# Official Journal C 453/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 453 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5717 December 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 453

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5717 December 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 453/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7445 — 3i Group/Christ Juweliere und Uhrmacher seit 1863) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2014/C 453/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7445 — 3i Group/Christ Juweliere und Uhrmacher seit 1863) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2014/C 453/02 | Council Decision of 15 December 2014 appointing a member of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for Germany | 2 |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 453/03 | Euro exchange rates | 4 |
| 2014/C 453/04 | Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing | 5 |
| 2014/C 453/05 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 14 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(1) — Shrimps — Rapporteur: Ireland | 11 |
| 2014/C 453/06 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(2) — Shrimps — Rapporteur: Ireland | 12 |
| 2014/C 453/07 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Shrimps (AT.39633) | 13 |
| 2014/C 453/08 | Summary of Commission Decision of 27 November 2013 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the TFEU (Case AT.39633 — Shrimps) (notified under document C(2013) 8286) | 16 |
| 2014/C 453/09 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 20 June 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms — Rapporteur: Germany | 19 |
| 2014/C 453/10 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Mushrooms (AT.39965) | 20 |
| 2014/C 453/11 | Summary of Commission Decision of 25 June 2014 (Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms) (notified under document C(2014) 4227 final) | 21 |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2014/C 453/12 | Special Report No 22/2014 Achieving economy: keeping the costs of EU-financed rural development project grants under control | 24 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2014/C 453/13 | Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (Notice regarding an application for an exclusive licence to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons — the Beckenrand Licence)
   (
  1
  ) | 25 |
| 2014/C 453/14 | Commission information notice pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community — Repeal of public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services (
  1
  ) | 27 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2014/C 453/02

Council Decision of 15 December 2014 appointing a member of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for Germany

2

European Commission

2014/C 453/03

Euro exchange rates

4

2014/C 453/04

Commission Decision of 12 December 2014 notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

5

2014/C 453/05

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 14 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(1) — Shrimps — Rapporteur: Ireland

11

2014/C 453/06

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(2) — Shrimps — Rapporteur: Ireland

12

2014/C 453/07

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Shrimps (AT.39633)

13

2014/C 453/08

Summary of Commission Decision of 27 November 2013 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the TFEU (Case AT.39633 — Shrimps) (notified under document C(2013) 8286)

(notified under document C(2013) 8286)

16

2014/C 453/09

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 20 June 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms — Rapporteur: Germany

19

2014/C 453/10

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Mushrooms (AT.39965)

20

2014/C 453/11

Summary of Commission Decision of 25 June 2014 (Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms) (notified under document C(2014) 4227 final)

(notified under document C(2014) 4227 final)

21

Court of Auditors

2014/C 453/12

Special Report No 22/2014 Achieving economy: keeping the costs of EU-financed rural development project grants under control

24

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2014/C 453/13

Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (Notice regarding an application for an exclusive licence to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons — the Beckenrand Licence)
   (
  1
  )

(Notice regarding an application for an exclusive licence to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons — the Beckenrand Licence)

1

25

2014/C 453/14

Commission information notice pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community — Repeal of public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services (
  1
  )

1

27

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 453/15 | Closure of complaint CHAP(2012) 710 | 28 |

V   Announcements

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

2014/C 453/15

Closure of complaint CHAP(2012) 710

28

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

---

II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7445 — 3i Group/Christ Juweliere und Uhrmacher seit 1863)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 453/01)

On 11 December 2014, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in the English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7445. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32014M7445. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/2

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 15 December 2014

appointing a member of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for Germany

(2014/C 453/02)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2062/94 of 18 July 1994 establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (1), and in particular Article 8 thereof,

Having regard to the lists of candidates submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States and by the employees' and the employers' organisations,

Having regard to the lists of members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Safety and Health at Work,

Whereas:

| (1) | By its Decisions of 2 December 2013 (2) and of 12 June 2014 (3), the Council appointed the members and alternate members of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for the period ending on 7 November 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By its Decisions of 2 December 2013 (2) and of 12 June 2014 (3), the Council appointed the members and alternate members of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for the period ending on 7 November 2016.

| (2) | The employees' organisation European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has submitted a nomination for one post to be filled, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The employees' organisation European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has submitted a nomination for one post to be filled,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following shall be appointed member of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for the period ending on 7 November 2016:

II.   REPRESENTATIVES OF EMPLOYEES' ORGANISATIONS

| Country | Member | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Germany | Ms Sonja KÖNIG | |

Country

Member

Germany

Ms Sonja KÖNIG

Article 2

The Council shall appoint the members and alternate members who have not yet been nominated at a later date.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 15 December 2014.

For the Council

The President

M. MARTINA

---

(1)  OJ L 216, 20.8.1994, p. 1.

1

(2)  Council Decision of 2 December 2013 appointing the members and alternate members of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OJ C 360, 10.12.2013, p. 8).

2

(3)  Council Decision of 12 June 2014 appointing the members and alternate members of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for Lithuania and Malta (OJ C 182, 14.6.2014, p. 14); Council Decision of 12 June 2014 appointing the members and alternate members of the Governing Board of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work for France (OJ C 186, 18.6.2014, p. 5).

3

---

European Commission

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/4

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

16 December 2014

(2014/C 453/03)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,2537 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 145,79 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4407 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,79650 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,5510 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2009 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,5420 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,607 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 312,23 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,45280 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2061 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4790 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,9797 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,5206 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4612 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 9,7206 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6050 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6312 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 354,09 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 14,6054 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,7624 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,6670 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 16 144,54 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,3769 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 56,118 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 91,5200 |
| THB | Thai baht | 41,302 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,4196 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,5391 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 80,2218 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,2537

JPY

Japanese yen

145,79

DKK

Danish krone

7,4407

GBP

Pound sterling

0,79650

SEK

Swedish krona

9,5510

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2009

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,5420

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,607

HUF

Hungarian forint

312,23

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,45280

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2061

RON

Romanian leu

4,4790

TRY

Turkish lira

2,9797

AUD

Australian dollar

1,5206

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4612

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

9,7206

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6050

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6312

KRW

South Korean won

1 354,09

ZAR

South African rand

14,6054

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,7624

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,6670

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

16 144,54

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,3769

PHP

Philippine peso

56,118

RUB

Russian rouble

91,5200

THB

Thai baht

41,302

BRL

Brazilian real

3,4196

MXN

Mexican peso

18,5391

INR

Indian rupee

80,2218

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/5

---

COMMISSION DECISION

of 12 December 2014

notifying a third country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

(2014/C 453/04)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (1), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

| (2) | Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure to identify non-cooperating third countries, the démarches in respect of such countries, the establishment of a list of such countries, the removal from that list, the publicity of that list and any emergency measures.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to notify third countries of the possibility of their being identified as non-cooperating countries. Such notification is of a preliminary nature. The notification is to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. The Commission is also to take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of that Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and considerations underlying such identification, provide those countries with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the notified third countries adequate time to answer the notification and reasonable time to remedy the situation.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing. A third country is to be identified as non-cooperating if it fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (5) | The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of the IUU Regulation.

| (6) | In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to establish a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply to those countries.

| (7) | Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of validated catch certificates from third country flag States is subject to a notification to the Commission of the arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by the fishing vessels of the concerned third countries.

| (8) | Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Pursuant to Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of that Regulation.

2.   PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

| (9) | From 19 to 20 May 2014, the Commission visited Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

From 19 to 20 May 2014, the Commission visited Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in the context of administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation.

| (10) | The visit sought to verify information concerning Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The visit sought to verify information concerning Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures to be complied with by its fishing vessels and the measures taken by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (11) | The final report of the visit was sent to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on 13 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The final report of the visit was sent to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on 13 June 2014.

| (12) | To this day, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has not provided to the Commission its comments on that final report. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

To this day, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has not provided to the Commission its comments on that final report.

| (13) | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a contracting party to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a contracting party to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA).

| (14) | In order to evaluate Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' compliance with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital (13) and established by the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) referred to in that recital, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In order to evaluate Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' compliance with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State set out in the international agreements referred to in recital (13) and established by the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) referred to in that recital, the Commission sought and analysed all the information it deemed necessary for the purpose of such an exercise.

| (15) | In that regard, the Commission used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case ICCAT, as well as publicly available information. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In that regard, the Commission used information derived from available data published by RFMOs, in this case ICCAT, as well as publicly available information.

3.   POSSIBILITY OF SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES OF BEING IDENTIFIED AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (16) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of that review the Commission took into account the criteria listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

3.1   Recurrence of IUU Vessels and IUU trade flows (Article 31(4) of the IUU Regulation)

| (17) | With respect to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

With respect to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged vessels it is noted that on the basis of information retrieved from RFMOs vessel lists there are no vessels in provisional or final IUU lists and no evidence of past cases of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged vessels exists that would enable the Commission to analyse the performance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to recurring IUU fishing activities in accordance with Article 31(4)(a) of the IUU Regulation.

| (18) | In the absence of information and evidence as explained in recital (17) it is concluded, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(a), that there are no elements to evaluate the compliance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, with its duties under international law as a flag State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In the absence of information and evidence as explained in recital (17) it is concluded, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(4)(a), that there are no elements to evaluate the compliance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, with its duties under international law as a flag State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals.

