), appe al docke ted No. 2007-1216 ( Fe d. Cir. Mar. 19, 2007) . In that case , the plaintiff filed suit under § 1581(i), see king a

n order requiring Commerce to instruct Customs to assess duties on its unreviewed e ntries at an a mended r ate that had bee n corr ecte d for ministerial er rors, both re trospectively

and prospe ctively . I d. at 1286. Commerce ha d deter

mined, in a prior a dminist rative r eview c oncer ning a simil arly -situated party , that the prope r method of r equestinga re fund for excess duties was to re quest anCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 16

administrative re view, and the n obtain interest on over pay ment of duties base d on the re sults of that revie w pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673f. The pla intiff failed to re quest an a dminist rative revie w to challeng e Commerce ’s pra ctice, instea d filing immediate ly under § 1581( i). The c ourt found that the plaintiff c ould have br oug ht their claim under § 1581(c) , and ther efor e that jurisdiction was unava ilable under § 1581(i). In Americ an Signa ture, howe ver, the plaintiff soug ht to challeng e a le g al deter mination made in the context of an administrative re view. Commerce published no se parate notice or reque st for comment re g ardingthis determination. The Rese ller Policy , in contrast, is a policy announce d following notice and c omment under the APA, and is separ ate f

rom any administrative re view. Even a ssuming that the r efe renc e to the Reseller Policy constituted a leg al conclusion in an a dminist rative r eview, the court disagree s with Defe ndant’s conte ntion that relief under a nother subsec tion of § 1581 must be a virtual impossibil ity befor e a pa

rty may bringsuit under § 1581(i). The Fe dera l Circuit’s treatment of jur isdiction in cases ar ising fr om the unconstitutionality

of the ha rbor maintena

nce tax (“H MT”) illustrates a somewhat broa der view of § 1581( i). In the ca se of U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F .3d 1564 (F ed. Cir. 1997), the c ourt was c alled upon to consider the constitutionality

of the HMT. The plaintiff fi le d u nd e r § 15 81 (i ), but th e de fe nd ant a rgue d th at § 1 58 1( i) jur isd ic tio n w a s unava ila ble beca use U.S. Shoe should have pr otested Customs’s collection of the HMT, which, following denial of that protest, would have le d to jurisdiction under § 1581(a) . I d. at 1568. The c ourt of appea ls disagr eed, f

inding that Customs’s minist eria l acc eptanc e of a n HMT pay

ment involved no “dec ision-making pr ocess,” and ther efor e wa s not a dec ision withi n the meaningof 19 U. S.C. § 1 51 4. I d. at 15 69 . In th e a bs e nc e of § 1 58 1( a ) j ur isd ic tio n, the c ourt he ldCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 17

that § 1581(i) jurisdiction was available. I d. at 1570–71. Subsequently , in Swisher International, I nc. v. United States, 205 F .3d 1358 (F ed. Cir. 2000), the F eder al Circuit held that “[n] either our

decision [in U.S. S hoe] nor that of the Supreme Court . . . rea ched the question of whether section 1581(a ) jurisdiction would have bee n available had a pr otest been f iled and denied f ollowing the f

iling and de nial of a r efund r equest.” I d. at 1364. The c ourt conc luded that “ U. S. Sh oe do e s n ot p re c lud e our c on sid e ra tio n o f s e c tio n 1 58 1( a ) j ur isd ic tio n in thi s c a se wher e a r efund r equest a

nd protest wer e, in turn, filed a nd denied.” I d. The c ourt thus allowed the suit to procee d under 28 U .S.C. § 1581(a) to cha lleng e the de nial of the plaintiff’ s protest of
a de nia l of a re fu nd of its HM T p ay

me nts . I d. at 13 65 . T ake n to g e the r, the se tw o c a se s su g g e st that althoug h the plaintiff in U.S. Shoe could have obtained jurisdiction under § 1581( a) by filing a ref und reque st and protest with Customs, j urisdiction under § 1581(i) was simult aneously

available
. De fe nd ant i mpl ie s th at § 1 58 1( a ) j ur isd ic tio n w a s ava ila ble in S wi sh e r, but no t in U.S. Shoe, beca

use “onc e the HMT ha d been de clar ed unconstitutional, a dete rmination by Cus tom s n ot t o g ra

nt a re fu nd to t he pla int if

f, un lik e a c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to a statut e pla c ingCus tom s in

a min ist e ri a l r ole , w a s a

pr ote sta ble de c isi on .” (D e f. ’s Re ply Sup p. Mo t. t o Dismiss 9.) This argument might have merit if the plaintiff’ s protest in Swisher had be en denied a fter the HMT was de clar ed unconstitutional. Howeve r, in its complaint, Swis her state d that it filed a re fund re quest on September 28, 1994, a nd protested the de nial of that re fund
re qu e st o n N ov e mbe r 2 3, 19 94 . Se e Swi sh e r I nt’ l v. Un ite d St ate s, No . 9 5- 03 -0 03 22 , Co mpl
. ¶¶ 12, 16 ( CI T Mar. 29, 1995) . Customs denied that pr otest on Marc h 26, 1995. See Swisher, 205 F.3d at 1361. This Court did not decla re the HMT unconstitutional until almost sevenCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 18

