DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DOUGLAS HARRISON and LAURA RAYBIN MILLER,

Appellants/Petitioners,

v.

SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a MEMORIAL 

HEALTHCARE SYSTEM and KIMARIE STRATOS,

Appellees/Respondents.

Nos. 4D2023-0441 and 4D2023-0444

[November 8, 2023]

Consolidated appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 19-005895 CACE (14); and Petition for writ of 

certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Carlos A. Rodriguez, Judge; L.T. Case No. 19-005895 

CACE (14).

Michael R. Piper and Christopher J. Stearns of Johnson, Anselmo, 

Murdock, Burke, Piper & Hochman, PA, Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellants/petitioners.

Chris Kleppin and Chelsea Lewis of KLK Law Firm, Plantation, for 

appellee/respondent Kimarie Stratos.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants Douglas Harrison and Laura Raybin Miller, members of the 

Board of Commissioners of the South Broward Hospital District d/b/a 

Memorial Healthcare System (“the District”) seek review of an omnibus 

order denying their motions for summary judgment. 

In case number 4D2023-0441, Defendants appeal a nonfinal order 

denying their motion for summary judgment claiming immunity under 

section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). In case number 4D2023-

0444, Defendants seek certiorari review of the denial of their motion for 
2

summary judgment claiming common law absolute immunity for their acts 

as public servants.1 

We have consolidated these cases for resolution by the same panel and 

for opinion purposes.

We agree with Defendants that they are entitled to immunity as a 

matter of law as to Plaintiff’s tort claims against Defendants for 

defamation, tortious interference with an advantageous business 

relationship, outrage, and gross negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

Accordingly, we reverse the order, grant the petition, and remand for 

the trial court to grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on these 

claims.

Background

In the underlying case, Plaintiff, Kimarie Stratos, has sued the District 

for alleged violations of Florida’s Whistleblower’s Act. § 112.3187, Fla. 

Stat. (2018). 

Stratos formerly served as the District’s Executive Vice President, 

General Counsel, and Chief Privacy Officer. Defendants Harrison and 

Miller are commissioners on the District’s Board of Commissioners. 

Stratos alleges that, in September 2018, when Harrison was serving as 

chairman, the Board conducted two unauthorized public meetings to 

review Stratos’ performance and voted (4 to 2) to terminate Stratos. The 

complaint alleges this action was taken in retaliation for Stratos reporting 

that Defendants had committed Sunshine Law violations and other 

improper conduct.2

In addition to her Whistleblower’s Act claim against the District, Stratos 

brought claims against Defendants individually for defamation, tortious 

1 In case numbers 4D2020-2644 and 4D2020-2655, Defendants previously 

sought review of the denial of their motions to dismiss raising these issues. 

Review was limited in those proceedings to the four corners of the complaint, and 

this Court denied relief without prejudice for Defendants to raise their claims in 

subsequent proceedings. Harrison v. Stratos, 326 So. 3d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2021).

2 In case number 4D2023-0443, which is consolidated with the instant case for 

panel purposes but proceeding separately, the District has sought certiorari 

review from the portion of the order denying its motion for summary judgment 

on Stratos’ Whistleblower Act claim. 
3

interference with an advantageous business relationship, outrage, and 

gross negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 Stratos’ claims are based 

on Defendants’ words and actions at the meetings, and their decision to 

vote for Stratos’ termination.

The trial court agreed with Stratos that a genuine disputed issue of fact 

exists as to whether the Board had authority to terminate Stratos. Stratos 

contends that, pursuant to the District’s Bylaws, she was supervised solely 

by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and the Board had no authority to 

review her performance or to terminate her. The trial court agreed with 

Stratos that the Board had authority to review and terminate the CEO and 

no other employee. Stratos maintains that she worked for the District, not 

the Board.

Defendants timely brought these proceedings seeking review.

Jurisdiction and Legal Standards

We have nonfinal appeal jurisdiction over the order denying the claim 

of immunity under section 768.28(9). Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(F)(ii). We 

have certiorari jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ claim of common law 

absolute immunity. See Gay v. Jupiter Island Compound, LLC, 358 So. 3d 

780, 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). For certiorari relief, Defendants must show 

that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law 

resulting in material injury that cannot be corrected on postjudgment 

appeal. Id.

We review the purely legal issues in these proceedings de novo. City of 

Fort Lauderdale v. Israel, 178 So. 3d 444, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); 

Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). 

Immunity Under Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on 

Stratos’ tort claims because they are immune from suit for actions they 

took in the scope of their function as Board members under section 

768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides:

An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its 

subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or 

named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or 

3 Stratos has also brought a civil assault claim against Defendant Harrison only. 

The assault claim is not at issue in these proceedings.
4

damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of 

action in the scope of her or his employment or function, 

unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or 

with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and 

willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

§ 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). This immunity extends to members of 

appointed boards of special districts for acts or omissions “relating to 

members’ conduct of their official duties.” § 768.1355(3), Fla. Stat. (2018).

