[Cite as In re Ke.R., 2017-Ohio-7533.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LUCAS COUNTY 

In re Ke.R., K.P., Ki.R. Court of Appeals Nos. L-17-1092 

 L-17-1093 

 

 Trial Court Nos. JC 16255659 

 JC 16254000 

 

 

 DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

 

 Decided: September 7, 2017 

 * * * * * 

 Adam H. Houser, for appellant. 

 Bradley W. King, for appellee. 

* * * * * 

SINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} This is a consolidated case in which appellant, E.R., appeals the March 22, 

2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, where 

the court granted permanent custody of her three children to appellee, Lucas County 

Children Services (“LCCS”). Finding no error in the judgment, we affirm. 

 
2. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error: 

1. The Guardian Ad Litem did not perform her duty under the Rules of 

Superintendence and her testimony should not have been allowed and should have 

been stricken. 

2. The Finding that the Child (sic) Could not be Placed with Appellant 

Within a Reasonable Time was Against the Manifest Weight of Evidence. 

Facts 

{¶ 3} This consolidated appeal is from case Nos. JC 16255659 and JC 16254000, 

of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. 

{¶ 4} Case No. JC 16254000 commenced in March 2016, when appellee, LCCS, 

sought protective services for appellant’s children, K.P. and Ki.R. The complaint was 

filed based on an LCCS caseworker, Katie Bertsch, alleging the children were neglected 

and abused. The day after the filing, the magistrate granted interim temporary custody of 

the children to LCCS. 

{¶ 5} Bertsch knew of a family history of abuse and neglect because she had 

investigated concerns regarding K.P. as far back as September 2014. In September 2014, 

the father of K.P. (“father”) had physically abused both appellant and K.P., who was born 

in August 2013. Resulting from the 2014 abuse, K.P. was adjudicated dependent, 

neglected and abused, and a no-contact order was put in place to protect appellant and 

K.P. from father. Ki.R. was born in February 2015. 
3. 

{¶ 6} In July 2015, protective services were terminated for K.P., however, the 

court ordered that the no-contact order remain in effect. In September 2015, appellant 

and father participated in mediation at the Lucas County Child Support Enforcement 

Agency (“LCCSEA”), and appellant did not inform the agency about the no-contact 

order. Because it lacked knowledge of the order, LCCSEA proceeded to develop a 

shared parenting plan for appellant and father. Father was granted unsupervised time, 

and reports indicate appellant later stated she felt it was not her responsibility to inform 

the authorities of the no-contact order that remained in effect. 

{¶ 7} In March 2016, LCCS received a referral to investigate the family again 

after father choked Ki.R. unconscious. This is when Bertsch began her investigation in

case No. JC 16254000. Appellant had called police to her home. When they arrived, 

Ki.R. and father were outside. The child was reported to appear lifeless. Ki.R. was taken 

to the hospital. No adults were with him during his admission to the Pediatric Intensive 

Care Unit. While in jail for the assault, father admitted to trying to kill Ki.R. by choking 

him, and also admitted to trying to kill K.P. in the past. 

{¶ 8} Eventually LCCS learned and reported that appellant had allowed father into 

her home on the occasion he attempted to choke and kill Ki.R. Appellant had done so, 

despite the fact that the day before father had choked appellant unconscious and dangled 

K.P. over a bannister. 

{¶ 9} Father was arrested and sentenced to 30 months incarceration for the 

choking incident, and appellant was offered case plan services, including substance 
4. 

abuse, mental health, parenting, and housing services. She also underwent a psychiatric 

evaluation which she completed and was diagnosed with “Adjustment Disorder with 

Depressed Mood.” Nevertheless, appellant did not pursue mental health services. The 

magistrate granted temporary custody of K.P. and Ki.R. to LCCS in April 2016. 

{¶ 10} Case No. JC 16255659 was filed in May 2016, after Ke.R. was born and 

LCCS sought protection for the child, within three days from her birth. The magistrate 

granted interim temporary custody and, then, granted temporary custody of the child in 

August 2016. The two cases involving the children were then consolidated. 