The c ourt notes that the plaintiff in U.S. Shoe filed suit in this C ourt on Novembe r 3, 7 1994, prior to Customs’s publi cation of a n interim rule g overningprotests. See Use r F ee Protests, 59 Fed. Reg . 60,044, 60,044 (De p’t Tre asury Nov. 21, 1994) (notice of interim rules)
. At that time, Custom s rec og nized only a prote st of pay

ment proce dure, which was inva lidated by U.S. Shoe. The rule w as to provide a protest of the “ calc ulation, collection and de mand for pay ment” of use r fe es under

various statutes, includingthe HMT. See U ser F ee Prote sts, 59 Fed. Re g . at 60 ,0 44 . Re c og nit ion of the re fu nd pr ote st p ro c e dure s b y

the c ourt s a

nd Cus tom s occur red a s a re sult of Swisher. See id., 205 F.3d at 1364–65. Nonetheless, the r efund r oute was decla red to have existed, a previously unsettled route to jurisdiction, but not an impossibl e one. Thus, U.S. Shoe could have f iled a re fund re quest and prote st prior to Custom s’s publication of specific g uidance on the matter. months later, on Octobe r 25, 1995, U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 19 CI T 1284, 907 F. Supp. 408 (1995), a

nd the Supreme Court did not aff irm that finding until Marc h 31, 1998, United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). Swisher’s prote st was filed a nd denied long befor e the HMT w as dec lare d unconstitutional by any court. The court c an disce rn no re ason why a re fu nd re qu e st w a s n ot a lso an ave nu e to j ur isd ic tio n f or the pla int if

f i n U .S. Sho e . T hu s, the c ourt fi nd s th at th e tim ingof

the tw o c a se s d oe s n ot r e so lve the jur isd ic tio na l ano ma ly prese nted by

the Fe dera l Circuit’s treatment of the se cha lleng es to the HMT. 7 Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit ’s re a so nin gin S wi sh e r p oints t o s e ve ra l f a c tor s th at g ave ri se to § 1581(i) jurisdiction in U.S. S hoe. The Fe dera l Circuit recognized its holding in Miller that § 1 58 1( i) is n ot a

va ila ble wh e n a

no the r j ur isd ic tio na l pr ov isi on wa s o r c ou ld h ave be e n u se d to g a in r e lie f, but ne ve rt

he le ss h e ld t

hat it s f ind ingin U .S. Sho e did

“ no t c on tr ol s ub se qu e nt s uit s
asser ting similar cha lleng es but in differ ent proc edura l postures.” Swisher, 205 F .3d at 1364. Ins te a d, the c ourt

e xpla ine d th at it s “ ho ldi ngin M ill e r ( and oth e r d e c isi on s) [wa s] me ant m e re ly to preve nt a par

ty from asse rting residual ( subsection (i)) jurisdiction when jurisdiction under
ano the r s ub se c tio n w ou ld b e a pp ro pr iate .” I d. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Pa rt ie s c ha lle ng ingthe HM TCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 19

could ar rive in cour

t via more than one “proc edura l path,” in par t beca use “it appe ar[ed] that there was much c onfusion in Custom s and amongexporters as to the prope r proc edure for challeng ing the constitutionalit y of the HMT.” I d. at 1364–65. I t appea rs that the U.S. Shoe plaintiffs could have filed a r efund r equest a nd protest, but the Fe dera l Circuit found that “there was not one obvious jurisdictional basis that this court could have require d the U.S. Shoe plaintiff to use.” I d. The c ourt finds the re asoningof Swisher pe rsuasive he re. L ike U.S. Shoe, the re is n o s ing le ob vio us jur isd ic tio na l ba sis that w ou ld b e mos t a pp ro pr iate in t

he se circ umstances. Nor

is it clear, a s a proc edura l matter, that a c halleng e to a r egulatory policy g overningthe automatic liquidation of entrie s not covere d by an administrative r eview must be broug ht to the attention of an a g ency in an administrative re view. Def endant a rgues that application of § 1581(i) jurisdiction would forc e the c ourt to r e vie w s imi lar a g e nc y

de te rm inatio ns un de r d isp arate sta nd ard s o f r e vie w. (D e f. ’s Re ply in Supp. Mot. t o Dismiss 13–14.) Defe ndant claims that, under the cour t’s analy sis, if Comm erc e
wer e to find in an a dminist rative r eview that a re seller wa s aff iliated with its producer, the
rese ller would be r equire d to challeng e that dete rmination in the context of that administ rative revie w. (I d. at 13.) A subse quent cour t challeng e to that deter

mination would be broug ht under § 1581(c) , subject to the substantial evidenc e standa rd of r eview. ( I d.) In contra st, Defe ndant argues, if Commerce wer e to deter mine in an administrative re view that a r eseller was not aff iliated with a produc er, that reseller would not be re quired to bringa cha lleng e in the administrative re view. (I d. at 14.) Instead, it would immediately file suit under § 1581(i) , su bje c t to the arb itr ary

