# Official Journal C 214/16 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 214 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6616 June 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 214

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6616 June 2023

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| Contents | page |
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| | |
| | EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 16 to 19 January 2023TEXTS ADOPTED | 1 |

Contents

page

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 16 to 19 January 2023TEXTS ADOPTED

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1

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| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| --- | --- |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 17 January 2023 |
| 2023/C 214/01 | European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2023 on the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade (2022/2874(RSP)) | 2 |
| | Wednesday 18 January 2023 |
| 2023/C 214/02 | European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments (2022/3015(RSP)) | 8 |
| 2023/C 214/03 | European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on consumer protection in online video games: a European single market approach (2022/2014(INI)) | 15 |
| 2023/C 214/04 | European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2048(INI)) | 26 |
| 2023/C 214/05 | European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI)) | 54 |
| 2023/C 214/06 | European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2022 (2022/2049(INI)) | 77 |
| | Thursday 19 January 2023 |
| 2023/C 214/07 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (2023/2504(RSP)) | 104 |
| 2023/C 214/08 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the storming of the Brazilian democratic institutions (2023/2505(RSP)) | 106 |
| 2023/C 214/09 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the situation of journalists in Morocco, notably the case of Omar Radi (2023/2506(RSP)) | 107 |
| 2023/C 214/10 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP)) | 109 |
| 2023/C 214/11 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran (2023/2511(RSP)) | 114 |
| 2023/C 214/12 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — Annual Report 2021 (2022/2153(INI)) | 123 |
| 2023/C 214/13 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2021 (2022/2152(INI)) | 133 |
| 2023/C 214/14 | European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the small-scale fisheries situation in the EU and future perspectives (2021/2056(INI)) | 150 |

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

2023/C 214/01

European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2023 on the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade (2022/2874(RSP))

2

Wednesday 18 January 2023

2023/C 214/02

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments (2022/3015(RSP))

8

2023/C 214/03

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on consumer protection in online video games: a European single market approach (2022/2014(INI))

15

2023/C 214/04

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2048(INI))

26

2023/C 214/05

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI))

54

2023/C 214/06

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2022 (2022/2049(INI))

77

Thursday 19 January 2023

2023/C 214/07

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (2023/2504(RSP))

104

2023/C 214/08

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the storming of the Brazilian democratic institutions (2023/2505(RSP))

106

2023/C 214/09

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the situation of journalists in Morocco, notably the case of Omar Radi (2023/2506(RSP))

107

2023/C 214/10

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP))

109

2023/C 214/11

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran (2023/2511(RSP))

114

2023/C 214/12

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — Annual Report 2021 (2022/2153(INI))

123

2023/C 214/13

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2021 (2022/2152(INI))

133

2023/C 214/14

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the small-scale fisheries situation in the EU and future perspectives (2021/2056(INI))

150

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| | II   Information |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 17 January 2023 |
| 2023/C 214/15 | European Parliament decision of 17 January 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning Rule 7 on defence of privileges and immunity and Rule 9 on procedures on immunity (2022/2210(REG)) | 167 |

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

2023/C 214/15

European Parliament decision of 17 January 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning Rule 7 on defence of privileges and immunity and Rule 9 on procedures on immunity (2022/2210(REG))

167

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 17 January 2023 |
| 2023/C 214/16 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the authorities of New Zealand competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism (10092/2022 — C9-0288/2022 — 2022/0157(NLE)) | 170 |
| 2023/C 214/17 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision authorising Member States to ratify, in the interest of the European Union, the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (06438/2022 — C9-0146/2022 — 2021/0383(NLE)) | 171 |
| 2023/C 214/18 | Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 (COM(2021)0709 — C9-0426/2021 — 2021/0367(COD)) | 172 |
| 2023/C 214/19 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU (COM(2021)0565 — C9-0041/2022 — 2021/0434(CNS)) | 223 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

2023/C 214/16

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the authorities of New Zealand competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism (10092/2022 — C9-0288/2022 — 2022/0157(NLE))

170

2023/C 214/17

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision authorising Member States to ratify, in the interest of the European Union, the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (06438/2022 — C9-0146/2022 — 2021/0383(NLE))

171

2023/C 214/18

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 (COM(2021)0709 — C9-0426/2021 — 2021/0367(COD))

172

2023/C 214/19

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU (COM(2021)0565 — C9-0041/2022 — 2021/0434(CNS))

223

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EN

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16.6.2023

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/1 |
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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/1

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2022-2023 SESSION

Sittings of 16 to 19 January 2023

TEXTS ADOPTED

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/2 |
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16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/2

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P9_TA(2023)0006

The creation of a European Capital of Local Trade

European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2023 on the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade (2022/2874(RSP))

(2023/C 214/01)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Petition No 0699/2021, |
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—

having regard to Petition No 0699/2021,

| — | having regard to Article 3(3) and Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty on European Union, |
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—

having regard to Article 3(3) and Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty on European Union,

| — | having regard to Articles 24, 153, 173 and 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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—

having regard to Articles 24, 153, 173 and 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (1), |
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—

having regard to Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (1),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and (EU) No 652/2014 (2), |
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—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014 and (EU) No 652/2014 (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC (3), |
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—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC (3),

| — | having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422) (4), |
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—

having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422) (4),

| — | having regard to the communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Think Small First’ — A ‘Small Business Act’ for Europe (COM(2008)0394), |
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—

having regard to the communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Think Small First’ — A ‘Small Business Act’ for Europe (COM(2008)0394),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (5), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on tackling non-tariff and non-tax barriers in the single market (6), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on tackling non-tariff and non-tax barriers in the single market (6),

| — | having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Europe’s moment: repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020)0456), |
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—

having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Europe’s moment: repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020)0456),

| — | having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103), |
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—

having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103),

| — | having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘A European retail sector fit for the 21st century’ (COM(2018)0219), |
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—

having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘A European retail sector fit for the 21st century’ (COM(2018)0219),

| — | having regard to the study of July 2020 by the European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs entitled ‘Territorial supply constraints in the EU retail sector’, |
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—

having regard to the study of July 2020 by the European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs entitled ‘Territorial supply constraints in the EU retail sector’,

| — | having regard to Rule 227(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 227(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Committee on Petitions has received petition No 0699/2021 proposing the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail; |
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A.

whereas the Committee on Petitions has received petition No 0699/2021 proposing the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail;

| B. | whereas the petitioner’s suggestions could serve as an inspiration for the selection procedure for the European Capital of Local Trade and Retail; |
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B.

whereas the petitioner’s suggestions could serve as an inspiration for the selection procedure for the European Capital of Local Trade and Retail;

| C. | whereas retail is a very important ecosystem in the EU economy, accounting for 11,5 % of EU value added and directly employing more than 29 million people; whereas its performance is key for household budgets and suppliers, as consumers spent on average 30 % of their budget on shopping; |
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C.

whereas retail is a very important ecosystem in the EU economy, accounting for 11,5 % of EU value added and directly employing more than 29 million people; whereas its performance is key for household budgets and suppliers, as consumers spent on average 30 % of their budget on shopping;

| D. | whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including family-run business, are the backbone of Europe’s economy; whereas they account for 99 % of all businesses in the EU and employ around 100 million people (7); |
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D.

whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including family-run business, are the backbone of Europe’s economy; whereas they account for 99 % of all businesses in the EU and employ around 100 million people (7);

| E. | whereas retail SMEs are crucial for urban and rural local communities, form part of the social fabric and contribute directly to maintaining town and city centres as vibrant areas where services to cover citizens’ needs are provided a short distance from their home; whereas retail SMEs also help tackle rural depopulation; whereas retail SMEs contribute directly to the prosperity, inclusiveness and wellbeing of citizens, to local cultural life and the heritage of EU towns and cities, as well as providing a significant number of employment opportunities in those communities, which in turn leads to better experiences for consumers; |
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E.

whereas retail SMEs are crucial for urban and rural local communities, form part of the social fabric and contribute directly to maintaining town and city centres as vibrant areas where services to cover citizens’ needs are provided a short distance from their home; whereas retail SMEs also help tackle rural depopulation; whereas retail SMEs contribute directly to the prosperity, inclusiveness and wellbeing of citizens, to local cultural life and the heritage of EU towns and cities, as well as providing a significant number of employment opportunities in those communities, which in turn leads to better experiences for consumers;

| F. | whereas, on the other hand, a lack of local commerce contributes to the social, economic and physical degradation of urban centres and districts and even leading to a vicious circle of deteriorating safety; whereas the lack of retail services is recognised as one of the reasons for depopulation of rural areas; |
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F.

whereas, on the other hand, a lack of local commerce contributes to the social, economic and physical degradation of urban centres and districts and even leading to a vicious circle of deteriorating safety; whereas the lack of retail services is recognised as one of the reasons for depopulation of rural areas;

| G. | whereas local commerce makes it possible to offer more personalised and direct service to consumers; |
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G.

whereas local commerce makes it possible to offer more personalised and direct service to consumers;

| H. | whereas the retail ecosystem has been seriously affected by the COVID-19 crisis; whereas SMEs have been affected by an unprecedented shock to the world economy, when shops were either closed or bound by stringent precautionary measures; whereas. secondly, the sector has faced the pressures due to the current crisis, including the conflict in Ukraine and rising energy costs; whereas the viability of many SMEs, often family-run microenterprises, is endangered and jobs are at risk; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the retail ecosystem has been seriously affected by the COVID-19 crisis; whereas SMEs have been affected by an unprecedented shock to the world economy, when shops were either closed or bound by stringent precautionary measures; whereas. secondly, the sector has faced the pressures due to the current crisis, including the conflict in Ukraine and rising energy costs; whereas the viability of many SMEs, often family-run microenterprises, is endangered and jobs are at risk;

| I. | whereas it is often very difficult for SMEs to maintain a competitive position against a backdrop of globalisation of the entire retail value chain led by large companies; whereas collateral consequences include standardisation of the commercial offer and of the urban landscape, emptying of urban centres, increased of ecological footprints and the impact on working conditions; whereas strengthening local trade could help address these consequences; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas it is often very difficult for SMEs to maintain a competitive position against a backdrop of globalisation of the entire retail value chain led by large companies; whereas collateral consequences include standardisation of the commercial offer and of the urban landscape, emptying of urban centres, increased of ecological footprints and the impact on working conditions; whereas strengthening local trade could help address these consequences;

| J. | whereas with the rapid development of e-commerce, the retail sector is currently undergoing a dramatic transformation, while multi-channel retail, combining offline and online sales, brings both new opportunities and challenges for the sector; |
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J.

whereas with the rapid development of e-commerce, the retail sector is currently undergoing a dramatic transformation, while multi-channel retail, combining offline and online sales, brings both new opportunities and challenges for the sector;

| K. | whereas euro area inflation is continuing to soar; whereas energy and fuel prices continue to rise at a rate considerably exceeding average inflation, remain highly volatile and are one of the main reasons for SME closures; whereas these factors make retail sector SMEs and microenterprises particularly vulnerable; |
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K.

whereas euro area inflation is continuing to soar; whereas energy and fuel prices continue to rise at a rate considerably exceeding average inflation, remain highly volatile and are one of the main reasons for SME closures; whereas these factors make retail sector SMEs and microenterprises particularly vulnerable;

| L. | whereas small traders are often affected by large sales platforms that offer lower prices because they have shifted their production costs to third countries; |
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L.

whereas small traders are often affected by large sales platforms that offer lower prices because they have shifted their production costs to third countries;

| M. | whereas in order to ensure an equal and fair retail trade across the European Union, it is essential to install high-capacity digital networks to all regions of the EU; whereas according to the European Court of Auditors there are still serious shortcomings in the deployment of these networks in the EU, which can deepen the digital divide and jeopardise the sustainability of local shops located in sparsely populated areas compared to those located in big cities; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas in order to ensure an equal and fair retail trade across the European Union, it is essential to install high-capacity digital networks to all regions of the EU; whereas according to the European Court of Auditors there are still serious shortcomings in the deployment of these networks in the EU, which can deepen the digital divide and jeopardise the sustainability of local shops located in sparsely populated areas compared to those located in big cities;

| N. | whereas the Commission communication entitled ‘A European retail sector fit for the 21st century’ aims to strengthen the competitiveness of the retail sector; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the Commission communication entitled ‘A European retail sector fit for the 21st century’ aims to strengthen the competitiveness of the retail sector;

| O. | whereas the Revitalise Retail initiative presented by the Commission supports digitalisation and modernisation of retail SMEs; whereas supporting small retailers’ capacity to adapt to these changes is one of the most important steps for EU policy makers; |
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O.

whereas the Revitalise Retail initiative presented by the Commission supports digitalisation and modernisation of retail SMEs; whereas supporting small retailers’ capacity to adapt to these changes is one of the most important steps for EU policy makers;

| P. | whereas the Commission has welcomed the petitioners’ proposal to create a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail and will consider the options for addressing the specific issues raised therein: whereas, given the priority of ensuring that the Commission’s support programmes have an impact, the Commission will, in particular, consider the importance of moving beyond awareness-raising, and contribute directly to solving challenges faced by retail SMEs and generating positive impact for them; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the Commission has welcomed the petitioners’ proposal to create a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail and will consider the options for addressing the specific issues raised therein: whereas, given the priority of ensuring that the Commission’s support programmes have an impact, the Commission will, in particular, consider the importance of moving beyond awareness-raising, and contribute directly to solving challenges faced by retail SMEs and generating positive impact for them;

| Q. | whereas the proposal could reinforce the ongoing work in cities in the framework of industry and SME policy, in particular the Intelligent Cities Challenge, which brings together an active community of 136 cities from 21 countries to leverage cutting-edge technologies and to drive a green and digital transformation and social resilience; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the proposal could reinforce the ongoing work in cities in the framework of industry and SME policy, in particular the Intelligent Cities Challenge, which brings together an active community of 136 cities from 21 countries to leverage cutting-edge technologies and to drive a green and digital transformation and social resilience;

| R. | whereas the building of a robust retail community can be very useful for those looking to modernise and improve their competitive position; |
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R.

whereas the building of a robust retail community can be very useful for those looking to modernise and improve their competitive position;

| S. | whereas complying with administrative formalities affects SMEs more than bigger companies due to their limited financial and human resources; |
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S.

whereas complying with administrative formalities affects SMEs more than bigger companies due to their limited financial and human resources;

| T. | whereas the task of regulating the retail sector lies primarily with Member States. whereas any assessment of the barriers faced by the retail sector should be based, among other things, on the experiences and perceptions of businesses, workers and consumers; whereas Member States should ensure that existing regulations do not disproportionally affect SMEs and microenterprises and hinder their activities; |
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T.

whereas the task of regulating the retail sector lies primarily with Member States. whereas any assessment of the barriers faced by the retail sector should be based, among other things, on the experiences and perceptions of businesses, workers and consumers; whereas Member States should ensure that existing regulations do not disproportionally affect SMEs and microenterprises and hinder their activities;

| U. | whereas retail is a sector that makes a significant fiscal contribution that helps to pay for public spending on public services for all citizens; |
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U.

whereas retail is a sector that makes a significant fiscal contribution that helps to pay for public spending on public services for all citizens;

| V. | whereas the objective of this proposal is to promote local retail and contribute to collective awareness of its economic and social importance; |
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V.

whereas the objective of this proposal is to promote local retail and contribute to collective awareness of its economic and social importance;

| W. | whereas local trade is often sourced from regional or national suppliers, thereby helping to reduce the carbon footprint of their products; whereas production within the Union’s borders guarantees quality standards and working conditions; |
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W.

whereas local trade is often sourced from regional or national suppliers, thereby helping to reduce the carbon footprint of their products; whereas production within the Union’s borders guarantees quality standards and working conditions;

| X. | whereas support for retail SMEs and local trade in the EU is crucial for boosting the EU’s economy and making supply chains shorter, more agile and safer; |
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X.

whereas support for retail SMEs and local trade in the EU is crucial for boosting the EU’s economy and making supply chains shorter, more agile and safer;

| Y. | whereas promoting local trade contributes to the green transition in the trade sector for short-circuit products; whereas it is necessary to raise public awareness of the importance of local and proximity trade in order to contribute to the fight against climate change; |
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Y.

whereas promoting local trade contributes to the green transition in the trade sector for short-circuit products; whereas it is necessary to raise public awareness of the importance of local and proximity trade in order to contribute to the fight against climate change;

| Z. | whereas it is necessary to promote and preserve the products and services from European Union towns, cities and regions in order to strengthen their heritage and the European single market; whereas if it follows up on the proposal in the petition, the Commission would be able to better track and define protected geographical indications in order to promote our products in the internal market and globally, and to preserve them from spurious competition; |
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Z.

whereas it is necessary to promote and preserve the products and services from European Union towns, cities and regions in order to strengthen their heritage and the European single market; whereas if it follows up on the proposal in the petition, the Commission would be able to better track and define protected geographical indications in order to promote our products in the internal market and globally, and to preserve them from spurious competition;

| AA. | whereas most EU policies and legislation are implemented at local and regional level and today cover almost all political, economic and social domains; |
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AA.

whereas most EU policies and legislation are implemented at local and regional level and today cover almost all political, economic and social domains;

| AB. | whereas, according to Eurostat data, retail trade in the EU decreased by 1,3 % in August 2022 compared to the same period in 2021 (8); |
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AB.

whereas, according to Eurostat data, retail trade in the EU decreased by 1,3 % in August 2022 compared to the same period in 2021 (8);

| AC. | whereas the Commission already manages programmes supporting the creation and sustainability of jobs and local economic activities, which could and should support this proposal such as the European Innovation Council, the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (EASME) and the Erasmus+ programmes; |
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AC.

whereas the Commission already manages programmes supporting the creation and sustainability of jobs and local economic activities, which could and should support this proposal such as the European Innovation Council, the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (EASME) and the Erasmus+ programmes;

| 1. | Calls on the Commission to work on and develop the proposal to create of a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail and to present a specific programme on this issue and ensure that support programmes deliver concrete proposals on resources and budget implications that will contribute directly to challenges faced by local retail sector; |
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1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to propose a Union action entitled ‘European Capital of Local Trade and Retail’, whose objective should be to highlight the vital role that local retail plays in significantly supporting social cohesion, in promoting and protecting the uniqueness and diversity of European towns, cities and regions and in helping local businesses with the challenges generated by unfair competition; |
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2.

| 3. | Calls on the Commission to form a selection panel every year which is to be composed of various stakeholders, such as representatives of SMEs, local trade associations, civic organisations, young entrepreneurs, local representatives, MEPs and members of the Committee of the Regions; calls for the selection board to determine the eligibility and selection criteria which could take into account factors such as good labour conditions, environmental protection or promotion of local products; considers that the selection process should be open to towns and cities regardless of their number of inhabitants; specifies that the selection board must submit a report to the Commission, Parliament and the Council on nominations, judged against the objectives and characteristics of this action; |
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3.

| 4. | Calls on the Commission to promote the hosting every year by a European town or city of a year of conferences, workshops and initiatives on, for example, how to digitalise trade, how to boost technological innovation in local retail, how to contribute to protecting the environment, how to increase its cultural trends or how to optimise communication and engagement with consumers; |
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4.

| 5. | Emphasises the importance of the Commission’s role in providing support and advice for Member States in their efforts to create a fairer, more open and integrated retail market, taking into account best practices and guidelines that would help Member States identify less restrictive measures to ensure that a balance is struck between achieving public policy objectives and ensuring the development and growth of retailers; calls, in particular, on the Commission and Member States to take action to facilitate the creation and/or consolidation of supply chains; |
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5.

| 6. | Calls on the Member States to adopt measures for revitalising, modernising and adapting business models in the small retail sector, including family-run business, so that public authorities can help small retailers embrace technological and digital changes and modernise in order to meet the challenges of the future, such as environmental and energy supply, in particular following the COVID-19 pandemic and significant changes to buying habits; |
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6.

| 7. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide incentives to developing functioning local strategies that could steer local policy towards making a real impact on the life and work of small retailers, including the promotion of training in new retail sector technologies, in order to ensure that all traders can adapt to new forms of online sales; |
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7.

| 8. | Stresses that local trade has a major impact on rural areas and that in medium-sized towns and cities it is a vital economic driver for the whole area; stresses that this type of trade boosts the economy and employment of these areas and is very closely linked to other sectors such as tourism or culture, where synergies and partnerships often boost the economic the development of towns and cities in the area; |
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8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively support and help small retailers during all stages from their creation to their day-to-day running, while taking into account the subsidiarity principle and the need to ease the administrative burdens for small companies and retailers; asks for small retailers to be supported in overcoming obstacles and difficulties in their digital transformation; |
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9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to launch a dedicated EU communication campaign on retail trade through an ‘EU local trade’ brand aiming to promote EU local trade and encouraging citizens to participate in the retail sector, both as consumers and suppliers; calls on the Commission to launch public awareness campaigns on the importance and benefits of local trade; |
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10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission to fully use the Single Market Programme to provide support to local businesses, in particular SMEs, with the aim of boosting their competitiveness and sustainability, including in the retail sector, thereby facilitating access to markets, strengthening distribution networks, promoting entrepreneurship and the acquisition of entrepreneurial skills, promoting the modernisation of industry and reducing its environmental and energy footprint; |
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11.

| 12. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the viability of the sector at a particularly complex time and to put in place the additional funds and aid needed for the survival of retail trade in the EU; stresses that the current supply crisis, as well as price increases, are affecting SMEs more acutely; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls on the Member States and regional and local authorities to include the retail sector as a horizontal priority in their operational programmes, urban and rural development policies, smart specialisation strategies and partnership agreements for 2021-2027 in order to finance retail support projects; |
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13.

| 14. | Calls on the Commission to further incorporate the promotion of local trade under the objective of strengthening the urban dimension of cohesion policy, as it is a key sector for local and regional economies; |
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14.

| 15. | Encourages the Member States to promote fiscal incentives for small traders who choose to settle in sparsely populated areas in order to use this tool to combat the demographic challenge in the EU; |
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15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission, moreover, to take account of the possible synergies between its various Directorates-General given the cross-cutting nature of local trade, in fields such as tourism, transport, culture, regional development, urban policy, employment and climate; |
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16.

| 17. | Calls on the Commission to work with the European Innovation Council and EASME to develop the creation of a European Capital of Local Trade and Retail; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls on the Commission to produce an annual report evaluating the results of the previous year’s event, including an analysis by the organisers of the event with testimonials and a compilation of good practices and know-how to be transmitted from city to city; calls for this report to be presented to Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions; calls for the Commission to be able to revise this initiative by making proposals which it judges necessary for the smooth operation of this action and, in particular, with a view to the future enlargement of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Committee of the Regions and the governments and the parliaments of the Member States. |
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19.

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(1)  OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36.

(2)  OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 33.

(4)  OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36.

(5)  OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 2.

(6)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 212.

(7)  https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes_en

(8)  Eurostat, Euroindicators, 5 September 2022: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/ 2995521/14698165/4-05092022-AP-EN.pdf/e19fec60-f51a-dde7-51cb-0b8d0bd7f6fc

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Wednesday 18 January 2023

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/8 |
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16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/8

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P9_TA(2023)0007

30th Anniversary of the single market

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments (2022/3015(RSP))

(2023/C 214/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 3 of the of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 9 and 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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—

having regard to Article 3 of the of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 9 and 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to the public hearing of 27 October 2022 organised by its Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the 30th anniversary of the single market, |
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—

having regard to the public hearing of 27 October 2022 organised by its Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the 30th anniversary of the single market,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on strengthening the single market: the future of free movement of services (1), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on strengthening the single market: the future of free movement of services (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘Towards a more sustainable single market for business and consumers’ (2), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘Towards a more sustainable single market for business and consumers’ (2),

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors 2022 special report No 13 entitled ‘Free movement in the EU during the COVID-19 pandemic: Limited scrutiny of internal border controls, and uncoordinated actions by Member States’, |
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—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors 2022 special report No 13 entitled ‘Free movement in the EU during the COVID-19 pandemic: Limited scrutiny of internal border controls, and uncoordinated actions by Member States’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘Long term action plan for better implementation and enforcement of single market rules’ (COM(2020)0094), |
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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘Long term action plan for better implementation and enforcement of single market rules’ (COM(2020)0094),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 2 February 2022 entitled ‘An EU Strategy on Standardisation: Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market’ (COM(2022)0031), |
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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 February 2022 entitled ‘An EU Strategy on Standardisation: Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market’ (COM(2022)0031),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 September 2022 entitled ‘SOLVIT’s Helping Hand in the Single Market: celebrating 20 years’ (SWD(2022)0325), |
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—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 September 2022 entitled ‘SOLVIT’s Helping Hand in the Single Market: celebrating 20 years’ (SWD(2022)0325),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518), |
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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518),

| — | having regard to the statements by the Council and the Commission of 16 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market, |
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—

having regard to the statements by the Council and the Commission of 16 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, |
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—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

| A. | whereas 30 years ago, a joint vision, common efforts and determination by the European institutions and Member States working closely with European consumers, businesses, workers and civil society led to the creation of the EU single market, protecting social standards, thus marking a major step in the history of European integration and its ever closer cross-border cooperation; |
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A.

whereas 30 years ago, a joint vision, common efforts and determination by the European institutions and Member States working closely with European consumers, businesses, workers and civil society led to the creation of the EU single market, protecting social standards, thus marking a major step in the history of European integration and its ever closer cross-border cooperation;

| B. | whereas the single market is today the world’s largest internal market, accounting for 56 million European jobs and generating 25 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP), and has developed high standards of consumer protection; |
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B.

whereas the single market is today the world’s largest internal market, accounting for 56 million European jobs and generating 25 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP), and has developed high standards of consumer protection;

| C. | whereas, after three decades, the single market continues to face changes; whereas the recent supply shortages deriving from multiple crises underline the need to make the single market an instrument that strengthens the EU’s resilience and to speed up the transition to a fully circular economy by 2050; |
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C.

whereas, after three decades, the single market continues to face changes; whereas the recent supply shortages deriving from multiple crises underline the need to make the single market an instrument that strengthens the EU’s resilience and to speed up the transition to a fully circular economy by 2050;

| D. | whereas it remains necessary to continue addressing fragmentation, mainly by introducing common EU policies to foster Europe’s global and internal competitiveness and fair competition to enhance its geopolitical impact, while recognising the specific role played by services of public interest; |
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D.

whereas it remains necessary to continue addressing fragmentation, mainly by introducing common EU policies to foster Europe’s global and internal competitiveness and fair competition to enhance its geopolitical impact, while recognising the specific role played by services of public interest;

| E. | whereas only a social and competitive Europe will be able to drive forward the economic recovery and sustainable growth, jobs and innovation, contribute to delivering the green and digital transition and enable ‘open strategic autonomy’; |
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E.

whereas only a social and competitive Europe will be able to drive forward the economic recovery and sustainable growth, jobs and innovation, contribute to delivering the green and digital transition and enable ‘open strategic autonomy’;

| F. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit have posed serious challenges to the integrity of the single market, in particular regarding the free movement of goods and persons and the smooth functioning of supply chains; |
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F.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit have posed serious challenges to the integrity of the single market, in particular regarding the free movement of goods and persons and the smooth functioning of supply chains;

| G. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is now further highlighting the importance of unity and cooperation between Member States; |
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G.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is now further highlighting the importance of unity and cooperation between Member States;

| H. | whereas research shows that further action in the area of facilitation of the free movement of goods could significantly boost intra-EU trade, with potential economic benefits of between EUR 228 billion and EUR 372 billion per year; |
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H.

whereas research shows that further action in the area of facilitation of the free movement of goods could significantly boost intra-EU trade, with potential economic benefits of between EUR 228 billion and EUR 372 billion per year;

| I. | whereas research also shows that further action in service sectors could be beneficial, with between EUR 279 billion and EUR 457 billion of additional GDP per year in the long term; whereas the EU’s achievements in the digital single market are estimated to have contributed EUR 177 billion to economic growth in the EU each year; |
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I.

whereas research also shows that further action in service sectors could be beneficial, with between EUR 279 billion and EUR 457 billion of additional GDP per year in the long term; whereas the EU’s achievements in the digital single market are estimated to have contributed EUR 177 billion to economic growth in the EU each year;

| J. | whereas developing a well-functioning single market for goods and services is an integral part of the path towards more open strategic autonomy and more resilience through sustainable development; whereas the digital single market is the backbone of a European tech ecosystem that can both foster growth and help uphold democratic principles, civil liberties and an open internet; |
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J.

whereas developing a well-functioning single market for goods and services is an integral part of the path towards more open strategic autonomy and more resilience through sustainable development; whereas the digital single market is the backbone of a European tech ecosystem that can both foster growth and help uphold democratic principles, civil liberties and an open internet;

| K. | whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe put forward proposals to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of the EU’s economy, and to strengthen the single market, including digitalisation measures to consolidate the economy and the single market in a fair and sustainable way, enhance the digital single market for companies of all sizes and make Europe a world leader in a human-centric digital transformation; |
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K.

whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe put forward proposals to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of the EU’s economy, and to strengthen the single market, including digitalisation measures to consolidate the economy and the single market in a fair and sustainable way, enhance the digital single market for companies of all sizes and make Europe a world leader in a human-centric digital transformation;

| L. | whereas the single market has always developed and grown in response to the challenges facing it; whereas it again needs to be transformed and updated to address new challenges and to remain a motor of European integration; |
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L.

whereas the single market has always developed and grown in response to the challenges facing it; whereas it again needs to be transformed and updated to address new challenges and to remain a motor of European integration;

The single market matters: undiminished importance and current challenges

| 1. | Recalls that, by boosting businesses, protecting consumers and supporting citizens over both the short and long term, and promoting competitiveness and sustainable growth throughout the EU, the single market is the engine of European integration and the backbone of its economy; |
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1.

| 2. | Recalls that the single market has been and continues to be the key path towards peace, stability and prosperity on the European continent, as well as making a vital contribution to Europe’s role on the global stage; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines that all four freedoms of the single market, as laid down in the Treaties, are essential to these goals and need to be implemented in order to deepen the single market; |
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3.

| 4. | Emphasises that the single market cannot be taken for granted; underlines that the headwinds facing it are powerful, ranging from long-term geopolitical challenges and their effects on global economy and trade, to climate change, and to the challenges within the EU and in its neighbourhood; |
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4.

| 5. | Stresses that the powerful impact of Brexit on businesses in both the United Kingdom and the EU, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and on many citizens, bears out the central role of the single market not only in fostering economic integration but also in bringing Europe’s people together, and underlines the importance of the single market, the customs union and the value of EU membership; |
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5.

| 6. | Observes that the COVID-19 crisis and the variety of unilateral national restrictions imposed had a serious and disruptive impact on the free movement of goods and citizens, in particular cross-border workers, adversely affecting businesses in the EU; points out, however, that the single market proved to be one of Europe’s most important tools with which to respond to the crisis through cooperation; recognises the role of the single market in lifting national export bans during the COVID-19 crisis, providing essential goods and services to citizens, and stepping up manufacturing of medical equipment; |
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6.

| 7. | Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has once again put the resilience of the single market to the test, as it has disrupted supply chains and trade flows, leading to shortages, including the scarcity of some critical raw materials; |
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7.

| 8. | Considers that the single market is a key tool in times of crisis if Member States can act in a coordinated way; considers that the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) should be central to ensuring such coordination so as to prevent shortages and ensure the smooth functioning of the single market, including the free movement of essential goods and services throughout the EU; |
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8.

| 9. | Stresses that efforts to ensure the proper functioning of the single market must go hand in hand with efforts to achieve the EU’s fundamental objectives in terms of sustainable development and a social market economy; urges the Commission, therefore, to target resources on issues affecting the single market, in particular unjustified barriers that prevent the realisation of the single market’s full potential for consumers, workers and businesses, especially SMEs; considers, in this regard, that efforts should be intensified, notably through the Single Market Enforcement Task-Force (SMET); reiterates its call on the Commission to present concrete outcomes of the work of the SMET by the end of 2023; |
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9.

| 10. | Maintains that in order to further strengthen the single market and achieve gains for EU consumers and businesses, additional efforts are required, including timely and adequate policy-making; emphasises the contributions to single market policy and the legislative framework made with the leadership of its Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO); underlines that updating the single market includes embedding common treaty goals into the internal market policies; |
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10.

| 11. | Emphasises that the recent entry into force of the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act represents an essential contribution to the creation of a harmonised, fair, competitive and trustworthy digital single market; considers it essential to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of these two legislative acts including by making available sufficient financial and human resources; calls on the Commission to monitor implementation of these acts continuously and closely and to report to the relevant parliamentary committee accordingly; |
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11.

| 12. | Remains committed to delivering good results in the future artificial intelligence act, data act and cyber resilience act, which will be key instruments in promoting a single market approach to artificial intelligence and for creating a single market for data, as well as robust protection for consumers and users alike; stresses that these proposals are of key importance to shaping the rules underpinning the digital transition in the single market and to strengthening Europe’s lead in pioneering technologies; adds that the Artificial Intelligence Act must have a human-centric approach at its core; |
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12.

| 13. | Underlines that recently agreed rules on a common charger for mobile phones and other electronic devices are evidence of the beneficial role the single market can play for citizens, businesses and the environment; highlights in this regard the role the European Parliament, and the IMCO Committee in particular, has played in devising such rules over the last 12 years; |
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13.

| 14. | Recognises the positive contribution of the new legislative framework to the integration of the single market; |
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14.

| 15. | Acknowledges the need for an effective European standardisation system that enables rapid publication of harmonised standards that grant presumption of conformity and that is aligned with international standards to support global trade; |
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15.

| 16. | Stresses the importance of the effective recognition of professional qualifications and the removal of unjustified barriers to the free movement of professionals in order to make EU professional services globally competitive in future decades; encourages the Commission to remain vigilant in pursuing infringement procedures where Member States do not comply with EU legislation on the recognition of qualifications; |
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16.

| 17. | Recalls that the Commission should submit a report on the implementation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (3) by May 2024; considers that the amendment of the Directive seeks to update and improve the application of consumer protection rules in order to address new developments in the single market; |
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17.

| 18. | Underlines, furthermore, the need to assess and manage the EU’s strategic dependency on countries outside the bloc in a number of critical areas, including by increasing the reuse or recycling of products, and remains committed to delivering an ambitious legislative framework on batteries and semiconductors, as well as to advancing European standardisation and the SMEI as important factors in ensuring the EU’s security of supply, crisis management and resilience; |
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18.

| 19. | Highlights that consumers are at the heart of the single market; underlines the important role of consumer protection in ensuring that the single market can function properly and efficiently; |
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19.

| 20. | Is fully committed to maintaining a high level of consumer protection, including in the digital and green transitions, and to the ongoing work on the general product safety regulation, the consumer credits directive and the directive on distance marketing of consumer financial services directive; |
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20.

| 21. | Believes that the circular economy is an important goal, that it is essential that products are designed to last longer and to be easily and safely repaired, and that consumers receive reliable and clear information on durability and repairability, while at the same time avoiding disproportionate burdens on traders, in particular SMEs; plans to contribute constructively to that end through its work on the Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition and the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products initiatives; calls in this regard on the Commission to come up swiftly with its announced legislative proposal on the right to repair; |
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21.

| 22. | Believes that products placed on the single market should not only meet the highest product and safety standards but should also comply with the highest production standards; underlines, therefore, that products made with forced labour should be prohibited on the single market; underlines the essential role of both market surveillance authorities and businesses in ensuring that all goods entering the single market from countries outside the EU comply with EU law; |
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22.

| 23. | Acknowledges the role that EU public procurement rules can play in a transition towards a sustainable and circular economy; |
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23.

| 24. | Strongly believes in the importance of an effective legal framework for customs, and points to the importance of the digitalisation and interconnection of customs and non-customs systems by 2025 as a strategic objective of the EU; considers that electronic customs procedures can contribute to a well-functioning digital single market; welcomes in this respect the Commission’s Interim Evaluation Report on the implementation of the Union Customs Code (UCC) and its intention to reform the Customs Union by a legislative package to improve the UCC and adapt it to meet the challenges and risks arising from e-commerce in particular; encourages the Commission to take into account the conclusions and recommendations of the ‘Wise Persons Group on Challenges Facing the Customs Union’; |
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24.

| 25. | Emphasises that Member States have primary responsibility for effectively and uniformly implementing and enforcing existing single market legislation; |
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25.

Updating the single market to renew its promise

| 26. | Believes that the best way to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the single market is to update it to renew its promise to deliver benefits for consumers and businesses; considers that a single market with a high level of consumer protection, which takes into account environmental and social considerations, and a frictionless framework for business is what makes it attractive on a global scale and what further drives European integration; |
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26.

| 27. | Considers that further development of the single market is a process that must provide renewed engagement with all citizens, as well as educational incentives to ensure that opportunities to acquire the new skills required by the green and digital transitions of our economies are provided; |
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27.

| 28. | Is convinced that, while underlining the need for competition within the single market, partnership and cooperation in the single market is a motor of European integration; believes that cooperation and collaboration need to be developed further as they can enhance strengths and compensate for weaknesses in the single market, especially in times of crises; takes the view that the single market should remain a key tool for people and businesses in such situations; |
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28.

| 29. | Maintains that single market policy should not only be about reducing barriers but rather should guide the EU towards further development based on common values, in particular in terms of clearly defining what needs to be done to facilitate businesses and workers in the transition, and to protect consumers and the environment; |
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29.

| 30. | Calls on the Commission to continue looking at new digital opportunities and trends, including virtual worlds, to make sure the single market continues to function properly and that consumers are well protected; calls on the Commission to examine the impact of environmental measures on services sectors, including digital services, and whether there is a need to update such measures; |
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30.

| 31. | Reiterates the need to facilitate the free flow of non-personal data to enable European innovation, support the growth of businesses and the digital single market; expresses its support for moving towards a fully functional e-procurement regime and e-invoicing; |
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31.

| 32. | Believes that Europe should assess the regulatory framework for products and services, and whether rules need to be put in place on remedies and guarantee rights in order to incentivise sustainable consumption; |
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32.

| 33. | Considers also that Europe needs to further develop the second-hand market; |
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33.

| 34. | Advocates strengthening further the external dimension of the single market and preserving the EU’s interests and its strategic independence; considers that the single market’s high standards can spill over and expand across the world and should be properly enforced in order to create a level playing field for European businesses; |
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34.

| 35. | Underlines the importance of European standards and European standardisation deliverables for the single market, the competitiveness of European industry and for the safety and security of citizens; welcomes the new EU strategy presented by the Commission; underlines the importance of consulting all relevant stakeholders, including SMEs, consumer organisations, and environmental and social stakeholders and of taking public interest in general into account; considers that the EU must develop a more strategic approach to standards, including on international standardisation activities in relevant global formats, in particular in the digital domain; |
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35.

| 36. | Highlights the need to provide a framework for regulation for short-term property rentals and accommodation, including by improving transparency and legal certainty, especially as regards data generation and data sharing; |
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36.

| 37. | Considers that consumer protection needs to be updated, in a way that also takes digital asymmetries into account, in order to cover the digital services sector, such as gaming, virtual reality, augmented reality and virtual worlds; stresses the importance of fostering innovation and new businesses; |
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37.

| 38. | Believes that the European Accessibility Act and the Web Accessibility Directive have been noteworthy achievements in removing barriers for persons with disabilities and thus enabling all EU citizens to take part in the single market for products and services as well as the wider digital single market; considers, however, that the implementation of such crucial legislation varies widely across Member States and, in general, has not yet been satisfactory; invites Member States to take due account of accessibility rules in procurement procedures; stresses, in this context, that the Accessible EU Centre should be given a central role in supporting Member States in the implementation phase; further believes that businesses have benefited from common, harmonised rules on accessibility; asks the Commission to consider how to address remaining barriers and improve accessibility in order to continue benefiting citizens and businesses; |
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38.

| 39. | Highlights that e-commerce measures targeting unjustified geo-blocking, notably Regulation (EU) 2018/302 (4), have contributed to creating the framework for a less fragmented single market and enhancing consumer choice for online shopping; |
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39.

| 40. | Underlines the important role that the SOLVIT network plays in helping enhance the functioning of the single market by supporting businesses, citizens and public authorities with the correct application of single market rules; stresses that SOLVIT stands out as a front runner in the digital provision of EU services and as a promoter of an alternative approach to ensuring compliance with EU rules; reaffirms that the SOLVIT system is not a substitute for enforcement by the Commission when Member States fail to implement the rules; |
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40.

| 41. | Calls for the Single Market Scoreboard to be updated; considers that the scoreboard requires continuous updating as it does not measure all aspects of the single market, particularly in the case of services; suggests exploring new indicators to measure the single market’s successes in a qualitative way to investigate how it delivers benefits for businesses and consumers; |
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41.

| 42. | Underlines the importance of effective, timely and correct application and enforcement of the single market regulatory framework; stresses that this requires close cooperation between the Commission and Member States, full commitment of national authorities responsible for the proper application and enforcement of the law, better cooperation between customs and market surveillance authorities and greater involvement of stakeholders such as consumer organisations and other public organisations, as well as businesses; |
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42.

| 43. | Underlines that proper enforcement and compliance with single market rules is crucial to building consumer trust and confidence, as well as to creating a level playing field for all businesses, including those from countries outside the EU selling products and services in the single market, with a particular focus on the market surveillance framework, product safety and mutual recognition; |
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43.

| 44. | Emphasises the need to ensure robust enforcement, which may in some cases extend beyond the traditional remedial measures, such as infringement procedures, to put much more stress on prevention, and in particular on further deepening the collaboration and cooperation between national competent authorities when enforcing EU rules; |
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44.

| 45. | Highlights that for a functioning customs union, national obstacles need to be removed in order to prevent harmful traffic of goods and protect the EU Single Market from illegal products; calls on the Commission to set up an EU customs agency; |
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45.

| 46. | Advocates strengthening the funding of single market policies by updating the current multiannual financial framework; |
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46.

Conclusions: a crucial moment for strengthening and developing the single market

| 47. | Believes that the EU will only be able to make the most of its economic power if the single market receives renewed commitment from the Member States and EU institutions; considers that, in order to succeed, strong political will is needed, as well as a new overarching programme with an agenda for action towards 2030 and beyond; |
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47.

| 48. | Considers that strengthening and developing the single market requires a broader strategy strengthening the single market for services, as well as a real digital single market in which data can flow freely within the EU and across sectors to the benefit of businesses, researchers and public administrations, in compliance with privacy and data protection rules; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Recognises the special status of services of general interest and the need to guarantee them in the public interest, as ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, taking into account the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as laid down in Protocol (No 26) TFEU on services of general interest; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Considers that in order to foster resilience, ensure security of supply, reach the Union’s connectivity goals and promote open strategic autonomy in key sectors, the Commission and Member States should work towards creating a true single market for energy and for telecommunications services, with strong engagement and protection of consumers, as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Acknowledges that the new legislative framework for products has been a success for product regulation in Europe for decades; stresses that it needs to be updated in the light of technological developments and the digital and circular economy; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Takes the view that EU institutions, Member States and all stakeholders for their part should genuinely commit to developing the single market in the collective interest and to strengthening the EU’s place in the world; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Invites the Commission to provide a vision and guidance for the new programme; calls on Member States to commit to partnership and cooperation; reaffirms its readiness to continue playing its constructive part in this process; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Wishes the single market a happy 30th birthday; |
| --- | --- |

54.

o

o o

| 55. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

55.

---

(1)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 14.

(2)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 10.

(3)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22).

(4)  Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market (OJ L 60 I, 2.3.2018, p. 1).

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/15

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P9_TA(2023)0008

Consumer protection in online video games: a European single market approach

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on consumer protection in online video games: a European single market approach (2022/2014(INI))

(2023/C 214/03)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, and General comment No 25 (2021) of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, and General comment No 25 (2021) of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 22 April 2008 on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the use of video games (COM(2008)0207), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 April 2008 on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the use of video games (COM(2008)0207),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 on shaping Europe’s digital future (COM(2020)0067), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2020 on shaping Europe’s digital future (COM(2020)0067),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 on the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 on the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 May 2022 entitled ‘A Digital Decade for children and youth: the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)’ (COM(2022)0212), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 May 2022 entitled ‘A Digital Decade for children and youth: the new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)’ (COM(2022)0212),

| — | having regard to the Council Resolution of 1 March 2002 on the protection of consumers, in particular young people, through the labelling of certain video games and computer games according to age group (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council Resolution of 1 March 2002 on the protection of consumers, in particular young people, through the labelling of certain video games and computer games according to age group (1),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (2),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services (3),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules (4),

| — | having regard to Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5),

| — | having regard to the Commission notice of 29 December 2021 entitled ‘Guidance on the interpretation and application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market’ (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission notice of 29 December 2021 entitled ‘Guidance on the interpretation and application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market’ (6),

| — | having regard to the Commission notice of 29 December 2021 entitled ‘Guidance on the interpretation and application of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights’ (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission notice of 29 December 2021 entitled ‘Guidance on the interpretation and application of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights’ (7),

| — | having regard to the Commission fitness check of EU consumer law on digital fairness, which was launched with a call for evidence on 17 May 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission fitness check of EU consumer law on digital fairness, which was launched with a call for evidence on 17 May 2022,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (8),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2009 on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the use of video games (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2009 on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the use of video games (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on protecting children in the digital world (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on protecting children in the digital world (11),

| — | having regard to its position of 28 March 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Creative Europe programme (2021 to 2027) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its position of 28 March 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Creative Europe programme (2021 to 2027) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 (12),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 April 2022 on building a European strategy for the cultural and creative industries ecosystem (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 April 2022 on building a European strategy for the cultural and creative industries ecosystem (13),

| — | having regard to the study of the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies of the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies of July 2020 entitled ‘Loot boxes in online games and their effect on consumers, in particular young consumers’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study of the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies of the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies of July 2020 entitled ‘Loot boxes in online games and their effect on consumers, in particular young consumers’,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0300/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0300/2022),

| A. | whereas video games are played by all age groups in Europe, with half of all Europeans between the ages of 6 and 64 playing video games and with the largest age group being 45-64 years old; whereas 73 % of children aged 6-10, 84 % of those aged 11-14 and 74 % of young people aged 15-24 play video games (14); |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas video games are played by all age groups in Europe, with half of all Europeans between the ages of 6 and 64 playing video games and with the largest age group being 45-64 years old; whereas 73 % of children aged 6-10, 84 % of those aged 11-14 and 74 % of young people aged 15-24 play video games (14);

| B. | whereas the European video game sector is the fastest growing cultural and creative sector in Europe, with an estimated European market size of EUR 23,3 billion in 2020 and with a higher worldwide turnover compared to music and movie companies (15), whereas this sector represents an important potential for growth and job creation, and contributes to Europe's digital single market; whereas the video game sector is the only cultural and creative industry to have experienced turnover growth during the COVID-19 crisis (16); |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the European video game sector is the fastest growing cultural and creative sector in Europe, with an estimated European market size of EUR 23,3 billion in 2020 and with a higher worldwide turnover compared to music and movie companies (15), whereas this sector represents an important potential for growth and job creation, and contributes to Europe's digital single market; whereas the video game sector is the only cultural and creative industry to have experienced turnover growth during the COVID-19 crisis (16);

| C. | whereas video games have a unique creative value compared to computer programs, as recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU (17), and are protected under Directive 2009/24/EC (18) on the legal protection of computer programs and Directive 2001/29/EC (19) on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, on which the value chain is based; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas video games have a unique creative value compared to computer programs, as recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU (17), and are protected under Directive 2009/24/EC (18) on the legal protection of computer programs and Directive 2001/29/EC (19) on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, on which the value chain is based;

| D. | whereas despite its central role in the European cultural and creative ecosystem, the video game sector is still neglected by policymakers in comparison to other media industries, especially film and other audiovisual products, which generally receive more funding and are used as a model to shape regulations and policies around video games, an approach that does not consider the differences between them; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas despite its central role in the European cultural and creative ecosystem, the video game sector is still neglected by policymakers in comparison to other media industries, especially film and other audiovisual products, which generally receive more funding and are used as a model to shape regulations and policies around video games, an approach that does not consider the differences between them;

| E. | whereas the European video game industry is mainly made up of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups, which play an important role in innovation and growth in this sector (20); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the European video game industry is mainly made up of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups, which play an important role in innovation and growth in this sector (20);

| F. | whereas the video game industry has a complete value chain based on innovation and creativity, encompassing a vast range of skills and know-how; whereas technological developments in the online video game sector are becoming increasingly important and spill over to other sectors and industries like construction, design, retail, education, marketing, virtual/augmented reality and online shopping; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the video game industry has a complete value chain based on innovation and creativity, encompassing a vast range of skills and know-how; whereas technological developments in the online video game sector are becoming increasingly important and spill over to other sectors and industries like construction, design, retail, education, marketing, virtual/augmented reality and online shopping;

| G. | whereas some of the companies in the sector use content created by minors and young children; whereas measures should be put in place to protect minors and young children from being commercially exploited as online game content creators (21); |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas some of the companies in the sector use content created by minors and young children; whereas measures should be put in place to protect minors and young children from being commercially exploited as online game content creators (21);

| H. | whereas video games are one of the most popular forms of entertainment in Europe, alongside other entertainment activities, as a Eurobarometer study from 2019 found that 27 % of Europeans play games online at least once per month compared to 48 % who stream music and 47 % who watch films or TV shows on online platforms; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas video games are one of the most popular forms of entertainment in Europe, alongside other entertainment activities, as a Eurobarometer study from 2019 found that 27 % of Europeans play games online at least once per month compared to 48 % who stream music and 47 % who watch films or TV shows on online platforms;

| I. | whereas the functioning of online gaming relies on connectivity in order to provide a stable and high-quality experience; whereas the level of Europeans’ satisfaction regarding upload and download speeds of their internet connections varies across Europe, exceeding 90 % in some Member States and reaching as low as 65 % in others (22); whereas in rural areas, dissatisfaction with internet connectivity is 30 % higher than in urban areas; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the functioning of online gaming relies on connectivity in order to provide a stable and high-quality experience; whereas the level of Europeans’ satisfaction regarding upload and download speeds of their internet connections varies across Europe, exceeding 90 % in some Member States and reaching as low as 65 % in others (22); whereas in rural areas, dissatisfaction with internet connectivity is 30 % higher than in urban areas;

| J. | whereas online video games can be played on many different devices and can be enjoyed using a number of functionalities, design choices and tools, such as multiplayer mode, real-time voice chat systems, online shopping, augmented reality, virtual reality, free or paid downloadable content, subscriptions and loot boxes, that can shape the gaming experience for players; whereas not all video games enable online interaction with other players; whereas parental control tools exist to disable any interaction with other players; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas online video games can be played on many different devices and can be enjoyed using a number of functionalities, design choices and tools, such as multiplayer mode, real-time voice chat systems, online shopping, augmented reality, virtual reality, free or paid downloadable content, subscriptions and loot boxes, that can shape the gaming experience for players; whereas not all video games enable online interaction with other players; whereas parental control tools exist to disable any interaction with other players;

| K. | whereas so-called loot boxes containing apparently random objects are usually accessible through the game or can be paid for with real money; whereas they can be sold using game designs, commonly known as dark patterns, which could have negative psychological and financial consequences through unwanted or uncontrolled purchases, especially for minors and young children; whereas there is an ongoing court case in the Netherlands on the measures to apply to loot boxes; whereas Slovakia is also investigating the appropriate measures to take; whereas this lack of a harmonised approach leads to the fragmentation of the market for video games within the EU; whereas there are no specific consumer protection mechanisms at European level to ensure the protection of all players, particularly minors and young children, as regards paid loot boxes; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas so-called loot boxes containing apparently random objects are usually accessible through the game or can be paid for with real money; whereas they can be sold using game designs, commonly known as dark patterns, which could have negative psychological and financial consequences through unwanted or uncontrolled purchases, especially for minors and young children; whereas there is an ongoing court case in the Netherlands on the measures to apply to loot boxes; whereas Slovakia is also investigating the appropriate measures to take; whereas this lack of a harmonised approach leads to the fragmentation of the market for video games within the EU; whereas there are no specific consumer protection mechanisms at European level to ensure the protection of all players, particularly minors and young children, as regards paid loot boxes;

| L. | whereas the gaming industry has evolved in recent decades from an arcade and boxed revenue model to a now widely employed games-as-a-service, pay-to-win or freemium business model; whereas despite spiralling development costs, game prices have stabilised owing to the possibility of spreading these costs via game extensions; notes however that the end cost for the extended game experience can significantly increase over time; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the gaming industry has evolved in recent decades from an arcade and boxed revenue model to a now widely employed games-as-a-service, pay-to-win or freemium business model; whereas despite spiralling development costs, game prices have stabilised owing to the possibility of spreading these costs via game extensions; notes however that the end cost for the extended game experience can significantly increase over time;

| M. | whereas some online video games are based on monetising users through data collection and advertisements, creating an incentive to get users, including minors and young children, to spend as much time as possible on games; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas some online video games are based on monetising users through data collection and advertisements, creating an incentive to get users, including minors and young children, to spend as much time as possible on games;

| N. | whereas spending excessive amounts of time playing online video games, which is aggravated by manipulative design, can create addiction and lead to ‘gaming disorder’, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (23); |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas spending excessive amounts of time playing online video games, which is aggravated by manipulative design, can create addiction and lead to ‘gaming disorder’, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (23);

| O. | whereas consumer protection related issues may occur when playing video games, in particular with regard to minors and young children, regardless of the amount of time spent playing; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas consumer protection related issues may occur when playing video games, in particular with regard to minors and young children, regardless of the amount of time spent playing;

| P. | whereas minors and young children under the supervision of their parents and caretakers have the right to participate in the digital world in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas minors and young children under the supervision of their parents and caretakers have the right to participate in the digital world in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child;

| Q. | whereas Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that all children have the right to play and to freely and fully experience cultural life and activities appropriate to their age; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that all children have the right to play and to freely and fully experience cultural life and activities appropriate to their age;

| R. | whereas in-game purchases can allow players to, for example, receive cosmetic items like skins or content to give them a gameplay advantage, avoid advertising, remove cool-down timers or avoid excessive waiting times and escape ‘grinding’; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas in-game purchases can allow players to, for example, receive cosmetic items like skins or content to give them a gameplay advantage, avoid advertising, remove cool-down timers or avoid excessive waiting times and escape ‘grinding’;

| S. | whereas a majority of parents use some form of parental control tool; whereas the majority of parents are concerned about the amount of time their children spend playing video games and the risks of exposure to harmful content, bullying, contact with adult strangers and in-game purchases; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas a majority of parents use some form of parental control tool; whereas the majority of parents are concerned about the amount of time their children spend playing video games and the risks of exposure to harmful content, bullying, contact with adult strangers and in-game purchases;

| T. | whereas many parents in Europe are aware of the Pan-European Game Information (PEGI) system and find the PEGI label useful in deciding whether or not to buy a game for their children (24); |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas many parents in Europe are aware of the Pan-European Game Information (PEGI) system and find the PEGI label useful in deciding whether or not to buy a game for their children (24);

| U. | whereas industry figures indicate that time spent playing video games is overall stable, with Europeans spending an average of 9 hours a week playing video games in 2021, 9,5 hours in 2020, 8,6 hours in 2019, 8,8 hours in 2018 and 9,2 hours in 2017 (25); whereas the time spent playing video games is still less than the screen time spent on other activities, such as watching TV, which was on average 25 hours a week in 2020; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas industry figures indicate that time spent playing video games is overall stable, with Europeans spending an average of 9 hours a week playing video games in 2021, 9,5 hours in 2020, 8,6 hours in 2019, 8,8 hours in 2018 and 9,2 hours in 2017 (25); whereas the time spent playing video games is still less than the screen time spent on other activities, such as watching TV, which was on average 25 hours a week in 2020;

| V. | whereas health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity; whereas mental health and well-being are interrelated issues that need to be taken into account in all areas, such as education, health, employment and social inclusion; whereas videogames can be important tools to support mental health and well-being and can be used to make progress in these areas, as well as to help to develop skills that are essential in a digital society and for the building of the digital single market; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity; whereas mental health and well-being are interrelated issues that need to be taken into account in all areas, such as education, health, employment and social inclusion; whereas videogames can be important tools to support mental health and well-being and can be used to make progress in these areas, as well as to help to develop skills that are essential in a digital society and for the building of the digital single market;

| W. | whereas in 2019, 20 % of people employed by the video game industry were women; whereas the lack of representation of women is a well-known and systemic issue in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics disciplines, including in the video game sector, both in the industry itself and in the hyper-sexualised representation of many female characters in game design; whereas 37 % of girl gamers experience harassment as a result of their gender in online multiplayer games (26); whereas despite the efforts that have been made in terms of accurate, equal and non-stereotypical representation of women in video games, progress must continue and go hand in hand with the equal presence of women in all positions in the value chain, as well as with the fight against sexual abuse and discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas in 2019, 20 % of people employed by the video game industry were women; whereas the lack of representation of women is a well-known and systemic issue in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics disciplines, including in the video game sector, both in the industry itself and in the hyper-sexualised representation of many female characters in game design; whereas 37 % of girl gamers experience harassment as a result of their gender in online multiplayer games (26); whereas despite the efforts that have been made in terms of accurate, equal and non-stereotypical representation of women in video games, progress must continue and go hand in hand with the equal presence of women in all positions in the value chain, as well as with the fight against sexual abuse and discrimination;

| X. | whereas in 2020, one fifth of the EU population was persons with disabilities; whereas the Union is committed to improving their social and economic situations, including online; whereas there are certain disabilities that can be particular challenging for online video games, like colour blindness, visual challenges or hand mobility impairments; whereas colour blindness affects 10 % of the male population; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas in 2020, one fifth of the EU population was persons with disabilities; whereas the Union is committed to improving their social and economic situations, including online; whereas there are certain disabilities that can be particular challenging for online video games, like colour blindness, visual challenges or hand mobility impairments; whereas colour blindness affects 10 % of the male population;

Online video games in the EU

| 1. | Underlines the value of video games for both online and offline play as popular entertainment enjoyed by a significant number of Europeans across all ages and Member States and as pieces of cultural expression by their creators, individual players and wider gaming communities; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Emphasises that video games are a highly innovative digital sector in the EU and that the sector is responsible for more than 90 000 direct jobs in Europe; underlines that the video game sector offers an increasing number of new job opportunities for many cultural creators, such as game developers, designers, writers, music producers and other artists, which any Union action in this field, especially funding activities, should take into consideration; stresses that video games straddle both the digital and cultural sectors, as video games also represent a crucial part of the cultural and creative ecosystem, making up over 50 % of the added value of the overall EU market for audiovisual content; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Stresses the importance of the video game industry in bolstering innovation in Europe; stresses that the video game sector has contributed to the development of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and virtual and augmented reality technologies, among others; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Recalls the importance of SMEs in the European video games value chain and the global prominence many European companies developing for console, PC and mobile gaming markets enjoy; expresses disappointment that such international success and cultural appeal is often overlooked when considering European leadership in digital technologies and services; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Welcomes the launch of Parliament’s proposed pilot project entitled ‘Understanding the Value of a European Games Society’, which aims to gather comprehensive data to support policy-making that affects the sector; notes that some of the problems faced by the sector include talent development and retention, a complex and fragmented regulatory framework in a global marketplace, access to finance and the social and cultural impacts of video games; |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bolstering consumer protection in online video games

| 6. | Emphasises that consumer protection is essential to ensure a safe and trustworthy online environment for video games and gamers and that building confidence among consumers can boost the economic growth of the video game industry; believes, however, that consumer protection could be further improved; invites the Commission to take into account consumer protection issues in online video games as part of its ongoing fitness check on EU consumer law to ensure equal fairness online and offline; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Acknowledges that the EU consumer law acquis provides for strong consumer protection, which is fully applicable to video games; notes the Commission notice of 29 December 2021 on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the single market, which provides direction on the application of EU consumer law on in-game promotions and advertising, including to children, in-game purchases and the presence of paid random content; notes, however, the need for a consistent and coordinated approach between Member States and consumer protection authorities in order to avoid fragmentation of the single market and to protect consumers in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Urges the Commission and national consumer protection authorities within the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network to ensure that European consumer law is fully respected and enforced in the video game sector; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Notes the existence of online video game platforms that allow players, including minors and young children, to create their own games using the tools provided and owned by the developer; calls on the Commission to adopt, if needed, regulatory measures in order to protect users, especially minors and young children, from illegal practices in which these platforms may be engaged; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the fact that, from January 2022, Directive (EU) 2019/770 will apply to video games, including free-to-play games, and will thus provide additional protection for consumers; regrets, however, that some Member States have not yet transposed the directive and urges those Member States to implement it without delay in order to ensure greater consumer protection across the Union; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the transposition process for the directive, to maintain a close dialogue with Member States lagging behind on its implementation and to consider launching infringement procedures, where necessary; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Welcomes the development and implementation of parental control tools that help to filter content and video games by age, monitor time spent playing games, disable or limit online spending and restrict communications with others or the viewing of content created by other players; recalls that platform-level parental controls are not the only method used by parents to monitor and manage access to content by their children; notes, however, that, even when available, parents may also not be aware of or may have difficulty implementing such tools, which reduces their effectiveness; believes that the responsibility for developing such mechanisms lies with the industry; considers that such mechanisms must be easy to use, understand and set up and must be consumer protective ‘by design’ and ‘by default’; believes that the implementation of parental controls lies both with parents and the industry; calls for mechanisms to be put in place to exercise stricter parental control over the amount of time and money minors and young children spend on games, among other things, while respecting the rights and development of minors; encourages platforms to increase awareness and information on how to use such tools; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the promotion of public and private education and information campaigns directed at parents and caretakers in order to inform them of the tools in place, such as the PEGI phone application, and to encourage their usage; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Points out that there are a variety of business models adopted in the video game sector; notes that some online video games offer their users in-game purchases using in-game currencies, which can be either purchased with real money or earned in the game, in order to obtain items through loot boxes or any other type of apparently randomised in-game purchase, the content of which the player cannot know before paying; points out that different types of loot boxes exist (27), notes that such systems are not without consequences for consumers and that games with a pay-to-win model, in particular aggressive pay-to-win models, or models that lock popular content behind paywalls have attracted negative reactions from gaming communities, leading to negative reviews and even changes to games prior or soon after their release; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Stresses that in-game purchases have been present in video games for many years; supports the Commission’s recently adopted guidance on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (28), which clarifies the rules as regards paid apparently random items that are present in video games; stresses that in-game purchase systems must also be compliant with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the recently adopted guidance to ensure that they do not result in harmful practices affecting consumers, especially minors and young children; calls for the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to be complied with and swiftly implemented to ensure consumer protection in the single market, particularly for minors and young children; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Acknowledges its commissioned study on loot boxes and their effects on consumers, particularly minors and young children; notes that the study recommended that loot boxes be examined from the perspective of consumer protection legislation in order to avoid harmful effects and exploitative practices of loot boxes, especially for minors and young children (29); calls on the Commission to analyse the way in which loot boxes are sold, and to take the necessary steps to bring about a common European approach on loot boxes to ensure adequate protection of consumers, in particular minors and young children; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Points out that some game designs used for in-game purchases are manipulative and exploitative by design, as they use aggressive commercial practices that significantly impair the consumer’s freedom of choice and motivate them to make financial decisions that they would not have taken otherwise; notes that such practices are clearly prohibited under Directive (EU) 2019/2161; calls on video games developers and vendors to ensure that games targeted towards minors respect minors’ and young children’s rights, including as regards privacy, targeted advertising and manipulative practices; considers that minors and young children, when playing online video games, should benefit from an equal level of protection to that provided by the Digital Services Act; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Notes that, beyond in-game purchases systems and paid random items, other deceptive designs also occur in video games and can distort consumers’ behaviour; calls on national authorities to effectively enforce European and national consumer protection laws, in particular the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and the corresponding guidance thereon, which prohibits certain dark patterns, aggressive marketing practices and misleading transparency on information that is required to be provided to consumers; calls furthermore on the Commission to continue assessing these issues, in particular dark patterns, as part of the ongoing fitness check on EU consumer law on digital fairness and to present adequate initiatives if deemed necessary; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Stresses that developers of online games that are directed towards to minors and young children must take their ages, rights and vulnerabilities into account; stresses that they must meet the highest possible standards by design and by default when it comes to safety, security, privacy and setting time limits, notes that, in addition to supplementing the standards by default, parents can play an important role in protecting minors and young children when playing video games; points out, however, that the gaming industry should carry out awareness campaigns and support on the use of appropriate tools and information on how to better protect their minors and young children; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Stresses that video games are both tools for playing and works of art with cultural value; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Stresses that consumers should have all the necessary information about an online video game, including on the presence of in-game purchases such as loot boxes and other apparently randomised in-game purchases, and should be aware of the type of content before starting to play and during the game, stresses that such information should be clearly displayed and easily understandable for all consumers before the purchase of the game and before each in-game purchase to better protect consumers, especially minors and young children, and to help parents to understand and control their spending; notes that, when virtual currencies are used in online games, their value in real-world currency should always be clearly and prominently indicated to consumers for each purchase; recalls that the absence of such information is clearly prohibited under Directive (EU) 2019/2161; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Points out that online video games that give players the option to obtain an edge in return for payments in pay-to-win models must clearly inform players about this feature before they start to play; reckons that such pay-to-win models can create a disparity between players depending on their means; encourages games using such models to therefore include a play mode without pay-to-win transactions; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Welcomes that the Commission will examine auto-renewals for subscriptions and contracts in the upcoming fitness check of consumer protection legislation; notes that auto-renewals can be beneficial for both the user and the trader, improving convenience for users and limiting subscriber administration for the trader, but they can also be problematic if the auto-renewals continue indefinitely against the consumer's intentions; encourages both the Commission, in its examination, and traders, in their company policies, to take into account best-practices from Member States or companies that already have consumer-friendly auto-renewal policies in place; calls on the Commission to introduce an obligation at EU level whereby traders must provide users with an opt-in proposal at purchase instead of having it as a default feature, as well as with clear and easily accessible information on how to cancel auto-renewals at any time, and must make the process of cancelling the auto-renewals simple and as easy as signing up; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls for greater transparency from video games developers on the probabilities in loot box mechanisms, including information in plain language about what algorithms are trained to achieve; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Underlines that return and refund guarantee policies are a corner stone of the Union’s consumer rights, and that consumers have the same right to return and ask for a refund for online purchases as they have for in-person purchases; notes that for online and digital content, whether downloaded or streamed, the right to a refund applies if the product or service is faulty or if the consumer does not gain access to the product as expected; calls on traders to fully comply with EU consumer protection rules and to provide clear, transparent and reliable information on how to request a refund or make use of the right of withdrawal; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Stresses that persons with disabilities should be able to play all types of online video games; and that both technical and communicative features of online video games and any relevant information related to playing or purchasing the game must be inclusive and accessible; calls on the Commission to present initiatives to improve the accessibility of online video games for persons with disabilities; encourages providers of online video games to make games accessible by applying the accessibility requirements of Annex I of Directive (EU) 2019/882 (30); |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Points out that once an item has been obtained in a video game, it can, in certain cases, be exchanged within the game or through third-party websites for real money, which is contradictory to the terms and conditions applied by video game publishers; calls on national authorities to put an end to illegal practices allowing anyone to exchange, sell or bet on in-game sites; stresses that, above and beyond consumer protection issues, these services could lead to money laundering; calls on the Commission to put an end to this practice; considers that the Digital Services Act may help mitigate this problem, in particular through the implementation of the ‘know your business customer’ obligations; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Is concerned that gold farming may be connected with forced labour and exploitation in developing countries and with money laundering; calls on the Commission to assess the use of gold farming in connection with financial crimes and human rights abuses and to present appropriate initiatives if necessary; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on the Commission to put forward a European video game strategy that unlocks the economic, social, educational, cultural and innovative potential of this sector to enable it to become a leader in the global video game market; calls on the Commission to assess during its upcoming fitness check of EU consumer law on digital fairness whether the current consumer law framework is sufficient to address all the consumer law issues raised by loot boxes and in-game purchases and, if not, calls on it to present a legislative proposal to adapt the current EU consumer law framework for online video games or to present a stand-alone legislative proposal on online video gaming to establish a harmonised European regulatory framework that ensures a high level of consumer protection, in particular for minors and young children; considers that these proposals should assess whether an obligation to disable in-game payments and loot boxes mechanisms by default or a ban on paid loot boxes should be proposed to protect minors, avoid the fragmentation of the single market and ensure that consumers benefit from the same level of protection, no matter their place of residence; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of requiring providers of online video games that are directed towards minors and young children to develop ex-ante child impact assessments based on the 4Cs (‘content, contact, conduct, contract’) framework for classifying risk and to effectively mitigate any identified risks to minors’ rights; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Additional benefits and risks for consumers

| 29. | Emphasises the importance of mental health, particularly that of minors and young children; notes that video games provided relief during strict lockdown periods during COVID-19; recalls the positive role that online connectivity played in ensuring that Europeans could still communicate, interact and create together, including via online video games; recalls that gaming can provide interactive avenues for individuals who experience social disconnection or isolation in real-life environments; notes that this has been particularly true for elderly people, who are among those who have suffered the most from isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic; notes that the WHO believes that online games can become a key instrument in nurturing our bonds to others (31); notes the benefits of cross-platform online games for the user experience — by enabling players to interact easily across different platforms — and for game developers, and calls on the video game industry to make every effort to make the fullest possible use of this feature; notes more generally the opportunities and new perspectives generated by access to creative expression and cultural content, in particular for minors and younger children; calls on the Commission to continue to act to improve Europe's digital infrastructure, which supports not only the creative industries in developing high-quality content, but also European citizens’ access to those culturally significant works; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Believes that many people use video games not only as a leisure activity, but also as mental exercises, such as by solving demanding tasks and puzzles, engaging in contests with other players that require a high level of concentration and developing skills such as problem-solving, spatial and hand-eye coordination, teamwork, visual acuity and speed; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Proposes to organise a yearly EU online video game award at Parliament in Brussels — the European Award in online video games — in order to highlight the importance for the European digital single market of companies producing online video games, many of which are SMEs, in terms of jobs, growth, innovation and the promotion of European values; considers that the award should aim to promote online video games that are respectful of consumers’ rights or that have a positive impact on specific areas, such as education, or on the development of skills; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Welcomes the innovative EU Kids Online research project, which gathers high-quality data from across Europe on children’s perspectives on their online experiences; calls for more frequent updates to this world-leading initiative; calls on the Commission to fund this and similar initiatives in the future; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Stresses that online video games are important for education, as they can be a useful tool during learning processes, and that many games are specifically designed for educational purposes, such as to provoke debate about societal issues or to improve understanding of historical or cultural events; recalls that video games feature on national educational curricula; notes that commercial video games are also used for educational purposes; points out that video games are also used to develop critical thinking and skills and to stimulate creativity; stresses too that video games have further applications later in life, as they may offer mental stimulation and opportunities for connectivity for older persons; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Stresses that playing online video games excessively can have a negative impact on social relations, work, school drop-out rates, physical and mental health and poor academic performance, while research also shows that video games may have a positive impact; emphasises therefore the need to strike a healthy balance; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Stresses that video game addiction, also known as ‘gaming disorder’, is a problem for some players; notes that the WHO has classified gaming disorder as a form of addiction characterised by impaired control over gaming, increased priority given to gaming over other activities to the extent that gaming takes precedence over other interests and daily activities, and continued or escalated gaming despite negative consequences; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Emphasises that the video game industry, users and parents should not underestimate the risks and effects stemming from gaming disorder; recalls that scientific research has shown that puberty and adolescence are periods in life in which people are most at risk of addictive behaviour; calls for further collaborative work among video game designers, publishers, platforms and the wider stakeholder community, including national competent authorities and the Commission, to help mitigate the risks of gaming disorders; suggests that more awareness campaigns should be launched to ensure that parents and young gamers are aware of the risks related to gaming disorder and calls on game developers to avoid manipulative game design that can lead to gaming addiction, isolation and cyber-harassment; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Notes a lack of EU-wide disaggregated data on average time spent playing games, average in-game spending, general gaming experience and consequent socio-psychological effects, calls on the Commission to collect this data on a yearly basis and present a report to Parliament on it; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Notes that the gaming industry has access to vast quantities of sometimes sensitive personal data; stresses that it has to ensure that personal data processing is undertaken in line with the General Data Protection Regulation other EU legislation and that users profiles created using behavioural data are not used for manipulative and discriminatory purposes; calls on the competent authorities to ensure that relevant EU and national law is rigorously enforced; stresses that patterns analysis of players through the collection of data should not favour techniques aiming to hook players, but should instead focus on enhancing the gaming experience; encourages developers to consider game design in chapters or frequent save points to facilitate attention breaks during which players are able to disconnect; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Points out that online video game platforms can be used by fraudsters for phishing; calls for information campaigns to be conducted in order to raise awareness about the risks involved, especially among minors and young people; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Urges the video game industry, the Commission and the Member States to develop an action plan to ensure gender balance in all stages of development in the online games industry; calls, in addition, on the industry to avoid objectifying women and to avoid creating, repeating or exacerbating gender stereotypes; stresses that these far too common practices create a hostile environment for women and girls in online games; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Ensuring a safe online environment for online video game users

| 41. | Welcomes industry-led initiatives, such as PEGI, which is used in 38 countries; considers that such a rating system can be particularly beneficial in providing content descriptors and information on the recommended age for playing a game, which helps parents to select appropriate games for their children; underlines that the rating system forms one part of the overall PEGI Code of Conduct, which collectively aims to ensure a safe environment for gamers; welcomes the updated approach by PEGI, which now informs consumers if a game includes paid apparently random features; underlines that the presence of in-game paid content, including paid apparently random content, does not preclude parents from managing access to that type of content, while permitting a child to access the base game if judged to be age-appropriate; notes that some countries have made the PEGI system into law; calls on the Commission to assess how the PEGI system is being implemented in the different types of games available on the market and across the Union and to explore the possibilities for enshrining it in EU law in order to make the PEGI system and its Code of Conduct the harmonised, mandatory age-rating system applicable to all video game developers, app stores and online platforms in order to avoid fragmentation in the single market and provide legal certainty for the video game industry; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Acknowledges the potential of the PEGI system to provide important pre-contractual information to consumers; considers however that this industry-led initiative should be complemented by additional measures to ensure the highest level of consumer protection and to resolve the consumer law issues created by in-game purchases and loot box mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Encourages the industry, including game platforms and publishers, independent expert partners and rating agencies to continue awareness-raising campaigns on the PEGI system, so that more parents know about its existence, and to remain reactive in order to adapt the rating system in response to developments in video games and their in-game content to continue to facilitate parental choice; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls on the Commission to develop minimum standards on privacy preservation and to assess the need for secure and inclusive age-assurance system; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Notes with concern the risks associated with the use of hate speech and cyberbullying on online video game platforms, which is particularly dangerous when directed at minors and young children; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Stresses that online video games must provide a safe digital environment for users; welcomes the recent adoption of the Digital Services Act, which updates content moderation rules in Europe in order to better tackle illegal online content, including for video games; calls for it to be transposed into national law and implemented swiftly; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Draws attention to the fact that, in addition to illegal content, harmful content can also be disseminated in video games through in-game communication features or gaming social media platforms; stresses that the video game industry must adopt appropriate measures and tools to protect all users from harmful content, in line with applicable national and EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States’ consumer protection authorities to ensure that consumer law is fully respected and enforced, including in the video game sector, by conducting sectoral ‘sweeps’ or by launching a coordinated enforcement action, under Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (32), when necessary; |
| --- | --- |

48.

o

o o

| 49. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

49.

---

(1)  OJ C 65, 14.3.2002, p. 2.

(2)  OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69.

(3)  OJ L 136, 22.5.2019, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 328, 18.12.2019, p. 7.

(5)  OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64.

(6)  OJ C 526, 29.12.2021, p. 1.

(7)  OJ C 525, 29.12.2021, p. 1.

(8)  OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

(9)  OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1.

(10)  OJ C 87 E, 1.4.2010, p. 122.

(11)  OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 33.

(12)  OJ C 108, 26.3.2021, p. 934.

(13)  OJ C 160, 13.4.2022, p. 13.

(14)  COM(2022)0212.

(15)  Interactive Software Federation of Europe and European Games Developer Federation, ‘Key facts from 2021: Video games — a force for good’, accessed 19 December 2022.

(16)  EY, ‘Rebuilding Europe: the cultural and creative economy before and after the COVID-19 crisis’, January 2021.

(17)  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 January 2014, Nintendo Co. Ltd and Others v PC Box Srl and 9Net Srl., C-355/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:25.

(18)  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16).

(19)  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10).

(20)  European Commission, ‘The value of European video games society’, 30 May 2022.

(21)  Parker, S., ‘The trouble with Roblox, the video game empire built on child labour’, The Guardian, 9 January 2022.

(22)  Kantar at the request of the European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer — Report — E-Communications in the Single Market’, June 2021.

(23)  WHO, ‘Gaming disorder’, accessed 15 December 2022.

(24)  Interactive Software Federation of Europe and European Games Developer Federation, ‘Key Facts 2020: The year we played together’, 24 August 2021.

(25)  Interactive Software Federation of Europe and European Games Developer Federation, ‘Key facts from 2021: Video games — a force for good’, accessed 19 December 2022.

(26)  Written evidence submitted by the Anti-Defamation League to the Joint Committee on the Draft Online Safety Bill of the UK Parliament (OSB0030), ‘How Algorithms Influence Harmful Online Conduct’, September 2021.

(27)  The types of loot boxes can differ depending on different eligibility conditions (waiting time, displaying ads, paying with real money), the reward, its transparency, the chances of getting the item and the possibility of converting the item obtained into game currency or real money, among others.

(28)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22).

(29)  Forbrukerrådet, ‘Insert coin –How the gaming industry exploits consumers using loot boxes’, 31 May 2022.

(30)  Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70).

(31)  Bloomberg, ‘Games Industry Unites to Promote World Health Organization Messages Against COVID-19; Launch #PlayApartTogether Campaign’, 10 April 2020.

(32)  Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 1).

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/26

---

P9_TA(2023)0009

Implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2022

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2048(INI))

(2023/C 214/04)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21 and 36 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21 and 36 thereof,

| — | having regard to the report of 14 June 2022 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘CFSP Report — Our priorities in 2022’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 14 June 2022 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘CFSP Report — Our priorities in 2022’,

| — | having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022 on Wider Europe, Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Western Balkans, economic issues, the Conference on the Future of Europe and external relations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022 on Wider Europe, Ukraine, the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Western Balkans, economic issues, the Conference on the Future of Europe and external relations,

| — | having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 2022 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy of 12 October 2022 (COM(2022)0528), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 2022 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy of 12 October 2022 (COM(2022)0528),

| — | having regard to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ (A/RES/ES-11/L.1) and of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (A/RES/ES - 11/L.5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ (A/RES/ES-11/L.1) and of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (A/RES/ES - 11/L.5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (1),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2021)0644), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 October 2021 entitled ‘2021 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2021)0644),

| — | having regard to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations of 7 April 2022 entitled ‘Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council’ (A/RES/ES-11/L.4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations of 7 April 2022 entitled ‘Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council’ (A/RES/ES-11/L.4),

| — | having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 9 May 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 4 May 2022 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution on the follow-up to the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe of 4 May 2022 (2),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (3),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on COVID-19, crisis management and resilience, security and defence, external aspects of migration and external relations adopted on 16 December 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions on COVID-19, crisis management and resilience, security and defence, external aspects of migration and external relations adopted on 16 December 2021,

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (4),

| — | having regard to the NATO Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the NATO Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000 which established the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000 which established the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda,

| — | having regard to the joint communication of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 November 2020 on the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III entitled ‘An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action’ (JOIN(2020)0017), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 November 2020 on the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III entitled ‘An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action’ (JOIN(2020)0017),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2022 on the prospects of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2022 on the prospects of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine (5),

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation signed on 10 January 2023 by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation signed on 10 January 2023 by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0292/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0292/2022),

| A. | whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, with the support of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, has brought war back to the European continent and has caused serious destruction and suffering; whereas war crimes have been perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine; whereas this all significantly threatens and continues to challenge European and global security; whereas Russia has made nuclear threats; whereas global supply chains have been negatively affected and food security undermined in several areas of the world; whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has created economic uncertainty, led to a spike in energy prices, exacerbated the climate crisis and has considerable potential to further destabilise many Member States and third countries, especially those in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, and has therefore significantly changed the geopolitical context of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP); whereas the war of aggression against Ukraine was part of Putin’s plan to reshape the Euro-Atlantic security architecture; whereas this plan has been thwarted thanks to the Ukrainian army’s heroic defence; whereas since 2014 the EU has not been able to fully utilise its common security and defence (CSDP) instruments to effectively support Ukraine’s fight against Russia, although some improvements are visible this year; whereas in order to be perceived as a successful and credible global actor, the EU needs to further develop its capabilities and strengthen its political will to provide security in its immediate neighbourhood; |
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A.

whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, with the support of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, has brought war back to the European continent and has caused serious destruction and suffering; whereas war crimes have been perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine; whereas this all significantly threatens and continues to challenge European and global security; whereas Russia has made nuclear threats; whereas global supply chains have been negatively affected and food security undermined in several areas of the world; whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has created economic uncertainty, led to a spike in energy prices, exacerbated the climate crisis and has considerable potential to further destabilise many Member States and third countries, especially those in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, and has therefore significantly changed the geopolitical context of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP); whereas the war of aggression against Ukraine was part of Putin’s plan to reshape the Euro-Atlantic security architecture; whereas this plan has been thwarted thanks to the Ukrainian army’s heroic defence; whereas since 2014 the EU has not been able to fully utilise its common security and defence (CSDP) instruments to effectively support Ukraine’s fight against Russia, although some improvements are visible this year; whereas in order to be perceived as a successful and credible global actor, the EU needs to further develop its capabilities and strengthen its political will to provide security in its immediate neighbourhood;

| B. | whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of this aggression spilling over into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilisation of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU; |
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B.

whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of this aggression spilling over into neighbouring countries; whereas the destabilisation of our immediate neighbourhood threatens the stability, peace and security of the EU;

| C. | whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the need for stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU action on the world stage, and accentuates the necessity for the EU to autonomously set its own strategic objectives and develop and deploy the capabilities to pursue them; whereas it once again underlines the need for Europe to prioritise its energy independence; |
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C.

whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the need for stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU action on the world stage, and accentuates the necessity for the EU to autonomously set its own strategic objectives and develop and deploy the capabilities to pursue them; whereas it once again underlines the need for Europe to prioritise its energy independence;

| D. | whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, presenting an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanised the momentum towards achieving a geopolitical redefinition of the CFSP and EU external action in general, with a bold vision guided by Union interests in the new geopolitical reality, with a genuine will to act and with transatlantic cooperation, in order to deliver strategically relevant results; whereas in the face of Russian aggression, Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO; whereas this conflict shows the urgent need for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Member States; whereas this war has reaffirmed the role of NATO as the bedrock of European security and the indispensability of a strong transatlantic bond; |
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D.

whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, presenting an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanised the momentum towards achieving a geopolitical redefinition of the CFSP and EU external action in general, with a bold vision guided by Union interests in the new geopolitical reality, with a genuine will to act and with transatlantic cooperation, in order to deliver strategically relevant results; whereas in the face of Russian aggression, Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO; whereas this conflict shows the urgent need for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Member States; whereas this war has reaffirmed the role of NATO as the bedrock of European security and the indispensability of a strong transatlantic bond;

| E. | whereas it is imperative for the Union to address its key vulnerabilities, such as its recent overdependence on Russia and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC), and strengthen its resilience and preparedness in the face of threats emanating from totalitarian and non-democratic regimes; |
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E.

whereas it is imperative for the Union to address its key vulnerabilities, such as its recent overdependence on Russia and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC), and strengthen its resilience and preparedness in the face of threats emanating from totalitarian and non-democratic regimes;

| F. | whereas Russia’s invasion also highlights the necessity, underlined by the citizen-driven outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe, for the Member States to demonstrate the necessary political will to transform the CFSP into a fully-fledged European policy; |
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F.

whereas Russia’s invasion also highlights the necessity, underlined by the citizen-driven outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe, for the Member States to demonstrate the necessary political will to transform the CFSP into a fully-fledged European policy;

| G. | whereas the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign policy, security and defence action as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty has been used and exploited only in a very limited way during the past decade due to a lack of political will by Member States; whereas, due to the changing European security environment, it is high time to use all instruments as provided for by the TEU, in particular as regards the CSDP; whereas the Lisbon Treaty contains features such as a military start-up fund under Article 41(3)(b), the possibility to form a small group with more ambitious security and defence objectives under Article 44, and the defining of a truly European capabilities and armaments policy under Article 42(3), which have existed since December 2009; |
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G.

whereas the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign policy, security and defence action as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty has been used and exploited only in a very limited way during the past decade due to a lack of political will by Member States; whereas, due to the changing European security environment, it is high time to use all instruments as provided for by the TEU, in particular as regards the CSDP; whereas the Lisbon Treaty contains features such as a military start-up fund under Article 41(3)(b), the possibility to form a small group with more ambitious security and defence objectives under Article 44, and the defining of a truly European capabilities and armaments policy under Article 42(3), which have existed since December 2009;

| H. | whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement of unanimity to qualified majority voting in specific policy areas; whereas the current threat to European security requires the immediate adaptation of certain working methods; |
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H.

whereas passerelle clauses could be used immediately to switch from the requirement of unanimity to qualified majority voting in specific policy areas; whereas the current threat to European security requires the immediate adaptation of certain working methods;

| I. | whereas the Council has acted rapidly and in a united way and has to date adopted nine packages of sanctions against Russia because of its actions in Ukraine, including sanctions on individuals such as the freezing of assets and travel restrictions, economic sanctions that target the financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors, restrictions on media, diplomatic measures, restrictions on economic relations with occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and with the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk not controlled by the government and measures relating to economic cooperation, all of which constitute solidarity and unity, but are still not enough to stop the aggressor; |
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I.

whereas the Council has acted rapidly and in a united way and has to date adopted nine packages of sanctions against Russia because of its actions in Ukraine, including sanctions on individuals such as the freezing of assets and travel restrictions, economic sanctions that target the financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors, restrictions on media, diplomatic measures, restrictions on economic relations with occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and with the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk not controlled by the government and measures relating to economic cooperation, all of which constitute solidarity and unity, but are still not enough to stop the aggressor;

| J. | whereas the decline of media freedom and the rise of disinformation campaigns, foreign interference and attacks on journalists is a worldwide trend, most clearly evident in backsliding democracies and recalcitrant totalitarian states; whereas, internationally, the consequences for human rights, democracy, public participation and development are worrying; whereas the EU must strengthen its collaboration with like-minded partner countries to promote and defend media freedom and freedom of expression and to counter disinformation and foreign interference in third countries; |
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J.

whereas the decline of media freedom and the rise of disinformation campaigns, foreign interference and attacks on journalists is a worldwide trend, most clearly evident in backsliding democracies and recalcitrant totalitarian states; whereas, internationally, the consequences for human rights, democracy, public participation and development are worrying; whereas the EU must strengthen its collaboration with like-minded partner countries to promote and defend media freedom and freedom of expression and to counter disinformation and foreign interference in third countries;

| K. | whereas the long-standing instability and unpredictability of security at the EU’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood pose a direct threat to the security of the EU and its Member States; |
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K.

whereas the long-standing instability and unpredictability of security at the EU’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood pose a direct threat to the security of the EU and its Member States;

| L. | whereas, at the direction of Vladimir Putin, the Government of the Russian Federation has continued to conduct acts of international terrorism against political opponents and sovereign states, which have culminated in its invasion and occupation of Ukraine since 2014; |
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L.

whereas, at the direction of Vladimir Putin, the Government of the Russian Federation has continued to conduct acts of international terrorism against political opponents and sovereign states, which have culminated in its invasion and occupation of Ukraine since 2014;

| M. | whereas the global consequences of the Russian Federation’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine are compounded by the impact of the ongoing and unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan, in the PRC; whereas the return of full-scale war to the European continent, economic instability and the Russian Federation’s deliberate instrumentalisation of energy volatility are resulting in immediate geopolitical uncertainty for citizens of the European Union, candidate Member States and prospective candidate Member States, as well as for partners around the world; |
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M.

whereas the global consequences of the Russian Federation’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine are compounded by the impact of the ongoing and unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan, in the PRC; whereas the return of full-scale war to the European continent, economic instability and the Russian Federation’s deliberate instrumentalisation of energy volatility are resulting in immediate geopolitical uncertainty for citizens of the European Union, candidate Member States and prospective candidate Member States, as well as for partners around the world;

| N. | whereas achieving strategic autonomy requires the Union to be able to pursue all matters of strategic significance to the EU without undue reliance on the capabilities of third states and actors, including through the elimination of vulnerabilities that leave the Union open to internal division and enforced concessions to authoritarian actors; whereas achieving strategic autonomy will allow the Union to further enhance its external action from a basis of strength, more effectively pursue and project its values-based interests and strengthen its contribution to global multilateralism, the peaceful resolution of conflict and the development of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights worldwide; whereas the EU will not be able to defend itself or be a credible actor without genuine investments in Member State defence; whereas despite the continued Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, the decision of NATO leaders to commit a minimum of 2 % of GDP to defence spending has only been implemented by a few allies who are Member States, in particular those on the Eastern flank; whereas meeting this threshold shows genuine will to strengthen European security and the EU’s position at the same time; |
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N.

whereas achieving strategic autonomy requires the Union to be able to pursue all matters of strategic significance to the EU without undue reliance on the capabilities of third states and actors, including through the elimination of vulnerabilities that leave the Union open to internal division and enforced concessions to authoritarian actors; whereas achieving strategic autonomy will allow the Union to further enhance its external action from a basis of strength, more effectively pursue and project its values-based interests and strengthen its contribution to global multilateralism, the peaceful resolution of conflict and the development of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights worldwide; whereas the EU will not be able to defend itself or be a credible actor without genuine investments in Member State defence; whereas despite the continued Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, the decision of NATO leaders to commit a minimum of 2 % of GDP to defence spending has only been implemented by a few allies who are Member States, in particular those on the Eastern flank; whereas meeting this threshold shows genuine will to strengthen European security and the EU’s position at the same time;

| O. | whereas the voluntary accession of European states to the EU remains the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument; whereas on 23 June 2022, European leaders granted Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova candidate status for EU membership and recognised Georgia’s European perspective; whereas in 15 December 2022, the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status for EU membership, and the Republic of Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership; |
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O.

whereas the voluntary accession of European states to the EU remains the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument; whereas on 23 June 2022, European leaders granted Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova candidate status for EU membership and recognised Georgia’s European perspective; whereas in 15 December 2022, the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status for EU membership, and the Republic of Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership;

| P. | whereas the Union’s CFSP is guided by the values of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law; whereas the Union’s values, as enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, are in its immediate interest; whereas autocratic pressure on these democratic values continues to mount, eroding checks on abuse of power, increasing the incidence and severity of human rights violations and constricting space for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements; whereas, according to Freedom House, 2021 was the 16th consecutive year of global democratic decline; |
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P.

whereas the Union’s CFSP is guided by the values of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law; whereas the Union’s values, as enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, are in its immediate interest; whereas autocratic pressure on these democratic values continues to mount, eroding checks on abuse of power, increasing the incidence and severity of human rights violations and constricting space for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements; whereas, according to Freedom House, 2021 was the 16th consecutive year of global democratic decline;

| Q. | whereas the effects of climate change are having increasingly severe impacts on different aspects of human life as well as on development opportunities, the worldwide geopolitical order and global stability; whereas those with fewer resources to adapt to climate change will be hardest hit by the impact of climate change; whereas EU foreign policy should focus more on promoting multilateral activities by cooperating on specific climate-related issues, building strategic partnerships and strengthening cooperation and interactions between state and non-state actors, including major contributors to global pollution; |
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Q.

whereas the effects of climate change are having increasingly severe impacts on different aspects of human life as well as on development opportunities, the worldwide geopolitical order and global stability; whereas those with fewer resources to adapt to climate change will be hardest hit by the impact of climate change; whereas EU foreign policy should focus more on promoting multilateral activities by cooperating on specific climate-related issues, building strategic partnerships and strengthening cooperation and interactions between state and non-state actors, including major contributors to global pollution;

| R. | whereas the rules-based international order, founded on international law and the institutions of multilateralism, is under ever-increasing risk, both from within and from outside; whereas autocratic states, working alone and through concerted action, attempt to undermine multilateral organisations and agencies as well as international humanitarian and human rights law, subvert this law’s meaning through co-optation, or circumvent or thwart its implementation, while promoting the further development of autocratic norms in the EU and in third countries, including through the use of diplomatic, economic or military incentives and coercion and through disinformation campaigns; whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its deliberate war crimes are an attack on the foundations of the multilateral rules-based global order; |
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R.

whereas the rules-based international order, founded on international law and the institutions of multilateralism, is under ever-increasing risk, both from within and from outside; whereas autocratic states, working alone and through concerted action, attempt to undermine multilateral organisations and agencies as well as international humanitarian and human rights law, subvert this law’s meaning through co-optation, or circumvent or thwart its implementation, while promoting the further development of autocratic norms in the EU and in third countries, including through the use of diplomatic, economic or military incentives and coercion and through disinformation campaigns; whereas Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its deliberate war crimes are an attack on the foundations of the multilateral rules-based global order;

| S. | whereas the EU must improve its capacity to take swift and effective decisions, in particular under the CFSP, to speak with one voice and to act as a truly global player in response to crises; |
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S.

whereas the EU must improve its capacity to take swift and effective decisions, in particular under the CFSP, to speak with one voice and to act as a truly global player in response to crises;

1.

Points out that the EU’s swift, unified and sustained response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its ability to learn from and address previous geostrategic mistakes is a testament to the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy guided by our shared values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; underlines that, in order to enhance its role as a credible values-based foreign policy player, a reliable international partner and a credible security and defence actor, the Union must adopt and, in areas in which these are presently available, implement decision-making procedures conducive to this objective;

2.

Notes that the response of the EU to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by many autocracies around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; underlines that in order to be a credible actor, the EU and its Member States need to increase their military, political and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and strengthen their defence in countering Russian threats to European security;

3.

Is convinced that ensuring the security, prosperity and leadership of the EU at global level is closely linked to consolidating the enlargement process, accelerating the accession of candidate and potential candidate countries and consolidating EU neighbourhood policy;

4.

Underscores that the tectonic shift in the geopolitical landscape caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and other international challenges, including the continued rise of global authoritarianism, increasing Sino-Russian cooperation, the PRC assertive foreign policy, the climate emergency and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic call for a swifter implementation of the concept of strategic autonomy, solidarity and for a geopolitical awakening of the EU, based on concrete and credible actions on priority thematic and geographical issues and at the same time show the need for closer cooperation with NATO and like-minded allies across the globe; stresses that in view of this, the direct or indirect support of a third country for the illegal positions of Russia, namely by voting with Russia at the UN General Assembly on relevant resolutions or by helping it circumvent EU sanctions, should bring clear, swift and specific consequences in our political and trade relations with that country;

5.

Emphasises that the Union can only fulfil its vocation as a global player and security provider on the basis of more flexible and efficient decision-making, including on security and defence policy;

6.

Emphasises that the Union’s actions should be guided and consistent with the values and principles on which the Union was founded, in line with Article 21 TEU;

7.

Considers that Article 21(2) TEU should be amended to include the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ on the list of CFSP objectives in order for the EU to become an effective diplomatic and security actor by implementing its own foreign and security policy based on strong action through concrete measures, policies, budgets and commitments;

8.

Recalls that the Strategic Compass adopted by the Council in March 2022 gives the EU and its Member States strategic guidance and the tools to improve their defence capabilities, to become an effective security provider in an increasingly adversarial global and regional environment and a more assertive global actor for peace and human security; calls therefore on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to prioritise its swifter and full implementation in cooperation with like-minded partners and in full complementarity with NATO and its Strategic Concept of 29 June 2022, while taking into account the lessons learned from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

9.

Underlines the need for a strong communication campaign highlighting the benefits of the Strategic Compass for European security and European citizens;

10.

| — | adapting the EU’s institutional and decision-making arrangements and generating political will and unity in foreign and security policy by adopting qualified majority voting in order to allow early preventive action and rapid responses, |
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—

adapting the EU’s institutional and decision-making arrangements and generating political will and unity in foreign and security policy by adopting qualified majority voting in order to allow early preventive action and rapid responses,

| — | operationalising strategic autonomy and solidarity while strengthening its approach to multilateralism and alliances, reducing strategic dependencies on non-democratic regimes and enhancing the Union’s resilience, |
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—

operationalising strategic autonomy and solidarity while strengthening its approach to multilateralism and alliances, reducing strategic dependencies on non-democratic regimes and enhancing the Union’s resilience,

| — | leading the reinforcement of multilateralism, strengthening and consolidating alliances and partnerships and building new strategic partnerships for a better world with like-minded democratic partners, while addressing the assertiveness of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, |
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—

leading the reinforcement of multilateralism, strengthening and consolidating alliances and partnerships and building new strategic partnerships for a better world with like-minded democratic partners, while addressing the assertiveness of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes,

| — | enhancing parliamentary diplomacy as a preventive and effective foreign policy tool; |
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—

enhancing parliamentary diplomacy as a preventive and effective foreign policy tool;

11.

Underscores that the ambitious commitment and rhetoric of the EU’s external human rights policy requires it to be consistent and exemplary; regrets therefore that in practice, the EU continues to be inconsistent towards comparable human rights situations worldwide; deplores, further, the deterioration of the human rights and rule of law situation in a number of its own Member States, which undermines the credibility of the EU; calls on the EU and its Member States to lead by example and strictly uphold human rights;

12.

Stresses that the EU should remain committed to arms control and to multilateral agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation;

Strengthening the EU’s institutional and decision-making arrangements in foreign and security policy

Strengthening the EU’s institutional and decision-making arrangements in foreign and security policy

| 13. | Welcomes the remarkable level of unity and resolve of the EU in responding swiftly and forcefully to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; urges the Member States to maintain and, where necessary, increase this high and coherent level of support for Ukraine and its citizens in full alignment with Ukraine’s evolving needs and the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for the same level of unity when faced with attacks against our democracies or common values in the future; |
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13.

Welcomes the remarkable level of unity and resolve of the EU in responding swiftly and forcefully to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; urges the Member States to maintain and, where necessary, increase this high and coherent level of support for Ukraine and its citizens in full alignment with Ukraine’s evolving needs and the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for the same level of unity when faced with attacks against our democracies or common values in the future;

| 14. | Urges the Member States to maintain their unity and resolve and to build on this unprecedented level of cooperation; underscores the importance of unity and consistency with the Union’s founding values and principles and of preserving this unity and continuing to strengthen the strategic sovereignty, security and resilience of EU and the Member States through more efficient decision-making in CFSP, which could be achieved by:






  (a) | switching as soon as possible to qualified majority voting for decisions in all areas of the CFSP, starting with priority areas within a year, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) and other foreign policy areas, by using the passerelle clauses provided for in the Treaties, except for the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the CSDP, for which unanimity must still be required; |
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14.

Urges the Member States to maintain their unity and resolve and to build on this unprecedented level of cooperation; underscores the importance of unity and consistency with the Union’s founding values and principles and of preserving this unity and continuing to strengthen the strategic sovereignty, security and resilience of EU and the Member States through more efficient decision-making in CFSP, which could be achieved by:

(a)

switching as soon as possible to qualified majority voting for decisions in all areas of the CFSP, starting with priority areas within a year, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) and other foreign policy areas, by using the passerelle clauses provided for in the Treaties, except for the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the CSDP, for which unanimity must still be required;

passerelle

| (b) | convening a convention by activating the procedure for revising the Treaties provided for in Article 48 TEU, with the objective of, inter alia, enshrining qualified majority voting for all matters relating to the EU’s CFSP in the Treaties; |
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(b)

convening a convention by activating the procedure for revising the Treaties provided for in Article 48 TEU, with the objective of, inter alia, enshrining qualified majority voting for all matters relating to the EU’s CFSP in the Treaties;

| (c) | striving to achieve a genuine military and defence union that is interoperable and complementary to the NATO Alliance and that can act independently when needed; |
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(c)

striving to achieve a genuine military and defence union that is interoperable and complementary to the NATO Alliance and that can act independently when needed;

| (d) | encouraging, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; |
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(d)

encouraging, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU;

| (e) | ensuring that Member States adhere to the principles of the Treaties in both theory and practice, especially Articles 24 and 42(7) TEU and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which call for the Member States to support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity; underlines that the conditions for the activation of Article 42(7) TEU and the modalities for support have never been clearly defined; considers it necessary to urgently develop a solidarity policy strategy and operational implementation measures for the mutual assistance clause stipulated in Article 42(7) TEU; |
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(e)

ensuring that Member States adhere to the principles of the Treaties in both theory and practice, especially Articles 24 and 42(7) TEU and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which call for the Member States to support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity; underlines that the conditions for the activation of Article 42(7) TEU and the modalities for support have never been clearly defined; considers it necessary to urgently develop a solidarity policy strategy and operational implementation measures for the mutual assistance clause stipulated in Article 42(7) TEU;

| (f) | making full use of the integrated political crisis response (IPCR) mechanism and creating a European Security Council, comprised of Member State Ministers, in order to respond swiftly in emergency situations and to develop an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, as well as a Council of Defence Ministers; |
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(f)

making full use of the integrated political crisis response (IPCR) mechanism and creating a European Security Council, comprised of Member State Ministers, in order to respond swiftly in emergency situations and to develop an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, as well as a Council of Defence Ministers;

| (g) | implementing and making full use of the ‘Team Europe’ approach to coordinate and avoid duplication in the EU’s foreign and security policy while projecting unity; |
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(g)

implementing and making full use of the ‘Team Europe’ approach to coordinate and avoid duplication in the EU’s foreign and security policy while projecting unity;

| (h) | providing sufficient funding, institutional capacity and technical support at EU and Member State level to prepare for and respond without delay to current, emerging and future challenges; calls in particular for increased financing for all EU external action; |
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(h)

providing sufficient funding, institutional capacity and technical support at EU and Member State level to prepare for and respond without delay to current, emerging and future challenges; calls in particular for increased financing for all EU external action;

| (i) | introducing a role for Parliament for decisions on sending military and civilian security missions abroad; |
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(i)

introducing a role for Parliament for decisions on sending military and civilian security missions abroad;

believes, in light of the above, that it would be appropriate for Parliament to hold a plenary debate before relevant Council decisions and to adopt a resolution that would politically authorise an operation, including its objectives, means and duration;

| 15. | Urges the Member States to pursue the strict application of Article 31 TEU, which allows, inter alia, the Council to take certain decisions by qualified majority in CFSP matters without military implications, in particular those concerning sanctions and human rights, and, in the case of Article 42(7) TEU, to move to reinforced qualified majority voting; calls on the Member States to make full use of the passerelle clause contained in Article 31(3) TEU without further delay, especially in priority areas; |
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15.

Urges the Member States to pursue the strict application of Article 31 TEU, which allows, inter alia, the Council to take certain decisions by qualified majority in CFSP matters without military implications, in particular those concerning sanctions and human rights, and, in the case of Article 42(7) TEU, to move to reinforced qualified majority voting; calls on the Member States to make full use of the passerelle

| 16. | Reiterates its support for the adoption and implementation of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, enabling the EU to swiftly impose targeted restrictive measures against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide; welcomes the Commission’s intention to extend the scope of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime in a timely manner to include acts of corruption, thereby acknowledging the close link between corruption and human rights violations; urges the Commission to augment this legislative proposal with avenues enabling an enhanced role for the European Parliament in proposing cases of serious human rights violations; reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for the adoption of restrictive measures imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; |
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16.

