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[Federal Register: June 28, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 124)]
[Notices]               
[Page 37799-37801]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr28jn11-67]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

 
DOE Final Decision in Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements 
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: On April 27, 2011, The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
reaffirmed their Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements 
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers, to the 
Department of Energy. In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(d), the following 
represents the Secretary of Energy's final decision on the 
recommendation and the reasoning for his decision.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 
Indiana Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer, 
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585.

    Issued in Washington, DC on May 27, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
    Report on the Secretary of Energy's Final Decision and 
Supporting Reasoning Regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board (Board) Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements 
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
    SUMMARY: This report, together with its attachments, documents 
the Secretary of Energy's final decision and supporting reasoning 
regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board) 
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.

[[Page 37800]]

    DISCUSSION: The Board issued Recommendation 2010-1 on October 
29, 2010. The Recommendation focused on the Department of Energy 
(DOE) requirements for developing and approving Documented Safety 
Analyses for nuclear facilities. The Recommendation identified six 
specific sub-recommendations.
    As explained in detail in the Department's February 28, 2011, 
response to the Recommendation (the text of which is included as 
Attachment 1 to this report), the Secretary of Energy agreed with 
the intent of the Recommendation, but took exception to some of the 
included technical details on how best to meet that intent. The 
Secretary of Energy's response constituted a partial acceptance of 
the Recommendation.
    Per 42 United States Code (USC) Section 2286d paragraph (d), 
when the Secretary of Energy does not fully accept a Recommendation, 
the Board must either reaffirm or revise the recommendation, and the 
Secretary of Energy must then:

    * * * consider the Board's action and make a final decision on 
whether to implement all or part of the Board's recommendations. 
Subject to subsection (h), the Secretary shall publish the final 
decision and the reasoning for such decision in the Federal Register 
and shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services and on 
Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives a written report containing that decision and 
reasoning.

    The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation in a letter to the 
Secretary of Energy on April 27, 2011. In the letter, the Board 
provided clarifications regarding the purposes for each sub-
recommendation and stated that there was flexibility in the manner 
in which the sub-recommendations were intended to be implemented by 
the Department. The Secretary of Energy agreed that the 
clarifications provided by the Board will allow the Department to 
develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies DOE's and the Board's 
mutual objectives of ensuring that DOE requirements are clear and 
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers, and the 
environment. For example, the Board clarified that use of the term 
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) controls is inclusive of 
administrative controls. Further, the Board clarified that the 
recommendation did not require that the Department use quantitative 
risk assessment to make determinations of what constitutes adequate 
protection for the public.
    In a letter dated May 27, 2011, the Secretary of Energy 
reaffirmed his February 28, 2011, response as his final decision 
(the text of which is included as Attachment 2 to this report). DOE 
agrees with the critical importance of the use of the 25 rem 
evaluation guideline in determining safety controls that provide 
adequate protection of the public. DOE has appropriately applied 
this approach in the safety analyses for the overwhelming majority 
of its nuclear facilities. For the few existing facilities where 
existing safety controls could not mitigate the dose below the 25 
rem guideline in some accident scenarios, DOE has implemented 
necessary compensatory measures and will continue to strengthen both 
those and take any additional measures necessary to provide adequate 
public protection. Further, the Secretary of Energy confirmed 
continuation of the policy that the 25 rem evaluation guideline will 
be met for all new facilities.
    DOE believes its existing nuclear safety regulatory framework, 
utilizing the DOE Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. 
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety 
Analyses, as a safe harbor methodology, can continue to be used to 
effectively implement the 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements. DOE 
has committed to and is in the process of revising Standard 3009 and 
its associated safety analysis review Standard (DOE Standard 1104, 
Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety 
Design Basis Documents) to ensure the Standards clearly describe how 
the 25 rem evaluation guideline is to be applied for designating 
safety controls and the process that will be followed when mitigated 
dose cannot be reduced to less than the 25 rem evaluation guideline.
    DOE will strengthen its review criteria and approval process for 
situations where the 25 rem evaluation guideline cannot be met for 
existing facilities, including designation of appropriate senior 
management levels of approval authority when the guideline is 
exceeded. DOE anticipates the review criteria to be deterministic 
criteria rather than criteria that would required a risk analysis.
Attachment 1

