T h e H on or abl e D av i d A. K at z, U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e N or t h ern D i st r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0558n.06 No. 08-6395 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. WI LLIA M RI CH AR

DS, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WE S TE RN D IS TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY

Be for e : C OLE a nd C LA Y, Ci r c uitJudg e s; and K AT Z , District

Judge. * KA TZ, Distr ict Judge. De fe nd a nt Wi lli a m Ric ha rd s a pp e a ls his c on vic tio n on tw o c ounts of making false statements to influence administrative ac tion in viol ation of 15 U.S.C. § 645(a). Richards wa s indicted and tried by a jury on three counts of making fa l s e s t at em en ts on three applications he submitted to the Small B usiness Administration ( “SBA ”); the jury acquitted him on one count a

nd convicted him on the r emaining counts. We AF F IRM

. BACK GR OUND In l a t e 2 0 0 5 , t h e f

i v e c h i l d r e n o f H a r

r y Lu s k , c o - f

o u n d e r o f C o m m o n w e a l t h S o l u t i o n s , LLC ( “ C o m m o n w e a l t h ” ) , f

o u n d e d D i v e r s i f

i e d S o l u t i o n s , L L C ( “ D i v e r s i f i e d ” ) , a c o n s t r u c t i o n c o m p a n y. L eig h Ann Alexander, one of the L u s k s i b l ings, w as to be Dive rsified’s f inancial ove rsee r; her br oth e r, Jef

f Lus k, wo uld be the op e ratio ns mana g e r; a nd br oth e r M ic ha e l L

us k, a n atto rn e y , w ou ld be the c omp a ny ’s pr e sid e nt.No. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

2 Diversifie d hired Richar ds, a consultant who ha d experience in pr eparing and submitting g overnme nt applications for small businesses, to prepare and submit an applica tion for Diver sified to r e c e i v e H U B Z o n e c e rt i f i c a t i o n f r o m t h e S B A

. T h e Lu s k c h i l dr e n kn e w R i c h a r d s f ro m hi s association with their fa

ther, a nd they knew that he had succ essfully obtained HUB Z one ce rtification for Commonwea lth. The HU BZ one prog ram is desig ned to enc ourag e economic deve lopment in dist resse d communities. To be cer

tified, a company must have its princ ipal office in a HUB Z one and ha ve at least thirty -five pe rce nt of its employ ees live in a HUB Z one. On J anuar

y 23, 2006, Richards submitted a HUB Z one application on behalf of D iversified stating tha t Diversified ha d two employ ees, one of whom lived in a HU BZ one, and that Diversified’ s principal off

ice wa s located in a

HUB Z one at 212 East Caroline Stree t in I rving ton, Kentucky . At the time Richards submitted the applications, however, D iversified ha d no employ ees a nd no office in a HUB Z one. The application also identified Mic hael Lusk as the “pe rson submitti ng ” the application, instead of

Richards. When Michae l L u s k fo u n d out that he had be en desig nated a s

su bmi tti ngthe a

pp lic a tio n, he c a lle d the SB A, ha d th e a pp lic a tio n w ith dr a wn , a

nd tol d Ri c ha

rd s to resubmit the application with R i ch ards identifie d as the “ person submitting” it. On Febr uary 15, 2006, Richards re submitt ed the a pplication, with the only

chang e beingthat he wa s now listed a s the “per son submitt ing” the application. A p re vio us HU B Z on e a

pp lic a tio n p re pa

re d b y Ric ha rd s a y e ar befo re f

or Com monwe a lth also listed 212 East Caroline Stree t as Com m o n we alth’s principa l office , and stated tha t Com monwe a lthha d tw o emp loy e e s, on e of wh om l ive d in a HU B Z on e . A lth ou g h Co mmo nw e a lthNo. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

3 did in fact re nt office space at 212 East Caroline S t re et , n o one wor ked ther e. While two of Commonwealth’s owner s claimed to work for ty hours a we ek for

Commonwealth, and one of them claimed to live in a HU BZ one in St. L ouis, neither wa s on the company ’s pay roll. After a Commonwealth employ ee w rote a n anony mous letter to the SBA casting doubt on Commonwealth’s qualifications to be a HUB Z one compa ny , t h e S BA an d the Depa rtment of Def ense ope ned an inve stigation that led to a one-c ount gra n d jury indictment char g ing Richa rds with falsely

stating on the C ommonwealth application that Commonwealth had two employ ees, one of whom lived in a HU BZ one. The g rand jury l at er s u p er s eded the indictment to add a count char g ing Richa

rds with falsely

stating that Comm onwea lth’s principal off ice wa s in a HUB Z one. Ric ha rd s mo ve d to dis mis s th e se c on d c ount a s mu lti pli c ito us , a rguin g that su

bmi tti ng a fa lse application constitutes only on e cr i m e, no matter how ma ny false sta tements appe ar in that application. The Gover

