### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 003 -CV

Ca r oly n Bar ne s , A ppe lla nt

v. University F ederal Cr edit Union an d Gover nm ent Em ployees Insu rance C om pany/ GEICO Insurance , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-08- 0037 27 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Carol y

n Ba rnes appeals fr om the trial court’ s order g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

ap p el l ee s Un i v er s i t y

Fe d er al C re d i tUn i o n(U FC U) an d Government Employ ees I n s u r an c e Co mp an y

( G E I CO )
. B arne s a ls o a p p e a ls f r o m t h e tr ia l c o u rt’ s o r d e r

o f s e v e r an c e . We aff irm both the summary

judgme nt and the orde r of se vera nce.
BACK GR OUND I n 2004, Ba

rnes obtaine d a loan for $14,066 from UFCU, using two personal ve hicles
a s col la te r a l
. A s p arto f

t h e l o ana g r e e m e n t , B ar n e s s i g n e d

a d o c u m e n te n t i t l e d , “ A g r e e m e n tto Provide I nsuranc e,” which included the following lang uag e: “I understand that one of the lender ’s
re qu ir e me nts is that I pr ov ide a de qu a te ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e on the pr op e rt

y se c ur ingmy

loa n. Th is insurance must at least provide c omprehe nsive and c ollisi on cover ag e. The policy must contain a loss pay able c lause e ndorsement na ming the le nder a s lienholder.”Ba rnes a lso had persona l injury protec tion and u ninsured motorist cover ag e for eac h 1 vehicle. This amount repre sented a $1,030 premium for one vehicle a nd a $570 pre mium for the 2 other. T h er e ap p ear s to have be en some dispute in the trial c ourt as to whethe r GEI CO was

3 proper ly named a s Ba

rnes’ s insurance car

rier, or whether a related entity , Colonial County Mutual I ns ur anc e Com

pa ny , s ho uld

have be e n n a me d a s th e ins ur anc e c arr ie r. Th e pa rt ie s d o n ot a dd

re ss this iss ue on appe al, so we w ill assume that GEI CO was prope rly named. 2 Fr o m Marc h 25, 2005 to J une 17, 2005, UF CU sent Ba rnes a number of le tters
re qu e sti nga

c op y of the re qu ir e d c omp re he ns ive and c oll isi on ins ur anc e po lic y

on the tw o v e hic le s. I n the last of the s e l etters, UF CU stated, “I f we do not rec eive e vidence of insuranc e mee ting our require ments, collatera l protec tion insurance ( CPI ) may be issued throug h our insuranc e prog ram.” The letter went on to s t at e t h at i f C P I is issued, the premium will be added to the loa n balanc e. Ba rnes did not provide the require d proof of insu ra n ce in response to these notices. B arne s’s insurance policy

statements from the r eleva nt time period indi cate that she had liability cover ag e on the ve hic le s, bu t did

no t ha ve c omp re he ns ion

or c oll isi on c ov e ra g e and

ha d n ot n a me d U F CU a s a lienholder a s require d. On July 6, 20 05 , B arn e s c a lle d U F CU to a sk a bo ut p ayingof

f t he loa n in 1 anticipation of selling one of the vehicles. At that time, she le arne d that CPI had bee n issued and that premiums in the amount of $1,600 had be en adde d to the loan balanc e. Th e ne xt day , U F CU 2
se nt B arn e s w ri tte n n oti c e re g ard ingthe CPI and the $1 ,6 00 in p re miums. Ba rnes f iled suit ag ainst U FC U an d GE I CO, her insura nce c arr ier, for

brea ch of
co n t ra ct , fr au d , d ec ep t i v e t ra d e p ra ct i ce s , n egl i gen ce , an d gro s s neg lige nce. She a lso br ou g ht c la ims 3 specific ally

ag ainst UFCU f

or fr aud in the induceme nt and “unc onscionable c ontrac t of adhe sion.” She took the position t hat GEI CO h ad m i sled her r eg ardingthe scope of her cover ag e and ha dAcc ording to Ba rnes, the pr incipal balanc e on the two loans, ex clusive of f ees, inter est, and 4 the CPI premiums, was $7,328.80 at the time of the settlement off er. 3 conspired w ith UFCU to wrong fully char g e her

the $1,600 pr emium. Ba rnes late r ame nded her petition to ad d claims for r etaliation, def amation, invasion of priva cy , malice, a nd intentional inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss.

