United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2007

Decided November 30, 2007

Before

 Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 07-2322 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IVY T. TUCKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-144-001

J.P. Stadtmueller, 

Judge.

O R D E R

The district court convicted Ivy Tucker of unlawful possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and sentenced him to 15 years’

imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. After his

release, he committed multiple violations of his release conditions. His probation

officer petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, and Tucker

admitted to eight violations of the conditions. The court revoked his release and

sentenced him to twelve months and one day in prison. Tucker filed a notice of

appeal, but his appointed counsel seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he can find no nonfrivolous issues on which to base his

appeal. Tucker has not accepted our invitation to reply to counsel’s motion. See

Cir. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s brief is facially adequate, we confine our review to

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07-2322 Page 2

the potential issues he identifies. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74

(7th Cir. 2002).

Tucker’s attorney first considers whether he could challenge the validity of

the petition that led to the revocation on the ground that the petition was filed by a

probation officer rather than an attorney. But 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8)(B) commands

the “probation officer” to “immediately report any violation of the conditions of

release to the court.” Counsel acknowledges that the statute’s reference to

“probation officers” is unambiguous, and that every circuit court to consider the

potential argument the petitioner must appear through a government attorney has

rejected it. See United States v. Ahlmeier, 391 F.3d 915, 924 (8th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Amatel, 346 F.3d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Cofield,

233 F.3d 405, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bermudez-Plaza, 221 F.3d

231, 234-25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Mejia-Sanchez, 172 F.3d 1172, 1174

(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998). We,

too, have done so, albeit in a nonprecedential order. United States v. Ingram,

208 F. App’x 453, 455 (7th Cir. 2006).

The one case counsel found that suggests otherwise, United States v. Jones,

957 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Ark. 1997), was expressly repudiated by its own circuit

court in Ahlmeier (as well as the other circuit courts), reasoning that the statute

expressly obligates and authorizes probation officers themselves to petition for the

revocation of supervised release. 391 F.3d at 923. Probation officers themselves

appear before the court because they are servants of the court. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3602. Even if the Eighth Circuit had not repudiated Jones, a district court

decision from another circuit is entitled only to the weight merited by the

persuasiveness of its reasoning. Colby v. J.C. Penney, 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir.

1987). Given the statutory command that probation officers report release

violations to the court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8)(B), and their status as officers of the

court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3602, it would be wholly without merit for counsel to argue

that probation officers may not themselves petition the district court that they serve

to revoke supervised release.

Next, counsel considers whether he could argue that the district court abused

its discretion by revoking his supervised release. As counsel notes, we would review

the decision for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Young, 41 F.3d 1184, 1186

(7th Cir. 1994), and here there was none. Tucker admitted to eight Grade C

violations of his release, including periods of unemployment, convictions for traffic

offenses, alcohol use, and a positive test for cocaine use. Once the district court had

found just one Grade C violation, it acted within its discretion to revoke supervised

release. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2).
No. 07-2322 Page 3

Finally, counsel contemplates whether he could challenge the reasonableness

of the postrevocation sentence of reimprisonment. We review a lower court’s

sentence of reimprisonment only to determine if it is “plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Kizeart, No. 07-1397, 2007 WL 2938374, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 10,

2007). This is the “narrowest judicial review of judgments we know,” and thus

requires only “a modicum of evidence.” Id. at *3. Tucker’s violations were Grade C

violations, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3), and his criminal history category was VI. The

court correctly calculated a guidelines range of 8-14 months’ imprisonment. 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The court properly consulted the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors as

well when it considered Tucker’s criminal history, uniformity in sentencing, and the

need to protect the public from future criminal conduct. See United States v. Carter,

408 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2005). Finally, the court sentenced him to twelve

months and one day in prison. Counsel cannot identify any argument that this

within-guideline sentence was plainly unreasonable, and we agree that challenging

it as such would be frivolous.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.