{¶ 11} LCCS caseworker, Christina DeSilvis, investigated appellant’s completion 

of services and living conditions. DeSilvis testified that she recommended appellant 

maintain contact with her domestic violence group and voluntarily pursue parenting 

programs. Appellant was reported to deny the need to maintain contact with the domestic 

violence group. Appellant was also reported to have expressed an interest in the 

parenting programs, but the record indicates she never enrolled. 

{¶ 12} DeSilvis testified that appellant lived with her father, but that appellant 

always met her on the porch, which did not allow a thorough investigation of the 

premises. To DeSilvis this refusal was most alarming when she offered to do a safety 

check to assess whether the home environment was child-safe, but was denied access by 

appellant. In August 2016, LCCS decided it would pursue permanent custody of the 

children. 
5. 

{¶ 13} Steven T. Casiere was appointed as guardian ad litem (“GAL1”) for the 

children. GAL1 filed a report in which he recommended LCCS be given temporary 

custody of the children. The recommendation was based on GAL1’s review of the 

“LCCS Complaint, LCCS file, criminal records, the juvenile court file regarding the prior 

cases and pediatric records.” GAL1 also spoke with DeSilvis, appellant, the children’s 

foster caregivers, and “staff at Family Care Center,” during his investigation. GAL1 had 

observed the children at their placement, on two occasions, and observed the children 

with mother during a visitation at LCCS. 

{¶ 14} In September 2016, GAL1 withdrew from the case, and the court then 

appointed Allma-Tadema Miller (“GAL2”). GAL2’s investigation consisted of 

contacting appellant, the foster caregivers, DeSilvis, appellant’s maternal grandmother, 

and the children. GAL2 did not contact father, but her report did evidence review of his 

case file and conviction. 

{¶ 15} GAL2 reported that she had difficulties meeting with appellant. For 

instance, GAL2 testified that after three attempts to arrange a meeting, to observe 

appellant with the children during visitation, appellant did not show. GAL2 also reported 

reviewing prior filings related to the children, GAL1’s report, LCCS’s case file, criminal 

records for appellant and father, “Centralized Drug Testing records” for appellant and 

father, and medical records for K.P. and Ki.R, in her investigation. As of February 2017, 

GAL2 recommended that permanent custody to LCCS would be in the best interest of the 

children. 
6. 

{¶ 16} LCCS moved for permanent custody of the children. A hearing to address 

the motion was scheduled for March 2017. At the hearing, the court heard testimony 

from Bertsch, DeSilvis, and Miller. No other witnesses testified and, although duly 

served and notified, appellant did not appear at the hearing. During the hearing the court 

admitted into evidence, without objection, certified judgment or docket entries regarding 

the family’s past and current juvenile neglect cases, father’s conviction for attempted 

felonious assault on Ki.R., father’s conviction for domestic violence against appellant, 

and appellant’s charges for drug abuse. GAL2’s report was also admitted into evidence 

without objection. 

{¶ 17} The court journalized the judgment on March 22, 2017. In the entry, the 

court held that permanent custody of K.P., Ki.R., and Ke.R. was awarded to LCCS for 

adoptive placement and planning, and that all of appellant’s parental rights in and to the 

children were terminated, except her right to appeal. Appellant timely appealed. 

First Assignment of Error 

{¶ 18} Appellant first asserts the trial court erred in admitting GAL2’s testimony 

and report because GAL2 failed to satisfy minimum standards set forth in Sup.R. 48(D). 

Appellee contends GAL2 satisfied the reasonable effort requirements under Sup.R. 

48(D). 

{¶ 19} The purpose of a guardian ad litem in a permanent-custody proceeding is 

“to protect the interest of the child and ‘assist a court in its determination of a child’s best 

interest.’” In re C.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 231, 2011-Ohio-2899, 951 N.E.2d 398, ¶ 14, citing 
7. 