Ba rnes r equeste d and obtained a temporar y restra ining order preventing GEI CO or UF CU fr om t a kin g any

a c tio n to c oll e c t on

the loa ns or fr om r e po rt inghe r t o a c re dit a g e nc y un til a hea ring could be he ld on her re quest for a temporar y injunction. After a

hear ing, the t ri al cour

t dissolved the tempora

ry restra ining or der a

nd denied B arne s’s reque st for a te mporary injunction. Over the cour se of the litig ation, a number of di scover

y disputes arose betwee n the par ties, leading to n ume ro us mot ion s to c omp e l and re qu e sts fo r s a

nc tio ns on

bo th s ide s. On April 5, 2006, UFCU se nt Ba rnes a settlement proposal, stating that in return f or $8 ,0 00 , U F CU wo uld

c on sid e r t

he re le va nt l oa ns to b e pa id i n f

ull , r e le a se the lie ns on

he r v e hic le s,
and fo re g o co lle c tio n of any late fe e s, pe na lti e s, int e re st, or a tto rn e y s’ fe e s. The proposa l further 4 states, “UF CU and B arne s will ex ecute rea sonable a nd mutual l y agre eable full relea ses and other
s e t t l e m e n t d o c u m e n t a t i o nn e c e s s ar y t o f u l l y r e s o l v e an d

d i s m i s s t h e c u r

r e n tp r o c e e d i n g s . ” In
re sp on se , B arn e s se nt U F CU a c a sh ie r’ s che c k f or $8 ,0 00 , a c c omp anie d b y

a le tte r s tatin g , “ Ia m in
rec eipt of y our extortion demand with threats of additi onal economic and financial terr orism if Ido
no t c omp ly

wi th your d e mand s. Th is r ans om a nd e xtor tion m on e y

is b e ingpa id u

nd e r e xtre me economic a

nd financ ial duress and not be cause it is due and owing .” The letter g oes on to state that the funds were being tender ed “with all rig hts rese rved.” UFCU the n sent notice that it would not
acc ept B arne s’s che ck unless she signe d a rele ase of all claims. Ba

rnes did not sig n a re lease , andI t is no t cle ar f ro m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r whe the r t he de nia l of

summa ry jud g me nt a s to 5 Ba rnes ’s b reach-of

-contra ct claim re fer

red to the a lleg ed bre ach of the loan ag ree ment or to the alleg ed bre ach of

the Rule 11 ag ree ment. At the jury trial on t h e n o n-seve red c laims, Bar nes wa s allowed to proc eed on both claims, so we will assume that summary judgme nt was denie d as to both. I n a dd iti on , th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d U F CU ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to 6 its countercla ims ag ainst Ba rnes f or bre ach of

contra ct, quantum m er u i t , unjust enrichment, and conver sion. Bar

nes’s no-e vidence motion on UFCU’s counte rcla ims was also denied. 4 UF CU de c lin e d to ne g oti a te the $8 ,0 00 c he c k. B arn e s file d UF CU ’s le tte r wit h the tr ia l cou

rt a s a Rule 11 Ag ree ment, althoug h the filed letter does not include B arne s’s signa ture. On June 26, 2006, B arn e s f ile d a “ su pp le me nta l or ig ina l pe tit ion ,” a lle g ing th at UF CU ha d b re a c he d th e pa rt ie s’ Rule 11 ag ree ment by

proce eding with liti g ation afte r re ceivingher c ashier’ s chec k for $8,000. On J uly 5, 20 0 6 , t h e t rial cour t gr anted UF CU’s motion to compel and for
sanc tio ns a g a ins t B arn e s, a sse ssi nghe r $ 50 0 in sa nc tio ns re late d to dis c ov e ry abu se s. Ev e ntu a lly all parties f

iled motions for summary judgme nt, and a summary -judg ment h ea ri n g was he ld on Dec ember