February 28, 2011

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

    This is in response to your October 29, 2010, letter which 
provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
    The Department of Energy (DOE) is strongly dedicated to the 
safety of the public, our workers, and the environment at all of our 
facilities. We share your conviction that a clear set of 
requirements and standards is vital for safe operations. In 2008, we 
began a comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear safety 
requirements to assure they were clear, concise, complete, and 
current. In March 2010, we enhanced our Directives Reform effort to 
better define and expedite it, and we have made good progress in 
revising key nuclear safety Directives and the DOE Nuclear Safety 
Policy.
    We have not changed our interpretation of requirements for 
developing and approving Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We have 
made significant nuclear safety improvements by upgrading facility 
safety bases and designs and by improving our safety standards and 
procedures. Much has been learned and will continue to be learned 
about improving safety. With your assistance, we have applied the 
lessons learned from industry incidents to upgrade our requirements. 
Our improving safety record reflects these lessons.
    Though DOE has an improving safety record, we always strive to 
do better. Complacency will not be tolerated. With this in mind, the 
Department has carefully evaluated Recommendation 2010-1 and how we 
can use it to improve nuclear safety at the Department. The 
Department partially accepts the Board's Recommendation; a detailed 
explanation is provided below. We have clarified aspects of sub-
recommendation 1, 2, 3c, 4 and 5e. Several elements of 
Recommendation 2010-1 will be addressed in the revision of Standard 
3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses. As we develop the 
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2010-1, we will further 
engage the Board.
    Sub-recommendation 1--Immediately affirm the requirement that 
unmitigated, bounding-type accident scenarios will be used at DOE's 
defense nuclear facilities to estimate dose consequences at the site 
boundary, and that a sufficient combination of SSCs must be 
designated safety class to prevent exposures at the site boundary 
from approaching 25 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent].
    DOE Standard 3009 details DOE's expectations for accident 
analyses to identify hazard controls for most DOE nuclear 
facilities. DOE agrees that Standard 3009 specifies that the 
consequences of unmitigated accidents should to be compared to the 
25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline to determine if safety class 
controls are warranted. As you know, new facilities follow the 25 
rem TEDE limit as a siting criteria according to DOE Standard 1189, 
Integration of Safety into the Design Process. For existing 
facilities safety class Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) 
are normally utilized to prevent exposures from exceeding 25 rem 
TEDE. Standard 3009 also includes provisions for use of other means 
and controls to assure safety where off-site exposures are not 
reduced to below 25 rem TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The 
revised Standard 3009 will further clarify the use of the Evaluation 
Guideline in accident analyses for both new and existing facilities.
    Sub-recommendation 2--For those defense nuclear facilities that 
have not implemented compensatory measures sufficient to reduce 
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct the 
responsible program secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to 
meet this requirement within a reasonable timeframe.
    DOE's responsible Program Secretarial Officer has evaluated the 
safety measures planned or currently in place to protect the public 
at the few remaining defense nuclear facilities that have potential 
accident doses above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined that these 
measures provide adequate protection. This conclusion is based on an 
evaluation of all protective measures in place at these facilities, 
including disciplined formal operations, training, safety management 
programs, control of materials, and layers of controls to prevent 
accidents and/or mitigate their consequences.
    Consistent with DOE's commitment to continuous safety 
improvement, we will

[[Page 37801]]

