COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CHARLES GILBERT TAYLOR 

v. Record No. 1977-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JULY 18, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

Richard B. Potter, Judge 

 JoAnne B. Butt for appellant. 

 Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Charles Gilbert Taylor was convicted by a jury of 

involuntary manslaughter. He contends that the trial court erred 

by admitting into evidence the results of a blood alcohol serum 

test because the Commonwealth did not prove an unbroken chain of 

custody for the blood sample and did not prove that the method 

for drawing and testing the blood sample was reliable. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's determinations. 

 Charles Gilbert Taylor drove his pickup truck across the 

center line of the highway and struck another vehicle head-on, 

killing the car's driver. John Whitcomb, an FBI special agent, 

witnessed the accident. Whitcomb, while assisting Taylor from 

his truck, noticed a very strong odor associated with alcoholic 

beverages on Taylor's breath. Another witness, Tawana Mack, who 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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assisted Whitcomb, also noticed the smell of alcoholic beverages 

from inside the truck. Greg Duvall, a Virginia State Trooper who 

also assisted Taylor from the truck, observed that Taylor was 

"unsteady on his feet" and had "an obvious odor of alcohol about 

him." Mark Chadwick, an emergency medical technician at the 

scene, noticed a strong odor of alcohol on Taylor's breath. 

 At the hospital, Deborah Oaks, an emergency room nurse, 

tended to Taylor. Because Taylor was a trauma patient, Oaks was 

required to take a sample of his blood. She cleansed his arm 

with a seventy percent isopropyl alcohol solution and wiped the 

area dry with a sterile four-by-four gauze pad. Oaks drew the 

blood, injected it into sealed vials, placed Taylor's name and 

hers on the vials, placed the vials on Taylor's stretcher, and 

waited with him. This area of the emergency room was accessible 

only to physicians and to hospital employees. 

 Oaks testified that shortly after placing the vials on the 

stretcher, she "made sure they [the vials] were taken" to the 

hospital laboratory for analysis. The laboratory was located one 

hundred feet from where Taylor was on the stretcher. Oaks could 

not remember or identify the person who took the blood vials to 

the lab. Jean Scott, a medical technologist, testified that she 

received the blood vials at the lab and performed the blood serum 

analysis on the sample. Scott was not able to remember who 

brought the blood vials to the lab. She said, "I'm not sure 

whether an emergency room staff member brought it to the lab or a 
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lab staff member brought it to the lab." 

 At trial, Nurse Oaks testified that the procedure she used 

for cleansing Taylor's arm and drawing his blood is a standard 

and customary procedure. She acknowledged, however, that had 

Taylor been brought to the hospital by police for a "legal" blood 

alcohol test, rather than as a trauma patient, she would have 

cleansed his arm with soap and water. Jean Scott, the medical 

technologist, testified that the manufacturer of the machine that 

the hospital uses for measuring blood alcohol content recommends 

"that [when taking blood for 'legal' purposes,] we use soap just 

in the off chance that the alcohol swab could cause some 

contamination." Scott testified that the machine is calibrated 

regularly and was in proper working order. 

 Dr. Anh Huynh, a state toxicologist, testified that the 

blood alcohol test results showed that when Taylor's blood was 

drawn, the serum contained 181.6 milligrams of alcohol per 

deciliter of blood. He equated this amount to a whole blood 

alcohol level (B.A.C.) of .155. He stated that a B.A.C. of .155 

would affect a person's perception, vision, judgment, and 

coordination. Dr. Huynh testified that a person with that 

quantity of alcohol in his blood "would [have] some difficulties 

of walking straight" and that "also the manner you brake or you 

swerve the car" would be affected. 

I. CHAIN OF CUSTODY 

 Taylor contends the chain of custody of the blood sample was 
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broken because neither Nurse Oaks nor Jean Scott could account 

for how or who handled or took the blood sample from the 

stretcher to the laboratory. 

 A party proffering scientific test results performed upon a 

substance must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the substance tested is authentic, that is, that it is the 

substance which it is purported to be. See Ives v. Commonwealth, 

184 Va. 877, 882, 365 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1946). Authentication 

requires "proof of a chain of custody and a showing with 

reasonable certainty that the item had not been altered, 

substituted, or contaminated prior to analysis, in any way that 

would affect the results of the analysis." Washington v. 

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 550, 323 S.E.2d 577, 587 (1984) 

(emphasis added), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985). Only if a 

"vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for," is 

the reasonable certainty requirement not met, "because then it is 

as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the evidence 

originally received." Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136, 

138, 183 S.E.2d 179, 180 (1971), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 

(1981). 

 [The Commonwealth] is not required to exclude 

every conceivable possibility of 

substitution, alteration, or tampering. All 

that is required in order to establish a 

chain of custody is that the Commonwealth's 

evidence "afford reasonable assurance that 

the exhibits at trial are the same and in the 

same condition as they were when first 

obtained." 
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Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121, 360 S.E.2d 352, 357 

(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988) (quoting Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 554, 559, 248 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1978)). 

