Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 13 / Friday, January 19, 2018 / Notices 2855 

Commission does not view ‘‘monitor’’ as a more or 

less stringent obligation than ‘‘surveil’’ with respect 

to the continued listing requirements. 

32 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). 

33 15 U.S.C. 78k–1(a)(1)(C)(iii). 

34 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). 

35 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3As discussed in further detail herein, ICE Clear 

Europe is required to establish a recovery plan 

under relevant provisions of the UK Financial 

Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition 

Requirements for Investment Exchanges and 

Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001 (SI/2001/1995) 

and Commission Rule 17Ad–22(e)(3)(ii), 17 CFR 

240.17Ad–22(e)(3)(ii). 

The Plan is also designed to be consistent with 

the Committee on Payments and Market 

Infrastructures (‘‘CPMI’’)—International 

Organization of Securities Commissions (‘‘IOSCO’’) 

Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 

(‘‘PFMIs’’), including supplemental guidance from 

CPMI–IOSCO which includes its report on 

‘‘Recovery of financial market infrastructures’’ 

published in October 2014 and revised July 2017 

(the ‘‘Recovery Guidance’’). 

4Capitalized terms used but not defined herein 

have the meanings specified in the Rules. 

compliance with the continued listing 

requirements. If the Fund is not in 

compliance with the applicable listing 

requirements, the Exchange will 

commence delisting procedures under 

NYSE Arca Rule 5.5–E(m). 

This approval order is based on all of 

the Exchange’s statements and 

representations, including those set 

forth above and in Amendment No. 6. 

For the foregoing reasons, the 

Commission finds that the proposed 

rule change, as modified by Amendment 

No. 6, is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) 

of the Act 32 and Section 

11A(a)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act 33 and the 

rules and regulations thereunder 

applicable to a national securities 

exchange. 

IV. Conclusion 

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to 

Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,34 that the 

proposed rule change (SR–NYSEArca– 

2017–87), as modified by Amendment 

No. 6, be, and it hereby is, approved. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.35

Eduardo A. Aleman, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00849 Filed 1–18–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–82496; File No. SR–ICEEU– 

2017–016] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; ICE 

Clear Europe Limited; Notice of 

Proposed Rule Change, SecurityBased Swap Submission or Advance 

Notice Relating to the ICE Clear 

Europe Recovery Plan 

January 12, 2018. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on December 

29, 2017, ICE Clear Europe Limited 

(‘‘ICE Clear Europe’’) filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

changes described in Items I, II and III 

below, which Items have been prepared 

by ICE Clear Europe. The Commission is 

publishing this notice to solicit 

comments on the proposed rule change 

from interested persons. 

I. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Terms of Substance of the Proposed 

Rule Change, Security-Based Swap 

Submission, or Advance Notice 

Consistent with its obligations under 

applicable laws and regulations,3 ICEU 

has adopted a Recovery Plan identifying 

certain critical clearing services it 

provides and addressing its tools, 

mechanisms and options for addressing 

scenarios that threaten its ability to 

continue to provide such services. 

II. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the 

Proposed Rule Change, Security-Based 

Swap Submission or Advance Notice 

In its filing with the Commission, ICE 

Clear Europe included statements 

concerning the purpose of and basis for 

the proposed rule change and discussed 

any comments it received on the 

proposed rule change. The text of these 

statements may be examined at the 

places specified in Item IV below. ICE 

Clear Europe has prepared summaries, 

set forth in sections (A), (B), and (C) 

below, of the most significant aspects of 

such statements. 

(A) Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the 

Proposed Rule Change, Security-Based 

Swap Submission or Advance Notice 

(a) Purpose 

Consistent with its obligations under 

applicable laws and regulations, ICE 

Clear Europe has adopted a Recovery 

Plan. The Recovery Plan is based on, 

and is intended to be consistent with, 

ICEU’s Clearing Rules (the ‘‘Rules’’) 4

and Procedures, as well as its existing 

risk management frameworks, policies 

and procedures. 

