IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TERRANCE WATSON, § § No. 688, 2014 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware in and

v. § for Sussex County § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1202008234 § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: March 30 , 2015

Before HOLLAND

, VALIHURA

, and VAUGHN , Justices.

O R D E R

This 30 th day of March 2015 , upon careful consideration of the

a ppellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior

Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Terrance Watson, filed this appeal from the

Superior Court’s November 19, 2014 order that summarily dismissed his

mot ion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

(“Rule 61”). The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the

Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of2

Watson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. 1 We agree and

affirm.

(2) The record reflects that , following his arrest in February 2012

and three

- count indictment in April 2012, Watson agreed to plead guilty to

Possession of a Non

- C ontrolled Prescription Drug

, and the State agreed to

e nter a nolle prosequi on the remaining two charges

. On June 20, 2012, the

Superior Court accepted Watson’s guilty plea and sentenced him to six

months at Level V suspended after four months and then discharged as

unimproved.

(3) It appears from the record that, a t the time of his arrest in

February 2012, Watson was on parole from a life sentenc e imposed in

1985

. 2 At a parole hearing on August 28, 2012, Watson’s parole was

revoked, and he was ordered to return to prison to serve the balance of the

1985 sen tence, subject to reapplying for parole in twenty

- four months. 3

( 4 ) In October 2012, W atson began filing a series of motions

seeking a modification of the sentence imposed on June 20, 2012. By order

1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).

2 The Court takes judicial notice of the Superior Court docket in State v. Watson , Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 85000384DI.

3 See docket at 42, State v. Watson , Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 85000384DI (Aug. 30, 2012).3

dated June 21, 2013, the Superior Court denied the lates t motion as moot

because , by that time, Watson had completed the six

- month sentence.

( 5 ) O n June 2, 2014, Watson filed a motion for postconviction

relief under Rule 61. Watson sought to have his 2012 drug conviction

vacated based on a claim that the State was required , under Brady v.

Maryland (hereinafter “ Brady claim”)

, to disclose alleged misconduct in the

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”)

. 4 By order d ocketed on

November 19, 2014, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Watson’s

postconviction motion after determining that the Brady claim was

unavailing

, and that Watson no longer had standing to file for relief under

Rule 61. We agree and affirm.

(6) Watson raises a Brady claim based on alleged misconduct in

the OCME. A simila r claim was recently addressed and rejected by this

Court in Brown v. State

. 5 In Brown we held that:

By pleading guilty, Brown gave up his right to trial and his right to learn of any impeachment evidence. Brown is bound by the statements he made to the Superior Court before his plea was accepted, and Ruiz prevents him from reopening his case to make claims that do not address his

4 Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establis hing that a defendant has a right to receive exculpatory material from prosecutors at trial).

5 Brown v. State , ___ A.3d ___, 2015 WL 307389 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015).4 guilt, and involve impeachment evidence that would only be relevant at trial. 6

In Watson’s case, as in Brown , the Brady claim alleged in Watson’s

postconviction motion was effectively waived by his preceding guilty plea.

Moreover, Watson has not asserted that the prescription drug providing the

basis for his 2012 conviction was ever sent to the OCME for testing.

( 7 ) Generally , u nder Delaware law, once a criminal sentence is

completed, any postconviction claim with respect to that conviction is moot

because the defendant is no longer “ in custody under [the] sentence.” 7 In

this case, the Superior Court determined that Watson is no longer in custody

under the sentence imposed for the 2012 drug conviction that was the

subject of Watson’s motion for postconviction relief

. Watson does not

specifically identify a right lost or burden imposed as a result of the 2012

conviction to overcome the general rule mooting his claim for relief. 8 Under

these circumstances, the Court agrees with the Superior Court that Watson

lack ed standing to seek postconviction relief under Rule 61.

6 Id. , at *5 (Del. Jan. 23, 2015) (citing Somerville v. State , 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) and United States v. Ruiz , 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002)).

7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1) (providing that “[t]his rule governs the procedure on an application by a person in custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside the judgment of c onviction”). Paul v. State , 2011 WL 3585623, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2011) (quoting Rule 61(a)(1)).

8 Paul v. State , 2011 WL 3585623, at *1 (Del. Aug. 15, 2011) (quoting Gural v. State

, 251 A.2d 344, 344

- 45 (Del. 1969)).5

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to

affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice