### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July11, 2002 Session MONICA L. GOLDBERG V 

### . RUSSELL A. GOLDBERG Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County No. 27310 Russ Heldman, Chancellor

No. M2001-01442-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 16, 2003

This is a divorce case involving alimony and proper ty division. The parties have f ive children; the oldest is severely ha

ndicapped and the three y ou ngest are mino rs. The husband is a hospital consu ltant. The wife works part-time as a nurse and owns a small business. In addition to c hil d support, the trial

court or dered th e husband to pay

substantia

l al im on y in futuro , and assu me approxima

tely ninety-eig

ht percent of the ma rital debt. The husba

nd was al so order

ed to main

tain a con siderable amount of life insurance to secure his spousal and c hild support obligations. On appeal, the husband argues that the award of alimony is excessive, that rehabilitative alimony instead of al im on y in futuro should have been awarded, that the trial cour t improperly divided the

marital debt, and that t

he amount

of life in surance

required was exce ssive. We a ffirm in p art and r

everse in part. We affirm the trial court’s holdingwith regard to the division of marital debt and the amount of life insura nce, and mod ify the awa rd of alimony, awa

rding rehabilitative alimony in a reduced amount. Tenn. R. App.P. 3; Judg ment of t he Chance ry Court

is Affirme

d in Part and Rever

sed in Part H OLLY K IRB Y L ILLARD , J., deliver ed the opinion of the

court, in which W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and A LAN E. H IGHERS , J., joined. Thomas F. Bloom, Nashville, Tennessee, for appe llant, Russell A. Goldberg Virginia Lee

Story, Franklin, Tenne ssee, for appellee, Monica L . Goldberg OPINION Monica L. Goldberg (“

Wife”) and Russell A. Go ldber g (“Husband”) were married on April 19, 1980. At the time of

their marriage, Wife had just earned her Registered Nurse license and Husband hadjust completed a dual master’s degree in gero ntol ogy and pub lic ad mini strat ion. The ma rriage produced five children, the oldest of whom is severely disabled andnow lives in a supported group home funded by the sta

te.1 Husband could not rec all the exa ct amo unt of his se veran ce pa ckag e, nor did he pro duc e any re cord of his

sever ance pay. -2- During most of the marriage, Husband worked for Columbia/H CA. Towar

d the end o f his employment

with Columbia/HCA, Husband earned $120,000 per y ear plus a potential yea

rly bonus of $50,000. In October 1997 Husba nd was laid off a

nd rece ived appr oximately $160,000 t

o $200,000 1 in sever ance pay . This money was used for living expenses and to start a jewelry company for Wife. Husband’ s experie nce with a

for-pr ofit medic al in stitution s uch as Columbia/H CA left him with mental health concerns and philosophica lly unwilling to continue working at for-profit medical institutions. Consequently, he began working for non-profit medical facilitie s. Husband f

irst work ed as a c onsultant

for succ essive no n-profit hospitalsin Flor ida, Alabama, a nd Washing

ton state. He then o

btained a permane nt position a

t Phyve Corpor

ation in Tennessee, but was laid off approximately seve n months l ater. At the time of the trial, Husband workedfor St. Ma

ry ’s Hospita

l in St. Louis, Missouri, as a consulta nt, earning $3,350 pe

r week, with a gross average monthly

income of $11,106 per month, and net pay of $6,772.67. Aft e r Husband was laid off f

rom Columbi a/HCA, Wif e reac tivated her nursing lice nse in ord er to be gin working part time administering allergy shots. She also earned money from the jewelry busine ss, which was operated out of her home. I n 2000, Wife earned approximately $28,000. On August

17, 2000, Wife filed for

divorce , citing

Husband’ s inappro

priate ma rital conduct. The next month H usband was ordered to move into an apartment. He wa s ordered to pay Wife $5,000 per month pendente lite . At the pendente

lite hearing , Wife indic ated tha t her month

ly expenses were $7,270. The trial was held on February 20 and 23, 2001. At the time of tr ial, Husba

nd was fo rty -six yearsold an d Wife was forty- two years old. B oth parties testified with regard to Wife’s earning ca pa ci ty. Citing hisexperien ce in health care, Husband t