R.C. 2151.281(B) and Sup.R. 48(B)(1). The guardian ad litem’s role is to “perform 

whatever functions are necessary to protect the best interest of the child[.]” See R.C. 

2151.281(I). 

{¶ 20} Sup.R. 48 was adopted “to govern guardian ad litem standards in Ohio and 

* * * is the first rule that sets statewide standards regarding the appointment, 

responsibilities, training and reporting requirements of a guardian ad litem.” In re K.G., 

9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA0016, 2010-Ohio-4399, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 21} Sup.R. 48(D)(13) specifically states: 

 A guardian ad litem shall make reasonable efforts to become 

informed about the facts of the case and to contact all parties. In order to 

provide the court with relevant information and an informed 

recommendation as to the child’s best interest, a guardian ad litem shall, at 

a minimum, do the following, unless impracticable or inadvisable because 

of the age of the child or the specific circumstances of a particular case: 

(a) Meet with and interview the child and observe the child with 

each parent, foster parent, guardian or physical custodian and conduct at 

least one interview with the child where none of these individuals is 

present; 

 (b) Visit the child at his or her residence in accordance with any 

standards established by the court in which the guardian ad litem is 

appointed; 
8. 

(c) Ascertain the wishes of the child; 

(d) Meet with and interview the parties, foster parents and other 

significant individuals who may have relevant knowledge regarding the 

issues of the case; 

(e) Review pleadings and other relevant court documents in the case 

in which the guardian ad litem is appointed; 

(f) Review criminal, civil, educational and administrative records 

pertaining to the child and, if appropriate, to the child’s family or to other 

parties in the case; 

(g) Interview school personnel, medical and mental health providers, 

child protective services workers and relevant court personnel and obtain 

copies of relevant records; 

(h) Recommend that the court order psychological evaluations, 

mental health and/or substance abuse assessments, or other evaluations or 

tests of the parties as the guardian ad litem deems necessary or helpful to 

the court; and 

(i) Perform any other investigation necessary to make an informed 

recommendation regarding the best interest of the child. 

See, e.g., In re C.G., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-15-1256, L-15-1257, 2016-Ohio-375, ¶ 51. 

{¶ 22} As an instructive case we point to In re E.S., in which we found no error in 

admitting a guardian ad litem’s testimony and report despite acknowledging that the 
9. 

guardian’s investigation could have been more expansive. See In re E.S., 6th Dist. 

Ottawa Nos. OT-14-008, OT-14-009, OT-14-011, OT-14-012, 2014-Ohio-3067, ¶ 64. In 

In re E.S., we recognized that Sup.R. 48(D)(13) does not have the “force of law,” since it 

is only intended to be a general guideline “for the conduct of the courts and do[es] not 

create substantive rights in individuals or procedural law.” 

{¶ 23} Based on this recognition and two dispositive considerations, it was 

appropriate for the guardian’s testimony and report to be admitted and considered. 

{¶ 24} First, we noted the extent of the guardian’s investigation and how “there 

were tasks described in Sup.R. 48(D)(13) that were performed.” Id. at ¶ 65. In that 

regard, the record reflected that the guardian interviewed the parents, communicated with 

the children’s service agencies at issue, reviewed the case plan, reviewed discovery, 

reviewed the court record, and considered the children’s interest to the extent possible in 

consideration of the fact that they were too young to offer meaningful input. Id. 

{¶ 25} Second, we stated how the guardian’s testimony “was brief and was 

certainly not the exclusive factor driving the court’s decision.” Id. at ¶ 66. The record 

reflected the guardian was only one of many witnesses and that the court did not place 

much emphasis on the guardian’s testimony or recommendation. Further, we found the 

guardian was subject to a challenging cross-examination and there was evidence on 

record to allow the trial court to “believe or disbelieve [the] testimony, to assign it 

whatever weight it deemed appropriate, and to consider it in the context of all the other 

evidence[.]” Id. 
10. 

