Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 3263 

Amendment Number 14 Effective 

Date: April 25, 2017, superseded by 

Renewed Amendment Number 14 on 

December 11, 2017. 

Renewed Amendment Number 14 

Effective Date: December 11, 2017. 

SAR Submitted by: Transnuclear, Inc. 

SAR Title: Final Safety Analysis 

Report for the Standardized NUHOMS®

Horizontal Modular Storage System for 

Irradiated Nuclear Fuel. 

Docket Number: 72–1004. 

Certificate Expiration Date: January 

23, 2015. 

Renewed Certificate Expiration Date: 

January 23, 2055. 

Model Number: NUHOMS®–24P, 

–24PHB, –24PTH, –32PT, –32PTH1, 

–37PTH, –52B, –61BT –61BTH, and 

–69BTH. 

* * * * * 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day 

of January 2018. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Pamela J. Shepherd-Vladimir, 

Acting Chief, Regulatory Analysis and 

Rulemaking Support Branch, Division of 

Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2018–01278 Filed 1–23–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–9418; Product 

Identifier 2016–NE–23–AD; Amendment 39– 

19167; AD 2018–02–14] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Honeywell 

International Inc. Turboprop and 

Turboshaft Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Honeywell International Inc. 

(Honeywell) TPE331 turboprop and 

TSE331 turboshaft engines. This AD 

was prompted by reports that 

combustion chamber case assemblies 

have cracked and ruptured. This AD 

requires inspection of the affected 

combustion chamber case assembly, 

replacement of those assemblies found 

cracked, and removal of affected 

assemblies on certain TPE331 and 

TSE331 engines. We are issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective February 28, 

2018. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of February 28, 2018. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Honeywell International Inc., 111 S 34th 

Street, Phoenix, AZ 85034–2802; phone: 

800–601–3099; internet: https://

myaerospace.honeywell.com/wps/ 

portal. You may view this service 

information at the FAA, Engine and 

Propeller Standards Branch, 1200 

District Avenue, Burlington, MA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 781–238–7759. 

It is also available on the internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

for and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

9418. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

9418; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this final rule, 

the regulatory evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The address for Docket 

Operations (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Operations, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Joseph Costa, Aerospace Engineer, Los 

Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, 3960 

Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, CA 90712– 

4137; phone: 562–627–5246; fax: 562– 

627–5210; email: joseph.costa@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain Honeywell TPE331 

turboprop and TSE331 turboshaft 

engines. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on April 19, 2017 (82 

FR 18402). The NPRM was prompted by 

reports of three accidents involving 

combustion chamber case assembly 

ruptures. Investigations have shown 

numerous cracked and ruptured 

combustion chamber case assemblies 

resulting from high stresses in the asdesigned weld joints and contributing 

factors due to repair weld quality, poor 

maintenance and inspection practices, 

and cycles-in-service. The NPRM 

proposed to require inspection, 

replacement of the affected combustion 

chamber case assemblies, and removal 

of affected assemblies on certain 

TPE331 turboprop and TSE331 

turboshaft engines. We are issuing this 

AD to address the unsafe condition on 

these products. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this final rule. 

The following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Revise Internet Address 

Honeywell requested that its internet 

address be revised. 

We agree. We revised the internet 

address as requested by Honeywell. 

Request To Revise Service Information 

Honeywell requested that we revise 

the service bulletins in this AD to 

reference the latest revisions. 

We agree. We revised the references 

in this AD to Honeywell Service 

Bulletins (SBs) TPE331–72–2218; 

TPE331–72–2235; and TPE331–72–2244 

from Revision 1 to Revision 2. However, 

we did not update the references to the 

SB that is incorporated by reference 

since this SB is already at the latest 

revision. 

Request To Revise Discussion of 

Proposed AD Requirements 

Honeywell requested that we 

reference the TSE331 turboshaft engine 

in the ‘‘Proposed AD Requirements’’ 

section of this final rule. 

We partially agree. We agree that we 

inadvertently omitted mention of the 

TSE331 turboshaft engines from the 

‘‘Proposed AD Requirements’’ section in 

the NPRM. We disagree with making a 

change to this final rule because the 

‘‘Proposed AD Requirements’’ section 

does not exist in this final rule AD. We 

did not change this AD. 

