### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00180- CR

Juan David Gar za, Jr., A ppellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F H AY S CO UNTY, 22ND J UDICIAL DI STRICT NO. CR-08 -84 6, H ONO RAB LE GARY L. STEEL, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant J uan David Garza, J r. of the off ense of indece ncy with

a child by contac t and assessed punishment at nine y ear s’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. T h e 1
district court rende red judgme nt on the verdic t and, on the jury ’s rec ommendation, s u s pended imposit ion of the sentenc e and p lace d Gar za on community supervision for ten y ear s. I n a single
issue on appea l, Gar za asser ts that he rec eived ineffe ctive assistance of counsel during trial. We will
aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

BACK GR OUND

Gar za was char g ed with e ng ag ing in se x ual contac t w ith his stepdaug hter, A.N., by touching her ge nitals. During trial, A.N., who was by then ni netee n y ear s old, testified t hat when

See Tex. P enal Code § 21.11( a)( 1). 1she was eig ht y ear s old, Gar za had enter ed her bedroom at night, “cuddle d with her,” and then

“pick[ed] [her] up and put [her] on top of him, with [her] leg s around the sides of him; and he took
his hands under [her] shorts, under [her] underw ear , and touching [her] butt towards—[her] vag ina
in a stroking- ty

pe motion.” Severa l day s later, A.N. further rec ounted, she had repor ted this incident to her mother, Stepha

nie J ones, and also informed her that Ga rza had e ng ag ed in similar behavior

on two o r t h re e other occa sions. J ones also testified at trial and descr ibed A.N.’s acc ount in a

manner consistent with A.N.’s testimony

. J ones added that she had also co n fr o n ted Gar za with
A.N.’s alleg ations. I n response , J ones indicated, Gar za had not denied the alleg ation and had instead
become “upset, ve ry apolog etic, emotional, cry ing, say ing he was sorry , it wa s an acc ident.” A.N.
simil arly testified that Gar za had crie d and apolog ized to her “for making [her] fee l uncomforta ble.”
After confr onting Gar za, J ones h ad taken no further action in response to her daug hter’s alleg ations. Approxim ately five y ear s later, howeve r, A.N. made an outcry to her aunt, Carrie J ones. Carrie testified that she had discussed the matter with her husband, who had notified 2
CPS . Melissa Rodrig uez, the prog ram director of the children’s advoca cy cente r i n Hay s County , subsequently conducte d an interview with A .N. in w hich A.N. told her that Garza had touched her
“butt” and her “priva tes.” A video rec ording of the interview was admitted into evidenc e. Other
evidenc e considered by the j ury , which we d i s cu ss in more detail below as it become s rele vant t o Moore’ s issue on appea l, included the testimony of the investiga t i n g l aw enfor ceme nt office r,
L ieutenant J eri Skrocki of the Hay s County Sheriff’ s Offic e; Gar za’s biologica l daug hter, S.G., who

We use her f

irst name to distinguish her from Stephanie Jones. 2
2was permitted to testify that Gar za had eng ag ed in simil ar sexual contac t with her; and Garza, who

denied that he had eve r conta cted A.N . or S.G. in a sexual manner.

The jury found Garza g uilty as char g ed and assessed punishment as indicated above.
After the district court rende red judgme n t on the jury ’s verdic t and suspended imposit ion of the

sentenc e, Gar za filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by opera tion of law. T h i s ap p eal
followed.

JURISDICTION

Be fore turning to the merits of Gar za’s appea l, the State ar g ues that we lack jurisdiction beca

use Gar za failed to timely file his notice of appea l. As a g ener al rule, a defe ndant 3

must file his notice of appea l “within 3 0 d ay s afte r the day sentenc e is imposed or suspended in
open court.” Howeve r, a defe ndant may extend the appellate deadline to 90 day s if he “timely files

4

a motion for new trial.” A motion for new trial is timely if filed no later than 30 day s afte r the date 5
the trial court imposes or suspends sentenc e in open court. Gar za’s sentenc e was suspended in open 6

court on Fe bruar

y 1, 2013. On Fe bruar

y 6, he timely filed a motion for new trial, there by extending
the deadline to file hi s notice of appea l to 90 day s. Gar za filed h i s n o t i ce of appeal on Marc h 12, 2013, within the 90-day

deadline.