Reiterates its support for the adoption and implementation of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, enabling the EU to swiftly impose targeted restrictive measures against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide; welcomes the Commission’s intention to extend the scope of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime in a timely manner to include acts of corruption, thereby acknowledging the close link between corruption and human rights violations; urges the Commission to augment this legislative proposal with avenues enabling an enhanced role for the European Parliament in proposing cases of serious human rights violations; reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for the adoption of restrictive measures imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime;

| 17. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to step up their support for civil society organisations, activists and investigative journalists engaged in the fight against corruption, by promoting the establishment of effective anti-corruption institutions, adopting robust regulatory frameworks and addressing secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens, in particular within their own jurisdictions; |
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17.

Calls on the EU and its Member States to step up their support for civil society organisations, activists and investigative journalists engaged in the fight against corruption, by promoting the establishment of effective anti-corruption institutions, adopting robust regulatory frameworks and addressing secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens, in particular within their own jurisdictions;

| 18. | Highlights the fact that the enforcement of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation is paramount to limiting its ability to pursue its war of aggression against Ukraine and must therefore be the highest priority; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on third countries enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whether by facilitating sanctions circumvention or by providing direct military assistance; welcomes the restrictive measures imposed on the regime in Belarus; welcomes the decision of the Council to impose restrictive measures on the Islamic Republic of Iran in view of its supply of unmanned aerial vehicles to the Russian Federation for use against Ukraine, in particular against civilian targets; calls for the expansion of restrictive measures in light of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued provision of unmanned aerial vehicles and planned provision of surface-to-surface missiles; strongly supports the proposal for a directive (6) criminalising the violation of Union restrictive measures and calls on the EUropean Public Prosecutor’s Office to be tasked with ensuring the consistent and uniform investigation and prosecution of such crimes throughout the EU; |
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18.

Highlights the fact that the enforcement of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation is paramount to limiting its ability to pursue its war of aggression against Ukraine and must therefore be the highest priority; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on third countries enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whether by facilitating sanctions circumvention or by providing direct military assistance; welcomes the restrictive measures imposed on the regime in Belarus; welcomes the decision of the Council to impose restrictive measures on the Islamic Republic of Iran in view of its supply of unmanned aerial vehicles to the Russian Federation for use against Ukraine, in particular against civilian targets; calls for the expansion of restrictive measures in light of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued provision of unmanned aerial vehicles and planned provision of surface-to-surface missiles; strongly supports the proposal for a directive (6

| 19. | Expresses concern over the increasing frequency and intensity of environmental and climate disasters, which have particularly dire consequences for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable individuals and communities; recalls that the direct and indirect impacts of climate change undermine global peace and security while deepening existing vulnerabilities and inequalities and posing risks to human rights; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint ‘Team Europe’ approach, must play in the promotion of climate diplomacy globally in order to safeguard global peace and security, in particular through increased bilateral and multilateral engagement with international partners, the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and further commitments made, in particular, to developing partners, and the mainstreaming of climate action across all dimensions of its external action; urges the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to design and conduct robust EU climate diplomacy whose aim is to foster international cooperation on the Paris Agreement, strengthen the external dimension of the Green New Deal and provide tangible support for ambitious CO2 reduction targets in third countries; |
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19.

Expresses concern over the increasing frequency and intensity of environmental and climate disasters, which have particularly dire consequences for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable individuals and communities; recalls that the direct and indirect impacts of climate change undermine global peace and security while deepening existing vulnerabilities and inequalities and posing risks to human rights; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint ‘Team Europe’ approach, must play in the promotion of climate diplomacy globally in order to safeguard global peace and security, in particular through increased bilateral and multilateral engagement with international partners, the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and further commitments made, in particular, to developing partners, and the mainstreaming of climate action across all dimensions of its external action; urges the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to design and conduct robust EU climate diplomacy whose aim is to foster international cooperation on the Paris Agreement, strengthen the external dimension of the Green New Deal and provide tangible support for ambitious CO2

| 20. | Insists on the full implementation and systematic integration of gender mainstreaming and the EU Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) in all EU external action, including trade and sustainable development policy, at all levels of engagement and in all relevant activities and concepts, including beyond the lifetime of the GAP III; urges the EEAS to enhance its geographical balance in order to have appropriate national representation reflecting the diversity of all Member States, as indicated in Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials; |
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20.

Insists on the full implementation and systematic integration of gender mainstreaming and the EU Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) in all EU external action, including trade and sustainable development policy, at all levels of engagement and in all relevant activities and concepts, including beyond the lifetime of the GAP III; urges the EEAS to enhance its geographical balance in order to have appropriate national representation reflecting the diversity of all Member States, as indicated in Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials;

| 21. | Calls on the EU and the Member States to exercise leadership in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; underlines that women play a key role in the prevention of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peace keeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction; stresses the need for the EU to ensure women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain peace and security; |
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21.

Calls on the EU and the Member States to exercise leadership in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; underlines that women play a key role in the prevention of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peace keeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction; stresses the need for the EU to ensure women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain peace and security;

| 22. | Calls for the strengthening of the EEAS and EU delegations’ capacities by providing them their own and permanent EU instruments and resources for foreign affairs and human rights protection and promotion and the fight against disinformation; calls for an update of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 in order to be able to better fulfil the EU’s objectives, values and interests worldwide; |
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22.

Calls for the strengthening of the EEAS and EU delegations’ capacities by providing them their own and permanent EU instruments and resources for foreign affairs and human rights protection and promotion and the fight against disinformation; calls for an update of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 in order to be able to better fulfil the EU’s objectives, values and interests worldwide;

| 23. | Urges the Member States and the Commission to strengthen the role of the VP/HR; points out that this can be achieved through a Treaty change that would make the VP/HR foreign minister of the Union, make them the main external representative of the Union in international forums and allow them to be present ex officio in negotiating formats initiated or led by Member States; supports the call from citizens of the Union expressing their wish in the Conference on the Future of Europe for the EU to speak with one voice; |
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23.

Urges the Member States and the Commission to strengthen the role of the VP/HR; points out that this can be achieved through a Treaty change that would make the VP/HR foreign minister of the Union, make them the main external representative of the Union in international forums and allow them to be present ex officio

| 24. | Takes note of the VP/HR’s speech at the 2022 Annual Conference of EU Ambassadors and expects that the shortcomings of the EU diplomatic service identified will be effectively addressed in order to strengthen its capacity and efficiency; calls for autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, among others, determined by a common diplomatic culture and a real EU esprit de corps; welcomes the start of the pilot project entitled ‘Towards a European Diplomatic Academy’, which aims to promote the acquisition of common skills and competences to promote and effectively defend the EU’s principles and interests in the world; underlines that this pilot project should also focus on target groups for a future academy and allow the possibility of including those who are not Member State diplomats to become EU diplomats in the future; |
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24.

Takes note of the VP/HR’s speech at the 2022 Annual Conference of EU Ambassadors and expects that the shortcomings of the EU diplomatic service identified will be effectively addressed in order to strengthen its capacity and efficiency; calls for autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, among others, determined by a common diplomatic culture and a real EU esprit de corps

| 25. | Underlines the strategic roles played by international cultural cooperation and cultural diplomacy in EU foreign policy in strengthening relations with partner countries, promoting the EU’s democratic values, protecting cultural heritage abroad, promoting intercultural dialogue, the mobility of artists and cultural professionals, conflict prevention, countering disinformation and foreign interference in third countries and in the fight against illicit trafficking, looting and destruction of cultural property; calls for the EU’s cultural diplomacy to be strengthened by mainstreaming culture as a strategic pillar across the Union’s external action and by developing an EU instrument that embodies the cultural aspects of the Union worldwide and fosters international cultural relations based on cultural cooperation and co-creation, actively involving civil society and the cultural sectors of third countries; stresses that this instrument could provide EU capacity-building and financial assistance to cultural, creative and innovative sectors of third countries’ civil society; supports the inclusion of culture in all current and future bilateral and multilateral agreements, with due respect for the commitments made under the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; |
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25.

Underlines the strategic roles played by international cultural cooperation and cultural diplomacy in EU foreign policy in strengthening relations with partner countries, promoting the EU’s democratic values, protecting cultural heritage abroad, promoting intercultural dialogue, the mobility of artists and cultural professionals, conflict prevention, countering disinformation and foreign interference in third countries and in the fight against illicit trafficking, looting and destruction of cultural property; calls for the EU’s cultural diplomacy to be strengthened by mainstreaming culture as a strategic pillar across the Union’s external action and by developing an EU instrument that embodies the cultural aspects of the Union worldwide and fosters international cultural relations based on cultural cooperation and co-creation, actively involving civil society and the cultural sectors of third countries; stresses that this instrument could provide EU capacity-building and financial assistance to cultural, creative and innovative sectors of third countries’ civil society; supports the inclusion of culture in all current and future bilateral and multilateral agreements, with due respect for the commitments made under the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions;

| 26. | Stresses that geopolitical and humanitarian global crises demonstrate the need for the EU to obtain credible and first-hand information on current and possible external threats to the EU, in order to be able to react rapidly and effectively, as well as to better protect its interests abroad; calls for the strengthening of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre by enhancing their resources and capabilities; |
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26.

Stresses that geopolitical and humanitarian global crises demonstrate the need for the EU to obtain credible and first-hand information on current and possible external threats to the EU, in order to be able to react rapidly and effectively, as well as to better protect its interests abroad; calls for the strengthening of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre by enhancing their resources and capabilities;

| 27. | Highlights the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council as the current regulatory framework provided both by the Treaties and the interinstitutional agreements on the external representation of the EU abroad is unclear about the competences of each institutional role; considers that this lack of clarity can lead to some duplication in the EU’s external action or confuse the EU’s counterparts and/or interlocutors worldwide in their relations with the Union; |
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27.

Highlights the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council as the current regulatory framework provided both by the Treaties and the interinstitutional agreements on the external representation of the EU abroad is unclear about the competences of each institutional role; considers that this lack of clarity can lead to some duplication in the EU’s external action or confuse the EU’s counterparts and/or interlocutors worldwide in their relations with the Union;

Operationalising strategic autonomy

Operationalising strategic autonomy

| 28. | Underlines that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s grave and massive destruction, war crimes and deliberate violations of human rights and the fundamental norms of international law have highlighted the need for a stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU presence and action on the world stage; emphasises the need for the EU to more vigorously set its own strategic objectives, as provided for in the Strategic Compass, and develop the capabilities and enablers to pursue them, while working both autonomously and in close cooperation with like-minded partners; is of the opinion that regaining all of Ukraine’s occupied territories, safeguarding its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the swift completion of the legal procedure for the confiscation of assets frozen by sanctions, as well as bringing the perpetrators, including Vladimir Putin and the top military and civilian leadership of the Russian Federation, to justice internationally should be considered a goal of EU policy towards Ukraine; |
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28.

Underlines that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s grave and massive destruction, war crimes and deliberate violations of human rights and the fundamental norms of international law have highlighted the need for a stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified EU presence and action on the world stage; emphasises the need for the EU to more vigorously set its own strategic objectives, as provided for in the Strategic Compass, and develop the capabilities and enablers to pursue them, while working both autonomously and in close cooperation with like-minded partners; is of the opinion that regaining all of Ukraine’s occupied territories, safeguarding its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the swift completion of the legal procedure for the confiscation of assets frozen by sanctions, as well as bringing the perpetrators, including Vladimir Putin and the top military and civilian leadership of the Russian Federation, to justice internationally should be considered a goal of EU policy towards Ukraine;

| 29. | Recalls that the EU will only become an effective diplomatic and security actor through strong action and that the EU will only increase its strategic sovereignty and solidarity through concrete measures, policies, budgets and commitments; |
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29.

Recalls that the EU will only become an effective diplomatic and security actor through strong action and that the EU will only increase its strategic sovereignty and solidarity through concrete measures, policies, budgets and commitments;

| 30. | Welcomes the shift in the Member States’ approaches, which signifies a move towards enhanced EU strategic autonomy through the swift implementation of the main actions laid down in the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass; notes that these highlight the need to strengthen EU and Member State defence capabilities and to contribute positively to European, transatlantic and global security, in close collaboration, complementarity and coordination with NATO when relevant to the EU, in particular when moving towards creating greater EU strategic autonomy; |
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30.

Welcomes the shift in the Member States’ approaches, which signifies a move towards enhanced EU strategic autonomy through the swift implementation of the main actions laid down in the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass; notes that these highlight the need to strengthen EU and Member State defence capabilities and to contribute positively to European, transatlantic and global security, in close collaboration, complementarity and coordination with NATO when relevant to the EU, in particular when moving towards creating greater EU strategic autonomy;

| 31. | Welcomes the adoption on 10 January 2023 of the third joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation; urges the Union and those Member States who are also NATO allies to ensure the coherent implementation of the objectives and priorities highlighted in the Strategic Compass, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the third joint declaration; underlines that these strategic processes within NATO and the EU offer a unique opportunity to further intensify our consultations and cooperation in order to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond; |
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31.

Welcomes the adoption on 10 January 2023 of the third joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation; urges the Union and those Member States who are also NATO allies to ensure the coherent implementation of the objectives and priorities highlighted in the Strategic Compass, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the third joint declaration; underlines that these strategic processes within NATO and the EU offer a unique opportunity to further intensify our consultations and cooperation in order to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond;

| 32. | Notes that European defence capabilities should be compatible and complementary with NATO, which remains the foremost security guarantor in Europe; underlines that the EU is a partner of NATO and that EU-NATO cooperation is mutually reinforcing and based on transparency, reciprocity, inclusiveness and on each organisation respecting the decision-making autonomy of the other; |
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32.

Notes that European defence capabilities should be compatible and complementary with NATO, which remains the foremost security guarantor in Europe; underlines that the EU is a partner of NATO and that EU-NATO cooperation is mutually reinforcing and based on transparency, reciprocity, inclusiveness and on each organisation respecting the decision-making autonomy of the other;

| 33. | Stresses that any process for achieving EU strategic autonomy must be complementary to and compatible with NATO; notes, therefore, that the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities is essential for increasing the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in line with the principle of the single set of forces; reiterates that a European capability to act, either in partnership or autonomously, is essential for complementarity and for contributing to the fulfilment of NATO’s core tasks, as well as for enhancing conflict prevention, and is therefore essential for the security of the European continent as a whole; |
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33.

Stresses that any process for achieving EU strategic autonomy must be complementary to and compatible with NATO; notes, therefore, that the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities is essential for increasing the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in line with the principle of the single set of forces; reiterates that a European capability to act, either in partnership or autonomously, is essential for complementarity and for contributing to the fulfilment of NATO’s core tasks, as well as for enhancing conflict prevention, and is therefore essential for the security of the European continent as a whole;

| 34. | Considers that the Strategic Compass constitutes an important step towards a genuine European defence union and must form the foundation for developing a common strategic culture at the level of both the Union and its Member States; calls on the EU and the Member States to show the necessary unity and political will to swiftly implement the ambitious measures to which they have committed in the Strategic Compass, including the timely operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity; believes that the implementation of the Strategic Compass would bring the EU closer to the objective of strategic autonomy; underlines the need to take into account the effects of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and to shorten the deadlines for accomplishing all individual actions and projects; |
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34.

Considers that the Strategic Compass constitutes an important step towards a genuine European defence union and must form the foundation for developing a common strategic culture at the level of both the Union and its Member States; calls on the EU and the Member States to show the necessary unity and political will to swiftly implement the ambitious measures to which they have committed in the Strategic Compass, including the timely operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity; believes that the implementation of the Strategic Compass would bring the EU closer to the objective of strategic autonomy; underlines the need to take into account the effects of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and to shorten the deadlines for accomplishing all individual actions and projects;

| 35. | Recalls, however, that the capability gaps between the Member States and the key areas of effort required for defence have been correctly identified for some years by the European Defence Agency, the European Union Military Staff, the EEAS and the Commission; considers, therefore, that the ambitions set out in both the Strategic Compass and the Versailles Council Conclusions will only be of worth if they are effectively implemented by the Member States; |
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35.

Recalls, however, that the capability gaps between the Member States and the key areas of effort required for defence have been correctly identified for some years by the European Defence Agency, the European Union Military Staff, the EEAS and the Commission; considers, therefore, that the ambitions set out in both the Strategic Compass and the Versailles Council Conclusions will only be of worth if they are effectively implemented by the Member States;

| 36. | Welcomes the swift and repeated use of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to provide the necessary support to enable Ukraine to defend and regain effective control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders; highlights the need to improve the Union’s ability to act with sustainable and appropriate funding by building on the EPF support already delivered to Ukraine, including through the Clearing House Cell, and to use the lessons learnt in the Union’s support for Ukraine to enhance its readiness for future scenarios; welcomes the Council’s decision of 12 December 2022 to increase the budget of the EPF by EUR 2 billion, while allowing for the possibility of a further increase of the EPF’s overall financial ceiling by a maximum total of EUR 5,5 billion by 2027, given the need to continue supporting arms and ammunition delivery to Ukraine and other partner countries, including on the African continent; urges the VP/HR to swiftly present a proposal to amend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509; stresses, further, the need to establish a second off-budget facility which would manage the development and generation of the entire life-cycle of capabilities, which includes common military research and development, procurement, training, maintenance and security of supply; |
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36.

Welcomes the swift and repeated use of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to provide the necessary support to enable Ukraine to defend and regain effective control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders; highlights the need to improve the Union’s ability to act with sustainable and appropriate funding by building on the EPF support already delivered to Ukraine, including through the Clearing House Cell, and to use the lessons learnt in the Union’s support for Ukraine to enhance its readiness for future scenarios; welcomes the Council’s decision of 12 December 2022 to increase the budget of the EPF by EUR 2 billion, while allowing for the possibility of a further increase of the EPF’s overall financial ceiling by a maximum total of EUR 5,5 billion by 2027, given the need to continue supporting arms and ammunition delivery to Ukraine and other partner countries, including on the African continent; urges the VP/HR to swiftly present a proposal to amend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509; stresses, further, the need to establish a second off-budget facility which would manage the development and generation of the entire life-cycle of capabilities, which includes common military research and development, procurement, training, maintenance and security of supply;

| 37. | Calls for an increase in financial and military assistance to Ukraine and for the immediate deployment of modern equipment, weapons and a next-generation air defence system; expresses its support for the decision by a number of Member States and international partners to provide Ukraine with infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers; reiterates its call on the Member States to initiate the delivery of modern main battle tanks, including Leopard 2s, under a coordinated EU initiative through the EU Military Staff clearing house cell hosted by the EEAS; supports the establishment of the Military Assistance Mission to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces on EU soil and calls for its swift deployment; recognises the current work of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine and welcomes the recent adjustment of its mandate in order to support Ukrainian authorities in facilitating the investigation and prosecution of any international crimes committed by the Russian armed forces and mercenaries in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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37.

Calls for an increase in financial and military assistance to Ukraine and for the immediate deployment of modern equipment, weapons and a next-generation air defence system; expresses its support for the decision by a number of Member States and international partners to provide Ukraine with infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers; reiterates its call on the Member States to initiate the delivery of modern main battle tanks, including Leopard 2s, under a coordinated EU initiative through the EU Military Staff clearing house cell hosted by the EEAS; supports the establishment of the Military Assistance Mission to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces on EU soil and calls for its swift deployment; recognises the current work of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine and welcomes the recent adjustment of its mandate in order to support Ukrainian authorities in facilitating the investigation and prosecution of any international crimes committed by the Russian armed forces and mercenaries in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

| 38. | Reiterates its call on the VP/HR, the Member States and international partners to prepare a swift and decisive response should Russia deploy chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons against Ukraine; |
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38.

Reiterates its call on the VP/HR, the Member States and international partners to prepare a swift and decisive response should Russia deploy chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons against Ukraine;

| 39. | Welcomes the adoption of the joint communication of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward by the Commission and the High Representative and calls on Member States to jointly develop and procure the necessary capabilities to fill these gaps by making full use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), as well as new EU instruments to incentivise more joint procurement, which will help to increase the security of both Member States and NATO allies; |
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39.

Welcomes the adoption of the joint communication of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward by the Commission and the High Representative and calls on Member States to jointly develop and procure the necessary capabilities to fill these gaps by making full use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), as well as new EU instruments to incentivise more joint procurement, which will help to increase the security of both Member States and NATO allies;

| 40. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission and the VP/HR launched the Global Gateway strategy on 1 December 2021 to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport and strengthen health, education and research systems across the world and in particular in the Global South; emphasises the geopolitical centrality of this trusted connectivity strategy, which integrates sustainable development with oriented, transformational, resilience-enhancing and values-based dimensions in a ‘Team Europe’ approach; calls for the effective governance of the Global Gateway; welcomes the first meeting of the Global Gateway Board, which took place on 11 December 2022 and to which Parliament was invited as an observer; asks to be duly involved in the decisions on the Global Gateway investment programmes and to be regularly informed about any developments, including budgetary implications; |
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40.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission and the VP/HR launched the Global Gateway strategy on 1 December 2021 to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport and strengthen health, education and research systems across the world and in particular in the Global South; emphasises the geopolitical centrality of this trusted connectivity strategy, which integrates sustainable development with oriented, transformational, resilience-enhancing and values-based dimensions in a ‘Team Europe’ approach; calls for the effective governance of the Global Gateway; welcomes the first meeting of the Global Gateway Board, which took place on 11 December 2022 and to which Parliament was invited as an observer; asks to be duly involved in the decisions on the Global Gateway investment programmes and to be regularly informed about any developments, including budgetary implications;

| 41. | Believes that considerably more efforts are needed to enable this strategy to live up to its full potential and calls on the EU institutions and all Member States to accelerate its further development and speedier implementation; considers it essential to team up with like-minded partners in expanding the scale and impact of this strategy; calls for decisive steps at G7 level in order to address global infrastructure investment gaps, including by providing the necessary funding; |
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41.

Believes that considerably more efforts are needed to enable this strategy to live up to its full potential and calls on the EU institutions and all Member States to accelerate its further development and speedier implementation; considers it essential to team up with like-minded partners in expanding the scale and impact of this strategy; calls for decisive steps at G7 level in order to address global infrastructure investment gaps, including by providing the necessary funding;

| 42. | Points out the high geopolitical significance of the EU Green Deal as a long-term tool that will influence the EU’s relations with third countries; |
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42.

Points out the high geopolitical significance of the EU Green Deal as a long-term tool that will influence the EU’s relations with third countries;

| 43. | Underlines the importance of an ambitious EU climate policy in order to achieve the European Green Deal goals, particularly its internationalisation and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks; expects, given the current geopolitical shifts and challenges, the European Green Deal’s implementation to contribute to building new partnerships and diversifying the EU’s energy mix as alternatives to Russian fossil fuel supplies; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Underlines the importance of an ambitious EU climate policy in order to achieve the European Green Deal goals, particularly its internationalisation and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks; expects, given the current geopolitical shifts and challenges, the European Green Deal’s implementation to contribute to building new partnerships and diversifying the EU’s energy mix as alternatives to Russian fossil fuel supplies;

| 44. | Underlines the importance of stepping up the EU’s efforts, in cooperation with NATO and other international partners, to address and foster resilience against hybrid threats, cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, both within the Union and in third countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in close cooperation with NATO and non-NATO partners, to treat the protection of critical European infrastructure, including offshore pipelines, submarine communications and power cables, as a matter of highest priority; reiterates the urgent need for European institutions, agencies and other bodies to be properly protected against hybrid threats and attacks by foreign state actors; underlines the need to also develop their strategic communication capabilities through the StratCom Task Forces, including those directed at third countries and with a particular focus on the populations of Russia and Belarus, as well as to allocate adequate financial resources to this end and to equip themselves with secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity to counter attacks and to greatly increase their resilience; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Underlines the importance of stepping up the EU’s efforts, in cooperation with NATO and other international partners, to address and foster resilience against hybrid threats, cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, both within the Union and in third countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in close cooperation with NATO and non-NATO partners, to treat the protection of critical European infrastructure, including offshore pipelines, submarine communications and power cables, as a matter of highest priority; reiterates the urgent need for European institutions, agencies and other bodies to be properly protected against hybrid threats and attacks by foreign state actors; underlines the need to also develop their strategic communication capabilities through the StratCom Task Forces, including those directed at third countries and with a particular focus on the populations of Russia and Belarus, as well as to allocate adequate financial resources to this end and to equip themselves with secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity to counter attacks and to greatly increase their resilience;

| 45. | Welcomes the resolve displayed by the Union and most Member States in the pursuit of full energy independence from the Russian Federation and in diversifying their energy supply sources; reiterates its call for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports of fossil fuels and uranium and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to remain closed and be completely abandoned; emphasises that short-term diversification of energy sources should not be at the expense of meaningful human rights dialogue with alternative energy providers; notes that this highlights the essential nature of speeding up the green transition; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Welcomes the resolve displayed by the Union and most Member States in the pursuit of full energy independence from the Russian Federation and in diversifying their energy supply sources; reiterates its call for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports of fossil fuels and uranium and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to remain closed and be completely abandoned; emphasises that short-term diversification of energy sources should not be at the expense of meaningful human rights dialogue with alternative energy providers; notes that this highlights the essential nature of speeding up the green transition;

| 46. | Calls for initiatives to strengthen the resilience of strategic supply chains and EU critical infrastructure through regular comprehensive stress test exercises conducted by the Commission, including on health, energy, foodstuffs, semiconductors and critical raw materials, as well as offshore pipelines and cables, with a view to preventing severe supply chain disruptions and reducing EU dependencies on third countries, in particular those which do not share the Union’s values or with which the Union finds itself in a state of systemic rivalry, to non-critical levels; underlines the importance of enhancing the Union’s own capabilities in cooperation with like-minded partners; stresses that further cooperation with democratic partners is needed to secure the strategic resources used in the manufacturing of batteries, chips, semiconductors and other critical technologies and to decrease dependencies on non-democratic regimes for the supply of these resources; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Calls for initiatives to strengthen the resilience of strategic supply chains and EU critical infrastructure through regular comprehensive stress test exercises conducted by the Commission, including on health, energy, foodstuffs, semiconductors and critical raw materials, as well as offshore pipelines and cables, with a view to preventing severe supply chain disruptions and reducing EU dependencies on third countries, in particular those which do not share the Union’s values or with which the Union finds itself in a state of systemic rivalry, to non-critical levels; underlines the importance of enhancing the Union’s own capabilities in cooperation with like-minded partners; stresses that further cooperation with democratic partners is needed to secure the strategic resources used in the manufacturing of batteries, chips, semiconductors and other critical technologies and to decrease dependencies on non-democratic regimes for the supply of these resources;

| 47. | Underlines the strategic dimension for Europe of the space sector; underlines the need to ensure the Union’s visibility and credibility as an international space actor and in advancing the development of technologies that would ensure European strategic autonomy; calls for increased EU commitment to developing a comprehensive international space regulation, building upon, updating and reinforcing current UN treaties, declarations and legal principles underpinning space governance and taking account of rapid technological progress; underlines that this updated regulatory framework for space would further the sustainable and peaceful development of space while limiting and regulating its weaponisation and militarisation; welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will present a space strategy for security and defence; considers that enhancing the EU’s strategic sovereignty in space is essential to its broader efforts to achieve all-encompassing strategic autonomy; |
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47.

Underlines the strategic dimension for Europe of the space sector; underlines the need to ensure the Union’s visibility and credibility as an international space actor and in advancing the development of technologies that would ensure European strategic autonomy; calls for increased EU commitment to developing a comprehensive international space regulation, building upon, updating and reinforcing current UN treaties, declarations and legal principles underpinning space governance and taking account of rapid technological progress; underlines that this updated regulatory framework for space would further the sustainable and peaceful development of space while limiting and regulating its weaponisation and militarisation; welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will present a space strategy for security and defence; considers that enhancing the EU’s strategic sovereignty in space is essential to its broader efforts to achieve all-encompassing strategic autonomy;

| 48. | Stresses that access to safe drinking water is one of the major problems of the 21st century, especially since nearly 60 % of aquifer resources straddle political territorial borders; underlines that water stress resulting from the increased freshwater needs of the world’s population, subject to the strategic control of rivers at their source by some countries can lead to the most serious conflicts if the use of flows is not provided for in an integrated and shared manner; urges the EU to establish a political strategy to facilitate solutions in these areas with high destabilising potential while encouraging countries in areas facing the most serious water-related conflicts to sign the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Stresses that access to safe drinking water is one of the major problems of the 21st century, especially since nearly 60 % of aquifer resources straddle political territorial borders; underlines that water stress resulting from the increased freshwater needs of the world’s population, subject to the strategic control of rivers at their source by some countries can lead to the most serious conflicts if the use of flows is not provided for in an integrated and shared manner; urges the EU to establish a political strategy to facilitate solutions in these areas with high destabilising potential while encouraging countries in areas facing the most serious water-related conflicts to sign the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes;

| 49. | Calls for the Union to develop its digital sovereignty, in particular in cyber security, in order to protect democracy and its institutions; stresses the specific threat that the new digital technologies pose for human rights defenders and others because they can be used for controlling, restricting and undermining their activities, as illustrated recently by the Pegasus Project revelations; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Calls for the Union to develop its digital sovereignty, in particular in cyber security, in order to protect democracy and its institutions; stresses the specific threat that the new digital technologies pose for human rights defenders and others because they can be used for controlling, restricting and undermining their activities, as illustrated recently by the Pegasus Project revelations;

| 50. | Stresses that the Union, in cooperation with like-minded partners, should strive for global competitiveness in the research, development, production and deployment of drones; |
| --- | --- |

50.

Stresses that the Union, in cooperation with like-minded partners, should strive for global competitiveness in the research, development, production and deployment of drones;

| 51. | Welcomes the Commission’ announcement that it will work on proposals for a defence of democracy package, which would shield the Union from malign interference; |
| --- | --- |

51.

Welcomes the Commission’ announcement that it will work on proposals for a defence of democracy package, which would shield the Union from malign interference;

Leading the reinforcement of multilateralism and building partnerships for a better world

Leading the reinforcement of multilateralism and building partnerships for a better world

| 52. | Stresses the need to strengthen the UN as a priority and to develop a truly strategic partnership between the UN and the EU on global priorities such as climate action and human rights, but also for crisis management; emphasises that the Union must continue to take the lead in the promotion of a more relevant, resilient and effective multilateralism which forms the basis for inclusive policy dialogue, cooperation and convergence aimed at advancing human security, sustainable development and the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts in full respect of international law and human rights; urges the Union and its Member States to speak with one voice in multilateral forums, strengthen ties with like-minded partners around the world, intensify outreach to third countries and their populations and pursue pragmatic sectoral multilateral solutions in areas in which doing so is in accordance with its values-based interests; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Stresses the need to strengthen the UN as a priority and to develop a truly strategic partnership between the UN and the EU on global priorities such as climate action and human rights, but also for crisis management; emphasises that the Union must continue to take the lead in the promotion of a more relevant, resilient and effective multilateralism which forms the basis for inclusive policy dialogue, cooperation and convergence aimed at advancing human security, sustainable development and the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts in full respect of international law and human rights; urges the Union and its Member States to speak with one voice in multilateral forums, strengthen ties with like-minded partners around the world, intensify outreach to third countries and their populations and pursue pragmatic sectoral multilateral solutions in areas in which doing so is in accordance with its values-based interests;

| 53. | Calls on the Commission, the Council, the EEAS and the Member States to come forward with sound proposals on how to achieve and guarantee an own and permanent seat for the Union in all multilateral forums, including the UN Security Council, in order to strengthen the EU’s actorness, coherence and credibility in the world; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Calls on the Commission, the Council, the EEAS and the Member States to come forward with sound proposals on how to achieve and guarantee an own and permanent seat for the Union in all multilateral forums, including the UN Security Council, in order to strengthen the EU’s actorness, coherence and credibility in the world;

| 54. | Underlines the importance of intensified diplomatic efforts to communicate our position in the most efficient way and to coordinate with like-minded democratic partners in order to maintain the strongest possible unity within the international community in condemning Russia and defending the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law and the rules- and values-based international order, within the UN and its Charter and other multilateral forums; stresses the importance of robust diplomatic actions in respect of countries that obstructed the vote or abstained on the UN Resolutions of 2 March and 12 October 2022 in order to highlight the gravity of Russia’s aggression and the need for an unanimous response from the international community; stresses that priority should be given to building strong and reliable alliances, partnerships and multilateral arrangements and to building strategic solidarity with like-minded countries; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Underlines the importance of intensified diplomatic efforts to communicate our position in the most efficient way and to coordinate with like-minded democratic partners in order to maintain the strongest possible unity within the international community in condemning Russia and defending the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law and the rules- and values-based international order, within the UN and its Charter and other multilateral forums; stresses the importance of robust diplomatic actions in respect of countries that obstructed the vote or abstained on the UN Resolutions of 2 March and 12 October 2022 in order to highlight the gravity of Russia’s aggression and the need for an unanimous response from the international community; stresses that priority should be given to building strong and reliable alliances, partnerships and multilateral arrangements and to building strategic solidarity with like-minded countries;

| 55. | Underlines the need for EU unanimity in condemning Russian aggression and for leaders of some EU countries not to open separate lines of contact with Putin; stresses that negotiations with Russia should not be sought until and unless the Ukrainian authorities decide to enter into them and that until that happens, the EU should continue to provide financial, materiel and military assistance to Ukraine; |
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55.

Underlines the need for EU unanimity in condemning Russian aggression and for leaders of some EU countries not to open separate lines of contact with Putin; stresses that negotiations with Russia should not be sought until and unless the Ukrainian authorities decide to enter into them and that until that happens, the EU should continue to provide financial, materiel and military assistance to Ukraine;

| 56. | Underscores that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further highlighted the need for the EU to continue building alliances and understanding among partners and to intensify cooperation with existing like-minded partners around the globe, especially with transatlantic NATO allies, while expanding its partnerships, in particular with countries in the Global South; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Underscores that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further highlighted the need for the EU to continue building alliances and understanding among partners and to intensify cooperation with existing like-minded partners around the globe, especially with transatlantic NATO allies, while expanding its partnerships, in particular with countries in the Global South;

| 57. | Underlines that, as NATO remains fundamental to the European security order, the EU and its Member States must commit to strengthening NATO’s European pillar, inter alia those Member States which are also NATO allies, by consistently meeting the NATO defence spending benchmark of 2 % of gross domestic product as of 2024 while preventing duplication, reducing fragmentation and enhancing interoperability; urges the two remaining NATO allies which have not yet done so to ratify Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO without delay; considers that the strategic partnership with NATO should be based on trust; insists on consolidating and clarifying the strategic partnership with NATO in a reciprocal manner; |
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57.

Underlines that, as NATO remains fundamental to the European security order, the EU and its Member States must commit to strengthening NATO’s European pillar, inter alia those Member States which are also NATO allies, by consistently meeting the NATO defence spending benchmark of 2 % of gross domestic product as of 2024 while preventing duplication, reducing fragmentation and enhancing interoperability; urges the two remaining NATO allies which have not yet done so to ratify Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO without delay; considers that the strategic partnership with NATO should be based on trust; insists on consolidating and clarifying the strategic partnership with NATO in a reciprocal manner;

| 58. | Calls for the further strengthening of cooperation with NATO and other partnerships, such as the G7, and with other like-minded partners; points out that such partnerships should constitute an integral pillar of the CFSP; |
| --- | --- |

58.

Calls for the further strengthening of cooperation with NATO and other partnerships, such as the G7, and with other like-minded partners; points out that such partnerships should constitute an integral pillar of the CFSP;

| 59. | Calls on the EU and its international partners to make full use of all relevant instruments to fight impunity, including through enhanced support to the International Criminal Court and to special tribunals at national and international level, as well as by establishing flexible cooperation and funding mechanisms to swiftly collect and analyse evidence of international crimes; calls on the international community to make sure that all instigators and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity are held fully accountable; urges the EU and its Member States to work towards the establishment of a special tribunal, as initiated by Ukraine and with support from the international community, to investigate and hold the Russian military and political leadership to account for the crime of aggression, as well as to continue their support for the International Criminal Court’s investigation into allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide currently being committed; reiterates its call on the Commission to present an EU action plan on impunity; stresses that this action plan should seek to better coordinate and harmonise Member States’ resources and efforts to prosecute war criminals in the EU; is of the view that transitional justice plays a fundamental role in securing peace in the long term and urges the Commission to develop an ambitious programme to build the capacity of Member States and third countries to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in their domestic legal systems; |
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59.

Calls on the EU and its international partners to make full use of all relevant instruments to fight impunity, including through enhanced support to the International Criminal Court and to special tribunals at national and international level, as well as by establishing flexible cooperation and funding mechanisms to swiftly collect and analyse evidence of international crimes; calls on the international community to make sure that all instigators and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity are held fully accountable; urges the EU and its Member States to work towards the establishment of a special tribunal, as initiated by Ukraine and with support from the international community, to investigate and hold the Russian military and political leadership to account for the crime of aggression, as well as to continue their support for the International Criminal Court’s investigation into allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide currently being committed; reiterates its call on the Commission to present an EU action plan on impunity; stresses that this action plan should seek to better coordinate and harmonise Member States’ resources and efforts to prosecute war criminals in the EU; is of the view that transitional justice plays a fundamental role in securing peace in the long term and urges the Commission to develop an ambitious programme to build the capacity of Member States and third countries to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in their domestic legal systems;

| 60. | Welcomes the first meeting of the European Political Community in October 2022 as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with close partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening the security of the European continent and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; welcomes the fact that 44 countries took part in the first meeting in Prague, including close partners such as the UK; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this Community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances precipitate or form a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries; |
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60.

Welcomes the first meeting of the European Political Community in October 2022 as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with close partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening the security of the European continent and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; welcomes the fact that 44 countries took part in the first meeting in Prague, including close partners such as the UK; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this Community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances precipitate or form a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

| 61. | Highlights the need to intensify the dialogue with the United Kingdom on possible avenues for future cooperation and coordination on foreign, security and defence policy, in line with the provisions of the Political Declaration and including in the framework of the EU-NATO partnership, the United Nations, the European Political Community and other international forums; urges closer EU cooperation with our British neighbours, as we are facing common challenges on foreign and security issues; regrets that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not include provisions on cooperation in foreign policy and defence; underlines the importance of coordinating sanctions regimes; calls for stronger involvement of the United Kingdom in European security and defence projects; welcomes in this regard the decision of PESCO members and the Council of 14 November 2022 to invite the UK to join the Military Mobility PESCO project, which would improve mutual rapid security and defence assistance; |
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61.

Highlights the need to intensify the dialogue with the United Kingdom on possible avenues for future cooperation and coordination on foreign, security and defence policy, in line with the provisions of the Political Declaration and including in the framework of the EU-NATO partnership, the United Nations, the European Political Community and other international forums; urges closer EU cooperation with our British neighbours, as we are facing common challenges on foreign and security issues; regrets that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not include provisions on cooperation in foreign policy and defence; underlines the importance of coordinating sanctions regimes; calls for stronger involvement of the United Kingdom in European security and defence projects; welcomes in this regard the decision of PESCO members and the Council of 14 November 2022 to invite the UK to join the Military Mobility PESCO project, which would improve mutual rapid security and defence assistance;

| 62. | Urges the UK to ensure the full implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, and to pursue practical, flexible and durable common solutions within the Protocol’s legal framework; stresses that the full implementation of the Protocol is fundamental for maintaining the peace and stability in Northern Ireland ensured by the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, as well for the integrity and the proper functioning of the European single market; |
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62.

Urges the UK to ensure the full implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, and to pursue practical, flexible and durable common solutions within the Protocol’s legal framework; stresses that the full implementation of the Protocol is fundamental for maintaining the peace and stability in Northern Ireland ensured by the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, as well for the integrity and the proper functioning of the European single market;

| 63. | Underlines the importance of strong transatlantic cooperation, again highlighted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, based on shared values and objectives, and on the principle of partnership of equals in leadership and responsibility, while respecting the other party’s autonomy and specificities, interests and aspirations; applauds the role of the US in deterring Russia’s aggression, in particular through intelligence sharing, military assistance, humanitarian aid and political support and by bolstering the most exposed part of NATO's Eastern flank; underlines the need to further strengthen EU-US transatlantic cooperation by means of an ambitious transatlantic agenda; invites the political leadership and institutions of the United States to continue on a path of ever closer cooperation and coordination in all fields that are of interest in countering global threats affecting our shared values, security and prosperity; |
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63.

Underlines the importance of strong transatlantic cooperation, again highlighted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, based on shared values and objectives, and on the principle of partnership of equals in leadership and responsibility, while respecting the other party’s autonomy and specificities, interests and aspirations; applauds the role of the US in deterring Russia’s aggression, in particular through intelligence sharing, military assistance, humanitarian aid and political support and by bolstering the most exposed part of NATO's Eastern flank; underlines the need to further strengthen EU-US transatlantic cooperation by means of an ambitious transatlantic agenda; invites the political leadership and institutions of the United States to continue on a path of ever closer cooperation and coordination in all fields that are of interest in countering global threats affecting our shared values, security and prosperity;

| 64. | Welcomes the ongoing cooperation, determination and united stance in supporting Ukraine and in implementing an unprecedented sanctions regime with the goal of deterring Russia from continuing its illegal aggression and supporting Ukraine’s full liberation within its internationally recognised borders; fully supports and commits to pursuing synergies and shared foreign and security objectives by further deepening cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy, and to addressing many of the key global challenges such as climate change and the threat posed by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes globally, including in Europe and Asia; |
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64.

Welcomes the ongoing cooperation, determination and united stance in supporting Ukraine and in implementing an unprecedented sanctions regime with the goal of deterring Russia from continuing its illegal aggression and supporting Ukraine’s full liberation within its internationally recognised borders; fully supports and commits to pursuing synergies and shared foreign and security objectives by further deepening cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy, and to addressing many of the key global challenges such as climate change and the threat posed by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes globally, including in Europe and Asia;

| 65. | Recommends that summits between the EU and the United States should be held on a regular basis and at least once a year in order to give a continued high level impetus to transatlantic cooperation; welcomes in this regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council and reiterates its proposal to establish a Transatlantic Political Council, which would serve as a forum for regular and effective institutional dialogue on foreign and security policy; welcomes the US’s strong commitment to European security, in particular its massive military aid to Ukraine and troop deployments on the eastern flank of NATO; |
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65.

Recommends that summits between the EU and the United States should be held on a regular basis and at least once a year in order to give a continued high level impetus to transatlantic cooperation; welcomes in this regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council and reiterates its proposal to establish a Transatlantic Political Council, which would serve as a forum for regular and effective institutional dialogue on foreign and security policy; welcomes the US’s strong commitment to European security, in particular its massive military aid to Ukraine and troop deployments on the eastern flank of NATO;

| 66. | Takes note of the 23rd EU-China Summit of April 2022; is deeply concerned by the outcome of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which highlights Xi Jinping’s geopolitical ambitions; notes that the relationship between the EU and the PRC is increasingly characterised by economic competition and systemic rivalry; reiterates its requests for a renewed, more assertive, comprehensive and coherent EU-China strategy that shapes relations with the PRC in the interest of the EU as a whole and takes full account of the challenges stemming from the PRC’s rise as a global actor and its increasingly oppressive domestic policies and assertive foreign policy, including towards the Union and towards candidate and potential candidate countries; |
| --- | --- |

66.

Takes note of the 23rd EU-China Summit of April 2022; is deeply concerned by the outcome of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which highlights Xi Jinping’s geopolitical ambitions; notes that the relationship between the EU and the PRC is increasingly characterised by economic competition and systemic rivalry; reiterates its requests for a renewed, more assertive, comprehensive and coherent EU-China strategy that shapes relations with the PRC in the interest of the EU as a whole and takes full account of the challenges stemming from the PRC’s rise as a global actor and its increasingly oppressive domestic policies and assertive foreign policy, including towards the Union and towards candidate and potential candidate countries;

| 67. | Expresses concern at the wide range of political, economic and military instruments used by the PRC to increasingly strong-arm countries into submission and to seek to impose its authoritarian ideology on international organisations, such as the UN, to expand its presence, project power, and to adapt its strategy, intentions and military rearmament accordingly; is especially concerned about its partnership with the Russian Federation and their joint attempts to undermine the rules-based world order, which are contrary to our interests and values; condemns the PRC’s de facto pro-Russian position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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67.

Expresses concern at the wide range of political, economic and military instruments used by the PRC to increasingly strong-arm countries into submission and to seek to impose its authoritarian ideology on international organisations, such as the UN, to expand its presence, project power, and to adapt its strategy, intentions and military rearmament accordingly; is especially concerned about its partnership with the Russian Federation and their joint attempts to undermine the rules-based world order, which are contrary to our interests and values; condemns the PRC’s de facto pro-Russian position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

| 68. | Calls on the EU and the Member States to reconsider their dependency on the PRC and address economic dependencies in strategic sectors that may result in vulnerabilities; calls for greater coordination and cooperation between like-minded partners on issues of common concern, especially but not exclusively on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and to promote rules-based multilateralism and strategic solidarity between democracies; |
| --- | --- |

68.

Calls on the EU and the Member States to reconsider their dependency on the PRC and address economic dependencies in strategic sectors that may result in vulnerabilities; calls for greater coordination and cooperation between like-minded partners on issues of common concern, especially but not exclusively on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and to promote rules-based multilateralism and strategic solidarity between democracies;

| 69. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Chinese government-led system of forced labour and its crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, which represent a high risk of genocide; urges the Chinese government to end the systematic persecution of Uyghurs, including the appalling fact that Uyghur women are specifically targeted by the authorities, implementing an official scheme of targeted birth prevention measures, including forcing women of childbearing age to be subjected to abortions, intrauterine injections and sterilisation, measures that could meet the criteria for the worst crimes against humanity; remains deeply concerned about the situation in Tibet and the Chinese Communist Party’s policy targeting freedom of speech and the freedoms of thought, belief and religion; |
| --- | --- |

69.

Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Chinese government-led system of forced labour and its crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, which represent a high risk of genocide; urges the Chinese government to end the systematic persecution of Uyghurs, including the appalling fact that Uyghur women are specifically targeted by the authorities, implementing an official scheme of targeted birth prevention measures, including forcing women of childbearing age to be subjected to abortions, intrauterine injections and sterilisation, measures that could meet the criteria for the worst crimes against humanity; remains deeply concerned about the situation in Tibet and the Chinese Communist Party’s policy targeting freedom of speech and the freedoms of thought, belief and religion;

| 70. | Reiterates its urgent call for the remaining 10 Member States who have not yet done so to suspend active extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong; strongly condemns the PRC’s campaign of transnational repression targeting overseas and diaspora Chinese and Hong Kong individuals and members of ethnic and religious minority communities, notably on EU soil; urges the Commission and the Member States, in coordination with like-minded partners, to identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate the PRC’s transnational repression efforts; |
| --- | --- |

70.

Reiterates its urgent call for the remaining 10 Member States who have not yet done so to suspend active extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong; strongly condemns the PRC’s campaign of transnational repression targeting overseas and diaspora Chinese and Hong Kong individuals and members of ethnic and religious minority communities, notably on EU soil; urges the Commission and the Member States, in coordination with like-minded partners, to identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate the PRC’s transnational repression efforts;

| 71. | Reiterates its condemnation of the PRC’s undermining of democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong; calls on the Commission to review the autonomous status of Hong Kong in the light of the PRC’s breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

71.

Reiterates its condemnation of the PRC’s undermining of democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong; calls on the Commission to review the autonomous status of Hong Kong in the light of the PRC’s breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

| 72. | Recalls that our ‘One China Policy’ is one of the cornerstones of EU-China relations; underlines that preserving peace, stability and the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region remains of critical importance to the interests of the EU and its Member States; strongly condemns the PRC’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Strait of Taiwan; expresses grave concern about the Chinese government’s position stated at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force in Taiwan; reiterates that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait should not be unilaterally altered against the will of the Taiwanese people; welcomes the clear condemnation of PRC’s military exercises by Member States and partners in the region and underlines that our unity is key to deterring any aggression by the PRC and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; is of the view that the dispute between Taiwan and the PRC should be solved through peaceful dialogue without any preconditions; |
| --- | --- |

72.

Recalls that our ‘One China Policy’ is one of the cornerstones of EU-China relations; underlines that preserving peace, stability and the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region remains of critical importance to the interests of the EU and its Member States; strongly condemns the PRC’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Strait of Taiwan; expresses grave concern about the Chinese government’s position stated at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force in Taiwan; reiterates that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait should not be unilaterally altered against the will of the Taiwanese people; welcomes the clear condemnation of PRC’s military exercises by Member States and partners in the region and underlines that our unity is key to deterring any aggression by the PRC and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; is of the view that the dispute between Taiwan and the PRC should be solved through peaceful dialogue without any preconditions;

| 73. | Calls on all competent EU institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security challenges in Taiwan; |
| --- | --- |

73.

Calls on all competent EU institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security challenges in Taiwan;

| 74. | Expresses its firm solidarity with the people of Taiwan and sees in Taiwan a like-minded partner that shares the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to establish strategic cooperation with Taiwan and to swiftly follow up on the recommendations contained in its resolution on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation of 21 October 2021 and to strengthen economic, trade, and investment relations with the island, including through a bilateral investment agreement and sectoral agreements, for instance on resilient supply chains, cooperation on custom inspection systems and certification of origins and market access agreements; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties as a way to diversify supply chains in order to address EU’s vulnerabilities to the PRC; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; recommends that the Commission connects and integrates the Global Gateway initiative with Taiwan’s new Southbound Policy; |
| --- | --- |

74.

Expresses its firm solidarity with the people of Taiwan and sees in Taiwan a like-minded partner that shares the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to establish strategic cooperation with Taiwan and to swiftly follow up on the recommendations contained in its resolution on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation of 21 October 2021 and to strengthen economic, trade, and investment relations with the island, including through a bilateral investment agreement and sectoral agreements, for instance on resilient supply chains, cooperation on custom inspection systems and certification of origins and market access agreements; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to urgently begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties as a way to diversify supply chains in order to address EU’s vulnerabilities to the PRC; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; recommends that the Commission connects and integrates the Global Gateway initiative with Taiwan’s new Southbound Policy;

| 75. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping sustain democracy in Taiwan, free from foreign threats; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Calls on the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping sustain democracy in Taiwan, free from foreign threats;

| 76. | Underlines that Taiwan is a key EU partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region that contributes to maintaining a rules-based international order and upholds fundamental values; strongly urges the EU and its Member States to intensify cooperation and pursue a comprehensive enhanced partnership with Taiwan, in particular essential cooperation on critical supply chain resilience and countering disinformation and foreign interference; |
| --- | --- |

76.

Underlines that Taiwan is a key EU partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region that contributes to maintaining a rules-based international order and upholds fundamental values; strongly urges the EU and its Member States to intensify cooperation and pursue a comprehensive enhanced partnership with Taiwan, in particular essential cooperation on critical supply chain resilience and countering disinformation and foreign interference;

| 77. | Reiterates its advocacy for Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international and multilateral bodies and organisations; |
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77.

Reiterates its advocacy for Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international and multilateral bodies and organisations;

| 78. | Encourages increased economic, scientific, cultural and political interaction between the EU and Taiwan including at the most senior levels possible; highlights the importance of strengthening EU-Taiwan dialogue by deepening relations with civil society and fostering exchanges with Taiwanese media organisations and cultural exchanges, including establishing language schools; |
| --- | --- |

78.

Encourages increased economic, scientific, cultural and political interaction between the EU and Taiwan including at the most senior levels possible; highlights the importance of strengthening EU-Taiwan dialogue by deepening relations with civil society and fostering exchanges with Taiwanese media organisations and cultural exchanges, including establishing language schools;

| 79. | Calls on the PRC, in light of the reopening of its borders, to disclose complete and correct COVID-19 data in an intelligible and easily accessible way, including thus far absent data on hospitalisations, intensive care unit admissions and deaths; |
| --- | --- |

79.

Calls on the PRC, in light of the reopening of its borders, to disclose complete and correct COVID-19 data in an intelligible and easily accessible way, including thus far absent data on hospitalisations, intensive care unit admissions and deaths;

| 80. | Welcomes the good cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea as a key strategic partner, sharing the same commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a market economy; welcomes the alignment of the Republic of Korea with the EU and the US in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, in particular in adopting sanctions against Russia and Belarus; stresses the role of the Republic of Korea in supporting efforts towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme; calls on Member States to support a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this issue in close coordination with international partners; welcomes South Korea’s strengthened cooperation with NATO; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Welcomes the good cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea as a key strategic partner, sharing the same commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a market economy; welcomes the alignment of the Republic of Korea with the EU and the US in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, in particular in adopting sanctions against Russia and Belarus; stresses the role of the Republic of Korea in supporting efforts towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme; calls on Member States to support a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this issue in close coordination with international partners; welcomes South Korea’s strengthened cooperation with NATO;

| 81. | Strongly condemns the DPRK’s continued ballistic missile and nuclear tests and other nuclear proliferation-related activities as well as the increase in weapon tests since the beginning of 2022, which present a major threat to international peace and security; |
| --- | --- |

81.

Strongly condemns the DPRK’s continued ballistic missile and nuclear tests and other nuclear proliferation-related activities as well as the increase in weapon tests since the beginning of 2022, which present a major threat to international peace and security;

| 82. | Denounces in the strongest terms Qatar’s and Morocco’s alleged attempts to influence Parliament’s Members, former Members and staff through acts of corruption, thereby subverting the EU’s democratic process through malign interference; |
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82.

Denounces in the strongest terms Qatar’s and Morocco’s alleged attempts to influence Parliament’s Members, former Members and staff through acts of corruption, thereby subverting the EU’s democratic process through malign interference;

| 83. | Considers that the protection and promotion of human rights must be at the heart of the EU’s partnership with Morocco given its strategic character for the EU and its interests in the region; urges Morocco to cease its harassment and intimidation of journalists, human rights defenders and diaspora activists, to release political prisoners, and to work, in partnership with the EU, towards further developing education, employment and healthcare opportunities with a particular focus on historically marginalised regions, such as the Rif; |
| --- | --- |

83.

Considers that the protection and promotion of human rights must be at the heart of the EU’s partnership with Morocco given its strategic character for the EU and its interests in the region; urges Morocco to cease its harassment and intimidation of journalists, human rights defenders and diaspora activists, to release political prisoners, and to work, in partnership with the EU, towards further developing education, employment and healthcare opportunities with a particular focus on historically marginalised regions, such as the Rif;

| 84. | Strongly condemns authoritarian and illiberal regimes’ attacks against human rights and their universal character, as well as the corresponding erosion of their protection; calls on mature democracies and like-minded partners to adopt a defiant and public attitude reaffirming our commitment to defend the universality of human rights and the rule of law; calls on mature democracies and international and regional organisations to join forces by uniting under a global human rights framework in order to address threats and promote human rights worldwide; |
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84.

Strongly condemns authoritarian and illiberal regimes’ attacks against human rights and their universal character, as well as the corresponding erosion of their protection; calls on mature democracies and like-minded partners to adopt a defiant and public attitude reaffirming our commitment to defend the universality of human rights and the rule of law; calls on mature democracies and international and regional organisations to join forces by uniting under a global human rights framework in order to address threats and promote human rights worldwide;

| 85. | Underlines that the EU is committed to a free, open, connected and rules-based Indo-Pacific region; reiterates that the EU’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy needs to be implemented swiftly, as it offers our partners in the region an opportunity to address common challenges together, to defend the rules-based international order, international law and to stand up for the values and principles we share; underlines the importance of respecting free and open maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; opposes unilateral actions in the South China Sea and reiterates its support for resolving disputes through peaceful means in accordance with international law; |
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85.

Underlines that the EU is committed to a free, open, connected and rules-based Indo-Pacific region; reiterates that the EU’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy needs to be implemented swiftly, as it offers our partners in the region an opportunity to address common challenges together, to defend the rules-based international order, international law and to stand up for the values and principles we share; underlines the importance of respecting free and open maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; opposes unilateral actions in the South China Sea and reiterates its support for resolving disputes through peaceful means in accordance with international law;

| 86. | Calls for enhanced EU presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region; underlines that cooperation with Pacific countries should be reinforced taking into account the real needs of our partners on the ground, highlights the importance of our cooperation with both the Pacific Islands Forum and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States for implementing the objectives set out in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy; advocates stronger cooperation with countries in the region, in particular Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, as well as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); welcomes the EU-ASEAN commemorative summit, which took place on 14 December 2022; welcomes the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand and the entry into force of the EU-Australia Framework Agreement; |
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86.

Calls for enhanced EU presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region; underlines that cooperation with Pacific countries should be reinforced taking into account the real needs of our partners on the ground, highlights the importance of our cooperation with both the Pacific Islands Forum and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States for implementing the objectives set out in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy; advocates stronger cooperation with countries in the region, in particular Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, as well as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); welcomes the EU-ASEAN commemorative summit, which took place on 14 December 2022; welcomes the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand and the entry into force of the EU-Australia Framework Agreement;

| 87. | Underlines the important role that Japan plays in promoting stability in the region, and calls for a stronger strategic partnership between the EU and Japan across a wide range of areas, including the Indo-Pacific, connectivity, the defence of the multilateral rules-based order, trade and investment, security, digital transformation, climate action, research and innovation, frontier technologies, and resource analysis/mapping; reminds that Japan is one of the EU’s closest, like-minded partners with which it shares values and principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and multilateralism; strongly supports the conclusion of the EU — Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and calls on the remaining Member States to proceed with the ratification of the agreement; encourages the negotiation of a security and information agreement between the EU and Japan as a step towards facilitating broader collaboration on security and defence; |
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87.

Underlines the important role that Japan plays in promoting stability in the region, and calls for a stronger strategic partnership between the EU and Japan across a wide range of areas, including the Indo-Pacific, connectivity, the defence of the multilateral rules-based order, trade and investment, security, digital transformation, climate action, research and innovation, frontier technologies, and resource analysis/mapping; reminds that Japan is one of the EU’s closest, like-minded partners with which it shares values and principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and multilateralism; strongly supports the conclusion of the EU — Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and calls on the remaining Member States to proceed with the ratification of the agreement; encourages the negotiation of a security and information agreement between the EU and Japan as a step towards facilitating broader collaboration on security and defence;

| 88. | Notes that the ASEAN is a key partner for the EU; calls for a continued focus on the Asian continent, as many countries are exposed to the increasing fragility of supply chains and agri-food systems, and the erosion of macroeconomic stability arising from Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has further stressed the global system which had already been impacted by the COVID-19 crisis; |
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88.

Notes that the ASEAN is a key partner for the EU; calls for a continued focus on the Asian continent, as many countries are exposed to the increasing fragility of supply chains and agri-food systems, and the erosion of macroeconomic stability arising from Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has further stressed the global system which had already been impacted by the COVID-19 crisis;

| 89. | Strongly condemns the Myanmar military junta’s illegitimate rule and continued violent repression of the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar following its unlawful coup d’état, as well as Russia’s and the PRC’s support for the Tatmadaw; reaffirms its solidarity with the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar, represented by the National Unity Government (NUG), and calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate or, where applicable, enhance engagement with and support for the NUG, while reinforcing their restrictive measures against the Tatmadaw; urges ASEAN, in the light of the Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to achieve progress on the Five-Point Consensus, to work with the NUG, independent civil society and the international community to achieve a sustainable democratic resolution for Myanmar; |
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89.

Strongly condemns the Myanmar military junta’s illegitimate rule and continued violent repression of the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar following its unlawful coup d’état, as well as Russia’s and the PRC’s support for the Tatmadaw; reaffirms its solidarity with the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar, represented by the National Unity Government (NUG), and calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate or, where applicable, enhance engagement with and support for the NUG, while reinforcing their restrictive measures against the Tatmadaw; urges ASEAN, in the light of the Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to achieve progress on the Five-Point Consensus, to work with the NUG, independent civil society and the international community to achieve a sustainable democratic resolution for Myanmar;

| 90. | Emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s strategic partnerships with India in a comprehensive way; points out that relations with India are increasingly important and should be deepened through the ongoing trade negotiations and by enhancing synergies in bilateral cooperation with interested partners in Africa; recalls the importance of this partnership for the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); encourages the EU and India to make full use of the Connectivity Partnership concluded in 2021; welcomes the closer consultations on security and defence and the joint naval exercises with India and with other Indo-Pacific partners; calls for human rights and democratic values to be adequately addressed in the EU’s engagement with India; |
| --- | --- |

90.

Emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s strategic partnerships with India in a comprehensive way; points out that relations with India are increasingly important and should be deepened through the ongoing trade negotiations and by enhancing synergies in bilateral cooperation with interested partners in Africa; recalls the importance of this partnership for the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); encourages the EU and India to make full use of the Connectivity Partnership concluded in 2021; welcomes the closer consultations on security and defence and the joint naval exercises with India and with other Indo-Pacific partners; calls for human rights and democratic values to be adequately addressed in the EU’s engagement with India;

| 91. | Is concerned about India’s stance on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, its abstention in the votes on the UN Resolutions and especially on providing financial support for the Kremlin not only by not aligning with the sanctions against Russia, but also by increasing imports and purchasing Russian weapons and fossil fuels; expresses the hope that India will align its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the EU and calls on the Council and VP/HR to continue diplomatic efforts in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

91.

Is concerned about India’s stance on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, its abstention in the votes on the UN Resolutions and especially on providing financial support for the Kremlin not only by not aligning with the sanctions against Russia, but also by increasing imports and purchasing Russian weapons and fossil fuels; expresses the hope that India will align its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the EU and calls on the Council and VP/HR to continue diplomatic efforts in this regard;

| 92. | Reaffirms its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognised borders; acknowledges that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a negative impact first and foremost on the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to start without delay a thorough reflection on a reform of the Eastern Partnership policy to make it fit for the future in light of the worsening geopolitical situation and on the basis of the strategic and political importance of the region to the EU and of the different challenges faced by Eastern Partnership countries; notes that security and peace in the Eastern Neighbourhood presupposes the upholding of international law, territorial integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms; underlines the importance of strengthening political and financial support and the presence of the Union in the region, in close cooperation with independent civil society; |
| --- | --- |

92.

Reaffirms its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognised borders; acknowledges that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a negative impact first and foremost on the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to start without delay a thorough reflection on a reform of the Eastern Partnership policy to make it fit for the future in light of the worsening geopolitical situation and on the basis of the strategic and political importance of the region to the EU and of the different challenges faced by Eastern Partnership countries; notes that security and peace in the Eastern Neighbourhood presupposes the upholding of international law, territorial integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms; underlines the importance of strengthening political and financial support and the presence of the Union in the region, in close cooperation with independent civil society;

| 93. | Underlines that Russia is also implementing an aggressive policy towards Georgia and Moldova; stresses that the Russian Federation continues to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova through the presence of its troops in the region of Transnistria and fosters political and social unrest by using energy as a weapon and through disinformation campaigns in order to put pressure on the government of Moldova and the European orientation of the country; calls on the Russian Federation to completely and unconditionally withdraw its military forces and armaments from the Transnistria region in an orderly manner, in accordance with the repeated requests of the Moldovan authorities; underlines that any resolution to the Transnistrian issue must respect Moldova’s sovereign right to choose its own foreign policy and defence orientation; acknowledges that Georgia was the first country to experience a full-scale Russian military aggression in August 2008, when Russia attempted to forcibly change the borders of a sovereign state in Europe, to occupy regions which are an indivisible part of Georgia — Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia — and take steps towards their de facto annexation, to expel hundreds of thousands of people from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing and to divide societies with occupation lines; urges the EU to keep demanding that Russia must implement its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement; encourages the EU to strengthen its engagement in peaceful conflict resolution in the Eastern Partnership region; |
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93.

Underlines that Russia is also implementing an aggressive policy towards Georgia and Moldova; stresses that the Russian Federation continues to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova through the presence of its troops in the region of Transnistria and fosters political and social unrest by using energy as a weapon and through disinformation campaigns in order to put pressure on the government of Moldova and the European orientation of the country; calls on the Russian Federation to completely and unconditionally withdraw its military forces and armaments from the Transnistria region in an orderly manner, in accordance with the repeated requests of the Moldovan authorities; underlines that any resolution to the Transnistrian issue must respect Moldova’s sovereign right to choose its own foreign policy and defence orientation; acknowledges that Georgia was the first country to experience a full-scale Russian military aggression in August 2008, when Russia attempted to forcibly change the borders of a sovereign state in Europe, to occupy regions which are an indivisible part of Georgia — Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia — and take steps towards their de facto annexation, to expel hundreds of thousands of people from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing and to divide societies with occupation lines; urges the EU to keep demanding that Russia must implement its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement; encourages the EU to strengthen its engagement in peaceful conflict resolution in the Eastern Partnership region;

| 94. | Welcomes the Union’s enhanced engagement with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, notably the swift adoption of an EU monitoring capacity mission along Armenia’s international border with Azerbaijan in order to monitor the situation in the region, build confidence and contribute to restoring peace and security; highlights the importance of decreasing Russian influence in the region through increased EU presence; calls on the Council to expand the number of deployed experts and increase the mission capacity, and calls for stronger presence in the region; |
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94.

Welcomes the Union’s enhanced engagement with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, notably the swift adoption of an EU monitoring capacity mission along Armenia’s international border with Azerbaijan in order to monitor the situation in the region, build confidence and contribute to restoring peace and security; highlights the importance of decreasing Russian influence in the region through increased EU presence; calls on the Council to expand the number of deployed experts and increase the mission capacity, and calls for stronger presence in the region;

| 95. | Strongly condemns the latest military aggression by Azerbaijan on 12 September 2022 on the sovereign territory of Armenia, which constituted a breach of the ceasefire and is having serious consequences on the peace process; is also concerned by the alleged war crimes and inhuman treatment perpetrated by the armed forces of Azerbaijan against Armenian prisoners of war and civilians; reiterates that the territorial integrity of Armenia must be fully respected and underlines the EU’s readiness to be more actively involved in settling the region’s protracted conflicts; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities, therefore, to immediately withdraw from all parts of the territory of Armenia and to release the prisoners of war under their control; strongly denounces Azerbaijan’s illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor, in violation of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, as it threatens to precipitate an intentional humanitarian crisis for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh; demands that the Azerbaijani authorities restore freedom of movement through the Lachin corridor with immediate effect; recalls that only diplomatic means will bring a just and lasting response to the conflict that will benefit the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan; |
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95.

Strongly condemns the latest military aggression by Azerbaijan on 12 September 2022 on the sovereign territory of Armenia, which constituted a breach of the ceasefire and is having serious consequences on the peace process; is also concerned by the alleged war crimes and inhuman treatment perpetrated by the armed forces of Azerbaijan against Armenian prisoners of war and civilians; reiterates that the territorial integrity of Armenia must be fully respected and underlines the EU’s readiness to be more actively involved in settling the region’s protracted conflicts; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities, therefore, to immediately withdraw from all parts of the territory of Armenia and to release the prisoners of war under their control; strongly denounces Azerbaijan’s illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor, in violation of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, as it threatens to precipitate an intentional humanitarian crisis for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh; demands that the Azerbaijani authorities restore freedom of movement through the Lachin corridor with immediate effect; recalls that only diplomatic means will bring a just and lasting response to the conflict that will benefit the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan;

| 96. | Is convinced that a sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot be achieved through military means but needs a comprehensive political settlement in accordance with international law, including the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Helsinki Final Act, as well the OSCE Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles of territorial integrity, self-determination and non-use of force; |
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96.

Is convinced that a sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot be achieved through military means but needs a comprehensive political settlement in accordance with international law, including the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the 1975 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Helsinki Final Act, as well the OSCE Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles of territorial integrity, self-determination and non-use of force;

| 97. | Supports the initiative taken by the President of the European Council Charles Michel to convene and mediate bilateral meetings of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels and encourages the work on the ground by the EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia; believes that the EU can play the role of an honest broker to prevent further escalation and achieve sustainable peace; urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully engage in the drafting of a comprehensive peace treaty; reiterates that such a treaty has to address all the root causes of the conflict, including the rights and security of the Armenian population living in Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes under the control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, inter-religious dialogue, the protection and conservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage and territorial integrity; |
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97.

Supports the initiative taken by the President of the European Council Charles Michel to convene and mediate bilateral meetings of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels and encourages the work on the ground by the EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia; believes that the EU can play the role of an honest broker to prevent further escalation and achieve sustainable peace; urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to fully engage in the drafting of a comprehensive peace treaty; reiterates that such a treaty has to address all the root causes of the conflict, including the rights and security of the Armenian population living in Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes under the control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, inter-religious dialogue, the protection and conservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage and territorial integrity;

| 98. | Calls for the full implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia and underlines the need to continue negotiations on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan; |
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98.

Calls for the full implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia and underlines the need to continue negotiations on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan;

| 99. | Insists that any deepening of EU relations with Azerbaijan must remain conditional on the country making substantial progress on the respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental freedoms; |
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99.

Insists that any deepening of EU relations with Azerbaijan must remain conditional on the country making substantial progress on the respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental freedoms;

| 100. | Stresses the importance of a free, democratic, sovereign and prosperous Belarus; reiterates its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition, which continues to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader and the regime’s complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in spite of ongoing crackdowns; insists that all sanctions applied to the Russian Federation must be mirrored for the Belarusian regime while avoiding adverse consequences, in particular the provision of visas, for the Belarusian people; denounces disinformation by Lukashenka's regime and Russia about alleged threats to Belarusian territory; recognises the aspirations of the majority of the people of Belarus to live in a free, sovereign and democratic country and urges the Commission and the Member States to make adequate preparations, in cooperation with the formal representatives of the democratic opposition, to assist with the country’s future democratic transition; condemns attempts to destabilise Europe through artificial migration crises and calls on the EU and all partners to block and investigate human trafficking and people smuggling by Lukashenka’s regime and his accomplices; |
| --- | --- |

100.

Stresses the importance of a free, democratic, sovereign and prosperous Belarus; reiterates its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition, which continues to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader and the regime’s complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in spite of ongoing crackdowns; insists that all sanctions applied to the Russian Federation must be mirrored for the Belarusian regime while avoiding adverse consequences, in particular the provision of visas, for the Belarusian people; denounces disinformation by Lukashenka's regime and Russia about alleged threats to Belarusian territory; recognises the aspirations of the majority of the people of Belarus to live in a free, sovereign and democratic country and urges the Commission and the Member States to make adequate preparations, in cooperation with the formal representatives of the democratic opposition, to assist with the country’s future democratic transition; condemns attempts to destabilise Europe through artificial migration crises and calls on the EU and all partners to block and investigate human trafficking and people smuggling by Lukashenka’s regime and his accomplices;

| 101. | Highlights the hesitation and, in certain cases, unwillingness of Central Asian states to lend their support to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a sign of Russia’s decreasing regional influence; notes the PRC’s and Türkiye’s increasing engagement with the region, notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative; calls for enhanced EU involvement in Central Asia, based on the respect for fundamental rights and the Union’s values-based interests, including through the Global Gateway; |
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101.

Highlights the hesitation and, in certain cases, unwillingness of Central Asian states to lend their support to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a sign of Russia’s decreasing regional influence; notes the PRC’s and Türkiye’s increasing engagement with the region, notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative; calls for enhanced EU involvement in Central Asia, based on the respect for fundamental rights and the Union’s values-based interests, including through the Global Gateway;

| 102. | Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to pay particular attention to the countries of Central Asia in order to maintain stability and connectivity in this region, which is going through a delicate situation given its geographical location; considers that the EU strategy on Central Asia needs a thorough revision to reflect the profound shifts that have occurred in the region and around it since its adoption in 2019, such as the impact of Russia’s illegal war of aggression on Ukraine on geopolitical competition and economies of the states of the region, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the violent Taliban takeover of power there, power transitions in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the violent conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the rising regional role of the PRC, among others; considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest to the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral rules-based international order; |
| --- | --- |

102.

Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to pay particular attention to the countries of Central Asia in order to maintain stability and connectivity in this region, which is going through a delicate situation given its geographical location; considers that the EU strategy on Central Asia needs a thorough revision to reflect the profound shifts that have occurred in the region and around it since its adoption in 2019, such as the impact of Russia’s illegal war of aggression on Ukraine on geopolitical competition and economies of the states of the region, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the violent Taliban takeover of power there, power transitions in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the violent conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the rising regional role of the PRC, among others; considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest to the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral rules-based international order;

| 103. | Welcomes the fact that the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted the EU to reprioritise its enlargement policy; emphasises that, while the widening and deepening of the Union must go hand-in-hand, the necessity for EU internal reforms should not be a pretext for slowing the merit-based accession process; welcomes the granting of candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and calls for it to be granted to Georgia, provided that the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion have been addressed; encourages the Council and the Commission to launch accession negotiations with the new candidate states as soon as possible after the fulfilment of the specific conditions specified by the Commission; welcomes the application for EU membership by the Republic of Kosovo; underscores that, while enlargement has proven to be the Union’s most effective foreign policy tool, expanding the area where European values and principles have a significant impact, its implementation should be reassessed to allow for the accelerated integration of accession countries that demonstrate strategic orientation towards the EU and unwavering commitment to EU-related reforms, democratic consolidation and foreign policy alignment, including through their phase-in into specific Union policies and initiatives; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Welcomes the fact that the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted the EU to reprioritise its enlargement policy; emphasises that, while the widening and deepening of the Union must go hand-in-hand, the necessity for EU internal reforms should not be a pretext for slowing the merit-based accession process; welcomes the granting of candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and calls for it to be granted to Georgia, provided that the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion have been addressed; encourages the Council and the Commission to launch accession negotiations with the new candidate states as soon as possible after the fulfilment of the specific conditions specified by the Commission; welcomes the application for EU membership by the Republic of Kosovo; underscores that, while enlargement has proven to be the Union’s most effective foreign policy tool, expanding the area where European values and principles have a significant impact, its implementation should be reassessed to allow for the accelerated integration of accession countries that demonstrate strategic orientation towards the EU and unwavering commitment to EU-related reforms, democratic consolidation and foreign policy alignment, including through their phase-in into specific Union policies and initiatives;

| 104. | Highlights the need for sufficient and sustained support for the energy security of EU accession countries, with particular focus on those countries which remain substantially exposed to Russian manipulation of supply, as well as for the establishment of security compacts with accession countries vulnerable to Russian aggression; |
| --- | --- |

104.

Highlights the need for sufficient and sustained support for the energy security of EU accession countries, with particular focus on those countries which remain substantially exposed to Russian manipulation of supply, as well as for the establishment of security compacts with accession countries vulnerable to Russian aggression;

| 105. | Calls for a more active and effective communication strategy and for efforts to be stepped up to promote the role and benefits of enlargement and close partnership between EU and Western Balkans countries and to advance EU funded projects, reforms and CSDP missions; |
| --- | --- |

105.

Calls for a more active and effective communication strategy and for efforts to be stepped up to promote the role and benefits of enlargement and close partnership between EU and Western Balkans countries and to advance EU funded projects, reforms and CSDP missions;

| 106. | Underlines that impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia is one of the factors that allowed Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; is of the opinion that the Ukrainian victory not only will bring freedom to occupied regions of Ukraine, including Donbas and Crimea, but also to Belarus and will be decisive for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova; |
| --- | --- |

106.

Underlines that impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia is one of the factors that allowed Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; is of the opinion that the Ukrainian victory not only will bring freedom to occupied regions of Ukraine, including Donbas and Crimea, but also to Belarus and will be decisive for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova;

| 107. | Calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report on violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement given that the EU bears special responsibility as mediator of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement; calls on the EEAS to identify and communicate the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil them, in particular the withdrawal of its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allowing the establishment of international security mechanisms in the country and allowing the EU unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate; |
| --- | --- |

107.

Calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report on violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement given that the EU bears special responsibility as mediator of the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement; calls on the EEAS to identify and communicate the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil them, in particular the withdrawal of its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allowing the establishment of international security mechanisms in the country and allowing the EU unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate;

| 108. | Reaffirms that the future of the peoples of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as well the Western Balkans lies within the EU; reaffirms its commitment to enlargement, to which there is no alternative and which is more than ever a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united EU; strongly believes that a prospect of full EU membership for the countries striving to become Member States of the EU is in the Union’s own political, economic and security interest; calls on Georgia to tangibly deliver on the priorities drawn up by the Commission and endorsed by the European Council in its conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022; |
| --- | --- |

108.

Reaffirms that the future of the peoples of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as well the Western Balkans lies within the EU; reaffirms its commitment to enlargement, to which there is no alternative and which is more than ever a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united EU; strongly believes that a prospect of full EU membership for the countries striving to become Member States of the EU is in the Union’s own political, economic and security interest; calls on Georgia to tangibly deliver on the priorities drawn up by the Commission and endorsed by the European Council in its conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022;

| 109. | Welcomes the measures announced by the Commission for strengthening Ukraine, such as access to our internal market and lifting roaming fees; trusts that the same measures will be extended to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, which is in equal need of strong signals of support from the EU and of concrete steps towards EU integration given the strong destabilising forces threatening their democracies; |
| --- | --- |

109.

Welcomes the measures announced by the Commission for strengthening Ukraine, such as access to our internal market and lifting roaming fees; trusts that the same measures will be extended to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, which is in equal need of strong signals of support from the EU and of concrete steps towards EU integration given the strong destabilising forces threatening their democracies;

| 110. | Reiterates the EU’s commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders and supports their efforts to fully enforce these principles; underlines the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Member States in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

110.

Reiterates the EU’s commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders and supports their efforts to fully enforce these principles; underlines the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Member States in this regard;

| 111. | Urges the Commission to closely monitor Russia’s destabilising actions in the Republic of Moldova and to provide the necessary support for the Moldovan authorities and civil society to respond to emerging threats; |
| --- | --- |

111.

Urges the Commission to closely monitor Russia’s destabilising actions in the Republic of Moldova and to provide the necessary support for the Moldovan authorities and civil society to respond to emerging threats;

| 112. | Insists that the EU’s foreign and security policy must be reformed to orient it towards crisis prevention, cooperative regional security cooperation, global climate and environmental action, strengthening both political and social human rights and ensuring the implementation of the goals of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; |
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112.

Insists that the EU’s foreign and security policy must be reformed to orient it towards crisis prevention, cooperative regional security cooperation, global climate and environmental action, strengthening both political and social human rights and ensuring the implementation of the goals of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

| 113. | Reiterates its strong support for the European future and EU accession of all Western Balkans countries as full members of the EU family; calls on the Member States to renew their commitment to enlargement by delivering on the EU’s commitments to the Western Balkan countries, in particular by immediately lifting visa requirements for citizens of Kosovo; welcomes the granting of candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina; underlines the importance of the European integration of these partner states for the stability and security of the European continent as a whole; |
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113.

Reiterates its strong support for the European future and EU accession of all Western Balkans countries as full members of the EU family; calls on the Member States to renew their commitment to enlargement by delivering on the EU’s commitments to the Western Balkan countries, in particular by immediately lifting visa requirements for citizens of Kosovo; welcomes the granting of candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina; underlines the importance of the European integration of these partner states for the stability and security of the European continent as a whole;

| 114. | Emphasises the necessity for the EU to reinforce the credibility of the enlargement process by safeguarding its merit-based nature, including by maintaining the central role accorded to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, as contained in chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis under the revised enlargement methodology, while avoiding the politicisation of the enlargement process through bilateral disputes; underlines that progress on the EU path should depend on sustained and irreversible progress made through the necessary EU-related reforms, in particular in the rule of law; |
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114.

Emphasises the necessity for the EU to reinforce the credibility of the enlargement process by safeguarding its merit-based nature, including by maintaining the central role accorded to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, as contained in chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis

| 115. | Welcomes the start of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and urges all relevant parties to pursue the necessary steps to enable Albania and North Macedonia’s swift progress; denounces the malign influence played by regional actors and Russian and other foreign interference in the countries of the Western Balkans; |
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115.

Welcomes the start of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and urges all relevant parties to pursue the necessary steps to enable Albania and North Macedonia’s swift progress; denounces the malign influence played by regional actors and Russian and other foreign interference in the countries of the Western Balkans;

| 116. | Stresses the importance of the full alignment of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s foreign and security policy, especially its policy of sanctions against third countries; regrets Serbia’s continued low level of alignment with the CFSP, notably with regard to the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine; reiterates its position that further negotiating chapters should be opened only when Serbia strengthens its commitment to reform in the areas of democracy and rule of law and demonstrates full alignment with the CFSP; recalls that Serbia, as a country that strives towards European integration, has to adhere to the EU’s common values and rights; |
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116.

Stresses the importance of the full alignment of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s foreign and security policy, especially its policy of sanctions against third countries; regrets Serbia’s continued low level of alignment with the CFSP, notably with regard to the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine; reiterates its position that further negotiating chapters should be opened only when Serbia strengthens its commitment to reform in the areas of democracy and rule of law and demonstrates full alignment with the CFSP; recalls that Serbia, as a country that strives towards European integration, has to adhere to the EU’s common values and rights;

| 117. | Emphasises the urgent need for the EU-led Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue process to be intensified with the objective of normalising bilateral relations on the basis of mutual recognition; denounces the continuous pattern of escalatory actions by Serbia and Serbian-sponsored actors, including through illegitimate blockades, violent attacks and the threat of military action, with the objective of forcing concessions and undermining the Republic of Kosovo; recalls its position that the independence of the Republic of Kosovo is irreversible and reiterates its call on the five Member States that have not yet done so to recognise Kosovo’s independence with immediate effect; |
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117.

Emphasises the urgent need for the EU-led Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue process to be intensified with the objective of normalising bilateral relations on the basis of mutual recognition; denounces the continuous pattern of escalatory actions by Serbia and Serbian-sponsored actors, including through illegitimate blockades, violent attacks and the threat of military action, with the objective of forcing concessions and undermining the Republic of Kosovo; recalls its position that the independence of the Republic of Kosovo is irreversible and reiterates its call on the five Member States that have not yet done so to recognise Kosovo’s independence with immediate effect;

| 118. | Welcomes the European Council’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15 December 2022 on the understanding that a number of steps are taken to strengthen the country’s readiness for accession negotiations; urges the country’s political actors to show commitment and take significant steps towards EU membership by advancing on the eight steps in the Commission recommendation, by significantly making progress on the 14 key priorities and implementing the substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case of 22 December 2009; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in swiftly implementing the key priorities and in preventing backsliding into nationalistic policies of the past; reiterates the need to ensure that every citizen’s rights, regardless of the ethnic, political and religious affiliation, are fully respected in line with ECHR rulings, Constitutional Court decisions and Venice Commission recommendations; |
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118.

Welcomes the European Council’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 15 December 2022 on the understanding that a number of steps are taken to strengthen the country’s readiness for accession negotiations; urges the country’s political actors to show commitment and take significant steps towards EU membership by advancing on the eight steps in the Commission recommendation, by significantly making progress on the 14 key priorities and implementing the substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina

| 119. | Denounces the ongoing secessionist rhetoric and activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the celebration by Bosnian state and third-country actors of national holidays proclaimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina; reiterates its call for the adoption of targeted sanctions against destabilising actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of Republika Srpska and third-country officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council; |
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119.

Denounces the ongoing secessionist rhetoric and activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the celebration by Bosnian state and third-country actors of national holidays proclaimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina; reiterates its call for the adoption of targeted sanctions against destabilising actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of Republika Srpska and third-country officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council;

| 120. | Commends the work of European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea and welcomes the extension of its mandate beyond November 2022; recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and calls on the EU and its international partners to increase its capacity; |
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120.

Commends the work of European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea and welcomes the extension of its mandate beyond November 2022; recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and calls on the EU and its international partners to increase its capacity;

| 121. | Notes that the Council acknowledged in the Strategic Compass that security and stability throughout the Western Balkans is still not a given and that there is a risk of potential spillover from the current deterioration of the European security situation; recalls that the Strategic Compass calls for support for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; |
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121.

Notes that the Council acknowledged in the Strategic Compass that security and stability throughout the Western Balkans is still not a given and that there is a risk of potential spillover from the current deterioration of the European security situation; recalls that the Strategic Compass calls for support for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

| 122. | Expresses concern over the timing, content and manner of introduction of changes to the election law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were proposed on election day by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which risk undermining democratic legitimacy and consolidating ethno-nationalism; |
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122.

Expresses concern over the timing, content and manner of introduction of changes to the election law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were proposed on election day by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which risk undermining democratic legitimacy and consolidating ethno-nationalism;

| 123. | Stresses the need for candidate and prospective candidate countries of the Western Balkans to fully align their policies to the EU’s CSFP and calls on the Commission and Member States to use the CSFP as a tool to enhance cooperation with Western Balkan countries; stresses that countries wishing to join the EU must fully align with fundamental values and common policies in light of Russia’s illegal war of aggression; emphasises that human rights and human dignity are non-negotiable and that therefore candidate countries must mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities, the LGBTI+ community, women and girls, and other vulnerable groups across all sectors and policies; calls for closer collaboration between the EU and candidate and potential candidate states on security and defence; |
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123.

Stresses the need for candidate and prospective candidate countries of the Western Balkans to fully align their policies to the EU’s CSFP and calls on the Commission and Member States to use the CSFP as a tool to enhance cooperation with Western Balkan countries; stresses that countries wishing to join the EU must fully align with fundamental values and common policies in light of Russia’s illegal war of aggression; emphasises that human rights and human dignity are non-negotiable and that therefore candidate countries must mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities, the LGBTI+ community, women and girls, and other vulnerable groups across all sectors and policies; calls for closer collaboration between the EU and candidate and potential candidate states on security and defence;

| 124. | Remains deeply concerned about reports that the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement deliberately seeks to circumvent and undermine the centrality of democratic and rule of law reforms in EU accession countries; urges the Commission to inititate an independent and impartial investigation into whether the conduct engaged in and policies furthered by the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement constitute a breach of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission and of the Commissioner’s obligations under the Treaties; |
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124.

Remains deeply concerned about reports that the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement deliberately seeks to circumvent and undermine the centrality of democratic and rule of law reforms in EU accession countries; urges the Commission to inititate an independent and impartial investigation into whether the conduct engaged in and policies furthered by the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement constitute a breach of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission and of the Commissioner’s obligations under the Treaties;

| 125. | Takes note of the 2022 report on Türkiye presented by the Commission on 12 October 2022; is deeply concerned by the fact that Türkiye’s government has not reversed the negative trend of deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary and that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP, with an alignment rate of only 7 % in the reporting period; reiterates its position of 18 May 2022 that it cannot envisage any resumption of the accession negotiations with Türkiye; remains, however, committed to democratic and political dialogue with Türkiye, especially with its civil society; |
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125.

Takes note of the 2022 report on Türkiye presented by the Commission on 12 October 2022; is deeply concerned by the fact that Türkiye’s government has not reversed the negative trend of deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary and that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP, with an alignment rate of only 7 % in the reporting period; reiterates its position of 18 May 2022 that it cannot envisage any resumption of the accession negotiations with Türkiye; remains, however, committed to democratic and political dialogue with Türkiye, especially with its civil society;

| 126. | Deplores the fact that Türkiye has still not ratified the applications of Sweden and Finland to join NATO; |
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126.

Deplores the fact that Türkiye has still not ratified the applications of Sweden and Finland to join NATO;

| 127. | Reiterates its appreciation for Türkiye’s condemnation of the unjustified Russian invasion and military aggression against Ukraine and for its role as facilitator between Ukraine and Russia, including through its vital contribution to the important deal to export Ukrainian grain; expresses, however, serious concern at the continuing lack of alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, particularly on the free movement of goods derived from the current custom union and against the backdrop of its recently strengthened trade and financial relations with Russia; stresses that Türkiye’s geopolitical role does not override the serious shortcomings in the human rights situation in the country, which remain the main obstacle for progress in EU-Türkiye relations; |
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127.

Reiterates its appreciation for Türkiye’s condemnation of the unjustified Russian invasion and military aggression against Ukraine and for its role as facilitator between Ukraine and Russia, including through its vital contribution to the important deal to export Ukrainian grain; expresses, however, serious concern at the continuing lack of alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, particularly on the free movement of goods derived from the current custom union and against the backdrop of its recently strengthened trade and financial relations with Russia; stresses that Türkiye’s geopolitical role does not override the serious shortcomings in the human rights situation in the country, which remain the main obstacle for progress in EU-Türkiye relations;

| 128. | Reiterates its previous call for the EU to urgently define an overall strategy for its short-, medium- and long-term relations with Türkiye, combining all aspects and policies, in order to foster a more stable, credible and predictable partnership, given that Türkiye plays a key role in the region and taking into account the country’s continuous destabilising activities in the Western Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and South Caucasus and its ongoing democratic backsliding; deplores the Turkish government’s recent threatening rhetoric about Greece, a Member State and its NATO ally; urges all parties involved to reduce tensions and promote the resumption of diplomatic dialogue in order to find sustainable solutions for the disputes in the region; |
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128.

Reiterates its previous call for the EU to urgently define an overall strategy for its short-, medium- and long-term relations with Türkiye, combining all aspects and policies, in order to foster a more stable, credible and predictable partnership, given that Türkiye plays a key role in the region and taking into account the country’s continuous destabilising activities in the Western Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and South Caucasus and its ongoing democratic backsliding; deplores the Turkish government’s recent threatening rhetoric about Greece, a Member State and its NATO ally; urges all parties involved to reduce tensions and promote the resumption of diplomatic dialogue in order to find sustainable solutions for the disputes in the region;

| 129. | Regrets that more than 25 years after the launch of the Barcelona Process, the space of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries in the Southern Neighbourhood has not been created; calls on the Commission to support the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood in recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and to cushion its adverse effects on these countries and the supply shocks and price increases resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in particular in the domain of food security and fertilisers; welcomes the UN-brokered Black Sea grain initiative; urges Russia to end the renewed weaponisation of food exports, which irresponsibly risks generating further food insecurity in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and to abide by the terms of the agreement in full; calls for the enhancement of energy partnerships with relevant countries in the region, taking full account of the need to diversify both energy suppliers and resources, while assisting partner countries in their respective green and digital transitions; calls for the promotion of secure fair and equitable access to vaccines around the world, including by temporarily lifting relevant patent rights; |
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129.

Regrets that more than 25 years after the launch of the Barcelona Process, the space of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries in the Southern Neighbourhood has not been created; calls on the Commission to support the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood in recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and to cushion its adverse effects on these countries and the supply shocks and price increases resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in particular in the domain of food security and fertilisers; welcomes the UN-brokered Black Sea grain initiative; urges Russia to end the renewed weaponisation of food exports, which irresponsibly risks generating further food insecurity in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and to abide by the terms of the agreement in full; calls for the enhancement of energy partnerships with relevant countries in the region, taking full account of the need to diversify both energy suppliers and resources, while assisting partner countries in their respective green and digital transitions; calls for the promotion of secure fair and equitable access to vaccines around the world, including by temporarily lifting relevant patent rights;

| 130. | Calls on the Commission to fully implement the initiatives outlined in the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR of 9 February 2021 on the renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood and as adopted in Parliament’s recommendation on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood; |
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130.

Calls on the Commission to fully implement the initiatives outlined in the joint communication of the Commission and the VP/HR of 9 February 2021 on the renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood and as adopted in Parliament’s recommendation on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood;

| 131. | Stresses that the instability and insecurity in the European Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge; calls on the EU and its Member States to step up cooperation with partner countries in the Southern Neighbourhood in order to mitigate the consequences of human trafficking and the smuggling of illicit weapons and cultural goods and to prevent violent extremism in order to preserve security and stability in the European Southern Neighbourhood; |
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131.

Stresses that the instability and insecurity in the European Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge; calls on the EU and its Member States to step up cooperation with partner countries in the Southern Neighbourhood in order to mitigate the consequences of human trafficking and the smuggling of illicit weapons and cultural goods and to prevent violent extremism in order to preserve security and stability in the European Southern Neighbourhood;

| 132. | Stresses that the instability in Libya has consequences not only for its neighbouring countries, but also for Europe; underlines that the absence of a functioning state, divisions between factions and the proliferation of armed groups provide fertile ground for traffickers of drugs, arms and human beings; |
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132.

Stresses that the instability in Libya has consequences not only for its neighbouring countries, but also for Europe; underlines that the absence of a functioning state, divisions between factions and the proliferation of armed groups provide fertile ground for traffickers of drugs, arms and human beings;

| 133. | Denounces the continuous threat posed by Russia at the UN Security Council to extending Syria’s last humanitarian aid corridor, Bab al-Hawa, putting at risk more than four million people who depend on humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs for food, medicine and other vital supplies; |
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133.

Denounces the continuous threat posed by Russia at the UN Security Council to extending Syria’s last humanitarian aid corridor, Bab al-Hawa, putting at risk more than four million people who depend on humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs for food, medicine and other vital supplies;

| 134. | Is concerned by the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan following the violent Taliban takeover, with particularly adverse effects on the rights of women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities, human rights defenders, independent media representatives and individuals who provided assistance to the EU and its Member States; expresses deep concern about the regional instability caused by the Taliban takeover and in particular about Taliban ambitions to expand their influence to neighbouring countries by building and strengthening terrorist networks across the region; notes that Pakistan is particularly vulnerable in this regard; |
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134.

Is concerned by the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan following the violent Taliban takeover, with particularly adverse effects on the rights of women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities, human rights defenders, independent media representatives and individuals who provided assistance to the EU and its Member States; expresses deep concern about the regional instability caused by the Taliban takeover and in particular about Taliban ambitions to expand their influence to neighbouring countries by building and strengthening terrorist networks across the region; notes that Pakistan is particularly vulnerable in this regard;

| 135. | Urges the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure the full and timely evacuation of staff of the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan and EUPOL Afghanistan, other particularly vulnerable persons, and their dependent spouses, children, parents, and unmarried sisters, in accordance with Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/151 (7); |
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135.

Urges the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure the full and timely evacuation of staff of the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan and EUPOL Afghanistan, other particularly vulnerable persons, and their dependent spouses, children, parents, and unmarried sisters, in accordance with Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/151 (7

| 136. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure additional funding for humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan; reiterates its non-recognition of the Taliban regime; supports the five key benchmarks that were adopted by the Council on 21 September 2021 and serve as guiding principles for future engagement with the Taliban but believes that a major effort in defining a long-term strategy is needed to address the human rights emergency and gender-apartheid in Afghanistan today; calls on the EU to step up its support for justice for the victims of heinous crimes committed in Afghanistan, including women and girls, ethnic minorities and LGBTIQ+ people, and to provide all the necessary assistance to the recently renewed International Criminal Court investigation into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Afghanistan; expresses in the strongest terms its condemnation of the Taliban’s decisions to ban women and girls from attending secondary and university education and to prohibit the employment of women with non-governmental organisations, with potentially catastrophic humanitarian ramifications; urges the Commission and the Member States, together with the UN, civil society and international partners, to increase pressure on the Taliban to reverse these decisions without delay; |
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136.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure additional funding for humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan; reiterates its non-recognition of the Taliban regime; supports the five key benchmarks that were adopted by the Council on 21 September 2021 and serve as guiding principles for future engagement with the Taliban but believes that a major effort in defining a long-term strategy is needed to address the human rights emergency and gender-apartheid in Afghanistan today; calls on the EU to step up its support for justice for the victims of heinous crimes committed in Afghanistan, including women and girls, ethnic minorities and LGBTIQ+ people, and to provide all the necessary assistance to the recently renewed International Criminal Court investigation into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Afghanistan; expresses in the strongest terms its condemnation of the Taliban’s decisions to ban women and girls from attending secondary and university education and to prohibit the employment of women with non-governmental organisations, with potentially catastrophic humanitarian ramifications; urges the Commission and the Member States, together with the UN, civil society and international partners, to increase pressure on the Taliban to reverse these decisions without delay;

| 137. | Condemns the brutal crackdown by Iran, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on the demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini, following her violent arrest, abuse and ill-treatment by Iran’s ‘morality police’; calls on the EU and its Member States to include the IRGC on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts (EU terrorist list) in the light of its terrorist activity, the repression of protesters and its supplying of drones to Russia; reiterates its support for the peaceful protest movement across the country, protesting against Mahsa Amini’s killing, the systemic and increasing oppression of women and the severe and mass violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; is appalled by the unrestrained and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian police and security forces against peaceful protesters; condemns in the strongest terms the Islamic Republic’s execution of peaceful protesters; considers that the Iranian regime’s blatant disregard for the human dignity and democratic aspirations of its own citizens, as well as its support to the Russian Federation, necessitates further adjustments in the EU’s position towards Iran; urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to annul, without delay, all death penalty sentences pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and to impose an immediate moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its full abolition; calls for a robust EU response to Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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137.

Condemns the brutal crackdown by Iran, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on the demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini, following her violent arrest, abuse and ill-treatment by Iran’s ‘morality police’; calls on the EU and its Member States to include the IRGC on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts (EU terrorist list) in the light of its terrorist activity, the repression of protesters and its supplying of drones to Russia; reiterates its support for the peaceful protest movement across the country, protesting against Mahsa Amini’s killing, the systemic and increasing oppression of women and the severe and mass violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; is appalled by the unrestrained and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian police and security forces against peaceful protesters; condemns in the strongest terms the Islamic Republic’s execution of peaceful protesters; considers that the Iranian regime’s blatant disregard for the human dignity and democratic aspirations of its own citizens, as well as its support to the Russian Federation, necessitates further adjustments in the EU’s position towards Iran; urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to annul, without delay, all death penalty sentences pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and to impose an immediate moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its full abolition; calls for a robust EU response to Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

| 138. | Strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people, who want to live in a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country that respects its national and international commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms; welcomes, in this regard, the restrictive measures imposed on Iranian individuals and entities, including the so-called morality police, for their role in the repression of the ongoing, women-led protests in Iran demanding equal rights and an end to the systematic discrimination of women and broader violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic; welcomes UN Human Rights Council Resolution S35/1 of 24 November 2022 on the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran and calls on the EU to fully support preparations for and the implementation of the mission; calls on the EEAS, the Commission and Member States to continue to raise human rights matters in all exchanges with Iran; |
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138.

Strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people, who want to live in a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country that respects its national and international commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms; welcomes, in this regard, the restrictive measures imposed on Iranian individuals and entities, including the so-called morality police, for their role in the repression of the ongoing, women-led protests in Iran demanding equal rights and an end to the systematic discrimination of women and broader violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic; welcomes UN Human Rights Council Resolution S35/1 of 24 November 2022 on the establishment of an independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran and calls on the EU to fully support preparations for and the implementation of the mission; calls on the EEAS, the Commission and Member States to continue to raise human rights matters in all exchanges with Iran;

| 139. | Reiterates that sanctions against the IRGC leadership must not be lifted and calls for additional restrictive measures against the IRGC; calls on the Council to include the IRGC and its subsidiary forces, including the paramilitary Basij militia and the Quds Force, on the EU terrorist list; |
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139.

Reiterates that sanctions against the IRGC leadership must not be lifted and calls for additional restrictive measures against the IRGC; calls on the Council to include the IRGC and its subsidiary forces, including the paramilitary Basij militia and the Quds Force, on the EU terrorist list;

| 140. | Notes that non-proliferation is a cornerstone for the stabilisation of the Middle East and the Gulf region; calls for diplomatic efforts to be continued to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons; is of the opinion, however, that any further negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) cannot disregard Iran’s other harmful policies, projects and military programmes; |
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140.

Notes that non-proliferation is a cornerstone for the stabilisation of the Middle East and the Gulf region; calls for diplomatic efforts to be continued to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons; is of the opinion, however, that any further negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) cannot disregard Iran’s other harmful policies, projects and military programmes;

| 141. | Reiterates the need to support the JCPOA Treaty as well as the ongoing negotiations for its implementation; |
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141.

Reiterates the need to support the JCPOA Treaty as well as the ongoing negotiations for its implementation;

| 142. | Takes the view that the EU should enhance the capabilities of StratCom Task Force South with the aim to further develop a concrete strategy for combating disinformation in the Southern Neighbourhood, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, aiming to counter fake news and propaganda in order to reinforce democracy and stability; |
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142.

Takes the view that the EU should enhance the capabilities of StratCom Task Force South with the aim to further develop a concrete strategy for combating disinformation in the Southern Neighbourhood, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, aiming to counter fake news and propaganda in order to reinforce democracy and stability;

| 143. | Welcomes the ambition to strengthen the EU’s relations with the Gulf countries, as underlined in the joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘A strategic partnership with the Gulf’ of 18 May 2022; notes that there is a common interest in engaging more strategically with Gulf partners in particular as regards the promotion of regional security, cooperation, climate action and human rights as a key strategic objectives; calls on the EU and the Member States to continue to emphasise the respect for human rights and gender equality as well as the progressive alignment of values, in particular for countering Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences; deeply deplores the decision of OPEC+ to cut oil production, driven in particular by Saudi Arabia, that will worsen global inflation and undermine international efforts to fight Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; takes note of the fact that the United Arab Emirates have been added to the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force because of its strategic deficiencies in preventing money laundering; is concerned that it has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs sanctioned by the EU; emphasises that a true strategic partnership with the Gulf requires dialogue and cooperation in the field of human rights and alignment in countering the Russian aggression in Ukraine; |
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143.

Welcomes the ambition to strengthen the EU’s relations with the Gulf countries, as underlined in the joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘A strategic partnership with the Gulf’ of 18 May 2022; notes that there is a common interest in engaging more strategically with Gulf partners in particular as regards the promotion of regional security, cooperation, climate action and human rights as a key strategic objectives; calls on the EU and the Member States to continue to emphasise the respect for human rights and gender equality as well as the progressive alignment of values, in particular for countering Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences; deeply deplores the decision of OPEC+ to cut oil production, driven in particular by Saudi Arabia, that will worsen global inflation and undermine international efforts to fight Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; takes note of the fact that the United Arab Emirates have been added to the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force because of its strategic deficiencies in preventing money laundering; is concerned that it has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs sanctioned by the EU; emphasises that a true strategic partnership with the Gulf requires dialogue and cooperation in the field of human rights and alignment in countering the Russian aggression in Ukraine;

| 144. | Reiterates its support for the Abraham Accords, which have normalised diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and which later led to Morocco and Sudan signing a normalisation agreement with Israel; |
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144.

Reiterates its support for the Abraham Accords, which have normalised diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and which later led to Morocco and Sudan signing a normalisation agreement with Israel;

| 145. | Points out that on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU remains united in its commitment to achieving a two-state solution based on the parameters in the Council conclusions of July 2014 that allow the State of Israel to live side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition with an independent, democratic contiguous sovereign and viable State of Palestine, with Jerusalem as the future capital of both states; recalls that settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under international law; calls on the new Israeli Government to actively and credibly show its commitment to the two-state solution, which remains both a key objective of EU policy on the Middle East peace process and a key element of the EU-Israel partnership; |
| --- | --- |

145.

