Docket No . 103777.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOI S, Appe llee, v.

MI GUEL DE LE ON , A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed January 25, 2008.

CHIEF JUS TI CE TH OMAS deliv ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, wit h op inion. Justice s Fr

eeman, F i tz g er ald, Kilbride, G ar man, Ka rmeier , a nd Bur ke c onc ur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Fo llowing a

bench t rial, d efenda nt , Mig uel De leon, was convi cted of fir st d egr ee mur der (7 20 I LCS 5/ 9–1 (a )( 1) (Wes t 199 6) ) a nd attempted fi

rst deg re e murder (720 I LCS 5/8–4, 9–1(a)( 1) (West 1996) ). The trial

court sentence d

him to a manda t or y li

fe t er m for t he fi rst de gre e m

urder a nd a c ons ecuti

ve 30- yea r ter m f ort he attempted fi rst degre e m

urder. D ef

endan t appea l ed, an d the appe l l ate court affir m ed both th e con vi cti ons a nd th e se nten ces
. People v. Deleon , No. 1–99–0028 (2000) (unpubl is hed orderun de rSu pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23). Later, defendan

t file d a p ostc onv

i cti on pet itio n ar guing t hat t he
mandatory

lifeter m m us t b e v ac ate d b ec au se

th e statu te aut hor izing it was invalidate d in People v. Wooters , 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1 999 ). The trial co ur t su mmar ily

dismissed t he pe t itio n. D efenda nt app ealed , a nd-2- t he appe l l atecou

rt v ac ate d de f

en da nt’ s l i f e s en ten cean d re man de d f or a new s en tenc i ng h eari ng. People

v. Deleon , No. 1–01–2469 (2003) (unpu bl ished or der unde r S upr eme Co ur t Rule 2 3) . At t he
re sent encing hear ing , t he trial court im posed a 100-year ex

tendedterm sent ence for t he first deg re e mur der and a gain im posed a
co nsec ut ive30-y

ear s en tenc e f or the attem

pted f i rst deg ree m urder. Defend ant appe al

ed , a n d th e a pp el l ate cou rt aff irm ed the sentences. No. 1–04–

2934 ( unp ubl i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23). We allo we d d efe nd an t ’s pe t it ion for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a ).

BACK GROUND Defend ant was a member o f the Impe rial Gang st er s, a rival ga ng of the Latin Ki ngs. On the

afternoon of A

pril 4, 1997, defenda

nt met wi th so me o f his f

ello w g an g me mb ers in “the Jun

gle ,” a
ne i gh bor hood loca t ed ne ar t he inte rse ct ion o f Mannheim Ro ad a nd CrownRo ad in

Frankl in Park. Defen

dant was prov

i di ng “ se cu ri ty” f or t he Impe rial Gang st er s t hat day, which means he ca rr ied a g un in t he event of a n alte rc at ion wit h t he La ti n K i n gs . A t so me p oi n t, defend ant and his c o ho r t s no t ic ed a re d F ord M us tan g dr i vi ng we stw ard

on Crown Ro ad. Because the car bore a Sto ne Park regi stration sticker and co nt ain ed a “ cr o wn air fr es he ne r , ” t he I mpe r ial G ang sters surmi sed t hat it bel onged to a Latin Ki ng. Wh en som eone y elle d “f l akes ,” a t er m meaning “rival gang member, ” de fendant and another Imperi al Gangster ran t hro ugh a n apa rt ment c omp lex to inter cep t t he Mus t ang o n Schiller S t re et . Whe n t he Mu st ang appe are d on Schi ll er Str eet, de f

en da nt a nd one of hi s f el l owgang members s t epp ed int o t he street and stopped the car. An al tercation ensued, an

d, fr o m a dis tance of three feet, def

endan t fi red two shots through the drive r’s si de win dshi el d. On e of thos e shot s hit t he dr iver, Jo se S anche z, in the ch est. Sanch

ez sped away

to ward Man

nhe im R oad, passin

g an i ce cream truck surrounded b

y chi l dren

. Defe n dant contin ued fi rin g at Sanch ez, and seven

-year-old Juana Ni

eto, who was standi

ng be si de t he i cecre am

truck, w assh

ot and ki ll ed. A thr ee- year- old boy and t he ice cream tru ck driver al so sust ain

ed in juries. At tria l , San chez testif

i ed th at, a f

ter hearing the ini

tial gunshots, he felt a “ bu rning in

[hi s] chest.” As

he sped toward Mann

hei m R oad, Sanch eznoticed an

ic e cream truck that was parkedon Schi ll er Street1 Although this di s tan ce is no t a p art o f t

he re co rd on app e al, th

isco urt
may ta ke judic ial notic e of the dis ta nces b etween two lo catio ns. See Daw

dy v. Union P

acific R.R. Co. , 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177-78 (2003).

-3- and surrounded by

chi ldren . When

he reach

ed Mann hei m R oad, Sanc hezdr o ve t o a g as st at io n lo ca t ed at t he co rne ro f Ma nnh eim Roadand Gran

d Avenue, a di stance of approxi ma tely 1,500 feet

f rom t he scene of

the shooting. 1 At the gas station , Sanc h ez

con ti n ue d to feel t he bu rning in his ch es t an d “ felt som ethi ng r unn i ng i n the b ack.” As he ex i te d the Must ang, Sanchez recovered t he bul let “f rom [his] back.”Whe n a sk ed dir ec t ly whe t he rt he bu ll e t “w en t t hr o ug h” his bo dy, S an ch ez an sw er ed “ye s. ” S imila r ly, S an ch ez an sw er ed “ye s ” when ask ed wh ethe r the bul le t “exi ted” hi s body

