United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-2417

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Joseph Mobley

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

St. Luke’s Health System, Inc.

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: June 16, 2022

Filed: November 16, 2022

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Before LOKEN and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and MENENDEZ,1 District Judge. 

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MENENDEZ, District Judge. 

1

The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States District Judge for 

the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
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Appellant Mobley appeals the District Court’s2 grant of summary judgment 

in favor of Appellee St. Luke’s Health System, Inc. (“St. Luke’s”). For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

Joseph Mobley worked in customer service for St. Luke’s3 for more than six 

years, beginning in 2012. During his tenure, Mobley received two promotions, most 

recently in 2016, when he was named Patient Access Supervisor. In that role, 

Mobley was responsible for training and managing a team of approximately 20 

employees to assist patients over the phone in verifying insurance coverage and 

determining out-of-pocket healthcare costs. Most of Mobley’s direct-reports 

telecommuted full time, although the lowest-performing members on Mobley’s team 

worked in the office. St. Luke’s policy allowed managers to telecommute one day a 

week, and, as of 2018, two days per week. Mobley’s manager, Jessica Lillard, 

allowed her direct-reports additional teleworking days on a case-by-case basis. 

In 2016, Mobley was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (“MS”). As his MS 

progressed, Mobley began to have difficulty walking, standing, and breathing, and 

experienced fatigue and burning sensations in his eyes and hands, particularly when 

his MS flared. At times, St. Luke’s management team observed Mobley’s mobility 

challenges around the office. Mobley’s neurologist encouraged him to continue 

working, even when his condition flared. 

Mobley first requested an accommodation in December 2017, when he asked 

Lillard if he could telecommute when his MS flared. Lillard indicated that she would 

2 The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western 

District of Missouri. 

3

 Although neither party describes what St. Luke’s is, according to its website 

it “includes 16 hospitals and campuses across the Kansas City region.” About St. 

Luke’s, https://www.saintlukeskc.org/about-saint-lukes (last visited August 3, 

2022). 
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consider it and work with Mobley as the need arose. The following month, however, 

Lillard denied that accommodation, explaining to Mobley that allowing him to 

telecommute during a flare-up would be unfair to his co-supervisor. Instead, 

St. Luke’s suggested that Mobley use paid time off and Family Medical Leave Act 

leave on those occasions. 

In February 2018, Mobley again asked for permission to telecommute when 

his condition flared and supplied St. Luke’s a letter from his neurologist 

recommending as much. Subsequently, in March 2018, Lillard and St. Luke’s 

human-resources representative met with Mobley, and he renewed his request to 

telecommute when he experienced a flare-up of his MS. St. Luke’s denied the 

request, instructing Mobley that he could ask Lillard on a case-by-case basis to work 

from home during a flare-up. Lillard advised that St. Luke’s could not accommodate 

his request because he needed to supervise direct-reports in the office and because 

his flare-ups were unpredictable. Mobley asked Lillard to reconsider the decision, 

but she refused to do so. Despite this refusal, Mobley recalled only one instance 

when Lillard denied a request to telework during a flare-up and required him to take 

time off instead. 

Mobley voluntarily resigned in August 2018, as he feared that he was in 

danger of being discharged due to his condition. He did not communicate this 

concern to St. Luke’s either before he resigned or in his resignation letter. 

Mobley sued St. Luke’s pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Mobley alleged that St. Luke’s: discriminated 

against him on the basis of his disability, gender, and race; failed to accommodate 

him; and retaliated against him. St. Luke’s sought summary judgment on all issues, 

and the district court granted St. Luke’s motion. Mobley appealed the district court’s 

ruling regarding only his claims of disability discrimination under the MHRA and 

failure to accommodate under the ADA and the MHRA.
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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Whittington v. Tyson 

Foods, Inc., 21 F.4th 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

B. Failure-to-Accommodate Claims

Mobley alleges that St. Luke’s violated the ADA and MHRA in failing 

accommodate him. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims 

because Mobley failed to demonstrate that he could perform his essential job 

functions either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and because he did 

not demonstrate that St. Luke’s failed to engage in the interactive process in good 

faith regarding Mobley’s requested accommodations. Though we disagree with the 

district court on the first of its holdings, we agree with the second. Therefore 

summary judgment was appropriate and we affirm. 

“The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating ‘against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Ehlers v.

Univ. of Minnesota, 34 F.4th 655, 659 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a)).4 Failing to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes 

discrimination. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 

4 Because the ADA and MHRA use the same modified burden-shifting 

framework, we evaluate Mobley’s state and federal failure-to-accommodate claims 

simultaneously. See Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prod., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1216 (8th 

Cir. 1999).
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To make a prima facie case for a failure to accommodate under the ADA, an 

employee must show that he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 

(2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment 

action due to his disability. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th

Cir. 2007). A “disability” under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1). Because there is no dispute that Mobley had a disability as defined by 

the ADA, Mobley satisfies the first element of his prima facie case. 

To meet the requirements of the second element, proving he is a qualified 

individual under the ADA, an employee must demonstrate that he: (1) possesses the 

skill, education, experience, and training the position requires, and (2) can perform 

the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. Hill v. 

Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota

& E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003)). There is no dispute that Mobley had 

the skill, education, experience, and training necessary for the position. Therefore, 

we turn to whether Mobley could perform the position’s essential functions, “the 

fundamental job duties of [his] . . . position,” with or without a reasonable 

accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). An employee must show that a desired 

accommodation is “reasonable on its face.” U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 

391, 401 (2002). 

The district court concluded that Mobley failed to demonstrate that he could 

perform his essential job functions with or without a reasonable accommodation. 

However, drawing all reasonable inferences in Mobley’s favor, we conclude that a 

genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether he was able to perform the 

essential functions of his job through his proposed accommodation of teleworking 

while he experienced a flare-up of his condition. By allowing Mobley to consistently 

work remotely aside from his medical condition, St. Luke’s implicitly demonstrated 

a belief that he could perform his essential job functions without being in the office

all the time. Moreover, while working remotely, Mobley continued to receive 
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positive performance reviews, reflecting that he was able to effectively supervise his 

employees despite not being on site. 

In support of summary judgment, St. Luke’s emphasizes the opinions of its 

management team who preferred that he work in the office on all but his regularly 

scheduled teleworking days. St. Luke’s explained that “[o]ne of the reasons [it] 

rejected [Mobley]’s request to telecommute when his condition flared was 

because—as a Patient Access Supervisor—his duties required providing in-person 

supervision.” Appellee’s Br. 22 (emphasis in original). Yet nothing in the record 

indicates that had Mobley been permitted to telework for an additional unquantified 

number of days during flare-ups, his job performance would have been inadequate. 

Indeed, St. Luke’s points to no evidence to justify its stance, merely submitting brief, 

conclusory, and unsubstantiated opinions to the contrary. Additionally, St. Luke’s 

does not contend that Mobley had any performance issues.

The legal authority St. Luke’s references in support of its argument does not 

support summary judgment here. Most critically, none of the decisions involve a

case in which a disabled employee, much less nearly all employees in a department, 

regularly teleworked, yet the employer rejected that employee’s proposed 

accommodation to telework when his or her condition flared. See, e.g., Lane v. Ball, 

854 F. App’x 111, 112–13 (8th Cir. 2021) (employer denied employee’s proposed 

accommodation to telework because one of her job’s essential functions was 

“handling questions and requests from members of the public, which she could not 

do outside of business hours or from home”); Brunckhorst v. City of Oak Park 

Heights, 914 F.3d 1177, 1183 (8th Cir. 2019) (employee failed to make a facial 

showing that he could perform his essential job functions remotely, and admitted 

that there were certain functions of his job that he was unable to perform remotely). 

St. Luke’s argument that this case is analogous to Evans v. Coop. Response Ctr., 

Inc., 996 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2021), also misses the mark. In Evans, the plaintiff 

requested additional leave, which differs from Mobley’s request to telework and 

St. Luke’s ensuing instruction to take leave. Id. at 546. Mobley wanted to work 

more, not less. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mobley, he has raised 
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a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he could perform the essential job 

functions with a reasonable accommodation. 

However, for a failure-to-accommodate claim to survive summary judgment, 

an employee must do more than establish a prima facie case—he must also show 

that his employer failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith. See

Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999). “To establish 

that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process, an employee must 

demonstrate that the employer knew about his disability, and that the employee 

requested an accommodation for his disability.” Sharbono v. N. States Power Co., 

902 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561

F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2009)). In this case, there is no dispute as to either of these 

elements. However, the employee must then demonstrate that his employer “did not 

make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations.” Id. 

(quoting Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952); see Ehlers, 34 F.4th at 662. We agree with the 

district court that the record does not demonstrate a material dispute on this element, 

and that summary judgment was appropriate.

The record demonstrates several steps that St. Luke’s took in response to 

Mobley’s request for accommodation. See Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 954 (“All the 

interactive process requires is that employers make a good faith effort to seek 

accommodations.”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that after 

Mobley made his initial accommodation request in December 2017, St. Luke’s 

approved permission for Mobley to work from home on a case-by-case basis. The 

evidence further shows that in February 2018, Mobley asked to work from home 

when his condition flared, and St. Luke’s again responded that he could reach out to 

his manager on a case-by-basis, but that St. Luke’s would not approve a blanket 

request to work from home during flare-ups. Additionally, St. Luke’s offered that 

Mobley could follow up if he had any questions or concerns. While Mobley sent an 

email indicating that he might need a follow-up conversation with management 

regarding this decision, he never requested one. Moreover, only one of Mobley’s 

requests to work from home was actually denied, and on that day he used paid time 
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off. These steps support a finding that St. Luke’s engaged in the interactive process 

and took action to accommodate Mobley. See Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 939 

F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2019). Because there is no triable issue as to whether 

St. Luke’s acted in good faith, we need not reach the final step of the analysis, which 

is whether St. Luke’s could have reasonably accommodated Mobley. Summary 

judgment on Mobley’s failure-to-accommodate claim is affirmed.

C. Constructive-Discharge Claim

Mobley also alleges that he was constructively discharged from his job at 

St. Luke’s. However, Mobley did not raise a constructive-discharge claim before the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

3 F.4th 1075, 1081 (8th Cir. 2021). Likewise, in opposing St. Luke’s motion for 

summary judgment before the district court, Mobley failed to argue his constructivedischarge claim. See Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 540 (8th 

Cir. 2020). Therefore, the claim is not properly before this Court, and the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment is affirmed.

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