UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARLO WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-0752-13-0127-C-1

DATE: May 8, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Carl R. Hudson, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Janelle M. Sherlock, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial 

decision, which denied her petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement

that resolved her removal appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one 

only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the 

initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings 

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent 

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting 

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal 

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the 

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the 

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM 

the compliance initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 Effective August 18, 2012, the agency removed the appellant from her 

position of Stamp Distribution Clerk. See Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB 

Docket No. AT-0752-13-0127-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8, Part 4 at 3-7. 

She subsequently filed a Board appeal challenging her removal. IAF, Tab 1. 

During the appeal process, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that

resolved the appellant’s Board appeal. See IAF, Tab 13. Under the terms of the 

settlement agreement, the agency agreed, among other things, to cancel the 

appellant’s removal, reinstate her to her former position, and provide her with 

back pay for the period of time from the issuance of the notice of proposed 

removal on June 8, 2012, until her return to work on February 11, 2013. Id. at

5-6. The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal as 

settled and entering the settlement agreement into the record for enforcement 

purposes. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The administrative judge 

found that the settlement agreement was lawful on its face and freely entered into 

by the parties in a matter over which the Board has jurisdiction, and that the 
3

parties understood its terms. ID at 1-2. The initial decision became final when 

neither party petitioned for review. See ID at 2-3; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.

¶3 The appellant filed a petition for enforcement alleging that the agency 

failed to comply with the settlement agreement. Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, 

MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-13-0127-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tabs 1-3, 5. 

The agency responded, asserting that it had complied with the settlement 

agreement and attaching documentation indicating that it had provided her back 

pay. CF, Tab 7. The agency also stated that the processing of the appellant’s 

back pay was delayed because she refused to sign the Postal Service (PS) Form 

8039, Back Pay Decision/Settlement Worksheet, and failed to explain why she 

disputed the agency’s calculations. CF, Tab 6. The appellant replied to the 

agency’s response, restating her argument that the agency miscalculated her back 

pay and providing documentation in support of her argument. CF, Tab 8. In a 

compliance initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency 

complied with the settlement agreement and denied the appellant’s petition for 

enforcement. CF, Tab 9, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 1, 5.

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial 

decision. Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-13-0127-

C-1, Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tabs 1-2. The agency has 

filed a response in opposition.2

 CPFR File, Tab 6.

 2 The agency’s response to the petition for review was filed 3 days late. See CPFR File, 

Tabs 5-6. The appellant has not replied to the agency’s response or contested it as 

untimely. Although the Board sets time limits for agencies to submit evidence of 

compliance, additional submissions may be accepted beyond the time limits if the 

circumstances warrant, such as when the evidence is new and material. See Gevaert v. 

Department of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 303, 306 (1997). Thus, we will consider the 

agency’s evidence of compliance because it directly rebuts the appellant’s claims on

review. 
4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶5 In her petition for review, the appellant contends that the administrative 

judge erred in denying her petition for enforcement because the agency allegedly 

breached the settlement agreement by failing to provide her with the appropriate 

amount of back pay. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The Board has the authority to 

enforce a settlement agreement that has been entered into the record in the same 

manner as any final Board decision or order. Vance v. Department of the 

Interior, 114 M.S.P.R. 679, ¶ 6 (2010). A settlement agreement is a contract, and 

the Board will therefore adjudicate a petition to enforce a settlement agreement in 

accordance with contract law. Id. Where, as here, an appellant files a petition for 

enforcement of a settlement agreement over which the Board has enforcement 

authority, the agency must produce relevant, material, and credible evidence of its 

compliance with the agreement. Id. However, the ultimate burden of proof is on

the appellant, as the party seeking enforcement, to show that the agency failed to 

fulfill the terms of an agreement. Id.