 The Commonwealth's evidence reasonably assures that Taylor's 

blood samples taken by Oaks were the same samples tested by Scott 

and that they had not been altered, tampered with, or 

substituted. Oaks took the blood sample, placed it in vials, 

labeled the vials, placed the vials on a stretcher with Taylor, 

and waited there with him. Access to the area was limited to 

physicians and employees. Scott stated that either an emergency 

room staff member or a lab staff member brought the sealed vials, 

which contained the blood sample, to her at the lab. The vials 

were carried only one hundred feet from the stretcher to the lab. 

 The links in the chain of possession in the hospital were 

sufficiently accounted for to provide reasonable assurance that 

the blood sample had not been altered, adulterated, or 

substituted. The evidence is sufficient to support the trial 

court's finding that the blood sample was authenticated as 

Taylor's without being altered. 

II. RELIABILITY OF BLOOD TESTING 

 The appellant contends that the blood test result is invalid 

because the nurse used an alcohol swab, rather than soap and 

water, to cleanse Taylor's arm and, as a consequence, probably 

contaminated the blood sample with isopropyl alcohol. Thus, he 

argues, the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results 
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into evidence. 

 The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court. We will not disturb the trial court's ruling 

to admit evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988) 

(citation omitted). "When scientific evidence is offered, the 

court must make a threshold finding of fact with respect to the 

[fundamental] reliability of the scientific method." Spencer v. 

Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 97, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621, cert. denied, 

498 U.S. 908 (1990). 

 Code § 18.2-268.5 requires that, when withdrawing blood for 

purposes of a DUI prosecution under Code § 18.2-266, the area 

from which blood is to be drawn must be cleansed with soap and 

water, polyvinylpyrrolidone iodine, or benzalkonium chloride. 

Because the DUI statutes specify the means for cleansing the 

puncture area, failure to comply with the statutory requirement 

necessitates that the prosecution be dismissed. See Brush v. 

Commonwealth, 205 Va. 312, 136 S.E.2d 864 (1964), and Kyhl v. 

Commonwealth, 205 Va. 240, 135 S.E.2d 768 (1968). The statutory 

requirements of Code § 18.2-268 are to be strictly applied, Lutz 

v. City of Richmond, 205 Va. 93, 97-98, 135 S.E.2d 156, 159-60 

(1964), but the requirements apply only to DUI prosecutions under 

Code § 18.2-266, Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 

216 (1984), and not to an involuntary manslaughter prosecution 

under Code § 18.2-36. 
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 In an involuntary manslaughter prosecution, the degree of 

the driver's intoxication or impairment from alcohol ingestion is 

relevant to a determination of the driver's "negligence, whether 

ordinary, gross, or wanton" so as to demonstrate a reckless 

disregard of human life. Id. at 283, 322 S.E.2d at 221-22. For 

blood test results to be admissible to prove the degree of 

impairment or intoxication, the evidence must prove "the 

reliability of the procedures used," Essex, 228 Va. at 285, 322 

S.E.2d at 223, that is, that the procedures utilized are likely 

to produce a reliable result. The burden is on the Commonwealth, 

as the proponent of the evidence, to prove that the procedures 

used yielded a reliable result. 

 Nurse Oaks testified that, except when drawing blood for DUI 

prosecutions, the traditional and customary procedure for 

cleansing and sterilizing the puncture area is with an isopropyl 

alcohol solution. She testified that before drawing the blood, 

she dried the area with a sterile gauze pad. While no direct 

evidence was offered that the procedure could not affect the test 

results, from Oak's testimony, the fact finder could infer that 

because the area was dry, no isopropyl alcohol remained to 

contaminate the area or the blood sample and, therefore, that the 

test results were accurate and reliable. Accordingly, the 

Commonwealth met its burden of proving the reliability of the 

testing procedure. 

 The evidence offered by Taylor concerning the recommended 
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procedure by the manufacturer of the machine for testing goes to 

the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. See State 

v. LaFountain, 231 A2d 635 (1967). The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by admitting the blood test results for the 

purpose of proving the effects of alcohol ingestion upon Taylor. 

 Therefore, we affirm the involuntary manslaughter 

conviction. 

Affirmed.
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BENTON, J., dissenting. 

 To introduce a scientific analysis of blood, the proponent 

of the evidence must first establish as a proper foundation for 

the admission of the analysis a chain of possession of the blood 

that was analyzed. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 550, 

323 S.E.2d 577, 587 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985). 

The rule is often stated as follows: 

 The basic rule for admitting demonstrative 

evidence is that the burden is upon the party 

offering the evidence to show with reasonable 

certainty that there has been no alteration 

or substitution of it. . . . However, "[t]he 

requirement of reasonable certainty is not 

met when some vital link in the chain of 

possession is not accounted for, because then 

it is likely as not that the evidence 

analyzed was not the evidence originally 

received." 

Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136, 138, 183 S.E.2d 179, 180 

(1971)(citation omitted). The evidence in this case failed to 

establish a chain of possession. 

 The Commonwealth failed to present any evidence to account 

for the handling of Taylor's blood from the time it was taken 

from Taylor until the time it was delivered to the laboratory. 

Nothing in the record or in the majority's opinion addresses the 

void created by the failure to account for this vital link in the 

chain of possession. Approving the admission of this evidence 

violates the fundamental principle that "where the substance 

analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not 

leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it 
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between the taking and the analysis". Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 

197 Va. 527, 531, 90 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1955). 

 For these reasons, I would hold that the trial judge erred 

in admitting the blood analysis report. Therefore, I dissent.