21, 2006. On J anuar

y 24, 2007, the trial cour

t issued an orde r on summary judgme nt, gr anting GEI CO’s and UF CU’s motions in part, denying t h em i n part, a nd denying B arne s’s motion. Spe c if ic a lly , th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f UF CU on a ll of B arn e s’ s c la ims other than br eac h of contra ct and g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of GEI CO on all of B arne s’s 5
c la ims oth e r t

ha n d e c e pti ve tr a de pr a c tic e s. 6 Additional summary

judgme nt motions and supplementa l pleading s were then filed, and on Oc tober 17, 2007, GEI CO filed a motion to sever the cause s of action re solved by the trial
cour t ’s o rd er grantingpartial summary judgme nt. Ba

rnes f iled a re sponse in opposition t o the motion to s ever

and soug ht sanctions ag ainst GEI CO for filing the motion.5 I n November

2007, the trial cour

t placed the matter on the doc ket of c ases to be dismiss ed for

want of pr osecution. B arne s filed a motion to reta in, which the trial court g rante d over the op po sing pa

rt ie s’ ob je c tio ns . In Se pte mbe r 2 00 8, UF CU and GE I CO fi le d a

joi nt m oti on

to dismiss on the g rounds that B arne s had not taken steps t o s ch ed u l e and c omplete mediation as require d in the order

of retention. At the hearing on the m otion to dismiss , the trial cour t entere d an order of sever ance , sever ing out those cause s of action that had alre ady been decide d on summary jud g me nt a

nd a ssi g nin g the m to c a

us e numbe r D- 1- GN -0 8- 00 37 27 , the c a us e numbe r g ivi ngri se to this appeal. The order

of severanc e also include d the following lang uag e: “It is further ORDERED that the only

rema ining iss u es i n t h is ex isting litigation are Plaintiff’s c laims for De ceptive T rade Practice s Act ag ainst [GEI CO] and breac h of contra ct aga inst [UFCU].” The order of severa nce ha d the ef fec t of making the trial court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt final and a

ppeala ble, and this appe al followed. See P iercev. Re ynolds , 3 29 S.W. 2d

76 , 7 8- 79 (T e x. 19 59 ) ( “ A j ud g me nt whic h f ull y adjudicate s one of the sever ed cause s is appea lable eve n though the entire c ontroversy as it exi sted prior to the seve ranc e is not determined the reby .”).

I n four issues on a

ppeal, Ba rnes argues that the trial cour t erre d by (1) g ranting the motion to s ever , (2) de nying he r motion for summary judgme nt, (3) a ssessing disc overy sanctions ag ainst her in the a

mount of $500, and (4) g rantingsummary judgme nt in f

av o r of UFCU and GEI CO. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Severa nce of claims under the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure r ests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Lib e rty Nat ’l Fi re In s. Co. v . A k in , 927 S.W .2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996) (o ri g . p ro c e e din g ); se e als o Te x. R. Civ. P. 1 74 . Ac la im i s p ro pe rl y se ve ra ble if (1 ) t he c on tr ov e rs y6

involves more than one cause of action, (2) the sever ed claim is one that would be the pr oper subjec t of a la wsuit if independently

asser ted, and ( 3) the seve red c laim i s n o t s o i n terwove n with the
rema i n i n g action that they involve the same f

acts a nd issues. Guaranty Fed. Sav s. Bank v. HorseshoeOperating Co. , 793 S.W .2d 65 2 , 6 5 8 (Tex. 1990) (op. on re h’g ). An orde r of
se ve ra nc e is r e vie wa

ble on a pp e a l, b ut w e wi ll n ot d ist ur b th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to g ra nt a
sever ance absent a

n abuse of

discretion. Id. We reviewa trial c ourt’s imposition of sanctions for a

n abuse of

discretion. Cir e v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004)
. The ruling will be reve rsed only if it was ar bitrary
or unre asonable
. Id. at 839.

Summary judgme nts ar e reviewed de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 16 4 S. W.3 d 6 56 , 6 61 (T e x. 20 05 ). To pr e va il on a moti on fo r sum mary jud g me nt, the mov ant m

us t show that there is no issue of materia l f ac t an d that it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law. TX Far W est, Ltd. v. Texas Inv

s. Mgmt., Inc

. , 1 2 7 S
. W .3d 295, 301 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pe t.) . E vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to t he no n- mov ant i s ta

kena s tr ue and e ve ry re a so na ble inf e re nc e mus t be indulg ed in favor of the non- movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. I nre v i ew i n g a no-evide nce summar

y judgme nt, we examine the entire rec ord in the light most fa vorable to the nonmovant to determine w hether more than a s ci n t i l l a of probative evide nce w as pre sented to ra ise a g enuine issue of m at erial fact. See P erdue v . Patten Corp. , 142 S.W .3d 596, 604 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pet.). When the evidenc e supporting a finding rises to a leve l t hat would enable rea sonable, fair-minded persons to differ in their conc lusions, more than a scintilla of evidenc e exists. See id.A final a nd appea lable judgme nt in D-1-G N-05-003010 was signe d on October 9, 2009. 7 B arn e s’ s a

pp e a l f ro m th a t ju dg me nt i s c ur re ntl y pe nd ingbe fo re thi s Co ur t a s a pp e llate c a

us e numbe r 03- 10 -0 01 47 -C V. We have g ra nte d Ba rn e s’ s motio n to allo w the re c or d in this a pp e a l to also serve as the re cord in 03-10- 00147-CV, subject to any nece ssary

supplementation. 7 DI SCU SSIO N Procedural Posture of this Appeal

As a pre liminary

matter, we addre ss the proce dural posture of this appea l. T he re cord and brie fs filed in this appea l ident i fy the trial cour

t’s cause number a s D-1-G N-05-003010. Ho we ve r, a t the ti me this a pp e a l w a s f

ile d, the re wa s n o f

ina l and a pp e a la ble jud g me nt i n c a

us e number D- 1-GN- 05-003010. B arne s’s notice of this appe al states that she se eks to appea l from the
o rd er o f s ev er an ce an d , i f t h e o rd er o f s ev er an ce i s u p h el d , fr o mt h o s e s u m m ary -j u d gm en tru l i n gs deeme d final and appea lable as a result of the se vera

nce. T hus, the trial cour

t cause number g iving rise to this appea l is D-1-G N-08-003727, the cause number that was cre ated by the trial court in the order of seve ranc e and to whic h the claims re solved by summary judgme nt were assig ned. 7 Order of Sev erance

I n her f irst issue on appea l, Ba

rnes a rgues that the trial court err ed in issuing the or der of seve ranc e bec ause the sever ed ca uses of action are so interwove n with the remaining claims that they involve the s ame facts and issues. See H orseshoe Ope rating , 7 9 3 S
. W
. 2 d a t6 5 8
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, the seve red c auses of

action were Bar

nes’s claims ag ainst GEI CO and UF CU for fr aud, neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, r etaliation, def amation, invasion of priva cy , malice, a nd intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as her claims ag ainst UFCU f or “unc onscionable c ontrac t of adhe sion,” dece ptive trade prac tices, and fra ud in the i nduceme nt, and her claim ag ainst GEI CO for bre ach of8

c on tr a c t. B arn e s’ s b re a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im a g a inst UFC U and de c e pti ve tr a de pr a c tic e s c la im ag ainst GEI CO both remained pe nding in the or igina l cause , trial court c ause numbe r D-1- GN-08- 00 30 10 , a nd ult imate ly

we nt t o tr ia l. Ba rnes a rg ues that the seve red claims involve the s ame facts and issues as the nonsever ed cla ims, and theref ore that the trial court a

bused its d i s cr et ion in orderinga seve ranc e. Howeve r, our f

orthcoming discussion on the merits of the summary judgme nt confirms t hat the
se ve re d c la ims imp lic a te dif fe re nt iss ue s and re qu ir e pr oo f of dif fe re nt e le me nts tha

n th os e c la ims that survived summary

jud gm ent. In addition, many of the seve red c laims, including re taliation, i nvasion of priva cy , and malice , do not repre sent valid ca uses of a ction in the manner that Ba rnes ha s p le a de d th e m. T he purp os e of g ra nti nga se ve ra nc e is t o e ns ur e jus tic e is do ne, preju dic e is avoided, a

nd convenie nce is fur

there d. City of

Dallas v. Redbird De v. Corp. , 143 S.W .3d 375, 386 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.). Given the trial court’s broad discretion in matters of seve ranc e,
as we ll as the underly

ing pur pose of a llowing a sever ance , we c annot conc lude that the orde r to sever in this case wa s an abuse of discre tion. See H o rseshoe Ope rating , 793 S.W .2d at 658. For that matter, e ven if the or der of sever ance was iss u ed i n er ror, it i s not readily appar ent what r emedy
wo uld be a va ila ble
. Th e re wo uld be no pr a c tic a l e ff e c t to re ve rs ingthe or de r, a s th e se ve re d c la ims h av e b ee n re s olved on summary judgme nt and final judg ment has bee n enter ed base d on a jury verdic t as to the non-seve red c laims.