and wh en asked whe ther t he bullet “[ca me] o ut of” his back . Aft er re co ver ing t he bullet , S anche z we nt inside t he ga s station a nd as ke d f orhel p. When t he pol i ce ar ri v ed , Sa n ch ez h an de d th e b ul l et to an of fi cer. Sanchez
was t he n t ak en by amb ula nc e t o Lo yo la U nive r sit y Ho sp it al. Pho t og ra phs t ake n at t he ho spit al dep ict a bullet wo und in t he le ft
cen ter of Sa n ch ez ’s ch est. The trial co ur t fou nd

defen dant guil ty of the f irst degree m

urder of Juana Ni eto and the att empted fi rst degree murder of J

ose Sanchez

. At t he same t ime, t he t rial co ur t acq uit t ed d efenda nt of t he attempted fi rst de gre e m

urders of t he three-year-ol d boy a

nd the i ce cream truck dri ver, both of whom

sustain ed wounds duri

ng the sh

oot in g. Fol l owi ng a sen tenc i ng h eari ng, th e tri al court i m posed a m andatory lifeterm f or t he f irst degree m

urder conviction, bas ed on the fa ct that defen dant was 17 yea rs o ld at t he t ime of t he o ffense and t he vic t im
was under the age of 12. See 730 ILCS 5/5– 8–1(a)( 1)(c) (ii ) (West 1996)

. For the a ttem

pte d fi rst degree murder convi

ction, the trial
co ur t impose d a c ons ecu t ive sent ence of 3 0 year s in priso n. See 730 IL C S 5/5–8–4( a) (West 199 6). I n the course o f i mposin g these sent ence s, t he trial

court specifi

cally found that Sanch

ez “was struck through t he che st ” and t ha t “t he bu llet we nt t hr o ug h his ch es t an d in fact exi ted hi s b ac k.” Th e c ourt a

l so n oted tha t, as a re sul t of defendant’s conduct, “the in div idua l wh o was driv

in g the ic e cream truck was st ru ck a nd injure d” a nd “ano ther chi

ld on the s

treet was struck i n the neck a

nd i nj ured.”-4- Defend ant appe al

ed , a n d th e a pp el l ate cou rt a f f i rm ed b oth th e co nvictio ns and the s en

tenc es. Deleon , No. 1–99–0028 (unpubl is hed order under Sup re me

Court Rul e 23). Later, defendan t file d a postconv i cti on petiti

on arg ui ng th at his m andatory lif e t er m must be vacated beca use Pu blic Act 8 9–2 03, which ena ct ed t he re levant
mandatory

se n tencing pr ovisio n, w as invalidat ed in People v. Wooters , 18 8 Il l. 2d 500 (1 999 ). The t rial co ur t summarily dismissed t he pet itio n, and def

endan t appealed. Ci

ting Wooters , t he appe l l ate court vacated def endan t’s l i f e se nten ce a nd r em anded f or re sentenci

ng unde r t he la w that was in

eff ect prior to the enactm

ent of Publ

ic Act 89–203. Deleon , No. 1–01 –2469(un pub li shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Rul e 23). Fo llowing t he r emand, defend ant wasappoi nted new counsel . In hopes of a sce

rt a in in g new m iti gation ev ide nce, def ense couns el subpoenaed

d efend an

t’s rec ords f rom the Ill i noi s D ep artm

en t of Co rr ect ions (he

rei naf ter, Corrections). Because such records “shall be
co nf ident ial” (730 IL CS 5/3 –5–1( b) (W est 199 6)), the

tria l court exa mined defen dant’s Corrections f

il e in camera . Fo llowing t he examinat ion, the tri

al court off ered th e f oll owi ng s um mary in o pen cou rt: “The pos i

ti ve pa rt of thedoc ume

nts i s one page wh

ic h
wo uld sh ow that M r. D el eon pas sed his G.E .D . t est . T he ot her docum en ts I t hin k, un fo r t un at ely, we ll, I won’ t go any f urthe r. That’ s th e on l y docum en t” The t rial co ur t t hen o ffered t o mak e t hat singlep ag e a v ai l ab l e to def ense co unse l, and defens e co unse l resp ond ed, “That wo uld be suf f i cien t, Judge .” Defendant’s re sent encing heari ng was h el d several

wee ks lat er . At t he st ar t , d efense co unse l ackno wledg ed t hat he had recei ved a copy of def endan t’s n ew pre sen tenc i ng i nv esti gation (PSI) r

eportand that he had rev

i ewed that rep ort wit h defend ant . Amo ng ot her t hings, t he PSI report noted that defendan t had obtain

ed hi s G. E

. D. wh ile in carcerated, had be en wo rk ing st ead ily since ar riving in priso n and
even recei ved a p ro moti on, an

d w ashou se d i

n th e “ ve ry l ow agg re ssive cell hou se. ” T he r epo rt also included a long sta tem en t of
remorse fro m defenda nt , in which he explained t hat he was “y oung at t he tim e,” that he “n

ever i nten ded to h urther,” and that he “

wis h[ed] he c ould take i

t all back.” Def

endan t also stated that Juana Ni eto’ s-5- murder “ h au n ts me ever y day” and “ i s s om eth i n g Ih av e to l i v e wi th f orthe res t of m y l i f e.” El sewhere

i n th e PS I re por t, d efen dant asks t he courtt o u nder st and that he “ didn’ t do it,” th at he ’s“stil

l y oung,” and th at a l l h e w an ts i s th e “ch an ce to b e y oun g a n d f re e a n d w i th my f am i l y .” In agg ra vat ion, t he Sta

te rec oun ted th e f ac ts of t he ca se. At o ne poi n t, th e tr i al court inter

ject ed t hat it r eca lled t he ca se w ell and offered the foll

owing sum

mary of the relevant facts: “As I remem

ber i t, we had a [ga

ng m em ber] who was over in Fr an klin Park who saw an i ndi vi dual who is driv in g through what is ca lled ** * t he jun gle of Fran kli n Park. An

d he ch ased t he car, shot t he i

ndi vi dual . That indi

vi dual recei ved a sh ot in t he ch es t. And he d ro ve t o a n emerg ency facility wher e t he bul le t fel l out of his back an