Overview of the Recovery Plan 

The Recovery Plan identifies the 

critical services that ICEU provides, and 

the business functions that support 

those services. In ICEU’s view, its 

clearing services (for both the F&O and 

CDS product categories), and its related 

treasury and banking services, represent 

its critical services. The Recovery Plan 

outlines a number of firm-specific and 

market-wide stress scenarios that, in 

ICEU’s determination, may result in 

significant losses or liquidity shortfall, 

suspension or failure of its critical 

services and related functions and 

systems, and damage to other market 

infrastructure, with resulting 

uncertainty in the markets for which 

ICEU clears. These include both losses 

from Clearing Member default and nondefault loss scenarios. The Recovery 

Plan further evaluates different impact 

categories and severity levels of these 

stress scenarios. The Recovery Plan then 

addresses the tools, mechanisms and 

options (‘‘Recovery Options’’) upon 

which ICEU may draw (based on its 

existing Rules, Procedures and policies 

and frameworks) in order to address a 

stress scenario and continue to provide 

its critical services, and the actions to 

implement those options (including 

appropriate escalation and early 

warning procedures). The Recovery Plan 

also addresses communication with 

regulators and other relevant 

stakeholders and related governance 

issues. The Recovery Plan further 

considers the implications of certain 

situations that may be beyond its 

control, such as interdependencies with 

other institutions. 

The Recovery Plan also addresses the 

roles and responsibility of ICEU Board, 

management and other personnel, 

including with respect to development, 

review and approval, testing and 

maintenance and liaison with relevant 

regulatory authorities. The Recovery 

Plan also includes a description of 

ICEU, its organizational structure, its 

applicable regulatory regime and the 

standards and guidelines that have 

informed the Recovery Plan. The 

Recovery Plan is based on the Rules and 

Procedures of the clearing house as they 

are in effect, and does not itself change 

the rights and obligations of the clearing 

house or its Clearing Members 

thereunder. 

Critical Services and Functions 

As noted above, ICEU has determined 

that both its F&O and CDS product 

category clearing services, as well as its 

related treasury and banking services, 

are critical services. The Recovery Plan 

sets out the methodology used by the 

clearing house in assessing the 

criticality of services for this purpose. 

ICEU has also identified the front-end 

business functions and support areas 


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2856 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 13 / Friday, January 19, 2018 / Notices 

5 ICEU notes that it is preparing to propose 

certain amendments to its Rules relating to 

Recovery Options with respect to CDS contracts, to 

provide for auctions and variation margin gains 

haircutting and to eliminate forced allocation, 

among other changes. 

(including IT services) that support 

these critical services. In particular, the 

Recovery Plan identifies the particular 

IT systems and services used by ICEU in 

providing its clearing services 

(including trade management systems, 

collateral management systems, risk 

systems and delivery systems). The 

Recovery Plan notes the locations from 

which these services are provided and, 

in cases where the services are provided 

by an affiliate or other third party, 

identifies that party. The Recovery Plan 

also identifies other key service 

providers on which ICEU relies, 

including custodians, concentration 

banks, other approved payment banks, 

investment managers and delivery 

services providers. The Recovery Plan 

considers the key services provided by 

ICE affiliates in support of the ICEU 

clearing activities, including 

information technology and risk 

management services. 

Stress Scenarios 

The Recovery Plan analyzes different 

stress scenarios that may affect ICEU’s 

ability to continue to provide its critical 

services. The two relevant categories of 

stress scenarios are default losses and 

non-default losses. Default losses for 

this purpose are losses suffered by ICEU 

as a result of the default of one or more 

Clearing Member(s). Non-default losses 

are those suffered by ICEU from 

identified general business and 

operational risk events, investment 

losses, system outages or world-wide or 

regional political or macroeconomic 

events. In both categories, ICEU also 

considers losses resulting from liquidity 

risks and from the risk of contagion. 

ICEU uses a risk-based approach to 

scenario analysis, consisting of different 

impact categories and severity levels. 

Specifically, ICEU looks at impacts in 

five areas: Financial and operational 

impacts (affecting ICEU’s own finances), 

Clearing Members and their customers 

(affecting their financial viability), other 

group infrastructure (affecting the 

efficiency or effectiveness of other 

related ICE entities (including 

exchanges cleared by ICEU), legal and 

regulatory considerations and 

macroeconomic (affecting market 

operations and market stability). 