{¶ 26} Consistent with In re E.S., we found minimum standards of Sup.R. 

48(D)(13) met in another demonstrative case, In re C.G., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-15-1256, 

L-15-1257, 2016-Ohio-375. In that case, we held as such despite the argument that a 

successor guardian ad litem had insufficient time to conduct an independent investigation 

to properly determine the best interest of the child. Id. at ¶ 49. 

{¶ 27} In In re C.G., a second guardian was appointed during the proceedings, 

who did not specifically interview the father or child in reaching a recommendation or 

drafting a report. Nevertheless, based on the guardian’s testimony, the record reflected 

that the child was only an infant who was unable to express wishes, and that the guardian 

made several attempts to contact and arrange a meeting with the father, to no avail. Id. at 

¶ 52. The guardian’s report and recommendation were stated to be based on “background 

of the case from the court records, filings, the caseworker, and the foster mother.” Based 

on this limited investigation, the guardian nevertheless found reasonable grounds to 

conclude that the father never visited the child, that neither parent participated in 

services, and that the children’s services agency had adopted an older sibling of the child 

and was in position to adopt the child at issue. We, therefore, found the investigation was 

sufficient to satisfy the reasonable effort requirements. 

{¶ 28} Here, based on review of the record, consistent with In re E.S. and In re 

C.G., we find that GAL2 satisfied the requirements set forth in Sup.R. 48(D)(13) before 

offering a report and testifying. 
11. 

{¶ 29} In discussing GAL2’s testimony, the March 22, 2017 trial court judgment 

entry in pertinent part states: 

At the close of all evidence, the Court heard testimony from AllmaTadema Miller, [GAL2] for the children. Ms. Miller testified that she had 

been involved with the case since September of 2016. She testified she 

conducted a separate investigation into the case and had interviewed 

[appellant], family members, and LCCS personnel. She testified she also 

reviewed documents concerning this case. Ms. Miller had difficulty 

meeting with [appellant] and had attempted to do so at the visits set up for 

[appellant] and the children. [Appellant] did not attend these visits, but the 

two were able to meet three weeks before this trial after Ms. Miller 

contacted [appellant]’s step-mother. 

Ms. Miller testified that [appellant] was reluctant to acknowledge the 

history of domestic violence between her and [father]. [Appellant] also 

minimized concerns for violent behavior by blaming it on [father]’s 

substance abuse. 

At the conclusion of her testimony, Ms. Miller testified that she 

believed an award of permanent custody was in the best interest of the 

children. She testified that her recommendation was based on a totality of 

the circumstances, and she has serious concerns for the safety of the 

children in their parents’ care. 
12. 

{¶ 30} The judgment entry eventually follows with, “[t]he Court finds that, after 

performing a separate and independent investigation, the guardian ad litem recommends 

that permanent custody is in the best interest of the children.” 

{¶ 31} Based on our review of the transcript of the March 2017 hearing, GAL2 

confirmed that she had limited contact with appellant, and that appellant missed three 

visitation appointments on the days GAL2 was there to observe. These were scheduled 

for Saturdays, after appellant had requested that Saturday be her visitation day. Further, 

GAL2 testified how she visited the children at their placement residence with the foster 

caregivers, and that the children were thriving in the healthy environment. GAL2 

discussed her suspicions that appellant could not keep the children safe, based on 

enabling father’s past neglect and “significant” abuse, appellant’s ongoing drug use and 

pattern of domestic violence, and appellant’s lack of initiative in taking responsibility for 

her past actions or mental health problems. 