3.2   Failure to cooperate and to enforce (Article 31(5) of the IUU Regulation)

| (19) | The Commission analysed whether Saint Vincent and the Grenadines effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Commission analysed whether Saint Vincent and the Grenadines effectively cooperated with the Commission, by providing a response to requests made by the Commission to investigate, provide feed-back or follow-up on IUU fishing and associated activities.

| (20) | In that respect, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines fisheries has not provided to the Commission any information or reply on how it will address the deficiencies in its fisheries management system identified during the Commission's visit. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In that respect, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines fisheries has not provided to the Commission any information or reply on how it will address the deficiencies in its fisheries management system identified during the Commission's visit.

| (21) | In addition, in the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' duties to discharge its obligations as flag State, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cooperates with other States in the fight against IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In addition, in the context of the overall assessment of the fulfilment of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' duties to discharge its obligations as flag State, the Commission also analysed whether Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cooperates with other States in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (22) | The Commission established during its visit that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was not in a position to follow up the activities of its fishing fleet. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines submitted that all its fishing vessels operating in the ICCAT area land or tranship exclusively in Trinidad and Tobago Ports (Port of Spain and Chaguarams). However, that assertion could not be corroborated due to the fact that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not use landing and transhipment declarations. Based on the informal cooperation with Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines receives the data from the log-books of its fishing vessels only once a year for the whole year. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not receive or request any inspection reports from Trinidad and Tobago. In addition to the lack of the landing and transhipment declarations, the information from the logbooks cannot be cross-checked, since the fishing vessels are not equipped with the Vessels Monitoring System (VMS). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is effectively unaware of the destination and use of those fish products. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Commission established during its visit that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was not in a position to follow up the activities of its fishing fleet. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines submitted that all its fishing vessels operating in the ICCAT area land or tranship exclusively in Trinidad and Tobago Ports (Port of Spain and Chaguarams). However, that assertion could not be corroborated due to the fact that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not use landing and transhipment declarations. Based on the informal cooperation with Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines receives the data from the log-books of its fishing vessels only once a year for the whole year. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not receive or request any inspection reports from Trinidad and Tobago. In addition to the lack of the landing and transhipment declarations, the information from the logbooks cannot be cross-checked, since the fishing vessels are not equipped with the Vessels Monitoring System (VMS). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is effectively unaware of the destination and use of those fish products.

| (23) | According to Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, coastal and flag States are to cooperate with regard to straddling and highly-migratory fish species. Articles 7 and 20 of the UNFSA further develop the obligation of States to cooperate, respectively in setting compatible conservation and management measures and in ensuring compliance and enforcement with such measures. That is further specified in points 28 and 51 of the IPOA IUU, setting out detailed practices for direct cooperation between States, including the exchange of data or information available to coastal States. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

According to Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, coastal and flag States are to cooperate with regard to straddling and highly-migratory fish species. Articles 7 and 20 of the UNFSA further develop the obligation of States to cooperate, respectively in setting compatible conservation and management measures and in ensuring compliance and enforcement with such measures. That is further specified in points 28 and 51 of the IPOA IUU, setting out detailed practices for direct cooperation between States, including the exchange of data or information available to coastal States.

| (24) | The importance of efficient cooperation mechanisms has to be appraised in the context of the informal cooperation between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. As described in the recital (22) and according to the information provided by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities during the Commission's visit in May 2014, all their fishing vessels operating in the ICCAT area land or tranship exclusively in Trinidad and Tobago ports. However, the cooperation between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago is of an unofficial nature and limited to minimum exchange of information. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines receives only once a year from Trinidad and Tobago the logbooks of its fishing vessels for the full 12 months period. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks landing and transhipment declarations. In addition, the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities do not receive or request any inspection reports from Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to validate ICCAT statistical catch documents for Bigeye and Swordfish for fish stemming from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines flagged vessels landing in Trinidad and Tobago ports. However, from the publicly available information (ICCAT website) retrieved on 20 May 2014, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is not registered with the ICCAT Secretariat, as requested by the ICCAT Recommendations 01-21 and 01-22, for the validation of such catch documents. That situation reveals a serious lack of effective cooperation between third countries and RFMOs that may render ineffective any potential action to investigate, provide feedback or follow up to any potential IUU fishing activities. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The importance of efficient cooperation mechanisms has to be appraised in the context of the informal cooperation between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. As described in the recital (22) and according to the information provided by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities during the Commission's visit in May 2014, all their fishing vessels operating in the ICCAT area land or tranship exclusively in Trinidad and Tobago ports. However, the cooperation between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago is of an unofficial nature and limited to minimum exchange of information. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines receives only once a year from Trinidad and Tobago the logbooks of its fishing vessels for the full 12 months period. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks landing and transhipment declarations. In addition, the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities do not receive or request any inspection reports from Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to validate ICCAT statistical catch documents for Bigeye and Swordfish for fish stemming from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines flagged vessels landing in Trinidad and Tobago ports. However, from the publicly available information (ICCAT website) retrieved on 20 May 2014, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is not registered with the ICCAT Secretariat, as requested by the ICCAT Recommendations 01-21 and 01-22, for the validation of such catch documents. That situation reveals a serious lack of effective cooperation between third countries and RFMOs that may render ineffective any potential action to investigate, provide feedback or follow up to any potential IUU fishing activities.

| (25) | With respect to effective enforcement measures, Article 19(2) of the UNFSA establishes that sanctions applicable in respect of violations are to be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and are to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. In that respect, although Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does have a legal framework in place for the management of its fishing vessels (in particular the High Seas Act 2001 and High Seas Fishing Regulation 2003), it lacks clear definitions of IUU fishing and serious infringements. In addition, that legal framework has not been properly enforced since its entry into force in 2001 and 2003 respectively. According to the information provided by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in May 2014, it has not imposed sanctions provided by that legal framework in the last 10 years. That may render the legal framework ineffective and undermine the deterrence of the system. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

With respect to effective enforcement measures, Article 19(2) of the UNFSA establishes that sanctions applicable in respect of violations are to be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and are to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. In that respect, although Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does have a legal framework in place for the management of its fishing vessels (in particular the High Seas Act 2001 and High Seas Fishing Regulation 2003), it lacks clear definitions of IUU fishing and serious infringements. In addition, that legal framework has not been properly enforced since its entry into force in 2001 and 2003 respectively. According to the information provided by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in May 2014, it has not imposed sanctions provided by that legal framework in the last 10 years. That may render the legal framework ineffective and undermine the deterrence of the system.

| (26) | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also failed to take into consideration the recommendations in point 24 of the IPOA IUU which advises flag States to ensure comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing, through the point of landing, to final destination, including by implementing the VMS in accordance with the relevant national, regional and international standards. That includes the requirement for vessels under its jurisdiction to carry VMS on board. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also failed to take into consideration the recommendations in point 24 of the IPOA IUU which advises flag States to ensure comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing, through the point of landing, to final destination, including by implementing the VMS in accordance with the relevant national, regional and international standards. That includes the requirement for vessels under its jurisdiction to carry VMS on board.

| (27) | In May 2014 during its visit to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Commission observed that there was no Fishing Monitoring Centre (FMC) as such, to control the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines long distance fishing fleet. In addition, the national VMS management system has been shut down since at least 2012 following the breakdown of the previous system. For that reason, since 2012 the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines fishing vessels are not sending the VMS signal to the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines FMC. The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines FMC does not receive any information on the positions of its long distance fleet by VMS or any other positioning system and as a consequence, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot monitor and control its long distance fleet. In particular, it cannot monitor the activities of its long distance fleet operating on the high seas, in third countries waters or calling in third countries ports. It cannot confirm whether a given vessel is in or out of a given geographical area and if a given vessel when fishing in a given area (Exclusive Economic Zone or RFMO) is actually authorised to operate there. Furthermore, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot monitor whether its vessels follow the seasonal closed areas as established by ICCAT. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

In May 2014 during its visit to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Commission observed that there was no Fishing Monitoring Centre (FMC) as such, to control the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines long distance fishing fleet. In addition, the national VMS management system has been shut down since at least 2012 following the breakdown of the previous system. For that reason, since 2012 the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines fishing vessels are not sending the VMS signal to the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines FMC. The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines FMC does not receive any information on the positions of its long distance fleet by VMS or any other positioning system and as a consequence, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot monitor and control its long distance fleet. In particular, it cannot monitor the activities of its long distance fleet operating on the high seas, in third countries waters or calling in third countries ports. It cannot confirm whether a given vessel is in or out of a given geographical area and if a given vessel when fishing in a given area (Exclusive Economic Zone or RFMO) is actually authorised to operate there. Furthermore, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot monitor whether its vessels follow the seasonal closed areas as established by ICCAT.

| (28) | The facts described in recitals (22), (26) to (27) indicate that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines failed to fulfil the conditions of Article 94 of the UNCLOS which stipulates that a flag State assumes jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers and crew. The described behaviour of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to its vessels is also in breach with Article 18(3) UNFSA which stipulates measures to be taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag. Furthermore, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not fulfil its compliance and enforcement obligations as a flag State stipulated in Article 19 of the UNFSA since it has failed to demonstrate that it acted and operated in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in that Article. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The facts described in recitals (22), (26) to (27) indicate that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines failed to fulfil the conditions of Article 94 of the UNCLOS which stipulates that a flag State assumes jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master, officers and crew. The described behaviour of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to its vessels is also in breach with Article 18(3) UNFSA which stipulates measures to be taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag. Furthermore, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines does not fulfil its compliance and enforcement obligations as a flag State stipulated in Article 19 of the UNFSA since it has failed to demonstrate that it acted and operated in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in that Article.

| (29) | With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing those aspects is equally compromised by the described lack of clarity and transparency. As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the lack of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

With respect to the history, nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the manifestations of IUU fishing considered, the possibility of assessing those aspects is equally compromised by the described lack of clarity and transparency. As a consequence of such shortcomings, it is not possible to establish, in a reliable way, the potential dimension of IUU fishing related activities. It is however an acknowledged fact that lack of transparency combined with the lack of effective controls encourages illegal behaviour.

| (30) | With respect to the existing capacity of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, it should be noted that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (2), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is considered as a high human development country (91nd in 187 countries). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories, in line with the list of aid recipients of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipients of 1 January 2013 (4). Account taken of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines position, it is not considered necessary to analyse its existing capacity. That is because the level of development of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as demonstrated in this recital, cannot be considered as a factor undermining its capacity to cooperate with other countries and pursue enforcement actions. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

With respect to the existing capacity of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, it should be noted that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (2), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is considered as a high human development country (91nd in 187 countries). In the Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories, in line with the list of aid recipients of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recipients of 1 January 2013 (4). Account taken of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines position, it is not considered necessary to analyse its existing capacity. That is because the level of development of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as demonstrated in this recital, cannot be considered as a factor undermining its capacity to cooperate with other countries and pursue enforcement actions.

| (31) | Despite the analysis under recital (30) it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission's visit in May 2014, it cannot be considered that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks financial resources. Rather Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment and empowerments to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its international duties as flag, coastal, market and port State. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Despite the analysis under recital (30) it is also noted that, on the basis of information derived from the Commission's visit in May 2014, it cannot be considered that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks financial resources. Rather Saint Vincent and the Grenadines lacks the necessary legal and administrative environment and empowerments to ensure the efficient and effective performance of its international duties as flag, coastal, market and port State.

| (32) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(5) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and 31(5) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has failed to discharge its duties under international law as flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement efforts.