B arn e s a lso c on te nd s tha t the se ve ra nc e or de r wa s issu e d in viol a tio n of d ue pr oc e ss beca use she did not have prior notice that the motion to sever would be taken up during the hea ring
on the j oint motion to dismiss
. Whil e the trial court did addre ss the motion to s ever during a hea

ringI t is not abundantly clea r that the due -proc ess re quirements of Pe ra lta e ve n a pp ly to t his 8 c a se , a s it is the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r o n s umm ary jud g me nt, rathe r t

ha n th e or de r o f s e ve ra

nc e , th a t “ is to be acc orded finality ” for purposes of the sever ed claims. The or der of sever ance mere ly

rende red the summary -judg ment order final and a

ppeala ble. We n ote that U F CU a lso pr oc e e de d at tr ia l on its c ounte rc la ims a g a ins t B arn e s. 9 9 on a diffe rent motion, Ba

rnes was not de prived of a rea sonable opportunity

to respond to the motion to sever, a s she had pr eviously filed a r esponse a

nd objections to the motion. F urther, de spite her lack of prior notice that the motion to s ever would be addr essed at the hear ing, B arne s did attend and prese nt argument in opposition to the s ever ance . Be cause Ba rnes ha d notice that the motion to sever was pe nding and had an opportunity to file written objec tions, we conc lude that no violation of due proce ss occur

red. See P eralta v. He ights Med. Ctr., Inc. , 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988) ( holding that in a pr oc e e din g “ wh ic h is to b e a c c or de d f ina lity ,” du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e s n oti ce that is re a so na bly
c a lc ulate d to a

pp ri se int e rested part ies of pe nd e nc y

of a c tio n a nd a ff or d th e m op po rt

un ity to prese nt objections). 8

F ina lly , B arn e s argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r i mpr op e rl y se ve re d c e rt a in c la ims that she had r aised for

the first time in supplemental pleadin g af t er the orde r g rantingsummary judgme nt was issued. B arne s’s first, sec ond, and third supplemental petitions raise newclaims of brea ch of f

iduciary duty and bre ach of

fair de bt collection laws. The rec ord in this appeal include s
a transcr ipt of the August 2009 jury trial on Ba

rnes’ s non-seve red c auses of action. This transc ript ref lects that the trial court determined that B arne s was entitled to proc eed at trial on claims that wer e raised for the first time after the summary

judgme nt order. There fore , even if the orde r of se vera

nce 9Whil e the rec ord i s less than clea r, it appea rs that B arne s’s motion for summary judgme nt 10 on her Rule 11 c laims was filed on Septembe r 19, 2006, hear d on October 23, 2006, and denie d by an o rd e r o n M arc h 7 , 2 00 7. Thus , B arn e s’ s r e qu e st f or summa ry jud g me nt on he r Rul e 11 c la ims wa s n ot e ve n a dd

re sse d in c onne c tio n w iththe su mma ry judgment p ro c e e din g be fo re us in t his appea l. The or d er of sever ance states that “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment” should be included i n t h e re cord f

or ca use number D -1-GN -08-003727. Pre sumably , this refe rs to Ba rnes’ s no-evide nce motion on UF CU’s counter claims, which wa s filed Dec ember 4, 2006, and denie d by the trial cour

t in the same January 24, 2007 order that g rante d in part and de nied in part UF CU’s and GEI CO’s motions for summary judgme nt. 10 imp ro p er l y

s ev er edcl ai m s t h at h adn o tb ee nre s o l v edo ns u m m ary j u d gm en t , t h at i s s u e w as re medied wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt

pe rm itt e d B arn e s to pr oc e e d w iththo se c la ims a t tr ia l. We overrule Ba

rnes’ s first issue on appea l. Barnes’s Motion for Summary J udgment I n her se cond issue on appe al, B arne s argues that the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing he r mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to he r c la ims re late d to br e a c h of the Rul e 11 a g re e me nt. Ab sent c e rt a in e xce pti on s n ot a pp lic a ble he re , th e de nia l of

a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i s interlocutory and ca

nnot be appe aled. See Nov ak v. Ste vens , 59 6 S.W. 2d 84 8, 84 9 (T e x. 19 80 ). Th is is not a situation where the parties f iled cross-motions fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt and the trial c ourt g rante d one and de nied the other, in which ca se we would revie w all summary -judg ment evidenc e and dete rmine all questions pr esente d. See Tex as W orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advoc ates of Tex. , 1 36 S.W. 3d