and c a pr ic iou s st and ard

of re vie w. (I d. ) D e fe nd ant’ s a rgume nt f a ils to distinguish the ty

pe of c halleng e involved in the above hy pothetical and the challeng e pre sentedCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 20

in this case. A r eseller ’s suit seekingto overturn Commerc e’s f inding that it was una ffiliated with a produc er w ould constitute a cha lleng e to a f actua l determination made in administrative revie w, which is amongthe deter minations enumerate d in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)( 2)(B ). Unlike Def endant’ s hy

pothetical, the c halleng e in this case is not direc ted to a fa ctual or le g al deter mination Com merc e made in the course of the F inal Results, but t o the consistency of the Reseller Policy with Comm erc e’s r egulations and the APA.

Acc ording ly , the cour

t finds that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U .S.C. § 1581(i). In c a se s b ro ug ht u

nd e r § 15 81 (i ), the c ourt

is d ir e c te d to “ re vie w the matte r a s p ro vid e d in section 706 of title 5.” 28 U.S.C. § 2640(e) . Section 706 direc ts the court to “hold unlawf ul and set a side ag ency

action . . . found to be . . . arbitra ry , capr icious, an abuse of discre tion, or oth e rw ise no t in

a c c or da nc e wi th l aw. ” 5 U .S. C. § 70 6( 2) (A ). Ty pic a lly , a g e nc y

a c tio n is
arb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s “ if

the a g e nc y

ha s r e lie d o n f

a c tor s w hic h Co ng re ss h a s n ot i nte nd e d it to consider, e ntirely

failed to c onsider an importa nt aspec t of the problem, of fer ed an
e xplanatio n f

or its de c isi on

that r un s c ounte r t o th e e vid e nc e be fo re the a g e nc y , o r i s so implausible that it could not be ascribe d to a diffe renc e in view or the produc t of ag ency expertise.” Motor Ve hicle Mfr s. Ass’n of the U .S., I nc. v. State F arm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Discussion A. The ResellerP olicy is Not Inconsistent w ith 19 C.F .R. § 351.212(c ).

Pla int if fs argue that th e Re se lle r P oli c y is i rr e c on c ila

bly inc on sis te nt w ith Commerce’ s regulation gove rningthe automatic liquidation of antidumping duties, located at 19Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 21

C.F.R. § 351.212(c) . Under that regulation, “[i] f a r eview is not re quested, duties ar e asse ssed at the rate established in the c ompleted re view cove ringthe most rece nt prior per iod or, if no revie w has be en complete d, the ca sh deposit rate a pplicable at the time mercha ndise was enter ed.” I d. § 351.212(a) . As noted above , the re g ulation provides that “[i] f the Sec reta ry does not rec eive a

timely reque st for an a dminist rative r eview of an orde r . . . the Sec reta

ry , without additional notice, will instruct the Customs S ervic e to. . . [a]s sess antidumping duties or counter vailing duties . . . at rates e qual to the ca sh deposit . . . require d on that merc handise at the time of entry .” I d. § 351.212(c) (1). Similarly , if Commerce “re ceive s a timely reque st for
an a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w o f a n o rd e r, ” it w ill ins tr

uc t “ the Cus tom s Se rv ic e to a sse ss
anti dumpi ngdutie s o r c ounte rv a ili ngdutie s . . . on the me rc ha

nd ise no t c ov e re d b y

the re qu e st in acc ordanc e with par ag raph ( c)( 1) of this section.” I d. § 351.212(c) (2).

Plaintiffs contend that whe n a re quest for r eview is made , but a re seller is not named in the r equest for

an administrative r eview, the rese ller’s e ntries must be liquidated at the cash de posit rate re quired at entry in acc ordanc e with § 351.212(c )(1) . Plaintiffs’ argument relies on the a ssumption t hat if no re view wa s reque sted for the rese ller, then none of its entries
wer e “c overe d by

the re quest” for

revie w of a

n order . That assumption ignor es the situation that the Reseller

Policy is designe d to addre ss. When a revie w of a produce r is reque sted, Comme rc e may

sti ll b e a c tin gun de r t

he a ssumpt ion

that th e pr od

uc e r i s a wa re of the ult imate destination of its sales to the rese ller. Thus, at the time the r eview w as re quested, the r eseller ’s
e ntr ie s w e re c ov e re d b y

the re qu e st t o r e vie w the pr od uc e r’ s sa le s to the Un ite d St ate s a nd to identified re sellers. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c )(2) applies only to entries that ar e not cove red by the reque st for the re view; it say s nothing a bout entries that we re c overe d by the re quest for r eview,Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 22

but are not within the scope of the f inal results of the r eview. T he Reseller Policy fills this g ap in the regulation and is theref ore not inher ently