¶6 The appellant alleges that the agency erroneously charged her with 24 hours 

of leave without pay (LWOP) from July 11, 2012, through July 13, 2012. CPFR

File, Tab 1 at 4; see CF, Tab 8 at 39. The agency submitted a declaration from its

Acting Manager of Financial Programs Compliance admitting that the agency 

charged the appellant with 24 hours of LWOP from July 11, 2012, through July 

13, 2012, but also stating that the agency converted the disputed 24 hours of 

LWOP to paid administrative leave in pay period 17 of 2012. CPFR File, Tab 6 

at 6-7. Moreover, the agency’s pay journal for pay period 17 of 2012 reflects that 

the agency adjusted pay period 15 of 2012 by subtracting 24 hours of LWOP 

(payroll code 60), subtracting 16 hours of other paid leave (payroll code 86), and 

adding 40 hours of other paid leave (payroll code 86). Id. at 10; see IAF, Tab 8, 

Part 3 at 62 (payroll codes chart). The Supervisor of the Payroll Department’s 

declaration signed under penalty of perjury and the PS Form 8039 both support 

the agency’s position that the appellant was paid administrative leave from 
5

July 11, 2012, though July 13, 2012. CF, Tab 7 at 9-11, Tab 8 at 10. Based on 

the agency’s evidence, we find that the agency properly converted the disputed 

24 hours of LWOP to administrative leave. 

¶7 The appellant further alleges that the agency failed to pay her overtime for

pay periods 15 through 18 of 2012. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The agency noted in 

the PS Form 8039 that the appellant was not entitled to back pay for pay periods 

“2012-13-2 thru 2012-18-1” because she received administrative leave for these 

pay periods. CF, Tab 8 at 10. Moreover, the Supervisor of the Payroll 

Department’s declaration states that the agency paid the appellant administrative 

leave for pay periods 13 through 18 of 2012, from June 8, 2012, through 

August 17, 2012. CF, Tab 7 at 9-11; see CPFR File, Tab 2 at 4 (pay period 

calendar for 2012). The declaration is supported by the agency’s pay journals for 

pay periods 15 through 17 of 2012, which establish that the appellant was paid 

administrative leave (payroll code 86) for these pay periods. CPFR File, Tab 6 at 

8-10; see IAF, Tab 8, Part 3 at 62 (payroll codes chart). Additionally, the 

agency’s back pay report shows that the appellant was paid 3.06 hours of 

overtime for week 2 of pay period 18 of 2012. CF, Tab 7 at 13. Therefore, we 

find that the agency paid the appellant administrative leave instead of back pay

for pay periods 15 through week 1 of pay period 18 in 2012 and paid her back pay 

for week 2 of pay period 18 of 2012, including overtime. 

¶8 Finally, the appellant argues that the agency did not provide documentation 

showing that it paid her administrative leave for pay periods 13 through 18 of 

2012. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The Supervisor of the Payroll Department’s 

declaration stating that the agency paid the appellant administrative leave for pay 

periods 13 through 18 of 2012, from June 8, 2012, through August 17, 2012, 

establishes that the appellant was compensated for these dates. See CF, Tab 7 at 

9-11; see also CPFR File, Tab 2 at 4 (pay period calendar for 2012).
6

¶9 For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency 

complied with the settlement agreement and find that the appellant has failed to 

provide a reason to disturb the compliance initial decision.

3

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination 

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5 

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you 

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a 

signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after 

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your 

 3 The appellant asserts that she did not cause the back pay processing delay because she 

tried to express her disagreements with the PS Form 8039 to the agency, but the Labor 

Relations Specialist allegedly did not return her telephone calls. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4; 

see CID at 3. She also argues that the administrative judge erred by stating an incorrect 

date for a corresponding pay period. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see CID at 4. Even 

assuming that these disputed findings of fact are erroneous, we find that they are 

immaterial to the outcome of this matter and, thus, we decline to address them further. 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a).
7

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no 

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to 

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your 

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your 

discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States 

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with 

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If 

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order 

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar 

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to 

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to 

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of 

prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 

29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board