### NUM BER 13-09- 0021 6-CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C OR P U S C H R I S T I - E D I N B U R G IN THE INTEREST OF I. E. W., A CHILD On ap pe al f rom th e C ou nty C ou rt atL aw No . 1 of C alh ou n Co un ty , T exas . 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON Be fo re C hie f J us tice Vald ez an d Ju stice s Ga rza an d Be na v ide s

M em o ra n d u m Op in io n b y J u st ic e Ga rza Appel lan t, J.G ., chal len g es the t ri al cour t’ s d eni al of his moti on to v acat e a tem pora ry

protec t ive o rder prohib iting him f rom h aving any contact wi th his da ughter, I.E. W ., a c hil d. J.G . arg ues by three iss ues that the tr ial co urt er re d i n deny ing hi s mot ion to v acat e. W e aff ir m in par t and rev erse and render i n par t. I. B A CKGRO UND I.E. W
. wa s born on Februa ry 5, 200 3. On Dece mb er 8, 20 04, I.E.W .’s mot her, S.W ., filed a pe ti ti on to es tabl is h J.G .’ s parentag e of I .E.W
. The pet it ion w as acc ompani ed by a s tatem e n t of pate rn ity sw or n to by

J. G. in w hic h he ack now led g ed th at he i s t he biological fath er of

I.E.W . J.G . and S.W . later con sent ed to a f inal de cree, da ted Janu ary 25, 200 5, est ablishin g J.G.’s p a re n tage, awarding S.W . the ex clusiv e rig ht to estab lish I.E. W .’s residence , and provi ding thatJ.G. w ould h ave visi tatio n w ith I.E. W . “as mut uallyT he a gr eed or der changed I
. E. W
. ’ s nam e by app endi ng J. G
. ’ s sur nam e t her et o. For conv eni ence, 1 we wi l l r ef er t o t he ch i l d as I
. E. W
. , whi ch ar e t he i ni t i al s of hernam e as used i n t he t r i al cour t pr oceedi ngs, rat he r t ha n I
. E
. W
. -G
. , w hi c h a re t he i ni t i al s of he r l eg al na m e a c c ord i ng t o t he Ja nu ary 25 , 20 05 orde r. 2 ag re ed by the par

ti es. ” Si nce that ti me, I.E. W
. has re si ded w it h her mother and mater nal 1 grand mo the r, D.W ., at D.W .’s hou se in Sea drif t, T exas. For tw o y ears, th e pa rties w ere able to arrange, by mutu al agreem ent , period ic v isits fo r I.E.W . w ith he r fa the r. On M ay 30, 2007, J.G . f il ed a peti ti on w it h the tri al cour t to m odi fy the 2 005 ag re ed order to prov ide thatJ. G. w oul d hav e standard v is it ati on w it h I. E.W
. J.G . l ater fil ed an a m ended p eti ti on c ontai nin g an a ddi ti onal req uest thathe b e appoi nted joi nt manag ing cons er v ator of the c hil d. After a hear ing , t he tr ial co urt aw ard e d J .G
. jointmanag ing cons er v atorshi p and ordered standard v is it ati on to be ph ased in. See T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 153. 312 ( Ver non Su pp. 2 009)
. Spec ific all y , J .G. w as aw ard e d t w o i nit ial w eeken ds of overni g ht v is it ati on w it h I. E.W . i n Oc tober 2007, w it h s tandard v is it ati on to st art at T han ksgiv ing of

thaty ear. Acc ording to J.G ., he and S.W . enj oy ed a “g ood” rela ti onshi p pr ior to his se eki ng stan dard visitation, b ut the rela tionsh ip “dete riorated ” af terw ard. J.G. alleges th at, a lmo st immedi atel y

after he first re q uest ed s tandard v is it ati on, S .W . and D .W . “ made a s er ies of unsuc ces sful ini ti al attempt s at g etti ng [cr imi nal ] charg es filed ag ain st [J. G.] and hi s fia ncée [ K
. G
. ] , a n d li m it in g h is vis it a t io n . ” F o r e xa m p le , J. G
. n o t e d t h a tS
. W
. a t t e m p t e d t o h a ve sta lk ing ch arg es filed ag ain st him based so lel y on h is “ dr iv ing f ro m a diff erent direct ion than usual to pic k u p [I .E.W .]. ” Testi mony l ater es tabl is hed t hat S .W . visi te d the chi ef of the Sea drif t Police Dep artm ent , Roger Tum linson, at his h o m e , in an ef fort to press th ese charg es. C hie f Tum li nson adv is ed S. W . t hat t he ev ents sh e des cr ibe d oc cur re d out si de the c ity l im it s o f S eadr ift and therefore ou t of hi s j ur is dicti on; h e al so tol d S. W . t hat t he ev ents sh e des cr ibe d do not i n any ca se cons ti tute a c ri me. Und er the ter ms of the tr ial co urt’ s o rd er , J .G. ’s ov er nig ht v is its with I.E. W . t ook pla ce as sch ed u l e d o n t h e w e e k e n d s o f O c t o b e r 6 a n d O c t o b e r

2 0 , 2 0 0 7
. A c c o rd i n g to J.G ., the v is it s w ent w ell , and I.E.W . “had a great t ime. ” J. G. dropped I .E.W . off w it h her3

mo the r a n d grandm oth er on th e afterno on o f Octob er 21, 2 007 ; he ha s not see n his d a u gh t e r s in c e t h a td a y. Sho rtly af ter I.E. W .’s f irst sche dule d overnig ht v isit, S .W . reporte d tha t I.E.W . told her thatsh e had sl eepw alk ed w hil e s tay ing ov er nig ht ather father ’s hous e. Acc ordin g to S.W ., I.E. W . said tha t: (1) she sleepwalked all the w ay out side of J.G.’s hou se, atw hich po i ntK .G
. “ dr ug ” he r ba c k i nt o th e ho us e; ( 2) s he w as t he n pu t ba c kt o s l ee p i nt o th e s am e bed as J. G. and K. G.; and (3 ) J.G . w as sl eepi ng i n the nude. Acco rd ing to pol ic e records ent ered into evidence , S.W . cont acte d the Calhou n Coun ty She riff ’s Of f ice to repo rt these ev ents and to req uesta rest ra ini ng order “beca use she [S.W .] did not w ant [ K.G. ] around her daug hter .” S. W . w as infor med bya Sher iff’s Off ic e inv est ig ator , Rennet t Todd, that the ev ents sh e des cr ibe d do not cons ti tute a c ri me, and “t here w as nothi ng thatco uld be d one on how [J .G. ] c hose to r a ise [I.E. W .] on hi s w eeken ds. ” Inv est ig ator Todd not ed i n her re por t that she tol d S.W
. “t hat law enforc ement coul d not g et i nv olv ed unl ess there w as an outc ry made by