See Perez v. State , 424 S.W .3d 81, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“‘ A timely notice of appea l 3 is nece ssary to invoke a court of appea ls’ j u ri s d iction.’” (quoting Olivo v. State , 918 S.W .2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. (1996))). Tex. R. App. P . 26.2(a) (1). 4
Id . R. 26.2(a)( 2). 5 Id . R. 21.4(a). 6
3The State contends that Gar za’s motion for n ew t ri al was ineffe ctive to extend

the appellate deadline beca use the rec ord does not demonstrate that h e prese nted that motion to
t h e d i strict court. Howeve r, R ule 26.2 extends the appellate deadline upon the t imely “filing ” o f 7

a motion for new trial. There is no additional require ment of prese ntment. I n contending otherwise, 8
the State cites t o Ca r r a n z a v. State , in which the Court of Criminal Appea ls held that in order

to prese rve err or rela ting to a trial court’s ref usal to hold a hear ing on a m o t i o n fo r n ew trial,

an appellant is require d to both f ile the motion and prese nt it to the trial court. Howeve r, that rule 9
has no eff ect on the deadline for filing a notice of appea l. Be cause Gar za timely filed his notice of
appea l within the 90-day deadline trig g ere d by the timely filing of h i s m o t i on for new trial, we have jurisdiction over this appea l. Acc ording ly , we overr ule the State’s challeng e to this Court’s 1 0 jurisdiction.

MERITS

I n his so l e i s s ue on appea l, Gar za asser ts that his trial counsel render ed ineffec tive
assistance

. Specifica lly , Gar za complains that trial counsel provided ineffe ctive assistance by : (1) “opening the door” to the admission of extraneous-off ense evidenc e conce rning Gar za’s alleg ed
sexual contac t with his biologica l daug hter, S.G.; (2) fa i l i n g to call an expert witness to provide

See id. R. 21.6 (“The defe ndant must prese nt the motion for new trial t o t h e t ri al co u rt 7 within 10 day s afte r fili n g it, unless the trial court in its discretion permits it to be prese nted and hear d within 75 day s from the da te when the court imposes or suspends se ntence in open cour t.”). See id . R. 26.2. 8
See 960 S.W .2d 76, 79-80 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998). 9
See Tex. R. App. P . 26.2(a) (2). 1 0
4testimony conce rning false alleg ations of sexu a l a b u s e ; a nd (3) conducting himself “inappr opriately ” during trial, including being “re peate dly repr ima n d ed ” b y t he district court and ultimately held in contempt.
“I neff

ective- assistance -of- counsel claims are go v er ned by the familiar Strickland
framework: To preva il, the defe ndant must show that counsel’s perf ormanc e was defic ient and that
this defic ient perf

ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense .” “An a ttorney ’s per formanc e is defic ient if it 1 1
is not within the rang e of competenc e demande d of attorney s in criminal cases as ref lected by
p r e v a il in g p r o f

e s sional norms, and courts indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct w a s
not defic ient.” “I f trial counsel has not been aff orded the opportunity to explain the rea sons for his 1 2 conduct, we will not find him to be defic ient unless the challeng ed conduct was ‘so outrag eous that

no competent attorney would have eng ag ed in it.’” I n other words, in the absenc e of a rec ord 1 3 explaining the rea sons f

or counsel’s decisions, we will not find counsel’ s perf ormanc e defic ient if
any rea sonably

sound strateg ic motivation can be imag ined. 1 4
Strickland establishes a simil arly high bar for establishing prejudice : “A defe ndant
suffe rs prejudice if there is a rea sonable pro b ab i lity that, absent the defic ient perf ormanc e, the

outcome [of the proce eding ] would have been differ ent.” “A rea sonable probability is a probability 1 5