3.3   Failure to implement international rules (Article 31(6) of the IUU Regulation)

| (33) | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is contracting party to ICCAT. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has ratified the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is contracting party to ICCAT.

| (34) | The Commission analysed all information deemed relevant with respect to the status of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as contracting party of ICCAT. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The Commission analysed all information deemed relevant with respect to the status of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as contracting party of ICCAT.

| (35) | In 2011 ICCAT issued a letter of identification to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines maintaining the identification of the country under the ICCAT Recommendation 06-13 concerning trade measures (5). It was stated that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 on compliance with statistical reporting obligations. In the same letter it was stated that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not provide all necessary data and reports by the set deadlines. Specifically, the following reporting deficiencies were noted: 1) some data submitted after the deadline; 2) Task II (catches sizes) data were not submitted; 3) some figures for the compliance tables were submitted after the deadline; 4) internal actions report for vessels greater than 20 meters was submitted after the deadline; 5) information on the large-scale tuna long line vessel management standard was submitted after the deadline. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

In 2011 ICCAT issued a letter of identification to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines maintaining the identification of the country under the ICCAT Recommendation 06-13 concerning trade measures (5). It was stated that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 on compliance with statistical reporting obligations. In the same letter it was stated that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not provide all necessary data and reports by the set deadlines. Specifically, the following reporting deficiencies were noted: 1) some data submitted after the deadline; 2) Task II (catches sizes) data were not submitted; 3) some figures for the compliance tables were submitted after the deadline; 4) internal actions report for vessels greater than 20 meters was submitted after the deadline; 5) information on the large-scale tuna long line vessel management standard was submitted after the deadline.

| (36) | In 2012 ICCAT lifted the identification of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines under its Recommendation 06-13 but issued a letter of concern since Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 (6). The following deficiencies for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were noted: 1) annual report submitted late; 2) Task I (fleet characteristics) data on fleet characteristics were not submitted; 3) Task II (catches size) frequency data were not submitted; 4) compliance tables were submitted after the deadline; 5) information on the large-scale tuna long line vessel management, action for vessels more than 20 meters report were submitted late. In addition, ICCAT requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to review its data collection and reporting procedures with regard to ICCAT requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In 2012 ICCAT lifted the identification of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines under its Recommendation 06-13 but issued a letter of concern since Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 (6). The following deficiencies for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were noted: 1) annual report submitted late; 2) Task I (fleet characteristics) data on fleet characteristics were not submitted; 3) Task II (catches size) frequency data were not submitted; 4) compliance tables were submitted after the deadline; 5) information on the large-scale tuna long line vessel management, action for vessels more than 20 meters report were submitted late. In addition, ICCAT requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to review its data collection and reporting procedures with regard to ICCAT requirements.

| (37) | In the letter of concern issued in 2013, ICCAT again expressed its concern that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 (7). The following deficiencies for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were noted: 1) Task I data on fleet characteristics were not submitted; 2) compliance tables were submitted after the deadline of 15 September 2012; 3) ICCAT did not receive a reply to its letter of concern of 2012. ICCAT requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to clarify which ICCAT requirements were applicable to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and to review its data collection and reporting procedures with regard to ICCAT requirements. In addition, ICCAT expressed its concern about possible illegal at-sea transhipments of by-catches of ICCAT species and urged Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to investigate these activities and report back to ICCAT. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In the letter of concern issued in 2013, ICCAT again expressed its concern that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not fully and effectively complied with its obligations in accordance with the ICCAT Recommendation 05-09 (7). The following deficiencies for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were noted: 1) Task I data on fleet characteristics were not submitted; 2) compliance tables were submitted after the deadline of 15 September 2012; 3) ICCAT did not receive a reply to its letter of concern of 2012. ICCAT requested Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to clarify which ICCAT requirements were applicable to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and to review its data collection and reporting procedures with regard to ICCAT requirements. In addition, ICCAT expressed its concern about possible illegal at-sea transhipments of by-catches of ICCAT species and urged Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to investigate these activities and report back to ICCAT.

| (38) | The Commission also analysed information available from ICCAT on the compliance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with ICCAT rules and reporting obligations. For this the Commission used the ICCAT 2012 Compliance Summary Tables as well as the ICCAT 2013 Compliance Summary Tables (8). In addition to the deficiencies highlighted in recitals (36) to (37) potential issues of non-compliance in 2013 of the conservation and management measures were noted, namely of the Recommendation 11-02: no swordfish fisheries development or management plan was submitted. In relation to the quotas and catch limits, potential issues of non-compliance in 2013 were highlighted: compliance tables received late and clarification as regards Southern Albacore catches were requested. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Commission also analysed information available from ICCAT on the compliance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with ICCAT rules and reporting obligations. For this the Commission used the ICCAT 2012 Compliance Summary Tables as well as the ICCAT 2013 Compliance Summary Tables (8). In addition to the deficiencies highlighted in recitals (36) to (37) potential issues of non-compliance in 2013 of the conservation and management measures were noted, namely of the Recommendation 11-02: no swordfish fisheries development or management plan was submitted. In relation to the quotas and catch limits, potential issues of non-compliance in 2013 were highlighted: compliance tables received late and clarification as regards Southern Albacore catches were requested.

| (39) | Furthermore, it was revealed during the Commission's visit in May 2014 that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Registry is settled in three registering offices located outside Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Those offices are not interconnected and do not have access to their respective information. Moreover, the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has not direct access to the registries. The low level of control by the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities to the registration process and the lack of relevant requirements such as those established in point 14 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance has as a result that the authorities do not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have a genuine link with the country. The lack of such genuine link between the State and the vessels that are registered in its registry is in breach of the conditions set out for the nationality of ships under Article 91 of the UNCLOS. This conclusion is further confirmed by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) which considers Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as a flag of convenience (9). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Furthermore, it was revealed during the Commission's visit in May 2014 that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Registry is settled in three registering offices located outside Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Those offices are not interconnected and do not have access to their respective information. Moreover, the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has not direct access to the registries. The low level of control by the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities to the registration process and the lack of relevant requirements such as those established in point 14 of the FAO Guidelines for Flag State Performance has as a result that the authorities do not ensure that vessels flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have a genuine link with the country. The lack of such genuine link between the State and the vessels that are registered in its registry is in breach of the conditions set out for the nationality of ships under Article 91 of the UNCLOS. This conclusion is further confirmed by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) which considers Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as a flag of convenience (9).

| (40) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

3.4.   Specific constraints of developing countries

| (41) | It is recalled that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (10), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is considered as a high human development country (91st in 187 countries). It is also recalled that, according to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

It is recalled that according to the United Nations Human Development Index (10), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is considered as a high human development country (91st in 187 countries). It is also recalled that, according to Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is listed in the category of Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories.

| (42) | Account taken of that ranking Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot be considered as a country having specific constraints directly derived from its level of development. No corroborating evidence could be established to suggest that the failure of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to discharge its duties under international law is the result of lacking development. In the same manner, no concrete evidence exists to correlate the revealed shortcomings in respect of the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities with the lack of capacities and infrastructure. In this respect it is noted that the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities have not revoked any argument on development constraints. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Account taken of that ranking Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot be considered as a country having specific constraints directly derived from its level of development. No corroborating evidence could be established to suggest that the failure of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to discharge its duties under international law is the result of lacking development. In the same manner, no concrete evidence exists to correlate the revealed shortcomings in respect of the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities with the lack of capacities and infrastructure. In this respect it is noted that the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines authorities have not revoked any argument on development constraints.

| (43) | In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to fisheries are not impaired by its level of development. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

In view of the situation explained in this Section and on the basis of all the factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines with respect to fisheries are not impaired by its level of development.

4.   CONCLUSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF IDENTIFICATION AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (44) | In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third countries in fighting IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to the failure of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, that country should be notified, in accordance with Article 32 of the IUU Regulation, of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third countries in fighting IUU fishing.

| (45) | In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In accordance with Article 32(1) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission should notify Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country. The Commission should also take all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In the interest of sound administration, a period should be fixed within which that country may respond in writing to the notification and rectify the situation.

| (46) | Furthermore, the notification to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries, |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Furthermore, the notification to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of the possibility of being identified as a country which the Commission considers to be non-cooperating for the purposes of this Decision does neither preclude nor automatically entail any subsequent step taken by the Commission or the Council for the purpose of the identification and the establishment of a list of non-cooperating countries,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines shall be notified of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2014.