d he surv iv ed. But during t

h at sa me shooting, there were som e chi ldren over by an i ce cream truck. And it was t he sho ot ing as he ra n ar ou nd th e c ar [that] aff ectedthe chi

ldren there, kil

li ng the twel

ve ye ar old,
wo unding th e th

re e y ea r ol d, a n d, i n f ac t, I bel ie ve, st riking t he dri ver of th e ice cream

truck.” The Stat e t hen ask ed the trial court once agai

n to im pose a co nsec ut ive30-year s entence f or t he attempted

m urder c onv

i cti on. In
so doi ng, th e State rem

i nde d the tria l courtof its prev ious f in din g that t he gun sh ot woun d to Sa nc hez’ s che st w asa s evere

bod i l y i njury. F or t he first deg re e mur der co nvictio n, t he Sta te requested an exten

dedterm sentence of 100 y ears, based upon the v

ictim ’s age. See 730 ILCS 5/5–5 –3.2(b)(4)(i

), 5–8– 2(a)(1 ) (We st 1996 ). In response, def

ense couns el

focused p r ima ril

y on the Uni ted Stat es Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cis io n in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 147 L . Ed. 2d 43 5, 120 S. C t. 2348 (2000). Defens e counsel argued st r en uo us ly t h at Ap

prendi preclude d the im

positi on of an
ex tended-term

se nten cef or de f en da nt’ s f i rs t de gre e m

urder c onv

i cti on bec ause th e rel

ev an t sta tutor y ag gr av ati n g f ac tor– th at J ua n a N i eto was un de rt he ag e o f 12 at t he t ime of t he o ffen se –w as ne it he rple d in t he in dictment nor proven b ey

ond a r easo nable do ubt . I n add itio n, defense counsel asked the court t o consider the i nf ormation contai

ned in the PSI repor t, incl

udin g “def en dant’s s tate men

t i n th at re port of
som e rem orse.”-6- Bef ore im posin g s entence , the trial

court stated t hat it ha d reviewed “ the tran scri ptsan d the f ac ts of t he ca se, ” as well as t he PSI
repor t. The trial

court then i

mposed an ex tended-term sen

tence of 100 years in priso n f

or the fi rst degree murder convi ction an d a
co nsec ut ives entence o f 30 y ears in pri son for t he atte mpted fi rst degree murder conviction. Three weeks later, defense counsel fi le d a moti on to r ec o nsid er t he se nt en ce in w hic h he r eit er at ed his Apprendi
argu men t. Speci fi cally , defense counsel

argued that “the C our t did
n ot, at the tim

e of trial, speci fi

cally fi nd that the age of the v

ictim was proven b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t. ” D efens e counsel al so acknowl edged, howe

ver, that he was “ work

i ng wi thou t the be ne f i t of
a tr anscript o f the Cou rt ’s origi nal fi ndi ng.” The tria

l co ur t denied t he motion to reconside

r sentence, an

d defen dant appealed. On appe al , def

endan t argued , inter al

ia , that ( 1) his n

ew defense counsel was i nef fecti ve b ecause h

e nei ther obtaine d nor revi ewed

t he trial trans cri pts pri or to the rese

nten ci ng h eari ng; (2 ) the tri

al court erredby not allowi ng def ense couns el

to exam in e the nonconf

ide ntial po rt ions of d efenda nt ’s Co rr ect ions r eco rd s; and (3) the evidence did
no t sup po rt t he t rial co ur t ’s finding t hat , fo r c ons ecu t ive sent encing purpo ses, Sanchez’s gunsh ot wound was a “s ev erebod ily injury.” T he appe l l ate co ur t re ject ed e ach o f t h ese argum ents and af

fi rmed defendan t’s sentences. No. 1–04–2934 ( un pu blish ed un de rSu pr eme Court Rul e 23). In addi ti on to hi s b rief , de f en da n t f iled a mot ion as king t he appe l l ate cou rt to condu ct a n in

dependent review of defendant’s Co rr ect ions fi

le “ to ascertain the cor rectness of t he t rial co ur t ’s r uling
re gar ding the existenceof m i ti ga ti on e vi de nc e.” A t the con cl us i on of that moti on , de f

en da n t i n f orm ed th e c our

t th at, “[b ]e cau se t he [Co rr ect ions ] file i s i

n th e h an dsof [Cor recti ons ], d ef

en da nt c an not o bt ain the record him

self an d have i t certif ie d as a suppl

em ental record.” Altho ugh t he St at e ad vised t he ap pellat e co ur t t hat it had no obj ec ti on to def endan t’s re quest, the ap

pel l ate court entered an order den y i n g def en da n t’s moti on wi th out c om

men t. We al l owe d de f en da nt’ s p eti ti on f orle ave to appeal. 210 Il

l. 2d R. 315(a ).2 In hi s o pe ni ng bri ef , de fe nd ant main tain s th at a de novo sta ndar d i s likew is e war ra nted beca use “ this c as e involves app licat ion of section 5–8– 4(a) toundi sputed

fac t s i n t he re co rd .” I n h isre pl y b rie f, h ow eve r, de fendant co ncede s tha t one of the principal fac ts r elev ant t o this iss ue– wheth er the bullet fired into S anchez’s chest exit ed throu gh Sanche z’s ba ck– is in

di spute. -7-

DISCUSSION Severe B odi l

y Inj ury Defendant’s first ar gument is tha t t he t rial co ur t er re d in imposing
a co nse cu t ive se nt en ce fo rt he at t emp t ed first degree murder
co nvictio n. The go ver ning st at ut e o n t his po inti s s ec ti on 5 –8– 4(a ) of the Unifi ed Code of Corrections, whi ch at the rel evan