The trial court agreed with Stratos that Defendants acted outside the 

scope of their employment and “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful 

disregard of human rights, safety, or property” because the Board allegedly

had no authority to review Stratos’ performance or to discharge her.

Common Law Absolute Immunity

“Under Florida common law, absolute immunity for words spoken or 

written by public servants—however false, malicious, or badly motivated 

the words may be—extends to public servants in judicial and legislative 

activities, and to county and municipal officials in legislative or quasilegislative activities.” Gay, 358 So. 3d at 786–87 (citing Hauser v. Urchisin, 

231 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1970)).

The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “the privilege, or 

immunity, is absolute and the protection that it affords is complete. It is 

not conditioned upon the honest and reasonable belief that the defamatory 

matter is true or upon the absence of ill will on the part of the actor.” 

Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 584, at 243).

The privilege applies to other torts beyond defamation, such as tortious 

interference and infliction of emotional distress. City of Stuart v. Monds, 

10 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“We reject respondents’ argument 

that the doctrine of absolute immunity is inapplicable because of the 

absence of a defamation claim.”); Cassell v. India, 964 So. 2d 190, 196 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“We further hold that absolute immunity bars [the 

plaintiff’s] claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This claim 

is simply a recast of the defamation claim; it too is barred by the 

privilege.”). The privilege likewise applies to Stratos’ tort claim for 

“outrage.” 
5

The immunity extends to all “words or acts within the scope of the 

authority of the public servant.” Crowder v. Barbati, 987 So. 2d 166, 168 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

The controlling factor in deciding whether the absolute 

privilege applies is whether the communication was within the 

scope of the [public official’s] duties. The scope of [a public 

official’s] duties is to be liberally construed. The term “duties” 

is not confined to those things required of the [public official], 

but rather extends to all matters which [the public official] is 

authorized to perform. Because the balancing of interests 

favors the public official, it is considered better to leave 

unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest [public officials] 

than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant 

dread of retaliation.

Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 194. The alleged conduct need only be “related to 

the official’s duties.” Prins v. Farley, 208 So. 3d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2017) (granting certiorari under similar circumstances, where a 

terminated city manager alleged that a city councilman tortiously 

interfered with the manager’s employment relationship with the city “by 

misleading two council members to vote to discharge” the manager); see 

also Stewart v. Sun Sentinel Co., 695 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) 

(“Since the statements made concerning the plaintiff’s discharge were 

related to and made within the scope of the defendants’ official duties, we 

hold that these defendants are entitled to an absolute privilege and are, 

therefore, immune from liability for the alleged defamation.”).

“[A]lthough statements made by government officials are protected by 

absolute immunity in certain situations, in order for immunity to attach, 

the statements must be made within the scope of the official’s duties and 

powers.” Albritton v. Gandy, 531 So. 2d 381, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Analysis

The key issue in both of these cases is whether the Board had authority 

to hold the meetings and to vote for Stratos’ discharge. 

We agree with Defendants that the trial court departed from the 

essential requirements of law and reversibly erred in denying their claims 

of immunity. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Board had 

authority to review Stratos’ performance and to terminate her. Defendants 

cannot be sued based on words spoken and actions taken as Board 

members.
6 

The District is a special tax district, and its Charter is set out by the 

Legislature at Chapter 2004-387, Laws of Florida. The Charter’s Section 

3 provides that the District’s governing body is the seven-member Board 

of Commissioners appointed by the Governor. 

The Charter’s Section 4 gives the Board broad authority and provides 

(in relevant part): 

(1) The Board of Commissioners of the South Broward 

Hospital District shall have all of the following governmental, 

corporate, and proprietary powers: 

... 

(d) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to exercise 

all of the powers of a corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 

607, Florida Statutes. 

... 

(i) To appoint and employ a superintendent or administrator 

and such other agents and employees as the board deems 

advisable. 

... 

(2) The provisions of this act shall be so construed as to 

secure and extend to the board of commissioners all powers, 

whether governmental, corporate, or proprietary, not expressly 

prohibited by the State Constitution and to remove any 

limitations judicially imposed or otherwise.... 

Id. 

The District’s Bylaws recognize the Board’s authority under the Charter 

and that the Bylaws cannot supersede that authority. The Bylaws provide

(in relevant part): 

Article I, Governing Board. . . . Section 3. General Powers: The 

general and specific powers of the Board shall be those 

authorized under the provisions of the Charter. No portion of 

these Bylaws may be construed as superseding or exceeding 

such authorized powers. 
7 

(emphasis added). 