inconsistent with 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c). Plaintiffs argue that the a ll others rate is often a less a ccur ate r efle ction of the
rese ller’s a ctual pric es, and the ref ore a less “prope r” r ate than the produce r’s c ash deposit rate. (Pls.’ Mot. for J . on the Ag ency R. 16–17.) Acc urate or not, requir ing Commerc e to liquidate an unaff iliated rese ller’s e ntries at its produce r’s c ash deposit rate per petuates Commerc e’s use of a false a ssumption. I f Commerce had per fec t information at the time the ca sh deposit rate w as
se t, u na ff ili ate d r e se lle rs wo uld

have po ste d c a shde po sit s at th e a ll o the rs ra te , n ot at th e ir produce rs’ ra

tes. Whil e, idea lly , Commerce w ould determine whether a produc er kne w of the destination of its sales to rese llers duringthe initial antidumping investig ation, Commerce ha s
c ho se n to a

pp ly its re so ur c e s e lse wh e re . T o r e qu ir e Comme rc e to a dh e re to a pr od uc e r’ s c a sh de po sit rate in l iqu idatin ge ntr ie s, e ve n a ft e r i t di sc ov e rs that th e a ssumpt ion up on wh ic h th e us e of that rate was ba sed is false, w ould not result in the rate the rese ller should have r ece ived, i.e., the “pr oper r ate.” See Mittal, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (“ [I ]twould be strang e indee d to prefe r assessment at the de posit rate whe n the produc er’ s administrative revie w will determine what the appr opriate a ssessment rate is based on the pr oducer ’s testimony relating to the dispositive fac tor: i.e., whethe r the produc er kne w that the mer chandise sold to the reseller was de stined for the U.S. marke t.”). Unde r the Rese ller Policy , Commerce ha s chosen to apply the rate the
rese ller would have been a ssigne d had Commerce initially known that the re seller, r ather than the produc er, w as the fir st party in the commerc ial chain to know of the destination of the
merc handise. Use of the a ll others rate most closely adher es to Commerce ’s policy of setting antidumping duty

rate s based on the f

irst entity in the commerc ial chain that ha s knowledg e ofCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 23

the destination of the subjec t mercha ndise. Thus, the all others r ate is the “ proper ” rate. B. The Re se lle r P oli c y is notAr bit r ar y o r Ca pr ic iou s

Plaintiffs also contend that the Rese ller Policy is inconsistent with t he purpose of the 1984 Act, a

nd is theref

ore a rbitrar y , capr icious, and otherw ise not in acc ordanc e with law. As Pla int if

fs no te , th e 19 84 Ac t w a s d e signe d to lim it the numbe r o f a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie ws in which intere sted parties e x presse d littl e or no inter est. H.R. Rep. No. 98-1156, a t 181 (Conf. Rep.) (statingthat the amendme nt to 19 U.S.C . § 1675 “is desig ned to limit t he number of revie ws in case s in which there is lit tle or no intere st, thus li miting the burde n on petitioners and responde nts, as well as the a dminist eringauthority”). Cong ress c hose to eff ect this policy

by requiringinterested pa

rties to reque st reviews dur ing the anniver sary month of a g iven antidumping or

counter vailing duty

order . See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a). Plaintiffs contend that Commerce’ s former

prac tice, automatica lly

assessingduties at a produc er’ s cash de posit rate for unaff iliated rese llers that lack a rate of their own, is more eff ective tha n the Reseller

Policy at reduc ing the number of r equests for administrative re views. Unde r the Rese ller Policy , a
rese ller is more likely

to reque st a revie w to protec t its i ntere sts in the event that Commerce de te rm ine s th at it s e ntr ie s are no t c ov e re d b y the re qu e st f

or a re vie w o f i ts p ro du c e r. Thus , Pla int if fs argue that Co mme rc e c ann ot d e ri ve a uth or ity to i ssu e a po lic y that w ill e ff

e c tiv e ly incre ase the number of a dminist rative r eviews f rom an Ac t desig ned to re duce the number of revie ws. Commerce a g ree s that the number of administrative re views, vis-a- vis the prior policy , may

incre ase. See Reseller N otice, 63 F ed. Reg . at 55,363. Compared to pr e-1984 A ctCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 24

prac tice, howe ver, the Reseller Policy will sti ll result in a reduc tion in the number of re views. Th e Re se lle r P oli c y

do e s n ot u

nd e rm ine Con g re ss’ s inte nt t o c re ate a vo luntary

re vie w s y ste m to repla ce the old sy stem of automatic r eviews. I ndeed, the leg islative history of the 1984 Ac t ind ic ate s th at Co ng re ss i nte nd e d to a llo w C omm e rc e to r e g ulate the are a of a uto matic assessments. See H .R. Rep. 98-1156, at 181 (1984) (Conf. Rep.) ( stating that Comm erc e “should provide by

regulation for the a ssessment of antidumping and counte rvailingduties on entries f or which r eview is not re quested, includingthe elimination of suspension of liquidation, and/or the c onversion of c ash deposits of estimated duties, pr eviously order ed”) . Commerce must balance a number

of compe ting policy

conce rns in fashioningits assessment regulations. See Reseller

Policy , 68 Fe d. Reg . at 23,957 (discussingconce rns that re sellers may “mar g inshop” and statingthat incentives a re ne eded to pr omote acc urate marg in calculations). Plainti ffs
c ite Con g re ss’ s o bv iou s c on c e rn wi th a dmi nis tr ativ e e ff

ic ie nc y in t he 19 84 Ac t, b ut t

he re is nothing in the 1984 Ac t to sugg est that Congr ess intended to subordinate all other g oals, such as the c on sis te nt t

re atme nt o f s imi larl y

sit uate d r e se lle rs and

the pr e ve nti on

of ra te manip ulatio n, to the g oal of re ducingthe number of administrative re views. Consequently , Commerce did not rely on fac tors Congr ess did not intend it to consider, or ig nore a n important aspec t of the problem in issuing the Rese ller Policy
.