t t im e stated: “The co ur t sha ll

not im pose consecutiv

e sentenc es for off

enses whi ch were co mmit t e d as part of a si ngle course of conduct dur ingwhich t her e wa s no subs t ant ial change in the na ture of t he crim in al obje ctive , unl ess, one of the o ff enses for whi

ch defend ant was convi

cted wa s a

Cl as s X orCla ss 1 f

elo ny and the defendant infl icted severe bodily injur y *** i nwhi ch event the court sha

l l en ter sen tenc es to run

cons ecuti

ve l y .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 7 30 IL CS 5/5 –8–4( a) (West 199 6). Acco rd ingto defendan

t, the im position of consecutive se ntence s in t his case is u

nwarranted because , although attempted f irst degree murder is u nd en iab ly aClass X felony, t he r eco rd do es no t sup po rt t he trial co ur t ’s find ing t ha t de fe nd an t inflic t ed “s ev er e b o di ly inju ry” upon Jose Sanch

ez. As a pr elimi

nar y m atte

r, w e m us t deter m i n e th e a pp rop riate stan dard of revi ew for a trial

court ’s de t erm

i na ti on th at, f or co nsec ut ivesen

te nc i ng p urpose s, a b odi l

y i nj ury i s “ sev ere.” Defend ant argues that such revi ewrequires

i nterpreti ng th e statutory phrase “s ev erebod ily

injury” and that a de novo stan dard i s the ref ore wa rranted. 2 The

State res ponds that wh ethe r a par tic ular i nj ury i s “sev ere” isa qu es t io n o f fac t an d t ha t a ma nife st we igh t st an da r d is there f ore war ra nt ed. We ag re e wit h t he St at e. In People v . Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335 , 3 44 ( 200 1) , t his co ur t he ld thatwhat constitutes “great bo dil y h arm” un

der the aggravated battery statute (see 720 ILCS 5/ 12 –4 ( a) ( We st 20 06 ) ) is a qu es t io n p r o pe r ly l e ft to t he f act-8- f i nde r. We see no reason to t reat t he question of what consti tut es “s ev erebo dily

i nj ury ” an y di f f eren tly. If the fact fi nder can be trusted to sort o ut whic

h bodi l y ha rm s are “great,” it can c ertainl

y b e trusted to sort o ut whic

h bo dily inju r ies ar e “ se ve r e. ” A cc o r din gly, we ho ld that a tri al

court’s determ i na tion that a b odi l

y i nj ury is “ seve re” f or purposes of c onse cuti

ve sen tenc i ng m ay be revers ed o nly if it is agai nst the m anifes t weigh t o f the ev

ide nce. A fi ndi ng i s against t he m

ani fest wei ght of the evi

dence only if the oppo si te concl

usi on is cl early evi dent or if

the fi ndi ng i tsel f i s unreasonab le , arbi

trary, or not based

on the evi den ce pre sen ted. In re D.F. , 201 Ill . 2d 4 76, 498 (2 002 ). Unde r t he manifest weight standard, we giv e d efe r en ce t o t he t r ial c o ur t as t he fin der of f act because it is in the bestpos i ti on to ob serv e the c ond

uc t an d de mea nor of t he pa rt ies and wi

tnes ses
. D.F. , 201 Ill . 2dat 498 -9 9. A review ing courtwil l n ot subst it u te i

ts j udgm en t for th at of the tri al

court re gar ding t he cr edibility of wit nesse s, t he we ight t o be give n to the
evi den ce, or the i nf eren ces to be dra wn
. D.F. , 201 Ill . 2d at 499. Here, the evi

dence is m

ore t han suf fi ci ent to suppo rt t he trial
cou rt’ s f inding t hat Sanc hez s ust ained a “sever e bo dily i njury.” One
o f de f en da nt’ s f el l ow g an g m em be rs tes ti f i ed tha t de f en da nt s hot Sanch ezin t he che st fro m a dist ance of a ppr oximat ely thr ee fee t . T he pho t og ra phs in

tro duced by

the Stat e reveal

a bu llet wo und t o t he le ft center of Sa n ch ez ’s ch est. Sa n ch ez testi f i ed th at, aft er being sho t , he felt a “bur ni ng

i n [hi s] ch es t.” A nd wh i l e the p hotog

raphs do n ot depi ct an ex it wound, the Stat e asked Sanchez three dif

ferent times , and in three dif feren t ways, wh

ether the bul

le t pa ss ed t hr o ug h his body and exi ted thro ugh hi

s back. Each

tim e, he responded “

y es.” Giv en t his evi dence, the trial

court was enti

rely jus tif ie d in concl udin g that Sanch ez“was s truck t hrough the che st,” that “the bulle t went thro ugh his ch es t an d in fac t ex it ed his b ac k, ” a nd t ha t su ch an in ju r y i s suf fi ci ently “sev ere” to justif

y a consecutiv

e sentenc e. In opp osi ti on to thi s res ul t, d ef en da n t m akes two a rgum en ts. Fi rs t, defend ant poi

nts to the f ol l owi ng exch an gebe twe en the pros ecutor and San chez: “Q. Where did t he bul

le t go through your body? A t what poi n t di d i t com e ou t?-9- A. It cam e out–it didn’ t go all the way through because I had a sw ea t er
. Whe n I go t o ut o n t he st r ee t , it st ar t ed r unning down . I got it i

n m y ha nd w hen I g ot out o f

the c ar.” Acco rd ingto defen

dant, Sanchez ’s statemen

t t hat “it did n’t go all the way through because I h

ad a sweater” confi

rms tha t t he b ull et did not pass through

San chez’ s b ody

but i nstead on l y “g raz[e d] hi s ch

est.” Co ns eq ue nt ly, de fen da nt ar gu es , t he t r ial c ourt ’s f in din gs that Sanchez “was s t ru ck t hro ugh t he ches t ” and t ha t “t he bu llet we nt t hr o ug h his chest and i

n f act exi ted his back” are n

ot supported by the ev

ide nce. Defend ant r ea ds t o o muc h int o t hi s isolated, and at best amb iguous, pie ce of testim ony. A ccording to defen

dant, when Sanch ez stated that “i

t d idn’t go all the way through because I h

ad a
swe at er ,” Sanc hez mus t have mea nt t hat t he bullet did no t go all the way t hro ugh his body