nment ag ree d with Richards that the c ounts were arguably multipl icitous and soug ht a continuanc e of the trial to reque st that the g rand jury consolidate the two c ounts into one. Ric ha rd s o bje c te d to the c on tin ua nc e , b ut w a s o ve rr

ule d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

. During the continuanc e per iod, the Government prese nted the evide nce f rom the Diver sified

a pp lic a tio ns to t

he gran d jur

y , w hic h r e tur

ne d a se c on d s up e rs e din g ind ic tme nt, wi th C ount I

c h a r g i n g R i c h a r d s w i t h m ak i n g f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h a p p l i c a t i o n ; C o u n tII

c harg ing Richa

rds with making false sta tements in the J anuar y 23 Diversifie d application; and Count I I Ichar g ing Richa

rds with making false sta tements in the Fe bruar y 15 Diversifie d application. Richar d s m o v ed to dismiss C ounts I Iand I I I , alleg ing that the Gover nment had ac ted bey ond the scope of the continuanc e in see king to a dd new c harg es to the super seding indictment. T he districtNo. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

4 court denie d

Ri c h a r d s ’ s mo ti o n , n o ti n g th a t n o th in g in it s p r io r o r d e r p r o h ib it e d

th e G o v e r

n me nt from bring ing a dditional charg es. After trial, the jury

acquitted Richa

rds of Count Ibut convicted him on Counts I Iand I I I . The district court denie d Richards’s motion for a new trial and sentenc ed him to two y ear s’ probation. Ric ha rd s n owa pp e a ls. DI SCU SSIO N Ri char ds first argues that the district cour t abused its discretion whe n it gr anted the Go ve rn me nt a

c on tin ua nc e to c or re c t th e po ssi ble mul tip lic ity e rr or in the su pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt, instead of simply dismiss ing the second count outrig ht. “The matter of a continuance is wit hin the discr e ti o n o f th e tr ia l ju d g e , w h o s e d e c is io n w il l b e r e v e r s e d o n ly u p o n a s h o w in g o f a

b use of discretion.” Un ite d S

tat es v . M ar tin , 740 F.2d 1352, 1360 ( 6th Cir.1984) (interna l citation omitt ed). So too, “[ t] he standa

rd of r eview of

a district court’s ref

usal to dismis s an indictment is whether there

was a n abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Ov ermy er , 899 F.2d 457, 465 ( 6th Cir. 1990). The district court in this case wa s require d to dismi ss the second c ount, in Ri char ds’s view, beca us e an y multipl icity

problem wa s the Gover

nment’s fa

ult. Ri char ds also contends that the Go v ern m en ts o u gh tt h e c o n t i n u an ce i n b ad fa i t h , i n o rd er t o ci rc u m v en tt h e n ec es s i t y o f b ri n gi n g a motion under Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 404(b) to a dmit evide nce of the statements contained in the Di ve rs if ie d a pp lic a tio ns . B ut R ic ha

rd s c ites no a

uth or ity fo r t he pr op os iti on

that a tr ia l c ourt

is require d to dismi ss a possibly multipl icitous charg e outrig ht, instead of g ranting the prosec ution a

c on ti nu ance to c or

re c t th e po te nti a l e rr or . N or is the re a ny

a uth or ity fo r t he no tio n th a t it

is pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t to se e k to a me nd a n in dic tme nt o n th e ba sis of evi dence that w ou ldNo. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

5 otherwise only

be admitted at tria l pursuant t o Rule 404(b). To the ex tent that Richards a rg ues that the continuanc e viol ated the Speedy Trial Act, he has waived this obj ection by failing to move for dismiss al on Speedy

Trial Ac t gr ounds befor e trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)

. R i c h a r d s n e xt c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt s h o u l d h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e t w o ne w c ou nts relating to the Diversified application in the s econd superseding indictment. Richards ar g ues that the Go ve rn me nt’ s c ourse inse e kin g to a dd the se ne w c ha

rg e s w a s “ sh a rp pr a c tic e ” a nd se ve re ly prejudicia l. But, as the district c ourt noted, “[a]lt houg h [t he] June 9, 2008, order to c ontinue the trial

wa s sp e c if

ic a lly g ra nte d to a llo w the Go ve rn me nt a n op po rt un ity to c or re c t th e mul tip lic ity

iss ue in its indi ctment, nothing in the or der pr ohibited the Gover nment from bring ing ne w and a dditional

c ha rg e s. ” (M e m. O p. & Or de r 2 ). To the e xten t tha t Rich a rd s mig ht ha ve re qu ir e d a dd iti on a l ti me to pr e p a r e a d e f

e n s e to th e n e w c h a r g e s , h e c o u ld h a v e s o u g h t a c o n ti n u a n c e u n d e r 1 8 U.S.C. § 3161(h). B ut Richards did not seek suc h a co ntinuance, a nd thus his arg ument that he wa s p re j u d i ce d b y

the district court’s r efusa l to dism iss the new counts a dded during the continuanc e period ring s hollow. Ric ha rd s a lso a rgue s th a t th e re wa s in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to al low the jur y to fi nd him

g uil ty on the two counts of making f alse stateme nts on the Diversified a pplication. Specifica lly , Richards contends that the e vidence was insuffic ient to support a finding that he made the false statements on th os e app li cat io n s k no wi ng th em t o b e fal se, or t hat he d id so for th e pu rpo se o f i nfl uen cin g SBA action. The statute Richards wa s convicted of violating r eq u i re s p roof of both elements. See 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) (“ Whoever make s any statement knowing it to be false .