estified that Wife h ad an ea

rning c apacity of $50,000 to

$100,000, noting that some hospitals were offering a sta rting bonus of $10,000. He asserted that he could use his extensive contacts in the health care industry to assist Wife in obtaining full-time, flexible work. In c ontrast, Wife testif ied that a person with her experience could only earn between$13.00 and $13.50 per hour, or approximately $27,000 per yea

r. Neither party

offered expert proof with regard to Wife’s earning capacity

. At the trial, Wife testifiedthat she had revised her calculation of expenses to be $9,175 per mont h. Wife said t

hat the ma

rital home

was wort

h approxima

tely $390,000 m

inus rea l estate commissions and repair fees, and was enc umbered by a

ppro xi ma te ly $ 340,000 in outstanding mortga ges. Husband testified that the parties’ home was worth $410,000 to $420,000. The proof at trial showedthat the p arties a ccumula ted $76,9 84.50 in ma

rital debt, which w as mostly comprised of debt consolidation loans, a loan from Husband’s brother, and an outstanding IRS debt from 1999. Husbandalso te stified that, at that time, he maintained a life insurance policy in the amount of $300,000. He testified that his bipolar condition and medi cine usage would prevent him from qualifying f

or additional insurance.2 The trial court’s May 22, 2001 F inal Judgment appears to order Husband to mainta in $500,000 in l ife insur ance

forthe child support obligat ion and $100 ,000 for the alimony obligation, for a total of $6 00,00 0, although the p arties, in their appellat e brief

s, i ndicat e that

Husband was ordered t o maintai n $850,000 in li fe i nsuranc e.

-3- Shortly after the trial, onFebruary 27, 2001, the trial court granted Wife the divorce, based on Husband’s stipulation of inappropriate marital conduct. The final judgme ntwas entered

on May 22, 2001. In the final order, the tria l court concluded that Wife was incapable of rehabilitation, and aw ar de d a li mo ny in futuro : The Court specifically

has consi dered a

ll statutor y a nd allrelevant factors in setting alimony in this cau se and finds th at Wife is i ncapable of being rehabilitated a nd thereforeal im on y in futuro is awarded. [Wife] cannot be rehabilitated when viewed in the context of the standard of living in relation to [Husband]. Her rehabilitation is no t fea si bl e. Al im on y in futuro shall terminate upon the death or remarriag e of [Wife] or upon [Husband’s] death. The tr ia l c ou rt or de re d H us ba nd to pa y Wi fe $3 ,0 00 pe r m on th al im on y in futuro , and $3 ,114 per month in child support. In addition, Husban d was o rdered to maintain $500,000 in life insurance to secure the child support payments, and $100,000 in life insu

rance t o secure the alimon

y pa yme nts. The trial court allocated approximately ninety-eig

ht perc ent of the $76,984.50 in marita l debt to Husband. Husband w as order ed to pay Wife $ 6,300 in attorney’s fees. Wife was awarded the marital home subject to the outstanding mortgage s. From this order, Husband now appeals. On appeal, Husband arguesthat the trial court erred in award ing Wife periodic alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month. He asserts that this amount is excessive and that Wife should have been awarded

rehabilitative alimony instead of a limony in futuro . Husband further argues that the trial court er

red in assigning appr

oximately ninety -eight

percen t of the ma

rital debt to him, and

in ordering him to maintain $600,000 in life insurance to secure alimony and child support pa

yme nts. 2 Wife asse rts that the trial c ourt’s or der is ap propria te and seeks her a

ttorney ’s feesfor this a

ppeal. Becau se this case was heard by the trial court sitting without a jury, we r

eview the case de novo upon the r

ecord w ith a pre sumption of correctness of th

e trial c ourt’s findings o f fact, unless the evidence preponderates ag ainst the decision of the trial court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Wright v. City of Knoxville , 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) (c itation omitte d). I

n reviewing an a

limony award o r a division of marit

al prope rty , the appe

llate courtwill not overturn the judgment of the trial court unless the awar d evidences an ab use o f discretion. See Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W.2d 175, 179, 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision against logic that causes a harm to the complaining party or when the trial court applies an incorrect leg al standard. Eldridge v
. Eldridge , 72 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Te nn. 20 01) (ci ting State v. Shirley , 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)). An order requiring an obligor to maintain life insurance is also reviewed under a standa rd of abuse of discretion, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-10 1(g); Young v. Young , 971 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), as is the3 The factors enumerat ed in sec tion 36- 5-101(d)(1)(A)- (L) are: (A) The relat