Request To Revise Discussion of 

Removal and Replacement Times 

Honeywell requested changes to the 

Differences Between This Proposed AD 

and the Service Information section 

contained within the NPRM, 

recommending revision of the removal 

and replacement statement. Honeywell’s 

referenced service bulletins in the 

NPRM recommend a revised 

compliance calendar deadline for 

certain redesigned combustion chamber 

case assemblies. Honeywell indicated 

the compliance deadline is March 31, 

2021, for all redesigned combustion 

chamber case assemblies. 

We partially agree. We agree it would 

be appropriate to reference this calendar 

deadline in this discussion within the 


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3264 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 

NPRM. We do not agree to revise this 

final rule because this discussion does 

not exist in this final rule. Further 

explanation in this final rule is not 

necessary. We did not change this final 

rule. 

Request To Revise Number of Affected 

Engines 

Honeywell indicated its records show 

11,280 engines have been shipped with 

suspect combustion chamber case 

assemblies. Honeywell, therefore, 

requested we revise the number of 

engines accordingly within the Costs of 

Compliance section in this final rule. 

We disagree. We estimate costs based 

on the number of affected engines in the 

U.S. Registry. We estimate 50% of the 

engines Honeywell shipped are in the 

U.S. Registry. We did not change this 

final rule. 

Request To Revise Applicability To 

Include TPE331–12B Engine 

Honeywell requested we revise the 

applicability of this AD to include the 

TPE331–12B engine. Honeywell 

commented this engine was used in 

military operations but now is operated 

commercially and has experienced 

similar cracks in its combustion 

chamber case assembly. 

We partially agree. The combustion 

chamber case assemblies installed on 

these engines are subject to the same 

cracking as those installed on the other 

affected TPE331 engines. However, in 

the interest of safety, we will proceed to 

publish this final rule without adding 

the TPE331–12B engine model. We will 

consider further rulemaking action to 

incorporate the TPE331–12B engines. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time 

Honeywell, Council 331 (a TPE331 

operators and maintenance group), and 

an individual operator requested a 

change to repetitive compliance time for 

the visual inspection of the combustion 

chamber case assembly and suggested a 

specified calendar date. The 

commenters noted compliance at 50 and 

400 hours would not align with the fuel 

nozzle inspection interval and requested 

clarification. 

We partially agree. We interpret 

Honeywell’s comment on the 50-hour 

initial compliance interval as a request 

to clarify the intent of the 50-hour 

interval rather than as a request to 

change this AD. We used the 50-hour 

compliance interval and not a calendar 

date because a grace period is necessary 

to give operators time to comply with 

this AD. 

We agree the repetitive combustion 

chamber case assembly inspections 

should be aligned with the fuel nozzle 

inspections not to exceed 450 hours. We 

revised this AD to indicate repetitive 

visual inspection of the combustion 

chamber case assembly be performed 

before accumulating 450 hours since 

last fuel nozzle inspection. 

Request To Note Ruptures of Additional 

Combustion Chamber Case Assemblies 

Honeywell requested this final rule 

note that combustion chamber case 

assembly ruptures occurred on parts 

other than those part numbers (P/Ns) 

mentioned in paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Honeywell indicated ruptures have 

occurred on other P/N combustor 

chamber case assemblies. 

We agree. Combustion chamber case 

assembly ruptures have occurred with 

other configurations other than those 

P/Ns mentioned in paragraph (g) of this 

AD. We agree the public should be 

aware of combustion chamber case 

assembly cracks that may propagate to 

failure or rupture if not properly 

inspected and maintained. We reviewed 

other combustion chamber case 

assembly configurations and determined 

the risk of rupture for P/N 3101668–x 

(‘‘x’’ denotes all dash numbers) is lower 

than those configurations identified in 

paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. We have 

adequately addressed more frequent 

inspections and removal from service of 

high risk and cracked combustion 

chamber case assemblies. We did not 

change this AD. 

Request To Remove All Combustion 

Chamber Case Assemblies From Service 

Honeywell requested that we revise 

the Compliance section of this AD to 

require removal from service, at the next 

removal from the engine, all combustion 

chamber case assemblies other than the 

P/Ns listed in paragraph (g)(2) of this 

AD. In addition, Honeywell has 

performed a Continued Airworthiness 

Assessment, in accordance with 

Advisory Circular 39–8 and determined 

replacement of the combustion chamber 

case assemblies with redesigned 

assemblies is the only corrective action 

that would return the product to the 

level of safety intended by the original 

basis of certification. 