Pla int if fs c la im that th e le g isl ativ e his tor y of the 19 84 Ac t “ e xpre sse d Co ng re ss’ intention” to limi t Comm erc e’s discr etion in cre atingautomatic liquidation regulations. (Pls.’ Mo t. f or J. onthe Ag e nc y

R. 1 0. ) S pe c if

ic a lly , Pl a int if

fs argue that Co ng re ss i nte nd e d to preve nt Comm erc e fr om cre atingan automatic a ssessment regulation that provides for othe r than the “e limination of suspension of liqui dation, and/or the c onversion of c ash deposit[s] ofCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 25

estimated duties, pre viously order ed.” I d. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-1156, at 181 (Conf. Re p. )) . E ve n a ssumin gthat th is l angua g e wo uld re qu ir e Comme rc e to f

a sh ion a uto matic liq uid atio n r e g ulatio ns that li qu idate on ly at th e rate fo r “ pr e vio us ly or de re d” c a shde po sit s, thi s argument fails for the same re ason the Rese ller Policy is not inconsist ent with the exist ing automatic asse ssment regulations. The cited leg islative history applies only

to “entrie s for which re view is not reque sted.” I d. The leg islative history does not contemplate the treatment of entrie s which we re subjec t to the reque st for an a dminist rative r eview, but a re not c overe d by the fi na l r e su lts . Co mme rc e ha s a uth or ity to f ill g a ps in a le g isl ativ e sc he me it i s e ntr us te d to administer, eve n wher e Cong ress ha s not provided a dire ct statement de leg atingrulemaking authority . See Vira

j Group v. United States, 476 F .3d 1349, 1357 (F ed. Cir. 2007) (c iting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De f. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)) (discussing implicit delega

tion of rulemakingauthority ). Plaintiffs also argue that the r egulation “fa ils to consider an important aspe ct of the pr ob le m” by

inc re a sin gre se lle rs ’ u

nc e rt a int y a s to wh e the r t

he y sh ou ld r e qu e st
a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie ws . ( Pls. ’ M ot. fo r J. o n th e Ag e nc y R. 2 3– 24 .) Ac c or din gto P la int if fs , prior to the Reseller

Policy , an unaf

filiated re seller kne w with cer tainty that its entries would be liquidated at the rate at which the y wer e ente red, a

bsent a re quest for r eview of that rese ller. Under the new sy stem, by

contra st, a rese ller that has be en assumed to be aff iliated with a produce r does not know whe ther its entries will be liquidated at the cash de posit rate until after the c los e of

re qu e sts fo r r e vie w. I f a

re qu e st f or re vie w i s ma de of

a pr od uc e r, the re se lle r w ill not know what its liquidation rate will be until Com merc e dete rmines whethe r the produc er knew, or should have known, that sales to the re seller we re de stined for the United States.Court No. 06-00289 Pag e 26 The Rese ller Policy

does incre ase the uncer

tainty fac ed by rese llers that have not
e sta bli sh e d th e ir

status a s a ff

ili ate d o r u

na ff ili ate d. Comme rc e a c kn ow le dg e d th is o utc ome in publishing the Rese ller Policy , see Rese ller Notice , 63 Fe d. Reg . at 55,364, but deter mined that the policy was justified despite that a dded imposition. S o long a s a re seller c ontinues to rely on Comme rc e ’s ini tia l a ssumpt ion that it is a ff ili ate d w itha

g ive n p ro du c e r, that r e se lle r w ill
rema in vulnerable to Comm erc e’s de termination that its assumption i s faulty . In such a c ase, howeve r, a r eseller ’s position is no worse than it would have be en had Commerc e investig ated the re se lle r i n th e or ig ina l inve sti g atio n. At wo rs t, t he Re se lle r P oli c y

inc re a se s r e se lle rs ’
uncer tainty about whethe r they

will continue to be elig ible for the unde serve d benef it of
c la imi nga

pr od uc e r’ s r ate to whic h th e y

are no t e nti tle d. Mo re ov e r, if a re se lle r w ish e s to avo id the unce rtainty

that Commerce w ill review the nature of its re lationship with a producer , the
re se lle r m ay

re qu e st a n a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w o f i ts o wn e ntr ie s, and

ob ta in a c a shde po sit

rate specific to it. I f, at the e nd of the a nniversar y month, it appears that no r equest ha s been ma de for the pr oducer

in question, the rese ller may withdraw its re quest. Plaintiffs are corr ect that the Re se lle r P oli c y

wi ll f or c e many

re se lle rs to e xpe nd

re so ur c e s to be mor e vig ila nt t o r e qu e st a revie w if they

wish to avoid application of the a ll others rate . Neve rtheless, be cause the Reseller Policy provides ince ntives for re sellers to obtain rates specif ic to themselves, rather than r elying on a potentially

faulty assumption by

Commerce, the uncer

tainty introduced by

the Reseller Policy is not arbitrary

or ca pricious. C. P lai nt iffs’ Al le ge d P r oc e dur al E r r or s W e r e Har m le ss