For the Commission

Karmenu VELLA

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

1

(2)  Information retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

2

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

3

(4)  DAC List of ODA Recipients (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclistofodarecipients.htm).

4

(5)  ICCAT letter, 18 January 2011, ICCAT Circular No 168.

5

(6)  ICCAT letter, 21 February 2012, ICCAT Circular No 639.

6

(7)  ICCAT letter, 11 February 2013, ICCAT Circular No 612.

7

(8)  ICCAT, COC Reports November 2012 and 2013; Doc.No. ICCAT COC 2012-11 and Doc.No. ICCAT COC 2013-18.

8

(9)  http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm

9

(10)  Information retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

10

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/11

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 14 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(1) — Shrimps

Rapporteur: Ireland

(2014/C 453/05)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission assessment of the facts as an agreement and/or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission assessment of the facts as an agreement and/or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees that the complex of agreements and/or concerted practices constitutes a single and continuous infringement for the time frame in which it existed. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees that the complex of agreements and/or concerted practices constitutes a single and continuous infringement for the time frame in which it existed.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees that the Commission is entitled to rely on evidence furnished by the leniency applicant and evidence relating to Kok Seafood in the form of recordings of telephone conversations and transcripts. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees that the Commission is entitled to rely on evidence furnished by the leniency applicant and evidence relating to Kok Seafood in the form of recordings of telephone conversations and transcripts.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have as object a restriction of competition. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have as object a restriction of competition.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission assessment on the duration of the infringement for each addressee. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission assessment on the duration of the infringement for each addressee.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission draft decision as regards the conclusion that the agreements and concerted practices between the addressees were capable of having an appreciable effect upon trade between EU Member States. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission draft decision as regards the conclusion that the agreements and concerted practices between the addressees were capable of having an appreciable effect upon trade between EU Member States.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission draft decision as regards the addressees of the decision, specifically with reference to imputation of liability to parent companies of the groups concerned. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission draft decision as regards the addressees of the decision, specifically with reference to imputation of liability to parent companies of the groups concerned.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/12

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 November 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39633(2) — Shrimps

Rapporteur: Ireland

(2014/C 453/06)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fines. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fines.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction of the basic amount for two undertakings due to mitigating circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction of the basic amount for two undertakings due to mitigating circumstances.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the further reduction of the basic amounts for all undertakings on the basis of Point 37 of the 2006 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the further reduction of the basic amounts for all undertakings on the basis of Point 37 of the 2006 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction of the fine for one undertaking based on the 2006 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction of the fine for one undertaking based on the 2006 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the rejection of the claim for inability to pay of one undertaking on the basis of Point 35 of the Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the rejection of the claim for inability to pay of one undertaking on the basis of Point 35 of the Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/13

---

Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Shrimps

(AT.39633)

(2014/C 453/07)

I.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | The hearing officer originally responsible for this case was Mr Michael Albers. He organised and conducted the oral hearing and submitted an interim report to the competent member of the Commission in accordance with Article 14 of Decision 2011/695/EU. Following the departure of Mr Albers from the Commission, I took over this case as from 16 October 2013. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The hearing officer originally responsible for this case was Mr Michael Albers. He organised and conducted the oral hearing and submitted an interim report to the competent member of the Commission in accordance with Article 14 of Decision 2011/695/EU. Following the departure of Mr Albers from the Commission, I took over this case as from 16 October 2013.

| 2. | Thus, as regards the procedural steps that took place before my appointment, this report is based on the findings of the previous hearing officer. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Thus, as regards the procedural steps that took place before my appointment, this report is based on the findings of the previous hearing officer.

II.   PROCEDURE

A.   Investigation phase

| 3. | Subsequent to an immunity application submitted on [...] under the Leniency Notice (2) by the North Sea shrimps trader Klaas Puul (3), the Commission carried out inspections at several business premises and private homes of alleged cartel participants in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands on 24, 25 and 26 March 2009. The Commission granted conditional immunity to Klaas Puul on 17 March 2009. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Subsequent to an immunity application submitted on [...] under the Leniency Notice (2) by the North Sea shrimps trader Klaas Puul (3), the Commission carried out inspections at several business premises and private homes of alleged cartel participants in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands on 24, 25 and 26 March 2009. The Commission granted conditional immunity to Klaas Puul on 17 March 2009.

B.   Statement of Objections

| 4. | On 12 July 2012, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) against Heiploeg Holding BV, Heiploeg Beheer BV, Heiploeg BV and Goldfish BV (together ‘Heiploeg’); Klaas Puul Holding BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV and Klaas Puul BV (together ‘Klaas Puul’); Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co. KG. (‘Stührk’); Holding L.J.M. Kok BV and L. Kok International Seafood BV (together ‘Kok Seafood’). The Commission accused these traders of North Sea shrimps of having shared markets, allocated customers and coordinated their sales prices to retailers and purchase prices to fishermen. |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 12 July 2012, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) against Heiploeg Holding BV, Heiploeg Beheer BV, Heiploeg BV and Goldfish BV (together ‘Heiploeg’); Klaas Puul Holding BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV and Klaas Puul BV (together ‘Klaas Puul’); Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co. KG. (‘Stührk’); Holding L.J.M. Kok BV and L. Kok International Seafood BV (together ‘Kok Seafood’). The Commission accused these traders of North Sea shrimps of having shared markets, allocated customers and coordinated their sales prices to retailers and purchase prices to fishermen.

C.   Access to file

| 5. | In July 2012, DG Competition granted the addressees of the SO access to the file via a DVD and access to the corporate statements of Klaas Puul at its premises. DG Competition also offered the external counsels of the addressees of the SO the opportunity to listen to audio recordings of phone calls between Kok Seafood’s managing director and other alleged cartel participants and to review conversation notes of such calls in a data room at its premises. Only Heiploeg took up the opportunity to access the corporate statements, listen to the audio recordings and review the conversation notes. |
| --- | --- |

5.

In July 2012, DG Competition granted the addressees of the SO access to the file via a DVD and access to the corporate statements of Klaas Puul at its premises. DG Competition also offered the external counsels of the addressees of the SO the opportunity to listen to audio recordings of phone calls between Kok Seafood’s managing director and other alleged cartel participants and to review conversation notes of such calls in a data room at its premises. Only Heiploeg took up the opportunity to access the corporate statements, listen to the audio recordings and review the conversation notes.

| 6. | [...] (4). Only Heiploeg made use of the opportunity to comment on these documents, which it did on 21 February 2013. On 8 November 2013, DG Competition sent Heiploeg a letter in which Klaas Puul had clarified the modalities of the discovery of those documents. The Commission allowed Heiploeg to comment on that letter before 14 November 2013. |
| --- | --- |

6.

[...] (4). Only Heiploeg made use of the opportunity to comment on these documents, which it did on 21 February 2013. On 8 November 2013, DG Competition sent Heiploeg a letter in which Klaas Puul had clarified the modalities of the discovery of those documents. The Commission allowed Heiploeg to comment on that letter before 14 November 2013.

D.   Oral hearing

| 7. | The oral hearing was held on 7 February 2013 and was attended by all the addressees of the SO. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The oral hearing was held on 7 February 2013 and was attended by all the addressees of the SO.

E.   Access to Stührk’s reply to the SO

| 8. | On 27 September and 4 October 2013, DG Competition shared extracts from Stührk’s reply to the SO with all other parties and granted them the opportunity to submit written comments on those extracts (5). Only Heiploeg and Klaas Puul submitted written comments (6). |
| --- | --- |

8.

On 27 September and 4 October 2013, DG Competition shared extracts from Stührk’s reply to the SO with all other parties and granted them the opportunity to submit written comments on those extracts (5). Only Heiploeg and Klaas Puul submitted written comments (6).

III.   PROCEDURAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES

A.   The removal of evidence from a private home

| 9. | Kok Seafood claimed that there was no legal basis for the removal of evidence from the private home of its managing director to the business premises during the inspection, and that the Commission should therefore discard the evidence in question. DG Competition informed me that only five pieces of evidence used in the SO have been transferred from the private home to the business premises (7). Since the Commission is not relying on that evidence in the draft decision, the issue has become without object. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Kok Seafood claimed that there was no legal basis for the removal of evidence from the private home of its managing director to the business premises during the inspection, and that the Commission should therefore discard the evidence in question. DG Competition informed me that only five pieces of evidence used in the SO have been transferred from the private home to the business premises (7). Since the Commission is not relying on that evidence in the draft decision, the issue has become without object.

B.   Legal professional privilege

| 10. | Kok Seafood claimed that audio recordings of telephone conversations between its managing director and other alleged cartel participants, reports of these audio recordings drawn up by the managing director of Kok Seafood or one of his employees, and processed reproductions of these audio recordings by the Commission, benefit from legal professional privilege and, therefore, may not be used as evidence. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Kok Seafood claimed that audio recordings of telephone conversations between its managing director and other alleged cartel participants, reports of these audio recordings drawn up by the managing director of Kok Seafood or one of his employees, and processed reproductions of these audio recordings by the Commission, benefit from legal professional privilege and, therefore, may not be used as evidence.

| 11. | It is, however, settled case-law that documents are merely covered by legal professional privilege if they have been drawn up exclusively for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence (8) which have a relationship to the subject-matter of the relevant Article 101/102 TFEU procedure (9). Since Kok Seafood admitted in its reply to the SO that it mainly wanted to use the information as evidence in a contractual dispute, and thus not exclusively for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence in the North Sea shrimps cartel case, it can be concluded that the legal professional privilege claims of Kok Seafood are unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

11.