We disagree. This AD requires 

corrective actions that reduce the 

probability of combustion chamber case 

rupture. We identified in paragraph 

(g)(2) of this AD certain combustion 

chamber case assemblies with high 

stresses in the specified weld joint that 

showed higher incidents of cracking and 

rupture, a short crack propagation life, 

and poor crack detectability compared 

to other combustion chamber case 

assemblies. These combustion chamber 

case assemblies require replacement 

within the AD’s specified compliance 

time. We did not change this AD. 

Request To Clarify Identity of 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

Holder 

Honeywell requested we clarify that 

Honeywell is not the holder of the STC 

referenced in this AD. 

We agree. Indication of ownership of 

the subject STC may assist owners to 

identify the engine modification. We 

changed this AD by identifying National 

Flight Services Inc. as the holder of the 

STC SE383CH. 

Request To Clarify Engines That Have 

Been Modified With Increased P3 

Pressures 

Honeywell requested we clarify 

paragraph (g) of this AD to describe how 

operators would determine that their 

engines have been modified with 

increased P3 pressures not under STC 

SE383CH. 

We agree that operators may be 

unable to determine that their engines 

have been modified with increased P3 

case pressures. Therefore, we will limit 

the applicability of paragraph (g) of this 

AD to the referenced STC. We revised 

paragraph (g) of this AD by removing 

the phrase ‘‘modified with increased P3 

pressures, including, but not limited to 

. . .’’ from this paragraph.’’ 

Request To Limit Weld Repairs 

Honeywell requested we revise the 

compliance section of this AD to 

disallow any weld repairs on any 

combustion chamber case assemblies 

that are affected by this AD. 

We partially agree. We agree a weld 

repair is a sensitive process that may 

affect the fatigue life of the combustion 

chamber case assembly. We agree not to 

allow use of any weld repair procedures 

dated before the effective date of this 

AD. We will assess repair procedures of 

certain combustion chamber case 

assemblies with lower stresses on a 

case-by-case basis. We did not change 

this AD. 

Request To Prohibit Installation of 

Weld-Repaired Combustion Chamber 

Case Assemblies 

Honeywell requested the compliance 

section be revised to prohibit 

installation of any applicable 

combustion chamber case assembly 

which has been weld repaired. 

We do not agree. In paragraphs (g)(2), 

(h) and (i) of this AD, we identified the 

combustion chamber case 

configurations with the highest risk of 

rupture. Prohibiting installation of all 

welded combustion chamber case 

assemblies is unnecessary because they 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 3265 

do not all create the same unsafe 

condition. We did not change this AD. 

Request To Add Further Information on 

Combustion Chamber Assembly 

Failures 

Perimeter Aviation LP (Perimeter) 

requested we add information to this 

AD regarding the number of failures of 

combustion chamber assemblies with or 

without the one-piece bleed pad. 

Perimeter requested further information 

on how these failures relate to the P/N 

3101668–12 combustion chamber 

assembly. 

We agree. We note that five of the six 

combustion chamber case assemblies 

that ruptured were assemblies without 

the one-piece bleed pad. P/N 

3101668–x has the one-piece bleed pad 

with P3 boss, which demonstrated 

significantly reduced cracking between 

the P3 and bleed boss; therefore, this 

combustion chamber case assembly is 

not affected by this AD. No further 

changes are needed. We did not change 

this AD. 

Request To Add More Frequent 

Inspections 

Hancock Enterprises, Inc. and Council 

331 requested we require more frequent 

visual inspections and/or fluorescent 

penetrant inspections during the 

combustion chamber case assembly’s 

removal. They recommended allowing 

the assembly be re-installed and 

replaced with an updated part at the 

next overhaul or continuous 

airworthiness maintenance. Council 331 

cited the non-destructive testing 

experience of these combustion 

chamber case assemblies. 

We disagree. We do not believe more 

frequent inspections would maintain an 

adequate level of safety. Allowing the 

most difficult-to-inspect and highest 

risk combustion chamber case 

assemblies back into service would 

allow excessive risk. Although we agree 

more frequent visual inspections would 

improve the probability of detecting 

cracks, thereby reducing the risk of a 

rupture, the FAA believes the 

probability of crack detection for a 

visual inspection of an installed 

combustion chamber case assembly is 

generally low and will not maintain an 

acceptable level of safety. We did not 

change this AD. 