Pla int if fs a lso argue that th e Re se lle r P oli c y is v oid be c a us e it w a s n ot p a sse d in
acc ordanc e with the proc edura l require ments of the APA g overningthe publication ofCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 27

re g ulatio ns . ( Pls. ’ M ot. fo r J. o n th e Ag e nc y R. 1 9– 20 .) Th e APAre qu ir e s a g e nc ie s to c omp ly with the various proc edura l require ments when issuing new “ substantive” or “ leg islative” rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). The se proc edura l require ments g ener ally include a “ notice of proposed r

ule making. . . published in the Fe dera l Reg ister,” a nd an opportunity

for “ interested persons” to submit“wr itten data, views, or arguments.” I d. § 553(b)–( c). An ag ency is require d to consider the c omments it receive s and publish a final rule toge ther with a “ statement of . . . basis and purpose ” explaining the r ationale f or its decision. I d. § 553(c) . The APA provide s an
e x c e p t i o n , h o w e v e r , f

r o mth i s r e qu i r e m e n tf

o r “ i n t e r p r e t at i v e r

u l e s , g e n e r a l s t at e m e n t s o f p o l i c y, or rules of

ag ency org anization, procedur e, or pr actice ,” ofte n called “ interpre tive rules.” I d. § 553(b). Al tho ugh th e Re se lle r P oli c y purp or ts t o b e a “ c lari fi c atio n” of

19 C.F .R. § 3 53 .2 12 , Pl a int if

fs argue that it

is a le g isl ativ e ru le . In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a ru le is “leg islative” or “ interpre tative” in cha rac ter, the F eder al Circuit has held that “ ‘substantive rules’ . . . e ffe ct a c hang e in exist ing la w or policy

or . . . af fec t individual rights and obligations,” while “‘[i]nt erpr etive rule s’ . . . clar ify or explain ex isting law or regulations.” P ar al y z edVe t er an s o f A m . v . W es t , 1 3 8 F. 3 d 1 4 3 4 , 1 4 3 6 (F ed
. C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Or en go Cara ba llo v. Re ic h, 11 F .3 d 1 86 , 1 95 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 3) ) ( oth e r c itatio ns omi tte d) . A c c or din gto the Fe dera l Circuit, “‘[a]n i nterpre tive statement simply indicates a

n ag ency ’s re adingof a statute or a r

ule. I t does not intend to crea te new r ights or duties, but only reminds af

fec ted pa rt ie s o f e xistin gdutie s. ’” I d. (q uo tin gOr e ng o Ca

ra ba llo , 1 1 F .3 d at 14 36 ); se e a lso Am
. Fr ozen Food Inst., I nc. v. United States, 18 CI T 565, 573, 855 F. Supp. 388, 396 (1994) (“[S] ubstantive or leg islative-ty pe rule s are those which re late to and c hang e the standa rds ofCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 28

conduct, a

nd have f orce of law.” ). Thus, if a r ule “a dopts ‘a new

position i nconsistent with’ an exis ting r egulation, or eff ects ‘a substantive chang e in the re g ulation,’ notice a nd comment ar e require d.” U.S. Tele com Ass’n v. F .C.C., 400 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quotingShalala v. Guer nsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995)) (empha sis omit ted). This does not mea n that
ani n t e r p r e t at i v e r

u l e mu s tb e d e v o i d

o f a l l s i g n i f i c an c e ; ani n t e r

p r e t i v e r u l e m ay “ ‘ s u

p p l [ y] crisper and more detailed lines than the authority beinginterpre ted.’” Ore ng o Caraba llo, 11 F.3d at 195 (quoting A m. Mining Cong . v. Mine Safety & H ealth Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 3) ). Thus , a c lari fi c atio n ma

y pr omp t a pa rt y to b e ha ve dif fe re ntl y fr om h owit would have a cted in the a bsence of interpr etive guidance
. Turningto the policy

at hand, the c ourt finds that the Reseller Policy is not a new position i nconsistent with the exis ting r egulation at 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c) . As discussed above, the Reseller Policy applies to entries that are cover ed by the re quest for a

revie w, but are not cover ed by

the final re sults of the review . I t fills a ga p in the exis ting r egulatory scheme , but does not alter the way

in which § 351.212 g overns liquidation of entrie s which we re not c overe d by a re quest for r eview. Similarly , beca use 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c ) does not addr ess the treatment of entries f

or which a

reque st was made, but a

re not include d in the final re sults of an administrative re view, the Rese ller Policy does not eff

ect a “substantive cha

ng e” in the regulation’s provisions.