In terms of impact severity, ICEU 

assesses scenarios in categories of low, 

moderate, high, very high and severe. In 

the context of a default loss, a low 

severity impact would include a loss 

contained to the financial resources of 

the defaulting Clearing Member. By 

contrast, an event with a severe impact 

level would be expected to exhaust the 

funded resources of the clearing house 

(including ICEU’s contribution and the 

Guaranty Fund contributions of nondefaulting Clearing Members). Other 

intermediate severity levels will involve 

corresponding levels of resource 

consumption and impact on the clearing 

house. For non-default losses, a low 

severity is generally defined as a loss of 

less than 25% of capital resources or a 

loss having no direct impact on Clearing 

Members. By contrast, a severe nondefault loss would be one in excess of 

75% of capital resources are used, or 

one that otherwise involves a severe 

degradation of operations. The Recovery 

Plan contemplates that the range of 

responses to a loss scenario, including 

the potential Recovery Options used, 

will depend on the severity level (with 

low severity loss events involving 

limited or no use of Recovery Options, 

and severe loss scenarios requiring use 

of all of the available Recovery Options). 

The Recovery Plan also contemplates 

different levels of coordination with 

other CCPs, market participants, 

regulators and others depending on the 

severity of the event. 

Recovery Options 

The Recovery Plan sets out the likely 

Recovery Options that ICEU may 

implement depending upon the severity 

of the impact of the scenario, as 

discussed above. The Recovery Options 

are based on the rights and obligations 

of the clearing house under the Rules, 

Procedures, Risk Management 

Framework, Default Management 

Framework, Liquidity Risk Management 

Framework and other relevant policies 

and procedures. 

The Recovery Plan considers a nonexhaustive list of available Recovery 

Options in terms of a number of factors, 

including the speed with which each 

option can be implemented, the impact 

on the clearing house, the impact on 

Clearing Members and their customers, 

and the effect on other market 

infrastructure. The Recovery Plan 

analyzes loss impact and the use of 

Recovery Tools separately for F&O 

defaults, CDS defaults and non-default 

losses. In general, in the case of default 

losses, relevant Recovery Options 

include, consistent with the Rules, 

powers of assessment, use of a default 

auction in accordance with auction 

procedures to fully unwind the 

defaulter’s portfolio (for F&O contracts), 

forced allocation, to the extent the 

defaulter’s positions cannot otherwise 

be unwound (for CDS contracts), 

variation margin gains haircutting (for 

F&O contracts), porting of client 

positions and clearing service 

termination (for F&O contracts).5 In 

terms of non-default losses, Recovery 

Options include emergency liquidity 

facilities, investment loss allocation to 

Clearing Members to the extent 

permitted by the Rules and service 

closure. The Plan contains greater detail 

regarding how each tool assists with the 

recovery process. Consistent with the 

Default Management Framework, the 

Recovery Plan is intended to be flexible 

and provide a structure and guidance to 

management. It is not designed to be 

prescriptive and it recognizes that the 

actions to be taken by the clearing house 

may vary depending on the prevailing 

circumstances which lead to the default 

rules being implemented. The Recovery 

Plan also examines the reliability, 

timeliness and legal basis of different 

Recovery Options. 

Recovery Option Application 

The Recovery Plan outlines the 

situations (and sequence) in which each 

of the Recovery Options is likely to be 

used, recognizing that the clearing 

house has discretion as to the particular 

actions to take in a default or nondefault loss scenario. In general, use of 

Recovery Options is expected in 

extreme circumstances where losses 

exceed pre-funded resources of the 

clearing house. The Recovery Plan 

specifies the expected bases for using 

Recovery Options, such as powers of 

assessment and variation margin gains 

haircutting. It further specifies the 

decision-making process for the use of 

such options, separately for default and 

non-default loss scenarios. These 

arrangements generally specify a 

particular scenario in which a Recovery 

Option may be used, along with the key 

decision-makers involved. In most 

cases, under the Rules and the default 

management frameworks, the decision 

will be made by the ICEU president and 

managing director pursuant to the 

authority delegated by the Board, for 

both default and non-default loss 

events. In the case of default events, 

such actions would be taken having 

regard to the advice of the default 

management committee. In practice, the 

president, where appropriate and time 

permitting, would be expected to 

consult with the Board or with 

individual Board members before taking 

significant actions. The president may 

also call an emergency Board meeting or 

make Board members aware of the 

current position. The president will 


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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 13 / Friday, January 19, 2018 / Notices 2857 

6 15 U.S.C. 78q–1. 