64 3, 64 8 (Tex . 2 00 4) . Wh ile UF CU ’s summa ry -j ud g me nt m oti on

did a dd re ss Ba rnes’ s Rule 11 claims in its di scussion of the bre ach- of-c ontrac t clai m , UFCU’s motion was denied a s to the brea ch-of -contra ct claim. As a

result, B arne s’s claims re l ated to the Rule 11 ag ree ment wer e not disposed of on summary judgme nt and ther efor e could not have been r ender ed final and appea lable by the order of seve ranc e. Fur

thermore , our review of the August 2009 trial 1011

tr ans c ri pt i n th e no n- se ve re d acti on re fl e c ts t hat B arn e s p ro c e e de d at tr ia l on he r c la ims re late d to brea ch o f t h e Ru l e 11 ag ree ment. As a re sult, we ca nnot addre ss the denial of he r motion for summary judgme nt on that issue.
Discove ry Sanctions

I n a third issue on appea l, B arne s argues that the trial court err ed in issuin g a dis c ov e ry or der dat ed J uly

5, 20 06 , g ra

nti ngUF CU ’s mot ion

to e nf or c e and a sse ssi ng$5 00 in sanctions ag ainst Ba

rnes. The J uly 5, 2006 discovery order was issued in trial cour

t cause number D- 1- GN -0 8- 00 3010 . T his a pp e a l is lim ite d to tho se matte rs that w e re se ve re d to tr ia l c ourt c a us e number D- 1-GN- 08-003727 by the o rd er o f s ever ance . Thus, we c annot addr ess B arne s’s issue
re late d to the sanc tio ns or de r i n th is a pp e a l. T he sanc tio ns ord er may , h ow e ve r, be pr op e rl y
a dd re ssed in Barnes ’s app eal fro m t he fi nal ju dgmen t i n cau se n um ber D -1- GN-0 8-0 03 01 0, c ur re ntl y pending befor e this Court as appellate cause number 03-10- 00147-CV, assuming it is properly raised i nap p el l at e b ri ef

i n g. Summary J

udgment I n her fourth issue on appe al, B arne s argues that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of UFCU and GEI CO on the sever ed claims. GEI CO filed a motion for
summa ry jud g me nt o n B arn e s’ s c la ims fo r d e c e pti ve tr a de pr a c tices, fraud, br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, r etaliation, def amation, invasion of priva cy , malice, a nd intentional infliction of emotional distr es s, assertingthat there was no issue of material fa ct and that B arne s
c ou ld no t pr ov e he r c la ims a s a matte r of law. UF CU mov e d fo r summa ry jud gment on bo th12

traditional and no-e vidence g rounds on B arne s’s claims for br eac h of contr ac t , fr aud, fr aud in the in d u ce m en t , d ec ep t i v e t ra d e p ra ct i ce s , n egl i gen ce, gr oss neg lige nce, r etaliation, def amation, invasion of privac y , malice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and “ unco n s cionable c ontrac t of adhesion.” See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c), ( i).

I n revie wing a summary

judgme nt, we mus t take all evidenc e fa vorable to the nonmovant as true a

nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe re nce in f avor of the non-movant. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. M

gmt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548-49 (Te x . 1985). View ing the rec ord i n this li g ht, the evidenc e ref

lects that Ba

rnes signe d an ag ree ment to obta in comprehe nsive and c ollisi on insurance
on tw o v e hic le s u se d a s c oll a te ra l f or a loa n f ro m U F CU . Su

bs e qu e ntl y , a

re pr e se ntativ e of

GE I CO informed B arne s that she had “ full cover ag e,” when in fa ct she did not hav e compre hensive or colli s i o n cover ag e on the ve hicles in question. Ba rnes’ s policy

documents, attac hed to GEI CO’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, ind ic a te that he r p olicy cov ere d b od ily inj ur y lia bil ity , p ro pe rt

y d amage liability , uninsured motorist bodily injury and prope rty

damag e, and pe rsonal injury protec tion, but did not inc lude compre hensive or collision c overa g e. The doc uments further ref lect that no li enh ol der w a s n a me d o n th e po lic y . B a se d o n th e ina de qu a te ins ur anc e c ov e ra g e , U F CU iss ue d r e tr oa c tiv e ins ur anc e a nd c ha rg e d B arn e s $1 ,6 00 in pr e miums. B arn e s’ s e vid e nc e in r e sp on se t o UF C U’ s an d