. . fo r t he purpose ofNo. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

6 inf lu e n c in g in a n y w a y th e a c ti o n o f th e [S B A ]

. . . s h a ll b e p u n is h e d b y a f ine of not more than $5,000 or by

imprisonment for not more than two y ear s, or both.”). Th is C ourt

mus t up ho ld t

he jur y ’s v erdi ct if

“ a ft e r v ie wi ng the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) (e mph a sis in

or ig ina l) . In makin g thi s de te rm inatio n, the Court “ dr a w[s ] al l a va ila ble inf e re nc e s a nd re so lve [s] all issues of credibility

in favor of

the jury ’s ver dict.” United States v. Maliszewski , 161 F.3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir. 1998). The prosecution “may meet its burden throug h circ umstantial evidence alone, and such e vidence need not ex clude every possible hy pothesis except that of g uilt.” United States v. Jac kson , 55 F.3d 1219, 1225 ( 6th Cir. 1995). Thus, “a de fenda nt cl ai m i n g i n s u fficiency of the evidenc e bea

rs a he avy

burden.” Maliszewski , 161 F.3d at 1005. Richards c annot meet that “ heavy burden” i n t h i s ca s e. Richar ds testified at trial that he

re c e ive d th e fa lse inf

or ma tio n a bo ut Di ve rs if

ie d’ s e mpl oy e e s a nd pr inc ipa l of fi c e fr om t

he Lus ks , an d s i mp l y en t er ed t h at i n fo rm at i o n i n t o t h e f o rm , b el i ev i n g i tt o b e t ru e. M i ch ae l Lu s k an d L ei gh Ann Alexander both testified that they did not provide the fa lse information to Richards. According to Richards, this testimony only shows that J eff Lusk (who did not testify at t rial) must have been the per son who g ave him the f alse infor mation. B ut R ic ha

rds hi ms elf

ind ic a te d in

his te sti mony

that th e Lus ks did

no t a c tua lly

te ll h im Diversifie d had an of

fice at 212 East C aroline Stree t or that any employ ees w orked at that location at the time Richards pr epar ed the a pplication, only

that Diversifie d was planningto eventually rent office space at that l ocation and transfe r employ ees there. (Trial Tr. V ol. I I I187-88). More over, theNo. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

7 jur y wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to fi nd

Ric ha rd s’ s te sti mony

c re dib le . Ins te a d, the jur

y mig ht h a ve fo un d th a t, jus t a s Mic ha e l Lus k a nd L e ig h An n A le xan de r d id n ot p ro vid e the fa lse inf or ma tio n to Ric ha

rd s, neither did Jeff L

usk. Richards a

rg ues that the proof at trial was also insufficient to support a f inding that he acte d “for the purpose of

influencingin any

way the ac tion o f t h e [ S BA ]

. . . . ” 15 U.S.C. § 645(a)

. Spe c if ic a lly , Ri c ha

rd s cla ims that bec a

us e the SB A wo uld no t hav e a c te d o n h is a pp lic a tio n unle ss he re sponded af

firmatively

to a subsequent em ail asking him to certify the completene ss and

acc urac y of the a pplication, and he ha d no intention o f re s p o n d i n g t o such an e mail, he did not submit t he application for the requisite purpose . But it has long been se ttled that this element of § 64 5( a ) “d oe s not re qu ir e the g ov e rn me nt t o s ho w that th e pa rt ic ula r s ta te me nt w ou ld h a ve , in fa c t, aff ecte d the ac tion of the S.B.A.” United States v. Carter , 526 F.2d 1276, 1278 ( 5th Cir. 1976). The evidenc e in the rec ord supports a jury finding that Richards submitted the application as part of a n eff ort to have the SBA c ertify Diversifie d as el i gi b l e t o rec eive c ontrac ts reser ved for HUB Z one businesses, which is enoug h to sustain the jury ’s ver dict as to the sec ond element of § 645(a)

. Finally , Richards a

rg ues that the district cour t a bused its discr etion in de ny ing his motion for

a n e w tr ia l. I n s u

p p o rt o f th is a r g u me n t, Ri c h a r d s c o mp la in s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o urt overlooke d unspecifie d instances of “bully ing” of witnesses and argues that his conviction was c ontrary to the weig ht of the evidenc e at trial. For substantially the same re asons noted above , howeve r, Richar ds fails to car

ry his burden of showing that any err ors in his trial, cumulatively or individually , war

rant

re lie f f ro m th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t.No. 08-6395

United States v. Richards

8 CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n is AF F IR M ED

.