7 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22. 

8 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F). 

9 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(3)(ii). 

report decisions to the Board at the next 

formal Board meeting. If the President is 

absent, the Chief Operating Officer will 

act in his stead. 

The Recovery Plan recognizes the 

importance of clear communications 

and contemplates that use of Recovery 

Options would be expected to be 

implemented through close discussions 

with the ICEU Board, ICEU Board Risk 

Committee, Clearing Members, 

regulators, shareholders and other 

stakeholders. The Recovery Plan 

recognizes the risk that ICEU’s actions 

could cause contagion and envisages 

communication with regulators and 

other financial market infrastructures to 

mitigate such effects. 

The Recovery Plan also sets out a 

series of early warning indicators and 

tools intended to notify ICEU 

management that use of Recovery 

Options may be required, and where 

possible, avoid the need for such 

actions. These include liquidity 

forecasting and monitoring, use of a 

conservative approach to counterparty 

credit analyses and establishment of 

margin and Guaranty Fund 

requirements, use of comprehensives 

risk metrics to monitor Clearing Member 

financial performance, back-testing and 

stress testing, and other assessments. 

The clearing house also retains the 

mechanisms and resources to take 

prompt decisions, and allow an 

immediate response to an emerging 

situation. The Recovery Plan sets out 

detailed lists of potential early warning 

indications of a potential loss scenario, 

such as repeated non-compliance by a 

Clearing Member with membership or 

other requirements, actions taken by 

regulators or other governmental 

authorities with respect to a Clearing 

Member, certain quantitative factors, 

restructuring and similar events. The 

Recovery Plan outlines particular means 

of monitoring for potential loss 

scenarios following such indications. 

Limitations of the Recovery Plan and 

Related Monitoring 

The Recovery Plan has set out 

arrangements for identifying and 

responding to structural weaknesses in 

governance and risk management that 

may be identified in a default event or 

non-default event. ICEU’s tools to 

address such potential weaknesses 

include: Default tests, operational risk 

measures (including for business 

continuity and disaster recovery 

purposes), an operational oversight 

committee, internal audit and 

consultation with external legal counsel. 

The Recovery Plan also notes certain 

potential limitations of the Recovery 

Plan, including the risk of potential 

legal uncertainty (such as a challenge by 

Clearing Members or other market 

participants to the use of Recovery 

Options, notwithstanding the 

protections available to ICEU under 

applicable law and the legal diligence 

conducted by the clearing house with 

respect to its Rules and policies and 

procedures). The Recovery Plan also 

identifies risks of reliance on third party 

market infrastructures, and notes that 

the risk of such infrastructure being 

unavailable is contemplated in stress 

scenarios. The Recovery Plan also notes 

ICEU’s reliance on the continued 

support of Intercontinental Exchange, 

Inc., including as to technology, 

replenishment of capital resources and 

business continuity and disaster 

recovery. 

Governance 

The overall accountability for the 

Recovery Plan lies with the ICEU 

President. The Recovery Plan was 

prepared with the active involvement of 

the management of ICEU. The Recovery 

Plan is reviewed and approved by the 

ICEU Board. The Head of Regulation is 

responsible for facilitating the overall 

production and implementation of the 

Recovery Plan as well as its 

maintenance. The ICEU Board Audit 

Committee, Chief Risk Officer, Chief 

Operating Officer and Executive Risk 

Committee also have roles in the 

implementation of the Recovery Plan. 