GE I C O’ s m o t i o n s fo r s u m m ary j u d gm en tco n s i s t s p ri m ar i l y o f h er o wn 2 5 -p age aff idavit, detailing he r a l l egations. W hile self-se rving aff idavits are not ne cessa

rily improper summary -judg ment evidenc e, af fidavits consisting only

of conc lusion s ar e i nsufficie nt to raise an issue of fa ct. See Trico Tec hs. Corp. v. Montiel , 9 49 S.W. 2d 30 8, 31 0 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Life I ns. Co. of Va. v. Gar-

Dal, Inc. , 570 S.W .2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1978). Ba rnes also relies on letters of c omplaint13

that she wrote to UFCU, he r own testimony at prior he aring s, and docume ntation reg ardingthe rates she paid for

car insurance from a ne w insuranc e ca rrier afte r leaving G EI CO. The trial court determined that the only claims for w hich questions of fa ct exist ed
wer e the c laims that UFCU bre ache d the loan ag ree ment and/or the parties’ Rule 11 ag ree ment, and the claim that GEI CO committed dece ptive trade prac tices. We ag ree that the summary -judg ment
rec ord conta ins no evidence of a de famatory statement that would support her de famation claim, no evidenc e of a

ny actionable invasion of privac y , and no evide nce of the t y pe of e x treme a

nd outrag eous conduc t nece ssary to support a claim of intentional infliction of e motional dist ress. See Kro ge r Te

x . Ltd

. P’ ship v. Sub e ru , 2 16 S.W. 3d 78 8, 79 6 ( Te x. 20 06 ) ( ho ldi ngthat in or de r t o
su pp or t c la im o f i nt ent io nal i nf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss, c on du c t mu st b e “ so ou tr a g e ou s in char acte r, and so e x treme in de g ree , as to g o b ey o n d al l possible bounds of dece ncy , and to be
re gar d edas at ro ci o u s , an d u t t er l y i n t o l er ab l e i na c i v i l i z edco m m u n i t y ”) (q u o t i n g Twyman v. Twyman , 855 S.W .2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)).

The summary -judg ment rec ord also contains no evidenc e that UF C U commi tted fra ud. Wit h respe ct to B arne s’s fra ud claim ag ainst GEI CO, there is no summary -judg ment evidenc e that G EI CO ’s state me nt r e g ard ingB arn e s’ s in sura nc e c ov e ra g e wa s ma de wi th k no wl e dg e of

its falsity or made rec klessly

without knowledg e of its truth. Se e Er ns t & Y ou ng , L.L. P. v . P ac ifi c Mu t. Life Ins. Co. , 51 S.W .3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001) (elements of common-law fra ud). Ba rnes maintains that G EI CO tol d h e r s he ha d “ fu ll c ov e ra g e .” Whil e thi s st a te me nt may have be e n mi sle a din g a s to the extent of her c overa g e, ther e is no evidenc e t h at i t wa s m ad e with knowledg e of its fa lsity orFor purposes of Ba rnes’ s dece ptive trade prac tices claim ag ainst GEI CO, Ba rnes wa s not 11 require d to e stablish that GEI CO had an intent to misrepre sent the scope of her cover ag e or t hat GEI CO had knowledg e that its repr esentation was untrue. See E agle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer , 807 S.W .2d 714, 724 (Tex. 1990). 14 made r eckle ssly

without any

knowledge of the truth. F o r t h a tm a t t e r , t h e r e i s n o s u m m ar y- 11 judgme nt evidence that this statement was def initively false, a s Ba

rnes did have liability

insurance in excess of the minimum requirements imposed by the State of Te x as. Wit h respe ct to the neg lige nce and g ross neg lige nce c laims, Bar nes has pr esente d no evidenc e that UF CU brea ched a ny duty imposed by law, as oppose d to a duty imposed solely

by the contra ct. See Southwestern Be ll Tel. Co. v. De lanney , 809 S.W .2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1991) (whe re du ty
arose solely

from contr act, c laim for breac h of t hat dut y sounded i n contra ct, rather than tort). A s for the ne g lige nce claims ag ainst GEI CO, the summary -judg ment evidenc e, spec ifically the insurance p o l i cy