[I .E.W .]. ” O n t h e e v e n i n g o f

O c t o b e r 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 , a f

t e r J
. G
. h a d re t u r n e d I
. E
. W. t o S
. W. , S
. W. cont act ed Officer

Tim S mith , an ass is tant chi ef w it h the Seadr ift Pol ic e D epar tment, and a s k e d t o f i l e a re p o rto f a b u s e . A c c o rd i n g t o t h e o f fe n s e r e p o rte n t e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , S
. W. tol d O f ficer Smi th t hat I .E.W . “ had bee n s ex ual ly abus ed w hil e w it h [J .G. ] t he prev iou s ev eni ng .” Ac cordin g to Off ic er Smi th’ s repor

t, S.W
. st a te d t hat I .E.W . c omplai ned of s o r e n e s s i n h e r

g e n i t a l a r e a a f

t e r r e t u r n i n g h o m e . S
. W. a l s o s t a t e d t h a t I
. E
. W. t o l d D
. W. tha t “Daddy touche d me there, ” wi th “there” referring to her genital area . Of f icer Smith did n o ta t t e m p tt o i n t e r

v i e w t h e a l l e g e d p e r p e t ra t o r , J
. G
. , o r t h e a l l e g e d o u t c r

y w i t n e s s , D
. W. Ins tead, Officer

Smi th a d vised S.W . t hat h e w oul d ar ra ng e for a forens ici nter v iew and SAN E ( Sex ual As saul t N urse Ex aminer ) ex aminat ion as soon as possi ble
. To thi s end, he called h is w ife, Be v erly Smith , an em ployee at the Harbor Children’s Alliance and Victim Cen ter ( “H ar bor”) i n Port Lav aca, T ex as. Bev er ly Smith conduc ted an i nter v iew w it h the chi ld the fol low ing mor nin g . Off ic er Smi th ac compani ed S.W ., D. W ., and I .E.W to Har bor for the int er

v iew and, lat er

thatday , t o C it iz ens Me dic al Cen ter i n Vi cto ri a, Tex as, for t he4

SAN E ex aminat ion
. At t he H ar bor

i nter v iew , Be v er ly

Smi th t alk ed w it h I. E.W . abo ut pr iv ate p arts of the bod y and then asked I.E.W . w het her an y one had touch ed h er priv at e p a rt s. I.E.W . f irst sai d no, but then chang ed her ans w er and sai d tha t her

father touc hed her p riv ate p arts w it h hi s fin g er . Bev er ly Smi th t hen as ked I.E. W . w hat he r f a th e r sa id to her w hen he touc hed her

pr iv ates w it h hi s fin g er ; I .E .W . respon ded t hat h e s aid , “ I w il l touc h y our pr i v at es .” A c c ordi ng t o Be v er l y S mi th , th atres po ns e “ s ee m[ ed ] s tran g e, ” b ut“i t’ s n otmy pla ce to s ay

thatsh e i s t ell ing the tr uth o r that she is not. ” I. E.W . furt her ex pla ine d tha t t he touc hin g oc cur re d “ [a]tmy daddy ’s house .
. . [i ]n my room” and t hat K .G. w as presentat the t ime. T he SA NE examina tion was condu cted by Sexual Assau lt Nurse Ex am iner Leslie Kal lus
. Kal lus tes ti fied th at I.E.W . informed her that“ [m]y

daddy touc hed me h ere [po int ing to he r gen it a l a rea] w it h hi s fin g er . It ti ck led
. W e w ere i n my bedroom. It w as li g ht out side.” Kallus th en a sked I. E.W . mo re questions a bou t the touch ing, but I.E .W . w ould notanswer. T he p hysical examina tion revealed “some
. . . s a n d-like deb ris bilaterally in the l abi a maj ora, . . . s ome cl ear se creti ons sur ro undi ng the cl it or is , and
. . . a re ddened area f rom [tw o] o’clock to [eleven] o’clock on the hyme n.” Kal lu s testif ied th at th ese findi ng s w ere “n onspe ci fic,” and “c oul d be c onsi ste nt w it h s ex ual as saul t or se x ual abus e, but [are] als o seen in nonabused chil dren.” Kal lus noted, as Bev er ly Smi th di d, t hat s he is trai ned to acceptw hat chi ldren tell her as the truth , and that“ iti s b ey ond [ her] s cope” to det ermin e w het her or nota child is being coache d or coerced to ma ke false allegatio ns. J.G . den ied ev er

hav ing touc hed I .E.W . in an i nappropr iat e w ay , or ev en i n a w ay that coul d be thoug ht of by so meone el se as ina ppropr iat e. Nev erthel ess , as a resul t of the o utc ry

made by

I. E.W ., prosec uti ng att or neys so u ght c harg es ag ain st J.G . for ind ecency

w it h a c hil d, a sec ond- deg re e felony
. See T EX . P EN AL C OD E A NN . § 21. 11(a )(1), (d) (Vernon Su pp. 200 9). Also as a result of the outcry , S.W
. app lied for a fam ily v iolence protec ti v e order

forbi ddi ng J. G. from hav ing co ntac t w it h I. E.W
. See T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85 .02 2 (Verno n Sup p. 20 09). On Dece mb er 10, 2 0 0 7 , J.G. w as served w ith S.W .’sJ .G . n o te d i n h i s m o ti o n to va c a te th a t: 2 on t he a dv i ce ofl egal counsel [ he] di d not
. . . t est i f y at t he pr ot ect i v e or der hear i ng by v i r t ue oft he t hen pendi ng G ran d J ur y pr esent at i on a nd t her ef or e si gned an ‘ AG R EE D ’ and ‘ T EM PO R AR Y’ pr ot ect i ve ord er t o av oi d t est i fy i ng o r t he p ossi bi l i t y of a def aul t f i ndi ng o f f a m ily v io le n c e . [J .G .] a lle g e s h is a c tio n s in s ig n in g th e T e m p o r a r y O r d e r w a s [s ic ] t h e o n ly r easona bl e m annerof due pr ocess a v ai l abl e t o de fend hi m sel ff r om t he f al se accu sat i ons

5 protec ti v e order

appli cat ion as w ell as a temporar y ex par te protec ti v e order

prohi bit ing J. G. from hav ing co ntac t w it h I. E.W . and se tti ng a he ar ing for D ecember 12, 2007. Accordin g to J.G. , his criminal def ense atto rney advised tha t he co nsen t to the entry of the protec ti v e order