Points out that on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU remains united in its commitment to achieving a two-state solution based on the parameters in the Council conclusions of July 2014 that allow the State of Israel to live side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition with an independent, democratic contiguous sovereign and viable State of Palestine, with Jerusalem as the future capital of both states; recalls that settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under international law; calls on the new Israeli Government to actively and credibly show its commitment to the two-state solution, which remains both a key objective of EU policy on the Middle East peace process and a key element of the EU-Israel partnership;

| 146. | Takes note of the resumption of the EU-Israel Association Council in 2022; notes that the purpose of the Association Council is not only to strengthen the EU-Israel partnership but also as a forum for dialogue on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as a means to revive the Middle East peace process; recalls and supports the EU position as laid out and unanimously approved by the Council in preparation for the 12th Association Council, which took place in Brussels on 3 October 2022; supports the efforts of the High Representative in bringing Arab leaders together with a view to making progress towards a comprehensive regional peace that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and brings substantial security, trade and other cooperation to the region; |
| --- | --- |

146.

Takes note of the resumption of the EU-Israel Association Council in 2022; notes that the purpose of the Association Council is not only to strengthen the EU-Israel partnership but also as a forum for dialogue on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as a means to revive the Middle East peace process; recalls and supports the EU position as laid out and unanimously approved by the Council in preparation for the 12th Association Council, which took place in Brussels on 3 October 2022; supports the efforts of the High Representative in bringing Arab leaders together with a view to making progress towards a comprehensive regional peace that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and brings substantial security, trade and other cooperation to the region;

| 147. | Reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by Union funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence; |
| --- | --- |

147.

Reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by Union funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence;

| 148. | Welcomes the adoption of the Union’s multiannual contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ensuring predictable support for Palestinian Refugees in line with the EU-UNRWA Joint Declaration 2021-2024; welcomes the Union’s additional contribution to the Agency under the Food and Resilience Facility for the purposes of addressing food insecurity; emphasises that UNRWA continues to contribute to regional stability and peace; |
| --- | --- |

148.

Welcomes the adoption of the Union’s multiannual contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), ensuring predictable support for Palestinian Refugees in line with the EU-UNRWA Joint Declaration 2021-2024; welcomes the Union’s additional contribution to the Agency under the Food and Resilience Facility for the purposes of addressing food insecurity; emphasises that UNRWA continues to contribute to regional stability and peace;

| 149. | Considers Israel to be an important partner of the EU commends Israel and Lebanon on the agreement on the delineation of their maritime boundary; |
| --- | --- |

149.

Considers Israel to be an important partner of the EU commends Israel and Lebanon on the agreement on the delineation of their maritime boundary;

| 150. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the enabling role of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus; calls on the Russian leadership to end it immediately and withdraw unconditionally from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and any other country, in particular Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, whose territory or parts thereof it unlawfully occupies; urges Russia to guarantee a free flow of grain and other raw materials across the globe; calls on the Council to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism; urges the international community to support all legitimate international and national processes, including under the principle of universal jurisdiction, in order to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes with a view to holding all those responsible for the countless war crimes and human rights violations, including mass rapes and forced deportation of Ukrainians, accountable before a court of law; reaffirms that Russia will have to compensate all the damages and destruction it has caused in Ukraine; notes that many Russian citizens are leaving Russia to avoid conscription; calls for all those who voluntarily assisted Russia in any way in this war or in the organisation of illegitimate referendums be held accountable and individually sanctioned; |
| --- | --- |

150.

Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the enabling role of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus; calls on the Russian leadership to end it immediately and withdraw unconditionally from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and any other country, in particular Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, whose territory or parts thereof it unlawfully occupies; urges Russia to guarantee a free flow of grain and other raw materials across the globe; calls on the Council to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism; urges the international community to support all legitimate international and national processes, including under the principle of universal jurisdiction, in order to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes with a view to holding all those responsible for the countless war crimes and human rights violations, including mass rapes and forced deportation of Ukrainians, accountable before a court of law; reaffirms that Russia will have to compensate all the damages and destruction it has caused in Ukraine; notes that many Russian citizens are leaving Russia to avoid conscription; calls for all those who voluntarily assisted Russia in any way in this war or in the organisation of illegitimate referendums be held accountable and individually sanctioned;

| 151. | Welcomes the suspension of the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement; calls on the Member States to fully implement the Commission’s guidelines on general visa issuance for Russian applicants and checks on Russian citizens at the EU’s external borders, in full compliance with EU and international law, and to ensure that every asylum application by, inter alia, dissidents, deserters, draft dodgers and activists is dealt with on an individual basis, taking into account the security concerns of the host Member State and acting in accordance with the EU asylum acquis; calls on the Council and the Commission to closely monitor the Russian visa situation; |
| --- | --- |

151.

Welcomes the suspension of the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement; calls on the Member States to fully implement the Commission’s guidelines on general visa issuance for Russian applicants and checks on Russian citizens at the EU’s external borders, in full compliance with EU and international law, and to ensure that every asylum application by, inter alia, dissidents, deserters, draft dodgers and activists is dealt with on an individual basis, taking into account the security concerns of the host Member State and acting in accordance with the EU asylum acquis

| 152. | Welcomes the adoption of the latest sanctions package against Russia; calls however on the Council to extend the list of individuals directly targeted by EU sanctions, taking into account the list of 6 000 individuals presented by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation; |
| --- | --- |

152.

Welcomes the adoption of the latest sanctions package against Russia; calls however on the Council to extend the list of individuals directly targeted by EU sanctions, taking into account the list of 6 000 individuals presented by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation;

| 153. | Is strongly convinced that only Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia will defend the global order and deter other aggressive actors from conducting wars of aggression; calls on the competent EU institutions to jointly draw up end of war scenarios taking into account a potentially destabilised and weakened Russia and planning for its potential reform; |
| --- | --- |

153.

Is strongly convinced that only Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia will defend the global order and deter other aggressive actors from conducting wars of aggression; calls on the competent EU institutions to jointly draw up end of war scenarios taking into account a potentially destabilised and weakened Russia and planning for its potential reform;

| 154. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in the preparation of a multilateral mechanism overseeing, enforcing and disbursing the payment of Russian reparations to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

154.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in the preparation of a multilateral mechanism overseeing, enforcing and disbursing the payment of Russian reparations to Ukraine;

| 155. | Takes note of the prevalence of support for Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine in many countries, in particular due to the effective nature of Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns; encourages the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to enhance diplomatic outreach to these countries, to increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation and to intensify strategic communication; highlights the central role to be played by the Global Gateway in tackling shared challenges on the basis of democratic values, equal partnerships and environmental sustainability; |
| --- | --- |

155.

Takes note of the prevalence of support for Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine in many countries, in particular due to the effective nature of Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns; encourages the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to enhance diplomatic outreach to these countries, to increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation and to intensify strategic communication; highlights the central role to be played by the Global Gateway in tackling shared challenges on the basis of democratic values, equal partnerships and environmental sustainability;

| 156. | Calls on the international community to mitigate as much as possible the negative spillover of the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on the Arctic, where the preservation of peace, prosperity and stability should remain a priority; expresses its concern about Russian military activities in the Arctic and the changing security landscape in the region and reaffirms the strategic importance of the Arctic; calls for a stronger EU engagement in the region, taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as it is of key strategic importance for the EU in view of climate change, industrial and economic policies, free navigation as well as geostrategic influence and due to the growing Russian and Chinese interests and movements in this region; |
| --- | --- |

156.

Calls on the international community to mitigate as much as possible the negative spillover of the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on the Arctic, where the preservation of peace, prosperity and stability should remain a priority; expresses its concern about Russian military activities in the Arctic and the changing security landscape in the region and reaffirms the strategic importance of the Arctic; calls for a stronger EU engagement in the region, taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as it is of key strategic importance for the EU in view of climate change, industrial and economic policies, free navigation as well as geostrategic influence and due to the growing Russian and Chinese interests and movements in this region;

| 157. | Calls for the active involvement of EU leaders in preventing nuclear threats arising from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, including the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant; |
| --- | --- |

157.

Calls for the active involvement of EU leaders in preventing nuclear threats arising from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, including the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant;

| 158. | Stresses the importance of strengthening relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by updating the EU-LAC strategy, with a strong emphasis on joint efforts to strengthen the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights, in particular against the backdrop of the increasing and disproportionate influence of the PRC and Russia in the region in comparison with the EU and the increased threats to European supply chains due to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region and further strengthen existing partnerships with like-minded countries, trade relations, investment, democracy support and interparliamentary cooperation; stresses, in this context, the importance of gender, climate change and indigenous people’s rights and of swiftly signing and ratifying the planned balanced and modernised association agreements with Chile, Mexico and Mercosur which include a legally binding and enforceable chapter on trade and sustainable development with a strong human rights dimension and alignment with the goals of the European Green Deal, provided that in the case of Mercosur, agreement is reached on the additional instrument for the meaningful pre-ratification of commitments; welcomes the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement; urges the Commission, in this regard, after more than two years of negotiation of the additional instrument to deliver a final agreement as soon as possible; underlines the need for the ratification of the Association Agreement between the EU and the countries of Central America by all parties; |
| --- | --- |

158.

Stresses the importance of strengthening relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by updating the EU-LAC strategy, with a strong emphasis on joint efforts to strengthen the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights, in particular against the backdrop of the increasing and disproportionate influence of the PRC and Russia in the region in comparison with the EU and the increased threats to European supply chains due to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region and further strengthen existing partnerships with like-minded countries, trade relations, investment, democracy support and interparliamentary cooperation; stresses, in this context, the importance of gender, climate change and indigenous people’s rights and of swiftly signing and ratifying the planned balanced and modernised association agreements with Chile, Mexico and Mercosur which include a legally binding and enforceable chapter on trade and sustainable development with a strong human rights dimension and alignment with the goals of the European Green Deal, provided that in the case of Mercosur, agreement is reached on the additional instrument for the meaningful pre-ratification of commitments; welcomes the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement; urges the Commission, in this regard, after more than two years of negotiation of the additional instrument to deliver a final agreement as soon as possible; underlines the need for the ratification of the Association Agreement between the EU and the countries of Central America by all parties;

| 159. | Expresses its support for the democratic and constitutional order of Peru, which was threatened by now former President Pedro Castillo and his allies when he attempted to illegally dissolve the Congress on 7 December 2022 in order to avoid his own impeachment; expresses its hope that the impeccable and responsible behaviour of the Peruvian authorities will only strengthen democracy in the country and calls for presidential and legislative elections to be held as early as possible to overcome the political impasse; |
| --- | --- |

159.

Expresses its support for the democratic and constitutional order of Peru, which was threatened by now former President Pedro Castillo and his allies when he attempted to illegally dissolve the Congress on 7 December 2022 in order to avoid his own impeachment; expresses its hope that the impeccable and responsible behaviour of the Peruvian authorities will only strengthen democracy in the country and calls for presidential and legislative elections to be held as early as possible to overcome the political impasse

| 160. | Reiterates its firm commitment to the defence and promotion of democracy in Latin America; condemns the blatantly anti-democratic, violent far-right assault on Brazil’s democratic institutions, which took place on 8 January 2023, spurred by deliberate and widespread disinformation regarding the legitimacy of Brazil’s recent presidential election; expresses its full support for Brazil’s democratically elected president, Lula da Silva, and the Brazilian Government’s swift and decisive response to the insurrection; |
| --- | --- |

160.

Reiterates its firm commitment to the defence and promotion of democracy in Latin America; condemns the blatantly anti-democratic, violent far-right assault on Brazil’s democratic institutions, which took place on 8 January 2023, spurred by deliberate and widespread disinformation regarding the legitimacy of Brazil’s recent presidential election; expresses its full support for Brazil’s democratically elected president, Lula da Silva, and the Brazilian Government’s swift and decisive response to the insurrection;

| 161. | Emphasises that the EU’s relations with the African Union are of utmost importance in order to meet the needs of and develop the great potential of partner countries in Africa as well as pursue shared interests; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to implement the commitments agreed on at the AU-EU Summit, to swiftly implement the Global Gateway projects in Africa and to strengthen partnerships on security, trade, health, development and assistance in mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic with countries in the African continent, in line with the Strategic Compass, on the basis of equality and particularly with the aim of promoting the SDGs, digital and green transformations, human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflict in accordance with the principles of international law; underlines that EU engagement with Africa, including through development and trade cooperation, must prioritise contributing to strong and resilient societies, enhancing social equality and security and supporting democratic structures on the ground; |
| --- | --- |

161.

Emphasises that the EU’s relations with the African Union are of utmost importance in order to meet the needs of and develop the great potential of partner countries in Africa as well as pursue shared interests; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to implement the commitments agreed on at the AU-EU Summit, to swiftly implement the Global Gateway projects in Africa and to strengthen partnerships on security, trade, health, development and assistance in mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic with countries in the African continent, in line with the Strategic Compass, on the basis of equality and particularly with the aim of promoting the SDGs, digital and green transformations, human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflict in accordance with the principles of international law; underlines that EU engagement with Africa, including through development and trade cooperation, must prioritise contributing to strong and resilient societies, enhancing social equality and security and supporting democratic structures on the ground;

| 162. | Welcomes the allocation of funding under the European Development Fund to mitigating growing food insecurity resulting, among other reasons, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; calls for further similar measures to be taken as necessary; reiterates its call to move towards a full partnership of equals with human development and the protection of natural resources at its core; |
| --- | --- |

162.

Welcomes the allocation of funding under the European Development Fund to mitigating growing food insecurity resulting, among other reasons, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; calls for further similar measures to be taken as necessary; reiterates its call to move towards a full partnership of equals with human development and the protection of natural resources at its core;

| 163. | Calls for a strong EU strategic communication and outreach campaign to African countries in order to counter the harmful narratives, in particular those being spread in the region by the Russian Federation and PRC; |
| --- | --- |

163.

Calls for a strong EU strategic communication and outreach campaign to African countries in order to counter the harmful narratives, in particular those being spread in the region by the Russian Federation and PRC;

| 164. | Denounces Russia’s democracy-endangering interference in Africa, in particular through the increased footprint of the Wagner group on the continent; strongly condemns the abuses and crimes committed by the Wagner group; |
| --- | --- |

164.

Denounces Russia’s democracy-endangering interference in Africa, in particular through the increased footprint of the Wagner group on the continent; strongly condemns the abuses and crimes committed by the Wagner group;

| 165. | Calls for an Africa-Europe partnership aiming to create an area of solidarity, security, peace and lasting prosperity; calls for swift EU actions to counter the growing presence of the Wagner group in several African countries, fuelling further instability and undermining the efforts in the fight against terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

165.

Calls for an Africa-Europe partnership aiming to create an area of solidarity, security, peace and lasting prosperity; calls for swift EU actions to counter the growing presence of the Wagner group in several African countries, fuelling further instability and undermining the efforts in the fight against terrorism;

Enhancing parliamentary diplomacy as a foreign policy tool

Enhancing parliamentary diplomacy as a foreign policy tool

| 166. | Highlights Parliament’s specific contribution to the EU’s foreign and security policy through its parliamentary diplomacy assets; calls for closer parliamentary scrutiny on matters of strategic relevance in European foreign affairs; recalls, among others, that there is intensive cooperation at political and technical level between the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada and Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

166.

Highlights Parliament’s specific contribution to the EU’s foreign and security policy through its parliamentary diplomacy assets; calls for closer parliamentary scrutiny on matters of strategic relevance in European foreign affairs; recalls, among others, that there is intensive cooperation at political and technical level between the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada and Parliament;

| 167. | Notes that Parliament is actively involved in the CFSP through its specific instruments; underlines the importance and unique nature of Parliament’s democratisation programmes, such as the ‘Jean Monnet Dialogue’, aimed at fostering and strengthening the work of parliaments; recalls that all EU institutions should participate and work together in activities that aim to counteract global backsliding on democracy, including through election observation, mediation and dialogue activities, conflict prevention, the Sakharov Prize award and network and parliamentary diplomacy; |
| --- | --- |

167.

Notes that Parliament is actively involved in the CFSP through its specific instruments; underlines the importance and unique nature of Parliament’s democratisation programmes, such as the ‘Jean Monnet Dialogue’, aimed at fostering and strengthening the work of parliaments; recalls that all EU institutions should participate and work together in activities that aim to counteract global backsliding on democracy, including through election observation, mediation and dialogue activities, conflict prevention, the Sakharov Prize award and network and parliamentary diplomacy;

| 168. | Calls on the EEAS to adopt press freedom and freedom of expression as priorities and to take all the necessary steps to uphold, in full, the EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline; urges EU delegations to improve preventive protective measures, plan for emergency responses to deteriorations in press freedom and provide demonstrable and visible support to local journalists and civil society; |
| --- | --- |

168.

Calls on the EEAS to adopt press freedom and freedom of expression as priorities and to take all the necessary steps to uphold, in full, the EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline; urges EU delegations to improve preventive protective measures, plan for emergency responses to deteriorations in press freedom and provide demonstrable and visible support to local journalists and civil society;

| 169. | Calls for the improvement of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive foreign policy tool for preventing conflicts between third parties from breaking out and supporting them in finding peaceful solutions to rising tensions; |
| --- | --- |

169.

Calls for the improvement of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive foreign policy tool for preventing conflicts between third parties from breaking out and supporting them in finding peaceful solutions to rising tensions;

| 170. | Underlines the importance of the parliamentary assemblies as forums for cooperation and institutional dialogue, and their valuable contribution to European foreign policy action on matters of security, as well as the need to promote their activity and guarantee their proper functioning and development; |
| --- | --- |

170.

Underlines the importance of the parliamentary assemblies as forums for cooperation and institutional dialogue, and their valuable contribution to European foreign policy action on matters of security, as well as the need to promote their activity and guarantee their proper functioning and development;

| 171. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action, including by continuing regular consultations with the VP/HR and the Commission, and by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the European Peace Facility and the Strategic Compass; recalls that Parliament engages in a degree of informal cooperation with the EEAS, which was enhanced following the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 and the High Representative’s declaration of political accountability of 2010; highlights that is necessary to further strengthen the framework for interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the EEAS, including its delegations; calls for a framework agreement on strengthening external action cooperation between the EEAS and the European Parliament, which could enhance the EU’s own foreign policy toolbox; underlines the need to use the mid-term review of the European Defence Fund (EDF) in order to introduce proper parliamentary oversight via delegated acts for work programmes; stresses the need to also establish a similar level of parliamentary oversight for the upcoming common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP); underlines that for Parliament to properly fulfil its important role of democratic oversight it should be provided with the necessary information and documents in a transparent and timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

171.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action, including by continuing regular consultations with the VP/HR and the Commission, and by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the European Peace Facility and the Strategic Compass; recalls that Parliament engages in a degree of informal cooperation with the EEAS, which was enhanced following the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 and the High Representative’s declaration of political accountability of 2010; highlights that is necessary to further strengthen the framework for interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the EEAS, including its delegations; calls for a framework agreement on strengthening external action cooperation between the EEAS and the European Parliament, which could enhance the EU’s own foreign policy toolbox; underlines the need to use the mid-term review of the European Defence Fund (EDF) in order to introduce proper parliamentary oversight via delegated acts for work programmes; stresses the need to also establish a similar level of parliamentary oversight for the upcoming common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP); underlines that for Parliament to properly fulfil its important role of democratic oversight it should be provided with the necessary information and documents in a transparent and timely manner;

| 172. | Recalls the important role of national parliaments in the Member States; underlines the key role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play and calls for a further strengthening of the European Parliament’s relations with it; |
| --- | --- |

172.

Recalls the important role of national parliaments in the Member States; underlines the key role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play and calls for a further strengthening of the European Parliament’s relations with it;

| 173. | Calls on all EU institutions and agencies, as well as the Member States, to commit sufficiently to the fight against disinformation and propaganda undermining their policies by stepping up strategic communication and narrative on their work; calls for increased support for strategic communication to be given to EU delegations and missions; |
| --- | --- |

173.

Calls on all EU institutions and agencies, as well as the Member States, to commit sufficiently to the fight against disinformation and propaganda undermining their policies by stepping up strategic communication and narrative on their work; calls for increased support for strategic communication to be given to EU delegations and missions;

| 174. | Condemns any attempt by third countries to interfere with or corrupt elected officials; is resolved to fully investigate and properly address cases of corruption and improper actions by third countries seeking to buy influence in Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

174.

Condemns any attempt by third countries to interfere with or corrupt elected officials; is resolved to fully investigate and properly address cases of corruption and improper actions by third countries seeking to buy influence in Parliament;

| 175. | Insists on Parliament’s right to information on CFSP matters under Article 36 TEU; points to the judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Mauritius Agreement (8) and the Tanzania Agreement (9), according to which the timely and comprehensive provision of information to Parliament is crucial to allow it to play its democratic scrutiny and advisory role in CFSP matters; |
| --- | --- |

175.

Insists on Parliament’s right to information on CFSP matters under Article 36 TEU; points to the judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Mauritius Agreement (8

9

| 176. | Affirms that Parliament should make full use of its oversight and budgetary powers on Union decisions on international affairs; highlights the importance of Parliament’s democracy support programmes, which have great potential to reinforce the EU’s role around the world by engaging key political stakeholders and facilitating sustainable democratic governance in non-EU and EU accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

176.

Affirms that Parliament should make full use of its oversight and budgetary powers on Union decisions on international affairs; highlights the importance of Parliament’s democracy support programmes, which have great potential to reinforce the EU’s role around the world by engaging key political stakeholders and facilitating sustainable democratic governance in non-EU and EU accession countries;

o

o o

| 177. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

177.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

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(1)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.

1

(2)  OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 109.

2

(3)  OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

3

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0406.

4

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0443.

5

(6)  COM(2022)0684.

6

(7)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/151 of 3 February 2022 on a European Union action to support the evacuation of certain particularly vulnerable persons from Afghanistan (OJ L 25, 4.2.2022, p. 11).

7

(8)  Judgment of 24 June 2014, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, C-658/11, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025.

8

European Parliament

Council of the European Union

(9)  Judgment of 14 June 2016, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, C-263/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:435.

9

European Parliamen

Council of the European Union

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/54

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P9_TA(2023)0010

Implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI))

(2023/C 214/05)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (1) (EDF), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (1) (EDF),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s proposal of 19 July 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (COM(2022)0349), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s proposal of 19 July 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (COM(2022)0349),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (3),

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at its meeting on 19 November 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at its meeting on 19 November 2018,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (4) (EPF), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (4) (EPF),

| — | having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (5), (CFSP) 2021/749 (6) and (CFSP) 2021/750 (7) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (5), (CFSP) 2021/749 (6) and (CFSP) 2021/750 (7) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) (8),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (9),

| — | having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (10),

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) (11),

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021, and 24-25 March, 30-31 Mayand 23-24 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021, and 24-25 March, 30-31 Mayand 23-24 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 12 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 12 December 2022,

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) (12),

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 (13) establishing an EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and its decision of 19 December 2022 to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 (13) establishing an EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and its decision of 19 December 2022 to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia,

| — | having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the CSDP, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the CSDP,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2020 on Youth in external action, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2020 on Youth in external action,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — a new Agenda for the Mediterranean, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — a new Agenda for the Mediterranean,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2021 on Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation EUFOR Althea, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2021 on Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation EUFOR Althea,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 May 2022 on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 May 2022 on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture,

| — | having regard to the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 May 2022 and that of the Foreign Affairs Council with Defence Ministers of 17 May 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 May 2022 and that of the Foreign Affairs Council with Defence Ministers of 17 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

| — | having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 6 November 2020 and to Parliament’s resolution of 7 June 2022 thereon (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 6 November 2020 and to Parliament’s resolution of 7 June 2022 thereon (14),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 March 2014, entitled ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy’ (JOIN(2014)0009), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 March 2014, entitled ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy’ (JOIN(2014)0009),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 on the Commission contribution to European defence (COM(2022)0060), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 on the Commission contribution to European defence (COM(2022)0060),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘EU Policy on Cyber Defence’ (JOIN(2022)0049), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘EU Policy on Cyber Defence’ (JOIN(2022)0049),

| — | having regard to the second annual work programme of the European Defence Fund for 2022, adopted by the Commission on 25 May 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the second annual work programme of the European Defence Fund for 2022, adopted by the Commission on 25 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

| — | having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the applications by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, jointly submitted on 18 May 2022, and to the signature by NATO Allies of the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the applications by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, jointly submitted on 18 May 2022, and to the signature by NATO Allies of the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

| — | having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the seventh progress report of 20 June 2022 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the seventh progress report of 20 June 2022 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the relevant reports and recommendations adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the relevant reports and recommendations adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA),

| — | having regard to the EU-United States summit statement of 15 June 2021 entitled ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU-United States summit statement of 15 June 2021 entitled ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’,

| — | having regard to the Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the VP/HR of 3 December 2021 on the launch of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as well as to the subsequent meetings of this dialogue, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the VP/HR of 3 December 2021 on the launch of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as well as to the subsequent meetings of this dialogue,

| — | having regard to Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova’s region of Transnistria, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova’s region of Transnistria,

| — | having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), space capabilities and quantum computing, which present new opportunities for humanity, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), space capabilities and quantum computing, which present new opportunities for humanity, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies,

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Article 2.4 prohibiting the use of force and Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Article 2.4 prohibiting the use of force and Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1889 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2493 (2019) on Women, Peace and Security and Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020) on Youth, Peace and Security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1889 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2493 (2019) on Women, Peace and Security and Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020) on Youth, Peace and Security,

| — | having regard tο the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Cyprus, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard tο the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Cyprus,

| — | having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (15), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (15),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (16), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (16),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (17), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (17),

| — | having regard to its position of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework (18), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its position of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (19),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security (‘Procurement Directive’), and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (20), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security (‘Procurement Directive’), and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (20),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (21), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (21),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (22), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (22),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (23), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (23),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021 (24), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021 (24),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (25), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (25),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (26), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (26),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (27), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (27),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (28), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (28),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (29), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (29),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new agenda for the Mediterranean, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new agenda for the Mediterranean,

| — | having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (30), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (30),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0296/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0296/2022),

| A. | whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the non-military threats include disinformation, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations, acts of sabotage, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration, and subversive political influence; whereas any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable and should lead to the strongest possible response; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; whereas this war of aggression is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party; whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; whereas President Vladimir Putin’s decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the non-military threats include disinformation, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations, acts of sabotage, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration, and subversive political influence; whereas any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable and should lead to the strongest possible response; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; whereas this war of aggression is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party; whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; whereas President Vladimir Putin’s decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war;

| B. | whereas Ukraine’s victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Ukraine’s victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy;

| C. | whereas in response to these threats the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests, values and citizens, both within and outside its borders, and first and foremost in its neighbourhood, to deliver peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy and to support its partners; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance, realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine, most notably through the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO; whereas Russia’s hybrid aggression makes it necessary to design the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats; whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; whereas NATO has deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air, and maritime forces to its eastern flank; whereas NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine; whereas the explosion damaging the Nord Stream gas pipelines was a targeted attack against the EU’s critical infrastructure; whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia’s war against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas in response to these threats the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests, values and citizens, both within and outside its borders, and first and foremost in its neighbourhood, to deliver peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy and to support its partners; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance, realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine, most notably through the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO; whereas Russia’s hybrid aggression makes it necessary to design the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats; whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; whereas NATO has deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air, and maritime forces to its eastern flank; whereas NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine; whereas the explosion damaging the Nord Stream gas pipelines was a targeted attack against the EU’s critical infrastructure; whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia’s war against Ukraine;

| D. | whereas on 12 December 2022 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to increase the overall financial ceiling of the EPF by EUR 2 billion in 2023, with the possibility of a further increase at a later stage; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas on 12 December 2022 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to increase the overall financial ceiling of the EPF by EUR 2 billion in 2023, with the possibility of a further increase at a later stage;

| E. | whereas in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to Ukraine for support throughout 2023; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to Ukraine for support throughout 2023;

| F. | whereas, according to the Strategic Compass, ‘a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand’; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas, according to the Strategic Compass, ‘a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand’;

| G. | whereas the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises provides for a coherent use of the EU’s different capacities, within which its security and defence policy should complement and be complemented by other civilian tools to contribute to human security and sustainable peace in Europe and the wider world; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises provides for a coherent use of the EU’s different capacities, within which its security and defence policy should complement and be complemented by other civilian tools to contribute to human security and sustainable peace in Europe and the wider world;

| H. | whereas the People’s Republic of China has increased its defence spending over the last decade by about 600 % and is making use of its military power to intimidate and threaten its neighbours, most notably Taiwan, as recently illustrated by the military manoeuvres following the visit by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August 2022, whereas China’s dangerous military actions and provocations continue to occur on a daily basis; whereas the People’s Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the People’s Republic of China has increased its defence spending over the last decade by about 600 % and is making use of its military power to intimidate and threaten its neighbours, most notably Taiwan, as recently illustrated by the military manoeuvres following the visit by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August 2022, whereas China’s dangerous military actions and provocations continue to occur on a daily basis; whereas the People’s Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills;

| I. | whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security; |
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I.

whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security;

| J. | whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; |
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J.

whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine;

| K. | whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration; whereas Russia’s increasing military activity and build-up in the Arctic is alarming; |
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K.

whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration; whereas Russia’s increasing military activity and build-up in the Arctic is alarming;

| L. | whereas Russia’s influence in Africa has developed, in particular due to the expanding footprint of the Wagner Group on the continent; whereas Wagner has been gaining a strong foothold in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR); whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the CAR; in Mali, it is reinforced by the non-cooperative stance of the authorities towards Western partners (including the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali), regional organisations and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); |
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L.

whereas Russia’s influence in Africa has developed, in particular due to the expanding footprint of the Wagner Group on the continent; whereas Wagner has been gaining a strong foothold in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR); whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the CAR; in Mali, it is reinforced by the non-cooperative stance of the authorities towards Western partners (including the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali), regional organisations and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA);

| M. | whereas industrial fragmentation along national lines of the development and procurement of European military capability costs between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion each year and it has a considerable impact on the overall competitiveness of the defence sector; whereas the Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020, and 8 % in 2021, despite co-financing via EU budget-funded programmes such as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and despite their pledge to reach 35 % of common defence procurement; whereas from 1999 to 2021, combined EU defence spending rose by 20 % compared with 66 % in the United States, 292 % in Russia and 592 % in China; whereas Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending that should be primarily channelled into cooperative initiatives and aligned with the defence spending commitments of EU NATO members; whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence; whereas the EU’s ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); whereas since 2017 a total of 61 PESCO projects have been launched without any of them having achieved tangible results; whereas the Commission and the EEAS have proposed the establishment of the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA), a short-term EU instrument aimed at incentivising joint procurement to meet our most critical needs; whereas it will be backed by EUR 500 million from the EU budget on top of the Member States’ own investments; whereas in 2023, after the finalisation of EDIRPA, the Commission is expected to put forward a regulation establishing a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) setting conditions for joint procurement by Member States while benefiting from VAT exemption and EU financial support; whereas defence remains one of the key competences of the Member States; |
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M.

whereas industrial fragmentation along national lines of the development and procurement of European military capability costs between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion each year and it has a considerable impact on the overall competitiveness of the defence sector; whereas the Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020, and 8 % in 2021, despite co-financing via EU budget-funded programmes such as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and despite their pledge to reach 35 % of common defence procurement; whereas from 1999 to 2021, combined EU defence spending rose by 20 % compared with 66 % in the United States, 292 % in Russia and 592 % in China; whereas Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending that should be primarily channelled into cooperative initiatives and aligned with the defence spending commitments of EU NATO members; whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence; whereas the EU’s ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); whereas since 2017 a total of 61 PESCO projects have been launched without any of them having achieved tangible results; whereas the Commission and the EEAS have proposed the establishment of the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA), a short-term EU instrument aimed at incentivising joint procurement to meet our most critical needs; whereas it will be backed by EUR 500 million from the EU budget on top of the Member States’ own investments; whereas in 2023, after the finalisation of EDIRPA, the Commission is expected to put forward a regulation establishing a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) setting conditions for joint procurement by Member States while benefiting from VAT exemption and EU financial support; whereas defence remains one of the key competences of the Member States;

| N. | whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions and eight military operations under way with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas only three of these are operations with an executive mandate (Atalanta, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EU NAVFOR MED IRINI), EUFOR Althea); whereas CSDP missions and operations suffer from slow decision-making and excessive micro-management from the Council, compounded by insufficient coordination between training activities and the provision of military equipment to partners; whereas the number of total personnel deployed by the Member States has steadily declined in recent years, and missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas such operational failures impede the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood; whereas Civilian CSDP Compact is the key instrument to strengthen the civilian CSDP; whereas EU CSDP missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, putting at risk their effectiveness in stabilising the country in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability whose only beneficiaries are malicious third states; whereas EUFOR Althea aims to guarantee the application of the Dayton agreements negotiated in 1995 and still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the mandate of EUFOR Althea was extended for another year by the UN Security Council; whereas the continuation of EUFOR Althea is in the best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council, and combating illicit weapons and human trafficking; |
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N.

whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions and eight military operations under way with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas only three of these are operations with an executive mandate (Atalanta, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EU NAVFOR MED IRINI), EUFOR Althea); whereas CSDP missions and operations suffer from slow decision-making and excessive micro-management from the Council, compounded by insufficient coordination between training activities and the provision of military equipment to partners; whereas the number of total personnel deployed by the Member States has steadily declined in recent years, and missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas such operational failures impede the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood; whereas Civilian CSDP Compact is the key instrument to strengthen the civilian CSDP; whereas EU CSDP missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, putting at risk their effectiveness in stabilising the country in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability whose only beneficiaries are malicious third states; whereas EUFOR Althea aims to guarantee the application of the Dayton agreements negotiated in 1995 and still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the mandate of EUFOR Althea was extended for another year by the UN Security Council; whereas the continuation of EUFOR Althea is in the best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council, and combating illicit weapons and human trafficking;

| O. | whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the participation of women in peacekeeping and military operations should be encouraged and strengthened; whereas women constitute 24 % of participants in civilian CSDP missions and only 5 % in military missions and 6 % in military operations (31); whereas, given the importance of gender equality and women’s contribution to peace processes, the inclusion of the gender perspective in the EU’s security and defence policy is essential; |
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O.

whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the participation of women in peacekeeping and military operations should be encouraged and strengthened; whereas women constitute 24 % of participants in civilian CSDP missions and only 5 % in military missions and 6 % in military operations (31); whereas, given the importance of gender equality and women’s contribution to peace processes, the inclusion of the gender perspective in the EU’s security and defence policy is essential;

| P. | whereas security and defence partnerships, as well as sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU’s ambition to be a global actor; whereas EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP; |
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P.

whereas security and defence partnerships, as well as sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU’s ambition to be a global actor; whereas EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP;

| Q. | whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations; whereas cultural diversity plays an important role in the promotion of conflict prevention, reconciliation and counter-extremism; |
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Q.

whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations; whereas cultural diversity plays an important role in the promotion of conflict prevention, reconciliation and counter-extremism;

| R. | whereas data and new technologies such as AI are increasingly critical in maintaining military competitiveness and are used in the development of new or enhanced military capabilities such as AI-powered cyber-weapons, drones and autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons and vehicles, and intelligence and situational awareness tools, all of which have a transformative effect on military operations and strategy; |
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R.

whereas data and new technologies such as AI are increasingly critical in maintaining military competitiveness and are used in the development of new or enhanced military capabilities such as AI-powered cyber-weapons, drones and autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons and vehicles, and intelligence and situational awareness tools, all of which have a transformative effect on military operations and strategy;

| S. | whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations; whereas Parliament can legitimately exercise political control and oversight over the executive at EU level; whereas there is a lack of formal scrutiny powers as regards the EPF and EDF; whereas Parliament’s diplomacy is a proven and complementary means of enhancing strategic communication, and the visibility and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; |
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S.

whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations; whereas Parliament can legitimately exercise political control and oversight over the executive at EU level; whereas there is a lack of formal scrutiny powers as regards the EPF and EDF; whereas Parliament’s diplomacy is a proven and complementary means of enhancing strategic communication, and the visibility and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations;

Using momentum to enhance the CSDP

| 1. | Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way in order to deliver the security expected by EU citizens; |
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1.

| 2. | Underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values; calls on the EU to increase and speed up its efforts and provide Ukraine with the necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid and equipment, including lethal equipment and especially heavy weaponry, including Leopard tanks and modern air defence systems, needed to win this war; strongly welcomes the Council’s decision to set up, after a previous call by Parliament, a military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), aimed at enhancing the military capability of Ukraine’s armed forces to effectively conduct military operations, in order to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect civilians; calls on the Member States to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular the provision of weapons in response to clearly identified needs; calls in this respect on German Chancellor Scholz to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay; calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations so as to help the country restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia; calls for the imposition of further sanctions against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for the various crimes committed against Ukraine; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines the need for solidarity among Member States, especially with those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to various imminent threats and challenges by land, sea and air; fully supports efforts to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU in this respect; |
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3.

| 4. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s illegal annexations of Crimea and the four Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and condemns Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons; stresses that the enforcement of restrictive measures against Russia remains one of the key elements in the EU’s toolbox for countering Russian military aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the Commission’s ninth package of restrictive measures in response to the illegal referendums organised in the Ukrainian regions, the mobilisation of Russian conscripts and Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons and welcomes preparations for a ninth package; underlines that the impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia is one of the factors leading to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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4.

| 5. | Urges the EU and the Member States to significantly narrow the gap between the military assistance ‘promised’ and ‘delivered’ to Ukraine; calls on them to overcome the political bottlenecks which are hampering the delivery of long-range missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles to Ukraine in sufficient quantities to support the launch of a scaled-up counter-offensive; calls on the EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid; |
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5.

| 6. | Strongly welcomes the continuation of important military support to reinforce Ukraine’s air defence and infantry capacities; calls upon EU and NATO members to increase their military assistance, in particular by delivering the necessary heavy weaponry; |
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6.

| 7. | Is deeply shocked that several Ukrainian nuclear power plants have been attacked and occupied, and have repeatedly been the scene of hostilities since Russia started its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned about the fact that Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and its staff, some of whom have been temporarily abducted, has been working constantly under pressure from the occupying forces; is equally concerned about the fact that power supplies to the power plant have repeatedly been cut owing to fighting in and around the plant, severely increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe; demands the immediate withdrawal of Russian military personnel from within and around the ZNPP, and the creation of a demilitarised zone around the plant, recognising that fighting around the plant could lead to a major disaster with unimaginable consequences; urges the EU to help the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organisations to implement the necessary nuclear safety measures without delay; calls on the EU and its Member States to promote a full prohibition of military attacks on or from within nuclear installations, without exception, under international law; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls on the EU and the Member States to consider solutions to bolster maintenance, servicing and repair facilities so as to increase the resupply of repaired military equipment from the partner countries; |
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8.

| 9. | Welcomes new EU initiatives to enhance European security and defence as well as the capabilities of EU Member States, notably the Versailles Declaration, the Strategic Compass and the joint communication on defence investment gaps; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to incentivise joint procurement (EDIRPA) while stressing the need for the allocation of budgetary resources, especially via the Member States and their increased defence budgets; underlines that an enhancement of the EDA’s roles and responsibilities in future joint procurement projects should be explored; calls for increased ambition in defence investment expenditure and joint procurement by the Member States; welcomes the announced presentation by the Commission of the European Defence Investment Programme regulation (EDIP) after the finalisation of EDIRPA in 2023, the budget of which should also be significantly increased; highlights that these constitute a major step towards a European Defence Union; calls for increased funding opportunities for the European defence industry provided that they are invested in collaborative projects and generate added value; welcomes the European Investment Bank’s Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) announced on 10 March 2022 which aims to mobilise EUR 6 billion in investment to support Europe’s dual-use security and defence systems and encourages it to explore all possible funding options for the European defence industry’s collaborative projects including by revising its rules; calls for an adequate budget to be allocated to all European defence instruments, notably the European Defence Fund, Military Mobility, the future EDIRPA and EDIP and, therefore, calls for an adequate budget for all European Defence instruments; underlines NATO’s 2 % goal, reconfirmed at the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, and welcomes the fact that lately most EU NATO Member States have moved towards this objective, which should be treated as a minimum target, but despite the biggest security threats in decades, until now has been achieved only by a few states in the case of Europe — mostly by those on the Eastern flank; underlines, however, that given the current level of challenges, further investments in the defence sector will be necessary; |
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9.

| 10. | Welcomes the new ambition in the Strategic Compass to provide the Union with a vision, a common strategic defence culture and the tools to be an effective security provider as well as to enhance EU security and defence by increasing the EU’s resilience and by making it more capable and responsive, so it can act rapidly to defend our interests, principles and values and protect the EU and its citizens; welcomes the strong commitment in the Strategic Compass to promoting and advancing human security across the CSDP; recalls that the Strategic Compass must be a dynamic process, which must be regularly updated and adapted on the basis of the common threat analysis; considers the Strategic Compass a major impetus that could generate the necessary momentum towards a genuine European Defence Union, build on the EU’s integrated approach, and enable the EU to act as a capable security actor and a reliable partner; calls for the timely and operational implementation of the approximately 80 concrete actions and for them to be updated regularly along with the EU’s Threat Analysis; stresses that this common threat analysis will strengthen the EU’s strategic culture as well as provide guidance on prioritising policy objectives and making necessary adjustments in the field of security and defence; welcomes the particular focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation; notes that the response to the new external security issues facing the EU and its Member States lies, above all, in confirming and implementing capabilities on the ground that will make it possible to improve the evaluation of crisis situations, take decisions more rapidly and act more decisively; calls for the sustained political will of all Member States and EU institutions in this process in order to ensure that the Union is prepared to face the broad range of military and non-military threats; reiterates the call for deeper cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and its peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security; calls on the EEAS to report regularly and comprehensively on the implementation of the Strategic Compass to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence; stresses the importance of the meaningful involvement of civil society in the formulation of the CSDP; |
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10.

| 11. | Strongly welcomes the EUR 18 billion support package agreed by the EU in December 2022 and sees it as proof of the unwavering support for Ukraine by the EU and its Member States and as a powerful testament that this support will continue for as long as it is needed; |
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11.

| 12. | Welcomes the significant use of the EPF throughout 2022 to support partners in preventing conflict, preserving peace, and strengthening international security and stability; calls on Member States to increase the EPF’s budget to enable the EU to strengthen the resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; recalls the need for military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF to meet the growing operational requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces while fully complying with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, as well as providing adequate transparency and accountability; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls on the EU to support the principles of the Kyiv Security Compact as an immediate interim solution for Ukraine’s security; |
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13.

| 14. | Welcomes the Council’s decision of December 2022 to increase the EPF budget and calls for its swift implementation but stresses that this increase will probably not suffice and hence reiterates the need to further raise the ceiling of the EPF and to create a separate EPF envelope for Ukraine that guarantees adequate support for the country; underlines the need to ensure continuity with the support provided to African partners, considering the number of crises the continent is facing and not to neglect other priority regions, including our immediate neighbourhood; calls for a significant increase in all aspects of military support, including training and information sharing with other particularly vulnerable countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkan countries; calls for all EPF support for the provision of equipment to also contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and, when relevant for European sovereignty, to be carried out in coordination with all the EU’s partners, including NATO, to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication; reiterates that the EPF also functions as a funding option for the common costs of military operations within the CSDP; concurs with the Strategic Compass that the scope of common costs can be expanded to allow greater EPF utilisation and incentivise force generation for CSDP military missions and operations; calls for effective evaluation of the implementation of EPF assistance measures and their impact on conflict dynamics in the partner countries; |
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14.

| 15. | Highlights the importance of PESCO in improving the EU’s defence capabilities; regrets the fact that Member States are still not making full use of the PESCO framework and that progress on implementation still falls far short of expectations; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to conduct a thorough review of the results of PESCO projects and their prospects, which should also include the possibility of merging, regrouping and even closing projects that lack sufficient progress and redirecting efforts towards a small number of priority projects intended to lead to concrete actions as stated in the Strategic Compass; strongly regrets that Parliament is not in a situation to exercise proper scrutiny of PESCO projects; |
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15.

| 16. | Welcomes the importance of situational awareness and strategic foresight rooted in intelligence-based capacities within the Strategic Compass; underlines the importance of accurate and timely intelligence for effective EU decision-making and crisis management as well as the need to significantly enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States, including at Union level, and with like-minded partners; calls for the creation of intelligence units, where necessary, in CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU Intelligence and Analysis Centre (EU IntCen), EUMS, MPCC and CPCC; calls for all CSDP missions and operations to enhance their cooperation and information sharing with the EU IntCen, EUMS, MPCC and CPCC; underlines the importance of secure communications for reliable intelligence; calls for the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EU on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; calls for the strengthening of the EU IntCen and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre by enhancing its resources and capabilities with the aim of Member States sharing intelligence safely, formulating a common strategic culture and providing strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; notes the important work conducted by the European Union Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) and underlines that the EU must have adequate resources in the fields of space imagery and intelligence-gathering, notably in order to provide high-resolution satellite imaging in support of CSDP missions and operations; |
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16.

| 17. | Stresses the need to substantially strengthen the society-wide focus on resilience and the response to hybrid threats; calls for existing Union instruments to be made operational so that they can contribute more effectively to preventing and countering hybrid threats; welcomes the joint communication on an EU cyber defence policy and the decision to develop an EU hybrid toolbox for a coordinated response to hybrid campaigns; calls on the EU and its Member States to improve their capabilities to identify hybrid threats; stresses the need to further develop the EU’s cyber-defence policy and capabilities, including the setting up of cyber rapid response teams; emphasises the need to fight adverse disinformation and propaganda; underlines the need to pay special attention to the EEAS’s assets, premises and activities abroad and the safety of EU staff delegated to non-democratic countries with repressive regimes; reiterates the urgent need to develop their strategic communication capabilities including secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity; emphasises the need to assist, in close cooperation with NATO, partner countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, to effectively combat cyberattacks and hybrid warfare; stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-European narratives by third countries, the EU has to step up its efforts to provide support, training and capacity-building with like-minded partner countries; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls for additional support in training and capacity building in border and crisis management for countries affected by significant migration flows, including those countries faced with inflows of Russian citizens fleeing the Russian Federation since the mobilisation, while fully respecting their fundamental rights, especially for Member States and countries with existing CSDP missions or operations present on their territory; stresses that resilience in the digital age also depends on reducing dependencies for critical materials such as rare earth metals, critical components such as chips, and critical technologies such as drones and autonomous military equipment; highlights that semi-autonomous and autonomous drones are increasingly used in both military operations and in the maintenance and security of critical infrastructure installations; is deeply concerned by their supply and malicious use; |
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18.

| 19. | Stresses that dependence on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in critical sectors, including energy, represents a grave security risk for the EU; calls on the EU to prioritise reducing this dependence and to work with our democratic allies to ensure secure and resilient supply chains; notes the need for comprehensive assessment and actions to secure offshore oil and gas pipelines, cables and other strategic infrastructure assets; calls on the EU and its Member States to take decisive action in the EU energy market to ensure a stable energy supply; |
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19.

| 20. | Highlights the need to secure and protect critical European infrastructure and supply chains, such as those in the energy, electricity, communication, transport or industrial sectors from sabotage and foreign interference and put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems; condemns the suspected sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea and calls for a thorough investigation and proportionate response; stresses the importance of including the protection of undersea infrastructure, such as pipelines and fibre-optic cables, as a priority; |
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20.

| 21. | Welcomes the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, which recognises climate change as a ‘threat multiplier that fundamentally affects our long-term security’ and sets out concrete actions to address the increasingly important climate and security nexus; recommends that climate change implications be considered during the planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations; underlines the need to increase investments in ‘green’ defence, in particular by dedicating a higher share of military and dual-technology innovation to carbon-neutral fuels and propulsion systems for military aircraft, ships and other vehicles; underlines that the EU’s external action and the armed forces of the Member States should work towards reducing their own carbon footprint to mitigate their effect on climate change and the environment; reiterates its call for the EU to adopt an approach incorporating the energy, carbon and environmental footprint by design when implementing relevant EU funds; |
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21.

| 22. | Notes the emerging security challenges in the Arctic caused by the changing environment, the increasing militarisation and the growing geopolitical interest in the region; underlines the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CSDP; stresses that the EU must engage in effective cooperation with NATO, including cooperation on situational awareness; stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, while taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills; |
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22.

| 23. | Underlines the necessity of further strengthening the EU’s role as a global maritime security provider; welcomes the revision of the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy and stresses the need for the revised strategy to be aligned with the Strategic Compass and to reflect new opportunities and challenges; believes that similar reviews should be carried out on other EU policies, and hence welcomes the forthcoming communication on space and the CSDP, expected for early 2023; stresses that, given the growing geopolitical tensions at sea, the EU must safeguard freedom of navigation and ensure that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively to prevent illegal activities; calls on the Member States to consolidate their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the maritime sector; |
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23.

| 24. | Recognises the significance of coordinated maritime presences (CMP) as a crucial tool in strengthening EU maritime security engagements around the world; underlines the contribution of the pilot CMP in the Gulf of Guinea to reducing maritime security incidents and welcomes its extension until 2024; welcomes the expansion of the CMP to the North-West of the Indian Ocean; underlines the importance of close cooperation and complementary action with other CSDP operations in the region, including the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation, among others; supports the valuable work of the CSDP missions EUBAM Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, which are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability; continues to support, in particular, IRINI’s core task in enforcing the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the UN; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Stresses the urgent need to significantly increase investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, particularly in multilateral approaches; stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European level on arms exports, especially in anticipation of a period of increased defence spending; points to the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and acknowledge their competences in their defence acquisition policies; calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (32) as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 (33), and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability and halt arms export licensing if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient might use the arms aggressively against another country, in general, and the Member States, in particular; acknowledges the Member States’ competences in their defence procurement policies; underlines the importance of a thorough assessment of applications for authorisation to export technology and military equipment; laments the use of Russian hypersonic missiles in Ukraine and believes that the EU should seek to help prevent an international hypersonic missile arms race; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Recalls the need to define arms export policies as part of security policy and to urgently establish an effective EU-level arms export policy which guarantees that the Member States fully comply with the eight legally binding criteria on arms exports, that their national exports do not fuel regional tensions or undermine the security of other Member States, allies, partners or of the EU as a whole, while fully supporting the legitimate security and defence needs of allies and partner countries, especially those whose territorial integrity is violated and which are exercising their right to self-defence as enshrined in the UN Charter; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Reaffirms its full support for the commitment by the EU and its Member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts; expresses deep concern that no outcome was reached at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT due to Russia’s unwillingness to join the consensus; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Notes that the Member States may assess the reform of the decision-making process with a view to realising considerable untapped potential within the Treaties, in particular by activating Article 31 TEU extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to areas relating to the CSDP and pursuing full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises and secure EU sovereignty; proposes that changes to the Treaties be considered in the case of the CSDP, to be discussed and decided upon within a convention following up on the Conference on the Future of Europe, which should address (1) switching from unanimity to QMV for Council decisions with military implications with the exception of the mutual defence clause in Article 42(7), on defence matters for situations where passerelle clauses do not apply, and only in the case of the dispatch of military equipment or CSDP missions that do not involve an executive mandate, (2) introduction of provisions in Articles 42 and 46 TEU enabling the joint procurement of defence equipment and other security-related spending from the budget of the Union as well as the establishment of joint and permanently stationed multinational military units including command structures, and (3) revision of Article 346 TFEU in order to limit possibilities for EUMS to deviate from the provisions of the Procurement Directive as well as to introduce the requirement of justification for such deviations to be assessed by the Commission and communicated to Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to unleash the full potential of the provisions of the Treaty relating to CSDP and to give serious consideration to implementation arrangements for Article 44 TEU on entrusting the implementation of a CSDP task to a group of Member States to make the CSDP more flexible and efficient in the field, while maintaining a strong collective European dimension; stresses the importance of continuing to carry out exercises; highlights the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance in the short run and to clarify the coherence between this and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering that not all EU Member States are NATO members; stresses that the conditions for activating Article 42(7) and the arrangements for providing the assistance required have never been clearly defined; underlines that a Treaty modification could define terrorist attacks, hybrid attacks, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion by third countries as elements that would trigger Article 42(7) TEU; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Strengthening capabilities by increased, joint and smarter spending

| 30. | Welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities; stresses the need to make full and better use of EU initiatives and budgets, notably the envisaged regulations on EDIRPA and EDIP, EDF, PESCO, CARD and Military Mobility as well as the Civilian CSDP Compact, in order to close critical capability gaps and ensure swift deployability of armed forces, replenish depleted stocks, reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector, achieve full interoperability of our forces, reinforce the EDTIB’s supply chains by excluding state-affiliated enterprises from non-partner states that may pose a risk to the EDTIB’s resilience, innovative character and competitiveness via potential export controls or intellectual property theft via espionage; urges maximum consistency between these initiatives to prevent overlaps and guarantee efficient public investments, in particular between PESCO and EDF projects, for which the linkages need to be clarified; welcomes the action plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries and calls for its implementation to be stepped up; encourages technology transfers from the defence sector to the civilian sector; calls on the Member States to focus, in the process of strengthening the EU’s military abilities, on the needs of military personnel and specialised training to deal with emerging issues (e.g. climate change); underlines that any progress in this key field would also strengthen the European pillar within NATO; is of the view that the valuable contribution of the armed forces during the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the importance of the use of Member States’ military assets and capabilities in support of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Welcomes Member States’ announcements concerning defence investment plans aimed at military procurement and improvement of their defence forces; building on the EDF model and as highlighted in the Joint Communication on defence investment gaps; considers it crucial to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, in particular replacing Soviet-era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, including a discussion on the feasibility of a European-wide anti-ballistic missile shield and calls for liaison with NATO’s European Sky Shield Initiative, operationalising the ‘Eurodrone’, expanding existing main battle tank and armoured vehicle capabilities, strengthening Europe’s ship-building capacity and naval forces, intensifying maritime cooperation to counter hybrid threats against offshore cables and pipelines that are vital to Europe’s energy and connectivity security, improving satellite-based secure connectivity, investing in industry partnerships that prioritise collaboration with SMEs and stronger investment in research and development (R&D) while contributing to a stronger European cyber-defence ecosystem and expanding the EU’s military mobility programme; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Underlines the need to complement the capability development initiatives with joint procurement mechanisms; stresses that joint procurement of defence products developed and manufactured in Europe is an essential tool for efficient public spending and therefore urges the Member States to utilise the EDIRPA to jointly procure defence products and avoid competition, facilitate cost savings, strengthen the EDTIB and promote interoperability; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Urges the Member States to commit to a significant increase in funding for the envisaged joint EU procurement mechanisms, such as the EDIRPA and the EDIP, by providing adequate funding and to take swift and thorough action in this crucial field while ensuring interoperability with NATO; considers that the rules applicable to the EDIRPA should be similar to those adopted for the European Defence Fund; recalls that the financial support provided for by the EDIRPA and the future EDIP should benefit European industry as a matter of priority; calls on the Member States to adopt it as soon as possible following the completion of negotiations between Parliament, the Council and the Commission; calls on the Council to provide it with the necessary financial support; considers that the rules applicable to the EDIRPA should be similar to those adopted for the European Defence Fund, which have proved their worth, particularly as regards the involvement of third countries; calls on the Member States to work on procuring and developing defence capabilities designed and produced within the EU; considers that the VAT exemption alone will not be sufficient to make the future EDIP decisive in supporting the EDTIB; calls on the Commission to consider various financial incentive mechanisms to support the EDTIB; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to establish another off-budget financial facility which would pool parts of national defence budgets and urgently address the entire life-cycle of military capabilities at EU level to ensure they are effectively and efficiently implemented from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Underlines the urgent need to establish a truly European defence equipment market; underlines the need for increased financial support for EU research and development efforts and production in high-tech defence systems that would otherwise be too expensive for individual Member States so as to ensure that the EDTIB remains competitive, is able to meet armed forces’ real needs, demands and increasing ambitions, adapts to emerging threats, and reduces reliance on foreign parties; points out that in addition to capability development, the EDF should also contribute to a consolidation of the EDTIB; calls for the evaluation of the EDF before the mid-term review of the MFF, with a view to strengthening its budget if necessary; encourages the establishment of further initiatives to increase the involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises and innovation in the defence and military industry; calls for the further development of new technologies such as AI and quantum computing through strong links between military and civilian innovation; stresses the importance of reducing dependence on critical technologies and value chains in order for the EU to move towards better operational capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Highlights the positive effects of investments in the defence industry in economic and technological terms; calls for more and smarter defence investments in order to foster industrial cooperation, cost savings and increased interoperability; reaffirms that acting within the EU framework is a way to reduce fragmentation and avoid duplications; calls for synergies with other EU financial instruments to be leveraged and access to private funding for the defence industry to be facilitated; recalls that the EDF and PESCO are crucial to the development of a genuine European Defence Union by enhancing defence cooperation between Member States; calls for other EU policies to be consistent with the EU’s efforts to strengthen the defence industry; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Calls for a swift revision of the MFF in order to provide the necessary funds for EU instruments in the area of defence; calls, in this context, for the strengthening of the EDF; encourages the EU to assess when a revision of the MFF would be appropriate; stresses that any additional resources allocated to meet the NATO target of spending 2 % of GDP on defence should be used in a coordinated and cooperative manner by EU NATO members; calls for the strengthening of the industries’ access to private funding to ensure that the European defence industry has sufficient access to public and private finance and investment on a sustainable basis; calls on the Commission to consider developing parameters for a financial product that aims to support investments in European security including actions by the defence industry; calls for incentivising investments in critical sectors, such as cyber; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Reinforcing CSDP missions and operations

| 37. | Supports the review and reinforcement of all civilian CSDP missions and military operations to align them more closely with the real needs of the countries concerned; supports improving force generation and capacity building for all CSDP missions and operations, particularly those affected by the deteriorating threat landscape, by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, as well as the necessary resources, staffing, funding, training, strategic communication tools and equipment to meet the requirements of more targeted mission objectives; recognises the need for effective training and operational capabilities to keep pace with the evolving threat environment; stresses the need to strengthen their resilience and effectiveness by enabling them to better address hybrid security challenges, such as through better coordination with other EU actors and Justice and Home Affairs Agencies, as well as like-minded partners outside the EU, enhancing strategic communication and further investing in cyber-defence capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Considers it important that CSDP missions and operations are based on a clear understanding of the types of crisis and conflict the EU seeks to respond to with civilian and military instruments, especially where others are not willing or able to intervene or in hostile or non-permissive environments; recalls that all EU engagements must be credible in the eyes of local and regional authorities, especially since other, often more malign, parties are more than willing to step in to fill any gaps; recalls that missions must pay special attention to conflict dynamics, robust risk assessment and mitigation processes, and must include more impact-based monitoring and evaluation of CSDP interventions as well as more consultation and feedback mechanisms; stresses the particular need for military operations to have sunset provisions so as to allow a sustainable exit; notes that out of the eight current military operations, only three have an executive mandate; recalls the EU’s overall engagement in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa through six civilian missions and six military operations; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Calls for the adoption of a new Civilian CSDP Compact by mid-2023 that will provide objectives on the type, number and size of civilian missions and calls for a civilian capability development process to be set up by 2024, as stipulated by the Strategic Compass; recalls that it is crucial that the Civilian CSDP Compact 2.0 be adopted during the first half of 2023 to ensure continuity in the process of the development of civilian capacities; invites the EEAS to re-visit the participation agreements with third countries with the aim of strengthening their participation in CSDP missions; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the urgent need to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations, in particular with regard to the use of the future Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC); demands that its Full Operational Capability should be reached immediately, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which envisaged a 2020 deadline; also demands that the MPCC’s staffing level should be increased considerably up to 250 personnel; believes that one of the existing four national Operational Headquarters should be designed as fall-back option; reiterates its call to enable the secure exchange of classified information, including with Member States and CSDP missions or operations; stresses the need for the MPCC to plan and conduct all military missions with a clear chain of command and to be provided with the necessary personnel, funds and infrastructure; points out that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine renders progress in that regard more urgent; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats and attacks stemming in particular from Russia and China but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions and operations directly; stresses the need for the EU to increase cooperation with like-minded partner countries and to provide support, training and capacity building with them to counter hostile foreign information manipulation and interference; calls on the EEAS to take concrete steps to support CSDP missions and operations fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda as well as to strengthen the capacities of the StratCom division including its task forces; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Is concerned by the persistent structural problem of ensuring that CSDP missions and operations are fully staffed; urges the Member States to follow through on their decisions to launch missions and operations by providing the necessary personnel; recalls that the Strategic Compass underlines that CSDP missions and operations require better trained personnel; strongly urges all Member States to fulfil their pledges so as to match their actual engagement to their ambitions; urges the EU to provide personnel engaged in missions and operations with adequate equipment and training; strongly urges the Member States to take into account the social and working rights of military personnel when they are trained and deployed together in an EU framework; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls, given its importance for the EU’s security and defence architecture, for the operationalisation of the VP/HR’s proposal for the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) enshrined in the Strategic Compass to be implemented as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest, so as to ensure the ability to respond rapidly and decisively during crises, and to serve and protect the EU’s citizens, interests and values across the world; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers by 2025, in particular those linked to the RDC; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Underlines the need for gender equality and women’s rights to be a core component of security and defence measures; strongly condemns war crimes committed against civilian populations, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to expedite the implementation of the gender-related commitments of the Strategic Compass to ensure effective gender mainstreaming; emphasises the importance of cybersecurity measures to monitor and prevent trafficking of women affected by conflict; encourages the Member States to reduce career barriers for women within their defence forces; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Highlights that women’s participation in CSDP missions and operations contributes to their effectiveness and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of equal rights for men and women worldwide, while recalling the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024), which requires systematic integration of a gender perspective in all EU policies and external actions including the CSDP; urges the EEAS to promote an increase in the number of women in CSDP military operations in particular and a better gender balance in the personnel and leadership of CSDP missions and operations; considers a zero-tolerance approach to sexual and gender-based harassment and sexual exploitation within all CSDP missions and operations to be paramount; emphasises the important work of gender advisers in CSDP missions and operations and the need to finance them; calls for collaboration between CSDP missions and operations and the European Institute for Gender Equality; calls on the EEAS to report on its progress in gender-related actions to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE); |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Recognises the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security; calls on the EEAS to commit to more systematically integrating young people into its youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda, and pursuing and adopting a comprehensive strategic framework for the implementation of the YPS agenda; calls on the EEAS to involve young people as partners in the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Welcomes the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine); expects it to allow for the training of the Ukrainian armed forces in a flexible way through strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine; considers that EUMAM will be effective provided that the MPCC is reinforced, and will be able to exercise strategic command and control over the mission; calls on the EEAS to open this mission to the participation of third states; calls on the Member States to provide the necessary support for its implementation; stresses the importance of communicating to the Ukrainian people that the EU will remain by their side throughout the period of Russian aggression; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Commends and underlines the importance of the work of the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes its new tasks, which include providing support to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes; calls for the review and strengthening of the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality; calls for the strengthening of the staffing, response capability, resources and strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Georgia and the reinforcement of the EU’s diplomatic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Welcomes the cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, including through the EUFOR Althea and the Kosovo Force operations; recalls that the lessons learned from both operations add substantial value to all current and future military and civilian CSDP missions and operations; calls for the strengthening of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in close cooperation with NATO and other allies, in order to guarantee the necessary stability for the country and the whole region; welcomes the EU’s unequivocal support for the extension of EUFOR Althea’s mandate; underlines the need to bilaterally enhance military-security cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in parallel with the EUFOR framework; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Stresses the need for continued close cooperation with African and international partners in a bid to ensure a collective effort to achieve stabilisation and development, involving in particular the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the UN and international financial institutions, as well as other key bilateral and regional players; underlines the EU’s global commitment in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa through eight civilian (EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Somalia) as well as military (EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, EUMPM Niger) missions; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Expresses deep concern about developments in the Sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; highlights the strategic importance of that region to the EU; condemns the increasing presence of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group in the Sahel and other parts of the African continent; firmly believes that the latter’s involvement in West Africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace, security and stability to the region; acknowledges that the various international missions in the Sahel have not yet achieved their primary goal of lasting peace in the Sahel region and that a reflection process on the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of Islamist terrorist groups, in particular Al-Qaeda, Daesh and Al-Shabaab in the Middle East and Africa; calls for more joint action and policy coherence between different EU and partner interventions in the Sahel; deplores the deteriorating security environment in Mali and welcomes the decision to suspend all operational training and delivery of military equipment to the country; calls on the EU and its Member States to provide effective assistance tailored to the needs of the countries concerned; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Believes that any international security support in the region must prioritise improving the protection of civilians, alleviating conflict dynamics, and promoting good governance of the security sector; emphasises the need for more political engagement with the relevant governments to ensure greater transparency, to combat corruption, cultivate inclusivity and engage with citizens in an effort to curb the explosion of armed and ethnic conflicts; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Welcomes the renewal of the CSDP EUCAP Sahel for two years and insists on the importance of coordinating with EUBAM Libya for the EU-led development of the border capacities of the Sahel states; calls for joint efforts between the EU and the UN to address the destabilisation and violence in Mali and to work with local forces to promote stability and security; takes note of the extension and refocusing of the EUAM and EUTM in the CAR and remains very concerned about the continuing deterioration of the political and security situation there; welcomes the progress already made by the EUTM Mozambique and calls on the EEAS to consider delivering lethal weapons under the EPF to Mozambican forces and to speed up the delivery of equipment; calls for a broad public debate about the EU’s involvement in Mozambique and for public discussion of what a meaningful integrated approach that addresses the root causes of unrest in Cabo Delgado could look like; recalls reports about systematic and violent attacks by security forces against large swathes of the local population, forceful displacements by security forces, high levels of inequality, regional neglect by the central government, conflicts over natural resources, high levels of corruption and the violations of various rights; supports the reform of the Mozambican armed forces and insists on the need to pursue an integrated approach to the crisis in Cabo Delgado; welcomes EPF assistance for the Nigerien armed forces and underlines the need to provide CSDP military support to Niger; calls on the Council to step up coordinated maritime operations in the Gulf of Guinea; calls for the extension of EU NAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate, which is set to expire at the end of 2022, in order to further combat piracy; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Regrets the increasing inadequacy of the EUTM missions that were intended to meet the security challenges of the Sahel and Central African countries (Mali and the CAR); calls for a thorough review of the objectives and guiding principles of EUTMs; considers that EUTM mandates should be extended to accompanying measures in particular, in order to enable EU advisers on the ground to verify as accurately as possible the extent to which training programmes have been properly implemented and are in line with the operational needs of the local armed forces; underlines the added value of advisory missions to the mission’s command structures and accordingly encourages the participation of Member States in EUTMs, particularly in an advisory capacity where incoming officers would make it possible to provide significant support to the conduct of operations, as well as multilateral military assistance; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Welcomes the Council decision establishing the military partnership mission to support Niger (EUMPM Niger), aimed at enhancing the ability of the Niger Armed Forces to contain the threats to the country, protect the population in the country and ensure a safe and secure environment, in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Stresses, with regard to the maritime component of IRINI, the international obligations regarding search and rescue of people in distress at sea; calls on Member States to ensure that IRINI acts in full compliance with maritime law, in particular obligations related to search and rescue; reiterates its grave concern at the fate of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Libya, whose already dramatic situation continues to deteriorate; calls on the Libyan authorities and militias to close detention facilities for migrants; deplores the fact that the withdrawal of ships from any given area with a significant presence of migrants is envisaged; demands clarification of the envisaged decision-making process and modalities on any future decision related to the so-called ‘pull factor effect’, for which there is currently no scientific evidence; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Reiterates its call on the EU to take full advantage of its position and reputation in the Indo-Pacific as a credible and autonomous global actor for peace amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the region; recalls that the added value of EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures, including well-developed non-military contributions; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Expresses grave concern over China’s rapid military build-up in the South China Sea as well as its continued military pressure, assault exercises, airspace violations and other grey-zone military actions including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan; urges China to halt all these actions, which pose a threat to the stability of the entire region and have, overall, a direct impact on European security and prosperity; reiterates its support for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Strongly welcomes the robust references to EU cooperation in both Japan’s recent update of its National Security Strategy and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy; reiterates the strong partnership with both Japan and South Korea and calls on the EU to further deepen its military and defence cooperation with both key partners; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Vehemently condemns the numerous missile tests conducted by North Korea in 2022 and underlines the need for the international community to increase efforts to contain North Korea and prevent it from conducting a further nuclear test in 2023, which would be a serious escalation and a threat to regional and global security; underlines the particular responsibility of China and Russia when it comes to North Korea and calls on them to use their influence to prevent any further escalation; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Expresses its serious concern about the delivery of weapons by North Korea to the Wagner Group and underlines that this further highlights the need for the EU and its Member States to not only increase their focus on the Korean peninsula but on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Strongly condemns Iran for supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its illegal war against Ukraine, and recalls that in doing so it is violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231(2015); welcomes Council’s decision of 12 December 2022 to adopt further sanctions against Iran both for the ongoing violations of the human rights of its own people as well as for Iran’s active support to Russia, which is being used against the Ukrainian people; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component to its CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners in addressing security challenges related to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; calls on the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation; calls on the EU to develop a broad strategy to counteract such threats; recalls that EUAM Iraq is the only CSDP mission that has a cultural heritage protection component; expects EUAM Iraq to completely fulfil all dimensions of its mandate, including the protection of cultural heritage and the fight against artefact trafficking; calls for such provisions to be generalised to all CSDP mission or operation mandates; |
| --- | --- |

64.

Systematisation of security and defence partnerships

| 65. | Calls for the strengthening, when strategically relevant, of security and defence partnerships with like-minded partners worldwide to meet the EU’s level of ambition as a security provider; considers it essential to include security and defence issues more systematically in the EU’s political dialogues with like-minded partners; welcomes plans to convene the first ever EU Security and Defence Partnership Forum; calls for a more assertive, unified, and consistent position vis-à-vis non-democratic states that threaten European security and the international order; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Underlines the fundamental shared democratic values at the heart of the EU and NATO; calls for the deepening of EU-NATO relations on the basis of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity, mutual openness and transparency, in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members; welcomes the third EU-NATO Joint Declaration and underlines the importance of further steps aimed at deepening this partnership, building on the contents of the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept and on concrete steps to further enhance cooperation, especially in the fields of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure and resilience as well as increased joint exercises; underlines the need to strongly upgrade the strategic partnership with NATO to base it on the strengthening of political unity and solidarity and enhanced political dialogue on all aspects of common challenges and strategically relevant issues, including challenges related to climate change and rapid digitalisation; encourages coordinated operational responses in conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms to counter common emerging threats in geographical zones and areas of common interest; points out that EU capability development also strengthens the European pillar within NATO and contributes accordingly to transatlantic security; notes with concern the deep and persistent periods of tension between EU Member States and Türkiye, a NATO ally, which are hampering cooperation between the EU and NATO; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | While recognising the importance and potential of a strategic partnership with Türkiye, regrets Türkiye’s overall destabilising role in many areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods, which threatens regional peace, security and stability; is extremely concerned by, and strongly condemns, Türkiye’s illegal activities and threats of military action against EU Member States, in particular Greece and Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean; deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues its unilateral provocative actions and non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolution on the arms embargo on Libya with regard to operation IRINI, violating international law including UNCLOS and the sovereign rights of EU Member States in the area; reiterates the EU’s condemnation of the signature of the two memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are against international law; reiterates the EU’s readiness to use all instruments and options at its disposal, including those under Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States, as well as to uphold regional stability; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions, and calls upon Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU interests and missions in these areas; reiterates its call on Türkiye to align with the EU sanctions against Russia; calls on Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP in relation to Türkiye, including the strict application of criterion 4 on regional stability; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Strongly supports NATO’s Open Door Policy; stresses the importance of the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO as it would advance the security both of the EU and of NATO Allies; welcomes the swift ratification by most NATO Allies of the Finnish and Swedish NATO accession protocols and deplores the fact that Türkiye has still not ratified the applications of Sweden and Finland to join NATO; emphasises the need to address the security and defence concerns of Member States which are not part of NATO; invites the EU and NATO to reinforce cooperation on supporting the capacity-building of our partners; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Considers synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass essential, particularly in the areas of countering aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and countering Russia’s accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, addressing the challenges posed by China’s coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber-defence, hybrid threats and support for partners; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Emphasises the importance of developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities to boost the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in line with the principle of the single set of forces; calls on the EU and NATO to maintain global technological leadership in military capabilities; stresses the need to ensure coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; underlines the need for the EU to develop its own defence capabilities and strategic autonomy in order to also enhance its capacity to be a stronger partner to its allies; calls on the EU NATO Member States to increase their military budgets to at least 2 % of GDP in line with NATO guidelines; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Welcomes the participation of the US, Canada and Norway in the PESCO project on Military Mobility, which is essential for the defence of Europe and important to increase coherence between the respective efforts of the EU and NATO to facilitate the movement of military forces; recalls nevertheless that third country participation in individual PESCO projects must be decided on a case-by-case basis, when such participation is in the EU’s strategic interest; welcomes the United Kingdom’s recent application to join the PESCO project on Military Mobility; reminds participating Member States to PESCO of the need for swift implementation of their operational and collaborative commitments; welcomes the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility; welcomes the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 as presented by the Commission and the VP/HR on 10 November 2022 and calls for its swift implementation in synergy with the PESCO project on Military Mobility; calls for the strengthening of the Connecting Europe Facility regarding military mobility projects; calls on Member States to act to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permission to enable the EU Member States to act faster and increase the efficiency of response; stresses that the new Military Mobility Action Plan must ensure that requirements in the areas of infrastructure, resilience and logistics are assessed from a military strategy perspective; underlines the need for additional funding for this flagship EU-NATO cooperation initiative; calls on the EU to consider inviting Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to participate in PESCO projects such as military mobility; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Highlights the importance of the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law; values the United States’ and its current administration’s commitment and engagement to the territorial defence of Europe, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that threatens the whole continent; takes note of the fact that the United States is also being challenged in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s increasing military posturing stresses that EU Member States need to step up their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in order to pave the way for burden shifting in the long run, with the EU taking more responsibility for its defence; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Welcomes the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important milestone in closer transatlantic cooperation; encourages the VP/HR to devote particular attention to security in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods in this dialogue, to include in the discussion areas such as mutual security and defence initiatives, CSDP missions and operations, disarmament and non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, improving information exchange among intelligence services, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber-defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Reiterates its call for institutionalised security and defence cooperation with the United Kingdom; encourages the United Kingdom to seriously engage with the EU on pressing strategic challenges by ensuring complementarity and synergies of actions; encourages the VP/HR to invite the United Kingdom, on an ad hoc basis, to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern while fully protecting the EU’s decision-making autonomy; points out that the parallel projects for developing future combat air systems are an inefficient use of resources and therefore recommends that both projects should be merged; welcomes the UK’s support for Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Expresses strong concern about the increased instability of our neighbourhood, which often is the result of deliberate actions by malign actors who, through various actions, are weakening democratic reforms in order to ultimately weaken the EU; underlines that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of our immediate neighbours in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood as well as in the Western Balkans; calls for deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, including by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; calls for increased cooperation in the security and defence field with partners in the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean, having become an actor with the ability to guarantee the stability of the region, including in relation to energy security; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, human trafficking and the illicit trade in weapons; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Calls for the strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation on the Alliance’s eastern flank and for an increase in European military personnel in the Black Sea; believes it essential to recognise and capitalise on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine and to increase investment in European military projects in the region, including when it comes to modernising and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Expresses deep concern about the increasing tensions and recurrent outbreaks of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, where Armenia has been attacked within its internationally recognised borders and where Russia has not played a stabilising role; urges the VP/HR to fully engage in efforts to uphold the ceasefire; welcomes the launch of the civilian EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and the deployment of a transitional planning assistance team to enhance the EU’s awareness of the security situation, and to contribute to the planning and preparation of a possible civilian CSDP mission in the country; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Stresses that Russia is still not fully complying with the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia of 12 August 2008; strongly condemns Russia’s illegal military presence in, and occupation of, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report of violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, an agreement for which the EU bears special responsibility as the mediator, identify and communicate clearly the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations, which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations, notably to withdraw its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow the establishment of an international security mechanism in these territories, and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, pursuant to its mandate; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Underlines the importance of close alignment with CFSP positions by EU candidate and potential candidate countries; with regard to the Western Balkans, brings attention to Serbia’s relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia’s unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans; calls for stronger military security, including civilian/military as well as police/military security, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; calls, in this regard, on the EEAS to strengthen the role of the EU delegations and CSDP missions in third countries in order to reinforce their ability to detect and debunk disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign state actors; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Calls for closer relations and cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to achieve common goals and interests in the fields of security and defence; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Enhancing Parliament’s scrutiny of the CSDP

| 81. | Stresses the need to involve Parliament more actively in CSDP and defence industrial policy decision-making, in particular with regard to the implementation of the Strategic Compass, the EDF, EDIRPA, EDIP, the EPF and the various policies and initiatives which affect, or are of particular importance for, European defence and security; encourages proposals for further action by Parliament, and in particular its Subcommittee on Security and Defence, to improve its impact on the CSDP, and to ensure the effectiveness, consistency, democratic accountability and adequate parliamentary scrutiny of EU security and defence policy and initiatives by:






  — | including the Subcommittee on Security and Defence as co-deciding committee in accordance with rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in all legislative files with substantial and relevant implications for security and defence, |
| --- | --- | --- |

81.

—

including the Subcommittee on Security and Defence as co-deciding committee in accordance with rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in all legislative files with substantial and relevant implications for security and defence,

| — | using the mid-term review of the EDF and the upcoming negotiations on EDIRPA to implement adequate and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny rights via delegated acts for work programmes for the main defence industrial programmes, |
| --- | --- |

—

using the mid-term review of the EDF and the upcoming negotiations on EDIRPA to implement adequate and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny rights via delegated acts for work programmes for the main defence industrial programmes,

| — | creating a fully-fledged Defence Council, |
| --- | --- |

—

creating a fully-fledged Defence Council,

| — | setting up a full Committee on Security and Defence, |
| --- | --- |

—

setting up a full Committee on Security and Defence,

| — | strengthening cooperation across Parliamentary committees where security and defence matters are discussed, |
| --- | --- |

—

strengthening cooperation across Parliamentary committees where security and defence matters are discussed,

| — | clarifying Parliament’s right to and access to information under Article 36 TEU, |
| --- | --- |

—

clarifying Parliament’s right to and access to information under Article 36 TEU,

| — | reinforcing inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation with national parliaments on European security and defence, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, with the aim of reinforcing accountability and scrutiny of security and defence policy; |
| --- | --- |

—

reinforcing inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation with national parliaments on European security and defence, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, with the aim of reinforcing accountability and scrutiny of security and defence policy;

| 82. | Calls for further strengthening of Parliament’s relations with the NATO PA, in the framework of which Parliament should support the establishment of the NATO Centre for Democratic Resilience aimed at monitoring and identifying challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and partner states; |
| --- | --- |

82.

o

o o

| 83. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU agencies in security and defence, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

83.

---

(1)  OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 149.

(2)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57.

(4)  OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

(5)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 106.

(6)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 109.

(7)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 112.

(8)  OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 93.

(9)  OJ L 117, 19.4.2022, p. 38.

(10)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 85.

(11)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 93.

(12)  OJ L 319, 13.12.2022, p. 86.

(13)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 93.

(14)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 19.

(15)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 86.

(16)  OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 22.

(17)  OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 16.

(18)  OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 71.

(19)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 47.

(20)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 54.

(21)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 105.

(22)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 102.

(23)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 148.

(24)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 167.

(25)  OJ C 125, 18.3.2022, p. 2.

(26)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.

(27)  OJ C 434, 15.11.2022, p. 59.

(28)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 136.

(29)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 70.

(30)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0439.

(31)  Report on the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

(32)  OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99.

(33)  OJ L 239, 17.9.2019, p. 16.

---

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/77

---

P9_TA(2023)0011

Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2022

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2022 (2022/2049(INI))

(2023/C 214/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’),

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

| — | having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, in particular principles 2, 3, 11 and 17 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, in particular principles 2, 3, 11 and 17 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and UN Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and UN Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

| — | having regard to the UN International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December 1979,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

| — | having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by UN General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by UN General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus on 9 December 1998, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus on 9 December 1998,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 13 December 2006, which entered into force in the EU on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 13 December 2006, which entered into force in the EU on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1),

| — | having regard to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 2006, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 2006,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on 13 September 2007, and to International Labour Organization Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on 13 September 2007, and to International Labour Organization Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989,

| — | having regard to the UN Arms Trade Treaty, in particular Article 7 on Export and Export Assessment thereof, and to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Arms Trade Treaty, in particular Article 7 on Export and Export Assessment thereof, and to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,

| — | having regard to the Beijing Declaration of 15 September 1995, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Beijing Declaration of 15 September 1995,

| — | having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration of 19 December 2018 and the Global Compact on Refugees of 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration of 19 December 2018 and the Global Compact on Refugees of 2018,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the assessment by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 31 August 2022 on human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the assessment by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 31 August 2022 on human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,

| — | having regard to the statement by the Chair of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine at the 51st session of the Human Rights Council on 23 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the Chair of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine at the 51st session of the Human Rights Council on 23 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development of 1994, and to the outcomes of its review conferences, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development of 1994, and to the outcomes of its review conferences,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (CETS No 164), adopted on 4 April 1997, and the protocols thereto, on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No 197), adopted on 16 May 2005, and on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201), adopted on 25 October 2007, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (CETS No 164), adopted on 4 April 1997, and the protocols thereto, on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No 197), adopted on 16 May 2005, and on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201), adopted on 25 October 2007,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) of 11 May 2011, which not all Member States have ratified, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) of 11 May 2011, which not all Member States have ratified,

| — | having regard to Council of Europe Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council of Europe Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

| — | having regard to the resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions on Ukraine of 30 and 31 May 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions on Ukraine of 30 and 31 May 2022,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (3),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 July 2021 on EU priorities at the UN during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, September 2021-September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 July 2021 on EU priorities at the UN during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, September 2021-September 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on EU priorities in UN human rights forums in 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on EU priorities in UN human rights forums in 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 July 2022 on EU priorities at the UN during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, September 2022-September 2023, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 July 2022 on EU priorities at the UN during the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, September 2022-September 2023,

| — | having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 March 2020 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024’ (JOIN(2020)0005), and to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2020 thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 March 2020 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024’ (JOIN(2020)0005), and to the Council conclusions of 18 November 2020 thereon,

| — | having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘EU Action Plan (GAP) III — An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action’ (JOIN(2020)0017), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘EU Action Plan (GAP) III — An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action’ (JOIN(2020)0017),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 on the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 on the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

| — | having regard on the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, as adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard on the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, as adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (4), as updated in 2009, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (4), as updated in 2009,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom and religion or belief, as adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom and religion or belief, as adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, as adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, as adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

| — | having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, as adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, as adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

| — | having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, as adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

| — | having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, as adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, as adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

| — | having regard to the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

| — | having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, as approved by the Council on 22 February 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, as approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

| — | having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service’s European Implementation Assessment of 24 August 2022 on EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service’s European Implementation Assessment of 24 August 2022 on EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2022)0071), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2022)0071),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

| — | having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled’2021 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled’2021 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World’,

| — | having regard to the European Ombudsman strategic initiative of 7 July 2021 on how the Commission ensures respect for human rights in the context of international trade agreements, |
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—

having regard to the European Ombudsman strategic initiative of 7 July 2021 on how the Commission ensures respect for human rights in the context of international trade agreements,

| — | having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2021 was awarded to Alexey Navalny, a leading Russian politician, lawyer and anti-corruption activist detained in Russia since January 2021, |
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—

having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2021 was awarded to Alexey Navalny, a leading Russian politician, lawyer and anti-corruption activist detained in Russia since January 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2018 on violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the world, including land grabbing (5), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2018 on violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the world, including land grabbing (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU (6), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (7), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (8), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (9), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on the effects of climate change on human rights and the role of environmental defenders on this matter (10), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on the effects of climate change on human rights and the role of environmental defenders on this matter (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) (11), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act) (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU (12), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU (12),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning corruption and human rights (13), |
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—

having regard to its recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning corruption and human rights (13),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2021 (14), and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports, |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2021 (14), and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the EU’s protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine (15), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the EU’s protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine (15),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion (16), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion (16),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 toward an EU strategy to promote education for children in the world: mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (17), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 toward an EU strategy to promote education for children in the world: mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (17),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the war against Ukraine on women (18), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 5 May 2022 on the impact of the war against Ukraine on women (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (19), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (19),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang police files (20), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang police files (20),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on a new trade instrument to ban products made by forced labour (21), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on a new trade instrument to ban products made by forced labour (21),

| — | having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 entitled ‘Global threats to abortion rights: the possible overturning of abortion rights in the US by the Supreme Court’ (22) and of 7 July 2022 on the US Supreme Court decision to overturn abortion rights in the United States and the need to safeguard abortion rights and women’s health in the EU (23), |
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—

having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 entitled ‘Global threats to abortion rights: the possible overturning of abortion rights in the US by the Supreme Court’ (22) and of 7 July 2022 on the US Supreme Court decision to overturn abortion rights in the United States and the need to safeguard abortion rights and women’s health in the EU (23),

| — | having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 144 of its Rules of Procedure since 2019, in particular those adopted in 2021 and 2022, |
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—

having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 144 of its Rules of Procedure since 2019, in particular those adopted in 2021 and 2022,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, |
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—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0298/2022), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0298/2022),

| A. | whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas the Union's action on the international scene should be guided by the principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement and that it seeks to advance in the wider world, as enshrined in Article 21 TEU; |
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A.

whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Article 2 TEU; whereas the Union's action on the international scene should be guided by the principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement and that it seeks to advance in the wider world, as enshrined in Article 21 TEU;

| B. | whereas an effective protection and defence of human rights, as well as human dignity, must be at the core of all of the EU’s external policies including development, trade, security and defence, migration, neighbourhood and enlargement; |
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B.

whereas an effective protection and defence of human rights, as well as human dignity, must be at the core of all of the EU’s external policies including development, trade, security and defence, migration, neighbourhood and enlargement;

| C. | whereas consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies is an indispensable part of a credible and effective EU human rights policy; |
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C.

whereas consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies is an indispensable part of a credible and effective EU human rights policy;

| D. | whereas the Union strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order that is predicated on the observance of international law and democratic processes, and the set of universal values, principles and norms, including those laid out in the UN Charter, that guide the UN member states and their mutual relations; |
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D.

whereas the Union strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order that is predicated on the observance of international law and democratic processes, and the set of universal values, principles and norms, including those laid out in the UN Charter, that guide the UN member states and their mutual relations;

| E. | whereas gender equality is a core value of the EU; whereas the right to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter and should be fully respected; whereas the right to the integrity of the person is paramount under Article 3 of the Charter; whereas gender mainstreaming and an intersectional approach should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all EU activities and policies; |
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E.

whereas gender equality is a core value of the EU; whereas the right to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter and should be fully respected; whereas the right to the integrity of the person is paramount under Article 3 of the Charter; whereas gender mainstreaming and an intersectional approach should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all EU activities and policies;

| F. | whereas the rise in authoritarianism, illiberalism, populism and violations of human rights around the world threatens the global rules-based order and the values and principles on which the Union is founded; whereas according to the 2021 Democracy Index, less than half of the world's population (45,7 %) now live in a democracy ‘of some sort’ and more than 37 % live under authoritarian rule; |
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F.

whereas the rise in authoritarianism, illiberalism, populism and violations of human rights around the world threatens the global rules-based order and the values and principles on which the Union is founded; whereas according to the 2021 Democracy Index, less than half of the world's population (45,7 %) now live in a democracy ‘of some sort’ and more than 37 % live under authoritarian rule;

| G. | whereas terrorism continues to be one of the biggest threats to international peace and security and is a clear breach of human rights and fundamental freedoms; |
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G.

whereas terrorism continues to be one of the biggest threats to international peace and security and is a clear breach of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

| H. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic led to human rights setbacks around the world, as a consequence of the instruments and policies put in place under the guise of slowing the spread of the virus, and in many cases those instruments and policies have been linked to the loss of state democratic principles in a number of states; |
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H.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic led to human rights setbacks around the world, as a consequence of the instruments and policies put in place under the guise of slowing the spread of the virus, and in many cases those instruments and policies have been linked to the loss of state democratic principles in a number of states;

| I. | whereas environmental emergencies, including those resulting from climate change and deforestation, give rise to human rights violations and affect not only the people in their immediate vicinity, but also humanity as a whole; whereas in recent years there has been an increase in murders, assaults and other forms of violence against people who defend human rights, the environment and people’s access to their land and natural resources; whereas climate change and environmental degradation are two urgent and interlinked challenges underpinning both sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights globally; |
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I.

whereas environmental emergencies, including those resulting from climate change and deforestation, give rise to human rights violations and affect not only the people in their immediate vicinity, but also humanity as a whole; whereas in recent years there has been an increase in murders, assaults and other forms of violence against people who defend human rights, the environment and people’s access to their land and natural resources; whereas climate change and environmental degradation are two urgent and interlinked challenges underpinning both sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights globally;

| J. | whereas the energy crisis, coupled with the production crisis facing Europe, may increase poverty and vulnerability in Europe, with a potentially detrimental impact on human rights; |
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J.

whereas the energy crisis, coupled with the production crisis facing Europe, may increase poverty and vulnerability in Europe, with a potentially detrimental impact on human rights;

| K. | whereas violations of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the right to believe or not to believe, to espouse theistic, agnostic or atheistic views, to change or leave one’s religion and to express one’s own faith publicly, give rise to situations of oppression, conflict and war around the world; |
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K.

whereas violations of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the right to believe or not to believe, to espouse theistic, agnostic or atheistic views, to change or leave one’s religion and to express one’s own faith publicly, give rise to situations of oppression, conflict and war around the world;

General trends and global challenges to democracy and human rights

| 1. | Reaffirms the universality and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; stresses, in this regard, its strong commitment to addressing the challenges facing human rights within the EU and worldwide and reiterates the duty of the EU and its Member States to strive to be a global leader in the promotion and protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy in line with the founding values of the Union; |
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1.

| 2. | Insists that the protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the dignity of every human being must be the cornerstone of the Union’s external policy; strongly encourages the Union, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make the protection of human rights a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field; |
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2.

| 3. | Recalls that the 2020-2024 EU action plan on human rights and democracy should be used as a roadmap of the EU’s priorities concerning human rights and should therefore be at the centre of all EU external policies; stresses the importance of the Member States taking ownership of the EU action plan and publicly reporting on their actions under it; encourages national and regional parliaments, national human rights institutions and civil society organisations to engage with authorities at Member-State level on their contributions to the carrying out of the EU's external human rights policy; calls for Parliament to be involved in the Council’s future review and update of any of the EU’s Human Rights Guidelines and for more transparency in their implementation to be ensured; |
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3.

| 4. | Expresses deep concerns at the grave threats to human rights and democracy worldwide, noting that the number of democracies has continued to decline, while the number of authoritarian regimes has grown and nearly 75 % of the world’s population have experienced a deterioration in the situation of human rights in their country in the past year; underlines with concern the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in an increasing number of places around the world, as well as widespread impunity for these violations; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Deplores the fact that despite the need to concentrate on responses to the threats posed by climate change and the recovery from the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic through global solidarity, some authoritarian leaders have, in addition to mismanaging the pandemic and global resources, intensified their repression of political opposition, dissent, human rights defenders, civil society organisations, including community-led and belief- and faith-based organisations, and independent media, as well as fuelling and expanding existing internal and international conflicts and sparking new ones with devastating effects on human rights; deplores the several instances in which authoritarian leaders misused the effects of the pandemic to justify tightening their repressive policies; |
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5.

| 6. | Emphasises the importance of the EU and its Member States consistently acting together, notably in multilateral forums, to address global challenges to human rights and democracy, and of maintaining consistency within its internal and external policies; is of the opinion that maintaining the unanimity rule for certain EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions on human rights offenders, stands in the way of necessary decisive action owing to changing geopolitical circumstances, and should therefore be reconsidered; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Urges the EU and its Member States to intensify their efforts all over the world to support democracy and human rights; calls for the EU and its Member States, in this regard, both individually and in cooperation with like-minded international partners, to thwart unacceptable attempts to weaken democratic institutions and universal human rights and diminish the space for and role of civil society; reaffirms the value of multilateralism as an instrument to achieve this goal; stresses the importance of placing democracy and human rights concerns at the heart of the EU’s diplomatic relations with all counterparts, in particular with countries considered to be strategic partners; stresses, in addition, the importance of placing human rights matters at the heart of EU parliamentary activity, including by upgrading the Subcommittee on Human Rights to a stand-alone committee; notes the launch on 26 August 2022 of a pilot project to establish a European diplomatic academy; |
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7.

| 8. | Reiterates that the ambitious commitment and rhetoric of the EU's foreign human rights policy requires it to lead by example in order to avoid undermining its credibility when opposing the global democratic decline; calls for the EU institutions and bodies, including the European External Action Service (EEAS), to ensure that the EU’s and Member States’ human rights obligations are consistently implemented in the EU’s common foreign and security policy; encourages them, in this regard, to make use of all diplomatic tools, both privately and publicly, and both bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to raise human rights issues with partner countries; reiterates its call for the EU to take particular care to assess and prevent any violations linked to its own policies, projects and funding, including by the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in third countries and to create a complaints mechanism for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by EU activities in these countries; |
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8.

War of aggression against Ukraine

| 9. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus’s involvement enabling Russia to launch deadly attacks against Ukraine from its territory; expresses, in this regard, its deep grief at the human suffering and condemns the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed by the Russian armed forces and their proxies in Ukraine; |
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9.

| 10. | Welcomes the joint efforts of the EU, its Member States and civil society in response to the war; welcomes, moreover, the solidarity shown by a great number of countries towards Ukraine, as highlighted by their stance during the sessions and votes of the UN General Assembly on the illegal war in Ukraine; reiterates the need to increase EU diplomatic efforts towards the states that abstained from or voted against the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 March 2022 on aggression against Ukraine and the following resolutions on the matter in order to explain the seriousness of Russia’s aggression and the need for a unanimous response from the international community against this flagrant violation of international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to give the Ukrainian people the support they need to defend their freedom, democracy, human rights and international law; welcomes the unprecedented sanctions imposed in the context of the war and calls for them to be implemented in a coordinated manner; calls, additionally, for the EU and its Member States to support efforts and reinforce independent Russian civil society organisations with a view to helping to lay the foundations of a future democracy in Russia; |
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10.

| 11. | Strongly condemns and is deeply concerned by the atrocities, war crimes and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence, gender-based violence and the torture and killing of civilians and prisoners of war, committed by Russian armed forces and their proxies in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; urges all necessary measures to be taken to make sure that those who committed war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine are identified and held accountable as soon as possible and to provide effective remedies for the damages suffered by Ukrainian civilians; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to offer their full support to the relevant stakeholders, measures and mechanisms in this field, including Ukrainian prosecutors, investigators and the judiciary, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Commission of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council and national investigations under the principle of universal jurisdiction; welcomes in this regard the fact that the EU has provided support to the ICC’s investigation capabilities to help it scale up its investigations into war crimes in Ukraine; stresses the importance of swiftly gathering and preserving evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity and welcomes the efforts of civil society to this end; calls on the Commission to provide all the necessary assistance in this process, including funding from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI — Global Europe), and urges the Member States to engage in this process themselves whenever they are in a position to do so; welcomes the amended mandate of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine and the Commission’s proposal to extend the mandate of Eurojust to support the fight against impunity in all situations; calls for an informed decision to be made about the most appropriate solutions to hold to account the individuals and entities responsible for enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the war crimes committed on Ukrainian territory, which should include activating the prosecution of crimes of aggression in a specially created international court or under ICC jurisdiction; |
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11.

| 12. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to use all of the instruments at their disposal to support the fight to free Ukraine from its occupiers and to bring aid to people fleeing Ukraine and seeking support in the EU Member States; notes that 8,8 million Ukrainians have entered the EU since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, out of which 4 million are registered under temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe; welcomes all the expressions of solidarity and assistance shown to the Ukrainian people by EU citizens, including their involvement in humanitarian aid, and welcomes the triggering of the Temporary Protection Directive (24) in order to provide for immediate protection and rights for displaced Ukrainians arriving in the EU; underlines the importance of enhanced funding for the host countries, including a greater focus on access to education, economic opportunities, housing, healthcare and integration into the host societies; underlines the need to support, among others, those victims of sexual, gender-based and reproductive violence; |
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12.

| 13. | Denounces the forced relocation and deportation of Ukrainian children, including from healthcare institutions, to the Russian Federation and the Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine and their forced adoption by Russian families; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide support to locate these children and reunite them with their families or legal guardians; |
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13.

| 14. | Underlines that the illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has had a tremendous impact on global food security, given that Ukraine is the fifth largest grain exporter in the world; |
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14.

| 15. | Expresses deep concern regarding the safety of nuclear installations in Ukraine, which are in constant danger of military shelling; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to establish safety zones around these nuclear installations; |
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15.

Enhancing EU policies, instruments and diplomacy to protect and advance human rights and democracy in the world

NDICI — Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

| 16. | Calls for the EU to reflect on how to promote and best apply a human rights–based approach in all EU instruments and strategies in order to strengthen the EU’s human rights foreign policy and to adapt to and shape the evolving geopolitical situation; underlines that NDICI — Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, is one of the main tools at the EU’s disposal to improve the human rights situation around the world and help foster resilient, inclusive and democratic societies, while counteracting the influence of authoritarian regimes; stresses that the engagement of local civil society actors is vital to protect human rights and democracy in their countries and reiterates its call to fully engage them in all of the EU’s relevant external activities; welcomes in this regard the invaluable assistance currently being provided to civil society organisations and activists worldwide under the thematic human rights and democracy programme of NDICI — Global Europe and under the European Endowment for Democracy; highlights the importance that NDICI — Global Europe attaches to the promotion of human rights and democracy with strategic international and local partners, inter alia, through EU election observation missions; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to improve the sharing of all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to fulfil its role as enshrined in the treaties, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to engage in a dialogue with Parliament to ensure improvement in this regard; |
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16.

| 17. | Highlights the importance of long-term planning and continuing support for projects and initiatives under NDICI — Global Europe, particularly when it concerns regions affected by conflicts, war and natural disasters; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to integrate democracy support as a cross-cutting priority into all thematic and geographic NDICI — Global Europe programmes; |
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17.

| 18. | Reiterates its call for greater transparency regarding human rights-related provisions in financing agreements under the NDICI — Global Europe and for clarification on the mechanism and criteria for the suspension of such agreements in the event of a breach of human rights, democratic principles or the rule of law, as well as in grave cases of corruption; calls on the Commission to refrain from using budget support to third countries’ governments as an operational modality for cooperation with countries witnessing widespread violations of human rights and repression of human rights defenders; |
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18.

EU Special Representative for Human Rights

| 19. | Fully supports the work of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights in defending and advancing human rights in the world through engagement with third countries and cooperation with like-minded partners, and his important role in enhancing the effectiveness of the EU’s human rights policies through efforts to increase their coherence; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs on countries and regions in order to further improve this consistency, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; stresses the importance of the EUSR for Human Rights continuing to cooperate with international organisations, including the UN and its Special Rapporteurs appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, and with representatives of or envoys from other countries responsible for human rights; calls for the EUSR to publically engage more on individual human rights defenders and to closely cooperate with EU and country-based civil society organisations and human rights defenders; underlines the importance of EUSRs on country and regional situations engaging with national authorities on the protection of human rights and individual cases; encourages the EUSR for Human Rights to pursue diplomatic efforts to enhance the EU’s support for international humanitarian law and international justice; |
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19.

| 20. | Reiterates that the appointment of the EUSR for Human Rights should be subject to a prior hearing in Parliament; recommends setting up a framework whereby the EUSR for Human Rights is accountable to Parliament for achieving the goals set out in the EUSR’s working programme at the beginning of their mandate and must give a report on a regular basis on the progress towards those goals; stresses that, although Parliament maintains cooperation with the EEAS, enhanced by Council Decision 2010/427/EU (25) and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’s 2010 declaration on political accountability, it is necessary to further strengthen the framework for interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the EEAS, including its delegations, on human rights issues; emphasises that the EEAS needs to involve Parliament in the development of guidance notes for the implementation of EU human rights instruments, such as the EU Human Rights Guidelines and EU mechanisms on due diligence and the fight against corruption, among others, in third countries; |
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20.

| 21. | Highlights the importance of addressing the challenges that arise in coordinating between the EU institutions as regards the management of EU external relations in relation to human rights; welcomes the increased coordination among the EU delegations and the EEAS headquarters and the Directorate-General for International Partnerships in relation to urgent individual cases pertaining to human rights defenders; |
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21.

EU Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU

| 22. | Notes with regret that the post of the EU Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU has remained vacant for more than a year; reiterates its call for the Council and the Commission to carry out a prompt, transparent and comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and added value of the mandate of the Special Envoy, including in terms of its institutional position, in order to provide the Special Envoy with adequate human and financial resources, and to adequately support the Special Envoy’s institutional mandate, capacity and duties; welcomes the appointment on 7 December 2022 of Frans van Daele as Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU; recalls that the Special Envoy’s duties should focus on promoting and protecting freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, and the rights to non-belief, apostasy and the espousal of atheistic views; emphasises that the Special Envoy should also pay particular attention to forced conversion, misuse of blasphemy laws and the situation of non-believers at risk; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Recommends that the Special Envoy work closely and in a complementary manner with EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Group on Human Rights; calls, in addition, for the Special Envoy to have regular consultations with Parliament and to cooperate with Member States’ commissioners, envoys and ambassadors responsible for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief in order to coordinate actions; |
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23.

EU human rights dialogues and other bilateral contacts with third countries

| 24. | Underlines that human rights dialogues with third countries represent an opportunity to focus on human rights challenges and calls for them to be carried out in a result-oriented manner, regularly reviewed and harnessed to their full potential; reiterates its call for human rights dialogues to be based from the outset on a clear set of benchmarks that will enable the effectiveness of the dialogues to be monitored; calls for the EEAS to systematically carry out and communicate on evaluations of the outcomes of the dialogues and to follow up on them accordingly; stresses that in order to be effective, the dialogues must not be used as a stand-alone tool, but should instead be integrated within the EU’s comprehensive set of activities, including those relating to EU trade policy, with the third countries concerned, which would streamline the human rights dimension and reinforce the messages conveyed in the dialogues; draws attention to the importance of raising individual cases, in particular those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions and the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk, in the context of human rights dialogues and of ensuring adequate follow-up and reporting to Parliament on action taken on these cases; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Emphasises the importance of a systematic, genuine, accessible and inclusive consultation with all civil society organisations and stakeholders throughout the entire human rights dialogue process; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the resumption of human rights dialogues with third countries stemming from a more favourable context for engagement; is of the opinion that, where no tangible progress is reported following a series of human rights dialogues, as has occurred in a number of instances, the EU should adjust its aims, including as regards the wider conduct of bilateral relations; |
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26.