It is, however, settled case-law that documents are merely covered by legal professional privilege if they have been drawn up exclusively for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence (8) which have a relationship to the subject-matter of the relevant Article 101/102 TFEU procedure (9). Since Kok Seafood admitted in its reply to the SO that it mainly wanted to use the information as evidence in a contractual dispute, and thus not exclusively for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence in the North Sea shrimps cartel case, it can be concluded that the legal professional privilege claims of Kok Seafood are unfounded.

C.   The use of secretly recorded telephone conversations

| 12. | Heiploeg claimed that the audio recordings of telephone conversations made by the managing director of Kok Seafood cannot be used as evidence by the Commission because under the laws of certain EU Member States it is prohibited to either secretly record telephone conversations or make such recordings available to third parties. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Heiploeg claimed that the audio recordings of telephone conversations made by the managing director of Kok Seafood cannot be used as evidence by the Commission because under the laws of certain EU Member States it is prohibited to either secretly record telephone conversations or make such recordings available to third parties.

| 13. | During the oral hearing, Heiploeg confirmed that the recording of telephone conversations and the making available of those recordings to third parties are to its knowledge not unlawful under the law of the Netherlands (10), the country where the telephone conversations had been recorded and seized by the Commission during the inspection. |
| --- | --- |

13.

During the oral hearing, Heiploeg confirmed that the recording of telephone conversations and the making available of those recordings to third parties are to its knowledge not unlawful under the law of the Netherlands (10), the country where the telephone conversations had been recorded and seized by the Commission during the inspection.

| 14. | Even if the managing director of Kok Seafood infringed any national law, that does not necessarily mean that the Commission is not allowed to use those recordings as legitimate evidence. According to settled case-law, the prevailing principle in European Union law is that of unfettered evaluation of evidence and the only relevant criterion for assessing evidence produced lies in the reliability thereof (11). |
| --- | --- |

14.

Even if the managing director of Kok Seafood infringed any national law, that does not necessarily mean that the Commission is not allowed to use those recordings as legitimate evidence. According to settled case-law, the prevailing principle in European Union law is that of unfettered evaluation of evidence and the only relevant criterion for assessing evidence produced lies in the reliability thereof (11).

| 15. | Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) also does not require the Commission to set aside evidence which private parties have obtained in an unlawful manner, provided that the proceedings as a whole were fair (12), i.e. that the defendant has been given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity and the use of the evidence. The use of unlawfully obtained recordings does not in itself call into question the fairness of the procedure in the sense of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 6 ECHR (13). |
| --- | --- |

15.

Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) also does not require the Commission to set aside evidence which private parties have obtained in an unlawful manner, provided that the proceedings as a whole were fair (12), i.e. that the defendant has been given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity and the use of the evidence. The use of unlawfully obtained recordings does not in itself call into question the fairness of the procedure in the sense of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 6 ECHR (13).

| 16. | Since Heiploeg has been given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity and the use of the audio recordings, it can be concluded that the audio recordings should not be discarded as evidence on the basis that the telephone conversations in question have been secretly recorded by Kok Seafood’s managing director and have subsequently been made available to third parties. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Since Heiploeg has been given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity and the use of the audio recordings, it can be concluded that the audio recordings should not be discarded as evidence on the basis that the telephone conversations in question have been secretly recorded by Kok Seafood’s managing director and have subsequently been made available to third parties.

D.   Biased presentation of the facts by the Commission

| 17. | Both Kok Seafood and Heiploeg claimed that the reproductions of the audio recordings processed by the Commission are no real transcripts of spoken text, and that the Commission has added its own interpretation and included selective and wrong citations. |
| --- | --- |

17.

Both Kok Seafood and Heiploeg claimed that the reproductions of the audio recordings processed by the Commission are no real transcripts of spoken text, and that the Commission has added its own interpretation and included selective and wrong citations.

| 18. | In the draft decision, the Commission explains that it has sometimes edited the original conversation notes in order to facilitate the reading of text without interpunction and the identification of the parties to the conversation (14). Where the parties criticised the Commission’s interpretation of the original conversation notes, the draft decision explains why the Commission considers a certain interpretation or conclusion justified (15). In the light of the explanations provided, I do not share the view of Kok Seafood and Heiploeg that the Commission has presented the facts in a biased manner. |
| --- | --- |

18.

In the draft decision, the Commission explains that it has sometimes edited the original conversation notes in order to facilitate the reading of text without interpunction and the identification of the parties to the conversation (14). Where the parties criticised the Commission’s interpretation of the original conversation notes, the draft decision explains why the Commission considers a certain interpretation or conclusion justified (15). In the light of the explanations provided, I do not share the view of Kok Seafood and Heiploeg that the Commission has presented the facts in a biased manner.

E.   Right to be heard on intended rejection of inability to pay request

| 19. | During a state of play meeting that was held with Heiploeg on 5 November 2013, DG Competition indicated to Heiploeg that the Commission intended to reject its inability to pay request (‘ITP request’). Heiploeg complained to me that the Commission had not given Heiploeg sufficient opportunity to state its views on the intended rejection of its ITP request and on the reasons thereof. |
| --- | --- |

19.

During a state of play meeting that was held with Heiploeg on 5 November 2013, DG Competition indicated to Heiploeg that the Commission intended to reject its inability to pay request (‘ITP request’). Heiploeg complained to me that the Commission had not given Heiploeg sufficient opportunity to state its views on the intended rejection of its ITP request and on the reasons thereof.

| 20. | I am however of the view that the right to be heard in principle only relates to the matters to which the Commission has taken objection (16), and does not include a general right to comment on the position the Commission intends to take in its final decision (17). Since the relevant provisions of the Commission Notice on Best Practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (18) do not provide for a right to comment on the intended rejection of an ITP request either, there is in my view no reason to conclude that the Commission has not respected the effective exercise of Heiploeg’s procedural rights, in particular its right to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

20.

I am however of the view that the right to be heard in principle only relates to the matters to which the Commission has taken objection (16), and does not include a general right to comment on the position the Commission intends to take in its final decision (17). Since the relevant provisions of the Commission Notice on Best Practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (18) do not provide for a right to comment on the intended rejection of an ITP request either, there is in my view no reason to conclude that the Commission has not respected the effective exercise of Heiploeg’s procedural rights, in particular its right to be heard.

IV.   THE DRAFT DECISION

| 21. | Pursuant to Article 16(1) of Decision 2011/695/EU, the final report shall consider whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views. |
| --- | --- |

21.

Pursuant to Article 16(1) of Decision 2011/695/EU, the final report shall consider whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

| 22. | Upon review of the draft decision, I conclude that it does not deal with any objection in respect of which the parties have not been afforded the opportunity of making known their views. |
| --- | --- |

22.

Upon review of the draft decision, I conclude that it does not deal with any objection in respect of which the parties have not been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

V.   CONCLUSION

| 23. | Based on the considerations made above, it is concluded that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case. |
| --- | --- |

23.

Based on the considerations made above, it is concluded that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case.

Brussels, 26 November 2013.

Joos STRAGIER

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17).

2

(3)  Klaas Puul Holding BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV and Klaas Puul BV.

3

(4)  [...].

4

(5)  ID 2279-2292.

5

(6)  Heiploeg on 14 October and Klaas Puul on 18 October 2013.

6

(7)  ID 793, 800, 844, 846 and 847.

7

(8)  Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-3523, paragraph 123.

8

Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd

Commission

(9)  Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 1575, paragraph 23.

9

AM & S Europe Limited

Commission of the European Communities

(10)  According to Article 139c(1) Dutch Criminal Code, the recording of a telephone conversation is only unlawful if it is done by someone who is not a party to the conversation.

10

(11)  Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, paragraph 273.

11

JFE Engineering and Others

Commission

(12)  The Court has recognised the general principle of European Union law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process (Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC [2006] ECR I-3813, paragraph 65).

12

Eurofood IFSC

(13)  ECHR 26 April 2007, application No 71525/01, Popescu v Romania (No 2), paragraph 106.

13

Popescu

Romania

(14)  See, for example, recitals 95, 104, 138, 207, 212, 218 and 322 of the draft decision.

14

(15)  Also see recital 329 and the recitals referred to in footnote 521 of the draft decision.

15

(16)  See also Article 27(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

16

(17)  Cf. Case T-15/02 BASF v Commission [2006] ECR II-497, para. 94 and Case T-392/09 1. garantovaná v Commission, not yet reported, para. 74.

17

BASF

Commission

garantovaná

Commission,

(18)  OJ C 308, 20.10.2011, p. 6, paragraphs 87-90.

18

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/16

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 27 November 2013

relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the TFEU

(Case AT.39633 — Shrimps)

(notified under document C(2013) 8286)

(Only the Dutch and German texts are authentic)

(2014/C 453/08)

On 27 November 2013, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. A non-confidential version of the decision is available on the Competition Directorate-General website at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/

INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The Decision imposes fines on four traders of North Sea shrimps (Heiploeg, Klaas Puul and Kok Seafood from the Netherlands and Stührk from Germany) for infringing Article 101 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Decision imposes fines on four traders of North Sea shrimps (Heiploeg, Klaas Puul and Kok Seafood from the Netherlands and Stührk from Germany) for infringing Article 101 of the TFEU.

| (2) | In the period between June 2000 and January 2009 Heiploeg and Klaas Puul participated in an agreement to fix prices and share sales volumes of North Sea shrimps in the EU, and in particular in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Kok Seafood participated at least as from February 2005 and Stührk was involved in price fixing in Germany in the period between March 2003 and November 2007. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In the period between June 2000 and January 2009 Heiploeg and Klaas Puul participated in an agreement to fix prices and share sales volumes of North Sea shrimps in the EU, and in particular in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Kok Seafood participated at least as from February 2005 and Stührk was involved in price fixing in Germany in the period between March 2003 and November 2007.