Second line functions are responsible 

for ensuring that the Recovery Plan 

remains up-to-date and reviewed in 

accordance with internal review and 

governance control arrangements. On an 

annual basis, the owner will revise the 

Recovery Plan and present the revised 

version to the ICEU Board. Material 

changes to the Recovery Plan must be 

reviewed by ICEU management and be 

subject to governance control. Minor 

changes can be incorporated as part of 

the routine review process. 

As part of governance control, the 

Recovery Plan is subject to annual 

review by the ICEU Board Audit 

Committee. Recommendations and 

discussions by the ICEU Board Audit 

Committee are recorded and submitted 

to the Board in a timely manner. The 

scenarios and actions that support the 

Recovery Plan are subject to ICEU Board 

approval annually. Ad hoc reviews may 

be commissioned if the business 

materially changes, for example upon 

the introduction of a new service. 

Material changes to the Recovery Plan 

or the scenarios, including those 

brought about by market events, are 

subject to ICEU Board approval, 

following their review and discussion 

by the ICEU Board Audit Committee. 

Deviations from the Recovery Plan must 

be reported to the ICEU Board. Elements 

of the Recovery Plan are tested as part 

of normal operations and risk 

management procedures. 

(b) Statutory Basis 

ICEU believes that the proposed 

amendments are consistent with the 

requirements of Section 17A of the Act 6

and the regulations thereunder 

applicable to it, including the standards 

under Rule 17Ad–22.7

Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 8

requires, among other things, that the 

rules of a clearing agency be designed to 

promote the prompt and accurate 

clearance and settlement of securities 

transactions and, to the extent 

applicable, derivative agreements, 

contracts, and transactions, the 

safeguarding of securities and funds in 

the custody or control of the clearing 

agency or for which it is responsible, 

and the protection of investors and the 

public interest. In addition, Rule 17Ad– 

22(e)(3)(ii) 9 requires that each covered 

clearing agency shall establish, 

implement, maintain and enforce 

written policies and procedures 

reasonably designed to, as applicable, 

maintain a sound risk management 

framework for comprehensively 

managing legal, credit, liquidity, 

operational, general business, 

investment, custody, and other risks 

that arise in or are borne by the covered 

clearing agency, which includes plans 

for the recovery and orderly wind-down 

of the covered clearing agency 

necessitated by credit losses, liquidity 

shortfalls, losses from general business 

risk, or any other losses. 

The Recovery Plan is designed to 

meet the requirements of Rule 17Ad– 

22(e)(3)(ii), and is further consistent 

with the requirements of the Act. The 

Recovery Plan sets out ICEU’s plan for 

recovering from severe loss events, 

including from credit losses resulting 

from Clearing Member default, liquidity 

shortfalls, losses from general business 

risk, and other types of losses. The 

Recovery Plan outlines different loss 

scenarios of these types that ICEU 

considers as part of its planning process. 

The Recovery Plan further builds on the 

provisions of the Rules, and other risk 

management frameworks, to set out the 

different Recovery Options that the 

clearing house has available to it to 

address loss scenarios, and restore or 

maintain normal clearing operations. 

The Recovery Plan outlines triggers for 


daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
2858 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 13 / Friday, January 19, 2018 / Notices 

10 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(15). 

11 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(15). 12 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

the use of Recovery Tools, as well as the 

governance process around the use of 

Recovery Options. The Recovery Plan 

also provides greater transparency to 

market participants, including Clearing 

Members and their customers, about the 

expected sequence and scope of 

recovery actions that ICEU may take in 

a loss scenario. In ICEU’s view, the 

Recovery Plan thus meets the 

requirements of Rule 17Ad–22(e)(3)(ii). 

Furthermore, ICEU views the Recovery 

Plan as a key aspect of its general risk 

management framework, which furthers 

its ability to maintain the prompt and 

accurate clearance and settlement of 

transactions, including in severe loss 

scenarios, and thereby promote the 

protection of investors and the public 

interest, within the meaning of Section 

17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act. 