Plaintiffs’ argument would require the cour t to conclude that Commerc e ca nnot
a lte r i ts e sta

bli sh e d p ra c tic e of

liq uid atin gun a ff

ili ate d r e se lle rs ’ e ntr ie s at th e ir pr od uc e rs ’ c a sh deposit rate w ithout comply ing w ith APA procedur es, eve n if the for mer pra ctice w as not adopted in a f

ormal policy

statement. Althoug h many case s have r equire d a showingthat a priorCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 29

Thus, the cour

t does not adher e to its prior opinion denying Plaintiffs’ r equeste d 8 pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n, Park da le Int’ l, _ _ F . Su pp . 2 d at __ , Sl ip O p. 7- 72 , to the e xtent th at it conclude s that the Reseller Policy is an interpre tive rule. interpre tation was for

mally adopted by

an ag ency

befor e a subse quent cha

ng e may be subjec ted to APA require ments, some case s have sug g ested that a longsta nding pr actice is sufficient. Compare Par aly

zed Veter ans of Am. v. D.C. Ar ena L .P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (f inding that g overnme nt was not requir ed to provide notice and comment to cha ng e its interpre tation of
a re g ulation beca

use it never

authoritatively

adopted a

contra ry interpre tation) with Alaska Prof’l Hunter s Ass’n v. F.A .A., 177 F.3d 1030, 1031 ( D.C. Cir. 1999) (findingthat interpre tation followed for almost thirty

y ear s, and af

firmed in ag ency

adjudication, constituted an author itative interpre tation that could not be alter ed without notice and c omment rulemaking ); see a lso Shell Offshore Inc. v. B abbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001) ( finding that a cha ng e in “longestablished and c onsistent practice that substantially aff ects the r egulated ind us tr y ” wa s su bje c t to APAno tic e and

c omm e nt r e qu ir e me nts ). Th e c ourt no te s th at, althoug h Commerce ha s not published a prior interpr etation of this rule, it has fr equently issued instructions to Cus toms following administrative r eviews r efle ctingits prior prac tice. See supr a p. 6 and note 2. Unde r the Rese ller Policy , Commerce r ecognizes that resellers w ould fac e a g re ate r o bli g atio n to mon ito r t he re qu e sts fo r r e vie w o f t he ir pr od uc e rs ’ e ntr ie s, and

to r e qu e st revie ws of themselve s if nece ssary . See Reseller Notice, 63 F ed. Reg . at 55,363. The c ourt need not r esolve this question, howeve r, bec ause Plaintiffs have failed to a rgue that they

wer e harme d in any

way by Commerce’ s failure to follow cer tain aspec ts of the APA. 8 Even a ssuming that Commerce ’s long standing prac tice constitutes anCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 30

authoritative interpr etation of 19 C.F.R. § 351.212, the r ule is not automatically

invalid. J udicial re view under

the APA is conducte d with “due a ccount . . . of the rule of

prejudicia l
err or.” 5 U .S.C. § 706; Interc arg o Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 394 (F ed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that principles of ha rmless err or apply

to the revie w of a g ency

proce eding s.”). Thus, even if

Commerce should have labe led the Reseller Policy a re g ulation, rather

than a “cla rification,” if it complied with all material re quirements for the publication of a

leg islative rule, the policy

should not be voided. As noted, under

ordinary circ umstances the A PA require s an ag ency to provide
no tic e and

an o pp or tun ity fo r i nte re ste d p art ie s to c omm e nt o n a pr op os e d r e g ulatio n. I t is
re qu ir e d to c on sid e r s ub mis sio ns and iss ue a state me nt o f b a sis and

purp os e e xpla ini ngwhy

it
se ttl e d o n th e fi na l le g isl ativ e ru le . In th is c a se , Co mme rc e a pp e ars to h ave take n g re at pa ins to comply with these re quirements. In 1998, Commerce published a notice in the F eder al Reg ister i d en t i fy i n g th e p ro p o s edi n t er p re t at i o nan d

re qu es t i n g co m m en t s . R es el l er No t i ce , 6 3 Fe d
. R eg. at 55,361. I t then extended the comment per iod for the pr oposed cla rification on November 12, 1998, to allow for r ebuttal ar g uments from intere sted parties. Antidumping and Counterva iling Duty Procee dings: Asse ssment of Antidumping Duties, 63 F ed. Reg . 63,288, 63,288 (De p’t Commerce N ov. 12, 1998) (r ebuttal per iod for comments on policy conce rningassessment of
anti dumpi ngdutie s) . T he tim e fo r c omm e nt w a s e xten de d a g a in i n 2 00 2, to p ro vid e a la st opportunity

for c omment “[g]iven the passag e of time since the publication of the Propose d Clarification.” Antidumping and Counter vailing D uty

Procee dings: Asse ssment of Antidumping Duties, 67 F ed. Reg . 13,599, 13,599 (De p’t Commerce Mar. 25, 2002) (notice of additional comment per iod on proposed policy ). Publication of the fina l clarific ation wasCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 31

acc ompanied by

a deta iled discussion and response to the comments and re buttals submit ted by the par ties, including c omments rece ived af ter the of ficial e nd of the orig inal comment per iod. Se e 68 F e d. Re g . at 23 ,9 54 (“ [W]e h ave de c ide d to c on sid e r a nd re sp on d to a ll c omm e nts in order to allow for a

thoroug h analy sis of this is sue.”)
. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not attempt to argue that Commerce failed to provide notice of the pr op os e d c la

ri fi c atio n a

nd an o pp or tun ity to c omm e nt o n it . Ins te a d, Pla int if fs no te that a regulation should be labeled a “notice of

proposed r

ulemaking ” and listed in the semiannua l
a g e nd a of re g ulatio ns in t

he F e de ra l Re g ist e r. (P ls. ’ C omb ine d Re sp . to De f. ’s Mo t. t o D ism iss and Reply

Br . in Supp. Mot . for J. on the Ag ency R. 15.) As the Court of Appe als for the District of Columbia Circuit rece ntly noted, “the la

bel, howeve r, is not fatal.” U.S. Telec om Ass’n, 400 F .3d at 40. In that case , the FCC issued a “ decla ratory ruling ” that alter ed the e x tent of telephone companies’ obligations to provide consumers with portable telephone numbe rs. I d.
at 32 –3 3. Th e D. C. C ir c uit fo un d th at th e de c larator y ru lin ge ff

e c te d a su bs tanti ve c ha

ng e in policy , and ther efor e should have been tr eate d as a le g islative rule under the APA. I d. at 38. Neve rtheless, the D .C. Circuit refused to invalidate the rule be cause the FCC had pr ovided
no tic e and

op po rt un ity to c omm e nt o n th e pr op os e d r uli ng , h a d e xpla ine d it s r e a so nin gin i ts final dec ision, and the plaintiffs had not pointed to any harm flowingfrom proc edura l defic iencies in the r

ulemakingproce ss. I d. at 40–42. Fa ilure to label the le g islative rule in the semiannual a g enda did not pre judice the plaintiffs, a

nd there fore was not g rounds to void the FCC’s policy . I d. at 41.

Simi larly , in this case, Plaintiffs have not stated that they wer e pre judiced in any
wa y by the fa ilure to l a

be l th e “ c lari fi c atio n” a s a “ pr op os e d r

ule ,” and the c ourt wi ll n ot r uleCourt No. 06-00289 Pag e 32

that su c h a

fa ilure wi ll a

uto matic a lly

vo id C omm e rc e ’s po lic y . Pl a int if fs a lso argue that in pu bli sh inga ne w l e g isl ativ e ru le , a

n a g e nc y is r e qu ir e d to state wh e the r t he ru le c omp lie s w ith various statutes and e x ecutive or ders, includingthe Regulatory Flexibili ty

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602, and Executive Orde r Number 12,866. (Pls.’ Combined Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and Reply Br . in Supp. Mot . for J. on the Ag ency R. 15.) Plaintiffs ex pressly stated at ora l argument that they

have suf fer ed no pre

judice as a

result of Commerc e’s f

ailure to state whether the Reseller

Policy complies with these re quirements. (See Ora l Arg . Tr. 7:15–21, May 30, 20 07 .) Un de r t

he se c ir c ums ta

nc e s, any e rr or wa s a dmi tte dly

ha rm le ss, and

c ann ot s e rv e a s a basis to void the Reseller Policy
. Conclusion

For the re asons stated a

bove, the c ourt finds that the Reseller Policy is not arbitra ry , capr icious, or otherw ise inconsistent with law. Consequently , Plaintiffs’ Motion for J udg ment on the Ag ency

Record is DEN I ED. Judgment will issue for the De fenda nt.

/s/ Jane A. Re sta

ni J ane A . Restani C h i ef J u d ge Dated: This 8th day

of August, 2007. New Y ork, Ne w YorkUNITED STAT ES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________ : PARKDAL E I

NTERNATI ONAL , L TD., : RI VERVI EW S TEEL

CO., L TD., and : SAMUEL , SON & CO., L TD., : : Pla int if fs , :

: Be fo re : J an e A
. R es t an i , C h i ef J u d ge an d : : Court No. 06-00289 RUSS ELMETAL S EXPORT, : : Plaintiff-Interve nor, :

: v . : : UN I TE D ST AT ES, : : Def endant. : ____________________________________: J UDGMENT This case havingbeen submitted for decision and the court, a fter de liberation, havingrende red a

decision there in; now, in conformity with that decision, I T I S HEREBY ORDERED that Defe ndant’s Motion to Dismis s is DENI ED. Pla int if fs ’ M oti on

fo r Jud g me nt o n th e Ag e nc y Re c or d is DENI ED . Co ns e qu e ntl y , ju dg me nt i senter ed in favor of De fenda nt and all re maining motions are DENI ED as moot.

/s/ J ane A. Re sta

ni J ane A . Restani C h i ef J u d ge Dated: This 8th day

of August, 2007. New Y ork, Ne w York.