Nava v. State , 415 S

. W

. 3 d 2 8 9, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Strickland 1 1 v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Id . (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689). 1 2
Id . at 308 (quoting Mene field v. State , 363 S.W .3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). 1 3
See G arcia v. State , 57 S.W .3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 1 4
Nava , 415 S.W .3d at 308 (c iting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694). 1 5
5sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outcome.” “I t will not suffice for Appellant to show ‘that 1 6
the err ors had some conce ivable eff ect on the out co m e o f t he proce eding .’” “Rather , he must 1 7
show that ‘there is a rea sonable probability that, absent the e rror s, the fac tfinder would have had a

rea sonable doubt re specting g uilt.’” 1 8

“I t is a rar e ca se i n which the trial rec ord wil l by itself be sufficient to demonstrate

an ineffe ctive-a ssistance cl aim .” As a result, “cla ims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel are 1 9

g ener ally not succe ssful on direc t appea l and are more appropr iately urge d i n a h ea ri ng on an application for

a wr it of habea s corpus.” 2 0

Extraneous-off

ense evidence
Gar za first asser

ts tha t his trial counsel rende red ineffe ctive assistance by “opening
the door” to the admission of extraneous-off ense evidenc e rela ted to Gar za’s alleg ed sexual contac t with S.G. S.G. is the biologica l daug hter of Gar za and A.N.’s mother, Stephanie J ones, and is thus
A.N.’s ha lf-sister. A.N . is the older of the two by approximately

ten y ear s.

Id

. 1 6
Perez v. State , 310 S.W .3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. 1 7 at 693). Id . (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695).

1 8
N a va , 4 1 5 S.W .3d at 308 (citing Lopez v. State , 343 S.W .3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. 1 9 App. 2011)).

Lopez , 343 S.W .3d at 143 (citing Bone v. State , 77 S.W .3d 828, 83 3 n
. 13 (Tex. Crim. 2 0 App. 2002); Ex parte Nailor , 149 S.W .3d 125, 131 (Tex

. C ri m
. App. 2004); Mitchell v. State , 68 S.W .3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). 6I n 2011 or 2012, afte r char g es had b een filed ag ainst Gar za in this case , S.G. told

A.N. that Gar za had touched her g enitals, too. At trial, the State initially attempted to elicit evidenc e of S .G.’s outcry during its direc t ex amination of S tephanie J ones. The dist rict court excluded the
evidenc e at that juncture, sustaining objec tions by Gar za’s counsel that the testimony soug ht to be
elicited was inadmissible hear say and would have an unfairly prej u d icial eff ect substantially outweig hing its probative value. Howeve r, the d i s t ri ct court ultimately permitted the State to 2 1 explore the s u b

j ec t afte r Gar za’s trial counsel extensively cross-e x amined J ones reg arding past
statements in w hich she had purportedly char acte rized Garza f avora bly to police investiga tors as a “g rea t g uy ” and the “bac kbone of the family .” Concluding that Gar za’s counsel had “kicke d the door
wide open on just about any subject inside this family by y our cross-e x amination,” the district court permitted the State to elicit testimony from J ones on redire ct re gar d i n g S.G.’s outcry and later
allowed S.G. her self to testify to the underly

ing a lleg ed conduc t.
As support for his asser

tion that opening the door to extraneous-o ff ense evidenc e constitutes defic ient perf ormanc e, Gar za relies p ri m ar i ly on Garcia v. State

. During the 2 2
defe ndant’s testimony in that case , trial counsel as k ed the defe ndant if he had “eve r sexually
assaulted a

ny body ” or ha d “eve r bee n acc used of sexually assaulting any

body ,” and the defe ndant

answe red both questions in the neg ative. The State then proce eded, during its cross-e x amination 2 3
of the defe ndant and later during its case in rebuttal, t o p re s ent evidenc e tending to show that the