Request To Add Terminating Action 

Council 331 requested that 

compliance with one of the service 

bulletins listed in ‘‘Other Related 

Service Information’’ provide 

terminating action for the proposed AD. 

Terminating action in the AD will 

provide added incentive to operators in 

removing from service suspect parts 

with a documented history of failure. 

Council 331 commented that, as drafted, 

the new redesign combustion chamber 

case assembly does not eliminate the 

AD’s compliance requirements. There 

have been no known failures of the new 

redesign combustion chamber case 

assembly. 

We partially agree. We agree lower 

stress and improved reliability should 

eliminate the need for repetitive visual 

inspection. We also agree to limiting the 

ADs applicability to only the suspect 

configurations should provide adequate 

safety. We therefore changed the 

Applicability section of this AD to refer 

only to engines ‘‘with combustion 

chamber case assemblies, part numbers 

(P/Ns) 869728–x, 893973–x, 3101668–x, 

and 3102613–x, where ‘‘x’’ denotes any 

dash number, installed.’’ 

We do not agree it is necessary to 

specify terminating action in this AD. 

This AD only applies to the specified 

engine models with the specific P/N 

combustor chamber case assemblies 

installed. Therefore, a terminating 

action for new combustor chamber 

assemblies is unnecessary. We did not 

change this AD. 

Revision to Engine Operating Time 

Limit 

After further review, we revised the 

engine operating time limit in paragraph 

(g)(2) of this AD to ‘‘not to exceed 3,700 

hours time-in-service since last hot 

section inspection.’’ This is equivalent 

to removal of the combustion chamber 

case assemblies at their next removal 

from the engine, which was specified in 

the NPRM. 

Revision to Installation Prohibition 

After further review, we revised the 

Installation Prohibition, paragraph (i) of 

this AD, to limit this prohibition against 

installation of affected combustion 

chamber case assemblies in certain 

engine models. This clarification makes 

this prohibition consistent with 

paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this 

final rule with the changes described 

previously and minor editorial changes. 

We have determined that these minor 

changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM. 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this final rule. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

We reviewed Honeywell SB TPE331– 

72–2178, Revision 0, dated May 3, 2011. 

Honeywell SB TPE331–72–2178 

describe procedures for inspection and 

removal of the affected combustion 

chamber case assemblies installed on all 

affected engines except for the TPE331– 

12B engine. This service information is 

reasonably available because the 

interested parties have access to it 

through their normal course of business 

or by the means identified in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

Other Related Service Information 

Honeywell has also issued SBs 

TPE331–72–2228, Revision 0, dated 

June 12, 2014; TPE331–72–2230, 

Revision 0, dated June 19, 2014; 

TPE331–72–2218, Revision 2, dated 

February 18, 2017; TPE331–72–2244, 

Revision 2, dated March 20 2017; 

TPE331–72–2235, Revision 2, dated 

February 18, 2017; TPE331–72–2281, 

Revision 0, dated July 22, 2016; 

TPE331–72–2294, Revision 0, dated 

December 22, 2016; and TSE331–72– 

2245, Revision 0, dated November 11, 

2016. These SBs provide guidance on 

replacement of the affected combustion 

chamber case assemblies. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 5,644 

engines installed on airplanes of U.S. 

registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. 

operators 

On-wing inspection .... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ..... $0 $85 per inspection ..... $479,740 per inspection cycle. 


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3266 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 

We estimate the following costs to do 

any necessary replacements that would 

be required based on the results of the 

proposed inspection. We estimate that 

158 engines will need this replacement 

during the first year of inspection. 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Replacement of the combustion chamber assembly ... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ............................... $15,000 $15,085 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

This AD is issued in accordance with 

authority delegated by the Executive 

Director, Aircraft Certification Service, 

as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. 

In accordance with that order, issuance 

of ADs is normally a function of the 

Compliance and Airworthiness 

Division, but during this transition 

period, the Executive Director has 

delegated the authority to issue ADs 

applicable to engines, propellers, and 

associated appliances to the Manager, 

Engine and Propeller Standards Branch, 

Policy and Innovation Division. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2018–02–14 Honeywell International Inc. 

(Type Certificate previously held by 

AlliedSignal Inc., Garrett Engine 

Division; Garrett Turbine Engine 

Company; and AiResearch 

Manufacturing Company of Arizona): 

Amendment 39–19167; Docket No. 

FAA–2016–9418; Product Identifier 

2016–NE–23–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective February 28, 2018. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Honeywell 

International Inc. (Honeywell) TPE331–1, –2, 

–2UA, –3U, –3UW, –5, –5A, –5AB, –5B, –6, 

–6A, –8, –10, –10AV, –10GP, –10GT, –10N, 

–10P, –10R, –10T, –10U, –10UA, –10UF, 

–10UG, –10UGR, –10UR, and –11U, –12JR, 

–12UA, –12UAR, –12UHR, –25AA, –25AB, 

–25DA, –25DB, –25FA, –43A, –43BL, –47A, 

–55B, and –61A model turboprop engines, 

and TSE331–3U model turboshaft engines 

with combustion chamber case assemblies, 

part numbers (P/Ns) 869728–x, 893973–x, 

3101668–x, and 3102613–x, where ‘‘x’’ 

denotes any dash number, installed. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7240, Turbine Engine Combustion 

Section. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports that 

combustion chamber case assemblies have 

cracked and ruptured. We are issuing this AD 

to prevent failure of the combustion chamber 

case assembly. The unsafe condition, if not 

addressed, could result in failure of the 

combustion chamber, in-flight shutdown, 

and reduced control of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) For all affected engines: 

(i) Inspect all accessible areas of the 

combustion chamber case assembly, focusing 

on the weld joints, before accumulating 450 

hours in service since last fuel nozzle 

inspection or within 50 hours in service after 

the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later. 

(ii) Do the inspection in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 

3.B.(1) through 3.B.(2), in Honeywell Service 

Bulletin TPE331–72–2178, Revision 0, dated 

May 3, 2011. 

(iii) Thereafter, repeat this inspection 

during scheduled fuel nozzle inspections at 

intervals not to exceed 450 hours. 

(2) For TPE331–3U, –3UW, –5, –5A, –5AB, 

–5B, –6, and –6A engines with combustion 

chamber case assemblies, P/Ns 869728–1, 

869728–3, or 893973–5, installed, and 

without the one-piece bleed pad with P3 

boss; and for TPE331–1, –2, and –2UA 

engines modified by National Flight Services, 

Inc., supplemental type certificate (STC) 

SE383CH, remove the combustion chamber 

case assembly from service at the next 

removal of the combustion chamber case 

from the engine, not to exceed 3,700 hours 

time-in-service since last hot section 

inspection. 

(3) As of the effective date of this AD, do 

not weld repair the applicable combustion 

chamber case assemblies using procedures 

dated before the effective date of this AD. 

(h) Definition 

TPE331 model engines modified by STC 

SE383CH may be defined as the ‘‘Super 1’’ 

and ‘‘Super 2’’ for the compressor 

modification of the TPE331–1 and the 

TPE331–2, –2U, and –2UA engines, 

respectively. Figures 1 and 2 to paragraph (h) 

of this AD illustrate the appearance of 

combustion chamber case assembly, P/N 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 3267 

893973–5, without and with, respectively, 

the one-piece bleed pad with the P3 boss. 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C 

(i) Installation Prohibition 

After the effective date of this AD, do not 

install a combustion chamber case assembly, 

P/N 869728–1, 869728–3, or 893973–5, in 

TPE331–3U, –3UW, –5, –5A, –5AB, –5B, –6, 

and –6A engines or in TPE331–1, –2, and 

–2UA engines modified by National Flight 

Services, Inc., STC SE383CH, unless the 

combustion chamber case assembly has a 

one-piece bleed pad with P3 boss. 


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Figure 1 to Paragraph (h) of this AD. Combustion Chamber Case Assembly 

Without the One-Piece Bleed Pad with P3 Boss 

Figure 2 to Paragraph (h) of this AD. Combustion Chamber Case Assembly with 

One-Piece Bleed Pad with P3 Boss 
3268 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 16 / Wednesday, January 24, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 

1 16 U.S.C. 824(o). The approved Reliability 

Standards are available on the Commission’s 

eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. 

RM17–12–000 and on the NERC website, 

www.nerc.com. 

2 Id. 824o(d)(2). 

3 Id. 824o(e). 

4Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric 

Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the 

Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of 

Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No. 

672–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006). 