. But it is al so possible that Sanchez m

eant that t he b ul l et d i d n ot pa ss th ro ugh his sw

eater . Indeed, Sanch

ez was asked not only where the b

ull et had passed thro ugh hi s body, but also wh erethe bul

le t had “c o me ou t .” Sanc hez’s re spo nse be gins wit h t he st at ement “I t ca me o ut

. ” O nly t he n d o es Sa nc he z a dd t ha t “it didn’t go all the wa y t hr o ug h be ca us e I ha d a sw ea t er
. ” I t is c er t ain ly
r ea so na ble to read this

answer as say in g “i t came out of my

body b ut was ca ug h t b y m y sw ea ter ,”wh i ch , a f ter al l , c om por ts w i th Sanchez’s three uneq uivo cal affirmat ions t hat t he bullet did i n f act pass through his bod y and exit his back . At t he ver y least , w e ca nnot say t hat t he for ego ingex ch an ge r en de r s t he t r ial cour t’s un de rs tan di ng of Sanchez’s t est imony “unre aso nable, ar bitr ar y, o r no t base d o n t he
evi den ce pre sen ted.” Second, defen

dant argues that San

ch ez ’s be ha vi or af ter b ei ng sh ot co nfir ms that he did no t su st ain a “ se ve r e b o di ly inju ry. ” S pe cif ica lly, defend ant poi

nts out th at, des

pi te his gun shot wound, Sa nch

ez was ab le to dri

ve aw ay f rom t he scene, n

ot ic e an i

ce cream truck surrounded

by chi ldren, get himself to a nea rby ga s st at ion, co llect t he bul le t fr o m his s we at er , en t er t he ga s s t at io n a nd as k fo rhe lp, an d w ait f orthe police to arr iv

e. Moreover, defendan

t not es that, although Sanch ezwas taken to t he h

ospital for the t r ea t me nt of

hi s g un sh ot wound, t he Sta

te pre se n ted n o ev i den ce con cern i n g th e l en gth o f his ho sp it al s t ay, t he na t ur e o f his tre atm en t, or t he inte nsity o f his pain. Acco rd ingto defen

dant, these fa

cts confi rm that Sanch

ez’s i nj ury was

“ not the ty peof debi l i tati ng orextrem e injury co nt emplat ed by t he-10- l egi slaturetha

t wa rra nts the man da tory i m pos i ti on of consecut ive
sen tenc es.” W e dis agree. We h

ave al ready c oncl

uded that the ev idenc e ad eq ua t ely

supports t he trial

court ’s f in din gs that Sanchez

“was s truck through t he che st ” and t ha t “t he bu llet we nt t hr o ug h his ch es t an d in fact exite d his bac k. ” I rr esp ect ive of t he vict im’s po st sho ot ing beha vi or, we w ou ld have no diffi cult y affi rmingtha t a w oun d of that
na ture const itut es “severe bod il y i njury.” That said, d efendant’s
ar gument on t his po inti s s evere l y un de rm i ne d by thi s c ourt’ s dec i si

on in People v. Johnson , 149 Ill . 2d 118 (1992), which the Stat e ci

tes and defend ant does n

ot addres s. In Johnson , t his co ur t fou nd that “ sev ere bo dily inju ry” was sufficient ly pro ven whe re , a fte r be ing sho t o nc e in t he shoulder, the vi ct im walked o ut of t he ap ar t ment w her e t he sh oo t ingoc cur re d, flagged do wn a p assing mo t or ist, t old t he dr ive r there had b een

a robbery and a shooting, and had the moto rist dr ive him to a hospi

tal. See Johnson , 149 Ill . 2dat 1 28-2 9, 15 9. S anchez’s po st sho ot ing

beh avi or is not materially

dif feren t from the Johnson
v i cti m’s , and t her e is no re aso n t o be lieve tha t Sanc hez’s guns ho t wo und wa s a

n y l es s “ se v ere” th an th e Johnson vi

cti m ’s gun sh ot wound. Acco rd ingly, we r eject any sug ges t ion t h at Sanchez’s postsh ooti ng conduct rende

rs be ni gn hi s th roug h- an d-th roug h g un sh ot wou n d to th e ch est.

Inef

fecti ve A ssi stance Defend ant next ar gue s t hat defens e co uns e l pro vided ineffec t ive assi stanceat t he r es en t en cin g h ea r ing

. T his a r gu men t t ak es t wo ba sic for ms, and we w ill

add re ss ea ch in tu rn.

Failur e to Read the

Record a nd Transcripts Defend ant fi

rst argues that his res entenci ng counsel

wa s per se ineffect ivebecause

the r ec ord e sta

bl i sh estha t cou ns el , wh o di d n ot re pr ese nt defen

dant at the origin

al trial and sen tenci ng he arin g, never read the or igi nal trial and sen

tencing transcripts. In sup po r t o f t his
ar gu me n t, de fen

dant points to the foll

owing s tatement, which appeared in the motion to reconsi der senten cetha t cou ns el f i l ed on de fend ant ’s b eha lf:-11- “Counse l fo r d efe n dant ma

in tains , that t he Court did not, at t he tim e of trial, speci fi

cally fi nd that the age of the v

ic tim was proven be yo nd a r ea so na ble doubt, w hile acknow

ledging that counsel i s wo rk i n g wi thout the benefit of a transcript of the Court’s original finding .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Acco rd ingto de f

en da n t, th i s state men t ma ke s i t “apparent that [ co un se l] ne

ve r re ad De l eon ’s tri al tran scri ptsi n prep ara ti on for t he [resenten c in

g] heari ng.” Moreover, given the grav ity of such an omissio n, defend ant insists t hat he “sho uld no t be r equ ired t o p ro ve the prej udicial

ef f ect of thi s error.” The Stat e responds t hat defendant’s argumen t re sts on a f aul ty factual premi se. According to the St ate, the above st ate m en t in no way prov es that co un se l “ne ve rr ea d D ele o n’s t r ial t r an sc r ipt s in pr epar ati on for t he [ re sent encing] hear ing.” On t he co nt ra ry, t he abo ve sta tem en t appe are d i

n c oun se l ’s

moti on f or re consi de rati on of sentence , whi ch

was f i l ed th ree w eeks

af ter both the re se nt encing hear ingan

d the i m pos i ti on of sent ence . T hus, t he St at e mainta ins, t he mostit pr o ve s is that counsel prepared that motion wit ho ut t he be ne fit of a t rial t ra nscr ipt . T he St at e also not es t hat t he ori ginal t rial and sent encing transcripts were av ai la ble to co un sel

pr ior t o t he
re sent encing hear ing, a nd

there are ot her

comm ents f rom counsel

that suggest a working f

am il ia rity with the tri al

record. We agree wi

t h the State . The

record s i m pl y does n ot support defendant’s claim. In r elat ion t o oneof t he fact ual as ser t ions contain ed in the motion to reconsi der

sentence , counsel

conceded that he wa s “w o rkin g w it ho ut t he be ne fit o f a t r an sc r ipt

. ” F r o m t his
co nces sion, de fendant asks thi s court t o inf er that counsel h

ad been “workin g without the ben

efi t o f a transc

ript” al l a long, even

pri orto t he resentenci

ng he arin g itsel f. Li ke the appel

la te co urt, we are unwilling t o d ra w su ch an inf

er ence , a s it d ra matica lly exce eds t he
sc op e of c ouns el ’sconc ess i on. A l l that rea sona

bl y can be i nf err e d f rom co un se l’s co nc es sio n is t ha t he wa s “w o rkin g w it ho ut t he be ne fit of a transcri

pt” at t he tim

e h e pr epared the m

ot ion to reconsi der sent enc e
. The co nces sion a ppe ar s exc lusively i n t hat mot ion, and not hingabo ut it implicat es c ou nsel’s p er for mance a t or befo re t he
re sent encing he ari

ng i tself

. Of course, t hi s i s no way

proves that counsel ac t ua lly read

the origi nal trial and s ent encing tran

scri ptspri or to the resentencing he aring. On the record bef ore u s, as with m

ost-12- appe l l ate records , we h

av e no way

of k nowi ng on e way or the othe

r. But that i s suf

f i cien t to defe at def

endan t’s c l ai m , as “ [a] defend ant canno t r ely o n sp ec ula t io n o rco nje ct ur e t o jus t ify his c laim o f incompe t ent representation.” People v. Pecoraro , 175 Ill . 2d 294, 324 (1997 ).
Other Ineffectiveness Claims Defend ant ’s se co nd ineffect iveness c laim i s differe nt but related. E ss en t iall y, defen

dant ar gue s t hat co unse l’s failure t o r eview t he origi nal trial and sen tenci ng tran scri

pts ca us ed cou n se l to co m m i t a seri es o f pr eju dic ial err or s a t t he r es en t en cin g h ea r ing

. As w e w ill discuss more f ull y be l ow, th ese al

le ged “errors” were not in fact
er rors . B ef oregetti n g to that, howev er, we w ish to re iter at e t hat t he record in no way supports defendan

t’s repeated assertion that

counsel failed t o r eview t he o riginal t rial re co rd . C ons equ ent ly, to t he ext ent that de f en da nt a ttri bu tescou ns el ’s al l eg ed f ai l i ng s to a l ac k of fam il ia rity with the record, we rej ect hi s argum ent out o f h

and. In determ i ni ng w hether a defend ant was denied t he effect ive assi stanceof

cou n se l , w e a pp l y th e f am i l i ar two-pr ong te st s et f

orth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 6 74, 104 S. Ct. 2052 ( 1984) , and adopted by thi s court in People v. A lbanese , 104 I ll

. 2d 504

(19 84) . To pr

evai l on a cl ai m of i ne f f ec ti ve as sista nc e of
co un se l, a defendan

t must show both that counsel ’s perf ormance was deficient an

d th at th e def i ci en t perf orm an ce pr ej udi ce d th

e def en da n t. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (1984 ). More sp eci fi

cally , the defen

dant mus t demonstrate that
cou nsel’s performa nce was o bje ct ive ly un r ea so na ble unde r p re vailing professi onal no rms a nd t ha t t he r e is a “ r ea so na ble probabi li ty that, but f orcou ns el ’s un prof es si ona l err ors , th e re sul

t of t he pr o ce ed ing wo uld have been dif feren t.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. The fai lure to satisf

y e ither prong of the Strickland test pr eclud es a finding

o f ine ffec t ive as sis t an ce o f co un se l. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Defendant’s fi

rst cl aim is that counsel f ai le d to correct the trial
cou rt ’s mi staken be l i ef that an ex tended-term

sen tenc e was mandatory in t his case . I n sup po rt of t his claim, defend a nt points to the tr ia l
cou rt ’s st at eme n t a t t he resen tenci ng he arin g that defenda

nt was3 Ad mi tted ly , coun sel ’s se nte nci ng pr ese nta tion focu sed far more on Apprendi tha n it did on

the m itigating e vide nce described above. But that is not defen dant’s ar gument. Defendant’s ar gument is that counsel “fa il ed to
make any argu men ts i n m iti gat io n,” and that si m pl y i s not th e case
. -13- “en titled to” an ex tended-term

sent ence . Ac co rd ing t o d efenda nt , t he
use of the phrase

“en titled to” sugg es ts th

at the tri al cou rt “ wa s n ot awar e that the i m posi tion of a n exten ded term wasdi scre

tion ary .” In f ac t, th e p h

ra se “ en ti tl ed to” s ug ge sts n o su ch th ing. As d efined by Webster’s, “e nt it l e” m

eans “ to qual i f y (one) f or somethi

ng.” Webster’s Thi

rd New Intern ati onal Dicti onary

758 (1 993). S imila r ly, Black’s defi

nes “entitle” as “to *** qualify for.” Bl ack’s La

w Dicti onary

573 (8 th ed . 2004) . Clearl y , def endan t was “qual

i f i ed f or”
a n extended-term s entence, as h e stoo d convi

cted of murdering a se ve n- yea r - o ld

girl . The t rial

cour t’s st at eme nt mer ely r efle ct s t his obvious reali

ty, and couns el

t her efo re was unde r no obli gation to say ot herwi se. Defendant’s second cl

ai m i s that counsel

was ineffect ive for faili

ng to argue defe

ndan t’s youth, rem

orse, and good pr is on beh avi or as mitigat ingfac t o r s. Ag ain , t his cla im is co nt ra dict ed by t he r eco rd . T he record shows that counsel

specifi cally argued defe

ndan t’s remorse as
a m i ti ga ti n g f ac tor, a n d def en da n t pers on al l y ex pr es se d h i s rem ors e to t he t r ial co ur t just pr ior t o s ent encing. As for defend ant ’s ag e and po sitive pri son r

ecord, a l l of that was

set f orth i n the PSI rep or t, whi ch the trial court read and wh

ic h counsel specifi cally asked the trial courtto tak

e i n to ac cou n t wh en argui n g agai n st an ext ended-ter

m sentence

. 3 Defe ndan t’s third cl

ai m i s that counsel

was ineffect ivefor faili

ng to argue that Jose Sanchez di d no t su ff

er a se ver e bo dily i

njury and that conse cu

ti ve sente nc eswere th

ere f or e impe rmiss ible. On t his poi n t, t her e is a n o bvio us lac k o f prejudice , as we hav e al ready determi ned th at th e ev i den ce

m oreth an su pp ortsth e tr

ia l court ’s
sev erebo dily injury finding. Mo re ove r, co unse l reas ona bly could ha ve concl uded th at a ny such a rgum en t was f uti l e. The tri al

court determi ned at the or igi

nal sentenci ng he arin g that Jose Sanchez sustain ed a se vere b odi l y i nj ury, and t he o nly reaso n for t he r emand
was th at defend ant’s other sentence was in

val id. Under these circu msta nces , c ou nsel had litt le rea so n t o e xpec t t hat t he trial court-14- wo uld reverse itself

, and hi s decisi

on not to contest t he se ve r e b o dily in jury fi ndi ng theref ore was reasonabl

e. Defendant’s final claim

is tha t co unse l was ineffect ive for faili ng to correct t he t rial co ur t ’s “implicatio n” t hat defend ant was “a djudge d
r es po nsib le for” shooting an d woundin

g the t hre e- year- old boy and t he i ce cream

truck dri ve r. In support , defen

dant points to the tr ia

l
cou rt ’s obs er vat ion at t he r ese nt encing he ar ing t hat , a fte r sho ot ing San chezi n t he che st , d efenda nt co nt inued firing, “killi ng t he t welve ye ar old [ sic ], woundi

ng th e thre e-y ear-ol d, an d, i n f act, I b elie ve, st riking th e d

ri v er of th e i ce crea m tru ck .”A cc ordi

n g to def en da n t, co unsel sh oul d h av e rem i n de d th e tr i al cou rt th at def en da n t wa s ac t ua lly acquitted of the attempted murder c ha rge s th at a ros e f rom those t w o sh

ooti ng s, th ere by ensu ri ng tha t the tri al cou rt “ di d n ot cons i der these

f i ndi ngs i n re sen tenc i ng D eleon.” De fen da nt ’s ar gu men t is without meri t. It is well e stablis

hed that “ev ide nceof c riminal cond uct can be co nsid er ed at se nt en cin g e ve n if t he defen dant previously

had been acqui tt ed of thatconduct.” People
v. Jackson , 14 9 I ll. 2d 5 40, 549 -5 0 ( 199 2) . H er e, t her e is no di spute that t he trial

court acqui

tt ed defe ndan t o f the attempted m

urder chargesar ising fr o m t he sho o t ing an d w o un din g o f t he t hr ee - yea r - o ld boy an d t he ice cr ea m t r uc k d r iv er. Nevertheless, i t is equal ly cl ear that the trial

court remai

ned conv in ced t ha t de fen da nt did i

n f ac t sh oot and wo und both the boy a nd the dri

ver. At def

endan t’s origi nal sent encing he ar ing , wh ich wa s he ld ju st 30 da ys a ft er t he t r ia lcourt a cqui tt ed defen

dant of the two att em

pted murder counts, the trial
cour t specifi

call y f ound t hat, as a re su

l t of de f en da n t’s con du ct, “the in div idua l who was dri

vi ng the ic e cr eam t ru ck w as st ru ck a nd in jured” and “ another chi

ld on the s

treet was struck in

the n eck and i nj ured.” The tr i al cou rt th en r epe at ed t hese findings at t he
re sent encing he ari

ng. U nde r Jackson , these fi

ndi ngs were pe

rf ec tly proper, and the trial

court was f

ull y e ntitled to take them

into acc ou nt when fas hionin g defen da n t’ s s en ten ce s. Cou n se l h ad n othi n g to cor re ct a n d n o b as i s to ob

j ec t.