“ on a temporar

y bas is to av oid a de fault o r the n eces si ty to sta nd on hi s fifth amendment r ig hts
. . . i n v iew of all eg ati ons of a felony .” Therefore, on De ce m b e r 1 2, 20 07, w it hout hol din g an e v ide nti ar y hear ing , t he tr ial co urt rendered a “Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” w hic h had been cons ented to and sig ned byJ.G., S.W ., and thei r attor ney s. The order prohi bit ed J.G
. from: (1 ) commi tti ng family v iol ence, as defined in sec ti on 71. 004 of the family co de, see id. § 71 .004 (V er non 200 8) ; ( 2) co mmunic ati ng direct ly w it h I.E. W
. in a threateni ng or harass ing manner ; (3 ) communi cat ing i n any manner w ith I.E. W . except through S.W .’s atto rney; ( 4) engaging in any condu ct specif ically direct ed to w ard I.E. W
. that is re asona bly li kel y to “h arass , ann oy , al ar m, abus e, t or ment, or embar ra ss ” I.E. W .; (5 ) g oin g to or near S.W .’ s res ide nce or place of employ ment; and (6) g oing to or nea r I.E.W .’s residence or any child-care facility or school s h e norm ally atten ds. See i

d. § 85. 022. In 20 08, a C alh oun C ounty grand jur

y “no- bil led ,” or decl ine d to ind ic t, J.G . on the ind ecency

w it h a c hil d c harg e. J.G . t hen fil ed a moti on w it h the tr ial co urt on September 4, 20 08, s eeki ng to v acat e the temporar y protec ti v e order
. See i d. § 85. 0 25 ( Ver non 2008)
. In hi s mot ion , J .G. arg ued t hat: ( 1) S.W .’s p ro te ct iv e order appl ic ati on w as ins uff ic ien t bec ause itdi d notco ntai n a “ detai led des cr ipt ion of the fact s a nd c ircums tanc es conce rning the alleged fa mily v iolence ,” see id. § 82. 009( 1) ( Ver non 200 8) ; ( 2) the order it sel f contai ned no f in d ing of family v iol ence as re q uired by st atute , see id. § 85. 001 (V er non 200 8) ; and ( 3) there w as no c onti nui ng need for th e order , i n par t bec ause J.G
. h a d b e e n n o -b il le d b y t h e gra n d ju ry. 2an d t ha t he ha s su ffered da m ag es as a res ul t t he reo f.

(E m p h a s e s i n o rig i n a l .)

T h e tri a l c o u rt a l s o m a d e c e rta i n “n e g a ti v e ” fin d i n g s o f f a c t, s ta ti n g th a t: 3 T h e e v id e n c e a d m itt e d a t t r ia l f a ile d to e s ta b lis h , b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o fth e c r e d i b le ev i dence, t he f ol l owi ng f act s: 1. T h a t i t i s i n t he be s t i nteres t of [ I
. E
. W
. ] t ha t t he “T em po rary P rot ec t i ve O rde r” r ender ed a nd si gned D ecem ber 12, 200 7 be m odi f i ed. 2. T ha t i t is in t he be s t i nteres t of [ I
. E
. W
. ] t ha t t he “T em po rary P rot ec t i ve O rde r”

r ender ed a nd si gned D ecem ber 12, 200 7 be v acat ed. 3. T hat t her e i s not a cont i nui ng n eed f or t he “ T em por ar y Pr ot ect i v e O r der ” r ender ed and si gned D ecem ber 12, 200 7. 4
. T h a t i t i s i n th e b e s t i n te re s t o f [I.E .W .] th a t [ J .G .] b e g ra n te d a c c e s s to [I .E .W .]. 5. T hat i t i s i n t he best i nt er est of[ I
. E. W
. ] t hat [ J. G
. ] be gr ant ed a ccess po ssessi on o f

[I. E .W .]. 6 On N ov ember

24, 2008, after a f ull ev ide nti ar y hear ing , t he tr ial co urt rendered i ts orde r d e n yin g J.G.’s mo tion to v acat e. Sub sequen tly , on J.G. ’s req uest , the trial court e n te re d f in d in gs o f

fa ctan d co n clu sio n s o f la w. Th e f in d in gs o f fa ct in clu d e d th e fo llo wing: 5. The Co urt finds that , pr ior to Dec ember

12, 200 7 , [J .G .] commi tted family v iol ence ag ain st [I. E.W .]. 6. T he Cou rt fin ds tha t, prior to Decem ber 12 , 200 7 , [ J
. G.] en gaged in sexua l c o n d u c tt o wa rd [ I
. E
. W
. ] wh ic h wa s h a rm f u l t o [ I
. E
. W
. ] ’s m e nta l, emoti onal or

phy si cal w elfare. 7
. The C o u rt fi n d s t h a t i t i s n o t i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f [ I
. E
. W .] that the Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order

rendered and si g ned D ecembe r 1 2 , 2 007 be v acat ed. 8
. Th e C o u rtfi n d s t h a ti ti s no ti n th e be s ti n t e r e s tof [ I
. E
. W
. ] to m o d i fy the t er ms and condit ion s of the Temporar y Protec ti v e Order

rendered and s ig ned D ecember

12, 2007. 9. The Co urt f ind s that itis not in the best int erestof [I .E.W .] that [J. G.] be g ra nted poss ess ion of [I. E.W .]. 10. The Co urt finds that it is not in the b esti nterestof [I. E.W .] that [J. G.] be g ra nted acc ess to [I. E.W .]. 11. T he Cou rt fin ds tha t the re is a con tinuin g nee d for the “T em pora ry Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 2007. 12. The Cou rt finds thati t i s i n the bes t i nterestof [I. E.W .] that the Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order

remain in full force and effect.[ ] 3 T he co nclusion s of

law state d as follows:7

1. The Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order re ndered and s ig ned D ecember 12, 2007 i s a n order

rendered a n d s igned by mutual ag re ement an d conse nt of

[J.G.] an d [S.W .] pu rsuan t to § 85. 005 of the T exas Family Cod e. 2. By

v ir tue o f hi s a g re ement an d c onsen t t o the ter ms of the “Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 200 7, [J.G .] ha s judicially adm itted that rend ition of said orde r w as in the b esti nterestof [I. E.W .]. 3. By

v ir tue o f his ag re ement an d c onsen t t o the terms of the “Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 2007, [J. G.] has j udi ci all y admi tted that re ndi ti on of sai d order w as neces sar

y for t he prev enti on of family v iol ence. 4. By

v ir tue o f his ag re ement and co nsentto the t er ms of the “Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 2007, [J. G. ] is estopped from c hal len g ing the v ali dity of the “Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 2007. 5. The “ Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si gned D ecember 12, 2 007 s houl d notbe modi fied. 6. The “ Temporar

y Protec ti v e Order” re ndered and si g ned D ecember 12, 2 007 s houl d notbe v acat ed. This appeal foll ow ed. II. D I S CUS S I ON On ap peal , J .G. arg ues that the t ri al cour t er re d i n deny ing his moti on to v acat e the protec ti v e order for the follo w ing re asons : (1 ) there w as no ev ide nce adduc ed as to ev ents occ ur ri ng si nce the o ri g ina l re ndi tio n of the o rd er thatw oul d j ust ify

co nti nuati on of the orde r; (2) the origi nal protective orde r “is overly -broad , excessiv e, a v iolation o f [ J.G.’s] constit u ti o n a l ri g hts as a pa re nt, and i s n ot i n the bes t i nterestof the c hil d” ; and ( 3) the evidence a ddu ced a tt he h earing on J.G. ’s motio n to vacate was leg ally and factu ally in s u f f ic ie n tt o su p p o rtt h e t ri a l c o u rt ’s f in d in gs o f fa c ta n d co n c lu s io n s o f la w. A . Mo ot ness The p ro te cti v e order

at is sue ex pired tw o y ears a fter i t w as or ig ina ll y i ss ued, on Dec ember