PROCEDURE

| (3) | The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application of Klaas Puul. The Commission obtained further evidence from inspections that took place in March 2009 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. The Commission also sent out several requests for information to all the undertakings involved in these anti-competitive arrangements. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application of Klaas Puul. The Commission obtained further evidence from inspections that took place in March 2009 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. The Commission also sent out several requests for information to all the undertakings involved in these anti-competitive arrangements.

| (4) | A Statement of Objections was issued on 12 July 2012, following which all undertakings involved were given the possibility to receive access to the file and defend themselves against the preliminary view of the Commission in writing and during an Oral Hearing that took place on 7 February 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

A Statement of Objections was issued on 12 July 2012, following which all undertakings involved were given the possibility to receive access to the file and defend themselves against the preliminary view of the Commission in writing and during an Oral Hearing that took place on 7 February 2013.

| (5) | The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 14 and 25 November 2013, the Hearing Officer issued his final report on 25 November 2013 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 27 November 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 14 and 25 November 2013, the Hearing Officer issued his final report on 25 November 2013 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 27 November 2013.

SUMMARY OF THE INFRINGEMENT

| (6) | The decision concerns a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU. The infringement consisted of price fixing, market sharing and exchanges of sensitive commercial information between traders of North Sea shrimps. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The decision concerns a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU. The infringement consisted of price fixing, market sharing and exchanges of sensitive commercial information between traders of North Sea shrimps.

| (7) | The agreements and concerted practices formed part of an overall scheme which laid down the lines of participants' action on the market and restricted their individual commercial conduct with the aim of pursuing an identical anti-competitive objective and a single economic aim, namely to jointly influence the price level for North Sea shrimps, limit competition and stabilise the market. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The agreements and concerted practices formed part of an overall scheme which laid down the lines of participants' action on the market and restricted their individual commercial conduct with the aim of pursuing an identical anti-competitive objective and a single economic aim, namely to jointly influence the price level for North Sea shrimps, limit competition and stabilise the market.

| (8) | All participants aimed at achieving increases or at least the stabilisation of downstream sales prices for North Sea shrimps by way of coordinating price offers to customers. Benchmark price fixing was used to ensure this objective, where needed supported by ancillary collusive action, be that concerning purchase prices, market sharing and customer allocations and specific actions towards potential competitors. These ancillary arrangements further limited or reduced competition in the North Sea shrimps trade. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

All participants aimed at achieving increases or at least the stabilisation of downstream sales prices for North Sea shrimps by way of coordinating price offers to customers. Benchmark price fixing was used to ensure this objective, where needed supported by ancillary collusive action, be that concerning purchase prices, market sharing and customer allocations and specific actions towards potential competitors. These ancillary arrangements further limited or reduced competition in the North Sea shrimps trade.

| (9) | The anti-competitive arrangements took place notably in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Denmark, but affected the North Sea shrimps trade in the entire EU because they were connected in terms of prices and commercial strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The anti-competitive arrangements took place notably in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Denmark, but affected the North Sea shrimps trade in the entire EU because they were connected in terms of prices and commercial strategy.

| (10) | The cartel described in this Decision operated by way of bilateral contacts. In these informal contacts, every aspect of the business could come up for discussion, including the sales price level, prices paid to fishermen, competition and customers. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The cartel described in this Decision operated by way of bilateral contacts. In these informal contacts, every aspect of the business could come up for discussion, including the sales price level, prices paid to fishermen, competition and customers.

| (11) | All four undertakings that are the subject of this Decision contributed in their own way to the idea of limited competition in a stable market with a coordinated price level. Heiploeg and Klaas Puul were in close contact with each other on all aspects of the cartel, at different levels and in different countries. Stührk exchanged price information with Heiploeg and took this information into account for its own commercial decisions, at least in Germany. The role of Kok Seafood was mainly limited to accepting a contract with Heiploeg under which it was remunerated for supplying shrimps to Heiploeg in function of the cartelised Heiploeg price and that came with the hidden clause that Kok Seafood should not come to the market as a viable competitor. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

All four undertakings that are the subject of this Decision contributed in their own way to the idea of limited competition in a stable market with a coordinated price level. Heiploeg and Klaas Puul were in close contact with each other on all aspects of the cartel, at different levels and in different countries. Stührk exchanged price information with Heiploeg and took this information into account for its own commercial decisions, at least in Germany. The role of Kok Seafood was mainly limited to accepting a contract with Heiploeg under which it was remunerated for supplying shrimps to Heiploeg in function of the cartelised Heiploeg price and that came with the hidden clause that Kok Seafood should not come to the market as a viable competitor.

| (12) | The infringing behaviour lasted from at least 21 June 2000 until 13 January 2009 and for each addressee an individual duration of the infringement period was established. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The infringing behaviour lasted from at least 21 June 2000 until 13 January 2009 and for each addressee an individual duration of the infringement period was established.

| (13) | Each addressee is held liable according to its own involvement in the cartel arrangements, i.e. either as a direct participant, or, in the case of a parent company, because the behaviour of the subsidiary is imputed to the parent given that the parent exercised decisive influence over the conduct of subsidiaries during the period of the infringement. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Each addressee is held liable according to its own involvement in the cartel arrangements, i.e. either as a direct participant, or, in the case of a parent company, because the behaviour of the subsidiary is imputed to the parent given that the parent exercised decisive influence over the conduct of subsidiaries during the period of the infringement.

| (14) | The decision is addressed to the following entities and for the following individual duration: Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV and Heiploeg Beheer BV (21.6.2000-13.1.2009), Heiploeg Holding BV (3.2.2006-13.1.2009); Klaas Puul BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV and Klaas Puul Holding BV (21.6.2000-13.1.2009); Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co KG (14.3.2003-5.11.2007); L. Kok International Seafood BV and Holding L.J.M. Kok BV (11.2.2005-13.1.2009). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The decision is addressed to the following entities and for the following individual duration: Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV and Heiploeg Beheer BV (21.6.2000-13.1.2009), Heiploeg Holding BV (3.2.2006-13.1.2009); Klaas Puul BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV and Klaas Puul Holding BV (21.6.2000-13.1.2009); Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co KG (14.3.2003-5.11.2007); L. Kok International Seafood BV and Holding L.J.M. Kok BV (11.2.2005-13.1.2009).

REMEDIES

| (15) | In setting the fines, the Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines as well as the provisions of the 2006 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In setting the fines, the Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines as well as the provisions of the 2006 Leniency Notice.

| (16) | The basic amount is set between 15 and 30 % of the undertaking's average value of sales of North Sea shrimps of the financial years covered by the individual infringement period in the relevant geographic area. This geographic area is the EU for Heiploeg, Klaas Puul and Kok Seafood and Germany for Stührk. Account was taken of the very serious nature of the infringement and the high combined market share of the cartel participants. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The basic amount is set between 15 and 30 % of the undertaking's average value of sales of North Sea shrimps of the financial years covered by the individual infringement period in the relevant geographic area. This geographic area is the EU for Heiploeg, Klaas Puul and Kok Seafood and Germany for Stührk. Account was taken of the very serious nature of the infringement and the high combined market share of the cartel participants.

| (17) | The basic amount is multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement taking fully into account the duration of the participation for each undertaking in the infringement individually. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The basic amount is multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement taking fully into account the duration of the participation for each undertaking in the infringement individually.

| (18) | In addition, a percentage between 15 and 25 % of the undertakings value of sales is added in order to deter the undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In addition, a percentage between 15 and 25 % of the undertakings value of sales is added in order to deter the undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements.

| (19) | Attenuating circumstances taken into account for reducing the amount of the fines are the substantially limited participation of Stührk and Kok Seafood and the cooperation of Stührk outside leniency with the Commission investigation. The fines were also reduced on the basis of point 37 of the Guidelines on Fines to take into account in the specific circumstances of the case that all undertakings involved were to a different but large extent dealing with North-Sea shrimps. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Attenuating circumstances taken into account for reducing the amount of the fines are the substantially limited participation of Stührk and Kok Seafood and the cooperation of Stührk outside leniency with the Commission investigation. The fines were also reduced on the basis of point 37 of the Guidelines on Fines to take into account in the specific circumstances of the case that all undertakings involved were to a different but large extent dealing with North-Sea shrimps.

| (20) | Where necessary, the amount of the fines was further reduced to the legal maximum of 10 % of the worldwide turnover of the undertaking in the financial year before the adoption. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Where necessary, the amount of the fines was further reduced to the legal maximum of 10 % of the worldwide turnover of the undertaking in the financial year before the adoption.

| (21) | As regards the application of the 2006 Leniency Notice, Klaas Puul is granted immunity from fines. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As regards the application of the 2006 Leniency Notice, Klaas Puul is granted immunity from fines.

| (22) | One undertaking claimed inability to pay the fine. This claim was analysed based on point 35 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines and was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

One undertaking claimed inability to pay the fine. This claim was analysed based on point 35 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines and was rejected.