EU Delegations

| 27. | Considers it of utmost importance to take every possible action to raise awareness on the EU’s Human Rights Guidelines in EU delegations and urges all delegations to ensure the proper implementation of these Guidelines; reiterates, in this regard, its call for the EU delegations and their human rights ‘focal points’ in third countries to do more involved work by providing regular support to human rights defenders, including Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk, and by thoroughly addressing topics and individual cases raised in Parliament’s resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; calls for the officials in the EU delegations to raise cases of oppression and persecution of human rights defenders, democratic opposition and civil society activists to state authorities, and if the affected individuals are in detention, to monitor their situations, visit them in prison, attend their trial procedures and raise their cases in the human rights dialogues that the EU conducts with the countries concerned; |
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27.

| 28. | Draws attention to the instances in which EU Member States' missions and EU delegations have taken different approaches on human rights protection and promotion in third countries, although EU Member States share a common commitment on this matter; underlines that EU Member States’ embassies, like EU delegations, should play an increasing role in promoting and protecting human rights, as well as supporting civil society in third countries; calls for EU delegations to establish human rights working groups bringing together the relevant services of Member States’ embassies and EU delegations, and to cooperate closely with representatives from international and regional civil society organisations in third countries concerned; |
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28.

EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR — EU Magnitsky Act)

| 29. | Welcomes the fact that the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime has been increasingly used as an essential tool that strengthens the EU’s role as a global human rights actor through the use of targeted sanctions by the Council; calls for the restrictive measures that have already been adopted to be implemented effectively, in full and in a coordinated manner, and for the adoption of additional measures if necessary; calls for the EU to make more dynamic use of this tool as an integral component of its foreign human rights policy; calls for the rigorous, consistent and uniform application of restrictive measures and their monitoring in all Member States, as a condition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; calls for the EU to work with like-minded partners to encourage more countries to adopt sanction regimes and to coordinate the adoption of targeted restrictive measures jointly in order to maximise their effectiveness at a global level; welcomes the President of the Commission’s commitment in her 2022 State of the Union Address to present measures to update the EU legislative framework for fighting corruption and to include corruption in the EU GHRSR, which is in line with Parliament’s position, in order to effectively target the economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers; reiterates its call for the introduction of qualified majority voting for the Council’s decisions and the implementation of sanctions under the EU GHRSR; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to strive to incorporate Parliament’s recommendations for future targeted sanctions, as stipulated in its resolutions and elsewhere; |
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29.

| 30. | Welcomes the listings made in 2021 under the EU GHRSR; calls on the Council, the Member States and the EEAS to develop a strategy to improve the interplay between the EU GHRSR and geographical sanction regimes, in particular through making better use of the EU GHRSR to tackle violations that cannot directly be linked to a state, for example in cases in which mercenaries commit human rights violations in territories outside of government control or in cross-border cases, such as human trafficking; |
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30.

| 31. | Expresses deep concern about and condemns some countries’ deliberate policies of arresting, arbitrarily detaining and prosecuting foreigners, including EU citizens, on trumped-up charges for propaganda purposes, to use prisoners as an instrument of international negotiation and exchange or as a means of exerting political pressure; stresses that putting such a policy into action constitutes an act of hostage-taking within the meaning of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to take measures to prevent such acts and to warn EU citizens, especially dual nationals, about the risk of being arrested when visiting certain countries; calls on the Council to consider applying restrictive measures under the EU GHRSR to persons or entities responsible for the arbitrary arrest or detention of EU citizens as ‘state hostages’; |
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31.

Corruption and human rights

| 32. | Stresses that corruption seriously weakens democratic governance, hinders the enjoyment of human rights worldwide, facilitates and perpetuates violations of human rights and the rule of law and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups in society; calls for the fight against corruption to be a part of all of the EU’s efforts and policies to promote human rights and democracy, by formulating a dedicated global anti-corruption strategy, including programmes under the EU’s external financial instruments and enhancing Parliament’s role of scrutiny; underlines the utmost importance of the EU and its Member States leading by example by fighting corruption linked to EU-based actors, by applying the highest transparency standards to their external funding and by stepping up their support for civil society organisations, activists and investigative journalists engaged in the fight against corruption; |
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32.

| 33. | Calls for the EU to work towards proposing the creation of a set of anti-corruption standards that would be uniformly applicable worldwide, to promote the establishment of effective anti-corruption bodies and the adoption of robust regulatory frameworks and to address secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens; encourages the promotion of cooperation among the EU, its Member States, third countries and international organisations, particularly at judicial, law-enforcement and intelligence levels, with a view to exchanging best practices and effective tools in action to tackle and prevent corruption; calls for the creation of an international anti-corruption court under the supervision of the UN to be worked towards; |
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33.

Human rights clauses in international agreements

| 34. | Reiterates its call to include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and third countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to actively reflect on how to ensure that the human rights clauses in existing international agreements are monitored and effectively enforced; stresses that the EU should react swiftly and decisively to persistent breaches of human rights clauses by third countries, including by suspending the relevant agreements if other options prove ineffective; highlights that the review of the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), the ongoing legislative process for a new regulation on the GSP and the review of GSP beneficiary countries’ implementations of international conventions related to human rights, including labour rights, offer an opportunity to strengthen the commitment to upholding respect for human rights in third countries concerned; |
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34.

| 35. | Calls on the Commission, when negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with third countries, to require them to ratify the main international conventions relating to human rights, labour rights and the environment, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; stresses that ratification of these conventions by third countries should ideally occur before concluding FTA negotiations, so that compliance with these conventions is elevated to an essential aspect of FTAs and that dedicated clauses are agreed upon; further calls for the substantive clauses of the FTAs to recognise that States Parties must respect and protect human rights as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, customary law and the international conventions to which they are party; |
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35.

| 36. | Stresses the importance and calls for the substantial enhancement of the quality of ex-ante and ex-post sustainability impacts assessments (SIAs); stresses that the objective of SIAs should be to ensure that the agreement being negotiated, in its detailed, worded clauses, provides sufficient tools to avoid negative impacts on human rights; recommends that civil society organisations be part of the steering of SIAs, that assessments be conducted by human and labour rights experts and that input from civil society organisations be taken into account; |
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36.

Democracy support activities

| 37. | Highlights that 2022 marks the 10th anniversary of Parliament’s decision to exert political leadership in committing to a major advancement in its democracy support activities, which it has implemented through a comprehensive democracy support approach since 2014; welcomes, in particular, its support for capacity-building for partner parliaments, mediation and fostering a culture of dialogue, and compromise, including among young political leaders, as well as for empowering women parliamentarians, human rights defenders and representatives from civil society organisations and the free media; calls on the Commission to continue to pursue and step up its activities in these areas and to bolster funding and assistance for EU bodies and agencies, as well as other grant-based organisations, while respecting the principle of non-discrimination; underlines that in the current context of heightened global tensions and repression in an increasing number of countries, direct support for civil society organisations, human rights defenders and people who express critical and dissenting opinions is of the utmost importance; |
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37.

| 38. | Stresses the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to consider updating the election observation methodology to reflect the developments of the last two decades; urges third countries to put into practice the recommendations made by the EU's election observation missions with a view to improving the organisation of and environment for future electoral processes and thus boosting their transparency and legality so as to improve the democratic standards of the states concerned; stresses the importance of stepping up EU support to local electoral observers, notably in terms of protection; reiterates its call for the EU to closely collaborate with domestic and international organisations, such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the other organisations that have endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation; |
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38.

Multilateralism and EU work at a multilateral level

| 39. | Reaffirms that the effective protection of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance the efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, both politically and financially, including all UN human rights bodies, notably the treaty bodies and special procedures; calls on the UN Secretary-General, to this end, to provide appropriate resources from the UN budget and urges the Member States to increase their voluntary contributions; underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to strive to speak with one voice both at the UN and in other multilateral forums, and to promote the highest standards on human rights in this way; recalls the obligations of all UN member states to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the Founding Charter of the United Nations and UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251; deplores the fact that two permanent members of the UN Security Council are responsible for gross human rights violations amounting to war crimes and even genocide; calls on the UN member states to refrain from taking backwards steps that weaken the protection of human rights; stresses the responsibility of the UN Human Rights Council to address all the grave violations of human rights around the world; deplores the fact that a number of members of the UN Human Rights Council have displayed blatant disregard for their human rights obligations, have proven track records of grave human rights violations and have failed to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms; calls in this regard for a fundamental reform of the criteria for members of the UN Human Rights Council; calls on the EEAS to initiate and spearhead an effort towards a coordinated position of the EU and the Member States on UN Human Rights Council membership, which would promote greater transparency in the election process, notably by making EU Member States’ votes public and providing the rationale for that vote, foster a genuinely competitive process by ensuring that the three regional blocks of which the EU Member States are members present more candidates than seats, and provide accountability for candidates by scrutinising their voluntary pledges and track records of cooperating with the UN Human Rights Council, UN treaty bodies and special procedures; |
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39.

| 40. | Strongly condemns all attacks against UN special procedure mandate holders and against the independence of their mandates; calls on the Member States and the EU’s democratic partners to decisively counter these attempts and to enact all possible measures to help provide safe and open spaces for individuals and civil society organisations to interact with the UN, its representatives and its mechanisms; highlights the work of UN commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions, which are increasingly being used to respond to situations involving serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and to combat impunity; |
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40.

| 41. | Calls for the EU and the Member States to support the strengthening of regional human rights systems, including through financial assistance and cross-regional experience sharing; highlights, in particular, the critical role of monitoring bodies and judicial mechanisms established under these regional systems and their complementarity with the UN human rights system; |
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41.

| 42. | Calls for the EU and the Member States to lead efforts in multilateral forums to promote the adoption of a universally recognised definition of terrorism, bearing in mind the objective of combating this scourge; calls for them further to lead efforts, in the context of the Eighth UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review in 2023, to insert strong language recognising the negative impact that the misuse of counter-terrorism laws and policies has had on civic space and urging all states to take the necessary steps to reform or repeal their counter-terrorist legislation to ensure it does not negatively impact civil society and human rights defenders; calls for the EU and the Member States to lead efforts within UN forums to establish a constructive dialogue with civil society organisations and human rights defenders, and to ensure they are meaningfully involved at all stages of the development and implementation of counter-terrorist policies; |
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42.

| 43. | Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian regimes, including through challenging the universality of human rights, relativising them, claiming them to be an instrument of cultural hegemony deployed by Western countries, eroding international human rights law by reinterpreting it, and undermining the functioning of UN bodies and mechanisms to hold states accountable for human rights violations; stresses that the EU must uphold the defence of the universality of human rights as a main priority, and to this end, lead a pact and work in alliance with other democracies and like-minded partners to strengthen multilateral organisations and to defend the rules-based global order against rising authoritarian powers; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of UN bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the EU Member States and like-minded partners to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend; |
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43.

| 44. | Underlines the need to carry out an impartial, fair and transparent review of the applications for consultative status on the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) by non-governmental organisations (NGOs); calls for steps to be taken to establish an own seat for the Union in every multilateral forum, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the already existing, permanent seat of one of the Member States on the Security Council, which would strengthen the EU’s ability to act, as well as its consistency and credibility in the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to participate in the general debate of the UN General Assembly and urge the ECOSOC members to continue to address the unjustified obstacles that NGOs face to obtain their ECOSOC accreditation, in particular those whose applications have been pending for a very long time; |
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44.

Upholding international humanitarian law

| 45. | Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the ongoing conflicts around the world; underlines the utmost importance for humanitarian aid agencies and charitable organisations to be able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all vulnerable populations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations and humanitarian, medical, media and educational workers; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations in order to allow civilians at risk to escape the conflict, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; |
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45.

| 46. | Recalls that international humanitarian law should guide EU policies in relation to situations of occupation or annexation of territory and underlines the importance of ensuring their consistency regarding those situations; highlights the responsibility of EU-based companies to apply the most stringent due diligence policies towards any economic or financial activities in or with the territories concerned, and to ensure strict compliance with international law and EU sanctions policy when applicable; |
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46.

Combating impunity and strengthening international criminal justice

| 47. | Stresses the link between human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries affected by conflicts; strongly welcomes the continuous contribution of the ICC to the fight against impunity; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide the ICC with sufficient support to enable it to carry out its work; reiterates its condemnation of continuous efforts to undermine the legitimacy and work of the ICC; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue their efforts to counter them and respond to threats and sanctions against human rights defenders and witnesses cooperating with the ICC; stresses the vital role of the ICC in carrying out investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue cooperating with the ICC on combating and preventing such crimes; welcomes the continued support of the EU and its Member States for the ICC and calls on the EU Member States to match this commitment to the sustainable funding needed to deliver justice in all situations that come before the ICC; |
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47.

| 48. | Calls for the EU to support the Prosecutor of the ICC in investigating and prosecuting suspected perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and, possibly, genocide by providing political support, gathering and making available any evidence in its possession, including open-source intelligence, information and data, satellite imagery and intercepted communications, and providing adequate human and financial resources to the general budget of the ICC in order to fully protect its independence and impartiality; |
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48.

| 49. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to encourage partner countries to ratify the Treaty of Rome and thus expand the ICC’s jurisdiction; calls for the EU to act in line with Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP on the International Criminal Court (26), while maintaining a strong position on the crime of aggression as called for by Parliament's resolution of 17 July 2014 on the crime of aggression (27); |
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49.

| 50. | Reiterates its call on the Commission to develop a comprehensive EU action plan on fighting impunity, which should include, among others, chapters on the important role of civil society organisations in the struggle against impunity and their protection in all situations that require it, and on measures to fight impunity for gender-based sexual violence, including violations of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in conflict settings; calls for the EU and its international partners to make full use of all relevant instruments to fight impunity, including support for universal jurisdiction at national level, special tribunals at a national and international level including for the crime of aggression, as well as establishing flexible cooperation and funding mechanisms to swiftly collect and analyse evidence of crimes; calls on the Commission to ensure that these instruments are applied in a coordinated and complementary manner with other relevant EU and Member State instruments; calls on the Commission to develop a programme to build the capacity of both Member States and third countries to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction in their domestic legal systems; |
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50.

Making progress towards the universal abolition of the death penalty and the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment

| 51. | Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and is irreversible; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; calls for the EU and its Member States to defend abolition in all international forums and advocate for the widest possible support for this position; encourages the continuing efforts of the UN bodies on the universal abolition of the death penalty, in line with the resolutions of the UN General Assembly; condemns in strong terms the enforcement of blasphemy laws that carry the possibility of the death penalty if convicted across the globe; reiterates that the freedom to choose one’s religion, including whether to believe or not to believe at all, remains a fundamental human right that cannot be punished by death or any degrading treatment; calls on all countries that have not yet done so to abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium as a first step towards its abolition; calls, additionally, on the countries concerned to reduce the list of crimes or offences punishable by death; calls for transparency around death sentences and executions in countries that do not disclose these statistics; |
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51.

| 52. | Condemns any incidents of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and unlawful killings and deplores the fact that they continue to be common in many countries; notes with great concern the trend of increasing instances of torture worldwide and widespread impunity for its perpetrators; recognises the important role that civil society organisations and human rights defenders play in the fight against torture and other forms of ill-treatment; |
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52.

Responding to global human rights and democracy challenges

Response to and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic

| 53. | Is deeply concerned about the long-term negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on both the general state of democracy and human rights worldwide; highlights the disproportionate adverse impact on groups in the most vulnerable situations, including women, children, persons with disabilities, persons living with certain chronic diseases, the elderly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons, impoverished people, persons belonging to ethnic, belief and religious minorities, refugees and migrants, and persons in prison or detention; is further concerned about delays and barriers in access to health services and the consequent increase in unintended pregnancies, sexual and gender-based violence, unsafe abortions, and maternal and neonatal deaths; notes with regret the use of COVID-19 prevention measures as a pretext to deny visits from family members or lawyers to detention facilities and to violate the rights of detainees; praises the role that human rights defenders and journalists have played, sometimes even risking their lives, in reporting or attempting to prevent human rights violations during the pandemic; |
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53.

| 54. | Reiterates that enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and universal access to healthcare are among the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the defence of these rights, especially in countries and regions where health services are scarcest and urges countries to make progress in facilitating access to health services; asserts that the EU should continue to fund the development and global supply of COVID-19 vaccines, provide education about the benefits of vaccination and increase the availability, accessibility and affordability of vaccination in order to avoid vaccine-preventable diseases; |
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54.

| 55. | Reiterates that personal liberty, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief and freedom of expression are cornerstones of democracy; is deeply concerned by the growing use of mass surveillance technologies, in particular by authoritarian regimes, to curtail these freedoms, which increased further under the guise of COVID-19 prevention measures; calls for a strict and effective ban on sales of mass surveillance technologies; calls for a greater response to the mass infiltration of disinformation and conspiracy theories within the digital sphere, perpetuated largely but not exclusively by authoritarian regimes, as well as non-state actors; |
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55.

Women’s rights, women’s empowerment and gender equality

| 56. | Condemns the fact that no country in the world has achieved gender equality yet; underlines the persistence of widespread gender-based violence and intersecting discrimination in every region of the world; underlines that women and girls continue to be the main victims in violent crises and that sexual, gender-based and reproductive violence has continued in many places around the world, and is notably used in armed conflicts as a weapon of war; stresses that women human rights defenders, activists, journalists and lawyers have been particularly targeted, and that they face rapidly increasing online harassment and intimidation and ongoing threats and attacks; |
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56.

| 57. | Highlights with deep concern the increase in gender-based and domestic violence and deplores setbacks to SRHR in both developing and developed countries; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to fully support the right of women to bodily integrity, dignity and autonomous decision-making and to effectively fight gender-based and domestic violence; draws attention to the fact that, despite the efforts of the EU, women are still a minority in leadership positions, they earn less than men for the same responsibilities and positions and their abilities and skills are underestimated or undermined because of their gender; |
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57.

| 58. | Calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure full enjoyment of human rights by women, girls and vulnerable groups, and to ensure equal opportunities for all; calls for the worldwide eradication of laws and practices preventing women from exercising their rights, notably the rights to education, work and participation in political and public decision-making; deplores situations in which women and female-headed households, particularly in humanitarian crisis areas, are denied access to humanitarian aid and essential services because national and local authorities insist that these services be provided by female workers, while at the same time limiting women's access to employment; calls on states that have not yet done so to ratify and implement the Istanbul Convention; |
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58.

| 59. | Condemns in strong terms any use of early and forced marriage, house arrest, rape and other degrading treatment against women; calls on the Commission and the EUSR for Human Rights to address the issue of early and forced marriage; |
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59.

| 60. | Reminds states of their obligation to guarantee access to comprehensive SRHR services, including modern contraceptive methods, safe and legal abortion, maternal, prenatal and postnatal healthcare, assisted reproduction and access to education and information on SRHR, including comprehensive sexuality education, without any form of discrimination; calls for legal rights and protections to be further strengthened and for the removal of barriers to access SRHR globally; reiterates its call to include the right to safe and legal abortion in the Charter; welcomes the publication of the updated World Health Organization guidelines providing key recommendations to health systems for providing abortion care; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully support and promote SRHR, including access to abortion, in multilateral and bilateral relations in accordance with international human rights law and standards; |
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60.

| 61. | Calls for more concerted efforts to eliminate the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and to fight impunity for the perpetrators of such violence; calls on the Commission to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation worldwide; calls for a stronger EU commitment to and support for protecting the rights of women in third countries throughout its efforts in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction operations, transitional justice and the promotion of human rights and democratic reforms, with a particular focus on the rights of women who suffer hostility, discrimination or stigmatisation, who are pregnant or have newly born children, or who are unemployed or in poverty; |
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61.

| 62. | Reiterates the need for robust action to ensure full implementation of GAP III; calls for the EU, as set out in GAP III, to strongly address intersectionality by developing a policy to fight the multiple forms of discrimination faced by the millions of women and girls who are victims of caste-based, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights violations, including sexual abuse and violence, displacement, forced and/or bonded labour, prostitution and trafficking; |
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62.

| 63. | Reiterates its condemnation of the commercial practice of surrogacy, a global phenomenon that exposes women worldwide to exploitation and human trafficking, while targeting financially and socially vulnerable women in particular; highlights its severe impact on women, women’s rights, women’s health and gender equality, and underlines its cross-border implications; calls for a European legal framework to address the negative consequences of commercial surrogacy; |
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63.

| 64. | Condemns legislation, policies and practices that enable child selection on the grounds of sex, race, disability or any other ground; |
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64.

Rights of the child

| 65. | Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights throughout the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to protect children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations and welcomes the Council conclusions on this subject; expresses concern that the growing number of such crisis situations around the world, coupled with the long-lasting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, has led to increasing violations of child rights around the world, including violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, forced separation of children from their parents and vice versa in the cases of modern slavery, child labour, child forced labour, recruitment as child soldiers, a lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; stresses the disproportionate and long-term effects of food insecurity on children, which directly affects not only their health and development but also their education, as well as increasing the outrageous practice of child marriage; highlights the still large number of children around the world forced to work under usually hazardous conditions in hard-to-reach places such as mine shafts, in the extraction of raw materials, including rare minerals, in industry and in agriculture; stresses that 2021 was the International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour and recalls the EU’s zero tolerance policy on this practice; calls on the remaining countries which that not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to do so as a matter of urgency; |
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65.

| 66. | Deplores the continuous targeting of children as a tool of war; reiterates that because of their vulnerability, minors are often the first to suffer violence in war-ridden territories, especially with regard to ethnic reprisals by warring tribes, groups and ethnicities; condemns the forced recruitment of underage children in areas of war, as well as their instrumentalisation and the targeting of sexual violence towards them; stresses the need to create paths for reintegration and reparations for children that have had their rights violated and that the UN agenda on children and armed conflict must be mainstreamed into all of the EU’s external actions; calls on the Member States concerned to ensure the protection of children who are nationals of these Member States and who are imprisoned or detained in third countries; calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to combat impunity for war crimes against children, to strengthen its cooperation with child-focused humanitarian organisations and NGOs and to safeguard the rights of children when cooperating and partnering with third countries; |
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66.

| 67. | Stresses that the right to education has suffered particular setbacks, with unparalleled disruptions to education due to COVID-19 but also to religious extremism and gender discrimination against girls; expresses concern regarding the expulsion of pregnant teenagers from schools; recalls that every child has the right to comprehensive sexuality education that is non-discriminatory, evidence-based, scientifically accurate and age-appropriate and that tackles harmful gender norms; calls for the EU to step up its work to provide access to education, including innovative ways to circumvent the obstacles imposed by national authorities; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to step up their support for third countries to help them adapt to the challenges they have faced during the COVID-19 pandemic in the field of education; stresses that support could take the form of an increased funding allocation through NDICI — Global Europe, but could also include providing capacity-building and best practices based on the lessons learned through the EU delegations worldwide; highlights that the changing international environment may require a financial solution enabling a multi-donor response to cover the growing funding gap to achieve UN Sustainable Development Goal 4, which aims to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; |
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67.

| 68. | Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to maintain robust funding for education through all EU external financing instruments, in line with the 10 % benchmark on education in the NDICI — Global Europe; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to also support the governments of third countries in building and further developing stronger gender-responsive and inclusive education systems; recalls that women’s access to education has been established as a fundamental right by the UN; believes that increasing girls’ access to education and supporting women’s participation in education and careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics as a matter of priority should be a central policy target for the EU; insists, in this regard, on the need for girls to be able to complete their education and have access to age-appropriate information and services, free from discrimination and gender bias and with equal opportunities to fulfil their potential; stresses the urgent need to address gender-related barriers to education, such as laws, policies and harmful socio-cultural norms that prevent girls from continuing education in the event of pregnancy, marriage or motherhood; encourages tackling gender stereotypes and harmful socio-cultural norms through education, and preventing violence through gender-sensitive education; |
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68.

Rights of elderly people

| 69. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people; underlines the challenges to the full enjoyment of all human rights by the elderly, including age-based discrimination, poverty, violence, a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services as well as barriers to employment; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider providing active support to that work; |
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69.

Rights of persons with disabilities

| 70. | Welcomes the adoption of the 2021-2030 EU strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities and their rights worldwide, particularly poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment and participation in political life; calls for a systematic internal and external implementation of this strategy; underlines that the duty of caring for persons with disabilities is commonly borne by their families, in particular by women, and calls for the EU to assist third countries in the development of policies in support of carers for persons with disabilities; |
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70.

| 71. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase their efforts to promote equal rights for persons with disabilities through EU external action; underlines the need for a structured dialogue with organisations of persons with disabilities, in partner countries to ensure their meaningful participation and successful involvement in planning, implementation and monitoring of EU external financing instruments; emphasises the need to urge candidate and potential candidate countries to implement reforms to improve the situation of persons with disabilities and calls on the Commission to assist them in developing a structured process for consulting persons with disabilities and their representative organisations; calls for EU delegations to be provided with investment, training, and capacity-building in order to implement the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on humanitarian action and international cooperation; |
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71.

Intolerance, xenophobia and discrimination

| 72. | Underlines its opposition to and condemnation of intolerance, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, which in many of the world’s regions leads to killings and persecution, especially in conflict situations; stresses that racism, discrimination, xenophobia, religious persecution and related intolerance continue to be a major problem worldwide, leading to rights violations in all spheres of life, including access to education, healthcare, work and access to justice, and that these issues have been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against antisemitism and welcomes the adoption of the EU strategy to this end; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and EU delegations to develop, in collaboration with the Member States and with input from Parliament, specific local strategies to help fight caste-based discrimination in the countries most affected by it, in dialogue with local representatives and civil society organisations, and to invite them to consultations resulting from EU agreements or instruments, including human rights dialogues; |
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72.

| 73. | Recommends that Parliament address caste-based discrimination in all its relevant committees (the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Development and International Trade and the Subcommittee on Human Rights) and delegations, appoint a focal point person on caste-based discrimination and, when visiting countries affected by the issue, consult with Dalit organisations, raise caste-based discrimination with Parliament's counterparts and with the authorities and hold a hearing to review EU actions and progress as part of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; |
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73.

National, ethnic and linguistic minorities

| 74. | Deplores that many countries, despite their commitments to protect minorities, are pursuing policies of forced assimilation of national, ethnic and linguistic minorities by disregarding their rights; emphasises that minorities should not become a target or instrument of any military tension or conflict; recalls the obligations of states based on international treaties and agreements to protect the rights of these minorities within their respective territories; calls on the governments of the EU’s partner countries to respect the rights of national, ethnic and linguistic minorities, including their cultures, languages, religions, traditions and histories in order to preserve diversity and linguistic and cultural identity; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide active support for these partner countries to this end; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including within the human rights and democracy thematic programmes of NDICI — Global Europe; |
| --- | --- |

74.

LGBTIQ rights

| 75. | Strongly condemns the human rights violations, including discrimination, stigmatisation, arbitrary detention, torture, persecution and killings, that LGBTIQ persons around the world continue to face; believes that practices and acts of violence against individuals on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics should not go unpunished and must be eradicated; stresses that LGBTIQ persons and their defenders around the world continue to face human rights violations, including discrimination, stigmatisation, persecution, violence and killings; calls for the EU to step up its efforts to ensure that LGBTIQ persons can fully enjoy their human rights both internally and externally, and to play a leading role in defending their protection in its external policies; calls for the full implementation of the 2020-2025 LGBTIQ equality strategy as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ people around the world; calls for the EU institutions to lead by example by proactively defending the rights of LGBTIQ persons across the globe and by thoroughly and consistently applying the EU guidelines throughout EU foreign policy to promote and protect LGBTIQ persons’ enjoyment of all human rights; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Freedom of expression, media freedom and the right to information

| 76. | Underlines the utmost importance of freedom of expression — both online and offline — and access to reliable information for democracy and flourishing civic space; expresses deep concern about the growing limitations on and violations of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of association and assembly imposed by state and non-state actors in many countries around the world, particularly for journalists, through censorship or the need for self-censorship and the abuse of laws on counter-terrorism, money laundering, defamation and corruption, which serve to silence journalists, civil society organisations and human rights defenders; denounces the use of overly broad terminology that allows authorities to outlaw countless acts and criminalise legitimate human rights work, and the lack of sufficient human rights safeguards in many of these pieces of legislation, in particular regarding the right to a fair trial; denounces, in addition, the use of technologies such as spyware to persecute journalists or hinder or control their work; expresses deep concern, moreover, about the physical safety of journalists, attacks against them, including extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions, and the fact that more than 61 journalists and media workers have been killed so far in 2022; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Calls on the Commission to safeguard freedom of expression and to ensure public access to information through the internet as means of achieving freedom of speech; condemns the brutal crackdowns and the use of force, harassment, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings against peaceful protestors in a number of third countries; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Calls for the EU to support credible media and information sources that contribute to accountability of the authorities and to democratic transitions; expresses concern over the widespread use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and human rights defenders, including environmental human rights defenders, worldwide; underlines that this practice further restricts space for civil society and human rights defenders across the globe, in a context in which civic space has been continuously shrinking for several years and public authorities and private actors have been increasingly attacking the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal for a directive aimed at protecting journalists and human rights defenders from abusive court proceedings and SLAPPs; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Urges the Commission and the EEAS, in coordination with the Member States, to develop a strategy to address the widespread use of SLAPPs against human rights defenders, journalists, activists and trade unionists worldwide; further calls on the Commission and the EEAS to include guidance on ways to provide effective protection for victims of SLAPPs, including through financial assistance to cover legal fees, in such a strategy; calls on the EU delegations to document SLAPPs and include them in their monitoring, reporting and assessing activities; encourages legislators from third countries to draft laws with the same objective, as part of general initiatives aimed at supporting and safeguarding the freedom of expression, including media freedom and pluralism; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Welcomes the Commission’s intention to fund projects to assist journalists on legal and practical issues, including outside the EU, through the European democracy action plan; calls for the EU to intensify its efforts to assist targeted journalists worldwide and to ensure their safety, including by providing a safe haven and means to continue their work in case they have to leave their place of residency and by working closely with partner countries on this matter, especially in the framework of EU partnership agreements with third countries; welcomes the role played by programmes such as Media4Democracy and the EU-funded activities of the European Endowment for Democracy to this end; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Expresses its serious concern about restrictions on academic freedom and an increase in the censorship and imprisonment of scholars worldwide, which have important consequences for the right to education; calls for the EU and the Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts and emergency protection and support through bilateral and multilateral engagement in relation to threats or attacks on academic freedom by state and non-state actors; calls for the EU to ensure continued high-level support to the Global Campus of Human Rights, as a flagship example of the EU’s support for human rights education worldwide; |
| --- | --- |

81.

Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

| 82. | Notes that 2021 marked the 40th anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; recalls that freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief is a fundamental right of every human being and applies to all persons equally; notes with grave concern that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to hold a belief, to not believe, or to identify as an atheist or agnostic, including the right to demonstrate religious or non-religious convictions through expression, teaching and practice and the right to change or leave one’s religion, is still violated in many countries around the world; stresses the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as some governments are still using it as a pretext for further discriminatory practices, including violence against and scapegoating religious minorities; condemns violence against and persecution of people belonging to minorities on the grounds of their belief or religion; deplores that it affects many religious and belief communities, as well as groups of people who are atheists, humanists, agnostics or who do not identify with any religion; observes with deep concern that non-religious, secular and humanist organisations are facing growing persecution, including unprecedented waves of incitement to violence against them, hatred and killings, in a number of countries; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Denounces the attacks against countless individuals and civil society organisations for peacefully questioning, criticising or satirising religious beliefs and recalls that expressing critical opinions about religion is a legitimate expression of freedom of thought or artistic creation; |
| --- | --- |

83.

| 84. | Further expresses concern about the misuse and instrumentalisation of religion to foment intolerance or undermine human rights, such as the rights of LGBTIQ persons and women’s rights, namely SRHR, as well as children’s rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to work with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls on the Commission and the Council to implement ambitious programmes to defend this right worldwide, including encouraging and supporting international efforts to collect evidence of atrocity crimes on the grounds of belief or religion, bringing the perpetrators to court, rendering effective criminal sentences and compensating the victims; calls on the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to work with third countries to adopt measures to prevent and fight hate crimes in all EU external policies; calls on the EEAS and the EU delegations, where appropriate, to include faith-based organisations in their dialogues with civil society in order to tailor human rights policies to country-specific religious and cultural contexts, owing to the role of some faith-based organisations in responding to humanitarian crises, among others; observes that the population that does not identify with any religion should not be neglected in the EU policy framework on freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; calls for an evaluation of the 2013 EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, as provided for in Article 70 thereof; |
| --- | --- |

85.

Human rights defenders and civil society organisations

| 86. | Strongly supports the work of human rights defenders and highlights the risks they face in their endeavours to protect human rights, including threats against them and their families, harassment and violence; condemns the fact that hundreds of human rights defenders have been killed for their work, the majority of whom were environmental defenders; welcomes the EU’s efforts to support human rights defenders in their work, including the ProtectDefenders.eu mechanism; calls for such efforts to be intensified in order to mitigate the growing risks faced by human rights defenders around the world, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, verbal and physical attacks, legal harassment and restrictions and transnational threats or repression; calls on the Member States to suspend all active extradition treaties with countries in which the human rights situation is incompatible with Member States' international non-refoulement obligations; |
| --- | --- |

86.

| 87. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to address actively legislative or administrative attempts to close down the space for the defence of human rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to develop a strategic high-level vision to counter the mounting global attacks against human rights defenders, including through adopting strong EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions laying down a collective high-level strategy for EU global action on human rights defenders, and to fully implement their political commitments on the protection of at-risk human rights defenders, such as those included in the 2020-2024 EU action plan for democracy and human rights and in the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders; calls for the EU and its Member States to also actively support the development and implementation of appropriate and effective protection systems for human rights defenders at risk or in vulnerable situations, including through meaningful consultation with them and based on comprehensive, qualitative risk analyses, ensuring that such mechanisms are holistic and appropriately resourced, assess and manage the risks in a preventive manner and build protection plans that truly respond to the protection needs of individuals, collectives and communities; calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EUSR for Human Rights and EU ambassadors, to be more active in publishing public statements and other forms of public and private political engagement in support of human rights defenders at risk and those imprisoned for long periods, as well as in helping to conduct prison visits for the latter and facilitating external visits by their families; insists that the EEAS and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and that they take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation; calls on the EEAS to report back regularly on action taken on the cases of Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists who are detained, face restrictions on their freedoms or whose whereabouts remain unknown; |
| --- | --- |

87.

| 88. | Expresses concern over the obstacles encountered by human rights defenders worldwide in accessing EU humanitarian and/or short-term visas; recalls the importance of this essential security and protection tool that allows human rights defenders to access safe havens when necessary, to take advantage of existing opportunities for rest and respite, to benefit from temporary relocation programmes and to carry out essential international advocacy, mobilisation and networking activities in EU territory; calls for an EU-wide scheme for issuing short-term humanitarian visas for the temporary relocation of human rights defenders at risk, as well as a more coordinated EU policy regarding the issuing by Member States of emergency visas for human rights defenders; calls for the EU develop a more predictable, coordinated and consistent policy on visas for human rights defenders, allowing for flexible and reactive protocols, including in critical situations; |
| --- | --- |

88.

| 89. | Deplores the various forms of bans and limitations on civil society organisations and their activities, such as laws, including counter-terrorism laws, whose aim is to shrink civil society space and silence dissenting voices or the promotion of organisations sponsored by third-country governments (government-organised NGOs (GONGOs)); deplores the widespread adoption of so-called foreign agents laws in many countries, which force individuals and entities receiving funding from abroad to register themselves as foreign agents; expresses particular concern over the use of these laws to stigmatise and restrict the work of civil society and human rights defenders, including through restricting the right to access funding; calls for the EU to work with counterparts in order to obtain the repeal or revision of such laws and calls for the EU institutions and bodies, in particular the EEAS in coordination with the Commission, to develop a coordinated strategy to this end; |
| --- | --- |

89.

| 90. | Deplores that women human rights defenders face gender-based violence and suffer from a lack of access to adequate resources and protection mechanisms; rejects the fact that women human rights defenders and women’s rights activists continue to be sexually assaulted, threatened, intimidated, criminalised and even killed; deplores, additionally, that women human rights defenders working on SRHR are particularly targeted worldwide, and calls for the EU and its Member States to publicly and privately condemn attacks and threats against human rights defenders working in this area and to proactively ensure adequate representation of SRHR defenders in its consultations; stresses the need for the EU to politically and financially support civil society organisations that promote the rights of women and girls in all areas; |
| --- | --- |

90.

Migrants and refugees

| 91. | Reaffirms the inalienable human rights of migrants, refugees and forcibly displaced persons, which must be reflected in the EU’s migration and asylum policy and in its cooperation with third countries in this area; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, in particular of women, children, ethnic, religious and belief minorities and persons with disabilities, who are among the most vulnerable, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility of enjoying a decent and safe life in their home country; stresses the need to manage migration and asylum policies in a manner governed by the principles of solidarity, balance and the sharing of responsibility between countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the countries hosting most refugees, as well as transit countries and countries of origin; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that migration-related European funding, training or other forms of support to third countries do not directly or indirectly facilitate the perpetration of human rights violations, nor reinforce or perpetuate impunity for such violations; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with third countries remain key to preventing migrant smuggling and human trafficking; stresses in particular the need to expand the fight against organised crime groups that engage in human trafficking, which should strictly be in line with international human rights standards; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling is crucial; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs of children and other vulnerable groups and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; condemns in this regard the placement of migrant children in detention centres, especially when they are separated from their parents or legal guardians; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU, including the development of Talent Partnerships with partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

91.

| 92. | Recalls its commitment to the rights of refugees, as provided by international human rights and refugee laws, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto; recalls the obligations of states to protect refugees and respect their rights in accordance with the relevant international law; deplores the number of migrant deaths occurring along migration routes and illegal pushbacks in violation of international law; recalls that the EU and its Member States, in their external and extraterritorial actions, agreements and cooperation in the areas of migration, borders and asylum, should respect and protect human rights, notably those enshrined in the Charter, including the right to life, liberty and to seek asylum, through the individual assessment of asylum applications and the principle of non-refoulement; highlights in this regard the importance of the Member States leading by example by strictly upholding their obligations under international refugee law, and of substantially increasing their assistance to those fleeing repression or war, their hosting capacity and their resettlement pledges; |
| --- | --- |

92.

| 93. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to be fully transparent about the allocation of funds to third countries for cooperation in migration matters; reiterates its calls on the Commission to ensure transparent ex-ante risk assessments performed by independent EU bodies and experts on the impact of any formal, informal or financial EU cooperation with third countries on the rights of migrants, refugees and forcibly displaced persons, and to take full account of these assessments, as well as monitoring mechanisms, to evaluate the human rights impact of cooperation on migration with third countries; notes with concern that the number of people forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order reached an unprecedented 89 million by the end of 2021, 36,5 million of whom were children; recalls that refugees and migrants, especially undocumented migrants, face barriers in access to healthcare around the world, that sexual and gender-based violence is a frequent occurrence during displacements, and that in many settings, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence do not receive the essential sexual and reproductive healthcare they need; stresses, in this context, that international action and cooperation is more essential than ever to ensure protection for refugees; |
| --- | --- |

93.

Indigenous peoples

| 94. | Notes with regrets that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; recalls that indigenous peoples play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, notably in relation to free, prior and informed consent; recommends that the EU and its Member States include references to indigenous peoples and the rights contained in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the relevant and emerging frameworks for due diligence; reaffirms the need to create a grievance mechanism to lodge complaints regarding violations and abuses of indigenous peoples’ rights resulting from the activities of state and non-state actors; recommends that countries that have not yet done so ratify the provisions of International Labour Organization Convention No 169 of 27 June 1989 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples; |
| --- | --- |

94.

Wars and conflicts around the world and their impact on human rights

| 95. | Is seriously concerned by the persistence of the scourge of wars and military conflicts around the world; stresses the multitude of threats to human rights caused by modern warfare and conflicts around the world today; underlines that in addition to the States Parties themselves, such conflicts often involve non-state actors including private military and security companies as well as terrorist organisations; stresses the disastrous humanitarian consequences of these conflicts and their devastating impact on civilians, who are directly targeted, have to endure grave human rights violations, and often have no or limited access to justice or legal remedies; calls for the EU to continue developing and implementing tools to enable it to respond swiftly and efficiently to such conflicts, including by addressing their root causes, investing in conflict prevention and mediation efforts, seeking and maintaining space for political solutions, creating alliances with like-minded countries and regional organisations, providing further financial and technical support and personnel to peacekeeping civilian missions and military operations missions, and promoting trust-building initiatives between belligerents; calls for the EU to help put an end to the perpetration of human rights violations and to provide assistance to the victims; |
| --- | --- |

95.

| 96. | Condemns the increase in violations of democratic constitutions in the world; reiterates its concern about the threat caused by military takeovers at the cost of civilian lives, security and peace; stresses the need to strengthen accountability and combat impunity for human rights violations and war crimes that have been committed as a result of violent regime changes; |
| --- | --- |

96.

| 97. | Reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify healthcare-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, vulnerable groups such as refugees, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and sexual and reproductive health in their humanitarian aid response, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors and future funding; calls for the EU to adopt a gender-sensitive perspective to comprehend how conflicts affect women and the LGBTIQ community and to integrate it throughout its efforts in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction operations, transitional justice and the promotion of human rights and democratic reforms; |
| --- | --- |

97.

| 98. | Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 on Export and Export Assessment of the UN Arms Trade Treaty and of the EU Common Position on arms exports (28), including by refusing any transfer of arms and surveillance equipment that would result in the risk that the importing actors may commit or facilitate violations of human rights or international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

98.

Right to food and food security

| 99. | Reiterates that the right to be free from hunger is a human right; underlines its grave concerns about the challenges to the right to food and food security and the affordability of food in many countries around the world; calls for the EU, the Member States and the international community to immediately step up their efforts to halt the trend of emerging serious food shortages; underlines that while the parlous food security situation has several causes, it has been aggravated by many conflicts occurring around the globe, including current conflicts in countries that are large global exporters of primary food products, with tremendous consequences in several areas of the world; strongly condemns the use or the threat of food insecurity as a political instrument of war; |
| --- | --- |

99.

| 100. | Highlights with concern the fact that religious, belief or ethnic background can be used as a discriminating factor in the distribution of food and humanitarian aid in the context of food insecurity and humanitarian crises; calls for the EU, its Member States and the Commission to bring this issue to the attention of the governments of third countries concerned; |
| --- | --- |

100.

Climate change and environment

| 101. | Underlines that human rights, a healthy environment and combating climate change are dependent on one another; welcomes the progress towards the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, as laid out in Resolution 76/300 of the UN General Assembly; stresses its appreciation for the essential work undertaken by environmental human rights defenders, including land and water defenders, journalists, investigative journalists, whistleblowers, lawyers and indigenous activists, to preserve and safeguard the environment despite threats of violence against them and the risk to their lives; recognises, moreover, the important role of civil society organisations, as well as indigenous peoples for their invaluable work in the preservation and protection of the environment; |
| --- | --- |

101.

| 102. | Stresses that climate change jeopardises the enjoyment of human rights, including the right to food security, safe drinking water, sanitation, health and adequate housing, as well as the rights of local communities; rejects the unlawful exploitation of natural resources, which constitutes a major sustainability and environmental challenge; draws attention, furthermore, to the risks posed by climate change to peace and security, as food insecurity and water scarcity can lead to competition over natural resources and then to instability and conflicts within and between states; stresses that biodiversity and human rights are interlinked and interdependent and recalls the human rights obligations of states to protect the biodiversity on which those rights depend, including by providing for the participation of citizens in biodiversity-related decisions and providing access to effective remedies in cases of biodiversity loss and degradation; |
| --- | --- |

102.

| 103. | Calls for the EU to seek to counter the effects of climate changes by, inter alia, introducing effective and sustainable policy actions, and to comply with the goals of the Paris Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their contribution to the fight against climate change and biodiversity loss globally, in particular by ensuring that goods imported by the EU are produced in accordance with human rights protected under international law, including the rights of indigenous people, and do not contribute to the destruction or damage of natural ecosystems, in particular primary and old-growth forests, using a balanced approach that does not harm populations in third countries; highlights that the least developed countries are the most vulnerable to climate change, as they find it hardest to withstand its devastating impacts, despite producing small quantities of greenhouse gases than richer countries; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Business, trade and human rights

| 104. | Underlines that trade agreements often offer the possibility for the EU to work with third countries to address their domestic situation by providing some conditions that would serve to enhance living standards, as well as allow for conditionality to improve the human rights situation in those countries; notes, however, that in some cases there has been little to no improvement in the countries concerned; notes that excessive and exploitative business activities often have detrimental effects on human rights in third countries; recalls that the substantive clauses included in trade agreements provide that States Parties must respect, protect and foster human rights as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, customary law and the international conventions to which they are party; |
| --- | --- |

104.

| 105. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to condemn, in the strongest terms, crackdowns against civil society, in particular when they happen in countries with which the EU has concluded FTAs, and to engage effectively with the national authorities in those countries, including at the highest level, to ensure that civil society may act freely, participate in public affairs and monitor and document the implementation of the FTAs; calls for the EU to address any violation of FTA commitments, including those laid out in the chapters on trade and sustainable development and in the essential elements clauses of partnerships and cooperation agreements; in cases of serious or widespread violations, asserts that the EU should trigger human rights clauses, envisaging dedicated conditionality and adequate measures, on this basis, including the setting up of a dedicated human rights monitoring body to assess the respect of human rights commitments under FTAs and to provide recommendations to the parties; |
| --- | --- |

105.

| 106. | Calls for the EU to make consistent use of clauses in trade agreements that protect human rights, including closer monitoring and enforcement of human rights commitments, and to use the full potential of conditionality on human rights to grant preferential access to its market to third countries; calls, in particular, for a closer link between preferential treatment and progress on human rights in the updated Regulation on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+); calls for greater transparency throughout all steps of the procedure for granting GSP+ status, including improved engagement with civil society and for following up on any possible violations; calls on the Commission to keep Parliament adequately informed about matters in this field; calls for the parties involved in negotiating EU agreements or establishing or strengthening EU relations with a third country to examine the possibility of extending a bilateral standing invitation to observe their respective elections; stresses that this possibility should also be addressed in already existing agreements; reiterates its calls for the Commission to systematically carry out human rights impact assessments focused on the risks of human rights violations prior to granting any preferential regime to a country and to swiftly investigate and respond to any violations, including the revocation of GSP+ status if warranted; underlines the need for adequate resources and clear procedures to properly carry out the human rights impact assessments and monitor the application of international human rights conventions; calls in this regard for the EU delegations concerned to receive an increase in human resources to contribute to these assessments and the EU monitoring of preferential trade access to the EU market under the GSP+ scheme; |
| --- | --- |

106.

| 107. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence as a step towards fostering responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; highlights the importance of holding companies accountable through judicial mechanisms, including civil liability; emphasises that the directive’s requirements as regards reporting on the sustainability and due diligence strategies should apply to all large undertakings and to small and medium-sized undertakings that are publicly listed or operating in high-risk world regions and economic sectors; calls for the inclusion in the directive of a specific article on consultation of stakeholders, in particular affected persons and local communities, trade unions, workers’ representatives and human rights defenders; |
| --- | --- |

107.

| 108. | Condemns all forms of forced labour and modern slavery; highlights that according to the latest ‘Global Estimates of Modern Slavery’ report, 2,7 million more people were subjected to forced labour between 2016 and 2021, with up to 17,3 million people in the private sector only; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union’s market; highlights also that the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated this trend; stresses that the crisis also resulted in a deterioration in working conditions for many workers, in some cases leading to forced labour; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead actions in multinational forums to eradicate forced labour and modern slavery; reminds the Member States of the need to prosecute and condemn these activities carried out in both the countries of origin and in groups with international mobility; reiterates its call for all countries to fully implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and calls on the EU Member States that have not yet adopted national action plans on business rights to do so as soon as possible; encourages the EU and its Member States to constructively and actively participate in the work of the UN open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights and to adopt a negotiating mandate to this end; considers this to be a necessary step forward in the promotion and protection of human rights; |
| --- | --- |

108.

| 109. | Denounces the increasing practice by authoritarian states of hosting mega sport or cultural events in order to boost their international legitimacy, while further restricting domestic dissent; calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with national sports federations, corporate actors and civil society organisations on their ways of participating in such events; calls for the development of an EU policy framework on sports and human rights; |
| --- | --- |

109.

Human rights and digital technologies

| 110. | Stresses that human rights must fully encompass the digital sphere and must be protected from the illegal use of technology, either by state or non-state actors who provide or benefit from these technologies; underlines the risks posed by digital technologies, including artificial intelligence, to personal liberty, the right to privacy and democracy at large and condemns the role of digital technologies in human rights violations, in particular through surveillance, monitoring, harassment and limitations on freedom of expression; stresses the threats that disinformation campaigns, in combination with digital tools, pose; stresses also the specific threat that new digital technologies pose for human rights defenders, opposition figures, journalists and others in controlling, restricting and undermining their activities; calls for more intensive efforts to establish a comprehensive global legal framework on digital technologies, which should take advantage of the possible gains such technologies can offer for human well-being, while strictly respecting human rights; insists on the importance of an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace that upholds the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; strongly supports voluntary, non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, encompassing respect for privacy and the fundamental rights of citizens; calls for the swift adoption of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act as an effective tool to ensure that AI is used to this aim, with special focus on high-risk AI; calls for the attention economy — used by, among others, social media platforms — to be included within the scope of high-risk AI in order to protect vulnerable groups from being targeted by disinformation and the manipulation of public opinion; |
| --- | --- |

110.

| 111. | Deplores practices by authoritarian regimes, among others, that limit citizens’ access to the internet, including internet blackouts during public assemblies and protests; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with other democratic countries, to invest in research and technology allowing undisturbed and affordable global access to the internet; calls for the EU to fund research on effective digital ways to filter and counter digitally spread fake news, disinformation and malicious propaganda; |
| --- | --- |

111.

o

o o

| 112. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly, the President of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU Heads of Delegation. |
| --- | --- |

112.

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(1)  OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p. 35.

(2)  OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 303, 15.12.2009, p. 12.

(5)  OJ C 118, 8.4.2020, p. 15.

(6)  OJ C 411, 27.11.2020, p. 30.

(7)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 202.

(8)  OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 11.

(9)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 70.

(10)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 111.

(11)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 152.

(12)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.

(13)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 295.

(14)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 191.

(15)  OJ C 434, 15.11.2022, p. 50.

(16)  OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 33.

(17)  OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 44.

(18)  OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 155.

(19)  OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 68.

(20)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 96.

(21)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 132.

(22)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 120.

(23)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0302.

(24)  Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

(25)  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30).

(26)  Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position 2003/444/CFSP (OJ L 76, 22.3.2011, p. 56).

(27)  OJ C 224, 21.6.2016, p. 31.

(28)  Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99).

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Thursday 19 January 2023

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/104 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/104

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P9_TA(2023)0012

Humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (2023/2504(RSP))

(2023/C 214/07)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and the outside world, the Lachin corridor, has been blocked by self-proclaimed environmentalists from Azerbaijan since 12 December 2022; whereas this has disrupted access to essential goods and services, including food, fuel and medication, for the 120 000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively placing them under a blockade; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and the outside world, the Lachin corridor, has been blocked by self-proclaimed environmentalists from Azerbaijan since 12 December 2022; whereas this has disrupted access to essential goods and services, including food, fuel and medication, for the 120 000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively placing them under a blockade;

| B. | whereas the blockade has led to a severe humanitarian crisis, significantly affecting the most vulnerable populations; whereas the transfer of critically ill patients is nearly impossible, with one death resulting from this situation; whereas hundreds of families remain separated; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the blockade has led to a severe humanitarian crisis, significantly affecting the most vulnerable populations; whereas the transfer of critically ill patients is nearly impossible, with one death resulting from this situation; whereas hundreds of families remain separated;

| C. | whereas this humanitarian crisis was further aggravated by Azerbaijan’s disruption of the natural gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, which left houses, hospitals and schools without heating; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas this humanitarian crisis was further aggravated by Azerbaijan’s disruption of the natural gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh, which left houses, hospitals and schools without heating;

| D. | whereas by sustaining the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan is breaching its international obligations under the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020, under which Azerbaijan must guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the corridor in both directions; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas by sustaining the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan is breaching its international obligations under the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020, under which Azerbaijan must guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the corridor in both directions;

| E. | whereas the impediments to the use of the Lachin corridor set back the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and undermine international confidence; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the impediments to the use of the Lachin corridor set back the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and undermine international confidence;

| 1. | Deplores the tragic humanitarian consequences of the blockade of the Lachin corridor and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Urges Azerbaijan to respect and implement the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and immediately reopen the Lachin corridor to enable freedom of movement and ensure access to essential goods and services, thus guaranteeing security in the region and safeguarding residents’ livelihoods; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines the need for a comprehensive peace agreement, which must guarantee the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population; calls on Azerbaijan to protect the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and refrain from its inflammatory rhetoric that calls for discrimination against Armenians and urges Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from undermining the functioning of transport, energy and communication connections between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in future; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Strongly condemns Azerbaijan’s scapegoating of human rights defenders and CSOs and calls on EU and Member State representations to support their work; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Condemns the inaction of Russian ‘peacekeepers’; considers that their replacement with OSCE international peacekeepers, under a UN mandate, should be negotiated urgently; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls for international organisations to be granted unimpeded access to Nagorno-Karabakh to assess the situation and provide the necessary humanitarian assistance; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls for a UN or OSCE fact-finding mission to the Lachin corridor to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls for the urgent resumption, without preconditions, of negotiations based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Urges the EU to be actively involved and ensure that the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are no longer held hostage by Baku’s activism, Russia’s destructive role and the Minsk Group’s inactivity; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe and the Presidents, Governments and Parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. |
| --- | --- |

11.

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/106 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/106

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P9_TA(2023)0013

The storming of the Brazilian democratic institutions

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the storming of the Brazilian democratic institutions (2023/2505(RSP))

(2023/C 214/08)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 8 January 2023, thousands of far-right extremists and supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalised the National Congress, Supreme Court and Alvorada Palace in Brasília, calling for military intervention to overthrow President Lula da Silva; whereas ex-President Bolsonaro’s former Justice Minister, Anderson Torres, has been arrested and the Governor of the Federal District (which includes Brasília), Ibaneis Rocha, has been suspended; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 8 January 2023, thousands of far-right extremists and supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalised the National Congress, Supreme Court and Alvorada Palace in Brasília, calling for military intervention to overthrow President Lula da Silva; whereas ex-President Bolsonaro’s former Justice Minister, Anderson Torres, has been arrested and the Governor of the Federal District (which includes Brasília), Ibaneis Rocha, has been suspended;

| B. | whereas violent attacks on democratic institutions by the far right are a global phenomenon; whereas the events in Brasília represent a flagrant attack on Brazilian democratic institutions and display clear similarities with the assault on the US Capitol in 2021; whereas former US President Donald Trump and ex-President Bolsonaro played an instrumental role in these respective events; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas violent attacks on democratic institutions by the far right are a global phenomenon; whereas the events in Brasília represent a flagrant attack on Brazilian democratic institutions and display clear similarities with the assault on the US Capitol in 2021; whereas former US President Donald Trump and ex-President Bolsonaro played an instrumental role in these respective events;

| C. | whereas social media platforms continue to fail to moderate or constrain the diffusion of anti-democratic campaigns, transnational fascism and extremism, especially through algorithms promoting hateful content and disinformation and an unwillingness to remove illegal content, and played a fundamental role in these events by amplifying aggressive rhetoric and violence and facilitating mobilisation and the spread of disinformation; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas social media platforms continue to fail to moderate or constrain the diffusion of anti-democratic campaigns, transnational fascism and extremism, especially through algorithms promoting hateful content and disinformation and an unwillingness to remove illegal content, and played a fundamental role in these events by amplifying aggressive rhetoric and violence and facilitating mobilisation and the spread of disinformation;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest terms the criminal actions perpetrated by supporters of ex-President Bolsonaro and supports the ongoing efforts to ensure a prompt, impartial, proper and effective investigation in order to identify, prosecute and hold accountable all those involved, including the instigators, organisers and financial backers, as well as state institutions that failed to act to prevent these attacks; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Expresses solidarity with democratically elected President Lula da Silva, his government and Brazilian institutions; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Deplores the attempts by ex-President Bolsonaro and some of his political supporters to discredit the voting system and the electoral authorities, despite there being no evidence of electoral fraud, and urges them to accept the democratic outcome of the elections; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Acknowledges the connection between rising transnational fascism, racism, extremism and, among others, the events in Brasília, the storming of the US Capitol in January 2021 and the arrests in December 2022 concerning a planned attack on Germany’s Bundestag; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights that on 13 January 2023, the Supreme Court approved a request from federal prosecutors to investigate ex-President Bolsonaro as he ‘may have contributed, in a very relevant way, to the occurrence of criminal and terrorist acts’; expresses concern about the acts and omissions of public officials, in particular the Governor and Military Police of the Federal District; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses the importance of legislative frameworks, such as the Digital Services Act, regulating social media platforms and tech companies, to effectively combat and prevent the online spread of hate speech and misinformation and thereby avoid further radicalisation; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Brazil. |
| --- | --- |

7.

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/107 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/107

---

P9_TA(2023)0014

Situation of journalists in Morocco, notably the case of Omar Radi

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the situation of journalists in Morocco, notably the case of Omar Radi (2023/2506(RSP))

(2023/C 214/09)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas independent investigative journalist Omar Radi, who covered Hirak protests and state corruption scandals, has been detained since July 2020 and sentenced to six years in prison on trumped-up charges of espionage, as well as on rape charges in July 2021; whereas his sentence was upheld on appeal in March 2022; whereas numerous due process guarantees were violated, rendering the trial inherently unfair and biased; whereas these violations included prolonged pre-trial detention of one year without justification and prevention of access to his case file and two key defence witnesses, who were prevented from appearing in court; whereas Mr Radi has appealed to the Court of Cassation; whereas he was awarded the 2022 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Prize; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas independent investigative journalist Omar Radi, who covered Hirak protests and state corruption scandals, has been detained since July 2020 and sentenced to six years in prison on trumped-up charges of espionage, as well as on rape charges in July 2021; whereas his sentence was upheld on appeal in March 2022; whereas numerous due process guarantees were violated, rendering the trial inherently unfair and biased; whereas these violations included prolonged pre-trial detention of one year without justification and prevention of access to his case file and two key defence witnesses, who were prevented from appearing in court; whereas Mr Radi has appealed to the Court of Cassation; whereas he was awarded the 2022 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Prize;

| B. | whereas journalist Taoufik Bouachrine has been detained since February 2018 and was sentenced on appeal in September 2021 to 15 years in prison for sexual offences; whereas there were major violations of due process guarantees in the case of Soulaimane Raissouni, who in February 2022 received a five-year prison sentence for sexual offences in an unfair trial; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas journalist Taoufik Bouachrine has been detained since February 2018 and was sentenced on appeal in September 2021 to 15 years in prison for sexual offences; whereas there were major violations of due process guarantees in the case of Soulaimane Raissouni, who in February 2022 received a five-year prison sentence for sexual offences in an unfair trial;

| C. | whereas press freedom in Morocco has been continuously deteriorating, dropping to 135th place in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index; whereas numerous journalists, e.g. Ignacio Cembrero, have been under digital surveillance, been intimidated and judicially harassed, and sentenced to long prison sentences, e.g. Maati Monjib; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas press freedom in Morocco has been continuously deteriorating, dropping to 135th place in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index; whereas numerous journalists, e.g. Ignacio Cembrero, have been under digital surveillance, been intimidated and judicially harassed, and sentenced to long prison sentences, e.g. Maati Monjib;

| D. | whereas in 2020 Reporters Without Borders raised concerns with the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls regarding the misuse of sexual assault charges to discredit journalists, a worrying practice also condemned by the feminist organisation Khmissa and Morocco’s Association for Human Rights; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas in 2020 Reporters Without Borders raised concerns with the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls regarding the misuse of sexual assault charges to discredit journalists, a worrying practice also condemned by the feminist organisation Khmissa and Morocco’s Association for Human Rights;

| 1. | Urges the Moroccan authorities to respect freedom of expression and media freedom, guarantee imprisoned journalists, in particular Omar Radi, Soulaimane Raissouni and Taoufik Bouachrine, a fair trial with all due process guarantees, secure their immediate provisional release and cease the harassment of all journalists, their lawyers and families; urges the authorities to fulfil their international human rights obligations in line with the EU-Morocco Association Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Strongly condemns the misuse of allegations of sexual assault to deter journalists from performing their duties; believes that this misuse endangers women’s rights; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is deeply concerned about allegations that the Moroccan authorities have corrupted Members of the European Parliament; calls for the application of the same measures as applied to representatives of Qatar; reiterates its commitment to fully investigate and address cases of corruption involving non-EU countries seeking to buy influence in the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Underlines that its resolution of 15 December 2022 called for a special committee tasked with identifying potential flaws in the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity and corruption and making proposals for reforms; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Urges the Moroccan authorities to end their surveillance of journalists, including via NSO’s Pegasus spyware, and to enact and implement legislation to protect them; urges Member States to stop exporting surveillance technology to Morocco, in line with the Dual-Use Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of 2018 Sakharov Prize finalist Nasser Zefzafi; calls for the release of all political prisoners; condemns the violations of the rights of peaceful protesters and diaspora activists; deplores the flawed trials and convictions of 43 Hirak protesters, as well as their torture in prison; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue raising with the Moroccan authorities the cases of detained journalists and prisoners of conscience and attend their trials; calls for the EU to use its leverage towards concrete improvements in the human rights situation in Morocco; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of Morocco. |
| --- | --- |

8.

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/109 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/109

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P9_TA(2023)0015

The establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP))

(2023/C 214/10)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (1) and of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (1) and of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (2),

| — | having regard to the London Declaration of 13 January 1942, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the London Declaration of 13 January 1942,

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolutions 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the Definition of Aggression and 377 (V) (the Uniting for Peace resolution) of 3 November 1950, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolutions 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the Definition of Aggression and 377 (V) (the Uniting for Peace resolution) of 3 November 1950,

| — | having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in particular Article 8 bis thereof and the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression thereto, and to the 2006 Agreement between the ICC and the EU on cooperation and assistance, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in particular Article 8 bis thereof and the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression thereto, and to the 2006 Agreement between the ICC and the EU on cooperation and assistance,

| — | having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolutions 2433 (2022), 2436 (2022), 2463 (2022) and 2473 (2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolutions 2433 (2022), 2436 (2022), 2463 (2022) and 2473 (2022),

| — | having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice of 16 March 2022 on Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice of 16 March 2022 on Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

| — | having regard to the resolution entitled ‘The Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its people, and its threat to security across the OSCE region’ adopted at the 29th annual session of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly from 2 to 6 July 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution entitled ‘The Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its people, and its threat to security across the OSCE region’ adopted at the 29th annual session of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly from 2 to 6 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the joint statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of 16 October 2022 calling for the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of 16 October 2022 calling for the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ and of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ and of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’ and of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’ and of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 and 21 October 2022 and of 15 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 and 21 October 2022 and of 15 December 2022,

| — | having regard to the statement of the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen of 30 November 2022 on Russian accountability and the use of Russian frozen assets, in which she makes reference to the need to set up a specialised court to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine backed by the UN, and to subsequent related high-level statements from Germany, Poland and other countries, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen of 30 November 2022 on Russian accountability and the use of Russian frozen assets, in which she makes reference to the need to set up a specialised court to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine backed by the UN, and to subsequent related high-level statements from Germany, Poland and other countries,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

| B. | whereas since February 2014, Russia has waged an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which it relaunched on 24 February 2022 with a massive invasion of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas since February 2014, Russia has waged an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which it relaunched on 24 February 2022 with a massive invasion of Ukraine;

| C. | whereas the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the fundamental principles of international law and various international agreements, such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the fundamental principles of international law and various international agreements, such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum;

| D. | whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and have carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting civilian infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and have carried out acts of terror throughout the country targeting civilian infrastructure;

| E. | whereas thousands of civilians, including children, have already been murdered and many more tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas thousands of civilians, including children, have already been murdered and many more tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law;

| F. | whereas the reported atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces in Bucha, Irpin and many other Ukrainian towns during the Russian occupation reveal the brutality of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and underscore the importance of coordinated international action to establish accountability for the crime of aggression and all violations of international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the reported atrocities committed by the Russian armed forces in Bucha, Irpin and many other Ukrainian towns during the Russian occupation reveal the brutality of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and underscore the importance of coordinated international action to establish accountability for the crime of aggression and all violations of international humanitarian law;

| G. | whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia;

| H. | whereas the Russian Federation has been recognised by the European Parliament and many national parliaments and assemblies as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the Russian Federation has been recognised by the European Parliament and many national parliaments and assemblies as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state which uses means of terrorism;

| I. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945 and thus requires an adequate legal response at the international level; whereas in its resolutions (3), the UN General Assembly has recognised ‘the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ to be ‘in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter’ and that ‘the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas those responsible for committing the crime of aggression against Ukraine must not go unpunished; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945 and thus requires an adequate legal response at the international level; whereas in its resolutions (3), the UN General Assembly has recognised ‘the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ to be ‘in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter’ and that ‘the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas those responsible for committing the crime of aggression against Ukraine must not go unpunished;

| J. | whereas Russia’s aggression has also been explicitly denounced by representatives of various states and international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the Nordic Council and others; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Russia’s aggression has also been explicitly denounced by representatives of various states and international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the Nordic Council and others;

| K. | whereas on 16 March 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered the Russian Federation to immediately suspend its military operations in the territory of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas on 16 March 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered the Russian Federation to immediately suspend its military operations in the territory of Ukraine;

| L. | whereas since 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the ICC has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine in relation to past and present allegations of crimes committed by the Russian Federation since 21 November 2013, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas although Ukraine is not a party to the ICC, it has acknowledged the jurisdiction of the ICC and is cooperating with it; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas since 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the ICC has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine in relation to past and present allegations of crimes committed by the Russian Federation since 21 November 2013, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas although Ukraine is not a party to the ICC, it has acknowledged the jurisdiction of the ICC and is cooperating with it;

| M. | whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ and states that a ‘war of aggression is a crime against international peace’ and that ‘aggression gives rise to international responsibility’; whereas Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute defines the ‘crime of aggression’ as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas an ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter; whereas according to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the crime of aggression is different from war crimes or crimes against humanity; whereas the crime of aggression is generally a leadership crime in that it can only be committed by those with the power to shape a state’s policy of aggression; whereas the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which focused on the crime of aggression, ruled in 1946 that aggression was ‘the supreme international crime’; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ and states that a ‘war of aggression is a crime against international peace’ and that ‘aggression gives rise to international responsibility’; whereas Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute defines the ‘crime of aggression’ as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’; whereas an ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter; whereas according to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the crime of aggression is different from war crimes or crimes against humanity; whereas the crime of aggression is generally a leadership crime in that it can only be committed by those with the power to shape a state’s policy of aggression; whereas the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which focused on the crime of aggression, ruled in 1946 that aggression was ‘the supreme international crime’;

| N. | whereas a war of aggression is a grave international crime, especially in the context of the possible use of all types of weapons of mass destruction leading to catastrophic consequences for world peace and human livelihood, as well as severe, long-term damage to the natural environment and climate; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas a war of aggression is a grave international crime, especially in the context of the possible use of all types of weapons of mass destruction leading to catastrophic consequences for world peace and human livelihood, as well as severe, long-term damage to the natural environment and climate;

| O. | whereas in the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice indicated that the obligations derived from outlawing acts of aggression are obligations towards the international community as a whole as opposed to towards individual states; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas in the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice indicated that the obligations derived from outlawing acts of aggression are obligations towards the international community as a whole as opposed to towards individual states;

| P. | whereas the ICC, following two ad hoc declarations by Ukraine, has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, but does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments, in this situation, because neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation have ratified the Rome Statute and the amendments related to the crime of aggression; whereas the Prosecutor of the IСС has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine since 2 March 2022; whereas the establishment of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression will not affect the jurisdiction of the ICC over other crimes, and will instead complement it; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the ICC, following two ad hoc declarations by Ukraine, has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, but does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments, in this situation, because neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation have ratified the Rome Statute and the amendments related to the crime of aggression; whereas the Prosecutor of the IСС has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine since 2 March 2022; whereas the establishment of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression will not affect the jurisdiction of the ICC over other crimes, and will instead complement it;

| Q. | whereas the European Parliament and the Parliaments of Czechia, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland have adopted resolutions supporting the establishment of the ad hoc international special tribunal; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the European Parliament and the Parliaments of Czechia, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland have adopted resolutions supporting the establishment of the ad hoc international special tribunal;

| R. | whereas on 30 November 2022, the Commission presented alternative options on how to establish an accountability mechanism for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; whereas any decision on such a mechanism should be taken in close cooperation with Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas on 30 November 2022, the Commission presented alternative options on how to establish an accountability mechanism for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; whereas any decision on such a mechanism should be taken in close cooperation with Ukraine;

| S. | whereas in its conclusions of 15 December 2022, the European Council encouraged further efforts to ensure full accountability for war crimes and to secure accountability for the crime of aggression and invited the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Council to take this work forward, in accordance with EU and international law, stressing that the prosecution of the crime of aggression is of concern to the international community as a whole; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas in its conclusions of 15 December 2022, the European Council encouraged further efforts to ensure full accountability for war crimes and to secure accountability for the crime of aggression and invited the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Council to take this work forward, in accordance with EU and international law, stressing that the prosecution of the crime of aggression is of concern to the international community as a whole;

| T. | whereas the UN Security Council is paralysed over the situation in Ukraine owing to Russia’s ability to veto any substantive action; whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) set a precedent by providing the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one permanent member of the UN Security Council uses its veto to obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions as mandated by the UN Charter; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the UN Security Council is paralysed over the situation in Ukraine owing to Russia’s ability to veto any substantive action; whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) set a precedent by providing the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one permanent member of the UN Security Council uses its veto to obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions as mandated by the UN Charter;

| 1. | Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, its unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its call on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Emphasises that the Russian crime of aggression against Ukraine is a clear and undisputed breach of the UN Charter, which, in the interests of global security and the rules-based international order, cannot remain unanswered by the international community; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to support full accountability for all crimes committed by Russia and its allies and proxies during their war of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States, in close cooperation with Ukraine and the international community, preferably through the UN, to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies and to find a legally sound, common way forward on this matter; believes that establishing such a tribunal would fill the large gap in the current institutional international criminal justice set-up and should be based on the standards and principles that apply to the ICC as set out in the Rome Statute; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to work in close cooperation with Ukraine to seek and build political support in the UN General Assembly and other international forums, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the G7, for creating the special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Considers that the establishment of the special tribunal would complement the investigative efforts of the ICC and its Prosecutor, as it would focus on alleged genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine; reiterates its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine; underlines the importance of Ukraine ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC and its amendments and formally becoming a member of the ICC; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls for the active use of EU public diplomacy and strategic communication in support of the creation of the special tribunal; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Underlines that, while the exact composition and methods of operation of the special tribunal remain to be determined, they will have to respect the highest criteria on transparency and impartiality; deems, furthermore, that the special international tribunal must have jurisdiction to investigate not only Vladimir Putin and the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation, but also Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the political and military leadership in Belarus, as an enabling state, from the territory of which and with the logistic support of which the Russian Federation is committing its war of aggression against Ukraine, as it falls under the description of a crime of aggression according to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Emphasises that the EU’s preparatory work on the special tribunal should begin without delay, focus on establishing the arrangements for the special tribunal in cooperation with Ukraine and support Ukrainian and international authorities in securing evidence to be used in the future special tribunal; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls for the EU institutions, in particular the Commission and the European External Action Service, to provide support in the meantime for the establishment of an interim prosecutor and notes that setting up this office would be a very important practical step forward in the investigation and prosecution by the future special tribunal of the crime of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Condemns the Russian practice of blocking any action at UN level aimed at holding it accountable for the war of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Emphasises the important role of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine in seeking justice for the Ukrainian people, in deterring other international actors from imitating Russia’s illegal aggression and in facilitating the claim for reparations and any future reconciliation; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Invites the EU and the Member States, as well as their partners and allies, to engage in discussion on the legal possibility of using sovereign assets of the Russian state as reparations for the violations of international law by Russia in Ukraine, including potentially by denying such assets the protections of sovereign immunity or limiting such protections owing to the gross nature of these violations; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Strongly believes that the establishment of this special tribunal for the crime of aggression would send a very clear signal to both Russian society and the international community that Putin and the Russian political and military leadership can be convicted for the crime of aggression in Ukraine; underscores that the establishment of this tribunal would also be a clear signal to the political and business elite in Russia and Russian allies that it is no longer feasible for the Russian Federation under Putin’s leadership to return to ‘business as usual’ with the West; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Supports the UN General Assembly recommendation as the first step towards the establishment by UN member states, in cooperation with Ukraine, of an international register of damage to serve as a record for future reparations for damage, loss or injury to all natural and legal persons concerned, and the long-term, widespread and severe damage to the natural environment and the climate, as well as to the state of Ukraine, caused by the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation and its allies in or against Ukraine, as well as to promote and coordinate evidence gathering; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls for the EU to adopt a common position on the crime of aggression and on the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression to the ICC’s Rome Statute; calls on Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary and Romania to accept and ratify the Kampala Amendments; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Court, the G7 countries, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the Belarussian authorities, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

16.

---

(1)  OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 68.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0405.

(3)  UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, of 24 March 2022 entitled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’ and of 15 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’.

---

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/114 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/114

---

P9_TA(2023)0016

EU response to the protests and executions in Iran

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran (2023/2511(RSP))

(2023/C 214/11)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, in particular those of 6 October 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran (1) and of 17 February 2022 on the death penalty in Iran (2), as well as all its other resolutions on the human rights situation in Iran, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, in particular those of 6 October 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran (1) and of 17 February 2022 on the death penalty in Iran (2), as well as all its other resolutions on the human rights situation in Iran,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly Third Committee resolution of 16 November 2022 on Human Rights in Iran, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly Third Committee resolution of 16 November 2022 on Human Rights in Iran,

| — | having regard to the statement by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 10 January 2023, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 10 January 2023,

| — | having regard to the statement by the UN Experts of 11 November 2022 calling on Iran to stop sentencing peaceful protesters to death, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the UN Experts of 11 November 2022 calling on Iran to stop sentencing peaceful protesters to death,

| — | having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council on the Islamic Republic of Iran, which took place on 24 November 2022, and the resolution adopted at that session, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council on the Islamic Republic of Iran, which took place on 24 November 2022, and the resolution adopted at that session,

| — | having regard to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 22 September 2022, 18 June 2022, 13 January 2022, and 11 January 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 22 September 2022, 18 June 2022, 13 January 2022, and 11 January 2021,

| — | having regard to the G7 foreign ministers’ statement of 4 November 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the G7 foreign ministers’ statement of 4 November 2022,

| — | having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 12 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 12 December 2022,

| — | having regard to the sanctions against Iranian individuals and entities adopted by the Council of the EU on 12 April 2021, 17 October 2022, 20 October 2022 and 14 November 2022 and to Council implementing decision (CFSP) 2022/2433 of 12 December 2022 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the sanctions against Iranian individuals and entities adopted by the Council of the EU on 12 April 2021, 17 October 2022, 20 October 2022 and 14 November 2022 and to Council implementing decision (CFSP) 2022/2433 of 12 December 2022 (3),

| — | having regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sanctions against European and British entities and individuals, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sanctions against European and British entities and individuals,

| — | having regard to the statements of the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 7 January 2023 on the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, of 8 December 2022 on the execution of Mohsen Sekari and of 15 January 2023 on the execution of Mr Alireza Akbari, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements of the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 7 January 2023 on the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, of 8 December 2022 on the execution of Mohsen Sekari and of 15 January 2023 on the execution of Mr Alireza Akbari,

| — | having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Iran of 25 September 2022 and the statement by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 19 September 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Iran of 25 September 2022 and the statement by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 19 September 2022 on the death of Jina Mahsa Amini,

| — | having regard to the press release of the EEAS spokesperson of 9 January 2023 announcing the summoning of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the press release of the EEAS spokesperson of 9 January 2023 announcing the summoning of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union,

| — | having regard to the statements of the Chair of its Delegation for Relations with Iran of 22 September 2022, 9 November 2022 and 13 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements of the Chair of its Delegation for Relations with Iran of 22 September 2022, 9 November 2022 and 13 December 2022,

| — | having regard to the joint statement by Canada and the United States of 9 December 2022 on the human rights situation in Iran, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint statement by Canada and the United States of 9 December 2022 on the human rights situation in Iran,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and to Iran’s ratification thereof in June 1975, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and to Iran’s ratification thereof in June 1975,

| — | having regard to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime,

| — | having regard to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (4),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (5),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (6),

| — | having regard to the EU guidelines on the death penalty, on human rights defenders and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU guidelines on the death penalty, on human rights defenders and on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 13 September 2022, 22-year old Kurdish Iranian woman Jina Mahsa Amini was arrested in Tehran by Iran’s ‘morality’ police for an alleged failure to observe the mandatory veiling law; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was brutally tortured and died on 16 September 2022 while in police custody; whereas a proper investigation has not been concluded; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 13 September 2022, 22-year old Kurdish Iranian woman Jina Mahsa Amini was arrested in Tehran by Iran’s ‘morality’ police for an alleged failure to observe the mandatory veiling law; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was brutally tortured and died on 16 September 2022 while in police custody; whereas a proper investigation has not been concluded;

| B. | whereas, following the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, nation-wide protests broke out across the country, involving hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens representing all segments of society; whereas the protests were initiated by women demanding accountability for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and calling for an end to violence and discrimination against women in Iran; whereas during the protests, many women have taken off their hijabs or cut their hair in protest at Jina Mahsa Amini’s death; whereas the women’s protests inspired solidarity from men, sparking a pan-Iranian revolution and a protest movement against the regime; whereas students are protesting at numerous universities across the country by boycotting their classes and demonstrating against repression; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was from the Kurdistan region of Iran, in which protests have been widespread and have met with a repressive response from the regime; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas, following the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, nation-wide protests broke out across the country, involving hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens representing all segments of society; whereas the protests were initiated by women demanding accountability for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini and calling for an end to violence and discrimination against women in Iran; whereas during the protests, many women have taken off their hijabs or cut their hair in protest at Jina Mahsa Amini’s death; whereas the women’s protests inspired solidarity from men, sparking a pan-Iranian revolution and a protest movement against the regime; whereas students are protesting at numerous universities across the country by boycotting their classes and demonstrating against repression; whereas Jina Mahsa Amini was from the Kurdistan region of Iran, in which protests have been widespread and have met with a repressive response from the regime;

| C. | whereas the response of the Iranian security and police forces to the protests is violent, indiscriminate, disproportionate and unrestrained; whereas the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi have repeatedly expressed praise for, and encouraged, the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations and the killing of protesters by the paramilitary Basij militia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the response of the Iranian security and police forces to the protests is violent, indiscriminate, disproportionate and unrestrained; whereas the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi have repeatedly expressed praise for, and encouraged, the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations and the killing of protesters by the paramilitary Basij militia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);

| D. | whereas, as of 16 January 2023, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed several hundreds of peaceful protesters, including dozens of children, and detained, arrested and abducted more than 20 000 demonstrators, among them human rights defenders, students, lawyers and civil society activists, including EU citizens and residents from Germany, Poland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas, as of 16 January 2023, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed several hundreds of peaceful protesters, including dozens of children, and detained, arrested and abducted more than 20 000 demonstrators, among them human rights defenders, students, lawyers and civil society activists, including EU citizens and residents from Germany, Poland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden;

| E. | whereas Iran does not recognise dual nationality, thereby limiting the access that foreign embassies have to their dual nationals held in the country; whereas ex-deputy Iranian Defence Minister Alireza Akbari, a holder of British and Iranian dual nationality, was convicted of spying for the United Kingdom in Iran, which he denied, sentenced to death and executed; whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmadreza Djalali, who specialises in emergency medicine and is a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces; whereas he was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018; whereas Franco-Iranian researcher Fariba Adelkhah was arrested in June 2019 and sentenced to five years in prison for ‘undermining national security’; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Iran does not recognise dual nationality, thereby limiting the access that foreign embassies have to their dual nationals held in the country; whereas ex-deputy Iranian Defence Minister Alireza Akbari, a holder of British and Iranian dual nationality, was convicted of spying for the United Kingdom in Iran, which he denied, sentenced to death and executed; whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmadreza Djalali, who specialises in emergency medicine and is a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces; whereas he was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018; whereas Franco-Iranian researcher Fariba Adelkhah was arrested in June 2019 and sentenced to five years in prison for ‘undermining national security’;

| F. | whereas other EU nationals are being arbitrarily detained in Iran, including the Belgian national Olivier Vandecasteele, who was sentenced to a total of 40 years in prison and dozens of lashes on the basis of a series of fabricated allegations; whereas the sentence was handed down after Belgium’s highest court suspended a controversial bilateral treaty on prisoner exchanges that would have allowed Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi, convicted of attempted terrorism in Belgium, to be sent back to the Islamic Republic of Iran in return for Olivier Vandecasteele’s freedom; whereas seven French citizens are still being detained in Iran, including Cécile Kohler, a teacher and trade unionist, and her partner Jacques Paris, as well as Benjamin Brière, who were arrested in May 2020 and sentenced to eight years and eight months in prison for ‘espionage’; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas other EU nationals are being arbitrarily detained in Iran, including the Belgian national Olivier Vandecasteele, who was sentenced to a total of 40 years in prison and dozens of lashes on the basis of a series of fabricated allegations; whereas the sentence was handed down after Belgium’s highest court suspended a controversial bilateral treaty on prisoner exchanges that would have allowed Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi, convicted of attempted terrorism in Belgium, to be sent back to the Islamic Republic of Iran in return for Olivier Vandecasteele’s freedom; whereas seven French citizens are still being detained in Iran, including Cécile Kohler, a teacher and trade unionist, and her partner Jacques Paris, as well as Benjamin Brière, who were arrested in May 2020 and sentenced to eight years and eight months in prison for ‘espionage’;

| G. | whereas Iran has the world’s highest number of executions per capita; whereas the Iranian regime has imposed and carried out death sentences against peaceful protesters, including minors, following unfair and summary judicial proceedings violating the most basic and fundamental requirements of a fair trial; whereas Amnesty International has found evidence that the Iranian regime continues to wield the death penalty as a weapon of repression to crush protest; whereas the police and security forces of the Islamic Republic perpetrate widespread torture, rape, and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment against detainees in Iranian prisons; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas Iran has the world’s highest number of executions per capita; whereas the Iranian regime has imposed and carried out death sentences against peaceful protesters, including minors, following unfair and summary judicial proceedings violating the most basic and fundamental requirements of a fair trial; whereas Amnesty International has found evidence that the Iranian regime continues to wield the death penalty as a weapon of repression to crush protest; whereas the police and security forces of the Islamic Republic perpetrate widespread torture, rape, and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment against detainees in Iranian prisons;

| H. | whereas Amnesty International has compiled a list of approximately 25 individuals who are at serious risk of execution, notably Mohammad Ghobadlou; whereas Amnesty International raises fears that many more people could face the death penalty for their participation in the protests; whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that more than 40 Iranian artists have been charged with crimes carrying the death penalty; whereas Iranian actors, musicians, athletes and other celebrities have publicly backed the protests against the clerical establishment; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Amnesty International has compiled a list of approximately 25 individuals who are at serious risk of execution, notably Mohammad Ghobadlou; whereas Amnesty International raises fears that many more people could face the death penalty for their participation in the protests; whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that more than 40 Iranian artists have been charged with crimes carrying the death penalty; whereas Iranian actors, musicians, athletes and other celebrities have publicly backed the protests against the clerical establishment;

| I. | whereas the human rights situation in Iran is continuing to deteriorate; whereas the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and others, as well as the current wave of executions, are illustrative of the ongoing human rights crisis in Iran; whereas this deterioration is perpetuated by the systemic impunity of the Iranian regime and its security apparatus, which has permitted widespread torture as well as extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings; whereas the Iranian criminal justice system relies heavily on forced confessions extracted through torture and other forms of coercion and constraint; whereas the worldwide abolition of the death penalty is one of the main objectives of the EU’s human rights policy; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the human rights situation in Iran is continuing to deteriorate; whereas the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and others, as well as the current wave of executions, are illustrative of the ongoing human rights crisis in Iran; whereas this deterioration is perpetuated by the systemic impunity of the Iranian regime and its security apparatus, which has permitted widespread torture as well as extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings; whereas the Iranian criminal justice system relies heavily on forced confessions extracted through torture and other forms of coercion and constraint; whereas the worldwide abolition of the death penalty is one of the main objectives of the EU’s human rights policy;

| J. | whereas, in blatant violation of the separation of powers, on 6 November 2022, 227 members of the Iranian parliament called on the judiciary to act decisively against people arrested during the protests and to make use of the death penalty as a punishment; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas, in blatant violation of the separation of powers, on 6 November 2022, 227 members of the Iranian parliament called on the judiciary to act decisively against people arrested during the protests and to make use of the death penalty as a punishment;

| K. | whereas the Iranian Constitution grants ethnic minorities equal rights; whereas the death penalty is disproportionately applied to LGBTIQ+ people and those belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, notably the Baluch, Kurds, Arabs, Baha’is and Christians; whereas an increasing number of human rights defenders have been arrested since the killings and the crackdown started; whereas women and girls, who have been at the forefront of protests, including members of ethnic and religious minorities, have been arrested and jailed for demanding an end to systemic and systematic discriminatory laws, policies and practices, and are being particularly targeted with charges carrying the death penalty and with death sentences; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Iranian Constitution grants ethnic minorities equal rights; whereas the death penalty is disproportionately applied to LGBTIQ+ people and those belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, notably the Baluch, Kurds, Arabs, Baha’is and Christians; whereas an increasing number of human rights defenders have been arrested since the killings and the crackdown started; whereas women and girls, who have been at the forefront of protests, including members of ethnic and religious minorities, have been arrested and jailed for demanding an end to systemic and systematic discriminatory laws, policies and practices, and are being particularly targeted with charges carrying the death penalty and with death sentences;

| L. | whereas a group of human rights experts, including several UN Special Procedures mandate-holders, have issued a statement condemning the killings and the crackdown by security forces in Iran on protesters; whereas the experts conveyed their deep concerns about the ‘excessive and lethal force’ used against demonstrators in the protests that followed Ms Amini’s death, including sexual violence against women and girls, intimidation and harassment against protesters, and systematic impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations; whereas the UN Experts urged the Iranian regime on 11 November 2022 to stop indicting people with charges punishable by death for their participation, or alleged participation, in peaceful demonstrations; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas a group of human rights experts, including several UN Special Procedures mandate-holders, have issued a statement condemning the killings and the crackdown by security forces in Iran on protesters; whereas the experts conveyed their deep concerns about the ‘excessive and lethal force’ used against demonstrators in the protests that followed Ms Amini’s death, including sexual violence against women and girls, intimidation and harassment against protesters, and systematic impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations; whereas the UN Experts urged the Iranian regime on 11 November 2022 to stop indicting people with charges punishable by death for their participation, or alleged participation, in peaceful demonstrations;

| M. | whereas the UN Experts called on the Human Rights Council to urgently take the necessary actions to hold a special session on the situation in Iran and to establish an international investigative mechanism, to ensure accountability in Iran and to end the persistent impunity for grave human rights violations; whereas the Human Rights Council held a special session on 24 November 2022 on the situation in Iran; whereas at this special session it was agreed that an independent international fact-finding mission should investigate human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, collect and analyse evidence and engage with stakeholders to establish the facts surrounding these allegations with a view to bringing all perpetrators of severe human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the highest authorities, to justice; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the UN Experts called on the Human Rights Council to urgently take the necessary actions to hold a special session on the situation in Iran and to establish an international investigative mechanism, to ensure accountability in Iran and to end the persistent impunity for grave human rights violations; whereas the Human Rights Council held a special session on 24 November 2022 on the situation in Iran; whereas at this special session it was agreed that an independent international fact-finding mission should investigate human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, collect and analyse evidence and engage with stakeholders to establish the facts surrounding these allegations with a view to bringing all perpetrators of severe human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the highest authorities, to justice;

| N. | whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated on 10 January 2023 that the weaponisation of criminal procedures to punish people for exercising their basic rights amounts to state sanctioned killing; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated on 10 January 2023 that the weaponisation of criminal procedures to punish people for exercising their basic rights amounts to state sanctioned killing;

| O. | whereas the EU foreign affairs ministers adopted Council conclusions on Iran on 12 December 2022; whereas these conclusions notably call on the Iranian authorities to immediately abolish the deplorable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and ensure that due process is provided to all detainees; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the EU foreign affairs ministers adopted Council conclusions on Iran on 12 December 2022; whereas these conclusions notably call on the Iranian authorities to immediately abolish the deplorable practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters as well as to annul without delay the recent death penalty sentences pronounced in the context of the ongoing protests and ensure that due process is provided to all detainees;

| P. | whereas on 9 January 2023, the Secretary-General of the EEAS summoned the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union, on behalf of the High Representative, to reiterate the EU’s abhorrence at the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, who were arrested and sentenced to death in connection with the protests in Iran; whereas Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard were executed for their participation in the protests on 8 and 12 December 2022, respectively; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas on 9 January 2023, the Secretary-General of the EEAS summoned the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the European Union, on behalf of the High Representative, to reiterate the EU’s abhorrence at the recent executions of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, who were arrested and sentenced to death in connection with the protests in Iran; whereas Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard were executed for their participation in the protests on 8 and 12 December 2022, respectively;

| Q. | whereas Canada and the United States issued a joint statement on 9 December 2022 condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s brutal acts of violence against peaceful protesters and the ongoing repression of the Iranian people and the oppression and state-sponsored violence against women; whereas both countries further adopted sanctions against Iranian officials connected to human rights abuses, including those committed as part of the ongoing brutal crackdown; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas Canada and the United States issued a joint statement on 9 December 2022 condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s brutal acts of violence against peaceful protesters and the ongoing repression of the Iranian people and the oppression and state-sponsored violence against women; whereas both countries further adopted sanctions against Iranian officials connected to human rights abuses, including those committed as part of the ongoing brutal crackdown;

| R. | whereas the EU has recently and on several occasions adopted restrictive measures related to these blatant violations of human rights, notably against high-ranking individuals within the IRGC, including asset freezes, bans on travel to the EU and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available for the listed individuals and entities in response to their role in the violent crackdown in Iran and the Islamic Republic’s provision of armed drones used in terrorist activities perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; whereas the list of those subject to EU restrictive measures in the context of the existing Iran human rights sanctions regime now comprises a total of 126 individuals and 11 entities; whereas the EU sanctions list notably includes Iran’s Minister of Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, its Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Issa Zarepour, the Iranian law enforcement forces and the provincial heads of the IRGC; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the EU has recently and on several occasions adopted restrictive measures related to these blatant violations of human rights, notably against high-ranking individuals within the IRGC, including asset freezes, bans on travel to the EU and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available for the listed individuals and entities in response to their role in the violent crackdown in Iran and the Islamic Republic’s provision of armed drones used in terrorist activities perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; whereas the list of those subject to EU restrictive measures in the context of the existing Iran human rights sanctions regime now comprises a total of 126 individuals and 11 entities; whereas the EU sanctions list notably includes Iran’s Minister of Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, its Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Issa Zarepour, the Iranian law enforcement forces and the provincial heads of the IRGC;

| S. | whereas, as a reciprocal action, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted counter-measures under the sanctions mechanism which notably target Ms Neumann, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the Arab Peninsula, as well as other Members and German and French former politicians; whereas in response to Iran’s sanctions on Members of the European Parliament, in November 2022 Parliament decided that its delegations and committees will no longer engage with the Iranian authorities; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas, as a reciprocal action, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted counter-measures under the sanctions mechanism which notably target Ms Neumann, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the Arab Peninsula, as well as other Members and German and French former politicians; whereas in response to Iran’s sanctions on Members of the European Parliament, in November 2022 Parliament decided that its delegations and committees will no longer engage with the Iranian authorities;

| T. | whereas the Islamic Republic, in particular through the IRGC, engages in large-scale, sophisticated and violent transnational repression activities targeting exiled and diaspora activists, dissidents, independent journalists, and human rights defenders, including on EU soil, as well as threatening and harassing their family members in Iran; whereas the Islamic Republic, both directly and by acting through local proxies, has assassinated diaspora dissidents, kidnapped exiles for abduction to Iran, and plotted bomb attacks in several countries, including EU Member States; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the Islamic Republic, in particular through the IRGC, engages in large-scale, sophisticated and violent transnational repression activities targeting exiled and diaspora activists, dissidents, independent journalists, and human rights defenders, including on EU soil, as well as threatening and harassing their family members in Iran; whereas the Islamic Republic, both directly and by acting through local proxies, has assassinated diaspora dissidents, kidnapped exiles for abduction to Iran, and plotted bomb attacks in several countries, including EU Member States;

| U. | whereas the regime of the Islamic Republic is deliberately disrupting internet and mobile connections and severely restricting social media platforms to undermine the ability of the Iranian population to organise protests; whereas the EU sanctions regime also includes a ban on exports to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment which might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the regime of the Islamic Republic is deliberately disrupting internet and mobile connections and severely restricting social media platforms to undermine the ability of the Iranian population to organise protests; whereas the EU sanctions regime also includes a ban on exports to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment which might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications;

| V. | whereas Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell, in his statements of 8 December 2022 and 7 January 2023, condemned the execution of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hossein; whereas his statements call on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters; whereas, in these statements, the EU further calls on the Iranian authorities to annul without delay the recent death sentences and to strictly abide by their international obligations; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell, in his statements of 8 December 2022 and 7 January 2023, condemned the execution of Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hossein; whereas his statements call on the Iranian authorities to immediately end the practice of imposing and carrying out death sentences against protesters; whereas, in these statements, the EU further calls on the Iranian authorities to annul without delay the recent death sentences and to strictly abide by their international obligations;

| W. | whereas the Islamic Republic has accused Kurdish groups, including those inside Iraq, of inciting protests in Iranian Kurdistan; whereas, under this pretext, the IRGC has launched armed attacks against the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, killing dozens, including civilians; whereas the crackdown on the protests has been especially severe in northwest and southeast Iran, where many members of the country’s Kurdish and Baluch minorities live; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas the Islamic Republic has accused Kurdish groups, including those inside Iraq, of inciting protests in Iranian Kurdistan; whereas, under this pretext, the IRGC has launched armed attacks against the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, killing dozens, including civilians; whereas the crackdown on the protests has been especially severe in northwest and southeast Iran, where many members of the country’s Kurdish and Baluch minorities live;

| X. | whereas the IRGC, comprised of the paramilitary Basij militia, the Quds Force, the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Force and the Navy, plays a central role in the repression of internal dissent and external military activity; whereas the IRGC, acting as a state within a state, reportedly controls two thirds of the Iranian economy, including holdings in the infrastructure, petrochemicals, financial, telecommunications, automotive, and marine industry sectors, as well as sizeable patronage trusts known as ‘bonyads’ and large-scale illicit smuggling networks; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas the IRGC, comprised of the paramilitary Basij militia, the Quds Force, the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Force and the Navy, plays a central role in the repression of internal dissent and external military activity; whereas the IRGC, acting as a state within a state, reportedly controls two thirds of the Iranian economy, including holdings in the infrastructure, petrochemicals, financial, telecommunications, automotive, and marine industry sectors, as well as sizeable patronage trusts known as ‘bonyads’ and large-scale illicit smuggling networks;

| Y. | whereas women and girls are brutally murdered in Iran in so-called ‘honour killings’; whereas victims often receive no justice in crimes committed against them in the name of ‘honour’; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas women and girls are brutally murdered in Iran in so-called ‘honour killings’; whereas victims often receive no justice in crimes committed against them in the name of ‘honour’;

| Z. | whereas the IRGC perpetrates, guides and contributes to terrorist activity both domestically and regionally; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine has resulted in the deepening of Tehran’s relations with Moscow; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas the IRGC perpetrates, guides and contributes to terrorist activity both domestically and regionally; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine has resulted in the deepening of Tehran’s relations with Moscow;

| AA. | whereas the aggressive interior policy of the Mullah regime is emulated in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy; whereas the regime contributes to destabilising the whole Middle East region and beyond; |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas the aggressive interior policy of the Mullah regime is emulated in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy; whereas the regime contributes to destabilising the whole Middle East region and beyond;

| AB. | whereas Ebrahim Raisi, who was elected President of Iran in June 2021 and is on the US sanctions list, previously served as chief of the Iranian judiciary, despite having a well-documented record of grave human rights violations; whereas Ebrahim Raisi’s victory was engineered by the Islamic Republic’s institutions in elections that were not fully free or fair; whereas only 7 out of 592 candidates received the green light from the Guardian Council to run for the presidency; whereas none of the candidates were women, persons from minority groups or those who held views opposed to the regime’s; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas Ebrahim Raisi, who was elected President of Iran in June 2021 and is on the US sanctions list, previously served as chief of the Iranian judiciary, despite having a well-documented record of grave human rights violations; whereas Ebrahim Raisi’s victory was engineered by the Islamic Republic’s institutions in elections that were not fully free or fair; whereas only 7 out of 592 candidates received the green light from the Guardian Council to run for the presidency; whereas none of the candidates were women, persons from minority groups or those who held views opposed to the regime’s;

| AC. | whereas negotiations on the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have still not been officially suspended; whereas talks continue on the safeguards probe that was launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency after it found traces of uranium at three undeclared sites in Iran; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas negotiations on the renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have still not been officially suspended; whereas talks continue on the safeguards probe that was launched by the International Atomic Energy Agency after it found traces of uranium at three undeclared sites in Iran;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest terms the death sentences against and executions of peaceful protesters in Iran, notably Mohsen Shekari, Majidreza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini; demands that the Iranian authorities immediately and unconditionally halt any plans to carry out executions and refrain from seeking further death sentences; calls on the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to establish an official moratorium on executions with the objective of abolishing the death penalty completely; urges the Iranian authorities to quash all convictions and death sentences; reiterates its firm and principled opposition to the use of capital punishment at all times and in all circumstances; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all protesters sentenced to death, including Mohammed Boroughani, Mohammad Ghobadlou, Hamid Ghare Hassanlou, Mahan Sadrat Marani, Hossein Mohammadi, Manouchehr Mehman Navaz, Sahand Nourmohammad-Zadeh, Saman Seydi, Reza Arya, Saleh Mirhashemi Baltaghi, Saeed Yaqoubi Kordafli, Javad Rouhi, Arshia Takdastan, and Mehdi Mohammadifard, Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaghoubi; strongly condemns the fact that the criminal proceedings and the death penalty have been weaponised by the Iranian regime to stamp out dissent and to punish people for exercising their basic rights; calls on the Islamic Republic to review its legal code and eliminate moharebeh (‘enmity against God’) and mofsed-e-filarz (‘corruption on earth’) as punishable offences; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Expresses its solidarity with the Iranian youth, women and men, including minorities, leading and participating in the protests; supports the peaceful protest movement across the country against the systemic and increasing oppression and against the severe and mass violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people to live in a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country; condemns the Iranian regime’s systematic discrimination against women through laws and regulations that severely restrict their freedoms, lives and livelihoods; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Extends its condolences to the families of all those who have been killed, tortured, abducted or unlawfully imprisoned following the recent and previous protests in Iran; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Reiterates its strong condemnation of the widespread, brutal, intentional and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against peaceful protesters; calls on the Iranian authorities to put an end to the crackdown on their own citizens; recalls that the right to peaceful assembly must be ensured; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Demands that the international community and the EU and its Member States use all engagements with the authorities of the Islamic Republic to demand an immediate end to the execution of protesters and violent crackdown against protests, and the unconditional release of all those arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly; calls on the EEAS and Member States to continue holding the Iranian regime accountable for the killing of its own people and grave human rights violations; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Iranian regime to allow for an international, impartial and effective investigation into the regime’s human rights abuses, including Jina Mahsa Amini’s killing, the killing of hundreds of protesters, and torture and ill-treatment suffered by those arbitrarily detained, to be conducted by an independent competent authority in cooperation with international organisations; demands that the Iranian authorities allow for a swift, evidence-based, impartial and effective investigation into all killings of protesters and that those responsible be brought to justice; underlines that the EU should continue to address the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and the way the Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Urges the immediate release of all individuals detained for their involvement in peaceful demonstrations, and all political prisoners; calls for targeted restrictive measures to be imposed under Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 on all judges issuing sentences against protesters; further demands that the Iranian authorities immediately and unconditionally drop all charges against anyone who is imprisoned solely for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly in connection with the protests; calls on the Iranian authorities to live up to their international obligations, including those under the ICCPR; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Welcomes the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 12 December 2022 and the adoption of the recent restrictive measures against those involved in the violence against protesters and against all those associated with the ‘morality’ police, who are found complicit in or responsible for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini; considers, nevertheless, that the Iranian regime’s blatant disregard for the human dignity and democratic aspirations of its own citizens as well as its support to the Russian Federation necessitate further adjustments in the EU’s position towards Iran; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to expand the EU sanctions list to all individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations and their family members, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi, and Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, as well as all foundations (‘bonyads’) linked to the IRGC, notably the Bonyad Mostazafan and the Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan; calls also on the VP/HR, the Council and the Member States to consider sanctions against the 227 Members of the Iranian parliament who encouraged the use of death sentences; welcomes the ongoing preparation in the United Kingdom for the inclusion of the IRGC on the UK list of terrorist organisations; vigorously condemns the sanctions imposed by the Iranian authorities against German and French former politicians as well as against Members of the European Parliament; recalls that as long as European parliamentarians are sanctioned by the authorities, the inter-parliamentary dialogue should remain suspended; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Council and the Member States to add the IRGC and its subsidiary forces, including the paramilitary Basij militia and the Quds Force, to the EU terrorist list, and to ban any economic and financial activity involving businesses and commercial activities related to, owned, wholly or in part, by, or fronting for, the IRGC or IRGC-affiliated individuals, regardless of their country of operation, while avoiding any adverse consequences for the people of Iran as well as for EU humanitarian and development aid; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to urge any country in which the IRGC deploys military, economic, or informational operations to sever and outlaw ties with the IRGC; strongly condemns the IRGC’s unprovoked attack in the Erbil Governorate of Iraqi Kurdistan and stresses that such indiscriminate attacks threaten innocent civilians and the region’s stability; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Reiterates its strong condemnation of the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, for which the Islamic Republic, its highest leadership and its security forces, including the IRGC, hold sole responsibility; demands that the Iranian authorities respect ethnic and religious minorities and LGBTIQ+ people’s fundamental rights and freedoms; calls on the Iranian authorities to eliminate all forms of discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the establishment of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, mandated by the UN Human Rights Council in resolution S35/1 of 24 November 2022 to investigate human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran and collect and analyse related evidence, and calls for its swift deployment; urges the authorities of the Islamic Republic to provide the fact-finding mission with full and unimpeded access to carry out its mandate and to refrain from harassing and intimidating those, or the family members of those, who cooperate with the fact-finding mission; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully support preparations for, and the implementation of, the fact-finding mission; urges the UN Human Rights Council to immediately refer the Iranian case to the UN Security Council in the absence of cooperation from the Islamic Republic; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Further asks the Iranian authorities to allow visits of all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, and particularly to ensure that the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran is allowed to enter the country; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Demands that the Iranian regime release all human rights defenders; asks the Iranian regime to cease targeting all human rights defenders in Iran and to guarantee, in all circumstances, their ability to carry out their legitimate human rights activities without fear of reprisals and free from all restrictions, including judicial harassment; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Condemns the arrest of dozens of journalists and calls on the Iranian authorities to release them immediately; is deeply concerned about the arrest of more than 80 media workers, including Niloofar Hamedi, the journalist who first broke the news about Jina Mahsa Amini’s arrest and hospitalisation, and calls on the Iranian authorities to free them without delay; calls on the Islamic Republic to respect the freedom of expression and belief of everyone living in Iran; expresses its concern about the criminalisation of and violence against medical professionals by the security forces and calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide civilian medical personnel with all available assistance so they can provide impartial medical aid; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic use of torture, including sexual violence as a weapon, in Iranian prisons and calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of torture and ill-treatment of all detainees; strongly condemns the Islamic Republic’s policy of forcing confessions using torture, intimidation, threats against family members or other forms of duress, and the use of these forced confessions to convict and sentence protesters; further condemns the practice of denying detainees access to phone calls and family visits; expresses grave concerns about detainees’ inability to access legal representation during interrogations; calls on the Iranian regime to treat prisoners with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings; reiterates its call on Iran to ratify without delay the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to act in full accordance with the provisions contained therein; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release all EU nationals arrested and drop all charges against them; strongly condemns the sentencing of Belgian national and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staffer, Olivier Vandecasteele, to 40 years in prison, 74 lashes, and a fine amounting to EUR 1 million on fabricated espionage charges, and the continued imprisonment of, and death sentence issued against, Swedish national Ahmadreza Djalali, as well as the Islamic Republic’s cynical use of hostage diplomacy to force the release of convicted terrorist Asadollah Asadi; calls for the immediate and unconditional release and safe repatriation of Ahmadreza Djalali and Olivier Vandecasteele and the seven French citizens still detained in Iran including Cécile Kohler; condemns in the strongest terms the execution in Iran of Iranian-British national Alireza Akbari; expresses further concern about the public threats by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security against European embassies; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on Member States and NGOs to store, preserve and share any available evidence that may contribute to investigations, and to cooperate with and support the work of the International Criminal Court; urges the Iranian authorities to take steps to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; stresses that the continuous and grave human rights violations being committed by the Iranian regime against its own people jeopardise the negotiations on the JCPOA; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Strongly condemns the Islamic Republic’s continued practice of shutting down internet and mobile networks in the context of protests in the country, which prevents communication and the free flow of information for Iranian citizens; underscores that such actions are a clear violation of international law; welcomes the various EU restrictive measures enacted under the sanctions mechanism in response to the repression, notably those targeting individuals and entities active in the area of information and communications technology and those responsible for disinformation; further welcomes the addition of the Iranian minister of information and communications technology to the EU sanctions list; calls on the Commission to consider, in compliance with the principle of necessity, allowing EU-based communications providers to offer safe tools to the citizens and residents of Iran; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Calls on the Member States to commit to enabling Iranians to access a free internet in spite of the regime’s massive internet censorship; suggests that the necessary technical and financial resources could be provided through an EU fund; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Urges all Member States to exercise universal jurisdiction over all Iranian officials reasonably suspected of criminal responsibility for crimes under international law and other grave violations of human rights; urges those Member States whose domestic legislation does not yet provide for the enactment of the principle of universal jurisdiction to introduce such legislation without delay; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls for the expansion of restrictive measures in the light of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provide unmanned aerial vehicles and plans to provide surface-to-surface missiles to the Russian Federation for use against Ukraine; stresses that the Islamic Republic is contributing to war crimes in Ukraine, as these weapons are being used to target civilians and civilian infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on the Commission and the Council to close all loopholes in the enforcement of existing sanctions, including financial loopholes, to ensure their strict implementation and to closely coordinate and cooperate with international partners for effective implementation of restrictive measures; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Expresses deep concern over the structural transnational repression carried out by the authorities of the Islamic Republic, which includes espionage, assassinations, attempted bomb attacks, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and other control efforts, in particular by its embassies and the IRGC, against the Iranian diaspora living in the EU, which stifles the freedom of speech and of expression of EU citizens and residents, endangers their safety, and amounts to malign interference; calls on the EU and the Member States to expand protections for the Iranian diaspora against the Islamic Republic’s transnational repression; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to find avenues for providing technical and capacity support to those helping Iranian civil society while ensuring Iranian ownership of these activities; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Condemns the recent attacks by Iranian officials against the newspaper Charlie Hebdo and welcomes the launch of the investigation into the cyberattack on the newspaper following the publication of satirical cartoons; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls for the EU, including the VP/HR, to continue raising human rights concerns with the Iranian authorities in bilateral and multilateral forums and to use all planned engagements with the Iranian authorities for that purpose, in particular in the context of the EU-Iran High Level Political Dialogue; reaffirms that respect for human rights is a core component in the development of EU-Iran relations; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Reiterates its call on all Member States to jointly make public statements and undertake diplomatic initiatives to monitor unfair trials and visit prisons where EU hostages in Iran, human rights defenders and other prisoners of conscience are being detained; encourages stronger coordination among the EU embassies accredited in Tehran; urges all Member States with a diplomatic presence in Tehran to use the mechanisms provided for in the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders to support and provide assistance to the individuals sentenced to death and to those unlawfully condemned and arrested; urges the Member States to ensure that prisoners are able to receive visitors and to carefully monitor their detention conditions; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Urges the Iranian authorities to grant independent observers from Member States’ embassies in Iran access to all trials connected to the protests; asks the Member States to monitor all trials connected with the protests, with particular attention to capital trials, and to publicly denounce their flaws; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to extend and enhance tangible support for the democratic aspirations of the people of Iran, notably by enhancing support for independent human rights and civil society organisations, as well as independent media platforms, and by supporting the efforts of like-minded partners to maintain internet connectivity in Iran; encourages the democratic opposition of Iran to pursue greater unity where possible, on the basis of shared values and with the involvement of exiled and diaspora Iranians, in order to facilitate further support by the international community; urges the EU and its Member States to increase their strategic communications directed towards the Iranian people, notably by enhancing the mandate of the EEAS StratCom Task Force South to include the Islamic Republic and by substantially increasing its funding and visibility; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to facilitate the issuance of visas to any person who has a well-founded fear of persecution for peacefully exercising his or her right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly in connection with the demonstrations in Iran; calls on the EEAS to reach out to Iran’s immediate neighbours to ensure that border crossings remain open to activists fleeing Iran and to ensure that these individuals can safely apply for asylum in Europe from these countries; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Office of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. |
| --- | --- |

32.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0352.