ive ear ning capacity , obli gati ons, nee ds, and f inanci al resources of each party, including incom e from pens ion, pr ofit sharin g or re tireme nt plan s and all other sourc es; (B) The relat ive educat ion and t

raini ng of each party , the ab ility and o ppo rtunity of ea ch pa rty to secure such education and traini ng, and the n ecessi ty of a party to secur e furt

her education and training to imp rove such p arty’s earn ing cap acity to a r easo nab le level; (C) T he du ration o f the ma rriage; (D) Th e age and m ental co ndition of eac h par ty; (E) The phys ical

condi ti on of each par

ty, incl uding, but not

limi ted to, physi cal disab ility or incap acity due to a ch ronic deb ilitating disea se; (F) The ext ent to wh ich it woul d be undes irable f or a party to s eek empl oyment outs ide the hom e bec ause su ch pa rty will be cu stodia n of a m inor ch ild of the marria ge; (G) Th e sep arate a ssets of ea ch pa rty, both real an d pe rsona l, tangible and in tangib le; (H) Th e pro visions m ade with rega rd to th e ma rital pro perty a s define d in § 3 6-4-1 21; (con tinued ...) -4- award of attorney’ s fees. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Aaro n v . Aaron , 909 S.W.2d 4 08, 411 (Tenn. 1995 ); Fox v. Fox , 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983)). Husbandfirst argues that the trial court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony . Section 3 6-5-101( d) of the Tenness ee Co de Annotated, which governs awards of alimony , clearly sta tes a preference for r

ehabilitative alimony when fe asible: It is the inte

nt o f t he gen

eral as sembly

that a spo

use who iseconomic ally disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse, be rehab ilitated whenever po ssi b le by the granting of an order for pay ment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance. Where there is such relative economic disadvantag e and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factor s, including those

set out in th

is subsection, th en th e c ou rt ma y g rant an o rder for pay ment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until the de ath or rem arriage of the recipient except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(3). . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (2001) (emphasis added)

. Thus, there is a legislative preference for an award of rehabilitative alimony when possible. Robertson v. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d 337, 340 (Tenn. 2002); Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d 356, 3 60 (Tenn . 2000). T he court must first determine if a

spouse is economically disadva ntaged, and then consider all relevant factors enumerated in section

36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L

), 3 as well as any

other pertinent facts, to determine if3 (.. .cont inu ed) (I) T he stand ard o f living of the p arties esta blished during the ma rriage; (J) Th e exten t to which each party ha s mad e such tangib le and in tangib le con tribution s to the marriage as monetary and h ome mak er co ntributio ns, and tangib le and intangib le con tribution s by a p arty to the edu cation , training o r increa sed e arning pow er of the other p arty; (K) The relative faul t of the parties in cases where the cour t, in its discretio n, dee ms it ap pro priate to do so; and (L) Such othe r factors, includ ing the tax cons equ ence s to each party, as are necess ary to consider the equ ities betw een the parties

. Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1 )(A)-(L) (2001). -5- rehabilitation of the disadvantaged spouse is feasible. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 33 8; Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d at 358. These factors must also be considered in setting the amount of the alimony awa rd. See Robertson , 76 S.W.3d a t 340. Alimo ny i s not intended to put one spouse on equal f

ooting w ith the other, or

to let the o

bligee spouse to live in the

manner t o which he or she was accustomed during the marriage. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d a t 340; see Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d at 359-60. In Robertson , the parties were divorced after twenty-two y

ears of marriage. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d a t 338. They wer e in their early

forties and had one minor child. Id. at 339, 343. The husband earned approximately $60,000 per yea

r working for TVA. Id. at 342. During the marriage, the wife had primarily

been a homemaker, occasionally doing substitute teaching. Id. At the time of the divor

ce she ha d recen tl y earned a degree

in education and planned to work as a teacher , earning approximately $22,500. To increase her salary , she planned to obtain her master’s degree. Id. The trial court had awarded reha bilitative alimony for one

year. Id. at

339. The c ourt of a

ppeals modified this, awardi ng al im on y in futuro

. Id. The court of appeals acknowledg ed that, after divorc e, the pa rties often cannot maintain their prior standard of living, but concluded that “the inquiry as to whether a

requesting spouse can be rehabilitated must be viewed in the context of ‘the standardof living of the parties established during the marr iage.’ ” Robertso n v. Robertson , No. E2000-01698-COA-RM-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 573, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. Au g. 25, 2002) (citation omitted). Utilizing this reasoning, the court of appeals concluded that the wife could not be re ha bi li ta te d a nd sh ou ld re ce iv e a li mo ny in futuro