See Tex. R. Evi d. 403, 801. 2 1
308 S.W .3d 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.). 2 2
Id . at 66. 2 3
7defe ndant had been acc used of s ex u al assault i n the past. Although trial counsel objected t o the 2 4
admission of this evidenc e on multipl e g rounds, the trial court overr uled the objections, concluding
that trial counsel had opened the door to the extraneous-off ense evidenc e “by inquiring about prior
sexual assaults as well as by offe ring evidenc e of the defe ndant’s g ood char acte r.” The revie wing 2 5

court c oncluded that c ounsel’s conduc t constituted deficient pe rfor mance :

Her e, by eliciting testimony from Gar cia on direc t examination broadly disclaiming that he had ever sexually assaulted someo n e, d ef en se counsel opened the door for the State to cross-e x amine Gar cia, and to prese nt rebuttal evidenc e of an extraneous o ffe nse of the same char acte r as the char g ed ag g rava ted sexual assault. Simi l ar l y , by eliciting testimony that Gar cia was a “l aw abidi ng ” citizen, defe nse counsel opened the door for the S tate to cross-e x amine Garcia conce rning other “bad acts” to correc t any false impression cre ated by his direc t testimony and to impeach his cre dibilit y
. . . . Given the inhere ntly p re j udicial nature of extraneous offe nse evidenc e, the fac t that the evidenc e would not have been otherwise admissible by the State during g uilt/i nnocenc e, and the fac t that Gar cia’ s defe nse rested almost entirely on his cre dibilit y , there could have been no rea sonable trial strateg y for Ga rcia ’s counsel to elicit and open th e d o o r to the simil ar extraneous offe nse and the numerous instance s of “ba d acts.” [ ] 2 6

We conclude that Garcia is distinguishable from this case
. Unlike Garcia , trial
counsel here did not attempt to “broadly disclaim” that Gar za had eng ag ed in other sexual
misconduct or sug g est that Gar za was a “law- abiding ” citizen. I nstead, the focus of counsel’s crossexamination was to emphasize that J ones, while claiming to have hear d outcries of child molestation by Gar z a, h ad quite incong ruously termed him a “g rea t g uy ” and the “bac kbone of the family ” to

Id

. 2 4
Id . at 66-67. 2 5 Id . at 68 (interna l citations omit ted). 2 6
8police investiga tors there afte r. I n short, counsel’s questions w ere in the nature of impeachme nt of

J ones with prior inconsistent st at em en t s , seeking to discredit her prior testimony rec ounting the alleg ed outcr ies and he r truthfulness g ener ally

. Counsel likewise divulge d on the re cord that his 2 7
examination of J ones also soug ht to elicit evidence “about motive on these people’ s parts to c ome up with this t ale a

nd to back it up eve ry

way they can.”
We cannot conclude on this rec ord that this constitutes defic ient perf ormanc e. J ones

was t h e State’s desig nated outcry witness during trial. Her cre dibilit y was thus a critica l issue 2 8
in the case
. I t would not fa l l b el o w an objective standard of rea sonablene ss for trial counsel, as part of his defe nsive strateg y , to ag g ressively and thoroug hly att ac k J ones’s cre dibilit y on crossexamination, including on matters rela ting to her past favor able observa t i ons, opinions, and

statements conce rning Gar za, even if in doing so counsel might have inadver tently opened the
door to evidenc e rela ted to S.G.’ s outcry

. On this rec ord, we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s 2 9

I n fac t, as the district court obs er v ed d uring a bench confe renc e, Gar za’s counsel 2 7 mounted “an attack on [J ones’s] c hara cter for about three of the four hours of cross-e x amination.” Throug hout this cr o s s -e x ami nation of J ones and other witnesses for the State, counsel repe atedly attempted to attack their cre dibilit y and implied that they wer e ly ing about various aspec ts of either the incident or the investiga tion.

See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. a rt. 38.072. 2 8 See, e.g. , W

illiams v. State , 301 S.W .3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009 ) (f i n d ing no 2 9 defic ient perf

ormanc e when trial counsel opened door to evidenc e of extraneous murders alleg edly committed by defe ndant during testimony of State’s witness whe n t rial counsel did so in order to show that witness had “a bias as to why she’s testify ing” ); Johnson v. State , 432 S.W .3d 552, 558-60 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref ’d ) (f i n ding no defic ient perf

ormanc e when trial counsel inadver tently opened door to extraneous offe nses when “ther e is nothing in the rec ord here to sug g est that defe nse counsel purposely elicited extraneous-off en s e ev idence from his client or otherwise intentionally opened the door to s u ch ev idence ”); Josey v. State , 97 S.W .3d 687, 695-96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (finding no defic ient perf ormanc e when trial counsel opened door to evidenc e of extraneous sex offe nse during cross-e x ami n at i o n of State’s outcry witness; 9cross-e x amination of J ones was outsid e “t h e ra ng e of competenc e demande d of attorney s in

criminal ca ses.” 3 0

Expert te stim ony

Gar za next complains o f t ri al counsel’s failure to prese nt expert testimony
“re g arding a child’s motives for making false alleg ations of sexual misconduct ag ainst a pare nt.”
Such testimony was nece ssary , Gar za contends , t o re but testimony from the State’s experts, specific ally

J eri Skrocki a

nd Melissa Rodrig uez.” 3 1
A s suming without deciding that the failure to call an expert witness in this case w o u ld
constitute deficie nt perfor mance , we c annot conc lude on this rec ord t hat Garza was prejudiced by
any such def iciency . To prove pr ejudice from t he failure to ca ll ex pert witnesse s, the rec ord must
show that such witnesses wer e available to testify and that appellant would have ben ef i t t ed fr om their t estimony

. Her e, the rec ord contains no such showing. Prior to trial, two individuals wer e 3 2

concluding that “[c]ounsel’s inquiry repr esents an attempt to undermine the credibility of .

. . [t he outcry witness]

. . . . We cannot say attempting to discredit one
. . . of the State’s primary witnesses is improper trial strateg y or otherwise falls below the level of an objectively rea sonable standard of conduct” ). Cf

. Robertson v. Stat e , 187 S.W .3d 475, 484-86 (Tex

. Crim. App. 200 6) (finding trial c o u n s e l’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e d e f ic ie n t w h e n c o u

n s e l in te n ti onally elicited testimony from defe ndant rela te d to defe ndant’s prior convictions, as part of trial strateg y to prove that defe ndant was being truthful).

See Nava , 415 S.W .3d at 307. 3 0 Skrocki provided testimony rela ting to the conce pt of “dela y ed outcries” and the proce ss 3 1 of “g rooming ,” wher eby an abus er wi l l at tempt to “dese nsitiz e” a potential victim to make them “fe el more comforta

ble with sexual activity .” Rodrigue z provided simil ar testimony rela ting to the “g rooming ” proc ess and a lso provided testimony rela ting to the f

abric ation of outcrie s. See Perez , 310 S.W .3d at 89 4 (c i t i n g K ing v. State , 649 S.W .2d 42, 44 (Tex. Crim. 3 2 App. 1983)); Butler v. State , 716 S.W .2d 48, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); W ashi n g t o n v. State , 417 S.W .3d 713, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2013, pet. re f’d)

. 10desig nated as possible expert witnes s es b y the defe nse—Shelley Gra ham, a licensed profe ssional counselor, and Matthew Fe rra ra, a psy cholog ist. The specific matters to which they wo u l d h av e testified if called are not disclosed in the rec ord. A third possible expert, identified only as Geor g e Parker , was mentioned by trial counsel during a hear ing on counsel’s moti on for continuance. At
that hear ing, counsel disclosed that Gra ham “said she doesn’t fee l competent to testify about a false outcry ” and that Parker would not b e available to testify until sever al day s afte r the trial was schedule d to conclude