12, 2009, w hic h w as after submi ss ion of the ins tant appeal to thi s C our t. See T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85. 025( a) ( sta ti ng thata pro te ct ive order i s e ff ect iv e unt il the secon d an niversary

of the dat e the o rder w as issued , unle ss a n earlier expiration dat e is8

sta ted in the order ). Therefore, ev en th oug h the i ss ue of mootnes s w as not a ddress ed or br iefed by

ei ther par ty , w e mustaddres s w hether or not J. G.’ s a ppel lat e i ss ues are moot. See Clem ents

v. Hask ovec , 251 S.W .3d 7 9, 83 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 2008, no p et.) (ci ti n g Lab rado v. Coun ty of El Paso , 132 S.W .3d 5 81, 5 89 ( Tex . Ap p.–El Pas o 2004, no p et.) (describing mo otn ess as “a com pon entof subjectmat ter jurisdiction”)); Scha ban- Ma ur

er v. M a u re r-Schaban , 238 S.W .3d 8 15, 8 22- 23 ( Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth 2007, no pet .)
. The g eneral rule i s th at a cas e bec omes moot , and thus unrev iew abl e, w hen it appe ars thata party seeks to obt ain relief on som e alleged con troversy w hen in re ali ty none ex is ts. W illiam s v. Lara , 52 S.W .3d 1 71, 1 84 ( Tex . 200 1) ; Clem ents , 251 S.W .3d a t 83; Scha ban- Ma ur er , 238 S.W .3d at 82 2. An ex pired te mpora ry protec ti v e order is generall y

consi dered moot for this reason . See Jam es v. Hubb ard , 21 S.W .3d 5 58, 5 60 (Te x . App .–S an An ton io 200 0, no pet. ). How ev er , Tex as law

recog niz es a “ col lat eral conseq uence s” ex cept ion to the mootnes s d oct ri ne. See, e.g., Gen. Land Off ic e of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A ., Inc ., 789 S
. W
. 2 d 5 6 9 , 5 7 1 (T e x. 1 9 9 0 ). T h is e xc e p t io n is a p p li e d wh e n p r ej u d ic ia l e ve n t s h a ve occ ur re d tha t w il l cont inu e to sti g mati z e the su bje ct of the protec ti v e order l o ng after

the order h a s ce a se d t o operate. See Clem ents , 251 S.W .3d a t 84; In r e C um m ing s , 13 S.W .3d 4 72, 4 75 ( Tex
. App.–Cor pus Chr is ti 2000, no p et.)
. The ex cept ion appl ies to a prote ctiv e orde r contain ing a find ing of fam ily violence , beca use su ch a f inding carries a soc ial st ig ma, as w ell as l e gal c o n seque nces , ev en after the order

has ex pired. Scha ban- Ma ur

er , 238 S.W .3d at 822- 23; Jam es , 21 S. W .3d a t 560 ; In r e C um m ing s , 13 S.W .3d a t 475 ; s ee T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 153. 004( f) ( Ver non Su pp. 2 009) ( mandat ing tha t a trial court mu st consid er the issua nce o f a prote ctiv e orde r in d e t e rm in ing child cus tody i ss ues) ; Clem ents , 251 S.W .3d a t 84. W e therefore conc lud e tha t J .G. ’s appel lat e issues are review able und er the “ c o lla teral con sequen ces” exception to the m oot ness doct ri ne. B. A pp licab le L aw an d St and ard o f Rev iew A prote ctiv e orde r und er section 85. 022 of the fam ily code ma y notbe issued unlessSect i on 85. 025( b) of t he f am i l y code pr ov i des t hat a m ot i on t o v acat e a pr ot ect i v e or der m ay be f i l ed 4 “no t e arl i er t ha n t he fi rst an ni vers ary o f t he d ate on w hi c h t he o rde r w as re nd ere d
. . . .” T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85
. 025( b) ( Ver non 2008)
. Al t hough t he h ear i ng a nd o r der on J. G
. ’ s m ot i on t o v acat e t ook pl ace m or e t han one y ear aft er t he p r ot ect i v e or der was r ender ed, t he m ot i on i t sel fw as f i l ed on S ept em ber4, 2008, whi ch was l e s s th a n o n e y e a r a fte r th e o rig i n a l r e n d i ti o n o f th e o rd e r o n D e c e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 7
. N e v e rth e l e s s , n e i th e r p a rty r ai sed t he i ssue o ft he t i m el i ness o fJ. G
. ’ s m ot i on e i t her wi t h t he t r i al cour t orwi t h t hi s C our t , and w e do not a d d re s s th a t i s s u e h e re . See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33. 1( a) ; 47. 1. 9 the t ri al cour

t finds thatfamil y

v iol ence (1 ) has occ ur re d and (2 ) is l ik ely to occ ur i n the future. T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 81. 001 (Verno n 200 8); § 85. 001 (a), (c). A perso n w ho is the s ubj ectof a protec ti v e order “ mayfil e a mot ion
. . . req uest ing thatthe cour t rev iew the protec ti v e order

and deter mine w heth e r there i s a co nti nui ng need for th e order .” Id. § 4 85.025( b)
. After a hear ing , i f the t ria l cour t finds there i s a “ cont inu ing need” for t he prote ctiv e orde r, the orde r wi ll rem ain in ef fect un til the stat uto ry

tw o-y ear pe riod expires; how ev er , i f the tr ial co urt finds there is no “c onti nui ng need,” the cour t “s hal l order

thatthe prote ctiv e orde r ex pires on a date set by the court.” Id. The best int er est of t he chi ld is the pr imar y cons ide ra ti on in de te rmi nin g cons er v atorshi p and poss ess ion of and ac ces s t o the ch il d. Id. § 153 .00 2 (Verno n 20 08). A tr ial co urt has w ide di sc re ti o n i n d e te rm ini ng the besti nterestof a c hil d i n famil y l aw matters s uch as cus tody , v is it ati on, a nd pos ses si on. Gi l les pi e v . Gi llespie , 6 4 4 S. W .2d 449, 451 ( Tex . 198 2)
. W e w il l re v erse the t ri al cour t’ s j udg ment onl y

w hen i t app ears from the record as a w hol e tha t t he tr ial co urt abu sed it s d is creti on. Id. ; see Stam per v. Knox , 254 S.W .3d 537, 542 (Tex . App.–H oust on [1 st Di st. ] 200 8, no pet. ) (“ A tr ial co urt’ s d eci si on modify ing the parent- chi ld rela ti onshi p is re v iew ed for abuse of dis creti on, a nd w il l onl y be dis tur bed w hen i t i s cl ear the cour t acted in an arbi trar

y or unreas onabl e manner, w it hout referen ce to an y

g uiding rules or principles.”). C. A nal ysis T he Decemb er

1 2, 2 00 7 orde r

d oe s n otc on ta i n an y

fi nd i ng t ha t fami l y

v i ol ence occ ur re d or

thatfamil y

v iol ence is l ik ely

to occ ur in the future. See T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85. 001 (a), (c). Inste ad, it state s me rely tha t the restrictions contain ed in the orde r “ are for the sa fety and w elfare an d in the best inte rest of mem bers of

t he fam ily

and are neces sar

y for t he prev enti on of

f amil y vi ole nce. ” Af

ter the Nov ember

24, 2008 heari ng on10

J.G.’s mo tion to v acat e, th e trial court did specif ically f ind that J.G. had com mitt ed fam ily v iol ence, but itm ade no findi ng as to a lik eli hood of f uture v iol ence. See i

d. J .G. arg ues t h a tt h e fa il u re o f

t h e t ri a l c o u rtt o m a k e t h e re qu is it e f in d in gs m e a n s , a s a m a t t e r o f la w, that itw as er ro r for th e tr ial co urt t o deny hi s mot ion to v acat e. On t he ot her

hand, the tr ial co u rt c o n cluded, and S .W . c ontends on a ppeal , t hat “[ b]y co nsent ing to the rendi ti on of a protec ti v e order pursuantto the prov is ion s o f [sec ti on] 85.022, [J .G. ] has judi ci all y admitted al l under ly ing f act s neces sar y to the rend it ion of the protec ti v e order .” The t ri al cour t al so conc lud ed th at J .G. , hav ing a gre ed to the or ig ina l p ro t e c t i v e o rd e r , i s n o w “ e s t o p p e d f ro m c h a l l e n g i n g t h e v a l i d i t y ” o f t h a to rd e r . W e disagree. By agreeing to t he tem pora ry p rotect iv e orde r, it is a ppa rent tha t J.G. volunta rily c o n s e n t e d t o se ve re re s t ri c t io n s o n h is p a re n t a l ri gh t s . G ive n t h e fa c tt h a tt h e p ro t e c t ive order st ated no ex pirati on dat e, i t c an al so be s aid thatJ. G. cons ented to t he i mposition of these re str ic ti ons for as l ong as tw o y ears. See i d. § 85 .02 5(a). How ever, w e are unwill ing to say

thatJ.G. v olun tarily

conse nte d to f indings tha t he co m mitt ed fam ily v iol ence, and w as li kel y t o c o m m itfamil y

v iol ence in the future, merely bec ause he cons ented to t he protec ti v e order
. Acc ordin g to J.G ., his co nsentto the re n d it io n o f the De c e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 p ro t e c t i v e o rd e r wa s o n t h e a d vic e o f h is cr im in a l d e fe n s e a t t o rn e y, and wa s d o n e s ole ly

to av oid hav ing to tes ti fy or pl ead hi s fifth a mendment r ig hts at a prote ctiv e orde r hearing. Regardless of wheth er t his ration ale w as legally or strategically so u n d , t h e fa ctrem a in s t h a t th e De ce m b e r 1 2 , 20 0 7 o rd e r co n ta in e d n o exp lic itf in d in gs as to famil y

v iol ence or

the li kel iho od of future v iol ence. W e c annot presume that J.G
. w oul d hav e c onsen ted t o s uch an order had thos e findi ng s b een ex pli ci tl y i ncl uded. W e note als o tha t t he doc tr ine of jud ic ial es toppel , w hic h under li es the c oncep t of ju d ic ia l a d m is s io n , is in a p p li c a b le h e re . Fo r a ju d ic ia l a d m is s io n t o e xis ta n d b e co n c lu s ive ag ain st a p a rt y, th e f o ll ow ing el ements mustbe s how n: (1 ) the s tatementreli ed on w as made d u r i n g t h e c o u rs e o f a j u d i c i a l p ro c e e d i n g ; ( 2 ) t h e s t a t e me n t i s c o n t ra r yto an ess enti al fact embraced in the t heor y of re cov er

y or defense ass erted b y the p erson w ho made the statement ; (3) the sta tement w as deli berate, cl ear , and uneq uiv ocal ; ( 4) g iv ing11

conc lus ive e f

f e ct to t he s tatementw oul d be cons is tent w it h publ icpol icy ; and ( 5) the sta tement re lat es to a fact upon w hic h a jud g ment for th e oppos ing par ty may be b ased. Bal aban v . Ba lab an , 712 S.W .2d 775 , 777 -78 (Te x . App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 19 86, w rit re f’d n.r .e.)
. Here, ev en i f one cou ld infer the ex is tenc e of

f amil y vi ole nce by

J. G.’ s c onsen t to th e original protective order, the order certain ly did not cont ain any “delibe rate, clear, [or] uneq uiv ocal ” admis si on th at famil y v iol ence occ ur re d or w as li kel y

to occ ur i n the future. See i d. ; see a lsoT EX . F AM . C ODE . A NN . § 8 5
. 0 0 5 (e ) (V e rn o n 2 0 0 8 ) ( “A n a gr e e d p ro t e c t ive order i s n ot en forcea ble as a cont ra ct. ”)
. Fur ther , the doct ri ne of j udi ci al admis si ons does not a ppl y

to cont ra dictor

y pos it ion s t aken in the s ame pro ce e d ing
. Est ate o f D evitt , 758 S
. W
. 2 d 6 0 1 , 6 0 4 - 0 5 (T e x. A p p . –A m a ri ll o 1 9 8 8 , p e t
. d e n ie d ). Fo r t h e s e re a s o n s , we dis ag re e w it h the tr ial co urt’ s c oncl usi on that J.G
. is est opped from chal len g ing the v ali dity of the order

by v ir tue o f his pr ior

co nsent
. W e the refore ad dress J.G.’s sub stan tiv e challen ges to the o rig inal prote ctiv e orde r, to t he tr ial cour

t’ s deni al of hi s moti on to v acat e, an d to the fin din g s o f factand conc lus ion s of law ente re d by

the tr ial co urt. 1. Ev id ence o f Ev ent s Occ ur rin g Sin ce Or ig in al R end it io n of Or der By hi s first is sue, J. G. cont ends that the t ri al cour t er re d i n deny ing hi s m o ti o n to v acat e the Dec ember 12, 2007 protec ti v e order bec ause there w as no ev ide nce adduc ed as to ev ents oc cur ri ng si nce th e o rigi nal rendi ti on of the order thatw oul d j ust ify

the cont inua tion o f

the ord er. Sect ion 85.0 25( a) (1 ) of t he Tex as Fami ly C ode prov ide s t hat, if a protec ti v e order does not s tate an ex pirati o n dat e, t he order sh all ex pire tw o y ears a fter i t i s first is sued. T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85.025( a) (2 ). As noted, sect ion 85.0 25( b) prov ide s t hat a person w ho i s t he s ubj ectof a protec ti v e order “ mayfil e a mot ion req uest ing thatthe cour t rev iew the prote ctiv e orde r and de term ine w het her the re is a continu ing need for the o rder.” Id. § 85 .02 5(b). No evi den ce w as add uced at the Novembe r 24, 20 08 h earing indicatin g tha t, since the p ro tec ti v e order

w as is sued, J.G. had committ ed anyvi ola ti ons of the prot ect iv e order12

or had eng ag ed i n any

othe r ina ppropr iat e behav ior
. J. G. arg ues that thi s c ompell ed th e tr ial co urt t o v acat e the protec ti v e order
. How ev er , t he fact that n o f a m ilyv iol ence has occ ur re d s inc e ent ry

of the o rd er

does not necess a rily m e a n thatthere i s n o c onti nui ng need for the ord e r. On the c ontrar y , t he tr ial co urt c oul d hav e det er mined that: ( 1) the prote ctiv e orde r w as itself the m ain facto r ensuring that J
. G
. r e f ra ined f rom e ngaging in o bj e c t i o n a b l e b e h a v i o r ; a n d ( 2 ) w i t h o u tt h e p ro t e c t i v e o rd e r re m a i n i n g i n fo r c e , I
. E
. W. w oul d be left ex posed to the p otent ial dang er thatthe order

so ug ht t o el imi nate. J.G . furt her

cl aims that( 1) “ the O rd er w as suppo sed to be temporar y . . . and w as inten ded to last on ly

so long as the crimina l charges were pend ing,” and (2) “[b]eca use it w as temporar

y , it w as neces sar il y int ended to las t les s than the sta tut o ry 2 y ears.” How ever, J.G. doe s not provide t his Court w ith an y auth oritysupp orting these conte ntion s. On t h e c o n trar

y , upo n as ki ng thatthe order be v acat ed, t he burden w as on J .G. to est abl is h that there w as no “con ti nui ng need” for the order
. See i

d. § 85. 025 (b). The re is no presumpt ion that a protec ti v e order must ex pire pr ior to the s tatut or

y tw o- y ear

l imi t, and the o rd er ’s ch aract er iz ati on as “ temporar y ” does not a lt er

thatfact. W e ov er ru le J.G .’ s first is sue. 2. Ch allen ges to C on te nto f Pro te ct iv e Or der By hi s sec ond is sue, J.G
. arg ues that the o ri g ina l protec ti v e order , w hic h prohi bit ed any conta ct betw een him an d I.E. W ., “is ov erly -broad , excessive , a violation of [J.G.’s] cons ti tuti onal r ig hts as a pa re nt, and i s n ot i n the bes t i nterestof the c hil d.” “The ter ms of an o rd er thatdeni es poss ess ion of a c hil d to a parent o r impos es re str ic ti ons or

l imi tati ons on a parent’ s r ig ht t o pos ses si on of or ac ces s t o a chi ld maynot exceed t hose thatare required to prote ct the best inte rest of the child. ” Id. § 153. 193 (V er non 200 8)
. Ev en as sumi ng thatJ. G. commi tted the a ct of famil y v iol ence of w hic h he is acc used, w e find that the rest ri cti ons pla ced on J .G. ’s ac ces s b y the Dec ember

12, 2007 protec ti v e order

f ar ex ceede d w hat w as req uired to protec t I .E.W .’ s b esti nterest
. The tr ial cour t w a s empow ered, e v en i f it found “a hi sto ry or patt er n” of family

v iol ence, to order super v is ed v is it ati on, among other thi ng s, in order to ensure that the chil d’s best i nterest s13

ar e protec ted w hil e also prov idi ng some acc ess for t he parent. See i d. § 153 .00 4(d); In re J.R.D. , 169 S.W .3d 740, 749 (Tex . Ap p.–Aus ti n 2005, pet. deni ed) ( “The leg is lat ure has decl ar ed a pr esumpt ion thati t i s i n the ch il d’s bes t i nterest to hav e the mini mum amount of time w it h anyreaso nabl y safe parent . . . .”)
. Ins tead, the tr ial courtapprov ed an ag re ed protec ti v e order that prohi bit ed any cont act betw een J.G . and I. E.W ., despi te t he fact that onl y one ins tanc e of family

v iol ence had bee n al leg ed, a nd no facts had been al leg ed th at w oul d s upport a f ind ing of a l ik eli hood of future v iol ence. Ev en i f J.G. , upo n adv ic e of couns el, deemed the p ro tec ti v e order ’s rest ri cti ons to be in his best int erest , it w as the t ri al court’s respo nsibility to reject th at agreed p rotect iv e orde r if it w as no t in the b est inte rest of the c hil d. See T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . § 85 .00 5(b) (noting tha t agreed prot ective orders ar e s ubj ectto the t ri al cour t’ s a pprov al) ; id. § 85. 005( c) ( “I f the c our t app ro v es an agreem entbetween th e pa rties, the court sha ll rend er an agreed protec t ive order tha t is in the b esti nterestof the a ppl ic ant, the family or house hol d, or a member of the famil y or house hol d.” ); id. § 15 3.0 02 (“ T h e b e s ti n t erest of the child sh all alw ays be th e prima ry cons ide ra ti on of the cour t in deter mini ng the is sues of cons er v atorshi p and poss ess ion of and access to th e child.”). W e not e furt her

thati t i s u ncl ear

w hether t he tr ial co urt ev en had the a uthor ity to app rov e a prot ective order, such as the o ne agreed to by J.G. and S .W ., tha t impo sed su ch sev ere rest ri cti ons on one parent’ s a cc ess to the chi ld. Par ti es are permitted t o c onsen t to protec ti v e orders, but s uch ag re ed orders are subj ect to the approv al of the tr ial co urt, and t ri al cour

ts are s tr ic tl y

prohi bit ed from a pproving a ny ag re ement t hat req uires an “app licant to do or ref rain f rom d oing an act u nde r Section 85.0 22. ” Id. § 85 .005( b)
. The Dec ember 12, 2007 order pr eci sel y track s t he l ang uag e of sec ti on 85. 022 i n req uir ing that J.G . ref ra in e nti re ly

from, among othe r thi ng s, communi cat ing w it h I. E.W . or g oin g to or n ear her resi dence
. See i

d. § 8 5
. 0 2 2
. I f J
. G
. i s c o n s i d e r e d a n “ a p p l i c a n t ” under the sta tute, then the tr ial courtlack ed the authori ty to approv e of the ag re ed protec ti v e order becau se itrest ri cte d J .G. as prov ide d under se cti on 85. 022. See i d. § 85.0 05(b ). W e c oncl ude t hat t he D ecember 12, 2007 protec ti v e order v iol ated th e s tatut eSpeci f i cal l y , we r ev er se t he t r i al cour t ’ s f i ndi ngs o ff act num ber s sev en t hr ough t wel v e; concl usi ons 5 o f l a w n u m b e rs tw o th ro u g h s i x ; a n d a l l fi v e “n e g a ti v e ” fin d i n g s o f f a c t. 14 gov erning such orders by (1) failing to i nclud e specif ic f indings as to the likelihood of f utu re family v iol ence, and (2) incl udi ng rest ri cti ons on J.G. ’s acces s to I.E.W . that ex ceede d w hat w as re q uired to protec t I .E.W .’ s b esti nterest
. See i d. §§ 8 5.0 01(c), 15 3.1 93. The se defici enci es w ere broug ht to the tr ial cour t’ s atten ti on in J.G .’ s moti on to v acat e and at t he subs eq uent hear ing
. See i d. § 87 .001 (V er non 200 8) ( “O n t h e m o ti o n of any par ty , t he cour t, after noti ce and hea ri ng , maym odi fy an ex is ti ng protec ti v e order to: ( 1) ex cl ude any it em i ncl uded i n the order ; or ( 2) i nclu d e a ny

i tem th at c oul d hav e been inc lud ed i n the order .” ); Jam es , 985 S.W .2d a t 518 ( sta ti ng that a protec ti v e orderi s a per manent inj unct ion t h a t “ ‘ ma y b e r e v i e w e d , o p e n e d , v a c a t e d o r mo d i fi e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u rt u p o n a show ing of chang ed c ondi ti ons’ ”) ( q u o ti n g S m ith v. O’ Neill , 8 1 3 S
. W
. 2 d 5 0 1 , 5 0 2 (T e x. 1991) ). The t ri al cour t had no di sc re ti on, t herefore, to de ny thatmoti on, a nd i t w as re v ersi ble er ro r for i t t o hav e done so. See Walk er v. Packer

, 8 2 7 S
. W
. 2 d 8 3 3 , 8 4 0 (T e x. 1992) ( “A

tr ial co urt has no ‘di sc re ti on’ in determi nin g w hat the law is o r appl y ing the law to t he facts .” ). Ac cordin g ly , w e s ust ain J. G.’ s s econd i ss ue. 3. Fi nd in gs of

F actan d Co ncl usi on s o f Law J.G. con ten ds by his t h ir d issu e tha t the ev iden ce w as legally and factu ally ins uff ic ien t t o s uppor

t t he tr ial cour

t’ s findi ng s of fact and conc lus ion s of l aw is sued after the N ov ember

24, 2008 h ear ing on J .G. ’s moti on to v acat e. W e hav e al re ady co ncl uded that the t er ms of the or ig ina l protec ti v e order w ere c ontrar

y to I.E. W .’ s b esti nterest s a nd v iol ated the s tatut e gov er nin g such orde rs ; accordin g ly , w e rev erse the f ind ing s of factand co n clu sio n s o f

la w th a t a r e t o t h e co n tr a ry. W e no w co n sid e r th e rem a in in g f in d in gs 5 is s u e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u rt ; sp e c if ic a ll y, we a d d re s s f in d in gs o f fa c tn u m b e rs f ive a n d si x, sta ti ng thatJ. G. commi tt e d f a m ily v iol ence ag ain st and eng ag ed i n s ex ual co nductw it h I
. E
. W
. , re s p e c t ive ly. W hen t he tr ial cour

t ac ts as a fact- finder , as here, w e rev iew i ts findi ng s u nderW e no t e t hat T exa s app el l at e cou r t s ar e di v i ded ov er t he p r operst andar d t o em pl oy i n r ev i ewi ng 6 th e e v i d e n c e s u p p o rti n g p ro te c ti v e o rd e rs . C om par e I n r e Epper

son , 213 S
. W
. 3d 5 41, 543 ( T ex. A pp . –T ex ark an a 20 07 , no pe t
. ) and Thom pson v. Thom pson- O ’ R ear , N o. 06- 03- 00129 - C V, 200 4 T ex. App. LEX I S 5033, at * 4 ( T ex. App. –T exar k ana June 8, 200 4, no pet
. ) (m em . o p.) ( appl y i ng a buse ofdi scr et i on st andar d) wi th Cl e m e n t s v . H askovec , 2 5 1 S
. W
. 3d 79 , 84 (T ex . A pp . –C orp us C hri s t i 20 08 , no pe t
. ) and V o n g o n ta rdv . Tip p it , 137 S. W
. 3d 1 09, 112 ( T ex. App. –H oust on [ 1st D i st
. ] 200 4, no pet
. ) ( appl y i ng l egal and fac t ua l su ffi c i en c y stan da rd). 15 traditio nal l egal and factu al suf f iciency stan dard s. In re Doe , 1 9 S
. W
. 3 d 2 4 9 , 2 5 3 (T e x. 6 2000) ; Clem ents , 251 S.W .3d a t 84. I n c onsi der ing l eg al suffici ency , w e cons ide r all the evidence in th e lig ht m ost favorable to th e trial co urt’s f inding, indu lgi ng e v eryin feren ce in it s fav or . In r

e L.M.I. , 119 S .W .3d 7 07, 7 18 (Te x . 200 3). W e w ill susta in a legal suf f iciency com plaintonly if

the reco rd rev eals: (1) the com plete abse nce of a v ital fact; (2) the court is bar re d by ru les of l aw or of ev ide nce from g iv ing w eig ht t o the onl y ev ide nce off ered to prove a v ita l f a c t ; ( 3 ) th e evidence of fered to prove a v ital fact is no m ore tha n a m ere sc int il la; or

( 4) the ev ide nce est abl is hes conc lus iv ely the oppos it e of t he v it al fact. City of Kel ler v. Wils on , 1 6 8 S
. W
. 3 d 8 0 2 , 8 1 0 ( T e x. 2 0 0 5 ). W h e n t h e e vid e n c e o f fe re d t o p ro ve a v it al fact i s s o w eak as to do no more tha n c re ate a m ere s ur mis e or su spi ci on of i ts ex is tenc e, t he ev ide nce is l ess than a s ci nti ll a and, i n l eg al eff ect , i s n o ev ide nce. F ord Mo tor Co. v . Ridg way , 135 S.W .3d 5 98, 6 01 ( Tex . 200 4)
. The ul ti mate t estfor l eg al suf f iciency is w het her the ev iden ce at trial w ould ena ble reaso nab le an d fai r-mind ed p eop le to mak e the findi ng under rev iew
. See City of K

eller , 168 S.W .3d a t 827
. In rev iew ing f act ual suff ic ien cy , w e consi der all of the ev ide nce and w il l uphol d the findi ng unl ess the su p p o rt ing ev ide nce is so w eak or the findi ng so ag ain st the ov er w hel ming w eig ht of the ev ide nce as to render the findi ng man if e stl y

unj ust
. Golden Eagle Archer

y v . Jack son , 116 S.W .3d 7 57, 7 61- 62 ( Tex . 200 3)
. W e rev iew co ncl usi ons of law de n ov o. BM C Soft ware Bel g., N. V. v