FINES IMPOSED

| — | Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV and Heiploeg Beheer BV, jointly and severally |
| --- | --- |

—

Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV and Heiploeg Beheer BV, jointly and severally

EUR 14 262 000

| — | Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV, Heiploeg Beheer BV, Heiploeg Holding BV, jointly and severally |
| --- | --- |

—

Heiploeg BV, Goldfish BV, Heiploeg Beheer BV, Heiploeg Holding BV, jointly and severally

EUR 12 820 000

| — | Klaas Puul BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV, Klaas Puul Holding BV, jointly and severally |
| --- | --- |

—

Klaas Puul BV, Klaas Puul Beheer BV, Klaas Puul Holding BV, jointly and severally

EUR 0

| — | Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co KG |
| --- | --- |

—

Stührk Delikatessen Import GmbH & Co KG

EUR 1 132 000

| — | L. Kok International Seafood BV and Holding L.J.M. Kok BV, jointly and severally |
| --- | --- |

—

L. Kok International Seafood BV and Holding L.J.M. Kok BV, jointly and severally

EUR 502 000

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/19

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 20 June 2014 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms

Rapporteur: Germany

(2014/C 453/09)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes agreements and/or concerted practices between undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes agreements and/or concerted practices between undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertakings concerned by the draft decision have in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertakings concerned by the draft decision have in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the agreements and/or concerted practices was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the agreements and/or concerted practices was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have been capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU and EEA. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have been capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU and EEA.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement for each addressee. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement for each addressee.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the addressees of the decision. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the addressees of the decision.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressees of the draft decision. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressees of the draft decision.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amounts of the fines. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amounts of the fines.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fines. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fines.

| 10. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no mitigating/aggravating circumstances applicable in this case. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no mitigating/aggravating circumstances applicable in this case.

| 11. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the adaptation of the fines based on point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines.
  A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the adaptation of the fines based on point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines.

A minority abstains.

| 12. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2006 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2006 Leniency Notice.

| 13. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2008 Settlement Notice. |
| --- | --- |

13.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the reduction of the fines based on the 2008 Settlement Notice.

| 14. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines. |
| --- | --- |

14.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines.

| 15. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

15.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/20

---

Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Mushrooms

(AT.39965)

(2014/C 453/10)

On 9 April 2013, the European Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2) against Bonduelle SCA, Bonduelle SAS, Bonduelle Conserve International SAS (‘Bonduelle’), Lutèce B.V., Lutèce Holding B.V., C4C Holding B.V. (‘Lutèce’), Prochamp B.V., Peffer Holding B.V. (‘Prochamp’) and [another undertaking].

Following settlement discussions and settlement submissions in accordance with Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (3), on 15 May 2014 the European Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) addressed to Bonduelle, Lutèce and Prochamp (the ‘Settling Parties’), stating that they had participated in one single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

The infringement described in the SO addressed to the Settling Parties concerned an EEA-wide cartel in the private label sales (MDD, HD and MPP) (4) of canned mushrooms via tender procedures to retailers and the food service channel. It was aimed at stabilising the market shares for the cartelized product and stopping the decline of prices. The cartel lasted from 1 September 2010 until 22 December 2011 for Lutèce and until 28 February 2012 for Bonduelle and Prochamp.

The Settling Parties' respective replies to the SO confirmed that the SO addressed to them reflected the contents of their settlement submissions.

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which the Settling Parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views, and I have come to a positive conclusion.

In view of the above, and taking into account that the Settling Parties have not addressed any requests or complaints to me (5), I consider that the effective exercise of the procedural rights of all the Settling Parties in this case has been respected.

Brussels, 23 June 2014.

Wouter WILS

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’) (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

2

(3)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

3

(4)  MDD stands for ‘Marque des Distributeurs’, HD stands for ‘Hard Discounts’ and MPP stands for ‘Marque Premier Prix’.

4

(5)  Under Article 15(2) of Decision 2011/695/EU, parties to the proceedings in cartel cases which engage in settlement discussions pursuant to Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, may call upon the hearing officer at any stage during the settlement procedure in order to ensure the effective exercise of their procedural rights. See also paragraph 18 of Commission Notice 2008/C 167/01 on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (OJ C 167, 2.7.2008, p. 1).

5

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/21

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 25 June 2014

(Case AT.39965 — Mushrooms)

(notified under document C(2014) 4227 final)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(2014/C 453/11)

On 25 June 2014, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The Decision relates to a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement concerning mushrooms sold in cans and jars (‘canned mushrooms’). The anticompetitive conduct concerned by the present proceedings relates to the private label sales (MDD, HD and MPP) (2) of canned mushrooms via tender procedures to retailers and the food service channel (3). The Decision is addressed to the following entities: (i) Bonduelle SCA, Bonduelle SAS and Bonduelle Conserve International SAS (Bonduelle); (ii) C4C Holding B.V., Lutèce Holding B.V. and Lutèce B.V. (Lutèce) and (iii) Peffer Holding B.V. and Prochamp B.V. (Prochamp). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Decision relates to a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement concerning mushrooms sold in cans and jars (‘canned mushrooms’). The anticompetitive conduct concerned by the present proceedings relates to the private label sales (MDD, HD and MPP) (2) of canned mushrooms via tender procedures to retailers and the food service channel (3). The Decision is addressed to the following entities: (i) Bonduelle SCA, Bonduelle SAS and Bonduelle Conserve International SAS (Bonduelle); (ii) C4C Holding B.V., Lutèce Holding B.V. and Lutèce B.V. (Lutèce) and (iii) Peffer Holding B.V. and Prochamp B.V. (Prochamp).

2.   CASE DESCRIPTION

2.1.   Procedure

| (2) | Following the immunity application by Lutèce in December 2011, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections in February 2012 at the premises of various producers of canned mushrooms. As of April 2012 the Commission sent several requests for information to the parties. In September 2012, Prochamp applied for a reduction of fines. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Following the immunity application by Lutèce in December 2011, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections in February 2012 at the premises of various producers of canned mushrooms. As of April 2012 the Commission sent several requests for information to the parties. In September 2012, Prochamp applied for a reduction of fines.

| (3) | On 9 April 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressees of the Decision and another party with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Subsequently Bonduelle, Lutèce and Prochamp submitted to the Commission their formal request to settle pursuant to Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (4). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 9 April 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressees of the Decision and another party with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Subsequently Bonduelle, Lutèce and Prochamp submitted to the Commission their formal request to settle pursuant to Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (4).

| (4) | On 15 May 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Bonduelle, Lutèce and Prochamp. All these parties confirmed that it reflected the contents of their submissions and that they therefore remained committed to following the settlement procedure. The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 20 June 2014 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 15 May 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Bonduelle, Lutèce and Prochamp. All these parties confirmed that it reflected the contents of their submissions and that they therefore remained committed to following the settlement procedure. The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 20 June 2014 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 June 2014.

2.2.   Addressees and duration

| (5) | The addressees of the Decision have participated in a cartel and/or bear liability for it, infringing therefore Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, during the periods indicated below:






  Entity | Duration |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Bonduelle SCA
  Bonduelle SAS
  Bonduelle Conserve International SAS | 1 September 2010 – 28 February 2012 |
| C4C Holding B.V.
  Lutèce Holding B.V.
  Lutèce B.V. | 1 September 2010 – 22 December 2011 |
| Peffer Holding B.V.
  Prochamp B.V. | 1 September 2010 – 28 February 2012 |

(5)

The addressees of the Decision have participated in a cartel and/or bear liability for it, infringing therefore Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, during the periods indicated below:

Entity

Duration

Bonduelle SCA

Bonduelle SAS

Bonduelle Conserve International SAS

1 September 2010 – 28 February 2012

C4C Holding B.V.

Lutèce Holding B.V.

Lutèce B.V.

1 September 2010 – 22 December 2011

Peffer Holding B.V.

Prochamp B.V.

1 September 2010 – 28 February 2012

2.3.   Summary of the infringement

| (6) | The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to stabilise the market shares for the cartelized product and stop the decline of prices. Summarized, the cartel was a non-aggression pact with a compensation scheme in case of customer transfer and application of minimum prices which had been agreed beforehand. To achieve this aim the cartel members exchanged confidential information on tenders, set minimum prices, agreed on volume targets and allocated customers. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to stabilise the market shares for the cartelized product and stop the decline of prices. Summarized, the cartel was a non-aggression pact with a compensation scheme in case of customer transfer and application of minimum prices which had been agreed beforehand. To achieve this aim the cartel members exchanged confidential information on tenders, set minimum prices, agreed on volume targets and allocated customers.

| (7) | The cartel members held numerous regular multilateral meetings and occasionally some of the cartel members had additional contacts on bilateral basis and secrecy was applied to the cartel arrangements. The implementation of the cartel was carried out thoroughly not only by the exchange of prices to be offered in tenders and disclosure of individual customers in follow-up meetings but also by having a mechanism in place to compensate transfers of customers between competitors and thus stabilise market shares for private label sales. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The cartel members held numerous regular multilateral meetings and occasionally some of the cartel members had additional contacts on bilateral basis and secrecy was applied to the cartel arrangements. The implementation of the cartel was carried out thoroughly not only by the exchange of prices to be offered in tenders and disclosure of individual customers in follow-up meetings but also by having a mechanism in place to compensate transfers of customers between competitors and thus stabilise market shares for private label sales.

| (8) | The geographic scope of the infringement, as regards all the settling parties, was EEA-wide during the entire period of their participation. The cartel contacts started at least on 1 September 2010 with regular multilateral meetings between the cartel participants. These cartel contacts lasted until 28 February 2012 (22 December 2011 for Lutèce). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The geographic scope of the infringement, as regards all the settling parties, was EEA-wide during the entire period of their participation. The cartel contacts started at least on 1 September 2010 with regular multilateral meetings between the cartel participants. These cartel contacts lasted until 28 February 2012 (22 December 2011 for Lutèce).

2.4.   Remedies

| (9) | The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (5). With the exception of Lutèce, the Decision imposes fines on all the entities listed under point (5) above. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (5). With the exception of Lutèce, the Decision imposes fines on all the entities listed under point (5) above.

2.4.1.   Basic amount of the fine

| (10) | In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the undertakings' sales of canned mushrooms (as defined in paragraph 1) in the EEA in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination and market sharing arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the cartel and an additional amount to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the undertakings' sales of canned mushrooms (as defined in paragraph 1) in the EEA in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination and market sharing arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the cartel and an additional amount to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices.