The Bylaws also recognize the Board’s authority to employ personnel: 

The Board of Commissioners is responsible for attaining the 

objectives specified in the Charter. These objectives include, 

without limitation, selecting and appointing a competent and 

experienced President and Chief Executive Officer, and 

Medical Staff Members; employing personnel; formulating or 

approving such Bylaws as may be desirable for the proper 

operation of the Hospital District’s facilities; securing and 

controlling the use of all materials and supplies and 

maintaining and repairing of the property. 

(emphasis added). 

The Bylaws require the Board to select and appoint a President and 

CEO and provide (in relevant part): 

Article V President and Chief Executive Officer . . . 

The President and Chief Executive Officer shall be given the 

necessary authority and responsibility to operate the facilities 

of the Hospital District in all its activities and departments, 

subject only to such policies as may be adopted and such 

orders as may be issued by the Board or by any of its 

committees to which it has delegated power for such action. 

The President and Chief Executive Officer shall act as the 

authorized representative of the Board in all matters in which 

the Board has not formally designated some other person to 

act... 

The Bylaws set out the President and CEO’s authority and duties as 

follows: 

Section 3. To select, employ, control and discharge all 

employees authorized by the Budget. No Board member may 

issue orders to or direct any employee except through the 

President and Chief Executive Officer. 

(emphasis added). 
8 

Stratos contends that, under the Bylaws, she reported only to the CEO 

and only the CEO could fire her. Stratos pointed to evidence that in 2016 

and 2017, Defendants tried to get the Board to change the Bylaws to give 

the Board authority to review and terminate the general counsel. Former 

Board members, the CEO, and other employees testified in deposition that 

they did not believe the Bylaws gave the Board authority over Stratos’ 

position as general counsel. 

These witnesses’ opinions, however, are not controlling. The proper 

interpretation of the Charter and Bylaws is a question of law reviewed de 

novo. We conclude that the Charter and Bylaws on their face plainly give 

the Board (acting as a unit) broad authority, including the authority to 

employ personnel. The Charter’s Section 4 gives the Board authority to 

“appoint and employ . . . other agents and employees as the board deems 

advisable.” The Bylaws expressly state that its provisions cannot 

supersede the authority granted to the Board by the Charter, and also 

recognize the Board’s authority to employ personnel. 

While the Bylaws prohibit any individual Board member from directing 

an employee, this does not impact the Board’s authority to act as a unit. 

The Board had authority to hold meetings to review Stratos’ performance 

and to vote for her discharge. The Charter’s Section 4 is clear that the 

Board is given “all powers, whether governmental, corporate, or proprietary,

not expressly prohibited by the State Constitution.” (emphasis added). 

This broad grant of authority includes the Board’s actions in this case. 

Stratos claims that, after the Board’s vote at its September 2018 public 

meeting, the CEO did not immediately discharge her and allowed her to 

remain on medical leave until late December 2018 because he allegedly 

did not believe the Board had authority to fire her. 

Even if Stratos was correct that only the CEO could terminate her 

employment, this did not preclude the Board from voting and directing the 

CEO to discharge Stratos. The Bylaws clearly recognize the Board’s 

authority to direct employees through the CEO. S. Broward Hospital Dist. 

Bylaws, art. V, § 3 (“No Board member may issue orders to or direct any 

employee except through the President and Chief Executive Officer.”) 

(emphasis added); S. Broward Hospital Dist. Bylaws, art. V (“The President 

and Chief Executive Officer shall be given the necessary authority and 

responsibility to operate the facilities of the Hospital District in all its 

activities and departments, subject only to such policies as may be adopted 

and such orders as may be issued by the Board or by any of its committees 

to which it has delegated power for such action.”) (emphasis supplied). 
9

The trial court also erred in concluding that Defendants acted willfully 

and wantonly under section 768.28(9)(a). The court premised this ruling 

on its mistaken belief that the Board did not have authority to terminate 

Stratos.

Stratos contends that Defendants are not immune under section 

768.28(9)(a) because she presented sufficient evidence to show they acted 

in bad faith and with malicious purpose. 

Even if this is correct, the common law privilege absolutely immunizes 

Defendants for the tort claims at issue. The privilege applies even if 

Defendants were acting in bad faith and maliciously. Gay, 358 So. 3d at 

786–87. Defendants cannot be sued based on how they acted and voted 

as Board members – regardless of their intentions. Thus, Stratos’ tort 

claims against Defendants cannot succeed as a matter of law, and 

summary judgment should have been granted in Defendants’ favor.

Accordingly, we reverse the order, grant the petition, and remand with 

instructions to grant summary judgment on the tort claims at issue.

Reversed and remanded; petition granted.

CIKLIN, CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.