(2)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 286.

(3)  Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/2433 of 12 December 2022 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran (OJ L 318 I, 12.12.2022, p. 36).

(4)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

(5)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70.

(6)  OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6.

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/123 |
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16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/123

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P9_TA(2023)0017

Control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — annual report 2021

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — Annual Report 2021 (2022/2153(INI))

(2023/C 214/12)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the European Investment Bank (EIB) activity report 2021 entitled ‘The Innovation Response’, published on 27 January 2022, |
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having regard to the European Investment Bank (EIB) activity report 2021 entitled ‘The Innovation Response’, published on 27 January 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Financial Report 2021 and the EIB report on financing and borrowing activities 2021, both published on 5 May 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Financial Report 2021 and the EIB report on financing and borrowing activities 2021, both published on 5 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2021, published on 20 January 2021, |
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having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2021, published on 20 January 2021,

| — | having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2020/2021: Building a smart and green Europe in the COVID-19 era, published on 21 January 2021, |
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having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2020/2021: Building a smart and green Europe in the COVID-19 era, published on 21 January 2021,

| — | having regard to the implementation plan for the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap 2021-2025, adopted by the EIB’s Board of Directors on 14 November 2020 and published on 14 December 2020, |
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having regard to the implementation plan for the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap 2021-2025, adopted by the EIB’s Board of Directors on 14 November 2020 and published on 14 December 2020,

| — | having regard to the EIB Climate Strategy, adopted in November 2020 and published on 15 November 2020, |
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having regard to the EIB Climate Strategy, adopted in November 2020 and published on 15 November 2020,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2021, published on 6 July 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2021, published on 6 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework, adopted on 2 February 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Group Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework, adopted on 2 February 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2021, published on 21 July 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2021, published on 21 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Fraud Investigations Activity Report 2021, published on 7 July 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Fraud Investigations Activity Report 2021, published on 7 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the Annual Report of the Procurement Complaints Activity and the Procurement Complaints Committee of the European Investment Bank 2021, published on 7 April 2022, |
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having regard to the Annual Report of the Procurement Complaints Activity and the Procurement Complaints Committee of the European Investment Bank 2021, published on 7 April 2022,

| — | having regard to the working arrangement signed by the EIB, the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on 7 December 2021, |
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having regard to the working arrangement signed by the EIB, the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on 7 December 2021,

| — | having regard to the EIB Compliance Activity Report 2021, published on 25 August 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Compliance Activity Report 2021, published on 25 August 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group PATH Framework — Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement (Paris Alignment for Counterparties framework), published on 26 October 2021, |
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having regard to the EIB Group PATH Framework — Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement (Paris Alignment for Counterparties framework), published on 26 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group Anti-Fraud Policy, published on 5 August 2021, |
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having regard to the EIB Group Anti-Fraud Policy, published on 5 August 2021,

| — | having regard to the 2020 Annual Report of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee, published on 8 April 2022, and to the Committee’s operating rules, |
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having regard to the 2020 Annual Report of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee, published on 8 April 2022, and to the Committee’s operating rules,

| — | having regard to the codes of conduct for EIB Group staff, for members of its Audit Committee and for its Management Committee, |
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having regard to the codes of conduct for EIB Group staff, for members of its Audit Committee and for its Management Committee,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group’s Risk Management Disclosure Report 2021, published on 9 August 2022, |
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having regard to the EIB Group’s Risk Management Disclosure Report 2021, published on 9 August 2022,

| — | having regard to the EIB’s Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to the EIB’s Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the European Investment Bank (the Tripartite Agreement), which came into force in November 2021, |
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having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the European Investment Bank (the Tripartite Agreement), which came into force in November 2021,

| — | having regard to the EIB Group Transparency Policy, published on 18 November 2021, and to its whistleblowing policy, published on 24 November 2021, |
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having regard to the EIB Group Transparency Policy, published on 18 November 2021, and to its whistleblowing policy, published on 24 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the new EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, published on 13 October 2021, |
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having regard to the new EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, published on 13 October 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — annual report 2020 (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank — annual report 2020 (1),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0294/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0294/2022),

| A. | whereas the EIB Group consists of the EIB and the EIF, is the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world and one of the largest providers of climate finance; whereas the EIB focuses on the priority areas of climate and environment, development, innovation and skills, small and medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure and cohesion; whereas the EIF supports small and medium-sized enterprises with financing for entrepreneurship, growth, innovation and research, employment and regional development; |
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A.

whereas the EIB Group consists of the EIB and the EIF, is the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world and one of the largest providers of climate finance; whereas the EIB focuses on the priority areas of climate and environment, development, innovation and skills, small and medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure and cohesion; whereas the EIF supports small and medium-sized enterprises with financing for entrepreneurship, growth, innovation and research, employment and regional development;

| B. | whereas the EIB is required by the treaties to contribute to EU integration, as well as to the balanced and steady development of the internal market, taking into account public policy goals such as social cohesion and sustainable development, in order to address inequalities by providing better conditions for accessing jobs and education opportunities, public infrastructures and services, and promoting a healthy and sustainable environment; |
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B.

whereas the EIB is required by the treaties to contribute to EU integration, as well as to the balanced and steady development of the internal market, taking into account public policy goals such as social cohesion and sustainable development, in order to address inequalities by providing better conditions for accessing jobs and education opportunities, public infrastructures and services, and promoting a healthy and sustainable environment;

| C. | whereas the EIB is bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas human rights principles are integrated into its due diligence procedures and standards, including publicly available ex-ante assessments; |
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C.

whereas the EIB is bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas human rights principles are integrated into its due diligence procedures and standards, including publicly available ex-ante assessments;

| D. | whereas EIB investments have the capacity to support the social sector, including health, housing and education; |
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D.

whereas EIB investments have the capacity to support the social sector, including health, housing and education;

| E. | whereas territorial and social cohesion, sustainable development and tackling unemployment, poverty and social exclusion should be at the heart of the EIB’s activity; whereas sustainability is required to be integrated into any lending, borrowing and advisory activities because the EIB’s remit is to foster sustainable growth within the European Union and abroad; whereas support for cohesion is enshrined in its Statute and the EIB’s investments aim at contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market; |
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E.

whereas territorial and social cohesion, sustainable development and tackling unemployment, poverty and social exclusion should be at the heart of the EIB’s activity; whereas sustainability is required to be integrated into any lending, borrowing and advisory activities because the EIB’s remit is to foster sustainable growth within the European Union and abroad; whereas support for cohesion is enshrined in its Statute and the EIB’s investments aim at contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market;

| F. | whereas the EIB plays a key role as the EU climate bank in the fight against the global emergencies of climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss; whereas the EIB is committed to aligning all of its activities to the Paris Agreement in order to increase the annual financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to more than 50 % of total lending by 2025; whereas it is committed to investing at least EUR 1 trillion in climate financing over the next decade; |
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F.

whereas the EIB plays a key role as the EU climate bank in the fight against the global emergencies of climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss; whereas the EIB is committed to aligning all of its activities to the Paris Agreement in order to increase the annual financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to more than 50 % of total lending by 2025; whereas it is committed to investing at least EUR 1 trillion in climate financing over the next decade;

| G. | whereas the Guarantee Agreement with the EIB Group (EIB and EIF) under InvestEU was negotiated in 2021 and at the beginning of 2022 and was signed on 7 March 2022; |
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G.

whereas the Guarantee Agreement with the EIB Group (EIB and EIF) under InvestEU was negotiated in 2021 and at the beginning of 2022 and was signed on 7 March 2022;

| H. | whereas the Member States may entrust to the EIB the implementation of financial instruments which they use to invest Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds into eligible projects; whereas the EIB may offer further financing and dedicated advisory support to the Member States for investing their RRF funds; |
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H.

whereas the Member States may entrust to the EIB the implementation of financial instruments which they use to invest Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds into eligible projects; whereas the EIB may offer further financing and dedicated advisory support to the Member States for investing their RRF funds;

| I. | whereas the EIB contributes to implementing the political and economic goals of the European Union and supports the Union’s external action priorities in all regions around the world, including in politically sensitive countries in the Eastern and Mediterranean Neighbourhood regions; |
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I.

whereas the EIB contributes to implementing the political and economic goals of the European Union and supports the Union’s external action priorities in all regions around the world, including in politically sensitive countries in the Eastern and Mediterranean Neighbourhood regions;

| J. | whereas the EIB is the largest multilateral lender in the EU Neighbourhood regions, covering the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa; whereas the EIB runs operations outside the European Union through a network of nearly 30 external offices located in Africa, Latin America and Asia; |
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J.

whereas the EIB is the largest multilateral lender in the EU Neighbourhood regions, covering the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa; whereas the EIB runs operations outside the European Union through a network of nearly 30 external offices located in Africa, Latin America and Asia;

| K. | whereas the EIB Group works closely with the EU institutions and other partners to support the Union’s objectives and policy priorities; whereas, in particular in the framework of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the EIB Group works in conjunction with the Commission and with national promotional banks and institutions and development finance institutions; whereas in order to achieve the principles and goals of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2020, the EIB Group worked in coordination with the European External Action Service and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; |
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K.

whereas the EIB Group works closely with the EU institutions and other partners to support the Union’s objectives and policy priorities; whereas, in particular in the framework of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the EIB Group works in conjunction with the Commission and with national promotional banks and institutions and development finance institutions; whereas in order to achieve the principles and goals of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2020, the EIB Group worked in coordination with the European External Action Service and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

| L. | whereas the EIB is at the forefront of tackling the COVID-19 crisis in the European Union and has made a considerable effort to offer additional support in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by establishing the new Pan-European Guarantee Fund (EGF) to provide capital for SMEs, which have been hit particularly hard by the effects of the crisis; |
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L.

whereas the EIB is at the forefront of tackling the COVID-19 crisis in the European Union and has made a considerable effort to offer additional support in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by establishing the new Pan-European Guarantee Fund (EGF) to provide capital for SMEs, which have been hit particularly hard by the effects of the crisis;

| M. | whereas the EIB’s AAA rating is necessary to ensure appropriate market sources of financing at the most preferential rates and must therefore be preserved; |
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M.

whereas the EIB’s AAA rating is necessary to ensure appropriate market sources of financing at the most preferential rates and must therefore be preserved;

| N. | whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest levels of integrity, transparency, accountability and good governance, as well as adequate measures to effectively and efficiently combat all forms of money laundering, the financing of terrorism, organised crime and harmful tax practices, as well as the types of prohibited conduct identified in its recently reviewed Anti-Fraud Policy; |
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N.

whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest levels of integrity, transparency, accountability and good governance, as well as adequate measures to effectively and efficiently combat all forms of money laundering, the financing of terrorism, organised crime and harmful tax practices, as well as the types of prohibited conduct identified in its recently reviewed Anti-Fraud Policy;

Performance of the EIB’s financial transactions

| 1. | Underlines that the EIB is a leading issuer and continuously contributes to innovations and developments in the capital markets while promoting the most rigorous standards; |
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1.

| 2. | Remarks that on 31 December 2021 the total EIB Group balance sheet stood at EUR 568 billion, which was an increase of EUR 11,9 billion compared to 31 December 2020; |
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2.

| 3. | Notes that in 2021 the bank’s new lending signatures amounted to EUR 65,4 billion, in line with the target set in the Operational Plan 2021 and close to the results of the previous years (EUR 66,1 billion in 2020 and EUR 63,3 billion in 2019); acknowledges that EUR 54,3 billion of this amount was under the bank’s own resources (compared to EUR 64,6 billion in 2020, also under the bank’s own resources); |
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3.

| 4. | Points out that, as in previous years, the biggest share was allocated in Italy, France and Spain (16 %, 14 % and 12 % of the total signatures respectively) and that, as in previous years, the transport, global loans and energy sectors received the largest shares (30,2 %, 18,5 % and 14,8 % respectively); |
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4.

| 5. | Remarks that the total disbursements amounted to EUR 41,4 billion in 2021, of which EUR 40,4 billion was under the bank’s own resources (in 2020, disbursements amounted to EUR 58,3 billion, of which EUR 56,8 billion was under the bank’s own resources); |
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5.

| 6. | Observes that since 31 December 2021 the outstanding volume of signed loans has slightly decreased to EUR 556,4 billion (from EUR 558,7 and EUR 560,3 billion respectively in 2020 and 2019), 82 % of which was for projects within the EU (82,2 % in 2020 and 81,4 % in 2019); notes that the EIB’s disbursed loan portfolio amounted to EUR 433,4 billion, compared to EUR 444,6 and EUR 447,5 billion at the end of 2020 and 2019 respectively; |
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6.

| 7. | Underlines that the above financing trend in 2021 reflects the EIB’s increasing focus on using third-party funds in the European Union, such as transactions deployed under the EGF and decentralised financial instruments, which complement the EIB’s own resources and enable it to increase the overall volume of higher-risk transactions; remarks that the EIB only accepts taking credit, market and liquidity risk in line with its risk appetite and public mission; |
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7.

| 8. | Notes that in 2021 the EIB was the largest multilateral development bank issuer of green and sustainability use-of-proceeds bonds, reaffirming its role as leader in the global green and sustainability bond markets, with a new record of EUR 11,5 billion in climate and sustainability awareness bonds (against EUR 10,5 billion equivalent issuance in sustainability debt products in 2020); notes also that this increased the sustainability funding share in its total funding to 21 % from 15 % in 2020 (considering both climate awareness bonds and sustainability awareness bonds — CABs and SABs); |
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8.

| 9. | Appreciates the report entitled ‘Evaluation of the EIB’s Climate Awareness Bonds’, adopted in March 2021 by the EIB’s Board of Directors; understands that the CABs and SABs will be gradually aligned with the forthcoming EU Green Bond Standard (EU GBS); |
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9.

| 10. | Is aware that the EIB raises long-term funds through bond issuance on the international capital markets to meet its lending needs; notes that during 2021 the EIB raised the equivalent of EUR 55,3 billion in 21 currencies; |
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10.

| 11. | Takes note that the EIB generates income by financing large volumes of loans at a low margin and that on 31 December 2021 it reported a net profit of EUR 2,5 billion, which was an increase in comparison to EUR 1,7 billion and EUR 2,4 billion in 2020 and 2019 respectively; |
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11.

| 12. | Remarks that, because profits are retained to support the EIB’s operations, the bank’s consistent profitability has led to the build-up of considerable reserves over the years; welcomes the fact that the reserves have increased from EUR 73,5 billion at the end of 2020 to EUR 76,1 billion at the end of 2021; |
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12.

| 13. | Notes that the overall loan portfolio continued to perform well, with only 0,3 % impaired loans at the end of 2021 (compared with 0,4 % at the end of both 2020 and 2019); observes that the portion of payments overdue by more than 90 days remains very low, totalling EUR 116,3 million at the end of 2021 (compared with EUR 117,1 million and EUR 146,0 million at the end of 2020 and 2019 respectively) and, as in previous years, representing only 0,03 % of the risk portfolio; |
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13.

| 14. | Welcomes the Board of Directors’ approval on 15 December 2021 of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2022-2024; appreciates that the new Operational Plan confirms the EIB’s alignment with the EU’s political priorities and its commitment to step up its ambition for the digital and green transitions; |
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14.

| 15. | Remarks that the Operational Plan reflects the anticipated borrowing needed to achieve its operational targets and that the Board of Directors has authorised global borrowing of up to EUR 50 billion for 2022; notes, furthermore, that the EIB has announced a funding programme expected to amount to EUR 45 billion; |
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15.

| 16. | Calls on the EIB to play an active role in supporting projects that contribute to the just transition, such as research, innovation, digitalisation, SMEs’ access to finance, social investment and skills; |
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16.

Actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic

| 17. | Stresses that the European Union’s 2021-2027 long-term budget (EUR 1,2 trillion in current prices), together with the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) temporary recovery instrument (EUR 806,9 billion in current prices), are an unprecedented and unique response aimed at helping to repair the economic and social damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitating the digital and green transitions; |
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17.

| 18. | Notes that, in 2021, the various pandemic waves disrupted the activities of many of the bank’s clients, including SMEs and large companies as well as financial institutions, which resulted in reductions in volumes and disbursements; |
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18.

| 19. | Remarks that the COVID-19 pandemic has not materially affected the quality of the EIB’s loan portfolio thanks to its credit risk management strategy; |
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19.

| 20. | Notes with appreciation that despite the general context of uncertainty in the global financial markets caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the EIB continues to maintain a robust liquidity position and the highest credit rating; |
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20.

| 21. | Notes that, in 2021, the EIB approved 109 stand-alone transactions aiming to respond directly to the COVID-19 crisis totalling EUR 12,9 billion (out of a total approved volume of EUR 55,8 billion); points out that since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic the EIB Group has approved almost EUR 72 billion in targeted support for the public health sector, the delivery of vaccines and for businesses which have been severely hit by the crisis; |
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21.

| 22. | Underlines the significant support provided by the EIB via the EGF, which complements other actions taken at EU level to tackle the pandemic and post-pandemic crises; appreciates that this support acts as an incentive for financial intermediaries to lend more to companies and under better conditions, thereby helping businesses to access advantageous financing rapidly in order to overcome pandemic-related issues; expresses concerns about the lack of transparency around the EGF, which may result in the near impossibility of assessing whether the fund has actually benefited the European economy; |
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22.

| 23. | Notes that the EGF enabled the EIB Group to scale up its support for mostly European SMEs, providing up to EUR 200 billion in additional financing; congratulates the EIB Group for having reached many businesses across the European Union; underlines that projects totalling EUR 23,2 billion have been approved since 31 December 2021 (of which EUR 18,1 billion has already been signed) and that this is expected to mobilise total investments of EUR 174,4 billion; |
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23.

| 24. | Appreciates that the EUR 6,0 billion increase in the EIB healthcare pipeline enabled investments in the healthcare sector and medical infrastructures, as well as research, vaccine and treatment-related financing; notes that on 31 December 2021, loans signed under this pipeline amounted to EUR 5,4 billion, part of which related to COVID-19 vaccine research; |
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24.

EIB support in key policy areas

| 25. | Notes that the InvestEU programme, the successor to the European Fund for Strategic Investments, is to be deployed under the 2021-2027 MFF and that the EIB will also be the key implementing partner, responsible for managing 75 % of the overall budget of the mandate; understands that over the 2021-2027 period, InvestEU’s EUR 26,2 billion guarantee, with provisioning from the MFF and NGEU, is expected to mobilise more than EUR 372 billion in additional private and public investment in Europe, mainly for sustainable infrastructure, research innovation, digitalisation, SMEs’ access to finance, social investment and skills; |
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25.

| 26. | Calls on the EIB to respect the EU priorities supported by InvestEU and to ensure strong protection of the EU’s financial interests; expects the EIB to report to Parliament about its activities and investments related to the InvestEU programme in 2022; |
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26.

| 27. | Stresses that Europe’s 23 million smaller firms represent 99,8 % of non-financial businesses and provide around two-thirds of all jobs; underlines that SMEs are a driving force for economic development across the globe and are also key drivers of innovation; understands that the costs of digitalisation and climate actions were at their highest during the COVID-19 pandemic and have put additional pressure on SMEs, which have received EIB support mainly through the COVID-19 financing package and the EGF; |
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27.

| 28. | Praises the EIB Group, whose financial support in 2021 to over 431 000 SMEs and mid-caps sustained 4,5 million jobs; recalls that the EIB’s support to SMEs accounts for 47 % of the overall volume of financing signed by the EIB and almost all of the EIF’s activities; recalls that, in absolute terms, in 2021 SME financing represented EUR 45 billion of the EIB Group’s total lending of EUR 94,9 billion, offered at favourable financing terms in the form of lower interest rates and/or longer maturities and advisory services; calls on the EIB to continue its actions and enhance support with additional growth capital to enable SMEs to scale up their operations; |
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28.

| 29. | Is concerned that the current high energy prices are seriously affecting European SMEs’ competitiveness; calls on the EIB to assess whether the current level of support for SMEs is sufficient in the context of high energy prices and rising costs of raw materials and to inform Parliament about how it intends to adapt its actions to tackle these new challenges; |
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29.

| 30. | Reiterates its call for a fair and transparent geographical distribution of projects and investment, with a focus on less developed regions, especially in innovation, digitalisation and infrastructure, with a view to promoting inclusive growth and economic, social and territorial convergence and cohesion; calls for the EIB to be more active in addressing recurring shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from taking full advantage of the EIB’s financial activities; |
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30.

| 31. | Notes that in the present difficult context (the post-pandemic crisis and the Russian aggression against Ukraine), the gap between the economic situations and capacities of the Member States has deepened and underlines the importance of ensuring that the most affected regions and countries adjust to the new circumstances so that no one is left behind; |
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31.

| 32. | Reiterates its call on the EIB to increase investments in breakthrough innovations to facilitate the digital and green transition; |
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32.

| 33. | Maintains that all of the EIB’s financial flows should be fully consistent with net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and with the EU’s increased climate objective for 2030; insists that the climate transition must be inclusive and fair and that green investments must be viable; recalls that the EIB is expected to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services in order to support citizens and businesses facing socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy; |
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33.

| 34. | Reiterates its call for the strengthening of technical assistance for and the financial expertise of local and regional authorities, especially in regions with low investment capacity, and for projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States before project approval, in order to improve accessibility to EIB funding; |
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34.

| 35. | Reiterates its calls for the EIB to carry out due diligence in the preparation phase of all the projects in order to include careful consideration and respect for human rights and indigenous communities, and to develop a clear human rights strategy that includes human rights risk and impact assessments; |
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35.

| 36. | Stresses that the requirement for financial intermediaries and corporate clients to draw up decarbonisation plans as soon as possible and at the latest by the end of 2025 must facilitate access to finance for SMEs; notes, however, that this is a crucial requirement in light of the EIB’s ambitions of becoming the EU’s climate bank and achieving a rate of at least 50 % of financing going into green and sustainable projects; |
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36.

| 37. | Calls for a focus on the credibility of short-term decarbonisation plans, for their stringent implementation and greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and for an evaluation to ascertain whether these can be included in contractual clauses between the EIB and its clients; |
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37.

| 38. | Is aware that the EIB’s actions connect climate, innovation and development and recognises that innovation and technology are key enablers for the transition to a net-zero emission economy; welcomes the partnership between the Commission and the Breakthrough Energy Catalyst aiming at mobilising up to USD 1 billion over the 2022-2026 period in order to accelerate the deployment and commercialisation of innovative technologies that will help deliver European Green Deal ambitions and the European Union’s 2030 climate targets; |
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38.

| 39. | Emphasises the need to achieve an adequate level of energy security in order to achieve the fast and stable independence of European countries; |
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39.

| 40. | Calls on the EIB to increase financing in order to boost the technological transition, provide funds to SMEs for long-term research and innovation, support the development of skills adapted to real labour market needs, and promote investment in employees’ and entrepreneurs’ digital skills, digital infrastructure and capacity-building for digitalisation; stresses that European SMEs are lagging behind in embracing digital technologies, with only 55 % of EU SMEs with at least a basic level of digitalisation; |
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40.

| 41. | Notes the reported increase in the percentage of EIB signatures related to the horizontal public policy goal on EU Economic and Social Cohesion and Convergence from 34,5 % in 2020 to 41,5 % in 2021; welcomes the EIB’s ambition set in its new Cohesion Orientation paper for 2021-2027 regarding increased EIB Group financing dedicated to cohesion with an orientation of 40 % of financing in the EU for 2022 (reaching 45 % by 2025), of which 20 % is in less developed regions (reaching 23 % by 2025); calls on the EIB to continue providing advisory services to cohesion regions, which helps them to make better use of the available investments; |
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41.

| 42. | Calls on the EIB to continue to prioritise investments in health infrastructure, staff training and in the quality of health services in order to reduce inequalities between countries; |
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42.

| 43. | Welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors in September 2021 approving the creation of EIB Global, the new branch responsible from 1 January 2022 for all of the EIB’s activities in the enlargement region and the countries of the European Union’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific; calls for EIB Global to be centred around an equitable and sustainable development agenda in recipient countries, while demonstrating clear development additionality; points with concern to the challenges faced by projects in non-EU countries, particularly corruption, misuse of funds and ensuring that they reach the intended recipients and deliver on the principles of key policy areas; |
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43.

| 44. | Believes that EIB Global should enjoy the operational autonomy needed to successfully implement the EU policies embracing the appropriate corporate culture of a development bank, while benefiting from the bank’s legal framework and sharing the same policies and high standards; calls on EIB Global to ensure the highest standards of due diligence in project appraisal processes; |
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44.

| 45. | Underlines the crucial role of the EIB in meeting the goals of the Just Transition Mechanism and calls for more involvement and concrete actions in this respect; |
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45.

| 46. | Underlines that the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors are key players for growth and development in rural areas; calls on the EIB to provide better assistance and support innovation in these relevant sectors, which can significantly contribute to food security; underlines that the financial needs of farmers, especially young and new entrants, are significant and that farmers and enterprises in this sector have a lower rate of success when applying for financing; calls for the EIB to continue to work on new financial tools that will boost accessibility for the agricultural sector; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Condemns the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression and invasion of Ukraine; underlines the fact that the war has created a severe humanitarian crisis and has had a fundamental impact on the economic and security situation in the EU and its neighbourhood, which needs to be broadly reflected in the EIB’s activities and investment plans; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Is concerned about the energy dependency and vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova which the current energy crisis has exacerbated; urges the EIB to support investments in the Republic of Moldova’s long-term energy autonomy and diversification; |
| --- | --- |

48.

EIB compliance, transparency and accountabilit

  y

| 49. | Reiterates that the EIB’s AAA rating is necessary to ensure appropriate market sources of financing and must be preserved; believes that financial strength, good governance, conservative risk appetite, long-term sustainability and the EU’s support are essential components as well as intrinsic qualities of its successful business model; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Takes note of the EIB Audit Committee’s observations and recommendations to the bank for 2021; calls on the EIB to implement these recommendations and to complete the implementation of those pending from the previous years; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Agrees with the EIB Audit Committee’s view that there is a need for enhanced monitoring, management and oversight of operational and technology risks, including cyber risks and other non-financial risks; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Welcomes the EIB’s focus on digitisation strategy and information security risk management and cyber-security and the adoption in May 2021 of the EIB Group — Digital Ambition (ICT) Strategy; recalls that cyber-attacks are liable to result in operational, reputational and legal risks; expects the EIB to adopt an action plan encompassing both defence against and recovery from cyber-attacks, with specific deliverables and clear indicators, and to promote a strong cyber-security culture among employees; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Notes that the EIB, the Commission and the ECA renewed the Tripartite Agreement on 11 November 2021; regrets the fact that the revised agreement does not offer the extensive solution which Parliament has called for; welcomes, however, that the new agreement allows for greater access to and improved streamlining of audited EIB documents; reiterates that the ECA is expected to have full access to all information related to EIB operations intended solely for the implementation of EU policies; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Notes that in 2021 the EIB’s complaints mechanism registered 64 new cases (compared with 77 in 2020), processed 107 cases (compared with 137 in 2020) and closed 64 cases (compared with 94 in 2020); encourages the EIB to monitor the complaints mechanism recommendations and to make intensive efforts to reach out to stakeholders to offer tailored events; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Calls on the EIB to ensure that the complaints mechanism is accessible, effective and independent in order to detect and redress any possible human rights violations in EIB-related projects; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Is aware that the Inspectorate General’s Investigations Division (IG/IN) is an internal department which launches enquiries into the types of misconduct defined in the Anti-Fraud Policy in order to provide the EIB Group with relevant facts and recommendations to form the basis of the EIB decision-making process; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Notes that the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic have had an impact, for the second year in a row, on the competent division of the Inspectorate General in carrying out its activities, resulting in fewer allegations received (174 in 2021 and 183 in 2020), fewer investigative missions carried out (5 in 2021 and 10 in 2020) and fewer recommendations and opinions issued (45 in 2021 and 52 in 2020, compared with a bigger number of cases completed, i.e. 204 in 2021 and 195 in 2020); |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Observes that the number of cases where allegations were substantiated following investigation decreased sharply in 2021 (17 cases substantiated out of 67 investigations opened in 2021 and 37 cases substantiated against 91 investigations opened in 2020, which is a decrease from 41 % to 25 %); |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Welcomes the signature on 29 October 2021 of the working arrangement between the EIB and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), which should pave the way towards more effective prevention and detection of risks linked to EIB Group funding; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Welcomes the establishment of a new system for following up and reporting on recommendations and opinions; asks the EIB IG/IN to report to Parliament in more detail about the outcome of its investigations; calls for the EIB IG/IN annual report to cover the financial impacts of the cases it investigates, going beyond the mere narrative of the case studies, in order to provide valuable insight for assessing the protection of financial interests, including the EIB’s evaluation of the financial, operational and reputational risks when deciding whether an investigation to that end is appropriate; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Appreciates the continuous work of the Proactive Integrity Reviews Unit and encourages enhanced cooperation between EIB exclusion and debarment capabilities, the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System and other relevant actors (such as the Irregularities Management System database of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the ARACHNE risk-scoring tool) in order to enhance the fraud prevention and detection activities that are essential to safeguard the Union’s financial interests; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Reminds the EIB that its dual nature (EU body and financial institution) makes its alignment with EU law even more relevant, and that appropriate governance, processes and mechanisms should consistently be designed, implemented and adhered to in line with the Union’s standards and criteria and well integrated with those followed by other Union services with which the EIB interacts frequently; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Takes note of the updated codes of conduct of the Management Committee and the EIB Board of Directors of August 2021; welcomes the introduction of a longer cooling-off period for members of the Management Committee (24 months instead of 12) and for members of the Board of Directors (12 months instead of 6); regrets, however, that there is no provision excluding vice-presidents from overseeing and taking decisions on operations in their countries of origin, and insists that this be addressed in the next revision; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Trusts that project assessments relevant to grant financing decisions are drawn up in compliance with objective technical, financial and economic indicators, and that project quality is the decisive factor in them; believes that the ‘governance package’ adopted by the Board of Governors in August 2021 and which includes new codes of conduct for the Board of Directors, the Management Committee and the Audit Committee, together with the revised Operating Rules of the Ethics and Compliance Committee, strengthens the EIB’s ethical framework, as it includes more stringent rules on post-employment activities; reiterates its call for addressing the remaining shortcomings regarding avoidance of conflict of interests in the next revision of the Management Committee’s code of conduct; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Is concerned by the failings of the EIF’s first and second lines of defence reported to the EIB Audit Committee in internal audit reports in December 2021 and January 2022; calls on the EIB to take appropriate remedial action and to inform Parliament about such interventions; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Welcomes the revised EIB Group whistleblowing policy of November 2021, which also grants protection to whistleblowers who are not EIB staff members; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Recognises that human rights, inclusiveness and sustainability are fundamental pillars of the EIB Group’s activities and operations; welcomes the progress made in 2021 in the revision and adoption (finalised in February 2022) of the Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework; is aware that the new framework consists of the revised EIB Group Environmental and Social Policy and the EIB’s Environmental and Social Standards and that lessons learned through complaints lodged with the Complaints Mechanism and the European Ombudsman are duly fed into this review; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Takes the view that a strengthened anti-fraud policy should indicate effective ways to correct misconduct and mitigate risks and should provide a set of tools that are compatible with the regulatory framework in order to successfully freeze projects affected by credible suspicions and to terminate contracts with non-compliant clients; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Reiterates its concern about several cases which OLAF closed in 2020 focusing on educational allowances unduly granted to EIB staff members; welcomes the EIB’s revision and reform of the allowances system and its correction of many of the errors which OLAF detected, including steps to recover undue payments; reiterates its request to the EIB to report to Parliament on the outcome of the follow-up to OLAF’s recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Welcomes the adoption of the EIB Group’s revised transparency policy on 17 November 2021 following an extensive public consultation; notes that this policy lays down provisions for the proactive publication of information and documents and their disclosure upon request; recalls the importance of transparency for intermediaries, for internal decision-making procedures and for the environmental and human rights impact of projects through to their full implementation; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Invites the EIB to better implement its transparency policy, to implement the Ombudsman recommendations from the three decisions published on 21 April 2022 calling on the EIB to adopt a more ambitious approach to its disclosure practice, in line with EU transparency legislation, and to take several transparency steps; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Urges the EIB to quickly respond to the Ombudsman’s requests to enable the public to see more easily the potential environmental impact of the projects it finances; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Reiterates its call for more transparency and accountability to Parliament; reiterates, in particular, the importance of greater Parliament scrutiny over decisions of the EIB Board of Directors, with enhanced transparency from the Commission on the positions it takes in the EIB Board of Directors meetings; in this regard calls for the consideration of the possibility for Parliament to have observer status in the Board’s meetings; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Considers that the Commission should provide more transparency on its opinions on the projects financed by the EIB, as this would help clarify its role in respect of the Union’s policy objectives; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Is aware that the calls for enhanced transparency cannot lead to reduced protection of the legitimate financial interests of clients and need to fall within the existing legal frameworks and the data protection regime; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Invites the representatives of the bank to increase the level of engagement and interaction with Parliament, especially regarding the control of financial activities; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Is concerned that the targets set in the diversity and inclusion strategy 2018-2021 have not been fully achieved; calls on the EIB to make concrete efforts to improve the gender balance of its staff, in particular at management and senior official levels; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Understands that the reduced recruitment during the COVID-19 pandemic, the specific nature of the profiles sought by the bank (in risk management, compliance and IT roles, recruited in many cases from the banking industry and specialised sectors that are not necessarily diverse themselves) and the competitiveness of the labour market in Luxembourg are examples of the limitations to be taken into consideration in assessing the overall situation; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Acknowledges the long-standing concerns and complaints regarding the vast pay gaps between administrative and professional categories of staff; draws attention to the high costs of living in Luxembourg and notes that the correction coefficient for Luxembourg is fixed at 100 %, although it should be higher; points to the challenges faced by the staff members employed under the administrative category and how these can negatively impact the attractiveness of working at the EIB and the standard of living of its staff; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Encourages the bank to persist in taking action to achieve more discernible gender balance within its organisation; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Welcomes the fact that the EIB is constantly monitoring geographical balance and that the data on this are taken into consideration for ongoing and future recruitment processes; |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation from all Member States in its administration, taking into consideration the competences and merits of the candidates; calls on the bank to publish, annually, a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Notes the two proposals for a Framework on the Right to Strike and a Framework on the Recognition of Trade Unions and understands that the Management Committee will adopt these frameworks in a timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

83.

| 84. | Invites the bank to further report on the implementing measures that have been rolled out on the basis of the 2021 health and wellbeing survey; in particular, invites the bank to report on transparency in internal management and internal recruitment processes and on measures taken to address the outcomes of the ‘staff satisfaction surveys’; |
| --- | --- |

84.

Follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations

| 85. | Calls on the EIB to continue reporting on the state of play and status of the previous recommendations issued by Parliament in its annual resolutions especially as regards:






  (a) | impacts (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union; |
| --- | --- | --- |

85.

(a)

impacts (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

| (b) | actions adopted to enhance the countering of misconduct and conflicts of interest, tax avoidance, fraud and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

actions adopted to enhance the countering of misconduct and conflicts of interest, tax avoidance, fraud and corruption;

| (c) | measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators when implementing EU policies and to avoid any new requirements that create more bureaucracy for SMEs; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators when implementing EU policies and to avoid any new requirements that create more bureaucracy for SMEs;

| (d) | follow-up to the calls and requests made in this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

follow-up to the calls and requests made in this resolution;

o

o o

| 86. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and calls on the Council and EIB Board of Directors to hold a debate on this resolution. |
| --- | --- |

86.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0299.

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/133 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/133

---

P9_TA(2023)0018

Protection of the EU’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2021

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2021 (2022/2152(INI))

(2023/C 214/13)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to the Commission report of 23 September 2022 entitled ‘33rd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud — 2021’ (COM(2022)0482) (PIF Report 2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission report of 23 September 2022 entitled ‘33rd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud — 2021’ (COM(2022)0482) (PIF Report 2021),

| — | having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Report 2021 and the 2021 Annual Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Report 2021 and the 2021 Annual Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee,

| — | having regard to the OLAF Supervisory Committee Opinions No 1/2021 of 4 February 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s recommendations not followed by the relevant authorities’, No 2/2021 of 31 May 2021 on the ‘Working arrangements between OLAF and EPPO’, No 4/2021 of 18 October 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s Preliminary Draft Budget for 2022’ and No 5/2021 of 17 December 2021 entitled ‘Analysis of OLAF’s investigations lasting more than 36 months in 2019’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the OLAF Supervisory Committee Opinions No 1/2021 of 4 February 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s recommendations not followed by the relevant authorities’, No 2/2021 of 31 May 2021 on the ‘Working arrangements between OLAF and EPPO’, No 4/2021 of 18 October 2021 entitled ‘OLAF’s Preliminary Draft Budget for 2022’ and No 5/2021 of 17 December 2021 entitled ‘Analysis of OLAF’s investigations lasting more than 36 months in 2019’,

| — | having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2021 Annual Report published in March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2021 Annual Report published in March 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the EU institutions (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the EU institutions (1),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations (2) (OLAF Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2223 of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of the European Anti-Fraud Office investigations (2) (OLAF Regulation),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (3),

| — | having regard to the Commission report of September 2021 entitled ‘VAT Gap Report 2021’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission report of September 2021 entitled ‘VAT Gap Report 2021’,

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (4) (PIF Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (4) (PIF Directive),

| — | having regard to the Commission report of 6 September 2021 on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (COM(2021)0536), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission report of 6 September 2021 on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (COM(2021)0536),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (5) (EPPO Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (5) (EPPO Regulation),

| — | having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (6),

| — | having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 and the CJEU’s conclusions that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law, which confirmed the appropriateness of the legal basis and the compatibility of the general regime of conditionality with Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the principle of legal certainty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21 and C-157/21 and the CJEU’s conclusions that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law, which confirmed the appropriateness of the legal basis and the compatibility of the general regime of conditionality with Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the principle of legal certainty,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary (COM(2022)0485), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 September 2022 for a Council implementing decision on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary (COM(2022)0485),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (7) (the Conditionality Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (7) (the Conditionality Regulation),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’ (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’ (8),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 29 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 29 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 December 2020 on the review of the European Union under the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nation Conventions against Corruption (UNCAC) (COM(2020)0793), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 December 2020 on the review of the European Union under the Implementation Review Mechanism of the United Nation Conventions against Corruption (UNCAC) (COM(2020)0793),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (9),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning corruption and human rights (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning corruption and human rights (10),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170),

| — | having regard to the judgment of the CJEU of 1 September 2021 in Case T-517/19, Homoki v Commission (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the judgment of the CJEU of 1 September 2021 in Case T-517/19, Homoki v Commission (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2020 (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2022 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2020 (13),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0299/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0299/2022),

| A. | whereas Member State authorities manage more than 85 % of EU expenditure, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and collect the EU’s traditional own resources (TOR) while the Commission oversees both of these areas, sets standards, verifies compliance and reports to both Parliament and the Council on the measures taken to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests, pursuant to Article 325(5) TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Member State authorities manage more than 85 % of EU expenditure, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and collect the EU’s traditional own resources (TOR) while the Commission oversees both of these areas, sets standards, verifies compliance and reports to both Parliament and the Council on the measures taken to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests, pursuant to Article 325(5) TFEU;

| B. | whereas sound public spending and the protection of the EU’s financial interests should be key elements of EU policy in order to increase citizens’ confidence by ensuring that taxpayers’ money is used properly and effectively; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas sound public spending and the protection of the EU’s financial interests should be key elements of EU policy in order to increase citizens’ confidence by ensuring that taxpayers’ money is used properly and effectively;

| C. | whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy; whereas it is key to ensure that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests and that citizens’ rights are fully respected; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy; whereas it is key to ensure that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests and that citizens’ rights are fully respected;

| D. | whereas the annual PIF Report is based on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, which is analysed to identify the areas most at risk, and whereas it describes the countermeasures adopted and makes it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the annual PIF Report is based on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, which is analysed to identify the areas most at risk, and whereas it describes the countermeasures adopted and makes it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels;

| E. | whereas the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget has been applicable and enforceable since 1 January 2021; whereas all breaches in a Member State of the principles of the rule of law, such as fraud, that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget and the financial interests of the EU in a sufficiently direct way since that date are therefore subject to that regime; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget has been applicable and enforceable since 1 January 2021; whereas all breaches in a Member State of the principles of the rule of law, such as fraud, that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget and the financial interests of the EU in a sufficiently direct way since that date are therefore subject to that regime;

| F. | whereas the Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to take measures — for example, the suspension of payments or the application of financial corrections — to protect the budget from fraud and shield the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to take measures — for example, the suspension of payments or the application of financial corrections — to protect the budget from fraud and shield the rule of law;

| G. | whereas the CJEU has dismissed claims by two Member States, ruling that the Conditionality Regulation falls within the powers conferred by the financial rules for the implementation of the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the CJEU has dismissed claims by two Member States, ruling that the Conditionality Regulation falls within the powers conferred by the financial rules for the implementation of the EU budget;

| H. | whereas the Commission should apply the same criteria, based on respect for the rule of law, with regard to funds provided to non-EU countries under the EU budget, and adopt an uncompromising stance to stop any ongoing financial transactions to such countries in cases where the latter exert undue influence on EU institutions or lawmakers; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the Commission should apply the same criteria, based on respect for the rule of law, with regard to funds provided to non-EU countries under the EU budget, and adopt an uncompromising stance to stop any ongoing financial transactions to such countries in cases where the latter exert undue influence on EU institutions or lawmakers;

| I. | whereas in 2021 the EU completed the adoption of the 2021-2027 spending programmes, including the Union Anti-Fraud Programme, which supports the fight against fraud by providing grants for specific initiatives and enabling the financing of dedicated IT platforms and tools to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States and the EU; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas in 2021 the EU completed the adoption of the 2021-2027 spending programmes, including the Union Anti-Fraud Programme, which supports the fight against fraud by providing grants for specific initiatives and enabling the financing of dedicated IT platforms and tools to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States and the EU;

| J. | whereas the Union and the Member States share responsibility for protecting the EU’s financial interests; whereas, regarding the unprecedented deployment of funds under the RRF, they also share responsibility for regulating and implementing the national recovery and resilience plans (RRPs); whereas the role of national authorities in ensuring an adequate level of protection of the EU’s financial interests has increased significantly as a result; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the Union and the Member States share responsibility for protecting the EU’s financial interests; whereas, regarding the unprecedented deployment of funds under the RRF, they also share responsibility for regulating and implementing the national recovery and resilience plans (RRPs); whereas the role of national authorities in ensuring an adequate level of protection of the EU’s financial interests has increased significantly as a result;

| K. | whereas the implementation of the RRF will increase the pressure on European and national administrations in the coming years, and it coincides with the 2021-2027 spending programmes; whereas the Member States will need to master different management modes linked to the implementation of the various funds and the Commission will need to strengthen its monitoring capacity, given that it is currently only capable of monitoring a fraction of all expenditure; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the implementation of the RRF will increase the pressure on European and national administrations in the coming years, and it coincides with the 2021-2027 spending programmes; whereas the Member States will need to master different management modes linked to the implementation of the various funds and the Commission will need to strengthen its monitoring capacity, given that it is currently only capable of monitoring a fraction of all expenditure;

| L. | whereas the Commission has made efforts to support national authorities on the design and assessment of RRPs, paying particular attention to the provisions concerning measures to protect RRF resources from fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the Commission has made efforts to support national authorities on the design and assessment of RRPs, paying particular attention to the provisions concerning measures to protect RRF resources from fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding;

| M. | whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (14) (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and the RRF Regulation ensures that the Commission, OLAF, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the EPPO are able to exercise their mandates and that national authorities put in place effective anti-fraud measures taking into account any risk identified; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (14) (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and the RRF Regulation ensures that the Commission, OLAF, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the EPPO are able to exercise their mandates and that national authorities put in place effective anti-fraud measures taking into account any risk identified;

| N. | whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States is a disadvantage and needs to be adequately addressed in order to create more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU, with a view to effectively preventing and overcoming irregularities and combating fraud and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States is a disadvantage and needs to be adequately addressed in order to create more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU, with a view to effectively preventing and overcoming irregularities and combating fraud and corruption;

| O. | whereas deficiencies in the validity and comparability of data and reporting technologies, including as a result of the varying levels of digitalisation in the Member States, continue to severely undermine the quality and reliability of the information available; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas deficiencies in the validity and comparability of data and reporting technologies, including as a result of the varying levels of digitalisation in the Member States, continue to severely undermine the quality and reliability of the information available;

| P. | whereas the Arachne tool is voluntary and, although it is already widely used in cohesion policy and is being introduced for agricultural spending, making it mandatory — as repeatedly requested by Parliament — would be a major step forward, according to the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the Arachne tool is voluntary and, although it is already widely used in cohesion policy and is being introduced for agricultural spending, making it mandatory — as repeatedly requested by Parliament — would be a major step forward, according to the Commission;

| Q. | whereas value added tax (VAT) is an important revenue source for national budgets and whereas VAT-based own resources account for around 10 % of own-resource revenue (12,3 % of total EU budget revenue in 2020 and 11 % in 2019); |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas value added tax (VAT) is an important revenue source for national budgets and whereas VAT-based own resources account for around 10 % of own-resource revenue (12,3 % of total EU budget revenue in 2020 and 11 % in 2019);

| R. | whereas the Commission’s action plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy (COM(2020)0312) contributes to the EU’s strategy for simplifying and adapting taxation to the digitalisation of the economy and the green transition and identifies the fight against VAT fraud as a priority; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the Commission’s action plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy (COM(2020)0312) contributes to the EU’s strategy for simplifying and adapting taxation to the digitalisation of the economy and the green transition and identifies the fight against VAT fraud as a priority;

| S. | whereas on 1 June 2021 the EPPO finally started its operational activities as the final pillar of the anti-fraud architecture designed by the Union to enhance the protection of its financial interests; whereas the workload of the EPPO is expected to increase; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas on 1 June 2021 the EPPO finally started its operational activities as the final pillar of the anti-fraud architecture designed by the Union to enhance the protection of its financial interests; whereas the workload of the EPPO is expected to increase;

| T. | whereas the EPPO, despite minimal resources and extreme time pressure, has already demonstrated its capabilities and cost-effectiveness; whereas the EPPO’s budget for 2021 was less than EUR 45 million, while EPPO judges ordered the seizure of more than EUR 250 million in the organisation’s first year of operations, illustrating that the EPPO can deliver a massive and immediate return on investment; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the EPPO, despite minimal resources and extreme time pressure, has already demonstrated its capabilities and cost-effectiveness; whereas the EPPO’s budget for 2021 was less than EUR 45 million, while EPPO judges ordered the seizure of more than EUR 250 million in the organisation’s first year of operations, illustrating that the EPPO can deliver a massive and immediate return on investment;

| U. | whereas the Commission’s knowledge of the extent, nature and causes of fraud is somewhat limited and many potential frauds are not reported through the irregularity management system; whereas corruption undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and jeopardises the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, as well as posing a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the Commission’s knowledge of the extent, nature and causes of fraud is somewhat limited and many potential frauds are not reported through the irregularity management system; whereas corruption undermines citizens’ trust in the EU and jeopardises the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, as well as posing a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law in the EU;

| V. | whereas, according to Article 83 TFEU, corruption is among the particularly serious crimes that have a cross-border dimension and affect all Member States to varying degrees; whereas criminal organisations are particularly active in the interception of European funds and are able to exploit the heterogeneity of legal and administrative systems in Member States to penetrate their economic, financial, business, social and political fabric, thereby harming economic freedom and free competition; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas, according to Article 83 TFEU, corruption is among the particularly serious crimes that have a cross-border dimension and affect all Member States to varying degrees; whereas criminal organisations are particularly active in the interception of European funds and are able to exploit the heterogeneity of legal and administrative systems in Member States to penetrate their economic, financial, business, social and political fabric, thereby harming economic freedom and free competition;

| W. | whereas the unprecedented increase in EU spending under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 and the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) recovery plan poses significant risks, including the potential for misuse of funds by organised criminals; |
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W.

whereas the unprecedented increase in EU spending under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 and the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) recovery plan poses significant risks, including the potential for misuse of funds by organised criminals;

| X. | whereas cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; whereas OLAF signed administrative cooperation arrangements with two international partner authorities in 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the World Customs Organization (WCO); whereas OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; whereas OLAF signed administrative cooperation arrangements with two international partner authorities in 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the World Customs Organization (WCO); whereas OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world;

1.

Welcomes the 33rd Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud — 2021;

2.

Is aware that 2021 was a challenging year in which the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic required the adaptation of control strategies and a focus on prevention through specific mitigating measures and targeted actions to detect irregularities and fraud;

3.

Recalls that, on 19 February 2021, the RRF, which is the main pillar of the NGEU, entered into force, financed by the Commission’s borrowing on the capital markets and aiming at financing reforms and investments in Member States retroactively from the start of the pandemic in February 2020;

4.

Underlines the fact that in 2021 operations were eligible for EU financing under the MFF 2014-2020 (which will end in 2024), under the MFF 2021-2027 and within the NGEU recovery package;

5.

Highlights the fact that the new MFF 2021-2027, the last programmes for which were adopted in 2021, coupled with the NGEU recovery plan, provides the EU with EUR 1,8 trillion, representing an unprecedented volume of resources; highlights the fact that Parliament (for the purpose of ensuring discharge), OLAF, the ECA, the Commission itself and, where applicable, the EPPO may access relevant data and verify the use of funds to complement and strengthen the auditing measures laid down by the regulations in force;

6.

Notes that Parliament and its Budgetary Control Committee should have a strong role in the RRF’s governance, including through regular, structured dialogues where the Commission is invited to discuss the implementation of the RRF, with the Commission being required to take into account the views arising therefrom;

7.

Stresses that a correspondingly high level of attention and control is also needed and expected in order to guarantee that these funds can make the best possible contribution to the common goals of the Union; recalls the increased pressure on the authorities managing EU funds, the increased volume of resources deployed and the increased risks related to their management (following the introduction, in the context of the pandemic, of simplified and urgent procedures, which are prone to abuse);

8.

Takes the view that the enhancement of transparency, the digitalisation of the fight against fraud and the continuous strengthening and development of fraud risk assessment and fraud risk management should be pursued in parallel with a sound implementation of the EU anti-fraud architecture;

9.

Calls for enhanced levels of digitalisation, interoperability of data systems and harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the EU and, to this end, reiterates its call on the Commission to harmonise definitions so that comparable data can be obtained across the EU;

10.

Calls on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal on mutual administrative assistance in those areas of EU fund spending that do not so far provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to develop a system for the exchange of information between competent authorities to enable cross-checking of accounting records concerning transactions between two or more Member States in order to avoid transnational fraud within the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), so as to ensure a cross-cutting approach to the protection of the financial interests of the EU;

11.

Expresses concern about the quite late publication of the annual PIF Report, since the report for year n is only published in September of year n+1; understands that the main reason for this is the fact that the Member States submit their information quite late; invites the Commission to be more proactive in requesting that the Member States submit their data earlier so that its annual report can be finalised sooner, which would allow the Parliament resolution on the report to be adopted earlier, ideally within year n+1;

12.

Takes the view that, especially in light of the entry into force of the new OLAF Regulation, the RRF Regulation and the Conditionality Regulation, as well as the beginning of the operational activities of the EPPO, which completes the EU anti-fraud architecture, it is necessary to make the annual PIF Report more holistic in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all relevant actors, identify best practice and address shortcomings; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Commission to explore new avenues to that end;

Fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities detected

Fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities detected

| 13. | Notes that the number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities — 11 218 in total — remained stable in 2021 relative to 2020 (when there were 11 755 cases overall); points out that the value involved in these irregularities rose significantly, more than doubling (+121 %) from EUR 1,46 billion in 2020 to EUR 3,24 billion in 2021, due to a small number of large cases in certain Member States; expresses its grave concern about the increased magnitude of fraud and irregularities; |
| --- | --- |

13.

Notes that the number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities — 11 218 in total — remained stable in 2021 relative to 2020 (when there were 11 755 cases overall); points out that the value involved in these irregularities rose significantly, more than doubling (+121 %) from EUR 1,46 billion in 2020 to EUR 3,24 billion in 2021, due to a small number of large cases in certain Member States; expresses its grave concern about the increased magnitude of fraud and irregularities;

| 14. | Acknowledges that the number of irregularities detected that are reported as fraudulent is an indication of the level of detection and of the capacity to intercept potential fraud by the Member States and Union bodies, and is not a direct indicator of the level of fraud affecting the Union budget or a specific Member State; understands that the detection and reporting of an irregularity implies that corrective measures have been taken in order to protect the Union’s financial interests and that, whenever relevant, criminal proceedings have been launched; |
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14.

Acknowledges that the number of irregularities detected that are reported as fraudulent is an indication of the level of detection and of the capacity to intercept potential fraud by the Member States and Union bodies, and is not a direct indicator of the level of fraud affecting the Union budget or a specific Member State; understands that the detection and reporting of an irregularity implies that corrective measures have been taken in order to protect the Union’s financial interests and that, whenever relevant, criminal proceedings have been launched;

| 15. | Observes with concern that the great majority of reported irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) are detected during ex post controls and that this results in a significant time lag between the moment in which irregularities are committed and when they are reported to the Commission, with this lag averaging from two and a half to three years; is also concerned that some Member States do not report any irregularities, which might indicate insufficient detection efforts; |
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15.

Observes with concern that the great majority of reported irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) are detected during ex post controls and that this results in a significant time lag between the moment in which irregularities are committed and when they are reported to the Commission, with this lag averaging from two and a half to three years; is also concerned that some Member States do not report any irregularities, which might indicate insufficient detection efforts;

| 16. | Is aware that much EU expenditure follows multiannual cycles, with implementation increasing progressively towards programme closure, such that peaks in the reporting of irregularities usually appear in year n+2 or n+3 after the final year of the cycle; points out, therefore, that a year-to-year comparison of the reporting of irregularities does not offer a reliable analysis of the real-time situation, while a multiannual perspective can mitigate distortions; welcomes the approach adopted to mitigate this effect whereby the results from the reported year are compared with the five-year average for TOR and with the average for the relevant programming period for expenditure, with the exception of annual spending for direct aid to farmers and market support; stresses, however, that the differences in the regulatory frameworks governing different programming periods can make comparison sterile and nullify the analysis efforts; |
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16.

Is aware that much EU expenditure follows multiannual cycles, with implementation increasing progressively towards programme closure, such that peaks in the reporting of irregularities usually appear in year n+2 or n+3 after the final year of the cycle; points out, therefore, that a year-to-year comparison of the reporting of irregularities does not offer a reliable analysis of the real-time situation, while a multiannual perspective can mitigate distortions; welcomes the approach adopted to mitigate this effect whereby the results from the reported year are compared with the five-year average for TOR and with the average for the relevant programming period for expenditure, with the exception of annual spending for direct aid to farmers and market support; stresses, however, that the differences in the regulatory frameworks governing different programming periods can make comparison sterile and nullify the analysis efforts;

| 17. | Calls on the Commission to increasingly focus on more severe issues, such as intentional manipulations of tender criteria to favour the applications of certain bidders, corruption in relation to bidder selection, and conflicts of interest in general, instead of minor formal errors; |
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17.

Calls on the Commission to increasingly focus on more severe issues, such as intentional manipulations of tender criteria to favour the applications of certain bidders, corruption in relation to bidder selection, and conflicts of interest in general, instead of minor formal errors;

Major threats

Major threats

| 18. | Is concerned by the increasing threat to the EU budget posed by organised crime, including mafia-type organisations and oligarchic structures; is aware that organised crime groups try to infiltrate the legal economy and perpetrate administrative irregularities with criminal methods that are more harmful and more difficult to investigate and remedy; points out that their modi operandi increasingly include making use of highly skilled intermediaries who are able to carry out extremely sophisticated, hard-to-detect EU fund fraud by making money disappear through complex financial architectures, sometimes with the help of tax havens, making it particularly difficult to trace and recover funds; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Is concerned by the increasing threat to the EU budget posed by organised crime, including mafia-type organisations and oligarchic structures; is aware that organised crime groups try to infiltrate the legal economy and perpetrate administrative irregularities with criminal methods that are more harmful and more difficult to investigate and remedy; points out that their modi operandi increasingly include making use of highly skilled intermediaries who are able to carry out extremely sophisticated, hard-to-detect EU fund fraud by making money disappear through complex financial architectures, sometimes with the help of tax havens, making it particularly difficult to trace and recover funds;

| 19. | Reiterates its concern that the prevalence of oligarchic groups has reached an unprecedented magnitude in recent years and that oligarchic systems often go hand in hand with widespread corruption, tight control over the media and an ability to influence the judiciary and prosecution services in such a way as to conceal possible criminal activities and avoid prosecution; |
| --- | --- |

19.

Reiterates its concern that the prevalence of oligarchic groups has reached an unprecedented magnitude in recent years and that oligarchic systems often go hand in hand with widespread corruption, tight control over the media and an ability to influence the judiciary and prosecution services in such a way as to conceal possible criminal activities and avoid prosecution;

| 20. | Recalls that fraud affecting European funds increasingly has transnational dimensions, that criminal organisations take advantage of the heterogeneity of legal systems to perpetrate fraudulent activities against the financial interests of Member States, and that the EU, within the limits set by the TFEU, has an obligation to intervene in anti-corruption policies and is obliged to counter corruption with measures to combat and prevent it; calls, therefore, on the Commission to do everything possible to align the Member States’ criminal laws; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Recalls that fraud affecting European funds increasingly has transnational dimensions, that criminal organisations take advantage of the heterogeneity of legal systems to perpetrate fraudulent activities against the financial interests of Member States, and that the EU, within the limits set by the TFEU, has an obligation to intervene in anti-corruption policies and is obliged to counter corruption with measures to combat and prevent it; calls, therefore, on the Commission to do everything possible to align the Member States’ criminal laws;

| 21. | Recalls that the lack of efficient legislation and action to combat organised crime in many Member States provides fertile ground for the growing number of cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime (15) and its position on the need to establish a new common definition of organised crime, which is in keeping with the latest developments and takes into consideration the use of violence, corruption or intimidation by criminal groups to gain control over economic activities or public procurement or affect the democratic process; calls on the Commission to promote the good practices of those countries in the EU that have an advanced regulatory framework for fighting organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Recalls that the lack of efficient legislation and action to combat organised crime in many Member States provides fertile ground for the growing number of cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime (15

| 22. | Stresses that timely cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as between such authorities and the relevant EU agencies and bodies, is a key component of an effective response to transnational crime to protect the EU’s financial interests; advocates, as part of this cooperation and response, efforts to advance common policies combating mafia-related criminality and to follow the example of the most diligent and experienced countries in this area; |
| --- | --- |

22.

Stresses that timely cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as between such authorities and the relevant EU agencies and bodies, is a key component of an effective response to transnational crime to protect the EU’s financial interests; advocates, as part of this cooperation and response, efforts to advance common policies combating mafia-related criminality and to follow the example of the most diligent and experienced countries in this area;

| 23. | Stresses that corruption, especially high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, is a particularly serious crime with the potential to extend across borders, whose impact affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, representing a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law across Europe, and undermining citizens’ trust in democratic institutions in the EU and in the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Stresses that corruption, especially high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, is a particularly serious crime with the potential to extend across borders, whose impact affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, representing a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law across Europe, and undermining citizens’ trust in democratic institutions in the EU and in the Member States;

| 24. | Is appalled that at least two non-EU countries were able to perpetrate high-level acts of corruption and exert undue influence on MEPs, which led to criminal investigations by the Belgian authorities in December 2022; stresses that such dealings threaten the principle of citizens’ democratic representation in EU decision-making and undermine citizens’ trust in EU institutions; demands in this regard that the Commission present a draft interinstitutional agreement as soon as possible for the establishment of an EU ethics body with the necessary independence and the right to conduct its own investigations, as demanded by Parliament since September 2021, in order to overcome the weaknesses of the current system; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Is appalled that at least two non-EU countries were able to perpetrate high-level acts of corruption and exert undue influence on MEPs, which led to criminal investigations by the Belgian authorities in December 2022; stresses that such dealings threaten the principle of citizens’ democratic representation in EU decision-making and undermine citizens’ trust in EU institutions; demands in this regard that the Commission present a draft interinstitutional agreement as soon as possible for the establishment of an EU ethics body with the necessary independence and the right to conduct its own investigations, as demanded by Parliament since September 2021, in order to overcome the weaknesses of the current system;

| 25. | Considers that a revision of the Staff Regulations, and especially Article 22c thereof, is necessary in order to align it with Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (16) (the ‘Whistleblower Directive’); calls on the Bureau, in the interim, to immediately revise Parliament’s Internal Rules Implementing Article 22c of the Staff Regulations to bring them into line with the protections provided for in the Whistleblower Directive; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Considers that a revision of the Staff Regulations, and especially Article 22c thereof, is necessary in order to align it with Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (16

| 26. | Calls on the Commission to produce an annual report on corruption, in a similar vein to the existing report on fraud, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of the approaches, procedures and tools used by the Member States in their fight against corruption and to help to assess which areas are most at risk, thereby making it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels; |
| --- | --- |

26.

Calls on the Commission to produce an annual report on corruption, in a similar vein to the existing report on fraud, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of the approaches, procedures and tools used by the Member States in their fight against corruption and to help to assess which areas are most at risk, thereby making it possible to implement more targeted action at both EU and national levels;

| 27. | Emphasises the role of the EPPO, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption; calls for the capacities of and cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF to be strengthened further; calls for common anti-corruption rules applicable to MEPs and staff of EU bodies; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Emphasises the role of the EPPO, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption; calls for the capacities of and cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF to be strengthened further; calls for common anti-corruption rules applicable to MEPs and staff of EU bodies;

| 28. | Highlights the fact that in order to effectively fight corruption and protect the financial interests of the Union, the Commission and other EU institutions and bodies should adopt a consistent approach to transparency, incompatibilities, illegal lobbying, revolving-door situations and conflicts of interest, while also strengthening internal control mechanisms; calls for the EU institutions to urgently adopt measures to introduce the practice of minimum ‘cooling-off periods’ for senior EU officials and former MEPs, in order to avoid the phenomenon of revolving doors; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Highlights the fact that in order to effectively fight corruption and protect the financial interests of the Union, the Commission and other EU institutions and bodies should adopt a consistent approach to transparency, incompatibilities, illegal lobbying, revolving-door situations and conflicts of interest, while also strengthening internal control mechanisms; calls for the EU institutions to urgently adopt measures to introduce the practice of minimum ‘cooling-off periods’ for senior EU officials and former MEPs, in order to avoid the phenomenon of revolving doors;

| 29. | Recalls that the weakening independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring and controlling finances in certain Member States seriously harms the Union’s financial interests and represents a threat to the rule of law; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Recalls that the weakening independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring and controlling finances in certain Member States seriously harms the Union’s financial interests and represents a threat to the rule of law;

| 30. | Believes that the enhanced and consistent level of protection for journalists and whistleblowers across the Union helps to detect corruption and counter the spread of a subculture of impunity, silence and conspiracy, and that more efforts should be made in this vein; stresses the important role played by the media and investigative journalists in the fight against corruption; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Believes that the enhanced and consistent level of protection for journalists and whistleblowers across the Union helps to detect corruption and counter the spread of a subculture of impunity, silence and conspiracy, and that more efforts should be made in this vein; stresses the important role played by the media and investigative journalists in the fight against corruption;

| 31. | Is of the opinion that offshore companies and organisations that involve offshore companies and organisations in their ownership structures should be excluded from the use of EU funds; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Is of the opinion that offshore companies and organisations that involve offshore companies and organisations in their ownership structures should be excluded from the use of EU funds;

Revenue

Revenue

| 32. | Observes that, for TOR and compared to the five-year average, in 2021 the number of irregularities remained stable while the amounts affected increased by 32 % for fraudulent irregularities and 13 % for non-fraudulent irregularities; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Observes that, for TOR and compared to the five-year average, in 2021 the number of irregularities remained stable while the amounts affected increased by 32 % for fraudulent irregularities and 13 % for non-fraudulent irregularities;

| 33. | Notes that inspections by anti-fraud services and post-release controls were the most successful detection tools for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities, respectively, and that the most frequent modi operandi involved undervaluation, incorrect origin, misdescription of goods and smuggling; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Notes that inspections by anti-fraud services and post-release controls were the most successful detection tools for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities, respectively, and that the most frequent modi operandi involved undervaluation, incorrect origin, misdescription of goods and smuggling;

| 34. | Remarks that China remained the country of origin for most goods affected by irregularities; stresses that a number of the cases investigated, which involved products sent from China, are emblematic of the challenges posed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative; is concerned by the recurrence of cases of absorption and circumvention of trade defence measures and by the difficulty in detecting them; calls on the Commission to adopt countermeasures and deploy them intensively to address unfair trade; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Remarks that China remained the country of origin for most goods affected by irregularities; stresses that a number of the cases investigated, which involved products sent from China, are emblematic of the challenges posed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative; is concerned by the recurrence of cases of absorption and circumvention of trade defence measures and by the difficulty in detecting them; calls on the Commission to adopt countermeasures and deploy them intensively to address unfair trade;

| 35. | Calls for the EU and the Member States to join forces in tackling missing trader intra-community VAT fraud, which, according to Europol, costs EUR 50 billion annually in tax losses or up to 27 % of the annual EU budget; believes that this measure would significantly increase the resources available for EU policies and reduce the annual contributions of the Member States to the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Calls for the EU and the Member States to join forces in tackling missing trader intra-community VAT fraud, which, according to Europol, costs EUR 50 billion annually in tax losses or up to 27 % of the annual EU budget; believes that this measure would significantly increase the resources available for EU policies and reduce the annual contributions of the Member States to the EU budget;

| 36. | Stresses that the VAT gap is due to several factors, which may differ in each Member State, such as a lack of resources, limited digital efficiency in tax administrations, or legislative loopholes affecting the effectiveness of control measures deployed to counter tax evasion and tax avoidance; reiterates its call on the Member States to strengthen administrative cooperation, based on the model of the cooperation between members of Eurofisc, and the multilateral warning system for combating VAT fraud, with a view to rapidly detecting carousel-type fraud; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Stresses that the VAT gap is due to several factors, which may differ in each Member State, such as a lack of resources, limited digital efficiency in tax administrations, or legislative loopholes affecting the effectiveness of control measures deployed to counter tax evasion and tax avoidance; reiterates its call on the Member States to strengthen administrative cooperation, based on the model of the cooperation between members of Eurofisc, and the multilateral warning system for combating VAT fraud, with a view to rapidly detecting carousel-type fraud;

| 37. | Highlights the fact that the EPPO has the authority to investigate serious offences against the common VAT system provided that they are associated with the territory of two or more Member States and involve a total loss of at least EUR 10 million, and that, acting as a single, transnational prosecution office, it brings unprecedented efficiency to the fight against VAT fraud; notes in particular that in 2021, the EPPO investigated 91 such cases involving estimated losses of EUR 2,5 billion; welcomes the Commission’s second report, published on 16 September 2022, on the implementation of the PIF Directive (COM(2022)0466), which also focuses on the appropriateness of the EUR 10 million VAT threshold; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Highlights the fact that the EPPO has the authority to investigate serious offences against the common VAT system provided that they are associated with the territory of two or more Member States and involve a total loss of at least EUR 10 million, and that, acting as a single, transnational prosecution office, it brings unprecedented efficiency to the fight against VAT fraud; notes in particular that in 2021, the EPPO investigated 91 such cases involving estimated losses of EUR 2,5 billion; welcomes the Commission’s second report, published on 16 September 2022, on the implementation of the PIF Directive (COM(2022)0466), which also focuses on the appropriateness of the EUR 10 million VAT threshold;

Expenditure

Expenditure

| 38. | Remarks that, according to the PIF Report 2021, the level of controls and audits on expenditure remained high, despite the flexibility introduced to address the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and that the measures put in place to mitigate the risks arising from the pandemic-related constraints on audits and controls were robust and effective; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Remarks that, according to the PIF Report 2021, the level of controls and audits on expenditure remained high, despite the flexibility introduced to address the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and that the measures put in place to mitigate the risks arising from the pandemic-related constraints on audits and controls were robust and effective;

| 39. | Asks the Commission to publish audit reports and findings before the end of the implementation period, which can take several years; believes that the public has the right to be aware of the actions that Member States are required to take to protect the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Asks the Commission to publish audit reports and findings before the end of the implementation period, which can take several years; believes that the public has the right to be aware of the actions that Member States are required to take to protect the EU budget;

| 40. | Observes that for agriculture, the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 confirms a very low incidence of reported fraud in proportion to disbursements for direct payments, with the highest level observed for market measures in the fruit and vegetable sector and related to the promotion of agricultural products; notes, however, the progressive increase in fraudulent irregularities in rural development related to the 2014-2020 programming period; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Observes that for agriculture, the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 confirms a very low incidence of reported fraud in proportion to disbursements for direct payments, with the highest level observed for market measures in the fruit and vegetable sector and related to the promotion of agricultural products; notes, however, the progressive increase in fraudulent irregularities in rural development related to the 2014-2020 programming period;

| 41. | Underlines the need for a strict application of the new social conditionality mechanism introduced under the latest common agricultural policy reform, linking subsidies to work and employment standards; recalls the vital importance of this new mechanism for the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and requests that adequate measures in this respect be put in place by both the Member States and the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Underlines the need for a strict application of the new social conditionality mechanism introduced under the latest common agricultural policy reform, linking subsidies to work and employment standards; recalls the vital importance of this new mechanism for the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and requests that adequate measures in this respect be put in place by both the Member States and the Commission;

| 42. | Notes that for the ESIF implementing cohesion policy, the number of fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period remained in line with the number reported for the 2007-2013 programming period, while there was a fall in the number of non-fraudulent irregularities; remarks with concern that the financial amounts involved in the fraudulent irregularities linked to the cohesion policy in 2021, compared to the five-year average for 2017 to 2021, increased by 186 %; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Notes that for the ESIF implementing cohesion policy, the number of fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period remained in line with the number reported for the 2007-2013 programming period, while there was a fall in the number of non-fraudulent irregularities; remarks with concern that the financial amounts involved in the fraudulent irregularities linked to the cohesion policy in 2021, compared to the five-year average for 2017 to 2021, increased by 186 %;

| 43. | Remarks with concern that in the case of the ESIF, most fraudulent irregularities concerning ethics and integrity were related to conflicts of interest and stresses the importance of the Commission’s urging all Member States to ensure that they have stringent rules against conflicts of interest; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Remarks with concern that in the case of the ESIF, most fraudulent irregularities concerning ethics and integrity were related to conflicts of interest and stresses the importance of the Commission’s urging all Member States to ensure that they have stringent rules against conflicts of interest;

| 44. | Calls on the Commission to urgently ensure the implementation of Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (17) (Financial Regulation) on conflicts of interest, which prohibits any persons or national authorities involved in budget implementation from taking any action that may bring their own interests into conflict with those of the Union; considers it necessary for the Commission to evaluate the practical implications of the provisions under Article 61 and to consider a possible way forward; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Calls on the Commission to urgently ensure the implementation of Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (17

| 45. | Observes that, in ESIF matters, infringements of public procurement rules were the most frequently reported non-fraudulent irregularities, but only in 4 % of these cases was fraud detected; believes that enhanced transparency in public procurement would ensure sounder management of resources; takes the view that reducing single bids by shining a spotlight on them through ex post controls, encouraging the adoption of electronic public procurement systems, and providing training on public procurement for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises would help boost participation and facilitate public scrutiny and controls, increase competition in public contracts and allow a more efficient use of EU funds in public procurement, while reducing the risk of fraud and irregularities; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Observes that, in ESIF matters, infringements of public procurement rules were the most frequently reported non-fraudulent irregularities, but only in 4 % of these cases was fraud detected; believes that enhanced transparency in public procurement would ensure sounder management of resources; takes the view that reducing single bids by shining a spotlight on them through ex post controls, encouraging the adoption of electronic public procurement systems, and providing training on public procurement for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises would help boost participation and facilitate public scrutiny and controls, increase competition in public contracts and allow a more efficient use of EU funds in public procurement, while reducing the risk of fraud and irregularities;

| 46. | Observes that the analysis of irregularities highlights risks in relation to the green transition for investments in energy efficiency, the provision of drinking water, waste management, renewable energy (particularly solar power) and risk prevention; notes that the risks linked to the digital transition relate to services and applications for small and medium-sized enterprises, in terms of the number of irregularities, and services and applications for e-government, in terms of the financial amounts involved; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Observes that the analysis of irregularities highlights risks in relation to the green transition for investments in energy efficiency, the provision of drinking water, waste management, renewable energy (particularly solar power) and risk prevention; notes that the risks linked to the digital transition relate to services and applications for small and medium-sized enterprises, in terms of the number of irregularities, and services and applications for e-government, in terms of the financial amounts involved;

| 47. | Calls on all Member States to maintain a high level of checks and monitoring on emergency spending and, in the case of ex post controls conducted for urgent procedures, to assess emergency procurement on a case-by-case basis; calls on the Member States to finally complete the transition to e-procurement processes; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Calls on all Member States to maintain a high level of checks and monitoring on emergency spending and, in the case of ex post controls conducted for urgent procedures, to assess emergency procurement on a case-by-case basis; calls on the Member States to finally complete the transition to e-procurement processes;

| 48. | Observes that, in the case of direct management, the number of fraudulent irregularities detected has fallen since 2016 and that, despite the marginal increase in 2021, they remained stable over the preceding four years, while non-fraudulent irregularities continued to decrease, with 2021 being the year with the lowest figures in terms of both the number of cases and the amounts concerned; notes with appreciation that recovery remains at positive levels; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Observes that, in the case of direct management, the number of fraudulent irregularities detected has fallen since 2016 and that, despite the marginal increase in 2021, they remained stable over the preceding four years, while non-fraudulent irregularities continued to decrease, with 2021 being the year with the lowest figures in terms of both the number of cases and the amounts concerned; notes with appreciation that recovery remains at positive levels;

| 49. | Recalls that transparency has a key role in the management of public funds, both as a deterrent and to build trust among citizens; invites the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts to strengthen transparency in the use of funds, including concerning information on final beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Recalls that transparency has a key role in the management of public funds, both as a deterrent and to build trust among citizens; invites the Commission and the Member States to step up their efforts to strengthen transparency in the use of funds, including concerning information on final beneficiaries;

| 50. | Points out that risk analysis is still making a marginal contribution to detecting fraud; takes note of the significant and growing role of information from civil society (including information published in the media) in this area; stresses the importance of protecting these valuable sources of information, who often face threats and even risk their lives; calls for the Commission to propose legislation as soon as possible against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPS), which are often used to silence people who report fraud and irregularities, as previously requested by Parliament in its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society (18); |
| --- | --- |

50.

Points out that risk analysis is still making a marginal contribution to detecting fraud; takes note of the significant and growing role of information from civil society (including information published in the media) in this area; stresses the importance of protecting these valuable sources of information, who often face threats and even risk their lives; calls for the Commission to propose legislation as soon as possible against strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPS), which are often used to silence people who report fraud and irregularities, as previously requested by Parliament in its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society (18

| 51. | Believes that integrity pacts allow increased transparency, accountability and good governance by fostering civil society-supported monitoring in public contracting; calls on the Commission to encourage the use of and promote this tool in the 2021-2027 programmes currently under design and assessment by providing support and guidance to Member States so that they can gradually mainstream them in these programmes; |
| --- | --- |

51.

Believes that integrity pacts allow increased transparency, accountability and good governance by fostering civil society-supported monitoring in public contracting; calls on the Commission to encourage the use of and promote this tool in the 2021-2027 programmes currently under design and assessment by providing support and guidance to Member States so that they can gradually mainstream them in these programmes;

| 52. | Notes that despite the reported figure, the proportion of cases of suspected fraud that have not led to a conviction remains high, while the share of cases in which fraud is established is low, suggesting the need to invest more in investigating and prosecuting such cases; notes that the average indictment rate based on OLAF recommendations to Member States decreased to only 35 % for the period between 2017 and 2021; asks OLAF and the Commission to systematically follow up with Member States to ascertain why the recommendations provided have not resulted in the launch of judicial proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Notes that despite the reported figure, the proportion of cases of suspected fraud that have not led to a conviction remains high, while the share of cases in which fraud is established is low, suggesting the need to invest more in investigating and prosecuting such cases; notes that the average indictment rate based on OLAF recommendations to Member States decreased to only 35 % for the period between 2017 and 2021; asks OLAF and the Commission to systematically follow up with Member States to ascertain why the recommendations provided have not resulted in the launch of judicial proceedings;

| 53. | Stresses the need to address the lack of information on the owners and ownership structure of companies or groups of companies with the aim of making the current distribution of funds more transparent and helping to make significant improvements in the efficient detection of irregularities; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Stresses the need to address the lack of information on the owners and ownership structure of companies or groups of companies with the aim of making the current distribution of funds more transparent and helping to make significant improvements in the efficient detection of irregularities;

| 54. | Demands that the Member States collect data on the final recipients of funds and make this data available on request; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Demands that the Member States collect data on the final recipients of funds and make this data available on request;

IT support

IT support

| 55. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposals on the compulsory use of a single integrated IT system for data mining and risk scoring, on the increased scope and effectiveness of the early-detection and exclusion system (EDES) and on the enhanced use of digitalisation and technology to increase the efficiency and quality of controls and audits; believes that these measures would strengthen the response to the increased risks of serious irregularities that follow the urgent delivery of funding under pressure in emergency situations; |
| --- | --- |

55.

Welcomes the Commission’s proposals on the compulsory use of a single integrated IT system for data mining and risk scoring, on the increased scope and effectiveness of the early-detection and exclusion system (EDES) and on the enhanced use of digitalisation and technology to increase the efficiency and quality of controls and audits; believes that these measures would strengthen the response to the increased risks of serious irregularities that follow the urgent delivery of funding under pressure in emergency situations;

| 56. | Emphasises that the EDES, as the EU’s blacklist, has huge potential to flag people and companies that misuse EU funds; welcomes the Commission’s proposal (19) to change the Financial Regulation in order to strengthen the use of the EDES not only in direct management but also in indirect and shared management; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Emphasises that the EDES, as the EU’s blacklist, has huge potential to flag people and companies that misuse EU funds; welcomes the Commission’s proposal (19

| 57. | Underlines the need to make the use of the single integrated IT system compulsory as soon as possible, without waiting for the next MFF, as also stated in the ECA’s Opinion 06/2022 of 27 October 2022 (20); |
| --- | --- |

57.

Underlines the need to make the use of the single integrated IT system compulsory as soon as possible, without waiting for the next MFF, as also stated in the ECA’s Opinion 06/2022 of 27 October 2022 (20

| 58. | Welcomes the Commission’s continued support for Member States through the structural reform support programme and the Technical Support Instrument; expresses its support for the financing of the CORE project, which aims to develop a procedure to compute corruption risk in public procurement during the pandemic and improve the early detection of corruption risk; |
| --- | --- |

58.

Welcomes the Commission’s continued support for Member States through the structural reform support programme and the Technical Support Instrument; expresses its support for the financing of the CORE project, which aims to develop a procedure to compute corruption risk in public procurement during the pandemic and improve the early detection of corruption risk;

| 59. | Welcomes the decision adopted by the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) to set up an expert group dedicated to the use of IT tools to protect RRF resources; |
| --- | --- |

59.

Welcomes the decision adopted by the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) to set up an expert group dedicated to the use of IT tools to protect RRF resources;

| 60. | Calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of using artificial intelligence for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; |
| --- | --- |

60.

Calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of using artificial intelligence for the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the internal components (OLAF, EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, Commission, ECA and EIB)

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the internal components (OLAF, EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, Commission, ECA and EIB)

| 61. | Underlines the fact that the EU anti-fraud architecture is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multilayered network of cooperation: the first layer is grounded on horizontal cooperation among EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; |
| --- | --- |

61.

Underlines the fact that the EU anti-fraud architecture is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multilayered network of cooperation: the first layer is grounded on horizontal cooperation among EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations;

| 62. | Highlights the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud by overcoming national systems’ limitations, especially for cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results achieved by the EPPO and OLAF; emphasises the role of the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption; |
| --- | --- |

62.

Highlights the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud by overcoming national systems’ limitations, especially for cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results achieved by the EPPO and OLAF; emphasises the role of the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol and OLAF in the fight against corruption;

| 63. | Welcomes the start of operations of the EPPO on 1 June 2021, as the final component of the EU anti-fraud architecture to be put in place; observes that in its first half year of operational activity, the EPPO received 2 832 reports and opened 576 investigations; notes, with regard to the proceeds of criminal activities, that 81 recovery actions took place in 12 of the participating Member States and that the EPPO requested that a total of EUR 154,3 million be seized, of which the seizure of EUR 147 million was granted; |
| --- | --- |

63.

Welcomes the start of operations of the EPPO on 1 June 2021, as the final component of the EU anti-fraud architecture to be put in place; observes that in its first half year of operational activity, the EPPO received 2 832 reports and opened 576 investigations; notes, with regard to the proceeds of criminal activities, that 81 recovery actions took place in 12 of the participating Member States and that the EPPO requested that a total of EUR 154,3 million be seized, of which the seizure of EUR 147 million was granted;

| 64. | Praises the EPPO for having created a new climate of trust for citizens and invites the Commission and the Member States to increase their cooperation in order to enable the full implementation of the EPPO’s mandate; recalls in this regard that, on the one hand, the Member States’ detection rates need to be enhanced, and that the cooperation of OLAF has a key role to play in the EU anti-fraud structures; recalls also the various critical shortcomings identified in the EPPO Regulation that need to be addressed as soon as possible; invites the Commission to urgently take action on the requests made by the EPPO on its budgetary implementation, so that the EPPO can become a fully effective and independent prosecution office; |
| --- | --- |

64.

Praises the EPPO for having created a new climate of trust for citizens and invites the Commission and the Member States to increase their cooperation in order to enable the full implementation of the EPPO’s mandate; recalls in this regard that, on the one hand, the Member States’ detection rates need to be enhanced, and that the cooperation of OLAF has a key role to play in the EU anti-fraud structures; recalls also the various critical shortcomings identified in the EPPO Regulation that need to be addressed as soon as possible; invites the Commission to urgently take action on the requests made by the EPPO on its budgetary implementation, so that the EPPO can become a fully effective and independent prosecution office;

| 65. | Notes the observations and considerations expressed by the European Chief Prosecutor on the need to amend the EPPO Regulation; calls on the Commission to engage in a discussion with the EPPO to identify the improvements required to enhance its operational effectiveness; recalls that the EPPO is an independent body of the Union and should not be assimilated to an agency, as this would have an impact on its independence and efficiency; notes that there are several other provisions of the EPPO Regulation that have an impact on the operations of the EPPO and, therefore, on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and asks the Commission to propose solutions to improve the situation and to report to Parliament in line with Article 119(1) of the EPPO Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

65.

Notes the observations and considerations expressed by the European Chief Prosecutor on the need to amend the EPPO Regulation; calls on the Commission to engage in a discussion with the EPPO to identify the improvements required to enhance its operational effectiveness; recalls that the EPPO is an independent body of the Union and should not be assimilated to an agency, as this would have an impact on its independence and efficiency; notes that there are several other provisions of the EPPO Regulation that have an impact on the operations of the EPPO and, therefore, on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, and asks the Commission to propose solutions to improve the situation and to report to Parliament in line with Article 119(1) of the EPPO Regulation;

| 66. | Deeply regrets the fact that five Member States still refuse to participate in the EPPO, namely Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland; |
| --- | --- |

66.

Deeply regrets the fact that five Member States still refuse to participate in the EPPO, namely Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland;

| 67. | Regrets the fact that the participation of Member States in the EPPO is not obligatory; reiterates its call on the remaining Member States to join the EPPO as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures; |
| --- | --- |

67.

Regrets the fact that the participation of Member States in the EPPO is not obligatory; reiterates its call on the remaining Member States to join the EPPO as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

| 68. | Highlights the fact that the legal frameworks of OLAF and the EPPO clearly provide for the two offices to work in close cooperation while respecting their individual mandates, powers and competences; notes in this regard that, in 2021, OLAF opened 26 complementary investigations and carried out eight supporting operations; remarks that OLAF forwarded 167 files to EPPO, mainly related to shared management (63) and direct expenditure (34) and in equal number concerning internal and international investigations (25 cases each); appreciates that this transmission resulted in the opening by the EPPO of 85 criminal investigations and that such cases relate to an estimated total loss to the EU budget of EUR 2,2 billion; encourages both OLAF and the EPPO to continue to enhance their cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

68.

Highlights the fact that the legal frameworks of OLAF and the EPPO clearly provide for the two offices to work in close cooperation while respecting their individual mandates, powers and competences; notes in this regard that, in 2021, OLAF opened 26 complementary investigations and carried out eight supporting operations; remarks that OLAF forwarded 167 files to EPPO, mainly related to shared management (63) and direct expenditure (34) and in equal number concerning internal and international investigations (25 cases each); appreciates that this transmission resulted in the opening by the EPPO of 85 criminal investigations and that such cases relate to an estimated total loss to the EU budget of EUR 2,2 billion; encourages both OLAF and the EPPO to continue to enhance their cooperation;

| 69. | Remarks that OLAF actively cooperates with the ECA, Eurojust and Europol; welcomes the joint efforts of OLAF and Europol to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of the RRF instrument and their cooperation with other Commission services entrusted with supervising the RRF (the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Commission Secretariat-General); appreciates the joint OLAF/Europol report entitled ‘Assessing the threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’; |
| --- | --- |

69.

Remarks that OLAF actively cooperates with the ECA, Eurojust and Europol; welcomes the joint efforts of OLAF and Europol to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of the RRF instrument and their cooperation with other Commission services entrusted with supervising the RRF (the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Commission Secretariat-General); appreciates the joint OLAF/Europol report entitled ‘Assessing the threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’;

| 70. | Appreciates the working arrangement between Europol and the EPPO, which entered into force on 19 January 2021; notes that working arrangements were also signed on 3 September 2021 for a framework for cooperation between the EPPO and the ECA; |
| --- | --- |

70.

Appreciates the working arrangement between Europol and the EPPO, which entered into force on 19 January 2021; notes that working arrangements were also signed on 3 September 2021 for a framework for cooperation between the EPPO and the ECA;

| 71. | Is aware that the EPPO and the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group have also signed working arrangements to guarantee that the EIB can smoothly transmit information falling within the EPPO remit before any action is undertaken by the EIB Inspectorate General; |
| --- | --- |

71.

Is aware that the EPPO and the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group have also signed working arrangements to guarantee that the EIB can smoothly transmit information falling within the EPPO remit before any action is undertaken by the EIB Inspectorate General;

| 72. | Calls for closer cooperation with Eurojust; welcomes the sharing of expertise and the exchanges between attendees at seminars and other presentations, but believes that Eurojust’s contribution should be assessed and defined in the framework of the anti-fraud architecture, building on its complementarity with the EPPO and confirming the synergies from its cooperation with OLAF; |
| --- | --- |

72.

Calls for closer cooperation with Eurojust; welcomes the sharing of expertise and the exchanges between attendees at seminars and other presentations, but believes that Eurojust’s contribution should be assessed and defined in the framework of the anti-fraud architecture, building on its complementarity with the EPPO and confirming the synergies from its cooperation with OLAF;

| 73. | Welcomes the launch of Operation Sentinel and the NextGenerationEU — Law Enforcement Forum, the latter of which is a joint initiative, co-led by Europol and Italy, that brings together Europol, the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training and the Member States, providing a forum for intelligence sharing and coordination of operations to tackle the infiltration of organised crime in the legal economy, and to protect the NGEU stimulus package, with a specific focus on corruption, tax evasion, embezzlement and money laundering; takes the view that, in order to effectively address the threat posed by organised crime, the exchange of best practice and development of common and coordinated strategies are pivotal; |
| --- | --- |

73.

Welcomes the launch of Operation Sentinel and the NextGenerationEU — Law Enforcement Forum, the latter of which is a joint initiative, co-led by Europol and Italy, that brings together Europol, the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training and the Member States, providing a forum for intelligence sharing and coordination of operations to tackle the infiltration of organised crime in the legal economy, and to protect the NGEU stimulus package, with a specific focus on corruption, tax evasion, embezzlement and money laundering; takes the view that, in order to effectively address the threat posed by organised crime, the exchange of best practice and development of common and coordinated strategies are pivotal;

| 74. | Recalls that OLAF was created not only for internal investigations but also to support Member States in external investigations; recalls that the subsidiarity principle prevents OLAF from launching investigations where Member States are in a better position to act, but this does not preclude OLAF from conducting analyses of recurring cases, trends and patterns, or from building on the enhanced cooperation and successful actions brought about by its ability to detect these phenomena; |
| --- | --- |

74.

Recalls that OLAF was created not only for internal investigations but also to support Member States in external investigations; recalls that the subsidiarity principle prevents OLAF from launching investigations where Member States are in a better position to act, but this does not preclude OLAF from conducting analyses of recurring cases, trends and patterns, or from building on the enhanced cooperation and successful actions brought about by its ability to detect these phenomena;

| 75. | Acknowledges, on customs-related matters, the extremely close operational coordination between OLAF, the European Union Intellectual Property Office, Interpol and the WCO; regrets the weakness of the Member States’ alert systems; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Acknowledges, on customs-related matters, the extremely close operational coordination between OLAF, the European Union Intellectual Property Office, Interpol and the WCO; regrets the weakness of the Member States’ alert systems;

| 76. | Is aware that on 18 June 2021 the Commission and the EPPO signed the administrative arrangements for implementing the mutual information and consultation obligations set out in Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, under which the EPPO can more effectively investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the EU budget, and Commission departments can ensure appropriate administrative, financial and disciplinary follow-up of the EPPO’s investigations, including precautionary measures to protect the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

76.

Is aware that on 18 June 2021 the Commission and the EPPO signed the administrative arrangements for implementing the mutual information and consultation obligations set out in Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, under which the EPPO can more effectively investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the EU budget, and Commission departments can ensure appropriate administrative, financial and disciplinary follow-up of the EPPO’s investigations, including precautionary measures to protect the EU budget;

| 77. | Deplores the fact that in 2021, out of an overall budget of EUR 44,9 million, the EPPO was forced to return EUR 9,5 million (about 20 %) to the EU budget, after having requested and obtained additional resources from the budgetary authority to hire statutory staff because the clearance to hire them was not granted by the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

77.

Deplores the fact that in 2021, out of an overall budget of EUR 44,9 million, the EPPO was forced to return EUR 9,5 million (about 20 %) to the EU budget, after having requested and obtained additional resources from the budgetary authority to hire statutory staff because the clearance to hire them was not granted by the Commission;

| 78. | Is of the opinion that OLAF should also follow up on its financial recommendations in order to compare them with the amounts recovered at the end of the procedures by the Commission and thereby contribute to the overall monitoring of the recovery of funds; |
| --- | --- |

78.

Is of the opinion that OLAF should also follow up on its financial recommendations in order to compare them with the amounts recovered at the end of the procedures by the Commission and thereby contribute to the overall monitoring of the recovery of funds;

| 79. | Reiterates its concerns related to the permanent understaffing at OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and Eurojust and their lack of financial and human resources, as they need an adequate and predictable budget to be able to organise and carry out their work to the best of their ability; underscores that their workload has now further increased due to the adoption of the NGEU and the provision of extraordinary funds to support Ukraine; reiterates its call to ensure that those EU bodies and agencies are adequately resourced and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud actions returns to the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

79.

Reiterates its concerns related to the permanent understaffing at OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and Eurojust and their lack of financial and human resources, as they need an adequate and predictable budget to be able to organise and carry out their work to the best of their ability; underscores that their workload has now further increased due to the adoption of the NGEU and the provision of extraordinary funds to support Ukraine; reiterates its call to ensure that those EU bodies and agencies are adequately resourced and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud actions returns to the EU budget;

| 80. | Asks the Commission to increase the EPPO’s and OLAF’s financial and human resources to enable them to tackle the challenges that will arise from the spending of the exceptionally large recovery fund; asks the EPPO and OLAF to avoid any overlapping of work and any delays in proceedings; is of the opinion that OLAF and the EPPO should complement each other’s work and focus their respective investigations on those fields where the other institution has no competence; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Asks the Commission to increase the EPPO’s and OLAF’s financial and human resources to enable them to tackle the challenges that will arise from the spending of the exceptionally large recovery fund; asks the EPPO and OLAF to avoid any overlapping of work and any delays in proceedings; is of the opinion that OLAF and the EPPO should complement each other’s work and focus their respective investigations on those fields where the other institution has no competence;

| 81. | Calls on the Commission to establish a mechanism for small and medium-sized enterprises to lodge a complaint directly with the Commission whenever they are faced with a high level of corruption, severe misconduct by national authorities, irregular or biased treatment in tenders or regarding the distribution of subsidies, pressure or intimidation from criminal structures, organised crime or oligarchic structures, or any other severe infringement of their rights; |
| --- | --- |

81.

Calls on the Commission to establish a mechanism for small and medium-sized enterprises to lodge a complaint directly with the Commission whenever they are faced with a high level of corruption, severe misconduct by national authorities, irregular or biased treatment in tenders or regarding the distribution of subsidies, pressure or intimidation from criminal structures, organised crime or oligarchic structures, or any other severe infringement of their rights;

| 82. | Recognises the principle of confidentiality of OLAF investigations; is of the opinion, however, that there is an overarching public interest and that EU citizens also have the right to access the reports and recommendations relating to closed OLAF investigations and national follow-up procedures, as ruled by the CJEU in Case T-517/19; asks OLAF, therefore, to set up a mechanism to publish the reports and recommendations for which there is no longer any legitimate reason to maintain the principle of confidentiality; |
| --- | --- |

82.

Recognises the principle of confidentiality of OLAF investigations; is of the opinion, however, that there is an overarching public interest and that EU citizens also have the right to access the reports and recommendations relating to closed OLAF investigations and national follow-up procedures, as ruled by the CJEU in Case T-517/19; asks OLAF, therefore, to set up a mechanism to publish the reports and recommendations for which there is no longer any legitimate reason to maintain the principle of confidentiality;

| 83. | Reiterates its request for a mechanism to be put in place by OLAF to grant access on request to its investigation reports and recommendations, which are often of great public interest, in order to increase transparency while respecting the confidentiality of its investigations; |
| --- | --- |

83.

Reiterates its request for a mechanism to be put in place by OLAF to grant access on request to its investigation reports and recommendations, which are often of great public interest, in order to increase transparency while respecting the confidentiality of its investigations;

| 84. | Welcomes the targeted revision, initiated by the Commission, of the action plan accompanying the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy, and calls on the Commission to take into account the proposals put forward herein and in Parliament’s previous resolutions on PIF matters; |
| --- | --- |

84.

Welcomes the targeted revision, initiated by the Commission, of the action plan accompanying the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy, and calls on the Commission to take into account the proposals put forward herein and in Parliament’s previous resolutions on PIF matters;

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the external components (Member States, AFCOS, NAFS, UAFP, the rule of law)

The EU anti-fraud architecture: the external components (Member States, AFCOS, NAFS, UAFP, the rule of law)

| 85. | Underlines the important role that the Member States play in protecting the Union’s financial interests; is aware that, under the new delivery model adopted with the RRF, the Member States have greater responsibility for preventing and countering fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding; believes, however, that the European level of protection is also crucial for the protection of the EU’s financial interests and that efficient cooperation between the EU and the national authorities is essential for proper delivery; |
| --- | --- |

85.

Underlines the important role that the Member States play in protecting the Union’s financial interests; is aware that, under the new delivery model adopted with the RRF, the Member States have greater responsibility for preventing and countering fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding; believes, however, that the European level of protection is also crucial for the protection of the EU’s financial interests and that efficient cooperation between the EU and the national authorities is essential for proper delivery;

| 86. | Calls on the Member States that participate in the EPPO to provide the necessary support to the office (through support staff and appropriate working conditions for European delegated prosecutors, access to databases, police officers, prompt cooperation from taxation and customs authorities, etc.), so that it can optimise its efficiency in protecting the EU’s and Member States’ budgets; |
| --- | --- |

86.

Calls on the Member States that participate in the EPPO to provide the necessary support to the office (through support staff and appropriate working conditions for European delegated prosecutors, access to databases, police officers, prompt cooperation from taxation and customs authorities, etc.), so that it can optimise its efficiency in protecting the EU’s and Member States’ budgets;

| 87. | Encourages the Member States to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union's financial interests by using data from all available sources, analysing data and exchanging information, including with law enforcement authorities and the Commission, in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

87.

Encourages the Member States to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union's financial interests by using data from all available sources, analysing data and exchanging information, including with law enforcement authorities and the Commission, in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner;

| 88. | Welcomes the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 and calls on national authorities to take it into account in their control activities; |
| --- | --- |

88.

Welcomes the analysis in the PIF Report 2021 and calls on national authorities to take it into account in their control activities;

| 89. | Reiterates its worries about the bureaucratic overburdening of the national authorities; calls on the Commission to always strive to decrease the number of indicators needed for audit and control purposes when determining which indicators and data are truly relevant, necessary and proportionate; |
| --- | --- |

89.

Reiterates its worries about the bureaucratic overburdening of the national authorities; calls on the Commission to always strive to decrease the number of indicators needed for audit and control purposes when determining which indicators and data are truly relevant, necessary and proportionate;

| 90. | Asks the Commission to strengthen the conflict-of-interest provisions in the review of the Financial Regulation to include the preparation of the budget by public officials; |
| --- | --- |

90.