documents cle arly

noting the a

bsence of collision and compre hensive insura nce, neg ates the e lement of for esee ability as a matter of law. See D oe v. B oys Clubs , 907 S.W .2d 472, 47 7 ( T e x. 1 9 9 5 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t p r o xi m a t e c a u s e , w h i c h i n c l u d e s c o mp o n e n t o f f o r e s e e a b ili ty , is require d element of neg lige nce)
. But see id. a t 48 1 ( “ F or DT PA c la ims , th e pla int if fs ne e d o nly show producingcause , and nee d not establish that the harm wa s fore seea ble.”) (interna l citation omitted). To prove f

orese eability , a plaintiff must establish that a person of ordina ry intelligenc e should have a

nticipated the da

ng er c reated by

the neg lige nt act. Id. at 478. The lawpresumes that a par ty to a contra ct has re ad and unde rstood the contra ct. See A merican Em ployers’ I

ns. Co. v. Aike n , 942 S.W .2d 156, 161 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, no writ). T h us, it would not have be e n r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble tha t ba se d o n a

state me nt t

hat sh e ha d “ fu ll c ov e ra g e ,” B arn e s w ou ld ignor e her insurance policy

statements indicating that she did not have collision and comprehe nsiveW h i l e s t at utory cause s of ac tion for re taliation do exi st in the employ ment context, no 12 employ er/e mploy ee r elationshi p i s i m p l i cate d here
. See, e .g. , Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 161.134 (West 2001). 15 cov e r a g e , an d

th a t s h e w o u ld

th e ns u f

f e r d a ma g e s in

th e f o r m o f r e tr o a c ti v e c o lla tera l ins ur anc e pr e miums.

Ba rnes pr esente d no evidenc e that UFCU employ ed tricker y or ar tifice to convinc e he r t o e xec ute the lo an ag re e me nt a s r e qu ir e d to pr e va il o n h e r c la im f or fr a ud in t he ind uc e me nt. Se e Carawa

y v . Lan d De

sig n S tud io , 47 S.W .3d 696, 698 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Her claim for dece p t i v e t ra d e pra ctices a g ainst UFCU a lso fails as a matter of law be cause lending activities do not constitute goods or service s that would tr i gger the protec tions of the Texas Dec eptive Tra de Prac tices Ac t, unless the goods or services ult imately soug ht by the borrow er f

orm the basis of the c omplaint. Se e Ri v e rsi de Nat ’l Ba nk v . Le wis , 603 S.W .2d 169, 174-75 (Te x . 1980); see also W

alker v . FDIC , 970 F.2d 114, 123 ( 5th Cir. 1992). Be cause Ba rnes does not alleg e any complaint reg arding the g oods she soug ht to acquir e with the loan proce eds, she is not a “consume r” subject to statutory

protec tio n i n connec tion with her transa ction with UFCU. See id. Fur ther, Ba rnes pr oduced no e vidence of any brea ch of c ontrac t by

GEI CO
. Finally , Ba

rnes’ s remaining claims of “unc onscionab l e contract of a dhesion,” re taliation, and malice do not appea r to be 12 independe nt cause s of ac tion under Texas law.

Ba rnes a lso argues that the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingn o -evide nce summar y judgme nt beca

use she ha d not y et had a dequate time fo r d i s co v er y at the time the motion was g rante d. A no-e vidence motion is only proper afte r there has been “ adequate time for discove ry .” Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i). We revie w a trial c ourt’s dete rmination that an ade quate time for discovery h as passed unde r an a

buse-of -discre tion standard. Madison v. W illiamson , 2 4 1 S. W. 3 d 1 4 5, 15516

(Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) . I n the pre sent ca se, litigation had been ong oing for ove r a y ear b ef

o re the no-evidenc e motion was filed. It is clear that discovery was c onducted during that time, as the re cord c ontains a number of UFCU’ s and GEI CO’s response s to Bar nes’s discovery reque sts. Whil e the case appea rs t o have be en plagued with discover y disputes, the rec ord befor e us re flec ts that these disputes wer e re solved by the trial cour t in favor of

UFCU a nd GEI CO, twice r esulting in sanc tions ag ainst Ba rnes. Give n t h i s p ro ce d ural history , we c annot say that the trial court e rre d in determining that an ade quate time for discovery

had passe d t o ru l e on a noe vid e nc e mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Ba sed on the fore g oing, we hold that the trial court did not err in g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of UFCU a nd GEI CO on the sever ed cla ims. W e over rule B arne s’s fourth issue
on a pp e a l.
CO NC LU SION

We affir m the summary

judgme nt and the orde r of se vera nce.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: May

27, 2010