De fen da nt ’s Co rr ec t io ns F ile Defe nda n t’ s fina l ar gu men t is t ha t t he ap pe llat e c o ur t er r ed in
re fusing to conduct an in

dependent review of defendant’s Co rr ect ions-15- file an d “ as certai

n th e c orre ctn es s of the trial co ur t ’s r uling re gar ding t he exis t enc e o f mi

tiga tion evi

dence.” A

ccording to defen

dant, that refusa l “effect ively deni ed De le on review of the trial court ’s rul

in g, t her eby in fri ngi ng hi s *** constitutional

righ t to app eal .” B y

wa y of
r eme dy, de f

en da nt ask s th

i s c our t to con

duc t i ts ow n r ev i ew of defendant’s Corrections rec or ds a nd to reman d the cause f

or a new sent encing hear ing if the file co nt ains ad dit ional po t ent ially mitigat ing evi dence. The re is a f ata l problem wi

th defendant ’s argumen

t, and it rel ates to the conces sion tha

t def endan t ma de i n h i s ap pel l ate court moti on: defendant’s Co rr ec t io ns f ile is no t pa r t o f t he r ec o r d o n a pp ea l. Rather, the fi

le was re t ur ned t o t he De par t ment of Corrections af ter t he r es en t en cin g h ea r ing , an d w it h C o rr ec t io ns it remai ns. Tho ugh t he appe l l ate co ur t did no t give a

re aso n for denying de fendant ’s mot ion, t his i s al most certai

nl y i t. The re l evan

t re cor ds w er e no t par t of t he record, an

d th e a pp el l ate court therefore had n

ot hi ng to review, even if it were so i

ncl in ed. In th i s c our t, the S tate

di re cts our atte n ti on to Supreme Court Rul es 415(e) and 415(f) (134Il l . 2d Rs . 415(e ), (f )). In re l ev an t pa rt, Rul e 415(e) states t hat “[m ]aterial excised pursuant to judici al order sha ll be sealed, im

pounded an d p re se rved i n th e rec ord s of

th e c our t, to be ma de avai

la ble to t he revi

ewi ng court in the ev

ent of an appeal .”134 Ill . 2d R. 415(e). Simi la rly , Rule 415(f

) states th at, “[i

]f t he cou rt en ters an orde r gran ti ng rel i ef f ol lo w in g a showi

ng in
camera , t he ent ire r eco rd of su ch sho wing shal l b e seal ed, im pounded, and pr es er

v ed i n th e rec ord s of

th e c our t, to be m ade available t o t he
r ev iew ing co ur t in

t he eve nt of a n app eal. ” 13 4 I ll. 2d R . 4 15( f). The Sta te ar gue s t hat , ha vingf

ail ed to en sure

tha t the un di sc l ose d por

ti on of his Co rr ect ions fi

le was “sealed , impo unde d, and p re ser ved in t he records of th e c our t,”de f en da n t h as wai v ed an y ri gh t to rev i ew of t he trial cou rt ’s r ea din g o f t ha t file. De fen da nt r es po nd s t ha t “no t hing in t he la nguage of the se rul es puts the burden on t he def

endan t to assure compl ia nce wit h t his pro ced ur e. ” Ra t her , “[ a] s o nly the trial court had
access to th e do cu men t s, it wa s it s bu r de n t o co mply w it h S up r eme Court Rul e 415 .” Defendant’s argument is preclude d b y t his c o ur t ’s de cis io n in People v. Coates , 10 9 I ll. 2d 431 (1 985 ). In t hat cas e, t he de fendant
so ught t o su bp o en a c er t ain re co rd s fro m the Departmen t o f Ch il dren-16- and Fam il y Serv ic es f or purpo ses of i

mpe achm ent. Because such records ordi

na ri l y areke pt co nfid en t ial, the trial court conducted an in camera i

ns pe cti on of t he r eco rd s. As i

n th i s c as e, n ei

th er th e S tate nor defens e co unse l was p re sent for t he in spec t ion. Fo llowing t he inspec t ion, t he t r ial cou

rt allo we d t he de fen da nt t o us e o nly ce r t ain po rt ions of

th e D ep ar

tmen t’ s reco rds, keepin

g the remai

nder under
se al. On appe al , the def

endan t argued , inter al

ia , that the trial

court erredin fail

ingto com

pl y wi th Ru l e 415 (f ), “i n that i t ma de n o record of the pro ceedings in camera and f ai le d to sea l, impou nd and pr ese rve t he records inv

olve d.” Coates , 10 9 I ll. 2 d a t 43 8. T his court rejected that ar gument , st at ingth at “ [t]h e rec ord f ai l s to sho w t hat defend ant requestedan y su ch ac t io n, an d u nd er t he cir cu mst an ce s, t he r e is not hingbef

ore us for revi ew.” Coates , 109 Ill . 2d at 438. I n other
wo rd s, a nd

contrary to defendan

t’s argumen

t, t he b urden “to as sure compl ia nce with thi s procedure” does re st w

i th t he co mp lain ing pa r t y, at lea st in the fi rst instance. And absen

t a req uest for such c ompl ia nce, an y de fic ien cy in t he r ec o r d w ill be at t r ibu t ab le t ha t pa r t y. The bott om li

ne i s that it is the appell

a nt’s b urden

to pres en

t a su fficie nt ly

com pleterec ord of

the proc ee di ng s b el ow to suppo rt a cla im of err orand, i n the ab sence

o f a c o mple t e r ec o r d o n a pp ea l, it will be pr esum ed t ha t t he o r de ren t er ed by t he cir cu it co ur t wa s in
c o n f orm i ty wi th the l aw an d ha d a suf f i cien t factual ba si s. People v. Fair, 193 Ill . 2d256, 26 4 (200 0). Here , def endan t is ask i ng th i s court to r ev iew t he ac cu r ac y o f the t rial court ’s reading of defendant ’s Co rr ect ions fil

e. Ho weve r, t hat fil

e is no t par t of t he r eco rd , a nd defend ant never reque ste d th at it be m ade part of the record. Co nseq uent ly, as in Coates , “there is n othi ng b ef ore us f or revi ew.”

CONCLUSION Fo r t he fo re go ing re aso ns, t he judg ment of t he ap pe llat e c o ur t is aff irm ed.
Aff irmed

.