NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DANETTE MILLER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

THOMAS ANDREW MILLER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0304

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2007-008371

The Honorable Christopher T. Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

McCulloch Law Offices, Tempe

By Diana McCulloch

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Thomas A. Miller, Tempe

Defendant/Appellant in Propria Persona
MILLER v. MILLER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

K E S S L E R, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Thomas Andrew Miller (“Father”) appeals the order 

granting judgment for Danette Miller (“Mother”) on her petition to 

enforce the asset distribution agreement contained in the consent decree. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶1 This appeal concerns Mother’s post-decree petition to 

enforce the parties’ agreement concerning the sale of corporate stock. 

When the dissolution action was filed, the parties owned significant 

shares of Premier Information Management (“PIM”), a publicly traded 

company. In May 2009, the parties reached an agreement, memorialized 

on the record pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 69, and 

adopted by the court. The agreement was later incorporated in a consent 

decree signed by the court in July 2009. As relevant, the decree provided: 

Mother is awarded 3 million shares of Premier Information 

Management Inc. stock which currently (at May 27, 2009) 

is/was in Father’s name. Father is to have this done 

immediately following the May 27, 2009 hearing. The intent 

is that Mother has the ability to sell the 3 million shares . . . 

and that it does not reach affiliate status. In addition, Father 

will pay for any opinion letter, and will make wife whole if

she loses money regarding the period of time from when she 

gets the stock and when she wants to sell it and getting the 

opinion letter. 

 1 As Mother points out, Father’s statement of facts does not comply with 

Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 13(a)(4). We rely on our 

review of the record for our recitation of the facts. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 192 Ariz. 255, 257 n.1, 963 P.2d 334, 336 n.1 (App. 

1998).
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¶2 In January 2013, Mother moved the court to enforce the 

portion of the decree concerning the distribution of stock to Mother. She 

alleged the stock price decreased from $.035 on May 27, 2009 (when she 

received the stock), to $.01 on June 22, 2009 (when she received the 

opinion letter necessary for her to sell the stock), and asked the court to 

order Father to make her whole by paying the difference in value of her 3 

million shares of stock, $75,000. Mother also sought reimbursement for 

the cost of the opinion letter. Father opposed the motion, arguing Mother 

had failed to show that she suffered a loss in the sale of the stock. After 

conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court granted judgment 

for Mother in the amount of $69,123.50.2

¶3 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(2) (Supp. 2013).3

DISCUSSION

¶4 Father argues the superior court erred by granting Mother a 

judgment of $69,123.50. We apply an abuse of discretion standard when 

reviewing the family court’s division of property. In re Marriage of 

Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 581, ¶ 15, 5 P.3d 911, 915 (App. 2000). As the trier 

of fact, it is the family court’s responsibility to observe the parties, weigh 

the evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve disputed issues 

of fact. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347-48, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 

680-81 (App. 1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the court’s findings and will uphold them if they are supported 

by any reasonable evidence. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 323, 732 

P.2d 208, 214 (1987).

¶5 Mother sought to compel Father to pay her $75,000 for the 

loss in value of the PIM stock between May 27, 2009, when she received 

 2 The court impliedly denied Mother’s request for an award of attorneys’ 

fees, first raised in her reply in support of the petition.

3 Although other post-decree matters remained pending, the court’s order 

fully resolved Mother’s petition to enforce and was therefore appealable. 

See Williams v. Williams, 228 Ariz. 160, 165-67, ¶¶ 19-29, 264 P.3d 870, 875-

77 (App. 2011) (explaining total finality in post-decree context is not 

required as long as petition at issue is fully resolved). 
MILLER v. MILLER

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the stock, and June 22, 2009, when she received an opinion letter,4 plus 

$3124.50 for the cost of the opinion letter.5 She testified at the evidentiary 

hearing that the parties agreed as part of the dissolution that she would 

receive three million shares of PIM stock and, if she incurred a loss on the 

stock between when she received it and when she obtained the opinion 

letter required to sell the shares, Father would reimburse her for the 

difference. She offered evidence that the price of the stock on the day she 

received it was $.035 per share and when she obtained the opinion letter it 

was valued at $.01 per share. She also claimed the stock now has no 

value.

¶6 As the superior court noted, Father did not dispute Mother’s 

testimony regarding the dates she received the stock and the opinion 

letter, or her assertion that the stock now has no value. He did, however, 

challenge Mother’s evidence regarding the value of the stock on the 

relevant dates and questioned whether she had sold any of the three 

million shares she received.

¶7 The superior court accepted Mother’s evidence regarding 

the change in the value of the stock between May 27, 2009 and June 22, 

2009, and her testimony that she had only recovered $9000 for the stock. It 

granted Mother a judgment against Father for $69,123.50 (the difference in 

stock value plus the cost of the opinion letter).6 Father challenges the 

 4 Although neither entirely clear from the record nor fully explained by 

the parties, it appears that the stock Father conveyed to Mother on May 

27, 2009 was “restricted,” and federal securities laws therefore prohibited 

Mother from selling the stock in the public marketplace until she received 

the opinion letter. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa; 17 

C.F.R. § 230.144.

5 We reject Father’s argument that the superior court had previously 

denied Mother’s claim as untimely. In the minute entry Father cites, 

dated February 10, 2012 and filed on March 7, 2012, the court stated: “to 

the extent there are any motions before the Court [that] have not been 

ruled upon[,] they are denied as untimely.” Mother filed her motion to 

enforce the asset distribution agreement on January 25, 2013. 

6 Mother asserts the court erred by offsetting the $75,000 loss by the $9000 

value of her stock sales, but states she is not asking this Court to enlarge 

the judgment. See ARCAP 13(b)(3) (stating appellate court may direct that 
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sufficiency of Mother’s evidence, arguing the court erred by accepting her 

testimony because she did not provide a full accounting of all sales of 

stock from her brokerage account, so the court could not determine what 

stock she sold and for what price.7

¶8 Father contends Mother’s evidence did not support the 

court’s ruling because if Mother had attempted to sell all of her stock on 

May 27, 2009, the large-volume sale would have lowered the share price. 

As the superior court noted, Father did not offer any evidence to support 

his theory, assist the court in valuing the stock, or otherwise contradict 

Mother’s evidence concerning the price of the stock on the relevant dates.

¶9 The evidence reasonably supports the superior court’s 

findings and we find no abuse of discretion. See Mitchell, 152 Ariz. at 323, 

732 P.2d at 214; Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347-48, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680-81.8

¶10 Mother requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349 (Supp. 2013) and ARCAP

25. We deny Mother’s request because she has not shown that the appeal 

 

a judgment be modified to enlarge the appellee’s rights only if the 

appellee has cross-appealed seeking such relief). 

7 Father also challenges the court’s interpretation of the decree, arguing 

the provision concerning Mother’s sale of PIM stock was vague and 

unenforceable. We decline to consider this argument because Father did 

not raise it in the superior court. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 

300, 878 P.2d 657, 658 (1994) (“Because a trial court and opposing counsel 

should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects before 

error may be raised on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances, errors 

not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.”).

8 Father complains the superior court showed no “leniency or 

consideration” for the fact that he was self-represented. “Parties who 

choose to represent themselves ‘are entitled to no more consideration than 

if they had been represented by counsel’ and are held to the same 

standards as attorneys with respect to ‘familiarity with required 

procedures and . . . notice of statutes and local rules.’” In re Marriage of 

Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 549, ¶ 13, 200 P.3d 1043, 1046 (App. 2008) (citation 

omitted). Nevertheless, we deny Mother’s request that we sanction Father 

for the inclusion of this statement in his opening brief.
MILLER v. MILLER

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was frivolous or that Father brought it without substantial justification or 

for the purpose of delay or harassment.9

¶11 Mother also requests an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-324 (Supp. 2013), which grants courts discretion to award 

attorneys’ fees in a divorce case after considering both parties’ financial 

resources and the reasonableness of their positions throughout the 

proceedings. Because we lack evidence of the parties’ current financial 

resources and in the exercise of our discretion, we deny Mother’s request. 

Mother, however, as the prevailing party is entitled to recover her costs on 

appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

 CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

 9 We also deny Mother’s request that we sanction Father for his inclusion 

of the sealed consent decree in the appendix to his opening brief, but on 

the Court’s own motion, it is ordered sealing the opening brief.