continue to evaluate options for enhancing the safety of these 
facilities. In some cases, such as the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates that several near-
term planned improvements will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to 
below 25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have already made substantial 
progress in reducing the projected offsite dose that could result 
from specific types of accidents. For many limited life facilities 
we will achieve permanent, long-term risk reduction through 
deactivation and decommissioning. Once we revise DOE Standard 3009, 
DOE will evaluate the documented safety analyses for all facilities 
as part of the required periodic update process. The Implementation 
Plan will describe the steps that will be taken to evaluate safety 
improvement options for those facilities determined to need such 
improvements.
    Sub-recommendation 3--Revise DOE Standard 3009-94 to identify 
clearly and unambiguously the requirements that must be met to 
demonstrate that an adequate level of protection for the public and 
workers is provided through a DSA. This should be accomplished, at a 
minimum, by: (followed by four paragraphs labeled a-d).
    DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to clearly indicate which of 
its provisions are mandatory. DOE will implement the specific steps 
identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this sub-
recommendation. However, DOE will not commit to implementing 
paragraph (c) as written, because doing so would predetermine a 
specific outcome to the current revision process without any 
technical basis. This would be contrary to DOE's standards 
development process. DOE will consider the advice provided in 
paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the criteria that must be met 
for safety class Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)), during 
the Standard 3009 revision process.
    The Implementation Plan will outline the development process and 
how the steps identified in all the paragraphs in this sub-
recommendation will be followed.
    Sub-recommendation 4--Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by incorporating the 
revised version of DOE Standard 3009-94 into the text as a 
requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited in Table 2.
    The purpose of a ``safe-harbor'' is to provide a standard 
methodology that, if followed, will provide credible analyses and 
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept implies that ``safe-harbor'' 
methodologies are the only way to meet requirements. Of course, 
alternative approaches must be approved by DOE, and the criteria for 
accepting these alternatives should be clearly defined.
    DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 (issued in 2001), which 
identifies nuclear safety requirements, but we cannot commit to the 
exact language prescribed in the Recommendation-that is placing 
Standard 3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our review, we 
will update DOE Standard 3009, clearly identifying those provisions 
that are mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not applied, 
appropriate means for reviewing and improving alternative 
methodologies will be established. This will assure implementation 
of DOE Standard 3009, where appropriate, while maintaining the 
flexibility to improve the standard, as needed. This approach has 
allowed DOE to make several important improvements to DOE Standards 
in the past. Details of the revision process will be provided in the 
Implementation Plan.
    Sub-recommendation 5--Formally establish the minimum criteria 
and requirements that govern Federal approval of the DSA, by 
revision of DOE Standard 1104-2009, and other appropriate documents. 
The criteria and requirements should include: (followed by five 
paragraphs labeled a-e).
    DOE agrees with the need for clear guidelines and requirements 
on the appropriate delegation of nuclear safety authorities and will 
revise DOE Standard 1104-2009 and other appropriate DOE documents to 
achieve this. DOE will implement the specific steps identified in 
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE 
cannot commit to implementing paragraph (e) as written, because it 
implies that quantitative risk-based decision making must be 
established and used. The Department is exploring how quantitative 
methods could be applied to support decision-making on safety issues 
at our sites and will keep the Board apprised of developments in 
this area. Today, deterministic and qualitative means are used.
    The Department agrees that the decision to approve safety bases 
must rest on a documented conclusion. The conclusion should indicate 
that the safety basis provides a reasonable assurance that the 
facility can be operated safely, that the hazards have been 
adequately analyzed, and that the engineered and administrative 
controls provide adequate protection for the public, workers and the 
environment. The Implementation Plan will outline DOE's revision to 
standard 3009 and the safety basis development process, will clarity 
the safety basis approval process, and identify how the steps in 
this sub-recommendation will be addressed.
    Sub-recommendation 6--Formally identify the responsible 
organization and identify the processes for performing independent 
oversight to ensure the responsibilities identified in Item 5 above 
are fully implemented.
    DOE has already identified the responsible organization for 
performing independent oversight for the Secretary: the Office of 
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and 
Security (HSS). However, HSS Independent Oversight protocols and 
delegation processes will be reviewed and modified as necessary to 
assure adequate oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The 
Implementation Plan will describe the steps DOE will take review and 
update the protocols and delegation processes.
    We appreciate your advice and will continue working closely with 
the Board to improve the Department's Directives in a manner that 
meets our shared objectives to the safe, effective, and efficient 
execution of our mission. We look forward to working further with 
the Board and its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
    If you have any further questions please contact Glenn Podonsky, 
Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security, at 202-287-6071.

Sincerely,

Steven Chu.

Attachment 2

May 27, 2011

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

    Thank you for the clarification provided in the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board's letter dated April 27, 2011, reaffirming 
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers. As described in 
our initial response, dated, February 28, 2011, we had largely 
agreed with the intent of your Recommendation, but had disagreed on 
some of its technical details. Your letter addressed those details, 
and indicated that you intended for there to be flexibility in 
implementing them.
    Since last February, our staffs have worked closely to ensure 
that we understood the original intent of Recommendation 2010-1, as 
well as the underlying safety improvements that were sought. Valuing 
the significance of this recommendation, and the importance I place 
upon having an effective working relationship with your office, I 
have also directed that Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman and Associate 
Deputy Secretary Mel Williams maintain an active engagement with the 
Board members to facilitate effective communications between our 
organizations on all safety matters. The clarifications you provided 
in your reaffirmation letter have furthered that dialogue, and will 
help guide our work to develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies 
our mutual objectives of ensuring that our requirements are clear, 
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers and the 
environment, and can be implemented as written.
    We are well on our way to making some of the improvements that 
our staffs have discussed. I deeply appreciate the efforts both the 
DNFSB and DOE have made in working together, especially in the past 
month. While the analysis and conclusions in my enclosed letter 
dated February 28, 2011, still hold and constitute my final 
decision, I believe our implementation plan will meet the underlying 
safety improvement objectives of your Recommendation. I have 
assigned Dr. James B. O'Brien, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Safety, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security, to be the 
Department's responsible manager for developing the Implementation 
Plan. Dr. O'Brien can be reached at (301) 903-3331.

Sincerely,

Steven Chu.

Attachment 2
[FR Doc. 2011-16141 Filed 6-27-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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