. Id. at *18. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. It quoted the al imony statute, which requires consideration of the parties’ standard of living, along with numerous other factors. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 341 n.2. Nevertheless, it said that it disagreed with the court of appeals ’ c onclus ion “that the parties’ standard of living should be” the standar d by which a c ourt must determine whethe

r an eco nomically

disadvan taged spouse

can be rehabilitated. Id. at 340. It “encouraged”trial courts to use means other than a limony to meet the

needs of an econ omically disadvantaged spouse, such as the division of marital property or marital debt. Id. at

341. Noting that the parties had substantial marital debt and thus would not be able to attain their prior standard of living, the supreme court simply concluded that

the wife should be awarded rehabilitative alimony only, in the amount of $250 per month for two y ears. Id. at 343.-6-

Robertson must be viewed against the backdrop of the supre me c ou rt’s ear

lier dec ision in Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2000). In Crabtree , the proof showed that the husband earned in excess of $400,000 per ye ar. Id. at 356 n.1. The wife worked part time as an

accoun tant. Id. at 360. The most optimistic testimony, provided by the husband, was that t

he wife h ad the ab ility to earn between $65,000 and $100,000 p er yea r. Id. The trial court ordered both rehabilitative alimony an d a li mo ny in futuro

. Id. at 357-58. The court of appeals affirmed the award of both ty

pes of alimony , expressing conc ern that rehabil itativ e a li mo ny a lone woul d not enab le the wif e to approxima

te the stand ard of liv

ing fro m the par

ties’ twe nty -th ree ye ar marri age. Id. at 359. The TennesseeSupreme Court rejected this reasoning, awar d ing rehabilitative alimony alone, without refe re nce to the parties’ former standard of living or the c onsiderable disparity in their e arning capacity

. Id. at 359-61. From Robertson and Crabtree , we must conclude that, although the alimony statute refers to the parties’ relative earning c apacity a nd their standard of living as factors to be cons idered, these factors have been deemed of only ma rginal relevance to the issue of whe ther the obligee spouse can be rehabilitated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (d)(1)(A) and (I ) (2001). Rather, the focus under both Crabtree and Robertson appear s to be whe ther the obligee spouse ca

n earn e nough mo ney

to be self-sufficient, even if at a level far below theparties’ former standard of living and e ven if the earning capacity

of the obligor spouse is far grea ter. In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that

Wife “cannot be rehabilitated when viewed in the context of the standard of living in relation to [Husba nd].” In light of Crabtree and Robertson , we must

conclude that this finding is erroneous; we hold that Wife is capable of being re ha bi li ta te d, an d t ha t t he aw ar d o f a li mo ny in futuro must be reversed. Husbandalso appe als the amount of alimony awa rded, arguing that the trial court should not have awarded Wife $3,000 per month. Husband asserts that Wife’s need for the funds , coupled

with her ability to earn money , as well as his income level, warrants at most an award of re habilitative alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month for

ten year s, instead of the $3,000 per month alimony in futuro ordere d by

the trial court. H e notes th at in sett ing alimony

obligat ions, the t

wo most importantfactors to consider are the obligee’s ne ed fo r t he fu nd s a nd th e o bl ig or ’s ab il it y to pa y. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). It is erroneous for a tr ial court to order anobligor to pay a n amount of alimony bey ond his ability to pay