. Additionally , even if Parker had bee n available to testify , there is nothing
in the record summ arizing wh at h i s t est imony would have been. Thus, on this rec ord, t here is no
way for this Court to deter mine whether Gar za would have benef itted from the testimony of any of
the possible experts for the defe nse. Acc ording ly , we cannot conclude that t h er e i s a rea sonable probability that, absent trial counsel’s failure to call an expert witness, the outcome of the proce eding
would have be en diffe rent. 3 3

Counsel’s behavi or during trial

Finally , Gar za asser

ts that trial counsel was ineffe ctive in the manner i n which
he conducte d himself during trial. Specifica lly , Gar za ref ers to s ev er al occa sions in which the
district court, outside the prese nce of the jury , admonished trial counsel for not following the court’s
instructions and repe atedly disag ree ing with the court’s evidentiar y ruling s, including its ruling that

See, e.g. , Ex parte Flores , 387 S.W .3d 626, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Perez , 3 3 310 S.W .3d at 894-95; Ex parte Ramirez , 280 S.W .3d 848, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 0 7 ). Cf

. Ex parte Ove rton , 444 S

. W.3d 632, 640-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (finding prejudice prong satisfied when rec ord included summary of ex p er t’s qualifica tions and specific matters to which expert would have testified; concluding th a t e xp e r t’ s “ c r e dibilit y combined with his testimony would have ha d a strong impact on the jury and suff iciently undermine[d] t he outcome of the trial”)

. 11counsel had “opene d the door” to S.G.’s outcry . Additionally , on the first day of trial, outside t he
prese nce of the jury , the district court held trial counsel in c ontempt a fter he had asked a witness a question that the court ha d instructed him not to ask. 3 4

Assuming without deciding tha t c o u n s e l’ s c o n d

u c t d uring trial fell below an objective
standard of rea sonablene ss, there is n o thing in the rec ord to sug g est that trial counsel’s conduct
influence d the jury ’s verdic t in any manner or that the jury would have rea che d a d i ff ere nt verdic t absent counsel’s conduct. Moreove r, the district court’s admoni s h ments and sanctions
of trial counsel took place outside the prese nce of the jury

. On this rec ord, Gar za has failed to demonstrate that there is a rea sonable probability that, absent counsel’s unprofe ssional conduct, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en diffe rent. 3 5

We overrule Gar za’s sole issue on appe al.

During a bench confe renc e, trial counsel had ex p lained to the district court that he 3 4 intended to question A.N.’ s m o t h er reg arding an allege d incident i n which A.N. had “demanded” that her materna l g randf

ather assist her in procur ing the “day -af ter abortion pill.” The district court responde d to the reque st as follows: “I can’ t imag ine that’s rele vant. I f y ou want a hear ing on that at t h e end of the day , I ’ll g ive it to y ou, but, no.” Almost immediately there afte r, trial co u n s el proce eded to question the witness reg arding the alleg ed incident, p rompting the district court’s contempt ruling

. Trial counsel insisted that he had not intended to disobey the court, but had mere ly misunderstood the court’ s ruling.

See W hite v. State , 190 S.W .3d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); 3 5 Dev is v. State , 18 S.W .3d 777, 785-87 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.); see also Hansley v. State , No. 01-12-01023- CR, 2014 Tex. App. L EXI S 80, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] J an. 7, 2014, pet. ref

’d) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication) (“While trial counsel’s behavior and the sanctions meted out b y the trial judge sug g est a want of profe ssionalism, the alleg ed events ar e n o t sufficie nt to establish ineffe ctive assistance under Strickland .”); Samuels v. State , No. 05-03-00683- C R , 2 0 0 4 Tex. App. L EXI S 4575, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20, 2004, pet. ref ’d) (not desig nated for publication) (counse l being held in co n t em pt does not “invar iably ” lead to conc lusion that counsel provided inef fec tive assistance ).
12CONCLUSION
We affir m the judgme nt of the district court.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice
Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Pemberton a nd Bour land
Affir med Filed: Apr il 9, 2015
Do Not Publish

13