ICEU further notes the requirement in 

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(15) 10 to hold 

sufficient liquid net assets funded by 

equity to cover potential general 

business losses so that the covered 

clearing agency can continue operations 

and services as a going concern if those 

losses materialize, including by (i) 

determining the amount of liquid net 

assets funded by equity based upon its 

general business risk profile and the 

length of time required to achieve a 

recovery or orderly wind-down, as 

appropriate, of its critical operations 

and services if such action is taken, and 

(ii) holding liquid net assets funded by 

equity equal to the greater of either (x) 

six months of the covered clearing 

agency’s current operating expenses, or 

(y) the amount determined by the board 

of directors to be sufficient to ensure a 

recovery or orderly wind-down of 

critical operations and services of the 

covered clearing agency, as 

contemplated by the recovery and winddown plans established under Rule 

17Ad–22(e)(3)(ii). 

ICEU has determined that it holds 

equity capital at least sufficient to cover 

the costs of a recovery of its critical 

clearing services under the Recovery 

Plan, consistent with the requirements 

of Rule 17Ad–22(e)(15).11

(B) Clearing Agency’s Statement on 

Burden on Competition 

ICEU does not believe the proposed 

Recovery Plan would have any impact, 

or impose any burden, on competition 

not necessary or appropriate in 

furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 

The Recovery Plan does not itself 

change the rights or obligations of the 

clearing house or Clearing Members, 

and reflects the Recovery Options set 

out in existing Rules and risk 

management policies. The Recovery 

Plan has been designed to meet specific 

regulatory requirements concerning 

recovery planning, and is applicable to 

all clearing activities. ICEU does not 

believe the amendments will impact 

competition among Clearing Members 

or other market participants, or affect 

the ability of market participants to 

access clearing generally. While 

implementation of the Recovery Plan, 

and in particular use of the Recovery 

Plan in a severe loss scenario, would 

likely impose costs on Clearing 

Members or other market participants, 

such costs are consistent with the 

existing Rules, and are, in ICEU’s view, 

appropriate in light of the goals of 

recovery and maintenance of critical 

clearing service in accordance with 

applicable regulations. 

(C) Clearing Agency’s Statement on 

Comments on the Proposed Rule 

Change Received From Members, 

Participants or Others 

Written comments relating to the 

proposed amendments have not been 

solicited or received by ICE Clear 

Europe. ICE Clear Europe will notify the 

Commission of any comments received 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the 

Proposed Rule Change, Security-Based 

Swap Submission and Advance Notice 

and Timing for Commission Action 

Within 45 days of the date of 

publication of this notice in the Federal 

Register or within such longer period 

up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may 

designate if it finds such longer period 

to be appropriate and publishes its 

reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which 

the self-regulatory organization 

consents, the Commission will: 

(A) By order approve or disapprove 

the proposed rule change or 

(B) institute proceedings to determine 

whether the proposed rule change 

should be disapproved. 

The proposal shall not take effect 

until all regulatory actions required 

with respect to the proposal are 

completed. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views, and 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change, security-based swap submission 

or advance notice is consistent with the 

Act. Comments may be submitted by 

any of the following methods: 

Electronic Comments 

• Use the Commission’s internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml) or 

• Send an email to rule-comments@

sec.gov. Please include File Number SR– 

ICEEU–2017–016 on the subject line. 

Paper Comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities 

and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street 

NE, Washington, DC 20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–ICEEU–2017–016. This file 

number should be included on the 

subject line if email is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

internet website (http://www.sec.gov/ 

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change, security-based swap submission 

or advance notice that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change, security-based 

swap submission or advance notice 

between the Commission and any 

person, other than those that may be 

withheld from the public in accordance 

with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will 

be available for website viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Section, 100 F Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20549, on official 

business days between the hours of 

10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such 

filings will also be available for 

inspection and copying at the principal 

office of ICE Clear Europe and on ICE 

Clear Europe’s website at https://

www.theice.com/notices/Notices.shtml?

regulatoryFilings. 

All comments received will be posted 

without change. Persons submitting 

comments are cautioned that we do not 

redact or edit personal identifying 

information from comment submissions. 

You should submit only information 

that you wish to make available 

publicly. All submissions should refer 

to File Number SR–ICEEU–2017–016 

and should be submitted on or before 

February 9, 2018]. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.12

Eduardo A. Aleman, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2018–00853 Filed 1–18–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 


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