Asks the Commission to strengthen the conflict-of-interest provisions in the review of the Financial Regulation to include the preparation of the budget by public officials;

| 91. | Calls on Ireland and Poland to immediately start cooperating with the EPPO on the basis of existing mutual legal assistance treaties and legislation and emphasises that their current lack of cooperation goes against the duties of sincere cooperation (Article 13 TEU) and the specific objective, and related obligations on the Member States, of the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests (Article 325 TFEU); |
| --- | --- |

91.

Calls on Ireland and Poland to immediately start cooperating with the EPPO on the basis of existing mutual legal assistance treaties and legislation and emphasises that their current lack of cooperation goes against the duties of sincere cooperation (Article 13 TEU) and the specific objective, and related obligations on the Member States, of the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests (Article 325 TFEU);

| 92. | Believes that uneven and fragmentary legislation, controlling mechanisms, digitalisation of data and reporting systems across the Member States represent obstacles to the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests, hindering comparability and preventing the evaluation and mapping of the scale, nature and causes of fraud in the EU; stresses that, in particular, the diverse implementation of the PIF Directive, combined with the rules set out in Article 25 of the EPPO Regulation, make it impossible for the EPPO to exercise its competence in some Member States (for example, with regard to smuggling and situations where national and EU funding overlap), creating loopholes in the anti-fraud architecture; |
| --- | --- |

92.

Believes that uneven and fragmentary legislation, controlling mechanisms, digitalisation of data and reporting systems across the Member States represent obstacles to the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests, hindering comparability and preventing the evaluation and mapping of the scale, nature and causes of fraud in the EU; stresses that, in particular, the diverse implementation of the PIF Directive, combined with the rules set out in Article 25 of the EPPO Regulation, make it impossible for the EPPO to exercise its competence in some Member States (for example, with regard to smuggling and situations where national and EU funding overlap), creating loopholes in the anti-fraud architecture;

| 93. | Stresses the need for complete transparency in accounting for the transfers and loans provided for under the RRF, so that any potential fraud to the EU’s financial interests can be pursued by the EPPO and/or OLAF; calls on the Commission to ensure that Parliament has full access to all relevant information; |
| --- | --- |

93.

Stresses the need for complete transparency in accounting for the transfers and loans provided for under the RRF, so that any potential fraud to the EU’s financial interests can be pursued by the EPPO and/or OLAF; calls on the Commission to ensure that Parliament has full access to all relevant information;

| 94. | Observes that the transposition of the PIF Directive is a precondition to enabling the EPPO and its partners to effectively carry out investigations and prosecutions; welcomes the first report of the Commission on the transposition of the Directive, published on 6 September 2021; notes that, since then, and despite the transposition of the Directive by all the Member States, the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 17 Member States for not correctly transposing the PIF Directive (21); |
| --- | --- |

94.

Observes that the transposition of the PIF Directive is a precondition to enabling the EPPO and its partners to effectively carry out investigations and prosecutions; welcomes the first report of the Commission on the transposition of the Directive, published on 6 September 2021; notes that, since then, and despite the transposition of the Directive by all the Member States, the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 17 Member States for not correctly transposing the PIF Directive (21

| 95. | Recalls that 18 infringement procedures have been opened for the incorrect transposition of Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (22); points out that the deadline for the transposition of the Whistleblower Directive was 17 December 2021 and that by that date only five Member States had transposed it, while four more have adopted specific legislation in 2022; encourages the Commission to take all further steps needed to ensure effective compliance by the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

95.

Recalls that 18 infringement procedures have been opened for the incorrect transposition of Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (22

| 96. | Notes with concern that the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 15 Member States for not having transposed the Whistleblower Directive; |
| --- | --- |

96.

Notes with concern that the Commission has opened infringement procedures against 15 Member States for not having transposed the Whistleblower Directive;

| 97. | Recalls that an effective fight against money laundering is essential to protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure the full recovery of funds; |
| --- | --- |

97.

Recalls that an effective fight against money laundering is essential to protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure the full recovery of funds;

| 98. | Is concerned by the overall lack of action by many Member States, which is preventing the creation of a more uniform playing field in the anti-fraud landscape; |
| --- | --- |

98.

Is concerned by the overall lack of action by many Member States, which is preventing the creation of a more uniform playing field in the anti-fraud landscape;

| 99. | Is aware that on 1 January 2021 the Union Anti-Fraud Programme (UAFP), the successor to Hercule III (23), entered into force; observes that the new UAFP redesigns and merges the resources financing the Hercule III programme, the Anti-Fraud Information System and the Irregularity Management System so as to enhance coordination and synergies; remarks that OLAF plays a leading role in its implementation; |
| --- | --- |

99.

Is aware that on 1 January 2021 the Union Anti-Fraud Programme (UAFP), the successor to Hercule III (23

| 100. | Recalls that anti-fraud coordination services (AFCOS) are a requirement in every Member State and that they should facilitate effective cooperation and information sharing with OLAF; regrets, however, the fact that not all Member States effectively entrust their AFCOS with coordinating the fight against fraud and corruption affecting the EU’s financial interests; maintains that effective coordination at national and EU levels can be achieved with the adoption of a national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS) that allocates tasks and defines processes and responsibilities clearly; |
| --- | --- |

100.

Recalls that anti-fraud coordination services (AFCOS) are a requirement in every Member State and that they should facilitate effective cooperation and information sharing with OLAF; regrets, however, the fact that not all Member States effectively entrust their AFCOS with coordinating the fight against fraud and corruption affecting the EU’s financial interests; maintains that effective coordination at national and EU levels can be achieved with the adoption of a national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS) that allocates tasks and defines processes and responsibilities clearly;

| 101. | Appreciates that the Commission’s encouragement to Member States to adopt a NAFS has resulted in a steady increase in the number of strategies adopted; notes that by the end of 2021, 17 Member States had adopted or updated a NAFS (up from 10 in 2019 and 14 in 2020); observes that of the 10 Member States yet to adopt a NAFS, four reported that they were in the process of drafting, or close to adopting, a strategy; regrets the fact that, despite the improvements compared to 2020, six Member States are still far from adopting a NAFS; |
| --- | --- |

101.

Appreciates that the Commission’s encouragement to Member States to adopt a NAFS has resulted in a steady increase in the number of strategies adopted; notes that by the end of 2021, 17 Member States had adopted or updated a NAFS (up from 10 in 2019 and 14 in 2020); observes that of the 10 Member States yet to adopt a NAFS, four reported that they were in the process of drafting, or close to adopting, a strategy; regrets the fact that, despite the improvements compared to 2020, six Member States are still far from adopting a NAFS;

| 102. | Insists that even in the Member States where such strategies have already been adopted, a revision is required to reflect the new anti-fraud landscape, including new challenges, as well as developments in systems; stresses that the EPPO has been operational since June 2021 and the RRF Regulation was adopted in February 2021, and there is an opportunity to reflect significant new risks, such as those associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of the RRPs; |
| --- | --- |

102.

Insists that even in the Member States where such strategies have already been adopted, a revision is required to reflect the new anti-fraud landscape, including new challenges, as well as developments in systems; stresses that the EPPO has been operational since June 2021 and the RRF Regulation was adopted in February 2021, and there is an opportunity to reflect significant new risks, such as those associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of the RRPs;

| 103. | Remarks that in the PIF Report 2021, the Commission recommended that Member States adopt or revise a NAFS in order to take into account RRF-related risks; is aware that the adoption of NAFSs by the Member States is also to be encouraged by the Commission’s services under point 37 of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy Action Plan (24); calls on the Commission and OLAF to consider providing support and advice to the Member States in a more structured way, taking a cross-cutting approach, and to that end, to update the AFCOS guidelines initially formulated in 2015, which are no longer adequate to effectively assist the national authorities in developing a well-structured coordination service; asks the Commission, furthermore, to submit a detailed explanation of the work in progress in this regard to the discharge authority; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Remarks that in the PIF Report 2021, the Commission recommended that Member States adopt or revise a NAFS in order to take into account RRF-related risks; is aware that the adoption of NAFSs by the Member States is also to be encouraged by the Commission’s services under point 37 of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy Action Plan (24

| 104. | Is aware that in its PIF Report 2020, the Commission made targeted recommendations to Member States aiming at enhancing cooperation and strengthening internal control frameworks; notes that attention was drawn to risk assessment and risk management, the collection and analysis of data on irregularities and fraud, and the use of integrated and interoperable information and monitoring systems for the implementation of RRF- and EU budget-financed activities; regrets that not all the Member States have implemented such recommendations, and notes that some of them have systematically refused to do so; asks the Commission to enhance its monitoring actions for those Member States that have not implemented the PIF recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

104.

Is aware that in its PIF Report 2020, the Commission made targeted recommendations to Member States aiming at enhancing cooperation and strengthening internal control frameworks; notes that attention was drawn to risk assessment and risk management, the collection and analysis of data on irregularities and fraud, and the use of integrated and interoperable information and monitoring systems for the implementation of RRF- and EU budget-financed activities; regrets that not all the Member States have implemented such recommendations, and notes that some of them have systematically refused to do so; asks the Commission to enhance its monitoring actions for those Member States that have not implemented the PIF recommendations;

| 105. | Welcomes the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation; reiterates that it entered into force on 1 January 2021; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU of 16 February 2022 concerning the actions brought by two Member States against the conditionality mechanism and its conclusions confirming that the EU does indeed have competences regarding the rule of law in the Member States and that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law; |
| --- | --- |

105.

Welcomes the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation; reiterates that it entered into force on 1 January 2021; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU of 16 February 2022 concerning the actions brought by two Member States against the conditionality mechanism and its conclusions confirming that the EU does indeed have competences regarding the rule of law in the Member States and that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law;

| 106. | Recalls that Member States’ ineffective or untimely cooperation or non-cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitutes grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the EPPO and OLAF to therefore report each case where Member States have failed to comply with their obligations to inform, to assist, to take appropriate action and precautionary measures and to ensure an appropriate and timely follow-up of reports and recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

106.

Recalls that Member States’ ineffective or untimely cooperation or non-cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitutes grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the EPPO and OLAF to therefore report each case where Member States have failed to comply with their obligations to inform, to assist, to take appropriate action and precautionary measures and to ensure an appropriate and timely follow-up of reports and recommendations;

| 107. | Points out that the Conditionality Regulation is a permanent instrument applying beyond the limits of a given MFF and applicable across the board as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds; |
| --- | --- |

107.

Points out that the Conditionality Regulation is a permanent instrument applying beyond the limits of a given MFF and applicable across the board as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds;

| 108. | Recalls that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TEU are prerequisites for gaining access to funds, that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the resources of the RRF as explicitly stipulated by Article 8 of the RRF Regulation, and that no measures may be financed under the RRF that are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; |
| --- | --- |

108.

Recalls that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TEU are prerequisites for gaining access to funds, that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the resources of the RRF as explicitly stipulated by Article 8 of the RRF Regulation, and that no measures may be financed under the RRF that are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

| 109. | Considers that the Conditionality Regulation is sufficient and able to prevent or remedy democratic backsliding, but only if it is used in a timely manner, with strict and clear conditions and followed up by close monitoring of the implementation of the national remedial measures; |
| --- | --- |

109.

Considers that the Conditionality Regulation is sufficient and able to prevent or remedy democratic backsliding, but only if it is used in a timely manner, with strict and clear conditions and followed up by close monitoring of the implementation of the national remedial measures;

| 110. | Deeply regrets the fact that under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, the Commission presented Hungary, as remedial measures, with a set of 17 conditions that are not sufficient to rectify the serious breaches of the rule of law; regrets that the Commission did not request more substantial changes and safeguards to restore the independence of the judiciary, reduce the level of corruption and guarantee the adequate protection of the EU’s financial interests; |
| --- | --- |

110.

Deeply regrets the fact that under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, the Commission presented Hungary, as remedial measures, with a set of 17 conditions that are not sufficient to rectify the serious breaches of the rule of law; regrets that the Commission did not request more substantial changes and safeguards to restore the independence of the judiciary, reduce the level of corruption and guarantee the adequate protection of the EU’s financial interests;

| 111. | Maintains that compliance by the Member States with the principles of the rule of law is a prerequisite for sound financial management, in general, and for the efficient and effective management of EU resources, in particular; believes that violations of such principles therefore pose a serious danger to the Union’s financial interests; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU (25) that have recently highlighted the clear relationship between respect for the principles of the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the Union budget; reiterates that only by strengthening the EU anti-fraud architecture can the protection of the EU’s financial interests be effectively and efficiently pursued and enhanced by overcoming the national systems’ inherent limits, which are an obstacle when dealing with financial crime, which has become an increasingly transnational form of misconduct; takes the view that only effective judicial review can ensure compliance with EU law as noted by the CJEU, namely that expenditure ‘cannot be fully guaranteed in the absence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law; the existence of such review, both in the Member States and at EU level, by independent courts and tribunals, is of the essence of the rule of law’ (26); |
| --- | --- |

111.

Maintains that compliance by the Member States with the principles of the rule of law is a prerequisite for sound financial management, in general, and for the efficient and effective management of EU resources, in particular; believes that violations of such principles therefore pose a serious danger to the Union’s financial interests; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU (25

26

| 112. | Highlights the detrimental effects of corruption on the rights of citizens; reiterates once again its recommendation that the EU should become a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), since there are no legal obstacles to its full membership; invites the Commission, therefore, to recommend that the Council conclude an international agreement with GRECO to set down its membership; requests the Council to take a clear position on the EU joining GRECO, clarifying whether there is any specific opposition and, if so, from which Member State or States; |
| --- | --- |

112.

Highlights the detrimental effects of corruption on the rights of citizens; reiterates once again its recommendation that the EU should become a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), since there are no legal obstacles to its full membership; invites the Commission, therefore, to recommend that the Council conclude an international agreement with GRECO to set down its membership; requests the Council to take a clear position on the EU joining GRECO, clarifying whether there is any specific opposition and, if so, from which Member State or States;

| 113. | Recalls that in order to effectively protect the EU’s financial interests, more coherent and systematic rules on transparency, incompatibilities, conflicts of interest, illegal lobbying and revolving doors should be put in place; highlights the need to enhance the EU transparency register; calls on the Commission to strengthen its internal control mechanisms, including through the setting up of an internal corruption mechanism for the EU institutions; |
| --- | --- |

113.

Recalls that in order to effectively protect the EU’s financial interests, more coherent and systematic rules on transparency, incompatibilities, conflicts of interest, illegal lobbying and revolving doors should be put in place; highlights the need to enhance the EU transparency register; calls on the Commission to strengthen its internal control mechanisms, including through the setting up of an internal corruption mechanism for the EU institutions;

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

| 114. | Notes that more attention should be given to the control of funds for assistance in non-EU countries under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe); observes that this is especially important in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine; recalls that overall, the EU dedicates around 10 % of its budget to external action; |
| --- | --- |

114.

Notes that more attention should be given to the control of funds for assistance in non-EU countries under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe); observes that this is especially important in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine; recalls that overall, the EU dedicates around 10 % of its budget to external action;

| 115. | Calls on the Commission to update the fraud report system for funds spent in non-EU countries; notes that the new system should take into account specific issues that the EU faces when spending money outside EU territory; |
| --- | --- |

115.

Calls on the Commission to update the fraud report system for funds spent in non-EU countries; notes that the new system should take into account specific issues that the EU faces when spending money outside EU territory;

| 116. | Notes from the ECA’s report on the implementation of the Union’s budget for 2021 that in the case of the NDICI-Global Europe (under the Union’s general budget), out of the 67 transactions examined, 32 (48 %) were affected by errors, and despite the limited sample size, the audit results confirm that the risk of error in this MFF heading is high, and 24 of those errors were identified as having an impact on the EU budget; notes, furthermore, that the most common categories of error for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ (heading 6) were expenditure not incurred, ineligible costs, absence of supporting documents and public procurement errors; |
| --- | --- |

116.

Notes from the ECA’s report on the implementation of the Union’s budget for 2021 that in the case of the NDICI-Global Europe (under the Union’s general budget), out of the 67 transactions examined, 32 (48 %) were affected by errors, and despite the limited sample size, the audit results confirm that the risk of error in this MFF heading is high, and 24 of those errors were identified as having an impact on the EU budget; notes, furthermore, that the most common categories of error for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ (heading 6) were expenditure not incurred, ineligible costs, absence of supporting documents and public procurement errors;

| 117. | Recommends the suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where authorities manifestly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, while ensuring that the assistance reaches the civil population through alternative channels; calls for greater priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations with a focus on capacity building, such as via specialised anti-corruption bodies; calls on the Commission to send clear signals to candidate countries that a backlash against rule-of-law standards is jeopardising or delaying the accession to the EU; regrets the fact that, according to ECA Special Report No 01/2022, EUR 700 million in financial support for the improvement of the rule of law in the Western Balkans provided by the EU between 2014 and 2020 had little impact on fundamental reforms; |
| --- | --- |

117.

Recommends the suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where authorities manifestly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, while ensuring that the assistance reaches the civil population through alternative channels; calls for greater priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations with a focus on capacity building, such as via specialised anti-corruption bodies; calls on the Commission to send clear signals to candidate countries that a backlash against rule-of-law standards is jeopardising or delaying the accession to the EU; regrets the fact that, according to ECA Special Report No 01/2022, EUR 700 million in financial support for the improvement of the rule of law in the Western Balkans provided by the EU between 2014 and 2020 had little impact on fundamental reforms;

| 118. | Highlights the fact that cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; welcomes the administrative cooperation arrangements that OLAF signed in 2021 with two international partner authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the WCO; welcomes the fact that OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world; |
| --- | --- |

118.

Highlights the fact that cooperation with international partners is crucial to protect EU funds spent outside Europe and the revenue side of the EU budget; welcomes the administrative cooperation arrangements that OLAF signed in 2021 with two international partner authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the WCO; welcomes the fact that OLAF organised online events in 2021 to establish new operational contacts with investigative authorities in non-EU countries and encourage the reporting of fraud and irregularities through EU delegations around the world;

o

o o

| 119. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

119.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0448.

1

(2)  OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 49.

2

(3)  OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17.

3

(4)  OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29.

4

(5)  OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ L 274, 28.10.2019, p. 1.

6

(7)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.

7

(8)  OJ C 123, 18.3.2022, p. 12.

8

(9)  OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110.

9

(10)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 295.

10

(11)  Judgment of 1 September 2021, Andrea Homoki v European Commission, T-517/19, ECLI: EU:T:2021:529.

11

Andrea Homoki v European Commission

(12)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.

12

(13)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0300.

13

(14)  OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

14

(15)  OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42.

15

(16)  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).

16

(17)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

17

(18)  OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.

18

(19)  Commission proposal of 16 May 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (COM(2022)0223).

19

(20)  Opinion 06/2022 (pursuant to Article 322(1), TFEU) concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ C 446, 24.11.2022, p. 26). The full opinion is available at https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/OP22_06/OP_Recast_EN.pdf.

20

(21)  By the end of 2021, 13 out of the 14 procedures launched in 2019 had been closed. In the subsequent conformity check, the Commission services assessed the compatibility of these notified national transposition measures with the Directive’s provisions and obligations. In December 2021, the Commission launched infringement proceedings for incorrect transposition against another eight Member States.

21

(22)  Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43).

22

(23)  Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110).

23

(24)  Commission staff working document of 20 September 2021 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS) Action Plan — State of Play June 2021’ (SWD(2021)0262).

24

(25)  Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97 and the judgment of 16 February 2022, Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-157/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:98.

25

Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

(26)  Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 132.

26

Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

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| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/150 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/150

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P9_TA(2023)0019

Small-scale fisheries situation in the EU and future perspectives

European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the small-scale fisheries situation in the EU and future perspectives (2021/2056(INI))

(2023/C 214/14)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Commission maritime economic paper No 08/2020 of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘The EU fishing fleet 2020: Trends and economic results’ (1), |
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having regard to Commission maritime economic paper No 08/2020 of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘The EU fishing fleet 2020: Trends and economic results’ (1),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 16 June 2020 entitled ‘Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2021’ (COM(2020)0248), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 16 June 2020 entitled ‘Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2021’ (COM(2020)0248),

| — | having regard to Articles 38 to 44 and Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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having regard to Articles 38 to 44 and Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to recital (4) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (2) (the ‘CFP Regulation’), which states that the CFP should contribute to ‘long-term environmental, economic, and social sustainability’ and to ‘a fair standard of living for the fisheries sector including small-scale fisheries’, and to recital (33) thereof, which states that ‘access to a fishery should be based on transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’ and that ‘Member States should promote responsible fishing by providing incentives to those operators who fish in the least environmentally damaging way and who provide the greatest benefits for society’, |
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having regard to recital (4) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (2) (the ‘CFP Regulation’), which states that the CFP should contribute to ‘long-term environmental, economic, and social sustainability’ and to ‘a fair standard of living for the fisheries sector including small-scale fisheries’, and to recital (33) thereof, which states that ‘access to a fishery should be based on transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’ and that ‘Member States should promote responsible fishing by providing incentives to those operators who fish in the least environmentally damaging way and who provide the greatest benefits for society’,

| — | having regard to Article 17 of the CFP Regulation, which states that, when allocating fishing opportunities, the Member States are to use ‘transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’, |
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having regard to Article 17 of the CFP Regulation, which states that, when allocating fishing opportunities, the Member States are to use ‘transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature’,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1184/2006 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 (3) (the ‘CMO Regulation’), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1184/2006 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 (3) (the ‘CMO Regulation’),

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (4), |
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having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (4),

| — | having regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, and amending Council Regulations (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1005/2008, and Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards fisheries control (5), |
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having regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, and amending Council Regulations (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1005/2008, and Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards fisheries control (5),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 (6) (the ‘EMFAF Regulation’), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 (6) (the ‘EMFAF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) (the ‘EMFF Regulation’), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) (the ‘EMFF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on a farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on a farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system (8),

| — | having regard to the report of the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) of 20 August 2019 entitled ‘The 2019 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 19-06)’ (9), |
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having regard to the report of the Commission’s Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) of 20 August 2019 entitled ‘The 2019 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 19-06)’ (9),

| — | having regard to the STECF report of 26 September 2019 entitled ‘Social data in the EU fisheries sector (STECF 19-03)’ (10), |
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having regard to the STECF report of 26 September 2019 entitled ‘Social data in the EU fisheries sector (STECF 19-03)’ (10),

| — | having regard to the STECF report of 8 December 2021 entitled ‘The 2021 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 21-08)’ (11), |
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having regard to the STECF report of 8 December 2021 entitled ‘The 2021 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 21-08)’ (11),

| — | having regard to the STECF report of 10 December 2020 entitled ‘Social dimension of the CFP (STECF 20-14)’ (12), |
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having regard to the STECF report of 10 December 2020 entitled ‘Social dimension of the CFP (STECF 20-14)’ (12),

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Regional Conference ‘Building a future for sustainable small-scale fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea’, held in Algiers from 7 to 9 March 2016, |
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having regard to the conclusions of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Regional Conference ‘Building a future for sustainable small-scale fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea’, held in Algiers from 7 to 9 March 2016,

| — | having regard to target 14.b of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which calls for access to marine resources and markets for small-scale artisanal fishers, |
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having regard to target 14.b of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which calls for access to marine resources and markets for small-scale artisanal fishers,

| — | having regard to the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication, |
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having regard to the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication,

| — | having regard to the FAO report entitled ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020: Sustainability in action’, |
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having regard to the FAO report entitled ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020: Sustainability in action’,

| — | having regard to the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture for 2022, as proclaimed by the UN, |
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having regard to the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture for 2022, as proclaimed by the UN,

| — | having regard to the 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) and the concepts enshrined therein, such as planetary boundaries and ecological limits, |
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having regard to the 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) and the concepts enshrined therein, such as planetary boundaries and ecological limits,

| — | having regard to the publication entitled ‘Small-Scale Fisheries in Europe: Status, Resilience and Governance’ (13), |
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having regard to the publication entitled ‘Small-Scale Fisheries in Europe: Status, Resilience and Governance’ (13),

| — | having regard to the MedFish4Ever ministerial declaration and road map (14), |
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having regard to the MedFish4Ever ministerial declaration and road map (14),

| — | having regard to the EMFF implementation report 2020 (15), |
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having regard to the EMFF implementation report 2020 (15),

| — | having regard to the ministerial declaration of 2018 on the Regional Plan of Action for Small-Scale Fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, |
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having regard to the ministerial declaration of 2018 on the Regional Plan of Action for Small-Scale Fisheries in the Mediterranean and Black Sea,

| — | having regard to the 2018 study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Relative Effects of Fisheries Support Policies’ (16), |
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having regard to the 2018 study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Relative Effects of Fisheries Support Policies’ (16),

| — | having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Small-scale fisheries access to fishing opportunities in the European Union: Is the Common Fisheries Policy the right step to SDG14b?’ (17), |
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having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Small-scale fisheries access to fishing opportunities in the European Union: Is the Common Fisheries Policy the right step to SDG14b?’ (17),

| — | having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Defining Small-Scale Fisheries and Examining the Role of Science in Shaping Perceptions of Who and What Counts: A Systematic Review’ (18), |
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having regard to the scientific article entitled ‘Defining Small-Scale Fisheries and Examining the Role of Science in Shaping Perceptions of Who and What Counts: A Systematic Review’ (18),

| — | having regard to the 2017 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Small-scale Fisheries and “Blue Growth” in the EU’ (19), |
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having regard to the 2017 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Small-scale Fisheries and “Blue Growth” in the EU’ (19),

| — | having regard to the 2021 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Workshop on electronic technologies for fisheries — Part III: Systems adapted for small-scale vessels’ (20), |
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having regard to the 2021 study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries entitled ‘Workshop on electronic technologies for fisheries — Part III: Systems adapted for small-scale vessels’ (20),

| — | having regard to the study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries of July 2021 entitled ‘Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture’ (21), |
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having regard to the study conducted for the Committee on Fisheries of July 2021 entitled ‘Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture’ (21),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2012 on small-scale coastal fishing, artisanal fishing and the reform of the common fisheries policy (22), |
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having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2012 on small-scale coastal fishing, artisanal fishing and the reform of the common fisheries policy (22),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on innovation and diversification of small-scale coastal fishing in fisheries-dependent regions (23), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on innovation and diversification of small-scale coastal fishing in fisheries-dependent regions (23),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2017 on the role of fisheries-related tourism in the diversification of fisheries (24), |
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having regard to its resolution of 4 July 2017 on the role of fisheries-related tourism in the diversification of fisheries (24),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions’ (25), |
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having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions’ (25),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘Fishers for the future: Attracting a new generation of workers to the fishing industry and generating employment in coastal communities’ (26), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘Fishers for the future: Attracting a new generation of workers to the fishing industry and generating employment in coastal communities’ (26),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0291/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0291/2022),

| A. | whereas the EMFAF Regulation defines ‘small-scale coastal fishing’ as fishing activities carried out by marine and inland fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres and not using towed gear and also by fishers on foot, including shellfish gatherers, and whereas this is the only definition of coastal fishing existing in EU legislation; |
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A.

whereas the EMFAF Regulation defines ‘small-scale coastal fishing’ as fishing activities carried out by marine and inland fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres and not using towed gear and also by fishers on foot, including shellfish gatherers, and whereas this is the only definition of coastal fishing existing in EU legislation;

| B. | whereas the current definition of small-scale fishing included in the EMFF Regulation and the EMFAF Regulation excludes certain types of vessels, such as those using some traditional gears, which in turn struggle to obtain EU funding as a result of this exclusion; whereas this exclusion also reduces the visibility of small-scale fishing and its presence within EU statistics, as these units are not counted as belonging to the sector; |
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B.

whereas the current definition of small-scale fishing included in the EMFF Regulation and the EMFAF Regulation excludes certain types of vessels, such as those using some traditional gears, which in turn struggle to obtain EU funding as a result of this exclusion; whereas this exclusion also reduces the visibility of small-scale fishing and its presence within EU statistics, as these units are not counted as belonging to the sector;

| C. | whereas there are other, less strict approaches to the definition of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fishing, such as in the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication or in the ongoing discussions of the working group on small-scale fishing within the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean; |
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C.

whereas there are other, less strict approaches to the definition of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fishing, such as in the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication or in the ongoing discussions of the working group on small-scale fishing within the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean;

| D. | whereas, in most Member States, the defining characteristics of small-scale fishing go beyond the EMFAF definition, as governments apply a range of additional criteria, including with regard to the gears allowed, the maximum vessel length, the engine power, the maximum duration of fishing trips, the distance from port at which vessels can operate, the area of operation, the maximum allowed travel time and vessel ownership; |
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D.

whereas, in most Member States, the defining characteristics of small-scale fishing go beyond the EMFAF definition, as governments apply a range of additional criteria, including with regard to the gears allowed, the maximum vessel length, the engine power, the maximum duration of fishing trips, the distance from port at which vessels can operate, the area of operation, the maximum allowed travel time and vessel ownership;

| E. | whereas the current CFP does not properly define the concept of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing or coastal fishing, basing it solely on the vessel’s length, while other more appropriate and up-to-date definitions of this type of fishing are set out in international conventions; whereas the European definitions of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing and coastal fishing should be revised; |
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E.

whereas the current CFP does not properly define the concept of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing or coastal fishing, basing it solely on the vessel’s length, while other more appropriate and up-to-date definitions of this type of fishing are set out in international conventions; whereas the European definitions of artisanal fishing, small-scale fishing and coastal fishing should be revised;

| F. | whereas, in 2019, the small-scale fisheries (SSF) sector in the EU-28 consisted of a fleet of 42 838 vessels — which represented only 7,5 % of the gross tonnage and 5,4 % of the landed weight across the Member States overall — and employed 62 650 fishers, accounting for 75 % of the active fishing ships and 48 % of crew; whereas the large-scale fleet represented 19 % of the total vessels and 67 % of the gross tonnage, employing 46 % of all fishers and accounting for 81 % of the landed weight recorded in the Member States; whereas the distant-water fleet numbered only 259 registered vessels, representing less than 1 % of the overall number of vessels but 19 % of the gross tonnage and 14 % of the total landed weight recorded in the Member States; |
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F.

whereas, in 2019, the small-scale fisheries (SSF) sector in the EU-28 consisted of a fleet of 42 838 vessels — which represented only 7,5 % of the gross tonnage and 5,4 % of the landed weight across the Member States overall — and employed 62 650 fishers, accounting for 75 % of the active fishing ships and 48 % of crew; whereas the large-scale fleet represented 19 % of the total vessels and 67 % of the gross tonnage, employing 46 % of all fishers and accounting for 81 % of the landed weight recorded in the Member States; whereas the distant-water fleet numbered only 259 registered vessels, representing less than 1 % of the overall number of vessels but 19 % of the gross tonnage and 14 % of the total landed weight recorded in the Member States;

| G. | whereas, in addition to very limited resources being made available for vessel support under the EMFF (EUR 500 million) and to a generally low implementation rate, small-scale fishing, despite its size and importance, is the least supported segment, receiving the smallest share of funds: it accounts for 38 % of the total number of vessel-linked operations, which in turn represent just 25 % of the total EMFF spending on vessels; |
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G.

whereas, in addition to very limited resources being made available for vessel support under the EMFF (EUR 500 million) and to a generally low implementation rate, small-scale fishing, despite its size and importance, is the least supported segment, receiving the smallest share of funds: it accounts for 38 % of the total number of vessel-linked operations, which in turn represent just 25 % of the total EMFF spending on vessels;

| H. | whereas the European fleet has continued to shrink in recent years and, in 2020, recorded decreases of 17 % in the value of the fish landed, of 19 % in employment and of 29 % in profits compared with 2019 (27); |
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H.

whereas the European fleet has continued to shrink in recent years and, in 2020, recorded decreases of 17 % in the value of the fish landed, of 19 % in employment and of 29 % in profits compared with 2019 (27);

| I. | whereas the small-scale fishing fleet is the fleet with the most limited financial resources; |
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I.

whereas the small-scale fishing fleet is the fleet with the most limited financial resources;

| J. | whereas the typical features of small-scale fishing include its low environmental impact; its seasonally diverse nature in terms of species, fishing grounds and gears; the small scale of its production operations; its respect for the biological and migratory cycles of different species thanks to its versatile nature and a highly selective use of gears; its low levels of species bycatch and discards; and its capacity to generate more revenue per euro invested, greater catches per litre of fuel consumed and more socio-economic value per kilo of fish landed; |
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J.

whereas the typical features of small-scale fishing include its low environmental impact; its seasonally diverse nature in terms of species, fishing grounds and gears; the small scale of its production operations; its respect for the biological and migratory cycles of different species thanks to its versatile nature and a highly selective use of gears; its low levels of species bycatch and discards; and its capacity to generate more revenue per euro invested, greater catches per litre of fuel consumed and more socio-economic value per kilo of fish landed;

| K. | whereas due account needs to be taken of the marked differences between fleets, fleet segments, the environmental impact of different fleet segments, target species, fishing gear, productivity and the consumption preferences of the various Member States, in addition to the special characteristics of fishing activity resulting from its social structure, forms of marketing and structural and natural inequalities between the various fishing regions; |
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K.

whereas due account needs to be taken of the marked differences between fleets, fleet segments, the environmental impact of different fleet segments, target species, fishing gear, productivity and the consumption preferences of the various Member States, in addition to the special characteristics of fishing activity resulting from its social structure, forms of marketing and structural and natural inequalities between the various fishing regions;

| L. | whereas the general characteristics of the small-scale fleet include very old segments and inadequate technology, highlighting the need for a specific support programme for small-scale fishing and strong public financial support for its modernisation and development, without which its continuity will be jeopardised; |
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L.

whereas the general characteristics of the small-scale fleet include very old segments and inadequate technology, highlighting the need for a specific support programme for small-scale fishing and strong public financial support for its modernisation and development, without which its continuity will be jeopardised;

| M. | whereas the EMFAF Regulation imposes an obligation on the Member States to take into account the specific needs of small-scale coastal fishing when carrying out the analysis of the situation in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats referred to in the Regulation; |
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M.

whereas the EMFAF Regulation imposes an obligation on the Member States to take into account the specific needs of small-scale coastal fishing when carrying out the analysis of the situation in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats referred to in the Regulation;

| N. | whereas, in 2019, 64,9 % of the vessels in the EU-28’s fishing fleet were at least 25 years old (28) and the average fleet age stood at 29,9 years overall (29) and 32,5 years for the small-scale fishing fleet, which necessarily implies that a very significant portion of the fleet is very old, thus not guaranteeing the best safety and operational conditions, increasing the associated risks and making operations costlier; |
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N.

whereas, in 2019, 64,9 % of the vessels in the EU-28’s fishing fleet were at least 25 years old (28) and the average fleet age stood at 29,9 years overall (29) and 32,5 years for the small-scale fishing fleet, which necessarily implies that a very significant portion of the fleet is very old, thus not guaranteeing the best safety and operational conditions, increasing the associated risks and making operations costlier;

| O. | whereas the age profile of small-scale fishers is higher than for other types of fishing, with 72 % of small-scale fishing professionals being over 40 years of age and 11 % over 65 years of age; |
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O.

whereas the age profile of small-scale fishers is higher than for other types of fishing, with 72 % of small-scale fishing professionals being over 40 years of age and 11 % over 65 years of age;

| P. | whereas the limited nature of the existing statistics makes it difficult to conduct an accurate analysis of the role of women in fisheries; whereas, however, empirical evidence demonstrates that women play a significant part in small-scale fishing, taking a more prominent role in its operations in some communities, having an important presence in shellfishing and taking a leading role on land in the preparation of operations and gear, as well as in the sale and processing of fish, particularly in the canning industry; |
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P.

whereas the limited nature of the existing statistics makes it difficult to conduct an accurate analysis of the role of women in fisheries; whereas, however, empirical evidence demonstrates that women play a significant part in small-scale fishing, taking a more prominent role in its operations in some communities, having an important presence in shellfishing and taking a leading role on land in the preparation of operations and gear, as well as in the sale and processing of fish, particularly in the canning industry;

| Q. | whereas, according to the report on the social dimension of fishing in the EU, women account for 5,4 % of the total number of people employed in small-scale fishing (more than double the respective figures for large-scale and distant-water fishing); |
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Q.

whereas, according to the report on the social dimension of fishing in the EU, women account for 5,4 % of the total number of people employed in small-scale fishing (more than double the respective figures for large-scale and distant-water fishing);

| R. | whereas the EU fishing sector plays a key role in supplying fish to the public and keeping food stocks in balance in the Member States and the EU as a whole; |
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R.

whereas the EU fishing sector plays a key role in supplying fish to the public and keeping food stocks in balance in the Member States and the EU as a whole;

| S. | whereas it must be ensured that the centralisation of fisheries management advocated by the CFP is compatible with the local management that is essential for ensuring the sector’s socio-economic viability; |
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S.

whereas it must be ensured that the centralisation of fisheries management advocated by the CFP is compatible with the local management that is essential for ensuring the sector’s socio-economic viability;

| T. | whereas regionalisation is one of the pillars of the CFP and the decentralised approach is of particular importance for the small-scale coastal fishing sector, taking into account the differences in the fisheries sector among individual Member States; |
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T.

whereas regionalisation is one of the pillars of the CFP and the decentralised approach is of particular importance for the small-scale coastal fishing sector, taking into account the differences in the fisheries sector among individual Member States;

| U. | whereas local co-management is key to ensuring the participation of the small-scale fisheries segment in the decision-making process; |
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U.

whereas local co-management is key to ensuring the participation of the small-scale fisheries segment in the decision-making process;

| V. | whereas the CFP therefore does not offer the clear and differentiated legislative support for small-scale fishing that could help to ensure its socio-economic viability; whereas the Member States are also failing to establish effective measures for this type of fishing; |
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V.

whereas the CFP therefore does not offer the clear and differentiated legislative support for small-scale fishing that could help to ensure its socio-economic viability; whereas the Member States are also failing to establish effective measures for this type of fishing;

| W. | whereas, in many European coastal regions, and in particular in the Mediterranean, small-scale fishing and shellfish gathering operate at the intersection of the economic, social and environmental dimensions, making an important contribution to socio-economic well-being, employment and the promotion of economic and social cohesion in various coastal regions and outermost regions (ORs) that often face structural constraints and need support to harness opportunities for economic diversification; |
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W.

whereas, in many European coastal regions, and in particular in the Mediterranean, small-scale fishing and shellfish gathering operate at the intersection of the economic, social and environmental dimensions, making an important contribution to socio-economic well-being, employment and the promotion of economic and social cohesion in various coastal regions and outermost regions (ORs) that often face structural constraints and need support to harness opportunities for economic diversification;

| X. | whereas income from fisheries should therefore not be deemed only as profit, as it also contributes to perpetuating a way of life that has immense cultural and historical value for many coastal communities, while at the same time providing an important social and economic safety net; whereas, in this sense, SSF represent a solution to increasing depopulation, ageing populations and mounting unemployment, which are all major challenges for most of the coastal regions of European countries and islands; whereas SSF’s influence on the social and cultural heritage of coastal areas is exceptional and diverse; |
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X.

whereas income from fisheries should therefore not be deemed only as profit, as it also contributes to perpetuating a way of life that has immense cultural and historical value for many coastal communities, while at the same time providing an important social and economic safety net; whereas, in this sense, SSF represent a solution to increasing depopulation, ageing populations and mounting unemployment, which are all major challenges for most of the coastal regions of European countries and islands; whereas SSF’s influence on the social and cultural heritage of coastal areas is exceptional and diverse;

| Y. | whereas SSF can play a fundamental role in the achievement of the SDGs, as explicitly recognised by target 14.b; whereas SSF can also provide contributions to the other policy imperatives underlying the SDGs, such as SDG 2 — ‘Zero Hunger’ and target 2.3 thereof, SDG 5 — ‘Gender Equality’ and targets 5.a and 5.b thereof, SDG 8 — ‘Decent Work and Economic Growth’ and target 8.5 thereof, and SDG 13 — ‘Climate Action’ as a whole; |
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Y.

whereas SSF can play a fundamental role in the achievement of the SDGs, as explicitly recognised by target 14.b; whereas SSF can also provide contributions to the other policy imperatives underlying the SDGs, such as SDG 2 — ‘Zero Hunger’ and target 2.3 thereof, SDG 5 — ‘Gender Equality’ and targets 5.a and 5.b thereof, SDG 8 — ‘Decent Work and Economic Growth’ and target 8.5 thereof, and SDG 13 — ‘Climate Action’ as a whole;

| Z. | whereas fishers have a role as ‘guardians of the sea’ and fishing makes a contribution to the supply of protein-rich foods for a healthy, balanced diet; |
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Z.

whereas fishers have a role as ‘guardians of the sea’ and fishing makes a contribution to the supply of protein-rich foods for a healthy, balanced diet;

| AA. | whereas the vast majority of accidents and incidents on fishing vessels are the result of human factors (62,4 %), with system/equipment failures being the second most common cause (23,2 % of cases); |
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AA.

whereas the vast majority of accidents and incidents on fishing vessels are the result of human factors (62,4 %), with system/equipment failures being the second most common cause (23,2 % of cases);

| AB. | whereas in many circumstances small-scale fishing is carried out with only one professional on board; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas in many circumstances small-scale fishing is carried out with only one professional on board;

| AC. | whereas the safety- and comfort-related issues of the SSF fleet cannot be viewed in isolation from fishing effort and fish yield; whereas, in this regard, the gross tonnage limitation, as a criterion to measure fishing capacity, has a negative impact on the safety and comfort of the SSF fleet, as it limits the incentive to replace and modernise vessels or increase available space in order to improve crew comfort, safety and ultimately the attractiveness of the sector, especially for young people and women; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas the safety- and comfort-related issues of the SSF fleet cannot be viewed in isolation from fishing effort and fish yield; whereas, in this regard, the gross tonnage limitation, as a criterion to measure fishing capacity, has a negative impact on the safety and comfort of the SSF fleet, as it limits the incentive to replace and modernise vessels or increase available space in order to improve crew comfort, safety and ultimately the attractiveness of the sector, especially for young people and women;

| AD. | whereas such safety-related issues cannot be viewed in isolation from the particularities of the SSF fleet in the Member States, such as the fact that the fleet may be exposed to high levels of risk as a result of the lack of specialised safety advice for the sector, the single-handed nature of operations, the long working hours or the danger of entrapment in the equipment; whereas operating conditions vary for the fleet; whereas part of the fleet operates from beaches or ports and harbours where operating conditions are very often precarious; whereas, in light of this situation, consideration should be given to tailoring the propulsion power to the fleet’s characteristics and the operating conditions, without increasing fishing effort or catch rates, with a view to making conditions for the fleet safer when entering and exiting port; |
| --- | --- |

AD.

whereas such safety-related issues cannot be viewed in isolation from the particularities of the SSF fleet in the Member States, such as the fact that the fleet may be exposed to high levels of risk as a result of the lack of specialised safety advice for the sector, the single-handed nature of operations, the long working hours or the danger of entrapment in the equipment; whereas operating conditions vary for the fleet; whereas part of the fleet operates from beaches or ports and harbours where operating conditions are very often precarious; whereas, in light of this situation, consideration should be given to tailoring the propulsion power to the fleet’s characteristics and the operating conditions, without increasing fishing effort or catch rates, with a view to making conditions for the fleet safer when entering and exiting port;

| AE. | whereas these aspects relating to an increase in engine power for specific safety reasons should be financed through subsidies and, under certain conditions, should be supported by the EMFAF, provided that they do not increase the fishing effort or the ability to catch fish; whereas, for these reasons, EMFAF support should also be available for port and harbour dredging operations; |
| --- | --- |

AE.

whereas these aspects relating to an increase in engine power for specific safety reasons should be financed through subsidies and, under certain conditions, should be supported by the EMFAF, provided that they do not increase the fishing effort or the ability to catch fish; whereas, for these reasons, EMFAF support should also be available for port and harbour dredging operations;

| AF. | whereas small-scale fishing is much more dependent on sea conditions than large-scale fishing, which leads, depending on the type of vessel and gear, to greater irregularity in fishing periods, thus affecting the number of working days per year on which sailings are possible; |
| --- | --- |

AF.

whereas small-scale fishing is much more dependent on sea conditions than large-scale fishing, which leads, depending on the type of vessel and gear, to greater irregularity in fishing periods, thus affecting the number of working days per year on which sailings are possible;

| AG. | whereas artisanal fisheries are sustainable in terms of the biological management of fish stocks and with regard to resources and selectivity, as well as socially and economically, all of which contributes to the deep-rootedness of this activity; |
| --- | --- |

AG.

whereas artisanal fisheries are sustainable in terms of the biological management of fish stocks and with regard to resources and selectivity, as well as socially and economically, all of which contributes to the deep-rootedness of this activity;

| AH. | whereas factors exerting pressure on fish stocks, and which also cause direct and indirect damage to fisheries, include pollution, habitat loss, maritime traffic and competition for space, as well as climate change, notable effects of which are rising water temperatures, acidification, changes to ocean currents, species asynchrony and the arrival of non-indigenous species; |
| --- | --- |

AH.

whereas factors exerting pressure on fish stocks, and which also cause direct and indirect damage to fisheries, include pollution, habitat loss, maritime traffic and competition for space, as well as climate change, notable effects of which are rising water temperatures, acidification, changes to ocean currents, species asynchrony and the arrival of non-indigenous species;

| AI. | whereas it is necessary to increase capacities to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change and crises by adopting measures to strengthen the resilience of coastal communities; |
| --- | --- |

AI.

whereas it is necessary to increase capacities to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change and crises by adopting measures to strengthen the resilience of coastal communities;

| AJ. | whereas small-scale fishing also has the potential to contribute to decarbonisation and increased energy efficiency and therefore ultimately to climate mitigation efforts; |
| --- | --- |

AJ.

whereas small-scale fishing also has the potential to contribute to decarbonisation and increased energy efficiency and therefore ultimately to climate mitigation efforts;

| AK. | whereas small-scale fishing is very important in the EU, especially for a number of fishing communities, in combination with large-scale and distant-water fishing; |
| --- | --- |

AK.

whereas small-scale fishing is very important in the EU, especially for a number of fishing communities, in combination with large-scale and distant-water fishing;

| AL. | whereas many of the causes of the worsening socio-economic situation in the sector have still to be addressed, including the need to strengthen the position of fishers in the supply chain; |
| --- | --- |

AL.

whereas many of the causes of the worsening socio-economic situation in the sector have still to be addressed, including the need to strengthen the position of fishers in the supply chain;

| AM. | whereas the recognition of producer organisations, associations and fishing guilds would enable them to access financial aid, and the promotion of their active participation through co-management could clearly improve earnings in the sector; |
| --- | --- |

AM.

whereas the recognition of producer organisations, associations and fishing guilds would enable them to access financial aid, and the promotion of their active participation through co-management could clearly improve earnings in the sector;

| AN. | whereas earnings for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries are impacted by volatile prices and sharp market fluctuations, which are sensitive to many external factors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

AN.

whereas earnings for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries are impacted by volatile prices and sharp market fluctuations, which are sensitive to many external factors, such as the COVID-19 pandemic;

| AO. | whereas the different systems of income and wages in the fishing sector are highly variable and largely contingent on the fishing opportunities offered by the sea, and this is one of the factors that makes it less attractive to new generations; |
| --- | --- |

AO.

whereas the different systems of income and wages in the fishing sector are highly variable and largely contingent on the fishing opportunities offered by the sea, and this is one of the factors that makes it less attractive to new generations;

| AP. | whereas fishing professionals are often paid low wages and have to contend with difficult — often precarious — working conditions in a profession that remains the most dangerous in the world, while the rising costs associated with starting up a fishing business, combined with the increasing concentration in the industry, make it a less attractive prospect, particularly to young people; |
| --- | --- |

AP.

whereas fishing professionals are often paid low wages and have to contend with difficult — often precarious — working conditions in a profession that remains the most dangerous in the world, while the rising costs associated with starting up a fishing business, combined with the increasing concentration in the industry, make it a less attractive prospect, particularly to young people;

| AQ. | whereas markets are often dominated by a small number of established products and SSF products that offer a sustainable alternative to heavily exploited species do not receive sufficient marketing attention; whereas consumers are often prevented from obtaining full information about the product that they are buying or the production system and fishing gear involved; |
| --- | --- |

AQ.

whereas markets are often dominated by a small number of established products and SSF products that offer a sustainable alternative to heavily exploited species do not receive sufficient marketing attention; whereas consumers are often prevented from obtaining full information about the product that they are buying or the production system and fishing gear involved;

| AR. | whereas the sustainable profitability of SSF is important to increase the attractiveness of the sector; |
| --- | --- |

AR.

whereas the sustainable profitability of SSF is important to increase the attractiveness of the sector;

| AS. | whereas small-scale vessels are the most severely impacted by the challenges surrounding the allocation of fishing licences in UK waters, due to the difficulties that they face in proving their fishing history; |
| --- | --- |

AS.

whereas small-scale vessels are the most severely impacted by the challenges surrounding the allocation of fishing licences in UK waters, due to the difficulties that they face in proving their fishing history;

| AT. | whereas SSF enterprises are often undercapitalised or underfunded and have very limited access to basic accounting tools, credit, microfinance and insurance; |
| --- | --- |

AT.

whereas SSF enterprises are often undercapitalised or underfunded and have very limited access to basic accounting tools, credit, microfinance and insurance;

| AU. | whereas the SSF sector continues to experience economic difficulties and a substantial decrease in revenues as a result of the significant increase in operating costs and other aggravating factors such as the reduction in the value of first-sale fish and rising fuel prices; whereas these and other factors have rendered SSF ever more reliant on fuel subsidies and often require fishers to increase fishing effort in order to make their activity economically viable; |
| --- | --- |

AU.

whereas the SSF sector continues to experience economic difficulties and a substantial decrease in revenues as a result of the significant increase in operating costs and other aggravating factors such as the reduction in the value of first-sale fish and rising fuel prices; whereas these and other factors have rendered SSF ever more reliant on fuel subsidies and often require fishers to increase fishing effort in order to make their activity economically viable;

| AV. | whereas the TFEU and the EMFAF Regulation envisage and provide for specific support for the EU’s ORs; |
| --- | --- |

AV.

whereas the TFEU and the EMFAF Regulation envisage and provide for specific support for the EU’s ORs;

| AW. | whereas the SSF sector has traditionally suffered from a lack of organisational capacity; whereas the main factors that limit collective action by SSF include the large number of actors in the SSF sector, combined with their geographical dispersion; the nature of the business, which is mainly based on small family enterprises; the lack of trained staff devoted to management; and the lack of financial support for SSF organisations to take part in the decision-making process; |
| --- | --- |

AW.

whereas the SSF sector has traditionally suffered from a lack of organisational capacity; whereas the main factors that limit collective action by SSF include the large number of actors in the SSF sector, combined with their geographical dispersion; the nature of the business, which is mainly based on small family enterprises; the lack of trained staff devoted to management; and the lack of financial support for SSF organisations to take part in the decision-making process;

| AX. | whereas SSF in the EU have generally been neglected in terms of monitoring and control by fisheries scientists and fisheries managers at national and EU levels; whereas the monitoring and control of small-scale fisheries should be improved to substantiate the sustainable management of EU fisheries and provide proof of fishing activities when necessary; |
| --- | --- |

AX.

whereas SSF in the EU have generally been neglected in terms of monitoring and control by fisheries scientists and fisheries managers at national and EU levels; whereas the monitoring and control of small-scale fisheries should be improved to substantiate the sustainable management of EU fisheries and provide proof of fishing activities when necessary;

| AY. | whereas greater investment is needed to conduct up-to-date research on and enhance understanding of the state of natural resources, marine ecosystems and specifically fish stocks, in order to ensure their sustainable management; |
| --- | --- |

AY.

whereas greater investment is needed to conduct up-to-date research on and enhance understanding of the state of natural resources, marine ecosystems and specifically fish stocks, in order to ensure their sustainable management;

| AZ. | whereas management strategies based solely on the reduction of fishing days, such as that applied to the Western Mediterranean, are bringing the SSF sector to its knees; whereas such continuous reductions, combined with the already precarious situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, risk leading to the collapse of a large share of the sector, which would no longer be able to reach the minimum profitability threshold that guarantees its survival; whereas these reductions also raise numerous issues, such as concerns around safety on board, a heightened risk of injuries, an increase in illegal fishing and the social repercussions of unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

AZ.

whereas management strategies based solely on the reduction of fishing days, such as that applied to the Western Mediterranean, are bringing the SSF sector to its knees; whereas such continuous reductions, combined with the already precarious situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, risk leading to the collapse of a large share of the sector, which would no longer be able to reach the minimum profitability threshold that guarantees its survival; whereas these reductions also raise numerous issues, such as concerns around safety on board, a heightened risk of injuries, an increase in illegal fishing and the social repercussions of unemployment;

| BA. | whereas fishers’ associations such as guilds are key players in the food systems of some Member States, where they operate as not-for-profit social economy entities representing the fisheries sector, and especially the small-scale coastal fleet and shellfish gatherers, performing functions of general interest for the benefit of maritime fishing and workers in the fisheries sector, as well as carrying out business-related tasks, such as marketing products and providing advisory and management services; |
| --- | --- |

BA.

whereas fishers’ associations such as guilds are key players in the food systems of some Member States, where they operate as not-for-profit social economy entities representing the fisheries sector, and especially the small-scale coastal fleet and shellfish gatherers, performing functions of general interest for the benefit of maritime fishing and workers in the fisheries sector, as well as carrying out business-related tasks, such as marketing products and providing advisory and management services;

| BB. | whereas there is a need to determine a fisheries resource management policy that respects collective access to fisheries resources, is based primarily on their biological aspects and takes the form of a fisheries co-management system that considers the specific conditions of fisheries resources and the respective sea areas, with the effective participation of those working in the sector; |
| --- | --- |

BB.

whereas there is a need to determine a fisheries resource management policy that respects collective access to fisheries resources, is based primarily on their biological aspects and takes the form of a fisheries co-management system that considers the specific conditions of fisheries resources and the respective sea areas, with the effective participation of those working in the sector;

| BC. | whereas the farm to fork strategy urges that associations such as guilds be recognised under EU law and be eligible to receive financial aid on an equal footing with producer organisations; whereas the Commission has been asked to adopt an initiative in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

BC.

whereas the farm to fork strategy urges that associations such as guilds be recognised under EU law and be eligible to receive financial aid on an equal footing with producer organisations; whereas the Commission has been asked to adopt an initiative in this regard;

| BD. | whereas artisanal fishers have a need for training, including to develop new skills; |
| --- | --- |

BD.

whereas artisanal fishers have a need for training, including to develop new skills;

| BE. | whereas work by women provides added value in the artisanal fisheries sector; |
| --- | --- |

BE.

whereas work by women provides added value in the artisanal fisheries sector;

| BF. | whereas the SSF sector finds itself increasingly in competition with other blue economy activities, as well as with renewable energy interests that affect many activities along the coast, in beaches or harbour areas, thus potentially taking over areas previously used almost exclusively by SSF, resulting in displacement and ‘sea and coastal grabbing’; |
| --- | --- |

BF.

whereas the SSF sector finds itself increasingly in competition with other blue economy activities, as well as with renewable energy interests that affect many activities along the coast, in beaches or harbour areas, thus potentially taking over areas previously used almost exclusively by SSF, resulting in displacement and ‘sea and coastal grabbing’;

| BG. | whereas gentrification processes occurring in many developing coastal areas risk making it increasingly unaffordable for small-scale fishers to live in coastal areas, pushing them far away from their place of work and thus rendering their activity even more difficult and inconvenient; |
| --- | --- |

BG.

whereas gentrification processes occurring in many developing coastal areas risk making it increasingly unaffordable for small-scale fishers to live in coastal areas, pushing them far away from their place of work and thus rendering their activity even more difficult and inconvenient;

| BH. | whereas the increased focus on conservation promoted by the EU has a particular impact on small-scale fishing, an example of which is the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) and MPA networks, which affect small-scale fishing by restricting the associated activities and limiting mobility; whereas the impact on this segment is rarely considered in the design of these policies, an aspect that is aggravated by the fact that actors from the segment are not adequately involved in these processes (30); |
| --- | --- |

BH.

whereas the increased focus on conservation promoted by the EU has a particular impact on small-scale fishing, an example of which is the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) and MPA networks, which affect small-scale fishing by restricting the associated activities and limiting mobility; whereas the impact on this segment is rarely considered in the design of these policies, an aspect that is aggravated by the fact that actors from the segment are not adequately involved in these processes (30);

| BI. | whereas the fishing sector in general and small-scale fishing in particular are under-represented when defining fisheries management policies and policies on the use of maritime space; |
| --- | --- |

BI.

whereas the fishing sector in general and small-scale fishing in particular are under-represented when defining fisheries management policies and policies on the use of maritime space;

| BJ. | whereas there are various types of fishery organisations, with different levels of membership representing small-scale fishing: from producer organisations to fishers’ associations, shipowners’ associations and cooperatives, among others; whereas many small shipowners are not affiliated to any organisations; whereas professionals in the fishing industry are represented in fisheries trade unions; whereas it should be up to the sector to determine how it organises itself; |
| --- | --- |

BJ.

whereas there are various types of fishery organisations, with different levels of membership representing small-scale fishing: from producer organisations to fishers’ associations, shipowners’ associations and cooperatives, among others; whereas many small shipowners are not affiliated to any organisations; whereas professionals in the fishing industry are represented in fisheries trade unions; whereas it should be up to the sector to determine how it organises itself;

| BK. | whereas the disaggregation of the relevant data is inadequate, which makes access to detailed information difficult, particularly where small-scale fishing is concerned, and hampers analysis, in particular in terms of breaking down undertakings, shipowners, fishing professionals, vessels and gear, working conditions, age and gender, among other things; |
| --- | --- |

BK.

whereas the disaggregation of the relevant data is inadequate, which makes access to detailed information difficult, particularly where small-scale fishing is concerned, and hampers analysis, in particular in terms of breaking down undertakings, shipowners, fishing professionals, vessels and gear, working conditions, age and gender, among other things;

Strengthening small-scale fisheries along the value chain, promoting higher fisheries incomes and providing income diversification opportunities

| 1. | Takes the view that the future of small-scale, coastal and artisanal fishing depends not only on long-term and sustainable measures, but also on immediate, meaningful and effective measures to increase fishers’ profit margins also through higher quota allocations in line with scientific advice; considers it necessary to enhance the organisational and commercial capacities of the sector and the profession’s attractiveness, to provide training and targeted support for young people and to improve operating conditions, in particular for the inclusion of women on board vessels and in the sector more generally, and to strengthen its position in the supply chain; calls on the Commission, therefore, working in close cooperation with the Member States, to establish and implement support mechanisms, within the EMFAF framework, for small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries that make it possible to tackle the specific problems in this part of the sector; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Believes that the future of small-scale fishing requires that its specific nature be recognised in the CFP and that the present instruments be adapted in order to meet the needs of this sector; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Stresses the need for a common, broader and more appropriate definition of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries; stresses that such a definition should be pragmatic, measureable and clear; also emphasises that the definition should result from an appropriate assessment, taking into account the characteristics and criteria of the SSF segment other than vessel length, in order to bring the EU definition of SSF into line with the reality of the segment, as is already the case with the existing definitions included within certain international conventions such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) or the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM); |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Stresses the fact that this definition should be included in a more horizontal regulation, such as the CFP Regulation, so as to encompass EU fisheries legislation in its entirety; considers that any change to the definition should not impact the implementation of the EMFAF for the current period; calls on the Commission to address this issue within the future review of the CFP Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Affirms the need to strengthen and shorten the sector’s value chain between the producer and the consumer, thereby increasing the opportunities for direct sales from fisher to consumer and reducing the number of intermediaries in order, ideally, to reach the point where the producer is able to supply the final customer directly; stresses the need to promote marketing strategies, including through the promotion of new distribution channels, and to foster mechanisms to improve product differentiation, so as to obtain the maximum benefit for fishers, increase profitability, support higher remunerations and promote the fair and appropriate distribution of added value to fishers; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls for a fairer and more proper distribution of added value along the sector’s value chain and for consideration to be given to forms of intervention along the lines of guarantee and guide prices, for which the production costs should be taken as a variable, in order to achieve the above aim and improve fishers’ incomes; reiterates that when there are serious imbalances within the chain, Member States should have the power to intervene; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses the fact that SSF are the weakest segment along the value chain and marketing arrangements often tend to favour the interests of the buyer rather than the fishers, who have little to no control over pricing, which in turn leads to marginal earnings for the products sold; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls for measures at EU or Member State level aimed at defending or creating markets of origin, thereby advocating preferential short sales channels for traditional products; stresses the importance of promoting and defending the qualities of fish caught by small-scale fishing such as, among others, freshness, seasonality, cultural heritage and sustainability; calls for stronger support for such products at trade fairs, small shops and restaurants, taking into account the population’s eating habits, as a way of maximising the value of local fisheries products and promoting local development; insists on the creation of promotional campaigns for local fishing products taking full advantage of the common organisation of the markets (CMO) and CFP; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Stresses the need to promote product diversification through initiatives aimed at creating new markets, valuing lesser known edible and consumed species in order to improve SSF’s market position, alleviate the demand for products whose constant supply throughout the year can only be guaranteed by imports and help reduce fishing pressure on overexploited species; reiterates the need to also support the promotion of product diversification in the canning industry, namely through the use of undervalued or less-consumed species; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls for the implementation of a training programme for the hotel, restaurant and catering (Horeca) sector, providing knowledge of seafood products and good practices to protect resources, in particular raising awareness of the ‘non-sale’ and ‘non-consumption’ of species during the closed season; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Emphasises the importance of implementing innovative projects in the retail sector, highlighting the cooperation work with fisher’s guilds and associations of SSF, through which a close relationship with the final consumer is maintained; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Member States and producer organisations to consider better ways to promote the marketing of processed fisheries products with higher added value, including canned products, following the example of certain agricultural products, and programmes for the external promotion of EU fisheries products, including their presentation at international competitions and fairs; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Stresses the fact that the seafood sector has very limited tools, such as labels, available to consumers in order to assess the sustainability criteria for the SSF segment and promote low-impact products; underlines that where labels exist, they could become a disadvantage to SSF, as it might be burdensome to access some of the data needed or they may lack the financial capacity to initiate a certification process; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Points out the need for an ambitious revision of the CMO Regulation with the aim of increasing its contribution to the sector’s income and to market stability, as well as to improve the marketing of fishery products and increase their added value; in this context, stresses the importance of creating certified seafood labels and fisheries product brand mechanisms, as well as of increasing traceability in the supply chain, which would in turn improve information to consumers, encouraging them to buy locally and sustainably sourced seafood and raise their awareness of SSF products; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls for small-scale fishing support programmes to be facilitated through the EMFAF with a view to improving business management and organisational capacities, driving down production costs, improving first-sale prices and ensuring economic and environmental sustainability, in particular through a more sustainable and modern fleet; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Stresses the difficulties that the SSF sector is still experiencing, which can also be aggravated by fluctuating and rising prices for fuel and other inputs, a situation that particularly affects the less competitive fleet segments, namely small-scale, artisanal and coastal fishing; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Improving operating conditions and guaranteeing the future of small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries

| 17. | Welcomes the fact that the EMFAF provides the possibility to support the modernisation, replacement or acquisition of newer engines that emit less CO2, including engines using new energy-efficient technologies, and the conversion of petrol engines; considers that the highest existing co-financing rates should be used; warns that many of these alternative motorisation solutions have not yet been sufficiently developed or involve a significant increase in gross tonnage, such as in the case of some electric motors; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Underlines that in certain regions, the majority of the SSF sector is dependent on fuel subsidies; warns that the Commission’s proposal for a Council directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (COM(2021)0563), by ending the current mandatory exemption for the fishing sector and introducing a minimum rate of taxation, puts at risk the viability of the majority of the SSF segment, which cannot make long voyages in order to refuel in ports with lower prices; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure equal conditions at international level and therefore continue to exempt the fishing industry from fuel taxation; stresses that any new approach should not result in a burden for SSF and should focus on alternative solutions that allow the sector to combine a just transition towards the goals set in the Green Deal with the ability to thrive economically and guarantee decent conditions for its workers; considers, in that regard, and given the current extraordinary inflation of fuel prices, that extraordinary measures could be envisaged by the Member States to provide aid to the small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries segment for the expected rising production costs, in particular within the scope of the EMFAF and the national operational programmes; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Highlights the difficulties and the serious adverse economic and social effects that the COVID-19 crisis has had on the fisheries sector and the importance for Member States to channel the available national and EU funds, if needed, as well as the consideration of exceptional measures to help fishers, including workers, in overcoming crises or market disturbances; calls on the Member States to use the resources made available through the crisis mechanisms to support SSF; underlines that, in spite of the crisis, the small-scale coastal fisheries sector still continued to function, giving EU citizens access to seafood, especially in isolated coastal regions, islands and the ORs; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Urges Member States to allocate funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility to investment in the small-scale coastal fleet with the aim of helping fishers and operators who do associated work, mainly women, such as net menders, shore-based assistants and packagers, and workers; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Urges the Commission to facilitate, under the aegis of the EMFAF, SSF sector-specific support for the installation of storage, freezing and refrigeration infrastructure and for maintaining the cold chain from boat to final consumer; considers this support a decisive element to enable the SSF segment to take full advantage of fisheries resources — without destroying or depleting stocks — as well as to ensure a regular supply and delivery of fresh and high-quality products to the public, the Horeca sector and the food processing industry; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Considers that proper storage conditions in ports could facilitate and guarantee the preservation of fish and assist commercial placement, with a view to improving the profitability of fish by acting indirectly in price formation; recalls, in this context, the possibilities provided for in the CMO and by producer organisations; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Takes the view that the EMFAF and the new national operational programmes should strengthen and provide clear support to small-scale fishing, in order to contribute to ensuring the sustainability and future viability of the countless coastal communities that are traditionally dependent on fishing, so as to address the specific problems of this segment and support the local sustainable management of the fisheries involved; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Considers that the support channelled by Member States when implementing the EMFAF should be marshalled to address structural failures, thereby contributing to increased incomes from fishing, promoting jobs with rights in the sector and ensuring fair prices for producers, supporting the development of related activities, upstream and downstream of fishing, contributing to the development and cohesion of coastal regions within a framework of sustainable fishing and a future for the SSF sector; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Stresses that, with a view to improving the execution rate of EMFAF financing and ensuring that SSF have access to support, it is necessary to look into and implement measures to streamline procedures, thereby reducing the red tape, complexity and approval time surrounding applications; amend the funding process for receiving aid and replace it with a system of pre-financing; and fully utilise the fund’s financing limits; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Stresses that the EU is missing a tool to understand the extent of EMFF and EMFAF investments in the SSF sector, the number of good practices funded, the delivery of concrete results and how Fisheries Local Action Groups are working and effectively implementing the CFP; calls on the Commission to establish such a tool as a fundamental step in order to understand how to scale up good practices and replicate virtuous fishing methods on an EU-wide scale; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on Member States to provide technical assistance at local level to facilitate small-scale fishers’ access to EU and national funding; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Warns of the high average age of the small-scale fishing fleet and stresses, in this regard, the need to make the fishing activity of this segment attractive for young people and women; emphasises the need to renew and update the small-scale fleet with a view to improving safety and living conditions on board, improving energy efficiency and making the segment more environmentally friendly, while ensuring that there is no increase in fishing capacity in the overall fishing fleet and improving the social and economic sustainability of the fishing communities that depend on the fleet; in this context, highlights the need to address situations where vessels have become obsolete bringing increased operating, maintenance and reclassification costs (economically and environmentally), which in turn compromise the guaranteed safety conditions during operations; stresses that the gross tonnage criteria to measure fishing capacity, by also including the space reserved for crew facilities and comfort, might hinder the modernisation of fishing vessels and the much-needed improvement of the working conditions of the small-scale fishing fleet; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review these criteria and other interlinked provisions in order to find a solution capable of balancing the needs of small-scale fishing workers with the need to ensure that the EU fleet’s fishing capacity is not increased; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Reiterates that support for the required renewal and/or modernisation of the fleet is necessary for improving the safety, working conditions and economic and environmental sustainability of activities; stresses, however, that this should only be achieved without increasing fishing capacity; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Takes the view that ignoring the need for fleet renewal and the maintenance and improvement of vessels, particularly but not exclusively, of obsolete and inefficient vessels, would endanger the future of small-scale fishing, especially in the ORs; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Points out that the EMFAF provides opportunities for investments in safety, better living conditions and energy performance for vessels, which may also benefit the small-scale coastal and artisanal fleet, and that it should also offer funding opportunities for the renewal, restructuring and resizing of vessels, and the purchase of new vessels in the small-scale fishing fleet — especially in the identified cases where this fleet is of an advanced average age and does not guarantee essential conditions of safety and operability — as well as for increases in engine power where duly justified in order to ensure better safety conditions on board during operations and at entry and exit from the sea, and to increase the time spent at sea, provided that there is no increase in fishing effort capacity, particularly in the ORs; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Urges the Member States to ensure the full implementation of EU standards and regulations in relation to safety, labour and living conditions on board fishing vessels; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Emphasises that Member States should continuously work on maintaining and upgrading their ports and harbours to ensure that catches can be landed and unloaded in conditions of safety; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Stresses the socio-economic importance, in terms of employment and social cohesion, of the fisheries sector, including small-scale, artisanal and coastal fisheries for the ORs, areas that are characterised by structural constraints and fewer opportunities for economic diversification; calls, therefore, for an increase in EU support for the SSF sector in those regions; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Notes the support, provided under the EMFAF, for the fisheries sector in the ORs, with a view, in particular, to providing support for the additional costs arising from remoteness when it comes to selling certain fisheries products from some ORs; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Points to the specific features of the fisheries sector value chains in the ORs and maintains that special attention is needed in order to strengthen them and facilitate their access to markets, an aim that could be achieved by not only re-establishing a POSEI scheme for fisheries, but also by establishing a similar scheme for transport; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Highlights the potential of tourist fishing in these regions as a way of attracting young people into the profession and diversifying fishers’ incomes without increasing their fishing effort, respecting the fishing effort limits and raising public awareness about the traditions of the sector and sea literacy; stresses the need to guarantee a reduction in bureaucracy related to this activity and to provide EU support for these activities; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Considers that the future of small-scale fishing requires that EU regulations ensure a regulatory environment that strengthens the position of fishers in the supply chain and provides investments for the long-term sustainability, stability and economic competitiveness of the sector; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Takes the view that the objectives of a fisheries policy should include guaranteeing the supply of fish to the public — as part of ensuring food security and sovereignty — developing coastal communities, while ensuring that fisheries activities develop within ecological limits, and promoting the fisheries-related professions by increasing their attractiveness; highlights that the implementation of the CFP should also recognise the socio-economic role of SSF in fishing communities, providing jobs and improving the living conditions of fishers and of the workers carrying out auxiliary tasks, usually women, with the improvement of working, habitability conditions and safety conditions for crews, in order to attract young people and achieve a generational renewal of this activity, within a framework of guaranteed sustainability and good resource conservation; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Reiterates that the reality of fisheries in the EU is complex and varies widely from Member State to Member State in terms of the respective fishing fleets, the environmental impact of different fleet segments, fishing gear, fish stocks and their state of conservation, and the consumption habits of the population; highlights the possibility of the regionalisation, where appropriate, of fisheries management within the framework of the CFP, while at the same time ensuring a level playing field for all fishers, including in regional fisheries management organisations; reaffirms that this great diversity requires the management of fisheries to be accompanied by exceptions that permit Member States and regions to implement more specialised management practices, that take into account specific characteristics, promote dialogue, involve the sector and coastal communities in the decision-making process, in defining and implementing policies, and that are based on sound scientific knowledge; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Believes, therefore, that management initiatives at local level through co-management need to be considered in the Member States’ EMFAF programmes; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Emphasises that the revision currently under way of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 on the control of fisheries should respect the special features of small-scale fishing activity and not overload it with bureaucracy, particularly in relation to geolocation or electronic sending of catch data; calls for a control system that is specifically designed and suited to the reality and the diversity of the small-scale coastal fleet, including shellfish gathering and fishing without vessels, in which proportionality and a phased approach are key; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Considers that the diversification of activities within the broader sustainable blue economy is important, entailing shoring up the culture of communities, promoting fishing by-products and products that, while they have potential, have no commercial value; considers, however, that such activities should not compromise fishing activity or fishers’ historic rights to the sea; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Believes that the use of maritime space for other areas of economic exploitation should not compromise historic fishing rights; considers that small-scale fishing should be fully integrated into the strategic planning of these policies; believes that a similar situation exists in inland waters, where SSF face increasing conflicts over resources and freshwater use, competing with industries that have a negative impact on riparian habitats and fish resources; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Stresses that the socio-economic and environmental challenges arising from the management of MPAs offer a potential solution to reconcile conservation and sustainability objectives on the one hand with the integration of the SSF sector into management decisions in and around MPAs on the other; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to develop participatory approaches to the management of MPAs, based on biological and socio-economic data jointly formulated, implemented and revised together with MPA practitioners, concerned stakeholders and the SSF sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider developing participative management practices, also with a view to striking a balance between the sustainable development of SSF and, where applicable, the sustainable development of responsible tourism; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Points out the need for economic and social protection during non-fishing periods and in the event of disasters that hamper activities; highlights the need for mechanisms providing for wage compensation for lost earnings during such periods; stresses that such compensation should be treated as actual working time for the purposes of the retirement pension and other social security entitlements; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Believes that, if we wish to see generational renewal, attractive conditions for young people and women must be put in place, which means valuing the income of fishing while ensuring its stability, and the application of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, increasing quota allocation to SSF in line with scientific advice, ensuring training under conditions that take due account of the diversity of fishing practices, fishing gears and needs of each Member State, as well as guaranteeing adequate working conditions and safety on board; recalls that the EMFAF provides support for training and professional development; considers that training should guarantee a strong practical component, taking into account the specific reality of the national, regional or local context in which it takes place; holds the view, in addition, that it should be possible to combine this with theoretical training, while also profiting from the accumulated knowledge of those who have been or are at sea; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls for the financial and technical resources for fisheries research in each Member State to be increased with a view to developing activities targeted at fisheries and fishery resources, stepping up and improving data collection and the assessment of the state of resources; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Calls for an increase in the financial and technical resources for fisheries-related scientific research and development in the EU and in each Member State; in particular, stresses the need to support research institutes and laboratories in this area with material and human resources with a view to developing activities targeted at promoting small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries, and guaranteeing better understanding of the various causes of fish stock depletion, and the conservation of fish resources; stresses the need to involve fishers and fishers’ associations in scientific monitoring, mapping, data collection, management and control activities, in order to take full advantage of their knowledge; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Calls on the Commission to launch a comprehensive and region-wide mapping action to develop an accurate and complete body of baseline data on SSF with a view to measuring the economic and social impact of SSF both in quantitative and qualitative terms and to estimate the value of the output produced by SSF; their economic impact on coastal communities; and their impact on related sectors; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Calls on Member States and the Commission to support research into practices increasing and diversifying the income of fishing communities and the fishing sector, including SSF; believes that the result of such research should be disseminated in the EU with a view to replicating, implementing and promoting projects both at national and EU level; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Highlights that in spite of improvements in data coverage, there is still a lack of exhaustive economic, social and territorial statistical data and indicators at European level on SSF; stresses that this lack of statistics does not allow for a proper analysis of the segment and therefore make it more difficult to put in place proper legislative action to tackle the most critical issues SSF are facing; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Calls on Member States to step up and improve the proper collection and disaggregation of data on fisheries, obtaining adequate statistical data on catches and landings with a view to better resource assessment and management, including associated activities, social and economic aspects, and analyses of other commercial uses, particularly for SSF and the communities associated with them; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Calls on the Commission to launch a comprehensive and region-wide mapping of social protection systems and the national legislation in place and available to SSF in the Member States with a view to identifying and promoting the most successful options, including legislative and institutional mechanisms which ensure the full participation of SSF in all activities related to the sustainable development of the sector, such as the development of alternative activities, co-management, financial support, labelling, traceability and the right to decent work and social protection; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Takes the view that when implementing the CFP, Member States must ensure that the implementation of the necessary environmental objectives must go hand in hand with defining social and economic objectives, and that their interdependence should be taken into account by the Commission and the Member States, both when implementing legislation and when designing future legislative initiatives; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Stresses that producer organisations can play a key role in the management of the commercialisation structures of SSF products, in improving market access for SSF products and in increasing the availability of local food products within coastal communities; stresses in particular the fact that these strengthening and promotion activities would help to put SSF in a better position to negotiate prices, and would promote healthy intra-sectoral competition and a more efficient use of their own structures and resources through collective action; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Stresses, in this regard, the crucial importance for the SSF sector to have a stronger dedicated organisational capacity in order to strengthen its position in the value chain; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take measures to increase the bargaining power of small-scale fishers and to support, encourage and facilitate the creation of producer organisations, associations and cooperatives for this segment as an important tool in improving their strength in the supply chain and increase their negotiating power vis-à-vis other market actors, in order to ensure good profit margins and to better manage their fishing activities; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Insists that associations and guilds must be recognised and eligible to receive financial aid on an equal footing with producer organisations; calls on Member States and the Commission, in particular within the framework of the reform of the CMO, to adopt initiatives on this matter with the aim of removing any discrimination between guilds and producer organisations; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to follow up on the CMO Regulation by establishing regional plans for SSF producers’ organisations in order to increase the SSF sector’s profitability and improve the quality and traceability of its products; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Stresses the importance of involving small-scale fishers in decision-making processes at the EU, national and local levels, and calls on the Council and Member States to improve transparency in the decision-making process concerning SSF to ensure accountability; encourages the empowerment of associations of small-scale fishers to share responsibility and decision-making power in the drafting and implementation of co-management plans with national authorities in co-management committees; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Stresses that the viability of SSF critically depends on secure access to resources and fishing areas on the one hand, and to value-added markets on the other; calls, in this respect, for a differentiated approach to the management of SSF that includes priority access to inshore fishing areas; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Considers that co-management is a vital tool for SSF, making it possible to optimise the management of fishing resources using an integrated approach, taking into account all aspects of sustainability, including environmental, social and economic aspects, and incorporating the active participation and involvement of the administration, the fishing sector, the scientific community and civil society organisations; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Underlines the low environmental impact of fisheries and its healthy food production, as it does not involve artificial feeding, antibiotics, fertilizers or any use of chemical pesticides; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Stresses that an artificial conflict between industrial versus small-scale fishers should not be created; takes the view that the industrial and small-scale fishers are not in competition with each other, as they mostly fish for different species in mostly different fishing grounds; takes note of the fact that the so-called industrial fishing companies are also family businesses that have existed for generations and are deeply rooted in and connected to local fishing communities; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Points out that the declaration of 2022 as the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture constitutes an exceptional opportunity for directing global attention to the work done by this segment of the fleet for food security and the sustainable use of natural resources, as well to ensure that artisanal fishing gains visibility and is included more actively in decision-making processes; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Considers that improving selectivity and making the transition towards low-impact fishing techniques is key for the survival and prosperity of SSF; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Stresses that public institutions should facilitate access to finance to the weakest segments of the fleet in order to foster value chains and prevent market failures; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up legislative initiatives to facilitate access to formal finance for the SSF sector; stresses that this should include access to both formal credit for capital expenses and financing for fishing operations; the development, in partnership with financial institutions, of facilities and financial products for medium to long-term investment; and the application of formal financing schemes such as production contracts or storage receipts, with the participation of fishers, traders and public authorities; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Highlights that marine spatial planning (MSP) is key in ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in decisions concerning the use and protection of the marine environment; highlights that MSP is a key tool to ensure the participation of small-scale fishers in the decision-making process; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Maintains that the continuous fall in EU support for the sector under successive multiannual financial frameworks and, in particular, the cut in funding for the EFF/EMFAF and the CMO, is one of the factors which has been serving to worsen the situation in the sector; reiterates, therefore, that the EU’s financial support for the fisheries sector needs to be stepped up considerably; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Considers the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication to be a valuable contribution in defining a framework to safeguard, maximise and promote small-scale fishing within the context of a fisheries management policy; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Calls on all Member States to enhance the role of work by women in fishing through specific projects and by giving full legal recognition to the role of women as ‘assistants’ and co-workers in family fishing firms, with the aim of ensuring greater labour guarantees, income for the future and social security benefits; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Considers it appropriate to strengthen cooperation with a view to recognising basic training provided by schools or educational institutions that are recognised by the national education systems of each Member State or third country and which are internationally recognised; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Considers that building points of unity between the diverse range of organisations representing the sector would be an important element in defending its claims and ensuring that it is duly taken into account in defining fisheries management policies and policies for the use of maritime space; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Calls on the Commission to promote projects, in the context of cohesion policy, that will make a contribution to protecting coastal and island areas as integral parts of fishing and maritime heritage; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Stresses that the SSF sector, more than the rest of the fleet segments, may bear the brunt of the impact of the growing need for renewable energy sources to meet the goals set by the EU Green Deal; stresses that SSF will be particularly affected if displacement deriving from the installation of a growing number of offshore windfarm units within inshore fishing grounds takes place, as they may not have the capacity to move to fishing grounds further afield or to change fishing methods; calls, in this regard, for appropriate marine spatial planning in order to guarantee the interests of all sectors and for fair compensation to small-scale fishers as a last resort; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Stresses the opportunities deriving from possible synergies between SSF and other sectors and, in particular, with coastal tourism that shares the same assets and infrastructures as the SSF sector; stresses that such synergies would enable diversification in the local economy, provide additional jobs and income to families, and help stabilise the declining profitability and employment in the fisheries sector; calls, in this regard, for a clear definition of ‘pesca-tourism’ that allows for a regulated activity and at the same time for professional small-scale fishers to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by synergies with the blue economy sector; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Highlights that within the SSF sector women continue to be under-represented; stresses that in spite of this, women have always played an active, although frequently invisible, role within the SSF sector; stresses that this ‘invisibility’ is attributable not only to cultural reasons, but also to the lack of official statistical data on women’s employment within the SSF sector; calls on the Commission and Member States to support projects dedicated to collecting information on women’s employment, as well as to enable women to enter the SSF sector and occupy a central role within it; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Considers that guaranteeing an accessible working environment, including within the fisheries sector, with a view to reintegrating into the labour market both active and former fishers and other workers in the fishing industry who suffer from physical or mental disabilities, would lead to more social inclusion and help to create more incentives for income generation in the fisheries sector and fishing communities; |
| --- | --- |

78.

o

o o

| 79. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

79.

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(1)  Maritime economic paper No 08/2020, ‘The EU fishing fleet 2020: Trends and economic results’, European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 9 March 2021.

(2)  OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22.

(3)  OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135.

(5)  OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 218.

(6)  OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 149, 20.5.2014, p. 1.

(8)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 2.

(9)  ‘The 2019 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 19-06)’, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 20 August 2019: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ca63ab82-c3bf-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1

(10)  ‘Social data in the EU fisheries sector’, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 26 September 2019: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fd0f6774-e0dd-11e9-9c4e-01aa75ed71a1

(11)  ‘The 2021 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 21-08)’, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 8 December 2021: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/77fb8e7b-58a7-11ec-91ac-01aa75ed71a1/

(12)  ‘Social dimension of the CFP (STECF 20-14)’, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 10 December 2020: https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/2672864/STECF+20-14+-+Social%20+dimension+CFP.pdf/a68c6c42-6b64-41fc-b5a0-b724c71aa78e

(13)  Pascual-Fernández, J.J., Pita, C. and Bavinck, M. (eds), Small-Scale Fisheries in Europe: Status, Resilience and Governance, MARE Publication Series, Vol. 23, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2020.

(14)  https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-28756-declaration-malte-surpeche-mediterranee.pdf

(15)  EMFF implementation report 2020, European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Fisheries and Aquaculture Monitoring and Evaluation Support Unit, September 2021: https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-09/emff-implementation-report-2020_en.pdf

(16)  Martini, R. and Innes, J., ‘Relative Effects of Fisheries Support Policies’, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 115, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/relative-effects-of-fisheries-support-policies_bd9b0dc3-en

(17)  Said, A. et al., ‘Small-scale fisheries access to fishing opportunities in the European Union: Is the Common Fisheries Policy the right step to SDG14b?’, Marine Policy, Vol. 118, 2020: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X20302475

(18)  Smith, H. and Basurto, X., ‘Defining Small-Scale Fisheries and Examining the Role of Science in Shaping Perceptions of Who and What Counts: A Systematic Review’, Frontiers in Marine Science, Vol. 6, 2019: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2019.00236/full

(19)  Study — ‘Small-scale Fisheries and “Blue Growth” in the EU’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B — Structural and Cohesion Policies, 18 March 2017: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/573450/IPOL_STU(2017)573450_EN.pdf

(20)  Study — ‘Workshop on electronic technologies for fisheries — Part III: Systems adapted for small-scale vessels’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B — Structural and Cohesion Policies, 30 July 2021: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/690863/IPOL_STU(2021)690863_EN.pdf

(21)  Study — ‘Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department B — Structural and Cohesion Policies, 7 July 2021: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/690880/IPOL_STU(2021)690880_EN.pdf

(22)  OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 167.

(23)  OJ C 58, 15.2.2018, p. 82.

(24)  OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 20.

(25)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.

(26)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 67.

(27)  Commission communication of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2022’ (COM(2021)0279).

(28)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/FISH_FLEET_ALT__custom_1479572/default/table? lang=en

(29)  https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/facts_figures_en?qt-facts_and_figures=2

(30)  See p. 8 of Small-Scale Fisheries in Europe: Status, Resilience and Governance.

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/167 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/167

---

P9_TA(2023)0005

Amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning Rule 7 on defence of privileges and immunity and Rule 9 on procedures on immunity

European Parliament decision of 17 January 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning Rule 7 on defence of privileges and immunity and Rule 9 on procedures on immunity (2022/2210(REG))

(2023/C 214/15)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the letters from its President of 9 November and 16 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letters from its President of 9 November and 16 December 2022,

| — | having regard to Rules 236 and 237 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 236 and 237 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0001/2023), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0001/2023),

| 1. | Decides to amend its Rules of Procedure as shown below; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Decides that the amendments shall enter into force on the day following their adoption; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council and the Commission, for information. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Amendment 1

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 7 — paragraph 1

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   In cases where it is alleged that an infringement of the privileges and immunities of a Member or former Member by the authorities of a Member State has occurred or is about to occur, a request for a Parliament decision as to whether those privileges and immunities have been or are likely to be breached may be made in accordance with Rule 9(1). | 1.   In cases where it is alleged that an infringement of the privileges and immunities of a Member or former Member by the authorities of a Member State
  or by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
  has occurred or is about to occur, a request for a Parliament decision as to whether those privileges and immunities have been or are likely to be breached may be made in accordance with Rule 9(1). |

Present text

Amendment

1.   In cases where it is alleged that an infringement of the privileges and immunities of a Member or former Member by the authorities of a Member State has occurred or is about to occur, a request for a Parliament decision as to whether those privileges and immunities have been or are likely to be breached may be made in accordance with Rule 9(1).

1.   In cases where it is alleged that an infringement of the privileges and immunities of a Member or former Member by the authorities of a Member State
  or by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
  has occurred or is about to occur, a request for a Parliament decision as to whether those privileges and immunities have been or are likely to be breached may be made in accordance with Rule 9(1).

Amendment 2

Amendment 2

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 1

Rule 9 — paragraph 1

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Any request addressed to the President by a competent authority of a Member State for the immunity of a Member to be waived, or by a Member or a former Member for privileges and immunities to be defended, shall be announced in Parliament and referred to the committee responsible. | 1.   Any request addressed to the President by a competent authority of a Member State
  or by the European Chief Prosecutor
  for the immunity of a Member to be waived, or by a Member or a former Member for privileges and immunities to be defended, shall be announced in Parliament and referred to the committee responsible. |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Any request addressed to the President by a competent authority of a Member State for the immunity of a Member to be waived, or by a Member or a former Member for privileges and immunities to be defended, shall be announced in Parliament and referred to the committee responsible.

1.   Any request addressed to the President by a competent authority of a Member State
  or by the European Chief Prosecutor
  for the immunity of a Member to be waived, or by a Member or a former Member for privileges and immunities to be defended, shall be announced in Parliament and referred to the committee responsible.

Amendment 3

Amendment 3

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 5

Rule 9 — paragraph 5

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   The committee may ask the authority concerned to provide any information or explanation which the committee deems necessary in order for it to form an opinion on whether immunity should be waived or defended. | 5.   The committee may ask the authority
  of the Member State
  concerned
  or, as the case may be, the European Chief Prosecutor
  to provide any information or explanation, which the committee deems necessary in order for it to form an opinion on whether immunity should be waived or defended. |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

5.   The committee may ask the authority concerned to provide any information or explanation which the committee deems necessary in order for it to form an opinion on whether immunity should be waived or defended.

5.   The committee may ask the authority
  of the Member State
  concerned
  or, as the case may be, the European Chief Prosecutor
  to provide any information or explanation, which the committee deems necessary in order for it to form an opinion on whether immunity should be waived or defended.

Amendment 4

Amendment 4

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 8

Rule 9 — paragraph 8

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 8.   The committee may offer a reasoned opinion as to the competence of the authority
  in question
  and the admissibility of the request, but shall not, under any circumstances, pronounce on the guilt, or otherwise, of the Member, nor shall it pronounce on whether or not the opinions or acts attributed to the Member justify prosecution, even if the committee, in considering the request, acquires detailed knowledge of the facts of the case. | 8.   The committee may offer a reasoned opinion as to the competence of the authority
  of the Member State concerned or, as the case may be, the European Chief Prosecutor
  and the admissibility of the request, but shall not, under any circumstances, pronounce on the guilt, or otherwise, of the Member, nor shall it pronounce on whether or not the opinions or acts attributed to the Member justify prosecution, even if the committee, in considering the request, acquires detailed knowledge of the facts of the case. |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

8.   The committee may offer a reasoned opinion as to the competence of the authority
  in question
  and the admissibility of the request, but shall not, under any circumstances, pronounce on the guilt, or otherwise, of the Member, nor shall it pronounce on whether or not the opinions or acts attributed to the Member justify prosecution, even if the committee, in considering the request, acquires detailed knowledge of the facts of the case.

8.   The committee may offer a reasoned opinion as to the competence of the authority
  of the Member State concerned or, as the case may be, the European Chief Prosecutor
  and the admissibility of the request, but shall not, under any circumstances, pronounce on the guilt, or otherwise, of the Member, nor shall it pronounce on whether or not the opinions or acts attributed to the Member justify prosecution, even if the committee, in considering the request, acquires detailed knowledge of the facts of the case.

Amendment 5

Amendment 5

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 10

Rule 9 — paragraph 10

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 10.   The President shall immediately communicate Parliament's decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned, with a request that the President be informed of any developments and judicial rulings in the relevant proceedings. When the President receives this information, he or she shall transmit it to Parliament in the way he or she considers most appropriate, if necessary after consulting the committee responsible. | 10.   The President shall immediately communicate Parliament's decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned
  or, as the case may be, to the European Chief Prosecutor
  , with a request that the President be informed of any developments and judicial rulings in the relevant proceedings. When the President receives this information, he or she shall transmit it to Parliament in the way he or she considers most appropriate, if necessary after consulting the committee responsible. |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

10.   The President shall immediately communicate Parliament's decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned, with a request that the President be informed of any developments and judicial rulings in the relevant proceedings. When the President receives this information, he or she shall transmit it to Parliament in the way he or she considers most appropriate, if necessary after consulting the committee responsible.

10.   The President shall immediately communicate Parliament's decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned
  or, as the case may be, to the European Chief Prosecutor
  , with a request that the President be informed of any developments and judicial rulings in the relevant proceedings. When the President receives this information, he or she shall transmit it to Parliament in the way he or she considers most appropriate, if necessary after consulting the committee responsible.

Amendment 6

Amendment 6

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 12

Rule 9 — paragraph 12

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 12.   Parliament shall only examine requests for the waiver of a Member's immunity that have been transmitted to it by the judicial authorities or by the Permanent Representations of the Member States. | 12.   Parliament shall only examine requests for the waiver of a Member's immunity that have been transmitted to it by the judicial authorities or by the Permanent Representations of the Member States
  or, as the case may be, by the European Chief Prosecutor
  . |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

12.   Parliament shall only examine requests for the waiver of a Member's immunity that have been transmitted to it by the judicial authorities or by the Permanent Representations of the Member States.

12.   Parliament shall only examine requests for the waiver of a Member's immunity that have been transmitted to it by the judicial authorities or by the Permanent Representations of the Member States
  or, as the case may be, by the European Chief Prosecutor
  .

Amendment 7

Amendment 7

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Parliament's Rules of Procedure

Rule 9 — paragraph 14

Rule 9 — paragraph 14

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 14.   Any inquiry as to the scope of Members' privileges or immunities made by a competent authority shall be dealt with in accordance with the above rules. | 14.   Any inquiry as to the scope of Members' privileges or immunities made by a competent authority
  of a Member State or, as the case may be, by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
  shall be dealt with in accordance with the above rules. |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

14.   Any inquiry as to the scope of Members' privileges or immunities made by a competent authority shall be dealt with in accordance with the above rules.

14.   Any inquiry as to the scope of Members' privileges or immunities made by a competent authority
  of a Member State or, as the case may be, by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
  shall be dealt with in accordance with the above rules.

---

III Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 17 January 2023

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EU/New Zealand Agreement: exchange of personal data between Europol and New Zealand

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the authorities of New Zealand competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism (10092/2022 — C9-0288/2022 — 2022/0157(NLE))

(Consent)

(2023/C 214/16)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (10092/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (10092/2022),

| — | having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the authorities of New Zealand competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism (9269/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part, on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the authorities of New Zealand competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism (9269/2022),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 16(2), Article 88 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0288/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 16(2), Article 88 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0288/2022),

| — | having regard to its non-legislative resolution of 10 July 2020 (1) on the conclusion of an agreement, under negotiation, between the European Union and New Zealand on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the New Zealand authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its non-legislative resolution of 10 July 2020 (1) on the conclusion of an agreement, under negotiation, between the European Union and New Zealand on the exchange of personal data between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the New Zealand authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism,

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0003/2023), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0003/2023),

1.

Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of New Zealand.

---

(1)  OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 71.

1

---

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Convention on Cybercrime: Second Additional Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the draft Council decision authorising Member States to ratify, in the interest of the European Union, the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (06438/2022 — C9-0146/2022 — 2021/0383(NLE))

(Consent)

(2023/C 214/17)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (06438/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (06438/2022),

| — | having regard to the draft Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (14898/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (14898/2021),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 16, Article 82(1), and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0146/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 16, Article 82(1), and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0146/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0002/2023), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0002/2023),

1.

Gives its consent to the draft Council decision;

2.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and to the Council of Europe.

---

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |

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C 214/172

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P9_TA(2023)0003

Shipments of waste

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 (COM(2021)0709 — C9-0426/2021 — 2021/0367(COD)) (1)

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 214/18)

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (1) | It is necessary to lay out rules at the Union level to protect the environment and human health against the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. These rules should also contribute to the facilitation of environmentally sound management of waste, in accordance with the waste hierarchy laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as to the reduction of overall impacts of resource use and to the improvement of the efficiency of such use, which is crucial for the transition to a circular economy. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1)

It is necessary to lay out rules at the Union level to protect the environment and human health against the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. These rules should also contribute to the facilitation of environmentally sound management of waste, in accordance with the waste hierarchy laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as to the reduction of overall impacts of resource use and to the improvement of the efficiency of such use, which is crucial for the transition to a circular economy.

| (1) | It is necessary to lay out rules at the Union level to protect the environment and human health against the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. These rules should also contribute to the facilitation of environmentally sound management of waste, in accordance with the waste hierarchy laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as to the reduction of overall impacts of resource use and to the improvement of the efficiency of such use, which is crucial for the transition to a circular economy
  and for reaching climate-neutrality by 2050 at the latest
  .
  In this regard, waste management should be considered as one step of the product life-cycle spanning from production to secondary raw materials, for which sustainable innovative techniques which seek to improve material recovery, energy efficiency, and waste management’s overall contribution to decarbonisation should be prioritized. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

It is necessary to lay out rules at the Union level to protect the environment and human health against the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. These rules should also contribute to the facilitation of environmentally sound management of waste, in accordance with the waste hierarchy laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as to the reduction of overall impacts of resource use and to the improvement of the efficiency of such use, which is crucial for the transition to a circular economy
  and for reaching climate-neutrality by 2050 at the latest
  .
  In this regard, waste management should be considered as one step of the product life-cycle spanning from production to secondary raw materials, for which sustainable innovative techniques which seek to improve material recovery, energy efficiency, and waste management’s overall contribution to decarbonisation should be prioritized.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1a) | Waste treatment and disposal activities can, if not properly managed, have various negative impacts on the environment and on people's quality of life, some of which are difficult to mitigate. More information therefore needs to be made available online on the various waste management operations carried out, in terms of quantities, types, routes and associated destinations, as well as on the inspection and monitoring of waste management activities. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a)

Waste treatment and disposal activities can, if not properly managed, have various negative impacts on the environment and on people's quality of life, some of which are difficult to mitigate. More information therefore needs to be made available online on the various waste management operations carried out, in terms of quantities, types, routes and associated destinations, as well as on the inspection and monitoring of waste management activities.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1b) | Progress in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of waste management should be accompanied by measures to reduce the generation of waste addressing in particular the waste upstream in production and consumption; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1b)

Progress in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of waste management should be accompanied by measures to reduce the generation of waste addressing in particular the waste upstream in production and consumption;

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (3) | The European Green Deal (34) sets out an ambitious roadmap to transform the Union into a sustainable, resource efficient and climate neutral economy. It calls on the Commission to review the Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. The New Circular Economy Action Plan (35) adopted in March 2020 further stresses the need for action to ensure that shipments of waste for re-use and recycling in the Union are facilitated, that the Union does not export its waste challenges to third countries and that illegal waste shipments are better addressed. In addition to the environmental and social benefits, this can also result in ameliorating EU’s strategic dependencies on raw materials. Both the Council (36) and the European Parliament (37) have also called for a revision of the current Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3)

The European Green Deal (34) sets out an ambitious roadmap to transform the Union into a sustainable, resource efficient and climate neutral economy. It calls on the Commission to review the Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. The New Circular Economy Action Plan (35) adopted in March 2020 further stresses the need for action to ensure that shipments of waste for re-use and recycling in the Union are facilitated, that the Union does not export its waste challenges to third countries and that illegal waste shipments are better addressed. In addition to the environmental and social benefits, this can also result in ameliorating EU’s strategic dependencies on raw materials. Both the Council (36) and the European Parliament (37) have also called for a revision of the current Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006.

| (3) | The European Green Deal (34) sets out an ambitious roadmap to transform the Union into a sustainable, resource efficient and climate neutral economy. It calls on the Commission to review the Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. The New Circular Economy Action Plan (35) adopted in March 2020 further stresses the need for action to ensure that shipments of waste for re-use and recycling in the Union are facilitated, that the Union does not export its waste challenges to third countries and that illegal waste shipments are better addressed. In addition to the environmental and social benefits, this can also result in ameliorating EU’s strategic dependencies on raw materials. 
  Keeping more of the generated waste within the Union will, however, require improved recycling and waste management capacity.
  Both the Council (36) and the European Parliament (37) have also called for a revision of the current Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006.
  To support the circular economy, innovative business initiatives such as taking back waste for the purpose of recycling, refurbishment, research or for improvement of product design should be supported. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The European Green Deal (34) sets out an ambitious roadmap to transform the Union into a sustainable, resource efficient and climate neutral economy. It calls on the Commission to review the Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. The New Circular Economy Action Plan (35) adopted in March 2020 further stresses the need for action to ensure that shipments of waste for re-use and recycling in the Union are facilitated, that the Union does not export its waste challenges to third countries and that illegal waste shipments are better addressed. In addition to the environmental and social benefits, this can also result in ameliorating EU’s strategic dependencies on raw materials. 
  Keeping more of the generated waste within the Union will, however, require improved recycling and waste management capacity.
  Both the Council (36) and the European Parliament (37) have also called for a revision of the current Union rules on waste shipments established under Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006.
  To support the circular economy, innovative business initiatives such as taking back waste for the purpose of recycling, refurbishment, research or for improvement of product design should be supported.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (8) | The Union submitted in October 2020 a notification, covering shipment of waste within the Union, to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention under Article 11 of that Convention. In line with that Article, the Union might therefore set out specific rules applying to the intra-EU shipments of waste which are not less environmentally sound than those provided for by the Basel Convention. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8)

The Union submitted in October 2020 a notification, covering shipment of waste within the Union, to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention under Article 11 of that Convention. In line with that Article, the Union might therefore set out specific rules applying to the intra-EU shipments of waste which are not less environmentally sound than those provided for by the Basel Convention.

deleted

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10a) | Research and innovation should be an integral part of the European waste management sector. The research and innovation network for waste should include industry, universities and other research institutions. Accordingly, revisions of this Regulation and its relevant associated acts should take into account innovation in waste management techniques, where such techniques contribute to the environmentally sound management of waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10a)

Research and innovation should be an integral part of the European waste management sector. The research and innovation network for waste should include industry, universities and other research institutions. Accordingly, revisions of this Regulation and its relevant associated acts should take into account innovation in waste management techniques, where such techniques contribute to the environmentally sound management of waste.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10b) | To ensure a real transition towards a circular economy for shipments of waste from its place of origin to the best place of treatment for such waste, the principle of proximity, material efficiency as well as the need to reduce the environmental footprint of waste should be taken into account. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10b)

To ensure a real transition towards a circular economy for shipments of waste from its place of origin to the best place of treatment for such waste, the principle of proximity, material efficiency as well as the need to reduce the environmental footprint of waste should be taken into account.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (11a) | This regulation should provide legal certainty and ensure uniform application of Union legislation within the area of waste management to facilitate compliance with the relevant provisions on protection of the environment and human health. Creating an undue administrative burden, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, should be avoided. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11a)

This regulation should provide legal certainty and ensure uniform application of Union legislation within the area of waste management to facilitate compliance with the relevant provisions on protection of the environment and human health. Creating an undue administrative burden, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, should be avoided.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (16a) | To take account of innovation in waste treatment technologies with regard to environmental sound management, as well as of changes in consumer behaviour with regard to the sorting of waste, it is essential that Annex IIIB be continuously updated. The Commission should in particular assess whether to add entries on used footwear, clothing and other textile products, mineral wool and mattresses. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16a)

To take account of innovation in waste treatment technologies with regard to environmental sound management, as well as of changes in consumer behaviour with regard to the sorting of waste, it is essential that Annex IIIB be continuously updated. The Commission should in particular assess whether to add entries on used footwear, clothing and other textile products, mineral wool and mattresses.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (16b) | A well-functioning Union market for waste shipments should prioritise proximity, self-sufficiency and the use of the best available techniques in waste management as guiding principles. Achieving a fair transition to a circular economy is essential to attaining a climate neutral, resource-efficient and competitive Union economy that is sustainable in the long run. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16b)

A well-functioning Union market for waste shipments should prioritise proximity, self-sufficiency and the use of the best available techniques in waste management as guiding principles. Achieving a fair transition to a circular economy is essential to attaining a climate neutral, resource-efficient and competitive Union economy that is sustainable in the long run.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (20) | It is necessary to provide for procedural steps and safeguards, when a notifier wishes to ship waste
  subject to the procedure of prior written notification and consent
  , in the interests of legal certainty and to ensure uniform application of this Regulation and the proper functioning of the internal market. It is also necessary, in line with Article 6(11) of the Basel Convention, to ensure that the costs arising from situations where the shipment of waste subject to the prior written notification and consent cannot be completed or is illegal, are borne by the relevant operators. To this end, the notifier should establish a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance for each shipment of
  such
  waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20)

It is necessary to provide for procedural steps and safeguards, when a notifier wishes to ship waste
  subject to the procedure of prior written notification and consent
  , in the interests of legal certainty and to ensure uniform application of this Regulation and the proper functioning of the internal market. It is also necessary, in line with Article 6(11) of the Basel Convention, to ensure that the costs arising from situations where the shipment of waste subject to the prior written notification and consent cannot be completed or is illegal, are borne by the relevant operators. To this end, the notifier should establish a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance for each shipment of
  such
  waste.

| (20) | It is necessary to provide for procedural steps and safeguards, when a notifier wishes to ship waste, in the interests of legal certainty and to ensure uniform application of this Regulation and the proper functioning of the internal market
  , contributing to long-term competitiveness of the Union
  . It is also necessary, in line with Article 6(11) of the Basel Convention, to ensure that the costs arising from situations where the shipment of waste subject to the prior written notification and consent cannot be completed or is illegal, are borne by the relevant operators. To this end, the notifier should establish a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance for each shipment of waste. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

It is necessary to provide for procedural steps and safeguards, when a notifier wishes to ship waste, in the interests of legal certainty and to ensure uniform application of this Regulation and the proper functioning of the internal market
  , contributing to long-term competitiveness of the Union
  . It is also necessary, in line with Article 6(11) of the Basel Convention, to ensure that the costs arising from situations where the shipment of waste subject to the prior written notification and consent cannot be completed or is illegal, are borne by the relevant operators. To this end, the notifier should establish a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance for each shipment of waste.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (22) | In order to reduce delays in the processing of notifications for the shipment of waste and facilitate the exchange of information between the relevant authorities, it is
  necessary
  that the issuance and exchange of information and data, which relates to individual shipments of waste within the Union, be made via electronic means. It is also necessary to empower the Commission to lay out the procedural and operational requirements for the practical implementation of the systems ensuring this electronic submission and exchange of information (such as interconnectivity, architecture and security). It is also necessary to provide sufficient time for competent authorities in the Member States and economic operators to prepare for the shift from a paper based approach, as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, to an approach to exchange information and documents electronically. This new obligation should therefore become applicable 24 months after the date of
  application
  of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22)

In order to reduce delays in the processing of notifications for the shipment of waste and facilitate the exchange of information between the relevant authorities, it is
  necessary
  that the issuance and exchange of information and data, which relates to individual shipments of waste within the Union, be made via electronic means. It is also necessary to empower the Commission to lay out the procedural and operational requirements for the practical implementation of the systems ensuring this electronic submission and exchange of information (such as interconnectivity, architecture and security). It is also necessary to provide sufficient time for competent authorities in the Member States and economic operators to prepare for the shift from a paper based approach, as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, to an approach to exchange information and documents electronically. This new obligation should therefore become applicable 24 months after the date of
  application
  of this Regulation.

| (22) | In order to reduce delays in the processing of notifications for the shipment of waste and facilitate the exchange of information between the relevant authorities
  and the economic operators
  , it is
  imperative
   that the issuance and exchange of information and data, which relates to individual shipments of waste within the Union, be made via electronic means
  . The central system and the national system should be interlinked and fully operational. To facilitate the reduction of delays, it is crucial that those systems allow document sharing and contain a fully searchable database of information related to shipments of waste
  . It is also necessary to empower the Commission to lay out the procedural and operational requirements for the practical implementation of the systems ensuring this electronic submission and exchange of information (such as interconnectivity, architecture and security). It is also necessary to provide sufficient time for competent authorities in the Member States and economic operators to prepare for the shift from a paper based approach, as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, to an approach to exchange information and documents electronically. This new obligation should therefore become applicable 24 months after the date of
  entry into force
  of this Regulation
  , before which access to the central system, in its final version should be granted to relevant authorities for the purpose of testing and learning
  . |
| --- | --- |

(22)

In order to reduce delays in the processing of notifications for the shipment of waste and facilitate the exchange of information between the relevant authorities
  and the economic operators
  , it is
  imperative
   that the issuance and exchange of information and data, which relates to individual shipments of waste within the Union, be made via electronic means
  . The central system and the national system should be interlinked and fully operational. To facilitate the reduction of delays, it is crucial that those systems allow document sharing and contain a fully searchable database of information related to shipments of waste
  . It is also necessary to empower the Commission to lay out the procedural and operational requirements for the practical implementation of the systems ensuring this electronic submission and exchange of information (such as interconnectivity, architecture and security). It is also necessary to provide sufficient time for competent authorities in the Member States and economic operators to prepare for the shift from a paper based approach, as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, to an approach to exchange information and documents electronically. This new obligation should therefore become applicable 24 months after the date of
  entry into force
  of this Regulation
  , before which access to the central system, in its final version should be granted to relevant authorities for the purpose of testing and learning
  .