. See Goodman v. Goodman , 8 S.W.3d 289, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted) (reducing husband’s alimony obligation from $2,200 to $1,000 per month, which ultimately reduced his total monthly support obligation from $4,4 35 per mon th to $3 ,234 per

month, allo wing him t

o retain just under

fifty percent of his disposable income). In the case at bar, Husband’s gr oss income is $11,106 per mont h. His net income is $6,772.6 7. After H

usband pa

ys h is curre nt child su

pport obli gation o f $3,114 p er month a nd his alimony obligat ion of $3,0 00 per mon

th , he is left with less than $700 per month, or less than ten percent of his income, to support himself. At the time of trial, Wife earned approximately $28,000 per yea r, or $2,333.33 per month. Wife testified at trial that she could start in a full-time nursing4 W e note t hat Wife’ s st ated expens es at t he pendente li te hearing were $7,270 per mo nth. 5 Th is permi ts Husband t o ret ain $2,158. 67 per mont h, or app roxim ately thirty-two perc ent of his net i ncome. 6 The factors enumerat ed in sec tion 36- 4-121(c) are: (1) T he du ration o f the ma rriage; (2) The age, phy sicaland mental healt h, vocational skil ls, employabil ity , earni ng capacit y, es tate , financia l liabilities and financia l need s of eac h of the p arties; (3) The tangi ble or i ntangi ble contributi on by one (1) party t o the educat ion, t raini ng or in creased earnin g po wer o f the othe r party; (4) T he rela tive ab ility of each party fo r future ac quisition s of cap ital assets an d inco me; (5) The c ontr ibut

ion of each party to t

he acqu isi ti on, pr eser vati on, a ppreci ati on, de preci ati on or dissipati on of the marital or separate property, incl uding the contribution of a party t o the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with t he contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earne r to be given the same weight if ea ch pa rty has fulfilled its ro le; (6) T he valu e of the se para te pro perty o f each p arty; (7) T he esta te of ea ch pa rty at the time of the m arriage ; (8) The ec onomi c ci rcu mst ance s of eachpart

y at th e t ime th e di vi si on of prope rt y i s t o beco me effective; (9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of t he asset, an d oth er rea sona bly fore seeab le exp enses a ssocia ted with the asse t; (con tinued ...) -7- position at $13.00 to $13.50 per hour. Husband opined, based on his experience in health care, that Wife could earn $50,000 or more per y ear as a home-based clinical ca se manager. Even considering Wife’s stated expenses of $9,175 per month, 4 we find that the awa r d of $3,000 per month alimony is excessive and simply bey ond Husba

nd’s ability t

o pay. Ther

efore, we modify the awa rd of alim ony to $1,500 p er month in

rehabil itative a limony for a pe riod of te n ye ars, or upon the death of Wife, if her death occurs bef ore the end of the ten-y

ear period. 5 Husbandnext argues that the trial court erred in assigning approximately ni nety-eig ht percent of the marital debt to him. The trial court is afforded wid e latitude when distributing the marital propert y and the marital debt. Watters v. Watters , 959 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The division of marital property and marital debt is to be equitable, not necessarily equal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (2001); Watters , 959 S.W.2d at 591. When d ividing marital pr

operty anddebt, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in section 36-4-121(c) of the Tennessee Code Annotated. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). 6 The Tennessee Supreme Court has encouraged6 (.. .cont inu ed) (10) The a mountof s ocial secu rit y bene fi ts avai labl e to e ach s pouse; and (11 ) Suc h othe r factor s as are nece ssary to c onsid er the e quities b etwee n the p arties. Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (200 1).

7 W ife test

ifi ed at trial that the hous e had been for sale f or a year

and had not been sold. The house was origina lly lis ted at $459, 000, an d had su bseque ntl y been reduc ed to $429, 000. The par ti es owe d approxi matel y $341, 000 on the home. -8- adjusting the division of marital property a s a means of meeting the nee ds of the ec onomically disadvantaged

spouse. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 341 (c itin g Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d a t 361 n.4; Renfro v. Renfro , 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993)). The Robertson court stated: When practical, . . . a trial court should consider award ing more assets to an economic ally

disadvantag ed spo use to provide future support, rather than rely ing solely upon an award of alimony . When there are fe w marita l assets bu

t a consider able amount of marital debt, a trial court should similarly consider awarding a disadvantaged

spouse a lesser amount of marital debt. Careful distribution of the marital property may

assist the disadvan taged s pouse

in achieving re

habilitat ion in fu rt he ra nc e o f t he le gi sl at iv e p ol ic y of el im in at in g s po us al de pe nd en cy. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 341. Thus, pursuant to the legislative goal of eliminating spousal de pe nd en cy, it is proper for a trial court to divide the marital property anddebt in such a way tha t helps the disadvantaged spouse achieve f inancial independence. Here, the only

marital asset whose value was in dispute was the marital residence . Husband testified that the p

roperty had appr oximately $70,000 to

$80,000 in

equity , while

Wife’s testimony indicatedthat the propert

y ha d approxima

tely $50,000 in

equity , minus re

pairs and real e state fees. 7 Regar dless of the am

o un t o f e qu it y in the marital home, Wife was apparently granted all of that equity when the trial judge awarded he r the house, subject

to the outstanding mortgages. Husband is responsi

ble for $ 75,360, or

approxima

tely nin ety-eigh t perce

nt of the ma

rital debt, and Wife

is responsible for $1,624.50, or approximately two pe rcent of the debt. Applying the statut ory require ments and

casela w to this situation, we find that the trial court didnot abuse

its discre tion when it divided t

he marita l proper ty and marital debt. In this case, during the pa rt ie s’ tw en ty- yea r m ar ri ag e, Wi fe pr im ar il y rai sed the pa rties’ children w

hile Husba

nd built his career and enhanced his earning capacity

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5). Moreover, Husband’s income is at least four times greater than Wife’s; thus, his ability to acquire capitalassets in the future is much greater than that of Wife. See Tenn. C o de Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(2) and (4). While Husband’ s debt obli gation i s consi de ra bl y higher than Wife’s allocated debt, his alimony obligation has been reduce d, and asthe child ren gr ow older , his child

support ob ligation s will also be reduced. Therefore, the t rial c ourt’s division of marital property a nd marital debt is affirmed.8 Section 3 6-5-101 (g) states:
The cour t may d irect eithe r or b oth parties t o designate the other party and the children of the marriage as benefi ciari es underany existin g po licies insurin g the life of e ither pa rty and maintenance of existi ng polici es insuring the lif e of either party, or the purcha se and maint enance of lif e insurance and designation o f beneficiaries.
Te nn. Co de A nn. § 3 6-5-1 01( g) (20 01)

.

9 If Husband h as i n fa ct be en orde red t o main tai n in exces s of $600,000 in li fe i nsuranc e, th e amount required is herebymodif

ied t o $600,000. -9- Next , Husb and arg

ues that th

e trial c ourt abus ed its disc retion wh en it orde

red him to maintain life insurance in the amount of $600,000. The tria l court ma

y r equire t he pay or spouse to maintain life insurance in order to secure pay ment to the pa yee spouse in the event of the pay or’s death. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(g); 8 Young v. Young , 971 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). The decision of the trial court regar ding such life insurance will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 392. Here, the trial court ordered Husbandto maintain $100,000 in life insurance to secure his alimony oblig ation and $500,000 in life ins urance to secur e his child support obligat i on. Hu sband asserts that he currently maintains a $300,000 policy, and that his medica l history would prevent him from economically obtaining additional coverage. At tr ial, however, Husbandoffered no proof that he had attempted to ob tain addi tio nal coverage, or proof tha t such an attempt had been declined. Based on this recor d, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Husband to maintain $600,000 in life insurance. 9 Fi na ll y, Wife seeks her atto rney ’s feeson appea

l. Here, Wife rec eiv ed the equity in the marital home, andHusband will still pay over sixty -eight percent of his net income in child support andalimony, while maintaining re sponsibility for a substan tial amoun

t of the ma

rital debt. Under all of these circumstances, we decline Wife’s re quest for attorney ’s fees. In sum, under Crabtree and Robertson , we findthat Wife can be rehabilitated, and therefore that an aw ar d o f a li mo ny in futuro is notwarranted. We also conclude that the amount of alimony awarded exceeds Husband’s ability to pay . Therefore, the award of alimony is modified to $1,500 per month for ten yea

rs, or upon the death of Wife, if her death occurs before the end of the te n-year period. We affirm the division of marital propert y and d ebt, and a

ffirm Hu sband’s o

bligation to maintain life insurance in the amount of $600,000. Wife’s request for attorney ’s fees on appeal is denied.-10-

The decision of

the trial court is a ffirmed in part, re

versed in part, a

nd modified as set f

orth above. Costs are taxed equally to appellant, Russell A. Goldber g, and his surety , and appellee, Monica L. Goldberg , for which execution may issue if necessary .

___________________________________ HOLL Y KIRBY L

IL LARD, JUDGE