{¶ 32} Lastly, GAL2’s written report indicates that GAL2 interviewed appellant, 

her maternal grandmother, the children to the extent possible, LCCS, and the foster 

caregivers. The report also indicates GAL2 reviewed “prior filings,” “prior GAL report,” 

“LCCS Case file,” “Criminal records for Father and Mother,” “Centralized Drug Testing 

records for Mother and Father,” and “Mercy Medical records for K.P. and Ki.R.” The 

report discusses the disturbing case history of the children, the current safe and healthy 

(foster care) placement of the children, the fact that the foster caregivers are interested in 

adopting all three siblings, and the lack of parental progress displayed by appellant’s 
13. 

inconsistent completion of case plan services and scheduled visitations. The report also 

highlights how the children are all too young to express sincere wishes regarding their 

placement. 

{¶ 33} Therefore, based on review of the entire record, including the trial court 

judgment, the transcript of the March 2017 hearing, and GAL2’s written report, we find 

tasks described in Sup.R. 48(D)(13) were performed by GAL2, and that GAL2’s 

testimony and report were not the exclusive factors driving and supporting the court’s 

decision. See In re E.S., supra. Moreover, we find that despite GAL2 being appointed 

with only seven months left in the case, her investigation provided reasonable grounds to 

support her findings and the conclusion that LCCS should be granted permanent custody. 

See In re C.G., supra. 

{¶ 34} Consequently, we can neither say that GAL2 failed to satisfy the minimum 

standards set forth in Sup.R. 48(D), nor that the trial court erred in admitting and giving 

consideration to GAL2’s testimony and report. 

{¶ 35} Accordingly, appellant’s first assigned error is not well-taken. 

Second Assignment of Error 

{¶ 36} Appellant next argues the award of permanent custody to LCCS was in 

error by challenging the trial court’s finding that her children could not be placed with 

her within a reasonable time. Appellee contends the grant of custody was supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. 
14. 

{¶ 37} A trial court can award permanent custody to a public children’s services 

agency upon finding that the child “cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents 

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent,” so long as the court 

also determines that the award of permanent custody is in the child’s best interests. See

R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). 

{¶ 38} Under R.C. 2151.414(E), a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

one of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(16) exists is necessary to establish 

that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not 

be placed with either parent. In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 661 N.E.2d 738 (1996), 

syllabus. In turn, R.C. 2151.414 (D) lists relevant factors to be considered by the court in 

determining whether an award of permanent custody to a public children’s services 

agency is in the best interest of the child. 

{¶ 39} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that will “produce in the mind 

of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In 

re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), quoting Cross 

v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

A. Placed Within a Reasonable Time 

{¶ 40} “[T]he existence of only one of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is 

sufficient to determine that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable 

time.” In re S.P., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1113, 2014-Ohio-5075, ¶ 32, quoting In re 

R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214, 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 24. 
15. 

{¶ 41} In this case, we will only address the four factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) 

which were explicitly relied on in the trial court judgment against appellant. 

1. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) provides: 

Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency 

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to 

be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to 

resume and maintain parental duties. 

{¶ 42} Here, the judgment entry states that appellant “has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed 

outside the home.” This was found by the court to be apparent “notwithstanding 

reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parent to remedy 

the problems that initially caused the children to be placed outside the home[.]” 

{¶ 43} Based on our review of the testimony on record, we find there is clear and 

convincing evidence to support this finding. Specifically, testimony and other evidence 
16. 

reveal K.P. was subject to his father attempting to kill or severely injure him as far back 

as September 2014. Although a no-contact order was put in place then, appellant still 

allowed the father to see the child, even though father posed an obvious threat to the 

child’s well-being. Appellant even failed to report the no-contact order to LCCSEA, 

because she was not aware it was her responsibility to report the order and protect her 

children. 

{¶ 44} Further, appellant enabled father to physically harm Ki.R. because, when 

father did so by choking the child in an effort to kill him, appellant was fully aware of 

father’s propensity to commit physical violence against her and the children, yet she left 

father alone with Ki.R. The record actually reveals that the day before choking Ki.R., 

father dangled K.P. over a bannister and choked appellant until she collapsed, and that 

father had admitted to attempting to kill K.P. numerous times prior to that occasion. We 

find adequate support for the trial court’s finding that appellant failed to protect her 

children and lacked awareness, and these initially caused the children to be placed outside 

her home. 