. M ar chand , 83 S. W .3d 789 , 794 (Tex. 2002 ). Un d e r bo th le gal an d fa ct u a l su f f ici e n cy st a n d a rd s, th e fa ct -f in d e r is t h e so le ju d ge of the w it ness es’ credi bil ity and the w eig ht to be g iv en th eir tes ti mony . See Cit

y o f Ke ller

, 168 S.W .3d at 819 (stating that, und er legal-suf f ic ie n c y stand ard, fact-f inde r is “the sole judge . . . of

the cred ibility

of the wi t n e s s e s and the weig ht to be giv en th eir testim ony”); Po o l v. For

d Motor C o. , 7 1 5 S
. W
. 2 d 6 2 9 , 6 3 5 ( Te x . 1 9 8 6 ) ( “ [ I ] n c o n d u c t i n g a fa c t u al16

suf f iciency rev iew , a court m ust no t me rely substitu te its judgme nt fo r that of the jury . . . .”); Can al Ins . C o. v

. Hopki ns , 238 S.W .3d 549, 557 (Tex . Ap p.–Ty ler 2007, pet. deni ed) ( op. on reh ’g)
. Here, t he e vide n ce sh ow ed th at I .E.W . made an out cr y of one i nst ance of sex ual abuse to three peopl e: (1 ) D. W ., I.E. W .’ s g ra ndmother ; ( 2) Bev er ly Smi th, w ho i nter

v iew ed I
. E
. W. a tH a r b o r ; a n d ( 3 ) K a l l u s , t h e n u rs e t h a tc o n d u c t e d t h e S A N E e x a m i n a t i o n o n I
. E
. W. Acc ordin g to Kal lus , her ex aminat ion of

I. E.W ’s g eni tal area rev eal ed abno rmal it ies that mayor may not hav e been the resul t of se x ual abuse
. J.G
. arg ues that “[ t]he ev ide nce of any se x ual as saul t boi ls dow n to tw o bare hears ay statement s b y

[I .E.W .] that w ere made in re sp o n se to directand sug g est iv e q uest ion ing i n the co ntext of dete rmi nin g w hy her g eni tal area w as re d and sw oll en.” W hil e thi s may be t ru e, J .G. does not chal len g e the admis si bil ity

of Smit h’s or

Kal lus ’s tes ti mony

as to I.E. W .’ s o utc ry , nor does he s ug g estthat “t he c our t i s b ar re d by

r ule s o f law

or of ev ide nce from gi v ing w eig ht” to that ev ide nce. See City of K eller , 168 S.W .3d at 810
. T he fact tha t I.E. W
. ma de a sub stan tially similar outcry sta tement to t hr ee di ff er ent p eopl e g iv es ri se to more tha n a mere s uspi ci on th at t he ev ents sh e de sc rib e d ac tu a lly oc cu rre d ; t h a t is , t h e e vide n ce s u p p o rt in g t h e tri a l co u rt ’s f in d in gs amounts to m o re t h a n a mere s ci nti ll a. See F or d Motor C o. , 135 S.W .3d a t 601
. Our rev iew of t he evidence a lso shows that J.G. did not est ablish co nclusively thatthe ou tcry sta tements made by

I. E.W . w er e fals e, c oache d, or co er ced. See Cit

y o f Ke ller, 168 S.W .3d a t 827
. V ie win g t h e e vid e n c e in t h e li gh tm o s tfa v o r a b le t o t h e t ri a l c o u rt ’s f in d in gs , we c an no t s ay

t hat reaso na bl e an d fai r- mi nd ed p eo pl e c ou l d no t ha v e r ea c he d th os e s am e conc lus ion s. See i

d. M or eov er , c onsi der ing al l the e v ide nce, w e c annot conc lud e tha t t he trial court’s f indings are so cont rary t o the great w eight and p repo nde rance o f t he e v iden ce as to b e m ani festl y

unj ust
. See Golde n Eag le Archery , 1 1 6 S
. W. 3 d a t7 6 1 - 6 2
. W e therefore c oncl ude t hat t he ev ide nce adduc ed atthe No vem ber 24, 2008 he ar ing w asW e n o te th a t e v i d e n c e th a t a p e rs o n h a s e n g a g e d i n a b u s i v e c o n d u c t i n th e p a s t m a y a llo w , b u t 7 d o e s n o t re q u i re , a n i n fe re n c e th a t t h e p e rs o n w i l l c o n ti n u e v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r i n th e fu tu re . Schaban- M aurer v. Maurer

- Schaban , 2 3 8 S .W .3 d 8 1 5 , 8 2 4 ( T e x . A p p .– F o rt W o rth 2 0 0 7 , n o p e t.); s e e C l e m e n ts , 251 S. W
. 3d a t 8 7 -8 8 ; I n r

e Epper son , 213 S. W
. 3d a t 543 - 44 ( “ O f t ent i m es, past i s pr ol ogue; t her ef or e, past vi ol ent cond uct c an be co m pe t en t evi de nc e w hi c h i s l eg al l y an d fa c t ua l l y su ffi c i en t to s us t ai n t he aw ard of a p rot ec t i ve o rde r. ”) ; see a lso G onz al ezv. G al van , N o. 13- 08- 488- C V, 200 9 T ex. App. LE X I S 2 78 8, at * 5- 6 ( T ex. App. –C or pus C hr i st i Apr
. 23, 200 9, no pet
. ) ( m em . op. )
. However , t he t r i al cour t m ade no f i ndi ng, at anypoi nt i n t he under l y i ng p r oceedi ngs, t hat t her e was a l i k el i hood off ut ur e f am i l y v i ol ence i n t hi s case. T her ef or e, we do not add r ess t he q uest i on o fwhet her t he e v i dence adduce d at t he N ov em ber 24, 2008 hear i ng su ppor t ed su ch a f i ndi ng. 17 legally and factu ally suf f icient to supp ort f indings of fact nu mb ers f iv e an d six
. J.G.’s third 7 is sue is ov er ru led
. III . C ONCL US I ON W e rev erse the j udg ment of the tr ial co urt den y ing J. G.’ s mot ion to v acat e and re n d e r j u d gm e n tva c a t in g t h e De c e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 t e m p o ra ry p ro t e c t ive o rd e r i n it s e n t ir e t y. Fu rt h e r, we a ff ir m in par t and rev erse in par

t t he tr ial co urt’ s fin din g s o f factand conc lus ion s o f law

as st ated in thi s o pin ion
. DO RI C ON TRERAS G AR ZA, J u s t i c e Del iv er ed and filed the 21stday of Janua ry , 201 0.