5North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 

FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g and compliance, 117 

FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. 

v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in paragraph (k) of this 

AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(k) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Joseph Costa, Aerospace Engineer, 

Los Angeles ACO Branch, FAA, 3960 

Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, CA 90712– 

4137; phone: 562–627–5246; fax: 562–627– 

5210; email: joseph.costa@faa.gov. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Honeywell Service Bulletin TPE331–72– 

2178, Revision 0, dated May 3, 2011. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Honeywell service information 

identified in this AD, contact Honeywell 

International Inc., 111 S 34th Street, Phoenix, 

AZ 85034–2802; phone: 800–601–3099; 

internet: https://

myaerospace.honeywell.com/wps/portal. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Engine and Propeller Standards 

Branch, 1200 District Avenue, Burlington, 

MA. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 781–238–7759. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

January 17, 2018. 

Robert J. Ganley, 

Manager, Engine and Propeller Standards 

Branch, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2018–01228 Filed 1–23–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 40 

[Docket No. RM17–12–000; Order No. 840] 

Emergency Preparedness and 

Operations Reliability Standards 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission approves 

Emergency Preparedness and 

Operations (EOP) Reliability Standards 

EOP–004–4 (Event Reporting), EOP– 

005–3 (System Restoration from 

Blackstart Resources), EOP–006–3 

(System Restoration Coordination), and 

EOP–008–2 (Loss of Control Center 

Functionality). 

DATES: This rule will become effective 

March 26, 2018. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

E. Nick Henery (Technical Information), 

Office of Electric Reliability, Division of 

Reliability Standards and Security, Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 

Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, 

Telephone: (202) 502–8636, Nick.Henery@

ferc.gov. 

Bob Stroh (Legal Information), Office of the 

General Counsel, Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street 

NE, Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: 

(202) 502–8473, Robert.Stroh@ferc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Before 

Commissioners: Kevin J. McIntyre, 

Chairman; Cheryl A. LaFleur, Neil 

Chatterjee, Robert F. Powelson, and 

Richard Glick. 

1. Pursuant to section 215 of the 

Federal Power Act (FPA),1 the 

Commission approves Emergency 

Preparedness and Operations (EOP) 

Reliability Standards EOP–004–4 (Event 

Reporting), EOP–005–3 (System 

Restoration from Blackstart Resources), 

EOP–006–3 (System Restoration 

Coordination), and EOP–008–2 (Loss of 

Control Center Functionality), 

submitted by the North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), 

the Commission-certified Electric 

Reliability Organization (ERO). The 

Commission also approves the 

associated violation risk factors, 

violation severity levels, 

implementation plans, and effective 

dates. In addition, the Commission 

approves the retirement of currentlyeffective Reliability Standards EOP– 

004–3, EOP–005–2, EOP–006–2, and 

EOP–008–1 immediately prior to the 

effective dates of the EOP Reliability 

Standards. 

2. The Commission determines that 

the approved EOP Reliability Standards 

will enhance reliability by: (1) Providing 

accurate reporting of events to NERC’s 

event analysis group to analyze the 

impact on the reliability of the bulk 

electric system (Reliability Standard 

EOP–004–4); (2) delineating the roles 

and responsibilities of entities that 

support system restoration from 

blackstart resources which generate 

power without the support of the bulk 

electric system (Reliability Standard 

EOP–005–3); (3) clarifying the 

procedures and coordination 

requirements for reliability coordinator 

personnel to execute system restoration 

processes (Reliability Standard EOP– 

006–3); and (4) refining the required 

elements of an operating plan used to 

continue reliable operations of the bulk 

electric system in the event that primary 

control center functionality is lost 

(Reliability Standard EOP–008–2). 

I. Background 

A. Regulatory Background 

3. Section 215 of the FPA requires a 

Commission-certified ERO to develop 

mandatory and enforceable Reliability 

Standards that are subject to 

Commission review and approval. The 

Commission may approve, by rule or 

order, a proposed Reliability Standard 

or modification to a Reliability Standard 

if it determines that the Reliability 

Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential and in the 

public interest.2 Once approved, the 

Reliability Standards may be enforced 

by the ERO, subject to Commission 

oversight, or by the Commission 

independently.3

4. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, 

the Commission established a process to 

select and certify an ERO,4 and 

subsequently certified NERC.5 On 

March 16, 2007, the Commission issued 

Order No. 693, approving 83 of the 107 

Reliability Standards filed by NERC, 


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