{¶ 45} We likewise find support for the court’s finding that appellant has not 

changed her parental conduct to allow her to resume and maintain parental duties. For 

instance, despite appellant participating in recommended case plan services, the record 

reflects she was inconsistent with the services because she did not fully or voluntarily 

participate in parenting and/or drug therapy. She actually failed drug tests and was 

charged and arrested for possession during the time period of the proceedings, in spite of 
17. 

her claiming and recognizing that the children’s father was a threat due to his drug use. 

There is also evidence she did not maintain stable employment or independent living 

arrangements and, thus, we find appellant has not substantially remedied the conditions 

that led to the removal of K.P., Ki.R., and Ke.R. 

{¶ 46} Consequently, we find ample evidence to support the trial court’s findings 

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). 

2. R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) provides: “The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment 

toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate 

permanent home for the child[.]” 

{¶ 47} Here, the trial court judgment entry states that appellant “has demonstrated 

a lack of commitment toward the children by failing to regularly visit with them when 

able to do so.” The record supports this finding because an LCCS caseworker testified 

that up until September 2016, appellant was consistent with her visits. However, 

according to testimony of LCCS and GAL2, starting October 2016, appellant became 

inconsistent with the visits. GAL2 actually testified that she and appellant arranged three 

visits in which appellant had an opportunity to show interaction with the children during 

visitation, but that appellant failed to attend all three. LCCS also noted that appellant had 

not shown that she had an adequate permanent home for the children and, although 

appellant lived with her father, during their investigation appellant did not allow LCCS 

into her father’s residence to view the conditions and appropriateness of the home. 
18. 

{¶ 48} In terms of more recent behavior, an LCCS caseworker explained how 

appellant was placed “on an hour show,” which required appellant to “arrive and check in 

for her visit an hour prior to visitation start time.” This was done to ensure appellant was 

going to attend before the foster caregivers went out of their way to bring the children to 

visitation. Appellant was not present at the March 2017 hearing to explain her absences 

and, thus, we cannot say she was unable with justification to visit on the occasions she 

missed. 

{¶ 49} Accordingly, we find clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial 

court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). 

3. R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) provides: “The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide 

food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child 

from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental 

neglect.” 

{¶ 50} Here, the judgment entry states that appellant “is unwilling to prevent the 

children from suffering physical or emotional abuse.” As articulated above in addressing 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), we find ample evidence appellant failed to protect her children and 

lacked awareness as regards their physical, mental and emotional well-being. 

{¶ 51} Accordingly, the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) is 

supported by the record. 

 
19. 

4. R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) provides: “Any other factor the court considers relevant.” 

{¶ 52} Here, the judgment entry states that appellant “failed to participate in the 

permanent custody trial despite having previously attended court appearances and being 

duly served and notified. 

{¶ 53} At the March 2017 hearing the court engaged in discussion with appellant’s 

counsel regarding appellant’s absence: 

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Ms. Stoner, let’s start with 

your client. 

COUNSEL: Your Honor, I do not know where my client is this 

morning. She has been present at other court hearings. Most recently the 

February pretrial date. So I have no explanation for her nonappearance. 

THE COURT: She is aware of today’s date? 

COUNSEL: Yes, she is, Your Honor. And since she was at court 

recently and I’m aware of her wishes— 

THE COURT: You can proceed? 

COUNSEL: I can proceed. 

THE COURT: Okay. Maybe she’s just late. I would say for the 

record that it is 9:33 and this case was scheduled to begin at 9 o’clock. So 

all right. * * * 

{¶ 54} Based on appellant’s counsel statement that appellant knew of the 

important hearing yet failed to attend, we find there is support for the trial court’s finding. 
20. 

Such a failure to appear reflects poorly on appellant’s desire to regain custody, to display 

responsibility and, further, is evidence she lacked care in supporting her legal position. 