2.4.2.   Adjustments to the basic amount

| (11) | The Commission did not apply any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Commission did not apply any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

2.4.3.   Application of the 10 % turnover limit

| (12) | The adjusted basic amounts of the fine for both Lutèce and Prochamp exceed 10 % of their total turnover in 2013. Therefore, the fine for both companies is capped at 10 % of their respective total turnover. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The adjusted basic amounts of the fine for both Lutèce and Prochamp exceed 10 % of their total turnover in 2013. Therefore, the fine for both companies is capped at 10 % of their respective total turnover.

2.4.4.   Application of the 2006 Leniency Notice: reduction of fines

| (13) | The Commission granted Lutèce full immunity from fines and Prochamp a 30 % reduction of fines. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The Commission granted Lutèce full immunity from fines and Prochamp a 30 % reduction of fines.

2.4.5.   Adaptation – Point 37 of the Guidelines on Fines

| (14) | In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and reduced the fine of Prochamp by 10 % to ensure an appropriate level of deterrence without being disproportionate. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and reduced the fine of Prochamp by 10 % to ensure an appropriate level of deterrence without being disproportionate.

2.4.6.   Application of the Settlement Notice

| (15) | As a result of the application of the Settlement Notice, the amount of the fines imposed on all addressees was reduced by 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

As a result of the application of the Settlement Notice, the amount of the fines imposed on all addressees was reduced by 10 %.

3.   CONCLUSION

| (16) | The following fines were imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:






  (a) | Bonduelle SCA, Bonduelle SAS and Bonduelle Conserve International SAS, jointly and severally: EUR 30 204 000; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(16)

The following fines were imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:

(a)

Bonduelle SCA, Bonduelle SAS and Bonduelle Conserve International SAS, jointly and severally: EUR 30 204 000;

| (b) | C4C Holding B.V., Lutèce Holding B.V. and Lutèce B.V., jointly and severally: EUR 0; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

C4C Holding B.V., Lutèce Holding B.V. and Lutèce B.V., jointly and severally: EUR 0;

| (c) | Peffer Holding B.V. and Prochamp B.V., jointly and severally: EUR 2 021 000. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Peffer Holding B.V. and Prochamp B.V., jointly and severally: EUR 2 021 000.

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  MDD stands for ‘Marque des Distributeurs’, ‘HD’ for ‘Hard Discounts’ and MPP stands for ‘Marque Premier Prix’.

(3)  The retail channel includes sales to supermarkets, hypermarkets and hard discounters.

The food service channel includes sales to food wholesalers and processors.

Sales of fresh and frozen mushrooms are not concerned.

Sales of canned mushrooms that are not channelled through tender procedures, such as the sales of parties own brands, are also not concerned.

The business to business channel (i.e. industrial customers which use canned mushrooms as an ingredient for the products they sell to the retailers or the foodservice) is also not part of the infringement.

(4)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

(5)  OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2.

---

Court of Auditors

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/24

---

Special Report No 22/2014 ‘Achieving economy: keeping the costs of EU-financed rural development project grants under control’

(2014/C 453/12)

The European Court of Auditors hereby informs you that Special Report No 22/2014 ‘Achieving economy: keeping the costs of EU-financed rural development project grants under control’ has just been published.

The report can be accessed for consultation or downloading on the European Court of Auditors’ website: http://eca.europa.eu

A hard copy version of the report may be obtained free of charge on request to the Court of Auditors:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Publications (PUB) |
| 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Publications (PUB)

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

E-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

or by filling in an electronic order form on EU-Bookshop.

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/25

---

Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (1)

(Notice regarding an application for an exclusive licence to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons — ‘the Beckenrand Licence’)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 453/13)

On 8 August 2014 Vermilion REP SAS, a company with registered offices at 1762, route de Pontenx, 40160 Parentis-en-Born (France), applied for an exclusive five-year licence to prospect for liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (‘the Beckenrand licence’) in the Department of Haut-Rhin.

The perimeter of the area covered by this licence is demarcated by the straight lines connecting the points defined below:

| Point | NTF meridian of origin Paris | RGF93 meridian of origin Greenwich |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Longitude East | Latitude North | Longitude East | Latitude North |
| BLOCK 1 | A | 5,60 gr | 53,80 gr | 7°22′36′′ | 48°25′12′′ |
| B | 5,70 gr | 53,80 gr | 7°28′00′′ | 48°25′12′′ |
| C | 5,70 gr | 53,70 gr | 7°28′00′′ | 48°19′48′′ |
| D | 5,60 gr | 53,70 gr | 7°22′36′′ | 48°19′48′′ |
| BLOCK 2 | E | 5,50 gr | 53,60 gr | 7°17′12′′ | 48°14′24′′ |
| F | 5,60 gr | 53,60 gr | 7°22′36′′ | 48°14′24′′ |
| G | 5,60 gr | 53,40 gr | 7°22′36′′ | 48°03′36′′ |
| H | 5,50 gr | 53,40 gr | 7°17′12′′ | 48°03′36′′ |

Point

NTF meridian of origin Paris

RGF93 meridian of origin Greenwich

Longitude East

Latitude North

Longitude East

Latitude North

BLOCK 1

A

5,60 gr

53,80 gr

7°22′36′′

48°25′12′′

B

5,70 gr

53,80 gr

7°28′00′′

48°25′12′′

C

5,70 gr

53,70 gr

7°28′00′′

48°19′48′′

D

5,60 gr

53,70 gr

7°22′36′′

48°19′48′′

BLOCK 2

E

5,50 gr

53,60 gr

7°17′12′′

48°14′24′′

F

5,60 gr

53,60 gr

7°22′36′′

48°14′24′′

G

5,60 gr

53,40 gr

7°22′36′′

48°03′36′′

H

5,50 gr

53,40 gr

7°17′12′′

48°03′36′′

The area as defined above covers approximately 201 km2.

Submission of applications and criteria for awarding rights

The initial applicant and competing applicants must prove that they meet the requirements for obtaining licences set out in Articles 4 and 5 of Decree No 2006-648 of 2 June 2006 (as amended) on mining rights and underground storage rights (Official Journal of the French Republic, 3 June 2006).

Interested companies may, within 90 days of the publication of this notice, submit a competing application in accordance with the procedure summarised in the ‘Notice regarding the granting of mining rights for hydrocarbons in France’ published in
  Official Journal of the European Communities C 374, 30 December 1994, p. 11, and established by Decree No 2006-648 of 2 June 2006 (as amended) on mining rights and underground storage rights (Official Journal of the French Republic, 3 June 2006).

Competing applications must be sent to the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy at the address given below. Decisions on the initial application and any competing applications will be taken within two years of the date on which the French authorities received the initial application, i.e. by 16 August 2016 at the latest.

Conditions and requirements regarding performance of the activity and cessation thereof

Applicants are referred to Articles L. 161-1 and L. 161-2 of the Mining Code and to Decree No 2006-649 of 2 June 2006 (as amended) on mining and underground storage operations and the regulations governing mining and underground storage (Official Journal of the French Republic, 3 June 2006).

Further information can be obtained from the following address:

| Ministère de l’écologie, du développement durable et de l’énergie |
| --- |
| Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat — Direction de l’énergie |
| Bureau exploration et production des hydrocarbures |
| Tour Séquoia |
| 1 place Carpeaux |
| 92800 Puteaux |
| FRANCE |
| Tel. +33 140819527 |

Ministère de l’écologie, du développement durable et de l’énergie

Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat — Direction de l’énergie

Bureau exploration et production des hydrocarbures

Tour Séquoia

1 place Carpeaux

92800 Puteaux

FRANCE

Tel. +33 140819527

The abovementioned laws and regulations can be consulted on the Légifrance website:

http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr

---

(1)  OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3.

---

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/27

---

Commission information notice pursuant to Article 16(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community

Repeal of public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2014/C 453/14)

| Member State | ITALY |
| --- | --- |
| Routes concerned | Aosta-Rome Fiumicino and vice versa |
| Original date of entry into force of the public service obligations | 29 September 2013 |
| Date of repeal | 18 November 2014 |
| Address where the text and any relevant information and/or documentation relating to the public service obligation can be obtained | Reference document


  OJ C 41, 13.2.2013, p. 3.
  For further information, please contact:





  Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti |
| Direzione Generale per Aeroporti e il Trasporto Aereo |
| Tel. +39 0659084908/4041/4350 |
| Fax +39 0659083280 |
| E-mail: dg.ta@pec.mit.gov.it |
| Internet: http://www.mit.gov.it |

Member State

ITALY

Routes concerned

Aosta-Rome Fiumicino and vice versa

Original date of entry into force of the public service obligations

29 September 2013

Date of repeal

18 November 2014

Address where the text and any relevant information and/or documentation relating to the public service obligation can be obtained

Reference document

OJ C 41, 13.2.2013, p. 3.

For further information, please contact:

Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti

Direzione Generale per Aeroporti e il Trasporto Aereo

Tel. +39 0659084908/4041/4350

Fax +39 0659083280

E-mail: dg.ta@pec.mit.gov.it

Internet: http://www.mit.gov.it

---

V Announcements

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

| 17.12.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 453/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 453/28

---

Closure of complaint CHAP(2012) 710

(2014/C 453/15)

By the acknowledgement of receipt including the pre-closure notice published in OJ C 230, 1.8.2012, p. 12 regarding multiple complaints on the exchange of former Italian national currency against euro banknotes and coins (reference CHAP/2012/710) complainants were informed of the result of the Commission’s examination of their complaints and of its intention to proceed with the closure of the dossier.

Given the absence of a response from the complainants within the indicated time period from the publication of the pre-closure notice and for the reasons explained therein, the Commission hereby confirms that their complaints are closed on the date of publication of this notice.

---