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (22a) | Competent authorities should ensure that there are alternative procedures as safeguards in the electronic system. In the event of a temporary failure of the central system, data should remain protected and accessible, and procedures related to shipments should be carried out without unnecessary delays. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22a)

Competent authorities should ensure that there are alternative procedures as safeguards in the electronic system. In the event of a temporary failure of the central system, data should remain protected and accessible, and procedures related to shipments should be carried out without unnecessary delays.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 30

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (30) | With a view to ensuring that competent authorities are able to correctly process the documents submitted to them relating to the shipment of waste,
  it is necessary to lay out an obligation for
  the notifier
  to
  provide an authorised translation of these documents in a language acceptable to these authorities,
  if they
  so request. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(30)

With a view to ensuring that competent authorities are able to correctly process the documents submitted to them relating to the shipment of waste,
  it is necessary to lay out an obligation for
  the notifier
  to
  provide an authorised translation of these documents in a language acceptable to these authorities,
  if they
  so request.

| (30) | With a view to ensuring that competent authorities are able to correctly process the documents submitted to them relating to the shipment of waste,
  while avoiding an undue administrative burden,
  the notifier
  should
   provide
  notifications, information, documentation or other communications in the official language of the Member State of the competent authorities concerned or in English.
  An authorised translation of these documents in a language acceptable to these authorities,
  should be provided if the competent authorities
  so request
  , but only in duly justified cases
  . |
| --- | --- |

(30)

With a view to ensuring that competent authorities are able to correctly process the documents submitted to them relating to the shipment of waste,
  while avoiding an undue administrative burden,
  the notifier
  should
   provide
  notifications, information, documentation or other communications in the official language of the Member State of the competent authorities concerned or in English.
  An authorised translation of these documents in a language acceptable to these authorities,
  should be provided if the competent authorities
  so request
  , but only in duly justified cases
  .

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 31

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (31) | In order to avoid disruptions of shipments of waste or goods, due to a disagreement between competent authorities on the status of these waste or goods, it is necessary to set out a procedure to resolve such disagreements. It is important in that regard that competent authorities base their decisions on the provisions relating to the determination of by-products and to the end-of-waste status of Directive 2008/98/EC. It is also necessary to lay out a procedure to resolve disagreements between competent authorities as to whether waste should be subject or not to the notification procedure.
  To ensure a better harmonisation across the Union of the conditions under which waste should be subject to the notification procedure, the Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing criteria for the classification of specific waste in the relevant Annexes to this Regulation, which will determine whether or not it is subject to the notification procedure.
  In addition, in order to avoid that waste are falsely declared as used goods
  and to provide legal clarity, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing
  criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific commodities for which such distinction is important, especially for their export from the Union. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(31)

In order to avoid disruptions of shipments of waste or goods, due to a disagreement between competent authorities on the status of these waste or goods, it is necessary to set out a procedure to resolve such disagreements. It is important in that regard that competent authorities base their decisions on the provisions relating to the determination of by-products and to the end-of-waste status of Directive 2008/98/EC. It is also necessary to lay out a procedure to resolve disagreements between competent authorities as to whether waste should be subject or not to the notification procedure.
  To ensure a better harmonisation across the Union of the conditions under which waste should be subject to the notification procedure, the Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing criteria for the classification of specific waste in the relevant Annexes to this Regulation, which will determine whether or not it is subject to the notification procedure.
  In addition, in order to avoid that waste are falsely declared as used goods
  and to provide legal clarity, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing
  criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific commodities for which such distinction is important, especially for their export from the Union.

| (31) | In order to avoid disruptions of shipments of waste or goods, due to a disagreement between competent authorities on the status of these waste or goods, it is necessary to set out a procedure to resolve such disagreements. It is important in that regard that competent authorities base their decisions on the provisions relating to the determination of by-products and to the end-of-waste status of Directive 2008/98/EC. It is also necessary to
  establish criteria for the classification of specific waste in the Annexes to this Regulation and to
  lay out a procedure to resolve disagreements between competent authorities as to whether waste should be subject or not to the notification procedure. In addition, in order
  to provide legal certainty and
  to avoid that waste are falsely declared as used goods
  , it is necessary to establish
  criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific commodities for which such distinction is important, especially for their export from the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

In order to avoid disruptions of shipments of waste or goods, due to a disagreement between competent authorities on the status of these waste or goods, it is necessary to set out a procedure to resolve such disagreements. It is important in that regard that competent authorities base their decisions on the provisions relating to the determination of by-products and to the end-of-waste status of Directive 2008/98/EC. It is also necessary to
  establish criteria for the classification of specific waste in the Annexes to this Regulation and to
  lay out a procedure to resolve disagreements between competent authorities as to whether waste should be subject or not to the notification procedure. In addition, in order
  to provide legal certainty and
  to avoid that waste are falsely declared as used goods
  , it is necessary to establish
  criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific commodities for which such distinction is important, especially for their export from the Union.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (36) | To protect the environment of the countries concerned, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the prohibition of exports of hazardous waste destined for recovery in third countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply, in accordance with the Basel Convention. In particular, it is necessary to clarify the list of waste to which that prohibition applies and to ensure that it also includes the waste listed in Annex II to the Basel Convention, namely waste collected from households, residues from the incineration of household waste and hard-to-recycle plastic waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36)

To protect the environment of the countries concerned, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the prohibition of exports of hazardous waste destined for recovery in third countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply, in accordance with the Basel Convention. In particular, it is necessary to clarify the list of waste to which that prohibition applies and to ensure that it also includes the waste listed in Annex II to the Basel Convention, namely waste collected from households, residues from the incineration of household waste and hard-to-recycle plastic waste.

| (36) | To protect the environment of the countries concerned, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the prohibition of exports of hazardous waste destined for recovery in third countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply, in accordance with the Basel Convention. In particular, it is necessary to clarify the list of waste to which that prohibition applies and to ensure that it also includes the waste listed in Annex II to the Basel Convention, namely waste collected from households, residues from the incineration of household waste and hard-to-recycle
  , contaminated or mixed
  plastic waste. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

To protect the environment of the countries concerned, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the prohibition of exports of hazardous waste destined for recovery in third countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply, in accordance with the Basel Convention. In particular, it is necessary to clarify the list of waste to which that prohibition applies and to ensure that it also includes the waste listed in Annex II to the Basel Convention, namely waste collected from households, residues from the incineration of household waste and hard-to-recycle
  , contaminated or mixed
  plastic waste.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36a) | The Union should thoroughly rethink the management of its plastic waste, starting with prevention and ensuring that such waste is collected, reused and recycled. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36a)

The Union should thoroughly rethink the management of its plastic waste, starting with prevention and ensuring that such waste is collected, reused and recycled.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36b) | Plastic waste poses particular challenges. There is a wide diversity of polymers, and they often contain hazardous additives and numerous contaminants. Measuring the levels of hazardous additives and of contaminants for export control purposes would require costly testing. Recycling levels for plastic waste are low, and the recycling of plastic waste can create large amounts of residual waste. Some major shipping companies are committed to stopping the transport of plastic waste to help curb pollution. In light of various problems created by plastic waste management in third countries, the Union should gradually phase out the export of all kinds of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36b)

Plastic waste poses particular challenges. There is a wide diversity of polymers, and they often contain hazardous additives and numerous contaminants. Measuring the levels of hazardous additives and of contaminants for export control purposes would require costly testing. Recycling levels for plastic waste are low, and the recycling of plastic waste can create large amounts of residual waste. Some major shipping companies are committed to stopping the transport of plastic waste to help curb pollution. In light of various problems created by plastic waste management in third countries, the Union should gradually phase out the export of all kinds of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36c) | To ensure there is effective enforcement of the phase-out of export of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries, it is necessary to carry out regular monitoring and inspection at checkpoints, including to prevent any circumvention of the phase-out requirement by false claims that it is not waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36c)

To ensure there is effective enforcement of the phase-out of export of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries, it is necessary to carry out regular monitoring and inspection at checkpoints, including to prevent any circumvention of the phase-out requirement by false claims that it is not waste.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 d (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36d) | To promote plastics recycling in the Union, a market for products containing recycled plastic should be supported. The Commission should assess the introduction of targets on recycled content, particularly, but no limited to, for products made out of plastic, and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal accordingly. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36d)

To promote plastics recycling in the Union, a market for products containing recycled plastic should be supported. The Commission should assess the introduction of targets on recycled content, particularly, but no limited to, for products made out of plastic, and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal accordingly.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 37 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (37a) | It is necessary to ensure that the shipment of waste that is necessary for building strong value chains is facilitated within the internal market, while ensuring that adequate controls are in place. Strengthening key value chains will accelerate the development of our resilience and enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(37a)

It is necessary to ensure that the shipment of waste that is necessary for building strong value chains is facilitated within the internal market, while ensuring that adequate controls are in place. Strengthening key value chains will accelerate the development of our resilience and enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 38

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (38) | Countries to which the OECD decision applies are subject to the rules and recommendations laid down by the OECD on the shipment and management of waste, and have generally higher standards for the management of waste than countries to which the OECD decision does not apply. It is however important that the export from the Union of non-hazardous waste for recovery does not create damages to environment and public health in countries to which the OECD decision applies. It is therefore necessary to establish a mechanism to monitor shipments of non-hazardous waste to such countries. In cases where
  the export of non-hazardous waste from the Union to the country concerned has considerably increased within a short period of time and
  there is a lack of information available demonstrating the ability of the country concerned to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner, the Commission should enter into a dialogue with the country concerned and, if the information is not sufficient to prove that the waste is recovered in an environmentally sound manner, be empowered to suspend such exports. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(38)

Countries to which the OECD decision applies are subject to the rules and recommendations laid down by the OECD on the shipment and management of waste, and have generally higher standards for the management of waste than countries to which the OECD decision does not apply. It is however important that the export from the Union of non-hazardous waste for recovery does not create damages to environment and public health in countries to which the OECD decision applies. It is therefore necessary to establish a mechanism to monitor shipments of non-hazardous waste to such countries. In cases where
  the export of non-hazardous waste from the Union to the country concerned has considerably increased within a short period of time and
  there is a lack of information available demonstrating the ability of the country concerned to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner, the Commission should enter into a dialogue with the country concerned and, if the information is not sufficient to prove that the waste is recovered in an environmentally sound manner, be empowered to suspend such exports.

| (38) | Countries to which the OECD decision applies are subject to the rules and recommendations laid down by the OECD on the shipment and management of waste, and have generally higher standards for the management of waste than countries to which the OECD decision does not apply. It is however important that the export from the Union of non-hazardous waste for recovery does not create damages to environment and public health in countries to which the OECD decision applies. It is therefore necessary to establish a mechanism to monitor shipments of non-hazardous waste to such countries. In cases where there is a lack of information available demonstrating the ability of the country concerned to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner
  , as well as information about the negative impacts of the management of domestic waste in the country concerned
  , the Commission should enter into a dialogue with the country concerned and, if the information is not sufficient to prove that the waste is recovered in an environmentally sound manner, be empowered to suspend such exports. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Countries to which the OECD decision applies are subject to the rules and recommendations laid down by the OECD on the shipment and management of waste, and have generally higher standards for the management of waste than countries to which the OECD decision does not apply. It is however important that the export from the Union of non-hazardous waste for recovery does not create damages to environment and public health in countries to which the OECD decision applies. It is therefore necessary to establish a mechanism to monitor shipments of non-hazardous waste to such countries. In cases where there is a lack of information available demonstrating the ability of the country concerned to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner
  , as well as information about the negative impacts of the management of domestic waste in the country concerned
  , the Commission should enter into a dialogue with the country concerned and, if the information is not sufficient to prove that the waste is recovered in an environmentally sound manner, be empowered to suspend such exports.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 49

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (49) | To support and complement the enforcement activities of the Member States, the Commission should be empowered to carry out investigative and coordinating actions in respect of illegal shipments, which might have serious adverse effects on human health or the environment. In carrying out these activities, the Commission should act in full respect of procedural guarantees. The Commission may consider, as a matter of its internal organisation, entrusting certain enforcement actions foreseen by this Regulation to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which possesses relevant expertise in that regard. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(49)

To support and complement the enforcement activities of the Member States, the Commission should be empowered to carry out investigative and coordinating actions in respect of illegal shipments, which might have serious adverse effects on human health or the environment. In carrying out these activities, the Commission should act in full respect of procedural guarantees. The Commission may consider, as a matter of its internal organisation, entrusting certain enforcement actions foreseen by this Regulation to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which possesses relevant expertise in that regard.

| (49) | To support and complement the enforcement activities of the Member States, the Commission should be empowered to carry out investigative and coordinating actions in respect of illegal shipments, which might have serious adverse effects on human health or the environment. In carrying out these activities, the Commission should act in full respect of procedural guarantees. The Commission may consider, as a matter of its internal organisation, entrusting certain enforcement actions foreseen by this Regulation to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which possesses relevant expertise in that regard.
  If competent authorities in the Member States of dispatch and destination are notified of an illegal shipment of waste, they should consider how they could increase their control measures for similar shipments to identify illegal shipments of waste at an early stage. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

To support and complement the enforcement activities of the Member States, the Commission should be empowered to carry out investigative and coordinating actions in respect of illegal shipments, which might have serious adverse effects on human health or the environment. In carrying out these activities, the Commission should act in full respect of procedural guarantees. The Commission may consider, as a matter of its internal organisation, entrusting certain enforcement actions foreseen by this Regulation to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which possesses relevant expertise in that regard.
  If competent authorities in the Member States of dispatch and destination are notified of an illegal shipment of waste, they should consider how they could increase their control measures for similar shipments to identify illegal shipments of waste at an early stage.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 50

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (50) | Member States should provide the Commission with information concerning the implementation of this Regulation, both through the reports submitted to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention and on the basis of a separate questionnaire. The Commission should produce a report every
  four
  years on the implementation of this Regulation, based on the information provided by the Member States as well as on other information, gathered in particular through ad hoc reports by the Commission and the European Environment Agency on the shipments of plastic waste and other specific waste streams that are a source of concern. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(50)

Member States should provide the Commission with information concerning the implementation of this Regulation, both through the reports submitted to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention and on the basis of a separate questionnaire. The Commission should produce a report every
  four
  years on the implementation of this Regulation, based on the information provided by the Member States as well as on other information, gathered in particular through ad hoc reports by the Commission and the European Environment Agency on the shipments of plastic waste and other specific waste streams that are a source of concern.

| (50) | Member States should provide the Commission with information concerning the implementation of this Regulation, both through the reports submitted to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention and on the basis of a separate questionnaire. The Commission should produce a report every
  three
   years on the implementation of this Regulation, based on the information provided by the Member States as well as on other information, gathered in particular through ad hoc reports by the Commission and the European Environment Agency on the shipments of plastic waste and other specific waste streams that are a source of concern.
  The central system for electronic submission and exchange of information and documents should be designed in such a way that data can be extracted from the system for the purpose of those reports. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Member States should provide the Commission with information concerning the implementation of this Regulation, both through the reports submitted to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention and on the basis of a separate questionnaire. The Commission should produce a report every
  three
   years on the implementation of this Regulation, based on the information provided by the Member States as well as on other information, gathered in particular through ad hoc reports by the Commission and the European Environment Agency on the shipments of plastic waste and other specific waste streams that are a source of concern.
  The central system for electronic submission and exchange of information and documents should be designed in such a way that data can be extracted from the system for the purpose of those reports.

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 52

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (52) | In order to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation for the implementation of this Regulation, Member States should designate competent authorities and correspondents and notify them to the Commission, which should make this information publicly available. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(52)

In order to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation for the implementation of this Regulation, Member States should designate competent authorities and correspondents and notify them to the Commission, which should make this information publicly available.

| (52) | In order to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation for the
  harmonised
  implementation of this Regulation, Member States should designate competent authorities and correspondents and notify them to the Commission, which should make this information publicly available. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In order to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation for the
  harmonised
  implementation of this Regulation, Member States should designate competent authorities and correspondents and notify them to the Commission, which should make this information publicly available.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 54

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (54) | In order to supplement or amend this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of Articles
  37(13), 40(8)
  and Article
  72
  of this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (52). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(54)

In order to supplement or amend this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of Articles
  37(13), 40(8)
  and Article
  72
  of this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (52). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

| (54) | In order to supplement or amend this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of Articles
  14(3), 28(4), 38(1), 42(4)
  and Article
  75
  of this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (52). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

In order to supplement or amend this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of Articles
  14(3), 28(4), 38(1), 42(4)
  and Article
  75
  of this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (52). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 55

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (55) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt
  measures on a
  harmonised method for calculating the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance
  , to clarify the classification of waste under this Regulation (including the establishment of contamination level threshold for certain waste) and to clarify for certain types of commodities the distinction between used goods and waste when shipped transboundary
  . Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (53). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(55)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt
  measures on a
  harmonised method for calculating the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance
  , to clarify the classification of waste under this Regulation (including the establishment of contamination level threshold for certain waste) and to clarify for certain types of commodities the distinction between used goods and waste when shipped transboundary
  . Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (53).

| (55) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt
  a simple, risk-based and
   harmonised method for calculating the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (53).
  If the Commission determines that a harmonised calculation method for the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is appropriate, it should consider how the central system could be utilised to enable innovative methods for determining financial guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt
  a simple, risk-based and
   harmonised method for calculating the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (53).
  If the Commission determines that a harmonised calculation method for the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is appropriate, it should consider how the central system could be utilised to enable innovative methods for determining financial guarantees.

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 55 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (55a) | To further facilitate harmonisation of the internal market and practices between Member States in relation to shipments of waste, the Commission should investigate whether further standardisation of contracts is possible in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(55a)

To further facilitate harmonisation of the internal market and practices between Member States in relation to shipments of waste, the Commission should investigate whether further standardisation of contracts is possible in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| This Regulation lays down measures to protect the environment and human health by preventing or reducing the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. It establishes procedures and control regimes for the shipment of waste, depending on the origin, destination and route of the shipment, the type of waste shipped and the type of treatment to be applied to the waste at its destination. | This Regulation lays down measures
  to
  to protect the environment and human health by preventing or reducing the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste
  including in third countries
  . It establishes procedures and control regimes for the shipment of waste, depending on the origin, destination and route of the shipment, the type of waste shipped and the type of treatment to be applied to the waste at its destination.
  It seeks to contribute to achieving a circular economy, resource efficiency, climate neutrality and zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment by applying the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC. It also seeks to reduce the administrative burden by harmonising the shipment of waste rules within the Union and by digitalising the exchange of information concerning shipments of waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This Regulation lays down measures to protect the environment and human health by preventing or reducing the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste. It establishes procedures and control regimes for the shipment of waste, depending on the origin, destination and route of the shipment, the type of waste shipped and the type of treatment to be applied to the waste at its destination.

This Regulation lays down measures
  to
  to protect the environment and human health by preventing or reducing the adverse impacts which may result from the shipment of waste
  including in third countries
  . It establishes procedures and control regimes for the shipment of waste, depending on the origin, destination and route of the shipment, the type of waste shipped and the type of treatment to be applied to the waste at its destination.
  It seeks to contribute to achieving a circular economy, resource efficiency, climate neutrality and zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment by applying the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC. It also seeks to reduce the administrative burden by harmonising the shipment of waste rules within the Union and by digitalising the exchange of information concerning shipments of waste.

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — point 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (4) | ‘environmentally sound management’ means taking all practicable steps to ensure that waste is managed in a manner that will protect human health and the environment against adverse effects which may result from such waste; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4)

‘environmentally sound management’ means taking all practicable steps to ensure that waste is managed in a manner that will protect human health and the environment against adverse effects which may result from such waste;

| (4) | ‘environmentally sound management’ means taking all practicable steps to ensure that waste is managed in a manner that will protect human health
  , the climate
  and the environment against adverse effects which may result from such waste
  , and the treatment thereof
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(4)

‘environmentally sound management’ means taking all practicable steps to ensure that waste is managed in a manner that will protect human health
  , the climate
  and the environment against adverse effects which may result from such waste
  , and the treatment thereof
  ;

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| In addition, the definitions of ‘waste’, ‘hazardous waste’, ‘treatment’, ‘disposal’, ‘recovery’, ‘preparing for re-use’, ‘re-use’, ‘recycling’, ‘waste producer’, ‘waste holder’, ‘dealer’ and ‘broker’ laid down in Article 3, points (1), (2), (14), (19), (15), (16), (13), (17), (5), (6), (7) and (8) respectively of Directive 2008/98/EC shall apply. | In addition, the definitions of ‘waste’, ‘hazardous waste’, ‘treatment’, ‘disposal’, ‘
  recovery’, ‘material
  recovery’, ‘preparing for re-use’, ‘re-use’, ‘recycling’, ‘waste producer’, ‘waste holder’, ‘dealer’ and ‘broker’ laid down in Article 3, points (1), (2), (14), (19), (15), (
  15a), (
  16), (13), (17), (5), (6), (7) and (8) respectively of Directive 2008/98/EC shall apply. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

In addition, the definitions of ‘waste’, ‘hazardous waste’, ‘treatment’, ‘disposal’, ‘recovery’, ‘preparing for re-use’, ‘re-use’, ‘recycling’, ‘waste producer’, ‘waste holder’, ‘dealer’ and ‘broker’ laid down in Article 3, points (1), (2), (14), (19), (15), (16), (13), (17), (5), (6), (7) and (8) respectively of Directive 2008/98/EC shall apply.

In addition, the definitions of ‘waste’, ‘hazardous waste’, ‘treatment’, ‘disposal’, ‘
  recovery’, ‘material
  recovery’, ‘preparing for re-use’, ‘re-use’, ‘recycling’, ‘waste producer’, ‘waste holder’, ‘dealer’ and ‘broker’ laid down in Article 3, points (1), (2), (14), (19), (15), (
  15a), (
  16), (13), (17), (5), (6), (7) and (8) respectively of Directive 2008/98/EC shall apply.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 2 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | Waste that contains or is contaminated with a substance listed in Annex IV of Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants if not listed elsewhere; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(aa)

Waste that contains or is contaminated with a substance listed in Annex IV of Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants if not listed elsewhere;

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 4 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the amount of waste does not exceed 150 kg or any higher amount agreed on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities concerned and the notifier. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b)

the amount of waste does not exceed 150 kg or any higher amount agreed on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities concerned and the notifier.

| (b) | the amount of waste does not exceed 150 kg
  for laboratory analysis, 2 000  kg for experimental treatment-trials
  or any higher amount agreed on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities concerned and the notifier. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the amount of waste does not exceed 150 kg
  for laboratory analysis, 2 000  kg for experimental treatment-trials
  or any higher amount agreed on a case-by-case basis by the competent authorities concerned and the notifier.

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   Paragraph 2 shall apply to shipments of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, from other waste producers or from both, as well as to mixed municipal waste which has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties, where such waste is destined for recovery operations. Shipments of such waste destined for disposal shall be prohibited. | 5.   Paragraph 2 shall apply to shipments of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, from other waste producers or from both, as well as to mixed municipal waste which has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties,
  for example refuse- derived fuels,
  where such waste is destined for recovery operations. Shipments of such waste destined for disposal shall be prohibited. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

5.   Paragraph 2 shall apply to shipments of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, from other waste producers or from both, as well as to mixed municipal waste which has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties, where such waste is destined for recovery operations. Shipments of such waste destined for disposal shall be prohibited.

5.   Paragraph 2 shall apply to shipments of mixed municipal waste collected from private households, from other waste producers or from both, as well as to mixed municipal waste which has been subject to a waste treatment operation that has not substantially altered its properties,
  for example refuse- derived fuels,
  where such waste is destined for recovery operations. Shipments of such waste destined for disposal shall be prohibited.

Amendment 35

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Only notifiers that have received a permit
  or are
  registered in accordance with Chapter IV of Directive 2008/98/EC may submit a prior written notification (‘notification’). | Only notifiers that have received a permit
  or are
  registered in accordance with Chapter IV of Directive 2008/98/EC
  or operators of experimental treatment trials or laboratories
  may submit a prior written notification (‘notification’). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Only notifiers that have received a permit
  or are
  registered in accordance with Chapter IV of Directive 2008/98/EC may submit a prior written notification (‘notification’).

or are

Only notifiers that have received a permit
  or are
  registered in accordance with Chapter IV of Directive 2008/98/EC
  or operators of experimental treatment trials or laboratories
  may submit a prior written notification (‘notification’).

or are

or operators of experimental treatment trials or laboratories

Amendment 36

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 3

Article 5 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| When the notifier is not the original waste producer referred to in Article 3, point (6)(a)(i), the notifier shall ensure that the original waste producer or one of the persons indicated in Article 3, points (6)(a)(ii)
  or (iii
  ), also signs the notification document. | When the notifier is not the original waste producer referred to in Article 3, point (6)(a)(i), the notifier shall ensure that the original waste producer or one of the persons indicated in Article 3, points (6)(a)(ii)
  , (iii) or (iv
  ), also signs the notification document.
  A dealer or a broker shall ensure they have a written authorisation from one of the persons referred to in Article 3, points (6)(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), to act on their behalf, and that written authorisation shall be included in the notification. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

When the notifier is not the original waste producer referred to in Article 3, point (6)(a)(i), the notifier shall ensure that the original waste producer or one of the persons indicated in Article 3, points (6)(a)(ii)
  or (iii
  ), also signs the notification document.

or (iii

When the notifier is not the original waste producer referred to in Article 3, point (6)(a)(i), the notifier shall ensure that the original waste producer or one of the persons indicated in Article 3, points (6)(a)(ii)
  , (iii) or (iv
  ), also signs the notification document.
  A dealer or a broker shall ensure they have a written authorisation from one of the persons referred to in Article 3, points (6)(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), to act on their behalf, and that written authorisation shall be included in the notification.

, (iii) or (iv

A dealer or a broker shall ensure they have a written authorisation from one of the persons referred to in Article 3, points (6)(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), to act on their behalf, and that written authorisation shall be included in the notification.

Amendment 37

Amendment 37

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 6

Article 7 — paragraph 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 6.   By way of derogation from paragraph 5, where the waste shipped is destined for interim recovery operations or disposal operations and a further recovery operation or disposal operation takes place in the country of destination, the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance may be released when the waste leaves the interim facility and the competent authority concerned has received the certificate referred to in Article 16(4). In that case, any further shipment to a recovery or disposal facility shall be covered by a new financial guarantee or equivalent insurance unless the competent authority of destination is satisfied that such a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is not required. In those circumstances, the competent authority of destination shall be responsible for obligations arising in the case of take-back where the shipment or the further recovery or disposal operation cannot be completed as intended, as referred to in Article 22, or in the case of an illegal shipment, as referred to in Article 24. | 6.   By way of derogation from paragraph 5, where the waste shipped is destined for interim recovery operations or disposal operations and a further recovery operation or disposal operation takes place in the country of destination, the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance may be released when the waste leaves the interim facility and the competent authority concerned has received the certificate referred to in Article 16(4). In that case, any further shipment to a recovery or disposal facility shall be covered by a new financial guarantee or equivalent insurance unless the
  shipment is between two facilities controlled by the same legal entity or the
  competent authority of destination is satisfied that such a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is not required. In those circumstances, the competent authority of destination shall be responsible for obligations arising in the case of take-back where the shipment or the further recovery or disposal operation cannot be completed as intended, as referred to in Article 22, or in the case of an illegal shipment, as referred to in Article 24. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6.   By way of derogation from paragraph 5, where the waste shipped is destined for interim recovery operations or disposal operations and a further recovery operation or disposal operation takes place in the country of destination, the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance may be released when the waste leaves the interim facility and the competent authority concerned has received the certificate referred to in Article 16(4). In that case, any further shipment to a recovery or disposal facility shall be covered by a new financial guarantee or equivalent insurance unless the competent authority of destination is satisfied that such a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is not required. In those circumstances, the competent authority of destination shall be responsible for obligations arising in the case of take-back where the shipment or the further recovery or disposal operation cannot be completed as intended, as referred to in Article 22, or in the case of an illegal shipment, as referred to in Article 24.

6.   By way of derogation from paragraph 5, where the waste shipped is destined for interim recovery operations or disposal operations and a further recovery operation or disposal operation takes place in the country of destination, the financial guarantee or equivalent insurance may be released when the waste leaves the interim facility and the competent authority concerned has received the certificate referred to in Article 16(4). In that case, any further shipment to a recovery or disposal facility shall be covered by a new financial guarantee or equivalent insurance unless the
  shipment is between two facilities controlled by the same legal entity or the
  competent authority of destination is satisfied that such a financial guarantee or equivalent insurance is not required. In those circumstances, the competent authority of destination shall be responsible for obligations arising in the case of take-back where the shipment or the further recovery or disposal operation cannot be completed as intended, as referred to in Article 22, or in the case of an illegal shipment, as referred to in Article 24.

Amendment 38

Amendment 38

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 10 — subparagraph 1

Article 7 — paragraph 10 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission shall, at the latest by [OP: Please insert date of two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], assess the feasibility of establishing a harmonised calculation method for determining the amount of financial guarantees or equivalent insurances and, if appropriate, adopt an implementing act to establish such a harmonised calculation method. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2). | The Commission shall, at the latest by [OP: Please insert date of two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], assess the feasibility of establishing a 
  simple, risk-based and
  harmonised calculation method for determining the amount of financial guarantees or equivalent insurances and, if appropriate,
  by ... [insert the date three years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation]
  adopt an implementing act to establish such a 
  simple, risk-based and
  harmonised calculation method. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall, at the latest by [OP: Please insert date of two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], assess the feasibility of establishing a harmonised calculation method for determining the amount of financial guarantees or equivalent insurances and, if appropriate, adopt an implementing act to establish such a harmonised calculation method. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2).

The Commission shall, at the latest by [OP: Please insert date of two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], assess the feasibility of establishing a 
  simple, risk-based and
  harmonised calculation method for determining the amount of financial guarantees or equivalent insurances and, if appropriate,
  by ... [insert the date three years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation]
  adopt an implementing act to establish such a 
  simple, risk-based and
  harmonised calculation method. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2).

simple, risk-based and

by ... [insert the date three years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation]

simple, risk-based and

Amendment 39

Amendment 39

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 2

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where, within 30 days after submission of the notification,
  the competent authority of destination has not taken a decision under paragraph 1,
  it shall provide the notifier with a motivated explanation
  upon request
  . | Where
  the competent authority of destination is not able to take a decision under paragraph 1
  within 30 days after submission of the notification, it shall
  inform the notifier within those 30 days and
  provide the notifier with a motivated explanation
  unsolicited. A final decision by the competent authority shall be taken within 60 days of submission of the notification
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where, within 30 days after submission of the notification,
  the competent authority of destination has not taken a decision under paragraph 1,
  it shall provide the notifier with a motivated explanation
  upon request
  .

the competent authority of destination has not taken a decision under paragraph 1,

upon request

Where
  the competent authority of destination is not able to take a decision under paragraph 1
  within 30 days after submission of the notification, it shall
  inform the notifier within those 30 days and
  provide the notifier with a motivated explanation
  unsolicited. A final decision by the competent authority shall be taken within 60 days of submission of the notification
  .

the competent authority of destination is not able to take a decision under paragraph 1

inform the notifier within those 30 days and

unsolicited. A final decision by the competent authority shall be taken within 60 days of submission of the notification

Amendment 40

Amendment 40

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 3

Article 9 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   A written consent to a planned shipment shall expire on the later date as indicated in the notification document. It shall
  not
  cover a period of
  more than one
  calendar
  year or
  any shorter period as indicated in their decision by the competent authorities concerned. | 3.   A written consent to a planned shipment shall expire on the later date as indicated in the notification document. It shall cover a period of
  two
  calendar
  years or,
  any shorter period as indicated in their decision by the competent authorities concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   A written consent to a planned shipment shall expire on the later date as indicated in the notification document. It shall
  not
  cover a period of
  more than one
  calendar
  year or
  any shorter period as indicated in their decision by the competent authorities concerned.

3.   A written consent to a planned shipment shall expire on the later date as indicated in the notification document. It shall cover a period of
  two
  calendar
  years or,
  any shorter period as indicated in their decision by the competent authorities concerned.

Amendment 41

Amendment 41

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 4

Article 9 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The planned shipment may take place only after fulfilment of the requirements set out in Article 16(1)
  , points (a) and (b)
  , and during the period of validity of the tacit or written consent of all competent authorities concerned. A shipment shall have left the country of dispatch by the end of the period of validity of the tacit or written consents of all competent authorities concerned. | 4.   The planned shipment may take place only after fulfilment of the requirements set out in Article 16(1), and during the period of validity of the tacit or written consent of all competent authorities concerned. A shipment shall have left the country of dispatch by the end of the period of validity of the tacit or written consents of all competent authorities concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The planned shipment may take place only after fulfilment of the requirements set out in Article 16(1)
  , points (a) and (b)
  , and during the period of validity of the tacit or written consent of all competent authorities concerned. A shipment shall have left the country of dispatch by the end of the period of validity of the tacit or written consents of all competent authorities concerned.

4.   The planned shipment may take place only after fulfilment of the requirements set out in Article 16(1), and during the period of validity of the tacit or written consent of all competent authorities concerned. A shipment shall have left the country of dispatch by the end of the period of validity of the tacit or written consents of all competent authorities concerned.

Amendment 42

Amendment 42

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 7

Article 9 — paragraph 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 7.   Any withdrawal of consent shall be transmitted by means of official notice to the notifier, the competent authorities concerned and the consignee. | 7.   Any withdrawal of consent
  , including the reason for such withdrawal,
  shall be transmitted by means of official notice to the notifier, the competent authorities concerned and the consignee
  and the Commission for the purpose of reporting
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

7.   Any withdrawal of consent shall be transmitted by means of official notice to the notifier, the competent authorities concerned and the consignee.

7.   Any withdrawal of consent
  , including the reason for such withdrawal,
  shall be transmitted by means of official notice to the notifier, the competent authorities concerned and the consignee
  and the Commission for the purpose of reporting
  .

Amendment 43

Amendment 43

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point i

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point i

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (i) | the waste cannot be recovered in a technically feasible
  and
  economically viable manner, or must be disposed of due to legal obligations in Union or international law; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(i)

the waste cannot be recovered in a technically feasible
  and
  economically viable manner, or must be disposed of due to legal obligations in Union or international law;

and

| (i) | the waste cannot be recovered in a technically feasible, economically viable
  and environmentally sound
  manner, or must be disposed of due to legal obligations in Union or international law. |
| --- | --- |

(i)

the waste cannot be recovered in a technically feasible, economically viable
  and environmentally sound
  manner, or must be disposed of due to legal obligations in Union or international law.

and environmentally sound

Amendment 44

Amendment 44

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point ii

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point ii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (ii) | the waste cannot be disposed of in a technically feasible
  and
  economically viable manner in the country where it was generated; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ii)

the waste cannot be disposed of in a technically feasible
  and
  economically viable manner in the country where it was generated;

and

| (ii) | the waste cannot be disposed of in a technically feasible, economically viable
  and environmentally sound
  manner, in the country where it was generated; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the waste cannot be disposed of in a technically feasible, economically viable
  and environmentally sound
  manner, in the country where it was generated;

and environmentally sound

Amendment 45

Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point iii

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point a — point iii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (iii) | the planned shipment or disposal is in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency
  at Union and national levels
  as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(iii)

the planned shipment or disposal is in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency
  at Union and national levels
  as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC;

at Union and national levels

| (iii) | the planned shipment or disposal is in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the planned shipment or disposal is in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC;

Amendment 46

Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 11 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the notifier or the consignee has previously not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental protection; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

the notifier or the consignee has previously not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental protection;

| (b) | the notifier or the consignee has previously not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental
  or human health
  protection,; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the notifier or the consignee has previously not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental
  or human health
  protection,;

or human health

Amendment 47

Amendment 47

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11 — paragraph 3

Article 11 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Where the competent authorities concerned have not authorised a planned shipment of waste destined for disposal within
  the 30-day
  time limit
  referred to in Article 9(1)
  , the notification of that shipment shall cease to be valid and the shipment shall be prohibited in accordance with Article 4(1). In cases where the notifier still intends to carry out the shipment, a new notification shall be submitted, unless all the competent authorities concerned and the notifier agree otherwise. | 3.   Where the competent authorities concerned have not authorised a planned shipment of waste destined for disposal within
  a
   time limit
  of 60 days
  , the notification of that shipment shall cease to be valid and the shipment shall be prohibited in accordance with Article 4(1). In cases where the notifier still intends to carry out the shipment, a new notification shall be submitted, unless all the competent authorities concerned and the notifier agree otherwise. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Where the competent authorities concerned have not authorised a planned shipment of waste destined for disposal within
  the 30-day
  time limit
  referred to in Article 9(1)
  , the notification of that shipment shall cease to be valid and the shipment shall be prohibited in accordance with Article 4(1). In cases where the notifier still intends to carry out the shipment, a new notification shall be submitted, unless all the competent authorities concerned and the notifier agree otherwise.

3.   Where the competent authorities concerned have not authorised a planned shipment of waste destined for disposal within
  a
   time limit
  of 60 days
  , the notification of that shipment shall cease to be valid and the shipment shall be prohibited in accordance with Article 4(1). In cases where the notifier still intends to carry out the shipment, a new notification shall be submitted, unless all the competent authorities concerned and the notifier agree otherwise.

Amendment 48

Amendment 48

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point d — point ii

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point d — point ii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (ii) | the recovery operation in the country of destination takes place under conditions that are
  broadly
  equivalent to those prescribed in the national legislation of the country of dispatch; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ii)

the recovery operation in the country of destination takes place under conditions that are
  broadly
  equivalent to those prescribed in the national legislation of the country of dispatch;

broadly

| (ii) | the recovery operation in the country of destination takes place under conditions that are
  considered
  equivalent to those prescribed in the national legislation of the country of dispatch; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the recovery operation in the country of destination takes place under conditions that are
  considered
  equivalent to those prescribed in the national legislation of the country of dispatch;

considered

Amendment 49

Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | limiting incoming shipments of waste destined for recovery operations
  other than recycling and preparing for re-use
  is necessary for a Member State in order to protect its waste management network, where it
  is
  established that such shipments would result in domestic waste having to be disposed of or treated in a way that is not consistent with their waste management plans; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

limiting incoming shipments of waste destined for recovery operations
  other than recycling and preparing for re-use
  is necessary for a Member State in order to protect its waste management network, where it
  is
  established that such shipments would result in domestic waste having to be disposed of or treated in a way that is not consistent with their waste management plans;

other than recycling and preparing for re-use

is

| (e) | limiting incoming shipments of waste destined for recovery operations is necessary for a Member State in order to protect its waste management network, where it
  can be
  established that such shipments would result in domestic waste having to be disposed of or treated in a way that is not consistent with their waste management plans; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

limiting incoming shipments of waste destined for recovery operations is necessary for a Member State in order to protect its waste management network, where it
  can be
  established that such shipments would result in domestic waste having to be disposed of or treated in a way that is not consistent with their waste management plans;

can be

Amendment 50

Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point f

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | the notifier or the consignee has previously been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental protection. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

the notifier or the consignee has previously been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental protection.

| (f) | the notifier or the consignee has previously been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental
  or health
  protection. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the notifier or the consignee has previously been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to environmental
  or health
  protection.

or health

Amendment 51

Amendment 51

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 5

Article 12 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   Objections raised by competent authorities on the grounds set out in paragraph
  1, points (d) and (e), of
  this Article shall be reported by Member States to the Commission in accordance with Article 68. | 5.   Objections
  , including the specific grounds for objection,
  raised by competent authorities on the grounds set out in paragraph
  1of
  this Article shall be reported by Member States to the Commission in accordance with Article 68. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   Objections raised by competent authorities on the grounds set out in paragraph
  1, points (d) and (e), of
  this Article shall be reported by Member States to the Commission in accordance with Article 68.

5.   Objections
  , including the specific grounds for objection,
  raised by competent authorities on the grounds set out in paragraph
  1of
  this Article shall be reported by Member States to the Commission in accordance with Article 68.

Amendment 52

Amendment 52

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 5 a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 5 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5a.
     
  The competent authorities shall inform the notifier of the specific grounds for their objection to a planned shipment of waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5a.
     
  The competent authorities shall inform the notifier of the specific grounds for their objection to a planned shipment of waste.

Amendment 53

Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | the waste contained in the different shipments has essentially similar physical and chemical characteristics; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

the waste contained in the different shipments has essentially similar physical and chemical characteristics;

| (a) | the waste contained in the different shipments has essentially similar physical and chemical characteristics
  , to be interpreted in accordance with Article 28
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the waste contained in the different shipments has essentially similar physical and chemical characteristics
  , to be interpreted in accordance with Article 28
  ;

, to be interpreted in accordance with Article 28

Amendment 54

Amendment 54

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point c

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | a description of technologies employed, including R-code(s), for the recovery operation for which the pre-consent is requested; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

a description of technologies employed, including R-code(s), for the recovery operation for which the pre-consent is requested;

| (c) | a description of technologies employed, including R-code(s), for the recovery operation for which the pre-consent is requested
  , as well as technologies applied for greenhouse gas (GHG) savings, energy generation, material recovery, efficient resource use and other relevant technologies
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

a description of technologies employed, including R-code(s), for the recovery operation for which the pre-consent is requested
  , as well as technologies applied for greenhouse gas (GHG) savings, energy generation, material recovery, efficient resource use and other relevant technologies
  ;

, as well as technologies applied for greenhouse gas (GHG) savings, energy generation, material recovery, efficient resource use and other relevant technologies

Amendment 55

Amendment 55

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point e a (new)

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point e a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ea) | the quantity of residual waste generated through the recovery operation and the subsequent waste management thereof, |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ea)

(ea)

the quantity of residual waste generated through the recovery operation and the subsequent waste management thereof,

the quantity of residual waste generated through the recovery operation and the subsequent waste management thereof,

Amendment 56

Amendment 56

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point g

Article 14 — paragraph 2 — point g

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (g) | evidence or attestation that the legal or natural person owning or exercising control over the facility has not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to waste management. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(g)

evidence or attestation that the legal or natural person owning or exercising control over the facility has not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to waste management.

| (g) | evidence or attestation that the legal or natural person owning or exercising control over the facility has not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to waste management
  in particular with regard to the protection of the environment or human health
  . |
| --- | --- |

(g)

evidence or attestation that the legal or natural person owning or exercising control over the facility has not been convicted of illegal shipment or any other illegal act in relation to waste management
  in particular with regard to the protection of the environment or human health
  .

in particular with regard to the protection of the environment or human health

Amendment 57

Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 9

Article 14 — paragraph 9

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 9.   Unless stated otherwise in the decision to approve the request for pre-consent, the pre-consent of a recovery facility shall be valid for seven years. | 9.   Unless stated otherwise in the decision to approve the request for pre-consent, the pre-consent of a recovery facility shall be valid for seven years
  with at least one inspection conducted by the relevant authorities during the validity period in order to verify compliance with the latest applicable regulatory requirements
  . |
| | A pre-consent for a recovery facility issued by the competent authority in one Member State shall be valid in all Member States. However, a competent authority may decide not to accept the pre-consent of the competent authority of destination. That decision and the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the facility and to the competent authority that issued the pre-consent. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

9.   Unless stated otherwise in the decision to approve the request for pre-consent, the pre-consent of a recovery facility shall be valid for seven years.

9.   Unless stated otherwise in the decision to approve the request for pre-consent, the pre-consent of a recovery facility shall be valid for seven years
  with at least one inspection conducted by the relevant authorities during the validity period in order to verify compliance with the latest applicable regulatory requirements
  .

A pre-consent for a recovery facility issued by the competent authority in one Member State shall be valid in all Member States. However, a competent authority may decide not to accept the pre-consent of the competent authority of destination. That decision and the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the facility and to the competent authority that issued the pre-consent.

A pre-consent for a recovery facility issued by the competent authority in one Member State shall be valid in all Member States. However, a competent authority may decide not to accept the pre-consent of the competent authority of destination. That decision and the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the facility and to the competent authority that issued the pre-consent.

Amendment 58

Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 — paragraph 3

Article 15 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Within
  one day
  of the receipt of the waste by the facility which carries out the interim recovery operation or interim disposal operation, that facility shall provide confirmation to the notifier that the waste has been received. This confirmation shall be supplied on, or annexed to, the movement document. | 3.   Within
  two working days
  of the receipt of the waste by the facility which carries out the interim recovery operation or interim disposal operation, that facility shall provide confirmation to the notifier that the waste has been received. This confirmation shall be supplied on, or annexed to, the movement document. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Within
  one day
  of the receipt of the waste by the facility which carries out the interim recovery operation or interim disposal operation, that facility shall provide confirmation to the notifier that the waste has been received. This confirmation shall be supplied on, or annexed to, the movement document.

3.   Within
  two working days
  of the receipt of the waste by the facility which carries out the interim recovery operation or interim disposal operation, that facility shall provide confirmation to the notifier that the waste has been received. This confirmation shall be supplied on, or annexed to, the movement document.

Amendment 59

Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 3

Article 16 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   The facility shall, within
  one day
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received. | 3.   The facility shall, within
  two working days
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   The facility shall, within
  one day
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received.

3.   The facility shall, within
  two working days
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received.

Amendment 60

Amendment 60

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 17 — paragraph 3

Article 17 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Where essential changes referred to in paragraph 1 involve competent authorities other than those concerned in the original notification, a new notification shall be submitted. | 3.   Where essential changes referred to in paragraph 1 involve competent authorities other than those concerned in the original notification, a new notification shall be submitted
  , unless the competent authorities concerned can agree unanimously to waive the need for a new notification
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Where essential changes referred to in paragraph 1 involve competent authorities other than those concerned in the original notification, a new notification shall be submitted.

3.   Where essential changes referred to in paragraph 1 involve competent authorities other than those concerned in the original notification, a new notification shall be submitted
  , unless the competent authorities concerned can agree unanimously to waive the need for a new notification
  .

Amendment 61

Amendment 61

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 18 — paragraph 4

Article 18 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The recovery facility or the laboratory and the consignee or, in case they have no access to a system referred to in Article 26, the person referred to in paragraph 2 shall, within
  one day
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received by completing the relevant information contained in Annex VII. | 4.   The recovery facility or the laboratory and the consignee or, in case they have no access to a system referred to in Article 26, the person referred to in paragraph 2 shall, within
  two working days
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received by completing the relevant information contained in Annex VII. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The recovery facility or the laboratory and the consignee or, in case they have no access to a system referred to in Article 26, the person referred to in paragraph 2 shall, within
  one day
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received by completing the relevant information contained in Annex VII.

4.   The recovery facility or the laboratory and the consignee or, in case they have no access to a system referred to in Article 26, the person referred to in paragraph 2 shall, within
  two working days
  of receipt of the waste, provide confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received by completing the relevant information contained in Annex VII.

Amendment 62

Amendment 62

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 21 — paragraph 1

Article 21 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The competent authorities of dispatch
  or destination
  shall make publicly
  available by appropriate means
  information on notifications of shipments they have consented or objected to, as well as on shipments of waste subject to the general information requirements, where such information is not confidential under national or Union legislation. | Without undue delay and no later than 30 days after giving a consent or making an objection,
  the competent authorities of dispatch shall make publicly
  accessible through the central electronic submission and exchange system referred to in Article 26(2) or the national system referred to in Article 26(3) if applicable,
  information on notifications of shipments they have consented or objected to, as well as on shipments of waste subject to the general information requirements, where such information is not confidential under national or Union legislation
  or personal data protected in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679

   (1a). |
| | The competent authorities shall make at least the following information publicly accessible: |
| | (a) | the type of waste designated according to the European Waste Code in the European Waste Catalogue; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The competent authorities of dispatch
  or destination
  shall make publicly
  available by appropriate means
  information on notifications of shipments they have consented or objected to, as well as on shipments of waste subject to the general information requirements, where such information is not confidential under national or Union legislation.

or destination

available by appropriate means

Without undue delay and no later than 30 days after giving a consent or making an objection,
  the competent authorities of dispatch shall make publicly
  accessible through the central electronic submission and exchange system referred to in Article 26(2) or the national system referred to in Article 26(3) if applicable,
  information on notifications of shipments they have consented or objected to, as well as on shipments of waste subject to the general information requirements, where such information is not confidential under national or Union legislation
  or personal data protected in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679

   (1a).

Without undue delay and no later than 30 days after giving a consent or making an objection,

accessible through the central electronic submission and exchange system referred to in Article 26(2) or the national system referred to in Article 26(3) if applicable,

or personal data protected in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679

1a

The competent authorities shall make at least the following information publicly accessible:

The competent authorities shall make at least the following information publicly accessible:

(a)

(a)

the type of waste designated according to the European Waste Code in the European Waste Catalogue;

the type of waste designated according to the European Waste Code in the European Waste Catalogue;

| (b) | the total quantity of waste intended to be shipped; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

the total quantity of waste intended to be shipped;

the total quantity of waste intended to be shipped;

| (c) | the treatment operation the waste will undergo; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

the treatment operation the waste will undergo;

the treatment operation the waste will undergo;

| (d) | the name of the facility at the final destination; and |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

the name of the facility at the final destination; and

the name of the facility at the final destination; and

| (e) | whether the notification has been consented to or not. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

(e)

whether the notification has been consented to or not.

whether the notification has been consented to or not.

Amendment 63

Amendment 63

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 22 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

Article 22 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The take-back obligation set out in paragraph 2 shall not apply if the competent authorities of dispatch, transit and destination involved are satisfied that the waste can be recovered or disposed of in an alternative
  way
  in the country of destination or elsewhere by the notifier or, if that is not possible, by the competent authority of dispatch or by a natural or legal person on its behalf. | The take-back obligation set out in paragraph 2 shall not apply if the competent authorities of dispatch, transit and destination involved are satisfied that the waste can be recovered or disposed of in an alternative
  and environmentally sound manner and without endangering human health
   in the country of destination or elsewhere by the notifier or, if that is not possible, by the competent authority of dispatch or by a natural or legal person on its behalf. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The take-back obligation set out in paragraph 2 shall not apply if the competent authorities of dispatch, transit and destination involved are satisfied that the waste can be recovered or disposed of in an alternative
  way
  in the country of destination or elsewhere by the notifier or, if that is not possible, by the competent authority of dispatch or by a natural or legal person on its behalf.

way

The take-back obligation set out in paragraph 2 shall not apply if the competent authorities of dispatch, transit and destination involved are satisfied that the waste can be recovered or disposed of in an alternative
  and environmentally sound manner and without endangering human health
   in the country of destination or elsewhere by the notifier or, if that is not possible, by the competent authority of dispatch or by a natural or legal person on its behalf.

and environmentally sound manner and without endangering human health

Amendment 64

Amendment 64

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 24 — paragraph 1

Article 24 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Where a competent authority discovers a shipment that it considers to be an illegal shipment, it shall immediately inform the other competent authorities concerned. | 1.   Where a competent authority discovers a shipment that it considers to be an illegal shipment, it shall immediately inform the other competent authorities concerned.
  The competent authorities of dispatch concerned shall increase inspections of subsequent shipments that are similar in terms of notifier, waste producer, collector, dealer or broker or waste holder, in order to prevent any further illegal shipments. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Where a competent authority discovers a shipment that it considers to be an illegal shipment, it shall immediately inform the other competent authorities concerned.

1.   Where a competent authority discovers a shipment that it considers to be an illegal shipment, it shall immediately inform the other competent authorities concerned.
  The competent authorities of dispatch concerned shall increase inspections of subsequent shipments that are similar in terms of notifier, waste producer, collector, dealer or broker or waste holder, in order to prevent any further illegal shipments.

Amendment 65

Amendment 65

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The following information and documents shall be submitted and exchanged via electronic means, either via the central system referred to in paragraph 2, or via a national system in accordance with paragraph 3: | 1.   The following information
  , data
  and documents shall be submitted and exchanged via electronic means, either via the central system referred to in paragraph 2, or via a national system
  interlinked with the central system
  in accordance with paragraph 3: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The following information and documents shall be submitted and exchanged via electronic means, either via the central system referred to in paragraph 2, or via a national system in accordance with paragraph 3:

1.   The following information
  , data
  and documents shall be submitted and exchanged via electronic means, either via the central system referred to in paragraph 2, or via a national system
  interlinked with the central system
  in accordance with paragraph 3:

Amendment 66

Amendment 66

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| he Commission shall operate a central system that allows for the electronic submission and exchange of information and documents referred to in paragraph 1. That central system shall provide a hub that shall be used for the exchange in real time of the information and documents referred to in paragraph 1 between existing national systems for electronic data interchange. | The Commission shall operate a central system that allows for the electronic submission and exchange of information
  , data
  and documents referred to in paragraph 1. That central system shall provide a hub that shall be used for the exchange in real time of the information and documents referred to in paragraph 1 between existing national systems for electronic data interchange.
  The central system shall store data which to make reporting and analysis of, inter alia, the frequency of objections, the time between the submission of the notification and when the decision is taken, and the number of notifications for the different types of recovery operations possible. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

he Commission shall operate a central system that allows for the electronic submission and exchange of information and documents referred to in paragraph 1. That central system shall provide a hub that shall be used for the exchange in real time of the information and documents referred to in paragraph 1 between existing national systems for electronic data interchange.

The Commission shall operate a central system that allows for the electronic submission and exchange of information
  , data
  and documents referred to in paragraph 1. That central system shall provide a hub that shall be used for the exchange in real time of the information and documents referred to in paragraph 1 between existing national systems for electronic data interchange.
  The central system shall store data which to make reporting and analysis of, inter alia, the frequency of objections, the time between the submission of the notification and when the decision is taken, and the number of notifications for the different types of recovery operations possible.

, data

The central system shall store data which to make reporting and analysis of, inter alia, the frequency of objections, the time between the submission of the notification and when the decision is taken, and the number of notifications for the different types of recovery operations possible.

Amendment 67

Amendment 67

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 26 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  Information stored in the central system shall be made publicly available, easily accessible and in an open data format, unless such information is confidential under national or Union legislation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  Information stored in the central system shall be made publicly available, easily accessible and in an open data format, unless such information is confidential under national or Union legislation.

Amendment 68

Amendment 68

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1 — point b a (new)

Article 26 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1 — point b a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ba) | alternative procedures in case of a temporary failure of the central system; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ba)

(ba)

alternative procedures in case of a temporary failure of the central system;

alternative procedures in case of a temporary failure of the central system;

Amendment 69

Amendment 69

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 26 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  The functionality of the central system shall be reviewed by the Commission every two years. The findings of these reviews shall be communicated to the European Parliament and the Member States. |
| | The review shall take into account, inter alia, comments raised by the correspondents. The review may additionally take into account feedback from other users, such as competent authorities and notifiers. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  The functionality of the central system shall be reviewed by the Commission every two years. The findings of these reviews shall be communicated to the European Parliament and the Member States.

The review shall take into account, inter alia, comments raised by the correspondents. The review may additionally take into account feedback from other users, such as competent authorities and notifiers.

The review shall take into account, inter alia, comments raised by the correspondents. The review may additionally take into account feedback from other users, such as competent authorities and notifiers.

Amendment 70

Amendment 70

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 27 — paragraph 1

Article 27 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Any notification, information, documentation or other communication submitted pursuant to the provisions of this Title shall be provided in a language acceptable to the competent authorities concerned. | 1.   Any notification, information, documentation or other communication submitted pursuant to the provisions of this Title shall be provided in a language acceptable to the competent authorities concerned.
  English shall in all cases be considered to be an acceptable language unless due justification is provided by the competent authority concerned for not accepting English as a language. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Any notification, information, documentation or other communication submitted pursuant to the provisions of this Title shall be provided in a language acceptable to the competent authorities concerned.

1.   Any notification, information, documentation or other communication submitted pursuant to the provisions of this Title shall be provided in a language acceptable to the competent authorities concerned.
  English shall in all cases be considered to be an acceptable language unless due justification is provided by the competent authority concerned for not accepting English as a language.

Amendment 71

Amendment 71

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 27 — paragraph 2

Article 27 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   The notifier shall provide the competent authorities concerned with authorised translations of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 into a language which is acceptable to them, where they so request. | 2.   The notifier shall provide the competent authorities concerned with authorised translations of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 into a language which is acceptable to them, where they so request.
  English shall in all cases be considered to be an acceptable language unless due justification is provided by the competent authority concerned for not accepting English language as a language. |
| | The centralised database system established under Article 26 shall facilitate machine translation of any information provided. Where machine translation has been used, the translated information provided shall be accompanied by an indication to that effect. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   The notifier shall provide the competent authorities concerned with authorised translations of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 into a language which is acceptable to them, where they so request.

2.   The notifier shall provide the competent authorities concerned with authorised translations of the documents referred to in paragraph 1 into a language which is acceptable to them, where they so request.
  English shall in all cases be considered to be an acceptable language unless due justification is provided by the competent authority concerned for not accepting English language as a language.

The centralised database system established under Article 26 shall facilitate machine translation of any information provided. Where machine translation has been used, the translated information provided shall be accompanied by an indication to that effect.

The centralised database system established under Article 26 shall facilitate machine translation of any information provided. Where machine translation has been used, the translated information provided shall be accompanied by an indication to that effect.

Amendment 72

Amendment 72

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 28 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 28 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  In the event of disagreements between competent authorities in relation to classification issues, the question maybe forwarded to the correspondents of the Member States, who may hold meetings to examine the questions raised. Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to such meetings, or parts of such meetings, where appropriate. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  In the event of disagreements between competent authorities in relation to classification issues, the question maybe forwarded to the correspondents of the Member States, who may hold meetings to examine the questions raised. Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to such meetings, or parts of such meetings, where appropriate.

Amendment 73

Amendment 73

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 28 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

Article 28 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| In order to facilitate the harmonised classification of waste listed in Annex III, Annex IIIA, Annex IIIB or Annex IV in the Union, the Commission
  is empowered to
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria, such as contamination thresholds, on the basis of which certain wastes shall be classified in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV. | In order to facilitate the harmonised classification of waste listed in Annex III, Annex IIIA, Annex IIIB or Annex IV in the Union, the Commission
  shall
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement
  or amend
  this Regulation by establishing
  or modifying
  criteria, such as contamination thresholds, on the basis of which certain wastes shall be classified in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV
  , and the thresholds for characterising physical and chemical characteristics as being essentially similar
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

In order to facilitate the harmonised classification of waste listed in Annex III, Annex IIIA, Annex IIIB or Annex IV in the Union, the Commission
  is empowered to
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria, such as contamination thresholds, on the basis of which certain wastes shall be classified in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV.

is empowered to

In order to facilitate the harmonised classification of waste listed in Annex III, Annex IIIA, Annex IIIB or Annex IV in the Union, the Commission
  shall
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement
  or amend
  this Regulation by establishing
  or modifying
  criteria, such as contamination thresholds, on the basis of which certain wastes shall be classified in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV
  , and the thresholds for characterising physical and chemical characteristics as being essentially similar
  .

shall

or amend

or modifying

, and the thresholds for characterising physical and chemical characteristics as being essentially similar

Amendment 74

Amendment 74

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 28 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

Article 28 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission
  is also empowered to
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific categories of commodities for which this distinction is of particular importance for the export of waste from the Union. | The Commission
  shall also
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76
  , not later than two years after the entry into force of this Regulation,
  to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific categories of commodities for which this distinction is of particular importance for the export of waste from the Union
  , including to avoid circumvention of the rules set out in this Regulation
  . 
  The criteria provided for in those delegated acts shall be the same as those provided for in Directive 2008/98/EC. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission
  is also empowered to
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific categories of commodities for which this distinction is of particular importance for the export of waste from the Union.

is also empowered to

The Commission
  shall also
  adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76
  , not later than two years after the entry into force of this Regulation,
  to supplement this Regulation by establishing criteria to distinguish between used goods and waste, for specific categories of commodities for which this distinction is of particular importance for the export of waste from the Union
  , including to avoid circumvention of the rules set out in this Regulation
  . 
  The criteria provided for in those delegated acts shall be the same as those provided for in Directive 2008/98/EC.

shall also

, not later than two years after the entry into force of this Regulation,

, including to avoid circumvention of the rules set out in this Regulation

The criteria provided for in those delegated acts shall be the same as those provided for in Directive 2008/98/EC.

Amendment 75

Amendment 75

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — title

Article 30 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Border-area
  agreements | Multilateral
  agreements |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Border-area
  agreements

Border-area

Multilateral
  agreements

Multilateral

Amendment 76

Amendment 76

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 1

Article 30 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   In exceptional cases, and where the specific geographical or demographical situation warrants such a step, Member States may conclude bilateral agreements making the notification procedure for shipments of specific flows of waste less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility located in the border area between the two Member States concerned. | 1.   In exceptional cases, and where the specific geographical or demographical situation warrants such a step, Member States may conclude bilateral
  or multilateral
  agreements making the notification procedure for shipments of specific flows of waste less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility located in the border area between the two
  or more
  Member States concerned. |
| | Such agreements may also be concluded for shipments of waste destined for disposal pursuant to Article 11, if the geographical and demographical situation warrants concluding such agreements. In this regard, the conditions provided for in Article 11 paragraph 1, points (a) to (f) may be made less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility for disposal, in accordance with Directive 2008/98/EC and the environmentally sound management of waste. |
| | Multilateral agreements shall demonstrate that the waste is treated in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency at Union and national levels, as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC; that the waste is treated in accordance with environmental protection standards, in accordance with Union legislation; that, if the facility is covered by Directive 2010/75/EU, the best available techniques as defined in Article 3(10) of that Directive are applied in compliance with the permit for the facility; and that the agreements do not lead to a significant fragmentation of the Union market for shipments of waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   In exceptional cases, and where the specific geographical or demographical situation warrants such a step, Member States may conclude bilateral agreements making the notification procedure for shipments of specific flows of waste less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility located in the border area between the two Member States concerned.

1.   In exceptional cases, and where the specific geographical or demographical situation warrants such a step, Member States may conclude bilateral
  or multilateral
  agreements making the notification procedure for shipments of specific flows of waste less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility located in the border area between the two
  or more
  Member States concerned.

Such agreements may also be concluded for shipments of waste destined for disposal pursuant to Article 11, if the geographical and demographical situation warrants concluding such agreements. In this regard, the conditions provided for in Article 11 paragraph 1, points (a) to (f) may be made less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility for disposal, in accordance with Directive 2008/98/EC and the environmentally sound management of waste.

Such agreements may also be concluded for shipments of waste destined for disposal pursuant to Article 11, if the geographical and demographical situation warrants concluding such agreements. In this regard, the conditions provided for in Article 11 paragraph 1, points (a) to (f) may be made less stringent in respect of cross-border shipments to the nearest suitable facility for disposal, in accordance with Directive 2008/98/EC and the environmentally sound management of waste.

Multilateral agreements shall demonstrate that the waste is treated in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency at Union and national levels, as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC; that the waste is treated in accordance with environmental protection standards, in accordance with Union legislation; that, if the facility is covered by Directive 2010/75/EU, the best available techniques as defined in Article 3(10) of that Directive are applied in compliance with the permit for the facility; and that the agreements do not lead to a significant fragmentation of the Union market for shipments of waste.

Multilateral agreements shall demonstrate that the waste is treated in accordance with the waste hierarchy and the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency at Union and national levels, as laid down in Directive 2008/98/EC; that the waste is treated in accordance with environmental protection standards, in accordance with Union legislation; that, if the facility is covered by Directive 2010/75/EU, the best available techniques as defined in Article 3(10) of that Directive are applied in compliance with the permit for the facility; and that the agreements do not lead to a significant fragmentation of the Union market for shipments of waste.

Amendment 77

Amendment 77

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 2

Article 30 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   The
  bilateral
  agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may also be concluded where waste is shipped from and treated in the country of dispatch but transits another Member State. | 2.   The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may also be concluded where waste is shipped from and treated in the country of dispatch but transits another Member State. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   The
  bilateral
  agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may also be concluded where waste is shipped from and treated in the country of dispatch but transits another Member State.

2.   The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may also be concluded where waste is shipped from and treated in the country of dispatch but transits another Member State.

Amendment 78

Amendment 78

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 3

Article 30 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Member States may also conclude
  bilateral
  agreements referred to in paragraph 1 with countries that are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. | 3.   Member States may also conclude agreements referred to in paragraph 1 with countries that are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Member States may also conclude
  bilateral
  agreements referred to in paragraph 1 with countries that are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area.

3.   Member States may also conclude agreements referred to in paragraph 1 with countries that are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area.

Amendment 79

Amendment 79

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 4

Article 30 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The agreements referred to in this Article shall be notified to the Commission before they take effect. | 4.   The agreements referred to in this Article shall be notified to the Commission
  and the correspondents
  before they take effect.
  Questions or concerns put to the correspondents in relation to bilateral or multilateral agreements may be raised at meetings of the correspondents. Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to such meetings, or parts of such meetings, where appropriate. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The agreements referred to in this Article shall be notified to the Commission before they take effect.

4.   The agreements referred to in this Article shall be notified to the Commission
  and the correspondents
  before they take effect.
  Questions or concerns put to the correspondents in relation to bilateral or multilateral agreements may be raised at meetings of the correspondents. Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to such meetings, or parts of such meetings, where appropriate.

Amendment 151

Amendment 151

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 a (new)

Article 30 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 30 a




  Shipments from an outermost region





  1.
     
  By way of derogation from Article 5(5), Article 8(3), (4), (5) and (6) and Article 9(1), (2), (6) and (7), for shipments of waste between an outermost region referred to in Article 349 of the TFEU and its Member State requiring transit through another Member State, a tacit decision of consent to transit shall be deemed to have been issued by the authority of transit, unless that authority of transit objects within three days of receipt of written consent from the competent authority of dispatch and destination.






  2.
     
  Such tacit consent shall be valid for the period mentioned in the written consent of the competent authority of dispatch and destination. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 30 a

Shipments from an outermost region

1.
     
  By way of derogation from Article 5(5), Article 8(3), (4), (5) and (6) and Article 9(1), (2), (6) and (7), for shipments of waste between an outermost region referred to in Article 349 of the TFEU and its Member State requiring transit through another Member State, a tacit decision of consent to transit shall be deemed to have been issued by the authority of transit, unless that authority of transit objects within three days of receipt of written consent from the competent authority of dispatch and destination.

2.
     
  Such tacit consent shall be valid for the period mentioned in the written consent of the competent authority of dispatch and destination.

Amendment 80

Amendment 80

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point b a (new)

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point b a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ba) | Waste containing or contaminated with a substance exceeding the concentration levels provided for in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ba)

(ba)

Waste containing or contaminated with a substance exceeding the concentration levels provided for in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants;

Waste containing or contaminated with a substance exceeding the concentration levels provided for in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants;

Amendment 81

Amendment 81

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 37 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

Article 37 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Paragraph 1 shall not apply to exports of waste destined for recovery to a country included in the list of countries established in accordance with Article 38 for the waste specified in that list. | Paragraph 1 shall not apply to exports of waste destined for recovery to a country included in the list of countries established in accordance with Article 38 for the waste specified in that list.
  Exports of plastic waste to countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply other than EFTA Member States shall not be covered by Article 38. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Paragraph 1 shall not apply to exports of waste destined for recovery to a country included in the list of countries established in accordance with Article 38 for the waste specified in that list.

Paragraph 1 shall not apply to exports of waste destined for recovery to a country included in the list of countries established in accordance with Article 38 for the waste specified in that list.
  Exports of plastic waste to countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply other than EFTA Member States shall not be covered by Article 38.

Exports of plastic waste to countries to which the OECD Decision does not apply other than EFTA Member States shall not be covered by Article 38.

Amendment 82

Amendment 82

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 38 — paragraph 4 — introductory part

Article 38 — paragraph 4 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  two years
  following its establishment, update the list of countries to which exports are authorised, in order to: | 4.   The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  year
   following its establishment, update the list of countries to which exports are authorised, in order to: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  two years
  following its establishment, update the list of countries to which exports are authorised, in order to:

4.   The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  year
   following its establishment, update the list of countries to which exports are authorised, in order to:

Amendment 83

Amendment 83

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 40 — paragraph 1

Article 40 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission shall assess the requests submitted pursuant to Article 39 without undue delay and, if it is satisfied that the requirements set out in that Article are complied with, it shall include the country making the request in the list of countries to which exports are authorised. The assessment shall be based on the information and supporting evidence provided by the country making the request, as well as other relevant information, and
  aim to
  determine if the country making the request has put in place and implements all necessary measures to ensure that the waste concerned will be managed in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56. In order to perform this assessment, the Commission shall use, as points of reference, the relevant provisions in the legislation and guidance referred to in Annex IX. | 1.   The Commission shall assess the requests submitted pursuant to Article 39 without undue delay and, if it is satisfied that the requirements set out in that Article are complied with, it shall include the country making the request in the list of countries to which exports are authorised. The assessment shall be based on the information and supporting evidence provided by the country making the request, as well as other relevant information, and determine if the country making the request has put in place and implements all necessary measures to ensure that the waste concerned will be managed in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56. In order to perform this assessment, the Commission shall use, as points of reference, the relevant provisions in the legislation and guidance referred to in Annex IX.
  The Commission shall also consult stakeholders, including national experts, relevant industry representatives and non-governmental organisations, in the assessment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission shall assess the requests submitted pursuant to Article 39 without undue delay and, if it is satisfied that the requirements set out in that Article are complied with, it shall include the country making the request in the list of countries to which exports are authorised. The assessment shall be based on the information and supporting evidence provided by the country making the request, as well as other relevant information, and
  aim to
  determine if the country making the request has put in place and implements all necessary measures to ensure that the waste concerned will be managed in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56. In order to perform this assessment, the Commission shall use, as points of reference, the relevant provisions in the legislation and guidance referred to in Annex IX.

1.   The Commission shall assess the requests submitted pursuant to Article 39 without undue delay and, if it is satisfied that the requirements set out in that Article are complied with, it shall include the country making the request in the list of countries to which exports are authorised. The assessment shall be based on the information and supporting evidence provided by the country making the request, as well as other relevant information, and determine if the country making the request has put in place and implements all necessary measures to ensure that the waste concerned will be managed in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56. In order to perform this assessment, the Commission shall use, as points of reference, the relevant provisions in the legislation and guidance referred to in Annex IX.
  The Commission shall also consult stakeholders, including national experts, relevant industry representatives and non-governmental organisations, in the assessment.

Amendment 84

Amendment 84

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 41 — paragraph 2 — point c a (new)

Article 41 — paragraph 2 — point c a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ca) | the export of plastic waste listed in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV, to countries to which the OECD decision applies other than EFTA countries shall be phased out by ... [insert the date four years after the entry into force]; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ca)

(ca)

the export of plastic waste listed in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV, to countries to which the OECD decision applies other than EFTA countries shall be phased out by ... [insert the date four years after the entry into force];

the export of plastic waste listed in Annex III, IIIA, IIIB or IV, to countries to which the OECD decision applies other than EFTA countries shall be phased out by ... [insert the date four years after the entry into force];

Amendment 85

Amendment 85

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 1

Article 42 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission shall monitor the
  levels of export
  of waste from the Union to countries to which the OECD Decision applies, with a view to ensuring that such exports
  do not lead to serious environmental or human health damages
  in the country of destination. As part of such monitoring, the Commission shall assess requests from natural or legal persons which are accompanied by relevant information and data showing that export of waste from the Union
  leads to serious environmental or human health damages
  in a country to which the OECD Decision applies. | 1.   The Commission shall monitor the
  exports
  of waste from the Union to countries to which the OECD Decision applies, with a view to ensuring that such exports
  fulfil the requirements of environmentally sound management as referred to in Article 56
  in the country of destination
  and do not cause substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country
  . As part of such monitoring, the Commission shall assess requests from natural or legal persons which are accompanied by relevant information and data showing that export of waste from the Union
  does not fulfil the requirements of environmentally sound management as referred to in Article 56
  in a country to which the OECD Decision applies
  or cause substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission shall monitor the
  levels of export
  of waste from the Union to countries to which the OECD Decision applies, with a view to ensuring that such exports
  do not lead to serious environmental or human health damages
  in the country of destination. As part of such monitoring, the Commission shall assess requests from natural or legal persons which are accompanied by relevant information and data showing that export of waste from the Union
  leads to serious environmental or human health damages
  in a country to which the OECD Decision applies.

1.   The Commission shall monitor the
  exports
  of waste from the Union to countries to which the OECD Decision applies, with a view to ensuring that such exports
  fulfil the requirements of environmentally sound management as referred to in Article 56
  in the country of destination
  and do not cause substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country
  . As part of such monitoring, the Commission shall assess requests from natural or legal persons which are accompanied by relevant information and data showing that export of waste from the Union
  does not fulfil the requirements of environmentally sound management as referred to in Article 56
  in a country to which the OECD Decision applies
  or cause substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country
  .

Amendment 86

Amendment 86

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 2

Article 42 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   In cases where
  the export of waste from the Union to a country to which the OECD Decision applies has considerably increased within a short period of time, and
  there is insufficient evidence available demonstrating that the country concerned has the ability to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56, the Commission shall request the competent authorities of the country concerned to provide, within 60 days, information on the conditions under which the waste in question is recovered and the ability of the country concerned to manage the waste in question. The Commission may grant an extension of this time limit if the country concerned makes a reasoned request for an extension thereof. | 2.   In cases where there is insufficient evidence available demonstrating that the country concerned has the ability to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56
  , or where there is evidence that the country concerned fails to meet the requirements of Article 56 for this waste, or that there are substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country due to the importation of waste from the Union
  , the Commission shall request the competent authorities of the country concerned to provide, within 60 days, information on the conditions under which the waste in question is recovered and the ability of the country concerned to manage the waste in question
  , including any domestic waste that may be affected by imports
  . The Commission may grant an extension of this time limit if the country concerned makes a reasoned request for an extension thereof. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   In cases where
  the export of waste from the Union to a country to which the OECD Decision applies has considerably increased within a short period of time, and
  there is insufficient evidence available demonstrating that the country concerned has the ability to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56, the Commission shall request the competent authorities of the country concerned to provide, within 60 days, information on the conditions under which the waste in question is recovered and the ability of the country concerned to manage the waste in question. The Commission may grant an extension of this time limit if the country concerned makes a reasoned request for an extension thereof.

2.   In cases where there is insufficient evidence available demonstrating that the country concerned has the ability to recover this waste in an environmentally sound manner as referred to in Article 56
  , or where there is evidence that the country concerned fails to meet the requirements of Article 56 for this waste, or that there are substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste in that country due to the importation of waste from the Union
  , the Commission shall request the competent authorities of the country concerned to provide, within 60 days, information on the conditions under which the waste in question is recovered and the ability of the country concerned to manage the waste in question
  , including any domestic waste that may be affected by imports
  . The Commission may grant an extension of this time limit if the country concerned makes a reasoned request for an extension thereof.

Amendment 87

Amendment 87

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point a

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | put in place and implemented an adequate legal framework for the
  import and
  management of
  the
  waste
  concerned
  , as well as adequate measures to ensure the environmentally sound management of the residual waste generated through the recovery of
  the
  waste
  concerned
  ; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

put in place and implemented an adequate legal framework for the
  import and
  management of
  the
  waste
  concerned
  , as well as adequate measures to ensure the environmentally sound management of the residual waste generated through the recovery of
  the
  waste
  concerned
  ;

import and

the

concerned

the

concerned

| (a) | put in place and implemented an adequate legal framework for the management of
  domestic and imported
  waste, as well as adequate measures to ensure the environmentally sound management of the
  waste imported into its territory as well as of the
  residual waste generated through the recovery of
  that
  waste; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

put in place and implemented an adequate legal framework for the management of
  domestic and imported
  waste, as well as adequate measures to ensure the environmentally sound management of the
  waste imported into its territory as well as of the
  residual waste generated through the recovery of
  that
  waste;

domestic and imported

waste imported into its territory as well as of the

that

Amendment 88

Amendment 88

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point b

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | sufficient capacity in its territory allowing the waste concerned to be managed in an environmentally sound manner, taking into consideration the increased volume of waste imported into its territory; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

sufficient capacity in its territory allowing the waste concerned to be managed in an environmentally sound manner, taking into consideration the increased volume of waste imported into its territory;

| (b) | sufficient capacity in its territory allowing the waste concerned to be managed in an environmentally sound manner, taking into consideration the increased volume of waste
  , which may be present due to the waste
  imported into its territory; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

sufficient capacity in its territory allowing the waste concerned to be managed in an environmentally sound manner, taking into consideration the increased volume of waste
  , which may be present due to the waste
  imported into its territory;

, which may be present due to the waste

Amendment 89

Amendment 89

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point c

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | put in place
  an
  adequate
  strategy to address the possible negative impact of an increase in
  the import of the waste concerned on the collection and management of the waste generated domestically; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

put in place
  an
  adequate
  strategy to address the possible negative impact of an increase in
  the import of the waste concerned on the collection and management of the waste generated domestically;

an

strategy to address the possible negative impact of an increase in

| (c) | put in place adequate
  measures, including separate reporting of waste generated domestically and waste imported, to ensure that
  the import of the waste concerned
  has no substantial adverse effect
  on the collection and management of the waste generated domestically; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

put in place adequate
  measures, including separate reporting of waste generated domestically and waste imported, to ensure that
  the import of the waste concerned
  has no substantial adverse effect
  on the collection and management of the waste generated domestically;

measures, including separate reporting of waste generated domestically and waste imported, to ensure that

has no substantial adverse effect

Amendment 90

Amendment 90

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point d

Article 42 — paragraph 3 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | put in place and implemented adequate enforcement measures to address possible illegal shipments or treatment of the waste concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

put in place and implemented adequate enforcement measures to address possible illegal shipments or treatment of the waste concerned.

| (d) | put in place and implemented adequate enforcement measures to address possible illegal shipments or
  non-environmentally sound
  treatment of the waste concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

put in place and implemented adequate enforcement measures to address possible illegal shipments or
  non-environmentally sound
  treatment of the waste concerned.

non-environmentally sound

Amendment 91

Amendment 91

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 42 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  For the purpose of the verifications referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall, where relevant, consult relevant stakeholders. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  For the purpose of the verifications referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall, where relevant, consult relevant stakeholders.

Amendment 92

Amendment 92

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 42 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

Article 42 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where, further to the request referred to in paragraph 2, the country concerned does not provide sufficient evidence as referred to in paragraph 3 that the waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by prohibiting the export of the waste concerned to this country. | Where, further to the request referred to in paragraph 2, the country concerned does not provide sufficient evidence as referred to in paragraph 3 that the waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56,
  or that there are no substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste as a consequence of the waste import,
  the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by prohibiting the export of the waste concerned to this country. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where, further to the request referred to in paragraph 2, the country concerned does not provide sufficient evidence as referred to in paragraph 3 that the waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by prohibiting the export of the waste concerned to this country.

Where, further to the request referred to in paragraph 2, the country concerned does not provide sufficient evidence as referred to in paragraph 3 that the waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56,
  or that there are no substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste as a consequence of the waste import,
  the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to supplement this Regulation by prohibiting the export of the waste concerned to this country.

or that there are no substantial adverse effects on the management of domestic waste as a consequence of the waste import,

Amendment 93

Amendment 93

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 43 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has set up internal reporting channels, including adequate protection of whistle-blowers. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has set up internal reporting channels, including adequate protection of whistle-blowers.

Amendment 94

Amendment 94

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 2

Article 43 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   In order to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1, a natural or legal person intending to export waste from the Union shall ensure that the facilities which will manage the waste in the country of destination have been subject to an audit by an independent and accredited third party with appropriate qualifications. | 2.   In order to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1, a natural or legal person intending to export waste from the Union shall ensure that the facilities which will manage the waste in the country of destination have been subject to an audit by an independent and accredited third party with appropriate qualifications. 
  The third party carrying out the audit shall be certified in accordance with Union or internationally recognised standards, such as ISO 19011:2018, and the exporter shall obtain written confirmation of that certification prior to exporting. In order to safeguard the independence and objectivity of the audit, the natural or legal person that has commissioned it shall not intervene in the execution of the audit in any way. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   In order to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1, a natural or legal person intending to export waste from the Union shall ensure that the facilities which will manage the waste in the country of destination have been subject to an audit by an independent and accredited third party with appropriate qualifications.

2.   In order to fulfil the obligation referred to in paragraph 1, a natural or legal person intending to export waste from the Union shall ensure that the facilities which will manage the waste in the country of destination have been subject to an audit by an independent and accredited third party with appropriate qualifications. 
  The third party carrying out the audit shall be certified in accordance with Union or internationally recognised standards, such as ISO 19011:2018, and the exporter shall obtain written confirmation of that certification prior to exporting. In order to safeguard the independence and objectivity of the audit, the natural or legal person that has commissioned it shall not intervene in the execution of the audit in any way.

Amendment 95

Amendment 95

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

Article 43 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| A natural or legal person intending to export waste shall ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has been subject to an audit referred to in paragraph 2 prior to exporting waste to the facility concerned
  and that the audit is repeated at regular intervals, following a risk-based approach, with a minimum frequency of every three years after the first audit. | A natural or legal person intending to export waste shall ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has been subject to an audit referred to in paragraph 2
  that was carried out no longer than two years
  prior to exporting waste to the facility concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

A natural or legal person intending to export waste shall ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has been subject to an audit referred to in paragraph 2 prior to exporting waste to the facility concerned
  and that the audit is repeated at regular intervals, following a risk-based approach, with a minimum frequency of every three years after the first audit.

and that the audit is repeated at regular intervals, following a risk-based approach, with a minimum frequency of every three years after the first audit.

A natural or legal person intending to export waste shall ensure that the facility which will manage the waste in the country of destination has been subject to an audit referred to in paragraph 2
  that was carried out no longer than two years
  prior to exporting waste to the facility concerned.

that was carried out no longer than two years

Amendment 96

Amendment 96

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

Article 43 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also carry out
  an
  ad-hoc audit without delay in case it receives
  plausible information
  that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X. | A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also carry out ad-hoc audit without delay in case it receives
  evidence
  that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also carry out
  an
  ad-hoc audit without delay in case it receives
  plausible information
  that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X.

an

plausible information

A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union shall also carry out ad-hoc audit without delay in case it receives
  evidence
  that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X.

evidence

Amendment 97

Amendment 97

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 7 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

Article 43 — paragraph 7 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Natural or legal persons exporting waste outside the Union shall provide an audit report, formulated on the basis of the audit as referred to in paragraph 2, to the Commission prior to exporting that waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Natural or legal persons exporting waste outside the Union shall provide an audit report, formulated on the basis of the audit as referred to in paragraph 2, to the Commission prior to exporting that waste.

Natural or legal persons exporting waste outside the Union shall provide an audit report, formulated on the basis of the audit as referred to in paragraph 2, to the Commission prior to exporting that waste.

Amendment 98

Amendment 98

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 7 a (new)

Article 43 — paragraph 7 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 7a.
     
  The Commission shall establish and maintain a central, publicly accessible and up-to date register of audited facilities. The register shall contain the names and location of the audited facilities and the date of the most recent audit. The information shall not include confidential business information or information about the person commissioning the audit. Disclosure of personal data protected in accordance with the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (‘GDPR’) shall also be prevented. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

7a.
     
  The Commission shall establish and maintain a central, publicly accessible and up-to date register of audited facilities. The register shall contain the names and location of the audited facilities and the date of the most recent audit. The information shall not include confidential business information or information about the person commissioning the audit. Disclosure of personal data protected in accordance with the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (‘GDPR’) shall also be prevented.

Amendment 99

Amendment 99

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 8

Article 43 — paragraph 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 8.   Where an international agreement between the Union and a third country to which the OECD Decision applies recognises that the facilities in that third country will manage waste in an environmentally sound manner, in accordance with the criteria laid down in Annex X, natural and legal persons which intend to export waste to that third country shall be exempted from the obligation in paragraph 2. | 8.   Where an international agreement between the Union and a third country to which the OECD Decision applies recognises that the facilities in that third country will manage waste in an environmentally sound manner,
  as referred to in Article 56 and
  in accordance with the criteria laid down in Annex X, natural and legal persons which intend to export waste to that third country shall be exempted from the obligation in paragraph 2. |
| | A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union to a facility in a third country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement shall carry out ad-hoc audit without delay in the event it receives evidence that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X. The natural or legal person shall in such a case notify the competent authorities of dispatch of that evidence as well as its plans to carry out an ad-hoc audit. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

8.   Where an international agreement between the Union and a third country to which the OECD Decision applies recognises that the facilities in that third country will manage waste in an environmentally sound manner, in accordance with the criteria laid down in Annex X, natural and legal persons which intend to export waste to that third country shall be exempted from the obligation in paragraph 2.

8.   Where an international agreement between the Union and a third country to which the OECD Decision applies recognises that the facilities in that third country will manage waste in an environmentally sound manner,
  as referred to in Article 56 and
  in accordance with the criteria laid down in Annex X, natural and legal persons which intend to export waste to that third country shall be exempted from the obligation in paragraph 2.

A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union to a facility in a third country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement shall carry out ad-hoc audit without delay in the event it receives evidence that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X. The natural or legal person shall in such a case notify the competent authorities of dispatch of that evidence as well as its plans to carry out an ad-hoc audit.

A natural or legal person exporting waste from the Union to a facility in a third country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement shall carry out ad-hoc audit without delay in the event it receives evidence that a facility no longer complies with the criteria laid down in Annex X. The natural or legal person shall in such a case notify the competent authorities of dispatch of that evidence as well as its plans to carry out an ad-hoc audit.

Amendment 100

Amendment 100

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 43 — paragraph 9 a (new)

Article 43 — paragraph 9 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 9a.
     
  The Commission shall adopt guidelines with regard to the application of this Article. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

9a.
     
  The Commission shall adopt guidelines with regard to the application of this Article.

Amendment 101

Amendment 101

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 56 — paragraph 2

Article 56 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   For the purposes of export of waste, the waste shipped shall be deemed to be managed in an environmentally sound manner as regards the recovery or disposal operation concerned, where it can be demonstrated that the waste will be managed in accordance with human health and environmental protection requirements that are
  broadly
  equivalent to the human health and environmental protection requirements laid down in Union legislation. When assessing such
  broad
  equivalence, full compliance with requirements stemming from Union legislation shall not be required, but it
  should
  be demonstrated that the requirements applied in the country of destination ensure a similar level of protection of human health and the environment than the requirements stemming from Union legislation. | 2.   For the purposes of export of waste, the waste shipped shall be deemed to be managed in an environmentally sound manner as regards the recovery or disposal operation concerned, where it can be demonstrated that the waste
  , as well as any residual waste generated through the recovery operation,
  will be managed in accordance with human health and environmental protection requirements that are
  considered
  equivalent to the human health and environmental protection requirements laid down in Union legislation
  , in particular those referred to in part 1 of Annex IX, and using as points of reference the international guidance as specified in part 2 of that same Annex and respecting the international Conventions on labour rights, as referred to in part 2a of the same Annex
  . When assessing such
  considered
  equivalence, full compliance with requirements stemming from Union legislation shall not be required, but it
  shall
  be demonstrated that the requirements applied 
  and enforced
  in the country of destination ensure a similar level of protection of human health and the environment than the requirements stemming from Union legislation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   For the purposes of export of waste, the waste shipped shall be deemed to be managed in an environmentally sound manner as regards the recovery or disposal operation concerned, where it can be demonstrated that the waste will be managed in accordance with human health and environmental protection requirements that are
  broadly
  equivalent to the human health and environmental protection requirements laid down in Union legislation. When assessing such
  broad
  equivalence, full compliance with requirements stemming from Union legislation shall not be required, but it
  should
  be demonstrated that the requirements applied in the country of destination ensure a similar level of protection of human health and the environment than the requirements stemming from Union legislation.

2.   For the purposes of export of waste, the waste shipped shall be deemed to be managed in an environmentally sound manner as regards the recovery or disposal operation concerned, where it can be demonstrated that the waste
  , as well as any residual waste generated through the recovery operation,
  will be managed in accordance with human health and environmental protection requirements that are
  considered
  equivalent to the human health and environmental protection requirements laid down in Union legislation
  , in particular those referred to in part 1 of Annex IX, and using as points of reference the international guidance as specified in part 2 of that same Annex and respecting the international Conventions on labour rights, as referred to in part 2a of the same Annex
  . When assessing such
  considered
  equivalence, full compliance with requirements stemming from Union legislation shall not be required, but it
  shall
  be demonstrated that the requirements applied 
  and enforced
  in the country of destination ensure a similar level of protection of human health and the environment than the requirements stemming from Union legislation.

Amendment 102

Amendment 102

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 56 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 56 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  By [insert the date 18 months after the date of publication of this regulation], the Commission shall adopt guidelines clarifying the use of relevant best available techniques with respect to the assessment of equivalence. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  By [insert the date 18 months after the date of publication of this regulation], the Commission shall adopt guidelines clarifying the use of relevant best available techniques with respect to the assessment of equivalence.

Amendment 103

Amendment 103

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 56 — paragraph 2 b (new)

Article 56 — paragraph 2 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2b.
     
  By [insert the date 2 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall publish a report on the establishment of mandatory recycled content targets for products, particularly but not limited to, products made out of plastic, if not already applicable under Union legislation. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by legislative proposals. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2b.
     
  By [insert the date 2 years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall publish a report on the establishment of mandatory recycled content targets for products, particularly but not limited to, products made out of plastic, if not already applicable under Union legislation. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by legislative proposals.

Amendment 104

Amendment 104

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 56 — paragraph 2 c (new)

Article 56 — paragraph 2 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2c.
     
  The Commission shall, by ... [OJ: please insert the date one year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], publish a report assessing the impacts on environmentally sound management of plastic waste within the Union related to the phase-out of exports of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries. Where appropriate, it shall be accompanied by measures to mitigate identified adverse impacts on the Union waste management capacity for environmentally sound management of plastic waste and promote innovation and investments in that sector. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2c.
     
  The Commission shall, by ... [OJ: please insert the date one year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], publish a report assessing the impacts on environmentally sound management of plastic waste within the Union related to the phase-out of exports of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries. Where appropriate, it shall be accompanied by measures to mitigate identified adverse impacts on the Union waste management capacity for environmentally sound management of plastic waste and promote innovation and investments in that sector.

Amendment 105

Amendment 105

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 57 — paragraph 2 — point a a (new)

Article 57 — paragraph 2 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | at collection, at storage and at sorting facilities; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

at collection, at storage and at sorting facilities;

at collection, at storage and at sorting facilities;

Amendment 106

Amendment 106

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 57 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 57 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  Member States shall carry out inspections to prevent and detect illegal shipments of waste on the basis of a Union risk-based targeting mechanism. |
| | In order to ensure the harmonisation of inspections, the Commission shall adopt implementing acts to define the detailed elements of the Union risk-based targeting mechanism. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  Member States shall carry out inspections to prevent and detect illegal shipments of waste on the basis of a Union risk-based targeting mechanism.

In order to ensure the harmonisation of inspections, the Commission shall adopt implementing acts to define the detailed elements of the Union risk-based targeting mechanism. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2).

In order to ensure the harmonisation of inspections, the Commission shall adopt implementing acts to define the detailed elements of the Union risk-based targeting mechanism. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 77(2).

Amendment 107

Amendment 107

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 58 — paragraph 1

Article 58 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Inspections of shipments shall include at least verification of documents, confirmation of the identity of the actors involved in those shipments and
  , where appropriate,
  physical checking of the waste. | 1.   Inspections of shipments shall include at least verification of documents, confirmation of the identity of the actors involved in those shipments and physical checking of the waste. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Inspections of shipments shall include at least verification of documents, confirmation of the identity of the actors involved in those shipments and
  , where appropriate,
  physical checking of the waste.

1.   Inspections of shipments shall include at least verification of documents, confirmation of the identity of the actors involved in those shipments and physical checking of the waste.

Amendment 108

Amendment 108

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 58 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 — point a a (new)

Article 58 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | as to the audit report pursuant to Article 42; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

as to the audit report pursuant to Article 42;

as to the audit report pursuant to Article 42;

Amendment 109

Amendment 109

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 58 — paragraph 5

Article 58 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   In order to ascertain whether a shipment of waste subject to the general information requirements set out in Article 18 is destined for recovery operations which are in accordance with Article 56, the authorities involved in inspections
  may
  require the person who arranges the shipment to submit relevant documentary evidence, provided by the interim and non-interim recovery facility and, if necessary, approved by the competent authority of destination. | 5.   In order to ascertain whether a shipment of waste subject to the general information requirements set out in Article 18 is destined for recovery operations which are in accordance with Article 56, the authorities involved in inspections
  shall
  require the person who arranges the shipment to submit
  the audit report required in Article 42 as well as, where appropriate
  relevant documentary evidence, provided by the interim and non-interim recovery facility and, if necessary, approved by the competent authority of destination. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   In order to ascertain whether a shipment of waste subject to the general information requirements set out in Article 18 is destined for recovery operations which are in accordance with Article 56, the authorities involved in inspections
  may
  require the person who arranges the shipment to submit relevant documentary evidence, provided by the interim and non-interim recovery facility and, if necessary, approved by the competent authority of destination.

5.   In order to ascertain whether a shipment of waste subject to the general information requirements set out in Article 18 is destined for recovery operations which are in accordance with Article 56, the authorities involved in inspections
  shall
  require the person who arranges the shipment to submit
  the audit report required in Article 42 as well as, where appropriate
  relevant documentary evidence, provided by the interim and non-interim recovery facility and, if necessary, approved by the competent authority of destination.

Amendment 110

Amendment 110

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 58 — paragraph 6

Article 58 — paragraph 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 6.   Where the evidence referred to in paragraph 4 has not been submitted to the authorities involved in inspections within the period specified by them, or they consider the evidence and information available to them to be insufficient to reach a conclusion, the shipment concerned shall be considered as an illegal shipment and shall be dealt with in accordance with Articles 24 and 25. The authorities involved in inspections shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the country where the inspection concerned took place accordingly. | 6.   Where the evidence referred to in paragraph 4
  or paragraph 5
  has not been submitted to the authorities involved in inspections within the period specified by them, or they consider the evidence and information available to them to be insufficient to reach a conclusion, the shipment concerned shall be considered as an illegal shipment and shall be dealt with in accordance with Articles 24 and 25. The authorities involved in inspections shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the country where the inspection concerned took place accordingly. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6.   Where the evidence referred to in paragraph 4 has not been submitted to the authorities involved in inspections within the period specified by them, or they consider the evidence and information available to them to be insufficient to reach a conclusion, the shipment concerned shall be considered as an illegal shipment and shall be dealt with in accordance with Articles 24 and 25. The authorities involved in inspections shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the country where the inspection concerned took place accordingly.

6.   Where the evidence referred to in paragraph 4
  or paragraph 5
  has not been submitted to the authorities involved in inspections within the period specified by them, or they consider the evidence and information available to them to be insufficient to reach a conclusion, the shipment concerned shall be considered as an illegal shipment and shall be dealt with in accordance with Articles 24 and 25. The authorities involved in inspections shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the country where the inspection concerned took place accordingly.

Amendment 111

Amendment 111

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Inspection plans shall include, at least, the following elements: | 2.   
  Inspection plans shall include the minimum number of physical checks of facilities and waste shipments in line with the risk assessment conducted pursuant to article 59, paragraph 1. The plans shall not contain any details about operational programming. The
  inspection plans shall include, at least, the following elements: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Inspection plans shall include, at least, the following elements:

2.   
  Inspection plans shall include the minimum number of physical checks of facilities and waste shipments in line with the risk assessment conducted pursuant to article 59, paragraph 1. The plans shall not contain any details about operational programming. The
  inspection plans shall include, at least, the following elements:

Amendment 112

Amendment 112

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — point c

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | information on planned inspections, including on physical checks; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

information on planned inspections, including on physical checks;

| (c) | information on
  the number and types of
  planned inspections, including on physical checks; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

information on
  the number and types of
  planned inspections, including on physical checks;

the number and types of

Amendment 113

Amendment 113

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — point g a (new)

Article 59 — paragraph 2 — point g a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ga) | information as to how concerns or irregularities can be reported to a prescribed organisation, as provided for in the relevant Union legislation on whistleblowing. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ga)

(ga)

information as to how concerns or irregularities can be reported to a prescribed organisation, as provided for in the relevant Union legislation on whistleblowing.

information as to how concerns or irregularities can be reported to a prescribed organisation, as provided for in the relevant Union legislation on whistleblowing.

Amendment 114

Amendment 114

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 59 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  Member States shall ensure that the outcome of the inspections carried out pursuant to the plans referred to in this Article, any remedial actions taken by the relevant authorities as a follow up to those inspections, the names of the operators involved in illegal shipments, and the penalties imposed are available to the public, including electronically. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  Member States shall ensure that the outcome of the inspections carried out pursuant to the plans referred to in this Article, any remedial actions taken by the relevant authorities as a follow up to those inspections, the names of the operators involved in illegal shipments, and the penalties imposed are available to the public, including electronically.

Amendment 115

Amendment 115

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 59 — paragraph 5

Article 59 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   The Commission shall review the inspection plans notified by the Member States in accordance with paragraph 4 and
  , if appropriate,
  draw up reports, based on the review of these plans, on the implementation of this Article. Such reports may include, inter alia, recommendations on priorities of inspections and on enforcement cooperation and coordination between the relevant authorities involved in inspections. Such reports may also be presented, where appropriate, in the meetings of the waste shipment enforcement group established under Article 63. | 5.   The Commission shall review the inspection plans notified by the Member States in accordance with paragraph 4 and draw up reports, based on the review of these plans, on the implementation of this Article 
  within 1 year of the reception of the inspection plans. Such reports shall take into account the flows, tonnage and value of waste to third countries to identify relevant priorities
  . Such reports may include, inter alia, recommendations on priorities of inspections and on enforcement cooperation and coordination between the relevant authorities involved in inspections. Such reports may also be presented, where appropriate, in the meetings of the waste shipment enforcement group established under Article 63
  , and shall be made available to the European Parliament and the European Council
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   The Commission shall review the inspection plans notified by the Member States in accordance with paragraph 4 and
  , if appropriate,
  draw up reports, based on the review of these plans, on the implementation of this Article. Such reports may include, inter alia, recommendations on priorities of inspections and on enforcement cooperation and coordination between the relevant authorities involved in inspections. Such reports may also be presented, where appropriate, in the meetings of the waste shipment enforcement group established under Article 63.

5.   The Commission shall review the inspection plans notified by the Member States in accordance with paragraph 4 and draw up reports, based on the review of these plans, on the implementation of this Article 
  within 1 year of the reception of the inspection plans. Such reports shall take into account the flows, tonnage and value of waste to third countries to identify relevant priorities
  . Such reports may include, inter alia, recommendations on priorities of inspections and on enforcement cooperation and coordination between the relevant authorities involved in inspections. Such reports may also be presented, where appropriate, in the meetings of the waste shipment enforcement group established under Article 63
  , and shall be made available to the European Parliament and the European Council
  .

Amendment 116

Amendment 116

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 63 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 63 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  The waste shipment enforcement group shall publish an annual report on trends in illegal shipments and best practices to tackle such shipments, as recommended by Member State competent authorities. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  The waste shipment enforcement group shall publish an annual report on trends in illegal shipments and best practices to tackle such shipments, as recommended by Member State competent authorities.

Amendment 117

Amendment 117

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 63 — paragraph 3 b (new)

Article 63 — paragraph 3 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3b.
     
  Within two years of its establishment, the waste shipment enforcement group shall propose to the Commission an action plan to tackle illegal shipments of waste. The proposal for an action plan shall be updated at least every four years based on new or persistent trends in illegal shipments and enforcement activities. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3b.
     
  Within two years of its establishment, the waste shipment enforcement group shall propose to the Commission an action plan to tackle illegal shipments of waste. The proposal for an action plan shall be updated at least every four years based on new or persistent trends in illegal shipments and enforcement activities.

Amendment 118

Amendment 118

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 63 — paragraph 4

Article 63 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The waste shipment enforcement group shall meet at least twice a year. In addition to the members referred to in paragraph 2, the chairperson may invite to the meetings, where appropriate, representatives of other relevant institutions, bodies, offices, agencies
  or
  networks. | 4.   The waste shipment enforcement group shall meet at least twice a year. In addition to the members referred to in paragraph 2, the chairperson may invite to the meetings, where appropriate, representatives of other relevant institutions, bodies, offices, agencies networks
  or other stakeholders
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The waste shipment enforcement group shall meet at least twice a year. In addition to the members referred to in paragraph 2, the chairperson may invite to the meetings, where appropriate, representatives of other relevant institutions, bodies, offices, agencies
  or
  networks.

4.   The waste shipment enforcement group shall meet at least twice a year. In addition to the members referred to in paragraph 2, the chairperson may invite to the meetings, where appropriate, representatives of other relevant institutions, bodies, offices, agencies networks
  or other stakeholders
  .

Amendment 119

Amendment 119

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 64 — paragraph 2 — point b

Article 64 — paragraph 2 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the powers conferred onto the Commission or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), respectively, in other legal acts, in particular in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (65), Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (66), or Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (67) . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

the powers conferred onto the Commission or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), respectively, in other legal acts, in particular in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (65), Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (66), or Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (67) .

65

66

67

| (b) | the powers conferred onto the Commission
  , the European Prosecutor's Office
  or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), respectively, in other legal acts, in particular in
  Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939

   (1a)

  ,
  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (65), Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (66), or Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (67) . |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the powers conferred onto the Commission
  , the European Prosecutor's Office
  or the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), respectively, in other legal acts, in particular in
  Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939

   (1a)

  ,
  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (65), Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 (66), or Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (67) .

, the European Prosecutor's Office

Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939

1a

,

65

66

67

Amendment 120

Amendment 120

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 69 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 3

Article 69 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The report mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be drawn up for the first time by [OP: Please insert date of the end of the
  fifth
  year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and every
  four
  years thereafter. | The report mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be drawn up for the first time by [OP: Please insert date of the end of the
  third
  year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and every
  three
  years thereafter. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The report mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be drawn up for the first time by [OP: Please insert date of the end of the
  fifth
  year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and every
  four
  years thereafter.

fifth

four

The report mentioned in the first subparagraph shall be drawn up for the first time by [OP: Please insert date of the end of the
  third
  year after the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and every
  three
  years thereafter.

third

three

Amendment 121

Amendment 121

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 69 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 69 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  The Commission shall assess and present a report to the Council and the European Parliament on how the financial obligations under-extended producer responsibility should apply to used goods or waste shipped from the Union. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  The Commission shall assess and present a report to the Council and the European Parliament on how the financial obligations under-extended producer responsibility should apply to used goods or waste shipped from the Union.

Amendment 122

Amendment 122

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 69 — paragraph 4 b (new)

Article 69 — paragraph 4 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4b.
     
  Using data from the central system, as well as data from reports by relevant EU agencies, this report shall present an analysis of shipments and treatment of specific waste streams, identified as illegal practices in this regard, of implementation of this Regulation, including compliance by competent authorities with deadlines set out in this Regulation, and of the contribution by the sector towards the transition to a circular economy and climate neutrality by 2050 in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the ‘European Climate Law’). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4b.
     
  Using data from the central system, as well as data from reports by relevant EU agencies, this report shall present an analysis of shipments and treatment of specific waste streams, identified as illegal practices in this regard, of implementation of this Regulation, including compliance by competent authorities with deadlines set out in this Regulation, and of the contribution by the sector towards the transition to a circular economy and climate neutrality by 2050 in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the ‘European Climate Law’).

Amendment 123

Amendment 123

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 69 — paragraph 4 c (new)

Article 69 — paragraph 4 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4c.
     
  The waste shipment enforcement group, the correspondents and the sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships within the waste sector shall be invited to review and give comments on the report ahead of its publication. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4c.
     
  The waste shipment enforcement group, the correspondents and the sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships within the waste sector shall be invited to review and give comments on the report ahead of its publication.

Amendment 124

Amendment 124

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 69 — paragraph 4 d (new)

Article 69 — paragraph 4 d (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4d.
     
  In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission shall facilitate sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships within the waste sector of the economy. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4d.
     
  In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission shall facilitate sector-specific climate dialogues and partnerships within the waste sector of the economy.

Amendment 125

Amendment 125

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 72 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 72 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | The Commission shall, if requested by Member States or if otherwise appropriate, periodically hold a meeting of the correspondents. During those meetings, correspondents shall examine the questions raised by the implementation of this Regulation, and may also discuss other relevant topics related to the implementation of this Regulation. Particular attention may be given to discussions on the monitoring the state of the Union market for shipments of waste, to enabling the exchange of best practices, information and facilitating cooperation between competent authorities, with the aim of removing barriers to the harmonisation of practices of shipments of waste between Member States and the implementation of environmentally sound techniques for waste management. |
| | Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall, if requested by Member States or if otherwise appropriate, periodically hold a meeting of the correspondents. During those meetings, correspondents shall examine the questions raised by the implementation of this Regulation, and may also discuss other relevant topics related to the implementation of this Regulation. Particular attention may be given to discussions on the monitoring the state of the Union market for shipments of waste, to enabling the exchange of best practices, information and facilitating cooperation between competent authorities, with the aim of removing barriers to the harmonisation of practices of shipments of waste between Member States and the implementation of environmentally sound techniques for waste management.

The Commission shall, if requested by Member States or if otherwise appropriate, periodically hold a meeting of the correspondents. During those meetings, correspondents shall examine the questions raised by the implementation of this Regulation, and may also discuss other relevant topics related to the implementation of this Regulation. Particular attention may be given to discussions on the monitoring the state of the Union market for shipments of waste, to enabling the exchange of best practices, information and facilitating cooperation between competent authorities, with the aim of removing barriers to the harmonisation of practices of shipments of waste between Member States and the implementation of environmentally sound techniques for waste management.

Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate.

Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate.

Amendment 126

Amendment 126

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 72 — paragraph 1 b (new)

Article 72 — paragraph 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate.

Relevant stakeholders shall be invited to the meetings of the correspondents, or parts of those meetings, where appropriate.

Amendment 127

Amendment 127

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 75 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 75 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to amend Annex III, in particular Part I, paragraph 2, point (fa) in order to modify contamination thresholds. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 76 to amend Annex III, in particular Part I, paragraph 2, point (fa) in order to modify contamination thresholds.

Amendment 128

Amendment 128

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 75 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 75 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  By ... [insert the date 12 months after the date of publication of this regulation], the Commission shall assess adding entries on mixtures of waste such as used footwear, clothing and other textile products, including the mixtures of these, mineral wool, as well as mattresses to Annex IIIB. Where appropriate, that assessment shall be accompanied by a delegated act in accordance with Article 76 to amend Annex IIIB. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  By ... [insert the date 12 months after the date of publication of this regulation], the Commission shall assess adding entries on mixtures of waste such as used footwear, clothing and other textile products, including the mixtures of these, mineral wool, as well as mattresses to Annex IIIB. Where appropriate, that assessment shall be accompanied by a delegated act in accordance with Article 76 to amend Annex IIIB.

Amendment 129

Amendment 129

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 80 — paragraph 1

Article 80 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| By 31 December
  2035
  , the Commission shall, taking into account, inter alia, the reports drawn up in accordance with Article 69, and the review referred to in Article 59(5), carry out a review of this Regulation and submit a report on the results thereof to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied, if the Commission deems it appropriate, by a legislative proposal. | By 31 December
  2030
  , the Commission shall, taking into account, inter alia, the reports drawn up in accordance with Article 69, and the review referred to in Article 59(5), carry out a review of this Regulation and submit a report on the results thereof to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied, if the Commission deems it appropriate, by a legislative proposal. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

By 31 December
  2035
  , the Commission shall, taking into account, inter alia, the reports drawn up in accordance with Article 69, and the review referred to in Article 59(5), carry out a review of this Regulation and submit a report on the results thereof to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied, if the Commission deems it appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

2035

By 31 December
  2030
  , the Commission shall, taking into account, inter alia, the reports drawn up in accordance with Article 69, and the review referred to in Article 59(5), carry out a review of this Regulation and submit a report on the results thereof to the European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied, if the Commission deems it appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

2030

Amendment 130

Amendment 130

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 80 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 80 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | By 31 December [2038], the Commission shall review the data and justifications underpinning the decision to restrict the export of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries, with a view to assessing the proportionality of that measure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

By 31 December [2038], the Commission shall review the data and justifications underpinning the decision to restrict the export of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries, with a view to assessing the proportionality of that measure.

By 31 December [2038], the Commission shall review the data and justifications underpinning the decision to restrict the export of plastic waste outside of the Union and EFTA countries, with a view to assessing the proportionality of that measure.

Amendment 131

Amendment 131

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IA — Block 7

Annex IA — Block 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7) | PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7) |
| 1. | Drum |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7)

PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7)

1.

Drum

| 1. | Drum |
| --- | --- |

1.

Drum

| 2. | Wooden barrel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Wooden barrel

| 2. | Wooden barrel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Wooden barrel

| 3. | Jerrican |
| --- | --- |

3.

Jerrican

| 3. | Jerrican |
| --- | --- |

3.

Jerrican

| 4. | Box |
| --- | --- |

4.

Box

| 4. | Box |
| --- | --- |

4.

Box

| 5. | Bag |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bag

| 5. | Bag |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bag

| 6. | Composite packaging |
| --- | --- |

6.

Composite packaging

| 6. | Composite packaging |
| --- | --- |

6.

Composite packaging

| 7. | Pressure receptacle |
| --- | --- |

7.

Pressure receptacle

| 7. | Pressure receptacle |
| --- | --- |

7.

Pressure receptacle

| 8. | Bulk |
| --- | --- |

8.

Bulk

| 8. | Bulk |
| --- | --- |

8.

Bulk

| 9. | Other (specify) |
| --- | --- |

9.

9.

Other (specify)

| 9. | Bale |
| --- | --- |

9.

9.

Bale

| 10. | Other (specify) |
| --- | --- |

10.

10.

Other (specify)

Amendment 132

Amendment 132

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IB — Block 7

Annex IB — Block 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7) | PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7) |
| 1. | Drum |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7)

PACKAGING TYPES (Block 7)

1.

Drum

| 1. | Drum |
| --- | --- |

1.

Drum

| 2. | Wooden barrel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Wooden barrel

| 2. | Wooden barrel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Wooden barrel

| 3. | Jerrican |
| --- | --- |

3.

Jerrican

| 3. | Jerrican |
| --- | --- |

3.

Jerrican

| 4. | Box |
| --- | --- |

4.

Box

| 4. | Box |
| --- | --- |

4.

Box

| 5. | Bag |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bag

| 5. | Bag |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bag

| 6. | Composite packaging |
| --- | --- |

6.

Composite packaging

| 6. | Composite packaging |
| --- | --- |

6.

Composite packaging

| 7. | Pressure receptacle |
| --- | --- |

7.

Pressure receptacle

| 7. | Pressure receptacle |
| --- | --- |

7.

Pressure receptacle

| 8. | Bulk |
| --- | --- |

8.

Bulk

| 8. | Bulk |
| --- | --- |

8.

Bulk

| 9. | Other (specify) |
| --- | --- |

9.

9.

Other (specify)

| 9. | Bale |
| --- | --- |

9.

9.

Bale

| 10. | Other (specify) |
| --- | --- |

10.

10.

Other (specify)

Amendment 133

Amendment 133

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IC — Part V — point 46 — subparagraph 1

Annex IC — Part V — point 46 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Block 18: This block is to be completed by the authorised representative of the disposal or recovery facility upon receipt of the waste consignment. Tick the box of the appropriate type of facility. With regard to the quantity received, please refer to the specific instructions on block 5 (paragraph 36). A signed copy of the movement document is given to the last carrier. If the shipment is rejected for any reason, the representative of the disposal or recovery facility must immediately contact his or her competent authority. According to Article 16(3) or, if appropriate, 15(3) of this Regulation and the OECD Decision, confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received must be provided within
  one day
  (with the exception of those OECD transit countries which have informed the OECD Secretariat that they do not wish to receive such copies of the movement document). The original movement document shall be retained by the disposal or recovery facility. | Block 18: This block is to be completed by the authorised representative of the disposal or recovery facility upon receipt of the waste consignment. Tick the box of the appropriate type of facility. With regard to the quantity received, please refer to the specific instructions on block 5 (paragraph 36). A signed copy of the movement document is given to the last carrier. If the shipment is rejected for any reason, the representative of the disposal or recovery facility must immediately contact his or her competent authority. According to Article 16(3) or, if appropriate, 15(3) of this Regulation and the OECD Decision, confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received must be provided within
  two working days
  (with the exception of those OECD transit countries which have informed the OECD Secretariat that they do not wish to receive such copies of the movement document). The original movement document shall be retained by the disposal or recovery facility. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Block 18: This block is to be completed by the authorised representative of the disposal or recovery facility upon receipt of the waste consignment. Tick the box of the appropriate type of facility. With regard to the quantity received, please refer to the specific instructions on block 5 (paragraph 36). A signed copy of the movement document is given to the last carrier. If the shipment is rejected for any reason, the representative of the disposal or recovery facility must immediately contact his or her competent authority. According to Article 16(3) or, if appropriate, 15(3) of this Regulation and the OECD Decision, confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received must be provided within
  one day
  (with the exception of those OECD transit countries which have informed the OECD Secretariat that they do not wish to receive such copies of the movement document). The original movement document shall be retained by the disposal or recovery facility.

one day

Block 18: This block is to be completed by the authorised representative of the disposal or recovery facility upon receipt of the waste consignment. Tick the box of the appropriate type of facility. With regard to the quantity received, please refer to the specific instructions on block 5 (paragraph 36). A signed copy of the movement document is given to the last carrier. If the shipment is rejected for any reason, the representative of the disposal or recovery facility must immediately contact his or her competent authority. According to Article 16(3) or, if appropriate, 15(3) of this Regulation and the OECD Decision, confirmation to the notifier and the relevant authorities that the waste has been received must be provided within
  two working days
  (with the exception of those OECD transit countries which have informed the OECD Secretariat that they do not wish to receive such copies of the movement document). The original movement document shall be retained by the disposal or recovery facility.

two working days

Amendment 134

Amendment 134

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III — Part I — paragraph 2 — point f a (new)

Annex III — Part I — paragraph 2 — point f a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fa) | for waste shipped within the Union, the reference to ‘almost free from contamination and other types of waste’ [in Basel entry B3011] shall be understood to mean that the content of contamination does not exceed in total a maximum of 6 % of the consignment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fa)

(fa)

for waste shipped within the Union, the reference to ‘almost free from contamination and other types of waste’ [in Basel entry B3011] shall be understood to mean that the content of contamination does not exceed in total a maximum of 6 % of the consignment.

for waste shipped within the Union, the reference to ‘almost free from contamination and other types of waste’ [in Basel entry B3011] shall be understood to mean that the content of contamination does not exceed in total a maximum of 6 % of the consignment.

Amendment 135

Amendment 135

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex III — Part I — paragraph 2 — point g

Annex III — Part I — paragraph 2 — point g

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (g) | For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry B3011 does not apply and the following entry applies instead: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(g)

(g)

For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry B3011 does not apply and the following entry applies instead:

For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry B3011 does not apply and the following entry applies instead:

deleted

deleted

[...]

(This amendment applies throughout the text. References to EU3011 shall be replaced by references to Basel entry B3011.)

(This amendment applies throughout the text. References to EU3011 shall be replaced by references to Basel entry B3011.)

Amendment 136

Amendment 136

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IIIA — point 2 — point e a (new)

Annex IIIA — point 2 — point e a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ea) | mixtures of wastes classified under Basel entries B1010 and B2020; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ea)

(ea)

mixtures of wastes classified under Basel entries B1010 and B2020;

mixtures of wastes classified under Basel entries B1010 and B2020;

Amendment 137

Amendment 137

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IIIA — point 2 — point e b (new)

Annex IIIA — point 2 — point e b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (eb) | mixtures of waste classified under Basel entries B3011, B3040 and B1010 limited to waste from window and door frames. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(eb)

(eb)

mixtures of waste classified under Basel entries B3011, B3040 and B1010 limited to waste from window and door frames.

mixtures of waste classified under Basel entries B3011, B3040 and B1010 limited to waste from window and door frames.

Amendment 138

Amendment 138

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IV — Part I — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

Annex IV — Part I — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Waste classified as hazardous in the list of waste established pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Waste classified as hazardous in the list of waste established pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC.

Waste classified as hazardous in the list of waste established pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC.

Amendment 139

Amendment 139

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IV — Part I — paragraph 2 — point f

Annex IV — Part I — paragraph 2 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry Y48 does not apply and the following entry applies instead: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

(f)

For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry Y48 does not apply and the following entry applies instead:

For waste shipped within the Union, Basel entry Y48 does not apply and the following entry applies instead:

deleted

deleted

[...]

(This amendment applies throughout the text. References to EU48 shall be replaced by references to Basel entry Y48.)

(This amendment applies throughout the text. References to EU48 shall be replaced by references to Basel entry Y48.)

Amendment 140

Amendment 140

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex V — point 2 — subparagraph 1

Annex V — point 2 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| This Annex consists of two parts. Article 36 further refers to the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC. For the purposes of this Regulation and to determine whether a specific waste is listed as referred to in Art. 36 of this Regulation, the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC applies only when Part 1 of this Annex is not applicable. If a waste is not listed in Part 1 of this Annex
  or
  in the list of waste as referred to in Article
  7 of
  Directive 2008/98/EC, only then it should be checked if it is listed in Part 2 of this Annex. | This Annex consists of two parts. Article 36 further refers to the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC. For the purposes of this Regulation and to determine whether a specific waste is listed as referred to in Art. 36 of this Regulation, the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC applies only when Part 1 of this Annex is not applicable. If a waste is not listed in Part 1 of this Annex
  , and not listed as a hazardous waste
   in the list of waste as referred to in Article
  7of
  Directive 2008/98/EC
  , namely types of waste marked with an asterisk
  , only then it should be checked if it is listed in Part 2 of this Annex. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

This Annex consists of two parts. Article 36 further refers to the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC. For the purposes of this Regulation and to determine whether a specific waste is listed as referred to in Art. 36 of this Regulation, the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC applies only when Part 1 of this Annex is not applicable. If a waste is not listed in Part 1 of this Annex
  or
  in the list of waste as referred to in Article
  7 of
  Directive 2008/98/EC, only then it should be checked if it is listed in Part 2 of this Annex.

or

7 of

This Annex consists of two parts. Article 36 further refers to the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC. For the purposes of this Regulation and to determine whether a specific waste is listed as referred to in Art. 36 of this Regulation, the list of waste as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2008/98/EC applies only when Part 1 of this Annex is not applicable. If a waste is not listed in Part 1 of this Annex
  , and not listed as a hazardous waste
   in the list of waste as referred to in Article
  7of
  Directive 2008/98/EC
  , namely types of waste marked with an asterisk
  , only then it should be checked if it is listed in Part 2 of this Annex.

, and not listed as a hazardous waste

7of

, namely types of waste marked with an asterisk

Amendment 141

Amendment 141

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex VIII — Part 2 — point 7 a (new)

Annex VIII — Part 2 — point 7 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

| (7a) | Fundamental ILO Conventions |
| --- | --- |

(7a)

(7a)

Fundamental ILO Conventions

Signed:

Signed:

Ratified:

Ratified:

yes □

yes □

yes □

yes □

no □

no □

no □

no □

Amendment 142

Amendment 142

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annnex VIII — Part 2 a (new)

Annnex VIII — Part 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Part 2a (new) |
| | Commitment to ensure that waste(s) received from the European Union is managed and treated in accordance with Article 56. |
| | Hereby, [name and contact details of competent authority], on behalf of [country] (hereafter ‘the country’) declares that the country ensures that any waste shipped to its territory is managed without endangering human health and in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56 of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Part 2a (new)

Part 2a (new)

Commitment to ensure that waste(s) received from the European Union is managed and treated in accordance with Article 56.

Commitment to ensure that waste(s) received from the European Union is managed and treated in accordance with Article 56.

Hereby, [name and contact details of competent authority], on behalf of [country] (hereafter ‘the country’) declares that the country ensures that any waste shipped to its territory is managed without endangering human health and in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56 of this Regulation.

Hereby, [name and contact details of competent authority], on behalf of [country] (hereafter ‘the country’) declares that the country ensures that any waste shipped to its territory is managed without endangering human health and in an environmentally sound manner in accordance with Article 56 of this Regulation.

Amendment 143

Amendment 143

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IX — Part 1 — point 2 — point b

Annex IX — Part 1 — point 2 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions.

| (b) | Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions
  , including adopted best available techniques
  . |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions
  , including adopted best available techniques
  .

, including adopted best available techniques

Amendment 144

Amendment 144

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex IX — Part 2 a (new)

Annex IX — Part 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a | International Conventions on labour rights |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a

2a

International Conventions on labour rights

The eight fundamental ILO Conventions as defined under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work

   (1a)

The eight fundamental ILO Conventions as defined under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work

1a

Amendment 145

Amendment 145

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 1

Annex X — point 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1. | The audit referred in Article 43(2) verifies that the facility managing the waste in the country of destination complies with the following conditions: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.

The audit referred in Article 43(2) verifies that the facility managing the waste in the country of destination complies with the following conditions:

| 1. | The audit referred in Article 43(2) verifies that
  the actual performance of all activities of
  the facility managing the waste in the country of destination comply with the following conditions,
  where relevant
  : |
| --- | --- |

1.

The audit referred in Article 43(2) verifies that
  the actual performance of all activities of
  the facility managing the waste in the country of destination comply with the following conditions,
  where relevant
  :

the actual performance of all activities of

where relevant

Amendment 146

Amendment 146

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 1 — point b

Annex X — point 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | it is designed, constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally sound manner and, in particular, it has the required processes, organisation and infrastructure in place to treat the waste in question, and insurances covering potential risks and liabilities. To this end, as a minimum, information on the waste treatment methods, including how they deal with residual waste, notably through downstream traceability, must be checked; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

it is designed, constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally sound manner and, in particular, it has the required processes, organisation and infrastructure in place to treat the waste in question, and insurances covering potential risks and liabilities. To this end, as a minimum, information on the waste treatment methods, including how they deal with residual waste, notably through downstream traceability, must be checked;

| (b) | it is designed, constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally sound manner and, in particular, it has the required processes
  , appropriate recycling technology
  , organisation and infrastructure in place to treat the waste in question, and insurances covering potential risks and liabilities. To this end, as a minimum, information on the waste treatment methods, including how they deal with residual waste, notably through downstream traceability, must be checked; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it is designed, constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally sound manner and, in particular, it has the required processes
  , appropriate recycling technology
  , organisation and infrastructure in place to treat the waste in question, and insurances covering potential risks and liabilities. To this end, as a minimum, information on the waste treatment methods, including how they deal with residual waste, notably through downstream traceability, must be checked;

, appropriate recycling technology

Amendment 147

Amendment 147

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 1 — point c — introductory part

Annex X — point 1 — point c — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | it establishes management and monitoring systems, procedures and techniques that have the purpose of preventing, reducing, minimising and to the extent practicable eliminating: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

it establishes management and monitoring systems, procedures and techniques that have the purpose of preventing, reducing, minimising and to the extent practicable eliminating:

| (c) | it establishes
  and operates
  management and monitoring systems, procedures and techniques that have the purpose of preventing, reducing, minimising and to the extent practicable eliminating: |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it establishes
  and operates
  management and monitoring systems, procedures and techniques that have the purpose of preventing, reducing, minimising and to the extent practicable eliminating:

and operates

Amendment 148

Amendment 148

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 1 — point f

Annex X — point 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the last five years; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the last five years;

| (f) | it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the last five years;
  if a plant has operated for less than five years, it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the time it has operated; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the last five years;
  if a plant has operated for less than five years, it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the time it has operated;

if a plant has operated for less than five years, it establishes and is able to provide records of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the time it has operated;

Amendment 149

Amendment 149

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 2 — introductory part

Annex X — point 2 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2. | Upon verifying compliance of a facility against the above criteria, the independent third party performing the audit must in particular take into account, as a point of reference and where relevant: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.

Upon verifying compliance of a facility against the above criteria, the independent third party performing the audit must in particular take into account, as a point of reference and where relevant:

| 2. | Upon verifying compliance
  of all relevant activities
  of a facility against the above criteria, the independent third party performing the audit must in particular take into account, as a point of reference and where relevant: |
| --- | --- |

2.

Upon verifying compliance
  of all relevant activities
  of a facility against the above criteria, the independent third party performing the audit must in particular take into account, as a point of reference and where relevant:

of all relevant activities

Amendment 150

Amendment 150

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex X — point 2 — point b a (new)

Annex X — point 2 — point b a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ba) | other Union legislation as referred to in Part 1 of Annex IX. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ba)

(ba)

other Union legislation as referred to in Part 1 of Annex IX.

other Union legislation as referred to in Part 1 of Annex IX.

---

(1)  The matter was referred back for interinstitutional negotiations to the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph (A9-0290/2022).

1

(31)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3).

31

(31)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3).

31

(34)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European GreenDeal (COM(2019)0640 final)

34

(35)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 11 March 2020, A new Circular Economy Action Plan — For a cleaner and more competitive Europe (COM(2020)0098 final).

35

(36)  Council conclusions on Making the Recovery Circular and Green (13852/20 OJ CONS 34).

36

(37)  European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (2020/2077(INI)).

37

(34)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European GreenDeal (COM(2019)0640 final)

34

(35)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 11 March 2020, A new Circular Economy Action Plan — For a cleaner and more competitive Europe (COM(2020)0098 final).

35

(36)  Council conclusions on Making the Recovery Circular and Green (13852/20 OJ CONS 34).

36

(37)  European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (2020/2077(INI)).

37

(52)  OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

52

(52)  OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

52

(53)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

53

(53)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

53

(1a)  
  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

1a

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

(65)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1)

65

(66)  Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).

66

(67)  Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

67

(1a)  
  Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

1a

Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

(65)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1)

65

(66)  Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1).

66

(67)  Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

67

(1a)  
  https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm

1a

https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm

---

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/223 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/223

---

P9_TA(2023)0004

Rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes

European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2023 on the proposal for a Council directive laying down rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU (COM(2021)0565 — C9-0041/2022 — 2021/0434(CNS))

(Special legislative procedure — consultation)

(2023/C 0/19)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0565), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0565),

| — | having regard to Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0041/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0041/2022),

| — | having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0293/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0293/2022),

| 1. | Approves the Commission proposal as amended; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, in accordance with Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Amendment 1

Proposal for a directive

Recital 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (1) | Ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the Union. While recent years saw important progress in this area, especially with the adoption of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (10) concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of Council Directive 2011/16/EU (11) on administrative cooperation, further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion, which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the Union. In particular, multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal substance, to lower their overall tax liability, including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax Member States in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. This proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework, which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership, whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own, such as real estate or property of high value. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1)

Ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the Union. While recent years saw important progress in this area, especially with the adoption of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (10) concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of Council Directive 2011/16/EU (11) on administrative cooperation, further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion, which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the Union. In particular, multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal substance, to lower their overall tax liability, including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax Member States in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. This proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework, which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership, whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own, such as real estate or property of high value.

| (1) | Ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the Union. While recent years saw important progress in this area, especially with the adoption of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (10) concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of Council Directive 2011/16/EU (11) on administrative cooperation
  in the field of taxation
  , further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion,
  including through the misuse of shell entities
  , which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the Union
  . In that regard, the Pandora Papers’ revelations reported on the creation of shell companies with the purpose of moving money between bank accounts, avoiding taxes and committing financial crimes, including money laundering, and circumventing Union sanctions on Russian oligarchs
  . In particular, multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal
  economic
  substance, to lower their overall tax liability, including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax Member States in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. This proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework, which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership, whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own, such as real estate or property of high value. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the Union. While recent years saw important progress in this area, especially with the adoption of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (10) concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of Council Directive 2011/16/EU (11) on administrative cooperation
  in the field of taxation
  , further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion,
  including through the misuse of shell entities
  , which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the Union
  . In that regard, the Pandora Papers’ revelations reported on the creation of shell companies with the purpose of moving money between bank accounts, avoiding taxes and committing financial crimes, including money laundering, and circumventing Union sanctions on Russian oligarchs
  . In particular, multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal
  economic
  substance, to lower their overall tax liability, including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax Member States in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. This proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework, which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership, whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own, such as real estate or property of high value.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a directive

Recital 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1a) | There can be valid reasons for using companies with minimal economic substance. Therefore, it is important to guarantee a proportionate legal framework that safeguards the position of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that use legal structures to promote investments, comply with national laws or operate in different national markets while, at the same time, legislating in concrete terms on the misuse of shell entities to avoid taxation
  .
  The quality and completeness of data are therefore essential in order to reap the greatest benefits from this Directive. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1a)

There can be valid reasons for using companies with minimal economic substance. Therefore, it is important to guarantee a proportionate legal framework that safeguards the position of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that use legal structures to promote investments, comply with national laws or operate in different national markets while, at the same time, legislating in concrete terms on the misuse of shell entities to avoid taxation
  .
  The quality and completeness of data are therefore essential in order to reap the greatest benefits from this Directive.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a directive

Recital 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1b) | The lack of an international instrument on the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes creates a significant loophole in the global efforts to combat tax fraud and evasion and aggressive tax planning.


  In addition, it creates an uneven playing field among businesses. The absence of such an instrument confirms the importance of the legal standards laid down in this Directive. It is essential to guarantee that the obligations provided for in this Directive are proportionate and effective from a taxation point of view, preserving the competitiveness of Union undertakings. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1b)

The lack of an international instrument on the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes creates a significant loophole in the global efforts to combat tax fraud and evasion and aggressive tax planning.


  In addition, it creates an uneven playing field among businesses. The absence of such an instrument confirms the importance of the legal standards laid down in this Directive. It is essential to guarantee that the obligations provided for in this Directive are proportionate and effective from a taxation point of view, preserving the competitiveness of Union undertakings.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a directive

Recital 1 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (1c) | The misuse of shell entities for tax purposes leads to a reduction in tax liability and tax loss within the Union. It is therefore essential that this Directive sets ambitious and proportionate standards for the definition of common minimum substance requirements, for the improvement of exchange of information between national tax administrations and for the dissuasion of the use of shell entities promoted by certain intermediaries. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1c)

The misuse of shell entities for tax purposes leads to a reduction in tax liability and tax loss within the Union. It is therefore essential that this Directive sets ambitious and proportionate standards for the definition of common minimum substance requirements, for the improvement of exchange of information between national tax administrations and for the dissuasion of the use of shell entities promoted by certain intermediaries.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a directive

Recital 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (2) | It is acknowledged that undertakings with no minimal substance may be set up in a Member State with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage, notably by eroding the tax base of another Member State. While some Member States have developed a legislative or administrative framework to protect their tax base from such schemes, the relevant rules often have a limited effect, as they only apply in the territory of a single Member State and do not effectively capture situations that involve more than one Member State. Furthermore, the national rules that apply in this field significantly differ across the Union while some Member States have no rules at all, to tackle the misuse of undertakings with no or minimal substance for tax purposes. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2)

It is acknowledged that undertakings with no minimal substance may be set up in a Member State with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage, notably by eroding the tax base of another Member State. While some Member States have developed a legislative or administrative framework to protect their tax base from such schemes, the relevant rules often have a limited effect, as they only apply in the territory of a single Member State and do not effectively capture situations that involve more than one Member State. Furthermore, the national rules that apply in this field significantly differ across the Union while some Member States have no rules at all, to tackle the misuse of undertakings with no or minimal substance for tax purposes.

| (2) | It is acknowledged that undertakings with no minimal substance may be set up in a Member State with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage, notably by eroding the tax base of another Member State
  , creating a window of opportunity for aggressive tax planning
  . While some Member States have developed a legislative or administrative framework to protect their tax base from such schemes, the relevant rules often have a limited effect, as they only apply in the territory of a single Member State and do not effectively capture situations that involve more than one Member State. Furthermore, the national rules that apply in this field significantly differ across the Union while some Member States have no rules at all, to tackle the misuse of undertakings with no or minimal substance for tax purposes.
  It is therefore important to create a Union-wide legal approach to ensuring a framework for safeguarding the integrity of the internal market, fully respecting the highest standards of accessibility, simplicity and transparency
  . |
| --- | --- |

(2)

It is acknowledged that undertakings with no minimal substance may be set up in a Member State with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage, notably by eroding the tax base of another Member State
  , creating a window of opportunity for aggressive tax planning
  . While some Member States have developed a legislative or administrative framework to protect their tax base from such schemes, the relevant rules often have a limited effect, as they only apply in the territory of a single Member State and do not effectively capture situations that involve more than one Member State. Furthermore, the national rules that apply in this field significantly differ across the Union while some Member States have no rules at all, to tackle the misuse of undertakings with no or minimal substance for tax purposes.
  It is therefore important to create a Union-wide legal approach to ensuring a framework for safeguarding the integrity of the internal market, fully respecting the highest standards of accessibility, simplicity and transparency
  .

Amendment 6

Proposal for a directive

Recital 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (3) | It is necessary to lay down a common framework, in order to strengthen Member States’ resilience against practices of tax avoidance and evasion linked to the use of undertakings which do not perform an economic activity even if presumably they are engaged with economic activity and therefore do not have any or have only minimal substance for tax purposes. This is done in order to ensure that undertakings lacking minimal substance are not used as instruments of tax evasion or tax avoidance. As those undertakings may be established in one Member State but may be used with the effect of eroding the tax base of another Member State, it is critical to agree on a common set of rules for determining what should be considered as insufficient substance for tax purposes in the internal market as well as for delineating specific tax consequences linked to such insufficient substance. Where an undertaking has been found to have sufficient substance under this Directive, this should not prevent the Member States from continuing to operate anti-tax avoidance and evasion rules, provided that these are consistent with Union law. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3)

It is necessary to lay down a common framework, in order to strengthen Member States’ resilience against practices of tax avoidance and evasion linked to the use of undertakings which do not perform an economic activity even if presumably they are engaged with economic activity and therefore do not have any or have only minimal substance for tax purposes. This is done in order to ensure that undertakings lacking minimal substance are not used as instruments of tax evasion or tax avoidance. As those undertakings may be established in one Member State but may be used with the effect of eroding the tax base of another Member State, it is critical to agree on a common set of rules for determining what should be considered as insufficient substance for tax purposes in the internal market as well as for delineating specific tax consequences linked to such insufficient substance. Where an undertaking has been found to have sufficient substance under this Directive, this should not prevent the Member States from continuing to operate anti-tax avoidance and evasion rules, provided that these are consistent with Union law.

| (3) | It is necessary to lay down a common framework, in order to strengthen Member States’ resilience against practices of tax avoidance and evasion linked to the use of undertakings which do not perform an economic activity even if presumably they are engaged with economic activity and therefore do not have any or have only minimal substance for tax purposes. This is done in order to ensure that undertakings lacking minimal substance are not used as instruments of tax evasion or tax avoidance. As those undertakings may be established in one Member State but may be used with the effect of eroding the tax base of another Member State, it is critical to agree on a common set of rules for determining what should be considered as insufficient substance for tax purposes in the internal market as well as for delineating specific tax consequences linked to such insufficient substance. Where an undertaking has been found to have sufficient substance under this Directive, this should not prevent the Member States from continuing to operate
  more stringent minimum substance rules and other
  anti-tax avoidance and evasion rules, provided that these are consistent with Union law. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It is necessary to lay down a common framework, in order to strengthen Member States’ resilience against practices of tax avoidance and evasion linked to the use of undertakings which do not perform an economic activity even if presumably they are engaged with economic activity and therefore do not have any or have only minimal substance for tax purposes. This is done in order to ensure that undertakings lacking minimal substance are not used as instruments of tax evasion or tax avoidance. As those undertakings may be established in one Member State but may be used with the effect of eroding the tax base of another Member State, it is critical to agree on a common set of rules for determining what should be considered as insufficient substance for tax purposes in the internal market as well as for delineating specific tax consequences linked to such insufficient substance. Where an undertaking has been found to have sufficient substance under this Directive, this should not prevent the Member States from continuing to operate
  more stringent minimum substance rules and other
  anti-tax avoidance and evasion rules, provided that these are consistent with Union law.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a directive

Recital 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (3a) | To achieve the aims of this Directive, increasing the capacity of tax administrations and improving the exchange of information across the Union is of the utmost importance. It is necessary that Member States share the relevant information to which they have access, implement systems supporting the exchange of that information and, as a final step, enforce proposed sanctions against non-complying entities. In support of this Directive, the Commission should suggest specific activities within the Fiscalis programme. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3a)

To achieve the aims of this Directive, increasing the capacity of tax administrations and improving the exchange of information across the Union is of the utmost importance. It is necessary that Member States share the relevant information to which they have access, implement systems supporting the exchange of that information and, as a final step, enforce proposed sanctions against non-complying entities. In support of this Directive, the Commission should suggest specific activities within the Fiscalis programme.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a directive

Recital 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (4) | To ensure a comprehensive approach, the rules should apply to
  all
  undertakings in the Union which are taxable in a Member State, regardless of their legal form and status, as long as they have their residence for tax purposes in a Member State and are eligible to obtain a certificate of tax residence in that Member State. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4)

To ensure a comprehensive approach, the rules should apply to
  all
  undertakings in the Union which are taxable in a Member State, regardless of their legal form and status, as long as they have their residence for tax purposes in a Member State and are eligible to obtain a certificate of tax residence in that Member State.

| (4) | To ensure a comprehensive
  and proportionate
  approach, the rules should apply to undertakings in the Union which are taxable in a Member State, regardless of their legal form and status, as long as they have their residence for tax purposes in a Member State and are eligible to obtain a certificate of tax residence in that Member State.
  That broad scope is mitigated by a set of standards regarding the economic activity of the undertakings included in the scope of this Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

To ensure a comprehensive
  and proportionate
  approach, the rules should apply to undertakings in the Union which are taxable in a Member State, regardless of their legal form and status, as long as they have their residence for tax purposes in a Member State and are eligible to obtain a certificate of tax residence in that Member State.
  That broad scope is mitigated by a set of standards regarding the economic activity of the undertakings included in the scope of this Directive.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a directive

Recital 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (5) | To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, the proportionality and effectiveness of potential rules, it would be desirable to limit their scope to undertakings which are at risk of being found to lack minimal substance and used
  with the main objective of obtaining
  a tax advantage. It would therefore be important to establish a gateway criterion, in the form of a set of three cumulative, indicative conditions, in order to conclude which undertakings are sufficiently at risk as aforementioned to justify that they be subjected to reporting requirements. A first condition should enable the identification of undertakings presumably engaged mainly in geographically mobile economic activities, as the place where such activities are actually carried out is usually more challenging to identify. Such activities normally give rise to important passive income flows. Hence, undertakings, which income consists predominantly of passive income flows would meet this condition. It should also be taken into account that entities holding assets for private use, such as real estate, yachts, jets,
  artworks
  , or equity alone, may have no income for longer periods of time, but still enable significant tax benefits by way of owning those assets. As purely domestic situations would not pose a risk for the good functioning of the internal market and would be best addressed at domestic level, a second condition should focus on undertakings engaged in cross-border activities. Engagement in cross-border activities should be established having regard, on the one hand, to the nature of the transactions of the undertaking, domestic or foreign, and on the other, to its property, given that entities that only hold assets for private
  , non-business,
  use may not engage in transactions for a considerable time. Additionally, a third condition should point out to those undertakings which have no or inadequate own resources to perform core management activities. In this regard, undertakings that do not have adequate own resources tend to engage third party providers of administration, management, correspondence and legal compliance services or enter into relevant agreements with associated enterprises for the supply of such services in order to set up and maintain a legal and tax presence. Outsourcing of certain ancillary services only, such as bookkeeping services
  alone
  , while core activities remain with the undertaking, would not suffice in itself for an undertaking to meet this condition. While such service providers might be regulated for other, non-tax purposes, their obligations for such other purposes cannot always mitigate the risk that they enable the set up and maintenance of undertakings misused for tax avoidance and evasion practices. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5)

To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, the proportionality and effectiveness of potential rules, it would be desirable to limit their scope to undertakings which are at risk of being found to lack minimal substance and used
  with the main objective of obtaining
  a tax advantage. It would therefore be important to establish a gateway criterion, in the form of a set of three cumulative, indicative conditions, in order to conclude which undertakings are sufficiently at risk as aforementioned to justify that they be subjected to reporting requirements. A first condition should enable the identification of undertakings presumably engaged mainly in geographically mobile economic activities, as the place where such activities are actually carried out is usually more challenging to identify. Such activities normally give rise to important passive income flows. Hence, undertakings, which income consists predominantly of passive income flows would meet this condition. It should also be taken into account that entities holding assets for private use, such as real estate, yachts, jets,
  artworks
  , or equity alone, may have no income for longer periods of time, but still enable significant tax benefits by way of owning those assets. As purely domestic situations would not pose a risk for the good functioning of the internal market and would be best addressed at domestic level, a second condition should focus on undertakings engaged in cross-border activities. Engagement in cross-border activities should be established having regard, on the one hand, to the nature of the transactions of the undertaking, domestic or foreign, and on the other, to its property, given that entities that only hold assets for private
  , non-business,
  use may not engage in transactions for a considerable time. Additionally, a third condition should point out to those undertakings which have no or inadequate own resources to perform core management activities. In this regard, undertakings that do not have adequate own resources tend to engage third party providers of administration, management, correspondence and legal compliance services or enter into relevant agreements with associated enterprises for the supply of such services in order to set up and maintain a legal and tax presence. Outsourcing of certain ancillary services only, such as bookkeeping services
  alone
  , while core activities remain with the undertaking, would not suffice in itself for an undertaking to meet this condition. While such service providers might be regulated for other, non-tax purposes, their obligations for such other purposes cannot always mitigate the risk that they enable the set up and maintenance of undertakings misused for tax avoidance and evasion practices.

| (5) | To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, the proportionality and effectiveness of potential rules, it would be desirable to limit their scope to undertakings which are at risk of being found to lack minimal substance and used
  mainly to obtain
  a tax advantage. It would therefore be important to establish a gateway criterion, in the form of a set of three cumulative, indicative conditions, in order to conclude which undertakings are sufficiently at risk as aforementioned to justify that they be subjected to reporting requirements
  . Undertakings should carry out the gateway test by themselves in the form of a self-assessment
  . A first condition should enable the identification of undertakings presumably engaged mainly in geographically mobile economic activities, as the place where such activities are actually carried out is usually more challenging to identify. Such activities normally give rise to important passive income flows. Hence, undertakings, which income consists predominantly of passive income flows would meet this condition. It should also be taken into account that entities holding assets for private use, such as real estate, yachts, jets,
  art
  , or equity alone, may have no income for longer periods of time, but still enable significant tax benefits by way of owning those assets. As purely domestic situations would not pose a risk for the good functioning of the internal market and would be best addressed at domestic level, a second condition should focus on undertakings engaged in cross-border activities. Engagement in cross-border activities should be established having regard, on the one hand, to the nature of the transactions of the undertaking, domestic or foreign, and on the other, to its property, given that entities that only hold assets for private use may not engage in transactions for a considerable time. Additionally, a third condition should point out to those undertakings which have no or inadequate own resources to perform core management activities. In this regard, undertakings that do not have adequate own resources tend to engage third party providers of administration, management, correspondence and legal compliance services or enter into relevant agreements with associated enterprises for the supply of such services in order to set up and maintain a legal and tax presence. Outsourcing of certain ancillary services only, such as bookkeeping services, while core activities remain with the undertaking, would not suffice in itself for an undertaking to meet this condition. While such service providers might be regulated for other, non-tax purposes, their obligations for such other purposes cannot always mitigate the risk that they enable the set up and maintenance of undertakings misused for tax avoidance and evasion practices. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, the proportionality and effectiveness of potential rules, it would be desirable to limit their scope to undertakings which are at risk of being found to lack minimal substance and used
  mainly to obtain
  a tax advantage. It would therefore be important to establish a gateway criterion, in the form of a set of three cumulative, indicative conditions, in order to conclude which undertakings are sufficiently at risk as aforementioned to justify that they be subjected to reporting requirements
  . Undertakings should carry out the gateway test by themselves in the form of a self-assessment
  . A first condition should enable the identification of undertakings presumably engaged mainly in geographically mobile economic activities, as the place where such activities are actually carried out is usually more challenging to identify. Such activities normally give rise to important passive income flows. Hence, undertakings, which income consists predominantly of passive income flows would meet this condition. It should also be taken into account that entities holding assets for private use, such as real estate, yachts, jets,
  art
  , or equity alone, may have no income for longer periods of time, but still enable significant tax benefits by way of owning those assets. As purely domestic situations would not pose a risk for the good functioning of the internal market and would be best addressed at domestic level, a second condition should focus on undertakings engaged in cross-border activities. Engagement in cross-border activities should be established having regard, on the one hand, to the nature of the transactions of the undertaking, domestic or foreign, and on the other, to its property, given that entities that only hold assets for private use may not engage in transactions for a considerable time. Additionally, a third condition should point out to those undertakings which have no or inadequate own resources to perform core management activities. In this regard, undertakings that do not have adequate own resources tend to engage third party providers of administration, management, correspondence and legal compliance services or enter into relevant agreements with associated enterprises for the supply of such services in order to set up and maintain a legal and tax presence. Outsourcing of certain ancillary services only, such as bookkeeping services, while core activities remain with the undertaking, would not suffice in itself for an undertaking to meet this condition. While such service providers might be regulated for other, non-tax purposes, their obligations for such other purposes cannot always mitigate the risk that they enable the set up and maintenance of undertakings misused for tax avoidance and evasion practices.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a directive

Recital 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (6) | It
  would be fair
  to exclude from the envisaged rules undertakings whose activities are subject to an adequate level of transparency and therefore do not present a risk of lacking substance for tax purposes. Companies having a transferable security admitted to trading or listed on a regulated market or multilateral trading facility as well as certain financial undertakings which are heavily regulated in the Union, directly or indirectly, and subject to increased transparency requirements and supervision, should equally be excluded from the scope of this Directive. Pure holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as the operational subsidiary and their beneficial owner(s) are not likely to serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage either. Similar is the case of sub-holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as their shareholder or ultimate parent entity. On this basis, they should also be excluded.
  Undertakings that engage an adequate number of persons, full-time and exclusively, in order to carry out their activities should equally not be considered to lack minimal substance. While they are not reasonably expected to pass the gateway criterion, they should be excluded explicitly for purposes of legal certainty. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6)

It
  would be fair
  to exclude from the envisaged rules undertakings whose activities are subject to an adequate level of transparency and therefore do not present a risk of lacking substance for tax purposes. Companies having a transferable security admitted to trading or listed on a regulated market or multilateral trading facility as well as certain financial undertakings which are heavily regulated in the Union, directly or indirectly, and subject to increased transparency requirements and supervision, should equally be excluded from the scope of this Directive. Pure holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as the operational subsidiary and their beneficial owner(s) are not likely to serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage either. Similar is the case of sub-holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as their shareholder or ultimate parent entity. On this basis, they should also be excluded.
  Undertakings that engage an adequate number of persons, full-time and exclusively, in order to carry out their activities should equally not be considered to lack minimal substance. While they are not reasonably expected to pass the gateway criterion, they should be excluded explicitly for purposes of legal certainty.

| (6) | It
  is fair and proportionate
  to exclude from the envisaged rules undertakings whose activities are subject to an adequate level of transparency
  and tax supervision
  and therefore do not present a risk of lacking substance for tax purposes. Companies having a transferable security admitted to trading or listed on a regulated market or multilateral trading facility as well as certain financial undertakings which are heavily regulated in the Union, directly or indirectly, and subject to increased transparency requirements and supervision, should equally be excluded from the scope of this Directive. Pure holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as the operational subsidiary and their beneficial owner(s) are not likely to serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage either. Similar is the case of sub-holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as their shareholder or ultimate parent entity. On this basis, they should also be excluded.
  That exclusion applies expressly to undertakings that are regulated or presenting little risk of lacking substance. The exclusion should be seen as entity-by-entity and not broadened to cover a whole group. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

It
  is fair and proportionate
  to exclude from the envisaged rules undertakings whose activities are subject to an adequate level of transparency
  and tax supervision
  and therefore do not present a risk of lacking substance for tax purposes. Companies having a transferable security admitted to trading or listed on a regulated market or multilateral trading facility as well as certain financial undertakings which are heavily regulated in the Union, directly or indirectly, and subject to increased transparency requirements and supervision, should equally be excluded from the scope of this Directive. Pure holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as the operational subsidiary and their beneficial owner(s) are not likely to serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage either. Similar is the case of sub-holding undertakings which are situated in the same jurisdiction as their shareholder or ultimate parent entity. On this basis, they should also be excluded.
  That exclusion applies expressly to undertakings that are regulated or presenting little risk of lacking substance. The exclusion should be seen as entity-by-entity and not broadened to cover a whole group.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a directive

Recital 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (8) | To facilitate implementation of this Directive, undertakings at risk of being found to lack substance and used with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage should declare, in their annual tax return, that they possess a minimum level of resources
  such as
  people and premises in the Member State of tax residence and provide documentary evidence if that is the case. While it is recognised that different activities may require a different level or type of resources, a common minimum level of resources would be expected under all circumstances. This assessment should solely aim at identifying the substance of undertakings for tax purposes and does not question the role that ‘trust or company service providers’, as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12), have in the identification of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing. Conversely, the absence of a minimum level of resources may be considered to indicate a lack of substance where an undertaking is already at risk of being found to lack substance for tax purposes. To ensure compatibility with relevant international standards, a common minimum level should draw on the existing Union and international standards on substantial economic activity in the context of preferential tax regimes or in the absence of corporate taxation (13), as developed in the context of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. It is necessary to provide for submission of documentary evidence with the tax return in support of the declaration of the undertaking that it disposes a minimum of resources. It is also necessary in order to allow the administration to form a view based on the facts and circumstances of the undertaking and decide whether to initiate an audit procedure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8)

To facilitate implementation of this Directive, undertakings at risk of being found to lack substance and used with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage should declare, in their annual tax return, that they possess a minimum level of resources
  such as
  people and premises in the Member State of tax residence and provide documentary evidence if that is the case. While it is recognised that different activities may require a different level or type of resources, a common minimum level of resources would be expected under all circumstances. This assessment should solely aim at identifying the substance of undertakings for tax purposes and does not question the role that ‘trust or company service providers’, as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12), have in the identification of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing. Conversely, the absence of a minimum level of resources may be considered to indicate a lack of substance where an undertaking is already at risk of being found to lack substance for tax purposes. To ensure compatibility with relevant international standards, a common minimum level should draw on the existing Union and international standards on substantial economic activity in the context of preferential tax regimes or in the absence of corporate taxation (13), as developed in the context of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. It is necessary to provide for submission of documentary evidence with the tax return in support of the declaration of the undertaking that it disposes a minimum of resources. It is also necessary in order to allow the administration to form a view based on the facts and circumstances of the undertaking and decide whether to initiate an audit procedure.

| (8) | To facilitate implementation of this Directive, undertakings
  included in the scope of this Directive and
  at risk of being found to lack substance and used with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage should declare, in their annual tax return, that they possess a minimum level of resources
  , namely,
  people and premises in the Member State of tax residence, and provide documentary evidence if that is the case.
  The requirement relating to premises in a Member State should take into account the growing prevalence of remote working, for which legitimate enterprises downscale their premises and move away from retaining exclusive premises
  . While it is recognised that different activities may require a different level or type of resources, a common minimum level of resources would be expected under all circumstances. This assessment should solely aim at identifying the substance of undertakings for tax purposes and does not question the role that ‘trust or company service providers’, as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12), have in the identification of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing. Conversely, the absence of a minimum level of resources may be considered to indicate a lack of substance where an undertaking is already at risk of being found to lack substance for tax purposes. To ensure compatibility with relevant international standards, a common minimum level should draw on the existing Union and international standards on substantial economic activity in the context of preferential tax regimes or in the absence of corporate taxation (13), as developed in the context of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. It is necessary to provide for submission of documentary evidence with the tax return in support of the declaration of the undertaking that it disposes a minimum of resources. It is also necessary in order to allow the administration to form a view based on the facts and circumstances of the undertaking and decide whether to initiate an audit procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

To facilitate implementation of this Directive, undertakings
  included in the scope of this Directive and
  at risk of being found to lack substance and used with the main objective of obtaining a tax advantage should declare, in their annual tax return, that they possess a minimum level of resources
  , namely,
  people and premises in the Member State of tax residence, and provide documentary evidence if that is the case.
  The requirement relating to premises in a Member State should take into account the growing prevalence of remote working, for which legitimate enterprises downscale their premises and move away from retaining exclusive premises
  . While it is recognised that different activities may require a different level or type of resources, a common minimum level of resources would be expected under all circumstances. This assessment should solely aim at identifying the substance of undertakings for tax purposes and does not question the role that ‘trust or company service providers’, as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12), have in the identification of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing. Conversely, the absence of a minimum level of resources may be considered to indicate a lack of substance where an undertaking is already at risk of being found to lack substance for tax purposes. To ensure compatibility with relevant international standards, a common minimum level should draw on the existing Union and international standards on substantial economic activity in the context of preferential tax regimes or in the absence of corporate taxation (13), as developed in the context of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. It is necessary to provide for submission of documentary evidence with the tax return in support of the declaration of the undertaking that it disposes a minimum of resources. It is also necessary in order to allow the administration to form a view based on the facts and circumstances of the undertaking and decide whether to initiate an audit procedure.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a directive

Recital 9

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (9) | To ensure tax certainty, it is imperative to lay down common rules on the content of undertakings’ declarations. Undertakings that pass the gateway criterion and are consequently subject to reporting requirements should be presumed not to have sufficient substance for tax purposes if they also declare not to possess one or more of the elements that cumulatively constitute a minimum level of substance, or do not provide the required supporting evidence. Undertakings that declare to possess all the elements of the minimum level of substance and provide the required supporting documentation should instead be presumed to have minimal substance for tax purposes and should incur no further obligations and consequences under this Directive. This, however, should be without prejudice to any applicable law and the right of the administration to perform an audit, including on the basis of the supporting documentation
  , and possibly, arrive at a different conclusion
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9)

To ensure tax certainty, it is imperative to lay down common rules on the content of undertakings’ declarations. Undertakings that pass the gateway criterion and are consequently subject to reporting requirements should be presumed not to have sufficient substance for tax purposes if they also declare not to possess one or more of the elements that cumulatively constitute a minimum level of substance, or do not provide the required supporting evidence. Undertakings that declare to possess all the elements of the minimum level of substance and provide the required supporting documentation should instead be presumed to have minimal substance for tax purposes and should incur no further obligations and consequences under this Directive. This, however, should be without prejudice to any applicable law and the right of the administration to perform an audit, including on the basis of the supporting documentation
  , and possibly, arrive at a different conclusion
  .

| (9) | To ensure tax certainty
  and stability
  , it is imperative to lay down common rules on the content of undertakings’ declarations. Undertakings that pass the gateway criterion and are consequently subject to reporting requirements should be presumed not to have sufficient substance for tax purposes if they also declare not to possess one or more of the elements that cumulatively constitute a minimum level of substance, or do not provide the required supporting evidence. Undertakings that declare to possess all the elements of the minimum level of substance and provide the required supporting documentation should instead be presumed to have minimal substance for tax purposes and should incur no further obligations and consequences under this Directive. This, however, should be without prejudice to any applicable law and the right of the administration to perform an audit, including on the basis of the supporting documentation
  . In order to allow Member States to allocate the resources of their tax administrations efficiently, Member States should be able to determine a period during which the undertaking is presumed to have minimum substance, provided that the factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged during that period. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

To ensure tax certainty
  and stability
  , it is imperative to lay down common rules on the content of undertakings’ declarations. Undertakings that pass the gateway criterion and are consequently subject to reporting requirements should be presumed not to have sufficient substance for tax purposes if they also declare not to possess one or more of the elements that cumulatively constitute a minimum level of substance, or do not provide the required supporting evidence. Undertakings that declare to possess all the elements of the minimum level of substance and provide the required supporting documentation should instead be presumed to have minimal substance for tax purposes and should incur no further obligations and consequences under this Directive. This, however, should be without prejudice to any applicable law and the right of the administration to perform an audit, including on the basis of the supporting documentation
  . In order to allow Member States to allocate the resources of their tax administrations efficiently, Member States should be able to determine a period during which the undertaking is presumed to have minimum substance, provided that the factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged during that period.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a directive

Recital 10

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (10) | It is recognised that
  whether an undertaking is actually performing economic activities for tax purposes or serves mainly tax avoidance or evasion purposes is ultimately a matter of facts and circumstances. This should be assessed on a case by case basis in respect of each specific undertaking. Therefore, undertakings presumed not to have minimal substance for tax purposes should be entitled to prove the contrary, including to prove that they do not serve primarily tax objectives, and rebut such presumption. After fulfilling their reporting obligations under this Directive, they should provide
  additional
  information to the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes. While they may provide any additional information that they deem appropriate, it is essential to set common requirements of what may constitute appropriate additional evidence and should thus be required in all cases. Where the Member State, based on such additional evidence, considers that an undertaking has rebutted a presumption of lack of substance in a satisfactory manner, it should be able to issue a decision to certify that the undertaking has minimal substance for tax purposes in accordance with this Directive. Such decision may remain valid for the period during which factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged and up to
  6
  years from the time the decision is issued. This will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that have been evidenced not to be a shell for the purposes of the Directive. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10)

It is recognised that
  whether an undertaking is actually performing economic activities for tax purposes or serves mainly tax avoidance or evasion purposes is ultimately a matter of facts and circumstances. This should be assessed on a case by case basis in respect of each specific undertaking. Therefore, undertakings presumed not to have minimal substance for tax purposes should be entitled to prove the contrary, including to prove that they do not serve primarily tax objectives, and rebut such presumption. After fulfilling their reporting obligations under this Directive, they should provide
  additional
  information to the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes. While they may provide any additional information that they deem appropriate, it is essential to set common requirements of what may constitute appropriate additional evidence and should thus be required in all cases. Where the Member State, based on such additional evidence, considers that an undertaking has rebutted a presumption of lack of substance in a satisfactory manner, it should be able to issue a decision to certify that the undertaking has minimal substance for tax purposes in accordance with this Directive. Such decision may remain valid for the period during which factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged and up to
  6
  years from the time the decision is issued. This will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that have been evidenced not to be a shell for the purposes of the Directive.

| (10) | The evaluation of
  whether an undertaking is actually performing economic activities relevant for tax purposes or serves mainly tax avoidance or evasion purposes, is ultimately a matter of facts and circumstances. This should be assessed on a case by case basis in respect of each specific undertaking. Therefore, undertakings presumed not to have minimal substance for tax purposes should be entitled to prove the contrary, including to prove that they do not serve primarily tax objectives, and rebut such presumption. After fulfilling their reporting obligations under this Directive, they should provide
  the necessary
  information to the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes. While they may provide any additional information that they deem appropriate, it is essential to set common requirements of what may constitute appropriate additional evidence and should thus be required in all cases. Where the Member State, based on such additional evidence, considers that an undertaking has rebutted a presumption of lack of substance in a satisfactory manner, it should be able to issue a decision to certify that the undertaking has minimal substance for tax purposes in accordance with this Directive. Such decision may remain valid for the period during which factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged and up to
  5
  years from the time the decision is issued. This will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that have been evidenced not to be a shell for the purposes of the Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The evaluation of
  whether an undertaking is actually performing economic activities relevant for tax purposes or serves mainly tax avoidance or evasion purposes, is ultimately a matter of facts and circumstances. This should be assessed on a case by case basis in respect of each specific undertaking. Therefore, undertakings presumed not to have minimal substance for tax purposes should be entitled to prove the contrary, including to prove that they do not serve primarily tax objectives, and rebut such presumption. After fulfilling their reporting obligations under this Directive, they should provide
  the necessary
  information to the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes. While they may provide any additional information that they deem appropriate, it is essential to set common requirements of what may constitute appropriate additional evidence and should thus be required in all cases. Where the Member State, based on such additional evidence, considers that an undertaking has rebutted a presumption of lack of substance in a satisfactory manner, it should be able to issue a decision to certify that the undertaking has minimal substance for tax purposes in accordance with this Directive. Such decision may remain valid for the period during which factual and legal circumstances of the undertaking remain unchanged and up to
  5
  years from the time the decision is issued. This will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that have been evidenced not to be a shell for the purposes of the Directive.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a directive

Recital 11

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (11) | As the objective of this Directive is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion
  that are likely to flourish
  through actions by undertakings without minimal substance, and in order to ensure tax certainty and enhance the proper functioning of the internal market, it is paramount to provide for a possibility of exemptions for undertakings which meet the gateway criterion but yet whose interposition has no actual advantageous impact on the overall tax position of the undertaking’s group or of the beneficial owner(s). For that reason, such undertakings should be entitled to request the administration of the Member State, where they reside for tax purposes, to issue a decision which exempts them from complying with the proposed rules altogether and upfront. Such exemption should also be limited in time, to allow the administration to verify on a regular basis that the factual and legal circumstances justifying the exemption decision remain valid. At the same time a potential extended duration of such decision will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that should be exempt from the scope of the Directive. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11)

As the objective of this Directive is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion
  that are likely to flourish
  through actions by undertakings without minimal substance, and in order to ensure tax certainty and enhance the proper functioning of the internal market, it is paramount to provide for a possibility of exemptions for undertakings which meet the gateway criterion but yet whose interposition has no actual advantageous impact on the overall tax position of the undertaking’s group or of the beneficial owner(s). For that reason, such undertakings should be entitled to request the administration of the Member State, where they reside for tax purposes, to issue a decision which exempts them from complying with the proposed rules altogether and upfront. Such exemption should also be limited in time, to allow the administration to verify on a regular basis that the factual and legal circumstances justifying the exemption decision remain valid. At the same time a potential extended duration of such decision will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that should be exempt from the scope of the Directive.

| (11) | As the objective of this Directive is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion through actions by undertakings without minimal substance, and in order to ensure tax certainty and enhance the proper functioning of the internal market, it is paramount to provide for a possibility of exemptions for undertakings which meet the gateway criterion but yet whose interposition has no actual advantageous impact on the overall tax position of the undertaking’s group or of the beneficial owner(s). For that reason, such undertakings should be entitled to request the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes to issue a decision which exempts them from complying with the proposed rules altogether and upfront,
  without requiring the untertaking to perform the substance test, if it can prove the lack of tax benefit for the entity concerned
  . Such exemption should also be limited in time, to allow the administration to verify on a regular basis that the factual and legal circumstances justifying the exemption decision remain valid. At the same time a potential extended duration of such decision will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that should be exempt from the scope of the Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

As the objective of this Directive is to prevent tax avoidance and evasion through actions by undertakings without minimal substance, and in order to ensure tax certainty and enhance the proper functioning of the internal market, it is paramount to provide for a possibility of exemptions for undertakings which meet the gateway criterion but yet whose interposition has no actual advantageous impact on the overall tax position of the undertaking’s group or of the beneficial owner(s). For that reason, such undertakings should be entitled to request the administration of the Member State where they reside for tax purposes to issue a decision which exempts them from complying with the proposed rules altogether and upfront,
  without requiring the untertaking to perform the substance test, if it can prove the lack of tax benefit for the entity concerned
  . Such exemption should also be limited in time, to allow the administration to verify on a regular basis that the factual and legal circumstances justifying the exemption decision remain valid. At the same time a potential extended duration of such decision will allow to limit the resources allocated to cases that should be exempt from the scope of the Directive.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a directive

Recital 13

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (13) | To ensure effectiveness of the proposed framework, it is necessary to establish appropriate tax consequences for undertakings that do not have minimal substance for tax purposes. Undertakings that have crossed the gateway criterion and are presumed to be lacking substance for tax purposes while, additionally, have not provided evidence to the contrary or evidence that they do not serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage, should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, to which the Member State of their tax residence is a party and from any other agreements, including provisions in international agreements for the promotion and protection of investments, with equivalent purpose or effect. Such undertakings should not be allowed to benefit from Council Directive 2011/96/EU (14) and Council Directive 2003/49/EC (15). To this effect, those undertakings should not be entitled to a certificate of tax residence to the extent that this serves to obtain those benefits. The Member State where the undertaking is resident for tax purposes should therefore deny to issue a certificate of tax residence
  . Alternatively, that Member State should be able to
  issue
  such certificate while indicating, by means of a warning, that it should not be used by the undertaking to obtain tax benefits as above
  . This denial of a certificate of tax residence
  , or alternatively the issue of a special certificate of tax residence,
  should not set aside the national rules of the Member State of the undertaking with regard to the tax residence and relevant obligations linked thereto. It would rather serve to communicate to other Member States, and third countries, that no relief or refund should be granted with regard to transactions involving this undertaking based on any treaty with the Member State of the undertaking or Union directives, if applicable. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13)

To ensure effectiveness of the proposed framework, it is necessary to establish appropriate tax consequences for undertakings that do not have minimal substance for tax purposes. Undertakings that have crossed the gateway criterion and are presumed to be lacking substance for tax purposes while, additionally, have not provided evidence to the contrary or evidence that they do not serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage, should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, to which the Member State of their tax residence is a party and from any other agreements, including provisions in international agreements for the promotion and protection of investments, with equivalent purpose or effect. Such undertakings should not be allowed to benefit from Council Directive 2011/96/EU (14) and Council Directive 2003/49/EC (15). To this effect, those undertakings should not be entitled to a certificate of tax residence to the extent that this serves to obtain those benefits. The Member State where the undertaking is resident for tax purposes should therefore deny to issue a certificate of tax residence
  . Alternatively, that Member State should be able to
  issue
  such certificate while indicating, by means of a warning, that it should not be used by the undertaking to obtain tax benefits as above
  . This denial of a certificate of tax residence
  , or alternatively the issue of a special certificate of tax residence,
  should not set aside the national rules of the Member State of the undertaking with regard to the tax residence and relevant obligations linked thereto. It would rather serve to communicate to other Member States, and third countries, that no relief or refund should be granted with regard to transactions involving this undertaking based on any treaty with the Member State of the undertaking or Union directives, if applicable.

| (13) | To ensure effectiveness of the proposed framework, it is necessary to establish appropriate tax consequences for undertakings that do not have minimal substance for tax purposes. Undertakings that have crossed the gateway criterion and are presumed to be lacking substance for tax purposes while, additionally, have not provided evidence to the contrary or evidence that they do not serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage, should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, to which the Member State of their tax residence is a party and from any other agreements, including provisions in international agreements for the promotion and protection of investments, with equivalent purpose or effect. Such undertakings should not be allowed to benefit from Council Directive 2011/96/EU (14) and Council Directive 2003/49/EC (15). To this effect, those undertakings should not be entitled to a certificate of tax residence to the extent that this serves to obtain those benefits. The Member State where the undertaking is resident for tax purposes should therefore deny to issue a certificate of tax residence
  and
  issue
  a statement indicating the grounds on which the decision was based
  . This denial of a certificate of tax residence should not set aside the national rules of the Member State of the undertaking with regard to the tax residence and relevant obligations linked thereto. It would rather serve to communicate to other Member States, and third countries, that no relief or refund should be granted with regard to transactions involving this undertaking based on any treaty with the Member State of the undertaking or Union directives, if applicable. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

To ensure effectiveness of the proposed framework, it is necessary to establish appropriate tax consequences for undertakings that do not have minimal substance for tax purposes. Undertakings that have crossed the gateway criterion and are presumed to be lacking substance for tax purposes while, additionally, have not provided evidence to the contrary or evidence that they do not serve the objective of obtaining a tax advantage, should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, to which the Member State of their tax residence is a party and from any other agreements, including provisions in international agreements for the promotion and protection of investments, with equivalent purpose or effect. Such undertakings should not be allowed to benefit from Council Directive 2011/96/EU (14) and Council Directive 2003/49/EC (15). To this effect, those undertakings should not be entitled to a certificate of tax residence to the extent that this serves to obtain those benefits. The Member State where the undertaking is resident for tax purposes should therefore deny to issue a certificate of tax residence
  and
  issue
  a statement indicating the grounds on which the decision was based
  . This denial of a certificate of tax residence should not set aside the national rules of the Member State of the undertaking with regard to the tax residence and relevant obligations linked thereto. It would rather serve to communicate to other Member States, and third countries, that no relief or refund should be granted with regard to transactions involving this undertaking based on any treaty with the Member State of the undertaking or Union directives, if applicable.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a directive

Recital 13 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (13a) | The Commission and Member States should make sure that those tax consequences are articulated in a consistent manner with existing bilateral tax agreements concluded between Member States and third countries. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13a)

The Commission and Member States should make sure that those tax consequences are articulated in a consistent manner with existing bilateral tax agreements concluded between Member States and third countries.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a directive

Recital 15

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (15) | Directive 2011/16/EU should therefore be amended accordingly. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15)

Directive 2011/16/EU should therefore be amended accordingly.

| (15) | In light of the fact that
  Directive 2011/16/EU
  on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) laid down the rules and procedures for cooperation between Member States on the exchange of information between tax administrations of the Member States, notably the automatic exchange of information for tax purposes, this Directive
  should therefore be amended accordingly
  allowing Member States to automatically exchange the information received in the framework of this Directive
  . |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In light of the fact that
  Directive 2011/16/EU
  on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) laid down the rules and procedures for cooperation between Member States on the exchange of information between tax administrations of the Member States, notably the automatic exchange of information for tax purposes, this Directive
  should therefore be amended accordingly
  allowing Member States to automatically exchange the information received in the framework of this Directive
  .

Amendment 18

Proposal for a directive

Recital 16

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (16) | In order to improve effectiveness, Member States should lay down penalties against the violation of the national rules that transpose this Directive. Such penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. To ensure tax certainty and a minimum level of coordination across all Member States, it is necessary to fix a minimum monetary penalty, also taking into account the situation of each specific undertaking. The envisaged rules rely on self-assessment by the undertakings
  as regards
  whether or not they meet the gateway criteria. To achieve effectiveness of the provisions, incentivising adequate compliance across the Union, and taking into account that a shell undertaking in one Member State may be used to erode the tax base of another Member State, it is important that any Member State has the right to request another Member State to conduct tax audits of undertakings at risk
  for
  not fulfilling minimum substance as defined in this Directive.
  Accordingly, to reinforce effectiveness, it is essential that the requested Member State has an obligation to carry out such audit and to share information on the outcome, even where there is no finding of ‘shell’ entity. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16)

In order to improve effectiveness, Member States should lay down penalties against the violation of the national rules that transpose this Directive. Such penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. To ensure tax certainty and a minimum level of coordination across all Member States, it is necessary to fix a minimum monetary penalty, also taking into account the situation of each specific undertaking. The envisaged rules rely on self-assessment by the undertakings
  as regards
  whether or not they meet the gateway criteria. To achieve effectiveness of the provisions, incentivising adequate compliance across the Union, and taking into account that a shell undertaking in one Member State may be used to erode the tax base of another Member State, it is important that any Member State has the right to request another Member State to conduct tax audits of undertakings at risk
  for
  not fulfilling minimum substance as defined in this Directive.
  Accordingly, to reinforce effectiveness, it is essential that the requested Member State has an obligation to carry out such audit and to share information on the outcome, even where there is no finding of ‘shell’ entity.

| (16) | In order to improve effectiveness, Member States should lay down penalties against the violation of the national rules that transpose this Directive. Such penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. To ensure tax certainty and a minimum level of coordination across all Member States, it is necessary to fix a minimum monetary penalty, also taking into account the situation of each specific undertaking. The envisaged rules rely on
  a
  self-assessment
  performed
  by the undertakings
  to determine
  whether or not they meet the gateway criteria. To achieve effectiveness of the provisions, incentivising adequate compliance across the Union, and taking into account that a shell undertaking in one Member State may be used to erode the tax base of another Member State, it is important that any Member State has the right to request another Member State to conduct
  joint
  tax audits of undertakings at risk
  of
  not fulfilling minimum substance as defined in this Directive.
  Joint audits allow for the pooling of expertise, thereby ensuring a complete determination of the facts and promoting acceptance of the audit results. Council Directive (EU) 2021/514

   (16)

  created a uniform framework for joint audits and therefore, in appropriate cases, they should be used. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In order to improve effectiveness, Member States should lay down penalties against the violation of the national rules that transpose this Directive. Such penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. To ensure tax certainty and a minimum level of coordination across all Member States, it is necessary to fix a minimum monetary penalty, also taking into account the situation of each specific undertaking. The envisaged rules rely on
  a
  self-assessment
  performed
  by the undertakings
  to determine
  whether or not they meet the gateway criteria. To achieve effectiveness of the provisions, incentivising adequate compliance across the Union, and taking into account that a shell undertaking in one Member State may be used to erode the tax base of another Member State, it is important that any Member State has the right to request another Member State to conduct
  joint
  tax audits of undertakings at risk
  of
  not fulfilling minimum substance as defined in this Directive.
  Joint audits allow for the pooling of expertise, thereby ensuring a complete determination of the facts and promoting acceptance of the audit results. Council Directive (EU) 2021/514

   (16)

  created a uniform framework for joint audits and therefore, in appropriate cases, they should be used.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a directive

Recital 18

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (18) | In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed new rules, the Commission should prepare an evaluation on the basis of the information provided by Member States and other available data. The Commission’s report should be published. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(18)

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed new rules, the Commission should prepare an evaluation on the basis of the information provided by Member States and other available data. The Commission’s report should be published.

| (18) | In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed new rules,
  as well as their impact on tax revenues in Member States and on the capacity of tax administrations
  , the Commission should prepare an evaluation on the basis of the information provided by Member States and other available data. The Commission’s report should be published
  and, if appropriate, accompanied by a review with a view to increasing the effectiveness of this Directive and by a legislative proposal amending this Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed new rules,
  as well as their impact on tax revenues in Member States and on the capacity of tax administrations
  , the Commission should prepare an evaluation on the basis of the information provided by Member States and other available data. The Commission’s report should be published
  and, if appropriate, accompanied by a review with a view to increasing the effectiveness of this Directive and by a legislative proposal amending this Directive.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a directive

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — point 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (5) | ‘beneficial owner’ means beneficial owner as defined in
  Article 3, point (6), of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5)

‘beneficial owner’ means beneficial owner as defined in
  Article 3, point (6), of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| (5) | ‘beneficial owner’ means beneficial owner as defined in
  Article 2, point 22, of [please insert reference — proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing — COM(2021)0420 final]; |
| --- | --- |

(5)

‘beneficial owner’ means beneficial owner as defined in
  Article 2, point 22, of [please insert reference — proposal for a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing — COM(2021)0420 final];

Amendment 21

Proposal for a directive

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — point 6 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (6a) | ‘tax benefit’ means a reduction in the obligatory liabilities of an undertaking to the government of tax residence. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6a)

Amendment 22

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Member States shall require that undertakings meeting the following criteria to report to the competent authorities of Member States in accordance with Article 7: | 1.   Member States shall require that undertakings meeting the following
  cumulative
  criteria to report to the competent authorities of Member States in accordance with Article 7: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1.   Member States shall require that undertakings meeting the following criteria to report to the competent authorities of Member States in accordance with Article 7:

1.   Member States shall require that undertakings meeting the following
  cumulative
  criteria to report to the competent authorities of Member States in accordance with Article 7:

Amendment 23

Amendment 23

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point a

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | more than
  75 %
  of the revenues accruing to the undertaking in the preceding two tax years is relevant income; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

more than
  75 %
  of the revenues accruing to the undertaking in the preceding two tax years is relevant income;

75 %

| (a) | more than
  65 %
  of the revenues accruing to the undertaking in the preceding two tax years is relevant income; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

more than
  65 %
  of the revenues accruing to the undertaking in the preceding two tax years is relevant income;

65 %

Amendment 24

Amendment 24

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point b — point i

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point b — point i

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (i) | more than
  60 %
  of the book value of the undertaking’s assets that fall within the scope of Article 4, points (e) and (f), was located outside the Member State of the undertaking in the preceding two tax years; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(i)

more than
  60 %
  of the book value of the undertaking’s assets that fall within the scope of Article 4, points (e) and (f), was located outside the Member State of the undertaking in the preceding two tax years;

60 %

| (i) | more than
  55 %
  of the book value of the undertaking’s assets that fall within the scope of Article 4, points (e) and (f), was located outside the Member State of the undertaking in the preceding two tax years; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

more than
  55 %
  of the book value of the undertaking’s assets that fall within the scope of Article 4, points (e) and (f), was located outside the Member State of the undertaking in the preceding two tax years;

55 %

Amendment 25

Amendment 25

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point b — point ii

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point b — point ii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (ii) | at least 60 %
  of the undertaking’s relevant income is earned or paid out via cross-border transactions; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ii)

at least 60 %
  of the undertaking’s relevant income is earned or paid out via cross-border transactions;

at least 60 %

| (ii) | more than 55 %
  of the undertaking’s relevant income is earned or paid out via cross-border transactions; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

more than 55 %
  of the undertaking’s relevant income is earned or paid out via cross-border transactions;

more than 55 %

Amendment 26

Amendment 26

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point c

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | in the preceding two tax years, the undertaking outsourced the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

in the preceding two tax years, the undertaking outsourced the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions.

| (c) | in the preceding two tax years, the undertaking outsourced the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions
  to a third party. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

in the preceding two tax years, the undertaking outsourced the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions
  to a third party.

to a third party.

Amendment 27

Amendment 27

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 2– subparagraph 1 — introductory part

Article 6 — paragraph 2– subparagraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   By derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that the undertakings
  falling within any of the following categories
  are not subject to requirements of Article 7: | 2.   By derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that the
  following
  undertakings are not subject to requirements of Article 7: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   By derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that the undertakings
  falling within any of the following categories
  are not subject to requirements of Article 7:

2.   By derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that the
  following
  undertakings are not subject to requirements of Article 7:

Amendment 28

Amendment 28

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 6 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 — point e

Article 6 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | undertakings with at least five own full-time equivalent employees or members of staff exclusively carrying out the activities generating the relevant income; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

undertakings with at least five own full-time equivalent employees or members of staff exclusively carrying out the activities generating the relevant income;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 29

Amendment 29

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | the undertaking has own premises in the Member State,
  or
  premises for its exclusive use; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

the undertaking has own premises in the Member State,
  or
  premises for its exclusive use;

or

| (a) | the undertaking has own premises in the Member State, premises for its exclusive use
  or premises shared with entities of the same group
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the undertaking has own premises in the Member State, premises for its exclusive use
  or premises shared with entities of the same group
  ;

or premises shared with entities of the same group

Amendment 30

Amendment 30

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the undertaking has at least one own and active bank account in the Union; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

the undertaking has at least one own and active bank account in the Union;

| (b) | the undertaking has at least one own and active bank account
  or e-money account
  in the Union
  through which the relevant income is received
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the undertaking has at least one own and active bank account
  or e-money account
  in the Union
  through which the relevant income is received
  ;

or e-money account

through which the relevant income is received

Amendment 31

Amendment 31

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 2

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (2) | are
  qualified and
  authorised to take decisions in relation to the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking or in relation to the undertaking’s assets; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(2)

are
  qualified and
  authorised to take decisions in relation to the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking or in relation to the undertaking’s assets;

qualified and

| (2) | are authorised to take decisions in relation to the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking or in relation to the undertaking’s assets; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

are authorised to take decisions in relation to the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking or in relation to the undertaking’s assets;

Amendment 32

Amendment 32

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 3

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (3) | actively and independently use the authorisation referred to in point (2) on a regular basis; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(3)

(3)

actively and independently use the authorisation referred to in point (2) on a regular basis;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 33

Amendment 33

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 4

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point i — point 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (4) | are not employees of an enterprise that is not an associated enterprise and do not perform the function of director or equivalent of other enterprises that are not associated enterprises; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(4)

(4)

are not employees of an enterprise that is not an associated enterprise and do not perform the function of director or equivalent of other enterprises that are not associated enterprises;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 34

Amendment 34

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point ii

Article 7 — paragraph 1 — point c — point ii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (ii) | the majority of the full-time equivalent employees of the undertaking
  are resident for tax purposes
  in the Member State of the undertaking, or at no greater distance from that Member States insofar as such distance is compatible with the proper performance of their duties, and such employees are qualified to carry out the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ii)

the majority of the full-time equivalent employees of the undertaking
  are resident for tax purposes
  in the Member State of the undertaking, or at no greater distance from that Member States insofar as such distance is compatible with the proper performance of their duties, and such employees are qualified to carry out the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking.

are resident for tax purposes

| (ii) | the majority of the full-time equivalent employees of the undertaking
  have their habitual residence as set out in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008
  in the Member State of the undertaking, or
  are
  at no greater distance from that Member States insofar as such distance is compatible with the proper performance of their duties, and such employees are qualified to carry out the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the majority of the full-time equivalent employees of the undertaking
  have their habitual residence as set out in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008
  in the Member State of the undertaking, or
  are
  at no greater distance from that Member States insofar as such distance is compatible with the proper performance of their duties, and such employees are qualified to carry out the activities that generate relevant income for the undertaking.

have their habitual residence as set out in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008

are

Amendment 35

Amendment 35

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 2 — point g a (new)

Article 7 — paragraph 2 — point g a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ga) | an overview of the structure of the undertaking and associated enterprises and any significant outsourcing arrangements, including the rationale behind the structure, described in the context of a standardised format; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ga)

(ga)

an overview of the structure of the undertaking and associated enterprises and any significant outsourcing arrangements, including the rationale behind the structure, described in the context of a standardised format;

an overview of the structure of the undertaking and associated enterprises and any significant outsourcing arrangements, including the rationale behind the structure, described in the context of a standardised format;

Amendment 36

Amendment 36

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 7 — paragraph 2 — point g b (new)

Article 7 — paragraph 2 — point g b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (gb) | a summary report of the documentary evidence submitted under this paragraph, containing in particular:








  — | a brief description of the nature of the activities of the undertaking; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(gb)

(gb)

a summary report of the documentary evidence submitted under this paragraph, containing in particular:

a summary report of the documentary evidence submitted under this paragraph, containing in particular:

—

a brief description of the nature of the activities of the undertaking;

a brief description of the nature of the activities of the undertaking;

| — | the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis; |
| --- | --- |

—

the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis;

the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis;

| — | the amount of profit or loss before and after taxes. |
| --- | --- |

—

the amount of profit or loss before and after taxes.

the amount of profit or loss before and after taxes.

Amendment 37

Amendment 37

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 8 — paragraph 1

Article 8 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   An undertaking that declares to meet all the indicators of minimum substance set out in Article 7(1) and provides the
  satisfactory
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed to have minimum substance for the tax year. | 1.   An undertaking that declares to meet all the indicators of minimum substance set out in Article 7(1) and provides the
  required
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed to have minimum substance for the tax year. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   An undertaking that declares to meet all the indicators of minimum substance set out in Article 7(1) and provides the
  satisfactory
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed to have minimum substance for the tax year.

1.   An undertaking that declares to meet all the indicators of minimum substance set out in Article 7(1) and provides the
  required
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed to have minimum substance for the tax year.

Amendment 38

Amendment 38

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 8 — paragraph 2

Article 8 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   An undertaking that declares not to meet one or more of the indicators set out in Article 7(1) or does not provide
  satisfactory
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed not to have minimum substance for the tax year. | 2.   An undertaking that declares not to meet one or more of the indicators set out in Article 7(1) or does not provide
  the required
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed not to have minimum substance for the tax year. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   An undertaking that declares not to meet one or more of the indicators set out in Article 7(1) or does not provide
  satisfactory
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed not to have minimum substance for the tax year.

2.   An undertaking that declares not to meet one or more of the indicators set out in Article 7(1) or does not provide
  the required
  supporting documentary evidence in accordance with Article 7(2) shall be presumed not to have minimum substance for the tax year.

Amendment 39

Amendment 39

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 9 — paragraph 1

Article 9 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Member States shall take the
  appropriate
  measures to allow undertakings that are presumed not to have minimum substance under Article 8(2) to rebut this presumption by providing any additional supporting evidence of the business activities which they perform to generate relevant income. | 1.   Member States shall take the
  necessary
  measures to allow undertakings that are presumed not to have minimum substance under Article 8(2) to rebut this presumption
  , without undue delay and excessive administrative costs,
  by providing any additional supporting evidence of the business activities which they perform to generate relevant income. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Member States shall take the
  appropriate
  measures to allow undertakings that are presumed not to have minimum substance under Article 8(2) to rebut this presumption by providing any additional supporting evidence of the business activities which they perform to generate relevant income.

1.   Member States shall take the
  necessary
  measures to allow undertakings that are presumed not to have minimum substance under Article 8(2) to rebut this presumption
  , without undue delay and excessive administrative costs,
  by providing any additional supporting evidence of the business activities which they perform to generate relevant income.

Amendment 40

Amendment 40

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — point a

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | a document allowing to ascertain the
  commercial
  rationale behind the establishment of the undertaking; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

a document allowing to ascertain the
  commercial
  rationale behind the establishment of the undertaking;

commercial

| (a) | a document allowing to ascertain the
  business
  rationale behind the establishment of the undertaking
  in the Member State where the activity is performed; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

a document allowing to ascertain the
  business
  rationale behind the establishment of the undertaking
  in the Member State where the activity is performed;

business

in the Member State where the activity is performed;

Amendment 41

Amendment 41

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — point b

Article 9 — paragraph 2 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | information about the employee profiles,
  including
  the level of their experience, their decision-making power in the overall organisation, role and position in the organisation chart, the type of their employment contract, their qualifications and duration of employment; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

information about the employee profiles,
  including
  the level of their experience, their decision-making power in the overall organisation, role and position in the organisation chart, the type of their employment contract, their qualifications and duration of employment;

including

| (b) | information about the
  full-time, part-time, and freelance
  employee profiles,
  namely
  the level of their experience, their decision-making power in the overall organisation, role and position in the organisation chart, the type of their employment contract, their qualifications and duration of employment
  , safeguarding high levels of data protection and privacy
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

information about the
  full-time, part-time, and freelance
  employee profiles,
  namely
  the level of their experience, their decision-making power in the overall organisation, role and position in the organisation chart, the type of their employment contract, their qualifications and duration of employment
  , safeguarding high levels of data protection and privacy
  ;

full-time, part-time, and freelance

namely

, safeguarding high levels of data protection and privacy

Amendment 42

Amendment 42

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 9 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 9 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  The Member State shall consider a request for the rebuttal of the presumption within a period of nine months after the introduction of the request and it shall be considered to be accepted in the absence of an answer from the Member State after the expiry of that nine-month period. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  The Member State shall consider a request for the rebuttal of the presumption within a period of nine months after the introduction of the request and it shall be considered to be accepted in the absence of an answer from the Member State after the expiry of that nine-month period.

Amendment 43

Amendment 43

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 10 — paragraph 1

Article 10 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   A Member State shall take the
  appropriate
  measures to allow an undertaking that meets the criteria laid down in Article 6(1) to request an exemption from its obligations under this Directive if the existence of the undertaking does not reduce the tax liability of its beneficial owner(s) or of the group, as a whole, of which the undertaking is a member. | 1.   A Member State shall take the
  necessary
  measures to allow an undertaking that meets the criteria laid down in Article 6(1) to request
  , without undue delay and excessive administrative costs,
  an exemption from its obligations under this Directive if the existence of the undertaking does not reduce the tax liability of its beneficial owner(s) or of the group, as a whole, of which the undertaking is a member. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   A Member State shall take the
  appropriate
  measures to allow an undertaking that meets the criteria laid down in Article 6(1) to request an exemption from its obligations under this Directive if the existence of the undertaking does not reduce the tax liability of its beneficial owner(s) or of the group, as a whole, of which the undertaking is a member.

1.   A Member State shall take the
  necessary
  measures to allow an undertaking that meets the criteria laid down in Article 6(1) to request
  , without undue delay and excessive administrative costs,
  an exemption from its obligations under this Directive if the existence of the undertaking does not reduce the tax liability of its beneficial owner(s) or of the group, as a whole, of which the undertaking is a member.

Amendment 44

Amendment 44

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 10 — paragraph 2

Article 10 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   A Member State may grant that exemption for one tax year if the undertaking provides sufficient and objective evidence that its interposition does not lead to a tax benefit for its beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be. That evidence shall include information about the structure of the group and its activities. That evidence shall allow to compare the amount of overall tax due by the beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be, having regard to the interposition of the undertaking, with the amount that would be due under the same circumstances in the absence of the undertaking. | 2.   A Member State may grant that exemption for one tax year if the undertaking provides sufficient and objective evidence that its interposition does not lead to a tax benefit for its beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be. That evidence shall include information about the structure of the group and its activities
  , including a list of its employees working on full-time equivalence
  . That evidence shall allow to compare the amount of overall tax due by the beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be, having regard to the interposition of the undertaking, with the amount that would be due under the same circumstances in the absence of the undertaking. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   A Member State may grant that exemption for one tax year if the undertaking provides sufficient and objective evidence that its interposition does not lead to a tax benefit for its beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be. That evidence shall include information about the structure of the group and its activities. That evidence shall allow to compare the amount of overall tax due by the beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be, having regard to the interposition of the undertaking, with the amount that would be due under the same circumstances in the absence of the undertaking.

2.   A Member State may grant that exemption for one tax year if the undertaking provides sufficient and objective evidence that its interposition does not lead to a tax benefit for its beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be. That evidence shall include information about the structure of the group and its activities
  , including a list of its employees working on full-time equivalence
  . That evidence shall allow to compare the amount of overall tax due by the beneficial owner(s) or the group as a whole, as the case may be, having regard to the interposition of the undertaking, with the amount that would be due under the same circumstances in the absence of the undertaking.

Amendment 45

Amendment 45

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 10 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 10 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  A Member State shall consider the exemption request within a period of nine months after the introduction of the request and it shall be considered to be accepted in the absence of an answer from the Member State after the expiry of the nine-month period. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  A Member State shall consider the exemption request within a period of nine months after the introduction of the request and it shall be considered to be accepted in the absence of an answer from the Member State after the expiry of the nine-month period.

Amendment 46

Amendment 46

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where an undertaking does not have minimum substance for tax purposes in the Member State where it is resident for tax purposes, that Member State shall
  take any of the following decisions: | Where an undertaking does not have minimum substance for tax purposes in the Member State where it is resident for tax purposes, that Member State shall
  deny any request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of that Member State. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where an undertaking does not have minimum substance for tax purposes in the Member State where it is resident for tax purposes, that Member State shall
  take any of the following decisions:

take any of the following decisions:

Where an undertaking does not have minimum substance for tax purposes in the Member State where it is resident for tax purposes, that Member State shall
  deny any request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of that Member State.

deny any request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of that Member State.

Amendment 47

Amendment 47

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | deny a request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of this Member State; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

(a)

deny a request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of this Member State;

deny a request for a certificate of tax residence to the undertaking for use outside the jurisdiction of this Member State;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 48

Amendment 48

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | grant a certificate of tax residence which prescribes that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, and of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

(b)

grant a certificate of tax residence which prescribes that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, and of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC.

grant a certificate of tax residence which prescribes that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and where applicable, capital, and of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 49

Amendment 49

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 12 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | When denying a request for such certificate, the Member State shall issue an official statement duly justifying such decision and prescribing that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and, where applicable, capital, or of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

When denying a request for such certificate, the Member State shall issue an official statement duly justifying such decision and prescribing that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and, where applicable, capital, or of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC.

When denying a request for such certificate, the Member State shall issue an official statement duly justifying such decision and prescribing that the undertaking is not entitled to the benefits of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation of income, and, where applicable, capital, or of international agreements with a similar purpose or effect and of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/96/EU and Article 1 of Directive 2003/49/EC.

Amendment 50

Amendment 50

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 12 — paragraph 1 b (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | In cooperation with Member States, the Commission shall ensure that those tax consequences are well articulated in relation to existing bilateral tax agreements with third countries so that they receive the information on the presumed shell companies. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

In cooperation with Member States, the Commission shall ensure that those tax consequences are well articulated in relation to existing bilateral tax agreements with third countries so that they receive the information on the presumed shell companies.

In cooperation with Member States, the Commission shall ensure that those tax consequences are well articulated in relation to existing bilateral tax agreements with third countries so that they receive the information on the presumed shell companies.

Amendment 51

Amendment 51

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Directive 2011/16/EU

Article 8ad — paragraph 4 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the VAT number, where available, of the undertaking required to report pursuant to Article 6 of Directive [OP]; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

the VAT number, where available, of the undertaking required to report pursuant to Article 6 of Directive [OP];

| (b) | In the case of lack of TIN,
  the VAT number, where available, of the undertaking required to report pursuant to Article 6 of Directive [OP]. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

In the case of lack of TIN,
  the VAT number, where available, of the undertaking required to report pursuant to Article 6 of Directive [OP].

In the case of lack of TIN,

Amendment 52

Amendment 52

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Directive 2011/16/EU

Article 8ad — paragraph 4 — point g

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (g) | summary of the evidence provided by the undertaking in accordance with Article 7(2). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(g)

summary of the evidence provided by the undertaking in accordance with Article 7(2).

| (g) | summary of
  the declaration, and where appropriate,
  the evidence provided by the undertaking in accordance with Article 7(2). |
| --- | --- |

(g)

summary of
  the declaration, and where appropriate,
  the evidence provided by the undertaking in accordance with Article 7(2).

the declaration, and where appropriate,

Amendment 53

Amendment 53

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Article 13 — paragraph 1 — point 2

Directive 2011/16/EU

Article 8ad — paragraph 6 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 6a.
     
  Where, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 or 3, the competent authority of a Member State identifies other Member States likely to be concerned by the reporting of the undertaking, the communication referred to in those paragraphs shall include a specific alert to those Member States deemed to be concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6a.
     
  Where, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 or 3, the competent authority of a Member State identifies other Member States likely to be concerned by the reporting of the undertaking, the communication referred to in those paragraphs shall include a specific alert to those Member States deemed to be concerned.

Amendment 54

Amendment 54

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 14 — paragraph 2

Article 14 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Member States shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least
  5 %
  of the undertaking’s
  turnover
  in the relevant tax year, if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline
  or
  makes a false declaration in the tax return under Article 7. | Member States shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least
  2 %
  of the undertaking’s
  revenue
  in the relevant tax year, if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline
  and an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least 4 % of the undertaking’s revenue if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6
  makes a false declaration in the tax return under Article 7.
  In case of an undertaking with zero or low revenue, defined as being below a threshold determined by the national tax authority and not falling below a minimum threshold set by the Commission in an implementing act, the penalty should be based on the total assets of the undertaking. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Member States shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least
  5 %
  of the undertaking’s
  turnover
  in the relevant tax year, if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline
  or
  makes a false declaration in the tax return under Article 7.

5 %

turnover

or

Member States shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least
  2 %
  of the undertaking’s
  revenue
  in the relevant tax year, if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline
  and an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least 4 % of the undertaking’s revenue if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6
  makes a false declaration in the tax return under Article 7.
  In case of an undertaking with zero or low revenue, defined as being below a threshold determined by the national tax authority and not falling below a minimum threshold set by the Commission in an implementing act, the penalty should be based on the total assets of the undertaking.

2 %

revenue

and an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least 4 % of the undertaking’s revenue if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to Article 6

In case of an undertaking with zero or low revenue, defined as being below a threshold determined by the national tax authority and not falling below a minimum threshold set by the Commission in an implementing act, the penalty should be based on the total assets of the undertaking.

Amendment 55

Amendment 55

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 14 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 14 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | The implementing act referred to in the second subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 18a. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The implementing act referred to in the second subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 18a.

The implementing act referred to in the second subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 18a.

Amendment 56

Amendment 56

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 15 — title

Article 15 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Request for tax audits | Request for
  joint
  tax audits |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Request for tax audits

Request for
  joint
  tax audits

joint

Amendment 57

Amendment 57

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 15 — paragraph 1

Article 15 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where the competent authority of one Member State has reason to believe that an undertaking which is resident for tax purposes in another Member State has not met its obligations under this Directive, the former Member State may request the competent authority of the latter to conduct a tax audit of the undertaking. | Where the competent authority of one Member State has reason to believe that an undertaking which is resident for tax purposes in another Member State has not met its obligations under this Directive, the former Member State may
  , specifying such reasons,
  request the competent authority of the latter to conduct a 
  joint
  tax audit of the undertaking
  following the procedures laid down in Article 12a of Council Directive (EU) 2021/514

   (17)

  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where the competent authority of one Member State has reason to believe that an undertaking which is resident for tax purposes in another Member State has not met its obligations under this Directive, the former Member State may request the competent authority of the latter to conduct a tax audit of the undertaking.

Where the competent authority of one Member State has reason to believe that an undertaking which is resident for tax purposes in another Member State has not met its obligations under this Directive, the former Member State may
  , specifying such reasons,
  request the competent authority of the latter to conduct a 
  joint
  tax audit of the undertaking
  following the procedures laid down in Article 12a of Council Directive (EU) 2021/514

   (17)

  .

, specifying such reasons,

joint

following the procedures laid down in Article 12a of Council Directive (EU) 2021/514

17

.

Amendment 58

Amendment 58

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 15 — paragraph 2

Article 15 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The competent authority of the requested Member State shall initiate
  it
  within one month from the date of receipt of the request and conduct
  the tax audit
  , in accordance with the rules governing tax audits in the requested Member State. | If the requesting competent authority is not able to conduct a joint tax audit due to legal reasons,

  the competent authority of the requested Member State shall initiate
  a national audit
  within one month from the date of receipt of the request and conduct
  it
  , in accordance with the rules governing tax audits in the requested Member State. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The competent authority of the requested Member State shall initiate
  it
  within one month from the date of receipt of the request and conduct
  the tax audit
  , in accordance with the rules governing tax audits in the requested Member State.

it

the tax audit

If the requesting competent authority is not able to conduct a joint tax audit due to legal reasons,

  the competent authority of the requested Member State shall initiate
  a national audit
  within one month from the date of receipt of the request and conduct
  it
  , in accordance with the rules governing tax audits in the requested Member State.

If the requesting competent authority is not able to conduct a joint tax audit due to legal reasons,

t

a national audit

it

Amendment 59

Amendment 59

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 16 — paragraph 1 — point f

Article 16 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | number of audits to undertakings that meet the conditions laid down in Article 6(1), |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

number of audits to undertakings that meet the conditions laid down in Article 6(1),

| (f) | number of audits to undertakings that meet the conditions laid down in Article 6(1),
  broken down into joint audits and regular audits, |
| --- | --- |

(f)

number of audits to undertakings that meet the conditions laid down in Article 6(1),
  broken down into joint audits and regular audits,

broken down into joint audits and regular audits,

Amendment 60

Amendment 60

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 17– title

Article 17– title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Reports | Review |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Reports

Reports

Review

Review

Amendment 61

Amendment 61

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 17 — paragraph 1

Article 17 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   By
  31 December 2028
  , the Commission shall
  present
  a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of this Directive. | 1.   
  By ... [five years after date of transposition of this Directive]
  the Commission shall
  submit
  a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation
  and operation
  of this Directive.
  Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a review with a view to increasing the effectiveness of this Directive and a legislative proposal amending this Directive. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   By
  31 December 2028
  , the Commission shall
  present
  a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of this Directive.

1.   
  By ... [five years after date of transposition of this Directive]
  the Commission shall
  submit
  a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation
  and operation
  of this Directive.
  Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a review with a view to increasing the effectiveness of this Directive and a legislative proposal amending this Directive.

Amendment 62

Amendment 62

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 17 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 17 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  The report shall review and assess the impact of this Directive on tax revenues in Member States, on tax administration’s capacities and in particular, whether there is a need to amend this Directive. The report shall also assess whether it would be appropriate to add a substance indicator based on pre-tax profit per employee in Article 7 and to extend the obligation to report on indicators of minimum substance for tax purposes set out in that Article to regulated financial undertakings and, if necessary, review the exemption granted to them in Article 6 (2b). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  The report shall review and assess the impact of this Directive on tax revenues in Member States, on tax administration’s capacities and in particular, whether there is a need to amend this Directive. The report shall also assess whether it would be appropriate to add a substance indicator based on pre-tax profit per employee in Article 7 and to extend the obligation to report on indicators of minimum substance for tax purposes set out in that Article to regulated financial undertakings and, if necessary, review the exemption granted to them in Article 6 (2b).

Amendment 63

Amendment 63

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 17 — paragraph 2

Article 17 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   When drawing up the report, the Commission shall take into account the information communicated by the Member States pursuant to Article
  15
  . | 2.   When drawing up the report, the Commission shall take into account the information communicated by the Member States pursuant to Article
  16
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   When drawing up the report, the Commission shall take into account the information communicated by the Member States pursuant to Article
  15
  .

2.   When drawing up the report, the Commission shall take into account the information communicated by the Member States pursuant to Article
  16
  .

Amendment 64

Amendment 64

Proposal for a directive

Proposal for a directive

Article 18 a (new)

Article 18 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 18a




  Committee procedure





  1.
     
  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.






  2.
     
  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 18a

Committee procedure

1.
     
  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2.
     
  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

---

(10)  Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (OJ L 193, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

10

(11)  Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1).

11

(10)  Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (OJ L 193, 19.7.2016, p. 1).

10

(11)  Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1).

11

(12)  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

12

(13)  General Secretariat of the Council, 9637/18 FISC 241 ECOFIN 555, Code of Conduct (Business Taxation), Guidance on the interpretation of the third criterion; OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5: Final Report.

13

(12)  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

12

(13)  General Secretariat of the Council, 9637/18 FISC 241 ECOFIN 555, Code of Conduct (Business Taxation), Guidance on the interpretation of the third criterion; OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5: Final Report.

13

(14)  Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, p. 8).

14

(15)  Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States (OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 49).

15

(14)  Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, p. 8).

14

(15)  Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States (OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 49).

15

(16)  
  Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1).

16

Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1).

(17)  
  Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1).

17

Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1).

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