{¶ 55} Consequently, we find clear and convincing evidence supports the finding 

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), and weighing the above-mentioned factors under R.C. 

2151.414(E) provides sufficient grounds for us to determine that K.P., Ki.R., and Ke.R. 

cannot be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. 

B. The Children’s Best Interest 

{¶ 56} When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in a child’s best 

interest, the trial court “must consider all the relevant factors, including those enumerated 

in R.C. 2151.414(D): the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the 

child, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence in his life, and 

any applicability of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11).” In re E.M., 9th Dist. 

Wayne No. 15CA0033, 2015-Ohio-5316, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 57} In this case, we will individually address the three factors under R.C. 

2151.414(D) which were relied on in the trial court judgment against appellant. We note 

that although the trial court stated the factors separately, it only provided the following 

paragraph addressing the three factors collectively. 

The children are placed together and are thriving. The children are 

getting any and all services they require. They have not been able to visit 

consistently with their parents due to [father]’s incarceration and 

[appellant]’s failure to attend her visits regularly. The children are in need 
21. 

of a legally secure and permanent placement and such a placement cannot 

occur without an award of custody to LCCS. 

1. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) provides: “The interaction and interrelationship of the child 

with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, 

and any other person who may significantly affect the child[.]” 

{¶ 58} Here, and as articulated above, we find ample support for the trial court’s 

concern that the interaction and interrelationship of the children with their parents 

jeopardizes the children’s safety and well-being. The record reflects that the foster 

caregivers are much better suited to provide a child-safe and permanent home, to provide 

adequate care, to meet the needs of the children, and to nurture and foster a healthy 

environment and upbringing for all three children. The caregivers want to adopt all three 

children, allowing the children to be raised together as a family unit. 

{¶ 59} Consequently, we find clear and convincing evidence which supports the 

trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). 

2. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) provides: 

The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 
22. 

twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 

2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary 

custody of an equivalent agency in another state[.] 

{¶ 60} Here, LCCS filed its complaint in dependency, neglect, and abuse for K.P. 

and Ki.R. on March 8, 2016. The next day the magistrate granted interim temporary 

custody of the children to LCCS. On May 17, 2016, Ke.R. was born and LCCS sought 

protective services for her three days later. The magistrate granted interim temporary 

custody of Ke.R. to LCCS on May 25, 2016. 

{¶ 61} The children have been in custody for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) 

since LCCS was granted interim temporary custody. As reflected in the transcript of the 

March 2017 hearing the court, in addressing this factor, stated: “(D)(1)(c) I believe these 

children have been in the care of the Agency for 12 months now out of the last 22 months 

and so I am going to indicate that (D)(1)(c) applies.” This finding was in error because 

although the court was close in its estimation, none of the children were in LCCS’s 

custody for 12 months at that point in time. 

{¶ 62} Thus as of the date of the March 2017 hearing, we cannot say that the 

custodial history of the children satisfied the requirements of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). 

3. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) provides: “The child’s need for a legally secure permanent 

placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency[.]” 
23. 

{¶ 63} Here, the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement would 

be satisfied with permanent custody to LCCS because the current foster caregivers intend 

on adopting all three children into their healthy, child-safe home environment. There is 

no doubt these young children are in need of stable placement, and we find no evidence 

in the record to reveal that the children would otherwise have such healthy, safe 

permanency without LCCS intervention, as appellant has not provided sufficient 

evidence to the contrary. Appellant’s second assigned error is found not well-taken. 

{¶ 64} Accordingly, there is clear and convincing evidence that legally secured 

placement of the children cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to 

LCCS and, in also considering R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) as analyzed above, we cannot say 

it was error to award permanent custody to LCCS in the children’s best interest. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 65} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 

24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
24. 

 In re Ke.R. 

 C.A. Nos. L-17-1092 

 L-17-1093 

 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

James D. Jensen, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE